I have written this Master’s thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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Abstract

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIETAL VALUES AND MODELS OF DEMOCRACY: EVIDENCE FROM 28 COUNTRIES

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Conditions for democratic stability have been an important topic in political science, from both theoretical and practical points of view. While some scholars argue that democratic stability depends on the institutional design adopted by a specific country, for example presidentialism or parliamentarism, others attribute democratic stability to certain types of values and political culture. This thesis aims to contribute to the debate on democratic stability by examining the relationship between societal values and models of democracy. In particular, it seeks to establish whether societal values and democratic models adopted in different countries correspond to each other.

To achieve this aim, this thesis performs several tasks. Firstly, it lays out a theoretical framework for studying a link between values and models of democracy based on congruence theory. The main idea behind this research is that congruence, that is similarity or correspondence, between societal values and democratic features at the institutional level is an important factor in ensuring democratic stability. To test whether such congruence occurs, this thesis suggests three hypotheses: that self-direction is positively linked with liberal democracy, that universalism is positively linked with liberal democracy, and that universalism is positively linked with egalitarian democracy.

Secondly, this thesis presents a research design developed on the basis of the theoretical framework to test the suggested hypotheses. In particular, Pearson’s correlations are run to see whether an association between values and models of democracy is positive and strong. The dataset used in this research consists of 28 countries that were chosen out of the countries where the sixth wave of the World Values Survey was conducted based on these countries’ scores on the Electoral Democracy Index provided in the Varieties of Democracy dataset. Data from these two projects are used in the operationalisation of the key concepts: universalism and self-direction (values) and liberal and egalitarian democracy. Each of the concepts is measured in two ways: values are measured at a more abstract level and a more specific one, and models of democracy are measured using...
component democracy indices as well as full democracy indices, which are aggregations of respective component democracy indices and an Electoral Democracy Index.

Thirdly, this thesis presents the results of the performed data analysis. It relies on the obtained Pearson’s correlation coefficients as well as visualisation of the relationship between the variables in the form of scatter plots to make conclusions about this relationship. The results of the data analysis are mixed, and while some of the variables demonstrate weak / moderate, moderate or even strong association, if outliers are removed from analysis, many correlation coefficients are not statistically significant. Therefore, evidence for the congruence between societal values and models of democracy provided in this research is inconclusive.

Despite such mixed and inconclusive evidence, there is potential for further exploring the relationship between societal values and models of democracy. Since this research seems to indicate that less abstract values or attitudes demonstrate better correlations with models of democracy, one way to proceed with the research on this topic is to apply other operationalisations of the value concept. What is more, more specific values might be correlated with certain features of democratic models as opposed to models as a whole. This might produce better results due to more direct and clear-cut links between such variables. In addition, there is potential for exploring differences in congruence in established and new democracies. This thesis addresses this question only briefly, but there is definitely room for comparative research in this regard, including by using qualitative methods and case studies.
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List of Abbreviations

V-Dem – Varieties of Democracy
WVS – World Values Survey
WVS 6 – sixth wave of the World Values Survey
EDI – Electoral Democracy Index
LCI – Liberal Component Index
LDI – Liberal Democracy Index
EgCI – Egalitarian Component Index
EgDI – Egalitarian Democracy Index

List of Country Abbreviations

ARG – Argentina
BRA – Brazil
COL – Colombia
DEU – Germany
ESP – Spain
GEO – Georgia
IND – India
KOR – South Korea
NLD – the Netherlands
PER – Peru
ROU – Romania
SWE – Sweden
TWN – Taiwan
USA – United States of America

AUS – Australia
CHL – Chile
CYP – Cyprus
ECU – Ecuador
EST – Estonia
GHA – Ghana
JPN – Japan
MEX – Mexico
NZL – New Zealand
POL – Poland
SVN – Slovenia
TTO – Trinidad and Tobago
URY – Uruguay
ZAF – South Africa
Introduction

The relationship between culture and people’s values on the one hand and political institutions on the other has become a subject of an important debate in political science. In the context of democratisation, the question of whether democracy requires a specific institutional setup or rather a specific set of values to succeed and consolidate has been seen as crucial, from both theoretical and practical points of view.

In terms of institutions, the discussion has been centred, for example, around suitability of presidential and parliamentary systems for sustainability of democratic regimes. Linz (1990), for instance, presented a list of threats that presidentialism poses to democracy. While acknowledging possible exceptions, he considered parliamentarism to be more conducive to a stable democratic regime. By contrast, Horowitz (1990) argued that what is important is whether a political system produces a sharp divide between government and opposition, regardless of this system being parliamentary or presidential.

On the other end of the institutions – culture debate are those authors who have underscored the importance of culture and values to establishing and preserving democracy. According to Fukuyama (1995), for instance, democracy has to consolidate at four different levels: ideology, or normative beliefs, institutions, civil society and culture. The two latter levels are deeper and change slowly; thus, these are the levels at which the major struggle between liberal democracy and its competitors (e.g. paternalistic Asian authoritarianism) takes place. Similarly, while Almond and Verba (1989) recognised the importance of elite attitudes and behaviour and political structures, they emphasised the role of political attitudes of ordinary citizens in ensuring democratic stability. In making their argument, these authors partly relied on congruence theory developed by Eckstein. Particularly, they referred to Eckstein’s (1998) hypothesis that democratic governments can only perform well if their authority patterns combine democratic and non-democratic features. Another core hypothesis within congruence theory posits that governments perform well if their authority patterns are congruent, that is correspond to or are the same, with the authority patterns characteristic of other social units. In addition, it has been argued that socioeconomic development and improved economic situation of the populations, in particular in those countries which are referred to as Western democracies, has brought about the shift in people’s values. The emphasis on survival has been substituted by the focus on the quality of life and self-expression.
values such as individual liberty, human diversity, civic autonomy etc (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Self-expression values in turn have been conducive to the establishment and consolidation of democratic regimes (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

Academic discussions of democracy go beyond the debate about its roots and conditions for its stability. The concept of democracy as such has been studied extensively, and numerous definitions, characteristics and models of democracy have been suggested. Democracy can be defined as a system for organising relations in a state in which citizens can hold rulers accountable and which gives citizens a variety of means to express their interests and values (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Lijphart (1999) distinguished between two types of democracy: majoritarian, or Westminster, model and consensus model. Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning and Teorell (2016) posited that a consensus exists that democracy goes beyond mere elections, which has led to the introduction of various models that expand electoral definition of democracy and emphasise characteristics such as popular participation, social-economic equality, liberal constitutionalism and deliberation.

This master’s thesis is based on several ideas that have been developed in the literature on culture, values, democracy and regime stability. It adopts a stance that democracy requires certain values to be predominant in a society in order to emerge, consolidate and be stable. At the same time, this research intends to explore the relationship between democracy and values at a new, deeper, level since the existing research on this topic often deals with values that can be labelled as liberal, or self-expression, and their contribution to democratisation and does not distinguish between different types or conceptions of democracy. Therefore, the aim of this master's thesis is to find out whether there is congruence, in other words correspondence or similarity, between various societal values and specific models of democracy that exist in different countries, that is whether societal values are reflected at the institutional level.

Particularly, while existing rich and detailed data concerning values have already allowed for generalisations regarding trends in political culture (Coppedge, 2012), these data could be further used to examine a variety of values and orientations, which correspond to different behaviours or states desirable by people, in various countries. What is more, it has been argued that most of the existing measures of democracy do not reflect the
diversity of models of democracy; in particular, these measures have been criticised for
their narrow scope, that is primary focus on elections, political institutions, parties and
elites (Doorenspleet, 2015). As a result, there has been a call for a new multidimensional
approach to measuring democracy that reflects different conceptions of democracy
(Coppedge et al., 2011). The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project is based on such
a new approach and provides a dataset that goes beyond equating democracy with
elections and aims to measure, through a large number of indicators, seven principles of
democracy (electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, majoritarian and
consensual) (Mechkova & Sigman, 2016). Currently the V-Dem dataset contains 5
democracy indices: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian.

Thus, the research question that this thesis seeks to answer is the following: What is the
relationship between societal values and different models of democracy? The main idea
that underpins this research is that certain values that are widespread or have strong
support in a society are reflected in a specific type, or types, of democracy that emerges
in that particular society. The overarching expectation is that there is a positive
association between societal values and models of democracy. Taking into account the
available data, this research focuses on three main hypotheses: that self-direction is
positively linked with liberal democracy and universalism is positively linked with liberal
democracy and egalitarian democracy.

If the expected relationship proves to be true, it might not only start to unmask a more
nuanced association between values and democracy, but also strengthen the overall
argument for the importance of culture and values for democratic performance and
stability by demonstrating that there should be correspondence between societal values
and institutions as opposed to an emphasis on institutional arrangements only. Self-
expression, or liberal, values might be crucial to the establishment of a democratic regime
and democratic institutions in the first place, which means the introduction of channels
through which people are able to express their interests and values. In turn, thanks to the
existence of such channels, overtime more specific types or models of democracy might
emerge in different societies in accordance with dominant values. More importantly, in
accordance with congruence theory, the emergence and consolidation of such models in
the form of different institutions and mechanisms might be a crucial factor in ensuring
successful democratic performance. The exploration of a possible link between values
and models of democracy is therefore not just a matter of an academic debate; it is important from a practical point of view when there is a need to design sustainable democratic institutions. In addition, although this thesis will not directly solve the problem of not taking people’s views on democracy into account, since the V-Dem dataset that is used in this research relies on expert knowledge (Doorenspleet, 2015), it will contribute to the linking of V-Dem data to surveys that explore people’s opinions.

Taking into account the research question and the aim of this thesis, it will adopt a large-N research design in order to answer the research question with more certainty, minimise possible errors and allow for generalisation of the findings, even if only modest due to the exploratory nature of this research and possible limitations related to the available data. In particular, the hypothesis related to self-direction will be tested on 28 democratic countries, while the hypotheses that deal with universalism will be tested on 26 countries due to missing data. While this research recognises the importance of culture and values in ensuring successful institutional performance, it does not exclude a possibility that institutions can have an impact on culture and values. Therefore, this research does not make a distinction between independent and dependent variables and only checks the relationship between variables for correlation, not causality. The data used in this thesis come from two big projects: V-Dem project and World Values Survey (WVS), a project that is dedicated to the study of changing values by means of using a common questionnaire and conducting nationally representative surveys (in waves) in almost 100 countries in the world (“Who We Are,” n.d.). The software used to carry out this research includes Excel, for carrying out simple calculations and finalising the dataset, and Stata for producing graphs and running correlations.

To answer the research question, this thesis performs several tasks, which are reflected in the thesis structure. The first chapter introduces the theoretical framework for this research: it deals with the main theories related to the topic and explores the main concepts used in this research and relations between them. The second chapter lays out the methodology of this research: it explains the operationalisation of the key concepts and introduces the datasets and methods used to test hypotheses. The third chapter presents the results of the undertaken analysis in light of the thesis aim. These chapters are followed by a concluding section that briefly summarises the key findings of this thesis and offers topics for future research.
1. Theoretical Framework: Congruence between Societal Values and Models of Democracy

This chapter presents the theoretical framework for studying the relationship between values that are widespread in different societies and various models of democracy. It deals with the key concepts used in this research as well as some of the theories that have been put forward to explain the relationship between these concepts. Based on this discussion, this chapter elaborates on the theoretical expectations and hypotheses that are tested in the third chapter.

