The Politics of Immigration Discourse among the Contemporary British Right:
Migration from East and Central Europe and Societal Security

Master thesis

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/Teele Arak/
“Speaking and writing about security is never innocent”

(Jef Huysmans 2002: 43)
Abstract

The aim of the thesis is to investigate whether immigration from East and Central European countries to Great Britain has been politicised or taken one step further within the securitisation framework. The research conducted for this study relies on the Copenhagen School (CS) securitisation theory and links it to critical discourse analysis (CDA) for a more in-depth investigation of the linguistic manufacture of fear and insecurity. CDA allows to generate data on the underlying meanings, assumptions and ideologies behind textual productions. This is done within the context of the latest EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007. The time frame of the study thus extends from 2004 up until the present [2013] to include the possible repercussions of both enlargements within a considerable time frame. The integral focus of the study is on two British political parties- namely the Conservative Party, currently in coalition government with the Liberal Democrats; and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which is the fastest growing political party in the country. UKIP’s recent success in local elections indicate increasing discontent and concern among the wider public about the direction of the country with regard to issues such as immigration and relationship with the EU. For a more profound investigation John Kingdon’s “three streams model” is applied within the securitisation context; whereas Fairclough’s “three-dimensional framework” is employed to analyse the discursive construction of texts. The two separate models in different frameworks have several binding points, which add value and reliability to the study. The research paper argues that politicisation and calls for practical securitisation of ECE immigration take “place along the dimensions of social [and economic] welfare... and cultural identity” rather than racial and ethnic denominators (Ibryamova 2002: 3; Williams 2003).
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1. Introduction

The Copenhagen School\(^1\) has broadened the area of research in security from the traditional, state-centric conception of security in military terms to comprising five different sectors “each with their particular referent object and threat agenda” (Williams 2003: 513). Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) have added the political, economic, environmental and societal sectors, the latter of which has an integral focus in the thesis at hand. CS scholars have come up with a theory which “captures the structural and social dimensions embedded in language” (Trombetta 2011: 148). In the societal sector, “the identity of a group is presented as threatened by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements” (Williams 2003: 513). Therefore the crucial link between the immigration discourse of the British political elite and notions of insecurity and threat; economic instability; pressure on welfare and jobs; crime and violence; or an erosion of national solidarity and British identity is at the centre of the analytical focus of the study. Societal security, in short, refers to the survival of traditional values and identity of a community, or as Ole Wæver et al. (1993: 23) maintain that it “concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats”. With regard to immigration, defining these “possible” and “actual” threats, however, can be complicated since there is “no simple proportional formula for calculating when immigration becomes a threat” (Buzan in Waever et al. 1993: 43). Thus, borrowing one of the main assumptions from the securitisation theory, the study highlights that immigration from East and Central European countries does not become a (security) concern because it actually exerts existential negative influence on British values, norms; welfare and labour market, but because it has been \textit{presented} as having such an influence through the discursive construction of language. Theiler (2009) has argued that societal security has objective and subjective markers, which are being selectively used by the British political elite to garner support for their policies and objectives. Objective markers indicate self-evident values such as traditional customs and language;

\(^1\) The term “Copenhagen School” was coined by Bill McSweeney in the critical review essay “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School”(1996) Review of International Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 81-94
whereas subjective markers refer to what Karl Deutch (1957) has termed a “we-feeling”, which emphasises “the fact that each nation perceives...social objective markers differently and assume the level of threat at very different stages” (Theiler 2009: 106). Securitisation of an existential threat requires the mobilisation of “a 'we' against a supposedly threatening 'them'”, which might entail fabrications, manipulations and selective approach to the presentation of facts and figures to advance one’s success on a political path (Karyotis 2011: 16).

In this context it is important to bear in mind that immigration might become an essential part of a country’s economic and social development. Since Great Britain is a nation gradually built on “multiple migration and crossbreeding processes”, it must be highlighted that often migrants and their cultural and societal qualities do not pose a threat in itself- “rather, it is the political exploitation of these cultural differences that confers a security dimension to immigration” (Karyotis 2011: 19). Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010: 136) argue that “competition between migrants and citizens of a host state for jobs, housing, and other resources can lead to enmity and intercommunal rivalry and violence”. This is further stoked by media and right-wing political parties. While the far-right British National Party (BNP) can be seen as internally incoherent, politically inaccurate and thus largely unsuccessful in the British political terrain, UKIP is increasingly gaining popular support due to its hard-lined rhetoric and arguably charismatic leader- Nigel Farage. Farage is also widely popular in the media (BBC, ITV, SKY News, Youtube) due to his fresh and entertaining attitude, which means he gets a very large amount of publicity for a leader of quite a small party.

Immigrants can also be portrayed as a threat to public order, stability and national identity as well as a challenge to traditional patterns of living (Huysmans 2000; Karyotis 2011; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). Karyotis (2011: 13) says that migrants from less wealthy European countries are attracted by the British welfare system and are therefore “believed to be 'plotting' to exploit national welfare provisions and available economic opportunities at the expense of citizens”. Thus migration can be linked to problems and even security threats, which “cut through a range of societal, criminological and economic arguments”- all of which will be addressed in the current study in the context of the CS politicisation/securitisation spectrum (Karyotis 2011: 19).
The research framework applied in the study combines linguistic and socio-political as well as cultural and historical elements that are all necessary for understanding the sentiments prevalent in contemporary Britain with regard to immigration from the East and Central European states. Analysing the topic from such various and spatially divergent contexts should offer an imperative backdrop for a thought-provoking research. The role of the media is also discussed, which pertains a considerable impact in swaying public opinion and which “further deepens the assessment of official discursive hegemony as well as the relationship between the political and the media more broadly” (Hansen 2006: 55).

1.1. Purpose and Research Questions

When it comes to defining politicisation and securitisation in the societal sector and more specifically in the context of migration, the spotlight has predominantly been on the migratory patterns of developing countries. Similarly, regional migration in the developed world with regard to security has been generally overshadowed by the notions of illegal migration and asylum. As Ibryamova puts it: “Immigration from the Central and Eastern European countries remains sidelined by the more conspicuous cases of racially, ethnically and religiously charged immigration from developing countries” (Ibryamova 2002: 3). Therefore the primary aim of this thesis is to address the eclipsed phenomenon of ECE migration to the UK and analyse whether the subsequent discursive construction of these migratory movements by the British political elite entail elements of threat and insecurity.

The analysis attempts to examine the immigration effects of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the European Union and its ramifications on British key social institutions such as the labour market and welfare state. The topic is even more intriguing as on 1 January 2014 Britain will lift labour restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals. This might result in a rapid inflow of A2 nationals, which might subsequently place “downward pressure on wages for the lowest paid” locals as well as threaten the jobs of other ECE nationals resulting in increased rates of crime and violence (Blinder 2013). Furthermore, the sentiments regarding the grave
miscalculations of the Labour Party in 2004 regarding the influx of A8 migrants and subsequent decision not to impose transitional measures on nationals from these states are still reflected in the immigration rhetoric of the political elite.

To provide a more thought-provoking analysis of the discursive construction of insecurity posed by ECE immigration, the study attempts to thoroughly investigate the speeches and announcements delivered by the Conservative Party political elite and the United Kingdom Independence Party, which is considered to exert a considerable influence on the discursive development of the Conservative rhetoric (Parker 2013; Freedland 2013; Rawnsley 2013). This allows comparing and contrasting the speech acts and methods of the Conservative and UKIP politicians and subsequent proposals and changes to immigration legislation in the UK and within the wider context of the EU.

Bearing in mind the outlined research aims, the research questions are formulated as follows:

1. Has the immigration from East and Central European countries to the UK been securitised by the Conservative Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party or is their rhetoric rather confined within the framework of politicisation?

2. Is the Conservative Party’s discursive construction of immigration rhetoric influenced by UKIP’s calls for practical securitisation?

These questions require tracing the evolution of immigration patterns in the United Kingdom and attitudes towards multiculturalism more generally. Since “different states and nations have different thresholds for defining a threat” (Buzan et al. 1998: 30), it is an imperative task to assess the British historical and sociocultural context where the processes of politicisation and securitisation take place. The research paper argues that the UK does not only have a strained relationship with the EU as an institution that is perceived to undermine British sovereign rights and values, but also in the societal
domain with the post-communist space, which has been part of the hostile “Other” for decades, thus contributing to the ECE immigration rhetoric (Mitsilegas et al. 2003; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010).

1.2. Delimitations and Clarifications

Before moving on to the contextual framework of the thesis, necessary delimitations and clarifications need to be addressed for a more thorough and comprehensive research.

The term “migrant” is normally perceived as self-evident, without the further need of explanation. With regard to different nations and contexts as well as to the main focus of the study at hand, however, the term needs some further clarification. Among the wider public and policy-makers as well as in “government documentation and research”, a migrant is often defined as ‘foreign born’ (Anderson 2010: 104). The term “foreign born”, however, can indicate a British citizen born outside Great Britain. Therefore it must be highlighted that in the current study, migrants refer to foreign-born nationals, who are the citizens of their country of birth. More specifically, the research paper is interested in migrants, who are European nationals.

With regard to the societal focus of the research and frequent allusion to the “British identity” and the values of “British nationals”, the latter concept needs to be delineated. British Nationality Law (1981-1983) differentiates between six types of British nationals: British citizens, British Overseas Territories Citizens (BOTC), British Overseas Citizens (BOC), British subjects, British Nationals (Overseas) (BNO) and British Protected Persons (BPP) (www.homeoffice.gov.uk). British nationals in this context exclude the five latter categories and focus on the “British citizens” category, whether those born in the UK, born overseas to at least one British parent (British

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2 See, for example, UK’s Migration Advisory Committee (MAC)- a body of economists tasked to advise the government on immigration (Anderson 2010: 104)
3 In addition to the 'European national' category, the most commonly used migration categories are: Non EEA Labour Migrants, Non EEA Students, Family members, Young People on the Youth Mobility scheme, Refugees, Asylum seekers and Refused asylum seekers (Spencer and Pobjoy 2011: 15-16).
4 “The originality of the British System was the lack of a national citizenship until 1981” when the British Nationality Act 1981 was ratified (Voicu 2009: 71).
citizenship may descend to one generation born abroad) or born in Britain and then moved overseas. The category in this particular study excludes first and second generation immigrants, whether citizens of Great Britain or not.

The terms “(in)flow”, “influx” and “immigration” refer to migrants entering the country; “outflow” and “emigration” to migrants leaving the country; “net migration” indicates the balance between these figures.

The term “(im)migrants” are used when the statements presented could be applied more broadly, not just within the context of East and Central Europe. When the regional context is predominant, it will be explicitly defined so- namely “ECE (im)migrants”.

The term “ECE” in general refers to the former socialist countries in the East and Central Europe. Since the focus of the current study is narrowed down and placed within the context of the latest EU enlargements, ECE countries here indicate A8 countries\(^5\) that joined the EU in 2004 and A2 countries\(^6\) that joined in 2007.

The main aim of the research paper is to investigate the discursive constructions of ECE immigration to Great Britain within the politicisation/securitisation spectrum. Thus, the actual numbers of migrant inflow from ECE states and its percentage of the total inflow of immigrants to the UK is not the integral focus of the study. The study is interested in how these inflows are constructed through linguistic manufacture and subsequently presented to the audience. The overall idea of the ECE immigration figures, however, are presented in paragraph 1.6 for the general backdrop of the study.

\textit{1.3. East versus West- The Influence of Historical Enmity and Incongruity}

Jef Huysmans argues that “the differentiation between the self and the other” is one of the main starting assumptions when trying to analyse the politicisation and securitisation of an issue (Huysmans 2006: 49). He makes an important remark essential to the current study that securitiation logic identifies “what is hostile to the unity rather than on structuring the substance of the unity itself” (Huysmans 2006: 50). This means

\(^5\) Comprising Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
\(^6\) Comprising Bulgaria and Romania
that immigration is discursively constructed and subsequently presented as the main force behind the failures of a state benefit system, health service or unemployment, rather than tackling the problem from inside. Thus the analysis of Britain in the wider regional complex is imperative for a more in-depth research.

Ibryamova argues that during the Cold War there was almost no “interaction between the two halves of Europe, giving Eastern Europe only a peripheral place in the West European public consciousness” (Ibryamova 2002: 7). With the demise of the Soviet Union, the East and Central European rose from the communist debris and “undertook a process of political and economic transformation” to become part of the Western clubs such as EU and NATO (Ibryamova 2002: 7). Yet, as Fierke (1999: 12) describes, these countries instantly adopted an inferior stance and presented themselves as “new born” and “fragile” democracies. Mädksso (2009: 663) adds that this kind of self-perception and self-presentation as victims gives post-communist states “the right to complain, protest and make demands” which places Western European states in an uncomfortable position and at the same time deepens the “liminal Europeanness” of the former Eastern bloc. Ibryamova similarly highlights the notions of “the abandoned Eastern Europe” and “the myth of Yalta”7, which are supposed to evoke “sense of guilt” and a kind of “historical responsibility” towards the countries of East and Central Europe and provoke a sense of “kinship duty” of belonging to the same entity (Ibryamova 2002: 8).

The British imperial past, successful war history, national pride and geographical location as an island nation (often explicitly highlighted in immigration speeches, e.g. Cameron 2013c; Howard 2005b) allows it to claim the label “exceptional”. Historians who specialise on British national identity (e.g. Linda Colley, Tom Nairn) have argued that the core of British identity “is shaped by recurring wars (especially with France), the Protestant religion... the image of Britain as an empire builder” and one of the leading nations in the world- sentiments, which are still echoed in one form or another in contemporary British politics (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 6). This can be noted in current British immigration discourse, which increasingly presents Britain as a

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7 “The myth of Yalta” refers to the Yalta Conference held in February 1945 where Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Jossif Stalin agreed to divide Europe into spheres of interest and decide upon the faith of East and Central Europe conceding it to Stalin. For more, see F.A.M. Alting on Geusau (1992) Beyond Containment and Division: Western Cooperation from a Post-Totalitarian Perspective, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
“reluctant receiver of its Eastern and Central European ‘kin’” (e.g. increasing propositions for negative advertising campaigns\(^8\) and for the modification of EU regulations) due to economic and social dislocations as a possible accompanying effect (Ibryamova 2002: 9). Furthermore, the “Eastern and Balkan routes” [and increasingly southeastern routes] are presented as the main routes of “illegal immigration into the EU” and thus a destabilising force by some of the West European states (Mitsilegas et al. 2003: 127).

Peoples and Vaughan-Williams rightly note that “certain issues and objects are easier to securitise [and politicise] than others depending on the associated connotations” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 79). Thus the politicisation/securitisation logic of ECE immigration to Britain can be associated with historical enmity and the belonging of these countries to the sphere of the hostile “Other” in the past. Migrants from East and Central Europe can therefore be presented as a concern [on occasion as a threat] to the traditional existence of a British “way of life” and conception of national identity. Estonian politician and historian Mart Laar has pointed out that there is and always will be an inevitable gap between the East and West European countries, which eliminates the possibility for any grander social and political integration than we currently have- this is stemmed in ideology, memory and history (Laar 2012).

1.4 United Kingdom versus the European Union - The Strained Relationship

The European issue has always been emotionally and politically charged for Britain— one just needs to think about the debates over the adoption of Euro; opt-outs in the key areas of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the free movement of people; ratification of the Maastricht Treaty; ERM (European Exchange Rate Mechanism) and the Black Wednesday\(^9\); or the British membership of the Union itself, which was

\(^8\) See, for example, “Negative ads about Britain: it’s not as if we’re short of material”, *The Guardian*, 28 January 2013 or “Immigration: Romanian or Bulgarian? You won’t like it here”, *The Guardian*, 27 January 2013.

\(^9\) Refers to the date (16 September 1992) when the British Conservative government had to withdraw the pound sterling from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
Initially vetoed twice by French president Charles de Gaulle, “on the grounds that Britain was hostile to European integration” (Watt 2013b).

British Euroscepticism has received considerable academic attention and Britain’s relationship with the EU has been described by various scholars as “reluctant” (Geddes 2004; Gifford 2008), “semi-detached” (George 1998; Bulmer 1992) and most notoriously by George (1994; 1998) as “awkward”. These observations can be put on the account of Britain’s self-perception as “exceptional” in comparison to mainland Europe, which “describes how Great Britain- by virtue of its history and culture- is uniquely disposed to act as an example to the world” (Pram Gad 2011: 60). Buonfino (2004a: 5) argues that during the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major, for example, “Europe was seen in.. direct contrast with Britain”. Thatcher’s infamous Bruges speech of 1988 denounced “federalism” and aggressively defended the nation-state, while provoking internal political turmoil within the Conservative Party about Britain’s place in Europe (Young 1998; Bache and Jordan 2006). These sentiments must be borne in mind when analysing Britain’s stance towards immigration emanating from continental Europe, as well as in the context of the past and future EU enlargements and fluctuations in immigration policies. It can be argued that even opening the British labour market to A8 nationals without any restrictions (apart from the Workers Registration Scheme- WRS) was due to “self-interested bargaining” deriving from “self-maximising behaviour” in the hope of hosting the crème de la crème of the ECE labour force (Ibryamova 2002).

