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PARADIPLOMACY AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE
CASE OF RUSSIAN DIASPORA POLITICS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Public Administration

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THE AIMS OF THE CURRENT THESIS IS TO ANALYSE THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF THE NON-CENTRAL
GOVERNMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE RUSSIAN DIASPORA POLITICS. THE THESIS IS
BASED ON THE QUALITATIVE CASE-STUDY OF THREE RUSSIAN REGIONS. THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS OF
THE PARADIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES OF THE RUSSIAN REGIONS ARE INVESTIGATED: THE SPECTRE OF
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CENTRAL AND NON-CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS, THE PATTERN OF THE
REGIONS´ ACTIVISM AND THE EXISTING “OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE” FOR PARADIPLOMACY IN
RUSSIA. THE MAIN FACTORS DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF REGIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE
DIASPORA POLITICS FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ARE FINANCIAL RESOURCES, HUMAN
RESOURCES AND POLITICAL AMBITIONS OF THE REGIONS´ LEADERS. THE SPECTRE OF THE
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CENTRAL AND NON-CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS IS DIVERSE AND IT IS POSSIBLE
TO FIND THE ELEMENTS OF THE CO-OPERATION, CO-ORDINATION AND PARALLEL MODELS.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Understanding international relations in North America and Western Europe is nowadays impossible without considering the variety of actors and the complexity of interrelations between them. Non-governmental organizations, international organizations, non-central governments and other domestic policy-making actors are actively involved in foreign policy-making and international relations. Above-mentioned actors not only influence foreign policy, but also try to become internationally active themselves (Hocking, 1991).

During the 20th century along with the changes in the political processes, the domestic politics and foreign politics started to be interrelated. It is hard to understand the domestic politics and their institutional framework without analysis of the international environment (Hocking, 1993). This is also true at the level of the local governments and regions. The scholars (Duchacek, 1990 and Hocking, 1991, 1993) of federal states and regionalized systems (i.e. European Union) are convinced of the increasing role of non-central governments in North America and Western Europe in both domestic and foreign politics. Non-central governments due to deconcentration of power and increase of jurisdictional autonomy in domestic affairs are also involved in the foreign politics via establishing contacts with foreign partners at governmental and non-governmental levels. (Duchacek, 1990: 1) It is hardly possible to find a capital, regional government or a ministry of Western democratic country without its own foreign relations department. Some of the influential regions and local governments have their permanent representations in other countries and international organizations. The activism of non-central governments on international arena is sometimes characterised by the term “paradiplomacy”.

Within the paradiplomatic theoretical framework it is extremely interesting to analyse the relations between different levels of governments. There is no universal model of incorporation of non-central and non-governmental actors into the foreign policy.
The multilayered diplomacy (Hocking, 1993: 68) exists in different continuously changing forms. What is the nature of the interrelations between the central governments and local authorities in foreign policy decision-making and implementation? Is it possible to talk about the conflict or rather co-operation?

There is a number of interesting case-studies on the intergovernmental relations in foreign policy conducted in such countries as Belgium, Canada, USA, Austria, France, Switzerland etc (Michelmann and Soldatos, 1990; Hocking, 1991; Aldecoa and Keating, 1999). Traditionally the foreign policy of Russian Federation is seen via the prism of the narrowly defined politicians and bureaucratic key-players, so called Kremlinological studies (De Spiegeleire, 2000: 293-295). Still, it is interesting to examine the nature of the Russian federalism from the point of view of Russian regions´ international activities.

The present thesis analyzes the nature of the intergovernmental relations in Russian Federation based on the example of one of the directions of foreign policy – Russia’s politics towards its diaspora or as it is defined in the official documents - compatriots living abroad. The term diaspora politics has a broader meaning. On the one hand diaspora politics is characterised by a complex of measures implemented by the home state towards its diaspora. On the other hand diaspora has a proactive role as well. Diaspora has to formulate its political attitudes towards its home and host states. It is an “interactive process by which states, acting on the international arena, forge a conception of a co-ethnic community extending beyond the boundaries of the state itself, and by which bounded, self-conscious, ethnic communities abroad relate to the domestic politics and foreign policy of a state or other political entity conceived as conterminous with representative of an ethnic homeland” (King and Melvin, 1999: 12).

The participation of Russian non-governmental actors in the diaspora politics and their interrelation with the structures of the central government are analysed from the institutionalism perspective. The general hypothesis is that notwithstanding the unified legislative basis there is no single paradiplomatic “opportunity structure” or institutional
framework regulating the paradiplomatic activities of non-central governments. Therefore, the pattern of interrelations between central federal institutions and non-central governments is diverse, and there are different paradiplomatic models balancing on the edge of co-operation – conflict.

In order to answer to the research question I have chosen three non-central governments in Russian Federation and conducted interviews with public officials of their foreign relations departments or other units involved in the international relations. Additionally, I interviewed representatives of the Russian central government institutions both on political and public administration levels and two representatives of the non-governmental organizations and one representative of the newspaper with experience of co-operation both with the central and non-central units in Russia.

The international activity of the non-central government is considered in the Western world to be important in a sense of cultural, economic, social and political development (Makarychev, 1999: 518). The combination of the topics of diaspora politics and paradiplomacy in the context of Russian studies contributes to a better understanding of the current political and administrative systems of Russia as well as of the functioning of the unique asymmetrical federal system. As a result of the research it is possible to trace the constraints for the international activism of the regions both at political and institutional levels. Segmentation of policies (including foreign relations) and actors seems to be a natural process for the democratic federal states (Duchachek, 1990). Regionalization and transregional co-operation is believed to be one of the ways to assist Russia’s domestic reforms (De Spiegeleire, 2000).

The present thesis proceeds to the second chapter, which is intended to explain the theoretical background on the paradiplomacy (paradiplomatic paradigm) and intergovernmental relations in the context of paradiplomacy. Paradiplomacy as well as diaspora politics, which is covered in the following section, are the new fields of international relations scholarship. They presume the interaction between different actors and different levels of the policy-
making process. The thesis continues my previous study made at the bachelor level on the topic of the diaspora organizations´ participation in the policy-making process of Russia.

In the third chapter I briefly introduce the case of the participation of the Russian non-central governments in diaspora politics. I also give a brief description of the opportunity structure for paradiplomacy and the factors influencing it. The final hypotheses are posed in the following chapter “Methods of analysis”, where the selection of methods, sampling and the structure of the interviews are explained and justified.

In the final section I present the results of the analysis and formulate the dimensions for future research.

I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to all the people who helped and inspired me during the work on the thesis. I am grateful to my academic adviser Taavi Anus. I would like to thank Karmo Tüür for interesting discussions on Russian regionalism, Ken Kriz for invaluable comments. My special thanks are for Andrei Katsuba, Aleksandr Aidarov, Jevgenia Mihhaltšenko and Martin Kiilo for help and support during the preparation of the thesis.
2. NON-CENTRAL AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF FEDERALISM

The aim of this thesis is to study the interrelations between the non-central and central governments in Russia on the example of the Russian politics towards the compatriots abroad. The notion “central government” refers to the political and administrative institutions of a state at a central level (i.e. ministries, parliament etc of a state). Non-central governments is a term which describes the political and administrative institutions of constituent units of a state (local governments, federal units or in case of Russian Federation, so called “subjects of federation”). The synonyms for the term non-central government are non-central unit or regions (in the case of Russia).

The theoretical background for the thesis is based mainly on the traditions of analysis of the Western European and North American political processes.

Throughout the Western democratic world two simultaneous processes are currently taking place. The economic relations are becoming more and more global. At political level the power is devolving from central governments to non-central governments (regional or local). (Fry, 1998) The forces driving the globalization also stimulate decentralization. At the level of non-central government and central government relations this is a process “with a lot of names” in the political and administrative sciences. One can speak about regionalism, regionalization, regional empowerment, multi-level governance (in the case of the European

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1 Hocking, 1991: 11.
Union), paradiplomacy and etc. There is a constant search for the new forms of state-hood and new understanding of the role of non-central units and non-governmental organizations on the international arena. The debates on the relations between the centre and local units also involve such issues as nationalism, regionalism and federalism (Vos, Boucke and Devos, 2002: 201-202).

The discussion on the power deconcentration “along the axis of an endless dialectic centralization/decentralization” (Aguirre, 1999: 193) takes place not only within the realm of the domestic policies, but also concerns foreign policy. Foreign policy has become more local, even when domestic policy is more and more internationalized. The borders between them are fading.

The illustration of the erosion of the borders between domestic and foreign issues is based on the development of the European Union. The European Union (EU) issues are no longer part of the realm of foreign relations, yet at the same time they do not belong to the realm of domestic issues in their traditional understanding. “In today’s EU, any divide between domestic and international politics or between national and international interests has become artificial. National governments no longer monopolise sovereignty, nor can they impose preferences or control the access and influence of other groups to EU policy-making arena” (Van Keulen, 2002).

The regionalization in the EU is usually considered in the context of the multi-level governance. The EU multi-level governance system is characterized by the following keywords: non-hierarchical, interdependent, deliberative, as well as co-ordination, embeddedness and interest competition (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996; Van Keulen, 2002). Some authors refer to the diffusion of sovereignty between supranational, national and subnational levels (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1998: 273-293). For example, Vos et al.

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find that the first-level player is the European Union, the second-level players – member states and the third-level players – non-central units. The concrete model of the interrelations is determined in the process of “power sharing” separately in all the Member States.

In parallel with the discussions about the EU one can find analogous debates on the paradiplomacy (Aldecoa and Keating, 1999; Hocking, 1991; Hocking, 1993; Michelmann and Soldatos, 1990; Fry, 1990 and 1998; Lecours, 2002 etc).

The prefix “para” derives from the Greek language and has two meanings: nearby and outside. (Oxford English Dictionary) “Paradiplomacy” is a term with two possible interpretations. It can be perceived as an addition to the classical inter-state diplomacy, but also as a deviant form of diplomacy (not-normal or out-side). Analogously with the above-mentioned linguistic interpretation of the prefix “para”, the paradiplomacy is interpreted by the scholars of social sciences both in positive and negative sense (in contrary with the multi-level governance system, which is ordinary perceived as a positive and innovative notion).

On the one hand the participation of non-central governments on the international arena contains a potential for political opportunism, since it may lead to the strengthening of the existing regional elites and disintegration of a state (Hebert, 1993 in Church and Reid, 1996; Fry, 1998; Lecours, 2002 etc). Aldecoa and Keating (1999) also find that in general the independent states do not support the idea of internationally active non-central units.

On the other hand, paradiplomacy brings foreign policy closer to the local level and citizens. Competitive and co-operative nature of foreign policy (in case the non-central governments are accepted into the game) is beneficial to the democratic development of a state. Kincaid (1990: 56) finds that it is not accidental that the most active non-central governments in the world are those of the most democratic states. Openness of foreign relations is also the prerequisite for local governments’ development. Jenkins (2004: 2) argues that international activism of subnational units (i.e. cross-border co-operation) is not a sign of “declining state
capacity, but an indication of the state’s inherent strength, a testament to its flexibility and endurance”. Paradiplomacy is a reconfiguration of a state in accordance with the demanding global environment.

As the thesis is devoted to the case of Russia there is a need to narrow the scope of the further theoretical discourse and concentrate on the participation of the non-central governments in foreign relations in the context of federalism, keeping in mind that the processes discussed above could be relevant to federal, unitary or quasi-federal states.

Federalism as a notion is about the nature of the division of power between different levels of government, when the authority to make decisions independently from each other is granted to the different tiers of government (Söderlund, 2006: 2-8). Söderlund (2006: 7) finds that decentralization and democracy affect the functioning of federation by determining “whether constituent units in reality are protected from the domination and intervention of central government”. Decentralization is associated both with democratic developments and the principle of federalism, but at the same time, it is a separate category of analysis and is more about the actual distribution of powers between the government levels. The federal structure of governing is not inevitably a feature of a democratic state or a decentralized state.

Both multi-level governance and paradiplomacy (in positive or negative sense) in a federal state can be considered as phenomena describing the (re)distribution of powers within the context of federal institutions and processes and reflecting the dynamics of the intergovernmental relations. The amplitude of these phenomena simultaneously depends on the level of democracy and the scope of decentralization practices in a federal state; and creates prerequisites for further democratization and deconcentration of power.
2.1. FROM DIPLOMACY TO PARADIPLOMACY

The invention of the term paradiplomacy has been related mainly to the academic debate focused on the changes in the federal states in 1970s and 1980s, in the framework of the so-called “new federalism” discourse (Aguirre, 1999). The term paradiplomacy was invented in order to compensate the insufficiency of the “diplomacy” to cover all the spectres of international relations\(^3\). The research on paradiplomacy is mostly based on the experience of the federal states. The experience of these countries rather than of the EU’s is more relevant to the analysis of the political processes in Russia. For example De Spiegeleire (2000: 296) finds the comparison of the United States and Russia to be useful for the understanding of the regionalization in Russia.

The second reason lies in the fact that the paradiplomatic concept acknowledges “the potential for tensions” between the central and non-central governments in the international relations (Wright, 2002). Paradiplomacy reflects both the ideas of parallelism and subsidiarity. In this sense paradiplomacy is closely connected with the in-state relations between non-central and central units as well as with the motivation factors of the former to establish diplomatic relations. Paradiplomacy is often the extension of the domestic policy. (Lecours, 2002: 93-97)

It goes without saying that the phenomenon of international activism of the non-central governments can be also considered from a broader perspective and the justification for the usage of the term “paradiplomacy” can be questioned. Aguirre (1999) suggests that “paradiplomacy” is in some way a matter of fashion in the academic world. Paradiplomacy has a “deconstructive” meaning, it is aimed to deconstruct the concept of diplomacy into “a series of opposite or alternative concepts“ (Aguirre, 1999: 193). The “paradiplomacy” is a

\(^3\)“The traditional inter-state diplomacy is not well equipped, even at the level of the EU, for the introduction of regions as unconventional international actors” (Vos, Boucke and Devos, 2002: 205).
product and a reflection of postmodernism. Aguirre finds the term “postdiplomatic” to be more useful for describing the complexity of interrelations between different actors on the international arena. Kincaid (in Jenkins, 2004: 3) also invents his own term for the description of international activism of non-central states – constituent diplomacy, which he distinguishes from subnational diplomacy and paradiplomacy. He claims that paradiplomacy does not acknowledge that non-central governments in federal states are constituent units of federal polities, of co-sovereign national policies. Naturally, the concept of “paradiplomacy” can be considered as “a self-referential” (Searle, 1995: 32) social concept, which exists in a “set of systematic relations to other (institutional) facts” (Searle, 1995: 35). One can question the necessity of different names for the processes of the same nature. Still, in the frame of this thesis I prefer to use the term paradiplomacy and refer to the theoretical material aggregated around this notion. Taking into the consideration the criticism of Aguirre (1999) I use the notion of paradiplomacy as an analytical concept, which allows forming a suitable operational framework for the research on international activities of non-central governments in Russia.

“The term diplomacy is derived via French from the ancient Greek diploma, composed of diplo, meaning “folded in two.” Historically, diplomacy referred to the conduct of the official relations between sovereign states” (Britannica Online, 2006).

Diplomacy in its classical definition is a part of the public administration and diplomatic service and deals with the implementation of foreign policy of sovereign states (Nicolson, 1988; Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995). In the 20th century the meaning of the term diplomacy started to become more and more complex. Due to economical, technological political and social changes diplomacy covers the international relations of non-governmental organizations, subnational units; one can even speak of people’s diplomacy (Vickers, 2004: 183). Brian Hocking (1991: 9-10) finds that contemporary diplomacy is characterized by two paradoxical trends: a growing internationalization and localization of foreign policy issues or growing alertness on the part of subnational interests. Foreign policy is also more and more
segmented both functionally (between the line ministries) and territorially (involves non-central units) (Soldatos, 1990: 36).

