UNIVERSITY OF TARTU
Faculty of Social Sciences and Education
Institute of Government and Politics

Maria Leek

A (de)construction of Normative Power Europe: The Case of Military Intervention in Libya

Master Thesis

Supervisor: Viacheslav Morozov, PhD

Tartu 2013
Olen koostanud töö iseseisvalt. Kõik töö koostamisel kasutatud teiste autorite tööd, põhimõttelised seisukohad, kirjandusallikatest ja mujalt pärinevad andmed on viidatud.

Olen nõus oma töö avaldamisega Tartu Ülikooli digitaalarhiivis DSpace.

...........................................

/töö autori nimi/
Thesis summary

In 2002 Ian Manners introduced the concept of “Normative Power Europe” (NPE) which was an attempt to think beyond traditional conceptions of the European Union’s international role. Looking at the literature, the concept of NPE has often been used without much critical reflexion with regard to what it really means, which has left normative power Europe without conceptual clarity. So this thesis strives to critically assess Manners’ widely discussed concept, with the objective to problematize and further deconstruct the term “normative power”. It seeks to overcome the conceptual shortcomings by treating normative power as an identity attributed to European Union which is constructed through the practice of Othering. This thesis studies the nature of normative power Europe in the context of the military intervention in Libya in 2011. The research uses poststructuralist discourse analysis in order to study the discourse constructing Europe’s normative power identity against the Libyan “Other” and how this identity enables or constraints the Union as an actor in crisis management. It reveals that during the Libyan crisis there were two main discourses present within the Union which articulated different constructions of the Libyan conflict and the European Union and, therefore, called for different actions. The study of the first discourse finds that Europe’s normative power identity is constructed on representation of the EU as a “power of example”, a “carrier of universal values and norms” and a “multilateral actor” which promoted action from the soft side of the spectrum. The study of the critical discourses revealed that there was only one alternative discourse present that articulated different self/other constructions and called for an alternative EU action. The analysis of the EU’s counter-discourse resisting the calls for alternative action seeks to understand whether and how the Union’s normative power constructions were used to argue against them. The study demonstrates that the NPE is actually an identity construction practice within the Union’s and not a power as the EU fails to project real influence through it. Furthermore, it demonstrates that this self-construction imposes constraints to Union’s foreign policy as it is used as a justification for the EU’s internal incoherence and non-interventionism.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Viacheslav Morozov for his support, encouragement and enthusiasm for my research. His constant readiness to give feedback and constructive advice has been of great support during this whole process. I feel very lucky that I could follow a course he taught during my studies at the University of Tartu which gave me a lot of inspiration in writing this thesis.
# Table of Contents

Thesis summary .................................................................................................................. 3  
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 4  
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 6  

Chapter I – Theoretical framework and case overview .................................................. 8  
  1.1. Background and academic debate ........................................................................... 8  
  1.2. The Study of the EU’s foreign policy though Normative Power Europe .......... 13  
  1.3. Case selection: Why Libya? ................................................................................... 15  
  1.4. Poststructuralist discourse analysis ...................................................................... 17  
  1.5. A timeline of key events ....................................................................................... 19  

Chapter II – The study of the European discourses on the Libyan conflict ............... 25  
  2.1. Libyan uprising as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” ......................... 25  
    2.1.1. Calls for EU action ....................................................................................... 33  
  2.2. Libya as “another Yugoslavia“ ............................................................................. 46  
    2.2.1. Alternative action – calls for the no-fly zone ............................................. 52  
    2.2.2. EU’s counter-discourse .............................................................................. 58  

Chapter III – Analytical conclusions: the limits of NPE constructions ..................... 63  
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 67  
Lühikokkuvõte .................................................................................................................... 69
Introduction

Ever since the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, scholars have struggled in conceptualizing the European Union as an international actor. The study of the EU’s foreign policy is complex because the Union is not a traditional actor in world politics but it still practices foreign policy, and has an influence in the international arena. But it is not only scholars who have problems in explaining the complex subject of EU’s foreign policy, it seems that the EU itself has difficulties in defining its role in world affairs and developing an effective and consistent foreign policy in response to conflict situations. Different theories have produced contrasting explanations to the EU’s actorness but there is no common agreement on what it entails. In 2002 Ian Manners introduced the widely debated concept of normative power Europe with the attempt to explain the EU’s foreign policy. However, it has become a concept that is used by researchers to fit the EU’s foreign policy into a certain frame, instead of explaining what exactly the Union’s foreign policy consists of. So this thesis seeks to explore the widely debated concept of normative power Europe by taking a critical perspective. The study treats normative power Europe as an identity construction practice by the European Union actors against an “Other”.

This thesis studies the nature of normative power Europe in the context of the military intervention in Libya in 2011 which was the EU’s latest attempt to project to the world that it is a relevant actor in crisis management. The European Union was extensively criticised for its action, or rather inaction in Libya. The Union has worked on developing its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) over a decade and the Treaty of Lisbon aspired to make the Union a more coherent international actor. Given that the Libyan crisis was about democratic aspirations in the EU’s own neighbourhood and relatively small in scale, many saw this as an opportunity for the European Union to take the lead. The EU’s weak performance during the Libyan conflict not only raised questions about its capability as a crisis manager but also about the Union’s objectives and priorities in its foreign policy.

The aim of this research is to demonstrate that the concept of normative power played a key role in shaping the EU foreign policy discourse in the context of Libyan
conflict and find out which constraints this self-construction imposed on the Union’s foreign policy. The research addresses the following questions:

a. What identity does the concept of “normative power Europe” provide for the European Union?

b. Does the identity of NPE enables or hinders EU actions?

To answer these questions, the research uses the methodology of poststructuralist discourse analysis in order to study how Europe’s normative power identity is constructed through the practice of Othering and how this identity enables or constraints the Union to act in crisis management. The research will analyze the official and media-level discourse within the European Union and its member countries before, during and in the aftermath of the military intervention in Libya. In terms of sources, for the study of the political-level discourse the research uses speeches, declarations, statements and reports on Libya issued by European institutions. For the study of the media-level discourse, European journals and newspaper articles are examined. The research reveals that two discourses were present within the European Union during the Libyan crisis. These discourses articulated two different constructions of the Libyan Other and the Europe’s Self and, thus, appealed for different actions. The study concludes that the Union’s NPE construction indeed played a key role shaping its foreign policy discourse during the Libyan conflict and also reveals two aspects in which the normative power Europe construction set constraints for EU’s policy response in Libya.

In accordance with the above directions, the thesis is divided into three chapters in addition to introduction and conclusion. The first chapter outlines the academic debate on NPE, theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis, and gives an overview of the case. The second chapter outlines the empirical findings of the research and is divided into two major themes. The first part analyses the official EU discourse that represented Libya in terms of “oriental version of the Eastern European revolutions in 1989” and called for actions from the soft side of the spectrum. The second part studies the critical discourse present within the Union which articulated Libya in terms of “another Yugoslavia” and called for military intervention. The final chapter outlines the analytical conclusions of the research.
Chapter I – Theoretical framework and case overview

1.1. Background and academic debate

Since the concept of normative power Europe was first introduced by Ian Manners in 2002, it has been actively and intensively debated by scholars in the fields of European Studies and International Relations. NPE is considered as one of the most widely used and influential ideas in the study of the European Union in the last decade.

Normative Power Europe is not the first attempt to conceptualize the EU’s foreign policy – the European Union has been described also as a civilian power and a soft power. The former concept was introduced by François Duchêne\(^1\) and it is based on the idea of pursuing the domestication or “normalization” of international relations by tackling international problems within the sphere of contractual policies. Hedley Bull criticized the idea of Europe being a civilian power in his article “Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” published in 1982. Bull, the leading academic of the English School, claimed that civilian power concept is a contradiction in terms given that the only real power is the one exerted through military means\(^2\). He suggested that Europe should become more self-sufficient in security and defence, and develop its own military potential\(^3\). The concept of soft power was introduced by Joseph Nye\(^4\) in 2004. It marks a country’s ability to influence events through multilateral cooperation, institution-building, integration and the power of attraction, rather than military or economic coercion. Originally applied to the United States, later studies have sought to use the term to analyze the soft power resources of the European Union\(^5\).

Manners suggested that these conceptions have become outdated as they share the common assumptions about the centrality of the nation-state and the notion of

\(^1\) Duchêne F.,(1973), The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence, in M. Kolistam and W. Hager (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems Before The European Communities, London: Macmillan
\(^3\) Bull, 1982: 152-156
national interests. In his article “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” published in 2002, Manners proposes that the Union should rather be seen as a normative actor. Manners most famous definition of normative power is “the ability to shape the conceptions of “normal” in international relations”6. NPE advocates the idea that the European Union is normatively different type of actor in world politics because of the combination of its historical context, hybrid policy and legal constitution7. Manners identifies nine core norms which form the EU’s normative basis – the centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, social solidarity, anti-discrimination and sustainable development, which can be traced in the Union’s law or declarations8. The EU is considered a true normative actor if it actively promotes these principles. In a later article he suggests that the specificity of the EU as a normative actor is founded on the norms that are “generally acknowledged, within the United Nation system, to be universally applicable”9. Furthermore, Manners outlines six mechanisms of norm diffusion in the EU’s external relations, including contagion, transference, informal diffusion, procedural diffusion, overt diffusion and cultural filter10. He insists on the relative absence of force in EU’s imposition of norms and its aims that are linked to universal goods rather that self-interest11. Manners concludes that “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what is says, but what it is,”12 framing the European Union as a power of example. Manners traced the empirical evidence on the value-oriented policies pursued by the Union in the international arena such as the EU’s norm advocacy in abolishing death penalty13.

Manners’ article sparked a scholarly debate on the content of the concept of NPE. Helene Sjursen’s criticism that normative power Europe seems to be more a

---

7 Ibid. p 241
8 Ibid. p 242
10 Manners, 2002: 244-245
12 Manners, 2002: 252
13 Manners, 2002: 245-254
political, rather than an analytical concept\(^{14}\) has triggered a substantial research that has led to attempt to further define and explore the concept features. Sjursen contributes to the debate by questioning the theoretical validity of the normative power literature as it does not provide precision to empirical analysis. The underlying question that emerged was – how does one recognize normative power Europe when one sees it?\(^{15}\) Sjursen proposes that the solution is to study how the EU changes the structural foundation in world politics by strengthening the international law. Therefore, her article aims at establishing benchmarks for analyzing the Union’s normative power and sees the EU’s key impact on the cosmopolitan dimension of the international law.

Federica Bicchi contributes to the debate by contesting the understanding that the EU’s norms are of universal character. Instead, she suggests that European foreign-policy making is often Eurocentric and “based on an unreflexive attempt to promote its own model”\(^{16}\). Consequently Bicchi suggests that the standard for a normative power should be firstly, the *inclusiveness* of foreign policy-making process and secondly, *institutional reflexivity*. Inclusiveness refers to the “extent to which EU foreign policy-makers permit a role (in theory or in practice) in EFP-making for external actors affected by EFP”\(^{17}\). Reflexivity refers to the extent to which foreign policy-makers usually analyse the policy it conducts in order to anticipate its effects and then adapt it to the expected effects on third parties. She concludes that an actor fulfils the role of a “normative power” if their norm promotion in an area of foreign policy is both, inclusive and reflexive\(^{18}\).

