‘Gifts make slaves just as whips make dogs:’
Re-examining neo-colonialism in the context of China’s cooperation with the
African continent

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Abstract

This Master’s thesis conceptualises and analyses the concept of neo-colonialism in the context of China-Africa relations, with an emphasis on Zimbabwe. The thesis is built on examples of cooperation between China and Africa, and then China and Zimbabwe, in order to understand the role of China’s foreign policy in Africa as a whole and in Zimbabwe in particular. First, the methodology will be explained, and then a theoretical framework will be offered for geopolitics of resources, followed by outlining the theory of neo-colonialism before empirical evidence on the Sino-Africa cooperation is offered. The following five variables: development cooperation, market and resource seeking, foreign direct investment (FDI), infrastructure projects and soft power, will be considered in a pan-African and then Zimbabwe-specific context with evidence from local and international media, academic journals, government reports and policies, publicly available data, think tanks and international organisations. Then, the role of Africa in China’s foreign policy will be assessed based on these five variables and empirical findings. Finally, concluding remarks will determine the extent to which the following neo-colonial characteristics are present in China’s activities in Africa as a whole and Zimbabwe in specific: (1) noticeable asymmetry in the relationship; (2) a degree of agency from the colonised state; (3) multiple entities to carry out business and other activities, including the state, private- and state-owned businesses and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); (4) no assumption of a former colonial relationship; (5) multiple areas of spreading influence, including economics, culture, education and other soft power areas. The extent of these in Africa and in Zimbabwe in particular will be assessed using the five independent variables before making conclusive remarks.

Keywords: neo-colonialism, geopolitics of resources, China, Africa, Zimbabwe.
List of abbreviations

CCP – Chinese Communist Party
EITI – Extractive Industries Transparency Institute
EU – European Union
FDI – foreign direct investment
FOCAC – Forum on China Africa cooperation
IMF – International Monetary Fund
MOFCOM – Chinese Ministry of Commerce
NGO – non-governmental organisation
ODA – overseas development assistance
POEs – privately owned enterprises
PRC – People’s Republic of China
SOEs – state owned enterprises
UN – United Nations
WTO – World Trade Organisation
ZANU – Zimbabwe Africa National Union
ZANU – PF – Zimbabwe Africa National Union – Patriotic Front
ZMDC – Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation
1. Introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has in recent years found itself heavily criticised for its interest in the African continent. China’s presence in Africa has been described as a ‘scramble,’ ‘mad dash,’ ‘resource grab,’ and even ‘rape.’ All these derogatory and submissive terms create an image of a helpless African population, who are passively submitting to yet another external power and portray China as an insatiable hegemon. The Chinese are branded selfish with their incessant quest for natural resources, which is damaging Africa’s fragile efforts to improve governance and build a sustainable future for themselves. Chinese presence in Africa is assessed on the presumption that the warm relations between the Asian giant and the African continent are solely founded on China’s need to access Africa’s natural resources. On other occasions, however, the Chinese are seen benevolent and their contribution to a foundation for long-term economic development through infrastructure projects, revenue and jobs creation is seen as a new approach to development. Only a handful of studies (Brautigam 2009, Park 2015, Moyo 2009, Rich and Recker 2013) place Sino-African relations within a greater historical context, which allows observers to see the Sino-African relationship as mutually constructed and dynamic, instead of focusing solely on what China receives or extracts from various African nations. While it is important to look at China’s Africa Policy and consider the overall history and impact of these two giants, I contest the analyses of China and Africa, as if they were relationships between two countries, instead of one and fifty-four. In reality, the relationship between China and Africa is much more complex and categorising the Chinese as ‘good’ or ‘evil’ for Africa without delving into various aspects of engagement between the two would be short-sighted. China has diverse strategies in several African countries and vice versa – some African countries are much more open to Chinese investment than others.

Bearing in mind the differences and various possibilities of engagement with the fifty-four countries of Africa, the current thesis aims to bring an understanding of the scope of Chinese activities in Africa and analyse the instruments China uses to engage with the continent as a whole. From this stems the first research question:
1. Which economical and soft power instruments are used by China to engage with African countries?

The answer to this question will aim to configure the role of Chinese foreign policy in Africa by analysing the following Chinese foreign policy instruments as independent variables: development cooperation, infrastructure projects, market and resource seeking, FDI and soft power. These will give the reader a wider basis on which to see the Sino-African relationship and grasp the many ways China does business, seeks to influence and reap gains from African countries. Then, using the same variables, the relationship between China and Zimbabwe will be analysed. Sino-Zimbabwe historical ties, their mutual relationship, Zimbabwe’s policies and Chinese activities in the country will be considered in order to understand how China’s relationship with Zimbabwe differs from its relationship with other African countries. Thus the second research question:

2. What are the similarities and differences of China-Zimbabwe relationship to China’s relationship with Africa as a whole?

Finally, the theory of neo-colonialism will be applied to China’s relationship with Africa with an aim to determine the scope, terms and instruments of China’s engagement with the African continent, and to gauge China’s role in Africa. Hence the third research question:

3. To what extent does the relationship between China and Africa have neo-colonial characteristics?

The answers to these questions are complex and multi-faceted and the relationship is not always transparent. The growth in Chinese political, economic and social activities in the African continent has generated a flood of literature, which can broadly be divided into two distinctive genres. The first stream sees the PRC as a threat to the interests of both African countries and the international community, because of China’s alleged role in supporting corrupt African leaders, preventing the spread of good governance in the
region and its hunger for natural resources. Some see China as the new colonial power in Africa, making many African countries puppet states whose economic choices depend on Chinese investment and where China is helping sustain pariah regimes, who appropriate money from their own population. The second group of works engages in myth-busting and putting the Chinese foreign policy and activities in Africa in context in specific regions and countries. Those partaking in this line of thinking do not see the Chinese as bearing the sole responsibility for Africa’s problems, they acknowledge that eradicating poverty, bad governance and corruption must come from inside Africa and cannot be successfully enforced by China or any other state. These works outline cases, where Western countries have similarly invested in rogue regimes in Africa, and bring out the positive projects Chinese aid and investment have enabled in a number of African countries. Taking accounts of both the views described above, this thesis aims to reach an informed conclusion on the extent of China’s neo-colonialism on the African continent and in Zimbabwe. In addition to that, both negative and positive aspects of Chinese engagement on the continent, the history of China in Africa and opinions from the West, China and Africa will be considered when analysing the independent variables.
2. Methodology

2.1. Empirical data

The primary objective of this research paper is to conceptualise the notion of neo-colonialism, and use the subsequent theoretical framework to understand how and why China engages with Africa, and the scope of these activities in order to scale the Chinese neo-colonialism on the continent. There is a substantial body of literature on neo-colonialism in relation to China’s activities and role in Africa, hence a research based on existing literature has been considered sufficient to cover the scope of this thesis. This will be done through analysing quantitative and qualitative data made available by various academic journals, Chinese, Zimbabwean, European Union (EU), and various NGO and think tank papers. Apart from the officially available data, a number of newspaper reports and speeches by Chinese officials, African and Western leaders will be considered to gain a better understanding of the atmosphere surrounding China’s relationship with Africa.

Some of the literature available is more objective and nuanced than others, some concentrate on a region, some on a country, some on an industry. In order to get a full picture, this thesis includes a range of books, reports and articles, which have all been critically considered to enable a conclusion, which takes into account different perspectives and opinions. An important foundation and a source of information for this thesis are Deborah Brautigam’s reports and books, which give the reader an in depth view of China’s historical and contemporary activities in Africa, including Zimbabwe. Brautigam is known as one of the primary defenders of Chinese activities in Africa and is often referenced in works that divulge into myth busting in this topic. She provides a very detailed story on the relationship and looks into a number of aspects that constitute China-Africa politics.

A number of other academic sources have been used, especially journals concerned with area studies and contemporary Chinese politics. These include papers by Chinese, Zimbabwean and Western authors in order to get the views from all sides and make informed conclusions. European Union and African Union policy papers have also been analysed along with Chinese policy and white papers that have been made available to
the public. In addition to this, news articles and reports from Chinese state-run media enterprise Xinhua and various Zimbabwean newspapers have been used in the background research and to get a feel of the opinions on the ground. The majority of the Western media reports are from UK broadsheet newspapers, given the country’s increased interest in Zimbabwe as a former colony.

2.2. Delimitations

China in Africa is a colossal topic, which is filled with a number of issues to explore, but in order to keep the scope of this thesis as limited and focused as possible, and considering the resources available, the notion of neo-colonialism with a specific focus on Zimbabwe has been chosen. This choice was made as the term ‘neo-colonial power’ is finding increasing use in academia as well as mainstream media and is regularly attributed to Chinese activities in Africa. As a result, there is a popular opinion as portrayed in the media and heard from prominent opinion leaders in the West as well as Africa that China is prolonging Africa’s problems, and in some cases is even to be blamed for Africa’s troubles. However, the objective is not to find a scapegoat for Africa’s problems, but to show the extent of Chinese activities in Africa with an aim to achieve a balanced argument, which will enable making intelligent conclusions. The term ‘Africa’ covers a wide range of differences among the fifty-four countries that make up the continent, so addressing a specific country will yield a more detailed and focused research. The same goes for generalising ‘China’ and its activities in Africa. In order to avoid this, this thesis will explore the various ways in which China engages with Africa and support these claims with examples from different countries, industries and areas.

One of the biggest limitations is the lack of governance and reporting on projects in Africa, including Zimbabwe, which means some data may be missing or some numbers may be increased or decreased. Corruption in these countries affects how much of the funds aimed at development projects or invested in Africa actually reach the intended projects and how much goes in the pockets of the political elites. There is also very little information on deals done between local African leaders and Chinese state owned
and/or private firms, which poses another limitation. A well-known feature of China’s development cooperation is that its exact volume is not revealed and the terms of agreement remain undisclosed, which is also a significant data limitation. The lack of transparency in transactions has created confusion, both inside and outside China, about how to distinguish between foreign aid and FDI. Beijing encourages government agencies and commercial entities to closely combine foreign aid, direct investment, service contracts, labour cooperation, foreign trade and export, which further blur the distinction between aid and investment.

I will use the largest public database of Chinese development finance in Africa - Aid Data - in order to provide an acceptable analysis of Chinese development finance to Zimbabwe. This is a collaborative online platform that makes data on Chinese development finance flows to Africa more accessible by sharing, synthesising and standardising diverse sources of development finance, such as information from journalists, scholars, government officials, business professionals and local community leaders. The database details almost 1700 projects in 50 countries between 2000 and 2011 (Provost and Harris 2013). Since it is not possible to find 100% accurate data on this issue, the database will be used in addition to reports from international NGOs and think tanks, Chinese and Zimbabwean government reports, academic journals and local and international media.

Another data limitation in qualitative research on the topic of China in Africa is bias in reporting. A large chunk of the media in Zimbabwe is government controlled and journalists are easily bought and/or intimidated into writing what is favourable for the government. The non-government controlled media on the other hand, is differently biased and sometimes prone to blow things out of proportion in order to damage the ruling regime. At the same time, the Chinese government and state-controlled media reports may not provide the full picture, either. Chinese aid and involvement in Africa is normally portrayed as a selfless act of help to the downtrodden, making China a heroic and resourceful nation, who are able to help those in need. As such, these reports, articles and studies have been approached with a slight sense of scepticism, but not forgetting that this style of reporting, true or not, says a lot about the countries involved.
2.3. Case selection

2.3.1. Why China?

A number of observers - academic, political and media – have warned of the inherent dangers the Chinese model of engagement poses to the African continent. Tiffen (2014) warns African states of the risks associated with the Chinese model of engagement, in particular of the imbalance in trade. This means that countries, who concentrate on producing one commodity are being held hostage by Chinese high demand and low prices. This affects Angola and Nigeria, who export most of their oil to China, Côte d’Ivoire with their cocoa production, Namibia’s fishing industry, Zambia’s copper mining and Zimbabwe’s diamond mining. French (2014) similarly condemns the Chinese business model; moreover, he cautions both the African and Chinese leaders, who are at the forefront of making trade deals, to watch out for the increasingly active African civil society, who are demanding information about where the billions given by China have really gone. This engagement has been labelled a new form of colonialism, economic colonialism, neo-colonialism and neo-paternalism, but there are very few studies focusing on what exactly these terms mean. Even fewer studies are concentrating on the benefits of Chinese involvement in Africa for Africa and few succeed in applying a different stance on China other than a greedy, resource-hungry, exploitative superpower. Yet when Sautman & Hairong (2009) asked the explicit question of whether China is practicing a form of neo-colonialism, African survey respondents overwhelmingly rejected the notion. Moyo (2012) is one of the few African commentators that sees China’s interests in Africa as quite pure. She believes leaders in Beijing need to keep economic growth rates high and continue to bring people out of poverty in order to prevent a crisis of legitimacy for their rule. To do so, China needs arable land, oil and minerals, yet she maintains that colonial ambitions are not in sync with China’s current thinking and that the Chinese are largely welcomed by the African public.

It is compelling to discover what else China is doing in Africa apart from the widely reported land appropriation, involvement in resource expropriation, supporting pariah regimes and building roads to make their businesses in Africa run smoother. China is a changing country, its privately owned enterprises (POEs) have a lot more freedom to
operate than is commonly known and the majority of them are not in Africa to feed China’s resource hunger, but to look for new markets. Considering more than the need for resources and market expansion paints a very different picture of China in Africa and allows seeing the relationship from a less hostile angle. At the same time, when looking at how forcefully China has established itself in Africa in recent years, it is difficult to see it as anything else but a form of neo-colonialism.

