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Master’s Thesis

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Application of the European Union’s Human Security Approach to the European Union Monitoring Mission to Georgia

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I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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## Contents

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 7

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS AND LOGIC OF CONSEQUENCES ........................................................................................................ 16

Methodology, Data Collection and Data Analysis ................................................................ 21

EUROPEAN UNION’S APPROACH TO HUMAN SECURITY .............................................. 31

HUMAN SECURITY UNDER CSDP MISSIONS .................................................................. 40

BACKGROUND: CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA AND EU’S ENGAGEMENT .................... 43

EU’S RESPONSE TO RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR: HUMAN OR TERRITORIAL SECURITY? ...................................................................................................................... 50

EUMM GEORGIA: MANDATE, INSTRUMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION- TRANSLATED INTO HUMAN SECURITY TERMS ....................................................... 52

UNDERSTANDING EU’S RATIONALE IN ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH IN EUMM IN GEORGIA ........................................ 68

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 74

LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 78

APPENDICES ..................................................................................................................... 89

Annex 1. Six-point agreement ............................................................................................. 89

Annex 2. Ongoing CSDP missions ....................................................................................... 89

Annex 3. Interview-guiding questions ................................................................................ 90
List of Acronyms

ABLs-Administrative Boundary Lines
CFSP-Foreign and Security Policy
CIS-Commonwealth of Independent States
COBERM-Confidence Building and Early Response Mechanism
CONOP-Concept of Operation
CSDP- Common Security and Defence Policy
CSOs-Civil Society Organizations
ENP-European Neighborhood Policy
ESDP-European Security and Defence Policy
ESS-European Security Strategy
EU-European Union
EUGS-European Union Global Strategy
EUGS-European Union Global Strategy
EUMM Georgia-European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia
EUSR-European Union Special Representative
GID-Geneva International Discussions
HSSG-Human Security Study Group
HSSG-Human Security Study Group
IDP-Internally Displaced persons
IIFFMCG-Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia
IPRM-Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism
JCC-Joint Control Commission
NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPLAN-Operation Plan
OSCE-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCA-Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
SGESC-Study Group on European Security Capabilities
UNDP-United Nations Development Programme
UNOMIG-United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UN-United Nations
Abstract

Human security refers to the security agenda, where individuals are treated as a centerpiece of security. By declaring human beings and their rights of personal security as a primary object of security, this new concept contradicts traditional understanding of security, which emphasized the primacy of security of the states. Emergence of this new security agenda is considered to be a result of the post-Cold War era developments on the political and security scenes. In the era of globalization the new forms of conflicts-like hybrid and cyber wars, in which a classical distinction between state and non-state, government and rebel, public and private, external and internal, economic and political are breaking down (Human Security Study Group, 2016:4; see Hoffman, 2007; Kaldor, 2013; Newman, 2004) – emerged and challenged the traditional understanding of security in the last two decades.

The thesis tries to explore the way in which this emerging security agenda has found its way into the security practices of an emerging security actor, the European Union (EU). In this context, while the work introduces the human security concept in the realm of the EU, in particular in the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) is being examined as a case where human security is put in practice. Thesis puts forward a set of three interrelated questions: Firstly, whether human security approach was followed by the EU in EUMM Georgia and secondly, how it was implemented. For this purpose, the six principles of human security, defined by Madrid Report of 2007 will be scrutinized and will be used as an indicator to measure practical implementation of the EU human security approach on the ground, in case of EUMM Georgia. And thirdly, it goes on to explore what was the rationale for the EU to opt for this approach. In order to account for this latter, the thesis applies both Constructivist and Rationalist theories along the human security concept in the framework of the EU’s CSDP, and argues that it is the combination of rationalist calculation and considerations of appropriateness that leads the EU to adopt a human security approach in CSDP, in this case in EUMM Georgia.

Key words: Human Security, CSDP missions, EUMM Georgia
Introduction

Conventional, Cold-War era understanding of security in the field of research of International Relations (IR) and Security Studies has a “Realist” theoretical underpinning and narrow sense of security, with an emphasis on the primacy of state, national security and military threats (see Walt, 1991). In the post-Cold War era, however, this situation has changed, which was resulted from the structural transformation of IR from a bipolar to a multipolar system. State-based approaches to security was challenged (see Bilgin, 2003; Buzan 1997), leading to re-evaluation of the definition of security (see Sahel, 2010). Consequently, in the debate two groups “wideners” and “deepeners” have emerged. Academics in the first group indicated the significance of the broader range of threats (such as economic and environmental) to the state, while academic from the second group indicating the need for the deepening of the security agenda either down, to make individual as a referent object of security or up to the international or regional level (see Krause et.al, 1996; Barry et.al, 1998;).

Thus, emergence of new threats, that moved beyond the national borders of the state because of the rise of non-state actors, failed states, terrorism and environmental degradation among others (Booth, 2005; Tadjbakhsh 2005), led to the increasing securitization of the spheres which were outside the framework of conventional understanding of security, before (see Buzan, 1997). Conflicts such as in Rwanda, which was characterized by a massive human rights violation, in addition to the rise of mass media, as one of the products of globalization has played their roles as well. Worldwide news coverage unveiled ordinary people’s suffering in real time and made the information available for everyone. As Lippmann famously noted, that which is “out of reach, out of sight, out of mind” has become possible to see (Lippmann, 1922: 29). Therefore, as Kotsopoulos puts it “the importance of protecting vulnerable individuals irrespective of their nationality” was revealed (Kotsopoulos, 2006:8). One of the attempts to response to this new security situation, made by international actors, including the European Union (hereafter EU) was “efforts to incorporate the dimension of human security” in their security practices (Sira and Gräns, 2009:1). As Martin, Kaldor and Serra (2013:1) further clarify:
“in moving beyond a world of states where security was defined by threats to the territorial and sovereign identity of the nations, the idea of human security set in motion a fundamental tension between ‘old’ security based on interpretations of national interest, and the ‘new’ security which looked at the needs and rights of people to lead lives free of fear or extreme deprivation”.

According to Matlary: “Human security refers to the emerging security agenda where the point of reference is the individual person and his or her right to personal security” (Matlary, 2008:135).

In general, the United Nations (UN) is one of the first major actors to contribute to the development of the conceptual definition of human security as well as one, acting on human security related issues (Kotsopoulos, 2006:8). This concept was officially introduced by the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report which defined this concept in broad terms, understandable from only “freedom from want” approach (“freedom from poverty”/“a concern with human life and dignity”). On the other hand other actors like Canada, adopted narrower definition of human security, understandable as “freedom from fear” (“Freedom from violence”/concern with weapons”), (Liotta and Owen, 2006:42).

When it comes to the EU known as “a second generation of human security” (see Martin and Owen, 2010; Human Security Study Group, 2016), development of this concept within the EU security policy framework is mainly related to the work of Human Security Study Group (HSSG). The HSSG under the leadership of Mary Kaldor, since early 2000s, has been actively promoting adoption of human security approach as the most appropriate strategic narrative for the EU, as a global actor. Over the last 15 years there is a continuing discussion on the importance of human security as a guiding strategy for the EU security policy as a twenty-first century actor (see Human Security Studies Group, 2016; Christou, 2014). Different EU institutions, like the

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1 In this thesis EU is defined as a collective actor, intergovernmental body constructed and acting on behalf of its member states. As the research focus is on the actual implementation of the EU’s security policy on the ground via EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) toolkit-civilian monitoring mission in Georgia, rather than on internal decision-making processes, therefore national interests of the member states, European institutions are not discussed separately.

2 Initially, known as “Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities. Convener Mary Kaldor, professor at London School of Economics (LSE). Team was/is comprising from people from academia as well as military and civilian practitioners, from all over the Europe.
European Commission and the European Council, EU High Representatives for Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as researchers have been engaged in this debate (Thomson 2016:1).

It is argued that “European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a Better World” (ESS) is a document where European shifted understanding of the concept of security was officially established, first time after the end of the Cold War (Martin and Owen 2010; Owen and Liotta, 2006; Gottwald 2014; Matlary 2008; Glasius 2008; Kotsopoulos 2006). The European Council adopted ESS in December 2003. In ESS, new security environment was described by emphasizing attention on non-traditional threats to security, like poverty, climate change, and bad governance together with the traditional threats like terrorism, regional conflicts and failed states. In addition, insecurity experienced by individuals as a challenge the EU has to address was underlined (European Security Strategy, 2003:2,5). Moreover, ESS’s title "A secure Europe in a Better World" also stressed the importance for the EU as a global security player to take a responsibility and play role as a “formidable force for good”, as then it is defined in the text (European Security Strategy, 2003:13). This document is considered by proponents of human security as the first clear manifestation of the EU’s shift towards human security approach (see Martin and Owen 2010; Kaldor et.al 2009). For instance, Liotta and Owen explain that nevertheless human security concept is not explicitly referred in the text of ESS, “the concept’s principles, including the need to address and solve longer-term development issues that could actually sustain and resolve the security dilemma of many in nations and regions in crisis, are omnipresent” (Liotta and Owen, 2006: 96-97). Therefore, from the ESS (2003) it is visible that human security agenda was already reflected in the new security thinking of the EU.

After the request of Javier Solana, HSSG prepared two reports: 1. “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities” in 2004 and 2. “Madrid Report: A European Way of Security” in 2007. They presented how European human security should be formulated, as well as presented practical guidelines for the EU’s engagement in crisis situations abroad, under CSDP. These reports defined human security as both “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”: as a “freedom for individuals from basic insecurities”, which is caused by
massive human rights violation (including genocide and slavery as well as violations of the right to food, health and housing) (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004:4). In this thesis exactly that definition of human security will be used, as it was initially defined by diplomat Report. Madrid Report further clarifies this definition saying that: “It is about helping people to feel safe in their homes and on the streets as well as ensuring they have what they need to live on” (Human Security Study Group, 2007:8).


Thus, given the above described information, the thesis tries to utilize the analytical leverage provided by the concept of human security to investigate the security practices of the EU, in particular, in the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In this thesis European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) is being examined as a case where human security is discussed in practical terms. Examining human security approach in the CSDP [missions] framework is chosen, because: first, in the EU, human security is presented as an effective guiding strategy/methodology for its external engagement, particularly in conflict affected regions (Martin, 2007:64); and second, if in traditional security thinking “hard security” is considered to be connected to state security, not so much to individual security, it would be interesting to see whether in the case of the EU even the hard security dimension is at the service of human security.
Given this research focus, an immediate caveat is in place: the aim of this thesis is not to engage in existing academic debate whether human security is adopted as a guiding strategy in the EU security and defence policy, but instead to find out whether it is followed *in practice* on the example of EUMM Georgia. Therefore, main objective of the thesis is to contribute to the academic debate about the analytical value of this concept and to analyzing its practical usage.

There are several reasons of why exactly the EU is chosen as case for examination of the practical usage of the human security concept: First, over the last fifteen years the EU has been gradually emerged as global security actor, developed its capacity to deal with international crises and expressing willingness to engage via CSDP instruments abroad (Heyenen, 2015:11; Howorth, 2010; Rogers, 2009), for instance via deploying military of civilian mission conflict-affected regions, ranging from post-tsunami peace building in Aceh; fighting piracy in Somali coast; to protecting refugees in Chad (Council of the EU, 2008a) “to safeguard European Security by improving global security” (Biscop and Whitman, 2013:1) and to promote its values worldwide. Thus, it differs from the state by its normative basis for which the human individual as the ultimate reference point (Manners, 2002), making the EU more prone to pursue human security approach.

Second, the EU differs from the other international organizations (for instance North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is based on the promotion of security by military means), by being able to deploy means across the entire spectrum of policy areas, to promote democratic development, justice, the rule of law and good governance. Thus, by following more comprehensive approach towards security, it is expected that the EU has advantage to address the new, broader security agenda that was discussed earlier in this chapter (Heyenen, 2015:11).

Therefore, if the human security concept has gained traction in the security practices of any international actor of significance, it should be the EU, and that human security thus is likely to be reflected in the EU’s CSDP.

In this context, while the work introduces the human security concept in the realm of the EU and its CSDP, the European Union Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM Georgia) is taken as an example to investigate whether and how the human security
approach was implemented in practice by the EU, and finally, to further explore why the EU opted for this approach?

Therefore, research questions are formulated in this way:

**Whether human security approach was followed in European Union Monitoring Mission Georgia (EUMM Georgia) by the EU? If yes, how was it implemented? And finally, what was the guiding rationale for the EU to implement this approach?**

To assess and analyse whether human security approach was implemented by the EU in EUMM Georgia, six principles of human security defined by “Madrid report-A European Way of Security-of the Human Security Study Group”, from 2007 will be scrutinized and be used as an indicator to measure EU’s application of the concept of human security on the ground. The main rationale for choosing these principles as an indicator was the fact that they were proposed by Madrid Report as the guidelines for the EU how it should implement human security approach on the ground. Therefore, their usage will be particularly useful for understanding how EUMM Georgia has performed on the ground in order to conclude whether human security approach was followed by the EU in this particular mission.

With regards to the first part of the research question (Whether human security approach was followed in the EUMM Georgia by the EU and how was it implemented?) the thesis expects that:

—**EU implements human security approach, in practice, in the EUMM Georgia.**

When it comes to the second part of the research question, the reasoning underlying the adoption of a human security approach in the EUMM Georgia, the thesis puts forward the hypothesis that

—**It is the combination of rationalist calculation and considerations of appropriateness that leads the EU to adopt a human security approach in EUMM Georgia.**

This means, that the thesis applies both Constructivist and Rationalist theories in combination along the Human security concept in the framework of the EU’s CSDP, in order to understand the underlying reasoning for adopting a human security approach in EUMM Georgia. Thus, in this study constructivist and rationalist approaches will be used as the complementary theoretical toolkits, with the aim to provide comprehensive
account for the EU's adoption of a human security approach in EUMM Georgia, the
explanatory power of both approaches, including reasoning based on rational
calculation (logic of consequences) and considerations of legitimate action (logic of
appropriateness), material factors as well as ideational factors will be combined.

The time frame of this research project is the period 2008-2016, more precisely,
etire period since October 1, 2008, when EUMM Georgia was deployed on the ground,
until December 1, 2016, when all the interviews were already conducted and data was
collected. As for the empirical part of the thesis, following Blaikie’s (2003)
identification data is collected through the combination of three techniques: Primary
(eight interview with EUMM Georgia representatives and experts); Secondary (all the
relevant EU documentation, such as Council Conclusions, European Parliament
Resolutions; Commission country strategy papers on Georgia); and Tertiary (academic
papers, field assessments studies, report produced by other scholars and experts).

As the human security is a relatively new concept for the EU it is yet to be
explored what explains the motivations for the EU’s this particular form of engagement
in Georgia since 2008 through the lens of this approach. EUMM Georgia is an unarmed
civilian monitoring mission, which was deployed by the EU to Georgia in October,
2008. The decision on the launch of the mission was received in the Council of the EU
on September, 15 (Council of the EU, 2008b) as a followed up action to the EU-
mediated Six Point Agreement (August 12, 2008; see annex 1) which ended the five-
day August war between Georgia and Russia (see below page). Through this mission
EU sent around 200 monitors to Georgia, with the main purpose to monitor
implementation of ceasefire agreement and to prevent renewal of hostilities. Since then,
EUMM Georgia is presented on the ground for 8 years3.

