Master’s thesis

Immigration and Integration Policy in France:
Relationship between policy research and political decision-making

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/Annika Murov/
Abstract

This thesis frames the ethno-political situation and immigrant integration in France through examining the relationship and interaction between integration policy research and actual political decision-making in terms of French immigration and integration policy. The thesis proposes that the relationship between policy research and political decision-making contradicts and reveals a gap. To support the argument, this study offers a relationship analysis over a decade-long time frame to evaluate under which integration indicators the policies have tended towards being restrictive and discouraging or nonrestrictive and encouraging. In order to analyze the linkage, the study focuses on different ministerial reports, national surveys, specific policies and legislation over the period of 2000-2013. The results indicate that firstly, problems surrounding French integration model derive from fundamental tension between republican universalist values on the hand and systematic rejection of ethnic and racial categories on the other; secondly, relationship between integration related policy research and political decision-making contradicts; and finally, two out of five indicators reveal that integration policies have tended towards being strongly restrictive.
Acronyms

ACIT  Access to Citizenship and its Impact of Immigrant Integration Project

ANAM  l’Agence nationale de l’accueil et des migrations i.e. French Agency in Charge of Migration and Welcoming Foreign People

ANRU  l’Agence nationale pour la rénovation urbaine i.e. National Agency for Urban Renewal

BEP   Brevet d’Études Professionnelles i.e. Vocational Studies Certificate

BEPC  Brevet d’Études du Premier Cycle i.e Undergraduate Certificate

CAI   Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration i.e. Reception and Integration Contract

CAP   Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnelle i.e. Professional Competence Certificate

CAS   Centre d’analyse stratégique i.e. Center for Strategic Analysis

CASNAV Centre Académique pour la Scolarisation des élèves allophones Nouvellement Arrivés et des enfants issus de familles itinérantes et de Voyageurs i.e. Academic Center for the Schooling of Newly Arrived and Travelling Children

CAV   Contrat d’Avenir i.e. Contract for the Future

CEFR  Common European Framework of Reference for Languages

CEP   Certificat d’Études Primaires i.e. Primary Education Certificate

CLA   Classes d’accueil i.e. Reception class

CLA-NSA Les classes d’accueil pour les élèves non scolarisés antérieurement i.e. Classes for students nor previously enrolled in the school system

CLIN  Classes d’initiation i.e. Introductory class

CNLE  Conseil national de politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté et l’exclusion sociale i.e. National council for policies against poverty and social exclusion
CRI  *Cours de Rattrapage Intégré* i.e. Integration class

CUI-CAE  *Contrat Unique d’Insertion – Contrat d’Accompagnement dans l’Emploi* i.e. Single integration and support contracts for employment

CUI-CIE  *Contrat Unique d’Insertion – Contrat Initiative-Emploi* i.e. Single integration and employment initiative contract

CVP  *Cellule de Veille et de Prévention* i.e. Monitoring and Prevention Unit for MLDS

DOM  *Département et région d’outre-mer* i.e. French overseas departments

DSU  *Dotation de solidarité urbaine* i.e. Urban solidarity grants

ELCO  *Enseignement des Langues et Cultures d’Origine* i.e. Courses in the culture and language of their country of origin

ENSA  *Élèves non-scolarisés antérieurement* i.e. Previously not enrolled students

FAS  *Fond d’Action Sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leurs familles* i.e. Social Action Fund for Immigrant Workers and their Families

FASILD  *Fonds d’Action et de Soutien pour l’intégration et la Lutte contre Discrimination* i.e. Action and Support Fund for the Integration and Fight Against Discrimination

GELD  *Groupe l’Étude et de Lutte contre les Discriminations* i.e. Group for the Study and the Fight against Discrimination

GRETA  *Groupements d’Etablissements* i.e. System of institutions offering adult training

HALDE  *Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité* i.e. French Equal Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission

HLM  *Habitation à Loyer Modéré* i.e. Low-rent housing

HCLPD  *Haut Comité pour le logement des personnes défavorisées* i.e. High Committee for Housing Disadvantaged People
ICMPD  International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IDI  *Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France* i.e. Immigrants and their descendants in France. Survey carried out by Insee
INED  *Institut national d’études démographiques* i.e. National Institute for Demographic Studies
INSEE  *Institute national de la statistique et des études économiques* i.e. National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
MAT  *Module d’Accueil Temporaire* i.e. Temporary welcoming model
MIPEX  Migrant Integration Policy Index
MLDS  *Mission de Lutte contre le Décrochage Scolaire* i.e. Mission to Fight Against School Dropout
MPI  Migrant Policy Institute
OFII  *Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’intégration* i.e. French Immigration and Integration Office
ONZUS  *Observatoire national des zones urbaines sensibles* i.e. National Observatory of Sensitive Urban Areas.
SRU  *Solidarité et au renouvellement urbains* i.e. Urban solidarity and renewal
TeO  *Trajectoires et Origines. Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France* i.e. Trajectories and Origins. Survey on Population Diversity in France, carried out by Insee and Ined
ZFU  *Zones Franches Urbaines* i.e. Urban tax-free areas
ZUS  *Zone Urbaine Sensible* i.e. Sensitive urban areas or disadvantaged neighbourhoods
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1 Introduction

As a former colonial empire, contemporary France is largely built on immigration, and flows from non-European countries are growing. Frequent changes in migration legislation and growing unrest among immigrants have led to heated debates over French integration model and its’ potential crises. Because French integration principles are derived from universalist view on citizens while integration is seen as one-sided process in which immigrants’ adapt to the host society, tensions and criticism have started to accompany naturalization policies and specially the notion of dual belonging and thus, dual loyalties. French model of integration is often criticized as not being able to respond to the specific needs of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity.

From this theoretical starting point two propositions are formed. The first one predicts a contradiction and a gap between integration related policy research conducted by different institutions and actual political decision-making by the political elite. The second argues that integration policies have tended towards being discouraging and restrictive regardless of the policy research outcome.

First introductory part of the thesis frames the ethno-political situation and immigrant integration in France by giving an overview of immigration history, current ethno-political situation, integration model, naturalization practices and essence of the crises regarding the integration model. The second part deals with the empirical background, juxtaposing and analyzing policy research through studies, surveys and reports, and contrasting the actual policy outcome i.e. political decisions during a time frame of 2000 – 2013. The third part analyzes and interprets the findings while answering whether the relationship and interaction between policy research and political-decision making has revealed a gap and if integration related policies are moving towards being more restrictive and discouraging.

Data is gathered from different surveys, national statistics, ministerial reports, studies and legislation. Two main surveys are: (1) "Immigrants and descendants of immigrants in France" (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France) conducted jointly with INSEE and General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration in 2012. This survey offers detailed data on immigrants’ situation in terms of demography, educational
pathways, access to employment, housing and living situation, citizenship acquisitions, and discrimination covering years from 2008 to 2011. (2) “Trajectories and Origins. Survey on Population Diversity in France” (Trajectoires et Origines. Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France) conducted jointly with INSEE and INED in 2010. This survey offers detailed data on additional categories such as sense of belonging and religion while covering years from 2008 to 2009. More detailed and specific data is gathered from French Labour Force Survey, Housing Survey, Population census and different reports.

Five indicators chosen for the thesis to frame the integration in economic social, cultural and political areas are commonly used to measure and characterize integration policies. These are the following: education (seen as one of the primary vehicles shaping integration and later access to labour market); labour market (characterizes the nature and accessibility of a countries’ labor market as well as gives incites to immigrants’ living situation), housing (characterizes the access to social housing and reveals the risk for residential segregation), naturalization (reveals the nature of citizenship laws and links the migration control to political interests most closely), and finally ‘sense of belonging’ (what it means to be French and how is it perceived by the immigrants).

The purpose of the thesis in addition to give a thorough overview of the French integration model and policies implemented according to each indicator, is to evaluate the relationship between policy research and political decision-making, and analyze whether integration policies have tended towards being restrictive and discouraging or the opposite.
2 Overview of ethno-political situation and integration practices

2.1 Immigration history and its patterns

France has been a country of immigration since the mid-19th century. It is crucial to note the difference between a *country* of immigrants and a *nation* of immigrants i.e. in case of France, state building and nationhood preceded the periods of intensive immigration unlike in the United States. Immigration is closely linked to three factors: slow population growth, industrialization, and political changes associated with republicanism and colonialism (Cornelius 2004: 144-144).

Immigration accelerated in the end of the 19th century due to the triumph of republicanism and with the take-off of capitalism. The historical pattern of immigration remained as a fluctuating recruitment of foreign labour throughout the 20th century. During the Third Republic, while immigrants came mostly from culturally similar neighbouring countries\(^1\), there was little state control (Cornelius 2004: 145-146). Yet, newcomers and immigrant workers were turned into Frenchmen through what Gérard Noiriel has called *le creuset français* i.e. the ‘French melting pot’ (Brubaker 2001: 535). With the rise of fascist ideologies, France remained free from the “fascist temptation” and thus had to welcome a great number of refugees from neighbouring countries (Payne 1995: 291-292). During the interwar period the State took its first steps to control immigration\(^2\) through national identity cards for both foreigners and natives, and with the creation of organizations for recruiting foreign labour. It was until the Great Depression when immigration started to decrease and government had to forcibly repatriate some workers (Cornelius 2004: 146-148).

The 30 years period after the Second World War, known as *Trente Glorieuses*\(^3\) (1945-1975), marked not only a rapid growth in French economy and urbanization, but also increase in population. While most European countries were withdrawing from their colonies and tightening economic relations among European states, the migration

\(^1\) Belgium and Switzerland, after the 1920s from Italy and Poland.

\(^2\) France became compatible with other immigration countries (US) in 1931: by then 6.6% of the population was foreign.

\(^3\) In English: ‘The glorious thirty’.
pattern was opposite in case of France (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003: 20). From 1950s France was opened to work migration through the guest-workers scheme. Institutional arrangements for the recruitment and incorporation of foreign workers were developed with a directive dating back to 1945. This legal framework created a National Immigration Office in charge of recruiting foreign workers and their families and it continued to function until 1974 (Maussen 2009: 110). During that period the share of foreign population rose from 1.75 million to 3.4 million. Immigration from 1946 to 1960s came mainly from Spain and Algeria, from the mid-1960s from former French colonies illustrating a decrease in European and increase in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asian immigrants (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003: 20). Until 1970s, immigration policy was viewed through republican principles i.e. it included profound respect for the civil and human rights of foreigners and refugees. From the mid-1970s, due to economic recession, guest workers were no longer seen as favourable labour force and the scheme was halted (Cornelius 2004: 148-149).

After the guest workers scheme ended in 1975, policies towards immigrants toughened – family reunification laws became stricter, repatriation policies were favoured and the conception of ‘zero immigration’ policies i.e. to halt all forms of immigration rose into the political debates. From 1982 to 1990 the foreign population share dropped, but alien immigration increased. Largest share of immigrants came from other European or neighbouring countries, Africa and former African-colonies such as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (Cornelius 2004: 149-150). The historic patterns of immigration have thus combined three factors: slow population growth, industrialization and the need for economic restructuring in post-war periods, and finally political changes associated with republican ideology and colonialism. Immigration and its diversity is thus a complex combination of consensus-based immigration in terms of structured recruitment of guest workers accompanied with controversies around liberal-republican policies, colonial legacy, strong national identity and increased hostility from the native’s part. Because

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4 ONI Office national d’immigration.
5 Mainly from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Mali, Laos and Vietnam.
6 France was first to ratify the Geneva Convention.
colonialism reflected, in a way, a substitution to boost economic growth, former colonial countries have remained as the main migration channels.

2.2 Current ethno-political situation

Since halting the guest workers regime in 1975, the number of immigrants has increased slightly due to direct consequence of the great immigrant influxes from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 the migration from east to west increased. The gap between men and women has reduced because of family reunification. From 1999-2008, the number of immigrants has increased by 22%. From 1999-2002 the annual average growth was 12%, from 2002 to 2008 0,4% (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 98). According to the national statistics from 2010 the distribution of foreigners can be divided into four main categories: largest share of population comes from African region (42.8%), then from Europe (37.4%), Asia (14.3%), and nationalities from American and Oceania amount the smallest percentage (5.4%). In terms of African region, immigrants mostly come from the Maghreb7. Table 1 reports the composition of the immigration population by the country of origin from 2010 dataset. Since 1975 the share of European origin immigrants has declined8. Immigration from Algeria has grown by 28% and the number of immigrants from Morocco has almost tripled. Since 1999, immigrants from other African (Cameroon, Ivory Coast, the Republic of Congo) and Asian countries (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam), especially from Turkey, have seen an increase (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 100) (see table 1).

7 Most of the region of Northwest Africa including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.

8 Immigrants from neighbouring countries (Spain, Italy and Portugal) returned to their country of origin.
Table 1. Share of foreign-population in France by country of origin.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>1,691,562</td>
<td>2,271,231</td>
<td>2,362,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerians</td>
<td>574,208</td>
<td>713,334</td>
<td>729,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>522,504</td>
<td>653,826</td>
<td>671,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisians</td>
<td>201,561</td>
<td>234,669</td>
<td>241,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African nationalities</td>
<td>393,289</td>
<td>669,401</td>
<td>719,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>1,934,144</td>
<td>1,808,425</td>
<td>2,062,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>571,874</td>
<td>580,598</td>
<td>588,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>378,649</td>
<td>317,260</td>
<td>303,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>316,232</td>
<td>257,315</td>
<td>248,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>147,954</td>
<td>153,598</td>
<td>153,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU-27 nationalities</td>
<td>505,296</td>
<td>526,864</td>
<td>526,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European nationalities</td>
<td>568,818</td>
<td>223,596</td>
<td>241,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>549,994</td>
<td>756,856</td>
<td>791,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>174,160</td>
<td>238,862</td>
<td>245,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodians, Vietnamese, Laotians</td>
<td>159,750</td>
<td>162,684</td>
<td>161,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian countries</td>
<td>216,084</td>
<td>355,301</td>
<td>384,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalities from America and Oceania</td>
<td>130,394</td>
<td>282,191</td>
<td>298,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,306,044</td>
<td>5,342,288</td>
<td>5,514,154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most recent data shows that French population is 66 million, including 63.9 million in France and 1.9 million in the overseas departments9 (INSEE 2014). According to 2010 data the share of foreign and immigrant population constitutes 8.6% of the total population (INED 2010). Data from 2008 shows that the number of immigrants is 5,3

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9 Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, Réunion and Mayotte.
million and the share direct descendants of immigrants is 6.7 million. 2.2 million (41%) of foreign population have acquired French nationality (INSEE 2012).

The survey on ‘Immigrants and their Descendants in France’ (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France) offers detailed and compendious data up to year 2009 in terms of geographical distribution, educational levels, labour market access, and living conditions such as income, housing and perceived discrimination levels (INSEE 2012).

Firstly, in geographical terms 66% of immigrants reside in urban areas in total. Between 1999 and 2007, the share of immigrants has increased in most regions of France. Due to high economic activity, immigrants are overrepresented in certain regions such as Île-de-France, Provence-Alpes-Côte-D’azur. This is more strongly the case of immigrants outside Maghreb and other Asian countries outside Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Immigrants from Spain and Italy usually reside near the borders i.e. 19% of Spanish origin immigrants live in Languedoc-Roussillon and 39% of Italian origin reside in Provence-Alpes-Côte-D’azur region. Algerian origin immigrants are more likely to live in the Rhône area because of their significant share in metallurgical industry. Maroccon origin immigrants are more present in southern departments with dominating agricultural sectors. A little over third of the Turkish immigrants reside in the Alsace region. 6 out of 10 immigrants from African countries (excluding Maghreb origin) and Asian countries (excluding Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Turkey) live in the Île-de-France region and mainly occupy jobs in the tertiary sector (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 116).

Secondly, in educational terms 38% of immigrants from the age of 30-49 have no higher educational degree (against 15% of non-immigrants). Diplomas obtained by immigrants vary according to their origin. Thus, 65% of Turkish immigrants, 53% Portuguese, 42% Moroccan and 46% Tunisian immigrants have no degree besides the CEP\textsuperscript{10} (diploma awarded at the end of elementary primary education). Over the last two decades the educational level of immigrants has grown steadily. The number of immigrants obtaining degree of higher education has doubled from 8 to 16%.

Educational level attained by immigrants largely depends on their migration history and

\textsuperscript{10} Certificat d’études primaires.
their age while arriving in France (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 166).

Thirdly, concerning the labour market, there is a clear overrepresentation of immigrants born outside the EU in most active age groups (25 to 64 years). Studies from 2010 have shown that 49% of immigrants born outside of the EU are employed or unemployed against 57% of non-immigrants and 51% of immigrants from the EU. Firstly, the activity rate varies strongly according to the gender of immigrant. It is lowest among non-EU female immigrants between the age of 30 and 54. This is explainable through the family situation i.e. women are at home with children more often than male immigrants. Secondly, the activity rate of immigrants varies strongly according to their country of origin. Rates are highest among ages 25 to 64 for Portuguese origin (80%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (79%). On the other hand, immigrants from the Maghreb (66%), Spain (66%), Italy (61%) and Turkey (58%) have the lowest activity rates. In 2010, the unemployment rate among immigrants rose up to 16% against 9% for non-immigrants. Hence, the situation is more complex and depends largely on the country of origin i.e. 20% of those born outside of the EU are more likely to be unemployed (against 8% of the EU citizens) (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 180 - 184).

