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An Insight to the EU Military Missions in Africa: French Leadership and Beyond

Master Thesis

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Abstract

The aim of the thesis is to analyse the leadership role member states – in particular France – play in implementing the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy with military crisis management missions in Africa. To that end, the research conducted in this thesis is placed within the framework of liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) theory. LI presupposes the centrality of the nation state in the European integration project, allowing for a closer analysis of the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy, and of the member states interests and motivations in the process, coupled with the limitations the system places on possible outcomes, with a focus on France. This is then placed in the integral context of the EU military missions to Africa, starting with Operation Artemis to the Democratic Republic of Congo, followed by EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Chad/CAR and Operation Atalanta/EU NAVFOR, with a brief overview of two non-missions that were under consideration. The thesis argues that EU military interventions in Africa are primarily done at the leadership of France, with the necessity of unanimity and compromise in a heterogeneous, ambiguous framework together with a need for political will and resource allocation from member states severely limits mission mandates as well as gives them a secondary rationale beyond humanitarian considerations.
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Introduction

Although the European integration project had, to a small degree of intensity, tried to incorporate foreign and security policy issues into the construct from the onset, the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of war in Kosovo played an instrumental role in the establishment of an international security character for the European Union. Concurrently with instability in its neighbourhood, in the rest of the world there was an upsurge in violent intrastate and inter-state conflict, and failing or failed states. Thus, during the 1990’s the EU faced several challenges, leading to the re-evaluation of its conflict management capabilities and policies. Since as a collective, the EU carries international weight primarily in the spheres of soft power (form trade to environmental policy) but in order to act more forcefully and in accordance with expectations and changes in the international system, an autonomous hard power capacity was found pertinent. As a result, the ‘common European policy on security and defence’ was officially launched at the Cologne Summit in 1999 as the ‘European Security and Defence Policy’ (ESDP), and with the Lisbon Treaty (entering into force in 2009) transformed into the ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’ (CSDP) (Bickerton et al. 2011). Its objectives are broadly two-fold: internal institutional development to allow for coherence, cooperation and thus a greater role in international security issues; and to give the EU practical autonomous means to intervene in conflict situations with military means if necessary (ibid.).

The mandate, resources and structure of ESDP/CSDP have been contested from the onset; the main cleavages pertaining to the civilian orientation of the EU, the relations with and the role of NATO, budgetary concerns, and the disparate strategic cultures, views and interests hindering political cohesion. Since member states have kept control of their national foreign and defence policies, the ESDP/CSDP and its conflict management policy has remained rooted in intergovernmentalism, with decisions made in the European Council and dependent on nation state’s political will and resource allocation. This allows states and in particular their interests to assert strong impact on common European policies; resulting in an ambiguous policy, whose implementation is conditioned on interest-based negotiations to find points of congruence in a system of
unanimity, influenced by domestic considerations about the use of force in military missions abroad. In spite of the problems and disagreements, since 2003 when ESDP became functional, the EU has undertaken around 30 civilian operations out of which six have been military missions, predominantly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Throughout the process, France in particular has been instrumental in shaping the policy and in its implementation. Deriving from its philosophical outlook, past experiences and decline in global power, France has been the most consistent engineer of the policy, advocate for enhanced cooperation and collective capacity bolstering, and been the main architect of the EU missions.

The salience and relevance of this thesis topic arises from the EU launching a new military mission in 2014 to Central African Republic at the insistence of France after a six year period where no new military missions were authorized. In order to understand the absence (there has not been an absence of crises e.g. Mali, South Sudan, Libya), the reluctance and future prospects for EU military missions, there is a need to understand what propels - under which considerations and in what context - the EU member states as a collective entity to act. Previous research has focused on single missions, on giving an overview on select missions or on mission outcomes and evaluation (Germond & Smith 2009; Knutsen 2009; Major 2009; Dijkstra 2010; Styan 2012; Pohl 2013b). There has not been comprehensive investigation with an intergovernmentalist approach focusing only on the drivers behind the military missions in Africa. Separating African and other missions is pertinent due to the character of the operating theatre; being a region where a number of member states have no immediate defence interests, there are other international security organizations present and the EU can alternatively utilize a mixture of its civilian crisis management tools and development funds.

Therefore in the light of the politico-institutional structure on the one hand and the leadership position France has taken in both driving and operationalizing the policy, the purpose of this case study is to examine the rationale behind EU’s military interventions and the shape those missions have taken in African crises. With the aim of investigating the role a lead member state has played in both developing the EU as an international security actor and in forming the EU’s military missions in Africa. In elaborating the role France has played in designing the CSDP, its continued interests in Africa and the patterns present in previous missions, this thesis aims to illustrate the importance of
member state leadership operating in a suitable context as necessary preconditions for the EU to be a military actor.

To this end, the study seeks to answer two main research questions – Why has the EU, operating autonomously, intervened militarily in particular cases in Africa? Have the interventions been shaped and formed primarily by the interests and at the insistence of a single member state? – And a range of narrower questions – What factors have driven the development of EU as an international security actor? Why have the states endowed the EU with military capabilities? Why has France taken the leadership position? Have the missions in Africa been undertaken as a response to external threats to European security, have they been motivated by humanitarian concerns or have they served other policy objectives? What explains the national participation of member states in different missions?

From the methodological and conceptual perspective the analysis of EU military missions in Africa serves as an illustrative case study (descriptive in nature, enables to show why the CSDP is driven by member state interests, with the bigger states taking the lead, by introducing the considerations surrounding mission authorization, mandate, force content) based on the liberal intergovernmentalist theory. The data in use relies primarily on secondary sources – academic articles and books – and was supplemented by reports of international organizations, state agencies and foreign policy research groups; and by the theoretical work on liberal intergovernmentalism done by Andrew Moravcsik. The data collection criteria depended largely on existing and obtainable material, with a linguistic limitation, since I cannot speak French. Principally, I chose material that reflected neutrally the situations and actors in question and presented necessary data to characterize different aspects of state involvement, French leadership and cooperation in the EU. The focus of the thesis is on military or armed crisis management missions, thus civilian crisis management initiatives, such as police or military training missions together with policy developments and initiatives launched and administered by the European Commission are not scrutinized.

The first chapter elucidates the theoretical basis for understanding state cooperation in the field of security and defence, by clarifying liberal intergovernmentalism and therefore the different facets of state motivations for integration. The second chapter, by giving an overview of the development of CSDP – its external and internal drivers, state
proposals, institutional configuration and controversies and divergences in preferences -
applies the theory by illustrating both the control states have had over the process, their
interests in developing the policy and limitations set by the EU system. The third
chapter gives a broad overview of state leadership and capacity to do so in foreign and
security policy-making in the EU, flowed by a closer analysis of French interests,
motivations and ideas for European security and Europe in international security,
together with establishing the connection and prevalent interest France has in Africa.
The fourth chapter gives an overview of EU military missions to Africa - Operation
Artemis, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Chad/CAR and Operation Atalanta – congruently with
an investigation into the mission authorization process and its outcomes, thus
illustrating both French leadership and the need for acquiescence form others, primarily
from the United Kingdom and Germany.
1. Theorizing European Political Cooperation

1.1. Perspectives on Integration

The EU as an International Power. The European project with the EU operating in international security has been conceptualized, analysed and explained by scholars using various approaches. Among others, theories have focused on: the actor-ness of the EU; the ESDP/CSDP acting as a counterweight to the United States; on the character of Europe or what type of power it can be perceived as – a civilian or soft power; a normative power; a strategic power or a small power – in effect, attempting to find the right qualifying adjective (Bickerton et al. 2011; Howoth 2007; Pohl 2013a).

Underlying this pursuit are the peculiarities of the EU. The collective operating as an international actor carries considerable weight due to being the biggest common market with substantial military resources, voting power in international organizations, and with a larger population total than the United States that nevertheless punches below its weight or underperforms on the global stage in matters of security and defence (Bickerton 2012: 154). But those approaches do not focus on member states and their interests and as such, while offering insights to the supranational EU, are insufficient in analysing member state leadership.

The Improbability of a Common Policy. Another strand, as discussed by Ojanen (2006: 58), in the research on security cooperation within the European integration framework has either concentrated on the absence or on the improbability of having such a development. Realist-based theories saw integration as a phenomenon wherein states in control of the process act to strengthen themselves, with decision making rights delegated in spheres of low politics when the subtotal of gains exceed those of losses. Renouncing authority in matters of security, defence and foreign policy i.e. high politics that form the core of national sovereignty, is seen as weakening the state in this zero-sum game (ibid.). In the functionalist approach this process of integration, once pursued, would lead to mechanisms of spill-over from one field to the next, intensifying the creation of a political community while lessening the control of states, because it would require a central, supranational institution to manage and govern the common
policies. In effect, the states would cede a considerable degree of sovereignty in order to make the system practicable. Thus, states would have no interest in this counterproductive action (Ojanen 2006: 59-60). Contrary to those expectations, the EU has been endowed with certain legal basis, military capabilities and security instruments in the fields of foreign, security and defence policy by its member states that furthermore have placed these policy fields in a complex and intertwined institutional architecture which nonetheless has not superseded national policies and has been operationalized with several military missions operating in a wider geographical scope than merely the EU’s neighbouring areas or theatres of direct interests. As such, evoking the questions of what factors have led to integration and are shaping the outcome in the field of security and defence from state to EU-level and what interests drive and explain the EU’s co-occurring military ambitions?

1.2. Liberal Intergovernmentalist Response to Integrationist Endeavours

Integration as a Two-Level Game. Foreign and security issues as policies have specific characteristics, due to the sensitivity and meaning in terms of state sovereignty, given to the sphere by national governments, implying questions of interest-formation and control. Therefore, when transferred onto the EU-level, although a common policy has been created and utilized, the issue-area has been characterized by being relatively isolated from the rest of the EU integration project, by being developed at a rapid pace when internal and external incentives for the member states arose and in spite of various setbacks, and by its substance being shaped by distinct mechanisms, with the Franco-British dyad being a crucial force (Kurowska 2008). In consequence of that, to analyse the creation, shape and form of the Common Security and Defence Policy, I will apply Andrew Moravcsik’s (1999) liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) framework. Since, the central argument of LI is of integration being a two-level game: of national preference formation and of interstate strategic interaction (Moravcsik 1993). Focusing on domestic preferences alone leaves out the strategic context in which states interact and focusing solely on interstate bargaining or on the international institutions omits the distribution and variation in preferences (ibid.). In sum, LI takes into account both
member state preferences in shaping and forming a security policy and the context of the EU that places limits on the outcomes.

The Importance of Domestic Context. Nation states and their leaders constrained by national preference formation and inter-state strategic bargaining, make rational choices to maximize their gains; with the primary interest of governments in liberal democracies being that of remaining in office. Operating through EU institutions allows to gain otherwise unachievable goals by providing avenues for more effective allocation of domestic resources, increasing the efficiency of interstate bargaining and by strengthening the position of national political leaders vis-à-vis their domestic opposition (Moravcsik 1993). But it is domestic politics that provides the context and interests that require EU-level cooperation, thus LI attributes causal force to domestic sources in determining what the EU does, including in the CSDP framework (ibid.). Although, there are commonalities across states, rationality with its underlying preferences is not fixed, but more context specific and contingent on the pressure from domestic social groups (the electorate, parties, interests groups and bureaucracies). Depending on the case, both the cross section of the particular groups and the amount of pressure applied may vary and alter across time and issues, between and within states (Moravcsik & Schimmelfenning 2004: 77; Moravcsik 1993: 483). Since policy-making, issues and their outcomes do not carry equal weight or interest; the internal pressure can be indirect, ambiguous or divided. Accordingly, the looser constrains allow for a wider degree of discretion, manifesting in political risk-taking to pursue a longer-term view, in broader coalitions and/or goals, in accepting short-term losses for long-term gains, or engaging in more controversial or idiosyncratic goals (Moravcsik 1993: 488). Nonetheless, domestic choices are aggregated through indigenous political institutions, resulting in a unitary actor with a set of national interests or goals expressed in interstate negotiations (Moravcsik & Schimmelfenning 2004: 77; Moravcsik 1993: 483). In turn, the international system and in particular the environment of the EU, also have its own structural-institutional constrains, placing restrictions on potential outcomes (Rosamond 2000: 136-137). The assumption is that, as a stage for bargaining, the EU has three specific characteristics (i) states enter into it voluntarily, moreover important decisions are made by unanimity, (ii) it is information-rich, both in regard to constrains and
preferences, (iii) transaction costs are low and can even strengthen domestic autonomy (Rosamond 2000: 137-138).

1.3. Preference Formation and Agenda Setting

As discussed, states face limits in preference formation on the domestic level and constraints on agenda setting on the EU-level. In part, to mitigate the effects of these complications states either use the EU as a facilitator or they transfer sovereignty to its institutions. The latter course is taken when the potential joint gains in pursuing preferences through delegating to a central body are more substantial, effective and lessen the problems of control than they would be when using other means. By lessening the influence of domestic politics and strengthening supranational oversight such conduct enhances compliance. The degree of delegation depends on value placed on issues and on the acceptability of potential outcomes (Moravcsik & Schimmelfenning 2004: 80). As such the EU level negotiations are cooperative and reflect patterns in the preferences of national governments (Moravcsik 1993). Although, European integration has been predominantly driven by economic preferences, purely single issue-specific explanation is not enough to account neither for the institutional design of the EU nor for the policies covered under EU purview. As such, LI allows for ideological or geopolitical preferences to have some impact on integration (Moravcsik & Schimmelfenning 2004: 79). And when specifically analysing the dynamics and developments of CSDP the impetus for integration can be attributed to a mixture of economic, ideological and geopolitical factors.

Deepening and Widening of the Security Paradigm. Factoring into the development of CSDP has been the shift in the meaning and reach of security in accordance with events in the post-Cold War international order. Traditionally, making and implementing security and defence policy has been the role of either nation states or military alliances. Besides questions of autonomy and control, in regards to national identity being interlinked with security and defence, the primary notion to content with would have to be that of existential threat to territory. Yet territorial defence is outside the remit of CSDP (Pohl 2013a), since there has been a change in what constitutes as security and
how to respond to threats. Extreme poverty and underdevelopment, migration, endemic diseases and epidemics, famine and environmental disasters, together with newer forms of challenges such as climate change, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and state failure - these broadened and deepened conceptualizations have been integrated into the international agenda, both as primary causes of human suffering and as more traditional military threat multipliers, forming a complex interlinked nexus of threats. This composite agenda requires a more comprehensive, cross-border approach, since pure military power is insufficient as an effective instrument in addressing a multifaceted world (Kaunert & Zwolski 2013). Concomitantly with new issues rising to the forefront, the questions shifted to legitimacy of using force and military power outside the purview of national territorial defence against external threats. In this context, the utility of the EU as a collective actor - a grouping of sovereign states, with a variety of political and economic instruments at its disposal - in security matters emerged (Sjursen 2001). But the process of integration has been dominated by the need to balance between two opposing imperatives: as a collective the EU has more influence and power in the world, than member states have individually, countered by the questions of maintaining sovereignty and freedom to act in national interests (McCormick 2002). Thus, in conjunction with international developments, the EU’s reach has extended from foreign policy to first include security and then defence, with the locus of security tasks shifting towards non-territorial threats and operations in third countries. In defining its security role, the EU ascribes to ‘new’ security tasks (Sjursen 2001: 195).