Elisabeth De Zutter argues in her article “Normative power spotting: an ontological and methodological appraisal” that the discussion on NPE has suffered from conceptual vagueness and force-for-good connotations. To overcome these shortcomings, she privileges the ontological question of what a normative power is rather than what it should be and delineates the concept from requirements of certain


\(^{17}\) Ibid. p. 288

\(^{18}\) Ibid. p. 298
types of norms or instruments. She develops a four-step methodology to “spot” a normative power. First, a normative power has material conditions enabling it to be a power in international relations. Second, the identity and role of a NPE are fulfilled if there is an awareness of these capabilities among the governing elites, construction of its own norms as universal, and willingness to project these norms in world politics. Lastly, a normative power’s norms have to have an impact on other political entities.19

Tuomas Forsberg tries to clarify the conceptual confusion surrounding the NPE by proposing that the studies should first trace whether the EU has normative interests, behaves in a normative way, uses normative means of power and achieves normative ends. He suggests that the EU should not be automatically considered as normative power. Instead, the NPE should be considered as an ideal-type, since it would be hard to fulfil all the criteria.20

As demonstrated above, there are very different interpretations on what a normative power is and how it should be studied. Yet there is an agreement that normative power is an identity of an international actor. Already Manners makes the claim that the EU is a normative power because it has a normative identity21. However, this is most explicitly stated by Diez who argues that “the narrative of ‘normative power Europe’ constructs the EU’s identity as well as the identity of the EU’s others”22. According to Diez, it is the construction of the “Other” as the violator of universal principles the EU engages in23. Closely related to the question of mechanisms of identity formation, these scholars have argued that the picture projected of the Union in the international arena, not only by the EU itself but also by researchers studying NPE, does not represent what the EU actually is but an “ideal Europe”. This means that the European Union is projected as a normative power even if it does not comply with its own norms – it suffices that it has the aspiration to promote them. They call, therefore, for a greater degree of reflexivity in discussing normative power and in the political

21 Manners, 2002: 239
23 Diez, 2005: 628
representation of the EU as a normative power. Diez, for instance argues that the discourse of the historical Other of Europe’s past was a discourse that instilled reflexivity in the EU’s self-representation, but it is a discourse in decline.

There are several studies that have focused on the identity construction processes involved in the emergence of the EU normative power. For instance, Diez suggests that the idea of the European Union as a normative power is largely articulated in contrast to the US, which is constructed as conducting its foreign policy by military means rather than by the force of norms. The study of Sibylle Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli supports that finding. Having looked at the EU’s normative power in the institutionalization of the International Criminal Court and in the elaboration and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, they found that the EU constructs its normative Self in opposition to the U.S. in terms of principles, goals and instruments the Union uses to advance its norms. Similarly, Michael Merlingen notes that by constructing itself as a NPE, the European Union empowers some actors and at the same time disempowers others.

The above overview gives an indication of how much dispute there is in the literature over the meaning of normative power Europe. The NPE literature is widening to empirical applications but it lacks critical reflection. There are still too many researchers focusing their discussion on to what extent the term describes the EU’s international behaviour. Consequently, they trace either the impact of norms in contrast to other possible factors or double standards in the application of norms, instead of analyzing the underlying nature and limits of the NPE construction.

---

1.2. The Study of the EU’s foreign policy through Normative Power Europe

This research takes a more critical stance, departing from the existing critique that normative power “is not an objective category that would allow us to classify states and other actors” but a discourse that represents the Union as a NPE\(^29\). The foundation of this claim lies on the idea that all powers – military, economic, civilian – can be read as one specific form of normative power because they all have a normative aspect to them\(^30\). All states use normative rhetoric, behave according to normative rules and have interest to diffuse its norms. Instead, as argued by Thomas Diez in a frequently cited article, the discourse of “normative power Europe” is a practice in European identity construction that is based on EU’s normative difference from other countries/blocs\(^31\). Therefore, instead of talking about whether the concept adequately describes the EU’s international behaviour, I will attempt to shift the focus of the analysis away from discussions of normative power as a phenomenon that is already pre-given to an analysis of the power inherent to the representations of “normative power Europe”. Put simply, the study will not focus on whether the European Union is a normative power but aims to analyze how it is constructed as such and how this identity affects the means and ends of the EU’s foreign policy.

The research departs from the argument that the narrative on “normative power Europe” constructs the identity of the EU as well of EU’s Others. Normative power is defined in terms of an identity of a power in the international system. My theoretical starting point is that a normative power is not “good” because it diffuses norms. Norms cannot be considered free by definition from interests\(^32\). The EU as a normative power has interest in diffusing its norms as it inevitably contributes to Europe’s security and to its advantage in the world economy\(^33\). Thus, the norms a normative power diffuses are not inherently universal but are constructed as one in order to legitimize its role as a norm-diffuser. Legitimacy is very important given that normative power is relational and actors who are exposed to normative power’s norm diffusion should see this as a

\(^{29}\) Diez, 2005:626
\(^{30}\) Ibid. p. 616
\(^{31}\) Ibid. p. 613-639
\(^{33}\) De Zutter, 2010: 1109
legitimate action. Secondly, I concur with Diez that it is not the instruments that define a normative power\(^{34}\). Normative power does not necessarily rely on “soft” instruments to spread its norms but has all possible instruments, from dialogue to physical force, in its disposal to fulfill its role. A normative power, therefore, has a self-image as a norm-diffuser but they do not all use the same instruments to fulfill its role. Recognizing this allows to separate normative power from a force of good connotation. Finally, normative power identity has both inclusive and exclusive features\(^{35}\). An actor which sets itself apart from the non-normative actors in world politics has an exclusive identity. However, as a normative power identity seeks to diffuse its norms, it also has to have inclusive identity which seeks to assimilate others.

By using these guidelines, the study seeks to understand what impact this self-construction of normative power has on EU’s actions during the conflict, and more broadly on its foreign policy and conflict resolution capacities. Does it enable it to play enabling role in conflict situations or is it rather restricting? I expect to find that in some instances, the normative power Europe discourse allows the EU to have a positive influence in conflict resolution but in other instances it can restrict Europe’s ability to impose changes on others. The restricting or permitting impacts of the NPE construction can be traced by examining how the Union uses its normative power identity to justify its actions and inactions. I believe to find an EU-level discourse which constructs the Union as a secure, postmodern and peaceful actor, a positive force, and a normative power against the world outside which is presented probably as the opposite of the Union’s characteristics. These constructions on Europe and its Others call for certain behaviour from the EU but at the same time impose constraints on the Union’s foreign policy. These findings would confirm that the EU is not in fact a normative power which imposes standards and that the NPE is just an identity of the Union.

\(^{34}\) Diez, 2005

\(^{35}\) De Zutter, 2010: 1112
1.3. Case selection: Why Libya?

Protests beginning in Benghazi on 15 February 2011 sparked a wave of anti-government demonstrations throughout Libya. The conflict escalated as protestors took control of the capital and Gaddafi in response used force and violence against the demonstrators. The escalating conflict in Libya became a worrying concern for the international community.

While some crises flare up and are forgotten rather quickly, others offer more permanent understanding of the global balance of power and the state of international relations. The Libyan crisis falls into the second category. In the European Union context, the strong involvement in the conflict has been perceived as an opportunity for the EU to assert itself as a strong global actor in its own neighbourhood. There have been enormous expectations of a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy after the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of External Action Service (EEAS). Moreover, this case, and the Arab Spring more widely, was the EU’s chance to promote its norms and universal values in its own near abroad.

While the response of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to the Libyan crisis was praised for its speed, the performance of the EU was met with criticism. The Union’s reaction was criticized for being too slow, weak, divided and essentially incoherent. The actions of the European Union during the Libyan conflict shed light on the divisions that exist among member countries regarding common foreign and security policy. There was not a unanimous support for the military intervention in Libya within the EU – France and Britain played the leading role, along with Spain, Italy and Poland playing a supporting role in the action. The main dissenter was Germany which abstained from the UN vote authorizing the intervention.

Up until now, there have been several researches dealing with the EU’s politics during the Libyan crisis. The EU’s response to the Libyan conflict has been analyzed in the framework of human security and “Responsibility Protect”\textsuperscript{36}. This kind of research


15
focuses first and foremost on the EU’s logic of security. It claims that the EU’s reorientation of security policy around the concept of human security was the Union’s primary motive for the EU’s response to the Libyan conflict. The failure to contribute to the military intervention is explained by the diverging interests among the member states. Moreover, there has been a lot of discussion on the impact of internal divisions and lack of resources on the European Union’s foreign policy and on its activity or rather inactivity during the Libyan crisis. The Union’s weakness to respond in crisis situation is presented as a leadership problem within the EU, and is explained by the fact that the Union favours civilian and humanitarian missions to military ones and prefers NATO for military action. This is certainly a valid explanation for the ineffectiveness of the common security and foreign policy and for the failed attempt to develop a coherent response to the Libyan conflict. But this does not explain why the European Union interfered in the conflict at all.

37 Gottwald, 2012: 23
1.4. Poststructuralist discourse analysis

In order to deconstruct different representations of “Normative Power Europe” the case is analyzed in the framework of poststructuralist discourse analysis developed by Lene Hansen\(^{39}\). My reading of the concept of normative power Europe takes its inspiration from poststructuralist work on self/other constructions in international politics. Othering is a practice by which a political entity constructs its own identity. It refers to the demarcation of the Self against the outside that can be represented in terms of threatening, inferior, violator of universal principles or simply different\(^{40}\). Securitization i.e. a continued portrayal of an “Other” as threatening to one’s political community may result in military action\(^{41}\). My research departs from the understanding that identities are central in foreign policy conduct. The ontological relation between identity and foreign policy is explained by Hansen as follows:” Foreign policies are legitimized as necessary, as in the national interest, or in the defense of human rights, through reference to identities, yet identities are simultaneously constituted and reproduced through formulations of foreign policy.\(^{42}\) In short, foreign policies are dependent upon representations, narratives and meanings given to the country, danger or security problem that the actor seeks to address. Poststructuralists reject a relationship of causality between identity and foreign policy. Instead, both are understood as discursive, relational, political and social practices. They are discursive because objects cannot be conceived outside language; relational because an “Other” is always needs in order to construct the “Self”; political because there are opposing discourses that struggle for domination over truth; and discourses are inherently social because policymakers address the wider public sphere in the attempt to institutionalize their understanding of the truth\(^{43}\).

In order to study the nature of European normative power identity the thesis analyses the discourses within the European Union and its member countries during the


\(^{40}\) Diez, 2005: 628-629


\(^{42}\) Hansen, 2006:xvi

\(^{43}\) Hansen, 2006: 5-6
Libyan conflict, starting from the beginning of the uprisings in 17 February 2011 until the end of military intervention in 31 October 2011. The research is reinforced by the study of media texts because they are widely read, responded to and have an effect to official discourse. In terms of sources, the research is based on the reading of a large number of texts including the policy documents, speeches and interviews conducted by those in power. The analysis of the popular-level discourse concentrates on the opinion pages and editorials of the most widely read European newspapers such as The Guardian, The Financial Times, The Economist, The Telegraph and Spiegel.

First of all, I map the main discourses which are the key representations of identity that are constructed on radically different Others and Selves\(^{44}\). In other words, I analyze the European Union discourses representing the Libyan conflict. Based on these representations, I study how the Europe’s Self is constructed against the Libyan Other. Secondly, within these main discourses, I trace what EU actions were argued for in response to the conflict. I analyze how certain policies were justified and others opposed, and how these discourses sought to stabilize both, their representations of identity and the link between identities and policy. Followed by these guidelines, I seek to demonstrate firstly, the basic discourses present within the EU during the conflict that articulate different representation of the Libyan conflict and constructions of the EU’s normative power identity. By tracing the actions advocated within these basic discourses, I hope to show what impact Europe’s normative power identity has on the Union’s ability to react in crisis situations and how the self-representation of the NPE is used arguing for and against certain actions.

\(^{44}\) Hansen, 2006: 46
1.5. A timeline of key events

Libyan civil war, also referred as the Libyan revolution, was an armed conflict between forces loyal to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and those seeking to oust his government. The causes of the uprisings were among others the corrupt government, high levels of unemployment and uneven distribution of wealth. The primary demand was to put an end the tyranny and authoritarian government and give power back to the people.

The protests in Libya against Muammar Quadaffi started with the arrest of human rights activist Fethi Tabbel in 15 February. On 17 February, the people of Libya called out for “A Day of Rage” against the oppressive regime with the aid of Facebook, Twitter, and other Internet sites. By 23 of February, headlines of online news services were reporting a range of themes underlying the unstable state of the regime – the outbreak of a full-scale civil war\(^{45}\), the liberation of the east of the country by the rebels\(^{46}\), the former justice minister stated he had proof that Gaddafi gave personal order about Lockerbie bombing\(^{47}\), mounting international pressure and condemnation of the crackdown by Libyan security forces on protesters\(^{48}\) and reports that Middle Eastern media support the end of Gaddafi’s rule\(^{49}\).

The first collective EU reaction came during a meeting of the foreign ministers four days after the “day of rage” in Tripoli. The communiqué condemned the repression

---


against peaceful demonstrators and deplored the violence and death of civilians\textsuperscript{50}. Several similar statements by the EU were issued afterwards. Negotiations on an EU-Libya framework agreement and ongoing cooperation contracts were suspended immediately.

