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Shaping the European Union strategic culture: the case of the United Kingdom

MA Thesis

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Introduction

This study intends to explore how a member state shapes the development of the European Union (EU) strategic culture. By answering this question, this thesis aims to make a contribution to better understanding of what is the EU strategic culture and what can be possible development of it after Brexit will be accomplished.

A direct premise that raises the importance of this question was British decision to leave the EU expressed in the referendum in 2016. Great Britain as one of the most powerful member states in the European Union as well as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a long-standing ally of the United States has always played an important role in shaping the security architecture in Europe. Common knowledge suggests that the United Kingdom has been advocating for limited military capabilities of the European Union which contributed to the low level of integration in the area of security and defense. Following this logic, one could conclude that lack of Great Britain in the EU will inevitably lead to a change of the EU’s strategic culture since the UK will not be able anymore to influence the EU’s approach to Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP). As a result, one could conclude that the UK will not be able anymore to influence the EU’s approach to Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP) and thus the EU strategic culture.

However, this stance does not reflect the complexity of strategic culture. It encompasses not only issues related narrowly to the deployment of armed force abroad. The sources of strategic culture can be of different kinds; therefore it might also be a case that the impact of UK on the EU strategic culture will preserve in some form even after the final exit of the Union. It is especially because of the multi-faceted activity of the European Union abroad that includes issues such as development aid, crisis management or special operations. If the UK has shaped the EU strategic culture in a way of developing not strictly military capabilities, it has arguably more permanent character that would be thought at first glance. It is only strengthened by the fact that strategic culture comprises such elements as habits (human or institutional), existing
procedures, and the experience of a given community of political and bureaucratic establishments. In other words, the strategic culture of the European Union (as other strategic cultures) does not rely exclusively on top-political or military decisions taken by narrow circles of current leadership.

Based on the above, the research question of the thesis is how the United Kingdom (UK) has shaped the EU’s strategic culture. The study hypothesizes that the elements of the UK’s strategic culture are reflected at the EU level. Moreover, these elements are to be seen in critical moments of developing the EU strategic culture that is selected, the EU, strategic documents: Maastricht Treaty, European Defense Strategy of 2003, and A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy of 2016.

The thesis is divided into three main parts:

1. The first part includes discussion of the existing literature on the concept of strategic culture including the strategic culture of a state as well as the European Union. The aim of this overview is to bring main approaches to study of strategic culture. It contributes to pointing out existing lacks and difficulties in conducting research on strategic culture. The research design of the thesis was built upon diagnosed (by other authors) obstacles in exploring the strategic culture. This part includes also a supplementary concept introduced to the research – Europeanization. The concept (especially bottom-up Europeanization) is chosen to explain how a member states transfer its own attitude towards strategic culture on the EU level.

2. The second part contains the explanation of a research design adapted for the study. The thesis tries to address one of the most significant problems in studying strategic culture – lack of proper methodological apparatus. The innovation of the study lies in the method chosen (process tracing) and putting main emphasis not on “what” question (e.g. what is the EU strategic culture) but how it is being developed (on the assumption that the EU strategic culture is a concept that is in the process of making rather than already set). In contrast to other studies, in this thesis strategic culture is a dependent variable. While
an independent variable is the UK’s uploading (namely, the process in which United Kingdom attempts to transfer the elements of own strategic thinking at the EU level). This part includes also a description of sources and operationalization.

3. The third part contains how the UK has shaped the EU’s strategic culture. The method adopted in the study requires pointing out the moments in time that the process of shaping the EU strategic culture by the UK is seen. Therefore, the timeline of the study comprises of three such moments: Maastricht Treaty; the European Defense Strategy of 2003 and A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy of 2016. These critical moments are chosen particularly to make an investigation if the UK’s expectations towards the EU strategic culture had been materialized in three documents of major importance for the EU defense and security policy and the use of force. This analysis will be preceded by the discussion on the elements of the UK strategic culture in order to make sort of comparative scale of the content of EU documents and the UK attitude towards strategic culture.

Finally, the study closes with a conclusion in which it discusses findings and assesses how United Kingdom has shaped the process of developing the EU strategic culture in all selected critical moments. Additional assessment will be devoted to the research method with an indication of the possibility of its possible application in future research.
Part I. Theoretical framework: the Europeanization of strategic culture

1.1 The concept of strategic culture

What is strategic culture?

Although strategic culture has been introduced to the field of political science in the 1970s, the content that the concept is supposed to explain had been studied even earlier. Moreover, it will not be probably an exaggeration to say that strategic culture deals with immanent part of a state’s activity – the attitude and readiness to use military force (Snyder: 1977; Gray: 1999). More specifically, the elements that are considered as the sources of strategic culture such as geographical location, historical experience or existing political and administrative institutions (Uz Zaman: 2009) were in use even before the concept occurred itself. This statement applies to modern states as well as to pre-modern forms of political organizations of different kinds. Therefore, when we talk about strategic culture we deal with the important element of politics – the organization of the use of violence.

Strategic culture has gained, over time, different approaches and applicabilities (see for instance Klein’s article on a theory of strategic culture: 1991; the main arguments of realism and constructivism in regards to EU strategic culture one may find in Rynning: 2003; Lantis: 2002). A repetitive element of these works is an attempt to explain what are circumstances in which the state is ready to use its armed forces. It is worthy to note that it refers not to the entire coercive apparatus that is at a state’s disposal. Strategic culture is applied rather to external relations with other states or international subjects.

Therefore, strategic culture concerns particularly such issues like waging a war, deployment of forces abroad, defense of borders. What strategic culture brings is an attempt to put all different motivations and scenarios of using a state’s military forces under one roof. Strategic culture is seeking a link between the historical or cultural
experience of a given political organization and the willingness (or lack of it) to use force. It bridges material and non-material factors with using armed forces.

Most works on strategic culture are devoted to the category of the state as a fundamental actor of international relations. This approach is understandable since the type of culture is also very often associated with the concept of nation. It does not exclude, however, the attempts to apply the concept also to non-state actors, the European Union (EU) included (Biava, Drent & Herd: 2011; Rynning: 2003; Haine: 2011). It is notably observed in the post-Cold War period when the concept found growing interest among political scientists representing especially (but not only) a constructivist approach to international relations.

The first part of the study is designated to bring theoretical foundations of the concept alongside with another supplementary concept of the thesis – Europeanization, in regards to the strategic culture that is analyzed from top-down as well as bottom-up perspectives. The latter perspective is sometimes depicted in the literature as uploading (Börzel, 2003) and this term will be mostly used in the thesis since the main focus here is on how member states shape the EU level and not to another way around.

It is worthy to note, however, that the idea of the EU’s strategic culture has its adherents (Cornish and Edwards: 2001; Norheim-Martinsen: 2011, while some authors remain critical about the applicability of the concept to the EU (Haine: 2011; list of obstacles in establishing of the EU strategic culture also in Biava, Drent & Herd: 2011; Rynning: 2003; Haine: 2011). Critics sometimes put into a question even the general ability to develop own strategic culture by the EU, since strategic assets are still mostly under control of member states instead of the supranational bodies. Therefore, it seems to be necessary at this point to say that this thesis assumes different perspective. This perspective is built on the stance that the process of building up the EU’s defense capabilities already proves that it is justified to pursue an academic inquiry on the EU strategic culture which is, almost by definition, \textit{in statu nascendi} concept. Furthermore, according to some authors, there is no convincing argument in
the literature that the EU strategic culture cannot be developed (Cornish and Edwards: 2001). They argue that the development of the EU strategic culture has fastened after Helsinki European Council in 1999 (ibid).

Arguably, the most likely situation that EU member states and the EU as a separate subject are facing currently is that the EU-level community logic influences the national strategic cultures (of each member state and this is “downloading), as well as each member state, has the potential to affect the EU strategic culture (and this is “uploading”). The researcher’s task is to analyze whether and to what extent these two processes are influencing each other and what are particularly the consequences of such interdependence, while this study is limited to explain the process of “uploading” a strategic culture.

**How did the debate on strategic develop?**

Political and military leaders have always been involved in the process of establishing a framework for the use of force. Until today, academic works dealing with strategy, war, or defense refer to such classics like Carl von Clausewitz’s “On War” (*Vom Kriege*) or Sun Tzu’s “The Complete Art of War”. These two famous books show simultaneously two different approaches to the use of force: “Western” (Clausewitz) and “non-Western” (“Chinese” – Sun Tzu). Another seminal example that is used to show the roots of Western thought of warfare is “The History of the Peloponnesian War” of Athenian historian Thucydides. While the extensive historical analysis of the roots of strategy and strategic culture is not an aim of this study, an interested reader may find already a useful guidance (including authors of Eastern and Western cultural circles) in others works on strategic culture (see for example: Uz Zaman: 2009; Klein: 1991).

In the mid-20th century onwards, scholars renewed attention to the relationship between culture and state behavior. In a certain simplification, it can be pointed out that what is currently being researched using strategic culture, has been associated also with such concepts as a political culture (Berger: 1995) and national character (Klein: 1991). Klein argues that national style was used to underline the importance of
existing habits of thinking and behaving of military leadership. Whilst Berger contends in a similar fashion that political culture can be understood as an interplay between norms and political institutions. On the one hand, institutions can contribute to rooting some norms or beliefs in society. On the other hand, culture can exert pressure on institutions and their way of functioning as well as culture legitimizes institutions and equips them in particular meaning (Berger: 1998 in Lantis: 2002).

Arguably, this interplay described by Berger is to be seen also at the EU level. EU politicians and servants are socialized in their national/ regional cultures. In this sense, they become a transmission belt of certain values or patterns of behaving at supranational (EU) level. Obviously, once the institutions were established they started to influence in the reverse direction as well. Whilst among member states some of them enjoy greater ability to shape the EU agenda than others. This study claims that United Kingdom is the one that possesses the greater ability to affect the EU’s decision-making process.

According to Lantis, the notion of political culture was first introduced by Almond and Sidney Verba as a “subset of beliefs and values of a society that relate to political system” (Lantis: 2002, p. 90). Whilst Uz Zaman recalls the study of Colin Gray in which he stated that the idea of a national character emerges in a logical way from the concept of political culture, since particular culture should influence a “particular style of thought and action” (Uz Zaman: 2009, p. 70; see also Gray: 1984).

In his article on strategic culture Lantis (2002) has carried out insightful analysis of different approaches to strategic culture. He argues that studies on national characters conducted in the 1940s onwards had established an important link between culture and state behavior. These studies, according to Lantis, applied anthropological models of analysis. Lantis describes also political culture as one of the core “enduring and controversial alternative theoretical explanation of state behavior” (Lantis: 2002, p. 90). As he further puts it, political culture considers “commitment to values like demographic principles and institutions, ideas about morality, and the use of force, the rights of individuals or collectivities, or predispositions toward the role of a country in
global politics”. In such a perspective strategic culture might be located within the studies on political culture or treated as a narrower concept that explains only a part of state political culture, the one related to the use of force.