1.4. Costs and Benefits of Integration

In the context of evolving multifaceted threats comprising the subjects/objects of foreign and security policy, the variation of domestic salience of specific issues within that amalgamation and the pursuit of interests by national governments, this rationalist logic brings in a second range of motives. Namely, considerations over material costs and gains can be integrated into the analysis of the government decision making process. While in Moravcsik’s view (1993: 494) a common foreign and security policy aims to provide non-socio-economic goods, there is a strong economic aspect attached
both to the framework of the policy and its various forms of implementation. Or as put by Ojanen (2006: 61) in security and defence “states can clearly gain materially from joining forces, shared planning, common standards, and of course from defence industrial co-operation and economies of scale. Also immaterial gains could be expected, as in cases where it is in state’s interests to support defence integration in exchange for concessions in other fields or use of power through an organization rather than in ‘crude’ form.”

On the other hand, governments need to demonstrate that they are not paying a disproportionate price for action when operating within the CSDP framework. If the result is negative externalities, then there is incentive to free ride rather than to cooperate. Furthermore, conflict is inherent, since costs and benefits are unevenly distributed among and within states; those with less to gain are likely to oppose moves within the politico-institutional application of CSDP (Moravcsik 1993). Outcome is determined by relative power and the asymmetries in the relative intensity of national preferences. The less intense the preference for agreement, the greater the bargaining leverage. The need to compromise with the least forthcoming government sets the limits of the possible outcome and driving the agreement towards the lowest common denominator (ibid.). In cases where the EU level agreement is not the best option and alternatives offer a value, the states can have several options for action: either taking a unilateral approach, forming coalitions where certain states are excluded, bi-and multilateral deals and formations, deepening cooperation in alternative institutions or favouring cooperation from larger states whose participation in needed for viability (Moravcsik 1993).

The Risks and Opportunities of the Diffuse Costs and Public Opinion in Foreign Policy.

On the subject of foreign policy, the costs and benefits for assorted groups are more diffuse and uncertain than they are in regards to various economic policies. As such, with less interest in the field, they assert less pressure, leaving domestic influence primarily to partisan elites and secondarily (albeit intermittently) to mass publics. The reasoning to justify policies tends to shift from calculated and concise to symbolic and ideological; giving rise to ideologically motivated heads of state and permitting them (especially those of larger member states) to come to the fore and to influence European
institutions to reflect their conceptions of national interests (Moravcsik 1993: 494). Pohl (2013a: 317) has highlighted two underlying domestic politically beneficial incentives for governments in CSDP crisis management. First, demonstrating influence on the international stage in accordance with domestic values and priorities can strengthen governments position since their legitimacy might be threatened by inaction, whether they are unwilling or unable to exert influence (especially in a highly mediatized context). Secondly, there is a threat of paying a seemingly too high price for action (in monetary or casualty terms). The risk and opportunity lies within either ignoring or taking account of public opinion and broader societal values (ibid.). As such there is an incentive to cater to the pressure of public opinion and the pressure from foreign policy elites (in the media, political parties, NGO’s bureaucracies and academia) and to ensure that the constituents judge the policies as legitimate and competent. Although, direct public opinion has more traction in cases that capture headlines (Pohl 213a: 317).

Arguably, when looking at the succession wars in the former Yugoslavia and the European public’s expectations and concerns about their governments (in)action in defending the values of European societies that had come to be their defining trait, were pivotal in prompting their involvement (or lack of willingness in the case of Germany). This background of earlier failure had a role in informing the decision to launch the CFSP itself and the conducting of the first CSDP mission in Macedonia and its largest one in Bosnia (Pohl 2013a: 318). Alleviating a humanitarian crisis - or a visible, albeit useless act in that effect - brings about a perception of action, the danger for a government lies in the balance between pointless activism and excessive risk-taking versus complacency and weakness. The suitable emphasis placed on interventionism, together with preferences over where and how, depend on geographic and historical factors and thus vary across member states (Pohl 2013a: 318).

1.5. Institution Building vs. National Governments

The EU’s powers and remit in foreign, security and defence fields has come to cover a comprehensive security paradigm with the concomitant, albeit scattered tools for crisis management operated by a complex and multilevel institutional framework. Before creating an internal military component, the EU member states had recourse to various
external organizations: WEU, NATO, and the UN. Hofmann (2011) has argued that creating an institutional overlap with multiple centres of political authority can both resolve and aggravate inter-state disagreement. One of the consequences is the range of strategic choices available - both in terms of constraining and empowering - to actors in order to achieve their preferences. For instance, being a member of several organizations allows for forum shopping, being a member of one institution can foster feelings of exclusion from decision-making processes leading to vetoing decisions. In both cases actors can politicise the resources and mandate dimensions of overlap to their advantage (Hofmann 2011).

The institutional structure of CSDP has been a matter of choice and negotiations, with NATO structure as the main model. The end-result - the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) – followed the given template, without substantial or significant controversy about the institutions as such (Hofmann 2011: 108). In creating a common representative, first with the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and then with High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the aim was to foster coherence and cooperation. But there are caveats of how much leeway the positions are allowed to have; they can expect close monitoring and oversight, with approval of autonomous decisions from member states. Moreover, the people filling the positions must be perceived as neutral and suitable by member states, before acquiring consent to fill the position (Moravcsik 1993: 511).

This institution building follows a dual logic: increasing efficiency and ensuring enforcement vs. ceding an acceptable amount of control. Since the commitment is to broad goals with the final oversight at the hands of national governments, bestowing a measure of agenda-setting power to EU institutions can offer a degree of efficiency. The bureaucracy can both act as a neutral information provider and as an arbiter in decision-making, in addition to playing a role in agenda-setting, forming the policy and identifying areas where there is overlap of means and ends (Moravcsik 1993: 511; Dijkstra 2012; Toje 2008: 133). Cooperation is also increased with a neutral enforcement regime in place that lessens the government’s reaction to evade inconvenient responsibilities and thereby weaken the whole system. This action, while
strengthening the credibility of the commitment also carries political risk (Moravcsik 1993:512). To alleviate negative consequences, member states protect their national interests and identity ostentatiously, by laying blame for domestically contentious issues on Brussels on the one hand. On the other, as is the case with CSDP, EU-level suggestions have remained dependent on member states willingness to engage (Pohl 2013a).

**Limits Placed on EU Institutions.** National governments in the EU’s Council of Ministers are regarded as the crucial actors in decision-making, while the criticism against this school of thinking has pointed out the lack of understanding of the role of EU-level processes and other institutions and overstating the government’s powers, a counterargument is that the institutional and political character of CSDP places it firmly in the hands of the Council and due to its military subject-matter it is not part of day-to-day politics (de Flers et al. 2012: 296); executive authority is needed for decision-making in military coercion. The Commission is active in the delivery and implementation of CFSP in many ways, since a large part of external relations and foreign policy involves trade and economic policy (Howorth 2007). Although, both the Commission, the Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) can act as wilful policy entrepreneurs and setters, for instance by side-lining the Council using technicalities or through case law; as such they can both temper member states interest, restrict options and influence specific policies and manipulate policy preferences. There has been fear of ‘competence creep’ with the Commission gaining influence in the defence field, for instance the British concern over the Commission adopting directives on defence trade (Bond 2013).

In general, government calculations over delegating or pooling sovereignty are influenced by the probability of the end result being an unforeseen, biased decision that negatively affects their interests (Moravcsik 1993: 511). With CSDP, governments have neither pooled national sovereignty nor delegated powers to a substantial degree to central institutions since the primary institutional input comes from agencies of intergovernmentalism; it is not under the direct control of the supranational branches of the EU (the Commission, the Parliament or the Courts); instead they have preferred imperfect enforcement and inefficient decision-making structures (Moravcsik 1993:
If governments are the sole crucial decision-makers then the outcomes reflect their interests, with non-decisions and sub-optimal results being the result of bargaining (de Flers et al. 2012).
2. Institution-Building in Foreign and Security Policy

2.1. The Drivers for Enhanced Cooperation in Security

The End of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War the processes of disintegration and integration collided. A mixture of external and internal factors - the dissipation of the Soviet threat, the unification of Germany, and the uncertainty and instability in its neighbourhood – ushered in a re-evaluation of the European project that hitherto had mainly focused on economic matters. Internally, the foreseeable enlargements to the east initiated proactive moves to maintain cohesion and develop closer cooperation. Working together within NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) on the one hand had led to a degree of convergence in policies. On the other, with no meaningful role for the WEU, and with the focus of NATO in conjunction with the United States shifting from Europe, leaving room for a new framework for the assumption of security responsibilities (Howorth 2007; Ojanen 2006). Furthermore, coupled with a favourable public opinion, the end of conscription (in some European states) and changes in questions about territorial defence, security and defence were moving away from high politics and becoming issues of low politics (Ojanen 2006: 63).

The Maastricht Treaty. In 1992 the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (The Maastricht Treaty) for the first time consigned a security function to the newly formed EU. The limited and voluntary European Political Cooperation (EPC), was remodelled with new instruments and decision-making procedures together with the revitalization and appropriation of WEU into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in part as a move towards a closer political union to counterbalance economic motives (Cameron 2012: 34-35; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 34, Sjursen 2001). However, the level of integration in CFSP remained low: the EU institutions were given limited competences, decisions were taken unanimously, and the external representation was at the hands of the rotating EU presidency (Klein & Wessels 2013: 457; Cameron 2012). Although, negotiations over placing the policy under community method and qualified majority voting took place before Maastricht, the absolute refusal of countries such as France and the UK quashed those ideas (Howorth 2007: 63). Nor did the Treaty provide a
framework or capabilities for military action since the Franco-German proposal to fully merge the WEU with the EU was turned down by the UK’s Conservative government, fearing the weakening of NATO (Hofmann 2011: 106). Allowance was made for a potential future defence policy “eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.” (TEU Article J.4) but overall, the text of the Maastricht Treaty was vague enough to satisfy divergent views of those like France, who wanted to see stronger integration and those like the UK who wished to continue within the framework of existing structures (Sjursen 2001: 191).

Institutional and Capability Shortfalls. These procedural and institutional developments proved of limited utility for the EU in its role as a peacemaker. Coinciding with the break-up of Yugoslavia and the onset of war in 1991, first in Croatia and then in Bosnia, the lack of resources – no defence institutions geared towards territorial defence, no deployable armed forces, no common strategic culture – to project force abroad became clear (Freire 2008: 11). There were modest and mainly low-key diplomatic successes, mostly in areas employing technical and financial resources, but the lack of consensus to employ the WEU left the EC/EU on the side-lines (Bowen 2005: 103; Cameron 2012). This experience of weak collective performance in their neighbourhood, the tensions with the United States over their reaction and lack of input in overall peacebuilding efforts, facilitated by changes in government in the UK, Germany and France, coupled with an emergence of an international community with humanitarian norms, led to policy reassessments that influenced the EU policy makers to rethink the Union’s overall practices and policies in order to acquire international credibility (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006; Sheperd 2009). While France had been intermittently (ever since the very beginning of the European project) advocating for a stronger role for the collective in security, for Germany and the EC/EU as an institution, the failure to stop atrocities highlighted a discord between identity perception and actual behaviour (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 36). Thus, governments recognized the need for closer cooperation to redress aforementioned shortfalls.

In endowing the EU with capabilities in security matters, there have been two general factors influencing state positions and their preferred outcomes. The first being relations with the United States and NATO. The second, views on the European project, its
ultimate shape and form, itself, since member states prioritize different policy issues and institutional means of achieving their particular preferences. Integration in matters of foreign and security policy has been coupled with the notion of a ‘Political Union’, therefore garnering resistance from those member states whose primary interest is economic integration and from those who are concerned with ceding sovereignty the supranational institutions (Sjursen 2001). Underlying these divisions is a philosophical difference on the nature of European security between the member states, with countries falling broadly into two fractions. First, supported by the United Kingdom - together with countries like the Netherlands and Portugal – are the so-called Atlanticists, with the preference of strengthening the role and identity of European countries in NATO for the benefit of the latter. The other side, the Europeanist/integrationist such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain prefer entrusting the EU with autonomous security capacity (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 37; McCormick 2002: 200). Since member states had an interest in ameliorating deficiencies, convergence was found in framing issues mainly in terms of peace support operations, leaving significant policy differences dormant, but intact (ibid.).

2.2. Adding institutional Complexity with a New Role

The Treaty of Amsterdam. The redressing of shortfalls was made in 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam. By incorporating the Petersberg Tasks of the WEU into CFSP, states endowed the EU with a basis to undertake a spectrum of military crisis management operations. Full role acquirement through the merger with the WEU was vetoed by the UK, arguing that it would weaken NATO (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006: 38; Sjursen 2001). The treaty also created the position of High Representative for the CFSP, together with Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit to add coherence. Although, the post of HR was created in June 1997, the first appointment, that of Javier Solana took until the summer of 1999. Member States had to agree on the suitable level of seniority and political remit of the appointee; France purportedly preferred a high-profile French politician, the UK a mid-career civil servant and both saw having influence as paramount (Howorth 2007: 66; Howorth 2010).
Another institutional component created was the, ambassadorial-level, Political and Security Committee (COPS) tasked with monitoring the international situation, drafting opinions for the Council and overseeing the agreed policies. However, as pointed out by Howorth (2007: 68) the institution can be bypassed and its work hindered by national capitals. In the event of a real crisis, such as Iraq in 2002-03 COPS was kept at arm’s length with instructions for some ambassadors from their respective MFA`s to keep the issue off the agenda. The degree of influence given to COPS was also under discussion, with diverging views on the appropriate seniority of the representation. France preferred senior ambassadorial representation that they could keep on point and who could lead the process, in addition to seeing the need for COPS to be high-level and influential (Howorth 2007). The UK preferred a lower level institution, proposing both an upgraded Political Committee and double-hatted permanent representatives shared with NATO, ideas rejected by France. The trade-off reached at Helsinki in 1999 was a relatively high profile COPS (with different level envoys) in exchange for elaboration of military capacity (Howorth 2007: 70).

Attempts to bypass deadlock. A cautious effort to bypass the deadlock of unanimity was made with the introduction of the principle of ‘constructive abstention’, allowing states to declare reservations and to stand aside to not block adoption of a decision, but the principle does not apply to military and defence matters, negating its impact in approaching contentious issues (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006: 38). The Amsterdam Treaty in Article J.13 does make allowance for using qualified majority voting, but only in cases “when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of common strategy” or when adopting a decision implementing such acts. An additional clause clarified that member states can block using qualified majority by declaring the issue as part of national policy. In this case, the Council can use qualified majority to refer the issue to the European Council for decision by unanimity (ibid.). Furthermore, this does not apply to decisions having military or defence implications (ibid.). Even though, adjustments to the CFSP were made, the overall changes were seen as minimal and therefore dependent on how the institutional changes were implemented and whether member states had political will to use the provisions of the policy (Sjursen 2001: 194).
Continued Limited Utility and Capacity Shortfalls. Once again, in spite of these institutional changes, the EU was unable to secure a solution with diplomatic means and with economic sanctions in Kosovo. (Freire 2008: 11) It became clear to European states that in some cases diplomatic action requires complementing it with more substantial military action. Moreover, the inability to take responsibility for security in their own continent highlighted the shortfalls in military capabilities, hindering European credibility as a shaper of international policy and security (Shepherd 2009). The permissive international and domestic environments offered an opportunity for a more forceful role for the EU. As the global demand for various security assistance and crisis management missions increased forming a notion of an international community that has a responsibility to protect built on a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Thus, there was an impetus to adapt to the meet the need (Shepherd 2009). Internally, the UK, under the leadership of Tony Blair, was seeing increased frustrations with the United States. There have been several causes or mixtures thereof put forth to explain the transformation in the British stance - disagreements over former Yugoslavia, Blair’s desire to lead a more active European policy - whatever the specific amalgamation of the root causes, it did act as a catalyst for conspicuous development since a major obstacle to strengthening the CFSP had been neutralized (Menon 2004: 224). In this situation of formalized support to peace operations on the one hand and a gap in capabilities to act on the other, the two militarily most powerful states in Europe proposed a new policy (Howorth 2007: 207).

