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Neighbourhood Europeanisation: Extending a hand to Southern Partners or securing internal security interests?

MA Thesis

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I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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Abstract

This thesis aims to shed new light on the usage of Europeanisation as a framework within which to evaluate the consequences of neighbourhood Europeanisation. This is done by looking at the diffusion of European values towards the EU's Southern ENP Partners in the period of 2007 up and until 2013. A comparative case study is drawn, assessing the normative or structural nature of the Union's narrative brought out by examining the reflections of the rapporteurs of the European Commission pertaining to the diffusion of the centrality of peace, democracy, and rule of law onto the Union's Southern ENP Partner States through the European Neighbourhood Policy. Discussion of the two case studies of Morocco and Egypt presented show reflection of a normative approach by the EU, but also indicate that normative diffusion can only be effective if the necessary instruments are sufficiently developed.

Abbreviations

EuroMeditteranean Partnership	EMP
European Commission	Commission
European Council	Council
European Neighbourhood Policy	ENP
European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan	ENP AP
European Neighbourhood Policy Progress Report	ENP PR
European Security Strategy	ESS
European Union	EU
European Union	Union
EU-Morocco ENP Progress Report	MPR
EU-Egypt ENP Progress Report	EPR
Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy	EUGS
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces	SCAF
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime	UNTOC
United Nations Convention on the Prevention of Trafficking in Women and Children	UNCPTWC

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Introduction

On December 6th 2002, then-President of the European Commission Romano Prodi held a speech in which he advocated for the creation of a new, attractive, motivating, dynamic external policy towards the countries that were in the direct proximity of the European Union's (henceforth: EU) territorial boundaries, which would serve the distinct purpose of fostering stability, security, and prosperity (Prodi, 2002: 5).

He looked at the imminent Eastward expansion of the European Union that would take place two years later and emphasised the changes that this would bring for Europe and the world, adding a new dimension to the European project and imposing upon the EU new responsibilities in the fields of security and sustainable stability (Prodi, 2002: 2).

Prodi lauded the EU enlargement's contributary role in facilitating the expansion of these two fields, but also saw the new challenges that enlargement brought in the wider proximity of the EU and territorial limitations that enlargement of the EU would inevitably bring about (Prodi, 2002: 3). Notably, he provided a geographical scope of the proposed change in relations in which spoke of his hope of seeing the formation of what he described as a "ring of friends", a diverse band of countries around the EU that engaged in friendly relations with the Union and one another (Prodi, 2002:4). With the thought of "sharing everything with the Union but institutions" in mind, the Commission set out to identify the best approach towards realising a framework within which common goals, peacebuilding and the fortification of the economies of both the European Union and its bordering countries would be secured by exporting the Union's principles, values, and standards to its neighbours (Prodi, 2002: 5,6).

The concrete outcome of the challenge posed at the time can be found in what is now known as the European Neighbourhood Policy (henceforth: ENP), a piece of European Union Foreign Policy of which the legal basis is contained in a combination of bilateral and multilateral agreements instigated by the Council, but finds execution through soft law that is derived from a combination of spoken and written commitments made by both the Council and the Commission (Šišková , 2014:63). In instances of engagement by the EU as an actor in foreign relations, it is bound by Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, which stipulates the EU's guiding principles when engaging in such relations. These concern the advancement of democracy, the rule of law, and human

rights and fundamental freedom protections, respecting human dignity, abiding by the principles of equality and solidarity, and upholding international law (European Union, 2012:28) .

In 2011, Catherine Ashton, the then-High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, published a review of the European Neighbourhood Policy in response to the EU's seemingly standing by as conflicts and challenges flared up in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhood (European Commission, 2011:1) that offered Southern ENP Partner States "a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity" vested on the elements of democratic transformation and institution-building, strengthening the civil society, and fostering sustainable and inclusive economic growth (European Commission, 2011:3). In order to realign the EU's actions with its guiding principles, a series of adaptations were made to the EU's approach towards its Partner States, introducing a stricter conditionality regime later dubbed the 'more for more' principle, in which an increase in EU support would be made conditional to progressive reforms reflecting their commitment to universal values. This allowed for differentiation in approaches between the EU and individual Partner States based on the extent to which the Partner State implements realises the priorities laid out in the Action Plans. (European Commission, 2011:2).

Contemporary debates on the workings of the European Union's handlings of foreign affairs often lean on some form of up- or downloading of EU policies, norms, and values to or from external actors. It is the objective of this thesis to analyse the extent to which the narrative put out by the EU towards its Southern ENP Partner States is based on normative values of the European Union and its member States, or whether it is vested in the pursuit of rational interests. More concretely, the aim is to analyse the normative and rational influences affecting the nature of the EU's approach towards its ENP Partner States. I will rely on Europeanisation theory as the umbrella framework within which the two respective theoretical approaches towards explaining the narrative are explored.

By means of a comparative case study, this thesis will fill in a gap in the knowledge by testing if the theory can be used to explain the manner in which the narrative

surrounding the Union's actions towards its Southern ENP Partner States can be explored.

For this purpose, a categorical central research question has been formulated, out of which flow two hypotheses.

The central research question this thesis seeks to answer is:

> **"Does the EU's narrative reflect a more value-based or interest-based approach towards the Southern neighbourhood?"**

This question seeks to find whether changes in domestic policy by Southern ENP Partner States come about as a result of the European Neighbourhood Policy will affect the EU's attitude towards the region. It does so by looking at the extent to which the EU was successful in norm diffusion by means of the ENP Action Plans.

Consequently, the hypotheses that need to be tested are as follows: The first hypothesis is that (1) the EU has been prioritising a values-based approach narrative towards the Southern neighbourhood. The second hypothesis is that (2) the EU has been prioritising an interest-based approach narrative towards the Southern neighbourhood.

Though these hypotheses are, in principle, mutually exclusive, one of the expected research outcomes is that that at least a limited extent of overlap between the two will be observed. The substantiation of the hypotheses will depend on the extent to which the impact of the EU's actions in the respective States of Morocco and Egypt aligns with its written objectives.

Road map and source justification

This thesis consists of five substantive chapters and a conclusion.

The first chapter provides an extensive theoretical background on Europeanisation and the IR theories of constructivism and rationalism. Here, the manner in which the analytical framework of Europeanisation will be operationalised and explored from a constructive and realist perspective will be laid out.

The second chapter provides a historical background of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Arab Spring, which was a major contributing factor in the revision of the ENP instrument in 2011 and the inclusion of the more-for-more principle.

The third chapter contains the methodology. Here, the approach towards carrying out the empirical study is elaborated upon. The purpose of this chapter is to bridge the gap between the theoretical framework and the empirical case studies.

The fourth chapter delves into the empirical cases of Morocco's and Egypt's efforts to meet the EU's expectations in diffusing the values and norms identified in the second chapter, and goes on to compare these to discuss the differences between the two.

The fifth chapter consists of the conclusion that is drawn following the examination and comparison of the case studies explored in chapter four.

Finally, after concluding this thesis, a list of consulted literature and other source material are described.

1. Conceptualising and operationalising the analytical framework

Before measuring the effects of the ENP on EU-Southern ENP Partner State relations, it is first necessary to formulate a theoretical and historical framework by defining several key terms. This chapter outlines the conceptual framework from which the rest of the thesis will be considered. Europeanisation will be conceptualised and operationalised, and the international relations theories of constructivism and realism will be put forward to substantiate the two differing hypotheses.

1.1 Europeanisation

Europeanisation is an analytical framework, incorporating constructivist and rationalist approaches towards data interpretation (Featherstone, 2003:12) that can be applied to examine changes in national institutions and policy that take place in response to policy practices that have been institutionalised on the European Union, specifically concerning the interaction between the EU and the state being studied in the areas of European rules, mechanisms and agreements (Coppieters et al., 2004:19). It serves to provide understanding of the role of domestic politics in processes of European integration (Radaelli, 2004:3), and is only suitable when pursuing research from the baseline that European integration is an ongoing process, bypassing the ontological discussion on whether or not and in what shape political integration takes place (Radaelli, 2004:2). In total, there are three main formats that define the area within which Europeanisation research takes place. These formats concern those of Membership Europeanisation, Enlargement Europeanisation, and Neighbourhood Europeanisation (Gawrich, Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2009:5). This thesis will focus on Neighbourhood Europeanisation in particular.

The study of the effects of Europeanisation on states that are not part of the EU is an underexplored domain of knowledge. Only recently have analyses that make use of the analytical framework of Europeanisation had their horizons expanded to include non-EU countries (Sedelmeijer, 2011:5). This research paper's focus is on the narrative of the EU illustrated through contemporary Europeanisation, thus historic definitions of Europeanisation that predate the European Coal and Steel Community will be foregone in favour of terminology that describes Europeanisation that has taken place following

the post-WWII rapprochement of European nation states in response to the comeuppance of the economic and political union (Radaelli, 2004:4). Applying the concept of Europeanisation allows one to describe a series of complementary phenomena and processes of change, but the term itself is a versatile one, which has garnished a variety of definitions and is employed in a broad sense (Olsen, 2002:923). Because of this, the term runs the risk of being ascribed too many relations, which undermines its clarity and validity (Radaelli, 2000:5). For this reason, it is important to accurately conceptualise and operationalise the term.

1.1.1   Conceptualising Europeanisation

The wide array of conceptualisations of, and vibrant debates on what Europeanisation entails (Radaelli, 2004: 28) makes it challenging to accurately define it. Kassim (2000:238) explored the width of the term's usage and concluded that the extent to which the conceptualisations had been stretched had led to its futility, whereas Olsen (2002:921, 950-951) found the term unsuitable as an explanatory concept, but also showed the term's potential to be used as a conceptual framework from which to explore the transformation of the European political order. This was done by redefining Europeanisation as a set of model-building puzzles that allow for empirical testing defined indicators (Olsen, 2002:944).

Looking at early attempts towards incorporating elements of different approaches to allow for the examination of the impact of the EU on domestic policies show a gradual development towards a more comprehensive definition of the term 'Europeanisation'.

Ladrech (1994:69) defined it as "an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making", and pushed for a new way of assessing the effects of Europeanisation where the traditional top-down approach is foregone in favour of a bottoms-up approach which emphasises "national-specific adaptation to cross-national inputs"(Ladrech, 1994:69, 70). This definition was subsequently superseded by Green Cowles, Caparoso, & Risse (2001:3), further delineating the definition of Europeanisation as "the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among

the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules". Like Ladrech, Green Cowles et al distinguished between a top-down and a bottom-up process. However, in stark contrast to Ladrech's observations, Green Cowles et al take a different approach towards categorising the processes of Europeanisation. Their claim rests on the idea that the "emergence and development at the European level of distinctive structures of governance" constituted a bottom-up process, and instead argue that the analysation of top-down processes did not occur until the field was established enough for "stimuli and commitments" from the European level to trickle down and enact policy change on the national level (de Flers & Müller, 2010:4, Green Cowles et al, 2001:3).

Radaelli (2003:28-30) divides the literary disagreement on defining and conceptualising Europeanisation into two distinct camps. The first focuses on the implicit, pre-ontological process of political integration, whereas the second approach bases itself on a more explicit, conceptually demarcated definition of the term 'Europeanisation' as a process, situation, or reaction following the instatement of institutions. Contextualisation of the first approach by Olsen (2002) led to the distinguishment between five contextual categories of phenomena that are referred to with Europeanisation. These are:

| Europeanisation as changes in external territorial boundaries – EU enlargement; |
| Europeanisation as the development of institutions of governance at the European level; |
| Europeanisation as central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance; |
| Europeanisation as exporting forms of political organisation and governance tha tare typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory; |
| Europeanisation as a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe |

Table: Five possible uses of Europeanisation, Olson (2002:923-924)

An alternative set of definitions that explain the term 'Europeanisation' was formulated by Buller & Gamble (2002), namely:

| Europeanisation as the development of institutions of governance at the European level; |

Europeanisation as the act of exporting distinct European forms of organisation and governance outside Europe's territorial boundaries;
Europeanisation as the achievement of political unification of Europe;
Europeanisation as a process by which domestic politics becomes increasingly subjected to European policy-making;
Europeanisation as a smokescreen for domestic policy manoeuvres.

Table: Buller & Gamble (2002: 13-15)

Radaelli goes on to note three major challenges when outlining what Europeanisation entails. The first challenge he identifies is concept misinformation (Radaelli, 2003:28). He points out several shortcomings in definitions of Europeanisation offered by a variety of fellow academics, and, referring to Adcock and Collier (2001)'s differentiation between background concepts and systemised concepts, advocates in favour of a developing systemised concept for Europeanisation. As his chapter was addressed at EU-oriented political scientists, the European Union is the central subject of interest. He goes on to state that to use Europeanisation as an analytic framework, it is necessary for it to be clearly articulated and explicitly formulated. The reason for this is that the coverage of research themes under the background concept of Europeanisation is broad, whereas the systemised concept of Europeanisation enjoys clearer delineation, making it more applicable for researching purposes (Radaelli, 2003:31).

The second challenge is conceptual stretching, which delves deeper into the description of a concept through the properties of intension and extension, which intension referring to the 'collection of properties covered by a concept', and extension to 'the class of entities to which the concept applies' (Radaelli, 2003:32). These two properties undermine one another, so emphasis on the one comes at the cost of sacrificing the other. In case of Europeanisation, emphasis in research has been laid on extension, allowing for easy motivation of broad analytical grids and the identification of a wide array of processes and instances covered by it. The extension property allows us to make sense of the way in which the research subject interacts with other actors and properties, but the broadness of its scope does not allow for more narrow, delineated

research questions to be answered. The effect of this is called 'degreeism', which is defined by Sartori (1970) as encompassing the replacement of difference in kind with difference of degree. In the studies of Europeanisation, this replacement takes place when looking at Europeanisation as a spectrum within which policy change occurs, with different results and ideas being ascribed to relate to different levels or degrees of Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2003:32).

By 2004, a working definition proposed by Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) defined Europeanisation as a post-ontological analytical framework consisting of "processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies" (Radaelli, 2004:3). They also argue that its aim is to explain the level of "adaptation to Europe, without making bold predictions" (ibid), and that Europeanisation can be applied to bring understanding to the way in which domestic change is processed (ibid).

An advantage of this working definition is that it purposely delineates the observable effects of Europeanisation as originating from observing the outcome that decisions come about from the EU policy process brings about in domestic affairs (Radaelli, 2003:31), with its EU-centrism (Radaelli, 2004:1) validating it as a theory that can be used to examine the effects of the ENP. It also lends itself well to both the top-down design studies of changes taking place in domestic political systems brought about by engagement with EU institutions or policies (Graziano & Vink, 2013:36), as well as to bottom-up design studies. The former is a discipline which can be used to focus on understanding how implementing European policies affect the Member States by exposing the way in which the flow of pressure from the EU finds itself facing intervening variables, which result in reactions and domestic change. This design study lends itself well for analysing domestic impact of the EU (Radaelli, 2004:4). The latter hones in on the specific role of an actor or an instance in the process of bringing about these changes (Radaelli, 2003:33), starting from interactions at the domestic level and measuring how a domestic system of interaction can have any of its main components changed by EU action (Radaelli, 2004:4-5). In the cases examined in this thesis, the way

the narrative put out by the EU is constructed will be tested by looking at how the ENP has resulted in concrete domestic level impact. This is a top-down approach emphasising the effects of Europeanisation on the domestic systems of the respective Partner States, and will allow for a comparison between the set goals and the realised policy change.

1.1.2 Operationalising Neighbourhood Europeanisation

The wide array of working definitions formulated by a broad range scholars, many of whom employing different theoretical frameworks, consisting of different measurable variables, have long restricted opportunities for a peer-reviewable, unitary approach towards foreign policy analysis using Europeanisation as the analytical framework. This view is corroborated by the 2009 review of academic literature on Europeanisation in foreign policy contained in de Flers and Müller's working paper on "Applying the Concept of Europeanisation to the study of Foreign Policy" (de Flers & Müller, 2009:2). The central argument put forward by this paper is that there are opportunities for linking the as of yet separated disciplines into a more singular approach, where the emphasis should be laid on distinguishing between dimensions, outcomes, and mechanisms of Europeanisation, rather than re-inventing the wheel on a regular basis by actively differentiating between different 'schools' of Europeanisation (de Flers & Müller, 2009:18). Thus, rather than developing a separate framework within which to assess the effects of Neighbourhood Europeanisation, this thesis will draw on existing frameworks and adapt them to be applicable on external actors. The level of adaptation and policy convergence lies central to gaining a deeper understanding of the downloading of EU policy into the domestic arena.

