From “Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland” to “Multikulti ist tot”: tracing German state approaches towards immigrant integration

Bachelor’s thesis

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1. Introduction

The recent years have once again brought the issue of integration to the top of the agenda in politics as well as in the wider public discourse in Germany and other European countries. It has been triggered by multiple factors – firstly, the new wave of mass immigration of asylum seekers coming from war-torn countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa and the continuous problems with integration of migrants coming to the surface. Secondly, a growing social gap and lack of equal opportunity for young people with migrant background as well as the increasing radicalization on young Muslims especially in the urban regions of West Germany. The recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, as well as several barely prevented attempted attacks on Germany itself, add to the notion of an integration failure in Europe’s diverse societies. All this has brought back the issue of integration and resulted in a renewed debate over Germany’s identity as an immigrant country with politicians questioning previous state practices and making strong statements such as Angela Merkel saying that “multiculturalism has failed, utterly failed” (Der Spiegel 2010b).

Against the backdrop of current discussions, this thesis aims to make two contributions. Firstly, on a conceptual level, I will be discussing multiculturalist vs. assimilationist approaches towards immigrant integration and thereby developing an analytical framework for a study on different state approaches towards immigrant integration. Secondly, empirically, in order to apply this analytical framework on my case-study of Germany, I am going to discuss the political changes that have taken place starting from the Kohl government in the 1980s. By looking back in time, I will provide insights into the broader and more recent questions regarding Germany’s political and institutional readiness to tackle the influx of new people and problems arising in this process. I will provide a process-tracing analysis that will give an overview of the events that took place as well as their possible causal links and outcomes in terms of what change they introduced as well as which debates they, in turn, brought up. By analyzing the developments so far, I aim to locate Germany’s policies vis a vis its immigrant communities over time on my developed ideal-typical continuum of different approaches towards immigrant integration and determine shifts that have taken place on the scale.
The analysis, which will start after a brief overview of migration waves starting from the guest-workers coming in in the 1950s, will focus on the period that stretches from the early 1980s all to the way to the present, dividing it into two main phases. For the discussion of the first phase that starts with the center-right Kohl government in 1982, a brief genealogy of postwar immigration to Germany will be given, starting from the recruitment of first guest-workers in the 1950s. Yet priority is given to analyzing policy developments and choices under the extended government of Helmut Kohl (CDU\textsuperscript{1}). This first period, which I will term as the politics of denial, ends with the 1998 elections after which the SPD-Green\textsuperscript{2} government took office and introduced new policies in the areas of citizenship legislation and integration. The SPD-Green government was replaced by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s first cabinet in 2005, when the Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU-SPD was formed for the first time. Between 2009 and 2013, CDU/CSU was in government with the FDP\textsuperscript{3}, after which the Grand Coalition returned by forming Merkel’s third cabinet. This is where my analysis will also end, as I deliberately aim to leave out the current debate in my analysis, since it mainly concerns asylum seekers, who are not conceptually in the main focus of this thesis (reasoning for that explained below) and since I argue, that the debate has opened a whole new phase in the immigration and integration discourse and is simply yet too fresh and beyond the scope of this thesis.

I will be taking a top-down approach and look at different state policy developments regarding citizenship and naturalization legislation, the legislation concerning aliens (\textit{Ausländergesetzgebung}) and the accompanying integration measures like those regarding education policies. This means that the analysis of legal changes concerns citizenship issues on the one hand and social policy issues on the other hand. The role of citizenship for integration will be elaborated on in the theoretical section. Social policy issues, however, have a larger impact on the every-day and personal life of people with migration background, who don’t have citizenship, as it regulates their possibilities, for instance, to bring over families or to benefit from the welfare state. Therefore, it is important to take into account. The top-down in this regard means that I will be

\textsuperscript{1} The Christian Democratic Union of Germany. Referred to as CDU/CSU on the federal level due to the joint action with the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU).

\textsuperscript{2} The Social Democratic Party of Germany and Alliance ’90/The Greens.

\textsuperscript{3} The Free Democratic Party.
focusing solely on the state action and not particularly on how the migrant groups respond to these changes. However, in the last part of the analysis, I will pay particular attention to issues of minority organization and participation which, in part, may be a consequence of the legal changes. I will thus look at various bodies and conferences of minority representation such as the Conference on Islam and the Integration Summit, that have been convened and operate in close proximity to government officials on the federal level. In fact, the existence of a body of representative organizations that regularly consult with government officials is a relatively new phenomenon in German politics which is characteristic for the later phase, which I will term the politics of acceptance, in the history of immigrant integration in Germany. Initiated during the SPD-Green government and further developed under Merkel, the focus seems to have moved from mere legislation to more state-level proactive measures. The focus of my analysis will then move to evaluating the extent to which these efforts have had an impact in reality.

Before starting the theoretical discussion on different modes of immigrant integration in liberal democracies, a short remark on the issue of immigrant categories is in place in order to sharpen the analytical focus of this study. Roughly speaking, migrants can be divided into three categories. The first group are migrants with citizenship, who gain it automatically due to state legislation, based on bloodlines (ius sanguinis), like for example Jews in Israel, or on a particular colonial legacy, like for instance in France. These people have citizenship right away, but they are still considered as people with migration background and require integration. The second group are foreigners in the sense that they don’t have the citizenship of their host country, but have acquired residence permits and live in the country for extended periods (or even their whole lives) and often have their children born in the country. In most countries, they also have the option to naturalize or become eligible for it at some point. They are also taxpayers and therefore eligible for some state benefits, but nevertheless don’t have the same legal status as citizens, even though the extent to which they are able to get state benefits varies from country to country. The third group are asylum seekers, who become refugees, once the receiving country grants them the right of asylum. These people fall under the international obligation to help people whose life at home is not safe and therefore differ from economic migrants, who move in hope to find better living standards in another country. Asylum seekers and even refugees are extremely
restricted in their eligibility for social benefits, but also in their possibilities to participate in the labor market and to pay taxes. Therefore, even though the question of asylum seekers is often a trigger for wider political debates on immigration and integration, they are fundamentally a different category from economic migrants. It is clear that, over time, migrants have the possibility to move from one of these three categories to another, and it is also clear that many state policies of integration may target all three of those groups. The latter is to be seen especially in the so-called soft policy areas such as education. However, for the context of this thesis, it is important to analytically differentiate between these groups, because fundamentally, the state takes a different approach towards them. The ones most affected by the approach that the state takes regarding immigrant integration, is the second group – migrants without citizenship – which is who this analysis is particularly interested in.

After completing a process-tracing analysis based on a developed analytical framework and the clear distinction of migrant groups affected, I will, in the end, return to the broader questions of Germany’s position and readiness at the doorstep of yet another phase in the country’s history of dealing with immigration and integration, which we are still witnessing today. By doing that, I aim to make a more general contribution of providing insights and background for the current developments and processes that itself do not yet fit into the scope this analysis.
2. Theoretical background

Approaches to immigrant integration

Policy approaches regarding immigrant integration, from a theoretical perspective, are usually described through a continuum, where on one end are multicultural approaches and on the other end are strongly assimilationist approaches. This following section aims to explain these concepts in order to provide theoretical background and better understanding for the empirical part of the thesis later on. It is important to note that this theoretical distinction in itself is rather ideal-typical. Thus, in reality, there are no cases that stand on the extreme ends of the continuum. This however does not reduce the usefulness of this framework for analyzing different cases as it provides measurement and helps us determine and pinpoint shifts in policy approaches.