2.3. Military Cooperation and Capacity Building

The Franco-British Dyad. The seminal moment for the EU as a security actor came at the St. Malo Franco-British Summit in December 1998, when both governments agreed that the EU needed to become a stronger independent actor (Howorth 2007). Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit (1998) stating that “to this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” when NATO is not involved, with the European Council operating
on an intergovernmental basis as the principal decision-maker. Both London and Paris began to argue that pooling military capabilities to project power was necessary to keep international order and security, to hinder the creation of international division of labour in peacekeeping and-building matters; and moreover it would protect European interests (Klein & Wessels 2013; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 38-39).

Still, the two parties diverged on their envisioned ends. The UK, with its new and less Euro-sceptic government, saw strengthening of the European security sector as a way to bolster NATO and to add to its credibility; deeming EU-level security as a potential ‘capability driver’ (Menon 2009: 232). Principal fear was that of American disengagement from the continent if the Europeans do not share their part of the burden. The UK’s position has been partly motivated by its overall reservations about a strong political role for the EU, thus the support it has given to foreign and security aspects has been conditional on consensus based decision making among the member states and on lack of interference from central EU institutions, namely the Commission and the Parliament (Sjursen 2001).

On the other side, the traditional French Gaullist objective, strengthening its influence by strengthening that of Western Europe, while concomitantly working towards the construction of ’Europe politique’, had remained the same. For Paris, the difference was in partners, instead of cooperating with Germany, it acted together with the United Kingdom. What is more, France saw an autonomous and capable EU in security affairs as a way to diminish the dependence on the United States. Congruently, France also saw security cooperation as a way to be more efficient and eliminate underperformance, by accomplishing greater complementarity and the avoidance of costly duplication (Bickerton et al 2011; Bowen 2005; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 39-40).

Despite their differences, in general both London and Paris wanted for the Europeans to take military instruments more seriously and more specifically, for them to concentrate on the development of expeditionary capabilities to prepare for participation in high intensity combat operations (Simón 2012). To have a tangible effect, the St Malo initiative needed the support of other EU member states and actors. Germany, the third influential player whose contributions were essential for security integration, supported the proposition. Its domestic security narrative had been developing towards taking a more proactive role in international efforts for peace and security. In addition its
political parties and the coalition government supported further creation of such a project on the EU level (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006: 40). The German EU presidency softened the initial Franco-British conception by highlighting the need for consensus and UN approval in line with their overall outlook (Simón 2012).

**Differing views and Member State Preferences.** Based on the St Malo Declaration and the set political course, the 15 EU heads of state and government made the decision at the Cologne European Council in June 1999 to enhance the CFSP through the European Security and Defence Policy (Howorth 2007). With these moves the EU was on the path to developing a distinct military aspect for crisis management. Since military capabilities or lack thereof were not the only influencing factors in decision making about the ESDP, the final outcome reflected a consensus of different views. Smaller member states had reservations and concerns about the proposed militarization of the Union. Countries like Finland and Sweden insisted on infusing civilian instruments into the policy to allow for a more multifaceted role for EU’s peacebuilding efforts (Freire 2008; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 41). The Nordic countries were supported by Germany’s social democratic-green coalition (Menon 2004: 229). Another contentious issue concerned giving the EU a collective defence function. Since nonaligned member states were reluctant, Austria cited constitutional requirements, and the UK, Poland, Czech Republic and the Baltic states saw it as superfluous as there already was a corresponding NATO commitment, it was not included in the final document. (Hofmann 2011: 108; Irondelle 2008: 157) France and the UK tried to keep the geographical reach and legal basis of potential future missions as vague as possible, while others wished to emphasise that the EU-forces would act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE Charter of European Security (Bailes 2008: 115).

**Institutionalizing the ESDP and Taking on Capacity Goals.** At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the basic structure, covering both military and civilian aspects was emplaced, resulting in the ESDP. The intergovernmental nature remained; although the European Council shares the power of initiative, the member states have the final say. France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy tabled a joint proposal for the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The Council agreed on the Headline Goal
(the aim was an army corps of approximately 60,000 troops, 100 ships, and 400 aircraft, deployable at 60 days’ notice for the duration of one year) (European Parliament 1999; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 41). Since both the military and civilian aspects of peace support operations had their advocates, in general, advantage of the momentum was taken; the fusion created a more holistic approach to security policy in the EU than previously envisioned at St. Malo (ibid.). Framing the CSDP around crisis management was in line with broader transformations and public perceptions, allowing the EU to respond to crises, primarily in and around Europe, that the US/NATO was not interested in. At the same time, heavy lifting was left to NATO, allowing the EU to distance itself discursively from more heavy handed tactics and approaches, while emphasizing the importance of non-military solutions (Simón 2012: 109).

2.4. Strategic Goals vs. Political Will

European Security Strategy. It took years for the EU to agree on its security priorities, on the initiative of France, Germany and the UK, the EU’s high representative for CFSP, Javier Solana was given a mandate to overcome the previous disparities. As a result, The European Security Strategy (ESS), “A Secure Europe in A Better World was adopted at the December 2003 European Council (Cameron 2012: 9).

As seen with the end of the Cold War, the situations in former Yugoslavia and the United States pivot away from Europe, throughout the existence of the EC/EU there has been a close interplay between the internal and external developments. The international context during the design of the EES included post-9/11 shift in discourse, pre-emptive US military actions, and a cleavage between EU members over the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As the United States was adopting a stronger, unilateral and interventionist attitude, the EU in response was to take a softer tone. In essence, while the ESS focuses on promoting peace, stability, development and human rights, it focuses on doing so through the use of peaceful methods, and moreover by acting cooperatively in using ‘effective multilateralism’ under the aegis of the United Nations. Military force was seen as the method of last resort and only as a part of a wider, holistic or and ‘comprehensive approach’ (Bailes 2008: 118).
A Strategic and Behavioural Cacophony in Implementation Perspectives. As summarised by Biava et al. (2011: 1231-1232) the net result of a relatively vague strategy without a clear guideline on the use of force is strategic incoherence, illustrated by countries behaviours e.g. Germany’s reluctance to use its troops abroad, Poland’s mistrust of others, the UK’s attachment to the US and NATO, and France’s insistence on a global role. Alternatively, the differences can be divided into two dominant categories, wherein smaller and non-aligned states favour the status quo of limited ambitions in crisis management decided by consensus; opposed by former colonial powers of France and the United Kingdom, with the will and capacity to act globally with force when necessary. Both strands wish to upload the domestic level on to the EU (ibid). Added complexity derives from the EU-NATO dichotomy (e.g. NATO development of a Rapid Reaction Force and disagreements between different members of these organizations i.e. Turkey and Greece, France and United States), as well as including the misgivings on the part of certain member states concerning the whole project and whether it was a means to an end or an end in itself (Menon 2004). Moreover, in some member states themselves (Germany, Sweden, Denmark) there are internal tensions between different political and strategic cultures resulting in a compromise reflecting the lack of conceptual clarity (Biava et al 2011).

The ESS was lightly revised and elaborated under the French Presidency in the second half of 2008, but countries such as Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden want a new security strategy. No official move towards discussing or endorsing a new strategy has been made, with France fearing loss of justification for ambitious Headline Goals and development plans, German reluctance of projecting military force and the UK wishes to increase capabilities not discuss strategy (especially if the strategy is based on the lowest common denominator) (Bond 2013).

In addition to attempts at fostering strategic coherence, in terms of capabilities there have been numerous capability conferences, action plans and other initiatives after the initial Helsinki Headline Goals. In 2003 the so-called ‘Chocolate Summit’, led by Germany and France, together Belgium and Luxemburg, called for a more ambitious European Security Defence Union as a military command separate from NATO. (Menon 2009: 241; Toje 2008) Yet these schemes have not resulted in considerable practical progress. Although, the EU as a bloc is the world’s second largest military
actor; with member states collectively spending €194 billion on defence and having 1.67 million people in uniform in 2009. Out of that, only a fraction, around 10% or approximately 170,000 is deployable and due to the need for rotation that number lessens to around 60,000 to 70,000 troops available for sustained expeditionary operations at one time. This aggregate consists of fragments, wherein over 75% of defence programs are done nationally and without coordination, leading to an inadequate interoperability (Biscop & Coelmont 2013: 78; Gomis 2012: 3). In regard to Headline Goals, member states have failed to meet the various targets (set by themselves) they also have tempered their ambitions: in the Headline Goal 2010, the previous goal of approximately 60,000 troops was replaced by battle groups initiative of approx. 1,500 troops to be deployable within 15 days (two groups on standby consisting of only land forces with restrictions on their rules of engagement). This change has been framed as focusing on quality not on quantity. (Bickerton et al. 2011: 6; Giegrich 2008; Menon 2009: 233) In theory, the battle groups by being in permanent standby should provide a deterrent and preventive force, remedying the ad hoc approach to military deployment. In reality, they have never been used (Simón 2012: 108). Every time when an opportunity has arisen, the member state in charge has been reluctant to utilize them, for both political and economic reasons. First, they see the concept as expensive to coordinate and to plan and second in case of application, the member states, in charge, should be able and willing to complete the initial task (Fernandez Sola 2013).

**Funding Mechanisms.** In harmonizing defence efforts and giving the EU a more autonomous capacity by setting common qualitative specifications and normative expectations has had its limitations. The consensus system allows for a ‘framework nation’ to take the lead role in running operations, with the operational headquarters having planning authority. One of the ‘big three’ has generally executed that position. Subsequently, member states like Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden have resisted attempts of institutionalization of such approach to politico-strategic decisions (Menon 2009: 237). Since the CSDP is not legally binding and owing to its design of decentralized interstate cooperation, the EU has been forestalled by having no access to member states full military forces. Member states have not contributed to the CSDP missions according to their abilities and capabilities; since participation and allocation
of assets is a matter of choice and the missions that have been undertaken have not been in response to member states direct security needs, some prioritize other operations (NATO, UN or ad hoc) (Bailes & Cottey 2010). The funding of missions primarily follows the principle of costs ‘lie where they fall’, meaning that the participating states share the transaction expenditure, supplemented by the Athena mechanism, whereby states contribute to common costs using a GNI-based index. Member states decide case-by-case what falls under the definition of ‘common’ (Menon 2009: 239). Although, this arrangement provides incentives for non-participation, but orienting it towards joint financing would create incentives for those states that are not interested to block missions. Using the other end of the continuum, full common costs, would create fears of encouraging excessively interventionist behaviour from some states (ibid.). In the context of an economic crisis and budgetary pressures and requirements, national defence budgets are under strain and have continued to decrease, with only a few European countries investing 2% of their GDP there. These budgetary constraints have affected the member states contributions to military and civilian missions (Fernandez Sola 2013).

2.5. Fostering Coherence while Remaining in Control

Another larger institutional and instrumental adjustment to the policy in question was made with the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2009. The ESDP was transformed into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Lisbon Treaty in the Article 28 B expanded the definition of the missions covered by the CSDP where “the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation”.

In fostering coherence, a more unified voice and centralized structure, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the positions of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the European Council, were created. The European Council and the Council of the EU retained their centrality in conceptualizing and implementing CFSP, the EEAS took over from
previously created bodies in an effort to coordinate all EU activities in foreign and security-defence policies (Klein & Wessels 2013: 463). The Court of Justice of the EU has no jurisdiction and the European Parliament, aside from being consulted and informed by the High Representative, can exert pressure via its budgetary powers (Klein & Wessels 2013: 463).

The European Council’s decision to appoint Herman van Rompuy (of Belgium) as the president and Catherine Ashton (of the UK) as the HR, disappointed those who wished for a stronger leadership and a clearer ‘single address’ for the Union for external matters, interpreting the choices as timid (Bailes & Cottey 2010: 166). The move signalling, as argued by Howorth (2010: 456) that the EU itself would not be setting agendas or taking major initiatives; even though consensus is needed to take decisions, the process can be facilitated by highly capable individuals. Furthermore, it is not the first time for the Council to face this type of personnel dilemma, resembling the discussion over the suitable level of the putative appointee for the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1997, albeit then the decision was eventually made on the basis of personal qualities rather than hierarchy (Howorth 2010).

In terms of flexible integration, the treaty allowed a group of willing member states to form a ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (PSC) in the field of CSDP, whereby they can adopt higher standards, specific goals for equipment cooperation and deployable forces, with the possibility of operational tasks being delegated to them (Bailes & Cottey 2010: 167). PSC was watered down from its initial Franco-German proposal to a vague and inclusive clause without exact requirements. Politically the agreement was to allow for only one PSC, but even that was hindered by the financial crisis, making the member states more reluctant to define and allocate a specific percentage of GDP to national defence budgets (Fernandez Sola 2013). By 2010 the antecedent objectives of permanence and ambition were discarded for a looser, a´ la carte framework of ‘pooling and sharing’ in order to avoid duplication and maximize resources (Simón 2012) and in December 2012 they agreed on further eleven proposals (although many of those have remained in the theoretical stages) (Fernandez Sola 2013).
**Importance of the Head of State or Government.** Although, the ultimate political authority is in the hands of the member states, aforementioned variety of EU agencies are involved in shaping and implementing it, leading to complex politico-institutional relations between the centre and its constituent parts. Thus placing limits on the scope of CSDP and inducing a division between the need to make the EU more effective and coherent on the one hand, and on the other the inclination to keep the centre weak (Howorth 2007: 91). In majority of the CSDP cases the Council is able to arrive at common positions. Since bulk of the work has been done in various committees, the highest level has to welcome what has already been achieved. But in cases where member state’s positions are conflicting and preparatory bodies have not reached consensus Heads of State or Government are expected to overcome fundamental disagreements and reach a constructive common position. That in turn is complicated by several factors: Heads of State or Government protect their country’s foreign policy; they are influenced by short-term domestic interests; they are not continuously available (no permanent leadership); the preparation for discussions is not done on the basis of European-level analysis with a common conclusion; they are not necessarily foreign and security policy experts; the European Council agenda is crowded with important issues not related to foreign policy (even at the height of an external crisis, internal issues are at the forefront, for example both Libya and Syria only partially occupied the agenda with principal attention going to the EU’s economic and financial situation); the European Council not the Foreign Affairs Council has the claim for leadership in crisis situations; reluctance to use enhanced cooperation to allow a group of states to move forward on an issue; and problems with having a single line of communication (Devuyst 2012). Instead of one spokesperson there is a cacophony wherein member states underline national positions and victories to the press with domestic public in mind, oftentimes resulting in a confusing message to the outside (Devuyst 2012). In spite of creating a central elements (the High Representative and the EEAS), the Member States, in particular the larger ones, do not pay much heed to them, tending to regard the HR as an official to use or to criticize as necessary. Similarly, the EEAS has been designated as a junior player by some Member States (e.g. the United Kingdom) (Devuyst 2012: 343).
From the onset the project of having and implementing CSDP has been characterized by controversies pertaining to its relations to NATO, the divergent positions on the war in Iraq, placing priority either on military or civilian capabilities and action-inaction as a response to crises in its neighbourhood and further afield. Moreover, many of the policies and frameworks that became parts of CSDP were first agreed outside the EU framework by interested member states and then brought onto the table. Member States have framed and presented the CSDP using angles suitable to their public; for France it is a force and influence multiplier; for the UK it is a limited measure used only when the United States does not wish to be involved; for Germany it corresponds to the new normative humanitarian culture (Howorth 2007: 58). This combination of the requirement of unanimity on the one hand and creative differences on the other shape the functioning of CSDP; its structure of convincing reluctant parties to participate works against rapid deployment of military interventions and of divisions to its ultimate size and purpose makes it unsuited for long-term strategic planning that would also benefit capabilities effectiveness (Menon 2009: 237). Agenda-setting within the CSDP is not dominated by a single issue or problem area and can involve any number of Member States. Although, more consistency and coherence has been attempted by centralizing leadership in the position of High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU officials still compete and are subservient to national governments in initiating missions, acquiring consensus and for providing necessary means (Smith 2012). While the Lisbon Treaty brought an aspiration for better institutional coordination, the system is still characterized by a complexity of the chain of command and the institutional separation of civil and military sides (Hynek 2011). Concomitantly, member states have opted for alternate routes when those are perceived as more useful or viable; there have been several bi-and multilateral initiatives, such as the 2010 Franco-British military agreements, the European Air Transport Command, Nordic defence cooperation and the Visegrad Battle Group (Fernandez Sola 2013); and unilateral and multilateral military operations outside the CSDP framework. In addition, the EU’s lack of coherence and internal discord has, to a high degree, been acted out on a public stage, with the concomitant lack of forceful action and military contribution in cases like the United States military campaign in Iraq or the humanitarian crisis in
Darfur, have been seen as proclamations declaring the stagnancy and near obsoleteness of ESDP/CSDP (Menon 2004: 225).
3. European Security Policy as a French Objective