By mid-February, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) Catherine Ashton activated the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) in order to facilitate the evacuation of EU citizens and maximise the use of transport and other logistical assets. In parallel, the European Union launched its humanitarian aid mission. The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) immediately made €3 million available to tackle the immediate humanitarian needs of refugees fleeing Libya across the Tunisian and Egyptian borders. In addition, ECHO deployed teams to the Tunisian and Egyptian borders and allocated funds for water, shelter and food needs mainly for the migrant workers fleeing Libya.

The gravity of the crisis was reflected in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vote on the 26 February which by using the language of “Responsibility to Protect”, demanded an immediate end to violence, imposed sanctions against Gaddafí and his close advisers and referred Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC), calling for a war crimes investigation\textsuperscript{51}. The breakthrough in achieving an international consensus was due to strong support from the Arab league and the African Union. The bold statements and diplomatic action that followed reflected a sense across the EU member states that it was less risky to act in the moment when emergency evacuations have sharply reduced the number of EU citizens stranded in Libya\textsuperscript{52}. On the 28 of February the European Union agreed a range of sanctions against Muammar Gaddafí’s regime, including an arms embargo, as asset freeze and travel ban on Gaddafí and his close associates. Throughout the crisis, the EU adopted a range of additional sanctions designed to interrupt the flow of weapons and money to the regime. The sanctions were

\textsuperscript{50} European Council (2011), 3069\textsuperscript{th} Council meeting: Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 21 February 2011. Available at \url{http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/EN/foraff/119435.pdf} (23.03.2011)


a positive, yet overdue sign that the EU was catching up with the fast pace of events in Libya. They were intended to reflect a strong and united stance of the European Union against the oppressive regime but the EU’s inability to decide the imposition of sanctions before the UNSC Resolution haunted the Union throughout the crisis and caused irreversible damage to the EU’s image.

The first calls for no-fly zone within the EU emerged already at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, held on the 23 of February with Sarkozy in the frontline. The rest of Europe remained hesitant but they did not rule out the option in case “the Libyan regime continued to put protests down violently”\(^53\). After the adoption of the UNSC resolution 1970, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Cameron aligned with Sarkozy in the calls for a no-fly zone over Libya but at that time they both received a lukewarm response from the international community and had to defend his plan after the United States Defence Secretary Robert Gates dismissed the idea\(^54\).

Meanwhile, the EU pushed for an independent, UN-led investigation into the human rights abuses allegedly committed by Libyan security forces. This initiative did not realize until 6 of March\(^55\) when the foreign ministers of the 27 member states agreed to send a technical fact-finding mission to Libya. It was supposed to support the discussions in the extraordinary European Council meeting, dedicated entirely on Libya with “direct information”\(^56\). The fact that the leaders of the EU were meeting in response to the Libyan crisis was in itself important for the EU as in ten years it has happened only three times: for the Georgian War, the Iraq War and the 9/11 attacks. At the extraordinary summit taking place on the 11-12 of March, the EU sought to adopt “hard line” with Muammar Gaddafi by reinforcing sanctions against the Libyan regime. In addition, the leaders discussed measures to address the Libyan humanitarian crisis,

---


the migration issue, more specifically, responses that the EU could provide in the event of mass influx of migrants and refugees to its shores, and in regards of the evacuation of EU citizens. On the same occasion, the High Representative and the Commission presented a proposal for reviewing EU’s Neighbourhood Policy with the aim to set up a new “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” with the South Mediterranean. By that time the EU was widely criticized by being “shamefully late” in its support for Arab rebels. Moreover, the divisions within the European Union became more and more obvious. Before the extraordinary summit France recognized unilaterally the Libyan National Transit Council (NTC) as the legitimate government of Libya which was met with a lot of fury by other EU member states as it undermined the Union’s credibility as a unitary international actor. It did less so in the European Parliament where MEPs adopted a resolution calling the EU as a whole to recognize formally Libya’s opposition as the only legitimate authority. The EU soon followed France and recognized the interim rebel council as a “legitimate interlocutor”.

In an attempt to show that they were on top of the issue, Cameron and Sarkozy issued a joint letter on the eve of the EU extraordinary summit warning that Gaddafi might be guilty of crimes against humanity. This was a powerful move as it would have given France and Britain the necessary legal cover for the imposition of a NFZ. However, the idea of a no-fly zone was met with a lot of scepticism and reluctance across the Union but the EU’s 27 member states agreed on the emergency summit that a no-fly zone could be imposed if three conditions were met: a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region. Meanwhile, France and UK continued

---

61 European Commission, op. cit., Ref. 33
drafting a resolution authorising “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians under threat or attack.

The divisions within the European Union were exposed again at the meeting of G8 Foreign Ministers on the 14-15 of March that was expected to recommend fresh measures to be included in a possible new UN Security Council resolution, as Germany blocked Anglo-French no-fly proposals. This set-back was even more shameful as two days before the Arab League called on the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone over Libya62. Moreover, on the same day the Libyan revolutionary national council delegation made an appeal to G8 countries in Paris to launch military strikes against Gaddafi forces to protect rebel-held cities as rebels had carried several military setbacks63. After the G8 summit not only was the European Union blamed for inaction but also the U.S. was criticized for indecisive leadership.

An international consensus on the imposition of a no-fly zone was achieved on the 17 of March with the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution 1973 which opened the way for military intervention. The Resolution sanctioned the establishment of a non-fly zone and authorized member states “to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi”64. Ten members of the Security Council voted in favour, with five abstaining including China, Russia and Germany. Germany’s decision to abstain was met with disappointment as it set under question the EU’s pretentions to have a common foreign policy.

NATO was chosen to carry out the military operation in Libya, and the United States expected the European Union to take the lead in intervening in Libya as it was not interested in becoming embroiled in another Muslim country. However, the operation was not truly handed over to European-led NATO mission. First of all, although the U.S. reduced the number of its air sorties, many of the intelligence,
surveillance and logistics assets remain American. Secondly, only ten out of the 21 EU member states in NATO (plus Sweden) committed themselves in participating in the *Unified Protector* operation. But only four of them – UK, France, Belgium and Denmark – offered air capacities for striking targets on the ground. The leaders of the European Union institutions distanced themselves from the military intervention by only supporting it rhetorically.

The coalition’s air strikes on Libya started two days after the adoption of the UNSC resolution. To general surprise, Gaddafi announced an immediate ceasefire, prompting relief among the rebels and Western leaders but the joy did not last long as the ceasefire proved to be a fiction. Gaddafi troops penetrated into Benghazi where street battles and artillery strikes continued through the day.

As the humanitarian situation in the country deteriorated, the EU started preparations for EUFOR Libya which was supposed to be a military operation designed to support humanitarian assistance in the region by securing the delivery of aid supplies. Council approved EUFOR Libya military mission on the 1 of April but as the EU capitals could not reach agreement of full-scale Common Security and Defence (CSDP) operation then the launch of the mission was made conditional on the request by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The operation never went into effect as the United Nations considered EU’s assistance “as a last resort”65. As a last effort to make the EU visible, the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton opened a European Union office in Benghazi on the 22 of May. The office aimed to facilitate the channelling of recourses and improve contacts with the opposition leaders and civil society. But more than anything it was a symbolic gesture of the EU being present in Libya.

The NATO mission, Operation Unified Protector, stopped on the 31 of October with the death of Muammar Gaddafi, ending the Western military intervention to Libya.

---

Chapter II – The study of the European discourses on the Libyan conflict

During the Libyan conflict two main discourses were present in the wider EU debate which articulated different constructions of identity and appealed to different European policy responses. Firstly, this chapter studies the discourse representing Libya as “an oriental version of the Eastern European revolutions in 1989” that constructed the European policy options as linked to soft instruments. Secondly, it outlines the critical discourse present within the Union which constructed Libya as “another Yugoslavia” and demanded a more bold, interventionist EU policy.

It must be stressed again that this research is guided by the theoretical claim that instruments do not define a normative power, meaning that a normative power does not necessarily rely on soft instruments. So this research does not judge the different foreign policy instruments used in dealing with the crisis but tries to demonstrate that the actions and discourses that legitimised them were simply different, and this difference resulted in different identity-constructions.

2.1. Libyan uprising as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions”

As reports of Libyan atrocities reached the European media, a discourse that represented the Libyan uprisings, its nature, participants and the role of the EU through the articulation of the Libyan revolution as “oriental variation of the 1989 revolutions” arose. It was accompanied by EU’s normative discourse about the protection of human rights, democracy promotion and the spread of prosperity to its immediate neighbourhood.

*The construction of the Libyan “Other”*

The discourse representing the Libyan uprisings as “oriental variation of the Eastern European revolutions” constructed the uprising in Libya as taking place between the Libyan people and the regime of Gaddafi. This discourse emphasized the “dictatorial” identity of Libya that was preventing the people of Libya from transforming and establishing a democracy.
The identity of the Libyans was constructed as similar to Europe while Gaddafi’s non-normative Otherness was emphasized through the articulations of the regime being “unreasonable”, “violent” and “illegitimate”. The requests of the Libyan people, on the contrary, were constructed as being based on the universal values of freedom, democracy, justice, progress and human rights – all values which represent the “silver thread” of the European project\(^6^6\) and constitute a fundamental part of the Europe’s self-image. Not only were the Libyans constructed as close to European Self because of what they stood for, but their demands were also constructed as being free of Islamist and anti-imperialist ideology\(^6^7\). “The uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have nothing to do with fundamentalism,” argued Herman Van Rompuy, “No, the protesters’ aspirations are familiar to young men and women all over the world: jobs and justice, a say in their country's politics, the right to speak. We are not witnessing extremism, or a clash of civilizations, but an episode in the fight for freedom and for justice.”\(^6^8\)

The uprisings changed fundamentally the so far prevailing construction of “Arab exception to democracy” as this discourse articulated Libyans as being capable of change. “I believe that every human being from whatever culture has the same aspirations for freedom,” explained Barroso, “This is an historic moment and we have to be on the right side of history. This is a life time opportunity to assist those who are in the pursuit of freedom, justice, democracy and human rights.”\(^6^9\) Or as Ed Miliband argued in *The Observer* that “All western governments have been taught a lesson: democracy has been shown to be valued by ordinary people in the Arab world as much as it was in Eastern Europe in 1989 or in the western world before. That should give us all a sense of optimism about human progress and the power of people to change to


world." This capability for transformation is crucial for the construction of the similarity between Europe and the Libyans which created a sense of responsibility for the EU in helping them to become more similar to Europe’s Self.

Furthermore, the Libyan uprising were argued to hold a deeper source of legitimacy as it represented the “active will of the people” in contrast to the illegitimate nature of the Gaddafi regime. "The will of the people in Libya must be respected and the EU stands by them," declared Catherine Ashton in the beginning of the crisis. The representation of the will of the people as a source of legitimacy is in itself notable, as the idea has been the one of the fundamental principle of legitimacy in Europe since Rousseau and it represents the direct mobilization of the people that claim universal rights and freedoms, in confrontation of the ruling.

The portrayal of Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” constructed Libya also as spatially close to the EU. The construction of Libya as Europe’s “back yard” created further responsibility for the EU to show that it was in front of the crisis. The Financial Times argues “For all that, this is a moment for Europe as important as any since 1989 – a test of whether the continent understands that its future cannot be detached from events in its near-neighbourhood.”

*The construction of Europe’s normative identity against the Libyan “Other”*

Next, I will look what identity this discourse on Libya provides for the European Union. Five distinct NPE identity constructions were spotted. First of all, the discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” constructed the EU’s normative power identity through the articulations of the European Union as the guarantor and carrier of liberal norms such as the rule of law, democracy, human rights, progress and good governance. It clearly represented the Union as above Libyans as the EU was

---


71 Hansen, 2006: 38


represented as the norm giver and no one really talked about a genuine Libyan contribution to norm creation. At the same time inclusive identity features were present as the discourse demonstrated EU’s openness and willingness to diffuse its norms. As Buzek put it “The EU’s ultimate goal is to ensure that our neighbours have a future of liberty and prosperity in their own country. They should no longer have to flee from an oppressive regime. We should support them to build a free and democratic country”74. The Economist concurred arguing that the European Union’s role is to “always demonstrate that its best friends are the democrats”75. This discourse created a strong sense of mission for the Union to diffuse its norms in Libya and, in the words of Barroso, stand “side by side with those who strive for democracy, freedom and a better future”76. Moreover, the representation of the Libyans as requesting the same norms and values “that are at the heart of the European ideal”77 had a strong legitimizing function as it was a confirmation for the EU’s elite that its norms were appealing to the rest of the world.

