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Church authority
in society, culture and politics
after Communism

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LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

The dissertation consists of the listed publications referred by Roman numbers:

I. **Kilp, A.** (2009). Secularization of society after Communism: ten Catholic-Protestant Societies. *ENDC Proceedings,* 12, 194–231.
II. **Kilp, A.** (2012). Are All Men Created Equal? Comparison of the Religious Legitimation of Racism in the History of United States, Southern Africa and Australia. *Forschungen zur Anthropologie und Religionsgeschichte (FARG)*, *43*, 79–96.
III. **Kilp, A.** and Saumets, A. (2009). Religion and Politics in Multicultural Europe. *ENDC Proceedings*, *12*, 13–42.
IV. **Kilp, A.** (2007). Church and politics in nine post-communist countries: historical consequences of the political involvement of the church. In I. Marga, G. G. Sander and D. Sandu, (Eds.), *Religion zwischen Kirche, Staat und Gesellschaft – Religion between Church, State and Society* (pp. 231–251). Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac.
V. **Kilp, A.** (2009). Patterns of Lutheran politics in a post-communist state: the case of Estonia. *Kultura i Polityka*, *6*, 65–76.

The author of the dissertation was the sole author of **Studies I**, **II**, **IV** and **V**. The author of this dissertation contributed to the **Study III** by initiating the research project, formulating the research questions, designing the theoretical framework and topical structure of the study, formulating the discussion over the theoretical dilemmas, conducting the comparative analysis, writing the manuscript and being responsible for the conclusions and arguments presented.

The publications are reprinted with the permission from the Estonian National Defence College (**I**, **III**), Ugarit Verlag (**II**), Verlag Dr. Kovac (**IV**) and Tischner European University (**V**).

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INTRODUCTION

Structural modernization has changed and diminished the authority that the traditional churches had in the culture and politics of pre-Enlightenment European societies. Since the Age of Enlightenment, modernization in Europe followed multiple paths and culminated with the paradigmatic confrontation between Capitalist democracies and collective Communist regimes during the Cold War.

This dissertation asks the following questions: "In comparison to Western democracies, what *specific* impact did the atheist Communist regimes have on the social authority of the traditional churches? To what extent did the Communist regimes have a different or similar influence on the emergence of modern forms of religion in society, culture and politics that have changed the traditional public functions and authority of church institutions?"

Five studies assess these research questions in detail (Table 1) by using the historical approach (Table 2) and the comparative method (Table 3). The main empirical focus is on the Western-Christian post-communist societies (**I**, **IV**).

Table 1. Research focus in five studies

Study	Research focus	
	Type of religion	**Public function of religion**
I	Traditional church institution	Social authority
II	Traditional church institution; modern forms of national, cultural and civilizational religion	Political legitimization of the social order
III	Traditional church institution; modern forms of national, cultural, and civil religion; and deinstitutionalized and individualized religiosity	Political culture and national identity (*regional* patterns)
IV	Traditional church institution; modern forms of individualized and deinstitutionalized religiosity	Political culture and national identity (*social* patterns)
V	Traditional church institution; modern forms of national, cultural, and civil religion	Political culture and national identity (*case study* of Estonia)

The research focus is limited to the types and the extent to which the traditional church institutions have retained their social, cultural and political authority. In traditional societies, the traditional church institutions were the *sole* institutional representatives of religion in society, culture and politics. Accordingly, their status, authority and functions in the public sphere have changed and declined in three main aspects. First, the traditional church institutions abandon their status and authority, and act in public sphere as denominations, interest or

pressure groups. Second, lay members occupying political offices and representing secular institutions (such as political parties) interpret religious tradition in the public sphere. Third, to the extent that modern religion has become autonomous from the traditional religious institutions (Bellah 1964:372; Burdziej 2005:167), the religion in the public sphere (such as civil religion) has also lost its connections to traditional church institutions.

The historical analysis starts from the symbolical year 380, when Christianity transformed from a *private,* associational and sub-cultural reality into a *public*, social, political and cultural reality (**I**, 198). In 380, the edict of emperors Gratian, Valentinian II and Theodosius I established Catholicism as the state religion and demanded the acknowledgment of the true doctrine of the Trinity as the test of political loyalty (Ehler, Morall 1967: 6–7). This transformation resulted in the social sacralization of Christianity, in the Christianization of society, culture and politics, and in the ontological change of Christianity (**II**, 83). Similarly, each new type of Christianization of political communities and cultures – such as confessionalization (Gorski 2003) and cultural nationalization (**II**, 84–85) – also involved a new kind of politicization of Christianity, and resulted in a new symbiosis between church and state.

The year 380 is also symbolical as a *starting point* of the public (cultural and political) meaning and functions of the narratives and myths, dogmas and sacred texts of Christianity (**II**, 83).

What Christianity (ontologically) *is* for the participating social actors in a particular cultural and political environment, depends on its relations with the social classes (Schoenfeld 1992) and on the functions it fulfils in the social order (**II**, 91). Christianity does not have a pre-determined, essentialist, objective and static attitude and doctrine towards cultural values and political order (**II**, 89). In empirical history, Christianity has had diverse, contested and changing relations to politics and culture.

The middle of the 19th century was another significant *turning point* in the history of Christian politics. In Western Europe, the visible and rapid changes of industrialization and urbanization resulted in the first wide-spread movements of self-conscious progressive positivists, secularists and atheists seeking after a society without the public functions of the traditional church (Keddie 2003: 14–15, 18) and aiming to replace previous religious ties with ideological bonds.

Table 2. Historical periods, phases and patterns identified in five studies

Study	Start of period	End of Study	Historical phases and patterns
I	380	2000	Two phases of _social secularization_ ('religious secularization'; 'secular secularization'), starting from the social sacralization of Christianity in the 4th century
II	380	1990s	Four phases of the _secularization of the legitimization of the social order,_ starting from the early Medieval pattern of the Christian Universe
III	16th century	2007	_Secularization of the political culture_ starting from the pre-Enlightenment patterns of universal-civilizational and confessional-territorial Christian cultures; the role of religion in defining the boundaries of cultural inclusion and exclusion changed from the church-defined _doctrinal_ and _mythical_ to the _symbolical_ defined by political culture and national community.
IV	Mid-19th century	2000	The historical patterns of the relationship of the traditional church to three kinds of political regimes (anti-national, Fascist, Communist)
V	Mid-19th century	2007	The historical development of the symbolical relationship between Lutheranism and Estonian national identity (from negative cultural 'Other' to positive cultural 'Us')

In the United States, religious modernization has accompanied the socio-economic structural changes. Since the mid-19th century, various forms of (Second) religious awakening, innovation (Charismatic Christianity), reaction (Fundamentalism) and accommodation have provided groups and communities with modern solutions to the modern needs of social life (Gorski, Altinordu 2008: 75–77).

In West-European nations, the cultural community of the nation replaced the previous religious community of the church. Consequently, in cases where the public function of the churches persisted, it changed from the _dogmatic_ and the _confessional_ to the _civil_ (Rousseau 1950: 134–135; Ferrari 2010; Hearn 1997) and the _national_.

