JOURNALISM at the CROSSROADS

Perspectives on Research
Journalism at the Crossroads
Perspectives on Research

Edited by
Ilaha Kolivita & Epp Leuk
Journalism at the Crossroads
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Edited by
Juha Koivisto & Epp Lauk
Foreword

JOURNALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH is a collective summary of the first Nordic-Baltic seminar on contemporary theory and methods in media research. The seminar for doctoral and master's students from several universities of the Scandinavian and Baltic countries was held from July 29 to August 8, 1996, in Estonia in the village of Pühajärve. In all, 39 students, teachers and researchers took part in the seminar, which was sponsored by the Nordisk Forskerutdanningsakademi (NorFA) and hosted by the University of Tartu, Department of Journalism.

This volume is a collection of articles based on papers originally presented at the seminar. Some of the essays are contributions by the professors who participated in the seminar as lecturers: Jan Ekecrantz from the University of Stockholm, Svennik Høyen from the University of Oslo, and Kaarle Nordenstreng from the University of Tampere. Professor Marju Lauristin from the University of Tartu was course leader. Professor Norman Fairclough (University of Lancaster) lectured on discourse analysis in media research.

The essays in this volume provide an example of the topics and problems that are at the focus of attention in ongoing research; the essays demonstrate the current stage and quality of the studies in progress. The volume is so organized that the first few articles cover more general theme; the more detailed discussions that follow are clustered according to their themes (journalism, broadcasting, and media conversation analysis). We would like to thank Mr. David Kivinen and Mr. Seppo Siuro for their help both with the English language and copy editing.

Juha Koivisto and Epp Lauk
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Transformations in the West: public discourse and interaction in the expanding media sphere

Jan Ekecrantz

My general concern in this paper is with the discursive constitution of the public spheres and with the (further) transformation of public spheres into media spheres, the consequences of which for society still remain largely unknown. This focus on discourse and public spheres does not imply, as is sometimes the case, a reduction of social structures and interaction to meaning and meaning production. Rather, the intent is to highlight power in interactive relations as well as communication aspects of structural domination and its resultant inequalities.

I will try to characterize, first in a rather general way, the media situation in Sweden from a social and political perspective. In most respects this also applies to the other Nordic countries and the English-speaking world. The perspective implies a focus on the changing modes of communication in our societies. I will then move on to the empirical parts of the Media, Culture & Society article, highlighting dimensions that relate to public spheres and discourse practices. This will be followed, finally, by a discussion of examples from a 1995 material. Throughout this introduction the notions of “public spheres” and “discourse” serve to relate media contents and activities to broader processes of socio-cultural and political change.

General outlook: a revolutionary decade

However we choose to define “public sphere” (as public culture, space, domain, etc.) it seems safe to follow Jürgen Habermas in that this sphere (or these spheres), squeezed between the economy and the state, a life-world threatened by system worlds, is becoming more and more dominated or invaded by the media. This tendency is reflected in one way or another in a range of theoretical approaches, such as the theses of the implosion of the social (Jean Baudrillard) and the decline of social capital because of television (Robert D. Putnam). The media sphere, according to a number of theorists, thus “eats” the public spheres. Many have at-
tempted broad generalizations: Norman Fairclough, for instance, in his various writings on discourse analysis, states that language and communication as such have gained increased significance in the modern world because of the expansion of media systems. There may not be more discourse, but communication and interaction is at least increasingly mediated and thus conditioned by some media logic, with all what that implies for interaction patterns and institutional performance.

The quantitative expansion of the media is often related to the globalization or transnationalization of capital and culture, but the argument tends to be circular. In order to understand changes in the modes of communication and in discourse practices in the media, one would also have to take into account the far-reaching geopolitical transformations in Europe (eastern and western) during the past decade. The fall of the Berlin wall was a symbolic event, creating turmoil in the whole political and ideological field, with its taken-for-granted polarities and metaphors. The breakdown of the Communist systems of East Europe has had repercussions throughout the Western world. In Sweden, for example, conservative politicians took the opportunity to call for a "systems change" in our country as well.

Another historical event is of course the continuing expansion and further integration of the European Union, implying, according to some writers, a continuous withering away of the structures of nation states.

Third, the end of the dominance of public-service media institutions and the explosion of commercial TV channels and private local radio stations is a process concomitant with the other developments. In 1996 the audience of commercial TV channels in Sweden surpassed the number for public-service channels for the first time. In the context of changes in the media systems one should of course also mention the Internet and the WWW, with as yet unknown consequences for the political and cultural public spheres and democratic institutions.

These three major changes both strike at the very heart of traditional journalism as we know it, based as it has been on social, political and cultural distinctions and hierarchies related to the geopolitical structures of the postwar era (West = us, East = them, individualism vs. collectivism, and other "grand dichotomies" etc.). There was also a code of professional ethics developed in an environment where social responsibilities and impartiality permeated news reporting on a general ideological level. In addition to the super-national contexts, it is often observed that local
media do not serve as watchdogs, but are overridden by regional interests coinciding with regional markets.

**The end of journalism: a dystopian scenario**

In this process journalism has lost its major coordinates of orientation in reality. This might even signal the end of journalism — a thesis that needs some explication. The societal changes sketched here have also brought about changes in the system of estates: what will happen to the fourth (or in Scandinavia the third) estate, the media, if and when the other estates, government and parliament lose their importance as centres of attention and as major source organizations for journalism? Logically, the media will gradually lose their classical functions. With this reorientation of their basic (watchdog, etc.) raisons d'être, one might envisage that the media system will take over some of the basic functions of the state: deviance control, schooling, self-legitimization and others — altogether attaining increased autonomy vis-à-vis both system and life-worlds, but with lasting repercussions on both. This has been a historical process, John Hartley argues in his recent book *Popular Reality*, taking on new forms in the late 20th century:

Meanwhile journalism, which as I have been arguing constituted the public sphere from the start, has shown a tendency throughout the twentieth century to take over and textualize the democratic functions of nations. It is now the place, means and agent of political participation for populations which are otherwise showing a marked and increasing disinclination to vote, to join political parties, or otherwise do their civic, constitutional or political duties as citizens of nation states. Governments of the oldest democracies are driven to recruiting representatives from their supposed binary opposite, i.e. entertainers from the furthest reaches of popular entertainment to seduce their own citizens... (Hartley 1996, 200)

The media fill out the voids left by the reduced spaces of the state and the autonomous life-worlds, a thoroughgoing transformation of the whole social order made visible in changing modes of public communication, forms of public address, and in new genres such as "reality television". The media world (as a social and textual entity) now increasingly operates as a public mode of communication geared by a media logic that controls interaction, a "public sphere" in its own right.

The coffee houses of the Habermasian, classical bourgeois public sphere of the 18th and 19th centuries have now been recreated within the
broadcast media (not only in the very popular “café programmes”). This process has been in the making from the very beginning. Sören Kierkegaard observed that the press had collapsed the private and the public realms into “public private talk” (quoted in Benjamin 1995). As 200 years ago, the print media and print journalism (particularly the tabloids) now exist in a symbiotic relationship with this new public sphere, inform about it, hail its heroes and celebrities, and report about the political and cultural events now originating above all in television. The expansion of the media sphere thus coincides with the decline of classical journalism as a public institution (“post-journalism”): direct un-edited broadcasting, visual imagery, primacy of sight and sound, hybrid genres diluting the traditional borderline between fact and fiction, the journalistic watchdogs turning into media celebrities.

Research implications

In this situation all text/context dichotomies become problematic. The media no longer serve as mediators only (if they ever did) between the public and the private or between the system and life-worlds — they also produce or reconstitute these spheres or worlds within their own realm. You need not buy this analysis wholesale, but at least some tendencies are relatively indisputable. The expansion of the media sphere internalizes, so to speak, other spheres. Political action, for instance, is now firmly integrated with the operations of the media, locally, nationally and globally. The production of audiences, the representation of induced response, all kinds of quasi-interaction and the rise to prominence of “synthetic” personalities all witness to the intervention of the media in the social world. They do produce “institutional facts” and they alter existing social relationships and status hierarchies. In John Fiske’s words: “We can no longer think of the media as providing secondary representations of reality; they effect and produce the reality that they mediate” (1994, xv).

The constructive/reconstructive functions of the media in late industrial societies imply a far-reaching organization and administration of public communication and dialogues, a staging of society, not only metaphorically, but also in terms of setting in motion dramatic interaction and struggle within and between agents and agencies in society (the “power triangles” and the “communication conflicts”). Not all of this is represented within the dramaturgy of the news.
I think it is reasonable to see the media as an increasingly autonomous institution, penetrating all sectors of society, an expanding sphere collapsing or problematizing all kinds of distinctions between what is inside and outside the media: text/context, discourse/public sphere, representation/construction, highlighting new forms of (quasi-)interaction, reconstitution of the social categories of journalists (as "hosts", "experts", etc.), sources, actors, audiences, re-functioning of word and image, etc.

Obviously, the sharp distinction between what has been termed, for instance, "intra" and "extra media data", signifying the world of representations in the media on the one hand, and, on the other, the reality that purportedly resides outside the media and independent of them — that distinction is obviously not an unquestioned premise here.

It is in the nature, of course, of (Foucauldian) discourse analysis that there are "realities" that have no autonomous existence outside of discourse: "Many of the objects that discourse refers to do not exist in a realm outside discourse. There are fuzzy borders between the set of things we know exist outside discourse and the things that have a reality only within it" (Parker 1992, 8). In particular, this applies to all kinds of social, institutional and cultural realities, so much the subject of news reporting.

The public sphere can be seen as a social communication practice, and as such it is a macro structure made up of communicative actions and interactions, of "speech acts", "presuppositions" and "intertextuality", to mention some of the concepts used in analysing communicative practices empirically (as does Bourdieu) or normatively (Habermas's universal pragmatics). Talk and interaction are much in focus in the papers presented to this seminar, more so than, for instance, the constitution of the fields within which this discourse takes place (cf. Bourdieu's criticism of "discourse analysis", commented on by Fairclough 1995).

Since talk to such a large extent is talk about talk (and discourses being so much the very subject for so much media discourse generally), a final quotation seems very relevant. It highlights the pervasiveness of discourse representation in social interaction.

The transmission and assessment of the speech of others, the discourse of another, is one of the most widespread and fundamental topics of human speech. In all areas of life and ideological activity, our speech is filled to overflowing with other people's words... The more intensive, differentiated and highly developed the speaking collective, the greater is the importance attaching... to another's word, another's utterance, since another's word will be the subject of passionate communication, an object of
interpretation, discussion, evaluation, rebuttal, support, further development and so on... (Bakhtin 1981, 337)

I think these observations are extremely useful when we try to understand what goes on in the expanded media sphere, and, more generally, the ways in which public spheres are continuously created and recreated in public discourse — be it of a private, political or other nature. For instance, in a modern society a significant portion of private talk and interaction sets out from or presupposes shared experiences derived from media consumption, be it of factual or fictional materials.

We shall now turn to the situation as it has developed historically in a specific society — Sweden in the 20th century.

The case of Sweden: public discourse forms 1925–1995

My article “Journalism’s discursive events...” reports on a major project and some of its results. I will reiterate just some of the results from the three chosen years (1925, 1955 and 1987), using photo material, not presented in the article. Then, finally, the article will be followed up by other examples from a 1995 material on the basis of which we have just finished a book, to appear in Swedish in late 1996 (*Medierummet*, or ‘Media spaces’, Becker *et al*. 1996). By way of introducing these illustrations, let me just recollect part of the theoretical rationale for this focus on forms of communication in the study of discourse and socio-historical change: What social relations are implied in the discourse of journalism? What communicative roles are institutionalized? The questions concern the social groups and categories that are pulled together in the represented world, the kind of communication that is performed between them. They are concerned with the communication that is actually established among actors, journalists and readers, between groups, organizations, etc. The communicative relations thus suggested form part of general constructions of social identities and of society as such. A particular “society” is worked out by the kinds of relations that are being pinpointed and/or taken for granted. The ways questions and answers are organized at different times may indicate how power relations change historically. Journalism thus contributes to the construction of both social problems and their solution (or dismissal from the public agenda).

The 1925–55–87 examples derive from a sample of 52 newspaper issues each year. In each year the shape and contents of the front pages
were strikingly homogenous. I would therefore say that the pictures to be shown here are fairly typical and representative.

A cacophony of utterances, with a minimum of editorial intervention, characterized the organization of voices in 1925 (Fig. 1). On this page one finds the male “pillars of society”, putting forth original proposals or counter-arguments. Occasionally an editor might construct an artificial debate pulling together voices from different sources. Class-bound monologues abound — not inter-group dialogue (slander would be the exception).

The three big front-page pictures from the 1955 sample all represent very typical social situations as constructed or represented in the People’s Home era (Fig. 2). First (top left), a group of respectable men congratulate themselves on having initiated and supervised the restoration of an old house for writers. Another fraternity is seen in the collection of drawings showing prominent men representing government, industry, unions and universities, speaking at a conference devoted to the future benefits of automation and atomic power, as it was still called in the fifties. People meeting across all kinds of social and physical borders constituted the symbolic event par préférence and the inauguration of new bridges and roads was such an event in a double sense (top right) — politicians meeting the public (electorate and audience) to celebrate the bridging of what was formerly kept apart.

The social communication thus symbolized in the pictures (Fig. 3), and in the texts (see article), was one of unanimous discussion among political and other elites meeting with the people, showing, demonstrating or explaining things, the people being portrayed as an attentive audience (see also Figures 4 and 5). In some cases it is obvious that it is the photographer who has arranged the situation. In other cases it is “live”. Sometimes newspapers also arranged panel discussions on various social issues, reported as highly significant front page news. This consensus in the making — through communication — was the Swedish version of the Habermasian model of rational communication in the public sphere. And, as in the Athenian democracy of the agora, it is a men’s world.
ÄSSJÖ INFÖR EN KRIS?
SOCIALISTREGIMEN VILL LÄTA LÄRarna BETALA.

Efter att frikostlighet mot kommunal- och nödhjälpssitarbetare förra en brysk lönereduktion för de intellektuella arbetande.

SVENSKA DAGBLADET
Fredagen den 13 November 1925

NOBELPRiset I FYSIK FÖR ÅR 1924 HAR GÅTT TILL SVENSK FORSKARE.

Professorn H. Stiglesten till Svenska Dagbladet.

Svensk koloni till Colombia för kaffeodling —

Nobelpredikation av Professor H. Stiglesten

Nobelpriset i Fysik för år 1924 har gått till svensk forskare.

Figure 1. 1925.
Bomb i droskibil
svensk parallell
till flygdramat

Figure 2. 1955.
Arosmässan kritiserade pensionsutredningen men regeringens proposition kommer 1957

4,5 öre av prishöjningen på mjölk till bönderna

Stillamm debatt om nya priserna vid RLF:s bondedag

Nya regeringens proposition om mjölkpriserna. För folkmöte i Örebro. Förurningen förlorar stöd i Folkpartiet. Och regeringen pressar vid mjölkpriserna.

Stilisam "lebalt om Bji priserna vid RLF:st bondedag"

Ruskig misshandel i Örebro

Handikappade barn får hjälp över 30 000 sekutor i aktion

Mordhotad fru kastades ut från tredje våningen, liken flicka fick piskrapp

SJÄLENS NÖD ÄR ANDLIGT SVULTNA MÄNNISKOR OCH TRASIGA SJÄLAR

Handikappade barn får hjälp över 30 000 sekutor i aktion

Figure 3. 1955.
The audience reappears in an inside photograph (Fig. 4) and this time even the few women are out of sight.

Figure 4. 1955.

Figure 5. 1955.
Nya bud från Ebberöd

Linn. 12 000 kronor

och stöttar forskning

Reformman byts i Sovjet

Boe Bøtt, son reformpartiets leder

Spårsvagn tillbaka i Stockholm

Samlar vagnar och stöttar forskning

Datorlåra i skolorna blev en miss

Förvåningen att ge högstadieelever 80 timmar datasets

om att många skolor

Styckmordet unikt i rätten

Det stora rättsliga problemet i utredningen

om det misstänkta styckmordet

Sammankopplad med

Samarbete med

Förbud fot

blyad bensin

TV-M Alternative

Sjötorvet

Tjernobyl

Vems ärende?

Vers förbjudet.

Både på detta

och på andra sidan

i Sverige.

Förbud fot

blyad bensin

TV-M Alternative

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Förbud fot

blyad bensin

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Sjötorvet

Tjernobyl

Vems ärende?

Vers förbjudet.

Både på detta

och på andra sidan

i Sverige.
The demonstration of a physical model by one or (mostly) more architects or engineers is a visual expression of the "Swedish model", a slightly modernized replacement of the older metaphor, the People's Home, the grand social engineering project.

In 1987 the Swedish model has broken down in many respects (Fig. 6). Social institutions do not work properly, financial resources are lacking in many (public) sectors of society and the environment is polluted. One can also see that the lonely individual, afflicted by the malfunctioning systems, has replaced the social gatherings of the 1950s. One is strolling on the shores of the dirty Baltic Sea, another person is earning money for a cancer foundation by collecting trolleys outside a shopping mall.

The 1995 pictures are chosen for what they can tell us about media and politics and the changing relationship between these two, increasingly intertwined, spheres.

First, the minister of justice visits a school to talk about the government's efforts to come to grips with racism in schools, a social problem high up on the public agenda these days, mobilizing not least the whole media industry (Fig. 7). It is the traditional image of a politician meeting citizens. There does not seem to be much of a dialogue, however, in this case. The role of the newspaper is also the traditional one when "covering" this event, initiated by a political youth organization.

**Rasistiska symboler förbjuds**

Justitieministern på Göteborgsbesök lovar nya skärpta lagar

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Rasistiska symboler förbjuds

Justitieministern på Göteborgsbesök lovar nya skärpta lagar
The school pupils framing a local politician in the next picture are much more active, protesting against cutbacks at their school (Fig. 8). The newspaper photographer is one of them in taking the pupils’ point of view, helping them to pin the power-holder “against the wall”. This is typical of the local newspapers’ more populist orientation. The next picture (Fig. 9) witnesses of a radical shift of focus, perspective and orientation.

Figure 8.

In this case it is the photographer who acts as a wall. The politician now being framed by the photographic arrangement is Göran Persson, who was later to become prime minister. At this stage, however, he had not yet made up his mind, thereby creating much irritation among political journalists. Professional conditions and problems of reporting (such as uncooperative sources) now make up a significant part of reporting. Persson preferred “to turn his back on the leadership crisis of the Social Democratic Party”, as this big tabloid paper put it in the cutline (a crisis produced by media scandals earlier that autumn, first initiated by this very paper). The text reads: “He is stubborn but rejoices in the public stage light”. But who are the others, taking the position of citizens in the last
picture and now moving themselves into the centre of the stage light? They are two well-known journalists. The woman on the left is a reporter from one of the two public television channels, waiting eagerly for her turn to talk. The other is the newspaper’s own reporter with his own picture in the photo byline further down on the same page.

Disney’s “Pocahontas”, the worldwide bestseller movie, had its Stockholm premiere during the chosen week. Celebrities, or “hot names” as they are often called in the Swedish media, from three sectors of society hastened to the pictures (or, as is often the case, were rushed by bus from some other celebrity party): politics/public administration, theatre/entertainment, media/journalism (Fig. 10). The two pages show a collective portrait, a family reunion after intensive social interaction in the media in the preceding weeks and months, including many of the official servants, TV hosts etc. now relaxing together, also bringing their children, many of them the product of earlier intercourse in the media sphere. More than a dozen persons in these pictures played a role in the media during the week we investigated, the one interviewing the other, playing together
in quizzes, chatting in sitcoms, etc. Most Swedes will probably recognize most of these politicians, singers, anchor persons and others, populating the media “demimonde”, a public sphere in its own right.

Figure 10.

Conclusion

The public sphere is a social sphere of communication, and the empirical analysis of that sphere still lies largely ahead of us. Focusing on the social communication and interaction aspect of what has been called the public sphere, we can relate it to structural changes in both society and the media system. The Wall and the EU have occurred parallel with the rise of broadcasting to its present dominant position in the overall media system. Context-oriented discourse analysis can be tied to the analysis of public sphere transformation. It thus turns out to be something more than a clever analysis of texts: a way of understanding social, political and cultural change, the transformations of the broader discursive orders of a society. The approach coincides with the pragmatic view of language as specified by Nancy Fraser: “Discourses are historically specific, socially
situated, signifying practices. They are the communicative frames in which speakers interact by exchanging speech acts. Yet discourses are themselves set within social institutions and action contexts. Thus, the concept of a discourse links the study of language to the study of society”. (Fraser 1992, 61)

The texts and the photographic images express some of the underlying social and political power relations — but they do not only represent actions and interactions going on somewhere else. These are also performed in the media. The media sphere is thus a sociological reality in its own right. Therefore we also need to trace, with other methods, the social and historical processes behind recent media developments and related, prevailing discourse practices.

University of Stockholm

Note

1 Revised lecture notes and illustrations for the Nordic-Baltic Course on Contemporary Theory and Methods in Communication Research, Tartu University/Pühajärve, Estonia, July 29 – August 8, 1996. This lecture sets out from my article, distributed to the participants: “Journalism’s discursive events and socio-political change in Sweden 1925–1987” (Media, Culture & Society, forthcoming 1997).

References

Civil society and public sphere in Central and Eastern Europe: a Polish case study

Karol Jakubowicz

“In countries where democratic reforms are doing relatively well, the media are, too” (East European Media, 1996). This simple journalistic verdict is elaborated upon by Charles Gati (1996), who in an overview of the situation in post-communist countries distinguishes between three groups of countries in the region:

— the seven leaders (i.e. the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) where, despite popular backlash, both political and economic reforms continue to be carried out, for the time being;

— the twelve laggards (i.e. the semi-authoritarian regimes of Slovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Russia, the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus) where reorganization and retrenchment coexist. Leaders reluctantly pursue modest market reforms, tolerate a press that is partly free and legitimate their rule in seemingly fair but manipulated elections;

— the 8 losers (authoritarian, though no longer totalitarian dictatorships of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus), an area that is essentially unreformed and oppressive.

Accordingly, says Gati, at least 20 of the 27 post-communist states are facing the prospect of neither democracy nor totalitarianism:

The transition to democracy has lost its early popular appeal and therefore its early momentum. Radicals have yielded to minimalists, the liberal impulse has yielded to a quest for egalitarianism, and demands for freedom have yielded to demands for order [...] Most people in the post-communist world have already made a choice between freedom and order and their preferred choice is order. Though approving a role for market forces, large majorities are nonetheless so nostalgic for the benefits of the communist welfare state, however meagre, that they are prepared to do away with what they see as the cumbersome, dissonant, and
chaotic features of democratic politics. With rule by the few the familiar alternative, what they are rejecting is not merely a leader of a party but the very system and values of Western-style democracy (Gati 1996, 6).

A similarly gloomy view is advanced by Daniel N. Nelson (1995) who maintains that since the transformation of political life away from one-party authoritarianism towards a plural, participatory democracy ultimately depends on citizenship, that transformation is threatened by the feeling of personal insecurity pervading much of Central and Eastern Europe. That stems from inequality in benefitting from the gains of “mutant capitalism” and may have a deleterious effect on citizens’ participation and commitment to tenets of tolerance, pluralism, competition. Democracy cannot exist where the public political sphere is weak or collapsing. Without a participatory ethos, government is neither responsive nor accountable to citizens. Therefore, the future of the nascent democracies in the region, says Nelson, is “security dependent”:

Civil society begot an expanded public political realm and the dawn of public legitimation in Communist-ruled Europe. That achievement is now endangered by the costs of transition and external perils — threats that make people feel insecure, thereby undercutting their commitment to change and their patience with transition processes. Trying to protect themselves and their families from increasing insecurity, they withdraw from public life. Once that begins to happen, the political sphere is left to neo-authoritarians or to the people who inhabited prior regimes, reborn with different labels (Nelson 1995, 15).

These appraisals are no doubt premature and refer to the “laggards” and the “losers”, rather than the “leaders”. Considering recent developments in Belarus, one of the “laggards”, where the despotic personal rule of President Lukashenko is finally being opposed by a growing wave of official and popular resistance, accelerating the development of civil society, they are certainly too hasty in jumping to conclusions. Fundamental social and political change does not happen overnight. The effects of decades of totalitarian/authoritarian rule, preceded by centuries of underdevelopment, foreign rule and a variety of upheavals cannot be undone within the space of a few years.

Still, it is important to bear these views in mind as we consider the record and prospects for the future as regards the emergence of civil society and the public sphere in Central and Eastern European countries. We will here concentrate on the Polish case, which should offer some indication of the situation in this regard in one of the “leader” countries. The
aim here is not so much to provide a full factual account of the process, but to suggest a possible framework for its analysis.

Civil society and public sphere: a convergence of problematics?

Consideration of these two closely associated problematics is complicated by the fact that definitions of these two concepts are becoming blurred. The very existence of the aspects of social reality denoted by them is sometimes questioned, and there is also evidence of a growing overlap between them in the approach taken by some writers.

To begin with the public sphere, there are those (e.g. Garnham 1993) who point out that the development of an increasingly integrated global market and centres of private economic power with global reach are steadily undermining the nation state, i.e. the framework within which the question of citizenship and of the relationship between communication and politics has been traditionally posed. Therefore, Garnham argues, the question becomes what new political institutions and new public sphere might be necessary for the democratic control of a global economy and polity? Others argue that “the public sphere is altogether phantom in an electronic environment” (Nerone 1995, 173).

From another angle, Taylor (1996) maintains that in the interest of the proper functioning of democracy, it is no longer enough to think of the public sphere as the bulwark which contains the expansion of potentially ubiquitous state power. The public sphere, in his view, should be a crucial element of the process of democratic decision-making, a forum for public debate central to the process of self-government, serving to provide a hearing for all groups of society and to promote the development of a common will, subsequently translated into common decision and action.

In this approach, the notion of the public sphere goes beyond the traditional understanding of the concept, encompassing civil society and the democratic process in general.

On the other hand, in a reconsideration of the concept of the public sphere, Habermas questions the need for the concept of civil society altogether, preferring in its place that of the “political public sphere”, or “public sphere operating in the political realm” which he describes as:

the quintessential concept denoting all those conditions of communication under which there can come into being a discursive formation of opinion
and will on the part of a public composed of the citizens of a state (Habermas 1993, 446).

Seen in terms of the traditional definitions of these concepts, Taylor’s view of the public sphere seems to be too all-embracing, while Habermas’s view of civil society as too constraining. Nevertheless, this even stronger coming together of two already related research problematics is very interesting. Developments in Poland may be seen as providing some evidence that they are sometimes hard to distinguish clearly in social reality as well.

**Civil society in the ascendant: the Polish dissidents**

Polish dissidents and other critics of the regime long sought to reason with and persuade the communist authorities to change their way, hoping to promote a gradual evolution of the system. Finally, despairing of chances to change or overthrow communist rule, they decided in the mid-1970s to develop a platform of “new evolutionism”, convinced, in the words of Adam Michnik (1984, 84), that

> the real addressee of the evolutionist programme should be not the totalitarian authorities, but independent public opinion. The programme should not seek to tell the authorities how to reform themselves, but give society an indication of what it should do. Nothing concentrates the mind of the authorities better than grassroots pressure. “New evolutionism” is based on the fundamental conviction of the strength of the working class whose tough and consistent stand has already forced the authorities to make spectacular concessions.

This approach proved to be a breeding ground for human rights movements and organizations serving the defence of persecuted opponents of the system, for underground publishers and periodicals, independent educational and artistic institutions, religious and ecological movements as well as fledgling political parties. This social space was given different names in different countries, such as “a parallel polis”, “independent society”, “independent culture”, “counter-society”, etc. In short, these independent movements sought to recreate what might be called bedrock civil society, i.e. to undertake collective action capable, with greater or lesser success, of protecting society against the invasion of arbitrary party and state power. Equally important was the fact that these movements developed models of responsible civic attitudes which held attraction for wide segments of society (Smolar 1991, 18).
Seligman (quoted in Dahlgren 1995) believes that the term “civil society” may have been used in Central and Eastern Europe prior to the collapse of communism largely as a neutral synonym for the general concept of democracy, rather than representing a new analytical turn in thinking about “civil society” as such. However original or derivative the analytical thinking itself was, this thesis is not really supported by the evidence. Charles Taylor (1994, 54) is closer to the mark when he says that the term, as used in Central and Eastern Europe, was meant to describe what those societies had lost and what they were now trying to recreate: “a network of institutions that are independent from the state, which unite citizens around issues of common concern and which by their very existence, or by their activities, can bring influence to bear on policy”. This strategy of long-term political change was clearly one of self-organization of society, serving the goal of “build[ing] up a pluralist structure” within the communist state (Kuroń 1981, 95). As Geremek explains, the prospect of creating democratic society was seen as a remote one:

The civil society project was a form not just of mass resistance to the Communist system, but also of openly isolating the authorities society was organizing itself to oppose. By opposing the delegitimated State in this way, we hoped ultimately to enclose this unwanted creation in a kind cocoon, and promote the gradual alienation and finally marginalization of state structures. (Geremek 1994, 237)

When “Solidarity” became a 10-million strong social movement in 1980–1981, the ultimate goal of social and political reform it was planning was the transformation of Poland into a “Self-governing Commonwealth”. This has been described as a “direct self-managing form of democracy”. Holzer (1984, 195) calls it “one of a long string of freedom-oriented socialist utopias”, but Smolar (1991, 22) seems closer to the mark when he calls this “apothecosis of self-management from top to bottom” a “utopia of the third way ... practically speaking a civil society liberated from the state” (emphasis added). When there was no way of telling when the communist state would disappear, the goal was clearly, as Arato (1981) points out, that of gradually reconstituting civil society through the re-establishment of the rule of law, an independent public sphere and freedom of association.

It was thus an effort to reverse the communist strategy of remodelling social organization with a view to eliminating the private sphere and filling the void with the values and patterns of the public (i.e. government-controlled) sphere. That strategy had been unsuccessful and was rejected by society with such vehemence that one of the many conces-
sions the system had to make was to respect the relative inviolability of a growing expanse of the private sphere. "Communist authorities became reconciled not only to the permanence of an uncontrollable private sphere, but also to the fact that it would be the domain of what they considered to be alien values. They insisted that these values should be held and articulated in the private sphere alone ... while the public one was to remain purely 'socialist' in nature" (Szacki 1994, 108). In the final stages of the system's existence, as efforts to create a space for free self-organization of society (i.e. some forms of civil society) operating within the communist state gained real momentum, the communist government was concerned solely with preserving its hold on the shrinking public sphere and protecting it from being invaded by the values of the private one. Thus, the thrust of marginalization had been reversed and dissident civil society was in the ascendant at that time.

Over time, the concept of civil society was used by Polish dissidents in a number of meanings (Ogrodzński 1991):

— the original, classical model as developed in Western social thought;
— the "defective model" constituted by the private sphere, resisting the encroachments of the totalitarian/authoritarian public sphere;
— the "ethical model" developed by the anti-communist opposition and perceived mostly in abstract, moral terms as an expression of the unity of "society";
— and the "transformative model", a fairly confused set of ideas emerging after the collapse of communism, combining those features of the idealistic ethical model which retained their vitality after the rude awakening of post-communist transformation with those of the classical model.

Given the origin of the "ethical model" of civil society and the authoritarian context in which attempts to create it were undertaken, it is hardly surprising that ideas and values animating it were antithetical to those of the then prevailing system: justice, equality, solidarity, access, participation. This is very much in line with Ralph Dahrendorf's definition of the operational core of civil society, seen as consisting of

a set of legitimate claims which can be described as civic rights. Civic rights provide the compass which helps us steer the right course between the Scylla of the state with all its competence of power, and the Charybdis of the corporate cartel of organizations and institutions which in some circumstances can be equally dangerous to freedom. As a set of legitimate claims, civic rights create a certain public situation: the protection of the people's right to participation against government interference on the one
hand and the variable impact of the market on the other” (Dahrendorf 1994, 236; emphasis added)

However, can this “ethical model” be regarded as that of a full and complete model of civil society? That depends on how we define civil society. The answer is positive if we accept Arato and Cohen’s view that civil society consists of “the institutionalized dimension of the lifeworld composed of family, associations and the public sphere” (Cohen 1996, 42), and that this is civil society against (i.e. separate from) the state (Arato 1981).

Other approaches are possible, however. Seligman (quoted in Dahlgren 1995) makes a distinction between two basic ways of perceiving civil society:

— at an institutional-organizational level, thus encompassing the general institutional and legal requirements for a democratic society with fully-fledged citizenship;

— at the level of beliefs and value systems, with a Durkheimian stress on universalistic moral bonds as a foundation of solidarity.

There is little doubt that the “ethical model” of civil society as developed in Poland represented this second perspective. Dahlgren (1995) argues that both aspects, appropriate institutional conditions and value systems, are necessary for civil society to exist, and that civil society and the state constitute the conditions for the other’s democratization. What emerges, says Dahlgren — in line with John Keane’s views — is the need for “double democratization” of a democratic state and civil society. In short, civil society must according to this view exist in the context of a democratic state: separate from it, but also organically linked to it.

This view is shared by Dahrendorf, who points out that civil society must, in addition to a requisite legal and political framework, have a foundation in a mature democracy and a mature political culture in which “the legitimate claims which can be described as civic rights” will be respected. It can be built only if there is widespread determination on the part of society to demand respect for, and observance of, individual civic rights, and popular will to hold to account anyone, or any institution, which violates them. This can hardly be done without the support of the institutions of the state.

Since that was impossible in communist Poland, civil society was seen as a way for the Poles to organize outside the structures of the party-state, with self-organized social groups and movements gradually expanding the areas of negative liberty and self-determination open to citizens (Ash
However, Arato (1981, 27) — though enthusiastic about developments in Poland — doubted that that would lead to the creation of a true civil society, given the need for some compromise with existing state power: Can a social movement, Arato asked, "achieve a workable model of civil society alone, through structural reforms from below? And if so, what kind of civil society will result, given a formally intact, authoritarian state?"

Very importantly from our point of view, however, Arato (1981) points out that given the absence of the two potential agencies for the constitution of civil society (that is the capitalist logic of industrialization and etatist logic of modernization from above), the social movement in Poland at the time could make an emancipated public sphere far more central in this nascent civil society than anywhere before. To all intents and purposes, the oppositional public sphere was the dissident civil society.

The public sphere in its proper sense is seen as a "space for rational and universalistic politics distinct from both the economy and the state" (Garnham 1986, 41), or as a situation in which "all voices hav[e] equal access to a neutral public sphere, where their unfettered rational discourse ... culminate[s] in the articulation of popular will" (Dahlgren 1987, 25). As with civil society in general, the public sphere, as projected by the dissidents, was to be based on the principle of inclusion, in line with Jean Cohen's (1996, 34) view that

The legitimacy of the public sphere is tied up with its potential for inclusion, and the existence of the public sphere as the central context of democratic access calls for programs of inclusion... Thus the formal legal guarantees (legal rights) together with mechanisms for the facilitation of equality of access to the public sphere... become all the more important in relationship to a functioning public sphere.

Again, the question has to be asked whether this was a true and complete public sphere.

Dahlgren (1995) distinguishes four analytical dimensions of the public sphere:
— media institutions;
— media representation;
— social structure (one public sphere for all, or a plurality of different public spheres?)
— and socio-cultural interaction.
One could say, without going into too many details, that the oppositional public sphere in Poland (Jakubowicz 1990) encompassed all of these elements, including underground print media (periodicals and books), and even underground radio broadcasts. Of course, there was also the official public sphere, with a different set of the same elements.

Dahlgren (1995, 7) points out that civil society constitutes the socio-cultural precondition for a viable public sphere. Such was certainly the case with the dissident civil society and oppositional public sphere in Poland, though of course both operated within the context of an authoritarian state.

In short, then, the energy and determination in creating a dissident civil society and an oppositional public sphere were rooted in resistance to the communist state and were an expression of that resistance in the face of a seemingly all-powerful enemy whom there was no real hope of defeating or overthrowing. It is important to remember that all this happened in the context of an authoritarian state — apart from, but also in some form of dialogue with, that state. The concept of civil society was based on a conviction of considerable social import, namely that attitudes and behaviour patterns leading to significant changes in the socialist State and its economy were to be found in an extra-State infrastructure of social life ... of its own initiative, this civil society entered into many qualitatively different types of interaction with the state ... The features of this civil society allowed its individual members and even more so organized collectivities to undertake many different actions (including many carefully planned and coordinated ones) with a view to the socialization of the state. These grassroots initiatives, entering directly into the domain of the state, made a ranking contribution to deforming the fundamental political goals and economic structures of the socialist State. It was thanks to them, and not just to pressure from the West, that governments of socialist countries superficially accommodated to the organization of Western parliamentary democracies (Kurczewska 1995, 80).

The features that Kurczewska mentions refer to the concept of civil society not just as a force which merely negated the communist state, but one — and this is clear from everything that has been said about it so far in this paper — which had a positive programme of building an "independent and self-governing Commonwealth" and constituted an internally coordinated societal entity which placed great stock on the ability to organize, gain individual and collective subjectivity and freedom. Not
just freedom from the communist state but freedom to organize and undertake collective action to change that state.

In this sense, says Kurczewska, the Polish dissident civil society evolved from an associational to a corporatist model — somewhat in line with Taylor's understanding of the public sphere. It derived its identity from struggle against the state (Kurczewska, Staszyńska and Bajor 1993).

After the fall: what prospects for civil society and the public sphere?

We noted above that the energy driving the creation of a dissident civil society and oppositional public sphere in Poland derived from anger, resistance and opposition to the communist regime. But what after the collapse of that regime? Where is the energy to create a civil society and a public sphere to come from in a democratic society, or one in which a democratic system is being created? This is the question asked by Dahrendorf:

How can we guarantee that political institutions which make possible a change of government without bloodshed will be rooted in social structures founded upon universal civil rights? How can democracy and civil society be created together and combined in such a way that democracy will be something more than a constitutional promise and civil society something more than just a resistance movement, even if it is organized resistance? (Dahrendorf 1994, 228).

Dahrendorf offers two types of answers to this question. First, that citizenship — which is the foundation of civil society — must become a reality in the minds and hearts, and above all in the habits of individuals. It must, he says, become an institution in the full sense of the word, i.e. a norm observed without any external sanctions, observed as a component of people's social behaviour. That, of course, requires time. But, says Dahrendorf, what it also requires is that citizenship be introduced by a dual effort: that of the authorities, and that of the people. He sees the need for an active agency on the part of the authorities in introducing and respective civil, political and at least elementary social rights and the creation of institutions which safeguard exercise of these rights (an independent judiciary, political parties and a free press, as well as a liberal economic system). And he, too, sees the need for

many courageous and determined people to create conditions in which substantive civic rights will be respected and exercised. They must be
constantly active in many areas. Some must be active in trade unions and political parties, others as lawyers and journalists, others still will set up independent organizations, and many will simply seek to maintain their enterprises, institutions or associations as autonomous elements of public life ... Civil society is a complex matter and many helpful hands are needed to create it (Dahrendorf 1994, 234).

This view is supported by Habermas (1993, 453), who points out that “a public sphere which functions politically” (his term for civil society) “requires more than the institutional guarantees of the constitutional state; it also needs the supportive spirit of cultural traditions and patterns of socialization, of the political culture of a population accustomed to freedom”.

In the conditions of Central and Eastern Europe or indeed any societies in transition, it is very important for this dual agency in favour of civil society to exist and work together, with the liberal democratic state playing a crucially important role in the process. We have already noted Dahlgren’s view of the need for double democratization of the state and civil society:

Each side [...] is a precondition for the democratization of the other [...] If the state is too weak, it cannot foster democratization of civil society. If it is too strong, it becomes too interventionist; without a viable civil society, the state becomes too all-encompassing. The democratization of civil society has to do with the development of a democratic culture or mentality within the context of everyday life (Dahlgren 1995, 6).

It seems clear, therefore, that for civil society fully to achieve its aims, it must have the ability not only to resist the state’s expansionist claims, but also successfully to bring pressure to bear on state power to achieve effective democracy. Crucially, this assumes that if civil society is to be able to hold its own in constant confrontation with an expansionist state, the two should be relatively evenly matched, even if conceptualization of that “even match” between them might present considerable difficulties. Also, the relationship between the two is of a dialectical nature in the sense that however much they may complement and indeed support each other, there is also a potential in-built conflict between them, stemming primarily from the inherent expansionist tendency of any state apparatus.

It is probably with this in mind that both Dahlgren and Dahrendorf note the great vulnerability of civil society. Dahlgren (1995, 6) notes that “in the face of the state, civil society remains relatively powerless”. Dahrendorf (1994, 234) goes even further and says that “one determined individual in power can jeopardize the tradition of civil society”.
All this is highly pertinent in the Polish context. There is no doubt that after the collapse of the communist system there was a clear clash between the budding civil society and the newly emergent state and in the first few years at least this dual agency was missing.

Leszek Balcerowicz (1995) notes that the sequence of changes taking place in Central and Eastern European countries has a number of specific features as compared with other cases of major societal transition (classical, neoclassical, non-communist economic reform, the Chinese form of post-communist transition).

In view of what has been said of the importance of the existence of a democratic state for the emergence of civil society and the public sphere, it is interesting that Balcerowicz places mass democracy at the beginning of the sequence of change. He explains this as follows:

It is misleading to speak of "simultaneous transitions" in post-communist Europe. It takes more time to privatize the bulk of the state-dominated economy than to organize free elections and at least some rudiments of political parties. Given the largely simultaneous beginning of the political and economic transitions, this asymmetry in speed produces a historically new sequence: mass democracy (or at least political pluralism, i.e. some degree of legal political competition) first, and market capitalism later (Balcerowicz 1995, 146).

On the other hand, Rychard (1993) argues that the actual orientation of the process of transition in Central and Eastern Europe is often far removed from that normative state of "transition to market and democracy". Geremek (1994, 245) also points out that "the overthrow of Communism and recovery of freedom is not tantamount to the rebirth of a democratic order. Democracy is created in a long process of development".
Post-communist transition in Eastern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Both political and economic system</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Rapid shift from non-democratic to the pluralist political arrangements, speed of economic reform differs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence</td>
<td>First mass democracy or at least political pluralism then --- capitalism?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of violence</td>
<td>Largely peaceful so far</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of mass media</td>
<td>Significant increase in the role of all mass media, especially radio and TV (visibility effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of external factors</td>
<td>Very important for countries other than the former USSR; without the collapse of the Soviet empire, the transition in those countries would have been impossible. In addition: democratic capitalism as a model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no real contradiction between Balcerowicz and the other two scholars, of course. What he is describing is transition to democracy, or indeed just to some degree of legal political competition. This is only the first stage of the process which must be followed by consolidation of democracy, adaptation and reinforcement of democratic structures and norms. According to Leonardo Morlino (cf. Gruszczak 1995), this process encompasses such areas as structures and procedures of decision-making; structural relations within the organization of the state; parties and party systems; structures of interests; mediation structures in relation to civil society as it gains autonomy, identity and ability to affect the state; mediation structures in relation to the state, expressed in its legitimacy and integration, growing social order and consensus. Such features of developed democracy as procedures of conflict resolution, effective representation and realization of interests, civil society and political representation of social interests must become established. Political culture will then begin to favour respect for democratic institutions and negotiations rather than conflict. The real trick, therefore, is not just to introduce conditions of legal political competition, but to ensure consolidation of democracy — a much more difficult proposition.

Political, not civil society

For the time being, though consolidation of democracy is happening in Poland, the country’s political culture prevailing is still closer to that of
the conflict-ridden, highly polarized and ideologized societies it was in the authoritarian era, than to that of mature democracies. As a result, what emerged was not civil society but "a political society" (Korbonski 1994).

Faced with the need to guide the nation through a difficult period of economic shock therapy and seeking to prevent the outbreak of social discontent, the early Polish post-communist governments pursued a deliberate policy of discouraging social participation in public and political life, i.e. of mobilizing the population for the purpose of elections or other short-lived campaigns, and dampening their enthusiasm at other times. The very same dissident and opposition leaders who had insisted that communist regimes accept, or reconcile themselves to, the development of civil society which "would populate the wilderness separating the individual from the [communist] state" (Smolar 1991, 15), "now — after they had gained power — abandoned that language in favour of the classic concerns for the state and the market" (Smolar 1993, 40). They argued that the development of a fully-fledged party system would be premature and that society should remain as united in facing the new challenges as it was in resisting the communist system. Therefore, they hoped to maintain Solidarity as a mass social movement providing a focus for popular backing for the process of transformation and delay as much as possible the emergence of political parties, with all the political differentiation and power struggles that it would bring in its wake. That policy involved effectively stifling some of the grassroots movements (such as the "civic committees" created to conduct the election campaign of spring 1989) which could have provided a foundation for an active and self-confident civil society (Fraczak 1992).

Grabowska (1995, 197) argues that an important factor in this regard was what she calls the authoritarian rule of post-Solidarity governments (caused by the fact that the "post-Solidarity political elites underestimated society and overestimated themselves"). According to Grabowska, this "authoritarian" style brought about an indifference of society, leading many people to opt out of public life, discouraged by lack of progress in solving the particular countries' problems and by what it perceived to be the interminable power struggle of politicians concentrating on issues without relevance to the everyday life of the people.

Writing a few years ago, Kurczewska, Staszyńska and Bajor (1993) concluded that in Poland the full development of civil society had been prevented until then by the fact that a weak society was interacting with a weak state.
Civil society was weak because:
— the number of new organizations and associations was not adequate to social needs;
— many institutions and organizations were relics of the past;
— the expectation that "the state would provide", i.e. would satisfy the needs of society, was still very strong.
Accordingly, society did not take full advantage of existing possibilities of activity and development.
In turn, the state was weak because:
— government structures remained largely unchanged;
— the legal and regulatory framework also remained largely unchanged, while at the same time a great many new laws and regulations were issued, sowing confusion and uncertainty;
— excessive segmentation of political parties led both to the instability of successive governments and fragmentation of civil society, reducing its ability to articulate its interests and translate them into effective electoral action;
— it was difficult, for a number of reasons, to create a new doctrine of a democratic and liberal state which would respect the independence and autonomy of civil society;
— the democratic system being created involved primarily procedural democracy, without effective channels of communication and negotiation between the state and basic interest groups emerging out of civil society.
Kurczewska, Staszyńska and Bajor (1993) list a number of barriers to the emergence of civil society that are either exogenous (to do with the relationship between the state and society) or endogenous (stemming from the characteristics of society itself).
The exogenous barriers were as follows:
— Central authorities single-handedly developed a doctrine describing the new social order\(^3\), and then proceeded to define ways of putting it into effect at the regional and local level as well, leaving little room for civil society to contribute to the process;
— Old local government structures blocked new local economic, cultural or political initiatives;
— Legislation dealing with local government did not favour the emergence of civil society;
— Political conflicts among political parties at the national level were reflected at the local level, leading to the politicization of many local
issues, lack of cooperation even on practical matters of importance to the local community;
— Distribution of competence between national and local authorities on the one hand and self-governing local entities, on the other, was unclear, fraught with conflicts;
— Social bonds among inhabitants of housing estates and city neighbourhoods had atrophied, undermining prospects for the development of communities capable of joining in common action.

The endogenous barriers included:
— Survival of the dependent mentality of the socialist welfare state, discouraging local initiative and breeding an expectation that the state had the duty to look after citizens;
— Preference for negative rather than positive institutionalization, i.e. self-organization to fight against something rather than to strive for something. This leads to short-lived forms of common action, usually quite aggressive, lack of will to negotiate, and finally the dissipation of social energy once the cause for common action had disappeared;
— A tendency for civil society groups to coalesce around political, religious or other similar identities, leading to the emergence of autarchic groups closed to others, claiming unreserved and total support from their members and treating other similar groups as potential enemies;
— A process whereby the elites of civil society, both at the national and local levels, had been drawn into institutions of power, depriving their communities and associations of leaders;
— A tendency that is deeply rooted in Polish social life, to perceive social values and institutions in macro-social, collectivistic terms, i.e. in terms of the nation as a whole, rather than local or regional communities. Hence individuals and collectivities are predisposed either to organize spontaneously at the level of minimal strategy, around a particular issue requiring a burst of energy to deal with, or as part of a large community (society or the nation) and its goals, usually divorced from the realities of life around them.