The Union’s determination in promoting its democratic agenda was largely due to the belief within the Union that its norms are universal. “Ultimately this is about people’s deep quest for freedom, justice, dignity, social and economic opportunities, and democracy. These are indeed universal values. I believe that every human being from whatever culture has the same aspirations for freedom. Every human being, if he or she has the opportunity, will choose freedom. That is precisely what the young people in these countries are showing us,” argued Barroso78. As said before normative power’s norms are not universal by definition. The norms, however, that the actor seeks to promote constitute an important part of its identity and create a powerful incentive for

action. Norms must be presented as universal in order to legitimize norm-diffusion in the eyes of other political entities. The discourse clearly portrayed the Union’s norms of democracy, human rights, freedom and progress as universal that are relevant to all members of the human kind. Furthermore, the EU’s norms were represented as in accordance with the international law: “Freedom of expression and the right to assemble, as provided for in particular by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are human rights and fundamental freedoms of every human being which must be respected and protected.” These constructions of the EU’s normative power identity and the “universality” of its norms created further impetus for the EU to fulfil its norm-diffuser role.

The discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” reveal that the EU’s normative power identity is constructed on its distinct nature as a political entity. This self-construction projects the EU as a **power of example**, as well as a role model to Others due to its own experience overcoming its historical hurdles and creating a democratic and prosperous political entity. “The European Union itself is a community of democratic Member States which have overcome tremendous historical hurdles. This European success story was possible when fear gave way to hope, when repression had to surrender to the tremendous forces of freedom,” argued Barroso, “We therefore totally understand where the nascent democracies in the Southern Mediterranean are coming from. Many people of these countries are showing that they don't want dictatorships. Now we need to support them in building real democracies.”

Barroso’s statement illustrates that the EU’s leaders expected Libya to imitate the Union’s normative model and example. Moreover, the EU’s self-representation that its norms promotion policy responds to Arab demands indicate that there is a general belief that the European normative model in principally “good” and exportable to different settings. As Ashton said in her speech to the European Parliament “It is also important to remember “why” we do what we do. We do this to promote and protect human rights

---

79 De Zutter, 2010: 1117
and democracy […] to help others obtain what we have. As I've many times reported a young man in Libya who said “we want what you have every day. You have deep democracy and freedom.”82

Drawing on historical analogue, the discourse also called on the Union to follow in its actions the same pattern as during the Eastern European revolutions two decades earlier. This construction reveals a belief among EU leaders that the Union should project its norms through “greater political and economic openness”83. As Barroso argued “The events unfolding in our southern neighbourhood are a rendezvous with history. Europe will rise to this challenge and support the current transformation processes. The Commission has a crucial set of political and economic tools that we are already deploying and that we will strengthen further.”84 The Observer concurred “Our template should be the EU’s response to the democratic revolutions of 1989 which helped make change in Eastern Europe irreversible, with economic aid, technical assistance and institution building.”85 The discourse constructs the European means of influence and instruments clearly as being from the soft side of the spectrum, claiming that the Union should promote its norms with political and economic openness. As The Economist put it “as a union, it may not have military power, but it has useful economic and political tools”86.

Finally, this discourse constructs the European Union as a multilateral actor. Besides being a strong advocate of norms that are seen by EU leaders as stemming from the international law, the EU is projected as an advocate of multilateral rules and cooperation. First of all, the Union emphasised that in dealing with the Libyan crisis it had to work in line with its international partners. As Ashton put it “The crisis in Libya

---

and the events that have unfolded in North Africa and the Middle East require a coordinated and comprehensive international response. The EU cannot act in isolation and as I have always said the international community is stronger and more effective if it works together."\(^87\) However, the discourse does not only construct the EU as a multilateral actor outside the Union but also inside. It articulates the special nature of the EU’s postmodern system of states. As Ashton said ahead of the Foreign Affairs Council „The nature of Member States is precisely that countries determine what their involvement should be, and countries are involved in different ways, but the EU as 27 is very strong.” In another statement she further argued “While contributing in a differentiated way, the EU and its Member States are determined to act collectively and resolutely, with all international partners, particularly the Arab League and other regional stakeholders, to give full effect to these decisions.”\(^88\) Ashton’s quotes demonstrate that the NPE construction involves an articulation of multilateralism which does not presuppose a collective action, as one would expect from the classical definition of the concept\(^89\) but instead, promotes different actions from actors in order to achieve a common goal. The construction of the EU as a multilateral actor was widely used during the Libyan crisis not only to justify the Union’s internal incoherence in dealing with the crisis but also its non-participation in the imposition of a no-fly zone.

The discourse became vulnerable to dislocations as questions were raised on Europe’s morality in its relations with Libya in the past. “Europeans did not investigate Arab suffering,” argued The Guardian, “because they did not believe they had a democratic duty to help it end.”\(^90\) The EU’s self-construction as a normative power was put to test by the media that criticized the EU for failing to enter in a normative dialogue with its southern neighbours in the past. Moreover, Europe’s normative discourse was

---


perceived hypocritical as news about the Union’s cooperation with dictatorships in North Africa reached the media. “It is questionable whether the EU has been so concerned for democracy, freedom and human rights in these North African countries in recent years,” concludes The Guardian, “The EU has backed authoritarian regimes and dictators such as Muammar Gaddafi as a trade-off for stability in the region and for a better control of immigration flows across the Mediterranean”\(^\text{91}\). Or as Paul Betts put it in The Financial Times “Support granted for years by European leaders to corrupt and authoritarian regimes showed that “ethical Europe” had no clothes.”\(^\text{92}\) Therefore, the Union’s failure to promote its democratic agenda in the Southern Mediterranean before the uprisings was perceived as EU’s failure to enact its normative identity. This representation put the EU in a very vulnerable position, undermining its privileged position as a positive example of democracy. The media discourse imposed great pressure on the European Union to react in accordance with its core values. The failure of the European Union to take on the moral and political obligation evoked by the discourse of Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” would have implied that the European own identity was corrupt.

The counter-discourse created further support among the EU leaders for action and led the European Union to adopt a discursive position which constructed responsibility for “those who demanded democracy”. The EU’s discursive strategy for countering criticism was to admit the mistakes made in the past and stand on the side of the democratic uprising. As Štefan Füle put it “First, we must show humility about the past. Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region. […] I am not saying that everything we did was wrong, rather that Europe, at this particular moment more than ever before, must be faithful to its values and stand on the side of democracy and social justice”\(^\text{93}\). The constant accentuation on


the EU as standing by the Libyan people and their aspirations strove to wash off the EU’s growing reputation as a double-dealing actor who preferred stability over values.

2.1.1. Calls for EU action

Overall, the construction of Libyan uprising as “oriental version of the Eastern European revolutions” was a powerful discourse which created a space where the EU had responsibility to help the Libyans to become similar to Europe. The representation of the values and that the Libyan people requested as “universal” and the Union as a carrier of these norms created an incentive for the EU to set up a normative agenda in its southern neighbourhood.

As the claim of this thesis is that the EU’s normative power identity enables the European Union to take certain actions and at the same time imposes constraints in taking other actions, this section will trace the foreign policy instruments that the European Union was willing to take. It seeks to study how the outlined constructions of the Europe’ Self and the Libyan Other within the larger “1989” discourse were used to justify these actions and establish the link between EU identity and discourse.

The central policy of the European Union from the outbreak of the Libyan civil war composed of three main parts. First of all, the Union committed itself in offering post-conflict support in the Libya’s transition to democracy. In the attempts to pursue and immediate policy in response to the crisis, the European Union imposed several sanctions against Libya. Lastly, the Union was providing humanitarian aid inside Libya and assisting with the evacuation of the EU citizens aimed at addressing the “humanitarian crisis”. The central political actors defending this policy approach were the European Commission together with the High Representative Catherine Ashton, President of the Commission José Manuel Barroso, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle and President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy. The section reveals that the discourse on Libya as “oriental variation of the 1989 revolutions” was used to argue for “soft” action and a political solution for the crisis.
A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity

Turning to the concrete actions that the European Union took, the discussion on EU’s assistance in post-conflict transformation in Libya, the so called “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”, held a central place within the discourse. “Europe's response to the Arab Spring is clear: It is a true Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity,” declared Barroso, reflecting the role that the European Union was most eager taking.

The discourse was aiming for EU’s involvement in Libya’s post-conflict transition to democracy. It proposed the policy of “three Ms” – money, market access and mobility. The content of this was the contribution in development of the economy of Libya, the removal of tariff barriers, and measures to support mobility between Libya and the European Union. The EU also wanted to offer its technical expertise in order to support the democratic transformation and institution-building, a stronger partnership with people and civil society, and economic development in Libya. It was supposed to differ from previous partnerships in the region by representing it as an “incentive-based approach” based on the principle “more for more,” meaning that those who go faster and further with the reforms, could count on greater support from the Union.

From the beginning of the crisis, it was articulated that the EU’s first priority was to “ensure the success of the democratic transitions”. The discourse reveals that the EU was determined to solve the Libyan problems by assisting it in its transition to democracy that permitted the Union to promote its norms of democracy, freedom, rule of law and development. The striking cultural differences did not discourage the European Union from setting up an ambitious normative agenda in Libya.

95 Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, COM(2011) 200 final, Brussels, 8 March 2011, pp 5.
The strategy arguing for democratic assistance in post-conflict Libya was the construction of the cause of the conflict in terms of “closed and unjust nature of these societies”, “high levels of unemployment”, “uneven distribution of wealth” and “a lack of economic opportunities”97. These representations allowed the Union to express that it was important not to just deal with “the fall-out of the crisis” but to address “the roots of this process,”98 mirroring the European own experience of ensuring that war would become unthinkable and impossible. Catherine Ashton defended this commitment in the opinion pages of *The New York Times* “Sometimes the toughest question in world politics is: ‘And then what?’ […] The test for us is not just what happens in the days ahead, but what happens in the months and years after peace returns and the media’s attention has switched to crises elsewhere.”99

Europe justified its special role in the region on two grounds, drawing on its normative power constructions. First of all, the Union expressed that it was in a good position to help in the post-conflict transition due to its own successful experience in striving for peace, democracy and prosperity. Barroso argued “The European Union itself is a community of democratic Member States which have overcome tremendous historical hurdles. This European success story was possible when fear gave way to hope, when repression had to surrender to the tremendous forces of freedom. We therefore totally understand where the nascent democracies in the Southern Mediterranean are coming from.”100 The EU’s narrative of its historic reconciliation and uniqueness of its peace project reflects the Union’s self-construction as a power of example. The Union’s model of governance is constructed as superior to existing forms and the Libyans are expected to imitate the EU. However, this self-understanding

---

actually undermines the Union’s normative power as it does not allow it to share its experience and norms on equal grounds.

Secondly, the Union argued that it already had a successful experience in supporting countries in transition from dictatorships to democracy. The echoes of the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 were obvious when Buzek argued “I remember very well after 1989, the European Union acted as a magnet for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This played a stabilising role. This helped with the hard decisions of crucial and deep structural reforms. The transition would not be possible without such reforms. We must be the same stabilising force today, although we cannot offer the prospect of membership.”

The Libyan upheaval, as William Hague and Guido Westerwelle argued, “Presents Europe with a challenge and an opportunity of a scale to match the [east European] revolutions of 1989. The EU response must match the scale of change and will be a key test of its credibility.”