Several rationales underpin the selection of the case of EUMM Georgia:

First of all, there are not many studies in the academic literature which applies
human security approach to the EU’s foreign and security policies, or the ones that write
about the possible motivations for the EU to follow this approach. As this is a newly
developed security field within the EU the vast majority of the literature discusses what

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3 External Action Service, European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia
https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm
this concept means for the EU or what place it occupies in the EU’s contemporary strategic discourse and practice (Christou 2014; Gottwald 2012; Kaldor et al 2007; Kostopoulos 2006; Matlary 2008). Indeed, there is a relatively high number of theoretical and empirical literature which investigates what kind of a security actor the EU is (Duchêne 1972; Bull, 1982; Manners, 2002; Hyde-Price, 2004), or what motivations drive its foreign and security policies (Kartsonaki and Wolff 2015; Biondo 2015; Youngs 2004; Smith 2003; Noutcheva et.at 2013; Kratochvil and Tulmets 2010; Noutcheva et.al 2013), why it responds to international crises/conflicts (Hazelzet 2006, Olsen 2009; Menon and Sedelmeier 2010). Empirical literature about the EU’s role and its involvement in the conflict-affected regions of Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) is also available (Akçakoca 2009; Jeppsson 2015; Bardakçı 2010; Kakachia 2010; Mithelidze 2009), some studies also try to asses EU’s effectiveness in these conflicts (Whitman and Wolff 2010; 2012; Popescu 2011; Simão 2013), but literature which discusses EU’s engagement in Georgia’s conflicts from the human security perspective is rare (see Martin, 2009; Sinkkonen 2011). Therefore, present study seeks to address this gap in the literature and offer new insights by presenting the EU’s actions on the ground from the people-centered approach to security.

Secondly, despite the fact that during mission set-up or its mandate human security as a concept was not explicitly mentioned in the documentation, principles of human security approach is still observable, for instance in the mandate under Normalisation pillar (Council of the EU, 2008b:27). In addition, structure of the mission also indicates on the existence of human security approach, in order to implement its mandate, the monitors of EUMM Georgia are divided into different teams who observe the situation on the ground. One of them is named “human security team” comprising of human security patrols with the main aim to "cover human security aspects of conflict management”4 This fact confirms the relevance of choosing EUMM Georgia as a case for consideration.

Moreover, this is the first ceasefire monitoring mission launched by the EU and a mission which is frequently used by the EU as an example for planning similar

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EUMM factsheet (2016), [https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM%20Factsheet%20ENG%202016.pdf](https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM%20Factsheet%20ENG%202016.pdf)
operations for the future, according to the Council of the EU’s Report from 2010, for instance Operation Plan (OPLAN) of EUMM Georgia is considered as the “most elaborate one with regard to integrating human rights”, as an example for collecting gender-disaggregated information, or as an example “why transitional justice needs to be considered as part of peacebuilding” (Council of the EU, 2010a:14,19).

Lastly, this monitoring mission was deployed on the ground in 2008, the same year when human security as a concept was explicitly mentioned, first time, in the EU official documentation, namely in the Report on ESS, therefore by looking into EU documentation produced on EUMM Georgia and on the situation in Georgia, in general and speeches of the missions representatives as well as EU practitioners it will be explored what role the human security concept has there and what actual, practical actions and policies were undertaken on the ground in order to conclude if this security approach can be counted as a case.

Limitations of the present project needs to be specified as well. First limitation is related to the restriction to the access of data. Due to existence of classified documentation on the EUMM Georgia (as this is still on-going mission under CSDP), access on the very specific information from Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Concept of Operation (CONOPs), as well as Mission’s reviews (for richer information) were not possible, except from its original mandate and followed up Council conclusions. But this limitation was addresses by conducting semi-structured interviews with current and former EUMM Georgia staff and people from academia, in addition to using outcomes of already existing studies in this field. Second, case selection of this research project might also has limitation in relation to generalization of the outcomes on the whole CSDP missions: geopolitical variation, the format of the mission and time of their deployment might change situation, by adding or reducing the number of variables, while explaining EU’s adoption of human security approach under CSDP. Third, in the discussion of human security approach in the EU, academic and policy advocacy are intertwined, meaning that this may result in certain biases, but this limitation was addressed by means of careful and conscious usage of the concept, as well as in depth-analysis of critical literature on this issue.
Also it should be underlined that the purpose of this study is not to argue whether human security concept plays a strategic role in the EU’s strategic narrative, but to show whether human security approach was observable in the EUMM Georgia and was implemented in practice. Additionally, understanding and evaluation EU’s role as an effective crisis manager actor in Georgia’s conflict regions is out of the scope of this research (see Popescu 2011, Whitman and Wolff 2010).

After presenting this introductory section, which briefly described main ideas and aims of the thesis, next sections of the study will elaborate in details the issues presented above. So, structured of this study is organized in the following way: First chapter explains theoretical framework underpinning the present research project. Here, main argumentations from each theoretical perspectives, from Rationalism and Constructivism will be presented and the need for and possibility of their combination will be suggested. The following, second chapter unveils methodological framework of the present study, that then is followed by a literature review of the existing studies which discusses human security concept, its place in the realm of EU’s security and defence policy and its practical implementation, concluding with the discussion of the place and importance of the research in the existing literature and its contribution to the further research. Final, empirical part of the thesis starts from the presentation of the EUMM Georgia’s case, followed-up by discussion of the findings of the research and by summary.

**Theoretical Framework: Logic of Appropriateness and Logic of Consequences**

In this section, theoretical framework of the thesis will be outlined, by introducing constructivism and rationalism as the two approaches that theoretically underpin this thesis: a debate between these two theoretical approaches is discussed and the main characteristics and argumentations, common grounds and differences from both perspectives are briefly presented. First of all, the main assumptions of Constructivist theory will be presented, and then more precisely, the essence of the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) (Manners, 2002), with its roots in social constructivism, will be discussed. Secondly, a critique of constructivism and of NPE will be suggested, which then leads then to the discussion of Rationalist arguments
(Hyde-Price, 2006) together with its critique, finally summing up with the presentation of third position, combination of both theoretical approaches in order to explain the puzzle of the thesis–EU’s eventual way of acting – in this chapter.

In the introduction to the fiftieth anniversary issue of International Organization, Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (1992:649,650) suggested that after the end of the Cold War a new debate between rationalism and constructivism would emerge, and that debate would be the main axes of theoretical thinking in IR. As Kratochvil and Tulmets conclude, nowadays, indeed this debate underpins theoretical thinking of IR as well as of European studies (Kratochvil and Tulmets, 2010:22). However, despite existence of epistemological and ontological differences between these two approaches, in this thesis Constructivism and Rationalism will be combined, and will be used as the complementary theoretical tools in order to explain one of the research question of the thesis. In particular, by analysing the case of EUMM Georgia this thesis tries to showcase that based on the combination of both, the logic of appropriateness – emphasized by constructivist approach – and the logic of consequences – underpinned by rationalists (March and Olson 1998), the EU can be expected to adopt a human security approach in its security and defence policy.


"since the late 1980s a new debate between constructivism and rationalism (including both realism and liberalism) has become more prominent as constructivists have built on epistemological challenges rooted in sociological perspectives emphasizing shared norms and values and with the end of the Cold war new theoretical developments in rationalist institutional theory, open-economy economics, and comparative politics provided scholars with new intellectual openings".

If, over the last decades, rationalist approach dominated the agenda, recently “constructivist turn” became apparent in the studies of IR as well as of European policies (Khuntsaria, 2014:20). Currently, they both represent the mainstream approaches in IR. Fearon and Wendt in their article "Rationalism V. Constructivism: A sceptical view” finely summaries:

"One way of interpreting Rationalism v. Constructivism in IR is in terms of the contrast between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. The former is a calculating machine who carefully assesses different courses of actions, choosing whichever provides the most efficient means to her ends. The latter is a rule-
follower who acts out of habit or decides what to do by posing the question 'how is a person in my role (or with my identity) supposed to act in this circumstance?"

As March and Olsen put it, *homo economicus* follows a "logic of consequences" while decisions are made by actors and sees actions driven by "prior preferences", as for *homo sociologicus* according to them in this case actors follow a "logic of expected appropriateness" and see actions as driven by "senses of identity". They argue that actors perform as rational utility maximizers on the basis of stable, consistent and exogenously determined preference, choosing among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives (March and Olsen, 1998:949-952). But according to them: "it seems to ignore the substantial role of identities, rules, and institutions in shaping human behaviour" (March and Olsen 1998:950). In contrast, constructivists see actions as "rule-based". Political actors "follow rules that associate identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations. The pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests; and with the selection of rules more than with individual rational expectations" (ibid, 951).

Nevertheless, the dichotomy between values and interests is overstated and that these two approaches do not exclude each other. Moreover, common grounds between these approaches can be seen. As Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel clarify (2003:13):

"Firstly, despite declared methodological individualism of rationalism, it is not so opposed to constructivist postulates, placing greater weight on social whole. Much rationalism work deals in practice with collective rather than individual actors. Secondly, even where individual agents do, in practice, hold explanatory pride of place in rational choice theory, they act within exogenous constraints (call them structures. which can be material, informational, institutional or even social)"

Therefore, the aim of the thesis to analyse comprehensively EU's application of human security approach on Georgian case, through the lens of the six principle of human security doctrine, leads me to an "analytic eclecticism" (an eclectic combination of diverse theoretical perspectives in making sense of cases), as I believe that none of these theories are able to explain thesis puzzle independently. Sil and Kazenstein argue that "eclecticism is an effort, a means for social scientists to guard against the risks of
excessive reliance on a single analytic framework and simplifying assumptions that come with it" (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010:414) and this analytical framework have two mains aims: “First, to problematize complex phenomena encountered by practitioners and ordinary actors, phenomena that are typically sliced into more narrowly circumscribed puzzles by adherents of research traditions and second, is designed to simultaneously traffic in theories from multiple traditions in search of linkages between different types of mechanisms” (Ibid., 426). But they also warn researchers that there might be "a danger of theoretical incoherence linked to the problem of incommensurability across traditions". Nevertheless, they themselves explain that “incommensurability can exist across theories within research traditions as well as across applications of the same theory in different contexts” (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010:414). The need for the utilization of the eclectic analytical approach, with the aim to use several approaches in combination while trying to explain EU’s foreign and security policy is also underlined by Adryan Hyde-Price, who argues that "Only in this way can we open up spaces for theoretical debate and discussion on the EU as an international actor"(Hyde-Price, 2004:112).

This idea is also supported by several authors, for instance March and Olsen believe that in order to explain actor’s behavior, particularly to understand what is behind one particular political action, both “logic of consequentiality” and “logic of appropriateness” needs to be combined because neither logic separately is able to provide comprehensive explanation. According to them these two logics are not mutually exclusive, meaning that any action might contain certain elements from each of the above described logics. Thus they argue that actors, particularly political actors are doing both, calculate what consequences their actions may have as well as follow existing rules. Therefore, state that actors are” constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected consequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions’ (March and Olsen, 1998:952). Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner also underline that "Neither perspective is adequate to cover all aspects of social reality. Constructivism is ideographic, whereas rationalism is nomothetic. But at one critical point they are joined. Both recognize-constructivism as a central research project and rationalism as a background condition-that human beings operate in a
socially constructed environment, which changes over time. Hence, both analytical perspectives focus in one way or another on common knowledge-constructivism on how it is created, rationalism on how it affects strategic decision making. The core of the constructivist project is to explicate variations in preferences, available strategies, and the nature of the players, across space and time. The core of the rationalist project is to explain strategies, given preferences, information, and common knowledge. Neither project can be complete without the other” (Katzenstein et.al, 1998: 682). Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane follow the Weberian approach and say that it is not "ideas rather than interests" (as interpreted by human beings) that "move the world", but "ideas as well as interests have casual weight in explanation of human action" and that ideas matter for policy even when human beings act rationally to achieve their ends"(Goldstein and Keohane 1993:3-5 original emphasis). When it comes to the literature on the EU foreign this view is also supported by Richard Youngs in his work “Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity”, who while trying to explain whether EU in normatively or strategically motivated actor, states that “constructivist and rationalist explanations might be combined to account for the way in which instrumental choices are made within a range of common normative understandings” because “ideational dynamics co-exist with power politics” (Youngs 2004:419). Also, similarly, Diez believes that “strategic interests and norms cannot be easily distinguished, and that the assumption of a normative sphere without interests is in itself nonsensical” (Diez, 2005: 625).

This means that based on the combination of both the logic of appropriateness (Constructivist approach) and the logic of consequentiality (Rationalist approach) the EU can be expected to adopt a human security approach. Neither alone is sufficient to account for the outcome, but in combination they reinforce each other. Taking into account above presented argumentations, it can be argued that based on both logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness there are reasons why the EU can be expected to pursue human security approach beyond its borders, in this case in Georgia.
Methodology, Data Collection and Data Analysis

In this chapter methodological framework of this research project is presented. More precisely, chapter discusses how all the necessary information was collected in order to provide answers on the research questions of this study. In addition, in this chapter will be clarified from which sources was collected data as well as presents the logic of data analysis path for the purpose of arriving to the reliable and valid outcomes.

As the main aim of this thesis is to understand why does the EU adopt human security approach in its Security and Defence policy on the example of EUMM Georgia, this thesis follows an outcome-centric research design. As Gschwend and Schimmelfenning summarise, the goal of an outcome-centric research design is “to comprehensively assess potential and alternative explanations by considering many independent variables, Xi, that in toto try to account for variance in the dependent variable, Y, as completely as possible” (Gschwend and Schimmelfenning, 2007:8). Rather than understanding the Rationalist and the Constructivist accounts as competing explanation for the EU’s adoption of a human security approach in CSDP and to test their explanatory power against each other, the aim of this research project is to account as comprehensively and in-depth as possible for the observed outcome. Thus, the purpose of undertaking a meaningful research, an in-depth analysis of the topic can be achieved by using a single case study design, which as Khuntsaria explains by “narrowing down the research focus to a specific case ensures the quality and reliability of the research findings within the chosen context” (Khuntsaria, 2014:7). In the thesis will be used the following definition of the case, which is suggested by Andrew Bennett, "as an instance of a class of events of interest to the investigator" and a case study as "a well-defined aspect of a historical happening that the investigator selects for analysis" and where the investigator decides which class of events, which variables to focus upon" (Bennett, et.al 2004: 21). In addition, Bennett and George underline that "the case study approach is the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events" (George and Bennett, 2004:5). According to Travers (Travers 2001, cited in Shaban,
2009: 1) in general, case study methods are used in order to “examine deeply and intensively to gain insight and understandings of phenomena that are new, not-understood, or unexamined”. Yin (Yin 2008, cited in Shaban, 2009:1) notes that case study methods allow researchers to understand how and why of contemporary events, problems and situations in ways that does not require control over those events or problems. They are designed to “illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” (Schramm, 1971 cited in Yin, 1994: 13). Therefore, as the human security concept is a relatively new phenomenon, particularly within the EU and not well examined yet, case study of EUMM Georgia would be useful to explore in-depth how human security approach was implemented by the EU and what the considerations there were.

But when it comes to the usage of a single case method instead of comparative design in the research it can have some disadvantages. Mainly, this type of research design does not allow an author to generalize the findings of the research on other cases. But, as the main aim of my thesis is not generalization, but rather a "thick description" with a detailed and careful explanation of the independent variables, single case study research design can be considered as an appropriate for the presented purposes. In addition, taking into consideration a fact that as the human security is a newly developed concept within the framework of the EU, and in particular within CSDP, and that there are several gaps in the existing literature, examination of case study with its outcomes will be a valuable contribute to further development of the field. For instance, it will give other scholars an opportunity to explore some other cases, do cross-case comparisons which in the end may follow up a further work towards generalization.

Following Norman Blaikie's identification, thesis is based on the combination of three data collection sources: primary data that are generated by a researcher; secondary data, which is raw data collected by someone else; and tertiary data that is the information already analysed by either the researcher who generated them or an analyst of secondary data (Blaikie, 2003:18, 19). This thesis is going to make use of all three sources of data collection in combination within one single case study, with the main purpose to avoid and reduce bias which may result from focusing on a sole case,
because there is no perfect, sole method for collecting a reach, unbiased and valid data and all those three, above mentioned sources of data collection applied separately while are having advantages, also experience some drawbacks as well (see also Khuntsaria, 2014). For instance, when it comes to the collecting and analysing secondary and tertiary data, there can be a problem of distorted information as these types of methods consists of sources of data collected by other scholars (Blaikie, 2003:18, 19). Working with the collection of information from primary sources, might be also complicated and susceptible to biases, due to this is the result of a direct communication between the researcher and the source (for instance, in case of document review - because of the selective survival of information; or in case of interview-interview biases, such as "social desirability bias") (Hox and Boeije, 2005:593).