1.1. Key Concepts

1.1.1. Democracy and Its Different Conceptions

Democracy, its essential features and characteristics, and various types of democracy have been a subject of extensive research in political science. Lijphart (1999), for example, adopted the following basic definition of democracy: it is government by the people or, in modern representative democracies, by their representatives; at the same time, it is government for the people, that is government according to people’s preferences (p. 1). Based on this definition, Lijphart conceptualised two types of democracy: majoritarian, or Westminster, model and consensus model, which exhibit important differences with regard to specific democratic institutions and rules.

According to Schmitter and Karl (1991, p. 76-80), while there are many types of democracy with unique institutional setups, democracy as a system of governance is characterised by specific generic features, components and procedures. In particular, in a democracy, citizens, who act indirectly through the cooperation and competition of their elected officials, can held rulers accountable for their actions. Elections play a central role in a democratic system; however, for its proper functioning, democracy requires the existence of numerous other channels through which citizens can influence public policy and express their interests and values during the periods between elections. Such channels include social movements, interest associations, different territorial or functional arrangements etc. Furthermore, while majority rule is an integral part of democracy, different mechanisms, including interest associations and civil movements, exist to protect the rights of minorities.
Both of the presented definitions put people or citizens at the centre of a democratic system. What makes a system of governance democratic is the availability of mechanisms through which citizens can channel their preferences, interests, values etc. The fact that democracy is a system responsive to people’s demands constitutes an important premise for this thesis: the values that are shared by the majority of people can, therefore, be, at least to a certain degree, translated into specific political arrangements.

While the basic definition of democracy as rule by the people seems to be widely accepted, there is no final consensus as to what democracy means, which is reflected in the fact that numerous conceptions, or models, of democracy have been developed by theorists. Among the key conceptions of democracy that have been put forward by different authors are electoral, majoritarian, deliberative, liberal, egalitarian and participatory conceptions (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 253). These models exhibit the following characteristics and features (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 253-254):

- the electoral conception or model of democracy is based on the idea that democracy is reached through competition between different leadership groups which participate in periodic elections and seek electorate’s support. In this model, elections, electoral institutions and procedures, and political parties that compete for power are the key elements, while other factors that are important for fair and competitive elections (e.g. civil liberties or independent judiciary) are viewed as secondary;

- in the liberal conception of democracy, the following features are crucial: civil liberties, transparency, rule of law, horizontal accountability, that is effective checks on the rulers, minority rights. Liberal conception is negative in its nature since it emphasises the limits placed on the government and procedures which ensure that minority and individual liberties are not infringed upon;

- the majoritarian conception of democracy is based on the idea that the majority is sovereign, and that majority’s opinions and preferences must prevail over those of a minority. Thus, political institutions in such democracies are centralised and power is concentrated. In some respects, this model is opposite to the liberal one: it favours majoritarian electoral systems rather than proportional ones, unitary rather than federal constitutions etc. At the same time, majoritarian model is compatible with human rights, transparency, civil liberties etc;
- the participatory conception of democracy is rooted in the direct, non-representative, model of democracy. This model views direct rule by citizens as preferable to delegating power to representatives wherever and whenever possible. Apart from voting, party primaries, referenda, citizen assemblies, social movements, public hearings and other forms of citizen engagement are of crucial importance in this model;

- the deliberative conception of democracy places emphasis on the process through which decisions are made. Deliberation involves reasoning that is focused on common good rather than parochial interests or emotional appeals. This model requires respectful dialogue among competent participants who are open to discussion and are willing to change their opinion if reasonable arguments are presented. While different consultative bodies, e.g. panels or hearings, are charged with a deliberative function, deliberation must be used at all levels, across all institutions and among citizens;

- the egalitarian conception of democracy strives to achieve equal participation, representation and protection, which means that civil liberties and due process are exercised by everyone, as well as equal resource distribution (income, healthcare, education). The idea behind this model is that resources bring about political empowerment. Thus, without more or less equal distribution of resources, or social equality, real political equality cannot be achieved.

While some conceptions might come into conflict with each other, as is the case with majoritarian and liberal democracy, in many respects these models are complementary (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 254). What is thus important is that the same country can exhibit features of several conceptually distinguishable models of democracy.

1.1.2. Political Culture, Values and Authority Patterns

The study of democracy has been linked to the research on political culture and values. The concept of political culture was introduced by Almond; he first defined this concept as “a particular pattern of orientations to political action” (Almond, 1956, p. 396; Chilton, 1988, p. 419). In 1963, Almond and Verba published a study dedicated to the civic culture and compared it with other types of political culture.
According to Almond and Verba (1989), the three major pure types of political culture are parochial, subject and participant political cultures. Parochial culture is characteristic of societies where there are no specialised political roles, and therefore members of such societies do not expect anything from the political system and do not hold any norms that would regulate their relation to it. The subject political culture presupposes the awareness of the central government and evaluation of it as either legitimate or not. However, the subjects are only oriented towards the outputs of the system and do not see themselves as active participants in it; therefore, the existing relationship between the political system and subjects is very passive. In the participant political culture, members of society are oriented towards both inputs into and outputs of the political system and they have a vision of self as an active participant in the system. The civic culture is essentially a mixed political culture. In the civic culture, participant political orientations are combined with parochial and subject orientations in a balanced manner, and activity and involvement coexist with passivity.

Another strand of literature that deals with the relationship between cultural patterns and democracy is focused on values. Values can be defined through a set of features that they exhibit (Schwartz, 1992, p. 3-4):

- they are beliefs or concepts;
- they are linked to desirable states or behaviours;
- they transcend particular situations, they are general and abstract;
- they serve as a guide for selecting and evaluating events and behaviours;
- they are ordered according to their relative importance.

The content of a value is a specific goal or a motivational concern that is expressed by it. Ten broad values have been identified according to underlying motivations, and these are recognised across cultures (Schwartz, 1992; Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). These ten values include (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003, p. 1208):

- power: social status, control or dominance over other people and resources;
- achievement: personal success through the demonstration of competence in accordance with social standards;
- hedonism: pleasure, sensuous gratification;
- stimulation: novelty, excitement, challenges in life;
- self-direction: independence in thinking and choosing a course of action, creativity, exploration;
- universalism: understanding, tolerance towards and protection of the welfare of all people and nature;
- benevolence: enhancement of the wellbeing of people with whom one is in close and frequent personal contact;
- tradition: acceptance and commitment to customs, traditional culture and religion;
- conformity: refraining from actions that are likely to upset others and violate social norms;

These ten values are related in a circular manner. The circle represents a motivational continuum divided into four areas: openness to change (self-direction and stimulation), self-enhancement (power and achievement), conservation (security, conformity and tradition) and self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence); hedonism shares elements of openness to changes and self-enhancement, but is closer to the former (Schwartz et al., 2014; Vecchione et al., 2015, p. 85). The closer any two values are to each other, the more compatible their motivations are; the more distant any two values are from each other, the more conflicting their motivations are. The ten broad personal values are distinct from core political values (Schwartz et al., 2014). Core political values are more specific in nature, they can be defined as “overarching normative principles and belief assumptions” about government, society, citizenship. They guide position taking in different political environments and situations that would otherwise be confusing. Examples of such values include individualism, a sense of equality, belief in the free enterprise system etc (McCann, 1992, p. 565).

Schwartz et al. (2014) identified eight core political values: traditional morality, blind patriotism, law and order, free enterprise, equality, civil liberties, foreign military intervention, accepting immigrants. According to these authors, more general basic personal values underlie and give coherence to more specific and context related core political values; therefore, basic personal values play a key role in political choice of individuals. What is more, basic personal values have been demonstrated to have a considerable effect on political activism, which in turn is viewed as a central issue in theories of democracy (Vecchione et al., 2015).
Another approach to values has its focus on value change. For example, Inglehart (1977) posited that a shift in values, that is basic priorities or basic world views, of Western publics has been taking place. According to him, value priorities can be divided into two pure groups, with possible mixed types in between: materialist values put emphasis on economic stability and maintaining order; post-materialist values, by contrast, emphasise freedom of speech and political participation. Conditions of exceptional economic security have resulted in lower prioritisation of economic wellbeing and physical security, while the quality of life has become more important, which is reflected in the shift from materialist to post-materialist values.

Based on the cases of Great Britain and Germany, the in-depth study of Norway (Eckstein, 1966) and then on further research, Eckstein introduced the concept of authority patterns. Authority patterns are different processes and structures by which social units are directed and governed, and authority relations are the interactions that form these patterns. Eckstein emphasised that not only states or its geographic subunits are governed and thus exhibit some authority patterns. Other units of society, including families, voluntary associations, schools, churches etc, also need to be managed in order to exist and last; therefore, these social units, although smaller and less complex than states, also require some governance structures and processes. Elements of authority patterns are the same in all social units. For example, all social units exhibit certain levels of directiveness, which means that activities in social units take place because of directives, rather than free will of their members (Eckstein, 1998, p. 5-6).

In conclusion, this section briefly introduced the concepts of democracy and its models as well as political culture, values and authority patterns, which form the broad basis for this research. The next section looks in more detail at how democracy, on the one hand, and values and political culture, on the other hand, are related. It starts with a broader discussion on the role of values in democratisation and then looks into the role of values, authority patterns and political culture in democratic performance and stability.

1.2. Connections between Values, Culture, Authority Patterns and Democracy
1.2.1. The Role of Values in the Emergence and Consolidation of Democracy
The concept of values has become central to the strand of literature that views cultural change as a source of institutional changes, in particular the emergence and consolidation
of democratic institutions. According to Inglehart (1977), along with the value change, that is the shift from materialist to post-materialist values, there has been a shift in the distribution of political skills. Particularly, ordinary people, in contrast to a narrow group of elites, have become interested in and capable of understanding national and international politics. The two reinforcing processes of the value change and spread of political skills have taken place at an individual level; however, they have had important system-level consequences, for instance in terms of changing salience of different political issues or relative decline of class conflict. Thus, individual value changes are aggregated and translated into broader societal changes at a system, or national, level.

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) further explored the relationship and causal links between economic development, values and democracy. They introduced a revised version of modernisation theory which is primarily interpreted in terms of human development, the core of which is the expansion of human autonomy and choice. Inglehart and Welzel substantiated their theory by conducting an extensive quantitative research using data from several World Values Survey and European Values Survey waves and different measures of democracy, including the Freedom House civil and political rights scores.

According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005), socioeconomic modernisation, particularly economic growth, higher levels of education, better access to information, more diversified human interactions, result in an increase in people’s material, social and cognitive resources. In this situation, people do not need to focus on survival any longer and become more autonomous in their choices. These completely new life experiences lead people to prioritise goals that previously were not very important. In cultural terms, this represents a major shift towards self-expression values. In particular, emphases shift from collective discipline to individual liberty, from group conformity to human diversity, from state authority to autonomy of an individual. Self-expression values and prioritisation of autonomy and free choice enter different areas of life and change gender roles, sexual norms, family values, political participation etc. What is more, self-expression values are humanistic rather than egocentric, which means emphasis on autonomy for everyone, not just oneself.

Next in Inglehart and Welzel’s sequence (2005) is the impact of culture on institutions. While value change occurs at an individual level, the effects of such a change are
manifested at a societal level. The new cultural mindset of people, new mass values bring about growing demands for civil and political liberties and responsive government, that is demands for democratic institutions since these are the institutions that entitle people to and protect their free choices. As the demands for democracy become stronger, it also becomes more difficult, for political elites for example, to resist the introduction of (liberal) democracy. Thus, the spread of self-expression values either results in democratisation or allows for democratic institutions to be sustained in case they already exist.

