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INDONESIA: AN ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL HEGEMONY-BUILDING

Master thesis

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Karin-Liis Lahtmäe
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I dedicate this thesis to my grandparents.
Abstract

This thesis examines the strengths and weaknesses of Indonesia’s hegemony-building. Qualitative research is carried out on three levels of analysis – the domestic, regional and global. The author has reformulated Pedersen’s (2002) three capacities to be indicative of regional hegemony-building: the domestic, ideational and international capacity. The study finds that Indonesia’s regional hegemony-building is weakened by its domestic capacity. Despite a strong ideational capacity, on a regional level this does not translate into strong hegemonic capacity. On a global level, the capacity is quantitatively bigger, yet marginal in effect. The thesis concludes that regional hegemony discourse should focus on the embryonic capacities of hegemony-building instead of trying to fit emerging regional powers into pre-existing strategies of regional hegemony.
**Introduction**

Broadly speaking, hegemony is known as a type of supremacy, a power far more capable than others, asserting its power over others, be it politically, militarily, economically or culturally. The easiest example that can be conjured when thinking of the word 'hegemony', is the United States as a superpower, a global hegemon, referred to as such already in 1904\(^1\). However, conventional and non-conventional theories of international relations have used (and abused\(^2\)) the concept of hegemony without the latter becoming an integral part of any of them. Debates and conceptualisation date back over 50 years, yet the application of hegemony is lacking in method. Concepts such as hegemons, hegemony, hegemonic leaders, hegemonic (global and regional) powers (and many more) are used interchangeably.

Furthermore, global theories and conceptualisations of hegemony do not necessarily refer to (or apply to) regional hegemony. I share the same dissatisfaction with hegemony discourse as Prys (2010). The hegemonic canon has been long dominated by global hegemony, with only two approaches to hegemony in international relations recognised as theories of hegemony, the neo-Gramscian approach and the Hegemonic Stability Theory. Applying theories of global hegemony to regions (i.e. regional powers) seems as arbitrary as discussing institution-building in regions outside of Europe with regard to the integration theories of the European Union. The logic here is not to take a 'hegemonic discourse’ and apply it freely to other regions of the world, but to find a contextually relevant, yet theoretically sustainable approach. Furthermore, applying global theories to regional empirics seems arbitrary, as it discards systemic and external pressures that regional hegemonies face, and global ones do not. Also, regional hegemons as rising regional powers, mostly in the Global South, carry a legacy of state formation that has left them internally vulnerable, with the processes of nation-building still ongoing (Dannreuther, 2007).

To date, there has not been sufficient research that examines the embryonic levels of hegemony-building in the Third World countries. Hegemony in this regard establishes a useful, if somewhat conceptually overloaded space for further analysis of regional

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\(^1\) Online Etymology Dictionary (2015). *Hegemony*.

\(^2\) Applied carelessly
hegemony. Critical engagement with previous work will help in navigating the (regional) hegemony problematic and provide a basis for the analysis of regional hegemony. Moreover, seeing that regional hegemonies are regional powers on the rise, the definition of (rising) regional powers is consulted.

In the words of Snidal (1985), the author is looking for “a theoretical filler to plug the gaps between a static theory and the empirical reality.” Not all behaviours that can be deemed hegemonic lead to a hegemonic outcome – becoming a hegemon. Analysing regional hegemony mixes patterns of ontological and causal nature. In order to become a regional hegemon, one has to show capacity to act like one, this capacity is utilised by action (what the would-be regional hegemon makes of this capacity) that is then subject to interpretation by others in the region (whether they accept these actions on behalf of the hegemon or not). However, across cases of regional hegemony there seems to be a ‘capacity-expectations’ gap. In the logic of Prys (2010), a regional hegemon cannot be detected by simply looking at the largest state in the region. This thesis entails to intercept the process of becoming a hegemon by analysing the capacity aspect of a (potential) hegemon. This conceptualisation is also informed of the problem of later operationalisation, were the categories of a potential regional hegemon’s strategies to turn out too narrow and static.

Aim and Scope of the Study

The aim of the research is to establish what are Indonesia’s strengths and weaknesses in hegemonic capacity. I will analyse Indonesia through three capacities – ideational, domestic and international – reformulated from the work of Pedersen (2002). By analysing Indonesia, the largest state in the Southeast Asian region, who, despite its size credentials has not attained regional hegemony, I conclude what hinders and what aids its commitment to hegemony. The underlying logic of this thesis is that the projection of capacities, indicative of commitment, sees the legitimation from others necessary for a regional hegemon. However, when capacity is weak, hegemony-building stalls.

This thesis does not attest to a single theory. However, some underlying notions are derived from the constructivist and English school theorists. The author has been

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inspired by Acharya and Stubbs theorising on Southeast Asian relations. Firstly, the state remains the central actor, although not in a realist, but in a Wendtian sense – states are primary actors, but not the only actors. Secondly, the agency of local actors counts for more than neorealists accredit it with. Coupling agency with sovereignty in the Southeast Asian sense can be best explained by constructivists who deal with norms, identity, institutions and interests. The English School theory offers explanations on order and the structure of the international system for a multi-level analysis. (Acharya & Stubbs, 2006)

The scope of the study is further determined by the methodology of a case study and the three levels of analysis, adapted from the work of Buzan and Waever (2003), modified for the purpose of this thesis as domestic, regional and global, which I will elaborate on in chapter 2.

**Limitations**

The research is narrowed down to an emphasis on hegemony as cooperative leadership, preferring benign not coercive measures, and leading, not dominating others. Other types of powerhood, especially the realist understanding of hegemony derived from military capabilities, are mentioned, yet not taken as a basis of this thesis.

Furthermore, even though the underlying notions of hegemony, such as power and legitimacy, are discussed, these will not be individually analysed. For example, I will not examine the extent to which others have legitimised the potential hegemon, as this would entail a multi-actor analysis too extensive in scope for a Master’s thesis analysing Indonesia.

In other words, the emphasis is on identifying Indonesia’s strengths and weaknesses regarding hegemony-building and seeing how these affect its capacities to pursue regional leadership (hegemony).

**Significance of the study**

One intended outcome of the study, on the theoretical level, is to identify a set of pre-capacities relating to a regional hegemon and its commitment. On a practical level, the study aims to clarify the concept of (regional) hegemony by analysing Indonesia in a
theoretically embedded context which allows for ‘Asian exceptionalism’ based on historicism and regional and national intricacies to be turned into ‘Asian universalism’ 4.

Overview

This thesis consists of four main chapters. In the first chapter, I trace the theory of hegemony resulting in a theoretical framework for the study of regional hegemony. I discuss the theories of hegemony currently existing in the study of international relations to guide my enquiry into the underlying notions of hegemony, which I then use to conceptualise hegemony. In tying global hegemony to regional hegemony, I turn to the concept of regional power, indicating its ontology as well as the weaknesses and opportunities it faces in becoming a regional hegemon. Finally, I will formulate a theoretical framework for analysing the capacities of regional hegemony which are consistent with the presumptions that both the notions of hegemony and (rising) regional powers entail.

In the second chapter, I present my chosen methodology. Firstly, I will indicate the pros and cons of case study and why I have chosen to do within-case study. Secondly, I will elaborate on why I have chosen Indonesia as the case study. I will then explain how I have gathered the data to be used in the qualitative research and what possible implications I have observed when first sourcing and later working with the data. Lastly, I will present my analytical framework in three levels of analysis to indicate how I have systemised the empirics.

In the third chapter, I present the data gathered through a ‘security lens’ 5 on the three levels of analysis in the case of Indonesia. I will look at the historic notions of Indonesia’s statehood and foreign policy, the transition to democracy and Muslim politics and radicalism. At the regional level I will introduce the norms shared in ASEAN, conflict mediation, agenda-setting and the principle of ‘ASEAN centrality’. Thirdly, I will investigate the global level relating to Indonesia’s hegemonic capacity, including engagement with China and the United States and in global institutions.

4 The latter has been argued for by Acharya and Buzan (2007).
5 See the emphasis on security in the Third World in Ayoob (1991).
In the fourth chapter, I will summarise the weaknesses and strengths of Indonesia’s hegemony-building with regard to the three capacities derived from the theory to be indicative of potential hegemony. By doing that I aim to answer what the strengths and weaknesses of Indonesia’s hegemony-building are and draw conclusions for the study of regional hegemony.
1. Theory

1.1 Theoretical background

1.1.1 Theories of Hegemony in International Relations

Andreas Antoniades (2008) has summarised the two existing, what might be called theories of hegemony in international relations – the Hegemonic Stability Theory and neo-Gramscian notions of hegemony (Cox’s seminal work on Gramsci). The latter presupposes legitimacy; the former does not require legitimacy per se.

Conventional approaches towards international relations maintain that military capabilities translating into gains in power create a disequilibrium where one state prevails and becomes a hegemon. This sits nicely with the realist understanding of an anarchic backdrop where states fend for themselves based on a strict self-help (and self-preservation) mentality. Drawing from economics, this disequilibrium translates into hegemonic stability theory which maintains that a hegemon is needed for continued stability. A single state, a possible hegemon, pursues goals that others find useful in an absolute-relative gains dichotomy. Following Kindleberger’s logic, Webb and Krasner (1989) state that "only a hegemon has sufficient power and motivation to provide the public good of international economic stability by its own actions."

Gilpin (1988) challenges this statement, bringing it back to mainstream security realism, asking whether this stability maintained by a hegemon translates into peace in a region. He, too, retains that 'different growth of power between states is what defines international relations’ and by investigating Thucydides concludes that the ’structure of the international system is provided by distribution of power among states’. A state’s successes, however, are not only determined by its politico-military power and outcomes. Gilpin fails to address what a hegemonic state does in an attempt to regulate international relations and maintain stability besides being an unchallenged power. Clark (2009), drawing on Layne and Keohane, notes material accounts of hegemony not to leave space for the conception of legitimacy. If material capabilities are seen as

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6 Note here that disequilibrium and stability are not opposites, stability is defined here as something not likely to change. Disequilibrium is stable when it is firmly established and asymmetry accepted as the status quo.
having primordial importance, the space for the conception of legitimacy to form is automatically removed; things are no longer negotiable, but simply given. It is worth noting that the theory has not stood up well to empirical testing.  

Legitimacy appears in the neo-Gramscian notions derived from the works of Antonio Gramsci, the leader of the Italian Communist Party. Cox (1983) cautions the reader to reflect on the selectivity of deriving ideas from Gramsci, adding that, Gramsci was a thinker reflecting on his own time, historicism cannot be ever avoided; writers write in their own time. Cox has divided Gramsci’s conceptualisation of hegemony into two debates: first one resulting from a revolutionary strategy for a socialist state, the second from Machiavelli. Gramsci borrows from Machiavelli the idea of power (and hegemony as a type of power) as a centaur. There needs to be dominance achieved and/or maintained by coercion and leadership obtained and maintained by consensus. The first conceptualisation that Gramsci is most concerned about, relates to a group within a state, although Gramsci understands the necessity for the underpinnings of a corresponding political structure in civil society, if his plan of having subordinates and providing them with concessions which lead to forms of social democracy is to work. Machiavelli, too, is concerned with what happens within the state, finding support for a united Italy, however, Cox argues that applying Machiavelli frees the Gramscian notion from its initial class-ties, allowing for a wider application to relations of dominance, subordination and world order. In conclusion, hegemony can be said to be an ongoing dialogue (a quest to seeking consensus) between the support base and the dominant, coercive (but only in marginal, deviating cases) leader.  

In conclusion, hegemony has been linked to power and legitimacy which stems from the hegemon providing goods or benefits by maintaining an order. Provisional goods, for example, range from security arrangements to a prosperous economic order. I will consequently present how this thesis conceptualises the underlying notions of power and legitimacy before turning to the concept of regional hegemony more specifically.

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8 Machiavellian skills (hard power) include sizing up the competition, setting exacting standards, whereas organisational skills (soft power) include being a leader that manages not only delegates. A combination of the two is referred to as smart power.
9 Order here refers to a set of norms and rules that form the behavioural basis of and order the constituents of a system.
1.1.2 Hegemony as power

Hegemony has been equated with power, however, the existence of great power capacity does not determine a potential hegemon. Watson (2007:90) has argued, similarly to neorealists, for the ‘material conditions of technological, economic and strategic superiority to constitute a group of powers or a great power’ “to bring such great inducements and pressures to bear that most other states lose some of their external and internal independence.” Snidal (1985), in his critique of the Hegemonic Stability Theory, points to similar types of hegemonies\(^\text{10}\) – benign and exercised by persuasion relating to inducements and benign but exercised by coercion relating to pressures. Both types aim to generate interest in and have the capabilities to influence others. This does not, however, mean that a hegemon necessarily has to coerce via military threats. Bull (1982) has said that a hegemonic power has the option of not resorting to force, thus not needing to exercise superiority, or even be superior to others, given that other constituents of the system provide the military dimension. This can also be interpreted as an inter-level exchange; a hegemonic power in a region can act benevolently, given that ‘hard power’ is externally attainable from other constituents of the international system.

Strange (1990) divides power into two categories: structural and relational. Even though her division is derived from the conduct (different modes, means and channels) of the U.S. and Japan in international political economy, Strange raises a powerful analogy for the research conducted in this thesis – a relational power, aware of the pressures of a structural power, has in some issues and for some purposes more influence than the structural power. Hart and Jones (2010) agree that emerging powers, despite (or due to) not carrying the economic and military heft or flag of innovation, have managed to become forces to be reckoned with due to their substantial multilateral weight in regional issues.