Therefore, to tackle the problems caused by the imperfect nature of a single research technique and to maximize their strength while minimize weaknesses, three of those data collection techniques will be used in combination. In other words, this thesis applies the principle of triangulation, which is considered to be a tool of research in social sciences for increasing the credibility and validity of results by incorporating several data collection sources (For an overview of a literature on triangulation see Campbell and Fiskel (1959), Web (1966) and Denzin (1970).

Denzin’s main argument in favoring of multiple measures was used in the name of reducing bias and improving validity. He argued that “the flaws of one method are often the strengths of another, and by combining methods, observers can achieve the best of each, while overcoming their unique deficiencies”(Denzin 1970:308 cited in Blaikie 1991:117). Additionally, Jick noted that the effectiveness of triangulation rests on the assumption that the “methods or strategies used will not share the same biases; their assets will be exploited and their liabilities neutralized” (Jick, 1983: 138 cited in Blaikie 1991: 117). Besides, as Yin suggests that “findings in a case study are likely to be more convincing and accurate if they are based on several different sources of information and that this combination broadens the range of the evidence” (Yin 2003:97). Reducing potential biases that emanate from the single case study design while dealing with the collection of information can be achieved through triangulation,
which allows ensuring validity and warranty of the results. To put it differently, validity and reliability of the findings will be ensured by combination of multiple sources of data/information within one case rather than across cases.

Primary data is collected through conduction of semi-structured interviews (with open-ended questions) with EUMM Georgia representatives and experts. Interviews are particularly helpful for understanding and clarification of the issues which were not quite clear for me during the research process while dealing with the EU’s documentation or already existing studies on this topic, as well as filling the gaps in the available information. At the same time, information retrieved from interviews served to cross-validate information from other sources such as EU documentation as well as from already existing studies. For collecting data from secondary sources, all the major documentation published by the EU in relation to the monitoring mission in Georgia will be used; particularly: the Council Conclusions, European Parliament Resolutions; Commission country strategy papers on Georgia. Tertiary materials include the utilization of the academic literature published on the issues relevant for this thesis, mainly this involves: analytical documents, academic papers, field assessments studies, scientific articles and all the major publications produce by the experts and academics on the issues what are relevant for this thesis (EUMM Georgia, Analysis of Human security Approach in the EU, EU and conflicts in Georgia).

To explain into more details, for primary data collection, interviews were conducted on the one hand with EUMM Georgia representatives (in total six) and on the other hand with people from academia (in total two)(see annex 3.). As for the EUMM Georgia personnel, this includes people who were monitoring situation on the ground from the very first days of the mission, members of the mission who joined team later on during different phases of the mission and those who are still presented there, in the implementation process of the EUMM Georgia: From Headquarter in Tbilisi (two persons), from the Zugdidi Field Office (one), from Mtskheta Field Office (one) and from the Gori Field Office (two). Having interviews with the people from EUMM

5 In the empirical part of this thesis the interviewees from the EUMM Georgia will be referred as “EUMM interview 1,2,3,4,5,6” while academics “Expert interviewee 1,2”. As most of them prefer not to be directly referred in the text.
Georgia’s Headquarter as well as from Field offices is a possibility to receive information from a variety of perspectives, for instance how the work is done by monitors on the ground on a daily basis, as well as how all the information is generated in the central office. Limited number of interviews might not allow generalization, but as this research is not based only on interviews, but additionally uses two more data collection techniques (secondary and tertiary data), the interviews are valuable sources to complement information which was not possible to receive through EU documentation, or from tertiary sources, from already existing studies which was undertaken by other scholars. Moreover, as the interviews were conducted with the mission representatives who served during different phases of the implementation of the EUMM Georgia, the collected data covers entire mandate of the mission, the collected information is about how the process was going on the ground, whether human security played any role and whether principles of human security approach were respected. Interviewing personnel who were officials at that time but at this moment represent academia (two of them) is one more opportunity to receive well-informed, yet at the same time less institutionally constrained information and their critical views as well, while officials usually are limited in their conversations and are not able to freely comment on some information which might be particularly useful for the research.

Additionally, apart from mission’s personnel, two people from academia: one head of Georgian think tank and one foreign expert- people who are working on the issues among others on Georgian conflicts and EU’s role there-was interviewed to obtain insights from outside of the mission’s work, which is once again an attempt to separate and receive unbiased information as much as it was possible from limited number of interviews. In addition to interviews, official documentation from the EU was used, such as the official mandate of the mission, reports, council conclusion together with field assessment studies. The focus was on the implementation side of the mission, the

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6 Access on the internal EU documentation about the EUMM Georgia, like a Concept of Operations (CONOPS); Operation Plans (OPLANS) and Mission Monitoring/Implementation Plans, which in details elaborates on how the mandate should be translated and by which measures it should be implemented by mission's staff, appeared to be restricted for public, due to EUMM Georgia is still on-going operation. But this drawback is compensated via interviews; nevertheless it became apparent that there is not big difference between the official mandate which is publicly available and in the internal documentation.
reason why representatives from the EUMM Georgia and not officials from Brussels were chosen for the interviews.

In order to analyse collected data at first raw data from interviews and document analysis will be transformed into meaningful information and will be interpreted in order to explain research questions, namely to establish whether the EU has adopted human security approach in the EUMM Georgia, how this approach was conceptualized and was put into practice in this particular mission. Starting from the analyzing of the documents, representing the legal basis of the mission, findings then will be corroborated by the results from conducted interviews and academic literature. Findings of all these three sources will be connected for finally, accounting for the observed outcome by means of linking the design of EUMM Georgia back to the reasoning from the EU side.

The Current State of the Field

No generally-accepted definition for the concept of human security exists. Since it first official appearance in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report in 1994 this concept is under discussion and is defined differently. On what academics and policy-makers agree is a change of a referent objects of security, namely from state (national security) to individuals (people centred security) (Liotta and Owen, 2006:37). In this new security thinking welfare of the individual is at the center of security policies.

Generally there are two understanding of human security: broad (ideal) and narrow (pragmatic). Broad approach is based on the concept of “freedom from want” and the narrow approach- on “freedom from fear” (Liotta and Owen, 2006:41; see Floyd 2007; Owen 2004; Tadjbakhsh 2005, Ellner, 2009).

In general, it is believed that the United Nations (UN) is a key actor in defining and acting on issues related to human security (Kotsopoulos, 2006:8). According to Martin and Owen, the UNDP Report of 1994, more precisely Chapter 2 “New dimensions of human security”, has two main contributions for the building human
security discourse at that time. “First, it defined the general characteristics of what human security should be” and Second, defined human security as a development issues, saying that is not as “a concern from weapons” but “concern with human life and dignity” (UNDP 1994: 22-25 cited in Oproiu, 2014: 37) by framing threats to human security “with reference to the principles of freedom from fear (from violence) and freedom from want (from poverty), seen as distinct categories” (Martin and Owen, 2010:213). Oproiu clarifies this further by saying “As a people-centered approach, UNDP defined human security as safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression and as the protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in jobs, in homes or in communities – highlighting its seven dimensions: personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health and food security” (UNDP 1994: 22-25 cited in Oproiu, 2014: 37; See Liotta and Owen, 2006). More narrow definition is adopted by Canada, defining it only as “freedom from fear” (from violence), mainly focusing on violent threats: “protection of civilians in a conflict, peace support operations, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and public safety” (Devon 2014:310). Thus according to Liotta and Owen these two definition falls in two categories: “being broad and ideal” and being “narrow and operable”, “narrower focus (Canadian) on human security emphasizes the more immediate necessity for intervention capability rather than long-term strategic planning and investing for sustainable and secure development (UN)” (Liotta and Owen 2006:43).

But Martin and Owen explain, that first generation of human security which is represented by UN and Canada, “appears to be in retreat” in recent years, instead a second generation of human security is emerging, driven mainly by the EU (US to some extent) (Martin and Owen, 2010:1-3). One of the most active proponents in terms of incorporation human security in the EU security policies is Mary Kaldor, professor from the London School of Economics and convener of Human Security Study Group(s). According to Kaldor, “rather than following a distinction between human security as either a development issue – in the sense used by the UN since 1994 – or a hard security issue of protection against violence (“responsibility to protect”), as implemented by the Canadian government”…human security should be understood as “both aspects of
individual wellbeing, these aspects are interrelated, and both are threatened by moments of crisis” (Kaldor et al 2007). Madrid Report of 2007 defines human security as a part of human development and human rights, but it is both a freedom for individuals from the harm caused by human rights violations, and about feeling safe on the streets or being able to influence political decision making (Human Security Study Group, 2007:8; Kaldor et.al 2008:2). For proponents of this approach, human security is about “how we respond to an urgent physical or material threat to individuals and communities” (Kaldor et.al, 2007:279).

Kador explains that human security has three dimensions: First, “human security is about the security of individuals and the communities in which they live” but this claim does not negate “the importance of the more traditional state centred threats”. Second, “human security is about the interrelationship between freedom from fear and freedom from want and about physical as well as material insecurity”. Third, “human security implies that relations between states are governed by a law paradigm rather than a war paradigm,” meaning blurring borders between the internal and the external (Kaldor, 2011:445,446). Together with other members of Human Security Study Group, she suggested the EU to adopt human security approach, as an guiding narrative for its foreign and security policies and as an “organizing frame that specifies how external intervention and engagement should be implemented” (Human Security Study Group, 2007:8). Believing that this is the most relevant strategic for the EU (particularly towards responding conflicts) as guidance in 21st century, in an era where traditional military instrument are no longer effective to tackle contemporary threats, but instead they worsen (HSSG, 2016).

In academia there is a controversial view with regards to human security as a concept itself and human security usage in EU security policies.

When it comes to the critics on the concept itself, human security is considered as ambiguous, vague, too broad, too soft or fuzzy and many question its practical relevance or added value in order to deal with existing security threats in practice (Fukunda and Messineo 2012:2; see Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007). Also, for some academics it is not considered useful in either theoretical or in practical terms (ex. Calling it “hot air”) (Paris 2001). Some indicate on the negative aspect of “securitizing”
every issue (in this case human rights), saying in this case security itself loses its substance (Buzan, 2007 chapter in Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007; cited in Taminnen 2009:9), some understand use of the human security concept as a way to justification Western states’ interventions abroad (Chandler, 2008). Some, particularly discussing it in relation to the EU, question added-value of this concept, saying that it just gives a name “to a security paradigm based on the human rights of the individual and that nothing is added to already existing EU policy by ‘streamlining’ it into operations” (Matlary 2008:142);

On the other hand, proponents of human security underline significance of this concept, arguing on the importance of human security for policy actions (Liotta and Owen 2006), referring it as a “paradigm-shifting” and a “bridging concept”, with its implications being the shift from a focus on state security to one on human rights, and, second, the indivisibility of physical and material security (Glasius, 2008).

The Human Security Study Group, particularly by establishing Madrid Report attempted to answer existing critics and tried to show that human security, with its essence was European. According to Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin and Sabine Selchow ‘Human Security, as a term, can be understood to encompass the concepts of conflict prevention, crisis management and civil–military coordination, but it takes them further”(Kaldor, Martin and Selchow, 2007: 278). Human Security is about “how and why civil and military capabilities are combined”, rather than a standard conflict toolkit (HSSG, 2007:11) and that it represents “entirely new way of functioning in crises”(Kaldor et.al 2007:280), additionally, perceive it as “a proactive strategic narrative with the potential to further EU foreign policy integration” (Kaldor et.al, 2007: 273). Martin for instance, straightforwardly claims that the EU is indeed, moving towards a human security approach, observable for her particularly in case EU’s intervention under the CSDP framework (Martin 2008).

On the other hand, Fukunda-Parr and Messineo and in response to these critics argue that it indeed has some added value in the security field, namely focus of attention on human beings and integration of non-military mechanisms as “means to security” (2012:3). Kotsopoulos arrives to the conclusion that “the concept of human security can have both internal and external benefits for the EU. From improved
coherence within the policy-making realm, to an improved presence abroad, a human security agenda can indeed provide added-value to the EU. It can also facilitate the ESS’s goal of “effective multilateralism” since it opens doors to cooperation, with the UN in particular.” (Kostopoulos 2007:230, cited in Matlary, 2008:140).

Despite such criticisms and contradict arguments, the concept of human security has been established in the security thinking of international actors. And it also finds its way in EU security thinking as well. Some scholars argue that human security strongly influences EU’s approach to security (see Ellner 2008), but certain mismatch between lexicon and practice in the EU with regards to human security approach still is observable, as Martin and Kaldor explain “operational doctrine of increasingly includes elements of human security, but this is not always applied coherently and is rarely matched by political rhetoric and commitment, that is to say, by a strategic narrative” (Martin and Kaldor, 2010:2) While, Christou points out that despite several attempts, and even its explicit inclusion in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, human security was not adopted yet by the EU as a driving strategic concept in its security thinking. Additionally, he argues that and that there is a low level of interest (as well as chances) in the EU to follow it as an overarching frame for security policy (without key norms entrepreneurs (like as it was Solana)), but however, believes that its practical implementation is reflective (Cristou, 2014:31).

Next chapter specifically discussed the development of human security approach within the EU, mainly on doctrinal level.
European Union’s Approach to Human Security

Before examining EU’s human security approach in the framework of CSDP, on the example of EUMM Georgia, it would be helpful firstly to start from the brief review how this new security agenda has found its way in the EU’s security thinking and what role does it occupy in the EU’s security and defence policy. This section focuses on the development of the human security approach within the EU, starting from 2003, when European Security Strategy (ESS) "A secure Europe in a better world", was adopted and finishes by discussion of the role of this approach in new security strategy, European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” adopted in June, 2016. Thus, this thesis includes very recent developments as well.

As it was already explained in the previous sections, following Matláry’s clarification human security denotes to “an emerging security agenda in which the point of reference is the individual person and his or her right to personal security” (Matláry, 2002:26). And as Kostopoulous argues, even before its explicit reference in 2008 Report de facto acceptance of the many general principles of human security approach by the EU was observable, even if the EU does not always articulate them as such (Kotsopoulos 2006: 12).

Generally, an introduction of human security approach in the EU’s security policy is ascribed to the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, but its foundation might be found earlier too (see Gottwald, 2012:13). In December 2003, the European Council approved ESS, which despite the fact that it neither directly refers to the concept human security as such nor explicitly outlined a human security agenda for the EU, emphasized a significance of “non-traditional threats to security and the importance of insecurity specifically as experienced by individuals” (Thompson, 2016: 164) and referred to several components, which according to Kotsopoulos can be considered as a human security agenda (Kotsopoulos 2006: 12). For example, in ESS it can be read “security is a precondition of development”, or that “in much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns” (ESS, 2003: 2). The ESS defined EU’s ambition to be “a formidable force for good in the world”,
“more active” and “more capable” player on a global scale to deal with variety of threats and challenges, including those of distant ones as the results of globalization (ESS, 2003). Gottwald finely explains that listing terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime as the key security threats by the ESS can be already considered as a reflection of “changing security environment by recognizing the shift from a merely military conception of security to the inclusion of social, economic and environmental security threats” (Gottwald, 2012:13). As ESS defined “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means” (ESS, 2003:7), therefore, it can be concluded that as Martin put it: “the ESS envisaged a distinctive role for the EU in which it provided a comprehensive package of security comprising the whole range of EU external policies under a ‘positive objective of effective governance at both the global and the regional level, that is promoting every individual’s access to […] basic public goods’” (Martin 2007: 66).

Generally, the impetus for the development of human security approach within the EU was mainly linked to the personal efforts made primarily by High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana (Christou, 2014), it was also his initiative to convene a Study Group on European Security Capabilities (SGESC) in 2003 under the leadership of Mary Kaldor, in order “to examine the possibility of formulating an EU human security policy and draw up plans to implement the ESS itself”(Kotsopoulos 2006: 12).