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) made an argument that causal links flow from the self-expression values, that is culture, to democracy, that is institutions. Thus, their primary conclusion is that democracy can only consolidate and be sustained if there is a cultural basis for it. A well-designed constitution or elite willingness to rule democratically are insufficient for a democracy to survive and thrive in case the support for self-expression values is lacking. While having introduced some new aspects to the theory developed in collaboration with Inglehart (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), Welzel (2013) overall confirmed the sequence in which a change in values results in the introduction of institutions that guarantee freedoms and argued that the desire for democracy as such does not lead to such institutions unless this desire is grounded in the existence of emancipative values.1

In conclusion, it has been argued and demonstrated that the improved conditions of living in the developed countries allow for a shift in people’s world views. Instead of focusing on survival, in new comfortable conditions people start to put emphasis on autonomy, freedom of choice and equal opportunities, which have been labelled as self-expression or emancipative values. The value change takes place at an individual level since people are the ones who start to value and seek new freedoms and rights. As the new values become more and more widespread among the members of a society, individual value changes lead to the growing public demand for and eventual institutionalisation of political and civil rights and other mechanisms to ensure people’s freedom of choice; in other words, individual value changes produce a change at a system level. Therefore, democracy is the result of individual value changes, which are reflected at the institutional

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1 Welzel (2013) argued that the concept of emancipative values is similar to that of self-expression values, but has advantages over the latter in terms of theoretical groundness, operationalisation and measurement quality.
level, or, if democracy has recently been established, its survival depends on whether self-expression values become dominant, since only institutions or elite’s good will are insufficient for a democracy to consolidate and last.

1.2.2. Congruence Theory: Authority Patterns and Governmental Performance

Self-expression values might play a crucial role in the establishment of democracy; however, the relationship between values and political culture on the one hand and democracy on the other can also be seen from a perspective of democratic stability and performance. Congruence theory developed by Eckstein (Eckstein, 1966; Eckstein, 1998) is an example of a theory that deals with stability of institutions, democratic in particular, by utilising the concept of authority patters, which was introduced above.

Eckstein (1998, p. 14-15) posited that what makes the concept of authority patterns useful is the fact that as a variable it is common to both the government and social units, that is it is neither external nor internal to the government, but rather shared by the government and the environments it operates in. Congruence in turn is a variable that describes how the government and other social units are linked. The core hypotheses of Eckstein’s theory can be summarised as follows (Eckstein, 1998, p. 3-4):

- “governments perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of other units of society” (p. 4). The more congruent these patterns are, the better performance the system has. This concerns the performance of any political system, democratic included;
- “democratic governments perform well only if their authority patterns exhibit “balanced disparities” – that is, combinations of democratic and nondemocratic traits” (p. 4). This hypothesis is the extension of the first one, and congruence remains the condition for successful performance of democracies. What is emphasised is that without the display of the specified disparities, the congruence condition cannot be satisfied.

According to Eckstein (1998, p. 10-13), congruence in general terms means that something broadly corresponds to or is in agreement with something else. Within his theory, Eckstein adopts two definitions of congruence:
“congruence exists if the authority patterns of all social units in a society are similar”;
“congruence exists if the authority patterns of a society exhibit a pattern of graduated resemblances.”

While all authority patterns in a society should have something in common, it is unreasonable to expect that they will all be identical. Thus, the second definition of congruence pertains to authority patterns of adjacent social units, that is those units that have a direct and significant impact on government in terms of serving as recruitment and/or socialisation channels into the government (Eckstein, 1998, p. 10-13). The hypothesis that democracies should exhibit balanced disparities is related to the fact that authority patterns of all social units cannot be identical; this results from the fact that some social institutions that are widely experienced by people and are highly consequential for their lives are not purely democratic in their nature (e.g. families). However, not all combinations of disparities are balanced and thus compatible with democracy. Specific combinations of such disparities largely depend on specific circumstances of different societies (p. 21).

In terms of the direction of the link between authority patterns of social units and authority patterns of governments, Eckstein (1998, p. 22-25) posited that adaptation towards increased congruence occurs towards conformity with authority patterns in the social units that are the most resistant to change, which means that less stable units adapt to more stables ones. While early socialisation into specific authority patterns (e.g. in a family, school) might be crucial due to its persistence, Eckstein did not exclude a possibility of adaptation of different social units to governmental authority patterns. Thus, congruence as a link might run in the direction of either smaller social units or the government.

Successful governmental performance, which constitutes an outcome of congruence between authority patterns of governments and authority patterns of other social units, is summarised by Eckstein (1998, p. 13) in the form of four interrelated conditions:

- durability of a polity, which means its persistence over time;
- civil order, which implies the absence of collective use of coercive actions and violence in order to attain public or private goals;
- legitimacy, which refers to the extent to which members of a society consider a regime that exists in it worthy of support;
- decisional efficacy, which means the degree to which governments are able to make policies and carry them out when responding to political challenges and demands.

In terms of an empirical basis for his theory, apart from the fact that Great Britain, as a stable and effective democracy, and German Weimar Republic, as a case of an extremely unstable and ineffective one, seem to confirm congruence theory in broad terms, Eckstein conducted an in-depth study of Norway, which he considered to be one of the oldest and most stable democracies in the world (1998, p. 15-16). According to Eckstein (1998, p. 17-18), an extraordinary degree of congruence exists among all aspects of Norwegian life, from families to trade associations, to the national government. Authority relations of all these units are characterised, for instance, by equality and participation. What is more, different organisations and associations are very common in Norway; almost all of them have constitutions, which are modelled on the democratic structure of the local government. In addition, very high numbers of children and youth participate in such organisations, which means early socialisation into democratic authority patterns. Therefore, Eckstein’s conclusion is that although Norway has numerous social and political cleavages, the homogeneity of authority patterns in this society ensures its stability.

Another basis for Eckstein’s theory is a motivational one and is related to what he termed “role strains.” According to Eckstein, each individual in a society performs a number of different roles related to their profession, family, religious membership as well as political participation (for example voting) etc. These roles consist of norms, which might be different or similar. The more inconsistency there is between the norms of different roles, the more discomfort, or strain, an individual experiences. Congruence of authority patterns means that norms of different roles are similar and, therefore, there is less strain experienced by individuals, which results in better role performance. This also implies easier socialisation into different roles through the reinforcement of similar norms (Eckstein, 1998, p. 18-19).
In conclusion, congruence theory more generally deals with the performance of any government, either democratic or authoritarian. For any government to be successful, its authority patterns should resemble authority patterns of other social units, especially those units that can significantly influence the government. For democracy it means that, on the one hand, all units in a society should have some democratic traits for a democracy to last. On the other hand, since some of the social units cannot be fully democratic due to their nature, the authority patterns of the government should exhibit certain non-democratic characteristics. Thus, the main idea behind congruence theory is that similarity between features of small-scale private entities and features of a large-scale complex system (such as a state) is crucial to the effective performance of the system and its stability over time. Individuals themselves might strive for the establishment of such congruence since it reduces the strain associated with possible diverging norms of different roles and makes navigation between these roles easier. The next chapter demonstrates how the concept of congruence can be applied beyond authority patterns to values and correspondence between them and models of democracy.

1.3. Expectations and Hypotheses: Congruence between Values and Political Institutions

Understanding of congruence as a linking variable, which accounts for similarities between authority patterns characteristic of different social units and those of governments, can be useful for understanding the connections between democratic stability and other concepts that have been put forward to explain it; it can serve as an overarching link. Eckstein (1998, p. 19-20) himself argued that congruence theory can be viewed as a high-order theory and other hypotheses regarding stability of democracy can be explained by it. Among such hypotheses is, for example, the connection between vibrant civil society and a stable democracy. Eckstein posited that while primary social institutions, such as families, are never fully democratic, civil society organisations, if they are governed in a democratic way themselves, serve as channels of socialisation into democratic behaviour.

When arguing that mixed civic culture is particularly suitable for a democratic system to be stable, Almond and Verba (1989) in part relied on Eckstein’s theory. While they recognised that civic culture is not the only democratic political culture (for instance, activist political culture is compatible with democracy), civic culture encompasses certain
contradictory political attitudes similarly to how democratic systems require a combination of contradictions, the balanced disparities, in order to function effectively. In particular, governments must keep balance between their ability to make and implement decisions (power) and their responsiveness to the demands of citizens. For this to occur, citizens should combine an active participant role with passive roles of subject and parochial (Almond and Verba, 1989, p. 337-341). Therefore, congruence, in that both civic culture and democracy display certain contradictions, democratic and non-democratic traits, activism and passivity, is what makes mixed civic culture and democracy especially compatible.

The concept of congruence might also be useful in understanding the underlying logic of the revised modernisation theory and be complementary to it. While the revised theory of modernisation deals with the process of democratisation in a more explicit manner than congruence theory, which deals with it only indirectly (Eckstein, 1998, p. 26-29), it can be argued that growing public demands for democracy represent growing demands for congruence between values held by people and political institutions. Congruence might well account for the fact that self-expression values, which emphasise freedom of choice and autonomy, result in democracy, that is a system of government which guarantees them.

Therefore, the idea that underlies the research question posed in this thesis is that congruence might stretch not just from the smallest social units to the system level, but from individual level to the system level, that is government. Specific values, which are located within individuals, might serve as a basis for the emergence of specific authority patterns, that is relations between two or more people might be governed by principles that are based on certain, most probably shared, values. For example, a relationship between parents and children in a family, where freedom of choice is respected, might be very different from a relationship in a family, where the leader of the family makes all decisions. In line with congruence theory, such values should be reflected in the authority patterns at different levels of society in order to reduce role strain and bring about stability and successful performance of political institutions. This relationship might be expected not only in connection with self-expression values and democratisation in broad terms; this relationship might encompass different subsets of values and different democratic arrangements, which might emphasise not only features related to elections or decision-
making processes, but also principles that are connected to economic and political equality. These different arrangements can be seen as various models of democracy.

For example, as was mentioned above, Eckstein (1998, p. 17) argued that authority relations of different social units in Norwegian society are characterised by equality and participation. These particular characteristics might be the result of such values, based on Schwartz’s typology, as benevolence (if they concern small social units where everyone knows and is closely linked to each other) and/or universalism (if they concern big social units where there is no personal interaction between all members). These values, through different levels of social units, might be connected to the system level in the form of specific democratic arrangements, which emphasise equality and participation. This is reflected in a model or models of democracy that are particularly well pronounced in a country, in this case Norway.

A link between congruence of societal values and political institutions on the one hand and democratic stability on the other might also be explored through the concepts of political efficacy and political trust, which have been viewed as important assets in democracies since they contribute positively to democratic process and citizen involvement (Lambert, Curtis, Brown & Kay, 1986). Political efficacy consists of internal efficacy, that is “beliefs about one’s own ability to influence the political process,” and external efficacy, that is “beliefs about the responsiveness of government officials to the concerns of the citizenry” (Anderson, 2010, p. 63). Political trust, which is distinct from trust in other people, is trust or confidence in government (Anderson, 2010, p. 65). It could be argued that the more congruence exists between individual values and principles by which society is governed the higher political efficacy and political trust will be due to the very similarity of these values and principles, which will eliminate role strain and make the functioning of the government easier to understand and accept.

Therefore, it is plausible to argue that for a democracy to be stable and perform well there should be congruence between individual values and the principles on which society’s political institutions are based. This means that there should be similarity or correspondence between certain features emphasised by democratic arrangements in each country and values that are widespread in this society. More support to a specific value is expected to go hand in hand with more emphasis on the features that correspond to this
value at the institutional level (authority patterns might serve as an intervening variable in this relationship). Such features at the institutional level can be summarised as different models of democracy.