Building on preceding conceptualisations of Europeanisation, Wong and Hill (2011:2) specifies the three main aspects within which to gauge the presence and extent of Europeanisation, dividing them up into a top-down, a bottoms-up, and a transformative element. The first of the three aspects, policy adaptation and convergence, refers to the application of top-down policy diffusion in which "changes in national foreign policies caused by participation over time in foreign policymaking at the European level" (Wong and Hill, 2011:4) result in "adaptation to EU demands and cross-national policy convergence" (Wong and Hill, 2011:7). The second aspect, national projection, provides a bottoms-up projection of "national preferences, ideas, and policy models onto the

level of the EU" (Wong and Hill, 2011:4). Examining national projection brings into perspective the capability of individual Member States to have its national agenda projected onto that of the EU by looking at state attempts to increase how their behaviour is reflected in the influence they carry and the way they use the EU (Wong and Hill 2011:7). By causally linking the adaptation and policy convergence to the national projection, insights can be made in the country's attitude towards policy change brought about through Europeanisation. The result of this is the third dimension, identity reconstruction, where bilateral interactions aimed at converging policy positions over a prolonged time (Hill and Wong, 2011:12) lead to the political identity of a country being reshaped through a "negotiated convergence in terms of policy goals, preferences, and even identity, between the national and the supranational" (Wong and Hill, 2011:4), which in turn leads to a convergence of shared values and national interests (Hill and Wong, 2011:7). Briefly put, Hill and Wong's conceptualisation and operationalisation of Europeanisation can be used distinguish between the respective roles of values and interests that drive State actors to adopt EU policies into their national frameworks.

All three aspects and their accompanying indicators are referred to in the table down below:

Aspects of Europeanisation	National Foreign Policy (FP) indicators
1 Adaptation and Policy Convergence - Harmonization and transformation of a Member State to the needs and requirements of EU membership ('downloading')	a) Increasing salience of European political agenda b) Adherence to common objectives c) Common policy obligations taking priority over national domaines réservés d) Internalization of EU membership and its integration process ('EU-isation') e) Organizational and procedural change in national bureaucracies
II National Projection - National foreign policy of a member state affects and contributes to the development of a common European FP ('uploading')	a) State attempts to increase national influence in the world b) State attempts to influence foreign policies of other Member States c) State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella d) National FP uses the EU level as an influence multiplier
III Identity reconstruction	a) Emergence of shared norms/values among policymaking elites in relation to international politics.

	b) Shared definitions of European and national interests
- Result of above two dimensions. Harmonisation process tending towards middle position; common EU interests are promoted ('crossloading')	c) Coordination reflex and 'pendulum effect' where 'extreme' national and EU positions are reconciled over time via bilateral and EU interactions

*Table: The Three Aspects of Europeanisation on National Foreign Policy, source*s: Hill & Wong (2011:2); *Wong (2007:326); Wong (2005:142); Tsardanidis and Stavridis (2005:220-224); Major and Pomorska (2005).*

Based on Wang's operationalisation of the three aspects that make up the concept of Europeanisation and the division of their indicators, it can be established that specific aspects of Europeanisation as a base framework can be moulded and mixed to serve as a working framework from within which to approach a variety of top-down and bottom-up research topics. The first and third aspects and their accompanying indicators used to measure their effects on national foreign policy fit the scope of a top-down oriented working framework within which this thesis aims to approach the research question posed. The second aspect is excluded from the working framework as the uploading of policies by the third-party sovereign States that altogether make up the Southern ENP Partner States to the ENP constitutes a bottoms-up contribution and thus falls outside of the scope of the top-down approach chosen for this thesis.

However, this immediately raises a problem. The identity reconstruction in aspect 3 is dependent on the cumulation of the two that precede it. As the topic of research in this thesis concerns the supranational narrative, it is necessary to reframe the second aspect to reflect the supranational projection and their expected observable effects on national Foreign Policy. For the purpose the research framework of this thesis, the second aspect now reads:

Aspects of Europeanisation	EU Foreign Policy (FP) indicators
II Supranational Projection	a) EU attempts to increase its influence in the Mediterranean region
- Supranational foreign policy of EU institutions affect and contribute to the development of a common EuroMediterranean foreign policy (incentives and pressure)	b) EU attempts to influence foreign policies of Southern ENP Partner States c) EU uses the ENP as a cover/umbrella d) EU institutions use FP as an influence multiplier

*(Table: adaptation of The Three Aspects of Europeanisation on National Foreign Policy, source*s: *Hill & Wong (2011:2); Wong (2007:326); Wong (2005:142); Tsardanidis and Stavridis (2005:220-224); Major and Pomorska (2005).*

This revision of the second aspect makes it possible to map out the impact of the projection of the EU's preferences, ideas, and policy models onto the implementation of the Association Agreement by means of the European Neighbourhood Policy[1], shedding light on the way in which the ENP as an instrument is used by the European Union to push its foreign policy agenda and on the trade-off between diffusing values and securing interests.

Summarising, the term 'Europeanisation' is a post-ontological, multifaceted term that seeks to provide an analytical framework through which to assess processes of European integration. By exploring the causal relationship between policy adaptation and convergence and supranational projection, it is my expectation that it will be possible to highlight the normative and structural factors that lie at the basis of the EU's narrative towards engaging in relations with ENP Partner States.

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[1] Adaptation of "national preferences, ideas, and policy models onto the level of the EU" (Hill and Wong, 2011:4) to reflect the EU's perspective

1.2 EU as a Foreign Policy actor: Normative or structural power of the Union

The European Union is an actor with its own foreign policy agenda, based on Title V of the Treaty on European Union. Through its actions on the international scene, the EU seeks to externally advance the principles of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental human right protections that guide it (European Union, 2012:28).

The European Neighbourhood Policy is one of the instruments of Europeanisation in external relationships (Schimmelfennig, 2012:18), with the qualification brought about through the ENP's objective of bringing to realisation the adoption of European norms and standards. Meanwhile, the EU acts as an actor seeking to use the ENP as a means to export its principles, normative standards, and regional integration model. Within this context, rather than assessing the impact of the Union on internal European integration, the impact of the Union on integration of European standards in the third country can be examined (Schneider, 2010:126). A dichotomous and somewhat contradictory distinction can be made when examining the causes and outcomes of Europeanisation. This distinction is between two approaches. The first approach is that of the European Union as a normative power. Here, the EU's "lack of effective coercive power-politics instruments" and its "identity as such which fosters normative values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law" are leading for establishing the Union's foreign policy (Schneider, 2010:127). The second approach is that of the Union as a structural power. In this case, rational assessments of the Union's own economic interests are leading its actions in foreign policy (Schneider: 2010:127).

1.2.1 A Union constructed of values: The EU as a normative power:

One of the ways in which the European Union is said to carry its power in foreign relations is by employing a normative approach based on exporting the EU's norms and values through its interactions with external actors, in effect projecting outwards its internal characteristics and identity (Schneider, 2010:125). This thesis will draw on Ian Manner's theory of EU normative power, in which the EU's "ability to shape conceptions of 'normal'" constitutes a "normative power of an ideational nature characterised by common principles and a willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions" (Manners, 2002:239).

Ian Manners description of the role of the "ideational impact of the EU's international identity/role as representing normative power" (Manners, 2002:238), observing that the historical context, hybrid polity, and political-legal constitution that the EU draws on to promote its norms differs from how other global actors carry their weight (Manners, 2002:240). He then singles out five distinct priorities of the European Union that form the basis of its normative nature. These normative factors are the centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Manners, 2002:242). Four further 'minor norms' are identified, consisting of the notion of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance (Manners, 2002:242). The normative basis of the European Union as explained by Manners is summarily presented in the table below:

Table 2: The EU's normative basis

Founding Principles	Tasks and Objectives	Stable Institutions	Fundamental Rights
Liberty	Social solidarity	Guarantee of democracy	Dignity
Democracy	Anti-discrimination	Rule of law	Freedoms
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms	Sustainable development	Human rights	Equality
			Solidarity
Rule of law		Protection of minorities	Citizenship
			Justice
Treaty base – set out in art. 6 of the TEU	Treaty base – set out in arts. 2 of TEC and TEU, arts. 6 and 13 of TEC	Copenhagen criteria – set out in the conclusions of the June 1993 European Council	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

(Source: Manners, 2002:243)

The manner in which the EU shapes norm diffusion in international relations is the basis upon which the argument of the EU as a normative power rests (Manners, 2002:244). 9This diffusion is can be explained by six factors, described in the table below.

Factor	Explanation	Source
Contagion	Unintentional diffusion of EU norms to external actors	Whitehead, 1996:6)

Informational diffusion	Diffusion of EU norms by means of strategic communication	Manners and Whitman, 1998
Procedural diffusion	Diffusion of EU norms by means of institutionalising the relationship between the EU and a third party	Manners and Whitman, 1998
Transference	Diffusion of EU norms by means of an exchange from a position of power	Manners and Whitman, 1998
Overt diffusion	Diffusion of EU norms by means of physical presence in third countries and international organisations	Manners and Whitman, 1998
Cultural filter	Diffusion of EU norms by tying it to social and political identities of norm subjects	Kinnvall, 1995:61-71

(Source: Manners, 2002:244-245)

1.2.2 A Union of rational interests: The EU as a structural power

In stark contrast to the idea of the EU as a normative power, the idea of the European Union as a structural power is vested in the notion that the protection of its core interests in external relations reflect a 'realist' foreign policy (Oeter, 2013), an observation that can by substantiated by the formulation of Article 21 (2) sub a TEU, which binds the EU to "define and pursue common policies and actions, and work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity" (European Union, 2012). Here, the EU emphasises its objectives as being comprised of elements inherently tied to the EU, which can be read as exhibiting a sense of exceptionalism that in effect breaks the EU's conduct apart from normative systems due to the incompatibility caused by differentiation between the equality of shared values and the individuality of securing interests (Blockmans and Koutrakos, 2018:405).

The approach towards Europeanisation from the realist perspective is sometimes referred to as pragmatic, or constituting realpolitik. The concept of realpolitik finds its origin in the mid 19th century, when the German liberal 'Ludwig von Rochau' examined alternatives to liberal utopianism whilst nonetheless holding on to the core ideals of liberalism. What he came upon was a redefinition of how to pursue liberal goals, 'holding out a vision of the future and a guide for how to get there' in a realistic way

(Bew, 2016:28). Its key concerns consist of power relations and national security, pursued through the analysis of concrete situations and only in case of necessity. Realpolitik is a conservative tradition built on pragmatic compromise and explained through the logic of the consequences of undertaken action (Goldmann, 2012:12).

1.2.2.1 From idealist to reactionist: Realpolitik with European characteristics

In the aftermath of the irregular migration influx challenges that brought European solidarity to the brink of breaking, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, brought before the European Council the 2016 'Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)'. This document set out five core priorities for the Union to pursue in its external action. These priorities consist of strengthening and ensuring the security of the Union through translation of the commitments of Member States to mutual assistance and solidarity into action, investing in the resilience of states and societies by targeting the most acute cases of governmental, economic, societal and climate/energy fragility and the development of more effective migration policies for the Union, engaging in practical and principled peacebuilding by expanding the meaning and scope of the 'comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises', cooperating with regional organisations to allow regions that lie outside of the Union's direct influence sphere to strengthen their position in the transnational arena, and focusing on the rule of law over the law of force as its global governance strategy through commitment to the United Nations and development of globally coordinated responses to crises. (Goldmann, 2016:9-10)

This outlining of the Union's external strategy signals a shift from the more idealist European Security Strategy (henceforth: ESS) of 2003, which was proactive of nature and aimed at building security through the spreading of good governance and democracy, to a more reactive modus operandum which appears to find a large portion of its external policy to be based on more pragmatic and situational analyses. Where the ESS was formulated on the auspices of promoting European values and ethics to a broader, external society as a means of creating internal stability, the EUGS takes a more moderate approach in which it is guided by positions taken through 'principled pragmatism, stemming from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as well as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world' (Goldmann, 2016:8) Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, lecturer at Gent University and director of the Europe in the

World programme at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels, identifies this shift as representing a return to interest-realpolitik, albeit with European characteristics (Biscop, 2016:92). He explains this shift through the example of the focus on Europe's internal and border security as an indispensable requirement for the Union to retain credibility amongst its citizens and Member States coming about as a reaction to the refugee crisis and terror attacks taking place in the territory of the Union (Biscop, 2016:92).

2. Historical background

The second chapter starts off with an exploration of the way in which the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has developed since its inception, operationalising the set of indicators used to measure the independent variable by identifying the categorical indicators contained in the Barcelona Declaration in preparation for comparing them to those contained in the country-specific association agreements. Next, the method chosen to measure the effectiveness of policies undertaken within the auspices of the ENP is explained,

In order to facilitate this, the historical background will also delve into the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Arab Spring.

2.1 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: from Barcelona to Paris

The dawn of the 1990s saw the global power dynamics upheaved in many ways. One of the results of this upheaval was a paradigm shift in the characterisation of the Mediterranean, a shift which saw, amongst other effects, a newly-found prioritisation on regional security come about (Kukushev, 2010:78). At the same time, democracy-building and the protection of human rights started making its way to the forefront of the externalisation of the Union's policies, creating linkage between the norms and values established within the EU and the exportation thereof towards third countries (Olsen, 2002:131-132). In light of the need to adequately respond to the new focus on regional security, the European Council published a communication reaffirming the strategic importance of expanding EU relations with 15 non-EU states surrounding the Mediterranean (Council of the European Union, 1995). giving its blessing to the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers in Barcelona to act as a founding block for renewed relations (Council of the European Union, 1995).

2.1.1 The Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership acts as the multilateral dialogue and cooperation forum between the European Union and its Mediterranean partner States (IEMED, 2015b). Its conception is the result of the 1995 conference in Barcelona, of which the founding State participants from the EU are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, whereas its founding

participants from the Mediterranean partner States are Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. Two founding participants concern institutions, these are the Council of the European Union and the European Commission (European Union, 1995:1,2).

The Declaration served as an enabling factor that brough these 15 Member States of the European Union and ten Mediterranean States to the negotiating table for the purpose of defining the future of their relation (European Union, 1995:3), addressing soft security issues coming forth from a post-Cold War political landscape (Schneider, 2010:128). The Partnership's general objective is to "turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability, and prosperity requiring a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures" (European Union, 1995:2). Association agreements between the EU and individual Mediterranean partner State form the bilateral dimension of the Euro-Med Partnership, with the ascription of concrete goals being foregone in favour of broader, general principles. Development of shared norms and regional integration for the purpose of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone and an area of peace and stability form the Partnership's multilateral dimension (Schneider, 2010:130).

This conference proved itself to be the bedrock of a transformational partnership between the European Union and its southern neighbours, as it led to the establishment of EUROMED; an intergovernmental partnership based on fostering a regional relationship based on cooperation in various policy areas. These areas are clustered under three distinct spheres, the first of which addresses the opportunities for a political and security partnership to foster a shared peace and stability, with a particular focus on the development of the rule of law and human right proliferation (European Union, 1995:3). The specific provisions are categorised and described in the following table:

Develop the rule of law in the national political system	Develop democracy in the national political system
Safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms	Safeguard the diverse and pluralistic nature of our contemporary societies

Respect sovereignty	Increase cooperation in anti-terrorism initiatives
Respect the right to self-determination	Fight against expansion and diversification of organised crime
Refrain from direct or indirect intervention in internal affairs of partner states	Promulgate and push non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control initiatives
Respect territorial integrity and unity	Keep military capacity in check
Exercise non-violent methods of dispute resolution	Build confidence and good relations throughout the region

Table: Political- and Security-related commitments derived from the Barcelona Declaration (European Union, 1995:2,3)

The second and the third spheres concern the economic and financial, and the social and cultural spheres(European Union, 1995:5-6). Aiming to improve cooperation in these spheres, the EU and the partner states established a work programme to facilitate the enaction of the objectives of the Declaration. The work programme hints at a need for the development of bi- and multilateral association agreements with one another to remove trade barriers and tariffs, ultimately seeking to create a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area and a far-reaching cooperative spirit between the members of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (henceforth: EMP) (European Union, 1995:8-13). More notably, this work plan identifies the actors upon which the agreed upon actions apply as "States, their local and regional authorities as well as actors of their civil society". This is where the top-down nature of this agreement comes to the forefront. Though it binds all signatory States to the priority actions, there is no mention of a binding commitment being taken on by the European Union. This is in spite of the first two signatories to the declaration belonging to the Council and the Commission(European Union, 1995:1).