The core of European Union policy is based on four freedoms: goods, capital, services and people- the last of which has become a source of heated debates and controversy, since people from nations with lower GDPs use the freedom to migrate to richer nations, thus contributing to “lower per-person funding of public services” and challenging the welfare system (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 10). There are already (and gradually increasing) sentiments of concern and uncertainty about the influx of ECE migrants and politicians from all camps are growing progressively vocal in fuelling and perpetuating these feelings through addressing the “undesirable economic and social impacts caused by the unchecked flows of immigrants” (Ibryamova 2002: 12). In addition, the restrictions to A2 nationals “will be lifted at a time when there is an
increasing political tension over Britain’s relationship with Europe” (Barrett and Freeman 2012). The contextual framework provides a significant backdrop to explaining the reasons behind politicisation and practical attempts of securitisation of ECE migrants in the UK.

Due to this “British mindset” towards the “European project”, Buonfino argues that while selling the idea of close integration and cooperation to the British public might prove to be complicated, the political elite could, however, “argue for a different role for Britain, not at the margins as it used to be but leading European developments” (Buonfino 2004a: 9; Buonfino 2004b). This was perhaps most evident during the New Labour, which actively employed “one of the favourite elements in British discourse...that of the leadership” (Buonfino 2004a: 9).

While analysing the relationship between Europe and the United Kingdom, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s levels of analysis provide an amplifying vantage point. On the unit level Europe remains “the Other”, but constructive Other, especially when it comes to fighting a common challenge inter-governmentally (Buonfino 2004a: 15). But this is the level, where Europe can also be described as the destabilising “Other”, due to its far-reaching regulations and arguable corrosive effects on British democracy. On the level of international (sub)systems, however, Europe is “self”- the context where close cooperation is emphasised and common policies are worked upon. The study at hand regards both levels- the former with regard to hostile sentiments towards ECE migration; the latter in the context of EU legislation and regulations, which place limits on British migration policies and discourse.

1.5 East and Central European Immigration to the United Kingdom- the General Backdrop

Multiculturalism has been gradually adopted as the official national policy of Great Britain ever since Roy Jenkins, the Home Secretary from 1965 to 1967, rejected the

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10 “In the study of International Relations, the five most frequently used levels of analysis are: international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits and individuals” (Buzan et al. 1998: 5-6).
11 Multiculturalism means “that immigrants should be able to participate as equals in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their own culture, religion and language, although usually with an expectation of conformity to certain key values” (Castles and Miller 2009: 248).
assimilationist politics and declared the new ideal that came to be known as “multiculturalism” by stating that the Labour Government no longer sought “a flattening process of uniformity, but cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Jenkins as cited in Lloyd 2002). The future for immigrants and the next generation lay in embracing a common public sphere of shared norms and values with equal opportunities. This ideal, however, was disturbed by gradually increasing sentiments of national distress, fear over the loss of British identity, national tradition and societal homogeneity (Huysmans 2000). Over forty years later, David Cameron attacked Britain’s decades-old policy of multiculturalism and claimed it encourages “segregated communities” (Cameron 2011).

ECE migration has been the subject of a relatively confined rhetoric in Great Britain as it has always been overshadowed by the migratory patterns of workers from the New Commonwealth (former British colonies in the Caribbean, the Indian subcontinent and Africa) (Castles and Miller 2009). The immigration discourse was predominantly “racially, ethnically and religiously charged” with perhaps the most notorious example being the Shadow Defence Secretary Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech in 1968, just two years after Jenkins’ declaration (Ibryamova 2002: 3). While the integral concern of Powell’s speech were non-white immigrants from former British colonies, it was an explosive speech “stoking the fear of British society under threat from outsiders” (Trujillo 2013). One could argue that there are undeniable echoes of Enoch Powell in contemporary British immigration discourse. Today the main source of concern, with regard to ECE migration, is along the lines of social welfare and labour market. Powell (1968), similarly, expressed concern for British nationals being made “strangers in their own country” not being able to get jobs, “obtain school places” and seeing their “neighbourhoods changed beyond recognition”, which is also expressively articulated by UKIP leader Nigel Farage, but increasingly also by other political figures in the country.

The EU enlargement of 2004 brought in 10 member states, while the expansion of 2007 added Romania and Bulgaria. The Labour government decided not to impose transitional measures on the countries which joined in 2004 underestimating the number
of inflow to just 5000-13 000 per year from these states (Castle and Cowell 2013). “The numbers enrolling in the government’s worker registration scheme (WRS)”, the only requirement placed on A8 migrants to be able to legally work in the UK, “totalled 90 950 between May and September 2004” (Geddes 2005: 728). By 30 June 2006, this number reached almost half a million (427 000) (Castles and Miller 2009: 115). Due to “significant disparities in wage levels” East and Central Europe became one of the main sources of migrants to the UK and “nationals from these states now constitute some of the largest foreign-born populations in the country” (McCollum and Findlay 2012: 1).

As a result of these grave miscalculations and unexpected numbers of influx, the Labour government became an easy target for the media, the Conservative Party, UKIP, the BNP and the wider British public, which led to the decision “to opt out of free movement for workers from Bulgaria and Romania in 2007” (Castles and Miller 2009: 116). Immigration restrictions to the lastly joined members, however, will be lifted on 1 January 2014, which has generated a plethora of new concerns about the increasing inflow of migrants from these two countries. Although the situation is completely different than it was in 2004, since all EU countries open their labour markets to Bulgaria and Romania at the same time, the experience of previous EU expansion and the overall sense of insecurity and unawareness is prevalent, which performs as a fuel for right-wing politicians. There are increasing concerns among the British public that Romanians and Bulgarians will be the new Poles and Lithuanians, taking over the British labour market, which has subsequently created rhetorical opposition to British open-door policy (The Economist 2006). Furthermore, the current economic climate is different than in 2004 due to large-scale youth unemployment and fears about the “triple-dip”\(^\text{12}\) recession highly featured in the media. Hence, A2 immigration is seen as something that will not help the problems of unemployment in general and youth unemployment in particular.

\(^{12}\) Refers to the fact that UK is in danger of entering a third period of recession since 2008. See, for example, “Will Britain slide into a triple-dip recession?”, The Guardian, 22 April 2013
Castles and Miller (2009: 110) emphasise that Great Britain “had its highest-ever inflow in 2004-494 000 persons- and net migration was 202 000”. The sudden surge was largely influenced by the EU enlargement of 2004. Since then, immigration from ECE states has gradually become “the focus of debate in the public, media and political arenas” (McCollum and Findlay 2012: 38). As seen from Figure 1, the inflow of A8 migrants reached its peak in 2007; the same year when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU. When the financial crisis hit the country, net migration dropped dramatically. This, however, was not reflected in the rhetoric of the political elite of the country, who found a perfect pretext in the face of recession to blame the migrants and subsequently provided a solid ground for UKIP to build its assertive campaign.

Thus the contemporary integration and immigration challenge in the UK is not centred on racial and ethnic denominators- “the...recent experience involving large-scale white migration from Eastern European sources has created a substantially different framing context for integration” (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 10). This context highlights the “semi-detached” relationship between the UK and the EU, where British “immigration exceptionalism has been challenged by policy objectives and interdependencies that link
Britain with other EU member states” (Geddes 2005: 731). This can be illustrated with British opt-outs from the Schengen Agreement. While at first Britain and Ireland refused to join completely, “insisting on their own stricter border controls of people coming from the continent”, they “eventually agreed to take part in some aspects of the Agreement” such as the Schengen Information System (SIS) (Castles and Miller 2009: 198). Similarly, the recent proposals by David Cameron (Cameron 2013c) such as the more robust residence tests for EU migrants and limits on their access to benefits are not necessarily against the free movement clause of the EU but once again presents Great Britain as the odd one out among the other EU countries with regard to migration policies for EU and EEA nationals.
2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Securitisation Theory

The integral focus of the study derives from the Copenhagen School securitisation theory, especially associated with Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde\(^\text{13}\), and which rests on the notion developed by J. L. Austin that security is a “speech act” (Austin 1962; Buzan et al. 1998; Laustsen and Wæver 2000). Austin has emphasised the idea that “each sentence can convey three types of acts, the combination of which constitutes the total speech act situation”: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary\(^\text{14}\) (Balzacq 2011: 5; Balzacq 2005: 175). Thus it means that the focal point of securitisation theory is on the function of language- an issue becomes a security threat through the discursive construction of linguistic attributes. Speech acts are “performatives”, which assume that “an issue becomes a matter of security when it presented as such, not necessarily because in reality it exists as such” (Ibryamova 2002: 4). Therefore the process of securitisation relies heavily on the notions of persuasion, bargaining and linguistic competence (Balzacq 2005). The reason behind such a strong focus on the performative aspect of the speech lies in the assumption that for a successful securitisation, it must be accepted by the audience (Buzan et al. 1998). Therefore it is an imperative task for any securitising actor to “tune to the level of the audience” and “identify with the audience’s feelings, needs and interests” (Balzacq 2005: 184). To gain more ground and leverage among the audience, the speech acts “use various artefacts such as metaphors, emotions, stereotypes, gestures, silence and even lies to reach its goals and sound persuasive” (Balzacq 2011: 2). Therefore the actual discursive inclusion of the word “security” is not even essential since Hansen (2012: 533) maintains that “securitising actors may reconstitute an issue such that it avoids the high-pitched nodes of radical, barbaric, blood-thirsty ‘Others’, while still situating it within a modality of securitisation”. For an illustrative example, Hansen draws attention to migration discourse which often deliberately avoids hard-edged rhetoric where


\(^{14}\) Locutionary- the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference; illocutionary- the act performed in articulating a locution; perlocutionary- which is the consequentialist effects or sequels that are aimed to evoke the feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions of the target audience” (Balzacq 2011: 5).
immigrants are “threats” to abstain from invoking hatred among the minority groups and instead opts for implicit references to security such as saying that they are “better helped by their own environments” (highly featured in Cameron 2013c) (Hansen 2012: 533). Furthermore, focusing on the negative aspects of immigration and openly depicting this phenomenon as a “security risk”, will make it considerably more difficult to “justify economically beneficial labour migration” (Boswell 2007: 2). This is particularly prevalent in British Prime Minister David Cameron’s speeches. Since he is considerably more constrained in his rhetoric due to his position as a Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party than for example UKIP leader Nigel Farage, he always relies on extreme “political correctness” and linguistic balance. Thus all of Cameron’s public statements on immigration have incorporated the beneficial aspects of immigration, whereas Farage has often explicitly focused on the negative aspects to induce a sense of heightened priority and tension. Cameron’s discourse also usually oscillates between different themes in a coherent manner, indicating the intense thought put into discursive construction to satisfy the largest proportion of the public.

Huysmans (2006) draws attention to several ways how to construct linguistic practices to securitise migration. He maintains that it can be done by highlighting numerical values as people respond to numbers “much more vigorously...than to an abstract claim” (Huysmans 2006: 47). Another tactic is to use strong metaphors, such as “flood” and “invasion”, which are perceived to increase heightened concern and will be further elaborated upon in the methodology section. Securitising actors can also highlight the characteristic features and stereotypes of migrants, most notorious examples being the derogatory terms “Polish plumber” and the “Romanian beggar”. The reasons behind such linguistic constructions have several aims including “winning the support” of neutral voters, ensuring the support base that an issue is being dealt with in a rigorous manner and “persuading or daunting the opposition”, where UKIP comes into play (Vultee 2011: 84). Derogating or patronising the minorities is an important rhetorical tactic, however, as van Dijk argues, “the overall strategy of most of the minority discourse is to emphasise the positive properties of us” in a stark contrast to “the negative discourse of them”, which is evident in the British “exceptionalism” rhetoric (van Dijk 1993: 105). Thus, in general, “securitisation works on the basis of ‘insecuring’” (Huysmans 2006: 61). This means that to join nationals of a country for a
common cause it is essential to first create a sense of insecurity in the community to justify the adoption of emergency measures and the expansion of powers to deal with the issue (Trujillo 2013; Huysmans 2006; Boswell 2007). Thus the basic idea behind securitisation theory is that a referent object (RO) is presented (through discursive construction) to be threatened by an existential threat (ET) and this is brought to the attention of the audience (A) by a securitising actor (SA) who practices securitising moves\(^\text{15}\) to achieve expected results (Figure 2).

![Diagram](image)

*Figure 2*

For the main architects of the theory, therefore, the central concept of “securitisation” has negative connotation, since it indicates a “failure to deal with issues as normal politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Therefore the notion of “desecuritisation” is introduced, which deals with issues within the domain of normal politics and suggests a move from the securitised to the politicised or in other words out of “threat-defence sequence” (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Rita Floyd, however, argues against

\(^{15}\) Securitising move is “a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object”. It alone “does not...create securitisation. The issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such” (Buzan et al. 1998: 25).
the negativity of the concept as well as against the Welsh School\textsuperscript{16} theorists, who maintain that securitisation is a positive phenomenon due to its emphasis on emancipation and freeing “people from the physical and human constraints providing them with true human security” and rather emphasises that it is “issue-dependent” (Floyd 2007: 328, 335).

To produce a resourceful analysis of the British political elite’s security discourse, one should first define the concepts of politicisation and securitisation in relation to each other. Here, Buzan et al. (1998: 23) provide a substantial vantage point: “Securitisation can be seen as a more extreme version of politicisation”. The authors have proposed a spectrum ranging from nonpoliticised, where the matter is not discussed within the public domain and is not even a matter of public concern; to politicised, where the issue is “part of public policy, requiring government decision”; to securitised, where the issue is “either a special kind of politics or above politics” and “presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (\textit{Figure 3}) (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24).

![Figure 3 The securitisation “spectrum”](source)

\textit{Figure 3} The securitisation “spectrum”

Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010) have contested the clear-cut division of “politicised” and “securitised” and argue whether these concepts can be treated as distinct separates. They draw upon several authors (Acharya 2006; Abrahamsen 2005; Williams 2003) who maintain that very often “issues move only very gradually from 'normalcy' to 'emergency', and are usually conceived of as 'security risks' rather than existential threats in between these two stages” (Peoples and Vaughan Williams 2010: 86). The question of what constitutes normal politics and when can we start considering an issue outside that domain is problematic. Sometimes exceptions to everyday policy-making “actually define normal day-to-day workings of politics” and cannot be regarded as a move to the security domain (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 86).

\textsuperscript{16}Predominantly linked to Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, who challenged the the definition of security in purely military terms and and “instead linked the study of security to the expansive goal of human emancipation” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 9).
This is also important with regard to the current study, since UKIP and Conservative Party rhetoric cannot always be seen belonging to the politicised or the securitised sphere, but as a fluctuation on the spectrum. Therefore, while the research paper argues that the Conservative Party would overall be located within the politicisation domain with regard to its discursive construction of ECE immigration rhetoric, UKIP would be placed slightly further, just on the borderline of securitisation; at the same time with regard to recent developments in the British political sphere and the lifting of labour market restrictions to Bulgarian and Romanian nationals in 2014, the Conservative Party’s rhetoric has seen a gradual shift towards a more rigorous stance, which on occasion might be argued to be on the borderline of securitisation.

The concept of “emergency measures”, however, is problematic and needs to be further elaborated upon. Buzan et al. (1998) mention that a referent object (in the societal sector a larger societal group joined by cultural and historical values, in this case British nationals) must be existentially threatened (by ECE immigrants) and this is brought to the public attention by securitising actors (British political elite, the members of the Conservative Party and UKIP), thus justifying the adoption of emergency measures to deal with the existential threat. At the same time Buzan et al. (1998: 25) maintain that:

We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimise emergency measures (Buzan et al. 1998: 25)

Therefore one must highlight that applying emergency measures to break away from the context of everyday politics is not a facilitating condition for a successful securitisation. The only prerequisite in this regard is a discursively constructed heightened sense of urgency, which creates a platform “from which it is ‘possible’ to legitimise emergency measures”; “while acting [and] actually putting to use such extraordinary means” is a completely different matter (Roe 2008: 621). Gordon Brown’s “British jobs for British workers”-campaign could be one of the illustrative examples, which David Cameron himself deemed unlawful and “illegal under EU law” (Cameron 2007). Yet, he made proposals in his latest immigration speech to limit EU migrants’ access to the British
benefit system, which might “put the UK at odds with the EU over restrictions on free movement of workers” (Cameron 2013; Wintour 2013). These proposals and “limitations on otherwise inviolable rights” can be seen as creating a platform for securitisation, while the actual measures might not even be implemented (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). While the adoption of emergency measures might not be essential, Salter (2011: 121) argues that some kind of public policy change is an integral criteria of successful securitisation, “either in discourse, budget, or in actual policy”, which will be more closely looked at in the empirical section of the study.

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s original framework has been contested, expanded and supplemented over the last decade, and perhaps most important contributions have come from Thierry Balzacq. Buzan et al. (1998) differentiate between three units of analysis, which are referent objects, securitising actors and functional actors\(^\text{17}\) (p. 36). Balzacq, however, has decided to broaden this framework and mentions that these three units all fall within one level of analysis, namely that of the agent- “it does not integrate two equally important elements...acts and context” (Balzacq 2011: 35, Balzacq 2009). Therefore he adds two more levels of analysis (\textit{Figure 4}), the level of the act and the contextual level- the former incorporates discursive and non-discursive practices such as heuristic artefacts, dispositif\(^\text{18}\), grammar and policies generated by securitisation, whereas the latter maintains that discourse is “contextually enabled and constrained” and thus one needs “a thorough understanding of the context of the discourse” (Balzacq 2011: 35-36). The differentiation between distal and proximate contexts are also important. The former refers to the “macro-environment of the securitising move” or the “broader historical and sociocultural context in which the securitising move is embedded”- in terms of Great Britain’s “exceptionalism”, imperial past and relationship with the EU- whereas the latter addresses the “micro-environment of the securitising move” or the immediate setting of the discourse like the stage, the genre and the audience (Wilkinson 2011: 98; Balzacq 2011: 37). Balzacq also adds the analysis of the audience reception to the original three units of analysis (agent level). Since the current

\(^{17}\) “Actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security” (Buzan et al. 1998: 36).

