Effects of semi-presidentialism on party system institutionalization
Does the shift to premier-presidentialism increase party system institutionalization?

MA thesis

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Tartu 2018
I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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Abstract

Party system institutionalization has been extensively studied in the political science scholarship, however semi-presidentialism which saw the resurgence of interest among transitional countries, and as a result also in academia at the end of the 1990s, remains loosely treated in the relevant literature. Even the studies which include semi-presidentialism as a regime type, tend to overlook the significant institutional differences within semi-presidentialism.

The aim of the current paper is to contribute to the understanding of party systems institutionalization in semi-presidential countries by discriminating between two sub-types within the regime which create distinct institutional arrangements, systems of accountability, and incentives for the parties involved in this system.

Underlying assumption behind this research is that the shift from president-parliamentary to the premier-presidential system produces increased institutionalization in party systems, based on the more individual-centric design of the first sub-type and the more party-oriented premier-presidential system in the second.

By mapping out the differences within the semi-presidential regime the paper also tries to refine the existing measurement of the party system institutionalization, in order to better account for the systematic character of interactions between parties in this regime.

In order to test the hypothesis five countries which underwent the shift from president-parliamentarism to premier-presidentialism are examined in this study. In terms of research design, the case selection employed here will permit a study of the effects of regime type on party system institutionalization, since all five cases had underdeveloped party systems at a time of constitutional amendment that brought semi-presidentialism.

The results largely support the hypothesis, four of five cases showed increased levels of PSI after the shift to premier-presidentialism, while one case deviated.

Based on the empirical results, conclusion is drawn that under-institutionalized party systems under president-parliamentarism, will improve their performance if they switch to the more parti-centric system.
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1. Introduction

The idea that the constitutional structure influences party politics (see Samuels & Shugart 2010: 10, 3) is almost as old as the first attempt at defining semi-presidentialism. Both of these studies can be traced back to the same author, Maurice Duverger. Although party systems have been of great interest to numerous scholars and are still examined extensively, arguably, more exhaustively among Western European countries and less so in the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet bloc, interest in semi-presidentialism has remained rather limited. Despite the renewal of interest in this regime at the end of the 1990s which led to refinement of the concept and finally refinement of reliability and validity issues by Robert Elgie, semi-presidential countries are still grouped under the “pure” regimes, ignoring or disregarding the merits of inclusion of this regime type in understanding institutional outcomes produced by different regimes. I argue that differentiation between two sub-types of semi-presidentialism will shed some light on the lagging of institutionalization in some of the selected countries. This, on the other hand, will help us clarify or manage our expectations regarding PSI under each sub-type generally, or even allow us to give recommendations regarding institutional design in order to achieve higher degree of party system institutionalization.

On rare occasions scholars have addressed the issue of influence of all three regime type on party system institutionalization, only to point to the “perils of semi-presidentialism” in relation to PSI in [newly] democratizing countries (see, for instance, Casal Bétoa 2014a, 2014b). Existing studies on party systems where semi-presidentialism is used separately from presidential and parliamentary systems, it is treated as a single variable analogous to the “pure” regimes. The research is mostly carried out based on cross-country analysis. Whereas, the current paper accounts for the significant institutional differences within semi-presidentialism, which can be classified under two sub-types: president-parliamentarism (PP1) and premier-presidentialism (PP2). The focus of the paper is the shift from the one (more individual-centric) sub-type to the other (more party-centric one). Based on the conceptualization of party systems by Peter Mair, it is proposed in this paper...
that the shift in semi-presidentialism produces increase in the level of institutionalization in party systems.

The structure of the thesis is as follows: chapter one gives an account of how the notion of semi-presidentialism evolved in the political science scholarship. Then turns to the so-called “three waves of semi-presidential studies” (Elgie 2015). This sub-section serves the purpose of placing the current study in the proper category of the semi-presidential scholarship, and furthermore, gives the research a context. Once context is clarified and the shortcomings of the prior attempts at defining semi-presidentialism are established, Elgie’s conceptual framework is introduced which offers a dichotomous treatment of the regime. While one sub-type promotes more party-centric politics, the other creates tensions between branches which leads to sacrificing the interest of parties.

Focus of the chapter two is the dependent variable, party system institutionalization. Similar to the previous chapter different approaches to understanding party systems are reviewed for the purposes of finding compatible approach to the aim of the current study. The “numbers of parties” and the “government formation” approaches are dismissed in favor of Mair, and Mair and Casal Bértoa’s conceptual framework, that traces the core of party system to the “structure of inter-party competition” for government.

Electoral systems serve as a conditional variable. Depending on the electoral design effects of semi-presidential sub-types can be increased or hindered.

In order to test the claim of semi-presidential system sub-types having the proposed effect on the party system institutionalization, factor-oriented research is employed in the study. The rationale behind the choice of factor-oriented research is that it is best suited for studying the way changes in the independent variable produce changes in the dependent variable (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig 2007: 7-8). Thus, the current study offers a cross-temporal analysis of cases in order to observe whether there is a hypothesized increase in the degree of PSI corresponding to the shift from president-parliamentary to premier-presidential system. To this end, five countries which at a time of constitutional amendment had under-institutionalized party systems and underwent a shift from the first sub-type to the more party-centric premier-presidential system, are examined in the study.
These countries are: Croatia, Georgia, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Ukraine. Final selection of cases leaves us with countries, which are the products of different waves of democratization, with different socio-economic development, different electoral rules in place. What they have in common is the regime type and the fact that each of these countries underwent a shift from president-parliamentarism to premier-presidentialism. This certainly gives the present study a certain advantage, not only to observe the evolution of party system institutionalization under semi-presidentialism but also to test whether the same results can be expected under different circumstances/ environments, at least in electoral democracies.

Empirical analysis illustrates how different features of each sub-type are manifest in individual cases. Inter-branch tension and president’s divergent agenda under PP1 in Portugal, further closure of the access to government after the shift to PP2 among cases which had strongly party-centric system under both sub-types and the initial stabilization straggles under PP2 are all testaments of the existing institutional effects on party system institutionalization.
2. Conceptualization:

2.1 Semi-presidentialism

2.1.1 The evolution of the notion

The scholarship on the subject is relatively new. To put it into perspective, it leaves us with more than a century of discrepancy between the regime on the ground and the resolution of methodological problems in research. This new type of political system was introduced by Maurice Duverger (1980 (the English version)) in an academic context (Elgie 1999: 1), who studied the distinct nature of the French fifth republic. Peculiarity of the 'semi-presidential government', as observed at a time (keeping in mind that before the 1990s only a handful of countries have adopted semi-presidential constitution), was that it incorporated popularly elected president along with the government accountable to the assembly (Duverger 1980: 165). These "borrowed" characteristics from the “pure” presidential and parliamentary systems has led to two major shortcomings in the scholarship. The first is the unconventional treatment of this regime type, and the second is the conceptual confusion regarding semi-presidentialism. To expend on the latter point, it [semi-presidentialism] is sometimes referred to as a mixed or a hybrid regime or even as a synthesis of the two “pure” systems. Such a loose treatment of the concept has led to misunderstandings in popular as well as scholarly articles as to how this system works and what should be expected from the political actors operating under such an institutional arrangement. Furthermore, the most important shortcoming of the scholarship was the unresolved reliability and validity issues inherited from the ambiguous conceptual framework. Despite these serious challenges the Duvergerian basic definition of the system (directly elected president, and PM and cabinet accountable to the assembly) has withstood this scrutiny, while scholars have revised and improved certain conceptual and operational aspects of this definition.

When Duverger initiated the study of this new 'government model', only a handful of countries had adopted semi-presidential constitutions, which made it an ever harder task to formulate a general conceptual framework that would apply equally to all cases, including the future ones. Nevertheless, Duverger correctly identified the foundation of the concept,
and significant variations within the system which required introduction of sub-types within semi-presidentialism, based on the empirics. The only shortcoming Duverger's model had was that it was based on president's "quite considerable powers", his/her position vis-a-vis the assembly majority, and other circumstantial aspects (Duverger 1980: 165 – 166, 177). In short, it was a strictly behavioral approach and slightly over-complicated model which left a lot to the judgment of individual scholars who would pick up the Duvergerian conceptualization to apply to their own study.

The single most important contribution to the concept of semi-presidentialism came from Robert Elgie in the late 1990s. By this time the number of semi-presidential countries had risen significantly. He observed that "quite considerable powers" in Duverger's definition made it difficult to replicate studies and also, led to a further problem of endogeneity. In order to rid the concept of these shortcomings Elgie shifted the focus from a behavioral to the strictly constitutional/institutional approach. Furthermore, and coming back to the unconventional treatment of semi-presidentialism, mentioned above, by removing president’s "powers" from the definition, Elgie made it possible for semi-presidentialism to be treated the same way as presidentialism and parliamentarism (see Elgie 2011: 2). Although, Elgie removed 'quite considerable powers' from the conceptualization, he still built upon Duverger's original definition. Although, it still proved extremely difficult to exorcise semi-presidentialism from presidential powers altogether. Elgie (2005) still came back to the “presidential powers” in his later work when he revisited semi-presidential sub-types. Moreover, he also maintained the assembly-president relation in his work, albeit an altered version. Originally, Duverger argued that the existence of an assembly majority had an influence over the president's practical powers (Duverger 1980: 182). So much so that this aspect would also be able to cause a shift in the sub-type of semi-presidentialism. In this sense, Duvergerian classification of semi-presidentialism was also more fluid. To some extent Elgie incorporates an aspect of "composition of parliamentary majority" feature and the president's position in terms of the assembly majority by emphasizing president's partisanship under the president-parliamentary system and his/her non-partisanship under the premier-presidential system.
2.1.2 Categorizing semi-presidential studies

It was only in the 1990's that semi-presidentialism really gained momentum both in academia and also on the ground. With the resurgence of interest in this model among transitional countries it became clear that the old conceptual framework (based on five cases/countries) fell short of a proposal of clear definition that would allow scholars to classify countries homogeneously. It can be argued that it was the rise in the number of semi-presidential countries which made conceptual revision possible. Henceforth, the re-conceptualization constituted the first of the three waves of semi-presidential scholarship. Since majority of semi-presidential countries at a time were transitioning to democracy, scholars started looking into the effects of the regime on democratic performance in these countries. And the final wave concentrates on the way in which semi-presidential institutional design affects “the political process”. In addition, the focus of this wave has been the governmental arena (see Elgie 2015), which connects the core of the dependent variable to this wave nicely. The reasons of which will become clear in the sub-chapter 2, which examines party system institutionalization.