3.1. Power Imbalances and Member State Interests

Concomitantly with developing and endowing the EU with foreign, security and defence policy capacities, the EU has widened and deepened on a broader spectrum. One of the more prominent changes has been the increase in the number of members from the 12 states during the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, to the current number of 28 members, with the unprecedented scope of enlargements in 2004 and 2007, primarily to Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of the CSDP, this relatively large grouping of states encompasses differing and often opposing views when it comes to approaches to security - as exemplified by the divergent views during the developing process and the concomitant agreed upon outcomes - from attitudes towards using force and projecting power to the legitimacy of interventions and the balance between hard and soft forms of power (Menon 2009). In general, falling under three categories: those who do not like the idea of peace enforcement missions in general; those like the Nordic countries who above questions of force and risk, consider having a tight mandate in accordance with international law as an imperative; and countries like the UK and France who in lieu of pure legality focus on more normative criteria and perceived need or interest to act (Bailes 2008: 124). Overall, this position and states input to the integration project is determined by their national foreign policy-making mechanisms that in turn are shaped by power (deriving from geography, demography, economic power, military power and diplomatic power), interests, identity, strategic culture and political will, both internal and external (Keukeleire & Delereux 2014).

Since the CSDP is not a single unambiguous policy nor is it geared towards a particular threat, but ultimately is an issue of political integration, with every enlargement, the growth in number and heterogeneity of interests and strategic cultures has multiplied the risk of paralysis and clash of visions, in a system based on consensus and unanimity (Irondelle 2008: 157; Mérand 2008). Although, this established politico-institutional system means that theoretically all member states are equals - in that they all have the same ability to promote and block decisions - in reality the 28 countries in the EU as a collective are characterized by substantial power discrepancies and scope of interests.
between the member states. The biggest contrast is between France, the UK and Germany on the one hand and smaller member states on the other (Keukeleire & Delereux 2014). Thus, form the onset as exemplified by the policy development process, the three biggest EU member states have been the driving forces behind CSDP, but they as well have not been equally active in the field. Envisaging the EU as a capable and visible military power with the accompanying drive towards engineering a strategic vision and pushing for policy application and instrumentalization has principally been done by France, while the UK and Germany have maintained a lesser degree of interest with a greater variation in involvement (Gegout 2010: Lehne 2012).

The Big Three. The countries with more power and capabilities behave and react differently to crises with different interests, objectives, responsibilities, and internal and external expectations (Keukeleire & Delereux 2014). The three biggest countries – Germany, France and the UK – besides standing out from the rest of the group, in terms of military power, form a dyad among themselves. On the one side are France and the UK, both nuclear powers that have regional influence in former colonial domains and a seat at the UN SC, coupled with the possibility for unilateral or independent (military) action and wide diplomatic reach (Howorth 2007). On the other is Germany, it does not share all of these assets and its ambitions are weighed down by history, however it is the world’s fourth-biggest economy and one of the biggest export nations (Lehne 2012). In aggregate, the three have more than 40 per cent of EU’s population, nearly 50 per cent of its GDP, around 60 per cent of its military expenditures, and around 40 per cent of EU’s diplomats work for them in more than 750 bilateral and multilateral diplomatic missions (Lehne 2012: 5). In sum, since the bigger countries own the majority of assets (diplomatic, military and monetary) they have more contribute, both in terms of assessing any given situation and in suggesting and implementing a suitable policy line. Germany has been reform-minded and has supported the forming of a common policy, but it has not exercised strong leadership. Its ambitions in international military engagements have been narrower and more limited, deriving from constitutional limitations and culture of pacifistic aversion, with focus being on maintaining economic strength and in recent years managing the Eurozone crisis (Lehne 2012). The United Kingdom has throughout the European project had a contentious relationship with the
EU and its predecessors, so much so that the question of its membership is still unresolved. Moreover, its most important security relationship is with the United States. Thus, it has safeguarded the primacy of national foreign policy using the EU actively and pragmatically when it serves to promote national interests (Lehne 2012).

The other large countries, Italy, Spain and Poland are more limited in their ambitions to areas with historical or geographical ties (ibid.). Smaller member states, can have specific assets to offer to the collective; privileged contacts with specific countries or regions (including with former colonies (e.g. Portugal or shared history e.g. the Baltic States) or other forms of immaterial power embodied in their reputation (e.g. The Nordic countries) as a neutral mediator, as a major donor of aid or as a provider of peacekeeping troops. In turn they gain more influence on the international arena than they would otherwise have, by appearing active or supportive a state can expect a reciprocal move in the future (Lehne 2012).

3.2. Security Cooperation as a French Vision

The objective of the European project from the onset has been peace and security with integration as a way to achieve it (Major & Mölling 2007). For France, Europe and developing a European foreign and security policy has been a central objective. Although, aspects of proposals have changed over time, the underlying principles have remained constant. During the early stages of the European integration process, France was the initiator of several security policy initiatives, such as the Pleven Plan in 1950s and the Fouchet plans in the 1960s (ibid.).

The end of the Cold War with the concomitant changes in the international security environment influenced France to rethink its policy; recognizing strategic and capability shortfalls in responding to new threats and military conflicts (the Balkans) with the need to address its concerns over both the growing unipolarity of the US and the re-unification of Germany (Major & Mölling 2007). Leading Mitterrand’s government to push for a more united Europe, that resulted in the creation of CFSP with the Maastricht Treaty, followed by the subsequent developments that were engineered with strong French input (Irondelle 2008: Menéndez Alarcón 2014: 31). Domestically, expressed in the 1994 White Paper (Livre Blanc) (with a predecessor in 1972) on security and
defence, the development of a European defence was made into a priority, endowed with a dual purpose of acting as a counterweight in the world and as a means to uphold stability within Europe. Focus also shifted from territorial defence to crisis management and multilateral commitments, both as a means to sharpen their own abilities and to demonstrate international influence; acting in parallel to wider trends in international security (Major & Mölling 2007: 5).

Aside from capacity insufficiencies, French interest in endowing the EU with foreign and security policy means arises from a more fundamental mixture of factors: disintegration of its colonial empire (and loosing wars of independence fought against it) with the concomitant weakening of power, the decrease of importance of the French language, culture and networks, in addition to the need to realign military and diplomatic efforts with its commercial interests, and a growing disillusionment with the UN’s peacekeeping efforts (Major & Mölling 2007; Menéndez Alarcón 2014, Chafer & Cumming 2010). Concerns over its diminishing international standing and power projection shortfalls derive from the enduring and relatively stable French view of its exceptionalism and proper standing in the world, derived from its historical legacy (the 1789 Revolution), the resultant endowment to promote universal values (i.e. human rights) and emphasis on independence (ability to act unilaterally) (Irondelle & Besancenot 2010: 22 Krotz & Sperling 2011). In fulfilling its foreign and security policy ambitions France has regularly had recourse to the use of force; since 1960’s being one of the few nations with the force-projection capabilities and political will to do so, even though the structural reality has been that of a gap between the strength of the military and the political aspirations (Bowen 2005).

With this realization that France acting alone cannot be a key international power, these principles are transposed externally into the model of Europe as a global power achieved by operating through intergovernmentalist institutional framework allowing for independence through selective dependence. On this level the French world ambitions manifest themselves in the notion of Europe puissance. While not precisely defined, it is supposed to mean ‘a great power able to have its own foreign policy, to defend its values and promote its interests in the world’ (Irondelle 2008: 155). The assumption is that of a great power in a multipolar world - means for France to be great with the dual function of being a force multiplier - capable of globally defending its
interests, guaranteeing its security, with military means if necessary, and behaving as a strategic actor (Bowen 2005).

The single voice of Europe will be determined through intergovernmental consultation and bargaining, the resulting amalgamation will be a mixture of single member states historical relationships and spheres of interest (Bowen 2005; Irondelle 2008: 156). As well as compensating for or managing several shortcomings that France has; budgetary constraints and a lack of resources, the growing multilateralization of global issues (e.g. trade agreements, climate change issues), and questions of international legitimacy (ibid.). To achieve its goals in the EU, France has at different times and for different proposals used either Franco-British or Franco-German dyad, most notably the former at St Malo and the latter at the so called ‘Chocolate Summit’ (Major & Mölling 2007).

The Summit in April 2003 and the resultant Declaration outlined the main French goals for the ESDP: general clause of solidarity, framing a supplementary enhanced cooperation, reformulation of the Petersberg tasks, creating a European Agency for military acquisitions and interoperability, and the creation of a European Security and Defence College. Subsequently, most of these propositions have been implemented with varying strength (Major & Mölling 2007).

3.3. **White Papers on Defence and National Security**

These views on the relationships between France and Europe, their positions in the world and definitions of interlinkages between concepts and actors, with the post-9/11 security issues increasing in salience, have been expressed in subsequent White Papers, the first ones – on Defence and National Security Policy, and on Foreign Affairs – were commissioned by President Sarkozy and released in 2008. Signifying the first rethinking of French security and foreign policy since 1994, followed by a White Paper on Defence and National Security issued in 2013 (*hereafter White Paper*).

The White Papers (2008: 2013) define and outline one of the central tenets of security policy for France: the ‘European ambition’ of turning the EU into a major player in crisis management and international security with corresponding capabilities. Moreover it is deemed a necessity for the EU as well. While noting disappointments in the EU’s developments, the 2008 White Paper (Chapter 7) proposed several goals for the EU that
either largely corresponded to the Helsinki Headline Goals or surpassed them in ambition, including capabilities to deploy several missions simultaneously, increased planning and operational capabilities and sufficient human resources, reforming the funding procedures to the principle of financial solidarity and a significant budget for CFSP; and advocated for an European White Paper on Defence and Security (ibid.). Notably, the ESDP’s intergovernmental nature and development outside treaty provisions was underlined (ibid.). While there is a strong integrationist undercurrent, this is delimited and constrained by notions of sovereignty, as exemplified by the approach towards common strengthened military capabilities. On the one hand in defence industries a privileged position should be prescribed to European frameworks for optimal results. On the other, certain strategically important areas and their maintenance is seen as remaining national e.g. nuclear deterrence and information system security. In practice, France defends its armaments industry using protectionist measures and majority control (White Paper 2008: 13; Major & Mölling 2007). The 2013 White Paper, in regards to the CSDP, holds the uniform approach. Expresses frustration over the lack of political will from other member states, advocates for revitalization and strengthening of the policy and its practical capabilities in order to contribute to greater efficacy in spending (the economic aspects of security are an overarching thread), and facing up to responsibilities and to become the referent framework for responding to complex crises. It also sees the project as a multifaceted instrument serving European interests, with the impetus from the European Council to develop strategic guidelines and political vision for the future developments; signing a driving role for France. Stating the exceptionality of the EU model: “[t]he world continues to expect things of Europe – a situation from which France can only benefit: the European Union is still the biggest economic and commercial power in the world, the second monetary power and the first in terms of humanitarian aid and development policy” and maintaining the EU’s credibility and influence as a major issue, France perceives this success as a cornerstone in its security in terms of international security projection (White Paper 2013: 16). The outlined vision emphasizes the need to remove deficiencies and duplication on the EU-level in context of freely agreed interdependencies that would strengthen sovereignty through resource availability (pooling and sharing), especially in the current financial situation (with implied cutting
costs) (White Paper 2013: 20). The exercise of its sovereignty is linked and placed in a context of closer political integration in security and defence (White Paper 2013: 17). The continuation of principles of independence of nuclear forces, full freedom of assessment (no automatic commitment) and freedom of decision is seen as paramount (White Paper 2013: 8).

In addressing one of the primary contentious issues surrounding the CSDP, that of relations between the policy and NATO, in both the 2008 and 2013 White Papers, the EU and NATO are taken as complementary frameworks and although the 2008 White Paper in Chapter 8 advocated for the full participation in NATO structures, that was seen as a parallel process with enforcing EU capabilities in crisis management. It emphasised both that the EU is a full-fledge actor in crisis management, not merely a civilian agency and that “21 members of NATO are members of the EU and have undertaken commitments with France in favour of European defence” (ibid.).

Keeping security and defence matters central but intergovernmental conciliates two primary albeit conflicting goals – independence and multilateralism – at the same time it is still perceived as moving towards deeper European integration, since there can be no political union without common defence; preserving the Gaullist paradigm of strong Europe with weak institutions (Irondelle 2008; Irondelle & Besancenot 2010) As such, a united Europe fitting a certain mould has been seen as a way to restore the place France had occupied in the past; “from de Gaulle’s to Hollande’s points of view, France must take the initiative in European affairs and try to lead Europe in creating a dynamic organization” (Menéndez Alarcón 2014: 32). Therefore, since France has valued military intervention as a foreign policy instrument (as exemplified by the 2008 White Paper outlined guidelines for the commitment of armed forces abroad and the prescribed operations), with primacy given to military and diplomatic responses over civilian and preventive ones, maintaining the flexibility to choose suitable forums in which to pursue interests and the ability to plan and conduct operations autonomously or as a lead nation in multilateral operation has remained paramount and a constant (Irondelle & Besancenot 2010).