2.3.2. Why Zimbabwe?

Zimbabwe, once known as the breadbasket of Africa, has been in the international media for everything but success stories in the past 16 years. The country’s radical land reform in 2000, which misplaced thousands of people and lead the country on a downward spiral, led by the infamous 92-year old Robert Mugabe, is seen by many as the primary cause for the country’s misfortunes. The EU and the USA met Mugabe’s reform with disregard and economic sanctions, so he turned his gaze towards the East and adopted a Look East Policy. Zimbabwe is the only African country that has an official Look East policy and which has signed a number of favourable trade and cooperation agreements with China. The country is also known for its human rights abuses, corruption and massive diamond, copper, gold and bauxite reserves, which all add fuel to the fire. Western media has painted a picture of a great Chinese-Zimbabwean friendship, which only benefits the ruling elite, leaving the majority of the country suffering poverty, hunger and lack of choices. However, many are unaware of the two countries’ long history of friendship, dating back to Zimbabwe’s freedom fight against the minority white rule. Observers and media don’t always report the bigger picture, which also includes the shortcomings of the Zimbabwean government, which is the vehicle China is using to make its gains from the resource-rich country. In spite of enthusiastic cooperation from the Zimbabwean government, it is clear that China has more say in the relationship and therefore makes more gains. The historical relationship between the two, however, has always been friendly, which makes this case slightly different from many other African states.
3. Theoretical framework

This thesis is framed by two concepts, which are most often applied to the Chinese involvement in Africa: geopolitics of resources and neo-colonialism. The two go hand-in-hand and must be seen as interwoven as both are concerned with the economics of sustaining a population’s resource need and the subjugation of less powerful countries through various means. Over the past 50 years, the concept of neo-colonialism has become central to the debate amongst politicians, academia, media and activists in order to explain and sometimes condemn on-going dependences of former colonies. Yet there is no consensus on its exact meaning and its conceptualisation lacks theoretical depth. Neo-colonialism was first broadly theorised as a further development of capitalism that enables capitalist powers to dominate subject nations through the operations in international capitalism rather than by means of direct rule. This chapter starts with the conceptualisation of resource geopolitics in the context of China in Africa to be followed by the review of the most important understandings and the history of the concept of neo-colonialism.

3.1. Geopolitics of resources

The quest for alternative sources of energy and favourable access to them is driving many growing economies to seek political and strategic partnerships far afield and China is perhaps at the forefront of such explorations, especially with its growing interest in African and South American states and their natural resources. In fact, the so called Chinese neo-colonialism is most often associated with extractive industries, implying that China is using its economic power to ‘steal’ resources from Africa to be used for the advancement of China while Africa makes little gains from its own riches. Consequently, Africa’s resource wealth is often termed a ‘resource-curse’ as these riches have not proven to benefit the African people as a whole, yet have filled the pockets of several government officials. Geopolitics of resources is thus a valuable view to be used in conjunction with neo-colonialism in order to provide a supporting theoretical framework to neo-colonialism as it is used today. Both the concepts of geopolitics of resources and neo-colonialism are closely linked to energy and natural resources security, hence a detailed understanding of both is necessary in order to make
informed conclusions and understand the rationale behind a country’s resource-search abroad, which might warrant them the label of a neo-colonial power. Power et al (2012) argue that there are three interlinked reasons for countries seeking resources elsewhere: (a) fossil fuels and minerals are distributed unevenly around the world, making some regions more resource-rich than others; (b) these resources are critically important for global economic development and growth and are valuable internationally traded commodities; (c) the anarchic nature of the international political realm means that the relative power and behaviour of states tend to determine political and economic outcomes more than regional and international governance institutions and international law.

China’s growing hunger for resources and increasing presence on the African continent is often used to illustrate these three points, especially after China’s distancing from Middle Eastern oil producers after 9/11 and moving towards Angola and Nigeria as its biggest oil suppliers (Brautigam 2009). Since then, however, Chinese private and government-owned companies have got involved in many more industries varying from cotton production to diamond mining to retail – all coupled with government policies and soft power initiatives. Unlike different branches of the Western governments involved in relief, energy procurement or defence, which view Africa largely as a site of humanitarian intervention, resource extraction and security threat respectively; the Chinese state sees Africa as a whole strategic-economic space, hence a wide-ranging Africa policy is required.

Needless to say, Africa is a vast continent with diverse geographic patterns and a relatively limited population. The resource base of Africa is enormous, with powerful rivers, huge concentrations of strategic minerals, and important petroleum and uranium deposits. Nevertheless, it is comprised mainly of developing states, with limited capacity and infrastructure. Power and Mohan (2010) consider Western powers largely failed in their efforts to do business with Africa and reduce poverty on the continent falling victim to Cold War politics, cultural differences and Africa’s colonial heritage. Besides, in the light of a much more convenient proposal from China, African leaders are no longer keen to satisfy Western conditionalities of governance and human rights
with little guaranteed benefit. With African leaders welcoming China as a new cooperation partner, Africa is seen by China as a *tabula rasa* – a blank sheet of opportunities, which can help along to China’s ascendance on the international stage (Power and Mohan 2010). China has already gained enormous support from African states for its One China policy, which interestingly is a condition of Chinese aid, and has isolated Taiwan from any closer cooperation with African countries.

China’s transformation from a peripheral, isolated, agrarian society into a major economic force and a key player in the global economy has generated a voracious appetite for energy sources, raw materials and other critical resources to sustain its economic growth, thus much of China’s foreign policy is driven by the need to establish ownership and control over these resources in addition to the country’s desire to be seen as a considerable force on the international arena. Africa presents a perfect opportunity for China to satisfy the needs of its large economy. To illustrate this, Carmody and Owusu (2007) identified six elements of China’s geo-economic strategy in Africa: (1) to ensure access to critical natural resources, especially oil and natural gas, to maintain the country’s economic growth; (2) to recycle its massive foreign exchange reserves into profitable investments overseas; (3) to facilitate the development of Chinese multinational companies; (4) to find new markets for the products of Chinese industry; (5) to develop African agriculture in order to provide non-food agricultural products to supply Chinese industry and consumers, and food products for China’s growing cities; (6) to source knowledge workers from Africa to support Chinese economic transformation.

Of course, different African countries have different resource geographies, but an extent of the above-mentioned activities can be seen in nearly all African states, which provide commodities and resources necessary to fuel China’s ‘peaceful rise.’ Consequently, China’s diplomatic goals, its need for natural resources and its relationship with African states cannot be seen in isolation or viewed without delving into geo-political considerations. Arguably, geopolitics of resources forms the basis of China’s Africa policy and is the underlying reason for China’s ever-warmer ‘mutually beneficial’ relations with so many African states, but this type of cooperation also has many
trappings of neo-colonialism, which paint a different picture of China’s approach to Africa.

3.2. Neo-colonialism

3.2.1. Historical origins

Neo-colonialism is a term that is controversial, over-arching, endowed with rhetorical power and hard to define in absolute terms. It is often referred to, but seldom defined, thus making the term descriptive rather than analytical. Some authors attribute it to Jean-Paul Sartre, a leading figure amongst the Francophone anti-colonial activists, who used the phrase in one of his writings in 1964 to describe it as the geopolitical practice of using capitalism, business, globalisation and cultural imperialism to influence a country. Crozier (1964) saw its origins in Leninism, where it was likewise used to describe a new form of domination applied after the colonial period in independent states, which relied on economic dependence without the need to actually colonise a country.

Neo-colonialism was defined during The All African People’s Conference in early 1960s as ‘the survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries, which become the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical means’ (Charney 1987). However, the term was only accepted into wider use a couple of years later in the works of Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of post-colonial Ghana. He described a state under a neo-colonial power as ‘independent and with all the outward trappings of international sovereignty, but its economic system and policies directed from outside’ (Nkrumah 1965). Rao (2000) suggests that in his publication Nkrumah argued that the struggle between classes had now been replaced by a struggle between nations, i.e. by an international conflict, where countries are looking for more efficient ways to acquire the raw materials and resources their population needs. A more recent adherent to a similar understanding of neo-colonialism is Noam Chomsky (1992), according to whom the Western capitalist economies fully rely on resources and the
manpower from their former colonies, which is why it is essential to preserve their dependence even after they gain independence.

Historically, the phrase thus established continuity between colonialism and neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism was seen as an adapted form of colonialism, which takes advantage of the weakness of the newly decolonised states in order to achieve economic, political and cultural benefits. The goal was to maintain the former colonies in dependent positions, which would allow economic exploitation, usually in the form of natural resource extraction, but also gave a wider audience to sustain the spread of the culture of the coloniser and coax the former colonies into partnerships and diplomatic agreements, which would benefit the Western powers.

There are various mechanisms to ensure dependence, which were used then and are arguably still in use, including control of the prices of primary and manufactured goods, the obligation to buy certain amounts of manufactured products from the neo-colonial master and to sell a certain quantity of raw materials in exchange for infrastructure projects, continuity of aid, favourable trade terms and political patronage in international forums. Rodney (1981) illustrates this aptly with the West African cocoa industry in the 1960s. During this time, production increased rapidly in many African countries due to demand from Europe and North America, which led to overproduction, which in turn led to a reduction in the selling price of cocoa worldwide. Neo-colonial theorists at the time proclaimed that economies based on the production of cash crops could not hope to develop, because the world economic system imposes a ceiling on the revenue that can be accrued from their production and so leave the country of origin with very small gains from its main source of revenue. The cocoa industry is still often used to illustrate corporate neo-colonialism, but an example that has made big waves recently is the extraction and export of minerals and oil from Africa, especially from countries with fragile and opaque governments, who tend to misappropriate the revenue gained from these deals. Moreover, such transactions would not normally serve to develop an African economy, because minerals are taken from African soil by foreign-owned or foreign-funded corporations, shipped to Europe, Asia or America, and turned
into manufactured goods, which are then resold to African consumers at value-added prices.

This is the economic dependence that anti-colonial thinkers in the 1960s warned African states about – independent countries are being taken advantage of because of their wealth and their weaknesses by wealthier states that hold a lot more bargaining power and can influence decisions in developing states through manipulating aid figures, issuing strict immigration rules, job creation and diplomatic meandering. The inability of many African economies to develop after independence soon led many of them to enlist aid from their former colonial masters and international organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This provided a link between independent African governments and the former colonisers and paved way for further dependence. Most foreign aid then was provided in the form of loans, which bore high interest rates, yet again enslaving the states already stuck in poverty. Ergo the repayment of these loans contributed to the underdevelopment of African economies, because the collection of interest ultimately impoverished African people. These repressive forms of cooperation may seem out-dated now, but they continue to form the basis of neo-colonial thought today, with some added characteristics.

3.2.2. Contemporary characteristics

A wide application of any term can cause its abstraction and misuse. As the understanding of international and intercontinental relations becomes more and more refined, the idea of neo-colonialism will continue to be revisited and further theorised. Even though the concept of neo-colonialism is still very similar to what Nkrumah and his contemporaries described and many parallels can be drawn with the present day, there are some significant additional characteristics that the theory of neo-colonialism has acquired since the 1960s.

The most important new feature of neo-colonialist thought is that in its current usage, neo-colonialism does not assume a former colonial relationship between the coloniser and the colonised. Neither does contemporary neo-colonialism assume land ownership
or taking explicit control of a government. However, it does assume a large degree of economic control, influence and self-gain, which are achieved mostly remotely and peacefully. In fact, a number of international corporate giants and the cooperation programmes of international organisations in developing countries are increasingly being classified as neo-colonialist powers, therefore being assigned agency similarly to states in their neo-colonial practices (Stoneman and Suckling 1987). Alike states, these corporations and organisations are accused of neo-colonial practices, looking to expand their markets, cut costs and searching for natural resources or diplomatic support in international forums. Thus the actors or perpetrators of neo-colonialism are not necessarily former hegemons seeking to continue their influence in a more democratic way, nor are these actors always states. This leaves observers in a somewhat difficult position: determining where normal business relations end and neo-colonialism starts, is becoming more and more ambiguous.

Another distinctive feature of neo-colonialism is that it is a relationship steeped in mutual economic and less often, political benefits, but is at the same time a remarkably asymmetrical liaison. As such, neo-colonialism is often conceptualised alongside ‘dependence,’ a term borrowed from the dependencia school of thought, which was popularised in the 1960s by a number of third world Marxists to describe economic dependence of Third World countries on foreign corporations and governments. By this view, developed countries and multinational corporations force economic sanctions, partnerships, trade deals and the like intentionally to foster and enforce a culture within developing countries that is economically dependent on their own. This kind of relationship can also be described as clientelism, which is justified and enabled by the ruling elites of the weaker country, which serves the needs of a more powerful hegemon. In return, the elite receive goods and services in the form of aid, trade agreements, concessional loans, infrastructure and industry development and diplomatic favours, however in the long-term see themselves locked in a rapacious relationship (Charney 1987). But with the rise of large developing countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China, former colonial powers are no longer seen to be at the forefront of such exploitation.
The emerging powers on the world arena are looking for resources to continue their growth and new markets to expand their economic influence under the guise of South-South cooperation. This is a widespread practice in many African countries, whereby the exchange of natural resources for manufactured goods is starting a new colonial relationship, which will prevent Africa from developing its own manufacturing capacity and therefore lifting people out of poverty through economic advancement. Albeit considered still developing, these are normally much more powerful and economically advanced states that seek resources. While they are not necessarily ready to wage a war over the access to resources, they will use diplomacy of persuasion and exercise their power over the weaker, resource-rich state(s) in order to remain competitive, but it is not always a liaison that is forced on the weaker party.

Neo-colonialism is typically exclusively attributed to outside forces and agents, which exempts the elites from any accountability for their role in the neo-colonial system of extraction. As such, caution is required when forming opinions on this issue, as neo-colonialism can serve as a scapegoat ideology, which imputes the shortcomings of the internal socio-political systems to the machinations of an exaggerated external enemy and lifts the accountability from potentially deep-rooted issues of governance. This is not to say that those poorly performing developing governments are to take the sole responsibility for entering in an unequal relationship, but to bring some balance to the argument, where complete objectivity is difficult to achieve due to defences from both sides. Opponents argue that the concept is merely an attempt to continue to blame colonialism for Africa's problems rather than confront the major issues hampering independent African governments, such as corruption, inefficiency, and protectionism. They argue that these problems, more than any systematic process of external exploitation, have been responsible for the poor performance of African economies since independence. As such, the relationship could be seen as a ‘marriage of convenience’ between elites rather than an explicit form of neo-colonialism.

Neo-colonialism is almost exclusively seen as an economic yoke, yet there are many tools in addition to economics that may be used by more powerful countries to engage in neo-colonial practices. Language and education are two very strong components of
advancing one’s influence in a country. This is evident in a number of formerly colonised states, where French, English, Spanish and Portuguese are spoken as official languages along with some of the indigenous languages of those areas that were much more widely used before the language of their former colonial masters took over. Language is usually coupled with education and the belief that the educational system of the hegemon is superior to a system that may have existed before (Rich and Recker 2013). The language one studies in will influence the culture one gets exposed to and grows to know even though it can be a long process, which takes decades. Thus the legacy of the British education system, for instance, is evident in its former colonies and a number of students from former British colonies wish to enrol in British universities as it is a familiar system and culture; the indigenous languages are peppered with English words, the local cuisines are mixed with those of their former European masters, the traditional music is coupled with Western genres and government institutions share the procedures of its former colonial master. Such a mixing of cultures would have happened sooner or later due to globalisation, however, colonialism made the various European cultures in Africa very concentrated and strongly institutionalised in specific areas, depending on the colonial power.

