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At the end of 1998, in Tartu University, there was the celebration of the 25th anniversary of "Theses on the Semiotic Study of Cultures" that was first published in 1973, both in Russian and English. Its title contains a specification: "As Applied to Slavic Texts" (Eng 1973).

Less than a year before his death J. Lotman independently wrote "Theses on the Semiotics of Russian Culture" (Lotman 1994) in which Lotman connects semiotic study of Russian culture with two tendencies. On the one hand, a researcher bases his work on the best means of contemporary cultural semiotics that help to describe Russian culture. The foundation of the second approach is the dissatisfaction with contemporary "semiotic culturology", and new impulses from the material of Russian culture to search for new methods. Lotman identifies himself exactly with the second approach, hoping to enrich the methodology of cultural semiotics through the material of Russian culture: "the dynamism, instability and permanent inner contrariness turn it into a certain historical and theoretical polygon ..." (Lotman 1994: 407).

Theorizing in material has been important also for J. Lotman and members of the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school created by him, but this certainly did not exclude dealing with general theoretical problems. However, this detail helps to understand the development of scientific metalanguage where, in the case of J. Lotman, one can first talk about semiotization of philological terms and addition of general semiotic concepts (later also those of other disciplines). In this way the concept of language was complemented by the terms of code and system. At analyses of texts, F. de Saussure's langue was only signifier of a system, because language is realized in text as a code that is derived from the pragmatics of the text. But as a code it equates to Saussure's term of speech (parole). Text, as a term, was originally just speech registered by writing, but as an object of research it obtained

possessing structure, and being framed; the characteristics also include the coherence or regularity of connections between elements and levels, and coherence in the unity of the beginning and the end. As terms, language and text dropped into wider field of meaning, neighboring the notions of model and modeling system. In his theses "Art among Modeling Systems" Lotman defined model through the analogue of an object perceived and the language of a modeling system or the notion of analogue of language. Correspondingly he used the notion of secondary modeling system to describe the functioning mechanisms of systems using natural language as material (Lotman 1990: 8–9). In the framework of this treatment, the status of a secondary modeling system is obtained by poetic language in relation to written language, or the language of pictorial arts in relation to the language of consciousness, i.e. natural language into which it is translatable or by which it is describable. According to this logic, natural language is the primary modeling system in relation to reality, and the secondary modeling system, as a language of description, relates to all other languages of art and in wider sense languages of culture (mythology, religion, behavioral norms, etc.). This was indulged in polemics by those semioticians for whom also prelingual or simply non-verbal communication, for example in the case of children and animals, was important. In this way T. A. Sebeok, a founder of zoosemiotics, has stated that natural language is, in ordinary usage, a secondary modeling system and is thus tertiary as a language of description (Sebeok 1989: 33–34).

Lotman's original logocentrism is only a parallel to those trends that seek for boundaries of semiotics, departing not from the semiotics of Ch. S. Peirce or Ch. W. Morris, but from the semiology of F. de Saussure. Therefore, R. Jakobson's vision of semiotics as a concentric circle that signifies investigation of communication through all types of messages is also convenient for Lotman. In this circle there is a smaller circle that signifies study of communication through speech messages and in which linguistics is engaged. Linguistics and semiotics, in turn, belong to a wider circle in which there forms a general science of communication and which, in his opinion, is directed by social anthropology, sociology and economics (Jakobson 1985: 320–321).

The relationship of linguistics and semiotics has given U. Eco a reason to demonstrate evolution from Saussure to Jakobson through

change in the treatment of the code. While Saussure speaks of linguistic code, Jakobson connects the notion of code with the correlation between elements of two different systems, and keeps in mind semiotic systems in both broader and narrower perspective in the face of codes and subcodes. Thus Eco admires also Jakobson's ability to bring semiotics into linguistics, not just the ability to distinguish between extralinguistic codes (Eco 1977: 48–49).

Eco's own semiotics as symbiosis of the theory of sign generation and the theory of code is definitely a continuation of this trend. In a later foreword to J. Lotman's book "Universe of the Mind", Eco also saw (Eco 1990) Lotman's evolution through this problematics. First he fixed Lotman's original state in the question: "Reconstruction of cultural code does not mean explanation of all phenomena of the given culture, but it rather enables us to explain **why** this culture has created these phenomena" (Eco 1994: 600). Eco viewed Lotman's extralinguistic attitude to the code as leaving borders of structuralism: "Lotman still understood that looking at text as a message produced on the basis of linguistic code is not at all the same as viewing the text (or set of cultural texts) as a code. Because he was aware of the fact that there is no historical period with one cultural code (although the modelhood constructed can be efficient abstraction), and that in every culture diverse codes exist simultaneously. /.../ In the course of his studies Lotman still reached the conclusion that a code identified in culture is much more complicated than the one that can be identified in language, and his analyses became more and more witty and obtained the background of bright and complicated historical knowledge" (Eco 1994: 600–601). Lotman's works of the last decade depart also from his attitude to codes: "Lotman understood undoubtedly already in the sixties that multiplicity of codes in a culture creates contraries and hybrids or "creolization". In his later works, especially in those written in the last decade, he has elaborated the term **semiosphere** analogous to the biosphere." (Eco 1994: 601).

Language, text, structure, model, (secondary) modeling system are these notions the dynamism of which — in the volume of their meaning — gives a good overview of the semiotics of Lotman and the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school until the birth of cultural semiotics in 1973. K. Eimermacher has called Lotmans ability to conjoin different terms and to provide them with novel meanings integrativity, and to

this he also dedicated an article "J. M. Lotman: Semiotic Version of Integrative Culturology" (Eimermacher 1998).

In fact, a so to speak non-structuralist reception can be noted already when Lotman's first books reached the West. So T. G. Winner stressed already in the foreword of the first translated book that Lotman's lectures on structural poetics do not view the text as independently existing, but "as a part of the context of extratextual elements" (Winner 1968: X).

A few years later he acknowledges that from treatment of artistic work as a secondary modeling system's semiotic structure Lotman has reached to a comparative treatment, viewing an artistic work as such compared with extratextual structures. T. G. Winner stresses that in Lotman's opinion signs in artistic works are not only indexic (in Peircean sense) as they are in natural language, but primarily iconic. Thus the plane of content and the plane of expression are connected in the text unlike in language. The peculiarity of art as a model is not only this iconicity, but the specific relationship to reality, the quality of the sign to be, via its elements or as a whole, a part of more than one system simultaneously (Winner 1971: X). It is characteristic that years later T. G. Winner has also stressed, while talking about Lotman's innovativeness, the essential connectedness of structures of texts with extratextual context, the binary oppositionist nature of intratextual and extratextual relations (Winner 1990: 233). Thus Lotman has never been considered as an immanent structuralist.

And a view from the inside. A leading member of the Tartu–Moscow school, A. Pjatigorski has used, when defining the object of the semiotics of the beginning of the 1960s, a phrase "anything". From Lotman's first book "Lectures on Structural Poetics" of 1964, literature became into the object (Pjatigorski 1996: 54), and in connection with literature the text as a fundamental notion of semiotics: "Exactly the "text" gave Juri Mihhailovich the possibility to pass from literature over to culture as the universal object of semiotics" (Pjatigorski 1996: 55). Defining literature as an organic object and culture as a meta-notion, Pjatigorski considers the contact of these terms, in Lotman's definition of culture, important in the aggregation of texts. By this, the traditional possibility of treatment "how I understand culture" was adjoined by a possibility to ask how culture understands itself or an another culture. Pjatigorski calls this textualization of culture and enlargement of textual analysis the ontologi-

zation of the method and refers to the naturalization of the object as its attendant phenomenon. Development from text to semiosphere resulted from the latter (Pjatigorski 1996: 55). Differentiation between two trends in Russian semiotics also concerns Lotman. Pjatigorski defines culture as an object of semiotics and Lotman a naturalist studying it, but at the same time he defines history as a second possible object of semiotics and V. Toporov a historiosoph studying it (Pjatigorski 1996: 55). In both tendencies Pjatigorski sees signs of withdrawal from semiotics, but as causes of both positions — location of the analyst inside the culture described. Undoubtedly, there is a historiosoph also in Lotman, be those ethical and political questions in articles of the current collection or discussion about the future of Russia and transfer from nihilist binary model of culture to European ternary treatment of culture in his last book "Culture and Explosion" (1992).

The literature-centered period in Lotman's work is concluded by the appearance of two books — "Structure of Artistic Text" (1970) and "Analysis of Poetic Text. Structure of Verse" (1972). In the same period (1970), two booklets appear into which articles on cultural typology have been gathered, and which is the sign of shift to the paradigm of cultural semiotics. In the definition of text the notions of material, forming, structurality, coherence and framedness are not stressed any more as inner features of organization. More important is the comparison of extratextual and intratextual relations that does not only mean the connection of text and context, but changes understanding of the ontology of text. Keeping the text in mind, it is possible to talk about subtextual meanings or meanings pertaining to language in general, as well as textual meanings and functions of texts in cultural system. Culture, in turn, is also describable through the description of three levels: a level of subtextual meanings, a level of culture as a system of texts, and a level of culture as a set of functions serving texts (Lotman 1970: 73–77). By the beginning of the 1980s, the symbiosis of text and culture has taken place, and the text as a monolingual formation has become into multilingual and semiotically heterogeneous formation that, all the more, has intellectual capabilities and memory. Besides recording and transmitting a message, the text is also concerned with the creation of new information.

When U. Eco differentiates between the notions of coding and recoding in his semiotics, and admits the possibility of optimal

reading, he connects deviations from the optimal or the right understanding of texts with the notion of extracoding. The modification of recoding into extracoding brings along the oscillation between two strategies of reading, undercoding and overcoding. The former means a simplification of texts, the latter an over-signification of texts and treating them as more complicated than reality (Eco 1977 b: 133–136).

In his article "Cultural Semiotics and the Notion of Text" (1981) Lotman replaces the notion of deciphering or decoding the text with the term of communication and creates, by describing circulation of texts in culture and relations between the text and the reader, a typology of different, although complementary processes: 1. communication of the addresser and the addressee, 2. communication between the audience and cultural tradition, 3. communication of the reader with him/herself, 4. communication of the reader with the text, 5. communication between the text and cultural tradition (Lotman 1990: 276–277). On the basis of this typology the object of cultural semiotics is formed by semiotic functioning of concrete texts, but in the evolutionary plane cultural semiotics means for Lotman the semiotics of secondary modeling systems (Lotman 1990: 4).

Evolutionally the name of Lotman and the notion of cultural semiotics are specifically connected. The cultural semiotics that was carried on by him contains enough aspects of general theory, but is applicatively still naturalistic (in Pjatigorski's sense), i.e. connected with Russian culture. This connection is made explicit both in program texts and process of reception (see also: Torop 1994).

Therefore, a collection of articles appeared in 1984 bears the title "Semiotics of Russian Culture" (Lotman, Uspenskij 1984), and a selection published a year later, respectively, "Semiotics of Russian Cultural History" (Lotman, Ginzburg, Uspenskij 1985). Also, "Theses on the Semiotic Study of Cultures", published with Lotman's initiative both Russian and English in 1973, from which the date of birth of cultural semiotics has been started to be reckoned, have a subtitle "as Applied to Slavic Texts". Although, next to the authors connected with the study of Slavic material, V. Ivanov, J. Lotman, V. Toporov and B. Uspenski, there was also A. Pjatigorski, the orientalist (Teesid 1998).

1973 is the year of interesting coincidences. In that year several books appeared that significantly influenced the study of culture,

development of semiotics and cultural semiotics, and induced an interesting symbiosis. Lotman and the Tartu–Moscow school presented the definition of cultural semiotics, calling it a science studying the functional relatedness of sign systems circulating in culture that departs from the presupposition that it is possible to operationally (proceeding from a theoretical conception) describe pure sign systems, but they function only in contact with each other and in mutual influences (Teesid 1998: 61). Dynamism is added by attitude to the text that is viewable as an individual sign, but also as a set of signs or a system. In culture, there are functionally possible texts as assemblages of signs and the semantics of such texts can be approached via the semantics of signs. However, there are also possible such texts that neither are discrete nor disintegrate into signs (Teesid 1998: 66). The relationship between discrete or indiscrete types of texts is important at the description-comparison of cultural epochs or cultural types. Complex treatment is also based on the same logic: "In the union of different levels and subsystems into a single semiotic whole — "culture" — two mutually opposed mechanisms are at work: a) The tendency toward diversity — toward an increase in differently organized semiotic languages, the "polyglotism" of culture. b) The tendency toward uniformity — the attempt to interpret itself or other cultures as uniform, rigidly organized languages (Teesid 1998: 86).

In 1973, in New York, there appeared the first print of C. Geertz's collection "The Interpretation of Cultures" (Geertz 1993) that arouse excitement in cultural theory, and in which the notions of interpretive and semiotic are used synonymously.

Thus his interpretive anthropology is a kind of parallel to cultural semiotics. Geertz suggests to get introduced to a science, not to turn into theories but to look what those who practice that science are doing. In his opinion social anthropologists "do" ethnography: "In anthropology, or anyway social anthropology, what the practioners do is ethnography" (Geertz 1993: 5). Talking about ethnography Geertz presents two treatments. According to the first treatment with the nature of the text book, ethnography is a compilation of reports on expeditions, transcription of texts, choice of informants, mapping of studies, etc. He personally offers another treatment from which it derives that ethnography is thick description, i.e. in reality the ethnographer meets the set of different and often intertwined conceptual structures in which there is no explicit regularity and which do not

always exist in an easily graspable explicated shape. Interviews, observations and recordings belong to the field work. But "doing" ethnography must mean an attempt to read a strange, figurative, incoherent manuscript in which the graphic signs of ordinary language are replaced by behavioral examples. And, in the framework of this conception, the culture described becomes itself an "acted document" that can be interpreted by communicating with it (Geertz 1993: 10). Geertz has surprisingly many similarities with Lotman and the Tartu–Moscow school, although the direct contacts between their conceptions were evidently missing.

In 1973, in Paris, there appeared a tiny book by the French semiologist R.Barthes "La plaisir du texte" (Barthes 1973) in which the analysis of intracultural contentment guides (differently from extracultural contentment) to individuality instead of subjectivity. The text corresponds to individuality as a thread in which infinite generation of meanings takes place, and at the same time it is an intertext that makes life outside the text impossible, be this text Proust, everyday newspaper or television screen: "book shapes thought, thought shapes life" (Barthes 1973: 59).

In this treatment intertextuality is connected with intermediality: intertwining of texts and mediums, as well as obscurity and unimportance lead us already to postmodern and poststructuralist pluralistic tolerance, but also to epistemological uncertainty.

In 1973, in Munich, there appeared a book of caution by the Austrian ethologist K. Lorenz — "Die acht Todsünden der zivilisierten Menschheit" (Lorenz 1973). Without stopping here at the dangers delineated by him (although amongst the sins there is also the negligence of traditions that comes to mind in the case of the Tartu–Moscow school as the one that binds traditions together), I would like to stress that in this book K. Lorentz analyses organic systems which form the basis of the social being of mankind, and inspects the relationship between nature and civilization, as well as the self-regulation of systems or homeostasis that connects them. Against the background of Lotman's later discussions on explosiveness, casualty, etc. in culture this treatment also belongs into the occasional whole of works presented.

These books that have occasionally happened to meet in time reflect in their scarceness still a certain and more general trend in which there could intertwine cultural semiotics, anthropology, post-

structuralism and ecology. This is a movement towards the analysis of a complex system, the results of which depend on the ability of the analyst to define his/her viewpoint, but also the ontological borders (a possible world) of the system analyzed, the parameters of his/her evaluation and criteria of exactness of results of evaluation.

Cultural semiotics, born in 1973 and in the environment referred, moved by its internal developmental tradition with the baggage of Russian formalism and the Prague Linguistic Circle away from structuralism. In this it is similar to the movement of French structuralist semiology into a poststructuralist paradigm and J. Kristeva, one who attended this movement and was one of those who propagated Lotman since the end of 1960s, as wella as one of those who replaced the notion of text with that of intertextuality, has noted also in Lotman's development the change of semiotics into intercommunicative (Kristeva 1994: 376).

One more accidental coincidence. In 1984, in London, there appeared a twin volume of high level cultural semiotics in which A. R. Kelkar tried to bind cultural semiotics with other disciplines oriented towards culture. In the Tartu–Moscow school, the use of the notion of semiosis, so common in classical semiotics, was not too actively circulated. At the same time semiosis, as a state or process in which something functions as a sign, can be used when specifying the research object of (cultural) semiotics. So, Kelkar offered a classification in which cultural semiotics correlates with semiosis in culture and cultural semiosis with ethnology of semiosis (Kelkar 1984: 132). This reminds of Geertz's two treatments of ethnography and the Tartu–Moscow school's dynamic inspection of the relationship between the sign and the sign system, as well as I. Portis-Winner's attempt to describe ethnic texts by the help of Lotman's cultural semiotics (Portis Winner 1989).

In 1984, there appeared Lotman's article on semiosphere that in fact conceptualizes these accidental connections between those books published in 1973 that were already mentioned. Casualness has turned into regularity. The notion of semiosphere has been derived from V. Vernadski's biosphere, or in connection with the notion of living environment. As life on earth depends not only on cosmic solar energy but also on human activity, then by growth of man's part in the fate of the planet one can start talking about noosphere, the intelligent living environment. Man can develop and destroy, but his activity oriented at

noosphere is traceable and describable. Noosphere itself is substantial-spatial, whereas semiosphere is abstract space in which languages, texts, and cultures intertwine. In the opinion of V. Ivanov, one of the most bright scholars in the Tartu–Moscow school, the task of semiotics is to describe semiosphere without which noosphere is unthinkable (Ivanov 1998: 792).

Semiosphere is this conditional space without which semiosis would be impossible, but at the same time the notion of semiosphere rather presupposes implication of the notion of intersemiosis. This means that the medley of sign systems that looks chaotic becomes organized on different levels of confining them. Thus the most important notion of semiosphere is the boundary. Once Lotman needed the notion of framedness in order to confine the text. Now it is boundary what frames the semiosphere, but the entanglement of boundaries inside semiosphere is just as important: "the boundary of semiotic space is the most important functional and structural position of this space that determines the essence of the semiotic mechanism of it. Boundary is a bilingual mechanism that translates external messages into the internal language of semiosphere and vice versa. So it is only through the boundary the semiosphere can be in contact with the non-semiotic and alien semiotic space." The same mechanism functions also inside semiosphere: "Thus the semiosphere is perforated by multiple inner boundaries that specify its regions in the semiotic sense. Translation of information across these borders, play between different structures and substructures, consistent semiotic "irruption" of one or another structure to an "alien territory" evoke the birth of meaning, emergence of new information".

The quality of the semiosphere to bind diachrony and synchrony, organize memory, transform systems turns it into a very functional mechanism that has been connected even with the Jungian term of collective unconscious (Cornwell 1992: 166).

On the other hand, in criticism, there have been made references to Lotman's approximation to the views of M. Bakhtin together with whom Lotman has directed Russian structuralism to paths parallel to poststructuralism. Thus, between the biosphere and the semiosphere there appears Bakhtin's notion of the logosphere (Mandelker 1994: 390). It really is possible to see connection between Lotman and Bakhtin exactly from the viewpoint of the notion of semiosphere, or more correctly the notion of boundary.

But this connection does not mean sameness. Lotman's notion of the boundary is inseparable from the term of individuality. Individuality is inside the boundary and the boundary is a mechanism of translation, i.e. between the own and the alien there exists difference. But Bakhtin maintains: "Man does not have inner independent territory, he is wholly and always on the border, looking himself into an eye he looks into an eye of the other or with the eyes of the other" (Bahtin 1979: 312).

Lotman's treatment is related to Bakhtin's attitude to culture in which he indeed excludes bordered territory, but marks borders with significance. In his opinion culture does indeed locate on boundaries: "One must not imagine culture as a spatial whole that has borders and also an inner territory. Culture does not possess inner territory: it is wholly located on borders, boundaries route everywhere, pierce all its moments, culture's inner unity fuses into atoms of cultural life, reflects like the sun in every of its drops. Every cultural act lives significantly on boundaries: in this lies its seriousness and importance; being separated from borders it loses its ground, becomes empty, tedious, degenerates and decays" (Bahtin 1986: 44). This short comparison allows to maintain that understanding of dynamism of the two scholars is different. For Lotman, it is important to find the border also in the biggest entanglement of boundaries, the dimension of wholeness, and principally it would be possible to create a typology in which boundaries of different level would be in complementary relationship (see also Torop 1998). In Bakhtin's treatment, the border (like dialogism, polyphony, etc.) is connected with ambivalence, and the notion of boundary is seen as a translation mechanism in both treatments. However, deeper comparison of Bakhtin and Lotman is becoming an object of wider interest (see Shukman 1989; Danow 1991; Grzybek 1994; Bethea 1997; Petrilli 1998). This comparison, however brings Lotman nearer to the poststructuralist paradigm in which Bakhtin's name has been actively used.

Cultural semiotics, having been developing as an international science, has expanded also disciplinarily. When leaving aside the use of semiotics in disciplines that study culture on the level of method or an aspect (e.g. cultural studies), two poles between which the development is going on have to be fixed (see also an overview: Bernard 1993 and an attempt to put diagnosis to the current state: Koch 1989). On the one hand, one can notify the attempts to revise the conceptions

pertaining to general semiotics and to analyze their culturo-semiotic productivity for the sake of interest of cultural semiotics (see e.g. Portis-Winner 1994). On the other hand, there can be notified the globalization of cultural semiotics, a wish to become an integrative cultural theory that treats both history of mankind (and the semiogenetic period in it) and synchronic typologies (Koch 1986). Several conceptions from different countries have not been switched into this context yet. But this means that the connections between culture and semiotics have not frozen yet, they create new forms of knowledge.

In 1973, it was possible to write in "Theses on the Semiotic Study of Cultures" about cultural semiotics as a science studying functional correlation between different sign systems. The present volume reflects both interest in different sign systems and cultural texts, and also relationships between sign systems. The editorial board is happy to attend the arrival of new names in our publication and the multitude of viewpoints related to these names. Materials of this collection reflect well the influence of material studied on the way of thought of scholars and choice of method. And like that this collection fits well to celebrate the anniversary of cultural semiotics. A large part of this collection's material is formed by presentations of two conferences ("Problems of Description of Literary Text" and "25 Years from the Birth of Cultural Semiotics").

For culture, it is inherent to be diverse, contain different sign systems and texts in complex thread. But at the same time the influence of the media environment on culture is deepening and due to this otherwise autonomous sign systems and texts happen to be side by side. They intertwine and transform, and the identification of their elements or signs turns out to be very difficult through one system or one text. This means that the specific conditions of semiosis also force us to talk about intersemiosis, associations of signs and texts that can not be studied hierarchically or that are too difficult to be studied so; however it may be possible to study them complexly or complementarily.

On the grounds of this we announce the next issue of Sign System Studies to be thematic and would like to discuss with our dear colleagues about the theme essential to contemporary culture — INTERSEMIOSIS AND SPACE OF INTERSEMIOSIS. Taking into account the youth of cultural semiotics and its centeredness at the object, the choice of this theme means an intention to find possibilities

of complex analysis, i.e. to search for objects of research enriching cultural semiotics itself, and at the same time to describe the environment generating them. In cultural semiotics, there are different traditions of research. Likewise, semiotics has become a natural part of many disciplines pertaining to cultural analysis and cultural theory. Therefore, cultural semiotics is not a detaching boundary here — cultural semiotician and semiotician in culture are, in the global plane, still located in the same space. We look for contributions by the beginning of the academic year of the new century — 1st of September.

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The dynamics of semiotics of culture; its pertinence to anthropology

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I argue in this paper that new and renewed perspectives are emerging in American anthropological studies, which I loosely group under Lotman's useful term "semiotics of culture," where the significant unit is the culture text. One of Lotman's definitions of text, which pertains to culture texts is the following:

> A (culture) text is a mechanism constituting a system of heterogeneous semiotic spaces, in whose continuum the message...(is) circulated. We do not perceive this message to be the manifestation of a single language: a minimum of two languages is required to create it (Lotman 1994: 377). [(1981]).

The assumption is that all communication is through signs, verbal, visual, movements, performances, rituals, etc. Peirce's classic definition of the sign is the following: "A sign is something which stands to somebody for something in some respects or capacity" (CP.1.372).

Among the agenda coming to the fore In the spirit of such semiotically oriented scholars as Charles Sanders Peirce, Mikhail Bakhtin, Roman Jakobson, Jurij M. Lotman, V. V. Ivanov and B. A. Uspenskij are the following: the close relations between verbal and non-verbal realms; an emphasis on ambiguity and dynamics in place of static structures; the integration as well as tensions and factions within and between cultural units; the search for the the inner point of view including memory; the significance of culturally specific versions of history and their relations to official accounts, and the effect of the anthropologist upon the group studied. I see our fundamental tasks as interpretation of the meaning and interrelation of all modes of sign communication, verbal or non-verbal, conscious or subliminal, including auto-communication; and the distilling from artistic tropes, whether consciously created or not by the culture bearers, their various

in satire, allegory and humor. Finally, one must look to underlying organizing principles in cultures and culture in general, such as perspectives of time and space, beliefs, and fundamental values. In this search the influence of the scholars mentioned was delayed since the Soviets held up the publication of the works of M. M. Bakhtin, Jurij Lotman, and other members of the Moscow-Tartu group, and unfortunately in the United States Charles Sanders Peirce had a similar fate and is only now being widely recognized as the greatest American philosopher, his works being energetically published at last. In fact Bakhtin and Peirce did not live to see the reception and publication of most of their works. During his American years Roman Jakobson tirelessly underscored the relevance of Peirce for the social sciences and humanities. Jakobson was teaching and writing in the United States since the days of the Second Word War, and remained a leading scholar in European countries as one of the founders of the inter-war Prague Linguistic Circle and before that the Moscow Linguistic Circle. Jakobson also did not live to see the increasing though hardly sufficient influence of his work among American anthropologists. Indeed, only after the onset of the Gorbachev era was he openly lauded in his own former homelands, Russia and Czechoslovakia. Fortunately, there were brilliant scholars, particularly in the former Soviet Union, led by Lotman, Ivanov, and Uspenskij of the Moscow-Tartu group, and brave scholars in Czechoslovakia, who never ceased to work in a semiotic mode, no matter how constrained they were.

Let us preface our discussion of semiotics of culture by a comment on the excessive relativisation of postmodernism, not shared by the above-named scholars, by calling on the philosopher Robert Innis (1994: 308) who follows Wittgenstein in seeing that one of the principal tasks of philosophy is to "see connections" (Innis 1994: 1). Disagreeing with Derrida concerning the issue of the existence of a reality of independent of signs, Innis rejects the view that "in the absence of a center or origin everything becomes discourse" (Derrida 1978: 280 quoted by Innis 1994: 3), Innis argues, rather, "(W)e can openly admit a rather differently conceived universal play of signification, but it is one that is not cut off from its roots in perception and action ..." (Innis 1994: 3).

For Peirce, as Innis stresses quoting Eco, the subject matter of semiotics "is coextensive with the whole range of cultural phenomena ..." (Eco: 1976a: 6 in Innis 1994: 1), and involves perception at all

levels. As Barnouw (1986:82 argues, Peirce's system "stresses the progressive determination of meaning" (1986: 82). However, Peirce's progression is a continuous direction with no end insight, a process which he called "infinite regress," characterized by *synechism* which means that there is no absolute discreteness since "elements of Third-ness cannot be entirely escaped" (CP 7.653). For "Continuity is fluidity, the merging of part into part" (CP 1.164), and it "involves the idea of infinity," (CP 1.165), Thus there is "continuous expanse" (1.166), Indeed "Evolution means nothing but *growth* in the widest sense of that word" (CP 1.173),

Innis finds that the positions of Peirce, Bühler, and Cassirer "arrive at the same conclusion: the theory of perception must necessarily advert to the sign-functions of the sense data found in it" (Innis 1994: 4–5). Innis also notes Vološinov's argument that "not only does 'expression organize experience' but 'there is no such thing as experience outside of embodiment in signs'" (1994: 5, citing Vološinov 1933).

The following summary remarks highlight what I hold are some of the focal concepts relevant to a semiotically oriented anthropology.

1. Peirce

Perhaps the most penetrating analysis of individual Identity and in-terrelations between ego and the other, which foresees the flexible and permeable boundaries of Lotman, is Peirce's program of the human sign. The human sign is not only a metaphor or a form of discourse for Peirce, it is a paramount construct structuring all communications of all humans. Peirce insightfully took the first leap that called for the formal study of the human sign, holding that all conscious perception involves self-consciousness, that is seeing oneself as object (Peirce CP 5.532, cf. Portis-Winner 1983a). One can thank Jakobson who called attention to this fundamental thought of Peirce. Jakobson noted that Bogatyrev, without knowing of Peirce's existence, realized Peirce's program, "launched over a century ago under the slogan 'Man, A Sign'" and urged that this program be furthered (Jakobson 1976: 30).

The human sign is placed within Peirce's vast scheme, but here I must confine myself to a major epistemological distinction which is a concomitant of Peirce's fundamental trichotomy, sign, object, inter-

pretant, and which makes clear the chasm between Peirce's world view and that of the post-moderns.

Importantly, Peirce sees two kinds of objects, which may be verbal or nonverbal, the *immediate object* and the *dynamical object*. Peirce's object is anything with which the sign presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some further information concerning it. Peirce also held that there are various interpretants, the immediate, the dynamical and the final or logical. Deledalle sees Peirce as holding that in describing aspects of reality the final logical interpretant is "that which *would* finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached" (CP 8.184)." But Deledalle asks "how can we distinguish the dynamical object which is outside the sign from the immediate object in the sign?" (Deledalle 1995: 26). Peirce holds that the dynamical object can be known only by "collateral experience' (CP 8.514)," In other words, we receive knowledge of the existence of the dynamical object, but not of its nature in itself, its substantial nature, as, writes Deledalle,

> ... we were born into a world that was already constituted..... Here , we do not start from the dynamical object, We start from signs. Not formal signs-representamens, but signs already constituted with their final logical interpretants and their objects Our distinctions shed light on the processes of their constitution and reveal their functions. They do not describe the state of things (*ibid.*: 29).

Peirce's human sign is the fertile plain which makes semiosis possible. Peirce wrote that everything present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves which does not prevent it from being a phenomenon of something without us (CP 5.283). Since "every thought is a sign" and "life is a train of thoughts ... (this) proves that man is a sign; so that every thought is an *external* sign, proves that man is an external sign. Thus, "when we think we are at that moment a sign ... the man and the sign are identical" (CP5.314). Thus reflexivity is the *sine qua non* of semiosis but also the basis for the whole process of semiosis representing, however imperfectly, outside reality. As Peirce wrote, "(E)xperience is our only teacher, its action takes place by a series of surprises, bringing about a double consciousness at once of an *ego* and a *non-ego* directly acting upon each other. An imaginary object was expected but something different comes instead" (CP 5.53).

2. Jakobson's aesthetic function and metonymic
metaphors and the importance of underlying iconicity

In its *Theses* (1929) the Prague Circle adopted Buehler's three functions for the verbal message, the referential, the emotive, and the conative. And the *Theses* added a fourth, the poetic (later broadened to the aesthetic) function focused on the message for its own sake, which Jakobson described as

> ... not the sole function of verbal art, but only its dominant, determining function, whereas in all other verbal activities, it acts as a subsidiary, accessory constituent. This function, by promoting the palpability of signs, deepens the fundamental dichotomy of signs and objects (Jakobson 1960: 356).

In 1960 Jakobson defined two more functions of the message, the phatic and the metalingual. Both have parallels in Bakhtin's program and for Lotman the *meta* conception is fundamental for all semiotics.

In scrutinizing Jakobson's model, we consider his challenging depiction of metonymic metaphors in poetry. As Jakobson wrote:

> The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection onto the axis of combination ... Similarity superimposed on contiguity imparts to poetry its thorough going symbolic, multiplex, polysemantic essence ... In poetry, where similarity is superimposed upon contiguity, any metonymy is slightly metaphoric and any metaphor has a metonymical tint (1960: 358).

In 1974 in the opening address in the First International Congress of Semiotics in Milan, Jakobson defined the *artifice*.

> The signs of a given art can carry the imprint of each of the three semiotic modes described by Peirce: thus they can come near to the symbol, to the icon and to the index, but it is obviously above all in their artistic character that their significance (*semeiosis*) is lodged.

As Jakobson continued,

> The 'artifice' is to be added to the triad of semiotic modes established by Peirce. This triad is based on two binary oppositions: contiguous/similar and factual/imputed. The contiguity of the two components of the sign is factual in the *index* but imputed in the *symbol*. Now, the factual similarity which typifies the *icon* finds its logically foreseeable correlative in the imputed similarity which specifies the *artifice*, and it is precisely for this

reason that the latter fits into the whole which is now forever a four-part entity of semiotic modes (Jakobson 1987: 451–2).

It is not clear, I believe, that we need a fourth semiotic mode, the artifice, since may already be accounted for by Peirce's hypoicon and degenerate index. Nor can we necessarily distinguish factual and imputed similarity for they blend into each other in index and symbol. Furthermore, Lotman's forms of montage also account for the artifice. Finally buried in the above quotation is the Saussurean dichotomy *signifier* and *signified* suggested by the discussion of the two components of the sign. Jakobson gradually dropped this distinction but it was not clear that Jakobson fully accepted Peirce's sense that the sign is indivisible, although I think that it was implied in Jakobson's last work, nor did he account for the interpretant (Jakobson and Waugh 1979).

3. Dialogic anthropology

Bakhtin analyzes his overarching dialogic program to the novel and the carnival (cf Ivanov 1975). For Bakhtin the significant units in culture are dialogic utterances in full context in which emerging subjects perform polyphonic, heteroglossic and double-voiced dynamic texts which cannot be separated from ideological spheres, nor in the last analysis from chronotopes or horizons. Bakhtin's chronotope refers to perceptions of time and space affected by cultural traditions which underlie and shape specific texts and involve the opposition incomplete vs. open as contrasted to closed vs. final.

Bakhtin's horizons are described by Holquist (1990a: xxiv) in the following way:

I see the world from a 'horizon, the world gives itself as immediately around me, as circumscribed by the unique angle of my vision, as a surrounding full of specific meanings by my own ends. The other, however, I see as existing in an environment: the world is the same for him as it is for others, for it is not conditioned by the uniqueness of his intentionality (as is my horizon) (Bakhtin quoted in Holquist 1981: 72).

The dilemma of the ethnologist in portraying the other is depicted indirectly by Bakhtin's above remarks. Our perceptions of time-space (chronotopes) and world view, consciously or unconsciously penetrate

our view of the environment and permeates the dialogue between sub-ject and investigator.

The ramifications of Bakhtin's dialogue could lead us through his entire works (cf. Portis-Winner 1999 in press). This did not go unno-ticed by the American ethnologists Tedlock and Mannheim, (1995: 2) who, largely inspired by Bakhtin, have designed their program of dia-logic anthropology as a replacement of interpretive anthropology. Tedlock and Mannheim also credit Jakobson with advancing the Bakhtinian dialogic mode as early as 1942. (The only early work of Bakhtin' was published in Russia in 1929. Others had to wait until the sixties). Jakobson saw dialogue as a more fundamental form of speech than monologue, and called the latter a form of social pathology (Jakobson 1953: 13 in Tedlock and Mannheim and Tedlock 1995: 1). Jakobson argued that the idea that folk tales could be told monologi-cally repeated from telling to telling is a fantasy, a projection of otherness that betrays it origins in a world of written literature and individualist social relations among first, second, and third persons (1995: 2). The two anthropologists correctly note Jakobson's argu-ment that dialogue as a more fundamental form of speech than mono-logue "directly challenges the Saussurean focus on the individual actor as the source of *parole or* speech." Consequently, Saussure's *langue* becomes an emergent property of dialogue rather than having ontological priority over all speech (Mannheim and Tedlock 1995: 1 referring to Jakobson 1953: 13). Indeed, even if the speakers of mono-logue "expect no answer, ... (they) nevertheless takes a position in a larger linguistic world that is already constituted through countless prior interactions of social relationships among first, second and third persons" (Mannheim and Tedlock 1995: 2). As the authors continue,

> (O)nce culture is seen as arising from a dialogical ground then ethno-graphy itself is revealed furthermore as an emergent culture (or in-tercultural) phenomenon, produced, reproduced, and revised in dialogues between field-workers and natives. This process of its production is of the same general kind as the process by which ethnic others produce the cultures that are the objects of ethnographic study (Tedlock and Mann-heim 1995:1).

Furthermore, "(E)ven as the voice of objectification or interpretation narrows itself toward an authoritative monologue," this only means that a multiplicity of voices are suppressed (*ibid.*: 2–3).

(The individual's) speech already has first and second person embedded in it. ... In addition to persons, there are other deictic elements that locate the speaker with respect to a world that already has persons or things in it.... No one can speak of language, as we know it, without already being situated in the world (7).

Kristeva's intertexuality (1980: 68–69), when other discourse infiltrates directly or indirectly into a text, is seen by Tedlock and Mannheim as a form of Bakhtin's dialogism, and they accept most of Bakhtin's basic concepts such as "heteroglossia," a mixing of linguistic registers (Mannheim and Tedlock: 16 referring to Todorov 1984: 56), and "double voicing," that is speaking in the manner of other voices without quoting them (Bakhtin, 1981:324-30). Tedlock and Mannheim (1995: 16) hold that dialogism exists even at the level of the individual word since the environment of the words of others is always implied (Bakhtin 1981: 276). And they note that Bakhtin speaks of parodies and ironic importation of a word from one speech type to another (Bakhtin 1981: 305–8). They agree with Jakobson that the folk tale, which Bakhtin did not treat, is more widespread and probably older than the epic, and that story tellers engage in code switching or heteroglossia in which every level of discourse has dialogic elements (Mannheim and Tedlock 1995: 16).

Many important themes unite Bakhtin with ethnological studies. I quote from Bakhtin's path-breaking interpretation of medieval European carnival which he places in an ethnographic context.

Of the meaning and functions of worldwide images of the rogue, clown and fool-from the deep recesses of pre-class folklore up to the Renaissance .... We encounter new forms for making public all unofficial and forbidden spheres of human life, in particular the sphere of the sexual and of vital body functions (copulation, food, wine), as well as decoding of all the symbols that had covered up these processes (common every-day symbols, ritualistic ones and symbols pertaining to the state religion) (Bakhtin 1981: 165).

Such carnivalesque characteristics are typical of many ethnic texts that exhibit reversals of all kinds, and particularly reversals of roles that pertain to different hierarchies and different bounded cultural worlds. Boundaries are understood here to have reference not only to spatial and temporal divisions, but also to other sociocultural divisions such as those of gender divisions, social and economic strata, religious distinctions, folk/urban dichotomies, and others. For Bakhtin the carnival

minimally opposes and integrates two cultural worlds and their many internal divisions.

Lotman associates his cultural dynamics with Bakhtin's broad program. As Lotman writes

> In Bakhtin's analysis inevitable action, change, and destruction are latent even in the stasis of the text. Therefore, there is a plot (*sjužet*) even in instances that would appear to be far removed from the problems of plot (*sjužet*).

and:

> As a generator of meaning, as a thinking mechanism capable of working, the text needs an interlocutor. This requirement reveals the profoundly dialogic nature of consciousness (1994: 378).

4. Lotman's Narration; Implicit and Explicit Montage

Lotman's work was very broad and in this brief statement I can only touch on some pf his penetrating concepts. For Lotman montage is only a special case of one of the most widespread methods of narration for forming artistic meanings — the juxtaposition (contrast and integration) of heterogeneous elements. In Lotman's system, montage may be *implicit* or *explicit* (1976: 47–61). Changes in *implicit montage* are modal, by transformation. An example of implicit montage described by Lotman for the cinema is the joining in one shot of an individual's face to a new version of the original, where the facial expression is changed, the alteration being a transformation which makes the perception of change gradual. Whether certain elements are rearranged, or whether there is a change in mood or scale, there is no clear addition of new elements but simply a change in the formal organization and thus the mode of the material. This form is plotless and timeless, being non-linear. *Explicit* montage, however, is based on the juxtaposition of units emanating from different semantic domains. In the new context these elements appear to have something in common at some level which, Lotman writes, creates a common modality (1976: 58), an example being Eisenstein's film *The Strike* (*Zabastovka*) where negative characters appear with animal heads. The unifying contextual agent may be a common mood, a setting or

element, even a repeated noise, which, by its association with certain dissimilar objects in the text, imparts a new meaning. *Explicit* montage is like plot because it clearly violates traditional orders, boundaries, and expectations, changes by addition of new elements, and is linear. Lotman's montage corresponds to Jakobson's metonymic metaphors, though Jakobson did not distinguish "implied" and "explicit."

