Ukraine’s attitude towards European integration since the 2010 presidential elections:

Through the lenses of Rationalism and Constructivism

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I have written the Master’s thesis independently.
All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of
literature and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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Abstract

This study focuses the issue of Ukraine’s attitude towards European integration since the 2010 presidential elections. It looks at speeches and articles from Ukrainian officials about European integration. Using constructivism and rationalism as lenses, we are able better understand Ukraine's attitude towards European. The periods preceding the 2010 presidential elections have been studied by Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) and state the period from 2006 – 2010 is a period of strongly rationalist modes of argumentation between EU and Ukraine. The research question is: how has Ukraine’s behaviour concerning European Integration changed since the 2010 presidential elections? This study is important because the presidential elections in 2010 marked a change of president, government, as well as potential change in foreign policy in Ukraine. The first chapter gives an introduction and looks at the methodology used in the study. The second chapter looks at what literature is available on the topic of European integration and gives a brief overview of the European Union's attitude towards Ukrainian integration. It also looks at the theoretical framework the case study will use, which is an adaptation of Kratochvil and Tulmets' original study. The third chapter includes the case study which starts by giving a brief background to Kratochvil and Tulmets' findings and follows on with the post-presidential election analysis. Finally conclusions are drawn finding that Ukraine’s attitude towards European integration has most stayed the same, with a focus on rationalist modes of argumentation. Similar to the before the elections, officials have also moved back to constructivist modes occasionally. The biggest change which was seen was Ukraine new ability to use Russia and the Customs Union as leverage, or as an alternative to EU integration, to European integration in an attempt to speed up the EU’s integration with Ukraine.
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# List of Abbreviations

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>IR</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction and Overview

1.1 Introduction

Ukraine’s stance towards European integration has been a subject of great debate in recent years since the 2010 presidential elections saw the victory of Viktor Yanukovych and the end Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency. Prior to 2010, the Orange Revolution had meant to have signified Ukraine’s decision to move closer to Europe. Following on until the end of Yushchenko’s presidency, Ukraine’s relations with the European Union moved in the downwards trajectory (Kropatcheva, 2011, p.527). Yanukovych’s victory in 2010 was seen in the media as an event which would dramatically change Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities, moving it away from the European Union and closer to Moscow (BBC, 2010). What did eventuate after the elections was Yanukovych reconfirming Ukraine’s European integration hopes by making his first foreign visit to Brussels and expressing future goals including signing the Association Agreement. Along with this, Yanukovych also planned to repair relations with Russia (Kropatcheva, 2011, p.527). Due to the geopolitical significance of Ukraine for the European Union and Russia, both actors also influence Ukraine’s European Integration progress, as well as influencing each other’s. This is specifically important now that Ukraine’s new government has stated its aim to ‘reset’ relations with Russia (Kropatcheva, 2011, pp.525). Due to Ukraine wishing to continue and develop relations with both Russia and the European Union, Russia is also an important player concerning Ukraine’s European integration and makes Ukraine’s vision of European integration not at all independent from the EU and Russia’s vision. With this multi-vector foreign policy Ukraine is now following (Kropatcheva, 2011, p.534), the verdict is still out as to whether Ukraine’s European integration, most immediately the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union, will be achieved in the near future.

What is expected is Ukraine’s official attitude towards European integration has changed because of changes in policy President Yanukovych’s has made since the beginning of his presidency. The stakes are high, as Ukraine and the European Union both see each other as important partners. At the same time, there are still issues which
are hindering a perfect relationship from forming, including their attitude towards each other. Ukraine is part of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, grouped with some countries with very little geographical and economic connection to Europe, as well as having no membership prospective with the EU. As well as this, internal issues in both the EU and Ukraine, such as the Eurozone crisis which has made member states more cautious of further enlargement in the EU and issues of ‘selective justice’ in Ukraine have slowed relations. This said, Ukraine and European Union officials alike have stressed the importance of further integration. President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso stated in the 2013 EU-Ukraine Summit that “The Association Agreement we have negotiated with Ukraine is the most advanced agreement of this type ever negotiated by the European Union and will bring concrete benefits to both EU and Ukraine's citizens” (EUROPA, 2013). Ukraine’s President Yanukovych has stated the importance of continuing the follow reforms moving Ukraine towards the European Union. “I want to assure that the policy of reforms will be continued. We believe that this is the only one real step which can be used to improve the life of Ukrainian people and is the only way which could lead Ukraine to the number of leading countries in the Europe” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2011b). Ukraine and the European Union see each as vital partners, therefore the issue of Ukraine’s European Integration is worthy of further study.

To gain a better understanding as to whether the presidential elections and Yanukovych’s victory in 2010 marks a turning point in Ukraine’s relations with the European Union and subsequently its attitude towards European integration, this thesis is going to look at the behaviour of Ukraine towards European integration post-2010. Through the lenses of rationalism and constructivism this study will look at the behaviour and argumentation Ukraine’s elites are using in speeches and articles written by them concerning European integration, allowing us to answer the research question: how has Ukraine’s behaviour concerning European Integration changed since the 2010 presidential elections. Most of the speeches and articles have been sourced from English language pages. Speeches which needed to be translated from Ukrainian into English have been professionally translated by Olesia Tymchenko, a professionally employed translator of Ukrainian and English. These results will be able to be compared to the
previous study by Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) in their previous work ‘Constructivism and Rationalism in EU External Relations’ to see whether the current government has in fact changed its behaviour concerning European integration compared with the final years of Yushchenko presidency.

Constructivism and rationalism are two theories which can be said to project two different types of behaviour when used as lenses to analyse discourse. As this thesis is a follow on from the previous work by Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010), the specific definitions of constructivism and rationalism will be taken from the previous study. Constructivist modes are identified as reasoning or argumentation whereby the actor follows certain rules concerning their identity. An example for Ukraine’s case can be the argumentation that Ukraine has a shared history and identity with other European countries therefore Ukraine has a place within the European Union. This shows that Ukraine’s identity requires Ukraine to comply with internal norms, such as their European identity, regardless to whether this is beneficial or not. Rationalist modes are identified when an actor is trying to maximize their benefits. For example, Ukraine wanting to move further forward with European integration because it would allow the country to gain access to further aid and it is the best option for improving living standards in Ukraine. (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010)

Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) in their study saw that since Ukraine’s independence the country has gone through “a linear transition from a constructivist interpretation of the mutual relations to the rationalist negotiations aiming at the maximisation of the country’s benefits” (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.85). Kratochvil and Tulmets found that the only break in this trend was after the Orange Revolution in 2004 where Ukraine reverted back to constructivist modes of behaviour which were eventually found to be ineffective when leaders “realised that not even the revolutionary change of the government was sufficient to more than marginally increase the EU’s willingness to welcome Ukraine as a new member” (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.85). This saw Ukraine forced back to the rationalist mode of behaviour in the years prior to Yanukovych’s victory. This represents an important point in this study, showing Ukraine’s original European integration hopes, specifically the farfetched attempt at getting full membership, were already seen as unrealistic by the Ukrainian government.
even before Yanukovych’s victory. We can see that, because of this, potentially Yanukovych’s victory does not mark such a massive change in Ukraine’s attitude towards European integration, like many predicted, due to Yushchenko’s government already having made such a change.

On the other hand, it is important to analyse the behaviour of Ukraine after 2010 because of the significant change in foreign policy concerning Russia. The Russian led Customs Union has come up as a potential alternative to the European Union – Ukraine Association Agreement since Ukraine’s new government has made one of its priorities the improvement of relations with Russia (Connolly & Copsey, 2011, p.554). This again could change Ukraine’s attitude towards European integration. To put it simply, the research question of this thesis is: how has Ukraine’s behaviour concerning European Integration changed since the 2010 presidential elections?

This study is split into three main chapters. This first chapter sets out the methodology used when researching for this thesis. It gives an overview of the resources collected, such as speeches and articles by elites from the government’s official websites and other online sources. The methodology is based on Kratochvil and Tulmets’ work but has needed to be modified to fit with the limitations of this thesis and with recognised weaknesses of the original study. The main difference between the two works is the previous work mainly relied on interviews as their primary resource whereas the current case study will strongly rely on speeches and articles to analyse the argumentation used towards European integration. As well as this, the original work looks at both third countries’ behaviours, such as Ukraine’s, as well as the European Union’s behaviour. This thesis looks only at Ukraine’s behaviour, requiring strong justification as to why we can assume the European Union’s behaviour has not changed.

The second chapter covers the theoretical framework and includes the literature review. First, the literature review is going to give a background to the previous research done on the topic of Ukraine’s European integration. At this point, the previous work by Kratochvil and Tulmets is excluded due to it being covered more fully later in the theoretical framework and run up before the case study is covered. The literature review finds that most authors look at the topic mainly in the light of rationalist thought,
not completely disregarding constructivism but still seeing Ukraine’s decision making concerning European integration as strongly a cost-benefit analysis for the elites.

Secondly in chapter two, the theoretical framework will be set out. It is strongly influenced by the previous work of Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) but also gives a more general background of rationalism and constructivism. The strength of Kratochvil and Tulmets’ (2010) study is it takes into consideration both constructivism and rationalism, instead of solely seeing Ukraine’s European integration through solely a rationalist or a constructivist framework. The theoretical framework for this study finds that it is in agreement between Kratochvil and Tulmets and other authors such as Jachtenfuchs (2002) that constructivism and rationalism are most successfully used when they are not fighting for primacy. Instead both constructivism and rationalism should be used together to successfully identify the main impacts ideas and identities have on decision making, in this case in the argumentation used by Ukraine. Finally there is a subchapter discussing how the European Union continues to be a rationalist actor towards Ukraine, this analysis is based on existing literature. It is important to understand the European Union’s attitude towards Ukraine because to gain a complete understanding of Ukraine’s attitude towards European integration, we need to understand what sort of actor Ukraine is working with.

In chapter three the case study is covered. It begins with a brief overview of Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) study of Ukraine to give an idea of where the study moves on from. This is the majority of the thesis work and will reveal the results of the case study.

Overall, this thesis looks at the changes which occurred after the 2010 presidential elections and see whether there has been any changing with Ukraine’s attitude towards European integration. To do this, this thesis uses rationalism and constructivism as lenses to look at the behaviour Ukraine has projected concerning European integration since the 2010 elections and see if this differs from the results Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) came up with concerning of the second half of Yushchenko presidency (2006-2009) prior to Yanukovych’s victory, which in this thesis will be referred to as the ‘fourth phase.’
1.2 Methodology

The previous research done by Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) looked at the timing and conditions in which the European Union and its neighbours moved between four positions, comprising of weak and strong constructivism and weak and strong rationalism (see Table 1, pp. 33). To follow on from this research, this thesis is going to use similar methodology to look at the behaviour of the new Yanukovych government to see if the 2010 elections marked a change in attitude towards European integration compared with the final years of the Yushchenko presidency.

Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) use what they called a ‘double triangulation’ methodological framework. The first ‘triangle’ was the three different types of datasets including interviews with elites, ENP official documents, and key speeches of leading decision makers. The second triangle consisted of the three groups they obtained the information from including decision makers from ENP partner countries, decision makers from chosen ENP member states, and representatives of EU institutions. Due to the smaller breadth of this thesis with its focus solely on Ukraine, the second ‘triangle’ which Kratochvil and Tulmets use is redundant. The datasets used in this thesis come from an adaptation of the first ‘triangle’ in Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) research. A strong focus is put on the analysis of key speeches and articles written by leading decision makers and representatives of Ukraine. Alone, these speeches and articles give a clear depiction of the current attitude Ukraine has towards the European integration.