History is known to repeat itself and so a slow seeping of a more powerful culture is already evident in China’s presence in various African states, where schools have established Chinese language and culture classes, where Chinese films are being shown in the cinema and visiting scholars from China visit even the most remote universities on the continent (Brautigam 2011). Yet again, the imbalance in the relationship arises – Chinese universities welcome only a handful of African scholars every year and even fewer of them will be assigned to China’s top universities. At the same time, African culture remains very stereotyped and little known in China due to lack of African cultural exports available to the Chinese public. This creates a situation, where a culture is hegemonic, seen as superior and more relevant, which will create a neo-colonial dominance over small, diverse cultures that are unable to survive against a giant such as China. Yet the trickling of another culture into Africa is not rejected or resented by the locals as it happens gradually. In fact, Brautigam (2011) found that the African population welcomes the variety of culture in addition to the usual European or North
American influences on the continent and the African elite is developing quite a fondness for Chinese opera and art. In time, the locals will grow even more accepting of the new culture, until it becomes natural, which would then in turn facilitate the economic and political machine between the countries.

As a result of the rapid expansion of Chinese businesses in Africa, increase in development aid and the country’s soft power offensive on the continent, the term neo-colonialism is finding more and more use by scholars and journalists alike when describing Sino-Africa relations. The accusations of colonialism started to grow in 2013 when Lamido Sanusi, the former governor of Nigeria’s central bank wrote in the Financial Times in 2012: “In much of Africa, they have set up huge mining operations. They have also built infrastructure. But, with exceptions, they have done so using equipment and labour imported from home, without transferring skills to local communities. So China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of colonialism.” As the theory of neo-colonialism explains, the exploiting power controls weaker states’ economic resources and political systems and exploits their wealth under the name of economic advancement and development.

Wang & Zou (2014) deny that such characteristics are applicable to Chinese relations with Africa. They follow the official Chinese stance according to which China is just another developing country with the means to help other developing countries. They praise China for advancing African economies and providing a fair market for their resources while also starting a number of social initiatives to improve the lives of the poor. Observing from a Chinese point of view, they see China’s diplomacy in Africa as all encompassing rather than one-dimensional and view China’s ‘new frontier’ diplomacy in Africa as a success for both China and the African states. Zhong (2011) rejects the idea of ‘Chinese neo-colonialism’ altogether as she sees it as a Eurocentric and Western dominated idea, which sprouted from a fear of losing influence in former colonies. In her view, China has given African states a new market to export their natural resources to and African consumers’ choice has been widened by the availability of affordable Chinese products. Rich & Recker (2013), who have a more Western point of view, similarly suggest that the Sino-African relationship should be seen as mutually
constructed and not solely focus on what China receives from African nations. They recognise Africa’s agency in the relationship and warrant observers to consider both parties, yet they concur that economics clearly motivates these growing relations and Chinese aid and business is welcomed by most African leaders due to China’s lack of conditionalities, which Western states normally apply and which have long been seen by African leaders as meddling in their internal affairs. In spite of the increase in aid and expansion of businesses, it remains an asymmetrical liaison, where China ‘buys’ rights to do business and extract natural resources from the African soil while gaining diplomatic support in international forums.

Owing to the lack of theoretical coherence and consensus, five main characteristics of neo-colonialism have been outlined to cover the scope of this thesis. First of all, there is no assumption of a former colonial relationship between the parties, which allows the theory of neo-colonialism to be applied in the case of China in Africa. Secondly, a neo-colonial power is not necessarily a state, but can be a multinational corporation or an international organisation. In addition to that, for a relationship to be classed as neo-colonial, there has to be a distinct asymmetry in the power that one party holds over the other. Nevertheless, the liaison is not without some agency and agreement from the weaker side, and finally, neo-colonialism is not solely an economic practice, but also includes facets of culture, diplomacy and soft power.

3.2.3. How does China see its relations with African countries?

China has been pursuing a cooperation strategy with several African countries since the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was launched in October 2000. FOCAC – a vehicle for promoting Sino-Africa relations – has become a mechanism for the dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China and the African continent (Zafar 2007). In 2006, China unveiled its official Africa policy, which serves as a guide to its relations with Africa and is based on five principles: respect for territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit in relations, and peaceful coexistence (Sun 2014). At the 2015 FOCAC meeting in South Africa, China revealed its second Africa policy paper, which reiterated much
of what was said in the 2006 paper. When introducing the policy, Chinese premier Xi Jinping said: “After 30 years of reform and opening up, China is now in the position to help Africa realize sustainable self-development with technology, equipment, skilful professionals and capital” (Xinhua 2015). He also ushered in a ‘new era of win-win cooperation and common development, continuing on the five principles the original policy was based on.

However, it does not always seem as a friendly exchange of services. China is the clear leader in the relationship and chooses to utilise its influence over smaller African states whenever help or support is needed. For instance, China is able to seek voting power from African countries in international institutions in return for development cooperation. In the United Nations (UN) China was able to take a permanent seat in the Security Council from Taiwan in 1971 as a result of African support. China mobilised its African voting bloc again in order to win the 2008 Olympic bid and to block the resolutions of the UN High Commission for Refugees, which condemned human rights abuses in China, and to block accusations of dumping from the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Park (2015) draws historical parallels with China’s current Africa policy and Sūn Zi’s philosophy Yì Yì Zhì Yì (use foreigners to subdue foreigners) – one of the significant historical ideologies meaning when the enemy or rival country was so powerful that huge losses could not be avoided, it utilised its neighbouring countries or tribes. He also brings an example of Confucius’ teaching Fù Guó Li Míng, by which rulers should make a country rich first, which will then benefit people, as has been the process in the PRC. These age-old views support the contemporary argument that China’s approach to cooperation is more focused on economic results rather than achieving good governance and transparency.

Yet, some Chinese commentators (Zhong 2011) reject accusations of China’s increased involvement in Africa as neo-colonialism and instead see it as ‘a broader participation in globalisation.’ They see Western countries as the main vehicles for any form of colonialism due to their capitalist system while China aims at ‘shared harmonious development and the harmonious structuring of the world.’ Chinese national news agency Xinhua often reports of Chinese officials’ visits to various African countries,
who always emphasise win-win cooperation and express hope that African development will get a new wind now that China is strongly investing in the continent. Zhang Jun, the economic director general at the Foreign Ministry of China, has emphasised closer ties with developing nations, especially with African states. He also stated that at the G20 meeting taking place in September 2016 in Hangzhou, African countries will have a bigger say and a more prominent position (Xinhua 2015).

There is no doubt Africa has become a more prominent issue for China in the past decade, but Africa’s strategic importance for Beijing remains low compared with the Middle Kingdom’s worries over its relations with the USA and its neighbours, for instance. China’s current Africa policy is focused on win-win cooperation, but pays little attention to economic considerations and makes no detailed plans or predictions for the future of this relationship. As for now, China aims to maintain an image of a cooperation based on ideological rather than economical considerations.

3.2.4. How does the West see China’s involvement in Africa?

Hillary Clinton as the US secretary of state in her 2012 speech in Senegal warned Africa about China: “The continent needs a model of sustainable partnership that adds value, rather than extracts it” (French 2014). David Cameron echoed these negative emotions when he said he was increasingly alarmed by Beijing’s leading role in the new ‘scramble for Africa’ and warned African states about China’s authoritarian capitalism, claiming that it is unsustainable in the long term (Hirono and Suzuki 2014). The European Parliament in its report on China’s Africa policy argues that China’s interest in Africa seems confined to resource-rich or ‘resource-cursed’ countries, bypassing a large number of other African countries (Gomes 2008). The Economist (2008) supported this sentiment: “China is building a lot of infrastructure – presumably to help it procure all the natural resources its firms are gobbling up.”

These views are closely linked to Western national interests, which are concerned about the Chinese power becoming a threat to Western interests in Africa and other developing countries. Willis (2014) acknowledges that Chinese involvement in Africa is not without its problems, but at the same time it does not merit accusations of neo-
colonialism greater than that of the more established Western actors. Corkin (2011) similarly sees it as a ‘marriage of convenience’ between elites rather than an explicit form of neo-colonial exploitation. Brautigam (2009) on the other hand, dispels the belief by most Western commentators that a grand strategy to colonise Africa masterminded by Beijing exists.

China is very active in resource-rich countries and their interest in these resources is very real, but the notion that aid is offered mainly as quid pro quo exchange for resources ignores several facts. In fact China gives aid to every single country in Sub-Saharan Africa that follows the One China policy, even the relatively wealthy South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius are recipients of Chinese aid. Eximbank’s concessional loans are given to more credit-worthy countries, who are actually capable of paying them back and have the ability to propose a project they will manage. If not, loans can be given for projects that can earn money to repay the loan, for example a Kenyan cement telephone pole factory and a mobile telephone network in Eritrea both received Chinese funding.

Hirono and Suzuki (2014) and Zhong (2011) also adhere to a more benevolent view of China in Africa and point out that the Eurocentrism in the study of international relations means that the rise of non-Western powers is under-theorised in the Western academia, resulting in an impoverished vision of the current world order, hence the overuse of the term neo-colonialism. Mrs Clinton and Mr Cameron may have fallen for the ‘Yellow Peril’ thesis, whereby the rise of an Asian power is seen as a unique and unknown development that would threaten the moral fabric and international order that has been constructed and historically dominated by the West. Hirono and Suzuki (2014) also believe that Western concerns over China reflect deeply rooted anxieties that their traditional dominance in Africa is about to be overthrown by a non-Western power.

Mawdsley (2008) studied how Western media depicts the relationship between Africa and China and found that the Western media is often rather poorly informed, with a tendency to generalise across the African continent and relies on tropes of timelessness, savagery, sexuality, tribal identity, conflict, and environmental disasters as apolitical
‘acts of god’. She makes a salient point of giving some more thought to how the West understands itself in Africa. There are profound differences between Western countries and their actions in Africa, but there is an on-going popularity of certain images centered on heroic white subjects from adventurers, soldiers, explorers and missionaries to the more contemporary, but still heroic, doctors, aid workers and journalists. The West has imagined itself as attempting to bring progress, science, technology and rationality to Africa, first through Christianity, then through commerce and now through good governance and development. She is critical of the recent language of partnership and reform, which glosses over the realities of an on-going post-colonial hegemony of knowledge, norms and institutions. Mercer, Mohan and Power (2003) also argue that Western political imaginaries of itself in relation to Africa remain dominated by an enduring notion of trusteeship despite a long history of exploitation and the lack of sufficient action to address systemic inequalities and injustice.

Another issue that Western observers often subscribe to is the view that Chinese finance is propping up rogue regimes in several African countries. Human Rights Watch argued in 2007 that “China’s growing foreign aid program creates new options for dictators who were previously dependent on those, who insisted on human rights progress.” China’s engagement with Zimbabwe under the oppressive regime of Robert Mugabe and China’s support to Omar al Bashir’s Sudan are central to this belief. Yet the political conditions attached to foreign aid and sanctions applied by Western powers have not yielded the desired outcomes, either. Before and after China got involved, European banks and the US Exim Bank gave loans to Angola; Chevron and Shell financed oil in Nigeria and Exxon Mobil in Equatorial Guinea; Rio Tinto is still a significant source of investment and revenues in Zimbabwe, thus finance from China differs little from the other options available to most African dictators. These companies and countries were not champions of human rights, before public advocacy claims hit them. As such, Beijing fits in with these other amoral financiers quite comfortably. Brautigam (2009) quotes Jeffery Sachs, a Columbia University economist saying: “The idea that aid should be heavily conditioned with political conditions was a mistake. The best way to end conflict is to end poverty.”
3.2.5. How does Africa perceive China’s involvement on the continent?

Opinions regarding Chinese involvement in Africa are divided on the continent: on the one hand, there are strong proponents of Chinese aid without its conditionalities and cooperation to better both economies, but on the other hand, some leaders are starting to demand higher returns for their part in the deal. Meles Zenawi, once the prime minister of Ethiopia makes a relevant point and assigns a large degree of agency to African leaders: “Good governance can only come from inside; it cannot be imposed from the outside.” Likewise, Serge Mombuli, ambassador from Congo-Brazzaville to the USA said that: “We [Africa] need both tangible and intangible things: better governance, democracy, transparency, but at the end of the day the population does not have anything to eat, does not have water to drink, no electricity at night, industry to provide work, so we need both. People do not eat democracy” (Brautigam 2009). President Kagame of Rwanda also commented in support of China that: “The Chinese bring what Africa needs: investment and money for government and companies. I would prefer the Western world to invest in Africa rather than hand out development aid” (Zhao 2014). President Mugabe of Zimbabwe has similarly praised China for developing its economy without plundering other countries. He regards the Chinese economic miracle as a source of pride and inspiration, but not everyone sees the relationship as mutually beneficial. Africans are increasingly suspicious of Chinese firms, worrying about their unfair deals and environmental damage.

Opposition is fuelled by Africa’s thriving civil society, who demand more transparency and accounting for human rights from both, their own governments and foreign investors in the countries. In Senegal, a residents’ organisation blocked a deal that would have handed a prime section of property in the centre of Dakar to Chinese developers and in Tanzania, labour unions criticised the government for letting in Chinese petty traders (The Economist 2015). Scepticism about China and the fear of the unknown giant is shared by many ordinary Africans, but rarely receives criticism from government officials. When the then Zambian presidential candidate Michael Sata made an anti-Chinese message the centrepiece of his campaign, following an explosion in a Chinese mine that killed 51 Zambians, the Chinese ambassador threatened to sever
relations with Zambia, thus once again demonstrating China’s overarching influence (Gill and Reilly 2007).

Thus determining the true sentiments of African leaders towards China is complex as those in positions of power are able to rake up a lot of the Chinese investment and put it in their pockets, which gives them more reason to praise their country’s friendship with China. Yet the majority of Africans’ hands don’t reach as far as that and they are left in poverty and without democratic choices, while their leaders sing the praises of their mutually beneficial cooperation partner.

3.3. Theoretical relevance and limitations

As stated above, neo-colonialism as a separate field of study is under theorised and therefore no distinguished schools of thought have emerged on neo-colonialism in contemporary international relations studies. The term is often used when describing China’s relationship with Africa in both academic and mainstream literature and media, but it is rarely defined and conceptualised, which can make it unclear and misleading. Its current conceptualisation has made the term neo-colonialism synonymous with ‘China,’ who is considered the perpetrator by default, which can be proven with much empirical, but little theoretical backing.