As a term, multiculturalism can be used for describing different phenomena. It can simply be understood as a description of an ethnically or culturally diverse society. Will Kymlicka (1995, 10-11), being one of the earliest and leading authors on the topic, divides the origins of this diversity in countries into two: multination states and polyethnic states. In multination states, cultural diversity arises from historical minorities that have been incorporated into one state. Polyethnic states, on the contrary, are created through immigration. The latter is the kind of diversity this thesis will be focusing on, regarding the case of Germany. However, in the context of this thesis, the term multiculturalism should not refer to merely the diversity in the society, but should instead be understood as a policy approach towards immigrant integration that strategically aims for diversity preservation. The central assumption behind multicultural rights and policies is that the recognition of cultural differences and fostering special rights based on these differences, as well as preventing cultural discrimination, are effective means for achieving integration and avoiding exclusion in a society. Tariq Modood (2007, 61), who extends the concept from ethnic minorities to religious groups as well and therefore emphasizes the recognition of difference in general, for instance, defines political multiculturalism as “an accommodative form of integration which would allow group-based racialized, ethnic, cultural, religious identities and practices to be recognized and supported in the public space, rather than
require them to be privatized.” With that, Modood explains multicultural policies as an attempt to turn negative difference of groups into positive. Diverse societies can be endangered by threats arising from a weak or nonexistent strategy to tackle the needs of such a society. Parekh (2000, 196) for instance, goes as far as claiming that the deeper the diversity in the society, the greater the unity and common belonging it needs. Therefore, unity and cohesion do not necessarily presuppose homogeneity. On a more specific policy level, multiculturalist goals can be achieved, for example, by allowing and funding mother-tongue teaching for immigrant children, allowing the practicing of different religions as well as habits/traditions based on that, fostering minority representation, supporting media in minority languages or even affirmative action etc. The most common examples of countries that have adopted multicultural policies towards immigrant integration have been Canada, the Netherlands. However, even in those countries, migrants are expected to learn the language, which proves the earlier notion about the ideal-typical character of the two ends on this theoretical continuum.

On the opposite end of the conceptual continuum introduced earlier, we find strongly assimilationist approach. According to Parekh (2000, 196-197), this assimilation is based on the conviction that common national culture, values beliefs and practices are the sole way for a stable and cohesive polity, making the nation state an ideal. Therefore, if a minority member wants to be treated equally, they need to assimilate. Assimilation by definition would mean becoming the same or similar, as in culturally indistinguishable in a fully homogenous society. In the context of immigrant integration, this process takes place in one direction only, meaning the assimilationist view therefore supports the immigrants’ absorption by the host society’s culture. The emphasis here is on the migrant actually giving up their ethnic and/or cultural identity in favor of the host society’s. Although a complete assimilation is sometimes considered utopian (Yanasmayan 2011, 24), there are examples that might prove that it’s actually possible, such as the so-called melting pot of the USA – giving up one’s ethnic or cultural differences might not fully happen within one generation, but is entirely possible over the course of multiple generations. However, according to Brubaker (2001, 534), assimilation in its general, abstract meaning is indeed a matter of degree, where the emphasis is on the process rather than a desired end state. Therefore, analytically, it is worth speaking of assimilationist policies, even though they might not have assimilationist outcomes. Both Brubaker (Ibid.) and Parekh (2000, 197) emphasize
the importance of drawing a line between voluntary and forced assimilation, the latter of which is, firstly, morally objectionable in democratic societies and can, secondly, have the opposite effect. As defined by Castles and Davidson (2000, 60), assimilation, on a policy level, is pursued through language learning encouragement and/or requirements specifically as well as expecting immigrants to adjust themselves to the social and cultural practices of the host society in general. I argue that this, however, does not fully grasp the idea – language learning, for instance, can also happen in a society with multiculturalist policies and does not mean assimilation right away. As noted earlier, assimilation specifically expects giving up the aspects in one’s identity that make them differ from the host society. Therefore, not only learning the language, but also using it with their children, who then in turn already grow up to be less different identity-wise. Assimilationist policies also mean that the state makes no difference based on ethnicity, religion, language or culture and discourages individuals to practice their culture in the public sphere. This differentiation between the public and the private sphere, to which the state cannot intervene, is crucial for the definition of positive assimilation. Thus, states on the more assimilationist side of the continuum, see that by discouraging cultural differences and promoting assimilation in the public sphere, such as through education in school environment by implementing a streamlined system that all immigrants have to go through as well, it helps migrants to succeed in the society. In practice, this policy can indeed increase the migrants’ chances on, for instance, the job market. In this sense, assimilation is achieved in a positive way (as opposed to forced assimilation and the violation of human rights) through the state not giving incentives for celebrating difference, but considering it a private matter instead which is not supported from outside. A commonly used country example for assimilationist policies is France and its policies regarding migrants, starting from the ones arriving from former colonies in the post-war decades.

States’ positions on this continuum are, of course, constantly changing. Many European immigration countries, for instance, have recently been discussed (ie. Koopmans 2010) in the context of a possible retreat from multiculturalist policies. Position shifts between the multiculturalist and assimilationist extremes, that can come about as a result of economic needs, change of government, external shocks (such as an emerging threat or a war in another country) or some other factor, can and have been taking place in both
directions. Therefore, with the analysis in this thesis, I aim at pinpointing Germany’s positions on this scale over time and discuss, which events caused the changes and why.

**The role of citizenship in the context of integration**

Since I will be looking at the shifts in German citizenship legislation in my analysis, it is worth discussing the meaning of citizenship in the theoretical context of integration separately as well. As already mentioned in the introduction, citizenship as a state instrument already makes a difference between migrant groups. Whereas some groups in some countries gain citizenship right away (based on *ius sanguinis* or colonial legacy, for instance), others are denied it and stay in the country as migrants with permitted residence only. The second group, however, depending on the country’s law, can become eligible for naturalization at some point after having legally lived in the country for a certain number of years or after completing some other requirement. Thus they become citizens eventually, but still not right away. An example of the former situation where migrants gain citizenship right away is France with many immigrants from former colonies, such as Moroccans, who have French citizenship. Many of them are still not very well integrated in the society, despite the equal legal status to the ethnic French. An example for the latter case is the Netherlands, where we find many foreigners from Southeast Asia or other parts of the world, for whom naturalization is not an option for various reasons. The country has taken a clear multiculturalist approach by not granting citizenship to migrants (including people from the Netherlands’ former colonies), yet most of the migrants are still well integrated, especially in economic terms. Thus, even though citizenship is often considered the highest level of integration or being accepted as part of society, legally, citizenship alone is often not enough to guarantee full social integration.