Since congruence is a linking variable that connects all levels of society by ensuring similarity in how they operate, an important question is that of the direction of congruence, that is what levels influence other levels and what levels adapt to this influence. The revised modernisation theory, which, as was explained above, can be understood from a congruence theory perspective, emphasises the impact of values on democracy, while values themselves are considered to be only modestly influenced by society’s previous levels of democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 10). In a similar vein, Welzel, Inglehart, Alexander and Ponarin (2012) argued that a substantial link exists between support for emancipative values and the introduction and consolidation of human rights, and that the direction of this relationship goes primarily from values to rights, although rights also influence values, however, to a lower degree, and overall values and human rights reinforce each other. Congruence theory itself is more explicitly two-directional since, according to Eckstein (1998, p. 22-25), the relationship can go from social units to government and vice versa. This thesis recognises the fact that the possible reverse impact of institutions on culture should not be neglected. Therefore, it does not presuppose causality in the relationship between values and models of democracy, that is that one leads to the other, but only assumes that certain values and certain models of democracy coexist, or are likely to coexist.

Since this research aims to move beyond self-expression values and democratisation and taking into account the available data, the focus of this thesis is on two types of values identified by Schwartz and other authors, who have worked with him: self-direction and universalism. Taking into account what these values mean and what main features different models of democracy emphasise, this research focuses on three hypotheses:

H1. Societies that emphasise self-direction score high on liberal democracy.

H2. Societies that emphasise universalism score high on liberal democracy.

H3. Societies that emphasise universalism score high on egalitarian democracy.
Self-direction, which places emphasis on independence, seems to be relevant to protection of individual rights and liberties, which is one of the key features of liberal democracy. Universalism, which presupposes tolerance towards others and protection of their welfare, might be relevant, on the one hand, to egalitarian democracy in terms of aspirations for more equality in a society and, on the other hand, to liberal democracy in terms of protection of minority rights. Apart from seeing whether the connection between universalism and liberal and/or egalitarian democracy exists, it might be illuminating to see whether this value contributes more to one of the models than the other. What is more, it should be noted that societies might value highly different things, and Schwartz’s circular model of values allows for compatibility between those values that are located close to each other on the circle. In addition, as was mentioned above, most of the models of democracy are compatible and the same country might have high scores in several democratic models. Therefore, the three hypotheses are not exclusive, but might be complementary.

In conclusion, this chapter explored the main concepts employed in this thesis and widened the use of congruence theory to account for the necessary correspondence between individual values and different models of democracy in order to ensure successful democratic performance and stability. It is expected that values that are widespread in a society should be reflected in a model or models of democracy under which this society operates, or, alternatively, these models should be reflected in societal values, depending on the direction of congruence. Without specifying the direction of the relationship, the aim of this thesis is to test whether congruence between values and models of democracy takes place.
2. Research Design

This thesis aims to explore the relationship between different types of values and different models of democracy and, in particular, see whether congruence occurs between these two variables. Thus, it adopts a large-N research design, based on the cases described below, which is suitable for uncovering whether an association between variables exists. This chapter deals with the operationalisation of the key concepts, data sources, case selection and statistical methods used to answer the research question and test suggested hypotheses.

2.1. Data and Measurement

2.1.1. Data Sources and Case Selection

The selection of cases for this research was, on the one hand, limited by the data available in the employed datasets. On the other hand, the research aim and research question placed a limitation on the case selection in terms of the regime types or systems of governance. A case in the context of this research is thus a democratic country in a particular year (country-year format of the data), for which data on both variables, values and models of democracy, are available.

The two big projects that provided data for this research are V-Dem (models of democracy) and WVS\(^2\) (values). The V-Dem project’s aim is to offer a new approach to measuring democracy, which reflects the complexity of this concept by distinguishing between and collecting data to measure seven high-level principles of democracy: electoral, liberal, deliberative, participatory, egalitarian, majoritarian and consensual.\(^3\)

The headquarters of the project are based at the V-Dem Institute, the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, which is located in Sweden (“About V-Dem,” n.d.). The V-Dem team consists of more than 50 social scientists from across the globe and works with over 3,000 country experts. The last released V-Dem dataset (version 8) covers 201 countries from year 1789 to 2017 (“V-Dem: Global Standards, Local Knowledge,” n.d.).

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\(^2\) A similar undertaking in terms of studying values within Europe has been the European Social Survey. For the purposes of this research one dataset, WVS, was used to ensure uniformity of questions and scales and, therefore, uniformity of the resulting operationalisations of the concept of values. In addition, using the WVS allows to include a wider range of countries from different parts of the world.

\(^3\) The last two principles, majoritarian and consensual are not available at the moment.
Overall, the V-Dem dataset includes around 450 specific indicators. These indicators pertain to different areas (e.g. elections, political parties etc.) and are mostly coded by either V-Dem team members and/or Country Coordinators (in case of the factual indicators) or Country Experts (in case data require a greater degree of judgement; Country Experts also indicate their confidence for some other indicators). Country Experts are academics or professionals working in a specific field; usually, and ideally, 5 or more experts code each variable. The numerous indicators and variables are in turn used to create composite variables, the highest level of which is democracy indices; currently five democracy indices are included in the dataset: electoral, liberal, participatory, egalitarian and deliberative (Coppedge et al, 2017; Coppedge et al, 2018a; Coppedge et al, 2018c). To perform all the necessary operations for carrying out the intended research, data from the original V-Dem dataset, version 8 (newest), were used (Coppedge et al., 2018b). This dataset was transformed to include only the countries and variables necessary for this research (4 democracy indices), and later calculated value scores were added to it to create a new dataset for performing statistical analysis.

The WVS is also global in its scope; it unites social scientists who are studying the impact of changing values on political and social life. The WVS Association and its Secretariat are headquartered in Vienna, Austria. The WVS started in 1981 and since then nationally representative surveys, based on common questionnaires and dedicated to human beliefs and values, have been conducted in almost 100 countries containing almost 90 percent of the world’s population (“Who We Are,” n.d.). WVS takes place in waves, and so far, six waves have taken place: in 1981-1984, 1990-1994, 1999-2004, 1995-1998, 2005-2009, 2010-2014 (WVS 7 is currently underway). Over the year, the WVS questionnaires have included a wide range of questions related to cultural values, attitudes and beliefs of people towards different topics and aspects of life. Some of the questions have changed, while the others have been used in all surveys (“Questionnaire Development,” n.d.). After having identified the wave to be used in the research, the main work in preparing the value scores was done by using the file that summarises the results of the wave, which will be referred to as the results file in what follows (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015). This file contains percentages of people who chose specific answers to all questions across all countries included in the wave.
The V-Dem dataset offers very clear-cut indices that are used to measure different models of democracy based on characteristic features of these models.\(^4\) VWS includes a wide range of questions concerning people’s attitudes and beliefs; however, the connection between them is less straightforward and these questions had to be examined to identify those that could be used to operationalise the concept of values. What is more, the V-Dem overall includes more countries than WVS. In addition, while some countries have been included in all WVS waves, some countries vary from one wave to another. Therefore, the WVS was explored first to see what were the possibilities for operationalisation of the value concept and what countries data are available for.

The fifth and sixth waves of the WVS (“World Values Survey (2005-2009)”, (2015); “World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015) included questions based on the typology developed by Schwartz, which is used in the hypotheses to be tested in this research. The fifth wave included 10 questions, while one more question, which seems particularly relevant to this research, was added in the sixth wave. Therefore, the selection of the countries to be included in the testing of hypotheses was based on the WVS 6 (2010-2014). Overall this wave included 60 countries.

The next step in selecting cases for this research was to choose those countries out of the 60 that satisfy a certain requirement, or meet a threshold, to be called democratic, since this research deals with models of democracy. This requirement is based on countries’ scores on the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI), which is measured in V-Dem.

The EDI captures Dahl’s concept of polyarchy and is thus measured using the following lower-level indices: elected executive index, clean elections index, freedom of expression index, freedom of association index, suffrage indicator, each of which in turn consists of several indicators. The EDI serves as a foundation for other democracy indices since, according to the V-Dem conceptual scheme, a regime cannot be considered democratic without elections (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning & Teorell, 2016; Coppedge et al, 2018a). The EDI from the V-Dem dataset was thus chosen as a threshold, on the one

\(^4\) It should be noted that authors, who have been working on the V-Dem project, have conducted both extensive theoretical work on the topic of models of democracy and empirical work. This is reflected in the fact that works by the same authors are used in this research for developing the theoretical framework as well as in the empirical part, which makes operationalisation of the concept of models of democracy rather unproblematic.
hand, due to elections being viewed as fundamental to the existence of a democratic regime and, on the other hand, to ensure consistency in how different models of democracy are conceptualised and measured.

The EDI runs from 0 to 1 (Lührmann et al, 2017). For example, in 2016 Armenia scored, approximately, 0.393 on the EDI, while Belgium’s score was 0.858 (Coppedge et al, 2018b). Initially, the range from 0 to 1 was divided into three parts that correspond to high (from 0.67 to 1), average (from 0.33 to 0.67) and low (from 0 to 0.33) EDI, and the idea was to select out of the 60 countries from the WVS 6 those that have high EDI scores in the survey year. In addition, to ensure that there has been continuity in a country’s scoring high on the EDI, as opposed to a one-time high score, scores for three consecutive years before and three consecutive years after the WVS 6 was conducted in each country were also checked. After checking the 60 countries against this requirement, it was decided to lower the EDI threshold to 0.55, which implies that a country is closer to a democratic regime in terms of elections, due to several reasons.

Firstly, this selection included a lot of established democracies; thus, it seemed plausible that they might have rather high, and similar, scores in both egalitarian and liberal democracy. Lowering the threshold allowed to include more recent democracies (in particular, based on their EDI scores, Colombia, Ecuador, Georgia), which, supposedly, had lower scores in different models of democracy. Thus, this allowed to increase variation on this variable, as well as value variable, which is important for applying statistical methods in order to check relationships between variables for correlations. Secondly, inclusion of new democracies is interesting from a theoretical point of view in terms of checking whether congruence theory can be applied to them alongside established democracies. If congruence between values and models of democracy as such proves to be taking place and be an important characteristic of established, and therefore stable, democracies, it could potentially be used in the research on new democracies as a predictor of their stability and success. This research, however, is concentrated on congruence in general and includes both established and new democracies in one dataset to increase variation on variables.

The final sample includes a variety of countries from different continents. Although the threshold was lowered, in most cases countries have scores higher than 0.6 during the 7-
year period, including in the year when surveys were conducted. The one noticeable exception to the 0.55 rule is Columbia, which had a score of 0.536 three years before the survey. However, after that this country has been demonstrating scores that meet and exceed the threshold; therefore, it was kept in the final sample. Table 1 shows the EDI scores of the selected countries in year when the WVS 6 in these countries was conducted as well as scores for three consecutive years before and three consecutive years after the survey year.

