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A NEW GENERATION IN PEACEBUILDING? A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE HYBRID PEACE

MA thesis

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Author’s declaration

I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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A NEW GENERATION IN PEACEBUILDING? A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE HYBRID PEACE

Heidi Mõttus

Abstract

Liberal peacebuilding continues to be the most dominant form of peacebuilding today. Yet, liberal peace practices have not always resulted in a sustainable peace and critical approaches to the liberal peace have emerged, which concentrate on how the liberal peace asserts itself in local contexts and how the emerging liberal-local interactions are able to transform the peace. One such concept is that of the hybrid peace, which combines liberal and emancipatory peacebuilding practices. While the concept of the hybrid peace is generally well understood, its theoretical framework is underdeveloped and although some scholars have suggested that the hybrid peace could be understood as a new generation in peacebuilding, conditions surrounding its emergence remain unclear. If the hybrid peace is to become a new generation in peacebuilding, greater clarity is needed for understanding whether it could be implemented from the outset in peacebuilding operations. This thesis seeks to enhance the current theoretical framework by suggesting a three-pillar model and a distinction between a more positive type of hybridity, the inclusive hybrid peace and a more negative exclusive hybrid peace. The three-pillar model is then used to comparatively analyse peace agreements and post-conflict peace processes in the case studies of Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste using indicators to measure the extent to which each pillar is represented in the documents. The findings suggest variance in the way in which the three pillars are represented in the case studies. The more adherence there is to the three pillars in the peace agreements as well as in implementation phases, the more likely inclusive hybrid peace becomes. Nevertheless, the findings also suggest that an inclusive hybrid peace is a difficult concept to implement, especially in violent ethnic conflicts that result in consociational power-sharing agreements, which tend to entrench ethnic divisions. A greater focus on bottom-up approaches in peacebuilding can foster reconciliation, especially at the grassroots level. However, at the level of implementation, the hybrid peace as a concept remains problematic.

Keywords: peacebuilding, liberal peace, hybrid peace, bottom-up, legitimacy
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<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>FBiH</td>
<td>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>FDTL</td>
<td>East Timor Defense Force</td>
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<td>FRETIILIN</td>
<td>The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor</td>
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<td>IICK</td>
<td>Independent International Commission on Kosovo</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Provisional Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDHJ</td>
<td>Provedor for Human Rights and Justice</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARET</td>
<td>Special Autonomous Region of East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
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Introduction

The international peacebuilding project\(^1\) has arrived at a point, where its current form continues to be practiced by the United Nations (UN) and its members amidst a growing amount of criticisms related to its inefficiency and lack of legitimacy. Peacebuilding as it is understood today relies on peace being achieved externally, i.e. the UN becomes responsible for peacekeeping in a post-conflict society and establishes measures for building democratic institutions through state-building. The peacebuilding agenda is practiced by liberal, usually Western states and encompasses missions in post-conflict settings all over the world, involving thousands of military and civilian staff. These liberal peacebuilding practices have, for the most part, managed to reduce post-conflict violence and establish some compliance in post-conflict societies with liberal institutions, but the overall record has been mixed. If understood simply as the ‘absence of violence’, then peace has indeed been achieved in a number of intrastate conflicts. This narrow definition, however, does little to address the root causes of the conflict. The aims of the liberal peace have, of course, not been to merely achieve an absence of violence or, in other words, a negative peace. The state-building component has attempted to address the sustainability of the peace by introducing democratic governance, however this is what has garnered the most amount of criticism: these practices have not always resulted in a sustainable peace. The current peacebuilding agenda is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of state institutions rather than reconciliation. It considers itself as universally applicable to a variety of settings and is usually administered in a top-down fashion, with limited input from the local actors. The implementation of liberal peace practices has often resulted in fragile states that are unable to govern themselves effectively and rely on the international presence for support. This, in turn, means that while the violence may have been stopped, the peace is not able to sustain itself. These developments have prompted scholars to look beyond the liberal peace and identify a new development in post-conflict societies: the hybrid peace. Hybridity in peacebuilding refers to a combination of internal and external peacebuilding processes, which interact to produce new forms of peace. As a concept, hybrid peace has been noted to emerge in various cases that have been subjected to external intervention in peacebuilding, however

\(^1\) International peacebuilding was defined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the 1992 *Agenda for Peace* as “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict”.
the development of a coherent theoretical model has not achieved extensive attention and empirical studies on the topic are confined to a few single case studies. Yet, in the context of peacebuilding, hybrid peace is important since it combines the international and the local. Because current understandings of peacebuilding are devised using Western understandings but usually implemented outside of the Western hemisphere, studying an approach that is able to transcend the top-down nature of the liberal peace and develop more inclusive understandings in peacebuilding, could be of enormous benefit to the success of future peacebuilding missions. While the idea that the hybrid peace might indeed have the potential to form a new generation in peacebuilding has been cautiously touched upon in peacebuilding literature, it is still unclear whether the hybrid peace has the potential to do this. There is conceptual understanding in terms of what the hybrid peace is and where it can be observed but the theoretical framework is underdeveloped. If hybrid peace is to be understood not as something that emerges spontaneously in a number of post-conflict settings, but as a phenomenon that could stand on its own, greater understanding is needed on the causes and the roots of the concept. If the current peacebuilding agenda is criticised for its lack of legitimacy and efficiency, is it time for a new approach that is able to transcend these shortcomings? Could hybrid peace become a new model upon which future peacebuilding efforts could be built?

The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to examine whether the hybrid peace could be understood as a new form of peacebuilding and a foundation for a new generation of understanding in how peace should be achieved in post-conflict societies. In order to do this, I first enhance the current theoretical understanding of the hybrid peace by suggesting a model, the three pillars of the hybrid peace, which are comprised of democracy, justice and legitimacy. These three pillars illustrate the ‘in-between’ form of the hybrid peace, situating it between the liberal peace and more emancipatory understandings. In addition, I argue that the hybrid peace is not a homogenous concept in that while hybrid forms of peace can emerge in a variety of settings, the peace in some cases is more sustainable than in others and the way in which it has been implemented can also differ, from very rigid, top-down implementation practices to practices that place greater emphasis on reducing tensions within the society. Therefore, I distinguish between two forms of the hybrid peace, the exclusive and the inclusive. The more top-down and narrow the peacebuilding process, the more likely it is that the peace will lean
towards an exclusive form. Secondly, the empirical part of the thesis uses the theoretical framework to develop an understanding of how the hybrid peace emerges and seeks to answer two research questions: 1) To what extent are the three pillars of the hybrid peace represented in the peace agreements of the case studies in question? 2) To what extent are the three pillars of the hybrid peace represented in the implementation phases of the case studies in question? I developed indicators for each of the three pillars in order to measure representation. While most studies on the hybrid peace have so far used single cases studies, the thesis is a comparative study that seeks to identify patterns across cases.

The thesis begins by introducing the theoretical framework, which is based on the most prominent form of peacebuilding, the liberal peace. The theoretical framework also introduces the hybrid peace and its theoretical foundations. Secondly, the research design and methodology are described. Thirdly, the thesis provides an overview of the conflicts in four of the selected case studies: Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste\(^2\) and their road towards the signing of the peace agreements. This is followed by the empirical analysis chapter. The first part of the empirical analysis focuses on assessing the peace agreements of the case studies according to the three pillars of the hybrid peace, the results of which are discussed in interim findings. The second part of the empirical analysis looks at the way in which the peace agreements were implemented, again using the three pillars model. The analysis concludes with a discussion. The findings of the thesis are summarised in a conclusion.

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\(^2\) This thesis uses the Portuguese name Timor-Leste, derived from the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, which is the official name of the state. East Timor is used when it is included in the title of a document, in a direct quote or is part of a name of an organisation.
1 Theoretical framework

As the ultimate goal of peacebuilding, peace itself is difficult define. Yet, before taking on the complex task of identifying how contemporary peacebuilding operates, the underlying theoretical background of peace can provide important insight into how peacebuilding has evolved. It should be noted that while the thesis acknowledges the valuable contributions to peacebuilding made by non-Western approaches, the theoretical perspective in this case rests mostly on Western understandings. This choice was made for two reasons. Firstly, the Western contribution has so far been the most influential in shaping the way peacebuilding is understood and implemented in post-conflict settings. Secondly, the post-Cold War security framework is based upon the liberal peace, the central framework used by leading, mostly Western states and institutions who engage in peacebuilding operations. Nevertheless, critical approaches along with more indigenous understandings of peacebuilding have emerged and are increasingly becoming more influential. These approaches are challenging the prevailing assumptions in peacebuilding today and are reflected upon in more detail when the thesis comes to discuss its central concept of the hybrid peace.

As noted before, peace is not an easy concept to define. It is, however, possible to distinguish between 'negative' and 'positive' peace. A negative peace suggests the absence of war or conflict. The violence has ended but the root causes of the conflict have not been addressed. Within societies, negative peace suggests the domination of one group over another. This type of peace depends on power relations between groups and is not sustainable since structural violence in domestic structures is still present (Richmond, 2014: 7). A positive peace, on the other hand, indicates the absence of violence as well as the absence of structural violence in the prevailing political system. Positive peace is characterised by stability in society and provides security guarantees to the general populations. It follows a view that suggests that not conflict but peace is inherent in human nature and can be provided by states and institutions. It seeks to be inclusive and meet the needs of all groups (Richmond, 2014: 11). The achievement of such a peace in contemporary societies that have emerged from conflict remains a difficult task.

The way we understand peace today is dominated by the liberal peace. Contemporary peacebuilding, in turn, rests on the collective international security
framework set in the 1945 UN Charter. This framework has been institutionalised in the form of the liberal peace, emphasising democracy and human rights, and utilising the means of intervention if deemed necessary (Chandler, 2004: 60). As a theoretical approach, the liberal peace challenges both the Realist approaches, which emphasise the emergence of conflict as a result of shifts in the balance of power in an anarchic world and the English School, which concentrates on equality among a society of states without considering their domestic political system. Proponents of the liberal peace, on the other hand, advocate the achievement of peace through the promotion of democratic and human rights practices. This prominent view is centred on the premise that liberal states are more likely to be peaceful than illiberal states. Drawing from Kant and the democratic peace theory, this understanding of peace is the most prominent and preferred among Western societies (Joshi et al, 2014: 366). As a result, the leading role in ensuring that this framework is achieved is taken by democratic, usually Western states who rest their approach on linking moral authority with political legitimacy (Chandler, 2004: 60). Although the liberal piece is by far the most dominant form of peacebuilding, authors such as Chandler (2010), Mac Ginty (2008, 2010), Zaum (2012) and Richmond (2010) to name a few have argued that the liberal peace is not unproblematic. The main criticism points to the practice’s overly top-down nature and unwillingness to ensure that the peace is not only legitimate globally but also locally.

To address the shortcomings of the liberal peace, critical approaches that suggest alternative forms of peace have emerged and identified a peacebuilding paradigm that combines external and internal peacebuilding processes (Mac Ginty, 2010: 392). Acknowledging that contemporary forms of peace are often a complex combination of both local and international efforts is not new. However, an important contribution made by scholars suggesting alternative approaches has been the conceptualisation of hybrid forms of peace in post-conflict societies. Scholars focusing on hybridity in peacebuilding have examined the interactions between global norms and the local agency in producing new forms of peace that challenge the traditional, top-down approaches that characterise liberal peacebuilding. While the focus of the current scholarship on establishing and expanding the conceptual literature on how the local agencies respond to liberal

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3 “Local actors” or the “local agency” refer to the range of actors that are engaged in peacebuilding and reconciliation at the local level. The local in this sense does not necessarily refer to actors who are non-liberal but rather the political and civil society counterparts to international actors.
peacebuilding efforts, the origins and emergence of the hybrid peace remain unclear. Thus, the thesis aims to tackle this issue.

1.1 The liberal peace framework

While it is possible to identify multiple accounts of peacebuilding, mainstream liberal understandings focus on the establishment of liberal institutions and privatisation practices (Visoka, 2012: 23). Liberal peacebuilding, therefore, is a way of establishing the liberal peace in conflict settings, which is then externally introduced and top-down in design (Richmond, 2014: 98). The liberal peace components that the peacebuilders strive towards in post-conflict societies include ensuring the rule of law and building liberal-democratic institutions based on good governance, human rights and a market economy (Joshi et al., 2014: 266; Zaum, 2012: 121). As noted by Herring (cited in Mac Ginty, 2010: 393), other core values associated with the liberal peace place emphasis on ‘the freedom of expression and association’ and ‘equality of opportunity’. Richmond (2006a: 295) argues that the liberal peace employs a communicative strategy through which it proposes reforms and which is dependent on the degree of legitimacy it has achieved in the receiving society. As a strategy, the liberal peace presupposes the successful implementation of each of its core components. This has been emphasised by Doyle (2005) who has advocated the ‘three pillars’ approach. According to Doyle (2005: 463), these pillars are comprised of three components: “republican representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human rights and transnational interdependence”. In this understanding of the liberal peace, lasting and sustainable peace can only be achieved through adherence to all three of these components. Commercial interdependence through free markets sustains cooperation among states, while the implementation of human rights norms is made possible only in the presence of transparent democratic representation (Doyle, 2005: 463-464). What is more, because the liberal peace emphasises individual rights and the freedom of speech, adopting these principles can potentially increase international respect for the recipient (Doyle, 2005: 464). Failing to implement these components would thus curtail the development of a positive peace. Yet, the liberal peace is underpinned by an assumption of universality, an understanding that it is applicable to a great variety of settings emerging from conflict. These assumptions about peace constitute a form of orientalism, where those
knowledgeable about peace create it for those who are not (Richmond, 2006a: 308). The liberal peace as a discourse is seen to be unproblematic by its proponents and issues within its methodological approaches are usually attributed to the receiving end not implementing the liberal reforms vigorously enough. This exercise in hegemony is thus dependent on the goals and objectives of the actors involved. Moreover, the liberal peace forms a framework, which is based on a consensus that this particular form of peace should be replicated in order to achieve states that are characterised by a market economy, the rule of law, democracy and human rights along with the presence of an active civil society. Since the end of the Cold War, this understanding has been applied to all UN and non-UN peacebuilding efforts (Richmond, 2006b: 380). The liberal peace is comprised of multiple discourses and has its foundations in the main theories of International Relations. As mentioned previously, distinction can be made between liberal peace as strands of thought and liberal peace as a model. Richmond provides a useful framework for distinguishing between four main types of thought: the victor’s peace, the constitutional peace, the institutional peace and the civil peace.

The victor’s peace is based on the argument that peace prevails following a victory by a hegemonic actor (Richmond, 2006b: 381). It follows a realist argument that a military victory is more likely to lead to a long-lasting peace (Richmond and Franks, 2008: 187). It is a form of negative peace and results in a fragile state that maintains a form of order until the victor is able to maintain its power (Richmond, 2014: 52). The victor’s peace is one of the oldest strands in peace literature and authors such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes have discussed its merits in their major works. This form of thinking is highly dependent on power relations and assumes that the hegemon has the right to exercise power (Richmond, 2014: 57). Contemporary forms of the victor’s peace can be observed in the cases of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) bombing campaigns against Serbia in BiH in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. In these cases, the campaigns were justified by referring to the immense violence and suffering in each of the conflicts and the need to establish peaceful, democratic states. Because the victor’s peace favours the victor, a major problem of this strand of thought in intrastate conflicts is its lack of legitimacy in the local context. While it might provide grounds for establishing a liberal peace framework in the society, there are always groups that are either excluded from the process or included but not to the same extent as the victor. This,
in turn, can lead to calls for self-determination from certain groups and can provide incentives for an external patron state to promote its own agenda. Moreover, since the victor’s peace depends on the hegemon maintaining its power, it is not likely to be self-sustainable.