For the scope of this thesis, however, five features, which take into consideration its historical as well as contemporary characterisations, are used to conceptualise neo-colonialism. Most importantly, an existing or historical colonial relationship is not considered a characteristic of neo-colonialism in the context of this thesis, which will allow China to be analysed within the theoretical framework previously provided. In addition to that, the geopolitical, economical and diplomatic intentions of the alleged neo-coloniser, born out of resource scarcity in their own country and a lack of power on the international arena, are considered. As the concept neo-colonialism is under theorised, the conceptualisation of the term in this thesis is considered sufficient to cover the scope of this thesis, but a more detailed framework will be required for any further works.
4. China’s foreign policy in Africa

4.1. A historical perspective on Sino-Africa relations

The founding of the PRC and the independence of African countries ushered in a new era in China-Africa relations. The two have since then sympathised with and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and paved way for South-South cooperation. There is a sense of historical mutuality around the shared experience of colonialism that is used to defend China’s current involvements in Africa against accusations of imperialism. In this discourse, China wants to be clearly situated to be seen as a part of the ‘developing’ and not the ‘developed’ world. There is a view popular both in China and in any parts of Africa that the West’s historical experiences in achieving development are distant and dissimilar to African experiences and offer few transferable lessons for the continent (Zhao 2015).

China’s engagement with Africa is generally divided into three phases over the past six decades. The first phase started with the creation of the PRC as an ideological quest promoting national liberation and world revolution – ‘politics takes command’ (Wang and Zou 2014) and lasted until the late 1970s. The aim in this period was to give each-other political and diplomatic support with anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism at the core. At the time, China was jostling for influence on the continent with the USSR in order to garner support in international forums and spread its ideology. Since China adopted its reform and openness strategy in the 1980s, however, this stance has been largely replaced by ‘economics takes command.’ Here, China became less concerned about ideological considerations and turned to the industrialised and developed West for its capital and development experience and stopped prioritising relations with African states. However, when the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 brought the world’s attention to China’s poor human rights record and Western powers distanced themselves from China, Beijing turned to Africa again. China was now looking for external support for internal development, new markets and opportunities to build trade relations. Sino-African trade increased 431% and China increased its foreign aid to Africa during this new transition period (French 2014).
Despite pursuing economic gains and friends in international forums, there still remains a discourse of mutual interdependence, which fits with China’s foreign policy discourse of peaceful ascendance. Sun (2014) identifies four spheres of national interests that China has historically sought and still pursues to satisfy in its relations with Africa. Politically, China seeks Africa’s support for its ‘one China’ policy and for its foreign policy agendas in multilateral forums such as the UN. Economically, Africa is seen primarily as a source of natural resources and market opportunities to fuel China’s domestic growth. From a security standpoint, however, the safety of growing Chinese investments and personnel is increasingly challenged as their presence increases. Ideologically, China sees the ‘China model’ in non-democratic African countries offering indirect support for China’s own political ideology and offers evidence that Western democratic ideals are not universal. China is promoting its efforts with extravagant rhetoric invoking the memory of colonial aggression and their common history with Africans as the subjects of outside oppression (Zhao 2014, Willis 2014). Indeed, China has no remarkable history of enslavement, colonisation or financing coups against unfriendly African regimes or deploying military forces in support of its foreign policies, but many see their recent involvement in Africa just as damaging as the Western powers had been in the past – a stance, which China strongly disagrees with.

4.2. Policy instruments

Africa is a low-priority area for China’s foreign policy as a whole and belongs to the category of developing countries. Africa is generally excluded from the ‘strategically important’ category and does not reach the highest level of decision-making and China’s Africa policy is mostly made, coordinated and managed at the government ministerial level (Sun 2014). However, for Africa, the importance of China is vast and cannot be overlooked. There are a number of ways China engages with Africa and the five most prevalent are analysed below.

The complexity of disassociating Chinese aid, investment and humanitarian activities and the lack of transparency in China’s overseas aid and investment allocation makes it difficult to view these activities outside of China’s political agenda and separate them
from the government. The Chinese justify this secrecy to avoid criticism and competition from major countries also competing for African resources and markets, and domestic criticism for providing aid to foreign countries instead of eradicating poverty domestically. All forms of cooperation and investment can be viewed as instruments to carry out China’s foreign policy in Africa. Most of the policy instruments described below are underpinned by the notion of non-interference, mutual trust and openness, as stated in China’s Africa policy in 2006 and again in 2015. It is necessary to emphasise that this is the official Chinese stance and they have not claimed to only be an aiding hand in Africa – it is a win-win relationship as they see it.

4.2.1. Development cooperation

China has a stance that the antidote to conflict and instability is sustained economic development. China’s 2006 white paper on Africa policy outlined a new strategic partnership, which pledged to respect African countries’ independent choice on the road to development (FOCAC 2006). But before delving into discussion on China’s development cooperation in Africa, it is important to understand the meaning of the term in this context. China prefers using the term development cooperation instead of foreign or development aid, which is a contrast to the Western-dominated hierarchal development paradigm of the donor-recipient relationship. The scope of Chinese development cooperation includes grants, loans, debt cancellation, scholarships and technical training programmes, infrastructure construction, provision of volunteers such as doctors, nurses, teachers and other skilled professionals (Caceres and Ear 2012).

Several Chinese participants, such as government, SOEs, POEs, private entrepreneurs, civil societies, scholars and volunteers, conduct these activities. Sometimes, a project or business in Africa is operated by a single player, but usually, much of the development cooperation is run by an unclear combination of different actors. China portrays itself differently from Western countries, and stresses a win-win partnership and similarities with the developing countries, although foreign aid is also seen as a way of paving the road to the African markets for the Chinese low-skilled and labour-intensive products. This is a strategy they adopted at home, and this is the theme of China’s current
strategic engagement in Africa. According to China’s policy, Africans should accept that aid can be offered in a frank exchange, as part of a relationship of mutual benefit, which makes aid less a one-way offering of alms and more a practical investment in a mutually profitable future.

China does not report its aid numbers and as a result there is no official data series or point of comparison to other donors. The Chinese view is that disclosure would put them in a delicate position vis-a-vis aid recipients, who may feel they are not receiving enough assistance (Samy 2010). China likes to portray itself as a still developing country, so not disclosing the aid figures could also be a way if quelling any resentment the local Chinese population may have against the government helping foreigners. Nevertheless, some scholars claim that in terms of geopolitical interests China’s development cooperation in Africa is no different from those of other powerful countries. The tendency to demonise and over-determine China’s role by Western critics perhaps reveals more about their fears and concerns about competition from China than it does about the shape of contemporary China-Africa relations.

From the perspective of resource rich countries, China’s ‘trade as aid’ is very attractive as it comes with no strings attached, whereas development aid from the West has conditionalities. Hence Chinese aid to countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe, known for their oppressive governance, tends to make headlines, but it is less reported that China also provides aid to counties such as Mauritius and Botswana, which are well-governed, democratic countries (Samy 2010). There is a popular myth surrounding Chinese aid and its use for securing oil concessions and mining rights. Proponents of this myth have linked the building of hospitals, airports, football stadiums, parliaments buildings and roads to China’s gaining access to raw materials found in Africa. A 2013 Rand Corporation study argues that China expects an expanded supply of resource commodities as payback for its aid (Wolf 2013), yet Drehrer et al (2015), who actually tracked Chinese aid commitments, reported that natural resource acquisition did not explain the pattern. In addition to that, Brautigam (2015) and her team of researchers did not uncover a single case where Chinese aid was directly swapped for a mining or oil concession. Only one well-known deal comes close to resembling this practice: in
2007, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and two Chinese construction companies founded a joint venture to bring a declining copper mine back to life. They negotiated with China’s Exim Bank to secure a $6 billion commercial rate loan, guaranteeing repayment out of the future profits from the mine. The loan, which was later reduced to $3 billion, would be used to finance infrastructure built by the two Chinese companies. Even in this case, however, it was clear that the primary interest of the Chinese companies was not access to mineral riches, but to find a way to finance the infrastructure projects they wanted to build in a country with a poor credit history and reap revenue from the project. In many other cases where Chinese banks have demanded a secure flow of income to guarantee large loans in Africa, there were no Chinese-operated mines or oil wells involved. For example, Ghana secured a $562 million loan to build its Bui Dam from China’s Exim Bank with the backing of cocoa produced by Ghanaian farmers.

Some observers (Moyo 2012, Brautigam 2009) assert that development cooperation in Africa has contributed to the general development of the continent, such as its economic standing and improved quality of life. Others, however, dispute its influence on Africa and are suspicious of the real motives of such cooperation, noting its exploitation of natural resources and increasing market encroachment (French 2014, Mohan and Power 2008). China’s growth-oriented and market-based development cooperation has led some observers to characterise it as ‘market extremism’ and even neo-liberalism, though one with Chinese characteristics in recognition of Maoism and the continuing importance of the state (Power and Mohan 2010). Dreher et al (2015), however, contest the current prevailing narrative of China’s ‘rogue aid’ to resource rich countries. Instead, they find that Chinese overseas development assistance (ODA) to Africa is strongly oriented toward poorer countries and Beijing does consider humanitarian and socioeconomic needs when making ODA allocation decisions. But they also found evidence that China rewards support to its foreign policy with aid. These findings suggest that Chinese ODA is allocated similarly to that of Western donors. By contrast, more commercially-oriented forms of Chinese state financing with higher interest rates and lower grant elements tend to go to countries rich in natural resources and with higher levels of corruption. This leads analysts and policymakers to believe that Chinese
aid still flows to rogue states that are resource-rich. However, it is not Chinese ODA that disproportionately flows to such countries, but other forms of state financing and not ‘aid’ in the traditional sense. For instance, the Rand Corporation study in 2013 tried to estimate Chinese aid by aggregating media reports and the figure the study’s authors reached was $189.3 billion for 2011 alone. This study counted all commitments and signings of memorandums of understandings, but only a small number of such agreements come to bear fruit in reality, so the number they reached is a huge overstatement and a result of a flawed methodology. Including commitments as an estimate of Chinese official aid would be false and create a misleading understanding of the real extent of Chinese finance in Africa (Brautigam 2015). Besides, one would be hard-pressed to identify long-term economic success from the decades of Western aid to Africa. For instance, from 1970 to 1998, the peak era for aid to Africa, poverty rose from 11% to 66% (Rich and Recker 2013), which is a strong sentiment to the lack of effectiveness of the ‘Washington consensus.’

Another popular, yet misleading claim is that China now provides as much, or more, aid to Africa than the United States. China committed approximately $31.5 billion of ODA to Africa between 2000 and 2013, or approximately $2.25 billion per year, according to AidData. By comparison, the United States committed nearly three times as much ODA to Africa over the same period of time: $92.7 billion from 2000 to 2013, or approximately $6.62 billion per year. When ‘other official financing,’ is included, Dreher et al (2015) found that China and the United States provide comparable levels of funding to Africa. They estimate that China and the United States committed $94.3 billion and $107.9 billion total official financing, respectively, to Africa between 2000 and 2013.

A review of Chinese reported assistance conducted by AidData in 2014 found that official Chinese aid (comparable to OECD aid) disproportionately goes to the region where that country’s political leader was born, showing potential corruption. This has led observers to conclude that Chinese aid is more likely to be deployed to the leader’s political advantage than is US or European aid, which have more checks and balances in place. Despite such concerns, Chinese aid is preferable by African leaders as it offers
them an alternative model of development based on trade instead of foreign aid and subsidised loans (Moyo 2009).

4.2.2. Market and resource seeking

China’s economic ascendance over the past decades has led it to seek alternative sources of energy and resources. Africa was integrated into China’s energy strategy as early as 1990 (Wang and Zou 2014) and began to import oil from Africa in 1992. China has invested $170 million in copper mines in Zambia, it has also invested in cobalt and copper mines in the DRC, titanium mines in Kenya and so on. But it was in 1999 that China devised a ‘going out’ (zhōu chūqù) policy, which encourages Chinese firms to directly invest overseas, that Chinese firms started to consider foreign investment in Africa’s resource rich areas on a larger scale. This policy was officially adopted only in 2004 and as a result concentrated half of the Chinese overseas investments in Africa and Australasia (Humphreys 2011). This policy came in handy when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) responded to the threat of energy vulnerability with a strategy founded on geopolitical considerations: first, enhance domestic energy supply by new exploration and production in its own territories; second, secure foreign energy supply through bilateral and multilateral distribution and transportation arrangements; third, diversify sources of energy supply from as many countries of the world as possible. Since the new policy was revealed, Chinese companies, which are supported by the government and its coordinated foreign policy, have acquired and opened hundreds of mines, farms and factories in Africa. Consequently, the trade between China and Africa hit a record high of $200 billion in 2014, with a 44% increase in Chinese investment into the world’s poorest continent.

In addition to increase in trade, this has also led to criticism of China’s engagement with Africa and warranted accusations of resource grabbing by Western governments as well as multinational companies, which have long been established in China. But, a Brookings Institute study concluded that Chinese firms are no more likely to invest in natural resources than firms from other countries, despite frequent accusations that the country is hungry for those resources. While Chinese states have been reluctant to
report their payments to a handful of governments, such as Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and São Tome and Principe, other companies have been just as reluctant (Chen, Dollar and Tang 2015). Despite allegations of plundering Africa’s resources, the partnership has not only boosted growth in China, but also pumped over $100 billion in jobs and infrastructural projects to the African continent, historically marred by conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment (Zafar 2007, Zhao 2014).

Many African leaders share China’s view that the relationship between them is neutral and business-oriented to generate economic growth for both China and African countries. China wants to buy minerals and Africa has them for sale. While African resources help feed China’s boom, Africa benefits from trade and infrastructure built and financed by China. New roads, railways, ports and airports have filled a critical gap that Western donors had been too shy to fill and opened the door of many African countries to a future of real development (Zhao 2014). Admittedly, much of the infrastructure built is crucial to China’s ability to operate effectively in Africa, but they still provided much-needed stimulus to the local economies. African leaders welcome Chinese businesses to their resources in return of turn-key projects, building of infrastructure and reviving industries, which have been left to deteriorate in the transition period after colonialism.