This last tendency is the result of a long period of statelessness and foreign rule, when the Poles naturally thought first of all in terms of national liberation and were united in defence of their national and cultural identity. That promoted a particular type of approach which put a premium on thinking in terms of the whole nation. Kurczewska (1995) points out that this tendency is still very strong today. While intellectuals think in terms of civil society, most other people still adopt the national frame of refer-
ence and unity around that cause. This discourages thinking in terms of local communities, associations, interest groups, etc., i.e. thinking in “divisive” and potentially conflict-generating terms. Among other reasons for difficulties with the full emergence of civil society are the following:

Polish society in the 1990s is relatively inactive for a number of different reasons. If there is mass participation by individuals and larger groups of importance in the process of modernization it usually happens in the context of organizations and initiatives which are directly initiated and promoted by the authorities. The social activities of most people are often confined to the private sphere, at the level of the family or small group. Individuals are only infrequently active in the public sphere. When they are, this usually means participation in protests and ad hoc drives to obtain immediate impact on state authorities. It could be said that individuals do not know how to act within their own institutions oriented to the protection and amelioration of the everyday life of the citizens. Also larger groups, whose activity is more important in terms of democracy, are usually quite passive. Many [sociological] analyses concluded that civic group identities are not well developed and participation in various movements and organizations is meagre [...] The Poles lack preparation for forming and running institutions placed in social space between the individual and society and the nation as a whole (Kurczewska 1995, 86–87). Nevertheless, it is sometimes argued that successful local government reform and empowerment of local authorities has created at the grassroots level “active citizenship needed for civil society ... [citizenship which involves] pride and the comfort of being in control of one’s home” (Pedziwol 1996, 86) and that democracy is strong at two levels in Poland: in parliament and in the communities, the lowest administrative level of the country, where local government has been given considerable autonomy in political, economic and legal terms. The problem is at the intermediate levels where there has been little administrative reform and where bureaucracy, rather than civil society, is in control.

After 1989, thousands of voluntary associations and other NGOs sprang up in Poland. By the end of 1994, the number of registered organizations stood at over 47,000. That, too, is a sign that civil society has a foundation on which to grow. However, Jacek Kuroni, the original ideologue of civil society among the dissidents, is probably right in his assessment that:

In Poland today, we have “desocialized” politicians, who conduct great historical disputes above the heads of society, and depoliticized social ac-
tivists who fear becoming involved in those disputes and fights (Skipietrow 1996, 5).

Much the same point is made by Teresa Sasińska-Klas (1996, 18):

Society proved sufficiently strong to liberate itself from an authoritarian state and a political party, but not strong enough to take advantage of new possibilities offered by the process of political democratization. Post-communist Polish society still expects politicians to take initiative and introduce regulations, also as regards change in particular segments and subsystems of society. Thus, the political system still continues to play — at least so far as societal expectations are concerned — the role of the main force of modernization. Contrary to expectations, the emergence of post-communist societies does not galvanize other fields of social life to an extent conspicuous at the macro level.

**Emergence of the public sphere: an incomplete process**

The question of the public sphere is made complex by the fact that, as Garnham writes, the original public sphere identified by Habermas was destroyed historically by the very forces that had brought it into existence. The development of the capitalist economy in the direction of monopoly capitalism led to an uneven distribution of wealth, to rising entry costs to the Public Sphere and thus to unequal access to and control over that sphere... In addition, the growth of the state’s role as a co-ordinator and infrastructural provider for monopoly capitalism led to the massive development of state power ... Thus the space between civil society and the state which had been opened up by the creation of the Public Sphere was squeezed shut between these two increasingly collaborative behemoths (Garnham 1986, 41).

Accordingly, says Garnham, the concept of the Public Sphere and the principles it embodies is an Ideal Type against which we can judge existing social arrangements and which we can attempt to embody in concrete situations in the light of the reigning historical circumstances (Garnham 1986, 43).

In the context of the post-communist period, the issue of social communication is certainly one of great importance, considering the very recent memory of censorship and information monopoly. Of the four dimensions of the public sphere mentioned by Dahlgren (1995) — media institutions, media representation, social structure, and socio-cultural interaction — we will concentrate here on the former two.
In general terms, communications and information are central to the exercise of full and effective citizenship. Murdock and Golding (1989) point out that this adds another dimension to T. H. Marshall's classic analysis of the three basic aspects of citizenship — civil, political and social — in that communication rights must be seen as an indispensable extension of social rights. They identify three main kinds of relations between communications and citizenship:

First, people must have access to the information, advice and analysis that will enable them to know what their rights are in other spheres and allow them to pursue these rights effectively. Second, they must have access to the broadest possible range of information, interpretation, and debate on areas that involve political choices, and they must be able to use communications facilities in order to register criticism, mobilize opposition, and propose alternative courses of action. And third, they must be able to recognize themselves and their aspirations in the range of representations offered within the central communications sectors and be able to contribute to developing their representations.

Murdock (1996) develops this line of argument in considering the evolution from "simple" to "complex" citizenship, as the concept of civil rights has been progressively extended and the nature and distribution of the resources required to render them substantial rather than nominal have been matters of continual argument. Full citizenship, he argues, is now seen as requiring satisfaction of full cultural rights, i.e.:

— Rights to Information;
— Rights to Experience: rights of access to the greatest possible diversity of representations of personal and social experience in fictional media genres (especially television ones), aiding efforts to answer fundamental questions which invariably spring up in people's lives;
— Rights to Knowledge: rights to explanations of patterns, processes and forces shaping the present and of its links with the past, helping to translate information and experience into knowledge and develop personal and social strategies;
— Rights to Participation.

For these and other rights to be safeguarded, and for full citizenship to be made possible, public communicative activity must, argues Murdock, meet the following conditions:

— It must provide a relatively open arena of representation, including barriers against cooperation by the two major centres of discursive power — state and government and the corporate world;
— It must demolish the accepted divisions and develop forms of representation and participation and scheduling that promote encounters and debates between the widest possible range of identities and positions;
— It must balance the promotion of diversity of information and experience against citizens’ rights of access to frameworks of knowledge and to the principles that allow them to be evaluated and challenged;
— It must ensure that the full range of its services remains equally available to all.

Observance of these “cultural rights” and implementation of the goals of public communicative activity could be seen as criteria for evaluating the contribution of the media to the operation of the public sphere and development of civil society.

Originally, Polish dissidents advocated the ideal of participatory communication as a way of dealing with these issues. The solutions they sought were largely in line with John Keane’s views on the role of the media in civil society:

There is need of ... a new constitutional settlement which ensures that political power is held permanently accountable to its citizens ... It is also the reason why the undermining of both state power and market power from below requires the development of a dense network or “hierarchy” of communication media which are controlled neither by the State nor by commercial markets. Publicly funded, non-profit and legally guaranteed institutions of civil society, some of them run voluntarily and held directly accountable to their audiences through democratic procedures, are an essential ingredient of a revised public service model (Keane 1993, 10; see also Keane 1991).

Keane sees a need for a plurality of non-state (and indeed non-market) media of communication which serve as the primary means of communication for citizens situated within a pluralistic civil society and safeguard both freedom and equality of communication. This necessitates the regulation and maximum feasible reduction of private corporate power over the means of communication, the maximum feasible decommodification and “re-embedding” of communication media in the social life of civil society is a vital condition of freedom from state and market censorship.

Keane proposes a system of widespread public interventionism in the media market-place which should always attempt to “level-up” rather than “level-down” citizens’ non-market powers of communication. It should, in his view, seek the creation of a genuine variety of media which enable little people in big societies to send and receive a variety of opin-
ions in a variety of ways. It should aim to break down monopolies, lift restrictions upon particular audience choices and to popularize the view that the media of communication are a public good, not a privately appropriable commodity whose primary function is to produce and circulate corporate speech for profit. It presumes the establishment of media enterprise boards to fund alternative ownership of divested media, and to support and subsidize public access to the media, and media access to the market, by use of public funds.

If the right to participation is at the core of civil society, then in the media field it must be understood as the right to communicate — and this is precisely what Keane insists on as a fundamental tenet of the new system of media serving civil society.

Dahlgren (1995) calls this approach romantic radicalism, or a Utopian concept of direct participatory democracy in communication. Rather, he says, we should have a blend of direct and representational mechanisms. In Poland (as well as in other Central and Eastern European countries; see Jakubowicz, 1994), the original approach of the dissidents was rejected after 1989.

After the collapse of the communist system, there was a first press boom as political parties obtained existing newspapers (as part of a policy of rearranging the press scene so that major new parties should be allotted or allowed to buy some newspapers in order to develop a pluralistic press system) or founded new ones in order to gain publicity, popularity and voters. Many organizations of civil society, long denied access to social communication, also seized on new publishing opportunities. Soon, however, most of the new politically or socially oriented newspapers went out of business for lack of sufficient interest on the part of the readers.

The second press boom which followed about a year later, sprang from the introduction of many new titles by commercially-oriented publishers, seeking to exploit different market niches. This had little to do with creating or enriching the public sphere. As a result, it was remarked in 1994 that

the media do not reflect or articulate the needs, interests and opinions of huge segments of society. The dailies in most cases speak for and are addressed to the intelligentsia. There is really no national newspaper or periodical that the largest social group, i.e. the workers, could call their own. Even left-wing newspapers are those of the left-wing intelligentsia. Also small businessmen, regarded as the core of the 'new Polish middle class', have no press of their own. ... It is debatable whether the farmers have newspapers that really speak for them (Jerschina 1994, 13).
Rather than represent segments of society, newspapers represent political orientations. Even though many party newspapers properly so called went out of business, the Polish press system has still been described as a “pluralistic system of party-oriented newspapers”, with particular newspapers committed to promoting a set of political interests or views. That helps to air divergent opinions and views, but usually of party elites, rather than their rank-and-file members or social constituency.

What further reduces the representativity of media content is the fact that many journalists regard freedom of speech as freedom to express their own views or biases, or continue to define themselves as “guardians” or “leaders” of society, called upon (by virtue of their superior access to information and understanding of the situation) to be in the forefront of political developments. The journalists’ inability to separate their political views from their profession is a heritage of the past both in the “old guard” of journalists once employed by official media and in the “new guard”. The view of journalism as politics conducted by other means dies hard. In consequence,

Journalists — the great majority of whom were committed politically — have been far from objective. The “civic attitude” inherited from the past [when under the communist system where one had to take sides in the struggle between communism and democracy — K. J.] led editors and journalists to do their utmost to promote the cause of their own political camp and its version of reality, than to inform objectively and provide a cold and dispassionate (such an attitude was wholly out of the question) analysis of the situation. As a result, the Polish press market has become dominated by politically affiliated journalism masquerading as objective. That was particularly obvious during election campaigns (Zakowski 1996, 205). According to some observers, what reduces the ability of the media to ensure adequate representation of society in media content is the process of their privatization and commercialization, leading to the replacement of old party censorship by “media capital censorship” (Becker 1995, 307), with the result that what prevails in such media is “corporate speech” (Keane 1991).

All this should not detract from the fact that the media system in Poland today (for a general overview see Kopper, Rutkiewicz, Schliep 1996) does constitute an element of the public sphere, in however imperfect a manner. While failing to provide conditions for the exercise of some of the cultural rights listed by Murdock, most notably the rights to experience (neither film nor television have been able to find a way to provide an account of the recent past or an adequate fictional representation of
contemporary reality) and participation, they do satisfy the right to information and, to some extent, knowledge, and do serve as a forum for public debate. Especially the development of the local press has meant a major change in the way the media serve society.

**Velvet restoration, or the morning after?**

This discussion of the slow emergence of civil society and public sphere in post-1989 Poland would be incomplete without some mention of the fact that the general election of 1993 returned to power a coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance (a grouping of nearly 30 parties and movements, led by the Social Democratic Party of the Polish Republic, born after the dissolution of the old Communist Party) and the Polish Agrarian Party, a successor to the United Peasant Party, once a client of the Communist Party and a part of the system of government in Communist times. This was followed in 1995 by an even more stunning event: a narrow victory in the presidential election by Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, leader of the Social Democratic Party of the Polish Republic and once a Communist official, over Mr. Lech Walensa, the legendary Solidarity leader and the country’s first popularly elected President.

Interpretations of these developments — seen by some as a breakdown of Polish democracy and the first step to the reinstatement of some form of authoritarian rule (see Gati’s comment at the beginning of this paper) — differ considerably.

Adam Michnik, a leading ideologue of the Solidarity movement and commentator of events after 1989, ascribes the Velvet Restoration to, among other things, the weaknesses and failures of post-Solidarity parties (“it is not so much that the post-Communist parties won, as that the post-Solidarity parties lost” — Michnik 1994, 4) and to a “fear of change” among the general population. Marcin Król (1995) lists what he calls the three really important causes for the victory of post-communist parties in the 1993 election:

1. The post-1989 Solidarity governments proved unable to create an ethos of transformation which would at least to some extent keep alive and adapt to new conditions the old ethos of Solidarity.
2. In their fascination with liberal economic theory the new leaders forgot that the working class employed in big industrial complexes had been an important partner in overthrowing communism and perceived
it as the main problem to be overcome in promoting restructuring of the economy;

3. There was no democratic justification and explanation for unavoidable political decisions: transformation was a top-down operation, with little involvement on the part of the general population or efforts to win its support.

Jerzy J. Wiatr (1995), a Marxist sociologist, one of the leaders of the Socialist Left Alliance, claims that the term “restoration” should properly be applied not to the return of former Communists (among others) to power, but to the “Solidarity” victory of 1989 which he sees as the restoration of capitalism after the hiatus of the Communist period.

This “restoration”, he says, was bound to be short-lived for the following reasons:

1. At the symbolic level, it aimed at total rejection of the last 50 years and their obliteration from Polish history and people’s memories. The extreme nature of this undertaking, which involved the expectation that individuals would deny their own past and regard their own lives under the communist system as worthless, provoked opposition and resistance.

2. At the political level, a strategy of ostracizing left-wing political forces and denying them legitimacy and the moral right to participate in democratic mechanisms, misfired and proved unrealistic when those forces proved to enjoy popular support and led right-wing forces to propose extreme policies (decommunization) and anti-democratic ways of maintaining power.

3. At the socio-economic level, the monetarist shock therapy, oriented towards the reinstatement of the free market without consideration for the social costs and inequalities which result from it, met with the most vehement rejection of the population.

Wiatr recalls the Hegelian triad and says that after the “thesis” of the Communist state and the “antithesis” of Solidarity governments with their neoliberal economic and social policies, the time has come for the “synthesis” — a balanced political system.

Some see the victory of left-wing parties as a major setback in the process of building democracy and civil society. There is, however, another potential way of looking at it. Another aspect of consolidation of democracy apart from those mentioned so far is the process of elite settlement and elite convergence. Elite settlement involves the attenuation of conflicts, acceptance of the rules of the political game, weakening of the
desire to challenge and subvert the system. Elite convergence happens when an opposition elite assumes power according to the procedures laid down by that which governed previously, and then honours, in the process of running the country, existing political institutions and norms. This is what has happened in Poland. While the new elites do seek to bend the rules of democratic governance a little, their victory also serves to mobilize their fragmented opponents into creating more viable political alliances and a more effective political force with a view to doing better in the next general election in 1997.

As we have said, both civil society and the public sphere develop in opposition to, and apart from, the state. After 1989, the fact that the state was personified by former dissident leaders and the Solidarity-led government was generally recognized as “our government” served to deprive forces involved in the creation of civil society and the public sphere of a focus. Now that focus is back, with parts of the public sphere and many of the elements of civil society united in their opposition to the governing coalition, with some of the old energy of resistance running through them. From this point of view, the “Velvet Restoration” (or “anti-Restoration”) may yet have a salutary effect on their development in Poland.

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Notes

1 The present paper is a revised version of a lecture with the same title presented during the Nordic-Baltic Course on Contemporary Theory and Methods of Communication Research, July 29 – August 8, 1996, Pyhajärve, Estonia. It was originally published in The Nordicom Review, No. 2/1996.

2 As Bronislaw Geremek (1994) puts it, the mindset of the dissidents involved a sense of the hopelessness of their endeavour. Writing in 1976, Michnik made that very clear: “The 19th-century dilemma of left-wing movements: 'reform or revolution?' is not the dilemma of the Polish opposition. The idea of a revolutionary overthrow of party dictatorship and deliberate organization of action to this end is both unrealistic and dangerous. It is unrealistic to hope to overthrow the regime in Poland if the political structure in the USSR remains unchanged. It is dangerous to seek to engage in underground activities. [...] Resolute and uncompromising efforts to promote reform, an evolutionary extension of civil liberties and human rights are — in my opinion — the only option open to Eastern European dissidents ... this assumes slow, gradual, partial change” (Michnik 1984, 83).

3 Michal Kulesza, a promoter of decentralization of the state and local govern-
ment reform in Poland after 1989, has pointed out that Solidarity governments “proceeded from the assumption that the situation was so dramatic that transformation [...] should be carried out on a top-down basis, with a strong hand. And that only after that was achieved would there be progress in establishing local democracy” (Pedziwol 1996, 87).

He discounts some of the stock explanations for it. In his opinion they are as follows: “Society was sick and tired of difficulties caused by the process of economic transformations”; “Squabbling within the democratic camp undermined its legitimacy”; “The twists and turns of the Church’s policies were harmful to the post-Solidarity governments”; “The policies of post-Solidarity governments were addressed to too narrow segments of society”; “The authorities were arrogant and disregarded public opinion”.

References


Beyond the four theories of the press

Kaarle Nordenstreng

The "Four Theories" here refers to a small book by Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, first published by the University of Illinois Press in 1956 and reprinted in more copies (over 80,000) — also translated into more languages — than perhaps any other textbook in the field of journalism and mass communication. This work was a bestseller for decades, because it obviously filled an intellectual gap among communication academics as well as journalism professionals. With the growth of the media there was inevitably a need to articulate the roles and tasks of mass media in society — including the relationship between media and politics — but in this respect the emerging scholarship had little to offer, and therefore even a casual collection of essays became a niche and a classic.

As suggested by the "Beyond", however, the classic is already a museum piece. Its analytical inadequacy and its political bias have been recognized, especially by the critical school of communication research since the late 1960s. Several complementary and alternative attempts to define the normative theories of the media have been made — not least by conservative scholars — without any of them gaining the same momentum as the original Four Theories. Today, towards the end of the 1990s, the question is no longer whether or not the classic is passé but what is the best way to get beyond it.

A most useful eyeopener was recently provided by a group of scholars from the same College of Communications in the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where the three authors of the classic once worked. Last Rights, edited by John Nerone and published by the University of Illinois Press in 1995, revisits Four Theories by critically assessing its relevance in a post-cold war world. After this impulse from the birthplace of the classic, the arena is open for new and different approaches. One such attempt is being developed by a group of five colleagues, including this author.

The present article first reviews not only the dominant model of the four theories but also several other proposals for normative theories of the
media developed over the years. Secondly, a preview is given of the new beginning, which the present author is pursuing with his colleagues to tackle the question of normative theories of the media. The chapter is written as an essay to introduce and discuss a challenge rather than to make a definite proposal.

The four and other typologies

*Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert *et al.*, 1956) introduced, according to its subtitle, “The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do”. These concepts or theories grew out of the question: Why do the media of mass communication appear in widely different forms and serve different purposes in different countries? — a typical task for anyone studying or teaching comparative or world media systems. The authors started with the thesis that “the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates. Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted.” (Siebert *et al.*, 1956: 1–2).

Such a task and such a thesis make great sense, but the four theories typology (summarized e.g. in Lambeth, 1995: 5) turned out to be a poor response to the authors’ own challenge. As pointed out by Nerone (1995), “*Four Theories* does not offer four theories: it offers one theory with four examples” (p. 18); “it defines the four theories from within one of the four theories — classical liberalism...it is specifically in classical liberalism that the political world is divided into individual versus society or the state” (p. 21); “*Four Theories* and classical liberalism assume that we have freedom of the press if we are free to discuss political matters in print without state suppression” (p. 22).

In a wider perspective, Nerone (1995) makes the point about the moment in intellectual history at which *Four Theories* was written: “By the mid-twentieth century, liberalism had reached a philosophical impasse. And, while political theory has moved beyond the impasse of liberalism, mainstream normative press theory in the United States has not.” (p. 4) The impasse was mainly caused by the fact that it was no longer feasible to view individuals as atoms, with natural rights, at a time when “politics became the stuff of institutions rather than of individuals” (p. 5). Moreover, the press had become an institution, separate from the people, and “it
became more intelligent to talk about the public’s rights — the right to know, the right to free expression — rather than the press’s rights. The press had responsibilities; the public had rights.” (p. 6)

_Last Rights_ helps to deconstruct _Four Theories_ — as typology, scholarship and ideology. This homework is indeed a logical first step for anyone who wishes to get beyond the famous typology by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm. Yet there are a number of other typologies worth recalling, regardless of their relationship to the four theories. In point of fact, the European examples listed below have little or no kinship with the American four theories, and therefore it would be misleading to view the latter as a universal baseline. On the other hand, several typologies have been proposed, especially in the United States, precisely intended to complement and revise the “original” four theories. We shall begin with the American revisions (with Mundt, 1991, and Lambeth, 1995, as useful guides), continuing our brief review through Europe to the Third World.

**The United States**

The first American to be listed among revisionists of the four theories is John Merrill (Universities of Missouri and Louisiana). With his colleague Ralph Lowenstein (Missouri and Florida), Merrill had developed in classes on mass media and society a critical approach to the four theories typology. Their textbook of 1971 made a distinction between media ownership (private, multi-party, government) and press philosophies, the latter displaying four types which were more differentiated than the original four: authoritarian with negative government controls, social-centralist with positive government controls, libertarian without any government controls, and social-libertarian with minimal government controls (Merrill & Lowenstein, 1971: 186). Lowenstein refined the classification in the second edition of this textbook, adding a fifth philosophy: social-authoritarian (Merrill & Lowenstein, 1979: 164), and gave final shape to his typology in another joint book (Lowenstein & Merrill, 1990).

Meanwhile, John Merrill pursued his own line in _The Imperative of Freedom_ (Merrill, 1974) by criticizing not only the four theories, particularly the social responsibility theory, but also the generally accepted notions of “the people’s right to know”, “right of access to the media”, and the press as “fourth branch of government”. He considered these as libertarian myths, which limited true freedom of the media and journalists.
Such an ultralibertarian position led Merrill to advocate non-utilitarian (Kantian) ethics and finally "existential journalism" (Merrill, 1977). Actually Merrill's contribution to media typologies was to reduce rather than to enrich the variation; his thinking is crystallized in a simple "political-press circle" between the poles of authoritarianism/totalitarianism and libertarianism/anarchy (Merrill, 1974: 42; Lambeth, 1995: 7). Still, he played a vital role as an uncompromising home critic of the libertarian camp.

William Hachten (University of Wisconsin) followed in the early 1980s with a revision retaining the authoritarian and communist concepts, but combining the libertarian and social responsibility variants into an overall "western" concept, and adding two new ones: revolutionary and developmental (Hachten, 1981). A revolutionary role was played by the early Pravda as well as various later samizdat outlets — from mimeographed newsletters to audiocassettes and e-mail — which challenged the existence of a monolithic political order. A developmental role was obvious to everyone who was aware of Third World realities (Hachten had experience from Africa). Accordingly, Hachten's typology consisted of five concepts, but in the third edition of The World News Prism (Hachten, 1992) he suggests that after the collapse of communism we might be back to four concepts (not, however, identical with those of Four Theories).

Robert Picard (Emerson College and State University of California, Fullerton) in the middle of the 1980s added one more variant to earlier typologies: democratic socialist (Picard, 1985). His source of inspiration was Western Europe, especially Scandinavia, where he observed that state intervention in media economics was exercised to ensure, and not to endanger, the survival of a free media "as instruments of the people, public utilities through which the people's aspirations, ideas, praise, and criticism of the state and society may be disseminated" (p. 70). Picard's democratic socialist theory, together with the original libertarian and social responsibility theories, constitutes three forms of western philosophy, whereas the rest of the world can be seen to be covered by Hachten's developmental and revolutionary concepts as well as the original authoritarian and communist theories (Picard, 1985: 69; Mundt, 1991: 25).

Herbert Altschull (Indiana and Johns Hopkins Universities) presented in his Agents of Power (1984; second edition 1995), not just a revision of the four theories, but an alternative paradigm based on the view that in all systems the news media are agents of those who exercise political and economic power (first of his "Seven laws of journalism"; Altschull, 1984:
298; 1995: 440). Still, he offers a three-part classification of media systems in the contemporary world: market or western nations, Marxist or communitarian nations, and advancing or developing nations. In each of the three worlds there are, especially among journalists, broadly held views on press freedom, on the purposes of journalism and a number of other "articles of faith" — both real and illusory — exposed by Altschull from a perspective fundamentally different from standard American libertarianism.

All in all, the American attempts to go beyond the four theories — from Merrill to Altschull — constitute a fairly rich reservoir of ideas and pedagogically useful typologies. The various proposals clearly suggest that Four Theories has failed to meet the scholarly challenge. Nevertheless, it enjoyed considerable respect and was widely used until the present day. Ironically, even the 1994 edition of a standard undergraduate textbook Modern Mass Media (with John Merrill as the first of three authors!) actually lists the original four theories under a chapter on press and government. On the other hand, the by now classic Introduction to Mass Communications, in its latest edition no longer reproduces all four theories but only two of them: authoritarian and libertarian (Agee et al., 1994: 27).

The United Kingdom

The first notable European proposal for classifying contemporary media systems comes from the UK and the early 1960s. Raymond Williams, the British cultural historian and a vital intellectual source for European media scholarship included in his Communications (Williams, 1962) a typology of four communication systems: authoritarian, paternal ("an authoritarian system with a conscience"), commercial, and democratic.

This was an openly normative typology, highlighting the necessity and feasibility of a democratic communication system providing public service and a right to communicate free from the limitations of the three preceding systems — "not only an individual right, but a social need, since democracy depends on the active participation of all its members" (Williams, 1962: 93; for a summary and background, see Sparks, 1993). Even if the actual development of media systems in Europe and elsewhere over the past three decades has not followed a particularly democratic
path (as defined by Williams), the typology is still relevant both as an intellectual-analytical tool and as a political project.

Somewhere between Williams and the American Siebert et al. can be seen the four types of roles which journalism may play in the state, proposed by Peter Golding and Philip Elliott in their international study of broadcast news from the mid-1970s (when only Merrill and Lowenstein had critically examined the Four Theories). Their first type was the classic fourth estate, in which journalism acts as an independent watchdog, the second was journalism as a public relations wing of totalitarian government, the third was a party-related political role yet independent from the government, and the fourth was the role of a neutral observer (Golding & Elliott, 1979: 46). This useful classification did not achieve larger recognition, nor did the authors subsequently elaborate it.

However, British media scholars did go on in the spirit of Williams and later cultivated the concept of a democratic media system. In this exercise, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and his concept of the public sphere became an increasingly important source of inspiration. An illuminating example of this approach is provided by James Curran. In one contribution (Curran, 1991a) he reassessed the role of media as watchdog, as consumer representative and as source of information, arriving at a working model of democratic media system. In another contribution (Curran, 1991b) he compares liberal and radical approaches, particularly the two dominant types of free-market liberal and collectivist-statist, proposing a third route to combine them as "radical democratic". More recently, John Keane (1995) and Nicholas Garnham (1995) pursued the issue from contrasting and compelling standpoints.

Scandinavia

Finland produced in the late 1960s — without notable attention to the US four theories and practically no knowledge of the British debate — a typology of her own as a byproduct of rethinking the role of the national broadcasting system (Nordenstreng, 1973; Pietilä et al., 1990). The three types of broadcasting, or media systems in general, were based on the primary objectives of social communication in question: first confessional (political, religious, etc.), second commercial (run by advertising, feeding consumerism), and third informational, based on maximizing audience
enlightenment and exercising neither ideological, nor commercial censorship.

Obviously this was a normative typology, designed to promote the informational option, according to which the media should transmit different world views instead of a hegemonic ideology. It was created in the spirit of the radical 1960s, but in fact it was not far from classic liberalism and standard Western journalism, which is also dedicated to pursuing the truth (representing epistemological realism). The typology was transformed into a set of informational news criteria (Ahmavaara et al., 1973; Nordenstreng, 1972), and for a few years it dominated national media policy debate, which at that time had an anti-commercial democratic orientation — a Nordic parallel to the British debate.

The informational policy line was further strengthened by classifying media ownership systems into three types depending on whether the control was exercised by civic associations (party and special interest press), by the Parliament (public service broadcasting), or by private capital (commercial media). Measured in turnover, private capital controlled 70%, while the other two forms of “democratic control” accounted for a mere 30%.

Such perspectives did not survive the 1980s and 1990s, which in Finland as in most other European countries were dominated by an offensive of commercial media forces and related postmodern ideas, including scepticism about media as vehicles of information. Still, the Finnish typology stands as a curious and instructive footnote to history.

The rest of Scandinavia, particularly Sweden, should be noted here for the typology used to officially define the functions which mass media play in democratic society and prepared in deliberations concerning state subsidies to the press (Borden 1995). Beginning with the overriding function to ensure free opinion building, the tasks of the media boil down to three: first to inform (media should provide citizens with such information that they may freely and independently form opinions on socio-political issues), second to criticize (media should be an independent institution monitoring and investigating the decision makers in society), and third to provide a forum (media should ensure public space for actors representing different views).

This typology represents a long historical tradition and a resulting political consensus, yet after academic expert advice (notably from Stig Hadenius, Lennart Weibull and Kent Asp). It is a pragmatic way not just to declare free media but to define the parameters of this freedom and even
to approach quality criteria for journalism such as truthfulness, informativity and relevance to decision making. A vital part of this philosophy is the overall versatility or pluralism of media supply, or media concentration as its opposite, which is monitored in Sweden by a standing committee.

Continental Europe

Early German sociology and political science had a lot to offer for reflections on the media-society relationship (Hardt, 1979), but there is little genuine scholarship from the postwar Germany that is worth recalling here — apart from Habermas. As far as the rest of continental Europe is concerned, there are two scholars on normative theories of the media to be noted here.

Denis McQuail, a British sociologist working in the Netherlands (University of Amsterdam), presented in his Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction (1983) the first European-based revision of the Four Theories, while the British and Scandinavian typologies listed above were not made with specific reference to the American classic. McQuail took the authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and Soviet theories more or less for granted, but he added two more: development media theory and democratic-participant media theory (McQuail, 1983: 84–98). The development theory is essentially the same as that proposed by Hachten in the US — independently and around the same time — and the democratic-participant theory is not far from the democratic variant proposed by Williams in the UK two decades earlier, or that by Curran one decade later.

McQuail retained his typology of four plus two in the second (1987) and third (1994) editions of this canonic textbook, just adding references to other proposals. However, in the latest edition he makes a point about the limitations of the press theory approach, because, for instance, with its focus on political news and information, there is “little of relevance in any of the variants of theory named which might realistically be applied to the cinema, to the music industry, to the video market or even to a good deal of sport, fiction and entertainment of television, thus to much of what the media are doing most of the time” (McQuail, 1994: 133). Also, he notes that the theories were typically formulated in very general terms, whereas actual media institutions and practices in most countries “display
a mixture of several elements: libertarian, ‘responsible’ and authoritarian’ (p. 133).

**PHILOSOPHICAL OR POLITICAL RATIONALES**

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**ACTUAL PATTERNS OF MEDIA**

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A — Authoritarian, D — Development media, D.P. — Democratic-participant

Figure 1. “Maps” of theories in the press, adapted from Jakubowicz (1990: 45–46)

**Karol Jakubowicz** from Poland has written a lot, particularly about the media transformation in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (see, e.g., Jakubowicz, 1995; 1996). He was unimpressed from the beginning by the prospects for true freedom and democracy, first following glasnost
and later following the collapse of communism. In his contribution to an East-West dialogue on democratization and the media, Jakubowicz (1990) offers an illuminating overview and analysis of various press theories. He challenges the conventional premise of the normative theories that the media are different by virtue of belonging to different social systems and proposes two dimensions for drawing maps of media systems and theories: first, autonomy vs. subordination of the media in relation to the power structure, and second, pluralism vs. dominance of the basic character of media content (Jakubowicz, 1990: 44).

Figure 1 reproduces the “maps” which Jakubowicz constructed by placing the original four theories and the two additions by McQuail along the two dimensions. The maps expose the discrepancy between political theory and actual practice — particularly as far as the libertarian theory (typically glorified by Americans) is concerned, but to a lesser extent also regarding the social responsibility and development theories (as Merrill admonished!).

The Third World

Despite their distinctive and rich cultural and philosophical traditions, Asia, Africa and Latin America have not nurtured major innovations in the particular area reviewed here. Relevant contributions by Third World scholars are typically reflections of Four Theories or its revisions — another proof of the dependencies involved. Yet it is likely that particularly Islam will give rise not only to concepts of media ethics (Mowlana, 1989) but also to normative theories of the media.

An example is seen in a consultation on press systems in the ASEAN countries, held in Indonesia in 1988: “Unlike the individualistic, democratic, egalitarian and liberal tradition of Western political theory, some societies value their consensual and communal traditions with their emphasis on duties and obligations to the collective and social harmony” (Mehra, 1989: 3). However, no theory of society and media is articulated, apart from political phrases about nation-building, freedom and responsibility. Obviously, developing countries with basically western orientation (such as ASEAN) are bound to be intellectually dependent on western political philosophies and media theories. The only major window of opportunity for alternative Third World perspectives has been provided by
the media reform movement towards a New World Information and Communication Order (Vincent et al., 1997).

A new beginning

In the late 1980s the present author joined four colleagues who shared a concern about what to put in the place of *Four Theories*. These "soul brothers" are Clifford Christians (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Theodore Glasser (Stanford University, formerly University of Minnesota), Denis McQuail (University of Amsterdam; see above) and Robert White (Gregorian University, Rome). Our discussions evolved into a project intended to continue from where *Last Rights* left off: to propose a fresh approach to normative theories of the media.

We admit the continuing need for normative theories as cognitive maps for media policymakers and professionals — despite suggestions that in these postmodern times they might be obsolete (Nerone, 1995: 184). However, normative theories are seen more clearly than before as culturally bound paradigms and not as really existing systems. For example: "Italian journalists, asked about their perceptions of their role, state that they follow the neutral and objective model of journalism... In reality, Italian journalists are advocates, linked to political parties and very close to being active politicians themselves." (Manchini, 1996: 2) Indeed, the point made by Altschull’s seventh "law of journalism" is well taken: "Press practices always differ from press theory" (Altschull, 1984: 298; 1995: 441).

Accordingly, there are two types of "theories of the press": firstly those prescribing openly normative tasks for the media in society, and secondly those describing the real role and impact of the media in society. The latter approaches the issue from the "objective" angle of media sociology, while the former deals with the "subjective" conceptions held by various actors (including public opinion) about the mission of the media. We may even see that the media-society relationship — not least the relationship between media and politics — should always be articulated at two levels, real and ideal:
In fact, journalism education has typically separated these two by placing the media sociological approach into the category of scientific studies, whereas the normative approach has been taught together with media law and ethics as something that is value bound and part and parcel of the professional doctrine in question. The normative approach has usually been taken for granted, without questioning its foundations and without really contrasting it to other doctrines and the categories opened by media sociological analysis. Thus the prevailing professional ideologies have remained unchallenged — even legitimized by "theories of the press".

But wasn’t the idea of *Four Theories* itself to help journalists and other media people, as part of their professional education, to relate themselves to various media philosophies and thus to raise their professional consciousness? Obviously the intention was something of the kind — after all, the essays were an offshoot of the National Council of Churches’s commission to Wilbur Schramm to elaborate on responsibility in mass media. Yet in reality the book became coopted by the prevailing ideology in the USA, both political and professional, as exposed in *Last Rights*.

The new beginning is inspired by the idea of raising professional consciousness within the media world — including media scholarship. We see that normative theories may not only serve as vehicles of conservative indoctrination but can also be made to sensitize media policymakers and professionals to acknowledge their own dependencies — by exposing the kind of discrepancies between philosophical rationales and actual operations as shown above in the maps by Jakubowicz (or as shown in an illustration of ideal and real relations between media, government and people in Nordenstreng, 1995, 119). Thus normative theories are justified, not as affirmative instruments to strengthen the prevailing ideology — typically the case of *Four Theories* — but as emancipating instruments to stand back from the prevailing ideology. In this respect, normative theories support media autonomy and self-regulation.
At the same time, however, we are inspired by the challenge posed by the two types of theories: ideal and real, normative and sociological. After reviewing the past attempts towards "theories of the press", one is no longer sure whether they cover the ideal or the real level. Obviously a new beginning must cover both, and not just to create emancipatory effects but also to join the eternal project of mass communication research: to understand the media, particularly in relation to society.

Today this project is particularly challenging, as new media and new types of messages enter the field (pointed out by McQuail above) and as this "information society" is moreover characterized by globalization, with simultaneous tendencies for localization (i.e. "glocalization" as proposed by Majid Teheranian in Vincent et al., 1997). Furthermore, a fundamental soul-searching is going on among social scientists, with classics such as Georg Simmel experiencing a revival in information society and communitarianism gaining momentum in the heartlands of liberalism. For example, a Finnish media sociologist, comparing legal dogmatics with social science, concludes (paraphrasing Simmel): "The idea of society does not belong to the same conceptual order as incidents and regularities of behaviour that are facts in the realm of 'Is'; the idea of society is a norm, and you find it in the domain of the 'Ought'." (Pietilä, 1997).

The new beginning does not aim at a universally valid typology. First, it deliberately limits itself to what might be called democratic theories, following the perspectives of democracy by Held (1987; 1995). Building the framework on models of democracy rather than models of communication also helps to avoid the tendency to develop a 'fortress journalism syndrome': to think in terms of media instead of the people. Second, it avoids a pigeon hole approach whereby each media system is placed in one category only. Instead, it suggests that each national media system and individual media — even each individual journalist — shares more than one paradigm, and that typologies serve the purpose of analytical distinctions and not of totalizing labels.

**Five paradigms**

Reflecting upon the various proposals for normative theories, particularly from the point of view of their relevance to the contemporary world, we arrived at a typology of five paradigms:
1) Liberal-individualist paradigm
A ‘pure’ version of the old libertarian theory, whereby individual liberty is the cornerstone of democracy, a freedom typically exercised through — and realized in — an open marketplace. Minimal role for the state ("night watchman") and no public right to know, nor public interest — just the public’s interest as the interests of the individuals who comprise the public. No content criteria for media performance; accountability measured by market forces requiring the media to honour individual freedom of choice.

2) Social responsibility paradigm
The original proposal by the Hutchins Commission and its philosopher Ernest Hocking stated that freedom of expression was not an inalienable natural right but an earned moral right, with obligations beyond self-interest. This contemporary version takes another step beyond this and the egalitarian appeals by Rorty and Rawls, suggesting that the cornerstone of the political order is not an equitable process but a social conception of the good and a common understanding of the moral subject. Thus news becomes an agent of community formation, the goal of reporting being active citizenship, instead of abundant information.

3) Critical paradigm
A version somewhere between Hachten’s revolutionary and Curran’s radical democratic theories, based on the Gramscian notion of hegemony and the Habermasian concept of public sphere. Freedom of expression is articulated in terms of repressive powers on the one hand, and oppressed masses on the other. Media are strategically located at the nexus of social structures and social consciousness, with a potential for emancipating the masses. Manifested in alternative media on the local level and the NWICO movement on the world scale.

4) Administrative paradigm
A new variant based on the notion of objective information, on the assumption of authoritative sources, and on the commitment to efficient transmission of this reliable information to many. Developed in line with the “modern” standards of technocratic excellence, has ambitions of professionalism in the service of political and economic elites (organized, corporativist interests), but remains insensitive towards people at large. Applicable to both quality papers (The New York Times) and public service broadcasting (the BBC).
5) Cultural negotiation paradigm

Another new type inspired by cultural studies and theological media theory. In contrast to the previous paradigm, denies a universal rationality, objective information and professional-bureaucratic efficiency. Capitalizing on the rights of subcultures with their particularistic values, promotes intersubjective understanding and a real sense of community. Media serve both communitarianism and cultural negotiation between conflicting values, aiming at mediations through drama rather than news.

While such a typology offers some food for thought, we do not present it as our alternative to *Four Theories*. We rather open several windows for a critical look at the way people — particularly professional communicators — speak and think about the media in society. One such window is provided by the roles which media play in democratic societies.

**Four roles**

There are countless ways to characterize the roles of the press and other media in society. The following classification of four stages is based on varying degrees of media autonomy:

1) Collaborative — a role the media play when a nation state is young and insecure; in times of war, emergency, etc.

2) Surveillance — a role typically designated as adversary, watchdog and agenda-setter ("AWA" role by Altschull), when violations of the moral and social order are exposed; also informational role when bringing important issues to the attention of the community.

3) Facilitative — a role for the media where journalists seek to create and sustain public debate ("conversation" model by Carey); essence of the public or civic journalism movement.

4) Critical/dialectical — a role for the media when journalists examine in a truly radical way the assumptions and premises of a community; constitutes public debate about, not within, the prevailing political order.

Such roles and such paradigms serve us as staple ingredients when trying to repackage this old but most problematic topic in both an intellectually and pedagogically satisfactory way.
Note


References


Why study journalistic genres?

Svennik Høyer

More than other kinds of texts journalism lacks an identity of its own in academia, or so it seems from the paucity of titles on the subject in the scholarly literature. Analytical approaches to the changing forms of journalism have been vacuous — moral indignation has been more celebrated. Critical scholarship in literature has a long tradition for biographing prominent authors and for interpreting "finer" canonical literature, sometimes studying the structure and "inner logics" of selected works. Media scholars, on their part, have only recently become interested in text linguistics and in the genres of journalism.

Journalism is an open text, its interpretation depends more on the context of communication than does the interpretation of other kinds of literature. Being part of a given stream of similar news in known channels adds essential dimensions of meaning to the single journalistic text, which it easily loses out of those contexts. In journalism the social and the literary elements are of almost equal importance. From this point of view studies of journalism fall between subdisciplines. Journalism is considered neither a proper study of popular culture, nor a form of aesthetic fit for analysis, nor is it expert language appropriate for semantic analysis, but an elusive mixture of all. Social scientists ignore journalism more completely by defining its "social functions", thus bypassing the qualities of the text. Journalism is seen as linkages transferring the cultural heritage, building local and national identifications, etc. While this is certainly true in many respects, journalism is no passive transmitter of ideas produced by others, but distinct cultural forms produced by journalists.

The lack of critical studies on the nature and criteria of normal journalism is thus due to many reasons: the content of journalism often concerns very trivial matters. In retrospect journalism is only a sketch, or history in embryo, not the fully-fledged story of an event or an epoch. In short, the content of media is rarely interesting for posterity by itself. Only as an index of something else does the content of journalism gain in importance. In contrast to literature and film studies, there are few clearly defined and classical text corpuses readily available for sophisticated interpretation.
This paper is concerned with some of the reasons why we should study the forms of journalism more closely for a while, apart from the content and effects of journalistic messages. I therefore maintain that form can — to some extent — be separated from content. Some argue that the aspects of communication are too closely entwined to be separated meaningfully. It is impossible to talk about one aspect without referring to the others. In this paper I take it more or less for granted that formal characteristics can be isolated in journalism, if only because textbooks in journalism are full of recipes containing descriptions of formal elements.

A more difficult problem is whether the mode of speech and the accompanying formal arrangements of the text include some given modes of interpretation by the public. For instance, the editorial, the news report and the feature may contain an unknown number of topics as forms, but they signify only three different styles of writing carrying an implicit message of how to interpret the author's intent. How closely styles of writing and presentation correlate with modes of interpretation is a problem I want to leave aside in this paper. I am more interested in the sender side of our problem. However, a regular feature of sender strategies is the nature of the audience. Journalism is embedded in more comprehensive social mores. Changes in form requires concurrent changes in rules of interaction, both for journalists and for their sources of information. But the kinds of information sources journalists usually contact is influenced by the nature of their audience.

In text linguistics and discourse analysis of journalism we thus often find two levels of analysis. The media text is produced within a strategy aimed at winning support from a market in impersonal and aggregate terms, rarely from a special group or an individual. At the same time, journalism is subject to organizational constraints and routines in order to balance the professional standards of journalists and the special interests of information sources in a continuing bargaining process. Such bargains take colour from the special nationalities and social groups that make up the audience. By contrast, the style elements are less influenced by the local environment and are more stable over time.

I will argue that the study of journalistic genres also belongs to this socio-literary context. In textbooks for vocational training, however, journalism is treated without a context in history or theory. It is described either by way of professional ideals or by its methods — how to write an intro, how to attribute and authenticate information, how to comment,
interview, edit, etc. More comprehensively, journalism is described as different methods of reporting: muckraking, adversary, new, investigative, precision journalism, etc.

While these golden rules have been taken as the collectively received wisdom of "how proper journalism is made", they are seldom scrutinized systematically or incorporated into historical analyses of long-term developments. Some questions beg some answers in this connection: What were the events or circumstances leading up to the invention of new forms? Which purposes did they originally serve? What problems were solved by the introduction of a new form or genre? How were the rules diffused, adopted, integrated into given media cultures, inherited, changed and refined over time and through space?

We know a little, but far from enough to depict a coherent pattern of how journalism changes and spreads internationally. Marion Marzolf (1982) gives us an inspiring glimpse. She describes how the American "new journalism" of Joseph Pulitzer, James Gordon Bennett Jr., and Adolf Ochs became a model for European innovators in Scandinavia first through Henrik Cavling who remade Politiken, in Copenhagen 1905, and by Oscar Hemberg five years later in Dagens Nyheter in Stockholm. The break with traditional editing principles was not as sharp and came many years later in Norway.

Journalistic genres

Genres are seldom limited to specific topics, they belong more to the general methods of telling a story — or to discourse. The purpose of genres is to set the reader in the proper mood for understanding the attitudes of the sender towards his subject matter: be it a pedagogical instance to the receiver or a more bottom-up view of the topic, sharing the joys and toils of discovery with the reader. Nor do two other aspects of genres have any explicit lexical meaning: the story line (or dramaturgy) and the layout (or staging) of one particular story or of similar stories. These are all strategies mainly to evoke attention and empathy from the audience.

Genres free and restrict the reporter at the same time. Individually, a genre confines the proper topics and meanings falling within its domain. At the same time it demands discipline on the part of writers which will clarify the available interpretations for the user. Genres, in the plural, is a tool kit for the journalist and gives him more choice of what to express
and how to do it. The differentiation of genres may thus be an index of emerging professionalization: of how journalistic texts became different from other types of texts requiring special training and talents. Several journalistic genres have been mentioned, described and even analysed: the announcement, the editorial, the commentary, debate, the column(ists), the enquête, the round table, the chronicle, the satire (petite), the paragraph, the single event-centred report, the multi-item reportage, the feature, the human interest story, the portrait or profile, the news interview. Each forms connotes a given tone, and a certain attitude towards the object by the reporter; it signals his presence or his absence in the text and at the same time reveals the intentions behind, giving the impression for example of an impersonal, undisputed fact or of a directed personal message.

Studies of media texts and their immediate environments may eventually give us a deeper understanding of journalism as a mixture of texts and peculiar social arrangements and interactions that is different from the literary system of book publishing and fiction writing. An important distinguishing mark appeared in the 1860s with the appearance of the rotary printing press. It was built for speed and volume in newspaper production, which needed a large audience to become economically viable proposition. The rotary printing press was not suitable for book production, so this marked the beginning of specialized production. Eventually, literature and journalism parted: there were fewer novelists and authors working as journalists, while newspapers concentrated on news, not so much on literary texts and essays.4

Certainly journalism has a history of its own that is related to the development of the news industry as such and to the development of the journalistic profession and its ideals, as Michael Schudson has demonstrated.5 The news interview, for example, used systematically as a fact-finding method from about the 1870s, succeeded a more passive collection of news when newspapers were dependent on information sources contacting them on their own initiative, especially in public affairs matters. The interview introduced a new and more aggressive method of collecting information.6 This of course had more than a coincidental link with the increase in editorial staff and the stiffening of competition in the newspaper industry in the United States of the late 19th century. But in typical media histories, inventions in journalism are most often described implicitly as something that well-known reporters, editors and entrepre-
neurs have done with their famous newspapers or programmes at decisive moments of change.7

However, journalism genres are not only textual arrangements invented by individuals; genres are conventions on which a consensus has been slowly built up among colleagues. They can thus be studied as a process of diffusion of cultural customs. Genres also require a set of social practices to be accepted or sanctioned (through censorship) by parties outside the media organization — sanctions which can suddenly disappear after political revolutions or social upheavals, leaving behind a social "black hole" or a kind of "normative vacuum", as in the now transitional countries of the former Soviet Union.