At the same time, the national cultural awakening began in the nine post-communist countries, which constitute the specific focus of study **IV** and the core region of the dissertation.

In both Western and Eastern Europe, the rise of national and ethnic Christianity (Storm 2011) accompanied the advance of ideological nationalism in cases where traditional churches had a positive tie to the national identity. In such cases, the overall public presence of _Christianity_ could remain constant or experience a resurgence, but the autonomous influence and direct authority of the traditional church declined, because the rise of nationalism resulted in the

political emancipation of the state from the church in the realms of political legitimacy and cultural socialization (education) (**II**, 84).

Correspondingly, while the year 380 symbolized the *origin* of the direct role and influence of the church in the public sphere, the middle of the 19th century symbolized the major transformation of the roles and functions of public Christianity. This *structural* change of the 19th century had *ideational* origins already at the end of 17th century (Locke 2003), and during the Age of Enlightenment, when the relevancy of dogmatic and confessional Christianities for political legitimization started to decline.

The *end points* of the historical analysis in Studies **I** and **IV** depend on the use of data from round 1999/2000 of the World Values Surveys. Study **V** uses the same set of comparative data, but extends its historical analysis until the parliamentary elections of 2007 in Estonia. The historical *end point* of Study **III** is enlargement of the European Union to the post-communist East-Central Europe (2004–2007). The *end point* of the historical analysis in Study **II** is the collapse of the South African apartheid regime in the 1990s.

The historical phases identified in five studies characterize different social, cultural and political aspects of the same phenomenon – the changes in the types of the publicly functional *traditional Christianity*. Therefore, to a significant extent, the historical phases overlap.

Table 3. Comparative analysis in five studies

Study	Units of *focus*	Units of *comparison*	Purpose
I	**Region**: (ECE)	**Regions** (ECE and West)	Identifies the <u>regional</u> patterns of church authority at the social level
	Societies (10 in ECE)	**Societies** (10 in ECE; 17 in West)	Identifies the <u>social</u> patterns of church authority at the social level
II	**Region**: Western Christian civilization	**Four historical phases** of the patterns of political legitimization of the social order (as exemplified by racialist policies until the mid-19th century)	Identifies the general historical trends of changes in the role and scope of *traditional church* and *religion* in the legitimization of the socio-political order in societies *which <u>did not experience</u>* the Communist regimes
	Societies: three culturally Protestant societies	Three **Protestant societies** (the United States, Australia, and South Africa)	Identifies the particular patterns of the role and scope of *traditional church* and *religion* in the legitimization of the social order (as exemplified by the justification of racialist policies from mid-19th century until 1990s)

Study	Units of *focus*	Units of *comparison*	Purpose
III	**Region** (ECE)	**Regions** (Western Europe *vis-à-vis* post-communist East-Central-Europe, including the orthodox societies outside of EU)	Identifies the changes in the political culture and national identity that accompany modernization; compares the 'social belief systems' of post-communist and West-European societies
IV	**Societies:** 9 post-communist Western Christian societies with independent statehood (excluding Eastern Germany)	**Societies:** 9 post-communist Western Christian societies	Identifies the historical legacy of the *relationship* (collaboration, opposition, non-cooperation) of the traditional churches with political regimes (anti-national, Fascist and Communist) on the *church religion* and *religion in general* (including deinstitutionalized and individualized forms of religiosity)
V	**Society**: Estonia	**Societies:** institutional and non-institutional religion in Estonian society is compared with six traditionally Lutheran societies – Latvia, Eastern Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland	Identifies Estonian society as having the *average* level of *religiosity*, but the *lowest* level of *church affiliation*, among traditionally Lutheran cultures of Europe; the case study of contemporary Estonian politics identifies four empirical patterns of Lutheran politics

ECE – East-Central European post-communist Western Christian societies
West – West-European Western Christian societies, which have not experienced the Communist regime

The impact of the Communist regime on the social, cultural and political status, function and authority of the traditional church is assessed in two ways.

First, the changes of church authority in the public sphere are analyzed historically by focusing on its status *before* and *after* the Communist regime. All studies cover periods *before* and *after* Communism. **Study II** is the only Study that does not concentrate on cases from the post-communist region and from the Communist period. The utility of this study consists in the outline of the general historical trends of changes in the role and scope of *traditional church* and *religion* in the legitimization of the socio-political order, which serves as comparative reference points for the other studies.

Second, the culturally Western Christian post-communist societies of East-Central Europe (ECE) are compared with West-European Western Christian societies (West) which lack the experiences of modernization under the Com-

munist regime. The comparisons identify the *regional* patterns of church authority between post-communist and West-European societies, and the *social* patterns of higher and lower levels of church authority. In **Study IV**, the comparison of societies is limited *only* to post-communist nations.

I. SOCIAL AUTHORITY

Study I compares the social authority of traditional churches in post-communist Western Christian societies and in seventeen West-European societies *after* Communism.

The paper starts with the *theoretical* outline of the component parts and dimensions of church authority at three levels of social life (individual, group and society). It maps the historical emergence of particular types of church authority in Western societies; the phases of *decline* of *particular* types of church authority; and the phases of *change* between the types of church authority.

Secularization is a process that results from modernization (the process of urbanization, industrialization, and rising levels of wealth and education) and consists in the declining authority of the traditional religious institutions, beliefs and values in society, culture and politics (**I**, 194). Typically, secularization occurs in three phases.

The first phase is the sacralization of Christianity and the Christianization of society. The second phase ('religious modernisation') is the emancipation (becoming autonomous) of the non-religious social spheres (politics, economy, science, cultural values and the like) from the previous church authority *without* emancipating from (Christian) religion (**I**, 203). Eventually, this phase results in a shift from universal religious institutions to religious pluralism (**I**, 199). The third phase ('secular secularization') is the emancipation of societies, and the spheres of social life, from explicit religious beliefs, authorities and institutions (**I**, 200, 201).

Each phase of secularization brings along a new (ideological or religious, explicit or implicit, organizational or informal) 'system of belief' (Tschannen 1991: 401, 408), which is considered by its adherents as sacred as the traditional Christian belief system was considered by Christians in traditional Christian societies (**I**, 199). Accordingly, during the third phase the emancipated secular societies and spheres of social life tend to sacralize the secular values (i.e. values which are not related to an explicit religious institution) of their own. Consequently, the secular race, state, nation (Burleigh 2005: 6; Smart 1997), economic class (**I**, 204), work (Bell 1976: 156), consumerism (Baudrillard 1998: 94), aesthetics, eroticism and science (Weber 1946) can be sacralized either culturally or within their sub-cultural sphere of social life.

The assessment of secularization focuses *solely* on the authority of the traditional church institutions in the public (cultural and political) life, and not on the social presence of the sense of sacred, *non-institutional* religious beliefs and practices, and the *implicitly* religious dimensions of the social, cultural and political communities. All manifestations of 'religion in the public sphere' and religion in society, which are beyond the authoritative control, interpretation and representation of the traditional church institutions, are *negatively* related to

the traditional church authority, which used to monopolize authoritatively the representation and interpretation of religion in society and politics.