Overall, the development of the ESDP/CSDP has been in accordance with and in continuity of the 1994, 2008 and 2013 White Papers, the 2001 Defence Strategy and the subsequent military programme bills that have all made the EU a focus of French
activities (Major & Mölling 2007). The dual French interest - stabilizing Europe and using it as a ‘force multiplier’ - have been evident throughout the CFSP/ESDP development. Among others, the French lobbied for the institutional set up of the policy with a reference to a defence dimension in the Maastricht Treaty; pushed for a stronger role for the WEU (as a consequents the WEU was integrated into the EU with the Amsterdam Treaty) to have a ESDP with a military dimension added to the CFSP; for the reform of the defence industry; the inception of permanent intergovernmental ESDP structures within the Council; together with the UK for a division between military and civilian aspects; for the idea of a European Foreign Minister (renamed as High Representative); together with the UK it shaped the HHG and developed the Battlegroup concept; the ESS that codifies French approaches (e.g. multilateralism and wide commitment); and co-initiated the European Gendarmerie Force (Major & Mölling 2007). France was opposed to expanding QMV, enhancing Parliamentary oversight and increasing the Commissions role; considering these changes as inefficient or infringements on sovereignty (Major & Mölling 2007). No development in ESDP/CFSP has been neither contrary not fully incompatible with French preferences; there has been no move towards a federalist orientation, no anti-nuclear clause nor a purely civilian orientation (Irondelle 2008: 160). By conceiving and placing itself as the leader of a politico-military Europe, France has created a frame in which it can embed its international role and exert influence. Although there has been a period of malaise in the relations between France and the EU, signified by the 2005 ´No’ vote on the Constitution Treaty, return to national involvement in crises, reluctant attitude towards successive enlargements and the growing understanding other member states do not share their views on role and capabilities of the EU (Irondelle 2008). French commitment has been revitalized, as expressed with the 2013 White Paper.

3.4. France and Africa – Continued Interest and a Source of Power

The 2008 Paper on Defence in Chapter 6 widens the geographic strategic area of interest, reaching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Eastern part of the European Continent and covers the prospect of major conflict in Asia. The 2013 White Paper has increased the focus on Africa with the Sahel as one of
the focal points, links the instability of the region with risks to Europe, illustrating the point with the situation in Mali, while recognizing that others in Europe may not share the interest or assign priority to the region links the instability of the region with risks to Europe.

Close Post-Colonial Relations. Postcolonial relations between France and North Africa, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa have been characterized by close economic ties, military assistance and direct intervention that mix business, politics and security concerns. They have considered Francophone Africa a pré carré français (a privileged reserve), signifying both a political symbol and an ideology that allows for developing African resources for French benefit (Bowen 2005: 102; Charbonneau 2008). With the French African policy underpinned by a Left-Right agreement that supported maintaining a sphere of influence in the region with the aim of bolstering its status in the world (French world power and its power in Africa were interlinked and mutually confirming) and preserving its commercial interests. The overall policy-making structures have been dominated by the president and with limited accountability to Parliament or civil society (Cumming 2013:26; Charbonneau 2008). This in turn has led to France signing defence agreements with eight and missions or bases in seven of its former colonies, together with military assistance agreements with 24 African states and around 30 military interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 30 year period of 1960-1989 (Cumming 2013:26). These interventions have tended to be concentrated in or near the territory of its former colonial empire and carried out under Gaullist and Socialist governments alike, although the stated reasons for intervention have changed over the years, from treaty obligations, the need to protect citizens to human rights protection (Bell 2014). As well as networks of contacts between officials, businessmen and operatives, supporting African (authoritarian) regimes and distinctive bilateral development aid system (Cumming 2013). As also noted by Cumming (2013:40) when looking at French approaches and responses they are influenced by “the fact that Africa is often as much a domestic as a foreign policy issue in France.”

This distinctive and neo-colonial approach and its underlying logic saw changes towards normalization or readjustments from 1990 onwards, especially after the genocide in Rwanda; with public awareness of the questionable practises rising, in 1990
President Francois Mitterrand declared a change in Africa policy that would make assistance to countries conditional on democracy and good governance. Two years later the shift was towards wider disengagement, pointedly demonstrated in 1999 when France did not intervene in Côte d'Ivoire (Bowen 2005: 102; Charbonneau 2008). The retrenchment included the closure of two of its seven military bases, reducing of troop strength by 20 per cent, reduction of Peace Corps-like volunteers and a 75 per cent reduction in the number of visas accorded to African nationals, characterized by a doctrine of 'neither interference nor indifference' (Bowen 2005: 102; Cumming 2013:26). However, this was also influenced by the wider reorganization and professionalization of the French army. Underlying continuities, between 1997 and 2002 France launched 33 operations in Africa, out of which ten were either mandated or under UN command (Charbonneau 2008: 283).

Change in Discourse. Since 2002 there has been a renewed French engagement in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, with assuming a markedly more interventionist role in Côte d'Ivoire, with a discourse of participating in African stability and prosperity within wider security policy directions of multilateralism, regionalism, and African ownership, meaning legitimizing its operations through regional African organizations, EU or UN (Ulriksen et al 2004). Concomitantly with wider trends towards prescribing to security-development nexus, wherein security and development are co-dependent and necessitating one another, France modified its military approach to serve the objectives of global governance (Charbonneau 2008).

In 2003, when addressing the National Assembly, the Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin defined French commitment to Africa as stemming from: urgency of the situations there (in terms of conflict), the potential of the continent (young labour force, economic growth), and as a window of opportunity for France (broadening horizons, place for action); once again placed in frames of legitimacy and human rights, regional stability and African mediation. The view is summarized by his statement that “[o]ur policy is translated into action every time, in military terms when necessary, in the form of a strong and long-term political commitment designed to mobilize the international community in the service of peace and development” (de Villepin 2003). Notably, under President Chirac France’s African military missions were partly Europeanized
(Cumming 2013), with France instrumentalizing the EU in order to legitimize and offer support to its interests in Africa, as illustrated by various ESDP missions. As discussed by Charbonneau (2008: 288) “France’s imagined political geographies of itself, Europe, and Africa are intimately intertwined and informed by its extensive colonial and postcolonial experiences.” The following, Sarkozy presidency was characterized by initial reform plans and impulses, with changes made that nonetheless were marked by both continuity of past practices and confusion in direction (Cumming 2013). The influential factors were both external (increase in EU involvement, Arab Spring, African rejection of French approaches) and domestic pressures in the form of civil society and journalists (Oxfam France and ONE launched campaigns and the latter wrote several books exposing French practices), combined with budgetary constraints. Countervailing forces comprising of French business lobby with competitive advantages in Africa and opportunities to spread costs of existing approaches through the EU in both civilian and military missions, together with overriding critical African voices and the limited accountability to the Parliament coupled with a preoccupation with the financial crisis lessening the domestic impact prevailed in influencing overall policy-making (Cumming 2013).

With extensive strategic and economic interests in Africa, for instance the continent remains an important market for French manufactures, as many as 240,000 French citizens live there, it depends in part on African uranium, and there is an affinity for groups that have embraced French culture, religion and language (Bell 2014). Furthermore, the French public has a history of supporting military operations in Africa, coupled with strong support for ESDP/CSDP. After the disintegration of its empire they signalled the continuity in its great-power status, presently the support is bound with pride in defending humanitarian principles, supported by the limited mandate, scale and risk of the operations (Bell 2014; Irondelle 2008).

On the one hand, given the deep strategic and economic ties to Africa, France (as well as the UK and Belgium) has learnt that operating under the rubric of multilateralism, makes it possible to retain influence in Africa (Rye Olsen 2009). Since, for the member states, the Union as a whole can provide political cover and legitimacy. The EU as a collective is greater than the sum of its parts. For instance, lessening or neutralizing the
problems that would arise when acting individually in parts of the world where some member states have considerable historical baggage (Menon 2009: 240). On the other, the so-called new threats affect Europe as a whole, with conflicts and crises in Africa can have negative effects in Europe, thus interventions at the source become the first line of defence and acting as a collective mitigates the costs of intervention (Charbonneau 2008). Even though, there is a fundamental divergence between EU member states about the former ESDP, current CFSP and use of force - in opposition to the French view of European security policy as stronger and wider reaching, most other states understand it less as a tool of coercion as a means to manage crises by allowing the EU to initiate and shoulder peacekeeping and stabilization missions - commonalities can be found and consensus reached in cases where there is a (highly mediatized or prominent) humanitarian or responsibility to protect impetus to intervention (Irondelle 2008: 156). Buttressing the EU capacities, in legal, material and normative terms, has opened up an avenue for pursuing national policy goals that otherwise would for various reasons be unreachable when acting alone as well as broadening and deepening the EU’s security paradigm and international role together with solidifying the CSDP (Major & Mölling 2007); enhancing the prestige of the Union by showing that it is a capable, responsible and independent actor. This pattern of French activism, humanitarian justification, limited mandates due to management of disparate views and UN authorization is illustrated by the operationalization the CSDP in several military missions in Africa.
4. European Union Military Missions in Africa

In devising a functioning policy area, member states faced two institutional challenges: to excogitate a framework that would allow for rapid and effective collective decision making, and secondly to see if it is practicable (Howorth 2007). Although the EU aims for a comprehensive approach, it has not developed a single model for missions, leaving a considerable degree of flexibility for individual mission planning and execution (Smith 2012).

Therefore, the EU is considerably more active, both with actions and resources, in devoting diplomatic, aid and other civilian efforts in far more countries than it is with principally military methods. Its resources for development assistance and external trade are substantial, while in conducting military crisis management the bulk of the costs are carried by participating states (Bailes 2008). Therefore, hitherto the EU’s missions, according to Bailes & Cottey (2010: 165-166) have roughly fallen into three categories: major efforts in the Balkans; moderately risky albeit limited missions in developing regions; and small, specialized, low-risk missions in neighbouring areas. As of March 2014 the EU has completed 19 missions: eight missions in Africa, nine in the Balkans/Caucasus region, one in Asia and one in the Middle East. Out of the 19 five were military operations (Artemis DRC, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Chad/CAR, and Concordia fYROM; in addition EUFOR Libya was not launched). The other 14 are civilian in character and include rule-of-law missions, monitoring missions, and technical aid missions (ISIS Europe 2014). And as of March 2014 there are 16 active CSDP and EU missions out of which nine are conducted in Africa, four in the Balkans/Caucasus region and three in the Middle East. Out of the 16, three are military operations (EUNAFOR Atalanta, EUFOR RCA in Africa and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (ibid.). The most significant cluster of activity covering near the full spectrum of prescribed civilian and military operations has focused on Africa. As a as a theatre of operations and the sole location for distinctive application of CSDP, it has modelled the policy’s operational practices as well as remit; Artemis as the first non-Berlin Plus operation, EUNAFOR Atalanta as the first naval operation; Chad/CAR as a bridging operation for the UN (Whitman 2013).
4.1. 2003 Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo

**Mandate.** The whole of African Great Lakes region and in particular the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been characterized and troubled by a mixture of political instability, civil wars, proxy wars and inter-state conflict. The faltering peace process in the DRC deteriorated in 2003, prompting the EU Council of Ministers into launching Operation Artemis with the aim of preventing a large-scale humanitarian crisis in the north-east of the country. It was the first mission undertaken within the framework of ESDP that took place outside of EU’s immediate neighbourhood, creating a precedent by extending the ESDP remit to Africa, and the first that did not use NATO assets. Instead the EU acted in response to the request made by the UN (Helly 2009a). The duration of the mission was delimited from the onset, lasting from 12 June to 1 September 2003, when full responsibility was transferred back to MONUC. The common costs budget was €7 million and the mission focused on the town of Bunia (eastern DRC). Overall 14 member states and three third countries contributed troops to the approximately 2,000 strong force (Helly 2009a: 181). The mission’s mandate, derived from the UN SC Resolution 1484 (2003) and was “to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town” (filling the security vacuum, providing the UN with room to reinforce its troops).

**A French Mission.** France acted as the framework nation; moreover, it started planning for the operation at least a month before the EU Council had formally launched the mission (Ulriksen et al 2004: 521). The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appealed first to Javier Solana to build support among the EU defence ministers and then to the French President Jacques Chirac with a request for assistance in May 2003, since the UN force on the ground was both insufficient in size and capacity. In effect, there were two parallel lines opened in advocating for intervention. The French offered to send personnel on certain conditions (robust mandate, limited timeframe and scope,
agreement from the host country), agreed to act as the lead country, in addition to sending a draft resolution to the UN SC (Morsut 2010; Koenig 2012). After multinationalizing the initial operation within the framework of ESDP, France was the main contributor of the forces (1,785 of which 1,651 were deployed, 42 stationed at the OHQ and 92 in the FHQ) overall providing 90 per cent of the ground forces, the Operation Headquarter (OHQ) was located in Paris (staffed with around 80 officers, 40 per cent of whom were non-French), it also provided the main air strike capabilities, also both the force commander and the operation commander were French (Giegrich 2008: 29; Helly 2009a: 183; Knutsen 2009: 448; Chafer & Cumming 2010: 1134). Sweden was the only other country that provided combat troops (around 70-80 in special-forces) operating in Brunia. Belgium contributed approximately 48 people for medical staff and tactical and strategic aircrafts based in Uganda, the UK had around 85 support personnel in Bunia and Uganda; and Germany provided approximately 350 troops stationed in Uganda, tasked with medical and logistical assistance. With a small national numbers, Austria, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain provided assistance at the OHQ (Hendrickson et al 2007; Helly 2009a: 183). Pushed by Sweden and the UK, changes had to be made to the initial operations plan, to include guarantees on issues like addressing the subject of child solders (Faria 2004).

Convergence of Interests. The launch of Artemis can be attributed to the interests of France and the UK (Rye Olsen 2009: 251). In the context of the controversial 2003 Iraq war and the resultant divisions in Europe (especially between France and the UK), the mission was a way to show cooperation and to reinforce the idea of European unity and international power. In addition, the former, under President Jacques Chirac – although in military terms the circumstances would have allowed it to act alone (Ulriksen et al 2004) - ‘found it pertinent for the EU to prove that it could act autonomously form NATO’ thus strategically Europeanising the initial Interim Emergency Multinational Force from a unilateral French intervention to an ESDP one (Rye Olsen 2009: 251; Ulriksen et al 2004), having also expressed desire for a more pro-active EU in African peacekeeping earlier in the year at the Franco-British summit in Le Touquet (Mace 2003: 5) and advocating for a stronger ESDP during the so-called ´Chocolate Summit´
few months prior (Major & Mölling 2007); while London was interested in developing a European defence dimension and EU’s role in Africa (Rye Olsen 2009: 251).

The opinions and official rhetoric expressed by French leadership reflected the mission’s focus on Europe with “the overwhelming balance of interpretation focused on the significance of the operation in the European framework” and far less humanitarian concerns (Utley 2006: 35). As further quoted and exemplified in Utley (2006: 35) Artemis was in Jacques Chirac’s view “‘an exemplary operation ... the first major operation conducted in the framework of the European Union, and as such cement[ing] the significant advances of European defence in which the French armed forces play[ed] a significant role’”; the view of the Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin was that of “the force in Ituri, the European Union’s first operation outside Europe ...[was] certainly a very strong symbol”; Pierre-Andre’ Wiltzer Minister of Francophonie and Cooperation thought that this was “an important stage in the confirmation of the European Security and Defence Policy”; and in the words of the Defence Minister Alliot-Marie the “mission [was] historic because it [was] the first autonomous mission of the European Union ... the moment of the real creation of European defence” (Utley 2006: 35).