Barcelona Report (2004) of the SGESC (now the Human Security Study Group) with the title “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe” reported to Javier Solana was first attempt to place human security in the context of the European Security policy. Barcelona Report defined Human security as a “freedom for individuals from basic insecurities”, which is caused by massive human rights violation (ranging from genocide and slavery to violations of the right to food, health and housing) and arrived to conclusion that in this new era, EU’s security policy should be built on human rather than state security (SGESC, 2004:4). Moreover, the report concluded two main things: 1. That “A human security approach for the European Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the
defence of the Union’s borders, as was the security approach of nation-states” (SGESC, 2004: 5) and 2. that “The most appropriate role for Europe in the twenty-first century would be to promote human security” (SGESC, 2004:26).

The report has the following main components:

First, the study suggested that the European security policy should be based on seven principles (later reduced to five): “the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force” (SGESC, 2004: 9, 16);

Second, the report proposed creation of “Human Security Response Force”, consisting of 15,000 people, both from civilian and military with the aim to be “somewhere between classic peace-keeping and classic military intervention but different from both” (SGESC, 2004: 6).

Third, a new legal framework to govern EU’s foreign missions, concerning both decisions to intervene and the rules that applies on operations on the ground. As Liotta and Owen explains “This would build on the domestic law of host states, the domestic law of sending states, international criminal law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law”(Liotta and Owen, 2006:49).

Fourth, report explains reasons why should the EU adopt a human security concept in its in CFSP and E/CSDP policies: morality, legality and enlightened self-interest. Morality argumentation is based on the “common humanity” idea, namely it is an obligation (but not only for the EU) to help each other when humans’ rights to live in security and dignity is threatened. Legality: EU’s legal obligation to “concern themselves with human security worldwide” (HSSG: 2004:5) due to existence of those norms which are embedded in international law; and Self-interest- this motivation can be translated like this “if people outside the EU are living in insecurity, the EU itself cannot be safe” (Glasius and Kaldor, 2005: 62-82; see also Kotsopoulou 2006:13).

Thus, this report constitutes an important aspect of the incorporation of the human security concept by the EU in its security policies. As Matlary further clarifies “the report represents the first coherent attempt to develop a policy for intervention based on the human security concept, not only in terms of policy and legal principles but also in terms of the needs of civilian–military integration”(Matlary, 2006: 86).
Moreover, as Opriou clarifies this is a recommendation that “the EU adopt the human security approach in order to realize its ambitions of playing a global role in the realm of security and at the same time to reflect its distinctive character and agenda dominated by the ideas of peace, democracy and human rights instead of the classic nation-state focus on defence of territory” (Oproiu 2014: 38-39).

Because of the above discussed developments, it is considered that in line with the development at the UN level, the European shift towards Human Security took place exactly in 2004 when it was first proposed “as the most appropriate approach for the EU’s foreign and security policy by the 2004 Barcelona Report” (Martin and Kaldor, 2010:1). But, this report showed and as Kaldor, Martin and Selchow argued there is a discrepancy between the EU “lexis and lexicon”, difference between “calling something ‘human security’ and actually doing ‘human security’”, in other words difference between “concepts or ideas and political practice […] “We already do human security [by means of CSDP], we just don’t call it that” (Kaldor, interview, cited in Kaldor et.al, 2007:274).

It is worth mentioning, in that period Finland was very active to further push human security agenda within the EU, particularly in E/CSDP. Consequently, the Finnish presidency of the EU (June-December 2006) reconvened the SGESC with the name Human Security Study Group (HSSG) again under Mary Kaldor, and requested examining ways how human security agenda could be further developed in the EU (Martin 2007:67; Thompson, 2016:165) in order to have a more explicit normative focus within the E/CSDP (Martin and Owen, 2010:218). This resulted in publication of one more report by HSSG in November, 2007, called as Madrid Report “A European way of security”. In parallel, Commissioner for External Relations (RELEX) Benita Ferrero-Waldner was active in promoting human security agenda since 2005 (see Martin and Owen, 2010), she was a person who regularly proposed it a policy framework as she believed in a holistic concept of human security arguing that “security can best be attained through development, and development through security. Neither is possible without an adequate level of other” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006, Speech) Moreover, she believed that “There can be no long-term peace and global security without human security” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005, Speech cited in Kotsopoulos, 2006:6)
and called “to put people, their human rights and the threats that they face at the centre of our policies. The EU has moved in this direction, and I am determined to push it further” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005, Speech).

Citing evidence from their background studies exploring EU’s engagements in different sites, ranging from man-made conflicts like in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to results of natural disaster, like after tsunami in Aceh, members of the HSSG reinforced previous argumentations and in Madrid Report of 2007 concluded that human security should become the basis of the EU’s as a global security actor’s activities under CSDP, because it is “more realistic” and “more effective” way to deal with current crises because it is “entirely new way of functioning in crises” (HSSG, 2007:11).

The Madrid Report in line with its predecessor Barcelona Report from 2004, recommended among others that every E/CSDP missions should be placed within planning and operational framework under civilian leadership, and that in their mandates human security principles should be used as guidance for the EU institutions, policy-makers or monitors on the ground how to act.

With a little bit difference from Barcelona Report, Madrid Report suggests the following principles of human security approach:

Moreover, it advises a commitment to six principles of operation in situations of insecurity.

- The primacy for human rights: is about “ensuring a respect for human rights […] and that civilian and military initiative should prioritize the protection of civilians over military victory and temporary suppression of violence. Protection refers to both physical and material protection, that is economic and social as well as civil and political rights.”
- The establishment of a legal political authority: “A legitimate authority is trusted by the population and is responsible for law and order and respect of human rights. Any outside intervention must strive to create a legitimate political authority.”
- A bottom-up approach on the ground: “Intensive consultation with local people by involving civil society, women, young people.”
- **Effective multilateralism**: “A commitment to work in the framework of international law, alongside other international and regional agencies, individual state and non-state actors.” Additionally, meaning “a better division of tasks and greater coherence, solving problems through rules and cooperation, and creating common policies and norms.”

- **An integrated regional approach**: “Regional dialogues and action in neighbouring countries should be systematically integrated into policies for crisis.”

- **Clear and transparent strategic direction**: In case of an external intervention by the EU, it should be based on a clear legal authorization, transparent mandates and a coherent overall strategy (HSSG, 2007:9, 10).

Exactly these principles defined by Madrid Report are used in the empirical part of my research project, as a guideline to understand whether human security approach was followed by the EU in EUMM Georgia and to assess their activities on the ground.

Thus, as we have seen from the above presented overview these two Reports on Human Security were crucial for the advancement of a commitment to human security approach within the EU, particularly under CSDP; as well as an attempt to identify the “need for an EU strategic narrative that would not only form the core of a common European strategic culture, but also replace the ad-hoc-ism which marked EU external action” (Opriou, 2014: 40).

This commitment was officially referred in the “Report of the Implementation of the European Security Strategy” (RIESS), commissioned by Solana and approved by the Council in 2008. The Report made individual as a referent object of security by stating that: “We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field [EU Common Foreign and Security Policy], including CSDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security” (European Council, 2008a: 10). As Opriou remarks, here, like in ESS security-development nexus was underlined by stating that “We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity” (Opriou, 2014: 40; Council of the EU, 2008a:2).
But after Lisbon Treaty, more precisely since 2008, further references of human security are not quite systematic in the EU reports, nevertheless it is still observable. Particularly significant is 2016, when human security concept and agenda regained importance in the EU security thinking. One of the recent development is 2016 Berlin Report “Rethinking EU Strategy towards Conflicts”, one more report from the Human Security Study Group (HSSG) under the leadership of Mary Kaldor, which was presented to EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini in February. The report once more argues that “the EU is a new type of 21st century political institution in contrast to the 20th century nation-state” (HSSG, 2016:3), meaning that there is no more clear distinction between inside and outside. In order that the EU to adapt to a twenty first century world and become able to deal with nowadays challenges, like Hybrid Peace⁷ what is no more possible by using of “20th century outside instruments like state-to-state diplomacy or economic and military coercion” (HSSG, 2016:3) this Report underlines significance of human security strategy and proposes the EU to opt for the a civilian-led “second generation human security approach to conflicts, as an alternative to Geo-Politics or the War on Terror” (HSSG, 2016:3, 8), as a political strategy which includes whole box of instruments, among others military force in order to be achieved “the security of people not states or regimes” (HSSG, 2016:3, 8). Thus, HSSG defines human security as an extension of inside instruments (rule of law, politics and policing) beyond the EU with particular emphasis on neighboring regions (HSSG, 2016:3, 8).

It is also highly interesting the most recent development with regards to the concept of human security in the official documentation of the EU’s security policy, namely in the new security strategy under the leadership of EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, published on July 28, 2016, few days after the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the Union. In line with the 2008 European Council Implementation report on ESS the new EU global strategy (EUGS) “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” explicitly mentions the concept of Human security in the text several

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⁷ In Berlin Report the term Hybrid Peace stands for the situation when there in neither war nor peace, condition that is characterization for conflicts, particularly in the aftermath of peace agreements. For example in Ukraine’s case. According to this report, “Hybrid Peace is what happens when 20th century methods of peace-making are applied in 21st century conflict contexts”(HSSG, 2016:8).
times. In comparison to its predecessor, the ESS from 2003, which was saying that “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” (ESS, 2003:1) the new Global Strategy reveals the existential challenges and radical changes that have been taken place in international affairs and in the EU’s wider neighbourhood during the last decade and recognizes: “We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat”(European Council, 2016:7). Taking into account all the recent developments, and challenges caused by external or internal crises, EUGS calls for renewed ambition for the EU on the international stage and a need for “Stronger Europe” and for “Strategy” to handle those challenges. Mogherini states in the foreword of the strategy: "We need a shared vision, and common action" (Council of the EU, 2016:3)

As several experts on the EU affairs already evaluated, in the renewed global strategy “principle pragmatism” of the EU can be seen, but simultaneously it states that "Our interests and values go hand in hand", which means that it is in the EU’s interest to promote its values on the international stage (Biscop, 2016: 1). In comparison to the ESS, which aimed at a “better world”, this new strategy pays much more attention to the immediate EU citizens’ interests and puts bigger emphasis on the protection of the EU and its internal security rather than contributing to having a “Better World”, as underlined in ESS 2003. But in addition to the first priority “The Security of our Union”, EUGS also lists four more priorities for its foreign and security policy, namely: the neighbourhood – “State and Societal Resilience to our East and South”; how to deal with war and crisis – “An Integrated Approach to Conflicts”; stable regional orders across the globe – “Cooperative Regional Orders” and effective global governance – “Global Governance for the 21st Century” (Council of the EU, 2016:18-39).

As for the priority of “Security of the Union”, it is clearly underlined intertwined nature of developments taking place outside the EU (external threats), particularly in its neighbourhood and EU’s own security. This interdependence, according to Grevi “requires European engagement, not retrenchment” abroad (Grevi, 2016:5) and calls for the EU and member states “to fully take on their responsibility to underpin unity, prosperity and security at home by taking more effective and joined-up action abroad” (Grevi, 2016:2). Moreover, conflict management also plays a critical role for the EU,
with the main focus on its neighbourhood and surrounding regions (from Central Asia to Central Africa). The strategy goes on to state that: "We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights" (Council of the EU, 2016:18). Reference of human security concept is under a chapter of “Integrated Approach to Conflicts”. Strategy states: “when violent conflicts erupt, our shared vital interests are threatened. The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, and foster human security through an integrated approach” (Council of the EU, 2016:9). Moreover, it added “Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighboring and surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world” (Council of the EU, 2016:14).

To sum up this chapter, it has been revealed that human security concept indeed play a role in the EU’s security policy thinking, particularly in CSDP framework. Despite the fact that this concept is less frequently used as an “overarching strategic narrative” in the EU’s security landscape (Thompson, 2016: 165), above discussed recent developments in the EU security thinking in 2016 show that human security thinking still matters within the EU, as there is an attempt to embed it within EU practice, frame human security under comprehensive/Integrated approach for crisis management, especially in an era where the lines between internal and external threat are blurred and when EU itself recognizes the importance of providing security abroad in order to maintain its own security inside.

Thus, it can be concluded that human security is still presented in EU reports and strategic thinking, but an attempt to make it as a driving strategic concept for the EU security policy, particularly for CSDP functionalization, is still lacking (Thompson 2016; Christou 2014; Opriou 2014; Gottwald 2012). As Christou argues, without active norm entrepreneurs like Solana and Ferrero-Waldner, or even HSSG members, human security concept is unlikely to become strategic narrative that shapes and drives EU security policy (Christou 2014:28). However, despite such a conclusion he
acknowledges that “the practices of the EU across the relevant institutional spaces are reflective of human security principles” (Christou, 2014:31, original emphases).

Next section deals more specifically with the role of the human security approach in the framework of CSDP missions and briefly overviews what are the existing studies which investigate human security role in these missions.

**Human security under CSDP missions**

As has been seen from the overview of human security development within the EU, all the discussion about this approach was taking place in the framework of CSDP. According to Tardy (2015), CSDP missions represent one of the major instruments of the EU to contribute to the international security and is considered as “the most visible EU’s activity” in the field of international security (Tardy, 2015:5,17). Exploring human security approach in the framework is particularly interesting because of two reasons: First, as this domain is considered as a “hard security” of the EU, and traditionally “hard security” is related to the security of the state, it would be interesting to understand whether in the EU “hard security” has a people-centered and not state-centered nature; and Secondly, as it was shown from the previous chapters, all the discussion about the development of human security perspective in the security policy was based on the presentation CSDP missions as the most effective guiding strategy for the EU to act as a globally security actor.

But before moving on to the discussion of the case study of EUMM Georgia, firstly it is necessary to briefly describe what role does the human security agenda play in the CSDP operations.

Following the creation of the CSDP in 1999, 2003 marks a first time when EU launched its first E/CSDP operation (Concordia, a military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Since then the EU send missions to different location, starting from Europe, Africa, the Middle East, to Asia. Up to date EU has
launched 35 missions in total, out of them more than twenty were qualified as civilian. At this moment there are 6 on-going military and 11 civilian missions, carried out by the EU and operating in different place, like Africa, Middle East, Balkans and Easter Neighborhood of the EU (see European External Action Service page, Grevi et.al 2009; Tardy 2015)

There are already several studies existing, apart from the background studies undertaken by HSSG members before preparing recommendations for the EU through each Human security Reports (2004, 2007, 2016), some more scholars also pay particular attention in exploring, for instance whether human security concept played any role in EU’s decision-making to launch any particular E/CSDP mission or/and whether human security approach is implemented already on the ground after its initiation (see Martin, 2007, 2008; Kaldor et.al 2009; Gottwald 2012, Tamminen 2009).

Having looked at them it can be seen that EU’s CSDP missions are indeed influenced by human security thinking. For instance Gottwald in her study argues that EU’s response to the Libyan crisis in 2011 was primarily motivated by human security concerns, which was visible from EU policy-makers discourse in Brussels (Gottwald 2012:23). According to Thompson (2016) in a similar vein civil war in Syria in 2013 was conceptualized by the EU in the “human security” terms as well as the security situation in the Sahel region, Africa (Thomson, 2016:166). Martin’s (2007) study explored whether a human security narrative was relevant in EU’s engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR DRC). Where she concluded that even in purely military mission like EUFOR RDC human security approach is observable, stating that “EU used coercive force in support of core norms such as human rights and democracy” (Martin, 2007:22). But as mostly studies which are undertaken up to date constitute background studies for HSSG in order to showcase how important, reasonable and effective is to have this approach for the EU in order to deal with international crises, in order to provide recommendations for the EU, they do not asses what was the motivation for the EU to adopt human security approach in that particular mission (see Kaldor et.al 2009, HSSG, 2016).

When it comes to Georgia, despite the fact that during mission set-up or its mandate human security as a concept was not explicitly mentioned in the documentation, principles of human security approach was already there (later on, in the mission structure established human security team). Moreover, this is the first ceasefire monitoring mission launched by the EU and a mission which is frequently used by the EU as an example for planning similar operations for the future, according to the Council of the EU’s report (2010), for instance OPLAN of EUMM Georgia is considered as the “most elaborate one with regard to integrating human rights […] as an example for collecting gender-disaggregated information and […] example why transitional justice needs to be considered as part of peacebuilding” (Council of the EU, 2010a:14,19).