2.1.3 Elgie's conceptual framework

The above overview of the literature on semi-presidentialism served four purposes: first, to see where the current study fits into the literature regarding semi-presidentialism; second, to get a sense of where contribution to the current debate on the topic is possible; thirdly, to establish a link or a common ground between the independent and the dependent variables. In the same vein, the current study appears to be a part of the third wave of semi-presidential studies. And the fourth objective, which was more general, was to figure out which definition suits the aims of this study best, and also how to avoid making critical research mistakes produced by careless conceptualization.

For the current study I employ Elgie’s conceptual framework, where semi-presidentialism refers to a system in which: “a constitution makes provision for both a directly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to
the legislature” (Elgie 1999: 13) (emphasis added). This proposition of conceptualization is praised in the scholarship for its “minimalist institutional definition”, which resolves prior Duvergerian ambiguity (see, for instance, Schleiter & Morgan-Jones 2010; Casal Bértola 2014a; Casal Bértola 2014b, etc.). Certainly, in Elgie’s definition, classification of the regime does not depend on the behavioral aspects rather the key differentiating features from other types of regime can be found in constitutions. Four aspects should be kept in mind when classifying countries as semi-presidential ones: (1) the origin and (2) the survival of the president; and (3) the origin and (4) the survival of the prime minister and the cabinet. In the case of the president, the origin – direct elections, and the survival – fixed office term, comes from the popular elections; or from the people. Hence, the president is independent of the assembly [in this regard]. The new dimension brought by the direct-election of the president into the game, is worth noting. It changes dynamics in the assembly-president relations. Under the circumstances when the president is partisan, this separate survival (of president) removes constraints on the president to defect from party politics/policies and to pursue his/her own agenda, even if elected on the same grounds as his/her party (Samuels & Shugart 2010: 29, 38). However, “the same grounds” do not necessarily translate into the overlapping platforms. An important principle which can lead to the defection of presidents from their parties is the asymmetry of presidential and parties' electoral platforms. The former is thought to have wider platform in general compared to that of [their] parties (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones 2009: 669).

Although the above conceptualization is unambiguous for the classification purposes due to its focus on the origin and survival of the president instead of his/her actual powers, this definition alone is not sufficient in accounting of the effects produced by the institutional differences within semi-presidential systems (closely follows Elgie 2015: 5–6). It has been established (see Roper 2002) that the variations within semi-presidentialism affect institutional outcomes, such as cabinet instability. Scholars have proposed different ways of differentiating between the types of semi-presidential systems; some have focused on presidential powers and arrived at three sub-types: highly presidential, balanced and parliamentary (Elgie 2005). However, in order to avoid falling into the same Duvergerian
trap with regard to presidential powers, for the current study I will apply Samuels and Shugart’s origin and survival, especially the latter, of the prime minister and the cabinet as a differentiating factor between the sub-types of semi-presidentialism. The rationale behind this choice is that the selection bias is avoided by tracing the institutional differences of this system in the constitution. Although the PM and the cabinet are accountable to the assembly according to Elgie’s definition above, under certain conditions survival can also depend on the president, this is the instance of president-parliamentarism (PP1 sub-type) (Elgie 2011). As long as the president has “control over the distribution of the spoils of office and/or the policy process, party behavior and organization will tend to mimic constitutional structure, giving rise to “presidentialized” parties” (Samuels & Shugart 2010: 15–16, 25, 29–30). When presidents have control over the distribution of the spoils of office, do not depend on the assembly for survival and also their agenda differs from that of their party platform, then the incentive to remain loyal to the party in terms of portfolio allocations is to be less expected. It is more likely that president in this system will assign ministerial posts to technocrats who would follow the president's agenda and not push the party’s interests. Thus, it can be argued, that the directly elected president brings a zero-sum component into the system (Elgie 2007: 56). However, as much as presidential defection from the party platform has to be tolerated, defection from the prime ministers can be punished from both sides, which would put partisan PMs into impossible position under the government formed by presidential influence. This sub-type is characterized by dual accountability, which does not exclude parties completely. In light of the tension between president’s and parties’ agendas higher frequency of government alternation can be expected, as the government performance is scrutinized from both sides. Due to lack of incentives for inter-branch cooperation alternation between technocratic and party-centric governments can be expected (Elgie 2011: 2).

Slightly different institutional arrangement is observed under premier-presidentialism (PP2), where “the prime minister and cabinet are collectively” accountable only to the assembly (Elgie 2011: 28 (following Shugart & Carey 1992)). This leads to different outcomes from that of PP1. In contrast to PP1, under PP2 necessary conditions for
presidentialization of parties is missing (Samuels & Shugart 2010:43). The focus is shifted from presidents to the assembly, to parties. By removing incentives for presidentialisation of political process sources of government instability are capped. In the first place, inter-branch competing agendas are no longer at the forefront of government re-formulation. And moreover, non-partisan, presidentialized cabinets should also be removed from the equation as the survival of cabinet belong to the assembly, exclusively and the president does not have the power to play tit-for-tat with the assembly.

Not only is the partisan composition expected to be partisan under PP2, but also this aspect due to the accountability structure is set to increase legislative control over the executive (Elgie 2011). As opposed to PP1, where non-partisan technocrats further contribute to the indifference to party politics.

Below, I present the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism: president-parliamentary (PP1) and premier-presidential (PP2) systems.¹

Table; key features of semi-presidential sub-types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System type</th>
<th>President-parliamentarism</th>
<th>Premier-presidentialism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Directly elected, fixed term</td>
<td>Directly elected, fixed term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov't, PM accountable to</td>
<td>The president &amp; the assembly</td>
<td>The assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checks and balances</td>
<td>Inter-branch</td>
<td>Intra-party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party loyalty</td>
<td>President can defect, no fear of dismissal from the assembly</td>
<td>PM can be dismissed by the assembly, (exclusively)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Maximization of presidential and parliamentary interests</td>
<td>Primacy of the assembly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elgie et al. 2011

Hence, based on the institutional differences and divergent incentives emerging from the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism, it is more likely to witness presidentialization and individual-centric politics under president-parliamentary system, with higher frequency of change in government. In contrast, under premier-presidential system more party-oriented

¹ Abbreviation coined by Robert Elgie in the data-set for semi-presidentialism.
approach and more stability in government is to be expected. To put this theoretical discussion in perspective I propose the following hypothesis:

*PSI increases when country moves from PP1 to PP2.* (corresponding countries’ move from PP1 to PP2)

To sum up the discussion regarding semi-preservationism, in order to turn semi-presidentialism into a useful category for comparison to account for systemic differences within semi-presidentialism is paramount. Thus, the independent variable, semi-presidentialism was dichotomized as president-parliamentary (PP1) and as premier-presidential (PP2) systems. This provides with the ground to compare and account for differences within semi-presidentialism and the effects of these two sub-types on the institutional outcomes (Elgie 2009: 161-163; Figure 5). the two sub-types under consideration in this study, emerge from the differences in the “collective accountability” of the PM and the cabinet which is derived from the constitution (Elgie 2011: 28). Moreover, these institutional differences are directly connected to the variation in the dependent variable – party system institutionalization, which will be explained in the following section.

### 2.2 Understanding PSI

#### 2.2.1 The numbers approach

There is a tendency in the scholarship on party system institutionalization (PSI) to propose different ways to classify party systems. But the conceptual part of what constitutes a party system and its institutionalization proper, has been somewhat overlooked. PSI is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and it is this multi-layered nature of the party system which draws all the attention sometimes at the expense of definition of the concept itself (see Casal Bétoa 2017). That said, the concept 'party system' implies the notion of interactions between "the set of parties" (Mainwaring & Torcal 2006: 205). The numerical character of the definition became a cornerstone in understanding party systems in the early phase of scholarship on the subject. In fact, particular parties became the party system in this
approach (Bardi & Mair 2008: 153). In discriminating between different types of party systems, scholars starting with Duverger have mostly focused their attention on some variation of "the number of parties in competition". Thus, one of the most commonly used approaches in studies regarding party systems was and still remains the numbers of parties approach.

One of the key contributors of this approach was Sartori who brought interactions between parties to the forefront of thinking about party systems by adding ideological dimension to the simple numbers-of-parties calculus. In this sense, his classification of party systems has two dimensions: number of competing parties and ideological distance (Mainwaring & Torcal 2006; Mair 1996). However, the way Sartori designed his framework, these two factors were there to discriminate between fully institutionalized or "consolidated party systems and non-systems". Henceforth, PSI was a dichotomous variable in his theory. Sartori was criticized for categorizing party systems this way. Mainwaring & Torcal (2006: 205 – 206) contended that dichotomy did not quite account for the systemic nature of party systems which implies "some pattern in inter-party competition". Thus, when studying party systems it is more useful to look into the varying degrees of institutionalization, and the types of variations these differences in the level of institutionalization bring about in the structure of inter-party competition.