In these transitional periods many styles and often contradictory canons of journalism may live side by side. Ann-Kristin Bjergne (1994), for example, has studied the rhetoric of four Moscow dailies in their coverage of Yeltsin's siege of the White House in Moscow on October 4th 1993, and found elements of old heroic rhetoric and literary style mixed with more down-to-earth, factual and realistic reportage. Bjergne concludes: "The story of the abortive coup in September/October 1993 was no reconstruction of events witnessing the triumph of the good over the evil, neither was it an objective rendering of events based mainly on calm observations. Elements of socialistic realism are still an important part of the rhetoric in the Russian press. This conclusion is also valid for newspapers which have fed themselves from the ideology of the former regime." The old heroes are gone, but new ones have arrived, like the young aggressive businessmen, while the idea of a personally comfortable life for everyone is still dependent on an image of "society" in the abstract.8

A form may become a fact with the help of an analyst ...

Even in terms of content journalistic texts differ too much over location and time to allow for strict comparisons. Without a classification scheme it is hard to understand what exactly links the contents of a newspaper together over several decades, except perhaps its logo. Categories of types of content are often necessary for analytical purposes, and even more useful for identifying the evolving forms of journalism. Forms and genres are theoretical constructs, and as such they need to be anchored to the practice of journalism.
When studying form a pattern is easily detected by the trained observer. Even so, it is hard to describe all the variations that a form comprises and to enlist all the clues by which we identify a form. So many different features fit a given pattern that they render the form itself almost meaningless for the uninitiated. Only when we understand the rules of transformation — what purposes make various details of a text equivalent in respect to a given form, or we understand what defines the range of variation within a form — can we perceive its function in communication. Equipped with such knowledge, it is easier for us to see how the form limits messages and thus adds a certain meaning to it.

Journalism is non-fiction presented in various genres, mostly by typographical and pictorial (iconographical) means and by certain (dramaturgical) principles of composition for the whole text as well as for the individual stories it contains. A genre is first and foremost a convention gradually copied between colleagues, but in the same process it develops into an implicit convention within the audience of how to perceive the intentions behind the forms of presentation: identifying, for instance, the importance of the news — as editorially evaluated — by the tokens of the size of headlines, the selection of words, the styles of reporting used in the text, etc. Other types of signals to orient readers in the avalanches of information in modern newspapers are sections and topical pages for culture, economy & business, sports, family and columns for a variety of contents regularly appearing at the same place in the same design, etc.

A close reading of the historical changes of genres may provide one method for reconstructing the way in which new groups of readers were included in the media discourse. Changes in journalism are the underlying theme of historical interpretations of how the popular press emerged in various periods, from the early 19th century (the Sun in New York) to the late 19th century (the Daily Mail in London). Using such close readings Halliki Harro demonstrates in this anthology how censorship and the current political climate clearly influences the way in which journalists tell their stories in the Estonian press.

In an experimental text analysis using a battery of well-defined genres, a group of students from the Department of Media Communication at the University of Oslo studied very select samples of issues from three Oslo papers between 1919 and 1939. They found a more consistent pattern of editing over time, an increased variety of genres, more active reporting and news gathering — all signs of modern journalistic methods. However, at the same time there were no definite signs of increased objectivity: at-
tributions of facts were often lacking and the inverted-pyramid form of dramaturgy not yet very prominent; by contrast the students found an increasing tendency to mix comments with reportage. This was a period of polarized political conflicts and of strong ties between the press and the parties, often in organized forms. In a similar, but more detailed, study (in progress) of four Oslo papers between 1908 and 1930, John Nonseid has found that the inverted pyramid became prominent earlier in telegram bulletins from the news agencies than in the news written by the newspapers themselves. This is a clear indication that new technologies have a direct and potentially strong impact on how journalism is conducted.

These findings are to be seen as indications of a more general trend that must be further investigated, but the methods used apparently have a great potentiality, they can be repeated in different contexts.

Similar experiments have been done by students of Epp Lauk and Halliki Harro at the University of Tartu in the spring of 1996, in a text analysis of Estonian newspapers between 1910 and 1940. Their preliminary findings indicate some similarities with the Norwegian development especially as concerns the lack of attributions. In 1920 about 80% of the stories did not mention any information source. Those named were in most instances news agencies. By 1930 this anonymity of how information was obtained decreased somewhat: between 50 and 60% of the news stories lacked attributions. The Estonian students under the supervision of Harro and Lauk also found indications of an increased variety of genres especially in the 1930s, when for example the news interview began to appear regularly. There seems to be a time-lag of about one decade between Norway and Estonia in this respect, however, both countries lagging far behind the United States where the news interview was used as a regular journalistic method as early as the 1860s and 1870s.

Much more comparable data are needed, but if further substantiated and corroborated these findings may contribute to a more general discussion of how journalism has been professionalized. There is, apparently, no uniform and smooth transitions to "modern" news journalism irrespective of national traditions, political regimes, etc., rather, it depends on social conditions conducive to some, but not necessarily all genres of international (or American) news journalism.
The story of an anti-story: the inverted pyramid

In professional folklore the summary lead was invented during the Civil War in the US, when the telegraph was still young and unreliable. Queuing up to send their messages through faulty and overworked wires, journalists cut down their reports to the most essential facts. If this was not the real story, and no one knows, it is sometimes supplemented by another story of the emerging Associated Press serving many newspapers of various political persuasions. In order not to offend editorial policies news telegrams were giving the bare facts without any interpretations.

This inverted pyramid form of presentation, as it was later called, is often considered the archetype of fact-oriented and non-involved journalism. The inverted pyramid gives priority to the essential facts of any news. With attributions to witnesses, quotations from authorities and experts, this technique of presentation helps to make the journalist absent and to free him for responsibility of the content, if not for the selection and presentation. This is “objectivity as ritual”, as Gaye Tuchman has called it. While this news genre tells how to present, news criteria serve to define the content of news as non-fiction: realistically telling what is important and what really happened — even to the extent of mirroring truth in the opinion of many journalists.

Even today the inverted pyramid seems to be a prominent, if not the dominant, form of news journalism. In a monumental study Teun A. Van Dijk and associates made systematic content analyses of more than 700 articles from 138 newspapers, selected from 200 newspapers of a dozen languages all over the world, of how the murder of president-elect Bechir Gemayel of Lebanon in Beirut on September 14, 1982 was reported. Compared across regions of the world, religious and political systems and military blocks, Van Dijk and associates found some differences in the selection of facts and in slanting the facts. At the deeper structural level, however, the inverted pyramid form was prominent. The most striking differences in presentation and in story lines were seen between “quality” broad sheet newspapers and the “popular” press. The tabloids focused on graphic details of the accident and told it in the dramatic chronological story line, also called the diamond or the fish. This difference in story-telling between the popular and middle-class newspapers was also noticed by Michael Schudson for the early 19th century US press in his history of American journalism.

The summary lead gave reporters the authority to define what is most important as Schudson remarks, and this role of “evaluation as fact” has
since been routinized to the extent of giving news a serene impression of detached objectivity, which may explain the fascination that journalists have for "facticity" to the point of boredom, as Gay Tuchman explains it. Most of the critical studies of the news business focus on this ascribed ideal of realism.16

Every experienced writer knows that the professionally accepted methods of telling a story also set limitations on what may be realistically told. If the conceived story does not fit certain formulas, it will not be accepted as newsworthy by colleagues at the desk.

Every experienced reporter also knows that the jumbles of facts and the unorderly succession of actions and impressions collected "in the field" does not necessarily fit the order of presentation ordained in the news formulae. Reality is too chaotic to be readily understood by the uninformed audience. As David Altheide (1976) suggests: The news report in process pass through a phase of "decontextualization" before being "recontextualized" in a more orderly fashion. A good deal of editing is needed even while working in the field. Journalists often start with, and use more time in phrasing the lead, than in writing up the rest of a news story, because the lead is important in organizing the whole news writing process. Studies confirm that editing continues at every phase of the writing process as the reporters clarify, rewrite and ad new details.17

The inverted pyramid is undeniably a very efficient form of telling the news, if disseminating information for efficient reading by competent readers is the only criterion of success. It gives the reader an overview in minutes, just by browsing the headlines and dipping into the leads. In the minds of editors and journalists the audience seems always to be in a hurry and on the move to something else. Recipients want a brief overview surveying their regular environment without "unnecessary" elaborations, explanations, interpretations etc. The International Herald Tribune may be the best example of a newspaper that uses the lead as its main journalistic method. A newspaper made for travellers to be consumed between airports.

The summary lead has some serious drawbacks. Starting out with conclusions, it destroys the dramatic potentialities of the story. Over time the lead technique in journalism has been modified and features of traditional story telling have crept into news studios, only to be decried as "infotainment". Studies in cognitive psychology demonstrate, however, that chronologically told studies are better understood and remembered compared to summary-lead stories — possibly because the audience gets
more fascinated by a story with a "natural" chronology, or maybe the inverted pyramid stories lack implicit explanations. But the chronological stories are, paradoxically, less trusted as objective facts compared to stories with a summary lead.

The pedagogical problem with the summary lead is often its lack of perspectives, the before and after. Birgitta Höijer and Olle Findahl demonstrated that in Swedish television news more than half of the stories lacked the news keg, or references to what happened before, and a majority of stories did not give any indications of likely consequences of the reported news. The authors concluded that television news apparently was meant for the already well-informed viewers who had built-in models and explanations to interpret the bare facts.18

These and many similar findings from cognitive studies have apparently crept into the conventional wisdom of newsmen. In television news a summary lead is frequently followed by comments and narratives, interviews with special correspondents or experts etc. that provide substance, colour and perspective to the information in the lead. Modern newspaper technology has also made it easier to avoid the drab summary lead, putting the relevant facts and chronologies in boxes attached to the story instead.

In spite of its drawbacks I still believe that the inverted pyramid will survive as a method of telling news. Multimedia and the Internet are based on the principle that you choose bits of information and put together your own mosaic. You create a new context for your collection of news, be it a reconstructed story or something else. In this process of combining you easily grow impatient of the long outdrawn introductions which clearly makes new combinations difficult.

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Notes

1 See e.g. Chomsky and Herman for a systematic, but one-sided critique of the press as an institution which systematically represses the true nature of politics to produce a wanted consensus as an input in the decision-making process governed from above by a collegiate of elites. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1988) Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York, Pantheon.

2 For an early formulation of the exchange theories in studies of journalism now coming into fashion, see Svennik Høyer, Stig Hadenius and Lennart


4 The proportion of authors of fiction, mentioned in the histories of Norwegian literature, who were also active in the press as editors, publishers, regular writers or contributors to newspapers fell from 94% of registered authors for the period 1814–49 to 69% for the period 1870–88. See: Svennik Høyer and Øyvind Ihlen (1995). “Forfattere i pressen. (Authors in the press. On the relationship between writers and the press in the nineteenth century.)” Norsk medietidsskrift. Vol. 2, no. 1.


8 The four papers analysed were: *Kommersant, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, Segodnja* and *Komsomolskaja Pravda.* Of these *Kommersant* tried to depict, somewhat unrealistically, Russia as a functioning economy in the Western style. *Komsomolskaja Pravda* was the most nostalgic on the part of the old Soviet system, while *Nezavisimaja Gazeta* emphasized liberal values of individual responsibility. *Segodnja* was the organ for an atypical segment of the Russian population: the efficient, democratic professionals. Ann-Kristin Bjergne (1994). *Dødens retorik — en studie av russisk presse oktober 1993.* (The Rhetoric of Death — A Study of the Russian Press October 1993.) University of Oslo, Department of Media and Communication.

9 Gro Maren Karlsen, Joakim Lie, Siri Anne Moe, Kristen Ulstein and Marte Slagsvold Winsvold (1995). *Profesjonalisering i mellomkringstidens journalistiske tekster. En analyse av Arbeiderbladet, Dagbladet og Aftenposten.* (Professionalization in the journalistic texts during the interview period in
three Oslo papers.) Oslo, Department of Media and Communication. (Gruppeprosjekt i pressehistorie, høsten 1995.)


12 The inverted pyramid is a model depiction of the technique of lead presentation, implying that the summary of major facts in the lead are followed by less prominent or minor details in a falling order of significance. If necessary in final editing, the story can be cut from behind, even up to the point of only keeping the lead intact. In a 60-year-old textbook, the lead is defined as follows: “The lead serves to summarize the story answering the questions who, what, when, where, and often why and how; and it serves to emphasize the newsworthy event.” The text goes on to demonstrate: The “Who” Lead, The “What” Lead etc. George Fox Mott (ed.) (1950). New Survey of Journalism. (Third edition, first edition 1937). New York, Barnes & Noble.


14 Most academic works on news criteria since Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruges seminal article “The structure of foreign news” (Journal of Peace Research 1965, 1: 64–90) have confined themselves to the selection of one telegram or story at a time, chosen or rejected by so-called gate keepers at the desk. Employed uncritically or alone the use of news criteria as an analytical tool ends up with a caricature of the journalism of the whole newspaper or of the whole television newscast. News criteria are of course only one set of rules for editorial works, ideas of the composition of the whole “menu” may be as important for how the contents of the newspaper is made up. Each important interest or target group within the audience must be regularly attended to, calling for a variety genres and topics, irrespective of sensational or other qualities defined by the news criteria.


Investigative journalism in the 1990s: increased power, professionalization or defence against commercialism

Irène Grundberg

During the 1970s there began to grow up a generation of more educated journalists. Traditionally, the journalist’s was a working-class occupation, but higher education and media expansion produced a new generation of journalists with a middle class background and a college education. A contemporary observer (Bagdikian 1973–74) mentions some results of this change and turbulence at editorial offices. The evolution of more stable newspapers, the growth of broadcast news, growing demands for public information, better educated journalism students, wage increases and higher job security through labour union pressure provided the context for this new, more professional generation of journalists.

The movement towards professionalization was a global phenomenon. In the United States Watergate was the most explicit and earthshaking expression of what this new generation of journalists could actually achieve: remove a president from his office. Watergate is indeed an important milestone in the history of investigative journalism. According to Bagdikian, investigative journalism was under threat before Watergate. He argues that the government supported the editors or the employer’s side of the journalistic society to the disadvantage of reporters and journalists. However, after Watergate there were also fears that poorly researched stories should be followed by libel suits. If these were lost, that would lead to the ruin of investigative journalism. This was essentially what inspired the founding of a new organization in 1975: Investigative Reporters and Editors, IRE, was set up by 120 American reporters. Professionalism and a high level ethics have become two of the organization’s catchphrases. One idea has been to help journalists cooperate and develop by facilitating contacts and exchange of expertise. In 1995 IRE had some 4500 members.

In Sweden, journalism education was extended and institutionalized in the late 1960s. In 1967, it was reorganized under the university system. The very first courses in journalism were arranged in 1947–48. Journalism education was originally launched at the initiative of the journalistic society and its organizations (Svenska Journalistförbundet, Publicistklub-
ben, Tidningsutgivareföreningen). In 1989 five Swedish members of the international organization IRE founded Grävande Journalister, Investigative Reporters and Editors Sweden (IRE Sweden). With a membership currently of some 800, IRE Sweden publishes a paper and holds seminars. There are also sister organizations in Norway, Denmark and Finland.

Does this development mean that investigative journalism has been growing in importance during the 1990s? That must of course be empirically verified, but certainly the activities of IRE Sweden have contributed in that direction. For a few years now IRE Sweden has also given an award to reporters and journalists working in newspapers, radio and television, known as Guldspaden (the golden spade). An institute of investigative reporting has also been founded, working closely with journalism education. It provides training for journalists, editors and students and arranges courses. The institute argues that there is evidence of investigative journalism gaining in importance as more and more editorial offices and programme departments are “digging” at the local level as well, that more and more “scandals” are being revealed by investigative journalists. Former candidate to the post of Prime Minister, Mona Sahlin, had to resign after a series of articles on her credit card bills and private finances. This was followed by investigations into the finances of other politicians as well.

However, this is not all new, but the private affairs of politicians have led to resignations even in the 1970s and 1980s. Is it possible that a higher degree of organized journalistic practice will have implications for the established power bases? Have journalists in fact acquired more power? Olof Petersson, professor of political science at Uppsala University and in charge of a project on media power in the late 1980s, argues that this is in fact the case. I will return to a recent article by Petersson later, but first it is necessary to define the concept of power.

Conceptualizing media power

Petersson’s concept of power is based on Steven Lukes’s (1974) and John Gaventa’s (1980) ideas of power and its three dimensions. The first dimension is visible power and its means, such as voting procedures and formal strategies. Who is participating and who is not? Power can be reached through political efficiency, experience and organizational strength. Pluralists tend to emphasize this dimension of power. The second dimension was developed by Bachrach & Baratz (1962, 1963, 1970),
who introduced the idea of the two faces of power. Power is not only exercised but also a process of excluding certain participants or questions, topics and interests which appeal to certain groups, but which never emerge on the agenda. Some questions are organized into politics, others never get a chance. The holders of power have the advantage of defining in advance whether a conflict should be allowed to take place and to decide what questions should be considered. The third dimension, as highlighted by Steven Lukes, means that holders of power also have the power to influence, form or decide the needs of the oppressed groups. The real needs of groups can be concealed through myths, ideologies, rituals and information control. The holders of power have the resources in each of the three dimensions to maintain their power. An important idea in the Swedish power project is “mind control”, probably derived from Steven Lukes who writes:

You don’t have to go as far as to Huxley’s beautiful, new world or the world of B. F. Skinner to realise; “mind control” is exercised in many less total and earthly forms, through information control and the mass media and through the process of socialisation. (Lukes 1974, 23).

“Mind control” and “the power of definition” are among the key concepts employed in the Swedish project. The mass media are described as both an agent and an arena for public opinion. The power of the mass media is a symbolic form of power that works through persuasion, albeit indirectly. The control of actions takes place through control over consciousness. The power of definition is the power over thought, the possibility of rewriting citizens’ cognitive maps. Over time this power has become less overt, and is now characterized largely by rival descriptions of reality and interests. People who have influence over public opinion are now an increasingly large group of people, and occupations specializing in public relations have differentiated into consultants, “spin doctors” and so on. The “trade with words” is now an industry. Ideological power is possibly more important than before, Petersson says. The power of definition is exerted when agents and problems are to be defined, when it is determined who shall have access to the public discourse to express their views. Petersson writes:

The mass media, and news in particular, are the dominant mediator of knowledge and opinions about society. The mass media play a crucial role in the process of communication that connects citizens and different power centres. Decision-makers in companies, interest organizations, political parties and official authorities and instances have to allow for the scrutiny of the media and are at the same time dependent on the attention of the media. (Petersson 1990, 34, translation by IG).
It is important to note here that one stage of the process is missing or implied. Through the concept of mind control, it is implied that the effects of the mass media on the citizen are considerable. That also makes the power of the media on citizens appear quite massive, almost as if citizens were completely unable to defend themselves against the influence of the mass media, and the definition of power at one level follows the power conceived at another level. That is, the media are thought to exercise great power when such words as mind control are used. These effects do not have to be explicitly discussed, but the concept of mind control is in fact a small theory of what effects the media have on citizens.

**Journalism as ideology**

In the chapter “Journalismen som ideologi” Olof Petersson (1996) provides an historical review of the connection between power and ideology in the sense of defining and formulating areas for societal consciousness and discussion. He refers to Harold Innis’s concept of “temporal imperialism”: empires are not only built on control over distance but also control over time. During this century, Innis argues, monopolies over time will be broken. The people who control information have a key position in any society. In agricultural society information was controlled by the clergy. Early industrial society saw the emergence of political parties, which together with organizations and movements took control. Today, in our emerging information society, this power is held by journalists. During the 19th century the journalist’s was a working class occupation. It then turned into a profession and now, Petersson suggests, constitutes a class in its own right. Petersson also argues that this emerging class has caused the spread of an ideology that he calls “journalism”, which is oriented towards action and to changing the world. According to the ideology, society consists of three groups: holders of power, journalists and citizens. The world consists of sources, the audience or readers and editorial offices or programme departments. According to the ideology the journalist has an important function as a link between institutions and citizens and is therefore crucial for the maintenance of democracy. Education is important in the selection of journalists, as a step in the socialization of students.

Petersson mentions some figures from his own study in the late 1980s. Some 50% of all students from journalism colleges in Stockholm and Gothenburg were politically biased to the left of the Social Democrats.
(vänsterpartiet och miljöpartiet) (Petersson 1990). 2 According to Petersson journalists are now holders of power and are challenging the establishment by revealing abuses of power, for instance. Their ideology of journalism is a mix of elitism and populism. This means that the new struggle for power and the advantage of definition is a rivalry between journalists and politicians. The journalists have the advantage of being the link between politicians and citizens and can interpret and define the political content as they wish. The language of journalism and the political language are opposite poles, Petersson says. The political language is complex rather than simplistic. Journalism aims at polarization, while the political endeavour is for compromises. Journalism is focused on persons and the political on programmes. Petersson writes:

Journalists say that they are scrutinizing power, but they have themselves through their power of interpretation become one of society’s most important elites of power. Journalism sees itself in opposition to the holders of power, but today the journalist also is one. (Petersson 1996, 7, translation by IG).

Petersson says that this enhanced position of power dates back no more than a few decades. Information technology now gives the opportunity for ordinary citizens to seek information without journalists having to serve as a link and interpreter. However, some damage has already been done. Society, its institutions and functions have already adapted to the mass media world-view. Courts of law allow media attention to influence their sentences, and other authorities also consider the media as an instance for evaluation. Schools are replacing books with newspapers. Politicians are adapting to journalistic practices and the journalistic language. A criticism of the power of journalists can always be seen as an attack on the freedom of speech and the independence of the media, Petersson says. What is missing is an active criticism of the mass media, within the media or from the outside. Power requires scrutiny, but who shall scrutinize the scrutinizers?

In contrast to Petersson’s view on the enhanced power of journalists (although there are certain similarities), I would like to refer to Gaye Tuchman’s and Mark Fishman’s view of the journalist’s role. Molotch & Lester (1974), Gaye Tuchman (1977, 1978, 1983) and Mark Fishman (1982) represent a tradition that starts from a phenomenological or ethnomethodological point of view. The routine practices of journalists result in an image of reality, and news cannot be objectively constructed. Mark Fishman writes:

Some happenings in the world become public events. Others are condemned to obscurity as the personal experience of a handful of people.
The mass media, and in particular news, make all the difference. (Fishman 1982, 219).

Gaye Tuchman takes a resource perspective on power. The people who hold the greatest power also have the greatest access to the media and the media, in particular the news, help the holders of power to get their message through to the citizens. But the media do not function in a democratic way, which is a result of among other things routines at the level of journalistic practice. Movements that are more loosely organized generate events that are often ignored by the media. They have their meetings outside the 9–5 working days, and perhaps a leader not elected in a bureaucratic way. A news net is spread over the institutions and organizations of society, but it is a news net with holes and meshes that does not catch categories of events generated by groups of people.

Professionalism, Tuchman argues, is an agent of the legitimation of power, and professionalism can be a way of ignoring events and knowledge. The media allocate reporters in the corridors of power and let chosen civil servants and representatives express their point of view. A sort of “naive empiricism” conceals the fact that groups, movements, and people are ignored. The media treat economic and social problems as objects and problems such as unemployment, poverty and so on as if they were accidents. Fishman uses the concept of “bureaucratic phase structure”, which serves as schemes of interpretation and relevance which are definitive of news events. The journalists follow the authorities and their processes and phases and report. Some events that do not suit the phase structures but could have been important news are ignored and become non-events. The journalist acts as a professional when he or she does not report events that are out of order. As an example he mentions an uninvited speaker who described an unwarranted arrest at a meeting where the police force’s local budget was to be discussed, and who was ignored by the reporters who treated this event as if it had not happened. Fishman writes:

Routine news legitimates the existing political order by disseminating bureaucratic idealizations of the world and by filtering out troublesome perceptions of events. It leads the public to assume that the world outside their everyday experience is a proper sphere of bureaucratic (official) control (...) What readers of routine news see is normalized bureaucratic work, nothing more nor less than the orderly bureaucratic universe as it is meant to be and as it is continually trying to be. (Fishman 1982, 237).

What unites the perspectives of Olof Petersson and the phenomenological perspective of Tuchman and Fishman is their mass media criticism and the criticism at the level of journalistic practice. Petersson mentions the
sharpening of views, simplification, polarization, intensification, concretization and personification. Tuchman mentions styles that create creditability and give the impression of objectivity and impartiality, the use of quotations, tables and figures, one side versus the other and so on. Just as Tuchman and Fishman, Petersson points out that news is a selection of events, referring to Walter Lippman who as early as 1922 said that each paper is the result of a long series of selections made. However, the conclusions are diametrically opposed. Petersson promotes the idea of enhanced power for journalists, who now constitute a class with a professional, spreading ideology. Tuchman and Fishman, on the other hand, view journalists as followers of power, using practices that legitimize the existing order.

It is necessary here to make a distinction between different kinds of journalism: Tuchman and Fishman are referring explicitly to routine news. Investigative journalism does not fit their description. It is less clear what Petersson is talking about, but the focus, apparently, is on news and current affairs. He explicitly mentions the daily tabloid press and television. Petersson writes:

A key concept in the ideology of journalism is revelation. The reality is concealed behind a veil. Not everybody has the privilege of tearing the veil away. For this a special heroic deed is required. (Petersson 1996, 5, translation by IG).

One might venture a guess that Petersson is talking about journalism in general, but investigative journalism in particular.

On some points I agree with Petersson. There are certain activities in the journalistic field that no doubt have implications for the established power. Investigative journalists and reporters have entered a higher level of organizational activity. The question is whether this development is worldwide or whether it applies to Sweden only. IRE Sweden stresses that its members have expertise in different areas (claiming to have a cognitive base). In a professionalization movement the next step could be an effort to institutionalize this cognitive base. This would also imply rivalry with academic experts. Journalists are often consulted by other journalists as experts, especially in issues concerning the mass media. It will still take some time before all citizens have access to the Internet and the facilities of modern information technology. Journalists were probably among the first occupational groups besides the original users (the military, researchers and computer professionals) to throw themselves into cyberspace and become Internet users, for several reasons. The journalist’s occupation is based on the search for information, and the faster it
can be acquired the better. In an occupation that involves information processing, there is probably also the question of prestige to handle the latest technology within the area. Many journalists now work as freelance Internet “guides”, i.e. write pieces about an issue and then provide access addresses for that particular home page to readers. In 1995 IRE Sweden offered courses on leadership, research and the Internet. However, this activity can also be seen as a step further in a movement towards professionalization or as a defence against a general development in the media as discussed above.

What distinguishes journalists from other occupational groups striving in the same direction is the impact they have at the political level. This branch of journalism has an action orientation and considered changes brought about by articles and programmes or organized activities as successes, as a fulfilment of purposes. Journalists take no responsibility for the long-term effects of these actions, as Petersson claims in his criticism of journalism. There exist no instruments or measures for the evaluation of these effects. IRE Sweden, for example, has been lobbying for free access to Rixlex, which contains bills, proposals etc. dealt with in the Swedish Parliament, sending each MP an e-mail message on this issue. Rixlex is now accessible free of charge as from 1 July 1996; an achievement in which the organization takes great pride.

But less manifest effects may also result if a contrafactual dimension is introduced. What if a particular person is the most suited for a commission or a post at the political level. This person has a few unpaid parking tickets that may become tomorrow’s news. It will now be the politicians or civil servants with the least to investigate or the most uninteresting secrets that will benefit and rise to power, not the most popular or suitable if careless with paying their bills. An Olof Palme could, at least hypothetically, be stopped in favour of a civil servant or accountant type of politician. What Petersson’s analysis does not permit is the fact that journalists and politicians can enter into temporary alliances. This was what happened when Mona Sahlin had to resign as a very strong candidate to the prime minister post. A series of articles, written by journalists, were followed by activities within the Social Democratic Party.

**Journalists as professionals: the theory**

Petersson emphasizes that journalists are not the only emerging power elite, but nevertheless the power elite worth mentioning. He describes the
way in which journalists have risen to power from an occupation through a profession to a class. However, several studies of journalists as professionals have observed that the journalist's is a semi-professional occupation, that is, it is not similar to the classical professions, i.e. lawyers and physicians (see e.g. Windahl 1975).

One of the most influential books in the sociology of the professions is Magali Sarfatti Larson's *The rise of professionalism — a sociological analysis* (1977). She says that the structural element is crucially important for successful professionalization (1977, 47):

1. The nature of the service that is marketed. The more salient, the more universal, and the less visible the service, the more favourable the situation is for the profession. — The journalist's is perhaps the most visible occupation or practice conceivable.
2. The type of market. The less competitive, the more favourable. The more independent from the capital and goods market, the more favourable the situation. — There is fierce competition between, for example, newspapers and now also between public service and commercial television.
3. The type of clientele. The more "universal" and the less organized the clientele, the more favourable. — Remark: The audience and readers are not organized at all, but the client orientation is indirect.
4. The cognitive basis. The more scientific the cognitive basis, the more favourable the situation for the profession. — The journalist's activity is intellectual but not mainly based on science. Knowledge of the craft is more useful.
5. The "production of producer's". The more institutionalized its form and standardized the process, the more it is under the profession's control, the more favourable. — Standardized education in journalism colleges is not the only way to become a journalist. Many journalists, especially older ones, have been trained within the media and have no or little special education in journalism.
6. The power relations. The more independent the professional market is from other markets, the more the state is compelled to protect the public by eliminating less competent professionals, the more favourable. Although a powerful sponsoring elite appears to be a favourable condition, in itself it can produce a secure but dependent situation. — During the era monopoly public service broadcasting in Europe, the state did not allow commercial competition. In the 1990s the situation is different. As far as newspapers in Sweden are concerned the state has given subsidiary contributions to help maintain pluralism.
7. The affinity with the dominant ideology. The more a profession's particular ideology coincides with the dominant ideological structures, the more favourable the situation for the profession. — This is of course not
the case when "journalism" as an ideology is described as by Petersson above.

According to Sarfatti Larson journalists, together with artists and teachers, are among the occupations that had greater difficulty in moving in the direction of professionalization. Engineers, architects, dentists, auditors and economists were more successful. The occupation of the TV news and current affairs producer can be compared to another occupation, i.e. the computer professional, that has emerged during the past couple of decades. Computer professionals have developed a cognitive base within the university, the TV producer has not.

Petersson describes the development of journalists from an occupation through a profession to a class. But what characteristics do journalists have that make them more of a class than, say, computer professionals and economists? I suppose one could say the same thing about economists who also exert much influence at several levels of society from the government to the smallest companies. Walter Korpi (1993) describes in an article the influx of academic economists into politics at governmental level, especially at the Ministry of Finance during the 1980s. The number of economists within the ministry increased four times over since 1976 and their proportion had increased from 15% to 50% of the personnel with politically relevant functions (as e.g. advisers and experts). According to Korpi, this could have influenced the Social Democrats in a more liberal direction and contributed to a tendency of seeking solutions within the neo-classicist paradigm of economy. In addition to this the deregulation of the financial markets has contributed to increasing international interdependence. It seems to me that, at least in Sweden, "economism" has been gaining more ground as an ideology than has "journalism".

Journalism has always served as a link between power and the public. What makes the situation different today; what mechanisms have made it possible for journalists to enhance their power position? This has not been the general trend in development during the past decade, at least as far as broadcasting in Europe is concerned. If the power of the journalist is examined in the context of total media development in broadcasting, a completely different picture emerges. Most of the programming of the new cable and satellite channels consists of sport, films and entertainment (with the exception of news channels such as CNN). Commercial television in Sweden is reluctant to produce current affairs programmes and documentaries, which with some exceptions (K alla fakta on TV 4 and some special programmes) are usually imported. Public service television in Europe is challenged both at the national and international level by
commercial television. Commercial television is not likely to employ large staffs of reporters and investigative journalists, unless it is a news channel or a channel with a public service commission that must be fulfilled for purposes of licence renewal. In Sweden this is the case with TV 4, a channel that has been drifting in a commercial direction. Independent production companies are not likely to produce current affairs programmes, but rather programmes that can attract large audiences.

So can enhanced power really be assumed for an occupation whose foundations are threatened by a total development that is contradictory? The higher level of organizational activity of investigative journalists can also be seen as a response to or defence against these lines of development. As commercial principles in broadcasting are becoming more dominant, other types of media personnel are required: not journalists, but rather hosts and hostesses, actors and actresses, entertainers, VR jockeys, people in advertising and other personnel required for these types of programmes.

What do journalists themselves consider to be professionalism, and how do they define themselves as professionals? The answers of eight investigative TV journalists were very different from the academic use of the term, and also from journalistic conventions. According to them professionalism is knowledge of the craft, the subject and changing society as well as the ability to make good television with the instruments made available. Professionalism is something you acquire over a long time, perhaps decades, a continuous learning process through experience in the occupation. When asked about changes that have occurred since the 1970s, the answers were less homogenous, but references were made to the development of the visual language, greater speed, greater variance and a more frequent use of dramatic means. This was seen as improved professionalism. Mention was also made of a higher level of productivity demands and a policy for higher efficiency, as well as standardization as a result of the competition from commercial television.

It is interesting that none of the producers/journalists used words or explanations that typically occur in academic descriptions, i.e. monopoly over a cognitive base, a standardized (university) education, control over entry and closure as a strategy for securing exclusiveness and prestige, jointly accepted ethics codes, and so on. Almost all referred to the ability to use the instruments available, general knowledge and occupational skills when asked how they defined professionalism:

— "the ability to use the instruments with which we make journalism and television"
— "a journalist should be well-informed about the subject and know the craft",
— "I consider myself to be a very professional person (...) because I can rely on a long, long experience on how to do things (...). Another side of it that confirms this image of myself is that I have received all the awards you can get in this business. I have Stora Journalistpriset, Expressens TV-pris, Guldsparben, Klubb 100:s priss, Prix Futura and the award that is equivalent to the Pulitzer Prize in TV-journalism in America" (23 years in television).
The craft, the methods or the instruments were emphasized, but also knowledge of the subject or topic and changing society.

When the producers/journalists were asked how they defined themselves as professionals, they often answered in a way that makes professionalism appear as a learning process:
— "I still think I am learning this (...). I feel as if I have just started with television and am in the process of understanding the basic conditions. I am more a professional at research than in the real TV description of it later". (5 years in television),
— "My professionalism lies of course in my experience. It lies in the craft to a great extent, and a capability that I think I have to look at myself in a context, not as a sort of satellite that wherever I am I could do anything. I think I can evaluate what I want to do right now, and do I have the opportunity to do what is important to me and at the same time gives me my support? (10 years in television).

Conclusion

In an ongoing discussion in Sweden on the power of journalists, Olof Petersson argues that journalists have gained increased power and that journalism as an ideology is spreading. Journalists, according to Petersson, now constitute a professional class: journalists are a power elite competing with politicians for power. As this paper points out, investigative journalists in the 1990s have embarked on a higher level of organizational activity. However, the number of members in the organization of investigative journalists in Sweden has risen only slightly. It has been shown in several studies that journalists and producers are a semi-professional occupation. This can be considered a step in a continuing movement towards professionalization. There is also another line of development that is not favourable for this branch of media production, and that is the
growing importance of commercial radio and television and the genres that benefit from commercialization. In Sweden commercial television is reluctant to produce current affairs programmes of an investigative kind. This higher level of organizational activity could be seen as a defence against this line of development.

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Notes

1 Journalism is called "journalistik" in Swedish. The distinction disappears in English. What Petersson emphasizes is journalism in the ideological sense, like for example liberalism.

2 However, the results of another table in this book shows that journalists did not differ very much from the electorate in general. See e.g. Table 6.7, p. 125 in Petersson 1990.

3 England has a longer tradition of commercial competition with public service in broadcasting (since 1954 in television). Commercial television has produced current affairs programmes in competition with the BBC since the 1960s. When Channel 4 started up in 1982, they chose a profile that mixed quality programmes with audience maximizing programmes. Channel 4 has produced documentaries and quality drama in addition to light entertainment (see Tunstall 1993). Swedish TV 4 has a public service commission but fails to produce documentaries and Swedish quality drama (with some exceptions).

4 The interviews have been conducted in the PhD candidate project "TV producers in Sweden". The main questions asked within the project are: Who are the Swedish TV producers? How are the programmes created or composed? and What does professionalism mean? Three programme forms have been included in the analysis, i.e. drama, documentaries and current affairs and light entertainment. 70 interviews will be performed in public service and in commercial television. To date 35 interviews have been conducted.

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Telephone interview with Michel Bajuk, IRE Sweden.
Change of journalistic conventions: whose speech was represented in Estonian newspapers in the 1920s and 1930s?

Halliki Harro

Introduction

This paper presents some ideas on the development of journalistic conventions and then focuses on one specific question: whose speech was represented in Estonian newspapers in the 1920s and 1930s?

It is immediately clear from an examination of newspapers in different countries at different periods of time that the treatment of different topics has varied. One difference is the presence and presentation of different speakers. For example, in present-day Estonian newspapers it is common to have the photograph of the author added to the column: the commentary is highly personal and the author clearly identified. With the exception of news, most of the articles are signed. During the Soviet period, the readers could find the author's name even under smaller news items.

Modern journalism relies to a great extent on quotations, news interviews and personality interviews. Apart from journalists, one can easily find politicians, readers, experts, or lay people saying something or telling their stories. This was not the case back in the 1920s, for instance: very few articles were signed and direct quotations were used mainly when reproducing statements by the power elite or protocols (from parliament or court proceedings) or possibly eyewitness accounts of major accidents. Journalistic methods began to develop in the late 1920s and early 1930s, bringing about changes in journalists' conventions. For example, the development of the interview genre put greater responsibility on information sources: profiles and personal interviews reshaped the boundary between the public and private.

Journalistic conventions have unfolded and evolved in an historical process and therefore an historical perspective would be useful for purposes of developing a concept of journalistic conventions. At the same
time I hope that the concept of journalistic conventions can contribute new angles to the history of journalism.

To study the changes that have happened in journalism it is necessary to decompose the newspapers of the era I am studying. The question that presents itself is, what methods can be used for this purpose. In this paper I have used a sampling method to analyse three dailies appearing in January 1921, 1924, 1929, 1935 and 1937. In addition to the analysis of newspaper structure and content, any descriptions of journalistic work and archives can be used.

Concept of journalistic conventions

Journalistic convention may be defined as a current negotiation/agreement between the media and society as to what is expected of journalism and, accordingly, what journalism expects of society. The negotiating process becomes visible in the event of a conflict between the mass media and society, which will spill over into public discussion on the conduct of the media, media criticism and court decisions. In September 1921, for example, journalists ran into a conflict with the police. The police dismissed a group of people, including journalists, who were watching English warships sailing into Tallinn port. The conflict attracted much public interest and the case was discussed in newspapers from various different aspects, including the privileges of journalists and the rights of lay people at public events, the public image of the police, the relations between the police and journalists, the requirement for newspapers to be objective, etc.

The ethical and legal regulation of journalism is based on conventional notions of the relations between the media, people and society. Conventions determine what can be discussed in public, what kind of event is newsworthy or who should inform the public about certain issues. Conventions of the genre determine how reality is reflected, what angle will or will not make sense, etc. Textbooks for media students reflect the journalistic conventions that are more or less agreed upon.

Journalistic conventions emerge historically, they reflect and reinforce the structures and values of a particular society. Some journalistic conventions depend on particular cultural traditions, some are universal. Most universal journalistic conventions (conventions of certain genres; evaluation of objectivity, special treatment of public persons, etc.) have
been more or less directly adopted from the USA, which has the world's longest history of free press.

Media historian Michael Schudson says that "Conventions help make messages readable. They do so in ways that 'fit' in the social world of readers and writers, for the conventions of one society or time are not those of another. Some of the most familiar news conventions of our day, so obvious they seem timeless, are recent innovations." (1995, 55). He refers to the emergence of five conventions, which are generally unseated conventions of twentieth-century American journalism; none were elements in journalism of the mid-nineteenth century (ibid. 1995, 55):

— summary lead and inverted pyramid instead of chronological account of an event
— president as most important actor
— news story started to focus on single event rather than a continuous or repeated happening, or if the action is repeated, attention should centre on novelty not on pattern
— a news story covering an important speech or document should quote or state its highlights
— a news story covering a political event should convey the meaning of the political acts in a time frame larger than that of the acts themselves.

Part of these changes concern the format/genre of the news story (lead, inverted pyramid), but most of the changes are changes of the news/information discourse. Generic changes are more easily visible than changes in news discourse. We can relatively easily find out when the lead or interview (as a genre) was invented. However, a special analysis is needed when we ask about the development of a schematic structure of a genre, new ways of presenting information and changes in conventional news values. A special analysis is also needed if one needs to find out how journalistic practice changed the treatment of information sources: focusing a story on an event, problem(s) or person or creating an aura of objectivity.

Particularly dramatic changes in society usually cause noticeable shifts in conventions. The elimination of censorship usually causes a vacuum in journalistic conventions for some time. Indeed, the vacuum in journalistic conventions after the establishment of independent Estonia in 1991 was probably the reason why I started to pay more attention to journalistic conventions. Who sets the rules, what kind of rules? How quickly are certain rules accepted by society as an established convention? To what extent is society aware of the existence and influence of journalistic con-
ventions? Does there exist a critical analysis of accepted journalistic conventions? What role do certain journalistic conventions play?

The importance of critical thinking on established journalistic conventions is one of the main reasons why I believe an historical perspective is called for to tackle the issue. The history of journalism could also answer such questions as, what could cause changes in media conventions, what are the results of a new convention?

The more influential and sophisticated a mass media institution becomes, the more society needs clear “rules of the game” and knowledge about these rules. More and more people are asking: What can I expect of that institution as a consumer, public figure, member of society? How am I protected against media intrusion? A critical analysis of media conventions could help to answer these questions.

Certain journalistic conventions may eventually become legalized. For example, the convention of clearly distinguishing between fact and opinion in news stories began to develop when the inverted pyramid was adopted as a standard for news presentation. According to Schudson (1978) the model of the inverted pyramid led to the presentation of news without commentaries. In 1964 The US Supreme Court took the first step towards legalizing the convention of separating facts and opinion, giving more legal rights to one textual discourse in newspapers than another. The Supreme Court suggested that the First Amendment protected opinion in the New York Times v. Sullivan case. In 1974, in Gertz v. Welch, the court said in dicta, by definition, opinion could not be defamatory (Middleton—Chamberlin 1988, 156–159).

At present the convention of separating fact and opinion in news presentation is conventionalized even more in the USA, while this question has gained considerable attention in English-language textbooks for media and law students (which means that the idea has spread not only across the USA but also into other countries using the textbooks). The following quotation from the textbook (ibid. 156, 157) demonstrates that the conventional requirement for the separation of facts and opinion has been developed and rationalized to the extent that opinion is measurable by certain criteria.

“Judges have approached the problem of distinguishing between fact and opinion in a variety of ways, but four criteria are gaining popularity:

1. Is there agreement that the language in question has a common precise meaning or, rather, is the statement indefinite and ambiguous?
2. Can the statement be proven true or false?
3. Does the entire document suggest that the individual statement is fact or opinion?
4. What is the social or political setting of the statement?

‘One court said that some types of writing or speech by custom or convention signal to readers or listeners that what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact.’ The courts have said that reasonable readers expect to see strongly stated opinions, rather than the precise statements of fact, in editorials, sport columns and restaurant reviews.”

Development of different journalistic genres in 1910–1940

Journalistic genres are more or less established conventions. Each genre has to develop its own practice, its own etiquette. Schudson (1995) has explored the development of the etiquette of different types of interviews and the historical development of the news genre (Schudson 1978) in the American press. Other genres: portrait, reportage, editorial etc. have received less attention.

On the basis of the present research into the history of Estonian journalism we can fix the approximate time of certain qualitative changes in Estonian journalistic practice: towards the end of the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century; during World War I and from the mid-1920s until the end of the 1930s.

In the late 19th century Estonian newspapers changed from conversational to anti-conversational. A similar shift from interpersonal communication to mass-mediated communication took place in America during the 19th century (Schudson 1995, 50, 51). Newspapers started to publish more telegraph news, which was probably the main reason why the whole news discourse changed: news became shorter, the emphasis on specific events became clearer and the conversational style disappeared. Some of the news stories were constructed exactly as the inverted pyramid, some were more like “quadrate”, but one tendency became clear: there was less and less commentary and subjectivity in news stories.

During World War I news became more dominant in newspapers than ever before, other genres developed very little. In the 1920s and 1930s the establishment of a free and autonomous media market became the catalyst for other qualitative changes in journalistic techniques. Some publishers started newspapers in new categories (tabloids for different reader groups). The party-paper audience was too small to support a newspaper economically, so big national dailies attempted (some more, some less) to make the content more attractive to the mass audience.
economically, so big national dailies attempted (some more, some less) to make the content more attractive to the mass audience.

From the beginning of the 1920s until the middle of the 1930s there was much public discussion on the status of the press within the independent democratic state of Estonia. Journalists themselves discussed the modern news concept (objectivity, accuracy and techniques of more lively story-telling) and the status of entertaining news-writing.

As a result of all these innovations several new journalistic methods were introduced. Investigative journalism developed from the beginning of the 1920s up to the middle of the 1930s (in 1934 press freedom was largely eliminated); from the 1930s onwards the interview as a questions-answers genre began to appear; and techniques of reportage and photo-reportage developed. The development of journalistic methods also changed journalistic conventions. One example is the presence of the news source and the journalist.

A group of students at Tartu University have carried out a text analysis of Estonian newspapers covering the period from 1910 to 1940. The purpose was to produce a rough map of genres present in newspapers and to record the main changes that had happened. Another concern was to establish how far the sources of information were presented in newspapers. The main problem was how to identify different genres. As Van Leeuwen (quoted in Fairclough 1995, 88) suggests: "... complex social constraints on journalism and its multiple purposes commonly manifest themselves in generically heterogeneous texts." As there does not yet exist a reliable method for analysing the generic schema of an article, the results of this work can only be taken as an approximate generic map of the genres present in 1910–1940.

The students used 25 generic types which could be divided into the following groups: news-story (short news without background information and extended news); editorial; column-type articles; protocol (police, court records); reportage, interview, portrait type of articles (one-person story); humour, popular science; travel articles, fiction. Each student analysed papers from two weeks in February and two weeks in October from a certain year. Five dailies were analysed. As regards the problem of identifying news sources and the question of whose speech has been reported, three main genres seem to be more interesting than others: the news-story, reportage and interview.
Presence of an author and information sources in different genres

*News-stories* were the dominant genre in the early part of the century as well as in the 1930s. In 1910 over half of all stories were very short news, reporting simply on an event and giving no background information or details. Less than one-third of all news-stories provided background information. It seems that different papers preferred different types of news-presentation in the 1920s and 1930s: most dailies published many short news without any background. During the second half of the 1930s the proportion of short news in the two leading dailies was as high as 60%. However, one conservative party paper contained mainly extended news, which accounted for around 40% of all news items, while only less than 10% of all news items were short news.

The person telling the news usually remained anonymous, although sometimes articles were signed with initials. If the source of the news was indicated, it was typically a news agency or another newspaper. The students found that about 80% of the news stories published in the 1920s and 1930s did not mention the author. It was common to start articles with expressions like: “We have learned that ...” or “Our local correspondent is informing us by the telegraph that ...” The absence of the author seems to be an old convention in Estonian journalism.

In the early 1920s Estonian newspapers presumably followed the English and German tradition of anonymity (Hardt 1979, 178–179). In 1910 Max Weber thought that in the case of the extremely powerful *Times*, the reason for anonymity might be that personalities from whom the newspaper received its information were frequently so important that it would be impossible for them to release information under their own names. In other cases anonymity may have been used for exactly the opposite reason. It depends: how does this question look in the light of conflicts of interest which exist between the interest of the individual journalist to become well known and the interest of the newspaper not to become too dependent upon the cooperation of this individual journalist (ibid.). However, the convention of anonymity could also be, in part, a heritage from the era of censorship, when anonymity provided some protection to the author.

On the other hand, German scholar Karl Bücher claimed at the beginning of century that the principle of anonymity spread across the continent from England. He explained that the acceptance of this principle was
based upon the argument that the press represented anonymous public opinion (Hardt 1979, 122–123).

I myself believe that the reasons for the convention of anonymity in the Estonian press in the 1920s was partly adopted from the European press and partly a local tradition. Estonian newspapers in the 19th century were mainly written by an editor, his name was known in any case (and usually it was printed in impressum). Many articles were more or less direct translations from German and Russian newspapers: the name of the interpreter was irrelevant as far as the reader was concerned. The protection of the author might have been the reason for anonymity if a farmer wrote about local life: the local landowner or priest would not have liked that.

In the late 19th century bigger newspapers already had small editorial staffs. In 1888 the daily Postimees, for instance, had a staff of three plus one freelance writer, but only editorials were sometimes signed. In the beginning of the 1920s editorial staffs were much bigger (7–8 people), but journalists were still not widely considered authors with a name and responsibility. The editor took full responsibility for the content of his paper: in many cases editors even went to court to protect the name of an author of a defaming article.