Fourthly, in 2010, the median monthly salary for immigrants was 1400 euros against 1550 euros for non-immigrants. Immigrants outside the EU have the average salary of 1300 euros. Working hours and the average salary depends again on the country of origin. Immigrants from Africa earn still slightly less than non-immigrants. Immigrants from Turkey and Africa, whether Maghreb or Sub-Saharan, receive the lowest wages for full-time jobs (1400 euros), while immigrants from the EU receive up to 1850 euros. These differences are closely linked to the character of the occupation and to the socio-demographic elements such as age or degree obtained and the level of French language proficiency (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 210).

The final part concentrates in the perceived discrimination level. Among those residing in metropolitan France, aged 18 to 50, 14% have reported experiencing discrimination or other form of unequal treatment during the past 5 years. This discrimination, whether because of origin or other, is most likely to be episodic (11%) than regular (3%).
Among those who have completed their studies 5% declare having suffered because of unfair refusal of employment. Immigrants and descendants of immigrants are more likely to counter with this situation than individuals without direct immigrant ancestry. Immigrants or descendants of immigrants from North Africa and other African countries declare themselves to be most often exposed to discrimination. Among the main reasons for discrimination are the following: skin colour, place of residence or neighbourhood, accent or way of speaking and religion (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 242).

2.3 French integration model

French integration model is in many ways controversial. Due to long history of immigration and the construction of the nation from different regions\textsuperscript{11}, the national population is an outcome of assimilation. Differences in religious or cultural identities as well as the possible claims for regional independence were overcame by transforming individuals into French citizens i.e. creating an universalistic view on citizens (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003: 15). While following the Republican values inherited from her political tradition, integration is seen rather universalist than assimilationist. Since the state does not formally recognize ethnic or racial groups, migrants and minority groups are seen equal on the basis of citizenship and thus emancipated through universalistic program (Bertossi 2011: 1565-1566).

The conceptual controversy derives from contrasting the republican universalism and assimilationist model: belief in integration based on values as freedom, equality and fraternity on the one hand (Sommaire 2006: 14) and seeing integration as one-sided process in which immigrants and their descendants give up their culture and adapt completely to the society they have migrated to on the other (Heckmann & Bosswick 2006: 4). Placed in specific historic setting of national public philosophies, France has followed a strong path dependency since 1789 i.e. integration refers to community of citizens (Bertossi 2100: 1563). Therefore France is a prototype for assimilationist policy

\textsuperscript{11} For example Burgundy, Brittany, and Provence.
that is related to the republican and universalist tradition, in which the model of political assimilation translates into national unity (Heckmann & Bosswick 2006: 21). According to Roger Brubaker, assimilation is seen in terms of similarity and not identity. To assimilate means to become similar, make similar or treat as similar (Brubaker 2001: 534). Since France became a terre d’immigration much earlier than (in the mid-19th century) most of her European neighbours (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003: 17), it needed a wide capacity to assimilate. The strong national identity encouraged individuals to become French (Sommaire 2006: 14). Therefore the controversy is hidden in the republicanism itself – according to Bertossi “/…/the Republic organizes the separation between public and private realms through a strict colour-blind approach to ethnicity and race, and between the state and the church (the concept of laïcité)” (Bertossi 2011: 1562). In other words, it follows strictly political definition of immigrant incorporation and seems to show that the country has overcame its colonial past and ethnic or racial divisions (Amiraux & Simon 2006: 192). Therefore, any differentiation such as cultural, religious or ethnic background should remain in the private sphere.

The integration policy can be divided according to four fundamental indicators: the role of schools, urban planning policy i.e. housing, anti-discrimination laws, and lastly nationality laws (next chapter). Firstly, French integration policy has focused on the integration of migrants’ children rather than on the migrants themselves. The concept of l’école républicaine is the carrier of universal principles, such as equality and secularism, for integrating the descendants of immigrants into cohesive French nation despite their real origin (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003: 23). This “colour-blind” approach is supposed to enhance the homogeneity. The school system expects the children of immigrants to join the mainstream system as soon as possible through specific encouraging measures such as special classes 12 and special training or information centres supporting their education 13 (Borkert, Maren et al. 2007: 12). Every

12 There are different welcoming and reception classes for immigrant children and non-native speakers.

13 Academic Center for the Schooling of Newly Arrived and Travelling Children Centre (CASNAV Académique pour la Scolarisation des enfants allophones, Nouvellement Arrivés et des enfants issus de familles itinérantes et de Voyageurs).
child, despite the residential status of its parents, has the right to education and is therefore seen as equal with French child i.e. he/she is treated in the same (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003: 24). The socialization and acculturation in schools is closely tied with becoming a citizen – automatic access to citizenship is provided after fixed years of residence and attendance to school or university.

Secondly, urban planning or public housing reveals the risk of segregation and the fine line between the formation of ethnic groups and maintaining social cohesion. With the increasing demand for social housing under the guest workers scheme France started with a housing policy called HLM (Habitation à loyer modère) i.e. low-rent housing. Even though until the 1970s the amount of foreign workers living there compared to natives was relatively low\textsuperscript{14}, the share of immigrant residents has since grown rapidly (Verdugo 2011: 178-180). Most of the buildings provided are either collective buildings, individual apartments in a block of individually owned flats or private housing estates (Fougère 2011: 9). Any family is eligible for residing if the head of the family is legally allowed to live in France and if the family income is below a fixed threshold. HLM is provided in most of the cities in France and it houses more than 12 million residents (Fougère 2011: 4). However, in order to avoid ghettoization, the threshold for eligibility is far from being low meaning that theoretically up to 70% of the French population can be eligible to reside in a social housing (Fougère 2011: 9). In order to avoid social unrest, potential conflicts, and the emergence mono-ethnic ghettos the policy tries to implement unofficial quota system in the allocation of housing (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003: 27). Yet, in 2007 almost two-thirds of African and Turkish immigrants were concentrated in three regions: more than 40% in the Paris region (Ile-de-France), one-tenth in the Rhône-Alpes region (Lyon), and a similar share in the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region (Marseille). Studies have also shown that segregation is slowly increasing (Pan Ké Shon 2011: 2).

Thirdly, in keeping with the principle of universalism, all forms of discrimination are forbidden in France. The preamble of French constitution of 1958 - quoting from the 1789 Human Rights Declaration - highlights the equality of all men and women before

\textsuperscript{14} For example: in 1968 the percentage of foreign workers living in Paris’ social housing was 5.5% against 15.3% of native workers.
the law and through the ‘sameness of treatment’ prohibits discrimination on the basis of one’s origin, race or religion. Since 1990, this applies to all foreign nationals within the national boundaries and offences against one’s ethnic belonging or religion have been put into the category of crimes against humanity (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003: 27-28). Independent law enforcement authority called HALDE (*Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité*) is rapidly developing a comprehensive case-law touching on different issues relating to race discrimination (O’Cinneide 2011: 11). Since France is diverse society particularly in religious terms, the idea of *laïcité* poses a strong controversy between the republican values of freedom and the expression of individualizing religious identities. In the light of secularism, a law that bans wearing explicit religious symbols publicly was enforced in 2004. This is one of the best examples of how strongly religion is believed to be part of individual’s private life when school or workplace is considered. Therefore the key for understanding restrictive laws on religion derives from the minimalist perspective on individual rights (Frégosi & Kosulu 195-197). Thus, because France does not officially recognize ethnic statuses, races and religions, racism and discrimination mainly derive from economic and social problems (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003: 38). Studies have shown that non-native groups suffer from large ethnic disadvantages (Lefranc 2010, Brinbaum & Cebolla-Boado 2007, Aeberhardt & Pouget 2006).

### 2.4 Naturalization practices

Due to specific historic setting of the second half of the 20th century, France as well as other European countries needed to fill the World War caused demographic deficit. The *ius soli* i.e. citizenship based on birth within the national territory became law at the end of the 19th century because *ius sanguinis* i.e. citizenship through blood relationship was unable to fill the deficit. This led to rapid increase in naturalization among immigrants and brought the racial question into heated political debates in the 1970s. Asylum and

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15 In English: French Equal Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission.
16 Such as equal access to housing and discrimination on grounds of residence.
17 Wearing religious garments such as Islamic veil, large Christian crosses etc.
family reunification policies have tightened since then and resulted in the increase of undocumented immigrants (Kirszbaum, Thomas et al. 2009: 10-11).

There are two ways to acquire French nationality: firstly, acquisitions by decree and secondly, acquisitions by declaration. The first one consists of acquisitions by naturalization (par naturalisation), by reintegration (par réintégration) and by marriage (par mariage). The second one consist of acquisitions by ius soli (acquisitions de plein droit) without formalities (sans formalités) for 18 years olds and (b) anticipated declaration (déclaration anticipée) for 13 years olds born in France to foreign parents (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 110).

In the first category, according to the Civil Code, acquisition through naturalization applies through the following conditions: being over age of 18, providing five years permanent residence in France, not having been convicted or condemned, being in good health, and showing a satisfying degree of assimilation to the ‘French community (French language skills, knowledge of rights and duties of a French citizen and adoption of French customs). Conditions are the same for acquisitions by reintegration for those who have lost their nationality\(^\text{18}\) (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 22). Acquisitions through marriage states that foreign spouse of a French national can claim French nationality after four years of ‘common and affective’ life after the date of marriage if the couple lived in France for at least three years. In addition, the spouse has to demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the French language, culture, history and right and duties of a French citizen (Historique du droit de la nationalité française, Ministère de l’intérieur).

In the second category, acquisitions by ius soli (acquisitions de plein droit) are divided into two: automatic nationality without formalities (sans formalités) for age of 18 and anticipated declaration (déclaration anticipée) for age of 13 born in France to foreign parents. The former applies to all foreigners born\(^\text{19}\) in France to foreign parents at the

\(^{18}\) Under certain circumstances, French nationality can be lost by declaration or by decree i.e. for example when the following strict conditions are met: being a French national ius sanguinis but having a permanent residence abroad or born to parents who have not lived in France for at least 50 years. This applies also for those who acquired another nationality after the independence of their country or by a declaration of loss submitted after their marriage to a foreigner (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 23).

\(^{19}\) Acquisition de la nationalité française de plein droit.
age of 18, if they live in France and can prove their residence (either continuous or not) for 5 years since the age of 11. The latter can be acquired if a young foreign national was born in France and has lived in France since the age of 8, his or her parents can claim French nationality on his or her behalf and with his or her consent after the age of 13 (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 19-21).

The request for citizenship starts with submitting naturalisation application and documentation\(^{20}\) to the prefecture office. Next steps include appeal for a language or integration test. Language or integration tests are not free of charge i.e. applicants must pay courses given by authorized language institutions (e.g. *Centre international d'études pédagogiques*). After the course, applicant must perform in a language assessment. In case of rejection, the applicant has a right for second consideration (Hajjat 2013: 1-6). Applicant must prove his/her level of integration and assimilation to the French community (French language skills, knowledge of rights and duties of a French citizen and adoption of French customs), have to have a stable income and must not have been convicted (Rallu 2011: 45-46). Refugees are exempt from residence requirements and, depending on their age, also from language requirements, but other ordinary naturalization requirements apply (Tjaden 2010: 10).

France has also a long tradition of dual nationality policy. Even though the 1963 Council of Europe Convention to reduce cases of dual citizenship was signed, the country has allowed newly naturalized citizens to retain their previous citizenship (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 5). The same holds true for descendants of foreigners born in France. They can choose whether to keep their former nationality or not when they come of age (Simon 2012: 5). The only way to lose it is through explicit request (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 13). Nearly half of the immigrants who acquire French nationality have kept their foreign one as well. Even though bi-nationals are seen as fully French, the question of loyalty and dual identities is often raised. Dual belonging is seen as a zero-sum game: commitment to a minority culture or a foreign country detracts from the quality of one’s commitment to French identity (Simon 2012: 1-5).

\(^{20}\) Must prove his/her identity (birth certificate), income, legal residence, health, morality (criminal record), assimilation (at least B1 level of French proficiency), personal links to the country (either relatives/spouse residing in France or nationality certificate) and proof of children’s education.
Because naturalization is the only mean for permanent residence in France, the share of naturalized persons is roughly 40% against 60% of foreigners. Despite the high share of bi-nationals, citizenship laws in France are more inclusive than in most EU countries with the exception of language and integration requirements (language proficiency and tests).

2.5 Crisis of the model

The core element of the crisis lies in the resentment towards the belief of France being a multicultural society. Multiculturalism is rather associated with the British and US models, and seen as a direct opposite of the French republican model of integration. It refers to communitarianism and therefore is seen as a threat to national identity and republican values. Because of the experience of slavery, colonization and mass migrations the concept of “universalist nation” is seen as the reason for overcoming ethnic and racial divisions (Amiraux & Simon 2006: 191-192). After the Second World War, French society profoundly changed. The loss of the colonial Empire followed by the economic recession\(^2\) and the end of the guest workers regime led to mass unemployment among unqualified non-European workers and affected the national identity. That in turn evoked hostile sentiments among the natives who targeted immigrants as the reason for deteriorating economic situation. It was evident that immigrant workers were neither ‘temporary’ nor assets for the economical restructuring and the government’s actions to control the situation ended in failure\(^2\) (Sommaire 2006: 15-16). In the mid-1970s Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s and Jacques Chirac’s government aimed to stop immigration\(^2\) and backing away from official ties with former colonies in North and West Africa. This period marked a shift in the thinking of immigration in France: further immigration was halted, family reunification policies

\(^2\) The post-war recession started in 1973 with the Yom Kippur War and the Arab oil embargo.

\(^2\) For example, unlike France, Germany stopped the guestworker immigration of Turks and convinced them to return home.

\(^2\) Whether all forms or only labour immigration is arguable.
hardened, and return policies favored through economic incentives or vice versa, discouraged by refusal to renew residence permits (Cornelius 2004: 155-156).

In the 1980s the politics of citizenship re-emphasized the principles of colour-blind and cultural integration based on the conception of an inclusive republican citizenship, strong national identity, allegiance and cultural integration. Nationality was and has been since grounded on the principle of progressive integration i.e. ‘the longer the link with French society, the fewer the foreign nationals who remain outside the community of citizens’ (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 6). Never the less, policies concerning immigration and antiracism have since varied. Under the Socialist government in the 1980s, many pro-immigrant policies were adopted but because de facto discrimination still existed, riots continued. They were never perceived as race disturbances but interpreted through the colour-blind conception (Bleich 2001: 280-287).

Since 1989, integration is seen as firstly, an individual process because State does not recognise ethnic status nor structured minorities; secondly, admission as a citizen and becoming a French national serves the purpose of population mixing i.e. it is a way of avoiding the emergence of structured minorities; and thirdly, the republican model of integration emphasises on the principle of equality (universalism) that should enforce the practice of equality in social life (Sala Pala & Simon 2008: 3). Thus French people is conceived as ‘one, without regard to origin’ (Jennings 2000: 584).

The ‘French exception’ or the ‘French model of integration’ remains unique because France has not followed the immigration path of other countries in Europe and has maintained an obscure conception of ethnic division of society despite the long tradition of assimilationist discourses and techniques (Sala Pala & Simon 2008: 2). Therefore the French model of integration is “colour-blind” i.e. policies towards integrating immigrants have rejected all elements of race-based affirmative action (Bleich 2001: 270). This approach illustrates tensions between the colour-blind principles of inclusiveness: on the one hand, French model emancipates individuals through its specific universalist program, despite the actual discrimination. On the other hand,

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24 Such as granting a ten-year residence permits and the right to form officially recognized associations.

25 Stated by the High Council for Integration (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration).
colour-blindness impedes efforts to improve the status of ethnic and racial minority group members and reduce the actual discrimination they suffer (Bertossi 2011: 1566). The particular fear of communitarianism i.e. the risk of political mobilization of ethnic, racial or sexual minorities and the consequences of their recognition in public for the French political model, have led to debates over a new form of racism (Amiraux & Simon 2006: 209).

The crises deepened in 2005, three weeks rioting in more than 250 towns were triggered in the French suburbs by an accidental electrocution of immigrant origin teenagers. While problems such as social housing, racial inequalities and ethnic discrimination rose (Murphy 2011: 38-40), government tried to link the rioting to illegal immigration, Muslim separatism and polygamous practices even though most of the rioters were second-generation immigrants. The essence of the riots therefore lied within the controversy of maintaining universalist integration model whilst not differentiating individual’s colour or religion (Sahlins 2006). After the riots the diagnosis of failure of the French model was made (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 6).

French model of integration is often criticized for not being able to respond to the specific needs of existing cultural, ethnic and religious diversity. On the other hand, in the context of universalism minority-oriented policies are seen as a threat to social cohesion and common national identity. The crisis has deepened because of actual cases of discrimination and violations against universalist principles. The strongest examples are the law on laïcité and several cases of Muslim discrimination regarding building of mosques or opening schools (Sala Pala & Simon 2008: 32-34). The faith of the model as well as the crisis itself depends on the actions taken by the state to acknowledge the growing diversity of French society.
3 Empirical background

3.1 Education

3.1.1 Policy research outcome

The policy research outcome concentrates on two surveys, one population census and statistics by the Ministry of Education:

- The 2012 survey “Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France” i.e. “Immigrants and descendants of immigrants in France” conducted by INSEE. Survey covers years from 2008 to 2011.
- Population census (Recensement de la population) from 2008 conducted by INSEE.
- Statistics of the educational system (système éducatif) by Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de la jeunesse et de la vie associative (Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sport).