In a broad sense then, both types of montage that belong, according to Lotman, to two forms of narration, permeate both artistic and mythological texts. Of course, such processes, which are aspects of metaphorical thinking, are not absent in non-narrative, non-artistic texts, but they are not dominant. I will show, in examples in this study, that ethnic texts, since they always combine at least two cultural worlds, demonstrate exceptionally well the artistic principle of montage, so well expressed in the carnival.

Lotman's *semiosphere* provides a semiotic term for a total culture and in this sense is very useful. Lotman writes "We shall define the semiotic space necessary for the existence and functioning of languages, not the sum total of different languages. In a sense, the semiosphere has a prior existence and is in constant interaction with languages" (1979: 123). One can compare this concept with Peirce's *phaneron* and with Jakobson's *universe of discourse*. All these concepts are in part a reaction against atomistic and additive approaches.

5. Semiotics of every-day behavior

Bakhtin's outlook resonates with Lotman and Uspenskij's semiotics of every-day behavior, humor, parody. An example of the semiotics of everyday behavior is taken by Lotman and Uspenskij from eighteenth century culture of the Russian nobility. During the reign of Peter the Great (1672–1725) every-day behavior, normally subconscious and considered natural by the actors, became something new to be learned since traditional every-day behavior had been replaced by imperial edict by new patterns modeled on European aristocratic culture (Lotman and Uspenskij 1984: 232). As a result, various Russian "styles" of every-day behavior coexisted from which the nobility could choose; and eventually such new patterns became theatrical in the sense that "an eighteenth century man would choose a certain type of behavior for himself. .... This role as a rule involved the selection of

an historical figure" or other types, such as a character from literature, to emulate (241). The "role," then, is a kind of "mask." The next step is a transition to "plot", which means "to regard one's life as a text which is organized according to the rules of a particular plot that emphasizes the 'unity of action' and focusing one's life on one immutable goal" (245). Plot introduces the idea of ending. "Death and destruction, as the subject of constant reflection, came to be seen as the crowning event of a life" (245).

Such role playing, adopting European styles by Russians, is a form a plot involving boundary crossing in Lotman's sense, which I see as an internalized transnationalism, a tension between two contrasting cultural traditions, one of which the individual attempts to suppress and one of which becomes the semantic dominant which the individual tries to enact.

Lotman and Uspenskij counterpose Bakhtin's concept of laughter in culture, based on Western European traditions, to the world of laughter in early Russian literature which was described by Lichaèev and Panèenko (1976 in Lotman and Uspenskij 1984: 39–52). Whereas laughter in Western culture freed individuals from religious and social constraints and transported them into a world of popular carnival utopia that reversed and parodied dominant socio-ethical hierarchies, in Russian medieval culture, "some laughter images ... bear no trace of ambivalence and do not lie outside the bounds of the of the official ... culture" (40), thereby resembling Turner's liminal world of reversals and the grotesque in tribal society which remains within the sacred realm (Turner 1964). Other studies of humor in tribal societies also see laughter as part of the sacred realm (cf. Bricker's study of the highland Chiapas (1973), Such performances are ritualized and not marked by irony and do not threaten the social order. In contrast Turner's liminoid, which he finds in modern post-tribal society (1982), which is not part of the sacred realm and recalls Bakhtin's carnival reversals of the social order in medieval Western society.

I can only mention here the close relation of Bakhtin's world to Jakobson's metonymic metaphors (1960) and Lotman's related implicit and explicit montages (Lotman 1976a), all of which confront images from two different domains or cultures and give rise to new reflection on their possible similarities, again opening new avenues of meanings and increased information and dynamics and typical of

every-day behavior, most often not realized by the actor (cf. Portis-Winner 1982, 1987).

6. History

The questioning of traditional concepts of history is a singularly modern concern. The issue is why are official concepts of history so inadequate? The shattering critique by B. A. Uspenskij (manuscript 1989: 324) of the nineteenth century view of history as a monolithic, homogenous and linear progression of events demands a rethinking of how history is conceptualized and perceived by, to use Bakhtin's terms, official and nonofficial *personae*. A semiotic approach focuses on how participants ascribe meaning to historical events from their subjective points of view and their cultural traditions. It is the different readings of these texts, dependent on differing "languages," that themselves reflect differing ideas and conceptions of space-time, which concern Uspenskij. He also probes the relation between dream time and historical time that demonstrates the inadequacy of a solely linear and chronological model.

In Lotman's discussion of historical fact in his *The Universe of the Mind* (1990), he notes that since the historian is condemned to deal with texts that stand between the event as it happened and himself, his task is to decode something encoded originally by someone with a purpose (217). Thus the historian creates facts from a story. It is insufficient to translate the text into the language of the day, rejecting whatever does not accord with the decoder's norms and the science of the day, relegating such aspects to "the fruit of ignorance and fantasy" (218). From the semiotic point of view,

> the code (or set of codes) which the creator of the text used has to be reconstructed and then correlated with the codes used by the researcher ... A decoding is always a reconstruction" (218).

For Lotman, considering the relation of science and history, chance and determinacy are not incompatible, but are two possible states. Thus history and science, though inseparable, also differ. History, as opposed to physical science, "is a process which takes place with interference from a thinking being." Thus in historical processes not only chance but conscious choice becomes the most important objec-

tive factor (232). Accordingly, historical semiotics must analyze how humans who make choices look at the world, and reconstruct different ethno-cultural types of consciousness (Lotman 231–232). For Lotman as for Uspenskij history is a dynamic process since the

> interrelationship between cultural memory and its self-reflections is like a constant dialogue: texts from...earlier periods are brought into culture, and, interacting with contemporary mechanisms, generate an *image* of the historical past, which culture transfers into the past and which like an equal partner in a dialogue, affects the present. But as it transforms the present, the past too changes its shape (Lotman 272).

Thus the dynamics of history from unofficial and official positions and their contrasts, and the role of memory in reconstructions of history, impel the researcher of the past to travel down many avenues.

7. The semiosphere, boundaries

Lotman''s term *semiosphere* subsumes all aspects of semiotics of culture, all the heterogenous semiotic systems or "languages" that are in constant process of change and at a deep level have some unifying qualities. The term semiosphere is a refiguration of Lotman's statement that culture itself is a large text.

> The unit of semiosis, the smallest functioning mechanism, is not the separate language but the whole semiotic space of the culture in question. This is the space we term the *semiosphere* (Lotman 1990: 125).

"Smallest" here is meant to imply an overall organization which of course subsumes smaller interrelated units or texts. For Lotman the semiosphere is not isolated from the rest of nature and is compared by analogy to V. I. Vernadsky's *biosphere*, "namely the totality and the organic whole of living matter, and also the condition for the continuation of life" (Lotman 1990: 125 commenting on Vernadsky 1960: 102).

The semiosphere is asymmetrical, marked by strong differences between the center and the periphery (127), and involves Lotman's notion of boundary, which he defined as "the outer limits of a first-person form." "Our" space is safe and harmonious, as opposed to "their" space, which is hostile and chaotic (131). The basic divisions within the semiosphere arise from human biophysical and universals

and fundamental culturally perceived differences, such as the distinction of the living from the dead, the settled from the nomadic, towns from countryside, the asymmetry of the brain, the rotation of earth, the movement of stars, the cycle of seasons, constants of human body weight in relation to gravity, the opposition of up and down, right and left, male and female, hot and cold, etc.

> The notion of the boundary separating the internal space of the semiosphere from the external is just a rough primary distinction. In fact, the entire space of the semiosphere is transected by boundaries of different levels, boundaries of different languages and even of texts, and the internal space of each of these sub-semiospheres has its own semiotic which is realized as the relationship of any language, group of texts, or separate texts to a metastructural space which describes them, always bearing in mind that languages and texts are hierarchically disposed on different levels [creating] a multileveled system (138).

Within this framework Lotman develops a semiotic notion of *personality* embedded in the cultural milieu. Thus a personality is not identified with a physical person alone but may include a group, and even property, social, religious or moral positions, etc. For example, a master's personality may encompass his wife, children, slaves, etc. Clearly then, when differing views of the boundaries of individuals collide, disturbances occur, as Lotman writes:

> The ... notion of collective personality, and not individual personality, lies behind the idea of blood feud, according to which the whole clan of the murderer is perceived to be responsible (139).

Lotman suggests the model I-I when the subject transmits a message to himself. A reformulation of the message from sender to receiver in internal communication brings additional meaning to the message. In this process, the addressor internally restructures himself to act simultaneously as the addressee (Lotman 1976: 229). Peirce, Lotman, and Jakobson and Bakhtin are united in finding that the fundamental activity of semiosis underlying all texts is auto-communication or inner dialogue. Culture, as Lotman writes, can be treated as "one message transmitted by the collective 'I' of humanity itself .... From this point of view human culture is a vast example of autocommunication" (1990: 33).

8. Conclusion

The main exponents of the programs discussed here are no longer living. Peirce died in 1914, Bakhtin in 1975, Jakobson in 1982, and Lotman in 1995. It is hoped that students of these towering personalities review their many heuristic insights and carry them further. It would be unfortunate if ethnologists did not join in this endeavor at a far greater intensity than is evident today, and were to leave this work to philosophers, poeticians and Slavists. This task is being facilitated since Lotman's complete works are now being published in Russian, and translations of Lotman's and Bakhtin's works into English are increasing. The Peirce Publication Project at Indiana University is now publishing all of Peirce's works, and most of Jakobson's works have appeared in his *Selected Writings* and elsewhere. Thus sources are becoming increasingly available.

I conclude with a general comment on the present state of the dynamics of semiotics of culture. Particularly relevant to today's transnationalism is the issue of "cultural explosions" as Lotman calls it. (1994: 379). Lotman's cultural explosion goes farther than gradual change. As he writes,

> The powerful external textual eruptions in a culture conceived of as a huge text not only lead the culture to adapt outside messages and to introduce them into its memory but also stimulate the culture's self-development, with unpredictable results. (Lotman 1994: 379).

Lotman urges the "comparative study of the semantics of different 'cultural explosions' in world history" (*loc. cit*), and argues that

> "(A)ccelerated development" reduces the variety and complexity of world civilization and, as a result, diminishes it to a monotonal Text; in other words, the process is one of informational degradation. However, this hypothesis is not confirmed by empirical reality: such a leveling does not take place in the course of the cultural explosions in world history. What does occur are processes that are diametrically opposed to each other (*loc. cit.*).

Lotman asserts that the more complex cultures in contact with other cultures do not always play a positive role.

> ... the more complex culture does not always play the role of stimulus for the more archaic one; the opposite tendency is also possible. Thus in the twentieth century texts from archaic and primitive cultures powerfully

erupted into European civilization, which consequently displayed increasing dynamic excitation. It is precisely the differences among cultural potentials, the difficulties in deciphering texts by means of languages of existing cultures, that are essential to bringing about such transformations (*loc. cit*).

Finally, Lotman's theory of texts is similar to Peirce's remarks that conclude this paper. For Lotman a Text

> is a mechanism constituting a system of heterogeneous semiotic spaces, in whose continuum the message [associated with the first textual function] circulates. We do not perceive this message to be the manifestation of a single language: a minimum of two languages is required to create it (*ibid.*: 377).

Thus Lotman's dialogic concept of cultural explosion raises the challenge of the particular complexities of our days, not new to world history but increasing by quantum leaps, and in Peirce's comprehensive metaphor

> The universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem — for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony — just as every poem is a sound argument. Thus dialogue is built into the very conception of reality (CP. 5.119).

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Динамика семиотики культуры, ее важность для антропологии

В статье предлагается обзор тех понятий семиотики (культуры), которые могут оказаться продуктивными в семиотически ориентированной антропологии. Например, в некоторых антропологических направлениях применяется понятие текста культуры. По Ю. Лотману текст культуры является механизмом, формирующим систему семиотических пространств. В описании явления культуры исходят из динамики его генезиса и сущности, из диалогичности данного явления. Таким образом, для антрополога становятся важными его собственное влияние на исследуемое явление, соотношение официальной и неофициальной версий истории и ранее незамеченные аспекты исследуемого явления. При учете всего контекста расширяется круг потенциальных значений текста культуры.

Дается обзор работ ученых, влияние которых на Западе до сих пор было ограниченным: Ч. С. Пирс, Р. Якобсон, Ю. Лотман, В. В. Иванов, Б. А. Успенский, М. М. Бахтин.

В работах Пирса автор подчеркивает его отношение к человеку как знаку — носителю рефлексивности и семиозиса, ученику внешней реальности. С такой позиции было бы антропологу хорошо начинать свою работу. Во взглядах Якобсона подчеркивается эстетический принцип, позволяющий более глубоко осмыслить соотношение объекта и знака. В концепции культуры Бахтина выделяется принцип

диалогичности, причем характер диалога зависит от *горизонта* (хронотопа) участников. Позиция этнолога также зависит от его горизонта. Учение Бахтина лежит в основе концепции диалогической антропологии, в которой важную роль, наряду с диалогом, играют и нарушающие обычные иерархические отношения принципы карнавальности. В концепции Лотмана подчеркивается принцип монтажности, соединения элементов разного происхождения. Указанные авторы сравниваются на фоне концепции семиосферы.

В анализе современных культурных процессов важен аспект культурно-семиотической динамики. В основу сравнительного анализа культур могут лечь разные аспекты семиотики культуры — от понятия текста культуры до понятия взрыва в культуре.

Kultuurisemiootika dünaamika;
selle olulisus antropoloogias

Artikkel annab ülevaate nendest (kultuuri) semiootika põhimõtetest, mis võiksid olla olulised semiootiliselt orienteeritud antropoloogias. Näiteks kasutatakse uue vaatenurgaga antropoloogilistes uuringutes 'kultuuriteksti' mõistet; Lotmani järgi on "(kultuuri) tekst mehhanism, mis moodustab erisuguste semiootiliste ruumide süsteemi". Kultuurinähtust vaadeldakse rõhutades selle tekkimise ja olemuse dünaamilisust, dialoogilisust. Nii omandavad antropoloogi jaoks tähtsuse tema enda mõju uuritavale, ametliku ja mitteametliku ajalooversiooni suhe ja mingi nähtuse teised, varem tähelepanuta jäänud tahud. Kultuuriteksti potentsiaalsete tähenduste hulk avardub kui arvestatakse kogu konteksti.

Ülevaade tehakse just nende teadlaste töödest, keda on Läänes avaldatud alles viimasel ajal või kelle mõju on olnud pärsitud: Charles S. Peirce, Roman Jakobson, Juri Lotman, V. V. Ivanov, B. A. Uspenski, M. M. Bahtin.

Artikli autor arvab, et nendele kõikidele on omane kultuurinähtuse dünaamika ja mitmepalgelisuse väljatoomine, samas ei lähe nad kaasa postmodernismi kalduvusega teha kõik suhteliseks; mille näitena on toodud Derrida arvamus, et keskuse või päritolu puudumisel muutub kõik diskursuseks.

Andes ülevaate Peirce'i ideedest, keskendub Portis-Winner reaalsuse ja inimtaju olemusele. Inimene sünnib maailma, mis on märgiline (esindatuna märgisisese vahetu objekti poolt); väline reaalsus eksisteerib Peirce'i järgi märgiväliste dünaamiliste objektide kujul. On olemas ka vahetu ja dünaamiline interpretant ning lõplik ehk loogiline interpretant. Viimane tähendaks reaalsuse tõest tõlgendamist, kui uurimine viidaks nii kaugele.

Pole võimalik jõuda dünaamilise objekti olemuseni, küll saab tajuda nende olemasolu "kõrvutatavate kogemuste" kaudu. Tajukogemused on samuti kehastatud märkides.

Kogemust peab Peirce inimese ainsaks õpetajaks: kui oodatu või kujuteldava asemel ilmub midagi üllatuslikku, teist. Nõnda on inimese maailmatajumine kahetise iseloomuga, ego ja mitte-ego vastastikkuse mõju tulemus. Peirce käsitleb inimest kui märki (human sign). Kui mõte on väline märk, siis inimene mõtleva olendina on väliste märkide jada; inimene ise on märk — refleksiivsuse ning semioosise kandja, välise reaalsuse õpilane. See võiks olla alus, mille arvestamisega antropoloog üldse asub uurimistöö juurde. Hiljem on artiklis näha, kuidas Peirce'i eeltoodud mõtetel tekib kooskõla Bahtini mõistega 'horisont'.

Jakobsoni puhul näitab autor ikoonilisuse kandvat osa tema töödes ning viitab esteetilisele funktsioonile, mille Praha ringi "Teesid" lisasid Bühleri kolmele funktsioonile. Kunstilises tekstis on esteetilisel funktsioonil dominandi roll; see muudab tajutavamaks objekti ja märgi suhte. Kunstiteksti märgid on mitmetähenduslikumad kui tavakeeles — tekstisisene sarnasuse printsiip on tähtsam kui piirnevuse printsiip (nt. luules, kus igal metafooril on metonüümiline varjund, ja vastupidi). Järgides loogikat, mille Portis-Winner ära toob, lisas Jakobson Peirce'i märgitriaadile neljanda osa artifice ('kunstivõte', 'järeletehtu'). Selles on sarnasus kahe märgi osa vahel taotluslik, saavutatud (kui ikoonmärgi puhul on see tegelik), nagu nt kunstilises tekstis. Artikli autor ei pea neljanda liikme lisamist tingimata vajalikuks, kuna see sisaldub juba Peirce'i süsteemi teistes märgi alatüüpides.

Liikudes edasi Bahtini kultuurikäsitluse juurde, märgib autor selle kandva osana dialoogisuhteid, mida mõjutavad osalejate 'horisondid' (kronotoop). Inimene näeb maailma läbi oma unikaalse välja; selles paistab maailm teiste jaoks ühesugusena eksisteerivat, ilma nende endi unikaalsete tähendusväljadeta. Etnoloogi maailmataju, tema suhtumine teise, sõltub tema horisondist. Bahtin inspireeris Ameerika etnolooge Tedlocki ja Mannheimi välja töötama dialoogilise antropoloogia programmi. Jakobson pidas samuti dialoogi monoloogist algsemaks ja fundamentaalsemaks. Tedlock ja Mannheim leiavad dialoogi ka monoloogi ja isegi üksiku sõna tasandil. Etnograafia ise sünnib kultuuride esindajate vahel toimuva dialoogi tulemusel. Etnoloogiale on olulised Bahtini uuringud keskaegsest karnevalikultuurist; karnevalil lõhuti ametliku ja mitteametliku piir, keelatu pääseb esile ja sotsiaalne hierarhia pööratakse hetkeks ringi.

Bahtini dialogism on autori sõnul sarnane Jakobsoni metonüümilistele metafooridele ning Lotmani montaažikäsitlusele, Kristeva 'intertekstuaalsus' on võetav selle ühe vormina. Põhimõte on ühendada kahe eri-

neva kultuuri või teksti ühikud. Saadud uue teksti uurimisel peaks arvestama avarate tõlgendusvõimalustega.

Lotmani puhul esitatakse tema montaažikäsitlus; montaaž kui viis kõrvutada eri päritoluga elemendid. Implitsiitse montaaži puhul uusi elemente ei lisata, aeg ning süžee ei muutu. Eksplitsiitne montaaž aga kasutab erinevatest semantilistest sfääridest pärinevaid osasid, mis uues kontekstis saavad ühise modaalsuse (nt. korduv hääl kui objektide ühendaja). Narratiivi erinevad vormid (nagu need kaks montaažitüüpi) domineerivad eelkõige kunstilistes ja mütoloogilistes tekstides; seda saab näidata ka karnevali puhul.

Bahtini uurimusi võrdleb autor Lotmani ja Uspenski omadega igapäevase käitumise semiootikast. Lotman ja Uspenski uurisid muu seas ka euroopalike kultuurinormide sissetungi 18. sajandi Venemaal. Tavaliselt alateadlik argikäitumine muudeti teadliku kontrolli objektiks. Võis valida erinevate rollide (nt. ajalooline, kirjanduslik) vahel. Autor peab sellist juhtumit internaliseeritud transnatsionalismi näiteks.

Kui Bahtin märkis, et naerul on Lääne kultuuris sotsiaalsetest reeglitest vabastav mõju, siis Lotmani ja Uspenski järgi kuulus naer keskaegses Vene kultuuris ametliku kultuuri piiridesse.

Klassikalist ajalookäsitlust on autori järgi kritiseeritud selle homogeense ja lineaarse sündmuste kujutamise pärast. Semiootiline lähenemine keskendub ajalooteksti taga seisnud isiku koodide taasloomisele; uurija peab leidma vastavussuhted nende ja oma koodide vahel. Ajaloosündmusele annavad osavõtjad tähenduse vastavalt oma vaadetele ja kultuurile. Lotmani arvates on ajaloos determinismi kõrval oluline objektiivne tegur inimeste teadlik valik. Ajalugu on vaadeldav ametlikust ja mitteametlikust positsioonist. Valikulisel mälul on siin kandev roll.

Muuseas on Lotmani mõiste 'semiosfäär' kõrvutatud Peirce'i phaneron'ga ja Jakobsoni 'diskursuse maailmaga'. Semiosfäär haarab endasse kõik kultuuri "keeled", samas on kultuuri semiootiline ruum vaadeldav ühe tekstina, mille sisemuses on mitmetasandiline alatekstide ja — keelte süsteem. Nõnda võib 'isiksust' semiootiliselt mõista laiemalt kui füüsiline isik. Terve kultuur on vaadeldav näitena autokommunikatsioonist, kus saatja restruktureerib end sisemise dialoogi käigus ka vastuvõtjaks, nõnda teatele uut tähendust lisades. Semiosfääri sisemine ruum on eraldatud välisest 'piiri' abil (meie-nemad) ning piiridega on semiosfäär jagatud vastavalt üldistele erinevustele ja omadustele (elus-surnud, paikne-rändav, tähtede liikumine jt.).

Tänapäeva rahvastevahelise suhete olukorras peab Porter-Winner oluliseks arvestada kultuurisemiootilise dünaamikaga. Ta toob ära Lotmani soovituse uurida võrdlevalt kultuurilisi plahvatusi ajaloos; sellise plahvatuse mõju on etteaimamatu: see võib samal ajal olla nii kiirenenud areng

kui ka paljususe vähenemine ühe Tekstini. Arenenuma kultuuri mõju arhailisemale ei ole alati positiivne; mõju võib olla ka arenenuma kultuuri suunas. Igal juhul on Teksti loomiseks vajalik vähemalt kahe keele dialoog. Peirce kirjutab, et universum argumendina on kunstiteos nagu ka iga luuletus on argument. Sellisena esineb dialoog reaalsuse enda olemuses.

Scientific thought and work of Yuri Lotman

Manuel Cáceres Sánchez

1. The work of Yuri Lotman is a good proof of the fact that the history of literary ideas admits numerous nuances, interrelations and dialogues with other approaches to literary and cultural phenomena as well as with the discourses produced in the different fields of human knowledge.

For the last 20 years Lotman managed to collect views relating him directly to the 'Russian formalism' (yet today references can be found to his presumably 'postformalist' activity) or to 'structuralism' (confusing sometimes the notion of structuralism in Lotman with a narrow immanence-based theoretic perspective). The majority, however, have spoken for years about the central position occupied by him in the semiotic studies of the 20th century. But recently scholars (like Cesare Segre, at a conference held in honour of Lotman in Granada in 1995) have asked if he did not go beyond the limits of semiotics in his last books (Segre 1997, 1988). Curiously, and in order to add another term, since his works of the 1960s, Lotman has used at times the expression 'structural-semiotic' as a synonym for 'structural method'. Anyway, when we refer to semiotics in Lotman, we should bear in mind that it is about an heterodox semiotics with a heterogeneous research interest, a solid semiotics, yet, always ready for a change as we will see below.

Generally speaking, and with a necessary warning to avoid reductionism, three important moments can be observed in the evolution of his ideas: the first, 'structural- semiotic', is marked by works, some of them published before and the others unpublished till then, compiled in the *Lektsii po strukturalnoi poetike* (*Lectures on Structural Poetics*, 1964), *Struktura hudozhestvennogo teksta* (*Structure of the Artistic Text*, 1970) — containing articles already published in the

previous volume and others that were published in the 100960s — or *Analysis of the Poetic Text* (1972).

The object of study common to those works, dominated by semantic analysis but with the presence of the pragmatic level, can be described with the very words Lotman uses for explaining the objective proposed in *Structure of the Artistic Text*:

"To offer a general outline of the structure of the artistic language, of its similarities and differences with regard to analogous linguistic categories, that is to say, to explain how an artistic text becomes carrier of a certain thought, of an idea, in what ways the structure of the text is connected with the structure of that idea" (Lotman 1970, 15).

The second landmark to consider is, perhaps, the most spread: it is "culture semiotics" that sometimes has been understood as a unique whole, when there can be observed an increasing interest in the study of the pragmatic level or in the receptional one (Lotman 1977a), in the study on the dynamics of culture (see, for example, Lotman 1974) or the relationships between the texts (see Lotman 1979 and 1981b). His interest in those and in other new themes culminates symbolically in a third moment: the one of the last years of his life, starting with works like *O semiosfere* (*About the Semiosphere*. Lotman 1984).

Speaking about three moments in his work is not contradicting the view of Desiderio Navarro (in my opinion it complements it) as he indicates two phases: one that has been called his initial 'tectonic', 'neostructuralist' phase, and the other phase that he considers more important, defined by him as 'dynamic', 'postneostructuralist', 'postmodernist' ("in the Hassanianic sense" as he annotates), the key concept of which will be that of 'semiosphere' (Navarro 1996, 17). Mihhail Lotman also distinguishes two phases in the evolution of the ideas of his father and the Tartu school seen from the point of view of philosophy: the first phase, the one of the 1960s in which the Kantianic basis of his postulates about "the statics of semiotic systems" stands out; and the second one, that of the 1970s, has a different philosophic basis (M. Lotman cites the *autocrescent logos* in Heracleitus) the dynamics of semiotic systems being regarded as a "cornerstone" of his studies now (M. Lotman 1995, 34).

However, his work can also be defined in another way: as a product of his peculiar *structuralist* activity. I am employing here the Barthesian notion of structuralism; namely, the activity characterized

by having man as a "manufacturer of meanings", the *homo significans* as an object of studies (Barthes 1963, 261). And there has never been another task for him from his earliest works at the end of the 1940s till his death in 1993. Barthes and Lotman have similarly studied not only literature but also other arts and diverse fields of culture. Although structuralism in Lotman is connected with the tradition of the Russian literary studies that, as he himself remarks, "has generally remained in the shadow", his attitude is very similar to the one expressed by Barthes at that time. In fact, Lotman considers himself a member of the 'party of the unsatisfied' because he does not seek to 'take care of' what some think has already been solved and arranged but, above all, to 'search' new ways, in spite of the imperfections that may arise in this search, "Structuralism does not aim at assuming an exclusive position in science, and in authentic science such a position cannot exist", he writes in 1967. In the same essay he affirms that a literary scientist must never accept "an interpretation to which he has got used to as an ultimate truth" (Lotman 1967, 75–76, 85–86) The provisional nature of the critical language of structuralism has also been observed by Barthes in the conclusion of his famous essay as follows: "the investigator knows that there only needs to emerge a new language from the history that would talk to him in its turn, to consider his task completed" (Barthes 1963, 262).

2. I agree with Peeter Torop who claims that *there are several Lotmans* (Torop 1992, 39). I would like to pay attention here to one of 'those Lotmans' from a very concrete angle: his relationship with a thought produced from the field of natural sciences. This link reveals how, next to the significant differences between the two periods that Navarro and M. Lotman indicate, there is something that remains during his more than 40 years as an scientist, something that today helps to speak about his entire work as an example of coherence: the desire not to dwell on what is already known but to think constantly about going on in search of new fields of study, at the time rethinking what has been written, introducing nuances into what has been said and inserting the results of his 'meta-reflection' in his discourse.[1]

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[1]   Desiderio Navarro thinks that "the 'genre' of the article has been the 'natural' way in which he has expressed himself, due to "a cognition of his role of a theoretical investigator, as that of an explorer of the *avant-garde*, who discovers a terrain, carries out the initial study of that, reports his

Maria Corti has precisely stated that the "dominant feature of his thought was that of being always on the way" (Corti 1994, 8).

As it has been indicated already, the tradition of the Russian literary studies that 'has remained in the shadow', according to Lotman, contributes to the notion of structuralism; the linguistics of N. I. Marr and its application to literary studies by Olga M. Freidenberg, the artistic typology of the 1930s and 1940s (G. A. Gukovski, V. M. Zhirmunski, V. I. Propp among others), or the attempts at constructing functional models of art, like those of I. N. Tynianov, V. Shklovski or S. M. Eisenstein, form a part of this tradition (Lotman 1964, 156).

M. Lotman also pointed out an event participating in the construction of the concept of structure, namely, the transference of problems (like that of structure) from the field of speculative philosophy to that of objective scientific knowledge in the late 1950s and early 1960s which became an important activity in the semiotic school of Tartu.

At that time, the most recent theories of nascent cybernetics, of the theory of information and of structuralist linguistics constituted the major object of his interest (M. Lotman 1997, 65).[2]

In 1967 Juri Lotman brought forth the ideal qualities that have to be combined in a scholar of literature, which are quite different from those of a traditional philologist. The scientist, far from specialization in an inflexible discipline, must command the empirical material as well as the "habits for deductive thinking elaborated by exact sciences", be a linguist, have experience "in the work with modelling systems", have knowledge of psychological science, be able to reflect on the general problems of semiotics and cybernetics, collaborate with mathematicians, "and — he ends up saying- in an ideal case,

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results ... and sets off immediately for the discovery of new lands, leaving to others the work of colonization, of systematic cartography and exploitation" (Navarro 1996, 13–14).

[2] The cybernetic ideas of the 1950s, in M. Lotman's recollections, had an influence on the formation of the Tartu group: "the heuristic processes of cybernetics (let us consider among them, for example, the method of the 'black box', the principle of the inverse relation, the homœostasis, etc.) were understood as approaches that possessed a general methodological and scientific significance" (M. Lotman 1997).

incorporate in himself a literary scientist, a linguist and a mathematician" (Lotman 1967, 85).

The ideas of the group of French mathematicians known by the name of Bourbaki lie at the basis of the concept of structure developed by him in his *Lectures on Structural Poetics*. The structural study presupposes the determination of "the correlation of elements between themselves and their relationships with the structural totality", while studying "the functional nature of the system and that of its parts". For that purpose, the structure has to be analysed by taking into account the "physical" level[3] (that is a more concrete level, a *given* structure) as well as the "mathematical" level[4] (that proves to be more abstract, a *whichever* structure). According to Lotman "it will be necessary to construct models of structures" of the two kinds for literary studies (Lotman 1964, 144–145).

He conceives mathematics not "as a distinct branch of science, but as a method of scientific thought, and a methodological basis for the discovery of the most general regularities of life". It is neither about uniting two sciences (one particular science and mathematics) into a third one, nor about applying simple mathematical methods, but about something that possesses much more scope: the creation of new methodology for the humanities, the elaboration of a new method of scientific thought (Lotman 1964, 152–154).

He finds that the main difficulty in the use of mathematical methods in literary studies "consists in the fact that the basic concepts of literary science have not yet been formulated". In the *Lectures on Structural Poetics* he seeks precisely to "bring nearer the moment of the solution of this task" in the specific field of the verse theory. Only in the secondary fields, he admits, the methods of mathematical statistics have been relatively efficient. Here he points out the essay of A. N. Kolmogorov and A. M. Kondratov on *The Rhytmics of the Poems of Mayakovsky* (1962), where they apply mathematical methods to the study of verse. For Lotman, this work reveals the impossibility of the application of the statistical method in reaching the

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[3]   i.e., the material nature of the structure and of the functions and relations of its elements.

[4]   i.e., the nature of the relationships between the elements, making abstraction of his material realization, and *the system of relations* which is present in the structure.

conclusions that would not turn out to be "subjective and indefinite", in spite of the fact that those investigators assemble "enormous statistical material". In *Structure of the Artistic Text* he, however, recognizes the advances of the studies by Kolmogorov and his school, particularly of what concerns the problem of the entropy of the poetic language and the possibility of measuring artistic information.

I would like to give here a short explanation concerning quite a widespread idea on those 'structuralist' years, namely, that at times it has been misinterpreted, in my opinion, that Lotman adhered unconditionally to "almost mathematical poetics" (Vázquez 1997, 240–241). I do not believe that his interest in mathematics could be interpreted as a devotion to what had been achieved by that time. Lotman and Kolmogorov himself were on the alert even about "the excessive enthusiasm about the still quite modest results of mathematical-statistical, theoretical-informational and, particularly, cybernetic studies of poetry" (Lotman 1970, 41). According to Kolmogorov, the experiments carried out in the 1950s and 1960s in order to create models of the processes of artistic creation by computers, "surprise us with their primitive character", whereas the formal analysis of the artistic creation carried out beyond the influence of information and cybernetic theories has achieved a more elevated level (Kolmogorov, quot. in Lotman 1970, 41). In this concrete case the theories of the Russian academic are good for reflections on the entropy of the artistic language of the author and on its difference in relation to that of the reader's language, "the same artistic text, seen from the point of view of the sender or the addressee, appears as the result of the consumption of distinct entropies and, therefore, as the carrier of different information" (Lotman 1970, 45–46).

This idea is related to quantum physics, to the method of the 'black box' in cybernetics (Lotman 1995, 31) or to the "principle of complementarity" by Nils Bohr (M. Lotman 1997, 81). In the same way that atomic physics has demonstrated that, on the atomic scale, the observation of a phenomenon modifies in an unpredictable way the phenomenon itself, Lotman proposes a revision of the communication scheme of Roman O. Jakobson. In contrast with the Jakobsonian scheme of communication conceived of as direct transmission of a message already elaborated, Lotman is known to have understood the act of communication as an act of transformation, as an act of translation, through what "the text transforms the language to the

addressee" and the text itself transforms, "stops being identical to itself" (M. Lotman 1995, 34):

"Thereby, the communication act [...] has to be considered not as simple transfer of a certain message that keeps coinciding with itself, from the conscience of the sender to the conscience of the addressee, but as a *translation* of a certain text from the language of my 'me' to the language of your 'you'" (Lotman 1977b, 54–55).

3. However, his work is not only what was published during the initial period. From the second half of the 1970s and, above all, the first years of the 1980s evolution towards a dynamic approach of semiotic systems became obvious, with the dialogue between science and humanities standing out. For example, in an essay of 1977, double inclination of the system of culture towards both diversity and stability or uniformity rose to the fore. Thus, the elements of the system of culture "specialize as its parts, on the one hand, and at the same time, acquire an increasing autonomy with independent structural formations on the other" (Lotman 1977b, 52). In order to avoid "schizophrenia of culture", its disintegration and transformation "into a situation of the 'tower of Babel' of the semiosis of a given culture" produced by the increase of diversity, he observes that culture possesses mechanisms "of orientation contrary to diversity" that guarantee the stability and the "arranged character of the whole" (Lotman 1977b, 55–56). This phenomenon, visibly contradictory, is explained by Lotman resorting to cybernetic theories and to that of the law of supercomplicated systems which maintains that "the stability of the whole increases with an increase of the internal diversity of the system" (Lotman 1977b, 52).

Simonetta Salvestroni has pointed out the consistency observable in Lotman's work. She recalls, for example, how, from the 1960s he started paying attention to the functioning of dialogical mechanisms. Since then, the Italian scholar says, he continued expanding his interest. As a proof of it there is the compilation of texts entitled *Testo e contesto* (*Text and Context*, 1980) and his essay *Mozg-tekst-kultura-iskusstvenny intellekt* (*Brain-text-culture-artificial intellect*, 1981a), apart from the writings compiled in her edition (Salvestroniá 1985, 19). In the same way "the study of the topological organization of dynamic systems" can be tracked down in his *Structure of the Artistic Text* (1970) up to the essays gathered in *Tipologia della cultura*

(*Tipology of the Culture*, 1975) or the above mentioned *Text and Context*. According to Salvestroni, at present this study on the dynamic systems "is remarkably advancing thanks to the help coming from Vernadski" (1985, 42–43).

The reader's attention is attracted by the "deep affinity" of the texts published in those years "with a series of works written recently in various cultural and geographic areas of the western world", that demonstrate Lotman's interest in the dialogical interaction between the scientific and the humanistic fields" (Salvestroni, 1985, 10–11). The essays by Gregory Bateson, Paul Watzlawick, Gerald Holton, Ignacio Matte Blanco, Josef Maria Jauch, Y. Elkama, Geoffrey Chew or by the already-mentioned Vernadski on the biological-epistemological investigation, the study of the hemispheres of the brain, scientific imagination, the quantum theory or the philosophy of science, share a common dedication of their attention "to what is dynamic and interactive, the interest for the unifying aspects, the more or less clear repulse to the dichotomic scheme of setting up mind against nature, avoidance of extremities or else the investigation of a balance between the polar pares like reason-imagination, continuouš-discontinuous, dynamism-homeostasis" (Salvestroni 1985, 13).

4. Doubt has been cast on Lotman's latest work by Cesare Segre, who considers *Kultura i vzryv* (*Culture and Explosion*, 1992) and *Cercare la strada* (*To Look for the Way*, 1994) his testament written "as if he had been urged by the fear of not being able to communicate all his ideas to us". Judging by the style the language he uses, in effect it may be interpreted like that: professor Segre observes how, as opposed to "the habitual expressive neutrality in works of history and of semiotics of culture", in his latest works "he gives rein to the taste for the metaphor and to personal evocation" (Segre 1997, 91). However, if we attend to the titles of some chapters in *Culture and Explosion*, we establish that he does not break up with what we have been expressing up till now, but above all, we perceive his relation with the ideas of Ilya Prigogine: «Discontinuous and Continuous», «The Logic of the Explosion», «The Moment of Unpredictability» ... In the third chapter of *To Look for the Way*, that also has a very significant title («Explosive Processes»), he admits explicitly the connection with the ideas of Prigogine (and Stengers) in *Between the Time and the Eternity** (Lotman 1994, 35)

As was the case in relation to the majority of the authors mentioned above, Lotman was not aware of the works of Prigogine either when he wrote for the first time about the fortuitous and the unpredictable. His essay *O roli sluchainyh faktorov v literaturnoi evolutsii* (*On the Role of Fortuitous Factors in Literary Evolution*), published for the first time in German in 1987 and afterwards, in 1989, in the *Semeiotiké* of Tartu, was written and presented at the Semiotics Seminar of the University of Tartu in 1985. Lotman himself recognizes that the works of Prigogine, which he for the first time got access to in 1986, when *The New Alliance* (or *Order as the Result of Chaos*, as it was translated in the United States) was translated into Russian, made "an extraordinarily strong impression" on him (Lotman 1989, 101), partly because, as Mihhail Lotman indicates, "coincided with his own intuitions and theoretical reflections" (M. Lotman 1997, 78. See Prigogine and Stengers 1994a)[5].

In fact, in 1981 he published *Brain-Text-Culture-Artificial Intelligence*, where curious affinity with the theories at the time and later expounded by Ilya Prigogine can be detected. According to Lotman, culture is known, for generating information, for constituting a "thinking device"; but he observes that in order to make a text to produce new messages it is necessary to "make another text to go through it, as it happens in practice when to a text 'connects' a reader who preserves in the memory some previous messages", in other words, "there has to be created a *semiotic situation*, presupposing an explosive transition from the state of Nature to the state of Culture" (Lotman 1981a, 211–212).

This idea is developed further in other works to follow, including the already-mentioned *On the Role of Fortuitous Factors* ... It is here that he observes that the paradoxical situation to be created ("to produce texts it is necessary to have already a text") is similar to the one produced in the autocatalytical reactions described by the Nobel Prize Winner in Chemistry: in order to achieve "the synthesis of some substance, the presence of the same substance is needed. In other words, to secure substance X, we should start with a system contain-

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[5]   There are even some researchers who examine *Structure of the Artistic Text* as related to the ideas formulated by Ilya Prigogine much later (See Abrioux 1995).

ing X from the very beginning" (Prigogine and Stengers 1994b; *apud* Lotman 1989, 246).