\(^{18}\) Dispositif is a “thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions” (Foucault 1980: 194 as cited in Balzacq 2011: 29).
study is not confined to the level of the agent, but also regards the methods of discursive construction and sociocultural context, Balzacq’s (2011) vocabulary of securitisation must be borne in mind.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Constituent analytics (UNITS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Agent  | • Securitizing actor, audience, functional actor  
|        | • Power positions/relations  
|        | • Personal and social identities  
|        | • Referent object and referent subject |
| Act    | • Action-type  
|        | • Heuristic artefacts  
|        | • Dispositif  
|        | • Policy |
| Context| • Distal  
|        | • Proximate |

*Figure 4 Balzacq’s vocabulary of securitisation*


The Copenhagen School perspective is not looking to provide a completely new framework for security analysis, but rather supplement and expand the earlier, traditional military focus of security and provide a broader agenda for research. It contests the traditionalist perspective, which “objectively declares what ‘real’ threats are” and highlights the importance of investigating how security issues are constructed in the first place (Charrett 2009: 17-18). Therefore in addition to the military sector of security, Buzan (1991) has formulated four additional sectors for security analysis: the environmental, the economic, the political and the societal sector- the latter of which provides a framework for the study at hand. The authors argue that “the organising concept in the societal sector is identity” and thus the referent objects are predominantly larger societal groups that “carry the loyalties and devotion of subjects in a form and to a degree that can create a socially powerful argument that this ‘we’ [along with its traditional ways of life] is threatened” (Buzan et al. 1998: 123). The most common existential threats in this sector run along the horizontal (“overriding cultural and linguistic influence”) or vertical lines (there is a threat from an integrating project such as the EU) or in the context of migration (Buzan et al. 1998: 121). UKIP has always
vigorously campaigned in all three spheres (with regard to dissatisfaction with the EU, (ECE) migration and the potential threat to national solidarity and identity emanating from immigration); whereas the Conservative Party has been more subtle in its rhetoric and been mainly confined to the migration sphere and rather passively in the vertical sphere (until recent developments regarding Cameron’s EU referendum).

It is important to note that when securitisation is not completed (i.e. issues are not lifted above ordinary politics or there is no audience consent), it is still relevant from the perspective of security analysis. Securitising moves as just as important for a researcher, since they indicate some kind of social instability, the development of social attitudes and give an idea about the future course of security politics (Buzan et al. 1998; Laustsen and Wæver 2000). Another important feature to be mentioned- before addressing one of the most underdeveloped concept of securitisation, namely that of the audience- is that the securitisation perspective also allows to securitise “the absence of securitisation”, which should be looked at in the context of the Conservative Party and UKIP mutual relationship (Buzan et al. 1998: 40). UKIP is the fastest growing political party in the country and this is largely due to addressing the other parties’ soft approach to immigration (Birrell 2013)

2.2. Audience in Securitisation Theory

It was already established that securitisation is deemed completed and successful if the discursive construction of a threat is accepted by significant portions of society i.e. the audience. However, while in general it is evident who the securitising actors are (political elite, pressure groups, bureaucracies, governments), the audience itself remains a fundamentally underdeveloped concept in the CS securitisation theory (Salter 2008; Balzacq 2011). Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) make no mention of who actually constitutes an audience or what does the acceptance by the audience entail. Therefore the concept has been developed further by other authors (e.g. Salter 2011; Hansen 2006; Roe 2008; Leonard and Kaunert 2011; Williams 2011) who argue that in general there are different settings of securitisation and therefore different threat rhetorics resonate with different audiences. As Salter argues: “It is over-simplistic to
describe one securitiser and one audience- one message and one decision” (Salter 2011: 117). Similarly it is too simplistic to draw a rigid line between successful and unsuccessful securitisation, since the process might be completed in one setting and not in others and thus should be considered “as a threshold rather than a binary” (Salter 2011: 119).

At this point, some of the most fruitful approaches to the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the concept of audience should be discussed. Salter has proposed a dramaturgical approach and subsequently four different settings (the popular, the elite, the technocratic and the scientific) for investigating the role of the audience in a securitisation process since “different settings operate on different logics of persuasion, different epistemologies and power/knowledge networks” (Salter 2011: 122). Thus all settings comprise of different audiences, who respond to security matters in a different way. There are also several considerations that must be borne in mind and which might affect the overall outcome of securitisation, such as the general conception that the wider public tends to have a short memory, politicians aim at the next election cycle, bureaucrats are risk averse and scientists might neglect the dynamics of everyday life and routine (Salter 2008). With regard to migration, for example, in one setting it might be just politicised, whereas in the other it has already entered the realm of security- “just as there are different national and psycho-cultural contexts- so too are there different sociological, political, bureaucratic, and organisational contexts within a populace” (Salter 2008: 326). The most interesting characteristic of this approach is that is uses “the vocabulary of the theatre” (e.g. “social settings, roles and performances of identity”, actors and audience) (Salter 2008: 328). Thus actors and their roles are under observation in the dramaturgical approach and how the language of the actors changes according to different roles and settings to gain the utmost effect and reception.

Another considerable approach has been suggested by Roe (2008) who distinguishes between the moral and formal support and argues that for a successful securitisation the securitising actor requires “moral support both from the general public and from relevant institutional bodies” as well as the “formal support of the institution [the parliament] that actually sanctions the use of force” (Roe 2008: 620; Balzacq 2011: 62). Roe thus argues that both moral and formal support are needed for a successful
securitisation or otherwise the issue remains largely within the frames of public political debate. However, he agrees with Salter’s idea of successful and unsuccessful securitisation being a threshold rather than a clearly delineated binary. Roe (2008: 616) suggests that the audience [in both moral and formal domains] may agree that a certain issue must be treated as a threat or a security risk but disagree with the use extraordinary measures proposed. Thus the securitisation of an issue is neither successful nor unsuccessful.

For the purpose of analysing audience perceptions towards ECE immigration in the United Kingdom and their subsequent reception of the rhetoric of the British political elite, the most resourceful approach has been proposed by John Kingdon (1984). In his book *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies* (1984) the author differentiates between three ‘streams’, namely the problem, policy and politics streams. While originally formulated to address changes in public policy, it has also been widely applied in securitisation literature. The decision behind opting for Kingdon’s model can be found in the fact that it allows to make a “useful analytical distinction between different audiences” tying each to a different stream, such as other policymakers and the political elite (problem), specialists, who are involved in forming migration legislation and research (policy) and the wider public, “which comprises elements such as public mood, pressure groups campaigns, election results” (Leonard and Kaunert 2011: 67; 74); while incorporating references to media, social context and significant events that might have an important effect on the overall outcome. Salter’s approach has been dismissed due to its inclusion of the scientific setting, which in this study remains irrelevant and Roe’s framework is regarded less productive due to its neglect of several important concepts such as the sociocultural context and the fluctuation in election results.

In Kingdon’s problem stream, “an actor aims to construct a policy problem by using indicators [including the media and statistics] and external events”, which signal the rise of a problem and can be subsequently used as an evidence and incentive in the construction of that problem (Leonard and Kaunert 2011: 65). The aim is to persuade the other members of the party, other political parties in the country, the governing political elite and policy-makers (Kingdon 1984). The policy stream is predominantly occupied, as the name infers, with policy formation and thus the audience in this
domain is composed of “specialists [i.e. think tanks, academics, bureaucracy] and technocrats” who tend to be “convinced by arguments based upon knowledge, rationality and efficiency” (Leonard and Kaunert 2011: 67). In this stream the main institutions under observation include Institute of Race Relations; Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS); Migration Watch UK; Migration Advisory Committee; The Migration Observatory, etc. This stream is the least biased, since it is based on statistical analysis and research, which might be used in other two streams selectively for one’s own political gain. The politics stream is associated most with common people and refers to the general public mood and election results as well as bargaining between parties and building winning coalitions to shift the public opinion (Kingdon 1984).

Thus, Kingdon’s model follows logical sequence- in the problem stream “a political problem is identified”, in the policy stream “policy alternatives are discussed” and in the politics stream the issue is placed “on a public agenda” (Zakopalová 2012: 9).

An important feature behind the audience acceptance, applicable in all three approaches, is constructing “political trust, loyalty and identity through the distribution of fear and an intensification of alienation” (Huysmans 2006: 47). This pertains to the idea that the audience in all settings are more supporting to the measures proposed to tackle the threats and insecurities when there is an overall unified sense of discomfort. Thus it is easier to focus on the dangerous outsiders and reflect it in political discourse through the distinction between “us” and “them” rather than to accumulate one’s resources for the restructuring of internal dynamics (Huysmans 2006). As Huysmans argues: “It is the rendition of dangerous life that makes the judgement of the good life possible” (Huysmans 2006: 47).

2.3. Facilitating Conditions

While the acceptance of the discursive construction of a perceived threat by different audiences in different settings is essential for a successful completion of securitisation, there are several conditions that must be present to ease this process. There are called “felicity” or “facilitating conditions” of a speech act theory- “conditions required for the successful accomplishment of a speech act” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 77).
Without these conducive elements, the process often remains within the frames of politicisation.

Balzacq mentions that the audience is often not fully informed of the scope or “on the temporal proximity and spatial substance” of threats and therefore is entirely reliant on discourses they are presented with (Balzacq 2011: 34). With immigration, however, people themselves perceive the changes to their everyday lives, or gradually transforming demographics in their local areas, which might provide a necessary push to move the issue out of the politicisation framework into the securitisation one.

Michael Williams (2003: 56) has similarly argued that images and visual representations construct the way “immigration is experienced by relevant publics”. He predominantly focuses on the images of illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers on television and news media, but it can be argued that images of Polish migrants queuing in front of job centres and “Romanian beggars” swamping the entrances of parks and malls can have a similar effect.

Buzan et al. (1998: 33) argue that the conditions for a successful securitisation are firstly, “the internal grammatical form of the act”. The grammar of the security discourse must be thought through so that the language best resonates with the audience. Therefore the speaker must “tune his/her language to the audience's experience” and expectations (Balzacq 2011: 9). This refers back to the issue of different settings, where, for example, the general British public and immigration analysts must be addressed differently to achieve the prospective effect. Secondly, “the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitising actor- that is, the relationship between the speaker and the audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitising attempt” (Buzan et al. 1998: 33). Therefore it can be concluded that “the more capabilities a securitising actor has the more likely this actor will succeed in attempted securitization” (Coskun 2012: 40).

Thirdly, “features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitisation” and whether the proclaimed threat can be “linked to previously securitised issues” (Buzan et al. 1998: 33; Zakopalová 2012: 5).

These three points derive from J. L. Austin’s criteria for a successful speech act, where he distinguishes between (1) “the internal, linguistic-grammatical”, and (2) “the
external, contextual and social” conditions (Austin 1975: 34 as cited in Buzan et al. 1998: 32). Thus securitisation in heavily contingent upon the context where the speech acts are delivered in and the linguistic manufacture it comprises.

2.4. Limitations

To comprehend the full potential of securitisation theory, in addition to facilitating conditions, possible limitations and pitfalls should be addressed. The problematic concepts of the “audience” and “extraordinary measures” were already discussed—the former due to its considerable underdevelopment, the latter due to its contradictory elements (extraordinary measures are not always necessary) in the original theory. The spectrum ranging from non-politicised to securitised and the problematic feature of rigid demarcation of the spheres on this spectrum was also discussed. An issue can always be accepted as an existential threat to a referent object in one setting (e.g., the government) but not in another (e.g., the public opinion) (like it was the case with the invasion of Iraq in Great Britain). In this case we can argue neither for nor against a successful and completed process of securitisation. In addition, an audience might agree “to the 'securityness' of a given issue”, but at the same time “disagree over the 'extraordinaryness' of the measures proposed” (Roe 2008: 616). In this case we similarly do not have a case of failed securitisation, since the audience accepted something as a security threat; or a case of a successful securitisation, “as the means necessary to deal with the issue are not also intersubjectively established” (Roe 2008: 616).

Furthermore, Buzan et al. (1998: 23) draw attention to the complicated nature of the “existential threat”. “It is extremely difficult to establish hard boundaries that differentiate existential from lesser threats”. It must be noted that identities change over time, and thus, something that could have been regarded as an existential threat before, might have become part of the natural evolution of the state at a later stage (Buzan et al. 1998). This idea is closely linked to the concept of “normal politics”, which is also dynamic rather than static and therefore there is no clear definition to the concept, similarly to that of “extraordinary measures” (Buzan 2009; Buzan 1993). The inherent dynamics of these concepts brings us to the issue of time framing and particularly to the
question of “How long does one have to wait for securitisation to take place?”.
Likewise, Vuori (2011: 191) makes an interesting remark by asking whether
securitisation is “like a wedding (once it is done you do not have to worry about it) or is
it like a marriage that needs [constant] maintenance”- an idea that is left upon the
individual analyst’s discretion.

Securitisation also allows for the “indefinite widening of the security agenda” since it
could be applied to pretty much everything (Roe 2008: 617). This, however, might
“destroy the internal coherence of the security field”- a critique most vocally elaborated
advise that “security analysis is interested mainly in successful instances of
securitisation”, because “they constitute the currently valid specific meaning of
security”. This statement, however, could be considered as an important weakness of
the original theory. As mentioned earlier, unsuccessful securitisation still indicates some
kind of social instability or gives an idea about the direction of the future security
discourse. In addition, Balzacq (2011: 34) draws attention to “selection bias” if one only
focuses on completed securitisation. He maintains that “the selection of cases on the
basis of outcomes can understate or overstate the relationship between dependent and
independent variables” (Balzacq 2011: 34). Focusing on outcomes often distorts the
research process and moulds it into an expected and comfortable research path. Thus the
study at hand is mainly interested in securitising moves and then looks at whether they
have been accepted by the audience. It first focuses on the process and then on the
outcome, rather than the other way round, as suggested by the original framework.

The weaknesses should also be addressed with regard to the adopted methodology.
Discourse analysis provides a necessary framework to understand “how securitisation
operates” and what kind of linguistic features are applied for the maximum result; but at
the same time discourse analysis is “weak in uncovering why certain securitising moves
succeed and when” (Balzacq 2011: 47). In addition, it must be highlighted that
discourse analysis only functions “at the behest of the individual researcher” (Daddow
2010: 387). Therefore it is entirely up to the researcher to decide what is important and
what is unimportant in the linguistic manufacture of texts. Thus the results are highly
dependent on the individual researcher’s own perceptions and viewpoints, which might undermine the validity and reliability of the findings.

With regard to this particular study, one must highlight the unequal power positions and thus different platforms and means of persuasion of the two British political parties under scrutiny. Due to the two-party and “first-past-the-post” electoral system in Great Britain, UKIP does not and probably will never have the same measures to influence public policy and legislation as the mainstream parties. UKIP has never had an MP elected to the House of Commons\(^{19}\), which also prevents the investigation of an open dialogue (i.e. a parliamentary debate) between the parties. UKIP does, however, exert considerable influence on all three main political parties in the country with regard to their immigration rhetoric (Birrell 2013). UKIP’s recent success in local elections should also not be dismissed since it indicates interesting political developments in contemporary Britain and fuels anticipation with regard to the upcoming general elections in 2015.

\(^{19}\) Bob Spink became UKIP’s first Member of Parliament in 2008 after having been first elected there as a member of the Conservative Party, but later decided to changed his allegiance (BBC 2008).
3. Methodology

3.1. Discourse Analysis

To fully comprehend the dynamics behind the construction aspects of language and textual productions, discourse analysis\(^{20}\) is adopted as the method of the study. For more in-depth and resourceful results, a specific form of discourse analysis, namely critical discourse analysis is applied. To fully understand the idea behind these methods, one should first elaborate what is meant under “discourse”. Discourse in the most conventional sense stands for text. Hardy et al. (2004: 20 as cited in Balzacq 2011: 39) maintain that discourses are “bodies of text...that bring...ideas, objects and practices into the world”. Yet, a plethora of authors\(^{21}\) do not agree with this rather simplistic interpretation and emphasise that discourses manifest themselves in both linguistic and non-linguistic practices. Already J. L. Austin, whose speech acts theory (1962) is the original idea behind CS securitisation framework, saw discourse more than a textual production. For him “discourse can be in written, visual or oral form, verbal or nonverbal” (Wodak 2008: 5). Van Dijk elaborates further and argues that discourse should be seen in a much broader manifestation, as a “communicative event”, including in addition to written text “conversational interaction... as well as associated gestures, facework, typographical layout, images and any other semiotic or multimedia dimension of signification” (van Dijk 2001: 98). Balzacq (2011: 39) adds to this idea by highlighting that text does not just stand for written and spoken words; it comprises a “variety of signs, including written and spoken utterances, symbols, pictures, music”. For Ted Hopf discourse is also about more than words or written texts- “it is also about the daily conduct in which each of us engages to make our way in the social world” (Hopf 2004: 32). Perhaps the best interpretation of “discourse” is provided by Laffey and Weldes (2004). They argue that discourse is not equivalent to language and linguistic attributes should not even be used in the definition of the concept. Instead they define discourse as “structure and practices” that are used to construct meaning in the world (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28). This perception stems from the idea that

\(^{20}\) Ruth Wodak clarifies that “the term discourse analysis stems etymologically from the Greek verb analuein ‘to deconstruct’ and the Latin verb discurrere ‘to run back and forth’” (Wodak 2008: 4)

\(^{21}\) See, for example, Torfing (2005); van Dijk (2001); Balzacq (2005); Balzacq (2011); Hopf (2004), Jackson (2007)
discourse is not simply collection of words, but a “constitutive set of structures and practices, that do not merely reflect thoughts or realities, but rather structure and constitute them” (Herrera and Braumoeller 2004: 16). Therefore one could argue that there is no one single definition of discourse that everyone can agree on, but the meaning of discourse rather depends on a particular research, theoretical approach, context and analytical framework. Due to the limited number of pages of the research paper at hand, the main focus of the analysis will be on verbal and textual aspects of discourse.