To address this issue, Soysal (1994, 8) conceptually divides the meanings of citizenship into two – a part of national identity vs. a guarantee for certain rights – and sees a certain disparity between the two. The phenomena of rights becoming more and more personal has brought about a new understanding of membership that is much less tied to the person’s national, ethnic or regional ties than citizenship, but on universal principles instead. It is what she calls a *postnational* model where entitlements are legitimized on the basis of personhood and where citizenship allows rights regardless of ethnic,
cultural or religious ties. In most countries today, what differentiates people with citizenship from those without is the right to participate in the country’s democratic procedures such as voting or running for a representative body, whereas, as Soysal (Ibid., 30) notes, other rights and privileges that were initially only accorded to citizens, have been made available for resident migrants as well. The latter including becoming a beneficiary of the state’s welfare system, participating in housing and labor markets, being involved in business and increasingly even taking part in the political sphere of the country through other means, since voting (except on a local level in some places) has still remained a citizen right. Therefore, we might ask if the rights that come with citizenship and thus citizenship itself have become rather symbolic than actually affecting the migrants’ everyday life. Being officially accepted (granted citizenship) by the state does not necessarily mean being accepted by the society as a whole and might therefore not be the most important goal from the migrant’s perspective.

Thus, a shift in citizenship legislation only might not constitute such a dividing watershed event as it is sometimes discussed, unless it is accompanied by more effective integration measures. The understanding behind citizenship as an institution is in some regard a much more important aspect in terms of actual change in state approaches. The meaning of citizenship itself reflects on the meaning of a change in citizenship legislation. Regarding the different groups of migrants discussed earlier, citizenship as a status is a proof of different things, which also varies country by country. Becoming a citizen as a person with a migration background might simply mean being born in the country (or its former colony) or having a special legal status due to one’s ethnic background (for example the children of ethnic Germans in Russia who grew up there, but are entitled to citizenship thanks to their heritage), but might also mark an end point of a longer path where the migrant has lived in the country for some time and become a naturalized citizen. In the first two cases, citizenship as such can hardly be associated with integration. In the third case regarding the group of migrants, with whom this thesis is mainly concerned with, however, the connectedness to actual integration, seems logically much higher.
3. Empirics: tracing policy developments

The aim of this empirical section of the thesis is to trace the policy development and political struggles over citizenship and integration legislation over time and to discuss the major political and discursive shifts the German political elite has gone through since the arrival of the first guest-workers in the 1950s. Two key phases in the development of German integration policy will be identified, the first roughly stretching from 1982 to 1998 (thus covering the entire Kohl era), the second starting with the change of government in 1998 and ending with the end of the second Merkel government in 2013.

Yet before tracing policy developments and political debates in each of these phases, a brief review of the state of postwar immigration to Germany is at place, thus providing a basic demographic backdrop to the analysis.

**From guest-workers to Spätaussiedler: immigration waves since 1950**

The situation in Germany regarding migrants today is a result of decades of immigration that often happened in big waves and by specific groups. Arguably the biggest reason behind Germany’s large population share with a migrant background has come about as a result of the guest-worker programs that started off in the 1950s to keep up with the needs of the labor market during the economic boom (*Wirtschaftswunder*) while the country’s own population was aging and the official working hours were reduced. Bilateral agreements were made to bring in temporary work force for mainly the industrial sector that did not require high qualifications. This included a list of countries – Italy 1955, Spain 1960, Greece 1960, Turkey 1961, Portugal 1964, Tunisia 1965 and Yugoslavia 1968. The policy, that included the recruitment of some 2.6 million foreigners (Oezcan 2004), ended up influencing the profile of the migrant community in West-Germany in the next decades. Recruitment went on until the halt in 1973, tables 1 and 2 aim to provide some statistical data to show and illustrate the impact of the guest-worker program.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population size (thousand)</td>
<td>56 174,8</td>
<td>60 650,6</td>
<td>61 644,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign population size (thousand)</td>
<td>686,2</td>
<td>2600,6</td>
<td>3900,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of foreigners</td>
<td>1,22%</td>
<td>4,29%</td>
<td>6,33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: the relative share of immigrants in the overall population. (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016, 26-27)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners among economically active population</td>
<td>1,3%</td>
<td>11,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of economically active people in the country</td>
<td>26,3 Mil.</td>
<td>27,7 Mil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force participation rate(^4)</td>
<td>47,7%</td>
<td>44,3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: the change on the labor market as a result of the guest-worker program. (BMI 2014, 14-15)*

Even though the Turkish minority has become a significant community of people with migrant background by now, the statistics in the beginning showed something else. Until the late 1960s, Italy, Spain and Greece were the most strongly represented countries of immigration. In the following years, though, the share of workers from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey started growing faster. By 1973, therefore, the Turks made up the biggest share of 23% among the all foreigners in the country (BMI 2014, 14-15).

The agreements were originally meant as one to two year contracts, after which the workers were expected to leave. However, the reality proved to be different, especially after the recruitment halt of 1973, which, for many workers, meant that it was no longer possible to return home only temporarily. Faced with the decision, many of the workers thus decided to not only stay (some had the right for free movement as citizens of the European Community whereas some had simply acquired residence permits), but also

\(^4\) The number of economically active and unemployed people among the whole population. By showing available workers in the society, it reflects the society’s characteristics.
bring over families. Therefore, the 1973 halt did not reduce the total share of foreigners in the country. However, the number plateaued at between 7-7.5% with some fluctuation until late 1980s whereas the population size itself stood slightly above 61 million. The women to men ratio has however been growing ever since the start of the program, after the recruitment halt and up until today. (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016, 26-27) The growth in the women to men ratio is an indicator that shows that whereas some men returned home, many stayed and brought over their families as well as later on had children, who did not gain German citizenship and therefore became a part of the foreign population. Therefore, in the theoretical context of this thesis, thanks to the guest-worker program in the 1950-1970s and the following family unification, the absolute share of immigrants without citizenship in the overall population of Germany has immensely grown and made the need for integration ever more apparent.

Concerning the other big group of migrants – the ones with citizenship – Germany also experienced immigration mainly from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Through that, between the 1950 and the late 1980s over 1.5 million so called Aussiedler, people of German ethnic origin mostly from Central Europe and Romania, came to live in West Germany. In the late 1980s with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this number rose significantly to over three million, with almost all ethnic German migrants now arriving from the former Soviet Union areas (Worbs et al. 2013, 28-30) (see table 3 below). After 1993 they were officially depicted as Spätaussiedler, as their profile had completely changed from what it had been in the past decades. Based on the citizenship law in Germany at the time, they and their families received automatic citizenship upon proving German ethnic roots. Even though the main focus of this thesis is on migrants without citizenship expecting that they are first and foremost the groups that need integrating, the Aussiedler and even more the Spätaussiedler are also often affected by the integration-related policies that I will be looking at due to the characteristics of the specific migrant group they form. Table 3 illustrates the influx of (Spät-)Aussiedler during the period of the first phase of this analysis.
Table 3: the influx of (Spät-)Aussiedler to Germany from 1950 to 2000 in thousands per year. (Worbs et al. 2013, 31-32)

As can be seen from the statistics, the influx of ethnic German immigrants became significant only with the breakdown of the Iron Curtain – during the decade from 1990 to 2000, more people were accepted as repatriates in Germany (2 124 791) than in the almost four previous decades since 1950 (1 999 691) (Ibid., 28-29). Having lived and/or grown up outside of Germany (and having often been subjected to Soviet repressive policies), many of them had lost most linguistic and cultural ties to Germany. This loss of cultural ties and the fact that the arrival took place in a big wave in the early 1990s meant that despite their legally equal status in the society, in reality the integration of these people into the German society was rather complicated. Moreover, unlike the guest-workers in the 1950-1970s, the Aussiedler rarely had a workplace waiting for them upon arrival which made economic integration more complicated as well.