Therefore, In light of the existing research as well as the EU’s continuous development of its CSDP dimension, EUMM Georgia represents a particularly insightful case for several reasons: Firstly, it is operational since 2008, this is a period from where human security as a concept starting appearance in official EU documentation (Implementation Report of ESS, in 2008). Therefore it would be possible to explore how this new security thinking was reflected and developed into EU’s actions on the ground in Georgia. Secondly, it is first CSDP ceasefire monitoring mission made by the EU (EUMM interviewee 1, 2016), without existence of template how this kind of a mission should be designed, therefore it can be expected that EU will use all the gained practices for the upcoming civilian monitoring missions. Third, mandate is very limited; it does not have any executive power. Thus, in contrast to EULEX Kosovo (civilian, rule of law mission launched in 2008), for instance, which has an executive mandate, in case of EUMM Georgia following human security principles on the ground might be difficult, because of the limited actions (no executive or coercive power).
**Background: conflicts in Georgia and EU’s engagement**

This chapter is developed in the following structure: it starts by briefly explaining the background to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, then it moves on overviewing the EU’s approach to engagement with the secessionist conflict regions in Georgia starting from the 1990s before 2008, continuing with the EU’s involvement since August War of 2008 and EUMM’s deployment on the ground. Then, this chapter introduces what does the mandate and instrument of the EUMM Georgia includes, later explaining what role does the human security approach plays in this mission, and sums up with an evaluation whether/how this approach is followed by the EU on the ground. The concluding part of this chapter tries to explain those main factors behind the EU policies towards Georgia’s conflict regions that drove it to be presented on the ground since the 2008 August war.

Historical origins of conflicts related to the two secessionist regions of Georgia – Abkhazia (Region on the Black Sea) and South Ossetia (Mountainous region bordering with Russian Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia) – can be found in Soviet and pre-Soviet politics in (South) Caucasus. Between the periods of 1988–2008, Georgia has experienced two violent ethnic conflicts on its territory (Whitman and Wolff, 2012:93). Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and Georgia’s declaration of independence in 1991 the violent conflicts broke out in the country between “central government and autonomous minorities” (Cornell, 2002:258) first in South Ossetia (1991-1992) and later in Abkhazia (1992-1993), which resulted in the defeat of Georgian forces by Abkhazian and South Ossetian forces with the external assistance from Russia, finally leading to de-facto secession after the ceasefire agreements were reached in 1992 and 1993, respectively (see Cornell 2002; Coppieters 2007; Coppieters et al. 2004; Popescu 2006; ). Before the wars in 1991-1993, both South Ossetia and Abkhazia had enjoyed autonomy within Soviet Georgia, while after the Georgia’s declaration of independence in 1991 found themselves as a part of a sovereign territory of this country. Having on the background an ethnically diverse composition of these regions (Abkhazia: in total 500,000 people, 17 per cent of the population were ethnic Abkhaz and 45 per cent of Georgians; South Ossetia: total – 98,000; Ossetians two-thirds (65,000) of the population (Cornell, 2002: 262; Popescu, 2011:61; Whitman and
Wolff, 2012:93)), Abkhaz and South Ossetians declared they wanted to “remain within the Soviet Union as they believed that their survival as ethno-cultural communities distinct from the Georgian majority would be in a danger in an independent Georgian state” (Whitmann and Wolff, 2012:93). According to Cornell, nationalist policies of the state, availability of external support and existence of autonomy structures contributed to the escalation of the conflict in both regions (Cornell, 2002: 265-268) which resulted in about 233,453 internally displaced persons (IDPs), many of whom have never been able to return.9

In order to stabilize situation and prevent further escalations in the conflict zones, international society engaged in peacebuilding process. On the one hand, in Abkhazia after United Nation’s (UN) Security Council’s resolution in 1993, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was deployed for ensuring fulfillment of the terms of Ceasefire Agreement of 27 July 1993 and resolve incidents related to its violations.10 In parallel to UNOMIG, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) also deployed forces in the region. On the other hand, in South Ossetia since 1992 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was playing its role and assisting Georgian government with conflict settlement. Through their joint activities maintenance of a relatively peaceful situation on the ground became possible, as violation became rare before the renewal of conflict in Tskhinvali (South Ossetia) in August 8, 2008. Taking into consideration Russia’s position in the UN Security Council and CIS though the presence of these actors on the ground its domination became apparent. Additionally, Russia played a key role in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) negotiation mechanism functioning in South Ossetia since 1992, in order to supervise security the situation, as well as contributing personnel to the Joint Peacekeeping Force (Stewart, 2011:75, 76). All these indicates to the existence of Russia’s "peacekeeping' monopoly" (Mikhelidze, 2009:37) in Georgia.

When it comes to the EU, its engagement in conflict regions of Georgia was very limited before 2008, but was not absent from there. While the UN and OSCE where the actors who were leading peacebuilding process in the secessionist regions since 1992, the Union was providing “soft” forms of engagement mainly focusing on humanitarian assistance and funding initiatives (Whitman and Wolff, 2010:89) instead of participation in political processes. For instance, based on the information provided by the European Commission in Country Strategy Paper 2007–2013 of Georgia, from 1997 until 2006 EU’s support to rehabilitation and confidence building activities in conflict regions amounted EUR 25 million for Abkhazia and about EUR 8 million for South Ossetia, which made the EU the largest donor in Georgia’s conflict regions (European Commission, 2007:34). Additionally, EU supported Georgian government, funded rehabilitation programmes and via the European Commission supported civil-society projects, to facilitate daily communication across the de facto borders between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Simão:2013). As Simão explains, rather than directly engaging in conflict settlement, the EU opted for the strategy to structurally support the Georgian government “in reforming institutions by making them more accountable and attractive to the separatist regions […] with the aim of reducing the incentives for conflict”(Simão:2013:2).

As Nicu Popescu notes during the 1990s, EU’s limited political engagement in Georgia and the South Caucasus in general, with regards to the conflict regions can be seen as driven by a “Russia-first approach” (Popescu, 2011:69). Following his argumentation, looking into 1995 Communication from the Commission it can be read: “A key element in an eventual resolution of the conflicts will be the attitude of Russia”, and makes this argumentation reasonable. Despite EU’s understanding that “given Russia’s drive to dominate the region militarily […], many look at the EU as the only other actor capable of playing a major political role”, (European Commission, 1995: 6, 9) the EU still did not adopt such a role and did not capitalized its objectives, probably because "South Caucasus was simply too far away and too fraught with difficulties for the EU to want to intervene” (Popescu, 2011:69).
EU’s role relatively rose since 2000s, particularly after Rose Revolution, when Georgia entered a new phase of state building and democracy development under the leadership of new government of President Saakashvili which was followed up by Georgia’s inclusion in European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 after EU’s eastward enlargement. Despite the fact that contractual relationship between Georgia and EU officially was already established by Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1999, it was ENP action plan where promotion of peaceful resolution of internal conflicts was given relatively high importance and was named as among 8 priory areas (European Commission, 2004). However, several initiatives made by the EU with regards to conflicts in Georgia, namely: European Commission’s involvement in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) for South Ossetia in 2001 (participating in the sessions dealing with economic issues and began funding mediation activities (Simão, 2014:304)); Appointment of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus in 2003; Deployment of the EU’s E/CSDP rule of law mission (EUJUST Themis) in Georgia in 2004 (to assist government in judicial reforms (Council of the EU, 2004)); Deployment of EUSR Border Support Team (Not a E/SCDP mission, but under CSFP framework (EUMM interviewee 1, 2016)) of 3 advisors (later extended to 12) in 2005 in response to Georgia's invitation to take-over terminated 150-person strong OSCE Border Monitoring Mission due to Russia's veto on its extension; and EU fact-finding mission in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2007 (see Popescu, 2009 and 2011 for detailed information), can be perceived as a manifestation of its diplomacy and efforts primarily directed to Georgia's economic and democratic development while lacking confidence building efforts in conflict regions between parties. Crisis management has been added in the EU’s policies towards Georgia, as an important toolkit only since 2008 after deployment of EUMM Georgia.

Overall, while the EU was not totally absent from the horizon it still did not exercised a high level of political activities with conflict-related policies in Georgia before 2008 (Bardakçi, 2010; Whitman and Wolf, 2010; Simão:2014; Popescu, 2011). As Lynch puts it: “The EU had a little presence in the negotiating mechanism, no direct involvement in mediation, and an undefined strategy to lead policy” (Lynch 2006:61).
Despite EU’s acknowledgement for instance in ESS (2003) that the resolution of conflicts in Georgia (in South Caucasus more broadly) was important element for ensuring stability and peace on whole European continent, this recognition was not translated into practical terms until the renewal of hostilities in South Ossetia in August, 2008, as well as was EU was not able to prevent this escalation. Thus, “the August war was the only event that led the EU to accept a conflict resolution role, as Georgia had actively requested” (Simão, 2014:306).

On August 7-8, 2008 following a long-lasting tense situation and incidents a fighting erupted in and around Tskhinvali, South Ossetia which soon raised into a "combined inter-state and intra-state conflict, opposing Georgian and Russian forces at one level of confrontation as well as South Ossetians together with Abkhaz fighters and the Georgians at another" (IIFFMC, 2009: 10) EU succeeded in suspending military activities via brokering ceasefire agreement between Moscow and Tbilisi on August, 12, 2008. Through which both warring parties agreed: not to renew hostilities; to grant access to humanitarian aid; to withdraw their military forces to the positions held prior to the outbreak of the war; as well as to open up international discussions on security and stability situation, in both regions: Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Council of the EU, 2008c:6,7; see Annex 1).

Combination of several activities from the EU side increased its profile as an international security actor, particularly in South Caucasus region, while granted the EU a role of a key player in Georgia’s conflict regions. The EU under the leadership of French presidency of Council, together with the OSCE chair (Finland at that time), played a decisive role in mediating ceasefire and brokering the six-point agreement (known as Medvedev-Sarkozy plan) signed by Russia and Georgia on 12 August, 2008(Whitman, Wolff, 2010: 6); EU earned a leading role in the Geneva International Discussions, known as Geneva Talks – official international mediation process – since October, 2008 (co-chairing together with the EUSR for the South Caucasus, in cooperation with the OSCE, the UN). The EU also appointed its own EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia, in September, 2008 with the mandate "to help preparation of international talks" and "to facilitate the implementation of the [ceasefire] agreements"
between Tbilisi and Moscow (Council of the EU, 2008d) and most significantly, deployed an unarmed civilian EUMM to Georgia to contribute to the stabilization of situation (Council of the EU, 2008b). Additionally, under the decision of December 2, 2008 the Council of the EU commissioned an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) to investigate the causes of the war, under the leadership of former UN Special Representative to Georgia, Heidi Tagliavani (Council of the EU, 2008c). Thus, EU’s policy towards conflict regions in Georgia was based on two main pillars “diplomacy and peacekeeping” (Martin, 2009:128).

Moreover, EU in every document declares its support for Georgia's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, while follows a policy of "Non-recognition and Engagement" in relation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia (officially formulated by Political and Security Committee of the Council of the EU in December, 2009), meaning EU’s commitment to Georgia’s territorial integrity on the one hand and efforts to engage with these two breakaway regions in order to promote conflict resolution (EUMM interviewee 1, 2016).

The rapid response to the needs on the ground and EU's ability to act quickly in terms of "decision-making, financing and deployment" (Whitman and Wolff, 2010:7) can be considered as a significant shift in the EU’s understanding of the "urgency and the need to play a more visible and active role in Georgia" (Simão, 2014:305).

It can be argued that it was a coincidence of factors and not availability of choices that lead the EU to be engaged in Georgia's conflicts more actively and visibly in 2008 than before. As Whitman and Wolf define EU is a "late-comer" in the field of crisis management and E/CSDP-EU’s "major reservoir" for conflict management toolkits became functional only since 2003, while UN and OSCE were major worldwide international actors in this field, particularly in case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since early 1990s (Whitman and Wolf, 2012:101). But OSCE and UN seemed unable to continue this function and "step aside for a couple of years" because Russia exercised veto power on the prolongation of their mandates as a member of both organizations (Sinkkonen, 2011:265,266); Neither did the United States (US) expressed its willingness to confront Russia, who traditionally perceived Georgia and EU's eastern

48
neighbourhood as its 'sphere of influence' or 'backyard', particularly at the time when the
"US was in the middle of a closely fought presidential election, as well as fully engaged
militarily in two conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq" (Martin, 2009:130), thus, nor the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be a player due to political reasons
(Expert interviewee 1, 2016). Consequently, this situational vacuum led the EU to
deploy mission on the ground, which would also prevent any potential escalations
between Georgia and Russia.

It should be clarified that exploring the reasons of EU’s engagement in this
conflict as well as an evaluation of effectiveness of the EU’s actorness as a security
player is out of the scope of this research project. Instead, in the next chapters by
analysing EU’s engagement and implemented policies it will be discussed whether
human security concerns have played a role, on the one hand in the EU’s official
discourse: documentation and statements and on the other hand in its actual policies on
the ground.

Before moving on exploring those two objectives stated above, it would be
reasonable first to frame the 2008 August war itself. According to Martin, this war can
be seen from different angles. First, as "a nationalist dispute of identity politics between
[...] the Abkhaz and the Ossetians, who feel themselves to be on the wrong side of a
boundary imposed in 1991 by the break-up of the Soviet Union"; Second, as a result of
"a strategic struggle for hegemony and influence between [...] Russia, staking its claim
to be pre-eminent in its own geographical backyard [...] and ‘the West’–trying to
extend its political culture into the lands of former Soviet state"; and Third, as a conflict
"about human security, and the depredations visited on ordinary people caught in the
middle of other people’s fights" (Martin, 2009:130,131). The war which lasted five days
resulted in substantial human losses as well as in high number of forced displaced
people. According to IIFFMCG August war resulted in about 850 casualties, 2 300 - 3
000 wounded and far more than 100 000 civilians who were forced to leave their homes
(IIFFMCG, 2009:223).
EU’s Response to Russo-Georgian War: Human or Territorial Security?

Before moving on the explanation of the EUMM Georgia mandate and then exploring whether in formal and practical terms EU adopted human security approach in this particular mission, it would be relevant to briefly frame EU’s understanding of Russo-Georgian August war, more precisely whether it was framed more in human or territorial security terms.

EU’s decision to launch EUMM Georgia can be considered as its willingness to protect people on the ground as well as to prevent renewal of hostilities between two parties: Georgia and Russia. Thus, in case of EUMM Georgia human and territorial security is intertwined. This interconnection is observable from several EU documentations, for instance from “Council Conclusions of August 13, 2008 on the situation in Georgia” (Council of the EU, 2008e:1), which states:

“A peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognized by international law and UN Security Council resolutions.” Thus, underlines more traditional security issues as of political sovereignty, by emphasizing territorial security. But as the following lines indicate simultaneously puts emphasis on the importance of security of people:

“In this context [loss of many human lives… inflicted suffering on the population…substantial material damage and further increased the number of displaced persons and refugees] the absolute priority is to stop the suffering and bring the fighting to an end“ (Council of the EU, 2008e:2, emphasis added). Moreover, Council considers that “the EU must be prepared to commit itself, including on the ground, to support every effort […] to a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia. The Council stresses the humanitarian emergency and the Union's resolve to provide vital assistance to the population” (Council of the EU, 2008e: 3, emphasis added).