Diplomacy refers to the implementation of foreign policy of a sovereign state. Paradiplomacy is much more general and it involves all the external activities of non-central states without distinguishing between the policy-making and implementation processes. Such general approach does not give a chance to formulate concrete criteria when the external activities of non-central governments can be considered as paradiplomatic. For example, is it possible to speak about paradiplomacy in case of transborder co-operation within the framework of the EU programmes? Is the existence of foreign relations office a criteria, which allows one to say that the non-central government is engaged in paradiplomacy?

Soldatos (1990: 35) suggests that the external activities of non-central governments can be considered as paradiplomacy when there are the constitutive elements of foreign policy and foreign-policy-making. Consequently, the non-central government should possess enough autonomy to formulate its foreign-policy objectives, to determine the way in order to achieve these objectives and to deal with implementation of the policy. In this context, the simple implementation of central-government’s decisions cannot be considered as paradiplomacy. Paradiplomacy is not about delegating or contracting-out of the policy implementation from central government to the local governments.

This understanding of paradiplomacy of Soldatos serves as a working definition for the thesis. Needless to say that non-central units do not possess the sovereignty of an independent state. The justification for the usage of the Soldatos´ definition lies in the concept of “perforated sovereignties” proposed by Duchachek (1990). Analogously with such spheres as social policy, environmental issues, culture, education etc the foreign policy also “goes local,” especially in federal states. The reason for that lies in the considerable degree of jurisdictional autonomy of non-central governments (guaranteed also at constitutional level) and in the fact that almost all domestic issues are turning to be international.
Paradiplomacy, as a phenomenon by its definition could only exist within the framework of trilateral relations: central government, non-central government and foreign actors. The nature of paradiplomacy can be described via analysing the essence of the interrelations between these three actors.

When speaking about the administration and implementation of foreign policy I use the terms “implementation of paradiplomacy” or “paradiplomatic actions.” According to Duchachek, such actions include holding permanent offices in the other states, conducting well-promoted and publicized trips abroad, trade and investment shows, establishment of foreign trade zones, and participation of the representatives of the non-central governments in the work of international conferences and organizations (Duchachek, 1990: 14-15). The list of these paradiplomatic activities seems to be quite natural for example, for the US states (Fry, 1998). Of course paradiplomatic actions can vary in forms and frequency. The new forms can appear. Paradiplomatic actions are implemented in co-operation with the central government or international partners.

Before I proceed to the formulation of research paradigm, the last question should be briefly considered. What are the possibilities for the academic analysis of the paradiplomacy? The most widely spread paradigm for the studies on international activities of non-central units could be defined, according to Sharafutdinova (2003: 613), as a functionalist approach with an accent on complex interdependence. The majority of studies belong to the field of international relations or comparative politics or both. Sharafutdinova argues that the number of the studies on the paradiplomacy in Russia is quite small; the main topics are cross-border co-operation (Sharafutdinova, 2003: 615). Some of the authors including Sharafutdinova (2003) and Boman (2005) introduce constructivism and studies of identity formation into their research paradigm.

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4 The studies on international activities of the Russian regions I am acquainted with confirm the suggestion of Sharafutdinova (2003). The distinctive studies are: De Spiegeleire (2000) and Makarychev (1999).
The scholars of paradiplomacy can be criticised for being mostly case-oriented. The majority of the studies on paradiplomacy are indeed of a descriptive nature and tend to evaluate the success of the policy within the context of a concrete state (Lecours, 2002: 93-94). For the purpose of my studies I also selected the classical for paradiplomacy case-oriented approach. The reason for selecting a case-study lies in the lack of researches conducted in the field of paradiplomacy in Russia both by Eastern and Western scholars. A case-study on the issue is a good opportunity to start the discussion and give some preliminary explanations on the nature of paradiplomacy in Russia.5

2.2. FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN LOCAL AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS:
INSIDE THE BLACK BOX

The analysis of paradiplomacy only from the perspective of international relations does not give an insight on the domestic causes of the phenomenon. I find that the neo-institutional theory that looks inside the “black box” (Lecours, 2002) of the paradiplomatic relations between the non-central and central governments of a state is appropriate for the purpose of this case-study.

Elazar (1987: 21 and 67-68, in Söderlund, 2006: 4-5) states that the understanding of the functioning of federalism should derive from both understanding of structure and process of government. "These two dimensions determine the actual division of power within a federal state. On the one hand, the structure of federalism manifests itself in a specific type of constitutional design and institutional framework. On the other hand, the process of federalism refers to the political practices that have evolved over time and determine the

5 Additionally, the nature of the MPA studies is also more practical. The understanding of the processes taking place in the Russian regions under investigation can be helpful for the formulation and implementation of the Estonian foreign policy.
nature of the relationships both among members and between different levels of government within a federal system” (Söderlund, 2006: 4-5).

In the following chapters of the thesis I will address the issue of the structure for paradiplomacy in Russia, such as legislative provisions and administrative framework. Legislative provisions refer to constitutional and legislative framework and focus on the ways in which the constitutional design influences paradiplomacy. Administrative framework describes institutional settings in a non-central unit and also involves such issues as distribution of budget, rules and regulations concerning the implementation and formulation of foreign policy, involvement of the non-central governments into the policy-making process and etc.

In addition to the structural dimension I will consider the dynamics of the intergovernmental relations, as “a key issue within federations is to achieve working relationships between central and regional governments through formal or informal intergovernmental negotiations and political bargaining” (Söderlund, 2006: 7). Paradiplomacy is a result of both the structural features and dynamic bargaining process between the federal centre and non-central units.

Lecours (2002: 110) summarizes the nature of the paradiplomacy as a Janus-faced phenomenon. It defines the categorization of paradiplomacy as internal-domestic or external-international. The explanation of paradiplomacy should involve both external and internal variables. Lecours (2002) mentions the following aspects that should be taken into consideration while describing the processes “inside the black box”:

- the nature of the intergovernmental relations,
- constitutional framework,
- the national foreign policy agenda,
- the existence of international organizations or/and states – actively seeking for diplomatic relations with non-central governments,
• the influence of global economy etc.

The above mentioned factors do not have only positive impact on the development of the paradiplomacy; they can also have a restricting impact. For example, international legal norms\(^6\), attitudes of foreign governments and sometimes even the bureaucratic norms of international organizations – all these can prevent non-central units from active participation on international arena (Hocking, 1993: 70).

The following model (Figure 1) was developed using the explanatory framework for paradiplomacy of Panayotis Soldatos (1990: 45) and Andre Lecours (2002).

![Figure 1. Opportunity structure for paradiplomacy](image)

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\(^6\) Tolstyh (2004) finds no objective criteria or any grounds in the international law, which can be helpful in the delimitation of the roles of central government and non-central units of federation in international relations. Tolstyh describes precedents when the subjects of federation have had autonomy on the international arena at least *de-jure* (for example, representation of Ukraine in the UN during the Soviet period of Ukraine’s history). Tolstyh also cites the norms of international law, which presumes that the participants of the international relations could also be the subjects other than sovereign states or international organizations (Tolstyh, 2004: 21-23).
The most important factor influencing paradiplomacy is intergovernmental relations and the balance between the interests of local and central governments.

Duchachek (1990: 28-29) formulates four scenarios for the interrelation between central government and non-central units:

- secessionist fragmentation in preparation of territorial secession;
- tight centralization of foreign policy as a reaction to too many international actors;
- combinative or coordinated foreign policy;
- co-operative/competitive segmentation as a mix of co-operation, duplication and competition.

The first and second scenarios seem to be extreme cases, which lead to changes in the political system as a whole and probably in the political regime. The intermediate variants are the combinative foreign policy and co-operative/competitive segmentation. Segmentation refers to the high level of autonomy of the non-central units. Combinative foreign policy takes into the consideration the needs of local units and tries to integrate them into the common foreign policy agenda.

Referring to the scenarios of Duchachek (1990: 28-29) integrated into the Soldatos’ (1990: 38-39) model for the nature of paradiplomatic actions I propose the following simplified model, describing the patterns of the paradiplomacy in the context of the intergovernmental relations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of intergovernmental relations in paradiplomacy</th>
<th>Non-central government (NCG)</th>
<th>Central government (CG)</th>
<th>Remarks/ examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Autonomous policy-making process, local interests are in contradiction/conflict with the central government.</td>
<td>The crisis of central government. No possibilities for monitoring or control over the policy-making at local level.</td>
<td>Examples of such cases: Prednestrovje (Moldova), South-Ossetia (Georgia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized foreign policy</td>
<td>Inability to exercise paradiplomacy and stay active on international arena.</td>
<td>Administrative and/or legislative constraints for local governments to deal with foreign policy issues.</td>
<td>The case of the USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordinated</td>
<td>Opportunities to participate in the co-ordinated (by central government) policy-making process.</td>
<td>Provision of opportunity structure/institutional framework for participation of local units in the decision-making. Coordination and control over decision-making process.</td>
<td>The actions of the EU to support cross-border co-operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative</td>
<td>Participation in the joint actions with CG.</td>
<td>Joint coordination and administration of foreign policy.</td>
<td>Foreign policy of EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Competition for resources within opportunity structure.</td>
<td>CG cannot restrict the activeness of NCG, but compete with them for resources.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel</td>
<td>Autonomous policy-making process. NCG</td>
<td>Can be implemented with or without CG’s</td>
<td>The model is similar to “fragmentation”,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
substitutes or compliments the policy of CG, harmonious relations/ non-contradictory. monitoring role. CG accepts the initiatives of NCGs and acknowledge their activities without attempts to regulate them. but without conflict.

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**Figure 2.** Types of paradiplomacy in respect to the intergovernmental relations (explanatory hypothetical framework).

This model inspired by Soldatos and Duchachek highlights the possibilities for both confrontation as well as constructive co-operation between local and central governments.

Fragmented model assumes that the central government has no control over the actions of the non-central governments. Their interrelations are already close to those of independent states. Secession can be both the cause and result of the paradiplomatic actions.

Parallel diplomacy occurs when the interests of the central and non-central governments do not coincide, as a result of which the central government does not perceive a need to intervene and regulate the activities of the non-central governments. The central government could in some cases monitor them and take their interests into consideration while making its own decisions.

Centralization of foreign policy can be accomplished at different levels. The extreme form is a totalitarian control over society and all the activities of non-central units, which is against the democratic principles of governing. To lesser extent attempts to centralize or control foreign-policy-making could be found in competitive, co-ordinated or even co-operative models.

Competitive and co-operative models refer to a high level of institutional autonomy of non-central units. The non-central and central units do not have privileges to change the “rules of
the game” or to reformulate the opportunity structure without consulting or negotiating with the other side. In the co-ordinated model the active role belongs to the central government, which understands the importance of non-central governments’ involvement in decision-making process and paradiplomacy.

The capacity of both central and non-central units to adapt and respond to other actors’ activities in co-operative model with a conflict-resolution mechanism is quite similar to the networking model of policy-making. According to the networking model, the complexity of the modern policy-making suggests using networks rather than hierarchies to facilitate the process of coalition building and policy development (Church and Reid, 1996). The mentioned above fact is also true for the foreign-policy-making.

Brian Hocking stresses the need for linkages capable of providing for each level of government an access to resources in the disposal of the others. Sometimes the non-central governments or NGOs possess the needed bureaucratic expertise in specific functional areas. At the same time the non-central actors lack the information and communication networks that are ordinarily provided by the diplomatic services. Hocking emphasizes the traditional arguments in support of decentralization and devolution of power. In the foreign policy analogous to domestic matters it is important to consider the local interests as well (Hocking 1993: 69-70).

On the other hand networking and non-hierarchical approach to foreign policy assumes that there is co-operation, not a conflict or competition between the actors involved into decision-making and implementation. The networking model could be successfully implemented in federal states, which assumes a high degree of decentralization and local/ regional autonomy. According to Duchachek (1990: 3-5) the critical ingredient of federalism is the “practice of competitive and pluralistic democracy both between and within the two interlaced layers of government.” The second important feature is “the internal division of powers between two

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7 Hocking names issues such as education, human rights, and environment (Hocking, 1993:69). But non-central governments could also possess expertise in relations with diaspora.
orders of government.” These two features result in the unification and at the same time fragmentation of power division in a federal state (unity and diversity). Competitive and pluralistic democracy⁸ and autonomy of non-central units of federal states allow them to be active on international arena and to protect the interests of the regions. The ideas of Duchachek (1990) find confirmation in the conclusion of Vos, Boucke and Devos (2002: 203), who argue that within the networking paradiplomatic paradigm the non-central units of decentralized federal states tend to be more successful actors on the international arena because of their strong legal constitutional positions and the access to the resources for policy-making (such as information, organisation, expertise etc).

The paradiplomatic paradigm constructed in the present section serves as a basis for the analysis of the Russian paradiplomacy in the case of diaspora politics. I have already considered paradiplomacy in the context of federal states, paradiplomacy along the decentralization/centralization axis as well as touched upon the relation between paradiplomacy and democratic development of a state. In the next sections I will introduce the “case” by giving a short analysis of the opportunities for paradiplomacy in the context of the Russian federalism.

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⁸ The insufficiency of democratic traditions and “rule of law” is considered to be an obstacle or the international activity of the Russian regions. At the same time, Tolstyh (2004: 47-48) finds that the international activity of Russian subjects of federation could serve as an impact for further democratic development.
3. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE

The structure for this section derives from the aim to cover two main fields important for the actual case-study. The chapter starts with a brief analysis of paradiplomacy in Russia in the context of the Russian federalism. The understanding of the ideas of asymmetric federalism contributes a lot to the understanding of the relations between Russian regions and central government in the realm of foreign policy. The second part is devoted to the diaspora politics or as it is officially called in Russia “the politics towards the compatriots living abroad.”

3.1. PARADIPLOMACY IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN MODEL OF FEDERALISM

In the previous sections I raised the question of what can be considered as paradiplomatic action and what is the nature of the paradiplomacy in Russia. Are Russian regions executing? or Do they have a potential for execution of paradiplomacy? The conclusions made in the current section are mainly based on the previous studies of Russian regions and international activities of the Russian subjects of federation.

3.1.1. RUSSIAN FEDERALISM AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

The Russian Federation consists of 89 constituent units, called “subjects of the federation”, which are divided into six different types (Salikov, 2004). Under the 1993 Constitution, which is still in force today, the republics, territories, oblasts, autonomous oblasts, autonomous regions, and cities of federal designation in Russia are held to be equal in their
relations with the federal agencies of state power. According to the Constitution, the Federation as a whole is sovereign, whereas the subjects of the federation are not. The constituent units being self-governing entities enjoy a considerable autonomy. Among the most important rights are the rights to adopt their own quasi-constitutions, to set up governmental structures and to decide on the allocation of power among them. However the federal constitution remains supreme and all the legislative and administrative provisions should correspond to the federal legislation.

The constitutional provisions refer to equal treatment of all the subjects of the federation in Russia. Nevertheless due to historical reasons the *de-facto* statuses and powers of different subjects are not the same.