Power is never absolute. Hart and Jones (2010) relay Baldwin’s (1979) ‘paradox of unrealised power’, “the fact that material capabilities and power over specific outcomes rarely approach the 1:1 ratio.” Although the role of material capabilities as a potential anterior variable is acknowledged, power, similarly to hegemony, requires more than

\(^{10}\) The third dynamic of coercive and exploitative behaviour referring to domination not hegemony.
just resources. According to Tellis et al (2001), state power is perceived at three levels: material resources, the ability of the state to use these resources for defined political purposes, and the influence over outcomes. They further emphasise the point of the utility of power depending on its purpose and on the target at which it is directed.

Similarly to Wendt’s (1992) argument that anarchy is what states make of it, power, too, is what states make of it. The ability of states to use resources to influence outcomes presupposes the existence of said resources. In the author’s view hegemony is aided, but not determined by material power. This, however, does not mean that the notion of domestic capacity taken to influence outcomes is wrong. On the contrary, strong domestic capacity allows for the projection of a hegemon’s power.

1.1.3 Legitimacy in hegemony
States are not solitary actors, thus, what states make of their power is encouraged or restrained by other constituents of the system. Legitimacy can be determined by how the hegemon engages its subordinates and the latter respond. Watson (2007:20) utilises hegemony as dialogue, stating that the exercise of hegemony involves continual dialogue between the hegemonial authority and other states, and a sense on both sides of the balance of expediency. Watson continues by saying that "hegemonial authority carries with it privileges but also responsibilities and derives additional advantages by making the exercise of hegemony acceptable to other members of the society" (Watson 2007:58). In saying that he agrees with Bull (1980:446) that "great powers cannot expect to be conceded special rights, if they do not perform special duties." The metaphor of ‘an ongoing dialogue’ offers more leeway in recognising embryonic hegemonic conduct by not immediately dismissing leaders who might not enjoy constant legitimisation (acceptance of one’s conduct), seeing that special duties require more capacity than a regional power might have.

The outcomes that a hegemon produces can be said to directly link to legitimacy, the possible benefits of the order propagated by the hegemon contribute to this. Parsons (1966) suggests that through socialisation subordinates acquire sets of values that motivate them to agree to the order and norms that the potential hegemon adheres to

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11 Play on words that includes both what a state makes of its power and what others make of it, effectively combining both the relativity of power and its legitimisation.
12 Constituents in this thesis refer mostly to other states and institutions.
itself. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990), having explored historical case studies of U.S.
diplomacy after World War I and II and the British colonial experience in India and
Egypt, bring together the notions of power and legitimacy, and link legitimate
domination at the international level with legitimacy at the domestic level in their theory
of socialisation. This added dimension of hegemony, according to the authors, “can also
explain why the ordering principles and norms of a given system are not isomorphic
with changes in the relative distribution of military and economic capability within that
system.” Although Ikenberry and Kupchan maintain that socialisation is triggered by
coercion\textsuperscript{13} and material inducements, they acknowledge the value of norms, the role of
which is most prevalent when hegemony is descending.

Ougaard (1988) has identified two dimensions of hegemony that relate to power – its
utilisation and legitimation via outcomes acceptable to others and the consequent
order/regime produced. Out of his two dimensions of preponderance and control over
outcomes, I focus on the latter. Ougaard makes a point of distinguishing harmony and
identity of interests from hegemony, stressing that conflicts that arise (between a
hegemon and its subordinates) should not be dismissed; it is the extent of the hegemon
prevailing more than not in managing conflicting interests that should be considered a
criterion. Ougaard has offered three possible types of change leading to a declining of
hegemony:

1. the alliance could face difficulties created by change;
2. the hegemon’s interests could become less compatible with those of others;
3. changes could occur in the hegemon’s own set of interests, leading to
   incompatibility between the domestic level and the goals pursued.

In this sense, hegemony as legitimacy can be seen as a continuous dialogue between the
hegemon and its subordinates, thus allowing for a theoretical space not to immediately
dismiss potential hegemony when subordinates dismiss a hegemon’s set of values or
show dissatisfaction with the order it is promoting\textsuperscript{14}. However, hegemony requires a
constant line of communication between the hegemon and its subordinates. Thus,

\textsuperscript{13} Meant as a manipulation of provisional goods.
\textsuperscript{14} In a Habermasian sense, support can be either specific or diffuse, but that does not negate the existence
of legitimacy, see Kivimäki (1993).
legitimation requires commitment capacity to communication on behalf of the hegemon to engage with its subordinates and subject itself to legitimation.

1.1.4 Regional Powers

In order to assess the capacity of regional powers in becoming regional hegemons, the literature on regional powers is analysed. Literature on regional (and middle, emerging) powers has mostly dealt with contextually defined ontologies. Theories of regional hegemonies have not been rooted in the main IR theories (Pedersen, 2002). The discourse focuses on middle powers and emerging (great) powers, also equated to regional powers. Among the most common regional powers investigated are the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries, leading to the understanding that how powers in a region conduct their business internationally varies greatly, as authors writing on regional powers usually, partly or mostly, focus on the historicism of a region\textsuperscript{15}. Therefore, it is of no wonder that there are only few frameworks for the systemic analysis of regional hegemony. According to Nolte (2010), regional powers have to meet various conditions:

\begin{quote}
1. The internal dynamics of such a state should allow it to play a stabilising and leading role in its region;

2. Such a state should indicate and demonstrate its willingness, and of course also its capacity or ability, to assume the role of regional leader, stabiliser and, if not peacekeeper, at least peacemaker;

3. Should be acceptable to its neighbours – the members of the security complex in which it operates – as a leader responsible for regional security. A broader, or extra-regional acceptance is perhaps a necessary condition, but not necessary, even if supported and promoted by big powers."
\end{quote}

Following Nolte, a regional power’s domestic situation might change to the extent that it cannot act as a hegemon anymore or is not viewed as one by subordinate states. Similarly, the state’s foreign policy rhetoric might change to discard the role of a hegemon. The domestic level is especially important in the light of new regional powers still engaged in nation-building; many of the countries in the South still face weaknesses

\textsuperscript{15} See regional hegemony literature on the BRICS countries, for example Iyob (1993), Turner (1991).
stemming from the historic legacy of colonisation; having been under colonial rule, borders were drawn arbitrarily and thus a low state capacity seems to still be a norm in the Global South especially (Dannreuther, 2007). The domestic level is not of immediate importance for a global hegemon, yet to emphasise Ikenberry and Kupchan’s view, a strong domestic hegemon can better socialise its subordinates, indicating the need to study hegemony on a domestic level. Moreover, the ‘capabilities-expectations’ gap drawn from the literature on the European Union offers some insight into how external factors cannot operate without internal capacities, seeing as it is difficult to change the status quo embedded in institutions or imposed by external actors to the region (Hill, 1993). Still, Hill (1993) concludes by saying that “cooperation [with others] is inevitable and desirable” in order to help close the ‘capabilities-expectations’ gap.

In order to engage with legitimising subordinates, Nolte (2010) accords the role of international institutions a primary role in regional power strategies. Institutions bring about and help maintain a certain order accepted by all, thus a hegemon operating within an institutional context is legitimised by the constraint that the commitment to the institution presupposes. Furthermore, it ‘solidifies’ commitments. Hurd (2008:78-9) sees hegemony as power constrained as „the strong subscribing to a minimum standard of compliance with the legitimized rule or institution and therefore the strong may be induced to alter their behaviour by the effects of legitimated rules,“ which in turn appeases the worries of domination of the subordinates. Hurrell (1995), in tying the role of a regional hegemon strongly with that of institutionalisation, highlights that an extremely dominant (not coercive) power might make institutional cooperation unnecessary, thus some ascendency of hegemony is needed for the hegemon to legitimise its position and pursue its interests.

These views correlate with those of liberal institutionalists, to whom institutions matter greatly. From the perspective of hegemony, institutions offer a theoretical win-win situation for both the subordinates and the hegemon. Subordinates may rest assured that institutions ’tie down’ the hegemon, at the same time, an influential state can use institutions as a platform to further diffuse its ideas and pursue its interests. Deudney and Ikenberry (1999) refer to this type of ‘golden caging’ as ‘security co-binding’ –
“attempts (by states) to tie one another down by locking each other into institutions that are mutually constraining.”

In further defining and conceptualising ‘followership’ needed to legitimise regional powers and looking for strategies to do so, Nolte (2010) stumbles by equating the regional power’s plan of action to institutionalisation. Hurrell (1995) and Pedersen (2002) also hold the opportunities that institutions allow for to be the most cost-effective and reliable instruments for hegemony. As a starting point, engagement in institutions seems logical in signalling to the subordinates the regional hegemon’s commitment and intentions.

However, regional hegemony can also look further than the regional level to legitimise its actions, especially in cases where regional institutions do not afford the hegemon with a notable platform to diffuse its ideas, something that Pedersen (2002) holds important. In Pedersen’s view the interests and strategies of the biggest state in the region can also explain the most important aspects of regional endeavours. He makes a logical case for accepting engagement in region-, institution-building as that of reflecting a potential hegemon. ‘Institutions alleviate the fears of unequal gains and mitigate fears of cheating’, when hegemony is subdued, it can be legitimised more freely by subordinate states, at the same time a big power wins in an arena for the diffusion of its ideas.

Although engagement in institutions is not the only possible strategy for a regional hegemon, it offers an arena for further investigation of regional hegemony, as institutions bring together regional and international players. This, however, raises the question whether a regional hegemon has explicit ambitions only at the regional level. Power aggregation in a Hobbesian world would entail that regional great powers use regional institutions as a stepping stone to gain international prestige and become more

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16 For a critique on institutions, see Mearsheimer „The False Promise of Institutions.“ Wendt, alluding to Krasner’s autonomy of regimes, has referred to liberal institutionalists as „realists before liberals, since only if international institutions can change powers and interests [perceptions of intent pertaining to the former’s utility] do they go beyond the “limits” of realism."

17 Power is not (only) based on material resources, but is here considered to be a dialogue between those affording the state its status in relation to their own power.
than a regional hegemon\textsuperscript{18}. The global role conception and ambitions of a regional power thus also offer some insight into regional hegemony.

1.2 Regional Hegemony
There are many conceptual issues which stem from the mixing of two totally different concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘region’ in the realm of IR. In recent years, writers like Prys (2010) and Destradi (2010) have undertaken the great task of conceptually clarifying and classifying regional hegemony and its strategies, respectively.

Destradi’s view on strategies seems to be too narrow for the purpose of this thesis. It is not in the scope of this thesis or in the interest of its author to see a regional hegemon fitted in pre-existing categories of hegemonic strategy. Furthermore, the author finds Destradi’s division of hegemony and leadership arbitrary. It is true that hegemony and leadership, when used interchangeably, have been used somewhat negligently, not accounting for the basic assumptions of either (first relating primarily to power and legitimacy, the latter to the more sociological aspects of engaging a group\textsuperscript{19}). Destradi argues that there is a fundamental difference between hegemony and leadership, with the former only acting on its own self-interest, and the latter leading a group in realisation of their common goals. However, what Destradi describes as a leadership, can still be viewed as hegemony, if common goals overlay with the self-interests of the hegemon in question\textsuperscript{20}. What is more, Destradi’s construction of leadership is zero-sum in nature, built on unanimous agreement among followers, leaving no room for disagreement on the followers’ side or possibility of weakened, unattractive leadership without losing said position in the group. In this sense, the concept of hegemony, taken to include strategies of political leadership, offers more leeway. Leadership also fits the underlying notions conceptualised in earlier chapters – the relational power, managing an order and the consequent legitimation.

\textsuperscript{18} By saying this, the author of this thesis is not trying to subject regional hegemony to being lesser than a middle power or a would-be great power, with regard to power these concepts overlap.

\textsuperscript{19} See Young’s (1991) three types of individual leadership.

\textsuperscript{20} Destradi (2010) also alludes to this by saying that „a hegemon might initiate a socialisation process with the aim of realising its own objectives, but in a second stage the adoption of its norms and values by subordinate states leads to a commonality of ends and interests, thereby transforming subordinates into followers,“ implying the existence of a leader. This seems more of a semantic distinction in the field of international relations, in which case leadership is married with hegemony for the purpose of this thesis.
For the purpose of this thesis, the author entails leadership to be indicative of hegemony. The author plans to bring closer together the fields of leadership and hegemony by showing that the latter can be effectively operationalised by the former; Leadership is essentially conceptualised as an activity, as stated by Nabers (2010). Even though the material preponderance is a strong anterior variable, providing the base for potential hegemony, leadership in the sense of hegemony should be studied independently from material power, as Wiener (1995) suggests. Furthermore, it fits nicely with the original meaning of hegemony. Derived from the Greek word *hegemonia*, taken to mean “leadership, a leading the way, a going first”, which in turn is derived from *hegeisthai* “to lead,” perhaps originally “to track down, seek, trace”. The etymology further indicates its dynamic make-up; if ‘seeking’ something leads to ‘hegemony’, then the author, too, is tracing the capacity indicative of hegemony.

1.3 Theoretical framework
The concept of hegemony as leadership marries well with Pedersen’s theory on cooperative hegemony. Pedersen’s (2002) contribution, although viewed by him not as a theory of regional hegemony, connects the role of the hegemon to the extent of regionalism that can be viewed in a region. In Pedersen’s opinion, ‘international hegemony accords institutions a much too limited role’, opting to focus on the role of institutions. Pedersen has been criticised by Prys as being too narrowly focused on institutionalisation, the same critique befalls Hurrell and Nolte (Prys, 2010). However, Pedersen’s further elaboration on a theory of co-operative hegemony, albeit embedded in regionalism and institutionalisation, offers pre-conditions for co-operative hegemony that can be adapted to the three levels of analysis (domestic, regional, global) of this thesis. Cooperative hegemony entails soft rule within and through co-operative arrangements based on a long-term strategy (Pedersen, 2002). Long-term strategy entails capacity to project hegemony. Although, Pedersen, too, has adopted to generalise on the basis of motives and strategies and not on the basis of outcomes, similarly to Destradi (2010), Pedersen’s pre-categories offer a wider base for analysis than Destradi’s. Pedersen’s (2002) pre-conditions for co-operative hegemony include the power aggregation capacity, power-sharing capacity and commitment capacity.