Depending on one's understanding of party systems, the factors which affect the degree of institutionalization also vary. In the 'numbers of parties' approach changes in the electoral rules are linked to changes in the number of parties in party system, since some rules result in two party systems (plurality single member district) and others promote multi-partism (proportional representation) (e.g. Bielasiak 2002). However, Mair building on Sartori's conceptual framework later demonstrated how change in the structure of competition in the party system could also affect the "electoral preferences", not just vice versa. It can be argued that Mair decoupled party systems from co-dependence on the electoral sphere by demonstrating that electoral changes do not automatically translate into party system alteration. What is more, the latter can change significantly without causing shifts in the existing "structure of competition", i.e. patterns in party systems interactions (Mair 1996).
Despite existing criticism, Sartori’s improvement of the pure numbers calculus is notable in the PSI literature. By supplementing the 'numbers of parties' approach with the second dimension of ideological proximity, he enabled 1) discrimination between what constitutes party system proper, independent from the influence of the electoral arena and 2) opened the door for locating the competition within the party system in the governmental arena (see Mair 1996). It was around this framework that Mair constructed his own understanding of party systems. He emphasized that the parties in the party system compete for the governing status. However, despite Mair’s alternative, improved study, the 'numbers of parties' approach is still quite commonly applied in the party systems scholarship (e.g. Bielasiak 2002). The rationale behind bringing the 'numbers' back in has been explained as an ineffectiveness of PSI to provide useful explanation globally, however useful it might be for party systems in developing countries (see Siaroff 2006).

In order to illustrate why this approach is not the right fit for the current study I have introduced Peter Mair, and Mainwaring and Torcal's criticisms of Sartori's framework. The latter, despite significantly improving simple 'numbers of parties' approach still falls short of providing a meaningful classification for the party systems in practice (Mair 1996; Mainwaring & Torcal 2006).

2.2.2 The government formation approach

Another notable approach to understanding PSI was designed by Dahl. His contribution to the scholarship came from the opposition perspective and offered an alternative to the numbers of parties approach. By tracing the center of the party system in opposition he brought government formation to the forefront of competition in party systems (Mair 1996). This approach seems more relevant in the current study, since government formation under semi-presidentialism follows a different logic than the "pure" presidential and parliamentary systems (see Almeida & Cho 2007). In parliamentary systems the executive is derived from the assembly. The origin as well as survival of the cabinet lies in the assembly. Hence, the distribution of seats in government also depends on parliamentary parties (Druckman & Roberts 2005: 536). It is safe to assume that cabinets consist mostly
of partisan ministers in this system, as a general rule. On the contrary, non-partisan cabinet members are quite common under presidentialism. As far as semi-presidential regimes go, "elections designate assembly parties and the president as potential … principals of the government" (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones 2010: 1418-1419). What this statement points to is that government formation is not only party prerogative in this system. This approach brings very actor-oriented understanding of government formation and secondly, and more importantly, brings the presidential powers, to wit nomination powers, back in. As it has already been established above, reversal to presidential powers should be avoided. On the basis of incompatibility of this approach with the independent variable and also, due to some tension vis-à-vis the core idea of the party system, this approach is also dismissed.

2.2.3 The structure of inter-party competition

Overview of the scholarship suggests that competition is the defining feature of the party system. Mair's definition of the phenomenon stands out in the scholarship due to the fact that he suggests the distinction between different types of party systems is to be found in the "structure of inter-party competition" for government (Mair 1996:89; Casal Bétoa & Mair 2010). This move from specific parties to systematic approach allows an explanation for the continuous existence of particular set of parties based on “constraints or opportunities” structure within the system (Bardi & Mair 2008: 153). Although competition has been a defining feature of party systems throughout the scholarship, arena for competition and the key competitors were novel in this framework. As far as the institutionalization of the party system goes, predictability and stability of inter-party competition is the test of institutionalization. In the PSI scholarship authors usually refer to these two elements when they talk about institutionalization (e.g. Huntington 1965, Mair 1996, Randall & Svasand 2002, Mainwaring & Torcal 2006, Casal Bétoa & Mair 2010 2010; Casal Bétoa 2015, Bielasiak 2002, etc.). However, it should be noted that PSI is not a dichotomous concept, rather there are degrees to which party systems can be regarded institutionalized. Hence, total predictability and stability although do show absolute institutionalization and the entire lack of these two aspect – non-institutionalization, it still
leaves plenty of room for the degrees to which predictability and stability can be manifested in the party system. In order to understand where these two aspects fit in in the party system paradigm, I will refer to Mair’s work.

Peter Mair (1996) argued that the cornerstone of party systems is the "stable structure of competition" (emphasis added). He put forth three factors which permit the assessment of predictability [of stable structures of competition] i.e. institutionalization of the party system:

1. **Alternation in government** which illustrates how incumbent party/parties are replaced by new [combination of] party/parties. There can be a total replacement i.e. the (1) wholesale alternation; (2) partial alternation which takes place when number of former parties stay in the office while some leave or are replaced in a new government; and (3) non-alternation – the same line-up of parties continue to form a new government. Thus, the focus of evaluation is alternation from one government to the next. Notably, the second pattern of alternation which hints to the lower institutionalization, as Mair further points out, can be observed in "fragmented system" (Mair 1996). However, the first and the third patterns can be somewhat problematic and might require caution in order not to overestimate/over-reward governing status of a party/parties. Especially if the partisan composition of government is significantly low.

2. Another factor is an **innovation or familiarity of governing formulae**. It concerns the line-up of parties in government, whether certain combination of parties has formed a government before which would be the example of a familiar formula, or it is a novel government in the sense that this particular set of parties have never governed together before. In order for a government to be considered innovative it does not require new set of parties; instead, parties which have governed before in different coalition but never together also qualify as innovative. Although an addition of a new party would also make government an innovative one (Mair 1996). However, it should be kept in mind, that this feature of PSI also measures degree of institutionalization on continuous scale. It is best reflected in the case when one coalition is replaced by another, which keeps number of parties in place, but adds or replaces some with different parties. Here the parties which
have been in government before count as a familiar share, while the new addition is an innovative part of the whole share. Thus, both aspects are taken into consideration when there are more than two parties in government. Single-party government is much more straightforward, since it is the case of either–or.

And finally, 3. there is the access to government. This aspect, similar to the second feature of PSI looks into parties in government over time, not just the change from one government to the next. And it assesses the closure or openness of the access. Although Mair clarifies that not all parties can be expected to gain access to government, the question he poses is somewhat ambiguous: "whether all relevant parties eventually cross the threshold of government"? (Mair 1996) (emphasis added). Now this openness or closure of party systems is very important in narrowing down competing parties in the governmental arena. However, Mair does not elaborate on what he means by "relevant parties", or to pose the question differently, what is the criterion for relevance. Does he follow Sartori and bring the ideological proximity in order to determine potential coalition parties, or is it the relative assembly size of the party that should guarantee it a seat in a new government (Siaroff (2006:1) in adopting numbers approach has set 3% representation threshold in the assembly for the relevance of a party in the party system)? Answer to the question of relevance of parties in the party system seems important in ascertaining when the system can be considered closed and when the access is still open. In order to solve this puzzle, we should keep in mind that party systems deal with party strategies. While in some cases ideological distance might keep some parties away from government, other times keeping the spoils to office within small number of familiar parties is "the strategy of self-preservation" (Mair 1996). Since neither parliamentary representation nor the ideological distance necessarily translate into obtaining governing status, calculation should be left to more neutral aspect. Closure of the party system would comprise of exclusion of some parties from government and thus alternation between parties with former governing status. Openness, on the contrary, would mean obtaining of this status by a new party (see Casal Bértola & Enyedi 2014: 267).
Mair's (1996) original framework was amended later by Casal Bétoa & Mair (2010). They added the fourth criterion for assessing the degree of PSI. Notably, this supplementation took place after looking into post-communist party systems where institutionalization was lagging behind compared to the experience of older democracies. The added criterion was 4. the frequency of change, which looks into "the number of changes in the party composition of government", whether these changes take place post or in between elections (Casal Bétoa & Mair 2010).

What looking into these factors tell us about the PSI is that the low rates of regular government turnovers are telling signs of high degree of institutionalization; while frequent, in-between election partial changes and new players popping up, shows low degree of institutionalization (Casal Bétoa & Mair 2010).

However, these criteria leave out non-partisan ministers and governments from consideration. The reason for concentration on partisan ministers was already provided above, in party system definition. Party systems are about interactions between parties (see Mair 1996), not between different actors. There are one of two ways this statement can be interpreted. The first is to omit the non-systemic elements from the calculation as Casal Bétoa, Mair et alia have done before; or we could consider further whether few partisan ministers in largely technocratic government can represent any structure of inter-party competition. Irrespective of to whom the appointment powers fall, my understanding of the structure of competition is derived, following Mair's logic (1996), from the idea that the 'governing status' is the objective parties pursue and thus they have the incentive to maximize the share of seats if it is up to them. To put it differently, if the competition or cooperation for government takes place between parties the governments formed from such interactions should be largely partisan.

Following the option one, of leaving the non-partisans out of the equation, Casal Bétoa has ascribed higher degree of institutionalization to the Georgian party system compared to the others in the Black Sea Region. The reason for this conclusion is that during the PP1 there was a single party represented in government along with non-partisans. Thus, Casal Bétoa has argued that since the Revolution, which also coincides with the democratic
transition in this country, "party politics has been dominated" the political scene. Contrary to development in Ukraine, where "parties played a secondary role". Thus far, the assumption regarding the non/partisan status of the government has been based on somewhat intuitive judgment regarding the cabinet composition, or more precisely, whether most of the cabinets were composed of "majority of independent or non-partisan (proximate to the President) political figures" (Casal Bétoa 2016: 121) (emphasis added). This statement seems bit too obscure to let researches decide the partisan status of the government. As a principle, it should not matter whether it is just one cabinet or many, changes or non-changes should be reflected all the same. Second, there is no clear threshold for each cabinet in terms of their non-partisan status; whether majority here means 80% or 51%? Neither is the rationale behind it explained, whether independents sharing incumbent party views or policy preferences should be added to the calculation, while non-partisans should not. And lastly, non-partisanship seems to be linked to the proximity to the president. It is not clear whether presidents' partisanship matters or it is his appointment powers that make cabinets non-partysan.