Thus, the EU justified its action in the region based on its own successful experience in the Eastern Europe of norm diffusion. Besides having the experience in supporting countries in transition, the discourse articulated also that the Union had the necessary expertise to help Libya. “We need to use the expertise in economic and political transformation which exists in Europe today. One can recall that political change and structural reform from dictatorship to democracy also happened in Europe,” argued Jerzy Buzek. The self-perception of the EU as a “stabilizing force” and a “magnet” presents the Union as a model of stability and prosperity which calls the Union to impose its norms and values to others. It implies that the EU’s model is perceived so attractive that others want to become similar to it. Moreover, this discourse is about giving others that are less developed and badly governed the chance to learn from the Europeans and adopt its model. The Union’s vision was to offer teaching, training and expertise, and Libya was

---


103 Jerzy Buzek, op. cit., Ref. 105.
expected to socialize and learn. The EU’s discourse resembled much to that of two decades ago when Eastern European countries began their “return to Europe”. It was at that time when the EU started to develop its normative discourse in order to legitimize and justify the enlargement. The universal nature of EU norms was then presented as the reason which motivated the CEE states to take upon all the Union’s normative conditions voluntarily for joining it\textsuperscript{104}. Enlargement was a very strong expression of the EU’s normative power as EU did not have to use any kind of persuasion but the Union’s model was so attractive that the new countries wanted to be part of the Union themselves\textsuperscript{105}. Thus, the proposed policy of “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” was hoped to be a substitute of the EU’s most successful foreign policy tool\textsuperscript{106} – enlargement.

As the EU’s approach towards Libya was clearly hierarchical, its strategy to create an illusion of self-determination was to emphasise the aspects of Libyan ownership and partnership. “Democracy cannot be imposed from outside,” said Buzek,\textsuperscript{107} referring to the Union’s changed paradigm towards its relations with Libya. The EU committed itself to “not dictating outcomes but supporting pluralism, accountability, deep democracy and shared prosperity”\textsuperscript{108}. The constant articulation of the Libyan uprisings through the notions of “ownership”, “popular” and “home-grown” indicates that the European Union wanted to distance itself from neo-colonial power labels. There were clearly fears that if Libyans feel any sense of imposition it would make the former European colony suspicious of EU’s motivations and, thus, reluctant to European norms export through post-conflict reconstruction. As Catherine Ashton argued “The democratic transitions have to be home-grown. It is for the people of the


\textsuperscript{107} Jerzy Buzek, op. cit., Ref. 105, 107.

region to determine what lies next. But we should be ready to offer our full support, if asked, with creativity and determination."\textsuperscript{109} In another statement she further elaborated the idea by saying “we know that in the end aid can play only a limited role. Countries must work and trade their way to prosperity.”\textsuperscript{110} The articulation of the new partnership as “Libyan led” had also a clear legitimizing effect to EU’s normative agenda.

Although the Union’s rhetoric underlined “partnership”, “inclusivity”, “openness” and “shared prosperity”, the asymmetry and hierarchy in the new policy was still apparent in its conditionality and differentiation. Just as in 1993 with the adoption of Copenhagen criteria, the EU again spelled out its normative criteria for Libyans to gain from EU’s political and economic openness. As Catherine Ashton argued “An incentive-based approach is needed, with greater differentiation among countries. The guiding philosophy is “more for more”: those partners that go further and faster with reforms should be able to count on greater support from the EU.”\textsuperscript{111} Or as Nick Clegg out it “We must have greater conditionality in our approach and much greater political and economic openness towards North Africa”\textsuperscript{112}. Clegg’s rhetoric on economic and political openness reflects also the asymmetric nature of the EU’s policies as granting third countries access to the highly legalised European Market requires a large degree of normative approximation, even harmonisation, on the part of those seeking that access\textsuperscript{113}.

The discourse on conditionality and differentiation indicates that Europe’s normative power identity is not as open and inclusive to “Others” which question the Union’s readiness to fulfil its role as a norm-diffuser. Another problem with this EU construction is that it lacks self-reflectivity. The Union has been applying the policies based on conditionality in his near-neighbourhood for decades. However, without any

\textsuperscript{109} Catherine Ashton, op. cit., Ref. 112.
\textsuperscript{111} Catherine Ashton, op. cit., Ref. 112, 114.
strong positive incentives, such as the prospective of membership (carrot) or a credible threat (stick), the Union has to rely on others in wanting to accept its norms.

Turning to the media discourse, it was not only the EU officials that supported this action, the media-level discourse also constructed the Union as suitable in helping Libya in its road to democracy due to its experience “having created institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to put central and Eastern Europe on the path to democracy and a market economy”\textsuperscript{114}. The democratisation of the Easter Europe was believed to be “a striking success for the “soft power” of the EU, a body without much of the hard sort”\textsuperscript{115}. Moreover, the Libyan protests were perceived as an assertion that aspects of the Western model are still attractive.

Europe’s discourse, however, was destabilized by the argument that besides membership prospect, the EU does not have efficient foreign policy tools and, thus, the Union’s action will not have same impact in Libya as in Easter Europe\textsuperscript{116}. “If enlargement has been the EU’s most successful foreign-policy tool, the attempt to promote reform in borderland countries with little hope of joining has largely been a failure,”\textsuperscript{117} wrote \textit{The Economist}. Moreover, the media questioned the morality and effectiveness of EU actions in its Southern neighbourhood. \textit{The Financial Times} argued “If there are grounds for scepticism, they lie in the fact that the EU has run various aid programmes for the region since 1995 without much impact”\textsuperscript{118}. Indeed, the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy in the South was generally perceived as a failure as it was believed to focus only on economic deals and failed to promote political reform in these countries. The EU actors responded to this criticism by acknowledging the past mistakes and emphasising the difference of the new partnership from previous ones. As Cameron said: “It’s a moment for Europe to say what we’ve done in the past hasn’t always worked. Now we should be reaching out to these countries, offering them a new


\textsuperscript{118} Europe meets the Arab awakening, “ The Financial Times, 10 March 2011. ePaper
partnership, opening up our markets and welcoming their approach of greater democracy, greater freedom, greater human rights.\footnote{Watt, N. (2011), „Nicolas Sarkozy calls for air strikes on Libya if Gaddafi attacks civilians,“ \textit{The Guardian}, 11 March. Available at \url{http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/11/nicolas-sarkozy-libya-air-strikes?INTCMP=SRCH} (6.04.2013)} Moreover, the Libyan revolution was articulated as a “historic opportunity” for the EU in order to “revive its original mission and to assert its ambition” in the Mediterranean area\footnote{European Parliament, Union for the Mediterranean Assembly calls for a “Marshall plan” for transition countries, 4 March 2011. Available at \url{http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20110228IPR14442+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN} (23.04.2013)} where the Union has previously failed to carry out its normative objectives.

\textit{Sanctions}

The imposition of sanctions against the Libyan regime was another action promoted within the wider discourse of Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions”. It drew on the normative arguments of the EU having responsibility to act in defence of its norms and values, and to address the suffering of the Libyan people who were constructed close to the EU, both spatially and in identity terms.

The calls for sanctions within the European Union started from the very beginning of the conflict. The discussion reflected a worry within the Union that if it did not act fast in defence of its norms, the EU’s own identity would seem corrupt. William Hague argued that there would be a “day of reckoning” for anyone involved in supporting Gaddafi’s human rights abuses against protesters in Libya\footnote{“Libya crisis: EU agrees sanctions as UK warns of ‘day of reckoning’ for Gaddafi,” \textit{The Guardian}, 28 February 2011. Available at \url{http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/28/libya-crisis-eu-sanctions-day-reckoning-gaddafi} (2.04.2013)}. The Finnish Foreign Minister, Alexander Stubb, concurred: “How can we on one side look at what’s going on in Libya, with almost 300 people shot dead, and not talk about sanctions or travel bans, and at the same time put travel bans and sanctions in Belarus?”\footnote{“EU denounces Libya’s brutal suppression of protests,” \textit{The Guardian}, 21 February 2011. Available at \url{http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/eu-libya} (3.04.2013)} German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, argued that sanctions would be “inevitable” if the Libyan regime continued to put down protests so violently. “There is a great deal of agreement with many partners in the European Union here,” he said. “If this violence continues, everyone in Europe will know that this cannot go unanswered. I cannot
imagine that, given these terrible pictures, these terrible events in our immediate neighbourhood, any other policy is possible in Europe.” The argumentation reveals that there was pressure from the member states to the European Union to take immediate action in response to these events in order to preserve its self-image as the carrier and protector of norms such as human rights and democracy.

However, it is notable that the European Union only implemented sanctions after the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1970 which gave the action a clear legal basis. Since mid-February there was constant pressure for the European Union not only from the member states, but also from the media to adopt sanction against Libya. Union’s decision to wait until the UN Security Council resolution projects the European Union’s NPE construction as a multilateral actor that acts in accordance with legal principles set by the United Nations. The EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, stated the measures, including an arms embargo, asset freeze and visa ban, “were aimed at reinforcing the UN Security Council sanctions against Libya.” “We will work with the United Nations, the Arab League, the African Union and our international partners to respond to the crisis,” expressed the European Council after the EU extraordinary summit. Multilateralism, thus, was used as a political and normative argument for EU’s commitment in imposing sanctions.

It was after the UNSC resolution that the European Union started on insisting the necessity of the promotion of the values underlying the European project in its own neighbourhood. Europe’s discursive strategy in justifying sanctions was the representation of Gaddafi as “illegal” and preventing the Libyan people from achieving their democratic aspirations. “We have a regime turning against its own people when they are standing up for freedom. […] So we have to intensify our international pressure

on the current regime to step down,” declared Barroso. Štefal Füle also made a convincing case arguing for EU’s responsibility to defend its values in Libya “I think it is absolutely clear to all of us that Colonel Gaddafi and the Libyan leadership have reached a point of no-return. The repression they have inflicted on their population had not been seen in Europe’s neighbourhood for at least a generation. Beyond our essential humanitarian and consular duties, there can be no more dealing with Libya’s government until he and the perpetrators of these acts are gone.”

Sanctions on Gaddafi regime were also justified referring to EU’s original normative mission in Libya. As Lothar Bisky, member of the European Parliament argued “If the violence in Libya did not stop the fragile shoots of democracy in the region can also be destroyed if the situation in Libya gets worse”. Overthrowing Gaddafi was seen as a “prerequisite to everything else” as the EU could not get involved with the transition to democracy in Libya before Gaddafi was relinquished from power. It was clear from the discourse that if the conflict in Libya turned against the rebels, the Union’s normative ambitions of a “democratic, stable, prosperous, peaceful North Africa” would fail.

The third action argued for within the wider discourse was humanitarian assistance but it was not a simple reproduction of the Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions in the Eastern Europe” but modified it through the expression of “humanitarian responsibility” for the victims of the conflict which activated a vast humanitarian aid operation in Libya. The call for humanitarian assistance was absolutely unanimous throughout the European Union, indicating that the EU identifies itself with this role very strongly.

The calls for humanitarian assistance in Libya were based not only on the Union’s responsibility to act in defence of its norms but it was also a securitization discourse trying to prevent the spill-over of the conflict. As Nick Clegg argued “There is no greater guarantee of the mass movement of people from north Africa into southern Europe than not matching the immediate humanitarian needs”\(^\text{131}\). The discussion on security concerns indicates that the focus on humanitarian assistance is not simply part of the EU’s external identity but shows that the promotion of human rights in Libya were also of a strategic relevance to the EU with the aim to address the roots of instability the crisis was causing. In response to this security concern, the EU leaders represented Libya in terms of a “humanitarian crisis”. The European Council’s declared in its statement “The humanitarian emergency in Libya and at its borders is reaching worrying proportions, aggravated by the massive migration movements resulting from the events”\(^\text{132}\). Furthermore, Kristalina Georgieva, European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, and Enikő Győri, Hungary’s Minister of State for EU affairs, argued in their joint statement “The unleashing of violence in Libya has triggered a major humanitarian crisis at Europe’s doorstep. Europe’s values and interests command us to act decisively and this is what we are doing.”\(^\text{133}\) Or as Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs put it “I am continuously concerned


by the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Libya […] The European Union needs concerted action to facilitate the relocation and resettlement of people in need of international protection.”

The reasoning on humanitarian grounds legitimized a vast humanitarian assistance operation in Libya. However, the discourse was not used to justify intervention as it was done in Bosnia and later in Kosovo as it could have possibly worsen the conflict and change the battlefield in favour of the Gaddafi government, thereby aggravating the “humanitarian crisis” the Union was trying to solve.

In addition to the securitizing arguments, the discourse also articulated a normative concern for safeguarding human rights in Libya. For example the President of the European parliament, Jerzy Buzek argued that “[Europe’s] obligation is to defend the dignity of the people, defend the dignity of human life”.

He elaborated the idea further in another statement by saying “We need a strong EU presence on the ground providing water, food, healthcare, sanitation, tents, and camp management. Let us build confidence and trust that we stand on the side of the people”.