The power aggregation capacity includes the external pressures (external constellation of actors) and the extent to which the potential hegemon is capable of rallying neighbouring states around its political project. Power aggregation can come to be viewed as ‘illegitimate’\(^{22}\) in the case of regional unipolarity, when a hegemon is too powerful, creating the need for subordinate states to discard the hegemon’s claims and counterbalance. The external constellation that Prys (2010) also alludes to with her regional openness, but does not elaborate on, may shift the power balance in a region, especially when there is an external power, creating military overlay, seen as threatening by the states in the region\(^{23}\). In this case, the smaller states may come to ignore the regional asymmetry and see the regional hegemon appeal to consolidate or retrench powers (Pedersen, 2002). In sum, power aggregation capacity refers to the potential hegemon’s capacity in (successfully) engaging with the members of the region and powers external to the region.

The power sharing capacity includes the domestic structural factors that Pedersen refers to as the strategic culture and regime(s) embedded in history and the polity structure of the state. Commenting on the latter, he notes democracies to have a greater power sharing capacity, while maintaining that “a weak democratic political culture /…/ may affect the way it [hegemony] is perceived by its neighbours”. (Pedersen, 2002) Power-sharing capacity highlights the domestic level as a possible source of incompatibility or weakness in projecting its hegemony in the region.

The commitment capacity depends on four factors (Pedersen, 2002):

1. The costs of non-commitment;
2. Constitutional rules and procedures facilitating participation in regional integration;
3. The great power’s economic interest and
4. The existence of supportive discourse.”

Pedersen (2002) implies ‘the non-commitment costs for geographically exposed regional powers to be high.’ In sum, commitment capacity sees the regional hegemony weigh the options of staying committed to the region or in the strategy of a

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\(^{22}\) Prys (2010) would argue that a negation of something reinforces its existence, thus not legitimating a powerful hegemon, reinforces its position as one.

\(^{23}\) Threats and power are mostly seen as economic and reactions to the pursuit of relative gains (Nye, 1990).
middle/emerging (regional) power engage the global arena. This decision is mostly based on security and economic considerations and also depends on the (potentially politically constructed) supportive discourse.

I will now reformulate Pedersen’s three capacities. Firstly, I will form the ideational capacity to include constitutional rules and procedures facilitating participation in regional integration, the existence of supportive discourse\(^{24}\) and the state’s strategic culture and regimes, including the great power’s [economic] interests.

Pedersen (2002) separates the state’s idea of the nation from its strategic culture. However, both the power-sharing and commitment capacities refer to the compatibility of a hegemon’s domestic values and norms to the region’s strategic culture and regime(s). For reasons of clarity, I have thus combined these under the ideational capacity.

Secondly, drawing from the regional power literature, drawing from the literature on regional powers, there seem to be more constraints on power-sharing than the type of polity a regional hegemon is. Following Hurrell (2006), I expand the power-sharing capacity to include domestic cohesion as one of the possible stumbling blocks of regional hegemony-building, re-naming it as domestic capacity.

Thirdly, drawing from both the literature on regional powers and institutionalism, I will include next to engagement with regional and external powers the engagement in regional and global institutions under what I will call the international capacity. I will also add the costs of non-commitment here, as the latter can affect the legitimacy of the regional hegemon and reduce its international capacity.

I will now see whether these three capacities suffice in order to adequately analyse regional hegemony in the case of Indonesia. The main questions is to look at strengths and weaknesses in ideational, domestic and international capacity across the three levels of analysis that a regional hegemon is subject to.

\(^{24}\)This is also taken to include Prys’ (2010) discourse on a hegemon’s exceptionalism.
2. Methodology

2.1 Within-case analysis

The methodology used in this thesis follows the logic of a within-case study. Ragin (1992:225) indicates that single-case studies should not be considered as inferior to multiple case studies, as single-case studies in their build-up “are multiple in most research efforts because ideas and evidence may be linked in many different ways.” Campbell (1975:81-2) adds that „even in a single qualitative study, the conscientious social scientist often finds no explanation that seems satisfactory. Such an outcome would be impossible if the caricature of the single case study ... were correct—there would instead be a surfeit of subjectively compelling explanations.“ ’Within-case analysis allows for a thorough immersion in a single case and supports, refutes or expands on the propositions derived from the phenomenon in question (Paterson 2010).’

The thesis employs a constructivist, not a positivist philosophy, as the author looks at activities and ideas rather than causally linked variables. The result may not be parsimonious, however, the empiric details gathered of the phenomenon can be used for later theory testing. “The case story is itself the result. It is a 'virtual reality', so to speak. For the reader willing to enter this reality and explore it inside and out the payback is meant to be a sensitivity to the issues at hand that cannot be obtained from theory [alone].“ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) The case of Indonesia will, thus, allow for reflection on the phenomenon of regional hegemony. In this sense, the thesis employs a deductive method of analysis, firstly, theorising, then analysing the qualitative data gathered and finally, seeing what Indonesia can tell us about regional hegemony and how it has been theorised.

Following Flyvbjerg’s (2006) 5 most common ‘myths’ of case study methodology, the author agrees that ’cases are of value since human learning is context-dependent rather than context-independent at the level of advanced learning. Generalisations are but one form of scientific advancement and thus should not be overemphasised. Case studies are
thought to be more useful for the pilot stages of larger research projects, however, case studies can provide pragmatic knowledge that can aid theory building.’

2.2 Case selection

Flyvbjerg (2006), when discussing strategy in choice of cases, admits that “a case can be simultaneously extreme, critical, and paradigmatic.“ Indonesia has been considered representative of regional hegemony, it possesses the geostrategic and geopolitical capacity to become a regional hegemon. However, when looking at the make-up of the regional setting, one can see that Indonesia does not necessarily stand out more than other founders of ASEAN, such as Singapore and Malaysia. These juxtaposing views make Indonesia both a 'most likely' and 'least likely' case for regional hegemony.

Indonesia is also a paradigmatic case. Dreyfus in Flyvbjerg (2006) explains it as follows: “Heiddeger says, you recognise a paradigm case because it shines, but I’m afraid that is not much help. You just have to be intuitive. We all can tell what is a better or worse case—of a Cezanne painting, for instance. But I can’t think there could be any rules for deciding what makes Cezanne a paradigmatic modern painter... [I]t is a big problem in democratic society where people are supposed to justify what their intuitions are. In fact, nobody really can justify what their intuition is. So you have to make up reasons, but it won’t be the real reasons.“ These “intuitive decisions are accountable, in the sense of being sensible to other practitioners or often explicable if not immediately sensible.“ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) Indonesia has been referred to Indonesia’s relative economic weight as well as its historical role of a hegemon, its geostrategic position of a pivot state and an interest to sustain regional peace and stability exhibit a capacity for regional hegemony. Moreover, international—both regional and global—developments suggest potential for hegemony.

25 see Emmers (2005, 2014)
26 This remark is based on the literature written on these countries the author came across when investigating Southeast Asia’s potential regional hegemones.
27 Stability here is referred to separately from peace since stability refers to whatever status quo is accepted in the region.
2.3 Data gathering and implications

'Case studies do not imply the use of any particular type of evidence, yet more often qualitative than quantitative data is used.' (Yin, 1981) The author has also opted to carry out qualitative research. The empirics are based on both primary and secondary sources. In overcoming the “bias toward verification, understood as a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions, so that the study therefore becomes of doubtful scientific value“ that Flyvbjerg (2006) alludes to, the author has applied two thought paradigms throughout the research: falsifying and verifying the existence of hegemonic capacity in Indonesia.

The author has sourced the material through a ‘security lens’, meaning that the information presented will mostly deal with issues of national security, conflict management and agenda-setting with regard to security within ASEAN28 and engagement with global powers. However, the author of this thesis will not discard the economic and social considerations, in strong conjunction with those of security29.

The author is aware of the strong linkage between Indonesia’s social scientists and the ruling elite, as summarised by Hadiwinata (2009). The author has also sought out works by scholars from other (Southeast) Asian nations to eliminate bias resulting from potential political rhetoric relating to Indonesia’s capabilities internationally. Furthermore, the author has made note of secondary sources where ASEAN’s hegemonic capacity was linguistically equated with that of Indonesia. Furthermore, a working knowledge of the Indonesian language would have proven useful to eliminate the possible bias arising from potential errors in translation.

28 The author does not argue here whether ASEAN is a security complex or community. Notably, in the late great Michael Leifer’s opinion ASEAN was a diplomatic community rather than an organisation bound by specific norms, „for diplomacy is a tool that serves the interests of states rather than subordinates those interests to any wider purpose or conception of order“ in Cotton, J. The domestic sources of regional order in Michael Leifer’s analysis of Southeast Asia in Order and Security in Southeast Asia, Essays in memory of Michael Leifer (Emmers & Liow, 2006). For a comprehensive analysis of ASEAN as a potential security community, see Acharya (2014), cf ch 5.

29 This approach is also complimentary to the comprehensive logic of the ASEAN Security Community Action Plan which commits ASEAN member states to address the political, economic and social aspects of community-building (Secretariat, 2014a).
2.4 Levels of analysis
I have chosen to study the phenomenon of regional hegemony on the following three levels of analysis: domestic, regional and global. The choice of levels of analysis is supported by the theory section, indicating possible domestic and global constraints to regional hegemony-building. The need to look at the domestic level stems from the weaknesses of regional powers’ domestic capacities. The need to understand the regional-global nexus can be matched with Tucker’s (1995:15-8) reflections embedded in psychology that leadership is most needed in situations of crisis, more specifically when the group is threatened from the outside and in the everyday business of IR, indicating that a regional hegemon has to deal with external actors. The regional level is introduced separately from the international system, as according to Buzan and Waever (2003) it acts as a separate ontological and analytical entity. Furthermore, including the regional level will create a conceptual space for the inclusion of regional institutions. Furthermore, by choosing three broad levels of analysis, I bypass the theoretical implications of the agency-structure problem, as elaborated by Wendt (1987).

2.5 Analytical framework
The main research question is stated as follows:

What are the strengths and weaknesses associated with Indonesian hegemony-building across the three levels of analysis?

The strengths and weaknesses can be ascertained by looking at whether they support or undermine hegemony-building in the three capacities derived from theory.

In sum, the following three capacities are:

1. ideational capacity (existence of supportive discourse, norm/rule, value and interest compatibility with the region or the external constellation)
2. domestic capacity (domestic polity and domestic cohesion)
3. international capacity (engagement with regional and global actors and institutions, responsibility, commitment)

In order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of hegemony-building, firstly, Indonesia’s historic-geopolitical identity is examined to indicate the existence of
supportive discourse to hegemonic ambitions. Secondly under examination are the possible implications of domestic insecurity. Thirdly, the strategic culture also featured in the set of constitutional rules and procedures and economic interests is examined. Lastly, for the engagement in various regional and international political projects and with superpowers, the establishment of institutions and agenda-setting, mediation of conflicts and inter-state relations are examined as suggested by Ougaard (1988).

The results will be reported in two sets of tables, indicating the main weaknesses and strengths to the three capacities regarding hegemony-building.
3. Empirics

Southeast Asia, a post-colonial space in the 1950s, was faced with many regional conflicts. Indonesia, led by Sukarno, was engaged in the foreign policy of Konfrontasi\(^{30}\). Trying to stabilise the region and not have it torn apart by polarising alignments that arose from the Cold War setting, in 1976 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established. ASEAN did not come to be overnight, the failure of Association of South Asia (ASA) and the Greater Malayan Confederation (Maphilindo), led to the understanding that Indonesia must exercise constraint to be included and function well in a regional formation.

After the fall of Sukarno, Suharto set out to emphasise its commitments to the principles of non-interference and non-alignment and the non-use of force. According to Leifer (1983:120-1), “regional cooperation with Indonesia’s enthusiastic participation was envisaged both as means to satisfy its natural ambition and also to contain its more objectionable hegemonic disposition.” Dijwandono cited in Emmers (2005) noted in 1989 that Indonesia’s membership in ASEAN might be enough to accord it with the status of first among equals\(^{31}\) without resort to confrontational foreign policy and coercion. Suharto’s policy had to alleviate the mistrust against Indonesia, not only towards the latter’s policies by showing no ill intent towards its neighbours, but also towards the latter’s functioning as a stable state by becoming socio-economically stronger and socially cohesive.

In a statement to the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the House International Relations Committee, Pauker (1976) describes Indonesian hegemonic capacity as rather weak. He accepts the strategic downplaying of Sukarno’s grand plans and Konfrontasi foreign policy by Suharto, indicating nevertheless that even if Indonesia had a stronger desire for a hegemonic position in the region, its policy of self-restraint has left the country militarily incapable of exerting influence over its economically more advanced neighbours. The former account tends to

\(^{30}\) Confrontation (1963-66) between Indonesia and Malaysia, a practice of coercive diplomacy designed to provoke diplomatic in Indonesia’s interest to stop the formation of a British-backed Federation of Malaysia (Leifer, 2013).

\(^{31}\) in Latin *primus inter pares*, both the English and Latin version are used interchangeably in this thesis.
favour the realist thought on material capabilities presupposing the rise of a hegemon, however, hegemony is more than materiality, as indicated in the theory section of this thesis.

Indonesia has frustrated academics for a long time. Indonesia, a geopolitically and geostrategically well-equipped state\(^{32}\), has been known to punch below its weight. Indonesia has not collapsed, despite many academics referring to the possible disintegration of Indonesia after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the subsequent fall of Suharto’s regime and the difficulties faced during the democratic transformation of the country.\(^{33}\) Yet, Indonesia has not reached its full potential either.