Although inclusion of non-partisan cabinets risks penalizing party systems, the argument for inclusion is that it not only increases our understanding of what these differences between semi-presidential sub-types bring to the table but also how repetitive the patterns of interactions between parties have become. If a party holds only a small share of government seats under its supposed single-party government and disappears from the political scene after new parties come to power, then perhaps accounting for these details is what allows us to realistically assess the situation, not overestimate the systematic character of certain inter-party or inter-branch interaction.

In chapter one, where the differences between PP1 and PP2 sub-types were addressed it was pointed out that due to the institutional set-up (not necessarily because of presidential powers) parties' power to compete for governing status might be reduced in PP1 sub-type. In order to find some delineation of what would count as partisan and, on the other hand, a technocratic or non-partisan government, a threshold for "party government" status has been introduced in this study. Schleiter and Morgan-Jones have proposed a way to
distinguish between two types of cabinets: presidential and parliamentary ones. They conceptualize presidential cabinets as the ones "formed without active participation" of the assembly parties or being composed of more than half (50% + 1) of non-partisan ministers (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2010: 1424). Following Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, I use the 50% + 1 threshold to decide in favor of “party government”. Failing to meet this limit would mean that competition for government is not inter-party. And thus, the competition for government is less about the party system as such. The aim of this distinction is to avoid over-rewarding or over-stating institutionalization of party systems. That said, parties which meet this criterion will qualify as 100% partisan in case of one party government; similarly, under multi-party government the share will be divided between partisan members and non-partisans will be excluded from the calculation.

2.3 Electoral systems

Inclusion of electoral systems in the current study might appear rather redundant, especially, by accepting Peter Mair's conceptual framework, it has been established that patterns of inter-party interaction have their own logic, independent of that of electoral preferences. However, considering from the independent variable side it is interesting to observe whether electoral rules correspond to the differences between semi-presidential sub-types, i.e. is PP1 accompanied by more individual-centric rules, while the shift to PP2 follows more party-centric electoral rules as well? Although proportional representation (PR) is regarded to be more party-centric than the "candidate-based multi-member systems" (see Lin 2011: 64), certain rules in PR system can also work in advantage of individualistic politics. Features of party versus individual-centric PR rules are roughly summarized in the table below.

Table, PR system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual-centric system</th>
<th>Party-centric system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open list, no vote pooling + MMD +/- nomination powers</td>
<td>Closed list + MMD programmatic parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Closed list + SMD + nomination powers

Kitschelt et al. 1999: 54.

Under conditions when electoral rules become more party-centric we should also keep in mind the possible outcomes of these rules; such as increase in the numbers of the parliamentary parties. Such changes in electoral rules pose a test to party system institutionalization; whether the structure of competition remains the same after the introduction of more proportional electoral rules or as Mair proposed electoral preferences will be managed according to the patterns of interactions between parties in party system. However, if under PP1 the party system has remained under-institutionalized and the country shifts to PP2 with more proportional rules we might expect increase in the number of parliamentary parties to contribute to the initial mitigation of the expected PP2 sub-type effects. Since cabinet dismissal depends solely on the assembly, in high number of parties no confidence vote might be easier to be pushed.

Therefore, electoral systems serve as a conditional variable in this study. In order to estimate full effect of institutional design of the regime type on PSI, the extent to which these effects are either increase or mitigated by differences in electoral system is also taken into consideration.

Hypothesis: individual-centric rules under PP1 contribute to the lower institutionalization, while in under-institutionalized party systems shift to PP2 accompanied by the party-centric rules will experience initial decrease in PSI scores.

However, keeping in mind that ideal-typical models are seldom found in practice, looking into electoral designs of the selected cases will help us to anticipate the kind of impact conditional variable might have on PSI.

Table: Electoral systems design for the assemblies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Parl. size</th>
<th>constituency</th>
<th>Parl. term</th>
<th>Avrg. Parl. duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1992 – mixed plurality SMD and PR 1</td>
<td>Btwn. 100-160</td>
<td>1992: SMD + 1 nationwide;</td>
<td>4 yrs.</td>
<td>3.4 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>System Description</td>
<td>Year Range</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Years 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Mixed: party list PR + majority system</td>
<td>2004 - 235; since 2008 – 150.</td>
<td>2 tiers: 1 nationwide &amp; SMD</td>
<td>4 yrs.</td>
<td>4 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STP</td>
<td>Closed-list PR</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>4 yrs.</td>
<td>3.8 yrs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** IDEA international's Electoral System Design database; IFES Election Guide; Inter-Parliamentary Union; Núñez, L., Electoral System Change in Europe since 1945: Portugal; Wikipedia.

Assemblies of the selected countries during the period under consideration are unicameral, and the countries are unitary systems.

Given certain expectations about the way in which certain electoral systems might accelerate or mitigate the effect of PP1 and PP2 sub-types on PSI, we would expect across the given set of cases that in Portugal & STP the effect would be accelerated because these two countries had party-centric electoral systems from the beginning, while in Croatia and to some extent in Ukraine the shift to PP2 is expected to experience an initial government instability, since the switched to more party-centric rules corresponded to the sub-type change. Georgia, similar to Portugal and STP maintained the electoral system in place, however, in this case the country never moved to fully PR system, but preserved the
balanced mixed system. Thus, the mixed system is expected to weigh in and lessen the benefits of the sub-type shift.

2.4 Control variable

In order to observe the proposed effects of semi-presidentialism on PSI, controlling for democracy is paramount (see Elgie & Moestrup 2016: 2). If the system is held closed artificially there is no point in measuring the stability of competition under different institutional conditions. In order to ensure that the selected cases meet the minimal criterion of the public offices are freely contested the index of electoral democracy is selected as a control variable. This index ensure that the selection of the executive and the assembly is carried out in competitive elections (Skaaning et al. 2015); looks into the conduct of elections, whether it is free and fair; freedom of association, and expression are guaranteed (Teorell et al. 2016).

3. Hypothesis

Above discussion suggests that party systems are institutionalized in a specific manner in semi-presidentialism. Keeping the above conceptualization of variables in mind, this means that the institutional arrangements in the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism produce different patterns of interactions among parties in governing arena.

Under the first sub-type of semi-presidentialism we should expect party politics to be somewhat secondary in the distribution of spoils of the office. To put it into Mair's terms I hypothesize president-parliamentarism to behave more as an open system, where cabinet survival depends not only on the assembly but also on the president, even if he is partisan and enjoys majority support in the parliament s/he is still expected to have a different agenda. Presidents under president-parliamentarism somewhat reduce the competition from the core of party system. So, if the structure of competition is at the heart of party systems then under-institutionalized party system under president-parliamentarism is hardly surprising.
H: PP1 leads to lower PSI because of higher number of non-partisan cabinets and higher frequency of change embedded in the institutional arrangement of PP1. In contrast, PSI should increase with the shift to PP2 due to the accountability structure of this sub-type. Thus, while PP1 creates conditions for lower institutionalization, move to PP2 should correspond to the increase in institutionalization.

\[
\text{PP1} \rightarrow \text{PSI} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{PP2} \rightarrow \text{PSI}_{\text{higher}}
\]

In addition, electoral systems are expected to further influence institutional design outcomes on PSI. The more individual-centric rules under PP1 are expected to increase the regime type effect and further contribute to the lower institutionalization of countries’ party system. Similarly, if country shifts to more proportional, party-oriented rules after the shift to PP2, which was preceded by lagging institutionalization due to PP1 sub-type specificity and less party-oriented rules, we should expect, at least, initial further opening of the party system and lowering of the IGA. In contrast, if party-centric rules were in place since PP1, we should expect a smooth transition.

4. Research design

Casal Bértoa (2014a; 2014b) has addressed effects of different regime types on PSI. In order to observe the outcomes all three regime types have on PSI, he uses combination of most similar (MSSD) and a most different systems designs (MDSD). Although his analysis is primarily a cross-country comparison, he also looks into the short, medium, and long-term effects of regime types on PSI. However, semi-presidentialism is used as a single variable, irrespective of institutional differences within it. Furthermore, long-term effects which cover both sub-types, risk correcting lower institutionalization scores under PP1, or averaging the effects of PP2 by calculating these two sets together.
Taking into consideration an impact selected research method has on our understanding of the effects semi-presidentialism has on PSI, the choice of method in this study tries to account for the specificities of both phenomena under consideration. First, this study needs to be carried out in a comparative perspective. As it has already been established earlier, due to "heterogeneous nature of semi-presidential countries" (Elgie 2011: 2) selection bias and/or the problem of endogeneity can be avoided if the systematic differences within this regime are captured and turned into useful comparative categories (PP1 and PP2), and these differences are demonstrated and compared.

Selection of the phenomenon and the research method best suited for the study determine the nature of the study. It is a few-N, factor-oriented comparative analysis. However, the aim of this paper/thesis is not only to compare few cases based on outcomes, but also to trace the process of institutionalization of party systems, the way it unfolds under each subtype. Thus, it is more of a diachronic analysis, which I think, is well suited for testing the hypothesis. The rationale for the cross-temporal analysis is that it increases our understanding of semi-presidentialism and the way party systems develop patterns of interactions in this regime. Furthermore, it will allow us to give recommendations regarding improving the performance of PP1.

Case selection is based on two criteria. First, countries should have shifted from president-parliamentary to premier-presidential system. Second, this shift should not be interrupted (experience constitutional gap or intervening another regime type). In order for countries to be classified as semi-presidential ones the constitutions need to specify and meet the following criteria proposed by Elgie: 1) origin and survival of president (independent of the assembly); 2) accountability of both prime minister and the cabinet to the assembly; and 3) the assembly should be able not only to consent to president's request to appoint or dismiss the government, but also to pass the vote of no confidence (closely follows Elgie 2011: 4–5).