The central argument within the constitutional peace is that of the democratic peace (Richmond, 2006b: 381). The key characteristics of the constitutional peace are based on the Kantian notion of the perpetual peace and include democracy, free trade and the idea that the populations of states should be understood as ends rather than means (Richmond and Franks, 2008: 187; Richmond, 2014: 62). The idea for the constitutional peace emerged during the Enlightenment period, when the classically realist view of war being inevitable began to be contested and included the notion of law and legitimate institutions being necessary for the achievement of peace. The contemporary democratic peace theory has its foundations in Kant’s ideas, which he described in his book *Perpetual Peace*. According to Kant, peace can be achieved if laws exist in a democratic political society. In addition, free trade is considered to be an important part of the constitutional peace (Richmond, 2014: 62). Contemporary understandings of the liberal peace are based on several key tenets of the perpetual peace, including the establishment of democratic institutions, the rule of law and a market economy. While the argument that democracies do not tend to fight democracies seems to hold, the constitutional peace rests on the assumption that democratic governments can be introduced to a variety of post-conflict settings when on many occasions, the resulting democratic representation remains flawed and the human rights of all groups within the society are not respected. Nevertheless, the constitutional peace remains central to the liberal peace framework.

The institutional peace rests on the idea that states should organise themselves multilaterally and develop an institutional framework for behaviour based on a set of normative and legal principles (Richmond, 2006b: 381). International law and international institutions support the development of the constitutional peace. The institutional peace not only operates within a normative and legal context but also expects states to enforce the same behaviour on states that are not part of this institutional framework (Richmond, 2014: 67). An important component of the institutional peace is the role of international law as it is seen to lead to stability in the international order. The institutional peace can be seen as one of the goals of UN-led peace operations since
elements such as democracy, human rights, the market economy and civil society should be represented in international treaties and relevant domestic documentation (Richmond, 2014: 122). If states share common goals and adhere to the same values and principles, then the maintenance of a stable international order is more likely. Likeminded states following liberal norms and legal principles would form the international community (Richmond, 2014: 68). Nowadays, international institutions play a key role in advocating the liberal peace agenda and introducing liberal norms and values to societies emerging from conflict.

The final strand of thought, the civil peace, emphasises the idea that in order to prevent and mitigate conflict and violence, a vibrant civil society is needed (Richmond, 2006: 381). In this strand of peace, the central focus is on human rights attainment (Richmond and Franks, 2008: 187). The civil peace represents a positive form of peace in which individuals organise themselves through social mobilisation to achieve peace. The role of the civil society is crucial to the development of peace as it allows the international peacebuilding actors to take into account the needs and interests of the local context (Richmond, 2014: 79). As part of the liberal peace framework, international actors welcome civil societies that represent and develop areas related to its own agenda and many civil society organisations in post-conflict societies promote gender equality, human rights, economic development and the eradication of poverty and so forth. However, not all civil society actors are interested in peace. Some advocate for the exploitation of certain socio-economic groups and have also faced criticism for advancing state rather interests rather than those of individuals in society (Richmond, 2014: 88). The civil peace has nevertheless become an important component of the liberal peace, which is increasingly more bottom-up than top-down. This, in turn, means that the civil society and local advocacy have played an important role in the emerging form of the hybrid peace.

The victor’s peace has largely remained a key component in the liberal peace discourse. Even types of peace that take a more emancipatory approach rest on the assumption that peace needs to be installed to conflict settings (Richmond, 2006a: 296). The top-down approaches to peacebuilding, even in cases, where the achievement of a civil peace has been a top priority, tend to focus on state institution-building, which can undermine the local capacity (Richmond, 2006a: 298). Non-state actors and
organisations, therefore, provide an opportunity for the liberal peace to promote its norms since it is in the interest of the international peacebuilders that the liberal norms are accepted and promoted.

1.1.1 The diffusion of norms in liberal peace

The way in which international norms are promoted by international actors in post-conflict settings sheds light on how the liberal peacebuilding agenda is able to exert its influence (Björkdahl and Gusic, 2015: 267). International peacebuilding today can be characterised as a form of norms diffusion in which ‘global’ norms are underpinned by the assumption of universality and thus transferred to post-conflict societies as part of the liberal peace. A key factor in any peacebuilding operation is institution-building and the way in which post-conflict societies respond to institutional change as part of the liberal peace agenda depends on how successfully the liberal peace norms are either accepted or rejected by the recipients. Institutions in this sense are understood as social structures and systems of rules, while organisations are formal institutions with written regulations for appropriate behaviour (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 4).

Diffusion can be defined as a way in which ideas, policies, institutions, practices spread across social and political spaces (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 5). Existing literature on norms diffusion and institutional change has suggested that the more recipient states are able to adapt to and cooperate with institution-building measures, the more likely behavioural compliance becomes. Institutional designs that are copied from different contexts can be problematic in terms of compliance (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 4). The receiving agency are not passive actors and the appliance of various institutional measures in regional contexts can generate both incorporation of new rules and regulations but also resistance (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 8). Partly effective institutions and a lack of local compliance that have emerged as a result of liberal peacebuilding lead to a hybrid form of peace. The liberal peace has been observed to react to barriers to liberal norms diffusion by intervening. The end goal is to ‘free’ societies from their ignorance so that they would realise the merits of choosing liberal norms (Chandler, 2013: 217). As argued by Diez (2013: 201), norms and interests cannot be separated: norms shape interests and interests shape norms. In this setting, the non-liberal becomes ‘exotic’ and ‘backward’. As has been established, norms promotion is likely to encounter setbacks from the receiving
societies and therefore operates by imposing institutional behaviour changes through incentives or conditionality. This type of statebuilding has not only been utilised by the European Union but by every major international institution, including the United Nations. However, how we understand the application of norms diffusion in peacebuilding can also be problematic. Theorising from this angle suggests a division between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘non-liberal’ or the ‘international’ and the ‘local’. The emphasis here is on the agency and how it chooses to reproduce norms (Chandler, 2013: 229). The liberal extends liberal norms and the non-liberal chooses to reproduce non-liberal norms. Norms promotion research and critique thus either sees the diffusion of norms either as imposing its own approaches to the non-liberal setting or the recipient agency as resisting, which should merit our acceptance and understanding (Chandler, 2013: 229). Nevertheless, liberal norms diffusion in peacebuilding results in interactions between the various actors involved and the degree of behavioural compliance to institution-building measures can determine the extent to which the peace remains inclusive and self-sustainable. Although referring to EU institutions, Börzel and Risse (2012: 12) develop a similar argument and note that the more fragile the state, the less likely it is that sustainable institutional change through norms diffusion is achieved. The success with which norms diffuse in peacebuilding is similarly dependent on the various understandings and practices already present in the local setting.

1.1.2 Critiques on liberal peacebuilding

The prominence of liberal approaches in contemporary peacebuilding has resulted in the development of a number critiques. These responses to the liberal peace have noted that peacebuilding has concentrated on building liberal institutions, free markets and societies rather than focusing their main goal on conflict resolution and prevention (Bellamy cited in Chandler, 2010a: 138). The Western liberal peace models that above all emphasise the creation of democratic institutions characterised by human rights and a free market economy run the risk of ignoring the situation on the ground, where the recipients of the peacebuilding project have their own interests. While the liberal peace can indeed ensure that peace is achieved, it also contributes towards maintaining the status quo of frictional encounters between groups, populations and states. As noted by Chandler (2010a: 138), through its universalising activities, the liberal peace can effectively undermine its own
agenda of achieving a sustainable peace. This refers to the problem of ignoring the needs of those subjected to peacebuilding, which can lead to inequalities and the maintenance of narratives from the conflict period, curtailing reconciliation and the effective functioning of institutions. Therefore, the liberal peace can occasionally drive itself towards undesirable outcomes.

While critiques on liberal peacebuilding have accepted that the liberal peace is not an unproblematic concept, they have approached the topic from various angles. Similarly to authors such as Chandler (2010a), Lemay-Hebert (2013) and Selby (2013), I suggest two broad frameworks for distinguishing between the different critiques. Firstly, the problem-solving critiques investigate how the liberal peace operates on the ground, its shortcomings and attempts at improving its performance. For example, Paris (cited in Selby, 2013: 63) argues that the liberal peace has often introduced its practices too rapidly, which has led to difficulties on the ground. Thus in Paris’ view, to improve the functioning of liberal institutions, the liberal peace should focus on building strong institutions and avoid withdrawing the peacebuilding mission too early. Such critiques are concerned with relapses into violence and aim to improve the functioning of liberal institutions. In another piece, Paris (2010: 343) also addresses the various critiques of liberal peacebuilding, noting that as a result of the critiques, the liberal peacebuilders are in a difficult position: they are expected to increase the duration of the peacebuilding operations to provide support in the development of democratic institutions and at the same time, not intrude excessively in the local practices and understandings.

Secondly, the values-based critiques, as suggested by the term itself, are concerned with the values associated with the liberal peace and argue that the character of the liberal peace is comprised of hegemonic power relations. In the view of those arguing within this group, the Western conceptualisation of peacebuilding allows little room for the discourses of those subjected to intervention. These critiques are related to Chandler’s (2005: 308) arguments on ‘peace without politics’. Using BiH as an example, the author argues that the international community tends to view state-building as separated from politics. In this view, peacebuilding is an administrative process and does not take into account the needs of the society that is being subjected to peacebuilding, being instead led by international actors (Chandler, 2006: 308). Therefore, this approach assumes that by initiating reforms in law and administration, the problem of politics will
also be solved and establish “good governance without democratic participatory politics” (Chandler, 2006: 311). Thus, Chandler’s critique is also connected to that of legitimacy: the processes led by the international peacebuilders are not concerned with whether the institution-building practices are creating locally legitimate institutions that give a voice to a variety of local actors. This, in turn, can hinder the development of the peace.

When critiquing any peacebuilding effort, it is important to consider the extent to which conflict resolution between states and populations is present (Chandler, 2010a: 138). The peacebuilding operation should strive towards a peace that is self-sustainable, able to function independently and without outside interference. The liberal peace remains the dominant and preferred form of peacebuilding today and while it has serious shortcomings, it is also currently the most sophisticated form of peacebuilding. While scholars have started to explore approaches that could go beyond the liberal peace and are ‘post-liberal’ in essence, no serious attempt has so far been made to devise an alternative that could address the absence of self-sustainability of peace in many post-conflict societies. Conceptual foundations have been made, however, that have the potential to reshape the way contemporary peacebuilding is understood in both theoretical and practical terms.

1.2 The conceptual framework of the hybrid peace
One of the most prominent critical approaches to have emerged to the liberal peace is the hybrid peace, which offers an alternative approach to conceptualising peacebuilding in post-conflict settings. It is a combination of the internal and external, where local and international actors interact and produce new forms of peace. This mediation is dependent on the diffusion of liberal norms to a post-conflict setting as all international norms exert their influence through a filter of domestic structures (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893). How successfully these norms have managed to penetrate the local societies and how well the local agency has responded is important for understanding how interactions between the international and the local produce hybridity.

The concept of the hybrid peace also has its foundations in emancipatory peace, which is concerned with the nature of progress in societies. Emancipatory approaches set their focus “from below”, rather than from above and consider the local agency as crucial to the peacebuilding process (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015: 831-832). An emancipatory
peace enables such aspects as rights, security and access to public services for the populations subjected to peacebuilding (Visoka and Richmond, 2017: 113). Emancipatory peace focuses on enablement rather than intervention, which recognises local needs, rights and practices and reconciles local, state and international norms to produce democratic and legitimate forms of peace (Visoka and Richmond, 2017: 113). Although several critical scholars have studied how those subjected to intervention interact with the external peacebuilders, the central conceptual framework of the hybrid peace is based on the works of Mac Ginty (2008, 2009, 2010) and Richmond (2008, 2010, 2015).

The conceptual scope of the hybrid peace is extensive, however, scholars who have contributed to this strand of literature have largely avoided going beyond noting that a hybrid form of peace is present. In his 2010 article on the conceptualisation of the hybrid peace, Mac Ginty maintains a cautious stance and notes that the goal of his article is not to advocate a form of peacebuilding but to provide an overview of a condition that is present in the real world. Richmond (2010: 668) uses the term ‘post-liberal’ peace to talk about the move towards a willingness to take the local context into account and notes that this approach denotes a more realistic understanding of the various agencies in peacebuilding and the development of institutional designs. Both authors recognise the dangers of romanticising the local. Mac Ginty (2008: 149) notes that a move towards the local or indigenous in peacebuilding should not automatically be taken to mean ‘good’ or as having a higher normative value. The author goes on to argue that rather than assuming that local approaches are somehow better than their liberal counterparts, any peacebuilding approach should be fit for purpose and undergo tests to judge their relevancy, although he does not provide any further examples on how or in what context these tests should be conducted. According to Richmond (2010: 669), a positive hybrid peace is characterised by representative institutions and forms of statehood that are locally inclusive. The peace that emerges as a result of this is therefore neither wholly liberal nor exclusively local, but characterised by an ‘in-betweenness’. It is hybrid, in the sense that the security interests of a range of actors are taken into account (Richmond, 2014: 106). As a new form of peacebuilding, a hybrid peace includes the rule of law, inclusive political institutions, security and human rights. If the hybrid peace can develop further to represent a new generation in peacebuilding history, these components will remain an
important part of its framework. In addition, local contributions, especially in the form of
the civil society, and relations within groups in post-conflict societies can shed light on
the local context, which has become increasingly important in terms of legitimacy.
Drawing from these conceptual understandings and Doyle’s model of the three pillars of
the liberal peace, which was discussed earlier, I suggest a three-pillar model for the hybrid
peace (Figure 1).

Figure 1: The three pillars of the hybrid peace. (Source: author)

The three pillars represent the ‘in-betweenness’ of the hybrid peace, bringing together the
liberal peace and the emancipatory peace. Pillars I and II refer to such components as
democratic representation, the rule of law and human rights, all necessary for the
successful functioning of peace. Pillar III draws from emancipatory discourses and is
concerned with the local context: are community rights respected, are conscious efforts
being made to foster reconciliation, including locally induced practices, and does the civil
society have a voice? These three pillars work together to create a hybrid form of peace,
which aims to be sustainable and legitimate both globally and locally. The model provides
a framework through which to assess the potential emergence of the hybrid peace and to
assess future possibilities of utilising the hybrid peace in a peacebuilding operation. As
argued by Belloni (2012: 23), the local context should not be viewed as being
incompatible with the liberal. The aim of the three pillars of the hybrid peace is not to
counter the liberal peace but to provide a model that takes into account the interests of the
various actors involved.

As noted by Richmond (2010: 669), moving beyond the hegemonic discourses
represented by the liberal peace should not denote the end for the liberal peace but enable
those subjected to peacebuilding interact with it in a variety of contexts. Local actors interact with international actors and often support the liberal peace framework and its components, while at the same time arguing for them to be applied to the specific context (Richmond, 2014: 115). Therefore, liberal-local interactions can either be successful and characterised by cooperation between the actors or there can also be resistance between liberal-local actors and frictional encounters between local-local actors. The concept of ‘friction’ was introduced by Björkdahl and Höglund (2013: 292) who conceptualise it as a process that emerges when the global and the local engage in conflictual encounters and is related to how liberal norms change through their diffusion in societies subjected to peacebuilding. Björkdahl and Höglund (2013: 290) argue that frictional encounters do not necessarily lead to negative outcomes when it comes to the long-term sustainability of the peace and can even inspire change in stagnant post-conflict societies. However, due to the asymmetric power relations between the external peacebuilders and the local agency, it is unlikely that the local context is able to pursue its own agenda to a significant extent. Furthermore, the complicated relations between the local actors contribute to fragmentation at the local agency level. Friction at this level is more likely to hinder the sustainability of the peace as internal divisions are difficult to overcome.