Although at first glance, it would seem that Indonesia has been a regional dominator and after the 1998 Asian financial crisis, detached from the region due to domestic instability, economic downfall and engagement in transition from authoritarianism to democracy, I will trace the case for Indonesia’s potential regional hegemony in the Southeast Asia region. The idea here is not to assert that Indonesia is or will become a hegemon, but trace the embryonics of hegemony-building. The material gathered and analysed in the next chapters looks at strengths and weaknesses of Indonesia’s hegemony-building at the domestic, regional and global levels. In order to analyse Indonesia’s potential regional hegemony, this case study starts off with the introduction of underlying notions of Indonesia’s foreign policy and shows the historic contingency of these beliefs throughout the independent Indonesia era.

### 3.1 Underlying notions of Indonesia’s foreign policy

Reasons why Indonesia has never thrown around its weight on the world stage can be found in the foundations of the constitution and the principles of Pancasila\(^{34}\), resulting in a diplomatic technique that Michael Leifer (1983:88), a long time expert and writer on Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, notes to encompass *diplomasi* (negotiation), *perjuangan* (struggle\(^{35}\)) and *mushawarah* (close consultations). He follows that this technique has been to a large part upheld since Indonesia gained

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32 By this the author means, among other things, Indonesia’s location in the heart of Southeast Asia, its historical leadership in the region and after 9/11 more purposefully projecting itself as a bridge between the Middle East and the West.

33 Most notably in A. Smith (1999).

34 In English literally the Five Principles.

35 Resulting, first and foremost, from Indonesia’s struggle with the Dutch for independence.
independence in 1949. The resulting foreign policy based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution can be described in the words of Adam Malik, Indonesia’s third vice president, quoted in Leifer (1983:115) as “independent and active, opposed to imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations, and participating in implementing a world role based on independence, abiding peace and social justice.” What came to be known as the politik bebas aktif holds the free (independent) and active component. The first relates to Indonesia not being dictated by great powers, the latter to actively shaping international relations as not to be subject to external pressure (Murphy, 2009).

Indonesia’s nationalist rhetoric is definitely one of paradox. This can be, firstly, summed up by what Leifer (1983:173) describes as Indonesia being a country led by its vulnerability:

“The experience of upholding independence in both domestic and international dimensions generated an abiding concern for the integrity of a state beset by social diversity and physical fragmentation. That concern was reinforced by a conviction about the country’s attractiveness to external interests because of its bountiful natural resources and important strategic location. A common and consistent theme of Indonesia’s foreign policy has been the need to overcome an intrinsic vulnerability.”

This vulnerability can be seen as stemming from the very same capacities that make it a state to consider – from its archipelagic state and having the 4th largest population in the world, making it difficult to effectively organise and provide for its nation.

Indonesia has been historically regarded as the rightful leader of Southeast Asia. Mohammed Hatta (1953), Indonesia’s first vice president, exemplifies Indonesia’s (continued) understanding of its position and role in foreign affairs:

“Nature has ordained that Indonesia, lying between two continents—the Asian mainland and Australia—and washed by the waters of two vast oceans—the Indian and the Pacific—must maintain intercourse with lands stretching in a great circle around it. From time immemorial, it has had relationships with all of them, varied as they are. Its position at

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36 A paradox of entitlement and insecurity based on the same key factors that Leifer (1983) also refers to. 37 See Emmers (2005, 2014), the former features an overview of Indonesia in Southeast Asia, the latter provides it with the theoretical base that was lacking in the former.
the very heart of a network of communications has for centuries made the archipelago a halting place for all races and a staging base in international travel. When one considers that the territory of Indonesia extends for more than 3,000 miles and is composed of thousands of islands, large and small, the magnitude of the problem of maintaining the security of the country is apparent. So extensive an area cannot be defended purely by military strength.”

Hatta’s paragraph illustrates the continued need for the upkeep of a unitary stable country and its security not only through material capabilities and reliance on Indonesia’s position, but also through engagement with neighbouring countries. Hatta has in his writing recognised that a Realpolitik view of the world is not sustainable, a lesson learnt from the colonisation and struggles for independence.

This view in Indonesia’s foreign policy can best be summed up in ‘concentric [self-interest] circles’, stemming from the grand strategy devised by General Benny Murdani38:

1. The first concentric circle begins with the nation itself – the independence, national unity, security and interest;
2. The second circle extends to include ASEAN;
3. The third circle covers the area of Southeast Asia;
4. The fourth circle spreads to cover the whole of Asia;
5. The fifth circle reaches the other developing and Islamic countries;
6. The sixth and final circle deals with global matters.

Murdani explains that “Our [Indonesia’s] pragmatic approach is such that we always look to safeguard the one before reaching out to the next.”39 Nation-building is still ongoing in Indonesia, thus domestic problems seep into its foreign policy. Concentric self-interest places the state and its inner workings at the forefront of foreign policy agenda, while still encouraging relations with neighbouring and other countries in ensuring the state’s security.

39 Ibid.
Indonesia has exemplified this concentric thinking time and time again. The 1997 Asian financial crisis and subsequent fall of Suharto and introduction of Reformasi saw Indonesia enter into a long period of recession and difficult transformation and withdraw from its previously more active role in foreign politics. Michael Leifer’s (1999a) account of early diplomatic paralysis from 1997-1999 substantiates this claim. A 2007 Department of Defence presentation on internal and external challenges showcases yet a similar concentric logic. As survival interests, territorial integrity and national sovereignty have been marked down; of vital interest are the promotion of good governance, democracy, human rights and economic recovery. Interestingly enough, engagement beyond ASEAN has been noted as marginal (Susanto, 2007).

In sum, Indonesia’s foreign policy is greatly influenced by its intrinsic weaknesses as an archipelagic state. Due to Indonesia’s colonial background and the struggle for independence the country has learned to carry out its foreign policy through a diplomatic technique valuing close consultations and negotiation instead of destructive methods that might invoke threats to Indonesia’s statehood or regional stability. Indonesia’s self-image of *primus inter pares* further showcases Indonesia’s commitment to being a leader of the Southeast Asian region. However, Indonesia’s foreign policy has been noted to work in concentric circles, meaning that unless the domestic level of security is maintained, focus will not be extended to the regional and global circles, indicating a possible decrease in hegemonic commitment depending on the domestic situation.

### 3.2 Domestic

The following domestic assessment focuses on Indonesia trying to maintain and increase its territorial and social cohesion. These are related to maritime vulnerabilities and issues stemming from and still accompanying the transition to democracy, for example, separatism and low socio-political cohesion.

Questioning Indonesia’s domestic stability is not a new occurrence. Many ASEAN member states have alluded to Indonesia’s domestic stability being of importance to the continued strengthening of regional commitments. Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Ghok Tong, speaking at the time of Indonesia’s difficult democratic transition, sums up

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40 Democratic transition.
the continued fear of Indonesia’s disintegration, indicating that “the consequence for the entire region will be horrendous” (Weatherbee, 2005). As an archipelagic state, Indonesia fears dismemberment. The result of this fear is translated into emphasis on “unity, rapid economic development, economic nationalism, political stability and the absolute sanctity of national borders,” Sebastian (2006). This led Indonesia to push for the ‘archipelago principle’ in the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, marked as “the greatest achievement of Indonesia’s norm-building efforts” by Anwar (2013). Indonesia, an archipelago of 13 000 islands, now enjoys wide jurisdiction based on UNCLOS, however, maintaining national unity and integrity on top of issues with illegal fishing, smuggling and other violations have shown the weakness of the Indonesian state in addressing these issues (Djalal, 2012).

The land and sea of Indonesia are of strategic importance to regional and global actors41, on the domestic level, maintaining the archipelago has brought along many issues for Indonesia. Djalal (2012) notes that the coastline and maritime zones offer relatively easy access to smugglers, drug dealers, pirates and terrorists. Maritime security is a problem not only for Indonesia, but for many countries in Southeast Asia, be it in issues such as overlapping claims on islands42, or illegal activities, such as smuggling, drug and human trafficking or legal delimitation issues.43 The small economic and financial capacity, especially a defense budget of only 1 percent44, make it difficult for Indonesia to maintain law and order to secure maritime resources and ensure that shipping interests through Indonesia’s maritime zones are met (Sebastian, 2006). Handling these problems has seen Indonesia turn to non-benign methods, including blowing up illegal fishing ships (Quartz, 2015).

Indonesia’s at times distinctly nationalist and inward-looking decisions have further counteracted its benign and committed leadership (Vatikiotis, 2012). Roberts’ (2012) account of the 1997 haze problem serves as an example. Smoke rising from the fires that swept Kalimantan and Sumatra created a wall of smoke that expanded from

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41 Dibb (2001) has expressed a similar stance from the point of view of Australia, naming Indonesia the key to Southeast Asia’s security. It seems that Indonesia is not only big enough, but also situated as such to interest many.
42 Most notably, the Spratly islands.
43 For an overview see Bateman et al. (2012).
44 In 2015, it is only 0.8 percent of GDP (Domínguez, 2015).
Indonesia to the rest of maritime Southeast Asia, Singapore and Australia. Regular incidents of transboundary pollution have continued to plague the region since and Indonesia has been called out for these human-induced fires by Singapore and Malaysia. Collaborative efforts have already been put in place to stop haze problems and curb palm oil misuse (Ardiansyah, 2010). However, a recent report showing the connection between palm oil plantation crimes and illegal logging, indicates that the problem is yet to be curbed due to poor policing capacity of the Indonesian government (Johnson and Wadley, 2014).

Recently, with the likes of Richard Branson asking President Jokowi to revoke the death penalty on drug smugglers, Indonesia’s benign leadership has once again been put on the (‘global’) spot (Taylor, 2015). Advocating itself as a supporter of human rights and not responding to pleas from abroad has dented Indonesia’s image, with Australia and Brazil pulling its ambassadors from Indonesia and France expected to do the same (BBC, 2015). The island state lacks capacity to deal with smugglers, thus sending a clear message to future criminals – get caught, be killed – seems to be the thought process behind the latest executions, popularised in media as the Bali Nine killings.45 Furthermore, accosting release for Aceh and Papua prisoners46 and responding to the Philippine’s plea to release an alleged drug trafficker47, one of the Bali Nine, yet failing to do so for two Australians executed earlier this April, seems to re-emphasise Indonesia’s following of a concentric logic that business at home comes first.

These examples of domestic insecurity are a select few, yet they illustrate Indonesia turning to non-benevolent and strict measures when its territorial integrity and sovereignty are threatened. Further emphasising the ‘concentric logic’, it also indicates that Indonesia is more likely to refrain from cooperative measures in light of its own problems despite them having (adverse) effects on others in the region. With Indonesia’s ‘loud actions’ concerning illegal fishing and human trafficking, many Southeast Asian states have questioned Indonesia’s commitment to the usually ‘silent diplomacy’ of the region (Siswo, 2015). Former suspicions of Indonesia’s aggressiveness seem to be buried, yet concerns about Indonesia’s self-centred approach

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45 This line of thought stems from a discussion with my supervisor, Eoin McNamara on 30 April 2015.
have others in the region worried about whether it can effectively take on the role of a regional hegemon.

3.2.1 Democracy

It seems that Indonesia is still considered fragile, as with every new election, concerns about the stability of the state, the possible riots breaking out, radicals rallying against the new government in power emerge.48 However, Sukma (2009b) offers hope in that Indonesia has successfully managed to internalise the means for peaceful dispute settlement and the function of elections as a legitimate means of political succession. The former is especially important in the light of the many ethnic challenges that Indonesia faces, and has previously responded to with violence. The violent response to East Timor’s independence, the 2005 insurgency in Aceh and the on-going conflict in Irian Jaya/West Papua are the latest examples. The latter two are still a source of strife for Indonesia, continuing to weigh down the central government.

Aspinall and Berger (2001) admit that losing Papua could be brushed off as a historical exception since Papua, similarly to East Timor, did not play a major role in the history of Indonesian nation-building; the resistance of the Acehnese to the Dutch colonial forces, however, has been incorporated in the Indonesian nationalist sentiment. Aceh, similarly to Papua, Riau and East Kalimantan, has been exploited for primary commodities, however, in Aceh this exploitation resonates strongly with the already existing discourse of deprivation, making the Acehnese see themselves as victims of the Indonesian state (Aspinall, 2007). Djalal (2012) further acknowledges that “most of the people in Indonesia live in the island of Java. This has created tension between Western Indonesia and its eastern regions, leading the latter to protest against being economically exploited in favour of the development in Java.” Low socio-political cohesion and a possible breakaway manifest themselves as definite weaknesses to Indonesia’s statehood and its commitment to the role of a regional hegemon.

However, there are silver linings offered by the democratic transition. In his article, Ghoshal (2004), analysing the prospects and challenges of Indonesia’s democracy and constitutional liberalism, concludes that at the grassroots level many civil society groups have been established, the fight against corruption, violence and the advocacy of

48 Sukma (2009b) alludes to this in the fear of history repeating itself during the 2009 elections.
human rights is in progress. The continuation of the (grass-root) democratic process and progress and economic recovery will not only strengthen democracy in Indonesia, but also aid in raising the levels of social and territorial cohesion, as more and more people will enjoy economic prosperity and see their rights being upheld by the central government\textsuperscript{49}. The notion of regional development helping to reduce regional disparities as well as political conflicts, especially in the eastern parts of Indonesia, are also featured in the Jakarta Commitment to fighting poverty (Salim, 2011).

On the other hand, these silver linings should be taken with a pinch of salt, as governments cannot guarantee economic growth, despite Indonesia having enjoyed an average 6 percent growth in GDP over the last few years (The World Bank, 2015). Political reformation from an authoritarian government to democracy needs work in the area of human capacity building. Moreover, Indonesia has showcased entrenched economic nationalism\textsuperscript{50} which could very well counter their economic growth which has already seen a drop to 4.7 percent in the first quarter (The Economist, 2015). Stemming from historic distrust, foreign ownership is disliked. Yet, foreign direct investment is essential for building up Indonesia’s infrastructure and democratic mechanisms.