Some cases exhibit clear features of 'managed competition', for example Kyrgyzstan and Armenia (Lansford 2015). By contrast, other countries have had back and forth with democratic progress and cannot be so easily dismissed.
Graph, electoral democracy scores


These filters leave us with the three solid, electoral democracies: Georgia, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Another set of countries are Croatia, and Ukraine. These two countries have transitioned to electoral democracy during the shift to premier-presidentialism.

Table; shift from PP1 to PP2 in selected cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>president-parliamentarism</th>
<th>premier-presidentialism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1991–2000</td>
<td>2001 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2004–2013</td>
<td>2013 –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rationale behind inclusion of Croatia and Ukraine is to observe results of the shift from PP1 to PP2, whether PSI is different under the second sub-type due to recent Democratization, or still follows the trend.

5. Data collection

The data regarding countries with semi-presidential constitutions, which experienced the shift from PP1 to PP2 was collected from Robert Elgie's dataset on semi-presidentialism. Due to the fact that the current study is based on Elgie’s conceptual framework and follows his classification of sub-types the existing data-set was deemed sufficient and suitable for the purposes of the current study.

The Index of Electoral Democracy was taken from the latest data version (v8) of the Varieties of Democracy Database.

For the dependent variable the data was collected from multiple sources. One general reason is the diversity of cases; another reason was to maximize accuracy. The most extensive coverage of countries in terms of cabinet composition and party affiliation of ministers were found on Casal Bértola's Who Governs Europe, Döring and Manow's Parliaments and Governments Database, and on Sonntag's Politica. Furthermore, if there was conflicting information provided by different databases, country expert articles were consulted. However, there was no information on São Tomé e Príncipe (STP) in any relevant database. The data on STP was collected from secondary sources.²

² Lansford's Political Handbook of the World covered some of the cabinet composition information. In addition numerous internet sources through internet archives and the Wikipedia were utilized. But more importantly, Dr. Gerhard Seibert kindly shared his data on STP, which provided me with the information regarding the number of ministers in each cabinet, parties in the cabinet, share of non-partisan members, legislative support, etc.
6. Operationalization of variables

The independent variable and its sub-types are assessed based on country constitutions.

As far as the dependent variable goes, PSI is operationalized as a continuous variable, as proposed by Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2014).

Calculation of PSI starts from the first assembly election after the adoption of semi-presidential constitution; and the shift to PP2 – from the first cabinet formed under this sub-type.

Analysis of PSI does not concern particular parties, rather it is carried out "at the systemic level" (Casal Bértoa 2016/2017), where "years [are used] as time units and the percentage of ministers as counting units". This way all three aspects of Index of Government Alternation (IGA) – wholesale, partial, and non-alternation are all accounted for (Casal Bértoa 2016: 120 – 121). Initially, Mair (1996), and Casal Bértoa & Mair (2010) following Mair's 1996 operationalization only looked into the changes in the composition of government, although conceptually, IGA was designed to incorporate not only alternation, but also non-alternation, and wholesale alternation, where the latter two were thought to illustrate higher level of institutionalization. Although the original Index of Government Alternation focused not only on the party replacement from government to government, but also on the position parties occupied in each government (Casal Bértoa & Mair 2010), this index used changes to demarcate time for analysis. Whereas, Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2014) turned PSI into a truly continuous variable by tracking non/changes on yearly basis (see also Casal Bértoa 2016: 120).

Still the question remains which [partisan] governments should be considered for calculation? Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2014) propose inclusion of governments following assembly elections. Even if the line-up of parties remain the same, changes in party position each time will be reflected in the percentage change of partisan ministers in a new government. However, they maintain Mair’s original position in excluding changes in particular PM and cabinet between elections if the combination of governing parties remain unchanged. In case of partial-alternation, even if the PM remains the same, such
government needs to be evaluated (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2014: 268). In addition and taking constitutional requirements for government resignation into account, depending on the sub-type and country specifications, constitution might require government resignation following presidential, not the assembly elections, in such cases presidential elections will be considered instead of the assembly and vice versa if the government resigns after every assembly elections.

IGA evaluates ministerial volatility.

**Formula:**

\[ MV = \frac{1}{2} \sum (m_{t2} - m_{t1}) \].

Where: MV refers to ministerial volatility and is calculated based on changes in time t2 minus time t1, in absolute numbers. However, this score needs to be standardized since it is measured from 50 to 100. In cases when the MV is < 50, the score is subtracted from 100. Below is the final IGA formula proposed by Casal Bértoa (2016).

\[ IGA = (MVis-50)*2. \]


The remaining two indicators are calculated from 0 to 100 (see Casal Bértoa 2016: 120 – 121; Casal Bértoa & Enyedi 2014). Hence, evaluation of composed PSI score requires standardization of IGA.

Innovation and/or familiarity of the **governing formula** is measured by the Index of Familiarity of Alternatives (IFA). In order to capture not only the number of innovative parties in the governing formula, but also their relative weight in the party system, Casal Bértoa & Enyedi advise for using the ministerial volatility, here as well. While the share of familiar parties will be maintained in the calculation based on their share of cabinet members; innovative elements will also benefit from the exact calculations. Previous calculation based on the number of parties in the government assumed that each party had the same ‘presence’ in government (see Casal Bértoa 2016; Casal Bértoa & Enyedi 2014).
And the final indicator, access to government uses the Index of Close (IC). Similar to the operationalization of the previous indicator, this is also measured on 0 to 100 point-scale; employs ministerial volatility to accurately estimate new-comers’ position (Casal Bértoa 2016; Casal Bértoa & Enyedi 2014).

Overall level of institutionalization is an average of the three indicators listed above.

**Formula:**

\[
\text{PSI} = \frac{(\text{IGA} + \text{IFA} + \text{IC})}{3}.
\]


Concerning the control variable, electoral democracy is measured on an interval scale in the Varieties of Democracy data-set.
7. Empirical analysis

In this part of the paper, empirical results of the cases are discussed. The structure is as follows: first the semi-presidential shift is outlined, followed by PSI results before and after the shift; this part is followed by analysis of the hypothesized effects on the PSI. Cases which registered higher institutionalization under both sub-types are discussed first, followed by two cases where the PSI has improved significantly after the shift. And lastly, an outlier case is presented.

As a general note, it should be clarified that there is no mention of semi-presidentialism in the constitutions of these countries, perhaps this also contributes to conceptualization difficulties for this regime type.

7.1 Portugal

Portugal adopted the first semi-presidential constitution following the Carnation Revolution, which also marks the beginning of the third wave of democratization. Characteristic of the third wave transitions it was a pact, or a compromise between different political forces. Direct elections of the president was introduced to "reward the military for" "the toppling of the authoritarian regime" but also, to created an opportunity for the 'civilianization' of presidency. Appointment and dismissal of the PM and a cabinet originated from the president, however the assembly also had the dismissal power up to 1982. In the 1982 amended constitution, confidence vote from the assembly was incorporated in cabinet investiture. Thus the survival of the PM and a cabinet depends solely on the assembly although the Constitution states that the government is responsible both to the president and the assembly. Although the president still maintains nomination powers, proposal needs to be originated from the assembly consultation. Furthermore, the government resigns following assembly elections, giving primacy to the legislature over the executive (Jalali 2011: 158-159, 162-164; Neto & Lobo 2008: 234, 238, 240; Art. 189-195).
In the table below, I present the results of the party system institutionalization under both sub-types.

**Table:** Portuguese party system before and after the shift

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>IGA</th>
<th>IFA</th>
<th>IC</th>
<th>PSI Score</th>
<th>No. of Elections</th>
<th>No. of Non-p Cabinets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1982</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 of 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 -</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, there has been an improvement in PSI, following the move to PP2. Although the Portuguese party system did not suffer from the under-institutionalization under PP1 the system has research almost perfect institutionalization after the shift to PP2.

All major political parties in the party system were formed during 1973-1974. Notably, this is the period from 1974 Revolution to the final pacted transition to democracy. These new parties, before they even started competition for government had to seek a compromise with the military (Jalali 2011: 158). Their active presence in the political scene is reflected not only in the constitutional amendment in 1982, but also incorporation of more party-centric [electoral] rules since the transition to democracy. Not only do the same parties dominate the political scene even today but the access to government has become completely closed since the shift to PP2 sub-type. In this sense lower score in governing formula hints to the possibility of developing new cooperation between former opposition groups.

In order to determine whether the proposed institutional vices of PP1 sub-type were present and contributed to lower institutionalization of the party system in the initial years of semi-presidentialism we need to examine the patters that emerged from the initial interactions.

Non-partisan governments amounted to one-third of all governments formed under PP1. Even though PP1 lasted only for seven years, from 1976 to 1982 (included) and one-third means only two non-partisan governments, still, it illustrates inter-branch competition for the government and an attempt by the president to put a technocratic cabinet in place. The
two non-partisan governments represent an extreme case, both were 100% non-partisan, formed at the same year. Notably, and contrary to Elgie's proposition, the president was non-partisan under president-parliamentarism, while all the following presidents were partisan. The reason in the first case is the military past of the first president, while the following presidents were all civilian. Although in assessing PSI 50% and less are sorted in the same category and does not make difference in determining the level of institutionalization, it might have played a greater role in the short-lived president-parliamentarism. Country experts ascribe the shift to PP2 to the desire to "eliminate the possibility of undisguised presidential governments" (Neto & Lobo 2008: 234, 240).

The initial PP1 years were accompanied by frequent alternations in government, not all due to disapproval of non-partisan programmes from the assembly (see Lansford 2015, Portugal; Neto & Lobo 2008). While the president tried to increase his influence on the government, parliament was also doing the same on its end. Hence the frequent disapproval and alternations in government. Thus, the institutional set-up did reduce PSI in PP1. However, it should also be noted, that from the stability perspective, appointment of the cabinet, clearly in conflict with the interests of the other institution which has the equal dismissal powers seems rather short-sighted.