The reason Ukraine is chosen over the other EaP countries is due to the large significance Ukraine has to the European Union being the largest EaP state. Ukraine represents a significant opportunity for the European Union due to its large economy as well as its geographic positioning between Russia and the European Union linking Ukraine with Europe’s energy security. The change in government in 2010 represented a significant time in Ukraine’s European integration also. The defeats of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko marked the end of the government the Orange Revolution had brought into power and many critics saw the new Yanukovych government being a sure sign of Ukraine’s failure, or having given up, with European integration and beginning of a slide back towards Russia.
In the study of Ukraine, the main methodological tool used was the examination of speeches and articles by Ukrainian official’s concerning European Integration. The speeches and interviews were sourced from online, most from official government websites such as the President of Ukraine’s website, the Party of Regions website, along with the website for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Particular focus was made on discourse from prominent elites who regularly spoke about European integration, such as: President Viktor Yanukovych, Minister of Foreign Affairs Leonid Kozhara, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kostyantyn Gryshchenko (10 March 2010 – 24 December 2012), Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, and Ambassador for Ukraine to the European Union Kostiantyn Yelisieiev. Overall, twelve speeches and two articles were sourced from online. Although there was a larger number of speeches available from some of the websites used, such the President’s Official webpage, speeches were chosen which had a significant segment devoted to the topic of European Integration. Speeches which only mentioned European integration briefly, not allowing for a mode of argumentation to be identified, were excluded from the study.

For each different piece of discourse the same examination occurred. Whereas Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) look at the type of arguments which are used by officials to explain their country’s participation in the ENP, because this thesis is focusing on Ukraine’s attitude towards European integration in general, with specific focus on current issues concerning integration such as the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, it is going to look at the specific arguments and behaviour Ukraine’s officials use towards not only the topic of the ENP, but more broadly the topic of Ukraine’s European integration. Their arguments and behaviour are looked at through the constructivist and rationalist lenses allowing for a conclusion to be made on whether Ukraine has continued with the mostly rationalist behaviour similar to the final years of the Yushchenko government, whether it deviated back to constructivist modes such as it was straight after the Orange Revolution, or perhaps moved into a territory in the middle where both constructivist and rationalist modes of argumentation are both used.

Within Kratochvil and Tulmets’ (2010) methodology their primary focus is on the vast interviews they did with elites. A weakness they mention is in these interviews it is possible for the interviewee to simply not tell the truth (Kratochvil & Tulmets,
2010, p.51). For this particular reason they also used speeches and documents to supplement the interviews to provide the ability to compare the results of the different datasets. For this thesis, the main focus is on the speeches and other official discourses. Speeches and other official discourses which are available online are not only abundant and easy to access, but also many are officially released by the Ukrainian government. The use of speeches in the previous study as method to understand the modes which Ukraine’s officials downplayed in their interviews shows the strengths of using speeches and other official discourses in such a study. Where many of the speeches and articles written by elites were solely focused on European integration, others were speeches where European integration was only one of the many topics. A limitation which occurred was the inability to gain sufficient amounts of discourse which had been translated into the English language. To solve this issue, the Ukrainian pages of official websites were also used and relevant excerpts from speeches and other releases in Ukrainian have been translated into English specifically for this thesis.

A methodological weakness which this study could encounter is the influence the European Union’s behaviour has on Ukraine’s behaviour and vice versa. Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) study looks at both the European Union as well as ENP member states whereas this study only looks at Ukraine. For some conclusions to be drawn, it is required for us to understand the European Union’s attitude towards Ukraine specifically. Because this study is only looking at the 2010 and onwards attitude of Ukraine itself, evidence from other scholarly articles is used to suggest the European Union’s rationalist behaviour has not changed towards Ukraine since 2010.

An inconsistency of the study is that the previous study looks at the European Union and neighbour’s behaviour towards the ENP, not European integration in general. This works well in a study of more than one ENP member because it allows for attitudes and behaviour to be gathered from different countries concerning the same policy with the EU. Because this study focuses solely on Ukraine’s behaviour, we are able to look more specifically at current events and issues concerning Ukraine’s particular European integration situation. This includes not just its attitude towards the ENP, but its attitude towards the Association Agreement as well as issues specific to Ukraine like the accusations of politically motivated charges.
Concerning the original study by Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010), there are a number of weaknesses which have been expressed by reviewers which need to be addressed. One criticism is that the original study’s research is mainly sourced from interviews with respondents which are not always convincing (Petrov, 2011, p.1753). Petrov (2011) states that most of the interviews are conducted with middle-level civil servants which may not represent accurately the whole picture. Petrov (2011) suggests that interviews should had been conducted more with “political leaders, opposition parties, experts, and academics” (Petrov, 2011, p.1753). In this case study, the main focus is on the main political leaders and decision makers concerning Ukraine’s relations with the European Union, including the President and Prime Minister. Although Petrov’s (2011) criticism is valid, with his suggestion that middle-level civil servants may not represent accurately the whole picture, it can be assumed that such a study which looks at statements of political leaders and decision makers would also give an accurate representation of the state’s position on the matter. Along with this, speeches from leaders and officials are more easily accessible. If we were to not take into consideration the words of political leaders and high officials in Ukraine, the question could be asked as to which official statements would be more representative of the country.

Petrov (2011) also states that the timeframe of the book is a weakness which is not the fault of the authors. Petrov (2011) states:

“Since that time, the political environment in most of the considered countries has considerably changed. For instance, the election of President Yanukovich in 2010 has led to drastic reshuffling of the executive responsible for Ukraine integration in Ukraine, and therefore many of the people interviewed by the authors have already left their posts.”(Petrov, 2011, p.1753)

Although this is a criticism of the original work which does not cross over to this case study, it does show the relevance for following on with this case study, in particular with Ukraine.

Due to the differences between this case study and the previous study by Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) it is clear that there is not going to be a perfect flow on
from the previous study into this case study. What this case study does do is give conclusions which are comparable with the previous study. From this study we are able to see whether Ukraine’s attitude has changed since the 2010 presidential elections even though there are differences in the methodology. The use of the same definitions for constructivism and rationalism and similar framework of analysis allows for the conclusion of both studies to be comparable, even if it is not perfectly replicating the previous work.

Overall, this thesis looks at the behaviour of Ukraine concerning European integration after the 2010 presidential elections. It is going to look at the argumentation in speeches and articles through the lenses of constructivism and rationalism to see which fits best with Ukraine’s attitude. This will allow for us to gain a better understanding of the current situation between Ukraine and the European Union and allow for us to see whether the 2010 presidential elections marked a turning point in relations between the two sides.
1.3 Overview of EU-Ukraine Relations

Ukraine’s relations with the European Union in recent years have been defined under the current European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) project. Preceding these, EU-Ukraine relations were set in writing with the “Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) which entered into force in 1998 and provides a comprehensive and ambitious framework for cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, in all key areas of reform” (European Union External Action, 2013a).

Within the ENP, ‘action plans’ are the main method the European Union offers financial assistance to ENP states, such as Ukraine. The 2004 Action Plan agreed between the EU and Ukraine set out goals to help Ukraine meet the objectives of the PCA which was signed in 1998. With the conclusion of the Action Plan, the 2009 Association Agenda was agreed upon to replace the Action Plan (European Union External Action, 2013a). Other Action Plans have also been signed between Ukraine and the EU, such as the Action Plan on Freedom, Security and Justice which has been in place since 2001, as well as the more recent 2010 Action Plan concerning visa liberalization (Council of the European Union, 2010).

EU – Ukraine relations are significantly important for both actors. Further political and economic integration with the European Union would strengthen Ukraine’s economy as well as benefit the European Union allowing easier access into Ukraine’s market place.

Of most importance to EU-Ukraine relations at present is the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement which will be the successor to the PCA which was signed in 1998. An agreement to negotiate the Association Agreement happened in 2008. Presently, the Association Agreement has been agreed upon by both the European Union and Ukraine in the 15th EU-Ukraine summit in 2011, but has not been signed yet. (European Union External Action, 2013a)

The Association Agreement has not been signed due to issues the European Union has with the current situation concerning in Ukraine. At the EU-Ukraine Summit in February 2013 the European Union delegates European Council President Herman
Van Rompuy and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso stated the areas the European Union needed to see tangible progress by May for the Association Agreement to be signed at the Eastern Partnership Summit in November. These were, the issues of “selective justice” particularly concerning former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and her Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko, who has recently been pardoned by President Yanukovych (Associated Press, 2013), progress made concerning democratic short comings from the October 2012 parliamentary elections, as well as an advancing in judicial reform (“EU sets May deadline for Ukraine’s reforms,” 2013).

The Association Agreement, if signed, would be the first agreement based on political association between the EU and any Eastern Partnership country. Along with this, it would be unprecedented in its breadth and in depth of the agreement signed due to number of areas covered and the detail(European Union External Action, 2013b). This said, the Association Agreement does not mention at all the future prospects for Ukraine to join the European Union as a full member.

“The key parts focus on support to core reforms, economic recovery and growth, and governance and sector cooperation in areas such as energy, transport and environment protection, industrial cooperation, social development and protection, equal rights, consumer protection, education, youth, and cultural cooperation” (European Union External Action, 2013b).

Kropatcheva (2011) gives an overview of the main benefits the Association Agreement would have for Ukraine.

- The DCFTA would open Ukraine to the world’s largest market. This is beneficial but not issue free, due to the European Union’s agricultural and steel industries being two of its most protected.
- It would integrate policies including justice and home affairs allowing in the future for visa liberalisation.
- Integration would allow for reforms across all sectors. This would allow for increased capacity in a more effective bureaucracy. This would be beneficial for citizens and business in Ukraine who would then be able to more effectively seek legal redress through judicial reforms.
- It would allow for Ukraine to gain access to further funds through the ENP to assist integration.

The ‘Deep’ in the DCFTA means that the agreement aims to establish economic regulations in Ukraine and not just slash tariffs, something which is not very beneficial to Ukraine due to its WTO membership along with the European Union. Established economic regulations would be in areas such as competition policy, state aid, and movement of capital and labour. Ukraine would gain from less protectionism in industries such as agriculture. ‘Comprehensive’ means it includes both goods and services. (Kropatcheva, 2011)

In concern to EU-Ukraine relations the domestic issues mentioned above, such as the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, as well as the issue of ‘enlargement fatigue’ has made relations strained. Experts believe that the European Union is using the ENP as a method to slow down integration with countries such as Ukraine due to the European Union having its own internal issues (Stegniy, 2011, p.63). These issues, combined with other factors such as Russia’s influence in the area, make current EU-Ukraine relations not so straightforward. Currently Ukraine is in a position where it is required to make further changes before the European Union is ready to sign the Association Agreement.
Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

2.1 Literature Review

Current literature on Ukraine’s progress towards European Integration is abundant and gives a background of the development and the issues which Ukraine has faced in the past up until now. The literature questions the possible direction Ukraine is pointed with current President Viktor Yanukovych striving for what seems to be a multi-vector foreign policy which situates Ukraine between both the European Union and Russia. Although Ukraine’s European Integration prospects is a complex topic which could be divided or categorized in many different ways, most analysis of EU – Ukraine relations is strongly rationalist and looks mainly at the interests and benefits for Ukraine and the European Union. Although constructivism is also applied in some studies such as Kropatcheva (2011) and Stegniy (2011), it is clear that rationalism is the more dominant way of studying Ukraine’s current foreign policy. Three possible factors which can be used to categorize influences on Ukraine’s foreign policy are: the influence and interests of external actors, the influence and interests of the political elites, along with the influence of Ukraine’s national identity. Although the study of the first two factors is almost an entirely rationalist task, the final factor concerning the influence of Ukraine’s national identity is constructivist but seems to be downplayed as having as much influence on foreign policy compared to the other two factors due to authors emphasizing the importance of Ukraine having a ‘rational’ or ‘pragmatic approach’ to its foreign policy in general (Stegniy, 2011, p.67) (Kropatcheva, 2011, p.535).

Kropatcheva (2011) uses neo-classical realist theory when looking at Ukraine’s foreign policy choices. The strength of neo-classical realist theory when it comes to looking at the foreign policy choices of a country such as Ukraine is that it strongly takes into the account the ability of the political elites to put personal interests first when making foreign policy decisions. Steven R David’s (David, 1991, p.239-240) definition stated in Kropatcheva’s (2011, p.523) article describes this in a fitting way for Ukraine. It says the state is ‘representative of a group that holds power in the capital …
and] do not want to relinquish their only opportunity to acquire and keep wealth and influence.’ This shows a strong rationalist approach to Kropatcheva’s theory which mostly leaves out the impacts of identity and culture. Kropatcheva explains that elite’s personal interests continue to be dominant influence in Ukraine due to the culture of seeking compromise in politics not having been established yet. Along with this, external actors, including the West and Russia, have severely restricted Ukraine’s foreign policy choices.