Table 2 shows that the share of non-francophone newcomers to French educational system has steadily increased. Even though it varies in terms of country of origin it follows the general pattern of immigration to France since the 1970s and 1980s. The most common groups are Moroccans, Turks, Africans and Algerians. Both surveys show that the educational levels of immigrants in France have improved and risen considerably, but variations can be seen because of the following factors: (a) social and family origin of immigrants (both parents’ and the child’s), (b) period of arrival (as well as residence time in France), (c) reason for admission, (d) French language proficiency and (e) schooling background (both parents’ and child’s).
Table 2. 2001-2010 Non-francophone newcomers to French educational system (metropolitan France).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary schools (école élémentaire/primaire)</th>
<th>Lower and upper secondary schools (collèges, lycées)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15,970</td>
<td>15,790</td>
<td>31,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>17,980</td>
<td>20,250</td>
<td>38,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>18,610</td>
<td>19,960</td>
<td>38,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>19,450</td>
<td>20,630</td>
<td>40,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>18,950</td>
<td>20,330</td>
<td>32,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>17,590</td>
<td>19,450</td>
<td>37,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>17,280</td>
<td>17,630</td>
<td>34,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>16,950</td>
<td>17,770</td>
<td>34,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>17,350</td>
<td>18,360</td>
<td>35,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>18,490</td>
<td>19,600</td>
<td>38,090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The main obstacle for immigrant children concerning the inclusion to the French school system is bound with whether they are speakers of French or of another language. Fluency in French language and literacy are seen as the prerequisites in order to access and integrate into the mainstream school system. If these criteria are not met, the lack of language mastery can be the trigger for deepening problems in the school system.

Firstly, there are two main factors that influence the language obstacle: (1) at what age the child or his/her parents arrive to France and (2) on which level (if any) the child or his/her parents’ master the French language. Finding from the ‘Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France’ survey verify that the age at arrival in France as well as the duration of schooling in France strongly influences the mastery both in speaking and writing in adulthood. Among immigrants aged 18 to 60 living in metropolitan France, 71% spoke foreign language with their parents during childhood and 25% at least two
languages, including French. Therefore the use of foreign language depends largely on whether they are French or foreign nationals and whether they speak French or another language. In terms of family language transmission families from Turkey and the rest of Asia, Morocco, Tunisia and Portugal are less likely to participate in learning French. The same applies for children whose both parents are foreign-origin and who have arrived to France in older age (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France: 160-162).

The entrance to the school system starts with evaluating one’s language skills. In this stage immigrant children are more heavily exposed to difficulties and tend to get much lower results than other students. After the first four years of secondary schooling, only 47% of immigrant children arrive in the upper secondary school level (see table 4) against 60% of other students. This leads to lesser students of immigrant origin to continue their academic path. Variables that influence this can be traced down to entering the education system at older age and without having any previous qualification, and on the other hand, is bound together with the education level, language proficiency and origin of one’s parents (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France: 166-170). Whether or not the parents’ master the French language sufficiently affects the ability to orientate in the French school system. The study showed that helping with homework or having regular conversations about what the child is taught are less frequent than in other families. This is often the cause of lower educational level of the parents, not sufficient proficiency in the French language or the lack of educational experience. This is one of the causes why immigrant origin children may encounter more difficulties (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France: 174).

Secondly, obstacles related to the country of origin influence the duration of schooling and diploma/certificate obtained. TeO survey shows that the percentage of persons with no qualifications or only primary school certificates (CEP\textsuperscript{26}) or lower secondary school certificates (BEPC\textsuperscript{27}) is 39% against 17% in the mainstream population. The percentage

\textsuperscript{26} CEP – certificat d’études primaires i.e. diploma obtained after finishing the primary or elementary school.

\textsuperscript{27} BEPC – brevet d’études du premier cycle i.e. diploma obtained after the acquisition of general knowledge at the end of lower secondary school (collège).
is highest among immigrants from Sahel region\textsuperscript{28} in Africa (65%), following Turkey (60%), Portugal (57%), Morocco (45%) and Tunisia (43%). 76% from those immigrants aged 18 to 60 who arrived in France before 1974 have low or no qualifications against 40% arriving after 1998. In terms of reason for admission 40% of those arriving at age 16 or over under family reunion, have no qualifications (TeO 2010: 38-40). Both studies agree that a descendant of immigrant is less likely to obtain diploma (whether vocational school or higher education) if both his/her parents are with immigrant origin and, regardless the social background, if he/she descends from outside the EU (see table 3) (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France: 166-170). TeO Survey also illustrates that 13% of the children of immigrants left education system without any qualification against 8% of the mainstream population. This also varied according to the parents’ country of origin being highest descendants of immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa (TeO 2010: 46).

\textsuperscript{28} Semiarid region of western and north-central Africa from Senegal to Sudan.
Table 3. Educational level or degree obtained by country of origin (age 30-49).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>No diploma or primary education (CEP) %</th>
<th>Lower (BEPC) and upper secondary school diplomas (lycée professionnelle) (CAP, BEP)</th>
<th>Baccalauréat i.e. academic qualification of upper secondary education (lycée général et technologique)</th>
<th>Baccalauréat + two years of higher education</th>
<th>Higher education (bachelors or higher)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU 27</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>530 000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>240 000</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outside EU</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>280 000</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>260 000</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>80 000</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>310 000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>110 000</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia, Laos,</td>
<td>70 000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam, America,</td>
<td>110 000</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non immigrants</strong></td>
<td>15 330 000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thirdly, obstacles concerning entering and staying in the school system also include (1) sense of discrimination and (2) school-related segregation. TeO survey makes an important differentiation – it studies the tracks of education taken in secondary and higher education. Findings show that descendants of immigrants are less frequently guided into the general education tracks than the mainstream population. Even though most children, regardless of origin, go on to upper secondary school (*lycée*), the percentage who leave school earlier is higher among immigrant origin students, particularly among Turkish and Algerian origin. Immigrants from West or Central Africa and from French overseas departments are over represented in vocational
education. TeO survey also concentrates on the experienced injustices in school. Findings show that 14% of immigrant origin students report ‘having been less well treated’. This is particularly high among immigrants from Maghreb region and Turkey claiming to encounter discrimination on the basis of origin or skin color.

In terms of school segregation, mainstream population families are most common to use avoidance strategies (30%) when choosing schools for their offspring. Immigrant origin parents have less choice and therefore put their children to schools with high proportions of immigrants (51% on average compared to 17% for the mainstream population). This leads to residential segregation – natives and the children of immigrants’ do not attend the same schools (TeO 2010: 47 - 51). Studies have also shown a clear relationship between the share of immigrants in school, school reputation and parental strategy resulting certain schools concentrating high numbers of immigrant students (Van Zanten 2006: 195-210).

Obstacles concerning the involvement into mainstream school system therefore make a complex mixture of uncontrollable variables such as the origin of the immigrant child’s parents, their and their child’s proficiency of the French language, previous educational background of the parents’ or of the child’s (in the country of origin), and problems deriving from these such as inability to orientate in the school system and lack of knowledge to support the child. Accompanied with inequalities in social and family capital, the educational outcomes are thus affected.
Table 4. The French school system and support structures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>Études supérieures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Upper secondary school</td>
<td>Lycée général et technologique Baccalauréat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lycée professionnelle CAP, BEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-16</td>
<td>Lower secondary school</td>
<td>Collège BEPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-12</td>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>École élémentaire/primaire CEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>CLIN Introductory class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>CRI Integration class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>Pre-school</td>
<td>École maternelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CLA Reception class
ENSA
CLA-NSA
MAT
Temporary welcoming model
GRETA
Adult training
MLDS
Against school dropout
3.1.2 Political decision-making

The school system modeled by the Third Republic has been considered the best instrument for integrating young people into French culture. Because the color-blind approach, school is considered to be the embodiment of equality and secularism where one’s ethnicity or origin does not play a role. Although there is no specific integration policy, there are special measures for immigrant children: special classes (classes d’accueil), special training and information centers supporting the education of immigrants’ children (CASNAV Centre Académique pour la Scolarisation des élèves allophones Nouvellement Arrivés et des enfants issus de familles itinérantes et de Voyageurs 29) have been implemented to encourage these children to join the mainstream school system as soon as possible (Borkert et al. 2007: 12). Most of these date back to 1970s and 1980s, and have been reformed with ministerial circulars from 2002 (no 2002-100, no 2002-102, and no 2002-063).

The school system (see table 4) is divided into five parts: pre-school (école maternelle), primary school (école élémentaire/primaire), lower secondary school (college), upper secondary school (lycée) of which one is general and technological (lycée général et technologique) and the other professional or vocational (lycée professionnelle). The former allows students to stay in the academic track and provides the access to University. The latter provides different vocational diplomas (BEP, CAP)30 and allows the access to the labour market (Brinbaum & Cebolla-Baodo 2007: 449).

Until the end of the guest-workers scheme in the 1970s there were no specific or official schooling programs for immigrant children, only experimental introductory classes for

29 In English: Academic Centers for the Schooling of Newly Arrived and Travelling Children. This institution was reformed and re-named in 2002. It was originally created in 1986 as CEFISEM - (Centres de Formation et d’Information pour la Scolarisation des Enfants de Migrants) Training and Information Centers for the Education of Migrant Children.

30 Diplomas such as: - brevet d’études professionnelles i.e. diploma obtained after finishing the vocational school (lycée professionnelle) preparing for a professional degree at the upper secondary level or CAP - certificat d’aptitude professionnelle i.e. diploma obtained after finishing vocational school (lycée professionnelle) in a given profession at the upper secondary level.
the children of Algerians existed. In 1970, ministerial circular no IX70-37 officially established special classes for non-francophone children who did not master the French language in a sufficient level (CLIN, CLA). In 1986, ministerial circular no 86-119 officially added language support module (CRI) (Lanier 2011: 73). Introduced alongside with family reunification policies, two systems have developed to support the immigrant children whilst entering the French school system: mainly child support facilities for non-francophone children and courses in the culture and language of their country of origin. The number of special support structures or classes is directly linked with the migratory situation of particular regions (whether urban on rural) i.e. these policies are localized and classes are formed on the basis of the number of non-francophone students. Since the second half of the 1980s, these support systems are organized through CASNAV and Ministry of National Education.

Because the integration model is assimilationist in core, fluency in the French language and literacy are strongly emphasized as prerequisites to enter the mainstream school system. In order to include newcomers into the normal curriculum as soon as possible, there are two support systems offered in each educational level: the first system offers support classes and temporary models for non-francophone children depending on their level of French proficiency, and second offers courses in the culture and language of their country of origin.

Firstly, in order to overcome the language obstacle, host schools are obliged to offer support. The first support system for non-francophone children includes two different types of support structures:

1) Provided in primary school level: Classes d'initiation (CLIN) and Cours de Rattrapage Intégré (CRI).

CLIN is an introductory class enrolling newly arrived children who are most in need of studying the French language. CRI is an integration class enrolling children who are integrated into ordinary curriculum but regrouped for French language studies (Les immigrants en France 2005: 96).

31 First tested in the 1950s.

32 Ministre de l’Éducation nationale, de la Jeunesse et de la Vie associative.
2) Provided in lower and upper secondary school level: Classes d'accueil (CLA) and Module d'Accueil Temporaire (MAT).

CLA is a reception class enrolling children with previous educational background but not sufficient knowledge of the French language. MAT is a temporary welcoming model to support newcomers with guidance concerning the school system and administrative formalities (CASNAV).

Introductory classes (CLIN) are provided in primary school level for non-francophone newly arrived students aged 6 to 12 without sufficient proficiency in the French language and without previous learning (Lanier 2011: 72). Circular no 2002-100 states that these classes are provided for 15 pupils in a class for one year under a volunteer teacher. Introductory classes go hand in hand with gradual participation in regular classes. They study French as a second language and are assessed at the end to evaluate their preparedness for regular curriculum. The aim of these classes is the rapid integration for students to attend regular curriculum classes (Bulletin officiel de l’éducation national spécial, No. 10, 2002).

Integration classes (CRI) are provided in primary school level for non-francophone students aged 6 to 12 who have some proficiency in the French language. They are enrolled in the regular curriculum i.e. attending classes with regular students but learn the French language for 6 to 7 hours per week. In 1970s these were aimed at ‘foreign origin children’, in 1986 for ‘newly arrived foreign children in France’ and since 2002 for ‘newly arrived without sufficient mastery of the French language or learning’. It is important to note that there is no explicit reference to the nationality of the children who can attend these classes. This is because the share of children with French nationality who have not lived on French territory or have not mastered the French language (Lanier 2011: 69-74).

Reception classes (CLA) are provided in the lower and upper secondary school level for non-francophone students aged 12 to 16. These classes have to be organized if there are more than 5 non-French students in a regular class. Since 2002 circulars reception classes were divided into two:

33 In case of little or no prior schooling, introductory classes can be taken for one more additional year.
1) *Les classes d'accueil pour les élevés non scolarisés antérieurement* (ENSA or CLA-NSA) i.e. classes for students nor previously enrolled in the school system or who have had very little schooling in their country of origin. After schooling, these students will be enrolled into regular classes.

2) *Les classes d'accueil ordinaires* i.e. regular welcoming classes. These classes combine studying the French language as well as major disciplines (Lanier 2011: 74-76).

CLA-NSA or ENSA was introduced because of large share of immigrant children without previous schooling and qualifications or with little previous schooling. The biggest problem concerning this group is their age i.e. they are at the age to attend secondary school but due to the lack of previous educational background (in many cases illiteracy), it is extremely difficult to meet the level of knowledge that regular students have at that age. This class is provided for non-French students aged 12 to 16 up to one year studying the French language. Having literacy classes and adapting to French model of education (*Bulletin officiel de l’éducation national spécial*, No. 10, 2002).

MAT is a temporary and short-term welcoming model to support newcomers aged 16 (in some cases younger) to 18 years old with guidance concerning the school system and administrative formalities (CASNAV). Because students who arrive to France or to the school system at the age of 16 are no longer subjects to compulsory schooling, this voluntary reception class is the support system they can benefit from (Les défis de l’intégration à l’école 2010: 17).

During 2003-2005 school year, there were 35,600 non-francophone newcomers and 82% of them benefited from these special classes (*Les immigrés en France* 2005: 96), during 2010-2011 school year, 79% of 38 100 non-francophone newcomers benefited (*Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France* 2012: 168). Table 5 reports that the number of CLIN, CLA and CRI classes have risen since 2001 to 2010 – accordingly 479 to 500, 432 to 549 and 347 to 877. The temporary model of MAT has remained steady – 137 to 131. Because the number of the classes depends on the number of foreign pupils in need as well as the geographical regions (more demand in urban and
less in rural areas\textsuperscript{34}), some departments have developed more flexible structure i.e. depending on the needs, teachers share their specialization for few hours a week in several institutions (Les immigrés en France 2005: 96).

Table 5. 2001-2010 Number of support classes for non-francophone students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>CLIN</th>
<th>CRI</th>
<th>CLA</th>
<th>MAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lanier 2011: 422.

Upon newcomers’ arrival, there are different assessment tools starting with French language proficiency evaluation as well as psychological testing to evaluate their adaptability to the schooling system. Language skills assessment is with key importance – this determines whether the child has to go to CLIN or CLA class (Lanier 2011: 108-109). Table 6 shows that these support systems are provided in all educational levels up to the upper secondary school. Issues concerning these classes are often related with the system being assimilationist, with evaluation procedures (there might be either shortage of places or the type of support class is inappropriate) and with the fact that non-

\textsuperscript{34}Non-francophone students are concentrated in five regions: Ile-de-France (academies of Paris, Creteil and Versailles) welcomes third of the newcomers; around 13\% arrive in the Mediterranean area (Aix-Marseille, Nice, Montpellier); around 13\% arrive around Lyon area (Lyon, Grenoble), and, finally, 7\% arrive in Alsace and Lorraine region (Strasbourg, Nancy-Metz) (Immigrés et descendants des immigrés en France 2012: 168).
francophone student’s difficulties in French are frequently equated with intellectual shortcomings or limited potential for academic success (Kirzbaum et al. (2009: 27-28).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class type</th>
<th>CLA</th>
<th>CLIN</th>
<th>MAT</th>
<th>Regular curriculum with support classes</th>
<th>Regular curriculum without support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>École élémentaire/ primaire and école maternelle</td>
<td>8,320</td>
<td>6,230</td>
<td>3,937</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collège</td>
<td>8,934</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>3,468</td>
<td>1,421</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGT</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>427</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10,343</td>
<td>8,320</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>10,768</td>
<td>5,428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The second system – Enseignement des Langues et Cultures d’Origine (ELCO) i.e. courses in the culture and language of their country of origin – was first established in the 1970s. Since guest workers were seen as temporary work force, the same logic was adapted whilst dealing with their children. Aims of the classes were to maintain the foreign child’s knowledge of their language and culture of origin while at the same time preparing their possible entry to the French school system; secondly, the aim was also to enable these children to reintegrate when they return home i.e. country of origin. Teaching their mother tongue whilst enabling a normal course of education was also a European Union level directive (Lanier 2011: 137-138).

France has signed bilateral agreements with countries whose immigrant communities are largest and present in the host country’s territory. Dating back to 1977, these are
Algeria, Spain, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Portugal, Serbia, Croatia (since 1994) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (since 2002) (L’intégration scolaire des enfants immigrants en Europe 2009: 23). Table 7 reports that even though the number of courses has declined\textsuperscript{35} since 1994, the Moroccan ELCO remains by far the most popular with 25 000 students following the Turkish (12 700 students), Portuguese and Algerian ELCO. Recent developments have brought these lessons closer to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) and most courses are now part of the CEFR. In 2010 – 2011 the total number of students engaging ELCO was 86312\textsuperscript{36} (Éduscol).