Not all church institutions are related to social order, but all societies are in need of 'systems of belief' that sustain moral order and social integration (Etzioni 2008; Durkheim 1967). Similarly, political governments need manifest rituals and ceremonies, and (implicit or explicit) religious beliefs and symbols, which legitimize the social relations of power (Lewellen 1992: 69–81; Habermas 2011: 17).

Therefore, the appearance of new political forms of religion or the intensification of the religion-related intra-social confrontations are not signs of reversal to a sacred religious system of social governance or an institutionalization of modern version of an organized religious authority (**I**, 200).

The religious authority in politics and culture functions effectively when it is perceived and experienced to be objective, self-evident and not of human origin (Wilson 1979: 278). Accordingly, the authority of the church institution is greatest, when it has monopolized the representation and interpretation of politically functional religion.

Modernization, however, tends to pluralize the 'religious sphere' (Berger 2010), which may result in the resurgence of religious vitality (Iannaccone 1991), but influences negatively the public authority of any particular traditional church (Berger, Luckmann 1991: 126).

The contemporary 'religion in the public sphere' is plural and not controlled by any particular ideological, religious or political organization. Multiple social actors and institutions interpret and represent the contemporary religion – among others the church hierarchy, lower clergy, political activists, political movements and parties, interest groups and academic scholars (**I**, 200–201).

In addition to pluralization, modernization undermines traditional religious institutions by individualizing (**I**, 201), de-institutionalizing (Ter Borg 2004) and de-traditionalizing (Boeve 2005) religion.

An individualized religion lacks the sense of belongingness (Beck 2010) and de-institutionalized religion lacks public functions. When religion lacks functional connections to sub-cultural-associational or cultural-political traditions, it lacks social validation and has become socially a "toothless" and non-committal marketable sentiment (Ter Borg 2008: 133). Accordingly, even traditional religious beliefs lose their authority, when not validated socially (Tschannen 1991: 408) either by bonding social capital within a religious association (Putnam 2000: 65–66) or by cultural norms, customs and socialization. In one way or another, the social validation of a religious tradition depends on its institutionalization.

Thus, social modernization replaces previous, traditional types of Christianity with new (early or late), modern kinds of Christianities. For example, when *confessional* Catholicism and Protestantism replaced *universal* Catholicism, the church authority of the universal Catholicism declined (secularized) and the authority of the early modern forms of Christianity increased (sacralized).

Empirically, **Study I** assesses the regional and society-specific patterns of social authority of the traditional churches according to six dimensions: religious affiliation, personal religiosity, religious practice, religious beliefs, traditional-religious values and perception of the role and status of the religious institution.

The findings of the study support the 'secularization due to modernization' thesis – the processes of modernization are accompanied by the decline of the social authority of traditional churches – in both West-European and post-communist regions (**I**, 221–222). The authority of the traditional church has declined and the types of public religion changed due to structural modernization, and innovations in the means of economic production and communication (Berger 1969: 109; Bruce 2011: 49; Turner 2007).

The abovementioned processes of modernization undermine traditional church authority by increasing the supremacy of the political and economic spheres over the 'sphere of religion' in social life (Habermas 2011). During modernization, the role of the state consistently increases, and the role of the traditional religious institutions decreases. With the advance of market mentality and the scientific worldview, the traditional belief systems either retreat (Guth et al 1988: 360) or transform themselves into articles of consumption (Turner 1994: 10; Davie 2005).

According to 'secularization due to modernization' thesis, the social authority of the traditional church should be lower in socioeconomically more developed West-European countries than in post-communist societies (**I**, 195). Several findings of the study confirm this theoretical argument.

Post-communist societies support more the presence of religious persons in politics and the social functions of the traditional churches in issues related to *morals, family* and *faith*. Their religious beliefs are more traditional and church-related – beliefs in sin and hell are more widespread in post-communist societies – and attitudes regarding family, gender and homosexuality are more traditional-religious than in Western European societies (**I**, 219). In West-European societies, the support of the traditional, institutionalized and hierarchical forms of religion, and established religious practices, has declined, while the levels of individual religiosity have remained relatively high (**I**, 201).

Therefore, the decline of *all* forms of religion does not accompany modernization. Instead, the socioeconomic development *changes* the socially operative types of religion. In the realm of sexual relationships, modernization does not result in the decline of sex and love, but results in the decline and change of the traditional institution of marriage (Ter Borg 2004: 112, 133). Analogically, modernization does not result in the decline of religion, but in the decline of the traditional church authority. Traditional church institutions may accommodate, endorse or resist these cultural changes, but to a significant degree, the values and beliefs of the religious institutions develop and change in parallel with the general development of social values (**II**, 83, 88, 89, 93).

Some of the findings, however, require detailed explanations.

First, the average level of religious affiliation is *higher* in *the West* than in ECE, which means that modernization does not undermine the formal sense of belongingness to a religious tradition particularly in cases where the 'religious tradition' has updated itself with modernity and has not disconnected itself from the traditions operative in contemporary society, culture and political community.

Second, modernization has not reduced the general religious interest and spiritual quest (Norris & Inglehart 2004: 4–5). Instead, modern religion has become inclusive. In modernity, the boundaries of a legitimate religion are extended and include several forms of spirituality, religiosity, individualized Catholicism and Protestantism, 'Sheilaism' – "Just my own little voice" (Bellah *et al* 1985: 221) – and pluralism of religious traditions, which in traditional European societies were not ranked within the category of legitimate religion. The expansion of the boundaries of legitimate religion in modernized societies results from the decreasing authority of the previous religious institutions to impose a common understanding of religion, and to define authoritatively its objective essence, form and boundaries.

Third, in the post-communist region, the general levels of *religiosity* (percentage of individuals for whom religion is important and who take time for prayer) are *lower*, and the proportions of convinced atheists and those for whom "God is not at all important" are *higher* than in West (**I**, 195). Paradoxically, people in the societies with the most advanced economies are likely to have opted out from formal religious affiliation than in economically less-advanced post-communist societies.

Similar to Western democratic and liberal route to modernity, also Communist regimes strived to eliminate traditional Christian authorities from the public sphere (to privatize religion), but they did not establish the cultural environment, which would favor the development of religious individualization, innovation and modernization (**I**, 199). Therefore, *unlike* the Western democratic societies, the Communist social structures did not contribute to the individualization and de-traditionalizing of religion (**I**, 222).

The results of this study confirm the 'cultural defense' thesis, which argues that the positive relationship between church and national identity is the main reason for the *under*-secularization in modernized societies (Wallis, Bruce 1992; Bruce 2002). In the post-communist region, the *social authority* of the church was preserved most in mono-confessional Catholic societies, where the historic religious tradition, national identity and national aspirations have been closely connected (**I**, 196). In this equation, the cultural connection to the national identity matters slightly more than type of Christian Confession.

Confession, however, comes second in explaining the patterns of church authority in post-communist societies. According to the 'socio-historical' thesis of secularization, secularization results from the struggle between social actors who promote and others who resist it (Kuru 2007: 590; Chaves 1994: 752; Philpott 2009: 185; Gorski 2003: 110, 116–118). The ideological attempt of the

Communist regimes to secularize 'from above' (Smith 1974: 8) succeeded most in Protestant societies, where pre-Communist struggles between church and state had already significantly weakened the organizational authority of traditional churches over their lay members and their secular authority *vis-à-vis* the state.