Obviously both concepts – political culture and national character - have not been superseded by the strategic culture, but it is always the choice of the researcher which concept decides to use in his research.

In the late 1970s, the term strategic culture was coined by Jack L. Snyder in his study of Soviet strategic culture. In his understanding, strategic culture is a certain mindset that a given community (elites of a state particularly) obtained from an existing set of rules, codes etc. (Snyder: 1977). His focus was on the use of a nuclear weapon by the Soviet Union against the West. He paid attention that combination of certain features of a given community may result in a specific outcomes that will be characterized only by that community: “(...)a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of ‘culture’ rather than mere “policy”. New problems are not seen objectively. Rather they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the strategic culture” (Snyder: 1977 p. 8).

It is important to note that later on Snyder had distanced himself from the concept of strategic culture. He contended that strategic culture can be applied only “when a distinctive approach to strategy becomes ingrained in training, institutions, and force postures”; when “strategic culture had taken on a life of its own, distinct from the social interests that helped give rise to it” (Snyder: 1990 in Uz Zaman: 2009, p. 76; see also Jacobsen: 1989).

Snyder’s retreat did not discourage other authors to use strategic culture but most of them made reservations about the explanatory possibilities of the concept. For instance, commenting on Snyder’s work, Lantis (2002) highlighted his distinction that Soviet and American nuclear strategies are the outcomes of different historical, political and organizational, or even technological developments and circumstances.
Johnston (1995) has divided the scholars dealing with strategic culture into three generations and his proposal was further adopted by other authors (see for example Uz Zaman: 2009). According to this distinction, the first generation of scholars emerged, at the beginning of the 1980s and their starting point was Snyder’s research. The second generation came in the mid-1980s. Their approach was mostly based on a Gramscian understanding of political hegemony, while strategic culture was treated as a tool of it. Finally, the third generation appeared in the 1990s. The representatives of this generation tend to be more strict on the variables they take into account. Their innovation is also to exclude behavior while they define the notion of culture. According to Johnston, it is a remarkable step forward that helps to avoid a tautological trap that was a case for the first generation of scholars. The primary conclusion made by Johnston is that the first and third generations tend to treat “historically and culturally rooted notions about the ends and means of war” as limiting factors of strategic choices, while the second generation is opposed to that (Johnston: 1995, p. 43). The former approach requires that researcher’s focus is oriented on “how to isolate strategic cultural influences on behavior from the effects of other variables”. Whilst the latter entails the need to “look at how strategic culture is used to obscure or mask strategic choices that are made in the interests of domestic and international hegemons” (ibid.).

However, Gray opposed the separation of strategic culture and behavior. In his opinion, strategic culture “surrounds and gives meaning to, strategic behavior, as the total warp and woof of matters strategic that are thoroughly woven together, or as both” (Gray: 1999, p. 50 quoted by Uz Zaman: 2009, p. 81). Commenting on it, Uz Zaman (2009) stated that strategic culture is, on the one hand, a “shaping context for behavior”. On the other hand, it is a “constituent of that behavior”. Whereas Kier (1995), recognizing the connection between culture and behavior, states that behavior does not affect the shaping of values leading to strategic choices, but affects the decisions of the government that lead to specific choices.
Most of the works from the first generation tend to treat strategic cultures as unique ones (e.g. Snyder’s work on Soviet strategic culture or Gray’s study on American one). A contrary point of view was expressed by Johnston (who logically should be classified as the representative of the third generation), who, while agreeing that there is an impact of strategic culture on state behavior, contends it is rather not “unique to any particular state” (Johnston: 1995, p. 33). Johnston also sees the advantage that the third generation prefers to focus on recent experience and practices that shape cultural values, while the first generation was oriented towards deeper historical research. In another place, he specifies that it is a strategic culture that equips in meaning “ahistorical or ‘objective variables such as technology, polarity, or relative material capabilities” (Johnston: 1995, p. 34).

All this debate over the origin and applicability of strategic culture (including scientific dispute on it) has contributed to make strategic culture an established concept. It seems that, regardless of different theoretical approaches to strategic culture, the main expectation towards the concept remains the same – to find out why and how a political actor (state or as in the case of this study European Union) is willing to use armed forces that are at its disposal.

**Strategic culture - in searching of theoretical and methodological foundations**

The lack of methodological and theoretical rigor has been repeatedly noted as the major challenge to develop the concept of strategic culture. However, it is already possible to track how the concept has evolved over time, what are the main trends in explaining the concept as well as methodological and theoretical approaches to strategic culture.

Along with the growing popularity of the link between culture and state behavior among scholars, the scope of use the concept of strategic culture has been extended. While Snyder limited the application of strategic culture to the use of a nuclear weapon, the next generations of scholars begin to extend the application of concept on the use of force as such.
There is a visible tendency to put main importance on the role of the overall historical experience in early works on the strategic culture (Gray: 1984). The significance of the administrative and bureaucratic arrangements of a given country was more appreciated by later researchers (however, the importance of a state’s bureaucracy was already highlighted by Snyder in his article on Soviet strategic culture in 1977). In Snyder’s opinion, the patterns of behavior existing at the administrative level contribute to the development of a strategic culture: “It is enlightening to think of Soviet leaders not just as generic strategists who happen to be playing for the Red team, but as politicians and bureaucrats who have developed and been socialized into a strategic culture that is in many ways unique and who have exhibited distinctive stylistic predispositions in their past crisis behavior (Snyder: 1977, p. 9). This means that the attitude towards the use of force might be also analyzed at the lower levels than top political and military leadership. This might be a case especially for the EU that is governed on a different level as well as possesses own “bureaucratic mindset”.

Moreover, devaluation of other than historical variables may be responsible for difficulties in conceptualizing strategic culture at the early stage of developing the concept. Concentrating on historical perspective exclusively covers the importance of other factors which in a given time period may have more significance than the experience gained in connection with the war or colonial past. In other words, paying attention to the existing mindset of the bureaucratic elite might occur particularly useful in the study of the EU’s strategic culture (Bulmer & Burch: 1998).

While Snyder’s work on Soviet strategic culture remained a reference point for next generation of scholars, there are more attempts to define the concept. In the book “Asian Power and Politics”, Lucian W. Pye defined culture as “the dynamic vessel that holds and relativizes the collective memories of a people by giving emotional life to traditions” (Pye: 2009 quoted by Lantis: 2002, p. 104). In Lantis’s view, it is an understanding of strategic culture as a “generator” of preferences and values.

For Stephen Rosen, strategic culture is the set of “beliefs and assumptions that frame (...) choices about international military behavior, particularly those concerning
decisions to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable” (Rosen:1996 quoted by Lantis: 2002, p. 105).

Alastair Johnston has proposed to define strategic culture as “an ideational milieu which limits behavior choices” (Johnston: 1995, p. 46). This milieu includes shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order on an individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political environment” (Johnston: 1995 quoted by Lantis: 2002, pp. 105-106). In addition, Johnston refers also to the anthropological studies on culture. As he states, his approach is based on the Clifford Geertz’s definition of religion as a cultural system (Geertz: 1973 in Johnston: 1995): “Strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic references seem uniquely realistic and efficacious” (Johnston: 1995, p. 46).

The approach of this study is built upon the primary findings of the third generation of scholars described by Johnston. With all respect to deep historical analysis that might shed additional light why certain cultural factors are rooted in a given society, this study implies the focus on recent events that are of crucial importance for shaping strategic culture.

**Current challenges and debates**

Among the works on strategic culture in the post-Cold War period, there are at least two repetitive threads. Firstly, that strategic culture and political culture more broadly are capacious concepts and deserves more attention from scholars (Duffield:2002; Uz Zaman: 2009). Secondly, that strategic culture lacks a solid theory and satisfactory methodological apparatus allowing to determine whether actually having a specific strategic culture determines the behavior of states against each other and anticipate their actions (Johnston:1995; see also Gray:1988). This means that the study on the EU
strategic culture requires good understanding how the concept was applied so far as well as propose a method that would be carefully shaped for the needs of applying this concept to the EU. This study will aim to address both these issues.

In his article, Lantis indicated constructivism as of a great importance for the increase of interest in the influence of culture on the behavior of states. Alexander Wendt paid particular attention to the role of identities in shaping state interest. In his view, both interests and identities are “socially constructed by knowledgeable practice” (Wendt: 1992). Whilst Valerie Hudson stated that constructivism “views culture as an evolving system of shared meaning that governs perceptions, communications, and actions (...)

Culture shapes practice in both the short and long term. At the moment of action, culture provides the elements of grammar that define the situation, that reveal motives, and that set forth a strategy for success” (Hudson:1998, pp. 28-29 quoted by Lantis:2002). For his part, Johnston (1995) points out that for adherents of cultural approach can be difficult to explain similar strategic behavior, in regards to strategic cultures represented by different states. While structuralist may have a problem to deliver an explanation of different strategic culture when structural conditions are the same. Finally, according to Johnston, “strategic culture approach challenges the ahistorical, non-cultural neorealist framework for analyzing strategic choices” (Johnston: 1995, p. 35).

According to Lantis, Katzenstein’s book “The Culture of National Security” was the milestone in setting a new phase in scientific inquiry on strategic culture. It was an attempt to establish a link between theory and national security strategy by explaining “how norms, institutions, and other cultural features affect state interests and policies” (Lantis: 2002, p. 97).

Finally, the authors focused on the concept of strategic culture after 1990 drew attention to various conditions that shape it. Some of them claim that the different attitude to use military comes from domestic political culture, which is by far more important than external conditions. Others wanted to explain how particular culture impacts that some military organizations choose certain types of strategies,
organizational solutions and exclude other. These authors, therefore, place much more emphasis on internal (or organizational) factors than on external ones (such as the location of a given country in the international system) in the process of shaping a given strategic culture (Uz Zaman: 2009; see also Kier: 1995; Legro: 1994; Farrel: 1998; Katzenstein, Okawara: 1993).

This means that depending on the subject, there is the different focus of the sources of factors: If one is interested in the how strategic culture is formed one should look inside (e.g. particular state). However, if the object of analysis is the EU strategic culture one should look at member state impact on EU strategic culture.

Klein (1991) postulates to locate strategic culture within the theory of war. He does not treat strategic culture as a concept able to explain everything in an actor’s behavior but claims it might be useful when treated as a “tool” allowing to track subtle (nonvisible at first glance) aspects how different actors deal with the initially similar and objective conditions of functioning in the international sphere. This lowering of expectations in relation to what strategic culture can actually explain may prove to be useful in conceptualizing new methodological approach. Furthermore, Klein’s approach to strategic culture is much more related to the military leadership than a political one. Therefore it does not come as a surprise that in his view strategic culture is “the set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it” (Klein: 1991, p. 5). In another place, he explains his approach by identifying strategic culture as a framework for planning or preparation for war.