Table 7. 2002 – 2009 ELCO program by languages and the number of students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic (Algeria)</td>
<td>7,815</td>
<td>9,019</td>
<td>9,902</td>
<td>11,342</td>
<td>12,336</td>
<td>13,564</td>
<td>14,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic (Morocco)</td>
<td>26,817</td>
<td>28,028</td>
<td>25,418</td>
<td>26,646</td>
<td>29,292</td>
<td>30,078</td>
<td>30,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>2,028</td>
<td>2,069</td>
<td>1,908</td>
<td>2,005</td>
<td>2,154</td>
<td>2,121</td>
<td>2,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic (Tunisia)</td>
<td>5,769</td>
<td>5,851</td>
<td>5,386</td>
<td>5,682</td>
<td>5,474</td>
<td>5,318</td>
<td>4,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish (Turkey)</td>
<td>16,455</td>
<td>16,399</td>
<td>16,504</td>
<td>17,727</td>
<td>18,604</td>
<td>19,066</td>
<td>19,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>1,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian (Croatia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian (Serbia)</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish (Spain)</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>1,533</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>1,386</td>
<td>1,289</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian (Italy)</td>
<td>3,264</td>
<td>2,867</td>
<td>2,045</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>1,864</td>
<td>1,760</td>
<td>1,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese (Portugal)</td>
<td>7,741</td>
<td>9,545</td>
<td>8,878</td>
<td>8,663</td>
<td>9,324</td>
<td>10,356</td>
<td>10,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{35}The decline can be associated with ELCO program’s some courses taking place outside school hours.

\textsuperscript{36}In elementary schools 80 0006 and in secondary level 6315.
The language obstacle also entails the parental background i.e. if parents do not master French sufficiently and/or if they do not have enough educational background from either from their country of origin or from France, the children of these parents are more likely to encounter difficulties. Until 2012 there were no official programs for parental guidance. Local authorities and schools were held as primary institutions to help the newcomers and offer information. From 2008 some pilot schemes have begun. Launched by the Ministry of the Interior\textsuperscript{37}, Ministry of Education, local authorities and overseas departments in 2008, an operation called ‘\textit{Ouvrir l’école aux parents pour réussir l’intégration}\textsuperscript{38},’ was made official in 2011 and rearranged in 2012 with a circular no 2012-081. It was implemented and evaluated across France: in 12 departments in 2008 to 64 departments in 2011. Its objectives are to offer parents, immigrants or foreigners outside EU (1) a better understanding of the French school system and educational institutions, (2) a better understanding of principles, values and customs of French society, and (3) to offer courses in French language (\textit{Relations école-famille. Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche}). In 2010, approximately 4000 parents received help by this operation (MIPEX).

Secondly, concerning educational achievements of non-francophone children – either the problem of having no qualifications or diploma or school dropout – there are two national systems working: GRETA\textsuperscript{39} and MLDS. GRETA is a structure of local public educational institutions that organize national education training for adults aged 16 to 25 (\textit{La formation tout au long de la vie. Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche}). This is a simple training model to prepare for a diploma (CAP, BTS) in lower (collège) and upper secondary school level (in both general and vocational schools). There are 210 GRETA structures in France in over 6500 locations offering also online courses. Its main tasks are to welcome and offer guidance for adults in terms of obtaining a diploma (whether general or vocational), assisting in developing professional projects, preparing for a job and developing job-specific skills, preparing for examinations etc. (\textit{La formation tout au long de la vie. Ministère de l’Intérieur.})

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ministère de l’Intérieur.}

\textsuperscript{38} In english: ‘Open schools for parents for successful integration’.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Groupements d’Etablissements.}
Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche.

The model of GRETA was first made official in 1993 with a circular no 93-159 and revised in 1997, 2013 and 2014 (Bulletin officiel, No. 6, 2014).

Concerning the dropout, there is a preventive system against school dropout called ‘La Mission de lutte contre le décrochage scolaire’ (MLDS). The system is used in two ways: (1) to reduce the number of school leavers aged to 16 without qualifications/diplomas, and (2) to support students over 16 years old who have already left the school system to obtain the qualification/diploma they once pursued for. MLDS is a module of re-motivation used in educational facilities and its final aim is the integration of students back to the school system and finally, into the labour market and society (MLDS Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche). The system has also a monitoring unit ‘Cellule de veille et de prévention’ (CVP) to assess the developments of each individual as well as the educational institution’s approaches. CVP offers individual guidance as well as psychological help involving, if needed, not only the individual in question and the school staff, but also higher administrative institutions (also social workers) (CVP Cellule de veille et de prévention, Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche). The support system was first formed under the Educational Code from 1989, then specified under the Labour Code in 1993 and reformed with circular no 2013-035 in 2013. A study that monitored 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school years confirmed that more students have gained help from this these structures: in 2006-2007 school year 80% received help and in 2007-2008 84% received help (76% were oriented towards further training, 6% to employment and 4% to other structures) (Bilan de l’activité de la MGI. Année scolaire 2007-2008. Ministère éducation nationale 2009: 8).

Thirdly, the problem of discrimination and school related segregation has been perhaps most strongly in the heated debates. In keeping with the principle of universalism, all forms of discrimination are forbidden in France. This derives from the 1789 Declaration of human and civil rights, and from the 1958 Constitution. French Code of Education promotes integration, equality and the right to access education, regardless of social,__________

40 In english: Mission to fight against school dropout.
41 In english: Monitoring and Prevention Unit.
cultural or geographical background (circulars no 2005-102, no 2005-380, no 2006-396). Anti discrimination law was launched in 2004 (circular no 2004-1486, no 2006-396) and an independent governmental agency (HALDE\textsuperscript{42}) against discrimination was formed to investigate cases of discrimination. Therefore, racial discrimination is forbid in the field of education. On the other hand, due to the strong notion of \textit{Laïcité}, the fact that religious signs such as Muslim headscarves are forbidden\textsuperscript{43} in public schools is a great injustice for religious groups (Sala Pala & Simon 2005: 10-11).

In term of avoidance of school segregation, heated debates concerning a policy scheme to officially compound parents to put their children in a specific school according to their place of residence started in 2006. It is blamed not being able to prevent ethnic segregation (Sala Pala & Simon 2005: 35). To assure equal opportunities, the Law on Equality and Opportunities launched in 2006 (circular no 2006-945) opened access to certain schools for students located in areas with a lower standard of living. The law creates additional measures designed to curb educational segregation. For example, some of the most prestigious schools in France have signed the ‘priority education agreement’ ensuring qualified students from these zones to take part of competitive exams, to be admitted\textsuperscript{44} and to ensure access to the best preparatory schools\textsuperscript{45} (Hogan & Hartson 2007). Even though the racial discrimination is prohibited and ‘positive discrimination’ has been applied in several occasions, the ‘school ghettoization’ and segregation is still an issue.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} HALDE \textit{Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité}, in English: ‘The French Equal Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission’.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Law dating back to 2004, no 2004-228.
\item \textsuperscript{44} The prestigous Paris school of human sciences and politics (Sciences-Po Paris) signed the agreement in 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{45} The prestigious Lycée Henri IV in Paris signed the agreement in 2006.
\end{itemize}
3.2 Labour market

3.2.1 Policy research outcome

The policy research outcome concentrates on five surveys and statistics by the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs:

- The 2012 survey “Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France” i.e. “Immigrants and descendants of immigrants in France” conducted by INSEE. Survey covers years from 2008 to 2011.
- The Labour Force Survey (l’enquête Emploi) 2007 to 2012 conducted by INSEE.
- The 2010 Migrant Integration Policy Index III (MIPEX) from 2007-2010.
- Statistics by Ministère du travail, de l’emploi et du dialogue social (Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs).

The historical heritage of guest-workers scheme still appears to affect the labour market characteristics today. Hiring in low skilled jobs during the ‘trente glorieuses’, the immigrants did not follow the upward career paths as did their French colleagues and remained mostly workers. Dayan et al. (1997) found that after 20-25 years of career, nearly three-thirds of immigrant workers are still workers, more than one-third without qualification while for men born in France, the proportion of workers falls to 30% and only one-quarter is without qualification (Meurs et. al 2010: 461-462).

Today the situation is more complicated because the ‘selective’ work migration i.e. France denies all non-EU residents selected to live there with equal opportunities in more areas of its labour market than most European countries. Non-EU residents have limited opportunities to enter a career that matches their skills and are excluded from 30% of all jobs in France. Much of this protectionism dates back to the late 19th century and the 1930s. They are mostly oriented towards jobs where manpower is needed. Due to this protectionist stance, France is missing out migrants’ full economic potential and risking long-term social and economic exclusion (MIPEX).

First problem concerning immigrant origin population is the protectionism and
selectiveness in the field of French labour market i.e. restricted access for immigrant origin population. Even though all forms of discrimination are forbidden in the workplace, discrimination exists largely due to tensions between ethnic and universalistic principles. There are only two official exceptions: firstly, officers in the civil service who have to be French citizens and secondly, an organization for immigrant workers and their families providing professional training, housing and social work services was formed in 2001 (FAS - Fond d’Action Sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leurs familles\textsuperscript{46}) (Borkert et al. 2007: 13). MIPEX survey carried out in 2010 in 31 countries\textsuperscript{47} covering the years 2007 to 2010 shows that France is the second least favourable of all countries in terms of access to the labour market and denies legal access to more jobs than in all surveyed countries. It estimates around 7 million excluded jobs i.e. 30% of all jobs in France: firstly in public sector (permanent civil servants), secondly 50 professions in the private sector (e.g. veterinarians, pilots, tobacco shop owners) and thirdly, from starting business in many regulated professions (e.g. lawyers, doctors, architects and pharmacists). In 2004, immigrants’ also lost their previous right to be elected to the Labour Court (Conseil de prud’hommes) that deals with disputes between employers and employees, and to Councils and Chambers of Commerce (CCI Chambres de commerce et d’industrie) (MIPEX). This kind of ‘labour market discrimination’ has led France into highly selective immigration policy to meet the labour needs, especially after the post-war ‘baby-boom’ generation begins to retire (Simon 2003).

The second problem concerning immigrant origin population is the high unemployment rates, shown in table 8. It is partly linked with the previously handled protectionism and on the other hand, with problems regarding the character of the job, educational attainments and qualifications obtained by the immigrant origin population. TeO survey presents the results for the entire survey population aged 18 to 50. ‘Immigrés et descendants des immigrés’ covers ages 25 to 64. Both surveys show a strong link between the dependence on immigrants’ country of origin: unemployment affects 20%
of those born outside the EU-27 against 8% of EU citizens (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 196).

Table 8. Unemployment and long-term unemployment from total population (among 15-64 years olds, 2009-2011) (in %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By region of origin</th>
<th>Long-term unemployment</th>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-immigrants</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By country of origin</th>
<th>Long-term unemployment</th>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Main reason for unemployment is the job character i.e. mostly because the end of a temporary job or to a lesser extent, because dismissal (IDI: 190). Unemployment is particularly high among immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and sub-Saharan Africa - the risk is more than twice that of the mainstream population. Descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb are those who face the greatest difficulties on the labour market (they are most likely to be unqualified, but at the same time over-represented) (TeO 2010: 54-56). The highest employment rates that are close to the mainstream population are among immigrants from Spain, Italy and Portugal (TeO 2010: 53). In 2010, the unemployment rate for immigrant origin population aged 15 or more was 16% against 9% of non-immigrants. The access to the labour market is more difficult for women with immigrant descent (22% are unemployed against 18% of men) and for least qualified or unskilled workers. As was seen in the previous chapter on education,
these percentages are closely linked with the fact that many recently arrived immigrants’ start their studies at older age and form the highest share of population who possess a lower level of study or primary school certificates (CEP). 23% of immigrants with CEP or lower level education are unemployed against 13% of non-immigrants. Both surveys show that unemployment affects less those who have acquired French nationality. Longer residence in France gives them a better understanding of society and more ways to establish a network that facilitates their access to the labour market. Therefore non-immigrants and descendants of immigrants who have resided in France longer suffer unemployment (39%) for shorter period of time than immigrants (46%) who remain unemployed longer (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 190-196).

The third problem concerns the character of the job or occupation obtained. Since the early 1980s France suffered a persistent mass unemployment which still modifies the conditions to access the labour market today. Regardless of the level of degree attained whilst leaving the education system, access to employment starts with short-term contracts and interim assignments. Often the job or career immigrant origin individuals enter does not match their skills and they are oriented towards jobs where manpower is needed (often characterized by short-term contacts) (MIPEX). In terms of socio-occupational categories, persons born in France between ages 30 to 59 who have both parents with immigrant origin are more likely to be workers (71%) than those whose parents are non-immigrant origin (37%) (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 200-206). Therefore immigrants are mainly represented in four categories: non-skilled sectors of textile and leather, more skilled in building and public works (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 192) (Table 9).

48 French nationality also facilitates the possibility to work in the public sector.
Table 9. Share of immigrants in major economic sectors in 2011 (in %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
<th>All sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-immigrants</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>90.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-immigrants</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-immigrants</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Enquêtes Emploi* (Labour Force Survey), INSEE 2011

Male immigrants are significantly over-represented in the field of construction (mainly Turkish, Maghreb and Portuguese origin) and both, men and women, born outside the EU in accommodation, catering, administrative and support services (e.g. cleaning). During the recent period the share of executives, intermediate professions and craftsmen, traders and entrepreneurs has increased at the expense of worker’ jobs. The decline in blue-collar jobs has particularly affected immigrants born outside the EU (*Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France* 2012: 192-194). Table 10 shows the share of foreign born population according to occupational category.
The fourth problem concerns labour market discrimination. Many studies have shown that immigrants and children of immigrants are at a disadvantage compared with mainstream population (Frégosi & Kosulu 2013, Meurs et al. 2006, Dupray & Moullet 2004, Brinbaum & Werquin 1999). If educational attainment and certificates and/or diplomas obtained can be linked with social origin and parental educational background, then disadvantages in labour market that some groups encounter (mainly Maghreb) must in part be associated with the effects of discrimination that are seen in table 11. TeO survey asked participants whether they encountered discrimination and/or being unjustly turned down for a job in the preceding 5 years. 7% of men and 9% of women said this happened to them. Of the population exposed to the risk of unemployment, those who least frequently reported experiencing discrimination were immigrants from Portugal, Spain and Italy whilst the highest percentages are found among immigrants from Algeria (30%) and sub-Saharan Africa (26%). In no other
group is the risk of reporting unfair job application rejection as low as in the mainstream population (TeO 2010: 57-60). On the other hand, among immigrant workers aged 18 to 50 in metropolitan France only 23% have declared to benefit from a promotion in the preceding 5 years against 37% of non-immigrants. A third or more immigrants from Morocco, Tunisia and the EU-27 (except Portugal) have benefited a promotion against immigrants born in Algeria, Turkey outside the Maghreb region in Africa (*Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France* 2012: 204).

Table 11. Perceived discrimination in hiring during the following three years after leaving education system, 2007, in %.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived discrimination against hiring</th>
<th>Native French</th>
<th>Immigrants from Southern Europe</th>
<th>Immigrants from African countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin colour</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of residence or neighbourhood</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presumed origin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France*, INSEE 2012

Labour market discrimination is also linked to the place of residence. ONZUS reports on sensitive urban areas (*Observatoire national des zones urbaines sensibles*) have shown that the area of residence has a residual effect on unemployment among those who live in ‘sensitive urban areas’. Between 2008 and 2009 unemployment increased significantly in these neighborhoods as a direct result of the economic crises, mainly those with large housing projects built between 1990-1999. It also stated that the gap

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50 In English: National Observatory of Sensitive Urban Areas.
between an individual living in a disadvantaged neighborhood and an individual living in other parts of the agglomeration is higher, specially in case of women – without taking into account their age and degree/certificate obtained, women in areas of the city policy have 2.5 to 4 times less likely to be employed (ONZUS 2010: 124-129). On the other hand, certain neighborhoods attract newly arrived immigrants or immigrants with the same country of origin that already reside in these areas. Most problematic regions are in the border areas and urbanized or industrial areas such as Ile-de-France, Southeast (Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, Languedoc-Roussillon, Corsica) and in Alsace. In contrast, immigrants are under-represented in the regions of the West (Upper-Normandy, Normandy, Brittany, Pays de la Loire, Poitou-Charentes), in the Nord-Pas-De-Calais and Auvergne (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 188).

Obstacles concerning the access and successive involvement in the labour market therefore make once again a complex causality between variables such as the origin of the immigrant, his/her educational attainment and degrees/certificates/skills obtained, protective and selective characteristics of the French labour market, and discrimination. Often accompanied with being low skilled or unskilled and living in disadvantaged neighborhood, the situation reflects in high unemployment percentages or in high risk for unemployment.

3.2.2 Political decision-making

France has moved towards government-controlled immigration since a restrictive shift in immigration policies in 2002. New laws and reforms (2003, 2006, 2007, 2011) have since aimed at highly selective immigration policy, openness towards skilled workers only, restricting family reunifications and fighting against illegal immigration. The 2003 law no 2033-1119 concerning ‘The Control of Immigration, the Residence of Foreigners in France, and the Nationality’ illustrates the formerly mentioned shift. Initiated by the former president Nicolas Sarkozy, for the first time a distinction between expected immigration such as family reunification or asylum seekers and chosen immigration according to the needs of French’ economy, were made (Lochak 2006: 4).
New policy pursued two main objectives: (1) the selection of highly skilled immigrants, to adverse labour market impacts on low-skilled nationals, and (2) the limitation of access to welfare benefits for foreigners, to maximize net contributions of foreigners. For this, obtaining resident status was made more conditional and restrictions concerning the entry and stay of foreigners in France more strict (Jarreau 2014: 2). Following the ‘Immigration and Integration Law’ no 2006-911 in July 2006, selective immigration system aimed towards government-controlled immigration. The new law mirrored a robust campaign against illegal migration that emphasized employment-driven immigration at the expense of more than 100,000 immigrants who arrive in France annually for family-related reasons (Murphy 2006). Aimed at (1) selective immigration (*immigration choisie*), (2) mandatory integration for potential long-term residents (CAI *Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration* i.e. reception and integration contract), and (3) co-development with countries of origin in migration development (Chou & Baygert 2007: 4-6). Further implementations were made with the so-called Hortefeux law 51 (no 2007-1631) in 2007 that introduced pre-departure integration measures and toughened the conditions for political asylum (MIPEX). Reforms were also introduced with the law no 2011-672 on ‘Immigration, Integration and Nationality’ in July 2011.