What is clear is that the capacity of the local should not be romanticised (Richmond, 2010: 669). There are, however, voices speaking against the ‘in-betweenness’ of the hybrid peace. For example, contrary to Mac Ginty, Richmond (2010: 682) takes a conscious stance in favour of emancipatory peace. In his view, if emancipation is the goal of peacebuilding, then peacebuilding should be the domain of the local and not the international. If the peacebuilding processes are led by international actors advocating the liberal peace, the local agency is more likely to resist. Compliance, on the other hand, is likely to be higher when the local needs are taken into account. While this thesis argues from the viewpoint that hybridity should be understood as a global-local ‘in-between’ form, a combination of liberal and emancipatory understandings of peace, Richmond’s understanding nevertheless suggests variance in the hybrid peace and merits further discussion.
1.2.1 Inclusive and exclusive hybrid peace

The previous discussion in the thesis suggests that the more inclusive the peacebuilding effort, the more likely it is that a hybrid peace that is characterised by emancipation and inclusion will emerge. In other words, if there is a lack of legitimacy, the third pillar in my analysis, the success of achieving a sustainable peace becomes less likely. Yet, the discussion on these developments or the potential for their emergence in the current literature does not account for this variance sufficiently. As discussed previously, the general consensus among hybrid peace scholars is that due to the dominance of Western, liberal approaches to peacebuilding, hybridity emerges when liberal forms of peacebuilding interact and combine with local understandings. The current literature on the hybrid peace does not for the most part, however, go beyond stating that local-liberal interactions in peacebuilding can lead to hybridity and identifying that unless a peacebuilding effort encourages the local aspect to take a more active role instead of being passive recipients, a sustainable peace cannot be achieved. How the emergence of hybridity can be traced and why the hybrid peace has yielded more positive results in some cases and remained mostly characterised by a negative outcome in others have not been thoroughly researched and a clear distinction between the two factors has not been made.

This thesis suggests conceptualizing the hybrid peace through a model, which distinguishes between inclusive and exclusive hybridity. Simply put, the more top-down practices prevail, the more exclusive the hybridity. The more bottom-up practices are included, the more inclusive the hybridity. It should be noted here that conceptualising the hybrid peace in terms of its inclusiveness or exclusiveness does run the risk of reproducing the same binary the concept’s “in-betweeness” is trying to avoid (Millar, 2017: 294). Namely, there are similarities with Galtung’s negative/positive framework and indeed, Richmond (2015: 51) uses the framework to describe what he calls the “positive hybrid peace”. Galtung’s framework conceptualises peace as either absence of conflict, often with the remaining presence of structural violence or as emancipation, civil and human rights or democratic institutions (Richmond, 2006: 386). Since in this framework peace can only be understood as either positive or negative, it uses a simple binary to describe a complex phenomenon that is peace. It, therefore, retains a fixed sociocultural understanding of the liberal and the non-liberal (Chandler, 2014: 39). Yet, while recognising the shortcomings of the framework is important, the positive/negative
paradigm can nevertheless provide a useful backdrop against which future research on the hybrid peace can be based.

As mentioned previously, although being critical of the framework, Richmond (2014, 2015) utilised it in his own works to describe a ‘positive’ hybrid peace, one that gets both external support and local input and thus enjoys both local and international legitimacy. A hybrid peace where international peacebuilders are unable to promote their best practices and transform the societies is described as a ‘negative’ hybrid peace. This theoretical backdrop provides clarity but does not allow us to move beyond the current peacebuilding framework. Hybrid peace should be understood as an approach to peacebuilding that takes into account the diversity of post-conflict settings and a particular local context, the current understandings of transitions from conflict to peace, the inequalities between groups and is able to reconcile the liberal framework with bottom-up localised patterns. Hybrid peace should not be viewed as merely a graduation within the liberal peace but as an approach and a model that is capable of transcending the institutional and constitutional peace promoted by the UN in its missions. Thus, as an alternative model it has the potential to go beyond what is understood as negative or positive peace. Nevertheless, as the hybrid peace takes into account the local context, which varies, it cannot be understood as a homogeneous concept. Neither is it unchanging as its premise describes a concept that has gone through an evolution. As an “in-between” form of peace, I suggest that the hybrid peace can best be explained genealogically, illustrated in Figure 2, through the theoretical foundations of the liberal peace together with contemporary understandings of bottom-up approaches of peace.
When applied in practice in a post-conflict setting, they combine to produce a new, hybrid form of peace. Moreover, the hybrid peace takes different forms in different contexts and while it has been observed to have emerged in several cases, it has not resulted in an equally inclusive peace.

1.2.2 Future challenges and developments

One of the main criticisms for more emancipatory versions of peace has been its relative vagueness. Authors have agreed that greater participation and legitimacy from local actors would enhance the sustainability of the peace. As argued by Paris (2006: 356), there is a lack of clarity on what this participation would entail or what it means for peace to be emancipatory. Since Paris’ critique, the concept of hybrid peace has emerged but has so far been characterised by a similar vagueness both in terms of how it should more
precisely be understood theoretically and how it could be implemented in practice. While this thesis has sought to fill this gap by suggesting a theoretical model and then utilising it in empirical analysis, the hybrid peace faces challenges that could become the focus of any further research on the topic.

Firstly, this thesis has analysed the development of hybridity in cases that have already been subjected to peacebuilding and so far, has indeed been a result of liberal peacebuilding. The main challenge to tackle is the question of implementing hybridity as a form of peacebuilding from the outset. By understanding hybrid peace as something not opposed to the liberal peace but as a practice that uses both the liberal peace and the emancipatory peace to create a ‘hybrid form’, there is indeed potential for a new generation in peacebuilding to emerge. For that to happen, however, there needs to be greater understanding on what ‘implementing hybridity’ would entail. Very few authors have attempted to tackle this issue, most notably Wallis (2012) in her analysis on building a liberal-local hybrid in Bougainville. Bougainville is a highly interesting case, where a liberal peacebuilding operation has engaged with the local from the outset (Wallis, 2012: 615). Wallis’ research supports the empirical argument put forth in this thesis that initial peacebuilding documents are important for the emergence of hybridity. For example, in Bougainville’s case, the Constitution provides opportunities for representatives of traditional leaders to participate in the political process and includes other locally legitimate practices in addition to democratically elected government institutions in the text (Wallis: 2012: 618). The Bougainville case thus creates scope for other such studies to be conducted on how a hybrid peace can be implemented from the very start of the peacebuilding process. As suggested by the author (2012: 631), implementing a liberal-local hybrid could contribute to the development of a legitimate state to a greater extent than implementing the liberal peace and later acknowledging the local context.

Secondly, related to the previous point on building a hybrid peace from the outset, there are several challenges to overcome. As argued by Millar (2014: 511), the hybrid peace can be administered but there is always an amount of uncertainty attached to this. By taking into account local legitimacy, the hybrid peace also depends on the existing norms that have already internalised among the local populations and then come into contact with liberal peace practices (Millar, 2014: 511). One of the main criticisms of the liberal peace is that it operates from an assumption of universality, that it is applicable to
all post-conflict settings, regardless of any specific circumstances. The challenge for the hybrid peace, then, is to avoid the same kind of universalising practices and to take into account the specific context in which it is being applied. In some societies, existing rituals and assumptions play a much larger role than in others, which means that the way the local communities understand institution-building differs. This, in turn, means that simply assuming how the local communities experience institution-building is not enough for establishing a successful hybrid peace (Millar, 2014: 511). It requires a much greater understanding from the part of the international actors on local beliefs and practices.

Thirdly, the concept of the hybrid peace itself is not without its problems. The thesis suggests a distinction between inclusive and exclusive hybridity, drawing from previous scholars conceptualising the hybrid peace through ‘hybridity-as-emancipation’ and ‘hybridity-as-oppression’, as noted by Nadarajah and Rampton (2014: 57). This distinction can also prove to be problematic as it echoes the inclusion and exclusion usually attributed to the liberal peace. Yet, both forms have been observed to emerge, which suggests that homogenising hybridity would not do the concept justice. A future challenge for the hybrid peace, is therefore not only the practicalities related to implementing it from the outset but also avoiding the more exclusive form, which emerges when the established institutions are not locally legitimate. Of course, by emphasising inclusiveness, the communities involved should also be cautious of romanticising the local as it also possible that local understandings of peacebuilding can display excessively nationalistic or discriminatory practices and understandings. In addition to questions regarding implementation, one of the main challenges for the hybrid peace is, therefore, related to maintaining its hybridity without reproducing the shortcomings of the liberal peace.
2 Research design and methodology

This section explains the research design, methodology and case selection. Moreover, the section will describe the specific methods that will be used and what kind of empirical data will be analysed. The hybrid peace remains understudied, especially when it comes to its potential in providing an alternative peacebuilding framework to the currently prevalent liberal peace. The aim of the thesis is, therefore, to firstly improve the existing theoretical understanding of how the hybrid peace emerges, especially in the form of a theoretical framework, which is currently understudied in the literature and secondly, to provide an empirical context in which this emergence can be understood. The research puzzle concerns the very essence of the hybrid peace: can the hybrid peace be understood as a new form of peacebuilding, capable of providing a foundation for a new generation in peacebuilding? For the hybrid peace to become an approach that is able to go beyond the liberal peace, its outcomes need to result in a self-sustainable peace. Current understandings suggest that this has not always been the case and conditions that can be described as hybrid have been observed in a variety of cases, some characterised by greater success than others. This led me to suggest in the theoretical framework that the hybrid peace is not a homogeneous concept and that it takes different forms in different contexts, culminating in either an inclusive form or an exclusive form. The contribution of the thesis is, thus, twofold. Firstly, using existing understandings on the conceptual framework of the hybrid peace, it seeks to enhance the theoretical framework by suggesting a three-pillar approach and the inclusive and exclusive forms. Since the hybrid peace is understood as an ‘in-between’ form of the liberal peace and the emancipatory peace, the three pillars are democracy, justice and legitimacy. Secondly, the empirical part of the thesis suggests an approach that has so far been neglected in scholarly literature: to understand how the hybrid peace emerges, it is necessary to firstly go back to the foundations of the peace processes and examine the peace agreements on which the subsequent peace is being built and secondly, to analyse the implementation of the peace agreements. So far all studies on the hybrid peace have been conducted using single case studies. This thesis uses a comparative study to compare the emergence of hybrid peace across cases. To assess the hybrid nature of the peace processes, the thesis seeks to answer two research questions:
**RQ1:** To what extent are the three pillars of the hybrid peace represented in the peace agreements of the case studies in question?

**RQ2:** To what extent are the three pillars of the hybrid peace represented in the implementation phases of the case studies in question?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar I – Democracy</strong></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Efforts are being made for the holding of free and fair elections according to a competitive process, which is characterised by political rights for the population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar I – Democracy</strong></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Functioning and democratic government institutions are being established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar II – Justice</strong></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Reforms are being established for the development of an independent judiciary, which operates without interference. Attention is being paid to the rule of law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar II – Justice</strong></td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Adherence to fundamental human rights and personal freedoms is ensured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar III – Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>The rights of minority communities are guaranteed. Efforts are being made to further reconciliation. Gender equality is addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar III – Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>The civil society is allowed to be active and operate freely and without interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To assess representation, the thesis uses indicators to examine each peace agreement and implementation document, which are summarised in Table 1 above. The indicators are assessed dichotomously, i.e. an indicator is either represented or not represented in a relevant document. If an indicator is partly present, then efforts are being made to ensure its representation but the success of the implementation has been limited. As noted in the theoretical framework, hybrid peace is usually understood to emerge when liberal norms go through a filter of domestic structures. The success with which the peacebuilding practices have managed to create a sustainable peace that is inclusive in nature is key to understanding how the two forms suggested in the theoretical framework, inclusive and exclusive hybrid peace, emerge. More top-down and narrow forms of peace suggest that the peace leans more towards an exclusive form, curtailing the chances of reconciliation. More bottom-up and both locally and globally legitimate forms suggest a leaning towards an inclusive form and institutional arrangements that lead to tensions are important for understanding why an inclusive hybrid peace is not always achieved. Findings summarised after each empirical subchapter identify key criteria based on the findings that are more likely to contribute towards each type of the hybrid peace. Ultimately, understanding how the hybrid peace emerges is a step towards developing an alternative and inclusive peacebuilding model.
Table 2. Variables and types of hybrid peace.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>BiH</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Timor-Leste</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intrastate conflict</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National self-determination</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal peacebuilding</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnically defined peace agreement</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reconciliation efforts</strong></td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inclusive hybridity</strong></td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exclusive hybridity</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The thesis uses the small-N MSSD comparative research design, which demonstrates how hybrid peace outcomes differ across cases. The study examines four cases: Kosovo, BiH, Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste. The cases were chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, there has been an ethno-nationalist intrastate conflict dimension in these cases. Secondly, all cases have demonstrated national self-determination claims. Thirdly, all cases have been subjected to a liberal peacebuilding paradigm in an attempt to contain the conflicts. Finally, although initially displaying similar conditions, the cases have not all resulted in a hybrid peace that is equally inclusive. A comparative study can shed light on the potential causes for this variance. The timeframe of analysis covers the period of the peace agreements from 1995 to 1999 and the subsequent implementation phases up until today. The availability of data varies in the different cases, which is why the documents chosen for analysis are ones that are the most relevant for understanding the post-agreement phase. Specific methods will include policy and document analysis to gain an understanding of how the peace has been
implemented in each of the case studies. The empirical analysis consists of two parts. Firstly, whether the three pillars of the hybrid peace are present in the peace agreements is examined. The purpose of this approach is to gain an understanding of the initial requirements set for the achievement of peace and whether the agreements contain elements conducive to the development of the hybrid peace. The agreements examined are the General Framework for Peace/the Dayton Accords (1995), the Good Friday Agreement/the Belfast Agreement (1998), the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor/the East Timor Agreement (1999) and Security Council Resolution 1244 together with the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo/the Rambouillet Accords (1999).

The Rambouillet Accords were not signed, however Resolution 1244 establishes self-governance in Kosovo taking into full account the Rambouillet Accords (S/Res/1244, 1999: p. 3), giving effect to the Accords and thus necessitating the study of the two documents together.

A peacebuilding agenda that is externally introduced to a post-conflict society often faces legitimisation issues from the local institutions that are not able to fully implement the liberal peace. Institutional arrangements that are not fully accepted and implemented by the local setting, can lead to a situation of hybridity, where the liberal peace has not been successful and the local institutions are not self-sustainable. In order to gain an understanding of these developments and to answer the research questions posed above, a selection of documents from the implementation phase will be analysed. Each case is analysed using three documents, selected on the basis of the most significant achievements or developments in the peace process timeline, always also including the most recent documents and reports available. The indicators are assessed by looking at whether in the year or period in question, the indicator can be understood as represented, according to information presented in the documents. For Kosovo, the documents selected were the following: a full report on the operation plan for peace implementation of the Secretary-General on UNMIK on 12 July 1999 (S/1999/779), the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (Ahtisaari Plan), fully supported on 26 March 2007 and the 31 January 2018 report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK (S/2018/76). For BiH, the following documents were used: the 15 December 1995 Security Council Resolution 1031 on the implementation of the Dayton Accords (S/RES/1031), a report of
the High Representative to the Secretary-General dated 7 May 2008 (S/2008/300), a report of the High Representative to the Secretary-General dated 2 November 2017 (S/2017/922). Northern Ireland documents included: the 2006 St Andrews Agreement, the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement and the 2016 Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report. Finally, the documents for Timor-Leste included: Security Council Resolution 1704, dated 25 August 2006, a 29 July October 2008 report of the Secretary-General (S/2008/501) and a 15 October 2012 report of the Secretary-General (S/2012/765), published right before the conclusion of the UNMIT mandate.