Thus, Europe’s discourse on humanitarian assistance was twofold – there were certainly elements of a securitizing discourse but it also reflects European Union’s concern for human rights in Libya. The latter demonstrates that the discourse on human rights is one of the normative criteria for EU actions.

However, this discourse, by constructing Libya in terms of a “humanitarian crisis” undermined the construction of the Libyans and Europeans as equivalent. The debate on immigration indicates that the discourse constituted Libyans as “foreign”. This was apparent from European discourse that articulated a concern of migration

---


flows resulting from Gaddafi’s repressions. Vito Bonsignore from the EPP Group argued that “the humanitarian crisis could result in a wave of migrants” to Europe. Italy, most concerned of the 27, worried that mass exodus from Libya could be “Biblical” in proportions. The articulation of Libyans in terms of a possible migration problem implies that the EU was not sure whether it wanted to be open to others, undermining the inclusive aspect of the Union’s normative identity.

This fear did not go unnoticed by the media which repeatedly criticised the Union for being more concerned about migrants trying to flee to Europe than Libyans. The Guardian, indicating to the fact that Tunisia had been taking the biggest burden of migrants fleeing from Libya argued “The EU is being hypocritical at best and racist at worst. How can Europe say they applaud the new democracy coming to North Africa and then, when people flee, we turn our backs to them?” The term “fortress Europe” made definitely a comeback during the Libyan refugee crisis which furthermore created a dividing line between Europe and Libya. In the attempt to defend its actions, the Union insisted on the scale and importance of its humanitarian assistance operation in Libya. “The EU has stood by the Libyan people during the conflict, including through the delivery of significant humanitarian assistance, and will continue to do so now,” concluded the Council after the end of the conflict.


2.2. Libya as “another Yugoslavia“

The analysis of the EU’s debate calling for EU’s “soft” action reveals a remarkable continuity throughout the Libyan crisis. The media’s criticism is acknowledged and incorporated into the discourse through the articulation of EU’s changed attitude and the pursuit of a value-based policy towards Libya.

The study of the alternative discourses reveals that there was actually one critical discourse present during the conflict challenging the discourse of the Libyan uprisings as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” and its policy of “soft” action. The critical discourse centred on the construction of the Libyan conflict as “another Yugoslavia” and called intensively for the imposition of a no-fly zone. These calls were advocated by some of the stronger member states, such as Britain and France who were backed up not only by the opposition from the media but also by some EU officials from the European Parliament.

This section studies first of all the alternative self/other constructions. Secondly, it analyses the calls for alternative action i.e. military intervention within this discourse. Lastly, as the Union managed to resist the pressure from the opposing discourse, the section will look at the block’s response to these calls in order to understand whether and in what way the EU’s NPE constructions were used as a justification for not participating in military action.

*The construction of the Libyan “Other”*

The study of the first discourse demonstrated that it was built on the articulation of Libyans as close to European Self, although inferior as they were norm-takers, and Gaddafi it terms of Europe’s non-normative Other. The opposing discourse on does not differ drastically in the construction of the Libya from the portrayal of the events in Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” as it in principal did agree with the “soft” measures the EU was advocating. However, this discourse did first and foremost insist on military intervention in Libya which demanded for a securitizing discourse
aimed at justifying this extraordinary measure. The Libyan conflict was placed in the realm of humanitarian security through the discursive practices of political elites that represented Libya in terms of “humanitarian catastrophe” and a “bloodbath”, and stressed the need to address massive human rights violations and prevent widespread human suffering caused by Gaddafi’s regime. This was a powerful discourse that moved the issue from the realm of “strategic” within the higher grounds of the morally good. These constructions imposed ethical responsibility for Europe to protect the Libyan people.

This discourse constructed the crisis in Libya as a space of two parties by separating the Libyan people and Gaddafi regime. The Libyan people were constructed in terms of “peaceful demonstrators” and “brave civilians” who could not take responsibility for their own defence and are, thus, dependent on the Other coming to their protection. As David Cameron argued “People, especially young people, are seeking their rights, and in the vast majority of cases they are doing so peacefully and bravely.” Moreover, the discourse, similarly to the “1989” discourse, represented Libyans as people whose identity was similar to European as they were demanding universal values. “The Libyan population wants the same rights and freedoms that people across the Middle East and North Africa are demanding, and that are enshrined in the values of the United Nations Charter,” argued Cameron.

Comparing to the discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the Eastern European revolutions”, the critical discourse put a lot more emphasises on the radical Othering of Gaddafi and his regime. Gaddafi was represented as the violator of human rights, brutal, criminal, mad and illegal in order to mobilize international intervention in Libya. As Cameron put it: “Gaddafi’s regime has ignored the demand of the UN Security Council in Resolution 1970, that it stop the violence against the Libyan people. His forces have attacked peaceful protesters, and are now preparing for a violent assault.

---

on a city of a million people that has a history dating back 2,500 years.”

In another statement he further argued “It is appalling what Qadhafi is doing in Misrata. He is murdering his own citizens, including children. The orders come directly from him.” The discourse linked the cause of the conflict directly to the persona of Gaddafi, presenting him as the “root of all Libyan problems” that was preventing the peaceful Libyans from achieving their legitimate demands. As Sarkozy and Cameron argued in a joint statement “The current regime has completely lost its legitimacy,” argued Sarkozy and Cameron in a joint statement, “Qadhafi must therefore go immediately.”

These constructions imposed a responsibility for the EU to protect the Libyan people and their demands for universal rights from the repressive regime of Colonel Gaddafi.

Moreover, it mobilized EU action by articulation Libya in terms of a security issue in Europe’s Southern border by representing Libya in terms of physically close, a potential migration problem, and an energy security issue. “North Africa is just 14 miles from Europe at its closest point, what happens to our near neighbours affects us deeply,” argued Nick Clegg, “at the level of human migration from North Africa to Europe, at the level of trade and investment between Europe and North Africa, and its importance to us in terms of energy, the environment and counter-terrorism”.

“Today, Libya is Europe’s Mexico. […] And Libya’s oil and gas help keep us warm, not Americans,” argued Michael White from *The Guardian*. This demonstrates how European support for military action was also mobilized through the articulation of the Libyan crisis as a security issue for the EU. *The Observer* for example argued “Libya could become a new Iraq, internally divided and externally weak. Tension on the Tunisian and Egyptian borders will increase – creating growth in anti-western feeling in

---


Cairo – and illegal migration to Europe will explode.”\textsuperscript{150} Thus, military action in Libya was presented as a necessity in order to protect Europe against the external Other. Inaction, in the words of Sarkozy, Cameron and Obama, “would condemn Libya to being not only a pariah state, but a failed state too […] any deal that leaves him in power would lead to further chaos and lawlessness. We know from bitter experience what that would mean. Neither Europe, the region, or the world can afford a new safe haven for extremists.”\textsuperscript{151} However, this construction of Libya as a security threat to Europe undermined the construction of Libyan people as close to Europe’s Self as they were represented as a potential migration issue for the EU.

\textit{Alternative construction of the European Self}

Equally to the discourse that represented Libya in terms of “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions”, this discourse constructed the European Union in terms of a carrier of universal norms which imposed to the Union to protect and promote these values. As Cameron put it “While it is not for us to dictate how each country should meet the aspirations of its people, we must not remain silent in our belief that freedom and the rule of law are what best guarantee human progress and economic success. Freedom of expression, a free press, freedom of assembly, the right to demonstrate peacefully: these are basic rights. And they are as much the rights of people in Tahrir Square as Trafalgar Square. They are not British or western values - but the values of human beings everywhere.”\textsuperscript{152} However, the fundamental difference between the two discourses lied in the understanding on how the EU should promote its values. While the EU represented itself as a power of example and insisted on promoting its norms through political and economic openness, the critical discourse believed that the EU should be capable in upholding its norms also by the use of force. To be clear, the discourse did not only support military action in Libya but also emphasised on the


\textsuperscript{152} Cameron, C. Prime Minister's statement on Libya to the House of Commons, Prime Minister’s Office, 28 February 2011. Available at \url{https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-libya--2} (2.05.2013)
importance of assisting Libya in the post-conflict transition to democracy. “Military action is not an objective as such. A lasting solution can only be a political one that belongs to the Libyan people,” argued Sarkozy and Cameron in a joint statement. However, the discourse articulated first and foremost Europe’s responsibility to use more forceful measures in order to fulfil its role.

EU’s unwillingness to secure its norms by using physical coercion, even when it had a wide international support, created a space by in which the Union was represented as a divided and weak military power. There was general frustration that the Union could not bring itself to take a unified and forceful action during the Libyan crisis. The echo of Yugoslavia was apparent in the argumentations which implied that due to the internal divisions, the EU was likely to repeat the failures in Libya as it did dealing with Yugoslavia in 1991 when they could not agree either on imposing a no-fly zone, nor the tricky area of diplomatic recognition. Just as Yugoslavia was seen as a first big test to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Libyan conflict was presented as the “first big test on the EU’s doorstep” after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty which created great expectations for EU’s common foreign policy. As The Economist put it “The crisis in North Africa looks like just the sort of problem that the institutions set up by the Lisbon Treaty were meant to deal with. But Catherine Ashton has been all but invisible.”

The weakness of the Union was also constructed through the radical Othering of the Union from the United Stated and its member states. The Union’s powerfulness was first of all contrasted against the “hard” power of its member states. The Telegraph argued “European Union is an emperor with no clothes when it comes to global power. […]Yet again on a major international crisis, the EU is looking like a deer in the

---


headlights. All of the real action at the moment on Libya is taking place in the major capitals of Europe at a nation state level – London, Paris, Berlin.”  

The criticism strengthened further when Germany decided to abstain from voting on the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly zone together with China and Russia. A commentator in The Financial Times argued: “The EU cannot build a common foreign policy on German neutrality. [...] The wider effect of all this has been to undermine, probably fatally, the EU’s hopes of emerging as a serious geopolitical actor. The bloc has its own foreign minister nowadays. It is building a fully-fledged diplomatic service. It is quite good at humanitarian missions. At the hard power end of the spectrum, however, national governments will continue to call all the shots.”  

This construction already creates a schizophrenic situation where the EU and its member states are represented in terms of two totally different actors.

Moreover, the Union’s powerlessness was not only expressed through its radical Othering from its member states but also through contrasting Europe to the United States. The EU’s reluctance to use military power and its tendency to assert normative goals with soft non-coercive instruments was opposed to the America’s military might. The argumentation drew again parallels with the Bosnian crisis two decades ago claiming that the Union could not resolve a crisis without the involvement of the United States. “Thus are the EU’s pretensions to act as an independent global power once again cruelly exposed,” argued Simon Disdall from The Guardian. “Europeans live closer to Libya than Americans. Like Bosnia, it's on their patch. It's their problem. But without the US, it seems, they cannot help themselves.”

The Guardian concurred by saying “US concerns about the European allies as reliable partners date back almost two decades, to the first years of the war in Bosnia. [...] Many Americans have concluded that European countries are simply unwilling to take the steps necessary to prevail in a

---


The critical speech of the U.S. Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates on the EU’s declining military power at the NATO meeting in June, only boosted the discourse on Europe’s irrelevance as a global actor. It was argued that if the Union did not achieve the objective to protect the Libyan civilians “it will slip inevitably into global strategic irrelevance.”

The discourse indicates that the EU’s self-representation as a special post-modern entity that does not use the traditional power instruments to diffuse its norms is not accepted by everyone. The above self/other constructions show clearly that there was an alternative representation of the Union that envisioned the EU more in terms of traditional nation states, such as the U.S, France and Britain and a global superpower that could protect its norms by intervening militarily in a global scale.

2.2.1. Alternative action – calls for the no-fly zone

Turning to the debate calling for military action, the continuity between the representation of Libya as “another Yugoslavia” and the promotion of the no-fly zone was evident in the representations of Libya in terms of “humanitarian catastrophe” and a “massacre”. It is noteworthy that the discourse on stopping the massive human sufferings in Libya that triggered the responsibility for humanitarian intervention has much resemblance with the discourses that surrounded the intervention on former Yugoslavia which mobilized the international community by articulating the situation in Bosnia in terms of genocide. Just as Jacques Poos, the foreign minister of Luxembourg, famously declared twenty years ago when Yugoslavia started to collapse that the “hour of Europe” has arrived, the echoes of Yugoslavia were apparent when

---

162 „Europe on the road to irrelevance,“ The Financial Times, 18 June 2011. ePaper
163 Hansen, 2006
opposition leaders called for military intervention representing the Libyan uprisings as a “historic test for Europe”165.