2. LEGITIMIZATION OF THE SOCIAL ORDER

Study II analyzes the role of Christian churches and beliefs in the political legitimization of the social order as exemplified by the legitimization of the racialist policies in Western history.

As mentioned above, some system of beliefs has always legitimized the operative social order. Almost in all traditional societies, the social order included elements of slavery and racism. Therefore, in late antiquity, when Christianity obtained social status and political functions, some existence of slavery and racism was a self-evident social reality (**II**, 81). Naturally, when Christianity legitimated the social relations, it legitimated also the socially existing forms of racism.

The paper identifies four historical phases of the religious legitimization of the social order. The role and authority of the church institution was greatest and the scope of the church-defined religious legitimization was largest in the first phase, where the traditional church institution provided political legitimization by interpreting authoritatively the politically functional Christian myths and passages from the sacred script (**II**, 83). In this phase, Christian norms, symbols, dogmas and beliefs functioned as 'a common language' and a social framework for all members, spheres and institutions of society (**I**, 202, 205).

The following phases witnessed the continuous decline of the autonomous role of the church and the steady rise of the secular state, although some version of (confessional, culturally humanist, national or civilizational) Christianity remained instrumental in providing for the political legitimization.

With the decline of the autonomous role of the church institution and church-defined beliefs, the policies of racialism became systematic and culminated during the advance of the biological conceptions of race and the triumph of colonialism in the 19th century (**II**, 84–87). In the fourth historical phase, the authority of the traditional church was limited to the symbolical representation of the – national or civilizational – cultural identity, and the social order was justified primarily with beliefs in biological and civilizational superiority (as manifested in the superior organization, education, technology, warfare, bureaucracy, and manners) (**II**, 79, 83, 85, 86).

At one extreme, all non-religious institutions were legitimated by sacred script and religious institution (Anderson 2006: 13, 14, 18) and at the other – contemporary – extreme, all religious – and later also ideological (Taylor 2011) – institutions have to translate their reasoning into a common secular language (Habermas 2011).

The influence of a religious institution over the secular governance was greatest when the church was autonomous from secular rulers, the state was weak and decentralized, the political authority was divided between multiple centers of power, and the *secular* authority of the church institution *vis-à-vis* other centers of *secular* power was the strongest (**I**, 202).

In the modern social, economic and political environment, the secular governments do not need the *kind* of legitimization provided by traditional Christian churches for secular governments in a traditional society. The four constitutive myths of Christianity (human beings are created by God; humans bear God's image despite their sinful nature; God guides the history of humankind; Christ is the only way of salvation) formed the basis of the social order of all Western societies until the Age of Enlightenment. For self-interpretation of contemporary societies, however, these Christian myths have become irrelevant. (**I**, 202)

The comparison of the religious legitimization of the racialist policies in the United States, Australia and South Africa provides additional evidence that the mid-19th century was a crucial *turning point* in West-Christian conceptions of political identity and political culture. Until the Enlightenment, *some* version of Christianity legitimated *all* Western social and political orders. Therefore, all contests for power were accompanied by conflicts between orthodox and heterodox interpretations of the Bible (and Christian tradition), between orthodox and heterodox selections of passages of the Bible, and between orthodox and heterodox meanings of the sacred text. The authority of God (including the functional social authority 'over God') was often contested, but "the impossibility of God's non-existence was a social fact" (Taylor 2005: 226).

In the middle of the 19th century, the United States witnessed its last political confrontation, where the opposing parties – both religious and political social actors – based their (pro- and against slave ownership) arguments on the interpretations of the Bible (**II**, 79, 92, 93).

By the end of the 20th century, modern conceptions of national Christianity have often remained politically operative, but Christian nationalism has irreversibly replaced the church-defined *biblical*, *dogmatic*, and *mythic* Christianity of the previous eras (**II**, 89). At present, the literal interpretation of the Bible has lost its social and political relevancy (**II**, 88, 93), although the literal content of the Bible, which has become freely accessible to anyone, has remained the same. It still yields more material for those who seek justifications for slavery than for human equality. Today's readers of the Bible in modernized societies of the West, however, believe in human equality, and interpret the Bible accordingly (**II**, 88, 93). They also believe in territorial allegiance and in loyalty to a (national) political community over the allegiance to the (religious) doctrinal truth and loyalty to a community of believers (**III**, 16).

To sum it up, some modern kinds of Christianity may still be functional in sacralizing the effective relations of power and providing for political legitimacy. Like other contemporary political legitimizations – ideological, scientific or Marxist – religious legitimizations have to be oriented towards this-worldly ends (Burleigh 2005). Accordingly, the traditional church institutions fulfill the legitimizing role in politics most likely as symbols of the immanent national cultures, not as representatives of the transcendent salvation religions (**II**, 89).

The theoretical statement of the symbolical value of a modernized – national, cultural or civilizational – Christianity in the legitimization of the social order is most valid for the traditionally Protestant cultures. Unlike Protestantism, Catholicism has retained several elements – universality, dogmatism, traditionalism, hierarchical structure of church organization, to name a few – that characterized churches in their relations with the state and society in traditional and early modern societies (Byrnes 2001).

3. POLITICAL CULTURE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

The last three studies focus on the role and status of the traditional churches in the cultural and national identity in regional (**III**) and social (**IV**) comparison, and in the case study of Estonia (**V**). The organization of studies enables to follow the analysis from general to particular and from the historical to the contemporary in the way that each subsequent study limits the comparative and historical focus, and engages in a deeper empirical analysis.

3.1. Post-communist and West-European patterns

The cultures of Europe can reasonably be termed 'culturally Christian' from the fourth century to this day. The essence, form and function of the cultural Christianity, however, have significantly changed during modernization.

Study **III** analyzes the role of the traditional churches and the types of Christianity in defining the cultural (civilizational, political and national) identity *vis-à-vis* cultural 'Others' from the 16th century (**III**, 14, 28) until the recent wave of the enlargement of EU (2004–2007). Additionally, it compares the commonalities and differences of issues related to multiculturalism and religion in post-communist and West European societies.

The cultural 'Othering' has been a constant feature of European history. Some representative of race, class, ideology or religion has always occupied the role of the cultural 'Other' (**III**, 28).

The historical trend of the changing relationships between the traditional church and the political culture resembles the trends in the status and role of the traditional church in society (**I**) and in political legitimization (**II**). Modernization does not eliminate religion from culture, but it decreases continuously the direct authority of the church and church-defined religion.

Accordingly, the post-communist societies are less secular and liberal in their value orientations, and their conceptions of political nationalism are less civic and multicultural than in the economically more advanced societies of Western Europe.

The crucial *turning point* in Western Europe occurred in the 1960s, when the cultures witnessed secularization, liberalization and individualization (**III**, 17). The social ties between individuals and the traditional churches weakened (McLeod 2007: 1, 2, 20). The de-Christianization and detraditionalization of the social value systems influenced most significantly the institution of marriage, the relations of gender (Woodhead 2008: 188) and the norms regulating sexuality.