Fostered by the relative lack of political sensibility attributed the area by the United States and NATO. For France additional set of motivations was to avoid another failure after Rwanda, to maintain its zone of influence (DRC is French-speaking) and enhance its prestige by initiating and conducting the mission (Gegout 2010: 130). The costs for the UK were minimal, out of 85 troops deployed 70 were engineers who upgraded the airfield (Gegout 2010: 131). As such, the UK was immediately in favour, while German initial reluctance - faced with French and British insistence - was quickly amended and other member states doubts that ESDP was not yet ready to address a situation as unstable as that in the DRC were reassured by the limited mandate, thus none expressed opposition (Faria 2004: 47; Ulriksen et al 2004).

Artemis succeeded in deploying troops to a remote operating theatre (over 6000 kilometres from Brussels); it had the capacity to protect civilians in its area, and offered a chance for closer coordination with humanitarian actors and other international organizations on the field (Helly 2009a: 183-184). Basing their judgement on modest criteria of fulfilling the limited mandate and ‘testing the machinery’ of ESDP the
European policy-makers judged the mission a success; the opposing view, shared by the International Crisis Group and a number of NGOs found the mission insufficient to foster change in the situation in the region and precisely criticized the limitedness of the mandate (Youngs 2004: 318; Ulriksen et al 2004). As discussed by Morsut (2010: 168), the EU had the necessary political will to act relatively rapidly and without delay, within a month the Council was able to approve two Common Positions and a decision to launch the mission, with forces on the ground 7 days later and full deployment was reached within three weeks from the start date. In the aftermath of the disagreement over Iraq there was a general consensus and unity among the 15 member states, coupled with the relatively low risk and France carrying the majority of the costs, thus allowing for the mitigation of both operational weaknesses and institutional constrains.

4.2. 2006 EUFOR in the Democratic Republic of Congo

**Mandate.** Three years later in 2006, after a partial breakthrough in the peace process and a transitional period, planning and conducting democratic elections in the DRC was made possible. Since the elections would change the balance of political power, and due to the slow demobilization process the candidates controlled armed troops, there were fears of renewed violence. The UN contingent was once again overstretched and relatively small, prompting the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in preparation, to ask for more troops from the SC. After negative replies, the UN turned to the EU asking for a support mission (Tull 2009: 46). In December 2005 the EU received a formal request from the UN for assistance in securing the elections in DRC taking place on 30 July 2006 (Knutsen 2009: 450). The source of the request created the first point of contestation, since the head of the UN peacekeeping department was a French diplomat and the informal channels prior to request were bypassed, the view among German officials was that of French initiative (de Flers et al 2011: 174).

After a fact-finding mission in January, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of April 2006 launching EUFOR RD Congo. The mission was mandated by the UNSC Resolution 1671 (2006) to support the UN mission (MONUC) in its stabilizing role, to protect civilians in the areas of deployment, to protect the airport, to act as deterrence and to execute evacuation operations. The length of the
mission was four months, from 30 July to November 2006. The JA set the common costs for the period at €16.7 million (not covering barracks and lodging for the forces and expenditure relating to their transport) (Major 2009: 315). The overall cost of EUFOR was about €100 million, with the common costs rising to approximately €23 million. Out of the remaining expenditure France contributed approx. €27 million and Germany around €26 million (Major 2009: 315). Furthermore, in addition to Artemis (2003), the EU has deployed three civilian missions focusing on security sector reform to Congo. EUPOL Kinshasa 2005-2007 followed by EUPOL RD Congo since 2007 and EUSEC RD Congo since 2005 (ISIS Europe 2014).

Effective Multilateralism. France, Belgium and the European Commission argued for the mission. The former two had national interests in keeping DRC stable, with France having a longstanding involvement in the region and in the peace process, as exemplified by and congruent with the previous EU mission. There was also a perceived need to assert credibility and unity in the wake of the no-votes for the Constitutional Treaty in Ireland, France and the Netherlands; together with the backdrop of the adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa in 2005 for which the mission was a test case (Chafer & Cumming 2010: 1135). Illustrated by an article published in the “Le Monde” newspaper in 3rd June 2006, wherein the French Minister of Defence, Michèle Alliot-Marie, put the context of the mission as a public desire that EU is actively pursuing “[a]ccording to a recent survey, 80% of Europeans would like our continent to have the capacity to deploy its defence forces independently of the United States. Without them necessarily realizing it, this wish is becoming a reality…and it continues to make headway despite the difficulties resulting from the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty last year”. For the EU, as discussed by Gross (2009: 57) “as far as the ESDP EUFOR RD Congo was concerned, this was about EU–UN cooperation and implementing “effective multilateralism” more so than a debate over the appropriateness of an ESDP operation in this particular geographic region”.

German Involvement. Even though France had an interest in the mission, they had led the previous operation and so to add credibility, France asked Germany to play the leading role (de Flers et al 2011). During the Franco-German Summit in January 2006,
Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Jacques Chirac had indicated that each would provide one third of the soldiers. Facing domestic scepticism and feeling pressured by France, together with participation under the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle raising fears of paying for the majority of the mission, Germany remained reluctant (ibid.). Despite the French suggestion, it was unwilling to deploy the Franco-German Battle Group which primarily comprised of German troops (Gross 2009). But, it was one of the few member states with a functioning OHQ; the UK although politically not opposed to the missions objectives and was giving financial support to the peace-process, was overstretched with commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan and perceived it as a hard sell domestically, had declined the role (Gross 2009: 88). Since Germany had a normative commitment to EU-level cooperation and the ESDP project, Berlin was willing to negotiate, setting preconditions that had to be met. After negotiations and pressure form EU pro-mission countries, notably France, and concern over non-participation would hurt the credibility of the ESDP Germany consented (Tull 2009: 49; de Flers et al 2011). The OHQ was thus led by Germany and located in Potsdam and the FHQ was run by France and located in Kinshasa (Knutsen 2009: 451). After requests in the PSC, followed by internal discussions and a conversation between the Polish President and the President of France and motivated by reputation-building and political investment, Poland agreed to send 130 military police (de Flers et al 2011). These discussions and negotiations continuously delayed deployment. Therefore, in contrast to the previous mission, it took the EU almost three months to give an affirmative answer to the UN and six months for the force to be operational (Rodt 2011: 50-51).

Altogether, twenty-one EU member states along with Turkey and Switzerland contributed. The peak strength was 2,466 troops. France deployed 1,090, Germany 730, Poland 130 and Spain 130, with special forces provided by France, Sweden and Portugal (Giegrich 2008: 30; Major 2009: 314). The troops were deployed in three locations: an advanced element of around 1,425 in Kinshasa, on call force of over 800 in Libreville, Gabon at a French military base and a strategic reserve in Europe (France and Germany), thus bringing the troop size to around 4,000. The Spanish unit of 130 soldiers was the only effective fighting force in Kinshasa, the Polish 130 military police protected the EUFOR facilities and the rest had support functions, including intelligence and medical services (Tull 2009: 50). After reaching a deal at the EU level, the German
Government had faced domestic negotiations. In the Government itself there were disagreements, with the Ministry of Defence and armed forces against the mission as such and the Chancellor and the Minister of Cooperation and Development supporting it with the difference being in the size and modalities; the debate justifying it was over the centrality and importance of multilateralism and the lack of strategic concept towards Africa (de Flers et al. 2011: 176; Gross 2009: 150-151). As a result, the German Bundestag placed geographical restrictions on the positioning of German troops in DRC; correspondingly to the limits on the Spanish contingent, circumscribing them to Kinshasa. Moreover, the German combat troops were stationed in Gabon, limiting their utility and operationalization (Knutsen 2009: 451; Major 2009: 315-316). In sum, France provided the majority of the troops in the primary operating theatre and moreover, considerable share of EU troops were placed outside of DRC.

Since the operation was temporally limited to the end of November, but the second round of elections was delayed, with the results announced not until 29 October or a few days before the mandate ended, France and Belgium wanted to extend the mission as a precaution, to address the danger of renewed conflict breaking out. Germany opposed this plan, in part because the Defence Minister had publicly promised to bring the troops home for Christmas (ibid.). Refusing the extension contradicted the mission objectives, since the initial fear was of violence caused by dissatisfaction with the results. Instead, the EU risked outbreak of conflict right when it was withdrawing (Tull 2009: 53). As argued by Gegout (2010: 132) “Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo were conducted because a humanitarian mission was necessary, but this was not a sufficient reason in itself. In fact, when other humanitarian missions could have been conducted in the DRC, the EU was not present.” Since the mission was limited in time and scope with success consisting of fulfilling its limited mandate EUFOR DRC did not contribute in regard to managing the conflict as a whole. It did not prevent more violence in the country, the conflict continued and the situation remained volatile (Rodt 2011).

Non-Mission to DRC in 2008. In 2008 the situation in the DRC had deteriorated once again to a point of reaching a severe humanitarian crisis. In October 2008 following a
EU foreign ministers meeting, French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, called the situation in DRC “unacceptable and murderous” (Vines 2011: 57). At their next meeting in November, DRC had moved to the top of the agenda, but concluded with a call to reinforce cooperation between actors involved. While using force was not ruled out, the EU was not united either. Kouchner discussed using the EU Battlegroups and called for EU military intervention, that idea was rejected by HR Solana, but in general French position was more towards giving humanitarian aid and supporting MONUC. When drawing parallels between using force with Artemis and the situation at hand in 2008, Foreign Minister Kouchner highlighted the complexity of the crisis, the lack of a specific goal and timeframe together with a need for a political solution as reasons for general reluctance and impetus to find alternative methods (Kouchner 2008). Faced with reluctance from the UK and Germany, various NGOs and public figures lobbied the EU governments for an intervention (Pohl 2013b; Vines 2011: 57). After the UN SC passed a resolution allowing for additional troops, in December 2008, the UN Secretary-General explicitly requested military support from the EU to act as a bridging force prior to MONUC reinforcement. Germany rejected the mission outright, unwilling to take part in another African mission with potential domestic costs coupled with a slowdown in its economy; the UK was more cautious in part due to media pressure to act on one hand but on the other there was strong concerns in the Ministry of Defence about military overstretch stemming from Afghanistan commitments; Spain and Italy cited inability to lead, as did the Netherlands (offered funds only): while Belgium due to the strong domestic public pressure was the biggest advocate. While the French foreign minister supported action, the rest of the administration had a more negative stance with the military doubting the feasibility of the mission (Pohl 2013b: Vines 2011: 57). On 6th December 2008, in a joint article in ‘Le Monde’, French foreign minister Kouchner and British foreign secretary David Miliband clearly stated that “fundamentally the situation in Congo can only be resolved by political means: there will be no military solution to this problem”. In sum, due to opposition, strong preference for civilian response and without a lead nation, the UN request was rejected.
4.3. 2008 EUFOR Chad and Central African Republic

Crisis in Darfur. The situation in Darfur that broke out in 2003 was on paper exactly the sort of mission the ESDP was created to undertake. It fell within the confines of purportedly acceptable use of force – a failed state where crisis management is needed to restore order and to protect civilians on humanitarian grounds. Furthermore, it would not have offered a clear benefit to any single member state (Toje 2008: 135). The UN SG Kofi Annan told the international community in April 2004 to be prepared to take measures in Darfur; the President of the EU’s military committee declared that the EU had the means to intervene; the UK seemed prepared to send troops. When none of the others were able or willing, since Germany together with some smaller states looked for non-military measures, and fearing bearing a large share of the burden without a likelihood of minimal national gain, France signalled an opposition to a military mission as well (Toje 2008: 136). In an interview to ‘Paris Match’ Foreign Minister Michel Barnier on 5th August 2004 spoke about need to give support to humanitarian organizations and the AU and put political pressure (in effect advocating for a political solution) on Sudan with an overall need of a common EU foreign policy for the region and to ‘Le Monde’ a few days later on 8th August Barnier (2004b) stated that “a definitive resolution of this crisis can be achieved only by supporting the Africans’ own efforts”. In addition France did not wish to jeopardise relations with the Arab world after the French opposition to the Iraq war. As well as being opposed to NATO being involved, stressing that it is not NATO’s role to be a police officer – concerned that NATO would expand its interests to Francophone Africa. (Gegout 2010: 132). The EU hoped that other actors would take the lead (the United States, Britain, the UN or NATO) and they could engage selectively form the fringes. By the end of 2004 the situation in Darfur had deteriorated to a point where accumulating pressure on the EU was close to a critical mass for an ESDP mission. The UK as a vocal advocate started planning for a unilateral intervention in July 2004, only to conclude a lack of military capabilities (Toje 2008: 137). As such the EU leaders lacked the necessary political will to act decisively, opting for discussions on the nature of the particular conflict, issuing declarations and statements, using financial aid, supporting regional organizations active in the area, without getting militarily involved (ibid.).
Chad as a Substitute. The conflict in Chad is closely linked with the conflict in Darfur. The latter has resulted in an outpouring of refugees together with internally displaced people meeting at the porous border areas between eastern Chad and Darfur, resulting in no secure environments to escape to from internal armed conflict and inter-ethnic violence, in addition to the proxy-war between Sudan and Chad. In 2006, the UK and France requested the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to start planning for an international presence (Dijkstra 2010; 397). The situation in Darfur was by then high on the domestic political agenda in France, influenced by the presidential elections in 2007. The newly elected President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner had during campaigning made a pledge to ‘do something about Darfur,’ coupled with domestic pressure from both the civil society as well as from media personalities, creating substantial expectations for the incoming administration (Pohl 2013b: 7). Sudan on the other hand would not allow for Western troops to participate in international operation, moreover the presence of the AU and the UN was on a precarious footing (Styan 2012). Further impetus was found with refocusing on the humanitarian situation in Chad with Mr Kouchner discussing various options, communicating with the EU and persistently working towards an intervention, since the EU partners were sceptical, deriving from the their suspicions of France pursuing its interest in its former colonial areas and fears of public backlash over intervening in an relatively unknown situation (Pohl 2013b). Germany, holding the rotating EU presidency, tried to focus on other priorities. With the transfer of the presidency to Portugal in July 2007, the plans for intervention were revived, supported by the Council Secretariat. During the planning stages, the geographical focus shifted squarely on eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR and discarding other more ambitious options (no fly zones, humanitarian corridors) on supporting the activities of the UN. France volunteered as the Framework nation, offered to provide 40 per cent of the troops and the OHQ for the mission (Dijkstra 2010; 397-398). One of the selling points for other member states was framing the mission as a bridging operation; the EU force would serve until a UN peacekeeping mission could take over.

In October 2007 the EU military operation EUFOR Chad/CAR was established; mandated to act complementarily to the UN Mission to Chad and CAR (MINURCAT) with a threefold objective: to protect civilians (in particular refugees and IDPs), to
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian workers, and to contribute to the protection of UN personnel and property (Helly 2009b: 339). The mission lasted from 15 March 2008 to 15 March 2009 (ibid.).