According to Matsuzato (1994) throughout the history the Russian Federation belongs to the family of the centralized states. Before the Revolution of 1917 the administrative division of the Russian empire was based on purely demographic principles. (Matsuzato, 1994: 185-188) Federalism in Russia was first proclaimed by the Constitution of 1918. During the Soviet period there has been a combination of ethnic and territorial factors that determined the nature of the federal governance. Still the “socialist federation” was in practice a unitary state. (Salikov, 2004) After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s the regional actors won a high degree of independence and influence on the politics (Shröder, 2005: 9). As a result the Russian Federation was in this period close to confederation (Matsuzato, 2004: 6). Due to the reforms of president Putin in 2000 and 2004-2005 the roles of the regions were again limited (Shröder, 2005: 9). Politically president Putin tries to establish exclusive relationships between the regions and the centre in order to obtain the obedience of the regional leaders/elite (Matsuzato, 2004; Rodin, 2006). The distribution of power between the centre and regions since the collapse of the USSR is mirrored in the participation of Russian regions in the international affairs. Before president Putin the international activities of the Russian regions were not regulated by the central government. There were plenty of international visits and the representations of the Russian regions were opened in many countries without concern of the central government. Since 1999, the central government
decided to regulate the international activity of the regions by introducing a number of legislative acts (Tolstyh, 2004: 80-81).

The Russian federalism is often characterised as asymmetrical and hierarchical (Söderlund, 2006; Rodin, 2006); these factors are important for the understanding of international activism of the Russian regions and deserve further consideration. The arenas of asymmetry range from political, economic to social and cultural. Traditionally the asymmetry of Russian federalism is based “on ethnic claims for self-determination” of certain regions. Some of the units have more rights and autonomy within the federation. The Republics in Russian Federation (such as Komi, Karelia, Sakha etc, in total 21) have their own constitutions and have rights to adopt their own laws. The other territorial units such as a krai and an oblast do not have such broad rights (Griffith Prendergrast, 2004: 3-5). Hypothetically the non-central units in Russia formed on the basis of ethnical factors are more likely to exhibit paradiplomacy and strive for contacts with other states and ethnic groups living in other states (like for example Quebec in Canada and its relations with France) (Tolstyh, 2004: 45; Sharafutdinova, 2003). This thesis focuses mainly on the non-ethnic local units in Russia. The local self-governments,\(^9\) which also execute public authority at the local level, are excluded from the research.

**Intergovernmental relations in Russia**

In theory, the intergovernmental relations in presidential federal systems are of complex and complicated nature. “They are fragmented and difficult to coordinate due to the occurrence of both horizontal and diagonal relationships between the executive and legislative branches at both the federal and subnational levels” (Watts, 1989: 8-9 and Cameron, 2001: 122 in Söderlund, 2006: 16).

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\(^9\) The local self-governments are performing by the population of the municipalities and rural areas (Salikov, 2004).
Indeed the relations between the central government and the regions in Russia are built through the process of negotiations, signing of the treaties and so called “horse-trading” (Mironov, 1998). “Horse-trading” or bargaining process could be considered as a display of not only constitutional asymmetry, but also socio-economic and political asymmetry. The main factors defining the bargaining process are access to structural resources (such as demographic, geographic etc) and the ability of actors to take advantage of the available structural resources (Söderlund, 2006: 23).

Söderlund (2006: 132-133) in the research on the division of power in intergovernmental relations in Russia emphasizes the turnaround towards more centralization after the election of Vladimir Putin. Centralization has been accompanied by the “fall of the regional chief executives” and only single regions “managed to consolidate their positions” and preserved a privilege to enjoy the informal bargaining with the federal centre. In the bargaining process the regions possessing certain political resources have ordinarily more influence in the intergovernmental relations. The main “political resources” delineated by Söderlund (2006) are the economic resources, the administrative status and the ethnical factor, electoral legitimacy and popular support, and time in power.

“Horse-trading”, decorative and at the same time chaotic and asymmetrical nature of Russian federal relations influences paradiplomacy as well. It is possible that for some of the regions a Latin proverb Quod licet Iovi non licet bovi\textsuperscript{10} can be valid.

3.1.2. PARADIPLOMACY IN RUSSIA: OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE

“Opportunity structure” for paradiplomacy in Russia consists of two main parts: legislative provision and implementation of the policies. Administrative framework could potentially show the real situation with international activity of the subjects of federation in Russia. It

\textsuperscript{10} In English: What Jupiter (supreme God) is allowed to do, cattle (people) are not.
illustrates the capacity of the Russian regions to be active internationally and to benefit from the legislative provision.

At the level of legislation the topic of paradiplomacy is a new one for the Russian Federation, even though the roots for paradiplomacy can be found in the Constitution of 1993. According to article 72(o) of the Constitution, the federal units have a right to enter into international agreements with constituent units of the other countries and with the consent of the Federation even with other sovereign countries. International relations are within the common jurisdiction of the central government and subjects of the federation. At least at the level of constitutional provisions the Russian non-central units have a potential to participate in the foreign policy decision-making and to have their own strategies in respect to international relations, also to implement it with their own resources (taking into consideration the provisions for fiscal federalism). Tolstyh (2004: 49) argues that several Russian regions in fact use the constitutionally provided opportunities and develop international relations with other foreign states and regions.

Additional analysis of the legislative provisions of Russian Federation in the sphere of international relations conducted by Tolstyh (2004) could be summarized as following:

- The subjects of federation have the right to express opinions and make proposals during the preparation of international agreements. At the same time the legislative provisions do not oblige the central government to accept them or to give any feedback.

- There is an “objective co-ordination” of international relations executed by central government towards non-central units. “An objective co-ordination” has a dual meaning. Firstly, the central government creates a unified framework, which defines the rules for execution of international relations for the non-central units. Secondly, the federal institutions formulate the general guidelines for foreign policy, leaving the non-central units space for planning more concrete actions.
• The documents aimed to regulate the international activities of the non-central units in Russia contain “contradictory principles” \(^{11}\), which are very difficult to implement into practice and which in some respect narrow the constitutional rights of the subjects of federation.

• There are a number of legal gaps in the regulation of the relations between the central government and the subjects of federation in Russia in the domain of international relations (Makarychev, 1999: 504).

However, Tolstyh’s conclusions are mostly theoretical and based on the analysis of the legislative acts only. His analysis might not reveal the real situation in Russia. The present thesis adds empirical information to the analysis which can prove or refute the theoretical conclusions of Tolstyh.

At practical level the list of paradiplomatic actions of the Russian regions includes such issues as the conclusion of international agreements, establishment of foreign offices abroad (mainly ethnic republics such as Bashkortostan, Burjatija, Sahha etc), participation in the activities of international organizations, organization of the official visits abroad, unofficial visits, and participation in the international conferences and other events (Tolstyh, 2004: 91-105). The paradiplomatic activities found in Russia by Tolstyh are similar to those found in other federal countries. Ordinary the most common actions are the permanent representations in foreign countries, participation in international conferences, trade missions and other events, as well as conclusion of international agreements and participation in joint

\(^{11}\) One example - a document called “Recommendations for preparation of the agreements by the subjects of federation with foreign partners” (prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)). In this document the MFA states that the agreements concluded by the subjects of federation are not the subject of international law and could not be considered as international agreement. Tolstyh argues that there is a legal contradiction with the norms of international law and also Constitution of the Russian Federation. (Tolstyh, 2004)

The interesting tendency is that sometimes Russian regions can find themselves being “the targets of social activism” (Hocking, 1991:23) of the international community. One of the examples of such tendency is the Republic Mari El and the activities of Finland, Hungary and Estonia towards Mari El in the fields of the preservation of Mari language (belonging to Finno-Ugric languages group’) and culture in the Republic. The other example is the pressure of the Western countries on the Russian regions in the beginning of 1990s to go international in order to facilitate in certain regions the processes of economic and institutional development (Makarychev and Perović, 2001).

Indeed, the phenomenon of the paradiplomacy in Russia reminds of an iceberg. The spectre of informal contacts and relations between the central government and non-central institutions is very diverse. Sometimes for the understanding of the processes it is not enough to deal only with legislation or official documents, informal relations constitute the largest part of the iceberg (Makarychev, 1999).

Makarychev illustrates quite well the horse-trading idea in the relations between the centre and regions as well as contributes a lot to the understanding of paradiplomacy in Russia while introducing political dimension to the discourse. The political leaders in Russia such as Luzhkov (mayor of Moscow) or Nemtsov (ex-governor of Nizhny Novgorod) questioned the official central government’s foreign policy on the issues of Belarus and Sebastopol. Makarychev argues that these “demarches of local leaders can be interpreted as direct discord with the president’s management of the foreign affairs” (Makarychev, 1999: 505). The case of Moscow City government and Crimea relations serves as an example of such “demarches”.

12 For example “Kindred People’s Programme of the Republic of Estonia 2005 – 2006”.
“Moscow – Crimea”: on the brink of conflict between Moscow and federal centre.

“Moscow - Crimea” is the name of one of the foundations operating under the aegis of the Moscow City Government in Crimea, Ukraine. The Moscow City Government also has a representation/office in Crimea. The analysis of the official internet site of the foundation “Moscow - Crimea” shows that the Moscow City Government played a role of “locomotive” (epithet often used by Muradov, Sorokin and Karpenko in the interviews) in the Crimea-Russia relations and in the support of Russia to this region. The co-operation between the Moscow City and Crimea took place firstly at the grassroots level and in 1996 the Government of Crimea and the Moscow City Government decided to establish jointly a foundation for conducting the co-operation. Due to the intervention of the Mayor Luzhkov into the debate on the status of Sebastopol at a high political level, the Prime-Minister of Crimea decided to stop co-operation with Moscow and foundation was established unilaterally (Foundation “Moscow-Crimea”, 1999).

The rhetoric on the political activism of Luzhkov in Crimea and especially Sebastopol confirm the increasing role of the Moscow City Government at the level of the global international politics at the end of 90s. Gromyko (1997) writes “traditionally the politics of the state and the politics of its capital are things – undividable” then continues: “Luzhkov was almost only politician, who understood the fullness of threat and undertook steps to prevent it.” Gromyko (1997) mentions the possibility for the conflict between Luzhkov and the federal centre. Tomberg in the interview also sees the potential for the conflicts with the “federals” (“Moscow acted too intensively, and the foreign relations should be regulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”). Still, the Moscow City Government continued being active in the Crimea dimension and supporting the compatriots living abroad, and in the following years the co-operation agreements between the Moscow City Government and

13 Hereinafter I start referring to the interviews conducted within the frames of the empirical study (see the sections 4 and 8 for more details on sampling and respondents).
Crimea Administration have been signed. These agreements and action plans regulate mostly cultural, social and educational co-operation as well as the frameworks for the humanitarian aid of the Moscow City Government to the compatriots in Crimea. At present the Moscow City Government is one of the most important partners for the Russian compatriots’ organizations in Crimea (Foundation “Moscow – Crimea”).

3.2. DIASPORA POLITICS IN RUSSIA: AN OLD WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE?

The ideas of the protection of compatriots abroad are not new in the history of Russia. The first mentioning of the “Russian rule of law” is associated with the defence of the rights of the Slavs, who lived on the territory of the Byzantine Empire (Muradov (ed.), 2003: 132).

In the 17th-18th century during the Russo-Turkish wars, one of the arguments for Russia’s intervention into the domestic issues of Ottoman Empire was the protection of the Orthodox people and Orthodox Church on the territory of the Empire (Revjakin, 2004: 140). During the period of the Russian Empire the term “compatriot” was not widely used, the same meaning had the term “co-religionist” (edinoverec). After the Revolution of 1917 the relationships with Russian diaspora abroad was regulated mainly by the legislation in the sphere of citizenship. People who immigrated abroad or have been deported mostly often lost the citizenship of the USSR (Muradov (ed.), 2003: 179-184).

The policy of the Russian Empire towards co-religionists is interesting in the context of the Rancour-Laferrier’s theory, which claims the foundation of the Russian national idea to be laid in the Russian Orthodox religion. Rancour-Laferrier claims that the Russian Orthodox religion has dominated for some period of time over the Russian national idea (Rancour-Laferrier, 2003: 28-29). Rancour-Laferrier argues that there is currently a Russian “identity crisis” and Russia is undertaking a search for a “national idea.”
For the understanding of the motivation for Russia and also for some of its regions to deal with diaspora politics I propose to analyse not only the objective factors (such as based on strictly practical “realpolitik” rather than idealistic actions), but to consider domestic factors as well. In the diaspora politics the foreign and domestic issues are interrelated just like in case of paradiplomacy. Zevelev (2001: 26-27) suggests that via preserving and constructing the relationships with Russian-speaking population living abroad the “invention of the Russian nation-state”\(^{14}\) takes place. Diaspora issues are also important for the electorate in Russia as the majority of people living in Russia have friends or relatives in other countries.

At present, the aspect of ethnicity is also in the centre of political and academic debate in Russia. Ethnic group is considered to be an important object in the international relations and foreign policy (Muharjamov, 2005: 288-293).

To sum up, diaspora politics is selected for the present thesis as an important part of Russia’s foreign political agenda and also as an issue which matters at the domestic level. The unity of the “Russian World” is impossible without engagement of the Russian-speaking diaspora abroad. It is intriguing to follow the paradiplomatic processes in the context of the diaspora politics keeping in mind the importance of diaspora in the context of the identity crisis and the possible ways out of it.

### 3.2.1. TERMINOLOGY FOR DIASPORA AND DIASPORA POLITICS

Diaspora itself is not a new notion. The word “diaspora” comes from the ancient Greek language; the original meaning of the word is “dispersal or scattering”. Historically the term “diaspora” was reserved only for concrete ethnic groups, whose minority status resulted from migration. Some authors referred to those groups as to “classical or archetypical diasporas,” i.e. Jewish, Armenian, Chinese, and Korean (King and Melvin, 1999: 6-7). Sheffer (2002: 234) finds three categories of diasporas: “historical diasporas” formed in antiquity or the

\(^{14}\) Or reinvention.
Middle Ages, “new diasporas” formed as a result of the Industrial Revolution and “incipient ethnonational diasporas” (also Russian diaspora) forming now.

In the academic world the discourse on “diaspora” and “diaspora politics” got the second wind with the renewal of discussions on the essence of nationhood and nation-states and introduction of constructivist approach to ethnic and national identities (Brubaker, 1997; Kymlicka and Staehle, 2000; Laitin, 1998; Smith, 1998; Smith, 1999). The mechanisms of diasporisation and the interrelations between the nation-building and diaspora identity forming could be traced to the history of the Jewish diaspora from Middle Ages until the 20th century, when diaspora had a decisive role in the restoration of Israel.\textsuperscript{15}

Laitin (1998: 30-31) and Smith (1999: 502) name the following functional attributes of present day diasporas (or dispersed ethnic groups):

- The ancestors of the classical diasporas dispersed from the specific original centre (the territory of the motherland) as a result of war or due to economical reasons.
- While living on the territory of a foreign state and being a minority in that state they retain a collective memory or “collective myth” about their original home state and the conception of the motherland is often idealized.
- The members of the diaspora group continue to be related to their home state, and feel ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity. Diaspora is committed to the maintenance or restoration of its home state and supports its safety and prosperity.
- Diaspora relations with the host state could be troubled; diaspora community lives relatively isolated from the host society.

The functional attributes of diasporas are similar to the six components of “ethnie” delineated by Smith (1988, 22-31): collective name, common myth of descent, shared history, distinctive shared culture, association with a specific territory and sense of solidarity.

\textsuperscript{15} See for example Elazari and Afek (1994); Sheffer (2002).
According to Anthony Smith (1988), the essence of contemporary diaspora is ethnopolitical and ethnocultural. Poloskova (1999: 38) summarizes the ethnocultural and ethnopolitical features of diasporas by naming multilevel self-identification patterns, referring to the political and cultural ties with either the state of living or home state. Diasporas are ethnopolitical, thus they should possess institutions intended to preserve diasporas and to participate in the diaspora identity formation. The important element in this process is the strategy for interaction with the state of residence and home state. King and Melvin (1999: 9) state that the diasporic identities are neither given nor genetically determined factors, “but arise as a result of the complex interaction between a particular ethnic population, the policy of the state in which it resides, and the existence of a home state beyond the borders of the state of residence”.