In spite of the good intentions of all signatories, it soon became clear that the imbalance in security interests between the EMP partners led to difficulties in defining and realising the set policy objectives. Following a resurgence of conflicts in the Middle-East (European Commission, 2000b:15), an inconclusive conference in Marseilles in 2000 (European Commission, 2000a:2-3), and the shift in paradigm of the global West towards securitisation following the September 11 attacks in New York (Tasche, 2010:54), the difficulties led to a failure to reach consensus on the topic of security reform.

2.1.2 The Paris Declaration and the Union for the Mediterranean

In February of 2007, on the campaign trail for his election bid to become the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy proposed the establishment of a new Mediterranean Union, modelled after the Council of Europe, comprised of specifically the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, and aimed at tackling concrete challenges in the region (Zoubir and Fernández, 2008:343). He strongly criticised the Barcelona Process, claiming the Union's focus on eastern enlargement on the one hand and the focus of the Union on trade with its EMP partners over the other proposals had led to disillusionment and had resulted in a failure to achieve the set goals (Escribano and Lorca, 2008:2). This proposition proved to be the impetus that was necessary to momentarily revitalise the EMP and propel it back into relevance, culminating in the signing of the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean on July 13th 2008 (European Commission, 2008). However, stark disagreements amongst EU Member States concerning the creation of a separate political entity outside of the EMP with a geological delimitation that did not include all EU Member States but did draw from the EU Budget (Tasche, 2010:56) ultimately led to a compromise which saw the grand proposal reshaped into a more comprising and less ambitious initiative (Tasche, 2010:67).

2.2 the European Neighbourhood Policy

The ENP is an instrument of EU foreign policy which operates through a combination of soft and hard law over a broad range of policy fields, by by uniting "norms, actors, and instruments within all these fields towards common objectives (van Vooren, 2012: 73)". Senden (2005: 81, 2004: 112) clarifies soft law as consisting of "rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at and may produce practical effects". He goes on to claim that soft law as a concept can be used as an umbrella term for a wide array of instruments that lack legally binding force, bestowing upon it a normative status in spite of a lacking legal enforceability (Senden, 2005:81-82).

Conceptualised through a framework initiative launched in December 2003 and launched after the European Union's eastward expansion of 2004, the original ENP

envisioned by the European Commission and the partner countries took the shape of a framework in which the relations between the European Union and its nearest neighbours could be reinforced (Commission of the European Communities, 2004). It was split to cover two geographical areas; the Eastern and the Southern Neighbourhood, the latter of which is made up of the Mediterranean countries of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Israel, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia.

The European Union External Action Service (2016) defines the core purpose of the European Neighbourhood Policy as encompassing a policy that lays out the framework between the European Union and its Southern and Eastern partners for the purpose of the fostering of stabilisation, security and prosperity. It aims to do so by incentivising the 16 countries that neighbour the European Union's external borders on the south and east by means of promises of commitment to providing support of financial and societal nature in exchange for the tackling of domestic political and economic reforms (Smith, 2005:763).

It is unsurprising that, followings its instigation, the European Neighbourhood Policy has been criticised for its promise for a one-size-fits-all approach within its geographical scope, disregarding concerns surrounding national and regional diversity and differentiation (Celeta and Coletti, 2015:4). It has also been criticised for its limitations on realising external neighbourhood Europeanisation due to the Union's inability to provide attractive incentives (Gawrich et al, 2009:6). What sets it apart from the EMP is that the ENP offers the opportunity to formulate asymmetric relationships between the EU and the Partner State, which allows for a more dynamic approach compared to the static approach towards the development of such relationships under the EMP (Govantes Romero, 2018:140).

The overall ENP infrastructure finds implementation through a series of bilateral Action Plans that are drawn up and agreed upon by both the EU and the individual partner state concerned. These Action Plans symbolise the materialisation of the commitments made by the partner state to share and adhere to the fundamental values of the EU. They are deemed to be the 'operational tools of the legal framework represented by the association agreements' (IEMED, 2015a). Subsequently, these plans establish specific priorities for the partner states to focus on, and the EU's level of support for the partner

states depends heavily on the transposition of these priorities into practice through national legislation, policy enactments, and social norms (Commission of the European Communities, 2004:13). By relying on conditionality clauses taken up in both primary and secondary agreements, the EU wields leverage in facilitating the exportation of 'shared values' to autocratic regimes in pushing through priorly agreed-upon reforms in spite of regime opposition or slacking (Thépaut, 2011:4). However, the EU's ineffectiveness in adapting this leverage to fit the political realities of North African States (Thepaut, 2011) is expected to lay bare discrepancies between the EU's exportation of values, and its institutions' valuation given to the gains and losses correlated and/or caused by the exportation, expressed in terms of achieving political interests.

Following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010 and 2011, the ENP was revisited, and its focus relayed to the promotion of deep and sustainable democracy and inclusive economic development. Moreover, a review of the ENP showed a clear wish for deeper commitments on security, defined as countries' resilience against threats they currently experience' (European Commission, 2015:12). The principle unveiled by the EU for this purpose concerns the "more for more" principle, which adds a new dimension of conditionality to the commitments, allowing the Union to differentiate in its conduct towards the neighbouring countries based on the level of commitment and progress they make towards the goal of democratic reform (European Commission, 2013:1).

The effectiveness of the ENP can be determined by looking at six factors singled out in a 2017 study commissioned by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry. These six factors are represented in the table below:

Factor	Definition	Indicators	Limitations
Conditionality	"The EU's ability to attach specific demands to incentives it offers to the neighbours." Most often studied in relation to democracy-promotion.	Sanctions Rewards Leverage	Pro-democracy and human rights promotion bias EU-centrism Risk of neglecting other (f)actors
Interests and values	Two driving factors of EU policy that can both coincide and contradict	Interests: pragmatic, functional	Too high a dependence on one risks

		cooperation on strategic objectives Values: The exportation of normative rules	negating the other, scholarly discussion largely focused on EU as singular actor, member-state perspective currently not well-represented
Levels of ownership and local dynamics	Extent to which a policy is centred-towards and controlled by EU or Partner State and the conditions in the area where the policy is being enacted	EU-centrist perspectives, oversight and control in hands of specific actor (EU or Partner State)	Scholarly discussion unsure about cause of apathy towards local conditions by EU
Visibility and perception of the ENP	The extent to which the enaction of the ENP is visibly traceable and the way expectations and obligations are balanced, differentiating rhetoric and reality	Communications and media, noticeability of ENP's effects in direct and less direct ways, level of symmetry between expectations of EU and of Partner State	Interpretation of data on visibility and/or perception of a concept can be suggestive, which may lead to researcher bias.
Influence of external (f)actors	(F)actors outside of the EU and/or the Partner State's control that affect the effectiveness of ENP goals	Any data on non-EU or non-Partner State related occurrences resulting in a tangible aberration of the expected effectiveness outcome	The scope and extent to which external factors influence ENP-effectiveness can range from the miniscule to the vast.
Coherence	"A predisposition towards collaborative and mutually reinforcing positions and actions of multiple actors"	Four levels of coherence: -Horizontal (Policy and Goal) -Vertical (EU and MS) -Institutional (between and within institutions) -Multilateral (irrelevant for ENP at this point in time)	Coherence's relevance for analysing the effectiveness of the ENP is debatable.

Table: Six factors of ENP effectiveness, their definitions, and their indicators. Source: Kostanyan (2017:8-10)

The EU actively promotes human rights, rule of law, and democracy in its foreign policy relations, and this is embodied in the cooperative aspects of the ENP. It does so through sector cooperation and providing incentives for ENP partner states in return for implementation of policies and standards that are aligned with those of the EU (European Union External Action Service, 2016). For example, the EU reciprocates advances in adaptation of basic rules on equal opportunities, economic participation and fair competition by giving ENP partner states access to the EU's internal market and financial support grants, which allows their respective economies to develop at a higher rate than if they were to engage in colder relations with the EU (European Union External Action Service, 2016).

Having taken a look at the format of the ENP Action Plans and Progress Reports, it is unlikely that all the Barcelona criteria can be assessed independently. As such, I have divided the Barcelona Criteria identified in the second chapter into three categories based on the terminology used in the ENP Progress Reports. The first two categories are "Democracy and rule of law" and "Protecting human rights". The third category purposely defined in broader terms as "Regional and international cooperation on justice, freedom, and security", which captures all criteria not captured by the two categories that precede it. The table below shows which criteria falls under what category. Some criteria may fall under multiple categories, and it is not guaranteed that all of the criteria are included in the ENP Action Plans and/or Progress Reports.

Democracy and rule of law	Develop the rule of law in the national political system; Develop democracy in the national political system; Exercise non-violent methods of dispute resolution;
Protecting human rights	Protecting human rights;
Regional and international cooperation on justice, freedom, and security	Respect sovereignty; Respect the right to self-determination; Refrain from direct or indirect intervention in internal affairs of partner states; Respect territorial integrity and unity; Safeguard the diverse and pluralistic nature of our contemporary societies; Increase cooperation in anti-terrorism initiatives;

	Fight against expansion and diversification of organised crime; Promulgate and push non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control initiatives; Keep military capacity in check

(Source: Table on Barcelona Criteria)

2.3 The Arab Spring

A substantial external factor that needs to be taken into consideration when assessing the progress made by Morocco and Egypt towards realising the goals set out in the ENP Action Plans is the Arab Spring, which threw a wrench into the relatively calm and predictable nature of their respective political landscapes. It is expected that observations flowing out of how this event is reflected in Action Plans and Progress Reports will give further insight in the construction and solidity of the EU's narrative on exporting values.

The Arab Spring refers to the 2011-2012 civil uprisings in multiple Arab countries, which had substantial consequences in as many as 17 countries (National Staff, 2011a), culminating in the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya being overthrown, with many concessions made by affected national governments to deflect tensions, often starting with violent crackdowns, and resulted in a multitude of civil wars and other local and regional conflicts (Naar, 2013).

The catalyst of the Arab Spring was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor whom had lit himself on fire on the 17th of December 2010 following a case of corrupt practices by the local police that resulted in his wares being confiscated (Lagerman, 2016). The act of this individual laid bare the deeper economic and social root causes of the civil uprising. Originally peaceful, the protests in the countries affected by the civil uprisings turned violent due to their respective governments' inability to resolve the root causes through dialogue, instead opting to crack down on the protestors (Mushtaq and Afzal, 2017:3-7).

The term "Arab Spring" itself is often misattributed (Haschke, 2011)(Mushtaq and Afzal, 2017:1) to Marc Lynch, whom wrote an interpretive article for Foreign Policy two days after Bouazizi set himself ablaze in which he compared the protests that had spread across a variety of Arab states (National Staff, 2011b) to the protests and clashes that occurred in the region in 2005 (Lynch, 2011). Nevertheless, the term proved

immensely popular, and was soon picked up by the mainstream media to refer to the 2011 protests (Keating, 2011). Locally, it was referred to as "ثورة" or "thawra", which is Arabic for 'revolution' (Alhassen, 2012).

2.4 The Kingdom of Morocco

The Kingdom of Morocco is a country that is located in the north-western part of Africa, and is the home of approximately 36,8 million inhabitants. The total area of the country is approximately 450 thousand square kilometres. It is a country with a young demographic, with as much as 45% of its population aged under 25 (World Population Review, 2020b). The country has enjoyed consistent economic growth since 2000, with growth varying between a low of 1.1% in 2016 and a peak of 7.6% in 2006, as outlined in graph one (World Bank, 2020).

Source: The World Bank

To better understand contemporary Morocco, it is necessary to evaluate the recent developments socioeconomic status of Morocco prior to 2011. Until 1999, Morocco was ruled by King Hassan II, whom ruled the country with an iron fist. As the then-monarch positioned himself as an ally against the Soviets during the Cold War, the authoritarian nature of his rule and the human rights abuses, including but not limited to torture and culling of political opponents (The Economist, 2009), were often

overlooked in favour of his support for Western initiatives (Haynes, 2014:131). After the Cold War had ended, he aptly adapted the legitimisation discourse by enacting seemingly democratic reforms in the second half of the last decade of the 20th century brought about in the spirit of the Barcelona Declaration (European Union, 1995), which were continued by his son and heir, King Mohammed VI, following Hassan II's death in 1999. This allowed the respective monarchs to present themselves as democratisers, garnishing popular support and substantial loyalty of their subjects in the process (Haynes, 2014:131-132). To this end, engaging in state violence as a coercion tactic was deemed delegitimising, which led to the Moroccan state minimising its deployment for the sake of keeping up the appearance that Morocco was developing itself into a stable democracy (Haynes, 2014:133).

When looking at the economic progress of Morocco however, it can be undeniably stated that the country has made substantial advancements, with an average annual growth of 4.7% between 2001 and 2013 despite a recession, the 2008 economic crisis, and the ripple effects of the Arab Spring (Jaida, 2016:146).

Unlike its fellow Northern African countries, the Kingdom of Morocco managed to steer clear of the brunt of consequences associated with the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, demonstrations and protests arose on the 20th of February 2011, with an estimated attendance of between 150 and 200 thousand protestors in 53 cities (Brouwers and Bartels, 2014:17). Led by the youth of the nation, popular support for, and participation in, the protests came from all segments of Moroccan society. Berbers, Marxists, socialists and Islamists walked together for the common purpose of bringing about an environment in which the nation would enjoy freedom, equality, real democracy, social justice, and dignity (Brouwers and Bartels, 2014:16). Together, they moved against the political authorities surrounding the monarch, whom had steered the wheel of Morocco's internal policies for decades (Brouwers and Bartels, 2014:17). But unlike the crackdowns that had occurred in other Arab countries, state violence was shunned, and only employed on a handful of occasions. Interestingly, a substantial amount of the protesters and spokespersons on the front lines were women, whom hoped to ring in a new age of female emancipation (El Ouali, 2011).

To alleviate the concerns brought up by the February 20 Movement, King Mohammed VI had the government hold a national referendum on constitutional reforms which would see him cede the majority of executive and judiciary powers to the national parliament and a supreme council, effectively separating the monarchy, the executive body of the country, and the judiciary body of the country. However, the monarch retains his control over security policies and religious decisions. It furthermore codifies commitments to human rights, gender equality, and freedom of worship (Al Jazeera, 2017). Despite this, the effective change from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy proposed through the constitutional amendments did not clearly define the role and the extent of power enjoyed by the king, paving the way for him to keep the country's decision-making bodies on a leash (Ottaway, 2011). However, critics argue that the process turned out to be superficial, at least insofar that the limited political reforms had not fostered an environment in which Morocco's authoritarian culture was phased out in favour of a more secular and less patriarchal culture (Monjib, 2011:5). With the rule of law remaining underdeveloped and the electoral system retaining a design that explicitly disadvantaged any opposition to the ruling elites, or 'makhzen', and the monarch, a strong argument can be made that Morocco's perceived democratisation had, in fact, been based on deceit (Monjib: 2011:5-6).

The relationship between the Union and Morocco has been contentious at times, but has enjoyed an overall constructive tone. Following Moroccan independence, it immediately started establishing deep relations with the EEC, signing a bilateral association treaty in 1969, subsequently followed by a broader co-operation agreement aimed at providing economic and financial aid through financial protocols (Haddadi, 2002:150).

