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Media's Role in Transition to Democracy: Estonia and Chile

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Introduction

The core assumption of this thesis stems from the argumentation of Colin Sparks that through the optic of media, “certain features of the structure of society” are more clearly illuminated than through others.\(^1\) As the contemporary societies are highly mediated, it makes sense to presume that the transformation of the media points to a broader political change.\(^2\) Taking this correlation into consideration, it is expected that the media in transitional societies obtains a special significance, as the turbulence of the transition phase evokes both elevated public interest and reflects the uncertainty of the times. For that reason, two countries that at first glance appear to have little in common, have been chosen for examination. Estonia and Chile went through transition from authoritarian regime to democracy almost simultaneously, adding a curious parallel of the same global trends affecting the processes of political change.

Estonia regained its independence in 1991, while the dictatorship in Chile officially ended in 1990. In both countries, the transition lasted throughout the 1990s. In the case of Estonia, it is possible to speak of the transition process ending around 2000, while in the case of Chile, it has been argued that the transition is not yet over.\(^3\) The Chilean constitution of 1980, designed and adopted under the dictatorship, is in effect to this day. This thesis begins with an overview of the developments in late 1980s, and finishes with the first few years of 2000s. As the primary focus of this thesis is on the media, the end point to the analysis has been chosen according to the significance of the developments in media sphere. The Press Law of 2001 in Chile bettered the situation of media freedom, while in Estonia, the implementation of EU legislation regarding audio-visual media in 1999/2000 marked an important unification with European media systems.

Chile and Estonia were strongly influenced by the prevalent tendencies in the world at the time, that is, the dispersion of democracy and capitalism. For different reasons, both countries opted for maximum liberalisation in economic terms, which in turn had a great impact on social and political developments. It is argued in this thesis that due to the shared economic approach chosen by Estonia and Chile, the processes of media developments have been, to an extent, similar as well. Surprisingly, the institution of democracy has not necessarily led to a pluralistic media system –

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\(^1\) Karol Jakubowicz, *Rude Awakening: Social and Media Change in Central and Eastern Europe* (New Jersey: Hampton Press Inc., 2007), 1

\(^2\) Ibid., 1

while the number of media outlets has steadily increased, the trends in content have rather
developed towards congruity. In both Estonia and Chile, the commercialisation and tabloidisation of
the media constituted the prevalent processes in the 1990s. Furthermore, it is hereby understood that
the media has a role of public service in a democratic society, which the developments towards
entertainment orientation do not necessarily support. This thesis seeks to explain why the media
plurality as reflected in the diversity of content seems to decline as the neoliberal transition
advances, even though the objective in a democracy naturally constitutes a democratic media
system.

While there are various ways to define the media – depending on the definition it can
comprise anything from simple leaflets to arts production – the media forms under consideration in
this thesis are newspapers, to a smaller extent magazines, and television. The reason for this choice
is related to the main theory used throughout this thesis for conceptualising the media. Relying on
the public sphere theory of Jürgen Habermas, the media is understood as an institution of the public
sphere, pointing to the central elements of participation, deliberation, and political communication.
Considering that the objective in this thesis is to understand media's role during the transition as a
period of rapid political change, and the subsequent deficiencies in the development towards a
democratic media system, the media is primarily understood as the sphere between the political and
the social, the public and the private. That is to say, the relevance of the media during the transition
process lies in its role as the political and social communication institution. Newspapers, analytical
magazines, and television have proven as the main channels used for this purpose.

In order to reach the given end, the thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter seeks to
set the general framework of how the transition process is understood, what are the possible
approaches to the relation of the media and democracy, and why does the neoliberal nature of the
transition process matter from the perspective of media development. The second chapter outlines
the general developments and tendencies of the media system in Estonia, beginning with the final
years of the Soviet rule and focusing section by section on the printed press and the television. The
third chapter focuses on Chile, and broadly follows the structure of the second chapter, but
additionally includes some further peculiarities of Chilean media culture in the last section. The
fourth and final chapter attempts to bring the two and two together, and examine the similarities and
differences of the Estonian and Chilean media development under the government of democratic
authorities. General conclusions are reached in the final chapter.

A case study of Estonian and Chilean media developments during the transition to
democracy in comparative perspective has not been conducted before, but the thesis makes
extensive use of works of authors who have studied the media developments in these countries
separately. First of all, as an introductory volume to the relations of media and democracy, Peter Dahlgren's analysis of the issues with political participation in a contemporary society, including the effect of market forces, has proven very useful for understanding the broader socio-economic context. Considering the centrality of the effects of the market on the development of democratic media, Adam Przeworski's study of economic reform and affluence affecting transitional democracies is greatly relied upon. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter have conducted extensive research on the countries going through transition as part of the third wave of democratisation, and have identified the recurring features and sub-processes in these countries. In joint with Gerardo Munck and Carol Leff's analysis of the primary actors and strategies of transition, this work benefited for better apprehension of the nature of the transition itself.

Concerning media system developments, Karol Jakubowicz has analysed the peculiarities of post-socialist countries, identifying similarities and underlining differences deriving from specific cultural, economic, and political variables. Jakubowicz, as well as the Estonian authors most relied upon – Marju Lauristin, Peeter Vihalemm, and Epp Lauk, are all concerned with the democratic qualities of the media system, which broadly relate to the Habermasian concept of the public sphere. Compiled or contributed to by the named Estonian authors, two books – Baltic Media in Transition and Return to the Western World – are used as the framework for understanding Estonian media processes, as they address the media and the political developments advancing jointly.

Rosalind Bresnahan's critical approach to Chile's post-authoritarian media developments offers perspectives on both the broader context of neoliberal transition and the media, as well as conditions specific to Chile. The biggest contribution to the understanding of both the media system and the social and political developments in Chile during the transition period has been Antonio Castillo's doctoral thesis on Chilean media in transition to democracy.

7 Gerardo L. Munck, Carol S. Leff, “Modes of Transition and Democratisation: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 29 (1997)
8 Karol Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening
1. Theoretical Framework

This chapter constructs the general theoretical framework used in this thesis. It begins with an introduction to the concept of democratic transition and will explain the main features of the process. A few possible academic approaches to the transition will be outlined, and the main method of conceptualising these changes, relying on the works of noted scholars, will be drafted. The neoliberal character of the transition process, as experienced by Estonia and Chile, will be sketched. The next section focuses on the connections of the media and democracy, and briefly addresses some of the theories regarding the media’s role in a democratic society. The main approach used in this thesis will be explained in more detail. The last section addresses the media in the context of the peculiarities of neoliberal transition, and will seek to understand the main pitfalls of the media in fulfilling its role, as conceptualised in the second section, within the context of neoliberalism.

1.1 Transition

Since the mid-1970s, two global trends – the spread of democracy and capitalism – have constituted a larger process, which Samuel Huntington, for its “unprecedented geographical reach,” has named the third wave of democratisation.\textsuperscript{12} The democratic transition process has taken place in numerous countries across Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa, and the multiple case studies have confirmed the pattern of democratic and neoliberal economic reforms to be a sign of a common vision of economic and political development dispersing worldwide. Estonia and Chile fit right into this mould, and the transition as a shared feature gives ground to comparative analysis of two otherwise distinctively different countries. This section will seek to clarify how the transition process is understood in the context of this thesis, and why it is important to examine the transition in the first place.

Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter broadly define the transition process as “the interval between one political regime and another,” which is “delimited, on the one side, by the launching process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime, and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy.”\textsuperscript{13} Transition takes place on multiple levels, and in cases such as the post-socialist countries in which the previous regime had attempted to build from scratch an all-encompassing order according to certain ideological principles, transitions to democracy require

\textsuperscript{12} Valerie Bunce, “Democratisation and Economic Reform,” \textit{Annual Reviews of Political Science} 4 (2001): 43-44

\textsuperscript{13} O'Donnell and Schmitter, \textit{Transitions from Authoritarian Rule}, 6
thorough “systemic changes”. This falls in line with Claus Offe's theory of “triple transformation”, by which he means that during the transition, both national-territorial and constitutional issues as well as a complete restructuring of the economic system may have to be dealt with. In addition, Marju Lauristin points out that “the most important systemic aspects of these processes are related to democratisation and marketisation.” Following these principles, the transition is hereby understood as the interim period between two political orders, during which systemic reforms on institutional, economical, and social level are conducted, with the objective of instituting a democratic order and a market economy.

A guiding theme in this thesis is the neoliberal principles according to which the transitions in both Estonia and Chile were followed through. As Karol Jakubowicz has pointed out, all post-socialist countries shared the two goals of consolidated democracy and an economic reform. In Chile, the neoliberal economic approach had already been implied under the dictatorship, but the importance of it in the context of this thesis lies in the decision to stay true to these principles throughout the transition. In Estonia, similar neoliberal objectives were opted for after the collapse of the previous regime. These policies which both Estonia and Chile followed are in accordance with the Washington Consensus, which is based on the principles of “liberalisation of markets, privatisation, deregulation and macroeconomic stabilisation.” Grzegorz Kolodko has summarised these policies as follows: “liberalise as much as you can, privatise as fast as you can, and be tough in fiscal and monetary measures.” The examination of the role of media in Estonian and Chilean transitions are understood as being heavily influenced by neoliberal thought.

The importance of the transition and transformation processes from an authoritarian regime to democracy lies in their uncertainty. Even though the desired outcome for the groups pushing for change might be a democratic system, such objectives are not always achieved as the first phases of the transition process are by no means irreversible. The initial liberalisation of a regime may be revoked and an even harsher regime imposed instead of the previous one, or the elite of the old regime might be powerful enough to dictate the course of the transition, and lead to an outcome of some form of authoritarian rule with limited liberties or an unconsolidated democracy with a considerable degree of restrictions. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, it is a period during

14 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 60
15 Ibid., 55-56
16 Marju Lauristin, “Contexts of Transition,” in Return to the Western World, ed. Marju Lauristin (Tartu: Tartu University press, 1997), 27
17 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 116
18 Dorothee Bohle and Bela Greskovits, Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery, (Cornell: Cornell University press, 2012)
20 Bunce, “Democratisation and Economic Reform,” 44
which “the rules of the political game are not defined”, and all parties struggle to satisfy their own needs, as well as set the rules for the future.\textsuperscript{21} Gerardo Munck and Carol Leff claim that transitions “set a society on a path that shapes its subsequent political development,”\textsuperscript{22} which explains why it is important to consider how the democratisation process is conducted and how the uncertainty inherent to transitions is dealt with.

What is meant by the path-setting effect of the nature of the transition process is that it affects the pattern of later elite competition, the subsequent institutional rules are crafted during this time and whether the key actors are inclined to reject or accept “the new rules of the game”.\textsuperscript{23} In short, understanding the democratisation process will help to determine whether the following democratic and economic system is viable and institutionally equipped to manage the elite competition.\textsuperscript{24} According to the transitology theory, the character of the transition process depends on three factors: “the starting point of the process of democratisation, the agents of democratisation and the objectives established.”\textsuperscript{25} In addition, Munck and Leff stress the strategies employed by the agents of democratisation as an important factor as well\textsuperscript{26} – that is, whether the regime change is a result of negotiation between old elites and counter-elites or one of them has an upper hand in the process. Furthermore, the transition process is also affected by the chosen reform strategy: whether the “bitter pill” of quick but socially costly or a more gradual but potentially long-lasting, ineffective and discontent causing reform dynamic is opted for.\textsuperscript{27}

The transition itself has been roughly categorised into three phases: the breakdown of the old regime, the democratic transition, and democratic consolidation.\textsuperscript{28} Focusing on the pre-consolidation phase, O’Donnell and Schmitter see the transition as three sub-processes jointly in action: liberalisation, democratisation, and socialisation.\textsuperscript{29} These are the main categorisation guidelines followed in this thesis. There are other possible distinctions to be made such as the institution- and the culture-building dimensions proposed by Piotr Stompka,\textsuperscript{30} or a substantial differentiation of transition and transformation, which Raivo Vetik has described as concepts representing “two different dimensions of democratization and development phases”, the first of which concerns the formal rules and institutions of democracy, the latter the much more elusive

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item O’Donnell, Schmitter, \textit{Transitions from Authoritarian Rule}, 6
\item Munck and Leff, “Modes of Transition and Democratisation,” 343
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid., 344
\item Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 130-131
\item Munck and Leff, “Modes of Transition,” 343
\item Przeworski, \textit{Democracy and the Market}, 147
\item Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 130
\item O’Donnell and Schmitter, \textit{Transitions from Authoritarian Rule}, 7-12
\item Lauristin, “Contexts of Transition,” 27
\end{itemize}
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process of social change and the development of democratic political culture.\textsuperscript{31} However, as the focus of this thesis is on the transition phase, the democratic consolidation and subsequent social transformation will not be addressed.

It is hereby understood that the breakdown of the old regime, which kick-starts the transition, begins with a liberalisation process in the society. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, “the authoritarian incumbents, for whatever reason, begin to modify their own rules”\textsuperscript{32} and the liberalisation manifests itself as “the process of redefining and extending rights”, including freedom of speech and the right to associate.\textsuperscript{33} The following phase, which may overlap with the democratic transition (if democracy is the objective and a realistic outcome), constitutes democratisation, characterised by “the rules and procedures of citizenship” being “applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles.”\textsuperscript{34} This is also understood as the institution-building phase, during which the fundamental economic restructuring, if necessary, takes place as well. The third phase constitutes consolidation, which partially overlaps with O'Donnell's and Schmitter's “socialisation” - the “double stream” process of equalising all citizens in their rights and obligations (“social democracy”), and providing the citizenry equal benefits in terms of goods and services (“economic democracy”).\textsuperscript{35}

The question of when is the transition over is another issue that must be touched upon. Adam Przeworski claims that “democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town.”\textsuperscript{36} He speaks of uncertainty as a quintessential feature of democracy, as due to the institutional design and the centrality of competition, there will always be sporadic winners and losers in a democratic system.\textsuperscript{37} He believes that a democracy is consolidated when all parties navigate by default within the institutional framework and know that they stand a fair chance of pursuing their interests in the future, if they wait and respect the institutional design set in place, even if they are temporarily in a disadvantaged position. In sum, democracy in this situation becomes “self-enforcing”\textsuperscript{38} and evokes “generalised compliance.”\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{32} O'Donnell and Schmitter, \textit{Transitions of Authoritarian Rule}, 6
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 7
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 8
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 12
\textsuperscript{36} Przeworski, \textit{Democracy and the Market}, 26
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 11
\textsuperscript{38} Przeworski, \textit{Democracy and the Market}, 26
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 30
Offe sees a consolidated system in decisions being taken “within' fixed and settled procedures, not 'about' them,” which also points to the universal acceptance of the institutional design in place. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have come up with “five arenas of consolidated democracy”: civil society (freedom of association and communication), political society (free and inclusive elections), rule of law (constitutionalism), state apparatus (rational-legal bureaucratic norms), and economic society (institutionalised market). In addition, Przeworski argues that for democratic institutions to be consolidated, they must “at the same time protect all interests and generate economic results.” In his opinion, the stability of a new democracy depends greatly on its economy.