In the 1920s the professional development in the field was very rapid: for example, the difference between reporters and editors developed during the 1920s. But even if the reporter referred to himself in the actual reportage in the 1930s (e.g. ‘I asked the men if they were happy to get home?’), the journalist remained anonymous.

The style of reporting strengthened the anonymity of speakers in newspapers. The passive voice dominated in newspapers, particularly in the 1920s: “it was decided”, “it will be used”, “this was done” etc. Who decided, who will use, who did — often this remained unclear.

The anonymity in news (desk) reporting in the 1920s served to protect politicians, allowing them to remain behind the curtains if they so wanted. When newspapers started to use interviews and quotations and the speakers began to “come out”, did this mean that journalism became more aggressive? To answer this question it is important to recall that since 1934 there was limited press freedom in Estonia. However, beside the legal regulations conventions also gave politicians quite a lot of power to decide what and how they spoke to the public. Active speech was only used when the event or announcement naturally included the actor; for example, if the core of a news story was the announcement by a minister or if the newspapers printed a protocol of a court proceeding.
One explanation for the absence of speakers could lie in the fact that especially during the first half of the 1920s the dominant journalistic method/genre was desk reporting, i.e. the articles were based on source-initiated material, the information "came in" from various organizations and institutions. Government meetings were the main news sources (what problems were discussed at the meeting, what was decided, who said what). This is a very passive journalistic genre which makes the newspaper more of a mediator than a powerful institution. Although the Estonian newspapers in the early 1920s proclaimed that the press was the seventh superstate, their passive and anonymous reporting shows that the status of journalists and the press institution was quite vague for society as well as for journalists themselves. The passive voice (unattributed speech) gives an edge of objectivity, authority and reliability to any message. Merging the voice of a ministry, for instance, with the voice of its own, a newspaper could represent itself as more "official" and more reliable.

I would suggest that another reason for the frequent use of the passive voice could be the convention of putting the emphasis on the event or problem rather than on the concrete people who said or decided something. In the 1920s, for the newspapers, it was a ministry that made the decisions, not a minister or other people in high positions. Even in the 1930s interviewees were often identified only by the social role they represented ("director of the Goldfield company"; "a farmer from Tarvastu" etc.) rather than by name.

A minor shift took place in the late 1920s and in the early 1930s as Estonian dailies tried to be more entertaining. There were more news stories that focused on people, factual realities and interpretations were more often dramatised through scenes, character sketches, descriptions and sometimes even with the help of a plot. There were more and more news that were produced through the interaction of a reporter and his news source (crime stories, where the reporter described the scene as a witness, newspapers started to use more interviews, even quotations).

To demonstrate this change I looked at 3–4 numbers of different newspapers from 1918, 1924, 1934, 1939 and 1940. For the present demonstration I chose two articles, which seem to be typical of the time. The first article is a news story from the conservative party daily Kaja ("Echo") in 1924 (Estonia has a broadcasting connection up to 3500 km. The broadcasting station at Haapsalu is completed). The event itself was the opening of a broadcasting station. Some background information is also given on the importance of the new station to Estonian broadcasting capacity. This article is a news story with the following components: the
event (opening of a new broadcasting station); evaluation of the event; historical background about the building process and its costs; and presentation of problems (one cannot always be sure that the message reaches the receiver). At the same time there are two paragraphs with elements of reportage (observation). The presence of a reporter as a witness is only evident indirectly, through two sentences:

"it comes to mind that this station (...) has an important place for our state."

"Watching the work of the station for a while it became clear that radio also has certain ill effects as well ..."

There is no use of the "I", but it is evident anyway that the reporter was witnessing the opening of the radio station. Although the first person singular is not used in the text, the mode of expression proves that the reporter was present at the opening of the station and the descriptive parts of the reportage really are his observations. The article gives no clues as to where the information has come from, there are no references to any sources, and no quotations of course. The anonymity goes even further in that there are no acting subjects in the verb structures. The personal element was missing in the reportage, which again was something of a convention: Estonian dailies in the 1920s did not make heroes and they did not use personal dramas. When the newly-created boulevard press started to use this method in the first half of the 1920s, the serious dailies and the general public were shocked. Journalistic trespassing upon private lives was sharply criticized in the mid-1920s.

Another example is an article which was published in Päevaleht ("Daily") in 1939 (75 new farms around Tallinn. To date 75 hectares of new farm land has been ploughed). It is a news story about the cultivation of new land around the Tallinn area. However, the story does not start with a problem or an event, but emphasizes the fact that the Päevaleht reporter had a conversation with agriculture expert Mr. Luik. The main information then follows. Next, the newspaper gives the floor to Mr. Luik, who makes his comments about the process and gives a positive evaluation of the government’s policy that encourages farmers to plough newly cleared land.

The second example represents a news-story format that the dailies used quite often in the 1930s (the first type had not disappeared entirely). In the 1930s Estonian dailies made a much clearer distinction between the newspaper’s own voice and outside voices than was the case in the 1920s. More names and more quotations were used, sometimes newspapers also explained to the reader how this information was gained: "Our newspaper
had a conversation with Mr. X”; “... our correspondent went to the scene of the accident ...”, etc.).

Reportage as observation on the spot (first-hand observation) was present as early as 1910. However, the discourse of reportage changed considerably during 1910—1940. To clarify the meaning of the genre of “reportage”, I make a distinction between three types of reportage.

1. A reportage without a special event (reportage from a market, reportage from a factory, reportage about very cold weather, etc.). Usually this type of reportage was partly a description of “what has been seen” and partly information about the object (prices at the market; history of a factory, etc.). It is quite difficult to make a distinction between this early form of a reportage and an article. This type of reportage was quite typical in the 1920s and 1930s.

2. Reportage of an accident or special event was used in the early 1920s (perhaps even earlier, but if so then very rarely). In such reportage different journalistic methods were mixed. Usually one method was to tell the story in a chronological way, starting with how the audience learned that something had happened and how this event developed (chronological description). Partly the description was in the present continuous tense, but on some occasions the newspaper even published the stories of witnesses in direct speech.

3. Description of a situation while people are acting and speaking, without the visible presence of a journalist (the journalist lets the people or situation tell the story). The intention of such reportage was usually to present a certain problem (unemployed people, contradictions in laws that put ordinary people into trouble, critique of government in the 1930s, etc.) This type of reportage started to develop in Estonian newspapers in the early 1930s, when journalists also started using direct speech and dialogues much more often.

This technique developed especially since 1934 when press freedom and direct criticism was limited. In the 1930s, for example, the official propaganda was to encourage people to have more babies. In 1937 Päevaleht published a reportage describing a situation in a train where a conductor fined a mother of eight because while travelling with only one of her children she has not paid for the child. She did not know that a special ticket for large families was only valid when the whole family was travelling. Through this description the journalist was presenting the problem of unclear rules and the contradictions between official propaganda and real life.
The elimination of the presence of the journalist and newspaper was particularly effective when the intention was to accuse those in power for braking the law. In 1935 the daily Päevaleht published the following story:

"The following conversation took place at a meeting between the local authorities and the people of the village Mõisaküla.

Village deputy MK: What is the literature that the local leaders are reading according to the financial report?

Head of the village: "That is the government's newspaper Uus Eesti ("New Estonia").

Village deputy MK: "The official publication of our government is Riigi Teataja (bulletin of the laws and acts of the state), but not a political newspaper."

Head of the village: "Last year we received a secret regulation where it was made obligatory for village authorities to subscribe to Uus Eesti."

Village deputy MK: "We cannot accept any authority who makes it obligatory to incur expenses by secret regulations. The village council's local costs are based on current laws and therefore we cannot believe that such a regulation exists at all.

Secretary: "It does exist."

Village deputy MK: "We would like to see it."

Secretary: "It is impossible, it is secret!"

In this story there is a clear message: The Newspaper Uus Eesti ("New Estonia") is not an independent paper, it is breaking the rules of fair competition, it is supported by the government and the government is actually breaking the law — by issuing secret regulations. This type of message could never be published in the format of a news story, editorial or commentary. But let us imagine the same news material written for a modern newspaper according to present journalistic conventions. I would suggest that the headline would be: "Minister X tries to put his hand into the local purse", or "Who has signed the secret regulations?"

The interview as a journalistic genre emerged in Estonian journalism in the early 1930s. The development of the interview as a genre went through four stages:

1. Dialogues presented as conversation. In the late 19th century Estonian papers sometimes used a dialogue between two fictional characters to present daily problems or humour stories. Estonian press historian Juhan Peegel has said that the early Estonian papers used the rhetoric of catechism.
2. Someone’s speech or announcement (as a monologue) published in the form of direct speech. A very typical “interview” was published on January 5th 1929. The Headline was: “Turn in Independence War. (...) A conversation with General Laidoner.” The article started as follows: “Yesterday at the meeting with journalists general Laidoner gave a detailed account of the events 10 years ago.” The text then went on with quotation marks. A summary was again given by the newspaper.

3. Reference to dialogue without quotation marks.

4. Direct presentation of a dialogue using questions and answers (use of direct speech) — this only began to appear since the mid-1930s. In late 1935 the newspaper Uus Eesti started to publish a section “Uus Eesti is asking ...” In this section the newspaper sometimes used dialogue form. In 1936 Päevaleht started a special section “Today’s interview”. These interviews were presented to the readers as dialogues. For example, in February 4th 1937 it starts as follows:

“Hello! Is this the head of the town council’s tax department speaking?”
“I am listening.”
“This is Päevaleht. Could you tell us about your work at this new department? Have people been paying their taxes well?”
“As you know yourself, it was only last summer that this department was set up ...”

It should be mentioned here that the Estonian press was not yet asking very aggressive questions even by the end of the 1930s. Most of the questions presented in interviews were “open questions”.

Summary

One of my hypotheses in this study was that the presence of journalistic conventions in a society clarifies the position of the media institution: what can people expect of different media channels, what type of relations prevail between the media institution and other institutions in society.

One way to study the change of journalistic conventions in the Estonian press is to study the newspaper text, particularly generic changes and changes in journalistic methods. New methods, once adopted, may have a direct impact on journalistic conventions. For example, the interview makes it possible to represent politicians, actors, sportsmen, etc. directly to the public. More sophisticated questioning by the interviewer could
help to establish the convention that a politician should not avoid giving open answers to the public through the media.

Whose voices are presented in the mass media is very much a question of established conventions. The development of journalistic methods can help to establish new conventions in this field. A fact-oriented news model eliminates to some extent the journalist as a party spokesman. A signed column might be an indication that the newspaper is not one unit, but a place for an exchange of ideas, a product of the work of different authors, not objective from beginning to end. "Let the events tell the story" method, where the journalist apparently disappears, might allow for indirect criticism of society and give an opportunity to give ordinary people a voice in the media.

High anonymity in news reporting in the Estonian press in the 1920s provided good protection for politicians, but if one looks at crime news, both the victims and the offender were usually identified by reference to their place of residence and age, sometimes their name. In the 1920s it was something of a convention that police protocols were printed in the press without thinking of the risk of dual punishment (legal and public). Today, journalistic conventions have done an almost complete volte-face: politicians get much less protection than do victims (and offenders before the court decision).

Since the establishment of the Estonian republic in 1918 until 1940, the Estonian press had to adapt to independent statehood, which meant news relations between the press and different institutions of society, a new status and ideology of the press and the rapid development of professionalism. The brief research carried out for this paper shows indeed that since the late 1920s, some basically new journalistic conventions were established.

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References


Journalistic editing in a closed society

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Research into the nature of journalistic editing has as yet been comparatively scarce. The concept has been used to refer to both the professional revision of texts and to reducing the number of their contents layers, and to placing texts into an (ideological) context. The editor appears as a central and connecting link in relation to all levels of the journalistic hierarchy and in mediating the text. Journalistic editing represents one of journalism's general problems. This paper focuses on editing as an activity that is specific of journalism. It is based on the work of the editors of Estonian Radio in the 1980s. ¹

Although the 1980s was an era of explicit and clear-cut ideological requirements, the crisis that was unfolding in society also became clearly visible during this period. Editorial activities reflected both these formal requirements and the real processes taking place in society. Journalistic editing implied participation in several processes and phenomena, which can be further explicated through the activities of the editor. In the Soviet journalistic institution, several antagonistic forces were at work that had different interests and different objectives and that were trying to use journalism as a means of realizing their aims. The following problem-setting as well as the material for the study come from what may be described as a closed society (see Popper 1945/1971b).

Social background of journalism in Soviet Estonia

The first 15 years of communist Estonian Radio (1940–1955) was a period of adaptation of Estonian journalism to the Soviet system. During the latter half of the 1950s journalism started to liven up. In the 1970s, disagreements within the local leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia (CPE) were aggravated. Intrigues and denouncements within the Central Committee brought ideological controllers from Moscow to Tallinn. Such commissions revised Estonian journalism in the Central Committee of the CPE in 1976 and 1979, for instance, bringing along corresponding ideological decisions. The same pattern was followed by Moscow in all Soviet republics. The contentions
within the Central Committee ceased in spring 1980 when Moscow re­moved from power the more liberal tendencies that had been representing Estonia in Moscow (including Vaino Väljas, the ideological leader of the CC of the CPE). The previous ideologists were substituted with faithful communists who followed and represented a Moscow-centred ideology and were to represent Moscow in Tallinn.

In the 1980s Estonian politics was in a state of extreme contradiction. The economy was in decline at the same time as ideological control was tightened. The political situation in Estonia was influenced by a secret decree issued by the USSR Council of Ministers to the republics of the totalitarian state on October 13, 1978, “On the means of further improvement of learning and teaching Russian in the Soviet republics”. On the basis of this decree, the Central Committee of the CPE adopted a secret decision on December 22, 1978, together with a detailed long-term plan of activities, the aim of which was total Russification.

The document became an important guideline for Estonian journalism during the 1980s. The existence of the document was general knowledge, the leaders of journalism had been introduced to it against a signature professing silence. It was first and foremost journalism that was conceived of as the executor of the ideological programme of the new totalitarian state.

This marked the beginning of a new stage in the relations of the Central Committee of the CPE and the Estonian media, with the CPE looking upon journalism as no more than an establishment of ideology. During 1981–1985 the central newspapers, radio and television were submitted to the direct daily control of the CC. Journalists were called “ideology workers”, members of the KGB and the Central Committee of the Party were appointed as leaders of journalism.

Changes were made to the established hierarchic relationships in editorial offices. A party group that was to solve the most important staff problems was formed. Also, the party nuclei were given more privileges at the expense of other staff members, undermining the unity of editorial collectives. The new leadership tried to get rid of several experienced and professional newspaper editors, the new editors were obliged to join the Communist Party. An attempt was made to create a system of party hierarchy within the editorial boards.
Soviet journalistic editing as a phenomenon

The editorial staff consisted mainly of professional journalists and ideology workers. The role of the Soviet journalistic editor was a combination of propaganda worker and journalist, at once covering the objectives and means of both contradictory roles.

Also characteristic of Soviet journalism was its rigid hierarchy of topics. Priority was given to party life and ideological materials. Soviet journalism highlighted the main ideological events of the year (Great October Day, Day of Constitution, Lenin’s birthday, Army Day, International Labour Day, Victory Day, etc.), the central events and the very foundation of Soviet ideological myths. The so-called “Ideological circle of events” with its period of preparations and aftermath shaped the rhythm of journalism; all other subjects were connected with the circle or occurred occasionally.

Soviet journalistic texts made use of numerous set expressions, fixed epithets that carried the main values of Soviet ideology: greatness, powerfulness, totality, generality, collectivity, positivity. The ideological use of verbs was probably inspired by a mythical element, the evoking of a power with the help of incantation and imagination.

The prevailing ideological paradigm was based on seven myths
— the myth of the victory of the Russian Revolution and of a new era;
— the myth of the creator — Lenin and the Party;
— the myth of the Soviet republics as a unified family, who, however, have numerous “enemies out there”;
— the myth of the Great Patriotic War and the invincibility of the Soviet Union;
— the myth of the development of socialism and its communist future;
— the myth of the free and happy Soviet people;
— the myth of labour and the working class as a leading “power”.

The above-mentioned myths, the “original events”, “original figures” formed the basic text of the established ideology, on which the whole Soviet interpretation of time, history, society and people was based.

Editing in the “closed” Soviet system denoted a situation where the material, i.e. the thoughts and sources used, were previously censored, controlled, treated and from which “forbidden” material had been removed.

Soviet journalistic editing can be described by using Lasswell’s (1948) scheme in which the media process is viewed as a whole that consists of certain elements. In the model of journalistic communication the elements
of the process are: 1) source, 2) message, 3) journalistic channel, 4) recipient, and 5) effect of communication. This description of the media process has helped to make the process as a whole more conscious and to determine it. On the basis of Lasswell's scheme we can attempt to define Soviet journalistic editing in its different stages.

1) The permissibility of the source had been checked in advance, the source of thoughts was either censored or pre-treated.

2) The material of the message was chosen from among permitted sources or treated according to needs and requirements; its text had been composed in a particular journalistic discourse that corresponded to the established ideological verbal usage. The composition and editing of the text thus included the proper interpretation of the phenomenon, its textual treatment and control.

3) The controlled message was presented by a trustful person in the ideological context of the media channel. The signs and codes mediated by the editor in interpreting the message were surrounded by a framework and interpretation deriving from the specificity of the media channel, which thus influences the contents of the message.

4) The recipient receives a message for journalism via a journalistic channel and appears as merely imaginary in the process. The person of a recipient is also imaginary, just as his role in listening, which is either that of a controller or merely a receiver of the message. A Soviet editor often operated in conflicting roles, seeing people simultaneously in the role of "recipient" and taking both into consideration.

5) The effect which denotes the "success" and influence of the reception. The imaginary influence of the imaginary reception was the aim of the work of the Soviet journalistic editor, which at the same time could be contradictory. It was impossible to examine the effect in reality, as the journalistic process was mostly interested in exercising an ideological influence on the recipient. In reality, the editor always had to take into account that the imaginary recipient would be incredulous towards the "message" and would check the truthfulness, decipher the real message hidden behind the message received.

From the point of view of editing the imaginary media process was contradictory, containing starting-points ambivalent towards the established ideological discourse and considering the recipient who had adopted a defensive position concerning journalism.

Censorship and manipulation were used in all phases of editing: in choosing topics, in interpretation, in developing relations in a text and in shaping the context, in performing.
In this connection a dilemma arises — a conflict between the interests of the ideological state apparatus and the recipients of journalism, as there were professional journalists who proceeded from the interests and expectations of the recipient, but they were lobbied by the ideological apparatus. At the same time control was exercised on several levels: those of the editor-in-chief, the editors and the censor. The main participant in the process was the editor who, in a closed system, was a censorial editor by nature.

**Demands on editing**

Within the journalistic institution the editor was increasingly reduced to the status of an object who was met with the requirements of influencing the listeners and manipulating the audience. In the 1980s it was made compulsory for creative workers to attend the University of Marxism-Leninism. On completing the course, editors had to write papers based on the ideological paradigm in which they were to criticize their own work ideologically.

Although no prescriptions or special demands were attached to employing editors and contracts of employment were virtually non-existent, the unwritten rules were quite strict. The claims on an editor were made by the party, the editor-in-chief, the leadership or a “co-editor” who was cast in an appropriate role and was authorized to make demands that would turn out to be demands on themselves.

Different editorial offices differed in their economic welfare, which quite accurately reflected the ideological importance of the broadcasts. Thus the authors of broadcasts for children often worked on minimal payment, even though it was more difficult to create and produce these broadcasts. Editors of children’s broadcasts were also overburdened with work.

Because the media was considered to be an ideological establishment, ideological struggle and counterpropaganda were of special importance. However, even editors defended and explained their own views and principles, exposing more and more explicitly the absurdity and inner inconsistency of the requirements.

Party meetings of editorial boards were mostly dedicated to “educating” the editors. At the same time the editors used the party meetings as a forum for discussing professional issues. There was a growing boldness to discuss professional problems quite openly. This
created a rift between the camp of editors who regarded party meetings as a stage for speeches and demonstration of one’s loyalty and, on the other hand, critically-minded editors.

The factors influencing editors were both direct and indirect, explicit and implicit. The more professional and independent the editors were, the more freedom they had in composing their broadcasts.

In the media organizations (the Estonian Radio among them), censorship was executed by the official censor and by most offices and on most levels. In a way, the whole work process involved continuous surveillance that appeared as a part of the process so that it was considered natural. Above all, the editor acted out the role of an official who was formally responsible for the production of texts. They were also responsible for the suitability of the contents and form in the light of the ideological and official criteria.2

The editor often viewed the reporter’s job as the first stage of text production, i.e. a bare tool in the working process. The editors were not interested in the substantial questions of the reporter’s text, or in the text as a form of creativity. Often, the authors’ opinions of themselves as creators were not given due recognition. The reporter would accuse the editor of failing to understand the meaning of the text, superficial and formal treatment, lack of professionalism. As Pant (1964, 99) has written,

"a fledgling editor can make even the most accomplished reporter wait for hours with nothing to do, what’s more — the minute that has succeeded best, but the meaning of which is not comprehended on casual listening, can be cut out of the reporter’s piece quite arbitrarily."

In the 1980s the roles of author and editor of the text were no longer kept so strictly apart from each other. Thus the editor, in the capacity of an author, had to occupy two positions at the same time: that of a free creator of a broadcast, and that of its first (and most thorough) censor. Thus the same process, which had been clearly divided between several people, had developed into an inner problem for the editor’s job, a conflict within the role of an editor (cf. Festinger 1957) by the beginning of the 1980s.

Censorial editing of broadcasts

A model of apparent dynamism in editing was in place throughout the period from 1978 to 1985. However, there was in fact no real development within the model, which simply implied continuous repetition and re-description of particular codes and canons.
The canon prescribed war veterans and heroes of labour, the greatest value of whose appearance was their live human performance (voice as a form). The dynamic of the contents, i.e. the creativity of the editor, was limited.

Looking at interviews with editors and at the texts of radio broadcasts, it is clear that in censoring and self-censoring the editor was constantly faced with the question: where does one draw the boundary-line? How much does one have to shorten, to neutralize actual texts? What has to be removed from a text with certainty, “to be on the safe side”?

Major treatment of texts before broadcasting, carried out because of the existence of an “imaginary controlling ear”, need not necessarily have been sufficient. Censorial editing by the editor-in-chief has generally been conducted in the form of advice: I advise you to take this or that extract out ... Try to understand, as far as I am concerned it could just as well be there, but if someone from “the white house” (ECP headquarters) should happen to be listening, there may be trouble. Thus the “imaginary editor-in-chief” or “the imaginary listening ear” itself consisted of several levels. The editor-in-chief did not make the decisions about censorial editing independently, but proceeded from “an imaginary controller” that was positioned higher up in the hierarchy. The “imaginary control” actually resided in the CC of the CPE, theirs in turn was located in Moscow where an observant listener could report onwards, which in turn could “cause trouble”.

To sum up then, the “implicit control” is incarnated in editors occupying hierarchically higher positions, but at the same time it was abstract and general, as none of the controllers bore direct responsibility but simply formed part of a general controlling system.

The difficulty facing the controllers came from the fact that, as they were used to written texts, they were unable to find their bearings among the transformative effects and the potential output of a live “presentation”. They were not able adequately to perceive the reality of the processes, either as a means of expression or as a whole, i.e. the contents. To keep the whole under control they had to restrict themselves to a particular form — a genre whose rules had been mastered in the course of time. Estonian Radio had worked out ideologically clear-cut sample broadcasts of fixed genres and codes, which were consistent with the Soviet world-picture. However, a contradiction arose from the fact that the general, overwhelming political text required a steady inflow of ever new topics and spheres that could be repeated as presented (unchanging) code.
A particular form that presented and repeated a certain world-view had to remain unchanged so as to guarantee the stability of the ideology (world-picture). During its long period of operation the form had become merged with the world-picture presented by it to such an extent that, as a recurring form, it began to carry a more important content than the content actually contained in the form. Thus, in the practice of Estonian Radio, Päevakaja (Echo of the Day, the major news programme) became an ideological sign of safety, the contents of which varied very little, as did the changing particular information provided in it, but the ever recurring attitudes and system of judgement remained the same. The form and genre developed into a kind of ideological code that the editors had to cherish and repeat. The broadcasting programme in general stabilized in the 1980s, the main forms of broadcasts had been worked out. The period was characterized by an inner development of broadcast forms. However, the more complicated the radio genre was, the more difficult it was for the “controlling ear” to follow it (as usually the controller did not listen to a broadcast more than once and made its cuts in the broadcast on the basis of a printed text after a single listening).

**Typical examples of censorial editing**

In the case of manipulative editing real problems and criticism are eliminated from the text. Violent connecting of the remaining parts makes the message of the text turn completely round from what was expected. The problem on which radio broadcast intended to focus may no longer exist, causing the whole text to lose its message, its conception, its significance. The following examples highlight sections that have been censored and cut out of the text.

— So there are deficiencies in the figures as well, aren’t there?
  
  Yes. / *Mainly we receive the figures from Moscow. We control them, / but there is so much work to do and the constructor cannot follow them very closely.* (6.3.1980)

The most common type of censoring includes the elimination of references to certain events and themes. In this way, in the course of editing, spheres of everyday life and themes not considered to deserve the attention of journalism were eliminated.

— ... This guarantees equality, because a man who answers him receives no help / from a *psychoanalyst* /, and still has to introduce himself ... (8.3.1980)
— Emotions do not play any role here, *the computer selects a person who once was an elector* / (8.3.1980)

— Then the town will be clean *it is not a shame to invite visitors from any country* / (21.6.1981)

— As we remember, *in bourgeois Estonia* agricultural mechanizers were prepared in short courses of 2–4 weeks.

Changed: ‘in bourgeois Estonia’ — ‘at that time’.

Discussion was censored if it referred positively to the practice and history of capitalist countries, especially to that of the Estonian Republic. In journalism this sort of subject could only be dealt with in a certain way (negatively). The wording of a problem in a text is often followed by describing the solution. The amount of discussion and arguments is often shortened. Examples are given instead of the arguments.

— I think that women should be prohibited from working at night. Lenin wrote about this as early as April or May 1917 when a new Party programme was in the making. He has an outline of the programme which also includes the prohibition about nightwork. This was not only Lenin’s idea, but widely spread in the international working-class movement, *And he is right — this has been done in several capitalist countries. And in bourgeois Estonia this was also the case during these years, by the way, nightwork prohibition.* / I think that we should adopt it as well. (2.3.1981)

Attitudes and evaluations of the events are also essential objects of manipulation, resulting in distortion between cause and consequence. Manipulation of causal links was typical of Soviet ideology and propaganda.

— *I don’t know what to say.* / Now I am more used to them, but then, *there was not much to eat,* when I went to the piggery in the morning, I heard heavy squealing. (11.8.1980)

Censored texts tried to preserve Soviet myths in their original purity, therefore texts not belonging to the canon were eliminated. The myths created the basis for analysis of reality, so journalistic text was only an illustration to some ideological myth.

Closer examination of the structure of censored texts revealed peculiarities that are specific of radio broadcasts as well as editing devices that make use of the following aspects:

— Relations within a radio text are not so much logical (cause-consequence relations) as associative.

— An emotional approach to the subject in a radio text is usually important.
— Reference to a phenomenon is in itself of decisive importance in radio.
The most frequent means of censorship consist in leaving out the exact
reference to the phenomena.
— The interviewers use leading questions, with the answers implicit in
the questions themselves (e.g. "Does much depend on the persons
themselves?"). In addition to the answer, an evaluation of a phenome-
non may also be prompted in this way.
— The most common methods of manipulation appearing in censorial
editing of radio broadcasts were:
— avoidance of generalizations;
— avoidance of naming the phenomena;
— avoidance of problems, contradictions;
— directing the text as a whole (by adding the so-called editor’s text):
— elimination of some parts from the world-view geographically and
ideologically;
— elimination of emotions;
— giving an example instead of creating a general picture;
— creating wrong relations.
Generally, it was characteristic of texts that have been subject to censorial
editing that the greatest number of changes and shortenings occur at the
beginning and at the end of the text — thus affecting its general frame, its
context.
It was typical that broadcasts were “ideologized” during editing. It is
mostly the contextually formative part of the text that is made ideological.
(For instance, to leave a more ideological impression of the whole, less
ideological parts are removed from the texts, the beginning or/and ending
of the text were provided with an ideological frame.)
On the basis of an analysis of corrections made to texts submitted for
censorial editing in Estonian Radio, the conclusion can be drawn that the
easiest method of manipulation is the omission from the text of certain
notions. The most important traces of textual corrections in censorial ed-
iting are concerned with changing the context and the connections created
by the text. Changing of emotions and evaluations has been almost
equally widespread.
Censorship (in terms of omission) can be divided into the following
categories: 1) omission of certain words; 2) omission of certain expres-
sions (phrases); 3) omission of certain thoughts; 4) omission of certain
ways of thinking; 5) omission of text-structures; and 6) forbidding the
whole text.
Conclusions

Editing is characteristically a normative activity. It is a process which consists of different activities. The most important stages of editing are making choices or decisions, identifying and interpreting phenomena, relating phenomena and creating a certain world-picture, i.e. a context, as well as presenting a text. Editing has a substantial influence on the general outlook of journalism. One of the central questions of society, culture as well as journalism is that of interpreting phenomena. Interpretation is also the central problem in editing. The question in particular resides in the manipulation of world-view on the level of the minutest parts of a journalistic text.

Editing means relating power, language and thinking to one another and presenting them. A journalistic editor who follows an established ideological paradigm is usually manipulated. Editing can support power in society, but also expose it. Examination of edited texts and interviews with editors suggested a division of editors into manipulating editors and critical-analytic editors on the basis of their relationship with power and the established ideology. These two types of editor represent extreme cases that do not exist in reality. However, it is typical that editors consider themselves to be analytic, even in cases where they clearly represent the manipulating type.

The strengthening of ideological pressure in the early 1980s changed the nature of censorial editing — its framework became formally narrower, but at the same time the real contents of the work was determined by the professionalism of journalists. In Estonian Radio sample texts that clearly corresponded to the Soviet world-picture were developed. However, as the requirements were not spelled out explicitly, the editor could express an inner protest when using them, exposing their real nature and adding the editor’s own experience. Explorating emotions as a means of transmitting a thought in a context was learnt: even in case of prescribed topics attempts were made to find aspects and questions that would be novel and with the help of which real experience could be mediated.

In the editing activities of Estonian Radio during the 1980s, editors formed an integral part of the ideological institution. As contradictions in social development gathered momentum, more and more attention was paid to the personality of the editor, to his/her own ideologies. By the end of the period discussed (1984), the problem of the personality of the editor was central in the radio organization.
Radio is extremely well-suited for manipulation and demagogy because of its specific ways of both constructing and presenting texts. It makes possible such devices of manipulation as playing on emotions, quick and unclear lines of thought, random presentation of arguments, illogical statements, etc. It can be said that radio has served as a school and practice ground for practitioners of political demagogy (most of whom have been practising as commentators on foreign affairs).

From the point of view of the history and development of Estonian Radio as a medium, the period appears to be one of unique professional double-thinking, an extreme case of a unified and systematic path of development. Although the whole era was characterized by double thinking as a phenomenon, it was in the radio and in the work of the editor that it became most apparent because of the specific nature (especially in consideration of the speed and emotional charge of the work as influencing factors) and social status of the channel.

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Notes

1 The article is based on a research paper on radio editing in 1980–1985, entitled “Editing as the creation and formation of a world-picture: the manipulator or the manipulated”, which provides a survey of the tendencies in Estonian journalism during those years. The bulk of the material used consists of broadcasts by Estonian Radio and texts of broadcasts. In order to expose the nature of editing and to describe censorial editing the censored texts of 110 broadcasts, dating from 1980–1982, have been used. (Estonian State Archive, file no. 1590, Archive of Party History, file no. 1450). In addition to the critical analysis, 20 present and former editors who have been engaged in editing on different hierarchic levels have been interviewed on their experiences of and problems encountered in editing. The interviews have been compared with the practical work of the same editors — the traces of editing radio broadcasts stored in archives. The discrepancies between practical editing and the formulated principles of editing discovered by this method have made it possible to explicate a general scheme of work and to pinpoint theoretical problems for further research. My own experience as a journalist also contributed to the study.

2 The censor of the radio was called by first name at the workplace and was taken as one of “us”. Control was also exercised by tapping editors’ telephone calls, registering and checking people visiting the Radio Building and by closely linking people’s private lives with the Radio Building. Overt censorship consisted in checking the broadcasting programme, choosing the broad-
casts, topics and authors and most of the particular decisions made in connection with work.

References


Journalistic discourse is full of conventionalized, almost dead metaphorical expressions, which are not always even recognized as metaphors but which nevertheless ideologically strengthen existing ways of perceiving the world. As Fiske (1987) observes, these metaphors have an important role particularly in creating the objectivity of news. This is because conventional metaphors tend to naturalize and thus maintain existing values. Occasionally, metaphors are also used creatively, opening up new views on issues.

Metaphors are part of the common cultural knowledge of journalists, citizens and politicians on which the way of conceptualizing issues is based. Both maintaining and questioning the existing order is actualized through metaphors, political symbols, myths and rituals (Gastil 1992, 487–489). Despite the crucial role that metaphors play in legitimating and occasionally questioning existing ideas, they are often neglected in media research. The media are likely to depict especially abstract and long-lasting processes through metaphors. To each of these domains there belong certain conventional, systematically used metaphorical expressions that highlight some aspects at the expense of other aspects.

My intention in this paper is, first, to theoretically elaborate the role of metaphors in journalism: what kind of issues are metaphorized and how is this done, whose vantage-point do metaphors highlight and finally, what is the role of metaphors in journalism. The latter question is addressed on the basis of empirical data. Secondly, my aim is to assess the changing and evolving nature of metaphors particularly in journalistic discourse. Empirically, my objective is to analyse the metaphors used in the Finnish EU discussion.

The debate on European integration (prior to Finland’s membership in 1995) attracted tremendous media attention in Finland, but most of the coverage consisted of a continuous updating on the process and provided only few analytical points of view. Systematically used metaphors played
a crucial role in constructing this continuity. The main empirical ques-
tions of my study are thus, which metaphors were used by whom, what 
was done by using such metaphors and finally, what kind of narratives 
were opposed to and in support of membership. The empirical data con-
sist of the coverage of two mainstream media in Finland, the country’s 
highest newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* and the Finnish Broadcasting 
Company YLE’s Finnish-language television programmes from the most 
intensive periods of debate on the European Union in 1992–94.¹

**Theoretical background on metaphors**

My analysis is grounded in the so-called “cognitive theory of metaphors” 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff & Turner 1989; Johnson 1987; Lakoff  
1987; Lakoff 1993), according to which metaphors are crucial tools in 
conceptualizing the world. The cognitive theory of metaphor says that 
“The essence of metaphors is understanding and experiencing one kind of 
thing in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 5).

More specifically, this means that a metaphor is a mapping across 
conceptual domains, consisting of source and target domains as well as a 
partial, structural mapping between these domains (Lakoff & Turner  
1989). Thus, metaphorical meaning is always contextual. The cognitive 
strength of metaphors is to explain and make it easier to understand an 
abstract or otherwise “taboo” issue in terms of a more concrete issue.

The question of what is metaphorical and what is non-metaphorical 
depends on the context. The importance of context in determining what is 
metaphorical and what is literal is well illustrated by the example sen-
tence, “*men are pigs*”. In most contexts this is metaphorical, but when 
uttered by Ulysses of his men in Circe’s place, it is meant literally (Kittay  
1987, 102). Further, some parts of a concept can be used in some respects 
metaphorically and in some respects literally. Part of the structure can be 
understood via metaphors and part directly, with its own terms.

In brief, to the extent that a concept is understood and structured on its 
own terms — without making use of structure imported from a completely 
different domain — we will say that it is not metaphorical (Lakoff &  
Turner 1989, 57).

The idea of partial mapping from one thing to another has its roots in the 
philosophical foundations of the cognitive metaphor theory in 
“experientialist realism” (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987). This has some
important consequences for the creative use of metaphors. According to
cognitive metaphor theory the human conceptual system is metaphoric.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980; see Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987) make a
distinction between metaphorical linguistic expressions and the basic
conceptual metaphor. At both levels the metaphor consists of both target
and source domains. The basic conceptual metaphor can be expressed
both visually and verbally (Forceville 1996). For example, such meta-
phorical statements as “the negotiations are now on the homestretch” and
“which candidate will be the first to reach the goal” or a political cartoon
on the same issue are expressions of a basic conceptual-level metaphor
according to which POLITICS IS SPORTS or more generally, POLITICS
IS A GAME and even more generally, POLITICS IS COMPETITION.
This conceptual level of metaphors can be studied through the linguistic
expressions belonging to it. However, this basic level is not similar in all
metaphors.

I argue that this conceptual, basic metaphor varies most significantly
according to how innovative or conventional it is and how generally it is
used. Some of these metaphors are meaningful only in the concrete cul-
tural contexts in which they are used, and only some of them are based on
the common experience of human beings. In other words, the convention-
ality of metaphors forms a continuum. At one end are the metaphors that
are clearly based on the bodily experience of all human beings, at the
other end are the metaphors shared by a very specific cultural group.

Experiential metaphors have their source domain in clear bodily expe-
riences and their target domain in a more abstract concept, such as the
amount of something. For example, standing up signifies good health,
lying down means illness; metaphorically, this means that up is generally
more and down is less. The up/down dichotomy is also used in discussing
social classes (for more on this issue, see e.g. Hall 1996, 290–292). Due
to their bodily, experiential basis these metaphors are almost universal.
They are often so conventional that it may be hard to notice their meta-
phorical nature.

Besides these conventionalized, bodily metaphors I make a distinction
between general structural metaphors and historical metaphors. Instead of
bodily bases, both depend on culturally shared ways of perceiving and
interpreting the world. Structural metaphors tie together general concep-
tual systems. They actualize conventionalized mental maps or schemas
that derive from some common activities such as raising children, buying
commodities, having hobbies, etc.
Historical metaphors attach historical events and tales to a new situation. They are often more innovative than structural ones because the basic level is a single event or national myth from the past. Historical metaphors are most often based on naming persons or things and are thus much more rarely used in journalistic discourse. They differ from structural metaphors because of their closer dependence on context. In historical metaphors there is an effort to combine a single event from the past to a new situation. These metaphors are dependent on the specific culture, time and context where they are used, and they often need a lengthy explanation to be understood. They are innovative but their meaning is quite easily reversed depending on the context.

These three different types of metaphors: bodily based experiential, structural and historical metaphors are not to be confused with so-called dead or sleeping metaphors, which have lost their original meaning. For example, the Finnish word “tietää” (“know”) etymologically means “kulkea tietä”, which means “walking along the road”, but its original meaning has disappeared from everyday language. These sleeping metaphors include such expressions as “the leg of the table”, which can be brought to life if some innovative aspects of the basic metaphor THE PARTS OF A THING ARE PARTS OF THE HUMAN BODY are taken into use. For the purposes of this study it is not meaningful to explore dead metaphors because they have lost their metaphorical meaning and are often regarded as literal.

The role of metaphors in journalism

In general, metaphors play a dual role in journalism. They both maintain, even strengthen existing cultural values, but they also reconceptualize and thus reconstruct existing concepts. The reconstruction of concepts and values mainly results from the invention of a completely new conceptual metaphor or from the new formulation of an old metaphor (Chilton 1987, 9–11; Chilton & Ilyin 1993). When distinguishing between the above-mentioned types of metaphors, historical metaphors are most likely to be used innovatively in reconstructing new ways of comprehending the world. Structural metaphors can be used as formulations of an old basic metaphor and in this way to maintain and legitimate these concepts. Experiential metaphors mainly serve to maintain the existing way of perceiving the world. It is not always easy even to recognize them.
From a cognitive point of view metaphors are used in communication as heuristic, conceptual tools with which new and complex issues are handled and new concepts are formed. The strength of metaphor is to understand and experience an abstract issue in terms of a more concrete issue (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). Applied to journalism, this means popularizing issues, appealing to common sense and making things matter to people (e.g. Fiske 1989, 192-194).

This popularization is established in various techniques used in journalism to gain common ground with the audience. Reunanen (1995, 256-260) highlights eight linguistic techniques of which at least concretization, condensation and dramatization all have to do — more or less — with metaphors.

**Concretization** can deal with major conceptual structures as well as single culture-based, historical events. In journalism, metaphors are also used to construct a coherent narrative from single day-to-day events. This **narrativization** is useful in the media in order to construct coherent narratives that make sense to the audience (see e.g. Ekecrantz 1994). In Dahlgren’s (1992, 14–15) words, narratives make news more familiar to people but also constrain the range of possible readings:

> Narratives have ingredients which culturally competent audiences can readily recognise and classify, which prestructure and delimit the likely range of meanings — and also help foster cultural integration. (ibid., 15).

Yet another function of metaphors in journalism is to present things in a **condensed** manner. This is important because of the present journalistic conventions according to which news should be quite short but still comprehensible to the wide audience (see e.g. Geist & Nachbar 1983, 5–8). Metaphor is also sometimes used as means of **dramatization** in journalism. Dramatizing metaphors often occur in headlines and in leads where it is usual to construct a conflict, especially in political processes.

As far as journalists are concerned metaphors are used to narrativize, condense and concretize issues. On the other hand, politicians and public relations officials are concerned to invent as condensed and slogan-like metaphors as possible, so that the media are hooked and can use them without editing. From the point of view of the media, the use of metaphors is economical because of this condensed form; and for the interviewee metaphors are useful because they always present the issue in a certain context and represent only one part of the issue. According to Kress & Hodge (1979, 9) transformations of language in general serve two functions, economy and distortion. When presenting issues in con-
densed manner they also serve as a certain (ideological) point of view on the issues covered.

In newspapers and magazines metaphors are mostly used by editorial journalists such as editorial writers, columnists and cartoonists, whose task it is to comment on issues. Their task is to crystallize the interpretation already implicitly suggested by news items and articles (Gamson & Lasch 1983, 402; Gamson & Modigliani 1989, 8–9). Most of these editorial metaphors are consciously and innovatively selected to frame the whole issue. But metaphors are of course often used in the news, too. In a news item metaphors are mostly utilized in headlines and leads in which it is important to handle the issue in a condensed manner. Furthermore, metaphors in general tend to offer popular resistance to people. According to Wilson (1990, 104) metaphors may be employed for connotative or emotional purposes in arousing emotions and reinforcing particular perspectives, and they can be used to elicit absurd images which can then be employed for the purposes of ridiculing one’s opponent.

I return now to the role of metaphors in journalism when considering the evolving nature of metaphors in journalism. The most prominent feature of changes in metaphor use has to do with the conventionalization of metaphors. Metaphors become self-evident in use. Another feature in this process of change is the possibility to step outside this gradually developing process. Alternative metaphorizations require creativity.

The changing nature of metaphors

The partiality of metaphorical mapping allows for the creative use of metaphors, i.e. for changes in metaphor use. The partiality of metaphors means that only some parts of the structure of the source domain in conceptual metaphor are used conventionally as metaphor. To metaphorize life as a journey is partial in the sense that there is no return from the final journey (Lakoff & Turner 1989, 44–45). This partiality enables the creation of “new” metaphorical expressions as it takes in use new parts of the conventional conceptual metaphor.

The distinction between counter and alternative metaphors is based on the idea of different types of “new” metaphors — that is different types of innovative and creative elaborations of metaphor. Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 53) distinguish between three kinds of elaborations. “New” metaphor can elaborate a certain part of this conceptual metaphor in innova-
tive ways, it can also take advantage of previously unused parts of the conceptual metaphor, or finally, it is possible to create a completely new conceptual metaphor.

I call both elaborations of certain parts of metaphors and the use of previously unused parts of basic conceptual metaphor countermetaphors (see e.g. Kivikuru 1996) because they aim at reconceptualizing conventional basic metaphors. Creating a totally new metaphor at the conceptual level and at linguistic level is what I call alternative metaphor. Alternative metaphor differs from countermetaphor in that it provides another way of perceiving issues instead of reformulating already existing basic metaphors. In this division I consider creating new conceptual metaphors most important because through them, it is possible to gain new insights of the world.

Conventionalization of metaphors has to do with the changing nature of metaphors. For example, different types of metaphors form a continuum: at the one end are dead metaphors, at the other end innovative metaphors. This continuum is not fixed or stable, but instead conventional metaphors can become clichés and turn into dead metaphors that can be brought to life and so on (see e.g. Wilson 1990, 107–108). Metaphors evolve as time passes by and their meaning transforms.

Nöth (1990, 131) points out that the conventionalization of metaphors takes place in stages. At first there is a creative innovative metaphor that becomes lexicalized when it becomes part of everyday language. When the original, literal meaning begins to vanish, the metaphor becomes opaque and finally it dies away when the literal meaning has totally disappeared. But Nöth does not elaborate on how this conventionalization actually happens and how the meaning of metaphor transforms through these stages.

In my opinion the role of journalism in the process of conventionalization is crucial because through the media, most creative metaphors become widely used, modified and finally conventionalized. The media provide metaphors — suggested by sources or journalists — that gradually become conventional ways of perceiving things.

Metaphors in the Finnish EU debate:

going into Europe or staying outside?

Finland’s decision to join the European Union has been one of the most momentous political events in the country’s recent history. The process of
integration started in March 1992 when Finland decided to apply for membership of the European Community. At that time it was quite clear that the EEA (European Economic Area) Treaty would not be sufficient for most of EFTA countries. Finland received the avis to its application in November 1992, and the EU started negotiations with Finland, Sweden and Austria in February 1993. The result was reached one year later. In a consultative referendum held on 16 October 1994, the majority of the Finnish electorate said “yes” to membership. Finland became a full member of the European Union at the beginning of 1995. Each of these phases implied turning-points in the media debate on integration.

Apart from these important turning-points in the political process, there have been two other important turning-points in the media debate about membership. The first period was the Maastricht referendum held in Denmark in June 1992, the second period was the publication of the EU’s agricultural proposal in November 1993. Both of these events raised critical debate against membership. It was expected that Denmark would be slowing down its integration process or even withdrawing. The agricultural proposal was seen as serious threat to Finnish agriculture and thus making it difficult for Finland to join.

From each of these phases I have included in my analysis a one-week-period from both media. The material is analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively. My main aim is to describe the metaphorical way of interpreting the EU question and thus to pay attention to what was emphasized and what was obscured in the discussion. Thus it is also possible to elaborate whose vantage-point was dominant in the discussion.

Experiential metaphors are based on bodily experiences of the world; they can be further divided into orientational and ontological metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). The former are based on experiencing the body in space: right and left, up and down, behind and in front of. Time, for example, is often depicted as passing from the past that is behind us to the future that is in front of us. Ontological metaphors, for their part, define everything as living creatures and often emphasize the inside and the outside of something.

In the EU debate these experiential, bodily based metaphors had to do with such fairly conventionalized issues as whether or not to join the Europe that was seen as a place a country could enter or remain outside of. This inside/outside dichotomy also has to do with the question of periphery versus centre. The centre is the place to be aimed at (Hardt-Mautner 1995, 181–183). This kind of discussion is the basis for most of the further metaphors used in the discussion. This question about whether
to join in or stay outside was repeated during the process mostly without recognizing its metaphoricality at all.

According to one headline in *Helsingin Sanomat*: “Finland will remain outside if there is no change in the EU’s attitude to agriculture” (HS, news 28 November 1993). This was also frequently used on television. “It is hardly considered what it would mean to stay outside” (YLE-TV current affairs programme, *A-studio* 29 November 1993). Journalists were also interested in what would be classified as an issue important enough to determine the EU question: “What seems to be the question determining whether Finland is going to stay outside the European Union or to join the Union?” (YLE-TV news 28 February 1994).

An example of the use of a living organism metaphor was the reference to the Western European Union, “WEU as the arm of the EU”. This metaphor was used constantly and taken very much for granted. For example, *Helsingin Sanomat* said that “According to the Maastricht Treaty the Western European Union WEU is an essential part of the EU — it is called the military arm of the union even though Denmark and Ireland are not members of it.” (HS, news 3 March 1994).

What these different kinds of experiential metaphors share in common is that they are highly conventionalized ways of perceiving the world. In spite of this they have an important effect in terms of maintaining the existing point of views. However, they can be used innovatively if new sides of them are taken into use.

One of the most frequently used structural metaphors was that of Finland travelling or on the road to Europe. Diametrically opposed to this pro-metaphor has been the anti-EU metaphorical interpretation that Finland is selling its independence, even though this metaphor has not gained publicity to the same extent as the one according to which Finland is on the way to Europe.