But China’s interest in Africa is not purely based on natural resources; China also needs Africa for its unexplored markets for its surplus goods and capital and according to some observers has been the continent’s biggest trading partner since 2009. Now, almost no African country is without its Chinese trade component, and almost every African country hosts Chinese diplomats, labourers, and entrepreneurs. This has sparked blames of neo-colonialism and greed on China’s part: international and local media outlets often colour Chinese in Africa with very dark tones and question China’s motives for investing in Africa. Zhang et al (2013) conducted a study in which they found that the Chinese private enterprises’ entry to the African market is mainly motivated by market seeking and not by resource seeking. The fierce domestic competition forces a number of Chinese companies seek alternative markets and the desire to enter African markets is huge: Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
approved 2,398 Chinese firms for establishment in Africa from 1988 to 2012. Only 1,120 of these were SOEs, which engage more in mining and quarrying and less in agriculture and manufacturing. With a projected population increase, the loss of vital agricultural land to industry and increasing consumption, Beijing sees a need to obtain stable sources of key foodstuffs. One solution for this is the investment in agriculture, fisheries and related production facilities in Africa. From this, another myth is born: China having an insatiable appetite for African land and plans to plant groups of Chinese peasants to form villages and grow food in Africa, which will then be shipped back to China.

Stories in popular media claiming that China had purchased half the farmland in the Democratic Republic of Congo and reports of the Chinese establishing villages across Africa circulated in the press in 2010. In 2012 the chief economist of the African Development Bank called China the biggest land grabber in Africa. Brautigam (2015) and her team examined 60 stories about Chinese agricultural investments, including the one in the DRC and they found evidence of fewer than 700,000 acres of land acquired by the Chinese as opposed to the reported 15 million acres. The largest existing Chinese farms were rubber, sugar, and sisal plantations; none of the farms studied were growing food for export to China. And while countries like Zambia now host as many as several dozen Chinese entrepreneurs, who grow crops and raise chickens for local markets, no villages of Chinese peasants have thus far been found in Africa.

4.2.3. Foreign direct investment

China’s Exim Bank, which is the main source of financial outflow to other countries, committed $4 billion to Africa in 2005, $5 billion in 2006 and $6 billion in 2007, almost equal to that of the World Bank (Park 2015). These numbers keep growing year-by-year as China wins more business in Africa. According to MOFCOM the value of new contracts signed in 2013 was $171.6 billion. European Council on Foreign Relations, however, reported in 2012 that since the Chinese ‘going out’ policy was reintroduced in 2010, their overseas investment has increased, but the main increase was in Europe, where investment increased 102% and the USA with 74% rather than emerging
economies. Nevertheless, China remains Africa’s biggest trading partner and plays an essential role in reconfiguring a number of African economies even if Africa’s importance for China may be small in comparison.

Many of the Chinese investments and contracts are in labour-intensive sectors, not only in construction but also in the extraction of energy and mineral resources. SOEs are driving the global expansion of Chinese direct investment: in 2010, foreign direct investment (FDI) by SOEs accounted for 61.6% of outward flows. In 2011 SOEs represented 80% of China’s stock market, and consequently dominate the domestic market as well as the sphere of international expansion (Parello-Plesner and Duchâtel 2015). Moreover, as China further liberalises, private Chinese businesses prop up and become less and less easy to control in China itself, let alone in Africa. This is a major conundrum for the Chinese government wishing to safeguard Beijing’s image abroad as a ‘responsible power.’ Contrary to popular belief, the Chinese companies abroad have considerable freedom to operate and thanks to favourable trade terms struck between China and various African states, will be able to reap even higher revenues.

Another criticism towards China and its business practices is their lack of reporting and secretive deals. However, Chinese companies have proven to be no more or less forthcoming than others about their investments, despite accusations that Chinese firms have a transparency problem. They filed reports about payments to governments of the countries they are investing in at roughly the same rate as companies based in other investing nations, according to the Extractive Industries Transparency Institute (EITI), which collects those reports and distributes the information, thereby implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a global reporting standard for natural resource investment transparency and accountability. According to EITI, in countries that are implementing the initiative, Chinese companies disclose information on payments to governments to the same extent as companies from other countries. That was found true even in highly sensitive areas like mineral mining and oil production. In other words, Chinese companies are largely abiding by global reporting standards (Matfess 2015). Chinese compliance with EITI requirements is all the more impressive when one considers that China is not an EITI implementing country and has not shown
any interest in adopting the EITI’s reporting provisions within its own borders. Yet despite this seemingly transparent reporting system, there are a number of Chinese companies that make deals directly with the government or corrupt officials. The investment and proceeds from these deals are rarely reported and normally get away without paying tax.

China-Africa trade is not a one-way flow of goods and commodities. In order to promote Africa’s market and economic development, China removed import tariffs from 45 categories of products from Africa. Consequently, in 2007 African products worth approximately $450 million were imported to China without any duty (Park 2015). In return, many African countries have lifted import tax from Chinese products - a move, which has not had favourable consequences. While the availability of Chinese products enhances Africa’s consumption levels, African industries have been undercut concurrently due to competition from imported Chinese goods. Labour-intensive industries such as textiles, clothing, footwear and furniture are the hardest hit: for instance, more than 40% of footwear and knitted fabrics purchased in South Africa come from China (Zhao 2014). While the majority of Chinese imports may originate from resource-rich countries, Chinese business interests are far more geographically diverse, with over 800 Chinese companies conducting business in 49 African countries. Additionally, many of these exports include commodities that are the main driver of the economy in the exporting countries. For instance up to 20% of China’s demand for cotton is met by trade with Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. Côte d’Ivoire supplies the vast majority of China’s cocoa; Namibia is one of China’s main suppliers of fish and Kenya remains one of the key suppliers of Chinese coffee (Tiffen 2014).

As China’s involvement in Africa deepens and Western policymakers worry about whether they can compete with a flood of Chinese cash and look at many failed projects as evidence of the mixed success of China’s ‘scramble for Africa.’ It is true that new railways and roads funded by China’s Exim Bank, and its investment in copper mines and oilrigs in places such as Zambia and Angola, are changing the face of the continent, but there is growing evidence that some Chinese firms that leap into Africa are struggling with the same problems Africa has long given Western investors. A common
problem is that Chinese firms assume that business works the way it does in China. In China, a company comes in, makes an arrangement with local government, and the government delivers. In Africa, they discover that government promises to build infrastructure, provide power or supply land are not as credible as they thought. Public land turns out to be occupied by squatters, who may have farmed it for generations; private land may not be owned by the people selling it. Local politicians do not accept deals struck by national ones and demand bribes. Chinese firms are now having to do what Western firms have long done: invest in corporate social responsibility programmes, hire African managers and do thorough due diligence.

There is a huge amount of red tape and bureaucracy, which all facilitate corruption; there is a lack of infrastructure and basic government services such as power, connectivity and fresh water supply. For instance, a Chinese firm invested over $1 billion in a 3 million-hectare palm oil plantation in the DRC. When work started, the Chinese found that there were no roads, the river was barely navigable and the villagers were hostile. The Chinese company went ahead nonetheless and planted a small amount of land – the crop was immediately stolen and the project soon disappeared (Sautman and Hairong 2009).

Never before has geopolitical risk and conflict overseas so impacted Chinese economic and security interests. The fate and well being of millions of Chinese individuals abroad has become a part of the Chinese national interest. Many Chinese companies were caught up in the turmoil of political changes in North Africa during the Arab Spring. More than $4 billion worth of projects were halted in Libya and more than 35,000 Chinese workers were evacuated after the fall of Gaddafi in 2011. The Chinese government also had to deal with the kidnapping of 29 Chinese workers in Southern Sudan in 2012 and deal with murdered Chinese managers in Zambia and a number of thefts (Zhao 2014).

The official number of Chinese workers in Africa at the end of 2012 was 200,00 compared to the more commonly repeated estimate of 2 million, which could be an underestimate (Parello-Plesner and Duchâtel 2015). Howard French (2014) in his book
“China’s Second Continent” interviewed a number of Chinese workers, who decided to stay in Africa beyond their project end date. He found that labourers staying on at the end of their contracts constitute the biggest single source of migration to Africa. Several African government and NGO officials argued that the Chinese government actively supports emigration by requesting loose immigration rules for Chinese nationals. As a consequence, Chinese firms have been accused of making predatory profits at the expense of local employment and growth.

In several countries there have been reports of hostility against the Chinese communities, who often live in closed compounds. The reality on the ground is more complex. At one extreme is a Chinese construction firm, which brought 12,000 Chinese workers to fulfil a contract in 2007 for the construction of 20,000 housing units in Angola. On the other extreme are construction projects carried out by companies, who have adopted a localisation policy and work with a minimal number of Chinese staff, who are mostly engineers and managers. The head of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway project, for instance, won in August 2013 by China Road and Bridge Corporation, told the press that 2000 Chinese employees and 30,000 Kenyans would carry out the work. At the same time, the IMF, World Bank, the EU and other Western funders deposit their aid, loans and grants straight into a government account, from where it might simply disappear. Government revenues from oil and natural resources exported to the West are exposed to the same risks. But as a result of this increased involvement of locals, Chinese companies have started to avoid some of the most chaotic corners of Africa and Chinese investors have realised that good governance norms are necessary to protect their investment.

4.2.4. Infrastructure projects

Infrastructure projects are some of the most visible tenets of the Chinese presence in Africa. When travelling along highways in Africa, it is difficult to miss the many signs proclaiming that a road, town sewage system or a new housing development was built with financing from China. When going through road works in Mozambique, for instance, there are hundreds of African workers wearing hi-visibility vests with Chinese
writing on it, trying to make sense of the instructions their Chinese manager is giving them in a mixture of Portuguese, English and Chinese. While infrastructure projects like roads, schools and housing units seem to benefit the whole community, China has been accused of only building infrastructure in Africa in order to facilitate taking out resources, but portraying these projects as selfless help to Africa (Foster et al 2008).

The World Bank in its 2008 report acknowledged a huge opportunity this unprecedented flood of infrastructure financing presents for many African countries, but they urged to seek tangible value for African countries in these deals. Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind other developing regions on most standard indicators of infrastructure development, prompting African leaders to call for greater international support in this sphere. By far the largest gaps arise in the power sector, with generation capacity and household access in Africa at around half the levels observed in South Asia and about a third of the levels observed in East Asia and the Pacific. Unreliable power supply leads to losses in industrial production valued at 6% of turnover. Furthermore, Africa’s limited infrastructure services tend to be much costlier than those available in other regions. For example, road freight costs in Africa are two to four times as high per kilometre as those in the United States, and travel times along key export corridors are two to three times as high as those in Asia due to poor road conditions (Odoom 2015).

A lot of China’s activities in the infrastructure sphere have focused on the construction of large hydropower schemes. By the end of 2007, China was providing at least $3.3 billion towards the construction of 10 major hydropower projects. If completed, these schemes would increase the total available hydropower generation capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa by 30%. In some cases, official assistance has simultaneously been used to provide transport and power generation infrastructure needed to facilitate export of minerals such as iron in Gabon or phosphate in Mauritania. According to Foster et al (2008) only 10% of Chinese infrastructure finance is directly linked to natural resource exploitation whilst most of the resources are directed to broader development projects. However, these development projects may in turn be tied to access to natural resources.
Another criticism of Chinese infrastructure projects is that in exchange for most Chinese financial aid to Africa, Beijing requires that infrastructure construction and other contracts favour Chinese service providers. Allegedly, 70% of them go to ‘approved’, mostly state-owned, Chinese companies, and the rest are open to local firms, many of which are also joint ventures with Chinese groups. While this used to be true, China has now relaxed these rules and is engaging local employees and the vast majority of employees at Chinese firms are now local hires, but managers still tend to be Chinese. Sautman and Hairong (2015) surveyed 400 Chinese companies operating in over 40 African countries and found that while management and senior technical positions tended to remain Chinese, more than 80% of workers were local. Some companies had localised as much as 99% of their workforce. Some local workers have even been sent to China for management training to train them in the ways of Chinese management styles and to give them an opportunity to learn Chinese and thus act as ‘middle men’ between China and Africa. These practices make economic sense for Chinese companies: in order to bring workers from China, they would have to pay much higher salaries, plus pay for airfare, room, and board. There are certainly tensions around many Chinese worksites in Africa, but they tend to stem from disputes about salaries and work conditions — not whether jobs exist for locals (Brautigam 2015).

4.2.5. Soft power

The former Chinese premier Hu Jintao identified soft power as a policy priority in 2007 and China has been making efforts to spread its cultural influence around the world, especially the global South, since then. Soft power has always been regarded as a relatively weak link in China’s foreign policy, by both Chinese and foreign observers. Despite this, the general public opinion towards China seems favourable according to the nine African countries included in the Pew 2015 Global Indicator (Sun 2015). However, this affinity seems to be evoked more by China’s economic allure and political friendship than cultural or ideological attractiveness. Joseph Nye, who coined the term ‘soft power’ reasons that China’s large investment in soft power has had a limited return, because China refuses to include African and its own civil society in its political and economical decision-making. He argues that China prefers to work with
governments as the source of soft power, rather than individuals, the private sector or civil society. In the Chinese view, the prevailing political norms and public opinion in African countries are heavily influenced by their former colonial masters. Sun (2015) points out that many, if not the most, African political and business elite receive their education in the West, causing them to identify more closely with Western culture, ideology and interests. Therefore, for Chinese culture, political values and discourse to prevail in Africa, China faces a significant psychological, cultural, educational and communications problem. In order to combat this, African civil servants are being trained by their hundreds in Chinese universities at the cost of the Chinese government, who regards education as a long-term investment to ‘win the hearts and minds of Africa’s future leaders’ (Kaiman 2013).

The Confucius Institutes, which are largely seen as a direct application of cultural influence, have opened in 29 African countries and provide thousands of fellowship opportunities to African youth apart from lessons in Chinese language, culture and customs. At the FOCAC meeting in Johannesburg in December 2015, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced 10 major plans to boost cooperation with Africa over the following three years. These include establishing a number of regional vocational education centres and several capacity-building colleges to address Africa’s lack of skilled workers. These will train 200,000 technicians and provide African students with 40,000 training opportunities in China. Xi pledged to offer African students 2000 education opportunities with degrees or diplomas and 30,000 government scholarships and invite 200 African scholars to visit China each year (Bothwell 2016). China will also continue sending medical teams to Africa, which it has been doing since 1963, to train local doctors and nurses and help out in remote clinics and hospitals. But in the recent wave of engagement expansion with Africa, these doctors and nurses have started to promote Chinese pharmaceuticals, especially anti-malarials, in the continent (Provost and Harris 2013). While Africans may understand that China is pushing heavily into the African market with its pharmaceutical products, Chinese medicine is generally more affordable to the African public than its Western equivalents, so with the lack of options, they would choose the cheaper option.
China also places a great emphasis on symbolic diplomacy to court African leaders. China hosts and funds high-level summits, state banquets and a number of high-ranking Chinese officials regularly visit various African countries. China has built the largest number of embassies and consulates and each year the first overseas trip of the Chinese foreign minister is to Africa. These displays of friendship and respect are widely appreciated in Africa and stand in contrast to the more dismissive attitude often adopted by Western countries (Willis 2014). Chinese multinationals involved in development cooperation are keen to construct national symbols, such as the president’s palace, the national assembly, government facilities and national sports arenas, in order to increase the Chinese presence, visibility and influence. Most famously, China provided the funds to construct the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. These buildings are not only big sources of revenue, but also help China to consolidate its friendship with African countries.