Indonesia’s ambitions, stemming from its national pride and ideology of being primus inter pares, have been indeed hampered by domestic constrictions, such as the worry over possible separatism in eastern parts of Indonesia. Indonesia has had a history of violence when responding to intra-state tensions. The transition to democracy highlighted this violence, as Aceh and Papua freedom fighters called for independence. As a newly democratic country, Indonesia is still facing troubles with socio-economic and socio-political cohesion. Despite enjoying economic growth, the state system needs further reformation in ensuring that corruption is eradicated and people regain their trust in the central government, making it easier for Indonesia to organise the country. Economic nationalism has called for alarm, as Indonesia’s economic growth has already experienced a drop compared to the last quarter. Indonesia’s constraint and continuous

\textsuperscript{49} The logic here alludes to the positive correlations between violent conflict and poverty, inequality, and variables measuring economic development in Indonesia’s local conflicts (Barron, Kaiser, & Pradhan, 2009).

\textsuperscript{50} This could also affect regional plans at the ASEAN Economic Community level. For more examples on Indonesia’s economic nationalism, see Vatikiotis (2012), Kurniawati (2014).
domestic improvement have, however, given further rise to Indonesia’s exceptionalism and instilled a new-found belief that Indonesia can once again become a driving force in regional and global institutions.

3.2.2 Muslim politics and radicalism

Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country\(^5\) in the world. This has offered both opportunities for political rhetoric as well as cautioned the ruling elite to tread carefully in keeping the nationalist Muslim movements at bay.

The authoritarian regime saw the downplaying of Muslim politics. During the Bush era, with the announcement of a ‘war against terror’, Indonesia saw the opportunity in avoiding being cast on the ‘axis of Evil’ and emphasised its role as a mediator of Islam and the West. With the rise of terrorism in the face of ISIS (the Islam State of Iraq and Syria aka ILIL, the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), the once held fears of Indonesia becoming a hotbed for terrorists and terrorism have resurfaced. Although General TNI Moeldoko has firmly restated that the military control will leave no room for ISIS recruiters in Indonesia (Antara, 2015), other analysts were quick to counter those claims by indicating to the rate at which Indonesians are being recruited (Wall Street Journal, 2015). Moreover, the concern lies in returning ISIS combatants whose influence was felt in the bombing of a shopping mall in Indonesia using chlorine (Safi, 2015).

Moreover, violent and non-violent extremists groups still exist in Indonesia. Two most notorious Islamist militia groups, FPI and Laskar Jihad, have not been tried for breaking the law (Smith, 2003), nor has Indonesia banned any political organisations, including Jemaah Islamiyah since 1998 (Ward, 2009). Ward (2009) offers tentative answers to whether a secular national ideology or the rival concept of an Islamic state will prevail in the future. However, there is nothing that suggests a move towards radical Islam in spheres of state governance. Murphy (2009) indicates that in 2004 when Islamic parties failed to make Islam the state religion, this discussion was put to rest. Taking Hizbut Tahrir (HTI), a non-violent extremist group in Indonesia as an example, Ward (2009) maintains that even though the Indonesian government has its hands tied with not curbing (non-violent) extremist activities due to a feared Muslim backlash of ‘silencing’

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\(^5\) Indonesia refers to herself as a Muslim country, not a Muslim state governed by Islam.
the people, HTI’s goals will not be seeing an increase in support until democracy and values associated with it have been deemed incompatible with Indonesia by the people voting.

Indonesia having the world’s largest Muslim population has in the wake of terrorism been seen as a potential threat to regional stability. The question has been raised whether there is room for Indonesia’s principle of ‘democracy’ that some local groups would like to see eradicated and some domestic groups in Indonesia would like to see reflected in Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially in ASEAN where many members still facilitate oppressive regimes. In general, it can be said that Indonesia has been successful in combining moderate Islam with democracy, increasing, in theory, its capacity for democracy projection to other Muslim countries.

3.3 Regional
Indonesia’s role in the region has been understated compared to the Suharto era, where Indonesia’s restraint on its previous confrontational foreign policy and a constraint on the country due to authoritarian rule was deemed as complimentary to Indonesia being primus inter pares and accepted by others as such. Anwar (1994) writes: “Voluntary restraint in Indonesia’s role in ASEAN was desired to allay any lingering suspicions towards Indonesia. Nevertheless, there was an expectation from the Indonesian leadership that the other members of the association should give due recognition to Indonesia’s low-profile role, and not take such self-restraint for granted. Moreover, Indonesia’s low posture was not meant to give an opportunity to other members to lead ASEAN.” Anwar further emphasises that “one of the most important roles of ASEAN for Indonesia as perceived by the political elite had been in helping to project the country’s image as a moderate, peace-loving, and development-minded state, especially in relation to major world economic powers.”

What Anwar wrote back in 1994, still applies to Indonesia in ASEAN today. The association helps maintain Indonesia’s international credibility and status; preserve regional harmony as well as act as a buffer for national security; aids in maintaining a non-aligned regional order. Lastly, the association provides a platform for international bargaining. Anwar states Indonesia’s primary interest to be in areas of politics and security, remarking an indirect interest in economics. This stems from Indonesia’s
economic nationalism and the fact that foreign direct investment for Indonesia’s development could only come from the great powers outside ASEAN. (Anwar, 1994)

By 2004, things had stabilised in Indonesia after the ouster of Suharto left the country in tatters, the immediate priority lay in restoring the international image to mend Indonesia’s broken confidence\(^{52}\) and appeal to foreign investors to ensure continuing development (Sukma, 2012). The shock of Indonesia losing its status as economy worsened reinvigorated Indonesia’s belief in remaining economically strong (Murphy, 2009). The last decade has thus seen the re-emergence of Indonesia as a regional (and global) player. What Emmerson (2012) thinks ASEAN needs is “being led quietly and ably ‘from behind’ by a member state with a sense of responsibility, the asset of credibility, and a preference for persuasion over confrontation,” hinting at Indonesia fitting the role.

3.3.1 ASEAN principles, shared norms

With the signing of the I Bali Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976, Indonesia signalled to its neighbours its commitments to adhere to the shared norms of Southeast Asian nations. What has come to be known as the ‘ASEAN Way\(^{53}\) can be traced in the second chapter of TAC (Secretariat, 2014b):

“a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;

b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;

c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;

d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;

e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;

f. Effective cooperation among themselves.”

\(^{52}\) Indonesia is arguably the most prideful country in Southeast Asia.

\(^{53}\) See Katsumata (2003) for an overview of the development of the ‘ASEAN Way’.
In a nutshell, the ‘ASEAN Way’ refers to the non-use of force and non-interference, aimed to protect sovereignty and emphasise commitment to constraint. ‘National resilience’ and ‘regional resilience’, found in the eleventh chapter of TAC (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014b), once again advocated by Indonesia, aid in the protection of sovereignty; a country’s efforts to maintain its territory and cohesion would be seen as translating into a more secure regional setting, too. The 1970 Declaration of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) introduced by Indonesia reinforced the ‘holy trinity’ of non-use of force, non-intervention and non-alignment, reconfirming that internally strong states would produce a strong region (Secretariat, 2000). To accommodate Indonesia’s initiatives taken towards Vietnam and the Soviet Union at the time of the Vietnamese incursion into Thai territory, ASEAN also agreed to the accommodation of member states’ freedom to pursue their own foreign policy (Snitwongse, 1998).

Freedom of foreign policy choice can be complemented by the evolving concept of non-alignment. Indonesia’s non-alignment principle shared with ASEAN has been stretched in concept and practice since the days of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). It is no longer taken to mean neutrality in great power balance of power play. Non-alignment now is seen as a foundation to the ‘balance of interest’ approach to powers surrounding the Southeast Asian nations (Sebastian, 2006). Sebastian (2006) indicates that “while Indonesians voice support for the idea that non-alignment as a principle should transcend ideology [stemming from an anti-communist sentiment], they are pragmatic in asserting that each country has the right to choose its own form of government and follow its own developmental path, in accordance with its particular national priorities, cultural background, and historical evolution.”

The code of conduct associated with the ‘ASEAN Way’ emphasises consensus and consultation, an informal means of negotiation, a two-track, silent diplomacy. Although ASEAN has been criticised for being ‘of process’ and not ‘of progress’54, lengthy dialogue and consultation have offered more leeway in reaching a consensus55, which

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54 The first ASEAN Formal Summit was held in 1976, 9 years after the initial inauguration, illustrating this “slow and steady” mentality.
55 As the disparities between the rich and poor ASEAN countries deepen, more recognition has been given to giving way to the formula of “10 minus X” in some cases (Snitwongse, 1998).
should not be understood as a procedural counting of votes, but rather as referring to a common understanding (even of things not understood or accepted by all) (Katsumata, 2003). Still to this day, the ‘ASEAN Way’ provides a necessary structure to build trust and confidence among members in various regional fora, including the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM), ASEAN Plus-Mechanisms, such as ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN together with China, Japan and South Korea), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).56

The strengths and weaknesses of the ideational capacity of Indonesia based on these common norms will be discussed in the following chapters.

3.3.2 Conflict mediation
Adhering to the ASEAN principles, Indonesia has helped reduce the potential for intra-regional conflicts through conflict management. Earlier mediations of Indonesia include the conflict between Malaysia and Singapore and the Philippine government and Mindanao separatists, Indonesia serving on the International Control Commission during the Vietnam War and as an ASEAN interlocutor in Cambodia (Anwar, 1994).

Indonesia has been increasingly active ever since it held the Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2011, indicating that a stronger Indonesia could afford looking at regional matters. However, it is difficult to assess the contribution Indonesia has had in managing regional conflicts in the 2000s, unless ad hoc measures were reported to be taken, as any other form of conflict management among ASEAN member states would fall under the joint flag of ASEAN. Moreover, the ‘corridor diplomacy’ and ‘ASEAN way’ of doing things leaves much hidden from the general public57.

A case in point would be the allusion to Indonesia’s crucial role in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. In 2008 when Cyclone Nargis hit and Myanmar was incapable of dealing with the consequent humanitarian crisis, calls for a humanitarian intervention were raised and ASEAN was pressured to act. Roberts notes his e-mail correspondence with an ambassador to Singapore who recalls that at an ASEAN Ministerial meeting “Indonesia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs leaned across the table and asked the Foreign

56 An extensive list of different fora for the three ASEAN pillars can be found at the ASEAN website at http://www.asean.org/
57 This includes researchers.
Minister of Myanmar what he thought ASEAN membership meant to Myanmar and what – at that time and in those circumstances – Myanmar’s membership meant to ASEAN – in terms of ASEAN’s internal coherence – international profile\textsuperscript{58} – and its membership’s shared vision for the future.” Roberts and Widyaningsigh (2014) highlight Indonesia’s role in pressuring Myanmar as a persuasive factor in the latter allowing foreign aid organisations into the country.

In 2011, Indonesia offered to mediate the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, a first in the history of ASEAN member state initiatives (Sukma, 2012). In February 2011, when the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute broke, it was arguably Indonesia’s “shuttle diplomacy” that helped put a stop to use of military power on both sides. Indonesia, although rejected many times by both parties, managed to have a team of observers sent over to the area of the disputed temple, Preah Vihear. (Afrida and Santosa, 2012) However, it was the ruling of the International Court of Justice that finally settled the conflict.

The biggest hindrance in maintaining these friendly relations have been the disputes regarding the South China Sea. In 2012, with Cambodia chairing ASEAN, Indonesia took it upon itself to maintain ‘ASEAN centrality’ after the customary communique was failed to be produced over diverging views on the South China Sea, a first in the 45 years of ASEAN. Even though Indonesia enjoyed international acclaim for Marty Natalegawa’s 10-day trip undertaken to ensure some sort of closure and easing of tensions, which resulted in announcing ASEAN’s Six Point Principles on the South China Sea, Indonesia’s shuttle diplomacy was also viewed as bypassing ASEAN multilateralism and ‘going at it alone’ without regard to the actual claimants of the dispute (Saragih, 2012).

Even though Indonesia is not a direct claimant, the Natuna Island, Indonesia’s biggest island in the South China Sea and natural gas field, has raised concerns about China’s intentions, with China publishing a nine-dashed line which shows that connecting China’s claimed areas in South China Sea would also cut through the exclusive economic zone of Natuna (Lee, 2014). Indonesia has avoided having an open

\textsuperscript{58} This internal coherence and the principle of non-intervention were threatened by calls from external actors to enter Myanmar without the latter’s consent.
confrontation with Beijing, seeing that bilateral trade with China amounts to a third of Indonesia’s total trade and China is the second market for exports after Japan (Dominguez, 2015). The Chinese Indonesian community makes up only 3% of the population, yet controls 70% of Indonesia’s economy (Adibe, 2015).

The developments on the South China Sea can challenge Indonesia’s role of a mediator, an ‘honest broker’ it has set out to be. Jakarta’s neutrality on the issue has been called to question (Suryadinata, 2015). Recalling Indonesia’s failures in dealing with regional issues that infringe directly on its territorial integrity and sovereignty, these fears are understandable. Sebastian (2006) lists the ‘West Irian campaign, Konfrontasi, and the invasion of East Timor in 1975 to highlight Indonesia’s military actions in areas of external security where diplomatic negotiations failed, that became a direct threat to national security.’