In sum, such approach towards the modern diasporas on the one hand “deconstructs” the classical understanding/definition of the “ethnic minority”, which even at the semantic level of analysis refers to the dual relationships between the “minor” ethnic group living in a state and the majority group (dominating nationality). On the other hand the functional features of diaspora and the diasporization process make an ethnic group a political active entity and “construct” the cultural and political ties between the ethnic group and its homeland. (Doroshko, 2003)

The term “diaspora politics” is versatile and can be applied to the political struggle of diasporas to maintain their distinctive identities and connections with their homelands and other dispersed groups of the same nation (Sheffer, 2002). The second part of the meaning, which is taken as operational for the present thesis, refers to the foreign politics of the home state aiming to preserve and cultivate the relationships with its diaspora staying abroad. In the term “diaspora politics” in the framework of the present thesis the focus is mainly on the homeland’s foreign policy agenda. There are three different levels that can be distinguished in home state’s diaspora politics. This classification is made in accordance to the target

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16 The scope of this thesis does not allow to concentrate on the complex of interrelations, usually named “diaspora politics” between the home state, host state and diaspora.
groups of the foreign policy and is proved to be successful in my previous study on the participation of diaspora in diaspora politics\textsuperscript{17} (Doroshko, 2003).

Global international politics. The first diaspora politics model involves the home state and other international actors, who are deciding the international questions of great political importance. In this model diaspora is presented as a source of “political capital” for the home state (King and Melvin, 1999: 13). Diaspora issues are discussed on the international arena possibly in order to achieve the home state’s political aspirations or represent the diaspora’s interests. The participation of the non-central governments at this level in my opinion is not very probable due to the lack of pragmatic interest towards the issues under consideration (except for possible political ambitious of the local leaders).

Dual international relations. In the second policy model diaspora may become an issue in the relations between the home state and the host state. The home state builds its relations with the host state. One of the issues in the bilateral relations can be the position of diaspora in the host state. By way of different sanctions and political measures the home state tries to influence the host state’s policy towards the diaspora. The aim of this policy is to improve the position of the diaspora in the host state. At this level the participation of non-central governments is more probable, especially in the frames of the transborder co-operation with neighbouring countries.

Dual relations between ethnic group and home state. The third model involves the relations between the home state and diaspora. In this model diaspora is a direct object of the home state policy, which includes the variety of political measures in economical, cultural, social and other spheres. The role of the non-central units could be quite significant in the

\textsuperscript{17} In the previous study conducted in 2003 I assumed that diaspora politics could be implemented on three different levels: the level of global international politics, the level of bilateral relations between the home and the host state, and the sphere of relations between the diaspora and the home state. The role of the diaspora as an actor in the policy formulation varies according to the level of politics. Diaspora had more possibilities to participate on the lowest level of politics.
implementation of the “grass-root” diaspora politics. The non-central units often have the expertise and essential resources to deal with concrete projects and programmes intended to support the diaspora organizations and their ties with homeland. The activities of the non-central governments could be tolerated and even supported by the central government.

3.2.2. RUSSIAN DIASPORA AND DIASPORA POLITICS OF THE RUSSIAN NON-CENTRAL UNITS

Two main aspects should be briefly introduced in order to give an overview on the context of the diaspora politics in Russia: the Russian diaspora and the frameworks for the diaspora politics of the Russian regions.

In search of the Russian diaspora

Defining one’s belonging to the “Russian diaspora” group is quite a complicated task, taking into consideration that diaspora is both ethno-political and ethno-cultural notion, and not forgetting the fact that ethnic identity and feeling of belonging could be constructed. The Russian Federation promotes the development of the common identity and consciousness in order to support the diaspora (Zevelev, 2001: 128-129). The “Russian-centric” definition of the diaspora could be found in the Russian legislative acts and political discourse on the protection of diaspora living abroad.

According to the researcher with Russian scientific background Tatyana Poloskova (1998: 25), as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, approximately 27 million of people of Russian origin found themselves living abroad. All these people are considered to be

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18 27 million of people are dispersed as following:

- states, where the number of Russians constitute more than 20% of population: Kazakhstan, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan;
- 10-20% of population: Byelorussia and Moldova;
potential members of the Russian diaspora or compatriots living abroad. Apart from the “new Russian diaspora of postsoviet area”, which was formed recently, there always have been immigrants from Russia who settled in the Western European countries and the USA during the twentieth century (Poloskova, 1998: 65). These people have also been included in the target group for the diaspora politics.

The definition of the target group for the Russian diaspora politics was a subject of the debates in Duma during the negotiations on the Federal Law “On the State Politics of the Russian Federation regarding the Compatriots Abroad”¹⁹ (hereinafter referred to as Federal Law). The Members of Duma stressed the factor of self-identification of the compatriots and the problematic of citizenship. In the Federal Law approved by Duma in 1999 citizenship is an objective criteria for the definition of belonging to the Russian diaspora (former citizens of the Russian Federation, USSR, Russian Republic, and Russian State etc). The Member of Duma Bindjukov mentions at the evening session of Duma on July 2, 1998 that the compatriots’ organizations of the CIS and Baltic States participated in the development of the Law and by that the compatriots supported the intention of the Russian Federation to preserve and develop contacts with them. (State Duma of the Russian Federation. Verbatim records)

The dimension of paradiplomacy in the diaspora politics introduces a new aspect in the definition of the Russian diaspora. Russian diaspora politics is not only for the Russians or Russian-speakers living abroad. For some of the ethnically based regions of Russia the diaspora politics is also about the preservation of ties with the compatriots of their nationalities (for example, for Tatarstan – with Tatars and for Dagestan – with Dagestanians etc).

¹⁹ In original: Федеральный закон «О государственной политике Российской Федерации в отношении соотечественников за рубежом»

• less than 10%: Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbadzhan, Georgia, Armenia. (Poloskova, 1998: 25)
Legislation base and administration of the Russian diaspora politics

The aims of the Russian policy stated in the Federal Law are the following: “to provide support for the compatriots living abroad in the realization of their human and civil rights in accordance with the norms of international law, international agreements concluded by the Russian Federation, the legislative acts of the Russian Federation, taking into the consideration the legislation of other foreign states”. The most important “human and civil rights” protected by the Russian Federation are the rights to preserve, develop and express the cultural peculiarities, to support and develop spiritual and intellectual potential, to establish and shape the connections between the compatriots and the Russian Federation, and to participate in the work of the non-governmental organizations at the local and international levels (Federal Law, paragraph 5).

At the present stage, in addition to the Federal Law, the Conception of Support of the Compatriots Abroad\(^20\) (hereinafter referred to as Conception) adopted in 2001 implies that the Russian Federation should support the diaspora and its organizations in order to guarantee the diaspora participation in the development of the Russian state. Diaspora politics should enable Russia to establish the mutually beneficial contacts with the foreign states, to defend the Russian international interests and to guarantee justice, stability and security in the region (Conception, chapter II).

The subjects of federation are also mentioned in the Federal Law (in the paragraphs 2, 16, 17, 25 and in the preamble). In the paragraph 2 it is stated that the participants in the relations with compatriots abroad are the bodies of central government of the Russian Federation and also institutions of the subjects of federation. The subjects of federation support the compatriots in the spheres of education, culture, language, social and economic affairs. Subjects of federation also have an access to the results of the state monitoring of the compatriots abroad (paragraph 25).

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\(^{20}\) In original: Концепция поддержки Российской Федерацией соотечественников за рубежом на современном этапе
According to the Conception, the control and direction of the diaspora politics are in the jurisdiction of the central government. The Government of Russia should work out and implement the specific programmes intended to support compatriots in foreign countries. The programmes determine the basic directions and measures for both central government’s institutions and also subjects of federation. The Conception also assumes that the financing of the measures implemented in its framework should be planned in the federal budget (Chapter IV). The Conception does not stress the role of the non-central units and concentrates more on the foreign policy matters.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) considers federal laws and normative acts related also to such topics as migration policy, citizenship policy, education, pensions, war veterans, language policy etc as part of diaspora politics (Russian MFA, 2006 I).

With regard to the legislative branch the most authoritative organ is the Committee for the Questions of CIS Countries and Compatriots21, which was created in order to coordinate the legislative process in the field of the diaspora politics. The consultative role in the legislative process belonged to the State Duma Compatriots’ Council,22 which consisted of the compatriots organizations’ representatives. In 2003 the Council stopped its activities.

Within the federal executive branch it is the Government Commission for the Issues of Compatriots Living Abroad23 that is responsible for the general coordination and control of the policy formulation and implementation. Among the members of the Commission are the representatives of the State Duma, Government, and Council of Federation, governmental organizations and also Moscow, St Petersburg City Governments and Tatarstan. (Russian MFA, 2006 II)

21 In original: Комитет по делам стран СНГ и соотечественников.
22 In original: Совет соотечественников при Государственной Думе.
23 In original: Правительственная комиссия по делам соотечественников за рубежом.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs bears the main responsibility for the implementation of diaspora politics. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it is the Department of the work with compatriots\textsuperscript{24} that is responsible for the concrete work with compatriots abroad. (Russian MFA, 2006 III)

In the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation the Board for Intergovernmental and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries is responsible for these topics.\textsuperscript{25} The Board is an advisory body of the President. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is subordinated directly to the President.

Respective structures and commissions can be founded at the regional level (Federal Law, paragraph 26). For example, in the structure of the International Relations Department in Moscow City Government there is a Division of the Work with Compatriots and the Moscow House of Compatriots. The Moscow City Government supports a number of public foundations that deal with the financing of diaspora projects. One of the biggest funds is “Moskva-Rossijane” that has its agencies in several regional centres of the Russian Federation. (International Relations Department, Moscow City Government) In other regions sometimes the dispora politics is in the competence of the international co-operation departments (like in St Petersburg) or in some cases in the Department of Education (Pskov) or of Foreign Economic Relations (Moscow Oblast).

The legislation on the compatriots´ politics presumes the co-ordinated model of non-central units´ participation in the diaspora politics. The model of “objective coordination” formulated by Tolstyh (2004) is relevant in the case of the diaspora politics. The Federal Law and Conception establish the general guidelines for diaspora politics and the non-central governments can decide on the possible ways of implementation of the politics. There is also an institutional framework which regulates the decision-making process on the diaspora politics issues, where the leading role belongs to the central government. The opportunities

\textsuperscript{24} In original: Департамент по работе с соотечественниками.
\textsuperscript{25} In original: Управление по межрегиональным и культурным связям с зарубежными странами.
of the subjects of federation to participate in the decision-making process are asymmetrical. Only three regions have positions in the Governmental Commission (Russian MFA, 2006 IV). At the same time, almost 40 regions sent their comments to the State Duma on the Federal Law in 1998 (State Duma of the Russian Federation. Verbatim records). Thus, there are several interested regions that are not represented in the Commission. In the following sections I will study further the phenomenon of the asymmetry in the opportunity structure for paradiplomacy in diaspora politics and the factors influencing this in Russia on the basis of the empirical study.

Diaspora politics between non-central units and federal level in 1993-2006

From the perspective of the non-central units’ diaspora politics the period since the collapse of the USSR until today can be divided into two logical parts: until 1999 – the period of active role of the Moscow City Government and some other Russian regions and since 2000 – the period restructuring of the administrative and legislative base for diaspora politics at the federal level. The representatives of the diaspora organizations and organizations working with diaspora whom I interviewed on this topic confirm that these two distinct periods exist.

Evgeni Tomberg, who has been co-operating with Russian institutions since 1993-1994, states that at the beginning, in 1994 the Moscow City Government was the only partner available for the Estonian organizations, “the only body offering help and assistance for diaspora living abroad”. In Tomberg’s opinion the federal level started dealing with compatriots issues in 1999 after the adoption of the Federal Law on Compatriots. As the member of the State Duma Compatriots’ Council Tomberg observed an intensive debate in Duma on the issues of compatriots’ politics, but as he comments “the discussions have not been accompanied by concrete actions or decisions.” Yadviga Yufereva continues the idea of Tomberg by stating that “the Moscow City Government preserved the good image of Russia in the relationships with compatriots.” As Yufereva remembers the period of 1998-1999, the federal level had resources but due to political instability and changes in the
Governmental Commission, these resources could not be allocated. The Moscow City Government’s administrative system was much more stable and for that reason efficient. Georgi Muradov thinks that in some periods before 1999 “Moscow has been the only organ capable of preserving continuity of work with diaspora.”

Vladimir Churov as the former representative of St Petersburg Government mentions that St Petersburg started its programmes for compatriots even earlier than it was done in Moscow (since 1993). Churov refers to the meeting with the representative of the Moscow City Government during which he introduced the experience of St Petersburg to Moscow.

The federal legislation base for diaspora politics has been formed since 1994 - the starting point for the diaspora politics in Russia, when the *Ukaz № 1681* was issued by the President Yeltsin (Muradov (ed.), 2004: 128). Kalinina (2005: 35-48) considers as an important step in federal policy the first Programme for the Support of Compatriots Abroad, adopted in May 1996. This Programme included the “classical” cultural, educational and economical measures for the support of the Russian diaspora, which can be found in the future programmes at the both federal and non-central units’ level. Kalinina took part in the development of the analogous second programme “Humanitarian Co-operation of the Russian Federation with States-members of the CIS and Baltic States in 1999-2000.” Kalinina testifies that the programme for 1999-2000 has not been implemented and the work with compatriots at the federal level stopped for certain period because of the winding up of the Ministry of CIS Affairs. This confirms the hypothesis expressed by Tomberg, Yufereva and Muradov about the lack of administrative capacity at the federal level.

The period since 2000 is characterized by the increasing role of the federal institutions in the diaspora politics. In 2001 the Conception on the protection of compatriots abroad was approved by the president Putin. In the same year president Putin participated in the First

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26 *In original: Программа мер по поддержке соотечественников за рубежом.*

27 *In original: Гуманитарное сотрудничество Российской Федерации с государствами-участниками СНГ и государствами Балтии на 1999-2000 годы.*
World Congress of Compatriots Abroad in Moscow and proclaimed the topic of compatriots being of vital importance for the Russian state (What Should a Russian Compatriot Know, 2004). Since 2001-2002 the Governmental Commission for the Issues of Compatriots Living Abroad is becoming more efficient in the allocation of funds earmarked for diaspora politics (Muradov (ed.), 2003: 354-357).

The Moscow City Government was also looking for a more structured and systematic approach to the diaspora politics. The first “Complex Goal-oriented Middle Term Programme for Support of the Compatriots abroad for the Years 2003-2005” was adopted by the Moscow City Government on the 12th July 2002. The second programme for the next period was approved in 2005. The interesting fact is that the analogous third federal programme “Main Directions for Support of the Russian Federation for Compatriots Abroad in 2002-2005” was approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on the 28th of November 2002 (approximately 4 months later than the programme of the Moscow City Government).30

In 2006 the Moscow City Government has been preparing to adopt the Moscow Law on the Participation of the Moscow City Government in the Implementation of State Compatriots’ Policy. This will be the first law adopted at the level of the subject of federation (Kaplun).

The allocations from the federal budget have been increasing since 2001, when the support amounted to 90 mln roubles. In 2005 the federal level’s budget for diaspora support was

28 In original: Комплексная целевая среднесрочная программа поддержки соотечественников за рубежом на 2003-2005 годы.
29 In original: Основные направления поддержки Российской Федерацией соотечественников за рубежом на 2002-2005 годы.
30 The main part of the “Main Directions…” does not differ in wording a lot from the Conception (approved in 2001), but compared with the Conception it includes the annexes with detailed description of measures and actions for the support of compatriots abroad with the mentioning of the responsible organs on the federal level (including, the MFA, Russian Centre for International Scientific and Cultural Co-operation (in Russian: Росарубежцентр), and Ministry of Finances etc).
already 302.4 mln roubles (Kalinina, 2005: 54). Despite this fact, on the press-conference on the 4th August 2004 (Materik, 15.08.2004) the representative of the Moscow City Government stated that the resources devoted by the Russian regions to the diaspora politics as a whole exceed the amount of money planned in the federal budget.