2.1.1 Influence of External Actors

Some of the main external influences which have affected Ukraine’s European Integration are the different degrees of support and the specific offers which the European Union and Russia have directed towards Ukraine as well as other influences such as the economic crisis which was extremely damaging to Ukraine’s economy and slowed down Ukraine’s integration (Connolly & Copsey, 2011, p.561). Concerning this thesis, the most important two are the European Union itself, as well as Russia.

Currently the Eastern Partnership (EaP), brought about by Poland and Sweden and now part of the ENP since its introduction in 2009, is one of the main projects which EU and Ukraine bilateral cooperation works under. Stegniy (2011) argues that the current bilateral dimension of the EaP is modelled on Ukraine–European Union relations. It results in the EaP having little added value for Ukraine in a bilateral sense.

The EaP has been used by Ukraine to move closer to an Association Agenda, which is currently initialled but not signed with the European Union. The Association Agreement has currently been postponed by the EU due to the current backslides in democracy in Ukraine. As Stegniy (2011) states, and is commonly agreed upon, the Association Agreement is a compromise for the European Union and Ukraine due to the member states unwillingness to commit to further enlargement. This is a rationalist view whereby Stegniy argues that the European Union is looking at gaining its own benefits from the EaP with Ukraine’s aims and goals being second priority to the European Union’s.
The Association Agreement with the European Union is an agreement which trumps Customs Union membership which has been proposed by Russia. Elena Kropatcheva (2011) in her article ‘Ukraine's Foreign Policy Choices after the 2010 Presidential Election’ states that Russia cannot offer long-term development which the EU is able to offer, but does draw attention from Ukraine due to its ability to offer short term help through lower gas prices. This is attractive to the Ukrainian government due to lower gas prices being of instant benefit for citizens, therefore very good for government support. This results in a situation where Ukraine is trying to gain benefits from both the European Union as well as Russia. Kropatcheva (2011) perspective is Ukraine’s decision makers need to make a cost-benefit analysis and decide which is most beneficial for Ukraine, the Association Agreement or the Customs Union.

During the election Yanukovych stated that many of his goals would not be able to be achieved without western help. Kropatcheva (2011) explains that this mainly concerns modernization where the European Union is in a much better position to help Ukraine unlike Russia which is unable to assist with modernization due to it being in a similar position to Ukraine with out-of-date and inefficient industry left over from Soviet times.

Kropatcheva (2011) lays out the potential gains Ukraine could get from signing the Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, visa liberalisation, further integration across all sectors, and access to more funds. The DCFTA is beneficial but not issue free, due to the European Union’s agricultural and steal industries being two of its most protected.

Even though the European Union’s offerings are potentially much more rewarding than anything Russia could ever offer, there are a number of barriers in Europe’s foreign policy toward Ukraine which mean have resulted in Ukraine not always showing full support for European Integration. Stegniy (2011) includes a survey in his article ‘Ukraine and Eastern Partnership; ‘Lost in Translation?’”. It offers us an insight into both the opinion of experts and of citizens in Ukraine. The ENP has been the main forum for dialogue between EU and Ukraine but has not been very effective. The Association Agreement would very much relight integration between both partners if it was to be signed. In the article, experts believe that the ENP is weakened due to its
lack of diversity (Stegniy, 2011, p.62). This is due to all countries in the ENP being lumped into one basket. This is seen as detrimental to Ukraine due to it being lumped with countries such as Libya and Syria which are countries in completely different situations to Ukraine concern European integration. The Eastern Partnership is seen as having similar problems within the ENP where there are countries such as Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the same article experts bring up the issue of uneven funds distribution within the ENP (Stegniy, 2011, p.62). Countries on the Mediterranean coast are directed more funds than Europe’s eastern partners due to interests by countries in the region such as France (Stegniy, 2011, p.62). This leads to experts concluding that the European Union and Ukraine have different objectives concerning the ENP (Stegniy, 2011, p.63). The European Union sees it as a way of creating a ‘buffer zone’ or a ‘ring of friends’ (Stegniy, 2011, p.63) which share common values with the EU, basically using the ENP purely for their own interests. The experts themselves believe the ENP is some sort of intermediate stage within EU-Ukraine relations which can only be half successful along with the Eastern Partnership, stating that it shows the EU reluctance to commit to further enlargement (Stegniy, 2011, p.63), yet another example of rationalist opinion this time towards the European Union side.

Proedrou’s (2010) study sets out three key factors which influence Ukraine’s foreign policy. These are Systemic Constraints, Societal and State interests, and Identity Politics. A key systemic constraint which Proedrou (2010) identifies is Russia’s influence on Ukraine in history. This continues to influence Ukraine today. Russia’s Black Sea Navy Base which is based in Sevastopol recently had its lease extended another 25 years past the initial 2017 expiry date by the newly elected Yanukovych government. Russia sees this deal of grave importance not just from a military perspective but also from geopolitical perspective. The removal of its Black Sea Navy from Ukraine would show a clear back slide of its influence in the country. Russia’s goal of keeping an influence in Ukraine comes from Russia identifying itself as an actor which wants to compete with the European Union over influence in the EaP area. Russia not only wants to identity itself as a potential superpower, or at least regional power, but also sees Ukraine has an integral part of the Customs Union’s expansion.
Having an even closer link to the ‘influences of external actors’ is the ‘geopolitical boundary’ which Stegniy (2011) discusses. It is clear in the Ukrainian case that the main geopolitical boundary is its positioning between the EU and Russia. Due to this Russia has a strong influence on Ukraine with the ability to potentially pull Ukraine away from Europe and towards itself. With this said, Stegniy concludes that the majority of Ukraine’s foreign policy is Euro-Atlantic Integration. Stegniy (2011) states it is important for Ukraine to improve relations with Russia if Ukraine is to try and develop relations further with the EU and the United States. This is not only because of Russia’s strong influence in Ukraine, but also Russia’s strong influence in Europe which can allow Russia to change Europe’s policies away from Ukraine if the EU-Russia relationship is threatened. Experts believe that European Integration should be given a priority over Russia integration due to the longer term rewards Europe offers. These results show a rationalist view is again used on Ukraine by Stegniy, whereby he sees Ukraine as looking for the most beneficial results and sees this as a position where Ukraine is working towards European Integration as well as keeping on better terms with Russia.

In April 2010 Ukraine and Russia signed the Kharkiv Accords, an agreement which seemed to contradict previous talks of a pro-western vector by Yanukovych. The Kharkiv Accords includes an extension of the stay of Russia’s Black Sea Navy fleet by 25 years in Sevastopol in exchange for a 30% reduction on gas prices until 2019. Along with this there were bilateral meetings discussing other matters. Kuzio (2012) states that if the Kharkiv Accords had been proposed before the election, Yanukovych may not been victorious. Many saw the agreement as bad for Ukraine due to it forcing the country to purchase too much gas, which could eventually result in an agreement which would include the loss of Ukraine’s gas transit lines to Russian ownership. (Connolly & Copsey, 2011, p.555)

On the other hand, the Ukrainian government has stated there are limitations concerning how far they are willing to go when it comes to resetting and establishing closer relations with Russia. Explained by Ukrainian authorities, their inability to join the Customs Union is due to Ukraine’s WTO membership and it being unable to join a union with non-WTO members (Kuzio, 2012).
What affect has the Kharkiv Accords had on European Integration prospects for Ukraine? Connolly and Copsey (2011) believe the agreement should have no effect on the DCFTA. It is believe that Yanukovych continues to see integration as a way of increasing living standards in Ukraine and seeks to gain easy wins such as the visa liberalisation within the Association Agreement which would hopefully increase his popularity. The increased stay of the Black Sea Navy in Ukraine is seen as an easy sacrifice to gain an arguably cheaper gas deal, another simple cost-benefit calculation. The Black Sea Navy is not a modern navy and is seen as a more nostalgic relic for Russia. Connolly and Copsey (2011) see the key issue for the European Union is the reduction of gas prices which lessens Ukraine’s need to become more efficient.

“Subsidized gas prices remove the incentive for Ukrainian consumers to become more energy-efficient. Higher levels of energy efficiency would make Ukraine’s economy as a whole more efficient, improve integration with the EU, and make the IMF more willing to support Ukraine as it emerges from an exceptionally severe economic slump” (Connolly & Copsey, 2011, p.559)

So why after the election did the new government turn its sites towards Russia so quickly? Connolly and Copsey (2011) state that the new government inherited debt which was unable to be funded by the IMF and other players on the world market due to Ukraine’s deficit of GDP and IMF’s requirement that Ukraine increase its domestic gas prices, something which would be a unpopular move on a government which was trying to maximize support. The only other way to gain IMF support, they argue, is for Ukraine to gain a cheaper deal from Russia and forward the reduction to Ukrainian consumers. Overall, Connolly and Copsey (2011) see Ukraine’s decision to gain closer relations with Russia after the 2010 elections as purely another tactic by Ukraine to gain benefits they desperately need. Connolly and Copsey’s (2011) reasoning concerning the Kharkiv Accords is again another example of rationalist thought concerning Ukraine’s foreign policy. No mention is made of the potential cultural links or similarities between Ukraine and Russia which could potentially have influenced such an agreement. Instead the Kharkiv Accords are seen as purely a strategic agreement by Ukraine to try and gain maximum benefits possible from its neighbour in the east with little substantive sacrifice.
The issue of energy supply through Ukraine from Russia to the European Union has also had an effect on the way the European Union and Russia has treated Ukraine and its integration prospects. Pavel Baev (2010) in the article ‘Energy Intrigues on the EU’s Southern Flank: Applying Game Theory’ looks at the issues concerning energy transportation which the European Union has. It looks at countries and how they have impacted this issue, mainly concerning the transportation of natural gas from Russia into the European Union. The 2006 gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia which resulted in an unstable supply of gas to Europe resulted in the European Union developing its own energy strategy. Stegniy (2011, p.16) finds in his survey of experts that there is a “‘Russian imprint’ on the strategic priorities of European Union countries such as France and Germany in relations to Ukraine.” Stegniy (2011) also found that Russia had an influence on Ukraine’s rhetoric towards Europe also. “The Participants in both expert and mass surveys observe a clear negative correlation between Ukraine’s attitude towards European integration and supplies of Russian gas to the country: the integration rhetoric increases when gas supplies to Europe are interrupted”(Stegniy, 2011. p.16). This again shows a rationalist view of relations between the European Union and Ukraine, as well as Russia. Not only are the strategic priorities of member states influenced by Russia due to its fundamental position as an energy supplier, but also Ukraine increases its integration rhetoric towards the EU when gas supplies are interrupted. This is another rationalist view where Ukraine is attempted to convince the European Union that it is beneficial for it to allow further integration because it will potentially stabilize Europe’s energy supply from Russia.

2.1.2 Nature of Political Elites

The ‘Nature of Political Elites’ in Ukraine has since independence had a strong influence on Ukraine’s foreign policy. Along with corrupt officials and politicians putting their own interests before national interests, politicians are also linked with different elites in different industries who have interests in Ukraine's foreign policy moving in one direction or another. Whereas some elites are against reform and integration with Ukraine, others fear Russia’s industrial complex and the threat it could
have on Ukrainian elites’ power if Ukraine was to move closer to Russia and its customs union.

Taras Kuzio (2012) states in the article ‘Ukraine’s relation with the west since the Orange Revolution’ that leaders in Ukraine have on more than one occasion put personal interests before national interests when dealing with issues concerning foreign policy, resulting in situations such as the failure to increase public support for NATO by Yushchenko and the postponement of the signing of the Association Agreement due to Tymoshenko’s imprisonment. Kuzio (2012) states both Yushchenko and current President Viktor Yanukovych both shares this trait of putting personal interests before national interests. These sorts of decisions by Ukrainian leaders have resulted in relations between the EU and Ukraine going through what Kuzio (2012) calls cycles of disinterest, partnership, and disillusionment. Even after the Orange Revolution, a time when Ukraine’s identity and European nature was meant to push Ukraine towards European Integration, authors still see that elite’s in power continued to fight for their own personal interests in a rationalist manner.