Difficulties in Mission Forming. In contrast to previous missions in the DRC, EUFOR Chad/CAR was a contentious mission from the onset within the EU. The countries were both former French colonies that have close political and military ties with France. France has had a military base in Chad since the mid-1980’s with around 3,000 troops being stationed there to buttress the government and stabilize the situation (Rye Olsen 2009: 255). Besides the rebels in Chad (France was supporting the Chadian regime), some French NGO’s expressed concern about the agenda motivating the intervention; and according to Rye Olsen (2009: 55) there was ‘a general agreement among observers and EU civil servants in Brussels that France played a remarkably strong role’, resulting in widespread criticism of the mission form several fronts. Although, Germany and the UK did not block the mission, they also did not contribute any troops and wished to keep common costs low. Germany having taken the lead in the previous mission to the DRC, after international pressure and domestic negotiations, opted out seeing no part for itself in Africa (de Flers et al 2011; Pohl 2013b). The UK was primarily concerned with Darfur, but also saw a danger of a regional conflict erupting; the Foreign Office was ready for the latter scenario, while the Ministry of Defence remained cautious with both refusing to participate and blocking funding. After an exchange between President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Brown did the UK send four staff officers, unblocked the money and - prompted by domestic public concern, pressure from British NGOs and the US administrations concern over the situation in Darfur- co-sponsored the UN-resolution authorizing the deployment (Chafee and Cumming 2010: 1136). During the Council Secretariat planning process, member states did not explicitly state their agreement for a military operation in Chad. Instead, informal decisions, led by France, took place. Since, Germany and the UK were not willing to deploy troops; France worked to get other member states to contribute, using the position of operation commander as a bargaining device. Even though Sweden showed initial interest, after a visit to the region, the Swedish Foreign Mister Carl Bildt announced that they would not be deploying the Swedish-led Nordic Battle Group (Dijkstra 2010: 398). The position of
operation commander was offered to Ireland during an informal defence ministers meeting. For the Irish government it was a way to illustrate its commitment to the UN-system and humanitarian purposes while gaining credibility in EU-matters after the lost referendum (Pohl 2013b). Along with filling the post, Ireland provided 450 troops. President Sarkozy’s diplomacy also had a success with Poland, which offered 400 troops. Other member states (all but Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Malta) made smaller contributions (Dijkstra 2010: 400; Styan 2012: 659). As stated by Pohl (2013: 8b) one of the primary reasons for not blocking the mission, was operating in the spirit of quid pro quo, meaning the unwillingness of governments to outright oppose another member states pet project when possible. The UK remained passive throughout the negotiation and deployment processes. As interpreted by Rye Olsen (2009: 255) there is a division of labour in Africa, whereby the UK and France would respect each other’s interests and activities, keeping a low profile when necessary. Since the prevalence of France and the ambiguous rationale behind the mission, some member states (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland) with the interest in acting in the region in accordance with an humanitarian agenda (motivated by domestic political interests) and supporting ESDP, insisted on the missions impartiality (Helly 2009b: 346; Pohl 2013b: 10). As such the EUFOR mandate excluded any political role, the mission was deemed to be strictly neutral (Styan 2012: 661).

Adding to the discord, during the drafting of the Joint Action the amount of common costs significantly increased. The initial estimate of €420 million was negotiated down to €99.2 million. A sum that Germany and the UK had agreed to; the revised proposal with an increase to €120 million led to disputes (Dijkstra 2010: 399). The combined total costs of the mission were approximately €1 billion; since the amount of the common costs was restricted, France as the largest troop contributor ended up with footing the majority of the bill (Helly 2009b: 342) After four force generation conferences, there was still a shortage of military hardware and other logistical support (mainly military transport helicopters and medical facilities). During the fifth and final conference, France decided to make up most of the shortfalls, the troop increases were made by transferring some of the troops from the French 1200-strong Epervier force in Chad under EU control. After lobbying, Russian Federation contributed four helicopters at a later date (Dijkstra 2010: 400; Styan 2012). The problems with troop commitments,
inadequate equipment and budgeting disputes delayed the formation of the mission by several months.

Reasons for consent have been attributed to the frustration and pressure to act in the situation in Darfur with Chad as an opportunity to something under the banner of humanitarian aid, while demonstrating the utility of ESDP in the field of peacekeeping, to the binding/bridging character of the mission with a clear time frame of one year, and it had – due to French lobbying - a wider range of contributors than previous missions in Africa (including among third states) (Rye Olsen 2009: 255). Like the aforementioned missions, EUFOR Chad/CAR did have some success in alleviating the violence even though similarly to EUFOR DRC the deployment was delayed, they were not authorized to provide security within the camps and were stopped from operating at the border area, together with an overall limited placement and lack of support from domestic, regional, European and international actors. Hence it had little overall impact on conflict management in Chad and the region, besides improving the security situation at the operation area (Rodt 2011: 53-54). Furthermore, due to the limited mandate, the mission had no effect on the situation in Darfur.

4.4. 2008 EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta

Acts of piracy - arising from the general instability and lack of effective state apparatus in Somalia for more than two decades - had been reported off the Somali coast and around the Horn of Africa prior to 2007 (Larik 2013). But, following the increase in number and intensity of acts in 2007 and 2008, including those on World Food Programme (WFP) vessels that were delivering humanitarian aid, the UNSC passed several resolutions to address the problem in the region. The French-US supported Resolution 1816 permitting according to international law ‘all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery’. Concomitantly, at first, various states (Canada, the Netherlands, France and Denmark) naval units and temporary NATO operation Allied Provider, were sent to the region to escort WFP vessels. (Germond & Smith 2009: 579; Vainio 2008). The Council established a coordination cell EU NAVCO (without military assets) in Brussels in September 2008, to support the anti-
piracy efforts carried out by some of the member states. In December 2008 the EU launched the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia – Operation Atalanta – its first naval mission, to support the UN Resolutions and to contribute to the protection of WFP and other vulnerable vessels in the area and to the deterrence and repression of acts of piracy; the mandate has been amended several times adding tasks, widening reach and extending the duration, although no changes have been made to its political objectives (Ehrhart & Petretto 2012). Compared to previous two military missions, EU NAVFOR was launched promptly, in 10 weeks. The common costs for the first 12 months were €8.4 million, with total estimated annual contributions at €400 million (Helly 2009c: 391). Atalanta was initially scheduled for one year, but its mandate has been extended until December 2014. Since there has been a constant rotation of vessels, the participation number fluctuates, but most member states have contributed (Larik 2013). During its initial duration, the mission operated with at least six warships, several reconnaissance planes and around 1,500 personnel (Weber 2009: 73).

**A Set of Motives for Action.** In the case of piracy there is a clearer direct threat to European citizens (yachters and sailors) who face the threat of kidnapping and ransoming. Piracy harms maritime trade, with a potentially damaging effect on European (and world) economy, since about 20 per cent of global trade passes through the Gulf of Aden, with the negative impact worsened by the soaring costs of marine insurance premiums - illustrated by European ship-owners lobbying EU governments for more forceful action - and threatening EU’s energy security as EU’s oil imports transit through the area. The situation has a negative influence on European fishermen and EC fishing vessels (primarily those of France, Italy and Spain) operating in the zone (in 2008 the loss was estimated over € 65 million to the 43 EC vessels operating in the region) (Barrueco 2009: 201; Rice & Gow 2008; Helly 2009: 394). Since targeted vessels are mostly oil and chemical tankers, the attacks also entailed an environmental risk. Therefore, from an economic point of view, it has been in the EU’s collective interest to address the situation. In addition, due to the unstable situation in Somalia and Yemen, there could be a potential risk of inter-linkage between pirates and terrorist groups; and disrupted deliveries of humanitarian and food aid harm the Somali
population who depend on the WFP (a priority for the Nordic countries and the Netherlands). The money gained and food, arms, cargo seized by the pirates support the local warlords, perpetuating the state of chaos (Germond & Smith 2009; Barrueco 2009: 201; Helly 2009).

Leadership and Participation. In April 2008 French President Sarkozy authorized the use of deadly force in response to the hijacking of *Le Ponant* with a Special Forces raid on land, and once again in September to rescue kidnapped French yachters (Germond and Smith 2009: 580). Between July and September France was holding the rotating EU Presidency, and was also the first official advocate for a military role for the EU, in part triggered by the high mediatisation of the aforementioned events, as stated by Foreign Mister Kouchner “thanks to the French European Union presidency, we launched in partnership with Spain the first European maritime operation” (Kouchner 2009). Giving the ESDP a naval dimension would work towards strengthening the policy, in addition France has been active in naval cooperation with other European countries outside of NATO (*Force Navale France-Allemande* and EUROMARFOR, Anglo-French cooperation) (Germond & Smith 2009: 584). Although France had an instrumental role in securing UNSC authorization for the mission and was seen as the main instigator, due to political considerations (having been at the forefront in the previous three missions and carrying a large burden with EUFOR Chad/CAR) and economic reasons (cuts in defence spending) it preferred not taking the leading role (Chafer & Cumming 2010: 1137).

German navy had been shifting towards a more interventionist character, reflected in doctrinal documents and in the participation in ‘out of area’ operations, namely the anti-terrorist operation Enduring Freedom at the Horn of Africa, Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean and naval component in UNIFIL off the coast of Lebanon (Germond & Smith 2009: 584). Therefore, it provided one vessel straight away and has participated in the long term. Other considerations included safeguarding national economic interests (most affected by piracy) and expressing support to the EU after its troop reductions in the Balkans (Weber 2009). As such, the bigger issue was getting the UK to agree on the role for the EU in anti-piracy. Since NATO had been the only competent actor in naval operations and regarding NATO-ESDP/CSDP relations as a zero-sum
game the British government was concerned about undermining NATO`s capacities. However, NATO was becoming overstretched at the time with the mission in Afghanistan and with monitoring potential terrorist activities. The UK as a major naval power in its own right, with a long tradition and competence; and its shipping interest being affected by piracy, doing nothing or allowing France to take the lead was not optimal or even a preferred solution (Germond & Smith 2009: 585). Furthermore, the UK Government was faced with lobbying by private sector actors since London is an international hub for commercial shipping (Chafer & Cumming 2010: 1137). Suitably, during the creation of ESDP/CSDP, the UK and the United States had advocated for a principle of subsidiarity for EU operations, seeing it as a useful tool for when either the United States or NATO are not willing or able to intervene. In the case of Atalanta, this was put into practice since delegating the anti-piracy operation to the EU freed up the US to a degree and allowed NATO to focus on other issues (namely terrorism) (Germond & Smith 2009: 585). The UK took the lead of the operation, citing protection of trade and commerce and self-defence as reasons for the mission. The decision was also made in the context of the ten year anniversary of the St Malo declaration, an event that led France and the UK to emphasize their cooperation (Norton-Taylor 2008).

In upholding SC Resolutions the EU had an opportunity to be a visible and responsible international security actor operating in a multilateral context, as well as to protect its economic interests and to place it within the facets of the `comprehensive approach` taken to address Somali issues (Larik 2013). In terms of risk to EU forces, the mission involves minimal action and exposure on land, supported by the substantial power discrepancies between European vessels and Somali pirate skiffs (ibid.) or as put by Weber (2009: 71) “the endeavour was plainly feasible, useful and legitimate” serving a humanitarian objective as well as European trade interests, with the request coming from the country itself. In justifying the mission, member states put emphasis on the multilateral framework and protecting universal values; German foreign minister clarified German participation arising from a rationale of guaranteeing the delivery of humanitarian aid, with national-economic interests as a secondary goal within a wider common interest; Sweden also put the protection of WFP vessels as the main priority
with; Spain was more explicit in protecting both international security and national interests as an interlinking concern (Larik 2011: 58-59).

Although, the mission has contributed to the considerable reduction in the number of attacks and succeeded in protecting WFP vessels, it has not put an end to piracy nor fostered a permanent and sustainable solution to underlying causes (ibid.). Moreover, having the EU mission has not stopped member states from operating in other frameworks, with countries - including Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain the UK and France – contributing to parallel missions or switching flags to conduct missions outside mandate purview (e.g. rescuing nationals) (Larik 2013).

Following the initial active period of 2003-2008 when the EU launched 27 operations, the activities came to a near standstill after EUFOR Chad/CAR and Atalanta. In the context of the aftermath over French pressure concerning the mission in Chad and the financial crisis in Europe, neither new civilian nor military missions were launched before 2012. After a six year gap, a new EU military mission was launched in February 2014, namely EUFOR RCA in Central African Republic (ISIS Europe 2014).
Conclusions

The EU is a hybrid entity with different constituent parts having various impelling forces for integration. When elucidating the drivers and the integration outcomes in the field of military aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy - its placement within the EU structure, shape and form as expressed in various treaties, HHGs and ESS, operationalization with missions – member states with their interests, goals and views have been paramount in broadening and deepening the security paradigm and architecture of the EU. The relatively rapid development of the ESDP apparatus, from its initiation in 1998 to creation in 1999 and acquiring a treaty base in 2001 to its first mission in 2003 together with treaty level new or added facets and political attention at Council summits to the creation of CSDP (Kaunert and Zwolski 2013) has been dictated by events that the member states have needed to respond to. Influenced by domestic public’s reactions to European discord and lack of leadership in prominent issues, together with views on their governments overall action or inaction and its accordance with their normative self-perceptions, since government actions are impacted by its perceptions of how a policy will affect its own power or what are its expected domestic political consequences (Pohl 2012a).

Form the pre-Maastricht outbreak of the Gulf War of February-March 1991 exemplifying a lack of unity; the situation in the former Yugoslavia triggering the whole CFSP to CSDP process and furthermore shadowing the Amsterdam negotiations, both times drawing attention to military capacity shortfalls and inadequacy of the collective toolbox in addressing military conflicts; changes in government, most importantly in the UK, allowing for closer cooperation at St Malo; the post-Nice progression shaded by 9/11 and influencing a common security strategy that defines the role conception of the EU towards a non-coercive crisis manager; to the Iraq war emphasising the inherent and prevalent divisions in Europe. As well as being faced with budgetary constraints and gradual fall in defence budgets; with the United States pivot away from Europe; and the shift in threat perceptions, security considerations and in the normative context. Overall, the constant themes underlying the concept framing have been difficulties in finding a common approach to the situations, highlighting the divisions between Member States.
views on projecting force, coupled with Europe’s inability as a collective to influence international events or to effectively partake in post-Cold War ‘crisis management’ (Menon 2004: 22; McCormick 2002). Coupled with the domestic interests in responding to these particular instances and developing a common approach altogether, has been the EU as a facilitating stage for negotiations setting limits in what can be achieved. Deriving from the EU’s a voluntary character (veto-power in the Council; states choose to join), lack of coercion, instead the transaction costs of bargaining are low (institutionalized system with the possibility of numerous offers and counteroffers), the member states operating in the system are risk-averse and avoid high costs, and the environment is relatively information-rich (Moravcsik 1993). Furthermore, as discussed in the first chapter, the outcome in the form of the CSDP has been determined by the relative intensity of national preferences with the need to compromise setting the limits (Moravcsik 1993). The goal has been fostering coherence and a common approach to multiply power and to that end to utilize the EU. Due to the multiplicity of viewpoints, the mandate and resources of the CSDP have been contested from the onset, but throughout the institution-building process the preference of member states (in which they have found compromise) has been for non-binding mechanisms that would preserve autonomy in spite of attempts towards more convergence; the intergovernmental and unanimity in decision-making was put in place with the Maastricht Treaty and has subsequently been reinforced with each new treaty revision. While the decision-making process that has arisen from all the institutional upgrades is complex, it is still based firmly on governments seeking unanimity in an ambiguous framework. The leitmotif has been the lack of commitment on the part of member states to fulfil their obligations such as the Headline Goals or utilizing Battlegroups, moreover the states have lowered the agreed upon goals. Although institutional structures for arriving at a single voice and representation have been created, they are made subservient to member states political will and control through, for instance personnel selection. Community method based EU institutions have been largely sidestepped, with member states having, as such, created one more option for force projection (allowing for forum-shopping and burden-sharing) and creating a scapegoat in case of unfavourable decisions or (in)actions.
Since the CSDP is a political and strategic project driven by converging interests the internal inability to agree on the overall strategic direction of external action has led to the CSDP missions lacking a unified framework for different stages. From planning to implementation, the ad hoc approach taken is “a bargaining game over the terms of co-operation” (Moravcsik 1993: 469), exemplified by ambiguous clauses about EU engagement in foreign and security policy. The configuration of national preferences allows for an assortment of potentially viable agreements, governments need to collectively come to an agreement in which conflicting interest and views on distributional consequences are reconciled (Moravcsik 1993: 497).