In 1987, the Council blocked[2] an attempt by Morocco to join the EEC on the basis of its existing economic ties with the EEC, and its commitments to liberalise its economy and democratise its politics (Haddadi, 2002:150). In its refusal, the Council argued that as Morocco is not a European State, it does not adhere to the material condition laid

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[2] The Council rejected Morocco's request on the ground that it is not a 'European' state: Council Decision of 1 October 1987, cited in *Europe Archives*, Z 207

down in article 237 of the Treaty of Rome (European Union, 1957:78). Nevertheless, the attempt did prove successful in putting EU-Moroccan relations in the limelight, with Jacques Delors, then-President of the Commission, visiting the country and emphasising the Commission's commitment to further develop the relations between them (Haddadi, 2002:152).

By the year 2000, an association agreement was concluded between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco within the framework of the European-Mediterranean Partnership that provides in the legal basis for further materialisation of deepening political and economic ties between the Member States of the supranational body and the Kingdom (European Communities, 2000). Its aim is to promote political dialogue, realise deeper economic and social relations, have an impact on regional foreign policy, and to promote cooperation (European Communities, 2000:2,3).The agreement also sets out to further consolidate the gradual process of Morocco's shift from an authoritarian regime to a democratic nation state that respects fundamental human rights by cementing its development in democracy-building and human rights protection as essential elements of the agreement (European Communities, 2000:3), in effect saying that the EU's participation is conditional on the extent to which Morocco adopts these values. Where Title II, III, and IV dive deeper in the details of the development of a free trade zone, Title V and VI set out the parameters within which cooperation as defined earlier in sphere one of the Barcelona Declaration is set to be realised. Title V sets out the parameters for economic cooperation with the purpose of supporting "Morocco's own efforts to achieve sustainable economic and social development" (European Communities, 2000:12). Title VI sets the parameters for cooperation on cooperation schemes for the improvement of social conditions (European Communities, 2000:16) and cultural cooperation projects (European Communities, 2000:17). Title VI sets the procedures for financial cooperation schemes and instruments (European Communities, 2000:18), whereas Title VII sets out the legal basis for implementing financial cooperation schemes and structures to attain the objectives of the agreement (European Communities, 2000:18). Title VIII consolidates a series of institutional, general, and final provisions.

Represented in the table below is the adaptation of the indicators identified in sphere one of the BA in the association agreement:

Barcelona Criteria	Association agreement	Articles
Develop the rule of law in the national political system	Basis for political dialogue and cooperation covering conditions required for peace, security, and regional development (henceforth: TI)[3]; basis for harmonising national standards with those of the EU; basis for cooperation to help Morocco bring its legal infrastructure closer to that of the EU	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4, art 51, art 52.
Safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms	TI; policy progression is conditional on human rights protection; basis for cooperation in fields of migration, the role of women, family planning, social protection and health cover system improvements;	Art 1 par 2, art 2, art 3, art 4, art 69.
Respect sovereignty	TI	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4.
Respect the right to self-determination	TI	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4.
Refrain from direct or indirect intervention in internal affairs of partner states	TI	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4.
Respect territorial integrity and unity	TI	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4.
Exercise non-violent methods of dispute resolution	TI	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4.
Develop democracy in the national political system	TI; basis for cooperation on education and training with a particular focus on access for women; basis for promotion of democratic values through cooperation between scientific communities,	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4, art 46, art 47.
Safeguard the diverse and pluralistic nature of our contemporary societies	TI; basis for cooperation in tourism promotion, basis for cultural cooperation projects and programmes,	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4, art 58, art 74.
Increase cooperation in anti-terrorism initiatives	TI	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4.
Fight against expansion and diversification of organised crime	TI; Basis for cooperation on counternarcotic operations	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4, art 62.
Promulgate and push non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control initiatives	TI	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4.
Keep military capacity in check	TI	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4.

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[3] The reason for abbreviating this to TI is because this segment validates each indicator of the Barcelona Agreement. TI covers articles 1 par 2, article 3, and article 4 of Title I.

Build confidence and good relations throughout the region	TI; basis for regional cooperation on all matters involved; basis for cross-border exchange programmes,	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4, art 45, art 69.

(source: Table BA, European Communities (2000) pg 3-4, and pg 12-18)

What the table shows is that while not all indicators identified in sphere one of the Barcelona Agreement are substantiated further in the Association Agreement, it does show that they all fall under its scope, meaning that the Barcelona criteria are covered by the Association Agreement and in effect by the ENP. In particular cases, further guidance and emphasis is provided, providing focal points and demarcations for subsequent agreements that will realise the policy goals.

Adopted on the 27th of July 2005, the bilateral EU-Morocco Action plan to implement the Association Agreement of 2000 sets out to define the progression of relations and the materialisation of the deepening of security cooperation and political, economic, social and cultural relations between Morocco and the EU between the European Union and Morocco (European Commission, 2005:1). The representatives of the two contracting partners set out a three-to-five year plan aimed at supporting the development of Morocco's economic and social structures, as well as its legislative and regulatory infrastructure, to help the country align itself with the European Union, all the while advancing the formation of a firm basis from which to work towards economic integration on both the local and the regional level (European Commission, 2005:1,2). By 2008, the European Union and Morocco concluded an agreement that designated the country as enjoying an advanced status in its relations with the Union, which singled Morocco out as the Union's closest Mediterranean partner and acted as an incentive for attracting economic progress, whilst the Union finds commitments made by the Moroccan government to move towards adoption of European standards and the active promotion of its interests in the broader region (Kausch, 2010:2).

To realise the goals set out in the action plan, the European Union set aside substantial funding through a variety of financial instruments, indicated in the National Indicative Programmes for Morocco, whilst incentivising the country to pursue internal reforms to make optimal use of its access to newly acquired financial assets and trade relations, as well as fostering regional cooperation between EU Member States and individual North-African states through the Union of the Mediterranean. For the period between

2005 and 2006, the total sum of financial support provided by the EU was €275 million (European Commission, 2004:6). For the period between 2007 and 2010, the total sum raised to €654 million (European Commission, 2007b:3).

The Action Plan sets a series of short- and medium-term reform objectives that the EU and the Moroccan government had agreed upon to be priority areas for improvement, with developments reported annually. Following its expiration in July 2010, the Action Plan continued to form the basis of the basis of the deepening of EU-Morocco ties within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy until its replacement by its successor in 2013, which was negotiated so as to better reflect the positive progression of relations following Morocco's advanced status acknowledgment within the ENP framework (European Commission, 2013b:2).

2.5 The Arab Republic of Egypt

The Arab Republic of Egypt is a country that is located in the north-eastern part of Africa, and extends into south-western Asia. It is home to an estimated 101 million inhabitants, spread over a territory of one million square kilometres. Demographically, the country has a firm demographic majority of ethnic Egyptians, making up approximately 91% of the country's population. Much like Morocco, the vast majority of its population is young, with 52% of its population aged under 25 (World Population Review, 2020a). Since 2000, Egypt has had a volatile but consistent annual GDP growth, ranging from a low-point of 1.77% growth in 2011 to a peak of 7.16% growth in 2008, as shown in graph 2 (The World Bank, 2020b).

☑ LABEL

EGYPT, ARAB REP.

8

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4

3

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2000   2002   2004   2006   2008   2010   2012   2014   2016

Source: The World Bank

Egypt's governing system only quite recently changed to that of a republic. Up until 1952, the ruling system of the country was monarchic, but controversies surrounding then-King Farouk al-Awwall's handling of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war resulted in the establishment of the Free Officers Movement, led by Gamel Abdel Nassar, whom would later become the second President of Egypt, through a coup d'êtat in 1952 (Allouche, 2017). Following Nassar's death, the reins of governance befell upon Muhammad Anwar Al-Sadat, whom set in motion the rewriting of Egypt's constitution, enshrining within it the form of governance as a 'Socialist Democratic State based on the alliance of the working forces of the people' (Egypt, 2007)[4] with its political system based on a 'multi-party system within the framework of the basic principles and components of Egyptian society'[5], and declaring Islam the formal state religion and the Sharia its judiciary source of jurisprudence,[6] with the declaration of Islam as a state religion constituting a shift away from his predecessor's secular nationalism, an act that consolidated Sadat's rule by garnishing the support of the Islamic groups within the country (Dewji, 2012). The Constitution was later amended in 1980, resulting in Sharia

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[4] art. 1 of the Egyptian constitution
[5] art. 5 of the Egyptian constitution
[6] art. 2 of the Egyptian constitution

becoming the principal source of legislation[7], widenings its effective scope, and introducing the possibility of indefinite terms of office for the President, so long as he receives an absolute majority.[8] Sadat was assassinated a year after the constitutional reform had taken place.

For the three decades leading up to the Arab Spring, Egypt was ruled by Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak, whom had been elected to the position of President eight days after the assassination of his predecessor, Anwar Al-Sadat, in 1981 (Knell, 2013) and continuously reimposed a state of emergency unabatedly until his ousting which provided him with exceptional powers, despite having promised to lift it on multiple occasions (BBC News, 2012). He held the presidency of the country for five successive terms, stepping down in 2011 following popular uprisings against the autocratic and repressive regime (Hatab, 2019:28). Mubarak was keen not to change the constitution, claiming that refraining from amending it would foster stability (Brown and Hamzawy, 2007:5), but nevertheless introduced a wide array of constitutional reforms in 2005 and 2006 following increasing pressure to democratise the Egyptian political landscape and the steady decline of the National Democratic Party (Dunne, 2006:5).

Egypt concluded an Association Agreement with the European Union in 2001, establishing an association between the EU and Egypt as per the first of June 2004 (European Union, 2001). The agreement firmly committed both contract partners to consolidating the traditional links they already shared and strengthening the political, economic, and social development and relations(European Union, 2001:1)[9], and to establishing a lasting partnership, with an explicit focus on the advancement of trade relations with one another through a variety of means, including working towards a Free Trade Agreement between Egypt and the bloc and financial cooperation aimed at modernising the country's economy, infrastructure, and attractiveness towards investors (European Union, 2001:1,26)[10]. This prioritisation is later corroborated in the 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper for Egypt, where the three strategic objectives of the EU are identified. These are to support "Egypt's reforms in the areas of democracy, human

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[7] Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution
[8] Article 76 of the Egyptian constitution
[9] Preamble, article 1 par 2
[10] Preamble, article 72

rights, good governance and justice," "developing the competitiveness and productivity of the Egyption economy," and "ensuring the sustainability of the development process with effective social, economic and environmental policies and better management of resources" (European Commission, 2007a:22-25)

The Association Agreement is vested in the mutual respect for democratic principles and internationally established fundamental human rights as a conditional factor for cooperation (European Communities, 2004:5)[11] . It is made up of nine titles. Title I addressed the political dialogue, Title II, III, and IV address the establishment of a free trade zone between Egypt and the EU, while title V sets out the priorities concerning economic cooperation. Title VI addresses cooperation on social and cultural matters. Titles VII and VIII address financial cooperation measures that will be made available, and the institutional, general, and final provisions (European Communities, 2004). Different from the association agreement with Morocco is that the EU-Egypt Association Agreement is joined by a series of declarations, accompanying protocols, and annexes. Represented in the table below is the adaptation of the indicators identified in sphere one of the BA in the association agreement:

Barcelona Criteria	Association agreement	Articles
Develop the rule of law in the national political system	Basis for political dialogue and cooperation in subjects of common interests, particularly peace, security, democracy, and regional development (henceforth: TII)[12]	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4
Safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms	TII; development of relationship dependent on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; prioritisation of cooperation in fields of migration, the role of women, family planning and child, social, and healthcare services, as well as poverty and knowledge and experience exchanges.	Art 1 par 2, art. 2, art 3, art 4, art 65
Respect sovereignty	TII;	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4
Respect the right to self-determination	TII;	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4
Refrain from direct or indirect intervention in internal affairs of partner states	TII;	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4

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[11] Article 2

[12] The reason for abbreviating this to TII is because this segment validates each indicator of the Barcelona Agreement. TII covers articles 1 par 2, article 3, and article 4 of Title I.

Respect territorial integrity and unity	TII;	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4
Exercise non-violent methods of dispute resolution	TII;	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4
Develop democracy in the national political system	TII; development of education and training with a particular focus on access for women; promotion of democratic values through cooperation between scientific communities,	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4, art. 42, art. 43
Safeguard the diverse and pluralistic nature of our contemporary societies	TII; development of tourism and cultural cooperation dialogue, projects, and programmes	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4, art 54, art 71
Increase cooperation in anti-terrorism initiatives	TII; develop information and experience exchanges, pursue joint research and studies; counterterror efforts fall under political dialogue and cooperation	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4, art 59, Joint Declaration on Article 3(2)
Fight against expansion and diversification of organised crime	TII; cooperate on countering money-laundering; develop effectiveness of counternarcotic operations;	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4, art 57, art 58
Promulgate and push non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control initiatives	TII;	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4
Keep military capacity in check	TI	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4.
Build confidence and good relations throughout the region	TI; development of regional cooperation; basis for exchange programmes for information, experts, and students,	Art 1 par 2, art 3, art 4, art 60, art 61, art 69.

(source: Table BA, European Communities (2001)

Like it was the case with Morocco, all BA indicators fall under the scope of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement. This means that there is a concrete legal basis upon which these indicators rest for their implementation through the ENP Action Plans. Interestingly, this Association Agreement was markedly more voluminous than its counterpart due to the inclusion of Annexes, Declarations, and Protocols, which provide further interpretation.

The first bilateral EU-Egypt Action plan to implement the Association Agreement that entered into force on the first of June 2004 was adopted in March 2007, and covered a three-to-five-year period. It set out to reaffirm the mutual commitment towards deepening of political, economic and social relations between the respective contract partners, and to transforming a mutually beneficial strategical partnership into a

mutually empowering relationship that will promote peace, stability, security, growth, development, and prosperity externally, while modernising Egypt's economy and society internally (European Commission, 2007c:1).

It aimed to do so by setting "ambitious objectives based on joint ownership, common interests, reciprocal commitments, differentiation, shared values and implementation of national plans and reform programmes, politically, economically, socially and institutionally" (European Commission, 2007c:1). These ambitious objectives concerned advancements in a variety of areas, most notably the modernisation of Egyptian society and economy, and security-building in the region through the allocation of suitable means of financial support (European Commission, 2007c:1,2) This is visibly represented in the Action Plan's set of priorities, where two foremost priorities are directly related to security, and the third up and until the tenth priority are directly related to democracy-building and strengthening Egypt's economic prowess (European Commission, 2007c:3,4). In the area of securitisation, priority is laid on the enhancement of political dialogue and cooperation based on international law and agreements with the aim to find a resolution to the conflict in the Middle East (European Commission, 2007c:3)[13]. Further priority is then laid on broader security issues related to weaponry access including disarmament and non-proliferation topics, as well as supporting anti-terrorism initiatives and peacekeeping(European Commission, 2007c:3).[14] The third and fourth priorities outlined in the Action Plan relate to democracy-building (European Commission, 2007c:3)[15] and the safeguarding of fundamental human rights (European Commission, 2007c::4)[16]. The six priorities that follow are all related to a range of trade agreements and strengthening Egypt's economy, starting with liberalisation of areas of trade such as trade in services and in agriculture with the purpose of fostering economic integration with the EU (European Commission, 2007c:4)[17], attracting foreign investments with the purpose of alleviating poverty and creating jobs by improving macroeconomic governance through reforms to

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[13] Priority 1
[14] Priority 2
[15] Priority 3
[16] Priority 4
[17] Priority 5

the financial sector EU (European Commission, 2007c:4)[18], supporting developments in industrial and enterprising capabilities, as well as competitiveness EU (European Commission, 2007c:4)[19], harmonise national legislation to standards applied by the EU by co-identifying areas that are suitable for this through dialogue EU (European Commission, 2007c:4)[20], continue reforming the tax system, public institutions and the management of public funds take place EU (European Commission, 2007c:4)[21], and finally promote trade between developing countries and regional development(European Commission, 2007c:4)[22]. The remainder of set priorities focus on various forms of improvements in cooperation between the EU and Egypt, covering a wide array of policy sectors and harmonisation efforts, including but not limited to the cooperation in the education and healthcare sector EU (European Commission, 2007c:4)[23], the IT, R&D and communication sectors EU (European Commission, 2007c:4)[24], the migration and organised crime sectors EU (European Commission, 2007c:5)[25], the transport, energy and environmental sectors (European Commission, 2007c:5)[26], and finally personal and civil society development (European Commission, 2007c:5)[27].