The above overview indicates that there is no theoretical approach to the concept of strategic culture that would not rise controversies. Even though the strand of literature on the concept is already relatively rich, there are still voices about the validity of the very existence of this concept. One possible way to overcome this challenge is a trial to establish such a research method that could be also implemented in other cases, regarding the EU strategic culture. This study seeks for such an attempt.
that, it is necessary to set the limits of application of this method, that will be indicated in the further section of this chapter.

**The bearers and sources of strategic culture**

The process of developing the concept of strategic culture goes obviously beyond formulating a satisfactory definition. Lantis (2002) has attempted to set in order the subjects who can make use of strategic culture as well as impact it. In his words, these subjects are the keepers of strategic culture.

The first category of keepers is institutions. According to Duffield, they are able to shape policy by “organizational processes, routines, and standard operating procedures” which “constrain the types of information to which decision makers are exposed” (Duffield: 1998, p. 29 in Lantis: 2002).

The second category of keepers of strategic culture is elites who make the decisions if certain cultural traditions should be kept in a given situation or to change current pattern of behavior concerning foreign policy (Lantis: 2002). In such perspective, elites are also treated as “users of culture” who “redefine the limits of the possible” in key foreign and security policy discourses (Cruz: 2000 quoted by Lantis: 2002, p. 107). Arguably, here the elites can be understood as all leaders and political bodies that impact foreign policy. However, Jeffrey Legro specifies additionally that the organizational culture of the military leadership has an overpowering impact on security policy since “it tends to be isolated, highly regimented, and distinct” (Legro: 1995 in Lantis: 2002). In the spirit of Snyder, the category of elites should be supplemented with middle and senior officials or bureaucracy as a set of certain norms of behavior.

The third category of strategic culture beares is public opinion. Lantis (2002) describes its role as a part of the ideational milieu that impacts strategic culture and shapes broader “parameters of acceptable state behavior”. Even though, he concludes, that the overall role of public opinion is ambiguous and there are studies that suggest a
limited role of public opinion in shaping political decisions in regards to national security.

In addition to the keepers of strategic culture, one can list the basic sources that appear in the literature. As Uz Zaman pointed out, the most important sources include: “geography; climate and natural resources; history and experience; political culture; the nature of organizations involved in defense; myths and symbols; key texts that inform actors of appropriate strategic action; and transnational norms; generational change and the role of technology” (Uz Zaman: 2009, p. 82). Some other authors include civil society and popular culture as one of the crucial factors in shaping strategic culture (Farrel: 2005 in Uz Zaman: 2009).

For the study of the EU strategic culture, it implies that there is a necessity to look for all possible keepers and sources of strategic culture. This study assumes that EU institutions can be treated as bearers of strategic culture, while the role of member states is twofold: they can be conceptualized as a source of strategic culture but also as bearers as they can control strategic assets.

**Continuity and change**

Lantis’s article brings also an overview of the problem of continuity and change that is associated with strategic culture. On the one hand, it is highlighted that concepts such as strategic culture are susceptible to change. The process of gaining experience serves as a “filter for later learning that might occur” (Lantis:2002, p. 109). The logic behind accepting that strategic culture changes over time is based on the premise that historical experience, political institutions or international commitments result from the position of a given country in the world order and shape strategic culture. Thus, foreign policies built upon these elements are somehow by definition susceptible to change as well. The weakness of this standpoint, one may argue, is that it should be first confirmed what elements shape (or not) strategic culture.

However, it should be noted that there are also important voices of criticism suggesting that strategic culture is rather a static concept. It comes from the conviction
that the focus on historical perspective makes the research that applies strategic culture highly predictive. Furthermore, skeptics highlight that strategic culture is dangerously close to being a tautology since it is difficult to separate dependent and independent variables in a convincing way. Therefore, this study makes it clear when it comes to variables and put the EU strategic culture as a dependent variable while the impact of a member state is an independent variable.

Finally, the risk is also related to the fact that interpretations based on strategic culture are almost by definition unique, which, implicitly, causes a problem with repeatability of research and their reliability (Lantis: 2002). One possible answer to these arguments is to say that all of them stems from the lack of sound methodology and comparative studies which is also underlined by opponents of strategic culture approach. Therefore, more attention should be paid to develop a proper methodological apparatus to be applied in strategic cultural studies. This study is simply one of such attempts.

Finally, there are also voices representing a middle way in regards to the problem of continuity and change of strategic culture. They generally agree that strategic culture can change, but it requires far-reaching and dramatic events that are serious enough to undermine the catalog of existing norms, rules, and values (Lantis: 2002).

Snyder’s standpoint on the problem of continuity and change can be also ranked as an intermediate. His approach to strategic culture includes a glance at a given community as a whole as well as the role of individual units in the process of reproducing certain codes of behavior: “strategic cultures, like cultures in general, change as objective conditions change. But there is also a large residual degree of continuity. Individuals are socialized into a mode of strategic discourse and acquire a fund of strategic concepts that evolve only marginally over time” (Snyder: 1977, p. 11).

By doing a research on Japanese and German antimilitaristic attitude, Lantis proposed two purposes of possible change of strategic culture. The first one is an “external shock” which cause a change of existing beliefs and patterns of behavior. In the case of Germany, according to Lantis, Kosovo crisis was such a shock that was powerful enough to undermine far-going pacifist attitude of German elites and made political
leaders reconsider the necessity of using military force in certain situations. The second one is the conflict between different strategic tenets that exist simultaneously and contradicts each other causing a strategic culture dilemma. According to Lantis, Japan suffered this kind of dilemma when faced the problem of East Timor struggling for its independence. The dilemma was based on the conflict of democratic standards of not using military force and a challenge to democracy that requires the use of force (Lantis: 2002). Arguably, different states may act differently in overcoming these dilemmas. Possible solutions include the attempts to redefine the catalog of values that built up one’s strategic culture, the change of international commitments of a state, or pursuing alternative diplomatic actions.

Interestingly, Lantis does not identify strategic culture dilemmas as a failure. They are rather points of departure for a reconsideration of existing modes of behavior. The outcome of such reconsideration can be both: a maintaining status quo and setting the new path in regards to foreign policy (Lantis: 2002, p. 112).

For the study focused on the EU strategic culture it helps to understand that the situation, in which strategic capabilities are still the characteristics of member states rather than EU institutions, does not evaluate itself the existence of the EU strategic culture. In addition, if any operation taken overseas by the EU is latter on assessed as a failure, it does not automatically means that there is no the EU strategic culture. As it was mentioned above, it should be rather treated as a dynamic concept (in the process of making) that is susceptible to both continuity and change.

1.2 Strategic culture of the European Union

The debate on the EU strategic culture overlap (at least partially) with the period of third generation authors working on the concept. Cornish and Edwards already in the early 2000s made an attempt to defined what EU strategic culture might be: “the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with
general recognition of the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities (albeit limited; Cornish and Edwards: 2001, p. 587)).

Sten Rynning brings an overview of opinions towards the EU strategic culture among scholars. The positive standpoint suggests that the EU is being equipped with necessary capabilities and political confidence to use force but still remains a civilian power. The negative standpoint argues that at the EU level there is no strategy and even policy since CSDP depends overwhelmingly on the member states (Rynning: 2003; see also Heisbourg: 2000; Howorth: 2001; Lindey-French: 2002).

The debate on the EU strategic culture is frequently put in the context of the missions or operations (mainly in Africa) that the EU was involved in (Haine: 2011; Biava, Drent, Herd: 2011). In such kind of analysis, the EU strategic culture is judged upon the success or failure of a given operation. It leads, however, to the unnecessary confusion of analysis fields. They are two different things: (1) readiness for use military potential and (2) the course of action with the use of armed forces on the ground. To use military genre, there might occur such circumstances on the battlefield which were unknown while the strategic culture was shaped. Therefore, both a success or a failure of the certain action (or battle) is not a success or failure of strategic culture. Strategic culture ends when the use of force really starts. In other words, strategic culture determines the attitudes toward (or lack thereof) of using force and only attitudes. It is not the same as the course of a given action or the tactics used during a military operation.

Cornish and Edwards contribute to this point by suggesting that the EU strategic culture tends to be based not on defense (which is the key responsibility of NATO) but rather on making “difference in crises and conflicts” Cornish and Edwards: 2001, p. 596). Besides all this, the EU is in a position of adapting to new security architecture in Europe that increases the possibility of developing the EU strategic culture (Cornish and Edwards: 2001). The link between member states and the EU institutions in regards to the strategic culture is rather commonly accepted by the authors. For instance, Per M. Norheim-Martinsen (2011) notices that the EU strategic culture is not
to replace the national one but to supplement it. So far, however, there was no analysis that would focus on the influence of particular member state on the EU strategic culture.

An important thread in the study of the EU strategic culture is also a relation between the European Union and NATO. Cornish and Edwards (2001) argue that on the one hand, it is necessary to define how the EU is going to use limited armed forces and the second part is to define why force would be used. For Cornish and Edwards, it correlates with political and military concepts that are formulated by nation states and NATO. According to them, the strategic culture of the EU is not the product of CSDP but it should be perceived as a mean “to start the process that will generate the political momentum to acquire capabilities (Cornish and Edwards: 2001, pp. 602-603).

Rynning concludes also in support of the role of member states in developing the EU strategic culture: “The EU does not have the capacity to become a ‘liberal power’. Instead it must encourage coalitions driven by great powers to cultivate their own type of transnational strategic culture – coalitions that can be ephemeral or deeply institutionalized, depending on the political affinities of the involved countries – and then trust that these coalitions will be driven to respect EU rules and principles by the potential of EU structural power as well as the dynamics of an integrated armaments market” (Rynning: 2003). If Rynning’s way of thinking is correct, this is one more argument to study the impact of other actors (such as member states) on the EU strategic culture. In the end, it is member states that will build up these coalitions mentioned by Rynning as we can observe in recently established PESCO mechanism.

Some scholars have already made an attempt to propose an analytical framework to study the EU strategic culture. It can be probably counted also as an answer to the existing need to develop methodological apparatus for the concept of strategic culture. Probably the most advanced trial in this regard is the research done by Alessia Biava, Margriet Drent and Graeme P. Herd (2001). Their analysis is based on the set of drivers of the EU’s strategic culture. This set includes: “the institutions, operations and strategic-level guidelines” (these express the purpose of strategic culture); “means and
goals of security policy” (these express the content of strategic culture); and “informal normative underpinnings” of such strategic culture (ibid: p. 1244). It might arguably conclude that the set of drivers comes directly from the strategic EU documents that authors analyzed in their article (starting from the early 1990s onwards).

This study will follow a similar logic of checking the content of strategic EU documents. However, there will be a variable that was not taken into account in the above-mentioned article – the role of a member state. It will thus supplement the findings of the drivers of the EU’s strategic culture by the knowledge how (by whom) these drivers were shaped, what is the potential source of these drivers. Only then one may draw further speculation about the development of the EU’s strategic culture.

**Summary of strategic culture**

The above brief overview of theoretical and methodological approaches toward strategic culture will serve as the basis for determining the analytical framework in the following parts of the paper. The theoretical assumptions are as follows:

1. The approach of this study is built upon the primary findings of the third generation of scholars described by Johnston. It refers particularly to the separation of a cultural factor from behavior.