To briefly touch up on the question of when is transformation over (as defined by Vetik), Marju Lauristin points out that there is a “discrepancy between the speed of institutional reforms and the slowness of cultural changes”, and Jakubowicz argues that social transformation can never truly be “over”. The consolidation of democracy in this thesis is first and foremost understood as having been reached when requirements of five arenas of consolidated democracy proposed by Linz and Stepan have been fulfilled. According to Antonio Castillo, there is a “link between the quality of political communication and the quality of democracy.” Following this thought, it can perhaps be argued that the performance of the media, as an institution of communication, can be conceptualised as a sort of a litmus test for the democratisation and social transformation processes. Freedom of press in relation to freedom of speech form an important pillar of democracy, and arguably speak something of the health of the entire system. Different options of how the media can be understood as reflecting the larger societal and political processes, will be explored subsequently.

1.2 Media and Democracy

This section focuses on the different theories concerning media's role in democracy, and sketches the framework of the main approach used throughout the thesis. The concept central to democracy is that of citizenship and citizenry, as democracy in its ideal form should be “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” By definition, civic participation of some sort is required in a democratically governed state, since the will of the people is central to democracy, “as expressed

40 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 80
41 Ibid., 27
42 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 188
43 Lauristin, “Contexts of Transition,” 27
44 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 51
45 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 163
through representation, consent, and participation.” The degree and form of engagement, however, varies greatly between societies, depending, among other factors, on the specific model of democracy at work in a given society. However, as Sonia Livingstone and Peter Lunt have argued, some form of mediated communication is necessary even in elite forms of democracy, for the consent of the populace is required.

Communication is one of the key requirements for a properly functioning democracy, and the task of mediation in contemporary society lies first and foremost with the media in its many forms. As Patrik H. O'Neil explains, the media provides necessary access to information for civil society, which enables informed political choice-making and the politicians require media “as a way in which they can take stock of the public mood, present their views, and interact with society.”

Some media theories also emphasise the role of media as the fourth estate, according to which the media should critically assess state action and convey relevant information to the public. In O'Neil's opinion, shared by many others, the media is a “vital conduit of relations between state and society.” However, as Peter Dahlgren points out, “the media are a prerequisite – though by no means a guarantee – for shaping the democratic character of society”, just as simply the occurrence of elections does not make a political system democratic.

Although the media can be considered a “major historical force,” it is important to note that the media are instruments of social forces, not primary social actors themselves. Thus, the collective frames of reference and knowledge taking form within the media are a result of agendas of various interrelated social actors. Furthermore, Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw have said that “the media can influence which issues are salient in the public consciousness” and Bernard Cohen has pointed out that “the media might not tell the audience what to think, but they do tell them what to think about”. Even though the broader vision of media's role in democracy is more or less agreed upon, such as voiced by O'Neil, the debate on the specifics of what does the media practically do in a society, or rather, what it ought to be doing, has led to the development of numerous media and communication theories. Similarly, the discussion on how should the media

48 Ibid., 4
50 Ibid., 2
51 Ibid.
52 Dahlgren, Media and Political Engagement, 2
53 Dahlgren, Media and Political Engagement, 3
54 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 6
55 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 224
achieve these objectives, whatever they be, is by no means a closed chapter. Some of the theoretical considerations are hereby addressed.

One of the common media theories seeking to explain media and society relations is the *Four Theories of the Press*, developed by Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm. It consists of four paradigms – the authoritarian theory (the press serves the government), the soviet theory (the government runs the press), the libertarian theory (the press exists as an independent institution), and the social responsibility theory (the press is independent but has a responsibility to serve public interest).\(^\text{56}\) An alternative approach has been proposed by Dennis McQuail, Kaarle Nordenstreng, Clifford G. Christians, and Robert A. White, which consists of five paradigms: the liberal-individualist, the social responsibility, the critical, the administrative, and the cultural negotiation model. Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini have sketched three models of media and society arrangements: a liberal model with no state intervention and the media is regulated by the market; democratic-corporatist model with a mixture of commercial and interest group related media; and the polarised pluralist model, in which the media serves political interests.\(^\text{57}\)

Peter Dahlgren speaks of three traditions of media and democracy relations: the political communication theory deriving from political science, the “culturalist” approach and the Habermasian public sphere tradition.\(^\text{58}\) The political communication model assumes that the politics is played out in the interaction of the political institutions and actors, the media, and the citizens. The second is the so-called “culturalist” approach, which offers “perspectives on themes such as meaning, identity, and practices, highlighting the idea of sense-making agents.”\(^\text{59}\) The important themes in the third, the public sphere tradition, postulated by Jürgen Habermas, are “communicative reality, deliberative democracy, and civil society.”\(^\text{60}\) The strengths of this approach, as articulated by Dahlgren, are the critical approach to institutional arrangements, including the media, and “constellations of power and patterns of communication that can support or hinder democracy.” From a critical perspective, he draws attention to the relative ignorance of “the socio-cultural circumstances of the citizens” of the public sphere theory.\(^\text{61}\)

In this thesis, the public sphere tradition of Jürgen Habermas is used as the main theoretical framework. Following Rosalind Bresnahan's analysis, the Habermasian public sphere concept is central to recent democratic media theory and the media is increasingly becoming “the primary

\(^{56}\) Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, *Four Theories of the Press* (Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1963)


\(^{58}\) Dahlgren, *Media and Political Engagement*, 4

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 5

\(^{60}\) Dahlgren, *Media and Political Engagement*, 5

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 4
arena of the public sphere.”62 Habermas defines the bourgeois public sphere as “the sphere of private people come together as a public,”63 thus forming a “social space for the expression of the demands and concerns of the civil society.”64 Next to the State and the market, the public sphere is imagined as a kind of a third space, where free association and discussion is possible.65 The public sphere should be equally accessible to anyone interested in participating in the rational-critical debate. In theory, the public opinion would form as a result of this debate, the best argument would prevail and political decision-making would be based on it. The development of public opinion in an open debate form “limits the incursion of bureaucratic and political control into everyday life.”66 In its inclusiveness, the public sphere as described by Habermas has the potential to serve as a powerful democratic resource.

The public sphere is “comprised of the institutional communicative spaces”,67 among which, according to Habermas, the press is the principal institution.68 He has described the development of the bourgeois public sphere being closely linked to the emerging press, which turned from “mere institutions for the publication of news” into “carriers and leaders of public opinion, and instruments in the arsenal of party politics” – this process is characterised by the emergence of the editorial function between gathering and publishing of the news.69 It can be argued that this change begun the development of the press into the mediating space between state and society. Looking at the contemporary society, however, Habermas has expressed the conviction that “the world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only,” as the public sphere has been “refeudalised” by interests other than the public good. He thinks that the potential of media remains unfulfilled in current conditions,70 due to party politics, media manipulation and commercial interests, and as a result “representation and appearances outweigh rational debate”.71 Despite these arguments, what is to be taken from this theory is that there is a version of the workings of the media in which it can serve as a democratic public sphere institution, even if not necessarily actualised in current conditions.

Habermasian approach is not without its critics, however. Some authors have argued that the bourgeois public sphere is a historical fiction and has never existed in its idealistic form. For

62 Bresnahan, “The Media and the Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 41
64 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 160
65 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 32
66 Livingstone, Lunt, “Mass Media, Democracy, and the Public Sphere,” 23
67 Dahlgren, Media and Political Engagement, 72
68 Habermas, Public Sphere, 181
69 Ibid., 182
70 Ibid., 171
71 Livingstone, Lunt, “Mass Media, Democracy, and the Public Sphere,” 10
example, Wolfgang Jäger claims that even in the peak period of bourgeois public sphere as imagined by Habermas, public opinion was still serving economic interests.\textsuperscript{72} Questions have been raised about the bourgeois public sphere's exclusiveness – Mary Ryan notes sardonically that “not only did Habermas neglect women's public spheres, but marks the decline of the public sphere precisely at the moment when women were beginning to get political power and become actors.”\textsuperscript{73} Working class and the disadvantaged in society have been marginalised as well. Douglas Kellner has found that Habermas does not acknowledge the potential of new communication media for educational and organisational purposes in his conviction that the mass media is not living up to the public sphere potential.\textsuperscript{74} These demurs have been duly noted and considered, and will be attempted to cautiously conciliate with the public sphere model implied to the media in the democratisation process.

It can be argued that under hostile conditions of an authoritarian rule, under which no meaningful participation in official institutions is possible and regime-critical thought is oppressed, alternative or unofficial media has the potential to reinvigorate the ideals of honest civic participation and develop, if the conditions permit, in the direction of embodying some of the public sphere ideals proposed by Habermas. If resistance to an unwanted regime starts with a sense of identity of a fragment of the society consciously, and actively, differentiating themselves from the identity forced on the populace from the top down, and if this identity develops into a purposeful civic agency, it can perhaps be argued that this agency will start to manifest itself in the only available public sphere institution – the media. In cases such as Chile, a viable alternative media flourished under the dictatorship, while in Estonia, the official media itself became the arena of public discussion once the censorship eased. As the notion of media furthering civic agency is supported both by the experience of Estonia and Chile, the analysis of the media's role in the democratisation process in this thesis treats the media as a potential public sphere institution in Habermasian sense. The media in the context of neoliberal transition is the topic of the next section.

1.3 Media and Neoliberal Transition

As Przeworski has argued, the authoritarian regimes perceive dangerous “not the breakdown of legitimacy but the organisation of counter-hegemony.” The “collective projects for an alternative

\textsuperscript{72} Peter U. Hohendal, “Critical Theory, Public Sphere, and Culture: Jürgen Habermas and His Critics,” in \textit{The Institution of Criticism} (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1982), 251
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 280
future”, he explains, are the real reason why the authorities are afraid of words – “even if these words convey what everyone knows anyway, for it its the fact of uttering them, not their content, that has the mobilising potential.” He shrewdly remarks that “once the king is announced to be naked, the equilibrium is destroyed instantaneously.” Owen Johnson, further underlining the importance of expressiveness, has made an interesting observation that many early leaders of the post-Communist governments were journalists and writers, such as Czechoslovak President Vaclac Havel and the Polish prime minister Tadeusz Mazowicki; so was Estonia’s President Lennart Meri.

While there exists an extensive literature affirming the connection between social change and mass communications, Karol Jakubowicz observes that there is no unanimity as to the specifics of this relationship, and claims that the issue of whether the media leads the social change or tails close behind it resembles “the chicken-or-egg question.” However, neoliberal principles of the transition give the media a distinctive character, which is hereby analysed.

It would make sense to assume that the media, having valiantly fought for the freedom of speech and press during the liberalisation phase, would simply begin operating according to the democratic values and principles, once the barriers of censorship and fear have collapsed. Ostensibly at liberty to finally print and broadcast without ideological constraint, the media could be expected to naturally become, or rather, to continue their role as the “agent for democracy”. In accordance with the theory of media as the public sphere, Antonio Castillo has argued that the role of journalism in the transition process is to reintroduce citizens to the newly democratic system, underlining the importance of not only disseminating information but also providing civic education. The democratic media should “promote an informed citizenry, public debate, and reasoning.” Failure to meet these criteria undermines the foundation of the new democracy. This approach, then, “conceptualises the media user above all as a citizen.”

The market model, however, implanted according to the neoliberal principles of privatisation, market competition and profit orientation, force the media outlets into a tough contest for advertising revenues. As attracting readership and upping audience ratings become the main objectives for the media organisations, for their livelihood depends on them, the media content is altered to cater the masses. Robert McChesney explains that this model of media generates “a

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75 Przeworski, Demorarcy and the Market, 54-55
76 Ibid., 58
78 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 3
79 Ibid., 1
80 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 161
81 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 42
82 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 161
83 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 42
passive, depoliticised populace”\(^84\) that “seeks privatised satisfaction in personal consumption rather than pursuing fundamental social change, which is portrayed as neither possible nor desirable.”\(^85\) Civic education and public debate start to lose importance in the media coverage, as the competition for advertising revenues overrides all other objectives. As Bresnahan has put it, the “neoliberal theory reduces citizens to consumers and media democratisation to the expansion of market choices.”\(^86\) This, in turn, creates the paradox of “rich media, poor democracy”\(^87\) and the problem of “informed elites” versus “entertained majorities”: a wide array of media outlets are available, but the content differs little; the meaning of “the public” changes from an active citizenship to “media spectatorship”.\(^88\)

The supporters of the neoliberal approach argue that the media plurality – the multiplicity of media outlets according to this viewpoint in itself points to a democratic character of the media – is best served through the market competition. Eugeoni Tironi, director of the Secretariat of Communication and Culture in the Aylwin administration, justified the market-driven, commercial media model as democratic because the media organisations as profit-seeking businesses “must satisfy the needs of advertisers who, in turn, respond to audience preferences.”\(^89\) If it is to be believed, as Przeworski has claimed, that “the only practicable mechanism we know today by which people can inform each other about their needs and their capacities is the price mechanism,”\(^90\) it could also be argued that radical ideology has no place in the neoliberal marketplace, as the majority preference would clearly indicate lack of demand for it. This, in turn, makes a solid case for the neoliberal approach in the eyes of the populaces recently emancipated from authoritarian rule, with a distaste for anything associated with state intervention.