The fortuitous and the regular, the chaos and the order, the static and the dynamic, pairs that are nothing but linked aspects. For Prigogine, order rises from chaos, it is not imposed from outside, thus, chaos has to contain a certain potency capable of generating order. Lotman finds similar phenomena in literary texts For example, what is known as 'influence' may be regarded as catalytical function "of the texts that come from the outside to the inside of one or another culture". "The eternal question of 'romantics before romanticism'" may also be considered a similar phenomenon (Lotman 1989, 246–247). For Mihhail Lotman his father's conception about the *energy* of artistic creation can be compared to what Prigogine holds with regard to autocatalytical reactions (M. Lotman 1997, 78). If the tradition arisen from Humboldt distinguishes between language as a finished product (*ergon*, speech, text) and language as creative potency (*energeia*, language), in Lotman *energeia* "is firstly a property of the text and not of the language" (M. Lotman 1995, 35).

According to Lotman, the ideas of Prigogine open up new paths for the study of fortuitous processes. Moreover, he sees in them "a real basis for the reconciliation of natural and humanistic sciences". This nexus is found in a study by Prigogine on the irreversibility of time that constitutes for Lotman the basis "of the universal model of the historical process (that flows in time)" (Lotman 1989, 101). In an interview, published also in 1989, Prigogine declares the following: at bottom the reintroduction of time is also the reintroduction of the coherent universe characterized by common time: all that we: the galaxies, the molecules, the stars, the living creatures and the cultures have in common is time; we all have the same direction of time, I would even say that the universe is characterized by temporal coherence" (Mataix 1989, 119).

If Prigogine recognized that philosophy and science acted in him as 'inciters' of his intellectual activity (Mataix 1989, 118), Lotman declared to Peeter Torop (in what I believe was his last interview) that the world we live in "is created on the conflictive unity of the models of art and science. The classical idea of science has been associated with the foreseeable (that is to say, with the cyclic or gradual processes, with the cause-result relationships), while the not foreseeable associated with explosive moments in which cause-result relationships

disappear, is characteristic of art. But the new scientific theories (Lotman, although he did not cite him on this occasion, was thinking of Prigogine) have contributed one of the most important ideas: "it is the idea of the historical, scientific or some another sense of unpredictability, unpredictability being a scientific object". As opposed to that notion "that is maintained with too much strength", of art being "a pretty flower", he responds that, like science art is "another way of thinking, another system of modelling the world. In essence, it is the creation of another world, parallel to our world [to that of science]" (Torop 1993, 128).

5. I would like to conclude this article by drawing attention to the way in which the ideas of Lotman are expanded. He himself uses the comparison of circles that water forms when a stone is dropped in it ("these circles try to seize all the space") to explain the tendency to the globalization of semiotics: "we find ourselves always in a different sphere, in endless annexations of different types of thinking". If in the 1950s and 1960s we might have thought "that mathematics was the science of science and was able to resolve it all", it is still maintained now, almost thirty years later, that "mathematics is something more complex, since it is not only a science, but it is also a method of thinking" (Torop 1993, 129).

I have already considered on more than one occasion the expansion of his ideas as an indication of unitary coherence in diversity and of stability in change in his gradual or explosive evolution. This coherence in expansion is detected even in the way in which he presents his reflections that, as I said in the beginning, are characterized for a double direction that actuate simultaneously: one looks towards the future, searching for new paths; and the other that looks towards the already said, making it possible to integrate the results of his 'meta-reflection'. Maria Corti has observed in his work "a fruitful intertextuality" that may be confirmed on the evidence of some chapters of *Culture and Explosion* and *To Look for the Way*, but also on the basis of the essays of the 1970s and his two last books (Corti 1994, 9–10).

The objective of this work has not been to make an exhaustive journey through the work of Lotman in order to clarify his relationships with the scientific thought of the 20th century. But the examples that have been exposed are more than sufficient for demonstration of

how his work constitutes an extraordinarily productive model for the role that semiotics can play in the dialogue between nature and culture.

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Юрий Лотман: научное мышление и труды

В статье характеризуется Юрий Лотман как ученый — дается обзор развития его научной мысли и соотношения ее с научными открытиями и направлениями его времени. Собрав разные мнения о развитии идей Лотмана, автор выделяет три главных "ядра": структуральная семиотика 60-х годов, куда относятся "лекции по структуральной поэтике" (1964) и "Структура художественного текста" (1970); семиотика культуры, и более поздний интерес к динамике культуры и межтекстовым отношениям, выраженный в работе "О семиосфере" (1984).

Характеризуя Лотмана как ученого, автор подчеркивает прежде всего вечную неудовлетворенность уже достигнутым, постоянное

движение вперед, интерес к математике и точным наукам в связи с стремлением применить их методы в гуманитарных науках. Такая разносторонность позволяет говорить о "нескольких", по выражению Пеэтера Торопа, Лотманах.

Juri Lotmani teaduslik mõttetöö

Artikkel kõneleb Juri Lotmanist teadlasena — antakse ülevaade tema mõtte arengust ja suhestumisest oma aja teaduslike avastuste ning suundadega. Autor annab omalaadse meta-ülevaate Lotmanist, ühendades erinevaid arvamusi tema ideede arengust. Üldistavalt võib öelda, et esimesel, neostrukturalistlikul perioodil oli tema jaoks peamine staatika semiootilistes süsteemides, sellal kui postneostrukturalistlikus järgus liikus uurimise keskmesse semiootiliste süsteemide dünaamika. Kuigi ta tegeles sügavuti ka vene formalismiga, tuntakse teda peamiselt kui semiootikut.

Eristatakse kolme "tuuma" Lotmani töödes: 1960. aastate strukturaalsemiootika, kuhu mahuvad tööd "Loengud strukturaalpoeetikast" (1964) ning "Taideteksti struktuur" (1970); kultuurisemiootika; ning kolmandaks hilisem huvi kultuuri dünaamika ja tekstidevaheliste suhete vastu, nt. töös "Semiosfäärist" (1984). Lotmani kui teadlase iseloomustuses tuuakse eelkõige esile rahulolematust juba saavutatuga, pidevat edasiliikumist, uute alade avastamist; laia teadlasehaaret, mis eeldas matemaatika ja teiste täppisteaduste tundmist, et rakendada neid meetodina humanitaaraladele. Taoline mitmekülgsus annabki põhjust rääkida "mitmest" Lotmanist, nagu Peeter Torop seda on teinud.

Lühidalt käsitletakse ka J. Lotmani viimaste raamatute väljenduslaadi; ent olulisemaks osutuvad sisulised paralleelid, mida saab nendest töödest tõmmata nii tema eelnevate mõtete kui ka uute avastustega keemia vallas. Nagu öeldud, liiguvad fookusesse kultuuri dünaamilisus, dialoogisuhted eri tekstide vahel, kaose ja korra suhe. Need ideed on seotud Vernadski ja Prigogine'i töödega; viimaseid luges Lotman alles 1986. aastal, kuid isegi enne seda võib nende vahel leida teatud mõttelist sugulust.

Tsiteeritakse intervjuud Lotmaniga, kus too kõrvutab kunsti ja teadust kui paralleelseid ja siiski erinevaid viise modelleerida maailma. Juhuslik, mis on pigem kunstile omane, on Lotmani sõnul muutunud teaduslikuks uurimisobjektiks.

Eelkõige on märgatav Januse-taoline sidusus Lotmani ideedes: vaadates küll pidevalt tulevikku ning olles otsingute keerises, vaatab teine pilk tahapoole ja paigutab mineviku-ainest, juba öeldut, ringi vastavalt oma meta-refleksioonile.

The dimensionality of metaphor

Marcel Danesi

Introduction

There is overwhelming evidence in the semiotic, psychological, and language sciences that abstract concepts are knowable primarily (if not exclusively) as "metaphorized ideas," i.e. as signifieds that are constructed cognitively through metaphorical reasoning. The ongoing research on metaphor in cognitive linguistics, for instance, now strongly suggests that metaphorical modes of conceptualization characterize all representational systems — language, gesture, narrative, the arts, etc. (recent summaries of relevant work in this domain can be found in Gibbs 1994 and Goatley 1997). However, in my view, the ever-burgeoning literature on what has come to be known as *conceptual metaphor theory* (henceforward CMT) (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987) still lacks a synthetic semiotic framework for interpreting the diverse, multiform manifestations of metaphor in human symbolic and communicative behavior. The purpose of this paper is to provide such a framework, drafted from Peircean theory, called *dimensionality theory* (DT), which I proposed as a target for discussion in a previous study (Danesi 1998).

Dimensionality Theory

In terms of semiotic method, DT posits nothing new. It simply provides a framework for investigating representational systems in terms of three dimensions, which Peirce called *firstness, secondness, thirdness*. DT asserts that any act or token of representation involves an interaction, or a "cognitive flow," among these three dimensions, to varying degrees (e.g. a sign constructed and/or interpreted primarily as a *symbol*, nevertheless will invariably have elements of *iconicity* and

indexicality in it). Dimensionality undergirds how we extract meaning from a sign, from a text, and, more specifically for the purposes of the present paper, from a metaphorical statement. The objective in the remainder of this paper is, in fact, to look at how dimensionality manifests itself in metaphorical reasoning and discourse.

The current research on metaphor, when looked at from the particular perspective of DT, suggests that the creation and use of metaphorical concepts follows a *firstness-to-secondness-to-thirdness* pattern. A *firstness* metaphor is one that is constructed with concrete vehicles (i.e. with vehicles referring to concrete referents), a process which produces a *conceptual metaphor*, as it is called in the relevant literature (e.g. Fauconnier 1985, 1997; Sweetser 1990; Croft 1991; Deane 1992; Indurkhya 1992; Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996). In this paper, a conceptual metaphor will be renamed a *metaform*, for it is in essence a *form* made up of a signifier referring to an abstract concept in terms of a concrete signified (Sebeok and Danesi forthcoming). The formula [thinking = seeing], for example, is a metaform because it is made up of an abstract signifier, [thinking], that is conceptualized in terms of forms, structures, categories, etc. that involve the concrete signifieds associated with [seeing]. This metaform underlies utterances such as:

1. I cannot *see* what use your *idea* might have.
2. I can't quite *visualize* what that *theory* is all about.

Each of the two parts of the metaform is called a *domain*: [thinking] is called the *target domain* because it is the abstract topic itself (the "target" of the metaform); and *seeing* is called the *source domain* because it enfolds the class of vehicles that deliver the meaning of the metaform (the "source" of the metaphorical concept) (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). A specific metaphorical statement uttered in a discourse situation is now construable as a particular instantiation of a metaform. So, when we hear people using such metaphorical statements as the following

3. Those ideas are *circular*.
4. I don't see the *point* of your idea.
5. Her ideas are *central* to the discussion.
6. Their ideas are *diametrically* opposite.
   etc.

it is obvious that they are not manifestations of isolated, self-contained metaphorical creations, but rather, specific instantiations of the

metaform whose target domain is [ideas] and whose source domain is identifiable as [geometrical figures/relations]:

Metaform   →   [ideas = geometrical figures/relations]

↓

> Those ideas are *circular*
> I don't see the *point* of your idea
> Her ideas are *central* to the discussion
> Their ideas are *diametrically opposite*

↑

Specific Instantiations (*Actual Metaphorical Statements*)

Psychologically, metaforms relate the "experience" or "understanding" of some target domain to something that is familiar and easily picturable in both mental and representational terms. They reveal a basic tendency of the human mind to think of abstract concepts iconically. Among the first to point this out was the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1688–1744), perhaps the first to see metaphor as the unique ability of the human mind to interconnect things and events in the world (Danesi 1993). Before Vico, metaphor was viewed as a manifestation of *analogy*. In traditional logic, analogy is defined as an inductive form of reasoning asserting that if two or more entities are similar in one or more respects, then a probability exists that they will be similar in other respects, as some continue to claim (Skousen 1989; Way 1991; Mitchell 1993). For Vico, on the other hand, metaphor was hardly an analogical strategy; it was the primary mental tool humans use for creating analogies themselves and, thus, for thinking about otherwise unknowable things.

The above metaform, [ideas = geometrical figures/relations], is, in effect, the reason underlying the common practice of representing ideas and theories with diagrams based on geometrical figures (points, lines, circles, boxes, etc.). All "models" are, in effect, geometric diagrams. For example, the "model" of a translation system reproduced below (from Antenos-Conforti, Barbeau, and Danesi 1997) was drawn in such a way as to show how any systematic conversion of an input, or source language (SL), text into an output, or target language (TL), text that preserves the intended meaning or content is purported to unfold. Note the use of lines, arrowheads, and boxes to make the model visually depictable:

A General Translation System

```
┌─────────┐     ┌─────────┐                          ┌──────────┐
│ SL Text │─────│ Content │                          │          │
└─────────┘     └────┬────┘                          │          │
                     │                               │          │
                     ▼                               │          │
                ┌─────────┐     ┌─────────────┐     ┌──────────┐│
                │ SL Form │────▶│ Conversion  │────▶│ TL Form  ││
                └─────────┘     │ Mechanism   │     └──────────┘
                                │ Consisting of│
                                │ Translation │
                                │ Operations  │
                                └─────────────┘
```

Metaforms reveal the deployment of a mental strategy that allows for abstractions to become knowable in concrete picturable ways. In Peircean theory, firstness corresponds to iconicity and metaforms are, indeed, iconic forms in that they attempt to simulate some abstract notion in some sensory or perceptual way. This aspect of metaphorical reasoning was, needless to say, noticed even by Aristotle (384–322 BC), who, as is well known, coined the term *metaphor*, because he noticed its common use in the production of knowledge and of new concepts. The sapient animal is a metaphorical thinker, Aristotle contended. However, Aristotle also affirmed that, as knowledge-productive as it was, metaphor's most common function was to spruce up literal ways of thinking and speaking. Remarkably, it was this latter position of Aristotle that became the accepted view of metaphor in Western society at large, until recently.

Since the source domain of a metaform encompasses concrete signs, it follows that the selection of one sign or another from a particular domain will produce connotative nuances. Take, for example the metaphorical statement "The professor is a *snake*," which is an instantiation of the metaform [human personality = perceived physical features of animals]. The meaning of [snake] that this statement embodies, however, is not its denotative one, but rather, the culture-specific connotations perceived in snakes, namely "slyness," "danger," "slipperiness," etc. It is this complex of connotations that is implied in the depiction of the topic, [professor]. Each different instantiation of this metaform changes the view we get of the topic: e.g. in "The professor is a *rat*," the [professor] is portrayed instead as someone "aggressive," "combative," "rude," etc.—a complex of connotations which are implicit in the new selected vehicle [gorilla].

The secondness dimension of metaphorical reasoning inheres in an extension of firstness metaforms; i.e. once the first "layer" of abstract metaforms in a language has been formed, on the basis of concrete source domains, then this layer itself becomes a new productive source domain for creating a higher (= more abstract) layer of concepts. Elsewhere, I have referred to this as the *layering principle* (Danesi forthcoming). Secondness associations among metaforms can be called *meta-metaforms*. Thus, for example, in utterances such as the following the target domain of [ideas] is rendered by source domains that are themselves metaforms [devising something in the mind = upward motion] and [reflecting = scanning motion].

7. Where did you *think up* that idea?
8. I *thought over* carefully your ideas.
9. You should *think out* the whole problem before attempting to solve it.

Even though these phrasal verbs have abstract referents, they nonetheless evoke images of location and movement. The phrase *think up* elicits a mental image of upward movement, thus portraying the abstract referent as an object being extracted physically from a kind of mental terrain; *think over* evokes the image of scanning with the mind's eye; and *think out* elicits an image of extracting something so that it can be held up to the scrutiny of the mind's eye. These constructions allow users to locate and identify abstract ideas in relation to spatiotemporal contexts, although such contexts are purely imaginary. It's as if these imaginary indexes allow us to locate thoughts in the mind, with the mind having the features of a territory and thoughts of objects within it. Meta-metaforms like this one imply indexicality in reference. Secondness meta-metaforms are, as Peircean theory predicts, indexical in their representational focus.

The third dimension of metaphorical reasoning is *symbol formation*. Metaforms and meta-metaforms are frequently the sources of symbols, of grammatical categories, and of the other representational techniques that make up the "signifying order" of a culture. Elsewhere I have referred to this as the *interconnectedness principle* (Danesi forthcoming). In Peircean terms, symbol formation is, of course, a thirdness phenomenon, because in this case the form, the form-user, and the referent are linked to each other by the forces of historical and social convention. For example, a rose is used as a symbol for love in Western culture because it derives ultimately from the metaphorical

association of [love] to a [sweet smell], to the color [red], and to the notion that love grows like a [plant]. These are all metaforms that lead to the formation of the symbol: [rose = love].

In summary, a dimensional model of metaphor posits that abstract signifieds are, first, experienced in terms of concrete ones producing, firstness metaforms with iconic properties. These then become themselves source domains for further metaphorization producing secondness meta-metaforms with indexical properties. Finally, the metaforms and meta-metaforms are themselves the basis of many symbolic processes since they become interconnected within the signifying order of a culture:

```
┌──────────────┐     ┌──────────────┐     ┌──────────────┐
│ Sensory /    │     │ Concrete     │     │ Metaforms    │
│ experimential│ ──▶ │ source       │ ──▶ │ with firstness│
│ input        │     │ domains      │     │ iconic properties│
└──────────────┘     └──────────────┘     └──────────────┘
                                                 │
                                                 ▼
                     ┌──────────────┐     ┌──────────────────┐
                     │ New          │     │ Meta-metaforms   │
                     │ source       │ ──▶ │ with secondness  │
                     │ domains      │     │ indexical        │
                     │              │     │ properties       │
                     └──────────────┘     └──────────────────┘
                                                 │
                                                 ▼
                                          ┌──────────────┐
                                          │ Source       │
                                          │ domains      │ ◀──
                                          │ for symbolism │
                                          └──────────────┘
                                                 │
                                                 ▼
                                          ┌──────────────┐
                                          │ Symbol-formation│
                                          │ categories of │
                                          │ grammar      │
                                          │ etc.         │
                                          └──────────────┘
```

Metaforms

In both philosophy and psychology, the term *concept* is used to designate a general strategy for referring to things that are perceived to subsume some general pattern, feature, etc. *Concept-formation* can thus be characterized as a pattern- or feature-inferencing process. A *concrete concept* can now be defined as the process of referring to a pattern, feature, etc. that is demonstrable and observable in a direct way, and an *abstract concept* as the process of referring to something that cannot be demonstrated or observed directly. So, for example, the word *car* refers to a concrete concept because one can always demonstrate or observe the existence of a car in the physical world. The word *love*, on the other hand, refers to an abstract concept because, although love exists as an emotional phenomenon, it cannot be demonstrated or observed directly (i.e. the emotion itself cannot be demonstrated or observed apart from the behaviors, states of mind, etc. that it produces).

The relevant psychological research shows that concepts are formed in one of three general ways. The first is by *induction* — i.e. by the extraction of a pattern from *specific* facts or instances. For example, if one were to measure the three angles of, say, 100 *specific* triangles (of varying shapes and sizes), one would get the same total (180°) each time. This would then lead one to *induce* that the sum of the three angles of *any* triangle is the same (180°). Induction reveals a type of conceptualization process whereby a *general* pattern is extractable from its *specific* occurrences. The second way in which humans form concepts is by *deduction*, the opposite of induction — i.e. by the application of a *general* pattern to a *specific* occurrence. For instance, if one were to prove, by the use of Euclidean notions that the sum of the angles of *any* triangle is 180°, then one would *deduce* that the sum of the angles in a given *specific* triangle (no matter what its size or shape as scalene, isosceles, etc.) would add up to 180°. Finally, concepts are formed through *abduction* (Peirce 1931–1958). For the present purposes, this can be defined simply as the visualization of an abstract concept on the model of an existing concrete, or already known, pattern. Abductive thinking is essentially a "hunch" as to what something means or presupposes. A classic example is the theory of atomic structure originated by the English physicist Ernest Rutherford (1871–1937), who conceptualized the inside of an atom as having the

structure of an infinitesimal solar system, with electrons behaving like little planets orbiting around an atomic nucleus. Rutherford's model of atomic structure was, in effect, an intuition as to what the inside of an atom looked like.

The distinction between concrete and abstract concept-formation is, needless to say, a general one. In actual fact, there are many degrees and layers of concreteness and abstraction in conceptualization that are influenced by connotative, social, affective, and other kinds of factors (Leech 1981: 9–23). But it is beyond the purpose here to investigate the role these factors play in concept-formation. Suffice it to say that most of the raw, unorganized information that comes from seeing, hearing, and the other senses is organized into useful *concepts* by induction, deduction, or abduction. Moreover, it is now evident that the type of conceptualization or representational process enlisted depends on the type of pattern that the human mind seeks from a specific situation. Often, all three processes — induction, deduction, abduction — are involved in a complementary fashion.

Metaforms are produced by abduction. In the [human personality = perceived physical features of animals] metaform it is the externally-demonstrable physical properties of [animals] that are abducted in order to understand human traits ("slipperiness," "aggressiveness," etc.). This form of reasoning has been amply documented by the CMT literature, which gained momentum in 1977 when Howard Pollio and his associates showed that metaphor was hardly a discourse option, but its very backbone (Pollio, Barlow, Fine, and Pollio 1977). This turning point led in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s to the development of two significant trends: (1) conceptual metaphor theory itself (e.g. Ortony 1979; Honeck and Hoffman 1980; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Kövecses 1986, 1988, 1990; Johnson 1987; Indurkhya 1992), and (2) a new branch of linguistics that now comes under the rubric of *cognitive linguistics* (Langacker 1987, 1990; Croft 1991; Deane 1992; Taylor 1995; Fauconnier 1997). The relevant research within CMT strongly suggests that most of our abstract concepts are stored as metaforms by our memory systems.

As discussed above, in CMT a specific *metaphor* is not considered to be an isolated construction, but rather, a specific instantiation of a metaform:

10. The professor is a *snake*.
11. Keep away from her; she's a *rat*.
12. What a *gorilla* he has become!
13. She's a sweetheart, a true *pussycat*!
14. He keeps everything for himself; he's a real *hog*.

As these examples show, the [human personality = perceived physical features of animals] metaform is one of the conceptual strategies used for understanding notions such as *slyness*, *betrayal*, *aggressiveness*, *kindness*, etc. Also as mentioned above, each different selection of a vehicle from the source domain — [snake], [rat], [gorilla], [pussycat], [hog], etc. — provides a different connotative depiction of the specific personality to be evaluated. Needless to say, perceptions of animal behaviors vary according to situation. But the fact remains that people the world over react experientially and affectively to animals in specific ways and that these reactions are encoded into a source domain for evaluating human personality:

Source domain   Target domain   Properties
                                              abducted from the
                                              source domain

[animals and humans are   [human personality = perceived physical
perceived as interconnected]   features of animals]

snakes   slyness
rats   betrayal
gorillas   *human personality*   aggressiveness
cats   kindness
hog   possessiveness
etc.   etc.

Once this concept has been formed, then it becomes itself a source for providing further descriptive detail to our evaluations of human personality, if such a need should arise. Thus, for instance, the specific utilization of [snake] as the vehicle can itself become a sub-domain (made up of types of snakes), allowing one to zero in on specific details of the personality being described:

15. He's a *cobra*.
16. She's a *viper*.
17. Your friend is a *boa constrictor*.
etc.

In effect, within each source domain, there are sub-domains that provide the metaform-user with an array of connotations that can be utilized to project subtle detail on to the description of a certain personality. This is perhaps why in 1973 the psychologist Elinor Rosch (1973a, 1973b) came to the conclusion that there are three levels in concept-formation. Some concepts have a highly general referential function. She called these *superordinate*. The metaform [human personality = perceived physical features of animals] itself is, in her scheme, a superordinate concept, because it refers to the general phenomenon of personality. Other concepts have a typological function. Rosch called these *basic*. The choice of specific metaphorical vehicles from the [animal] source domain — [snake], [rat], etc. — produces, in effect, basic concepts because vehicular choices allow for reference to types of personalities. Finally, some concepts have a detailing function. Rosch called these *subordinate*. The selection of subtypes of [snake], [rat], etc. — [cobra], [viper], etc. — are all subordinate concepts that might be needed for specialized purposes, as we saw above.

Metaforms are not generated in an arbitrary fashion, but on the basis of an experience of beings, objects, events, etc. The [human personality = perceived physical features of animals] concept is guided, arguably, by a common experience, namely that animals and humans are interconnected in Nature's scheme of things. What does talking about people in this way imply? It means that we actually perceive humans as behaving like animals, and that our reactions are parallel to those experienced physically when we see certain animals.

Lakoff and Johnson trace the psychological source of metaforms to *image schemas*. These are mental impressions of our sensory experiences of locations, movements, shapes, reactions, feelings, etc. They are the mental links between experiences and abstract concepts. These schemas not only permit us to recognize patterns within certain bodily sensations, but also to anticipate certain consequences and to make inferences. Schemas are mental *Gestalten* that can reduce a large quantity of sensory information into general patterns. Image schema theory suggests that the source domains enlisted in delivering an

abstract concept were not chosen originally in an arbitrary fashion, but rather, that they are derived from the experience of beings, objects, events, etc. The formation of a metaform, therefore, is the result of an experiential abduction. This is why metaphors often produce aesthetic or synesthetic effects, and this explains why metaphorical utterances are more memorable than others.

Lakoff and Johnson identify three basic types of image schemas. The first one involves mental orientation — *up vs. down, back vs. front, near vs. far*, etc. This guides the formation of such abstract concepts as [mood] ("I'm feeling *up* today"), the [economy] ("Inflation is *down*"), [growth] ("My income has gone *up*"), etc. The second type involves ontological thinking. This produces metaforms in which concepts are perceived as entities and substances: e.g. [the mind = a container] as in "I'm *full* of memories," "My mind is *empty*," etc. The third type of schema is an elaboration of these two. This produces metaforms that distend orientational and ontological concepts: e.g. [time = a resource] and [time = a quantity] underlie concepts such as "My *time* is *money*," "You cannot *buy* my *time*," etc.

As Lakoff and Johnson emphasize throughout their seminal 1980 study, we do not detect the presence of such image schemas in common discourse because of repeated usage. For example, we no longer interpret the word *see* in sentences such as "I don't *see* what you mean," "Do you *see* what I'm saying?" in metaphorical terms, because its use in such expressions has become so familiar to us. But the association between the biological act of seeing outside the body with the imaginary act of seeing within mind-space was originally the source of the conceptual metaform [understanding/believing/thinking = seeing], which now permeates common discourse:

18. There is more to this than *meets the eye*.
19. I have a different *point of view*.
20. It all depends on how you *look* at it.
21. I take a *dim view* of the whole matter.
22. I never *see eye to eye* on things with you.
23. You have a different *worldview* than I do.
24. Your ideas have given me great *insight* into life.

The presence of such metaforms in common everyday discourse challenges the Saussurean (1916) "arbitrariness" view of meaning. It is only after they have become conventionalized through frequent usage and routinization in a cultural context that their original metaphoric

relation to concrete referents is attenuated or lost to awareness. This view of concept-formation is not new. It has been implicit in the work of various semioticians, linguists, and philosophers for quite some time, not just in the work related to CMT (Lucy 1992). It simply has never been identified as such. Studying the link between perception and language was, of course, the goal of von Humboldt (1836), Sapir (1921) and Whorf (1956) — a goal that has never been truly entertained by mainstream linguistics until fairly recently. Many of the findings that are now discussed under the rubric of CMT theory, moreover, can already be discerned in the writings of Bühler (1908), Staehlin (1914), Vygotsky (1931, 1962, 1978), Richards (1936), Asch (1950, 1958), Osgood and Suci (1953), Brown, Leiter, and Hildum (1957), Black (1962), and Arnheim (1969), to mention but a few, well before the great upsurge of interest in metaphor in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Their work showed, cumulatively, that the meaning created by a metaphor was hardly a decorative one. They argued that, like two chemicals mixed together in a test tube, the result of mixing two domains through metaphorization created a dynamic interaction which retained properties of both domains but also unique ones of its own. CMT has added mainly that the resulting "semantic mixture" is the primary ingredient in abstract concept-formation.

Knowledge of human personality entails knowledge of metaforms such as the [human personality = perceived physical features of animals] one discussed here. Clearly, this kind of knowledge is culture-specific. The very same source domain could have been utilized differently; i.e. applied to a different target domains such as [justice], [hope], etc. Or else, a different source domain could have been used, in tandem with this metaform. In Western culture, for instance, the target domain of [human personality] is frequently conceptualized in terms of [mask-wearing]. Indeed, the original meaning of the word *person* reveals this very conceptualization. In ancient Greece, the word *persona* signified a "mask" worn by an actor on stage. Subsequently, it came to have the meaning of "the personality of the mask-wearer." This meaning still exists in the theater term *dramatis personae* "cast of characters" (literally "the persons of the drama"). Eventually, the word came to have its present meaning of "living human being." This diachronic analysis of *person* also explains why we con-

tinue to this day to use "theatrical" expressions such as *to play a role in life*, *to put on a proper face*, etc. in reference to persons.

Whatever the case, once a metaform gains currency in a cultural context, it makes representation and communication efficient and convenient, conditioning its users to anticipate or project its occurrence in other domains of reference and knowledge. In effect, any metaform can become a productive resource for further meaning-making activities (see also Levin 1977, 1988 on this point).

Meta-Metaforms

Once firstness metaphorical concepts such as the [thinking = seeing] metaform have entered the language, then they can themselves become new source domains for further metaphorizing. The process that is involved in such cases can be called *layering*. Layering results when different metaforms are interrelated conceptually — as for example, the linkage of the [thinking = seeing] metaform with the [thinking occurs in the light] metaform, resulting in a new metaform [thinking/knowing = seeing in the light]:

25. I finally *saw* what you meant in the *light* of what you had told me previously.
26. I now *see* what you said in a different *light*.
27. They *saw* eye to eye in the clear *light* of all the evidence.

Such conceptual assemblages can be called *meta-metaforms*. Their presence in language and discourse can, clearly, be enlisted to explain: (1) why there are various ways of conceptualizing the same target domains, and (2) why these are not separate from one another. Etiologically, the [knowing = seeing in the light] meta-metaform is derived from two metaforms. This specific example of conceptual layering can be shown graphically as follows:

The layering of metaforms to produce higher abstractions is an unconscious culture-based process. The higher the density of layering, the more abstract and, thus, more culture-specific, the concept (e.g. Dundes 1972; Kövecses 1986, 1988, 1990). Firstness metaforms like the [thinking = seeing] one are relatively understandable across cultures: i.e. people from non-English-speaking cultures could easily figure out what the statements that instantiate this metaform mean if they were translated to them, because they connect concrete source domains — e.g. *seeing* — to abstractions — *thinking* — directly. *Meta-metaforms*, on the other hand, are more likely to be understood primarily in culture-specific ways, and are thus much harder to translate, because they connect already-existing metaforms to abstractions.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) refer to the process of layering as *cultural modeling*. The following is an example of how a partial cultural model of [ideas/thinking] results from the layering of firstness metaforms:

[ideas/thoughts = food]

28. What he said left a *bitter taste* in my mouth.
29. I cannot *digest* all that information.
30. He is a *voracious* reader.
31. We do not need to *spoon feed* our students.

[ideas/thoughts = people]

32. Darwin is the *father* of modern biology.
33. Medieval ideas are *alive* and *well*.
34. Artificial Intelligence is still in its *infancy*.
35. She *breathed* new life into that idea.

[ideas/thoughts = clothing/fashion]

36. That idea is not in *vogue* any longer.
37. New York has become a center for *avant garde* thinking.
38. Revolution is *out of style* these days.
39. Studying semiotics has become quite *chic*.
40. That idea is an old *hat*.

[ideas/thoughts = buildings]

41. That is a *well-constructed* theory.
42. His views are on *solid ground*.
43. That theory needs *support*.
44. Their viewpoint *collapsed* under criticism.
45. She put together the *framework* of a theory.

[ideas = plants]

46. Her ideas have come to *fruition*.
47. That's a *budding* theory.
48. His views have contemporary *offshoots*.
49. That is a *branch* of mathematics.

Knowledge of the source domains — [food], [people], [clothing], [buildings], [plants] — is relatively independent of culture. However, not all concrete source domains are more or less culture-independent. There are some source domains that are dependent upon specific cultural knowledge, such as, for instance, the source domains for [ideas/thoughts] based on Euclidean geometry and on commodities:

[ideas/ thoughts = geometrical figures]

50. I don't see the *point* of your idea.
51. Your ideas are *tangential* to what I'm thinking.
52. Those ideas are logically *circular*.

[ideas = commodities]

53. He certainly knows how to *package* his ideas.
54. That idea just won't *sell*.
55. There's no *market* for that idea.
56. That's a *worthless* idea.

People living in cultures without knowledge of Euclidean geometry would be hardpressed to decipher statements (50)–(52); people living in non-materialist cultures would have a hard time understanding the rationale behind statements (53)–(56). The constant juxtaposition of such conceptual formulas in common discourse produces, cumulatively, a meta-metaform of [ideas/thoughts]:

This is, of course, only a partial model of the target domain; indeed, there are many more that can be added to it. Not only, but other linkages and associations from different and often new source domains can be added to this meta-metaform according to new experiences, new cultural situations, etc. The two points to be made here are: (1) that highly abstract notions are built-up from meta-metaforms (cultural models) which coalesce into a system of abstract meaning that holds together the entire network of associated meanings in the culture, and (2) that since this system is constructed intuitively (abductively) it can be changed at any time to suit new needs.

Thirdness Metaphorization

At a cultural thirdness level, metaforms and meta-forms can be seen to be the sources of symbols, grammatical categories, discourse flow, etc. The [knowing = seeing in the light] meta-metaform crystallizes, for example, in the art of *chiaroscuro* — the technique of using light and shade in painting, invented by the Italian baroque painter Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggio (1573–1610). It is also the conceptual source for the fact that *illumination* is emphasized by religions (Ong 1977; Wescott 1978; Hausman 1989). So-called "visionary" or "revelatory" experiences are regularly portrayed in terms of dazzling sensations of light. The metaform [justice = blindness], to use another example, crops up not only in conversations, but also in pictorial representations. This is why there are statues of blindfolded women inside and outside courtrooms to symbolize *justice*. The [love = a sweet taste] metaform, to use one further example, finds expression not only in discourse ('She's my *sweetheart*;' 'I love my *honey*;' etc.), but also in rituals of love-making. This is why sweets are given symbolically to a loved one at St. Valentine's day, why matrimonial love is symbolized at a wedding ceremony by the eating of a cake, why lovers sweeten their breaths with candy before kissing, and so on.

A *symbol* is a sign that stands for its referent in an arbitrary, conventional way. Symbols allow for representation separately from stimulus-response situations. But as examples such as those just cited make saliently obvious, symbolism is more often than not the end result of a metaphorical linkage process, a thirdness form of thinking that is not the result of conventional sense-making, but rather, its very

source. For example, the [human personality = perceived physical features of animals] metaform is the source of such symbolic activities as the use of animals in totemic codes, in heraldric traditions, in the creation of fictional characters for use in story-telling to children, in the naming of sports teams, and in the creation of surnames, to mention but a few.

This view of symbolism would also explain why cultural meaning systems are in a constant state of change. As Vico argued convincingly, the metaphorical capacity is tied to *fantasia*, the imaginative and creative faculty of mind that predisposes human beings to search out and forge new meanings constantly. This is why novel metaphors are being created all the time. If someone were to say "Those ideas are a cup of coffee," it is unlikely that one would have heard this expression before. But its novelty forces one to reflect upon its meaning. The vehicle used, a [cup of coffee], is a common object of everyday life and therefore easily perceivable as a source for thinking about [ideas]. The metaphor compels one, in effect, to start thinking of ideas in terms of the kinds of physical, gustatory, social, and other attributes that are associated with a [cup of coffee]. For this metaphor to gain currency, however, it must capture the fancy of many other people for a period of time. Then and only then will its novelty have become worn out and will it become the basis for a new conceptual metaform: [ideas = drinking substances]. After that, expressions such as "Your idea is a cup of tea," "That theory is a bottle of fine wine," etc. and the like will become similarly understandable as offering different perspectives on *ideas*.

More often than not, metaforms are also traces to a culture's historical past. A common expression like "He has fallen from grace" would have been recognized instantly in a previous era as referring to the Adam and Eve story in the Bible. Today we continue to use it with only a dim awareness (if any) of its Biblical origins. Expressions that portray life as a journey — "I'm still a long way from my goal," "There is no end in sight," etc. — are similarly rooted in Biblical narrative. As the Canadian literary critic Northrop Frye (1981) aptly pointed out, one cannot penetrate such expressions, and indeed most of Western literature or art, without having been exposed, directly or indirectly, to the original Biblical stories. These are the source domains for many of the metaforms we use today for talking about and judging human actions, bestowing a kind of implicit metaphysical

meaning and value to everyday life. All *mythical* stories are, in effect, extended thirdness metaforms. These allow people to depict supernatural, mythical entities in terms of human images, with human bodily forms and emotions. It is extremely difficult to think of a god in any other way. The God of the Bible, for example, is described as having physical characteristics and human emotions, but at the same time is understood to be a transcendent Being.

The metaphorical link to the past is also evident in proverbial language. Proverbs, like myths, are extended metaphors that provide sound practical advice when it is required in certain situations:

57. You've got too many fires burning (= advice to not do so many things at once).
58. Rome wasn't built in a day (= advice to have patience).
59. Don't count your chickens before they're hatched (= advice to be cautious).
60. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth (= equal treatment is required in love and war).

Every culture has similar proverbs, aphorisms, and sayings. They constitute a remarkable code of ethics and of practical knowledge that anthropologists call "folk wisdom." Indeed, the very concept of *wisdom* implies the ability to apply proverbial language insightfully to a situation. Homilies and sermons, too, dispense their own kind of advice and counsel through metaphor. Rarely does a preacher not use metaphorical discourse in a cohesive and persuasive way. The art of preaching lies in the ability to link metaforms effectively to a topic — [sex = dirt]; [sin = punishable by fire]; etc.

The use of metaphor extends to scientific reasoning. Science often involves things that cannot be seen — atoms, waves, gravitational forces, magnetic fields, etc. So, scientists use their metaphorical know-how to get a look, so to speak, at this hidden matter. That is why waves are said to *undulate* through empty space like water waves ripple through a still pond; atoms to *leap* from one quantum state to another; electrons to *travel in circles* around an atomic nucleus; and so on. The poet and the scientist alike use metaphor to extrapolate a suspected inner connection among things. Metaphors are slices of truth; they are evidence of the human ability to see the universe as a coherent organism. When a metaform is accepted as fact, it enters human life, taking on an independent conceptual existence in the real world, and thus can suggest ways in which to bring about changes in

and to the world. Euclidean geometry, for instance, gave the world a certain kind of visual metaphorical structure for millennia — a world of relations among points, lines, circles, etc. But this structure can be changed to suit new conditions and ideas. This is precisely what happened when Nicholas Lobachevski (1793–1856) literally imagined that Euclid's parallel lines would "meet" in some context, such as at the poles of a globe, thus giving the visual world a different structure. As physicist Robert Jones (1982: 4) aptly puts it, for the scientist metaphor serves as "an evocation of the inner connection among things." Experimentation is a search for connections, linkages, associations of some sort or other. As Rom Harré (1981: 23) has pointed out, most experiments involve "the attempt to relate the structure of things, discovered in an exploratory study, to the organization this imposes on the processes going on in that structure."

Metaforms can also be seen in the "meaning flow" that shapes most discourse situations. Over a seven-year period I tape-recorded everyday conversations as they unfold spontaneously in various social situations (from 1992 to 1999). The conversations caught on these tapes are typical instances of everyday social interactions. Most of the taping was done on the campus of the University of Toronto. It is certainly beyond the scope of the present study to provide a detailed breakdown and analysis of the data that these tapes contain. That is the objective of a future study. Here, the aim is simply to present an initial picture of how "meaning flow" in discourse is shaped by a syntagmatic chain of metaforms, a finding which suggests that discourse unfolds primarily through a "circuitry" of source domains through which interlocutors "navigate mentally," so to speak.

Take, once again, the expression "The professor is a snake." The following brief stretch of conversation between two students (captured on one of the tapes) shows how this instantiation of this source domain shaped the pathways of one of the circuits of their conversation:

Student 1:   You know, that prof is a real *snake*.

Student 2:   Ya', I know, he's a real *slippery* guy.

Student 1:   He somehow always knows how to *slide* around a tough thing.

Student 2:   Keep away from his courses; he *bites*!

The circuit that this metaphorical concept triggered in that conversation can be represented as follows:

[human personality = perceived physical features of animals]

An analysis of most conversation shows that verbal communication consists of arrays of such mini-circuits that are somehow seen as leading to an overall meaning source or purpose to a specific conversation.