While Chinese soft power may go unnoticed in North America and Europe, it is very visible in Africa, South America and the Middle East. Most TV satellite providers in the developing world now include CCTV channels – the Chinese state owned Central Television; copies of China Daily and various Chinese-edited opinion magazines can be found on newspaper stands in African countries. Specific Chinese product aisles have appeared in African supermarkets and Africans are increasingly opening their taste buds to new experiences, no longer fearing Chinese food as only being snakes and bugs. Apart from these very visual signs, China is increasingly taking part in peacekeeping operations on the continent and anti-piracy efforts in the region. The country now provides the largest number of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and is the 7th top provider of financial contributions to these operations (Wang and Zou 2014). The UN has also praised China for their highly trained peacekeepers and for providing help with demining across several African countries.

It would be foolish to disregard Chinese soft power efforts on the African continent as unfruitful. Soft power works slowly and takes time to seep into the society; visible signs and an interest in Chinese culture, beyond what China can do for Africa financially, are
emerging. The Sino-African ‘friendship’ may well be on its way beyond economic mutual gains.
5. China-Zimbabwe relations

5.1. A historical perspective

Seeking to emerge from the Soviet shadow and establish itself as a credible international player, China positioned itself as the leading patron of the global South by opposing Soviet-sponsored liberation movements on the continent. Mugabe’s foreign policy took advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to gain support for his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party, which later became ZANU-PF (Patriotic Front) after merging with Joshua Nkomo’s opposition and is ruling till today. With its patronage secure, Mugabe fully embraced China. He started to call himself a ‘Marxist-Leninist of Maoist thought,’ demonstrating his commitment to socialism and still prefers to be addressed as a comrade. He sent his troops to train in China and pledged to maintain strong ties with China once Zimbabwe had overthrown Ian Smith’s white minority government. Mugabe won Zimbabwe’s first multi-racial election in 1980 and solidifying diplomatic relations with China quickly became one of his top foreign-policy concerns. An official state visit by Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister and the President himself soon followed, but only to have their enthusiasm quenched by China. In their 1981 meeting, Deng Xiaoping reportedly told Mugabe that he needed to move beyond ideological concerns and further pursue the Chinese model of capitalism. China’s interest in Zimbabwe cooled, and vice versa. Mugabe was accepted by Western leaders for his acceptance of democracy and capitalism and stopped pursuing Chinese friendship (Edinger and Burke 2008).

The situation changed with the Tiananmen Square events of 1989. China was dismissed by the international community for its failure to support human rights. This is when China once again turned to Africa to find allies and friends. China started to emphasise its policy of non-interference and argued that Western views of human rights could threaten the African long-standing social systems and governments. Zimbabwe quickly adopted this rhetoric and made statements that defended China’s actions in Tiananmen Square. Mugabe criticised the ‘concerted efforts from Western circles to destabilise China’ and many African governments followed his lead. As a reward and cooling of relations with the West, China substantially increased its trade with Zimbabwe and the
other African states that had come to its defence. Since then, Mugabe has seen China as a better trading partner than the West. Both have similarly fought against colonialism and share socialist values, at least on paper. When Mugabe visited Beijing in 2014 in search for more investment, President Xi Jinping said: “The traditional friendship between China and Zimbabwe was forged in the glorious years when we stood shoulder to shoulder against imperialism, colonialism and hegemony,” thus likening the two countries’ history and struggle against the Western powers (Moore 2014).

Chinese high-ranking officials are often welcomed to Zimbabwe as rock stars. For instance, when Zhao Ziyang visited Zimbabwe in 1982, five thousand people waited at the airport to greet him, they stampeded on the runway and five women were trampled to death (Brautigam 2009). President Xi Jinping visited Zimbabwe for two days in early December 2015, which was the first by a Chinese President since the visit of Jiang Zemin in 1996. President Xi was received with pomp and pageantry and the streets of Harare were lined with posters welcoming the great friend and partner of Zimbabwe. Allegedly, over $1 billion has been earmarked for Zimbabwe’s energy and telecommunication sectors to boost its economic recovery. “We will work with Zimbabwe and all other friendly African nations to pave a broader and more solid road of mutual benefit and common development for China and Africa,” Xi said in his statement ahead of the visit. Mugabe reciprocated the sentiment: “Our friendship is now much more than mere friendship – there being economic agreements where China will assist Zimbabwe to develop economically” (Moyo 2016). To top it off, China awarded its Confucius Peace Price, the Chinese equivalent to Nobel Peace Price, to Mugabe in October 2015 for ‘injecting fresh energy into the global quest for harmony’ (Phillips 2015).

Yet all is not as bright and mutually beneficial as it first seems. Zimbabwe’s military intervention in Mozambique and then into the Democratic Republic of Congo in late 1980s and early 1990s placed an enormous strain on Zimbabwe’s resources and proved immensely unpopular in the West. With the economy failing, Mugabe found himself under intense pressure both at home and abroad. When the issue of land redistribution, which his party had promised to solve, re-emerged, Mugabe implemented an extremely
controversial programme of compulsory land redistribution in 2000, which saw land forcibly taken from white farmers and given to blacks. There are widely held perceptions that this was a desperate effort to garner domestic support. Whatever the motivation, Zimbabwe has since experienced a steady regression away from democratic governance toward social and political upheaval and a steep economic downturn. So the country, once heralded as the breadbasket of Africa and boasting nearly a 100% literacy rate, has since 2000 experienced a crisis of governance, which has led this once prosperous country into a socio-economic and political decline. Critics argue that this crisis has been intensified by China’s assistance to the Robert Mugabe regime and China’s protection of the regime in the UN Security Council. It is suggested that Zimbabwe as a whole will not and has not benefitted from the Chinese presence and assistance in the country, because they do not encourage good governance. Nonetheless China’s non-intervention policy is attractive to Mugabe, who officially declared a ‘Look East’ policy in 2003. President Mugabe praised that: “China has been able to develop its economy without plundering other countries and the Chinese economic miracle is indeed a source of pride and inspiration” (Hodzi et. al. 2012).

5.2. Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ policy

After the EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2003, which resulted in capital flight and economic depression in Zimbabwe, the country adopted a ‘Look East’ policy. “We have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to the west, where the sun sets. That’s where the majority of the world is, that’s where we also get the greatest support, because the East is the Third World,” Mugabe said to a crowd celebrating the country’s 25th year of independence a few years after this policy was accepted (Meldrum 2005). Ties between Zimbabwe and the West have loosened since then, while China is now described as the only major international supporter of Zimbabwe. A year later, Mugabe explained the rhetoric behind this policy to an audience celebrating the National Heroes’ Day in Harare. His argument was built on the common struggle Zimbabwe and China have and are fighting against the ‘pretentious, free, so-called Christian world, and China helped Zimbabwe win their freedom and liberties’ (BBC 2005).
Although the Zimbabwean government often refers to the Look East policy, it has never outlined what exactly this policy entails. Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states on its website that ‘Zimbabwe prioritises projects in which a cooperating country has expressed interests in projects in which Zimbabwe has a competitive advantage, projects that are ready for implementation and will promote exports and projects meant to assist in the re-capitalisation of distressed public enterprises.’ Based on this, a deliberate decision was made to initially focus on China, Iran, Indonesia, India and Malaysia in effecting this policy. The Ministry clarifies further that ‘there is an unwritten understanding that there are no permanent friends or enemies, but permanent interests. Therefore, Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy strives to foster long-standing relationships of mutual cooperation and trust.’

China has emerged as the clear focus of the Look East Policy and is ever more important for Zimbabwe, who is still under EU sanctions and despite some economic reforms, experiencing a downturn. Mugabe has paired this policy with his anti-white and anti-Western rhetoric. He said in the 2013 UN general assembly session that Zimbabwe was under constant threat from “covetous and bigoted big powers whose hunger for domination and control of other nations and their resources knows no bounds...Shame, shame, shame we say to the United States of America. Shame, shame, shame we say to Britain and its allies who have continued to impose sanctions, illegal sanctions upon our people.” His sharp criticism caused the US delegation to walk out of the general assembly session to demonstrate their disapproval of the president (Reuters 2013). Similarly, at the 69th session of the UN general assembly President Mugabe said: “Zimbabwe has been pre-occupied with the empowerment of its people economically...has become a victim of the evil machinations of western countries who continue to apply unilateral and illegal sanctions as a foreign policy tool to achieve short-term political objectives, particularly regime change...regime change is a diabolical illegal policy of interference in the domestic affairs of my country and no good can come from undermining our economy, or depriving our citizens of the necessities of life. Why, I ask, should Zimbabweans continue to suffer under the American and British yoke of unjustified and unwarranted illegal sanctions?”. It seems clear that Mugabe is dissatisfied with the West and its conditions and sanctions, which
make China an even more attractive partner in trade, development, agriculture and business.

5.3. Sino-Zimbabwe engagement

The relationship between China and Zimbabwe has only recently started to make more headlines despite the fact that the two countries share quite a long history. Partly due to Zimbabwe’s Look East policy and partly due to Zimbabwe’s troubles with its traditional supporters, the engagement between China and Zimbabwe has intensified in all areas of cooperation. The following will look at the extent of Chinese investment and involvement in Zimbabwe through the five areas discussed previously in a wider pan-African perspective.

5.3.1. Development cooperation

Zimbabwe is often brought as an example of a ‘victim’ of Chinese development cooperation, which has crippled the local economy while the elite have derived the benefits of the liaison. Hodzi, Hartwell and de Jager (2012) assessed the impact of China’s development assistance to Zimbabwe and found that the Chinese model of development seems to be based on the idea that projects, which are aimed at development, are deemed more important than concerns about good governance. This is illustrated by China’s own growth, where economic development helped lift several hundred million people out of abject poverty in the past 40 years without giving much attention to the issue of human rights, for instance. China’s non-interference policy in internal affairs and the fact that China does not insist on stringent conditions is an attraction to African leaders like the president of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe.

In the wake of the Zimbabwe crisis in late 1990s as the Mugabe regime became more and more isolated from Western investors and donors, it turned to China, Libya and Iran for assistance. By offering aid without preconditions, China has presented an attractive alternative to conditional Western aid, and in return gained valuable diplomatic support to defend its international interests. The study concluded that it has allowed for increased corruption amidst diminished political accountability, and undermined the
role of civil society in the country. They account this to the lack of conditions and good governance and praise the Western world for their respect for human rights. They argue that ultimately states have their self-interest in mind and with that China has only supported the oppressive Robert Mugabe regime and not promoted a developmental agenda. Caution must be applied in making such conclusions, as there is very little data available on the real amount of aid China has given to Zimbabwe, which can make such accusations pre-emptive.

According to AidData, which relies on information available publicly, China financed 166 development cooperation projects in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2013. In 2011, China signed off a $700 million loan to Zimbabwe that focused on agricultural development, machinery, medical care and water systems. The loan was followed by another $150 million to upgrade to expand the Victoria Falls International Airport in 2012, and further reinforced by a $319 million concessional loan for the expansion of Kariba Power Station in 2013. These projects also included sending teams of doctors to rural areas, building of schools, donating farming and IT equipment, food aid and even a TV screen installed in a mall to advertise Mugabe’s party ZANU-PF. China’s Xinhua news agency reported that Beijing invested more in Zimbabwe in 2013 than any other African country: $601 million in projects (Chen and McGroarty 2015). However, critics believe these investments are marginal compared to what Chinese companies have gained from Zimbabwe’s mineral wealth and have come at the cost of human lives and widespread human rights abuses. These examples show that, theoretically, both countries should have benefitted from this relationship, however, the on-going economic and governance crisis in Zimbabwe shows that perhaps the fruit of the cooperation with China has not had the expected benefits for everyone in Zimbabwe.

Even though Chinese development cooperation is somewhat secretive and exact numbers and sums cannot be reported with full certainty, 166 projects in 13 years speak volumes. In addition to that, when Xi Jinping visited Harare in December 2015, he pledged even more aid to the impoverished country, in exchange of which he allegedly seeks uranium and copper from the resource rich landlocked country. This most recent pledge has panned out in a surprisingly beneficial way for Zimbabwe: China’s long-
time rival Japan invited president Mugabe to visit soon after Xi’s visit to Harare and prime minister Shinzo Abe pledged development support worth $5.3 million to help rebuild Zimbabwe’s infrastructure (The Guardian 2016). It remains to be seen if Japan’s aid to African states will be painted with the same brush as China’s aid has been by the Western media, but it also urges even more caution when blaming other countries for plundering Zimbabwe. Mugabe himself praises China for extending a helpful hand while Western aid has dried up and it is not without the President and government’s agency that these transactions are able to take place.

5.3.2. Market and resource seeking

As China has given aid worth billions of dollars to Zimbabwe, Mugabe has extended a generous hand towards China many times as well. For instance, after the majority of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe were seized in 2000, China International Water and Electric, a state owned company, was contracted to farm 250,000 acres of land in exchange for tobacco (Hodzi et al 2012). Chinese firms also have mining rights for copper and gold in Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwean government has turned a blind eye on illegal poaching for rhino horn, which is mainly exported to China.