Limitations
On the whole, the thesis relies on empirical data available in the public domain. Documents from international organisations or government sources have been used where-ever possible. Every effort is made to ensure that the data used to assess the presence of the indicators is both valid and reliable. Nevertheless, there are certain limitations regarding the research, which I have addressed as much as possible throughout the thesis. Firstly, a major limitation concerns the lack of a well-established theoretical framework for the hybrid peace, which complicates studying the hybrid peace empirically. Although discussions in scholarly literature have established the concept of the hybrid peace, there has so far been no attempt at devising a theoretical framework or a greater theoretical understanding, which is necessary for the hybrid peace to become a serious alternative for the liberal peace. In the thesis, I have addressed this issue by dividing the hybrid peace into its two types, inclusive and exclusive, and drawing from the three-pillar approach to the liberal peace, a three-pillar approach to the hybrid peace, which can be used to conduct empirical analysis. This devised model strengthens the existing theoretical discussion and paves the way for further analysis.

The second key limitation is the availability of data. While the peace agreements of all the case studies are from a comparable period of the late 1990s, specifically from 1995 to 1999, the subsequent implementation phases are difficult to bring in line with each other as relevant resolutions and reports for all the cases were not all published in the same year. This has been addressed by selecting documents that are both relevant for each case studies’ peace process and that are either from the 2006-2008 period or the
2016-2018 period with one 2012 East Timor agreement and most up-to-date Freedom House data. Every effort is made to ensure that the data used is both valid and reliable.

Thirdly, while official implementation documents are useful for providing an indication of how the peace is being implemented and the measures that are being undertaken to ensure the sustainability of the peace as well as whether the three pillars of the hybrid peace are represented in the official discourse, the situation on the ground can be difficult to deduce from these types of documents alone. For that reason, latest reports from the Freedom House and secondary sources will be used where appropriate to supplement the information provided by the documents and to provide a more thorough overview of the peace on the ground. Finally, while this thesis uses a comparative study to compare the emergence of the hybrid peace across cases and illustrate the different outcomes, future studies on the topic would benefit from the inclusion of even more cases to further analyse the emergence of the hybrid peace and its two forms.
3 Conflict overviews: Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, Timor-Leste

This chapter provides a brief overview of the origins of the conflicts in each of the regions, subsequent external interventions and the road towards peace. The four case studies are all self-determination conflicts that have an ethno-nationalist component (Caspersen, 2017: 5). Attempting to end intrastate conflicts between self-determination seeking groups and sovereign states is a common element characterising the peace agreements in all these case studies. The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to look at the background context in which the peace agreements were ultimately reached. The focus will be on three main aspects that are common to all the case studies: the ethno-nationalist nature of the conflicts, the fact that the conflicts were all characterised by violence that resulted in significant casualties and displaced persons and the subsequent interventions in the conflicts.

The conflict in Kosovo

Like many other ethnic conflicts, the Kosovo conflict can be traced back to narratives formed hundreds of years ago, which were resurrected in the context of a wave of nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s and during the 1998-1999 conflict (Independent International Commission on Kosovo4, 2000: 33). Kosovo was incorporated into Serbia in 1912, which created bitter memories for the Albanian national movement. On the other hand, the Serb side frequently referred to the defeat of the Serbian army by the Ottoman armies in battle in 1389 (IICK, 2000: 33). This battle was used in the Serbian political discourse to portray the persecution of Serbs in Kosovo as part of a longer historical narrative that began in 1389 (Bieber, 2002: 100). Nationalist tendencies ultimately led to the rise of Slobodan Milošević and the adoption of extreme nationalist approaches in official government policy (IICK, 2000: 34). In the 1970s and 1980s, Albanian nationalism rose with many voices calling for secession from Serbia. The Serbs, in turn, asserted that discrimination against Serbs was used in order to achieve the “Albanianisation” of Kosovo (Woehrel, 1999: 4). Yugoslav authorities criticised the rising Albanian nationalism extensively. In 1987, Milošević gave a speech during his visit

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4 Hereafter the Independent International Commission on Kosovo will be referred to as IICK.
to Kosovo Polje on 24 April, declaring famously that “no one should dare to beat you” (IICK, 2000: 40).

Following Milošević’s rise to power, Kosovo’s autonomy was eliminated in 1990. This was followed by discriminatory practices towards Kosovo Albanians: more than 100,000 Albanians lost their jobs and the use of the Albanian language was restricted (IICK, 2000: 41). As a response, ethnic Albanians organised a movement and in 1991, issued a declaration of independence (Security Council Report). Another important point in the road towards conflict was the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1995. In 1996, the KLA began to claim credit for a number of attacks against Serbian officials (Security Council Report), which led to the Serbian authorities to declare the KLA a terrorist organisation and an increase in police harassment. The beginning of war was sparked by the killing of a KLA member Adem Jashari and his extended family by Serbian forces in February 1998. This was the result of a week of fighting in the Drenice/Drenica region, in which the Yugoslav forces used heavy artillery and left 58 people dead (IICK, 2000: 68). As a result, village militias in various parts of Kosovo emerged, affiliated themselves with the KLA and organised a resistance movement (IICK, 2000: 55).

Following the events in Drenice/Drenica, the conflict escalated. The KLA grew extensively in numbers and throughout 1998-1999, Serbian forces conducted large-scale military campaigns in towns and villages against the KLA (Freedom House, 2004). As the violence grew, the campaigns were also aimed at Albanian civil populations (IICK, 2000: 72). In addition to violence against the Albanian majority by Serbian forces, the KLA conducted attacks against the Serb and Roma populations (IICK, 2000: 72). All parties in the conflict were involved in increasing attacks against civilians, which ultimately prompted NATO to consider a military intervention (IICK, 2000: 72). Talks in Rambouillet commenced between the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Russia, which established the presence of international military forces in Kosovo until a more permanent solution could be reached (Freedom House, 2004). However, in March 1999 Albanian forces signed the deal but Serbian forces did not (Security Council Report). Following Serbia’s rejection of the deal and the continuation of attacks against civilians, NATO authorised an air campaign against Serbia on 23 March 1999 (Security Council Report; Freedom House, 2004). During the air campaign, more
than 10 000 Kosovo Albanians were killed and 2600 were abducted by Serbian forces, forcing another 1 million out of Kosovo (Freedom House, 2004).

In June 1999, Resolution 1244 was approved, which established the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Resolution created autonomy for Kosovo within Yugoslavia and facilitated the creation of a NATO peacekeeping force, the Kosovo Force. The post-conflict years under UNMIK were fraught with problems and the continuation of ethnic violence. Such was the case in March 2004, which resulted in 19 dead, Kosovo Serb property and religious buildings destroyed and 4000 displaced people. As a response, Serbia strengthened its parallel institutions in Kosovo (Freedom House, 2008a). Although the armed conflict had ended, ethnic tensions remained high and it was clear that the final status of Kosovo had to be determined. A UN-led process was formed in order to negotiate this, however the process was long and lasted throughout 2006 and 2007. Nevertheless, the governments of Serbia and Kosovo could not reach an agreement. Finally, on 17 February 2008 the Assembly of Kosovo issued a declaration of independence and invited the EU rule of law mission EULEX to oversee the implementation of the Comprehensive Status Proposal (the Ahtisaari Plan) (Freedom House, 2009). While currently 116 countries have recognised Kosovo’s independence, countries such as China, Spain, Russia and Romania have not (Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Serbia has especially strongly voiced its rejection of the declaration (UCDP\(^5\)). Although the recurrence of violence has been avoided, tensions in Kosovo remain amidst the international intervention campaign and the post-conflict state is fragile.

The Bosnian conflict

Bosnia and Herzegovina achieved its independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. The declaration of independence came soon after Slovenia and Croatia had seceded from Yugoslavia, where nationalist parties had come to power (UCDP\(^6\)). However, BiH lacked the kind of ethnic homogeneity that would have allowed similar events to happen there. Other former Yugoslav states fared more favourably once independence had been achieved. Croatia offered formal support for Bosnian independence but at the same time,

\(^5\) http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/412
\(^6\) http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/346
supported Croat separatism (Nation, 2003: 149). Both Croatia and Slovenia did not suffer from the same economic difficulties as BiH. With no significant Serb or Croat minorities, Macedonia’s road to independence was peaceful. What remained of Yugoslavia had become a Serbian national state with expansionist intentions. Independent BiH was faced with a difficult economic situation, ethnic tensions and potential external aggression (Nation, 2003: 149).

In 1991, Bosnia’s population was comprised of approximately 43% Bosniaks who are Muslim, 31% Serbs and 17% Croats (UCDP\(^7\)). This meant that BiH was in a difficult situation amidst the growing nationalism in neighbouring republics. After the 1990 elections in BiH, the national communities voted for their respective parties and a coalition government was formed. However, cooperation with the Serb Democratic Party and its leader Radovan Karadžić was difficult, amidst growing ethnic tensions (Lampe, 2018). In 1991, areas with large Serb populations declared “Serb Autonomous Regions”. This was followed by the creation of similar Croat communities (Lampe, 2018). In 1992, after the European Community had recognised the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, BiH organised a referendum on independence. Although almost no Serbs voted, the rest of the electorate voted for independence, which was declared in 1992 (Lampe, 2018). The opposition from the Serb community was at least partly due to them not wanting to become a minority within independent BiH (Nation, 2003: 151).

While the international community recognised Bosnia’s independence, the state’s security situation was extremely fragile and no offers were made to address the concerns of the Serb and Croat communities (Nation, 2003: 153). Fighting broke out soon after the United States had recognised Bosnia’s independence with Bosnian Serb paramilitaries firing on Sarajevo (Lampe, 2018). Areas with large Bosniak populations were attacked both by paramilitaries and the Yugoslav army with a large amount of Bosniaks being expelled from these territories (Lampe, 2018). Croats also played a part both as victims and as the perpetrators of violence. In April, the Serbs declared the independence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which later became known as Republika Srpska (the Serb Republic) (Nation, 2003: 153). By May 1992, the Serbs had gained control of approximately two thirds of the Bosnian territory (Lampe, 2018). Violence continued

\(^7\) http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/346
throughout the year with Serb forces fighting the Bosnian government (UCDP\(^8\)). Croat forces who had similarly declared their own independence as the Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, also fought the government in 1993 and 1994 (UCDP\(^9\)). In 1994, an agreement was reached between the Bosniaks and the Croats to form a joint federation (Lampe, 2018).

The international community initially refused to intervene in the conflict, although the United Nations delivered humanitarian aid to the region and established “safe zones” (Lampe, 2018). It was in one of these safe zones that the 1995 Srebrenica massacre took place. At least 7000 people died in the massacre (Smith, 2017). While NATO had already launched largely ineffective air strikes against the Serbs in 1994, the attacks became more concentrated following the Srebrenica massacre (Lampe, 2018). The Bosnian army, comprised of Bosniaks and Croats, launched a massive land offensive and managed to regain previously lost territory (Lampe, 2018). The combination of these attacks led to the Serbs agreeing to participate in peace talks in Dayton, Ohio in the United States (Lampe, 2018). According to the Dayton Accords, 51 percent of the land would be under the control of the FBiH, a Croat-Bosniak entity, and 49 percent would be controlled by RS (Lampe, 2018). The peace agreement was signed on 14 December 1995 (UCDP\(^{10}\)). A 60 000-member NATO-led force was deployed to ensure the implementation of the agreement (Lampe, 2018).

The Bosnian conflict was one of the most brutal conflicts in Europe since World War II with around 100 000 people killed, more than 2 million people displaced and civilian populations suffering from atrocities such as the rape of an estimated minimum of 12 000 Bosniak women (Crowe, 2013: 343). The Dayton Accords ended the violence in BiH, however the Bosnian society today remains deeply ethnically divided and suffers from weak political institutions and economy.

‘The Troubles’: the conflict in Northern Ireland

The Troubles refers to an armed conflict between the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British government over a period of thirty years (UCDP\(^{11}\)). The central

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\(^{9}\) http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/346  
\(^{10}\) http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/389  
\(^{11}\) http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/315
element in the conflict was the status of Northern Ireland: the unionist and Protestant majority wanted to remain part of the United Kingdom and the nationalist and republican Catholic minority wanted to become part of the Republic of Ireland (‘The Troubles’, BBC). Similarly to other such conflicts, the Northern Ireland conflict is several hundred years old with tensions existing at least from the 17th century onwards when England colonised Ireland. In the 18th century, the tensions had grown to violent clashes between Irish Catholics and English Protestants. As a result of Catholic riots, tough regulations were imposed on the Catholic population (UCDP\textsuperscript{12}). In the early 1920s, the northern part of Ireland came under British rule and the southern part remained under Irish rule.

Dissatisfaction with the way the unionist-dominated Northern Ireland parliament dealt with social issues led to violence in the late 1960s (The Troubles, BBC). By 1969, the IRA had become two organisations: the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA with the Provisional IRA campaigning for independence and eventually becoming known as the IRA (UCDP\textsuperscript{13}). As two British policemen died from an IRA bomb in 1970, rioting in the 1960s became a low intensity conflict (Darby, 2003; UCDP\textsuperscript{14}). In 1971, the conflict was already growing with intense fighting between the IRA and the British Army (UCDP\textsuperscript{15}). Throughout the 1970s, the IRA used bombs in Northern Ireland and increasingly also on the mainland in the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, more than 3500 had died as a result of the conflict (The Troubles, BBC). Over 2000 of these people were civilian with around 1270 Catholic and 730 Protestant dead (Kelters, 2013). Even though the number of casualties decreased significantly in the 1990s, attacks continued (UCDP\textsuperscript{16}). The violence further deepened any existing divisions between the communities.

Between 1974 and 1994, several attempts were made to reach a settlement, all of which included power-sharing between Catholics and Protestants (Darby, 2003). The Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 was the first serious attempt to solve the Northern Ireland conflict. The Irish government gained an advisory role and the Agreement declared that a change to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only happen if the people of Northern Ireland consented to it (The Troubles, BBC). The Agreement encountered

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\textsuperscript{15} \text{http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/315}
\textsuperscript{16} \text{http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/315}
opposition from both sides and it was not until 1994 that the IRA declared a ceasefire, which lasted until 1996 (The Troubles, BBC; UCDP\textsuperscript{17}). Although the ceasefire collapsed, the peace process continued (Darby, 2003). In 1997, the new Labour government in Britain allowed a previously banned Sinn Féin to participate in the talks on the condition that the IRA declared a ceasefire, which it agreed to do (Darby, 2003). Moreover, President Bill Clinton of the United States appointed US senator George Mitchell as chair of the talks (The Troubles, BBC). In 1998, the Good Friday Agreement was signed. Although the full implementation of the agreement has been a challenge, a fragile peace in Northern Ireland stands.