After the shift to PP2 sub-type there were no non-partisan governments, although the share of non-partisan ministers has increased on number of occasions even under PP2. Interestingly, this has been the case during the most stable governments when the cabinet was able to hold the office throughout full electoral cycle without early elections. On all occasions it was single party government, composed solely of PS members (and non-partisans) when the share of non-partisan members in government exceeded 40% but remained below 50%. It took place the first time after shift to PP2 in the second half of 1990s, notably during the short period when the PM and the president were from the same party. The second time, when the country was returned to cohabitation. Thus, there are two very different circumstances under which there has been a significant increase in non-partisan share of cabinet ministers. As a general trend, however, since the shift to PP2 the competition for government seems to have become the matter of interactions between
parties, solely. Portugal actually experienced decrease in the effective number of parliamentary parties soon after the shift to PP2, despite the fact that the country maintained party-centric electoral rules throughout the regime (under the both sub-types) (see Neto and Lobo 2009). It appears the constitutional amendment has produced the intended result of "partification' of government" (Lobo 2005: 274). Elimination of non-partisan cabinets can be traced to the institutional design of PP2 sub-type. More precisely, the required confidence vote from the assembly which capped the possibility of non-party elements making it to the government.

Although Portuguese party system has become highly institutionalized, frequent early elections are still quite common. The reason behind early parliament dismissals had been the "breakdown of agreement within the assembly" in 1979, 1982, 1985, 1987, and 2001. Furthermore, there have been two addition dissolutions in 2004 this was conditioned by the unpopularity of the government and less a matter of instability (Jalali 2011: 166-167); and again in 2011 due to parliamentary instability. Even though the parties in party system have been able to keep the access to government closed, this success has not been automatically translated into the assembly stability. Although, as observed above, former opposition parties have joined forces in government, not all interactions appear to be as strong.

Above theorized degree of institutionalization under each semi-presidential sub-type holds true in this case. Under PP1 Portuguese party system remained less institutionalized with new parties gaining access to government, experimenting with new governing formula and partial, in-between election alternations. Two non-partisan governments undoubtedly contribute to the openness of party system quite immensely, but it is not the sole weakening factor. The key institutional tensions built in PP1 are the root cause of lower PSI. As far as PP2 sub-type goes, the system has remained closed, almost with the perfect score. Even though there had been quite a few early assembly elections, sometimes following an innovative governing formula (under PP1), but other times familiar or the single-party government (under PP2). The access to government has been limited to the
existing parties; alternation had been either wholesale or none, and the governing formula had also remained familiar in PP2 sub-type.

7.2 São Tomé and Príncipe

STP adopted semi-presidential constitution in 1990, following the Portuguese model. The origin and survival of the president comes from the direct elections, serves for fixed term. The president has appointment and dismissal powers of the PM and the cabinet. Also, the Constitution (art. 68) declares it incompatible with the president’s office to hold any other public or private office concurrently (Seibert 2009:207; 2007: 50; 2016: 996). This means, formally s/he cannot hold a party position.

Following the constitutional amendment of 2003 (which came into force in 2006) the country moved from PP1 to PP2 sub-type. The president could no longer dismiss the government at will after the shift, rather the survival of the PM and the cabinet has become the assembly responsibility (Seibert 2003: 246; 2016: 997; 2009: 213-214).

**Table**: PSI scores of São Tomé e Príncipe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>years</th>
<th>IGA</th>
<th>IFA</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>PSI score</th>
<th>No. Of elections</th>
<th>No. Of non-p cabinets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-2005</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td><strong>82.2</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td><strong>97.4</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0 of 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to Portugal, STP has maintained party-centric rules since the adoption of semi-presidential constitution. This way the initial instability of moving from one party to multi-party system is contained in the PP1 sub-type, while the shift to PP2 becomes electorally and institutionally party-oriented, i.e works in advantage of PSI after the shift.

Despite the fact that STP adopted Portuguese constitutional model, both countries experienced increase of PSI and the party system closure after the shift to PP2, STP’s party system was also quite institutionalized during PP1 sub-type.
Contrary to Portugal, institutional shortcomings of PP1 are felt to a lesser extent in STP. While Portugal followed a zero-sum game between the executive and the assembly for government posts, in this case government appointment was more a result of inter-branch negotiations. Governments formed by the presidential initiative were not common under PP1. It only took place on rare occasions. The president nominated PM candidate after consultation with the assembly parties. Therefore, the dismissal of the cabinet and the PM by the assembly took place once during PP1 period (Seibert 2009: 204, 220; 2016: 997). Furthermore, the non-partisan share of cabinet ministers have also been quite low throughout the entire period of semi-presidentialism in STP, all the cabinets formed so far have been strictly partisan with one exception. Notably, this presidential government was formed under PP1 sub-type.

As far as the government dismissal goes from president’s side, this has happened when there was a single-party governments in office. Single-party governments contrary to coalitions are quite rare and among these rare instances two were dismissed by the president; the very first cabinet comprising of PCD members, and the second in 2001. Arguably the latter dismissal was the last straw in tolerating presidential meddling in the stability of government. It prompted assembly parties to work on the constitutional amendment to increase assembly control (Seibert 2009: 205, 211).

However, it was not frequent government alternations which led to lower PSI scores under PP1, as noted above, these were rare cases. Instead, it was innovative governing formula, which dragged the scores down. During PP1 there were also more instances of partial-alternation between elections. This dynamic has significantly changed in PP2, where the alternation is predominantly wholesale. Furthermore, coalition partners are either composed of the same line-up of parties or maintain two major former coalition partners. The reason for this is that the line-up of major parties has not changed much since the adoption of semi-presidentialism. There have been occasional name changes in parties but the continuity has not been disrupted. The close of access to government certainly underlines this fact.
During the early 2000s there have been few attempts at forming governments proportional to the assembly representation. Despite reaching unprecedented high level of support from the assembly these governments did not prove to be stable; quite the contrary, they were rather short-lived, lasted only for few months. Perhaps, such attempts to replicate assembly representation in the government upsets the pattern of interactions between parties. This leaves out the opposition and changes dynamics of the competition. Tries to bridge governmental and electoral arenas, which might work against the party system, because doing so would open the door to the non-systemic elements to affect the patterns of competition. This on the other hand would lead to de-institutionalization of party systems.

Contrary to Portugal, where usually PSD + CDS, and PS governments alternate, there is no clear major alliance emerging in STP's party system. Governments are formed from the former opposition groups, as well as from the former partners, single-party governments have allied with their former opposition parties as well. Due to the fact that there are three major parties still in the competition, governing formula but especially the access to the government has remained closed in PP2.

Overall, STP’s party system has been highly institutionalized under both sub-types, it still displayed visible improvements in the structure of interaction between parties after the shift. The fact that STP has withstood prolonged periods of cohabitation (Lin 2011: 146) might be the result of the high level of PSI.

7.3 Georgia

The country adopted semi-presidential constitution in 2004 after the Rose Revolution. The first step was towards president-parliamentarism, but the constitution was amended soon, in 2010 in favor of premier-presidentialism, which took effect in 2013 presidential elections. Although the regime type – semi-presidentialism is not explicitly stated in the constitution, institutional design outlined in chapter one is met in the amended constitutions of 2004 and 2010. The president is, again, directly elected for fixed term (Georgia had presidential system prior to the Revolution); the origin of the government
came from the president, therefore the government had an obligation “to resign following a presidential election”, not the parliamentary one. The survival of the prime minister and a cabinet under these circumstances was dependent on the both, president and the parliament (2004), and later (2013) exclusively on the assembly (Nakashidze 2016: 125–126). In the latter case, although the president nominates a prime minister, the proposal comes from the assembly and the nomination of the government also before the assembly falls to the PM (Art. 80, 81).

In order to observe the extent to which hypothesized effects are present in this case I present PSI scores before and after the shift to PP2 in the table, below.

Table; PSI scores of the Georgian party system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>years</th>
<th>IGA</th>
<th>IFA</th>
<th>IC</th>
<th>PSI score</th>
<th>No. Of elections</th>
<th>No. Of non-p cabinets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004-2012</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>1 pres.</td>
<td>3 of 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 -</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1 parl.</td>
<td>1 of 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant improvement in party system institutionalization after the shift to PP2 is observed from the table, above. Despite the fact that the time-span, especially for the PP2 sub-type has been rather short in this case, hypothesized patterns have emerged in the governing arena.

As expected, under PP1 more governments were formed, in general, and also, the number of non-partisan governments was higher in this sub-type. The choice of semi-presidentialism in the wake of the Rose Revolution has been claimed to be the by-product of the Revolutionary dynamics, to wit, that it could formally guarantee the power/authority to the Revolutionary leaders. “The presidency, premiership, and chairmanship of the legislature went to the three main leaders behind” the Rose Revolution (Nakashidze 2016: 218). After all, semi-presidentialism incorporates a dual executive system with the president and a prime minister along with the cabinet, sharing the executive power (see

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Few changes were made in partisan composition to the original data compiled by Casal Bétoa. I marked PM or a cabinet member as partisan based on my own knowledge and confirmed through various internet sources.
Elgie 2011: 14). Despite partisanship of the three leaders of the Revolution and the fact that their merged party held the majority in the assembly, did not guarantee the governing status for the party (ENM). In fact, the first cabinets formed under the “power-sharing” circumstances were non-partisan. Based on the theoretical expectations outlined in the chapter one, institutional features of president-parliamentarism makes non-partisan governments more likely to be formed in this sub-type. Therefore, lowering the institutionalization score of the party system was largely originated from the non-partisan governments. Despite the fact that throughout PP1 one party, ENM, had the assembly majority and enjoyed the governing status, its share of office was as low as the one-third of the cabinet at times. Moreover, although single-party government makes frequent government alternation hard to be accounted for, alternation between non-partisan and partisan status, due to its share of ministers provides with a tool to account for significant changes in government which take place between elections and by definition contribute to the reduction of the institutionalization score.