However, there are different models and levels of state intervention in existence, which may help to preserve or encourage the public sphere functions of the media. If the aforementioned link between the quality of political communication and the quality of democracy is as prevalent as argued, then it can perhaps be said that a purely commercial media system might not be the best way to serve democratic interests. As Graeme Turner and Stuart Cunningham have explained, the “government can provide two broad types of intervention: it can subsidise the input to cultural activity; or it can try to intervene through regulation.”\(^91\) This distinction of methods could be used to roughly differentiate between what have been described as the US model and the European model:

\(^{84}\) Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 42
\(^{85}\) Ibid.
\(^{86}\) Ibid.
\(^{87}\) Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 166
\(^{88}\) Dahlgren, \textit{Media and Political Engagement}, 44
\(^{89}\) Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 42
\(^{90}\) Przeworski, \textit{Democracy and the Market}, 118
\(^{91}\) Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 179
the US model assumes that plurality is “best achieved as a result of self-regulation of media markets”, while European regulation stresses “the provision for a public service broadcaster.”92 Castillo points out that in Chile, neither the regulation nor the subsidising variant was opted for, and the media development followed the US model.93 The post-socialist countries generally chose the European model, partially because of the pressures from European Union.94 Castillo argues that due to the lack of subsidised public media in Chile, the media in general has been unable to perform a positive role in democratisation, whilst in Europe, it has been the contrary.95 In Estonia, despite extensive privatisation during the reform period, the dual model of commercial media and public service broadcasting (PBS) was settled on. Castillo's argument on the qualitative difference these models will produce will be further examined in the following chapters.96 In conclusion, the ideal of the media as understood in this thesis is to serve as a public sphere institution during the transition process and beyond, but the actualisation of this model is constrained by variety of factors, such as the market imperatives. Furthermore, the neoliberal objectives and the public sphere are understood to be in a constitutive conflict, and in the following chapters it will be explored whether the different approaches as to the ownership and financing of the media within the neoliberal framework chosen by Estonia and Chile have resulted in different results.

2. Estonian Media in Transition

This chapter will examine the main characteristics of Estonian media development, beginning with the liberalisation during the final years of Soviet Union and finishing with the integration of EU requirements concerning audiovisual media in 1999/2000 to Estonian media legislation. The first section aims to offer a general background for the political opening manifesting itself in the changes of the media from 1987 onwards, which in turn created a space for public debate that had been repressed for decades. Liberalisation paved the way for the development of a democratic media system after Estonia had become independent. The following two sections will focus on newspapers and television broadcasting respectively, examining the changes in ownership, financing, content and audience during the neoliberal transition, against the backdrop of the public sphere function the

92 Jakubowicz, Rode Awakening, 188
93 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 188
94 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 190
95 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 169
96 Ibid., 181
media had in the years of liberalisation. The issue of the necessity of state intervention, either in the form of regulation or public service broadcasting will be addressed as well.

2.1 From Glasnost to First Elections

The starting point for Estonian media development during the last years of Soviet Union was a press and television system entirely under the control of the State and the Communist Party. The process of liberalisation as reflected in the media begun with the glasnost, initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. According to Jakubowicz, glasnost and perestroika were meant to serve as “tools of a carefully controlled process of social and economic modernisation”, but instead contributed to the collapse of the Soviet system.97 Estonian media was initially slow to respond to the “glasnost-induced growing freedom”,98 and only in 1987 did the journalists begin to trust that “the new, more open and sincere style of political discourse” was indeed not “just a political game”.99 However, once the media caught up with the changing political climate, their rise as the promoters of engagement, debate, and mass mobilisation followed with a striking verve.

The official mass media begun to channel dialogue between various groups and favour active public participation in 1987.100 The most remarkable programs launched that year were the weekly direct broadcasts of the Council of the Artist Unions on Estonian Radio, and a public discussion programme about “the tactics and strategies of democratic changes” called “Let's Think Again” on Estonian TV.101 In 1988 with the emergence of popular fronts in the Baltics and easing of censorship, new media outlets outside the official media system started to appear, and the official media itself “began to speak the language of popular movements.”102 The media became crucial for mass mobilisation, organisation of events such the Baltic Way in 1989 would not have been feasible otherwise.103

It has been argued that in Estonia, during “1987–1989, journalism became a sort of popular tribune from which to represent, voice and defend the opinion of the masses”,104 and that the

97 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 90
98 Ibid., 138
100 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 138
101 Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Transformation of Estonian Society and Media,” 25
102 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 139
103 Peeter Vihalemm, Epp Lauk and Marju Lauristin, “Estonian media in the Process of Change,” in Return to the Western World, ed. Marju Lauristin et al. (Tartu: Tartu University Press, 1997), 227
coordination of popular movements through the news media naturally led to its social leadership in the sovereignty movement. Lauristin and Vihalemm claim that the “breakthrough” period of 1988–1991 was “the peak of public interest in the media”, due to journalists “becoming leaders and advocates of new movements”, political pluralism being born and the emergence of the first wave of the new press. After 1989, the first non-Soviet papers appeared in Estonia and the general trend was to move away from political ideology towards a more objective form of journalism – even the Party's official paper Rahva Hääl distanced themselves from the official ideology. In 1990, following the victory of pro-independence candidates in the elections to Supreme Soviet, the Soviet power was declared illegal and the official transition to democracy was decreed; in 1991, Estonia became fully independent and in 1992, the first parliamentary elections followed.

The first elections were held on September 20, 1992, and were successful for “the national political forces supporting a radical marketisation and Westernisation of Estonia.” As mentioned in the first chapter, consolidation of democracy and economic reform were two imperatives of the post-socialist countries. According to Lauristin and Vihalemm, the main cause of division between the new government and the opposition was defined not by the Left-Right political affiliation but rather by the readiness to launch radical economic and political reforms. The reform strategy chosen by the government begun the neoliberal transition in Estonia: in accordance with the Washington Consensus principles discussed earlier, withdrawal of the state and creation of liberal market conditions were seen as the most important objectives. Lauristin and Vihalemm have summarised the reform strategy of the new government accordingly: “Trying to open the window of opportunity, the Estonian government chose the path of maximum liberalisation: no tariffs, no subsidies, no regulated prices (with the exception of governmental constraints on the price of energy, water, health services, postal services), no progressive taxes, no quotas and no extensive transfers of income. A private sector boomed, with about 15,000 new enterprises were registered yearly. Foreign investments grew rapidly, reaching one of the highest levels in Eastern Europe.”

Small-scale privatisation was quickly followed by large-scale privatisation program, conducted through international auctions.

Following the rapid reform strategy and the extensive privatisation, the media system found itself in fundamentally altered conditions. Aukse Balecviene has pointed out that while the West

105 Ibid.
108 Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Recent Historical Developments in Estonia,” 104
109 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 116
110 Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Recent Historical Developments in Estonia,” 107
served as a prime example for media development in the newly independent Baltic states, there is a certain discrepancy between the “peculiarities of the national setting”\textsuperscript{111} and the Western ideals. She argues that on the one hand, due to the Soviet past, the media in post-socialist countries have been highly suspicious of state intervention, legal regulation and information policy, but on the other hand, “the imported model of self-regulation does not work without being supported by strong traditions of democratic journalism and adequate political culture in society.”\textsuperscript{112} Thus, the development of independent Estonia's media system has been moulded by two paradigms: the liberal paradigm “favouring the complete independence and autonomy of the media and therefore complete withdrawal of the State from media”, and “the paradigm of service to national values, reconstruction and reinforcement of national identity, preservation of traditional values, and support of national culture”. This paradigm assumes continued State intervention in the media.\textsuperscript{113} In other words, while the neoliberal approach is imagined to favour the democratic character of the media due to the freedom it offers from authorities, it is recognised that the market imperatives alone do not foster the public sphere function of the media. The following two sections will examine the developing of the newspaper and television system as situated within this tension.

2.2 Newspapers

2.2.1 Trends in Ownership and Market Concentration

The easing of censorship in Estonia was promptly followed by a boom of journalism market – between 1989 to 1996, almost 800 new periodicals appeared. In 1987, there were 32 newspapers and 32 magazines published; by 1990, the number had risen to 52 and 51 respectively. In addition, there was an immense rise in the number of non-regular periodicals, launched by local communities, political movements, and different associations.\textsuperscript{114} The main national dailies published in Estonian during the final years of Soviet rule and the first years of independence were the following: Rahva Hääl (until 1990 Communist Party newspaper; 1990–1992 official newspaper), Päevaleht (until 01.02.1990 youth paper Noorte Hääl), Tallinn newspaper Õhtuleht and Tartu

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 40
\textsuperscript{113} Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 180
\textsuperscript{114} Vihalem, Lauk and Lauristin, “Estonian media in the Process of Change,” 232
newspaper *Postimees* (until 01.01.1991 *Edasi*). The biggest weeklies published before 1989 were *Televiisioon, Maaleht*, and the cultural paper *Sirp* (until 07.07.1989, *Sirp ja Vasar*).\(^{115}\)

The first new non-Soviet papers in Estonia were two weeklies, *Nelli Teataja* founded in October 1988 and *Esmaspäev* in May 1989.\(^{116}\) Soon after that, two other important papers were established which quickly gained a large readership: the “independent, privately owned general-interest weekly” *Eesti Ekspress*, founded in September 1989, dominating “the market from the outset in circulation figures and influence”, and an economic newspaper *Äripäev*, launched in October 1989 in cooperation with the Swedish firm Bonnier. These papers marked the emergence of “a new non-partisan style journalism”\(^{117}\) and “the revival of Western-style traditions (...) offering comparatively concise, clear and well-illustrated articles.”\(^{118}\) In 1991, two other popular weeklies, *Liivimaa Kroonika* and *Eesti Aeg* were founded.

The initial relief was soon replaced by confusion and difficulties as the state subsidies dried up, liberal reforms and privatisation were initiated and the media was reoriented towards profit creation. The main characteristics of the reform phase were the difficulties experienced in the privatisation process of Estonian press, rapidly changing editorial structures and journalistic functions, new work routines, lack of written regulations in 1991 and the search for new regulatory systems, as well as rapid product changes.\(^{119}\) The years of 1990 and 1991 were a difficult time for publications – they were “hit by soaring newspaper costs” due to “dwindling consignments from the East and the need to buy printing materials from the West,”\(^{120}\) while the state subsidies, which had so far supported the growing media market, were cut off. The costs of papers rose 100-fold between 1988 and 1993. Not being able to cope with the harsh economic conditions, bigger part of local and niche papers which had started between 1988 and 1991 closed down by 1993. Furthermore, the circulation of periodicals experienced a huge drop after 1990,\(^{121}\) in relation to the economic difficulties experienced by the population after the launching of radical economic reforms in 1992 – the living standards bottomed in 1992–1993, before starting to rise again in 1994.\(^{122}\)

The privatisation of the press begun in 1991 and took about five to six years. According to Kertu Saks, a specific feature of Estonian privatisation process was that “neither banks nor large industrial corporations participated (...) and are not featured among newspaper owners.”\(^{123}\) Instead,

\(^{115}\) Towards a Civic Society, appendix, 343-345
\(^{117}\) Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Transformation of Estonian Society and Media,” 26-27
\(^{118}\) Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Elementary School of Democracy,” 254
\(^{119}\) Saks, “From Soviet to Market-Oriented,” 191
\(^{120}\) Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Elementary School of Democracy,” 264
\(^{121}\) Vihalemm, Lauk and Lauristin, “Estonian media in the Process of Change,” 233
\(^{122}\) Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Recent Historical Developments in Estonia,” 108
\(^{123}\) Saks, “From Soviet to Market-Oriented,” 191
the most common ownership model immediately after the privatisation was a joint-stock company, where most of the shares were owned by the staff members. The joint-stock company model proved to be unsustainable as the new shareholders lacked both capital and experience, and the papers were later on sold to large media enterprises with foreign capital, led by business-oriented and economically more capable owners. Since 1993, the media has experienced a growing concentration of ownership, and by 1997, there were five national companies (AS Postimees, AS Meediakorp, Eesti Päevalehe AS, AS Maaleht, and AS Sõnumileht) controlling most of the press. Further developments in 1998 led to two companies, Eesti Meedia AS and AS Ekspress Grupp monopolising the Estonian newspaper market.

Since 1995, the influx of foreign investment has played an important role in Estonian media system – the first foreign investor was the Swedish company Bonnier, which had helped to establish Äripäev in 1989. In Spring 1998, half of the shares in AS Meediakorp (later AS Ekspress Grupp) were sold to Marieberg as a part of Bonnier Group. The Ekspress Grupp owned four papers, ten magazines, and five free city papers by 1999. The second biggest investor in Estonian press media was the Norwegian Schibsted; by 1998, the company had increased its shares in Postimees to 90% and under the name AS Eesti Meedia, it owned seven newspapers with five supplements and eleven magazines by 2000. Another change in ownership situation took place in 2001 when an Estonian businessman Hans Luik bought 50% of the shares in Ekspress Grupp, which had previously belonged to Bonnier Group.

By 2000, the most read papers published in Estonian were the national daily Postimees, daily tabloid SL Õhtuleht (a result of Õhtuleht and Sõnumileht merging in 2000), free city weekly Linnaleht, national daily Eesti Päevaleht (created with the merging of Päevaleht, Hommikuleht and Rahva Hääl in 1995), national weekly Eesti Ekspress, national weekly Maaleht, twice a week advertising paper Kuldne Börs, and national business daily Äripäev. By 2001, SL Õhtuleht had passed Postimees in circulation, becoming the most read paper in Estonia. Nearly all of the papers had suffered a huge drop in circulation in comparison to the 1990 and 1991 data – for example, the circulation of Postimees in 1990 was 130,000, while in 2001, it was 64,000; the circulation of Eesti Päevaleht dropped from 187,000 in 1990 to 38,000 in 2001. Only Eesti Ekspress had experienced a rather stable circulation, peaking at 60,000 in 1991 and continuing at 49,000 in 2001.

124 Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Elementary School of Democracy,” 232
125 Saks, “From Soviet to Market-Oriented,” 192
127 Lauk, Harro, “A Landscape After the Storm,” 161
128 Ibid., 165
129 Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Transformation of Estonian Society and Media,” 42
130 Baltic Media in Transition, appendix, 286-287
2.2.2 Changes in Content and Journalistic Vision

A prominent process in the 1990s was the “growing diversification and fragmentation” of the media: as the privatisation and marketisation progressed, new outlets were created to cater specific audiences on niche issues and interests. Vihalemm and Lauristin argue that had the media in the second half of the 1990s attempted to organise mass mobilisation on the scale of 1988–1989, it would have failed due to the changed nature of the media and audience fragmentation. Additionally, considering the growing importance of television and the general tendency of preference for entertainment over political content once the anxious political times are left behind, reading newspapers was increasingly becoming an elitist habit. A development of crucial importance during the radical reform period in Estonia was the generational shift among journalists – “the new generation of journalists did not share the experiences of their older colleagues, who took for granted an important political role for journalists in society.”