The conflict in Timor-Leste

The origins of the conflict in Timor-Leste date back to the country’s colonial history. East Timor is located on the eastern part of the island of Timor and was under Portugal’s colonial rule for more than 400 years (ReliefWeb, 1999). The first Portuguese settlement dates back to the mid-16\textsuperscript{th} century (UCDP\textsuperscript{18}). Competition with Dutch settlers led to the Western half of the island falling under the rule of the Netherlands with Portugal remaining in control of the Eastern part in mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century (Central Intelligence Agency). Japan briefly annexed the territory during World War II with Portugal re-establishing its colonial authority following the end of the war (UCDP\textsuperscript{19}). Meanwhile, Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands in 1949 and a civil war broke out in 1965 amidst growing political instability (ReliefWeb, 1999). Led by General Suharto, Indonesia launched a campaign to crush rebel opposition to the prevailing regime with at least 300,000 rebels killed as a result (ReliefWeb, 1999). The violence from Indonesia did not reach Timor-Leste until the Portuguese revolution in 1974 and subsequent rapid decolonisation (UCDP\textsuperscript{20}). While Timor-Leste hoped to gain independence, General Suharto launched a campaign to include Timor-Leste under Indonesia’s rule (ReliefWeb, 1999). Skirmishes between pro-Indonesian groups and the popular socialist movement The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) did lead to a brief declaration of independence in 1975. However, Indonesia, fearing that Timor-Leste would set a
precedent for other separatist movements within Indonesia, invaded the island on 7 December 1975. By 1976, Timor-Leste had become the 27th province of Indonesia (UCDP\textsuperscript{21}).

Indonesian rule over the island was fraught with numerous human rights violations. According to human rights groups, thousands of civilians died and entire villages were destroyed in the hands of the advancing Indonesian army (ReliefWeb, 1999). In addition, Indonesia commenced the repopulation of the island with Indonesians and banned the teaching of Timorese language (ReliefWeb, 1999). Fretilin and its armed grouping Falintil continued its resistance, however it was ultimately suppressed as a result of a growing military offensive from the Indonesian army. During Indonesia’s brutal rule over the island between 1975 and 1999, up to 250,000 people died (Central Intelligence Agency).

In the late 1980s, Falintil separated from Fretilin to form a national army. While the Timorese struggled against Indonesia’s occupation, the international community was largely disinterested and even supported General Suharto in the 1970s and 1980s, when Fretilin was perceived as a communist threat. The United States especially supported Indonesia by training their military personnel and providing military aid (UCDP\textsuperscript{22}). Despite pulling out from Timor-Leste in 1975, Portugal began supporting the independence of Timor-Leste and campaigned for the involvement of the UN in talks between Portugal and Indonesia (UCPD\textsuperscript{23}). Lobbying from Portugal, the Timorese diaspora abroad and rebel and civilian protests eventually managed to gain the interest of the international community in the late 1980s. In 1998, Indonesia experienced a severe economic downturn, which led to the resignation of General Suharto (ReliefWeb, 1999). UN-mediated talks between Portugal and Indonesia resulted in a referendum on the independence of Timor-Leste. Indonesia largely underestimated the extent of pro-independence forces in Timor-Leste and did not launch any major campaigns to persuade the Timorese to vote for autonomy within Indonesia (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001: 23). In August 1999, 78.6% of the population of Timor-Leste voted for independence (UCDP\textsuperscript{24}). Violence followed and Timor-Leste’s infrastructure was severely damaged, including

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water supply systems, electric grids, homes and schools as a result of the activities of pro-
Indonesian militias (Central Intelligence Agency). A significant proportion of the
population, at least 300,000 fled to the mountains or West Timor (Rabasa and Chalk,
2001: 23). A further 1400 East Timorese were killed (Central Intelligence Agency).
Claims from Indonesia maintained that the violence was largely between pro-
integrationist and pro-independence Timorese. The rhetoric from Indonesia emphasised
that Indonesia’s presence was required or the two main groups in Timor-Leste would turn
on each other. However, Falintil forces demonstrated restraint and avoided attacking the
militias, which meant that the violence remained one-sided and severely damaged
Indonesia’s reputation (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001: 23). Eventually, a UN-sanctioned and
Australian-led peacekeeping force arrived to stop the violence and in 2002, Timor-Leste
became an independent state with former leader of Fretilin Xanana Gusmão becoming
the first president.

While the UN peacekeeping mission finished its mandate in 2005, Timor-Leste
relapsed into violence in March 2006 and an Australian peacekeeping force was deployed
(Freedom House, 2007). Clashes in the capital Dili began when a third of the East Timor
Defense Force (FDTL) were dismissed (Freedom House, 2007). The members organised
a strike to protest poor working conditions and ethnic discrimination by those from the
east (the Lorosae) against those from the West (the Loromonu). Frustration with the
government’s inability to curtail poverty, unemployment and corruption eventually led to
the formation of gangs. FDTL clashed with the police and killed ten officers, a further 25
people died in the unrest and 150,000 Dili residents were displaced (Freedom House,
2008b). According to Scambary (2009: 272), the 2006 conflict was characterised by three
main phases: 1) a political crisis and clashes among security forces, 2) an ethnic gang-
based conflict between supporters of those dismissed from the FDTL (the Petitioners) and
supporters of the FDTL, 3) a more fluid conflict with shifting allegiances that spread
further from Dili. During the first two phases, groups identified themselves along ethnic
lines and campaigned for a common purpose. The third phase was based around smaller,
family-based units in rural Timor-Leste (Scambary, 2009: 282). While president Gusmão
retained his popularity, anti-Fretelin sentiments ran high and eventually led to the
resignation of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, amidst allegations of instigating the violence.
Furthermore, a UN report published in October of the same year blamed Alkatiri for the
violence and unrest characterised by east-west tensions resumed. The established UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) authorised a police presence in Timor-Leste and restored stability (Freedom House, 2007). Currently, while Timor-Leste’s democratic institutions and the judicial system remain fragile, the country has made significant progress. Transfers of power have remained peaceful, new political parties have emerged and the state pursues a policy of reconciliation. Freedom House (2018) now classifies Timor-Leste as ‘free’.
4 Analysis

The peace agreements form the foundation of post-conflict peacebuilding in each of the case studies. The aim of the first part of this chapter is to look at the way in which the peace agreements have contributed to the emergence of either inclusive or exclusive hybridity. The underlying foundation of the peace in the form of the peace agreements can provide insight into how the peace is expected to function. Have the peace agreements managed to create a peace that is ‘legitimate’, supported both from above and below (Caspersen, 2017: 10)? Why are we able to witness cases characterised more by inclusive hybridity than exclusive hybridity and how have the initial peace agreements contributed to their emergence? Can elements of the peace agreements be identified as conducive to a peace that can be characterised as hybrid? Of course, the success with which the conditions outlined in the peace agreements have been implemented varies and raises an important question of whether the resulting peace and thus, the peace agreement itself, is sustainable. In order to assess this, the peace agreements will be analysed according to three pillars, derived from the theoretical framework and necessary for the ‘in-betweenness’ of the hybrid peace to emerge. These three pillars are democracy, justice and legitimacy. To assess the presence of these pillars in the peace agreements, a number of indicators are used in each of the cases. The aim of this part of the chapter is not to assess whether the peace agreements have been successful per se but rather to evaluate them based on a set of defined criteria in order to identify elements in peace agreements that are likely to result in a hybrid peace. For the purposes of this thesis, the division between ‘success’ and ‘failure’ is not of crucial importance. What is important, however, is the resulting peace mechanism and whether the peace agreement has provided conditions for the grass-roots level to participate in the peace process or whether a top-down approach has prevailed.

The second part of my analysis focuses on the process that followed the signing of the peace agreements and whether there is compliance in the implementation phases with the three pillars of the hybrid peace. The same set of indicators are applied to the case studies in order to assess the post-conflict situation. The findings are then used in the discussion to assess the presence or absence of inclusive hybridity. Each part of the analysis begins by introducing the pillar and the indicators, which are then applied to each
of the case studies. Finally, the findings and their implications for the hybrid peace are discussed.

4.1 The peace agreements
This part of the thesis uses an in-depth analysis of the peace agreements of the four case studies. The aim is to gain an understanding of whether the agreements contain elements that are likely to contribute to the development of the either two types of the hybrid peace. The agreements were selected based on one main criterion: as the cases are all self-determination conflicts with an ethno-nationalist element, I require the peace agreement to attempt to find a solution to these types of conflicts. The agreements are all from a similar time period, 1995-1999 and due to their self-determination nature, are more comparable than other intrastate conflicts. Although the Rambouillet Accords and Resolution 1244, which gave affect to it in Kosovo was not a peace agreement in the very strict sense of the term, it nevertheless outlined a process for ending the violence and establishing a democratic political framework. Thus, it can be understood as a peace process agreement, an agreement that outlines a peace process for achieving an outcome, and is included in the analysis (Högbladh, 2011: 40). Analysing the peace agreements from the perspective of the hybrid peace did pose a challenge in that scholarly attention on the hybrid peace has so far not focused on the peace agreements and their role in the emergence of the hybrid peace. For that reason, I developed indicators for the three pillars of the hybrid peace, which I suggested in the theoretical framework of the thesis. The pillars will be introduced below.

4.1.1 Pillar I – Democracy
The first pillar, democracy, is derived from the theoretical foundations of the liberal peace. As the hybrid peace contains forms derived from the liberal understandings of peace, democratic political institutions remain crucial for its functioning. The extent to which the first pillar is represented in the peace agreements, is summarised in Table 3.
Both indicators 1.1 and 1.2 are elements of the liberal peace framework and are derived from the Agenda for Peace (1992), which states that the responsibility of the UN includes “rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife” and “reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation”. As a result, according to the victor’s peace, the institutional peace and the constitutional peace, democratic institutions are necessary for the establishment of a sustainable peace. As discussed in previous chapters, a hybrid peace includes these institutions and measures in addition to the inclusiveness of the peace locally.

The language of democratisation is present in the Kosovo peace agreements. In Resolution 1244, indicators 1.1 and 1.2 are mentioned simultaneously in the context of the development of democratic institutions necessary for self-governance and include the holding of elections (p. 4, emphasis added). Indicator 1.1 is present to a greater extent in the Rambouillet Accords: the central framework of the Accords includes the “right to participate in free and fair elections”. Chapter 3 of the Accords focuses on elections in even greater detail, outlining the exact conditions that are necessary for their organisation. The Accords have adopted an approach that uses inclusive language with special emphasis on an open and safe environment with all communities included in the process. The most relevant conditions in terms of indicator 1.1 include assertions that elections need to be conducted in “an open and free political environment” and characterised by “a safe and secure environment”, which is “representative of the population of Kosovo in terms of national communities and political parties” (p. 41). At first glance, therefore, the Kosovo peace agreements establish an environment for free and fair elections. Indicator 1.2 is another central element in democratising post-conflict societies. The universalising character of the liberal peace is evident from the way in which Resolution 1244 establishes Kosovo’s interim administration tasked with developing democratic self-governing institutions, which would ensure “conditions for a peaceful and normal life for

Table 3. Democracy

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all inhabitants in Kosovo” (p. 6, emphasis added). The Resolution thus suggests that without the establishment of democratic institutions, Kosovo would not be included in the broader European security framework. It could be argued that stability is also a key issue here, as the Resolution was concerned with the maintenance of a stable international order in a more broader sense. For that to happen, post-conflict states would need to adopt certain norms and principles. The exact conditions under which Kosovo’s self-governing institutions were to be established, are set in the Rambouillet Accords, which states that the “institutions of Kosovo shall exercise their authorities consistent with the terms of this Agreement” (p. 9). In terms of governance, the Accords establish the Kosovo Assembly, the President of Kosovo and the Government with detailed provisions on their election and responsibilities.

Indicator 1.1 is present to a large extent in the Bosnian peace agreement, the Dayton Accords. Elections are considered as crucial to the establishment of democracy and a representative government (Annex 3). The Dayton Accords establish the conditions for organising elections and emphasises a “politically neutral environment” in which citizens are able to “vote in secret without fear or intimidation” (Annex 3, art. I). In addition, indicator 1.2 provides a few noteworthy points. Firstly, the rigidity with which the power-sharing element is established is evident throughout the Accords. Institutions in BiH take into account the rights of each constituent group: the Parliamentary Assembly and the Presidency each consist of a set number of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. For example, the House of Peoples, one of the chambers of the parliament, includes five Bosniaks, five Serbs and five Croats (Annex 4, art. IV). This highly ethnically divided approach allows little room for the inclusion of any other group. Secondly, another key element of the Dayton Accords is the way in which they establish a highly decentralised institutional structure, while at the same time remaining relatively ambiguous. The Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS), are largely responsible for governmental functions and institutions within their own constituencies. The Accords do state, however, that the central state can acquire additional responsibilities on the basis of “sovereignty” and “political independence” and maintains the right for the creation of additional institutions in order to carry out these responsibilities, therefore strengthening the central state (Annex 4, art. III). As a result,

25 For a longer discussion, see institutional peace in Chapter 2.
the inclusiveness of the institutions comes into question. The political power-sharing structure is not undermined as such, however, the power of the entities could be diminished in favour of the largest group (Belloni cited in Caspersen, 2017: 82).

The Good Friday Agreement establishes elections (indicator 1.1) in Northern Ireland to take place according to existing Westminster constituencies. Indicator 1.2 is also applicable to the Good Friday Agreement, which establishes the Assembly in Northern Ireland, to be elected according to the single transferable vote to ensure proportional representation (p. 7). The Agreement also establishes safeguards that ensures that “all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions” (p. 7), referring to the legislative and executive powers of the Assembly. What is noteworthy about the Good Friday Agreement is the way in which it differs from the Kosovo and BiH peace agreements, although following a similar power-sharing structure. While the Good Friday Agreement follows consociationalist practices in the formation of its power-sharing institutions, it does so without the allocation of ethnic quotas. Instead, seats are allocated depending on party strength and Ministers elected according to how many seats parties have acquired in the Assembly (p. 9). Defining the agreement in non-ethnic terms could potentially allow for divisions between groups to become less pronounced.

The East Timor Agreement was devised with an aim of establishing an autonomous region within the Republic of Indonesia. The Agreement sets out conditions for an independence referendum and notes that if the proposed autonomy is not acceptable to the people of Timor-Leste, Indonesia would restore the state to its pre-1976 status. Timor-Leste would then, under the authority of the UN, begin a transition towards independence (p. 7). Nevertheless, both indicators 1.1 and 1.2 are represented in the Agreement as it establishes the SARET (Special Autonomous Region of East Timor), which would have been responsible for all matters except for defence, foreign relations and economic policies (p. 9, p. 10). The Agreement also establishes the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET as the legislative power, elected by the population (p. 14). The executive power was set to be exercised by a Governor and an Advisory Board upon the recommendation of the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET (p. 15). The provisions for democratic governance for independent Timor-Leste are set in the 2002 Constitution.
4.1.2 Pillar II - Justice

Similarly to democracy, rule of law and a functioning judiciary are necessary for the hybrid peace. The extent to which they are present suggests whether the peace is more likely to more inclusive or exclusive. The findings based on the peace agreements are summarised in Table 4.

Table 4. Justice

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Resolution 1244 refers to the Rambouillet Agreement when detailing the development of institutions for Kosovo’s self-government (p. 3). Indicator 2.1 is applicable to Chapter 1 (Annex V) of the Rambouillet Agreement (p. 18), which establishes Kosovo’s judiciary. When referring to the establishment of the judiciary, the Agreement adopts a broad ethnic approach and follows consociational power-sharing principles. For example, at least one of the Constitutional and Supreme Court’s nine judges must be from each national community, as specified in the Agreement (p. 19, 20). This is done according to ethnic thresholds: 10 seats are reserved for national communities whose members constitute more than 0.5 per cent but less than 5 per cent of the Kosovo population and the remaining 30 seats are left for populations whose members constitute more than 5 per cent of Kosovo’s population (p. 12). At the level of District and Communal courts, the Assembly determines their number. While the language in the Agreement is not as ethnically defined as it is in the case of BiH, the Agreement nevertheless notes that judges should be “broadly representative of the national communities of Kosovo”, therefore still remaining true to the general power-sharing structure (p. 20).