Table 1. Selected countries’ Electoral Democracy Index scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EDI/3 years before</th>
<th>EDI/2 years before</th>
<th>EDI/1 year before</th>
<th>EDI/survey year</th>
<th>EDI/1 year after</th>
<th>EDI/2 years after</th>
<th>EDI/3 years after</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td>0.791</td>
<td><strong>0.779</strong></td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>0.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>0.905</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td><strong>0.911</strong></td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>0.877</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td><strong>0.865</strong></td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>0.779</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td><strong>0.886</strong></td>
<td>0.906</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.866</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td><strong>0.647</strong></td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td>0.641</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.847</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td><strong>0.856</strong></td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>0.847</td>
<td>0.838</td>
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<td>0.903</td>
<td>0.902</td>
<td><strong>0.897</strong></td>
<td>0.879</td>
<td>0.865</td>
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<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td><strong>0.663</strong></td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td>0.641</td>
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<td>0.862</td>
<td><strong>0.863</strong></td>
<td>0.885</td>
<td>0.839</td>
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<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.898</td>
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<td>0.774</td>
<td><strong>0.759</strong></td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td><strong>0.679</strong></td>
<td>0.660</td>
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<td>0.660</td>
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<td>0.885</td>
<td><strong>0.888</strong></td>
<td>0.865</td>
<td>0.867</td>
<td>0.864</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>0.886</td>
<td><strong>0.887</strong></td>
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<td>0.776</td>
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<td>0.889</td>
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<td>0.925</td>
<td>0.913</td>
<td>0.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>0.745</td>
<td>0.745</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>0.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.790</td>
<td>0.776</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>0.775</td>
<td>0.775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.916</td>
<td>0.919</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td>0.909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.903</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.904</td>
<td>0.924</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>0.923</td>
<td>0.920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.797</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>0.734</td>
<td>0.729</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: prepared by the author by selecting relevant scores form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b)

In conclusion, the empirical part of this research and preparation of the dataset to be used to test hypotheses formulated based on the theoretical framework started with exploring the WVS data to identify questions that could be used to operationalise the value concept. The WVS 6, which included questions based on Schwartz’s typology, was chosen to be used in the analysis and as a basis for further case selection. In the next stage, out of the 60 countries that participated in the WVS 6, 28 countries with EDI scores above 0.55 were selected. To ensure that those countries that are included in the dataset have experienced some democratic stability, countries’ EDI scores were checked for seven years, with the survey year being in the middle of this period. Such an approach allowed to include in the analysis a variety of countries from different continents, and not just established democracies, but also new ones. This is expected to provide enough variation on the variables for conducting correlation analysis and give some preliminary insights into whether there might be differences in how congruence works in new and established democracies.

2.1.2. Operationalisation of Models of Democracy

As was previously mentioned, the V-Dem dataset currently provides scores in five models of democracy: electoral, discussed in the previous subsection, liberal, egalitarian,
participatory and deliberative. The highest level of aggregation of different indicators is the five democracy indices, which represent high-level, or “full” democracy, indices or thick versions of different democracy models. The EDI stands as such an index on its own and also serves as a basis for other indices due to the importance of elections for democracy (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning & Teorell, 2016; Coppedge et al, 2018a). Since the hypotheses developed within this research deal with liberal and egalitarian models of democracy, only these two indices are discussed in what follows. These indices consist of the following components (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning & Teorell, 2016; Coppedge et al, 2018a):

- Liberal Democracy Index (LDI): EDI and Liberal Component Index (LCI);
- Egalitarian Democracy Index (EgDI): EDI and Egalitarian Component Index (EgCI).

Respective component indices represent thin versions of different democracy models and include the main attributes of a particular model, which minimises their overlap with other principles (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning & Teorell, 2016, p. 581). Component indices of the selected models are based on the following indices and/or indicators (Coppedge et al, 2018a; Lührmann et al, 2017):

- LCI: equality before the law and individual liberties (in turn this includes, for example, transparent laws with predictable enforcement, freedom from torture, freedom of religion, freedom of foreign movement etc), judicial constraints on the executive (executive respects constitution, high court independence, lower court independence etc), legislative constraints on the executive (legislature questions officials in practice, executive oversight etc);
- EgCI: equal protection index (social class equality in respect for civil liberties, social group equality in respect for civil liberties, weaker civil liberties population), equal access index (power distributed by gender, power distributed by socioeconomic position, power distributed by social group), equal distribution of resources (educational equality, health equality etc);

Since V-Dem dataset distinguishes between high-level democracy indices and component indices, the main question regarding the operationalisation of the models of democracy is
whether to use one or the other to measure these models. The use of the component indices seems more appropriate due to a number of reasons.

Firstly, the EDI is used to select countries for this research in order to ensure that they are democratic or closer to a democratic type of regime. The selected countries already have high or relatively high (higher than 0.55 and higher than 0.6 for the survey year) scores on the EDI and the main focus of the research is on the features of democracy, which are added on top of the electoral democracy, that is features which allow to distinguish between different democratic models.

Secondly, in theory, a country can score high on a component index, but have a low score on the EDI, which means this country would not score very high on the full democracy index, and overall the highest level of realisation of a certain model of democracy can only be achieved if a country has high scores in both electoral democracy and specific component pertaining to this model (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning and Teorell (2016); Lührmann et al, 2017). Therefore, since the countries included in this research already have high or relatively high EDI scores, using high-level democracy indices, which include EDI scores within themselves, might be tautological and redundant for the purposes of this research. Using narrower component indices, untainted by the EDI, is expected to have a stronger association with different values. However, it should be acknowledged that EDI scores of various countries differ, sometimes to a large extent, which means that the use of the full indices might allow to account for these differences in electoral democracy scores. Therefore, to test the assumption about better correlations of values with component indices, the relationship between high-level indices and values will be tested as well.

In conclusion, the V-Dem dataset provides very straightforward indices to measure different models of democracy. In line with the specified hypotheses, two models are dealt within this research: liberal and egalitarian. The two models of democracy are operationalised by using component democracy indices, which seems to be preferable, as well as full democracy indices, which correspond to these models. Therefore, for each hypothesis, two models were tested: correlation between a component index and a respective value and correlation between a full democracy index and a value. The indices, component and full ones, as well as the EDI, are measured in interval scale and run from
0 (total absence of a democracy model or component) to 1 (full presence) (Coppedge et al, 2018a; Lührmann et al, 2017).

2.1.3. Operationalisation of Values
To operationalise and measure the value variable the data from the WVS 6 are used. As was mentioned before, initially different WVS waves were screened to identify the questions to operationalise values. While both the fifth and sixth waves of the WVS included questions based on Schwartz’s typology of values, the WVS 6 included an additional one that is relevant to this research.

In line with the aim of moving from the relationship between self-expression values and overall democratisation, the two values from Schwartz’s typology that are dealt with in this research are self-direction and universalism. The WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015, p. 139-170) includes 11 questions labelled as “Schwartz,” and these questions are presented in a uniform manner: “Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you?” This formula is followed by a specific statement that is supposed to grasp a certain value. Another choice was “a little like me,” and apart from these six options, “inappropriate,” “no answer,” or “don’t know” could be coded as well.

Out of the 11 questions, the statement “It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s own way” (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015, p. 139) clearly represents self-direction, which puts emphasis on independence of thinking and action. The statement “Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature and save life resources” (p. 165) represents part of the definition of universalism, which deals with both protection of nature and protection of people’s welfare. However, this part of the definition of universalism is not used in this research since it seems to be less relevant for the definition of different models of democracy.

The statement used in the operationalisation of universalism reads as follows: “It is important to this person to do something for the good of society” (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015, p. 151). The way in which the questions are ordered implies that this statement might be used to represent benevolence together with the statement “It is important to help people living nearby; to care for their needs” (p. 154). However, two
factors influenced the choice of this question to operationalise universalism. First of all, benevolence and universalism are part of the same group of values, self-transcendence, and they are located next to each other on the motivational circle of values, which means they are highly compatible in terms of their motivation. What is more, benevolence is directed towards people a person is in close contact with, while the statement refers to the society, a group much broader than close people, which is a feature of universalism that focuses on the welfare of all people.

Overall, the typology developed by Schwartz is useful because it allows broad generalisations and comparisons and offers the most basic distinction between different groups of values. However, this also implies that this typology is very general and value categories are very broad and encompass many distinct attitudes. This is, for example, the case with universalism, which is related to both people and nature. Due to such a broad scope, universalism seems relevant to both liberal and egalitarian democracy. Therefore, while keeping the main hypotheses of this research in the format presented above, three additional questions (one question per hypotheses) that are less abstract and narrower in their scope, to different degrees, but represent important features of universalism and self-direction, were chosen to test whether there might be correlations between these attitudes and models of democracy. This allowed to include in the analysis attitudes that are more directly linked to different characteristics of the models of democracy and make a clearer distinction between attitudes that can contribute to them.

The question chosen to complement the self-direction hypothesis is the following: “Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”: Civil rights protect people from state oppression” (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015, p. 310). Protection of civil rights seems to be related to the emphasis on independence and it constitutes an important characteristic of a liberal model.

The question used to complement the hypothesis on the relationship between universalism and liberal democracy reads as follows: “Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be
especially important?: Tolerance and respect for other people” (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015, p. 25). This quality was either mentioned or not mentioned by a respondent, who was presented with a list of qualities and had to choose several of them. Universalism presupposes tolerance towards all people, which might be the basis for protection of rights of minority groups and equality before the law of all people, which are important features of liberal democracy.

The complementary question to the hypothesis on the relationship between universalism and egalitarian democracy is: “Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. “Incomes should be made more equal” vs. “We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort” (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015, p. 203). This question pertains to universalism in that it deals with the welfare of people in terms of income, and equal distribution of resources is an important characteristic of egalitarian democracy. For the purposes of conciseness, the values and attitudes measured by the three complementary questions are referred to as civil rights, tolerance and income equality.

To measure how much emphasis different societies put on different values, that is how much support there is for a certain value or attitude in a society, net support scores for each value were calculated: from the percentage of people who support a value the percentage of people who are opposed to it was deducted. In comparison to only calculating the percentages of people who support certain values, this approach seems to offer certain advantages. In particular, rather high support levels might be accompanied by almost as high levels of opposition to a certain value. Net scores show the difference between these diverging views, and thus demonstrate how much more support than opposition to a value there is in a society, which might be more important for the actual realisation of the value at the institutional level than just support. In addition, middle answers, which might approximately mean the same as “I don’t know,” were not included in score calculations. These answers are rather neutral and demonstrate the absence of a strong opinion on a specific value, while the idea is to measure real support for values. People who choose such answers might be less concerned about the institutionalisation
of certain values or, alternatively, might be influenced by values embodied in the institutions to a lesser degree. The exception to this calculation logic is the question about tolerance towards other people. Respondents had to choose several qualities children should be taught out of a number of options, and a specific quality was either mentioned or not. Those who chose the quality definitely support tolerance, while those who did not might have an ambiguous attitude towards it, but not necessarily negative. Therefore, the resulting net support score shows the prevalence of those who support tolerance over both those who do not support it at all and those who do not have a strong opinion on this value.

To calculate the net support scores for universalism and self-direction, percentages of people who answered “very much like me” and “like me” were added up, and from this number percentages of people who answered “not like me” and “not at all like me” were deducted. The two middle categories “somewhat like me” and “a little like me” were omitted in line with the logic presented above; in addition, these two options are formulated in a vague manner and seem rather close to each other, which makes a choice between them difficult. The results file does not include data on Spain for universalism variable, and almost 50% of responses from Germany were coded as “no answer”; therefore, these two countries are not included in the analysis of the relationship between universalism and models of democracy.