Part of Proedrou’s (2010) three key factors fits in ‘nature of political elites’ also. The factor ‘state and societal interests’ has a strong link with political elites and their own personal interests. Proedrou identifies numerous state and societal interests which steer foreign policy. The article points out that the west can provide better security and modernization for Ukraine which is a better long term political, economic, and security choice, where as Russia has more attractive short term solutions which are in the interest of some in Ukraine also. Overall, it shows that there are opposing players in Ukraine, be it businessmen, elites, or politicians, who are split in support for either further European Integration or further integration with the Custom’s Union, or neither.

Politicians have played off these contrasting positions in Ukraine to gain popularity and prevent their oppositions gaining ground in either direction. Proedrou (2010) points out the post-Orange Revolution movement towards NATO and the EU by President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Viktor Yanukovych in opposition managed to gain support and block Ukraine’s military exercises with NATO by stating it threatened the establishment of a Unified Economic Area with Russia which was potentially beneficial to the Ukrainian economy, something which a lot of
the country supports. (Proedrou, 2010, p. 449) Putting personal interests in front of Ukraine’s national interests ultimately resulted in Ukraine’s failure to join MAP which would lead to NATO membership and pulled Ukraine closer to Russia with Yanukovych becoming Prime Minister.

Most authors still see personal business interests and rent seeking playing a large part in the current Party of Regions government. Along with this many members see further integration with Russia as beneficial to their own business ventures. Connolly and Copsey (2011) mention that Ukraine’s new foreign policy doctrine states that diplomacy would work in the primary interests of the Ukrainian economy. In the Party of Regions government this is understood as meaning it is in the interests of big business supporters of the party (Connolly & Copsey, 2011). Along with this, rent seeking within the government means that gaining concessions for an inefficient gas sector allows those in authority to gain. This has made the modernization of the gas sector not as urgent as it should be and removed the incentives of big gas consumers to become more efficient (Connolly & Copsey, 2011, p. 559).

The trial of Yulia Tymoshenko and her subsequent imprisonment was the biggest setback in Ukraine’s European Integration prospects since Yanukovych came to power. The European Union decided to draw a red line with Ukraine concerning Tymoshenko’s imprisonment due to it being potentially politically motivated and a breach of democracy. Kuzio (2012) argues that this is rather hypocritical of the European Union who in the past has ignored more democratic breaches by the Ukrainian government. This continues to be on the key issues inhibiting the signing of the Association Agreement. This is clearly an issue concerning the nature of political elites in Ukraine also. Taking in to account the threat Tymoshenko is towards Yanukovych’s power, the jailing of Tymoshenko is a clear example of the ruling party strengthening their position of power in a way which is detrimental to Ukraine’s progress towards European Integration. Kuzio (2012) stating that it is hypocritical of the European Union to now draw this redline and state that the European Union has previously ignored breaches of democracy again suggests that Kuzio (2012) views the situation as purely rationalist. The European Union has got to the point where it has decided to slow, or perhaps halt, Ukraine’s European integration for its own purposes.
This is applicable to Tymoshenko’s imprisonment also, where Kuzio sees the imprisonment as simply another method of the current governments to consolidate their own power.

2.1.3 Influence of National Identity

Ukraine’s national identity plays a role in the formation of Ukraine’s foreign policy. This is due to Ukraine’s bipolar society which is divided by historical ties as well as by language. Stegniy’s (2011) research clearing shows the clear east-west divide in Ukraine where the west is pro-Europe and the east is pro-Russia. Along with a geographical divide there are other demographic divides. The European Union is supported predominantly by the young and professionals with higher education where Russian orientation is supported by elderly and people with incomplete secondary educations (Stegniy, 2011, p.16). Most importantly, even though the Association Agreement with the European Union could be very beneficial to all Ukrainians, the majority of Ukrainians see EU-Ukraine relations still as a primary in interest of the EU.

Proedrou’s (2010) final factor is ‘identity politics’ which should play a huge role in a country like Ukraine due to its bipolarity. Due to the division in Ukraine there are low majority governments which end up not applying consistent foreign policy. This causes a lack of clarity when the country comes to choosing its ideological stance.

In Stegniy’s (2011) article he has ‘Cultural Boundary.’ Experts believe that Ukraine is perceived in Europe as a border country and has a limited place in Europe’s mental map. In a cultural and civilisation dimension experts agree that the similarities outweigh the differences between Europe and the Western Ways. Aligned with this, the survey of the Ukrainian public believe that there are some differences in culture between Ukraine and the West but these differences can potentially be overcome allowing for integration.

Overall it is evident in previous research concerning Ukraine’s European integration, most constructivist thoughts are put in second position to more rationalist modes when looking at what factors influence European integration.
Previous literature on the topic of Ukraine’s European Integration and foreign policy uses different frameworks and theories. Whereas the likes of Stegniy (2011) use a previously constructed ‘political boundary framework’ to look at the potential hindrances and also potential benefits which can help Ukraine gain closer integration with the EU, others such as Kropatcheva (2011) who use neo-classical realist theory and categorize influences into specific sections. The majority of authors who look at Ukraine’s European Integration see Ukraine’s decision mainly as a rational process where the actors are solely trying to find the most beneficial outcomes. This view is not always complimented by the constructivist side which is partly used by Stegniy (2011) in his incorporation of the ‘cultural boundary’ in his framework. Proedrou’s (2010) article also incorporates the constructivist school successfully. Kropatcheva’s (2011) five factors take into account identity’s influence on Ukraine’s foreign policy but continue to put a strong emphasis on the rational choices which need to be made by the new government. Overall, looking at recent literature written about Ukraine’s European integration prospects we are able to conclude that rationalism play a much stronger roll than constructivism. Although there is nothing specifically erroneous with this method, constructivism should play some role when examining Ukraine’s motives. In this case study rationalism and constructivism will be balanced by using both as lenses to examine Ukraine’s attitude and argumentation concerning European integration. This will follow on from the previous study which has used a comparable methodology when looking at European integration.
2.2 Theoretical Framework

Balancing rationalism and constructivism allows us to take a range of ideas into account when looking at Ukraine’s European integration. This study and the previous study by Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) are certainly not the first examples of this occurring. Authors Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel (Jupille, Caporaso, & Checkel, 2003) find that most contributions to the debate of constructivism and rationalism use a comparative testing method which occurs in this case study. Along with this, other authors such as Schimmelfennig, (2003) use constructivism and rationalism together in their studies. This shows the use of both theories used together are a popular way of conducting such a case study.

In the past integration theory has traditionally been dominated and divided between the neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist schools (Pollack, 2001). During the 1980s and 1990s the European Union saw a re-launch of integration which brought forward new more “general, generalizable, theoretical approaches” (Pollack, 2001). With this came the rationalist and constructivist debate which Pollack (2001) believes has contributed more broadly to International Relations instead of simply in the field of integration theory. Pollack states that neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist debates fit only within the European Union due to its uniqueness but the rational choice and constructivist debate works throughout IR as a whole now allowing the European Union to “serve as a laboratory for globalization, [and] institutionalization” (Pollack, 2001, p.18). This gives rationalism and constructivism strength over integration theories whereby it is more applicable to a wider range of applications. Along with this Pollack (2001) has argued that the rationalist model has worked as an umbrella to cover other approaches such as realist, liberal, and institutionalist approaches within IR. This shows signs of convergence around the one single rationalist model.

The framework for this study is strongly influenced by the previous research done by Petr Kratochvil and Elsa Tulmets (2010) in their book ‘Constructivism and Rationalism in EU External Relations.’ The book ‘Constructivism and Rationalism in EU External Relations’ is a study looking at the ways EU Institutions, member states, as well as third countries have conducted themselves and acted towards each other.
concerning the European Neighbourhood Policy, a policy which is an instrument used by the European Union to seek closer ties with its neighbouring countries. Importantly for this thesis, it looks at Ukraine and how Ukraine has acted since its independence concerning European Integration up until the end of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency in the beginning of 2010. The book uses two main theories, constructivism and rationalism, and looks at speeches, interviews and documents from each side to see how actors have acted concerning European Integration. In the same time periods it compares the European Union and three participating countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood; Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia. It then concludes which theory more closely matched to each actor.

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<th>External country</th>
<th>Normative actor</th>
<th>Rational Actor</th>
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<td>European Union</td>
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Table 1: Combinations of rationalism and constructivism  (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.30)

The two main theories being used here are theories which have been defined in conflicting ways in the past. To clear up the issue and create a study which would not get hung up on metatheoretical issues the authors create two definitions for the theories which are clear and contrastable. In the light of the definitions stated below, we can see that constructivism fits close to the idea of ‘normative’ interests, whereby an actor relates itself to an ideal standard or model when making decisions, such as Ukraine’s ‘Europeanness’. Rationalism fits close to a more ‘interest based’ model whereby an actor is making decisions based on its interests and maximizing gains.

“Constructivism, as we will discuss it here, is defined as the conviction that ideas matter and that the basic behavioural mode of social actors is rule-following. To rephrase the definition differently, actors’ (intersubjectively constructed) identities require compliance with internalised norms, irrespective of whether these norms bring these actors additional benefits or not.”

“Rationalism, on the other hand, is defined as the conviction that social actors try to maximise their self-interest (which may be both material and ideational)
and that they rationally manipulate their environment (which may also be both material and ideational) to reach their ends.” (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.26)

Jachtenfuchs (2002) states that some argue that rationalism, along with constructivism, “constitute acceptable ways of explaining and understanding the world which can only be accessed in its own framework” (Jachtenfuchs, 2002, p.652). It is added that there is some doubt that each can be tested against each other. Applying these thoughts to the study by Kratochvil and Tulmets, it appears they have come up with an appropriate framework which allows for both constructivism and rationalism to be applied in a way where they both effectively complement each other allowing us to further understand the behaviour of different actors when dealing with the European Union’s external relations. The study goes against the common assumption made by constructivists who believe that all of international relations only consists of either constructivists “who follow their traditional pattern of behaviours with inherited norms and values as the main guiding principle” or rationalists “who are egoistic, reflexive, and rational utility-seekers” (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.28)

Jachtenfuchs states that the current controversy between constructivism and rationalism “boils down to the debate on power of material interests on the one hand, and ideas and interests on the other hand” (Jachtenfuchs, 2002, p.653). Wiener (2003) sees it as constructivism simply being a countermovement to rationalist approaches in IR. Whereas rationalism purely looks at the interests different actors have in a cost-benefit manner, constructivists look more at the way social facts, such as norms and culture, construct the interests and the way identities of agents or states are constructed (Jupille et al., 2003, p.15). Jupille et al. (2003) states constructivism is not a substantive theory per se but an approach to social inquiry which works under two assumptions. “a) The environment which agents take action is social as well as material b) The setting can provide agents with understandings of their interests (and constitute them)”(Jupille et al., 2003, p.14). Overall, constructivism can be described as a countermovement which questions the materialism which rationalism is based.

Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) compare their two definitions with the Weberian notions of ‘goal-instrumental action’ and ‘traditional action’ stating that both rationalism and constructivism respectively are very similar but not identical. ‘Goal-
instrumental’ action is similar to rationalism as it aims to maximize its own utility. Countering this, ‘traditional action’ is rule orientated such like constructivism, whether it be in the form of unconscious compliance concerning customs, traditions, or in compliance with explicit yet also irrational acceptance of social, cultural, or religious norms which form the principle of the person or group’s behaviour. (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.26)

One popular argument against rationalism is its failing to take into consideration the impact cultural and ideational influences have on actor’s decision making. In Archer’s review of ‘Oakeshott on Politics’ he states that Oakeshott sees rationalists as “cooks who keep exactly to the recipe” (Archer, 1979) but sees this opinion of Oakeshott’s not as a strong argument against rationalism but simply an attack on the idea that technical knowledge is not the only type of knowledge. This is supported by Jachtenfuchs (2002) who states clearly that the fact both material interests and ideas and identities matter is simply a truism for people who are not aware of the ideas of rationalism and constructivism (Jachtenfuchs, 2002). Kratochvil and Tulmets in their definition state that rationalism “may be both material and ideational” (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010a) which allows for this criticism to be doubt with. Quackenbush (2004) backs up this position by stating that actors simply do what they ‘prefer’ to do which means that institutional, cultural influences, and psychological limitations are included. This is again said in the ‘Handbook of International Relations’ where it is stated rationalism is “any goal seeking behaviour” (Carlsnaes, Risse, & Simmons, 2002). Jupille et al. goes even further when describing rationalism by stating “when faced with several course of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to have the best possible outcome” (Jupille, Caporaso, & Checkel, 2003, p.11). In this light, we can see that through the lens of rationalism society is viewed from the ‘bottom-up’ with actors shaping events by following whatever their own interests are, opposed to constructivism which is seen as viewing society as ‘top-down’ where actors act in a way which is shaped by their identity and environment (Fearon, Wendt, Carlsnaes, Risse, & Simmons, 2002, p.53). The possible inability of rationalism to take into consideration the impact culture and identity has on actor’s decision making is not an issue in Kratochvil and Tulmets’ work because they are using along with rationalism the constructivist lens which takes this strongly into account, further showing the strength
of rationalism and constructivism being used in unison. Kratochvil and Tulmets’ (2010) aim in their research is to distinguish what behaviour the actors are following in specific periods of time. The two definitions clearly give the ability for the authors to identify whether an actor is being either constructivist or rationalist in any specific period.