2. With all respect to deep historical analysis that might shed additional light why certain cultural factors are rooted in a given society, this study implies the focus on recent events that are of crucial importance for shaping strategic culture.

3. While most of the studies on strategic culture treat the concept as an independent variable, this study indicates it as a dependent variable. More specifically, the EU strategic culture is a dependent variable. Whereas the research question, the study aims to answer is how has the United Kingdom impacted on the European Union’s strategic culture? Moreover, this study makes particular effort to address the need for developing the methodological apparatus of strategic culture that will be discussed in the second chapter.
1.3 The concept of Europeanization

To answer the research question of this study it is necessary to clarify mechanisms of how the Member States affect the strategic culture of the European Union. The concept of Europeanization will be particularly useful to address this need.

In the broader sense, the term “Europeanization” is sometimes conceptualized as a result of a development of a common European culture (Schmale: 2010). While the concept of Europeanization has its significant strand of literature related to the process of European integration (see for instance Olsen: 2002), there is also a literature presenting a non-EU-centric approach to the concept (Borneman and Fowler: 1997; Flockhart: 2010). However, the literature on Europeanization has been growing extensively at least from the beginning of the 1990s and this strand of literature is of main importance in this study.

Theoretically, Europeanization draws on various approaches such as (neo)functionalism or inter-governmental. A comprehensive discussion of this concept can be found, for example in the works of Tanja Börzel (2002; 2012; see also Börzel and Risse: 200 and 2012). In one of her article, she has provided the analysis of the “domestic impact of Europe” seen from different perspectives. It can be conceptualized as a process of institutional adaptation; redistribution of resources, or process of socialization. Depending on the approach taken, the outcomes of domestic change differ (Börzel: 2003).

One of the commonly known definitions of the Europeanization is the one proposed by Claudio Radaelli: “Europeanization consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli: 2004, p. 5). The advantage of this kind of definition is that it refers to material and non-material elements that can be Europeanized. Similar elements appear also when we talk about
the concept of strategic culture. On the other hand, this definition suggests that the process of Europeanization is somehow unidirectional (from the EU to the member states). While this study adopts a reverse direction: from a member state to the EU level. Therefore in the next section, there will be discussed also a process how the member states can transfer their ‘ways of doing things’ on the supranational agenda.

**Top-down vs. bottom-up logic**

The main difference between top-down Europeanization (downloading) and bottom-up Europeanization (uploading) comes to answer the question who influences whom. The first category refers to the situation in which the European Union “affects” other actors such as the member states (see Olson: 2002). The EU may affect the Member States in different ways. Knill and Lehkmkuhl (2002) has distinguished 1) “positive integration” that refers to standards created by the EU and adopted by member states; 2) “negative integration” that is about eliminating internal barriers in the Member States, e.g. for the development of policies related to the flow of goods, persons, and capital; and 3) “framing domestic believes and expectations which is about promoting, for instance, the EU values or certain policies indirectly, e.g. by making changes in the opinion of addressees in a cognitive sense (Knill and Lehkmkuhl: 2002 in Filipec: 2017).

The second category – uploading – includes, on the one hand, all measures that are taken by the EU member states to affect the EU policies according to their needs. All these practices are frequently described as the bottom-up model of Europeanization (Börzel: 2003). In practice, both dimensions of Europeanization are “active” simultaneously, while for this study uploading is of critical importance.

While discussing the issue of uploading, Börzel underlines the role of national governments in the “ascending” (policy formulation decision making) and “descending” (implementation) stage of the European policy process” (Börzel: 2003, p. 19). According to her, the national executives occupy a crucial position in both “the decision-making and the implementation of European policies and thus influence the way in which member states shape policies and institutions and adapt to (ibid.).
Arguably, it is the case for such policy areas as foreign and security issues that still remain under the strict control of member states. Therefore, it has also its significance in formulating the EU strategic culture.

Member States can also delegate national competencies at the EU level as well as influence the process of building supranational institutions (Schmidt: 2001; Hix and Goetz: 2000). All these aspects play a role when it comes to equipping the EU in military capabilities that are of critical importance for strategic culture.

**How member states shape strategic culture at the EU level**

Before the answer to the question of this section will be given, it is worthy to consider also what exactly can by ‘uploaded’ by the member states as well as other actors at the EU level, according to existing literature.

In the study of bottom-up Europeanization of social movements in France, McCauley proved that this concept can be successfully adapted also to non-state actors (McCauley: 2011). From the perspective of this study, even more, important is that he proved that the subject of uploading can be a certain ‘way of thinking’ or a postulate of a certain policy even if in advance it is certain that it will not be automatically a part of, for instance, existing European law. In other words, uploading has its important variant in advocating certain issues or policies or socially relevant problems.

In regards to the EU member states, Tanja Börzel argues that policy preferences and action capacity are two decisive factors for choosing the strategy based on ‘downloading’ or ‘uploading’: policy preferences and action capacity (Börzel: 2002, p.208). According to her, the countries with a stronger economic capacity may tend to choose a role of policy-makers in which uploading is a more likely strategy to be chosen. From the perspective of this research, her findings might serve as an additional explanation why the UK would be interested in uploading the elements of components of own strategic culture at the EU level.

According to Börzel, member states may shape “European policies, institutions, and processes to which they have to adapt later (Börzel: 2003, p. 19). Practically, both
uploading and downloading exist simultaneously, contributing to the interplay between the EU and member states (ibid.). While more recent studies suggest that there are no limits in terms of what kind of domestic policies can be Europeanized; rather all types of policies are susceptible to Europeanization (Graziano and Vink: 2013). In other words, there is no convincing argument in the literature to reject the idea of Europeanized strategic culture.

One more aspect related to uploading is the question why member states could be interested in uploading. Börzel brings the argument that making European policy similar to domestic one result in lower costs of adaptation and implementation process (ibid.).

Börzel argues that at the national level, different actors put pressure on the national executives to promote such policies at the EU level that are in favor of their interests. While at the EU level, the national governments try to pursue such policies that in result will satisfy domestic pressure (Börzel: 2003). It is a promising premise explaining why a member state would be interested in transferring own attitude toward strategic culture at the EU level. As it was discussed in previous sections, strategic culture has multiple sources. It results in that different domestic actors, as well as non-material factors, built up the pressure on the national government to fulfill expectations related to defense objectives. Thus, a national executive might be interested in meeting this expectation by addressing them at the EU level (when meeting them is not possible alone) or creating such international security architecture that would serve its own interests and low pressure at domestic level.

One of the relatively recent attempts to address this issue is the working paper by Müller and de Flers (2009). The authors point out that the outcome of up-loading is “the projection of national foreign policy preferences (ideas and policy templates) onto the EU level” (Müller and de Flers: 2009, p. 10). It can work especially when the Member States assume that there is no other way to achieve their foreign policy goals than bringing it to the EU level. Another motivation to shift towards EU level can be a reducing a risk and costs of implementation of controversial policy (e.g. sanctions) in
unilateral mode. According to those authors, uploading “ideally results in other Member States’ adoption of the projected policies. However, several Member States will often inject their preferences into EU-level negotiations (ibid.). For the process of developing the EU strategic culture, it shows what can be the motivation of a member state to “act” at the EU level. Is such action is present, then we can start to talk about how a given member of the Union shapes the strategic culture at the EU level.
Part II. Methodology

2.1 Research design

The research design adopted in the study is the Disciplined Interpretive Case Study (Odell: 2001). According to Odell, this type of research design is applied when the formulation of a new theory extends the framework of a study, but it pretends to contribute to the existing theory. It corresponds to the approach of this study while it is built on the attempt to address the existing lacks in the examined phenomenon. In this case, it is lack of solid methodological approach to studying strategic culture while the understanding of the concept itself is built on the findings of other authors.

While one part of the study is a comparison of the content of the EU strategic documents to the attitude towards strategic culture expressed by the UK’s political leaders, the main strand of analysis concerns particularly how one member state has shaped the EU strategic culture. Therefore, the analysis does not provide a comparatist insight of the role of different factors contributing to the UK’s strategic culture. The British attitude to the use of force is presented as certain aggregate without providing in-depth historical analysis of motivations or processes that made up the UK’s strategic culture. Finally, this study does not include the role of any other member state in shaping the EU strategic culture. These are the arguments for choosing this type of research design. It implies, that the possible result of the study might be a partial answer to the question what is the EU strategic culture by knowing how it is being developed. The value of the study lies in the rising awareness of how one of the sources of EU strategic culture (member state) shapes its strategic culture. In addition, this study attempts to propose a method to study EU strategic culture that (if confirms its reliability and validity) could be implemented to study the role of other member states in shaping the EU strategic culture and perhaps – in longer-perspective – conduct a comparative study of cases analyzed by the same method.
2.2 Case selection

The reasons why the United Kingdom was selected as a case country in this research are as follows:

1. It is one of the most powerful member states in the European Union that possesses the capacity for uploading own agenda at the EU level. Moreover, as an actor acting at the global level, the UK has a vital interest in shaping the security and defense architecture in Europe. In consequence, the UK uses possible ways of achieving its goals and at least part of them might be fulfilled at the EU level.

2. The UK has been for years actively participated in the European discussion on security agenda. If the planned assumption of the influential role of the UK in shaping the EU strategic culture is correct, then it is necessary to know how this strategic culture might evolve after Brexit. However, before making conclusions about this evolution one should know what was (or still is) the factual impact of the UK on the EU strategic culture.

3. The position of the UK in the international world order causes that the UK possesses its own strategic culture (see for instance: Macmillan: 1995; Miskimmon: 2004; Carr and Tomkins: 1998; the UK strategic culture will be discussed more broadly in the third part of the thesis). It makes then possible to establish a link between national strategic culture and the one that is to be transferred at the EU level.

4. Access to data. The UK provides a convenient access to the debate on ongoing political issues (including foreign and defense issues). Particularly the database of the British parliament allows following the standpoint of the British government on domestic and foreign affairs at least from the beginning of the 1990s. It has fundamental importance for the analysis how the UK has been
shaping the EU strategic culture since it makes possible to have a look at the UK positions quickly before or just in the moments (‘defining moments’) which were crucial for designing the EU strategic culture. It will show thus the UK attitude towards European grant strategy without the necessity of conducting a deep historical analysis of all elements making of the UK strategic culture.

2.3 Method

Process tracing is a method applied in the study. It is a well-recognized analytical tool of qualitative analysis in social sciences (Vennesson: 2008). Adherents of this method underline that it successfully combines description with causal interference and well-grounded description (even if remains static) which is an essential basis of further analysis of the sequence of events (Collier: 2011).

Process tracing allows catching a change since it focuses on the events happening over time instead of changes at one point. Such methodological perspective corresponds to my general theoretical assumption that any analysis of the EU strategic culture which considers the role of a member state must be based on sound investigation how this influence has occurred and evolved over time.