Although the instability/ frequent changes of PMs after the passing of the PM Zhvania, one of the leaders of the Rose Revolution and the first PM under PP1 had been increased, lowering the IGA, it was less a result of a dissolution of the initial power-sharing arrangement rather these changes were seen as “pawn sacrifices” during president-parliamentarism. There were prolonged rallies against the president and the government in 2007-2008. Replacing the partisan PM with the non-partisan PM Gurgenidze was seen as an attempt to ease the pressure on the incumbent government. Arguably, this represents an example, when the president pursuing his own agenda to preserve his position, diverges from the party interests. The extent to which these rallies challenged the legitimacy of the president can be observed through the fact that President Saakashvili called for early [presidential] elections in 2008 (Nakashidze 2016: 132, 131). The partisan status of the ENM started to increase in his second term, after the rallies.

The constitution was amended during the second and final term of Saakashvili’s presidency. With the reelection off the table securing party position became a priority. Before the parliamentary elections he appointed the leader of the ENM party as a prime
minister with a partisan cabinet composed of vastly ENM members. Although, it proved to be a rather short-lived win for the party; parliamentary elections of October 2012 brought a new victorious party and a new PM with it. This short history proves that the president's separate origin and survival do matter in how the PMs and cabinets are appointed, while under premier-presidentialism PMs indeed were appointed from the leading party in the legislature, shifting the focus from the executive to the legislature (along with the shift from one sub-type of semi-presidentialism to the other).

Since 2013 the president of Georgia is an independent, in line with Elgie's conceptualization. Although the current president was briefly, before the presidential election, a member of KODS coalition government, he also served as an independent minister under PM Ivanishvili's cabinet.

The shift brought the coalition government in power. However, parliamentary elections preceded presidential elections, which brought the constitutional changes in effect. Therefore, the old government was replaced in its entirety under PP1, while partial alternations occurred during PP2. Despite these changes in government, overall score continued to increase. Casal Bértola and Enyedi’s (2014) proposed model of measuring PSI based on ministerial volatility which assesses all indicators, does not penalize party systems for irregular/frequent but minor government alternations. In this case, the share of such parties was significantly low to impede on the overall score dramatically.

Contribution of indexes are diverse under PP1 and PP2. While the IGA was the highest in the former, after the shift alternation index became the lowest of the indicators although it has improved compared to PP1. The familiarity of governing alternatives and the access scores were aligned under PP2 and exceeded the IGA. Although it was only one party included in government under PP1, the innovation was caused from non-partisan governments. Innovation and familiarity further differ in this sub-type, since single-party government allowed for higher party system close even with non-partisan cabinets. While under PP2 the governments formed at a later point in time were composed of the familiar line-up of parties, although on two occasions a party was left out of the government, no new parties were added.
As far as the electoral system goes, Georgia had a mixed electoral system under the both sub-types, which stresses enduring individual-centric politics. There was also one non-partisan government under PP2 although unexpected after the shift.

7.4 Ukraine

Semi-presidential regime was adopted in Ukraine in 1996. The Constitution made provisions for direct-elections of the president. Appointment of the PM and the cabinet fall to the president (Matsuzato 2011: 200).

Constitutional amendment of 2004 (which took effect in 2006) maintained the origin and survival structure for president, while appointment of the cabinet became an assembly prerogative. The Constitution was also clear with regard to dismissal of the PM and a cabinet, which also became solely an assembly responsibility. Although the cabinet of ministers is accountable to both, president and the assembly, only the latter maintains power to dismiss the cabinet. Furthermore, the cabinet resigns following the assembly elections (Art. 113-115).

As far as the effects of these changes on PSI are concerned, below are listed the results of institutionalization prior and after the shift.

Table: Ukraine's PSI results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>years</th>
<th>IGA</th>
<th>IFA</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>PSI score</th>
<th>No. Of elections</th>
<th>No. Of non-p cabinets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996-2005</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8 of 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 -</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 of 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ukraine had the least institutionalized party system under PP1 sub-type among the selected cases. This is also the country which benefits from the separation of PP1 and PP2 sub-types the most. As it is clear from the table above, during PP2 inter-party competition has shown a significant improvement. However, despite significant differences in overall results, certain aspects remain still problematic in PP2.
Despite certain improvements in PP2 sub-type, alternation in government still remains high. The difference between the two sub-types is that the large part of under-institutionalization in PP1 was because of the sheer number of non-partisan cabinets. The share of such cabinets reached 57.1% in PP1, while under PP2 it accounted for only 8.3% of all governments. Thus, the trend of non-partisan governments in Ukraine corresponds to the sub-type peculiarities. However, cabinets were composed of five or six parties at a time, with some non-partisan members, under these conditions, the share of each party was spread so thinly that the inclusion or exclusion of new parties in the government affected the Index of Government Alternation to a lesser extent, even though the formula remained quite innovative and closely intertwined with the [open] access to government (in the first sub-type). The sheer number of parties in the party system remained high up until 2010 when it started to decrease slightly. It has been observed across the cases in the current study that the increase in PSI, especially after the shift, is accompanied by the decrease in the number of parties in party system. In this sense, Ukraine also follows the general trend, although its PSI level should be considered carefully.

In terms of electoral systems, Ukraine only had the pure PR system short, during 2006 – 2007 assembly elections, but this change did not necessarily increase the number of competing parties in government. Before and after these two elections Ukraine employed mixed electoral rules, similar to Georgia.

Although during PP2 parties started to become relevant, in general the trend of one-seat parties (occasion when a party is granted one seat in one government but is common to dismiss such parties from the coalition in the next cabinet) continued. Due to such additions governing formula underwent more changes than any other indexes. In this sub-type familiarity and access to government were quite distinct. Even though the partisan governments during the second part of PP1 and those of the first part of PP2 show more similarities, one leading party with four or five minor satellites alternating around them. Thus, although overall sub-type one and sub-type two produce quite different results, very much in line with what was hypothesized in earlier, still Ukraine's case shows a different, three types of developments in the competition.
7.5 Croatia

Croatia adopted president-parliamentary system in 1991, with dual accountability of the prime minister and a cabinet to the president and the assembly. In 2000 constitutional amendment president had the power to appoint the prime minister but the latter required confidence-vote, exclusively from the assembly. Linked to the confidence vote, the cabinet also nominated by PM, was appointed by the assembly, which for the survival depends on the assembly since 2000 (Art. 110-111).

Table institutionalization of the Croatian party system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>years</th>
<th>IGA</th>
<th>IFA</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>PSI score</th>
<th>No. Of elections</th>
<th>No. Of non-p cabinets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992-1999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Croatia is an outlier in the study. It illustrates reverse effects. The party system under PP1 was closed and perfectly institutionalized, while the institutionalization score decreased after the shift.

Under PP1 Croatia had one dominant party in government, which stayed in power throughout the period, with very low non-partisan ministers. Thus, the system remained closed with no alternation in government, throughout the period. Although Georgia also had one dominant party during PP1, the results of these two countries are very different. Croatian party system did not experience the same inter-branch struggles or pushing of presidential agenda at the expense of party interests.

The switch to premier-presidentialism was accompanied by democratization, improvement in economic performance, adoption of more party-centric electoral rules and the decrease in the party system institutionalization. Although, party-centric rules could have contributed to the initial instability of the government, as well as democratization; it should also be noted that Ukraine did not have high electoral democracy scores throughout both sub-types but the results were more or less aligned with the results of other cases.
Improving democratic performance although should not be ignored, differences Croatia's results should not be dismissed solely on this ground either.

The initial period of PP2 system proved quite unstable. Six parties replaced HDZ, but this new coalition did not prove to be especially stable. Years following the first assembly elections under this sub-type witnessed experimentation with innovative governing formula and a group of parties gaining access to the government. With time this effect has decreased. Croatia's HDZ party, which held the governing status during PP1 sub-type did not disappear after the opposition took over. It still continues to form government with a set of countries and also alone. In recent years, the party system produced two major parties SDP along with HDZ, which alternate in government with a small number of minor coalition partners. Although the access to government has closed again, due to the sheer amount of parties which originally gained access to government after the shift, governing formula is still innovative at times.

This case along with Georgia's transition from one type of semi-presidentialism to the other only demonstrates, how underdeveloped opposition can contribute to the lowering of the PSI levels. Even though there are striking differences between these two countries, electoral democracy scores; the fact that Croatia adopted more party-centric electoral rules, while Georgia practically maintained the same mixed system even after the switch. However, both countries experienced an initial period of coalition stabilization struggles during PP2. Because Croatia adopted premier-presidential constitution as early as 2000, patterns of inter-party interactions are becoming more concrete.

If we compare PP1 and PP2 only based on the PSI scores we will observe a decrease in the level of institutionalization in Croatia. But taking into account free contestation of elections and a proportional electoral system which were only becoming part of the political process in Croatia, weight in on significant deviation of this case.

Despite the institutional conditions during PP1 and more individual-centric electoral rules, Croatia party system was fully institutionalized under this sub-type, while the decrease in PSI took place after the shift. Croatian case somewhat undermines the hypothesis regarding the effects of institutional design on PSI. However, electoral system played
produced expected initial instability in PP2 sub-type. Thus, overall, if we compare the first and the second decades of PP2 in Croatia, we can clearly see the stabilization of government over time.
8. Conclusion

Significance of semi-presidential institutional design has been questioned number of times and hypotheses were put forth, arguing that it was less due to the institutional set-up, but more about the party affiliation of the president that really affected the share of partisan cabinet members. Almeida and Cho (2007: 21) have proposed that under non-partisan president 39% of ministers are expected to be non-partisan, whereas the longer the president has been associated with a party the lower the share of non-partisan cabinet members there would be. Contrary to this assumption and based on the evidence from the cases above, I argue that the difference between the two sub-types on the institutional level produces rather similar outcomes irrespective of behavioral factors. Both in Portugal and Georgia there were non-partisan cabinets during PP1, although in the former's case it was an extreme example, president's party affiliation did not increase ENM's partisan share in government in the latter. Furthermore, as we have observed in the conceptualization of semi-presidentialism in chapter 1, presidents are expected to be non-partisan under premier-presidentialism, following Almeida and Cho (2007) we should also expect low party involvement in government under PP2, which definitely is not the case, due to incentives institutional set-up brings in. Throughout the thesis, I tried to draw a clear line between the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism and argued that we should expect higher partisan composition under premier-presidentialism, despite (or because of) a non-partisan president and thus, we can talk about party systems as such under this sub-type, more than under PP1.