Opting for discourse analysis with regard to this study lies in the idea that it embodies a helpful tool in mapping the emergence, (re)production and evolution of patterns of representations which constitute ECE immigration to Britain as a threat image (Balzacq 2011). One must also keep in mind the fact that securitisation theory is a speech act theory, which assumes that discourses do not simply report on reality as it is, but rather do things (Wæver 1995; Wæver et al. 1993; Buzan et al. 1998). It is interested in the “power of language in transforming situations” (Trombetta 2011: 137).

Discourse theory is also problem driven, which seeks to interpret and analyse specific societal puzzles- or in other words describe the relationship between textual and social processes (Torfing 2005; Jackson 2007). These societal puzzles, however, might be the result of a skilled manipulation of discourse as Daddow maintains “discourses can be powerful legitimating and motivating devices” even when the validity of statements is only presented as such (Daddow 2010: 385). Foucault (1985 as cited in Torfing 2005: 7), for example, is not even concerned with the truth or the meaning of actual statements, but rather with “their discursive conditions of possibility”. Similarly, Oliver Daddow focuses on the “artificial closures” of politicians that “make their discourses appear to be the ‘truth’ about how the world works” and on language and phraseology more broadly to identify the way policymakers present their proposals as hegemonic to those of others (Daddow 2010: 386). Therefore discourse analysis has an integral importance when one attempts to capture the design of threat images (Balzacq 2011). The truth of the actual statement is not relevant. In this way, the Copenhagen School “does not focus on the truth of a statement but the truth effect of it” (Trombetta 2011: 137). What is important is the manipulation of discursive practices in a way that invokes
trust in the claims delivered by the securitising actor. Therefore language is
performative and threats and insecurities are the product of one’s discursive articulation
of the threat (Hansen 2006; Laffey and Weldes 2004; Trombetta 2011).

In addition to the validity aspect of delivered statements, discourse analysis regards the
contextual framework of discourse. Migration is one of the most loaded concepts “in a
political spectacle”, which is being articulated not only through “using...a technocratic
language of efficiency and effectiveness but a dramatic existential language of
emergencies, fears, and crises” linked to historic and social settings (Huysmans 2006:
82). So a resourceful discourse analysis must go deeper than mere examination of
linguistic practices and take into consideration the context where discourse is produced
and delivered (Balzacq 2011; Wodak 2008; Fairclough 1995). As Balzacq maintains,
since “discourse does not occur nor operate in a vacuum” the aim of discourse analysis
is to “establish the meaning of texts shaped by distinct contexts” (Balzacq 2011: 36,
40). This is especially important since the same word uttered in different social settings,
does not have the same effect and discourse analysis has the tools to explain these
different meanings across different contexts (Hopf 2004).

3.2. Critical Discourse Analysis

The research paper adopts critical discourse analysis (CDA) as the core methodology of
the analysis. The reasons behind opting for CDA and preferring it over its post-
structuralist counterpart will be outlined in the following section.

The simple idea behind critical discourse analysis is that it allows one to think critically
about the way world works and how discursive practices are often being used to create
images and perceptions to further one’s self-interest in various sociocultural and
historical contexts.

Laffey and Weldes (2004: 29) argue that discursive practices are always about the
production and distribution of power, or in other words, discourses entail “the
inextricably theoretical and practical struggle for power to preserve or transform the
social world”. Van Dijk argues that CDA is, so to speak, discourse analysis “with an
attitude”- “that is, CDA is biased and proud of it” (van Dijk 2001: 96). That means that critical discourse analysis is not politically neutral; as a critical approach it is politically committed to social change and uncovering the correlation between “textual properties and power relations” (Horváth 2011: 47). The critical orientation in discourse analysis, therefore, refers to the “explicit ways of power abuse in creating distorted perceptions and sometimes outright societal inequality” (van Dijk 1993: 96). Thus it is the best way to analyse the discursive practices which might contribute and (re)produce unequal power relations between political parties in Great Britain. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) add that CDA is usually opted for when the focus of analysis concerns “social classes, women and men, minorities and the majority” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 63). Therefore the critical strand of discourse analysis is “fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” or in other words the hidden and unhidden; implicit and explicit wiring behind the textual productions to garner support for proposed political programmes and policies (Wodak 2001: 2; Daddow 2010: 385).

Another reason for opting CDA stems from the relationship it assumes between discursive practices and social structures. Its argues for a dialectical relationship between the two (Figure 5)- “Discourse is a form of social practice which both constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 62; Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 1995). Poststructuralist discourse analysis, in comparison, sees discourse only as constitutive and ignores the dialectical relationship (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002).

![Figure 5](image.jpg)

Figure 5 The role of discourse in the constitution of the world
Fairclough’s idea is that when text is socially constructed, then the interpretation of this text might give us an idea about the cultural, social and psychological framework of this text; yet this framework places some limits on or creates incentives for the text itself (Fairclough 1992). This is particularly important as the discursive construction of ECE immigration as a threat is contextually bounded by the fact that Great Britain is a member of the EU which might place some restrictions on the structure and substance of linguistic practices. Furthermore, as Leonard (2013) argues that due to the “membership in the European Union, Europe’s nations do not have the luxury of disentangling themselves from one another”. Therefore the advantage of CDA is that it recognises both directions, and in particular it “[explores] the tension between these two sides of language use, the socially shaped and socially constitutive” (Horváth 2011: 46; Fairclough 1995: 131). Jørgensen and Phillips conclude that in CDA “language-as-discourse is both a form of action through which people can change the world and a form of action which is socially and historically situated and in a dialectical relationship with other aspects of the social” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 62).

3.3. Three-Dimensional Framework

Discourse analysis draws attention to two main features of text analysis: intratextuality and intertextuality. The former emphasises the internal coherence of text, the performative dimension i.e. what is the purpose of the text and what representations are created to achieve this, whereas the latter implies relationships among different linguistic practices (Balzacq 2011: 43). Intratextuality will be further analysed with the help of Fairclough’s model for discourse analysis in the second half of this section. Let us first elaborate further on the latter concept- intertextuality. Texts generally make references to previously written texts, whether just referring to them or using direct quotations to indicate the conjunction. Even using formerly used or coined words or phrases by others might refer to intertextuality (Hansen 2006). The meaning of and an idea behind a textual production is therefore “never fully given by the text itself but is always a product of other readings and interpretations” (Hansen 2006: 55). Thus, intertextuality has generative power. Politically salient topics generate further texts and
discourses, which refer back to the original sources. Therefore from a research perspective it would be futile to focus just on one text, but instead on “various genres of texts, at different points in time, in distinct social contexts” (Neumann 2008: 71 as cited in Balzacq 2011: 43). Balzacq maintains that if an analyst realises the potential of interplay between bodies and substance of texts, it will become clear that “patterns of representations emanate out of the interrelations between various texts” (Balzacq 2011: 43). Hardy et al. agree by maintaining that social reality arises out of “interrelated bodies of texts...that bring new ideas, objects and practices into the world” (Hardy et al. 2004: 20). It must be noted, however, that in addition to generative power of creating new ideas, intertextuality also has the power to revise and revitalise the past at certain points in time, whenever it might be useful for policymakers to draw upon past events. Within the context of the research paper at hand intertextuality is important as British politicians, as any other, “articulate their policies through references to other texts and...address other discourses within the public debate while seeking to establish their own discourse as hegemonic” compared to the opposition (Hansen 2006: 215).

Discourse seems to have more legitimacy when policymakers and authoritative figures can bolster their claims and propositions through referencing previously written texts. The concepts of intratextuality and intertextuality will receive heightened attention and practical application in the empirical part of the analysis. However, to give the analysis a more structured bend Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework for the analysis of discourse has been opted for, where intratextuality and intertextuality will be analysed in the second dimension of the method (Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 1995). Yet, Fairclough adds two more dimensions, which should not be dismissed if one wishes to execute a resourceful and meaningful analysis.

With regard to the particular study Fairclough’s three-dimensional model provides the best analytical framework for critical discourse analysis. Fairclough argues that “every instance of language use is a communicative event consisting of three dimensions” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 68). The textual, discursive and social dimensions are all interlinked and in a mutual relationship- an idea that other types of discourse analyses easily dismiss. The model is based on the premise that texts cannot be understood or analysed in isolation. Fairclough himself has argued that the three dimensional division of “the framework encapsulates what I think is an important principle for critical
discourse analysis; that analysis of texts should not be artificially isolated from analysis of institutional and discoursal practices within which texts are embedded” (Fairclough 1995: 9). The analysis should therefore focus on: (a) the linguistic features of the text (b) the production, consumption and distribution of the text (c) the wider societal context where the text has been produced in (and the sociocultural practice to which the communicative event belongs to) (Figure 6) (Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 1995; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). From the perspective of the securitisation/politicisation dichotomy, and the foundations for the former’s successful completion, we are most interested in the second dimension of the model, which addresses the consumption of the text. Text analysis in isolation from other texts and sociocultural context was already criticised. Fairclough’s model further highlights the importance of the audience reception, which should similarly not be overlooked. The second dimension’s consideration of “the diverse ways in which... texts may be interpreted and responded to” coincides with the Copenhagen School securitisation theory, which assumes the audience an integral role in the process of constructing an issue as existentially threatening (Fairclough 1995: 9).

Figure 6 Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for critical discourse
In the following the three different dimensions will be analytically separated and elaborated upon, which will prepare us for a more systematic understanding of the empirical part of the study.

3.3.1. The Core Dimension- Text

Fairclough (1992: 75) organises text analysis under four main headings: “vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure”. He maintains that this can be thought as ascending in scale, starting with the individual words, then moving to wider formations like clauses and sentences, then how these are linked together and finally the structure deals with “large-scale organisational properties of the text”. Particularly imperative with regard to the study at hand is the notion of ethos (“how identities are constructed through language”) and the use of metaphors (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 83). These give an idea how texts and wording construct “truth effect” as well as “particular versions of reality, social identities and social relations” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 83). Metaphors, for example, help to dramatise the socio-economic problematic of the issue addressed and translate the “experiences of economic and social uncertainty into opposition to and fear of immigrants” (Huysmans 2000: 769). Metaphors might create false perceptions and play an important role in structuring “the way we think and the way we act, and our systems of knowledge and belief” (Fairclough 1992: 194).

Regarding the securitisation of immigration, one can immediately notice the wording of media headlines and political discourse, which often integrate words such as 'flood', 'flock', 'wave' and 'invasion' of immigrants. The word 'flood', for example, is immediately associated with a natural disaster usually bringing along life-changing consequences and 'invasion', which is a military term, is generally linked to violence and submission and play an integral part in creating much powerful images in people’s minds than the situation might actually prove to be in the reality (Huysmans 2006).

For Fairclough, text analysis alone is not sufficient for discourse analysis, as it does not address the wider processes of discursive development and the links between texts and sociocultural structures. Therefore he has added two more dimensions of analysis, the second of which the research paper will now turn to.
3.3.2. The Middle Dimension- Discourse Practice

This dimension has a crucial mediating role in the model; it mediates “the relationship between texts on one hand and (nontextual parts of) society and culture on the other” (Fairclough 1995: 10).

Fairclough distinguishes three main focus points in this dimension: (a) the “force” of utterances and what type of speech acts they constitute (e.g. promises, requests, threats) to achieve an intended result; (b) the “coherence” of text, which is in close conjunction with the notion of previously discussed intratextuality; (c) the “intertextuality” of texts (Fairclough 1992). Intertextuality is concerned with “the question of which relevant 'external' texts and voices are included in a text, and which are (significantly) excluded” (Fairclough 2003: 61). This is an important consideration to bear in mind when analysing the consumption and interpretation of the text by audiences. The inclusion and referencing of previously written texts and conscious exclusion of other texts play a significant role in the overall perceptions it creates in the society.

Therefore, overall, these three headings allow the analyst to elaborate on the aspects of production and consumption of the text. Analysis involves both the detailed explication of how discourse has been put together, which discursive practices are being drawn upon and in what combinations and how it has been interpreted and consumed by the audience (Fairclough 1995).

3.3.3. The Outer Dimension- Social Practice

The last and the broadest dimension, and thus perhaps the most abstract, is linked to the social context of the text and with notions of ideology, hegemony and power.

Fairclough’s idea of power derives from Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. In a Gramscian view, politics is seen as a struggle for hegemony, which is maintained and articulated through ideology. Following this idea, Fairclough argues that power depends upon “achieving consent or at least acquiescence rather than just having the resources to use force, and the importance of ideology in sustaining relations of power” (Fairclough
This is not only about having the power over people in its traditional sense, but actually creating subtle levels of persuasion for achieving consent among the audience and maintaining that through constant rearticulation of ideology. This idea coincides with the theory of securitisation, which requires audience consent in defining security matters.

Therefore power should not be understood as exclusively oppressive and only in the context of coercion but as productive; “power constitutes discourse, knowledge, bodies and subjectivities” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 13). Fairclough borrows some of his assumptions from Foucault to whom he devotes significant attention in his earlier work (e.g. Fairclough 1992). Within this context it is important to highlight Foucault’s quotation: “It [power] needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression” (Foucault 1980: 119 as cited in Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 13). However in addition to Foucault’s view of power as productive rather than a pure coercion, critical discourse analysis highlights the notion of dominance and the “subjugation of one social group to another” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 63). Therefore critical discourse analysis stands out for its emphasis on power relations and how discursive practices are constructed in furthering the interests of particular social groups. To conclude, it must be pronounced that “language is not powerful on its own; it gains power by the use powerful people make of it” (Wodak 2011: 35). This coincides with one of the facilitating conditions for a successful securitisation, which emphasises the position of authority of the securitising actor.

Critical discourse analysis and more specifically Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional model has been opted for due to its capability to grasp textual (and non-textual) activities of securitisation; the underlying and hidden assumptions of discursive practices as well as linguistic characteristics of textual productions; their effect on the audience and the general role of the sociocultural setting the discourse has been produced and consumed in. This model follows the assumption of the CS that for a successful securitisation two rules- the internal or linguistic-grammatical and the external, contextual and social- must be fulfilled (Balzacq 2005; Buzan et al. 1998).
4. Empirical Analysis

4.1. Analytical Framework

The discourse analytic technique employed in the research proceeded in two stages. The first stage engaged in the selection of texts pertaining to discourse on Central and East European immigration to the UK; the threat image they are supposed to embody; East and Western Europe ideological divide deriving from historical incongruity; and texts reflecting British “exceptionalism”. It included primary and secondary sources - the former comprised of political speeches and statements, opinion polls and a variety of UK and EU legislation documents; the latter included academic works and publications.

Primary units of analysis were public speeches, statements and announcements by authoritative figures (Prime Minister, Home Secretary, MPs, party leaders, the Cabinet Secretaries) or authorised speakers of the immigration discourse (immigration think tank members, researchers) as well as media publications, which is often used as a platform for reaching wider audiences and garnering more layered public support. Most of the speeches were found from the government website archives (www.gov.uk) under speeches and transcripts; from the British political speech archive (www.britishpoliticalspeech.org); or from the party websites (www.ukip.org and www.conservatives.com). UKIP member speeches and announcements were slightly more difficult to reach due to the lack of available transcripts. UKIP website, however, has a considerable amount of videos of the speeches delivered and references to other sites where video transcripts can be found.

The timeline for the analysis was from 2004 until the present [2013] for both parties. All speeches were looked up with the keyword “(im)migration”; occasionally the “EU enlargement”; “Romania” and “Bulgaria”; “East and Central Europe” were applied. Most of the speeches were delivered at party conferences or at university campuses, which is important from two aspects. Firstly, for a more productive analysis, one needs to bear in mind the context- especially the distal and proximate variations proposed by Thierry Balzacq (2011). Secondly, the context aspect of the speeches coincides with Kingdon’s model (if delivered at a party conference, the main focus is to receive
audience acceptance in the problem stream) as well as Fairclough’s social practice dimension (the interplay of power, ideology and context).

Similarly to Richard Jackson’s thought-provoking analysis of “Islamic terrorism” in political and academic discourse, this study relied on “the labels, assumptions, narratives, predicates, metaphors, inferences and arguments” which politicians, authoritative figures and the media deployed as well as “the kinds of existing cultural-political narratives and pre-existing texts they drew upon” (Jackson 2007: 395). The second stage of the study applied Norman Fairclough’s previously described three-dimensional framework for analysing discourse, which gives specific attention to textual productions, discursive practice and the social dimension where the text is produced and consumed. Thus it linked text and context by adding contextual framework to the discursive productions of relevant texts to establish a coherent image of the politicising and securitising practices and attempts of the two political parties under observation.