In Kratochvil and Tulmets’ (2010) study, the authors go against the common assumption made by constructivists who believe that all of international relations consists of either constructivists “who follow their traditional pattern of behaviours with inherited norms and values as the main guiding principle”(Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.28), or rationalists actors “who are egoistic, reflexive, and rational utility-seekers”(Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.28). The author’s methodology includes the possibility for players to change their actions and behaviours to suit different situations. Along with this it is possible for actors to have different actions or behaviours towards other actors at the same time. For example, they state the European Union may have a utilitarian manner towards China while being more normative towards actors in its closer neighbourhood (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.29). Jupille also states that in situations of interdependent choice, such as in Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) study, the “actors will work strategically taking into account the expected actions of others”(Jupille et al., 2003, p.12). Due to this thesis only focusing on Ukraine’s behaviour towards the European Union, it is required to find solid evidence that during this time the European Union is working in one particular behavioural pattern, seen in subchapter 2.2.

Overall the use of rationalism and constructivism together is a method which is able to give integration theory an ability to widen its scope and contribute to other areas such as IR. Along with this, such a broader theory allows us to answer more general social theory questions by looking into the relationships between institutions, interests, and ideas. (Jachtenfuchs, 2002)

Pollack (2011) states that the rationalist school’s strength is that it allows us to model the interaction between domestic and international politics. We are able to see the impact globalization and other external effects have on domestic politics and on the domestic actors preferences. Along with this we are able to “understand the aggregation
of preferences within domestic institutions of individual states, and two level games played by chiefs of government” (Pollack, 2001, p.19).

The key for rationalism and constructivism to be successful Jachtenfuchs (2002) states is for it to have an open approach to preference formation in both domestic and international politics which tries to make an argument about the impact ideas and identities have on decision making “instead of trying to prove the causal primacy of either factor at any price” (Jachtenfuchs, 2002, p.656).

Kratochvil and Tulmets’ work fits strongly with Jachtenfuchs’ (2002) idea that rationalism and constructivism need to work together and not against each other for them to successfully identify the main impacts ideas and identities have on decision making concerning European Integration. Because of this, looking at the current Ukrainian government post-2010 elections is a follow up work which would be of value to contribute towards further understanding Ukraine’s foreign policy direction specifically concerning the European Union.
2.3 The European Union as a Rationalist Actor (2010- )

When looking at Ukraine’s attitude towards the European Union concerning European Integration, we need some understanding of what behaviour the European Union has at the same time towards Ukraine. This is because “actors will work strategicaly taking into account the expected actions of others” (Jupille et al., 2003, pg 12). The behaviour of the European Union towards ENP members is covered in the original work by Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) because they not only look at ENP members but also different institutions and countries in the European Union. What is important to remember is that the change in 2010, which is the point where the research on Ukraine’s attitude starts in this study, is the presidential election and victory of Viktor Yanukovych, an event which could strongly change the direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy, including its stance on European integration. At the same time, no real change happened in the European Union meaning it is possible that the European Union’s attitude towards Ukraine is still currently the same as it was prior to President Yanukovych’s victory.

Kratochvil (2011) states that there was a “gradual replacement of the constructivist, normatively-oriented rhetoric with… rationalist argument based on self-interest and egoistic utility maximisation” (Kratochvil, 2010, p.36). This is “also reflected in the increase in the reliance on argumentation based on consequences.” (Kratochvil, 2010, p.36) In the initial years of the ENP, it is stated that the European Commission spoke of enlargement and stressed the roles of common identity and values. Over the years up until 2010, when the study finished and arguably continuing on until now, they have changed their attitude to one of a more rationalist approach stressing a utilitarian orientation on common interests. With the institutional behaviour the European Union has, it has successfully managed to change Ukraine’s behaviour towards a rationalist approach.

The assumption that the European Union has continued to work in a rationalist behaviour is supported by Özgür Ünal Eriş (2012) in his article ‘European Neighbourhood Policy as a tool for stabilizing Europe's Neighbourhood.’ Eriş (2012) states that the ENP is an alternative for third countries made available for them instead
of membership prospects. Eriş (2012) states this has occurred due to the EU’s ‘enlargement fatigue’. At first glance it is argued that the ENP is a normative approach by the European Union because it is an attempt to spread Europe’s core liberal values and norms beyond its own borders using political conditionality as the main instrument. Looking deeper it is clear that the European Union, for now, continues to use the ENP in a rationalist manner focusing on its own interests. Post-2010 the European Union has not changed the ENP from being an alternative to membership, with the European Union in the EU-Ukraine Summit in 2011 not mentioning membership prospects at all.

Eriş (2012) continues by stating that some countries within the European Union, such as France and Belgium, also have strong reasons not to wish for further integration with Ukraine. This is due to the economic and political instability in Ukraine which Eriş (2012) argues would need to be solved at these countries’ expense. Situations like this show clearly the ENP which Ukraine and other third countries are now part of is very much a substitute for membership perspectives, making it a method for the European Union to minimize any harm which could potentially occur if these countries were to gain much closer ties with the EU. Along with this, the European Union has a crucial relationship with Russia which potential further integration with Ukraine could impede on. Because of these reasons, the European Union cannot be seen as being a fully constructivist or normative power when dealing with Ukraine. Because of situations such as this, Eriş argues that the European Union through its ENP is following more rationalist modes of behaviour.

“"The ENP was designed to achieve two objectives: to spread stability, security, and prosperity in EU’s neighbourhood as a way to minimize the risks of instability flowing across the EU’s borders, and to prevent the feeling of exclusion within the new neighbours and avoid further enlargement at the same time” (Eriş, 2012, p.256).

Eriş (2012) sums it up by stating that the European Union is in a position currently, and if factors stay the same will be in the same position into the future, where it is not in its own interest to make the ENP a priority. Although this does not make the ENP a purely rationalist agreement, it shows that the European Union is in a position where it is using many rationalist elements in its logic. This result comes from the
European Union continuing to use the ENP for mainly its own interests and not the more normative and constructivist interests which were initially set out by the EU, such as improving the socio-economic difficulties in the ENP region.

Bruce Jackson (2011) also states that the European Union is using the Eastern Partnership as a method of controlling countries like Ukraine. “At a minimum, the Eastern Partnership would keep the historically troubled and troublesome countries of Europe’s east gainfully occupied until such time as the European Union could figure out what to do with them” (Jackson, 2011, pp. 59). Jackson believes that the potential gains which Ukraine reasonably expects from the European Union through further integration with the Association Agreement are nothing like the European Union is willing to give. Jackson (2011) states that the visa liberalization which would be within the Association Agreement is far less specific than what Ukraine reasonably expected, and that the European Union “insists on withholding access to agriculture, certain services, multiple products, and labor mobility which negates much of the free market benefits for Ukraine” (Jackson, 2011, pp. 60). With such an attitude, it is clear the European Union is not acting within constructivist modes when dealing with EaP countries, in particular Ukraine. The European Union continues integration with Ukraine in a way whereby it is almost solely concerned with how much it can absorb and is willing to give. “The Eastern Partnership is simply a tent for bilateral ad hoc-ery” (Jackson, 2011, pp. 61).

Concluding, when looking at the evidence from Kratochvil (2010) and Eriş (2012) and Jackson (2011) we are able to conclude that although the President and government of Ukraine changed in 2010, an event which has potentially changed Ukraine’s attitude towards European Integration as well as its foreign policy as a whole, the European Union is still in the same situation as it was prior. This suggests it is still using rationalist modes of behaviour towards members in the ENP, particularly Ukraine in this case, even though originally the ENP was meant to be a more normative initiative. Although the ENP was originally a normative initiative it has become something which could potentially be detrimental to the European Union therefore the European Union has changed its behaviour and started having a rationalist behaviour towards ENP members in an attempt to benefit itself instead of fighting the socio-economic difficulties in the ENP countries.
Chapter Three: Case Study

3.1 Kratochvil and Tulmets' study of Ukraine (-2010)

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<th>Phase</th>
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<tr>
<td>Main Features</td>
<td>Return to Europe, identity politics, modernisation of Ukraine through a quick EU accession, Ukraine’s “right” to EU entry</td>
<td>Frustration from the rejection of a quick EU entry, growing domestic problems, focus on short-term benefits</td>
<td>Renewed enthusiasm following the Orange Revolution, hopes for change in the EU’s approach</td>
<td>Europeanisation, return to pragmatic cooperation, gradual integration, membership not discussed</td>
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<td>Mode of behaviour</td>
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Table 2: Ukraine’s previous four phases (Kratochvil and Tulmets, 2010, pp. 92)

Before stepping into the post-2010 research concerning Ukraine’s behaviour towards European integration, to give us a strong footing it is crucial to look at the previous phases of behaviour Ukraine has gone through which have been researched by Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010). In concern to Ukraine, the authors state that the country went through four phases (see table 2) concerning its attitude towards the European Union during the 1990s and up until 2009. The first phase between 1990 and 1999 they title ‘Strategy of EU Integration.’ In this phase Ukraine sees membership into the European Union as an absolutely necessary task and saw European Integration as something which is positive for all spheres of life in Ukraine including domestic and international relations. Through the discourse they discover that Ukraine did not
compare the costs and benefits of membership. Instead they talk of their European identity and their right to a place in Europe. This makes the first phase undoubtedly a time where Ukraine was working with in a constructivist mode of behaviour towards to European Union.

After the failure of their first phase, Ukraine moved towards having more moderate expectations concerning their European Integration. This meant a move from identity politics to more pragmatic considerations. Instead of speaking of simple membership into the European Union, Ukraine began working towards more concrete short term benefits and goals. The failure of the 1990s to achieve much progress was put down to lack of support from the European Union and also technical issues within Ukraine. During the 1990s Ukraine was working under a constructivist mind set and believed the European Union was also, but in second phase Ukraine had moved to a move rationalist behaviour. Due to this rationalist behaviour, membership was less mentioned in official speeches and instead speeches focused more on specific parts of European Integration. Ukraine also began to use ‘rhetoric action’ towards the European Union, a technique commonly used by rationalists towards constructivists. During the period of 1998 to 2003 the authors argue that internal documents showed business as usual between Ukraine and the EU up until the ENP was signed in 2003. The second phase was as unsuccessful as the first phase for Ukraine because the EU was working as a rational actor and not constructivist resulting in Ukraine’s rhetorical speeches failing to have any effect. We can see that due to the European Union working as a rationalist actor the second phase was a time of ‘strong rationalism’ instead of Ukraine expecting it to be a time of ‘weak constructivism.’ As a result of this failure the 2000 – 2004 period showed a diminishing in the idea of EU enlargement including Ukraine.

The Orange Revolution showed a dramatic change in behaviour by Ukraine in 2004. Ukraine saw that due to it making the ‘European decision’ and moving towards democracy as a result of the Orange Revolution, the European Union would begin to be a lot more open to Ukraine’s potential membership. Ukraine seemed to completely forget the Russian vector of the second Kuchma government and most officials began to speak of Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ and democratic change. This brought no change from the European Union. At this time Ukraine’s diplomats to the European Union
understood the EU’s continued unwillingness and were aware of the huge expectation gap between Ukraine and the EU. This resulted in diplomats speaking of Ukraine being better off not expecting so much from the European Union. They also continued to speak of Ukraine’s right to become an eventual member state also. This was in particular shown by Ukraine’s EU ambassador Shpek.