Furthermore, working on the relevant literature confirmed that semi-presidential cases are usually studied under the pure presidential or parliamentary systems, which on occasions even led to the inconclusive results or led scholars to adopt complex behavioral approach instead of constitutional/institutional power divisions (Shleiter & Morgan-Jones 2009; Shleiter & Morgan-Jones 2010). I find the latter approach rather problematic, since it risks understanding issues on case to case basis and ignores the underlying institutional principles at work.
Overview of the literature on semi-presidentialism, especially case studies on the countries covered in this study have provided with different explanations, mostly behavioral, as to why the regime experienced instability in governments, frequent cabinet alternations, or why popularly elected presidents pushed for technocratic or also referred to as "friends of the president" cabinets, which also did not last long due to assembly rejection of their government programmes. Although these historical perspectives are certainly insightful and gives us a sense of what transpired, one thing remains clear, at least among most of the cases examined here, that these trends of weak institutionalization are common under PP1, all due to the institutional design, irrespective of circumstances on the ground. I argue that circumstances do not really provide an answer as to why the structure of competition was linked to parties under PP2, although they elaborate or tell a story eloquently, they do not serve as explanations, but the institutional set-up does.

Differences in results between the current study and other similar studies lies in two aspects. The first is the research method employed in the current study, which is directly connected to the independent variable, or rather studying it from the sub-types’ perspective. I think the cases have benefited from differentiation from PP1 and PP2 sub-types. And another reason for divergent results is modification of the assessment model, inclusion of the non-partisan cabinets in PSI calculations.

For instance, in Casal Bértoua’s study (2016) Georgia and Ukraine are polar opposites. The former is depicted as highly institutionalized system, while the latter, under-institutionalized. In the current study, in contrast, they illustrate more similar trend. Although Casal Bértoua uses semi-presidentialism as a single variable, the key differentiating factor is the issue of inclusion/exclusion of non-partisan governments. In the current study, due to theoretical expectation based on PP1 institutional design, inclusion of non-partisan governments was seen as necessary. While in Casal Bértoua’s study shows different results, due to exclusion of non-partisans.

Empirical results largely support the hypothesis with the exception of Croatia. This means that the specific institutional design of semi-presidential system sub-types produce the
proposed outcomes despite significant differences between countries, at least in electoral democracies.

Differences between the selected countries should also be noted. Economically these countries are on different development levels.

Graph: GDP per capita of the selected cases


What this graph illustrates is a more or less similar starting conditions (economically) even though nowadays Portugal and Croatia have become much more prosperous. It is worth noting that economic improvement in these two countries coincides with the shift to premier-presidentialism, this is also true in the case of Ukraine to some degree, while Georgia’s economic performance started to improve under president-parliamentarism. And there are no significant differences registered in the case of STP.

Portugal and STP are the extreme cases. There is clearly a pattern in economic prosperity within the selected countries, which does not necessarily correspond to the institutional outcomes. On the contrary, Portugal and STP have demonstrated the most similar
outcomes in PSI improvement after the shift to PP2. Moreover, STP has shown more party-centric approach throughout semi-presidentialism.

In terms of economic prosperity, PSI tends to take its own course in semi-presidential countries. Even STP has highly institutionalized party system, despite the economic conditions. Furthermore, Portugal and STP show rather similar level of institutionalization, but in terms of economic performance these two countries represent two extreme cases of the upper and the lower economies in my selected cases. Croatia has a reverse trend, it was poorly performing economically under PP1, while maintaining a closed party system and it started improving economically, while its PSI score lowered but it was not a dramatic drop and is still a highly institutionalized system. What we need to keep in mind in this case is, again, democratization, which only took place later in Croatia. So, economic prosperity seems to be a secondary factor and the selected cases represented the same trend, irrespective of significant economic differences.

The current paper tries to tackle two problems: analytical/theoretical and social relevance (see Lehnert et al. 2007: 23-28) of the phenomenon studied here. Theoretically, there was an attempt to show significant differences within semi-presidentialism, and also to incorporate the missing, institutional specific (non-partisan cabinets) aspect in PSI index. Taking into consideration regular, that post-election government alternation is a characteristic of more institutionalized party system, this aspect significantly improves government accountability. And perhaps, these findings can be of some interest. However, the question is, however well supported by the empirical findings these claims might, do these findings have only limited/narrow political influence on the immediate parties involved, or whether these sentiments are shared among voters in shifting their priorities from president’s office to the assembly in elections, corresponding the shift in semi-presidentialism?

Given the institutional design, president's post seems rather important in distribution of seats in government under PP1, whereas under PP2 parties come to the forefront of the competition and hence the assembly elections are important. Following Mair (1996), I emphasize the influence of highly institutionalized party system on electoral preferences,
as has been clearly demonstrated in Portugal's case where highly proportional electoral rules did not increase fragmentation, rather the competition remained closed and between familiar parties. That said, based on government's performance voters might decide to reward or to punish the incumbent government. Considering that 'PM and the assembly are collectively' accountable to the assembly and the president under PP1, for voters both elections remain relevant. Conversely, under PP2, it is the assembly elections that matters, due to government's sole accountability to the former. Looking into voter turnout shows that voters in Georgia and São Tomé and Príncipe have clearly shifted their priorities corresponding to the sub-type change. Portugal displays a distinct trend, there have been slight spikes of turnout in every other presidential election, which closely followed or slightly exceeded turnout in parliamentary elections. However, it should also be noted that since 1976, every president has been reelected and the rise in turnout coincided with the first term elections. As far as Croatia and Ukraine go, they illustrate reverse trends. In the former turnout in presidential elections have always been lower, whereas in Ukraine it was parliamentary elections that received lower interest among voters.

Thus, the current topic can be studied from the social perspective as well.

Overall, differentiation between sub-types seems to have paid off. Even though, the set of countries which underwent the shift is quite limited, I think general patters are still visible which holds true to majority of cases. Research design further permitted capturing PP1 and PP2 institutional influences on PSI scores as well as how institutional characteristics have become embedded in party interactions. Although the increase in institutionalization is present numerically, that is not the only effect semi-presidential sub-types have ‘imposed’ on respective party systems. Furthermore, countries with similar electoral systems have produced different outcomes. For instance, contrary to Portugal, Georgia, or Ukraine institutional shortcomings of PP1 are felt to a lesser extent in STP, although still present. While Portugal followed a zero-sum game between the executive and the assembly for government posts, in STP government appointment was more a result of inter-branch negotiations. Governments formed by the presidential initiative were not as common under PP1. The president nominated PM candidate after consultation with the assembly parties.
Furthermore, the non-partisan share of cabinet ministers have also been quite low throughout the entire period of semi-presidentialism in STP. What STP illustrates is that the proposed ideal-typical effects cannot be expected to be present uniformly among all cases.

Across the cases, with the exception of Croatia, innovative governments are more frequent under PP1 sub-type, while the shift to PP2 causes farther closure of the access. Under PP1 IFA was the lowest, while under PP2 IC reaches the highest point.

All in all, I think, the cases analyzed above demonstrate that measuring PSI separately under each sub-type of semi-presidentialism gives us a certain advantage of catching a trend of increase of the level of institutionalization under the second sub-type. And also, the way party system mimics institutional design. Despite high institutionalization of the party system, it can still be improved institutionalization by switching to PP2 sub-type, STP and Portugal can serve as examples.

It can be argued based on the results that in general, PSI is higher under PP2 sub-type, always above 80 in the examined cases. The cases of Ukraine and Georgia where we have observed significant improvement in PSI scores best illustrate the benefits of the shift from PP1 to PP2. Therefore, one conclusion from these results can be, that countries suffering from under-institutionalized party systems under PP1 sub-type, should perhaps consider switching to PP2.

Considering that under PP2 party system institutionalization was generally high across the selected cases another direction the current paper can be developed is to test whether premier-presidentialism produces highly institutionalized party systems not just in comparative perspective but also in absolute terms. As opposed to, the more individual-centric president-parliamentarism.

Despite Croatia and STP, where the former demonstrated that total institutionalization is possible under PP1, and the latter’s case which showed that institutionally embedded system of cooperation between conflicting bodies can mitigate the detrimental effects of PP1 sub-type, it can still be beneficial for the party system if PP2 institutional design was
in place instead of PP1. This conclusion, of course, also challenges the assumption that semi-presidential systems are in general bad for democratization, PSI, or stability. Even though Croatia challenge the claim of increase in institutionalization, still the switch did not cause de-institutionalization of Croatian party system.
9. Acronyms

**PCD** - Partido de Convergência Democrática (Democratic Convergence Party; split from MLSTP-PSD).

**PCD-GR** - Partido de Convergência Democrática-Grupa de Reflexão (Democratic Convergence Party-Reflection Group; split from MLSTP-PSD, renamed PCD).

**CDS** - Partido do Centro Democrático Social (Social Democratic Center Party, est.1974).

**PSD** - Partido Social Democrata (Social Democrat Party, est.1974 as PPD [Partido Popular Democrático], 1976 renamed PSD).


**KODS** - Kartuli Otsneba – Demokratiuli Sakartvelo (Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia, est. 21 Apr 2012).

**HDZ** – Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union, est.17 Jun 1989).

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