For calculating the net support scores for civil rights, percentages of people who answered 8, 9 and 10 (on a scale from 1 to 10, where 10 means civil rights are an essential characteristic of democracy) were added up, and from this number percentages of people who answered 1, 2 and 3 were deducted. The net support scores for tolerance were calculated by deducing the percentage of people who did not mention this quality from the percentage of respondents who mentioned it. The net support scores for income equality were calculated by adding up percentages of people who chose 1, 2 and 3 (on a scale where 1 means complete agreement with making incomes more equal), and from this sum percentages of people who chose 8, 9 and 10 were deducted (10 means complete support for the larger income differences). Since democracy indices run from 0 to 1, the obtained net support scores in percentages were divided by 100% to use the uniform scale for both variables. In the rest of the text, these rescaled variables continue to be referred
to as net support scores. Table 2 (p. 39) summarises the questions used in the operationalisation of values and methods of calculation of the net support scores.

**Table 2. Operationalisation of values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Statement in the question</th>
<th>Net support score, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s own way</td>
<td>(“very much like me” + “like me”) – (“not like me” + “not at all like me”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights protect people from state oppression (civil rights)</td>
<td>(8 + 9 + 10) – (1 + 2 + 3); scale from 1 to 10, where 10 means essential characteristic of democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>It is important to this person to do something for the good of society</td>
<td>(“very much like me” + “like me”) – (“not like me” + “not at all like me”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance and respect for other people (tolerance)</td>
<td>“mentioned” – “not mentioned”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Incomes should be made more equal” vs. “We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort” (income equality)</td>
<td>(1 + 2 + 3) – (8 + 9 + 10); scale from 1 (completely agree with “Incomes should be made more equal”) to 10 (completely agree with the opposite statement)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the results file from WVS 6 (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015)*

In conclusion, universalism and self-direction are operationalised in two ways. First of all, the questions based on Schwartz’s typology of values available in the WVS 6 are used. This operationalisation is very abstract, in line with Schwartz’s definition of values. Furthermore, three additional questions which are, to varying degrees, more specific, but are related to the overall abstract values are used. The more specific values and attitudes might be more closely correlated with models of democracy since the connections between them and the characteristics of these models are more direct and easier to establish, while abstract values allow for different interpretations since they encompass
many different features. For all values, net support scores were calculated to measure how much more support for a specific value there is in a society in comparison to the opposition to this value, and these net scores were rescaled to run from 0 to 1 to match the democracy indices.

2.2. Methods: Measuring Correlation

As was explained in the chapter on the theoretical framework for this research, due to the fact that institutions might have an impact on values as well, this exploratory study does not seek to establish causality in the relationship between values and models of democracy, but rather looks at whether there is association, or correlation, between these two variables. In line with congruence theory, the expectation is that the more support there is in a society for a specific value, the more pronounced a related model of democracy is at the institutional level; at the same time, a lack of support for a value is accompanied by an absence or only minor realisation of it at the institutional level. In other words, the expected relationship is positive: the higher the net support score for a specific value is, the higher should be the respective democracy index score of a particular country.

Since both variables are continuous, that is they can take any value between 0 and 1, Pearson’s correlation (r) is used to measure an association between them. Pearson’s correlation produces a coefficient that shows the strength of an association between variables and its direction. This coefficient can take values from +1 (perfect positive relationship) to -1 (perfect negative relationship), with 0 meaning there is no relationship between variables. The interpretation of the strength of correlation coefficients might differ. In this research, the following scheme is adopted: 0.00 - 0.19 – very weak; 0.20 - 0.39 – weak; 0.40 - 0.59 – moderate; 0.60 - 0.79 – strong; 0.80 - 1.0 – very strong. The hypotheses suggested in this research will be confirmed if the coefficients show that the relationship between values and models of democracy is strong and positive, which will mean that congruence between values and institutions indeed occurs to a large extent across all, or almost all, cases.

In addition to presenting Pearson’s correlation coefficients, descriptive statistics on how countries perform on different indices and measures are provided in the next chapter. This allows to take a closer look at potential outliers and provides some insights into the
differences between established and more recent democracies. However, it should be mentioned that this is done only briefly since this research is mostly interested in the overall relationship between values and models of democracy and does not intend to go deeper into the exploration of single cases.

In terms of the software used, firstly, all the necessary indices and measures were gathered in one Excel file, where simple calculations (like additions and deductions for value scores) were carried out in order to finalise the dataset. This dataset was then imported into Stata statistical software, where all the graphs and correlation coefficients were produced.

2.3. Limitations of Research Design
Some of the limitations related to the outlined research design have been addressed in the sections above. However, since these limitations might influence the results of hypothesis testing, they are spelled out in a concise manner in this section. Three factors are particularly important in this regard.

First of all, the available data has put limitations on the case selection. The WVS includes a limited number of countries per wave; therefore, not all democratic countries in the world are included in the dataset compiled for the purposes of this research. The European Social Survey could provide data for additional democratic countries from Europe, which would widen the sample; however, the two surveys measure the value variable in different ways, which makes combining the two a complicated process.

Secondly, while inclusion of both established democracies and new democracies, which might have lower scores on the EDI, allows to increase variation on variables, it might also lead to weaker correlations between them. While this could be a topic for a separate research, a certain period of time might be required for congruence to occur. Thus, theoretically, new democracies might show lower levels of congruence, which will influence the overall relationship between the variables. The question of differences in value and democracy scores between established and new democracies will be addressed, at least partly, in the section on descriptive statistics, when countries’ scores on different indices are presented.
Thirdly, operationalisation of the value concept might place certain limitations on hypothesis testing. The main conceptual scheme used in this research, Schwartz’s typology, has both advantages and disadvantages to its utilisation, which was addressed in the section on the operationalisation of values. While certain perceived disadvantages might be mitigated by employing additional questions to test hypotheses, other operationalisations of value variables are possible, for example combination of different questions into indices, which could be done at different levels of abstraction or with more reliance on finding questions that are directly related to features of different models of democracy.

It should also be pointed out that although in the analytical part of this research specific countries are referred to as examples of certain patterns and some differences between established and new democracies are discussed, this discussion could be (and should be) developed further in future research on the topic. This research touches upon these themes only briefly.

In conclusion, this chapter presented the data sources used to operationalise values and models of democracy, explained the logic behind the measurement of these concepts and elaborated on the case selection process, which resulted in producing a dataset consisting of all the indices necessary for carrying out the intended research. The next chapter presents the results of testing the suggested hypotheses by applying Pearson’s correlation to the cases in this dataset.
3. Data Analysis and Results: Relationship between Values and Models of Democracy

This chapter presents the results of the data analysis conducted in accordance with the research design laid out in the previous chapter. Firstly, this chapter provides descriptive statistics on how countries included in the dataset perform on different indices used in this research and briefly looks into how the scores of new and established democracies differ. Secondly, it discusses the results of testing the suggested hypotheses and identifies some of the countries that stand out as outliers, that is countries that demonstrate significant deviation from the overall pattern of the relationship between variables. Thirdly, it summarises the results of hypothesis testing in order to answer the research question and provides possible explanations for the received outcomes.

3.1. Descriptive Statistics: Countries’ Scores on the Selected Indices

3.1.1. Democracy Indices

This research deals with two models of democracy: liberal and egalitarian. As was mentioned in the chapter on research design, both full democracy indices and component indices are used in testing hypotheses. Figure 1 (p. 44) shows countries' scores on the LCI and Figure 2 (p. 45) – countries' scores on the EgCI (p. 40).\(^5\)

The scores on the LCI range from 0.419 to 0.973 and on the EgCI from 0.455 to 0.969. Apart from Ecuador’s LCI score (0.419), Figure 1 and Figure 2 demonstrate that there is more variation on the EgCI, and that scores are in general higher on the LCI, which might suggest that liberal democracy characteristics (protection of civil rights and check and balances between different institutions) are seen as more essential to democracy overall than equality in the distribution of resources emphasised by egalitarian model.

Sweden scores the highest on both components. Other countries with high scores in both indices include the Netherlands, Germany and Australia. The USA has a high score on the LCI, while its score on the EgCI is located in the middle of the graph. Post-Soviet Estonian has a very high score on the LCI, and a rather high score on the EgCI. Post-communist Poland is located in the middle of the graphs on both indices. Ecuador and Georgia, which had EDI scores less than 0.6 before the survey year, predictably have the

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\(^5\) For the purposes of creating graphs, the democracy scores were rounded to three decimals to ensure readability.
lowest scores on the LCI (together with Mexico), although Ecuador’s score is significantly lower; at the same time, Argentina’s score on the LCI is close to that of Georgia’s, although Argentina has had more experience with democracy. Mexico, whose EDI score in the survey year is 0.679, also has a low score on the LCI and the lowest score on the EgCI.

Figure 3 (p. 45) demonstrates countries’ scores on the LDI and Figure 4 (p. 46) – countries’ scores on the EgDI. However, since it is expected that component indices might be a better measure of the models of democracy for the purposes of this research, which was explained above, full indices are only discussed briefly. Overall, the LDI and EgDI scores, which are aggregated by combining the EDI scores and respective democracy component scores, are lower than component scores, but the situation differs depending on the country, which suggests that in some cases the EDI influences the full democracy index positively and in some negatively. Sweden again has the highest scores in both cases, with the Netherland, Australia and Germany also being in the top on both. Mexico and Colombia have low scores on both indices, and Ecuador has the lowest score on the LDI.

Figure 1. Liberal Component Index scores
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b), and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)
Figure 2. Egalitarian Component Index scores
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data from the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)
3.1.2. Value Scores

To operationalise values, this research relies on five different questions from the WVS 6. Figure 5 (p. 47) demonstrates countries’ net support scores for self-direction. The scores run from -0.043 to 0.695. The lowest score belongs to Japan, and since it is negative, it means that there is more opposition to self-direction than support. South Korea and Taiwan have very low net support scores for self-direction as well. While these three countries might share certain cultural characteristics, which determine such low scores, the low score of the Netherlands, an established Western democracy, looks surprising. The USA, Germany and Australia also demonstrate low net support scores for self-direction, while Georgia’s score is slightly higher. Estonian’s score is very low, while Poland and Romania exhibit higher net support scores for self-direction. The highest net support scores for self-direction are exhibited by Ghana and Cyprus; these countries are followed by Ecuador, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago and Colombia.

Figure 6 (p. 48) shows countries’ net support scores for universalism. As was mentioned, the scores for Germany and Spain are not available. Like in the case of self-direction, Japan demonstrates the lowest negative score; South Korea’s score is also negative.
Taiwan’s net support score for universalism is rather significantly higher than that of Japan and South Korea. The Netherlands and the USA have low scores, as does Sweden in this case. Out of the six countries with the net support scores for universalism higher than 0.7, four countries score high on self-direction as well: Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Cyprus, Ghana; Georgia and Brazil also have high net support scores for universalism.

Figure 7 (p. 48) shows countries’ net support scores for civil rights. Here, the picture is different. Sweden has the highest score, and Germany and the Netherlands are also closer to the top of the list. Estonia has the second highest score and is followed by Romania and Poland. Japan has a middle low score in this case as opposed to the lowest scores in self-direction and universalism. The lowest and negative score is demonstrated by India, which is followed by Colombia.

Figure 5. Net support scores for self-direction
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (C oppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)
Figure 6. Net support scores for universalism
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)’’)

Figure 7. Net support scores for civil rights
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)’’)
Figure 8 (p. 49) presents countries’ net support scores for tolerance. Two countries have negative scores, South Korea and Argentina. Japan and Germany have rather low scores. The USA has an average score, while Sweden demonstrates the highest net support score for tolerance, and is followed closely by Australia, the Netherlands and Estonia. Colombia has the second highest score. Georgia and Romania exhibit relatively low net support scores for tolerance.