The federal centre pays since 2001 more attention to the capacity building of the diaspora politics. In 2003 the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was strengthened, as the post of the third deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Issues of Compatriots and Foreign Cultural Politics was established. In 2003-2004 there was a separate Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dealing with compatriots politics (Kalinina, 2005: 57-58).

In 2004, as Yuri Kaplun and Georgi Muradov state, the main problematic issue between the Moscow City Government and federal level in the diaspora politics was the adoption of the Law on Monetization of Social Benefits⁴¹. The case is relevant to the discussion on the opportunities of the Russian non-central units to participate in the diaspora politics. In August 2004, the series of amendments were made to the legislation concerning the organization of the non-central units in Russia and their spheres of responsibility. There has been as well an attempt to change the Federal Law on compatriots in order to deprive the non-central units from participation in the diaspora politics. After half a year of negotiations and lobby mainly from the Moscow City Government and with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some of the Members of the State Duma, the amendment was not approved and the non-central units preserved the right to deal with diaspora politics. Besides the Moscow City Government some other regions were also informed about the amendments and they sent their opinions to the “leaders” of the negotiations in Moscow (Materik, 15.08.2004).

⁴¹ According to the Law on Monetization of Social Benefits the social benefits in Russia were substituted with cash payments.
The Law on Monetization of Benefits – a technical mistake or an attempt to limit the role of non-central units in the diaspora politics?

The case of the adoption of the Law on Monetization of Social Benefits is considered by Georgi Muradov as “a mistake” and a situation when the technical problems dominate over the political decisions (Materik, 15.08.2004). The implementation of the social reform required the amendments to the large number of legislative acts and the redistribution of the functions between the central and regional authorities in Russia. The discussion of the Law caused the wave of protests and active debates in the society and in the State Duma. It is interesting to analyse the rhetoric and arguments of the debate between the non-central units and the government on these amendments.

Andrejeva (2004) claimed that the initiative for the amendment came from the side of the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance preferred to reduce the number of financial obligations taken by the subjects of federation - other than those of primary importance (such as education and social affairs). The main threat for the Ministry of Finance was that the poorest subjects of federation (“donors”) would distribute the financial means they receive from the central budget (as well as their own means) for the diaspora politics, at the same time neglecting the needs of the educational and social spheres. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not support the argumentation of the Ministry of Finance and the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance, in which he found that the amendments would throw into confusion the state diaspora politics.

According to observations of Andrejeva (2004) the central government was planning to limit the participation of the “economically weakest subjects of federation”. The authors of the amendments mentioned that it would be possible to conclude agreements between the central government and financially strong subjects of federation, which would delegate the authority to deal with diaspora questions to the subjects of federation.
The representatives of the Moscow City Government (as one of the most active participants in diaspora politics) stressed the need to continue the support of the diaspora from the budgets of non-central units and also the threat to the reputation of Russia on the international arena as a result of such amendments. The Moscow City Government worried mostly about the practical implementation of their plans and claimed that regions are the only actors effectively dealing with diaspora (Muradov).

The Member of the State Duma, Konstatin Zatulin, on the press-conference on August 4, 2004 (Materik, 15.08.2004) raised the question of the rights of ethnic regions to work with their diaspora abroad. This argument was not developed further during the discussion and the stress was made mostly on the obligations of Russia towards its compatriots.

The problematic touched upon in the case of the adoption of the Law on Monetization of Social Benefits confirms the hypothesis concerning the asymmetry of the Russian federalism economically and the importance of this factor in the opportunity structure for paradiplomacy. The active participation of the Moscow City Government in co-operation with some of the Members of the State Duma and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs testifies that the “more powerful” non-central governments have more influence on the decision-making process at the federal level in the questions of the diaspora politics.

The development of the administrative and legislative framework for the diaspora politics at the federal level and by the non-central units (mainly of the Moscow City Government), including the case of the Law on Monetization gives a ground for further analysis of the intergovernmental relations on different stages of the diaspora politics. I will come back to the role of the Moscow City Government in co-operation with compatriots in the following sections of the thesis.
4. METHODS OF ANALYSIS

In the present section, I would describe the methods of the conducted research, sampling, and methods of analysis of the qualitative data. The main method of the research is interviewing. Additionally, I referred to the context analysis of the articles, verbatim records of the meetings and press conferences.

4.1. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

My main research question is the following:

*What is the nature of the interrelations between the central government and non-central governments in foreign policy decision-making and implementation in Russia on the example of the Russian compatriots’ (diaspora) politics?*

The broader approach to the research question was selected because of the preliminary nature of the case-study and the need for descriptive empirical data. Each hypothesis presented below helps to describe the topics under consideration: firstly, the opportunities structure, secondly, the execution of paradiplomatic actions, thirdly, the nature of the paradiplomatic relations between central governments and non-central units and the level of the autonomy of non-central governments.

*H1: Notwithstanding the unified legislative basis there is no single paradiplomatic “opportunity structure” or institutional framework valid for all three cases under consideration.*
In the previous section the analysis of the official documents and regulations showed that the legislative base for the paradiplomatic actions in Russia is not sufficient enough to provide the uniformed opportunity structure for all non-central governments. The empirical research conducted in Russia should help to investigate the main compounds forming the opportunity structure in different regions and the preconditions for more active participation of certain regions in the diaspora politics implementation.

**H2: The paradiplomacy is executed mostly at the regional level (co-operating with diaspora organizations abroad and to some extent with the national governments of host countries).**

There are three levels that can be identified in diaspora politics; and the model of interrelations between the central and non-central governments differ in accordance with these levels. For example, if a non-central government participates in global paradiplomacy, the most probable result is a fragmented or centralized foreign policy model. At the intermediate level (involving bilateral relations with the host state) the most probable approaches are co-ordinated or also centralized models. On the regional (involving non-central units and diaspora organizations) the models can vary from co-ordinated, co-operative to parallel.

**H3: The spectre of the relationships between central and non-central institutions is diverse. The co-operative model of paradiplomacy in Russia is more probable for the non-central governments with more financial resources and corresponding human resources.**

The co-operative model is considered to be one of the most successful paradiplomacy models. Therefore, a special attention in this research is paid to the implementation of this model. I will try to identify preliminary, what are the factors which support the co-operation (partnership) between the non-central governments and central governments.
4.2. TWO CITIES AND AN OBLAST AS OBJECTS FOR THE CASE STUDY

Three cases have been selected for the research: Moscow City Government, St Petersburg City Government and Pskov Oblast.

The comparison of St Petersburg City, Pskov Oblasts and Moscow City can help to trace the differences in the relationships between central and local authorities in relation to the foreign-policy-making and implementation in the diaspora politics. The comparative approach enables to distinguish different roles of local governments in the foreign policy and the aspects influencing the formation of these roles.

Elimination of the ethnic units enables to narrow the field of research and to exclude the influence of the factors connected with the ethnical self-determination. All selected regions are located in the north-western part of the Russian Federation. They might have similar interests in respect to the compatriots living abroad. They have a similar status in the Russian Federation, but different financial bases and different levels of the involvement into the international relations.

Economically, Moscow is one of the most significant regions (in 2001 contributed app. 20\% of GDP (Pleines (ed.), 2005: 62-63)) and the Moscow City is independent of surrounding jurisdictions. It is a "city of federal significance," and it has the same status as the oblasts do. Moscow is considered to be the most important player in the relations with the compatriots living abroad. Pskov is not among the wealthiest in Russia. The level of Pskov Oblast’s involvement in the diaspora politics is not significant as well.

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32 The examples of the influence of ethnic factors could be found in such cases as the international relations of Tatarstan with Muslim-countries, Republics of Komi and Mari El with Finno-Ugric countries etc.
St Petersburg was on the third position among Russian regions in 2001 by the percentage of GDP (Pleines (ed.), 2005: 62). At the same time, its share of Russian GDP was only 3.5% (Moscow, as mentioned above, contributed 20%).

The reason for selecting Pskov region could be explained by its geographical location, it is a border region that has a potential to be involved into the cross-border co-operation. The border regions in Russia are considered to be important as mediators and negotiators with foreign partners and groups. (Makarychev, 1999). This can be an important aspect while investigating the involvement of Pskov region in the foreign relations.

Above-mentioned factors should be supplemented by the detailed analysis of the regions’ paradiplomatic activities (such as budget, strategic plans and political decisions). This information was collected through the interviews in the institutions of the regions and from the open-to-public official websites.

**4.3. INTERVIEWS AND ADDITIONAL MATERIALS**

The reasons for selecting qualitative semi-structured interview method of data collection is that it allows to follow a prepared interview questionnaire, and at the same time, to react on the emerging issues during the interview.

The research topic involves different spheres of political science and public administration. Semi-structured interview concentrates on each respondent’s sphere of interests and understanding of the problem. There are two main target groups of this research: representatives of the non-central governments and the central government. For them the structure and logics of the interview were accordingly different.
This case study is quite delicate and requires the establishment of trustful relations between the interviewer and respondent. That is why I decided to meet the respondents in person. According to Daymon and Holloway (2002), in the semi-structured interview, the sequencing of questions is not the same for every respondent as it depends on the process of each interview.

During the interviews, I followed the above-mentioned logic of the semi-structured interviews for the representatives of the non-central governments. Each interview was divided into four parts:

- **Introduction and general description of the case (legislation, statistics, brief history or the role of the respondent in paradiplomacy in general and diaspora politics in particular);**

- **Role of non-central governments in foreign policy. Why is the participation of non-central governments important/ not important or beneficial for the region and for Russian foreign policy?**

This block of questions helped to identify the attitudes of the respondents to paradiplomacy in general and to find out whether the respondent supported the idea of involvement of non-central government in the foreign-policy-making. One of the most interesting questions is

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33 Which is quite a problematic taking into consideration the bilateral relations between Russia and Estonia. The public opinion in Russia in respect of Estonia is not positive as well. According to the research conducted by Levada centre in Russia, Estonia belongs to the five countries, which are considered by Russians as enemies (Levada Centre, 05.06.2006).

34 See the questionnaire in the Annex 2
whether the respondent associates the paradiplomatic activities with the development of democracy in Russia and his/her region.

- **Opportunity structure for participation in diaspora politics. Opportunities, limitations, threats. International and domestic factors.**

The questions in this block allowed identifying the main factors that form the opportunity structure and also the attitudes towards the opportunity structure for participation in the diaspora politics.

- **Models of relationships with central government in correspondence to the levels of diaspora politics.**

In the questions concerning the interrelations with the central government I tried to collect both factual material and information on subjective attitudes. I paid special attention to the “rhetoric” (terminology, adjectives in descriptions etc) used by respondents, when they described the relationships with the central government’s institutions.

For the representatives of the central government I used the following logic for the interviews:

- **Introduction and general description of the case (legislation, statistics, brief history or the role of the respondent diaspora politics in particular);**

- **Role of non-central governments in foreign policy at general level. Why is the participation of non-central governments important/not important or beneficial/not beneficial for the region and for Russian foreign policy?**

- **Opportunity structure for non-central governments to participate in diaspora politics. Opportunities, limitations, threats. International and domestic factors.**

- **Models of relationships with non-central governments in relation to the levels of diaspora politics.**

During the context analysis of the articles and verbatim records, I took into consideration the following aspects:
• the arguments and points of view presented in the articles or on press-conference;
• factual material cited in the documents.

In the analysis, I made a difference between four categories of information: background information, behaviour/experience, knowledge and opinion/value (Patton 1990: 291-293).

4.4. SAMPLING

To guarantee the validity of the research the main criteria for sampling is the experience a respondent has regarding the research problem (Lindlof 1995: 125). The interviews covered the historical perspective starting from the 1993.

I tried to ensure that representatives of almost all institutions of central government and non-central governments involved in diaspora politics or in the case of non-central governments international relations are presented35.

I succeeded to interview 14 people, of whom three people represented the federal level (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Commission and State Duma). One person from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked not to record our conversation and I had an informal discussion with him. I also questioned three representatives of the non-government sector, who have a long-term experience of working with both non-central government and federal level on the implementation of the projects for diaspora. Two persons are from the Estonian organizations and one from a Russian newspaper. This allowed me to get an insight from the clients or partners of the non-central government and federal level organizations. The rest of the respondents are from the non-central governments, the majority representing the Moscow City Government at different levels, and three persons – Pskov and St Petersburg. The

35 See previous sections for the description of the structure of diaspora politics formulation and implementation in Russia at different levels.
reason for domination of Moscow City Government public officials lies in the multi-level structure of the diaspora politics implementation in Moscow. In Pskov Oblast Council and St Petersburg there exists one department or division which deals with the diaspora politics. In Moscow City Government there are at least three administrative levels: the International Relations Department, the House of Compatriots and several foundations (I met the representative of the Yury Dolgoruki Foundation).

One of the peculiarities of selected respondents I discovered during the interviews is the interconnectivity of the roles of the respondents. Some of the public officials in the Moscow City Government have had the experience of working for federal institutions. For example, the Director of the Moscow House of Compatriots has been working for a long time in the field of compatriots’ politics for the Ministry of Nationalities. The Member of State Duma and Deputy Chairman of the Committee for CIS affairs and relations with compatriots is at the same time the member of the Government Council and has been the head of the International Relations Department of St Petersburg administration (being responsible for diaspora politics implementation). On the one hand the interconnections of the roles of some respondents give a broader overview on the questions, on the other hand – it makes it difficult sometimes to distinguish the institutional belonging/ institutional identity of a respondent. Due to this peculiarity the respondents were mostly in the position of experts during the interviews. Some of the respondents were also familiar with the academic publications on this topic. In some of the interviews the background information was dominating, some interviews were valuable because of the knowledge and facts. Opinion and value judgements were represented in almost every interview. Sometimes, the respondents referred to the opinions of other people active in diaspora politics.

Almost all interviews (except for the representatives of the Estonian NGOs) were made in the Russian Federation from July 15 to August 31. All the interviews, except for one, were recorded and transcription was made in order to get empirical material for the analysis.
5. **RESEARCH RESULTS**

Analysis of the interviews conducted in Russia with the experts at federal and non-central regions´ level do not give the final answers to the research question, but allows one to pose more hypotheses and to create topics for further discussions both at political and academic level. It gives a chance to better understanding of the Russian policy-making and policy implementation process. The diaspora politics attracts attention in the context of the bilateral relations between Russia and host states and in the context of global international relations, i.e. Russia and the EU. On the background of the typical *Kremlinological studies*, the analysis of diaspora politics from the perspective of non-central government with the accent on the relations between federal centre and subjects of federation could be of interest both to the scholars and policy-makers in the countries with large Russian diaspora.

I proceed with the analysis of the opportunity structure for paradiplomatic actions, factors influencing the opportunity structure and the models of paradiplomacy in the diaspora politics.

**5.1. QUOD LICET IOVI NON LICET BOVI: OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE**

The discussion of the types of paradiplomacy in respect to the intergovernmental relations in Russia in the diaspora politics should be started with the opportunity structure of the subjects of federation for participation in the diaspora politics. There are four main aspects that have been mentioned during the interviews as important for the opportunity structure: at the domestic level - the financial resources, human resources and political factor; at the external level - the lobby of the compatriots’ organizations abroad.
Financing the diaspora politics

Almost all the respondents mentioned the financial resources as the main factor in the opportunity structure for paradiplomacy. Evgeni Tomberg (Deputy Mayor of the City of Tallinn in 1993-1994; member of the Estonian NGO working with Russia in the framework of the Russian diaspora support programmes) referring to the opportunity structure states that “in 1993-1994, when we started co-operation, we did not know any other budgetary source or concrete assistance in solving our problems besides the Moscow City Government.” When speaking about the participation of other subjects of federation in co-operation with Estonian compatriots Tomberg concludes “without resources it is not possible to co-operate and offer assistance.” The same conclusion is made by Marina Tee.