Apart from these two opposed interpretations of Finland either travelling happily to Europe or stupidly selling her independence and sovereignty, there has been a variety of other metaphors supporting or opposed to membership. The negotiation process has been conceptualized as sports, as business and as theatre, meanwhile the European Union has been presented as a house or a home of a happy eurofamily. These same metaphors were also used in the Swedish EU discussion (Jacobsson 1994, 81–88; Jacobsson 1995).

In the Finnish EU debate the most frequently used metaphor was indeed that of Finland heading for Europe — and very often the vehicle for the journey has been a train (see e.g. Mustaparta 1996; Becker 1992).
This metaphor was also used in the Swedish EU debate (Jacobsson 1994). In this metaphor the journey is the source domain and the EU negotiations the target domain of the metaphor.

The schematic structure of JOURNEY that is mapped onto the negotiations consists of travellers (Finnish citizens), travelling companions (other applicants), vehicle (train, car, boat or aeroplane), starting place (non-membership), finish (membership), motion (fast or slow), and route (road, seaway). This schema comprises all the various expressions dealing with some kind of travelling, showing the green light, describing the vehicles, speeding up or slowing down the process of integration.

The interpretation of integration as a journey of some kind is used throughout the negotiations. Each of the phases analysed involves different kinds of metaphorical expressions based on the more general concept of travelling to the EU. The journey metaphor was used all the way through the negotiations, and thus it provides an example of the use of countermetaphors as well as the conventionalization of metaphors. For example, applying for membership is presented through the journey of the concrete application to Brussels both in Helsingin Sanomat and on television. The journey is visualized through the briefcase that contains the application: “Finland’s journey to apply for membership in the European Union started ... at Merikasarmi a quarter past three this afternoon ...” (YLE-TV, news 18 March 1992). Helsingin Sanomat later reported on the historical event in the same way.

This metaphor was first used by MPs in early 1992 in debating whether or not Finland should apply for membership in the European Union. The main issue was whether Finland would reach the train in time, whether the application would reach Brussels in time for Finland to start negotiating with the EU together with Sweden and Austria, who had submitted their applications earlier (Mustaparta 1996, 174–175).

The journey metaphor was then adopted by journalists for purposes of framing the process of negotiations. For example, the result of the first referendum in Denmark, in which more than half of the population voted against the Maastricht Treaty, was conceptualized as slowing down the process of integration, or in other words the speed of the EU train.

The result also caused some critical debate on holding a referendum in Finland. This was the first phase of debate where “going to Europe” was not conceptualized as a natural and self-evident phenomenon. According to a leading article: “It is not too far removed from the truth to conclude that the Danish 'no' reflects the electorate's mistrust about the process of integration proceeding too quickly. Ordinary people have difficulty
keeping track with the pace of change in Europe. If given the opportunity, they — and not only the Danes — would prefer to apply the brakes” (HS, editorial 4 June 1992). This highlights membership as a preferable option and portrays the Danish people as some sort of rebels.

This positive slant to the journey metaphor was also reversed and included as part of an opposing interpretation of membership. One of the leading figures of the anti-EU camp, former editor-in-chief of the rural newspaper Kainuun Sanomat, Keijo Korhonen, was quoted as saying at an anti-EU demonstration that “We’ll have plenty of time later to get on to the eurotrain that we’ve heard so much about. There will always be plenty of room for anyone who pays his way...” (television news 1 February 1993). However, this statement does not question the inevitability of the journey or EU membership as the final objective.

Later on the journey metaphor was also used to ridicule and ironize this metaphor. On 17 October 1994 a current affairs journalist reported: “The train to Brussels has left on time — as of course trains generally do in Finland. We are all together in that train whether we like it or not. Austria’s train for Brussels also set out on time in June. (...) The important thing is to make sure we have something to eat with us so that we don’t get hungry on the way from yesterday’s euroenthusiasm to our final destination. The next stop on this journey is Finnish parliament. (...) But the train has started its (...) journey and it is going to arrive at its terminal station sooner or later.” (YLE-TV, A-studio 17 October 1994). In this example the use of the metaphor is not unconscious; instead it is used to frame the situation. In fact, it was used to ridicule the journey metaphor by making it visible. At the same time, however, it was used to condense, concretize and narrativize the process.

The treatment of such a complex and abstract issue as European integration in terms of a journey crucially simplifies the issue. The process is made more comprehensible by using such a metaphorical view, but at the same time the process is conceptualized as self-evident. The journey always has an end: in this case Finland’s membership of the European Union.

The second most common conceptualization of the process of negotiation is to deal with it in terms of GAME, especially as some kind of sports competition between the four would-be member states. The schema of game includes such parts as players (politicians), playing field (negotiations in Brussels), audience (Finnish citizens), goal (membership or non-membership), means (competition) and competitors (the applicant countries).
The game metaphor was sometimes used together with the train metaphor: "Out of the four countries applying for membership of the European Union, the first to reach the goal was Sweden. (...) Dinkelspiel welcomed the other applicants to join 'the train'." (HS, news 2 March 1994)

The negotiations were concluded on 1 March 1994, soon after Sweden. Therefore, Sweden was described as "the winner of the game" (YLE-TV, A-studio 4 March 1994). The last days of the negotiations were reported mostly using the metaphors of game and sports, which look at the process from more or less the same angle as the journey metaphor. Both media used such expressions as the last days of the "marathon" (HS, news 2 March 1994).

Game does not necessarily refer to sports; it may also refer to such activities as playing cards or chess, for instance. Finland was the first Nordic country to hold a referendum on membership, and consequently there were references to the "domino effect", based on the popular game of dominoes. This metaphor was widely used by the Americans as a justification for the Vietnam war. It was also liberally used in the Finnish debate on the EU. As the majority of people in Finland were in favour of joining, it was expected that Sweden and Norway would also "follow suit". After the referendum a television journalist reported: "The Swedish people are of course interested in the results of the Finnish referendum, which is believed to launch the domino effect and pull Sweden into membership for sure and possibly Norway as well" (YLE-TV, news 17 October 1994).

The metaphor of game emphasizes the nature of politics as competition among political actors. The people of Finland have little say on how things are managed; they are mere spectators in the quarrels over the nomination of the Commissioner and in the parliamentary decision on the date of the referendum. Political game also implies a popular concept of politicians simply promoting their own interests.

The above mentioned metaphors highlight the process of integration as something favourable and progressive. However, there was also an alternative interpretation of the process. According to the BUSINESS metaphor, membership was not free — the price was nothing less than Finland's independence that the country had struggled so hard to gain. The schema of business consists of the price, buyer and seller, and the commodity to be bought or sold. The business metaphor was often used together with the journey and war metaphors. According to Keijo Korhonen: "Finland is surrendering to foreign domination (...) if one considers the kind of road that is opened up by this acceptance of the Maas-
tricht Treaty without negotiations or any bargaining (...) At the end of the road what awaits us is loss of independence.’ (YLE-TV, A-studio 4 November 1992) Occasionally it was even stated that Finland was “surrendering its independence for free” (HS, news 2 February 1993).

The metaphor of WAR was used quite frequently. Its schematic structure includes debate on Finland surrendering, political fronts and attacking as well as strategies and tactics. It is common to talk about political tactics. The war metaphor was used in reporting on the unification of the anti EU camp: “The battle against unified Europe is also fought elsewhere” (YLE-TV, news 2 March 1994). In this example those opposed to the EU are represented as terrorists attacking what is portrayed as a beneficial process of integration. Talking about tactics and strategies could also be classified as metaphors of game, but I have placed it in the category of war. “Finland, Sweden and Austria all started negotiations with the EU with different tactics on Monday” (HS, news 2 February 1993). Warfare is often associated with cruelty and brutality. Used in the campaign context, it also carries some of these implications.

Politics was also discussed in terms of THEATRE. In theatre and drama, important decisions are made behind the scene. Parliamentary voting on whether or not to apply for membership was described by such accounts as, “Before the voting spectacle on Wednesday the Christian group was divided into two parts (...) (HS, news 19 March 1992). Theatrical terms were also used in reporting on an argument between ministers Esko Aho and Toimi Kankaanniemi in the middle of a press briefing: “... an extraordinary drama was played out as they attacked each other on applying for membership”, and in another piece of news: “... Salolainen had time to describe the whole episode as ‘unbelievable’ (...)” (HS, 2 news 7 November 1992). However, this metaphor was used quite sparingly if compared with the metaphors of journey, game, war and business.

Yet another structural metaphor was to use kinship relations in describing the relations between European countries. It was quite common to talk about the EUROFAMILY living in a European home. This is closely linked to the dominant metaphor of Finland’s journey to the EU, the goal of which is to become “European”. Eurofamily is associated with happiness and warmth, it is a secure group that the Finnish people should definitely join. However, family membership could mean very different things depending on whether Finland was to be a wife, a child or a servant. For the most part Finland appeared as a wanted and welcome member of the family. “Pangalos and van den Broek had friendly talks after more than 100 hours of negotiation on the admission of new members.”
"Companions and friends have now become family members." (HS, news 3 March 1994).

The concept of house also has various possible connotations. For example, the beginning of the negotiations was conceptualized so that the candidates Austria, Sweden and Finland were now "on the EU's doorstep" (YLE-TV, A-studio 1 February 1993). EU was thus a metaphorical house or "home" where everyone wanted to come and join the eu-family. These family relations were not always happy, however; it was also quite frightening to think of Finland's position in Europe. As opposition leader Paavo Lipponen put it: "It is recognized that it is now time for Finland to make sure its position in Europe. It is better to be master at the table where the decisions are made than servant in the entrance hall of the mighty Europe" (HS, news 3 March 1994).

The common feature about structural metaphors is that they have mostly been used for describing the process of negotiation and the future vision of Finland as a member or a non-member of the union. Whereas the expressions of the basic metaphors of journey, game and eurofamily have been pro-membership, those of business, theatre and war have mostly been against EU membership. There have also been some attempts to turn these around.

Historical metaphors combine historical events — or rather the popular images of these events instead of systematic schematic systems. The difference between structural and historical metaphors is in no way obvious because most historical metaphors become conventionalized in continuous use so that they become structural metaphors. The main areas or domains of historical metaphors derive from two topics: first, from Christian religion and second, from the fear of Russia.

Naming the EU as the demon that is going to destroy everything was used in religious discourse to take a stance against EU membership. However, in Helsingin Sanomat and on television it has mostly been used in a context in which it is denied that the European Union is THE BEAST FROM THE REVELATION OR SOME OTHER KIND OF DEMON. This is quite revealing of the way in which historical metaphors can be used as counterarguments that make their users seem ridiculous. The meaning of historical metaphors can easily be reversed. For example, a column published in Helsingin Sanomat on March 1994 said "There has been this mistaken view that the EU is some kind of a monster that will swallow up our unwilling country, a beast of the Revelation or a conspiracy of jesuits and Free Masons, as recently suggested by a publication of
a religious group. This demon image is far removed from the truth." (HS, column 3 March 1994).

Another context in which this kind of historical metaphor works well is where advocates and opponents are naming each other. This kind of behaviour is important for reasons of group cohesion and is common when defining the boundaries of one's own group in relation to the other group. The most commonly used metaphor of the anti-EU camp was that they are 'IMPIVAARALAINEN' (from the famous Seven Brothers by Aleksis Kivi), i.e. that they are inclined to hide in the woods and escape the civilized world. Finland was also frequently called a BACKWARD PLACE. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible to translate this kind of name-giving.

Other historical metaphors in the Finnish EU discussion included the comparison of membership to the events in Nazi Germany. According to this metaphor MEMBERSHIP MEANS THE SAME TO FINNISH FARMERS AS NAZIS MEANT TO THE JEWS. The farmers demonstrated against membership, especially after the publication of the EU's agricultural proposal in autumn 1993. Helsingin Sanomat quoted the farmers' argumentation: '... it seems as if Finnish farmers are being taken to the poison showers just as the Jews were 50 years ago' (HS, news 30 November 1993). This statement is based on the shared knowledge of the negatively valued events half a century ago. In the context of the EU debate it is used to make the point that the EU will kill Finnish agriculture.

Historical metaphors from Finland's history and especially Russophobia were used by those opposed to the EU: "According to Member of Parliament Mr. Seppänen, the elite is now on its knees having given in to the 'Brussians'. He blamed the political elite for surrendering Finland's independence". (HS, news 2 February 1993) This wordplay draws a parallel between Brussels and Moscow and "Brussians" and "Russians".

The main characteristic of all historical metaphors is that they are innovative and closely tied to the culture of which they are a part. Historical metaphors are loaded with culture-based meanings, some of which are relevant in western culture and some of which are appeals to the Finnish language. The latter are obviously the most difficult to translate to other languages and cultures.
Discussion

It is important to pay critical attention to the metaphors used in the media, particularly to the question of what side is emphasized and what is neglected with the use of certain metaphorical expressions. Metaphors are spread very widely through the media and are thus adopted into everyday language. This taken-for-granted knowledge had a crucial role in structuring the dominant and marginal discourses on the issue.

In the Finnish EU discussion it has been part of everyday language to understand integration as a natural and self-evident process; therefore an anti-integration stance has implied a stance against progress. This idealization of progress is part of a wider world-view aimed at technological progress. The question of whether to stand aside and remain alone or to move towards a new and peaceful Europe is indeed one of the major arguments used for membership. The other side of this narrative or interpretation is that Finland is seen as a backward corner of Europe and therefore progress is conceptualized as something worth aiming at.

According to this dominant narrative Finland was heading towards Europe, leaving its backwardness behind. The people of Finland could look forward to a brighter future if Finland were a member of the European Union. This implies a definition of Finland’s presence as an eastern, mystical country in contrast to positive western culture. According to the other narrative, Finland is losing her sovereignty. Finland is a neutral state but if the political and economic elite forces the country into membership and the Finnish people vote in favour, then this neutrality will be lost and Finland will become an outpost towards Russia.

According to this view the issue was indeed not about progress but about undemocratization in the EU process. Membership will cost Finland her sovereignty and independence. Finland’s position as Russia’s neighbour has been considered a threat and membership a leap into the unknown. According to this interpretation Finland is regarded as a haven of peace. This interpretation has occupied a marginal position in both Helsingin Sanomat and on public-service television, but perhaps a more influential position in some rural newspapers and local radio stations.

Both of these narratives were supported and opposed by various verbal and visual metaphors. For example, the treatment of such a multidimensional and abstract issue as European integration in terms of a journey crucially simplifies the issue. The process is made more readily understandable by using such a metaphorical view, but at the same time the process is also conceptualized as something self-evident. The journey
always has an end: in this case it was Finland’s membership in the European Union. This metaphor was meaningful from the vantage-point of EU supporters, but it was also used by those who were against membership.

Reporting politics as a game, sports and war emphasizes the vantage-point of competition. It implies the idea of competition as something that belongs naturally to politics; it therefore strengthens the popular image of politics as quarrelling and playing games. Compared to the journey metaphor, these competitive metaphors imply an image of equal parties fighting each other. The journey is inevitable and collective action.

Politics as business provides yet another image of the question. According to this image the issue was not about competition but politicians bargaining on an issue. This also comes close to the theatre metaphor, which highlights the contradiction between the elite and the popular masses. In cases the popular masses were represented as spectators viewing the drama acted out by politicians, unable to make any contribution. From the point of view of the ordinary citizen, all these metaphors underline the passiveness of citizens vs. the activeness of politicians.

The ideological function of the metaphors was to present the EU question largely as an inevitability. The same was true in Swedish EU journalism as well (Jacobsson 1995). In this construction of inevitabilities, three types of metaphors played a somewhat different role. The basis for experiential metaphors lies in their bodily experience of the world. It follows that they are taken for granted in everyday discussion. Most structural metaphors are also based on conventional ways of making sense of abstract issues in terms of concrete concepts. However, they always contain the possibility of innovative expressions. Most of the structural metaphors used in the Finnish EU discussion are widely used in western societies.

Historical metaphors, for their part, are more closely connected to Finnish national and cultural values. In these metaphors a historical event is used to concretize the present situation and to define national identity in contrast to the European identity. This was partly achieved through experiential and structural metaphors. Even if these kinds of expressions are used innovatively, they are based on the common-sensical knowledge of Finnish people. They are used to attach existing and self-evident values from the past to the present.

All in all these metaphors provided a popular view on the integration process. The abstract political process was concretized through the constant use of familiar metaphors from the domain of private life. Meta-
phors were useful tools for journalists, but at the same time they highlighted the positive values of EU membership.

In the EU-discussion these conventional ways of covering politics were at variance with the referendum, which highlighted the active role of the people. The media covered the EU process in the same way as political processes are covered: through conventional metaphors in order to concretize, narrativize and to a lesser extent dramatize the abstract political process. This tendency to offer a popular view on politics placed citizens in a paradoxical situation where metaphorizations suggested a passive role and at the same time people were told that their responsibility was to participate by voting — and the decision should be made rationally (see Hellsten & Renvall 1996).

This was clearly visible in interviews carried out with ordinary citizens. Most people said they actually did not know enough about the EU and yet the decision should be made rationally — even so all of them said they intended to vote (Alastalo 1995). This contradiction between active participation and passive spectatorship was resolved either by neglecting one’s responsibility to vote (and remaining passive) or by neglecting the requirement of making a rational decision (and fulfilling one’s duty). Those who remained passive felt that Finland would join the union regardless of the result of the referendum, and those who wanted to fulfil their responsibilities said they were going to collect information from outside the media or rely on information and opinions from friends and family members.

Highlighting participation would have needed an alternative way of covering the process. A creative reconsideration of the EU process would have paved the way for alternative metaphorizations. Do politics always have to be popularized as game in the politician’s interests: quarrelling and competing in public?

The important thing about alternative ways of covering issues is to step out of the ongoing discussion and into one (complementary) system of metaphoric conceptualizations. In order to surpass these conventional metaphors, the alternatives should give some insights at the conceptual level of metaphors. Changes at the linguistic level of metaphors, for example using previously unused parts of a conventional, conceptual metaphor only provides fresh aspects to the issue. However, it is no solution to use a new kind of sports event, for instance, because that does not change the competitive side of the metaphor.

So what exactly could be achieved by alternative conceptualizations? New metaphorical conceptualizations can help to throw light on new
sides of issues. A transformation of metaphors often underlies the development of scientific theories, for example. Most shifts in theories result from the invention of a new metaphor that “make us think about these difficult questions in new terms” (Hall 1996, 287). For example, the conceptualization of nature (and society) as a living organism that is born, lives and dies has given way to conceptualizing them as machine (e.g. Petersson 1987, 13–189; Johannesson 1990). This shift from organism to machine makes a great difference as an organism can die but a machine — made by human beings — can be fixed. And the machine does not need to be respected. As Hardy-Short & Short (1995, 106–107) point out, this shift in the metaphoric way of thinking led to the unreasonable exploitation of nature and to environmental pollution.

This shift in metaphors can also cause major cultural and social changes. According to Hall these metaphors have to function in two ways:

Metaphors of transformation must do at least two things. They allow us to imagine what it would be like when prevailing cultural values are challenged and transformed (...) and new meanings and values, social and cultural configurations, begin to appear. However, such metaphors must also have analytic value. They must somehow provide ways of thinking about the relation between the social and symbolic domains in this process of transformation (Hall 1996, 287).

This dual role of metaphors of transformation resembles the role of alternative metaphors in journalism — both metaphors of transformation and alternative metaphors have to step outside the constant, powerless discussion and into one metaphor defined by those in power. The alternatives become possible when the self-evidence offered by conventional metaphors is made visible.

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Notes

In the following text this linguistic level is written in *italics* and the basic conceptual level in SMALL CAPITALS.

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Media and the construction of sports heroes

Kalle Virtapohja

The naming of Curt Lindström, a Swede, as the head coach of the Finnish national icehockey team was a slap in the face of all Finnish coaches, a well-known Finnish sports journalist Ilkka Ala-Kivimäki wrote in the leading Finnish evening paper Ilta-Sanomat in May 1993.

This piece of news provides a good example of the atmosphere in which Curt Lindström started his project which was to culminate two years later when the Finnish team won the world championship for the first time ever. The victory provided a good reason for an impromptu celebration that lasted several days, even weeks in May 1995. The stars of the Finnish team were promoted to national heroes, in fact the players were celebrated more or less as one unit, a team; and the face of the team was none of the players’, but Curt Lindström’s.

This article provides an overview of the news coverage as well as some background information on the victory and celebration of the first ever world title in the history of Finnish team sports. The focus is on the role of the media in constructing the heroes. My aim is to interpret and analyse these phenomena as manifestations of Finnish identity at this particular moment in time in May 1995.

The article approaches sports journalism from the perspective of cultural studies. Using the method of discourse analysis, I will be attempting to reproduce, analyse, and de-mystify the hero image of Curt Lindström. Finally, I will discuss the importance of media-made heroes to national identity.

Sports journalism and sports in Finland

It seems to be impossible to discuss sports journalism without returning over and over again to one basic problem: Is sports journalism part of sports or part of journalism? The first researchers in Finland to point out the symbiotic connection between sports and journalism were Pertti Hemánus and Kalevi Heinilä in the early 1970s. The former is a professor
of journalism, the latter a professor of sports sociology. McChesney (1989) describes this symbiotic relationship enjoyed by sports and the mass media as an American phenomenon, but of course it has a more universal, at least western, nature. One interesting aspect of this symbiosis is the question of the "right distance" between the researcher and his/her topic. If the researcher is too close to his topic, in this case, if the researcher is a sports "fan", then there is the risk that he cannot gain a clear enough picture of the problems concerned. And yet, if the researcher is totally disinterested in sports, there is the opposite risk that he cannot see what is meaningful and what is not. I would not buy a book if the author said that he/she knows nothing about the topic. Sports is considered here as an important element of Finnish culture, but one should not overstate its significance or value: although the roots of sports lie in religion (Guttmann 1978), it is nowadays just another secular branch of culture.

This problem of bias shall not be discussed at further length here, but it is probably fair to add that I approach this relationship from the point of view of a researcher of journalism. On the one hand, my interest lies in the journalistic process, not in an enthusiastic way of planning how sports would best benefit from media involvement. On the other hand, the special interest of my study lies in the journalistic outcome, i.e. the text (or photos, tv, and radio "texts"). This study comes close to reception analysis, as the heroes are made or presented by the media. And of course, there are no heroes without an adoring audience.

Sports journalism cannot be understood unless we take into consideration four dimensions. At the end of the day the media are only one corner in "the Square of Sports Journalism". We must also take account of audience expectations. Some events are simply more popular than others. And of course the subject, i.e. sport itself, has a great effect on sports journalism.

We must also bear in mind that journalism is made by journalists, who are always individuals. All journalistic choices are made by individuals with different backgrounds. Some of the actions and choices made by the journalist can be explained by his/her training and experience, others by differences between individuals. Due attention must also be paid to "the long arm of culture" that influences journalistic decisions even if the journalist is not aware of it (Pietilä 1995).

Finland has traditionally excelled in individual sports, particularly endurance sports such as long-distance running and cross-country skiing. However, during the past ten years sports have changed dramatically, and not only because women are now actively demanding their share of atten-
Another thing that has very much affected sports is the involvement of television (Altheide & Snow 1991).

Altheide & Snow (1991) argue that prior to the television era, print and radio carried sporting events to fans in a fairly matter-of-fact manner without affecting the way the game was played, or viewed by the fan. Even these media provided a degree of hype, glorifying the sports hero and exalting the ideal of fair play and rivalry, but they had very little impact on the economics of sports, and they made no effort to create a large audience. Basically, print and radio served the fan (Altheide & Snow 1991, 217). I would slightly disagree here with the American view of Altheide & Snow, because in Finland the rise of newspapers and the victory of competitive individual sports over the gymnastics tradition took place simultaneously in the late 19th century and in the early 20th century. Competitive sports with its records and winners offered much more news material for local newspapers than did gymnastics. In fact the earliest news reports on running also had minor comments of the style of the competitors, as the rules did not emphasize effort alone but style as well. In the same manner it can be argued that the nationalist radio commentaries by the legendary Pekka Tiilikainen and Paavo Noponen had a lot to do with the celebration of skiing and skijumping heroes before the final breakthrough of television culture.

We can argue then that the media play an important role in creating idols and heroes. Russell (1993) reports that even before the Second World War in North America, earlier categories such as religious figures and representatives of the “serious arts” were largely supplanted by sports stars and personalities from radio and television. Thus, entertainment figures and sports heroes have emerged as visible categories providing models for youngsters. The shift in choices speaks volumes of the impact of the mass media.

In Finland team sports did not make their final breakthrough until 1995 when the country won its first ever world championship title in ice-hockey. The celebrations were wholly unprecedented in this country: people came out in the streets singing, dancing, hugging, waving flags, and smiling (Virtapohja 1996 and 1995).

It is not only ice-hockey that has brought team sports to the hearts of the nation. Finland’s sports journalists voted Jari Litmanen, Ajax Amsterdam’s football star, the first ever team player to be nominated “Athlete of the Year” in Finland.

A few words are in order here on the contrast between ice-hockey and football: The “world” championship title in ice-hockey is not comparable
to winning the World Cup in football, since there are at least four times as many countries in the world that play football than there are countries that play icehockey. Icehockey is played in 50 countries, so these countries make up the "world" of icehockey in the same way as people living in the developed countries often talk about the world when they are actually referring to the developed countries only. But these are only cold statistics. The meaning of the world championship tournament for the individual players or for the spectators is the same whether we talk about icehockey or football. This can be compared with the World Series in American football or baseball: the meaningful "world" is made up of those who take part in action.

In the case of Finland we must bear in mind that icehockey is by far the biggest spectator sport in the country with a 3 million cumulative spectator attendance in official games per year. Icehockey nowadays attracts more media attention than any other sport in Finland. Only the Olympic Games and World Championships in skiing, skijumping and athletics and the World Cup in football can occasionally outclass the popularity of icehockey. But when Finland won the world title in May 1995, a record audience of 2.2 million TV viewers, almost half the population of Finland, watched the mission impossible, the dream come true.

The biggest advantage of team sports compared with individual sports is the playing system, the league, the machine that produces "important" results several times a week to be delivered by the press, and to be consumed by the audience. This is mass production of results and news, a kind of "Fordism", if you like. Team sports provide more news to the media than individual sports, and this is one reason why they are so attractive to sponsors and why they get better sponsorship deals. And as a fast and masculine event where colourful fighting is part of the game, icehockey meets the interests of TV producers as well: it makes good entertainment. This is why new television channels are particularly interested in icehockey. The media moguls say, according to the media logic (Altheide & Snow 1991 and 1979): we want more icehockey.

Icehockey provides regular news from the Finnish national hockey league (SM-liiga), the Swedish hockey league (there are quite a few successful Finnish players in Sweden), from the European league, the North American NHL, and of course news concerning the Finnish national team. The Finnish national team plays many "important" tournaments during the year. The world championships are the most important of all, followed by the World Cup and then by smaller tournaments like the
Karjala-tournament in Finland in November and the Izvestija-tournament in Russia in December.

When the licence for the fourth national TV channel was issued in September 1996 to Ruutunelonen, one of the winning assets was that the Vice President of the Finnish Icehockey Federation, Mr Kalervo Kum­mola, is one of the owners of Ruutunelonen: the perfect guarantee for good icehockey entertainment. The most significant asset, however, was the fact that Ruutunelonen is part of the powerful Sanoma Corporation (Helsinki Media Company).

The story goes that the person who asked Curt Lindström to come to Finland in spring 1993 was Kummola. This was in a German night club after the Finnish team had just fallen short of all expectations and finished only 7th in the world championship tournament.

Today, international sports has become more and more dependent in economic terms on the mass media, as indeed has virtually every level of sports culture. From the character of sports heroes to how a game is watched, sports culture today is media culture (Altheide & Snow 1979, 217; see also Jhally 1989). Television domination of sports is not a re­gional phenomenon, as mass audiences view sports from the perspective of television entertainment and sports audiences now consist of TV view­ers, not just fans (Altheide & Snow 1991 and 1979).

Altheide (1985) calls the role and influence of the form and logic of major media in our lives “media power”. It involves the diffusion of me­dia formats and perspectives into other areas of life. Formats are, accord­ing to Altheide, rules and procedures for defining, selecting, organizing, and presenting information and other experiences. As a consequence some forms of culture, and in this case sports culture, find their way into the headlines more easily than others.

Altheide & Snow (1979, 217–235) give several examples where the change of sports can be explained by what they call “media logic”: 1) Because sports programmes have to compete with other channels to get their share of the viewers, sports is seen as entertainment. 2) TV brings money to sports so that many fields of sport are strongly dependent on the media and the money it offers through various ways. 3) The rule changes have been made in order to entertain the viewers. 4) The role of the sportscaster, the commentator, became more important with the growing pressure to entertain mass audiences. 5) The quantum effects of the mass media on professional sports coverage have now filtered down to the in­dividual players. While management depends on TV revenues, players have realized that they could get a larger share of the profits. So the
wages and payments have gone up. Two reasons can be found for this. First, the increased media coverage has made more money available. Second, the high-salaried players forged a new criterion and class of symbolic membership: the superstar. Earning big money is "proof" of one's outstanding ability. The effect of big salaries and the attention that such players receive from the press and television seems to promote the importance of belonging to the superstars more than belonging to a winning team. 6) Most important of all is the effect of increased media money on the overall quality of teams and their performance. Teams with larger player budgets are doing better than their counterparts.

All of these six explanations can be verified if we look at Finnish ice-hockey: 1) Icehockey on TV is entertainment. 2) Television brings money to professional icehockey through TV rights and sponsorship deals. 3) The rules have been changed in the Finnish league so that the championship is settled in an exciting and dramatic playoff system. Another example is that the best scorer of each team wears a golden helmet so the star player is easier to recognize. 4) The sportscaster took on an increasingly important role after the launch of local radio stations in Finland in 1985. Within the space of a few years the new colourful style spread to other radio channels and television as well. Icehockey, as a fast and popular game, was the best choice for Finnish local radio stations as an avenue for getting into contact with their audiences, especially local sponsors and markets. This was an opportunity for the sportscasters to compete with their ability to create drama and affection. 5) Superstars are more of an American than a Finnish phenomenon. However, as there are several highly paid Finnish players in the NHL, the question is acute every year when the Finnish national team is named for the world championships. 6) The best teams in the 1990s in the Finnish league, Jokerit and TPS, have far bigger budgets than their national rivals.

Media events create drama

Sports journalism that is related to big events like the Olympic Games or World Championships differs in many ways from everyday sports journalism. Dayan and Katz (1992) offer a model on how to separate media events from everyday journalism. They identify three kinds of media events: 1) Contest, 2) Conquest, and 3) Coronation.

Contests range from the World Cup to presidential debates. Their domain is sports and politics. They are battles of champions. Conquest is the
live broadcasting of “giant leaps for mankind”. Life is not the same after a televised Conquest — because of the great achievement itself. Coronations are parades, funerals and alike. They are all ceremony. Conquests and Contests also involve strong ceremonial ingredients (Dayan & Katz 1992, 26). Eco (1995) refers to The Royal Wedding, the marriage of the Prince and Princess of Wales, as a good example of an event that would not have taken place in the way it did if it hadn’t had to be conceived with television in mind.

What we see on television is chosen, by cameramen or directors, with the intention that we should see what is most exciting. Television programmes involve the arrangement of a complex set of visual and verbal codes which are refracted through a technical and institutional process of selection and organization. In covering sport, television does not simply represent the event but it also anchors and attempts to make sense of these events for the viewer (Eco 1995; Blain et al. 1993; Williams 1987; Dahlgren 1992; Cox 1995; Tuchman 1978).

The media did not invent contest, conquest and coronation to tell its stories. Neither did literature. They are on view in myth, in children’s games, in fairy tales. The events that concern us are situated close to the borderline between play and reality. They are constituted of elements of both. The Olympic Games or the World Championships in icehockey are real and influential, even though they are also ceremonially enacted and ceremonially witnessed. The Super Bowl and the setting of an Olympic record, playful as they may seem, also have a bearing on society and culture (Dayan & Katz 1992).

Dayan and Katz move close to such classic researchers of folktales as Propp and Greimas, who have created semiotic schemes for the analysis of the journeys, trials, and triumphs of heroes in the process of restoring order. There are three turning points in the Greimasian career of the hero that correspond to the three types of events classified by Dayan and Katz. One serves to “qualify” the hero (Contest), the second shows the hero reaching beyond human limits (Conquest); the third sets the stage for recognition and “glorification” of the hero (Coronation) (Dayan & Katz 1992).

The World Championships tournament in icehockey in 1995 was the contest where Curt Lindström and his team “conquered” the world of icehockey by winning the world title for the first time. This was one reason for the historical celebration after the victory.

Unlike folktales, contemporary media products are major commodities. When we talk about media we are dealing with such fundamental
matters as democracy — and business. They are connected with media and journalism, whether we accept it or not. Democracy and business are like the right and left hands of media. We can pretend that we are using only the other one, but we cannot help the fact that the other one is always following and present.

We could call the free press an index of western democracy, or maybe even its symbol. Freedom of the press means that anyone is allowed to start his or her own newspaper, for instance. So freedom of the press means “more media”. And “more media” means “more democracy”. This also means more business. The business of journalism, in short, creates the quest for dramatic stories.

When we are dealing with dramatic stories we go back to the roots of journalism — and story telling. The narrative, or story, is always there, no matter what happens with the development of the media. In fact, the stronger the media synergy, the stronger becomes the quest for dramatic stories. On the one hand this means that our culture is going to be more and more mediated: media events, bigger and better, are all that matter. On the other hand, this means that as researchers we must pay attention to the news stories not so much as information but as drama.

This idea of news as drama and not as information was presented by James W. Carey, who argues that news should be understood as ritual, and not just as the transmission of information. The ritual view of communication has its roots in old tribal communities. In a ritual definition, communication is linked to terms such as “sharing”, “participation”, “association”, “fellowship” and “the possession of a common faith”. A ritual view of communication is directed not towards the extension of messages in space but towards the maintenance of society in time; not the act of imparting information but the representation of shared beliefs (Carey 1975/1989).

**Drama and heroes go together**

Aristotle had a very simple, and effective definition of drama: it has a beginning, middle, and ending. In literature the concept of drama is associated to theatre, but it also has an everyday meaning which refers to excitement.

The drama of sports is created through the dualism of spectator sport: The spectators are observing, from a position of personal safety, the struggle of the contestants. Furthermore, the struggle of the contestants is
quite often a black and white world: the good against the evil, or, life or death.

The drama of the World Championship tournament in icehockey in 1995 has many flavours. First of all it is appropriate to start with media involvement. The tournament was a media event and the central media was television. In more detail, it was the first time that the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE) showed the tournament after three years of cable-TV delivery that precluded large numbers of Finnish households. YLE’s broadcasting team was therefore anxious to demonstrate the difference between a big national broadcasting company and a commercial operator. The objectivity of the commentators seemed to have vanished into thin air. The players, the coaches, the audience and the TV commentators all shared a common goal: they all wanted to win the world title. This meant that the commentary was very colourful; the commentators wanted to substitute for the drama of the games that the television spectators were missing by not being in the sports arena. While the YLE commentators wanted to create drama and excitement in order to entertain, the print media took a more critical role; some print journalists said they missed the absent NHL-players as the level of play seemed to be unusually poor.

The venue of the tournament, Stockholm, offered yet another dramatic element. For a period of some 600 years Finland was once the eastern part of Sweden and the Finnish people were ruled by the Swedish king. Centuries of Swedish rule are an integral part of Finnish mythology. Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, is the heart of Svea-Mamma, Mother-Svea, so if Finland wants to gain its place among the nations, this is where it must happen: in Stockholm.

This actually happened in 1912 when Finland was still seeking its identity, this time under Russian rule. A Finnish long distance runner, Hannes Kolehmainen, won three Olympic gold medals in Stockholm. A very similar thing happened again in 1995 in the World Championship final between Finland and Sweden.

The year 1995 is special in two ways. Firstly, Finland had joined the European Union at the beginning of the year with mixed feelings. When the result of the referendum was declared, the nation was split into two: the industrialized south was pro-EU, the agricultural north against EU, and in some places the flags were hoisted only half-mast as a sign of death, of loss of independence. The national identity ended up more or less in a state of crisis, and according to Dayan & Katz (1992, 28) the most dramatic events appear at moments of crisis and speak to a conflict
that threatens society. So the drama of the World Championship tournament in 1995 was much bigger for the Finns than it had ever been before. The people of Finland were seeking their national identity: What is going to happen to us? Who are we? And the cultural answer in the mass celebration was: “We are the champions, let’s get together.”

There was another time-bound fact that made the World Championships more meaningful for the Finns than ever before. There were some signs in the spring of 1995 that the depression was finally nearing its end. This was somehow connected to the new parliament, and high hopes were pinned on the new government’s employment programme which promised to halve the unemployment figure of half a million. So the icehockey tournament that took place in the spring, after a long and dark winter, and a long and dark depression, symbolized a new dawn, a new beginning, and a better future, for the Finnish people. Especially because of the historic success in the ice rink, which was an exceptionally positive sign, there was a promise of a turn for the better.

**Heroes as group servants**

Klapp (1962, 1964 and 1969) has done extensive work in studying heroes as symbolic figures. Klapp (1962) divides heroes into five main categories, each with several subcategories: 1) winners, 2) splendid performers, 3) heroes of social acceptability, 4) independent spirits, and 5) group servants.

As a hero, head coach Curt Lindström fits into all five categories presented by Klapp (1962). Lindström is a world champion (winner), he shines before his audience (splendid performer), he is liked and socially attractive (hero of social acceptability), he is carving out his own success in a foreign country (independent spirit) and he appreciates cooperation and solidarity (group servant).

According to Klapp (1969, 248) popular worship of heroes can be compared with religion:

“While it does not offer contact with a sacred reality beyond the ordinary world, there are important similarities. Fans do not pray to a popular hero as one might to a saint for intercession, but there is a kind of prayer in the wish: Can I be like that? There is no supernatural salvation, but a very real spiritual realization made possible by the hero as a model ... In main ... hero has this in common with religion: a profound concern with identity (both group and individual); and an ability to elevate, ennoble, realize,
give mystique ... It is easy ... for a hero cult to compete with, if not displace, religion as the institution having the most impact on character.”

So the media often treat heroes as if they were saints or superhuman. As a consequence, the hero is surrounded by a religious, spiritual, even mythological aura.

Finnish mythology is full of strong men. True, there are also strong women, but their role is different from those of men. Väinämöinen, from the national epic Kalevala, was characteristically a wise man. Marshal Mannerheim is another strong figure in Finnish mythology. Väinämöinen and Mannerheim were both wise leaders, group servants, who knew how to lead their men or the nation successfully. During the icehockey World Championship tournament in 1995 the successful head coach Curt Lindström was compared by the country’s evening papers to marshal Mannerheim.

It is interesting to see how strong the comparisons were between the characters of World War II and head coach Lindström. One reason for this was the new respect for independence that was partly generated by the news of the worldwide celebrities at the end of World War II. In fact the World Championship final between Finland and Sweden was played in Stockholm the very day (7 May 1995) that the top leaders of the world celebrated in London the 50th anniversary of the ending of the war. Another reason would be that joining the European Union and fears of losing national sovereignty had provoked nationalistic sentiments.

For many reasons Curt Lindström could not have had a worse start as national head coach in 1993. One of the reasons was that the first piece of news about Lindström’s nomination came from the Swedish media. It was not enough that a Swedish coach had been asked to come to Finland to tell us how to play icehockey, but even the scoop of this nomination was given to the Swedes. This was hard for the leading sports journalists in Finland to tolerate and it caused a lot of initial criticism against Lindström.

Lindström then took the Finnish national team to Olympic bronze and world silver medals in 1994, earning broad respect through his own work. Lindström thus started his career from the lowest rungs on the ladder, but soon reached, almost, the very top. Even so, the silver medals after losing the 1994 World Championships final to Canada in a penalty shootout were something of a national disaster, a huge disappointment. And the coach who had led the Finnish team to fame was at once a betrayer and a hero. Please note that Lindström had earned the status by his own work; that status cannot simply be given or inherited.
The disappointment after the 1994 tournament was probably one reason for the national celebrations in 1995. The victory fulfilled the macro-level drama. The main role in this macro drama was reserved for the head coach, Curt Lindström. During the 1995 tournament he received more publicity in the print press than the players, and he was compared to such mythological heroes as Mannerheim, and lieutenant Koskela, the fictional leader figure from Väinö Linna’s novel “The Unknown Soldier”, which tells the story of a Finnish platoon in the Second World War. It is a book of a team that works together to achieve their goal. Lindström was the first coach ever to create a Finnish sports Team with a capital T. In doing so Lindström challenged one national myth, according to which Finns can only reach world level in individual sports, not in team sports.

Traditionally, heroes have been males; the western concept of history is based upon male characters and stories about successful men. The main roles have been reserved for men. The deeds of heroes have required courage and power, typically male qualities. Nowadays feminist researchers are eager to criticize male dominance wherever they see it, but in this case the masculine nature of sports and the respective nature of traditional heroes and even the fact that almost all sports journalists are men, lead to the conclusion that most sports heroes are men. For instance, among the 318 Finnish sports heroes presented in four volumes (Kilpakenttien sankarit 1–4, 1992 and 1994) only 43 are female heroines, that is 14 per cent of all heroes.

Curt Lindström had an interesting “soft” flavour to his heroism in that his leadership was based on democratic values and respect for players as individuals. These can be seen as female values as opposed to the brutal nature of the game itself. Besides the numerous awards given to Lindström after the world title, it was also proposed that he should be nominated “mother of the year”.

The change of heroes

There is a reported tendency that heroes who reach their status by heroic deeds, become mere celebrities, who are, according to Boorstin, known primarily for their well-knownness. And there is the possibility that we blur the distinction between genuine heroes and celebrities (Virtapohja 1996, Boorstin 1961/1975).

Television gets involved with heroes through 1) the economics of big money, 2) the elite status as legitimized through the media, 3) the enter-
taining style of play that captures viewer attention, and 4) a rare ingredi-
ent, media charisma. A person with media charisma receives more atten-
tion and a higher status in sports media culture (Altheide & Snow 1991).

Altheide & Snow (1991, 238) have noted that media sports culture has
created the “new athlete”. He plays for the sake of the “show”, as op-
posed to gritty head to head competition for its own sake. In social psy-
chological terms, the significant other for the new athlete is the crowd, the
statistics in the record book, and the media story. The old nonmedia cul-
ture athlete was oriented more to other players, and they were not accus-
tomed to being evaluated by the media, especially off the field. Altheide
& Snow make here the distinction between heroes and celebrities: at best,
these old-timers were heroes and legends, not celebrities. The important
criterion was in the particular game, and the game was everything.

The combination of hero and celebrity is an extremely fragile one. In
May 1995 the headlines of newspapers and the covers of weeklies were
full of stories about Lindström. One of the most striking episodes was the
commercial MTV3’s television auction the day after the World champi-
onships final, where Lindström intuitively decided to sell his gold medal
for good purposes. However, the programme time was running out and
the auction had to be cut short after one hasty offer: a disappointing
30,000 Finnish marks was paid for the precious medal.

But this was not the whole story. The sale of the medal, and the stories
in the evening papers the day after, caused such a uproar among the Fin-
nish people that two days later the head of MTV3 Pekka Hyvärinen had to
apologize to Lindström for the abrupt ending of the show. The medal was
eventually returned to Lindström.

In mid-June the country’s leading evening paper Ilta-Sanomat reported
that philosopher Esa Saarinen was planning to write a book about Lind-
ström. Such was the status of Lindstöm that the author of a book about
him had to be someone like Socrates: no one else could understand the
genius of Lindström.

Gradually, the heroism of Lindström was emptied by the endless me-
dia coverage. Towards the end of 1995 and more so in 1996, the mytho-
logical charisma of Lindström somehow vanished. The Finnish national
team did not win another gold, not even a medal in the 1996 Cham-
pionships. There was no magic left, Lindström had become an ordinary mor-
tal, and his position had changed decisively, from hero to a mere celeb-
ritv.
Media sphere as a playing field of heroes

Heroes are, according to Karvonen (1988, 34), ideal actors on a public level or in the public sphere. This sphere is constructed by the media, as media texts constitute versions of reality in ways which depend on the social positions and interests and objectives of those who produce them. They do so through choices which are made at various levels in the process of producing texts (Fairclough 1995, 103–104).

Dahlgren (1992, 12) insists that journalism, as political communication, constitutes a link between the setting of the private sphere (home, friends, etc.) and the public sphere of current events and politics. On the other hand, Silverstone (1988, 25) is willing to place television in between the sacred and the profane. He adds that television provides a forum and a focus for the mobilization of collective energy and enthusiasm, for example, in the presentation of national events, from coronations to great sporting fixtures (“televised ritual”), and television “also marks a consistently defined but significant boundary in our culture between the domestic and taken-for-granted world and that of the unreachable and otherwise inaccessible world of, for example, show business, Dallas and the moon landings”.

Through the construction of this public sphere the media can, at least indirectly, affect the audience. But not vice versa. The audience has a certain position. It has the right to watch television and read newspapers, so the audience consumes the public sphere. But the audience cannot directly or immediately affect the media! So the heroes are chosen and created by the media. And I want to underline the above argument of Silverstone about the position of television in between the sacred and the profane: the heroes of television come from a different world, they are not profane but almost sacred.

In search of national identity

It is remarkable that this century of the mass media which is now drawing to its close, is also the century of modern sports. Itkonen & Knuuttila (1992) have suggested that sports heroes can be divided into six different categories in the history of Finnish sports. They call the first one “The Local talents”; the second one is “The Champions of the arenas”; the third one “Those who ran Finland onto the world Atlas”; the fourth one “The Fighters of the radio”; the fifth one “The Stars of television”; and
the sixth one “The Media operators”. Curt Lindström fits easily into the last category. These categories are related to the ways of communication. According to Altheide (1985, 15) every age has a dominant medium (see Postman 1987). And this medium has a significant role in the shaping and writing of history; as Altheide (1985, 26) argues, history speaks through the medium in use.

The reason the heroes are worth studying lies in the meaning of heroes as material for identity construction. Since we are dealing with media that have nationwide and even global coverage, it is evident that these media-made heroes have to do with national identity. Whatever the nation in question, the quest for identity inevitably involves questions of representation, nostalgia, mythology, and tradition (Jarvie 1993). The winning of the World Championship gold medals and the heroism of Curt Lindström, as we have seen, negotiate easily with all the mentioned aspects.

Here we also find an interesting dualism, as we have seen Curt Lindström, a Swedish coach, as a Finnish national hero. Lindström became a symbol of Finnish quality as the World Championship was personalized in him. This can be so explained that while Lindström was raised to hero status, he lost at once his original, Swedish, nationality in the eyes of Finnish sports fans. Lindström, or his media representation, became a liminal person who lived in between the real and the fantasy, who was not yet a god but no more a human like the heroes of ancient Greek mythology.

Sports is quite often referred to as light entertainment, but it also has educational aspects. It also provides younger people with elements for building their identity. Youngsters are socialized through sports, and this is one way of becoming a full member of the community (see Dahlén 1995). The sports community tends to be a world of its own, so the media sports provide an opportunity to join this special world. Watching sports on television is like a ritual: the more you watch, the quicker you get initiated into the sports world. This means that you learn by heart not just the values of sports, but especially the values of sports journalism, which, according to Hemánus (1973), are: masculinity, competitiveness, and nationalism.

The question of national identity, “who are we”, was very acute in 1995 when Finland had just become a member of the European Union. The fact that Lindström, who was not one of “us”, who came from abroad, could give the Finns a World Championship gold medal in ice-hockey, was a positive sign for the suspicious Finns: “Joining” Europe does not have to be so bad after all, as this Swedish coach could give us the title. There emerged spontaneous festivities all around Finland, and
this “communitas” feeling lasted for several days partly because the media were telling news about similar activities all around the country. It was an excellent example of media saturation in our daily lives (Real 1989). For a short period of time common values were turned upside down, time lost its meaning. The popular festival was like a national *rites de passage*, with Curt Lindström in the central liminal role. It was a welcoming of a new European identity that is very much a media product, but even more it was a celebration of the survival of the Finnish identity.

We cannot explain the festivities by Lindström’s heroic charisma alone, nor by the popularity of icehockey in Finland. The media were centrally involved in reporting the historical world championships, constructing the media event, but we need to look deeper at society and that particular moment in time to understand the public reactions. One crucial element is the timing. Lindström, the hero, was only one part of the puzzle.

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**Notes**

1 This article is based on the author’s Licentiate thesis: “Se on siinä!” Tutkimus jääkiekon maailmanmestaruudesta, mediasta ja urheilusankaruuden tuottamisesta. (A study of hockey world championship, the media, and the production of sports heroes) University of Jyväskylä 1996.