The first problem concerning the protectionist and selective nature of French labour market – restricted access for immigrant origin population – has shown only little improvement. Starting with the 2003 law towards more selective immigration policy, the peak came with the 2006 law on ‘Immigration and Integration’. Full transition to a selective immigration system entailed four main objectives:

1. Recruiting skilled workers;
2. Facilitating foreign students’ stay;
3. Tightening the rules of family reunification;
4. Limiting access to residence and citizenship.

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51 Law on the ‘Control of Immigration, Integration and Asylum’ that was promoted by the former Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Cooperative Development. He was in favour of strongly controlled immigration and toughened conditions on political asylum.
In the context of labour market, the first two are with key importance. In terms of the first objective, government is now authorized to identify particular professions and geographical zones of France that are ‘characterized by recruitment difficulties’. For that, list of shortage skilled occupations are made. This means that only immigrants with needed skills and qualifications are welcomed and that employers who are not on the government-selected list may have more difficulties obtaining residence permits for migrant workers. In terms of the second objective, foreign students are attracted to pursue their higher education in France and allowed to pursue ‘first professional experience’ if they receive masters or higher degree (Murphy 2006).

The law has thus applied targeted measures to orient immigrants’ who are not nationals of a Member State of the EU, another State of the European Economic Area (EEA) or the Swiss Confederation towards jobs where manpower is needed but which assume high skills or qualifications. To ease the procedures for entry and adapt to the market situation, occupations having recruiting difficulties i.e. shortage skilled occupations are registered in a government list or negotiated through bilateral agreements. This means that a list of jobs is formed according to regional needs and revised if needed. The beneficiaries are (1) foreign nationals of third countries (currently 30 jobs), (2) Bulgarian, Romanian and Croatian nationals (currently 291 occupations) until the end of the transition period in 2015, and (3) countries with whom France has signed migratory flow management agreements. The shortage skilled occupation list for third country nationals entailed 30 jobs mostly in mechanics, metallurgy, electronics, wood sector, construction and public works in 2008 i.e. largely male occupations. Due to

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52 Benin (16 occupations), Burkina Faso (64), Cap-Vert (40), Congo (15), Gabon (9), Mauritius (61), Senegal (108), and Tunisia (77).

53 List of shortage skilled occupations in 2008 to 2011 and 2013 (except the fourteen mentioned below): (1) computer studies, (2) insurance operations manager, (3) construction site and agricultural machinery mechanic, (4) cement placement and cement truck driving, (5) joiner (wood and related materials mass production), (6) mechanic and projector in electricity and electronics, (7) manufacturing technician in mechanical engineering and metal work, (8) quality test technician in mechanical engineering and metal work, (9) quality test technician in electronics, (10) production technician, (11) elevator installers and repairers (and in other automated systems), (12) repairers in electronics, (13) surveyors, (14) engineering
economic crises and the growing need for even more selective and highly qualified labour immigration, as well as an effort to reduce the number of foreign workers in France, the list was reduced to almost half in 2011 with the ‘Law on Immigration, Integration and Nationality’ (Home Conseil Relocation). The list of shortage skilled occupations was revised in 2013 and raised back to 30, but never the less, only 6 professions are common to the whole country (Immigration professionnelle, gouvernement). The easing of the entry procedures for immigrants from the third countries has not had a significant effect on the share of professional migrants. The share of immigrants from third countries in the labour force has remained low – 2.9% in 2006 and 3.2% in 2009 (Jolly et al. 2012: 12).

The second and the third problem concerning immigrant origin populations’ high unemployment rates and the character of the job obtained is tightly linked with the formerly described protectionist and selective labour and immigration policy, but also with toughened residence and working permit conditions. Since the second half of the 1970s, the entry of immigrants in France is no longer for work purposes but mainly because family reunions and family ties, studying and asylum as can be seen from table 12. Even though they are allowed to work in France without being a subject to control the employment situation (work permission is granted) because they have ‘private and family life’ residence permit (carte vie privée et vie familiale), they are most often

in construction and public works, (15) foreman in building and public works, (16) clerk of works, (17) commercial attaché in intermediate goods and raw materials.

List of shortage skilled occupations in 2011 to 2013: (1) audit and accounting control, (2) equipment manufacturing for furniture and wood, (3) mechanical products and metal design, (4) compliance inspection, (5) drawings and design in construction and public works, (6) merchandising, (7) engineer production and operation of information systems, (8) glass processing equipment, (9) e-consultancy and telesales, (10) control of mechanical production, (11) design of electrical and electronic products, (12) technical intervention methods and industrialization, (13) chemical and pharmaceutical production*, (14) machine operator in manufacturing industries of furniture and wood (and related materials). (Journal officiel de la République Français 2008 (URL: http://www.immigration-professionnelle.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/fckupload/arrete_du_18-01-2008_%20liste_30.pdf)).

* Not listed among the thirty occupations in 2013.
unskilled and/or unqualified. Because any request for hiring a foreigner for a job in France must be previously approved by the services of the state with regard to its compliance with the labour market legislation and the employment situation, residence permits according to the nature of work (either temporary or permanent) and level of qualification are strictly conditioned (Jolly et al. 2012: 12-13). This hinders particularly those with high unemployment risk i.e. share of the people coming from Maghreb countries and Sub-Saharan Africa. Even though the shortage skilled occupation list for third country nationals exists, it does not affect those who are unskilled or low skilled and have difficulties obtaining working permits.

Table 12. Migration from non-EU countries according to the reason of entry, 2005-2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic reasons (work)</td>
<td>24,293 13.1%</td>
<td>24,780 13.1%</td>
<td>26,732 15.4%</td>
<td>32,897 17.6%</td>
<td>31,154 17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reasons (family reunion)</td>
<td>94,383 50.7%</td>
<td>98,770 52.1%</td>
<td>87,791 50.5%</td>
<td>86,770 46.5%</td>
<td>77,868 43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum</td>
<td>12,002 6.5%</td>
<td>9,078 4.8%</td>
<td>6,703 3.9%</td>
<td>7,647 4.1%</td>
<td>9,278 5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>44,794 24.1%</td>
<td>46,160 24.4%</td>
<td>43,154 24.8%</td>
<td>50,280 27%</td>
<td>51,226 28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10,516 5.7%</td>
<td>10,661 5.6%</td>
<td>9,400 5.4%</td>
<td>8,889 4.8%</td>
<td>10,179 5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>188,988</td>
<td>189,449</td>
<td>173,780</td>
<td>186,483</td>
<td>179,705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Reforms accompanied the 2006 law opened four types of residence permits:

1) Temporary workers permit allows the recruitment of a foreign national for a period of less than 12 months, if the company cannot find an applicant with the qualifications for the available position from the labour market in France. This applies to foreign nationals of third countries, Croatian and Algerian nationals.
   (a) Seasonal worker i.e. statut de saisonnier (6 months or a year)
   (b) Temporary worker i.e. statut de travailleur temporaire (less than 12 months)

2) Skilled temporary workers benefit from:
(a) ‘Skills and talents’ card i.e. *carte compétences et talents* (3 years for foreign nationals who work on projects contributing to the economic development of France and their country, or to their intellectual, scientific, cultural, humanitarian, athletic or other influence).

(b) ‘Scientific’ card i.e. *carte scientifique* (1 year for holders of at least master’s degree either to teach or to conduct research)

(c) ‘Employees on assignment’ card i.e. *carte de salarié en mission* (for intra-group mobility of employees of companies in the same group, established in foreign countries, seconded in France for a temporary assignment)

(d) Artistic and cultural professions (concerns performers and authors of literacy and artistic works holding contracts of longer than 3 months with companies engaged in intellectual work) (*Immigration professionnelle, gouvernement*).

3) Highly skilled long-term workers who benefit from the 2011 law following the EU Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment:

(a) European Blue card – for highly skilled non-EU citizens that allows them to move freely within the EU, to live and work there. This card is valid for 1 to 3 years and is renewable. Blue card holders’ family is entitled to the resident permit of ‘private and family life’. On the other hand, requirements for the Blue card entail a 3-year university diploma or 5 years experience in the relevant area, 1.5 times the average gross monthly salary\(^{55}\) and a local work contract with French company for minimum of 1 year approved by the Labour Authority (*Home Conseil Relocation*).

4) Residence and working permits are also allowed:

(a) Exceptional economic contribution (Investors, who agree to invest at least 10 million euros in France and the creator save at least 50 jobs)

(b) With bilateral agreements whether within the scope of shortage occupations or young professionals’ exchange\(^{56}\) (*Immigration professionnelle, gouvernement*).

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\(^{55}\) The average gross monthly salary was 2041 euros in 2009 (INSEE 2011).

\(^{56}\) Un-ratified agreements with Argentina, Canada, US, Morocco, and New Zealand.
Table 13 reports that in terms of permanent stays, family reasons exceed all others. In terms of temporary stays, the main reason is studying. In general, the new system of residence permits clearly enhances the selective nature of the French labour market and puts the share of low skilled and unskilled immigrant population into a risk of long-term social and economic exclusion.

Table 13. Immigration according to permanent or temporary stay, 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Permanent stay (12 months or more)</th>
<th>Temporary stay (less than 12 months)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>14,601</td>
<td>3,562</td>
<td>18,163</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying</td>
<td>47,588</td>
<td>14,623</td>
<td>62,211</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reasons</td>
<td>81,001</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>82,378</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (including asylum)</td>
<td>30,406</td>
<td>1,815</td>
<td>32,221</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>173,596</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,377</strong></td>
<td><strong>194,973</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The fourth problem concerns labour market discrimination, both on ethnic basis and due to place of residence. Once again, in keeping with the principle of universalism, all forms of discrimination are forbidden in France. The French law on racial discrimination enacted in 1972 focused on fighting discrimination in the workplace and was added to the French Labour Code. Its article L.122-45 summarizes all forbidden forms of discrimination in the workplace, from religious to racial discrimination. It also states that no person can be excluded from a recruitment procedure or access to an internship or training program (Legifrance). This has been complemented by the creation of the French Equality Body HALDE in 2004 and anti-discrimination enforcements in 2006 (no 2006-340) and 2008 (no 2008-496). Due to universalistic conception of equality, France systematically rejects clauses in international conventions that imply on individuals’ rights on the basis of their membership to a

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minority, thus constituting a category on the basis of origin. Because that ‘color-blind’ approach, the resulting legal framework has developed along two complementary lines: the condemnation of inequality based on “origin” and the refusal to use the criteria of “origin” for policy and administrative purposes (Latraverse 2011: 5-7).

In terms of the place of residence, the territorial policies specific to disadvantaged suburbs use neutral considerations to propose a number of actions targeting a concentrated population of immigrant origin. Since the criteria of origin do not exist, action is carried out on the basis of socio-economic condition. The territorial policy specific to disadvantaged suburbs (politique de la ville) has priority educational measures (as was seen in the previous chapter) and also forms sponsoring programs for young immigrants towards employment since 1993 (Latraverse 2011: 120-121). Cooperation between NGOs and National Employment Agency (Pôle Emploi) has resulted in three measures: (1) offering different support contracts for employment: single integration and support contracts in employment (CUI-CAE contrat unique d’insertion – contrat d’accompagnement dans l’emploi), single integration and employment initiative contract (CUI-CIE contrat unique d’insertion – contrat initiative-emploi) and contract for the future (CAV contrat d’avenir), (2) offering apprenticeship and vocational training for disadvantaged youth aged 16 to 25 (mesures jeunes actifs) and (3) to face the national housing crises, funding disadvantage neighborhoods. These aid programs helped 483,000 individuals in disadvantaged position (ONZUS 2010: 258-266) but have dropped since 2006 – in private sector from 10% to 4%, and in the non-profit sector from 8% in 2006 to 2009 to 5% in 2010 (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 198).

3.3 Housing

3.3.1 Policy research outcome

The policy research outcome concentrates on four surveys and studies:

- The 2012 survey “Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France” i.e. “Immigrants and descendants of immigrants in France” conducted by INSEE. Survey covers years from 2008 to 2011.

• The 2012 study on ‘Inégalités d'accès au logement social: peut-on parler de discrimination?’ i.e. ‘Inequalities in access to social housing: can we talk about discrimination’ carried out in by economists Liliane Bonnal, Rachid Boumahdi and Pascal Favard. Study covers years from 2001 to 2006.

• The 2006 Housing Survey (Enquête Logement) conducted by INSEE.

Starting with the low-rent58 social housing act (HLM – habitation à loyer modéré) in 1949, social housing policies and conditions have since improved in general. Yet, even though the demand for accommodation began with the large share of foreign workers in 1950s with objective to clear the slum areas around main urban centers, the need for social housing increased after the end of guest workers scheme and with family reunions (Simon & Kirzbaum 2001: 22). Main problems now reflect the excess demand for social housing. Approximately 3.5 million people are still poorly housed, inequalities in access to housing have widened since the mid-1990s, and due to the effects of economic crises and inflation, housing prices have increased by 150 percent on average between 1995 and 2008 (Fougère et al. 2011: 18-19). The market has turned around and recovered vigorously in France supported by financing conditions and policies to stimulate demand but many problems concerning access to social housing to ghettoization have remained (Boulhol 2011: 2).

First problem in terms of housing is the fact that immigrants and their children are less frequently homeowners and more frequently occupy social housing than mainstream population. Because the living situation – either property owner or tenant in social housing – is a good indication of social status, sharp distinction of ownership varying according to the immigrants’ origin is revealed. TeO survey shows that according to living situation, immigrants can be divided into two groups: (1) immigrants whose

58 In 2006, rent for one household in social housing cost 310 euros on average.
Home ownership rates are similar to the mainstream population (57%) originate mainly from Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, Southeast Asia and Europeans from other EU-countries, and (2) immigrants whose home ownership rates are rather low come mainly from Turkey (38%), North Africa (27%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (13%) (TeO 2010: 93-94). This leads to the inevitability that non-European immigrants are more likely to live in low-income households and in HLM. In 2008, 33% of immigrants lived in public housing against 14% of those without direct ancestry (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 224-225). According to origin, immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and Algeria (56%) clearly represent the most socially deprived ‘customers’ of social housing whilst below 10% are immigrants from other EU-27 countries.

Second problem concerning social housing policies in France is the inequality of access to housing and discrimination according to whether the resident is an immigrant or not. TeO survey defined housing discrimination as ‘refusal of accommodation for no valid reason’ within the last five years. Experience of perceived discrimination was reported by 13% of immigrants, of whom 70% cited skin color or origin for the reason. This form of discrimination was most strongly perceived by immigrants from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa (from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) (TeO 2010: 97). According to Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France survey and table 14, among those who have changed or seek to change accommodation during the last five years, 5% declare to have suffered an unjust denial of housing rental or purchase. Immigrants and descendants of immigrants are thus respectively 2.5 and 1.8 times more exposed to housing discrimination than non-immigrants (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 242-243).

____________________________________
59 It is important to note that 63% of social housing units are occupied by the mainstream population.
Table 14. Feeling of unequal treatment or perceived discrimination during the last five years, %.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>During the last five years, have you perceived…</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>…unequal treatment or discrimination</td>
<td>…refusal of housing rental or purchase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain, Italy, Portugal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU-27 countries</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European countries</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African countries</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian countries</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America, Oceania</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The study on inequalities in access to social housing showed that at the same level in terms of income, family composition and the type of accommodation requested, non-European origin applicants had to wait an average of 20 months more for social housing than European applicants. Study also showed that 60% of European origin applicants have received their household within first six month after filling the application against 40% of non-Europeans. Waiting period for more than three years is almost three times higher in case of non-Europeans, respectively 32% for non-Europeans against 12% of Europeans. Table 15 reports the differences in waiting times for European and non-European origin immigrants. Yet, even though the study shows there is discrimination, it is difficult to determine the causes (Bonnal et al. 2012: 17-19).
Table 15. Social housing waiting time according to origin of householder, 2001-2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Non-European</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have not received housing %</td>
<td>Have received housing %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 1 month</td>
<td>345 12.8</td>
<td>241 17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 3 months</td>
<td>517 19.3</td>
<td>351 25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 6 months</td>
<td>429 15.9</td>
<td>256 18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 12 months</td>
<td>504 18.7</td>
<td>227 16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 - 36 months</td>
<td>575 21.4</td>
<td>203 14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 - 60 months</td>
<td>198 7.4</td>
<td>70 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 60 months</td>
<td>121 4.5</td>
<td>41 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2689 100.0</td>
<td>1389 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bonnal et al. (2012), *Inégalités d’accès au logement social : peut-on parler de discrimination?*, Économie et statistique No. 464-465-466

Third problem concerning housing and in particular the social housing, is related to residential segregation. Because there is a direct connection between the origin of immigrants residing in HLM, the patterns of segregation among European and non-European immigrants differ greatly – the latter is tends to be more segregated and the former more likely to go through residential mobility process. In 2007, almost half of the 5.1 million immigrants living in metropolitan France came from North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa or Turkey. Almost two thirds of them were concentrated in three regions: more than 40% in the Paris region (Île-de-France), one-tenth in the Rhône-Alpes region, and a similar proportion in the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region. Because segregation of a group is not proportional to its size, it can be directly related with the country of origin e.g. Turkish immigrants are fewer in number but are strongly segregated whilst Portuguese, Algerian and Moroccan immigrants are numerous but much less segregated (Pan Ké Shon 2011: 2). This also applies to whether they concentrate into social housing units and deprived neighborhoods: more than 15% of
African and Turkish immigrants are in this situation. The cleavage is also largest between immigrants from European countries. *Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France* survey shows that because there is a link between countries of origin and living in HML, the distribution of immigrant population is strongly uneven – almost half of the immigrants (of all origin) live in the 10% of districts or neighborhoods most densely populated against only 13% of 18 to 50 year olds who are non-immigrants (*Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France* 2012: 222-223). TeO survey measured the perceived segregation within the neighborhood and posed striking results: immigrants report that they live in a neighborhood where at least half of the inhabitants are of immigrant origin (47%), whilst only 26% report living in a neighborhood where virtually none of the residents are of immigrant origin. This shows that social tenants report themselves to be less segregated when they belong to the mainstream population (TeO 2010: 97-98).