The cultural pluralization of the 1960s affected not only religious institutions and systems of belief, but also *political* ideologies and parties, *secular* world-views and universities. In what has been termed as the age of the 'end of

ideologies', 'post-materialist value orientations', post-industrial or ultramodern society, post- or late modernity, authoritative social *knowledge* is no more effectively monopolized by any social institution (Carson 2002: 108). All social institutions operate in a situation of plurality, where they cannot impose authoritatively their definition of reality, but have to *market* it (Berger 1969: 138). Therefore, modernity *pluralizes* and pluralization *relativizes* the know-ledge, beliefs and worldviews of all institutions in the consciousness of individuals (Berger 2010: 3, 5).

In both Eastern and Western Europe, *political nationalisms* define the social belief systems. Since the 1960s, the cultures of West-European societies have shifted from principled confrontations between ideologies (capitalism and socialism), church and the state, cultural mainstream and cultural minorities, towards solutions that demand compromises and accommodations from all parties. Correspondingly, there have been shifts from monocultures towards multiculturalism, from state churches or radical separations of churches from state towards *principled distance* between state and the church and *moderate* secularism (**III**, 16–17, 21, 22; Modood 2010).

Contemporary West-European societies follow secularized and liberal social values that emphasize individualism over collective and gender equality over traditional values. The ways of life of Western Muslims serve as their defining cultural 'Other' (**III**, 34–35).

The typical post-communist culture is less liberal and individualistic, more ordered by ethnic and linguistic identities, and is inclined to define its dominant cultural 'Other' by references to the historical experience of the Communist rule (**III**, 24, 32).

The post-communist social belief systems are neither confessional-Christian nor atheist despite the legacy of the recent 'monumental' confrontation and 'zero-sum battle for the beliefs of the citizens' between Marxism and Christianity (Janz 1998: 31; Thatcher 2006: 586). Similar to the political cultures of Western Europe, the post-communist political cultures have retained connections to cultural Christianity (**I**, 207–210, 226; **III**, 32–35), but most of the West-European countries have lost the *kind* of cultural relationship to an institutional religion that still exists in post-communist Europe.

In several West-European countries, where the political nationalism is *civic* (Kuzio 2005: 225), the traditional churches cannot exploit the political role and cultural resource of 'ethnic Christianities' (Campling 1999: 10; Martin 2005: 32; Bruce 2002: 33) the way they can do in post-communist cultures.

In 'civic nationalisms' the churches are expected to distance themselves from collective identities (Hann 2000; Walzer 1984). The typical 'ethnic nationalism', however, is grounded on both linguistic and ethnic identity, and enables the church to represent the cultural community symbolically even in cases where the cultural values and national identity are predominantly secular (for example, in Estonia).

Therefore, the traditional churches in Western Europe can perform their cultural roles as 'vicarious religions' (Davie 2010), but their connection to political identities is significantly weakened in cases where the political nationalism is civic, and significant segments of the population are religious without operative ties to church institutions – they "believe without belonging" (Davie 1994) and "pray alone" (Davie 2002).

The more advanced secularization of the West-European cultures is manifest in the departure from the traditional norms that regulated the institution of marriage, the relations of gender and the norms of sexuality. The regional difference in social values is greatest in attitudes regarding homosexuality.

At the turn of the century, homosexuality was disapproved in ECE by 54.5% and in West by 26.4% of the respondents, while abortion was disapproved only slightly more in ECE than in West (**I**, 223). The enormous difference in attitudes regarding homosexuality is best explained by the legacy of the Communist regimes than by confession or modernization.

The communist regimes were anti-religious *and* anti-liberal. Therefore, the post-communist societies do not easily approve values which were disapproved by Communist regimes (such as homosexuality). They also fight against the bans on values that were approved during the Communist time (abortion). Accordingly, the legal ban on abortion in post-communist Poland is a particular manifestation of church influence (Kilp 2004), because it lacked the cultural support of the legacy of the Communist regime.

The persisting cultural intolerance of homosexuality, however, is not a clear-cut manifestation of a church authority. The cultural attitudes regarding homosexuality are as conservative in Estonia as they are in Latvia despite the enormous difference in levels of religious affiliation – one quarter of the population in Estonia is religiously affiliated (half of them Orthodox) and only one quarter of the population in Latvia is *not* religiously affiliated (**V**, 68). Nevertheless, both Estonian and Latvian populations disapprove homosexuality significantly more than the Scandinavian societies, where the levels of church membership are significantly higher, and levels of religious practice and individual religiosity are about as low as in Estonia. Therefore, the persistence of traditional conservative attitudes regarding homosexuality in Estonia has less to do with church religion (Lutheranism or Orthodox) than with the recent experience of the Communist rule.

3.2. Legacy of church-state relations in post-communist societies

Study **IV** tests the '**secularization due to the historical legacy of church-state relations'** hypothesis, which argues that the political failure of the clerical regimes determines most the decline of religious authority of the church

(Iannaccone 1991: 162; Tocqueville 1851: 315; Tocqueville 1899: 334; Casanova 1994: 29).

The sample of traditionally Western Christian post-communist societies – Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – offers a good opportunity to elaborate this thesis by comparing the legacies of clerical relationships with *three* kinds of political regimes – antinational, Fascist and Communist – on *church religion* (and on *religiosity in general*).

The study argues that the historical alliance with a failed regime does not result in uniformly negative consequences for the church and religion. Close collaboration between the church and the anti-national regime at the beginning of the national awakening (during the 19th century) has influenced significantly more the present status of the church and religion than the connections of the church to other politically failed – the Communist or Fascist – regimes (**IV**, 234).

Particularly, the positive connection to the Fascist regime has not resulted in long-term negative legacies (**IV**, 237, 240, 242). Fascism failed as a political regime, but it represents the radicalized version of nationalism, which has neither failed as an idea nor been defeated as a regime. Additionally, the historical clerical-fascisms have served as examples of close relations between the church and the national identity (**IV**, 242). Therefore, in comparison to Absolutism and Communism, which failed as ideas and as regimes, the collaboration with the Fascist regimes had a negative impact for the church only for immediate decades after the Second World War.

The study of nine post-communist countries emphasizes the legacy of the historical connection of the church to the anti-national regime, which has been absent in all countries – Poland, Slovakia, Croatia, and Lithuania – which at present have high levels of both *church religion* and *general religiosity*. In countries with low level of both *church religion* and *general religion* – Estonia, Latvia, and the Czech Republic – the church has sided with anti-national political forces during the early nation-building processes. (**IV**, 237, 240; **V**, 68–69)

This observation explains the patterns of cultural under- and over-secularization in both Eastern and Western Europe (Ireland, Poland *vs* France, the Czech Republic). The connection between the nation and the church becomes stronger, when the following conditions are fulfilled: nation-building takes place without independent statehood for an extended period of time; the political opponent of the nation follows a contrasting ideology or religion; the nations lack historical experience of the pluralist democratic politics; the type of political nationalism is ethnic (not civic); and the level of socioeconomic development is not high (Norris, Inglehart 2004).