**References**


Regional media as creator and voice of a collective "we"

Jaana Hujanen

There are in Finland 22 regional newspapers which have a circulation of between 30,000 and 140,000. Regional newspapers share an openly political past: all but one of them were founded as political organs. By the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, however, political ideology had been replaced by regionalism and an accentuated regionalistic role, highly effective in marketing the newspaper (Salokangas 1993). Regional newspapers carry out the role of regional voice, the defender.

Regionalism is typically defined as an activity whose purpose is to emphasize regional characteristics within a state and to oppose efforts at unification (Bradshaw 1988; Brown 1983). Regionalism, as a territorial practice, thus falls between nationalism and localism, and often intends to promote territorial interests. Today it appears that there is a tendency to replace the definition of traditional regionalism with a new one based on cooperation between regions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the regionalistic roles of the Finnish media. Related to the concept of regionalism, a regionalistic discourse is understood here as a news and editorial discourse which integrates and/or separates circulation areas from each other. Besides regionalistic discourses, regional role also embraces the policy of the newspaper.

The main purpose of the paper is to answer the dual questions of how and why. I will begin by addressing the issue of how regional newspapers carry out their regional roles and how a region is constructed. Secondly, I will look at the question of why the regional media still emphasize regional characteristics.

As a consequence of migration and rising educational levels, it is often argued that regional characteristics are no longer immediately apparent. However, this paper suggests that despite changes in social and historical contexts, the regional media still share a need for regional culture and identity. Accordingly, the regional media are considered as an institutional practice continually (re)producing and (re)defining regions as well as social identities. The article concludes with a discussion about the re-
source value of the emerging region and its (symbolic) borders in the ongoing struggle for circulation areas.

In previous studies a region has been regarded as a geographical location (or area). On the other hand, a region has also been defined as an historically continuous process (Paasi 1986a, see also Urry 1995) or as discourse (Häkli 1994), etc. In the latter definitions a region is defined as a construct that is continually reproduced in individual and institutional practices (e.g. economic, political, legal, cultural, etc.). Likewise, a region is understood here as discourse rather than a concrete category.

Material and methods

The newspaper texts used for this study date from 1987, before the idea of Finland joining the European Union (EU) began to gain currency. However, the study does not focus on the regionalistic roles of the Finnish media during one year only. Considering the fact that the regionalistic roles and discourses of the media continually reflect social circumstances, the findings also provide insights into regionalism in varying social and historical contexts.

The newspapers selected for this study originally differed in their political affiliation. Ilkka and Keskipohjanmaa favoured the Centre Party (the latter was declared politically independent in May 1996), Pohjalainen favoured the Conservative Party until 1991, Kaleva, Hämeen Sanomat, Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, and Forssan Lehti propose to be politically independent. Moreover, the papers differ in terms of the cultural and economic characteristics of their circulation areas. Ilkka, Pohjalainen, Keskipohjanmaa, and Kaleva are circulated in the “periphery”, i.e. in the central or northern parts of the country. By contrast, Hämeen Sanomat, Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, and Forssan Lehti appear in southern Finland, near the “centre”.

The study is based on textual analysis. First, I will analyse the agenda; secondly, the headlines pertaining to the circulation area; and finally, regionalistic news and editorial discourses on the circulation area. In addition, the editors-in-chief and two journalists from each paper were interviewed. The purpose of the interviews was to study the policy of the newspaper, its journalistic culture (news gathering and production processes), as well as the attitudes, values, etc. of individual journalists concerning regional identity (see Orjala 1995).
In autumn 1995, Jouni Backman, the Finnish Minister for Administrative Affairs, proposed dividing Finland into five (or six) provinces (a translation used by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior for “lääni”) instead of the current 11. In Backman’s proposal the circulation area of Keskisuomalainen would lose its administrative status. The lively debate in the media regarding the proposal highlights the competition for circulation areas in a current situation. Consequently, the regionalistic discourses in Keskisuomalainen on province structure are also examined. The texts cover the time period of January–October 1996.

During this time period, Keskisuomalainen proposed that the area embracing five provinces, including Central Finland (in Finnish “Keski-Suomi”), be called “Väli-Suomi” (“Middle Finland”). Due to the fact that the name of the region is crucial for creating the symbolic significance of the emerging region, this study also focuses on the new term.

Spatially biased agenda

In the agenda analysis the items were grouped into local, regional, national or international news. Items dealing with the communities within the circulation area were defined as local, items pertaining to the circulation area as a whole were considered regional, and items dealing with the nation or communities outside the circulation area were defined as national. Finally, items dealing with foreign countries were regarded as international (see Paasi 1986b; Kariel & Rosenvall 1981).

The percentages of local, regional, national and international news in each of the seven newspapers varied considerably. When these percentages were averaged for all seven papers, national news emerged on top, accounting for 43% of the total news items. Local news followed with 35%, international news, 17% and regional, 5%.

At the agenda level the newspaper market situation is of special importance. The paper is more likely to focus on local and regional events in news gathering if there is another regional paper competing for the same readers. Accordingly, local news coverage may be as high as 50%.

By contrast, a national paper, as a competitor, forces the regional paper to concentrate on national and international news as well. Although regionalism at the agenda level is mostly implicit (no more than 2–9% of the news items deal with the circulation area as a whole, while local news dominate with 26–51%), the results indicate that the media profile is regional rather than national.
One of the main conclusions of the "agenda setting" approach to the study of media impact has been that the press may not be successful in telling people what to think, but it is successful in telling its readers what to think about (McCombs & Shaw 1972, 177). In the case of spatial information (information dealing with regions, places and locations), the media bring places beyond the realm of direct experience to the attention of media users and then indicate how much importance to attribute to such places by giving varying prominence to each (Walmsley 1980, 343). Equally, while setting the circulation area boundaries the agenda plays a major role in the emergence of the region.

The textual analysis indicates that the headline and/or the beginning of a regional news item is a point of view and a frame of reference.

Regional media are distinguished by their own temporal and spatial logic required for presenting events in a particular manner. The temporal and spatial dimensions of an event become altered through the media (Altheide 1985, 31; Altheide & Snow 1991, 61–62). Consequently, the power of the regional media lie in the ability and position to choose and set the agenda filtered through their own regionalistic frame of reference (affecting news and source selection, topics discussed, etc.).

Media — a twofold regional symbol

In his theoretical framework for understanding the emergence of regions and the constitution of regional identity, Paasi (1986a) understands the media as part of the emergence of institutions which proportionally serve to strengthen the significance and the role of the territorial symbols and signs including the name of the region, etc. Institutions refer both to formal establishments (for example, the mass media, education) and to local or non-local practices in the sphere of politics, economics, legislation, and administration, that is, culture.

Consequently, the region attains specific symbols, that is organizations and institutions, which are linked with it through their identification apparatus (territorial symbolism), function and/or areas of influence (market areas, etc.). The emergence of regions is the field of group formation, in which the "supraindividual" logic of regional history is realized: individuals are socialized into varying regional community memberships (Paasi 1991).

The name of the region is one of the territorial symbols that is crucial for creating the symbolic significance of the region. Moreover, the power
to (re)define and (re)interpret the names of the regions provides the media with an apparatus for the constitution of regions and regional identities.

Traditionally, Finnish regions (a translation used by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior for "(talous)maakunta") lack an administrative status. Accordingly, there are continuous disputes about regional boundaries in various parts of the country. Concurrently, the regional media are continually (re)producing their circulation area boundaries also as those of the region by using specific name(s). Thus the media, first, choose titles with which to pertain to the circulation area.

Secondly, the results suggest that the regional media may aim at redefining an area name. For example, Ilkka has been redefining the historical Ostrobothnia according to its circulation area boundaries. Traditionally, the historical Ostrobothnia has been understood as a significantly larger area. Redefining regions in Ostrobothnia can be interpreted, however, as the consequence of the ongoing struggle of Ilkka and Pohjalainen for the same audiences and advertisers.

Third, the regional media may propose a new regional concept. Keskisuomalainen proposed during the Finnish EU parliament elections that the area embracing five provinces, including Central Finland, be called "Väli-Suomi"/"Middle Finland". At the same time, the paper emphasized the "fear" that all Finnish members of parliament would come from the "south". Following the "fact" that "Helsinki" needed a counterforce, the paper proposed "Väli-Suomi". This is not, however, all there is to "Middle Finland".

Keskisuomalainen started cooperation with five regional newspapers. "Väli-Suomi" covers, interestingly, the circulation areas of these five papers. Then, focusing on "Middle Finland" admittedly indicates the media strategy to create a counterforce to the national media (Helsingin Sanomat), and, possibly, to expand the future circulation area in Central Finland (cf. the following editorial, translated from Finnish).

The future of the regional newspapers in Middle Finland is bright if the papers share the will and the ability to cooperate. At the same time, the media can point the way to other collaboration which is in the best interest of Middle Finland (Keskisuomalainen 31.8.1996).

The role of the media in the institutionalization of regions should therefore not be taken for granted. Since the existence of a circulation area also depends on the provincial structure, the interests and motives of the regional media are of major importance.
Regional culture — “reality” or a “project”

Regionalistic news items and editorials are understood in this study as discourse. Discourse refers to language use; discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. Viewing language use as social practice implies that it is a mode of action and that it is always a socially and historically situated mode of action (see Fairclough 1992, 1993; cf. Foucault 1972).

Thus, regionalistic discourse is viewed as a way of representing a region, and regional identity. The question of whether a regionalistic discourse is true or false is less important than that it produces meaningful knowledge about a region.

Regionalistic news and editorial discourses/items are regarded as discourses/items which express and emphasize 1) the specific character of the region (culture, nature, and people), 2) a regional “we”-spirit, 3) demand regional solidarity and cooperation, 4) stress regionalism/provincialism (e.g. “every region should have an administration of its own”), and 5) polarize the circulation area with other areas (see Paasi 1986b; see also Table 1.).

The discourse which emphasizes the value of regional identity (people, nature or culture) is not apparent in southern Finland’s newspapers (see Table 1). Accordingly, the editors-in-chief in southern Finland do not value regional culture and identity as do their colleagues in Ilkka, Pohjalainen and Keskipohjanmaa.

The flow of migration within Finland has been from north to south. Accordingly it can be argued that regional identity remains most obscure in the Helsinki region. However, the opposing viewpoints of the media cannot be reduced to varying social circumstances. While highlighting regional characteristics, the situation of the media in the newspaper market also affects their regionalistic role.

Luostarinen and McInnes (1992, 12) propose that the media in Scotland value national culture depending on the respective audience. Similarly, the Finnish regional newspapers propose the idea of indispensable regional culture when it is regarded as a resource value in the struggle for circulation areas. Thus, the value of regional culture is to constitute a circulation area rather than to reflect local cultures and local/regional identities.
Table 1.
Occurrence of articles relevant to the regional roles and regional identity in the newspapers studied in 1987.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regionalistic news items &amp; editorials</th>
<th>Il</th>
<th>Po</th>
<th>Kes</th>
<th>Ka</th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>ESS</th>
<th>FL</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special character of the region</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional “we”-spirit</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personification of the region</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional solidarity &amp; cooperation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincialism/regionalism</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarizing regions</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending individual regional plans, proposals, etc.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Il=Ilkka, Po=Pohjalainen, Kes=Keskipohjanmaa, Ka=Kaleva, HS=Hämeen Sanomat, ESS=Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, FL=Forssan Lehti

“We” — the circulation area

Regional “we”-spirit refers here to the discourse which expresses a regional feeling of communality and togetherness. It is closely connected with the discourse on regional cooperation and solidarity. While the former is characterized by headlines in which a regional subject “we” “celebrates”, “wins”, etc., the latter requires a collective “we” for cooperation.
The articulations of a regional "we"-spirit exemplify, in particular, regionalism in Ilkka and Pohjalainen, whereas in Etelä-Suomen Sanomat and Hämeen Sanomat a region infrequently "beats" or "breaks" another region. The discourse demanding regional solidarity appears, however, in all the papers analysed.

The interest of the media in constituting a circulation area rather than in reflecting a regional communality appears in whose "we"-spirit is emphasized. Kaleva, for instance, as the voice of "Northern Finland", calls for solidarity between the people of "Northern Finland", which it nevertheless takes to refer to a much larger region than its actual circulation area (the Oulu region). Still, (re)defining Northern Finland provides Kaleva with an apparatus for expanding the circulation area, as in the following editorial (translated from Finnish):

When considering the whole of Northern Finland, there is more need for new jobs in Lapland than in the Oulu region. Consequently, it would be more rational to locate a new factory in Lapland, near the Sokli mine. Naturally, the city leaders in Oulu are not expected to examine the issues from the point of view of the whole of northern Finland. It is the responsibility of the media to explain to politicians, as well as to managers, the most reasonable solution in this case. (Kaleva 12.8.1996)

The conscious avoidance on the part of the regional media to juxtapose people or communities within the circulation area also suggests the idea of promoting a collective "we"-feeling. The media also give the impression that they are the only regional institutions working for the benefit of the whole region, unlike the arguing communities or MPs whose political ideology often supersedes regionalism.

In contrast to what was expected, the journalists from northern Finland papers suggested in their interviews that individual journalists are not characterized by a feeling of communality. More importantly, the interviews indicated that a "we"-spirit is produced and reproduced in media routines, in journalistic cultures. Thus, the effect of personal attitudes, values, and beliefs on regionalistic roles seems to be indirect, operating only to the extent that journalists hold power to override organizational routines and/or professional values (see Shoemaker & Reese 1991).

Fairclough (1993, 142) suggests that there is a major shift from so-called signification-with-reference to signification-without-reference. In the latter there is no real object, only the constitution of an "object" (signified) in discourse. The interviews as well as the text-based examination of the regionalistic discourses indicate that the "we"-spirit of a collective "us" is a "real" construction in discourse.
An administrative status is needed

The news items and editorials which emphasize the regional characteristics and/or "we"-spirit are part of the cultural dimension of regionalism. They aim at constructing regional solidarity and a feeling of togetherness among the people living in the region. Political regionalism, on the other hand, is understood here as journalistic discourse which defends the region and/or circulation area against other areas. This practice is understood to be articulated in the polito-administrative discourses on regionalism/provincialism or on polarizations between regions (see Table 1).

The discourse on regionalism and/or provincialism is characterized by the arguments for regional administration. Moreover, the discourse focuses on social and economic inequality. It should be noted that the discourse talks as there was interdependence between spaces per se. Moreover, it suggests that the centre is exploiting the periphery.

Political regionalism was strong in the newspapers of central and northern Finland. This was expected in view of the fact that Finnish regions traditionally lack an administrative status, and migration has been from north to south. At the same time, however, the structures of circulation area significantly influence the viewpoints of the regional media. The results indicate that when the circulation area reflects the province boundaries, the paper is likely to consider the province as an indispensable institution for people's everyday lives. On the other hand, when the boundaries of the circulation area differ from those of the province, it is rational for a regional newspaper to speak for regional administration, while provinces lose their resource value. The current politico-administrative discourses in *Keskisuomalainen* on the county structure also lend support to this conclusion.

*Keskisuomalainen* is circulated in the Jyväskylä region. Jyväskylä has the status of a provincial capital of Central Finland (in Finnish "Keski-Suomi", to which the name of the newspaper also refers). If the proposal of the Minister for Administrative Affairs is accepted in Parliament, it will reduce the number of provinces from 11 to 5. Accordingly, the province of Central Finland will be integrated into "Western Finland".

*Keskisuomalainen* has been opposed to Government policy, and has suggested their own "(province)county" (new term introduced by two regional newspapers during the province debate) a status it refuses to give up, cf. the following editorial (translated from Finnish).

The abolishment of the province of Central Finland would mean that an area currently known as Central Finland would cover a significantly
smaller area whose population might be 200,000 people instead of the current 260,000. The change would have dramatic consequences for various regional institutions. (Keskisuomalainen 3.2.1996)

There is increasing competition between places to present themselves as attractive to potential investors, employers and so on, to promote themselves and sell themselves. The interest of the regional media in defending the province boundaries is connected to this increasing competition between the regions. When the circulation area loses its administrative status, that undermines, in one crucial respect, the legitimacy of the regional media’s existence. Thus, the administrative status of the circulation area "forces" Keskisuomalainen to propose the idea of the indispensable province. Consequently, the dispute in the regional media over the number of provinces should be considered as a dispute over spatial structures (circulation areas) rather than administrative structures.

This paper has looked at how the regional media perform the role of regional defender. The question of regionalistic "voices" has so far been almost completely overlooked. However, it is important also to look at whose formulations and definitions constitute the regionalistic roles.

Typically, regionalistic voices are various regional and national officials, e.g. (province) governors, city leaders, and/or members of parliament. The voices suggest that a collective "we" is constituted in the regional institutions rather than emerging from the region. Consequently, a region becomes a reference group, in which the idea of community, produced and reproduced by the practices of institutions, is more substantial than the relations between single individuals conceived of as its members (see Paasi 1986a).

"We" against "they"

It has been characteristic of Finnish regionalism, with its rhetorical forms of expression, to have a strong tendency to create a dichotomy between the southern and northern parts of the country (Paasi 1994; Orjala 1995).

In particular, the regions were polarized in Ilkka, Kaleva, and Keskipohjanmaa. As opposed to the rich south/Helsinki/the capital, the central and northern parts of the country were reduced in the journalistic discourses to the province/the (poor) north. By contrast, the discourse of polarization did not characterize the southern papers. However, even the southern papers accused Helsinki (not the south) of exploiting regions outside the centre.
Shields (1991) emphasizes that the metaphors of north and south are cultural constructions, which have developed in England in part from the literary and journalistic writings of the nineteenth century, and which have afterwards been reinforced by cultural output during the twentieth century. These cultural constructions, importantly, transform the differences of social class into cultural geography. The terms north and south provide the regional media, however, another resource value in the struggle for audiences. Thus, the collective “we” of regional media almost necessarily produces “they” as something opposed to “us”.

In 1987 Northern Finland was suffering from exceptionally high levels of unemployment, causing heavy migration from Lapland to the Helsinki region. This explains in part why a discourse on polarizations appeared in the papers of northern Finland. All in all the study suggests that the regionalistic roles live with societal and historical changes, which, further, indicates that the regionalistic discourses should not only be considered as constitutive but also as socially shaped.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the regionalistic discourses and roles of Finnish media. Regionalistic roles have been discussed from the point of view of the media’s concrete interests. Since a region provides the media with a reference group, it is important that regional culture, province boundaries, and provincial and/or regional administration work for the benefit of the circulation area.

Bourdieu (1991) defines *symbolic power* as power to construct social reality, as an ability to produce representations, which make the groups visible to themselves and others. The power of regional media, then, lies in the ability to construct and (re)define a collective “we”, to make it and its social identity visible in the journalistic discourses.

The value of the emerging region and its (symbolic) borders provide the media with a resource in their struggle for circulation areas. So, despite the changes in the social and historical context, the regional media still share a need for regional cultures and identities. It appears that the regionalism of the Finnish media may be less likely to decrease as long as the structure of the press is based on regions rather than political ideology.
References


How could it happen?
Swedish television news and
the m/s Estonia ferry catastrophe

Eva-Lotta Frid

Introduction

This paper presents some results of my study on the television news coverage of the m/s Estonia ferry catastrophe in 1994.\(^1\) The ferry sank in the Baltic Sea on a stormy night on September 28, just half an hour after water started to force its way through the front ports of the vessel. There were almost one thousand people on board, only 137 were rescued in the extreme weather conditions. More than eight hundred people died. This was the biggest peacetime ferry catastrophe in Swedish history. Twenty-four hours after the accident, there was still very little information about what had happened. It was known that the ferry had gone down very rapidly, that only capsized lifeboats remained at the scene and that more than eight hundred people were still missing. Journalists were probably just as shocked as the rest of the people of Sweden.

The purpose of my study was to find out how the television news in Sweden tried to explain why and how the catastrophe could happen, and how the news tried to make some sense out of what had happened. A related goal was to expose the structure and content of the television news during the same period.

The material on which the study is based are the television news programmes broadcast on two public service television channels Sveriges Television TV 2, Rapport, and Kanal 1, Aktuellt, as well as the news programme on the commercial television channel TV 4, Nyheterarna. The period covered is the first seven days after the catastrophe, i.e. 28 September to 2 October 1994. I considered the use of a qualitative method the most appropriate. The analysis was carried out at two levels: horizontal, or chronological, and vertical, or thematic. The first step was to prepare a summary of the content of the news programmes during the seven days so as to get a picture of the whole.

It soon became apparent that the term cause was going to be very hard to unravel — not least because of the complexity of the event. Three different levels of the term cause could be distinguished: causes of the actual sinking, causes of the enormity of the accident and causes of the whole
event, the background, and structural causes. The first level comprises the more concrete use of the term, referring to actual technicalities: packings, gaskets, screws, eventual damage to the front port and the bow. The second bears the question: Why did so many people die? This mainly includes references to the cold water that caused people to freeze to death within half an hour and the high waves that made the rescue effort so extremely difficult. It also comprises the very fast course of events: it all happened so fast that people did not have a chance to find their way out of their cabins. Finally, there is the more overall use of the term cause that considers the background: e.g. the phenomena of putting luxury hotels on water, the economic interests (or greed) of the shipowners, the time pressure of transport companies.

Cutting across these three levels and uses of the concept of cause were different perspectives or models of explanation in the television news stories which were used to explain the catastrophe. I made a distinction between four different models, which also represent different levels of explanation. I have named them as follows:

— East meets West: a cultural model
— Man forgets about nature: a socio-material model
— The economy rules: an economically based model
— The inevitable: a fatalist model

Even during the very first day of news reporting it is possible to identify themes for explanations, for the allocation of responsibility and guilt. The first model to emerge is the cultural. During the second day, two other perspectives open up, i.e. economy and ship construction. In time, with the ceremonies and memorial services during the weekend, a more fatalistic attitude to the catastrophe could be identified, as some items and reports turned to God and to the sea itself to get an answer to the question “why”.

East meets West: a cultural model

The first perspective identified is one that is characterized by cultural, ideological and political notions of the conditions in the former east European states that were (are) prominent in Swedish society. This is what I have called the cultural model. Within the cultural model explicit and implicit suspicions towards the East are expressed, the idea that Sweden is a better and more developed society, that Sweden is better at dealing with security than other countries in general and east European states
in particular, and that the ferry catastrophe was caused by carelessness, disorder and failure on the part of the country of Estonia. This attitude is an expression of a more general opinion towards the former east European states as being backward and inferior to the West. The cultural model accommodates different explanations, from technicalities such as packings, gaskets, eventual damage to the front port, to ferry management and the professional skill and competence of the staff. However, what characterizes it is that what originates from the east is not as good as what originates from Sweden.

The cultural model emerges for the first time in comparisons with the earlier accident in the Baltic Sea which saw the Polish ferry Jan Hewelius capsize: the connection was made during the first, early morning broadcast at 6 am. The primary comparisons with the Polish ferry concern concrete redeeming causes, that is, that probably the cargo was shifting — which is exactly what happened to the Polish vessel on 13 January 1993. It was made clear that in the case of Jan Hewelius the accident was caused by the captain’s fatal mistakes. The comparisons with Jan Hewelius meant two things: first, it created prejudice concerning the concrete causes (cargo displacement), and second, it led implicitly to the expression that the accident was caused by negligence and the human factor.

Comparisons to earlier accidents are of course nothing unique in this sort of situation; in fact they have become an integral part of the journalistic method in covering accidents and catastrophes. It is important to put things in context and to compare them to other similar incidents. But why, in this case, are the comparisons confined to the Polish ferry Jan Hewelius? And every time that Jan Hewelius was mentioned, reference was made to negligence and disorder. That no one mentioned the catastrophe on the Norwegian ferry Scandinavian Star is understandable, because there the accident was caused by fire breaking out. But in 1987 the British ferry Herald of Free Enterprise capsized because water came in through an open port. However, all morning the dominant theory of what caused the wreckage of m/s Estonia was cargo displacement. It remains unclear whether the comparisons with Jan Hewelius were made because it happened geographically closer, or because Swedish lives were lost in that accident, too, or because it was easy to make the connection because both ferries were east European.

The East-West theme gained a strong foothold, developed and grew fairly freely mostly because of the chairman of the Swedish Seamen’s Union (Svenska sjöfolksförbundet), Anders Lindström. He appeared in all three news programmes during the first day and was allowed to talk with-
out being challenged. He said that the Estonia had not met international safety standards and that the authorities were not adequately prepared for such eventualities. I have found several examples where Lindström explicitly criticizes both east European ferries and the Estonian authorities. That he was partial — his union was involved in a major conflict with the shipping company causing loss of jobs among Swedish seamen — was not mentioned.

Lindström was not the only critic. Another union chairman, Christer Themnér of the Swedish Union of Commanders of Machine (Svenska maskinbefälsförbundet) appeared in all three news programmes voicing his criticism and suspicions towards Estonia and Estonian staff. Reporters, people described as experts on shipping (sometimes other journalists) and even private persons were also allowed to express their criticisms and suspicions towards Estonia and/or other east European countries. This was most noticeable during the first days after the catastrophe, but it continued later as well. For example, reports on the ferry that was going to replace m/s Estonia raised the question as to whether it should have Estonian or Swedish staff.

Even in the very few news items that probably were intended to be positive towards Estonia it was easy to find a patronizing attitude. During the seven days I analysed, the cultural model of explanation was obvious, some days even dominant. Especially in one of the programmes, i.e. Rapport, it had a constant presence and was represented in at least one item a day.

Man forgets about nature: a socio-material model

During spring 1996 the discussion on the wreckage of m/s Estonia focused (apart from the issue of recovering the wreck) on shipping constructions: proof of negligence, routines, corruption in connection with classifications, approvals of design of construction, approvals of the safety system and in inspections. Today, all accusations against Estonia have been dropped. It is now recognized that vessels of the ro-ro type with open car decks are less safe and that the “shoe-box” model causes instability. To a certain extent this theme also appeared in the television news during the first week after the m/s Estonia catastrophe. Items concerning shipping construction were first shown during the second day. I have described this model of explanation as the socio-material model.
The socio-material model includes the perspective that people have forgotten about nature: we human beings believe that we can control it and thereby lack respect for the strength of natural forces.

Within this model I have included news items on the phenomenon of floating luxury hotels. When on board these huge “temples of entertainment”, people tend to forget that they are at sea, until the going gets rough. In some items comparisons are made to the Titanic, the classic shipwreck that has become the stuff of songs and movies. One of the persons interviewed in this connection was a shipping historian, Claes-Göran Wetterholm. He said that the Titanic sank some eighty years ago and no one at that time thought it could happen. And today, no one thought it could happen either. But it did, because we forget that nature is stronger than we are. We should have learnt by now.

Another person who appears in the news programmes is a professor in shipping construction, Olle Rutgersson, who points out that the vulnerable point of the large modern ferry is its open car deck. If water gets into this open deck, the ferry will very quickly lose its stability. In another item Arnold Hansen, manager of a marine research centre, says that the reason why ferries have open car decks is to combine the transportation of cars and people. If ferries were built with watertight bulkheads, catastrophes like this could never happen. It ought to be “unimaginable” to build vessels like this. He says that scientists have known this for a long time. Yet neither he nor the professor make explicit accusations against shipping companies. The problem is more to do with thoughtlessness and ignorance.

The economy rules: an economically based model

During the second day after the catastrophe another theme begins to emerge, that is a more obvious economic perspective. Several items on all three channels pointed out that financial considerations rule the shipping trade and that this increases the risk of accidents. I have called this an economically based model of explanation, which implies criticism towards shipping companies in general and towards the owners of m/s Estonia, Nordström & Thulin, in particular. Several items also express the opinion that Estonia is a backward country and that the shipping company cut its expenses but at the same time compromised safety standards in recruiting Estonian instead of Swedish staff. Two different angles appear
within this model, i.e. that the system is to blame and that the manager of
the shipping company was greedy.

It was most particularly the economic news programme A-Ekonomi
(which is part of Aktuellt) which focused on the whole system of shipping
and trade companies. On the second day they reported that shipping com­
panies are ruled by financial considerations. Ferries are therefore built
with a view to fast loading and unloading: shipping companies are de­
pendent on road transport companies. This also means that ferries must
travel at (too) high speeds in order not to lose valuable time for truckers
who are on their way across the continent. And because of the same time
pressure, the trucks on the car deck are not always properly loaded, which
in turn could lead to overturned trucks.

The other perspective, which is represented above all by the channel
four news programme Nyheterna, is directed more specifically towards
individual persons — in this case the manager of the shipping company
Nordström & Thulin, Ronald Bergman. In one item in particular, on the
second day, he is singled out as responsible for the catastrophe because of
his own personal greed. He is said to have replaced the better-paid Swedish
ish staff with cheaper Estonian staff with a view to increasing his and the
shareholders’ profits. He wants to have cheap labour on all his ships all
over the world. Here we can see the cultural and the economic models
linked together.

This particular reportage is presented in such a manner that an alter­
native reading is very difficult. The previous item concerns a small girl
who has lost her mother. The anchor then comes on saying, “Today the
fury and despair is strong, and the anger is directed towards the shipping
company ... an empire controlled by Ronald Bergman ...” The first shot is
of the luxury entrance to the company’s offices. Then, Bergman appears
in extreme close-up, saying in an irritated voice, “No one will pay the
company one penny more to sail under the Swedish flag”. Then, an expert
on the shipping industry says that Bergman’s only motive is to make more
money.

The director of the Swedish Department of Sea Security (Svenska
Sjösäkerhetsverket), Jan Stenmark, was also among those who criticized
the shipping companies. He said that they fail to report near-accidents.
However, Stenmark only appeared during the first two days after the ac­
cident. It transpired that the reports concerned had in fact been lost in the
office’s internal bureaucracy, which obviously undermined Stenmark’s
credibility.
The inevitable: a fatalist model

The former three models attempted to explain the catastrophe at a more rational level: they tried to single out causes and effects, to apportion blame and responsibility. However, an event of this magnitude also requires explanation at a deeper level, extending all the way to the meaning of life and God. During the first seven days a large number of priests and other representatives of the Church appeared on television, mainly comforting the bereaved rather than trying to explain why the accident had happened. In the television news, they appeared above all during the weekend in items on memorial services. Stories from these services were full of symbols, close-ups and crosses, candle lights and images of Christ.

During the weekend a new theme emerged in the news: the theme of fate, the power of the sea that takes its toll. Accidents such as these are not something that we humans can prevent, they simply must be accepted as inevitable. This is what I have called the fatalist model. Not addressing the issue of causes at all, this, the last model should therefore be called a model of understanding/interpretation. This theme only appears during the weekend. It is probably dependent on the services held during these days and on the fact that the weekend brought a natural break in the flow of news and events.

In the items I have slotted under this model the sea is humanized, treated as if it had a soul, as if it could think and impose demands. The two main perspectives are that the sea will always take its victims and that one should treat the sea with respect. One should not disturb it but pay tribute to it. In this type of item I found a freer form of presentation, including music, more close-ups, pictures of symbols, a slower tempo and even slow motion. As was also evident in other contexts, the form is dependent on the content. This form would be inconceivable in reporting on gaskets or the front port.

Conclusions

In my studies of investigations into other major accidents covered in the media it became clear that besides reports on the number of casualties and the rescue operation, speculations on the causes of the accident had become customary. There is always a need to find someone responsible, someone at whom to direct anger and grief. The interesting thing is to examine what directions the explanations of the accident take.
After the initial chaos when the first sporadic reports of the catastrophe started to come in — a chaos that was clearly reflected in the news broadcasts during the first day — it was probably important to return to the recognizable structure and content of the news. As far as structure was concerned this meant returning to a more usual narrative form and a firm programme structure. This included, for instance, not showing unedited tapes, more reportage instead of telephone interviews and the return of other news. As regards content, this meant reliance on already known ideas of the world to make this large accident intelligible. The conflict of East and West, belief in techniques and economic views of social events are all known phenomena in the time and culture of Swedish society.

That ideas about destiny were given space during the weekend is not really surprising in that weekends always bring a break in the flow of events as departments and offices close their doors. In the absence of new facts, other things must be brought in to fill the programmes.

The different models of explanation reflect ideas and conceptions that were already present in Swedish society and its culture: one could say that the news programmes distributed the available information into pre-structured frames. Working with recognizable frames is a way of introducing a rationale into the inconceivable. It could also be interesting to reflect on what explanations did not occur. No one suggested any theories of terrorism, sabotage or other crimes, nor were there any attempts to explain the catastrophe by reference to a military accident (torpedo, mine, submarine). These might have appeared during the Cold War or in an earlier stage of the liberation process of the Baltic states.

Today there remain very few people who accuse Estonia or the Estonian staff for the terrible accident that happened in the Baltic Sea. In my opinion the prejudice against the state of Estonia occupied too large a role in the reporting on the accident, especially during the first couple of days. Making use of narrative techniques such as binary oppositions, the image of “us” and “them” was built up in both the verbal and visual language of news reporting. “Us” meant above all Sweden, but also Nordic and Western Europe. The opposites used included carefulness—carelessness, control—lack of control, responsibility—irresponsibility, security—insecurity. Dichotomies were also seen in the visual, for instance rusty old ships versus shining new ones.

Studies of other major accidents show that it is not unusual for reporters to get emotionally too involved. This does not, however, explain the fact that the negative reporting on Estonia was prominent throughout the whole first week after the catastrophe; on some days it was even domi-
nant. It appears that the image created during the initial stages of a major event is important to analyses and interpretations presented in the second stage, even if more information is by then available.

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Notes

1 My work was part of a major research project initiated by the Swedish Board of Psychological Defence. The project involved researchers from Estonia, Finland and Sweden.

Media use and everyday life

Bent Steeg Larsen

In recent years family life — and the concept of everyday life in general — has become a central theme in research concerned with the roles and functions of the media in modern societies, both empirically and theoretically. Morley (1986) and Lull (1988) are empirical studies concerned with television viewing in the everyday context of the family. Silverstone (1994) is an attempt to develop a general theory of the links between everyday life and television viewing. While these works deal specifically with television, the works of Scannell (1988) and Thompson (1995) offer a description of the development of the media and the impact of the media on the conditions of social life in modern society.

In this article my intention is to follow these very relevant attempts to understand the role of the media in everyday life. My approach does not differ radically from the works mentioned above. However, I would like to point out a very important aspect of media use, which, I think, has been more or less overlooked in recent years: the interplay between the most commonly used media in everyday life and the changing functions of these different media types in the everyday context.

Media use in present-day society is at an unprecedented level. We turn on the radio in the morning, browse through the headlines in the morning paper, listen to talk and music from the radio while working, read papers and magazines in the afternoon, possibly surf the Internet on the computer, and watch television in the evening. Our everyday needs for news, entertainment, relaxation and so forth are not met by one single medium, but by various different types of media. This may all seem quite trivial. However, my point is that the media do not exist, and are not used, independently of each other as far as the user is concerned. In order to understand the functions of mass media for the user in everyday life — and the effect of mass media in modern societies in general — we must accept that most people have a kind of media budget in their everyday life. An important task for qualitative research in the future is indeed to investigate the interplay between the different media we use on a daily basis. So compared with research which focuses on one single media type or media technology, my approach here is a “holistic” one.
A primary concern in this article is with the question of how we as subjects experience everyday life. Also, I will be addressing the question of how the daily use of media can be regarded as actions which take on their meaning as part of the context of everyday life. The focus is thus on the qualitative aspects of media use. I will introduce some of the basic concepts proposed by the Austrian sociologist and phenomenologist Alfred Schutz (1899–1959) and relate these concepts to media use in everyday life. Alfred Schutz did not incorporate the media in his theories of everyday life, but his theories nevertheless contain some very interesting notions on the structure and dynamics of everyday life which are very relevant in studies of media use.

A central concern in the writings of Alfred Schutz is with how we as subjects constitute a sense of ourselves and the world. This, I believe, is a very useful starting-point because we need to see media use as an inseparable part and even a constitutive element of everyday life. This is the main topic of this article. I would like to begin by describing a specific case, namely radio listening in Denmark. By presenting some of the research done in this area, I hope to make clear how the use of radio can be seen as an everyday activity with constitutive qualities and functions for the listener.

Let me start by briefly describing the radio situation in Denmark in quantitative terms.

Radio in Denmark

Denmark has both national, regional and local radio stations. Danmarks Radio is operated by the national Danish broadcasting corporation: it has three nationwide channels, including nine regional stations spread out across the country. There are a total of some 300 local radio stations, of which 150 are financed wholly or partly by advertising revenues, while the remaining 150 are grassroots stations (Andersen 1995, 71). Around 80% of total listening time is spent on Danmarks Radio, 20% on local stations and foreign radio (Radiolytning i Danmark 1992–1995, 4).

About 90% of the Danish population aged over 13 listen to the radio during the week. Most people listen from Monday to Friday, less so on Saturdays and Sundays. From Monday to Friday, the average listener aged over 13 spends about 2.5 hours a day listening to the radio; on Saturdays and Sundays the figure is lower at about 2 hours and 45 minutes a day.
Radio prime time is in the morning. Within the space of just four hours between 5 am and 9 am, a total of almost 2.7 million listeners tune into some radio station. That represents more than 60% of the Danish population over 13. The number of listeners at any single moment in time peaks at 1.6 million between 7 am and 7.15 am. The number of listeners begins slowly to fall after 9 am, but peaks again from 12 to 12.30 pm, when Danmarks Radio broadcasts its news on all three nationwide channels. The number of listeners then drops again, falling to a level which never exceeds around 160,000 after 7 pm — compared to 10 times as many listeners in the morning. After 7 pm television takes over, and is by far the most widely used medium from 7 pm till about midnight. Only 6 to 7% of the Danish population listen to the radio during these evening hours.

It is important to note here that this temporal structure in listening behaviour is very stable. Statistical measurements on radio use have been carried out for a number of years in Denmark, and the figures have repeatedly shown the same stable and regular structure. The number of listeners may fluctuate, but the overall structure remains the same, season after season, year after year.

The objective daily schedule

So what does statistical information like this tell us? First of all it tells us about the time geography or temporal rhythm of media use and indeed of everyday life in general. I shall call the overall temporal pattern of media use (such as this one with the radio) the objective daily schedule of everyday life.

The term objective daily schedule describes at one level the typical patterns of media use, i.e. how most people use the media during the day. But at another level — as I just mentioned — the statistics also describe the way in which everyday life in itself is organized in terms of when we do things, and which things we do at a particular moment in time during the day. For example: The temporal pattern of typical radio use reflects the way the working day — the “nine to five” working schedule — can be said to organize our day.

Looking at the statistical macrostructures, the radio is quite apparently the preferred medium during the time of the day we normally call the “working day”. Even though it is possible to listen to the radio 24 hours a day in Denmark, and even though not everyone has nine-to-five jobs, the traditional structure of the working day, the usual nine-to-five round, is
reflected in the listening-structure. When all the duties of the day are over and done with, at least as far as the wage-earning part of it is concerned, television seems to take over.

Talking about people's media budget, it seems that there is a kind of division of labour between radio and television in everyday life. People listen to the radio during those parts of the day when they can be described as being active, i.e. when (most) people are preparing themselves for the working day in the morning, driving to or from their places of work, or are actually working at their workplaces, earning their wages.

Radio is of course a much better suited than other media to simultaneous use, with other activities. Radio is a so-called secondary medium (e.g. Crisell 1986, 15), which means that it is not used on its own but as part of some accompanying activity, often regarded by people as the primary, more important activity.

Analysis of the objective daily schedule represents a quantitative macro-level of analysis at which we identify certain main characteristic features of the way in which we organize our everyday life. These macro-structures give us preliminary information on how media use is implicated in everyday life. It does so because statistics highlight some very regular and repetitive structures in media use. And regular and repetitive actions are exactly what characterize everyday life. As Anthony Giddens points out: everyday life is characterized by rituals and routines which we carry out every day (Giddens 1984, 60). It is routines that make social life possible in the first place because daily routines give everyday life its quality of predictability and ordinariness (see e.g. Silverstone 1994, 166), of a world that we can take for granted and in which we can do things "as usual" without having to experience everything or every situation as problematic and "unknown".

However, our daily, repeated actions are also an indication of what could be termed the objective conditions of everyday life. For example: The stable and regular structure of radio use reflects how for most people the temporal structure of the nine to five working day organizes our actions. These are objective conditions in the sense that we, as individual subjects, are unable to change them — at least without to a great deal of trouble. Most adults have to go to work each day at a certain time, for a certain period of time; and most people do the same thing at the same time each day. These routines go together to form a daily schedule, a repetitive time structure of daily activities to which we have to adapt. As Giddens points out, referring to Lévi-Strauss, time in modern societies is not linear, but reversible (Giddens 1987, 144). This means that our rou-
tine behaviour and repeated daily actions produce and reproduce the conditions for social life in modern societies.

It may be argued perhaps that I am attaching too much importance to the working day as an organizing factor of everyday life. However, I would insist that qualitative research needs to pay more attention than it does to knowledge derived from macro-level studies in order to supplement the evidence from qualitative micro-analysis. Qualitative micro-analysis tends to stress individuality and change, whereas statistical macro-analysis suggests that individuals have a great deal in common (e.g. the temporal patterns of our everyday lives) and that times are not changing as rapidly as we may be inclined to believe (see e.g. Rosengreen 1994, 3–29). The question of why we both act and “read media texts” in the same way seems to me far more interesting than to highlight diverging or oppositional “readings” that micro-level reception analysis has been eager to document during the past ten years or more (e.g. Fiske 1989).

The reason I want to stress the organizing role of the working day is that I consider this more acceptable than to suggest that our daily lives are organized by the output of the media. By the working day, I do not in fact mean the actual working day in a literal, concrete sense, but as a kind of mental construction which (both mentally and practically) divides our day into major time bundles (reproductive time including sleep, work time and leisure time) and which informs when to do what — most often synchronized with other people’s actions.

The discussion below looks at how and why the use of the media becomes such an integrated part of our daily activities. that question cannot be answered on the basis of quantitative data alone. For this purpose we need to have access to qualitative evidence on the subjective daily schedule — which of course is a supplement to the objective daily schedule. The discussion of everyday life as a context for qualitative analysis assumes much importance here.

**Everyday life as context**

The growing interest shown in the field of mass communication research in ethnography (see e.g. Moores 1993) has given added importance to the concept of context. Morley and Silverstone (1991) point out how the roles and effects of the media cannot be understood in isolation from the everyday contexts in which the media use is deeply embedded:
We need to investigate context — the specific ways in which particular communications technologies come to acquire particular meanings and thus come to be used in different ways, for different purposes, by people in different types of households (Morley & Silverstone 1991, 149).

But how exactly do we define and investigate this context? Two interrelated matters need to be highlighted here. Firstly, media use as such is a constitutive element of the everyday context. Secondly, and as a consequence, everyday life cannot be identified or treated as a self-contained or independent object of analysis. Everyday life must be regarded as a process, as repeated actions, and media use must be considered as a processual and action-oriented phenomenon.

Everyday life is not only a context “surrounding” media use; media use is not something “extra-ordinary” in everyday life. Instead, as Thompson (1995) points out, we must look at media use as “a routine, practical activity which individuals carry out as an integral part of their [the media users’] everyday lives” (Thompson 1995, 38).

When media use becomes a routinized part of everyday life, this is mainly due to the temporal organization of the media output. According to Scannell (1988), the temporal organization of media output is so deeply implicated in the temporal arrangements of modern life that the temporal organization has a more important social and cultural impact than the contents of the media. Scannell describes how the programmes of the broadcast media, radio and television, historically have transformed from being broadcast as unique “occasions” to now being broadcast as “domestic utilities” (Scannell 1988, 24) because the temporal arrangement of programming is conformed to the temporal patterns of everyday life (Scannell 1992, 334). In that way, broadcasting has increasingly become part of the routines of daily life.

Scannell suggests that the temporal symmetry between broadcasting and everyday life both produces and re-produces the conditions for social life in modern societies. The media mediate modernity, Scannell argues, because the media continuously and as a routine bring both the “public” and the “private” together into a world in common for whole populations (Scannell 1988, 27–28). Thus the media constitute a whole new public sphere. The media play an important part in making modern life understandable, knowable and familiar. The media play an important part in maintaining and constantly reproducing a fundamental trust in the world, which Giddens calls “ontological security” (Giddens 1984). Ontological security is the existential experience of belonging to the world where we
as individuals can trust that the world (both the natural and the social world) is as it appears to be and that we can take most things for granted.

The concept of ontological security describes a very general aspect of media use in modern societies. However, we do not listen to the same radio channels, we do not read the same newspapers and we do not watch the same programmes on television. Alfred Schutz defines the term *horizon* (Schutz 1970a, 318) in a way which makes the term a useful starting point for describing the way we use the media differently and attend to different media types, genres, etc.

The concept of horizon describes, in short, how each individual in a specific situation has a mental awareness of that situation and how that awareness is surrounded by a "fringe" of knowledge, expectations, memories, etc. which together form a horizon for the specific cognitive effort related to the situation. A horizon is mostly "subconscious" in that the horizon surrounding the specific situation or act confirms that everything is as usual and that the act in progress can continue without any disturbance. Schutz’s important point is that these individually constituted horizons are not naturally given, but have to be maintained and reaffirmed by the individual. My thesis is that the media play a part in the daily constituting of horizons surrounding our actions in everyday life. Our differentiated use of different media can to some extent be explained by our need to open up and demarcate the horizons we constitute in different situations at different times during the day. When constituting horizons we are involved in a process in which we try to create and maintain integrity, a balance between self and the world, between the public and the private, and which supports, as Thompson (1995, 43) puts it, "a sense of self" that makes us able to pursue our objectives in the world.

In the case of radio use, listeners to morning radio select their input from the radio in widely differing ways. Some listeners want to know about the news of the world. Some listeners consciously avoid the global in favour of the local, others simply prefer music and the weather forecasts. The point is that we establish different horizons in the actual situation and that these horizons allow us to act in a satisfactory way in the situation. We have different ways of situating ourselves in the world and our differentiated media use plays an important part in maintaining our own integrity.

The concept of horizon points to the fact that we are placed in different situations in the course of everyday life. When we constitute different horizons, this is a way of adjusting to the *conditions* of everyday life. Media use can thus be regarded as actions which allow us to *handle* some of
these conditions of everyday life. This notion points at the second aspect of everyday life as context, the question of how we identify and explore the everyday context.

Everyday life is not something substantial that we can define as something formal or as a self-contained object for analysis. Everyday life has to be considered as a processual concept. A description of the lived everyday life can serve as a point of departure for the theme we want to analyse. This, in practice, means that we can approach everyday life by looking at the activities, relations and processes which create and re-create everyday life.

Instead of trying to identify everyday life as an object for analysis we can, as was just pointed out, define the conditions of everyday life and the way in which we try to handle these conditions. To approach everyday life this way is of course connected to Giddens and the theory of structuration (Giddens 1984), a theory that defines subjects as agents that shape and reshape but also change the objective structures which makes actions possible. According to Schutz’s concept of the life-world, everyday life is the “place” or sphere where subjectivity and objectivity are integrated. Everyday life is where the objective conditions of life manifest themselves to the subject, where they become real and unavoidable circumstances for action. Objective conditions are fundamental conditions of life in modern societies; for instance, the working day creates temporal, spatial and social boundaries for the individual and the individuals’ opportunities for self-realization. These conditions are objective in the sense that they are not only constituted by the individual, but they are beyond the capacity of the single individual to change these conditions.

However, this does not mean to say that there is no room for subjectivity in everyday life. Our differentiated use of media is perhaps an expression of our attempt to balance between subjectivity and objectivity in everyday life. But given the fact, on the other hand, that so many people use the same media, listen to the same programmes (e.g. morning radio), it is because we as subjects try to constitute a “world in common”, to project some objectivity, something unchangeable into everyday life that makes it such a predictable and familiar place to be. A place with a horizon where, as Schutz puts it, “I can always do it again” (Schutz 1970a, 318).

Using the concepts of time, space and social relations, as defined by Alfred Schutz (Schutz 1970, 1974), everyday life can be described as conditions which bring about daily needs that we can try to satisfy in different ways. In this way media use becomes an integral part of everyday
life in the current analysis. I shall describe Schutz's concepts of time, space and social relations in more detail later on.

But how do we identify and study the objective conditions of everyday life and the way we as subjects handle these conditions? As for the conditions of everyday life, I have described how the macro structures of media use, the objective daily schedule, can point out some of the temporal, spatial and social conditions which can be used to highlight relevant contextual "areas" of everyday life in the study of media use. The task for qualitative research is to identify the subjective daily schedule, the lived and experienced rhythm of everyday life which creates the stable patterns of the objective daily schedule. The question is what motivates media use, what it is that media users use the media to manage in their everyday lives? At this point, I think, the concept of everyday life as developed by Alfred Schutz offers some very useful insights.