The representatives of the structures working with compatriots in the Moscow City Government (Sanin, Muradov, Sorokin) find that the strength of Moscow is in its budgetary opportunities. Giving comments on other regions’ activities in the diaspora politics Oleg Sanin states that both Pskov and St Petersburg do not have sufficient financial means for co-operation with compatriots abroad. The representatives of Pskov Oblast also find that the main problem for them is the lack of financial resources. The general tendency is that the subjects of federation do not have special funds allocated in their budgets to the work with compatriots. Usually with the exception of Moscow, St Petersburg and few other regions, the events for compatriots are carried out in the framework of the cultural or educational programmes (Muradov (ed.), 2004: 178).

One interesting observation is made by Oleg Sanin in respect to the competition for resources between Pskov Oblast, Moscow and St Petersburg. Sanin states that the aim of the Pskov Oblast is to attract the foreign investments (as opposed to Moscow with its humanitarian and in some sense altruistic mission). St Petersburg in his opinion is also trying to increase the
budgetary base on the expenses of Moscow (not only in the compatriots’ affairs, but also in other spheres).

The representatives of Pskov Oblast Administration confirm the fact of competition for resources. As it turns to be from the interviews conducted in Pskov, the Pskov Oblast applied for grants to finance the projects for compatriots from the Soros Foundation and from the federal budget via the Government Commission for the Issues of Compatriots Living Abroad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Moscow House of Compatriots also allocates the finances to Pskov Oblast for the organization of summer camps for children of compatriots (Malahova, Fomicheva).

As a result, the system of financing of activities for diaspora is complicated. The Moscow City Government is alongside the federal structures a donor, which supports the projects for compatriots not only outside Russia, but also allocates means to the organizations in other subjects of federation (for organization of summer camps, retraining of teachers and etc). The position of Pskov Oblast (as dotational region) in relation to the diaspora politics is more about implementation of political decisions, not about formulation of policy in accordance with its interests and political priorities.

The aspect of financing is connected closely to the human resources and competences of public officials working for the non-central governments.

**Human resources**

The majority of experts working for the structures of the Moscow City Government have an experience in diplomatic service or have worked for the Ministry of Nationalities’ Affairs/Ministry of CIS Affairs; particularly in its Department of Work with Compatriots. After winding up of the Ministry of Nationalities’ Affairs/Ministry of CIS Affairs a lot of experts were invited by the Moscow City Government (like for example the Head of Moscow House of Compatriots Yuri Kaplun). Tatyana Komarova speaking about the recently formed
Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which deals with the diaspora politics, mentions that the MFA “as political structure” does not have competencies for working with tenders and humanitarian programmes and for the organization of co-operation with the Ministry of Finances etc. The MFA widely uses the experience of the Moscow City Government both in the decision-making and implementation of the diaspora politics. In the Reference Book for Russian Compatriot it is stated that the MFA involves the Moscow City Government as “expert” in the field of the diaspora politics during the seminars meant for other subjects of federations on the topic of protection of compatriots abroad (Muradov (ed.), 2004: 177-178).

Oleg Sanin explaining the problematic of Pskov Oblasts’s participation in diaspora politics states that Pskov “does not have competencies, knowledge and experience in the topic of diaspora.” Vladimir Churov also mentions the lack of specialists in Pskov and the lack of knowledge on project writing and presentation.

Natalja Malahova explaining the weak position of Pskov in the diaspora politics refers to the lack of knowledge on the processes of distribution of financial means for diaspora projects. In Malahova’s opinion the office of the MFA in Pskov should be more active in lobbying the region and helping them with applications for grants and tenders at the federal level. The personal ties and informal relations are important for receiving the financial support both from the Moscow City Government budget and from the federal level. This coincides with the theory of Makarychev (1999) on the mechanisms of decision-making in paradiplomacy in Russia. As Makarychev suggests, the opportunities of non-central government to participate in the diaspora politics depend on the political figures involved into the process. Yadviga Yufereva, who works with diaspora on the voluntary basis, also confirms the importance of personal ties: “I do not have problems with fund-raising. I am in friendly relations with people I am working with.”

Vladimir Churov (as the ex-Head of the International Relations Department in St Petersburg Government) and Georgi Muradov (the Head of the International Relations Department in
the Moscow City Government) are the ex and actual members of the Governmental Commission for the Issues of Compatriots Living Abroad. They both confirm that there is an opportunity for Moscow and St Petersburg to participate in the decision-making process at the federal level. They also state that the most important factor for St Petersburg and Moscow is the political will of the cities’ mayors to deal with this question.

Political factors in the opportunity structure

Human resources and available budgetary means are not the only precondition for the paradiplomatic actions in the field of diaspora politics. In the table below I present the data on the budgets of the regions for the international co-operation and for the co-operation with compatriots.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject of federation</th>
<th>Budget for the year 2005 or 2006 (roubles)</th>
<th>Budget for international co-operation (roubles)</th>
<th>Budget for co-operation with compatriots (roubles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moscow City Government (Moscow City Government (2006); Budget for 2006)</td>
<td>561 186 826 000</td>
<td>283 743 000 (incl. compatriots) – international relations and international co-operation</td>
<td>199 653 000 – realization of Programme for support of compatriots abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of St Petersburg (Government of St Petersburg (16.11.2005); Budget for 2006)</td>
<td>173 037 000 000</td>
<td>49 836 700 – international co-operation</td>
<td>3 000 000 – organization of events for realization of state policy on the compatriots abroad and scholarships for 15 students-compatriots from</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3. Allocations on diaspora politics measures in the budgets of Moscow, St Petersburg and Pskov oblast.

As the table shows, 2/3 of the resources allocated by the Moscow City Government to international co-operation are earmarked for the diaspora support programme. In St Petersburg only approximately 6% of the funds for international co-operation are dedicated for diaspora policies. The respondents speaking about such an active role of the Moscow City Government in the diaspora politics mention the political decision of the Mayor of Moscow Luzhkov as the foundation for the Moscow diaspora programmes. The budget of the Moscow City Government to the diaspora support programmes testifies the high level of priority of these programmes on both political and administrative levels.

One of the arguments for Luzhkov’s decision is the “special role of Moscow in the uniting of Russian lands in XIV century”. Oleg Sanin stressed the feeling of responsibility of Moscow Mayor for the fates of compatriots in the time, when the “Kremlin did not do nothing”. The Moscow leaders had to think for all the Russia and also take care of diaspora as well. Yuri Kaplun speaks about “moral responsibility” of Moscow to offer help to the compatriots. The Head of the International Relations Department Muradov mentions the domestic issues as the reason for dealing with diaspora. According to his propositions every second Moscow inhabitant has relatives or friends abroad. This makes the topic of compatriots attractive for
politicians. Muradov also mentions the “personal attitudes and affiliation” of the Mayor Luzhkov to the problems of diaspora.

Interesting hypothesis could be made from a short analysis of the verbatim records of the meetings organized by the Moscow City Government for the discussion of the Programme for the Support of Compatriots Abroad.

Sarmanova, the head of the Kazakhstan Association of Teachers of Russian Schools (Moscow City Government, 2002: 31) finds in her speech at the meeting of April 24, 2002 in the Moscow City Government with the leaders of non-governmental organizations of CIS and Baltic states that the Kazakhstan Ministry of Education and departments are not interested in the support of the Russian Government of the Russian-speaking population in Kazakhstan. At the same time, Sarmanova finds that the attitude of the Almaty department towards Moscow is different due to the reputation of the Mayor Luzhkov. “The department of Education of Almaty is interested in the co-operation with the Moscow Committee of Education.” Mitrofanova hints at the same aspect in the interview: “…All the statements (activities) of the Administration of President or Government are judged at high political level, when the region is doing this (diaspora politics) along the same line as the state does (in accordance with state policy); there is a special aspect…” Mitrofanova does not explain what the advantage of the regions in co-operating with diaspora is. In my opinion, the regional paradiplomatic activities give a chance to escape the attention of the host countries to the projects implemented at the diaspora-home-state level (like Moscow-Almaty or Moscow-Tallinn). This partly explains the positive attitude of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the activism of the Moscow City Government in the diaspora politics (and the support of the Ministry to the Moscow City Government during the debate on the Law of Monetization of Benefits).
External factors - stimulating the paradiplomacy

As mentioned previously in the text, the Moscow City Government in 2002 invited compatriots and other interest groups to the meetings discussing the Moscow Programme for support of compatriots. Moscow City Government was experiencing a certain pressure from these groups to continue its support. The role of the compatriots’ organizations was to make proposals and introduce the situation in their regions, at the same time critically approaching the problems with the realization of diaspora politics at the federal level. The representatives of the Moscow City Government had to reply to the challenges explaining how the programme took into consideration the peculiarities of different host countries. So the image of Moscow as the “locomotive” was formed not only through the positioning of Moscow itself but also confirmed frequently by the compatriots’ organizations abroad. As it is seen from the speech of Bushmarinov – representative of the President’s Administration (Moscow City Government, 2002: 28-29) at the meeting of Moscow City Government with the compatriots’ organizations on April 24, 2002, this fact was acknowledged also at federal level.

According to the interviews (Tomberg, Tee) the activism of the Moscow City Government in the diaspora politics is prompted also by the activity of the diaspora organizations. Diaspora organizations are looking forward to receiving support from the Moscow City Government. As Marina Tee has observed sometimes there is a competition among the diaspora organizations for the resources the Moscow City Government allocates. As Oleg Sanin and Viktor Karpenko state, Estonia receives considerably much more support than other countries of near abroad because of the lobby of the Estonian organizations. Marina Tee criticizes the Moscow City Government for concentrating on working with individuals without establishing of the concrete “rules of a game” (for example in the system of grants or scholarships).
Conclusion

Referring to the functional definition of paradiplomacy of Soldatos (1990: 35) and based on the analysis of the opportunity structure made in this chapter only the Moscow City Government and partly the Government of St Petersburg have opportunities not only to deal with implementation of the state policy but also to participate actively in the decision-making process at the federal level. Paradiplomacy is not about delegating or contracting-out of policy implementation from central government to the non-central units. In this respect the position of Pskov Oblast is close to only implementation of the projects and Pskov (and possibly other “dotational” regions interested in co-operation with diaspora) is involved in the competition for the resources of both the Moscow City Government and the federal structures. It can be said that St Petersburg executes paradiplomacy, because the representative of St Petersburg administration is invited to participate in the work of the Governmental Commission and also due to the fact that St Petersburg has its own resources for the diaspora politics (for the year 2006 – 3 000 000 roubles).

The case of participation of the Russian non-central units in the diaspora politics shows that just as in other countries, the issues of foreign policy are more and more domesticated. The dynamics of participation of the non-central unions in diaspora issues are complex and depend firstly on the financial opportunities. The situation is similar, for example, to the United States, where the disproportion in financial term between the states is also quite significant and influences the behaviour of states on the international arena (Fry 1998: 43-45). In the period from 1994 till 2000/2001 due to the financial capabilities and political will of Mayor Luzhkov, the Moscow City Government had a rather atypical role for non-central government of the “unifier (sobiratelj) of the Russian lands”, accepting the responsibility for the Russian diaspora. The federal structures acknowledge the importance of the Luzhkov’s initiatives and this creates for the present period quite a diverse pattern of intergovernmental relations, which will be broadly considered in the following chapter of the analysis. Before proceeding to the analysis of intergovernmental relations in Russia in the context of diaspora
politics it is important to estimate the levels at which the non-central units are operating in
the diaspora politics.

5.2. FROM GLOBAL TO LOCAL LEVEL IN THE DIASPORA POLITICS

The Moscow Mayor’s initiatives in Crimea show a high level of independence obtained
during Yeltsin’s period, which became possible due to the prosperity of Moscow. So at this
time, Moscow operated at the level of the global international diaspora politics,
simultaneously developing the bilateral Moscow-Crimea relations (according to Tomberg
also Tallinn-Moscow relations) and establishing contacts with the diaspora organizations in
Crimea and in some other CIS and Baltic states.

St Petersburg according to Churov since 1993 tried to concentrate on the contacts with
compatriots’ organizations abroad, focusing on the Baltic States and Finland due to limited
financial resources.

Pskov Oblast as a border region preserved some personal contacts with educational
institutions in the Baltic States (also due to the friendship ties between public officials in
Pskov Oblast administration and in ministries and local governments in Baltic States).

The activism of the Moscow City Government as a result of the reforms of president Putin in
2000 and 2004-2005 (Pleines (ed.), 2005: 9) switched more to the relations with diaspora
groups abroad. On the present stage the Moscow City Government is dealing mainly with
project-based activities, supporting the diaspora organizations. At the same time, Moscow
still tries to be active on the global arena via the support to Global Russian Compatriots’
Organization (Mezhdunarodnyj Sovet Rossijskih Sootechestvennikov). Muradov claims that
the strategic goal of establishing the organization, being his both personal and professional
priority, is to make it as powerful in the world as the Jewish Congress. The Moscow City
Governments’ participation in the diaspora politics could be presented in historical
perspective as a way from the autonomous policy-making process and participation on the global arena to the project-based activities within the general framework of the state compatriots’ politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I Vacuum in responsibility</th>
<th>II MG as a „kick-starter“</th>
<th>III Going local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in the diaspora politics.</td>
<td>MG activity stimulates</td>
<td>More active role of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow City Government (MG)</td>
<td>the corresponding</td>
<td>MFA in coordination of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accepts the challenge</td>
<td>activity of the Federal</td>
<td>international activities of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and starts its own</td>
<td>Government (FG). FG</td>
<td>regions. MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>programmes.</td>
<td>had to react on the</td>
<td>concentrates on the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>provocative activism of</td>
<td>relations with diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luzhkov.</td>
<td>organizations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4: Moscow paradiplomatic activities stage by stage in 1994 – 2006**

The figure above is aimed to summarize the stages in the transition form the global to more localized activities of the Moscow City Government. The interesting fact is that the actors at the federal level “appreciate” the past actions of the Moscow City Government in Crimea (Mitrofanova).

The analysis of the wording of official documents gives further evidence of the changes in the level of activities of the Moscow City Government happened during the reforms of Putin starting from 2000. In the Order N 557/1-PM On the Founding of Scholarship of the Mayor of Moscow (signed by Luzhkov on the 4th December 1996) and in the analogous Order N 154-PM of the 1st March 1999 the scholarship schemes for the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian compatriots are established in the “framework of the programme for support of compatriots” (without concrete naming of the “programme” and without references to the state diaspora politics). Already in the Decree N844-IIII of the Moscow City Government of the 18th September 2001 “On Main Directions of Support of the Compatriots Abroad” there are references to the main federal level legislation acts (such as the Law of 1999 and *Ukaz* of
the President of 1994, *Ukaz* of the President of 1995 and the Decree of the Government of 1995). In the same text it is stated that the Moscow City Government implements the diaspora politics in a close co-operation with the federal organs of the Russian Federation (including the Governmental Commission, the MFA, other ministries, the Embassies of Russia abroad and respective committees in Duma etc). In the Complex Goal-oriented Middle Term Programme for Support of the Compatriots abroad for the years 2003-2005 it is stated that the programme determines the role of the Moscow City Government as a subject of federation in the implementation of measures for support of compatriots abroad. This confirms the proposition on the changing levels of activism of the Moscow City Government in the framework of the centralization of power initiated by Putin.