However, China’s involvement in the Marange diamond mine – the largest alluvial diamond field in the world – has caused the most controversy. The operations in Marange have come under fierce criticism globally for human rights abuses. Chinese companies operating there in cooperation with Zimbabwean government are blamed for their lack of concern for human rights and are said to be helping to preserve President Mugabe’s authoritarian rule. The discovery of alluvial diamond deposits in the rural Chiadzwa area of Marange district in Southeast Zimbabwe in 2005 brought a new dimension to politics in Zimbabwe and its relations with China. The mines cover an area of 10 square miles and are worth billions of dollars - a potential source of wealth for the next 80 years, which could make a vital contribution to rebuilding the country brought to ruin by economic mismanagement (Towriss 2013).
A British company, African Consolidated Resource was granted exclusive mining rights at first, but in 2006 the Mugabe regime declared the mines open to all comers in an effort to gain political capital. Thousands of unlicensed, desperate Zimbabweans descended on the area to pan for diamonds and police exploitation and corruption soared. When the miners started to smuggle diamonds out of the country through Mozambique, the government sent hundreds of soldiers to evict the miners by force and sealed the diamond field off from public access in November 2008. Human rights groups estimate that between 200 and 400 were shot dead, and many more were beaten, tear-gassed, mauled by dogs or raped (The Telegraph 2010). Anjin Investments, a Chinese company, and the state-owned Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) jointly owned the mine until the former was evicted by the Zimbabwean government in early 2016, allegedly for not paying wages to the labourers after the alluvial diamonds became scarce. The ZMDC, however, is owned by the Zimbabwe National Army through its subsidiary company Zimbabwe Defense Industries and by another company linked to the army (Freedom House 2012). The extractive sector in Zimbabwe is heavily militarised - the generals have become company directors and shareholders on behalf of the government, which has created an atmosphere of fear and violence around the Marange diamond mine. A secret airstrip next to the mine was discovered on aerial photographs in 2010 and analysts believe the runway is intended for arms shipments, which are paid for in gemstones from the mine (Thornycroft and Berger 2010). A Chinese businessman, known as Sam Pa, allegedly used to visit Zimbabwe once a month on his private jet and is accused of carrying out gemstones using the secret airstrip. He was also accused of providing the Zimbabwean secret police with $100 million and a fleet of trucks, but has denied both accusations (Sharife 2013). In a twist of plot, Sam Pa, who was seen as China’s trailblazer in Africa, was arrested in Beijing with accusations of corruption in relation to Sinopec. A prominent Zimbabwean human rights activist Farai Muguwu said in an interview given to Georgetown University in 2014 that “the Chinese companies are the most difficult to reach. They are simply not interested in dialogue with civil society, and do not agree to meetings. It is a politics of patronage. They come at the invitation of a politician and they are answerable to that politician, not even to the government.“ Similarly, many Zimbabweans on the ground believe the Chinese non-interventional trade and foreign
aid policies help along to human rights abuses in this and other mines across the country.

5.3.3. Foreign direct investment

Zimbabwe does not pose a huge market opportunity to China compared to some other African countries, nevertheless, Chinese products, especially pharmaceuticals and farming equipment, are making their way to the local shops and supermarkets. China became Zimbabwe’s biggest trading partner following Zimbabwe’s isolation by its former Western trading partners over the country’s human rights record. Headlines of China-Zimbabwe economic deals often grace the covers of the state-run Herald newspaper in Zimbabwe while the privately owned (mostly expat) Zimbabwean media is not so positive about the influx of Chinese FDI.

While Zimbabwe is not the most stable country to invest in, it possesses huge natural resource reserves and a market potential for expansion, which is an attraction to Chinese SOEs and POEs. The number of Chinese firms has rapidly increased in Zimbabwe, many of them involved in mining, but also in agriculture, retail and construction. In the light of increased interest in the country, China is keen to protect its investments in the country and to keep Chinese assets from being appropriated by corrupt government ministers. Luckily China holds many leverages over Zimbabwe to do that: China is Zimbabwe’s most important economic partner and has helped train the military there for more than two decades, by exerting diplomatic pressure on Mugabe. Thus China is protecting its own interests, given the threat to their investment in the country; besides, Zimbabwe needs the Chinese investment (Zhao 2014). In December 2015, Zimbabwe announced that it has made the Renminbi legal tender after Beijing confirmed it would cancel $40 million in debts (AFP 2015). This has not made a significant change in the nation, which also uses US Dollar, South African Rand and Botswana Pula as legal tenders, but has given Chinese businesses an incentive to invest, save on exchange rates, take money out of the country more easily and make transactions more predictably.

According to official Chinese statistics, Zimbabwe received the most Chinese investment among all African countries in 2013 (Sun 2014), but in 2015 China’s
Ministry of Commerce said that Chinese investment in Africa dropped 40% in the first six months of 2015 (Chen and McGroarty 2015). Due to economic downturn in China, the direct investment to Zimbabwe has decreased, yet the Chinese businesses that were active in Zimbabwe prior to 2015 are staying put and reaping the benefits of less competition. However, critics believe these investments are marginal compared to what Chinese companies have gained from Zimbabwe’s mineral wealth and have come at the cost of human lives. Theoretically, both countries should have benefitted from this relationship, however, the on-going economic and governance crisis in Zimbabwe shows that perhaps the fruit of the cooperation with China has not had the expected benefits for everyone in Zimbabwe.

5.3.4. Infrastructure projects

Zimbabwe has an estimated 85% unemployment rate, is crippled by the EU and USA imposed sanctions and to top it off, has been hit by drought and hunger this year. It is clear that Zimbabwe is seeking more than friendship from China. The concessionary funding received from China in 2015 will help increase the output of the Hwange power station, which will slightly reduce the power shortage in Zimbabwe – a problem, which has acquired comedy status in the once wealthy country. Moreover, China also awarded Zimbabwe a grant worth $62.4 million, which will be used to construct a new parliament building – the current building has become too small for the over 300 legislators, up from less than 40 during the pre-independence days (Moyo 2016). It remains to be seen whether or not this financial help will aid the country’s economic recovery and how much of it will actually materialise.

Chinese financed infrastructure projects in Zimbabwe have been subjects of much controversy. Allegedly, China is building roads to take resources in and out of the diamond mines, which only advance their own business interests. Indeed many mega-deals between the two countries have already received financing. The expansion of Victoria Falls Airport was one of the biggest recipients of Chinese loan with $150 million as was the rehabilitation of Harare’s municipal water supply and sewage treatment with $144 million along with the $319.5 million expansion of one of the biggest hydropower plants – Kariba. The state-owned fixed line telecommunications
firm TelOne also recently received a loan of $98 million to improve its fibre optic network. In addition to the on-going and future projects, there are a number of projects that have already been completed. The National Defense College was a 3-year project that was completed way ahead of schedule and has become a symbol and a physical manifestation of the Look East policy.

Despite these investments, the state of infrastructure in Zimbabwe remains poor. It only takes one turn off the newly renovated Airport Road to realise that the majority of the roads in the country have not received any attention in decades. It is not only the public infrastructure, which is in a poor state – the lack of power and water supply have caused manufacturing enterprises to produce less and therefore lose money. Patrick Chinamasa, Zimbabwe’s minister of finance and economic development, said that infrastructure remains the fundamental challenge to unleashing the country’s potential. He acknowledged that China has a significant role to play in sectors such as power supply and transportation, but Zimbabwe is seeking more value-added industries, such as processing raw materials in the country in order to revive its economy. Chinamasa said prior to Xi Jinping’s visit in December 2015: “For instance, we have coal, and if Chinese investors can bring in the equipment, then we may generate power to not only Zimbabwe, but other countries in this region” (Li and Zhao 2015). Mr. Chinamasa’s view may seem far fetched looking at Zimbabwe’s on-going power supply problems, but nevertheless the infrastructure development in Zimbabwe by China could turn out to be a blessing in disguise if both parties held to their own on the path to an even more mutually beneficial relationship.

5.3.5.  Soft power

According to MOFCOM, Chinese culture and people-to-people exchanges in Zimbabwe achieved ‘splendid results’ in 2015. MOFCOM’s website lists a number of successful encounters and visits of Chinese cultural ambassadors to Zimbabwe, but of course makes no mention of how they were received. In February, the ‘Cultures of China, Festival of Spring’ art troupe made a visit to Zimbabwe, organized by the State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the Shenzhen Municipal Singing and Dancing Troupe visited Zimbabwe, and participated in the art performance of the 20th Session of the UN
World Tourism Organization General Assembly and the inaugural ceremony of the Zimbabwean president, and the fourth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Legal Forum, which was held in Zimbabwe. The 13th Chinese medical team also arrived in Zimbabwe in 2015 and started its work, but it is not mentioned where the team has been stationed, how long they are staying or what they have expertise in. As elsewhere, education plays a major role in bringing the two countries and cultures together, so the Confucius Institute in Harare and the five Confucius Classrooms in Zimbabwe enjoyed greater influence, with an enrolment of nearly 800 students. Walls in Harare town centre are covered with posters inviting Zimbabweans to study in China and the Confucius Institute is actively recruiting students to learn Chinese. The newest shopping mall complex in Harare sports curved Chinese roofs, guardian lions and Chinese gates, and is complete with authentic Chinese restaurants, where one is served by Chinese-speaking Zimbabwean waitresses.

Supermarkets in Harare now have Chinese food aisles and Chinese restaurants are popping up. Though these developments don’t seem to be aimed at Zimbabweans, but rather at Chinese expats living in the county in their thousands. Zimbabweans are slowly taking interest in Chinese culture, but for the time being are still very sceptical about China and the Chinese and the Chinese mall and restaurants remain rather empty with local customers. The two groups lead separate lives in the country with the Chinese living in compounds, and only venturing out to do their weekly shop, go to a restaurant or run errands. Their children are home-schooled or attend a mini school in someone’s house in the compound, where all the learning is done in Chinese. There are a few more adventurous Chinese people one can spot in the haunts of the locals, but these are only a handful and even they find it difficult to mix with the sometimes hostile locals. The reports of Chinese economic takeover have seriously damaged China’s soft power quest in Zimbabwe and made locals sceptical of China and the Chinese, however, this does not mean China cannot ‘win over Zimbabwean hearts and minds’ like it planned in conjunction with its foreign policy.
6. Analysis

China is often classed as a neo-colonial power and has become synonymous with the concept of neo-colonialism, but the term itself is rarely conceptualized and put into a theoretical framework. With the five characteristics defined in this thesis, neo-colonialism can be applied or debunked more systematically and objectively. Using the independent variables and the five characteristics of neo-colonialism, I will aim to determine the scope and extent of Chinese neo-colonialism in Africa, followed by a country-specific analysis in the context of Zimbabwe.

6.1. The extent of Chinese neo-colonialism in Africa

China's increasing footprint in Africa has raised a number of questions to reflect on. The increasing cooperation can be an alluring opportunity or a terrifying threat, depending on how smartly Africa engages with Beijing and the types of instruments China chooses to use with a specific country or region.

The five features of neo-colonialism are all evident in China’s activities on the African continent as a whole, however, to varying extents in different areas of cooperation in the fifty-four African states. While Western observers frequently attach the label of neo-colonialism to China, Chinese officials and academia are keen to dispel China’s image as a neo-colonial power in Africa and adhere to a view whereby there are no losers in this relationship. Wang and Zou (2014) protectively state that allegations made by Western observers against China about neo-colonialism are not true. They contend that China’s ‘new frontier’ diplomacy helps African countries develop and nurture a mutually beneficial win-win situation. In response to accusations of resource exploitation, they argue that China’s high demand for raw materials has enabled these commodities to maintain relatively high prices and China is buying commodities at the world market prices as opposed to the old colonial powers that used to exploit African countries and their resources to their own advantage. Similarly, Liu Guijin, the Chinese government’s special representative to Africa stated in 2006: “China has no intention to undermine Africa’s democracy. China is working hard to build a socialist democracy and promote human rights and good governance at home...China is a responsible
major country in the world.” Speaking in Khartoum in February 2008, Liu Guijin went on to say: “We have never, and will never in the future, attach any kind of political conditions to these aid and development projects, because we think that providing assistance is just for the benefit of the people, it is not for political purposes, not for showing off to the outside world.” Indeed, China does not officially attach conditions to its aid and has become Africa’s biggest trading partner, which has benefitted many local industries, however, despite these displays of selfless friendship there are significant caveats to this South-South cooperation, which feature a number of neo-colonial characteristics.

China is notoriously secretive in revealing the details of many of its business deals and development projects, but the officials always take advantage of announcing large aid packages and concessional loans to be allocated to African countries, amongst others, in order to build the country’s reputation domestically and abroad as a benevolent rising power. At the FOCAC meeting in South Africa in 2015 the Chinese premier Xi Jinping pledged $60 billion in support of African economies. Yet a number of observers remain sceptical: is the pledge symbolic, designed to preserve China’s political and diplomatic influence on the continent or is it a cohesive plan to ramp up relations (Thomas 2016). Whichever it is, it is necessary to remain vigilant when making observations about the Chinese involvement in Africa as the announcement does not necessarily mean it will be realised. These announced amounts don’t always come to fruition and little data and reliable reporting, monitoring and evaluation is available on the development projects China has invested in, thus painting a false or skewed picture of the real extent of Chinese aid. Brautigam (2015) found that there is a tendency to overestimate ‘almost everything’ China is doing in Africa. An announcement may be made where a company hopes to spend $2 billion. When they start, they realise it’s difficult for one reason or another and it gets scaled back, but the initial report about the $2 billion is still out there.

Nevertheless, based on the figures and reports that are available, it is possible to resolve that the intention of China’s aid to Africa is not malignant, but certainly not altruistic either. China does not explicitly seek to use aid to influence the domestic politics of
African countries or dictate policies, but instead, it hopes to pave way for smoother business practices, access to raw materials, favourable trade terms, and to keep Chinese investments and staff safe on the continent. However, Chinese hefty aid packages are certainly not in exchange for nothing, but serve a greater purpose as outlined in China’s all-encompassing Africa policy, which sees development cooperation as one of the instruments through which to conduct its foreign policy and win favour from African leaders. A policy that has the power to influence another country remotely while opening doors for access to its natural assets and market share without any due tender processes or competition, could be termed as a neo-colonial practice.

Chinese development assistance creates access to Africa’s natural resources and local markets, creates business opportunities for Chinese companies and employment for Chinese labourers, but at the same time, many of these projects have large African components and have made significant contributions to the local economies and societies. Admittedly, the gains are unequally distributed with Africa normally on the losing side. Despite the favourable terms and grand announcements of massive aid packages, the concessionary loans must be paid back, frequently with raw materials, and are regularly used to construct large infrastructure projects tied to Chinese companies; the foreign aid is often tied to Chinese contractors or access to natural resources.