**Everyday life according to Schutz**

The work of Alfred Schutz can be described as sociology based on phenomenological considerations. The overriding concern in all his work was to transform a phenomenological description of daily life into a comprehensive sociology on everyday life. Schutz's theory is an ontology on everyday life which attempts to describe what makes social life possible in the first place. Schutz, then, describes how we basically constitute our "being" in everyday life, and at the same time he emphasizes an action-oriented, pragmatic and social dimension in his theories; or, as he preferred to describe his analytical intentions, his aim is to explore "what makes the social world tick" (Schutz 1970, xi). This social and dynamic dimension in Schutz's concept of everyday life makes his theories very useful at a micro-sociological level for an investigation of the experienced subjective daily schedule in everyday life.

In order to live and act in everyday life one must take a natural attitude towards the world (Schutz 1970a, 320). This means having no doubts about the world in which we live being real; we do not doubt its existence, and we take certain things for granted. To take a natural attitude towards the world is a fundamental condition for being able to act in everyday life.

According to Schutz everyday life is not an individual world but a common world. We are born into a social world inhabited by fellow men,
and it thus does not exist only for me. In everyday life acts are governed by pragmatic motives and a basic *practical interest*.

To it [the natural attitude] the world is from the outset not the private world of the single individual but an intersubjective world, common to us all, in which we have not a theoretical, but an eminently practical interest. The world of everyday life is the scene and also the object of our actions and interactions. We have to dominate it and we have to change it in order to realize the purposes which we pursue within it among our fellow-men. We work and operate not only within but upon the world (Schutz 1973, 208).

Everyday life is thus the “place” in which we act in accordance with our objects in life.

Adopting a natural attitude, we refer our experience of reality to a *stock of knowledge at hand*. This stock of knowledge contains both earlier experiences and knowledge handed down from parents, teachers, etc. The stock of knowledge makes us able to interpret the world as a world of objects which might offer resistance to our actions but which we are also able to modify.

*Reflection* in everyday life only happens when something, an experience or object, turns up as a strange element in the present situation (Schutz 1974, 189). The situation is then influenced by something unexpected and inconsistencies in the stock of knowledge have appeared. We experience these inconsistencies as problematic and we are forced to cope with the inconsistencies in order to continue with our actions.

What makes Schutz’s concept of knowledge so interesting is that the stock of knowledge is not built up as a fully or logical integrated pool of knowledge. Lack of coherence in the stock of knowledge is not always a threat because things in everyday life are characterized as unquestioned. As mentioned, Schutz points out that the unquestionable has a *horizon* within which it is unquestioned (Schutz 1994, 224). The acquisition of knowledge, then, is governed by a pragmatic interest in what it is *relevant* to acquire knowledge on in the given situation. According to Schutz knowledge and action are therefore two interrelated phenomena in everyday life.

Listening to the radio is very often a “background” to other activities. An analysis of the knowledge that radio listeners derive from the radio must therefore be related to the specific situations in which the radio is used and of which it becomes a part. This is because, as Schutz claims, acquisition of knowledge is not only acquisition of knowledge as representation, but an inseparable part of the pragmatic actions of everyday
life. This *situational* aspect is an important element in identifying the dif­ferent roles of different media in daily life.

Schutz's definitions of the temporal, spatial and social orientations in everyday life serve as a means to explore the way in which we experience different situations in everyday life.

**Time, space and social relations in everyday life**

Schutz's concept of time implies a separation of action and reflection in everyday life. Reflection only happens when we look back at our finished act and take on a reflective attitude, which Schutz calls "stopping and thinking" (Schutz 1974, 53). The meaning of our actions, then, is structured by time. Schutz distinguishes between ongoing activities (*action*) and the finished activity (*act*). Reflection on finished activities (*acts*) adds meaning to the finished acts, is stored in the stock of knowledge and serves as guidance for future actions.

According to Schutz, there are two ways of experiencing time. On the one hand there is an "inner", subjective time, the *longue durée* which is characterized by duration, the time in which the life-world is actually lived, as a continuous stream of un-differentiated experiences. On the other hand, there is the "outer" quantitative time, the standard time, the time of the running clock. With clocks, calendars, etc. standard time makes it possible to arrange the experienced "inner" time in measurable sequences and successions.

We live at the same time in both the "inner" and the "outer" time. But the "outer" time, standard time is an unavoidable condition which transcends the "inner" time and restricts our possibilities for action. The phenomenon "first things first" (Schutz 1974, 47) implies that we have to do things in a certain order to obtain a certain objective (e.g. I must take a bus at a certain time to get to work). The same goes for the phenomenon of "situation" (ibid, 49). I am bound to a certain period in time (e.g. I do not live in the Middle Ages but in late part of the 20th century).

The distinction between the ongoing *action* and the finished *act* raises some interesting questions about the differentiated use of media in everyday life. For instance, in the morning, during *prime time* radio, most people have the day ahead of them while in the evening, the *prime time* of television, the day is waning. I am well aware that the temporal concepts of Schutz should not be taken too literally, but anyway: Does the hour or the moment of the day make a difference in how we use the media? Does
it make a difference whether our daily duties, activities etc. are before or behind us? If the radio typically is turned on to accompany the recurrent and unavoidable daily duties, is television viewing then a way to withdraw from the progressive and ongoing flow of everyday life into a more reflexive state of mind in which we try to create a sense of meaning or coherence in the world we take for granted every day?

Schutz describes the spatial arrangement of everyday life as a coordinate system. We always find ourselves in the middle of a coordinate system, with ourselves as the origin and with the physical surroundings as a "fringe" around us (Schutz 1974, 36). Schutz's concept of space is built up around different zones or spheres which change every time we move. As we move, so too does the origin. The concept of horizon is derived from this spatial metaphor. The experience of the world around us, the horizon of knowledge, changes every time we move through space.

Schutz's relevance for the concept of media use

Many interesting issues are raised when we consider Schutz's concept of space in relation to media use. The media bring the world "out there" into the private sphere of the media user (Williams 1974, 27). I am not thinking only of news programmes and the like, but of the basic fact that all media content is, in principle, public, addressed to all and available to all. The media content, then, represents a public discourse compared with the private contexts of reception. The public discourse of the media is integrated into the present situations of the media users and then plays a part in constituting the horizons within which the media users act. The question is what it means to let the world "out there" into the horizons of the media users; what kind of relation is created between the public and the private by virtue of media use? Just as everyday life consists of different time perspectives, everyday life consists of different horizons in which something is relevant at some points of the day and something is not. The morning, for instance, can be a certain horizon in which the surrounding world is something we have quite literally to step into. Obviously weather and traffic reports are highly relevant at this point of the day. The evening might be another horizon in which we try to exclude the concrete surrounding outside our homes and therefore seek other information or pleasures.

According to Schutz everyday life is an intersubjective world. In everyday life we take part in social relations with other human beings. To
communicate is to act and is, Schutz argues, a foundation of intersubjectivity. In everyday life we communicate to intervene in the world and to pursue our objectives.

To use the media in everyday life is to act. When using the media we step into a world founded on the public discourse of the media. The media address us in a language we all understand and we are thus addressed as fellow human beings. To watch television or listen to the radio is to be addressed as a person in a situation which in many ways is similar to the situation of other people at the same point of the day. The media creates a sense of what Thompson described as “despatialized simultaneity” (Thompson 1995, 32). The radio has different ways of saying “Good morning!” to a whole population, a population consisting of individuals who are getting out of bed and preparing themselves to step into a social world.

The radio is used by listeners to integrate themselves into the social world on at least two levels. On a macro level, the use of radio in the morning gives a sense of belonging to a shared and familiar world. On a micro-level, the public discourse and therefore “neutral” information, is picked up by the listeners and used as a kind of “social glue” e.g. at the place of work, and is thus used as a way of stepping into real local contexts in everyday life. At the same time it is interesting to note that the listeners very rarely enter into so-called para-social interaction (Horton & Wohl 1956) with the radio hosts in the morning. Instead of establishing an intimate and emotional relation, radio users relate to a certain attitude of the radio hosts. Because radio listening in the morning goes on in a situation in which most people are preparing themselves for the working day and for living up to all kinds of expectations of being “professional”, most radio listeners pay attention to how the radio hosts display dynamism, energy and professionalism and how they fulfil their role as “professionals”. The radio users, then, use the attitude of the radio hosts as a source of inspiration to build up their own role in everyday life as “professionals”, as social human beings ready to act.

The social functions of the radio can be used as points of departure in identifying the differentiated use of media in everyday life. In what way is television viewing a means to take part in the social world? Listening to the radio in the morning is a way of integrating into the social world because we cannot avoid participating in it in a very concrete way. On the contrary, television viewing goes on, typically, in the evening and when, as I pointed out before, most of the day is over.
Radio listeners use the radio in the morning to bring themselves into what Schutz calls a “we-relation” to other human beings in the world. To step into a we-relation requires an immediacy and an awareness with the Other (the persons we relate to in everyday life). It is this immediacy and awareness that the radio listeners try to obtain when they use the radio to integrate into a common world and display participation through communication. Schutz argues that reflexion, on the other hand, is a withdrawal from the we-relation and thereby the immediate common experience:

The more I give myself over to reflection, the less I live in the common experience and the more distant and mediate is my consociate. The Other whom I experienced immediately in the we-relation becomes in the reflection the Object of my thought (Schutz 1974, 64).

I suggest that this withdrawn and reflexive attitude describes the way some people watch television sometimes. Radio listeners often describe television viewing as something which “catches you” when the day is over and that the awareness of the temporal and social settings of everyday life somewhat dissolves. That indicates that the social immediacy of everyday life is momentarily suspended in favour of a reflexive state of mind which constitutes the world as an object of thought. Radio, then, constitutes a field of practice in the morning. Television constitutes a reflexive state of mind in the evening.

This is of course a gross generalization which serves only as a preliminary thesis for further empirical investigations. And I do not suggest that television viewing can be characterized as a kind of philosophical lecture. On the contrary. Television viewing is a way of distracting ourselves, both physically and mentally, from the conditions of everyday life. But there has to be a reason why we attend to the TV screen and not the tapestry on the wall. Television viewing can be an “escape” from the duties of everyday life, but as Schutz points out, we cannot escape everyday life. Everyday life is an unavoidable condition, the paramount reality which we always return to. All actions, reflexion and thinking, relates to everyday life. One cannot live in the world of fantasy or philosophy, but “being there” might inspire, put perspective on and order the transient and chaotic world in which we live. The temporal conditions of everyday life do not allow frequent and prolonged reflexive steps out of the flow of the daily round — and especially not in those parts of the day that are occupied by labour. These temporal conditions can momentarily be suspended in the evening, and television viewing makes this suspension possible. But it is very important to emphasize (and this is due to the theories of Schutz) that our different attitudes towards the world are not connected to
a specific medium but to specific phases in everyday life. Schutz’s concept of everyday life, then, offers a very relevant analytical starting point for investigating the interconnections between media use and everyday life.

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**Notes**

1. The research I am referring to was carried out in 1994 and 1995 by myself in collaboration with *Danmarks Radio*, the national broadcasting corporation in Denmark. The research consisted of 15 focused group interviews with radio listeners all over Denmark. The main task for the research was to identify the basic functions of radio in everyday life.

2. The three national channels are: 1) *P1* — the “serious” channel with news, talk, debates, fiction and features on political, economic and cultural subjects, 2) *P2* — divided into “DanmarksKanalen” which includes the nine regional stations (6 am to 7 pm) with talk, news and popular music, mainly for people over 40, and “P2Musik” (7 pm to 1 am) with classical music. And finally 3) *P3* — talk and popular music, mainly for people under 40.

3. The statistical information I refer to here and in the following is taken from a general statistical report, *Radiolytning i Danmark 1992–1995*, which covers the population aged over 13. The population under 13 is dealt with in separate measurements.

**References**


A look at Danish television documentary

Rasmus Dahl

Introduction

I would like to begin by quoting the Danish media researcher, Ib Bondebjerg, on a writing about television fiction. This quotation, to me, seems just as relevant in the area of factual television as it is in fiction:

The Danes of the post-war period are in an essential manner shaped by the fictional experiences they have had through television; and our everyday life, memory and history are to a far larger degree than earlier generations carried by, and expressed through, pictures. There is nothing suspicious or threatening in this, because these pictures are not passive material, but something we rework and work with, and television experiences have presumably played a major part in sharpening our attention towards our history and towards our knowledge about ourselves and each other.

(Bondebjerg 1993, 421; RD's translation and emphasis added.)

If we replace the word fictional with the word factual, the quotation can be used as a point of departure for outlining the purpose of this paper: to elaborate on the role of visual documentary in the experiencing of Danish television.

The quotation raises two questions in this respect. One has to do with the nature and content of the viewing experience, the other with the influence of television, and the prominent part it has played in the media world of the post-war period.

Bondebjerg says that there is no reason to be concerned about the influence of the television tube, since the material will be worked with and interpreted by the active mind of the viewer. This seems plausible and logical at least as far as fiction is concerned. In film and literature, we traditionally allow ourselves to shift between absorption in the narrative and in identification with the characters, on the one hand, and the reflection and interpretation, on the other, in relating the fictive world to our own. However, as far as factual television is concerned, when the pictures are of the real world as in the news, in a current affairs programme, in a documentary or even a live broadcast, then the nature of the material changes, at least at a commonsensical level of conception.
How does this difference influence the effect and the shaping of the viewing experience? This is the one key question on which I shall concentrate on the following pages, and it arises, of course, out of the little twists I suggest to make in the quotation.

The next key question is also shaped by the twist, but could also be applied to television output in general. What part does factual television in general, and documentaries in particular, play in heightening our sense of history and our knowledge about ourselves and each other? Bondebjerg uses his book to answer the question mainly in the area of fiction, and in the following I will offer some clues which may help to answer it in the case of documentaries. It is not possible here, given the circumstances and the amount of space, to enter into an in-depth analysis of the role of factual and documentary television in our lives. Instead, the aim here will be to provide an overview of the determining factors and aspects concerning text, context and spectator which must be included in such an analysis.

While it is easy to accept the general statement that television possesses the quality of a cultural courtyard or marketplace, things become more complicated when we turn our attention to the level of a specific genre or a single programme. The point here is that a discussion of quality is necessary, since without that discussion we will end up with the anticipation that anything goes, that it does not matter what is on the screen as long as there is something — and who is prepared to accept that?

Television documentary

It seems appropriate to start with a treatment of the problems that emerge when a demarcation is required of television documentaries as a genre or as a distinct mode of expression. This will include a discussion of some of the characteristics of the medium, of visual documentary as a mode of reception as well as a juxtaposition of the characterization. It will also include a short account of the ontological and semiotic status of visual documentary. Later we will move on to the specific institutional and historical developments of Danish television documentaries.

What, then, are the characteristics of television documentaries as a genre — which programmes come within this scope, which do not? Whether we understand the concept of genre as based on a set of reoccurring textual elements, as a certain way of standardization of production or, as seems to be the most commonly accepted concept, as social and cul-
tural expectations shared by an audience, which collide when texts are made and perceived,¹ then an attempt to give a strict definition of the documentary genre, in film or television, seems impossible, or at least meaningless.²

So instead of offering a lexical and theoretical definition, it might be useful to tackle the problem on a commonsensical level. Here the notion of “documentary” seems to be accepted and understood at least by the people in the production environment and the critics as well as in academic circles.³ Whether or not it plays a distinct part in the experience of viewing is difficult to say, but it is the assumption here that it does. The purpose below will be to try and support this assumption. The effort will be founded on an understanding of television documentary, not as a genre but as a notion in the specific experience of viewing.

Factual television

In his book _Television Form and Public Address_, John Corner puts the documentary mode in a similar perspective:

However, the core mode of documentation from the 1930s through to today is the employment of the _recorded images and sounds of actuality_ to provide the viewer with a distinctive kind of “seeing” and “hearing” experience, a distinctive means of knowledge. Documentary was grounded in an appeal to _sensory evidence_. (...) the notion of the “evidential” provides the best place from which to start an examination of this type of programme making. (Corner 1995, 78)

The evidential nature is of course shared with all factional television output, and can be said to constitute a fundamental attractiveness in relation to the medium’s aesthetic. The ontological status of an electronic recording of physical reality — the reflected light from objects, the camera lens, the picture tube, and the physical nature of the magnetic tape — guarantees the connection between picture and reality. In a semiotic perspective this means that the picture takes on the characteristics of the indexical sign:

Representation involves one thing standing for another, an image or recorded sound standing for that from which it was “taken”. (...) “Taking” suggests what is peculiar to the indexical sign: a close physical or existential bond seems to exist between referent and representation. (...) The indexical bond of photochemical and electronic images to that which they represent, when formed by optical lenses that approximate the properties...
of the human eye, provides endless fascination and a seemingly irrefutable guarantee for authenticity. (Nichols 1991, 149)

Various arguments can be offered against this indexical authority of the picture, and certainly, as Nichols states, it is only a seeming guarantee for authenticity. Most obvious are perhaps the possibilities for electronic picture manipulation, but even without this technical opportunity it is possible in theoretical terms to contest this indexical authority. Before the picture reaches the screen, the process of production has taken place, including the decisions of what to shoot and how to shoot it. This even applies to live transmission by a single camera, and in other instances we must add the subsequent editing decisions about how to organize material, or edit between several cameras. This could be called the first transmission of reality, but on the way to the mental storage of the spectator a second transmission takes place. It would take us too far to describe this in detail, but it has to do with the cognitive and pragmatic aspects of seeing. That what we see is not as we might presume reality, but an interpretation we make on the basis of our experience, the context we take with us and the way our cognitive apparatus functions. The true and authentic representation of reality in a positivistic sense is not possible, and this is an important theoretical point in the understanding of the television medium as a symbolic practice with social and institutional motivations. We will return to this later, but first we have to tackle the paradox that has occurred between television as sensory evidence and as a construct.

Although the indexical bond gives us no philosophical guarantee of authenticity, and thereby aligns the factual modes of television with the fictitious, there still is a difference that makes a difference. On a textual micro-level, the single picture or shot, this difference has no significance — it must be related to the textual substance at large and the contextual contributory elements. In other words, the picture must be framed in a way that makes the factual decoding and interpretation proper.

Throughout our lives we develop various perceptual frames and schemes in the different layers of our consciousness. These are grounded on earlier experiences of communication in the different social, cultural and institutional realms of society. This means that the context of the pictures will awaken a certain perceptual pattern, and stimulate a certain kind of reading. Depending on the text-internal elements and the way they correspond with the factual texts we have met earlier on plus the specific text-external to read this as a factual exposition and our prior knowledge of the institutional setting we will attempt a reading with a very direct reference between picture and reality (Bondebjerg 1994). The authentic-
ity, or at least the guarantee for authenticity, is not “built in” ontologically, but is attributed by the viewer according to textual signals and contextual requests.

Yet the power of television continues to inhere in the sorts of experience of “second-hand seeing” which it provides for viewers; vicarious perceptions which, whilst they are *being* experienced as television immediacies, are routinely not regarded as “authored”. (...) “second-hand seeing” which seems like “first-hand” is, and is likely to remain, central to the television experience. It involves a particular force of knowing which is denied to the communicative repertoire of print and radio. (Corner 1995, 30)

On the one hand we can confirm that television documentaries and their pictures of reality are a construct, but on the other we must acknowledge that the readings by the viewers — the experience of a certain tie to reality, and the use as a sensory evidence, as seemingly first-hand impressions — are distinct and, given the circumstances, proper ways of perceiving television output.

So much about pictures of reality. We have so far concentrated on the characteristics of the television medium and the factual genres as such, but have not been specific about the documentaries, although the aspects mentioned are fundamental of the documentary mode.

**Documentaries**

In visual documentaries we have an experienced connection to the real world, a way of seeing into our own world, but in what ways does this experience differ from the one we can achieve by watching e.g. the news? Two quotations with a rather similar content, outline the main ingredients:

Documentary is a more symbolically expansive form than news, able to develop a range and density of depiction which becomes more open to interpretative variation as it extends beyond direct exposition into the implicit and the associational, often in the process touching on imaginative territories more closely associated with narrative fiction. (Corner 1995, 81)

or

Documentary is not as closely connected to the “front-stage” of the public sphere, and thereby to the conventions and rules, which inevitably are attached to a factual treatment which operates in the lines of news-broadcasting. In the Danish television pattern (and the remaining European) it is clear to see how a more privatized, intentional and declared subjective type of “back-stage” journalism and documentary stand out.
The private comes in focus and the dark side of the official society becomes visible, and this means that factual programmes focus on the area which in a traditional public understanding has been in the centre of fiction. (Bondebjerg 1994, 22; RD’s translation)

Whereas the former definition concentrates on form and depiction, the latter also comprises subject matter and content. In both cases the documentary mode is constituted by a way of rhetorical freedom which is denied to the news. This gives room for a greater creativity in the treatment of actuality, and allows visual documentaries to use means of expression that move the interpretative work of the spectator towards the one known from fiction.

Another rhetorical perspective on visual documentaries is offered by Bill Nichols (1991). In his view the documentary mode is a way of arguing about the world, or rather stating a specific point of view towards its arrangement:

Technique, style and rhetoric go to compose the voice of documentary: they are the means by which an argument represents itself to us (in contrast to the means by which a story does in fiction). The voice of a documentary gives expression to a representation of the world, to perspective and commentary on the world. The argument (...) is a proposition about how the world is — what exists within it, what our relations to these things are, what alternatives there might be — that invites consent. “This is so, isn’t it?” The work of rhetoric is to move us to answer “Yes, it’s so”, tacitly — whereby a set of assumptions and an image of the world implant themselves, available for use as orientation and guide in the future — or overtly — whereby our own conscious beliefs and purposes align themselves with those proposed for us. (Nichols 1991, 140)

Through an argumentation built on proving by the use of indexical pictures, on an appeal to our reason and on an awakening of our emotions, the spectator meets a “finished” interpretation of the world (or a part of it), and the rhetoric is used to convince us about its rightness.

The following summarizes the characteristics of the viewing experience connected to television documentaries as outlined so far.

First of all, we have a certain appeal through the seemingly direct admittance to the world constituted by the television picture. This is an appeal to our “factual curiosity” — a certain way of knowing more about the world and its workings, a way of getting information. But it is at the same time an emotional appeal, a way of provoking our sensory system towards an affective state of experiencing.

Secondly, we meet an interpretation of the world that is made up by the textual traits, the discursive structures, the stylistic features and the
rhetorical moves. We engage an argumentative structure which we can either eat raw, dismiss on the spot or work with in a more complex manner of moving back and forth between these two poles in the moment of perception as well as retrospectively.

Thirdly, we have a wide arena to act upon, while we perform our own personal interpretations and pull out significance or our meeting with the text. We can do this in a quite unrestricted fashion, using metaphorical, associative and imaginative modes of making sense and relations to the text and the represented world, respectively.

All three outlines can be said to be potentially at disposal, meaning that they can either be accomplished simultaneously or that they can come forward in a shifting relationship of domination, repression and absence. Between the first and the second, between index and construct, we find the fundamental paradox of the documentary discourse and the documentary aesthetic, which is also the basis of much of the controversy that is often associated with documentary television.

Journalistic discourse or artistic expression?

A route towards an understanding of viewers’ benefits in relation to watching television documentaries can be found through an investigation of two different discourses, traditions and self-conceptions connected to the production process. This also displays different views on the goals, intentions, methods and means of making visual documentaries. We shall look at a general discrepancy between journalism and the tradition of documentary cinema, and at the specific Danish institutional and historical settings of television documentary.

In a description of how the distinctive identity and range of British television documentary came to be established, we find the following:

One of the most important determinants of the social and aesthetic range of documentary in this period was the extent to which it was regarded within broadcasting institutions as a form of journalism. Seen thus, certain kinds of news-related subjects began to seem more appropriate than less topical themes and documentary styles organized around the “quest” of a presenter/reporter, often delving “behind the headlines”, became dominant. For those who regarded documentary as essentially a director’s form, as a space for authoring a kind of “visual essay”, the aesthetic limitations imposed by journalistic convention were often regarded as a threat. (Corner 1995, 84)
An expression of this “fear of journalistic influence” can be found in the following quote:

“The decay began as the journalists arrived”, said the old director. He was one of the questioned in a television serial on the history of television. The British serial had an episode on the placement of documentary within television and the conclusions were depressing. The documentarist elaborated on his assertion that it now was the quick and sensation-seeking description that was made. In its childhood television let people from the cinema describe humans and their milieus. Now one finds pictures to the words that have to be said. Earlier on “a narrative in pictures” was allowed to develop, (...) now television is a picture medium (!), which illustrates what the journalist is saying. (Müller 1986, 16; RD’s translation)

In Britain a collision of opinion took place when television started its depiction of current affairs. The strong documentary movement of the 1930s seemed an obvious force to draw on. A special documentary department was started in BBC television, and people from the cinema were recruited. However, within the BBC there was also a strong journalistic tradition in that most people working with programme design, first on radio and later in television, were journalists.

The British example can serve as a demonstration of how television in general is seen as a medium of journalistic endeavour. But in these surroundings the documentary concept of personal creativity and subjective treatment, will find it difficult to survive. The journalistic discourse is based on the assumption that the journalist through research can report on the essence of reality to her audience, and further, that it is possible with a neutral transmission of information, and an objective, truthful rendering of events in the historical world. Although there has been a general turn away from the positivistic perception of the objective and the truth, in the public as well as in the journalists’ own understanding, it still seems to prevail as part of the conventions and traditions defining good journalistic deeds. An example can be found in a Danish handbook of television journalism written by and for journalists. In a section on the use of the interview, the following formulation can be found:

The goal for a TV journalist working with the interview in a news and factual context is to provide the viewer with information which is as close to reality as possible. This does not mean a messy stream of undigested reporting and information, but an ordered extract of the events of the day/week/times, that have a direct or indirect consequence or principal significance for the everyday of the viewer.
The most important demands are that the information is *correct, essential* and *topical*, and that the information moreover is *easy to understand.* (Thorsen & Møller 1992, 59; RD’s translation)

The documentary is not mentioned explicitly in the quotation, but it is in the rest of the book lumped together with the rest of the factual genres. In the Danish context at least, the journalistic understanding of documentary is furthermore coupled with “hard-core journalism”, meaning that only top-quality work on highly controversial topics can aspire to this label. The subjective and interpretive treatments of reality are looked upon with a pathological perspective by the journalists, unless they are found inside a clearly marked borderline, as the commentary known from the press.

An understanding of great contrast can be found among the performances of documentary film-making. One of these is Anne Wivel, and in an interview book the following exchange can be found:

In films like *The silent girls* and *Face to face* you describe the life of teenage girls in an institution for runaway kinds, and a priest seminar, respectively. In what way are these films fiction to you?

When I have the opportunity to follow people over a period of time, I see a great many aspects of them. Therefore I choose to shed light on some aspect at the expense of others. When I furthermore call it fiction, it is morally easier for me to work with. I can talk with myself whether I can answer for it or not, if it is justifiable and how far I can go in my selection.

That is how a good documentary stands out as compared to the naive and cliché-filled documentary which dominates television. There it is guided by a requirement of objectivity that I do not have. That does not exist to me. (Birkvad & Dinesen 1994, 101; RD’s translation)

In spite of the clash of discourses and understandings in British documentary television, the film tradition has been a major influence over the years, as also pointed out by Comer (1995). In other countries with a strong tradition of documentary film-making there are indications of a similar influence. In Swedish television a special documentary section was set up from the beginning of the 1960s, and it was characterized by a close tie to the cinematic milieu through co-production, freelance assignments, etc. (see Furhammer 1995). However, in Denmark where the documentary tradition in film is even more acknowledged than in Sweden, this kind of tie and mutual influence has never been established. Although attempts have been made to his effect, they have always failed due to disagreements over questions of copyright and money (see Alsted & Nørrestad 1987), and also due to a general tendency within the national Danish television company to ignore this kind of depiction as a possible
form of independent production and to rely instead on buying programmes primarily from abroad (mainly from Sweden, England, Canada and the USA). Seen retrospectively, it seems quite absurd that the Danish television company withdrew the possibility of producing their own documentary material until the formation of the documentary group in 1988 — some 25 years later than a similar department in Sweden, and about 40 years later than in Britain. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that the Danish viewers were not totally denied the documentary experience due to the broadcasting of foreign material, national documentary films and output from other departments (current affairs and culture).

Developments in Danish television

It is time for a brief but hopefully not too simplified outline of some of the historical, cultural and institutional developments in Danish television. This will help to explain the context in which factual television viewing continues to take place.

Until 1988, Danish television was monopolized in DR, Danmarks Radio. DR is a non-commercial broadcasting corporation with a classical public-service profile. In the mid-1980s there were various experiments with local, regional and commercial television, leading in 1988 to launching of TV2, a second nationwide broadcasting company financed partly through advertising and partly through licence fees. TV2 is a strange hybrid both economically and in terms of its legal foundation which provides for a certain measure of state control and accordingly specific public-service demands. The end of the monopoly also paved the way for local commercial television as well as cable and satellite reception, and the overall picture has now completely changed, with most of the population having access to an international diversity of television stations. TV2 has established itself as the most popular channel. Danish people are generally fond of the national public service, with DR and TV2 commanding a combined share of over 70%.

The monopoly era consisted of three different stages. The discussion below looks briefly at each of them, drawing on Ib Bondebjerg’s account (Bondebjerg 1989). For each stage the focus is on two factors relevant in this connection: the status of in-house documentary production and the factual conventions/viewer expectations.

The first stage is the period of paternalistic television (1951–1964). During this period weekly output increased from 8 hours a week to 25,
while the number of licence payers grew accordingly: in the late 1950s there were around 250,000 and in the mid-1960s just over one million licences. This was the early childhood of the television medium. From the outset the medium was regarded as a secondary one, to be treated with suspicion and restriction. Its function was seen as that of a centralized monopoly.

The culture that was represented by the few and the well-bred, and which was the sum of the valuable, hegemonic culture was via a new media supposed to be brought out to even more people as pedagogical, decent, solemn and neutral as possible. The paternalistic cultural and political “his master’s voice” so to say, in opposition to “vox populi”. (Bondebjerg 1989, 89; RD’s translation)

This was also the period which saw the founding of viewer expectations towards factual television, and the conventions they had to act upon were those of the political public sphere and notably the press, which until 1964 was in control of the news coverage. But in the eyes of most politicians and also within the institution itself, the mission of television was not in the area of covering current affairs. Its role was to enlighten the people and to offer general education for the masses within the cultural area, meaning that television was an opportunity to expose people to the right, decent (high-)cultural values. Theatre, ballet and opera were transformed to fit into the medium, and the informative types of programmes also concentrated very much on the traditional high-brow arts, including literature and painting. The television department was only a small section within the radio institution, and it had no self-contained group covering news and current affairs. Instead subjects of societal, political and social nature were dealt with in educational/informative programmes taking the form of school-teaching. The period is therefore also known as “school-masters’ television”. This was the environment which saw the formation of the traditions of “enlightenment of the people”, in-house production of documentaries was non-existent and strangely enough was never even considered. Strangely, because the state-support within the area of feature and documentary film production had been a well-established, firmly organized tradition since the 1930s, based on the same ideas of enlightenment.

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, a considerable number of Danish feature and documentary films were shown on television, but these were produced independently and only considered as a supplement to television’s own production. A few documentaries from abroad (BBC, SVT, NBC) also found their way to the screen.
The second stage is the period of classical public-service television (1964–1980). Output increased to almost 50 hours a week, and the number of licence payers reached 1.8 million. This is the period during which DR’s own journalists took over. In 1965 a department for news and current affairs was set up to provide the viewers with daily news coverage, but individual programmes, magazines and debate programmes were also made. This was done under close state control, sometimes taking the form of advance censorship. Coverage of current affairs was subject to a heated parliamentary and political debate throughout the period, and several conflicts developed between the political representatives in the radio council (Radiorådet, the organ of political control) and the leaders and employees of the television institution. The turning-point of the conflict was the ideology of objectivity:

the ideology of objectivity is connected to the political obligations of programming in the area of information and news, which traditionally make up the “hard” core in the historical development and fighting of the institution. The earliest and most visible conflicts are therefore tied to the area of the factual since it is the place of the central fields of the political public, the common and the socio-political, which is the very centre of the overall democratic contract between society and the electronic media within the public service model. (Bondebjerg 1989, 98; RD’s translation)

The requirements of objectivity and fairness presented profound limitations on the practical, creative work of programme-making. The news and current affairs department covered the subject matters from the front stage of society. Political, economic, juridical and foreign affairs issues were the main concern, and accordingly this part of television production was at the centre of public and parliamentary controversy. However, there was also another department within the factual side, the culture department, which among other issues took care of the back-stage of society. Here we find subject matters of a socio-cultural nature: reports on the everyday lives and problems of the Danish people, themes of a psychological nature, issues on the family and the local society and also a treatment of the institutions within society — hospitals, schools, kindergartens, old people’s homes.

Thus the tracks moved side by side, the front-stage track having a need to develop its journalistic norms and codes in line with the development of journalism outside Danish television, but facing severe problems and limitations in this respect. Documentarism, as a journalistic concept involving thorough research and investigation to disclose hidden facts, was never really established. Nevertheless, the conventions and the viewer expectations did gradually unfold. Due to technological changes, it also
became easier to work creatively with recording and editing. Gradually television journalism developed new codes and norms which changed the earlier, very official way of reporting on reality. From the aesthetic of talking heads, television journalism moved towards narrating and describing in moving images. Despite the obstacles laid out particularly by the political right-wing, television managed to develop more professionalized standards and conventions of news and current affairs, partly inspired by the general tendency of a more complex and pluralistic attitude towards society, and according to the growing competence among viewers in the decoding process and the following heightening of demands and expectations. The back-stage track did not have to work in the same way with its hands tied behind its back. It had greater freedom in the treatment of reality and developed more in the direction of actual documentary depiction. At the same time programmes of a more experimental nature began to crop up — spontaneous games (spontanspil) where people were asked to play themselves in a constructed situation, and docu-drama programmes.

But there was still no self-contained documentary production, working consciously within or getting inspiration from this tradition. The documentary field was continuously laid in the hands of the film milieu from which television only showed a limited number of films, quite like films from foreign television companies.

This brings us to the third stage, the period of mixed culture television (1980—). While the number of licence holders peaked by the start of the period with almost all households included, the output increased dramatically as a consequence of the monopoly break in 1988. In 1994 both DR and TV2 screened almost 65 hours a week, and the commercial station TV3 more than 80 hours a week.

Until 1988 DR was still the only nationwide television station, and the seeds sown in the late 1970s are now bearing fruit. The viewer expectations and competencies have grown and a considerable mixing of elements between genres is taking place. Current affairs journalists are becoming more oriented towards the spectators, and towards the need to capture their attention by using the different means of narration. This also means the use of fictional elements in the depiction of reality.

The programming of the mixed culture becomes visible in the late 70s, but has its breakthrough with the extensive break of the monopoly in the 80s. Now we find ourselves on the other side of the classical distinction between elite culture and mass culture, and as a consequence television programming has become far more heterogeneous. The mixed culture is on the one hand a mix of cultural circuits that have been separated earlier on,
which also creates hybrids. On the one hand the mixed culture is also a
culture which mixes the genres and the types of programmes in a new
way, and it is a culture where the two main conventions of fiction and fact
to a very high degree become hybrid forms. (Bondebjerg 1989, 117; RD’s translation)

It still makes sense to distinguish between the two main tracks, but the
overall picture becomes more blurred. The focus of attention within the
department of news and current affairs is broadened and programmes begin
to dig deeper into the social circuits concentrating on human destiny,
the everyday life of people and other sociological topics. The consequen­
tial type of journalism gets more common, meaning that the point of view
of individuals is represented within news and current affairs. The profes­
sional standards are raised along with a heightened orientation towards
the viewers, and programmes with a tight dramaturgic construction of
visual narration come forward. The demands on objectivity and fairness
are not as profound as earlier on, and they often take part in a case, which
of course raises the need for explicit proof and documentation. Here again
we find loans of fictional elements, and they typically take the form of a
criminal investigation. The use of suspense, dramatized reconstruction
and identification with “the detective” heightens the emotional investment
of the viewer, and the digestion of the considerable amount of facts which
are often included becomes easier and more entertaining.

Within the back-stage track one type of programme in particular takes
advantage of the professionalization and technical conquests. In the so­
ciological reportage/montage it becomes possible to take the viewer along
to places in society where television has never been, at least not in the
same way as now. With a subjective perspective drawing on fictional de­
vices to create a sense of “being there” and an animation of the affective
way of everyday experiencing, the camera and microphone moved out to
catch the life and hear the voice of people within their own milieu, most
often in the dark corners of society among alcoholics, drug addicts, the
mentally retarded and prostitutes.

A great deal has happened within the television landscape since 1988.
In the area of factual television it is worth noting that after a while TV2
news attracted the highest audience ratings, that the break of the monop­
oly initiated the formation of specific documentary units in both DR and
TV2 (Dokumentargruppen — “the documentary group”, and Fak2eren —
“facts on number two”, respectively), and that the purely commercial sta­
tion TV3 soon started competing with its own news and later with docu­
mentaries as well (about two-thirds of the population get TV3 via satellite
or cable).
The factual side is given high priority by the stations with public service demands as a way of legitimizing their licence fees and also to underline their serious, public nature. TV3 is now attempting to compete and present a commercial alternative in the area of factual television. Another noteworthy tendency is the development of the "generic landscape". The number of new formats and different kinds of current affairs programmes is increasing dramatically, and at the moment it is quite difficult to say anything conclusive.

Epilogue

It is impossible to reach a satisfactory understanding of the role of documentary television in society without a more detailed textual analysis of individual programmes. What I have tried to do here, on a more general and tentative level, is to exemplify how an analysis of different aspects can enrich and enlarge our perspective. Through a reception-aesthetical characterization of the genre, an examination of the clash of traditions and a perspective on historical development, I hope to have shown some of the benefits of the methods and theory that are useful in principle, but also a few more conclusive findings concerning the specific context of Danish documentary television.

The mixing of fictional and factual elements and genres did not arise out of nothing. The development of journalistic norms and conventions, and the heightening of viewer competencies and expectations prepared the ground for progress in creative treatment. As we have seen this mixing has always been a part of the documentary idea, but it has had a hard time working its way into Danish television. The development of the back-stage track or the soft side of reality depiction indicates that it is somewhere in this area that the notion of documentary as something else, or more, than the mere reporting of current affairs can be brought into play at the earliest stage. The progression of documentary as a concept representing a distinct quality within aesthetic, reception and the socio-culture of society seems to take off from here. It is important to hold on to the fact that there lies a historic development behind the prominent place that documentary television occupies today. The programmes from Dokumentargruppen and Fak2eren, whether they belong to the "soft" or "hard" end of the spectrum, or somewhere in-between, have remarkably high ratings and viewer appeal, they are evaluated almost everywhere as being of outstanding quality, and their position within the television land-
scape as well as in the socio-cultural circuit might be difficult to underestimate.

A kind of formal liberation has been established, but it is a challenge now and in the future to keep discussing the responsibilities, the role — causes and effects — and the qualities of documentary television.

Even the most fictionalized factual programmes can be of high ethical standard. To give access to many voices and discourses is of vital importance for public television, but this democratic goal should neither lead to populist disregard for the need for intellectual debate and factual precision, nor to a simple division of programmes along class and educational lines. Hybridization programmes are fascinating and important to discuss: they frequently try to bridge the gap between different discourses, genres and between the public in the private and the private in the public. (Bondebjerg 1996, 44–45)

A discussion of quality cannot, as we have seen in relation to viewer expectations, be based solely on aesthetic criteria, but must also take some factual consideration into account. In the highly commercialized and competitive media landscape of the present, there is a latent danger that the aestheticism of visual documentaries and other factual types of television is getting out of hand. The line between use/misuse, creative treatment/manipulation and information/propaganda based on pictures of reality is very thin and fragile and will (hopefully!) continue to be the subject of much controversy, discussion and education.

University of Århus

Notes

1 This is not the place for a detailed genre discussion. The descriptions mentioned can be found in Schatz 1981 and Neale 1980, respectively.

2 Almost all writings about documentary contain a discussion of the genre problems. The conclusion, usually, is that a valid and adequate definition is impossible. See e.g. Furhammer 1995, 5–12; Nichols 1991, 12–31.

3 Although the theoretical problems of a genre definition are manifest, this does not prevent a growing academic output, which works with documentary as an autonomous field or issue.

4 “The world does not enter our mind nor does it deposit a picture of itself there spontaneously. Perception depends on coding the world into iconic signs that can re-present it within our mind. (...) To be comprehended, the physical world must first be mediated and translated. (...) The brain provides the translation service, organizing sensory impressions into patterns and then conferring meaning upon various kinds of patterns in order to construct a familiar, recognizable world” (Nichols 1981, p. 11–12). Nichols’s writings are
based on a semiotic-structuralist perspective from which the everyday perception is comparable with a kind of reading of visual texts. From a cognitive-pragmatic point of view, the perspective is the opposite, that the reading of visual texts is based on the same mechanisms as everyday perception (see e.g. Bondebjerg 1994). But in both instances the indexical bond of the picture, on the way from screen to mental storage, is affected and subdued by the individual contribution of the viewer. This contribution is determined by the socialization, earlier experiences and the socio-cultural ballast of the individual.


De Tavse Piger 1985 (82’). Ansigt til Ansigt 1987 (166’).

References


Questions, statements and power. Some considerations on the journalist’s role in broadcast talk

Mats Nylund

Introduction

The study of political messages has traditionally been one of the main concerns in the field of mass communication. Scholars of rhetoric have largely focused on political speeches, perhaps delivered at some party convention and/or distributed by print or broadcast media. In recent years, however, many scholars (e.g. Johannesson 1990, Fafner 1989) have pointed out that political messages are increasingly being communicated not through speeches, but through processes of spoken interaction. To a large extent, this is due to the growing influence and the development of talk genres in broadcast media. However, it could also be related to a more general orientation towards talk and interaction in contemporary societies.

When politicians appear on the radio or television, they do so usually as participants in interviews, discussions or debates. Monologues have been replaced by dialogues and multiparty talk-in-interaction. This change does not only affect politicians, but also journalists and their working practices. As Clayman (1991, 71) tells us, relatively spontaneous interactional encounters have come to replace fully scripted news reports both in England and the United States. The same trend is also seen in Finland and other Nordic countries. A manifestation of this is the growth of the news interview. I suggest then that when political discourse is analysed, it has to be acknowledged that it is often produced as interaction and as a joint achievement of politicians and journalists.

Aim of this paper

The aim of this paper is to present a preliminary analysis and to discuss an ongoing research project. As part of my Ph.D. thesis I am analysing
how interaction is organized in political multiparty radio discourse. My focus is on how interaction, and particularly how the performance of journalists, differs from traditional news interviews. Scholars of talk-in-interaction have provided strong evidence that in news interviews journalists mainly restrict themselves to asking questions. This is probably what journalists are expected to do in other forms of talk-in-interaction as well. A preliminary analysis of my material reveals, however, that journalists are also involved in much of what at least seem to be non-questioning turns. On the basis of this observation my intention is to study these non-questioning turns and to analyse what kind of methods journalists use to convey information and how politicians respond to these kinds of turns.

On the other hand, it can be argued that questions can also convey information. For example, the interrogative clause *where were you?* does not only seek information, but also conveys information — someone has been somewhere. Some of these kinds of questions that convey information correspond with the definition of rhetorical questions. This being the case, I will choose to analyse some questioning turns also, focusing on questions which seem to convey rather than seek information. The distinction of questions which seek and convey information is made by Freed (1994). In this paper, however, I will restrict myself mainly to discussing the importance of statements and questions and to presenting a quantitative analysis of the extent of non-questions in my data and finally to making some preliminary remarks about the discourse function of these turns.

**Data**

My data consist of three political multiparty radio discussions. The programmes were broadcast on the Finnish Broadcasting Company's (YLE) Swedish channel in 1991–1993. They were transmitted live and were thus unedited. The material was recorded on audiotape and transcribed according to a system commonly used within CA (see Sacks et al. 1974). The data corpus amounts to approximately two and a half hours. Each programme is led by two professional journalists. The other participants are politicians (four or five per programme) and experts (one or two per programme). Two of the programmes have certain topics: one programme concerns the subsidies to the failing banking sector, a major issue in Finnish politics in the 1990s, the other discusses the West European Union
(Finland joined the European Union in 1995). The third programme, broadcast during the parliamentary election campaign, deals with civic affairs more generally.

Why this data set? I find the programmes interesting because they represent a form of talk which clearly departs from the traditional news interview, constituting a grey zone between institutional and mundane talk. The interaction is characterized by a combination of institutional and mundane features. As radio discourse, the talk is by definition institutional. It is task-related, the participants represent formal organizations (e.g. the journalists represent the broadcasting company and the politicians represent their parties), they have certain pre-established roles. However, within these institutional settings the interaction exhibits many features that are atypical of institutional talk, such as jokes, laughter, certain types of informal lexical choices, etc. Thus, the programmes correspond to what Fairclough (1995) has termed the conversationalization of public discourse. One factor that may contribute to this is that none of the discussions took place in a broadcasting studio, but in the café in the Finnish parliament building.

Moreover, the programmes consist of multiparty discussions, a form of talk-in-interaction which has been far less studied than dialogues. A particularly interesting feature of multiparty talk is the possibility for the initiation of interactional teams (see Parker 1991).

A turn-taking system of news interviews

Until quite recently the study of how speech interaction is organized by politicians and journalists has been very much a neglected subject in journalism and mass communication research. More generally, one could say that analysis of the language of politics in the mass media is heavily biased toward the written language and therefore often restricted to the print media. This in spite of the fact that television, a medium that communicates mostly through spoken language and images, is widely considered to be the most powerful mass medium.

One common form of speech interaction in media is the interview. Some years ago a Norwegian journalism scholar, Hans Fredrik Dahl, drew attention to the major position that interviews hold in modern journalism. Still, Dahl claimed, “we know nothing about interviews” (1989, 3). Dahl was not disregarding the vast literature on interviews, but instead he pointed out that most of what was written on interviews is of a norma-
tive, professional and non-empirical character and thus does not meet the standards of scientific work.

The systematic study of spoken interaction in mass media started some 15 years ago and has been led by analysts (mostly sociologists and linguists) using methods and findings from the study of ordinary conversation. This research tradition is usually referred to as conversation analysis (henceforth CA). The main research topics among these media analysts have been the organization of talk in news interviews and the structure of journalist turns (Heritage 1985, Greatbatch 1985, 1988, Clayman 1988, 1992).

One important concern in the CA approach is with the question of how the turn-taking system is managed in news interviews and how it differs from mundane conversation. Greatbatch (1988) has summarized the main ramifications for the organization of British news interviews as follows:

1. Interviewers (IRs) and interviewees (IEs) systematically confine themselves to producing turns that are at least minimally recognizable as questions and answers, respectively.
2. IRs systematically withhold a range of responses that are routinely produced by questioners in mundane conversation.
3a. Although IRs regularly produce statement turn components, these are normally issued prior to the production of questioning turn components.
3b. IEs routinely treat IRs’ statement turn components as preliminaries to questioning turn components.
4. The allocation of turns in multiparty interviews is ordinarily managed by IRs.
5. Interviews are overwhelmingly opened by IRs.
6. Interviews are customarily closed by IRs.
7. Departures from the standard question-answer format are frequently attended to as accountable and are characteristically repaired.

This preallocated turn-taking system gives the news interview its normative question-answer format. It also contributes to the journalist’s powerful position in news interviews. By opening the interviews and asking questions, journalists are controlling the agenda of the interviews. In multiparty interviews they govern the talk by allocating the right to speak.

According to Greatbatch this kind of news interview turn-taking system has remained unchanged since the earliest days of broadcasting in the United Kingdom (ibid.). In contrast, Fairclough (1995, 22–23) argues that there are variations in news interviews both historical and contemporary,
depending on the medium, type of programme and so on. This does not have to mean that the other one of the statements should be false, while the turn-taking system allows considerable variation within the system.

The limitation of the system is that while it focuses on constant features of news interviews, it is not very sensitive to changes and variations. This is important while, at least in Finland, there is a wide range of political speech interaction in mass media today. The development towards different forms of political speech interaction in radio and television is particularly noticeable during election campaigns. Moring & Himmelstein (1993, 6) have noted that the emergence of different kinds of televised political talk has contributed to dynamic changes in Finnish political culture in the 1990s. As mentioned, the material analysed here can be seen as this kind of non-conventional political talk. For instance, none of the seven characteristics of news interviews in the previous section correspond with the interaction in the discussions. This means that the role of the journalists is also very different from the one in news interviews.