Notable here is that the priorities are firmly centred around sectors that are of strategic importance to the European Union, with the emphasis on values-based improvements, though present throughout, not coming into play strongly until the 11th priority. This relatively low prioritisation is more visible in the allocation expectations of EU support funds.

To realise the goals set out in the Action Plan, the EU provides funding through a series of financial instruments, indicated in the National Indicative Programmes for Egypt. For the period between 2007 and 2011, the total budget comes down to €558. Of this, 7% is allocated towards value-based reforms, 40% is allocated towards economic development, and another 53% towards sustainability development (European

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[18] Priority 6
[19] Priority 7
[20] Priority 8
[21] Priority 9
[22] Priority 10
[23] Priority 11
[24] Priorities 12, 13
[25] Priorities 14, 15
[26] Priorities 16, 17, 18
[27] Priority 19

Commission, 2007b:38). This is €449 million for the period between 2011 and 2013, with the allocation rate divided into 11%, 42%, and 47% respectively (European Commission, 2010:30).

The Action Plan sets several short- and medium-term reform objectives that the EU and the Egyptian government have agreed to prioritise, with progress being reported annually. Following its expiration in 2013, the Action Plan was replaced in 2017 (Association Council, 2017).

3. Methods and data collection

3.1 Methodology

To test the hypotheses constructed in the introduction chapter above, this thesis paper provides a comparative case study analysis developed by consulting official EU documents and statements put out by the European Council and Commission, scholarly articles, and external reports that shed further light on arguments made. The research question will be assessed through the lens of two opposing international relations theories, namely constructivism and realism. The analytical framework employed for this thesis concerns that of Europeanisation, conceptualised and operationalised within the specific context of Neighbourhood Europeanisation.

By executing this analysis, the EU's narrative towards the ENP will be put into perspective, laying besides one another the Europeanisation efforts by the Moroccan and Egyptian governments for the purpose of making a comparative case analysis of reforms passed by the respective countries vis-à-vis the level of compliance with the reforms laid out in the ENP Action Plans. By doing this, I will create a working framework from which to evaluate whether the narrative reflected by the EU is values- or interest-based. The findings will serve as indicators in discerning whether there are discrepancies between the narrative put forward by the European Union, and the materialisation thereof into Europeanisation.

The main reason for pursuing the research question by means of a process-tracing based comparative case study is because such studies lend themselves well to examining the effects of policy change, and, by extension, the positions and behaviour of the actors involved in realising policy change, over a specific timespan. The policy under examination flows out of series of agreements on reforms in return for political and economic incentives between the European Union and the sovereign States bordering the Mediterranean Sea, so by analysing a minimum of two cases, the reliability of the research outcome is heightened. It also contributes to the academic field of Europeanisation and ENP policy impact research by proving the replicability of the working framework over the course of the first two chapters, opening windows for further research by applying – and possibly, if necessary, adapting – the model to

further case studies, widening the spectrum of knowledge on the impact of the European Neighbourhood Policy in both the EU and abroad.

The case studies take place by first outlining the variables through which to measure the extent to which the EU's narrative reflects a more values- or interest-based approach towards its relations with its southern ENP Partner States by establishing the components of the analytical framework and by providing a background of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Morocco, and Egypt. This is done in Chapter two. Next, the narrative of the progress from the perspective of the EU is constructed by analysing the contents of the annually published ENP Progress Reports that reflect the way in which the EU interacts with Morocco and Egypt within the framework of the ENP.

For each case study, key policy fields are identified as variables through their connection to the theory. The units of observation are the rates of policy adaptation and convergence over time, set off against the supranational projection. The empirical primary sources of information are the ENP Action plans and accompanying Progress Reports associated with the countries under examination. This study will also rely on scholarly assessments of the ENP in more general terms as a theoretical secondary source, insofar this fits within the scope of the researched topic.

The material is approached from a qualitative perspective, using process tracing to establish a causal link between the independent and dependent variables of the research question. As this thesis will address the external adoption of EU standards, the main focus will be on the Neighbourhood Europeanisation phenomenon of the exportation of political organisation and governance (Olsen, 2002:924) to the respective nation states of Morocco and Egypt in exchange for favourable trade, developmental and diplomatic relations. This formulation narrows down the approach to top-down Europeanisation, with the emphasis on the Partner States downloading EU norms and values into their own governance structures.

An important challenge in answering this research question is dependent upon exploring the effects of changing the dimensions of the independent variable to examine how this affects the dependent variable. In this question, the independent variable concerns the level of adherence to the ENP goals set through the Association Agreement and

subsequent ENP Action Plans. The dependent variable is the narrative, reflected by the concrete results presented through first and foremost the ENP Progress Reports, but also through the changes made to the interpretation of the goals set in the Association Agreement as made visible through the ENP Action Plans. The effect of the independent variable on the narrative can be measured by altering the conditions under which the independent variable interacts with its dependent counterpart. The expectation is that changes in the fulfilment and interpretation of the goals set out in the ENP will find reflection in the narrative put out by the EU, and that this will provide insights into whether its approach is values- or interests-based. This should be particularly visible following the addition of the 'more for more' principle in 2011, as the divergence in approaches caused by the impact of the differentiation this brings is expected to leave visible marks.

The formulation of the central research question allows for exploration of the grey area between the respective approaches, providing the opportunity for a deeper level of analysis in which nuances are not disregarded. The link between theory and the empirical data is established by means of a clear, coherent, and consistent analysis of the indicators identified. Conceptualisation and operationalisation of the working framework through which the central research question is approached take place in Chapter two.

The research question is approached from the perspective of one of the core indicators of the ENP's effectiveness, namely the mutual level of adherence to the conditionality clauses, exemplified through the use of preconditions, incentives and other instruments. The reason for choosing this indicator is because looking at how conditionality affects the enactment of the ENP is expected to shed light on how the EU handles situations where the interests of the Partner State and the EU are not necessarily aligned, and whether this misalignment leads to the EU changing its position on the continuation of norm diffusion.

The way in which the effects of the ENP are measured is through a series of annually published progress reports, which gauge the extent to which the Partner State in question adheres to its ENP Action Plan. For this thesis, the working framework developed in chapters one and two is applied on the respective case studies of Morocco

and Egypt, with a timespan delineation ranging from 2007 to 2013. This delineation will be further divided up by an additional timespan delineation at 2011, the year where the more for more principle was reinforced, with the study differentiating between the pre-2011 and post-2011 developments. It is expected that changes in the observable trajectory of the policy adaptation and convergence rates constitute indications of the presence of one or both of the two types of narrative under examination. If the observable trajectory does not change or is otherwise minimally affected the principle, then conclusions flow forth from the consistency of the progression.

For the objective of providing an accurate answer to the research question posed, the following five factors are highlighted. First, it is necessary to establish indicators that can be used to follow the process of Europeanisation. For this purpose, the priorities for the Union as laid out in the Barcelona Declaration that promote the EU's foreign policy objectives outlined in article 21:2 TEU are identified. These priorities are then compared to their respective counterparts in the 2000 EU-Morocco Association Agreement and the 2001 EU-Egypt Association Agreement, which form the legal basis for closer bilateral relations between the EU and the two countries within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The concretisation of the Barcelona priorities in the Association Agreement set the base line of expectations from which to examine the respective case studies.

Next, relying on ENP Progress Reports, the level of development of the chosen indicators in the Partner States under examination will be mapped out. By adding the correlating financial commitments made by the EU contained in the ENPI, a clearer picture of the way in which the EU puts its money where its mouth is can be presented.

Together, the indicators and their corresponding financial commitments as made by the EU constitute a dataset compiled of dry data: steps undertaken in policy fields, and finance allocation information.

Armed with this dataset, the succeeding step is to give interpretation to the EU's actions and establish the narrative by looking at the Council's and the Commission's actions with regards to the neighbourhood, and more specifically by taking into account their adopted and taken provisions when it comes to Morocco and Egypt.

These actions are examined from a constructivist and a realist perspective, and put on a double time-line that will show how the countries behave over the ten-year period on the one hand, and the EU's reaction to the behaviour as shown by the accumulation of the Council's and the Commission's actions. Though focusing specifically on the ENP, secondary findings are expected to show influence of external factors on the findings.

By comparing the highlighted factors with their counterparts from the other case study, this thesis disseminates the narratives put forward by the European Union towards these two Southern ENP partner states, discern whether the 'more-for-more' principle is applied equally, explore the possibility that there could be a discrepancy between the narrative and the materialisation thereof, and, if so, elaborate on the reasons for this discrepancy.

The reasoning behind the selection of the cases is as follows. The countries of Morocco and Egypt have both shown sustained openness towards deepening their levels of regional integration with the European Union, and have both taken measures to work towards compliance with the priorities agreed upon in the Barcelona Declaration. However, following the Arab Revolution, the two countries diverged in terms of trajectory of political development. It is expected that this divergence in political development affects the trajectory of Europeanisation, and in effect the way in which the EU positions itself towards the Partner State in question. This allows for comparisons to be drawn over two distinguishable periods of time, with the line drawn in the year in which the Arab Spring picked up pace and the 'more for more' principle was introduced.

3.2 Collection of data

The data is gathered using directed qualitative content analysis, which is an approach that serves the purpose of "validating or extending conceptually a theoretical framework or theory" by providing "predictions about the variables of interest or about the relationships among variables, helping to determine the initial coding scheme or relationships between codes" (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005:1281).

It primarily takes place through weighing the European Commission's ENP Progress Reports up against the baseline indicators comprised of the priorities contained in the Barcelona Declaration and the country-specific Association Agreements. Further

primary sources include agreements between the EU and the partner states studied, and other reports commissioned by the European Commission within the framework of facilitating the deepening of political and economic integration with the EU's Southern ENP partner states. Where academic literature is consulted, care is taken to ensure the quality of the content.

3.3 Putting together the working research design framework

The working framework is constructed out of three layers, altogether forming an equation which makes it possible to give an answer to the research question. The outermost layer represents the umbrella framework of neighbourhood Europeanisation, which forms the broad basis. The middle layer represents the rate of adaptation and policy convergence, which can be measured by examining the extent to which the Partner State implements measures that flow out of the bilateral Association Agreements and Action Plans they have signed with the EU, and the rate of supranational projection, which is measured by looking at the impact of the EU's values and/or interests on policy change in its Partner States. The inner layer represents the rate of identity construction, which is determined by the emergence of shared norms, values, and interests between the EU and the Partner State[28]. The variables of the equation are then given values by creating an accurate chronologic depiction of the observations made by the European Commission in the rates of adaptation and policy convergence, which open the door for assessing the impact of the adaptation and policy convergence on the reconstruction of elements of the Partner States' identity. This impact assessment can then be addressed from the perspectives of the diffusion of normative values on the one hand, and the defending or promoting of structural interests on the other. Building on the first and second chapter, the flow chart below illustrates the body of the working framework.

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[28] See: Chapter 1.1.2, Table Wang,

3.4 Limitations

This thesis has some limitations that need to be taken into account. First of all, it is important to note that employing Europeanisation as an analytical framework is only possible when the ongoing process of European integration is assumed to be present, a preconception which may lead to researcher bias by ascribing elements of policy change as being reflective of this integratory process whilst this does not necessarily have to be the case. In addition to this, it is unclear how the actors responsible for mapping the progress of the ENP Action Plans draw some of their conclusions, and the format and content of the Progress Reports is not consistent throughout, particularly in case of the reports related to Egypt. This brings to light another limitation which may influence the manner in which observations are portrayed, namely that the dependence on not fully consistent documentation from the EU as main source material can result in the drawing of conclusions on a one-sided or biased basis, as the national perspective does not present itself as clearly as that of the EU and its institutions. This concern is partially mitigated by working on the assumption that the presentation of the data gathered by the European Commission and other institutions is factual, but that does not mitigate the concern of inadequate, lacking, or otherwise incomplete information colouring either the datasets themselves or the interpretation thereof.

As a safeguard against research bias, I clearly stipulate where a lack of information inhibits me from drawing conclusions from observations. By being transparent about the way I interpret the data available to me and by presenting a clear and replicable methodology, I expect to be able to consistently substantiate all claims put forward throughout the thesis.

4. Case studies

The first two chapters set out to establish the elements necessary to construct the body of the working framework within which to approach the research question. In this chapter, the working framework is applied on the respective case studies of the development of EU-Moroccan and EU-Egyptian relations, as reported upon through the lens of the respective countries' progression in realising ENP goals. Following this, differences and similarities between the respective cases will be discussed, from which a conclusion will be drawn in chapter five

4.1 Morocco

This case study examines the extent to which the Barcelona converge with the concrete measures flowing out of the EU-Morocco ENP Action Plan and logged by the ENP Progress Reports. The first part looks at the extent to which adaptation of the measures in the three categories under examination converge with the adaptation of the Action Plan in the period of 2007 until and including 2010, whilst the second part looks at this for the period from 2011 until and including 2013.

4.1.1 Policy Adaptation and Convergence 2007-2010

4.1.1.1 Democracy and the rule of law

In the areas of democracy and the rule of law, the Action Plan laid particular emphasis on the consolidation of the administrative bodies that are responsible for the reinforcement of respect for democracy and the rule of law, and cooperation in tackling corruption, but also on the reformation of the justice system (European Commission, 2005:4,5).

The first progress report examined noted that Morocco is experiencing positive developments in the areas of democracy and the rule of law, specifically in the consolidation of the administrative bodies required to improve its democratic practices and adherence to the rule of law. The year saw the country's first national election take place with both domestic and international observers present to monitor its proceedings, although the legal framework to accommodate this had yet to be established. Nevertheless, the overhaul of the country's electoral legislation remained ongoing. Decentralisation of its political landscape continued with the establishment of the High Authority for Audio-visual Communication, an institution which regulates the speaking

time for political parties on public broadcasting channels, and its accession to the European Commission for Democracy through Law. New laws were drafted and passed establishing a judicial body capable of trying government members, and an advisory council on matters pertaining to draft legislative and regulatory texts was brought into existence.

In spite of this, the report did stipulate severe shortcomings concerning the lack of a clearly defined strategy behind decentralisation processes being undertaken, the perceived credibility of Moroccan parties and its parliament following an election which was troubled by a considerable amount of invalid votes and abstentions, and an overall lack of clarity on the reassembled roles of elected officials. Furthermore, on the topic of combating corruption, although a Central Corruption Prevention Authority has been established, legislation aimed at stipulating asset declaration conditions for holders of public offices has been drafted, public procurement legislation has been adopted, and a national corruption and transparency development observatory has been set up, the report remains highly critical of the continuing prevalence of corruption in many sectors of Moroccan economy and among its population, noting that substantial behavioural change in this regard is required for progress to be made (MPR 2007:3)

Meanwhile, Justice reforms in 2007 largely focused on the simplification of judicial procedures and the improvement of accessibility. Though the report indicates advancements in arbitration, mediation, and ad hoc preparations for further accessibility improvements, the report discerns that the level of persistence of systemic dysfunctions in the judicial framework continue to result in an inability to guarantee citizen right protections. This is especially prevalent in the country's prison system, where modernisation through construction and development of facilities and through accelerated training and literacy programmes has yet to offset observations of ill-treatment and worse taking place inside the prisons (MPR 2007:3). The concrete progress in democratic and human right reform continued over the course of 2008, though a lack of reform of the justice system threatens the undertaking of developing a justice system capable of upholding the rule of law, providing the population with protection, and incentivising businesses (MPR 2008:2). The report continues to elaborate on the developments in democratic reforms, remarking that the national government has taken measures to improve the conditions of local governance by

adopting a new communal chapter to that effect, a new electoral code that empowers citizen participation in politics, and a simplification and decentralisation of control over the organisation of local authorities' finances. In particular, female empowerment is encouraged. However, progress has yet to be made in the area of independent election monitoring (MPR 2008:3). The 2008 report also delivered harsh criticism on the lack of progress in the development of the rule of law in relation to justice reform. Prison reform is happening too slowly, with the juvenile penal system reform seeing it retaining its overcomplex form and harshening sentences in spite of providing more legal protection (MPR 2008:3,4). In fighting back corruption, minimal reforms were implemented. This resulted in the country backsliding on the corruption perception index (MPR 2008:4). By 2009, the new electoral code led to more female representatives being elected into office, and working groups are established to formulate reforms of the judiciary aimed at making it more independent and accountable. Further legislation to combat corruption has also been enacted, though Morocco continues to regress on the corruption perception surveys. To this end, Morocco has set up a corruption prevention unit and an anti-corruption legal assistance centre (MPR 2009:4). The reformation initiatives found further realisation over the course of 2010, with the Moroccan government presenting 23 draft laws aimed at revising the justice system in accordance with the EU's expectations. To this end, the EU has vouched financial support as increases to the Justice budget are necessary to implement all proposed changes, particularly with regards to expanding the anti-corruption initiatives (MPR 2010:4). In addition to this, a regionalisation commission has been brought into life with the purpose of examining how to best harmonise regional with national governance inside the country's territorial borders (MPR 2010:5).