Special attention was given to reception by the audience, following Kingdon’s “three streams model”, which separates the problem, policy and politics streams. The framework was linked to the Fairclough’s CDA model on as many cases as possible for a more coherent approach; especially to Fairclough’s second dimension, which addresses the consumption of discursive practices. Kingdon’s three streams were addressed through extensive reading of policy documents, media publications and research papers conducted by think tanks and government agencies; public debates and an investigation of various opinion polls to get an overall idea of the general tendencies towards immigration among the wider British public.

4.2. UKIP versus the Conservative Party in British Politics

The Conservative Party is one of the two largest political parties in Great Britain and has currently formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, headed by Prime Minister David Cameron. The previously marginal right-wing populist UKIP, on the other hand, has become the fastest growing political party in the country (Figure 7) and
is making headlines due to its anti-EU and anti-immigration rhetoric not just in Britain but throughout Europe, thus creating apprehension among the bigger parties and eroding their support base. UKIP “burst onto center stage” in May 2013 when it captured “almost a quarter of the votes in local elections around the country, threatening to upset the stable two-party system that has existed for the last century” (Leonard 2013). This is considered to be “the biggest surge by a fourth party in England since the second World War”, indicating turbulent changes and developments in the contemporary British political terrain (Watt 2013a). UKIP is no longer simply seen as a protest party, which only garners votes due to prevalent discontent and disappointment with the largest two political parties in the UK. Over the years UKIP’s image as a single-issue party has changed due to its more widespread focus on issues such as the economy, taxes, education, climate, etc. in addition to its main debating platforms of immigration and the EU.

![Figure 7](http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/mar/09/ukip-opinium-observer-opinion-poll)

This has resulted in a gradual change of the rhetoric of the Conservative Party to regain ground from UKIP ahead of the next general election in 2015. It must be noted that
UKIP does not have a single member in the British House of Commons and therefore does not have the same means and resources for affecting British policymaking. At the same time, their constantly increasing support base and recent best ever parliamentary performance at the Eastleigh byelection on 28 February 2013, receiving more votes than the Conservative Party, is a clear indication of the increasing sentiment among the British public that immigration and the EU’s legislation on the matter is a growing concern within the country.

4.3. The Conservative Party Immigration Rhetoric- Recent Developments

The Conservative Party’s discourse was analysed over a time period of 9 years, from 2004 until the present [May 2013]. It is natural that different politicians have a “distinctive repertoire of ways of speaking” (Fairclough 2000: 96). There are some underlying dynamics that emerge throughout the Conservative discourse and overall one can note a gradual shift towards a more powerful use of language and choice of words. The first thing that catches the eye, especially regarding the Prime Minister’s speeches, is that he always starts with the beneficial aspects of immigration, linking it closely to British exceptional character as a host nation. This kind of tactic is excepted from a mainstream party, whose discursive construction is based on “political correctness” and rhetorical balance. Boswell highlights another important notion: “If migration is depicted [only] as a security risk, this will make it more difficult for a state to justify economically beneficial labour migration” which is important from the coherence aspect of discourse (Boswell 2007: 2). From an another end of the spectrum, critics maintain that Cameron “has been known to attack immigration and celebrate immigrants in the same speech” and this kind of fluctuation in the linguistic manufacture does not evoke trust among the public or an idea that the issue is being tackled (Rawnsley 2013).

One can also note constant references to British “exceptionalism” as a powerful island nation with rich history and altruistic politics, such as: “This is our island story- open, diverse and welcoming”; “The generosity” of our nation (Cameron 2013c); “We have the finest police officers in the world” (May 2012a); Britain is “the best country in the
world” with “the finest Head of State on earth”, “There is absolutely nothing we cannot do” (Cameron 2012); “To be British is to be generous; whenever there’s a disaster on the other side of the world, British people dig deep into their pockets and give their money” (Cameron 2009); “We’re an island. We’re the fourth richest nation in the world” (Howard 2005b); “Britain is the best country in the world” (Howard 2004).

Almost every immigration speech includes a section on British greatness, which can be considered a resourceful rhetorical tactic to evoke sentiments of national pride among the British public and create a sense of insecurity and concern about the erosion of great British values.

The Conservative Party texts were also analysed within the framework of Fairclough’s three-dimensional model, which firstly looks at the vocabulary, grammar and the use of metaphors or other linguistic attributes; secondly focuses on the “force” of utterances i.e. promises and confirmations- which were very much prevalent in all Conservative Party speeches- and the consumption aspects of the discourse as well as intertextuality or references to previously written texts; and finally the social context, wherein the discourse was delivered.

As already mentioned, due to the change in rhetoric over time, the linguistic manufacture of speeches has provided more analytical substance closer to the present day. Cameron’s most recent speech delivered at University Campus Suffolk in Ipswich included the metaphor “we should be rolling up that red carpet” for immigrants (Cameron 2013c); while the same metaphor was being used just a month before in India, mentioning that Britain will “have the red carpet rolled out” for Indian students (Cameron 2013b), referring to intertextuality and indicating David Cameron’s welcome to “hardworking Indians” in contrast to “the new EU entrants” (Lentin 2013). This is a significant observation in all three dimensions of Fairclough’s model- from the textual aspect and opting for the same metaphor; from the discursive practice viewpoint regarding the audience of both speeches and the “force” of utterance indicating clear sympathy for one group over another; and from the social practice dimension, which addresses the context and power play. Cameron does not seem to worry about the talented immigration of foreign nationals to Britain, but is rather concerned about the
unskilled labour force from the ECE countries. With regard to the former, Cameron is suggesting “to take down the barriers” and uses the word “partner” or “partnering” four times; the word “partnership” five times and the word “relationship” a staggering twelve times in a short 1600-word speech (Cameron 2013b). Thus, ECE migrants are increasingly becoming the victims of what has become known as “xeno-racism”\(^{22}\) only those are tolerated, who benefit the country; those, who simply come in search for a better life, are not. As Fekete maintains: “in this brave new post-Cold War world, the enemy is not so much ideology as poverty” (Fekete 2001).

Metaphors are used by both the Conservative Party members as well as the UKIP candidates. Their presentation, however, and the selection of words indicates much more powerful rhetoric from the UKIP side e.g. “our communities just can’t cope with the demands of ever greater numbers flooding in” from the EU (Cameron 2011c); or “On 1 January 2014 the floodgates will open for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens [to come to Britain]...the only way is a moratorium on immigration” (UKIP candidate Diane James as cited by the press association in the Guardian 2013a) and opening “our doors to massive oversupply in the unskilled labour market... is an outrage” (Farage 2013b).

The context of Cameron’s latest speech is clearly evident. While Cameron’s earlier speeches have not made references to specific countries, in his speech in Ipswich on 25 March 2013 he explicitly singles out and even stigmatises Bulgarian and Romanian migrants (e.g. they should not be “drawn by the attractiveness of our benefits system”). This is an important rhetorical statement from the perspective of power deriving from Fairclough’s social practice dimension, which looks at the subjugation of one social group, usually the minority or newcomers, to another. It can be argued that to create a sense of urgency and tension with regard to the latest newcomers of the EU, Cameron discursively links these migrants to welfare dependency and a strain on the labour

\(^{22}\) Xeno-racism indicates a phenomenon which “holds impoverished strangers, including whites, in its sight” and can be associated especially with Romanian and Bulgarain immigrants in the UK. Xeno-racism does not concentrate explicitly on racial, ethnic or religious values, but indicates an overall dislike of or discomfort with “the other”; but the way it “denigrates and reifies people” is an intrinsic quality of racism- “it is a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism” (Fekete 2001).
market. He mentions that “we can’t stop these full transitional controls coming to an end, but what we can do is make sure that those who come here from the EU... do so for the right reasons” (Cameron 2013c). His choice of language firstly indicates that the current British government would extend transitional measures if it would coincide with the EU legislation and secondly, refers already in advance to the possibility that A2 migrants might become a strain on the British welfare state. He also mentions that there are “450,000 British 18 to 24 year olds on Jobseeker’s Allowance...and that had happened at the same time as the largest wave of migration in our country’s history” linking youth unemployment in the country to ECE migration and EU enlargement. He also used the soft/tough dichotomy contrasting the Conservative government to the previous Labour one and mentioned that Britain needs to end the “something for nothing”-culture (Cameron 2013c). The cohesion and structure of the paragraph enforces the reader subconsciously associate the Tories with a tough stance on immigration, whereas the previous government was weak and soft on the matter (e.g. “We need to break out of the old government silos”) (Cameron 2013c). Furthermore, the inclusion of numerical values, as previously mentioned, has a rhetorical effect which gives substance to claims.

Cameron carried on that “by the end of this year...we are going to strengthen the test that determines which migrants can access benefits” (Cameron 2013c). This is an especially interesting proposition since the EU directive on the free movement of EU citizens (Directive 2004/38/EC) and EC Regulation EC 883/2004 maintain that with regard to social security benefits23 “EU citizens may not be treated differently from the nationals of a Member State” (once they are “habitually resident”24) (Kennedy 2011: 17). Cameron also proposed a tougher “habitual residence test” before migrants receive income-related benefit, which has raised more concerns as “the existing test is already the subject of complaints from the European Commission, which is threatening legal

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23 Make difference between social security benefits (e.g. child benefit, invalidity benefit or contribution-based Jobseeker’s Allowance; usually “granted to provide cover against the classical social security risks – sickness, maternity and paternity, accidents at work and occupational diseases, old-age and invalidity, unemployment”) and social assistance benefits (e.g. housing benefits and income support; these benefits are “typically means tested and given to people in need”) (European Commission in the UK 2013).

24 “Before EU citizens not active in the labour market become eligible for social security benefits they have to pass a strict “habitual residence test” proving that they have a genuine link with the UK”. This is a requirement implemented under Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 (European Commission in the UK 2013).
action against Britain, arguing that it breaches European agreements” (Castle and Cowell 2013). This means that the local people get priority in the social housing system, even though they might be less qualified. Cameron’s proposals can be seen as creating a platform for practical securitisation. However, it could be argued that securitisation, as introduced by Buzan and collaborators, remains rhetorical rather than practical in Cameron’s treatment.

With regard to the EU and EEA nationals using the National Health Service (NHS), Cameron insists that “it is right that they or their government pay for it... British taxpayers should support British families” (Cameron 2013c). He continues that migrants who settle in Britain must prove “a decent command of English”: “We’re going to make that assessment a real and robust one” (Cameron 2013c). Under new proposals “EEA nationals will lose Jobseeker’s Allowance and other benefits after six months unless they have a genuine chance of finding work and can show they have been trying to do so”- knowing the language is a necessary requirement for that (Grice 2013).

This speech can be seen as a significant cornerstone in the future developments of Britain’s immigration policies. The Conservative Party is clearly affected by UKIP’s success in opinion polls and in recent local elections, where it garnered approximately 25 per cent of the votes (The Guardian 2013b). Thus the context of the speech is important- lifting of labour restrictions for Bulgaria and Romania creates a sense of heightened tension among the British public; the start of campaigning for the next general election is at the doorstep and UKIP’s popularity is surging. Furthermore, the Conservative Party was still clearly “tormented by the Eastleigh defeat”, which gave them a push for proposing “a new set of policies...to win back the disenchanted” (Kesvani 2013).

The speech was delivered by David Cameron just two months after his proposal for a EU referendum: “we will give the British people a referendum with a very simple in or out choice...to stay in the EU on...new terms, or come out altogether” (Cameron 2013a). This statement also indicates a very clear British mindset as a “strong-minded member of the family of European nations” whose requests for special conditions and widely prevalent self-perception as “exceptional” is affected by “our geography [that] has
shaped our psychology” (Cameron 2013a). Cameron does not make any excuses for the request of a special treatment, but justifies it with British historical and geographical settings.

Home Secretary Theresa May is one of the strongest advocates for Britain leaving the European Convention on Human Rights, since the Article Eight of the Convention prohibits deporting dangerous foreign criminals under the “right to a family life” clause (BBC 2013a; Hennessy 2013b). She mentioned that a new immigration bill will be published in late 2013 “to give full legal weight to ministers’ demands” to deport a foreign criminal if it coincides with the need to “protect the public and control immigration” (Hennessy 2013b). The planned law could also contain restrictions on migrants coming from the ECE states, since last year [2012] a Romanian national, Lavinia Olmazu, who was convicted in a “multi million pound benefits fraud”, was allowed to stay in the country as she had a son living in Britain (Barrett 2012). The issue has been raised again among widely prevalent concerns about the A2 migrant inflow from next year and its allegedly close correlation to crime and violence. Coming back to Kingdon’s three streams model of public policy, this decision is accepted by the audience in the problem stream since “the new rules were backed unanimously by the House of Commons” but not by the audience in the policy stream since the bill does “not carry the full weight of law and because of this are routinely ignored by judges on the Immigration Tribunal” (Hennessy 2013b). This might refer to what Huysmans has called a “selective securitisation” (Huysmans 2006).

The Conservative Party politicians are increasingly debating the need for protecting benefits, public services and labour market from the misuse by ECE migrants. The discursive construction of a direct link between benefits, housing, unemployment, NHS, and/or crime on the one hand and ECE immigration on the other is a relatively new phenomenon among the Conservative politicians. While before the general elections of 2005 and 2010 immigration was predominantly addressed as a coherent whole, making explicit links only to illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers, then before the 2015 general election this balance has considerably changed. This is due to the imminent lift of labour restrictions for A2 migrants, but also because UKIP is being seen to address the most sensitive issues among the British public in a rigorous manner, thus eroding
the Conservative Party support base in the upcoming elections (Freedland 2013). The Conservative Planning Minister Nick Boles has argued that “arrivals from Romania and Bulgaria will put pressure on Britain's housing and public services” and supported “rules about income and job prospects being tightened to prevent immigrants immediately claiming benefits” (Jowit 2013).

Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, and often considered as one of the most popular Conservative politicians due to his outspoken character and bold vision for the capital, has similarly argued that ministers should renegotiate “the current deal allowing migrants from the two countries to live and work in the UK from the start of 2014” adding to the consensus aspect in Kingdon’s problem stream on the matter (Johnson 2013 as cited in Meredith 2013). Johnson also makes a firm prediction that “immigration from Bulgaria and Romania...will lead to an increase in rough sleeping of the kind seen from previous accession countries” which disturbs the social scene and dynamics of British cities (Johnson 2013 as cited in Meredith 2013).

4.4. The Conservative Party Immigration Rhetoric during the EU Enlargements of 2004 and 2007

The earlier immigration speeches of the Conservative Party members address immigration as a whole, without the explicit focus on specific countries or regions. Michael Howard, the Party leader from 2003 to 2005 and one of the hard-lined eurosceptics during the Major government, called immigration to Britain in 2004 “chaotic and out of control” (Howard 2004). He continues: “immigration has doubled under Labour” indicating Labour party’s liberal immigration policies and grave miscalculations with regard to the inflow of A8 nationals, although the total effect of mass immigration from ECE states at that point was not yet evident (Howard 2004). With regard to the European Union (and in the context of the EU big bang enlargement just months before) he mentioned that “we want to bring powers back from Brussels to Britain” (Howard 2004), which is a very similar rhetoric adopted by Margaret Thatcher who mentioned in her infamous Bruges speech in 1988: “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a
European level” referring to intertextuality to absorb more substance to one’s statements (Thatcher 1988). The general perception of Michael Howard was that Britain should be able to make its own immigration rules, an idea very strongly advocated by the UKIP leader Nigel Farage.

The context of the speeches delivered by the Conservative politicians in 2004 and 2005 is important to bear in mind. The Conservative party was in opposition in the government and in 2004 the biggest EU enlargement took place inciting discomfort, insecurity and unawareness about the future among the British public. Thus the Conservative Party linked the two contextual aspects and built their election campaign on blaming the Labour government’s immigration policy, which was summed up by Shadow Home Secretary David Davis as “clueless, chaotic and potentially catastrophic” (Davis 2004). There are no explicit references to ECE migrants in Davis’s speech as immigration is addressed as a whole. Davis also highlights that incoming immigrants, possibly alluding to A8 nationals, are going “to our most overcrowded areas...burdening housing, health, schools and other public services” (Davis 2004)- statement heavily addressed by London mayor Boris Johnson a decade later with regard to ECE migrants. In 2005, at the same year as the general election and when migration from A8 countries was in rapid incline, the Conservative immigration rhetoric was garnering more substance. The party leader, Michael Howard, delivered his immigration speech in Telford less than a month before the results of the general election. He argued that “Britain has everything going for it” but this “British sense of tolerance and of fair play is...being abused” thus playing on the subconsciousness of British nationals and their sense of national pride (Howard 2005). Howard portrays an altruistic image of British immigration tradition: “For centuries we have welcomed people from around the world with open arms” but “millions of people...would like to settle here” and “our communities simply cannot successfully absorb newcomers at this rate” (Howard 2005). Referring to such large arguably unfounded numerical values is sowing seeds of panic in the community; in addition he adds that “immigration is putting a strain on our public services” (Howard 2005). The words “chaos” or “chaotic” were mentioned four times, which is significant for a single-issue speech. Similarly to UKIP’s earlier immigration rhetoric, the Conservative politicians, such as Shadow Home Secretary David Davis, talk about ECE immigration mainly in the context of mismanagement by the EU and the
need of member states to “take back powers to their own countries” since it “is the most sensible option to help Europe cope with further enlargement” (Davis 2005). Davis makes the first public statement from the Conservative Party political elite since 2004 that the EU enlargement has resulted in pressures for the host state and need to be resolved; and includes the derogatory term “Polish plumber” (Davis 2005). At this time the ECE immigration was heavily figuring in the politicisation sphere- it was addressed and it was part of the public debate and normal politics. Solutions, as such, were not yet proposed.