Questions and statements

If the turn-taking system for news interviews is regarded as the initial form of talk between journalists and politicians, one can study statements produced by journalists as a non-typical form of political talk-in-interaction. In interviews the role of the journalist is usually to operate as report elicitor while maintaining a neutral and objective position. These features are in many western countries legally required in public broadcasting of news and current affairs. In YLE’s programme directives it is stated that “news journalists should strive for impartiality and avoid assertion of own opinions” (YLE 1994, 7). A similar news practice characterizes commercial broadcast news as well.

Both report eliciting and formal neutrality can be achieved when journalists confine themselves to producing turns that are at least minimally recognizable as questions. Correspondingly, statements produced by journalists can be seen both as a departure from the turn-taking system for news interviews and as measures that may jeopardize the neutrality of the journalists.

The journalists have been seen to be primarily statement elicitors and not to produce the statements themselves. However, this does not mean that questioning is the only thing that journalists are allowed to do. Particularly in interviews with politicians and other public figures journalists
often challenge, probe and cast doubt upon the interviewees (Greatbatch ibid., 405).

When journalists produce statements they do so usually as a part of questioning turn structures. A substantial number of journalist’s turns are built from more than one single “questioning” turn constructional unit. Typically, these kinds of question delivery structures consist of both statement/s and question/s constructed as a statement + question turn (excerpt 1)

IR: 1 → The price being asked for these letters is three thousand pounds
2 → Are you going to be able to raise it

(Heritage & Roth 1995, 39)

In the turn unit following arrow one the IR establish background information as a context for the question turn unit following arrow two. In these kinds of question delivery structures statements usually provide some background information with relevance to the question. However, as noted by Clayman (1988), journalists do not always embed their statements within questions. They sometimes allow them to stand freely to accomplish a variety of non-questioning actions.

Goffman (1981) has noted that there are variations in the degree to which speakers involve themselves in what they are saying. They can, for instance, choose between expressing their own thoughts or somebody else’s. When journalists produce statements in order to challenge or reject they often do so by attributing their statements to third parties and, thus, refraining themselves from their statement (Clayman ibid). This is done by the IR in excerpt 2.

IR: 1 → But on the other — Excuse me but on the other hand
2 → thuh President di::d say that there was a leadership vacuum there::, and that the agency was (. ) In effect a druh-adrift:t, a deep (. ) morale pruh-problem.

(Heritage & Roth 1995, 27)

In (2) the IR starts with projecting disagreement by using the contrastive particle chain but on the other hand (following arrow 1). Following arrow two the IR then proceeds by referring to the president. It can be said that the IR shifts footing in order to maintain a neutral position; the IR animates thoughts of a present or non-present author.

An animator, according to Goffman, is a person who presently utters a sequence of words, the one who originated the position or point of view
and perhaps also composed the specific words in which it is encoded is the author. Third-party statements are especially common in argument sequences and other sequences of controversy (Clayman 1988, 82).

A question of power

Why do statements produced by journalists matter? Political communication is often regarded as a form of power exercise. The problem of the effects of mass media exposition — often claimed, but rarely proven — lies at the heart of the study of mass communication. Today political media discourse is widely considered as a product of the journalist-politician relation. In this sense, interpersonal communication becomes an important feature of mass communication, a point that is largely neglected by traditional mass communication research (Heritage et al. 1988, 77-78). This interplay can be viewed as a power relation, but it is also characterized by mutual dependency. The politicians need journalists in order to gain publicity and journalists need politicians to gain information. One way to study this interplay is to analyse the interaction in broadcast talk-in-interaction.

Whether an utterance is a question or a statement may have implications on the power relations of journalists and politicians. Power relations and how they are locally constructed and maintained in institutional talk-in-interaction may not be the core issues of CA and related methods, but they can nevertheless be applied in studies of such problems, as shown by Linell & Luckmann (1991) and Peräkylä (1996).

Questions have traditionally been seen as powerful speech activities (e.g. Linell & Gustafsson 1987) and the right to ask is often restricted to the more powerful part in different kind of relationships, such as those between parents versus children and teachers versus pupils.

In news interviews the right to ask questions is preallocated to journalists. Questions can be used to set the agenda and to allocate turns, that is to decide what is to be spoken about and who are to speak about it. Thus, questions strongly direct the interaction into a certain direction. This type of agenda-setting has in recent years increasingly been noted as an important form of power (Gastil 1992, 490-2). In accordance with this, the reluctance to answer questions is often seen as evasive action. This is, of course, of particular interest in political interviews which may be seen and overheard by large audiences.
On the other hand, questions can also be used to create and restore power in a very different fashion. In ordinary conversations questions may reveal that the questioner is uninformed about the substance of the question. Moreover, the questioner also proposes by the act of questioning that the recipient is likely to be informed about this matter (Heritage 1984, 250). Thus, asking a question is also to construct an authority, a form of power based on knowledge (Peräkylä 1996). Of course, analysing these kinds of problems one has to consider the variation of different kinds of questions. In this paper, however, I leave this issue aside.

As noted, journalists can exercise power by asking questions, but they can also do it by "non-questions" which undermine the authority of their counterparts. This is something that journalists in talks with politicians are not usually expected to do, and in some cases it certainly may jeopardize their neutralistic stance. In order to maintain their neutrality journalists can apply different sorts of strategies to produce statements. For example, they can embed the statement in a question delivery structure (see example 1) or they can animate somebody else's statement (see example 2).

Some quantitative findings

To what extent do journalists produce statements without embedding them into question delivery structures? From a CA point of view, there is some controversy built into this question, while quantification remains a controversial issue within this field. On the other hand, it can be argued that CA frequently applies some quasi-quantitative formulations in describing talk. For example, in presenting the turn-taking system for news interviews Greatbatch uses formulations such as ordinarily, overwhelmingly, customarily and frequently, all estimations of quantity.

How does one study non-questioning turns? The first thing to do is to expel questioning turns (a task that is more complex than it may seem at first glance. In the three radio discussions analysed I found a total of 190 turns produced by the two journalists. Response tokens such as the English mm and oh were omitted. Turns including syntactic interrogatives (yes-no questions and wh-questions) amounts to 45% of the total amount (Table 1).
Table 1. Syntactic type of turns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turns including syntactic interrogatives</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turns with no syntactic interrogatives</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many turns with syntactic interrogatives also include statements and other declarative elements. The statement + question (see excerpt 1) was not the only turn construction found. Some turns included only a single question, but in some turns questions were followed by a statement (question + statement construction), and sometimes the turn structure was even more complicated. Often turns included more than one statement and/or questioning elements.

Ten per cent of turns with no syntactic interrogatives can be identified as functional questions, in this case either so-called B-event statements (Labov & Fanshel 1978, 100) or directives. This means that questioning turns amount to 51%. In other words, half of the turns produced by the journalists are non-questioning turns. Thus, the analysis of this turn type seems worthwhile as it represents an important feature of the role of the journalists in the discussions. Moreover, there seem to be big differences in the role of the journalists in the discussions and the one in news interviews in general where journalists “confine themselves to produce turns that are at least minimally recognisable as questions”. A quantitative analysis of news interviews gives, however, a more elaborated picture of the situation.

In a study by Heritage and Roth (1995) it is shown that journalists also produce turns without interrogatives or functional questions in the traditional sense. In British news interviews 18.1% and in American news interviews 34.9% of the turns were in this sense non-questioning. The study shows also that most of the formally non-questioning turns occasion answering. This can be done, for example, simply by the allocation of speaker rights. By allocating the right to speak to someone journalists simultaneously produce a strong incitement to respond and, thus, also speaker management turns can be seen as turns that occasion answering. Some 12 per cent of the turns in news interviews both in the UK and in the US were identified as statements. According to the study, these turns also normally occasion answering.
Some remarks on the function of statements

What is the discourse function of the statements, defined as turns with no syntactic interrogatives, in the discussions? Do they occasion answering? In Table 2 speaker management turns (turns that involve speaker rights allocation and presentation of speakers) are separated from the other statements. The table shows that one-third of the statements are concerned with allocating speaker rights or with the presentation of the speakers.

Table 2. Discourse function of non-questioning turns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker management</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table allocation and speaker presentation is clearly one major preoccupation of statements in this material. This is quite natural as there are more than two speakers and therefore the turn-taking system is more complex. However, speaker management is often only one of the functions of a statement. The problem with describing statements, as well as other turns, is that turns so often are multifunctional, that is they are doing more than one thing. In spite of this difficulty I will briefly sketch two other main functions of statements, challenges and topic initiation.

Most turns are in some way hearable as responses or comments to previous turns. In the case of journalist statements, turns usually constitute a challenge to a previous politician statement. This is commonly marked by the placement of the challenge-projecting conjunction but (in Swedish: men) at the beginning of a turn (excerpt 3, translated from Swedish and simplified, JRN=journalist, KH=politician).

JRN: 1 → But, i-it’s not about Delors
2 → It’s about a system, a union with certain rules
KH: Yes, but then you have to consider what will happen when we stay outside the EC

Challenges reflect the professional self-conception among Finnish broadcast journalists, the ideal that they should perform as counterweights and scrutinizers of those in power (Aula 1991). For politicians overheard by an audience, it is difficult to ignore challenges, protests or accusations by
journalists, and thus such statements are likely to be responded to. In excerpt 3 the structure of the challenge is, however, quite special. The JRN starts by rejecting an earlier contribution by KH (1 →). The JRN does not only reject it, but produces an alternative version (2 →). This is done without a shift in footing, in other words, the speaker does not refrain from the opinion expressed. The absence of explicit references to third parties is as a matter of fact characterizing the journalists’ statements in the data. On some occasions the journalists are even explicitly presenting opinions as their own (with formulations such as That was, I think, a wrong move ...) and thus taking quite a different role from what journalists do in news interviews. However, the most common way to express opinions is to use the pronoun one (in Swedish: man). One is characterized by its indefiniteness. It refers neither to a specific author, nor to the speaker himself. Instead, it leaves the author of the opinion unrevealed.

Challenges do not always have to threaten faces. Journalists may also object to the previous speaker in a milder way by giving supplementary information to a previous utterance or present “the other side” of something that has been stated.

As indicated, most journalist statements relate in some way to previous talk. However, there is a category of statements that do not build upon a previous turn, but initiate a new topic (excerpt 4).

JRN: van Ekelen, when he was here he defined it this way that if we join the European Community we are naturally not neutral towards Europe and then we

GH: Yes then we are again dealing with this word neutrality (...)

In (4) the JRN is animating a definition of neutrality proposed by the then secretary-chief of WEU van Ekelen. Thus, the turn sets the agenda for the next turn and invites GH to comment on the definition. Consequently, by statements journalists are either provoking a response or inviting one. Whether these responses are to be regarded as answers or not and if and how the responses differ from responses to questioning turns, remains to be solved.

Conclusion

This paper has presented a preliminary investigation of political radio talk where the role of the journalists differs from that in conventional interviews. Firstly, it was noted that a large part of journalists’ turns were not
questions, but statements. Secondly, when statements were produced they were only occasionally attributed to third parties.

Clearly, the distinction between statements attributed to third parties and non-attributed statements remains relevant to this ongoing study. Another dimension of the structure of the statements which can be important in the study of power relations is whether the statements are presented as facts or assumptions. Speakers manifest their levels of knowledge in different ways. One can know something for a sure, one can make an assumption or one can reveal one’s ignorance by simply asking someone else. Whether one knows something for sure or simply assumes something is shown by the status which is given to the statements one is producing. One could assume that usually when journalists produce controversial statements of facts they would rely on some other authority, i.e. animate someone else’s thoughts. When they are not, they themselves become not only authors, but also authorities.

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Notes

For practical reasons, the coding procedure is omitted from this paper. It is described in Nylund (1996).

References


A case of private talk in public

Minna Aslama

Introduction

Talkative television

Finland has joined the Golden Era of Televised Talk. Within the past few years, various kinds of interview programmes and talk shows have emerged on the two public-service channels TV1 and TV2 as well as on commercial television, i.e. the nationwide MTV3 and the regional PTV. In addition, the international cable channels provide talk in foreign languages for those who crave for more. These televised talk events range from journalistic talk shows such as current affairs panel discussions to infotainment and entertainment shows. The only subgenre of broadcast talk practically excluded from the domestic production is the carnevalistic audience participation format, although the Ricki Lake Show offers an American example on PTV, and some tendencies towards the vox pop approach are also in evidence in a few Finnish programmes.

One kind of national talkative television product has become particularly popular and widely discussed. Unlike the more traditional Finnish talk programmes, these televised discussions do not invite a panel of politicians and/or professional experts to debate a significant matter for Finnish society. Instead, the manner of talk and the language used, the topics, the structure and the personalizing approach in those programmes all point towards a certain kind of talk show which has accurately been described by Bruun (1994) as the “Therapy Genre”. Typically, this kind of programme introduces a two-party conversation between a host and a “personality”. The journalistic method of the host is to act as a confidant as well as an evaluating therapist. The guest, then, whether an “ordinary person” or a public figure, is brought to the studio to present her/his emotions, experiences and opinions about intimate and difficult themes, even taboos which are illuminated through an individual’s viewpoints — just as in the Oprah Winfrey or Ricki Lake style audience participation shows. However, unlike those talk carnivals, these programmes provide viewers
with an eavesdropper's position to a discussion which appears to be something between a therapeutic conversation and a living room chat between two close friends.

The best-known of these discussions is the case that will be addressed here, a programme called *Mirja Pyykkö Interviews* ("Haastattelijana Mirja Pyykkö", hereon referred also as MP), which has been at the peak of its popularity from the very beginning of the Finnish broadcast talk boom. The show in question differs from the therapy genre to some extent, presumably partly because its hostess has a long history as a current affairs journalist. In its thematic approach, *Mirja Pyykkö Interviews* does indeed resemble current affairs journalism: it often discusses "newsworthy" social issues from unemployment, drug abuse and racism to commemorating V-E Day. However, the topics are approached through the guest's individual viewpoint, via talk which is very everyday-like. The hostess emphasizes this approach by providing empathic questioning and clearly expressed encouragement to her interviewee.

To many viewers, MP is a programme which tackles current themes that — at the same time and at their most intense moments — bring the discussants to the verge of tears, providing on TV1 the kind of once-a-week primetime empathy never seen before on Finnish television. Some voices disregard the programme as the national TV therapy session which tends to get a bit too close to social pornography. Still, the hostess, the star after whom the show is named, has been voted more than once by devoted viewers as the "Female television personality of the year", given titles like "The Intellectual of 1993" and dedicated pages with praising headlines from the afternoon papers to women's magazines and companies' customer publications.

The publicity as well as a recent major audience satisfaction study by the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE (Kytömäki & Savinen 1996) indicate that *Mirja Pyykkö Interviews* has a special place in the Finnish scene of television talk. It is known, if not watched, by most of the Finnish people. In the study, MP was mentioned as an example of "quality programming" by various demographic groups of audiences. In the autumn of 1995, its average audience ratings amounted to 540,000 viewers, a figure which comprises 12% of the Finnish television viewers and which puts it among the most popular discussion-based programmes. Although the show is watched by both male and female audiences, it is particularly favoured by blue- and white collar-women, in the age range of 25 to over 55 years.
Magic of talk revisited

Popular televised talk has its roots in the United States, but it has become ever more produced and watched also in Finland and other European countries (see e.g. Bruun 1994 and Pedersen 1993 for the development in Denmark; Dahlgren 1995 and Ekström & Eriksson, 1996 for the Swedish situation; Fairclough 1995b, Livingstone & Lunt 1994, and Scannell 1991 addressing talk shows in Britain). This (Western) world-wide popularity of talk shows has inspired research and discussion on the generic characteristics of this programme type, its subgenres and its particular, mostly female, audiences (e.g. Bruun 1994; Masciarotte 1991; Pedersen 1993; also Scannell 1991). Also, the relevance of talk shows to “the public”, to political communication and participation and to the notion of the “public sphere” has been addressed (see also e.g. Dahlgren 1995; Jensen 1995; Keane 1995; Livingstone & Lunt 1994; Habermas 1989).

Relatively little attention, however, has been given specifically to the role of talk, language and interaction on which these shows by definition rely (see, however, some discussion in Fairclough 1995b; Livingstone & Lunt 1994; Scannell 1991). If and when these popular programmes can be assessed as having relevance in political communication, then their key element of talk can be seen as a basic concern for closer analysis and (critical) scrutiny as presented in individual media “texts” or products; as a part of institutional and discourse processes or practices; and as a part of broader sociocultural contexts and practices in which their political and cultural relevance is claimed to exist (see Fairclough 1995a, 98 & 1995b, 57–68).

In this article, I want to address the following questions: 1) how is this kind of televised public interaction — often private-like in form, often about issues of the private sphere — constructed; 2) what does that construction mean to its audiences; and 3) what relevance is there in this increasingly popular form of public communication and televised interaction to something(s) which could be called “women’s politics”? I tackle these questions using the ever so effective format of the talk show. First, I want to set the stage for the issue, the relevance of televised talk as interaction and its connection to feminist interpretation of communication and women’s politics. Then it is time to bring in the guest, our case in point Mirja Pyykkö Interviews, and allow both the programme and its audiences to “talk”. Last comes the judgement — as many-sided as in Oprah, Ricki or MP — on the relevance of talk shows and their mode of interaction to women’s politics.
Setting the stage: why what how?

Why: the relevance of talk television

It seems today, as Livingstone & Lunt (1994, 176) put it, that to the extent that social and political opinion influences political, economic and social decision-makers, this process is increasingly managed by popular culture. Accordingly, public affairs in the media have gone through a plastic surgery called privatization or “intimization” (van Zoonen 1991), where political action is approached and portrayed as a personal matter and individual behaviour. Especially television now moves increasingly towards addressing its audiences as consumers — for whom it serves products made according to the “commercial imperative” to constantly entertain (e.g. Fairclough 1995b). Popular or “entertainment values” seem to enter many forms of television: older formats of journalism from traditional news broadcasts and current affairs magazines to documentaries and “journalistic talk shows” (where journalists interview the members of the elite) have adopted popular elements and are partly given impulses by newer formats such as transnational TV news, tabloid-style news, infotainment such as “morning programmes” and vox pop talk shows (Dahlgren 1995).

The trends of popularization and intimization in the media (not perhaps equal, but definitively closely related) have specific relevance to women as represented in the media, as media audiences, and as citizens forming various alliances for different kinds of political action. To start with, feminist political science and media scholars have long discussed and criticized the gender division of the public/private spheres reflected e.g. in the news as “hard” and “soft” news or, more generally, in an ambiguous division of factual programming as masculine and popular entertainment genres as of women’s specific interest (e.g. Fraser 1989; van Zoonen 1991 & 1994; see also discussion in Dahlgren 1995). On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the pleasures of popular culture and the private approach in talk shows specifically address women audiences’ concerns and “women’s politics” (Brown 1990 & 1994; Fiske 1994; Masciarotte 1991; Pedersen 1993).

It seems, then, that these developments, illustrated e.g. in talk shows from vox pop to therapy, provide a double-edged sword for women to be present in and (politically) engaged by the media. The most optimistic view is that popular pleasures, by definition “of the people”, work in the politics of the everyday life to help people “make do” and to provide them
with ingredients of resistance and critical scrutiny of the official (de Certeau 1984; Fiske 1989, 1993, 1994). Following this thought, television as a popular media could create a “popular public sphere” (see Habermas 1989) where people as citizens can critically evaluate and discuss issues of public importance, perhaps even engage themselves politically. This might be said to be especially true with women’s television culture. First, when entertainment values and e.g. the features of popular tabloid television take over broadcast time and sneak into more “serious journalism”, women are seen more often on the screen. Although the job of women is often to decorate programmes, their increasing visibility also provides chances for alternative portrayals of gender identities (Pedersen 1993). Also, women are associated with the entertainment genres of television and their concerns are often absent from the official media representations such as the news, but the issues come up in more popular or entertaining genres such as soaps and talk shows (e.g. Brown 1990). The personalization which goes hand in hand with the popularizing trend in television could be thus connected with the feminist slogan “personal is political”.

But is this a perverse connection? The popular and intimate elements in the mass media have also provoked rethinking and criticism (starting from Habermas 1989) of the media as a potential link between civil society and the state: the world presented by the mass media is neither a public sphere nor does it provide the integrity of the private sphere to its consumers. Instead, the personalization of issues, as so clearly manifested in talk shows, distorts publicly important issues to the point of being unrecognizable; the emotional is made to matter more than the analytical and critical. With the gendered public/private dichotomy, this means that women and so-called “women’s issues” of the private sphere may be more present in the media. Yet, they are not made any more political than before but — regardless of the possibilities for diverse portrayals — mostly still tend to reinforce the stereotypes and thus widen the gender gap (van Zoonen 1991).
What: focus on interaction

The relevance of talkative television for women’s politics may derive from these contradictory aspects. Yet it may be found not (only) in content but in the manner of the communication produced. As the popularity of various kinds of talk shows and discussion programmes in Finland and other countries indicates, there is something about television talk which attracts audiences. Some crucial elements of interest can then be suspected also to be found in the language, interaction and communicative conventions that these programmes provide for their viewers.

Starting from Habermas (1989), the idea of the public as citizens includes the element of interaction, of talk between people. What we see and hear on television is by no means interaction face-to-face; yet much information on television is talk which is aimed at audiences on the other side of the screen. And if it is through everyday talk that individuals hold each other accountable for the maintenance of the self-evident nature of the world, it is through broadcast talk that the self-evident nature is produced and reproduced (Scannell 1991). Talk on television may then exceedingly resemble everyday conversation, but it still bears a feature not always present in face-to-face interaction, the most obvious of which is the existence of viewers as “imagined recipients” (Goffman 1981). This characteristic has partly contributed to the birth of certain forms of broadcast talk which have generic identifiable structures. However, these genres cut across the various programme formats in which talk is prevalent; they are pluralistic and aimed at various sectors of the audience which operate with varying sets of cultural knowledge (Tolson 1991). Talk shows form the type of broadcast talk which most excessively challenges and blends elements from other programme formats and communicative genres, and which most clearly demonstrates the trend of conversationalization of public affairs. In the shows, the developments of popularization and intimization bring together the public and the private as well as information and entertainment, also in the language and interaction (Fairclough 1995b, 10).

The question that flows from the above is this: Is it because of this communicative cocktail, the “struggle over meanings” between the private and public modes or “official” and “lifeworld” discourses (Fairclough 1995b) demonstrated in the talk show genre that makes it so popular and even relevant to “women’s politics”? At stake might be not only the content but the way in which it is verbalized and interacted; and not simply the interaction between the real participants in the pro-
grammes, but also between them and their viewers as imagined recipients. Feminist research of language indicates possible differences between the sexes in communicative conventions (see e.g. the account on research given in Crawford 1995) and this has also been discussed in connection with the media and the interaction it produces (e.g. Brown 1994; Masciarotte 1991; in the Finnish context Hakulinen 1991 & 1993). From a broad perspective the genres — e.g. soaps and talk shows — associated and/or watched by women follow modes which are connected to women’s oral culture, as opposed to the bardic genres of news, sports, action and documentary, attributed as masculine (Brown 1994). Oprah, then, with her cries of “c’mon girl” can be said to produce specifically feminine talk and interaction (Masciarotte 1991); and at least in Finland, it is mostly female journalists who facilitate the friendly, empathic and confession-provoking therapy chats on television. Although audiences of talk shows and discussion programmes can also be more closely connected by other variables than gender (see e.g. Kytömäki & Savinen 1996), there are some indications that viewers’ assessments of the interaction in the programmes do have a gender twist to them (e.g. Livingstone 1994, see also the following case in point).

How to tackle with the talk

How to test the relevance of private talk in public as an interactive event? Interaction has not been a key focus of media scholars and/or methods of mass media research, but one approach on interaction — whether everyday or institutional as in television — is conversation analysis (CA). The method, deriving from ethnomethodology, does not view language through static universal systems and categories, but as everyday action where the knowledge of participants of interaction and the action itself are constantly constituting each other (Schiffrin 1994). It is thus based on empirical data, describing the course of an interactive event and inducting the findings strictly from what emerges in the course of that particular interaction (Nuolijärvi 1990).

The beauty of CA is its interest in real (everyday) situations where micro-level structures of social action exist. It is able to describe, in a sense “deconstruct”, an event of interaction ranging from its basic elements of turn-taking to e.g. disagreements and interruptions, as well as to the various positions in the participation framework of a conversation (see Goffman 1981). However, when examining interaction and communic-
tive conventions in the mass media, the method mostly leaves aside such considerations as programme genres and their intertextuality, let alone the contents and broader sociocultural context to which they relate (for conversation analysis of televised interaction, see e.g. Clayman 1991 & 1992; Greatbatch 1988 & 1992; Heritage 1985; Heritage & Greatbatch 1991 and Schegloff 1988/89; on Finnish research e.g. the account given in Nulijärvi & Tiittula 1995; for a critique, see e.g. Fairclough 1989 & 1995a).

For the purpose of understanding the relevance of broadcast talk, both in a specific media event, as part of a certain broadcast talk genre and as an interaction possibly producing and reproducing broader social realities, the view of so-called critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1995a & 1995b) offers a framework which calls for a simultaneous scrutiny of a particular media text, of its discursive practices (including its production, reception and its connections to other texts and genres), and of its connections to wider sociocultural practices. Bridging the gap of micro and macro-level analysis requires, then, the application of a multiplicity of methods and research viewpoints.

However, my special interest in interaction in television brings into focus the way in which communication is organized. In order to establish a certain micro and macro link between private talk in public and its popularity, I aim to question not only in terms of discursive contents but mainly in relation to how they are presented. For that purpose, I connect the descriptive CA analysis of a few shows as communicative events together with the viewers' assessments related to the interaction in the show, and mirror the findings to the broader discussion of talk shows as a genre, to talk show audiences, and to the relevance of the genre as public communication.

The guest today: Mirja Pyykkö Interviews

Following the descriptive and inductive call of CA, I have closely examined the interaction in one show (some 60 pages of transcript, for the analysis, see Aslama 1995), in addition to excerpts from other shows all broadcast in 1993–1994. I have also had access to two focus group discussions on the programme, conducted by the Finnish Broadcasting Company in 1993 at one peak of the programme's popularity. The focus group method is widely used in the Company to test programme pilots or to get new ideas by mapping audience perceptions of specific programmes. The aim is to provide a situation where, through informal and
interactive discussion within the groups, the viewers have an opportunity to bring forward various, even contradictory understandings of programmes and provide further arguments for their views (Kytömäki & Savinen 1993). This particular study — its goal being programme development, not intensive data gathering — was conducted by using only two focus groups: one consisted of women of various demographic backgrounds, the other was a similarly varied group of men. While looking at MP herself through a magnifying glass, I have simultaneously been able to “listen” and analyse some viewers’ discussions or “discourses” on the programme.

Although the CA approach recognizes the uniqueness of every interactive situation, I still dare to draw broader conclusions from the conversational features I have detected in a few shows: there are many characteristics which correspond to other studies of talk shows as conversation or as a television genre. Also, the relevance of talk, interaction and communicative conventions can be seen in the focus groups’ assessments — as in Livingstone & Lunt’s (1994) study, for instance — in that the participants bring up and interestingly discuss the elements which comprise the communicative setting of the programme. Based both on the conversation analysis of some particular shows and on the focus group discussants’ assessments of the case in point, a few (and interconnected) aspects of the structure and mode of the interaction emerge: the realizations of 1) the role of the interviewer, 2) the role of the interviewee, and 3) the role of the viewer — as well as the gendered evaluations linked to these roles.

“*She’s quite a special person.*” The role of the interviewer

“When she comes and interviews someone one gets the feeling that ... she is very much at ease with herself and she talks and she is almost like an expert on the topic and very sympathetic. I bet she makes many people say things they didn’t want to reveal ...” (a female discussant)

“[In a particular show] they were smiling at each other, telling jokes ... It was like they didn’t care about the cameras ... they were letting you know that they are friends.” (a male discussant)

“It’s informal, personal, the language used is everyday-like and one could say quite daring too ...” (a female discussant)

The central characteristics of talk shows and the great contribution to their private and personalized approach is that they become largely identified with their host: we only need to think how programmes from *Oprah*
and the *Ricki Lake Show* to MP are named. The identity of a television programme is always connected to the topics taken up, the approach and mode chosen as well as the guests selected, but a great responsibility for all that is granted to the journalist. As Brand & Scannell (1991) note, talk shows are very dependent on the identity of their hosts; this identity, in turn, depends on his/her communicative style.

The style in *Mirja Pyykkö Interviews* differs notably from the conversational strategies in “official” news interviews, for example. Clearly, the two broadcast talk genres both feature elements typical of institutional conversation: they have a specific goal, they restrict participation by the participants (e.g. to interviewers as asking questions and guests as answering them), and they provide their own interpretive framework which enables participants to accept their limited roles within the interaction (Drew & Heritage 1992). However, in MP as in many more popular discussion programmes, the aim is to provide talk that to a great extent bears an illusion of a private chat (e.g. Greatbatch 1988, Langer 1991).

The frequent fading of the institutional character of talk in *Mirja Pyykkö Interviews* can largely be attributed to the role of the interviewer. Arguably, it is not the host alone who creates the mode and conversational style in a show. However, s/he is able to “utilize” her/his institutional role as a journalist in her/his own domain of television (see e.g. Hirsch 1989) to set the tone and to create an identity for the programme — which then is often followed by other participants. For example, where news interviewers aim at an institutional role of a seemingly neutral mediator who simply states questions (Clayman 1992), the interviewer MP does not hesitate to bring up her own views: “I feel” and “I think” are often included in her talk. Unlike news journalists who often disguise their disagreements with interviewees under a more general view of e.g. “the great public” or “the press” (Clayman 1992), MP may state differing opinions as her personal observations. Also, these points of view may be illustrated through MP’s stories about her journalist career as well as her as a private person.

Yet MP offers more sympathy than challenge to her guests. The general atmosphere of the show is intimate and empathic, two characteristics which make some viewers call her a psychiatrist-type of questioner. This good-humoured and understanding manner of conversation is often initiated especially by the hostess by agreeing nods, smile as well as laughter, a feature which often creates an intimate mode for conversation (Jefferson *et al.* 1987). As viewers put it, the participants of the show appear as old friends chatting and joking who seem to have a good time
together. Also, MP in her part utilizes non-official, non-institutional language, sometimes even daringly, as a viewer noted: her colourful metaphors, slang words, and humoristic expressions follow the popular challenge of the official discourse (Fiske 1989).

Another “everyday-like” feature of the communicative strategies MP follows seems to contribute to the empathic mode which makes the interviewer, according to the discussants, a different kind of journalist: in her turns of speech, the hostess often follows up on the interviewees’ turns; sometimes expanding the theme, sometimes rephrasing the guest’s statements and sometimes just using the same or a similar vocabulary in her next question. Furthermore, although many of the hostess’s turns include a question, an element typical of the representative of an institution in an institutional conversation (Drew & Heritage 1992), the questions are embedded in other elements like additive comments or evaluations. Both these features differ notably from the interaction often heard in news and current affairs interviews, where the journalist may, for a few-minute-long discussion, follow a strict agenda of questions without expanding very much on the interviewee’s answers. MP, then, is an hour-long television therapy where the guest/patient may and is often encouraged by the interviewer to explain her/himself in detail, and where the journalist’s traditional institutional task of asking questions is in many cases packaged softly in other elements of her turns.

In sum, the journalist MP is more than just a question-asker. As noted by Tolson (1991), talk shows provide interviewers many roles and require more performance and participation than traditional interviews. For Livingstone & Lunt (1994), the broader issue of talk shows challenging many generic conventions in television is indeed crystallized in the role of the host — which may easily vary from the adored hero or the chair of the debate to a conciliator, a host of a dinner party and the judge. This flexibility and personal performance of the interviewer can be illustrated through a comparison to the interaction in news interviews: news journalists, who provide public and official information, tend to aim towards abstraction of their involvement through a role of a sole mediator of information. Talk show hosts, then, follow a more varied interactional strategy in which the host participates and shifts his/her positions in the course of conversation.

This ambiguity and flexibility is the ground for the assessments by the focus group discussants, who regard MP as the primus motor of the programme: the expert, the therapist, the friend, and the tender interrogator who makes people reveal things they did not want to tell. And surely the
fluid identity of the journalist between the institutional and the personal gives viewers a certain commitment to the host, an illusion of her personality. “Mirja is like a friend”, states an evening paper, and a viewer evaluates: She’s quite a special person.

“It’s so nice to get to know what other people think.”

The role of the interviewee

“Her programmes tell more than other programmes ... one could see how things really are.” (a female discussant)

“It’s so nice to get to know what other people think.” (a female discussant)

If the interviewer MP is the one to set the tone for a private, everyday mode of talk, then the guests are to provide private information to be talked about. No panel of professional experts here: the role of the guests, in the Mirja Pyykkö Interviews and in many other talk shows, is to give individual insight through experiences and emotions. Be it a relationship issue or a “hard news” item, the topic is approached from the “everyday”, micro-level viewpoint. The focus group participants note that the show provides them with what the guests think, not with what they know. This approach seems to give viewers the feeling that issues are discussed more “deeply”, thoroughly and authentically: one could see how things really are. The appearance of authenticity is linked to giving emotions great value and importance. As traditional discussion topics of the private domain, emotions presented in talk shows narrow down the distance between the official, public broadcast talk and a personal chat. And when judged by viewers, the sense of authenticity seems to stem from the verifiability of feelings that we all can relate to, regardless of our factual knowledge. As one viewer stated, he cannot provide distanced critique about the programme since the emotional authenticity is so apparent to him: I can’t evaluate this (particular show) at all because it touched me so ... I’ve felt exactly the same.

Authenticity and the sphere of private may very well be at stake also in the many positions which are granted to the interviewee within her/his role in talk shows. MP and other talk show journalists have space to shift their roles; thus, as Livingstone & Lunt (1994) suggest, the ambiguous and changing standing of the host alters the roles of other participants. Although at least in MP Interviews it is still the hostess who mostly has the institutional right to position her guests in various standings, the standings may shift between professional and personal identities: for ex-
ample, a Finnish priest of African origin may comment, among other
things, on the policies of the Finnish Lutheran Church, on the situation in
South Africa, on his family, on his religious principles, and on the myth
of "black sexuality". This kind of negotiation of roles may be dominantly
initiated by the host, but it resembles a private, everyday conversation
where we change our positions according to constantly changing conver­sational context (Goodwin & Heritage 1990). The many-sided "practical
expertise" of the interviewees may stress the authentic image of their in­formation. Also, this way MP seems to provide in a limited scope a simi­lar "multiplicity of voices" as audience participation discussion pro­grammes (e.g. Fairclough 1995b): here, we are presented the voices —
maybe not as contradictory and varied — in the many roles of the guest.

"The viewer is in a way participating ..." The role of the viewer

"I bet many people get their information solely from the TV news and
think that what they see there is absolutely true. This programme is good
because it doesn't give that impression." (a male discussant)

"It feels as if one were the third person sitting in the studio next to the in­terviewer and the interviewee. The viewer is in a way participating [in the
programme]." (a male discussant)

The private and personal approach also applies to the interpellation of the
talk show audiences, in the form of the sense of participation. A studio
audience discussion programme may offer relatively more direct contact
through call-in sessions or also through the participation of the audience
in the show. MP, on the other hand, seems to invite viewers to participate
in a different manner. The focus group discussants note that the hostess
and the guest talk as if they were chatting in a private place, without refer­ring
to the presence of the home audiences: MP hardly ever introduces
her guest to the people on the other side of the screen, nor do she or the
guests directly address their viewers in any part of the show. Rather,
viewers are given the idea that they join in in the middle of a conversation
at the starting hour and are gently excluded when the programme time
ends. Also, the visual features of the programme enhance this illusion: the
camera often follows the conversation from the "point-of-view" angle,
letting viewers examine the situation from one participant's perspective,
while the discussants converse seemingly without noticing the cameras.
This kind of denial of the institutional and public character of their con­versation
gives the viewers the feeling that they are eavesdroppers, or
even participants who quietly sit in the studio next to the interviewer and interviewee.

In the interaction of *Mirja Pyykkö Interviews*, to state it in Goffman’s (1981) terms, viewers do not have an addressed role in the “participation framework” of the conversation; yet they are imagined recipients and participants of an “innuendo”, since the conversation is aimed at them. Viewers are included in the participation by the manner in which the host as a mediator indirectly addresses them. MP may state her questions using the expression of “we”, using this discursive “principal” (Goffman 1981) to indicate that there is a larger body of opinions and interests behind her statements. Often in institutional conversation, the principle refers to the institution which the speaker represents (see e.g. Goffman 1981); here, the expression is intended to include the “great public” whose views and interests the journalist is bringing forward. As noted about news interviews, journalists state their value judgements behind a certain distant principle, excluding themselves from the standpoint (Clayman 1992, Goffman 1981) and positioning the viewer as a passive receiver of narration. In talk shows from Oprah to MP, however, the expression is a collective, empathic voice which grants the viewer the position of a subject participating in a dialogical discourse (Masciarotte 1991).

The role of the viewer in *Mirja Pyykkö Interviews* is, however, greater than just being included through the empathic “we”. Both the roles of the interviewer and the interviewee serve the purpose of presenting multiple voices or standpoints where objectivity or one dominant discourse is not easily allowed to take the lead. Rather, it seems that talk shows involve audiences in “sceptical fluidity” typical to popular culture in general (Fiske 1993). When news generalize, group people and issues, and present in a certain sense indisputable, “official” truths, talk shows offer viewers the possibility of being social agents who can and should evaluate the information that is brought to the subject in a personal, grass roots form, and that can be applied to the everyday. This is illustrated pointedly when *Oprah* and *Ricki* at the end of their shows ask for a judgement on a difficult dating dilemma — something everyone according to their everyday knowledge may evaluate and form an opinion about. In that way, viewers are taken into the programme and encouraged to question the truthfulness of the meanings presented to them. As Rapping (1994) puts it, talk shows “admit they don’t know what’s right or wrong to anyone else.” The same encouraged, “fluid reception” seems to be present in MP as well: in the words of a viewer, the programme does not give the impression that what is said is absolutely true.
"I bet women watch this more than men." Gendered assessments

"The viewer could be a man who is surprised that he is interested in the MP Interviews show, after all, it's only prejudice." (a female discussant)

"I bet women watch this programme more than men do." (a female discussant)

Our guest MP is not specifically a "women's only" programme: its overall ratings show that it reaches 14% of the female television audiences and 10% of the male viewers of television in Finland. However, as can be seen in the two female viewers' comments, there is something about MP that connects it more to women audiences than male watchers, which may also be connected to the language and interaction presented on the screen.

The focus group discussants give comments which are similar to those Livingstone (1994) found when examining gender and the engagement in the viewing of audience discussion programmes, and which show gendered differences in how men and women perceive this show and its interaction. First, men would like to find a more factual connection between the interviewee and a nationally or internationally important issue. Women, on the contrary, agree with the intimization: they state that the show allows them truly to understand the topic and get close to the interviewee's thoughts. Second, men are somewhat annoyed by the concentration on individuals' opinions and emotions. They would appreciate to recognize clearer institutional roles of the guests; a variety including professional experts on the topic. Women, on the other hand, enjoy to see real life — as also realized in the various interactive positions of the interviewer and the interviewee. Third, most male discussants find talk shows like the one in question slow, boring and void of a clear topical structure, whereas women enjoy the tempo and claim that the host with her personalized approach is the key element which makes the programme interesting.

These surprisingly gendered viewpoints reflect the gendered value hierarchy of television genres in general as well as Brown's (1994) notion of the gendered oral modes of television: in the focus groups, many men seem to appreciate and ask for the features of the "bardic" news and current affairs programming, whereas women discussants enjoy the more private, oral presentation modes of soaps and talk shows. Even if MP may seduce both sexes to turn on the TV, the reception and uses differ: for many men MP seems to provide quality in form of a well researched but poorly presented interview (the theme was OK but why did they just
chat); whereas women enjoy specifically the personalization and intimi-
dation of the issue.

It seems that the popular, sometimes even tabloid-like presentation is
here at stake for female audiences. No matter the topic, MP takes on the
style of tabloid talk shows targeted to women and of other women’s gen-
res such as soaps, e.g. in narrative, open-ended structure with no clear
beginning and end (see e.g. Pedersen 1993). Soap-like features can also
be found in the slow pace of the show as well as in the visual style of ex-
tensive close-ups — let alone the overall concentration of Mirja Pyykkö
Interviews on the personal and the private in the issues. Many female
viewers in the focus group correspond in their views to Bird’s (1992)
findings about women as tabloid readers: they show no need to hesitate to
express the pleasure and private empowerment given to them by this
show. MP is frequently discussed about, especially in the workplace, but
also used for own philosophizing: when I went to bed, I was going over
the programme again and again in my head...

By no means would the journalist MP, who declares that gender is not
in any sense an issue for her, join Oprah’s declaration (in Squire, quoted
in Livingstone & Lunt 1994): “We do programme these shows to em-
power women”. Yet, this curious — calculated or not — mismatch of
current affairs style issues and popular approach in the manner of pre-
senting these topics seems to attract a positive response in women. In
sum, witnessing a current issue from a personal viewpoint, packaged in
empathy and friendliness which resembles a confidential chat in private,
seems to irritate some male viewers but greatly please most female
watchers.

What is the judgement?

According to the talk show procedure, I have introduced the issue of the
popular, private talk in television and I have presented a guest, a specific
case of Mirja Pyykkö Interviews. My special interest has been with the
interaction and communicative conventions evaluated on the basis of
viewers’ perceptions. It is now time for an assessment of the many voices
in the matter of private talk in public.

For women, politics and communication, there are two disturbing is-
issues in the case in point. First: Does the manner of private talk in pub-
lic — as realized in MP or any other popular televised talk — give us
tools for critical evaluation of issues of public importance or even guide
us towards a more viewer-friendly and engaging way of televised interaction? The account on interaction only tells how the talk is organized, but says very little of what kind of contents e.g. in the form of ideological use of language and social realities are presented.

The general fear of cultural critics — which should awaken someone examining the interaction in a popular media product — is that the privatized popular “pleasures” take over popular “resistance” and reconcile with the dominant (e.g. van Zoonen 1994). This is exactly what Rapping (1994) has concluded about talk shows. She argues that the programmes have taken on the feminist ideals of the 1960s in that the personal matters should be discussed about. But according to the nature of the mass media in a contradictory environment, the shows have utilized the best insights and traditions of that politicized time and declared them. Progressive ideas, once they gain strength, are contained by the media in a “large, immobilizing structure of the political status quo.” (Rapping 1994)

Because the approach of talk shows celebrates the individual instead of the collective and the emotional instead of the socially analytical, it may estrange us from politics by emphasizing personal viewpoints instead of collective responsibility and action. MP, then, might be said to confuse the real social problem of drug abuse by showing experiences of a female drug addict without any reference to the difficult life situation unemployed young women like her face; the issue of increasing refugee flows and racism is then tamed by asking a well-educated and assimilated Finnish priest of African origin to describe his experiences.

Furthermore, with a critical view to the content of interaction, the topics mentioned above might also raise questions about how dominant discourses of otherness and marginality — such as social standing, criminality and ethnic minority — are reproduced. For example, the interviewer MP with her institutionally more “powerful” position to address and question her guest, can sometimes position “you”, the interviewee, as the deviation of the norm (the addict, the criminal, the unemployed; the Black, the representative of the Church, the South African) as opposed to the emphatic “we”, including the general public.

If analysing interaction and its reception does not indicate what is talked about in the possible “popular public sphere” of a talk show, what does it say? It may show tendencies of how the personal and private is constructed in the communicative conventions, illustrated e.g. by the journalist MP’s involvement in the discussion and the created illusion of her personality as a journalist and a private person; by interviewees’ personal accounts on issues; and by the direct or indirect inclusion of audi-
ences in the discourse of the programme. Fitted into the most hopeful theoretization on popularization and backed up by remarks of the focus groups in the case, it means that personal accounts from various standings of an individual produce disputable truths, as well as an invitation to viewers to participate in that production process. That participation is partly identification with the personal, partly scepticism of the personalized. The talk show format of today makes public issues personal and apolitical; and judging by audience ratings, viewers prefer identification and entertainment over critical distance. My question is: could the media make issues of public concern political, with references to broader social realities, yet in a personal, engaged and engaging manner? Could the journalist and her/his “guests” or experts show involvement via interaction and urge involvement from the viewers as well?

Another question in the case involves women as audiences and political agents. What can be said from the assessments of a few focus group discussants? Which women (and men) do they represent and how does that position the differences shown earlier between the perceptions of female and male viewers? Most importantly, do these assessments mean anything for “women’s politics”? Here I take for granted the simple recognition from many studies that talk shows seem to matter especially, or in a special manner, for many women. Audience research involving MP seems to indicate the same about our case, and that alone makes the programme worth the scrutiny.

When considering the society and its television culture, I suspect that here is, in de Certeau’s (1984) terms, some sort of “making do” going on for some female viewers in the case of MP. Interestingly, the social, political and economic public/private division of genders should not apply very sharply in Finland. Most Finnish women have for a long time been participating in the public spheres of society: it is traditionally more a rule than an exception that women work outside of home, and they have also been very active in official politics as well as civic movements. Politics and the public sector have witnessed many women leaders, and although glass ceilings still exist, women are now taking over ever higher positions in the private sector of businesses. However, despite these developments, the news still represent the male elite. Finnish women are not portrayed either in television news or in radio or press any more frequently than in other countries (MediaWatch 1995; see also e.g. Sana 1995; Aslama & Salmi 1996).

Obviously, the media must reflect some cultural value hierarchies, stereotypes and dichotomies circulated regardless of the more concrete, “practical” possibilities for equality in the public fields of Finnish society.
Women in public positions are not granted as much publicity as their male counterparts, at least not in "serious journalism". Also, the private, which is considered a feminine domain and which certainly is relevant to working women as well, is not given the political importance in the "official" media genres. Neither are there many diverse or non-traditional portrayals of gender offered by the talking heads. Following Brown (1990, 1994), then, we may assume that if Finnish women cannot find a connection between their "public" and "private" lives and the contents as well as communicative conventions of the "official" media genres, they will seek elements for everyday politics where they can find them. If the private still is, or is presented in the mass media as women's domain, then (some/many) women will turn to the private and popular domain and communicative modes of the media. Ever since commercial television has recognized women as forming various subgroups of consumers, it has begun to provide a greater variety of gender representations in its entertainment and fiction programmes than the public-service broadcasting company in Finland has dared to (Nikunen et al. 1996).

As in any proper talk show, we can combine these pros and cons of the private talk in public. The political edge here is to recognize both the private/public polarization and the pleasure this (often inadequate?) dualism today offers for women: in MP as in any popular media product, the dichotomy can be both contested and utilized. In talk shows, there is a possibility of viewer engagement, enhanced greatly by the manner of interaction and communicative conventions, emerging from a closer analysis of the elements which attract viewers in the programme type.

For example, the focus group discussions on MP might indicate some trends in viewers' assessments of the information given to them and the possibility granted for political participation by the mass media. What many viewers seem to seek from Mirja Pyykkö Interviews is in-depth information instead of short headlines. They want to hear ordinary, even marginal, multiple voices instead of élite and official ones. They want to be addressed as if they directly, as in everyday conversation and in everyday-language, were participating in the discussion instead of being lectured at; and they appreciate a presenter who creates a personal and familiar identity for herself and for the whole programme.

The appreciation, in sum, is of the diverse voices in a conversational, private-like mode of televised interaction which includes the viewer. For the assessment of a possible, engaging televised interaction and public communication formed in/by/through TV talk, we can look at the interaction in the news as one way of presenting a media story (Bird & Dardenne
In this sense, talk shows follow the idea Fiske (1989) has phrased as follows: it is more important to encourage viewers to question information and to connect it to their everyday lives than it is to lecture them “distanced” truths. If, for the engagement of people in debate and assessment of politically relevant issues presented in a public forum, we need to choose between the two; between the one which mediates official information in a “down-from-above” manner and the other which may do the opposite, we may start to reconsider how political communication should be organized and conducted to reach audiences and encourage their participation.

With private talk in public, at stake is that we learn how to make use of those communicative elements in talk shows which could account for raw materials of engagement. This lesson to be learned does not need to celebrate the intimization and emotionalization of political issues with the cost of critical analytical communication; neither does it need to leave out the plurality of women or of women’s politics. Rather, the issue is in trying to utilize the particular potential of a media genre which tolerates more diverse voices than the most, and which includes its viewers in the communication.

Finnish Broadcasting Company

Notes

1 A version of this paper will be published in Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle & van Zoonen, Liesbet (ed.): Women’s Politics and Communication. Hampton Press, 1997.

References