Likewise, “European Parliament Resolution of 3 September 2008 on the situation in Georgia” also underlines the importance of both of them:

While this resolution underlines the importance of territorial security by stating that “the EU remains committed to supporting the independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders;” following sentences puts more emphasis on the concerns how the conflict has affected ordinary people, and that their personal security is under threat: “whereas about 158 000 people were uprooted by the crisis and forced to leave their homes and must now be assisted in their efforts to return; whereas the presence of cluster munitions, unexploded ordnance and landmines, as well as the Russian warnings and the lack of cooperation, make any such return unsafe”; “…Deplores the loss of life and human suffering”…and “Calls for a robust contribution by the EU to the planned international mechanism for the resolution of the conflict and therefore welcomes the decision of the European Council to deploy an ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) monitoring mission […].” 11

Thus, in this resolution European Parliament, human-rights-oriented position has been revealed. It mentions both, forced displacement of ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the violence against individuals, as well as called immediate actions from the EU for preventing further civilian losses (Racz, 2016: 24).

Despite the fact that EUMM Georgia's mandate clearly stated that it was operational "on a country-wide basis": "in Georgia” or "throughout Georgia" (Council of the EUb, 2008:7), in the internationally recognized territory of Georgia, automatically meaning Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well (but not explicitly mentioning), a dilemma emerged for the EU (Halbach, 2009:114-117), on the one hand denies from de-facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to cooperate with EUMM and posed restrictions on the access of Abkhazian and South Ossetian territories as these two entities declared independence shortly after the end of August war and that was formally recognized by Russia on August, 26, 2008; and on the other hand, EU's declared policy of non-recognition of these two secessionist regions, as a key notion for EU-Georgia relations (European Parliament, 2012:94). According to Mary Martin tension between human and territorial security revealed on the ground, due to the majority of incident which was closely related to the violation of human rights was happening around the administrative boundary lines (ABLs), EUMM Georgia monitors

faced a dilemma: “whether to recognise de facto if not de jure the boundary, and attempt to create a secure environment along the boundary lines, or abide by the legal position that the lines did not exist” (Martin, 2009:134, see also Halbach, 2009:117). Access still remains major impediment for the monitors to effectively implement declared objectives of the mandate, particularly when Russia does not fulfill its declared contractual obligation of the Six-point agreement to military withdrawal to the pre-war positions (see Six-Point Agreement, Point N5, annex 1). Thus, above presented argumentation showcased how interconnected is it human and territorial security in this particular case. Next chapter will briefly review EUMM Georgia, its mandate and activities in order to shed light what role human security concept has played in its launching and implementation processes.

EUMM Georgia: Mandate, Instruments and Implementation-translated into Human Security Terms

European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) operational since 1 October 2008, is a non-executive, independent, unarmed civilian monitoring mission under the CSDP framework with over 200 monitors. Deployment of the mission to Georgia was followed up step by the EU after that EU-mediated Six Point Agreement of August 12 (supplemented by the “Agreement on Implementing Measures” reached on September 8, 2008), was signed by both Georgia and the Russian Federation which ended the 2008 August war. Currently, the EUMM represents the only international mission operational on the ground12.

The decision to deploy a CSDP mission to Georgia in order “to contribute to stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building whilst also contributing to informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia” was approved by the European Council in September 2008 (Council of the EU, 2008b:27). The “Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia” stipulated that the mission has

12 European Monitoring Mission in Georgia https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm
two main objectives: First, “to contribute to long-term stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding region”; and Second, “in the short term, the stabilisation of the situation with a reduced risk of a resumption of hostilities, in full compliance with the six-point Agreement and the subsequent implementing measures” (Council of the EU, 2008b:27). In order to achieve these objectives, the EU mandated EUMM Georgia to cover and focus on four main tasks: stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building, as well as reporting to the EU on the situation on the ground. Through the examination of these tasks, it becomes evident that the prioritization of human needs is prevalent. Here, each task will be further defined.

First, Stabilisation means to ensure that there is no return to hostilities.\footnote{EUMM Georgia, Facts and Figures \url{https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/facts_and_figures}} Under this pillar, according to the Council Joint Action, the mission has to monitor, analyse and report on the situation relating to the stabilisation process, implementation of the six-point Agreement and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (Council of the EU, 2008b:27; see Fischer, 2009:382).

Normalisation means a facilitation of the resumption of a safe and normal life for the local communities living on both sides of the ABLs with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.\footnote{EUMM Georgia, Facts and Figures \url{https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/facts_and_figures}} As the mission is supposed to monitor, analyse and report on the situation relating to the normalisation process of civil governance, thereby focusing on rule of law, effective law enforcement structures and adequate public order. Additionally, the Mission’s task is also to monitor the security of transport links, energy infrastructures and utilities, as well as the political and security aspects of the return of internally displaced persons and refugees (Council of the EU, 2008b:27; see Fischer, 2009:382). Thus normalisation part of the mandate is the one that is largely related to human security together with Confidence building part of the mandate, which through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties and other measures attempts to contribute inception/continuation of talks and co-operation on incident prevention (Haber, 2009). Under this task mission has to contribute to the reduction of tensions through liaison,
facilitation of contacts between parties and other measures (Council of the EU, 2008b:27).

Fourth part of the mandate – Informing the European policymaking about the situation in Georgia is one more source for ensuring EU’s proper and necessary engagement in the situation. As EUMM Georgia does not have executive power, for instance, they cannot directly provide humanitarian assistance or capital aid to people (EUMM interviewee 1, 2016; see Levington, 2013:52) who was suffering from the results of the war, this is an instrument for them to inform EU about all the necessities on the ground, which cannot be solved by monitors alone. Thus sending reports to Brussels about the situation on the ground is one of the major activities of the mission.

Following these tasks, declared aim of the mission is twofold: First one is to avoid presumption of hostilities and escalation of conflict and second, to help make the areas adjacent to the ABLs of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia safe and secure for the local population, or as it is stated by EUMM: “The Mission wants to contribute to the freedom of movement of citizens who live close to the Administrative Boundary Lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia so that they can go about their daily lives without fear and obstacles”\(^{15}\). To achieve these goals, several instruments such as the hotline, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) are used by the Mission.

For the purpose of undertaking a mandate the monitors in each Field Office (Headquarters in Tbilisi and three Regional Field Offices in Mtskheta, Gori and Zugdidi, while Mtskhet and Gori Field offices are monitoring situation around the ABL with South Ossetia, Zugdidi Field office focuses on the developments around the ABL with Abkhazia) are split into three teams covering: 1. The Administrative Boundary Lines and the areas adjacent to them, monitoring issues pertaining to stabilisation, normalisation and confidence-building; 2. Compliance with the Memoranda of Understanding signed between the Mission and the Georgian Ministries of Defence and

\(^{15}\) EUMM Georgia (2016) Factsheet [https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM%20Factsheet%20ENG%202016.pdf](https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM%20Factsheet%20ENG%202016.pdf)
Internal Affairs; 3. Human security aspects of conflict management. Thus, from the structure of the mission importance of human security issues is clearly underlined. This claim will be further elaborated on again.

As it is defined by current Head of the Mission, compliance teams monitor how Six Point Agreement is implemented by the signatory parties, as well as report to the Headquarter in Tbilisi on the issues that might escalate situation. Thus, they are mainly concentrating on the tasks which are defined under the stabilization pillar. While the ABL and Human Security teams monitor and report about the needs and problems of the local population. Thus, they cover both, the stabilisation and the normalization aspects of the mandate (Jankauskas, 2015:71). During the interviews it was also specified that human security teams' focus on activities varies in each Field offices. For instance Zugdidi Field office is mainly concentrated on monitoring the issues related to the freedom of movement (crossing of check-points and documentations); Gori Field office-right of properties (lands), because of existence of "moving "borders"" and Mtskheta Field office-resettlement and integration of IDPs in the community (EUMM interviewee 6, 2016).

It is worth mentioning, that the structure of the mission underwent changes over time, from the analysis of relevant documents, as well as from the conducted interviews, it became clear that initially there was no such division of tasks between EUMM monitors, and particularly there was no human security related or human rights and humanitarian issues team in the field offices, there were only "experts" operating on the ground. But already from 2009 there was a specific team, titled "human rights and humanitarian issues" team which was later transformed into "Human security" team since 2011 (EUMM interviewees, 2016). As one interviewee explained, there is a discrepancy between the EU's lexicon and practice (EUMM interviewee 2, 2016). Meaning, that despite the fact that human security was not explicitly used in the structure from the first phases of mission, human security issues were the central focus of EUMM monitors everyday activities (EUMM interviewee 2, 3, 2016) and that big

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16EUMM Georgia (2016) Factsheet
https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM%20Factsheet%20ENG%202016.pdf
efforts were done to monitor “how human beings were affected by war, either infrastructure was sufficient for they daily lives, whether they had access to healthcare (EUMM interviewee 2, 2016). As it was explained during interviews (EUMM interviewee 3, 1, 2016) due to EUMM Georgia is very first EU’s mission monitoring ceasefire agreement, those above mentioned structural changes were mainly conditioned by absence of a prior-knowledge and experience in the EU, how this type of missions should be done, therefore decision was received after experiencing situation on the ground, and until now mission undergoes structural development (EUMM interviewee 1, 2016). According to the Council of the EU’s “Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament” latest OPLAN optimised the Mission structure in order “to better deliver in the current operational environment (i.a. focus on more analytical reporting, flexibility of the teams in the Field offices, allocation of a project cell to enhance Mission activities in the field of confidence-building)” (Council of the EU, 2015:236).17

Thus, in addition to having human security team on the ground, the fact that the focus was not only on monitoring purely territorial security situation, can be confirmed by having a look on the composition of the mission personnel (EUMM interviewee 2, 3). There were/are people with different professional experiences, like human rights experts; people with qualifications in gender, social studies and humanitarian issues; economists and diplomats and not only with police and military background (Levington, 2013:54; EUMM interviewee 2, 3). This diversification is observable during the whole period of mission’s functioning. Currently about one-third of the personnel in each field office is dealing with specifically human security issues (EUMM interviewee 1, 2016). This underlines an importance of human security.

After the initial establishment of EUMM Georgia on September 15, 2008 (over 200 observers were deployed by 24 EU Member States on the ground), and started their patrolling activities on October 1, 2008 the main focus of the mission was to oversee Russian armed forces’ withdrawal from the areas adjacent to South Ossetia and

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17 Council of the EU, 2014, Main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXV/EU/07/33/EU_73311/imfname_10566359.pdf
Abkhazia and also withdrawal of Georgia forces to the position held before the outbreak of war. But additionally, as Merlingen and Ostrauskaite describe, through their patrol happening 24/7, monitors were involved in the following activities: “resettlement and treatment of IDPs; the freedom and security of movement of civilians to and from Abkhazia and South Ossetia; law enforcement; de-mining; and the humanitarian situation in the conflict area; [...] identification of farmland ownership in the conflict zone, [...] and investigations of kidnappings in its area of operation.” (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2009:24). After the stabilization of the situation (relatively) monitors are more and more engaged with human security-related issues (EUMM interviewees, 2016). But as one EUMM representative explained during the interview, focus on human security was in the center of the mission from the very first days: "if in the beginning it was weak, later on it gained more and more emphasis” (EUMM interviewee 2, 2016). According to Jankaustas currently, their focus is mainly on the “issues related to ‘borderisation’ (installation of barriers, infrastructure and signs along the ABLs) and restrictions on freedom of movement” (Jankauskas, 2015:72).

By definition EUMM’s mandate is valid to operate within the whole, internationally recognized borders of Georgia, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Fischer 2009:382), but up to date the mission representatives operate only in the Tbilisi controlled territories, without an access to the other side of the ABLs (Jankauskas, 2015:71; EUMM interviewees, 2016). This fact represents one of the main challenges for the effective implementation of the mission’s objectives on the ground (interviews, 2016).

Originally authorized for 12 months, the mission’s mandate has remained unchanged and has been prolonged five times since its initial set-up in 2008. Current mandate of the mission, which is constituted from monitors, technical support staff from all the EU member states is operational until December 14, 2016 (Council of the EU, 2014). Since 2009, when the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and OSCE Border Monitoring Mission were officially terminated in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, respectively, after Russia’s veto on the prolongation of their mandates in

the UN Security Council and OSCE’s Permanent Council, respectively. EUMM represents the only international mission operational on the territory of Georgia. This fact also adds a great significance to the role of the EU’s presence and its involvement on the territorial conflicts in Georgia. In addition, existence of monitors from all EU member states, quick deployment of the monitors on the ground (about two weeks), as well as the continuing renewal of the mandate shows existing importance of the mission (interviews, 2016).

**Application of the principles of Human Security approach to the EUMM Georgia**

As it was visible from the previous chapter, human security related issues are reflective in the EUMM Georgia's mandate. Despite the fact that the concept human security was not explicitly mentioned there, nor in the operation plans and internal documentation (EUMM interviewees, 3, 4, 2016), human security-related concerns where emphasized. Therefore, main aim of this chapter is to explore whether and how they feature during the implementation process. Once again it is important to keep in mind that an assessment of the effectiveness of their actions will not be provided in this thesis. Instead, the main focus will be on exploring the means through which the above-listed six principles of human security were implemented.

As we have seen from the mandate, there is EU’s commitment to promote human security related issues, particularly visible under Stabilisation ("freedom of movement and actions by spoilers", "violations of human rights"), Normalisation ("political and security aspects of the return of internally displaced persons and refugees") and Confidence Building ("confidence building measures") pillars (Council of the EU, 2008b:27). Mission’s OPLAN (cited in Council of the EU, 2010a: 3) further elaborates this commitment by stating that:

“EUMM Georgia will promote human rights, international humanitarian law, the application of international criminal law and gender during its internal consultation process pertaining to all aspects of its mandate's implementation,

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19 Socor, V. 2009, OSCE RIP in Georgia [https://jamestown.org/program/osce-rip-in-georgia/](https://jamestown.org/program/osce-rip-in-georgia/)
including policy development, monitoring, information collection, data analysis, reporting, and staffing.”

This means that in this part of EUMM documentation there is clear reference of two particular principles of human security, defined by Madrid Report: “primacy of human rights” and “bottom-up approach.” Analysis will be provided by starting exploration of these two principals and then will move on the remaining four principles, in order to account whether these principles were presented in the mandate and then translated into actual policies.

When it comes to the principle "primacy of human rights", in the Madrid Report this is defined as "ensuring a respect for human rights and that civilian and military initiative should prioritize the protection of civilians over military victory and temporary suppression of violence" (Human Security Study Group, 2007:9,10). Shortly after its deployment, EUMM Georgia was mostly monitoring how ceasefire agreement was implemented by two warring parties: Russia and Georgia, and by de-facto authorities as well, with the particular focus on the observation of the withdrawal of their forces to the position held before the outbreak of war (EUMM interviewee 3, 2016; Halbach, 2009). From the interviews it became clear that the observation of human security related issues, like illegal detentions, how human beings were affected by war, either infrastructure was sufficient, if people have an access to healthcare, was already in the focus of monitors (EUMM interviewees, 2016). But there was no issue of "prioritization" of ensuring a respect of human rights over suppression of violence, because these two are closely related to each other, or as Martin puts it "initial objective of securing Russian troop withdrawals was intended to address the limited freedom of movement for the population" (Martin, 2009:137). When arrived on the ground and faced the situation, mission switched focus from “ceasefire-monitoring role” to identify needs of conflict-affected people, IDPs and to ensure improved security conditions for them, for instance by providing assistance to deal with unexploded ordnances (Martin, 2009:136; EUMM interviewee 2, 2016). Additionally, from the interviews it became apparent that since the initial stage, monitors in the field offices are more and more engaged with human security-related issues (EUMM interviewees, 2016). Hotline, for instance can be used as an example. This is one of the instruments which are used by
the EUMM representatives to promote confidence building between warring parties, and to respond to the urgent incidents, among others to human-security related issues with the aim to diffuse tensions and avoid escalation of the situation. The description of an incident as it was shown in a report of the parliament of the UK\footnote{EU and Georgia: EU Monitoring Mission, (2011). Cited in Parliament of the UK \url{http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-xxxv/42819.htm}} of provides an illustrative example:

“In May 2011 four Georgian citizens were detained and two were shot in the Sachkere/Znauri area of the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with South Ossetia. This was the most serious shooting incident at the ABL since March 2009. The EUMM quickly got information moving on the hotline, dispatched a fact finding team to interview locals and brokered a meeting of the concerned parties which led to the release of those detained during the incident. Their prompt action help prevent further escalation and neither side increased their alert status.”