As already mentioned, even though asylum seekers and refugees actually fall under a completely different legal category when speaking of immigration and integration, they are often high on the public discourse agenda and trigger debates and changes that affect the more relevant groups for this topic. Therefore, table 4 shows the statistics of the influx of asylum seekers from 1955 to 1998 where we can see a smaller but significant wave in 1980, after the 1973 recruitment halt, when a lot of Turkish asylum seekers
came in, and a bigger wave in the early nineties when in 1992 the yearly influx of asylum seekers reached an all time high of almost 440,000 (BAMF 2015, 11; BMI 2014, 17-18).

Table 4: the number of asylum seeking applications in thousands between 1955 and 1998. (BAMF 2015, 11)


The Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU5) government under chancellor Helmut Kohl that ruled with changing coalitions from 1982 to 1998 largely denied the need for more targeted integration policies with the infamous notion of “Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland” (“Germany is not a country of immigration”) being used over and over again in official statements (Winter 2010, 170). This position was actually not new compared to Kohl’s predecessors (Williams 2011, 57). The official policies under Kohl still followed the assumption that the immigrant guest-workers, who entered the country with the contracts made with Southern European countries during the 1950s and 1960s and who made up the majority of foreigners in the country, were going to return home at some point, even though the reality proved to be much different and many of them

5 Referred to as CDU/CSU on the federal level due to the joint action with the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU).
ended up staying as shown earlier, forming a large migrant community. Comprehensive policy developments regarding these processes were stagnating over a long period of non-decision-making leading many analysts to talk about deliberate political neglect. On the one hand, the fact that no formal integration policy structures, normally characteristic to immigration countries, were put in place was justified by the political standpoint that Germany was not seeking new permanent immigration (Green 2004, 6). This however was completely looking past the reality of the continuing dependant migration (the families seeking to reunite with their family members already in Germany) and the permanently staying immigrant workers even after the recruitment halt of 1973. On the other hand, multiple authors (Winter 2010, 170-171; Hailbronner, Faharat 2015, 2-3) have made the claim that the reason behind the strong neglect of any multiculturalism in Germany was the debate on nationality in Germany prior to 1990, which was largely focused on the goal of reuniting Germany. With that goal in mind, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRD) based their insistence on a common German nationality on the 1913 *Reichs- and Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* (Nationality Law), claiming that there was only one inseparable German nation and emphasizing the image of a divided nation with only one legitimate representative, the FRD.

A clear more practical demonstration of the government’s denial of Germany being an immigration country was the long process of reforming the 1965 *Ausländergesetz* (Aliens Act) that rose to the agenda already in the first half of the 1980s. In 1988 a draft for the reform leaked first to the social welfare organization *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* and on to the wider public through the magazine *Der Spiegel*. This, especially the second part of the draft, a proposal for an *Ausländeraufnahmegesetz* (Foreigners’ Entry Law), revealed CDU’s positions on the issue. The Entry Law aimed to introduce a range of restrictive measures regarding residence permits (making unlimited residency an exception, not a rule, and limiting the time limited residence permits could be extended) and children following their migrant parents to prevent any further immigration to West Germany (Green 2004, 60-61). The message was a clear statement that Germany was not seen as an immigration country and a more defensive and restrictive position had been taken by the government. In the following years over fierce debates between the government and the opposition, some amendments to the draft were made and in 1990, in a very heated process, it was finally pushed through with a very majoritarian and rushed approach taken by the CDU/CSU government to ensure its passing (Ibid., 68-72).
The eventually passed version of the Aliens Act received heavy criticism from the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens on the opposition side. However, it did bring some ease for immigrants in Germany. Simplified naturalization “as a rule” was introduced for foreigners with over 15 years of residence and foreigners aged 16-23 with over 8 years of residence and 6 years of attendance in German schools. The naturalization process depended on the person giving up their former citizenship, but in general, eased the access to German citizenship and the rights that came with it. Also, exceptions were made regarding the renunciation of previous citizenship rule, which made it possible for a number of people to still gain dual citizenship (Howard 2004, 4). This introduction of limited naturalization policies officially acknowledged long-term immigrants as a fact and can be considered as the first time Germany passed citizenship regulations normally common to traditional immigrant countries (Green 2004, 79; Borkert, Bosswick 2011, 99).

For a while, the thematic regarding legislation on immigrants got pushed out of the center of attention by the euphoria following the reunification on October 3, 1990 and seemed to have no significant effect on the first Bundestag election in December. However, it was quickly brought back to the top of the agenda as mass immigration skyrocketed as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as Yugoslavia disintegrating. These events caused the influx of several migrant groups in big waves (see tables 3 and 4 earlier) – the Aussiedler and Spätaussiedler as well as Jews from the former Soviet Union and refugees escaping the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The latter – more than 345 000 Bosnian refugees (as well as smaller amounts from other Balkan countries) – largely came in until the Dayton Agreement of 1995 that ended the Bosnian war (BMI 2014, 19). Jews gained a special legal status in 1991 when Germany officially started accepting the immigration of Jewish people and their families from the former Soviet Union – through that, over a 100 000 people had entered the country by 1998 (almost 200 000 by 2004 when the statistics in that regard dropped) (Ibid., 146). However, throughout the 1990s, the political discussion was more concerned with a general dispute over national identity than actual rational policy solution finding (Green 2004, 83-84). The early 1990s in the newly unified Germany were characterized by a series of decisions and policies in reaction to the fear of massive movement after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Restrictive amendments to the Foreigners Law were made. Treibel (2001, 115) describes this as the state’s message to the population with a migrant
background as well as potential immigrants about its restrictive, controlling and skeptical approach. Borkert and Boswick (2011, 106) state that the more liberal aspects in those amendments like the simplified naturalization process under certain conditions were less known to the public and therefore the common message remained in a restrictive light.

As for mechanisms existing already from before, there were charity institutions (*Wohlfahrtsverbände*) that worked on the social integration of resident labor migrants and the second generation by offering various services like community-related social work, counselling services, health care, support for transitioning onto the labor market, language acquisition as well as support for adolescent criminal offenders on probation (Borkert, Boswick 2011, 108). What may have left those efforts less noticed and ignored by the political discourse, though, was the fact that these services were often not directly aimed at migrants, but at wider socially disadvantaged groups, including citizens.