Commitment to ASEAN and the principles of consultation and consensus will still be upheld within and outside of multilateral frameworks. The 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting is in correlation with this logic. Despite Indonesia enjoying being courted by the United States and China, Marsrudi, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, indicated the country’s commitment to the multilateral resolution of the South China Sea dispute(s) (Otto, 2015). Moreover, in a recent interview with General Moeldoko of Indonesia, responding to fears of Indonesia confronting China, Moeldoko expressed Indonesia’s continued interest in easing tensions via multilateral engagement: “Indonesia is looking to establish a new multilateral forum that China will not be able to sabotage through diplomatic pressure on client states.” (Dominguez, 2015)

According to Sukma (1994), engagement with China within a multilateral framework, either through ASEAN or the ASEAN Regional Forum, has been a first preference of Indonesia. Leifer (1999b) notes that multilateralism “has been regarded in Jakarta as likely to be a more effective instrument for managing relations with a China regarded with apprehension and some foreboding.” This can be seen in the case of EAS, where

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59 However, Jokowi has been the first to address China’s claims as legally unfounded, see The Straits Times (2015).
60 This is not due to Indonesia’s domestic weaknesses and lack of resources to pursue radical transformation, but due to the long-standing underlying principles of Indonesia’s foreign policy in Santikajaya (2014).
Indonesia supported the inclusion of India and Australia in contrast to Malaysia’s proposal of limiting the EAS to the APT countries (Sukma, 1994). Roberts and Widyaningsigh (2014), for example, regard Indonesia’s leadership as critical for the establishment of the East Asia Summit, as well as persuading the United States and Australia to join TAC.

The establishment of new multilateral frameworks might seem excessive, a non-strategy at first glance. However, a web of bi-, tri- and multilateral relations maintained in the multiplicity of mechanisms involved is the heart of the idea of “dynamic equilibrium.” With ASEAN expanding its norms of consensus and consultation to the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), it has sought to ‘bind’ powers external to ASEAN in non-binding fora, “in which none are dominant and none are excluded,” says Poling (2013). The ‘power’ of the ‘ASEAN Way’ need necessarily reflect in efficacy of conflict management and dispute resolution, but rather on the constraints it puts on actors.

Indonesia has been playing a bigger part in regional conflict mediation since mid-2000s. Indonesia has been criticised of being too independent and not taking an interest where the country does not have anything to gain, especially when taking ad hoc measures to regional conflict management. Yet, despite taking ad hoc measures, Indonesia has still stayed committed to the ‘ASEAN Way’ of doing things. However, Indonesia has been better at dealing with regional problems that do not concern its national security, infringe on its sovereignty or cut off its interests. Still, advocating for peaceful resolutions might be the best attraction for the continuance of Indonesia’s hegemony-building.

3.3.3 Agenda-setting
Arguably, Indonesia’s hegemonic capacity to maintain peace is constricted by the principle of non-interference, as allowing for mediators inside a country might run the risk of infringing the state’s sovereignty. The following chapter will, thus, look at Indonesia’s initiatives in trying to stretch the principle of non-interference and promote democracy.

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By 2005, Indonesia had managed to finally stabilise the country, hold democratic elections and enjoy economic growth. Outcomes of Reformasi also put a demand on Indonesia’s foreign policy to reflect the domestic democratic values in foreign relations. Already in 2003, Indonesia acted as the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee, submitting the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) Plan of Action, including the idea of ‘flexible engagement’ to be discussed at the II Bali summit. The idea of ‘flexible engagement’ first introduced by Thailand in 1998, re-emerged in the 2000s. Indonesia was one of the initial opponents of the Thai proposal (Katsumata, 2003), later becoming an advocate of change to the rigid principle of non-interference. Sukma’s Action Plan for a Security Community stretched ‘flexible engagement’ to involve state and human security instances requiring prevention and resolution measures that were felt as infringing on ASEAN member states’ sovereignties (Emmerson, 2005).

Haacke (2005) indicates that the ‘red line’ was encountered with the proposed establishment of a regional peacekeeping force. Moreover, he adds, these capacities were regarded as politically and financially demanding. According to Haacke, member states felt that “Jakarta was trying de facto to steam-roll ASEAN into embracing a discourse and agenda that was not of all members’ choosing. Blaming Jakarta of not embracing the ‘ASEAN way’ has not been a single occurrence. In the lead-up to the II Bali Concord, the ASEAN People’s Assembly, a think tank in Jakarta, “urged transforming ASEAN into a body ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’ of Southeast Asia”, indicating an ‘American way’ with reference to Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address rather than the ‘ASEAN’ way (Emmerson, 2005).

Indonesia’s push for loosening of the non-intervention principle and emphasising domestic governance was marked by many as a failure of Indonesia’s leadership. The plan was rejected and then accepted as a watered-down version of the original, leading Indonesia to feel humiliated. Wain cited in Emmers (2014) has argued that “by agreeing to a watered-down version of the ASC Plan of Action, having rejected the original proposal earlier, some member states also rejected Indonesia as a first among

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62 Later renamed as the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC).
63 Sometimes also referred to as “constructive intervention”, see Mahathir and Irwan (2007).
64 This might also be a manifestation of Rizal Sukma’s dissatisfaction with ASEAN and how Indonesia’s efforts were disregarded, see chapter titled Sukma’s way in Emmerson (2005).
equals within ASEAN.” Anwar (2010) also highlights the ratification of The ASEAN Charter and the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in late 2008 and mid-2009, respectively, as watered-down versions of Indonesia’s proposals to include provisions on the protection of human rights with no provisions for sanctions for non-compliance being adopted.

This has led Sukma (2012) to accept that, at the moment, Indonesia is still not seen as capable enough to promote democracy and endorse human rights due to a host of domestic problems. Moreover, the reformation of the state system, namely the Foreign Ministry of Indonesia, and the emergence of non-governmental organisations, human rights groups and academics voicing their opinion have made foreign policy making more demanding as well as complex (Nabbs-Keller, 2013). The complexity is especially stark in comparison to the era of Suharto, when Indonesia was a strong regional leader, yet foreign relations required minimal, if any, consultation due to the nature of the authoritarian regime (Sukma, 1995).

Due to pressure at home, Indonesia’s drive to have human rights on the ‘regional table’ has persisted. The Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) introduced in 2008 already saw its 7th meeting held last year. BDF is a forum where participants can deliver speeches on what democracy means to their countries. Bali Media Forum, a side project will see best practices diffused among participating countries to ensure a widespread effect. (Jakarta Post, 2014) However, it has been argued whether Indonesia is actually doing something or just ‘talking the talk’. And that ‘talk’ is not something that all of the ASEAN countries want to hear, leading to accusations of Indonesia only trying to promote their own image and not dealing with the needs of the region (Damazo-Santos, 2014). The scope of the forum is indeed impressive with 85 representatives having joined the forum in 2014 (Jakarta Post, 2014). But the way the forum functions, as a speech festival, raises questions as to its efficiency.66

Indonesia’s hegemonic capacity might not be strong enough for endorsing democracy on a wide scale per se, but economic development in terms of assisting new members

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65 Sukma distinguishes between the projection of democracy and the promotion of democracy, alluding to Indonesia engaging in the normative emptiness of the former (Reid, 2012).
66 Although, as has been established, the views on success are less product- and process-oriented and more long-term.
with their economies and delivering economic goods could work well in promoting ‘pragmatic democracy’ and counterbalancing the Chinese and American economic models (Snitwongse, 1998). China’s influence is growing and can be seen in the possible polarisation of ASEAN with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thai and Vietnam, countries considered the poorer 5 of the ASEAN 10, choosing China over the United States (Menon, 2013). One of the factors would be the differences between the Beijing and Washington Consensus. The former adheres to economic authoritarianism, the latter to economic neoliberalism. Economy is indeed a powerful driver of policy, yet Indonesia is starting to pull its own weight. Indonesia together with Australia have been making plans for building up Myanmar’s economic capacity, with the former providing a solid example of a successful democratic transition. Moreover, Indonesia’s silent diplomacy towards Myanmar has been hailed as triumphing in the region, as military reformers and presidential advisors frequent Myanmar to share its experience of democratic transition (Vatikiotis, 2012).

Through ASEAN, Indonesia has tried to lobby for a revision of the non-intervention principle closely tied to ASEAN’s ‘flexible engagement’ approach. Indonesia has led the talks on democracy and the establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Council and the ASEAN Peace and Reconciliation Council. Even though Indonesia’s pro-democracy initiatives have not been met with great enthusiasm, Indonesia has managed to leverage its leadership to an extent where some changes to the formerly rigid principles of non-intervention have passed. The efficacy of these new initiatives is not evaluated within this thesis, yet the existence of these initiatives is taken as an indicator of hegemonic capacity.

3.3.4 ASEAN centrality
Indonesia has been feared to abandon its ASEAN-centric focus with the newly elected president Jokowi. Jokowi’s focus lies in the global maritime nexus (poros maritime dunia) not only for economic, but security reasons, too (Bentley, 2014). Once again, the need to protect state sovereignty is emphasised. McCawley (2014), distinguishing between an inward-looking ‘resilience path’ and an outward looking ‘reform path’,

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67 This does not mean that domestic violence, conflict, insecurities and weaknesses do not persist, yet Indonesia’s recovery and resilience have been remarkable.
69 For successful silent diplomacy by an upcoming regional hegemon, see Prys (2009).
gives prominence in Jokowi’s focus to the former, as the latter is littered with substantial obstacles. This follows with Sukma’s (2012) statement that “at present, the record suggests that the country’s influence in the global arena remains marginal. Indonesia still has a long way to go before it can realise its full potential to matter significantly in the global arena.”

The importance of foreign policy for Jokowi is best seen in comparison with the foreign policy of the second candidate for presidency, Prabowo. The latter’s foreign policy features the maintenance of politik bebas aktif, an active role in combating global warming and protecting Indonesian migrant workers. Jokowi focuses on the maintenance of the unity of the archipelagic state, acting as a middle power in different fora, expanding and strengthening the regional architecture to include the Asia-Pacific and continuing with the facilitation of democratic (and plural) foreign policymaking (Santikajaya, 2014). These views are not unsurprising, given Southeast Asia’s “adverse historical memories, nationalism and international scape-goating – as a political tool in response to weak political legitimacy,” says Roberts (2012). Furthermore, Christopher Dent (2012) has suggested that bilateralism70 is “more likely to bring division rather than inclusion to regional community building endeavours in Southeast Asia over the long run.”

However, Indonesia’s engagement outside of ASEAN channels should not be viewed as zero-sum: Indonesia looking beyond ASEAN does not negate its commitment to ASEAN. Following the logic of Indonesia’s politik bebas aktif principle, Indonesia has signed economic partnerships with Australia, Japan and India71, as these three powers do not impose an immediate threat to the regional equilibrium, but help maintain stability in asymmetry (Sukma, 1997). Also, the Indonesia-led ASEAN Political and Security Community blueprint restates the commitment to ASEAN centrality as “the driving force in charting the evolving regional architecture.” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009)

As expressed by Haacke (2005), “while ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture itself provides a pillar of regional stability and order in Southeast Asia, this pillar is in many ways connected, but also subordinated to, bilateral alliances and relationships, and multinational frameworks for security cooperation.”

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70 Here in the context of individual countries seeking bilateral agreements.
71 Indonesia and China do not have a bilateral economic agreement.
It might seem that maintaining ‘ASEAN centrality’ is nothing but wishful thinking. Goh (2011) states that “unfinished and urgent task of [ASEAN’s] internal consolidation acts as an important constraint to ASEAN’s ability to play its brokerage role vis-à-vis the great powers and regional order in East Asia.” Internal consolidation of ASEAN via institution-building and agenda-setting and also making use of bilateral and multilateral commitments with external actors would strengthen ASEAN centrality. Caballero-Anthony (2014) stresses the necessity of the former, urging ASEAN to work harder on building its institutional capacity. Ho (2012) stresses the necessity of the latter, “particularly so if ASEAN states – in their proclivity to avoid being drawn into big power rivalries – end up adopting an inward-looking, it-is-all-about-ASEAN mentality,” arguing that “the interests of ASEAN states would be better served in expanding their relational capacities (whether formally or informally) vis-à-vis other regional and global partners instead of over-emphasising the centrality of ASEAN.” In the light of this, suggestions that Indonesia is turning its back on ASEAN can be countered, for one, by analysing the evolving principle of ‘ASEAN centrality’.

Even though Indonesia has shown at times fickle commitment to ASEAN, Indonesia’s costs of non-commitment would see other member states take decisions on matters that might inflict on Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. ‘Keeping ASEAN in the centre of multilateral frameworks, commonly referred to as ‘ASEAN centrality’, keeps ‘a space’ for great power play and projection from opening up, using an “enmeshment” strategy’, as cited in Ho (2012). Understandably, Indonesia cannot control other countries’ links to superpowers, yet a zone of neutrality in the region as a whole like stated in ZOPFAN works has worked in theory (Weck, 2011).

‘ASEAN centrality’ has always been a key factor in balancing and hedging between great powers. Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ foreign policy fits well with not providing a space for great powers to dominate the region. This leads Beeson (2014), for example, to consider ASEAN as „the best hope for continuing stability in the world’s most important economic region.“ ASEAN centrality’ is vital, as APEC, EAS and APT, the former of which includes ASEAN and the latter two of which are extensions of ASEAN, have been seen to overstage ASEAN in areas of practical outcomes. For instance, Stubbs (2002) mentions the role of APT in the Asian Financial Crisis as
imperative, expressing APT’s potential to emerge as the most important organisation reflecting in the juxtaposition of the weakened positions of Japan and Indonesia resulting in a lessened interest in regional initiatives.

Furthermore, Indonesia strongly adheres to the principle of not having any great power dominate the region. In his book “Whose ideas matter? Agency and power in Asian regionalism”, Acharya (2009) makes a compelling case for the synthesis of the cognitive prior of Asia’s colonial past, the Cold War bipolarising pulls and the non-intervention principle of a Westphalia system of states leading to the underlying notions of enhanced non-intervention and non-alignment. The latter has been also reinforced in Indonesia’s vision to manage the relations of ASEAN member states independent of external interference. The politik bebas aktif (independent and active), the positioning of Indonesia between the United States and the Soviet Union by rejecting commitment to either bloc (Sukma, 1995), can still be seen today, as Indonesia maintains its position of a non-aligned but multilateral actor between, first and foremost, China and the United States, while also engaging with Japan, India and Australia.