4.1.1.2 Protecting human rights

In the area of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, the commitment reached in the ENP Action Plan concerned four fields, ranging from individual human rights protection to political assembly and labour rights. Here, the Moroccan government committed itself to working towards adherence to the international standards of human rights and fundamental freedom protection by reviewing its opt-outs to international conventions on human rights-related topics, pursuing legislative reforms that would consolidate human rights protection, evaluating the feasibility of acceding to

optional protocols to international human rights conventions in this regard, fostering dialogue on this topic, promoting the cultural and linguistic rights covering the full scope of inhabitants of Morocco, and pursuing the furtherance of criminal law reforms. Specific emphasis was placed on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children, in particular regarding the combating of discrimination and violence against women and the promotion of their role in social and economic progress, and the assimilation of the rights contained in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child into national law. Morocco also aimed to implement fundamental social rights and core labour standards, and enhance the legal protection provided to pregnant women in the workplace (European Commission, 2005:5,6). In regard to freedoms of association and expression, Morocco committed to revamping its law on freedom of association and of assembly, bringing it in line with the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, developing the Press Code, and supporting legislative reforms that would liberalise the audio-visual sector.

The 2007 Progress report clarifies the ongoing pursuance of objectives concerning the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as making steady process. In its quest to adhere to international standards, Morocco has signed onto a slew of international agreements that stipulate the conditions to which states that respect human rights are bound, and engaged proactively in its dialogue with the Union under the framework of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratisation, and Governance, and has started considering abolition of the death penalty (MPR 2007:4). In their efforts to strengthen cooperation on human rights, the European Community has provided financial and technical support in developing a national strategy and action plan aimed at democracy-building and human rights adherence. However, concrete recommendations concerning judicial reform, constitutional revision and adoption of international conventions and associated protocols made by the Equity and Reconciliation Commission have yet find implementation. A likewise issue arises when looking at developments in representation right equalisation, with liberalisation of the audio-visual sector and the registration of non-governmental organisations that may run contrary to perceived state interests still lacks consistent and fair application of the law, and when assessing police violence cases that took place during the year (MPR 2007:5).

It also put limited effort in campaigns and infrastructure-building aimed at developing the rights of women in the country. They have made efforts to expand on female representation in the new government, amended the Nationality Code so mothers can pass on the Moroccan nationality to their offspring, regardless of the father's nationality, and drafted a legal act that would provide women with more protection against violence, all the while preparing to set up a national observatory against domestic violence. Nevertheless, materialisation of all of these efforts have lacked behind. Morocco still hasn't withdrawn its reservations to CEDAW, nor has it adequately improved the capacity of its family courts for them to handle the increase in reports of violations flowing from the clearer delineations thereof (MPR 2007:5).

In the 2008 report, the rapporteur raises a substantial amount of concerns regarding the lack of concrete progress in the furtherance of human rights protections. Though the kingdom has expressed formal intent to bind itself to international conventions on human rights, this intent has yet to materialise into accession to or withdrawal of reservations from international conventions. It also has yet to further safeguard the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. Here, the rapporteur states that the general applicability of the primacy of international conventions in national case law is a concrete goal of the agreement (MPR 2008:4). This lack of progress is also brought forward by the rapporteur when he looks at the prison reform developments, stating that "prison conditions have not improved, particularly with regard to arbitrary violence, detention of minors in adult facilities and insignificant training and integration programmes" (MPR 2008:5). A national debate is stalling abolition of the death penalty, and the reorganisation of the prison administration will not find concrete output until 2009. Adding to this, proposed and enacted reforms of the freedom of press and assembly continue to fall short of promises made, with censorious laws preserved in the new draft Press Code and accessibility to legal rights for organisations continuing to be thwarted when this serves state interests (MPR 2008:5). Awareness raising events aimed at combating violence against women continue, but the absence of affirmative action when it comes to policy adoption has continued to leave women and children subject to undue harm. Child marriages labour remain abundant. Although the awareness campaigns appear successful in changing the mentality towards such issues, insufficient resources are being invested to provide the necessary tools and expertise for

the system itself to change along with it (MPR 2008:5) This lack of ratification of international conventions and accession to the ICCPR protocols continued throughout 2009, and national policy proposals to safeguard individual freedoms have yet to find their way into legislation. The discussion on the death penalty is still ongoing at this point, though it is currently not being carried out. Furthermore, though substantial progress has been made by Morocco in securing cultural and linguistic rights, this progress does not seem to extend towards the right to demonstrate or otherwise congregate in public, nor does it provide fundamental rights to marginalised societies in the Sahara (MPR 2009:5). When looking at the securing of female and child rights in Morocco, the prospects seem peachy but the practice seems bleak. Political commitments are not transposed into policy, and a legislative act against gender-based violence, as well as adaptations to the Family Code and Labour Code, are yet to be implemented effectively (MPR 2009:6). Morocco's inability to accede to protocols and ratify international human rights treaties continues through 2010 (MPR 2010:5), as does its reluctance to implement recommendations aimed at reducing discrimination, providing security for displaced people (MPR 2010:6), and ensuring that Moroccan citizens have access to freedom of expression, demonstration, and that of association(MPR 2010:5,6). Though the Moroccan government has made many commitments in these areas, very little of this has materialised, as can be seen by the outbreak of violence in a West-Saharan protest camp, and the disproportionate actions taken by the Moroccan authorities in this and other cases (MPR 2010:6). In contrast to this, Morocco is progressing in its devolvement of its hard hand in cases related to cultural and linguistic rights, having successfully launched a Amazigh language TV channel, and some headway is being made in safeguarding female and family rights, though implementation of these safeguards is challenging, as they override local preconceptions and traditions, as well as require substantial revision of the national legislative acts associated with these topics (MPR 2010:6,7).

4.1.1.3 Regional and international cooperation on justice, freedom, and security

In the areas of regional and international cooperation and security, the Action Plan lays out four key priorities to be pursued, three of which will be examined below. These are to enhance political dialogue and cooperation when common interests are at stake, develop cooperative means of handling issues, conflicts and crises, counterterrorism cooperation, and non-proliferation and anti-illegal arms export cooperation (European Commission, 2005:7,8). The additional priority of cooperation on justice and home affairs, covering the areas of migration and organised crime (European Commission, 2005:20-26), are also included in this assessment and joined together with the second and third priority, replacing the fourth priority.

The first priority concerns the enhancement of political dialogue and cooperation to secure common interests. The first progress report examined looks at the situation in 2007, and found that Morocco had gained ground its commitments towards regional security by means of Morocco's accession to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism at the ending of the previous year, its principled decision to support the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy declarations on a case-by-case basis, its commitment to exert control over the dual-use appliance export regimes, and its wish for closer European Security and Defence Policy cooperation following the country's highly successful participation in the ALTEA operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (MPR 2007:6). This upward trend continued over the course of 2008, with Morocco wishing to expand the multilateral enhanced political dialogue forum to include a wider range of subjects of common interests. This flowed out of the sharing of political views in the Association Council a few months prior. The rapporteur made notice of Morocco's proactive approach in reaching out to the necessary stakeholders for a deepening of mutual commitments on cooperative efforts. The country took part in a European crisis management exercise, furthered its cooperation in the area of controlling dual-use items, and expanded its counterterror and intelligence-sharing initiatives. The rapporteur does note that ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has yet to occur at this point in time (MPR 2008:6).

In the area of regional cooperation and initiatives, foreign ministers of ten Mediterranean countries including Morocco met on multiple occasions to discuss deeper levels of cooperation on security issues, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the AMU

and other topics. The rapporteur notes that political obstacles keep the AMU from becoming an effective player in the region, emphasising disagreements on technical issues and non-tariff barriers (MPR 2008:6). This trend is also visible in the 2009 report, which shows a consistent continuation of political dialogue and cooperative efforts in the fields of foreign and security relations, conflict prevention, and crisis management, with the rapporteur noting that efforts expended by the Moroccan government in the varying formal and informal meetings having brought about a strengthening of concertation and cooperation mechanisms between Morocco and its partners, both in the European Union, the 5+5 dialogue partners, and, to a more modest extent, the Arab Maghreb Union. Furthermore, the country is carving out a reputation for itself as the Union's main partner in Africa for the purpose of the promotion of democratic governance and human rights protection, all the while consolidating its role in regional cooperative initiatives in areas such as counterterrorism and combating organised crime. In spite of this, by 2009, Morocco has yet to move forward with the ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC (MPR 2009:6,7). The 2010 report notes the intensification of cooperation between the EU and Morocco in the UNHRC and in promoting democratic governance and human right protection in Africa, though it still has yet to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC. It also notes the distinct wish of the Moroccan government to cooperate with the EU on its regional counterterrorism strategy for Sahel, and that the negotiations between Morocco and the Council concerning cooperation with Europol has resulted in a draft agreement that has since been approved by Morocco. Regional cooperation within the AMU has shown minor signs of improvement, with commitments to an inter-Maghreb Free Trade Area coming to fruition despite being undercut by continuing political obstacles, and the continuation of the dialogues in the 5+5 format (MPR 2010:7). The year 2010 has also brought about the adoption of a decree outlining the residency permit issuance and withdrawal conditions for foreigners. The rapporteur emphasises that this adopted decree is in line with EU principles and approaches. The rapporteur furthermore notes the continued close and productive cooperation between Morocco and Spain, as well as the continuation of information exchanges, but also of the unrelenting lack of progress in negotiating an EU-Morocco readmission agreement (MPR 2010:15).

The second priority concerns the development of cooperative means of handling issues, conflicts and crisis. Here, the first progress report makes note of a territorial dispute with Front Polisario over the Western Sahara, where dispute settlement negotiations undertaken under the wing of the United Nations has resulted in early concessions on decentralisation of the region, with the proposal put forward by Morocco showing willingness to provide major political, economic and social autonomy to the region, under the condition that it submits itself to Moroccan sovereignty (MPR 2007:6,7). It also notes a major challenge with regards to migration. Looking at developments related to this topic, limited progress has been made. Transposition of legal acts providing real protections to refugees have not materialised despite signing an agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (henceforth: UNCHR) to this end. The establishment of a refugee status determination procedure is identified as a key priority to end the deadlock. In the extension of this, the UNHCR and the Moroccan Organisation for Human Rights are working on the development of a assistance centre for refugees and asylum seekers. This assistance centre is set to become an important provider of information and guidance for refugee status applicants. Furthermore, negotiations on the readmission agreement have continued to be ineffective, with little to no progress having been made over the course of the year (MPR 2007:14,15). When looking at legal migration, some tangible progress has been reported. Legal migration rates from Morocco to the EU raising following information exchanges and campaigns within the EC-funded institutional support project for the movement of people, whilst the Directorate of Migration and Border Surveillance has been empowered through higher resource allocation and better cross-institutional coordination, realised in part thanks to financial assistance from Union partners. This has led to a notable drop in irregular entries into the EU by individuals traveling from or through Morocco, as migrant smuggling networks find themselves in deep waters with their boats intercepted and their business models dismantled (MPR 2007:15). The following year saw advancements in border management and legal migration as the continuation of the cooperation programme with the Union for the purpose of strengthening Morocco's territorial borders were deemed 'satisfactory', as dialogue and information exchanges on tackling legal migration issues continue. The rapporteur makes note of the furtherance of dialogue and information exchanges on tackling legal migration issues,

including the first meeting of a working group dedicated to this topic under the Euro-Med Migration II programme (MPR 2008:15). In the area of irregular migration, the rapporteur remarks that though Morocco has made significant headway in curbing irregular migration streams through the country, the materialisation of early commitments on EC-Morocco readmission and the provision of recognition and legal protection to refugees continues to stall. The signing of the Headquarters Agreement with the UNHCR has still not brought any concrete improvements in this regard, nor has the appointment of an ad hoc committee tasked with analysing asylum management and proposing recommendations (MPR 2008:15).

Advancements in border management and cooperation in handling legal and illegal migration continue to progress over the course of 2009, with Moroccan-Spanish cooperation on curbing illegal migration singled out as an important factor. However, the legal structure required for readmission schemes to be implemented remain stalled, and the country continues to lack behind in its formulation of a legal structure that allows for recognition of refugee and asylum seeker status, instead relying heavily on the UNHCR to handle asylum procedures, and providing them support instead of taking charge. The concrete results include better protection and improvement of living conditions of those affected by these advancements, the credits of which are explicitly ascribed to the closer cooperation between Moroccan institutions, organisations, civil society, and the UNHCR (MPR 2009:14,15). The signing of the Headquarters Agreement with the UNHCR has, by 2009, not brought any concrete improvements in this respect, nor has the appointment of an ad hoc committee tasked with analysing asylum management and proposing recommendations (MPR 2008:15).

Lack of substantial progress is also observed in Morocco's handlings of irregular migration, with the ongoing absence of national legal and institutional frameworks on asylum and on status recognition for refugees and asylum seekers resulting in asylum procedures remaining to be handled exclusively by the UNHCR (MPR 2010:15).

The third priority concerns the enhancement of counterterrorism cooperation and the curbing of organised crime. The 2007 Progress Report only briefly mentioned anti-terror initiatives following a series of terrorist attacks (MPR 2007:6), but threads in much more detail when addressing the topics of and organised crime. Here, the

rapporteur is cautiously positive about the developments. Morocco has made progress in strengthening its cooperation with European partners on counterterrorism cooperation, receiving training and technical assistance, as well as reaching several bilateral agreements with individual Member States to restrict the rise of Al Qa'ida in the Maghreb. However, an agreement to combat human trafficking and accede to protocols of the UN Conventions against Transnational Organised Crime and the Prevention of Trafficking in Women and Children (henceforth: UNCTOC and UNCPTWC) remain unresolved, and the implementation of its earlier suggested national anti-drugs strategy has only been partially effective, with progress in decreasing cultivation of cannabis being offset by the increase in transit of hard drugs through its territory. The work that was put into combating money laundering has paid off, though, with 2007 seeing the launch of a new supportive twinning operation with Morocco's Union partners following transposition into law of the anti-money laundering act and its review of the establishment of a Financial Intelligence Processing Unit. Beyond this, the rapporteur notes that judicial and police cooperation is developing steadily, and notes in particular its active participation in the Euro-Med Justice Programme (MPR 2007:15). In contrast, the developments in initiatives aimed at countering organised crime only come up briefly the year after, mentioning advancements in combating cannabis cultivation and production, that nine of the country's regions implemented a national awareness campaign against money laundering, and that the Council of Ministers approved of the decree establishing the Financial Processing and Information Unit. No mention is made of advancements in judicial and police cooperation between Morocco and EU Member States. The rapporteur does makes observation of Morocco's accession to two Protocols to UNCTOC and UNCPTWC by 2009, providing the country with a stronger legal basis from which to combat illicit firearm trafficking and production, and trafficking of women and children(MPR 2008:15). He also notes that, by 2009, advancements are made in the area of combating drug crime. The national anti-drug strategy continues to be rolled out, with Morocco bolstering its bilateral cooperation with Spain and France in combating the transport of cannabis across the Mediterranean, whilst disincentivising cultivation through a directed socio-economic development programme and more stringent prevention efforts. At the same time, whilst cultivation and transport of cannabis are decreasing, the rapporteur notes that consumption of hard drugs is

increasing. To combat this, the Moroccan Ministry of Health has established specialised medical-psychological centres and has started training doctors, psychologists and other stakeholders (MPR 2009:15). In addition to this, the rapporteur also makes note of the furtherance of Morocco's establishment of a legal framework within which it can effectively combat money laundering, mentioning its partial adherence to international and EU standards. The rapporteur then goes on to suggest three focal points to bring the framework more in line with the requirements set out in the Action Plan. The legal framework itself requires an expansion of the criteria for establishing cases of money laundering, and an explicit reference to the punishable nature of this act, even when it is committed outside of Morocco's territorial borders. The rapporteur is also of opinion that normative developments are required in order to foster an environment of preventing money laundering (MPR 2009:15). At this point, pursuance of legal and police cooperation between Morocco and the EU has been mostly satisfactory. The country has shown interest in acceding to the European Convention on Cybercrime, and negotiations surrounding the strategic agreement Morocco wanted with Europol are set to commence on short notice. Furthermore, Moroccan judges and magistrates have enjoyed elaborate trainings to professionalise their knowledge and craft, and Morocco continues its participation in the Euro-Med Justice and Police II programmes (MPR 2009:15,16)

The rapporteur dedicates a paragraph to explicitly state that, by 2010, the Moroccan government still hasn't acceded to two of the three Palermo Protocols accompanying the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. In contrast, positivity can be read into the rapporteur's assessment of Morocco's ongoing battle against drug trafficking, with the country stating it intends to fully eradicate the cultivation of cannabis on its soil by 2018, and a major cocaine and cannabis trafficking network stretching from Latin America to Eurafrica having been dismantled in autumn. This is in contrast to drug consumption in the country, which has remained stable overall but also spreads amongst youth in spite of ongoing efforts by the Moroccan Health Ministry to thwart this (MPR 2010:15). The institutional twinning project set up between the EU and Morocco for the purpose of promulgating the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit drew to a successful close in spring of the year. On this topic, the rapporteur reports adherence with international and EU standards, but nevertheless suggests a deeper level

of legal foundations upon which to base its criminal and preventive standards is necessary. Broader checks and balances will be incorporated in 2011 with a new Anti-Money Laundering Act that is set to extend the list of punishable acts and reinforces alertness and oversight obligations (MPR 2010:16).