Michael Howard, as a Conservative Party leader, was more stable in his approach to immigration than his successor David Cameron. Howard considered immigration a problem for the “generous island nation” and even more so since the 2004 EU enlargement (Howard 2005a; Howard 2005b). When the Labour Party won the 2005 general election, Howard stepped down as the party leader and in his final speech at the Conservative Party conference in Blackpool he mentioned that the Conservative Party turned the topic of “immigration the most important [issue] in British politics” and the British “immigration system is in shambles” and in need to be tackled immediately- referring to high politicisation (Howard 2005b). What is significant in this context, though, is Howard’s own background as a son of a Romanian-born Jewish immigrant to which he makes several references in his speeches, mainly in conjunction with British greatness to which he owes his life to: “If it hadn’t been for Winston Churchill, and if it hadn’t been for Britain, I would have been one of them [those killed in the concentration camps] too” and “I owe everything I am to this country” (Howard 2004).

David Cameron assumed the position of the Conservative Party leader in 2005 and in 2006 delivered a speech to the Conservative Party Conference in Bournemouth. Since the Labour Party had won the 2005 general elections and UKIP was still a relatively marginal political force, the Conservative Party did not feel the need for a more abrasive rhetoric on immigration, even though the number of ECE migrants by the end of 2006 reached almost half a million. Thus the fluctuations and gradual movement towards more rigorous tones in Cameron’s discursive construction of ECE immigration rhetoric over time is clearly evident culminating with his 2013 immigration speech. Cameron’s 2006 speech at the Conservative Party conference was coherent and flowing, different
topics are joined so it is easy to follow and make logical assumptions e.g. crime is linked to social cohesion and the problematic issue of communities living “separate lives”; and social cohesion is joined to the necessity of educational reforms so that immigrants would learn English (Cameron 2006). Immigration itself, however, is on a relatively marginal position in the speech and becomes implicitly mentioned after environmental concerns towards the end of the public statement. David Davis, however, brings attention back to the immigration debate in 2007 and once again addresses the topic of ECE immigration in the context of EU enlargement. He attacks Labour “open-door” policy, highlights the miscalculations made by the government regarding the number of inflow from A8 states and links it to direct pressure on “housing, schools, communities” (Davis 2007). Davis also mentions that ECE immigration has reached a chaotic 700 000 in just two and half years and continues that the Labour government has made a huge mistake in “letting in too many people who shouldn’t be here” and slamming “the door on those we should be helping” making an obvious statement that ECE migrants are not the preferential part of the inflow to Britain. This once more indicates the power play and subjugation of particular social groups in Fairclough’s social practice dimension.

Davis’ speech is also clearly reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher, comparing the Iron Lady to Gordon Brown’s soft tactics and his failure to tackle immigration. What comes out from the Conservative speeches in general is that, although in opposition until 2010, a great deal of rhetoric concentrates on dising Labour policies and government, and relatively little on proposing actual solutions themselves. The majority of speeches just accentuate the overall idea that “we will do better”, which coincides with the discursive practice dimension of Norman Fairclough and the nature of the “force of utterances” (Fairclough 1992). There are a lot of “commissive speech acts that involve promises”, but few are actually being put into practice (Onuf 1998: 67).

In 2007, one can already notice the gradual shift in Cameron’s rhetoric. He gets more personal and talks about his travels through the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc and referencing “the lack of choice, the lack of freedom, the lack of expression” people in this area were confined to (Cameron 2007). This is an implicit discursive division between “us” and “them”- the superior and the inferior. Fairclough argues that this kind
of rhetoric refers to “imposing divisions on the world”- an idea propagated by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in the form of “symbolic violence” or “violence in the form of language” (Fairclough 2000: 48). While this kind of discursive construction of Eastern Europe reflects regret and guilt, in Cameron’s latest speeches this focus has transformed into a negative perception of people migrating from East and Central Europe and a need to curb this inflow.

In 2009, a year before the general election, Cameron addresses the death of his sick son as an arguably rhetorical tactic: “When such a big part of your life suddenly ends nothing else - nothing outside - matters” (Cameron 2009). He fittingly, however, moves onto highlighting British greatness and generosity and mentions that “if we want our country to carry on with this proud, open tradition, we’ve got to understand the pressures of mass immigration” (Cameron 2009). It can be argued that using inclusive plural pronouns like “our”, “us” and “we” creates an image of a threatened British identity among the British nationals and its direct link to immigration increases instant hostile sentiments towards incoming foreign nationals.

Since the Conservative Party came to power and formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in 2010, their rhetoric on immigration was generally confined to “non-EU migration, bogus students and family visa/economic routes”; and immigration as a whole, including the ECE migrants, which has “led to serious social impacts in some areas, with pressure being placed on key public services such as schools, the health service, transport, housing and welfare” (May 2010; Cameron 2010). May and Cameron both address the touchy subject of integration in Britain, or more specifically the lack of it, and subsequent “community tensions” it has created (May 2010; Cameron 2010; May 2012b). This problem is directly linked to the necessary requirement to learn the English language and the need to review the “language requirements across the immigration system with a view to tightening them further” (May 2010). In her later speeches May addresses the same issue, referring to intertextuality, yet solutions have not been provided: “After years of mass immigration, we now face the enormous task of building an integrated, cohesive society” and asks “how can people build relationships with their neighbours if they can’t even speak the same language? ” (May 2012b). Very common for Conservative Party politicians is the portrayal of a hopeful image for the
future, e.g. “Our country, Britain, is on the rise”; “We can make Britain the best place in the world” (Cameron 2012); “We are being positive about our plans” (Howard 2005b); “We will make Britain more secure and bring down crime”...“It can be done. It must be done. It will be done” (Davis 2004). This is a significant characteristic of Conservative rhetoric which pertains to Fairclough’s textual and discursive practice dimensions. This is in a stark contrast to UKIP politicians and especially to Nigel Farage’s discursive constructions, who is very blunt-spoken and does not paint a hopeful and agreeable picture of the future of Britain, but rather addresses the downfall of the country if immigration will not be tackled- an integral element of the CS securitisation logic.

Social cohesion- an underlying feature of many Conservative politicians’ speeches- is actually most vocally addressed by David Cameron in his 2011 Munich speech, which was not explicitly about ECE immigration to Britain, but nevertheless needs to be examined as it is an important landmark speech in the development of British immigration policy. Indeed there are two underlying themes in David Cameron’s speech: the securitisation of immigration (although with reference to religious extremism); and multiculturalism, linked to the question of national identity and solidarity, which alludes to the well elaborated three-dimensional model of discourse. Particularly important is Cameron’s condemnation of what he called the “hands-off tolerance” in Britain. Perhaps the most infamous line of the speech is a call for “muscular liberalism”, which condemns the “passive tolerance” of recent decades (very similar to his “hard” versus “soft” touch rhetoric of 2013) (Cameron 2011a). To fully understand Cameron, it is essential to examine what he means by “muscular liberalism”. Cameron says that a “muscular” approach suggests “the unambiguous and hard-nosed” defence of liberty and active promotion of certain values such as “freedom of speech, freedom of worship, the rule of law and democracy” but also following the rules of the host society, learning the language and “giving back” to the society to function properly in the new social order, while maintaining a certain degree of cultural distinctiveness (Cameron, 2011a). The idea behind this proclamation is that migrants cannot just enter the country and abuse the system, but need to be a beneficial force and contribute to the welfare of the society. This thought has been clearly articulated in Cameron’s 2013
immigration speech in Ipswich, where he mentioned that “something for nothing”
culture must stop. These ideas refer to previously discussed intertextuality and the
evolution of rhetoric towards a more rigid stance. Cameron’s speech at the Munich
Security Conference in 2011 arguably echoed the ideas once propagated by Enoch
Powell, both warning of dangerous fragmentation within society and the weakening of
national solidarity. A considerable transformation, however, is that immigration has
become detached from race, especially so as the vast numbers of immigrants in Britain
today are from Europe (Fekete 2001). It is also ironic that the very people that were the
target of Powell’s attack are now themselves feeling resentful of the latest wave of
immigrants from Eastern Europe, who are believed to threaten their welfare, safety and
put a pressure on social services leading to tensions and possible increase in the levels
of crime in the community (Omaar 2008; Grillo 2010).

Therefore, Cameron’s Munich proclamation is a landmark speech from where one could
actually start following the gradual change of the Conservative ECE immigration
rhetoric towards a more rigorous stance and UKIP’s influence on the discursive
construction of the Conservative elite’s language. From 2011 ECE migration is being
already explicitly referenced: “more than one million people from those countries have
come to live and work in the UK – a huge number”; “That's the largest influx of people
Britain has ever had…and it has placed real pressures on communities up and down the
country” (Cameron 2011b). While Cameron only addresses the problem, UKIP leader
Nigel Farage offers a solution for controlling the inflow of migrants: “He [Cameron]
has to face the fact that we have a total open door to the whole of Eastern Europe and
that from May 1, our social security rules change meaning that you can come from
Poland [or any other A8 countries] and automatically qualify for benefits...while we are
part of the European Union, we cannot have our own immigration policy” (Farage
2011a). In another statement Farage mentions the “massive oversupply of unskilled
labour for the last 5 or 6 years” and warns for “another massive wave of immigrants
coming in” (Farage 2011b). It can be argued that “adjectives with negative polarity”,
often used by Nigel Farage [such as “a massive wave of migrants” or “rampant
immigration”], contribute to “heightening the sense of urgency and crisis” (Mautner
2008: 38). Cameron maintains that “if and when new countries join the European
Union, transitional controls will be put in place” (Cameron 2011b). Farage, however,
argues that transitional measures do not restrict the inflow of migrants from the EU, it only postpones it for a couple of years (Farage 2011a). He adds that the main focus of the government is only on “one part of the immigration problem” as it ignores the “total open door” to ECE migrants (2011a). This is a direct call from UKIP for a more focused attention from the coalition government to ECE immigration and its repercussions for Britain. Cameron also mentions for the first time that immigration has become a “front-ranked political issue” in the country- referring to high politicisation (Cameron 2011c). Theresa May shares this concern and constructs direct links between immigration and a pressure on “infrastructure...housing stock and transport system” as well as “public services...schools and hospitals”- our “communities struggle to cope with this rapid change” (May 2011; May 2012a). Furthermore, since 2011, Cameron’s fears over competitors becomes increasingly evident. It can be seen from the gradual change in his EU and immigration rhetoric, but also due to his explicit references to UKIP, such as: “If people don’t feel that mainstream political parties understand these issues they will turn instead to those who seek to exploit these issues to create social unrest” (Cameron 2011c). The reference to UKIP is linked to a derogative term “social unrest”, which is important from the textual dimension, but also from the social practice dimension in terms of an increasing power struggle between the parties.

In 2012, Theresa May emphasises the need to “restrict the demand for European workers from British employers”, which indicates a clear concern about the numbers coming in from ECE states and taking British jobs. She adds that “immigration puts a downward pressure on wages”, which means “more workers competing for a limited number of low-skilled jobs” (May 2012b). May addresses the British working class, the core of British identity, to create tension and a sense of urgency.

4.5. UKIP- The Discursive Construction of Immigration Rhetoric

UKIP is a British right-wing populist party whose main policy objectives include leaving the European Union to regain control over its own borders and free itself from the chains of EU regulations, withdrawing from the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Convention on Refugees to be able to deport foreign criminals,
and “introduce a five year freeze on immigration for permanent settlement” (www.ukip.org). UKIP’s sudden rise in popularity has come at a time when the British public is ripe for persuasion. People are disappointed in the mainstream party polices, their failure to tackle immigration and protect the erosion of national solidarity and British identity. The Conservative and Labour parties are engaged in accusing each other of “helplessness and incompetence” which has resulted in “shambolic immigration” policies (Mautner 2008: 38).

UKIP rhetoric was, similarly to that of the Conservative Party, analysed within a timeframe of 9 years, from 2004 until the present day [2013] bearing in mind the aspects highlighted by Norman Fairclough in his three-dimensional model. The earlier discursive construction of immigration rhetoric has provided considerably less substance for analysis due to UKIP’s relatively marginal position in British politics. Furthermore, the main focus of UKIP’s earlier manifestos and public rhetoric have been first and foremost withdrawal from the European Union and then problems deriving from this membership, whether political, social or economic. An illustrative example is Roger Knapman’s (UKIP leader from 2002-2006) speech on the EU constitution, signed by all 25 member states in 2004 but never ratified. He saw the Constitution further eroding “the sovereignty of the United Kingdom”, and setting “a dangerous precedent for the future” (Knapman 2004). He then adds that “Great Britain does not need a European constitution which reverses the legal rights and privileges of British citizens” by “... implementing its proposals on immigration, justice and home affairs” (Knapman 2004). Knapman addresses the integral element of security- danger, but not as a direct result of immigration, but rather as something very prevalent in the future if Britain remains to be confined to EU regulations.

This focal point has shifted towards immigration from 2007 putting the issue at the heart of anti-EU arguments (on the unit level), making it the number one issue for the party by 2013 local elections (largely affected by the ending of transitional measures for Bulgaria and Romania). Illustrative examples can be found from the evolution towards immigration-centred discourse in manifestos (see next section) as well as Nigel Farage’s public statements.
In 2007 Farage warned that immigration, which he said was an “absolute mess”, was leading to an increase in community tension and there “needs to be a five-year moratorium on any new immigration to this country” (Farage 2007). He added that the current movement of people from Eastern Europe “dwarfed anything that has ever happened in our history” alluding to the repercussions of the 2004 EU enlargement and the highest influx of ECE nationals in 2007 since the enlargement. Farage provokes insecurity by arguing that ECE immigration is a problem and needs to be contained due to the “increase in social tension”, “unfair burden on the citizen” and “pressure on public services” (Farage 2007). Gerard Batten, London-based UKIP MEP, proposed dispersing immigrants in Britain in 2008 and sending them to less-populated areas, rather than allowing them to overcrowd London. He argued that “in recent years”- alluding to post-EU enlargement ECE migrant inflow- “the situation [immigration] has got out of control and the pressures on housing, transport and the infrastructure generally have become intolerable” (Batten 2008 as cited in Crerar 2008). This is arguably a very strong statement, usually avoided by mainstream politicians, since it echoes the distinguishing feature of the securitisation theory that “if the problem is not handled now it will be too late”- it will reach a “point of no return” and have unmanageable consequences (Buzan et al. 1998: 25-26).

In 2013, when the concern about the imminent A2 migrant inflow is more prevalent than ever, Farage begins heavily using the “open door” metaphor and explicitly maintains that the most urgent debate in Britain is the debate about immigration: “People in Britain are shocked at the change in every single city and market town since we opened the doors to Eastern Europe in 2004”- a statement clearly reminiscent of Enoch Powell (Farage 2013a). In a speech to the UKIP spring conference in March 2013, Farage was attacking all three main British political parties with regard to their “soft touch” on ECE immigration policies: “They all support that door being flung ever wider open to the 29 million people from Bulgaria and Romania” (Farage 2013b). The emphasis on the figure “29 million” can be seen as a rhetorical tactic to create a sense of heightened priority and drama among the British audience. It is clear that the entire populations of A2 countries (comprising 29 million people) will not migrate to Great Britain- this measure is being used to exploit the fears of an average Briton by highlighting a statement that is technically correct, but completely misleading (Blinder
Farage adds that it is an “outrage” that Bulgarian and Romanian nationals can “claim all the benefits that nationals can” and Britain should take back the control over its own borders (Farage 2013b). He ends with a powerful and resounding remark: “We will fight this battle”, which can be seen as an effort to securitise ECE immigration (Farage 2013b).

While in his earlier speeches, Farage has avoided making explicit links between crime and immigration and thus making ECE migration a direct security matter, in April 2013, just after returning from his trip to Bulgaria and being to Romania in the past, he argues that “you’ve got to see the poverty in these countries to believe it...millions of people living in misery”, alluding to the subconscious fact that Britain is being threatened by all these millions of poor people (Farage 2013c). Farage’s discursive construction of threat and insecurity serves to “sweepingly disparage whole countries” such as Romania and Bulgaria directly borrowing from the power play tactic of Norman Fairclough and his social practice dimension (Mautner 2008: 38). Farage directly links this statement to a reminder that Britain will lift labour restrictions for A2 nationals in 2014, which allows the audience to make their own conclusions and indicates well elaborated discursive construction of fear and insecurity. These sentiments have recently been echoed by Conservative politicians, such as John Baron MP, who maintains that a “surge of immigration” from these countries is inevitable since the minimum wage in Britain is “five to six times higher...than it is in Bulgaria or Romania” (Jowit 2013).

Farage continues: “we...do need to say NO to an open door... to masses of unskilled labour” especially because London is currently “in the middle of Romanian crime epidemic- for only 80 000 Romanians living in Britain at the moment in the Metropolitan Police area alone there have been nearly 30 000 Romanian arrests in the last 5 years” (Farage 2013c). These bold statements are delivered in the midst of local elections and well in advance of the European Parliament elections in 2014 and the general election of 2015, all of which will arguably bring unexpected results due to UKIP’s sudden surge in the British political terrain and growing empathy among the wider public towards the party as well as increasing sense of concern and drama in the county. On BBC Question Time, Farage adds that “with the first wave there will be a lot of criminals who will come to Britain”- making it a fact, rather than a prediction (Farage
Especially significant is comparison and contrast to Conservative politician Sajid David, currently the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, sitting on the same panel with Farage, who mentions that the Romanian and Bulgarian immigration is a problem, but since Britain cannot stem the flow according to EU rules, the only solution is making the country unattractive for ECE immigrants. This is a clear indication that ECE migration is unwanted and embodies a great and increasing concern for Great Britain. David also mentions that Cameron’s EU referendum has been proposed exactly due to this reason- the Conservative Party wants “a new kind of relationship” with the EU or “withdraw altogether” (Farage 2013c).