Around two years into the Yushchenko government Ukraine changed back to a rationalist behaviour after becoming frustrated with the European Union’s unwillingness. With the third phase being similar to the first phase where speeches focused on the cultural proximity to the EU and Ukraine’s European Identity, the fourth phase is similar to the second phase in the early 2000s with its rationalist behaviour. The fourth phase happened 2006 onwards and again was the end of speeches including the topic of membership, a topic the European Union never took showed interest in, and again began to talk of small steps being made. Along with this President Yushchenko even spoke of Ukraine being not ready to join the EU yet. During this time both parties criticized each other with Ukraine criticizing the ENP as well as the EU calling for more reform in Ukraine.

The authors explain if the Orange Revolution in Ukraine had not happened there would had been a linear trend from constructivist to rationalist behaviour by Ukraine. 2006 onwards Ukraine finally embraced a rationalist behaviour but it was a phase marked by contradictory tendencies. Ukraine accepted pragmatic cooperation and ‘piece meal’ integration with the EU but also at other times there were strong discursive eruptions of dissatisfaction by Ukraine’s current situation having had to have moved from a constructivist to a rationalist behaviour due to their failures.

Looking at the interviews the authors agree that they support the general discourse. The interviewees downplayed or ignored the third phase making the second and fourth rationalist phases join. This makes Ukraine look as if it had constructivist behaviour between 1990 and 2004 and a rationalist behaviour from 2004 until 2010. This suggests the respondents are trying to cover up their mistakes in the third phase, supporting the idea that interviews are not as reliable of source.
The ENP was introduced at the end of the first phase and respondents agree that even though the ENP does not mention membership it did bring Ukraine closer to Europe. The respondents do mention though they do not understand why the EU lumped Ukraine in the ENP with North African countries as well as other countries which can never join the European Union. Due to this Ukraine put an emphasis on the bilateral instead of the multilateral side of the ENP. Some respondents even saw the ENP as a way the European Union could keep Ukraine out.

A decisive decision in the fourth phase (2006- ) was Prime Minister Tymoshenko giving up on the ‘enlargement-or-nothing’ rhetoric and taking a new ‘down-to-earth’ approach with smaller steps. This change was not only attributed to the role of the European Commission and general pressure but also due to the internal politics, such as the change in Prime Minister, in Ukraine. The respondents go as far to say the talks with the European Union went from talks of ‘enlargement’ to talks in terms of ‘political association and economic integration’ implying that it was very clear enlargement now was not an option. During this (2006- ) phase diplomats in constant contact with the European Commission saw the relationship as very good under the ENP due to their isolation from high ranking officials who continued to still stress about enlargement.

The respondents did see the European Union’s approach towards Ukraine as one of ‘take it or leave it.’ This showed the European Union’s unwillingness to talk with Ukraine on an even level and also their unwillingness to accept Ukraine’s views on documents. With this said, the respondents agree that the European Commission managed to convince Ukraine it was on their side. This shows that the European Commission was trying to find a compromise for Ukraine and the member states and therefore Ukraine was going to have to respect the line the European Commission was drawing in concerns to their relations. Some respondents believe the European Commission understood Ukraine better than some member states with one respondent mentioning that some member states thought Ukraine was still the same as in 1993. With this line drawn by the European Commission, the authors agree that Ukraine needs to begin to lobby the member states directly to gain support due to the European
Commission’s limits having been reached due to its position as a proxy of the member states.

During this period Ukraine continued to work with the European Union as if it was the only ‘European’ choice, using the term ‘European Union’ and ‘Europe’ synonymously. During the entire period of Ukraine’s relations with the EU the EU has remained in control through all four phases. The final years of Yushchenko’s presidency saw an end of the constructivist behaviour which had sprung up following the Orange Revolution in 2004. While the article states that some elites who were disconnected from actual negotiations continued to speak in a constructivist way about the European Union, on the whole Ukraine had changed its attitude and was now working with the European in a more rationalist way looking for smaller steps and progress instead of speaking of Ukraine’s right to EU membership and Ukraine’s European choice. With the election of President Yanukovych in 2010 Ukraine has entered into a new period, and potentially a new phase of behaviour, in relations with the European Union which Kratochvil and Tulmets’ article does not reach into.
3.2 Case study – 2010 onwards

When looking at Ukraine’s attitude towards European Integration onwards from 2010, it is evident that Ukraine has stuck mainly with similar rationalist modes of argumentation which were seen during the fourth phrase of Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) study. There is also evidence that Ukraine’s officials have used constructivist modes of argumentation in certain cases. In times officials have been quoted speaking about Ukraine’s European identity and have showed their frustration when speaking about the European Union’s unwillingness and reluctance to move faster with Ukraine integration. Frustration has also been directed at the European Union’s unwillingness to offer membership prospects. As well as this, Ukrainian officials have used rationalist argumentation when speaking of Russia and the Russian lead Customs Union as a possible alternative to European integration. For comparison purpose it is possible to call the time of Yanukovych’s presidency up until now the ‘fifth phase.’
3.2.1 Post-Election Rationalism – The Inclusion of Russia

On the 25th of February 2010 Yanukovych assumed office as President of Ukraine. Soon after on the 27th gave a speech to parliament in which he identified his aims for Ukraine’s foreign policy.

“Ukraine will choose such foreign policy which will allow our state to get the maximum result from equal and mutually profitable relations with Russian Federation, European Union, USA and other countries which influence on the development of the situation in the world” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2010a).

At a first glance after the election it was seen that Ukraine had predictively changed its foreign policy, putting Russia as a closer partner than previously. Along with this, Ukraine had now planned to follow a pragmatic foreign policy where it would look for “maximum results” but also look for solutions which would be mutually beneficial for all actors. Yanukovych went on to state “we are ready to participate in such processes as a European non-aligned state” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2010a). These initial statements fit well with his election campaign in which it was promised to revive relations with Russia as well and continue to work with the European Union. His confirmation that he planned to push Ukraine in the direction of a ‘non-aligned’ state with the European Union worked with both the European Union and Russia’s goals where the European Union is not prepared to work towards future membership with Ukraine while Russia is eager to pull Ukraine closer to the Customs Union. With the European Union having shown its unwillingness to enlarge during the end of Yushchenko’s presidency, Yanukovych knew that Ukraine was not going to be able to develop better relations if Ukraine was to continue to push simply for membership prospects, a status which Ukraine had learned was a failure from the Yushchenko years (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.83). Pushing for relations with both Russia and the European Union in a ‘non-aligned’ status meant Yanukovych would be able to push for benefits from both sides while attempting not to cause soured relations with the other. This follows on from the pragmatic cooperation which shaped the end of the Yushchenko’s rule, with the main difference being the resetting of relations with
Russia which Yanukovych saw as imperative considering Ukraine geopolitical placement and bipolarity. These initial speeches by President Yanukovych suggest Ukraine had continued to work with a rationalist interpretation of EU-Ukraine relations similar to Yushchenko's final years of presidency. Although this thesis is focusing on EU-Ukraine relations after the 2010 presidential elections, it seems imperative to mention Russia due to Ukraine’s speeches often mentioning both the European Union and Russia hand-in-hand.

To further embed Ukraine as a pragmatic actor Yanukovych stated on the 27\textsuperscript{th} of April that Ukraine’s foreign policy has to be conducted under a “pragmatic understanding of existing realia; leaving ideological, separated from life schemes and unnecessary confrontation, [with] maximal orientation on the practical result” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2010b). This further suggests Ukraine having a rationalist interpretation of relations with the EU, with practical results being the sole goal of Ukraine’s foreign policy with a stress on pulling away from ideology and other constructivist interpretation which Yanukovych states is not necessary. Following on in the same speech Yanukovych again states that Ukraine’s aims are not only to work for maximize practical results for itself, but also to maximise practical results for its international partners. This suggests that beginning of Yanukovych’s presidency, Ukraine saw the European Union and other actors also working in a rationalist mode.

“I am on the side of comprehensive strategic development of mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia in all spheres. This cooperation benefits not only for Ukrainian and Russian people but both for the Europe and the world. And this cooperation, by definition, cannot be directed against others” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2010b).

This again shows the most significant change from the Yushchenko era of rationalist behaviour and Yanukovych’s era. While Yushchenko’s foreign policy in Ukraine’s fourth phase was looking for purely rationalist results with the European Union, Yanukovych’s behaviour towards the European Union is one which is rationalist but wants to take into account other actors, most importantly Russia, at the same time.
Looking at these two particular speeches from President Yanukovych, we can conclude that in the initial six months of his presidency Ukraine was working in a purely rationalist mode which was trying to not only keep relations with the European Union on the same course as Yushchenko but also trying to repair relations with Russia at the same time. In these two speeches he speaks of both the European Union and Russia as partners which Ukraine wants to have mutually beneficial pragmatic relations with. Whereas in the beginning of Yushchenko’s presidency after the Orange Revolution Ukraine had a purely constructivist attitude towards the European Union which eventually failed and resulted in a change to more rationalist relations, Yanukovych started his presidency with a different tactic, to put both the European Union and Russia into the same position for Ukraine and have Ukraine look for purely the most beneficial relations with both sides. In this sense, when looking only at the relations between Ukraine and the European Union, from these speeches we can see that the rationalist ‘small steps’ approach continued through the change from Yushchenko to Yanukovych.
3.2.2 Frustration – A Return to Constructivism

Pure rationalist argumentation did not continue with Ukraine through Yanukovych’s period in power up until 2013 when this study was done. Seventeen months later, on 27 September 2011, in a speech at the plenary session of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw, Yanukovych stated his frustrations concerning the Eastern Partnership’s unwillingness to offer future membership prospects for third countries involved, statements which contradict his previously mentioned aim for Ukraine to be ‘non-aligned’. “The "Eastern Partnership" should be far-reaching project and not create any restrictions on those countries that are interested in joining the European Union and are ready to take corresponding liabilities” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2011a). In the same speech Yanukovych uses constructivist argumentation when discussing Ukraine’s place in Europe: “For my part I confirm the readiness for further searching of the consensus decisions regarding clear definition of final cause of rapprochement with EU for those partners who see their historical place in the united Europe” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2011a). Although in this speech he does not specifically state that Ukraine’s ultimate goal is membership with the European Union, it does suggest that Ukraine continues to feel as if the European Union is not offering enough. Comparing this to the rationalist argumentation seen straight after the presidential elections concerning Ukraine looking for maximum results in relations with the European Union as well as other international partners, constructivist argumentation seems to continue to be used in situations where Ukraine is in a position where it cannot realistically offer any other strong rationalist style argumentation concerning why the European Union should offer membership prospects.

At the EU-Ukraine Summit in December 2011, President Yanukovych again showed signs of Ukraine’s frustration towards the lack of membership opportunity for Ukraine into the EU. “Ukraine comes from the fact that each European country can apply for membership in the EU on condition of achieving certain criteria which are formalized in the basic treaty of the EU” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2011c). Again, this should not be an issue if Yanukovych stuck to his original words stating Ukraine aimed for the position as a ‘non-aligned’ state between the EU and Russia. This shows similarities to Yushchenko in 2007 in the fourth phase
of relations, the final phase of rationalist behaviour in Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) study, where Ukraine continued to show its frustration towards the European Union unwillingness to offer membership prospects and seeing the ENP as a weak replacement (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.84-85).

In April 2012 further constructivist modes of argumentation are used by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (March 11, 2010 - December 24, 2012) Kostyantyn Gryshchenko at a Key Address speech in London concerning Ukraine’s European integration. In this speech constructivist modes of argumentation are used to support not just Ukraine’s European integration aspiration but also to defend the rebuilding of Ukraine-Russia relations. Given that the audience to this speech was not officials of the European Union directly, but instead an audience from the International Institute of Strategic Studies, a reversion to a constructivist mode of argumentation may be explained by the Minister’s understanding that the speech does not need to suit the European Union’s rationalist mode. In the speech Gryshchenko speaks of how countries such as Ukraine should not be seen purely as ‘post-Soviet’ because there are new generations of post-Soviet people entering politics.