The clerical connection to regime, however, explains why in certain cases religious modernization has not accompanied social and political modernization. The historical emergence of movements, parties and states devoted to 'assertive' secularism (Kuru 2007: 571, 590; Ferrari 2010: 752) and principled

atheism cannot be explained without references to widespread anticlerical reactions to the previous clerical political regimes (Taylor 2002: 7).

The historical tie between the church and the nation is of particular importance in the nine societies of this study, because they all have been historically part of multinational empires and their nation-states are peripheral and of late formation. They situate at the cultural borderlands between Eastern and Western Christianity. Unlike to Western Europe, their political nationalisms have laid strong emphasis on cultural, linguistic and religious elements, which were intensified by reactions to the Communist state secularism (**IV**, 232–233; **I**, 226–227).

Correspondingly, the policy of religion (and of church traditions) of Communist regimes was highly sensitive to the existing type of connection between nation and the church (Ramet 1987: 13). Regardless whether the pattern of Communist policy *vis-à-vis* the church was co-optative or repressive, the Communist period tended to weaken the pre-existing weak bonds between the church and the nation (Estonia, the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany), and to strengthen them where they were strong from the beginning (Croatia, Lithuania, Poland).

Therefore, for the present status of church authority and church religion in the post-communist region of the traditionally Western Christian societies, the cultural connection to national identity *is* a more important determinant than the nature of the church's relations with the Communist regime.

3.3. Confessional pattern: the case of Lutheran Estonia

The confessional differences between Catholicism and Lutheranism have been relevant in all five studies. In traditionally Protestant societies, the social authority of the church is the weakest, the religious legitimization of politics is most de-traditionalized, and the impact of the Communist period on church religion the worst (**I**, 227; **IV**, 237; **V**, 68).

Modernization does not need to decrease the levels of church membership in Lutheran societies (Scandinavia), yet every Lutheran church in post-communist societies has suffered a drastic decline in the levels of church affiliation.

Some of the reasons why Communist regimes succeeded in alienating the Lutheran populations from their church tradition exist in the confessional particularities of Lutheranism. In comparison to Catholicism, Lutheranism is a form of an individualized Christianity (**I**, 204); is based more on an individual belief and less on collective religious practice (Hervieu-Léger 1998: 29); and has been supportive to the 'religious quest' in nonreligious spheres of life (Weber 1958).

Additionally, Lutheranism has been one of the main historical carriers of secularization (Martin 2005), which weakened the church authority and its autonomy from the state long *before* Communism. Lutheranism's organizational

authority over its members and its status *vis-à-vis* any kind of political regimes – including the Communist states – has been weaker than the organizational authority and political autonomy of the Catholic Church.

The case study of the patterns of Lutheran politics in Estonia, however, identifies four types of Lutheran politics (**V**, 70–73) still operative in the culture, which is most alienated from an organized Christianity in the whole of Europe.

The most significant functions of the Lutheran church in Estonian politics are related to 'civil religion' and cultural nationalism. Both represent the types of church involvement in national politics which are *least defined* by church tradition and church institution (**V**, 68, 70, 74), yet are the most functional ones within the context of contemporary post-communist and ethnic nationalisms. The presence of church-defined norms and values within the political processes, however, would transform it from an institution of a political culture into one of multiple interest groups within a civil society.

Identification with Lutheranism as a national culture or its symbol, however, differs from identification with Lutheranism as a church religion (**V**, 69–70). While the patriotic sentiments can lead every Estonian to identify with the former, only one Estonian out of five identifies with the latter.

CONCLUSIONS

In Western Christian history, the declining authority of the *traditional church institutions* in society, culture and politics *is* the *sole* indicator of the social, cultural and political *secularization* that accompanies the processes of modernization.

Societies secularize by abandoning the *traditional* religious beliefs, values, loyalties and institutional practices, while the aggregate whole – traditional and modern, institutional and non-institutional – forms of religion may remain constant.

The *secularization of social values* manifests itself *primarily* in the departure from the traditional (church-defined) norms that regulated the institution of marriage, the relations of gender and the norms of sexuality.

Political cultures become autonomous from traditional religious institutions (secularize) and replace the traditional Christian social belief systems with modern systems of social belief. In traditional societies, church tradition and church institution defined the publicly functional religion. In modernized societies, the churches maintain political functions by providing symbols for the values, identities and beliefs *defined by* modern cultural and political communities that have been emancipated from the traditional authority of the religious institutions.

According to the West-European pattern, *polities* secularize by establishing a distance between church and state (moderate secularism) but *preserve* the (symbolical) public presence of modern types of political Christianity (civil religion, cultural Christianity).

The secularization and change of publicly functional Christianities in European societies has been dependent on the level of socioeconomic and political development.

Economic industrialization (and post-industrialization) and the development of free market economies has been historically instrumental for all turning points of secularization – the 16th century, the mid-19th century, and the 1960s.

The economically more advanced West-European nations have distanced themselves from traditional forms of church authority more than the post-communist countries. Accordingly, the level of economic modernization matters in explaining the reason, why traditional Christian churches have lost their *traditional* public functions in *both* post-communist and West-European traditionally Western Christian societies.

By the middle of the 19th century, the publicly functional Christianities in West-European societies had transformed from the *biblical* and *dogmatic, mythic* and *confessional* to the *cultural, civil* and the *national*. The cultural nation-building in the traditionally Western Christian post-communist societies started at the time when the period of the politically functional church-defined Christianity had ended and a significant *secularization* of societies, polities and political cultures had occurred in all European cultures.

Therefore, the *concurrent* experience of the transition from the agrarian to industrial modes of economic production explains the regional *similarities.* The variations in the level of *political modernization,* however, help to explain the *regional variations*.

In Western Europe, for about a millennium the *decline* of the authority of the church institution has been dependent on the *simultaneous* rise of the secular governments. In post-communist Western Christian societies, for an extended period, political nationalism developed without an independent nationhood and magnified the role of the ethnic, cultural and religious elements within the national political culture.

The Communist period has influenced the patterns of church authority within a framework of a socio-historical path-dependence. The outcome of the following two *pre*-Communist struggles between the church and the state has influenced the status of church authority *after* Communism *more* than the specific nature of church-state relations during the Communist period.

First, the historical struggles between Reformation and Counter-Reformation resulted in the political division of Western Christianity into confessional Catholicism and Protestantism. Thereafter, the organizational authority of Lutheran churches over their lay members and their *secular* authority *vis-à-vis* the states have been significantly weaker than the organizational and political authority of the Catholic churches. Accordingly, the Communist regimes succeeded in undermining the public presence, status and authority of *all* traditional Lutheran churches. In traditionally Catholic societies, however, they succeeded *only* in cases where the connection of the church to the national identity was negative from the start (the Czech Republic).

Second, the legacy of church-state relationships during the early national awakening in 19th century has influenced the social status of the traditional churches more than the relationships of these churches with the Communist or Fascist regimes. Regardless of whether the pattern of Communist policy *vis-à-vis* the church was co-optive or repressive, the Communist period tended to weaken the pre-existing weak bonds between the church and the nation (Estonia, the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany) but to strengthen them where they were strong from the beginning (Croatia, Lithuania, Poland).