The discourse calling for military action moved away from the articulation of the cause of the uprisings as due to “dire social and economic situation” and linked the cause of the conflict directly to the persona of Gaddafi. “We should be clear,” argued Cameron, “For the future of Libya and its people, Colonel Qadhafi’s regime must end and he must leave.”166 Furthermore, it constructed the Libyan crisis in terms of “humanitarian catastrophe”, a “massacre” and “exceptional” in order to mobilize international support for a military intervention. “Intervening in another country's affairs should not be undertaken save in quite exceptional circumstances,” argued David Cameron, “That is why we've always been clear that preparing for eventualities which might include the use of force - including a no fly zone or other measures to stop humanitarian catastrophe - would require three tests to be met. Demonstrable need. Regional Support. And a clear legal basis.” As Cameron’s quote indicates, the discourse justified military intervention on three grounds.

Starting with the articulation of a demonstrable need, the discourse called for the use of force through the radical Othering of the Gaddafi regime. He was constructed in terms of brutal, repressive and murderous as he used military force against its own people. The Libyans, in contrast to Gaddafi were portrayed as “peaceful demonstrators” demanding their universal rights. The newspapers liked to refer to Gaddafi as “Mad dog”167 which was first used by Ronald Reagan, giving him a nickname with a crazed and irrational subtext – a rhetoric that has been used in case of foreign dictators from Gamal Abdel Nasser to Saddam Hussein with the aim to claim monopoly on the moral high ground. Moreover, Gaddafi’s regime was articulated as illegal firstly because his

---


regime had “lost the consent of his people”\textsuperscript{168} and secondly, because he “ignored the the demand of the UN Security Council in Resolution 1970, that it stop the violence against the Libyan people”\textsuperscript{169}. The rhetoric on “illegitimacy” aimed at downgrading the Gaddafi’s regime by indicating that it has lost the “consent of the people” and legitimize the demands for a NFZ. Europe, therefore, had a moral duty in countering Gaddafi’s aggression against the protesters and “protect civilians from the murderous madness of a regime which is killing its own people”\textsuperscript{170}.

Prior to the extraordinary EU summit on the 11 of March, Cameron and Sarkozy called for military action arguing “Since the Libyan people have started to rise against Muammar Gaddafi’s brutal regime, the world is witnessing on a daily basis an unacceptable continuation of violence and repression in Libya. Ignoring UN Security Council resolution 1970 demands as well as calls from regional organisations and the whole international community, Gaddafi’s regime continues to attack his own people including with aircraft and helicopters. It is clear to us that the regime has lost any legitimacy it may have once had.”\textsuperscript{171} However, as the EU and the international community were slow to do more than just help with the humanitarian crisis and impose sanctions, the Franco-Britain rhetoric took a more forceful strategy for mobilizing European action. Drawing on the Yugoslavian analogue, Gaddafi, similarly to Milošević, was represented as responsible for crimes against humanity and mass human rights abuses against the civilian population\textsuperscript{172}. As Sarkozy and Cameron argued “This deliberate use of military force against civilians is utterly unacceptable. As warned by

\textsuperscript{168} Cameron, D. Prime Minister's statement on Libya, Prime Minister’s Office, 28 February 2011. Available at \url{https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-libya--2} (29.04.2013)


\textsuperscript{171} „Cameron and Sarkozy urge EU allies to be ready for 'all contingencies',“ \textit{The Telegraph}, 11 March 2011. Available at \url{http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8375044/Cameron-and-Sarkozy-urge-EU-allies-to-be-ready-for-all-contingencies.html} (26.04.2013)

\textsuperscript{172} „David Cameron: Comparing Yugoslavia and Libya,“ A World View Interview with Prime Miniter David Cameron, video, \textit{Youtube}, 28 February 2011. Available at \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=roDDdnACuDw} (7.04.2013)
the Security Council, these acts may amount to crimes against humanity.” The vilification of the Gaddafi’s regime was accompanied by demands that insisted Gaddafi to “step down”. “Gaddafi has promised to carry out terrorist attacks against civilian ships and airliners. And because he has lost the consent of his people any deal that leaves him in power would lead to further chaos and lawlessness. Colonel Gaddafi must go, and go for good” insisted Cameron, Sarkozy and Obama in a signed article.

Basically what this discourse did was saying that if Gaddafi did not step down, Europe had the moral responsibility to take him down itself. As Cameron put it: “It's important that the countries of Europe show political will, show ambition and show unity in being clear that Colonel Gaddafi must go, that his regime is illegitimate and what he is doing to his people is completely unacceptable.” Furthermore, the discourse expressed the EU’s duty to protect its norms of democracy and human rights that were in “danger”. As Sarkozy put it “Arab peoples have chosen to free themselves from the servitude to which they have felt bound for far too long. These revolutions have given rise to immense hope in the hearts of all those who share the values of democracy and human rights. But they are not without danger. [...] In the midst of the difficulties and trials of all kinds that they must face, these Arab peoples need our help and support. It is our duty.” Cameron further argued “Any decision to put the men and women of our armed services into harms' way should only ever be taken when it's absolutely necessary. But we simply cannot stand back and let a dictator whose people have rejected him, kill his people indiscriminately. To do so would send a chilling signal to others striving for democracy across the region.” Therefore, the discourse on Libya as “another Yugoslavia” did pressure the European Union to use force against the Gaddafi

regime by stressing the need to uphold the universal values and showed ambition to diffuse these norms by all means.

But it was not only these member states insisting on bold action, the majority of the members of the Parliament supported these calls by indicating that the situation in Libya may amount to genocide. “What do we do to avoid a second Srebrenica, Rwanda or a new Darfur,” asked Guy Verhofstadt from the liberal group of the European Parliament. Sarkozy repeated the idea at a summit of European leaders on the 24 of March arguing that the EU had to stop the repetition of the Serebrenica massacre in 1995. The Yugoslavian analogy, thus, was not used as a caution of entrapment in a foreign country but instead was utilized as a precedent which should guide the EU and even imposed a responsibility to use of force for the protection of the civilians. “After Sarajevo, Kosovo and the conflicts in the Balkans, after Sierra Leone and Guinea, this framework allowed us to intervene over Libya,” argued Bernard Kouchner.

Next, the discourse on Libya as “another Yugoslavia” justified the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya by stressing on the regional support and legal basis for the action. First of all, the arguments emphasised the support from the Libyan people and from the Arab League. As Cameron said “There must be a clear wish from the people of Libya and the wider region for international action. It was the people of Libya, through the Transitional National Council, who were the first to call for protection from air attack through a No Fly Zone. More recently, the Arab League have made the same demand. It really has been remarkable how Arab leaders have come forward and condemned the actions of Gaddafi’s government.” In another statement he further added “There has been such widespread support amongst the Libyan people - and in the wider Arab world - for the military action we are taking. [...] As one Misurata resident put it: "These strikes give us hope". Today we must be clear and unequivocal: we will

---


not take that hope away.”182 Secondly, the use of force against Gaddafi’s regime was justified by referencing to the UNSC Resolution 1973 which gave it a clear legal basis. As Sarkozy and Cameron argued in a joint letter “Today, NATO and our partners are acting in the name of the United Nations with an unprecedented international legal mandate.”183 This argumentation on regional support and clear legal basis had a strong legitimizing effect for foreign intervention. “Following an appeal by the Arab League to take action to protect the people of Libya, on 17 March the United Nations Security Council passed an historic resolution to protect civilians from the violence unleashed by Qadhafi’s war machine,” argued Cameron and Sarkozy at the London Conference on Libya184. Furthermore, it was used to distance the advocators of this approach from neo-colonial connotations. As Sarkozy put it “What makes us most proud is that among those who intervened were the Libyans’ Arab brothers: Qatar, the Emirates, Jordan. If the Arabs hadn’t had the courage to help their Libyan brothers, it would have been much harder for us because at no cost did we want Libya to think it detected a whiff of colonialism.”185 The constant emphasis on the legality and rightfulness of the intervention indicates that the actors calling for the use of force also constructed themselves in terms of a multilateral actor that follows the international legal order with the responsibility to “enforce international law”186. However, this discourse did not represent this multilateralism as a restriction in taking bold action as did the discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” but on the contrary, used it to justify the use of force.

Overall, it is clear that the opposing discourse tried to pressure the European Union to back up its spread of normative values by military force which demonstrates that there was an alternative view of the EU’s actoriness. The discourse did not differ

---

185 Sarkozy, N. Speech by President Sarkozy at the High Level Meeting on Libya, 20 September 2011. Available at http://www.ambafrance-rsa.org/Speech-by-President-Sarkozy-at-the (29.04.2013)
very drastically in its representation of the Libyan people as they were constructed as close to Europe’s Self due to their request for universal values. However, in order to justify the use of force, the discourse did emphasize on the threatening nature of Gaddafi’s regime and the situation in Libya and EU’s duty to act in protection of the Libyan people to enforce the international law. This kind of construction imposed a lot of pressure for the European Union to take tough action. After the adoption of the support from the Arab League and the UNSC Resolution 1973, it became even harder for the EU to distance itself from this discourse as all the conditions agreed on at the extraordinary summit for a no-fly zone were met.

2.2.2. EU’s counter-discourse

The EU’s response to this pressure was very consistent throughout the crisis. The study of the Union’s arguments justifying the Union’s non-participation in military action reveals that the Union’s arguments against the imposition of a NFZ were also based on the discourse that articulated Libya in terms of “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” and on the EU’s self-understanding as a “guarantor and carrier of universal norms”, a “power of example” and a “multilateral actor”.

Before the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1970 authorizing a no-fly zone, there were two clear arguments against military intervention. One of the discursive moves was the claim that it is hypocritical to use force to uphold human rights. “Human rights can never be imposed militarily,” argued the Willy Meyer, representative of the European Parliament. Or as Ashton put it “In a fluid situation such as this, our actions should be rooted in our core values and interests”. It projects the EU’s normative power construction as a power of example and a carrier of universal norms which justifies the EU’s norm-diffusion with non-coercive means.

---


The second discursive move in opposing military action was the articulation of the revolution as belonging to the Libyans. “This is the revolution of the Libyan people and nobody can take it away from them,” argued Jerzy Buzek. Van Rompuy concurred “the outcome is of course in the hands of the people in the countries concerned. It will not be decided in Brussels.” In the midst of pressure to take more forceful action, the EU’s strategy was therefore to argue that the uprisings were of “popular” nature and had to have Libyan ownership. The Union insisted that intervention, instead of helping, would risk expanding conflict and strengthening Gaddafi by allowing him to insist that his country is again the victim of colonial aggression. “The military solution seems so simple but is not so simple. It's risky and dangerous,” Westerwelle claimed, “We are concerned about the effects on freedom movements in north Africa and the Arab world. We admired the jasmine revolution in Tunisia ... but we want these freedom movements to be strengthened, not weakened.” This argumentation against the no-fly zone reflected the special European identity that derives its legitimacy from its guarantee of peace which does not allow it responding to violence with violence. Furthermore, the constant articulation of the Libyan revolutions as “home grown” reflects fears among EU leaders that any sense of imposition would make the Libyans reluctant to European norms export through and would undermine the Union’s self-representation as a “stabilizing force” and a “power of example”.

When the conditions for military intervention were met, the Union rhetorically supported the action. After the adoption of the UN Resolution 1973 Ashton claimed that this “means that the conditions that were set last week by the European Council are now fulfilled”. While for most of the international it signified a green light for a military

intervention, the European Union continued with its policies of strengthening sanctions and intensifying humanitarian aid. “Resolution 1973 is the backdrop against which we will now be looking at what more we can do in terms of economic sanctions, what more we can do for our planning to make sure that the EU as 27 is supportive,” 193 said Ashton prior to Foreign Affairs Council on the 21 March, indicating that it was not participating in the NATO-led military action. The EU, therefore, had to defend its non-participation and counter the criticism of why it was not itself participating in the imposition of a no-fly zone. The justifications of EU leaders drew on the special normative identity, role and influence of Europe in the international arena and expressed the Union’s commitment acting in accordance with this identity.