In 1992 in light of the mass influx of asylum seekers causing the extreme-right parties to rise to the surface and the first anti-foreigner violence acts happening in various places in Germany, the negotiations with the CDU/CSU and the FDP on one side and the SPD on the other side (leaving out the Greens who opposed to the asylum amendment) reached an agreement as part of the so-called *Asylkompromiss* (asylum-compromise). This combination of policies restricted the asylum-seekers’ influx on one side, but limited and restricted the regulations on ethnic German immigration, extended the simplified naturalization process as well as lowered the cost of normal naturalizations on the other side (Green 2004, 84-87). As mentioned earlier, sometimes the same policies can target legally different groups in an overlapping manner. This, however, was an interesting example of different groups being included in the same policy package as weights to achieve a compromise between opposing political parties. Therefore, some authors, such as Bade and Oltmer (2004) have noted that the title *Asylkompromiss* is rather misguiding since it was more of a general migration compromise.

These issues – naturalization, citizenship and dual citizenship questions were mainly kept up by the opposition during the early 1990s. Whereas the SPD brought it to the
asylum compromise in 1992, the Greens were petitioning for the legalization of dual citizenship which was then introduced to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat by the SPD, but got rejected by the CDU/CSU government in 1994 (Green 2004, 90).

As an interesting phenomenon from the integration perspective, Germany was the first country to introduce language tests in the country of origin as a precondition for immigration in 1997. This was meant to tackle the enormous influx of the ethnic German immigrants. However, the aim of the language tests was not as much to facilitate integration, but to require proof of actual German belonging by showing language skills in a specific dialect that’s characteristic to ethnic Germans having lived outside Germany for generations (Michalowski 2010, 185). Nevertheless, this is a sign of the government starting to respond to the changed profile of the Spätaussiedler that, in reality, was no longer as much in coherence with the idea behind the German national identity and its reflection in the citizenship policy that had long been granting citizenship to ethnic Germans without any other requirements besides proven German descent.

Looking back, multiple explanations can be assigned as reasons behind the fact that it was possible to not only deny the need to integrate immigrants for so long, but also deny a status or a national identity of an immigration country in general. As already said earlier, a strong but somewhat passive in the sense that it was not so openly brought up was the argument made by authors such as Winter (2010, 170-171) of one nation in the context of a divided Germany which could not have been dropped until the unification took place. The CDU under Chancellor Kohl kept a rather consistent line in that matter, even though being constantly opposed with pressures from the SPD and the Greens in the opposition, demanding for more liberal and open policies. This growing sense of opposition on the federal level was however also a reason in itself why legislation reforms kept on being unsuccessful. The complicated negotiation processes and the time consuming nature of these changes (some required even changing the Basic Law), especially in a very fragmented political organization such as the one in Germany, made it hard to keep up with the real-time developments in and around the country, especially with migrant groups arriving in big waves and in turn causing fast developments on the inner discourse level that sometimes escalated in acts of violence or protests.
In relation to the theories of immigrant integrating, then, in a way, one could argue that Germany completely falls out of this scale during the phase of denial as the state did not do anything to facilitate integration neither through assimilation or through multicultural policies. Nevertheless, I would still place Germany on the assimilationist side of the continuum during the first phase of this thesis for two main reasons. Firstly, acquiring citizenship through naturalization had been made extremely hard for migrants of non-German ethnic background through, for instance, long residence requirements. In reality, this meant that the migrant had to be culturally completely assimilated in order to become a German citizen. Secondly, even though a growing group of foreign migrants existed in the country (and moreover, the guest-workers came in as a part of a state policy of recruitment from abroad), the official standpoint did not recognize them as a minority or as a part of a multicultural society. Rights regarding their ethnic/cultural/religious differences from Germans were not recognized or supported and kept fully a private matter where the state did not intervene. This is similar to practices in the precedent case of France, where the state deliberately does not engage in any kind of specifically targeted policies towards various migrant ethnic groups living in the country. Therefore, by not pursuing any multiculturalist policies – expressed both in forcing migrants to go through the German system as well as the restrictive citizenship policy – in effect, creates a strong indirect assimilation pressure.

However, while the issue of reunification was now past, pressures from outside of the government for more action regarding immigrant integration as well as the realization within the political sphere of the need to take a more active stance, were growing. The CDU/CSU, in the meanwhile, remained on a conservative position, which is why these pressures were growing without any result until the change of government in 1998.

3.2. Phase two: from acceptance to Gestaltung⁶ (1998-2013)

The federal elections on September 27, 1998 ended chancellor Helmut Kohl’s long chancellorship of 16 years and brought about a complete change in government with the SPD-Green now forming a coalition under the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. This was a big step forward from a long period of non-decision making that

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⁶ The German word Gestaltung is here used to express the process of actually shaping integration.
had lasted throughout the 1990s due to conflicting positions between the CDU/CSU government and the opposition parties as well as lack of initiative to work towards compromises that had practically gridlocked any reform of the citizenship law. While the CDU/CSU in the government had again been experiencing internal disagreements, the SPD and the Greens on the other side started growing closer – the first more liberal and the second less radical. This also included developing similar positions on immigration and integration related topics such as supporting shorter waiting times for naturalization processes, dual citizenships and the introduction of *ius soli* (Green 2004, 94-95).

The new SPD-Green government presented itself as bringing paradigmatic shift and was widely expected to implement fast change to various policy areas, including citizenship legislation. It however turned out to be also, a government of major struggles that even included elements of populist politics, between the government and the conservative CDU/CSU, that now led the opposition, over migration policies. As Howard (2008, 50) notes, this was largely caused by the fact that the confident new government brought the debate on immigration and integration to the public discussion more than it had been brought before. The issue had largely been kept away from the public in order to avoid growth of anti-immigrant sentiments that would give rise to radical right political forces. Even though opinions on policies varied between parties, maintaining a stable political system was a goal that all parties shared. This was however shaken up by the SPD-Green government’s public confidence in successful and fast change as well as CDU/CSU’s change of tactic after finding itself in the opposition. As I will show later on, the CDU/CSU began, on the one hand, adjusting its positions further away from the common paradigm “Germany is not an immigration country” (*Deutschland ist kein Immigrationsland*). This was not only caused by the electoral defeat, but also, for instance, pressures from outside by the industry sector that was simply lacking human resources and thus in support of migration. On the other hand, however, the party, launched some major campaigns, such as the one against dual citizenship that the government, especially the Greens, had been supporting. The situation was further complicated after 1999 by the government having majority in the Parliament (*Bundestag*), but losing it in the *Bundesrat* (the representational body for the federal *Länder* in Germany) after the *Landtag* elections in the state of Hesse. A solution for that was found in negotiating with the opposition FDP to regain majority, instead of the
CDU/CSU, which finally led to the Nationality Act (*Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*) coming to force on January 1, 2000 (Green 2004, 102-103; Howard 2008, 52). An agreement for amendments to the citizenship law, which the conservative government had promised as a measure against xenophobic violence already after the 1994 elections, was finally reached.