Within the region of post-communist Western Christian societies, the *social authority* of the church was preserved most in mono-confessional Catholic societies, where the historic religious tradition, national identity and national aspirations have been closely connected.

In two indirect and unintended ways, however, the Communist regimes helped to conserve the traditions of church institutions and their values in society.

First, the social structures of the Communist regimes protected the traditional churches from religious individualization, innovation and modernization, which have weakened the church authority in Western liberal democratic societies.

Second, the anti-religious *and* anti-liberal value orientation of the Communist regimes contributed to the persistence of specific church-related traditional social value orientations (disapproval of homosexuality), which have remained strong, even in those post-communist societies where the connections to the traditional churches have largely been lost.

How much can we generalize?

In generalizing the findings of the dissertation, it must be kept in mind that the historically Western-Christian post-communist countries have only recently reached the economic (free market) and political structures (independent nation-states, democratic and pluralist cultures) which tend to undermine the public functions of the traditional churches. In societies with traditional modes of economic production and with systems of political government which are either new, weak or functionally absent, the provision of the *traditional kinds* of cultural, political and social functions by *traditional* types of religious authorities is expected. The decline of traditional religious authority *depends* on the level of economical, social and political development.

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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN

Kiriku võim ühiskonnas, kultuuris ja poliitikas peale kommunismi

Sekulariseerumisteooria kohaselt toob kaasajastumine kaasa traditsiooniliste kirikute võimu languse ühiskonnas, kultuuris ja poliitikas. Et doktoritöö keskendub *ainult* traditsiooniliste kirikute avalikule võimule, on traditsioonilise kirikliku institutsiooni võimu langus avalikul alal *ainus* (ja määrav) kaasajastumisega kaasneva sekulariseerumise tunnus.

Valgustusaja eelse olukorraga võrreldes on traditsiooniliste kirikute võim vähenenud nii postkommunistlikus kui ka Lääne-Euroopas. Doktoritöö läbivaks uurimusküsimuseks on: „Millist *spetsiifilist* mõju kiriku võimu vähenemisele ja muutusele avaldasid ateistlikud kommunistlikud režiimid?"

Töö regionaalne põhifookus on postkommunistlikel läänekristliku kultuuritraditsiooniga ühiskondadel, mida võrreldakse sotsiaalmajanduslikult kõrgemalt arenenud Lääne-Euroopa ühiskondadega, kus teoreetiliste lähte-eelduste kohaselt peaks kiriklik võim olema väiksem.

Uurimus teostatakse ajalooliselt ja võrdlevalt. Kiriku võimu analüüsitakse kommunistliku režiimi *eelsel, aegsel* ja *järgsel* ajal. Läänekristliku kultuuritraditsiooniga postkommunistlikke ühiskondi võrreldakse Lääne-Euroopa läänekristlike ühiskondadega nii regionaalselt kui ka ühiskonniti.

Uurimused lähenevad kiriku võimu langusele ja muutusele erinevate, kuid üksteist mitte välistavate, tahkude alt.

I uurimus käsitleb *sotsiaalset sekulariseerumist* kahes faasis – usulises (kristlikus) ja sekulaarses sekulariseerumises. Usulise sekulariseerumise puhul mitte-usulised ühiskondlikud sfäärid (poliitika, majandus jt) ja institutsioonid (riik) iseseisvuvad varasemast kiriklikust võimust *usuliselt* (kristlikult). Sekulaarse sekulariseerumise faasis ühiskonnad ja ühiskonnaosad emantsipeeruvad traditsioonilistest kristlikest uskumustest, usupraktikatest ja institutsionaalsest usulisest võimust sekulaarselt ehk sakraliseerides *omi* identiteete (rassi, rahvust), institutsioone (klassi, riiki) ja väärtusi (tööd, tarbimist, valikuvabadust).

Traditsiooniliste kirikute sotsiaalne võim on muutunud ja langenud Lääne-Euroopas rohkem kui postkommunistlikus regioonis, kus elanikkonnad toetavad rohkem traditsiooniliste kirikute sotsiaalseid funktsioone ja traditsioonilisi sotsiaalseid väärtusi.

Ehkki Lääne-Euroopa ühiskondade liikmed on rohkem hüljanud traditsioonilisi usupraktikaid, uskumusi ja kiriklikku võimu, ei ole ühiskondlik kaasajastumine vähendanud neis individuaalset usklikkust, usulist huvi ja formaalset usutraditsiooni kuuluvuse tunnet. Tänases Lääne-Euroopas on legitiimse religiooni piirid avardunud, hõlmates individuaalset usklikkust, uskumusi ja usuühenduste vorme, mida traditsioonilistes Euroopa ühiskondades legitiimse religiooni hulka ei liigitatud. Traditsiooniline kiriku võim avalikul alal on vähenenud ka kommunistlike režiimide tulemina, kuid viimased ei ole soodustanud

usulist individualiseerumist, innovatsiooni ja kaasajastumist võimaldava kultuurilise keskkonna tekkimist.

Kiriku sotsiaalse võimu variatsioone postkommunistlikus regioonis selgitavad kaks peamist tunnust – side kiriku ja rahvusidentiteedi vahel ning kristlik konfessioon (luterlus või katoliiklus). Kiriku *ühiskondlik võim* on säilinud kõige enam katoliiklikes ühiskondades, mille ajalooline usutraditsioon, rahvusidentiteet ja rahvuslikud püüdlused on olnud tihedalt seotud. Kommunistlike režiimide sekulariseerimise katset saatis suurim edu luterlikes ühiskondades, kus kommunismi*eelsed* võitlused riigi ja kiriku vahel olid nõrgendanud traditsiooniliste kirikute organisatsioonilist võimu oma liikmeskonna üle ning kiriku sekulaarset võimu avalikul alal.

II uurimus analüüsib *poliitilise legitiimsuse sekulariseerumist,* eristades rassistlike poliitikate näitel nelja ajaloolist faasi, mille käigus kiriku institutsiooni ja kristlike uskumuste roll sotsiaalpoliitilise korra legitimiseerijatena on vähenenud. Esimeses faasis olid kiriku institutsiooni võim ja kiriku poolt määratletud usuline legitiimsus suurimad, kuna kiriku institutsioon tõlgendas autoriteetselt kristlikke norme, müüte, sümboleid ja pühakirja osi, mis toimisid jagatud „keele" ja sotsiaalse raamistikuna kõigi ühiskonna liikmete, sfääride ja institutsioonide jaoks.

Järgnenud faasides kiriku institutsiooni roll poliitilise legitiimsuse tagamisel vähenes vastavalt sellele, kuivõrd tugevnes sekulaarne riik ning kaasajastus majanduslik tootmine. Ehkki mingi versioon (konfessionaalsest, kultuurilisest, rahvuslikust, tsivilisatsioonilisest) kristlusest jäi poliitilise legitiimsuse tagamisel instrumentaalseks ka viimases faasis, piirdus traditsioonilise kiriku võim selles sümboolse kultuuriidentiteedi esindamisega. 19. sajandi keskpaigast alates on rahvus- ja kultuurkristluse vormid vahetanud poliitilise legitiimsuse tagamise rollis lõplikult välja varasemad piibellikud, dogmaatilised ja müütilised lunastuskristlused.