First of all, the EU’s discursive strategy to justify its non-participation reflected its normative power constructions as a power of example. “If in this first phase of our foreign policy we cannot be present militarily (as the EU doesn't have its own army), we have to exercise a humanitarian profile, defend our values and use persuasion and cohesion - and we are doing it,” argued Ashton 194. This is a discourse that that rejects any involvement in the military intervention and at the same time shifts the responsibility of the imposition of a no-fly zone to other actors which in a way allowed the European Union actors to pursue its idealistic and pacifist policies.

Secondly, the Union’s counter-discourse drew on its normative power construction as a multilateral actor. For instance, Ashton argued that the international community, along with the UN, the Arab League and a number of countries were coming together “willing to offer different kinds of support. […] The nature of Member States is precisely that countries determine what their involvement should be, and countries are involved in different ways, but the EU as 27 is very strong.” 195 This is a discourse which seeks to construct the EU as supportive of the international action, yet simultaneously avoid any articulations which could imply to its own involvement in

195 Catherine Ashton, op. cit., Ref. 152.
military intervention. It reveals that the Union’s self-construction as a multilateral actor is a discursive practise that is used arguing that the international community consists of many divergent actors that take different actions in order to achieve a common goal which clearly justifies the Union’s idealistic role and instruments. Likewise, the same argumentation was used to justify the Union’s own internal decision-making process and role distribution. This demonstrates that multilateralism is a NPE construction that is used as an excuse for the EU’s internal incoherence and its non-interventionism. Moreover, these constructions allowed the Union to take credit for the military action, led by France and Britain. “Europe, both the EU as such and its Member States, is playing a critical political roles as well as military,” Rompuy said. In another statement he furthermore declared “the Union should take credit for international action which prevented a “bloodbath” in Libya, amid downgrading the bloc’s common security policy to a food-and-blankets aid mission. […] Without Europe nothing would have been done at the global level or at the UN level.”

Another strategy to counter the criticism on EU’s non-participation in the military action was the construction of EU action in providing aid and reconstruction as vital and essential for real peace and security. As Ashton put it “We were more successful after 1945, despite the Cold War, because we understood that we needed to do more than defeat Hitler. […]With Libya, success means not just protecting civilians in the days ahead, or even securing the end of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime. Success requires a strategy for what we do afterwards.” This quote reflects the Union’s engagement in constructions of the EU as a power of example and a stabilizing force by arguing that successful conflict resolution can happen only by addressing the fundamental economic, political and social needs. She furthermore argued “I readily concede that this agenda lacks glamour. But it does not lack ambition.”

196 Rompuy, Van H. (2011), „We were, we are and we will be on your side in facing these tremendous challenges,” Speech presented at Paris Conference on Libya, 1 September. Available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11327_en.htm (28.04.2013)
It can be concluded that the EU’s counter-arguments to the pressure imposed by the critical discourse reveal that Europe’s normative power construction provides a justification that it could not agree within the Union in taking a common stance and for its non-participation in the military intervention. Moreover, the discourse on the necessity of its actions and presenting itself as indispensable enabled the EU to some extent free ride on the intervention. The Union’s normative power identity, therefore, imposes constraints to its capability to act as it excludes any use of force or military action.
Chapter III – Analytical conclusions: the limits of NPE constructions

This thesis has critically assessed the concept of normative power Europe by treating the normative power Europe as an identity construction practice within the EU. The research mapped the prevailing foreign policy discourses within the European Union during the Libyan conflict in order to understand how the EU’s normative power is constructed against the Libyan “Other”. Furthermore, it studied how the construction of EU’s normative power identity was used to justify the actions the Union did and did not take. In order to establish the larger discursive field within which these official discourses were situated, critical discourses were studied as well. The aim of this research was to understand what constraints, if any, this self-construction of ENP poses on the Union’s foreign policy.

The analysis demonstrates that there were two main discourses present during the Libyan crisis that articulated different constructions of identity and appealed to different European policy responses. The discourse of Libya as “oriental version of the Eastern European revolutions in 1989” constructed the European policy options as linked to the EU’s soft instruments. At the same time, the opposing discourse constructed Libya in terms of “another Yugoslavia” demanding a bold and interventionist EU policy.

Analytical conclusions of the discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions”

Firstly, the discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe” identified the use of representations which emphasized the non-normative identity of Gaddafi that was preventing the people of Libya from transforming and establishing a democracy. The discourse constructed the Union’s normative power identity on the representations of the Union as a carrier and promoter of universal norms, an example-setter and a multilateral actor, which created strong normative arguments for the EU’s norm-diffusion in Libya. These self/other constructions were used to legitimize three actions from the soft power side of the
spectrum – assistance in post-conflict transition to democracy, sanctions and humanitarian assistance.

The analysis shows that the discourse on Libya as “oriental version of the 1989 revolutions” was used to argue for EU’s assistance in post-conflict Libya. Europe justified its role on two grounds. Firstly, it expressed its own successful experience in striving for peace, democracy and prosperity and secondly, its success in supporting countries in transition from dictatorships to democracy. The use of Eastern European analogy in constructing the Libyan crisis and Europe’s role was especially important as it was used to argue for the same action from the EU which was the successful in the CEE countries. The analysis of the discourse revealed that there was a widespread understanding within the EU that its model is perceived so attractive that others want to become similar to it, which justified the Union’s policy of Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity.

Next, the “1989” discourse also argued for sanctions and humanitarian assistance in Libya. The analysis showed that the imposition of sanctions was not the EU’s first choice of action. However, the EU took a hard line with Libya after the UNSC decision to authorize sanctions, which reflected the Union’s self-construction as an advocate of multilateral rules and cooperation. The discourse calling for humanitarian assistance was first and foremost a securitizing discourse as it constructed Libya in terms of “humanitarian crisis” and as a potential immigration issue. However, it also articulated a great concern for the grave human rights situation in Libya which shows that human rights is one of the normative criteria for its actions.

The analysis of the discourse representing Libya in terms of “oriental version of the 1989 revolution” demonstrates that the Union’s approach to the Libyan conflict was very similar to the one directed towards post-communist states in Eastern Europe. This indicates that the Union tends to follow the same pattern in its foreign policy. The EU’s self-understanding of its role in crisis management is characterized by an aspiration to be a role model and an example setter. The European Union perceives its norms and model as a higher standard and expects others to imitate it. However, the unreflective nature of the EU’s NPE construction becomes apparent in that it did not adjust its normative objectives to a rather different setting in the Southern Mediterranean.
Moreover, the study of the Libyan case shows that the Union has not distanced itself from the policies of conditionality and differentiation, and applies them even in cases where the other party does not have a prospect of EU membership as an incentive for accepting its norms. Therefore, the Union’s self-construction as a NPE poses actual constraints to its foreign policy as it has to rely on the other party accepting the attractiveness of the EU model as it does not really have any strong positive incentives. Besides, the representation of Libya in terms of “humanitarian crisis”, which reflects the Union’s fear of immigration, raises the question whether the EU really wants to fulfil its role and be open to others.

**Analytical conclusions of the discourse on Libya as “another Yugoslavia”**

Secondly, the research focused on the opposing discourses within the European Union in order to demonstrate that there was an alternative construction of Libya and European identity. Moreover, the study of this discourse allowed analyzing the Union’s justifications for its non-participation in the military intervention, revealing other limits of the NPE constructions for the EU’s foreign policy.

The study of the critical discourses unveils that there was actually one alterative discourse representing Libya as “another Yugoslavia”. Its strategy was using Yugoslavian analogue in order to pressure the Union to adopt a more interventionist approach in dealing with the conflict. The discourse constructed Gaddafi as radically different from Europe and the Libyans as “peaceful civilians”. However, as it was also to a large extent a securitizing discourse as it also represented Libya in terms of a “humanitarian catastrophe”, a “massacre” and a security threat in order to mobilize EU support. The discourse did contribute to the construction of NPE as it presented the Union in terms of a carrier of universal norms. However, it had an alternative understanding on how the EU should fulfil its role. It held a view that besides the assistance in post-crisis transformation, the European Union should be able to uphold its norms by military means. EU’s unwillingness to do so lead to the rise of a discourse constructing the Union as a weak and divided power, contrasting the Union’s tendency to assert normative goals with soft non-coercive instruments to the hard power of the U.S. and its own member states.
The military action was justified by constructing Gaddafi as a threatening Other to the European Union and by emphasizing on the legality and regional support for the action. It articulated that the EU had a moral duty to enforce the international law by stopping the mass killings in Libya and protecting its universal norms of democracy and human rights. The discourse on the need to end the massive human sufferings in Libya to trigger the responsibility for humanitarian intervention had much resemblance with the ones that surrounded the intervention on former Yugoslavia.

The analysis of the Union’s response to the critical discourse reveals that it was based on the EU’s normative power identity constructions. The study shows that there were fears among the EU actors that the use of coercive measures would undermine the Union’s self-representation in terms of a “power of example” and “carrier of universal norms” as it would make Libyans reluctant to Europe’s norms export. However, when the conditions for military interventions were met, the EU rhetorically supported the action. The Union then had to justify why it was not participating in the imposition of a NFZ. The analysis of the EU’s counter-discourse demonstrated that the European Union uses its NPE identity as a justification for its non-interventionism and internal incoherence. The Union, drawing on its self-representation as a multilateral actor, argued that all actors in the international community and within the Union exert different roles in achieving a common goal. Moreover, the EU rejected any involvement in the military action by legitimizing its special role in providing aid and reconstruction, which was portrayed as vital and essential for real peace and security.

In principle, the Union’s discursive practice was shifting the responsibility of military intervention to other allies and keeping the momentum towards conflict transformation. However, the failure to take part in military action reveals that the Union’s self-representation as a normative power sets constraints for its foreign policy capabilities as it rejects the use of military force and any other use of force.
Conclusion

This thesis studied the discourses on the Libyan crisis within the European Union. The aim of this research was to demonstrate that the concept of normative power played a key role in shaping the EU foreign policy discourse in the context of Libyan conflict and find out which constraints this self-construction imposed on the Union’s foreign policy.

The study demonstrates that two discourses were present during the Libyan conflict which articulated different self/other construction and called for contrasting actions. The official discourse of the European Union constructed Libyan uprising in terms of “oriental version of the Eastern European revolution”. By presenting the Libyans as liberating themselves from the dictatorial Gaddafi regime, it argued for actions from the soft side of the spectrum. It constructed the EU’s normative power identity on the representation of the Union as a “power of example”, a “stabilizing force”, a “carrier of universal norms” and a “multilateral actor”. The study of the critical discourses indicated that there was one alternative discourse, which constructed Libya in terms of “another Yugoslavia” and called for military intervention in Libya. It was to a large extent a securitizing discourse which represented Libya as a potential security threat for the EU but at the same time articulated the EU’s responsibility to protect the Libyan people and duty to uphold its universal norms by the use of force.

The analysis of the EU’s official discourse on Libya and its counter-arguments against the opposing discourse reveal that Diez was right in that normative power Europe is an identity construction practice of the European Union than a power as it is not backed up by any actual forms of power. It also reveals that the EU’s self-construction as a NPE played a key role in shaping its foreign policy discourse during the Libyan conflict.

First of all, the study reveals that the self-construction of the European Union as a normative power is expressed to a large extent as setting standards and leading by example, rather than using force in order to influence other actors. Europe's NPE construction promotes a certain type of behaviour, such as non-interventionism and
multilateralism. However, these constructions set constraints to the EU’s ability to play enabling role in crisis management as it excludes military action and other use of force.

Secondly, the Union’s aspirations to be the same “magnet” and “stabilizing force” for Libya as it was for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe demonstrate that the EU follows the same pattern in its foreign policy. A clear example of that was the EU’s policy of Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, which was designed as a measure aimed at transferring the Union’s norms, perceived as universal, through carrot-and-stick policies of conditionality. However, this self-understanding becomes constraining for the EU’s foreign policy as in the absence of a convincing “stick”, as was credible threat for the Libyans, the European Union has to rely on the other party accepting the attractiveness of the Union’s model. The latter is not always available, especially given the lack of any strong positive incentives.

It can be concluded that the construction of NPE imposes important constraints to the Union’s foreign policy which actually disempowers the EU’s political role as a global actor rather than empowers it.
Lühikokkuvõte

Euroopa normatiivse võimu (de)konstrueerimine: Liibüa militaarinterventsiooni juhtumiuuring


69