Furthermore, considering the growing importance of television and the general tendency of preference for entertainment over political content once the anxious political times are left behind, reading newspapers was increasingly becoming an elitist habit. A development of crucial importance during the radical reform period in Estonia was the generational shift among journalists – “the new generation of journalists did not share the experiences of their older colleagues, who took for granted an important political role for journalists in society.”

The “shock therapy” of the reform period divided the society into “winners” and “losers” - on the “losing” side were the intellectuals and older generation who were actively engaged in the restoration of independent Estonia, but who were effectively sidelined after the independence had been gained. The “winning” side was reserved for the new, younger economic and political elite who managed to take advantage of the conditions created by the rapidly developing liberal market and among whom the bigger part of the managerial roles were distributed in the nascent republic of Estonia. The dominant media outlets explicitly reflected this change. The market-driven new media clearly sided with the “winners,” and the ideological preferences of the media outlets were explicitly distinguishable: for example, the most influential weekly Eesti Ekspress strongly supported right-wing policies, as did the business weekly Äripäev.

Lauristin, Lauk, and Vihalemm have pointed out that the new media, by rejecting “the national democratic traditions of the Estonian press (...) overtly address their content to the new Establishment – young and successful audience”, while “gutter papers”, popular magazines and commercial television cater the masses, thus furthering the already remarkable social and cultural polarisation of the society. The tabloid SL Öhtuleht becoming the most read paper in Estonia in 2001 clearly indicates the tendency of mass preference for commercial content and tabloids.

131 Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Transformation of Estonian Society and Media,” 32
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., 30
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid., 50
Periodicals with cultural content, such as *Sirp*, experienced increasing difficulties and loss of readership. While ostensibly diverse, the prevalence of reform-oriented and right-wing media arguably undermined, not complimented the project of creating a democratic media system.

Media commercialisation in Estonian context poses another interesting issue. Unlike many other post-socialist countries, Estonia managed to escape the so-called “Italianisation” of the media – that is, strong political partisanship of media organisations.138 For example, the government attempted to privatise *Rahva Hääl* to government friendly owners in 1993, but infamously failed as the journalists of *Rahva Hääl* refused to cooperate and decided to establish a new newspaper instead.139 While generally free from direct political bias, the effects of commercial interests were striking in the 1990s news and story reporting. Estonian media disclosed numerous corruption cases in the 1990s,140 proving their ability to adjust to the watchdog role of democratic media. However, Jakubowicz has discussed that the market requirements which cause tabloidisation turn the journalists into “hunting dogs”, “eager to publish each day a “shocking true story” about a public figure.”141 This kind of news reporting, “dressed up as 'investigative journalism'”142 is partially the fault of lack of professionalism and knowledge among journalists, and turns the news into “an easily consumable hot dog.”143

Aukse Balcytiene claims that the problem with the media in Baltic countries is that there are no laws regulating cross-media ownership and media concentration,144 and from legal perspective, the media is treated as any other commercial institution: the “competition legislation applies to the media in the same way as it applies to all other economic sectors,” but the provision of information is not just a business.145 She argues that media commercialism, liberal laws, and lack of professionalism all contribute to the creation of populism in the media.146 “In Estonia,” she writes, “there is no institution to monitor media content systematically.”147 The state initiated attempts to “correct market failure”148 do not necessarily go very far, although there are some assistance schemes to help subsidise “cultural, youth and child-oriented, and scientific newspapers, magazines, and journals”.149

138 Lauk, Harro, “A Landscape After the Storm,” 147
139 Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Transformation of Estonian Society and Media,” 31
140 Lauk, Harro, “A Landscape After the Storm,” 157
141 Jakubowicz, *Rude Awakening*, 326
142 Ibid., 327
143 Lauk, Harro, “A Landscape After the Storm,” 158
144 Aukse Balcytiene, “State Intervention in Media Systems,” 51
145 Ibid., 50
146 Ibid., 45
147 Ibid., 40
148 Ibid.
149 Jakubowicz, *Rude Awakening*, 322
On a more positive note, Lauristin and Vihalemm have reflected on the shift in media during the crisis in public opinion following the 1999 elections and preparations for integration with the EU, and have observed that media were after a long interval “used again as an active agency of civic protest.”\(^\text{150}\) New social agenda entered the public debate, such as gender equality, poverty, drug problems, HIV and human rights; more attention was paid to the life and problems of the “average citizen”, resulting in a “more balanced picture of reality.”\(^\text{151}\) In fact, Lauristin and Vihalemm argue that “the crisis of 2001 appears to mark an end of the post-Communist transition in Estonia.”\(^\text{152}\) It can be argued, then, that while many issues concerning journalistic output continued and even intensified, it is possible to speak of a shift towards a more inclusive discourse in the press after the turn of the century.

2.3 Television

2.3.1 Public Broadcasting versus Commercial Television

The main feature of the development of television model in Estonia during the first decade of independence was the difficult process of figuring out how to settle on a functioning television system which would encompass both public broadcasting service and commercial television. The main obstacles were designing the character of public service media and finding a way to finance it without undermining the commercial interests. Even though the European vision for media system is generally understood as consisting of both public service and commercial media, the question of whether the public broadcasting service is necessary in Estonia was still debated in the end of 1990s. As Aukse Balcytiene has observed, the Baltic states soon figured out that changing the name of a previously Soviet controlled state media organisation to something indicating that its new function is to serve as a public broadcasting service, does not in fact mean that it naturally lives up to its new role.\(^\text{153}\) Arguably the television dynamics finally started to consolidate with the Amendment Act to the Broadcasting Act in 2001.

While the press had already experienced some diversification during the final years of Soviet Union, Estonia still had only one national TV channel until 1993. According to Hagi Shein, “the ideas and principles of public broadcasting were first introduced in Estonia in 1990 when it

\(^{150}\) Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Transformation of Estonian Society and Media,” 46
\(^{151}\) Ibid., 49
\(^{152}\) Ibid., 47
\(^{153}\) Aukse Balcytiene, “State Intervention in Media Systems,” 40
became possible for broadcast personnel to participate in European media discussion.”

Estonian Broadcasting was formed in 1990 as a replacement for Estonian SSR State TV and Radio Committee; in October, Estonian Television (ETV) and Estonian Radio became two separate organisations. In 1993, ETV was accepted to the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). It was an important step from the public service broadcasting (PSB) development perspective as EBU set the requirements according to which ETV's transition from Soviet state television to a PSB was to take place: the emphasis was on ensuring programme accessibility, objectiveness and balance, minorities' interests, programme quality and variety, and production of majority of its content.

The television market started to open up between 1992 and 1994 to domestic operators, and most firms who had applied for TV licences received them swiftly. Nine new operators appeared: Estonian Christian Television, AloTV, Reklaamitelevisioon (RTV), AS Eesti Video (further EVTV), AS Taska (Kanal 2), Narva Kommertstelevisioon, AS BFD Reklaamiklubi, AS Orsent, Eesti Sõltumatu Televisiooni AS (TV1) and Tipp TV. However, due to the smallness of Estonian market and the high expenses of production and transmission of programming, such a number of operators was unsustainable. The period of rough competition between bigger operators in 1993 and 1994 became known as the “TV wars”, and resulted in four national channels with 85-99% audience penetration dominating the market: ETV, TV1 (AS Sõltumatu Televisiooni AS; lost its licence in 2001), Kanal 2 (AS Taska), and TV 3 (EVTV, RTV, and Kinnevik's merger in 1996).

In search of some kind of regulatory framework, the drafting of the Broadcasting Act begun in 1993 and the Act was passed in 1994. The Broadcasting Act defined ETV and Estonian Radio as public broadcasting service, and established a scheme for their funding. The financing was to consist of state funding (the sum would be decided on yearly), and advertising revenues (the share of advertising could not exceed 5% of total programming). The Broadcasting Act set PSB and commercial broadcasting against each other in competition for advertising revenues, which the latter perceived to be unjust, as PSB was already receiving financial support from the state.

Furthermore, ETV did not stick to the set percentage of allowed advertising on its channel, and the tensions between PSB and commercial broadcasting intensified as a result of it. A few alternate financing schemes were experimented with – in 1997, ETV started selling its advertising time to the three main private channels, and in return received a share of their revenues. This model worked

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155 Ibid.
156 Ibid., 137
157 Ibid., 138
158 Ibid., 142
until 1999, when advertising revenues started to decrease and the private broadcasters failed to meet the payments to ETV. The final solution was settled on with the Amendment Act in 2001, according to which ETV would “abandon spot advertising, teleshopping and sponsorship,” state funding would become PSB's primary source of income.

Concerning television media ownership, Estonian companies and Estonian money eventually did not manage to sustain themselves on the television market, and all of the Estonian-owned private television broadcasters either went bankrupt or sold most of their shares. According to the Broadcasting Act, the private broadcasting organisations had to be controlled by a minimum of 51% domestic ownership; nevertheless, the full control of private broadcasters shifted to foreign owners. Kanal 2 was obtained by Norwegian company Schibsted, TV 3 by the Modern Time Group of the Swedish Kinnevik and the Finnish Mainos TV, and TV 1 by Polstat. As of 2001, the Estonian TV landscape included all Finnish TV stations with a 40% audience penetration, and Latvian TV near the border; the main cable programming providers were Tallinn Cable Television, Starman and STV. There were more than 60 channels available via cable networks, including over 30 Russian TV channels.

2.3.2 Changes in Programming and Audience Preferences

The tendencies in television content change in Estonia follow the general developments associated with the media in neoliberal market conditions. As the new TV channels were launched in liberal market conditions with no state subsidies, their programming was directed towards gaining high audience rates since their inception. But as Andres Jõesaar points out, since both the PSB and commercial broadcasters were exposed to the market forces and fought for advertising revenues in the 1990s, the general inclination among all broadcasters was towards entertainment and mass culture. It has also been noted that especially after 1993, as the society grew less interested in politics, the programs with highest viewer ratings were no longer the main ETV news broadcasts, but new game shows and serials.” This once more confirms the “rich media, poor democracy” paradox outlined in the first chapter. Reflecting on these changes, Hagi Shein has discussed that

160 Lauk, Harro, “A Landscape After the Storm,” 149-150
161 Shein, “Trends of Public Television in Estonia,” 167
162 Ibid., 152-153
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid., 156
165 Jõesaar, “EU Media Policy,” 99
166 Shein, “Trends of Public Television in Estonia,” 148
167 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 161
“the lack of necessary financial means, and, the need, whatever it took, to hold on to majority audience, and to move ahead the emerging private television that appealed first of all the mass tastes, coupled with an insufficient understanding of the nature of public TV programming, created insecurity and forced commercial tendencies in public broadcasting development.”

One indicator of the commercialisation process is the increase in average hours spent watching TV: in 1985, the average was two hours per day, at the beginning of 1994 – three hours, and by 1997, it had risen to four hours per day. After 1995, the audience fragmentation continued rapidly as a result of television broadcasters actively seeking for target audience, and the introduction of Western, mostly American productions became dominant. The cheap South American programmes, so-called “soap operas”, also became increasingly popular with the audiences. Research conducted on the changes in private broadcasting programming focusing on the years 1993–2004 have clearly shown that the transmission time of news dropped twice, bottoming at the minimum 5.4% required by law; transmissions of locally produced children's programs as well as educational programs disappeared completely; the transmission of current, public and political affairs dropped to 1% in 2004. Instead, the transmission time has been dedicated to game shows and entertainment.

The main reason for the commercialisation of the media were indeed the market mechanisms, but Shein has also seen a connection between the social and economical conditions of the time (the quoted section is about 1995–1997) which may explain why the audiences were interested in such content in the first place. His reasoning is the following: “. television programming fully reflected the controversies of real life at the time. The functions of the media were changing. News and information programmes remained important, but at the same time more and more programming time was devoted to fiction and entertainment. One third of the Estonian population was living below the poverty line and this fact may possibly explain the huge audiences gleaned by more than twenty different soap operas which ran daily on Estonian screens. Different games and game shows remained at the top of the ratings lists.”

This development connects with the idea of political and educational content losing importance after the political situation has somewhat stabilised, the public sphere concept becomes less relevant for the audiences as the market-oriented media offers more entertainment content to satisfy their media consumption needs.

Andres Jõesaar explains that the competition for advertising revenues caused a differentiation in orientation of the Estonian TV channels, a process reaching completion in 2000. In

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168 Shein, “Trends of Public Television in Estonia,” 137
171 Jõesaar, “EU Media Policy,” 55
172 Shein, “Trends of Public Television in Estonia,” 150
ETV programming, news, education and social programmes prevailed; Kanal 2 focused on films, serials, and soap operas; TV3 on the other hand on reality shows and participatory games for money. The statistics on the most popular TV programmes on each channel in 2000 confirms this observation. The most popular programs on ETV in 2000 were all Estonian-produced, including an infotainment program Pealtnägija, and the news program Aktuaalne Kaamera with high viewer ratings; one of the most watched programs on TV3 was a TV game Kuldvillak, and three out of five of the programs on Kanal 2 that made the list were serials – two of them Latin American and one of UK origin. In comparison, according to a survey, 13 out of 15 of the top TV programmes in 1994 appeared on ETV.

Interestingly enough, ETV had the highest audience share of all Estonian national channels until 1999. It is quite unusual for a public service broadcasting channel to be able to compete with commercial channels so successfully during a period where the entertainment function of the media is increasingly prevalent. Between 1995 and 1997, ETV's audience share was constantly between 35% and 40%, and the credibility and objectivity as estimated by the public was around 73%. Furthermore, “ETV remained the largest producer of the most varied home-produced programming in the Estonian language and in cultural programming as well. The average of home-produced programming on ETV was constantly over 60%, while commercial channels could not manage more than 30% of in-house production.”