But on the other hand, despite the fact that for instance, freedom of movement is considered as "a paramount issue" by the current head of the mission (Jankauskas, 2016, Speech, cited in Racz, 2016), EUMM's is not able to operate on the whole, internationally recognized territory of Georgia, as it is defined by the mandate. Therefore, monitors are not able to access other side of the ABL, consequently they cannot ensure to avoid detentions, to ensure for people basic human rights such as religious rights(to visit graveyards) or access to their property, because ABL and moving “borders” increasingly result in division of their properties, like houses from gardens (EUMM interviewee, 6, 2016). However, it can be concluded that human rights observation is presented in the mandate as well as is implemented on the ground. But there exist certain limitations as well.

When it comes to the principle: “a bottom-up approach on the ground”, "intensive consultation with local people by involving civil society, women, and young people" (Human Security Study Group, 2007:9,10), it is also observable to be respected. Results from the interviews showed that EUMM representatives are actively involved and working with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) from the initial phases of the mission. They organize information sharing meetings, with the purpose to share information and receive backgrounds from the representatives of NGOs, CSOs, also with students.
One recent example is the Peace Journalism Prize, a project which aims to contributing “to confidence-building and peace in the context of armed conflicts in Georgia”. Also, further examples can be found from Interview with EUMM representative, according to whom, EUMM Georgia, has Civil Society Strategy and in line with this strategy they actively work with different civil society organizations, including having civil society organizations in their field offices, that integrates both sides of ABL (EUMM interviewee, 1, 2016). According to this interviewee EUMM established an "EU Confidence Building Fund" in 2014, through which EUMM Georgia can provide financial assistance to the small projects that is not covered by Commission funds” (EUMM interviewee, 1, 2016). In addition, EUMM works closely with Confidence Building and Early Response Mechanism (COBERM) programme, which is a joint EU-UN programme, that funds certain projects with the financial support of the EU and in close coordination with the UNDP. Here, aim again is to bring together, and build confidence among people from both Tbilisi controlled territories and from breakaway regions.

But there are certain critics as well, one concern raised from the interviewees was that although the mission seeks to intensively communicate with CSOs and organize information sharing meetings, they mostly remain limited to provide open conversations and answer all the questions (EUMM interviewee 4; Expert interviewee 1). So, openness of the information is considered as one of the negative aspects here.

When it comes to the engagement with women, during interview it was revealed that having women as a monitor in the mission is considered as a positive factor that contributes to the engagement with local people, who are more open to talk to monitors about their needs and problems (EUMM interviewee 2, 2016). It is worth mentioning, that according to the Council of the EU’s Report from 2014, EUMM Georgia is considered a mission which has the highest number of females in the staff (38%). According to the field assessment study, review of the OPLAN from 2013, shows that "EUMM Georgia should cooperate closely with Georgian authorities, [...] and women’s groups [...] to enhance gender mainstreaming in Georgia" (Åhlin and Olsson, 2013:24).
Thus, commitment to work on the issues related to the engagement with women is visible in the mandate.

There are some examples that reflect EUMM Georgia’s attempts to practically implement these commitments. For instance, in 2009 inside the structure of the mission a gender adviser position was established (EUMM interviewee 2, 2016), which is responsible among others, for "liaising with relevant local and international counterparts in relation to gender equality issues" (Åhlin and Olsson, 2013: 24). Also, Council’s Special Report from 2010 states that “EUMM has successfully facilitated meetings with Georgian female police officers, which has resulted in the creation of Female RPOL Officers’ Associations in the Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti and Shida Kartli Regions” (Council of the EU, Special Report, 2010:4). In addition, EUMM engages women in their daily activities through organizing workshops and roundtable discussions, among others (Council of the EU, 2010:4). These examples show that EUMM is actively engaged with women and stated commitment in the mandate can be considered to be implemented on the ground as well. One concern that is voiced is that “EUMM does not monitor gender-based and domestic violence explicitly” (Council of the EU, 2010:4). Thus, based on the above mentioned information it can be argued that the principles of bottom-up approach and primacy of human rights are present in the official documentation, as well as is observable from the EUMM Georgia’s activities.

As for the third principle: Effective Multilateralism; this is “a commitment to work in the framework of international law, alongside other international and regional agencies, individual state and non-state actors” (HSSG, 2007:9,10). EU’s commitment to multilateralism, more specifically commitment to work in “close coordination” with the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the OSCE Mission in Georgia; “consistent with other Union activity” was explicitly referred in the Article 2 of the Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 (Council of the EU, 2008b:27). Which means that this principle of human security approach was included in the mandate from the initial stage.

It can be argued that this commitment was also translated into practice. Even before the establishment of EUMM Georgia, EU closely cooperated with OSCE in
supporting confidence building projects in South Ossetia (Martin, 2009:139). In addition, EU had been present as an observer in Joint Control Commission (JCC) for South Ossetia together with OSCE, and it was also involved in the third-party mediation UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Group of Friends (known as "Geneva Process"), where EU was represented by some of its member states (Whitman and Wolff, 2012:97), namely Germany, France and United Kingdom. Discussions also touched upon the issues, such as IDPs, human rights issues and refugee returns. Despite the fact that EU had very limited role in those two mediation processes (Whitman and Wolff, 2012:97) EU’s commitment to multilateralism was already there even before deployment of EUMM Georgia on the ground. This is also confirmed by the fact that the ceasefire agreement on August 12, 2008 was mediated by EU-OSCE jointly, which was not only about ensuring discontinuation of hostilities but also about providing "free access for humanitarian aid" for the people" (see annex 1.). Meaning, that in the ceasefire agreement a concern was put on the security of the conflict-affected people and not only intended to stop hostilities between conflicting parties.

Since the August War, EUMM co-chairs Geneva International Discussions (GID) together with OSCE and UN as a facilitator of discussion between conflict parties. One more instrument, Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meetings (IPRM) in Ergneti (South Ossetia) and Gali (Abkhazia) in addition to GID mainly concentrate on the issues related to crossing ABL, documentation, detentions and IDPs. One more example is the fact that when information is collected on the ground by monitors, it is distributed with other international organizations (UNHCR; UNDP; International Committee of Red Cross) which can provide direct financial or humanitarian assistance for people (Levington, 2013:56). EUMM representative one field office also underlined that they had UNHR office and were organizing weekly meetings for information sharing with each other (EUMM interviewee 2, 2016). One more example of multilateralism is COBERM programme, a joint EU-UN initiative which is funded by the EU and implemented by the (UNDP), already discussed above. At this moment, the EU is a sole international actor presented on the ground, who is dealing with the issues caused by August War, 2008. But this multilateral cooperation with other international actors, UN and OSCE was visible before and after war, as well as after OSCE and
UNOMIG mission's termination in 2009. Thus, with respect to assessing the character of the EUMM Georgia in terms of its security approach and application of the six human security principles, more specifically effective multilateralism its adoption seems visible.

Next principle of human security approach is an integrated regional approach, meaning that Regional dialogues and action in neighbouring countries should be systematically integrated into policies for crisis” (HSSG, 2007:9, 10). Despite the fact that in the mandate, under Article two we read that one particular objective of the mission should be: "to contribute to long-term stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding region" (Council of the EU, 2008b:27), this reference cannot be read as a commitment for having a regional approach. Interviews showed that in their activities and tasks actually regional element is not integrated because it is not covered by the mandate (EUMM interviewees, 2016). Therefore, their activities have hardly ever been linked to this issue. Mission is even limited to operate only in the Tbilisi controlled territories and not in the whole, internationally recognized territory of Georgia (Halbach, 2009: 112). As one respondent indicated during the interview: "EUMM Georgia is a tiny part from the EU’s general activities implemented in Georgia" (Expert interviewee 2, 2016). But, if EUMM has limited mandate, for instance EUSR for South Caucasus and Crisis in Georgia (at this moment Herbert Salber) is a person, who is tasked to contribute to the regional dialogue and cooperation between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia on different issues, like on "common security threats [through] the development of contacts with governments, […] other key political actors, […] and civil society" (Council of the EU, 2011) as well as to prevent conflicts and contribute to the peaceful solutions of the already existing conflicts, for instance "through promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.” However, one EUMM representative underlined during the interview that there are some joint meetings, reports and patrolling activities together with the EUSR, when they also discuss issues related to the issues of ethnic minorities for example, or what the security situation in the region is (EUMM interviewee 4, 2016). Briefly, it can be concluded that the principle of regional approach is not included in the mandate and in other EUMM Georgia internal documentation, consequently it is not followed either. Thus, EUMM
Georgia's activities are not directed to contributing regional dialogue and cooperation, for instance with Armenia, and Azerbaijan. One explanation of this can be the mission's limitation in the tasks and their activities, which is mainly monitoring and reporting on the situation on the ground, in addition to the small portion of the staff (around 300).

Next principle: clear and transparent strategic direction, means that “in case of an external intervention by the EU, it should be based on a clear legal authorization, transparent mandates and a coherent overall strategy” (HSSG, 2007:9,10). The decision to deploy monitoring mission on the ground was adopted by the Council of the EU on September 15, 2008 (Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP), as a follow-up response to the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement. It was also a response on the Georgia’s government’s insisting requests that the EU should engage in conflict-affected areas of the country (EUMM interviewee 1, Expert 2, 2016). EUMM Georgia's deployment was based on the bilateral Status of the Mission Agreement (SOMA) between the EU and Georgia, upon "the invitation letter by President Mikheil Saakashvili of 11 September 2008" (Official Journal of the European Union L 310/31; 21.11.2008, Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the status of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia).

The work of monitors is guided by the mandate and they look into how ceasefire agreement is respected by signatory parties. The areas of activities are clearly defined, directions what monitors are supposed to do are indicated, and mandate has not changed during the eight years, after every six months there is a review of the mission which is presented to the Council of the EU, in particular to Political and Security Committee (PSC). All the respondents – EUMM Georgia’s former and current representatives – remarked that the mandate is clearly defined and transparent, but sometimes they themselves decide on which aspect of the activities to focus on, based on the needs in that moment (EUMM interviewees, 2016). One problem which was pointed out during one interview was that there is no clear timeline how long the mission will last (Expert interviewee 2, 2016). In March, 2009, the head of EUMM Hansjoerg Habero declared that the EU should “find an exit strategy since such missions should not exist forever” (Echo Moskvy, 2009 cited in Popescu, 2011:91). There is not exit strategy indeed, but
they "discuss several scenarios in which case exit will happen but none of them seems realistic at this moment (for instance: intimidation of SOMA from Georgian government, Recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions from Georgia, or forced evacuation for security reasons)", as long as the objectives of the mission were not achieved yet, among others (EUMM interviewee 6, 2016). One more concern raised during the interview was related to the transparency of the mandate, more precisely how it was understandable to the local people. Despite the fact that the essence of the mandate is clearly defined for the mission personnel, there is a lack of awareness among population what the mission is for. From the interviews it was revealed that during their monitoring activities on the field EUMM personnel from field offices were facing challenges to explain to people, what are their role: that EUMM Georgia is not humanitarian mission to provide people with direct financial assistance or to help locals in repairing properties which were damaged after the war, nor that they are peacemakers who are protecting territorial security with coercive measures (EUMM interviewees, 2,4, 2016). And this is not an issue only in the initial phase of the mission, but even in 2013. Meaning, that EUMM Georgia lacks to reach their objectives to local people. In total, this principle was also respected. The mission was based on a legal authorization and has clearly defined objectives and tasks.

The last principle is legitimate political authority: that “requires the EU to observe and help establish an appropriate authority in the disputed territories” (Martin, 2009:137). Legal authority is Georgian Government (EUMM interviewees, 2016; Martin, 2009:138). The EU is following non-recognition but engagement policy towards breakaway regions (EUMM interviewee 1, 2016). In order to achieve stabilization and normalization goals of the mandate EUMM cooperates with Georgian government, particularly Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence (Fischer, 2009:382). This cooperation included two memoranda of understanding with Georgian ministries of Interior and Defence, which restricts in a certain manner movement of Georgian troops along the ABLs. But when it comes to issues whether this principle was achieved, it can be argued that no. As Martin say, in the initial phase of the mission establishment, when Russian forces started withdrawal of the appropriate authority in the disputed territories by the EUMM Georgia was clear, it was the period when
Russian forces moved away behind the administrative boundary line (Martin, 2009:383). Since then, for instance after Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia at the end of August 2008 and deployed Russian Federation Border Guards in 2009, when the ABL between Tbilisi Controlled Territories and Abkhazia and South Ossetia are gradually being transformed into "borders"\textsuperscript{21}, thus establishment of appropriate authority is closely related to the problems with the territorial sovereignty (Martin, 2009:138). Therefore, it can be concluded that this principles is not respected.

To sum up, this section showed that despite the fact that human security as a concept is not explicitly referred in the EUMM Georgia mandate (was not included in the original mandate and was included only later on in the form of an explicit mentioning of the human security team) but the principles of this approach, defined by Madrid Report of 2007, was presented in the mandate and internal documentation (OPLANs) as well as in their activities (except “integrated regional approach” and “legitimate political authority”) it can be concluded that overall the principles of the human security were followed by the EUMM Georgia. This means that there is human security in practice. In the implementation of this CSDP mission, the EU applies human security. Taking into consideration, that the mandate of the mission is very specific-to monitor compliance of a ceasefire agreement and it does not have any executive or coercive mechanisms (EUMM interviewees, 2016) this might have an impact on the effectiveness on their activities during implementation process. But, the thesis tries to explore whether human security approach was adopted in this mission by the EU, and not to evaluate how effectively it is done. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that EUMM Georgia is based on human security approach.

\textsuperscript{21} Council of the EU (2014), Main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXV/EU/07/33/EU_73311/imfname_10566359.pdf
Understanding EU’s rationale in adoption and implementation Human Security approach in EUMM in Georgia

As it was seen from the previous chapter, most of the human security principles were underlined in the EU documentations, in their decision to set-up the mission and in the EUMM Georgia’s mandate, as well as they were implemented on the ground (except two). On this basis, this section explores the rationale for adopting a human security approach in EUMM Georgia.

After exploring existing literature on this topic, together with EU documentation and interview results it was revealed that there is a combination of several factors that might led the EU to follow human security approach in EUMM Georgia. This argumentation will be presented through appropriateness and consequentiality logics, because as argued in the chapter on the theoretical framework, using each theoretical framework separately does not allow explaining certain outcomes comprehensively. This is the issue in this thesis as well. Using only rationalist argumentation, for instance, would leave the role of identities out of explaining EU’s behavior, therefore the thesis use both logics in combination to account to the outcome.

Logic of appropriateness – emphasized by constructivist approach – sees actions as driven primarily by “senses of identity” and that actors behave in line of what they consider to be appropriate in that situation (March and Olsen, 1998:949-952). As it was discussed in the chapter “EU’s Approach to Human Security” the development of EU’s security thinking with increasing importance of human security was noticeable already since 2003, when the European Security Strategy was adopted by the EU. This document showcases EU’s inclination to put emphasis on a need of having a comprehensive approach to security, in order to deal with both, traditional and non-traditional security threats, by stating that “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means” (ESS, 2003:7). Additionally, ESS defined EU’s role in the future as “a formidable force for good in the world”, “more active”, “more coherent” and “more capable” player on a global scale to deal with variety of threats and challenges (ESS, 2003:11, 3). Since then, discussions and efforts
to construct human security as an effective agenda to deal with crises was intensified (for instance, adoption of Barcelona and Madrid Reports, in 2004-2007, respectively), and was included in the EU discourse, particularly associated with personal efforts made by Javier Solana and Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Christou, 2014), finally leading to the explicit reference of human security in the EU’s official documentations (2008 Report on Implementation of ESS and 2016 Global Security Strategy). This can be called *a timeline argumentation*, meaning that as the mission set up took place (in 2008) human security thinking was well developed within the EU, as a result the logic of human security also reflects in the EUMM Georgia’s missions set up at the time.