Meanwhile, judicial and police cooperation development remains satisfactory, and 2010 saw Morocco accede to several international conventions, and continue its constructive discussions with Europol and the Council, making use of the discussion fora available to it to promote itself as a reliable partner whilst receiving beneficial trainings at the same time (MPR 2010:16).

4.1.2   Policy Adaptation and Convergence 2011-2013

Following the Arab Spring and the introduction of the more for more principle, the EU and Morocco further deepened their ties.

4.1.2.1 Democracy and the rule of law

The year 2011 saw a major shift take place in Morocco's political and legal system as a new Constitution was voted upon and adopted, restraining some of the power of the King in favour of the elected heads of government and cementing into constitutional law association and assembly rights (MPR 2011:4), press, freedom of expression, and information-accessibility rights, judiciary reforms, and anti-corruption measurements, with the rapporteur emphasising the conditional nature of increased support from the EU in the area of justice reform by implying that Morocco aiming to match sincere expectations of actual progress in line with the EU's expectations had a role to play in the formulation of policy reforms in the areas of judiciary independence and the rights of the incarcerated, as well as the manner in which Morocco intends to shake up its judiciary hierarchy to accommodate the necessary reforms, as several commitments made have yet to materialise in practice. Similar concerns are noted in the implementation of anti-corruption measures (MPR 2011:5) and freedom-of-association and assembly rights (MPR 2011:4). These concerns turn out to be warranted the year later, as the rapporteur heaps up criticisms ranging from the new government's inability to swiftly transpose constitutional law into national law and absenteeism plaguing the national Parliament, to more detailed descriptions of continuing violent repression of

dissent and further stalling of justice reforms (MPR 2013:5,6). With regards to the justice reforms, the rapporteur makes note of the growing irritation among professionals involved with these reforms, as the continuing absence of concrete plans by the Moroccan government make it ineligible for EU funds to help pay for setting up the necessary infrastructure (MPR 2013:6). This continues the year after, with the rapporteur noting that after two years, only a quarter of organic laws and only a third of the ordinary laws necessary to fully implement the reforms promised by the 2011 Constitution had found their way to adoption (MPR 2013:5). Further developments in devolvement of responsibilities onto regional governments continue to be stalled, and provisions aimed at strengthening civil society received pushback from that very same collective, as dialogues broke down over transparency issues. Freedom of speech and association rights continue to be repressed by abuse of power of the authorities, without a clear line of accountability (MPR 2013:6). This repression continues both against private citizens and legal entities involved as well as against the free press, which is still waiting on reform of the Press Code that would provide the minimum of additional protections to journalists and bloggers (MPR 2013:6,7).

4.1.2.2 Protecting human rights

The rapporteur notes that though the Constitution addresses multiple suggested fundamental human rights protection-related measures, for example by solidifying the Amazigh language as the country's official second language and dipping into giving regions more autonomy (MPR 2011:6,7), the accession to, and ratification of, protocols and treaties aimed at protecting human rights remain stalled throughout 2011. The same is said of transposition of the good intentions into appliable law, particularly in relation to providing protections for women, illegal or irregular migrants, and the incarcerated (MPR 2011:6). The rapporteur is similarly critical of developments in the area of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in the year after, as though Morocco takes more action in ascribing to international norms, it reserves many caveats for itself that mitigate gains made, or otherwise stalls the signing of the instrument of ratification necessary to ensure compliance with human right norms and agreements (MPR 2012:7). That does not, however, mean that Morocco is not making headway in strengthening the institutional framework necessary to safeguard human rights. It has allowed inquiry into reports of abuses of power in the penitentiary system and against migrants (MPR

2012:7,8), and is actively cooperating with the EU to empower female participation and inclusion as equal members of Moroccan society. Further measures to combat discrimination are also in the works, though, again, transposition into law has yet to take place (MPR 2012:8). This pattern repeats itself in the report of 2013, where the rapporteur highlights a UN report that shows that substantial failures of human right protection in the judiciary and penitentiary systems remain commonplace, and ratification of the Rome Statute and adoption and implementation of anti-discriminatory measurements deemed of relevance continue to either stall or, in the case of approving the Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, don't even make it onto the parliamentary agenda (MPR 2013:7,8). Similar shortcomings are observed in Morocco's approach towards adopting legislation aimed at providing basic economic and social rights, with child labour continuing to be prevalent throughout the country and international standards pertaining to protecting and caring for children not being sufficiently upheld (MPR 2013:8), and vulnerable migrants continuing to be subjected to violence, ill treatment, and repulsion from national support and protection mechanisms in spite of plans being drawn up to alleviate these concerns and EU aid (MPR 2013:9).

4.1.2.3 Regional and international cooperation on justice, freedom, and security

As the Arab Spring starts unfolding, the rapporteur remains positive about the Moroccan Kingdom's continued dedication to develop cooperative relations with its international partners, noting in particular its granting of the "Partner for Democracy" status by the Council of Europe and the deepening of collaborative efforts between Morocco, the CoE, and the EU. The country actively participates in the European Police Academy and is working on improving cross-border judicial and police cooperation (MPR 2011:13). The rapporteur also notes that the new Constitution's criminalisation of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes is a concrete step towards the country ratifying the Statute of the International Criminal Court (MPR 2011:12). On the topic of legal migration and border management, he describes Morocco's willingness to further reforms with the EU's support, but follows up by reporting the country's continuing reluctance to push for progressive reforms of its legislation surrounding asylum and refuges (MPR 2011:12). More progress was reported in relation to

Morocco's reforms aimed at combating organised crime, where it continues to improve its measurements against the organised drug trade and human trafficking, as well as implementing support measures to help fight addiction (MPR 2011:13). As a partner on the international arena, Morocco continues its positive trend of proactively and constructively participating in in cooperative schemes and dispute resolution attempts throughout 2012, even warming up further to cooperation with neighbouring states (MPR 2012:8,9). This careful positivity of the rapporteur is extended towards Morocco's commitment to securing a mobility partnership being presented as a sign of further improving EU-Morocco relations, for example by implying that the inclusion of international protection and asylum rights in the partnership will lead to broad support (MPR 2012:15). After sketching a positive framework for the future, the rapporteur turns his attention to current shortcomings, noting that the Moroccan government continues to fall short on expectations in regard to implementation and transposition into national law of made commitments. In his criticism, the rapporteur particularly singles out Morocco's non-implementation of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, that Morocco acceded to in 2011, noting that, despite EU-funded support schemes being in place, the national penal code has not been updated accordingly, disrupting the judiciary's capacity to handle related matters adequately, for example in cases where ambiguous legal grounding makes it impossible to legally differentiate between human traffickers and migrant smugglers. The rapporteur furthermore notes a lack of developments in combating organised crime in 2012, except for in the field of combating drug trafficking, though he also notes that the ongoing instability in the region may be in part to blame for this (MPR 2012:15). In regards to political dialogue aimed at deepening international and regional cooperation, Morocco continues its proactive approach throughout 2013, to which the EU and Morocco set up several sub-committees to discuss horizontal collaboration of the acumination of justice and security, social, migration, agriculture, and fishery affairs. Morocco also obtained observer status in an EU-initiated programme aimed at democratic reform strengthening in the Southern neighbourhood, and its status of "partner of democracy" was formally and unanimously adopted by the Council of Europe (MPR 2013:9,10). Besides this, bi- and multilateral dialogues continued, though the report does not specify the outcomes thereof beyond

further commitments towards securitising the region and enhancing trade relations (MPR 2013:10). With regards to Morocco's commitments in the areas of reforms that better the conditions under which regular and irregular migrants are treated, a comprehensive immigration and asylum policy has been devised to facilitate the implementation of legal and institutional measures that cover their rights, and several measures have been agreed upon with the EU in order to foster cooperation on establishing ways to handle the challenges that come with protecting those (MPR 2013:17,18). In light of Morocco's deliverance of a concrete strategy with which to tackle its challenges concerning the integration and reintegration of migrants, the EU set up a support structure to help combat human trafficking, and further bi- and multilateral cooperative platforms are established between Morocco, Spain, and the EU for combating drug and trafficking crime by means of both directly providing support to crimefighting activities, but also by supporting regional socio-economic development aimed at reducing incentives for people in rural areas to cultivate drugs illegally (MPR 2013:19,19).

4.2 Egypt

 This case study examines the extent to which the Barcelona converge with the concrete measures flowing out of the EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan and logged by the ENP Progress Reports. The first part looks at the extent to which adaptation of the measures in the three categories under examination converge with the adaptation of the Action Plan in the period of 2007 until and including 2010, whilst the second part looks at this for the period from 2011 until and including 2013.

4.2.1 Policy Adaptation and Convergence 2007-2010

4.2.1.1 Democracy and the rule of law

The ENP-Egypt Action Plan stipulates the enhancement of democracy and rule of law promoting institutions as conduits of civil society, judiciary reform, and prison reform (European Commission, 2007c:5,6). The rapporteur kicks off the 2007 EU-Egypt Progress Report by evaluating the expected outcome of constitutional reforms that passed earlier in the year. Immediately, a note is made of the opportunity for the state of emergency being lifted, as this would restore impaired civil rights. These reforms also affect electoral law, with the first post-amendment election registering a low voter turnout. Early steps were taken in setting up an effective anti-corruption strategy and in developing a clearer judicial independency by means of providing tools, trainings, and funds. Finally, the rapporteur was critical about prison conditions and prisoner rights, but noted Egyptian commitment towards improvement (EPR 2007:3,4) When the state of emergency is extended, rather than lifted, the year after, the rapporteur verbally iterates and emphasises that the EU's position on this matter is one of 'regret'. The ramifications of this action are expected to hinder the legitimacy of rulings by the judiciary as civilian court cases can be replaced by special courts with little oversight or accountability. Egypt is making headways into reforming the administration of justice, but needs also address concerns pertaining to undue influences from the executive branch. New electoral legislation continues to be drafted, as Egypt declined the EU's assistance in improving the electoral framework, and the Egyptian government is working on transposing into law the mechanisms necessary to provide better and more locally tailored public services and to battle centralised and localised corruption, both in the national and international arena (EPR 2008:4,5). With progress on counter-terrorism legislation proceeding slowly, the state of emergency is not revoked by 2009, further

blocking the path for judiciary independence reforms. Reforming the justice administration has already proven more successful, with a series of measures improving legal assistance and literature accessibility, automating processes in court, and by introducing a committee capable of monitoring economic courts. The rapporteur does make note of Egypt's continued rejection of offers of technical support for the upcoming elections and its stalling of adopting pre-trial detention related amendments that it has already committed to, but he is more positive about the anti-corruption and decentralisation measures being proposed, developed, and finalised (EPR 2009:3,4). Elections were held in 2010 to decide Egypt's representatives for the upper and lower chamber, leading to victory by the National Democratic Party in both cases. The rapporteur notes multiple irregularities being described by different actors of society, ranging from accusations of election rigging to literal voter repression. A small pro coming from this election is that the quota of female inclusion in the representative chambers was achieved, though one may argue about the legitimacy of such a vote with Egypt refusing international and independent electoral observation, as turn-out figures inconclusively vary between 5 and 23%. Additionally, the state of emergency got extended until 2012 in spite of commitments to end it, leading to further stalling of realising an independent judiciary, though some practical improvements of the administration of justice and local administration reforms continue to spark hope of improving access to justice and public services. This careful positivity is also evident in the rapporteur's reporting on the anti-corruption measures, as implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption is being supported by an EU programme and transparency improvements are recorded.

4.2.1.2 Protecting human rights

In the area of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, the AP's priorities stretch over five fields. These identified fields are general human rights and freedoms, the rights of women and children, the right to freedom of association, expression, and media plurality, the right not to be discriminated against, and the right to social and labour standards (European Commission, 2007c:6-8). To promote and protect human rights in Egypt, the National Council for Human Rights (henceforth: NCHR) set up a national plan aiming to institutionalise inclusion of human rights considerations. The rapporteur makes note of Egypt's to "..promote human rights at the international level,

while also adhering to its undertakings on strengthening human rights in the domestic context, promoting the role of NGOs, and preserving the freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary"(EPR 2007:4). The national human rights strategy was finished in 2008, as the NCHR raised its visibility and outreach by receiving and formally forwarding 6677 individual complaints, through its condemnation and reporting of torture, and its questioning of the legitimacy of the Emergency Law (EPR 2008:5).

Though Egypt has already acceded and signed several international and regional human rights instruments, it has yet to ratify several of them, most notably that of the Rome Statute of the ICC. The country still imposes the death penalty, and retains reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women. It also has regulatory constraints on the activities of civil society organisations, and freedom of expression is under stress from media crackdowns (EPR 2007:4,5). In 2008, Egypt was one of the world's first ratifying parties of the Convention of Rights of Persons with Disabilities. However, no progress was made on other human rights related convention ratifications, and Egypt voted against a global halt on the death penalty. Little movement is made in bettering prison conditions or guaranteeing expression and association freedoms, nor on combating right violations of migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and women, but children have seen their rights expanded (EPR 2008:7,8).

2009 saw much work take place in preparation for 2010's Universal Periodic Review under the Human Rights Council, with consultations and discussions between the government, civil society organisations, and other stakeholders resulting in a total of 65 recommendations made, of which 19 were accepted. The NCHR increased its outreach further by cooperating with the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office and by merit of its fast reports. Meanwhile, incompatibilities between Islamic and international law stalled acceding to the optional protocols of human rights instruments, the death penalty remains on the table, and torture and ill treatment remain prevalent in interactions between state authorities and private citizens. The new Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, association an assembly, and belief and practice of religion. Though packing out well for the first, the latter two still face several practical challenges unifying constitutional and ordinary law (EPR 2009:5). Less well-off are migrants,

refugees, and asylum seekers, who continue to have their rights violated through murder, pushbacks, and unfair arrests and trials. The promotion of women's rights is slowly progressing, though, with a new strategy to combat violence against women and draft legislation against sexual harassment in the works. The rapporteur found it worthwhile to note that 2009 saw the first person charged for performing female genital mutilation as a milestone, before reporting solid progress in child right promotion and protection (EPR 2009:6).