Indicator 2.1 is also applicable in the Bosnian context. When establishing the court structure, the Dayton Accords are characterised by the consociational power-sharing structure also evident elsewhere in the Accords. Thus, while non-dominant communities were included to an extent in the Rambouillet Accords, the Dayton Accords allocate members to the Constitutional Court solely from FBiH (four members) and RS (two members) (Annex 4, Art. VI). Additionally, the top-down structure of the judiciary is
evident from the way in which three members are appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights (Annex 4, Art. VI).

The Good Friday Agreement differs from the Kosovo and BiH peace agreements in that the Agreement itself does not explicitly set out conditions for the judiciary. It instead makes references to a separate review of criminal justice, planned to be completed in the Autumn of 1999. The Agreement makes frequent references to the community as a whole when discussing the criminal justice system and uses language that is less ethnically defined than in the cases of Kosovo and BiH. For example, according to the Agreement, the justice system is to take into account the community’s concerns and encourage its involvement. In addition, the aims of the justice system are explained as having “the confidence of all parts of the community” (p. 23, emphasis added), therefore using language that is more inclusive than in the previous two cases.

Although being applicable also to the East Timor Agreement, indicator 2.1 is treated more vaguely than in previous cases, no doubt owing to the still uncertain future of East-Timor at the time of the signing of the Agreement. The Agreement establishes the creation of an independent judiciary administered through Courts of First Instance, however the number and appointment of judges is not explicitly stated as the Courts will consist of as many judges “as may be required for the proper administration of justice” (p. 17).

As was to be expected, human rights as measured by indicator 2.2, are present in all the peace agreements of the four case studies. The way in which human rights are addressed and how they are prioritized, however, can have implications for the longer term stability of the peace. The general rhetoric of the peace agreements is favouring towards upholding fundamental human rights and references to human rights are frequent. Resolution 1244 states that the international civil presence is responsible for „protecting and promoting human rights in Kosovo (p. 4). Moreover, the Rambouillet Accords make frequent references to “human rights and fundamental freedoms” in the context of Kosovo’s self-governing institutions and authorities, the justice system, national communities and law enforcement (p. 9, p. 20, p. 21, p. 28). In addition, the Accords establish an Ombudsman, tasked with monitoring the rights of national communities and the realisation of the human rights of the population of Kosovo (p. 55). The position of the Ombudsman is externally implemented, in that candidates cannot be citizens of states
or neighbours of the former Yugoslavia and candidate lists are prepared by the European Court of Human Rights.

Table 5. Human rights in peace agreements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>Rhetoric</th>
<th>Institutional arrangements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Caspersen 2017; author.

The Dayton Accords also make references to human rights and includes an internationally recognised list of what adherence to human rights entails. This includes such freedoms as the right to life, freedom of expression, right to education and so forth (Annex 4, Art. II). In addition, the Accords establish a Commission on Human Rights, consisting of the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber (Annex 6, Art. II). The Accords transfer the operation of the Commission to the central state five years after the Agreement enters into force, unless agreed otherwise by the Parties to the Agreement (Annex 6, Art. IV). The Ombudsman, therefore, remains appointed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) until the transfer after which the Presidency of BiH takes over. The Human Rights Chamber operates according to the general power-sharing structure of BiH with members from FBiH and RS allocated according to ethnic quotas (Annex 6, Art. VII). Additionally, the Accords encourage cooperation with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations that specialise in the promotion of human rights (Annex 6, Art. XIII).

The Good Friday Agreement mentions “the protection and vindication of the human rights of all” when referring to past grievances and the suffering experienced by the population of Northern Ireland. The language is forward-looking in that it establishes the Agreement as a “fresh start”, through which the human rights of all will be protected, while at the same time acknowledging that the past legacies of violence should not be forgotten (p. 2). Thus, the Agreement establishes a slightly different tone from the other three Agreements from the beginning, attempting to speak to the people of Northern Ireland in relatively emotional language. Furthermore, the Agreement establishes a Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, which would take on a more extended role
than the previously established Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, and with an aim of advising the Government, promoting awareness of human rights and other such matters (p. 19). The Agreement also includes provisions for the Irish Government, in a similar manner to Northern Ireland, with a goal of strengthening “the protection of human rights in its jurisdiction” (p. 19).

The East Timor Agreement discusses the status of human rights in Article 46 of the Agreement but does not establish any institutions tasked with the implementation of human rights. An institution similar to the ones in the other three cases, the Provedor for Human Rights and Justice (PDHJ), was established under Law No. 7/2004, once Timor-Leste had become independent and adopted the 2002 Constitution. In the peace agreement, human rights language is confined within Article 46, which simply states the protection, promotion and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

### 4.1.3 Pillar III - Legitimacy

Any peace agreement will need to have a degree of legitimacy. This is often confined to the parties of the peace agreement, which will ensure short-term stability but not long-term sustainability. Peace agreements tend to focus on peace as state-building and result in narrow agreements that follow a standard procedure. As a result, the agreements follow a top-down structure and tend not to focus on the rights of individuals or smaller groups, which is important for local legitimacy. The extent to which this pillar is represented in the peace agreements can be seen in Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>BiH</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>East-Timor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted by Caspersen (2017: 97), agreements based on power-sharing and autonomy usually tend to ensure the rights of the majority groups. These groups are usually parties to the peace agreement as they are the groups who are most concerned with maintaining their power and consequently have the ability to disrupt the signing of the peace agreement if their rights are not included. Minority groups, which may include such
groups as women or smaller ethnic communities, as can be seen in Table 7, are thus often excluded.

**Table 7. Community rights.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>BiH</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Timor-Leste</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The rights of women</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority rights</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such is the case in the Dayton Accords, which make only fleeting references to indicator 3.1 in a chapter on refugees and displaced persons, which ensures “the protection of ethnic and/or minority populations” (Annex 7, Art. I). Gender equality is not mentioned in the Accords beyond a list of human rights conventions applicable to BiH. While Resolution 1244 makes no reference to community rights, the Rambouillet Accords establish national community rights, which allow national communities to “preserve and protect their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities” (p. 22). The Accords list a number of ways in which this can be done, including displaying flags and symbols and establishing educational and religious institutions. The Accords make a separate reference to the Republic Serbia by mentioning that Serbia’s national symbols can be displayed (p. 23). The Good Friday Agreement similarly mentions the right to display national symbols but in a way which develops “mutual respect rather than division” (p. 21). The Agreement ensures the respect and tolerance for the various languages of the ethnic communities, referring to them as being “part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland” (p. 21). Special attention is given to the promotion and encouragement of the use of the Irish language (p. 21). The Good Friday Agreement differs significantly from other peace agreements in that it makes explicit references to gender equality. For example, the Agreement states “the right of women to full and equal political participation” and the British Government’s responsibility to promote social inclusion in Northern Ireland, “including in particular community development and the advancement of women in public life” (p. 18, p. 20). Additionally, the Agreement guarantees “equal opportunity regardless of gender” (p. 18). The East Timor Agreement is relatively brief on the topic of group and individual rights, noting only “the right of
everyone to enjoy and participate in his or her culture” (p. 20). Most notably, the East Timor Agreement also includes “the right of women to full and equal participation in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life” (p. 20).

The notion of the civil society (indicator 3.2), considered important both by international peacebuilders in terms of its presence in maintaining organisations promoting the liberal peace agenda and by the hybrid peace in empowering women and youth groups and local grassroots activists, is largely absent from the initial peace agreements. The East Timor Agreement does not mention the civil society. The Dayton Accords mention NGOs but only in cooperation with international organisations and makes no reference to what their role would be (Annex 4, Art. V). The civil society is mentioned in the Rambouillet Agreement in terms of the role the international community is expected to play in the peacebuilding process, noting their “assistance to reinforce civil society” (p. 48). The Good Friday Agreement, on the other hand, again slightly differs from the other agreements. It is the only agreement that refers to community-based initiatives and their role in reconciliation practices. It draws attention to the difficulties faced by young people and the readiness of the conflict parties to provide assistance to grassroots organisations in supporting them (p. 20). Moreover, the Agreement notes that developing “reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect between and within communities and traditions” plays an important part in consolidating peace (p. 20, emphasis added). Finally, what is also noteworthy is the way the Agreement mentions services that are “sensitive to the needs of victims” and the role voluntary organisations are expected to play in “facilitating locally-based self-help and support networks” (p. 20, emphasis added).

4.2 Interim findings

Analysing the peace agreements from the perspective of the hybrid peace can allow for a discussion of preliminary findings. To answer the first research question, the three pillars of the hybrid peace were generally well represented in the peace agreements. Additionally, it was to be expected that peace agreements signed in the late 1990s would follow a fairly standard model. The language of human rights adds international legitimacy to the agreement and was present in at least some form in all the agreements. Peace understood as institution-building largely prevailed and was imposed externally,
facilitated by power-sharing arrangements. With a few exceptions, especially in the case of Northern Ireland, little room was left for community and individual rights. Yet, there are a few points that merit discussion in the context of the hybrid peace.

Firstly, all the agreements in question used a form of power-sharing. At the heart of all power-sharing agreements is the question of power: how much political power will groups and elites have after the peace agreement is signed? Therefore, self-determination conflicts will most likely end in power-sharing agreements. It is not likely that all the demands of the groups will be met but since dominant groups are also more willing to make compromises if they know they will be able to either retain or gain power, the achievement of peace is also more likely. The most widely used model of power-sharing, consociational democracy, is also the most problematic, especially in that it allows little room for integration and reconciliation. Such was the case of BiH and Kosovo, both of which are examples of ethnically defined peace agreements. The Dayton Accords followed the consociational model closely: institutions were established along ethnic divides, undoubtedly with an aim of addressing the concerns of the three most dominant ethnic groups. Ethnic quotas were also allocated in the Kosovo Assembly and courts according to ethnic community population size. Caspersen (2017: 75) argues that a significant criticism of consociational democracy is that it tends to entrench ethnic identities. Indeed, the peace agreements accommodated the largest ethnic groups using a system, which expects people to vote along ethnic lines, effectively cementing the narratives of the ethnic groups. Such agreements do not support the emergence of any other identities and remain divisive even in the case of changing identities. Besides the East Timor Agreement, which used territorial power-sharing as opposed to political, the Good Friday Agreement established its institutions in electoral rather than ethnic terms, which was contrary to Kosovo and BiH. In addition to providing immediate stability, this arrangement can have the potential to add inclusiveness and flexibility to the peace process to a greater extent than cases that favour ethnic quotas, simply because it refrains from reproducing the ethnic symbols that were used during the conflict. As a result, non-ethnic agreements have a greater potential for later sustainability of the peace since arrangements that are not ethnically impartial are less likely to induce reconciliation and depend on intra-community relations, which remain divided due to the ethnic character of the peace agreement. Even if the difference is largely down to the use of language and
it is well-known how the conflict parties will designate themselves when it comes to voting, less ethnically defined agreements provide a more inclusive solution to the complex process of drafting a peace agreement.

Secondly, the inclusion of human rights at the level of language and even more so at the level of institutions is likely to ease the inclusion of human rights in the post-agreement phase if the parties to the agreement have already agreed to their provisions (Caspersen, 2017: 113). Additionally, human rights serve the purpose of legitimising the peace agreement, both externally in the eyes of the international community and internally, by the conflict parties. The peace agreements strongly lean towards group rights rather than individual rights and often do so by vaguely mentioning the parties’ commitment to human rights or referring to international human rights treaties, as was the case with the Dayton Accords. References to ‘others’ are rare and while the rights of the most dominant groups are usually included, the peace agreements tend not to focus on the rights of non-dominant groups. The East Timor Agreement to a lesser and the Good Friday Agreement to a greater extent were notable in that they included gender equality and the rights of women in the agreements. The agreements also often refer to the responsibilities of the international community to support the establishment of human rights institutions according to international best practice. Because the peace agreements set conditions for future action, the lack of attention on non-dominant groups can have an impact on the implementation phase of peace process.

Thirdly, engagement with the civil society is important, however should not be constrained to NGOs and should include a variety of community groups, including women and youth groups, grassroots activists etc (The Berlin Report of the Human Security Study Group, 2016: 13). While supporting civil society organisations that consist mainly of NGOs ensures that these organisations support the activities and share the values of the peacebuilders, it is not likely to have an impact on the wider society as these NGOs do not resonate with the local populations. In the context of the hybrid peace, efforts should be made for including a variety of actors at the stage of peace negotiations that come from the grassroots community who are able to better represent the needs of the local communities. Including smaller groups in addition to those who are able to veto the peace agreement is not an easy task as it would require a significant amount of
compromises (Caspersen, 2017: 156). Yet, achieving local legitimacy is crucial for the achievement of a sustainable peace as it reduces the likelihood of instability.

To conclude, the development of a more inclusive hybrid peace is more likely when the peace agreements are less ethnically defined, include individual rights in addition to group based rights, include the development of legitimate political authority and encourage engagement with the civil society, not simply at the level of NGOs but also at the level of grassroots activists who are able to further reconciliation. Overall, instead of a top-down peace agreement, what is needed is a process that is inclusive both locally and globally, which includes the rights of local communities, focuses on individual rights and refrains from entrenching ethnic narratives. The current peace agreements focus on stability rather than sustainability in fear of reigniting the conflict and while violence will most likely not recur, reconciliation remains unlikely. Both locally and globally legitimate peace agreements devised according to an inclusive process are also less likely to cause to resistance within and between the communities and prevent the emergence of a hybrid peace that is exclusive in nature.

4.3 The post-conflict peacebuilding processes
While assessing the peace agreements allows us to identify certain key characteristics that are more representative of a more inclusive type of hybrid peace at the foundation stage of peacebuilding, what is most enlightening in terms of the hybrid peace is the process that followed the signing of the intrastate peace agreements and the way in which the provisions outlined in the peace agreements were fulfilled. For that, a number of documents relevant to the implementation process were analysed using the same indicators that were used in the assessment of the peace agreements.