Fourth problem concerning housing derives directly from accumulation of immigrants into certain urban areas with high percentage of public housing on the one hand and little home ownership on the other, accompanied with high unemployment rates and low percentage of secondary school level graduates. These areas are called (1) ‘sensitive urban areas’ or ‘disadvantaged neighborhoods) (ZUS *zone urbaine sensible*) and defined by the government as sub-urban areas with high-priority targets for the city policy since 1996, taking into consideration local problems (educational, economic and social difficulties) of its residents and (2) urban tax-free areas (ZFU *zones franches urbaines*) that are even more deprived (INSEE Definitions). Both are categorized with high unemployment rates, high share of people without educational qualification, high share of young individuals and low per capita fiscal capacity. The latter refers to areas where companies are located and thus benefit from tax exemptions (INSEE Definitions). In 2008, 46% of inhabitants in ZUS were from mainstream population, 35% were from Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and Turkey, 15% were immigrants from other countries and 4% were persons born in the French overseas departments (DOM *Département et région d’outre-mer*). ZFU had even smaller number of inhabitants from the mainstream population of 36% against 25% of African and Turkish immigrants, and 18% of their children (Pan Ké Shon 2011: 3-4). Both surveys show that immigrants and their descendants live much less often in rural areas or small
agglomerations that are not targeted by the city policy. Because the overrepresentation of blue-collar workers, clerical workers and high share of inactive in terms of employment, these areas suffer from high unemployment risk, segregation and potential ghettoization (*Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France* 2012: 222-223).

Obstacles concerning housing policies therefore reflect the fact that non-European immigrants are much more likely to live in social housing as well as in deprived neighborhoods. Because homeownership is a major contributor to integration and one’s well being, the gap between natives and immigrants reflects great differences in terms of socio-economic background. Low rents and municipalities with already existing immigrant over-representation tend to push newcomers into sensitive urban areas and neighborhoods.

### 3.3.2 Political decision-making

The first problem – the fact that immigrants and their children are less frequently homeowners and thus more frequently represented in the HLM than the mainstream population – is the root of the problem surrounding housing policies (others are handled in this chapter as follows). Table 16 shows that because the socio-economic status, homeownership is less common among non-Europeans. Even though tenants have the right to purchase their dwelling in HLM by law since 1965\(^60\), more recent HLM policies have been committed to increase the number of homes for sale in exchange for new buildings from 2007. The tenant can purchase the dwelling under certain conditions: (1) he/she has to have 10 to 15 year lease, (2) it is forbid to sell the property within 5 years to avoid windfall, (3) discount up to 20% of the market price implies, and (4) the building must have been built or acquired by the HLM organization for over 10 years and less than 15 years (Groupe 3F). Yet, because European households are better informed about the procedures, the rate of homeownership still remains low.

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\(^{60}\) Law no 65-556.
Table 16. Homeownership and renting rates of natives and immigrants (2006 and 2008) (in%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportion of homeowners</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-immigrants</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion living in HLM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-immigrants</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion living in other accommodation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-immigrants</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (1) For 2008, Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France, INSEE 2012, (2) for 2006 Enquête Logement (Housing Survey), INSEE 2006

The second problem emphasized in policy research chapter concerns the inequality of access to housing and discrimination, both perceived as in actual discrimination cases. Although it is important to note that causes are difficult to determine, there are several adjustments made to alleviate the possibility of discrimination. Means to fight against discrimination in France were almost non-existent until the end of the 1990s. The question became part of the national agenda in 1998. Since then, due to the characteristics of French policies, specific agencies were created to report issues of poor housing and discrimination, such as: High Committee for housing disadvantaged people (HCLPD Haut Comité pour le logement des personnes défavorisées), the Group for the Study and the Fight against Discrimination (GELD, Groupe l’Étude et de Lutte contre les Discriminations), The French Equal Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission (HALDE) and the Action and Support Fund for the Integration and Fight Against Discrimination (FASILD Fonds d’Action et de Soutien pour l’intégration et la Lutte contre Discrimination) (Sala Pala 2005: 61-62). The subject of discrimination as well as the concept of indirect discrimination was first addressed within the scope of European directive ‘on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin’ and entered the law in 2002 with the
Social Modernisation Act\(^6\) that criminalizes and sanctions discrimination in access to rental housing.

The second policy measure is the right to housing. Even though it has stated to be social right and it dates back to 1946, it was re-established and accompanied with various measures in 2007 with law no 2007-290. Since then the State must guarantee the right to housing of any person residing in French territory. Particular emphasis is on the six categories of ‘highest priority applicants’ i.e. roofless people, tenants facing eviction with no prospect of housing, people in temporary accommodation, people placed in housing considered to be unfit, people with at least one dependent child, people with a disability or with a disabled dependent whose housing is not regarded as decent (CNLE, \textit{Loi} 2007-290). First results published in 2008 by the monitoring High Committee for housing for disadvantaged people (HCLPD statistics) showed that 310 appeals were made of which 43\% were rejected and 45\% approved (CNLE, \textit{Loi Dalol}). In 2013, the activity rate increased rapidly and out of 91,091 appeals taken by the committee 41.4\% were approved, 1.6\% rejected and 22.2\% refused (who were accommodated or no longer in need for housing) (HCLPD statistics).

Because French policies avoid the sensitive category of race or ethnicity and remain neutral in terms of categorization, the universalist approach concentrates rather on categories of being ‘disadvantaged’ than being preferential in terms of origin. This way the racial classification is still avoided and ‘positive discrimination’ practiced.

The third and fourth problem that derived from policy research emphasized residential segregation and sensitive urban areas (ZUS \textit{zone urbaine sensible}) with high share of immigrant origin inhabitants. Both problems can be traced back to the uneven construction of the \textit{cités}. Areas with high density of social housing units have, on the one hand, been one of the main focuses in housing policies and on the other hand, raised a controversial conflict between social mixing and at the same time ensuring housing for all according to their needs. In 2009, there were 824 municipalities that constituted 405 sensitive urban areas (ZUS) and 126 urban tax-free areas (ZFU) (ONZUS 2009: \ldots\)

\(^6\) \textit{Loi de modernisation sociale}, Law no 2002-73 (also known as the DALO Law i.e. legally enforceable right to housing (\textit{droit au logement opposable})).
In 2004 18.3% of all immigrants lived in ZUS against 37% in 2012 (ONZUZ 2004, ONZUZ 2012). To ensure social cohesion and diversity and at the same time improve the conditions in sensitive urban areas, various legal arrangements have been implemented and yearly reports by ‘National Observatory of Sensitive Urban Areas’ (ONZUZ L’Observatoire National de la Politique de la Ville) are made on these areas.

The ‘Urban Solidarity and Renewal Act’ (SRU Loi de Solidarité et au renouvellement urbains) implemented in the 2000 paved the way to promote social mixing (mixité sociale). It modified the practice of urban planning deeply by giving the management to the communes i.e. every commune in an urban area is compelled to increase the social (ethnic) mix within housing tenures and have to devote at least 20% of their housing capacity to social housing. The law also states that in each urban district, one unit out of five has to be accessible for a tenant from the mainstream population i.e. French (Vie-Publique, La défense du droit au logement). In 2010, 426 municipalities were sanctioned for not meeting the 20% quota on social housing (Vie-Publique, Politique du logement social: chronologie).

The second most important housing act, ‘Direction and Operation of City and Urban Renewal’ (Loi d’orientation et de programmation pour la ville et la rénovation urbaine) implemented in 2003 created a National Agency for Urban Renewal (ANRU l’Agence nationale pour la rénovation urbaine) that provided urban reconstruction. Within 5 years 150,000 – 200,000 degrading dwelling units were demolished and 200,000 social housing units were built and renewed. The idea beneath the law was to mix tenants in degrading low-cost urban areas within better neighbourhoods (Vie-Publique, Politique du logement social: chronologie). It was accompanied with article L.2334-15 of the General code regulating local authorities that increased contributions for improvement in living conditions (ONZUZ 2009: 262). In 2010 compared to 2009, an increase of 9.7% was achieved in social housing funding (Vie-Publique, Politique du logement social).

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62 Law no 2000-1208.
63 The national average is 16%, Insee 2006.
64 Law no 2003-710.
The contradiction between focusing on social mixing and ensuring housing for all rises once again with the Rent Supplement Scheme (SLS *Supplément de loyer de solidarité*) introduced in 2005. This rent supplement is for tenants whose revenues exceed the ceilings for social housing entitlement by 20% (*Service public, logement social*). This scheme aimed at increasing the mobility of moving out from social housing. But because HLM units, particularly those in ZUS, remain to cost less than private housing and only the better off in terms of economic situation can move, it still limits the social mixing by growing the number of the poor (who are mainly immigrants from North-Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa) (Boulhol 2012: 17).

Fourth mean to encourage social mixing is the Social Cohesion Plan⁶⁵ (*Plan de cohésion sociale*) implemented by the government in 2005. This plan was first made for years 2005 to 2009 and it set a body of legislation on social cohesion. It aimed at improving employment and educational situation in areas with high density of HLM and immigrant population as well as for renovating degrading units and providing new ones (*Plan de cohésion sociale 2005-2009, gouvernement*). Plan provided 20 programs with 107 means in order to fight against unemployment, to promote social diversity, to solve the housing crisis by catching up in social rental housing and finally to ensure equal opportunities within different communes and fight discrimination. Respectively, to encourage social mixing and integration, four programs were introduced: (1) promoting the equality between territories by increasing funding for social and urban development in ZUS and forming ‘urban solidarity grants’ (*DSU Dotation de solidarité urbaine*) for municipalities of over 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants; (2) restoring the ‘the social bond’ by ensuring supply for social housing, strengthening the role of communes through decentralization, providing support and information on social rights, and developing social support structures; (3) improving the reception and integration of immigrants by creating the French agency in charge of migration and welcoming foreign people (*ANAM Agence nationale de l’accueil et des migrations*) that in 2009 becomes the French Immigration and Integration Office (*OFII Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’intégration*), creating the reception and integration contract (*CAI Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration*) by which the government agrees to provide certain

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⁶⁵ Also known as *Plan Borloo* after the presenter of the project – French politician Jean-Louis Borloo.
number of services (such as training programs) and the migrant agrees to participate, and finally better coordination on local levels, and finally by increasing the funding for FASILD, later to the Social Action Fund (FAS Fonds d’action sociale); (4) fighting against discrimination by creating the HALDE, implementing the legislation on racial discrimination and promoting ethnic diversity in business sector (Plan de cohésion sociale 2005-2009: 37-42).

Because housing in ZUS remains to be with lowest average rent, the share of immigrant population is still high. ONZUZ reports have shown that improvements have been made, but unemployment, discrimination and long delay in accessing social housing are still problems. For example, unemployment in ZUS decreased one-third between 2003 to 2008, but increased after the economic crises in 2010 to 2011 (ONZUZ 2009, 2012). On the other hand, in terms of housing, objectives were mostly achieved - nearly 100% of demolitions, 60% in constructing new units and 50% in urban renewal (ONZUZ 2009). The Social Cohesion Plan and strong decentralization have shown the strength of the French government in fighting against these problems. On the other hand, because large part of the legal body implemented remains hypothetically imperative, the reality still reflects problems tied with high immigrant concentration and accompanying problems i.e. the right to housing tends to concentrate the poorest population in sensitive areas and yet again, impede the social mixing.

3.4 Naturalization

3.4.1 Policy research outcome

Policy research outcome concentrates on five surveys and studies, and statistics by the Ministry of Justice:

- The 2012 survey “Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France” i.e. “Immigrants and descendants of immigrants in France” conducted by INSEE. Survey covers years from 2008 to 2011.

66 It was made mandatory from the 1st January, 2007.

• The 2010 research project “Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration (ACIT)” carried out by Migration Policy Group and France Terre d’Asile.

• The 2010 study on “Family Migration Policies in France” carried out by International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).

• The 2013 EUDO Citizenship Observatory’s country report on France.

• Statistics by the Ministry of Justice (Ministère de la justice) and the General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration (Secrétariat général à l’immigration et à l’intégration).

Despite permitting dual nationality, the core of French nationality lies within strong concepts of assimilationist practices on the one hand and universalist values such as treating all citizens equally on the other. Yet, French State and with recent reform, the prefects enjoy significantly increased discretion in terms of immigrant control and naturalization practices. Means to acquire French nationality are divided into two categories: (1) acquisitions by decree and (2) acquisitions by declaration. The first one consists of acquisitions by naturalization (par naturalisation), by reintegration (par réintégration) and by marriage (par marriage). The second one consist of acquisitions by ius soli (acquisitions de plein droit) without formalities (sans formalités) for 18 years olds and (b) anticipated declaration (déclaration anticipée) for 13 years olds born in France to foreign parents (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 110).

First problem concerning the acquisition of French nationality is the decrease of people acquiring, as shows table 17 particularly in terms of family reunification and acquisitions by marriage. Both surveys as well as population census and records of annual flows of citizenship acquisitions by the General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration (under the Ministry of the Interior) show that the number of people
acquiring French nationality is declining. Overall, foreign immigrants outnumber those who have become French. In 2008, 60% of immigrants were foreigners against 40% who acquired French nationality (TeO 2010: 115). *Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France* survey emphasises the dependence between the number of applications and changes in the administrative procedures as well as in legislation. If the acceptance of applicants by decree was 90,000 to 95,000 in 2008 to 2010, the number dropped to 66,000 by 2011. Due to similar reasons – reformed laws on immigration - the acquisitions by marriage experienced two sharp declines in 2005 and in 2008. The number of acquisitions by marriage dropped from 27,000 acquisitions between 1998 and 2007 to 22,000 in 2012 (*Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France* 2012: 110).

**Table 17.** Acquisition of French nationality, 2000-2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of acquisition</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By decree</td>
<td>77,478</td>
<td>101,785</td>
<td>87,878</td>
<td>70,095</td>
<td>91,918</td>
<td>91,948</td>
<td>94,573</td>
<td>66,273</td>
<td>46,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By naturalization</td>
<td>68,750</td>
<td>89,100</td>
<td>77,655</td>
<td>64,046</td>
<td>84,323</td>
<td>84,730</td>
<td>88,509</td>
<td>62,482</td>
<td>43,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By reintegration</td>
<td>8,728</td>
<td>12,685</td>
<td>10,233</td>
<td>6,049</td>
<td>7,595</td>
<td>7,218</td>
<td>6,064</td>
<td>3,891</td>
<td>2,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By anticipated declaration</td>
<td>35,883</td>
<td>27,258</td>
<td>26,881</td>
<td>26,945</td>
<td>25,639</td>
<td>23,771</td>
<td>23,086</td>
<td>23,342</td>
<td>24,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By marriage</td>
<td>26,056</td>
<td>21,527</td>
<td>29,276</td>
<td>30,989</td>
<td>16,213</td>
<td>16,355</td>
<td>21,923</td>
<td>21,664</td>
<td>22,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other declarations for acquisitions and reintegration</td>
<td>2,038</td>
<td>1,291</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>1,397</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>1,405</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>1,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition without formalities</td>
<td>8,570</td>
<td>2,966</td>
<td>2,553</td>
<td>2,576</td>
<td>2,335</td>
<td>2,363</td>
<td>2,455</td>
<td>2,122</td>
<td>2,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>150,026</strong></td>
<td><strong>154,827</strong></td>
<td><strong>147,868</strong></td>
<td><strong>132,002</strong></td>
<td><strong>137,452</strong></td>
<td><strong>135,842</strong></td>
<td><strong>143,275</strong></td>
<td><strong>114,584</strong></td>
<td><strong>96,088</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (1) Secrétariat général à l’immigration et à l’intégration (General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration), 2012; (2) Ministère de la justice (Ministry of Justice).

TeO survey emphasizes the strong correlation between the age of arrival, length of residence in France and the number acquiring French nationality. 64% of immigrants who arrived before age 10 become French, 53% who came between ages 10 to 16 and 32% of those who arrived after the age 16. Table 18 reports that differences are also
seen between groups of origin. More than 80% of Southeast Asian immigrants are French but mainly due to being political refugees. Those from North and Sub-Saharan Africa acquire nationality more often than southern European immigrants (TeO 2010: 116-117). The majority of immigrants acquiring nationality are from Africa (66%), Asia (14%) and Europe (15%), the four main nationalities are Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. The decline is seen among all immigrant origins: since the early 2000s the share of applicants from Maghreb has declined substantially from 51% in 2005 to 43% in 2011. Slighter decrease is seen among applicants from Asia and Europe. The most notable increase has been in recent years among applicants from Africa (excluding North Africa) who represented 14% in 2000 against 23% in 2011 (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 110-111).