Despite talks of looking past ASEAN, operating in a non-ASEAN way and self-interestedly, Indonesia’s commitment to ASEAN remains strong with ‘ASEAN centrality’ and the ‘ASEAN way’ of doing things being upheld. In the logic of the concentric circles introduced first by Colonel Murdani and reiterated by the later ruling elites, Indonesia seeks to maintain its security by maintaining an active and independent\textsuperscript{72} role in the region. This coincides with Indonesia’s politik bebas aktif principle. What speaks to Indonesia advantage is 50 years of varied experience in ASEAN and other multilateral organisations as well as an ASEAN belief that commitment to non-binding agreements offers more leeway for the countries not to operate in a setting of pre-destined actions, marginalising the more common language of conflicts, use of force and war.

\textsuperscript{72} Independent here is to be understood as not having the connotation of “going at it alone”, but as not having powers outside of the region and within it have enough control over Indonesia and its development.
3.4  Global
On a global level, Indonesia stands out due to its large Muslim population, its strategic position and its freshly minted position among the MINT\textsuperscript{73} countries. These factors have given base for Indonesia’s membership in various international organisations. Moreover, Indonesia’s ‘central’ position within ASEAN and the Southeast Asian region in general, have seen both China and the United States court it (Scarpello, 2010).

3.4.1  Engaging China and the United States
Since the 1990s, and in the case of Indonesia especially after the fall of Suharto in 1997, China has been enjoying a more positive response\textsuperscript{74} from the nations of Southeast Asia. Sukma (2009a) points out three focal points in future Sino-Indonesian relations. Firstly, the public perception of Indonesian Chinese minority has shown signs of considerable improvement after the atrocities of 1998\textsuperscript{75}, yet Indonesian Chinese are still at times viewed as responsible for corruption and fostering a culture of bribery in Indonesia. This prejudice has also been the source of frustration in the relations between Singapore and Indonesia (Hamilton-Hart, 2009). Moreover, the case of the 1998 has been sidelined without conclusive resolution (Sukma, 2009a). However, Sukma notes that China, careful not to infringe on Indonesia’s sovereignty, would also see the dilemma handled by Indonesia, as to not have to ‘defend its kin’ by breaching Indonesia’s sovereignty. Secondly, the continued nurturing of trust between the two countries and, thirdly, the resolving of bilateral issues, has had positive effects on the Sino-Indonesian relations.

Whether China is willing to forego two decades of projecting friendliness and building peaceful neighbourly with the nations of Southeast Asia, is another question, relating especially to the dispute over the South China Sea islands. However, the Chinese ‘influence’ on Southeast Asia (and Indonesia) should not be over exaggerated. A staff report on China’s economic ties published in March 2015 suggests that even though the ‘dependence’ on China has increased in poorer ASEAN countries and decreased in richer ones, China has yet to become a big investor in Southeast Asia, with its foreign

\textsuperscript{73} MINT is a term coined by Jim O’Neill collectively referred to the rising economies of Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey, see BBC (2014).
\textsuperscript{74} Although anti-Chinese sentiments remain, for an overview of Southeast Asian nations’ sentiments towards China see Cho and Park (2013).
\textsuperscript{75} See The Jakarta Post (1999).
direct investment resulting in 2.3% of ASEAN’s total FDI inflows in 2013 (Parameswaran, 2015a).

Taking into consideration that Indonesia has enjoyed an improvement in bilateral relations with China, yet is unsure of China’s intentions relating to Indonesia’s domestic and regional concerns, the latter, according to Sukma (1994), has engaged in a two-tier approach of both cooperation and kind of hedging. However, for example, Indonesia did not have much of a say in the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), which has caused trade deficit, industrial downturn and rising unemployment, leading Indonesia to seek a diversity in its economic partners (Hadi, 2012). “Indonesia has taken a mixed approach to economic diplomacy with China. On one hand, it has signed bilateral trade agreements with South Korea and Japan but not with China, suggesting—like India—a preference for closer trade relations with China’s wealthier neighbors (Salidjanova and Koch-Wesner, 2015).

Relations with China seem to be still plagued by historic distrust which is fuelled by the dispute on the South China Sea. Indonesia’s strength has been to engage with China both bilaterally and multilaterally, enmeshing China in Southeast Asian institutions, hoping to keep peace in the region.

The United States and Indonesia, similarly to China and Indonesia, have enjoyed good relations underlined by suspicion and distrust. Murphy names Indonesia’s and the United States’ shared interests to be counterterrorism, maritime security of the Malacca straits, vital for global shipping, and a wariness of a growing China. According to her, differences can be found in reactions to the Middle East and the global trade (liberalisation). Referring to the former, Indonesia, for example, has supported the Palestinian cause, but this has been based on the policy of self-determination, a just solution based on the United Nations’ legal framework, not religious solidarity towards Muslims, states Sukma in Murphy (2009). Azra (2006:92) describes this as follows: “Indonesia’s support for the Palestinian cause is not based on the principle of Islamic solidarity, but on humanity.” Smith (2003) further comments that leading Muslim parties in Indonesia have urged the people to regard the situation in the Iraq “as a political, and not a religious, struggle.”

76 For an overview, see (Sukma, 2009a).
The United States as the lead state of the West has shown continued interest in Indonesia, trying to encourage the country to adhere to the balance of moderate Islamic elements in a stable and democratic environment. Indonesia’s face-saving balancing act can be summed up in the words of Hadiz (2004): “Indonesia have needed to match the populist appeal of various Islamic-based adversaries—whose social justice rhetoric is sometimes virulently anti-American—while simultaneously ensuring continued engagement with US-led global economic and security processes.” The United States’ and Indonesia’s understanding of democracy differs to the extent that Indonesia has not been promoting the American ideological value-based democracy, but has viewed democracy as having pragmatic benefits, most notably for the economic growth and socio-political cohesion of the country (Murphy, 2009).

Smith (2003) has referred to Indonesia-U.S. relations as ‘a glass half full’: Indonesia, despite being hailed as a ‘poster child’ for US-led democracy, “a critical test case in the war against terrorism,” “has continued to challenge the global order (and thus the West led by the United States) by seeking to reform the Security Council, urging focusing on proliferation of nuclear weapons and adhering to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).” This is a testament to Indonesia doing things their way. Indonesia, for one, cannot be considered a ‘poodle’ of the United States,77 as Indonesia’s support for counterterrorism would maybe suggest. For example, Indonesia has never supported the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq or Iran. Smith (2003) also highlights Indonesia’s opposition to post-Gulf war sanctions and a unilateral U.S.-led attack outside the UN mandate against Iraq.

Also, Indonesia cannot afford to be too closely associated with the United States, not only because of its ‘independent and active’ policy, but due to China’s perceptions of the relationship and Indonesia’s public sphere distrusting (and blaming) the West78 and the United States. The latter refers especially to the International Monetary Fund bailouts of 1998 seen as ailing rather than aiding Indonesians.79 Indonesia’s sensitivity can be further traced to counterclaims to Muslim radicalism, e.g. the initial disbelief of

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77 The word ‘poodle’ was popularised in the context of U.S.-Great Britain relations in the early 2000s with regard to the war against terrorism. Tony Blair was referred to as the poodle of George W. Bush.
78 Smith (2003) references that Australians and Americans are especially not trusted, as their NGO ‘soft power’ has been hailed as one of the reasons for the loss of East Timor.
Al Qaeda’s involvement in the 9/11 attacks, the dismissal of Muslim radicals operating in Indonesia as CIA rumours. Smith (2003) further notes that suspicion remains even among Muslim moderates as to what are the United States’ intentions regarding the Muslim world. Murphy (2009) counters by saying that anti-Americanism is not as deeply rooted as one might think and can be altered by circumstance.

However, it is true that the United States still want Indonesia ‘on their side’ or at least ‘not on someone else’s side’, the latter here most commonly referring to China. Even though not readily agreeing with the United States on a number of different issues, Indonesia has been a responsible member in international relations abiding by the decisions taken by the UN Security Council. This is exemplified by Indonesia reluctantly accepting the UN resolution on a trade embargo on Iraq after the Kuwait invasion (Suryadinata, 1995). Indonesia’s commitment to international law and large Muslim population situated in a geostrategic area near maritime ways of immense importance will see to Indonesia’s glass remaining ‘half full’ from the United States’ point of view.

With the United States’ ‘pivot to Asia’ capacity weakened due to budgetary cuts (Freyer-Briggs, 2014), the United States would arguably more likely greet a strong regional leader in Indonesia than see its own direct presence in the region. The last remark comes with a caveat, as the United States has been seen to ramp up its anti-China pivot (Symonds, 2015). This fits well with the U.S. hub and spokes system, with the U.S. leading from afar as the hub via strategic partnerships and allies as its spokes. And, although, Indonesia is treading carefully not to upset the Chinese or the Americans, recent purchases of military equipment from the U.S. might be indicative of Indonesia trying to balance the growing militarism in the region (Tomkins, 2015).

Thus far, Indonesia has managed to hedge between the external powers, seeking out the United States when the Chinese influence on the region grows and vice versa. From the point of view of a regional hegemon, Indonesia has played to its strengths and tried to enmesh the two external actors as well as undercut balance of power type of thinking.

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80 This comment alluding to the CIA spreading rumours comes from Rachmawati Sukarnoputri, sister of the president Megawati Sukarnoputri cited in Smith (2003).
However, Indonesia’s weakness lies in the growing militarism in the region translating into military action.

3.4.2 Global institutions
On a global level, Indonesia enjoys a membership in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Even though Indonesia’s Islam is at times viewed as ‘peripheral’ and it does not have economic or geographic leverage in the OIC, its commitment to human rights meant that Indonesia became the first host of the Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC) of the OIC (Wahyuningrum and Hafiz, 2012). Indonesia has showcased its leadership skills before, for example, more recently by chairing OIC’s Peace Committee for Southern Philippines (Santos, 2015). Rosyadi translated in Suryadinata (1995) has made note of Indonesia’s unique position in the OIC, also having mediated conflicts in and between OIC members themselves. Unsurprisingly, Indonesia has been called upon this year to settle the conflict in Yemen (Xiunhua Net, 2015), indicating the appeal of Indonesia’s approach to foreign policy, more specifically, its conflict management.

A large Muslim population has ensured its place in the OIC, yet Indonesia has been adamant at participating in the organisation on the principles of the UN charter and the 1945 Constitution, signifying the non-Islamic nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy (Suryadinata, 1995). Indonesia has also held firm on the non-alignment principle in NAM, not wishing to link any political or religious disputes in states with a Muslim population to the organisation. For example, during the Bosnia Crisis, Indonesia maintained its disengagement with a co-religious image of helping the Bosnian Muslims, only agreeing to send troops to the area when requested by the United Nations to do so (Suryadinata, 1995).

This ‘middle path’ approach has to a greater extent characterised Indonesia’s policymaking. As the first ASEAN country to have been invited to join the G20, Indonesia has regarded this opportunity as a ‘civilisational’ platform to fulfil its role as a bridge between democratic and Islamic values (Lutfi, 2014). Moreover, Indonesia has

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81 The Group of Twenty refers to the 20 largest economies in the world.
82 The G20 has failed to legitimately answer the question of how countries are invited to join this exclusive economic club, see Patrick (2010) for an overview of the possible criteria. These suspicions spill over to Indonesia’s admittance, as its level of per capita income is still lower than that of other ASEAN countries such as Thailand and Malaysia in Indonesia in G20.
been given support by regional leaders in Southeast Asia to represent ASEAN in the G20.\footnote{This promotion of ASEAN in the G20 via Indonesia was also emphasised in 2011 when Indonesia took to chair ASEAN in Weck (2011).} For this purpose, the ASEAN G20 Contact Group was set up during the 15th ASEAN Summit to coordinate regional interests and positions prior to G20 summits (Week, 2011).

One could argue that with Indonesia engaged in different institutions and fora, it not only enjoys an increased international standing, but the commitments made in these institutions also help in focusing the country on improvement, signalling a responsible Indonesia to its regional audience. This is illustrated, for instance, by Indonesia in G20 focusing on fiscal transparency, reducing corruption, managing its public debt\footnote{In 1997/98 the public and private debt amounted to 100% over GDP in Weck (2011).}, promotion of stability in financial markets and good governance (Weck, 2011). Moreover, Indonesia as one of the developing countries in G20 has been coordinating a common voice with other developing countries, ensuring a better bargaining position in an institution dominated mostly by structural power.\footnote{The larger the per capita income, the more powerful the country.} The South-South cooperation was further emphasised by President Jokowi during the last Afro-Asian Conference (Parameswaran, 2015b). Despite lacking in structural power, Indonesia has managed to propose or gather support for initiatives relating to gas emission and executive honour pay reduction, a global expenditure fund creation, among others (Weck, 2011).

Garnaut (2012) states that Indonesia’s international political culture has helped shape the inelegant process of trade liberalisation. He also mentions that without the support of ‘Indonesia and ASEAN for the continued discussion on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the culture of collective decision-making influenced by Indonesia, APEC would not be as successful.’ He agrees to this sense of freedom leading to a more active role in taking the necessary measures for the implementation of the necessary trade liberalisation reforms. This also shows some fading of Indonesia’s economic nationalism, highlighting at the same time its wish to formulate a new economic culture adhering to Indonesia’s own wants. This is illustrated by Jokowi’s recent call for a non-Western economic order at the 60th anniversary celebrations for the Asia–Africa (Bandung) conference (Camroux, 2015). Chatib (2012) agrees that
“resistance to market reform from protectionist groups continues and it would be unwise to assume that pressure for trade protection will subside any time soon,” referring to the supply-side constrains and complexity of democratic policy-making. Basri and Hill (2011), however, maintain that Indonesia cannot backtrack, as it already participates in international trade agreements and, secondly, would not want to miss out in the face of competitive liberalisation.