Often the circuit is made up of a series of metaforms, which are interconnected to each other in the discourse pathway. In one conversation about *ideas*, an interlocutor made use of the following sequence of metaforms: [ideas = seeing] ñ [ideas = food] – [ideas = persons] ñ [ideas = fashion]:

"I do not *see* how anyone can *swallow* his ideas, especially since most of them have gone o*ut of fashion*, and thus are *dying*."

The circuit that his statement entails can be represented as follows:

The presence of metaforms can be found, moreover, in grammatical phenomena. The linguist Ronald Langacker (e.g. 1987, 1990) has formulated a theory of grammar suggesting that certain aspects of sentence grammar are, in effect, generated by what can be designated a *metaformal reflex system*, built from source domain thinking. Nouns, for instance, trace a "region" in mind-space — e.g. a count noun is imagined as referring to a bounded region, whereas a mass noun is visualized as referring to a non-bounded region. Thus, for example, the noun *water* elicits an image of a non-bounded referent; whereas, a noun like *leaf* evokes a picture of bounded referent. This entails a *grammatical reflexivization* in the forms and functions of these nouns — *leaves* can be counted, *water* cannot; *leaf* has a plural form (*leaves*), *water* does not (unless the referential domain is metaphorical); *leaf* can be preceded by an indefinite article (*a leaf*), *water* cannot; and so on. Similar reflex patterns can be found in other representational systems — in painting, for instance, *water* is represented either with no boundaries or else as bounded by other figures (land masses, the horizon, etc.); *leaves*, on the other hand, can be depicted as separate figures with circumscribable boundaries. As this suggests, the parts of speech are end-products of experiential factors and, more significantly, are interconnected with other representational forms and activities.

Grammar is really a metaformal code, "summarizing," so to speak, at the level of thirdness our direct perception of things in the world as they stand in relation to one another. It probably originated in the human species as a system of organizing the perceptual experiences encoded by metaformal thinking. This is perhaps why we can understand stories in virtually the same ways that we understand music or paintings. In the same way that a painting is much more than an assemblage of lines, shapes, colors, and melodies a combination of notes and harmonies, a sentence in language is much more than an assemblage of words and phrases built from some rule system in the brain. We use the grammatical elements at our disposal to model the world in ways that parallel how musicians use melodic elements and painters visual elements to model it.

As a concrete example of how grammar and metaforms are interrelated, consider the use of the prepositions *since* and *for* in sentences such as the following in English (Danesi 1995):

61. I have been living here *since* 1990.
62. I have known Lucy *since* September.
63. I have not been able to sleep *since* Monday.
64. I have been living here *for* fifteen years.
65. I have known Lucy *for* nine months.
66. I have not been able to sleep *for* five days.

An analysis of the grammatical forms that follow *since* or *for* reveals: (1) those that follow *since* stand for "points in time," i.e. they are complements that reflect a conception of [time] as a [point] on a "timeline" which shows specific years, months, etc. ("1990," "September," "Monday"); (2) those that follow *for*, on the other hand, reflect a conception of [time] as a [quantity] ("fifteen years," "nine months," "five days"). In effect, complements introduced by *since* are reflexes of the metaform [time = a point]; those introduced by *for* are reflexes of the metaform [time = a quantity]. This is, in fact, the kind of rule of grammar that interconnects concepts and parts of speech.

Take, as one last example, the selection of certain verbs in particular types of sentences in Italian. The verb *fare* "to make" is used to refer to the presence of [heat] and [cold] in Nature:

67. *Fa caldo* (literally) "It makes hot" ("It is hot ")
68. *Fa freddo* (literally) "It makes cold" ("It is cold")

If the [heat] and [cold] are in objects (such as cups of coffee), then the verb *essere* "to be" is used instead:

69. *È caldo* "It is hot"
70. *È freddo* "It is cold"

Finally, if the [heat] and [cold] are in people, then the verb *avere* "to have" is used:

71. *Ha caldo* "He/she is hot"
72. *Ha freddo* "He/she is cold"

The use of one verb or the other — *fare, essere,* or *avere* — is clearly motivated by an underlying metaphorical conceptualization of bodies, objects, and the environment as containers. So, the "container" in which [heat] or [cold] is located determines the verbal category to be employed. If it is in the environment, it is "made" by Nature (*Fa freddo; Fa caldo*); if it is in a human being, then the body "has" it (*Ha freddo*; *Ha caldo*); and if it is in an object, then the object "is" its container (*È freddo*; *È caldo*).

Concluding Remarks

The main purpose of this paper has been to show that DT can be used to provide a synthetic framework for relating what would appear to be disparate and heterogeneous findings on metaphor to each other. Symbols, grammar, discourse, and various forms of nonverbal representation are, by and large, products of metaphorical reasoning.

DT is not new. It has been identified in various ways, and with differing terminological guises, in the relevant literature. I have offered it here as a target to make it testable for use in further research on metaphorical discourse. As Henry Schogt (1988: 38) perceptively remarked, all languages "have meaningful units that articulate human experience into discrete elements." The domain of concrete concepts comprises the "discrete elements" of all human thinking. In this domain, concept-formation is "pattern-inferencing" based on concrete sensory perception. As argued in this paper, many common abstract concepts are based on such concrete source domains; they are the result of a firstness form of metaphorizing that produces what has been called *metaforms*. These in turn constitute source domains on their own that produce higher and higher (secondness) orders of abstraction (*meta-metaforms*). Metaforms and meta-metaforms surface not only in discourse but also in most thirdness representational systems.

One of the more fundamental questions that this line of investigation begs is: Are all abstractions and symbols based on metaphorical reasoning? As Levin (1988: 10) has aptly remarked, there appear to be many kinds of concepts and modes of knowing: "innate knowledge, personal knowledge, tacit knowledge, spiritual knowledge, declarative and procedural knowledge, knowing that and knowing how, certitude (as well as certainty), and many other varieties." The more appropriate goal for metaphor research should be, therefore, to determine to what extent metaforms populate the world of abstraction and what other types of abstractions, if any, are possible. Phylogenetically speaking, the universality of metaforms begs the question of the relation of metaphor to the emergence of conceptual thinking in the human species. In evolutionary terms, the crystallization of metaforms in human thought suggests that sensory perception was originally at the root of many of our abstract notions. If this is so, then as Howes (1999: 153) cogently suggests, future work in all areas of linguistics,

psychology, anthropology, and even semiotics should involve three paradigm shifts, which can be paraphrased as follows:

1. Theories and analytical frameworks within these sciences should be based on the relation that exists between perception and conceptualization, sense impressions and ideas.
2. A culture can be characterized, as a thirdness phenomenon, as the system of interconnections among metaphorical forms of reasoning, and it should be studied primarily in these terms.
3. Discovering how different cultures may select different properties of the senses for symbolic elaboration should be a central task of all the human sciences.

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Дименсиональность метафоры

В лингвистических и семиотических науках существует мнение, что абстрактные мысли можно знать, осознавать в основном или только как метафорические идеи, т.е. означаемые, когнитивно создаваемые в процессе метафорического хода мышления. Целью статьи является выявление фрейма, называемого теорией дименсиональности (ТД) и формулированного на основе теории Пирса. ТД, предложенная в предыдущей публикации для возможного обсуждения, предназначена для исследования метафоры во всех ее вербальных и невербальных проявлениях.

Исследование показывает, что метафорический ход мышления имеет три измерения: метафоры первичности называются метаформами, метафоры вторичности метаметаформами и метафорическое мышление третичности рассматривается как основание и для образования символов, грамматической формализации и дискурсивного потока. Подобный подход к метафоре нельзя назвать новым, но в данной работе он применяется для установления его пригодности в дальнейшей работе над метафорическим дискурсом.

В ДТ утверждается, что дискретные элементы всего человеческого мышления содержатся в области конретных понятий. Тут понятия образуются путем модельного заключения, в основе которого лежит все конкретно осязаемое чувствами. Многие общие абстрактные понятия происходят из этих конкретных сфер, они родом из формы первичности метафоризации, результатом которой является метаформы. Те, в свою очередь, оказываются источниковыми сферами, образующими все более высокие (вторичность) уровни абстракций (метаметаформы). Метаформы и метаметаформы встречаются не

только на внешней поверхности дискурса, но и в большинстве систем, презентирующих третичность.

Metafoori dimensionaalsus

Semiootilistes ja lingvistilistes teadustes on laiemalt levinud mõte, et abstraktseid mõisteid saab teada, teadvustada, peamiselt (või isegi ainult) kui metaforiseeritud ideid, s.o. tähistatavaid, mis luuakse kognitiivselt läbi metafoorilise mõttekäigu. Selle artikli eesmärk on tuua esile raamistik, mida nimetatakse dimensionaalsuse teooriaks (dimensionality theory, DT) ja mis on loodud Peirce'i teooria alusel. DT, mille autor oma eelmises uurimuses pakkus välja võimaliku mõttevahetuse teemaks, on mõeldud metafoori uurimiseks kõigis tema avaldumisvormides, nii verbaalsetes kui mitteverbaalsetes.

Uurimus näitab, et metafoorilisel mõttekäigul on kolm mõõdet (dimensiooni): esmasuse metafoore nimetatakse metavormideks, teisesuse metafoore meta-metavormideks ja kolmasuse metafoorilist mõtlemist vaadeldakse kui lähtekohta muu hulgas ka sümbolite moodustamisele, grammatilisele formaliseerimisele ja diskursuse voole. Selline vaatenurk metafoorile pole uus. Asjakohases kirjanduses on seda leitud mitmel erineval moel ning erinevate terminite varjus. Siin pakutakse seda metafoorikäsitlust kui sihtmärki järgiproovimiseks, katsetades seda kasutamise jaoks edasises uurimistöös metafoori-diskursusest.

Lühidalt öelduna väidab DT, et kogu inimmõtlemise "diskreetsed elemendid" sisalduvad konkreetsete mõistete vallas. Sellel alal moodustatakse mõisteid "mudel-järeldamise" teel, mille aluseks on konkreetne meeltega tajutav. Paljud üldised abstraktsed mõisted tulenevad nendelt konkreetse päritoluga aladelt; nad on pärit metaforiseerimise esmasuse vormist, mille tulemuseks on metavormid. Need omakorda kujutavad endast allikalasid, mis tekitavad järjest kõrgemaid ja kõrgemaid (teisesus) abstraktsiooni tasemeid (meta-metavormid). Metavormid ja meta-metavormid ei esine mitte ainult diskursuse, vaid ka enamike "kolmasuse" esindamissüsteemide väljendustes.

The life of signs in society — and out of it: Critique of the communication critique

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Cultural semiotics, as conceived by the Tartu school, seems to be concerned mainly with obstacles to communication: something which is a "text" in the culture (or non-culture) of the sender becomes a "non-text" in the culture of the receiver; or it becomes a text only being read by means of another "code" which, at least initially, leaves it deformed (cf. Sonesson 1992, 1998a, 1999b, c, in press a, b). But what is then this communication to which cultures offer obstacles? Lotman has certainly expressed some ideas on this; and so has, before him, the Bakhtin circle and the Prague school; and Posner actually builds his version of Cultural semiotics around a variety of the communication model. Yet, it seems that we are essentially stuck with the model of communication developed by Shannon & Weaver within the framework of the theory of information.

Lifting the dead hand of information theory

Even today all semiotic theory relies, more or less explicitly, on the communication model derived from the mathematical theory of information, which was designed to describe a few, by now rather old-fashioned, technological means of communication, telegraphy and radio, and in particular to devise remedies to the loss of information often occurring during transportation (cf. Fig. 1). Largely because of the influence of Jakobson (1960) and Eco (1976, 1977), this model has been used inside semiotics as a model of all communication, all signification, and of all kinds of semiosis.

$$\text{Source} \Rightarrow \underset{\text{message}}{\text{SENDER}} \Rightarrow \underset{\text{Noise}}{\overset{\text{signal}}{\text{Channel}}} \Rightarrow \underset{\text{message}}{\overset{\text{signal}}{\text{RECEIVER}}} \Rightarrow \text{Destination}$$

CODE

Fig. 1. The communication model of information theory.

This practice has produced at least two symmetrical, equally negative, consequences: by reducing all kinds of semiosis to the mass media kind, in particular to that employed by radio and telegraphy, we become unable to understand the peculiarity of more direct forms of communication; and by treating all semiosis as being on a par, we deprive ourselves of the means to understand the intricacies added to direct communication by means of different varieties of technological mediation. Taken together, this means that we dispose of no way of explaining the effects of the multiple mediations having accrued to the immediately given world of our experience in the last century. Beyond this, we may even discover a third, even more serious consequence: by projecting the communication model onto each and every form for conveying meaning, we lose sight of that which is really common to all kinds of semiosis.

It is really too easy to find faults with the communication model, both as a general description of meaning production, and in relation to particular means of communication. Thus, many of the observations I will make below are not entirely original, and I will refrain from mentioning other points of contention which might also have been included.

The spaces of communication

The most well-know criticism, of course, is that the model relies on a spatial metaphor, i.e., it emphasises the analogy with communication in the sense of trains, cars, etc., construing all meaning as some kind of object travelling from one point in space to another. Curiously, spatiality, in this sense, is not particularly pregnant in the model media, the telegraph and the radio — not, that is to say, in the sense of what we, following Gibson (1982), have called ecological physics, viz. the natural world as it is lived, rather than constructed by the natural sciences. While there is certainly something which moves in

space when a telegram is sent or a radio program is aired, nothing of this is projected to the space which is perceptually available to human beings, except at the beginning and end of the chain. The dominance of spatiality is more readily explained from a medium such as the letter, which ordinarily travels by train, and before that, by stagecoach or by foot-trodden messenger.

The identification of communication with transport is probably suggested by the spatial layout of the diagram itself, rather than by the media modelled (cf. Fig. 1). Or it may have some even deeper source, as suggested by Reddy's (1979) well-known analysis of the "conduit metaphor" (which, if we are to believe McNeill's [1994] study of the relevant gestures, only occur in Western countries). Interestingly, the transport model of communication was criticised already in 1929 by Voločinov (1986), well before it was embodied in the mathematical theory of communication. Yet it continues to be the basis of Lévi-Strauss' widely accepted parallelism between the three circulations of signs, commodities, and women.

More importantly from our point of view, however, the idea of there being a message moving from one point in space to another tends to obliterate the fact that, in many cases, other instances of the communication situation have to accomplish the movement, or to be active in other ways. Indeed, the displacements required of the sender and the receiver constitute one of the principal factors distinguishing different media in general, and modern and traditional media in particular.

Until recently, to send a fax, the sender had to go to the telegraph station, but now he may accomplish the same act from his computer. The receiver still has to go to the cinema to see a film, if he does not opt for using a video recorder instead. If we insist on perceiving the real thing, we will always have to visit a cave to see prehistoric frescoes. Sometimes, even continuous movement is required of the receiver, such as the person in the art gallery walking around the artwork, or the housewife leaving repeatedly the projection of the soap opera to attend to her domestic duties. In fact, changes in this respect are responsible for the utopia termed "the global village" by MacLuhan and "the third wave" by Toffler: they have to do, at least in part, with the subject being now able to accomplish from his home what would earlier have required an appreciable spatial displacement (cf. Sonesson 1987, 1995, 1997).

The active part of the receiver is better accounted for in an earlier, now much neglected, semiotic model, that of the Prague School (cf. Fig. 2 and Mukařovský 1970; Sonesson 1992, 1993a, 1997, 1999c; in press b). The Prague school notion of a "concretisation" of the perceptual objects conveyed always being necessary before communication takes place opens up this problem, but it does not tell us anything about the degree of the activity required, let alone its nature. Of course, movement is only one of its modalities. While it may be important to observe that, even in the transport model, this property is not always properly ascribed to the message, but may very well pertain to other instances of the communicative act, it is much more fundamental to observe that, even in the case of the message being spatially displaced, the sender *and the receiver* also have to take an active part.

NORMS   ⇔   **CONCENTRATION**
aesthetical norms and   filling in of empty places,
aesthetically deformed   determination of dominant structures
norms   ⇓⇑

Canon   ⇓   **Repertory of**   ⬇ S_c: **perceptual**   ⬇
   exemplary   **agent-critic**
⇓⇑   ⇔   **works**   ⬇
   ⇓⇑

| S_1: **creator** | ➡ | **Work Artifact** | ⇔ | **Aesthetical object** material vs intentional | ⇔ | S_2: **perceptual agent** |

SIGN

Fig. 2. The Prague school model.

Another way of pointing to the active part played by the receiver in communication may be to invoke the notion of dialogicity characteristic of the Bakhtin circle. Indeed, sometimes dialogicity seems to mean activity generally. Curiously, in Bakhtin's own texts, and in many passages of the Voloshinov texts also, dialogicity implies very little activity, or at least an activity of a very one-sided kind: one person quoting (and often qualifying) something said by another, normally in written form, which leaves very little possibility for one quoted to

react.[1] However, in an early article, Voloshinov (1983a) does refer to the anticipation by the hearer of the speaker's message, and the speaker's anticipation of this anticipation. Perhaps more essentially, the Bakhtin school approach has been understood in this way in latter-day semiotics (e.g. Wertsch 1991)

Another object of the communication situation which may well have to be brought into movement, or more generally given an active part, is the "code" or, as I would prefer to say, the schemes of interpretation. This becomes explicit in the Tartu model where it is a question of "texts" becoming "non-texts" or "deformed texts" in another culture, and then gradually being transformed into "texts" when a "code" has been reconstructed. Such a confrontation of "codes" is actually yet another aspect of the globalisation anticipated by MacLuhan.

Communication as an act in time

The Tartu model is essentially about obstacles to communication. The Prague model, on the other hand, also takes into account the possibility of communication taking place successfully, and, contrary to information theory, to which much of semiotics refer, including the Tartu school, it construes the receiver as an active participant in the process. Also, where the Tartu schools seems to be essentially concerned with entities differently distributed in space, the Prague school models most clearly focuses on relationships between different temporal phases of the same culture (cf. Fig. 2 and Sonesson 1995, 1996b, 199c; in press b).

According to this conception, as it was notably developed by Mukařovský and Vodička, *norms*, which in part are purely aesthetic, and in part have an extra-aesthetic origin, determine the production of the *artefact* by its creator, both directly, as a *canon*, or set of rules, and in the form of a *repertory of exemplary works of art* which are offered for imitation. In order to become an *aesthetical object*, the artefact must be perceived by the art public, and this process of perception,

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[1]   It is true that, in his Dostoevsky book, Bakhtin (1984) does imagine that the quoted text may in some way react back, but for my part, I find this inconceivable. Bettetini & alia (1995: 150ff) rightly distinguish the "interactivity" found in certain multimedia from real interaction; but dialogicity in the Bakhtinian vein often seems to be even less interactive.

termed *concretisation*, itself depends on the existence of norms, which are ideally more or less identical to those employed by the creator. More commonly, and more interestingly, the norms may have been modified and even exchanged for others since the artefact was created, in which case a new interpretation of the artefact will result. Concretisation involves the determination of the *dominants* appearing in the structure of the work of art, that is, the elements which are to receive emphasis and which will then organise the remaining elements of the structure according to their purpose; it also allows the perceiver to fill in lacking details from his own experience.

This model is an adaptation of the conception of perception propounded by Husserlean phenomenology, with an added social dimension (cf. Sonesson 1992, 1995, 1994a, b). We may therefore restore to the model its general import, applying it to all objects of perception, while retaining its social character. In this sense, the production of any artefact given to perception involves norms of different levels of generality, and so does its concretisation into the perceptual experience of a given subject of perception. On the other hand, the idea of there being a perpetual movement in which de-automatized norms are exchanged for automatized ones, an ever-repeated dialectics of "struggle and reformation" (in the terms of the Prague theses) applied to established artistic forms, really reproduces the conception of art presupposed, and even explicitly formulated, by the exponents of Modernism, as I have argued elsewhere (Sonesson 1998b).

According to Mukařovský, the constraints resulting from the norms may in some cases acquire the force of law, but at the other end of the scale they can just as well appear as simple recommendations. Perhaps we may be allowed to take this idea a little further, suggesting that the norm could also merely be an observed regularity, a habit, in the sense of Peirce and Husserl: that is, in other words, that which is considered to be *normal*. Thus we are brought back to the sciences of normality, Gibson's "ecological physics" and, beyond that, the Husserlean Lifeworld, which describe the core of all conceivable cultures, that which is taken for granted (cf. Sonesson 1994a, b 1996a, b).

Curiously, the *temporal metaphor* also embodied in the communication model has not come in for scrutiny: what is accomplished by the sender as well as by the receiver are acts in time, which are close but do not coincide. This is true of the telegraph, but not of everyday face-to-face interaction, nor of the messenger travelling

during many years. It applies even more awkwardly to the case of media having to be recreated before being received, such as a piece of music or, in a different way, a movie. The temporal presupposition seems even more beside the point in the case of prehistoric frescoes having been painted once and for all at some forlorn location. Once again, the communication model obliterates precisely those changes which characterise the age of information: even pictures have now become temporal acts, as testified by the television image and the picture imported from some Web server.

Instead of a continuous process initiated by a subject and affecting another, communication really should be seen *as a double set of acts*, which may coincide spatially and/or temporally, but often do not, and which are initiated by at least two different subjects, the sender and the receiver, or, to choose more appropriate terms, the *creator* and the *concretiser*. Curiously, the case of the radio, and to some extent even the telegraph, should really have suggested this model: no matter how much a program is broadcast, no communication will take place until somebody puts his radio receiver on. Nowadays, when we have to start up our computer, connect to the Internet service provider, start the e-mail program and then fetch our mail on the server, we get an even more acute idea of the double initiative required for communication to take place.

In these terms, what the Prague model says it that the two subjects involved in a process of communication may initiate their acts in time using different sets of norms; and what the Tartu model says is that they may initiate their acts in space using different cultural systems.[2] This is a way of saying that the meaning which is there for the receiver is not exactly the meaning which was there for the sender. In terms of the conduit metaphor, what goes in is *not* what comes out. A radical version of such a critique was formulated already by Voloshinov (1986) and was later echoed by Lotman (1988) and Wertsch (1991: 71ff). However, while Voloshinov thinks meaning is always transformed by being transmitted from one subject to another, Lotman allows for both the traditional model of communication and for another one in which meaning tends to grow (also cf. Lotman

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[2]   One tends to think of cultures as individuated in space, but of course we may also distinguish cultures in time; indeed, cultures may in fact be dispersed in time as well as in space, to the extent that they correspond to different subcultures, interests groups, and so on.

1979: 96f). The first model is best for assuring the conservation of meaning; the second one serves to generate new meaning; it is a "thinking device". Both models are present in all cultures, but one or the other is dominant in certain domains of activity and periods. Wertsch, who agrees with Lotman, identifies the second model of communication with Bakhtinian dialogicity. But to call "dialogical" a kind of communication in which the receiver is not even interested in finding out what the sender meant to say is at least an abuse of ordinary language.[3]

Such a conclusion seems to me not to take the Bakhtinian critique seriously enough. If the Bakhtin circle is right, then the communication model cannot be left in place, not even as an alternative. On the other hand, if we accept the Bakhtinean critique in its radicality, we are faced with an idea of communication which is not only difficult to model, as Lotman (1988: 35) suggests, but even to conceive in any other way. Elsewhere, Lotman (1977) applies this second model to "internal communication", the communication of a subject with himself, and this may be a reasonable use. It is however difficult to see what application it could have to the encounter of two subjects. But a more adequate solution to this conundrum is in fact suggested by another piece of Tartu school paraphernalia.

According to an idea, suggested by Lotman (as well as by Moles), the sender and receiver of any situation of communication start out with "codes" — or, as I would prefer to say, systems of interpretation —, which overlap only in part, struggling to homogenise the system of interpretation as the communication proceeds (cf. Fig. 3 and Sonesson 1995, 1997). We can extend this idea by referring to the Tartu school conception that cultures may be sender-oriented and receiver-oriented, and by transferring these properties to situations of communication. The communicative act may then be said to be *sender-oriented*, to the extent

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[3]   This becomes particularly absurd when Wertsch (1991: 76f) applies this distinction to Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg's ethic scale, claiming that women react in a more dialogical way, by answering another question that that posed by the interviewer. It may be more adequate to say, in Ricoeur's (1990: 199ff) terms, that women are more inclined to the "ethical" aim of living a good life, rather than applying abstract "moral" rules; but that of course contradicts the more general socio-psychological finding, that women tends to be more respectful of rules than men.

that it is considered to be the task of the receiver to recover that part of the system of interpretation which is not shared between the participants. It will be *receiver-oriented*, to the extent that the task of recovering knowledge not held in common is assigned to the sender. Art, as conceived in the 20th century, has been characteristically sender-oriented; mass media, in the received sense of the term (which is not really applicable to all modern media), have been noticeably receiver-oriented. Contrary to Wertsch, I would say that a dialogue is that takes place when each of the subjects adapts his schemes of interpretation somewhat to that of the other; that is, in Piagetean terms, when there is both *accommodation* and *assimilation*. On the other hand, when sender and receiver fail to negotiate the parts of the interpretation system which they do not both possess, the resulting concretisation will be a *deformation*. One or both of the subjects will then assimilate the message without accommodating to it. In this sense, both sender-orientation and receiver-orientation are deformations; but they are normally deformations which are prescribed by the culture.

Fig. 3. General model of communication.

In order to make sense of dialogicity (not necessarily Bakhtin's sense), we have to think of communication, not as a single, delimited act, close to a specious present, but as an extended stretch of behaviour, in which several acts take place and are reacted to, and meaning is continuously renegotiated. It is precisely because we accept too easily this view of meaning as a single, short art of give and take, that examples such as Voloshinov's "Well" (1983a) and "H'm" (1983b:

124ff), Grice's (1989: 93ff) 43 cents at the tobacconist's and Sperber & Wilson's (1983: 55) smell of gas seem to make nonsense of the rules-governedness of communication and establish meaning as something ineffable (cf. below Sonesson in press d).

In the case of verbal language, as well as various media relying it, it is easy to think of some kind of "originary" situation, in which a speaker produces sign after sign, until he has succeeded in conveying his meaning completely. This whole sequence of signs then seems to form part of the same act of communication. In some cases, common in the arts, but of course also in any written message, the sequence of signs is completed before reception takes place, so that any further sign required will be part of another act of communication. This would seem to be the normal case in visual communication. However, one may imagine the case when we make ever new and revised sketches of the street system, until our interlocutor manages to understand how he is supposed to reach our house.

The terms "system of interpretation" is used here to distinguish the emergence of meaning from *recoding*, the process of assigning new expressions to parts of signs (phonemes, graphemes, etc.), which is how letters are transferred into Morse signs, radio signals, and more recently digital coding. Recoding, just like physical transportation, is one possible, but not obligatory, part of the communicative act (cf. Fig. 3). Both serve to distinguish different modes of communication. In fact, it is precisely because recoding, unlike communication, is a simple question of equivalence, that I do not want to use the term "code" to speak about the mapping of expression to content.

The ghost out of the machine

The temporal presupposition entails another one: before the moment of sending, there is a *subject* making a decision to send. This is very clear in the case of the telegraph and other technological means: one must decide to go to the telegraph station or to open the Fax software of the home computer. There is much less clearly a preparatory stage, a phase of decision which can be separated from the act of sending, in ordinary verbal conversation, gesture, and so on. But can a subject not making the decision to send before sending properly be called a sender?

Another problem concerns the modifications of the status of sender and receiver introduced by Jakobson (1960). These terms, in Jakobson's version of the model, are amalgamations of what Shannon and Weaver call sender and source, and receiver and destination, respectively (cf. Fig. 1). In this parlance, receiver and sender are really mechanisms, such as the telegraph and the radio sender, not human beings. Jakobson and Eco do away with all the technological mediations, treating them as if they were always or never there.

Quite apart from the distinction between machines and men, however, we really need to have more instances, not less, in order to account for the complexities of sending and receiving. Several subjects are involved in the sending of a book: the writer, the editor, the editorial board, the proof-reader, the typesetter (nowadays largely identical with the writer in front of his computer), the enterprise doing the distribution, the critique, the bookseller, the one who buys the book as a present, etc. Of these intermediaries, only the critique has been given a place in the Prague school model; and a similar function is accomplished by the gate-keeper in some version of mass media studies (Cf. Sonesson 1987). Today, on the Internet, search mechanisms and portals serve as such intermediaries; but given the hyperlink structures of the Internet, any page may be, directly or indirectly, an intermediary to all the others.

Complicated cases may be cited from ancient and modern media alike. In Ancient Greece, inscriptions accompanying grave sculptures were intended to be read aloud by those who were able read, while the others were listening, and they were often written in the first person — which makes it difficult to decide who the sender is, the artist, the one reading the text, or the statue itself (Svenbro 1988). If you fetch a picture from a database somewhere out there on the Internet, it is not obvious who is the sender, the one who made the picture, the one who put it into the database, or you who pick it up. And to take a more homely example, should we not have to regard the "zapper" in front of his television set as a sender as well as a receiver of the mixture of images which he is perceiving (cf. Sonesson 1995)? In fact, the data base examples can be extended: when I use a database which I have myself set up at my home computer, I am certainly the receiver of the information, but I am also, together with the one who has created the software, a sender, or (as Bettetini et alia 1995: 191 say) a co-author.

Fortunately, there seem to be norms determining who the important sender of different kinds of messages is. The general view in our culture, for instance, is that the author is a more important sender of a book than his printer; but in some cases, as that of the critique or other avatar of the gate-keeper, the layman and the scholar take different views on the matter. In the case of ancient media, however, these norms are not always easy to recover; and they are not always fixed in the case of the new ones. There is an extreme opposition between medieval art, where the donator was the sender who counted, and modern art, where the artist is considered the sender of "ready-mades", and even, as is the case of the Swedish artist Dan Wolgers, of an exhibition, which he ordered from an advertising agency (Sonesson 1998b).

Particularly in the case of modern media, however, we are all the time confronted with cases in which it is not possible to distinguish one single — or even one most important — sender of the message communicated. In the end, however, this difficulty is perhaps not peculiar to recent media. When reflecting on the sense in which my own life is a story I tell to myself, Ricœur (1990: 189) suggests that I am myself the principal personage as well as the narrator, but only a *co-author*, or, in Aristotelian terms, the "sunaiton"; for the life which I live will be determined as much by the acts of other people and by the obstacles reality makes to my wishes, as by the plot I have written for myself. It will be remembered that Bakhtin (1990) found such a collusion of hero and author suspect, in literature if not also in life. And yet the Bakhtinean "ventriloquation" seems to describe a case in which I am only one of the authors of what I say (Bakhtin 1989; and for a more homely example Wertsch 1991: 129f, 138; as applied to photography Sonesson 1999a, c; in press d).

As was first observed in the Prague School model, and as literary historians know well, senders and receivers may even be instances embodied within the message. The possibility of filling in slots in the text now rapidly becomes accessible to everybody in the form of the false personalities you may take on when on the Internet, in particular in the case of the MUD-MOO (multi-user dungeon/mud-object-oriented), where, in extreme cases, you may appear even as part of the furniture (cf. Turtle 1995).

The Prague and Tartu models give, in some respects, a mo satisfactory account of the complexities of communication thar he Shannon & Weaver model, in so far as they add subjects and norms, and

the use of different interpretation systems, but they offer little help in the study of semiotic diversity. Also the dialogue, which is internal to both sender and receiver, according to the Bakhtin/Vygotsky model, and the transaction in which the sender and receiver are identical, but the message changes, as conceived by Lotman, add important qualifications, but fail to address the central issue (Sonesson 1995, 1996).

The basic problem of the communication model is that it is about recoding, not about original semiosis, that is, not about the emergence of meaning, but about its transformation. It tells us how letters are transferred into Morse signs, radio signals, and more recently digital coding, which really amounts to giving new expressions to parts of signs (phonemes, graphemes, etc.). It could certainly be argued that this conforms to the Peirce/Jakobson metaphor according to which meaning is a translation into other signs, but Peirce, at least, entertains the possibility of a final interpretant. In fact, all conceptions of meaning must start out from some zero-degree, however hypothetical. It has been called the Lifeworld.

The three world-wide circulations

According to Lévi-Strauss (1958: 329), there are three vast circulations going on in the world: the circulation of words, of merchandises, and of women. They are studied, in turn, by *linguistics*, *economy*, and *social anthropology*. Jakobson (1990: 19f, 460f) took this idea up and extended it: the three circulations concern messages (not only verbal signs), commodities (which comprise goods and services), and mates (men or woman as the case may be). The sciences which study these phenomena are *semiotics*, *economy*, and *social anthropology* in conjunction with *sociology*. The latter addition is perhaps not circumstantial: Lévi-Strauss is thinking about the kind of societies studied by anthropology, in which friendly relations are established between tribes by one tribe given wives to another, which then may give wives to a third one, until, in the end, the first tribe receives wives back from one or other tribe in the chain of exchange. In the societies studied by sociology, on the other hand, the circulation would rather consist in one man and one woman given themselves up to each other (or so the rhetoric goes). Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss agree that these sciences studying circulations are all part of some more general science which

they call the study of communication, but Jakobson also emphasise that they all imply the presence of language or other signs, so that, in the end, in may seem that this more general science is semiotics itself.[4]

Dan Sperber (1982) has taken exception to these parallels: while circulation is a constitutive factor of the kinship system, it is only an accidental property of language, which is essentially a repertory of messages; and when information has circulated for a sufficient time, we will all be in possession of it, but a woman or a horse which is exchanged is lost for the donor; and while language signifies by means of a code, women only acquire meaning by means of the attention being directed to them. It is easy to agree with the general drift of Sperber's argument, but sometimes he is widely off the mark. To begin with, a language which does not circulate (i.e. is not used in any acts of communication) is not much of a language; in fact, it is what we call a *dead* language (like Latin, or Hebrew until it was reborn). On the other hand, the circulation of women is certainly not constitutive *of women*. In fact, I think that, in the kinship system, women do not signify at all; it is the act of exchanging them which carries meaning. And this is certainly a difference to the exchange of signs, in which the latter carry at least the primary sense, which the exchange serves to convey. In fact, it is easy to imagine a way in which a woman, arriving from one tribe to another, does carry meaning in herself: speaking another language, having different customs, etc., she may appear as a "non-text" to the members of the receiving culture.[5] In fact, she may even carry meaning as the individual person she is: even after reducing the message to make translation possible, as Lotman (1979: 91) so nicely puts it, the message may still contain indications for reconstructing the personality of the other (cf. Sonesson 1987, 1992: 91ff).

Communication in the material sense (in the sense of the spatial metaphor rejected above) really implies that something which leaves one place is not there any more when it arrives at a second place: this is true of the train, as well of the letter which it may transport, and even of content of the latter, but not of course of the units of which the message

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[4]   In fact, Jakobsons's position as far as the different sciences goes is much less clear-cut than I suggest here; cf. the passages referred to above.

[5]   This may be to suppose to much heterogeneity between tribes which exchange women; it applies much more properly to women or men marrying into another society at the present time.

is made up (cf. Fig. 4). The circulation of women (and of mates generally) as well as of commodities suppose a double movement from one place to another: one tribe gives women to another tribe and receives women back (or a man and a woman "give themselves up" to each other); and when receiving a horse, I give money or perhaps a donkey back. But the exchange of signs is not necessarily double; it does not even necessarily imply any spatial movement in the Lifeworld. A television picture or a web page is transferred from afar but they are not perceived to move in space. It seems rather absurd to speak of the meaning of a fresco painting being transferred by circulation — though there is of course a movement of the photons from the rocky surface to the eyes of the observer. A fresco painting is an example of a sign which would certainly not remain at its place of origin if it were transferred to a museum. But the same is true of my drawing of the street systems if I send it to you by the post. As we said, it is also true of the accompanying letter, though not of its constitutive elements. However, there is a sense in which a picture postcard or a reproduction of Mona Lisa will remain at the point of origin while being sent of to some distant place (cf. Sonesson 1992: 91ff).

As a contrast and complement to the emphasis on circulation found in the semiotics of Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss, it is worth while considering, with Lotman (1976), that the *accumulation* of both information and merchandise precede their interchange and is a more elementary and more fundamental characteristic of a culture. According to Lotman, material objects and information are similar to each other, and differ from other phenomena, in two ways: they may be accumulated, whereas sleep and breathing, for example, cannot be accumulated, and they are not absorbed completely into the organism, unlike food, but remain separate objects after the reception. Here Lotman seems to treat the sign as being pure information, perhaps because he thinks mainly about verbal texts, where the material base is extremely mutable. On the contrary, a picture is as much a material object as a piece of information, as much an artefact as an object of perception. This is why we can accumulate pictures in a double sense: as material things, in the safe-deposit box of a bank, or as experiences in the mind. In both senses they maintain a certain distance with respect to our body. But it is only as an experience in the mind that they may be shared with everybody, and that they remain at the point of origin while proceeding in their circulation.

	Position of displacement A B	Final stage	Several B (endstages)	Displacement of receiver B A
Transport	a ➜ a	a at B, nothing at A	no	–
Exchange (of women, goods, etc.)	a ➜ a, b ⬅ b	a at B and b at A	no	–
Language	a ➜ a	a at A and B	possible	–
Picture postcard	a ➜ a	a at B (sometimes also at A)	no	–
Television picture, film picture	a ➜ $a^1...b^n$	$a^1...b^n$ at $A^1...B^n$ (and usually at A)	yes	film (and to some extent TV): b ⬅ b
Publicity poster	a ➜ $a^1...b^n$	$a^1...b^n$ at $A^1...B^n$	yes	b ⬅ b
Fresco painting	–	a at A	no	b ⬅ b

Fig. 4. Communication and circulation.

Some of the characteristics that Lotman attributes to information brings to memory those which are mentioned by Masuda (1980), one of the first propagandists of the information society: information is not consumable, no matter how much it is used, but it can be transferred to a new place without disappearing from the point of origin; it is not accumulated if it is not used as is the case of material goods but, on the contrary, by being used increasingly and being integrated with other information. Against Masuda as much as against Lotman it is possible to object that information must be incarnated in some type of material substance, quite apart from the fact that all access to the information depends on some material apparatuses called computers, hard discs and compact disc player. In the world of ideas the content of a book exists indefinitely; but, in reality, it evaporates with the last paper copy which moulders away or the last person that dies or forgets the content. Also computerised information is dependant on the continuous wear of the units of storage, such as floppies and hard discs.

In this sense all information goods are temporarily limited — even though some limitations can be of relatively long duration. Roland

Posner (1989) distinguishes two types of artefacts: the *transitory* ones (such as the sound of a woman's high heeled shoes against the pavement) and *enduring* ones (such as the prints that the woman's shoes may leave in clay, in particular if the latter is later dried). The transitory artefacts, in this sense, also have a material aspect, just as the lasting ones; they only have the particularity of developing in time, which is why they cannot be accumulated without first being converted. If we except the case of the animated sequences, the computer picture must be considered a lasting artefact; although it is very easy to go from a variant to another. At the same time, the computerised picture does not have the tangibility that we expect to find in an enduring artefact.

Normally, it is Posner's transitory artefacts whose development in time causes them to seem somehow "less" material (which is of course nonsense but must be taken seriously in the Lifeworld). It is easy to understand that thinkers of the Enlightenment like Diderot and Lessing could conceive of language (which they tended to imagine in its spoken form) a "more subtle material" than the picture, which endures in time (at least until air is let into the prehistoric caverns or car exhaust is allowed to devastate the frescoes of a later time). Harold Innes (1950) differentiated all cultures according as they emphasised more enduring storage media which were difficult to transport, such as stone tablets, or media which were less enduring, but easier to transport like the papyrus — in other words, according to the relative accent the cultures put on the aspect of accumulation and transport, in the sense of Lotman. In a similar way, Metz (1990) has claimed that a photograph, but not a film, could become a fetishist object, in the Freudian sense, precisely because the former has more of a material character (cf. also Sonesson 1995).

The difference between type and exemplar is described by Peirce with the terms "type" and "token" (or "replica"). In the previous phrase, for example, the word "and" appears once, considered as a type, but twice considered as a token. The letter "t" is also one type only, at the same time that only in the first sentence of the paragraph there appears eight tokens of it. This reasoning is easily extended to other systems of meaning; a reproduction of Leonard's "Mona Lisa" is of the same type as another reproduction, but they constitute two exemplars or tokens of those which exist. Considered as a totality, this article is a single type, but it will appear in as many tokens as this book is printed. As a first

approximation, it seems that it a sign the type of which provides for more than one token which may be universally shared, in the sense of Sperber and Masuda, and which may be said to remain at the point of origin while being sent out to circulate.