Table 18. Acquiring French nationality by decree or marriage according to origin 2000-2011, in %.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia, Laos</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>countries</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>America, Oceania</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France, INSEE 2012

The ACIT research shows that French citizenship policy is strongly preferential. Even though children of French citizens and children born on French territory have automatic
access to citizenship\textsuperscript{67}, conditions offered for family-related naturalization are weaker. Law limits child transfer and spousal extension (Tjaden 2010: 10). If family reunification was relatively stable between 2002 and 2005 with approximately 22,000 to 27,000 individuals coming in, a sharp decrease to 14,371 appeared in 2006\textsuperscript{68}. Once again it was a result of toughening reforms on immigration (Kofman et al. 2010: 12). The conditions in order to acquire nationality by marriage such as the minimum years of marriage and residence in France have been reformed several times. Yet, if the criteria are met and the applicant has no criminal offences nor ‘assimilation defects’\textsuperscript{69}, immigrants’ citizenship automatically extends to his/her children if they declare the child during the application process (Tjaden 2010: 10).

The second problem that also partly explains the decline in acquisitions is the restrictive requirements for ordinary naturalization i.e. toughened assessment of applicants’ assimilation. Alongside with reforms on immigration laws France imposes more and more demanding language and civic knowledge requirements resulting in hardening of the French exam necessary to obtain naturalization (Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France 2012: 110). These are accompanied with criminal record and economic resource requirements. Firstly, applicants must present a linguistic diploma awarded by an institution accredited by the French State that certifies minimally B1 level under the CEFR\textsuperscript{70} proficiency assessment. Secondly, applicants must prove their knowledge on history and culture while there is a lack of information and study resources available for the preparation. Thirdly, any conviction with a penalty of six months imprisonment or more without suspension disqualifies for naturalization. Finally, applicant has to provide tax reports (avis d’imposition fiscale conjoint) despite

\textsuperscript{67} Also persons with cultural affinity with special achievements for the country and persons serving in the French army. Special provisions also apply for those in a country where French is the official language, if the citizen speaks French as a mother tongue, or have received primary education in French (Tjaden 2010: 10).

\textsuperscript{68} Yet, the number of residence permits under the title ‘Private and Family Life’ almost doubled (Kofman et al. 2010: 12).

\textsuperscript{69} For example stepping over the rules set for religious expressions in public or not fully imposing to one’s assimilation in other ways.

\textsuperscript{70} Common European Framework of Reference for Languages.
the absence of clear legal provision. In addition, the duration of one’s residence also matters i.e. applicant are required five years of usual residence with no more than consecutive and ten total months of absence (Tjaden 2010: 11). The problem concerning particularly the assessment of assimilation reveals itself through the hardening conditions of the exam and lack of information and study resources. Main obstacle concerning the fulfillment of economic resource requirements is the absence of a clear legal framework.

The third problem concerns the recent decentralization process in charge of naturalisation i.e. since 2010 local authorities (préfectures) have wide ranging discretion to implement citizenship laws and to decide on individual naturalisation claims. While the formal law has not changed, in practice there is a higher risk of less consistent implementation of requirements (Tjaden 2010: 15). That means that in addition to legal requirements for acquiring French nationality, there are also practical and bureaucratic obstacles i.e. French central administration has to apply the rules equally across the country despite that every préfecture is able to make a decision alone and the national level intervenes only in case of negative decision (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 24). This means that cases of unjust denial, discrimination or any form of fluctuation in applying the naturalization process may occur more often.

Obstacles concerning the acquisition of French nationality and naturalization policies reflect the outcome of more selective immigration policy and the State’s control over immigration. The sharp decline in the number of acquisitions for French nationality reflects the results immigration laws being in midst of heated political debates and reforms. The hardening of naturalisation requirements and the reform on decentralization of decision-making has contributed to French’ citizenship regime moving towards being more inclusive and restrictive.

3.4.2 Political decision-making

All problems concerning the nature of citizenship policy, the decline in acquisitions and requirements needed are the result of changes made in the French nationality laws. Both means – by decree and by declaration – became political issue in 1985 and have since
been under several reforms and dependent on the ruling party. There have been five modifications since: in 1993, 1998, 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2011. It is important to note that *ius soli* principle was the first to underwent serious attempts to restrict access to French nationality: in 1993 the French Nationality Law\(^{71}\) abolished the child born in France to foreign parents to become French citizen without formalities and the right of parents to claim citizenship for their child after birth in France before his/her age of 18. Accompanied with restricted conditions of entry into the country and removing the application of double *ius soli*, the suspicion of mixed marriages also rose and new conditions were introduced. Even though principles of acquisition by declaration were re-established with the law adopted in 1998\(^{72}\), these changes in legislation caused confusion among individuals who thought they were already French and started an ongoing debate over French nationality laws with a clear shift towards more selective migration system (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 13-15). Since then the Nationality Law has been amended three more times: in 2003, 2006 and again in 2011 (*Vie-Publique, L’acquisition de la nationalité française*). It is also important to note that in terms of nationality acquisition legislation, policy decision-making is more a result of governing political parties and shifts in migration policy in general. Surveys made tend to reveal the consequences and continual problems.

The first problem addressed in the policy research chapter emphasizes the sharp decline in acquisitions for nationality by decree, in particular in acquisitions by marriage. Because family migration is the dominant migration flow, conditions for nationality through marriage play an important role. With the right wing returning to power in 2002, new attempts to restrict access to French nationality are introduced (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 17). The law no. 2003-1119 on Immigration Control, the Residence of Aliens in France and Nationality amended in 2003 reinforces the conditions to acquire French nationality in four ways: (*Vie-Publique, L’acquisition de la nationalité française*). Firstly, in order to strengthen the fight against illegal immigration the principle measure includes the creation of databases of fingerprints and photos of aliens applying for a residence permit. Secondly, to fight against supposed ‘marriages of

\(^{71}\) Law no 93-933.

\(^{72}\) Law no 98-170.
convenience’ the conditions for acquisition through marriage are tightened (Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes, 2007). Penalties are imposed for marriages and paternity of convenience i.e. proof must be made that community life cannot be reduced to a simple cohabitation but it is “emotional and physical”. Even more, the delay of access to French nationality for foreign spouses is two years against one year with 1998 reform if the couple lived in France for at least one year (otherwise it is extended to three years if the spouse is living abroad). Thirdly, French exam necessary to obtain naturalization is hardened. New criterion for assessing the assimilation into the French community through sufficient knowledge of the French language, rights and duties of French citizenship are introduced (Historique du droit de la nationalité française, Ministère de l’intérieur): “…no one can be granted French nationality unless he/she justifies his/her assimilation into the French Community, in particular with regard to a sufficient knowledge of the French language and the rights and duties conferred by the French State” (Strik et al. 2010: 5). This explains the sharp decline in nationality acquisitions in general and by marriage in 2005.

Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France survey showed another sharp decline in 2008 that can be explained with the 2006 Act of Immigration and Integration73 aiming at more selective immigration to meet the needs of the French economy on the one hand (encouraging the migration of highly skilled workers and creating new types of temporary residence permits as was seen in the chapter on labour market) and changing the conditions for family reunification on the other. The law also introduces the compulsory requirement to sign a ‘Reception and Integration Contract’ (CAI Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration) under the Social Cohesion Plan and fights illegal immigration through deporting aliens after ten years of illegal residence on French territory in a single decision (Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes, 2007). Even though all listed modifications influence the number of acquisitions in one way or another, the most important change reveals itself once again through tightening the rules on family reunification. Firstly, the delay of access to French nationality for foreign spouses is extended to four years (against two years in 2003) if the couple lived in France for at least three years (against one year in 2003). Secondly, foreign spouse can receive a 10-

73 Act no. 2006-911.
year residence permit after three years of marriage without interruption. The law also suppresses the exemption of delay of residence for foreigners from former colonies and francophone countries i.e. they are now subject to the ordinary law of five years of residence in France (Historique du droit de la nationalité française, Ministère de l’intérieur).

The 2007 law toughens the control over family immigration even more. Four principles are added to the existing system linked to tax reports (avis d’imposition fiscale conjoint): firstly, future immigrants must have a certain level of income to be eligible for family reunification; secondly, he/she has to pass a test on the French language level and values of the Republic; thirdly has to ensure the integration of his/her children under the ‘Reception and Integration Contract for Families’ (Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration pour la famille étrangère); and finally, undergo genetic testing (DNA test) for citizens of countries where there are serious doubts as to whether birth and marriage certificates are authentic (Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes, 2007).

The second problem concerns the restrictive requirements and toughened assessment of applicants’ assimilation. Requirements demanding language, cultural, historic and civic knowledge have undergone several changes. Since 1927 assimilation has been the fundamental requirement for naturalization. Immigrant had to prove sufficient proficiency in the French language and that they are ‘culturally assimilated’. The 2003 law reinforced this condition and added the requirements of proving sufficient knowledge about the ‘rights and duties’ of French citizenship. Aim of the amendment stated that newly naturalized citizens understood the significance of ‘becoming a citizen’ (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 18). These requirements are increased by the Act no. 2011-672 in 2011 which focuses on the linguistic and cultural assimilation, and marks the return to an elective and voluntarist conception of nationality. Applicants must now certify the level of B1 proficiency according to the CEFR system; secondly have sufficient knowledge of history, culture and French society; and thirdly, adhere to the fundamental principles and values of the Republic. These principles and values, as well

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74 Law no. 2007-1631.
as symbols of the Republic are contained in the charter of right and duties of the French citizen (Historique du droit de la nationalité française, Ministère de l’intérieur). This way the ‘rights and duties’ of 2003 become the ‘essential principles and values of the Republic’. The law also replaces the assessment of language skills and ‘linguistic assimilation’ through an interview\(^{75}\) by a civil servant that was in place since 1927 with a language diploma from an institution accredited by the French State (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 18). This Nationality Test (Test de Nationalité Française) checks the level of assimilation during a personal interview with an officer of the prefecture through a 10 multiple-choice questions that will be asked of all candidates. The Ministry of the Interior have designed a website that allows the applicant to practice through a free online test\(^{76}\).

The third problem addresses the decentralization process in charge of naturalization. Until 2008 there were two levels of decision: firstly the prefecture processed the case and gave its opinion on the application and secondly, the national administration was in charge of naturalization that made the final decision. Since the 2010 reform\(^{77}\) every prefecture is able to make a decision alone and the national level intervenes only in negative decisions. This, alongside with hardening the naturalization requirements have diminished the number of naturalizations dramatically (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 6). The candidate is a subject to an investigation by the gendarmes, the police, intelligence services and other civil servants before verification (Bertossi & Hajjat 2013: 24). Because the reform changed only the administrative side and not the formal law on citizenship implementation, no further modifications have been applied despite the possible risk of less consistent implementation of the requirements.

These reforms illustrate the inclusive nature of French nationality regime and a clear shift towards more selective migration policies. Six major legislative changes in 1993, 1998, 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2011 have restricted the access to French nationality and hardened the requirements for naturalization. Accompanied with the 2010 reform on decentralization local prefects now decide solely on naturalization. All together,

\(^{75}\) Procès-verbal d’assimilation.

\(^{76}\) http://www.testdenationalite.com/Test_de_Nationalite/Accueil.html

\(^{77}\) Reform IMIC1000113C.
these changes have kept the question of immigration, family reunification and fight against illegal residence into the midst of heated debates. In addition, the permission of dual nationality and the high number of bi-nationals have awaken new debates on dual loyalties and its effect to undermine “the foundations of the State” (Vie-Publique, L’acquisition de la nationalité française).

3.5 Sense of belonging

3.5.1 Policy research outcome

Due to the complexity of the issue, national belonging is difficult to measure and there are little quantitative surveys devoted especially to identity questions. Therefore the policy research outcome concentrates on the TeO survey (2010) carried out by INSEE and INED.

In addition to education, housing, labour market and citizenship related policies, integration can also determined by ‘sense of nationhood’ or ‘sense of belonging’ (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003: 12). Theories of assimilation mainly focus on the profound change in the personality of migrants and therefore their identity (Simon & Tiberj 2012: 3). Since France follows republican universalism, integration is seen as a process that should ensure that all people, regardless of their origins or beliefs, are likely to be ‘unified to’ (rattachés) political society and become French citizens despite their diverse backgrounds. This way the assimilationist nature of French integration policies and the question of belonging or identity refers to the State’s ‘right to formalise one’s sense of belonging to the nation’ (droit de rattachement) (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003: 16). Milton Gordon has divided the assimilationist variables into 7 categories and the ‘identificational assimilation’ is in the centre: it is explained as the development of a sense of belonging exclusively oriented towards the host society by an emotional attachment and connection i.e. a complete abandonment of the attachment to one’s original society (Gordon 1964: 71). Because France demands knowledge in French history, culture, language, and civic rights and duties, expectations for immigrants’ level of assimilation are high and profoundly questioned in the light of dual citizenship and recent riots (2005).
The main problem considering national belonging in French integration policy framework derives from permitting dual nationality. The research on French national identity ties the problem surrounding ‘sense of belonging’ and ‘Frenchness’ with dual nationality. The question whether someone can belong to France and still have ties to a minority culture or a foreign country has been criticised in France to be a zero-sum game i.e. commitment to a minority culture or a foreign country detracts from the quality of one’s commitment to French identity (Simon 2012: 1).

Because ‘national belonging’ is complex to study, TeO survey used series of questions and statements such as “I feel French” and “I feel at home in France” to measure national belonging (TeO 2010: 115). The question of ‘I feel French’ illustrates particularly an aspect of national sentiment that may be felt whether or not the person in question has French nationality. Even more, the fact of living in France creates a sense of belonging to the extent of which varies according to a person’s history, educational and cultural background, and socio-demographic characteristics. Therefore just the bare notion of having French nationality does not determine the relationship to “Frenchness” (TeO 2010: 119-120). TeO survey shows that having French nationality does not necessarily determine the relationship to ‘Frenchness’. It also emphasizes that even though 42% of immigrants will become French, being French does not prevent people from having another nationality and also does not automatically mean that the person in question feels French. The number of bi-nationals is high among immigrants and the share of naturalized immigrants who have decided to keep their original nationalities has grown from 7% in 1992 to 67% in 2008: nearly half the people who have acquired French nationality have also kept their original nationality. The share of bi-nationals is particularly high among North African immigrants (two-thirds have dual nationality), Turkish immigrants (55%) and Portuguese immigrants (43%). Dual nationality is lowest among immigrants from Southeast Asia (less than 10%) (TeO 2010: 115-118).

The question of attachment to France or one’s country of origin varies greatly: Turkish immigrants are the most attached to their nationality, but one third of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians are also bi-national. The situation is especially significant in the case of Algerians, who because of the dual ius soli, used to have French nationality at birth (TeO 2010: 119).
The situation is especially significant in the case of Algerians, who because of the dual *ius soli*, used to have French nationality at birth (TeO 2010: 119). Table 19 illustrates the fact that having French nationality does not automatically determine the feeling of ‘Frenchness’ - 16% of immigrants with French nationality did not feel French against nearly half of the foreigners. On the other hand, 54% of immigrants with French nationality feel French against 22% of foreigners. National sentiment is not an issue among mainstream population of whom only 2% reported not feeling French (TeO 2010: 120). In terms of country of origin, the percentage of those willing to feel at home in France is highest among immigrants from Portugal (73%), Spain and Italy (76%) and lowest among immigrants from (Africa (42%), Turkey (54%) and EU-27 (59%). Feeling attachment towards one’s country of origin is highest among African immigrants (68%) and particularly among Moroccans and Tunisians (61%). Many individuals who do not identify themselves as French still feel invested in the communities in which they live (Tiberj & Simon 2012: 16).

Table 19. Sentiment of ‘being French’ by link to migration and nationality (in %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mainstream population</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-response</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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3.5.2 Political decision-making

Nationality is a fundamental element of the French immigration policy. Since multiculturalism is strongly rejected, France follows republican and universalist traditions. Therefore transforming immigrants into French citizens and thus into national unity, is one of the main indicators of a successful integration. If nationality laws remained stable from 1945 to 1980, it was not the case from 1980s onward. The issue of immigration and particularly dual belonging endangering national identity has been increasingly in the political debates (Vie-Publique, L’acquisition de la nationalité française). Even though the problem roots back to the Third Republic\(^{78}\), criticism on behalf of dual belonging has risen into heated debates particularly after the 2005 riots among immigrants. Concerns regarding hyphenated identity and split allegiances of foreigners weakening social cohesion have followed the rising share of immigrants. In 2007 Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development\(^ {79}\) was formed with one task to ‘promote national identity’ (Simon 2012: 1). Two years later in 2009, “Great Debate on National Identity\(^ {80}\)” was launched by the government to codify ‘what it means to be French’ and ‘what is the contribution of immigration to national identity’ (Rovan 2009). During 350 meetings and 58,000 submissions to a dedicated website (“What is French?” it was perceived as a political ploy but at the same time illustrative example of doubt surrounding immigrants’ loyalty (Simon 2012: 1).

Criticism hardened during frequent reforms on nationality law. In 1998, the deprivation of nationality was provided under four conditions: if the person was convicted in an act of crime, violating the fundamental interests of the nation or constituting an act of terrorism; if convicted for an act of crime or offence under the Penal Code\(^ {81}\); if convicted of evading his obligations under national service code; and finally, if the person favoured a foreign state and was prejudicial to the interests of France. In 2010, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced a desire to expand the number of offenses that

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\(^{78}\) 1870-1940.


\(^{80}\) Grand débat sur l’identité nationale.