In Collier’s view, process tracing is “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in the light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigation”. As a part of the further explanation, he complements that process tracing is “an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier: 2011, pp. 823-824). The systematic examination of this study will be based on the selected events that are to show how the EU strategic culture has evolved over a certain period of time (with the reservation that only one factor in shaping the EU’s strategic culture is taken into account - the role of a member state). These events are of the same nature (EU strategic documents; described broader in the next section) that should increase the coherence of the study. Thus, the
result will be both (1) descriptive as the context of the selected event will be part of
the analysis as well as (2) causal inferences as on the basis of description and data
analysis there will be possible to draw conclusions how the examined phenomenon
(strategic culture) has been shaped which is thought – in this study - as a step forward
to better understanding of the EU strategic culture.

In the literature on process tracing there is a visible agreement on the fact that process
 tracing might be used when the cause and outcome are generally known. The
knowledge about them might be of the general character or drawing from the
literature (e.g. other studies in the given (Mahoney: 2012; Keating & della Porta: 2008).

In this study, the outcome is the EU strategic culture (dependent variable) at the
current stage of development characterized by a certain set of indicators. The cause is
the impact of the member state (the UK in this case). The knowledge about the impact
of the UK on the EU strategic culture will come from the analysis in the last part of the
thesis. The literature on the subject is a secondary source of knowledge that brings an
understanding of the key concepts in the study.

Process tracing requires also conducting a certain test for hypothesis (or even a set of
different tests). One type of the test indicates to show a factor (X) that causes the
outcome (Y). In between, there is also a mechanism (M) that is impacted by factor X.
The logic behind this test is to show how the factor X impacts the mechanism M. If M
has an impact on Y then it is logical that X causes Y.

The cause X in this research is the UK that shapes the EU strategic documents
regarding the use of force. While uploading is the mechanism “M” that makes this
impact possible. Strategic culture of the European Union is an outcome Y. Therefore, if
it is possible to show that the UK shapes the process of Europeanization of certain
rules and standards or way of understanding the use of force then one can make a
conclusion that the cause X impacts M it also impacts Y.
Process tracing will be complemented by the document analysis – regarding an analysis of the documents reflecting British position to the EU’s formulation of grand strategy. Whilst content analysis will be applied to investigate selected documents on the British strategic culture as well as the EU’s strategic documents.

This study expects to see either the confirmation of stated hypothesis or rejection of the hypothesis. In the case of rejection, there is an expectation to see enough prerequisites to make additional tests. In other words, an acceptable result of the test might be that the cause is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for the causal inferior (the terminology adopted from Collier: 2011).

**Graph 1. The defining moments of the European Union Strategic Culture**

![Graph showing the EU Strategic Culture Defining Moments]

- **1992**: Maastricht Treaty (Y)
- **2003**: European Defence Strategy (Y)
- **2016**: Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (Y)
- **The UK’s influence (X)**
2.4 Timeframe

The general timeframe of the study is 1990-2016. Starting date marks the beginning of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations and emerging a new phase of discussion on the EU’s foreign and defense policy among member states. The closing date marks the time when the result of Brexit referendum was known and the first attempts to reformulate EU’s global role were formulated.

However, process tracing requires also picking some specific defining moments in which the actual measurement is done. In this study, these defining moments are Maastricht Treaty; the European Defense Strategic of 2003 and a Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016. In each of this moment, it will be compared what elements of British strategic thinking are reflected at the EU level and the scope to which the United Kingdom has affected the EU strategic culture. Having done such analysis, the study will make an answer to the research question and try to indicate to what extent the UK’s influence on the EU strategic culture is of constant character.

2.5 Sources

The impact of the United Kingdom on the EU’s strategic culture will be tracked in the following sources:

1. Archives from the UK parliament (Commons Hansard). The online database (primary source).
2. Official statements of British officials – on the EU’s foreign and defense policy (supplementary source)
3. Strategic documents of the United Kingdom (supplementary source)

The selection of sources is motivated by the will to catch the moment in which the elements of the UK strategic culture are presented (even if it is not a fully cautious expression). What is more, parliamentary debates give an opportunity to look how the
UK strategic culture is understood by different political actors (e.g. the government and the opposition politicians).

2.6 Operationalization of independent and dependent variables

During the analysis, some quotations from the sources will be presented. This is done to secure the possibility to judge independently whether a given source allows drawing the proposed inference. In addition, the aim is to make the data available and useful for other studies. Each source quoted will be marked by the exact date and the headline that will make easier access to anyone interested in searching the Commons Hansard in future in regards to the topic discussed in this study. These findings will be complemented by the literature review on the British strategic culture as well as British impact on EU treaties (see for instance A. Forster: 1998).

In the second part of the analysis, a defined British approach will be subsequently compared with the EU documents and official statements and documents which reflect EU’s strategic thinking. The list of documents includes Maastricht Treaty – regarding the Second Pillar, European Defense Strategic of 2003, A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016. The second part of the analysis will be devoted to the analysis of the extent of the UK’s components of national strategic culture are (or not) reflected at the EU level. It should reveal some features of the EU strategic culture. The expectation is to see to what extent the EU strategic culture was/is susceptible to the impact of the chosen member state. For the clarity of the inference, the comprehensive and final discussion of the dependent variable will be put in the last part of the entire study. It will be complemented by the speculation and recommendations about the possible directions for further studies of the EU strategic culture.
Part III. The United Kingdom’s impact on the EU strategic culture

1.1 The United Kingdom’s approach to strategic culture

This section is intended to clarify what exactly is an object of analysis. It is worthy to start with the repetition of the aim the whole study – to explain how the European Union strategic culture was shaped by the United Kingdom. “How” is understood here twofold. Firstly, the analysis should show what elements of UK’s strategic thinking can be found at the EU level (in the EU’s strategic documents). Secondly, how (by using what mechanism) these elements have been transferred at the EU level. This paragraph focuses on explaining the first understanding of “how” question of the study. In the end, this section aims to indicate what elements of the UK’s strategic culture are expected to be present in the EU’s strategic culture.

A caveat necessary to introduce at this point is that this study does not aspire to provide an in-depth discussion on the origin of the United Kingdom strategic culture. It is a synthesis of the most frequent threads that appear in the literature of the subject. Besides the argument of conciseness, such choice is also motivated by the fact that the empirical material is primarily the records of the parliamentary debates in the UK. Therefore, the study makes an assumption that the positions of the politicians expressed during the debates are already a synthesis of different factors that construct a given attitude towards the use of force. In other words, the main focus is put on what was said during debates not why.

In addition, this study focuses only on the key elements of the UK’s strategic culture. These elements are significant enough to contribute to engaging politicians in the action aimed at securing a certain set of interests at the EU level. Again, having the complete image of the UK’s strategic culture is sacrificed for the clarity and conciseness of the study and not losing the dependent variable as the central point of analysis.
As it was outlined in the first chapter of the study, the concept of strategic culture shares some similarities with other concepts or has its origins in broader concepts such as political culture or national style. Therefore, it has own importance to have a look on the literature on the British strategic culture as well as these concepts that are close to it and are intended to explain the similar phenomenon which is the attitude to use of force.

One of the examples giving a valuable and initial insight on the British strategic thinking is an analysis of nation-state identities done by Marcusen, Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf, and Rosher (1999). Similarly to this study, their study focuses on the elite’s attitude but towards European integration in general. According to the authors, there has been practically no major change regarding the UK’s position towards European integration within the British elites since the end of the Second World War. While after the Cold War the UK’s attitude towards Europe is defined by the opposing to the further Europeanization. The authors make also an interesting argument that this specific social construction of being different to continental Europe is strongly linked to the institutions which have become also a “bearers” of a certain understanding of national sovereignty. Therefore – according to the authors – it should not be a surprise that the UK prioritizes an intergovernmental approach to the European integration that equipped member states with key importance in bargaining the shape of the European Union (details in Marcusen, Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf, and Rosher: 1999, pp. 625-630).

The above-mentioned study on the nation-state identities shows already the great significance of continuity in designing politics towards Europe by the UK’s politicians. It carries also an importance for the study of strategic culture. While for some European states the end of cold war has brought a fundamental change in “thinking of” strategic culture, for the UK it could be less significant that required securing the same set of interests by using new types of emerging European mechanisms such like Maastricht Treaty.
Among the works devoted specifically to the UK’s strategic culture, there are some elements of the UK’s strategic culture after the Cold War which is attached with crucial significance:

1. **Balancing Europeanist and Atlanticist vision of foreign policy** – it refers to the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. This element of the UK’s strategic culture had played a great role during the Cold War and remained important also afterward since the UK maintained its role of mediator between the US and Europe in security matters (Van Evera: 1990). Miskimmon (2004, p. 280) argues additionally that the relationship between British and the US defense structures is a “central pillar of the UK’s strategic culture”. The core meaning of this element in this study is confined to the role the UK assigns to NATO. In this perspective, NATO should remain the fundament of the European security architecture. The EU’s role is only to supplement the Alliance and in no case to replace it.

2. **Great power legacy** – this element refers to a certain mindset that British decision-makers inherited from the imperial past. However, in the contemporary context, this element is not about an imperial approach to foreign policy but about willingness to maintain privileged status of global power and keeping other state distanced from that status (Macmillan: 1995).

3. **Evolutionary change** – marks the attitude that prioritizes gradual change in the field of defense policy and avoids sharp, unexpected decisions that may lead to the effects that are difficult to predict and manage. This element also underlines the great role of continuity in British politics. While some authors (see for instance Jessop: 1971) link it with such categories as civility and traditionalism, others put it directly to the field of defense issues (Macmillan: 1995). The significance of this element lies in the preference of keeping status quo in regards to the European defense set-up that allows minor changes instead of significant re-design. While Macmillan has distinguished British political culture and the nature of decision-making process as two separate
elements of the UK’s strategic culture (where preference of evolutionary change is a part of British political culture) this study prefers to use more precise category than a political culture which is by definition broad. In fact, in Macmillan analysis, the preference of evolutionary change is the main characteristic of British political culture. This study assumes that the category of evolutionary change has more precise meaning and thus is less vague.

4. **Multilateralism** – it is traditionally linked with the British dilemma of securing the position of a sea power with the ability to maintain continental commitment. To address this dilemma, the UK had attempted repeatedly to keep own status of sea power and to keep continental Europe diverse in terms of power centers – to avoid a situation in which one European state is powerful enough to threaten the UK’s position (Freedman: 1995). In the European Union’s context, this element is confined rather to the preference of avoiding such constructs as “German Europe” or “French Europe”.

**Graph 2. The key components of the United Kingdom’s strategic culture**
All the elements discussed above are closely interlinked and in this study contribute to the overall image of the UK’s strategic culture. One may reasonably point out that *Balancing Europeanist and Atlanticist vision of foreign policy* is a crucial condition for the preference of *evolutionary change* (since the security architecture based on NATO is simply beneficial for the United Kingdom). Also, *great power legacy* and multilateralism are closely linked with each other since it was UK’s global status that allowed to keep own influence on the European continent.