Nevertheless, during 1997 and 1999, the weekly share of PBS gradually decreased as the private channels gained momentum, and finally in April 1999, TV3’s viewer ratings surpassed ETV’s with 2 percent. The ETV’s “flagship program”, the evening news broadcast Aktuaalne Kaamera, continued to be the most highly ranked news program.

Important developments concerning media legislation were the implementation of EU media policies and the amendment to the Broadcasting Act between 1999 and 2002. Central to the EU media policy is the ideology of common market, which however does not take into consideration country-specific circumstances, such as the size of the market or cultural and historical context. Namely the Television without Frontiers policy poses certain threats to national media market. As Jõesaar argues, in smaller countries there are fewer resources available for the national channels, and the commercial media organisations focus first and foremost on mainstream programming; thus, in the conditions of a small market such as Estonia, the role of PSB becomes even more

173 Jõesaar, “EU Media Policy,” 99
174 Baltic Media in Transition, appendix, 293
176 Lauk, Harro, “A Landscape After the Storm,” 151
177 Shein, “Trends of Public Television in Estonia,” 148
178 Lauk, Harro, “A Landscape After the Storm,” 151
179 Jõesaar, “EU Media Policy,” 75
significant. On a more positive note, some of the EU requirements implemented in 1999/2000 also emphasise cultural values – for example, “10% of the broadcasting time should be reserved to independent European producers”, 51% “to European works”, and “50% of the own productions about Estonia's present issues or Estonian cultural heritage must be broadcast during prime time.”

In conclusion, the development of Estonian media system as a result of the neoliberal principles applied during the transition process has led from a fully state-controlled media before 1987 to a highly privatised press and a European-style dual broadcasting model in television. From mid-1990s onwards, foreign investment and foreign ownership have been important shapers of the media development. Both the press and the television are very scarcely regulated, and from legal perspective, media organisations are treated as any other profit-seeking businesses. The only exception is the Broadcasting Act of 1994 with amendments and from 1999 onwards, EU requirements regarding audiovisual media. Content and purpose-wise, Estonian media has experienced the common issues associated with neoliberal transition: commercialisation and tabloidisation, struggles concerning state ownership and intervention, and diversification of media outlets but not necessarily of content. The main problem, however, might be that while the public sphere function of the media is continuously valued, private broadcasting does not prioritise it and the question of state intervention is continuously a sensitive one.

3. Chilean Media in Transition

The dynamics of the Chilean transition to democracy is very complex as there was no clear cut between the policies of the outgoing military rulers and the incoming democratic authorities in economic terms. In order to make sense of the media development in these conditions, the first section focuses on giving a general description of the process itself. The Chilean media developed, in a sense, on two fronts – as the official media and the alternative media, and the fate of these outlets have been accordingly different during and after the change of regime. The first section will thus review the conditions specific to Chilean neoliberal transition. The second section focuses on the print media – newspapers and magazines, and the third section on television. Changes of financing, ownership, content, and audiences will be addressed. The final section will briefly look at

180 Jõesaar, “EU Media Policy,” 75-76
181 Ibid., 55
the restrictions on the development of a truly democratic media in Chile during the transition period, both state and self-imposed.

3.1 The End of the Dictatorship

Patricio Navia has pointed out that the dictatorship in Chile, which lasted for 17 years, did not initially seek to build a new institutional order. The economically liberal but socially, culturally, and politically highly repressive regime started to experience economic difficulties after 1982. As the first wave of mass protests in Chile swept the country in 1983, the opposition started pressing for immediate transition to democratic order. They did not succeed in their objectives at the time, but the regime was gradually forced to “open some political room” for the opposition. As an important development, the middle class started to reappear in the public debate in 1983 – until then, they had been able to enjoy some level of financial comfort, but were now hit by the economic crisis which contributed to the growing social discontent. Furthermore, pro-democratic media begun to cautiously reappear; Radio Cooperativa as an example of one of the few non-regime stations still operating, had an important role in covering as well as promoting the public meetings and street rallies.

The next big step towards democratisation was the year 1986, which became known as the año decisivo, marked by a new wave of street protests and the creation of Civic Assembly. According to Castillo, in 1986 “the street protests became public spheres of community and dialogue.” John Paul II’s visit to Chile in 1987 confirmed that the authoritarian foundation was cracking: for the first time since Pinochet’s rise to power, uncensored broadcasting covering the meetings and papal events was allowed on television. Social protests and the rising opposition managed to pressure the authorities into agreeing to a plebiscite in 1988, which was to decide whether Pinochet should continue to lead the country for another eight years. The opposition, concentrated into Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia (in translation, “based upon agreement”), symbolised finally overcoming the “irreconcilability between the major political

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184 Navia, “Living in Actually Existing Democracies,” 301
185 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 75
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid., 76
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
camps”¹⁹¹ (Chilean partisanship had traditionally been strongly divided on the left/centre/right lines), allowing them to stand as a united force against the Pinochet regime and gain major public support.

Almost 90 percent of eligible Chileans visited the ballot box in 1988, a record turnout for the country.¹⁹² The regime officials had no doubt they would sweep to victory, and “went out of their way to ensure a fraud-free election so they could prove to doubters that they had won fairly.”¹⁹³ After all, the economic conditions at the time of the plebiscite were favourable for the regime,¹⁹⁴ and Pinochet counted on the support of the conservatives and the elites.¹⁹⁵ Even after the opposition had won the plebiscite, the military still remained in power for 17 months and Pinochet was officially the president until 1990. In 1989, both presidential and congressional elections took place, and were once again successful for the Concertacion coalition. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela have argued that the outgoing rulers were “utterly unprepared to compete in democratic context after 16 years of comfortable inaction”¹⁹⁶, while the Concertacion worked hard to build unity among themselves and line behind one presidential candidate, Patricio Aylwin, as their first priority was to re-establish democracy and not seek partisan advantage.¹⁹⁷ In 1990, the pro-democratic forces assumed to power, marking the beginning of transition to democracy.

If one were to decide based on external parameters, then Chilean transition might appear rather peaceful and unproblematic. For five years after the plebiscite in 1988, Chile developed quickly towards consolidation.¹⁹⁸ According to Przeworski, Chile was economically exceptional in Latin America, as the new democratic authorities did not assume to power during an acute economic crisis¹⁹⁹, nor inherited „an enormous external and internal debt”.²⁰⁰ The partisanship of different political camps had been ostensibly overcome: the Concertacion government consisted of several parties with different ideological guidelines but the same democracy-imbued approach, prepared to compromise with each other.²⁰¹ The concept of democracy built on an underlying consensus permeates the Chilean transition on all levels – politically, socially, economically, but more often than not, it has meant external uniformity instead of internal agreement. The two

¹⁹⁰ Geraldine Lievesley, Democracy in Latin America: Mobilisation Power and the Search for New Politics (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 54
¹⁹¹ Ibid., 53
¹⁹² Navia, “Living in Actually Existing Democracies,” 312
¹⁹³ Constable and Valenzuela, “Chile’s Return to Democracy,” 172
¹⁹⁴ Navia, “Living in Actually Existing Democracies,” 305
¹⁹⁵ Constable and Valenzuela, “Chile’s Return to Democracy,” 172
¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 178
¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 177
¹⁹⁹ Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 140
²⁰⁰ Ibid., 143
²⁰¹ Lievesley, Democracy in Latin America, 53
particularities – a high level of political consensus among political elites, and the persisting framework of neoliberal legacy left in place by the outgoing military regime, form a central paradox of Chilean transition.

The outgoing military rulers were able to dictate the terms of transition, and created favourable conditions for themselves in the post-authoritarian Chile. Several last minute reforms were conducted to make sure that the military personnel would not be convicted for human rights abuses, Pinochet received a position of senator for life, a national security council with strong military representation was created, the supreme court packed with pro-Pinochet members was left behind and an electoral law was put in place, which made the amendment of the 1980 Constitution virtually impossible without the consent of Pinochet's supporters. These conditions were accepted by the pro-democratic forces – their only advantage over the military regime was their legitimacy, but in case of a new military coup, they would have been powerless. The democratic authorities, in turn, legitimised certain features, such as the neoliberal economic policy, which had been imposed on the populace undemocratically during the dictatorship.

Claudia Mellado and Arjen Van Dalen have labelled Chile a “social laboratory”, for the neoliberal economic transformation since 1973 have been profound. They argue that the media have played a central role in “conveying a storyline of political cohesion, stability, and consensus between the political and economic elites," creating a continuity between the authoritarian and democratic regimes in Chile. In comparison, the period of socialist government of Salvador Allende from 1970 to 1973 was a time of diverse and ideologically polarised press (Castillo has called it “trench journalism”): as many as 46 newspapers were published and in vigorous confrontation with each other, either supporting or opposing the government. This phase of the most diverse media landscape in the history of Chile was in stark contrast with what came immediately afterwards. The dictatorship shut down all media outlets that did not support the military coup, cut the state funding, imposed censorship, and replaced educational and cultural programming on television with entertainment.

Nevertheless, the opposition managed to build “an impressive information infrastructure,” consisting of clandestine and semi-clandestine newsletters, other micro-media outlets, magazines

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203 Munck, Leff, “Modes of Transition,” 347
204 Julia Paley, Marketing Democracy: Power and Social Movements in Post-Dictatorship Chile (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2001), 125
205 Mellado, Van Dalen, “Changing Times, Changing Journalism,” 223
206 Ibid.
207 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 57
208 Ibid., 28
and newspapers with national circulation. Some magazines and newspapers offering alternative views to that of the official information started already a couple of years after the institution of the Pinochet regime, such as APSI and Analisis, and others such as La Bicicleta, Hoy, Cauce, and Pluma y Pincel were established throughout the authoritarian period. Two regime-critical newspapers, La Epoca and Fortin Mapocho were also available by 1987. Television as the most controlled media outlet went through a limited political opening only right before the change in regime: uncensored broadcasting of the Pope's visit was allowed in 1988 and both YES and NO campaigns were allowed 15 to 30 minutes of broadcasting time per day to promote their views before the plebiscite of 1988.

The media during the democratic transition, then, was oddly situated within the tension of multiple contradictory discourses. On the one hand, there existed the alternative media, which had been boldly supporting democracy during the authoritarian regime; after the institution of democracy, that same media was suddenly expected to prioritise consensus and support for the new authorities, without questions, over the analytical-critical role they had played during the dictatorship. Furthermore, if the media opposed the legacies of the authoritarian regime which had been left in place and legitimised by the new authorities, this was now interpreted as opposing the democratic elites themselves. Paley speaks of “marketing democracy” in Chile in the sense of carefully and intentionally promoting “images of democracy,” a construction and display of seeming commonality that became a mode of action of a sort, and a political purpose for the Concertacion coalition. The post-dictatorship regime in Chile has occasionally been called democracia lite – “low-fat democracy,” and has controversially resulted in an impoverished media landscape. The following two sections will examine the press and the television broadcasting in these conditions.

3.2 Newspapers and Magazines

Castillo has argued that the new authorities assumed power with no clear media policy in mind. However, as the entire transition had been built upon the concept of compromise and consensus, the
vision the new government had for the media was that they should help to legitimise the policies applied as a result of this obscure concurrence, as explained earlier. Concertacion, in the independent media sphere that had managed to bloom under the dictatorship, “inherited a major democratic resource,” but instead of finding ways to support and encourage them to fulfil their democratic potential, the new authorities rather treated the press as a threat instead of an ally. In fact, as Castillo has noted, the Chilean political elite favoured “moderation in the news coverage of controversial issues”, with the objective of “maintaining the integrity of ‘politics by agreements’”; they even called on the media “not to obstruct” the process of transition. Bresnahan has argued that not only did the government fail to support the independent media outlets, “but in some cases actively contributed to their demise.”

Perhaps the biggest issue concerning the Chilean press in the 1990s was the question of financing. Although the media system had been left to survive in neoliberal market conditions already under the dictatorship, many of the independent papers and magazines had received foreign financial aid – for example, the magazine Analisis had received funding from the Dutch government, which Chilean president Patricio Aylwin personally blocked in 1993. Other media outlets had been supported by international solidarity groups and European advertisers as well. The disappearance of these financial resources was justified by the government by ostensibly assisting the independent press “in weathering their own transition to a purely market environment”. The foreign organisations and institutions themselves did not believe further assistance was strictly necessary, now that democracy had been instituted in Chile. All media outlets were forced to compete for advertising revenues, but despite the change of government, the advertising market continued to be politicised to an extent which made it difficult, if not impossible, for independent papers and magazines to survive. According to Bresnahan, a publication’s political position was more important to advertisers than its demographics or even circulation.

A bigger part of the independent magazines and papers closed over the following years. An investigative journalism magazine Cauce closed in 1989, Pluma y Pincel in 1993 and Pagina Albierita in 1991. Analisis was bought by Christian Democrats in 1991 and managed to keep up its journalistic quality for a year, but then found itself in irresolvable difficulties. APSI attempted to tune to market demands and started including popular culture in its coverage, and thus managed to

215 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 46
216 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 169
217 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 46-47
218 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 190
220 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 47
221 Ibid.
last a little longer than others, but nevertheless closed down in 1995. Hoy magazine discontinued in 1998 and Fortin Mapocho in 1991. The small weekly El Siglo and the biweekly Punto Final offered critical approaches to Concertacion government, but their historical association with leftist movements kept the circulation down. The closure of La Epoca in 1998, however, was a true blow to the independent press scene in Chile – it was a symbolic “failure of the new politico-economic environment to sustain a pluralist press”, and was lamented for “the paper's failure to realise its full potential as an independent voice during the transition.”

By the end of 1990s, then, the only competitor to the duopoly of El Mercurio and Copesa was a “quasi-government paper” La Nacion – essentially, the press had circled back to what it had been like during the early years of the dictatorship. El Mercurio S.A. and Copesa were two media organisations that were allowed to operate and were strongly supported throughout the dictatorship by the military, due to their suitable ideological line and close personal relationships between the political and entrepreneurial elite. Kristin Sorensen has pointed out that “virtually all media has been owned by only a few different individuals and families who were staunch supporters of the Pinochet regime.” El Mercurio, belonging to Agustin Edwards Eastman and his family, was one of such papers. It was established in 1827 and has historically set the news agenda in Chile; Castillo claims that “when Agustin Edwards decides not to publish something, he leaves more than half of the Chileans without access to this information.” La Tercera, later the biggest paper of Copesa group, was founded in 1950 by Picó Cañas family. Both El Mercurio and Copesa experienced financial difficulties after 1982, were rescued by the military government, and Copesa was acquired by a business group that had a cozy relationship with the junta. Since 1990s, it has been controlled by one of the neoliberal economists close to the regime, Alvaro Saieh.