Yet it is not evident that the relation between type and token always is of the same kind. It seems reasonable to say that a painting first must be made in one exemplar before existing as a type; the first exemplar serves to establish the type, from which then further exemplars can be derived. In the same way, the first exemplar of an article must be written by the author, before a type is established, which then plays the role of a directive guideline for the different exemplars that are later created. In the case of phonemes, words, musical notes and so on, the procedure is different: there is not a first "l" which only then creates the type which is then repeated. It may certainly be possible to determine when a phoneme, or in any case a word, was used for the first time, but normally this is not relevant for the native speaker. And to the extent that it becomes relevant, the typicality has changed its character.

It will be convenient to distinguish between *temporarily bound* and *temporarily free* relations between type and token; in the first case but not in the second the type is established in time by means of the creation of a first exemplar (cf. Sonesson 1998a). Tokens of temporally free types may be sent off in all directions, but the types are still always available at the place of origin and elsewhere. The case of temporally bound types is more complex. Written texts are temporally bound types, but they are entirely made up of temporally free types. The scribbles made by the famous author on the back of his bar bill may remain the only tokens of their type, if they are not rescued by his editor. But once these notes make it unto the printing house, they are made available everywhere, at the bar where they were written as well as at any other place. Until recently, a picture was almost always, from the very beginning, a temporally bound typicality: whether it was a drawing or a photograph, all its elements where temporally bound — although the photograph is more easily made into a first exemplar engendering an indefinite number of tokens. With the advent of computer graphics, however, a picture is easily made from the combination of temporally free entities, whether these are items of clip-art or scanned images, or the product of algebraic formulas. This means that, also in the case of pictorial communication, both the temporally free

and the temporally bound types may give rise to an indefinite number of tokens. Thus, also pictures may still be present at the place of origin while reaching other coasts.

The distinction between temporally bound and temporally free types is not identical to the one which Goodman (1968) makes between *autographic* and *allographical* arts. Among the temporarily bound typicalities previously mentioned, the verbal text is allographic, whereas the visual work of work is traditionally autographic; in other words, the art work, but not the work of literature, is defined as to its identity as well as its value by our inherited social practice by means of its temporary association to the first exemplar created by a certain individual. This is why we do not have to queue up in front of the Stockholm National Library to read the only exemplar of "Röda Rummet" written by Strindberg, while a similar conduct is expected of us in the case of a work of visual art. The copy of the novel which we may buy at any book shop is a token of the temporally bound typicality produced by Strindberg, and so is the reproduction of Mona Lisa, which we can buy at the Louvre. But our current social practice assigns different values to these two instances of multiple tokens from one type.

To understand the decisive events of the history of the art, we have to take into account the entire hierarchy of values present in our society: the radicality of the first ready-made that Duchamp exhibited did not consist in treating a temporally free typicality as if it were a temporarily bound one. In fact, the-bottle dryer and the urinal also depend on typicalities which are temporarily bound. They are founded on some kind of prototype. The difference is to be found in the different values attributed to the first exemplar that creates the type in the production of the object of use and the work of art. By signing the urinal (with a false name, to be sure), Duchamp did not only transform a temporally bound type with an indefinite number of tokens into a type having only one token, but he also transmuted an allographic entity into an autographic one. And this is were the adventure of Modernist art begins: very soon (thanks to Linde), Duchamp's urinal becomes a type engendering new tokens. But to exist as art it still needs autography — the signature of the author.

Norms as normativity and normality

We will suppose that, as soon as there is a meaning, or something which could be taken as a meaning, there is a corresponding act of communication; or rather, as we said above, a double act, of creation, on the part of the sender or "addresser"; and of interpretation or concretisation, on the part of the addressee. It should be obvious that interpretation, as the term is used here, is much more general in import than in the usage of most literary critics and other interpreters of works of art. The latter mostly seem to be involved with cases in which interpretations becomes problematic, in which the trajectory from expression to content is not straightforward, but rather has to overturn obstacles to reach its goal. For my part, I don't think there is any solid reason for postulating any absolute limit between problematic and straightforward tasks of interpretation. I also suppose that some tasks of interpretation which are problematic and/or complex do not involve art, and vice versa. Indeed, in my view, all interpretation takes its point of departure in the ongoing practice of the everyday world, and never stops being continuous with that very practice: there is thus no special kind of interpretation in the aesthetic sciences. This is also why I do not believe interpretation by "qualified" interpreters such as literary critics and art critics, or even historians of literature or art, to be different in principle from that made by laymen; it only supposes a longer and more self-reflective scrutiny, or so it is to be hoped.

From semiosis to communication

In order to reconstruct the notion of culture in anthropology, Posner (1989), in his interesting systematisation of cultural semiotics, makes use of the model of communication derived from the mathematical theory of information (Cf. Fig. 1), in addition to the Tartu school concepts. In relation to the standard version of the communication model, however, Posner introduces two new elements: he ascribes an intention to the sender; and he splits the message into the two levels of the sign, signifier and signifier. In this sense, there is *communication*, when a *sender*, who finds himself in a *context*, intends to convey a *message*, consisting of a *signifier* and a *signified* correlated by *a code*, to an *addressee*, with whom he is connected by means of a *medium*.

The addressee then uses his knowledge of the code and the context to interpret the message.

Interestingly, Posner argues that *semiosis* (the process corresponding to a sign) is something wider than communication. Only a medium, a sign or a message, a context and a recipient are necessary for semiosis to occur. This means that there are two reduced cases of the communication model, which may or may not be combined. Sign processes involving no sender are called *signification*; and since there is no one around intending to communicate, the addressee is transformed into a mere recipient. Sign processes which function without a code, i.e. without any standard, conventional or innate, for correlating expression and content, are called *indication.*

Consider some of the examples given by Posner to illustrate the notion of signification, i.e. semiosis without a sender: red spots on the skin taken by the doctor as symptoms of measles; and the silhouette of a person with a skirt taken by Europeans as a sign of a woman. These examples seem to me rather problematic. In the first one, we recognise Grice's (1989: 213ff) favourite case of "non-natural meaning", which also lacks a sender. Elsewhere, I have argued that the symptoms, such as those of measles, are not signs in the full sense of the term (Sonesson 1989: 17f). The expression consists of a string of features, each one of which establishes the content more firmly, i.e. with more probability.[6] Symptoms suppose only a provisional differentiation of expression and content (cf. Piaget's criteria referred to below): when the expression in its entirety is given, the content is also given. Indeed, an illness is nothing else than the complete set of its symptoms, the last one of which may be death.

The second example is rather different, yet it is similar in not supposing any clear differentiation of expression and content. When the silhouette of a person with a skirt is used to indicate the woman's rest room, or to signify woman in Blissymbolics, expression and content are quite separate, but then the nature of the semiotic systems are such that we tend to ascribe intentionality to their use as a matter of course. At the other extreme, there is the case in which we meet a person who wears a skirt and conclude from this fact (probably along with several

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[6] This is why I find Grice's (1989: 213) claim that "those spot meant measles" entail "he had measles" dubious, if it is not justified by the retrospective view taken.

other factors) that she must be a woman. It could be argued that, here again, expression and content are not clearly differentiated: the skirt being a sign of being a woman is secondary to its being part of being a woman (this does not apply to a man, transsexual or other, who puts on a skirt, but then again this is a clear case in which we would ascribe an intention to the sign). In an article in which I discuss differences between the Occidental clothing system and the Mesoamerican one, I have suggested that for the Mesoamerican women to don a *quechquémitl* or a *huipil* is not to signify anything, but when young women studying anthropology in Mexico City do the same thing, their apparel is a sign which is both clearly differentiated and intentional: its says something like "I am a radical person who is in favour of the self-determination of indigenous people" (Sonesson 1993b). Posner rather seems to think about seeing the shadow of a person from afar and concluding from the contours opening up below the waist that it must be a woman, which would account for this being our only clue to the sex of the person in question. Seen in this way, the case does not seem to be so different from the former one.

These examples therefore seem to suggest that semiosis without a sender is also a process in which expression and content are not clearly differentiated; or rather, in which this differentiation is operated very provisionally by the receiver, only for the purpose of interpretation. If this is so, the decision to rename the addressee into the recipient may not have been an altogether happy one, for while it is true that there is no one addressing the interpreter here, the latter is actually far from passive, as is suggested by the new term. Rather, this is the case in which the interpreter comes into his own, a case, we might say, in which the process seems to be initiated on the "receiving" end. The receiver is not only a co-sender, but in fact the only one.

There may be cases of "pure" interpretation, in this sense, but most cases are probably rather indeterminate on this scale. Consider again the case of clothing discussed above: it is true, in a sense, as a suggested above, that the Mesoamerican women do not wear a *huipil* or a *quechquémitl* or whatever, to signify something: but we know that the choice of one or another, or some combination, as well as the pattern on the cloths, originally (and to some extent even today) served to separate different tribal groups. So we can postulate some kind of *Ursituation* in which the leaders of the tribe decided (probably not very explicitly) to wear their cloths in such a way that they are dif-

ferentiated from members of other tribes. Something similar could apply to Occidental women in relation to skirts (more so, perhaps, at a time when trousers first became a possible alternative). We are confronted with cases of *remote intentionality*.

Next, let us consider the examples of indication, or semiosis without a code, given by Posner. In some cases, according to Posner, codeless semiosis is also sender-less, as is the scratching noise in a conference room which is taken by the audience as a sign that the microphone is in operation, or a person crossing the main street taken by the driver in a side street as a sign of there being no fast traffic in that part of the main street. In other cases, semiosis without a code may have a sender, as when a man intentionally imitates the involuntary body movements of a woman in order to express his sympathy with her. Finally, some sender-less sign processes may follow a code, such as when the doctor diagnoses an illness, or when we classify an abandoned piece of clothing as a skirt or a dinner-jacket.

It will be noted that Posner here generalises the notion of code (in the sense of our system of interpretation) from the ordinary meaning of being a conventional standard correlating expression and content, to include also those correlations which are somehow innately given to human beings. However, I have been unable to find any examples of the latter in Posner's article. Perhaps he would like to say that the symptoms are "innately" connected to the illness which they signify: but, clearly, what allows the doctor to make a diagnosis it not any biological fact as such, but some regularities which he (or rather, earlier physicians) have been able to observe, between the presence of certain symptoms and a particular illness. The standard of correlation in this case is thus neither innate nor conventional, at least in the sense of a correlation being postulated between expression and content.

But precisely this kind of observed regularity seems to be present in the other cases which Posner claims to occur without a code. For instance, we know that the scratching noise in the microphone signifies it is working, because we have observed that at some earlier stage; and the person crossing the main road signifies that it is free from traffic precisely because we have observed that relationship earlier (or rather, it is an interpretation based on our anticipation of coherence). The skirt as a sign of a woman is certainly also an observation made in a particular Lifeworld, rather than an explicit convention. Indeed, even the imitation of a woman's involuntary movements to signify sympa-

thy only can be meaningful if we have observed such imitation to convey sympathy beforehand.[7]

In many other contexts, I have suggested that meaning starts out from that which is normal, i.e., expected to occur, rather than that which is normative, i.e. prescribed. Husserl talks about "the normal way of behaviour which things have" (Cf. Sonesson 1994a, b; 1996a, b). Indeed, Peirce had a name for interpretation based on that which is normal in the world of our experience: *abduction*. We start from a single fact and conclude to another single fact based on a regularity which is merely taken for granted. Thus, for instance, in Peirce's example, we know that somebody is a sailor because he walks in a way which we have come to expect of sailors. This seems to be exactly the same kind of regularity occurring in the world taken for granted which appears in most of Posner's examples.

Contrary to Posner, then, we will talk about a system of interpretation each time there is a standard of correlation between expression and content, based on some regularity, something which is or can be repeated all over again. This standard may be based on convention, observation or innate relationships. It seems to me, however, that an innate correlation could only be the foundation of a relationship of interpretation, to the extent that is becomes conscious as such.

Like our earlier discussion of semiosis without a sender, this one has had the effect of shifting the initiative from the sender to the receiver or, better, to the interpreter. For the "code", in the sense of an observed regularity, is something which is contributed by the interpreter (although a member of some interpretative community), not some shadowy creator. Rather than considering semiosis without a sender as a degenerative case of semiosis, we should start from the other end. Given the Prague school model of communication, for instance, we should allow for cases in which concretisation precedes the artefact, in the sense of being the first thing making it into an artefact,

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[7]   The example is curious, because what we know from the study of nonverbal interaction, is that we tend to unintentionally repeat the movements and positions of those persons with whom we feel sympathy. This then would be a case of an "innate" standard of correlation between signifier and signified. A man who imitates a woman's movements intentionally would only be able to do it based on an observation of such unconsciously produced regularities.

as happens when phases of an on-going process are singled out as expressions of later stages (Cf. Fig 2 and 3).

The pragmatic fallacy

In the following, I intend to take exception to the currently reigning model in the analysis of meaning, usually known as the "pragmatic model", in order to suggest that semiotics is a better alternative. It may certainly seem strange to oppose semiotics and pragmatics. One of the two well-known pioneers of semiotics, Charles Sanders Peirce, called his own philosophical stance pragmatism (and later pragmaticism). And even the term pragmatics itself originated as a subdivision of semiotics, proposed by Morris with reference to what he understood to be the dimensions of the Peircean sign. The point is not whether Morris understood Peirce correctly. The problem really begins when Morris's tripartition is taken oven by Carnap: the third part becomes what Bar-Hillel has characterised as "the pragmatic waste-basket", the place where you put problem you cannot or will not resolve. It seems to me that, even today, after Grice and Searle, pragmatics essentially remains as "waste-basket". In order to get rid of this overflowing waste-basket, however, we may have to tolerate a little more disorder on the desktop.[8]

While Bar-Hillel may have been preoccupied by the lack of formalisation, what worries me is the absence of explanatory power: "pragmatic" approaches leaves as a complete mystery how meaning is conveyed.[9] Semiotics, on the other hand, is about *how* something means, over and above *what* something means. So while it may be better to speak about the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic dimensions of a meaningful event, instead of three different sciences (as suggested by Eco 1992: 283ff), analysis will only be complete when

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[8] In the most thorough attempt to define the limits of semantics and pragmatics I know of, Levinson (1983: 5ff) has to admit he is unable to do so. Even his half-hearted suggestions that it can be done by defining semantics are merely "truth-functional" breaks down, when he later observes (p. 122ff) that implicaturs must have access to a much richer semantic interpretation.

[9] It is true that this is not always the case in the study of implications (cf. Levinson 1983: 97ff); it must be admitted that Sperber & Wilson (1986) sometimes go to great lengths to find the missing expression.

the pragmatic dimension has been resolved into the semantics of another semiotic system. Thus we can give all semiotic systems their due, without unduly privileging verbal language; and we will be able to explain the *how* of meaning, not just its presence.

In the following, I will take "pragmatics" (or, better, "contextualism") to be the idea that meaning is not the result of some general standard of interpretation, but is produced in a context, understood as some peculiar co-ordinates of time and space, and resulting from the specific intentions an individual brings to such a context.[10] Semiotics, then, is the opposite idea, according to which there is always some kind of regularity which accounts for the possibility of meaning being conveyed, and intentions are only part of the content present in certain types of signs. The claim for the semiotical character of the present model rest on its being derived from the basic concept of the sign. In the present context, it is of no avail whether we follow the Peircean or the Saussurean tradition: indeed, we are concerned with such basic properties of the sign that we could even refer to proto-semiotic work antedating both Peirce and Saussure. For the same reason, the model to be suggested is not vulnerable to the critique of the sign voiced inside semiotics, as, for instance, by Greimas and Eco: the sign, in our sense, is not necessarily static but could be seen as more of a process; and the expression plane of the sign is not necessarily continuous and perfectly delimited.

A sign, then, in our sense, consists of an expression and a content, which form a unity of inter-defining terms, and it is linked to a (potential) referent in the outside world. The trouble is that, as far as I have been able to discover, all semiotical traditions take the terms "expression" and "content" as givens. Elsewhere, I have tried to define these terms, with extensive help from Husserl and Landgrebe, on one hand, and Piaget, and the other (cf. Sonesson 1989: 49ff, 193ff). The expression is that which is directly given without being thematic, while the content is indirectly given and thematic. Normally, expression and content are discontinuous, both in the sense of being felt to represent different categories, and in the sense of the one not going over into the other in space or time. This accounts for what, following

[10]   This seems to me to be true of most currents of contemporary hermeneutics, as well as of speech act analysis and much of linguistic pragmatics; and it is also true, as we will see, of at least some formulations due to the Bakhtin circle.

cognitive psychology, we will call the *prototype* of the sign: the central instance of the category. But as some of these criteria fail to apply, we go continuously over to meanings which are less signs, or not signs at all. As we know from genetic psychology (cf. Sonesson 1992), such as transition happens in the development of the child, even though it may never had happened in ontogeny (as claimed by Sperber & Wilson 1986: 53, 258). The symptom model of the sign, which may be relevant to perception, if not entirely to pictures, can be described as the case in which the complete series of expressions is equivalent to the content (cf. Sonesson 1989: 17f, 1992a). The domain of interpretation is thus wider than the prototypical sign.

So far it may seem that at least the prototypical sign concords with what Sperber & Wilson call "the code model"; but this model clearly supposes the connection between expression and content to be a convention, which is something which I see no reason to accept. In the following, I will allow the standards of interpretation to be based on iconic and indexical links, as well as symbolic ones; and, contrary to what Sperber & Wilson imply, I think most semioticians would do the same today. In this respect, I certainly side with the Peircean tradition, rather than the Saussurean one, at least as the latter was interpreted by the French Structuralists and their contemporaries, such as Eco, in the seventies.[11] But it should not be forgotten that there is a venerable semiotic tradition, before Peirce and Saussure, for distinguishing different kinds of "grounds" making something into a sign (cf. Deely 1982; Manetti 1993).

Given this general concept of the sign, an act of interpretation can be seen as process in which something (an expression) is taken as evidence for the presence of something else (a content and, beyond that, a referent). In the case of verbal language, it is easy to think of some kind of "originary" situation, in which a speaker produces sign after sign, until the evidence for his meaning is complete, as manifested by the hearer. This whole sequence of signs then seems to form part of the same act of interpretation. In some cases, common in the arts, the sequence of signs is completed before reception takes place, so that any further sign required will be part of another act of interpretation. In non-verbal semiotic systems, its more difficult to establish an originary act of communication. Thus, in the case of visual

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[11]   This was actually the main point of Sonesson 1989.

communication, it is possible to think of the case when we make ever new or revised sketches of the street systems, until our interlocutor understands how he is going to reach our house. But this is a marginal situation: the normal case, in visual communication, rather seems to be the foreclosed series.

Two observations are in order: meaning is here, if not defined by, at least essentially dependant on, being seen from *the point of view of the hearer* or, more generally, the addressee. This is a conception which is implied by the Peircean sign model, and more generally by Peirce's idea that everything is addressed to another subject (cf. Colapietro 1989); it is also clearly built into the Prague school model of communication (see Sonesson 1992: 100ff). Grice (1989: 352f) has objected to such a characterisation, on the ground that hearer's meaning would have to refer to speaker's meaning. It is however a basic postulate of the view defended here, that both speaker's meaning and hearer's meaning are relative to the meaning of the signs. But even if we should go along with Grice in taking speaker's meaning as primary, the point of view of the hearer is important. A speaker may very well mean something in the sense of having an opinion; but he can only mean something in the sense of conveying a meaning, if there is somebody to which this meaning is conveyed (at least potentially). It is true, of course, that we all know, "semioticians included" (as Sperber & Wilson 1986: 24 put it) what the speaker's intentions are, in general, what counts. But it is not only the case, as Peirce tells us (quoted in Colapietro 1989: 105) that "it is much safer to define all mental characters as far as possible in terms of their outward manifestation"; in communication, it is the very business of the mental characters to become outwardly manifested.

The second observation is that, in characterising the sign from the point of view of the addressee, we have described something which sounds very much like *inference.* Within the semiotic tradition, signs have often been seen as inferences (cf. Manetti 1993), Peirce, of course, distinguished three types, induction, deduction, and, most notably, abduction. We can even enlist the support of Grice (1989: 349ff), who suggests that the two meaning concepts he describes may share the property of being consequences. On the other hand, Sperber & Wilson (1986: 13) claim all kinds of ills will come out of confusing signs and inferences; the former, they say, are "not warranted". In the case of the symptom model, which we described above, such a distinc-

tion cannot be maintained: indeed, it is probably because they fail to note the peculiarities of the linguistic situation of communication which we mentioned above, that Sperber & Wilson wants to maintain the distinctions between the "code" and the inferences.

Thus far, we have been able to side with Grice, but now we must part company with him. The common sense dogma which is at the heart of pragmatics as a current of thinking is formulated by Grice (1989: 340) as the second part of his fourth strand: "what words means is a matter of what people mean by them". In one sense this is trivially true: in all communication, as was suggested above, the addressee is directed to the intentions of the addresser. But there is no way for the addressee to reach these intentions other than by means of some kind of sign which conveys them, either the sign of interpretation, or some other sign interpreted for the sake of the first sign. And it is from these basis that the varieties of interpretation may be adequately distinguished.

The Context as Another Text

One of the properties which characterises the speech act (or "pragmatist") approach is the reliance on context for the determination of meaning, to the detriment of rules and regularities. I will examine, first, some examples given by Voloshinov, which seem to me to embody the extreme case of the pragmatist approach;[12] and then I will suggest that more well-known cases cited by Grice and his followers can be treated in the same manner.

The first example offered by Voloshinov (1983a: 10ff; cf. 1986) involves two persons sitting together in the room in silence, whereupon one of them utters the single word "Well", without receiving any answer from the other. Taken in isolation, Voloshinov claims, this utterance is completely void and meaningless. Even if we add that the intonation of the word was indignantly reproachful, but softened with a touch of humour, we are not much advanced. In order to interpret the utterance, we have to acquire knowledge about the spatial purview common to both speakers, as well as of their common knowledge and

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[12] It seems evident to me that Voloshinov is not just a pen-name for Bakhtin (for which see now also Morison & Emerson 1991), but on this particular issue the position of both men seem rather close. Cf. Bakhtin 1986.

understanding of the circumstances, and their evaluation of those circumstances. In this case, it so happens that they are seated in front of a window, and that when looking out of it they discover that it is snowing. They both know that it is May, which, in Russia, means that they are in their right to expect spring to begin. Finally, they are both longing for the beginning of spring and they are sick and tired of winter. Given these circumstances, Voločinov maintains, the meaning of the utterance becomes completely clear.

The second example is interesting because Voloshinov (1983b: 124ff) here presents us with two sets of circumstances which could be referred to the same utterance giving it different meanings (and because, in some ways, it is a dialogue). However, what recurs in both these situations is not entirely verbal, either (although Voloshinov fails to mention this fact): a man with a grey beard, sitting at a table, says, after a minute's silence, "H'm", after which a young man who stands in front of him flushes deeply, turns around and goes away. In one case, this event takes place at an examiner's table, and the examinee has just answered wrongly on one of the simplest questions put to him. Although the examiner's reproachful utterance contains some sympathy, the examinee feels ashamed and goes away. In the second case, the event takes place at a cash-desk, where a cashier hands over a fat bundle of notes, the winnings, making his utterance with a slightly envious admiration.

Voloshinov's claim is that there is nothing constant in these situations apart from the expression plane of the word (excluding even the intonation and other paralinguistic features). The same expression has "totally different meanings" (1983b: 126). The idea of there being an system of normatively identical language forms which the individual consciousness finds ready-made results from linguistics having mostly studied dead languages (1983c: 35, 42). For the speaker a linguistic form is important not as a stable and self-identical signal, but as an ever changeable and flexible sign. Signals are recognised, but understanding requires something much more than recognition (1983c: 40f).[13]

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[13] In other passages, Voloshinov (as well as the late Bakhtin 1986), actually tries to steer between the Scylla of "abstract objectivism" (Saussure) and the Charybdis of "individualistic subjectivism" (Spitzer, Croce), but the quoted passages are in contradiction to this goal. However, we are not interested in

The most obvious objection to Voloshinov's examples is that they are in no way typical of the use of verbal language, nor, indeed of any other semantically rich semiotic system (such as pictures, for instance). In both cases, the same message could be delivered by much more elementary means: by a grunt or some other non-linguistic sound (which is perhaps how "H'm" should be classified), by some gesture, or even by simply turning the gaze in some particular direction. It seems rather strange to speak about signs as something in which the only constant element is the expression (which then is not even an expression, properly speaking) and about signals when recognition is required (which supposes a mapping from expression to something else, i.e. a content). Indeed, what Voloshinov here describes seems much closer to phonemes, graphemes and other elements of the second articulation (in which case the repetition on the expression plane does not entail any repetition of the content plane). In no typical situation of communication, either in language or in pictures, could the constant element on the content side by so reduced. Not even an "abstract" picture would seem to carry so little content.

Another objection would be to say that examples such as these make for a very poor start in the study of literature or art in general, indeed, in the study of any "text" which is made to be interpreted outside of the context of its production, even such a "speech genre of ordinary language" (as Bakhtin 1986 would have said) as a letter. In the case of written language, according to a famous Plato quote, the "father" of the text is normally not around to attend to his "child"; and, in the case of other semiotic systems, such as pictures, this is the normal case, as we suggested above. That is why contexts must either be rendered as text, that is, circumstances must be transformed into a part of the utterance, or the message must be of such a kind that it can be interpreted without knowledge of attendant circumstances. In fact, what Voloshinov himself does in the articles quoted is precisely to follow the first procedure.[14]

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interpreting Voloshinov here, but in giving an extreme example of the pragmatist model.

[14] Indeed, in Voloshinov's second situation, as I noted above, what is constant in the two versions is not only the verbal signs, but signs of several other semiotic systems, such as the beard, the sitting position, the minute of silence, etc.

The basic objection, however, is of a different order, because it will apply not only to the extreme case of pragmatism, as exemplified by the Bakhtin circle, but to all pragmatist approaches. It consists in saying that meaning is still, in these descriptions, of the order of generality, i.e. it involves constant elements which can be repeated, or "iterated", tokens which must be referred to a type. Consider the case of the spatial purview: the point here is precisely that what can be seen by both parties to the conversation is the same. Of course, it is impossible for two persons to see exactly the same environment, even in a purely physical sense, as Bakhtin (1990), along with Husserl and Schütz (1964, 1967), has forcefully demonstrated. But there is a sense in which they may be said to see the same-for-the-purpose-of-the-conversation, and it is precisely this which explains that Voloshinov is able to render this element in his description of the situation. The identical argument applies to the "common knowledge" and the "common evaluation" involved in the situation. There is something which is repeated from the first to the second participant in the conversation, and it is precisely this which is repeated a third time by Voloshinov interpreting the situation. Context is not some mystical communion between speaker and listener: it consists of iterable elements stemming from other semiotic systems than language.

What has been said so far about the examples given by the Bakhtin circle also apply to those of Grice and his followers. In once case, Grice (1989: 93ff) goes to his regular tobacconist (from whom he also purchases other goods) for a pack of his regular brand of cigarettes, and instead of saying anything, he puts down the sum of 43 cents, which is the price of the pack, on the counter. The tobacconist understands want Grice wants and hands him the pack. In this case, Grice claims, he has meant something ("non-naturally", I suppose), which he had not in case he had put down the money on the counter only to demonstrate that he was in possession of the sum necessary for buying the pack. This example obviously supposes that none of the other goods which Grice is in the habit of buying from his tobacconist have the cost of 43 cents. It is possible, of course, that Grice has already bought something else having this price, but then it has not been one of those things he *habitually* buys. So, in this example, the gesture of putting down a particular sum on the counter only means something because there is a regular connection, known to Grice and the tobacconist, between the sum and the pack of cigarettes. It so happens that

the relation between the sum and the product is conventionally assigned; but what makes the connection meaningful here is the observation of a regularity in the behaviour of Grice.[15]

Next, consider an example from Sperber & Wilson (1986: 55). When Peter opens the door to their apartment, Mary stops and sniffs ostensibly. Following her example, Peter notices that there is a smell of gas. What Mary does, according to Sperber & Wilson, can be paraphrased as "There is a smell of gas". On another occasion, Mary and Peter have just arrived at the seaside. Mary opens the window overlooking the sea and sniffs ostensibly. In this case, Sperber & Wilson maintains, there is no one particular thing which Mary may be said to mean. In fact, however, I think it is reasonable to say that Mary does the some thing on both occasions: by exaggerating the movements associated with smelling, she manages to frame off the movement, so that it appears as an iconic sign of what is would otherwise be. This gesture means "There is a smell worthy of notice". No doubt the kinds of things we expect to smell at our doorstep and from a hotel room overlooking the beach are appreciably different. It could actually be argued that both stories correspond to type situations, which we have all experienced many times, if not in life so at least at the cinema, so that we will immediately know what kinds of smells are being referred to.

Let us know consider at somewhat more subtle example. In his Memories, a prime minister of Sweden in the last century, Louis De Geer, tells us about the circumstances in which he found out that his future wife, Caroline Wachtmeister, returned his love. He tells her that he finds the summer residence of her family so enchanting, that he could quite understand if she never wanted to leave it. After a moments reflection, she answers him: "The people here are more dear to me than the place itself". This answer, together with the fact that she hesitates before giving it, inspires in De Geer the conviction that she loves him: she would not hesitate to leave the place with somebody she loves, and she would not admit this to somebody she did not like. Pettersson (1990: 60f), who retells this story, concludes that "communication is not an end in itself". The question, however, is how all

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[15] I fail to see the point of saying that, in the other instance, nothing is meant. Of course, the message that Grice wants a particular brand of cigarettes has apparently been conveyed in some other way. But there must be some factor, for instance, in the attitude of the tobacconist, which makes the showing of the money mean "I have money".

this is conveyed by Miss Wachtmeister's answer. For my part, I would certainly had drawn the opposite conclusion from the one De Geer does. So either De Geer is making a wild guess, which, for all we know, turns out to be correct; or there is some regularity, either in the behaviour of upper class people at the time, or in Miss Wachtmeister's own behaviour, which justifies his conclusion. So, once again, meaning is only possible because there is a regularity.

Neither the Bakhtin circle, nor any other "pragmatist" seems to me to have any rival theory to offer about how interpretation is possible. If meaning does not rely on constant elements, in fact, if it includes something beyond constant elements, it is not clear in which way interpretation in the common sense world differs from telepathy or god-sent illumination. Bakhtin, it is true, proposes at least two elements of a rival theory, but, contrary to what he seems to think, they are only partial and no substitute for a theory built on rules-governed interpretation.

The first element has to do with that which first made Bakhtin famous in the West, the idea underlying Kristeva's notion of *inter-textuality* as the meaning derived from the relationship to some other texts being recognisable as the background of the text to be interpreted. Thus, for instance, Bakhtin (1982: 401) observes that "every discourse has its own selfish and biased proprietor; there are no words 'belonging to no one'." A text which refers to another text, either by simply reproducing it, or by somehow modifying it, thus depends for its interpretation on the identification of this other text. It is true that, unlike Kristeva and her followers, Bakhtin is not interested in the relationship between the given text and another particular text by a named author: before the passage quoted above, he speaks about the language of priests, of peasants, etc., and elsewhere he refers to standardised phrases, maxims, familiar sayings, and the like. Once he even tells us that the reference to another particular author in a text is of little interest.[16] From this point of view, Bakhtin's conception is quite different from the familiar reduction of his idea to the traditional study of influences.

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[16]   In Sonesson 1994c I tried to transplant "intertextuality" to "picture depictions", which I construed as consisting of a recognisable picture which was the referent and some kind of "commentary". Thus, I also failed to note that the essential issue for Bakhtin did not involve individual cases.

However, neither the traditional study of influences, nor the dialogicity between texts which interests Bakhtin, are what they seem to be: they are both possible kinds of interpretation, because they operate on the level of *types*, not tokens, i.e. they depend on our recognition of constant elements. Indeed, what Bakhtin here refers to is the repertory of standard phrases which Merleau-Ponty (1971) — erroneously, of course — identifies with Saussure's concept of "langue". But Merleau-Ponty's confusion is understandable, to the extent that these phrases are types, not tokens, and the same is actually true of any work of art. Above, I have noted the different nature of two kinds of types, the *temporally free types*, such as phonemes, words, and syntactic patterns, which are not experienced as having an origin in time, and the *temporally bound types*, such as a novel or a painting, in which case the first token produces the type at a particular moment in time and space, after which more tokens may be derived from the type (cf. Sonesson 1998a). Only in the second case does the sign really "belong to someone".[17]

Thus, it seems we will have to distinguish two levels of generality, the element of the system which is not dated, and the token which is felt to repeat a dated type. Bakhtin's second proposal is in fact explicitly concerned with generality, and it is more of the order of our first type of typicality: the *speech genres*. Although he insists that utterances are always individual, Bakhtin (1986) claims that we have access to "*relatively stable types*" (his italics) of utterances, which permit us to determine, at one stroke, words, syntax, context, social relations, set of values, sense of time and space, possible actions, and so on. These speech genres do not only correspond to well-known literary forms as the novel and the poem, but also include smaller com-

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[17] Of course, words, and even phonemes, have their origin in time (and space), but that is not relevant in the process of interpretation. It is also true, as Bakhtin and, in particular, Voloshinov would have said, that "standard language" can be seen as being imposed on everybody by a particular class or other social group, in which case it also "belongs to someone". But only in a case where this is felt to be true by the speakers of the language would the question whose voice standard language incarnates be relevant to interpretation.

binations of linguistic elements of which these, as well as everyday conversation, are made up.[18]

Bakhtin is of course not the only one to talk about the importance of genres to interpretation: both Hirsch and Gombrich have made the same observation. Indeed, Danto's famous example of the telephone book being presented as a work of visual art is of this kind, although it is not clear what the clues to this sea-change would be. But in the real world, Duchamp's presentation of the urinal as a art-object is precisely this kind of genre shift, which is operated by its being placed in a particular place, the art gallery, in which particular genre conventions apply (cf. Sonesson 1992, 1996a). The uproar about the Benetton publicity was due to the fact that pictures containing internal cues for news photographs were presented in a frame which categorised them as advertisements. But the important fact is that, in all these cases, meaning is only possible, because there is a regularity, which, given one element, makes us expect another.[19]

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[18] These two types of typicality, to the exclusion of anything similar to the language system, is normally what we find in pictures.

[19] For more discussion of pragmatics versus semiotics, see Sonesson in press d.

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Жизнь знаков в обществе и вне его: критика критики коммуникации

Ставится вопрос о модели коммуникации, которая соответствовала бы рассмотрению культуры в текстуальном аспекте, тому, каким образом соотносятся общие свойства коммуникации и семиозиса.

из этого, рассматриваются пространство, время, позиция субъекта, роли интерпретиции и нормы и т.п. в процессе коммуникации, имея в виду и сравнивая линвистическую, экономическую и антропологическую циркуляции. Подчеркивается, что в моделях коммуникации под особым вниманием оказывается трансформация смысла, а не его создание. Сравнивается подход к проблемам коммуникации в работах тартуско-московской и пражской школ и в трудах Бахтина и Волошинова.

Märkide elu ühiskonnas ja väljaspool seda: kommunikatsioonikriitika kriitika

Püstitatakse küsimus, milline on see kommunikatsiooni mudel, mis sobiks kokku kultuuri tekstuaalse käsitlusega, ehk kuidas suhestuvad kommunikatsiooni ja semioosise üldised omadused. Sellest lähtudes vaadeldakse ruumilisust, ajalisust, subjekti positsiooni, interpretatsiooni ja normi rolli jm. kommunikatsioonis, silmas pidades ja võrreldes lingvistilist, majanduslikku ja antropoloogilist tsirkulatsiooni. Rõhutatakse, et kommunikatsiooni mudeleis on tähelepanu all tähenduse transformatsioon, mitte selle loomine. Võrreldakse kommunikatsiooni käsitlust Tartu ja Praha koolkondades ning Bahtini ja Voloshinovi töödes.

On the history of joining *bio* with *semio*: F. S. Rothschild and the biosemiotic rules

Kalevi Kull

A belief, in biology, that signification is the process which may provide a key to understanding the specifics of life has arisen here and there during almost a century and through communication between scientists it has grown into biosemiotics. From the side of semiotics, the search for the origins of sign has also led to animals and other organisms, so that some have started to speak about the paradigmatic shift in semiotics which took place in the 1980s (particularly due to T. A. Sebeok's contributions in semiotics; cf. also Mandelker 1994).

Biosemiotics as a discipline, as a field, was born not much earlier than at the beginning of the 1990s, since this is the decade, when the name was taken into use in the titles of books and conferences, when an international society-like group of people appeared who regularly met and made attempts to approximate to each other's terminology, when the first university courses on the subject appeared, and when the history of the field was first reviewed (or built and constructed).

Biosemiotics as a domain, of course, has existed already much earlier, at least since the first decades of this century — as its history clearly shows (Kull 1999a; Wuketits 1998; Sebeok 2000).

Appearance of the term *biosemiotics*

In 1962, the *Annals of New York Academy of Sciences* published a paper by F. S. Rothschild, which includes the following statement:

> This approach presupposes acceptance of our position that the history of subjectivity does not start with man, but that the human spirit was preceded by many preliminary stages in the evolution of animals. The symbol theory of psychophysical relation bridges the gulf between these

disparate avenues of research and unites their methods under the name of *biosemiotic*. We speak of biophysics and biochemistry whenever methods used in the chemistry and physics of lifeless matter are applied to material structures and processes created by life. In analogy we use the term biosemiotic. It means a theory and its methods which follows the model of the semiotic of language. It investigates the communication processes of life that convey meaning in analogy to language. (Rothschild 1962: 777)

The definition as given in that paper shows that the scope and the importance of the domain as described by Rothschild corresponds to the meaning of 'biosemiotics' as it has been used later (by the scientists who had not read his writings), for instance in a big collective work under this title (Sebeok & Umiker-Sebeok, 1992). Similarly, Rothschild (1962: 775) claimed that "Protozoa, invertebrates, vertebrates, and finally man appear as four developmental stages of subjectivity. In each stage a new sign system overlays the already established ones and makes the unfolding of a new and higher level of experience possible."

In the biosemiotic literature, published since then in *Semiotica* and in other international semiotic periodicals, F. S. Rothschild's name can not be found. Most frequently, J. S. Stepanov's book of 1971 has been mentioned as the first which uses the term 'biosemiotics', although Rothschild introduced it almost ten years earlier.

An endemic semiotician:
Life and work of F. S. Rothschild (1899–1995)

When discovering Jakob von Uexküll for the field of semiotics, T. Sebeok has called him a cryptosemiotician. This is a class of semiotists, "who need themselves to become aware of the perspective that semiotic affords or whose work needs to be by others reclaimed and re-established from within that perspective" (Deely 1990: 119–120; Rauch 1983). Can we say that now we have a similar situation with Rothschild? Seemingly not, since he knew semiotics and applied it; there was simply no information exchange between him and other biosemioticians. Accordingly, we need to add a fourth class (in addition to the proto-, crypto- and ordinary semioticians) to Rauch's (1984) classification — the *endemic* semioticians. This is a branch of normal good scientists, about whom nobody in the field knows. Or a

small scientific group, who are developing the field on their own, publishing in journals which are not read by their colleagues in other countries.[1]

Friedrich Salomon Rothschild was born on December 17, 1899, in Giessen, Germany. Between 1918 and 1923, he studied medicine in the Universities of Giessen and München, specialising in medical psychology and psychiatry. From 1925 to 1928, he worked in Heidelberg with psychotherapist Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (1889–1957) and psychoanalyst Erich Fromm (1900–80), and from 1928 to 1933 in Frankfurt with neuroanatomist and clinician Kurt Goldstein (1878–1965). At that time, he was influenced by the philosophy of Ludwig Klages (1872–1956) and held a correspondence with him.[2] As, according to Klages, "*alles Leben beseelt ist*", the development of subjectivity over the evolution of living organisms became an interest of Rothschild.

During his studies in Frankfurt, Rothschild came to an idea that the structure and excitations of the brain can be seen as symbols of mental content and mental processes. As he later (1989: 192) wrote about this occasion: "Eines Tages, als ich über die Seitenkreuzungen der Fasern im Gehirn eines Tieres las, kam mir plötzlich die Idee, dass diese Kreuzungen für das Erleben des Tieres das Verhältnis zu seinen Objekten im Raum symbolisch repräsentieren." In 1935, he could publish his book "*Symbolik des Hirnbaus*: *Erscheinungswissenschaftliche Untersuchung über den Bau und die Funktionen des Zentralnervensystems der Wirbeltiere und des Menschen*".