It has its significance for the further analysis in this study. It might be sometimes difficult to indicate precise moment in which one of another element of the UK’s strategic culture is reflected in the EU’s strategic documents. Therefore, the analysis will be cautious when it comes to suggesting there is a direct impact on the UK on the EU strategic culture. However, the analysis will seek for the direct evidence such as institutional arrangements that were postulated by British politicians as well as the overall “spirit” of the EU’s strategic culture will be assessed in terms of its closeness or distance to the one of the UK. Therefore, the presence of each element of the UK’s strategic culture at the EU level will be assessed separately and the results of the analysis may range from more precise to less palpable. It will finally affect the verification of the study’s hypothesis.

### 1.2 Case 1 of ‘uploading’: Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union, TEU) was selected as a “defining moment” in this study since it is the document that still is a fundament of the European Union’s security arrangement. In this document, security and defense issues agreed in the separate Chapter, well-known as a Second Pillar (the three-pillar division was finally waived by the Lisbon Treaty, however, it did not invalidate the Maastricht’s provisions in the field of security and defense).

The international context in which TEU had taken place is also worthy to mention. Shortly after the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, the discussion
on the redefinition of security issues in Europe had to be expected. The engagement of the United Kingdom in this discussion could result of her status within the European Union as well as the role in the world order (strengthened by the special relationship with the United States and permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Furthermore, according to some research, British government considered the possibility of withdrawing its strong engagement in NATO for the sake of strengthening European integration in which Germany and France, arguably, could be a major beneficiary (Forster: 1998; see also Baker: 1989; Coker: 1992). In other words, there was an international pressure that British government could feel. In addition, this study expects to see that the government was subjected to pressure also from British politicians. This combination of external and internal factors should lead finally to the situation in which the government was trying to secure its interests related to the use of force at the EU level.

**Empirical analysis**

The document analysis of the primary source indicates that an issue of common European defense was an object of political debate in the UK’s parliament at least from the turn of 1990 and 1991. It was already in January 1991 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs addressed the issue of the greater involvement of European allies in NATO:

*The NATO ministerial meeting in December agreed that the European allies should take a greater role. For NATO, the Western European Union and the intergovernmental conference of the Twelve on political union, discussion of European defense will be a key task for this year (...)There are no plans to transfer our basic guarantees of security from NATO to anywhere else* (House of Commons: January 16, 1991; all excerpts come from the online database of the British Parliament, search by date, section 1988-2016)

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1 [https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/](https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/)
It is worthy to note that whenever the issues related to security, defense, and the use of force in the European context were discussed in the UK’s Parliament, there was no question for British politicians such like if UK should be engaged in creating the EU’s security architecture. There was only question how the UK decision-makers are going to be involved (implicitly how they want to secure UK’s security objectives). Therefore, it may serve as evidence that there was a common political expectation toward UK’s government to act at the EU level. In other words, there was significant domestic pressure on the government which is one of the preconditions necessary for uploading.

As predicted, the role of NATO, including the military presence of the United States in Europe, was ascribed with high importance and the UK’s government clearly stated that it is a fundament of the collective security in Europe:

*NATO, including the presence of north American forces in Europe, remains the basis for our collective security. The alliance is adapting to the new circumstances in Europe and we have put forward proposals for strengthening the European pillar within the alliance by building up the Western European Union. The WEU has shown that it can play a useful role in co-ordinating European military activities outside Europe* (House of Commons: February 13, 1991). (...)

*So far as we and most members of the Community are concerned, there is no question of trying to load on to the EC the responsibility for our defence that is shouldered by NATO. There is a question of how far we can build up the WEU, as my hon. Friend knows and approves, but the essence of our defence will continue to lie in the Atlantic alliance* (ibid.)

The necessity to be engaged in the treaty negotiations was not questioned. British decision-makers were determined to promote own vision of the future security arrangements and the possibility to use negotiations to achieve that is rather clearly visible. In addition, the UK put emphasis on intergovernmental bargaining:
(…)We want to improve foreign policy co-ordination, but the basis of our security in Europe must continue to be the Atlantic alliance. In order to allow European cooperation to prosper, we need a flexible treaty structure distinguishing between Community and intergovernmental activity (House of Commons: June 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1991)

The process of constructing new security architecture was influenced by the UK at different levels. Postulates regarding the defense of the future European Union (boiling down to complementing NATO's role rather than replacing it) was complemented by the process of influencing the transformation of NATO itself, by advocating the need to maintain US troops in Europe. In addition, the UK was able to build a temporary coalition with other members of European Communities (Italy in this case) that were ready to share UK's vision of defense capabilities of the future European Union. It shows the spectrum of measures that were at the UK's disposal to achieve strategic objectives as well as a determination to secure them:

(…) but we do not believe that, as a result of the Maastricht discussions, the Community should resolve itself into a defence Community. Our proposals, particularly in the Anglo-Italian paper on strengthening the Western European Union, are designed to deal with that point (…) Friend the Prime Minister will go to the NATO summit in Rome. NATO is completing the present phase of its transformation, which was launched at the summit in London in July last year. It is absolutely right that Europe should take a proportionately greater share of the effort in its own defences. That is the thinking behind the Anglo-Italian proposals which I mentioned. However, we are clear that it is neither wise nor safe to make or suggest arrangements within the European 12 which duplicate or undermine NATO (…) The principles behind the Anglo-Italian paper, (…) are that any reference to a European defence identity or a European defence policy needs to be married absolutely to the Atlantic alliance (House of Commons November: 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1991).

In the multithreaded speech in front of the House of Commons in November 1991, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs also referred to the issue of whether after the end of the Cold War, organizations such as NATO became
unnecessary. His answer reveals the way of British thinking about changes in the field of defense, which inclines to the evolutionary implementation of changes instead of wholesome transformations. This is a clear demonstration of the element of British thinking about strategic culture, discussed in the first part of this chapter:

*Europe is vulnerable to all kinds of uncertainties and instabilities. We have talked about Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. No one can be sure about what will come out of that. Looking at the Middle East or at north Africa, no one can be sure what threats that have not yet been clearly identified may emerge. To say that we should dismantle our security organisation and say goodbye to the Americans and Canadians is simply to fly in the face of history. The same mistake was made in the early 1920s (Ibid.)*

When the process of reforming NATO (in the light of the Rome summit in late 1991) and establishing the shape of a new treaty on the European Union were already advanced, British politicians began to express the opinion that strategic decisions regarding a new framework for cooperation in the field of defense and security in Europe are in line with British expectations:

*The NATO summit also, for the first time, considered in depth the European defence identity and the alliance. We affirmed some important principles: first, the principle that NATO is the essential forum for consultation and agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence of alliance territory; secondly, endorsement of the British proposals to use the Western European Union as the means of strengthening the European pillar of the alliance; thirdly, the need to establish clear and open relations between NATO and the Western European Union and to involve other allies on issues discussed in the Western European Union which affect their security. (Ibid.)*

Forsters (1998) argues that the process of strengthening British vision of the use of force by the European Union and weakening the French vision of strengthening Europe's defense capabilities at the expense of NATO was done by securing the creation of Alliance Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) under permanent British Command.
The satisfaction with the overall shape of the Maastricht Treaty was expressed by the Prime Minister, John Major in November 1993. He pointed out the role of national governments in the European Union, which has its significant importance on how the EU’s strategic culture is to be developed in future:

*Britain successfully used the Maastricht negotiations to reassert the authority of national governments. It is clear now that Community will remain a union of sovereign national states (J. Major in the Economist: 1993, p. 27).*

Such institutional setup (started in Maastricht) has laid down the basis for further development of the EU’s strategic culture. In the next section, it will be discussed what elements exactly of the British strategic culture were uploaded at the EU level at that time.

**The content of Maastricht Treaty**

A look into the concluded text of the Treaty on the European Union shows that one of the key elements of the UK’s strategic culture is reflected at the EU level in a way that can be described as a direct impact. It is the balancing Europeanist and Atlanticist vision of foreign policy. As the paragraph J.4 of TEU states:

*The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework* (TEU: 1993, Title V, J.4)

Also, a declaration on the Western European Union (WEU) attached to the TEU specifies the link between WEU, the EU, and NATO that is close to British vision of security architecture in Europe:

*(...) The objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defense component of the European Union (...) the objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop further*
the close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States in the Alliance (TEU, Declaration on Western European Union, pp. 243-244).

Other elements of the British strategic culture are not reflected in such a direct way. This is due to the character of TEU itself. It comprises rather general provisions that indicate the overall institutional shape of the European Union. There is no room for outlining a specific and detailed vision of the foreign policy and the use of force. One may also argue that the elements of British strategic culture are interlinked to each other. From this perspective, securing the engagement of the US military role after the cold war appeared as the most important part of negotiation package for the UK. Once achieved, the other elements are also present at least partially.

It is important to note, that the object of uploading is not just one or another specific provision in TEU. In fact, the UK has uploaded a certain vision of foreign and defense policy that includes also the use of force. This vision is based primarily on NATO as the only international and collective subject allowed exercising force. Since that moment, this arrangement has been the constant factor influencing the development of the EU’s strategic culture. Furthermore, the significant geopolitical change that occurred in Europe in the beginnings of the 1990s, could lead to major shifts in the field of security. In fact, alternative scenarios were also discussed but they did not reach enough support. The fact that Europe has chosen finally the way of gradually adapting to the new geopolitical situation, based on the same institution - US-led NATO - resonates additionally with the British approach to changes in foreign and defense policy which favors evolutionary change instead of revolutionary.

It cannot be unambiguously rejected that without the UK, similar provisions in the TEU would not have been agreed. However, as the document analysis has shown, it was the UK who was strongly advocating this set of arrangements and this issue was on the British political agenda at that time. One may oppose that the international context favored Britain in achieving its goals since after the cold war, the United States was indisputable leader in global politics and it could be somehow natural that Europe
would like to base own security on further close cooperation with the United States through a reformed NATO. On the other hand, however, it might be stated that the UK has used all means that possessed to secure own interests and transfer own strategic thinking at the EU level.

Regarding the research design of the study, some conclusions can be drawn from the case of TEU. Firstly, the mechanism introduced by process tracing – uploading – has occurred. There were enough domestic evidence to state that the UK government was under the pressure to be involved in the process of agreeing on the shape of the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, there was an international pressure to secure own security interests caused by major geopolitical changes such as the end of cold war, and dissolution of Warsaw Pact. This kind of pressure was a significant prerequisite for the UK’s government to start the process of uploading own vision of security architecture in the European Union, which finally took even a form of one specific provision that reassured the position of NATO in Europe. For the method chosen in the study – process tracing – it indicates that the hypothesis is confirmed since the factor X (British impact) shaped the mechanism M (uploading) therefore the outcome Y (the EU strategic culture shaped by the member state) occurred.

The final conclusion from the first case states that with a lot of certainties we can say that without the active European policy of the UK at the beginning of the 1990s, the fundamentals of the EU strategic culture expressed in TEU would have been different.