Therefore UKIP clearly makes a campaign out of exploiting “fears over mass immigration from Romania and Bulgaria” by linking it to crime and featuring the issue as a focal point in the local elections in May 2013, European Parliament elections in 2014 and British general elections in 2015, thus posing a significant electoral threat to the Conservative Party (Morris 2013). UKIP takes the issue of ECE immigration to the borderline of securitisation in the spectrum proposed by Buzan et al. (1998) due to direct discursive links to crime and violence, welfare, jobs and the British identity. Audience support indicates some aspects of successful securitisation. At the same time, UKIP does not have the resources to make the proposed changes, which is a considerable weakness in the completion of the securitisation process.

4.6. Manifestos- the Construction of Verbal Declarations

The Conservative election manifesto of 2005 mentioned the topic of “immigration” on the front cover as well as three times in the foreword. The “out-of-control immigration system”, however, was predominantly addressed within the context of asylum-seekers and illegal immigration (The Conservative Party 2005: 1). Immigration was also briefly mentioned with regard to the NHS and its abuse by non-British nationals- NHS is “a national health service not a world health service” (The Conservative Party 2005: 13). The abuse of the system was also mainly linked to non-EU migrants- an idea that has now expanded to EU nationals, most visible in David Cameron’s latest speeches. Immigration as a separate topic is mentioned after taxes, education, healthcare and
crime, but still linked to matters pertaining to non-EU nationals (e.g. “Australian-style points system for work permits”; “annual immigration limit”; “asylum seekers’ applications”; “controlled borders”) (The Conservative Party 2005: 19). The party manifesto published during the next election cycle in 2010 does not address the immigration topic separately, but ties it to the economy and crime sections. What is significant, however, is that the 130-page manifesto explicitly mentions EU migration in conjunction with EU enlargement: we will introduce “transitional controls as a matter of course in the future for all new EU Member States” and “we do not need to attract people to do jobs that could be carried out by British citizens” (The Conservative Party 2010: 21). Social cohesion has also been highlighted together with the necessity of embracing British core values as well as the need of learning the English language for an immigrant to function as a contributing member of society.

Even UKIP’s rhetoric and stance on ECE immigration has evolved over time. While the 2005 manifesto had pushed immigration on the seventh page, after the economy, healthcare and welfare, and education (UKIP 2005), then the 2010 general election manifesto presented concern for European immigration already on the fifth page (UKIP 2010). The 2013 local election manifesto placed the issue on the front cover in screaming font, which read “Open door immigration is crippling local services in the UK” (UKIP 2013). The first sentence that really catches the eye on the latest manifesto is printed on a red background in white font, similar to traffic stop signs that are familiar to everyone. It reads “On January 1st 2014, The UK will open its door to unlimited numbers of people from Romania and Bulgaria” (UKIP 2013). In a smaller font, just below the eye-catching headline, one can read “Nearly a quarter of all European nationals living in the UK are not working...551,000 out of 2.3 million are economically inactive and 146,000 have never worked in this country...The figure of those who have never worked has risen by 30% since 2008” (UKIP 2013). None of the previous UKIP manifests have made such a strong one-topic statement on the front cover. It shows that with the lifting of labour restrictions to Romanian and Bulgarian nationals on the horizon, immigration discourse becomes more intense and possible repercussions much more concerning. At this point, however, the earlier discussed economic situation must be addressed, which further enforces the rigorous construction of discourse and accentuates the fear of more immigration. This is in contrast to 2004 and 2005, for
example, when Britain was in need of labour force from ECE states and the economy was in considerably better shape.

The placement of UKIP and the Conservative Party on the politicised-securitised spectrum according to their manifestos indicate a clear contrast. Since (ECE) immigration has been mentioned in the Conservative manifestos but not explicitly linked to societal security, it can be comfortably located in the politicised sphere; whereas UKIP makes clear references to societal security in its latest manifesto and thus should be placed in the securitisation domain. This thought should be elaborated further in conjunction with crime and welfare- two of the integral aspects in the societal security sector.

4.7. Explicit Links to Crime and Welfare in the Conservative and UKIP discourse

Diane James, UKIP candidate in the Eastleigh by-election, which brought along a humiliating defeat for the Conservative Party has explicitly linked Romanian immigration to crime: “We are not just talking about pressure on services from immigration but also, and I have to say it, the crime associated with Romanians”. She continues that during the Olympics one of the biggest concerns was “Romanian criminal gangs pick-pocketing” (James as cited in the press association in the Guardian 2013a). Godfrey Bloom, UKIP MEP, has expressed similar discontent towards Romanian nationals. He writes that United Kingdom can no longer afford open borders to EU nationals, especially due to the increased levels of crime and violence associated with Romanian nationals: “Currently 90 per cent of cash point fraud is allegedly perpetrated by Romanian gangs” and “they are said to exploit children to beg and steal” (Bloom 2013). Bloom also explicitly links A2 nationals to “British joblessness”, “strain on the infrastructure” and “potential crime explosion” and calls Home Secretary Theresa May to “tear up the treaty” that lifts labour restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals- a proposal indicating “extraordinary measures” (Bloom 2013).

The media has an important contributing factor to this debate. In various publications it has been argued that “Eastern European migrants are arriving in London in
unprecedented numbers, flooding the capital with beggars...pickpockets before the Olympics” and “organised crime gangs are believed to be transporting coach loads of Romanians into the country with instructions to work a pre-allocated ‘pitch’” (Hodge 2012). The media often highlights quotes uttered by the British political elite: “They [Eastern Europeans] see rich pickings in Britain because there are no controls” (Khalid Mahmood, Conservative MP for Perry Barr in the Guardian as cited by Alleyne 2012 ).

In the same article, it has been highlighted that “Romanians were the most prolific offenders last year [2011], with...1,329 detained”, which is an astonishing number considering the relatively small proportion of Romanian nationals in the total UK population (Alleyne 2012). It has also been addressed by the Guardian that “a growing number of Conservative MPs now believe the UK should block the lifting of restrictions [for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals] even if it were to prompt a row with the European commission”, which is a measure above normal everyday politics and could be considered “extraordinary” if implemented (Boffey and Helm 2013).

Similarly to highlighting explicit links between ECE immigration and crime, it has been done by UKIP politicians between immigration and abuse of the British welfare system. Economic concerns, as a matter of fact, are often perceived as the main contributor to insecurity among the British public since the effect of migration on the economy is more immediate than, for example, on British national identity.

Since EU member states can only impose transitional measures for the newcomers up to seven years, on 1 May 2011, the British government was “forced to scrap safeguards on receiving handouts” (Hough and Whitehead 2011). This means that the requirement for the Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) was lifted and all A8 nationals could access “Jobseeker’s Allowance, council tax help and housing benefits” on the same account as British nationals (Kennedy 2011; Hough and Whitehead 2011). Nigel Farage instantly made a strong case from the abolishment of restrictions linking it to “benefit tourism”, thus paving the way for his recent success in 2013 local elections and biggest surge in polls since the party’s establishment in 1993. Cameron, however, replied with his 2013 immigration speech and publicly proposed tougher policies on benefits, housing and health care. What is significant, though, is that the push to the Conservatives was given through language practiced by UKIP and its success as a result of this linguistic
manufacture. As Fairclough maintains: “Political struggles have always been partly struggles over the dominant language”- a statement directly linked to his three-dimensional model, power and ideology (Fairclough 2000: 3).

Migrants are often depicted through negative polarity and seen as “free riders”, “scroungers” or “bogus”, trying “to exploit the socioeconomic fabric of the host European societies” (Karyotis 2011: 21; Mautner 2008). Unlawful migrants are coming up with new ways to exploit the British welfare system. These include “trafficking homeless people to the UK and then taking their passports so they can be used to receive state handouts” or “printing bogus birth certificates” to “claim...benefits for non-existent children” (Beckford 2008). Eastern European migrants are already claiming millions of pounds from the British welfare system, out of which there is an unknown number of bogus schemes (Karyotis 2011). A number of changes, however, are being implemented to tackle this problem and avoid unlawful schemes to go through. These include “tighter control on the issue of claim forms, fraud awareness training for staff, and deploying compliance officers in tax credit call centres” (Beckford 2008).

The gradually increasing local resentment and competition over jobs, healthcare, housing and welfare lead to what has become known as “welfare chauvinism” or the “privileging of national citizens in the distribution of social goods” (Huysmans 2006: 77). Migrants are seen to overburden the “already dilapidated welfare system” and thus they are not anymore simply rivals “but illegitimate recipients or claimants of socioeconomic rights” (Karyotis 2011: 21; Huysmans 2006: 77). This means that there is a growing sentiment not only among the wider public, but also among specialists and policy-makers that a “community should first and foremost provide benefits and welfare for its own people”, linking the problem to all three Kingdon’s streams (Huysmans 2000: 768-769). This has also been implemented in law and EU policies, which support the gradual shift towards “welfare chauvinism” and accepts the changes taking place in contemporary Western societies. Huysmans argues that “in this context these policies facilitate the creation of migration as a destabilising or dangerous challenge to West European societies” (Huysmans 2000: 753). Cameron often addresses immigration problems in close conjunction with welfare: “Immigration and welfare reform are two sides of the same coin...we will never control immigration properly unless we tackle
welfare dependency” (Cameron 2011b) and “immigration has compounded the failure of our welfare system” (Cameron 2011c).

4.8. The Power Game between UKIP and the Conservative Party

UKIP’s influence on the Conservatives is imperative from the context of Fairclough’s social practice dimension and power relations in British politics. It allows one to analyse the gradual success of UKIP and how discursive practices are constructed in furthering the interests of particular political parties.

UKIP’s primary objective, since its foundation in 1993, has been “withdrawal from the EU to regain our [Britain’s] self-governing democracy” (www.ukip.org). Thus it has generally been considered a single-issue party with the main aim of freeing Britain from the chains of EU regulations, and acclaimed the title of a “protest party”, which generally accumulated votes and support in opinion polls when the general public was not satisfied how the country is being run by mainstream parties.

This perception, however, has recently been through turbulent changes. It has been argued that “UKIP should no longer be seen as a protest party” since it offers considerable policy solutions in areas such as education, the environment, economy and taxes, in addition to its original focus on the EU and immigration. As Nigel Farage himself argues: “It is not about protest voting anymore... now it is about policy...putting forward positive, alternative policies, that will make this country a better place” (Farage 2013b).

The party that was described as a bunch of “fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists” by David Cameron in 2006 which echoed his predecessor, Michael Howard, who saw the UKIP members as “cranks and gadflies” is now posing a significant electoral threat to mainstream parties in 2015 (Assinder 2006; Parker 2013).

After its strongest performance ever in the 2013 local elections, UKIP leader Nigel Farage “announced the arrival of four-party politics in Britain” when the party garnered nearly 25 per cent of the votes (Parker 2013). Nigel Farage also declared that the British politics is on the course of a change, which is clearly indicated by the “biggest surge by a fourth party in England since the second world war” (Watt 2013a; White 2013).
The party won 147 council seats, a huge rise from just 7 seats in 2009. Furthermore, UKIP “fielded 1700 candidates, three times the number that stood in 2009” (BBC 2009; The Guardian 2013b). Farage maintained: “Britain is in a mess and we need radical reform...There is now a settled majority that wants us to get our country back” (Watt 2013a). He uses strong and effective language, referring to the mishaps of the mainstream parties and highlighting the recent successes of his own party, thus creating a conception that UKIP is the new and right way to restore the British greatness. This is a statement indicating the fluctuation of power relations in the country-an integral element in Fairclough’s third dimension.

The most evident influence of UKIP’s success over the Conservative Party was arguably the latter’s humiliating defeat in the Eastleigh by-election on the 28th of February 2013. UKIP made its best ever parliamentary performance gaining 27.8 per cent of the votes, leaving them second just behind the Liberal Democrat candidate and pushing the Conservative candidate to the third place (Rogers 2013). It is even more significant since Eastleigh is a vital seat for the Conservative Party because “since its creation in 1955, they have never won a general election without it” (Freedland 2013).

Andrew Rawnsley of the Guardian argues that when it comes to debating immigration, a “conspiracy of silence” has been replaced by a “conspiracy of noise” indicating high politicisation of the issue (Rawnsley 2013). This is largely due to the active emphasis of the UKIP political leadership on the issue. Lord Ashcroft has mentioned that the primary attraction of UKIP is the fact that “it will say things that need to be said but others are scared to say” thus shaking the political terrain of Britain (Ashcroft 2012). It seems, however, that UKIP does address the issues that really matter and are concerning the British public. This can be seen from David Cameron’s decision to propose an EU referendum and deliver an immigration speech, just a month after the Eastleigh by-election arguing that British immigration policies need considerable alterations. The outcome of this approach, though, has been discussed by the Conservative historian Tim Bale: “Rather than shooting Nigel Farage’s fox, all Cameron has done is feed it” (Freedland 2013). This statement has arguably solid foundation, which is clearly indicated by an opinion poll conducted by Lord Ashcroft in 2012 (n: 20 000): “The
research finds that 12% of those who voted for the Conservative Party in 2010 now [2012] say they would vote UKIP in an election tomorrow” (Ashcroft 2012).

Ian Birrell, a former speechwriter for David Cameron, and thus knowing the tricks of the speech trade, argues that Cameron’s immigration speech in March 2013 used “buzzwords beloved by focus groups” thus skillfully “exploiting voters’ fears” (Birrell 2013). He argues that the seeds for Cameron’s visible and sudden change of rhetoric were planted by UKIP’s rapid increase in popularity among the British public. Birrell maintains that “suddenly he [Nigel Farage] seems to be running the country”- all three mainstream parties running at its tail (Birrell 2013).

5. Audience acceptance through John Kingdon’s “three streams model”

The audience reception for politicisation and practical attempts for securitisation by both parties were analysed from the perspective of Kingdon’s three streams model, which firstly addresses the British political elite: the Cabinet, party members, MEP’s, policy-makers in the problem stream; secondly specialists, think tanks and researchers as well as policy solutions and proposals in the policy stream; and finally the public opinion and election results in the political stream. Some of the acceptance dynamics with regard to particular speech acts and proposals were already discussed. The following section, however, attempts to provide a more clear empirical overview of one of the most underdeveloped concepts of the securitisation framework.

5.1. Problem Stream

In Kingdon’s problem stream, the main question to be asked is whether the political elite of the country has a coherent and consistent political discourse on the matter of ECE immigration. Do they represent many voices along the lines of a party or is there a prevalent general consensus on the issue? Since both political parties under observation lean towards the right-wing politics, the overall sentiments towards immigration follow similar lines. There are, however, very different methods for linguistic manufacture,
production and presentation for texts, which have been already discussed in the previous sections of the thesis.

Home Secretary Theresa May, a strong advocate for Britain leaving the European Convention on Human Rights, has also indicated her keenness “to press for an end to the free movement of EU workers” (BBC 2013a; Barrett and Freeman 2012). Furthermore, in April 2013, a month after Cameron’s landmark immigration speech, May, backed by German, Austrian and the Netherlands’ counterparts, “wrote to the European Commission demanding tighter restrictions on access to welfare benefits and other state-funded services for EU migrants” (Waterfield 2013). In this joint letter, the four countries maintained that migrants from the European Union and particularly, the latest additions to the Union from ECE states “are putting considerable strain on schools, healthcare and the welfare state” (Waterfield 2013). This move can be seen as a measure above normal, everyday politics, since more stringent measures are claimed for and thus referring to an attempt to take the issue to the securitisation sphere. If the commission had responded affirmatively, then it would have created a platform for the implementation of extraordinary measures as proposed by Buzan and his collaborators. The Commission, however, “responded with a proposal for a new directive to make it easier for people to exercise their rights in practice in defiance of British claims that the current rules on free movement are being abused by migrants” (Waterfield 2013).

With regard to the claims of EU migrants abusing the British welfare system and feeding into what has become known as “benefit tourism”, an overall consensus prevails. As discussed earlier the “EU social security coordination rules (Regulation EC 883/2004) and the EU directive on the free movement of EU citizens (Directive 2004/38/EC)” maintain that a EU country “cannot restrict the access to social security benefits” of another member state nationals (Kennedy 2011: 17). Great Britain, however has imposed the so-called “right to reside” test for EU nationals to qualify for these social security benefits, which directly contravene the EU law since “Article 425 of

25 Article 4 Equality of treatment: Unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation, persons to whom this Regulation applies shall enjoy the same benefits and be subject to the same obligations under the legislation of any Member State as the nationals thereof (Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council)
this Regulation [Regulation EC 883/2004] prohibits indirect discrimination through the requirement for non-UK citizens to pass an additional right to reside test” (Kennedy 2011: 17). These directives have been ferociously disputed by Iain Duncan Smith, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and a former leader of the Conservative Party (2001-2003), who argues that giving up the “right to reside” test as asked by the EU “pose a fundamental challenge to the UK’s social contract” (Smith 2011). He added that this might result in the “British taxpayer paying out over £2 billion extra a year in benefits to people who have no connection to our country” (Smith 2011). This amount, however, is arguably a considerable overestimation and referenced in the hope to incite a sense of panic and drama to justify the measures that support the test in the UK- an integral element of a securitising move.