In Frankfurt, he also worked on the problem of brain hemisphere asymmetry and the functional importance of this phenomenon (Rothschild 1930).

In 1933, Rothschild lost his job due to the nazi laws against Jews. In 1936, Rothschild moved to Palestine. He worked as a Professor of

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[1]   There was a similar situation with H. E. H. Paterson and his group of evolutionary biologists, who developed the recognition concept of species during many years in South Africa, publishing exceptionally in *The South African Journal of Science*, until E. Vrba happened to find them and made widely known.

[2]   L. Klages knew well the works of J. v. Uexküll; he belonged to the contributors of the Uexküll's *Festschrift* volume (Klages 1934). It is not known to me whether there has existed any more direct line from Uexküll's semiotic biology to Rothschild's views than this one via L. Klages.

clinical psychiatry in the Faculty of Medicine in the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, from where he retired in 1965.

In the 1950s, he published two books on the problem of self and the symbolic aspects of the central nervous system (Rothschild 1950; 1958). He also wrote a paper about a classical phenomenon of zoosemiotics — the dance of bees (Rothschild 1953).

A conference "The Psychology of the Self", held by the New York Academy of Sciences in 1961, included a paper by Rothschild, in which he directly uses the semiotic approach of Ch. Morris, and introduces the term 'biosemiotic'. In semiotics, he sees the way to a non-cartesian approach: "The concept of the symbol shows the way to overcome René Descartes' partition of man into the self as *res cogitans* and the body as *res extensa*. In the symbol psychological meaning and physical sign appear as a unit" (Rothschild 1962: 774).

As a leader of the Israel branch of the Association for Dynamic Psychiatry, he published most of his later papers in the journal *Dynamische Psychiatrie / Dynamic Psychiatry*. On June 24, 1989, a symposium "From Causality to Communication — Biosemiotics of Friedrich S. Rothschild", dedicated to his 90th birthday was held in Berlin, in the German Academy of Psychoanalysis, which resulted in a special issue of *Dynamische Psychiatrie* 22 (3/4), 1989,[3] and later a book by Bülow and Schindler (1993).

F. S. Rothschild died on March 6, 1995 in Israel.

Three biosemiotic laws

In his 1962 paper, Rothschild made an attempt to formulate his conception in the form of three biosemiotic laws. "By laws I understand here the rules of syntax of each single communication system and the rules valid for the simultaneous utilization of different communication systems as they coexist in all animals and in man" (p. 777). The laws themselves are described by him as follows.

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[3] This includes a review of his life and work by Ammon (1989), a paper by Rothschild (1989) himself in which he describes his way towards biosemiotics, contributions by Hes (1989), Berendt (1989), Bülow (1989a), and a summary of the symposium (Bülow 1989b) illustated with 9 photographs from that event.

The first law.

Threat to given life elicits from the original passive state of the organism a component of activity, of inner self-assertion, transforming it *from an object into a subject of intentionality*. The first biosemiotic law expresses the intention to safeguard the structure that conveys the own essence, the self as a coherent *unity*. It is the basic rule of biosemiotic syntax. (p. 779)

The second law.

Inner polarization is necessary in order to permit the subjectivity of organisms to communicate with the objects of the world simultaneously with realization of the own self. This law dominates the arrangement of all communication systems from the cell upward. The manifestation of this inner polarity include the differentiation of motor and sensory systems in the sensori-motor foundations of experience and behavior, the bisexual disposition of organisms, the asymmetry between right and left, the differentiation of the vegetative nervous system inot a parasympathetic and sympathetic component, and the arrangement of the central nervous system in homolateral and heterolateral centers. (p. 780)

The third law.

As each new inner communication system emerges in evolution, it transcends its predecessor's horizon of meaning and requires for its actualization a new mode of intentionality. In this new form of intentionality, subjectivity is active and dominates over that of the preceding system because it is in opposition to it and thereby prevents an independent acitivity of the more archaic systems. The necessity of this *dominance* constitutes the third biosemiotic law: without such dominance, the new system cannot develop its function. (p. 781)

These three laws, indeed, seem to describe well some basic semiotic features of living beings, and will require a thorough analysis to discover their universality in the biological realm.

Signs of semiotics in philosophy of biology

An understanding of the importance of sign processes for living organisms has been growing in biology for centuries. For instance, the teleology of Johannes Müller (1801–1858), and Karl Ernst von Baer (1792–1876) has much in common with the contemporary understanding of the intentionality of sign processes. However, due to the absence of an appropriate theoretical framework in biology, and the lack of intercourse between semiotics and biology until the recent decades,

the terminology which has been used to describe essentially the semiotic side of biological processes varied to a great extent. This makes it really difficult to reconstruct the history of biosemiotics of the pre-biosemiotic period in biology. However, this does not mean that one may avoid it.

In a footnote of the book about Rothschild's biosemiotics, Bülow and Schindler (1993: 72) have also mentioned J. v. Uexküll:

> Beschränkt auf den Bereich der Biologie, kommt von Uexküll zu ähnlichen Ergebnissen wie Rothschild. Thure von Uexküll billigt der Zelle Subjektcharakter zu, in Anlehnung an Jakob von Uexküll. Wie Rothschild versteht er Organismen als lebende Systeme, die miteinander durch Zeichen, die sie selbst kodieren und beantworten, kommunizieren. Das Denken in kommunikativen Austauchprozessen löst auch bei von Uexküll das lineare Denken in kausalen Ursache-Wirkungs-Beziehungen ab.

Jakob von Uexküll, a sovereign pioneer of semiotic biology, had a number of supporters among biologists. These biologists — Hans Driesch (1867–1941),[4] Richard Woltereck (1877–1944), Adolf Meyer-Abich (1893–1971) — have not yet received much attention from the side of biosemiotics. However, we may speculate that this is mainly a result of their specific and quite individual terminology — they have not used the language of semiotics, whereas their approach itself could very well be compatible with semiotic biology.

Understanding inobligatory aspects

An unusual aspect in the works of F. S. Rothschild concerns his interest in parapsychology (cf. Berendt 1989), which separates him from the main trends in current biosemiotics. As a parallel, the same interest can be found in the works of Hans Driesch, a theoretical biologist of the beginning of the century. A key for understanding this

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[4]   Most of the textbooks on the history of biology interpret the views of Hans Driesch as if he was a cartesian philosopher, i.e. a dualist. Indeed, the direct statements by Driesch himself provide a strong argument for such a view. Most of the criticism against his neo-vitalism underlines that Driesch introduced non-material entities in order to explain living phenomena. However, it might well be so that a non-cartesian interpretation of Driesch' philosophy of biology can be a more adequate, and a much more useful one.

phenomenon can be found in a statement by Aloys Wenzl (1951: 155):

> Bedeutsam für das Lebensproblem ist, auch wenn wir von der Frage der Materialisation ganz absehen, jedenfalls die Tatsache, dass die *Vorstellung* leibliche Veränderungen bewirken kann.[5]

Thus, this is the influence of *Vorstellung* on body, which makes a scientist search for various explanations. The solution proposed by R. Sheldrake (and together with him, but much earlier, by H. Driesch or F. S. Rothschild in some of their works) differs from the one developed in the biosemiotics of the 1990s. It should also be mentioned that the view on biosemiotics as described by some colleagues of Rothschild (Hes 1989) differs in several aspects from the one established under this name in most of the contemporary biosemiotic literature.[6]

Conclusion

Thus, the term 'biosemiotics' was introduced by Rothschild (1962) almost at the same time when T. A. Sebeok coined the term 'zoosemiotics' (1963). However, since Rothschild's works appeared exclusively in a psychiatric context, these remained unnoticed by biologists as well as by semioticians for quite a long time.

A semiotic interpretation of the asymmetry of human brain hemispheres in terms of communication, as developed by Rothschild since the 1930s, is to some extent similar to the analysis of the same problem by J. Lotman in the early 1980s (Lotman 1983; cf. Kull 1999b).

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[5] This is taken from the chapter titled as "Parapsychologie und Lebensproblem", in A. Wenzl's (1951) work on H.Driesch.

[6] Rothschild has also touched the problems of religion in several of his writings. I even think that there can be found some aspects of similarity between Uexküll's and Rothschild's theological thinking (cf. Uexküll 1936; Rothschild 1986). However, the current situation in the discussions on creation and evolution do not provide the necessary atmosphere for a serious analysis of this part of their writings, since this belongs far beyond the creationism-darwinism context.

Psychosomatic medicine has been a field which has both applied the biosemiotic approach and contributed to it (Uexküll & Wesiack 1997; Hoffmeyer 1997). The contribution by Rothschild, whose work also belongs to the area between medicine and psychology, illustrates this thesis well.

The usage of the term 'biosemiotics' by Rothschild in 1960s, together with the absence of any reception of his works by those who developed this field for a longer time, just demonstrates that the logic of development of scientific thinking may create almost identical solutions independently by different thinkers in different places.[7] Seemingly, the idea of biosemiotics was just in the air at that time.

The three biosemiotic laws, formulated by Rothschild, represent a remarkable contribution to the field, and are worthy of attention and further analysis.

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[7] On the other hand, the social aspect of the development of scientific fields, namely the absence of communication in this case, is evidently an important reason why the Rothschild's biosemiotics in several aspects considerably differs from the mainstream.

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К истории соединения *bio* и *semio*:
Ф. С. Ротшильд и биосемиотические закономерности

В статье дается краткий обзор научной деятельности психиатра Ф. С. Ротшильда (1899–1995), который видимо является одним из первых, пользующих термином *биосемиотика* (в его статье 1962 года). Его определение биосемиотики хорошо соответствует содержанию этого раздела науки в 1990-е годы (когда биосемиотика формировалась в полной мере), несмотря на отсутствие его контактов с коллегами в этой области (поэтому его можно называть *эндемным* биосемиотиком) и своеобразие некоторых аспектов его подхода.

Ротшильд сформировал три основные правила (которые он называет законами) биосемиотики.

Первое утверждает, что первичная интенциональность и первичное образование субъекта связано с активностью организма хранить свою структуру , т.е. созиданием себя самого.

Второе правило гласит, что коммуникация связано с внутренней асимметричной поляризацией.

Третье правило утверждает, что знаковая система нового уровня при актуализации доминирует над старой.

В статье предлагается гипотеза, по которой семиотический аспект в биологии существует давно, имея представителей уже в XIX веке. Но из-за разной и специфической терминологии его выявление оказывается трудным и оставалось до сих пор почти незамеченным историками биологии.

Bio ja *semio* ühendumise ajaloost: F. S. Rothschild ja biosemiootilised reeglid

Artikkel esitab lühiülevaate psühhiaater F. S. Rothschildi (1899–1995) teaduslikust tegevusest, märkides, et ta oli arvatavasti esimesi, kes võttis kasutusele termini *biosemiootika* (artiklis Rothschild 1962). Tema esitatud biosemiootika määratlus vastab hästi selle mõiste kasutusele viimasel aastakümnel, kuigi tal ei olnud arvatavasti mingeid kontakte tänapäeva biosemiootikutega (mistõttu teda võib nimetada *endeemseks* biosemiootikuks), ning ta oma uurimistöö kaldus sellest mitmes aspektis kõrvale. Ometi on ta formuleerinud rea biosemiootika üldistusi, seahulgas kolm põhireeglit, mis artiklis ka ära tuuakse. Esimene reegel väidab, et primaarne intentsionaalsus ning esmane subjekti ilmumine on seotud organismide enesekohasusega, enda kaitsmisega; teine ütleb, et kommunikatsioon on seotud sisemise asümmeetrilise polariseerumisega; kolmas väidab, et uue taseme märgisüsteem aktualiseerudes domineerib vana üle.

Esitatakse hüpotees, et semiootiline aspekt bioloogias on vana, ent varjatud spetsiifilise ja erineva terminoloogia taha, mistõttu selle avamine on seotud raskustega ning jäänud seniajani bioloogia ajaloolaste poolt peaaegu tähelepanuta.

A note on the semiotics
of biological mimicry

Timo Maran

The term 'mimicry' is quite widely used nowadays. One can find it in most different areas: in psychology and education, where child is mimicking his or her's parents (Kuczaj 1998), in economy, where different products are similar (Daughety, Reinganum 1997), in anthropology, where native people are acting like us (Huggan 1997; Met 1996), in immunology and molecular biology where the immunosystem is not able to distinguish different proteins with similar structure (Requejo 1997; Wucherpfennig 1997), in ornithology where young birds are learning singing from the adults (Eens, Pinxten 1992), etc.

The wide use of the word makes the meaning of the term 'mimicry' inevitably indistinct and it is easy for one to lose the concept. However, the notion of 'mimicry' in biological and biosemiotic sense is quite well definable, as I will explain below. Generally speaking, we should distinguish two different concepts, which are often confused — similarity and imitativeness. In the first one, there is no internal connection between two objects, which seem similar to us; in the second case one object is somehow caused or affected by other. Mimicry in animate nature is a very complex phenomenon, which deeply differs from similarity relation of the physical realm, and it seems to be strongly semiotic also.

Historical overview

In 1861 H. W. Bates discovered 'imitative resemblance' in Amazonian butterflies *Heliconiidae* (Bates 1862, 1867). This event marks the beginning of mimicry research. Nineteen years later F. Müller

created a new concept of mimicry to explain similarity of warning colorations among insects (Müller 1878). In the last decade of the nineteenth century E. Poulton published several papers about mimicry in the context of natural selection theory (Poulton 1890, 1898). Contributions by H. Cott and F. Heikertinger should also be mentioned as highly significant (Cott 1940; Heikentinger 1954). In 1967, Wickler created a new concept of mimicry systems using terminology of information theory (Wickler 1967). From that point forward mimicry has been seen as ecological set-up that includes two or more protagonists, performing three roles: being a *model*, being a *mimic*, and being a *dupe* (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Every mimicry system includes three components: model, mimic and dupe. If one of these participants is missing, the whole system will lose its idea.

According to G. Pasteur,

> **model** *is a living or material agent emitting perceptible stimuli or signals*; **mimic** *is an animal or plant that simulates the model*; *and* **dupe** *is an animal enemy or victim of the mimic whose senses are receptive to the model's signals and which is thus deceived by the similar signals of the mimics* (Pasteur, 1982). If one of these participants is missing, the whole system loses it's idea.

Another definition has been given by Derlbert Wiens:

> **Mimicry** *is a process whereby the sensory systems of one animal (operator) are unable to discriminate consistently a second organism or parts thereof (mimic) from either another organism or the physical environment (the models), thereby increasing the fitness of mimic* (Wiens 1978).

These concepts themselves are strongly semiotic, because the terms model, mimic, and dupe or operator are defined through the transmission of signals and the protagonists relations to the transmitted information.

Terms and concepts such as eucrypsis, mimesis, Müllerian resemblance and others have also been used in several papers, in some cases as subdivisions of mimicry, in some cases separately. According to G. Pasteur there are still very different points of view about contents of these terms (Pasteur 1982). But generally speaking we can distinguish four major categories, which can be divided further. The first category includes the terms: eucrypsis, crypsis, camouflage, protective coloring, color imitations. In these cases, colors of mimic are similar to the natural background. The second is mimesis, which in some cases are divided as cryptic and phaneric mimesis. In this case both the forms and colors are imitated. The third includes Batesian, Mertesian, Peckhammian and other mimicry systems, where the model is a living being, that elicits a reaction in the signal receiver. The fourth is Müllerian mimicry or Müllerian resemblance where different noxious organisms have similar forms and colors.

Still, I would like to point out, that there are some very detailed classifications, for example G. Pasteur's classification, where mimicry systems have been divided according to the nature of the model, species composition type and function (Fig. 2) (Pasteur 1982).

The concept of mimicry is often seen in evolutionary context and in the 18th century it has been used as a strong argument for the Darwinian evolutionary and natural selection theory. Anyway, it seems important, that through the evolutional feedback loops, mimicry systems have certain dynamical stability.

On the one hand, these feedback mechanisms appear as balances between populations of models, mimics, and dupes in the same way as balances between populations of predators and pray-animals appear in Lotka-Volterra equation-systems.

On the other hand, these feedback mechanisms regulate a set of signals. Signals of mimics, which operators cannot recognize correctly will develop, but in the extent, it is possible from the natural material.

Mimicry	Species composition of the system	Function
Model Forbidding to the Dupes		
Batesian	Disjunct	Protective
Emsleyan	Disjunct	Protective
Gilbertian	S_1R/S_2	Protective
Browerian	$S_1\ S_2/\ R$	Protective
Wicklerian-Guthrian	Conjunct	Aggressive
Model Agreeable to the Dupes		
Wicklerian-Eisnerian	Disjunct	Aggressive
Vavilovian	Disjunct	Aggressive/ reproductive/ mutualistic
Dodsonian	Disjunct	Reproductive
Batesian-Wallacian	$S_1\ R/\ S_2$	Aggressive
Kirbyan	$S_1\ R/\ S_2$	Aggressive/ reproductive
Pouyannian	$S_1\ R/\ S_2$	Reproductive
Wasmannian	$S_1\ R/\ S_2$	Mutualistic, commensialist
Batesian-Poultonian	$S_1\ R/\ S_2$	Protective
Nicolaian	$S_1\ /\ S_2R$	Reproductive
Bakerian	$S_1\ S_2/\ R$	Reproductive
Aristotelian	$S_1\ S_2/\ R$	Protective
Wicklerian-Barlowian	$S_1\ S_2/\ R$	Reproductive
Wicklerian	Conjunct	Protective

Fig. 2. Mimicry classification by G. Pasteur (1982). Within the two major classes, mimicry systems are ranged according to species composition type (*disjunct* — all the protagonists are different species; *conjunct* — all the protagonists belong to the same species; $S_1\ R/\ S_2$ — model and dupe belong to the same species; $S_1\ /\ S_2R$ — mimic and dupe belong to the same species; $S_1\ S_2/\ R$ — model and mimic belong to the same species), and within each type of species composition according to function.

Therefore, the similarity between mimics and models is never absolute, but always rough and close, controlled partly by recognition, partly by evolutionary possibilities. I think this mechanism is similar to these, which insure the stability of natural languages, only upside

down, so the signals, which are not correctly recognized, are pre-
ferred.

Introducing semiotical approach

Although Th. Sebeok in his book "Essays in Zoosemiotics" has sug-
gested observing mimicry-systems on the assumption of semiotical
framework, there have been no serious attempts in the field yet
(Sebeok 1990).

I suggest that Ch. Peirce's sign theory and it's explications by
Ch. Morris provide an appropriate theoretical basis for looking mim-
icry in a semiotic context. In animate nature, we can observe organ-
isms with concrete properties in their environments, responding in
their specific way to the various situations. As J. v. Uexküll suggests,
from that basis we can derive conclusions about the meanings of
signals and signs for different organisms (Uexküll 1982). Linguistic
tradition, on the contrary, presumes that we have some *a priori*
knowledge about the meanings of signs, which limits the use of
theories based on the Saussurean tradition in the biological field.
Terminology used by Morris can easily be adjusted for different
occurrences of biological communication as mimicry (Fig. 3).

Terms used by Ch. Morris (1938)	Termsused in biology to describe mimicry (Wiens, 1978; Pasteur, 1982; etc.)
sign vehicle designatum interpretant	mimic and model searching image dupe, signal receiver (with his spe- cific reaction)

Fig. 3. Correspondences between semiotic terms used by Ch. Morris and
biological terms used by various biologists and ethologists.

At the first sight, it is not easy to see any possible connection between
the phenomenon of mimicry and J. v. Uexküll's Umwelt theory.
Furthermore, in his works Uexküll almost does not mention mimicry
or natural resemblance. However, from the other side there are signs
in the animate nature, which function as delusions for certain signal

receivers but are not detectable or deceptive for human senses. For instance some moths are making ultrasonic signals to deceive bats, and an orchid — the red helleborine *Cephalantera rubra* is similar with several bellflowers *Campanula sp* for the eye of the insect, but not for human observer. Therefore, the objects, which are similar in one Umwelt, may easily be distinguished in an other Umwelt, and unperceivable in a third. So mimicry, mimetic resemblance, camouflage and other similar phenomena always depend on the Umwelten and the concrete natural background or context as well.

In mimicry, we are not dealing with primary semiotic interaction, where interpretators derive meaning from objects of the physical realm. Rather the mimicry question is about finding or not finding difference between two similar objects or signs by derived meanings (Fig. 4). Therefore, the problem of signal receiver is not to recognize, but to recognize a difference. Hereby the phenomenon of mimicry is strictly connected with problems of discreteness and distinguishability of signs.

signal reciver

object 1 —— meaning 1 =∩≠ meaning 2 —— object 2

model   mimic

Fig. 4. Sign structure of mimicry.

The receiver must decide on difference or uniformity of two objects. However, situations, where both objects are performed to the receiver at the same time are not very usual in animate nature. Mostly the recall of the model is carried by the signal receiver.

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Заметки о семиотике биологической мимикрии

Несмотря на то, что понятие мимикрии стало за последнее десятилетие широко употребляться, значение и объем этого понятия в биологии и биосемиотике можно довольно точно очертить. В биологии под мимикрией понимается знаковой процесс, в ходе которого между живыми организмами происходит передача, восприятие и ложное понимание информации. Тем самым мимикрия может быть и объектом семиотического изучения.

Начиная с работ В. Виклера (1968) мимикрия описывается как акт коммуникации, в котором участвуют: *мимет*, организм, который подражает свойствам, характерным для какого-либо другого вида; *модель* — характерные черты которого становятся объектом подражания и *узнаватель*, организм, который должен, но не может различить мимет от модели.

Системы мимикрии являются самосохраняющимися структурами, стабильность которых поддерживается механизмами обратной связи в цепи мимет-модель-узнаватель, которые напоминают механизмы, характеризующие развитие и устойчивость естественного языка.

В случае мимкрии мы не имеем дело с примарным знаковым отношением, когда из объекта выводят значение. Процесс мимикрии является, скорее, процессом различения двух похожих носителей знака на основе выводимых значений. Т.е. для узнавателя важно не узнавание, а узнавание различия. Таким образом, феномен мимкрии тесно связан с проблематикой различия и дискретности сигналов и знаков.

Märkusi bioloogilise mimikri semiootikast

Olgugi, et 'mimikri' mõistet on viimasel kümnendil kasutatud rohkesti erinevates ainevaldades, võib öelda, et selle mõiste tähendus bioloogias ja biosemiootikas on küllalt täpselt piiritletav. Bioloogilises tähenduses on mimikri märgiline protsess, mille käigus toimub informatsiooni edastamine, vastuvõtmine ning vääritimõistmine elusolendite vahel, ning seega peaks mimikri kuuluma ka semiootika huvisfääri.

Alates W. Wickleri töödest (1968) on valdav mimikri kirjeldamine kolmest osapoolest koosneva süsteemina: **mimeet** (*mimic*) on organism, kes jäljendab mõnele teisele liigile või mõnele laiemale rühmale omaseid jooni; **modell** (*model*) on organism, kelle välimust, käitumist, lõhna, häält vms. omadusi jäljendatakse; **äratundja** (*receiver*) on signaali vastuvõtja, organism, kes peaks, ent ei suuda mimeeti ja modelli eristada.

Käesolev artikkel määratleb mimikri semiootilise kirjeldamise lähte-kohad.

Mimikrisüsteemid on ennastsäilitavad struktuurid, mille stabiilsus tule-neb mimeedi, modelli ja äratundja vahelistest tagasiside-mehhanismidest. Need mehhanismid sarnanevad neile, mis iseloomustavad loomulike keel-te arengut ja püsimist.

Mimikri puhul pole tegemist primaarse märgisuhtega, kus objektist tuletatakse tähendus. Mimikri protsess on pigem erinevuse leidmine või mitteleidmine kahe sarnase märgikandja vahel nendest tuletatud tähen-duste kaudu. Niisiis pole äratundja jaoks küsimuseks mitte äratundmine, vaid erinevuse äratundmine. Seega haakub mimikri fenomen otseselt sig-naalide ja märkide erisuse ning diskreetsuse probleemistikuga.

The problem of titles in painting

Virve Sarapik

Traditionally the medium of literature is considered to be the word while those of visual art are colour, form, line — i.e. media perceived through the eyes. The following is concerned with the word in a picture, foremost in a painting, thus, with an assumed secondary element in visual art.

In the early 20th century borderlines between the different forms of art seemed to be quite clear. The objects of pictorial art had spatial dimensions expanding in two or three dimensions, these could be hung on walls or displayed in exhibitions halls; while objects of the art of words were linear, proceeding in only one, the temporal dimension. This can be called the era of innocence in pictorial art and it mostly extends up to the World War I; in conventional discourse even further.

The following, as the heading already indicates, will concentrate on the interrelationship between what is seen and what is said. It is one of the key issues in the history of philosophy from the Stoics' theories up to modern linguistic philosophy and semiotics. Traditionally relations between the visual and the verbal have been treated as relations between the word and the notion, or between the word and the object, departing primarily from the process designated by the term signification. In the present case, however, the angle of approach is slightly shifted and we are interested in the counter-effect of the visible and the verbal and in their coexistence in the visual art. Primary difference from the above-mentioned limits the subject to the secondary and concentrates on the secondary use of the word in the intentional creative process. To some extent it includes signification, meanings and connotations. First and foremost the counter-effect operates on the textual, not on the notional plane.

The most typical examples of the use of verbal means in pictorial art are the letters, words or textual extracts (collage) torn out of

printed texts and used in Cubist or Dadaist paintings (first and foremost Kurt Schwitters). Possibilities, however, diverge:

(1) Title. Depending on the picture, trend or era connected with the picture in a loose or organic way.

(2) Provisionally and indirectly also the author's name, informing us of his reputation, the period he comes from, etc.

(3) A word in the title carrying with its connotations a potential visual text and guiding, together with the picture, its reception to a particular direction. Presuming, of course, that the word is clearly recognised and distinguished from the rest of the text, since mostly metaphorical relations are going to be discussed here. For example, *Yellow Christ*, *Blue Nude*, *Black Square*. On the other hand an emphasised meaningless title can carry connotations associated with meaninglessness.

(4) Part of the picture perceived as a written text, possessing, no direct meaning. Meaningless text or letters affect us differently from the rest of the picture.

(5) Part of the picture perceived as a written text conveying a particular meaning.

At this point two sub-cases can be pointed at. The written text can be in a language, which is not known to the audience, or the viewer can just not bother to go into it (in the context of an actual exhibition the latter is quite often the case and worth to be examined separately — like any other partial "reading" of a work, skipping over a book, omitting paragraphs, reading a page diagonally, watching only a fragment of a film, rushing through an exhibition hall without watching all the pictures). In this case the written text becomes just a visual component, affecting the onlooker in a different way from the other details of the work. This rather concerns reception than the work itself.

Flourishing verbalism or its total manifestation in visual art comes up in conceptualism. Conceptualism is naturally based on different points of departure — but at its roots one can see, on the one hand, withdrawal of the title becoming independent, and on the other hand, script on the surface of the painting.

One of the first examples of verbal text was the written title on the surface of the painting fixing either names of those portrayed, the subject, or hinting at the subject by quoting a canonical text. There is

no doubt that a title written on the surface of the painting makes a different impact from the situation, where the text is attached to the wall next to the painting, or when it is on the price-list of the gallery. (An intermediate possibility is the frame attached to the painting — although a separate item — carrying a label with the title.) In case the script is on the surface of the text, one cannot speak of a looser or tighter connection with the text. A written text always attracts attention, it is aggressive. It is true even, when the script is illegible or in a language that is not understood. Probably we perceive the written text so differently from the pictorial image, that the metaphorical tension created is insurmountable.

Besides the direct verbal components of a painting — its title or script elements — the depicted narrative should also be considered as a verbal component. Narrative as such has been viewed as a linguistic act (Bal 1985: 7–8). The story depicted on the picture, the source of its plot, can be seen as a part of the painting that can be verbalised. The verbal part can be treated in a wider sense, too, including the whole verbal context of a piece of art — the texts accompanying it, the context, reviews, critical analyses. The present study will concentrate on two narrow topics: the title of the painting and the script as it is used in visual art.

Until the break in art tradition in the second half of the 19th century the verbal part of a picture could foremost be seen in the narrative related to it. Narrative source for the medieval art was the Bible which at the time determined the development of art based on the story. Orientation on the narrative is the major and one of the most solid features of the Western painting.

The treatment of painting in *Laocoon* by Lessing is based on the verbal aspect of a picture which is conveyed by a narrative easily recognised. The story was the same for both poetry and painting, only the way of telling it was different. But in any case the story could be verbalised, presented with linear means.

In medieval paintings, stained glass windows and frescoes, the viewer (at least an informed viewer) could detect the corresponding plot that he knew beforehand from specific features of the picture. He was able to adhere it to the picture without considerable deviations and thus the title was of no importance — iconic signs performed signification anyhow. With later high style paintings on mythological and historical subjects the process is analogous. The title is but a

formal text, a label, perhaps a catalyst which has to point out the right story.

While Christian narrative dominated the titles were just formal labels like *The Virgin and the Child*, *St. Luke*, *The Birth of Christ*, *The Last Judgement*, et al. These were actually just names, conventional designations that could have been left unfixed in case there sufficed visual elements which enabled to recognise the plot. Such names could be used while speaking about the pictures, but writing them down was superfluous. Of course, late Middle Ages and Renaissance paintings are familiar with the tradition of writing the name straight on the surface of the picture. This, however, was more important in case of portraits than of narrative paintings. The re-emergence of portraits at that period brought along the need to fix the name of the person portrayed and frequently this was presented as part of the picture, as a writing on its surface. This text, however, like name of the story the picture depicts, is by no means the title of a picture as we understand it now.

Later, in the period of mythological and historical paintings, foremost in the eras of Baroque, Rococo and Classicism, the signature text could be more complicated while its role was practically the same — to recall a familiar story: *Embarquement pour l'Ile de Cythère* (Antoine Watteau), *The Oath of the Horatii* (Jacques Louis David) or *The Golden Age* (Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres).

Of the factors determining the emergence of the titles in the modern sense of the word three basic moments must be considered: exhibitions, catalogues and art criticism. It is natural that, as the painting became independent of the former chain of author and contractor, a way of signifying it permanently and uniquely had to be developed. Primarily the painting was recognized by the author's name but also by the name of the painting itself which generally was fixed by the author and was not altered.

In the course of time, up to the Romanticism, the importance of one of the verbal texts, that of the author's name, has increased. In the 20th century, too, personality of the author and his activity have been of greater importance than the materialised work itself.

One aspect that should be mentioned is the metonymical replacement of a particular art work as an item by its author's name, e.g. *in the museum there were two Manets, I looked at a Rubens, the Picasso cost* ... This is, no doubt, one of the most typical cases of metonymy

where name of the author substitutes his work and it is naturally used in other arts, too, in music and literature perhaps more often than in architecture, film or theatre. The impression is, however, that use of metonymy is most frequent in visual art. Reasons for that can only be hypothesised. One of them could be the fact that visual art has been commercialised. In the art market, which has enlivened mostly in the last century, the author has been more important than his work, or at least his name has been the major factor in establishing the market value. The commercial character is probably more important in visual arts than elsewhere and depends mostly on the fact that visual arts are "objective". Another reason could be that one author can produce more paintings or etchings than, for example, novels. In sketches the author's name is usually the only accompanying verbal text which helps to signify them.

Other verbal texts adhered to a picture, like data concerning the technique, form and size, are related to the work loosely and thus are rather insignificant. Of greater importance is the date of a work.

Further, I would centre my attention on the title of a painting, treating it as the most characteristic part of the verbal context.

The name of a piece of art, its title, is its most characteristic and at the same time its inevitable verbal companion. Pieces of art must be signified, mentioned, spoken about, they have to be included in catalogues; with the help of the title the author communicates with the audience. It would probably be quite difficult to establish a situation in which any verbal fixation of a given piece of art, any reference to it could be avoided. So every piece of art has got a name, in general it is the intentional title.

The names given for visual art form an intriguing genre in themselves — insofar as their independent existence is possible at all. In literary research investigation in the genre has recently been called titology (Fr. *titrologie*, Genette 1997: 55) and probably the term can be applied for studying the titles of visual art-works as well.

Studies on the titles of visual art, however, are quite rare and stress mostly certain aspects of the subject only (e.g. Fisher 1984; Bann 1985; Gombrich 1985; Levinson 1985). It seems that the similar field — titles of fiction — has been studied more frequently and thoroughly (see Genette 1997: 55). Yet especially the titles of visual art seem to offer plenty of material: both in terms of the quantity and variety of scale.

The most common point of departure is to view a title on the background of the philosophy of language. In this case the title is treated as a name, a proper name, creating analogous philosophical problems: connotation and denotation, the problem of meaning, the relationship between the common and the proper noun, etc.

The present paper is focused on another aspect — the title with no meaning, so semiotics of the negative. The meaning of non-existence, of negation, is of course vaguer and more difficult to interpret, having more connotations than that of a fixed, positive sign. At the same time it implies a primordial capacity, rich in information like the voice and meaning of silence.

To simplify the subject we have to admit, that up to now titology has always tried to cut the notion of the title, discussing *the real* or *the true* title which is usually the name the artist has intentionally given to the piece of art: "The only titles I am concerned with are the *true* titles — those given by the *artist* roughly at the time of creation." (Levinson 1985: 34). This approach is the simpler way in which part of the names, as fallen angels, have been thrown out with the explanation that these do not meet the requirements set on a title well enough. In case we proceed from the independent existence of a piece of art, that is not tied with its author, and focus our attention not on the intention of the author but on the title's actual influence on the reception of the work, we can enlarge the notion of the title: everything in reality (in other words — in the communication process), that functions as a title, can be treated as a title.

A catalogue as well as any talk or written text about the work of art can be viewed as a communicative situation. So, further as titles are seen any alpha-numerical series used to signify a work for the time being irrespective of the genesis of the series. Equivalent are the title given by the author, a later title given by anyone, its nickname — everything that is used in oral or written reference to the piece of art.

The questions arising thus are numerous, one of the major one is that of homonyms. Let us take for example the title *Untitled* (*Sans titre*) which has been used to designate an innumerable quantity of works. Or just three asterisks (***) that substitute the title. The ability of those titles of performing one of the initial functions of the title — to differentiate it from all the others — is probably next to non-existent. One author could have made several works of the same title, made in one and the same year, etc. Thus, there are more exact ways

to differentiate a piece of art, e.g. the number in the museum catalogue. The title alone without the name of the author, and frequently without the year of creation, present location and size of the work, cannot sort it out from all the others with the same title. The function of specification is certainly better performed by, for example, the ISBN or catalogue number of a book. Is this also a title in a wider sense? I would prefer the notion substitute title for the ways of specification just described. The substitute title helps to find the original title although the specification function of the latter is minimal analogically to the personal code that helps to make difference between all the people called John Brown or Ivan Popov. It helps to restore the title proper. Although a numerical system is efficient in differentiating works on the catalogue level, it cannot be used in traditional art communication. As the initial function of a title is to signify the work, one has to add that the title is indispensable in verbal communication. In former art criticism of the early 20th century the catalogue numbers of an exhibition were substitute titles, functioning in the process of writing about the works. So the 1916 annual show has been reviewed as follows: "There *The Landscape* (No 177) of a lonely bay burning in sunshine of blue flames ... Then *The Landscape* (No 168) of a droughty afternoon sun with pink, as if feverish clouds ... or *The Landscape* (No 189) with a red field as if screaming in fear, with a path disappearing into a valley and emerging nowhere, stormy clouds rolling above in the sky". The paintings are well-known today, but recognised by more clear-cut titles.

Another common feature in the reviews up to the present day is, that they proceed from what has been depicted on the picture, which is definitely of primary importance. Hence another significant function of the title — to guide the audience in perceiving and interpreting the picture. Like the title failed to be an ideal means of signifying the picture one-to-one, so one need not overestimate its capability to function as the decisive factor in interpretation. Playing with the effect of different titles has been one of the favourite children of postmodernism but not the only one. On the one hand it surely reaches back to conceptualism, and on the other hand, to the possibilities suggested by S. Eisenstein in his montage. If compared with the latter, the situation is quite similar — in both cases the context influences the interpretation of the details and of the signs. Like in a film where understanding of what is going on depends on having seen the previ-

ous shots, title of the picture should have an influence on our understanding of it. It is tempting to study these possibilities but one can exaggerate at that easily, especially when bearing in mind the experience of contemporary conceptualism and post-structuralism. The wish to throw the meaning as a whole into interpretation keeps haunting. Several familiar situations resist the decisive role of the title in interpretation. First, numerous artists and schools have declared, that the title has secondary importance for the picture: the latter has to communicate with no assisting features, and its visual possibilities are sufficient for guiding the interpretation. This idea is emphasised by the title *Untitled*. Secondly, the situation where the viewer does not bother to read the title is frequent enough, or where he thinks that it is irrelevant, or he cannot understand the language of the title. Can we say that when the viewer does not read the title, the picture remains meaningless to him? Evidently it depends: in some works the title is an irreplaceable component of the text of the work, but in some works it is not. It is easier to influence the plot-component of a work. In case a person depicted is named just with another name it could be either ignorance or a lie. Both options offer new material for the verbal interpretation of the picture, in paraphrasing it. The interrelations between the title and the picture often depend on the reception, on the single act of reading and interpretation. The more directive the title intentionally is, the more it affects the interpretation, and the more general or abstract it is, the more possibilities for reading will it leave open.

One could presume that iconic works are less influenced by their title. In case we have developed an opinion of our own about a piece of art before interpreting it, the impact of different titles or changes in them is smaller than in the case of perceiving a hitherto unknown work. A good comparison is the translation of film and book titles. As far as the Estonian practice goes, the translation title can be entirely different. The aim of the translation is to make the name attractive, memorable and "transparent" as far as the content is concerned. In this case interpretation of the work cannot rely on the text of the title. In picture titles the translation practice has been different: the purpose is to find an equivalent as close to the original as possible.

The name of a picture need not be related to it in a unique and the only possible way: shifts in the meaning are inevitable. The intention of the author is an act of the past and cannot be always restored

historically. Several works acquire a fixed nickname and are known by them. At the same time the connotations of a title can change in time as projected on the background of other works and titles.

The title of the picture became more independent and lost part of its picture-conditioned character, but still influenced it in a metaphorical way, in the Symbolist paintings.

Titles of the Impressionist paintings are just of an opposite character, their significance is reduced, they are never seen as irrelevant. The works can be successfully viewed without the titles which just name the picture without stressing their negativity: Claude Monet's *Impression. Sunrise* (*Impression, soleil levant*), *The Capuchin Avenue* (*Boulevard des Capucines*), *Rouen Cathedral* (*La cathédrale de Rouen*), *West Portal* (*Le portail*), *Foggy Day* (*Temps gris*).

A neutral relationship between the art-works and their titles characterises the paintings of the Post-Impressionists (foremost the works of Cézanne) and even more the drawings of *Les Fauves*. Characteristically the title becomes more and more conditional — it could be just a common noun like "landscape", "house", "man", "woman" or a modified phrase "man's portrait", "man with a hat", "man with a pipe".

Here the parallel with the theory of natural categories, popular in perception psychology since 1970s and associated mostly with the name of Eleanor Rosch Heider, is valid. The notion of category and the principle of categorizing the surrounding world is nothing new, of course; its development in philosophy can be traced back to Aristotle. Using language, the man inevitably categorizes the world: this is the basis for his cognitive abilities. Rosch applied the notion to abstract phenomena of perception — colour, form — and distinguished between artificial and natural categories. The latter are treated as "real", actually existent and designated generally in natural speech by words. A natural category develops after the knowledge acquired in human life including personal experience, semantic correlations, etc. The theory of natural categories introduced the notion of the best member, the prototype, and thus the members of a category turned inequal.

Within the framework of this theory a category is a set of objects designated by a word, i.e. a general name (*a car*, *a chair*), while the members of a category are related to each other in a system — the taxonomy. Within a taxonomy different layers can be distinguished with a different level of abstraction. The categories of a lower level are members of an upper level category. An abstraction level can be

brought out on this scale, the so-called basic level with basic catego-
ries. The latter are most informative for the man, they are distin-
guished most clearly. In their linguistic development children acquire
names of the basic categories first. Before that they learn to group
familiar objects into basic categories. From the point of view of
human consciousness the dismemberment of the surrounding world in
this way is the easiest and most economical (e.g. table, chair, dog,
man, woman, house).