As a result of the negotiations between the government under the Interior Minister Otto Schily of the SPD and the FDP, the general acceptance of dual citizenship was left out of the final agreement. However, it did include some significant changes. The residence requirement for naturalization was brought down from 15 years, that was agreed with the 1990 law, to 8 years. Simple *ius soli* was introduced. Named *Optionsmodell* (option-model), with this law, children born on German soil whose one parent had lived in Germany for at least 8 years with a matching residence permit (or 3 years with an unlimited residence permit), would qualify for German citizenship. To avoid controversy, any dual citizens created through the *ius soli* mechanism would have to be changed into single citizenship by the age of 23. (Green 2004, 102-103; Howard 2008, 53; Hailbronner, Faharat 2015, 7) The introduction of *ius soli* and the thereby created temporary dual citizenship allowance in itself were huge steps towards multicultural policies of a typical immigration country. However, as we can assume, with especially the 8-year and residence permit requirement, this leaves out a large number of children still born to immigrant parents in Germany. Some say (Green 2004, 106) that the SPD-Green’s initial plan to liberalize dual citizenship ended up being one of the biggest miscalculations in recent German political history costing the government a majority in the *Bundesrat* after the 1999 Hesse elections where the CDU/CSU strongly campaigned against dual citizenship and leading to a disappointingly modest reform for many voters. As a result, another kind of a stalemate situation emerged, which reduced the government’s options to go through with the initial plans and promises.

Authors, such as Williams (2014, 59-60), call the Nationality Act of 2000 a dividing line in Germany’s integration politics with a shift in the meaning that naturalization was given in the context of national identity and integration. With the passing of the new legislation, the acquisition of citizenship was officially accepted as an instrument of achieving integration, instead of the former understanding of it being more of an end point and proof of integration. Table 5 shows the number of naturalizations per year
from 1990 to 2010, putting the so-called dividing point, where the requirements for acquiring citizenship were reduced from 15 to 8 years of residence, in the middle. As seen, a sharp increase in the number of people becoming citizens through naturalization did not occur. Moreover, it has been decreasing since mid-1990s.

![Graph showing naturalizations per year from 1990 to 2010.](image)

*Table 5: the number of naturalizations per year 1990-2010. (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015:16)*

Therefore, I would say that the paradigm shift was clear, but more on the political level, and less so in real numbers. A change in government had brought about complete new way of officially interpreting the meanings of citizenship, naturalization and German national identity, which, however, had a long way to go regarding actual implementation and reflection in policies. The Nationality Act of 2000 was therefore a pioneer, of sorts, and a sign that a legislative shift was now possible, even though extremely complicated. In 2000 and 2001 a debate about a new law took over the political agenda – a full-scale immigration law (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*). Green (2004, 110) sees this event as proof of a shift in elite opinion. Departing even further from the “Germany is not an immigration country” standpoint, this law was to introduce regulation for new, high-skilled labour migration as well as new formal integration courses for non-nationals – clearly accepting migrants in Germany as a permanent fact that needed to be legally dealt with.
A change in perception also meant not seeing immigrants as a burden any longer, but as an advantage instead. Especially in a situation where the problems caused by an aging population and shortages on the labour market became more and more clear to the public as well as the private sector, the industry representatives started expressing interest and lobbying for hiring possibilities from abroad. One of these fields was the IT sector to which the Schröder government responded with introducing the so-called “Green Card” programme that allowed hiring IT-specialists from outside the European Union. It was policies like this one, that brought about a wider shift also among the public in how they perceived immigration. The CDU/CSU, in light of the already high unemployment rates in the country, created the infamous slogan “Kinder statt Inder” (Children instead of Indians), to express their opposition to the policy. However, when opposing to the dual citizenship issue had helped the conservatives to mobilize voters for the 1999 Hesse elections, opposing to the foreign recruitment didn’t work out the same way for the 2000 North-Rhine Westphalia elections (Ibid., 113). This failure to mobilize voters behind the opposition was not, however, the only struggle that the CDU/CSU was going through. Internal struggles as well as the party financing scandal that was uncovered in 1999 were signs of much needed change in the party itself.

Meanwhile, in spring 2000, Angela Merkel emerged from her party’s financing scandal as the new party leader steering the CDU into slightly more liberal waters regarding issues of immigration, integration and citizenship and the government could thus go ahead with its high-skilled labor immigration policies (Ibid., 115). Even the fact that she fully embraced that Germany is a country of immigration is a big step forward from CDU/CSU’s previous positions. By publicly saying that Germany is a country of immigration, she officially distances herself from CDU’s decades-lasting approach towards the one supported by, for example, the Greens – the most liberal party in German politics regarding immigration and integration (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2015). Not all conservatives have lined up behind the new course, however, and Merkel was faced with considerable opposition in her own party by those who did not agree in the liberal shift from early on.

In light of these events, the Minister of Interior Otto Schily began promoting a reform of legislation concerning immigrants and foreigners. An independent immigration commission, including representatives from among politicians, churches, industries,
unions and experts, was established for developing this proposal. Their report on 2001, suggesting a similar point-system to Canada and establishing a Federal Office for Immigration and Integration, was welcomed by the SPD-Green government as well as the FDP, but not the CDU/CSU. Schily’s commission, led by Rita Süssmuth, who was also one of the more liberal politicians within the CDU, was not however the only commission established. Another notable one was the one set up by the CDU. Whereas the latter remained on a much more restrictive position regarding immigration, both commissions agreed on promoting language training (Ibid., 121-122). In an effort to gain support from the majority-holding opposition powers in the Bundesrat, several concessions were made by the time minister Schily proposed a new Immigration Act, which was finally passed in 2004 and came into force January 1, 2005 (Borkert, Boswick 2011, 102-103). The process towards passing the bill turned out to be another long road in German politics, resembling the adoption of the Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz) of 1990, discussed earlier. The biggest hurdle was again gaining the necessary majority in the Bundesrat. To illustrate the complicatedness of it – in 2002, the bill came very close to being accepted, but was then challenged by several CDU-led Länder and struck down in the Constitutional Court of Germany due to the state of Brandenburg’s representatives having voted differently in the Bundesrat, which is against the law in Germany (Green 2004, 126-127). This was, however, a difficult time for the topics of immigration and integration globally, which also reflected in Germany. The 9/11 and Madrid train bombing terrorist attacks were the biggest events to cause wider political as well as public discourse level polarization.

The new Immigration Act that was initially supposed to quickly follow the new Nationality Act, but ended up coming to force four years later, constituted a legislative turning point in itself as well. For the first time in Germany, a legislative act not only combined regulations for immigration and integration, but also had a government body – the Federal Agency of Migration and Refugees – to oversee its implementation (Williams 2014, 61). The new law simplified the residence-status system, leaving only two types: limited and permanent residence permits. Integration measures were included in the law as a major feature and the requirements for naturalization were actually increased (Ibid.). Emphasis was put on proving sufficient German language skills, especially as a new feature for the family members of ethnic German immigrants, wishing to reunite. As a special feature, the successful completion of a so-called
integration course that included German history and politics lessons, was rewarded with reducing the required residency from 8 to 7 years (Hailbronner, Farahat 2015, 8). As for persons applying for residence permits, the eligible immigrants are entitled to the integration courses, whereas under certain conditions, participation in those courses is mandatory for residents – for instance when they are receiving welfare payments or if they are classified as “in special need for integration”. Refusing these provisions may cause sanctions. These courses were mainly aimed at teaching German language skills, but simultaneously promoting the “historical, cultural and legal orientation” of German society (Borkert, Boswick 2011, 106). Therefore, even though the Nationality Act and the Immigration Act were seen as turning points in Germany’s politics regarding immigration and integration, a major shift on an actual policy level was much less to be seen as it was on the general discourse level among the SPD-Green government. However, a change had definitely taken place. Firstly, in the sense that the official politics was no longer denying Germany’s status of an immigration country. Instead, it was now officially not only acknowledged as a fact – moreover, the country had come to accepting the realities of a large migrant community as well as the need for immigration in order to balance the negative trends in demographics alongside with shortages on the labor market that needed urgent attention and caused pressure on the political actors from the private sector. Secondly, the legal changes achieved under Schröder started to change the meaning of citizenship, which has become increasingly less of a proof of ethnic belonging and descent as it had been all through the previous decades, and more of a symbol of common values and belonging.