“They grew up with the faith, that at some point in their life their nations would be embraced by the rest of the continent as part of the big European family. Taking this faith away would mean undermining Europe’s potential of growth, both external and internal” (Gryshchenko, 2012).

“Today’s crisis is, first and foremost, a reminder to all Europeans to stay focused and to remember what the European unity is really about. In my view, it’s an unprecedented experiment to bringing together the nations that for centuries where (sic) opposed or hostile to each other” (Gryshchenko, 2012).

“This experiment shouldn’t be allowed to fail. Not because it’s “too big to fail”. But most importantly – because after two world wars and the “cold war” Europe is ready to step beyond yesterday’s hatred. Yet, in order to do so, it will need to step beyond yesterday’s stereotypes too. And most importantly – beyond the notion that Europe’s East and West (the EU and the post-Soviet space) cannot and won’t come together. They can and they should.” “Clearly, Europe cannot
be seen complete and truly “united” as long as the biggest in territory nation located entirely in Europe stays outside the EU” (Gryshchenko, 2012).

This strong reversion to constructivist argumentation clearly goes against previous speeches, such as the President’s which speak strongly of Ukraine’s foreign policy being one which is looking purely for ‘maximum results’. This shows a movement between rationalist and constructivist notions by Ukraine’s officials which suggests either that they are contempt with either ignoring the European Union’s rationalist tendencies, or that they simply use constructivist notions when speaking about the European Union (or other foreign actors) indirectly in such a forum where the European Union’s decision makers are not the main audience. To further strength the second suggestion, in the same speech strong constructivist argumentation is used to defend Ukraine’s renewed improved relations with Russia. Again this goes against previously strongly rationalist comments which had been made before.

“The Russian Federation is our closest neighbour and a (sic) biggest trade partner. In the light of the bonds connecting our countries millions [of] Ukrainians see it as more than just a neighbour and partner. For some- it is a second cultural motherland. For others – a nation coping with the same post-Soviet malaise Ukraine suffers from and wants to get rid of via EU integration” (Gryshchenko, 2012).

This particular speech shows a strong deviation away from the rationalist argumentation which had been stressed strongly at the start of Yanukovych’s presidency. Even though this shows that Ukraine’s officials are prepared to use constructivist argumentation when speaking about relations with the European Union and Russia, due to the type of speech it was and the type of audience listening it cannot be used to strongly convict Ukraine’s officials of using the constructivist mode on the same level as their use of the rationalist mode of argumentation.. What it does show is Ukraine’s willingness to continue using constructivist modes when possible, a similarity to the fourth phase of Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010) study where they found Ukraine showed frustration with the situation where they were forced to move away from constructivist politics to more rationalist benefit-seeking modes, due to the European Union.
3.2.3 Russia as a Rational Alternative

In speeches by President Yanukovych in August 2012 and Foreign Minister Leonid Kozhara in November 2012 Ukraine expressed its frustration, and perhaps stubbornness, concerning the European Union’s strong stance against internal issues in Ukraine, particularly the issue of ‘selective justice’ which have slowed Ukraine’s integration, as well as its frustration towards the slow progress being made in concerns to integration. These two speeches expressed Ukraine’s limits concerning the concessions it would make when working towards European integration. While Ukraine is mentioned as sticking to its European choice, strong rationalist modes of argumentation are again used concerning Russia, and that Ukraine should keep developing relations with Russia and the CIS, as well as strong rationalist modes used when arguing that Ukraine’s integration with the European Union is more beneficial for the European Union than Ukraine. Concerning European integration Yanukovych states that there are limits to the lengths which Ukraine would go to succeed further integration with the EU or Russia including not allowing for intervention in the internal affairs of Ukraine, possibly concerning the strong statements from the EU as well as other Western countries, in regards to the Tymoshenko case. “But we will never accept the integration at any cost, through loss of independence, economic or territorial concessions, and intervention in the internal affairs [of Ukraine]” (Press office of President Viktor Yanukovych, 2012).

Foreign Minister Leonid Kozhara in his speech at the conference ‘Ukrainian Foreign policy and the priorities of its OSCE Chairmanship 2013’ reiterated the frustrations Ukraine has when dealing with the European Union.

“I think the Europeans are still living with an illusion that there was in the past a kind of a golden age of the Ukraine – EU relations. They think if they just increase pressure on the current government, or simply change it, this golden age will return” (Kozhara, 2012).

Kozhara goes onto state:
“Those who talk about postponing of the EU-Ukraine summit, about sanctions and other such things, should think whom exactly they want to punish. Do they want to stop reform in Ukraine? Or is it better for the Europeans to deal with just talkers and imitators of reforms? Ultimately the choice is yours” (Kozhara, 2012).

This sort of questioning by Kozhara of the European Union’s motives concerning relations with Ukraine fits with Özgür Ünal Eriş (2012) in his article ‘European Neighbourhood Policy as a tool for stabilizing Europe's Neighbourhood’ where he determines that the European Union’s relations with Ukraine through the ENP are now purely rationalist with the European Union only working towards its own interests while neglecting Ukraine’s.

“The ENP was designed to achieve two objectives: to spread stability, security, and prosperity in EU’s neighbourhood as a way to minimize the risks of instability flowing across the EU’s borders, and to prevent the feeling of exclusion within the new neighbours and avoid further enlargement at the same time. (Eriş, 2012, p.256)”

Kozhara in his speech quotes experts from the British Chatham House in a study, stating:

“The negotiations on the Association Agreement have been highly technocratic, conducted in narrow official circles, with little effort to win over the general public or inform business of the implication and benefits. In the negotiations themselves, a fair degree of EU protectionism has been evident… The EU tends to approach any trade negotiations in terms of what the single market can absorb rather than focusing on the interests and needs of the negotiating party to make the cost-benefit analysis more favourable. Negotiations with Ukraine have not been different in that respect” (Kozhara, 2012).

Kozhara shows his frustration towards the European Union unwillingness to speed up relations with Ukraine and further mentions the benefits which further integration with Ukraine would have for the European Union. This again shows Ukraine’s understanding and expectation that the European Union is using a rationalist mode of relations towards
Ukraine. In the speech Kozhara goes so far to say that delaying the signing of the FTA, part of the Association Agreement, would only be beneficial for Ukraine’s producers. For the European Union, Kozhara states, that FTA is a lot more beneficial where as in Ukraine it would not benefit producers.

“However, it is no secret that the key part of the agreement – a free trade zone – is economically much more beneficial to the EU than to Ukraine.

If someone does not believe, one should look at how people in Ukraine discuss the FTA. Only politicians, policy experts and journalists speak about it. Over the last year I have not seen a single businessman, I emphasize, virtually no one, who would go to the streets and call for an immediate signing of the FTA. Ukrainian business is either silent or critical with regards to the FTA” (Kozhara, 2012).

Speaking to a European audience he states “So I just want to warn you: if your business in times of crisis does not need Ukrainian consumer market, please continue to further delay the signing of the FTA. Our producers will only thank you for that” (Kozhara, 2012). Furthermore this shows that the European Union is in fact now working as a purely rationalist actor which is looking simply for the most beneficial outcome for itself. If Kozhara’s statements are correct, meaning that the FTA in particular is almost purely beneficial for European business and not Ukraine’s, then frustration with why the European Union is not moving faster to implement such an agreement is reasonable. It specifically shows that the European Union currently works in a rationalist mode towards Ukraine to an extent but continues to respect the ‘red line’ which it has drawn in regards to a number of requirements it expects from Ukraine (Kuzio, 2012), most importantly concerning the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. This can be seen as the European Union falling back to a constructivist mode of argumentation in some cases, with Ukraine unable to understand why such issues are impeding on what they see as a relationship of which is purely of ‘strong rationalism’.

Soon after mentioning the limits which Ukraine is not prepared to pass in concerns to further integration, which can be seen as a reply to statements concerning
‘selective justice’ and the attempts the European Union has made to have President Yanukovych free Yulia Tymoshenko, Yanukovych went on to mention Russia and the importance it plays for Ukraine.

“Building a new state we are willing to build a new world, a new Europe of which Ukraine is an integral part. At the same time we must remember about the importance of relations with CIS, especially with our biggest trade partner and neighbor – Russia. We must develop all-round cooperation with our partners in the CIS where the biggest market for our producers is located. That’s why we shouldn’t leave integration processes in CIS out of sight” (Press office of President Viktor Yanukovych, 2012).

This again shows Ukraine specifically bringing up Russia, their possible alternative to EU integration, in the context of the European Union’s reluctance to move forward with integration with Ukraine.

Kozhara’s speech in November showed the same willingness for Ukraine to move towards further integration with Russia and the Custom’s Union in the east. It also shows Ukraine’s goal to integrate with both Russia and the European Union simultaneously.

“We are closely monitoring the Eurasian integration east of our borders. We can not ignore the processes occurring there. The share of the Eurasian Customs Union is already 40% of Ukraine’s foreign trade” (Kozhara, 2012).

Kozhara goes on to explain the percentage of value-added goods which are exported by Ukraine to countries of the Customs Union, and finalizes by saying: “These are the harsh economic realities in which Ukraine develops. They show that in the sphere of trade we can not just turn to one partner and forget about the other” (Kozhara, 2012).

This sort of discourse by Ukraine shows the ability of the new government under President Yanukovych to use Ukraine’s integration and trade prospects with Russia and the Custom’s Union as leverage to convince the European Union that it is in their interest to work faster in the progression of EU-Ukraine relations. This possibility was not able to be utilized by the previous Yushchenko presidency due to the sour relations
with Russia, giving the ability for the European Union to slow, or at least be reluctant with, integration with Ukraine without Ukraine having any other realistic alternatives.

In the same speech Yanukovych speaks with both constructivist and rationalist modes of argumentation concerning European Integration, Russia is also spoken of in the same manner, further confirming Ukraine’s ability to integrate east if the European Union decides to not go through with further integration, i.e. the signing of the Association Agreement.

“We are successfully building global interworking with our largest neighbor The Russian Federation with which we have old economical and humanitarian relations. Categories of pragmatism and constructive dialog were taken as a basis for Russian-Ukrainian cooperation and promote finding the ways of resolving the most pressing issues on the agenda in relations” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2012).

Ukrainian officials also seem to weaken their own arguments when speaking about Russia and the Russian lead Customs Union in comparison to European integration. Whereby it seems clear that Ukraine continues to try and use Russia to convince the European Union to go ahead with signing the Association Agreement and other forms of integration with Ukraine, Ukraine’s officials also at times make it clear that European Integration is by far best priority for Ukraine's foreign policy. Whereas in previous speeches talk of trade relations with Russia as being positive, such as Leonid Kozhara (Kozhara, 2012) speaking of the higher ratio of finished products being exported to Customs Unions countries compared with the European Union, the Ukrainian Ambassador to the European Union suggests strongly otherwise. An inconsistent opinion from Ukraine using rationalist modes of argumentation is clear in this example.

“All pros and cons of the European choice are clear. Achievements of the EU are obvious, as well as its challenges. Instead, the achievements of the Customs Union are yet hypothetical and virtual. They are all in the future, in the plans and desires of its masterminds” (Yelisieiev, 2013).
One month later Russia’s lead Customs Union is spoken of in both a rationalist and constructivist light by President Yanukovych, after speaking about Ukraine’s efforts to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. “At the same time I believe we should continue to actively seek mutually acceptable model of cooperation with the Customs Union” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2013). ‘Mutually acceptable’ suggests that Ukraine most likely does not want any integration with Russia to clash with its European integration targets. “Because Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan aren’t only trading partners and neighbors for us, but fraternal countries with which we associate a century of cooperative history” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2013).
3.2.4 European Integration as the Rational Priority

Soon before the 2011 EU-Ukraine summit in a speech in Kyiv to the heads of diplomatic missions in Ukraine, Yanukovych stressed the importance of reform in Ukraine.

“I want to assure that the policy of reforms will be continued. We believe that this is the only one real step which can be used to improve the life of Ukrainian people and is the only way which could lead Ukraine to the number of leading countries in the Europe” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2011b).