A more responsible image is not only projected through Indonesia’s promotion of democracy and engagement in global economy, but also in non-security areas of policy, for instance, climate and environmental policies. In 2007, Indonesia hosted the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Jotzo (2012) indicates a strong interest in leading global talks, as “the country is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change.” He notes that, although, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) still dictate the global agenda, Indonesia has contributed in the formation of the Bali Roadmap, ‘the principles of which still reverberate in the ongoing climate discussions.’ With a country as large as Indonesia, showcasing its environmental responsibility is a win-win for both the country itself and the regional (and global) environment.

Indonesia’s international role is best viewed through regional and global engagement. Indonesia as a pivotal state enjoys being courted by both the United States and China and has sought bilateral partnerships with India, Japan and Australia to further ‘enmesh’ great powers and reconfirm its commitment to non-alignment, also being a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Indonesia’s role in the G20 has further re-emphasised its growing commitment to comprehensive security by tackling economic issues and facilitating South-South relations. Having the world’s largest Muslim population living in a democratic country has offered Indonesia leverage in the OIC and issues relating to counterterrorism. Even reluctantly, Indonesia has still always upheld UN principles and appealed to the supremacy of international law, making it a responsible actor. Indonesia is also active in the fight against climate change and, although, the global agenda is still dominated by BASIC countries, Indonesia is eager to play a bigger part.
4. Results

4.1 Domestic level

Indonesia’s constitution and principles of Pancasila reinforcing diplomasi, consultation and consensus together with the principles of politik bebas aktif and the discourse on Indonesia’s exceptionalism as the primus inter pares of Southeast Asia provide a basis for strong ideational capacity. The ‘active and independent’ foreign policy has urged Indonesia to take an active part in foreign relations; this has been further supported by the feeling of being the ‘first among equals’. The latter two have also strengthened Indonesia’s commitment to regional and global affairs, serving as an international capacity.

However, the feeling of vulnerability, stemming from the historic legacy of Indonesia’s colonial rule and the country having fought for its independence, can be seen reiterated time and time again in concentric self-interest circles that have the country looking inward when its sovereignty and territorial integrity are threatened. The domestic capacity of Indonesia is considerably weakened due to problems stemming from its archipelagic nature (at the same time its strategic position is considered to increase its international capacity). Due to poor policing capacities, maintaining national and territorial unity has been difficult. The weak domestic capacity combined with the ideational capacity of concentric circles has also served to weaken the international capacity. This is seen in Indonesia withdrawing and acting in an unfriendly way, most notably in the cases involving illegal fishing and human trafficking which Indonesia answered to with strict measures.

Indonesia’s domestic capacity is strengthened by the continued improvement of democratic mechanisms in nation-building. Indonesia’s domestic capacity relating to democracy has also helped boost international capacity, with the United States, especially, favouring a strong moderate Muslim state, Indonesia, as democratic. Seeing that economic growth is the basis for continued support for democracy by the people and also a source of Indonesia’s heightened role in global affairs, relating respectively to the domestic and international capacity, economic nationalism can be seen to hinder this growth, thus having a negative effect in all of the three capacities. Caveats exist to maintaining the economic growth in ensuring improved territorial and socio-political
cohesion and building human capacity. Low socio-political cohesion, worries of separatism and remaining issues, such as corruption relating to the democratic polity serve to further weaken the domestic capacity. Low socio-political cohesion has also raised worries as to growing Muslim radicalism, especially in the light of the rise of ISIS, undermining the international capacity.

4.2 Regional

Indonesia’s high ideational capacity on the regional level relates to the adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way’, a continuation of the domestic foreign policy principles of *diplomasi* and *muswarah*, and also in the principles of non-interference, non-use of force and non-alignment introduced in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and reinforced in the Declaration of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. Adherence to TAC and ZOPFAN and the code of conduct related to the ‘ASEAN Way’ also show a responsible Indonesia, increasing its international capacity.

Ever since mid-2000s, Indonesia has been increasingly active in the region and especially within ASEAN. This can be seen in Indonesia mediating conflicts in ASEAN and between ASEAN and non-ASEAN regional actors. Mediating conflicts has been a strength of Indonesia in that by mostly taking ad hoc measures, peace has been retained in the region. However, due to this so-called ‘shuttle diplomacy’, Indonesia’s international capacity with regard to ASEAN has seen a decrease, as members have criticised Indonesia for only taking an interest in mediation when its own interests are not at risk.

Similarly to the domestic level, on the regional level, democracy is both a strength and a weakness. Reformasi put pressure on Indonesia to reflect its democratic values in foreign policy, thus Indonesia argued for ‘flexible engagement’ and the introduction of a regional peacekeeping force. Many non-democratic ASEAN member states felt that Indonesia was disregarding the region’s ‘ways’. What Indonesia got were watered-down documents of proposals that still featured provisions on the protection of human rights. Democracy and the resulting lobbying for the introduction of more democratic principles to ASEAN can be viewed as a weakness in the domestic capacity, the ideational capacity and the international capacity. However, the more pragmatic domestic capacity of democracy promotion through ‘silent diplomacy’ can be seen as a
promising international capacity, namely in Indonesia engaging Myanmar. Moreover, not assessing its efficacy, the Bali Democracy Forum, even though not a direct strength for Indonesia’s ideational capacity, has seen international capacity rise thanks to countries external to the region appreciating the ‘talk shop’.

Despite worries about Indonesia’s commitment, slightly decreasing the international capacity of Indonesia within ASEAN, Indonesia has maintained an ASEAN-centric focus. Maintaining ‘ASEAN centrality’ has not only alleviated fears of Indonesia ‘going at it alone’, but also helped Indonesia in balancing and hedging between great powers, increasing its international as well as ideational capacity in keeping ASEAN at the forefront as other members would also have it.

4.3 Global
On the global level, distrust towards external actors might at first glance decrease the international capacity to engage external actors, yet Indonesia’s distrust has seen an increase in international capacity with the continued commitment to hedge and balance between the United States and China. Indonesia’s continued participation in the Non-Aligned Movement adds to the international capacity of Indonesia to maintain this (dis)equilibrium. Indonesia’s economic growth, despite economic nationalism, has earned it a spot at the G20 table and increased it international capacity also in the eyes of other ASEAN states, as Indonesia is taken to represent the whole of ASEAN. Being part of the G20 has also meant that economic nationalism would be difficult to maintain, as backtracking from agreements would prove difficult. Its large Muslim population sees its international capacity further expanded by membership and a role as a mediator in the OIC. Commitment to human rights has fared better on the global level, as Indonesia became the first host of the Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission of the OIC. Furthermore, Indonesia has always adhered to the UN principles, increasing its international capacity. In general, Indonesia’s active participation in numerous global institutions has raised its international capacity, however, the effects of Indonesia’s participation have been marginal.

The discussion of empirics gathered on the three levels has been presented in the following tables:
## STRENGTHS OF INDONESIA'S HEGEMONY-BUILDING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic capacity</th>
<th>Ideational capacity</th>
<th>International capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>archipelagic state</td>
<td></td>
<td>of interest to many due to geostrategic position (G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>primus inter pares</em></td>
<td>active participation in international affairs (G/R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>politik bebas aktif</em></td>
<td>non-alignment with any great powers (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>diplomasi, muswarah, TAC, ZOPFAN</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>adherence to the ASEAN Way shows responsibility (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-alignment</td>
<td></td>
<td>NAM (G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN centrality</td>
<td></td>
<td>mediating conflicts (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy (values)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bali Democracy Forum (G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy (values)</td>
<td></td>
<td>an exemplary state for other Muslim states (G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy (pragmatic)</td>
<td>[democracy (values)]</td>
<td>silent diplomacy, e.g. engaging Myanmar (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large Muslim population</td>
<td>human rights</td>
<td>participating, mediating conflicts in OIC (G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>UN principles</em></td>
<td>adherence to the UN principles shows responsibility (G/R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>engagement in G20, representing ASEAN (G/R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vulnerability manifested in distrust</td>
<td>hedging between external actors has not seen a decrease in international capacity (G)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## WEAKNESSES OF INDONESIA'S HEGEMONY-BUILDING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic capacity</th>
<th>Ideational capacity</th>
<th>International capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>archipelagic state</td>
<td>vulnerability expressed in thinking in concentric circles</td>
<td>looking inward, neglecting benign conduct (G/R)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. R stands for regional level, G stands for global level, indicating on which level the international capacity has or has not manifested.
Conclusion

Having gathered data on the three levels of analysis – domestic, regional and global – I have presented my findings in Table 1.

The case study shows that Indonesia’s domestic capacity is weak, as the strengths and weaknesses both stem from the polity of the state, the ongoing consolidation of democratic mechanisms and tackling low socio-political cohesion. Indonesia has a large ideational capacity and enjoys a quantitatively large international capacity, yet this, too, is undermined by the democratic consolidation still in progress. Regarding Indonesia’s domestic capacity in the form of democracy, despite allowing for leverage on the global stage, it has not been able to take the necessary ideational measurements on the regional level. This is most notably exemplified by the pragmatic democracy used in silently engaging Myanmar working better than region-wide proposals that have not been accepted in their original form. Similarly, international and ideational capacity have seen a decrease in light of domestic turbulence, resulting in Indonesia withdrawing or acting non-benignly.

Based on the findings it can be concluded that changes in domestic capacity result in weakened projection of the ideational and international capacity, both on the regional and global level. Lack of capacity echoes a lack of commitment to hegemony-building. This finding reinforces the need for a domestic level analysis of regional powers and would-be regional hegemons.

However, Indonesia cannot afford to withdraw from the region, despite enjoying more international capacity on the global than on the regional level. Historic antagonisms and location manifesting itself in vulnerability have seen Indonesia look inward, yet this distrust has resulted in Indonesia actively engaging the region and external actors, so as not to have the region torn apart by external powers. The ideational capacity compatibility with that of the international capacity relating to the Southeast Asian region is stronger still than the ideational-international capacity compatibility on the global level, the biggest hindrance to the latter comes from economic nationalism. However, initiatives, such as the Bali Democracy Forum, show that the weak democratic political culture has left the regional actors dissatisfied, yet global actors
have welcomed the ideational capacity of democracy and seen it translated into an international one. This can be explained by a difference in ideational capacity and international capacity across the two levels of regional and global. International capacity is shown to be quantitatively stronger than international capacity on the regional level.

Based on the findings it can be concluded that on the regional level Indonesia’s international capacity tends to be associated with Indonesia’s domestic capacity; on the global level Indonesia’s international capacity is viewed from the point of view of ideational capacity. In conclusion, seeing that ideational capacity is the strongest and domestic capacity the weakest, it follows that global actors are more likely to legitimise Indonesia’s hegemony-building strengths and weaknesses than regional actors.

In order to adequately analyse regional hegemonies, a step should be taken back to analyse the embryonic capacities of hegemony-building. This allows to count for the ‘capacity-expectations’ gap experienced by regional powers. Regional powers, especially in the Global South, are still in the process of nation- and polity-building, indicating that only by accounting for the domestic as well as the regional and global level of analysis can capacity and the resulting commitment to hegemony-building be assessed.

Further research can include comparing hegemony-building capacities between a small and emerging regional power, as both small and emerging regional powers can exhibit relational power in sectoral issues. Even though not directly accounting for legitimation by others, Pedersen’s three reformulated capacities serve as a good basis for further analysis of regional hegemony-building.
Eestikeelne kokkuvõte


Indoneesia uurimiseks on autor kasutanud kolme tasandi analüüsi. Tasanditeks on siseriiklik, regionaalne ja globaalne tasand. Empiiria on kogutud esmastest ja teisestest allikatest, keskendudes julgeolekuküsimustele antud kolmel tasandil.

Empiiriast selgas, et Indoneesial esineb siseriiklike probleeme, mis tulenevad ta asukohast, saareriigi iseloomust, mis omakorda põhjustab sotsiaalse ja territoriaalse jaotuvuse, ajalooliselt eripära näha end ohustatuna ja demokraatlikule riigikorralle ülemineku jätjaks. Regionaalset tasandil on Indoneesia mänginud aktiivset rooli regionaalsete konfliktide lahendamises, demokraatlike põhimõttete propageerimises ja suurvõimu tasakaalustamises. 50 aastat Kagu-Aasia Rahvaste Assotsiatsioonis (ASEAN) tagab Indoneesiale keskse kohu organisatsioonis, ka organisatsioonile iseloomulikud kätitumismehhanismid ja –normid on internaliseeritud. Globaalsel
tasandil kuulub Indoneesia Mitteühinemisliikumisse, Islami Koostöö Organisatsiooni ja G20, globaalsete majanduslikult võimekate riikide hulka. Indoneesial on önnestunud siamaani ka edukalt Hiina ja Ameerika Ühendriikide, kahe regiooni suurvõimu vahel tasakaalustada.

Töö analüüsist selgub, et Indoneesia siseriiklik kapatsiteet on nõrk ning ka regionaalsel tasandil pole, vaatamata suurele normidepõhilisele kapatsiteedi ühtivusele, märkimisväärset rahvusvahelise kapatsiteeti. Globaalsel tasandil on rahvusvahelise kapatsiteedi mõju marginaalne, kuid kapatsiteet on kvantitatiivselt suurem. Tööst järeldub, et hegemooniaks pürgimisel peab eelkõige siseriiklik kapatsiteet tugev olema; normidepõhise ja rahvusvahelise kapatsiteedi olemasolu pole oluline, kui siseriiklikult puudub võimekus selle projitseerimiseks.

Kuigi Pederseni Reformuleeritud kapatsiteeti ei vaata hegemooniaid teistest (ja nende legitimeatsioonist) lähtuvalt, on nad heaks aluseks regionaalsete võimude uurimiseks, et tabada nõrkusi ja tugevusi hegemooniks pürgimisel.
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