\(^{81}\) Book IV of the Penal Code, Chapter II of the Title III.
allow nationality deprivation for French of foreign origin. During the parliamentary debate over the Law on Immigration, Integration and Nationality, the National Assembly (Assemblée nationale) voted in favour of the amendment providing deprivation for those convicted or causing someone’s death during an act of violence. This was rejected by the Senate and therefore not included in the 2011 Nationality Law (2011-672). This was followed by another debate in 2011. Led by the National Front and Marine Le Pen, a letter with 577 members’ signatures was formed asking to prohibit dual nationality. It was stated that dual loyalties would undermine “the foundations of the State”. Even though the ‘conflict of loyalty’ has a strong presence in the public discourse, dual nationality has not been forbidden. On the contrary, according to many dual citizenship is a keystone for integration and an instrument with great influence (Vie-Publique, L’acquisition de la nationalité française).
4 Interpretation of findings

Five indicators chosen for the thesis to frame the integration in economic social, cultural and political areas – education, labour market, housing, naturalization and sense of belonging – are the ones most commonly used to measure and characterize integration policies. Because education lays in many ways the foundation to further integration, school system and supportive structures provided within are seen as the primary vehicles for immigrant integration. Labour market characterizes the nature of host country’s migration policies – whether it is selective or not, how is the access for immigrants provided, what are the restrictive conditions and how policies deal with immigrants coming from less developed countries. These determine the extent of integration labour wise. Even though housing policies are often tied with the socio-cultural context of the previous regime, it shows the level of support structures offered, exposes the risk for residential segregation and at the same time, policies fighting against it. It also helps to contrast the share needing social housing within the mainstream and foreign-born population and thus say a great deal about immigrant origin socio-economic status. Naturalization policies reveal the nature of the policies regarding becoming a citizen and a national, the extent of restrictive conditions made and whether the system is encouraging or not. Studying ‘sense of belonging’ helps to frame the political discourse surrounding the questions of national identity, particularly in case of dual nationality. In terms of France, it has raised serious doubts whether dual belonging undervalues the loyalties towards the host country.

The relationship between integration policy research and actual political decision-making in terms of the first indicator – education – reveals that there is a common understanding towards the integration policy to be assimilationist. This means that number of elements acting as obstacles against successful integration into the educational system are bound with demands posed by the State or specific socio-demographic characteristics of the immigrant-origin student. Firstly, because fluency and literacy in French language are prerequisites to enter the mainstream school system, integration policies have developed a support structure offered in each educational level: introductory and integration classes (CLIN, CRI) accompanied with intensive language programs in primary school, and reception classes and temporary welcoming models (CLA, MAT) in lower and upper secondary school level. During 2003 – 2011, approximately 79% of non-francophone students benefited from these classes. Immigrant-origin students are also provided with courses on their culture and language of origin (ELCO) but the number of these courses has declined. Secondly, policy research showed that immigrant origin children are less likely to obtain certificates and more likely to have no qualification or CEP/BEPC level certificates. For this the State has launched several national systems of training (GRETA) and support structures against school dropout (MLDS). From 2006 to 2008 approximately 80% of students received help. Thirdly, in terms of discrimination and school segregation the State has only build a legislative body of anti-discrimination laws and except few cases of positive discrimination to provide access to certain schools, ‘school ghettoization’ and segregation are still strong issues. This shows that some problems, particularly linked to student’s origin and educational background, are continuously present. Thus the lack of interaction between policy research and political decision-making cannot be blamed.

The relationship between integration policy research and actual political decision-making in terms of the second indicator – labour market – reveals greater gap than in education policies. The turn towards more selective immigration policy, growing openness towards skilled workers and hardening restrictions of entry requirements have resulted in high unemployment among foreign origin population, limited the selectivity of immigration through rising numbers of illegal aliens and has still left the highest proportion of immigrant influxes to come through family reunification. The main problem revealed by policy research refers to the protectionist and selective nature of
the labour market i.e. France has restricted access to more jobs than any other European country. The situation has shown little improvement or even more, due to the shift towards high selectivity, list of shortage skilled occupations for areas with ‘recruitment difficulties’ are made for third countries’ nationals. Secondly, to ease unemployment and over-representation of immigrant-origin population in certain sectors, territorial policies or city policies (politique de la ville) have started a system of employment and training contracts organised in disadvantaged suburbs by National Employment Agency and NGOs. But because these are mainly addressed towards youth aged 16 to 25, these aid programs have not helped older foreign origin population. The selective nature of French labour market was enhanced again with the 2006 law opening new forms of residence and working permits. Because these are highly conditioned, low-skilled and unskilled population is still at risk of long-term social and economic exclusion. In these terms, the government has moved an opposite direction. Finally, the policy research section emphasized the labour market discrimination. Again, there have been series of anti-discrimination laws concerning the workplace, but forbidding any form of discrimination in general does not eliminate de facto cases and perceived cases of discrimination. Thus, the shift towards more selective migration and labour policy has not improved continuously present problems or even worse, has deepened the issues. This means that the gap between policy research and political decision-making reveals a strong correlation between existing socio-economical problems and governing political elite.

The relationship between integration policy research and actual political decision-making in terms of the third indicator – housing – reveals a contradictory, yet relatively successful interaction i.e. because the long history and ‘practice’ of social housing policies, problems surrounding housing have in many ways stayed the same and addressed over the years with slight improvements. It is difficult to assess whether these are the result of policy research or experience from social housing’s historical setting. First problem of policy research emphasized that immigrants are less frequently homeowners and thus more frequently occupy social housing. Because the problem is strongly linked to the socio-economic status of the resident in question, the State can only encourage the conditions for ownership and this has been practiced since 2007 through economic incentives. Despite the government driven actions, the rate of
homeownership remains low. Second problem that addressed unequal treatment and discrimination in terms of access to housing has been answered through developing a body of anti-discriminatory laws and agencies since respectively from 1990s and 2005, to either help disadvantaged people or to guide and help them in case of possible discrimination (HALDE, HCLPD, GELD). The activity rate of applicants for social housing (both tenants and purchasers) has increased since. Third and fourth problem focused on residential segregation and closely linked high number of sensitive urban areas. Because these problems are tied with the history of construction (to certain areas, around certain cities) and reveal a conflict between social mixing on the one hand and ensuring housing for all on the other, it is difficult to avoid the accumulation of certain origin immigrants’ into one place. This is the case even more if they form the largest share of immigrants and thus have the greatest need for social housing. Yet, to improve the situation particularly in ZUS, the State has formed a National Observatory of Sensitive Urban Areas in charge of reporting annually on improvements and deepening problems. Through several reforms, laws and plans social mixing as well as demolishing degrading buildings and building new ones has improved the situation. Even more, every commune has had to devote at least 20% of its housing capacity to social housing. Thus objectives in terms of building and demolishing have been achieved, but the high share of immigrant origin tenants and segregation has not. It is difficult to argue if the problems can be related back to the lack of interaction. It is rather a consequence of demand and offer i.e. because social housing remains to be with lowest average rent, the share of the population most in need (immigrant-origin) tends to reside there. Yet again, because French policies avoid the sensitive category of race or ethnicity and remain neutral in terms of categorization, the universalist approach concentrates rather on categories of being ‘disadvantaged’ than acting on the basis of, for example, a residing ethnic minority.

The relationship between integration policy research and actual political decision-making in terms of the fourth indicator – naturalization – reveals that the interaction has worked quite oppositely. France has had six major legislative changes on nationality laws (1993, 1998, 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2011) and one regarding the decentralization (2010) of authorities in charge of naturalization. Thus the problems addressed in the policy research part are more the consequences of the changes already made. Even
more, despite the problems addressed, naturalization policies have moved towards being more and more restrictive through hardening the access conditions, lengthening the minimum duration and adding several conditions particularly for nationality acquisition by marriage. Thus, the first problem derived from policy research shows the inclining number of nationality acquisitions in general and by marriage in particular. The number has dropped directly because of these reforms. Second problem is once again a cause for the incline and a result of the law reforms emphasizing on toughened assessment and growingly restrictive requirements for ordinary naturalization. Even though cultural assimilation and assessment of one’s level of assimilation have always played central part in naturalization procedures, new more demanding requirements on language proficiency, cultural, historic and civic knowledge have been implemented several times. Another reason for the hardened conditions is undoubtedly bound with the doubt surrounding dual citizenship i.e. by these demanding requirements the applicant is also directed towards being knowledgeable about the significance of becoming a citizen and the essential principles of the Republic. Third problem addressed the recent decentralization reform on authorities in charge of deciding on applicants’ acquisitions i.e. issues such as unjust denial and discrimination as well as high risk of less consistent implementation of requirements. Again this is a causal problem of decision already made by the State, but the risks are difficult to measure because the reform is relatively recent. Thus, because the formal law on citizenship implementation did not change, no further modifications have been implied. Therefore examining naturalization policies reveal quite controversial relationship – political decision-making in many ways exceeds the policy research i.e. the six major legislative changes implemented support the clear shift towards more selective migration policy revealed within labour related policies, and illustrate the growingly inclusive nature of French nationality regime.

The relationship between integration policy research and actual political decision-making in terms of the last indicator – sense of belonging – is the hardest to measure, to handle and to place between the interaction of research and policy making. Due to the complexity of the issue, there are also relatively little surveys to base on. Never the less, questions on ‘Frenchness’ adds another dimension to understand the current integration policies and shifts occurred. The policy research emphasized on the root problem for the doubt surrounding immigrants’ and newly naturalized individuals’ loyalty – permitting
dual nationality. The problem is more complicated because on the one hand, dual belonging is of key importance for integration i.e. it encourages acquiring French nationality without the need to give up the original one. On the other hand, dual belonging is always followed by the doubt being a zero sum game i.e. commitment to one’s foreign country might detract the quality of one’s commitment to French identity. Because multiculturalism is strongly rejected and republican and universalist values followed, ‘Frenchness’ has been in the midst of heated debates since the mid-1980s. Depending on the party as well as on general attitudes among the nation (radicalizing specially in deteriorating economic conditions or after riots), criticism on behalf of dual nationality has been made several times. Debates on nationality deprivation and even dual nationality prohibition have particularly densified alongside with the frequent reforms on nationality law. Even though it is hard to assess the relationship between policy research and political decision-making, the tone accompanying these debates is far from encouraging.

After evaluating the relationship between policy research and political decision-making in terms of every indicator, the part of whether integration has tended towards being discouraging (restrictive) or encouraging (nonrestrictive) can be addressed. Out of five indicators, only two - educational and housing related policies - have tended towards being encouraging and nonrestrictive. The other two – labour market, and naturalization related policies – have tended towards being discouraging and restrictive. ‘Sense of belonging’ is once again difficult to place within this framework. Even though the tone of political debates has been rather discouraging, no further policies have been implemented nor have been the dual nationality forbidden. For that reason, ‘sense of belonging’ is not placed into the notional matrix.

This division (restrictive vs. nonrestrictive and discouraging vs. encouraging) shows how policies within the four fields differ. In case of education and housing, several policies have been implemented that react to policy research and therefore aim to improve the situation. In terms of the former, the State has launched multiple programs for those who are no longer subjects to compulsory schooling as well as to fight against school dropout. In terms of the latter, the State has improved and built social housing units, implemented compulsory quota for the share of social housing in every commune and encouraged home ownership through economic incentives. The situation is quite the
opposite in terms of labour market and naturalization policies. Both have not reacted to policy research. Particularly in case of naturalization, the policy research has dealt with problems and obstacles occurred after the series of changes made to the nationality law. In terms of the labour market, France has taken a course towards highly selective immigration policy and implemented series of changes to meet the labour market needs through highly skilled workers. The restricted access to more jobs than any other European country accompanied with highly selective immigration policy has left large share of immigrant origin population unemployed or working in lowest paying sectors. In terms of naturalization, more demanding requirements have been set on language proficiency, cultural, historic and civic knowledge and conditions have been hardened twice particularly in acquisitions by marriage. Altogether 7 major changes in nationality legislation have left the area even more sensitive.

The integration system as well as changes under every indicator handled show and confirm the problems deriving from fundamental tensions between ethnicity and republican universalist values on the one hand, and the color-blind approach on the other. By systematically rejecting the recognition of ethnic or racial groups, immigrants and minority groups are seen equal on the basis of citizenship. If policies condemn the inequality based on ‘origin’ and yet refuse to use the criteria of ‘origin’ for policy purposes, there is a fundamental contradiction.
Summary

The aim of this master’s thesis has been to analyze and contrast the relationship and interaction between integration policy research and actual political decision-making in terms of French immigration and integration policy. Another objective has been to address the nature of these policies – whether they have tended towards being discouraging and restrictive or encouraging and nonrestrictive under five chosen indicators: education, labour market, housing, naturalization and sense of belonging. The indicators chosen frame the integration in economic social, cultural and political areas and are commonly used to measure and characterize integration policies. The core idea poses that policy research and policy-making reveal a contradiction and a gap i.e. the interaction does not necessarily mean that policies react to problems addressed by the policy research part.

To evaluate the relationship between policy research outcome and political decision-making, most significant problems deriving from policy research i.e. surveys were put forth and analyzed under each indicator. Then the political decision-making was contrasted according to every problem handled i.e. all major law enforcements, support structures, formed institutions and any other forms of integration policies were juxtaposed. This gave an overview of the relationship and characteristics of interaction under every indicator and at the same time, enabled to evaluate under which indicators the relationship worked backwards or revealed a gap.

To evaluate whether integration policies have moved towards being restrictive and discouraging or nonrestrictive and encouraging, problems derived from policy research and political decisions, developments and legislative changes were also analyzed in the light of public discourse. Accompanied with one additional indicator addressing the ‘sense of belonging’, another dimension was added to understand the integration policies and recent shifts occurred. This enabled to analyze the restrictive or nonrestrictive course taken under every indicator.

The results show that the relationship between integration policy research and actual political decision-making reveals a contradiction in terms of labour market and naturalization policies. Due to the clear shift towards highly selective immigration
policy, laws concerning resident and working permits as well as citizenship acquisition have undergone several major changes. Interaction has been more fruitful in terms of education and housing where functioning support structures have formed earlier due to French’ specific historic setting. Respectively, policies have moved towards being more and more restrictive and discouraging most significantly in terms of naturalization where not only the nationality law in general has been modified, but particularly hardened in terms of civic and language knowledge demands, and conditions for acquisitions by marriage. Strongly restrictive turn illustrates also the labour market where France has restricted access to more jobs than any other European country. Policies have moved or stayed towards being nonrestrictive and encouraging in terms of education and housing. The fifth additional indicator – sense of belonging – is difficult to place within this notional matrix, but it is clear that due to dual nationality permission, dual belonging is surrounded with doubt and fear for dual loyalties.
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10) HCLPD Haut Comité pour le logement des personnes défavorisées


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Kokkuvõte

Immigratsiooni ja integratsiooni politika Prantsusmaal: politikauuringute ja poliitiliste otsuste omavaheline suheestumine


Töö lähtetuluseks on ühelt poolt eelnevalt käsitletud fundamentaalne vastuolu etnilisuse, kommunitaarse vabariiklikuse ja universalistlike printsipide vahel ning teisalt vastes mudeli läbikukkumisest. Selle põhjal on käesoleval tööl kaks eesmärki: esmalt uurida ja analüüsida integratsioonialaste politikauuringute ning tegelike poliitiliste otsuste
omavahelist suhestumist ja nende vahel esinevat võimalikku vastuolu ning teiseks vaadelda, kas inetgratsioonialased poliitikad on võtnud suuna tugeva reguleerituse ja piiratuse või mitte piiratuse ja julgustamise poole. Mõlema eesmärgi uurimiseks ja integratsiooni poliitikate rahastamiseks nii majanduslikus, kultuurilises, hariduslikus kui sotsiodemograafiafilises võtmes on töö aluseks võetud viis integratsiooni alusindikaatorid: haridus, tööturg, (sotsiaalne) majutus, naturalisatsioon ning rahvuslik kuuluvustunne.


Tulemused saadi uuringute, statistika, raportite ja seadusandluse taustal poliitikauuringutes tõestatud probleemide esitamise ning tegelike poliitiliste otsuste kõrveltamise läbi iga valitud integratsioonialase indikaatori lõikes. Analüüsi põhjal on võimalik esmalt nimetada need integratsioonialased indikaatorid, mille lõikes poliitikauuringud ja poliitiliste otsuste tegemise suhe on olnud retsiprookne ehk poliitikauuringutest lähtuvana vastuolu mitte paljastav ning need, mille lõikes suhe ei ole toiminud ehk poliitilised otsused on poliitikauuringutest lähtumata paljastanud vastuolu. Vastuolu illustreerivateks indikaatoriteks olid tööturgu ning naturalisatsiooni korda puudutavad poliitilised otsused. Retsiprookset suhestumist illustreerivateks indikaatoriteks haridust ning mõõndusteega majutust puudutavad poliitikad. Kuna viiendat indikaatorit, rahvuslikku kuuluvustunnet on keeruline mõõta ning sellealaseid tulemusi võimaldas hinnata vaid üks uuring, siis poliitiliste otsuste elluviimise puudumise tõttu omavahelist suhestumist hinnatud ei ole. Küll aga on indikaator, sellealased toimumud poliitilised debatid ja esialgu tagasilükatud ettepanekud liサンプルPrantsusmaa mudeli müüagitse väärtusliku lisadimensiooni. Tulemuste teise osana
saab väita, et kasvava piiratuse ja reguleerituse suunas on liikunud samade indikaatorite alased poliitikad – tõöturule sisenemist ning naturalisatsiooni puudutavad. Pigem mitte piiratuse ning integratsiooni julgustavate poliitikate alla kuuluvad mõõndustega haridust ja majutust puudutavad indikaatorid (mõõndustega seetõttu, et mitmed toimivad struktuurid on olnud töö aastakümneid ning ei ole seetõttu olnud otsesteks poliitikauuringute tulemusteks).