The results of the Universal Periodic Review led to Egypt adopting a series of recommendations aimed at improving its position as guarantor of fundamental human rights, but the government also rejected a series of recommendations, perhaps most notably on the topic of abolishing the death penalty. There was no significant change reported concerning prisoner rights, but the reformulation of the definition of torture in line with the UN terminology is expected to raise opportunities to hold abusers to account. Egypt also continues to ignore calls by the UN for a Rapporteur on Torture to visit (EPR 2010:5,6). None of the three constitutional freedoms of expression, assembly, and of belief are harmoniously being absorbed into national law, with the widening of the freedom of expression's scope over the past years being narrowed back down over rising tensions in late 2010, the freedom of association and assembly continuing to be blocked by the Emergency and NGO law, and the continuing religious and sectarian violence leaving dead religious minorities behind (EPR 2010:6). Neither has Egypt taken adequate measures to prepare its legislation and infrastructure for the promotion or securing of rights of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, for example by clinging on to its reservations on the Geneva Convention. The materialisation of commitments towards promoting and protecting rights of women have also stalled, with no clear indication of expected reforms. Few reforms were pushed through in 2010 for the protection of children's rights (EPR 2010:7).

4.2.1.3 Regional and international cooperation on justice, freedom, and security

In the areas of regional and international cooperation and security, the Action Plan lays out four key priorities to be pursued, three of which will be examined below. These are to enhance political dialogue and cooperation when common interests are at stake,

develop cooperative means of handling issues, conflicts and crises, counterterrorism cooperation, and non-proliferation and anti-illegal arms export cooperation (European Commission, 2007c:8-10). Egypt's prominence in the Arab League plays an important role in the Arab Peace Initiative, and Egypt and the EU agree on the need for full implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access. (EPR 2007:6). Egypt's commitment to fostering common ground with the EU on security matters continues through 2008, as it takes upon itself the co-presidency of the UfM and positions itself as an important mediator between Palestinian factions (EPR 2008:8), and proactively facilitates a variety of dialogues, forms of assistance, and other aid in the Arab League and the African Union, positioning itself as a partner that opens door for the EU in Africa (EPR 2009:7). In 2010, Egypt played an instrumental peace in the relaunch of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and continued carving out its prominent role in African security-building by investing in developments and reconstructions in Sudan and Darfur, as well as mediate between North and South Sudan (EPR 2010:8). It was also permitted into a select group of countries with which the EU is ready to conclude crisis management operation agreements, as its successful co-presidency of the UfM came to an end (EPR 2010:8)

In 2007, Egyptian government is also proactively engaging in counterterror efforts by cooperating with the EU and developing a counterterrorism law in line with international agreements and expectations, particularly focusing on the role of the internet in (EPR 2007:6). This focus is continued over 2008, as Egypt seeks to find a balance between freedom of expression rights and control over internet site used for terrorist purposes. Challenges related to civil right protections led to further stalling of the counterterrorism law (EPR 2008:9), and even a visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism led to diminishable returns. Egypt remains very focused on prospects of fighting the online dissemination of terrorism-related materials, though it receives little support in this over freedom of expression concerns (EPR 2009:7). By 2010, there has still been no progress regarding the drafting of new anti-terrorism legislation, though Egypt does express willingness to foster deeper cooperation in counterterror initiatives with the EU. No direct suggestions were made by the rapporteur on how this could materialise. (EPR, 2010:8).

2007 saw Egypt continuing its established policy to pursue disarmament and non-

proliferation, particularly focused on ridding the Middle-East of nuclear weaponry, while remaining open to international checks and balances on the use of nuclear power for energy (EPR 2007:6). To this end, the European Commission has offered technical assistance and support (EPR 2008:9), and Egypt has asked for a Non-Proliferation Treaty review and an increase of dialogues related to denuclearising the Middle-East. However, the possibility of clearing up old mines in Sinai and El Alamein is hindered by Egypt's not signing the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (EPR 2009:7). Cooperation in the field of particularly nuclear disarmament between Egypt and the EU, noted as one of Egypt's key security interests, continues to deepen, with regular political dialogue being established (EPR 2010:8).

4.2.2 Policy Adaptation and Convergence 2011-2013

2011 was a turbulent year for the Arab Republic of Egypt. Following mass protests, power is placed firmly in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (henceforth: SCAF),which decided to leave engagement with long-term objectives and social and economic reform to the next democratically elected government (EPR 2011:3), leading to the formal suspension of the ENP until early 2013 (EPR 2011:2). The European Commission nevertheless continued its annual progress reports, though there were clear ramifications of the suspension that were detrimental to the quality of the reports.

4.2.2.1 Democracy and the rule of law

The transition of power towards a military-ran government was swift, but SCAF originally promised democratic elections within the year, they were subsequently postponed. Contrary to earlier years, Egypt was willing to let international observers not aligned to governments follow the elections, though no EU observation mission was agreed upon. In preparation for a peaceful transition of power to a democratically elected civilian government, constitutional reforms were put to a referendum and convincingly adopted in what the rapporteur explicitly states as "Egypt's freest vote in decades" (EPR 2011:4). Parliamentary elections were held in November 2011 and March 2012, and largely free presidential elections shortly thereafter, to which half of the eligible voters turned up. The new government, led by President Morsi, partially

lifted the state of emergency, though it did not address the legitimacy of the military courts nor help those already convicted or being prosecuted. Neither did it address the necessity to update the NGO law. However, substantial corruption cases are brought forward and perpetrators prosecuted. Cases of fraudulent land sales by the previous government were uncovered and annulled, and the President both set up a committee to investigate abuses against demonstrators and made the military establishment subordinate to the President (ENP PR 2012:5,6). The holding and passing of a referendum vote for a new constitution led to widespread demonstrations, with Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood party left ousted, banned, stripped of its finances, and branded a terrorist organisation (EPR 2013:4,5). Transitional justice and the independence of the judiciary didn't fare much better, as international observers were denied permission investigate, and the judiciary branch delivered verdicts that can be interpreted as being politically motivated, while military courts continued to try civilians and extend its influence on political decision-making processes (EPR 2013: 6).

4.2.2.2 Protecting human rights

Human rights and fundamental freedoms are fragile matters, and the Arab Spring proved how quickly a government like Egypt can slide back towards more autocratic forms of governance led by unilateral decisiveness instead of civil society deliberation. Directly after taking power, SCAF took the decision to subdue the judiciary, and crack down on demonstrators, civil society organisations, and the media for its purposes. Here, the rapporteur notes numerous concerns, stating that Egypt leaped backwards metaphorically, looking at the way in which the government restricted access to social media, gagged the old media with criminal sentencing behind the closed doors of military tribunals, and leave little to no means of safeguarding accountability, and literally in his mention of the country's drop to the 112th position in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (EPR 2011:4,5). The escalation of violence came to a peak when the government used excessive force against two groups of demonstrators, killing over 1000 people in the process. A new law was introduced following a two-month state of emergency that led to further withering of democratic values, as well as further protests and subsequent government crackdowns against said protests (EPR 2013:5,6). Meanwhile, it is reported that the death penalty is increasingly relied on as the revolution has led to an increase in martial courts taking place, as

hundreds claim they've been tortured. To boot, all the careful optimism constructed over the ENP Progress reports with regards to securing women's rights is wiped out by 2011's revelation that women are subjected to discrimination and abuse by male soldiers and security forces. Same goes for the rights of children, which has notably worsened since the Arab Spring began. Similarly for the right to religious freedom, as sectarian violence and religious bigotry clouds the judgment of those meant to lead (EPR 2011:6). The rapporteur notes not a single concrete improvement in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms protection in the two years that follow, just listening established reasons why the priorities addressed are failing to be met (EPR 2012:5-7) (EPR 2013; 4-7).

4.2.2.3 Regional and international cooperation on justice, freedom, and security

In spite of the unrest in the country's internal affairs, Egypt remained a dedicated partner in the Middle East Peace Process throughout 2011, bringing Israel and Palestine a step closer towards reconciliation even as relations between Egypt and Israel deteriorated (EPR 2011:6). The rapporteur credits the Egypt President and his team for their role in facilitating talks resulting in the Gaza ceasefire of 2012 (EPR 2012:7), but the ousting of the leader dampened the relationship between Egypt and Hamas, effectuated by Egypt's willingness to permit Israeli military action and cooperation in the Sinai region against Takfiri and Jihadi groups that both attacked Israel and harmed Egypt's internal interests (EPR 2013:8). The country also acted as an important player during the Libyan Crisis, and has expressed its will to reaffirm and redevelop relations with all African countries (EPR 2011:6), a dedication that found continuation through 2012, with Egypt being represented at the African Union Summit by its President for the first time in thirteen years (EPR 2012:7), but the country found itself suspended from the African Union following its undemocratic shift of government (EPR 2013:9). As the Arab Spring drastically lowers the prospects of cooperation on many fronts due to the damming of the political establishment in preparation for a peaceful transition of power, counterterrorism initiatives are no longer discussed by the rapporteur within the context of regional and international cooperation. Egypt's commitment towards disarmament, however, continue to be advocated for by its diplomats as a key priority (EPR 2011:6) (EPR 2012:8) (EPR 2013:9)

4.3 Discussion

The above cases describe the respective development of several of the normative priorities agreed upon between the European Union and Southern ENP Partner States, established through the Barcelona Agreement, legalised by the Association Agreements, and brought to execution by means of neighbourhood downloading of policies through the ENP Action Plans. In chapter one, the framework of Europeanisation was laid out and operationalised, and the factors of norm diffusion explained. In this paragraph, the descriptive data collected from the case studies will be put into the perspective of Europeanisation to see whether the EU's narrative is vested in the diffusion of norms, or the securing of interests. The similarities and differences between the way in which the social, political, and legal infrastructures of the two countries have developed in light of the normative priorities become particularly visible when looking at the reported developments following both the change in the weight of conditionality in receiving support and the political turmoil of 2011 onwards.

Looking at how the reports are constructed, it is evident that the two countries had very different approaches in how they made use of the opportunities brought about through their ENP partnerships with the EU. Morocco proactively participated in, and got EU support for, initiatives that fostered democratisation and the strengthening of civil society, the rule of law, and fundamental human rights, diffusing into its national legislature measures that established or solidified the infrastructure necessary. It allowed EU and international observers to observe elections taking place, saw the reformation, and, where possible, simplification, of laws and procedures aimed at enhancing citizens' accessibility to crucial services and information, and many bi- and multilateral focus and support structures have been set between Morocco and the EU, and in some cases Morocco and one or more individual Member States, to help Moroccan society transition towards a more sustainable democracy that treasures fundamental human rights and the rule of law. However, the rapporteur indicated that many of the commitments and good intentions of Morocco were not executed with the same enthusiasm as with which they were promoted, for example with regards to justice and freedom of information, speech, and association rights, in part flowing from challenges in uniting constitutional law with ordinary law. The country also expressed commitment to signing on to, and implementing, many international agreements and

instruments, but generally steered short of definitively latching on. Furthermore, its government was left relatively untarnished after the mass demonstrations of 2011, allowing for the continuation of progressive reforms without too much hinder.

With Egypt, most of the progress that was reported appeared to be in line with Egyptian security interests, while the implementation of more normative aspects of the ENP were generally unsuccessful. The EU found a dependable partner in Egypt in external conflict mediation and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but saw few opportunities to diffuse European norms and values into the Egyptian governing system. Instead, proposals and criticisms related to the topics of democratisation, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights were consistently pushed to the side as multiple transitions of power made consistent development of civil society in the country all but impossible. The EU found itself stuck with a partner that continually stalled materialisations of commitments that would better citizen life but would complicate that of its government. After the suspension of the ENP, the mannerism, style, and quality of content of the reports seemingly changed, and with no positive progress concerning normative diffusion, the rapporteur's listings of faults and criticisms lay bare the EU's inability to project its norms and values onto Egyptian society successfully.

Concerning the diffusion of democratic, human right and fundamental freedoms, and rule-of-law related norms, in Morocco's case, though improvements can still be made, civil society had been benefitting substantially from the transposition of European norms and values into the country's social, political, and legal structures. Meanwhile, in Egypt, where the government actively stalled, rejected, and otherwise impaired the opportunities for civil society to institutionalise itself, and citizens are more secure or empowered than they did before, if not less so. There are also similarities to be observed with regards to the challenges in practical application of the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly, and religion, as neither country was able to fully implement measures to these ends. For example, violations of normative standards pertaining to the development of freedom of expression rights in in Morocco were continuously reported as development on the Press code, which started in 2007, but had seen no concrete progress reported upon by 2013, froze. Meanwhile, the Egyptian government cracked down harshly on its press in the period leading up to and following the Arab Spring. A lot of similarities were reported between Morocco and Egypt related

to the respective partner countries' unwillingness to accede to or ratify international conventions, statutes, and protocols, some of which already signed, for example in case of their mutual unwillingness to abolish the death penalty or sign up to the ICC, both actions opposed by the EU, and in relation to international standards on organised crime, torture, and migrant-, children-, and women's rights protections. Meanwhile, participation of the two Partner States in bi- and multilateral dialogue and cooperation platforms has intensified over the years examined, which has led to the centrality of peace taking an ever more prominent role in the States' foreign relations. To this end, both Morocco and Egypt have presented themselves to be reliable but very different partners, with Morocco fostering regional security and stability through its participation in the ALTEA operation, crisis management and conflict prevention efforts, and even pushing for the further diffusion of democracy, good governance, and human rights protection among its African partners. Egypt, in contrast, focuses on positioning itself as a strategically relevant and valuable player in peace and crisis mitigation negotiations, as it has done in relation to Libya, Sudan, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Although it would be attractive to draw the conclusion that this means that the ENP is values based, it is important not to fall into the pitfall of cum hoc ergo propter hoc, where correlation in mistaken for causality. The fact of the matter remains that the successful implementation of many of these values-based considerations either stall or have their effectiveness mitigated by lack of further measures, or are sometimes reimagined as serving national security interests, as evidenced by the contrast between Morocco's and Egypt's handling of implementing ENP priorities.

5. Conclusion

This study analyses the role of European value diffusion by tracing how European values are transposed into national law by two of its Southern Partner States, Morocco and Egypt. This is done by looking at the Rapporteur's observations concerning the extent to which the normative factors identified in Chapter one, in particular those of 'centrality of peace', 'democracy', and 'rule of law' (Manners, 2002:242), find themselves transposed into the socio-political and legal systems of the third party Partner States.

Using Europeanisation as the overarching analytical framework, the cases of Morocco and Egypt are compared on the premise of their respective levels of policy adoption from – and policy convergence with – the European Union. Similarities and discrepancies in the approach taken by the Rapporteur in interpreting the progress on key priorities of the ENP Action plans are put into the perspective of European norm diffusion versus national interest securitisation. By clearly defining what the subject of study is, the methodological approach taken allows for generalisation of the research results and reproduction and application of the methodology on other Southern ENP Partner States. This contributes to the field of Europeanisation studies by presenting a new way in which to use established methods to interpret the construction of the EU's narrative towards norm diffusion towards third countries by means of the implementation of ENP priorities, paving the way more in-depth research on how to further external norm diffusion effectively.

The case studies show that the normative values of the European Union are at least in part absorbed into the social, political, and legal fabric of its Southern ENP Partner States of Morocco and Egypt, though set expectations of norm diffusion in the areas of democracy, peace, and the rule of law have largely proven too ambitious to realise in a short timeframe.

In addition, the very fact that the European Union is able to levy its institutions and human and financial resources to affect policy change in these countries means that supranational projection channelled through the European Neighbourhood Policy has affected the adoption of policies by these two countries that put them on a path of convergence with EU standards, in effect transforming aspects of the construction of the

socio-political normative identity of the Partner States so as to closer emulate that of EU Member States.

Looking at the manner in which the European Commission's rapporteurs take note of the extent to which normative measures are enacted in the Partner State under review, it can furthermore be concluded that the narration of the handling of provisions pertaining to the development of democracy and the rule of law, human rights and freedoms, and peace, follows values-based considerations in which the rapporteur continually makes note of possible reform opportunities and pitfalls that may affect the promotion and consolidation of those values as they come up. Thus, it can be concluded that the EU's narrative reflects a values-based approach towards its Southern ENP Partner States.

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