Already under Allende, El Mercurio “became a tool of psycho-political warfare”, assisted by CIA, and the editorial line advocated “the inevitability” of the military coup. Very little changed after the institution of democracy. The owners of both El Mercurio S. A. and Copesa stayed the same as they had been under the dictatorship, and continued to promote the familiar right-wing and conservative views. Castillo supposes that El Mercurio has been able to keep up a considerably large readership even under the democracy because it has been “aiming at general consensus on

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222 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 188-190
223 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 48
224 Ibid.
225 Sorensen, “Chilean Print Media and Human Rights,” 400-426
226 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 59
227 Ibid., 237
229 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 60
central conservative values such as free market and private property, and by playing the role of an intermediary among different factions of the Chilean right.”

El Mercurio also publishes the popular tabloids La Segunda and Las Ultimas Noticias, in addition 14 provincial papers; Copesa also owns the market leading tabloids La Tercera and La Cuarta, morning and afternoon free city papers, and the news magazine Que Pasa.

One way to assess the pluralism of Chilean print media is to take a look at whether and how is the authoritarian past treated in the press. An outstandingly important issue in the case of Chile is the difficult and painful legacy of human rights violations that took place under the Pinochet regime. The poor, the peasants, ethnic minorities, environmental agenda, and human rights groups have all been traditionally excluded from the news agenda of the prevalent right wing media. In the end of 1990s, the media coverage on such issues was exceptionally poor, as the old independent media had been forced out of business and new outlets had not yet emerged. According to Sorensen, comprehensive coverage on Pinochet regime and its legacy of human rights violations can only be found in alternative press, but many alternative outlets are unfortunately not widely read by the general audience. First notable exception to this rule was The Clinic, founded in 1998.

Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London on October 16, 1998 and detained in the London Clinic, which the new periodical took its name after. The Clinic was founded by a group of people in their twenties and thirties who had grown up under the Pinochet regime. According to Bresnahan, this paper proved to be immensely popular, especially among the youth, due to “its skewering of hypocrisy across the political spectrum and willingness to take on issues from human rights to sexuality.” Sorensen explains that The Clinic offers a fresh perspective, addressing taboo topics in Chilean society through a satirical lens, and that the “trickster is given unique authority to criticise the existing social order with relative safety.” Any serious newspaper would not get away with such explicit references to the former dictator. Furthermore, The Clinic is popular among a diverse array of readers, “many of whom would never dream of picking up a paper like El Siglo at the kiosk.” The founding of The Clinic begun a period of cautious revival of investigative and analytical press.

Other new independent papers and magazines appeared after the arrest, such as a political-cultural monthly Rociante, anti-neoliberal twice-weekly La Firme; Le Monde Diplomatique, La

230 Ibid., 59
231 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 48
232 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 5
233 Sorensen, “Chilean Print Media and Human Rights,” 400-426
234 Ibid.
235 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 49
236 Sorensen, “Chilean Print Media and Human Rights,” 400-426
237 Ibid.
Huella, El Periodista. All of them, however, have struggled for their survival in the politicised advertising conditions. Furthermore, Bresnahan argues that The Clinic could not fill the void of an independent daily newspaper. Several attempts have been made, most significantly El Mostrador, “financed by a group of investors willing to sustain the paper from their personal resources for a year or more until it became established, went online in 1999”; in September 2000, Primera Linea emerged, edited initially by the former editor of Analisis, Juan Pablo Cardenas, but the paper closed in 2003. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, then, the Chilean press landscape went through a new wave of diversification, but the continuous hostile market conditions and neoliberal ideology, hand in hand with the lack of state support, have suspended the emergence of a truly pluralistic press.

3.3 Television

Television was first introduced in Chile in early 1960s. Realising both the great potential and dangers of this new medium, the government placed it under the control of state universities – private ownership was not allowed, as the risk of manipulation was perceived to be too serious. Although television was regulated by the General Law of 1970, which assigned television the role of “maintaining, promoting, and developing local cultural expression” and attempted to guarantee editorial independence, it never quite fulfilled this purpose as the state-imposed educational concept was not supported by an adequate state funding scheme. As a result, advertisement became a major player in the television system from the very beginning. Under Allende, educational and social programming was promoted; under dictatorship, the function of television changed completely. The mixture of state and private funding was replaced with commercial advertising exclusively in 1975, “presumably stimulating a proliferation of companies skilled in publicity over the subsequent years.” At the same time, due to the influx of cheap imported electronic goods, by 1987 most of Chilean household were able to afford a television set.

As Paley puts it, “by the late 1980s, when competition for leadership of the country had begun, the conditions (in terms of access to TVs, and a history of government involvement in programming) were present for widespread use of televised publicity in politics.” The transition period marked a turning point for the television system, as commercial broadcasting and cable

238 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 49
239 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 30
240 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 31
241 Paley, Marketing Democracy, 118
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
television were introduced and the US-style commercial model took root in Chile. In the 1990s, television became attractive to foreign investors as the medium had a high level of market penetration: 95 percent nationally and 99 percent in Santiago.\textsuperscript{244} Transnational corporations quickly entered Chilean television market. The first private licence was granted to an ex-Pinochet official Ricardo Claro for Megavision, which aired in October 1990. Later, he sold 49% of the shares to Televisa, a Mexican media giant, but bought them back in 2002.\textsuperscript{245}

Newspaper chain Copesa marked their entrance to the television market with La Red, which was aired in May 1991. Mexico's TV Azteca bought 75% of La Red in 1998, and planned to focus on sports and news. In 1993, Channel 11, which had been so far controlled by University of Chile, was forced to lease its frequencies to Venezuelan media conglomerate, the Cinseros group, due to growing financial difficulties. The channel was renamed Chilevisión. Officially, University of Chile still owned the channel, but had little control over the content. There was also an expansion of cable and satellite television – around 20 percent of Chilean households receive paid services. The industry has consolidated rapidly and resulted in just two cable providers, Metropolis Intercom and VTR, control 95 percent of the national cable market, “making cable Chile's most concentrated medium.”\textsuperscript{246} The ownership of Metropolis Intercom is equally divided between Megavision's Claro and US-based Liberty Media. The leading cable provider VTR is entirely owned by subsidiary of UnitedGlobal Com – the largest international provider of broadband services. The satellite television is led by SKY-Chile: a consortium of Televisa, Brazil's Globo, and Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, which controls 90 percent of the market with DirectTV.\textsuperscript{247}

While the television market has rapidly expanded, just 2% of the programming in Chile is dedicated to cultural matters. The advertising revenues outweigh government subsidies on such a scale that it is hardly a surprise that Chilean television has been blamed for “eminently commercial character, its interest in capturing large audiences with simplistic language, its lack of innovation, and its insufficient contribution to the education of children”.\textsuperscript{248} Bresnahan sees this as an especially significant failure as the television, having recovered “from its low credibility during the dictatorship,” has become “the most relied-upon and trusted news source.”\textsuperscript{249} The state-owned National Television Network (TVN) represents a development with a more positive character. By the end of the dictatorship, TVN has in heavily in debt. Right-wings politicians loyal to Pinochet, deeming public service broadcasting unnecessary and potentially a challenge for the traditional right

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\textsuperscript{244} Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 183
\textsuperscript{245} Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 56
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., 57
\textsuperscript{247} Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 57
\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., 55
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid.
wing Catholic University Channel (13), proposed selling it. Since 1992, however, it has been
governed by a board of seven members, who represent diverse political views. Content-wise, the
channel carries “high-quality cultural programs and has rod on politically sensitive ground by airing
documentaries on human rights abuses during the dictatorship.”

Valerio Fuenzalida, further underlining the role TVN has on the Chilean television market,
argues that television has without a doubt become “the main source of information about the nation,
the world, and the locality for seven out of every ten Chileans.” News programs constitute the
main source of information, and television news receive higher ratings than the press or the radio
for “veracity, amount of information, and political objectivity.” During the 1990s, TNV in
comparison to the most popular channel TV 13 and Megavision, experienced the biggest growth in
broadcasting hours and hours of news viewed on the channel by households annually, concluding
that the Chileans are confident in the information dispersed by this channel. In the turn of the
century, TVN aired five news broadcasts, totalling three and half hours a day on weekdays and an
hours and a half on the weekends; an interview and debate program Medianoche, a news discussion
program La Entrevista del Domingo on Sundays, and two investigative journalism programs,
Informe Especial and Historie de la Notizia.

TVN by itself, however, is unable to balance the highly concentrated and commercialised
television market in Chile. Broadcasting is highly centralised: five channels are centred in Santiago
and transmit to the rest of the country; the ownership of television has mainly passed to
transnational media giants. An attempt was made in 1996 to create a new “ecological, citizen, and
cultural” channel, TV Canelo – it was supposed to be carried by VTR and feature socially conscious
programming. VTR dropped the project on the last minute, with the excuse of corporate policy
forcing them to focus on international programming. The main reason for the commercialisation
of the television market are the neoliberal economic policies, but Fuenzalida also brings in a social
element. According to audience survey in Chile, the expectations for programming were tied to the
desire to compensate for everyday life deficiencies concerning family and surroundings, mainly in
relation to material difficulties. Fuenzalida argues that “the home is the location of many of the
problems that most affect the audience”, and for the numerous people living below the poverty line,

250 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 183
251 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 56
252 Valerio Fuenzalida, “Television in Chile: A History of Experiment and Reform,” Journal of Communication 38
(1998): 77
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid., 79
255 Fuenzalida, “Television in Chile,” 78
256 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 65
257 Ibid., 68
television is a means for emotional support and self-confidence, rather than formal education. To Fuenzalida, this explains the popularity of soap operas and reality television.\textsuperscript{258} If that is true, the commercialisation of television content is not only due to the market conditions, but at least partially also responds to audience demand.

3.4 Legal Restrictions and Self-Censorship

Two other important features, which greatly affect the way Chilean media system functions, must be briefly addressed. These constitute the legal restrictions obstructing the work of journalists, and the prevailing culture of self-censorship. From a legal perspective, one of the main obstacles on the way of Chilean democratisation process is the fact that the new democratic authorities still operate within the framework of 1980 Constitution, adopted by the dictatorship. As mentioned earlier, the institutional traces left behind by the military regime have made it extremely difficult to amend the Constitution, not to mention replacing it. Restrictions on journalism are to a great extent the result of this Constitution of low democratic quality. Self-censorship stems from more elusive origins, but is a remarkable obstacle in the development of a democratic journalistic culture in Chile.

Three groups with special obligations were singled out in the 1980 Constitution: political parties, the unions, and the media. According to the Constitution, journalists have the greatest responsibility in the society and anyone who had been condemned or accused of terrorist acts within the last 15 years could not be a journalist – the “responsibility” clause was effective in extinguishing any spark of opposition in the media.\textsuperscript{259} The most obscure, and dangerous, part from media's perspective were firstly the section 6b of the State internal Security Law, which prohibited anything that would “defame, libel, or slander the President, government ministers, members of the Congress, superior court judges, and the commanders in chief of the armed forces.”\textsuperscript{260} Secondly, the Abuse of Publicity Law from 1967, which established “extremely harsh penalties against anyone who knowingly published classified documents or any material related to criminal investigations conducted by a court of law.”\textsuperscript{261} It also “recognised offences against honour and privacy as valid reason for prohibiting circulation of a publication.”\textsuperscript{262} These laws were used even during the 1990s after democratic authorities were in power – Bresnahan has marked that the government would

\textsuperscript{258} Fuenzalida, “Television in Chile,” 84
\textsuperscript{259} Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 41
\textsuperscript{260} Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 45
\textsuperscript{261} Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 38
\textsuperscript{262} Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 45
much rather keep its own political capital intact than sacrifice the undemocratic legal system keeping them untouchable.\textsuperscript{263}

Only in 2001 was the new Law on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Practice of Journalism, shortly the Press Law, finally passed. It eliminated many of the “legal weapons” that the dictatorship had used against the journalists who refused to walk the line. The Press Law eliminated the section 6b of the State Internal Security Law, revoked the provision allowing civilian journalists to be prosecuted in military courts, and replaced the Abuse of Publicity Law. However, it did not overturn all of the “insult” offences from the penal code.\textsuperscript{264} Castillo further argues that the Press Law “failed to incorporate a special defence against breach of privacy”, and journalists are still deprived of the public interest defence, the “cornerstone of defamation defences in other western democracies.”\textsuperscript{265} The Press Law also did nothing to fight the stifling atmosphere of self-censorship.

It has been said that Chile is in a sense a “democracy without people”,\textsuperscript{266} and that Chilean society lives in a “socio-cultural schizophrenia”, where the progressive free-market economy clashes with the culturally regressive sphere.\textsuperscript{267} One of the most difficult legacies to overcome is the pervasive culture of fear, which discourages journalists to try and pursue more daring stories, resulting in passivity. Under the dictatorship, there were no “official” guidelines on censorship, and what exactly was not allowed was quite often up to the person doing the censoring – this, among other things, encouraged the culture of self-censorship.\textsuperscript{268} The fear of confronting political and economic powers, being subjected to legal threats or pressure from the armed forces, and the culture of media authoritarianism all contribute to the lack if inquisitive journalism in Chile.\textsuperscript{269}

As a more commonplace reason for self-censorship is the hierarchical structure of newsroom in Chile. Surprisingly, Castillo has argued that the authoritarian command in the workplace accentuated during the transition, and compares the newsroom to the ranch: the journalist in this comparison is in the role of a peasant, while the editor takes the role of an omnipotent landowner.\textsuperscript{270} As the competition is tough and the press landscape in Chile is not outstandingly diverse, the journalists are keen to hold on their jobs and subdue to the prevailing system. Authors differ in their opinions on how restricted the journalists really are in Chile, but Castillo has flatly claimed that “in a hierarchical chain of command, editors receive instructions from the media owners, who then instruct journalists about the news agenda, news framing and even the sources that they should

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid., 40
\textsuperscript{265} Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 270
\textsuperscript{266} Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 156
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid., 152
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid., 96
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., 233
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid.
consult.” In any case, it is clear that there are several impediments in place that complicate the unbiased news and story reporting. For many, self-censorship seems less harmful than challenging the entire newsroom culture.