In the legal texts of St Petersburg’s administration there are also references to the Federal Law of 1999, the Conception of 2001 and other legal acts of the Russian Federation regulating this sphere (St Petersburg Government, 2006 I and 2006 II). On the official web site of the Pskov Oblast one can find the mentioning of the “coordinating role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” in the diaspora politics. Unfortunately I did not get access to the documents of St Petersburg and Pskov Oblast administrations for the period before 2000, making it difficult to make comparisons with the Moscow City Government’s early legal acts.

Both St Petersburg and Pskov representatives mention the intention to work not only with the diaspora organizations abroad, but also with the governmental level of the host countries. Pskov Oblast is interested in the direct relations with the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, for example. Churov asserts that St Petersburg is already co-operating with the governmental structures in Estonia. Pskov Oblast would prefer working with governmental level because of striving for stability in co-operation (“we cannot have long-term strategic plan with NGOs in Estonia” … “we do not want to depend on fancy of the leaders of NGOs in Baltic States” (Fomicheva)). Pskov Oblast cannot due to financial limitations compete with St Petersburg in the field of the retraining of teachers and as Fomicheva and Malahova say they cannot compete either with the Estonian higher education institutions offering the
retraining courses for Russian-speaking teachers. For this reason they are looking for long-term partnerships at the governmental level.

To sum up, non-central governments execute most of their diaspora politics at the level of bilateral relations with diaspora organizations. At the same time there is an interest towards co-operation with the governmental organizations in host-states. The Moscow City Government already has bilateral agreements with the Crimea region in Ukraine. In the case of Estonia (and possibly other Baltic States) St Petersburg and Pskov are interested in the co-operation at the ministerial level. At the global level and in relations with the host-state the federal centre has the co-ordinating role, which is acknowledged also by the non-central units in their documents.

5.3. MODELS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE DIASPORA POLITICS: THE CASES OF MOSCOW, ST PETERSBURG AND PSKOV OBLAST

Coming back to the Figure 2, it is obvious that in the context of the opportunity structure described above and the existing legislation the fragmented and centralized models of the intergovernmental relations are not probable for the Russian regions under investigation. There is evidence of parallel/fragmented paradiplomacy before the Putin period. The Moscow City Government substituted the central level in the Sebastopol case. As the first reaction the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entered into a confrontational relationship with the Moscow City Government. Subsequently the federal level even accepted and to some extent appreciated Moscow’s activities.

Moscow City Government presents the most diverse picture of the intergovernmental relations in sense of different roles and models (co-ordinated, co-operative, competitive and even parallel). A good illustration of the formation of the intergovernmental relations and the role the diaspora organizations in this process is the brief content analysis of the verbatim
records of the meetings and forums of the Moscow City Government on the development of the Complex Programme for Protection of Compatriot abroad for the years 2003-2005. First of all, it is interesting to follow, how Moscow City Government sees its role in the compatriots’ politics. Secondly, it is relevant to follow the position of the compatriots’ organizations invited to the meetings and the point of view of the representatives of the federal level on the role of Moscow in diaspora politics.

The Moscow City Government would prefer preserving the exclusive leading position among the subjects of federation in the diaspora politics and at the practical level of implementation of diaspora politics to propose best practices even to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Georgi Muradov in the opening speech (Moscow City Government, 2002: 8) for the meeting on April 24, 2002 confirms that the participation of federal level in the debates over the Moscow Complex Programme is “indispensable”; the work of the Moscow City Government takes place in the framework of the general policy and “it is not possible to divide the line (policy) of the Russian Federation and Moscow” (Moscow City Government, 2002: 56). Further in the speech Muradov (Moscow City Government, 2002: 8) uses the metaphor of “locomotive” and stresses the “special role of Moscow as a capital” in the relations with diaspora. Skrinnik (the Head of the Foundation “Rossiyane”, one of the foundations established and financed by the Moscow City Government) finds that the Programme under discussion is “a good landmark in the forming of the analogous programme at the federal level” (2002: 70-72).

At the federal level (State Duma, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidents’ Administration) there are different attitudes towards the “exclusive” position of the Moscow City Government in the diaspora politics.

At the practical level, Zatulin (the Member of the State Duma and long-term co-operation partner of the Moscow City Government) proposes to consider the Programme of Moscow as “a model” due to the fact that the federal programme has not been adopted yet.
The representative of the Presidents’ Administration Bushmarinov (Moscow City Government, 2002: 28) formulates the attitude of the President’s Administration towards the activities of the Moscow City Governments:

- acknowledges the fact that Moscow “is associating” with the compatriots by creating “one house of compatriots” and acknowledges the importance of Moscow amongst other regions of Russia in the diaspora politics;
- stresses the long-term discussions taking place at the federal level and at the same time the existence of some problems at the level of realization of diaspora politics;
- finds that the Programme is in harmony with the directions put by the Federal Centre and the President’s Administration.

Gusev (2002: 63-64), the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, recognizes the importance of the Moscow Programme for support of compatriots abroad and says that this has a “nation-wide significance” (2002: 63). Gusev confirms that there are different actors working with compatriots and the aim of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to make this work more coordinated. For that purpose the Ministry is discussing possibilities to establish a consultative body for the representatives of the Russian regions working with compatriots. Gusev proposes Moscow to take initiative in this work and to share the experience with other interested regions.

The position of the federal centre towards the initiative of Moscow can be formulated briefly as appreciation to what is going to be done and at the same time as a wish to show that the coordination of the diaspora politics is taking place at the federal level. The Moscow City Government accepts the coordinating role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but tries to stress, with the support from the federal centre, its unique position (of “locomotive”) among other regions.

This analysis serves as an illustration to the interactions between the Moscow City Government and the federal level institutions in the diaspora politics at the level of bilateral
relations with diaspora organizations abroad. The interviewees indicated as well that there is no single model of intergovernmental relations between the federal centre and Moscow City Government.

Co-ordination/ co-operation. The Moscow City Government is supporting projects abroad. The Moscow City Government does not have representations in the majority of countries Moscow is working with. For that reason the Moscow City Government is looking for the co-operation with the federal structures in these countries. For example, the Roszarubezhcentr and the Moscow City Government concluded a co-operation agreement, according to which the parties can mutually use the premises of the foreign offices for the projects they are implementing (Mitrofanova).

The Yuri Dolgoruki Foundation’s representative also values the expert opinion and information provided to the Foundation by the embassies and Roszarubezhcentr. The obligatory part of the application documents that should be submitted to the Foundation by the diaspora organizations is a letter from of support from any Russian state institution functioning on the territory of the host country. Oleg Sanin affirms that the decision on the financing of the projects is taken exclusively by the Foundation. Sanin adds that sometimes the “system is centralized, for example, in Estonia only the ambassador has a right to sign a letter of support”. In my opinion this gives a chance to the Embassy to control the diaspora organizations’ co-operation with the Foundation via putting a veto on a project. For the application for a project grant through the Governmental Commission it is “preferable to provide the application forms with the letter of recommendation-support from the Embassy of the Russian Federation” (Muradov (ed.), 2004: 530).

There are the cases when the Moscow City Government and the federal level are working on one project jointly. For example, the Moscow City Government pays for the treatment of compatriots in the best hospitals of Moscow and the Governmental Commission supports the health improvement of the treated persons after the treatment (Kaplun). When comparing the measures fixed in the Moscow and the federal programmes for support of compatriots
abroad, Kaplun also states that some of the measures coincide, and some differ slightly by target groups or regions. In case the measures coincide, the Moscow City Government and the federal organizations exchange information on the supported projects or planned actions and co-ordinate their activities in order not to duplicate the efforts.

Parallel/“locomotive role”. The Moscow City Government preserves the role of the “locomotive” in at least two spheres. First of all, the Moscow City Government is working with the far abroad countries. The federal level is only starting exploring this dimension, as the federal programme is currently intended only for the CIS and Baltic States (Muradov, Sorokin). Sanin informs that in 2007 it is planned to open the branch of the Yuri Dolgoruki Foundation in New-York (in order to strengthen the diaspora politics in the USA). At the same time Sorokin states that “the Moscow City Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinate the efforts and Moscow pays more attention to other foreign countries and the Ministry to the CIS and the Baltic States”. This in some way evidences the co-operation between Moscow and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The second project the Moscow City Government is actively working on is the aid to the establishment of the international organization of compatriots (which should be as powerful as, for example, the Jewish Congress) (Muradov). These two directions are autonomously or partly autonomously led by the Moscow City Government with the acknowledgement and approval at the federal level.

From the interviews and analysis of the documents I did not find any traces of competition or fragmentation in diaspora politics because of Moscow’s activities. The keywords describing the intergovernmental relations are “co-ordination” and “co-operation”. In only two spheres the Moscow City Government is in a role of a “locomotive”, but there is no competition with the central government in that. Thus, in the policy-making process the model of the intergovernmental relations is closer to the co-ordination model, and includes some elements of centralization, since the formulation of the directions in the global foreign policy is fully in the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the implementation of diaspora politics
and diaspora politics at the level of co-operation with diaspora organizations, there is a mutual co-operation between the equal partners close to the “networking model”.

The intergovernmental relations between St Petersburg and the federal structures are not as intensive as in the case of Moscow. St Petersburg does not allocate a lot of resources for the work with compatriots and it work focuses only on certain countries (Churov). Like the Moscow City Government St Petersburg pays attention to some countries of the far abroad like France, Israel and Canada. With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is a co-ordinated or co-operative approach – an exchange of information and consultations with the Ministry (Churov). Churov testifies that “at the federal level there is a fight for grants…” St Petersburg due to its own financing is much more independent compared to Pskov without its own budget for the diaspora politics. St Petersburg is also one of three regions that have representation in the Governmental Commission. Due to this fact St Petersburg’s relations with the centre are more of the co-ordinated and co-operative nature.

Pskov Oblast as a region with limited resources has some interactions with the federal centre and also with the Moscow City Government. Pskov Oblast participates in the competition for tenders organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Malahova, Fomicheva). Pskov Oblast would like to attract more resources via participation in the diaspora politics as a subcontractor. The Oblast is interested in more active position of the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pskov. The Pskov Oblast is looking forward to receiving help in the applications for grants and tenders for retraining of teachers from the Baltic States. There is a sign of competition with other border regions such as St Petersburg for the co-operation ties with Estonia, for example, and for the resources available at the federal level and through the Moscow City Government.

The diaspora politics mirrors, in my opinion, the general political discourse on the regionalization in Russia. The absence of one single model of intergovernmental relations could be explained by the unstable political situation in Russia and constant changes (“horse-trading”) on the axis of centralization-decentralization.
The second factor influencing the intergovernmental relations in diaspora politics is the existence of contacts, agreements etc established by the Russian regions with diaspora organizations and host states during the Yeltsin period and the lack of experience and competence of practical work with diaspora at the federal level (the diaspora organizations are used to working with Moscow or St. Petersburg or Pskov). On the one hand the Russian federal centre is trying to increase its co-ordinating role; but it has still to rely on the experience of the regions in this work.

The global diaspora politics remains at the rhetorical level (except for the topic of the “world organization of the Russian compatriots”) in the sphere of responsibility of the MFA. At the same time, the bilateral relations and the relations with compatriots’ organizations and to some extent with host states in the context of the diaspora politics are in the dual responsibility of the non-central units and federal level. The “rules of the game” are not yet stable and there are cases in the intergovernmental relations that are more of co-ordinated, co-operative or sometimes parallel nature. In my opinion the Moscow City Government is trying to achieve the co-operative pattern of relations within diaspora politics with elements of “locomotive role” (i.e. in the relations with far abroad diaspora). The federal level is looking for more co-ordinated approach with opportunity to form the institutional framework for the participation of the non-central units in the decision-making and implementation of diaspora politics.
6. Discussion: Involvement of Russian Regions in Diaspora Politics

Following the suggestion of De Spiegeleire (2000: 296) on the advantages of the comparison of the regionalization in the US and Russia, I decided to choose the analysis of the expanding role of state and local government in the US foreign affairs conducted by Earl H. Fry (1990, 1998) as basis for the discussion on the development of the Russian paradiplomacy.

Fry (1998) mentions different spheres of international activism of the US states. The primary motivation for the non-central governments for development of the international relations lies in the competition both at the local level and international arena for leading position in the international trade, attraction of international direct investments, search for tourists, new markets for goods and services and etc (Fry, 1990: 279). At the same time Fry (1998: 91-91) finds that there are worrisome “foreign policies” of state and local governments, when they intervene at the level of global politics.

The case of the Moscow City Government is unique also in the world perspective. During the Yeltsin times the rationales for the participation in the diaspora politics were connected more with global political and humanitarian ideas, and less with the economical purposes typical for the states of the United States and other active regions on the world arena. The paradiplomatic activities of the Russian regions have implications for the foreign policy of Russia, not only at the level of bilateral relations with the diaspora organizations but also at the level of global politics.

The thesis tried to follow the dynamics in the development of paradiplomatic activities of the Russian regions. There is a difference in the motivation for paradiplomacy between Moscow (as “locomotive” for diaspora politics with special status and partnership with the federal
level) and other regions, who are looking more for the economically beneficial co-operation. There has been a period in the intergovernmental relations, when the regions had to assert their right for participation in the diaspora politics and the Moscow City Government had to confirm its leading position in the diaspora relations.

One of the most interesting aspects of Russian diaspora politics is the existence of multilayer intergovernmental relations. Pskov Oblast is a subcontractor of the Moscow City Government and is at the same time competing for resources at the federal level with St Petersburg. The Moscow City Government is stressing in all the documents and speeches the solidarity with the federal level’s political priorities and at the same time is the leader in the relations with far abroad diaspora organizations. The federal level welcomes the activism of the regions, but not all the regions have the access to the decision-making process at the level of the Governmental Commission and there has been an attempt to make diaspora politics a privilege for the most economically prosperous non-central units.

Diaspora politics is a sensitive topic not only inside the Russian Federation; it is attracting attention of the Russian diaspora host states and also the global international community. In this respect the Russian federal centre would prefer to have a single political line at the global level of diaspora politics. At the same time the federal government understands that the non-central governments can make the implementation of diaspora politics easier.

Paradiplomacy is also a kind of a “vicious circle.” Namely, the pressure from the diaspora organizations is possibly one of the reasons why the Moscow City Government and St Petersburg are continuing the co-operation with diaspora organizations. This fact is acknowledged by the federal centre as well.

The hypothesis on the “horse-trading” and importance of personal ties along with financial resources proved correct. The success and intensity of the paradiplomatic actions depend a lot on the political will of the head of the regions and at the level of administration – on the background of chief public officials. In the Pskov Oblast there is a lack of project
administrators and lack of political influence and ties at the federal level. At the same time, the federal level’s team responsible for diaspora politics is very close to the executives of the Moscow City Government (the public officials have been working together).

The ethnic component in the intergovernmental relations (the ethnically based regions have been excluded from the present case study), the geographical position (on the border of the EU with its trans-border co-operation programmes etc) and many other factors influence the development of the position of Russian regions on the international arena. The present case-study shows the need for further research and debates at the academic and political levels. It is obvious that all the reforms taking place in Russia along the axis centralization-decentralization have impact on the international activism of the regions. It is a difficult task for the researchers and analysts in tracing these trends and making predictions for the future.

As the culmination for the thesis I would present a vision for the future role of the regions in diaspora politics in Russia. There are more possible strong players in the regional landscape of the Russian Federation with the ambitions to offer support for the diaspora organizations abroad. It is possible that for example the Moscow Oblast or wealthy Siberian regions will be interested in the topic and step into the competition with the Moscow City Government. The coordination from the side of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Governmental Commission will be more intensive as far as new actors will appear. As a factor motivating the regions for paradiplomatic relations with the compatriots abroad the economical argument will become more and more attractive.