4.3.1 Pillar I - Democracy
Indicators 1.1 and 1.2 include the holding of free and fair elections and the establishment functioning of democratic institutions respectively. As shown in Table 8, democracy is indeed represented in all the cases to a greater or lesser extent. Compliance with indicator 1.1 is slightly higher than with indicator 1.2. However, as the analysis shows, there is some variance in terms of the extent to which the indicators are represented in each of the case studies.
Table 8. Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>BiH</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Timor-Leste</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
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<td>Partly</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Kosovo**

All the documents from the implementation phase of the peace in Kosovo demonstrate efforts to adhere to the liberal peace framework and indicator 1.1 can generally be considered as applicable. For example, the 1999 Resolution 1244 implementation report (S/1999/779), discusses provisions set out in both indicators. Firstly, the report notes that a key element in the development of “free, fair and multi-ethnic elections” is efforts by UNMIK to conduct “wide-ranging activities” related to the “restoration of democratic political organizations and institutions” with special emphasis on voter registration, which was considered a challenge due to the unavailability of public records (p. 17). Secondly, the report notes that UNMIK will establish programmes and train officials in order to further the development of democratic institutions, while preserving existing structures as much as possible (p. 16). Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, an International Steering Group was formed to support the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, which outlined the status settlement conditions for Kosovo, following increased tensions between the Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb communities, and the Kosovo Assembly’s resolution declaring that the people of Kosovo supported self-determination. Indicator 1.1 is applicable to the Plan as it requires Kosovo to “organize general and municipal elections” according to international standards (Art. 10, 10.5). Indicator 1.2 is applicable to an extent that the Plan refers to a new Constitution in establishing the institutions that are necessary for a functioning democracy and includes provisions for the content of the Constitution, including the number of seats allocated to each community in the Kosovo Assembly according to the power-sharing format with 20 seats out of a total of 120 being reserved for community members (Serb, Roma, Egyptian, Ashkali, Bosniak, Turkish, Gorani (p. 12). Indicator 1.1 is also applicable to Kosovo as evidenced by the latest Resolution 1244 implementation report S/2018/76, which notes that in 2017 municipal elections were held in Kosovo. The elections were deemed as
generally competitive, however in Kosovo Serb communities, intimidation towards non-Serbian list candidates and supporters occurred, which indicates that tensions between the communities remain part of the everyday. People continued to vote along ethnic lines, especially in North Kosovo (p. 1, p. 3). In addition, turnout in the most recent Kosovo Assembly elections in 2017 was a little over 41% (KQZ, 2017). This is connected to a general lack of political will in Kosovo to conform to the institution-building measures required under the liberal peace framework. Nevertheless, Kosovo’s elections are generally well-administered and can be considered as relatively free and fair (Freedom House, 2017a). Progress in implementing measures to improve the democratic framework of the country continues to be slow, however, and full implementation of reform to ensure inclusiveness remains stagnant. In other words, the mechanisms are there but implementation remains problematic. The government is not likely to gain a significant rise in approval ratings among the population (Freedom House, 2017a). Indicator 1.2 was not discussed in report S/2018/76, most likely owing to the fact that institution-building mechanisms are already in place. Thus, the main issue in Kosovo seems to be that once relevant democratic institution-building mechanisms have been established, the international community is content (Franks and Richmond, 2008: 91). How these operations operate and whether they do so according to an inclusive process is another matter entirely and not one that is receiving attention.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

BiH continues to struggle with the implementation of democratic reforms to an even greater extent than Kosovo and while the documents stress the importance of conditions included in both indicators, the implementation aspect remains weak. While elections are not discussed in Resolution 1031, which is an implementation document of the Dayton Accords and transfers authority from the UN Protection Force to the multinational implementation force (IFOR), the document welcomes an agreement put forward by the OSCE on the implementation of elections according to criteria set in the peace agreement, as prescribed by indicator 1.1 Indicator 1.1 is present in implementation report S/2008/300, which notes that inter-communal tensions remain to a relatively large extent and that this would be reflected in upcoming elections (p. 5). In addition, fewer members of minority communities were expected to win seats on municipal councils (p. 5).
Indicator 1.2 is also present in S/2008/300 as the document refers to “attempts to weaken progressively the institutions and legitimacy of the State” and “tensions between political actors”, most likely referring to resistance coming from RS (p. 20). The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council reaffirms the readiness of the international community to utilise “necessary instruments to counter destructive tendencies” and that any unilateral changes to the constitution would not be tolerated (p. 20). The latest implementation report S/2017/922 addresses several negative occurrences regarding democracy in BiH. Firstly, in a pre-election environment, “divisive, nationalistic” issues were brought to the forefront (p. 3). This meant that any progress made on real reforms was unlikely as the political environment remained ethnically hardened with ethnic divisions “exploited and amplified” (p. 5). For example, any agreement that would enable local elections in Mostar, which has not had any local elections since 2008, was yet again met with failure (p. 15). Secondly, the performance of legislative and executive institutions as prescribed in indicator 1.2, was fraught with inefficiency with little legislative output, stagnation in the adoption of legislation and frictional encounters between the State and the RS, the latter of which also continues its past practices of denying the High Representative access to official information (p. 13, p. 14, p. 16).

**Northern Ireland**

While the St Andrews Agreement and the Fresh Start Agreement do not specifically address elections, it is clear from the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement that a stable and democratic elections system in Northern Ireland is in place. Elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly are conducted according to the single transferable vote system, in eighteen constituencies with six seats per constituency (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016: 170). Those who vote can largely be divided into two groups: the more conservative group comprised largely of older people who are also more likely to vote and the younger, more liberal group who are also less likely to participate in politics (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016: 173). Similarly, 1.2 is also applicable to Northern Ireland. The St Andrews Agreement reiterates the commitment of UK and Irish governments to the “fundamental principles of the Agreement: consent for constitutional change, commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic means…” and proposes a number of changes to the existing institutions in order to increase efficiency.
For example, it establishes a statutory ministerial Code, which requires ministers to act according to the Code. The aim of the Code is to ensure the participation and protection of “all sections of the community” for the benefit of the functioning of the institutions (Annex A, pt. 2). In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement initiates some institutional changes in order to improve devolution, including decreasing the number of Assembly members per constituency (p. 8, p. 35). While the devolved state experiences periods of shakiness, it remains relatively stable (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016: 11). How exactly Brexit is going to affect the stability of the government, remains to be seen but it is likely that some instability can be expected.

Timor-Leste

Indicators 1.1 and 1.2 are both applicable to Timor-Leste. The country has made significant progress since the 1999 peace agreement and subsequent independence in 2002. The most recent Freedom House report (2018) has classified the status of Timor-Leste as free due to fair elections that facilitated a transfer of power and allowed new political actors to enter the political system. More than ten years earlier, Resolution 1704 (2006), which established the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), notes that elections are “a significant step forward in the process of strengthening the fragile democracy of Timor-Leste” (p. 2). The resolution also encourages Timor-Leste to establish electoral legislation to ensure that the 2007 elections are free, fair and transparent (p. 5). Government institutions are democratic although fragile. Resolution 1704 expressed that enhancing democratic governance would also improve reconciliation at the national level (p. 3). The 2012 Secretary-General Report, significant for being the last before the ending of the mandate of UNMIT, describes several positive developments: political debate is present in the parliament and both the coalition and the opposition participate (p. 22). It also notes that Timor-Leste is on a “promising trajectory” and that political will in the long-term would continue to build upon the success. The report remarks that citizens enjoy constitutional rights and guarantees and capacities to monitor the transparency of public spending have increased (p. 5, p. 6).
4.3.2 Pillar II – Justice

As seen in Table 9, adherence to the rule of law (indicator 2.1) and human rights (indicator 2.2) is slightly more problematic than the establishment of elections and democratic institutions. The trend of relevant mechanisms being in place but suffering from a lack of successful implementation continues.

Table 9. Justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>BiH</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Timor-Leste</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kosovo

On the whole, the implementation documents of Kosovo tend to entrench ethnic divisions to a similar extent as the peace agreements, owing to the power-sharing structures established in the peace agreements and while reforms have been made, they have been met with mixed success. The judiciary is indeed considered an important factor in the documents, as prescribed by indicator 2.1, and the need to “re-establish a multi-ethnic and democratic judicial system in Kosovo” (S/1999/779, p. 5), is emphasised several times in most of the documents. For example, the S/1999/779 connects a multi-ethnic judicial system to progress towards reconciliation since it would “build public confidence” (p. 14). The Ahtisaari Plan reaffirms the need to appoint judges and judiciary staff that “reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo” (Art. 6, 6.6). Indicator 2.1 can be considered as applicable to the most recent document, S/2018/76, as it highlights challenges regarding integration in northern Kosovo, including lack of training, interpreters, a backlog of cases and incomplete translations of legal documents into Serbian (p. 6). Positive developments include improved structural issues within the judiciary and to implement the separation of powers, the Judicial Council of Kosovo members were required to be appointed by their peers and not by the legislature (Freedom House, 2017a). Financially, the institution responsible for its planning was the Kosovo Assembly, a change from the past when the executive powers were in control over this aspect (Freedom House, 2017a). However, since Kosovo struggles with the implementation of formal laws and practices, the success of this change remains to be
seen. Additionally, the slowness of administrative matters within the judiciary remains a problem and political interference contributes to a general lack of improvement. Indicator 2.2 can also be considered as applicable to Kosovo. S/1999/779 notes that in order to implement resolution 1244, UNMIK will “adopt human rights policies in respect of its administrative functions” (p. 9). In addition, to ensure human rights protection, UNMIK will have human rights monitors and advisors as well as establish an ombudsperson institution (p. 17, p. 18). The Ahtisaari Plan includes human rights measures in Article 2, Annex 1 of the Plan, requiring Kosovo to adhere to internationally recognised human rights principles. The Plan also asserts that Kosovo is to “promote and fully respect a process of reconciliation” among the Communities (Annex 1, Art. 2), which is an important measure, however not likely to be achieved if enforced through the ethnic narratives that are in place from the conflict period. Resistance from groups to the internationally established institutions continues, especially from supporters of opposition party Vetëvendosje. Four Vetëvendosje activists were sentenced at the end of 2017 for attacking the Kosovo Assembly building with an explosive in 2016 (S/2018/76, p. 6), continuing their resistance practices. Nevertheless, the report remains committed to promoting human rights in Kosovo and notes the establishment of small-scale human rights projects by UNMIK as a positive development (p. 8). Whether these projects had any real positive impact on the situation on the ground, remains to be seen.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

As transpires from the documents, the most pressing issue regarding the implementation of the peace agreement is the general lack of commitment to the rule of law. Therefore, indicator 2.1 is considered as partly applicable to BiH. Human rights developments are not reported on in great detail. The exception is Resolution 1031, which does not focus on the judiciary (indicator 2.1) but does state that “the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms” are important for the achievement of a sustainable peace and welcomes the OSCE and other human rights organisations to monitor the human rights situation in BiH, which establishes a mechanism necessary for the development of human rights (p. 2). Regarding indicator 2.1, the S/2008/300 document discusses the national justice sector reform strategy. The readiness to adopt this strategy can be considered a positive development, however RS was noted to undermine
the agreement by pointing out technical issues, which prevented the central state to play a coordinating role among the entities. Additionally, the report praises the efforts of the international community in the justice sector reform (p. 9, p. 10). Concrete measures to strengthen the overall rule of law also included the adoption of a national war crimes strategy and the adoption of a law on aliens and asylum (p. 22). Secondly, the Steering Board reaffirms its commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms and notes that the Dayton Accords apply this commitment to both entities (p. 21). In the latest document, indicator 2.1 is represented but indicator 2.2 is not. S/2017/922 notes the lack of political will as an issue. In addition, there is a general lack of respect for the rule of law by authorities to disregard decisions made by the judiciary (p. 6). Political corruption cases remain insufficiently prosecuted (p. 14). On the whole, political interference remains a challenge in the most recent years and the problem of inefficiency has not been addressed. Resistance towards state judicial institutions is prevalent, especially from RS who claim that the judicial system is biased against them (Freedom House, 2017b). In addition, RS opposed the presence of international prosecutors and judges in the State judiciary (S/2017/922, p. 17). Views that the central state does not sufficiently represent the interests of RS exacerbates the fact that BiH remains a divided state and society with monoethnic regions and lessens the likelihood of reconciliation and the inclusion of all groups in the peacebuilding process.

Northern Ireland

The NI Executive, UK and Irish government are committed to “law and order and the justice system” (Fresh Start Agreement, 2015: p. 14). Justice matters in Northern Ireland are mostly related to the eradication of paramilitarism and organised crime. For example, the Fresh Start Agreement establishes a task force to tackle these issues with support from the UK and Irish governments (p. 16) and a strategy for the eradication of paramilitary groups (p. 17). Measures were implemented to speed up the criminal justice system (p. 16). The St Andrews Agreement encourages the communities to actively support policing and criminal justice institutions (pt. 6). Both ‘ordinary crime’ and violent crime are in a downward trajectory (8.8 per cent of the population experienced crime in 2015 as opposed to 23 per cent in 1998), although the economically underprivileged are still more likely to experience violent crime (p. 24, p. 25). Indicator 2.2 is also applicable as commitment
to human rights is high. For example, the St Andrews Agreement establishes a number of strategies and legislations to further advance the status of human rights, including introducing an Irish Language Act, a Victims’ Commissioner and an Anti-Poverty and Social Exclusion Strategy (Annex B). A difficult issue in the topic of human rights is dealing with past human rights abuses and violence. The UK and Irish governments have sought to “assuage sectarian and paramilitary threats” by negotiating with the actors involved in the violence with an ultimate goal of reaching an agreement. Thus, the establishment of a universal, normative framework for dealing with past human rights issues is not yet on the table (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016: 166).

**Timor-Leste**

Indicator 2.1 is partially represented in Timor-Leste. Rule of law remains relatively weak (Freedom House, 2016). However, efforts have been made since 2008 to strengthen the judicial system, for example through training for judges, prosecutors and other legal personnel (S/2012/765, p. 23). The S/2008/501 document emphasised the commitment of Timor-Leste to the training of judiciary personnel and notes specifically the inclusion of women in these training programmes (p. 10). The 2012 report also notes that further support should be provided to the Provedor for Human Rights and Justice and efforts should be made to enhance vulnerable groups’ access to justice (p. 23). In other words, the measures are there but compliance still needs to be improved. Indicator 2.2 is similarly represented: there is emphasis in all the documents on guaranteeing fundamental human rights and personal freedoms, however human trafficking in rural areas remains a problem and the government has increased efforts to tackle this (Freedom House, 2018). Similarly to Northern Ireland, Timor-Leste struggles with dealing with past abuses, especially related to the 2006 crisis (S/2012/765, p. 12). Overall, the commitment for improving the human rights situation has been present since the establishment of UNMIT in 2006 (S/RES/1704, p. 3).

4.3.3. **Pillar III – Legitimacy**

As shown in Table 10, there is variance in the way in which this pillar is represented in the case studies with Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste leaning more towards inclusive practices than Kosovo and BiH.
Table 10. Legitimacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>BiH</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Timor-Leste</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kosovo

Indicators 3.1 and 3.2 are partially applicable to Kosovo. For example, while the S/1999/779 implementation document establishes an implementation plan in five stages and describes various measures to be undertaken in Kosovo, it is mostly concerned with the consolidation of authority of UNMIK and the functioning of institutions. The document does not discuss the situation of the Kosovo communities or how they would be included in the peacebuilding process. In a similar vein, conditions set in indicator 3.2 are also largely absent. Beyond making a vague remark that through UNMIK’s “strengthening and deepening of civil society” […] “the promotion of reconciliation at the grass-roots level” would be encouraged and that UNMIK would “build and support local human rights capacity, based on experience within Kosovo civil society”, the document makes no references to the inclusion of civil society (p. 18, p. 22). However, Annex II of the Ahtisaari Plan provides a detailed overview of the rights of communities, for example the right to “express maintain and develop their culture” (Annex II, Art. 3). The Plan requires the Government to provide assistance for the development of the identities of community members (Annex II, Art. 2) and establishes a Community Consultative Council in order to facilitate exchange between the communities and the Government (Annex II, Art. 4). There is no compliance in the Plan with indicator 3.2. Most recently, there is compliance with indicator 3.1 in report S/2018/76. Reconciliation efforts included UNMIK-launched projects to “support multi-ethnic women’s groups” and to “foster community integration through sports”, which can be considered a positive development (p. 8). Yet, the implementation of such projects remains top-down in nature. According to the document, the civil society was included in some endeavours, such as in an international campaign to raise awareness about gender-based violence (p. 8). Nevertheless, the civil society was generally not reported on in great detail, which raises
the question of the impact the civil society is able to have in the society, especially as a local agency counterpart to the liberal structures.

*Bosnia and Herzegovina*

The Bosnian documents are notable in that they almost exclusively focus on institution-building. None of the practices necessary for the indicators to be considered are represented are mentioned, which is similar to Kosovo but different from Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste, which remain more focused on community relations and reconciliation, even at the state level. The only reference to any of these practices in the Bosnian documents is in Resolution 1031 on the implementation of the Dayton Accords, which vaguely remarks that it is necessary “to create confidence between the communities” (p. 5). As noted by Belloni (2001: 163), the civil society in BiH tends to be understood from a purely technical viewpoint with financial aid being provided but with no real effort being made to reduce ethnic divisions.