Returning to the titles of *Les Fauves* composed of general names
one could point out their analogy to the notions of basic categories or
prototypes. This is not an absolute statement, of course, but it refers to
the general tendency with numerous exceptions. On the other hand,
sometimes authorship of the titles is not clear, because they may have
been added later, and in this case the title of a general name is under-
standable. On the other hand, to the present viewer the late origin of
the title does not matter, because he sees the picture with a particular
title only, and receives it with those particular associations. Such name
of a picture does not specify the objects on it, but it is detached from
the actual content, remaining loose and general. While the impres-
sionists retained exact references to the place, time and person, it
seems that *Les Fauves* concerned themselves with signifying the gen-
eral objects only, reducing both the person and the place depicted.
Frequently the title is markedly more general than the depicted scene.
The painting named *A Man with a Pipe* should, departing from the
title, depict an ordinary-looking man with an ordinary-looking pipe in
his mouth in a recognisable way. The picture could be used in an
ABC-book where it would successfully help a child spell A-MAN-
WITH-A-PIPE, or it could be in an elementary level German textbook
to help a learner remember the phrase EIN MENSCH MIT DER
PFEIFE. Most of the Post-Impressionist or Fauve men with pipes,
however, are not as unequivocal as that. Probably the interference of
the actual picture with the words *a man with a pipe* is slightly more
complicated.

Another noteworthy phenomenon of the same period, last decade
of the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th century,
introduces secondary vision into the title. First and foremost it in-
cludes colour names. Since the Fauves and German Expressionists the
visible has been depicted with decreasing "correctness", especially in
colour. The form is conditional, too, not aimed at copying the reality,

but in colours it is more conspicuous reducing a picture into a set of splashes subject to their visual qualities, the artist's discretion and will. In this case the title of a general name usually includes a colour name. Like the noun — being general or of basic category — so is usually general the colour name. Without performing a statistical investigation it can be said that red, yellow, blue, green, white and black are the most frequent colours, less used are violet and green. Thus, the words corresponding more or less to basic colours.

The second deviation would recall the notions of colour categories and basic colour terms. The latter notion — basic colour term — was combined by Bernt Berlin and Paul Kay (1969) and listed 11 colour words. The authors have suggested that diachronic development of the colour terms is subject to similar regularities irrespective of the language. Every colour term has got its best equivalent, a fixed point in the three-dimensional colour space or the focal colour, as well as various colours that can be designated with the word. These equivalents in their turn form a three-dimensional section of space, a colour space or range corresponding to the term. Departing from Berlin and Kay and their numerous disciples it is almost axiomatic that the foci of basic terms are quite similar for the people speaking different languages irrespective of their age or the existence of a separate term for the colour in the particular language. The ranges of colour terms, at that, can vary also within one language, their development can depend on age, dialect or cultural background. The hypothesis of basic terms and experiments enabled Rosch to speak of natural perception categories, i.e. categories referring to abstract visual qualities and principally depending on the neurophysiology of human sight. Thus, the analogues of basic categories are colour spaces corresponding to basic colour terms, all colours that can be designated with the word, the best example being the focal colour and sub-categories for example *light red, carmine, brick red*.

It is quite clear that the colour spaces of different colour names are different. Thus, the colour space of white and black is quite limited (of course in case these are not word groups), blue, green and brown are of wider range. The range of a colour space would definitely enlarge, should one take into account word groups, i.e. considers colour names, that are not abstract only. So, when we speak of red bricks, ochre, flag, sky, hair, cow and fire, the colours that we actually perceive are quite different from each other. At the same time the

word "red" has got a corresponding association with the colour in our consciousness which with high probability corresponds to the focal colour of the colour word. The preliminary reference to the colour word is primal for it inevitably influences the judgement of what is observed. In the case of word groups the process is probably slightly different. Customary associations like *red cow*, *white house* or *green tree* have in all likelihood no effect on what we see if the visible is not in marked dissonance with the phrase (for example, the cow is green). Unusual compounds — *blue nude*, *blue horse*, *green woman*, *yellow Christ* — are liable to sharpen our perception of what will be looked at and influence to see the colour as closer to the focal one.

Returning to the Fauves and the Expressionists one must say that while the titles frequently included colour names or general names, these were often illogical and combined items that one could not have experienced. The strangeness implies two cases. First, red could be called a pinkish animal, blue a horse or a nude, in which colour did not correspond exactly to the focal tone of blue. In this case the aim of the title was probably to make the otherwise more or less natural object seem more in the colour named, thus creating a certain attentive dissonance. In the other case the object depicted has probably been of an unusual colour and struck the eye in the picture already, while the title just confirmed and stressed the experience. Thus, the general name has been used in the above-described way as MAN WITH A PIPE and the dissonance emerging from a name inevitably has its influence on the picture.

A few examples. Paul Gauguin's *Yellow Christ* (*Le Christ jaune*, 1889):

In a way *Christ* is a general name in the Western culture. Yellow of the body of Christ depicted in the picture is by no means the focal colour, yet it is perceived as natural; as far as the title is concerned, however, it creates symbolic echoes departing namely from the possible connotations of the word *yellow* (in Medieval iconography it was mostly associated with Judas, *face can turn yellow, skin can be sickly yellow*, but these, of course, are not the only connotations). The titles *Crucification* or *Christ on the Cross*, most natural in art tradition, would leave a totally different impression departing from what has been depicted in the picture and perceived, thus, as most natural.

The same picture has been used by Gauguin as a background in his double painting *The Portrait of an Artist with Yellow Christ* (*Portrait*

de l'artiste au Christ jaune, 1889–90) depicting Gauguin himself. Here, too, the familiar generalization of naming has taken place — an actual and recognizable person has been reduced to "an artist". The same period includes another painting with a colour word: *White Angel. Mme Satre* (*La belle angéle. Mme Satre.* 1889) the title of which has been written on the surface of the picture. The phenomenon is more or less the same: the colour word possesses a direct symbolic value and the person — who has been mentioned this time — has been given a general name, too. Since the title on the picture surface was exceptional at that time, it had to be significant for the author. However, the writing is not perceived as an element of the painting like in the Cubist pictures but just as a title written on the surface of the picture.

Frequent are colour words in the Fauve titles, especially with Henri Matisse:

> *Red Studio* (*L'Atelier rouge,* 1911), *Red Room* (*Dessert. Harmony in Red*) (*La chambre rouge* (*Desserte. Harmonie en rouge*), 1908), *Blue Nude* (*Nu bleu,* 1907), *Nude* (*black and gold*) (*Nu* (*noir et or*), 1908), *Moroccan in Green* (*Marocain en vert debout,* 1913), *Yellow Curtain* (*Le Rideau jaune,* 1914–15).

These titles by Matisse, that emphasise colours, name actual focal tones already. Red fish are really truly red as well as the room. The green line on the nose of *Madame Marisse* is of interest in many respects. The painting has been called in different sources differently either as *The Portrait of Madame Matisse* or *The Portrait with a Green Line* (1905) and in the latter case the green line, no doubt, becomes significant. Looking at the picture under the first title and being familiar with the manner of the Fauves it is possible to leave the line unnoticed altogether. The second version, however, makes the line one of the most important details in the picture.

Simultaneously the German Expressionists also had a number of colourful titles. It concerns *Die Brücke,* but especially the works of the group *Blauer Reiter* which were more Symbolist in their approach. The name of the group is derived from the picture of a Blue Rider by Kandinsky and it could be viewed as the decisive one. The nude in *Blue Nude with Straw Hat* by Ernst Kirchner (1910) is blue enough, true, it is not in the focal colour corresponding to the word *blue,* but perceived as such that can be designated with the word. Most colourful, no doubt, are the animals of Franz Marc: *Red Horses*

(1911). *Blue Horse* I and II (1911), *Big Blue Horses* (1911), *White Bull* (1911), *Yellow Horses* (1912), *Yellow Cow* (1911), *The Tower of Blue Horses* (*Der Turm der blauen Pferde.* 1913), *White Cat* (1912), *A Red and a Blue Horse* (1912), *Blue Deer* (1912), et al. Conspicuous is the difference from the Fauves. *Les Fauves* painted with simple pure tones and withdrew from the reality mostly by the vividness and purity of their colours. *Die Brücke* Expressionists depicted their objects in colours which were never met in reality (blue nude) and the titles of the picture just stated and emphasised the difference created on the surface of the picture. The difference was included in the titles that harmonised with the picture. The coloured animals by Marc can be treated in terms of personal mythology of colour symbolism which the artist himself has confessed and explained: "Blue is the masculine force, strict and spiritual. Yellow is the feminine force, gentle and serene, while red is the matter, brutal and heavy, and always the colour which has to fight with the two others and be overcome by them." (März 1987: 7–8). The quotation comes from the year 1911 and *Red Horses* exemplifies its first manifestations.

In the history of titles the common name titles were subjected to a total change or revolution which introduced the extremities valid at the present day. The key figure here is Vassily Kandinsky, later the Dada and Russian Constructivist movements had a part to play. Kandinsky made the specific denominations — *Improvisation* and *Composition* — as significant as all the other titles. True, in earlier catalogues it was common to leave less important works nameless and call them just by their specification (*Landscape, Drawing, Blanc-et-noir*). Kandinsky, however, used them intentionally as titles, numbered them, and sometimes added a reference pointing at a particular improvisation. The connection with music and the use of titles is evident: *Opus No 56*. So titles of musical pieces can be considered one source of abstract, genre and numbered titles of pictures (by abstract titles I mean the use of numbers and words that have no direct meaning, as well as neologisms, like e.g. E. Lissitsky *Proun R.V.N. 2*, 1923).

Those "ambiguous" titles, neologisms, numbers and letters in the titles, can be treated as a poetics in their own, with rules which are more strict than those for the titles with a meaning, as the peculiar Constructivist Sonnet form. It reveals their reverse significance — representation of a certain pattern, in thinking. The difference is

especially marked in comparison with the literary titles of the Abstract Expressionism of the post-World War II era.

Comparing the titles of visual art and literature, we can see various differences. In literary titles the poetic value and sound aspects are indispensable (the title as the mandala). Some genres prefer a transparent hint at the content like films (detective, gothic and action stories). The key to the genre has to be grasped quickly in case of reference books and companions. A dictionary with the title *At Night* or *The Red and the Black* would be meaningless. The title of a piece of art can stress its banal or dull aspect, it can be abstract or unpronounceable. Literary titles are read in a different way.

Gerard Genette (1988) brings out the main difference between the titles of works of fiction and those of visual art: in case of a book, the title can represent the whole text, the text itself is often not known, not read, while the title is familiar. In visual arts the situation is just the opposite: the work itself or its reproduction is known (looking — or reading — of a visual text can take only a moment) while the title is either not known or not read, the same goes for other accompanying texts (the name of the author, year etc.) — like with fiction, film, music or a play, where the whole text is not read. In case of the latter, title could be the metonym replacement of a work, with visual arts it is impossible. Titles in the visual art form a literary genre of their own.

The audience of literary titles (that of fiction) is wider than that actually reading the books (one stage is the book-shop as a huge catalogue where one reads the titles only). The potential reader often decides on a book just by the title: "The title addresses itself to a larger number of people than does the text, people who, in one way or another, receive and transmit it, and thereby contribute to its circulation. For, if the text is an object of reading, the title, like the author's name, is an object of circulation — or if you wish, an object of communication" (Genette 1988: 707).

The relations between the picture and its title are various. First the independence of the title or — vice versa — its inclusion in the text of the picture. Further one could speak of the distance between the named and the depicted. These relations are not really related, rather they aim at different directions. If the difference between the title and the depicted is great, it proceeds from the tight unity of the text of the title and the text of the work while the simple naming of what has been depicted usually has a loose connection. Analysis of this distance

presupposes that the visual part and the name are treated as equal texts. A greater distance usually means an intentional title which is of major significance in interpreting the text appropriately. The two have a mutual influence on each other as equal components. Simple naming of what has been depicted presupposes a small distance and does not create the tension urging to interpretation. At first sight the title seems to be just a label. The former discussion of neutral titles of common names should convince us, however, that the problem cannot be as simple as that. Title as a common name carries a kind of negative information — its aim is to direct attention to the purely visual character of the work, avoiding or even denying any narrative interpretation. The accompanying text is inevitably a sign and always has an impact on the text of the picture.

Let us take the wide-spread title *A Head* as an illustration. The title became prominent in the sculpture of the early 20th century. At first (at least in the Estonian art) the *head*-title was used when the artist wanted to emphasise his interest in the form of the face, not in the person. Often the model could be someone close to the artist, but he thought that it was irrelevant or even misleading for the audience to inform about the person with the title. No doubt, the interpretations are different depending on whether the work is called *The Head of a Woman* or *The Portrait of my Wife* or *The Portrait of Mrs. Strandmann*. Originally it was still someone close that could be recognised. This situation can be described as the zero-version of the *head*-title. The next possible stage in its development was to distance from the recognisable person in favour of an impersonal head-form within the limits of reality. The *head*-title could designate a Cubist, abstract or Surrealistic work with no recognisable head on it at all (Karl Schmidt-Rottluff *Head* 1917; Pablo Picasso *Woman's Head* 1909; Naum Gabo *Head of a Woman* 1917–1920; Alberto Giacometti *Cubist Head*; Barbara Hepworth *Head* (*Elegy*) 1952). The greater the dissonance between the word "head" and the depicted form, the more distant is the common noun from a simple label creating new meanings. At the same time the relation between "a head" and a realistic, recognisable portrait is not absolutely neutral for it makes one ask for the actual name of the person.

In the through the 20th century are the following extreme possibilities between relations of the picture and the title texts:

1. meaningful, narrative or symbolic title corresponding to a meaningless (abstract) picture

2. title with zero-meaning (untitled) signifying a picture that has an image, ranging from abstract to recognisable real objects

3. abstract title — abstract picture

4. common noun title — recognisable image

5. meaningful, designating title — narrative picture

6. title referring to the genre (composition, painting, still-life, landscape).

The indicated diachronic changes and relations between the title and the picture texts are represented on two axes: the image, depiction change (relation to reality) and the signification (narrative). The zero-point of the two variables is the *Untitled* as the title of zero-meaning corresponding to a totally abstract work. The abstract titles (e.g. *Proun 23 N*) have a negative meaning (although still significant for their absolute value). Of relatively flimsy meaning are the common noun titles and so in case with both abstract and figurative works (*Head, Black Square,* further *Man with a Pipe*). Literary and narrative titles are of higher significance. Zero-level on the depiction axis includes the abstract works, the positive axis is directed towards the image becoming more realistic on the picture. The Surrealistic pictures include the negative reality (expressing antithetic or irony-based relations between the title and the picture like *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* by Magritte). The virtue of graphic presentation is the clear representation of the distance between the title and the picture text. Titles of the works with minimum distance are projected on the diagonal of the positive sector. The furhter is the contact surface of the texts from the axis, the greater is the difference between the picture and the title.

representation +

Head

Trip to the Island of Kythera

The Portrait of Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler

A Man with a Pipe

Still Life

Head

0

signification +

Rouen Cathedral, West Portal, Foggy Day

PROUN 23 N

Sans titre

Black Square

Head

La Trahison des Images

Fig. 1.

The figure, of course, is schematic which is a drawback: the picture texts have been simplified and reduced to one axis. This, however, is inevitable — a more refined figure would lose in its clarity.

It is clear that visual arts would never get rid of their linguistic Procrustean bed in spite of all the repeated attempts. As long as natural language will be the initial means of human communication it has to be so. So long as ideas will be exchanged about pictures, or these will be catalogued, the verbal part will inevitably be one of the accompanying elements.

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Проблемы подписи художественного произведения

В статье рассматривается роль вербального в визуальном искусстве. Анализируются два типа вербальных сообщений: подпись под картиной (название) и надпись на картине как часть художественного произведения. Главная проблема состоит в том, *что* брать за основу при рассмотрении связи между словом и картиной — примарность вербального мышления, вербальные модели познания или "визуальное мышление" определенного типа. Отдельный вопрос — вербальный текст, сопровождающий картину. Можно его рассмотреть в более узком аспекте: подписи под картиной, имя автора и иная словесная или цифровая информация, которая обычно присовокупляется к картине в виде отдельной таблички на стене музея или выставочного зала; и физически экзистирующие надписи на самой картине. Возможна и более широкая точка зрения, которая учитывает всякие

вербальные сообщения, связанные с контекстом данного произведения (критика, сопроводительная информация и т.п.).

Мы рассматриваем подписи под произведениями с точки зрения двух параметров — репрезентации и сигнификации. Формально можно соотношения между словом и картиной изображать и в виде графа.

Pildi allkirja küsimusi

Artikkel käsitleb verbaalse osa visuaalses kunstis. Vaatluse all on kaht liiki verbaalsed sõnumid: maali allkiri, nimetus ja kiri kui osa kunstiteosest. Peamiseks probleemiks näib olevat see, mida võtta sõna ja pildi seose aluseks — kas verbaalse mõtlemise primaarsus, verbaalsed tunnetusmudelid või teatud liiki "visuaalne mõtlemine". Omaette küsimuseks on pildiga kaasnev verbaalne tekst. Seda võib käsitleda kitsamalt — pildi allkirjad, autori nimi jm sõnaline või numbriline informatsioon, mis tavaliselt on teosele lisatud eraldi sildina muuseumi või näituseseinal, ning pildi pinnal füüsiliselt eksisteerivad kirjad. Võimalik on aga ka avaram vaatepunkt, mis võtab arvesse igasugused antud teose kontekstiga seotud verbaalsed sõnumid, kriitika, kaastekstid jmt.

Antud käsitluses kirjeldatakse teose allkirju kahe parameetri — kujutamine ja tähistamine — kaudu, ning formaalselt võib sõna ja pildi suhteid kujutada ka graafina.

Образно-языковой анализ тоталитаризма в двух «ленинских» картинах Дали

Олег Заславский

Семиотическая неоднородность культуры является, как неоднократно подчеркивалось Ю. М. Лотманом, минимально необходимым условием ее нормальной работы как семиотического механизма. В частности, в искусстве можно указать на противопоставление литературы и живописи как систем, основанных на языках, соответственно, дискретного и непрерывного типов. В свою очередь, внутреннее знаковое устройство каждой из этих систем также является существенно неоднородным. Если говорить о живописи, то существенным источником смысла может служить введение словесного текста внутрь картины или взаимодействие изображения и названия, делающее название значимым элементом художественного текста.

Довольно неожиданным образом оказалось, что существует еще один тип взаимодействия дискретного и непрерывного в живописи: язык может играть роль подтекста, причем художественно активной становится фонетическая структура слова — вплоть до создания анаграмм. Указанное явление было независимо обнаружено в творчестве Сезанна[1] и Дали[2], при этом речь идет не об отдельных курьезах, а об основополагающих структурных принципах, обобщающими понятие «язык как подтекст»[3]. В резуль-

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[1]   S. Geist. Interpreting Cézanne. Harvard University Press, 1988.

[2]   О. Б. Заславский. Язык как подтекст в живописи Сальвадора Дали, Arbor Mundi. М., 1997, вып. 5, с. 165–181.

[3]   Г. А. Левинтон. Поэтический билингвизм и межъязыковые явления (Язык как подтекст). В кн.: Вторичные моделирующие системы, 1979, Тарту, с. 30–33.

тате картины этих художников приобретают свойства, характерные для литературных произведений — главным образом поэтических (что, кстати, делает употребление термина «поэтика» особенно уместным). По этой причине их творчество представляет особенно благоприятное поле для изучения живописи методами, с успехом опробованными на материале словесного творчества — в полном противоречии с широко распространенным наивным представлением о роли стихийности и иррациональности в творчестве Дали.

Данная работа продолжает изучение указанного феномена в живописи Дали. Поскольку актуализация языка как подтекста затрагивает глубинные уровни как произведений, так и сознания, их порождающего, это позволяет, в принципе, уловить сущностные черты художественного мира автора и его мировоззрения, не затемненные внехудожественными высказываниями (в случае Дали зачастую принимавшими форму экстравагантных выходок). В данной работе мы ограничиваемся одним частным, но важным аспектом — отношением Дали к тоталитаризму, и предлагаем внутритекстовой анализ двух картин Дали, изображающих Ленина.

Hallucination partielle.
Six apparitions de Lénine sur un piano

Принципиальная роль языка в картине видна уже в заглавии с демонстративно созвучными «*part*ielle» и «*appari*tions». Как мы увидим далее, роль языка заглавием не ограничивается, а затрагивает подтекст, причем художественно активными являются сразу три языка — французский («основной» язык картины), а также английский и русский. Актуальность для картины элементов русской культуры и языка связана с ленинской темой и, шире, темой революции и власти. Здесь существенно, что для обозначения изображенного на картине музыкального инструмента (фр. «piano») в русском языке используется слово «рояль» — по своему происхождению французское: «royal» — королевский. Поскольку изображение Ленина порождает политические коннотации, слово «partielle» (частичная) отсылает к слову «партийная». С учетом этого в картине актуализируется выражение «партия роялистов» — т.е. сторонников короля. Это в свою очередь акти-

визирует тему Великой французской революции. При этом фигура, сидящая напротив рояля, т.е. долженствующая выполнять функцию пианиста, оказывается роялистом в соответствии с уравнением «piano» = «royal». А поскольку Ленин — глава революции, казнившей царя, то российская революция сопоставляется с французской, казнившей короля. При этом противопоставление революции и королевской власти закреплено пространственно: роялист сидит напротив главного революционера.

Революционный террор во Франции устойчиво ассоциируется с использованием гильотины. Но первое же слово названия как раз дает соответствующую анаграмму — «guillotine». Призрак вождя революции возникает в виде головы, отделенной от тела, а крышка рояля, на клавишах которого это происходит, напоминает острый нож гильотины. Таким образом, кровавое орудие и символ революционного террора представлены на картине двойным способом — и с помощью слова, и с помощью образа, причем в обоих случаях неявно: орудие казни зловеще проглядывает сквозь очертания других предметов и слов, как в кошмарном

сне — в полном соответствии с «hallucination» из названия картины.[4]

Другое проявление темы французской революции — замещение в тетради нот насекомыми, похожими на термитов. Их наименование — *«termites»* — актуализует название месяца по республиканскому календарю — *«termidor»*, когда был совершен контрреволюционный переворот, вошедший в историю как «9-е термидора» и закончившийся обезглавливанием вождей революции. Значимость нот в рассматриваемом аспекте подчеркнута тем, что музыкальным двойником «роялистской партии» является партитура — «партия рояля».

И расположение термитов из нотной тетради и расположение ягод на салфетке возле «роялиста» имеют сходную структуру: в обоих случаях один элемент отделен от общего множества, представляющего единое целое. В данном контексте это — еще одно указание на обезглавливание, отделение головы от тела. Красный же цвет ягод прямо ассоциируется с кровью.

Помимо французской революции, в истории Западной Европы есть еще одна, «прославившаяся» обезглавливанием короля — английская революция середины XVII века. Обратим теперь внимание, что салфетка на картине пришпилена к пиджаку *английскими булавками*[5] (это слово содержится не только в русском, но и французском наименовании — «epingle anglaise»). Это актуализует в произведении также и английский язык и делает правомерным английское прочтение салфетки — «napkin». В свою очередь это содержит двойную анаграмму: «nape» (затылок) + «king» (король), что в данном контексте намекает на казнь короля обезглавливанием. Подчеркнем, что такое анаграмматическое прочтение само по своей структуре воспроизводит мотив обезглавливания, поскольку получено рассечением единого слова на две части (такое структурное соответствие, кстати, решает столь болезненную в исследованиях анаграмм проблему возможного произвола). Еще одно проявление английского языка, отсылающее к теме революции, связано с трехзвенной цепочкой наименований: имя обезглавленного короля — *Char*les I, стул (аналог трона), на ко-

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[4] Было бы интересно проследить возможную аналогию между картинами Дали и прозой Набокова с характерными для нее анаграммами и переплетением разных уровней реальности.

[5] Выражаю благодарность З. Н. Ковалевой за это наблюдение.

тором лежат ягоды и салфетка, связанные с рассматриваемой темой обезглавливания, — «*chair*», сами ягоды (вишня или черешня) — «*cherish*».

Принципиальная роль французского языка как подтекста, необходимого для адекватного понимания картины, позволяет предложить еще одно анаграмматическое прочтение первого слова названия: «Hallucination» может быть понято как порождение галлицизмов («gallicisme»), перевод зрительных образов на французский язык. Частичным же («partielle») такой перевод оказывается по той причине, что помимо французского в произведении активен также и английский язык (а в некоторой степени — и русский).

Как следует из сказанного, сидящий напротив ленинских призраков не только может быть назван роялистом, но и воплощает самого короля (как французского, так и английского), т.е. *главу* государства. Соответственно, его vis-à-vis Ленин — *глава* государства победившей революции. Существенно, что наименование, связывающее социальную роль с частью тела, проявляется во всех трех актуальных для картины языках: русском, английском («head») и французском («à la tête de ...»). Тем самым мотив обезглавливания переплетается с темой власти не только на образном, но и на словесном уровне.

Обратим теперь внимание на числовые совпадения. Количество ягод равно 16 — во Франции был казнен Людовик XVI. Одна ягода выделена из общей кучи — в Англии был казнен Карл I. Количество призраков Ленина на рояле равно 6. Другими словами, соотношение между тремя «вождями» дублируется на числовом уровне: операция обезглавливания (вычеркивание «1» из 16) актуализует 6-кратное изображение «главного обезглавливателя» королей, стоящего во главе революционного террора.

То обстоятельство, что призраки Ленина появляются над клавиатурой рояля, неизбежно ассоциирует их с клавишами. В этой связи оказывается важным, что их не 7, а 6 — одна голова отсутствует. Это вновь актуализует тему отсечения, обезглавливания, причем по отношению к самому революционеру — «обезглавливателю».

Как уже говорилось выше, на месте нот в тетради оказываются термиты, изображение которых структурно повторяет изображение ягод, устанавливая отношение эквивалентности между ни-

ми. Это подкрепляется также и внешним сходством между ягодами и нотами. Получается, что ноты «сбежали» из нотной тетради, «превратившись» в ягоды: часть, в норме неотделимая от целого, получила противоестественную самостоятельность. Аналогичным же образом (как результат операции разделения) может быть интерпретировано и то обстоятельство, что стул отставлен неестественно далеко от рояля. В результате музыкальные произведения исполняться не могут: «партия рояля» оказывается уничтоженной, а музыка глохнет. Поэтому чрезвычайно содержательной оказывается актуализация в произведении языка как подтекста: одна знаковая система, основанная на звучании, заменяет собой другую — хотя бы в качестве внутренних, неслышимых звуков. Другими словами, своей собственной художественной структурой картина рассказывает историческую правду об атмосфере безгласия, воцарившегося в результате революционного террора.

Изображение ленинских голов само напоминает ягоды, причем собственно голова соответствует косточке, а ореол вокруг нее — мякоти. (Кстати, это еще раз объясняет их число: цифра 6 напоминает как ягоду, так и ноту.) На словесном языке это может быть прочитано как «плоды революции»: в конечном итоге вожди революции гибнут от действия запущенной ими самими революционной машины, на что и указывает отделенная от тела голова Ленина.

Гало вокруг голов Ленина порождает еще одну звукосмысловую перекличку: «hallucination» — «halo». То есть «галлюцинация» происходит сразу в двух планах — и в образном и в словесном. Причем между ними имеется пересечение — в данном случае за счет сходства означающих, которые, с одной стороны, порождаются образами этой галлюцинации («гало»), а с другой — описывают сам этот процесс (слово «галлюцинация»).[6]

Проблема части и целого, воплощенная в мотиве обезглавливания, проявляет себя и в соотношении личности и коллектива, человека и общества: вместо нот — знаков, связанных с индивидуальным творчеством, тетрадь кишит термитами, т.е. общественными насекомыми. Уже сам характер видения — многократ-

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[6] В «Tragic Myth of Millet's Angelus» Дали описал замысел этой картины, употребив слово «halos» в явном виде.

ное повторение одного и того же изображения — намекает на то-
талитарную трактовку личности в обществе ленинского типа.

Ленинские изображения обладают также сходством с лам-
пой — и формой, и ореолом. В соответствии с общей чуткостью
Дали к словесным штампам это позволяет предположить, что в
картине получило отражение знакомство Дали и с «электрифика-
цией всей страны» и с пресловутой «лампочкой Ильича». При
этом помещение (по принципу «джин в бутылке») головы вождя
в сосуд, носящий его имя, очередной раз актуализует столь важ-
ное для картины соотношение части и целого. «Частичность»
проявляет здесь себя по отношению к целостности двойную
агрессивность — и в том, что голова отделена от тела — своего
прежнего целого, и в том, что по отношению к новому объекту
часть «претендует» на доминирующее» положение, заполняя
«лампочку» почти целиком.

С учетом темы партии, воплощенной в названии, получается,
что чисто художественными средствами Дали продемонстриро-
вал, что мнимо целостное сочетание «коммунистическая партия»
содержит в себе неразрешимое противоречие между общим
(«коммунистическая») и отдельным («партия»), целым и частью.
А мир, построенный на таком фундаменте, оказывается ущерб-
ным и монструозным — как голова Ленина в лампочке-ягодке.
Другими словами, картина выявляет абсурдность клише тотали-
тарной идеологии и отвергает тоталитаризм с эстетических пози-
ций. Кроме того, картина показывает, что в исторической реаль-
ности стоит за семантическими противоречиями в таких клише:
гильотина, т.е. машина для отделения головы от тела, на практи-
ке реализует противоречие между частью и целым, ханжески
скрытое в мнимо безобидном названии «коммунистическая пар-
тия».

Сказанное отнюдь не означает, что миру тоталитаризма в кар-
тине противопоставлен мир абсолютизма королевской власти.
Напротив, ряд значимых деталей показывает, что и вождь рево-
люции и ее жертва обнаруживают родственные черты или допол-
няют друг друга в единое целое. Сидящая слева фигура «роя-
листа», воплощающего в себе королевскую власть, мертвенно
бледна, в то время как появляющиеся напротив нее головы
пышут здоровьем. Мертвенное целое и неестественно живая
часть образуют пару, обе составляющие которой (каждая по свое-

му) ассоциируются с обществом, непригодным для нормальной жизни. При этом мертвенность «роялиста» выражена (как и многое другое в картине) двойным, словесно-образным способом. На белой нарукавной повязке «роялиста» изображены ягоды (как и на стуле, которого он касается рукой, и где лежат «настоящие» ягоды). Слово «ягода» в английском языке, об актуальности которого для картины говорилось выше, — «berry», что звучит так же, как и «bury» — хоронить. Шесть изображений вождя-коллективиста и одно — вождя-абсолютиста составляют в сумме 7, т.е. число нот, давая таким образом сомнительную гармонию - как палача и жертвы, так и двух разных видов власти. Причем оба эти вида взаимно проникают друг в друга: 6 голов Ленина парят над роялем (королевская), а на плечах короля мантия заменяет кусок полотна — англ. «linen», что дает явную анаграмму «Ленин».

Слева на картине показана дверь, своим французским названием («porte») вновь отсылающая к проблеме части («part», «partielle»). Сияющий там голубоватый свет противопоставлен и желтизне ленинских лампочек и черно-белой мертвенной бледности королевской власти. Что за мир находится за дверью — неизвестно. Дверь приоткрыта лишь *частично*.

L'enigma de Guillaume Tell

Как и в предыдущем случае, язык оказывается ключевым фактором в смысловой структуре произведения. Прежде всего, само появление Ленина в данной картине дублируется на языковом уровне анаграммой в названии: «*L'enig*me» — «*Lenin*». При этом собирание единого образа из противоречивых элементов (исторических реалий разных эпох и народов) аналогично собиранию слова в анаграмму из букв «неправильным» способом, основанном на их перестановке. Уже одно это хотя бы отчасти проливает свет на природу указанной в названии «загадки» — она связана со скрытыми языковыми выражениями и анаграммами.

Ленин на этой картине изображен без штанов (что в свое время столь возмутило коллег Дали — сюрреалистов), т.е., по-французски, — «sans culottes». Это прямо отсылает к санкюлотам и подключает к проблематике картины тему Великой француз-

ской революции и — сообразно с героем картины — тему революции вообще. Здесь сразу всплывает главный революционный атрибут — гильотина, анаграмматически зашифрованная в имени персонажа: «*Guill*aume» — «*guill*otine» (ср. с анаграммой этого же слова в разобранной выше другой картине Дали). В таком контексте содержательным становится конкретный способ анаграммирования фамилии вождя революции: первая («*заглавная*» на родном языке персонажа) буква слова «L'enigma» отделяется от остальной части слова апострофом, давая иконическое соответствие гильотинированию.

Тема головы связана не только с революцией, но и (в соответствии с названием и темой картины) с швейцарской легендой о Вильгельме Телле. Согласно этой легенде наместник Габсбургов приказал установить на шесте шляпу с тем, чтобы прохожие ей кланялись. Другой ключевой момент легенды, связанный с головой, состоит в том, что наместник принудил Телля сбить стрелой яблоко с головы собственного сына. На картине из-за левого локтя Ленина выглядывает нечто, напоминающее то ли яблоко, то ли голову младенца, покрытую чем-то красно-коричневым. Поза Ленина и выражение его лица таковы, как если бы он действительно держал на руках младенца, не видного из-за плеча. В своем комментарии к картине Дали утверждал, что на голову младенца (с которым он отождествлял себя самого) возложена

котлета. Можно заметить, что указанное художником слово дает анаграмму фамилии Вильгельма и его сына: «с*ôtelett*e» — «*Tell*». Нужно еще учесть, что по-французски «обезглавливание» — «decollation», а «collation» — легкий обед. В рассматриваемом контексте это реализует метафору «революция пожирает своих детей», усиленную тем, что у Ленина, как известно, детей не было.

В картине благодаря как самой легенде о Вильгельме Телле, так и ее литературной версии, созданной Шиллером, актуализован и немецкий язык. (Значимость немецкой и швейцарской тем подкрепляется деталями революционной биографии Ленина.) В левом нижнем углу картины нарисована книга — «Buch». По-французски же «boucher» — мясник. Поскольку книга своими очертаниями напоминает плаху (которая во французском языке обозначается тем же словом «billot», что и чурбан для рубки мяса), все это сообщает теме поедания зловещие коннотации. А в упомянутую выше метафору «революция пожирает своих детей» вторгается образ разделки туш, ассоциирующийся с гильотинированием.

Ряд содержательных моментов, связанный с анаграммами, выявляется при помощи русского языка, на котором, как известно, разговаривал главный герой картины. Его инициалы В.И.Л., т.е. «верхушка» полного имени (буквенный аналог головы) получаются как раз отсечением первой части имени персонажа легенды, если его взять в немецком варианте и написать по-русски — *Вильгельм* (ср. с указанной нами выше ролью апострофа в слове «L'enigma»). То обстоятельство, что мотив отсечения головы затрагивает имя, служит достаточно ясным намеком на судьбу вождей революции, которых она уничтожает ими же избранным способом. Кроме того, надпись на книге, удваивая заглавие, тем самым акцентирует его как структурный элемент. А русское написание соответствующего слова — «*заглавие*» — отсылает, опять-таки, к теме головы. При этом ряд дополнительных деталей (срезанная часть обложки с острыми краями, поперечная тень от удлиненного козырька) очередной раз намекает на обезглавливание. Поскольку неестественно удлиненный козырек кепки на голове Ленина присоединен к шесту (где, согласно легенде, была водружена шляпа наместника), Ленин оказывается одновременно и в положении наместника, т.е. палача (тем более,

как сказано выше, вызывает ассоциации с гильотинированием), и жертвы — объекта будущего обезглавливания.

Тело Ленина включает в себя острый предмет, похожий по форме на наконечник стрелы, которая является существенным атрибутом легенды о Вильгельме Телле. По-французски стрела — «fleche», что ассоциируется с немецким «Fleiche» — плоть. Тем самым монструозное объединение в едином целом разных объектов дублируется на языковом уровне неестественным переплетением французского и немецкого языков, на которых сходным образом звучат столь разные по смыслу слова (плоть и орудие ее уничтожения). Заметим еще, что контуры фигуры Ленина напоминают свастику. В результате на картине предстает монстр, образованный соединением элементов, отсылающих к трем разным диктатурам — французской, русской и немецкой.

Конструктивный принцип произведения является зримым воплощением смыслового противоречия между целым и частью, общим и отдельным в словосочетании «коммунистическая партия», вождь которой изображен на картине. В этом отношении она дополняет созданную двумя годами ранее работу «Hallucination partielle ...», которая была проанализирована нами выше. Если в «Hallucination partielle ...» упор делался на противоестественном распаде, то здесь — на столь же противоестественном объединении в единое целое не сочетающихся друг с другом частей.[7] Отметим еще мотив отцовства, который в данном случае приобретает тоталитарные коннотации: на картине изображен, как отмечал сам Дали, «fantome *pater*nel», что анаграмматически отсылает к обществу, где доминирует часть — партия, «*parti*».

То обстоятельство, что название картины написано на книге, имеет общий смысл: оно подчеркивает роль словесного языка в картине (частными реализациями которого оказываются французский, немецкий и русский), давая тем самым код, с помощью которого может быть дана разгадка (разумеется, не более чем частичная) загадки, указанной в заглавии.

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[7] Ср. с «Предчувствием гражданской войны», в котором также значима ориентация на словесные штампы. См. об этом Е. Завадская. Загадка Сальвадора Дали. Творчество, 1989, № 1, с. 29.

Заключение

Обе рассмотренные картины обнаруживают сходство как в общих конструктивных принципах (прежде всего связанных с ролью языка как подтекста), так и в отдельных мотивах. В обоих случаях возникает анаграмматически зашифрованный мотив гильотины, анаграммирование затрагивает имя вождя революции и руководимой им коммунистической партии и т.д.

Проделанный выше разбор показал, что картинам Дали свойственна совершенно необычная для живописи степень аналитичности — в данном случае воплощенная в беспощадном и остроумном анализе семантических основ тоталитаризма. В значительной степени это, опять-таки, связано с ролью языка: в то время как образы в основном реализуют деятельность синтетического характера, язык с его дискретностью тяготеет к анализу. Двойной (логически — образный) характер творчества Дали оказался особенно уместен по отношению к теме тоталитаризма: наглядно продемонстрировано превосходство неоднородной семиотической системы (которая для нормального функционирования должна быть как минимум двуязычной) над свойственным тоталитаризму моноязычием.

Проделанный разбор, как и предыдущие работы (см. прим. 1,2), ставят ряд общих вопросов. С точки зрения общих принципов поэтики представляет самостоятельный интерес попытка классификации различных типов взаимодействий между образом и словом, приводящих к созданию анаграмм. Кроме того, сам по себе феномен «язык как подтекст» в живописи нуждается в дальнейшем осмыслении с семиотической точки зрения.

Image-and language-bearing analysis of totalitarism in two "Lenin" Dali pictures

It was shown in the previous author's work (Arbor Mundi 1997, #5, 165–181) that one of the fundamentals of Dali's poetics consists in the phenomenon «language as an underlying idea». In accordance with this, the key semantic role in a picture is played by the phonetic structure of words corresponding to images. Interplay between different implied words leads to the close similarity between a picture and poetic text. As such con-

nection touches upon deep links between language and thought, studying this phenomenon is of interest for elucidating how author's world view is embodied in his artistic creation.

In the present paper we study representation of the phenomenon of totalitarism in Dali's painting analyzing his two works depicting Lenin («Hallucination partielle. Six apparitions de Lénine sur un piano» and «L'enigma de Guillaume Tell»). We argue that in fact Dali carried out in these pictures the semantic analysis of the notion «communistic party» and reveal its inner contradictoriness in what concerns the relationship between the whole and part. The ultimate realization of this property is found to be a guillotine — machinery for beheading which is just the separation of the part embodying personality from the whole. Guillotine is present in both pictures either as an image (given as a hint) or as a word due to an anagrams. The method of constructing these anagrams duplicates, from the structural viewpoint, the principle of splitting the whole to parts. Apart from the anagram of guillotine, there are series of other key words and interplay between them in the pictures. They include, in particular, the name «Lenin» and some historical details mainly connected with the theme of Great French revolution.

Double (logical and graphic) character of the Dali creation turned out to be very much to the point with respect to the theme of totalitarism. It demonstrates clearly superiority of semiotically inhomogeneous system (which should be at least bilingual for normal functioning) over cultural unilinguism inherent to totalitarism.