In conclusion, the development of post-authoritarian media system in Chile represented both in content and in its mode of operation have been heavily constrained by the legacies of Pinochet’s regime. The potential for a democratic media has been cut short by the new democratic authorities, who have prioritised consensus and neoliberal economic policies over a substantially pluralistic and inclusive media system; the political elites, highly sensitive of any criticism towards themselves, have contributed to the demise of independent media. Furthermore, the duopoly of El Mercurio S.A and Copesa in the press remained unbroken during the transition, and the television landscape was taken over by commercial imperatives and foreign media conglomerates. New independent media outlets started to appear after a period of draught, making an important but not an overly influential contribution to the pluralisation of Chilean media. Equally, TVN has attempted to diversify the television programming available to the Chilean public, but has not been able to balance the prevalent commercial broadcasting. The Chilean media system, thus, during suffered from lack of state support and due to the market imperatives, was unable to serve as a functional public sphere institution.

4. Estonian and Chilean Media in Comparative Perspectives

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the media developments in Estonia and in Chile as outlined in the second and third chapter in a comparative perspective, and articulate it within the theoretical framework established in the first chapter. The present chapter first reviews the functions and operations of the mass media during the period preceding the regime change. It then proceeds to addressing the media under democratic rule, and aims to identify certain differences and similarities in the media system development in Estonia and in Chile. The third section addresses the question of the media and journalistic culture after the institution of democracy, and reviews the successes and downfalls of these developments. Throughout the chapter, the comparison is paralleled with the analysis of the media performance as a public sphere institution in Estonia and in Chile.

271 Ibid.
The starting point for the comparison of the media development and the media as a public sphere institution in Estonia and in Chile is the identification of the central transition narrative, that of continuity versus change. Indeed, certain continuities of the past are present both in Estonia and in Chile – the discrepancy in speed of cultural and institutional changes was briefly discussed in the first chapter – but rather, what is meant here by the persistence of authoritarian legacy concerns the attitude adopted by the prevailing elites in dealing with the collective experiences and institutional designs of the past. As discussed in the previous chapter, the most important feature of Chilean transition was that it did not constitute a clean break with the authoritarian regime. The bigger part of the military, political, and economic elite that had risen under Pinochet, continuously retained their importance in the post-authoritarian Chile. In the case of Estonia, a generalisation can be made that the imperative was to move as far away from the past as quickly as possible – this is illustrated by the disappearance of Soviet elites from the public life, the rapid emergence of new elites and the “bitter pill” reform strategy chosen by the new government. While Chile still has an ambiguous relationship with its past, Estonian approach has been quite unequivocal.

4.1 Agents for Change: Official Media vs Alternative Media

As outlined in the second and the third chapter, the media both in Estonia and in Chile had a notable role to play in the society prior to the change in political regime. In Estonia, the official media itself begun to embody some of the qualities of a public sphere institution, while in Chile, the alternative media had developed remarkably under Pinochet’s rule. The operations of the media, however, were distinguishably different in the two countries and had accordingly a different impact on the ensuing political development. This section will trace the modes of operation and the relevance of the agencies furthered by the media in the two countries politically, and will offer one possible explanation to why the impact of the media, in pushing for democracy, differed in Estonia and in Chile a great deal.

During the period of Pinochet's rule, a “purist approach towards liberalisation” was adopted, with no attention paid to social issues, and the military regime was built around the concept of a limited state, “only concerned with defence, law and order and administrative function”. There was no noteworthy attempt by the regime to create new authoritarian institutions – the desired result was achieved by “distorting rather than disbanding basic institutions of political democracy”.

272 Marju Lauristin, “Contexts of Transition,” 27
273 Lievesley, Democracy in Latin America, 168
274 O'Donnell, Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 22
approach was taken with the media organisations as well – instead of creating new media outlets faithful to the regime, the new political elite aimed to secure the loyalty of the already existing media. Private control and commercial mode of operation are characteristic features of Latin American media system. Instead of taking control of the media organisations, the regimes have used measures such as routine shut-downs, censorship of newspapers and persecution of journalists; state control of resources, such as advertising, tax imports, news print, and broadcasting licences has also been common.

After the military coup in 1973, the media system was subdued not only to pro-military censorship, but also to a new, neoliberal market ideology. The economic model applied in Chile was put together by a group of Chilean economists, known as The Chicago boys. They were convinced that the economy of Chile “had been suffocated by an extremely interventionist welfare state and hoped to replace it with an ultra-liberal free market model.” This approach fit well with the main objective of the media policy of the regime, which was to eliminate spaces of political dialogue and debate, and to create a demobilised and disinterested populace. By cutting state funding, imposing censorship, and replacing educational and cultural programming on television with entertainment, the dictatorship was rather successful at this task. By the time the first signs of political opening appeared, the dynamics of the Chilean media system was consolidated in their authoritarian form. El Mercurio S.A and Copesa papers and television were loyal mouthpieces to the regime, while the alternative outlets struggled to offer critical approaches to a limited public. The alternative media sphere went along with the opening, but the regime-friendly media continued as usual: even if the official media could have started to include sensitive issues and more objective reporting in their content, they decided not to do so.

The bigger part of the reason why the media’s role during the initial transition in Chile was arguably small, comes down to the identities of the primary agents for change. As discussed, the transition in Chile was a case of accommodation between the military elites and the pro-democratic forces. As a negotiated exit it did not stem from a collapse of the previous regime as in Estonia – it was “brought about through a series of pacts (…) between opposition politicians and military officials.” The civic society, which had been a key factor in the mobilisation for mass protests

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277 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 72
278 Paley, Marketing Democracy, 118
279 Munck, Leff, “Modes of Transition,” 344
280 Paley, Marketing Democracy, 126
between 1983 and 1986, was later neutralised by the Concertacion coalition.\textsuperscript{281} The oppositional elites abandoned the popular mobilising strategy\textsuperscript{282} after it became clear that the only way to change the political system was to work with the incumbent elites. Thus, the mass mobilisation role of the media in Chile was remarkably smaller than in Estonia. Instead, the alternative media largely focused on the human rights abuses – that in itself constituted an act of resistance in Chilean conditions. The “extreme suddenness and violence of the coup”\textsuperscript{283} after the experiment with socialist government roused continuous international attention. For many human rights groups and alternative media outlets receiving foreign funding, addressing the atrocities of the regime was the most efficient way to bring awareness and evoke international condemnation of the Pinochet regime.

In Estonia, an alternative media sphere did not emerge during the Soviet period, but the relaxing censorship following the political opening allowed the official media to fulfil the void of space for public discussion of both the experiences of the past and alternatives for the future. The political developments and the media were inextricably intertwined. Characteristic to Estonian pre-independence movements was that non-political organisations, such as the Cultural Heritage Society, became politicised, and the intellectuals became involved in politics. The media gained an especially important role in furthering change as journalists themselves became advocates for democracy.\textsuperscript{284} By 1989 the Communist Party in Estonia had not only lost control of the chain of events, but also their presentation in the media, as the Estonian-language outlets carried the views of the opposition – the Popular Front and the Citizens’ Committees.\textsuperscript{285} The group of activists advocating for democracy on the streets, in the media and within institutions overlapped a great deal. The capability of the mass media was demonstrated by the organisation of the Baltic Way in 1989 with the help of radio, and during the August Coup in 1991, the media organised mass resistance.\textsuperscript{286}

The opposition in Chile had no such leverage. In Estonia, what got covered in the media was dependent on the allowances the Soviet authorities were willing, and later, forced to make; in Chile, more than anything else, the local elite owning the official media not unwillingly aligned with the ideology promoted by the military government. That is, the division between “us” and “them”, the oppressors and the oppressed, was easy to make in Estonia. The Soviet powers were nearly

\textsuperscript{281} Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 139
\textsuperscript{282} Alexandra Barahona de Brito, “Human Rights and Democratisation in Latin America: Uruguay and Chile,” Oxford Scholarship Online: 2003
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{284} Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Recent Historical Developments in Estonia,” 83
\textsuperscript{285} Ibid., 91
\textsuperscript{286} Vihalemm, Lauk and Lauristin, “Estonian media in the Process of Change,” 227
universally seen, among Estonians, as the foreign enemy seeking to implement full institutional and ideological control over occupied nations. The Chilean elite during the dictatorship were not foreign occupiers but Chileans themselves, whose opportunism-driven motives prompted them to turn a blind eye to the seamy side of the system they were contributing to. Thus, the polarisation of the society into supporters and challengers of the regime in Chile followed the lines of ideological identification, rather than constitutive difference and incompatibility of the social groups sustaining and hollowing out the regime. The continuous presence of the old elites in post-authoritarian Chile have made a substantial contribution to the culture of “bad memory”. The complexity of addressing the past while the leaders of the past are still present in society, has led to the path of least resistance – not dealing with the bygone era at all.

4. 2 Media, Democracy, and the Neoliberal Marketplace

Lance Bennett, reflecting on the post-Communist transitions, has deemed that “the occurrence of the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe suggests that free media systems are much better at bringing down authoritarian regimes than they are at later sustaining stable, participatory democracies.” Przeworski has equally spoken of Henry Kissinger’s domino effect in relation to the fall of communism – the developments in one country inspired people in another to update their probability of success, and the more countries “went over brink”, the more others felt assured in their own success. Accommodating these ideas to fit both Estonia and Chile, one could argue that the liberalisation phase in transition generally cultivates a degree of euphoria, as people claim more and more previously prohibited ground – it is easier for the media to serve as a public sphere institution in conditions where the public interest is high and the common cause is easily identifiable. Castillo points out that the alternative media in Chile was left without a “natural enemy” after the change of authorities; similarly, the public enthusiasm ceased substantially over time in Estonia, after democracy had been instituted.

Lauristin, Vihalemm, and Tallo have outlined three phases of the development of political culture: the mythological, the ideological, and the critical-rational phase. The mythological phase coincides with the liberalisation period under an authoritarian regime of “emotional devotion, rather

287 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 152
289 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 3-4
290 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 187
than rational deliberation”; the ideological phase is characterised by strong polarisation between parties, the mythological symbolism being replaced with “key words characterising political ideologies”. The critical-rational stage constitutes a “true democratic political culture”, with “firm ties between political discourse and political practice”, and the discourse itself “becomes problem-solving and reflexive in character”. The critical-rational stage coincides with the main qualities of the public sphere as described by Habermas, given that the main purpose of political communication in this phase is rational deliberation in an inclusive, democratic manner. This stage has also been described to be the most difficult to reach – indeed, if one agrees with Habermas' approach to the contemporary developments of the public sphere, then in its perfect form perhaps impossible. The mythological phase, however, ended in Estonia with the gaining of independence and the reality of rapid reform strategy; in Chile, to the extent that it existed in the first place, the end of dictatorship had a similar effect on the alternative media sphere.

It seems fair to argue that during the period this thesis focuses on, neither Estonia nor Chile reached the critical-rational stage in the public sphere and political culture development, and to the extent that it is reflected in the media, in the communication sphere. Socialisation and re-socialisation have been identified as the main function of the media during periods of rapid social change, such as institution of a new political regime. However, the neoliberal transition, as described, has its own effects on the media. As a result of extensive marketisation, Dahlgren has identified the process of corporate values, such as “winning, efficiency, calculability, and profitability” pushing out democratic values in a society. He calls this phenomenon “economism”, defined as “asserting the priority of economic criteria over all other values or modes of reasoning.”

That coincides with Habermas's criticism of non-economic areas being “colonised” by economist patterns, such as the media imperatives changing from public service to profit-seeking. If these two concepts, the objective of socialisation and the dispersion of economism, are brought together with the ideological-political nature of political communication during the ideological phase, the picture turns increasingly complex. However, as there are many different factors concurrently at work in countries going through both democratisation and the institution (in the case of Chile, consolidation) of capitalism, these variables perhaps offer one possible approach to understanding the media developments both in Estonia and Chile.

292 Ibid., 200
293 Ibid.
294 Ibid., 238
295 Dahlgren, Media and Political Engagement, 20
296 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
The main conclusion that can be made based on the information provided in the second and the third chapter is that the market forces are one of the biggest, perhaps the main factor meddling with the media’s potential as a public sphere institution. Estonia initially experienced a boom in the press market after capitalism was adopted; however, both in Estonia and in Chile the press suffered considerable losses due to the same market-centric policies that had initially allowed unprecedented freedom. The politicised advertising forced alternative media in Chile out of business, and in Estonia, many new papers and magazines closed when the aftershock of the rapid reform strategy was experienced. Furthermore, the press, subjugated to the need to compete for advertising revenues, went through a dramatic commercialisation in Estonia, and furthered the process in Chile.

The tabloids SL Öhtuleht in Estonia, La Tercera and Las Ultimas Noticias in Chile leading the market by the end of 1990s and early 2000s, is a clear sign of both the change in the public preference of entertainment over serious news reporting, and of the profit orientation overriding other objectives, such as public participation and civic education. The media market in both countries clearly shows the applicability of the theory of public sphere's function diminishing in the media when placed in unregulated market conditions, as has been argued by Habermas and Jakubowicz. It is interesting to note that the consolidation of the media had led by the end of 1990s to the press market being dominated by two media organisations in both countries: in Estonia, these were AS Ekspress Grupp and Eesti Meedia AS; in Chile, El Mercurio S.A and Copesa.

The tendencies in television development were similar as well: both countries experienced consolidation of the market, foreign interest penetration and eventually, foreign ownership and domination of the television broadcasting. Perhaps the developments in the television market were even more similar than in the press, as in both countries, the television constituted the most important and controlled medium for the authoritarian elites. After the change of government, both television systems went through rapid changes. Estonia, with its single national channel until 1993, was diversified by nine new operators, that after mergers and bankruptcies were narrowed down to three – ETV, Kanal 2, and TV 3. In Chile, the traditional system of university control was toppled because of the need to compete for advertising revenues: Channel 11 was taken over by foreign ownership, and new commercial channels such as La Red entered the market, further consolidating the position of large media conglomerates in Chile. By the end of the 1990s, Estonian and Chilean television systems were for the most part operated by foreign companies.