This suggests that even though Yanukovych has stressed that Ukraine needed to improve relations with Russia as well as continue to work with the European Union, the European Union is the option which would be much more beneficial for Ukraine. Again this shows a rationalist mode of argumentation by Ukraine, but it also shows that since the 2010 presidential elections Ukraine still sees the European Union has the more important foreign policy target, even though Ukraine continues to stress the importance of better relations with Russia.

In the speech at the 2011 EU-Ukraine Summit Yanukovych further evidence of Ukraine embracing the rationalist mode of negotiations with the European Union is suggest by stating the mutually beneficial results of the Association Agreement.

“The Conclusion of the Association agreement is the interest for of both parties. In the first place if take into account the possibilities which are created by the deep and comprehensive free trade zone. By this we start new possibilities for progressive Ukraine integration to EU internal market. That is extremely prospective market for Ukrainian manufactures approximation for which will stimulate modernization of the national economy and meet the European standards” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2011c).

This also shows Ukraine’s prioritizing the European Union over Russia, by stating the gradual integration of Ukraine into the EU internal market.
Further use of the rationalist mode of negotiations is expressed not only by the President, but the Ukraine Ambassador to the European Union Kostiantyn Yelisieiev in an article which was released on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine webpage. When speaking of the dialogue between the EU and Ukraine Yelisieiev speaks of “the ever intensifying dialogues in education, aviation, transport, customs and taxation, science and technologies, outer space – all the day –to-day operations that hardly make headlines, but, in effect constitutes the “flesh and blood” of Ukraine’s European integration” (Yelisieiev, 2012). This shows Ukraine’s continued focus on smaller steps concerning EU-Ukraine relations which are again similar to the rationalist mode seen in the Yushchenko presidency. When speaking of the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko in the same article Yelisieiev states “Ukraine’s EU integration should not choke on the Tymoshenko case. After all, the price is high. It’s about the sense of direction for the largest country situated wholly in Europe” (Yelisieiev, 2012). Through each lens we can see that a statement such as this expresses both a rationalist and constructivist mode of argumentation by Ukraine. First, it shows Ukraine’s plan to continue in the rationalist mode of relations with the European Union, looking for the best result for Ukraine and the EU, while attempting to push aside an issue which could have potentially a massive impact on EU-Ukraine relations. As well as this, Yelisieiev states that issues such as Tymoshenko should not choke the current relations because it is about the direction of the largest country situated wholly in Europe, a constructivist argumentation which stresses Ukraine’s place in Europe which should, in some way, excuse the use of ‘selective justice’ the European Union has accused Ukraine’s politicians of in the Tymoshenko case.

In contrast to the strongly constructivist mode which was shown by Foreign Minister Gryshchenko in April 2012 at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, in May 2012 Prime Minister Mykola Azarov held a speech in front of the European Parliament. In this speech a strong rationalist mode of argumentation was used which focused clearly on pragmatic results for both Ukraine and the European Union, as well as making it clear that Ukraine understood the European Union’s tough situation at the moment which was resulting with its hesitance for further integration.
“Unfortunately, our strategic advance in relationships with the EU took place as Europe and the rest of the world had to face a series of new challenges. These include institutional changes in the EU, austerity measures to overcome the Eurozone financial crisis, and developments in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Many people call this current crisis the most complicated one in the history of the European Union” (Azarov, 2012).

This sort of dialogue compares well to Ukraine’s discourse concerning European integration in the second half to Yushchenko’s presidency (fourth phase) where Ukraine concedes that internal issues in the European Union are hindering EU-Ukraine integration. In 2007 the goal was to have Ukraine’s membership perspective included in the future Association Agreement. In 2012 the issue was broader, with Ukraine conceding that the European Union’s issues are hindering integration in general for Ukraine with the European Union.

“We shall take every effort to ensure that the new document recognizes Ukraine’s EU membership perspectives. At the same time we are aware of the difficult situation in the EU due to the failure of referenda on EU constitution” (Kratochvil & Tulmets, 2010, p.84).

In the same speech by Prime Minister Azarov in May 2012, further evidence is shown of Ukraine’s acceptance to continue working with the European Union in the mode of ‘strong rationalism’ which was seen before the presidential elections. As stated previously, Azarov accepts that the European Union is in a tough position which is hindering Ukraine’s integration prospects, but voices his hopes that the European Union will give support for Ukraine. The strongly rationalist mode of argumentation is shown when it is stated the benefits Ukraine would get from further integration, the reiteration that the European Union would support these aims, as well as a statement regarding the benefits the European Union would get by helping Ukraine.

“The Association Agreement for us also serves as a comprehensive road-map for modernisation of Ukraine, for the development of civil society, and for the operation of an open and liberal economy. We are undertaking as many responsibilities and commitments as other EU countries, and in the integration
process, we hope for adequate support from our European partners. We have begun the step-by-step integration of Ukraine into the EU internal market – a market of practically unlimited opportunities for the Ukrainian economy”

“But Ukraine too represents an enormous market for European business. Our country also offers natural resources, a highly-educated work force and a strong scientific tradition” (Azarov, 2012).

Yanukovych’s speech in December 2012 to foreign diplomats shows the continued occasional mixing in of the constructivist mode when speaking of EU-Ukraine relations. “The Ukrainian people deeply honor their European roots and have a strong belief in their European future” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2012) mixed in the same speech with statements such as “On the way to the further integration of Ukraine into the European Union the key point we consider to be is the transition to a new format of our relations - political association and economic integration” (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2012). The second statement, purely rationalist speaking of relations with the European Union as being of a simple format – political association and economic integration, completely neglects any ‘European roots’ which Yanukovych’s states are important for integration. This sort of inconsistency in Ukraine’s argumentation would be overlooked by most observers due to the fact that most people are not aware of the ideas of constructivism and rationalism, as well as the importance of identity, culture, as well as material interests simply being truisms for most people (Jachtenfuchs, 2002). That said, it is clear that concerning European Integration Ukraine has stuck mainly with rationalist modes of argumentation. The use of constructivist modes of argumentation, such the reference to Ukrainian’s ‘European roots’ mixed with rationalist argumentation speaking of economic and political association suggests the possible use of constructivist mode to simply eulogize Ukraine’s willingness.
Conclusions

This work aimed to look at the period after the 2010 presidential elections to look at Ukraine’s attitude towards European Integration and identify and changes with prior to the presidential elections. It is possible to come up with a number of conclusions about the ‘Fifth phase’ of behaviour concerning Ukraine’s attitude towards European Integration and draw some comparisons to the first four phases which were set out by Kratochvil and Tulmets (2010). The case study focused on the speeches and articles from Ukrainian officials concerning European integration, looking through the lenses of constructivism and rationalism.

First, straight after the 2010 presidential elections Ukraine asserted itself strongly as a rationalist actor towards not only the European Union, but also Russia and the Russian lead Customs Union. From the President’s speeches it is possible to see that Ukraine wished to continue its relations with the European Union in a strongly pragmatic way, also seeing the European Union as a rationalist actor. Yanukovych’s speeches spoke of Ukraine’s aim to have mutually beneficial relations with both the European Union, as well as its willingness to improve relations with Russia.

Initial speeches also spoke of Ukraine wish to continue relations with the European Union and Russia as a ‘non-aligned state,’ a position which strongly suggested Ukraine had decided to not speak of membership prospects with the European Union anymore. Ukraine as a ‘non-aligned state’ was putting itself in a position where it hoped to benefit from further relations with both the EU and Russia. Overall the first subchapter shows a continuation of the rationalist mode of argumentation which was evident in the final years of Yushchenko’s presidency.

Second we see a number of similarities between years running up to the 2010 presidential elections and the years following. Somewhat contradicting previous statements by the President concerning Ukraine’s ‘non-aligned’ status, in the years following the election speeches continued to voice Ukraine’s frustration towards the ENP and the absence of membership prospects for third countries such as Ukraine. In
speeches by the President, constructivist argumentation followed this frustration, speaking of Ukraine’s historical place in Europe.

Along with this, in some speeches, such as in Minister of Foreign Affairs Kostyantyn Gryshchenko’s speech to the International Institute of Strategic Studies reverted strongly back to constructivist modes when speaking of Ukraine’s European integration prospects. This showed Ukraine’s willingness to move back towards constructivist modes of argumentation in situations where the main audience were not officials, but the general public. In this speech, Gryshchenko’s use of constructivist argumentation also contradicted Yanukovych’s speeches which spoke of Ukraine’s search for ‘maximum results.’ This occasional reversion to constructivist modes of argumentation matches the final years of Yushchenko’s presidency.

‘Russia as a Rational Alternative’ shows the most dominant difference between the years before 2010 and the years after the Presidential elections, being the inclusion of Russia and the Customs Union in the discussion of European integration. It was found that Ukrainian officials used rationalist argumentation when using Russia as leverage against the European Union to convince them that they should move forward with the Association Agreement with faster pace. This was especially evident in speeches where issues the European Union had with Ukraine were spoken of.

Ukrainian Officials also seemed to contradict each other when discussing integration in the East as an alternative to European Integration. Compared with the rationalist argumentation in speeches by Kozhara and Yanukovych in the previous paragraph suggesting Russia and the Custom’s Union were a viable alternative, Ukraine’s Ambassador to the European Union Yelisieiev spoke about the clear benefits and achievements of the European Union compared to the “hypothetical and virtual” (Yeisieiev, 2013) achievements of the Customs Union.

Leading into the next subchapter, it is quoted that Yanukovych (Прес-служба Президента України Віктора Януковича, 2012) saw Customs Union integration as something Ukraine needed to follow through with but required each actor to find a mutually beneficial model, again showing that full membership was not an option, showing that Ukraine was still putting European integration as first priority.
The fourth and final subchapter is titled ‘European Integration as the Rational Priority’ and discusses how, even though Ukraine has used Russia and the Customs Union as leverage against the European Union and has spoken using rationalist argumentation about the benefits of further integration East, Ukraine has also continued to put European integration first. In most speeches Ukrainian officials have spoken about European Integration as the most beneficial option for Ukraine, as well as the benefits it would have for the European Union. Officials have continued to speak about integration with the European Union in mainly a rationalist mode discussing small steps, such as highlighted in Ambassador Yelisieiev (2012) article.

Ukrainian officials have also mentioned their understanding of the difficult situation the European Union faces. A comparison can be made with the fourth phase concerning this type of talk. In the fourth phase Ukrainian officials also spoke of internal European Union issues which hindered integration.

Constructivist modes of argumentation have also pointed towards European Integration being the priority. Ukrainian’s honouring of their ‘European roots’ and their ‘European future’ is mixed in with the rationalist mode of argumentation. Constructivist modes of argumentation however have been used in the backdrop of speeches, complementing more rationalist pragmatic talk.

Overall we can conclude that since the 2010 presidential elections Ukraine has continued with a rationalist mode of argumentation concerning European integration. Like the fourth phase in Kratochvil and Tulmets’ (2010), this is not without some ambiguities. While continuing with this rationalist mode, under the new presidency Ukraine has now included Russia in the discussion. While Ukraine sees itself working in a ‘strongly rationalist’ position with the European Union, now Russia and the Customs Union play a role as another actor in Ukraine’s foreign policy, possibly as an alternative to European integration. Ukraine has used rationalist modes of argumentation as leverage, in the case of Russia and the Customs Union, against the European Union, in the hope that it would convince the European Union to speed up integration. While doing this, Ukraine has also contradicted itself by stating that the Customs Union is both a viable as well as an uncertain direction for Ukraine to head. While in the fourth phase leading up to 2010 the Ukrainian government moved away
from speaking of membership prospect, both before and after the election in 2010 Ukraine has on occasions shown its frustration with the lack of membership prospects within the ENP, somewhat contradicting Ukraine being a ‘non-aligned’ state. On top of this, Ukraine has continued to use constructivist modes of argumentation when possible. With all the questioning of the European Union’s commitments, as well as Ukraine’s trade and integration prospects with Russia and its Customs Union, it is clear that Ukraine continues to put European integration in the forefront of its foreign policy. If we were to state the strongest similarity between 2010 onwards, and the fourth phase leading up to 2010 in Kratochvil and Tulmets’ (2010) study, it would be that overall Ukraine has continued to work in a mainly rationalist mode concerning European Integration, keeping it at top priority, and continues to see the European Union acting this way also.
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