Figure 9 (p. 50) demonstrates countries’ net support scores for income equality. The variation on these scores is the largest, since 12 countries have negative net support scores, implying that there is more opposition to income equality than support in these countries. The USA, Poland, Georgia, Taiwan, Ghana all have negative scores with Trinidad and Tobago exhibiting the lowest support for income equality. Sweden and Australia demonstrate slightly more support than opposition to income equality, while Estonia, Cyprus, Slovenia and Chile have the highest scores.

Figure 8. Net support scores for tolerance
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)
In conclusion, the democracy scores are to a certain degree consistent with the expectation that established democracies should score higher on them. This seems to be demonstrated to a larger extent by the liberal model, where, for example, the USA scores high, while its score in egalitarian democracy is lower. The value scores exhibit some interesting patterns. For example, the Netherlands or Australia do not score high on abstract self-direction and universalism, while their scores on less abstract net support for civil rights and tolerance are higher. Ecuador, in contrast, scores high on abstract values, but its scores on more specific attitudes are low. This might be related to the very broad nature of concepts such as self-direction and universalism, which is why less abstract concepts are included in this analysis. At the same time, a possible explanation for this could lie in the democratic experience itself. The longer the country has been democratic, the more familiar its citizens might be with democracy and thus be better aware of its different characteristics and underlying attitudes that they come to value. The next section will demonstrate whether less abstract attitudes are more strongly correlated with the models of democracy than abstract values.
3.2. Correlations between Values and Models of Democracy

3.2.1. Liberal Democracy and Self-Direction

To test the hypothesis for the relationship between liberal democracy and self-direction (H1. Societies that emphasise self-direction score high on liberal democracy) Pearson’s correlations were run for these combinations of variables and the results are the following:

- net support for self-direction and LCI: the result is not statistically significant (p < 0.0859, Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) = -0.3305);
- net support for self-direction and LDI: the result is not statistically significant (p < 0.1507, r = -0.2788);
- net support for civil rights and LCI: there is a moderate positive correlation between net support for the statement “Civil rights protect people from state oppression” as an essential characteristic of democracy and the Liberal Component Index (p < 0.0034, r = 0.5346*);
- net support for civil rights and LDI: there is a moderate positive correlation between net support for the statement “Civil rights protect people from state oppression” as an essential characteristic of democracy and the Liberal Democracy Index (p < 0.0008, r = 0.5965*).

These results demonstrate that the hypothesis regarding the relationship between liberal democracy and self-direction is not supported if self-direction is defined in very abstract terms like thinking up new ideas and being creative. However, if a more specific attitude related to self-direction is used, then the testing shows that some degree of congruence indeed occurs: in countries where there is more net support for civil rights liberal democracy is more developed.

To complement some of these results, scatter plots were created. Figure 10 (p. 52) shows the relationship between the LCI and net support for self-direction. There is one clear outlier, Ecuador, which is located far away from the best fit line: while it has a rather high score on self-direction, its liberal component score is the lowest. Countries in the upper left corner, like Japan, the Netherlands and Estonia, have high scores on the LCI, but low scores on the net support for self-direction, which contradicts the hypothesis, and the

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6 Conventionally, results are considered to be statistically significant if p < 0.05; statistical significance is indicated by the star (*) next to the Pearson’s correlation coefficient.
cases are rather scattered around the best fit line. Overall, the scatter plot indicates the lack of correlation between variables. Figure 11 (p. 53) shows the relationship between the LDI and self-direction.

Figure 12 (p. 53) presents the relationship between the LCI and net support for civil rights, and Figure 13 (p. 54) demonstrates the relationship between net support for civil rights and the LDI, which proved to be stronger than the relationship between the LCI and net support for civil rights. In Figure 13, Romania and Ecuador might be regarded as outliers; if they are removed from the correlation analysis, the strength of an association between the LDI and net support for civil rights increases: \( r = 0.7000^*, p < 0.0001 \). There is also scatter around the best fit line, which is reflected in the only moderate Pearson’s correlation coefficient, but more cases are located on the best fit line or close to it than on Figure 10 and Figure 11. Therefore, it might be argued that there is some correspondence between the level of societal support for civil rights as an important democratic characteristic and liberal democracy.

Figure 10. Liberal Component Index and self-direction
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”
Figure 11. Liberal Democracy Index and self-direction  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data from the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)  

Figure 12. Liberal Component Index and civil rights  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data from the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)
3.2.2. Liberal Democracy and Universalism

To test the hypothesis for the relationship between liberal democracy and universalism (H2. Societies that emphasise universalism score high on liberal democracy) Pearson’s correlations were run for four combinations of variables. The results are the following:

- net support for universalism and LCI: the result is not statistically significant (p < 0.0841, r = -0.3452);
- net support for universalism and LDI: the result is not statistically significant (p < 0.1167, r = -0.3153);
- net support for tolerance and LCI: the result is not statistically significant (p < 0.0854, r = 0.3309);
- net support for tolerance and LDI: there is a weak / moderate positive correlation between net support for the statement that tolerance and respect for other people is an important quality to teach children and the Liberal Democracy Index (p < 0.0374, r = 0.3953*).

The results demonstrate that the hypothesis regarding the relationship between universalism and liberal democracy is not supported when universalism is defined at a
very abstract level. There is also no statistically significant relationship between support for tolerance towards other people, as one feature of universalism, and liberal component of democracy. However, there is a weak / moderate positive correlation between net support for tolerance and the LDI.

In addition to running correlations, scatter plots were produced to illustrate the results of hypothesis testing. Figure 14 (p. 55) shows the relationship between the LCI and universalism. Ecuador stands out as a clear outlier. Countries that have high LCI, for example Japan, Estonia, the Netherlands, Sweden, demonstrate low or average support for universalism. There are also groups of countries (for example, Australia, Taiwan, Romania) that have different LCI scores, but the same or similar net support scores for universalism, which is reflected in the absence of an association. Figure 15 (p. 56) visualises the relationship between the LDI and universalism.

Figure 14. Liberal Component Index and universalism
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)

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Figure 15. Liberal Democracy Index and universalism
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)"

Figure 16 (p. 57) demonstrates the relationship between the LCI and net support scores for tolerance, and Figure 17 (p. 57) illustrates the relationship between the LDI and net support scores for tolerance. The latter relationship is statistically significant in contrast with the former one, although the strength of an association is only weak / moderate. There is rather a lot of scatter in Figure 17 and Ecuador, as well as Mexico and Colombia to a certain extent, stand out as outliers. If Ecuador is removed from the analysis, the strength of the association slightly increases: $r = 0.4146^*$, $p < 0.0315$. Therefore, congruence between societal support for tolerance and liberal democracy might occur to a minor extent.
Figure 16. Liberal Component Index and tolerance
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”).

Figure 17. Liberal Democracy Index and tolerance
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”).
3.2.3. Egalitarian Democracy and Universalism

For testing the hypothesis for the relationship between egalitarian democracy and universalism (H3. Societies that emphasise universalism score high on egalitarian democracy) Pearson’s correlations were run for the following combinations of variables. The results are as follows:

- net support for universalism and EgCI: there is a moderate negative correlation between net support for universalism defined as doing good for the society and the Egalitarian Component Index (p < 0.0406, r = -0.4042*);
- net support for universalism and EgDI: the result is not statistically significant (p < 0.0642, r = -0.3682);
- net support for income equality and EgCI: the result is not statistically significant (p < 0.2509, r = 0.2244);
- net support for income equality and EgDI: the result is not statistically significant (p < 0.0588, r = 0.3615).

The results demonstrate that the hypothesis regarding the relationship between universalism and egalitarian democracy is not supported. While there is a moderate correlation between universalism defined in abstract terms and egalitarian democracy (Egalitarian Component Index), the association is negative, which means that higher scores on one variable are accompanied by lower scores on the other. When universalism is defined in more specific terms, income equality, the hypothesis is not supported either.

The produced scatter plots visually demonstrate the relationships between the variables. Figure 18 (p. 59) illustrates the relationship between the EgCI and universalism. The values are rather scattered, which is demonstrated by only moderate Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The association is negative, in which countries with high EgCI (for instance Japan, Korea, Estonia, the Netherlands) have rather low scores on universalism. The opposite is true for countries like Georgia and Ghana, and especially Mexico and Columbia. Figure 19 (p. 59) visualises the relationship between the EgDI and universalism.
Figure 18. Egalitarian Component Index and universalism
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)’’)

Figure 19. Egalitarian Democracy Index and universalism
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)’’)

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Figure 20 (p. 60) visualises the relationship between the EgCI and net support for income equality, and Figure 21 (p. 61) demonstrates the relationship between the EgDI and net support for income equality. In both scatter plots, the variables are rather scattered around the best fit line, and Mexico and Colombia stand out as outliers in both. Sweden, which has the highest scores on both the EgCI and the EgDI, has only average support for income equality in comparison to other countries. Poland, which has a rather high EgCI and EgDI, has negative net support score in income equality, along with other countries, whose EgDI and EgCI scores are lower than those of Poland (for example, South Korea, Georgia).

Figure 20. Egalitarian Component Index and income equality
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data from the V-Dem dataset, version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)
3.3. Results of Hypothesis Testing and Possible Explanations

The three main hypotheses that were formulated based on the theoretical framework were tested in four ways each: in combinations of full and component democracy indices with abstract values and more specific attitudes. In eight out of the twelve variations of hypothesis testing the results were not statistically significant. What is more, even when the results were statistically significant, the strength of the association was moderate or weak / moderate and in one case the direction of association was negative, which contradicts the idea of correspondence between societal values and political institutions. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to conclude that congruence between values and models of democracy occurs. Closer look at the locations of different countries on the scatter plots provides more insights into this.

Countries like the Netherlands, the USA and Australia, established and stable democracies, score rather low on self-direction and universalism, while they have high scores in liberal and egalitarian models of democracy, which might suggest that congruence between societal values and political institutions might not be a crucial factor in ensuring democratic stability, at least in some cases, and that other factors might play
a role in this. In contrast to this, Colombia and Ecuador, whose Electoral Democracy Index scores reached the level of 0.6 shortly before the survey year and are among the lowest in the sample, score higher on self-direction and universalism, but their democracy scores are lower, which also suggests a lack of congruence. In the case of these recent democracies this could be explained by the fact that congruence takes more time to occur; however, since on average the established democracies do not demonstrate high congruence between self-direction and universalism on the one hand and respective models of democracy on the other themselves, this proposition seems unlikely.

Another possible explanation for such a difference in scores between some of the established democracies and new ones, which would have to be tested in a separate research, is that high support for the broad values of universalism and self-direction might express aspirations for better quality of democracy (or life in general) in those countries where democracy indices are not very high yet. For example, in those countries where egalitarian democracy is not well developed and therefore the distribution of resources is not equal, citizens might feel like they need to contribute to society more, while in established democracies people may rely on the government to provide social welfare. In addition, cultural differences, including in interpreting the questions, are another important factor that should be taken into account. The most striking example of this is Japan, which has high democracy scores and very low support for self-direction and universalism.

The situation, however, changes when values are operationalised in a less abstract manner and when more specific questions are used to represent some features of universalism and self-direction. The hypotheses that received some support (association between liberal democracy and support for civil rights and liberal democracy and support for tolerance) both demonstrate that the expected association is more likely to exist between a less abstract attitude and a model of democracy. This result confirms the assumption that self-direction and universalism might encompass too many attitudes to be connected to institutional arrangements, which have specific features. By contrast, the attitude that civil rights protect people from state oppression is clearly defined and directly connected to liberal democracy. Tolerance is less abstract than universalism, but it might not be as specific as civil rights, which may partly contribute to the weaker correlation between tolerance and liberal democracy than between liberal democracy and civil rights.
There is no statistically significant relationship between support for income equality and egalitarian democracy, while the connection between egalitarianism and equal income distribution as one of the components of equal resource distribution would appear to be logical. Therefore, the question is whether other forms of ensuring more equal resource distribution, for example high unemployment benefits, might be seen by citizens as more appropriate and legitimate and thus serve as a better way to operationalise an attitude that could be linked to egalitarian democracy (and more specifically to equal resource distribution).