Chinese officials emphasize that China also provides aid to countries that are not rich in natural resources to defuse international criticism, however, China may have its eyes on other things these countries can deliver, such as their support for ‘one China’ policy, for China’s agenda at multilateral forums, and for China as a ‘responsible stakeholder.’ In this sense, China’s comprehensive, multi-dimensional agenda of its aid to Africa defies any simplistic categorization or assessment. African states do win from these projects, especially while Western aid is diminishing or tied to conditions that countries are not ready to fulfil, but the initially attractive Chinese propositions have made many states dependent on Chinese development cooperation and are indirectly forced to share their riches at heavily discounted terms and little revenue compared to China’s gains.
Thus, the relationship is noticeably unequal: Africa’s strategic importance for Beijing is low, however trade with China, its foreign aid and diplomatic ties are of utmost importance to many countries in Africa. While China is Africa’s largest trading partner, remarkably, China’s trade with Africa accounts for only 5% of the country’s global trade (Sun 2014). China’s primary foreign policy goals and interests are still based on its relations with the developed powers, particularly the US, EU and Japan. Power and Mohan (2010) argue that many African leaders welcome China nonetheless, because it is different to other interventionist industrial powers. But this is not the only reason: Chinese investment is so widespread and Chinese aid so sought after that many countries on the African continent would see an economic collapse if Chinese FDI and aid were to come to a sudden halt. The asymmetry, typical of a neo-colonial relationship is helping China keep Africa under its powerful yoke and many African states have become so dependent on China’s business and aid that they have no choice but to accept China’s terms. With China’s slowing economic growth, many African economic analysts have become nervous and wonder if it is smart for Africa to continue to largely depend on its largest trading partner. Songwe and Moyo (2012) suggest that in order to make the relationship more equal, African countries must articulate a comprehensive China policy, which would go beyond trade and would also regulate the treatment of workers, environmental standards and transparency rules, but this would come with the risk of losing China’s business. Besides, not all African states take issue with the way Chinese are doing business in their markets, nearly all leaders and officials of African states where China is strongly involved in have a degree of agency in these deals and reap considerable benefits from deals with China, so reaching a consensus on a China policy would prove very difficult indeed.

Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang acknowledged hitches in the relationship when he visited four African countries in May 2014. He said: “There is a need to assure our African friends in all seriousness that China will never pursue a colonialist path like some countries did, or allow colonialism, which belongs to the past, to reappear in Africa” (French 2014). But at the same time, he also gave a nudge to African leaders not to meddle with Chinese investment and staff on the continent if they want to remain in the mutually beneficial relationship, which is not isolated from the events and
fluctuations that take place in the rest of the world. Caceres and Ear (2012) use an Eskimo proverb to sum up the relationship: ‘gifts make slaves just as whips make dogs:’ China locks resource-exporting countries and countries with lucrative new markets into a neo-colonial relationship, where China is the clear winner and Africa is left with billions of dollars aimed at development cooperation, which can end up in the pockets of the elite due to China’s non-interventionist policies and where African resources in conjunction with Chinese FDI are used to advance Chinese businesses, economy and diplomatic goals.

Brautigam (2011) is one of the few Western scholars that supports the claim of mutual benefit when it comes to the relationship between China and Africa. She finds that China is genuinely interested in extending the lessons it learned from its own development to Africa. She aims do debunk the widespread view of the Chinese presence in Africa as neo-colonialism and shows that both Africa and China win from this South-South partnership. However, some commentators find this view rather naïve as it masks unequal exchanges between parties. Li Anshan, director of the Institute of Afro-Asian Studies and Centre for African Studies at Peking University also argues against Western powers’ accusations of China being a neo-colonial power in Africa: “This is indeed ironic, coming from Western countries talking about abuse of human rights, when they have committed relentless human rights abuses during their colonial periods...It is almost shameful for these countries to accuse China of human rights abuses, when they have committed much more atrocious acts in the past.” Zhao (2014) argues that China has lifted millions of people out of poverty without democratisation and China’s model of a strong government and its focus on economic growth is looked upon by many African leaders as an example to follow. Furthermore, she asserts that the economic woes of many companies and enterprises in African countries started long before China increased its exports there and such woes are largely the result of economic globalisation, so China could not be held accountable for this alone.

Indeed, the lack of conditions and generous aid packages make China the perfect partner for many countries in the developing world, but despite their welcoming attitude and after years of ‘win-win’ partnerships, China seems to finally have realised that it
needs to improve the style and substance of its push into Africa in answer to international criticism and increasing condemnation by Africa’s civil society. For the African citizenry the engagement with China will be felt in the market presence of more and more Chinese products, which has the potential to prove a great business opportunity for local partners or a downfall of Africa’s small businesses, who simply cannot compete with China’s manufacturing capabilities. Chinese investments in infrastructure should in theory also influence the lives of ordinary Africans to the better and leave some budget funds to pay for civil servants’ salaries and provide better social services, but this has not yet played out in practice as the majority of newly built roads are not constructed with the citizens’ interests in mind, but are strategically placed to take resources out of the country and run businesses smoother. Therefore, as Sino-African relations deepen, the effects and changes this cooperation creates in Africa must be considered from the point of views of various stakeholders. The relationship has proven to be very lucrative for the elite and government officials, but has not created much change for the average citizens in Africa, who are growing more and more restless with their governments’ dealings with China.

6.2. The extent of Chinese neo-colonialism in Zimbabwe

Although some analysts suggest that China’s foreign policy is changing with its growing role as a world power and they are paying more attention to concerns such as human rights, there are still important limitations (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008). China may have slightly changed its values when looking at its condemnation of Iran’s nuclear plan, increasingly bitter relations with North Korea and its condemnation of government crackdown in Burma. However, economic interests still remain paramount for China and the country does not share the West’s views about human rights, governance and democracy. In fact, China’s Africa policy makes no mention of human rights and China has never declared to have human rights or fighting corruption at the forefront of its agenda in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has become notorious for its 92-year old head of state, hyperinflation and the squandering of resources. In 2016, famine, hunger and yet another monetary crisis have entered the list of Zimbabwe’s woes. While a number of educated Zimbabweans are leaving the country for lack of
opportunities, more and more Chinese are moving to the country along with their businesses and to work on government-backed projects, which are all lubricated by Zimbabwe’s Look East policy.

Zimbabwe adopted the policy after losing its traditional supporters in the West, especially the UK and the EU, with an aim to boost trade, get the country out of its economic slump and not to be completely isolated on the international arena, but also for the ease of doing business with China, the large concessional loans and grants, infrastructure projects and perks that many ZANU-PF officials directly benefit from. Indeed, Chinese activities are visible in Zimbabwe, especially near highly secured mining areas. While Chinese officials in Zimbabwe put the countries’ warm relations down to their historical friendship and fight against imperialism, the underlying aims of Chinese investment into Zimbabwe are to pave way for its companies, to access the country’s diamond, gold and copper reserves and to gather diplomatic support. Furthermore, Africa, including Zimbabwe with its vast resources and market potential, is not as critical for China as China is for the Zimbabwean economy, which gives China more flexibility in its Africa policy.

Zimbabwe is not in any position to hold bargaining power over China at the moment with its lack of other business and development partners, while Beijing holds leverage over Mugabe and his government with their large financial resources, which Zimbabwe desperately needs. As such, this is a clear manifestation of neo-colonialism on China’s part: it is coaxing the local government into deals that favour China using infrastructure projects, concessional loans, grants and imports as bait. These activities are carried out by Chinese SOEs and POEs, whose activities are aided by deals the two governments have agreed on. Zimbabwe, with its Look East policy, evidently had agency in facilitating the current situation, which is not only economical exploitation, but also a strong soft power and cultural push from China to win over Zimbabwean hearts.

Yet despite the clear inequality in the partnership, the relations between the two have so far been free of major disturbances thanks to a shared sense of historical victimisation by Western colonial powers and a common identity as developing countries, which
helps to keep diplomatic relations at bay. However, the financial dealings between the countries are no longer without differences of opinion. There is increasing criticism from Zimbabwean civil society, who are now realising that partnering with China has not lived up to expectations. Chinese companies have outsourced many value-added services from Zimbabwe, which has contributed to the country’s already high unemployment rate. This, coupled with unfounded rumours that Chinese companies only hire their compatriots, has created an almost blind hatred towards Zimbabwe’s Look East policy and many have started to criticise the government on these grounds.

Citizens of Zimbabwe realise that they have missed out on the country’s diamond revenue, which has been misappropriated or gone to Chinese-owned businesses while Zimbabwe’s GDP remains at 14.2 billion USD, which is even lower than its neighbouring Mozambique at 16 billion USD (World Bank 2016). In order to dispel dissatisfaction, companies such as Anjin Investments, who have come under fire in Zimbabwean and global media for mistreating workers and not adhering to labour laws in Marange mines, have had to downsize their operations with the application of Zimbabwe’s indigenisation law by which all companies must have at least 51% local ownership. Chinese government is fighting back to regain the full control of Chinese companies’ operations in the country, and China with its much higher weight is likely to win this dispute.

A report by a Zimbabwean NGO the Centre for Natural Resource Governance (2015) stated that mining in Zimbabwe is ironically associated with poverty. The law itself takes away community rights to land and gives them to mining companies. The government has adopted an extractivist model of development whereby development is hinged upon extraction and export of minerals, which in turn relies on demand from third parties such as China. The scaling up of mining activities vis-a-vis the absence of a strong mining law, institutional framework and political will to protect communities against displacements and other disadvantages brought about by mining mean more communities are going to be condemned to new poverty in the coming years. This means more mining conflicts are lined up for Zimbabwe, which may degenerate into violent conflicts, with or without Chinese involvement, thus placing a large amount of
responsibility on the Zimbabwean government, who are indirectly allowing Chinese mining firms to engage in neo-colonial practices. This has also enabled the coming in of corrupt mining syndicates that are not accountable to the people and state institutions but to their patrons who receive bribes in exchange for ‘protection’.

China is flexing its muscles in Zimbabwe through investment, development aid, grants, business opportunities and soft power. Neo-colonialism is demonstrable in these activities and the interactions between the two parties are unmistakably asymmetrical with China on the ‘win’ side. However, whether or not China is prolonging Zimbabwe’s governance crisis and economic downturn is a more complex issue. Even though China is gaining more from the cooperation, Zimbabwe does not emerge as a clear ‘loser’ in this liaison: they have received millions of dollars in grants and been given large loans, the repayment of which China has cancelled in order to win more favour. Chinese funding and firms have built a number of roads in the country and despite their primary goal of taking resources in and out of the mines, they do serve the local areas in which they have been built. More and more Zimbabwean students receive Chinese scholarships and a number of locals have been employed in Chinese businesses to help them cope with the specifics of local culture and run smoother. Therefore it is fair to say that each party has won from the interaction, however, the gains are very unevenly distributed and will not help along the whole country’s development process.
7. Conclusion

There continues to be a propensity to look at China-Africa relations from one of two polarised positions – China is seen as exploitative and neo-colonialist or as the great hope for a new era in the African development. The reality is somewhere in the middle, with the potential for deeper mutually beneficial relationships, but coexisting with some level of exploitation. Chinese investment provides new challenges for African countries, but also opportunities for a better positioning in the world market without Western conditions and sanctions. Chinese approach to cooperation with African countries is indeed unconventional and very different from the Western model of engagement with Africa, but that is not to say that exploitation and relentless self-gain are drawn into China’s foreign policy on the African continent.

Chinese activities in Africa from development cooperation to business to soft power all portray elements of neo-colonialism, which are met with the willingness from African states to voluntarily enter into the relationship. China needs to expand its market, find resources and gain diplomatic support; African states need help with poverty reduction, infrastructure and increasing their say in international forums. Thus economic interests should not trump efforts to encourage good governance and transparency among African leadership. However, things become more complicated when a state finds itself dependent on Chinese aid and business with limited ways of protecting itself from a country with much larger economy and diplomatic sway.

Based on the theory of neo-colonialism as outlined in this paper, there are irrefutable signs that China is a neo-colonial power in Africa. China is a new power on the continent, which has thus far been engaging with most African states without much opposition. This asymmetrical relationship is aided by African elites and some governments, who pave way for Chinese businesses and grant them favourable trade terms, which in turn make economies more and more dependent. This, coupled with the distribution of Chinese culture through media, education, retail and many other methods, has given reason to see China as a neo-colonial power on the African continent as a whole. Yet the fifty-four countries of Africa are all different and so is the extent to which they engage with China. Zimbabwe with its Look East policy and
shared history with China is exceptionally open to doing business with China, but with growing unrest and lack of trust in the government, it remains to be seen whether or not the ‘all weather friendship’ of China and Zimbabwe stays as warm as it is now. China is facing and will continue to face the same challenges as other countries do when investing in unstable regimes and considering continued Western support for oil producing and resource-exporting authoritarian governments, one should not expect China to carry the burden of such reforms in Africa.
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9. Kokkuvõte


Nimetatud viie sõltumatu muutuja uurimiseks on töös analüüsitud nii empiirilisi tõendeid, mis põhinevad uurival ajakirjandusel, ametlikul kaubandusnäitajatel, avalikult kättesaadavatel andmebaasidel, kui ka Hiina ja Zimbabwe riiklikke poliitikapabereid, kohalike ja rahvusvaheliste liidrite arvamusi ja mõttekodade raporteid.

Töö on üles ehitatud ressursi geopolitiika ning neokolonialismi teoreetilisele võrgustikule, kusjuures ressursi geopolitiika võimaldab Hiina-Aafrika suhteid vaadelda laiemas raamistikus ning neokolonialism tagab spetsiifilisema vaatepunkti. Neokolonialismi eripäraks on, et seda terminit kasutatakse väga tihti, eriti Hiina-Aafrika suhete kirjeldamisel, kuid neokolonialismi on harva defineeritud, mis teeb sellest pigem kirjeldava kui analüütilise termini.

Kuna neokolonialismi teoorias ei ole hetkel ühtki väljakujunenud koolkonda, siis põhineb käesoleva töö teoreetiline raamistik erinevate teoreetikute arvamustel ning neokolonialismi kui termini ajaloolistel tunnustel abil tuletatud viiel kaasaegsel neopoliitika tunnusmärgil: (1) märgatav asümmeetria suhetes; (2) koloniseeritud riigile omastatav roll suhetes; (3) erinevad neokolonialismi elluviijad, kaasa arvatud rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid ja korporatsioonid; (4) eelnevate koloniaalsuhete eelduse puudumine ja (5) mõju levik mitmetes valdkondades, sealhulgas majanduses, kultuuris, hariduses ja muudes pehme jõu valdkondades.

Hiina kui kasvav jõud maa-ilmapoliitikas ja –majanduses ning riigi üha suurenev vajadus ressursside järele on ajendanud paljusid uurijaid ja analüütilikuid riiki nimetama neokolonialistlikuks. Samas kujutetakse Aafrika mandrit ja riike kui vahendeid, mille abil Hiina oma kasvu säilitab ning oma mõjuvõimu laiendab. Sellistest väidetest sai
tõuke ka käsioleva magistritöö probleemipüstitus. Hiina tõeline roll ning ulatus Aafrikas ei ole selge ning süüdistused neokolonialisms ei põhine tihti faktidel, vaid emotsooniaid.