Some resistance practices were included, however, especially in the latest report. For example, the S/2017/922 document noted the various resistance practices coming from RS, which Milorad Dodik reiterated his belief that RS and the Republic of Serbia should unite:

“It may be time to start talking about a peaceful breakup in [Bosnia and Herzegovina]...because this kind of [Bosnia and Herzegovina] with massive interventionism by the international community has failed...” (Milorad Dodik, cited in S/2017/922, p. 23).

A statement of this type belongs to the general rhetorical politics practiced by Dodik, with which he displays resistance against international or “imperial” dominance (Toal, 2013: 198). What is apparent is that neither of the indicators are applicable to BiH. Ethnic tensions remain high and there is no reconciliation. No efforts are being made by political leaders to promote reconciliation, they instead focus on ethnic cleavages, which is evident, for example, in the education system, where Bosniak and Croat children attend separate classes with different curricula in schools (Freedom House, 2017b). The rights of minorities are not fully guaranteed and NGOs remain vulnerable to political interference and have little impact on political decision-making (Freedom House, 2017b).
Northern Ireland

On the whole, indicators 3.1 and 3.2 are applicable to Northern Ireland. The Fresh Start Agreement notes the need for reconciliation in several parts of the document, for example to “promote the interests of the whole community towards the goals of reconciliation” (p. 38). Special attention is being given to respecting linguistic diversity, especially the Irish language (p. 38). Gender equality is guaranteed under law (Freedom House, 2004). Female representation has increased in the Northern Ireland Assembly but is behind Scottish and Welsh institutions (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016: 12). Yet, female representation has been steadily increasing since the peace agreement and gender equality issues are being addressed (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016: 133). While there are problems with community relations, especially with regards to persisting mutual distrust among the two majority communities, support and preferences for living in an integrated community are in a slight downward trend, support for mixing remains relatively high with around 70% of respondents to the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighbourhood and 80% would prefer to work in a mixed-religion workplace (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016: 139). The civil society, as represented by indicator 3.2, is active in Northern Ireland, although there have been some concerns over funding. As noted by the Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report (2016: 141), the civil society has been contributing to peacebuilding with support from the EU Peace Programme. Funding through that programme, however, has been diminishing and Brexit has resulted in uncertainties regarding any future EU funding. The Fresh Start Agreement suggested a “compact civic advisory panel”, which would include civic voices „in relation to key social, cultural and economic issues” (p. 38). This would replace a post-agreement Civic Forum, which included representatives of civil society organisations. According to the 2016 report (p. 141), the new proposal did not manage to gather a lot of faith from civil society activists who believed the new panel to be politically motivated.

Timor-Leste

There is compliance with indicators 3.1 and 3.2. Minority rights are guaranteed and ethnic minorities are well represented in politics (Freedom House, 2018). A process of national reconciliation is underway with all three documents noting positive developments in the
field. The language remains relatively top-down in that regard, however, with Resolution 1704 noting that the efforts of the Timorese in “bringing about a process of national reconciliation” is being supervised by UNMIT (p. 3). However, Timorese political leaders seem committed to fostering dialogue and reconciliation. For example, the S/2008/501 document notes the role of a “mechanism for fostering political dialogue and national reconciliation” (p. 15). In 2012, then Prime Minister Gusmão reaffirmed the importance of reconciliation between communities in the peace process (S/2012/765, p. 17). Both the 2006 and 2008 documents noted efforts “to encourage women to participate in conflict mediation” activities with the communities (S/RES/1704, p. 3, S/2008/501, p. 9). The civil society is active, especially in the area of women’s human rights (S/2008/501, p. 14). The 2012 report states that village leaders organised democratic governance forums to “facilitate grass-roots dialogue and civic participation” (p. 4). While UNMIT and the international community has supported formal reconciliation practices, Timor-Leste is also known for its own customary reconciliation practices, namely the nahe biti. This is a local practice meant for both family and society members, which aims at establishing stability in the social order (Babo-Soares, 2004: 30). The nahe biti is a long-term understanding of peace and stability, an all-inclusive process of customary reconciliation and now also widely accepted and encouraged by Timorese political leaders (Babo-Soares, 2004: 22, 30). This practice, along with other efforts at fostering dialogue between communities has greatly helped Timor-Leste on its road towards a more inclusive peace.

4.4 Discussion

What immediately transpires from the case studies is the different degrees to which the three pillars have been represented in the case studies. As noted in the interim findings section of the thesis, the three pillars were generally represented in the case studies although Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste demonstrated greater compliance with the third pillar, legitimacy, which also indicates why the two case studies are leaning more towards an inclusive hybrid peace than an exclusive one. To answer the second research question, the three pillars of the hybrid peace were also mostly present in the implementation mechanisms but implemented with fewer deficiencies in some cases than others. The first two pillars, democracy and justice, were either present or partially present in most of the case studies. Compliance with the third pillar, legitimacy, was again more
problematic. While Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste were more inclusive in that regard, the pillar was only partially applicable in Kosovo’s case and largely not applicable in the case of BiH.

BiH and Kosovo as a whole struggle with the implementation of various aspects of the three pillars. The cases remain deeply divided ethnically and peacebuilding has been slow and difficult, especially in the case of BiH, which is a heavily decentralised state. The creation of a successful multi-ethnic state has not transpired and the Dayton Accords have resulted in a situation, where the established ethnic quotas do guarantee representation in numbers but not reconciliation or dialogue. The overarching narrative of multiethnicity has come at the expense of other identities that stand outside the “grand narrative” (Keranen, 2014: 133). When it comes to Republika Srpska, actors from that region seem to view the efforts made by the international community as undermining their right to self-determination. These findings are in line with Keranen’s (2014: 135) arguments on how the Bosnian Serb (and also Bosnian Croat) communities tend to view the multiculturalism advocated by the international actors as favouring the Bosniak community. This focus on ethno-national aspects has also resulted in a situation, where the civil society is used to shape the society in a direction suitable for the international actors, rather than as a powerful tool for promoting change from within (Kappler and Richmond, 2011: 265). Additionally, externally implemented institutions can result in a situation where the local actors are able to blame the international community for any shortcomings related to state-building while continuing with their polarising discourses.

Decentralisation has also proven to be problematic in Kosovo. The Ahtisaari Plan gave competencies to communities to govern their own affairs, however this has not resulted in the creation of a successful multi-ethnic state. This is especially evident between the two dominant groups, the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs, with popular movements such as Vetëvendosje using existing ethnic cleavages to demonstrate resistance towards the international presence. As noted in the interim findings, this is also why enabling engagement with the civil society not only at the level of state-sponsored NGOs but through youth groups, women’s groups and grassroots activists is necessary. If there is a lack of common spaces for dialogue, then the polarisation of discourses will continue. Moreover, the empowerment of NGOs can have unintended negative consequences. One of the more difficult issues for the hybrid peace is the question of how
to avoid implementing it from a top-down perspective, effectively rendering it a slightly more inclusive version of the liberal peace. Externally sponsoring NGOs without giving the citizens opportunities to be the drivers of projects that are developed according to their needs is nothing but a top-down practice in disguise, framed by a rhetoric of local empowerment (Belloni, 2001: 174).

Timor-Leste is a case that has made remarkable progress, both in the adoption of elements of the liberal peace and the emancipatory peace, and demonstrates a leaning towards inclusive hybridity. It is also a case, which merits further study, especially with regards to furthering the current knowledge of how the hybrid peace could be implemented from the outset. While the East Timor peace agreement did demonstrate a willingness to adopt more inclusive elements, the 2002 Constitution which was adopted following the independence of Timor-Leste notes that the state should “recognise and value the norms and customs of Timor-Leste that are not contrary to the Constitution and to any legislation dealing specifically with customary law” (Part I, Section 2, pt. 4). Elsewhere, the Constitution enables the state to “assert and value the personality and the cultural heritage of the East Timorese People” (Part I, Section 6). As argued by Wallis (2012: 752), the state has used these provisions to actively engage with the local context. Including local practices in state institutions can effectively increase the legitimacy of the existing institutions since people are more likely to participate in institutions that they are able to identify with and thus also develop further identification with state practices if they include familiar practices (Wallis, 2012: 753). The progress made by Timor-Leste also suggests that the hybrid peace is not opposed to the liberal peace. On the contrary, it encourages the liberal to engage with the local. The form of hybridity that has emerged in Timor-Leste might not closely follow a liberal peace model as envisioned by international actors but it is certainly more locally legitimate (Richmond, 2015: 125). This is connected to the three-pillar approach that has been suggested in this thesis, which is also based on the idea of engagement, a combination or a hybrid of the liberal and the local, which increases the legitimacy of institutions at the local level without losing the legitimacy at the global level.

Northern Ireland was characterised by a more inclusive hybrid type than the other cases, owing partly to the slightly different way the Good Friday Agreement was compiled and partly to implementation mechanisms that favoured more emancipatory
approaches. That is, of course, not to say that Northern Ireland is a complete success story. On the contrary, the society still faces many struggles, especially in the path towards reconciliation, however, efforts are being made to improve dialogue across the communities. In addition, Northern Ireland does not have any hostile neighbours or spoilers who would have greatly complicated the peace process. In that sense, Northern Ireland demonstrated a favourable environment for peace implementation (Mac Ginty, 2009: 704). Yet, as noted previously in the thesis, the fact that Northern Ireland, although having made considerable progress, is still facing problems suggests that the achievement of an inclusive hybrid peace is a very ambitious project. There are historical legacies and past abuses associated with every post-conflict setting that cannot and should not be trivialised. Reconciliation cannot be forced from the top-down, which is why enabling the local level to produce its own forms of furthering dialogue and reconciliation practices is important for the development of a more inclusive peace. What the Northern Ireland experience also suggests is that although the achievement of a completely inclusive hybrid peace after an intrastate conflict is unlikely, the inclusion of more emancipatory elements in addition to elements from the liberal peace in peace agreements and peace implementation mechanisms is likely to increase the sustainability of the peace. In that sense, the three-pillar model is a useful tool for bringing together the two approaches and analysing the situation from a hybrid perspective. Nevertheless, utilising a model that includes local practices needs to recognise that not all local practices are democratic or inclusive. Some practices can be predatory and by including the local in state practice, the very communities the hybrid peace is aiming to reach would suffer (Wallis, 2012: 759). Thus, the local should not be romanticised uncritically, it should be approached with pragmatism, which the Timor-Leste state has so far done relatively successfully.

The findings suggest that there is indeed variance in the extent to which the three pillars are represented in the case studies. The analysis also indicates that greater compliance with the elements suggested in the three pillars of the hybrid peace, both at the stage of signing the peace agreements and later at implementing them, also leads to a more inclusive than exclusive hybrid peace. To increase prospects for generalisation, further research on the hybrid peace could focus on including more cases into the analysis in order to identify further patterns across cases.
Conclusion

Although the liberal peace remains as the most preferred form of peacebuilding today, important critical debates have emerged to challenge this dominant approach. These debates have highlighted the top-down nature of the liberal peace and its tendency to focus on institution-building rather than reconciliation or the needs of those subjected to peacebuilding. This can have a negative effect on the stability of the peace as the narratives derived from the conflict are maintained. The cases of Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste show that encouraging dialogue and taking into account local perspectives of peacebuilding can have a positive impact on the inclusiveness of the peace. On the other hand, cases such as BiH and Kosovo demonstrate a greater lack of local legitimacy and more rigid top-down institution-building structures. A common factor in all these cases is a form of peace that critical scholars on the liberal peace have noted as the hybrid peace, which is usually understood as a practice that combines both internal and external peacebuilding processes. In other words, the hybrid peace is an ‘in-between’ form of peace, characterised by liberal-local interactions and varying interests between the actors involved in the peacebuilding process. Nevertheless, it has been unclear how these forms of peace emerge and whether it would be possible to implement the hybrid peace from the outset to a post-conflict setting.

This thesis has sought to analyse the emergence of the hybrid peace and its potential in becoming a new generation of peacebuilding. The current conceptual framework of the hybrid peace suggests that although there is an understanding in the academic literature on what the concept of the hybrid peace entails and the fact that it is indeed present in a variety of case studies, the model itself is lacking a clear framework for analysis. To address this shortcoming, I suggested a three-pillar model for the hybrid peace, which sought to bring together both liberal and emancipatory understandings of peacebuilding and represent the ‘in-betweenness’ of hybridity. The first two pillars, democracy and justice, are derived from the current understanding among hybrid peace scholars that a successful hybrid peace incorporates best practices from the liberal peace with the rule of law and functioning institutions being crucial to its success. The third pillar, legitimacy, is concerned with the extent to which bottom-up practices, represented by the civil society and the inclusion of minority groups in the analysis, are included in the peacebuilding process. The aim of introducing the three-pillar model was not only to
enhance the current theoretical framework but to also provide scope for further empirical analysis on how the hybrid peace is likely to emerge.

Previous analyses as well as this one suggest that the hybrid peace is not a homogenous concept. Interactions between the external peacebuilders and the local actors are likely to produce various outcomes, not all of them positive. As the hybrid peace seeks to transcend the boundaries between local and international understandings of peacebuilding, a more inclusive peace is also more likely to be sustainable. Therefore, I suggested a distinction between an inclusive hybrid peace and an exclusive hybrid peace. In the analysis, the more compliance there is with the three pillars of the hybrid peace, the more likely it is that the resulting hybrid peace is inclusive. Or in other words, the more top-down the peace implementation mechanisms, the less inclusive the hybridity. The thesis used a comparative study of four case studies, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste, to gain an understanding of the extent to which the three pillars are represented in the case studies and why the hybrid peace differs across cases. To test the three-pillar model, I analysed both the peace agreements of the cases studies as well as documents from the implementation phase.

The findings of the thesis suggest that the peace agreements do indeed have an impact on how the hybrid peace emerges. One of the most important findings of the thesis is that although the peace agreements follow a fairly standard model, the more the peace agreement is defined along ethnic lines, the less likely it is that an inclusive hybrid peace will emerge. The main reason for this is that more ethnically defined peace agreements tend to entrench existing ethnic divisions and are thus less likely to foster reconciliation. Ethnically defined agreements, in turn, are more likely in conflicts characterised by significant tensions and violence between ethnic groups. These types of agreements, following the consociational model, attempt to address the demands of the most dominant groups and frequently make use of ethnic quotas. Therefore, the more violent the conflict and the more it is characterised by ethnic divisions, the more likely it is that consociational democracy will be used in solving it. Such was the case in Kosovo and BiH, where the peace agreements were defined along ethnic lines and it also transpired from the implementation of these agreements, that reconciliation had not happened and wartime narratives were widespread. These findings thus suggest that the successful
implementation of an inclusive hybrid peace following a violent ethnic conflict is therefore also less likely.

From a more positive angle, the findings also suggested that although it is unlikely that the hybrid peace can currently be implemented from the outset as it requires the initial peace agreements to be more inclusive and adhere to the third pillar of the hybrid peace, the inclusion of certain emancipatory elements in both the peace agreements and the implementation mechanisms can make a difference. The cases of Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste demonstrated that a greater focus on individual rights, including those of women, developing locally legitimate political authorities and engaging the grassroots community in the peacebuilding process can have a positive impact on the sustainability of the peace. Thus, the analysis suggests that some cases do indeed demonstrate a greater likelihood of achieving an inclusive hybrid peace, or in other words, the greater the extent to which the three pillars of the hybrid peace are represented, the more likely inclusiveness becomes. Although the implementation of the hybrid peace is currently problematic and it is too early to talk about it as a new generation in peacebuilding, it does have the potential of increasing bottom-up approaches in peacebuilding processes. A greater focus on reconciliation and local legitimacy is a development in the right direction and can have a positive impact on the sustainability of peace in post-conflict settings.
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