Towards greater migrant participation and multiculturalism?

On September 18, 2005, early federal elections took place after a failed motion of confidence against chancellor Schröder, which was organized after the SPD’s loss in the state of North-Rhine Westphalia, that gave the CDU/CSU and FDP a working majority in the Bundestag. In a stalemate situation after the federal elections where the CDU/CSU won only 1% more votes than the SPD (35,2% and 34,2%), neither the CDU/CSU-FDP or the SPD-Green groups had gained enough votes to form a majority government. As a result, a Grand Coalition was formed with the CDU/CSU-SPD government under the leadership of Angela Merkel (CDU).
Following the legislature passing of the SPD-Green government, a new era, of sorts, started under Merkel. With Merkel being a more liberal leader of the party and with the SPD still sharing a seat in the government, the picture differed a lot from the pre-SPD-Green government times of the CDU/CSU being in power. If the period before the CDU/CSU’s return to the government was largely characterized by introducing new laws, the focus was now more on pro-active measures as the larger legal changes were mostly achieved and the emphasis shifted to implementation and thus continuing what had been started under Schröder. In fact, the extent to which the first Merkel government adopted policies and measures has led some authors, such as Mushaben (2011, 376-377), to view the grand coalition as having achieved more in terms of rights and opportunities for migrants in Germany than any other post-war government before.

Several minority representation and dialogue programs started under Merkel’s government – an activity encouraged by the European Union since 2005 (Musch 2012, 74). In 2006, shortly after Berlin’s first Integrationsgipfel (Integration Summit) the first one of this kind was held on a national level as well. Due to the fragmentation of responsibilities in the German political system and with the aim of promoting stronger cooperation and shared responsibility, firstly, representatives from federal, Länder and local level authorities were included. Secondly, from the society’s side, a wide range of umbrella organizations were included through a comparatively informal selection process – immigrant associations of various nationalities, ethnic Germans from Russia, the Working Group of Immigrant Associations in Germany, bi-national associations, individuals with migrant background from various fields (journalism, business, law, education, health, art), churches (Catholic, Protestant, Russian and Greek Orthodox), the Central Council of Jews in Germany, welfare and sports organizations, trade unions, business associations, several national foundations, researchers as well as media representatives (Ibid., 79). The second national Integrationsgipfel a year later introduced the National Integration Plan – another clear sign of Germany taking an active stance of an immigration country and dealing with immigration issues through engaging various state authorities, employers, ethnic associations and other integration stakeholders into the larger dialogue (Mushaben 2011, 383).

The nature of this document can be observed from its 10 central tasks: (Die Bundesregierung 2007):
1. Improving integration courses
2. Promoting German language acquisition from early age on
3. Securing education, vocational training and labor market mobility
4. Improving life conditions and opportunities for women and girls
5. Fostering integration as a local responsibility
6. Fostering integration through civic participation
7. Strengthening intercultural competence in public and private sectors
8. Advancing integration through sports
9. Promoting pluralism and diversity through the media
10. Opening German scholarship and research facilities to the world

These objectives seem much more to be promoting plurality and cultural differences in the public sphere, characteristic to a more multiculturalist approach of integration. Integration as a term itself, received the first government-endorsed definition in Germany that officially described integration as a two-way process, emphasizing the fact that successful integration does not mean giving up one’s own cultural identity (Die Bundesregierung 2007, 127). As the assimilationist approach of immigrant integration definitely includes notion of the migrant having to give up their identity, this could be seen as an official step further away and towards a more multiculturalist approach on the state level.

Another interesting phenomenon can be seen developing during the Merkel era. Namely, even though the federal political system of Germany has made education strictly a Ländersache (governed on the Länder-level), Merkel has brought it much more to the national level under the discussion on integration. This was mainly caused by the so-called PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) shocks in the early 2000s, when the study focused especially on immigrant students. The results showed some major achievement differences between ethnic German and migrant children. Another event pushing for more action in the field was the one that occurred in 2006 in Berlin Rütli school. Multiple teachers resigned, stating that their pupils’ aggressiveness and poor German language proficiency has made teaching impossible (Borkert, Bosswik 2011, 120). Thus, education as a topic was also included in the National Integration Plan and the first progress report published in 2008, whereas seen as the key areas for achieving integration (Die Bundesregierung 2008, 33). Avoiding
segregation in schools and fostering German language learning were emphasized as goals that would eventually help students with migration background have equal chances later in life (Ibid., 63-65). Even though making migrants learn the state language as a state policy does not yet mean assimilation (even the most multiculturalist countries in the world such as Canada expect migrants to learn the state language), this approach does not offer any kind of support for the migrants’ mother tongue languages in the public sphere, in this case schools. Even though education in the mother tongue languages of migrants has existed in Germany even after the guest-worker programs, they were never a part of a multiculturalist policy (Schönwälder 2010, 159-160). Thus, on the federal level, education is still handled in a rather assimilationist way, even under Merkel and after overall shift that has taken place regarding integration.

Other similar projects of fostering dialogue were launched during the period as well, such as, for instance, the first Migrant Youth Integration Summit in 2007, which gathered 80 young representatives alongside with the media and related organization representatives and focused on integration problems such as language and education questions as well (Mushaben 2011, 384) However, Merkel, being a more liberal and pro-active regarding immigration and integration than the former CDU/CSU politicians on high positions, did not enjoy a clear road ahead of herself either. Opinions about suitable stances varied within the party. After the first Integrationsgipfel in 2006, the then interior minister Schäuble gathered the Islamkonferenz (Conference on Islam) in the light of the Madrid bombings in 2005 and the growing concerns on terrorism among the public. The adequacy of Muslim representatives of this dialogue process remains a lot more debated, but for instance, another discussion body, the Coordinating Council of Muslims in Germany, grew out of Schäuble’s conference (Ibid., 385-386). The conference, however, only took place annually for three years.