In the context of the financial crisis the costs of new military ‘adventures’ such as a proposed mission to Darfur, the UN-suggested operation in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in the late 2008 or the proposed EUFOR Libya seemed relatively steeper with perceived domestic gain being to a smaller degree than acceptable (Pohl 2013a: 319). The two non-interventions to Darfur in 2003 and DRC in 2008 were due to lack of agreement, although that obstacle can be overcome, as seen with Chad/CAR, either reached through acceptable contextualization (in this case acting as a proxy for Darfur), through political negotiations (French diplomacy) or by bigger states neither participating nor blocking a decision to deploy. More importantly, in these cases there was no strong leader willing to take on the responsibility on the one hand. On the other due to political and economic concerns and complexities, deriving in part from the lack of a clear mandate options as well as no clear option for an end-date, there was outright opposition and preference towards civilian means. Within the created CSDP system, no state can act alone or without tacit acquiescence of the big three, Germany, France and the UK. The national public opinion in member states is generally not in favour of foreign military interventions. Against the background of renewed nationalism, as is evident in in France, in Greece, the UK, Finland and others, it is difficult for governments to obtain the support of the public for increasing defence budgets, participation in missions or promoting defence industries (Fernandez Sola 2013). The most recent and to date on-going EU mission EUFOR RCA, has exemplified in its early stages these difficulties and followed the previously set pattern of contentious missions (EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Chad/CAR). The mission planning followed French lead, has a perception of this being an internal African problem and the French approach
to the mission has been contentious since France started on their own in 2013 and asked for support after the event, characterized by delays in deployment, insufficient commitments, and mandate that has a limited timeframe and UN-bridging aspect. Furthermore, the EU’s attention and diplomatic efforts have been focused to the situation and tensions with Russia over Ukraine (Nimark 2014; Ducrotté 2014).

When looking the total number of missions and the balance between military and civilian orientation - despite the aim of the policy to foster military cooperation - the majority of CSDP missions have been civilian in nature. Such missions entail fewer costs, both in terms of political risk and financial means together with public support on ‘soft’ security; allowing for EU governments to engage internationally without taking on a substantial degree of responsibility. For a mission to be authorized, in broad terms, first a unanimous decision is needed and second an intervention force needs to be organized, that means assembling a national military and civilian resources and the will and ability to pay for them. Therefore, military operations have been justified on humanitarian terms and with limited timeframes as a way to mitigate political risks (Pohl 2013a: 319). But, as argued by Gegout (2010) having a humanitarian crisis is not a sufficient trigger for EU military intervention, a mixture of low risk to European forces and willingness to enhance prestige and power is needed. Further arguments are made by Bailes (2008) stating that the EU’s missions are not chosen on purely principled grounds (greatest humanitarian need, benefit to the greatest number, conformity with the principles of ESS or the UN Charter), but can be explained in terms of limited risk and cost, training value, ease of consensus and demonstration of autonomy and ability. Therefore, none of the missions have resolved the conflicts or offered a long-terms solution to the situation, best exemplified by the continuous situation in the DRC. As stated by Toje (2008: 127) “the EU favours small-scale, low-intensity pre-and post-crisis management in response to issues low on the international agenda.” Thus, the system created allows for picking and choosing issues that favour consensus with nothing to mandate leaders to put divisive issues on the agenda. Leading to inconsistencies, mere declarations on urgent crises, low level of commitment and applied coercive force in situations where the need for it is questionable; action characterized by not what is needed to meet a specific objective but what can be agreed
upon (Toje 2008:132). The ´costs lie were they fall´ system penalizes those who have capabilities during procurement and again when those capabilities are used, rewarding disinvestment and free-riding. In addition, it gives a far greater stay to those member states that are militarily stronger (ibid.). In this context, tabling a CSDP mission entails a twofold cost, both in immaterial terms in political capital and financially in delivering a substantial part of necessary capabilities. As such, Germany’s and the UK’s reluctance to participate in French-led military operations has been less a question of normative differences than about domestic political risks of participating in projects of dubious gain (Pohl 2013a: 319).

While a moral case can be made in intervening in cases with great breaches of security and human rights in former colonial areas that also are arguably linked with the colonial heritage, on the other hand the return of European military forces can be linked to neo-colonialism and self-serving economic interest protection (Bailes 2008: 124). Intervening as a collective offers a larger degree of legitimacy, on the other EU’s military involvement in Africa has been reluctant and has occurred at the initiative of France and been accompanied by internal power relations. Even though in some cases, such as EUFOR DRC and Atalanta, France has not taken the lead, but has worked to ensure the mission and provided the bulk of the troops and thus covered the largest share of costs. Out of the four analysed missions, Atalanta had the clearest self-interest and economic motive, the rest were more strongly argued as being humanitarian in nature, although that designation has had a questionable value. Illustrated by the first mission, Artemis, functioning as a unifier for the post-Iraq cleavages as well as being a show of power and autonomy for the nascent policy; EUFOR RCA being a French mission placed in an European context and although led by Germany, its forces were constrained in their freedom of action and geographic location, furthermore the mission was not prolonged even though there was potential need for it; and EUFOR Chad/CAR stemming from French commitments and concerns expressed during elections, with deployment depending on political negotiations.

This French leadership in European security policy has a long history, starting at the onset of the European project, as well as being in line with French self-perceptions, strategic outlook and the need for avenues for power projection to multiply its global
power. Its security culture has seen instrumental adaptations from downsizing nuclear investments, increasing investments in intelligence, ending of conscription based military, national procurement of armaments to consolidating its permanent seat at the UN SC, projecting its ambitions onto the European-level and its ‘light reintegration’ into NATO (Irondelle & Besancenot 2010: 24). A strong focus has been on the EU and the politico-institutional CSDP building, by driving both political statements and more precise guides for action. Throughout the process, France has remained the leader, depending on the question at hand together either with Germany or the United Kingdom (as also underscored in the 2013 White Paper). Although France has been successful, it also has had to compromise on its long-term goals to reach a cooperative agreement. Moreover, as a nuclear power, member of all the main multilateral security institutions it still operates an independent foreign policy; playing on two levels without a clear distinction, but according to strategic need and advantage. The pragmatic choice between form (unilateral or bilateral or multilateral) and institution (EU, UN, NATO) is based on context and on the issues at hand, but overall preferring cooperation that is either based on a statutory hierarchy of states (e.g. UN SC) or informal ‘directorates’ (e.g. the EU-3 in negotiations with Iran) (Irondelle 2008; Irondelle & Besancenot 2010). Presently, the French domestic support is also bound up with pride that France can take the lead in defence of humanitarian principles. It helps that the operations have mostly been small-scale, usually involving a few thousand soldiers at most, with little risk of extensive French casualties (Bell 2014). Although, a primary actor, France is not the only member state that has operated outside the EU framework, examples to that end include, European states making contributions to missions in Afghanistan and in Iraq (Menon 2004: 228), unilateral French intervention in Cote d’Ivoire in 2003 (Gegout 2010: 133) again in 2011 with support given to UN forces (Vines 2011: 55), the Franco-British led NATO mission Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011 and the French led Operation Serval in Mali in 2013 (Watanabe 2013). Both situations required a rapid, short-notice response; in addition the former depended on the superior air-support and intelligence capabilities of the USA and the latter depended on French pre-positioned forces in the region to be successful. But the overall French political trend has been to develop and promote EU missions (ibid.), with other member states being less active in this regard.
In sum, European Union member states, driven by external events and internal political considerations, have decided to endow the Union with a security and defence function. The current institutional architecture and politico-legal structure is a result of interstate bargaining in a specific institutional setting that has set the parameters on the outcomes. With security and defence being strongly linked with sovereignty and national interest protection, integration has been a balancing act between delegating a sufficient degree of powers for the EU policy mechanism to be efficient and coherent vis-à-vis remaining in control of their own national policies, choices and decision-making. In this process France as a previous colonial power and a still influential member state has been the key actor and interested party. Since its power has declined and means have been constrained, but its ambitions have to a large degree remained, exemplified by it being one of the countries that most often uses force abroad, France has worked to upload its ideas and ambitions to the EU-level while maintaining an avenue for alternative courses of action. The need for unanimity and compromise within a heterogeneous grouping has set limits on its achievements. In operationalizing the ESDP/CSDP framework, France was one again the most consistent and insistent driver, initiating all of the EU missions in Africa – region that it has strong past and present links and interests - to date as well as carrying the largest share of the burden of the missions. Since states need the consent and participation of others, with Germany and the UK being the other key players in this field, convergence between them has been found by limiting the mandates of the missions, employing its conception of effective multilateralism by supporting the UN or with the suitable context surrounding the operation authorization process. This also covers the need to exhibit cooperation and unity to emphasising the humanitarian need or economic self-interest. Thus, a suitable context for a limited mandate with a unifying factor, a strong and interested lead state willing to cover most of the costs, low risk and collective gain for the EU is needed for the launching of a mission.
List of References


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Kookuvõte


Kuna välis-ja julgeolekupoliitika on riikide suveräänsusega ning rahvuslike huvide kaitsega sügavalt seotud, siis seab see piiranguid võimalikule integratsioonile. Riigid on üheks küljest huvitatud kasu toovast koostööst, teisalt aga soovitakse omad võimalikult palju kontrolli protsessi üle, et vältida ettearvamatu tagajärgi ning negatiivseid tulemeid. Kuni Maastrichti lepinguni ei delegeerinud riigid välispoliitilisi kompetensse Euroopa Liidule, sealt maalt alates on aga EL`i ulatus antud sfääris kasvanud. Olles ajendatud Külma sõja lõpust, endise Jugoslaavia teritooriumil puhkenud konfliktidest ja neile reageerimise puudikkusest, NATO ja Ameerika Ühendriikide huvi vähinemisest, julgeoleku ja ohu mõiste lainemisest ning kaitse-eelarvete vähendamisest Euroopas. Alates St Malo Prantsuse ja Suurbritannia kohtumisest 1998. aastal kui lepiti kokku Euroopa kaitse- ja julgeolekupoliitika loomine (ESDP), kuni Lissaboni leppeni kus ühine kaitse-ja julgeolekupoliitika (CSDP) saavutas oma tänase kuju on riigid politikat edasi arendanud, lisanud institutioone, ühise EL`i juhtimise ning peaeesmärke, samas pole
loobutud Nõukogu rollist ega ka mitte ühehäälest hääletusest, lisaks on EL`i kesksed institustioonid jäänud sõltuvaks liikmesriikide poliitilisest tahtest ning nõusolekust, nii juhtivate inimeste ametisse määramisel kui ka nende töö suunamisel. Lisaks, on seatud sõjalisi eesmärke korduvalt vähendatud.

Antud protsessi on iseloomustanud Prantsusmaa liidriroll, lähtuvalt oma siseringlikkest huvidest, sealhulgas soovides tugevdatud oma positsiooni maailmas, olla sõltumatu Ameerika Ühendriikidest ja NATOst ning täiendada oma kaitse ja julgeoleku alaseid võimeku. Kuna EL`i Nõukogu süsteemis, kuhu CSDP on liikmesriikide poolt paigutatud, ei ole võimalik üksinda otsuseid vastu võtta, siis on Prantsusmaa pidanud koostööd tegema teiste Euroopa sõjalisest mõjukate suur-riikidega, ehk siis Suurbritannia või Saksaaga, selleks et uuendusi vastu võtta ning poliitikat ellu viia. Lisaks, liikmesriikide hulgast lähtuvalt koosneb EL erinevatest vaatepunktidest, strateegilistest kultuuridest ning huvides. Seega on esialgseid ettepanekuid kohandatud kõigile sobivatele, Põhjamaade eestvedamisest tulenevalt lisati näiteks esialgsele Prantsuse-Suurbritannia sõjalisele ESDP`le ka tsiviilmissionid.

Prantsusmaal on huvik ka jätkaa Aafrika kohaloleku osas, olles endine koloniaalvööm kellel on säilinud tihead poliitilised, majanduslikud ning kultuurilised sidemed regiooniga. Kuna Prantsusmaa Aafrika-poliitikat on iseloomustanud kohati vasutoluline sõjaline sekkumine, siis on üritatud viimastel aastakümnestel oma lähenemist legitimiseerida tegutsesed läbi rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide, ÜRO mandaadiga või humanitaar-kaalutustest lähtuval.

Põhjendused ja motivatisoonid missioonide läbi viimiseks, neis osalemiseks ning nendega nõustumiseks on muuhulgas oludad EL’i ühtsuse ja võimekuse demonstreerimine (Iraagi sõja vastuolude järgne Artemis), Prantsusmaa surveavaldu Saksamaale ning viimase soov panustada CSDP tugevdamisesse (EUFOR DRC). Darfuri kriisi mittessekkumisest tulenev tung olukorra lahendamiseks panustamisele (EUFOR Chad/CAR), ÜRO abipalvele vastamine (kõik kolm) ning majandushuvide kaitse (Atalanta). Nii Artemise kui ka Atalanta osas jõudis EL kollektiivina üsna kiiresti ühisele arvamusele, mõlemad EUFOR'id olid vastuolulisemad Prantsusmaa tugeva osaluse tõttu ning missoonide algus liikkus korduvalt edasi. Saksamaa ja Suurbritannia on mõlemad ühe missiooni eesotsas olnud, juhtudel kus Prantsusmaa on pidanud paremaks antud rollist loobuda, nii CSDP poliitilist tugevust silmas pidades kui ka enda piirangutest lähtuvalt.

Läbivaks jooneks on olnud missioonide humanitaarkaalutustele rõhumine, samas on aga mandaadid oludad piiratud nii ajaliselt, piirkondlikult kui ka vägede suuruse osas, peamiselt raamistikku milles suudeti kokku leppida ja osalejaid nõusse saada, mitte reaalsest kriisisituatsiooni vajadusest lähtuvalt. Misioonid on oludad ka vägedele vähese riskiga.

Kokkuvõttes võib väita, et EL’i ühine kaitse- ja julgeolekupoliitika on tugevasti mõjutatud olude liikmesriikide tahtest ja soovidest, kuna nad on protsess üle kontrolli oma valduses hoidnud. Integratsioon on sügavnenud juhtudel kui see on riikidele kasulik, on jätud piisavalte alternatiivseteks lähenemisteks ja kaitumiseks ning lõptulemus on läbirääkimiste käigus erinevate vaadete ühildamine. Kõige suuremat ja läbivamat roli, koostöös eri partneritega, on mänginud Prantsusmaa. Olles ka siseriikliklikliklik huvidest ning poliitilistest kaalutlustest lähtuvalt EL’i Aafrika missioonide eestvedaja ja neisse suurim panustaja. Selleks, et missioonid aga tervikule sobivad oleksid on nad oludad piiratud mandaadi, vähese riski ja vahendidtega, toimunud sobivas üldkontekstis ning panustanud EL’i poliitika üldarengusse ning tugevdamisesse.