For the host states with significant Russian diaspora (such as the CIS states and Baltic States) the activism of the Russian regions in diaspora politics makes more complicated the planning and implementation of ethnically sensitive internal and external politics. The traditional understanding of the interrelations between diaspora and its host and home states (Brubaker, 1997) is challenged not only by the activism of the international organizations but also by the non-central governments of the host-state. In case of the conflict between the non-central
units and federal government in the diaspora politics sphere it is extremely difficult for the host state to react on this situation.

For the diaspora organizations abroad the involvement of the non-central governments in the implementation of the diaspora politics offers more opportunities for finding co-operation partners. At the same time the managing of diverse co-operation ties requires a certain level of the administrative capacity (human resources for negotiations with different partners, resources for travel and communication expenses etc). It is a challenging task for the leaders of the diaspora NGOs to investigate all the opportunities and to find the most suitable partner. Like in the intergovernmental relations in Russia, the personal ties and experience are essential for success in the co-operation with the Russian non-central units. The activism of the ethnically based regions of the Russian Federation gives a chance to the diasporas of these units (like for example Tatars or Finno-Ugric peoples) for developing co-operation with their home-regions. Again making the analysis of the foreign policy more complicated for the host states and international organizations.

Comparing the other fields of the foreign policy conducted by the Russian Federation, the diaspora politics is not of the primary importance. Nevertheless the analysis of the diaspora politics from the point of view of the administrative practices of the regions could give a clue to the better understanding of the processes of the regionalization in Russia. For the international community (i.e. the EU member states), which is trying to involve the Russian regions into trans-border co-operation, it is important to take into the consideration not only the Russian legislation provisions but also the practices of their implementation. Hypothetically the most important factors for the successful co-operation with the Russian regions are the political support and human resources in the partner non-central unit.
7. CONCLUSION

In the context of cultural and economical globalisation the domestic and foreign politics are starting to be more and more interrelated. In order to be competitive the states are looking for the possibilities of “thinking globally, and acting locally”. The mission of the non-central governments of the federal states and the local governments of the unitary states is associated with the internationalization. This process demands the reformulation of the intergovernmental relations. In this context the minority groups are in turn started to be considered as objects of the international policies. Minority groups with diasporic identities are looking for opportunities to preserve the ties with their home lands and at the same time to establish the functional relations with the host states. Such approach incorporates diasporas into the system of international and interstate relations.

In this thesis the complexity of the intergovernmental relations in Russia is revealed through the prism of the Russian diaspora politics. The main research question of the present thesis was on the nature of the interrelations between the central government and non-central governments in foreign policy decision-making and implementation in Russia on the example of the Russian compatriots’ (diaspora) politics. The broader approach to the research question was selected due to the preliminary nature of the case-study and the necessity of descriptive empirical data. I concentrated on the three cases: Moscow City Government, St Petersburg Government and Pskov Oblast.

As a result of the qualitative research I found out that notwithstanding the unified legislative basis there is no single paradiplomatic “opportunity structure” or institutional framework valid for all three cases under consideration. The participation of the non-central governments at the global level of diaspora politics is not possible due to the legislative and administrative constraints. The paradiplomacy is executed mostly at the regional level (co-operating with diaspora organizations abroad and to some extent with the national
governments of host countries) with the exception of the Moscow City Government (which plays the “role of locomotive” and is active also on the international arena). The spectre of the relationships between central and non-central institutions is diverse. The most favourable and successful model for paradiplomatic relations in my opinion is co-operative model. In this case the processes of networking allow sharing the resources and achieving better results in the implementation of the policy. The co-operation is more probable for the non-central governments with more financial resources and corresponding human resources. The hypotheses were tested on three Russian regions involved in diaspora politics. The evidence of the results mentioned above was based on interviews conducted with several representatives of both federal level organizations and regional administrations as well as on analysis of legislative and administrative documents.

The research also pointed out the existence of multilayer intergovernmental relations, when the regional governments are competing for resources with each other and sometimes even with the federal centre. Secondly, the intergovernmental relations are of an asymmetric nature and depend on the financial means of the regions and results of the “horse-trading” (negotiations) with the federal centre. The evidence of these processes could be found in the historical overview on the changing role of the Moscow City Government in diaspora politics.

The most intriguing questions for further research are the further formation of intergovernmental relations in the context of the present reforms, the changing nature of the international relations in Europe due to the involvement of the Russian non-central governments. It is also important to analyse the ways of promoting democratization and supporting the democratic values in Russia while involving the non-central governments into the European level co-operation.
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OTHER MATERIALS AND WEB SITES OF GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS


Управление по межрегиональным и культурным связям с зарубежными странами администрации Президента. [The Board for Intergovernmental and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries of the President Administration]. http://www.kremlin.ru/state_subj/group84712.shtml (12.10.2006)
INTERVIEWS (2006)

Vladimir Churov
Ljudmila Fomicheva
Yuri Kaplun
Victor Karpenko
Tatyana Komarova
Natalja Malahova
Vladimir Mihailov
Eleonora Mitrofanova
Georgi Muradov
Oleg Sanin
Anatoli Sorokin
Marina Tee
Evgeni Tomberg
Yadviga Yufereva
9. LÜHIKOKKUVÕTE

Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärk on analüüsida Venemaa keskvöimu ja regioonide suhete mudelit Venemaa diasporaapolitiika kujundamisel ja elluviimisel.


Loomulikult ei ole maailmas veel leitud universaalset mudelit, kuidas peab keskvalitsus reageerima omavalitsuste ja regioonide soovile olla aktiivsed rahvusvahelisel arenil: kas tegemist on konfliktiga või koostööga; kas need protsessid ohustavad riigi terviklikkust ja suveräänsust või soodustavad majandussuhte arengut ja demokraatiat.

Vastavaid uuringuid on teostatud nt sellistes föderaalriikides nagu Belgia, Kanada, USA, Šveits jne (Michelmann and Soldatos, 1990; Hocking, 1991; Aldecoa and Keating, 1999). Nimetatud autorid uurisid föderaalriikide sisemist võimujaotust välissuhete kontekstis, kasutades osariikide välispoliitilise aktiivsuse kohta terminit „paradiplomaatia“. Käesolev töö on samuti ülesehitatud paradiplomaatia paradigmal.


Uurimistöös vaadeldakse Venemaa poliitikat oma kaasamaalaste suhtes; poliitika kujundamist ja elluviimist paradiplomaatia kontekstis. Analoogselt Vene föderalismi asümmeetrilise iseloomuga leiab ka paradiplomaatias erinevaid keskvõimu ja regioonide omavaheliste suhete mudeleid. On võimalik tuvastada nii koostööd, paralleelust kui ka konflikti. Töös püstitatud hüpoteeside järgi ei ole Venemaa ühtset ja läbipaistvat regioonide
ja keskvõimu vaheliste suhete mudelit vaatamata eksisteerivale seadusandlusele. Ainult suurematel ja jõukamatel regioonidel on väljakujunenud võimalused kaasmaalaste poliitikas osalemiseks.


protsess ning poliitiline motivatsioon kaasmaalastega tegemiseks. Üheks Moskva Linnavalitsuse aktiivse kaasmaalaste politika põhjuseks on see, et linnavalitsuse vastavates struktuurides töötab palju diasporaapoliitikaga föderaalstruktuurides varem tegelund ametnikile.


ANNEX I. LIST OF RESPONDENTS

1. Vladimir Churov. Member of State Duma. Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Commonwealth of Independent States’ affairs and relations with compatriots before being elected to the State Duma Vladimir Churov was the Head of the Committee for External Relations of St Petersburg. Churov was also responsible for the relations with compatriots abroad and represented St Petersburg in the Government Commission for the Issues of Compatriots Living Abroad.

2. Ljudmila Fomicheva. Rector of the Pskov Oblast Institute for Retraining of the Education Sector Employees (the Instituted is a state body). Fomicheva is involved in the implementation of the Pskov Oblast’s projects for compatriots.

3. Yuri Kaplun. Director of the Moscow House of Compatriots. Kaplun has worked for the Ministry of Nationalities’ Affairs/ Ministry of CIS Affairs. Kaplun has been involved in the topic of the compatriots for more than 10 years.


8. Eleonora Mitrofanova. Head of Roszarubezhcentr. Previously Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs responsible also for the Russian compatriots’ politics.

9. Georgi Muradov. Head of International Relations Department. Moscow City Government. Member of Government Commission for the Issues of Compatriots Living Abroad. Muradov has been dealing with the compatriots politics for several years. One of the initiators of the Moscow programmes for compatriots.

10. Oleg Sanin. Representative of the Yuri Dolgoruki foundation. The Foundation’s aim is to support compatriots abroad using the financial means provided by the Moscow City Government.
11. **Anatoli Sorokin.** Deputy Head of the International Relations Department. Moscow City Government.

12. **Marina Tee.** Leader and project manager of several NGOs registered in Estonia. The main profile of activities: cultural relations between Russia and Estonia. Tee has a long-term (more than 10 years) co-operation experience with St Petersburg, Moscow City Government and federal level institutions under the compatriots’ support programmes and initiatives.

13. **Evgeni Tomberg.** Leader of the NGO “Russkij Dom”, registered in Estonia. The aim of the NGO is to promote cultural co-operation between Russia and Estonia. Additionally Evgeni Tomberg is a well-known political figure (former Member of Parliament). Tomberg was also Deputy Mayor of Tallinn.

14. **Yadviga Yufereva.** Deputy Editor-in-chief of Rossijskaja gazeta [Russian Newspaper]. Yufereva initiated and implemented several projects for compatriots on volunteer basis with support from the Moscow City Government and federal institutions.
# ANNEX 2. QUESTIONNAIRE

## I NON-CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Responsibilities of respondent, organization of implementation of diaspora politics (main projects, budget, division of responsibilities, hierarchy, scheme of internal and external partners, motivation to deal with diaspora politics at the organizational level, etc). | The general background of the respondent: 
- experience with diaspora (time); 
- scope of responsibilities; 
- position in the hierarchy of organization (refer to the Q 3). |
| 1. Please introduce yourself?  
  - how long do you work for department? Non-central government?  
  - what are your spheres of responsibilities in the organization and in respect to the diaspora politics?  
  - what is you position in the structure of organization? | - number of people working in the field; 
- directions and projects (the scope of activities); 
- budget; |
| 2. Please describe the department you are working for (number of people, division of responsibilities, budget etc)? What is the budget for your activities? | Question helps to determine the main partners (before we start speaking about paradiplomacy). |
| 3 a) What are the other departments you co-operate with in the issues of diaspora politics?  
3 b) What are other external organizations/ bodies you co-operate with?  
3 c) What are the main foreign partners? | - at federal level; 
- at local level. |
| 4. What are the main legislative acts you are working in accordance with? | Motivation for dealing with diaspora. |
| 5. Why the topic of diaspora politics is important for your organization? What are the main reasons for dealing with the problems of diaspora living abroad? | |
| **Role of non-central governments in foreign policy. Why the participation of non-central governments important/ not important or beneficial for the region and foreign policy/ not beneficial?** | |
| **6. Summary of the previous answers of respondent (concerning the partners of department and the motivation to deal with diaspora politics).** | The aim of this block is to give feedback and summarize the most important points we have already talked about. |
| 7 a) Should the non-central governments be active in the foreign policy? Why? Why not?  
7 b) Why the foreign activism of non-central governments in diaspora politics is important? For a state? For non-central unit? For diaspora? | Personal attitudes of respondent. Pay attention on the terms respondent is using (key-words). |

**Opportunity structure for participation in diaspora politics. Opportunities, limitations, threats.**
### International and domestic factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. Who are your partners (from the side of the central governments) in the strategic planning of the activities, implementation and evaluation?</td>
<td>Ask separately:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Please describe your opportunities to participate in the political decision-making at the central level. What are the channels for this participation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. What are the main factors restricting your organization’s participation in the decision-making?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11a) Do you remember any cases when your government/department did not support the position of the central government in diaspora politics?</td>
<td>One of the most important questions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 b) What are the opportunities for your government/department to interrupt in case you disagree with the federal diaspora politics? What did you do in the case/cases you have described?</td>
<td>- ask more information on the case (documents, verbatim records etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 c) What are the main factors, which explain, why your organization was/was not successful in the dialogue with the central government?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Do you agree/disagree with the statement that the non-central governments in Russia have opportunities to work only with diaspora organizations? Do you cooperate with foreign countries, international organization?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. How do you judge the activities of other Russian regions in diaspora politics/foreign relations? Why is your government more/less successful in diaspora politics?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Models of relationships with central government in correspondence to the levels of diaspora politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14. What is the best term, which characterizes the relationships of your organization with central government?</td>
<td>Preliminary/personal attitude of the respondent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Do you feel the central government welcomes your initiatives in the diaspora politics?</td>
<td>Try to investigate the meaning of the term (Q14).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Do you feel that the central government needs you for planning, implementation, evaluation of the diaspora politics?</td>
<td>Try to investigate the meaning of the term (Q14).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. What could be done in order to improve your co-operation with the central government?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### II Central Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsibilities of respondent, organization of implementation of diaspora politics (main projects, budget, division of responsibilities, hierarchy, scheme of internal and external partners, motivation to deal with diaspora politics at the organizational level, etc).</td>
<td>The general background of the respondent: - experience with diaspora (time?); - scope of responsibilities; - position in the hierarchy of organization (refer to the Q 3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Please introduce yourself?</td>
<td>- how long do you work for department?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- what are your spheres of responsibilities in the organization and in respect to the diaspora politics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- what is you position in the structure of organization?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The general background of the respondent: - experience with diaspora (time?); - scope of responsibilities; - position in the hierarchy of organization (refer to the Q 3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Please describe the department you are working for (number of people, division of responsibilities, budget etc)? What is the budget for your activities?</td>
<td>- number of people working in the field; - directions and projects (the scope of activities); - budget.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 a) What are the other departments you co-operate with in the issues of diaspora politics?</td>
<td>Question helps to determine the main partners (before we start speaking about paradiplomacy).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 b) What are other external organizations/ bodies you co-operate with?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Why the topic of diaspora politics is important for your organization? What are the main reasons for dealing with the problems of diaspora living abroad?</td>
<td>Motivation for dealing with diaspora.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of non-central governments in foreign policy. Why the participation of non-central governments important/ not important or beneficial for the region and foreign policy/ not beneficial?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 a) Should the non-central governments be active in the foreign policy? Why? Why not?</td>
<td>Personal attitudes of respondent. Pay attention on the terms respondent is using (key-words).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 b) Why the foreign activism of non-central governments in diaspora politics is important? For a state? For non-central unit? For diaspora?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How do you judge the activities of the Russian regions in diaspora politics/ foreign relations? Name the best practices.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Who are your main partners (from the side of the non-central governments) in the strategic planning of the</td>
<td>Ask separately: - planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 a) Please describe the opportunities of non-central units to participate in the political decision-making at the central level. What are the channels for this participation? 8 b) Do the non-central governments use these opportunities/to what extend?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. What are the main factors restricting the participation of the non-central governments in the foreign policy decision-making? Diaspora politics?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 a) Do you remember any cases when the non-central government did not support the position of the central government in diaspora politics? 10 b) What were the actions of the non-central government in the case/cases you have described?</td>
<td>One of the most important questions. Ask more information on the case (documents, verbatim records etc.). Ask separately about Pskov, St Petersburg and Moscow City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. What are the main factors, which explain, why the non-central government was/was not successful in the dialogue with the central government?</td>
<td>Ask separately about Pskov, St Petersburg and Moscow City.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Models of relationships with non-central government in respect to the levels of diaspora politics.

12. What is the best term, which characterizes the relationships of your organization with non-central governments? Preliminary/personal attitude of the respondent.

13. What could be done in order to improve your co-operation with non-central governments?