Another important question is about the difference between various models of democracy. While civil rights play a crucial role in liberal democracy, they are related to egalitarian democracy as well, since it strives to ensure equal protection of people’s civil liberties. The EgCI in the V-Dem dataset includes an equal protection index, which is related to civil liberties. Therefore, although this was not part of the original design, Pearson’s correlation was run to check the relationship between net support scores for civil rights and the EgCI and the EgDI. The results demonstrate that there is a strong positive correlation between both net support for civil rights and the EgCI (p < 0.0000, r = 0.7629*) and net support for civil rights and the EgDI (p < 0.0000, r = 0.7480*). This result raises questions about the essential distinctions between different models of democracy in terms of their characteristics and respective values and attitudes that can underlie them.

The fact that more specific attitudes are better correlated with models of democracy also, to some extent, seems to be related to the distinction between established and new democracies. As was mentioned, countries like the Netherlands, the USA and Australia score rather low on self-direction and universalism, while Colombia and Ecuador score high on these values. The situation with these countries’ scores on the net support for civil rights is different: the Netherlands, the USA and Australia have higher scores than Colombia and Ecuador. While a deeper analysis could be done in terms of differences exhibited by established and new democracies to see in what cases what specific variations occur, these several examples might demonstrate that in established democracies, due to the longer democratic experience itself, citizens have undergone socialisation into specific concepts like civil rights and thus understand them better and value them as an important characteristic of democracy, which this is not the case in some
new democracies. If this argument proves to be true upon more detailed research, it could support a hypothesis that congruence might well occur in the direction from institutions to societal values.

Post-communist Estonia, Poland, Slovenia and Romania, which are now members of the EU, exhibit different patterns among themselves. Romania has the lowest scores on the EgDI and the EgCI as well as the LCI and the LDI, while the other three countries have better scores. On universalism and self-direction, Estonia scores rather low, and on the scatter plots it is located close to the Netherlands. Poland and Slovenia have the highest, and similar, scores here among these countries, while Romania is located in between these two countries and Estonia. Estonia, Poland and Romania have very high scores on the net support for civil rights, similar to those of Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. Estonia also scores the highest out of these countries on tolerance; Poland has a high score, while Romania’s score is rather low. The location of these countries on scatter plots gives insights into the extent to which these countries exhibit patterns similar to those of established democracies. Estonian is often located close to the Netherlands, while Romania is often located farther away from other European democracies. An interesting topic to follow up on with regard to these countries would be the development of illiberal democracies in Central Europe, in Poland in particular.

Contrary to the expectation that correlations might be stronger between values and component indices, in the case of two hypotheses related to liberal democracy correlation is stronger between scores in values and full democracy indices, which include electoral democracy scores. Since high scores on full indices depend on both EDI scores and component scores, the correspondence between values and institutional arrangements might depend on the quality of electoral democracy as well, at least in the case of liberal democracy. If it is assumed that the direction of congruence goes from values to institutions, fair elections will serve as a mechanism for choosing representatives who will uphold societal values. If it is assumed that congruence runs in the opposite direction, commitment of the elites to fair and transparent elections might contribute to the formation of respect for civil rights among citizens. What is more, such a result might be related to the fact that countries in the sample vary a lot on their EDI scores; in some cases, like with certain new democracies, it might mean bringing down their full democracy scores in line with their support for more specific attitudes.
In conclusion, the congruence theory in its application to the relationship between values and models of democracy received mixed evidence and insufficient empirical support in this research. When models of democracy are correlated with more specific attitudes rather than abstract values, the results show that congruence occurs to some extent. This is the case with support for tolerance and liberal democracy, support for civil rights and liberal democracy and support for civil rights and egalitarian democracy, with the latter demonstrating the strongest correlation, although this relationship was not initially chosen for testing. At the same time, universalism and egalitarian democracy demonstrate statistically significant relationship, but this association is negative. Such results could be related to the operationalisation of variables. To operationalise values, other questions, or combinations of WVS questions aggregated into indices, could be used. These in turn could be correlated with different sub-indices and indicators that are aggregated within the V-Dem to construct component and full democracy indices, which would allow to establish more direct connections between values and features of different models of democracy. The next, concluding, chapter connects the theoretical framework of this research and results of the data analysis and presents some suggestions on how to further research the relationship between societal values and models of democracy.
Conclusions and Discussion
This thesis aimed to explore the relationship between societal values and different models of democracy. Its objective was to go beyond the connection between self-expression values and democracy as such and examine the possible links between other values widespread in various countries and specific models of democracy, which put emphasis on different features added on top of free and fair elections.

The idea that there might be such links between values and different institutional features of democracies came from congruence theory, which constituted the central part of the theoretical framework for this research. This theory posits that stability and successful regime performance depends on whether there is congruence, that is similarity or correspondence, between governmental authority patterns and authority patterns of different social units. In a democracy, this also implies that governmental authority patterns should exhibit some non-democratic features to match authority patterns of other social units, some of which might not be fully democratic. While overall units that are less resistant to change adapt to those units that are the most rigid ones (like families), there is a possibility of social units adapting to governmental authority patterns.

While authority patterns imply the relationship between at least two people, these relationships themselves might be based on values that are held by individuals; institutions in turn might emphasise features related not just to elections or processes by which decisions are made, but also characteristics related to social and political equality. Therefore, congruence might link not just authority patterns of difference social units, but individual values and various principles that are embedded in specific institutional arrangements characteristics of different societies. When it comes to democracies, such arrangements constitute different democracy models.

Based on the idea that for democracies to be stable there should be correspondence between societal values and models of democracy adopted in different countries and taking into account the available data, the three formulated hypotheses posited that self-direction is positively linked with liberal democracy, that universalism is positively linked with liberal democracy, and that universalism is positively linked with egalitarian democracy. Since congruence might run in either direction, from social units to the government or in the opposite direction, this research made no distinction between an
independent and dependent variable. What is more, it should be noted that the broad nature of universalism allowed to connect it with two models of democracy, and the results of hypothesis testing were expected to show whether universalism has a stronger connection with one model or the other. In addition, since individuals might value different things and, at the same time, the same country might have adopted features of different democratic models, the three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary.

The three hypotheses were tested using the dataset compiled for the purposes of this research. The dataset included 28 countries from different parts of the world representing both established democracies, like the Netherlands and the USA, and new ones, like Colombia and Ecuador. The selection of the countries for this research was based on the sixth wave of the World Values Survey and countries’ scores on the Electoral Democracy Index from the Varieties of Democracy dataset. The WVS questions were used to operationalise the value concept, which was done at two levels: at a more abstract level, using the questions based on Schwartz’s typology, and a more specific level, using questions that are related to the features of self-direction and universalism, which in turn seem relevant to specific models of democracy. To measure how widespread values are in a society, net support scores were calculated a difference between percentage of people who support a value and percentage of people who are opposed to it. To operationalise models of democracy, countries’ V-Dem scores were used, and this was also done in two ways: both respective component democracy indices and full democracy indices, which are aggregated on the basis of component indices and electoral democracy scores, were used.

The three hypotheses were tested using Pearson’s correlation, which shows the strength and direction of association between two variables. Since congruence means correspondence between values and institutions, it was expected that higher support of certain values in a society should be accompanied by more pronounced realisation of respective democracy models. Therefore, high positive Pearson’s correlation coefficients would demonstrate that higher net support for a value is accompanied by a higher score in a democracy model, that this relationship is regular and that increase in variables occurs at approximately the same pace.
The results of hypothesis testing were mixed. Correlation coefficients from running Pearson’s correlations between models of democracy and values operationalised in an abstract manner (universalism and self-direction) were either not statistically significant at all, which does not allow to interpret them, or statistically significant, but negative (as was the case with Egalitarian Component Index and universalism, where countries with high democracy scores had rather low support for values), which contradicts the expectation that high support for certain values should go hand in hand with high scores in respective democracy indices.

The picture, however, changed when correlations were run between more specific features of universalism and self-direction and models of democracy. Three coefficients were not statistically significant. The correlation coefficient for net support for tolerance and Liberal Democracy Index demonstrated a positive weak / moderate association between these two variables. The association between net support for civil rights as an important characteristic of democracy and both Liberal Component Index and Liberal Democracy Index was positive and moderate; the correlation coefficient for net support for civil rights and Liberal Democracy Index was a bit higher. In addition, although this was not part of the original plan, Pearson’s correlation was run for net support for civil rights and egalitarian component and democracy indices, and the results demonstrated a strong positive correlation in both cases.

The obtained results have two important implications. From a theoretical perspective, in this research the congruence theory in its application to values and models of democracy did not receive substantial support. The different scores and scatter plots presented in the analytical part of this research visually demonstrate that some of the established democracies have low scores in different values. For example, the Netherlands scores low on support for universalism and self-direction, but has high score in liberal and egalitarian democracy; similarly, Germany has an average score on support for tolerance, but score high on liberal democracy. Therefore, in established democracies, which perform well and are stable, congruence does not always occur, according to the received results. This might mean that beyond more general congruence between self-expression values and democracy as such, other factors influence the choice of features which emphasised in a specific country. At the same time, the fact that positive results were obtained from
correlating some specific attitudes with models of democracy leads to the second implication: the need to explore other possibilities for operationalising variables.

While Schwartz’s operationalisation is theoretically sound and provides good basis for researching values, it might be too general to be linked with institutional characteristics embedded in models of democracy. This possibility resulted in including more specific questions in this research, and these, at least some of them, indeed demonstrated better explanatory power when correlated with models of democracy. Therefore, on the one hand, other possibilities for operationalising values should be explored. What is more, the fact that support for civil rights demonstrated stronger association with egalitarian democracy than liberal one poses questions regarding the definition of different democracy models. There might be overlaps between characteristics of different models, and civil rights is one example of this. One possible was to deal with this would be to further explore different sub-indices and indicators in the V-Dem dataset and match more specific attitude with specific features of different models of democracy.

Another possible direction which the research on congruence between values and models of democracy could take is related to the distinction between established and new democracies. While this thesis tried to touch upon this theme, it was not its primary focus. In general, congruence could be separately researched in these groups of countries and then the results could be compared to see whether there are significant variations in how congruence links different levels of society. This research, for example, demonstrated that some of the new democracies score high in abstract values, but have rather low scores in more specific attitudes, which the situations with established democracies seem to be opposite. This difference and its possible relation to congruence could be researched further, for instance, by means of qualitative research.

In conclusion, this research in broad terms addressed the question of democratic performance and stability by exploring the relationship between societal values and different models of democracy. By means of statistical analysis, it looked at whether congruence between values and these models occurs in democratic countries, which might be an important factor in ensuring democratic stability. While this research produced mixed results, and can offer only slight support to this proposition, this topic could be explored further by adopting other operationalisation of variables and looking at
cases of different countries. The combination of the two approaches can provide better insights into whether and how congruence works, and if congruence does matter, such research can provide the basis for a better design of institutions for new democracies or democratising countries.
**Bibliography**

**Theoretical Sources**


Empirical Sources


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