During the interviews, it was also revealed that more and more emphasis on human security issues of the mission is a reflection that the EU uses the UN’s experiences on how to approach crises in a comprehensive manner, as well as learns from its own experience (EUMM interviewees 1, 2, 2016). Indeed, the structure of the mission has been gradually developed. If initially, there were only “experts” later on separate teams has been formulated (among others human security team), each having its specific focus for operation. The main rationale for this structural change was a desire to more effectively respond to the needs on the ground (EUMM interviewee 4, 6, 2016). Particularly, when there was no template how to format and implement ceasefire monitoring mission, as EUMM Georgia was the very first mission of this nature, for the EU (EUMM interviewee 1, 2016). This can be called an *experience argumentation*. But, it needs to be clarified that sometimes argumentations cannot be defined purely under either “logic of appropriateness” or “logic of consequence”. In this case as well, while here structural developments refer to the improvement of the effectiveness of the actions and their outcomes; and are considered as a way how to approach situation in a comprehensive manner, some might argue that doing things more efficiently might be seen as EU’s calculation to save time or money, for instance. But in this particular case, learning argumentation is placed under the logic of appropriateness, because it is believed to be considered as an appropriate way to effectively implement security policy on the ground.
One more rationale which was revealed from the interviews, as well as was already brought out as an explanation in the 2004 Barcelona Report: Human security doctrine for Europe, for why the EU should follow this agenda, is that this is *morality argumentation* (HSSG: 2004:5), meaning that the EU is morally obliged to secure “a better world ‘out there’” (Keane, 2006:44). Thus, formatting the mission in the manner which puts emphasis not only on the importance of territorial security, but also to a great extent responds to the urgent need of local people and concentrating on the contribution to the improvement of daily life, security and living conditions for them, can be understood as the EU’s attempt to help a country (Georgia), which has undergone visible democratic developments since the Rose Revolution of 2003 (Expert interviewees, 2016; also see Popescu, 2011 for further information) and expressed it willingness to follow approachment policy with the EU (for instance by including Georgia in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)\(^{22}\) in 2004 or by sending first ever rule of law CSDP mission in the same year EUJUST Themis\(^{23}\), EU showcased that it wanted to cooperate with Georgia in order to contribute to the development of the country, and support in the implementation of structural reforms, among others). This argument is particularly significant as the EU is considered to be an actor that: “is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights […]” (consolidated Treaty on European Union (TEU) 2010, cited in Council of the EU, 2010:7\(^{24}\)) and sees their promotion as “the best means of strengthening the international order” (European Security Strategy, 2003:10).

In other words, as Manners say, the EU is normative power, the value-based actor who tries to project its core norms and values beyond its borders (Manners, 2002). Therefore, based on this normative power narrative, for the EU as a value-driven and moral actor it seemed appropriate to adopt a human security approach and help people out where it was needed.


When it comes to the “logic of Consequentiality”, which is grounded on the Rationalist approach, it sees actions as driven primarily by self-interest. According to March and Olsen, under the “logic of consequences” actors perform as “rational utility maximizers [...] choosing among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives” (March and Olsen, 1998:949-952). First two argumentations under this logic is a geopolitical importance of Georgia for the EU and EU’s interest to ensure its own security, primarily for its citizens. This means, in broader terms, that EU acts based on its self-interests while following human security approach in EUMM Georgia.

Similarly to the morality argumentation, the importance of the EU’s self-interest for maximizing its own security was also written in 2004 Barcelona Report as an explanation of why the EU should adopt human security doctrine by that time, stating that “Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity” (2004:5). This reasoning emphasizes intertwined nature of external and internal security, particularly in the post-Cold war era, meaning that by providing security abroad, the EU preserves its own security (Keane, 2006:44). New Global Security Strategy (2016: 9, emphasis added) also stresses the relevance of the above mentioned argumentation, by stating that:

“When violent conflicts erupt, our shared vital interests are threatened. The EU will engage [...] in peacebuilding, and foster human security [...]. Internal and external security are even more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighborhood and surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world”.

This means that human security approach is considered by the EU as an effective way to ensure sustainable security in EU neighborhood and therefore also for the EU itself. Therefore, it can be expected that EU felt the need to engage in Georgia’s conflict-affected regions because the conflict in their immediate neighborhood might have negative repercussions for its own security, in the long run. As Whitman and Wolff argue the EU acknowledged a critical importance of the two conflicts in Georgia—over Abkhazia and South Ossetia— to the EU and its member states, already in 2003 in the ESS (Whitman and Wolff, 2010:1,2) by saying that the EU “should now take a
stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus” (ESS, 2003: 7, cited in Whitman and Wolff, 2010:2,3) in the context when it was speaking how frozen and violent conflicts pose problems to the regional stability and the EU itself, and in 2008 Report on ESS as well by directly speaking about Georgia’s conflicts (Whitman and Wolff, 2010:2,3). This can be understood in the manner that ensuring the security of the countries including in the South Caucasus region, became a concern for the EU. Additionally, having the importance of energy security for the EU’s security thinking in mind, Lynch underlined Georgia’s role for the EU as “a transit route for energy goods from the Caspian Region” (Lynch, 2006:8). In 2006, before the 2008 August War, Lynch (2006: 66,67) also argued more specifically that EU’s rationale for seeking the peaceful settlement for the territorial conflicts is Georgia can be related to the fact that:

“Apart from the unacceptable cost of human casualties in Georgia itself, renewed conflict would leave the South Caucasus even more hostage to blockades and tensions. New wars would spill over also more widely through the Black Sea Region, and possibly affect the security of EU candidate countries.”

This includes now the EU member states Bulgaria Romania. After the recent enlargements of the EU after which EU closer approximated with the Georgia and South Caucasus more broadly, of ensuring security for EU members, especially those located within the wider region, attains much more relevance.

The same argumentation is developed by Kakachia, who argues that the challenges of political stability and democratic consolidation are the "factors that has a direct effect on the European security and welfare" (Kakachia, 2010:509) adding that “the unresolved conflicts risk renewed hostilities and new migration flows, thus posing a threat to human rights across the South Caucasus. In this context, any kind of regional destabilization may seriously affect security in the EU’s wider neighborhood.” (Kakachia, 2010:510-511; see also Foucher and Giuliani, 2008:5).

For further overview of the origins of the Abkhaz conflict and Western engagement, see Coppieters, B. (1999), Western security policies in the Georgian–Abkhazian conflicts

72
And last argumentation, is about the EU’s engagement in conflict-affected regions in Georgia and its repercussion on EU-Russia relations. Under this logic, it is argued that as Russia was directly involved in the August War of 2008 as a conflict party, by adopting human security approach and choosing civilian monitoring mission as a form of facilitation of crisis management, the EU ensured that it would not aggravate EU-Russia relations.

Thus, as it was shown, rational calculation and considerations of appropriateness together played a role in reasoning for setting up and implementation of EUMM Georgia on the basis of human security approach. Both types of reasoning, “logic of appropriateness”—emphasizing by Constructivist theory and “logic of expected consequences”—underlined by Rationalist theoretical approach are present. Both, values and interests has played role and in combination account for the eventual outcome of EUMM Georgia, including human security approach.
Conclusion

The thesis discussed how an emerging security agenda – human security, with the main focus on the security of human beings and their rights of personal security, in contrast to the traditional, state-centered understanding of security – found its way into the security practices of the European Union (EU). The main aim of the thesis was to explore the role of the human security in the EU, in particular in the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), to analyze its analytical value and practical usage on the example of European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia).

In order to achieve these aims the thesis put forward a set of three interrelated questions:

- **Whether human security approach was followed in European Union Monitoring Mission Georgia (EUMM Georgia) by the EU? If yes, how was it implemented and what was the guiding rationale for the EU to implement this approach?**

  First part of these questions was directed to exploring whether and how human security approach was followed in the European Monitoring Mission Georgia (EUMM Georgia) by the EU. For this purpose, the six principles of human security, defined by the Madrid Report – A European Way of Security – of the Human Security Study Group, from 2007 were used as the indicators to measure their practical implementation on the ground and to see whether they were also presented in the EU’s official documentation such as mission’s mandate.

  While the second part explored what was the underlying rationale for the EU to opt for this approach. For accounting for the latter, the thesis applied combination of both theoretical approaches: Constructivism and its “logic of expected appropriateness” and Rationalism and its “logic of consequences”, arguing that these two logics together leads the EU to adopt a human security approach in CSDP, in this case in EUMM Georgia.

  As for the methodological framework, thesis was based on principle of triangulation, with the combination of three data collection sources: for collecting primary data interviews were conducted with the current and former representatives of EUMM Georgia (in total six), both from the Headquarter in Tbilisi (two persons), from all field offices: the Zugdidi Field Office (one), from Mtskheta Field office (one) and from the Gori Field Office (two). These people were selected for the purpose of gaining
more detailed insight into how the work is done in practice by the EUMM Georgia and what is their understanding of the mission operating on the ground for already eight years. In addition, two experts from academia were also interviewed, with the objective to receive information from the “outside” perspective. Interviews were used as a complementary part of the data collection process, in order to address the gaps which had been emerged while dealing with other two data collection sources, namely secondary and tertiary data. Secondary data was collected by analysing the EU documentation: Council Conclusions, European Parliament Resolutions; Commission country strategy papers on Georgia. And tertiary data was collected from the already existing analytical documents, academic papers, and field assessments studies, from all the major publications produced by the experts and academics on the issues what are relevant for this thesis (EUMM Georgia, Analysis of Human security Approach in the EU, EU and conflicts in Georgia).

From the EU documentation it was revealed that human security related issues played a role in the EU’s decision to launch the EUMM Georgia, also recognition of the people-oriented position together with underlining more traditional security related issues, like political sovereignty (but not claiming its primacy over territorial security issues) also became apparent. Talking to the EUMM Georgia’s former and current representatives, there seemed to be agreement on the fact that human security related concerns has been one of the rationales for the EU’s response to the ongoing development in Georgia, shortly in the aftermath of the outbreak of the August war, as well as one of the main focuses on the daily activities of EUMM Georgia staff. In addition, the results from the interviews showed that the human security related issues gained more emphasis as time went by, when monitors operational on the ground witnessed several problems related to IDPs or free movement for individuals. At the end, from this research it became clear that overall, the EU adopts human security as an approach in EUMM Georgia, on a contractual level, even though the concept itself is not explicitly written in the mandate (but there is a human security team). During the actual implementation process of the mandate EUMM Georgia’s actions also follows human security approach. However, the result is mixed, meaning that not all principles are represented. Namely, principles of “integrated regional approach” and
“establishment of the legitimate political authority” are weakly respected by the EUMM Georgia. One explanation for this can be a limited nature of the mandate itself, as EUMM Georgia has a ceasefire-monitoring role, without any executive or coercive powers. This research revealed that, in case of EUMM Georgia human and territorial security concerns are intertwined. Limited access (or no access at all) for the monitors to the other side of ABL is considered as the main stumbling block for respecting the principle of “legitimate political authority”. All the other, four principles of human security approach, namely: primacy of human rights, bottom-up approach, clear and transparent strategic direction and effective multilateralism were presented in the mandate, as well as was followed during the implementation process of the mandate.

In the final part of the thesis it was concluded that the EU approaches human security in an instrumental way and acts, both based on his own security interests as well as his identity, as a norms and value driven international actor. This means that EU is pursuing both "logic of consequences" and "logic of expected appropriateness" together while following human security approach in the EUMM Georgia. The reasoning is stipulated by combination of several factors:

“Logic of expected appropriateness”: Morality argument; Timeline argument; Experience-from its own and UN practices.

“Logic of consequences”: European Security argument; Geopolitical reasoning; Repercussions on EU-Russia relations.

Thesis showcased that both, rational calculation and considerations of appropriateness were presented in the reasoning why EU followed human security approach in the EUMM Georgia. Both in combination accounted for the eventual outcome of EUMM Georgia, including human security approach.

All in all, this study presented whether human security approach was followed by the EU in its engagement in the conflicted-affected areas of Georgia, after the launch of the mission in October, 2008 until December, 2016. This was explored on the example of EU’s engagement via CSDP toolkit, EUMM Georgia.

As this research had a limited scope main focus was mostly on the actions which were made by the EU, but another side of the coin, assessment how effective these steps were, left out of the research focus of this topic. Therefore, for further research it would
be interesting to be explored how effective is the human security approach in practice in Georgia, as a people-centered security strategy for those for whom it is implemented and whether locals themselves perceive EU's actions as a human security approach. Since, from my interviews it became apparent that there is a lack of awareness among local population what this mission is doing, why and how. Therefore, a question arises: does this mean that EUMM objectives cannot be reached to other people? One more result of the study is that mission's mandate itself influences how the principles are implemented on the ground. From the interviews it became apparent that as the mission has only monitoring and reporting function, without any executive or coercive powers, this very much hinders effectiveness of their actions on the ground. Thus, further research might also be directed to exploring how mission's format itself affects the implementation of the human security approach.
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Appendices

Annex 1. Six-point agreement

(1) Not to resort to force;
(2) To end hostilities definitively;
(3) To provide free access for humanitarian aid;
(4) Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;
(5) Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional security measures;
(6) Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Source: Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on the situation in Georgia GEERAL AFFAIRS and EXTERAL RELATIOS Council meeting, Brussels, 13 August 2008

Annex 2. Ongoing CSDP missions

Annex 3. Interview-guiding questions

1. Could you please, briefly explain the nature of this mission?

2. What role does the EUMM play in contributing to improvement of the situation on the ground? What was the situation from the beginning of the mission and how it was/is possible to keep improvements and stability now, what has changed over time?

3. What was the main motivation for the EU to engage in Georgia after the 2008 August War? Why this conflict was important for the EU? What does it mean for EU security policies in the longer term?

4. In your opinion, why did the EU choose to engage via the CSDP framework and set the mission up in this format?

5. In your opinion, what role does the Human security concept play in the setup and implementation process of this particular mission? What was the motivation for the EU when they established EUMM Georgia? Can we say that concern about human security played a role?

6. What does the job of the human security team include? What are their resources to tackling these issues? What for the other teams?

7. Evaluation part: in your opinion, how the six principles (defined in 2007 Madrid report) of human security approach were respected during the mission implementation process (explaining the meaning of each principle and asking separate questions for each of them)?

   The primacy for human rights: for example, through which means do you observe that human rights are respected? What are you activities in this regard?

   A bottom-up approach on the ground: how do you involve civil society, women and local people in your activities? Are there any obstacles to getting them involved?

   Effective multilateralism: how do you cooperate with other international actors presented in the country? How do you coordinate with other EU representatives in Georgia?
An integrated regional approach: what is EUMM Georgia’s (or EU) role in promoting regional dialogue and cooperation between the neighbouring countries?

Clear and transparent strategic direction: in your opinion, is there a clear strategy guiding the mission?

The establishment of a legal political authority: who is considered to be an appropriate authority in the disputed territories; how is it possible to work with the conflict parties?

8. In your opinion, what are the EUMM Georgia’s major challenges in addressing issues envisaged by its mandate, in particular with regards to human security aspect of the mandate (examples)?

9. Can you say that the EU adopted human security approach in EUMM Georgia? If so, why/ what were the reasons/considerations?

List of the Interviewees

EUMM Georgia

1. Anne Palm- Chief of Operations in Zugdidi Field Office, 2008-2011 (skype call)

2. Teemu Sinkkonen- Team Leader, Human Rights team, Gori Field Office, 2009-2010 (phone call)

3. Caecilia van Peski- Team Leader Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues team, Gori Field Office 2010-2011 (skype call)

3. Rafal Zamrzycki, Deputy Team Leader Human Security Team, Mtskheta Field Office, 2012-2013 (skype call)

5. Johan Axander -Field Office Coordinator, Tbilisi Headquarter, 2012-till today (skype call)

6. EUMM representative, Tbilisi Headquarter (skype call)
Academia/experts

1. Kornely Kakachia- Professor of Political Science at Tbilisi State University and Director of the Georgian Institute of Politics, Georgia (skype call)

2. Nicu Popescu- Senior Analyst at European Union Institute for Security Studies, France (phone call)
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