3.3 Case 2 of ‘uploading’: The European Defense Strategy 2003

The European Defense Strategy of 2003 (EDS) was selected as the second ‘defining moment’ in the study since it was the first the EU’s document of this kind. It has been replaced only by A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy of 2016 which will be examined as the third ‘defining moment’ in this study.

In terms of the data taken into account in this case, the timeframe ranges from early 2001 up to the end of 2003. The supplementary source that is discussed here is the
UK’s The Strategic Defence Review White Paper of 1998 that was still valid during the European debate on the EDS.

**Empirical analysis**

On the general level, it can be noticed that the security and defense issues were still important themes of the parliamentary debates in the UK at The Strategic Defence Review White Paper. In comparison to the early 1990s, however, one could observe that the UK’s government expressed regularly the willingness to complement the potential of the EU and NATO in regards to security and defense. However, this kind of discussion was always accompanied with the reassurance of the leading role of NATO that should not be replaced by the EU. Such kind of slight change of the attitude or rhetoric may be caused by the fact the strategic role of NATO in Europe had been already strongly confirmed in TEU and there was no strong party in Europe able (or even ready) to change it. Moreover, in the early 1990s, there could be still certain uncertainty regarding the type of threats for the western international community. Still, the cold war understanding of potential threats could play a role, while in the early 2000s the character of threats has changed. In the year 2003, the ‘war on terror’ has been already launched by President George W. Busch and the invasion of Iraq started. Therefore, the member states could feel that there is a need to type of cooperation in addressing these threats since the conventional conflict in Europe seemed not to be possible. It is reflected also in the British parliamentary debate on security and defense issues in which the often repeated opinion was that no state can deal with contemporary threats alone. Therefore there was an atmosphere of necessity to act together.

Already in June 2001, the UK’s Prime Minister stated, commenting the results of the European Council meeting in Gothenburg:

(...) we discussed the progress which has been made in developing Europe's capacity for crisis management operations where NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged.

President Bush made clear his view that the development of this capacity will strengthen European security. We agreed on the need to assure the EU's access to
NATO’s planning capabilities, which is key to ensuring that the European Union’s security and defence policy is firmly linked to NATO (House of Commons: 21st June 2001)

The UK has expressed its interest in keeping the balance between the EU and NATO, while in fact the key role was ascribed still to NATO, as it was stated by Secretary of State for Defence if the European Defence Force:

Heads of State and Government agreed at Nice that the EU military staff will not have an operational planning function. They also agreed that NATO will carry out operational planning for EU-led operations that have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Operational planning for other operations may be carried out in existing national and multinational headquarters, such as the UK’s permanent joint headquarters at Northwood (House of Commons: 9th July 2001)

However, the key attitude toward the use of force was presented during the debate on NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI):

The UK is pressing for an intensified programme of work on the DCI over the coming months. The UK’s own DCI performance has been strong, with some 60 per cent. of DCI-related Force Goals being fully implemented and a further 30 per cent. being partially implemented. This reflects capability enhancements such as the introduction of the C17 strategic transport aircraft, the acquisition of a greater sealift capability and development and procurement of new precision guided munitions (House of Commons: 11th July 2001)

The debate on security and defense issues between 2001 and 2003 has shown also how the UK’s attitude toward the use of force has evolved. In contrast to the early 1990s, these debates were more specific. The types of operational capabilities and forces to be developed were often the themes of the discussions in the British parliament:

(...) The need for multiple, concurrent small to medium-sized operations will, therefore, be the most significant factor in force planning. Counter-terrorism and counter-
proliferation operations in particular will require rapidly deployable forces that are able to respond swiftly to intelligence and achieve precise effects in a range of environments across the world (…)

Expeditionary operations on that scale can be conducted effectively only if United States forces are engaged. When the United Kingdom chooses to be involved, we would want to be in a position to influence their political and military decision making (…)

the key to retaining interoperability with the United States, for our European allies as well as for the United Kingdom, is likely to rest in the successful operation of NATO’s new Allied Command Transformation (…)

in today’s environment success will be achieved through an ability to act quickly, accurately and decisively, so as to deliver military effect at the right time (…)

It follows that we no longer need to retain a redundancy of capability against the re-emergence of a direct, conventional strategic threat to the United Kingdom. Our priority must now be to provide the capabilities to meet a much wider range of expeditionary tasks, at a greater distance from the UK (House of Commons: 11th December 2003)

The examples above show the combination of the elements of the UK’s strategic thinking at that time. One can observe here at least two key elements of the UK’s strategic culture: the balancing between the Atlanticist and Europeanist approach to foreign policy as well as the willingness and ability to act globally as a part of great power legacy. Two other key elements: multilateralism and evolutionary change instead of revolutionary are rather present not directly. On the other hand, one may argue that all new security arrangements at the EU level are rather a continuation of the path settled in 1993 in TEU than a radical change of approach.

The discussion on the priorities of the international strategy for the UK that take place in ate 2003 has brought us at least initial understanding of multilateralism as one of the key elements of the UK’s strategic culture:
We will work through the UN, the EU, the G8, NATO, the Commonwealth and other groups. We shall also aim to build stronger strategic partnerships with Russia, China, Japan, and India, bilaterally and through the EU. One of our top priorities will be to engage constructively with Islamic countries (House of Commons: 2\textsuperscript{nd} December 2003).

However, the discussion on the UK’s armed forces in the same year has also shown that in terms of attitude the use of force, the UK’s involvement in serious military operation is almost entirely dependent on the decisions and actions of the United States:

\textit{Our policy is to continue to develop balanced, flexible forces able to undertake a wide range of military tasks, normally alongside the forces of other NATO and EU countries, in support of the United Kingdom’s security objectives, but, as I have repeatedly said, it is highly unlikely that the UK would be engaged in large-scale combat operations without the United States} (House of Commons: 3\textsuperscript{rd} November 2003)

Finally, commenting on the European Defense Strategy itself, The Secretary of State for Defence stated that:

\textit{There is no reason why support for NATO and support for the European defence policy need be mutually inconsistent. Indeed, as the United States has recognised in its approval of the Berlin plus arrangements, the two are complementary: by improving European defence capabilities, we are also improving the ability of European nations to contribute to NATO—something that the United States would like to see} (ibid.)

It does not come as a surprise that most of the standpoints on the security and defense, as well as the use of force expressed by British decision-makers in the period 2001-2003, were in compliance with Strategic Defense Review of 1998 (with amendments in 2002). Among the key priorities, the document lists the shift towards rapid deployable armed forces and “jointery”. “Jointery” is defined as a \textit{series of initiatives across defense to co-ordinate the activities of the three services more closely, pooling their expertise and maximising their punch, while at the same time eliminating duplication and waste} (Dodd and Oakes: 1998, p. 3).
The content of European Defence Strategy 2003

The relation between expectations of British politicians towards the use of force by the EU and the content of European Defense Strategy of 2003 is of a different character than it was in the case of TEU. There are no such evident examples of UK’s uploading as it was in 1993. One of the explanations of such a situation could be that since Maastricht Treaty the fundamental British postulate (NATO as the main pillar of European security architecture) was secured and there was no attempt to change it. Nevertheless, the special relationship between NATO and the EU as well as the EU and the United States had been underlined in the document:

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular, Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century (European Defense Strategy: p.13)

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence. (European Defense Strategy: p. 14)

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship (European Defense Strategy: p.10)

More visible aspect, in this case, is the link between British parliamentary debate on security, defense, the use of force and the general “spirit” of the EDS. The examples of the UK’s government standpoint, presented above are very alike to the content of the EDS. It applies, for instance, to the perception of threat, military forces to be developed or types of missions that are needed:
In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe. Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens (European Defense Strategy: p.6)

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means (European Defense Strategy: p.8)

(…) To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary (European Defense Strategy: p.13)

Multilateralism mentioned earlier as one of the key elements of the British strategic culture had been also reflected in the analyzed EU’s document:

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system (European Defense Strategy: p.13)

Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions (European Defense Strategy: p.10)

In particular, we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada, and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support. (p.15)

It is also worthy to note that EDS indicates that the EU needs to develop own strategic culture that would include the elements listed above:

We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention (p.12)
The assessment of the analysis of the second ‘defining moment’ of the study is twofold. On the one hand, one may argue that the UK was an active actor in developing the EU arrangements towards the use of force at the turn of XX and XXI centuries. The UK as one of the greatest military power in the world with the ability to act globally and having a special relation with the global leader – the United States – could be somehow naturally interested in continuation of shaping the EU strategic culture, especially after having an impact on the decision on the use of force enshrined in the TEU. On the other hand, the analysis conducted above does not show unambiguously that the shape of the European Security Strategy was done by the United Kingdom. In this case, the UK did not point out specific provisions that should be included in the EU strategic document. The debate on foreign policy, defense and security were undoubtedly dense in the years 2001-2003 but there is no such strong evidence of coalition building or formal and informal meetings organized to secure British approach to the strategic culture at the EU level.

Therefore, regarding the research design of this study, the most important conclusion is that there is a visible link between British strategic thinking and the content of European Defense Strategy but the hypothesis is not fully confirmed since it cannot be clearly demonstrated that there was British uploading. One may properly argue that it was rather a process of downloading and the British government was a recipient of the arrangements concluded at the EU level, than a “sender” of a specific approach to the use of force. The additional argument for such an explanation is that the period between 2001 and 2003 was marked with rather a high degree of uncertainty in the global politics. Therefore, perhaps some of the EU member states could be interested in making own approach to the use of force more coherent with a collective actor such as the EU.

While the analysis shows that the UK’s uploading could play a role in shaping the European Defense Strategy, additional research would be needed to exclude or confirm other possible explanations, especially downloading.
3.4 Case 3 of ‘uploading’: A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016

The third ‘defining moment’ stands out from the previous two. It is mainly because of the character of the discussion on security and defense issues in the UK’s parliament in the period taken into account in this case that is the turn of 2015 and 2016. The most decisive element of the context, in this case, was the British referendum on the exit of the European Union. In regards to the international context, Europe has faced the challenge of the influx of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa. The so-called migration crisis set the tone of the debate on the European security.

Empirical analysis

The analysis of the primary source of this case has revealed that the debate on security and defense issues in regard to the European Union was less dense than in two previous cases. It is especially visible in the year 2016 in which a major thread of the debate was British referendum about Brexit. Paradoxically, it was debated more frequently what could be possible scenarios for the UK after possible Brexit in regards to cooperation with the EU.

Nevertheless, the analysis of a Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016 brings some arguments for a persistence of the UK’s uploading of the elements of own strategic thinking at the EU level.