Changes in television content, again, clearly indicate commercialisation. In both countries, imported programming and the US-style shows formed the bigger part of television programming
on commercial channels. As Shein has argued about Estonia, and Fuenzalida about Chile, the social and economic difficulties experienced by the populations pushed them towards preferring entertaining content over social and educational – the harmless escapism that television programming was able to offer proved more effective as a distraction from everyday troubles than educational content. The only alternatives, ETV in Estonia and TVN in Chile, have both struggled throughout the 1990s for their survival. While the continuous existence of PSB shows that public service broadcasting is still valued, their existence has been threatened in Estonia by the distaste for state intervention, and in Chile, by the fear among the right wing economic elite that TVN will undermine other ideologically right wing television channels. While ETV in Estonia, quite remarkably, did manage to outpace commercial channels in audience share until the end of 1990s, the TVN in Chile plays a more marginal role.

Conclusively, the press indicates some continuity and revival of the public sphere and political culture. Coinciding with the ideological phase of political culture and market orientation causing “economism”, however, the new Estonian press in 1990s was heavily inclined towards the rhetoric of liberalism, the new generation of “winners” in Estonian society and progressiveness. The dominating Chilean press can be conceptualised on the same lines as well: in addition to the right wing bias in Chilean media, the content according to one study includes stories 40% on government, 12% on members of judiciary, 9% on politicians, 30% on middle class and armed forces, and less than 10% on the largest social class – the urban poor, working class and the indigenous people. The success-centrality characterises the dominant media in 1990s in both countries. On the other hand, the Estonian media have taken their independence from authorities very seriously – the journalistic culture will be the topic of the next section. In Chile, the re-emergence of alternative media have also contributed to the development of political culture and the public sphere. Concerning television, it is hard to conceptualise the commercial channels as portraying inclusiveness and the public sphere; ETV and TVN, however, aim towards that direction.

4.3 Media and Journalistic Culture

The ability of the media to perform their role as a public sphere institution among other things depends on the performance of the people creating the media content, the journalists; their performance, in turn, is closely related to the journalistic and media culture in a society. As in many

298 Shein, “Trends of Public Television in Estonia,” 150
299 Fuenzalida, “Television in Chile,” 84
300 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 227
other aspects, the change of authorities in Chile did not begin the development of a completely new journalistic culture; rather, Chilean media culture has been defined by the legacies of the past and institutional structures that were still in place after ten years of democratic rule, distinctively authoritarian in their character. In the case of Chile, the central question has been not how to build a new media culture, but how to restructure the one already in existence. In Estonia, however, the set Soviet journalistic model was inadequate for the needs of a democratic society, and the task of discovering, or rediscovering, the principles of a democratic media culture lie ahead.

Some of the works analysing Estonian media performance written in the early and mid-1990s are perhaps overly optimistic in hailing the Estonian media’s unbiased operations, political objectivity, and the valuing of journalistic mission. The later accounts give a more sober evaluation. The general desire to develop towards the West is very noticeable in the journalistic objectives and practices implied. Epp Lauk, discussing Estonian media development, has argued that the vision for the future in Estonia for the media constituted the “Europeanisation” – that includes reporting on EU issues with the objective of laying grounds for “constituting a common European public sphere”, and “application of standards, values, and principles generally agreed upon in so-called Western journalism”.301 This “liberal” model of journalism that the Estonian media has tried to adopt is based on “participatory democracy” and principles of “separation of powers, political freedom, transparency and accountability.”302 For the democratic values permeating the society are a prerequisite for such a media system, she also points out that the Western journalistic principles cannot be “implanted like some sort of a preventive injection.”303

The fact that these principles do not take root by themselves is illustrated by the problem of lack of professionalism in Estonian media in the 1990s, leading to the process of democratic “watchdogs” turning into “hunting dogs” for political scandal and marketable content, explained in the second chapter.304 The “liberal” journalism model, however, requires a degree of professionalism. Epp Lauk, trying to answer the question of why was the switch from the Soviet style journalism to the Western “liberal” model so difficult, points to Marc Howard’s argumentation that there are three necessary factors that can guarantee a lasting societal change – “first, new institutions must be authoritative and binding; second, they should build upon existing traditions and culture; and third, several decades and generations are needed to change people’s habits and acculturation so that the societal change is decisive and enduring.”305 The anticlimactic answer to

302 Ibid., 71
303 Lauk, “Changing Patterns of Journalism,” 71
304 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 326
305 Lauk, “Changing Patterns of Journalism,” 79
this problem might as well be that what Estonian journalistic culture needed was more time to develop; from the public sphere perspective, however, it could be argued that the time factor matters little if the media imperatives of profit-seeking do not change.

The revision of Chilean post-authoritarian journalistic culture tends to lead back to the issue of self-censorship. According to Sorensen, “by the end of the dictatorship in 1990, over 3000 people had been killed or disappeared, hundreds had been tortured, and an estimated 200,000 Chileans were living abroad in exile.”306 These experiences led Sorensen to discuss the “post-traumatic” factors as one of the reasons, in addition to the economic and state pressures, that led to the demise of alternative media in post-authoritarian Chile. She argues that the repressions had traumatised many journalists to the extent that they no longer had any interest in reporting on controversial and sensitive issues.307 As discussed in the context of hierarchical newsroom structure in Chile in the third chapter, the journalists did not enjoy job security. As the positions were scarce, replacements were easy to find.308 The highly controlled, hierarchical chain of power in journalism continued well into the transition period, further deepening the culture of self-censorship and “bad memory”.

As an example of continuous persecution of journalists and an illustration that the culture of self-censorship was not only a problem of subjective fear, Castillo has outlined a few cases of journalists being subject to repressions in the 1990s after publishing on sensitive issues in Chilean society. One of such was Francisco Martorell’s book, Diplomatic Impunity, which caused great furore, causing Martorell to leave Chile and live in exile – even in a namely democratic system, critical assessment of the past experiences and the current corruption in the ranks of the right-wing supporters resulted in grave punishments. The other infamous case was that of Alejandra Matus and The Black Book of Chilean Justice. According to Castillo, these cases became the symbols of “paradoxes and frustrations experienced by the Chilean journalists and the media in the democratic transition”, which had seemingly offered so much to the journalists in term of freedom of speech and of the press, of expression, and the media plurality.309 These cases also became an international embarrassment for the government that had assumed to power under the flag of representing democracy.

In comparison, Estonian journalistic culture in the 1990s struggled with the attempt to implement Western journalistic culture, which was constrained by the lack of experience with the watchdog and self-regulatory model of journalism. Journalists were simultaneously subdued to commercialisation accompanying the institution of market economy in Estonia, and the following

306 Sorensen, “Chilean Print Media and Human Rights,” 400-426
307 Ibid.
308 Sorensen, “Chilean Print Media and Human Rights,” 400-426
309 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 1
requirement to provide entertaining, audience-attracting content, while morally aspiring towards the
critical-analytical, watchdog type of journalism. Claudia Mellado and Arjen Van Dalen propose that
in societies with a higher level of political competition, the media polarises and the development of
a pluralist, critical press is more likely to happen.\textsuperscript{310} In contrast, the political competition in
transitional Chile has been minimal, which according to Mellado's and Van Dalen leads to a less
critical press. Partially due to the high level of consent among the political elite that did not
encourage a critical press, and partially in relation to the institutional, legal, and behavioural
legacies of the dictatorship, the media developments have led to the formally unified but inherently
repressed culture of journalism in Chile. As discussed, this is mainly expressed in the self-
censorship of content and the hierarchical chain of command in the newsroom.

Although Estonian press in the 1990s developed in conditions free of political ideology (but
not of economic ideology), the idea that “a high ranking for press freedom is not necessarily
accompanied with high-quality journalism and responsible performance”\textsuperscript{311} is confirmed by
Estonian experience. That is to say, the comparison of Estonian and Chilean developments clearly
mark that the freedom of the press is a crucial preliminary requirement of a full-fledged public
sphere oriented media providing high quality content, but does not bring such a media system into
existence by itself. Following Hallin and Mancini’s argumentation, “the cultural basis for
professionalisation is weaker where the political culture allows particular interest over the general
public good”,\textsuperscript{312} which aligns with Habermas's theory of economic interests “refeudalising” the
media sphere as a public sphere institution, leading to the demise of the public interest in the media.
Both in Estonia and in Chile, the public sphere potential germinated under the authoritarian
regimes, but struggled to grow in the commercial, and in the case of Chile, legally and culturally
restricting conditions. It can be justly reasoned, then, that the Estonian and Chilean media processes
have confirmed that the free market conditions, if combined with the “economism” proposed by
Dahlgren, result in an impoverished public sphere performance of the media.

\textsuperscript{310} Mellado, Van Dalen, “Changing Times, Changing Journalism,” 232
\textsuperscript{311} Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 72
\textsuperscript{312} Lauk, “Changing Patterns of Journalism,” 75
Conclusion

The extraordinary monopoly Agustin Edwards as the owner of *El Mercurio* had on the awareness of the Chilean population exemplifies how the media not only designates which issues are salient in the public consciousness, but in concentrated media markets, determines what basic information concerning any issue is available for deliberation at all. The provision of information, thus, is never simply a matter of profit-oriented business responding to the demands of the market, as has been argued in support of neoliberal principles. If it were, the imperative of authoritarian rulers to control all means of communication would seem senseless. The market-centric definition of the media not only downplays the importance of social and educational media content, but deems the central democratic principles of active and conscious participation irrelevant.

The Habermasian theory of the media's public sphere function highlights deliberation and discussion as a result of processing the information available as the essence of media's importance. Following the founding principles of democracy – participation and contestation – the open access and public debate rising from issues relevant to the public in the media, if serving as a public sphere institution, make Habermas' approach a pertinent way to conceptualise media. It is assumed that the media has a larger purpose in a society beyond fact-reporting and entertainment. The Western model of journalism generally aligns in its ideals with the theory of Habermas, in underlining the independent watchdog role and objective reporting functions, and serving the society. The expectations in both Estonia and Chile, as countries moving on from an authoritarian past, was to develop in that direction.

The practice has proved very much different, despite the promising beginning of the media developments during the final years of authoritarian rule in both countries. The educational purpose, concerning both addressing the past and discussing the present, was actively realised at the time – in Chile, more in print than in television, while in Estonia, both mediums played an important role. In Estonia, the deliberation grew into planning and action, that is, mass mobilisation, while Chilean media's role remained marginal. The starting points for the subsequent media developments were determined by the mode of transitions to democracy. In Estonia, already in the beginning of the democratic regime, the media had a certain heroic nimbus due to the fact that Estonian regime change had stemmed from the collapse of the previous one, to which the media had actively contributed. As the democracy in Chile was a product of negotiation, the opposition, turned into
new authorities, rather disfavoured the power of the media to tip the scale and ruin the delicate balance of post-authoritarian political consensus.

More than anything else, the direction of media developments both in Estonia and in Chile has been set by the neoliberal market conditions the media outlets were left to survive in. The public sphere function role of the media, while continuously valued, was overridden by more pressing objectives. In Estonia, the general distaste for state intervention after the Soviet regime did not favour the critical state support for the media to retain their independence from advertisers, while in Chile, the authorities preferred a limping media system over a democratic but critical contestant.

The processes of media development in both countries are to an extent externally similar. The press market became dominated by tabloids, the circulation of cultural and educational outlets declined and the ownership concentrated into the hands of large media organisations. Television audience in both countries surpassed the readership of the press. The orientation of the programming was moulded to attract large viewership, in order to receive higher advertising revenues, and by the end of the 1990s, the television market in both countries was dominated by foreign owners and imported content.

In a strikingly short period, the public sphere role of the media degenerated from high public interest in the late 1980s to highly questionable by the mid-1990s in both countries. It makes sense to argue that the restrictions posed by the authorities and the legal system in Chile after the end of the dictatorship played a small role, as these were a continuation of the past conditions, and a viable alternative media had been able to flourish under Pinochet despite them. Considering the similarities in the tendencies of media developments in Estonia and Chile, and the similar economic ideology, it is clear that the biggest reason for the demise of the public service function of the media in both countries was the neoliberal economic ideology. As the countries adjusted to new conditions, there were signs of public sphere's revival in the media in the final years of 1990s and early 2000s, with sensitive but publicly relative issues entering the debate and new, independent and analytical media outlets being founded, such as The Clinic in Chile. The state-subsidised television also managed to carry on that role.

Overall, relying on the experiences of Estonian and Chile as countries in democratic transition throughout the 1990s, it is concluded that the mass media's capability to serve as a public sphere institution declines with market imperatives entering the stage, as has been argued by Habermas. However, that does not imply that the media loses its inherent potential to serve the public interest, but rather that for the public sphere function to continue, simply eliminating any kind of restriction, legal or ideological, does not give way to the development of democratic media. While the neoliberal economy ostensibly emancipates the media ideologically, it chains them back
down economically. Supporting investigative and critical-analytical journalism might indeed seem as a contradictory move by the state, as the critical and deliberative approach it would encourage inevitably would turn against themselves as well, but if a true democracy is the objective, that seems to be the only reasonable way to proceed. A democratic and self-regulatory culture of journalism requires a strong democratic culture in the society, which, in turn, can be encouraged by the media. As exemplified by the experience of Estonia and Chile, the media as a public sphere institution and the development of substantive democracy are in a constitutive symbiosis.
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**Online Sources**


Summary in Estonian

Meedia roll ülemineku protsessis demokraatiale Eesti ja Tšiili näitel


Töö eesmärgiks on uurida, milline oli meedia roll ülemineku protsessis autoritaarselt režiimilt demokraatiale Eestis ja Tšiilis, ja millest tuleneb seaduspärasus, et demokraatlikus ühiskonnas ei vii arengud tingimata demokraatliku meediasüsteemini, ehkki taoline tulemus näib loogiline. Kesknide ideed, millest töös meediakäsitluses lähtutakse, on Jürgen Habermase avaliku sfääri teooria. Meediat käsitletakse kui avaliku sfääri institutsiooni, millel on potentsiaal ühendada ühiskonda ning luua demokraatliku kvaliteeti osaluse, arutelu ja poliitilise kommunikatsiooni kaudu. Seetõttu keskendutakse töös trükimeediale ja televisioonile kui meediumitele, mis on nii Eestis kui Tšiilis sellest perspektiivist lähtudes olnud kõige olulisemad.


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Tartus, 22. mai 2017