As we can see, the first Grand Coalition between 2005 and 2009 made some major efforts in order to develop official dialogue with minority representatives in the country. The year 2009 saw another federal election and, as a result, also a change in the government coalition. The Grand Coalition was dissolved and replaced with a CDU/CSU-FDP alliance, which meant that the more liberal SPD was back in the opposition. The strongest of the dialogue bodies – the Integrationsgipfel – has been continuing until the writing of this thesis (2016) and seems to have established a place
in German politics regarding the topic. However, in 2010, the arguably most quoted remark was made by Merkel at the Junge Union (the CDU youth) conference stating that the multicultural approach has utterly failed (Der Spiegel 2010b). Emphasizing that not only should migrants be supported (fördern), but they should also be expected to give something in return (fordern), she claimed that the multicultural approach of living side by side without integrating has failed (Siebold 2010). However, Merkel’s role in this debate was actually a more of a compromise finding one, as other CDU/CSU politicians, such as the CSU leader Horst Seehofer, were making even stronger claims, emphasizing the German Leitkultur and strongly opposing multiculturalism (Der Spiegel 2010a). Merkel’s message was that the migrant culture, such as mosques in the German landscape, should be accepted by now – therefore, still pushing for a two-way understanding of integration.

Thus, it can be said that the more recent years and the CDU/CSU-FDP government era of 2009-2013 has brought a kind of a backlash against multiculturalism in at least official statements of German politicians. It is important to note, that as the scale for this analysis is a continuum, I am not talking about a retreat from a full-scale multiculturalist approach, which never existed in Germany this far. But as Schönwälder (2010) argues, even though, on a federal level, such policies never existed in Germany, there is still reason to talk of a retreat from the whole idea of multiculturalism even in Germany. The government, but even the most liberal forces in the politics such as the Greens, are distancing themselves from the term. This however is taking place alongside with the continuing work of minority representation and dialogue fostering institutions. German politics under Merkel has been constantly building on the shift in approach that already took place during the Schröder era and was expressed through major legal changes. Whereas Williams (2014, 68) sees the paradigm shift in the integration summits taking place, Mushaben (2011, 383) argues that Merkel’s contribution was the completion of a shift started by the SPD-Green government. I, too, argue that the proactive Measures introduced by Merkel were necessary to bring change, which the Schröder era only started by laying a very important ground. This is also why I consider the Schröder and Merkel governments as one phase in the context of this thesis. Germany’s long and complicated history with accommodating migrants ever since the end of the Second World War has clearly shown that a change as fast and complete as initially expected from the SPD-Green government could not have possibly taken place. The biggest
political parties in the country have long have different understandings of how the issue is best dealt with. The opposition has, however, eased to some extent with firstly the CDU/CSU and the SPD forming a coalition together and secondly Angela Merkel increasingly taking up the role of a mediator between the more conservative side within the CDU/CSU and the more liberal forces in the politics that are now fully accepting Germany’s role as an immigration country and aim at rather more multiculturalist policy approaches to tackle the integration questions rising from that new national identity.

The end of the CDU/CSU-FDP government and the return of the Grand Coalition in 2013 is where the analysis of this thesis ends. As mentioned in the beginning, the current debate, mostly triggered by a new wave of mass-immigration of asylum seekers from mostly Muslim countries as well as continuing proof of integration policies not having achieved their goals in many countries around Germany as well, has tremendously changed the situation in which the debates are taking place now. Differing from past decades, the focus and debate is now clearly on migrants from Muslim countries and not much on Spätaussiedler, Jews, EU-migrants or other such groups. Thus, yet another new phase in this topic has been opened, which, in a way, already started from the Madrid bombings in 2004, but escalated in the recent years and especially with the Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016, and that phase is beyond the scope of this thesis.
4. Conclusion

When analyzing Germany’s experience with handling immigration and integration over the past decades, one is clear – it has been a long and rocky road of coming to acceptance with being a country of immigration. This has constituted reevaluating the whole national identity and integration policymaking, which has now been slowly catching up with the reality that is a community of millions of people with migration background living permanently in Germany.

The contribution of this thesis was to, first, provide a theoretical framework for analyzing state approaches towards immigrant integration. Based on various authors’ work, a continuum with the ideal-typical ends of multiculturalist and assimilationist approaches was developed. Most democratic states with sizable immigrant populations can be placed on that continuum by analyzing their policies. Multiculturalist states publicly promote and foster diversity preservation through, for instance, mother-tongue teaching, supporting minority representation or allowing the practicing of different religions. Assimilationist states, in contrast, expect the migrant to give up their former identity, at least in the public sphere. Private life, of course, cannot be intervened by the state in that way. In the context of this thesis, it is important to draw a line between forced assimilation (which is clearly a violation of human rights) and voluntary assimilation. A state with an assimilationist approach towards migrants, does not make difference based on their ethnicity or cultural differences and see this as the best practice for achieving integration in the society.

Secondly, this thesis focused on the case study of Germany. Even though large numbers of migrants were entering the country through various channels, the government remained on the position of not seeing Germany as an immigration country for a long time, even after the reunification, which had been a big reason why a notion of a strong national identity had been kept up, under Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The pressures started, however, growing and the need for addressing the issue of integration became more apparent as many of the immigrant guest-workers, who had been officially expected to return home, decided to stay and bring over their families. On the other hand, the profile of the German (Spät-)Aussiedler (ethnic German immigrants, who
gained citizenship right away due to descent) had started to change drastically, especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Thus, change was long overdue by the time it actually started slowly taking place in the 1990s.

An actual tangible shift was started after the change of government in 1998. The new SPD-Green government under Gerhard Schröder introduced major legal changes by accepting the new Nationality Act and Immigration Act coming to force in 2000 and 2005 respectively. Actually, these changes ended up being less than and took longer than expected, due to constant struggles with the opposition, as well as they did not initially reflect a watershed in, for instance, the number of naturalizations. Nevertheless, I argue that these changes constituted a paradigm shift in terms of laying the basis for further efforts and changing the official approach towards the issue of integration. Thus, I consider the era of Angela Merkel as a follow-up to the initial shift during the SPD-Green government that completed the process by introducing more pro-active measures and opening up official high-level dialogue with minorities.

In theoretical terms, I clearly see Germany more on the assimilationist side of the theoretical continuum created for this analysis. A shift towards a more multiculturalist approach started taking place with the legal changes done under Schröder. For that to be possible, the whole national identity had to change, in a way. A kind of *ius soli* was introduced. The meaning of naturalization, for the first time in Germany, changed from being an end goal to being a means in the process of integration. The following period of Merkel’s first Grand Coalition saw a more pro-active implementation of this new approach. In a way, the state-fostered and institutionalized dialogue, which constituted clear high-level minority representation and inclusion, could be seen as definite multiculturalist actions from the government’s side. However, if one looks at the reality behind these events, especially in the later years and during the CDU/CSU-FDP government that followed the Grand Coalition, a kind of a backlash from even the attempt for more multiculturalist policies towards more assimilationist integration efforts can be seen. Thus, by the end of this analysis and by the start of a new phase, Germany seems to have stagnated on the multiculturalist-assimilationist continuum, where, if not the introduction of more restrictive policies can be seen, definitely no movement towards more multiculturalism can be expected at this point either and effort is necessary to maintain what has been achieved.
Kokkuvõte


Literature


30. Winter, Elke. 2010 “Trajectories of Multiculturalism in Germany, the Netherlands and Canada: In Search of Common Patterns” *Government and Opposition* 45(2):166-186


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