During the parliamentary debate in 2015 and 2016 the issues regarding defense and security were concentrated, again, on the unquestionable role of NATO in defining the EU approach to use of force:

_The Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon):_ **NATO is the cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s defence. The European Union plays an important complementary role in supporting NATO’s response to international crises, by applying economic, humanitarian and diplomatic levers that NATO does not have. The Government, therefore, believe that the United Kingdom’s continued membership of a reformed**
The debate took place in the atmosphere of waiting for the results of the announced referendum regarding the exit of Great Britain from the European Union. Even then, British politicians sought to assure that if the United Kingdom remained in the Union, the government would counteract initiatives to create a European army that would consequently have to mean the independence of the European Union from NATO:

*Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con): Does my right hon. Friend accept that by advancing the rather quaint idea that somehow our membership of the EU enhances our national security, he is merely playing into the hands of people such as Mr Juncker and Chancellor Merkel who, if Britain votes to remain in the EU, would advance towards a European army and permanent structured co-operation, the result of which would be to undermine NATO—the very organisation that the Secretary of State says is the cornerstone of our national defence? (House of Commons: 29th February 2016).*

*Michael Fallon: We have made absolutely clear that we would not support any move towards a European Union army of the kind that my hon. Friend suggests. These two organisations have different memberships and slightly different objectives. As I have said, NATO is the key part and cornerstone of our defence, but legal, economic, diplomatic and humanitarian levers are available to the European Union that NATO does not have. Being a member of both gives us the best of both worlds. (House of Commons: 29th February 2016).*

The above standpoints were also addressed during the discussions on the EU global strategy itself. The example below shows also how uploading may work in practice. It is a description (presented in front of the British parliament) of the informal meeting of Foreign Ministers of the EU – informal in a sense it did not require a common standpoint afterward. But it shows how the countries may use all the possibility to address issues which are of particular importance for them:
EU Defence and Foreign Ministers met at a joint working lunch to discuss progress in the drafting of the strategy. Ms Mogherini stated her intention to produce a strategy that was broader than just security issues and covered the range of priorities for the EU. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Minister for Reserves highlighted the UK’s strategic defence and security review (SDSR) and commitment to spend 2% on defence and 0.7% on development. He said it was important that Europe should look first to NATO for its defence (House of Commons: 11th February 2016)

Before the assessment of the link between British strategic thinking and the content of A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016, it is worth quoting the speech of the UK’s Prime Minister, David Cameron, from February 2016. The speech shows that UK was concentrated rather on the reform of the EU as a whole and the security and defense issues are not even taken as a possibility to become more Europeanized. The only element of the British strategic thinking that was repeated regularly is the role of NATO as a fundament of the European approach to the use of force which in fact excludes the possibility of strengthening the EU separate military capabilities:

(... in the parts of Europe that work for us, and out of those that do not; in the single market; free to travel around Europe; and part of an organisation where co-operation on security and trade can make Britain and its partners safer and more prosperous, but with guarantees that we will never be part of the euro, never be part of Schengen, never be part of a European army, never be forced to bail out the eurozone with our taxpayers’ money, and never be part of a European superstate. (House of Commons: 3rd February 2016)

The content of A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016

The assessment of this ‘defining moment’ starts with the look how the EU has defined the link between own security capabilities and those brought by NATO:

When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States. At the same time, EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO. The EU will therefore
deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two. In this context, the EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO (A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (further: Global Strategy): 2016, p. 20).

The strong role of NATO as a ‘primary framework’ can be assessed as a great deal of continuation in developing the EU’s strategic culture in comparison to the previous documents. Such a wording would not be arguably rejected by the UK’s government. However, it may be also interpreted as a harbinger of change when the Global Strategy says about the need to create security community that is able to act in a more autonomous way. It must be also noted that in 2016 there were also other member states that were adherents of maintaining the strong bonds with the United States and NATO, especially Central European states.

There is also strong evidence of the will to act globally and in the multilateral environment by the EU:

We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights (...) (Global Strategy: p. 18)

Co-responsibility will be our guiding principle in advancing a rules-based global order (...) (Global Strategy: p. 18)

Capabilities should be developed with maximum interoperability and commonality, and be made available where possible in support of EU, NATO, UN and other multinational effort (Global Strategy: p. 45)

In terms of acting as an autonomous and independent actor, Global Strategy goes further than previous documents:

To acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm. Member States remain sovereign in their
defence decisions: nevertheless, nationally-oriented defence programmes are insufficient to address capability shortfalls (…) (Global Strategy: p. 45)

A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP (Global Strategy: p. 46)

It cannot be unambiguously drawn from the analysis whether it is due to the results of British referendum or other factors. The conclusion this study accepts is that the UK’s uploading was not that evident as in the previous ‘defining moments’. The UK’s somehow limited own influence on the shape of Global Strategy since the debate was concentrated on domestic issues related to the referendum about Brexit. On the other hand, it was arguably certain that the EU will not go in the direction of strengthening own military capabilities in a way that would make the EU fully independent actor from NATO. In fact, the rhetoric in the document is rather safe and one may find only some initial suggestions that it can be a potential path for the EU in future.

From this perspective, this study makes one of the final conclusions that the beginning of the 1990s and negotiations of the TEU was a crucial moment in defining the EU strategic culture. In that period, the UK was strongly involved in transferring own elements of the strategic culture at the EU level. It resulted not only in the certain vision of security architecture shared by the EU but also in some formal provisions that exist in the Treaties until today.

What we could observe in the cases of European Defense Strategy of 2003 and A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016 is rather a continuation of uploading this vision of the EU’s use of force (as a part of the broader security system with NATO as fundamental actor).

The final conclusion regarding the third ‘defining moment’ of the EU strategic culture is that even without such strong advocating the elements of own components of national strategic culture by the UK, one may argue that the general outlook of the document is in a compliance with the British strategic thinking. It might serve as an argument towards the persistence of the British impact on the EU strategic culture. This issue will be additionally discussed in the last part of the paper. However, in regards to the
research design the conclusion is similar as in the second ‘defining moment’ – the hypothesis cannot be confirmed since there is not enough clear evidence that the developments of the EU strategic culture in a Global Strategy are due to the UK’s uploading or other factors such like, again, downloading.
Part IV. Conclusions

4.1 Discussion: The UK’s impact on the EU’s strategic culture

The analysis of ‘three defining moments’ of the European Union strategic culture brings some conclusions about the link between a member state and the EU in regards to the use of force by the latter. It also reveals some characteristics of the EU’s strategic culture itself which will be discussed also in this section.

Starting from the assessing the research design, the final conclusion is that process-tracing combined with the concept of Europeanization has proved its explanatory potential in the study of the EU’s strategy culture. Especially in the case of Maastricht negotiations, it was clearly visible how a member state can influence the process in order to transfer the elements of own strategic culture at the EU level. It has to be noted that the set of elements that can be transferred is rather broad. It should not be limited to certain provisions or procedures but it refers also to less palpable elements such as the vision of the foreign policy or “way of doing things”.

In the case of the UK, the vision of foreign policy and the way how the EU should act globally are the most significant elements that were shaped by British strategic thinking. In fact, all the changes in the EU’s strategic culture since the 1990s were of evolitional, gradual character which remains in compliance with the key elements of the British strategic culture discussed in section 3.1.

Balancing Europeanist and Atlanticist vision of foreign policy was arguably the most significant achievement of the UK in regards to shaping the EU strategic culture. As this study argues, the moment it had taken place was Maastricht Treaty. This was a basis that allowed the UK to upload own vision of the use of force by the EU at later stages without such enormous contribution as it was in the early 1990s. The main conclusion from the analysis of the first ‘defining moment’ remains valid for the entire study: without the active European policy of the UK at the beginning of 1990s, the fundamentals of the EU strategic culture expressed in TEU would have been different. Therefore with the high level of confidence, it might be stated that the EU strategic
culture, in general, would be different without the strong contribution of the United Kingdom.

Regarding the hypothesis, the study makes the conclusion that it was confirmed in the first ‘defining moment’. While in the second and the third ‘defining moment’ the link between the UK’s and the EU’s strategic culture was found, however, additional research should be conducted since it cannot be unambiguously stated that there was a greater role of UK’s uploading than the EU’s downloading or by any other factors. The partial explanation that this study accepts and which found the confirmation in the literature on the concept of Europeanization (Graziano and Vink: 2013) is that the downloading and uploading (or bottom-up vs. top-down perspective) take place simultaneously. It should be a matter of further studies how to combine these two perspectives within one research.

The research design in the study proved its promising potential to study the EU strategic culture. The model proposed here could be implemented to study the influence of other member states in shaping the EU strategic culture. Ultimately, the comparative analysis of different cases would be the most desirable type of research design that could bring the most comprehensive explanation of the dependent variable – the EU strategic culture.

The answer to the research question is twofold. Firstly, it was empirically presented how the mechanism of shaping the European Union strategic culture by a member state works. Uploading is the key mechanism here, while it should be repeated that the character of uploading (the types of ‘elements’ that can be uploaded) may differ from one member state to another. Secondly, judging of the confirmation (or not) of the hypothesis in each ‘defining moments’ this study concludes that the UK has shaped the EU strategic culture towards the model which can be tentatively named as ‘Atlanticist’. The most significant feature of this model is that the crucial decisions about the use of force by the EU are bonded with NATO. In such an arrangement the EU does not possess a fully independent position in regards to using the own military capabilities.
4.2 The EU strategic culture

The last section is devoted to the discussion of the possible implications for the concept of the European Union that can be drawn from this study.

Firstly, as it was mentioned in the first chapter this study accepts different perspective towards the EU strategic culture than most of the research in existing literature of the subject. This perspective is built on the separation of culture and behavior proposed by the third generation of scholars dealing with the concept of strategic culture. It means that the existence of the EU strategic culture should not be assessed on the basis of the mission undertaken overseas. The failure or the success of the mission should not be a criterion for (not) having a strategic culture since the situation itself in which an actor uses any type of military force which is at his disposal proves there was at least a cognitive process of designing the possibility to use force. This cognitive process is, in fact, the essence of strategic culture since the concept is about the attitude to use (or not) force.

Secondly, as the analysis exemplified, the EU member states can be treated as bearers of the EU strategic culture. However, this study took the elitist (elites of a member state) perspective. It should be a matter of further studies what other bearers (or keepers to use Berger’s wording) could be distinguished. One of the most promising directions in this regard is the public opinion (European societies). It was discussed during the analysis that domestic pressure is one of the important prerequisites of a government’s active behavior at the EU level. Therefore the link between European public opinion and the EU strategic culture is an important part of further studies.

Thirdly, further discussion on the EU strategic culture requires more focus on the issues of continuity and change. On the basis of the analysis from this study, it might be argued that the high level of continuity in developing the EU strategic culture is due to the influence of the UK. However, it is arguably interplay of different factors including the character of the decision-making process existing within the EU which can be described rather as gradual than rapid. However, it might be an interesting
research field whether Great Britain’s decision about the exit from the EU will contribute to the change of the EU strategic culture.

Finally, it must be noted that this study does not aspire to give a comprehensive explanation how the EU strategic culture is being shaped. However, it shows how one of the factors (the role of a member state) works. One may argue that similar impact can come from a different factor and the answer which factor (if any) was decisive. This study agrees with this argument while it the role of the research here should be understood as the first step towards a comparative research of different factors that shape the EU strategic culture.
Bibliography

Part I


**Part II**


**Part III & IV**


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