III uurimus vaatleb *poliitilise kultuuri sekulariseerumise* ajaloolisi arengufaase ning ühiskondlikele ja regionaalseid mustreid postkommunistlikes ja Lääne-Euroopa riikides.

Ehkki alates neljandast sajandist saab Euroopa ühiskondi pidada kultuuriliselt kristlikeks, on vastava kultuurkristluse sisu, vorm ja funktsioon kaasajastumise käigus muutunud analoogiliselt kiriku sotsiaalsele võimule ja rollile poliitilise legitiimsuse tagamisel. Kaasajastumine pole kõrvaldanud kirikut avalikult alalt, küll aga on järjepidevalt vähendanud kiriku institutsiooni ja kiriku-defineeritud religiooni otsest võimu.

1960ndatel aastatel leidis Lääne-Euroopa ühiskondades aset murranguline ühiskondlike väärtushoiakute sekulariseerumine. Inimeste sidemed traditsiooniliste kirikute, kiriku õpetuste ja kollektiivsete usupraktikatega nõrgenesid ning lagunesid varasemad abielu institutsiooni, sugude vahelisi suhteid ja seksuaalsuhteid reguleerinud jagatud normid.

Postkommunistlike ühiskondade uskumused ja väärtushoiakud ei ole ei ateistlikud ega ka konfessionaalsed-kiriklikud. Ka postkommunistlikud kultuurid on

säilitanud sidemed kultuurilise kristlusega, kuid tüüpiline postkommunistlik kultuur on Lääne-Euroopa omast vähem liberaalne ja individualistlik ning enam korraldatud etnilis-keeleliste identiteetide järgi. Piirkonnas levinud etniline natsionalism võimaldab kirikul esindada kultuurkogukonda sümboolselt ka juhtudel, kui kultuurilised väärtused ja rahvusidentiteet on valdavalt sekulaarsed (nt Eestis).

IV uurimus analüüsib, kuidas on kiriku võimu vähenemisele kaasa aidanud kiriku klerikaalsed sidemed poliitiliselt ebaõnnestunud režiimidega.

Uurimusest selgub, et tihe seos rahvusliikumise vastase režiimiga 19. sajandil on mõjutanud kiriku ja religiooni staatust ühiskonnas rohkem kui sidemed teiste poliitiliselt ebaõnnestunud – kommunistliku või fašistliku – režiimiga. Kõigis ühiskondades, kus kirikliku religiooni näitajad on endiselt kõrged – Poolas, Slovakkias, Horvaatias ja Leedus – *puudub* kirikutel ajalooline side rahvusliikumisevastase režiimiga. Kõigis ühiskondades, kus kirikliku religiooni tase täna on madal – Eesti, Läti ja Tšehhi Vabariik – on kirik olnud rahvusliikumise alguperioodil rahvusliikumise vastaste poliitiliste jõudude poolel.

Uurimuse leid aitab selgitada kultuurilise sekulariseerumise mustreid nii Lääne- kui Ida-Euroopas, kuid on üheksa postkommunistliku ühiskonna seas märksa olulisema kaaluga, kuna viimastes on kiriku ja religiooni osa kultuurilises rahvusidentiteedis võimendanud pikaajaline rahvusluse areng ilma poliitilise omariikluseta ning ka kommunistliku režiimi periood. Sõltumata sellest, kas kommunistlik poliitika kiriku suhtes oli repressiivne või kaasav, kommunistliku režiimi periood kaldus nõrgendama eelnevaid nõrku sidemeid rahvuse ja kiriku vahel (Eesti, Tšehhi Vabariik, Ida-Saksamaa) ning tugevdama sidemeid, mis olid tugevad juba enne kommunismi (Horvaatia, Leedu, Poola).

V uurimus tuvastab nelja liiki luterlikku poliitikat Eesti kultuuris, mille liikmed on traditsioonilistest kristlikest institutsioonidest tänases Euroopas kõige enam võõrandunud.

Kõige tähtsamad luteri kiriku funktsioonid poliitikas on seotud tsiviilreligiooni ja kultuurilise rahvuslusega. Mõlema puhul on tegemist sellise kiriku osalusega poliitikas, mis on *kõige vähem* defineeritud kiriku traditsiooni ja institutsiooni poolt, ent on *kõige funktsionaalsem* kaasaja postkommunistlike etniliste natsionalismide kontekstis. Taas on oluline side poliitilise kultuuriga – kui luteri kiriku kui institutsiooniga (kodanikuühiskonnas toimiva huvigrupiga) samastub umbes iga viies eestlane, siis luterluse kui rahvuskultuuri sümboliga saavad samastuda kõik patriootilisi tundeid omavad eestlased.

Viie uurimuse kokkuvõttes saab järeldada, et kommunistliku perioodi mõju kiriklikule võimule on toimunud ajaloolises rajasõltuvuses (*path dependency*). Kaks kommunismi-*eelset* riigi ja kiriku vahelist võitlust – Reformatsiooniajastust tulenev jagunemine katoliiklikeks ja luterlikeks kultuuritraditsioonideks ning kiriku sidemed rahvusliikumisega 19. sajandil – on mõjutanud kiriku võimu *peale* kommunismi rohkem kui kommunismi-aegsete riigi ja kirikute suhete loomus.

Kaudselt, ehkki soovimatult, on kommunistlikud režiimid aidanud ka säilitada kiriku traditsioone ja väärtusi ühiskonnas. Kommunistliku režiimi sotsiaalsed struktuurid kaitsesid usutraditsioone kaasajastumise ja individualiseerumise eest ning kommunistlikele režiimidele omane illiberaalne ühiskondlike väärtuste süsteem on aidanud säilitada traditsioonilisi väärtushoiakuid (homoseksualismi taunimine) isegi ühiskondades, milles valdav enamus inimestest on tänaseks kaotanud sidemed traditsiooniliste kirikutega.

Tulemuste üldistamisel tuleb meeles pidada, et läänekristliku kultuuritaustaga postkommunistlikud ühiskonnad on alles hiljuti jõudnud traditsiooniliste kirikute avalikke funktsioone nõrgendavate majanduslike (vaba turg) ja poliitiliste (iseseisev rahvusriik, demokraatlik ja pluralistlik kultuur) struktuurideni. Ühiskondades, mille majanduliku tootmise viis on traditsiooniline ning poliitilise valitsemise traditsioon kas uus, nõrk või olematu, on oodatav, et usutraditsioonid ja usulised institutsioonid täidavad traditsioonilisi ühiskondlikke, kultuurilisi ja poliitilisi funktsioone.

Traditsioonilise usulise võimu langus *sõltub* majandusliku, ühiskondliku ja poliitilise arengu tasemest.

PUBLICATIONS

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- Democratic Institutions and Theories (2010, 2011, 2012)
- Introduction to Political Philosophy (2005, 2006, 2007)
- Introduction to Political Science (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011)
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Õpetamise kogemus

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