Similarly, London’s mayor and one of the most well-known Conservative politicians Boris Johnson has supported all proposed tough measures regarding ECE immigration and recently argued that “Cameron was right to stop people leeching off the system” (Wintour 2013).

Furthermore, Theresa May has proposed a new law, which allows to deport foreign criminals, in opposition to the Article Eight of The European Convention on Human Rights (and thus her proposal for withdrawal) which is currently being supported by “not only from within the Conservative Party, but also from the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party” indicating strong cohesion and consensus in the problem stream regarding the matter (Hennessy 2013b). But as discussed earlier, the issue was rejected by the audience in the policy stream since “Judges were denying the democratic and legal validity of ministers’ moves” (Hennessy 2013b). May proposed to overstep this opinion and work towards a new immigration bill to “give full legal weight to ministers’ demands that foreign criminals should not routinely be able to dodge deportation by citing Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights” (Hennessy 2013b).

Thus Theresa May is a strong advocate for more stringent measures regarding British immigration policies and eager to take the issue above the normal, everyday policy-making when deemed to be in contrast to British values an traditions.
Overall there seems to be a cross-party consensus on the matter of ECE immigration among the Tories, which is even extending beyond the party lines to the Labour and Liberal Democrat spheres who are also re-crafting their policies (not to mention UKIP whose once marginal ideas are increasingly becoming mainstream) (Lazarowicz 2013).

5.2. Policy Stream

The general consensus in the policy stream is that ECE immigration is an increasing concern in the country especially ahead of the upcoming end to Bulgarian and Romanian transitional measures. This, however, is a rather recent development.

As already discussed the only restriction imposed on A8 nationals in 2004 is that for working in the UK, they must be registered to the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS). The idea behind the Scheme was to “monitor the scale, geography and labour market characteristics of A8 migrants in the UK” (McCollum and Findlay 2012: 16). Britain was the only country, together with Ireland and Sweden that decided not to impose transitional measures for the countries that joined the EU in 2004. Thus, it could be argued that ECE immigration was not perceived as a problem at the time and not posing any significant effects on the British societal values, traditional ways of life and key institutions. These sentiments, however, went through a rapid transformation due to grave underestimation of the number of inflow from A8 states, which in just two years reached almost half a million. When Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, the British government decided to impose restrictions on their access to the labour market and welfare system, which indicates already prevalent concerns about the immigrant impact on British key institutions. The A2 nationals have to sign up for a “worker authorisation document” (either an accession worker card or a seasonal agricultural worker card) before they commence employment in the UK (Kennedy 2011).

The restrictions were initially in place until 2011, but were extended up to 31 December 2013 (BBC 2011). Sir Andrew Green, chairman of Migration Watch UK, strongly supported this decision by arguing that “this is absolutely the right decision...With 2.5 million people unemployed, it would be absurd to open our borders yet again to more
These measures, however, will be lifted in the beginning of 2014 in accordance with the EU law and cannot be extended. The ending of restrictions also applies to key benefits such as a Jobseeker’s Allowance, council tax benefit and housing benefit. The proposals for extension have been addressed by many politicians and specialists in the problem and policy streams respectively, but as long as this does not happen, the process of securitisation remains incomplete in this regard.

Experts on the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) agree that “immigration is likely to rise when the restrictions [for Bulgaria and Romania] are lifted, and have warned it will have a negative effect on the job market in Britain” (Barrett and Freeman 2012).

Similarly, Sir Andrew Green, director of MigrationWatch UK, said: “I think there could be a significant spike from Romania and Bulgaria, particularly as the economies in other parts of the EU are suffering serious difficulties” and “we need a further five year extension of the transitional arrangements. Britain has done our bit with Eastern European migrants - we have taken far more than any other country - and we could justify a special case for such an extension” (Barrett and Freeman 2012). This “special case” rhetoric is an important discursive tactic integral to the British mindset and “exceptional” political nature.

Life in the UK citizenship test was introduced in 2004 and it came into force in 2005. This test was meant for migrants seeking naturalisation or a permanent settlement in the United Kingdom26. “The policy driver behind the changes” according to Saggar and Somerville “has been rising numbers of immigrants” and a sudden influx that started in 2004 with the enlargement of the EU (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 16). What is significant, however, is that since Cameron’s immigration speech in 2013, the test has been tightened to include the English language test- a change implemented from October 2013 (BBC 2013b). This policy change does indicate a sense of heightened tension and concern about the British identity and integration and is especially significant since securitisation often occurs through the imposition of new regulations.

In addition to the proposed negative advertising campaign to influence Romanians and Bulgarians not to migrate to the UK, the Home Secretary “also floated the idea of a cash

26 For more information, see http://lifeintheuktest.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/
bond for EU migrants coming to Britain, which would then be paid back if they do not claim benefits” (Lazarowicz 2013). These two ideas, however, have received very mixed reviews across the political spectrum, having supporters and opponents from all parties, thus making the audience acceptance aspect difficult to judge.

5.3. Politics Stream

Over the last decades immigration has been a sensitive topic in Britain, arguably affecting the key social institutions, the infrastructure, labour market and eroding British national identity. The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, however, have fuelled these sentiments. As Geddes argues: “The 21st British Social Attitudes Survey in 2004 reported a rising tide of anti-immigration sentiment in Britain, with 74 per cent of residents wanting to see immigration reduced, up from 65 per cent in 1995”- an increase which might have its seeds sown in the “big-bang” enlargement and sudden massive inflow of Polish and other ECE migrants (Geddes 2005: 730). Saggar and Somerville (2012: 4) argue that recent British opinion polls indicate hostility and resentment towards immigration: “Around three-quarters of the population are hostile to immigration (both legal and illegal), higher than across Europe and North America, making the British public an outlier”. Furthermore, they argue that the salience of immigration “rose significantly in the early 2000s” and before that it was not even an issue for debate- neither in political nor media sphere, suggesting the strong impact the A8 and A2 nationals perpetuated on British nationals (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 4).

Thus, from the general British public perspective, immigration is increasingly becoming a matter of concern and even a source of threat and insecurity, which is also indicated by UKIP’s recent rise in the polls. Latest polls and ICM Research27 (n: 1990) show “that UKIP’s policies are favoured over those of the Tories among key Right-of-centre voters - particularly on immigration” (Hennessy 2013a). The most crucial category is the so-called “switchers”, who fluctuate between the two parties usually deciding on the very last moment their preference. This is a group which is crucial for Cameron to win.

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27 ICM- Independent Communication and Marketing- is a member of the British Polling Council
over during the next general election. In addition to “switchers”, who now seem to prefer UKIP’s stance on immigration to that of the Conservative Party by 62% to 34%, “Floating voters - those who do not express a strong preference for any party- also prefer the UKIP line” (Hennessy 2013a).

Furthermore, ahead of lifting the restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals in 2014 and “following widespread fears that the UK will be flooded with a new wave of immigrants, voters sent a forceful message to David Cameron stating border controls with Romania and Bulgaria should not be relaxed” (Meredith 2013). “Nearly eight out of 10 or 79 per cent of those quizzed for an opinion poll demanded visa restrictions on the Eastern European countries stay put” (Meredith 2013). The YouGov poll conducted in 2008 found that every other British national believes that there is an “immigration crisis” in the country, while 28% strongly agreed and 32% tended to agree with the fact that immigration is making Britain a more dangerous place in which to live (YouGov 2008).

A survey conducted by the thinktank British Future in January 2013 revealed that immigration is British society’s most important social problem: “One in three people believes tension between immigrants and people born in the UK is the major cause of division...Over the past two decades, both immigration and emigration have increased to historically high levels, with those entering the country exceeding those leaving by more than 100,000 in every year since 1998” (Boffey 2013).

With regard to the election results, UKIP did not make much electoral success during the 2005 and 2010 general elections (gained 2.2 % and 3.1 % of the votes respectively) (BBC 2005; BBC 2010). The party, however, has been on a steady incline ever since 2010 culminating with its best ever parliamentary performance at Eastleigh in February 2013 and subsequent success in local elections gaining 25 per cent share of the total votes cast. This bolsters the idea that UKIP remained a marginal political force until 2010 general election, from which it started to build its support base and exert influence on the Conservative Party.
Thus, the audience consent in the politics stream is strong on the matter of ECE immigration and arguably easily exploited if a coherent approach and more stringent measures were implemented.

6. Summary

To conclude, the research questions are answered in turn. Firstly, has the immigration from East and Central European countries to the UK been securitised by the Conservative Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party or is their rhetoric confined within the framework of politicisation? The study was set in the context of EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 and its repercussions on the British immigration rhetoric.

The theoretical framework adopted to answer this question is securitisation theory developed by Copenhagen School scholars in the 1990s. The idea behind the theory is that security is a speech-act which does “not simply describe an existing security situation, but brings it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such” (Williams 2003: 513). Such a measure allows securitising actors present an issue as existentially threatening to a referent object and thus justify the emergency measures opted for to tackle the problem above the domain of everyday politics. The discursive construction of perceptions of fear, insecurity, a heightened sense of drama and tension can all be considered as forms of securitising tools. If the matter is discussed as a part of everyday politics and these perceptions are not prevalent, the issue is confined to the sphere of politicisation.

For a more productive analysis of the linguistic manufacture practiced by the two parties under observation, Norman Fairclough’s “three dimensional framework” for critical discourse analysis was adopted. The main findings maintain that UKIP allows itself a more rigorous stance on the matter of ECE immigration, constructing direct links to crime and welfare dependency and using strong and effective language to sway the public opinion. Ever since UKIP grew out of its marginal position in British politics it has put immigration at the heart of EU debates. It maintains that Britain needs to get out of the EU which controls its immigration policies or otherwise there will be dire
consequences- an idea considered a clear indication of a securitising move by the original authors of the theory.

The Conservative Party members are more confined to “political correctness” and the balance of language due to being in the coalition government and one of the mainstream parties in the country. The study did find, however, that from 2011 the Conservative discursive construction of ECE immigration rhetoric took a course towards a slightly more abrasive stance making explicit links to ECE immigrants and the possible “strain” and “pressure” they could pose on the British key institutions, labour market and social structures. On occasion, practical attempts for securitisation could be noted.

Following Huysmans (2000) and Ibryamova (2002), the thesis argued that securitisation moves have mainly occurred along the lines of identity (together with traditional patterns of living, historical and cultural values, British exceptionalism) and welfare provisions by both parties. The creation of these links, however, is the outcome of “the production of a truth, or the creation of knowledge through a discourse” which is affected by the successful manipulation of power (Ibrahim 2005: 164). The notion of power is an underlying dynamic of the study. It is one of the facilitating conditions of securitisation process, integral to the power struggle between UKIP and the Conservative Party in the British political terrain and an effective element in both Kingdon’s three streams model as well as Fairclough’s three dimensional CDA model, the latter of which is interested in the power of language in transforming situations.

The thesis argues that securitisation/politicisation spectrum proposed by Buzan et al. (1998) should not be looked at as a binary, but rather as a threshold or a continuum “involving various degrees of intensity or strength” (Bourbeau 2011: 18). According to the original authors of the theory and their proposed nominal measurement- either securitisation occurs or not- the thesis would conclude that ECE immigration in Great Britain has not yet successfully securitised. At the same time, however, as the thesis applied a degree measurement suggested by some more recent publications (e.g. Bourbeau 2011; Salter 2011) the study concludes that UKIP generally practices its rhetoric just on the borderline of the securitisation sphere, occasionally falling within.
The problematic aspect of the study is that while UKIP’s discursive construction of ECE immigration rhetoric is on the borderline of securitisation, they are not represented in the House of Commons and therefore incapable of implementing their suggested policy-changes, which draws a line on their successful attempts of securitisation. On the other hand, the Conservative Party, who has formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats and thus have the upper hand in leading the country’s politics, maintains their ECE immigration discourse predominantly in the politicisation sphere, although recent changes in Cameron’s linguistic manufacture indicate fluctuations and changes in this regard.

The second research question asked whether the Conservative Party’s discursive construction of immigration rhetoric is influenced by UKIP’s calls for practical securitisation.

The study found that due to UKIP’s relatively marginal position in British politics up until the change of the government in 2010 and its reputation predominantly as a protest party, its influence on the Conservatives before the formation of the coalition government was minimal. This process, however, has been through a gradual change culminating with David Cameron’s immigration speech on 25 March 2013, which indicates clear influence exerted by the UKIP on the Conservative Party. Furthermore, UKIP’s electoral success, surge in opinion polls and Cameron’s recent proposal for an EU referendum to regain ground from UKIP all bolster the argument.

With regard to John Kingdon’s (1984) operationalisation and conceptualisation of the audience and thus successful securitisation process, the study maintains that audience acceptance regarding ECE immigration has been received in all three streams- the problem, the policy and the politics- on different occasions and various circumstances. The problem here to be highlighted, though, is the lack of coherence with regard to the streams and the unequal power positions of the parties under observation for a complete securitisation to occur.
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2. 6.10.04. Conservative Party leader Michael Howard’s speech to the Conservative conference in Bournemouth
3. 29.10.04. UKIP leader Roger Knapman speech on the EU constitution

2005

1. 10.04.05. Conservative Party leader Michael Howard’s immigration speech in Telford
2. 23.09.05. Shadow Home Secretary David Davis’s speech at Chatham House
3. 6.10.05. Conservative Party leader Michael Howard’s speech in Blackpool

2006

1. 4.10.06. Conservative Party leader David Cameron’s speech to the Conservative Party conference in Bournemouth

2007

1. 2.10.07. Conservative Party leader David Cameron’s speech to the Conservative Party conference in Blackpool
2. 2.10.07. Shadow Home Secretary David Davis’s speech to the Conservative Party conference in Blackpool
3. 7.10.07. UKIP leader Nigel Farage’s speech to the Ukip annual conference in Limehouse

2009

1. 8.10.09. Conservative Party leader David Cameron’s speech in Manchester

2010

1. 6.10.10. Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech at the Conservative Party conference in Birmingham
2. 5.11.10. Home Secretary Theresa May’s speech on immigration
2011

1. 5.02.11. Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech at the 47th Munich Security Conference
2. 14.04.11. UKIP leader Nigel Farage on immigration in SkyNews
3. 15.04.11. UKIP leader Nigel Farage on immigration in the European Parliament
4. 4.10.11. Home Secretary Theresa May’s speech to the Conservative party conference
5. 10.10.11. Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech on immigration to the Institute of Government
6. 14.04.11 Prime Minister's address to Conservative party members on the government's immigration policy
7. 25.03.2013 Prime Minister’s speech on immigration in Ipswich, University Campus Suffolk

2012

1. 9.10.12. Home Secretary Theresa May’s speech at the Conservative Party conference in Birmingham
2. 9.10.12. Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech at the Conservative Party conference in Birmingham
3. 12.12.12. Home Secretary Theresa May’s speech on immigration

2013

1. 23.01.13. Prime Minister David Cameron’s EU speech at Bloomberg
2. 6.02.13. UKIP Leader Nigel Farage speech at the European Parliament
3. 18.02.13 Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech at business event in Mumbai
4. 23.03.13. UKIP leader Nigel Farage speech at UKIP spring conference in Exeter
5. 25.03.13. Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech on immigration in Ipswich, University Campus Suffolk
8. Kokkuvõte


Uurimustöös on aga vaieldud, et algset julgeolekustamine/politiseerimise skaalat ei saa vaadelda läbi rangelt piiritletud grupeeringute, vaid pigem üksteist katva ja kohati seguneva kontiinumina. See lubab järeldada, et Suurbritannia kahe vaatluse all oleva poliitilise partei immigratsiooniretoorika ei ole surutud kindlatesse raamidsse, vaid muutub ajas ja kontekstis.

Julgeolekustamise teooria eripäraks on tema intersubjektiivne loomus, mis tähendab, et eduka julgeolekustamise puhul aktsepteerib auditoorium kõneakti. Siin on olulisel kohal veenmis- ja argumenteerimisstrateegia; kui auditoorium mõistab ohu määratlust ja kiidab heaks vastumeetmed, võib väita, et julgeolekustamine on edukalt lõpule viidud.

Selle käsitluse järgi võib julgeolekustamist pidada edukaks kui see on aktssepteeritud nii probleemi, poliisi kui poliitika harudes, kus on auditooriumiks vastavalt náiteks poliitiline eliti, parteiliikmed ja valitsus; spetsialistid, tehokraadid ja mõttekodade analüütikud; ning avalik arvamus.

Julgeolekustamise teoriast lähtuvalt on oluline ka märkida, et kõne all olev julgeolekuho ei pea olema realne, vaid võib olla sellena vaid presenteeritud, et õigustada teatud vastumeeetmete kasutuselevõttu (Buonfino 2004a; Buzan et al. 1998).


Julgeolekustamise edukas toimimine on tugevas korrelatsioonis julgeolekustaja positsiooniga. Sellise lähenedise juured on pärast realistlikust traditsioonist, mis põhineb võimujautuse ja sellest lähtuval tulemil- mida suurem on julgeolekustaja
sotsiaalne/loogilise võim ja positsioon, seda tõenäoliselt osutub julgeolekukäsitamise edukaks (Buzan et al. 1998). Seetõttu on uurimustöö keskmes Suurbritannia politiikut ja valitsuse immigratsiooni diskursiivne konstruktsioon.