Totalitarismi keelelis-kujundlik analüüs
kahe Dali "Lenini-pildi" põhjal

Eelmine autori töö (Arbor Mundi 1997, #5, 165–181) näitas, et Dali poeetika üheks põhikoostisosaks on "keele kui baasidee" fenomen. Vastavalt sellele mängib pildi puhul põhirolli kujunditele vastav sõnade foneetiline struktuur. Erineva tähendusega sõnade vastastikune mõju muudab pildi poeetilise teksti sarnaseks. Kuna seesugune sarnasus puudutab keele ja mõtlemise vahelisi süvaseoseid, võimaldab antud nähtuse uurimine seletada, mil viisil peegeldub autori maailmapilt tema loomingus.

Käesolevas töös uuritakse totalitarismi fenomeni esitust Dali maalides, analüüsides kaht tema Leninit kujutavat tööd ("Hallucination partielle. Six apparitions de Lénine sur un piano" ja "L'enigma de Guillaume Tell"). Väidetakse, et õigupoolest on Dali nendel piltidel andnud mõiste "kommunistlik partei" semantilise analüüsi, ning paljastatakse selle sisemine vastuolulisus osa ja terviku suhtesse puutuvas. Selle lõplik realisatsioon

näib olevat giljotiin, seadeldis peade maharaiumiseks, mis kujutab endast just nimelt isiksust kehastava osa eraldamist tervikust. Giljotiin esineb mõlemal pildil kas (vihjena antava) kujutisena või siis sõnana (anagrammides). Struktuuri vaatepunktist paljundab nende anagrammide konstrueerimise meetod terviku osadeks jaotamise printsiipi. Peale giljotiini-anagrammi leidub piltidel hulk teisi võtmesõnu ning vastastikuseid seoseid. Eriti koosnevad need nimest "Lenin" ja mõningaist peamiselt Suure Prantsuse Revolutsiooni teemaga seonduvaist detailidest.

Ilmnes, et Dali loomingu kahepoolne (loogiline ja graafiline) iseloom on totalitarismi teema puhul väga asjakohane. See demonstreerib selgesti semiootiliselt mittehomogeense süsteemi (mis peab normaalseks funktsioneerimiseks olema vähemalt kakskeelne) ülimuslikkust totalitarismile omase unilingvismi suhtes.

Память текста и текст как память

Юлле Пярли

Настоящая статья,[1] посвященная проблемам "памяти" поэтического образа, представляет собой попытку рассмотреть отдельное стихотворение как звено в творческом процессе. Как образы, повторяющиеся в предыдущих текстах и приобретающие в ходе этого повторения различные коннотации, способны создавать все более многозначные смысловые конструкции, — демонстрируется нами на анализе стихотворения Иосифа Бродского *Послесловие к басне*:

"Еврейская птица ворона,
зачем тебе сыра кусок?
Чтоб каркать во время урона,
терзая продрогший лесок?"

"Нет! Чуждый ольхе или вербе,
чье главное свойство — длина,
сыр с месяцем схож на ущербе.
Я в профиль его влюблена".

"Точней, ты скорее астроном,
ворона, чем жертва лисы.
Но профиль, присущий воронам,
пожалуй, не меньшей красы".

Я просто мечтала о браке,
пока не столкнулась с лисой,
пытаясь помножить во мраке
свой профиль на сыр со слезой".
1992² (III: 256)³

Стихотворение с названием *Послесловие к басне* можно понимать и как "послесловие", обобщение пройденной жизни — истории в структуре басни, и как послесловие к басне — творчеству, если "басню" истолковать не как жанр, а в значении "вымысла".

И в том и другом случае реализуется прямой смысл слова "после" — т.е. тогда, кода все уже завершилось.

Взгляд на собственную жизнь и творчество как на то, что длится, когда все уже было, длится "после" — взгляд, распространенный в поздних стихах Бродского. "Жизнь моя затянулась" — звучит через все стихотворение *Эклога 4-я (зимняя)* . Но сходная точка зрения встречается и в более раннем творчестве поэта. Ср., например: "Что сказать мне о жизни? Что оказалась длинной" в стихотворении *Я входил вместо дикого зверя в клетку ...* (1980, III: 7); "Жизнь бессмысленна. Или / слишком длинна." (*Мексиканский дивертисмент*, II: 373). А собственно "длина" жизни приближает ее к самой пустоте, к тому, что ее длинней — "Ничего на земле нет длиннее, чем жизнь без нас" (III: 157). В этом смысле *Послесловие к басне* перекликается с многочисленными элегическими стихотворениями Бродского, написанными *Памяти ...* или *На смерть ...*

Но, тем не менее, рассматриваемое нами стихотворение написано Бродским как своеобразный "эпимифий" именно к басне Крылова "Ворона и лисица". Само построение басни, где мораль предшествует изложению истории, оставляет конец открытым для такого послесловия. И изложенный Крыловым басенный сюжет, и двусоставность построения басни и ее серийность, и

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² Автор благодарен проф. Кильского университета Валентине Полухиной за уточнение времени написания стихотворения. В *Сочинениях ...* указан 1993 год.

³ Все тексты И. Бродского цитируются по изданию: *Сочинения Иосифа Бродского*. Санкт-Петербург, 1992–95.

низкое расположение в жанровой иерархии использованы Бродским в поэтике стихотворения.

Если *Послесловие к басне* действительно претендует на роль морали к басне, то мы имеем дело с текстом, абсолютизирующим свойство басенной морали не совсем соответствовать рассказу, о чем писала в свое время Е. В. Падучева, анализируя построение басен Эзопа (Падучева 1977: 53). Именно эту особенность выделяет в басне Крылова "Ворона и лисица" Л. С. Выготский: "мораль, которая идет от Эзопа, Федра, Лафонтена, в сущности говоря, совершенно не совпадает с тем басенным рассказом, которому она предпослана у Крылова" (Выготский 1987: 114). Построив стихотворение как разговор с осмеянной в традиционной басне вороной, поэт меняет "тематического" персонажа и стирает формальную грань между историей и ее обобщающим смыслом. У Бродского автор выступает в роли вопрошателя, строящего гипотезы, но в то же время он не лишен и свойств баснописца — за автором, участником диалога, стоит автор, знающий истинный, потаенный смысл происходящих событий.

Раздвоенность лирического субъекта, форма диалога — типичный для Бродского прием, выражающий изначальную и неизбежную раздвоенность "Я" и превращающий каждый из отдельно звучащих голосов в несамостоятельный. При этом своеобразно обыгрывается и двусоставность басенной структуры. Стихотворение представляет собой одновременно и историю, рассказ, и его осмысление; память о пройденном, утраченном, и смысл этой утраты. Сам басенный сюжет и ее условные герои — ворона, лиса — одна из возможностей "изоляции", дистанцирования от действительной истории, необходимая для ее эстетизации. Отсылка к классической басне занимает как бы среднее, промежуточное место в создании этой эстетизированной условной биографии "Я".

Не менее важным, чем связь с самой классической басней, является с точки зрения образования смысла текста "память" о тех произведениях, в которых уже встречались эпизоды сюжета басни "Ворона и лисица", и связь со стихотворениями, где образы, представленные в басне, включены в совершенно иной контекст. Основные образы стихотворения — басенные — 'ворона', 'сыр', 'лиса' — а также 'месяц', 'астроном', 'длина', 'ольха', 'верба' — образы, неоднократно повторяющиеся в творчестве

Бродского. В *Послесловии к басне* они сложно мотивированы семантикой, приобретенной в ходе этого повторения, продолжают "помнить", сохранять ее за собой. Многие из них повторяются и внутри анализируемого стихотворения. Так, например, 'ворона' ("Еврейская птица ворона"; "ты скорее астроном, / ворона"; "профиль, присущий воронам) и 'сыр' ("сыра кусок", "сыр с месяцем схож", "сыр со слезой") повторяясь, не совпадают в своих коннотативных значениях, они выдвигают то те, то другие оттенки значения и осуществляют тем самым одновременно диалог с разными произведениями из предшествующего творчества поэта. В то же время, через эти повторы они все более теряют определенность, что вполне соответствует основной ситуации стихотворения — ситуации исчезновения, потери.

Прежде всего *Послесловие к басне* входит в контекст стихотворений, тоже написанных как диалог с птицей (от *Диалога* 1962 года (I: 186–87) до *"Что ты делаешь, птичка, на черной ветке ..."* 1993 г. (III: 265). Оно примыкает и к кругу стихотворений, где мотивы творчества, души связаны именно с образом птицы: *Большая элегия Джону Донну* (I: 247–251), *Осенний крик ястреба* (II: 377–380) и другие. Первое обращение к самой крыловской басне относится к 1964 г., когда были написаны "Воронья песня" (I: 103) и "Развивая Крылова" (I: 321). Происходило это явно опосредованно, через интерпретацию ситуации и образов крыловской басни О. Мандельштамом. И далее в поэзии Бродского мандельштамовское истолкование сохраняется, обрастая новыми коннотациями.

В *Вороньей песне* поэт прямо соотносит себя с вороной из басни: "Выронив сыр из клюва / но поймав червяка" (I: 103). "Червяк чернильный" — песня, песня картавая. Обращение к басне служит здесь, в частности, средством создания самоиронии. В дальнейшем образ 'вороны' то сохраняет ироническую окраску, то теряет ее, — становится элементом поэтической метафизики Бродского, сближаясь с более благородными птицами в системе образов поэта , типа 'скворца' или 'ястреба'. В 60-е гг. творчество нередко сравнивается с карканьем вороны:

> Стихи его то глуше, то звончей,
> то с карканьем сливаются вороньим.
> *Дом тучами придавлен до земли ...* (I: 338)

Как птица неперелетная, 'ворона' приобретает значение поэта — патриота по необходимости:

> Хотя вообще для птичьего ума
> понятья нет страшнее, чем зима,
> куда сильней страшится перелета
> наш длинноносый северный Икар.
> И потому пронзительное "карр!"
> звучит для нас как песня патриота.
> *Отрывок* (II: 46)

Позже, в *Эклоге 4-й (зимней)* Бродский еще раз близко повторяет этот образ:

> Только ворона не принимает снега,
> и вы слышите, как кричит ворона
> картавым голосом патриота. (III: 16)

А последняя строфа *Прощальной оды* (1964), как известно, построена как смесь пения птицы певчей и карканья вороны:

> Карр! чивичи-ли-карр! Карр, чивичи-ли ... струи
> снега ли ... карр, чиви ... Карр, чивичи-ли ... ветер ... (I: 313).

Если в вышеприведенных примерах в образе 'вороны' можно было вычитать намек на поэта-еврея, то далее "картавость" будет прямо соотнесена с еврейским выговором: "[развалины] в ломаном "р" еврея / узнают себя ... (III: 43).

Есть в стихах Бродского и отголоски библейской легенды о не вернувшемся в Ковчег во́роне, наказанном за это Богом:

> В Ковчег птенец
> не возвратившись доказует то, что
> вся вера есть не более, чем почта
> в один конец.
> *Разговор с небожителем* (II: 210)

Образ вороны связан и с мотивом дома, гнезда (и разоренного), нередко со смертью. Но чаще всего все же с темой крика. Стихи о вороне являются одной из реализаций темы голоса — крика — звука.

Повторение звука **р** является важнейшей особенностью звуковой структуры стихотворения *Послесловие к басне*; все непарные рифмы содержат **р** как звуковое живописание речи "еврейской птицы".Однако, любопытно, что "картавость" — повторение звуков **к, а, р** — более свойственно речи поэта (еврейская, каркать, время, урона, терзая, продрогший — I строфа; скорее, астроном, ворона, жертва, профиль, присущий воронам, красы — III строфа). В речи же вороны доминирует другой паралелльный звуковой комплекс — **е, л, м** (нет, ольхе, вербе, длина, месяцем, влюблена — II строфа). Вообще II строфа по своему построению резко выделяется на фоне первой, выражая и на формальном уровне пафос отрицания, опровержения вороной точки зрения своего собеседника — 'Нет!'. Далее ворона как бы заражается "картавостью" у поэта, а последний, в свою очередь, меняет свою интонацию, принимая ответ вороны ('пожалуй' — прямое выражение такой уступки) и в IV строфе уравновешены оба фонетических комплекса. И в рифмах они взаимопроникаются — ворона/урона, кусок/лесок, вербе/ущербе, длина/влюблена. Думается, что определенное значение для смысла стихотворения имеет то, что по своей фонетической характеристике согласные 'р' 'л' и 'м' очень близки друг-другу. Будучи сонорными, они занимают промежуточную позицию между гласными и согласными, приближаясь с гласными по преобладанию музыкального тона. Такая промежуточность, стертость или невыраженность признаков вполне соответствует поэтике текста в целом.

Для ритмического рисунка текста характерно, что если в первой и второй строфах метрические границы могли "разбивать" слова (особенно во II строфе), то к концу стихотворения границы стопы и слова начинают все более совпадать. Сильное ударение на первом слоге первой строки особо выделяет вторую строфу — оно добавляет одну стопу и стих начинает звучать как четырехстопный дактиль. Слова 'главное' и 'с месяцем', изоморфные дактилической стопе, поддерживают такое впечатление. Но это не ассоциация с дактилическим размером как таковым, а отсылка к конкретному тексту, к элегии *Тучи* М. Лермонтова, к последней строфе стихотворения: "Нет, вам наскучили нивы бесплодные ... / Чужды вам страсти и чужды страдания". 'Нет' приобретает тем самым в стихотворении Бродского значение протеста против жанра басни. В отличие от лирического субъекта (в роли басно-

писца) ворона говорит длинными и сложными по синтаксической структуре фразами, что делает ее речь архаичной, сближает со звучанием классической элегии. Ворона и тучи имеют одинаковую функцию — быть противостоящим поэту риторическим партнером — alter ego поэта (с той разницей, что в *Тучах* поэт сам отвечает на задаваемые вопросы).

Возвращаясь к образу вороны, следует учитывать и то, что он участвует в поэтической системе Бродского в создании контраста черного и белого. Ворона изображается чаще всего на фоне зимнего пейзажа, снега: "Белым — бело. И видит каждый ворон ... " (I: 407).

Образ вороны становится символом мира — негатива, мира наоборот, перевернутого отражения. Наиболее ярким примером являются здесь строки из стихотворения *На отъезд гостя*:

> И, картавя, кричит с высоты
> негатив Вифлеемской звезды (I: 381)

Соотнесенность с небесной высью, как в этом стихотворении, так и в ряде других текстов, в свою очередь сближает этот образ, например, с превращающимися в точку ястребом из *Осеннего крика ястреба*:

> В астрономический объективный ад
>
> птиц, где отсутствует кислород,
> где вместо проса — крупа далеких
> звезд. Что для двуногих высь,
> то для пернатых наоборот.
> Не мозжечком, но в мешочках легких
> он догадывается: не спастись.
>
> И тогда он кричит. (II: 378–9)

Вопрос: "Ты скорее астроном / ворона, чем жертва лисы" в стихотворении *Послесловие к басне* во многом перекликается с поэтическим сюжетом этого стихотворения, а также с концепцией астрономии как науки потерь и ее музы Урании как богини утрат. Ср. в стихотворении *Литовский ноктюрн: Томасу Венцлова*:

> Муза точки в пространстве! Вещей, различаемых
> лишь
> в телескоп! Вычитанья
> без остатка! Нуля! (II: 329)

"Вычитание" же, собственно, то же "умножение во мраке", о котором говорится в *Послесловии к басне*, т.е. потеря очертаний, телесности, как "уступка тела душе" в *Литовском ноктюрне,* или слову, голосу, которые могут оставить тело, от него отделиться.

В целом образ вороны в разных текстах Бродского может находиться и в положении "низком" и "высоком", т.е. быть образом сакральным и профанным, что вполне соответствует амбивалентности ворона — вороны в мифах, его роли быть медиатором между жизнью и смертью, небом и землей, загробным царством (См. об этом: Гура 1993; Мелетинский 1979). И в *Послесловии к басне* он находится в центре вертикальной линии — тяготения вниз (мотив урона), и вверх (влюбленность в своего двойника — месяц).

В семе 'сыр', влекущей за собой паронимы 'сырье', 'сырость', в свою очередь оживляются значения, приобретенные в предыдущих текстах, и участвуют в образовании образа 'сыра' в анализируемом нами стихотворении.

Именно через этот образ осуществляется отсылка к теме памяти. Сыр — самая распространенная в поэзии Бродского метафора памяти. "Сыр дырявый" — память несовершенная, приобретает свой космический аналог в виде "черных дыр" в космосе. И когда, например, с помощью этого метафорического образа поэт описывает освещение, то, тем не менее, и здесь главными становятся ассоциации с потерей памяти:

> желтизну подворотни, как сыр простофили,
> пожирает лиса темноты.
> *Литовский ноктюрн (*II: 326)

А в стихотворении *Темза в Челси*:

> это — начало большого сырого мира,
> где мостовая, которая нас вскормила (II: 351)

К этим значениям прибавляется как воспоминание о России как о "матери-сырой земле". В стихотворении *Колыбельная Трескового Мыса*:

> перемена [империи] , связана с колкой дров,
> с превращеньем мятой сырой изнанки
> жизни в сухой платяной покров
> (в стужу — из твида, в жару — из нанки),
> с затвердевающим по орех
> мозгом. Вообще из всех
>
> внутренностей только одни глаза
> сохраняют свою студенистость ... (II: 357–8)

Метафорический эпитет 'сырое' перекликается с другими образами — синонимами "влаги", обозначающими наличие жизни, — в противоположность образам высыхания, затвердевания.

Далее 'сырое' будет соотнесено у Бродского с таким своим паронимом как 'сырье' в значении телесности, смертности человека. Человек — сырье для смерти, времени, искусства. Ср.: "... прялка морщин. Она работает на сырье залежей, чьих запас / неиссякаем, пока производят нас" (III: 237); [батареи системы отсутствия] работая, видимо, от сети / на сырье, поставляемом смертью, арестом или / просто ревностью" (III: 240); "Горизонтальная масса в морге / выглядит как сырье садовой скульптуры" (III: 203). И в то же время мотив сырости — влаги продолжает развивать тему памяти. Необработанные же в стихи воспоминания, впечатления — сырье стихов. В этом смысле 'сыр' — 'сырье' имеет перекличку с цветаевским бытом-сырьем, непреображенным в стихи материалом (См.: Ельницкая 1988: 269).

Образ "сыра со слезой" из стихотворения *Послесловие к басне* естественно вписывается в этот контекст. Хотя, именно в силу полимотивированности этого образа невозможно однозначно ответить на вопрос — что же досталось в добычу лисе. Прежде всего сыр является символом потери. Потери жизни, памяти, отказа от собственного тела, неизбежной жертвы при устремлении ввысь. Семантика потери заключена уже в звучании слова сыр. Единственный гласный "ы" — фонема в русском языке спорная. Существует ли она вообще? Когда Бродский пишет в стихотворении *Декабрь во Флоренции*: О, неизбежность "ы" в правописании "жизни"! (II: 358), то помимо разницы между словом произнесенным и словом написанным, правомерны и коннотации, основанные на этой двусмысленности самого звука. Как, впрочем, "ы" может отсылать и к осознанию поэтом неизбежного восточного начала в собственной биографии (ср. оценку "ы" как

звука татарского Андреем Белым). В *Портрете трагедии* (1991)
поэт актуализирует весь этот смысловой комплекс:

> Давай, трагедия, действуй. Из гласных, идущих горлом,
> выбери "ы", придуманное монголом.
> Сделай его существительным, сделай его глаголом,
>
> наречьем и междометием. "Ы" — общий вдох и выдох!
> "Ы" мы хрипим, блюя от потерь и выгод
> либо — кидаясь к двери с табличкой "выход".
>   (III: 207)

Тема потери, ущерба становится преобладающей в стихотворении *Послесловие к басне*. Она воплощается не только в семантике, но и в структуре образов. Так, в главных образах стихотворения, таких как 'птица ворона', 'месяц на ущербе', 'сыра кусок'
прямо выражено значение части какого-либо целого. При этом
небезразлично, что все они построены по принципу убывания. Не
кусок сыра, а сыра кусок. Интересна в этом смысле первая строка
стихотворения. Как обращение она представляет собой одну синтаксическую позицию, целое, но на лексическом уровне делится
на части — обозначение рода и вида. Семантика нецелого,
исчезающего, убывающего выражена и в следующих словах:
'лесок', 'время урона', 'профиль', 'меньшей'. Думается, что выражение 'точней ты скорее' реализует в одном случае значение
точки, т.е. стать все более похожим на точку, и в другом —
скорость превращения в нее. А в деепричастии 'терзая' сохраняется значение глагола "терзать" — рвать, раздирать на куски. Но
наиболее значимым и богатым коннотациями является в этом
ряду 'профиль', трижды повторяющийся в тексте стихотворения
в сходной позиции в начале строки: "Я в профиль ...", "Но профиль ...", "свой профиль ...". Профиль — это профиль вороны,
профиль месяца, сыра кусок, похожий на месяц на ущербе,
собственный профиль поэта. Именно в "профиле" все образы
сближены друг с другом, сливаются в одно, теряя свою дискретность, дополняют или становятся отражением друг — друга.
Лишь деревья — 'ольха' и 'верба' противостоят этому кругу образов — и не только потому, что "их главное свойство — длина",
но и из-за отсутствия у них профиля. По сравнению с анфас профиль, это твердость, резкость, обостренность контур, подчеркнутость границ. Ср.:

Повернись ко мне в профиль. В профиль черты лица
обыкновенно отчетливее, устойчивее овала
с его блядовитыми свойствами колеса:
склонностью к перемене мест и т.д. и т.п.
Повернись ко мне в профиль ... (III: 80)
Но было естественней каменеть
в профиль, утратив речь.
Полдень в комнате (II: 451)

Профиль, ввиду актуализации контуров, означает и предел бытия-небытия, крайнюю степень телесности. Ведь и затвердевание — то, чему следует превращение в пыль, в Ничто. Отсюда, например, и образ стула в профиль, напоминающий "ь" в стихотворении *Посвящается стулу* (III: 145–7), т.е. сравнение через непроизносимую букву, или образ 'ветра в профиль'. Профиль предполагает другую, скрытую от глаз сторону, это одна сторона из двух, левое, предпологающее правое. Думается, что и письмо, движущееся слева направо, видится поэту в профиль, а то, что скрывается за видимой частью письма, так и остается загадкой. В этом смысле сам облик строк символизирует то, что в них выражено, и то, что остается за ними невербального, невыраженного. Ср. также в стихотворении *Колыбельная Трескового Мыса*: "в полушарье орла сны содержат дурную явь / полушария решки". (II: 359). Образы той и обратной стороны вещей, образы изнанки часто встречаются в поэзии Бродского: "тыльная сторона светила" (II: 207), "с литерами ЭФАК" (II: 207), "Привет, оборотная сторона медали", "Прижаться /.../ / к грубой доске с той стороны иконы," (III: 206), "и капля , сверкая, плывет в зенит, / чтобы взглянуть на мир с той стороны сетчатки." (III: 216) и др. Все указанные коннотации участвуют в моделировании идейной структуры стихотворения *Послесловие к басне,* построенного по принципу рефлексии. А мечта о 'браке' во 'мраке', собственно, исчезновение за черту небытия, слияние с временем через свое телесное 'отсутствие'. Не случайно Бродский в другом стихотворении, написанном в форме диалога с птицей — *Что ты делаешь птичка, на черной ветке ...* (1993) — рифмует 'вечность' и 'бесчеловечность'. Отсюда и нерелевантность категории рода в словах ворона и месяц и обманный характер собственно любовного сюжета, вписанного в басню. 'Месяц' имеет в этом стихотворении значение и времени и небесного тела. Поэтическая идея вечной жизни тяготеет по мнению Бродского именно к космо-

гонии, что позволяет в в образе месяца одновременно видеть идею времени (история в структуре басни) и идею вечности (универсальный смысл истории). Значение же месяца как меры времени (ср. его название как производное от глагола "мерить", "измерять") приводит нас к образу двуликого Януса, как бы скрыто присутствующего в данном стихотворении. Знаменательно и то, что лики последнего могут быть "одно белое, другое черное" (Голан 1993: 136). Да и сам образ 'мрака', соединяя грядущее с прошлым (когда прошлое перестает быть освещенным памятью), приобретает значение времени. Время, соотносимое с земной судьбой человека, смертью, выражено и в образе лисы-охотника. Ср. в стихотворении *Дни расплетают тряпочку...*:

> То ли сыр пересох, то ли дыханье сперло.
> Либо: птица в профиль ворона, а сердцем — кенар
> Но простая лиса, перегрызая горло,
> не разбирает, где кровь, где тенор. (III: 20)

Думается, темой времени определен и выбор стихотворного размера. В формальной организации стихотворения в целом реализованы два принципа — дуальности и троичности. Текст состоит из четырех четверостиший (чередование голосов автора и вороны) с перекрестной рифмой. Размер трехсложный — амфибрахий, который оценивается Бродским как монотонный, обладающий интонацией времени, снимающий акценты. В этом размере поэтом написаны преимущественно рождественские стихотворения. Обладающий в поэзии Бродского определенным семантическим ореолом, он вносит в стихотворение *Послесловие к басне* новые смысловые оттенки.

То, что стихи на рождество написаны четырехстопным амфибрахием, а *Послесловие к басне* трехстопным, заставляет ритм стихотворения воспринимать как усеченный, несовершенный по сравнению с первыми, что соответствует и характеру идейных связей между ними.

В целом стихотворение моделирует ситуацию, о которой Бродский, говоря о свойствах поэзии, пишет: "устремляясь ввысь звук скидывает балласт". Многозначность образов, позволяющая реализоваться одновременно нескольким лирическим сюжетам и втягивать в экспрессивное поле текста самые разные иные тексты, превращает стихотворение в акт памяти, в котором стираются его собственные границы.

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Teksti mälu ja tekst kui mälu

Autor käsitleb konkreetse J. Brodski luuletuse "Järelsõna valmile" ana- lüüsi alusel teksti ja kujundi mäluga seonduvaid probleeme. Üksikteksti kujundisüsteemi on vaadeldud poeedi loomingu kui tervikteksti osana. Luuletuse interpreteerimisel on arvestatud konnotatsioone, mis on seonduvad teose põhikujunditega ('vares', 'juust', 'kuu' 'profiil' 'pime- dus' jt.) varem kirjutatud tekstides, žanri-mälu, viiteid, mis tulenevad luuletuse rütmilisest struktuurist. Autor püüab näidata, kuidas elemen- tidest, mis toovad uude teksti kaasa terve tähendustekompleksi, moo- dustub keeruline semantiline struktuur (tekstis realiseeruvad paralleelselt erinevad lüürilised süžeed), mille tähendusväli on praktiliselt piiritlematu. Luuletuse kui teksti piirid hajuvad, teda ennast võib vaadelda kui mäluakti.

The memory of a text and text as a memory

The author examines problems of the text's and image's memory founding her discussion on the analyses of a particular poem by J. Brodsky, "Afterword to a Fable". The image system of a single text is viewed as part of the larger text of the poet's whole creation. The interpretation of the poem takes into account connotations which were connected with the main images in the earlier written texts (*crow, cheese, moon, profile, darkness,* etc.), genre-memory, allusions deriving from the rhythmic structure of the poem. The author tries to show how elements,

which bring into the new text the whole complex of meanings, create an intricate semantic structure (different lyric plots are parallely realized in the text) whose plain of significance is practically indeterminable. The borders of a poem as a text vanish, the poem itself can be looked at as an act of memory.

Частеречная трансформация как троп в современной поэзии

(взаимодействие рефлексов бывшего перфекта)

Людмила Зубова

Ситуация в современной поэзии во многом определяется философией и эстетикой постмодернизма, которая и продолжает традиции авангарда, и отталкивается от них. Мир и язык перестали рассматриваться как система бинарных оппозиций. Ключевой момент постмодернистского мироощущения — признание того, что реальность изначально многозначна, неупорядоченна и процессуальна. В литературе XX в. внимание перенесено с результата познания мира на процесс познания, на переходные состояния, трансформации [см.: Ковтунова, 1990: 11; 1993: 9].

Основной принцип постмодернизма — эклектика и двойное или множественное кодирование, предоставляющее разные возможности понимания [см., напр.: Гройс, 1995: 47–48].

Установка на множественность и неопределенность реляционных значений приводит к тому, что грамматическая форма часто становится тропом: активизируется омонимия формообразующих флексий, создаются контексты, провоцирующие морфологическую и синтаксическую двусмысленность. В результате становятся наглядными условия и механизм трансформаций. Диахрония настойчиво внедряется в синхронию, сама эволюция формы становится художественным образом.

Рассмотрим это явление на формах перфектного происхождения — глагольных и адъективных коррелятах типа *устал — усталый*.

Современный глагол прошедшего времени происходит из древнего краткого перфективного причастия, которое в сочета-

нии с глаголом-связкой *быть* входило в состав перфекта. В древнерусском и старославянском языках, как и во многих современных индоевропейских, "перфект представляет нынешнее состояние как результат прошлых событий, а поэтому его можно назвать ретроспективной разновидностью настоящего времени" [Есперсен, 1958: 314]. Основным различительным признаком перфекта являлось качество субъекта, возникшее в прошлом действии или состоянии и актуальное для настоящего: *онъ есть забылъ* (*забылый*) означало 'теперь он является забывшим'. Для семантики перфекта существенна его субъективность, предполагающая аффективное участие говорящего, потребность специально обратить внимание на результат [см. напр.: Кузнецов, 1959: 195; Бехерт, 1982: 426, 428; Кашкин, 1980: 69].

Причастие совмещает в себе признаки прилагательного и глагола, и при распадении древней системы времен краткое причастие стало в русском языке носителем глагольной функции, а полное — адъективной. Это привело к появлению коррелятивных пар типа *горел - горелый, устал - усталый*.

Однако это соотношение в современном языке далеко от регулярности, а нерегулярность указывает на разную степень адъективации форм на *-лый*.

Во-первых, есть такие прилагательные без соответствующих производящих глаголов: *заядлый, квёлый, рыхлый, унылый* (в результате фонетических изменений и морфологического опрощения они отдалены от современных глаголов *есть, цвести, рыть, ныть* пропущенными звеньями словообразования).[1] Глагольность таких прилагательных можно считать утраченной.

Во-вторых, многие прилагательные лексикализуются в переносном значении, утрачивая прямое: *отсталый, пошлый, беглый, оседлый*. Иногда это приводит к фразеологической связанности: *впалый* (только о частях тела), *снулый* (только о рыбе), *постоялый* (только *двор*). Чем больше сужается значение прилагательного, тем меньше глагольности в нем остается.

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[1] Не исключено, что генетически связаны с перфектом и прилагательные *белый, весёлый, голый, дебелый, комолый, круглый, малый, милый, наглый, подлый, светлый, смуглый, сутулый, тёплый, тяжёлый, утлый, хилый, целый*. Во всяком случае, их суффикс *-л* омонимичен суффиксу перфективного причастия.

В третьих, помимо употребительных прилагательных типа *усталый, горелый, вялый, заплесневелый, облезлый, пухлый, бывалый, умелый, престарелый, прошлый* есть немало совсем редких — зафиксированных словарями, но не входящих в активный словарный запас современного носителя языка: *жевалый, зимовалый, опоздалый, побежалый, упалый, сиделый, стоялый, обветрелый, вспотелый, опрострелый, вымоклый* и мн. др.[2] Сравнение употребительных и редких слов такого типа показывает, что именно освоенность прилагательного языком способствует ослаблению глагольности (обычная деэтимологизация, свойственная и языковой метафоре в отличие от художественной).

Некоторые прилагательные легко присоединяют разнообразные префиксы, что способствует сохранению глагольности: *горелый, загорелый, обгорелый, подгорелый, перегорелый, пригорелый, погорелый, угорелый*, некоторые же совсем не подвержены префиксации и поэтому быстро теряют связь с глаголами (хотя однокоренные глаголы и есть в современном языке) и деэтимологизируются: *дохлый, дряхлый, дряблый, рыхлый, смелый, чахлый, щуплый*. Тенденцию к деэтимологизации проявляют все прилагательные перфективного происхождения, так как она имеет вполне ясные психологические основания: "Когда мы говорим *мерзлая говядина*, мы думаем не столько о том, что она замерзла, сколько о том, **какая** она: холодная, твердая, невкусная и т.д. При словах *заржавелый ключ* нам прежде всего представляется **цвет** ключа, а не то, что он когда-то был чист, а потом заржавел" [Пешковский, 1938: 100].

В. В. Виноградов установил связь употребительности прилагательных на *-лый* с продуктивностью глагольных классов (прилагательные, произведенные от непродуктивных классов, "составляют окаменевшую группу слов, относящуюся, по крайней мере, не к грамматике, а к словарю"), переходностью и возвратностью глаголов ("все прилагательные этого типа образуются только от непереходных невозвратных глаголов") [Виноградов, 1972: 180]. Краткие же формы прилагательных "употребляются лишь в тех случаях, когда они не омонимичны с формами прошедшего времени глагола или когда эта омонимия не создает неудобств для понимания, не ведет к двусмыслице" [там же].

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[2] Примеры из Обратного словаря русского языка.

Очевидно, что чем устойчивее следы глагольности в современном прилагательном, тем больше оно сохраняет в себе значение прошедшего времени, вида и способа глагольного действия. Именно эти грамматические значения, системно не свойственные категории прилагательного[3], но в разной степени унаследованные от перфективного причастия, и могут стать основой грамматического тропа.

Поскольку "две стороны значения перфекта [настоящего и прошедшего времени — Л.З.] трудно удержать в состоянии устойчивого равновесия" [Есперсен, 1958: 315], современные русские рефлексы перфекта — прилагательное и глагол постоянно влияют друг на друга, создавая обширную пограничную область грамматической не-определенности.

Современная поэзия проявляет повышенное внимание к неопределенности, а также к заполнению пустых клеток системы и к восстановлению утраченных звеньев в слово- и формообразовании. Авторы не избегают омонимии глагола и прилагательного в конструкциях типа *Как он смел*!, а, напротив, создают для нее благоприятные условия.

Многочисленные примеры из текстов показывают, что у глагола прошедшего времени потенциально присутствуют и могут вновь проявиться атрибутивные признаки, а у прилагательного— потенциальные предикативные. Иногда это прямо декларируется. Так, у В. Кальпиди грамматическая двойственность слова *выпукла* отмечается автокомментарием:

Обида за любовь и за
отсутствие любви —
росы внезрачная слеза,
что **выпукла** в пыли.
[Кальпиди, 1995: 90].

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[3] Впрочем, в русском языке есть немало отглагольных прилагательных не только перфективного происхождения. Все они сохраняют связь со значением действия или состояния: *молчаливый, терпеливый, забывчивый, ломкий, липкий* и т.п. [см.: Виноградов, 1972: 174]. Генетическая связь с глаголом имеется и у таких прилагательных, как *старый, хитрый* (← стати — 'стать', хытити — 'похищать'); ср. вполне живую связь: *хворый — хворать*.

"В данном случае я подставил образ-штамп "слеза=роса", слегка подретушировав его кратким прилагательным *выпукла*, у которого двойная функция: определения и сказуемого" [Кальпиди, 1995: 101].

Контекстов, в которых глагол предстает кратким прилагательным (сохраняя при этом и глагольность), очень много, особенно со словом *устал*. В современном русском языке соотносительность глагола *устал* и прилагательного *усталый* вполне системна и хорошо ощутима:

Юля, Юленька, Юля Петровна спешит,
Что-то там про себя напевая.
А в груди коммунарское пламя горит!
Ах, училка ты, свинка морская!

Ах, устала она, но довольна она —
торт "Славянка" для мамы достала.
И спешит и скользит ... А вчера допоздна
сочиненья она проверяла
[Кибиров, 1994: 105].

В этом тексте адъективность слова *устала* поддерживается как синтаксически однородным *довольна*, так и фразеологической ассоциацией — штампом школьных сочинений *усталые, но довольные*. В следующих примерах однородное краткое прилагательное тоже адъективирует глагол, однако глагольность сохраняется благодаря возможности конструкций типа *я стар и хочу покоя*, в которых союз *и* может быть не только соединительным, но и причинным:

Нет, ни за что не поеду
и россказням вашим не верю
Что за младенец грядущий?
Стар я уже и устал
Трудно без помощи слуг
нынче мне сесть на верблюда
[Стратановский, 1993: 123];

С некрасивых колоколен
Наковальный звон упал;
Мир пустынен и околен,
И своим добром завален,
И от этого устал,
И о чем-то знает он:

Лучше быть ему бродягой,
Попрошайкой, бедолагой,
Неказистым воробьем...
   [Мартынова, 1991: 208].

Средний род актуализирует окказиональность формы и усиливает ее грамматическую неопределенность:

Как ныне прощается с телом душа.
Проститься, знать, время настало.
Она — еще, право, куда хороша,
Оно — пожило и устало.
"Прощай, мой товарищ, мой верный нога,
проститься настало нам время.
И ты, ненадежный, но добрый слуга,
что сеял зазря свое семя.
И ты, мой язык, неразумный хазар,
умолкни навеки, окончен базар"
[Лосев, 1985: 95];

Тогда — навыверт знания и зренья,
иссеклась мысль — во: в небо бьющий Нил.
Но мутнышко **заядло** в ней **созрело**, —
пузырь безуминки, и чуть: чернил
[Бобышев, 1992 (б): 114].

Во втором из этих примеров слово *заядло* имеет признаки и прилагательного, и наречия, поскольку окказиональная форма может входить в сочетания *мутнышко заядло* и *заядло созрело*.

Окказиональный глагольный (или адъективный краткий) коррелят к узуальному полному прилагательному приводит к делексикализации этого прилагательного:

Содержится ль — как "что-то" — в прахе?
мы — средь останков: "как-то" там
не просто ... не одни останки ... —

(быть может — и движенья нет ...)

я — **заскорузл** — из древней глуби нов
забытой мною прямотой:

я — сплю — давно духовным сном
а снег
работает в полях — в ложбинах — как крестьянин
[Айги, 1995: 13];

> Как все превращается в гниль и смердь!
> Треугольный траурный ноготок
> Обвисшего клена — трухляв и **жухл**,
> И раскрошена дорогая ткань
> [Юрьев, 1992: 149].

Соответствующие формы глагола прошедшего времени мужского рода в современном языке образуются не так, как в приведенных текстах: без суффикса -л или, возможно, с суффиксом -ну: *заскоруз*, *заскорузнул* и *жух*, *жухнул*. При этом, вероятно, существенно, что все они являются редкими, следовательно, в практике нормативной, стилистически нейтральной речи место этих глаголов фактически не занято.

Возможно прочтение глагола причастием-определением и вне подкрепления однородным атрибутом, поскольку присвязочный предикатив в составном именном сказуемом может быть выражен и прилагательным, и глаголом, и совмещающим их признаки причастием:

> Словодырь — подозреваю себя.
> Умнолей — я обхожу себя.
> Вот я — навсегда я.
> Я — навсегда **устал**.
> Мне — **тихо**
> [Аронзон, 1992: 203];

> И опять напрягается ухо —
> плещет ветер, визжит колесо, —
> и **постыла** простая наука
> не заглядывать правде в лицо
> [Кенжеев, 1993: 61];

> — Что ты, мумия золотая,
> вся иссохла на дне фараона,
> отпали твои саркофаги,
> ты,
> как куколка,
> **зрела**,
> осталось тело —
> живого тела
> бабочка улетела
> [Кедров, 1990: 26];

> Не видел ты алтарь там, как ходил

искать траву? — "Да что там можно видеть?
Там мрак такой, что я от страха **стыл**.
Один песок". — "Ну ладно, хочешь выпить?"
[Бродский, 1992-I: 274].

Характерно, что такие формы с реставрированным синкретизмом глаголов-прилагательных, то есть восстановленные из глаголов и прилагательных причастия обозначают не активное действие, а состояние, связанное именно с утратой активности. При этом логический пассив приходит в противоречие с грамматическим активом.

Пониманию формы как краткого прилагательного способствует окончание женского рода множественного числа -*ы*, не совпадающее с окончанием глагола прошедшего времени -*и*:

Свалявшаяся пряжа — чаша праха
(но, может быть, конечно, и ландо),
горшок, куда летят как стрелы иглы,
на что они, когда мишени **гиблы**?
Колчан уж полн, узор плешив и редок
[Щербина, 1989: 457].

Заметим, что в древнерусском языке и у перфективных причастий на -*л* женского рода, ставших впоследствии глаголами прошедшего времени, было окончание -*ы*: *мужи суть гибли*, но *жены суть гиблы*.

Возможна также омонимия глагола прошедшего времени с существительным, исторически восходящая к синкретизму имени существительного, прилагательного и причастия. В современных текстах этот синкретизм часто воспроизводится. Такой эффект наблюдается, например, при смещенном порядке слов:

Где сиреневая **мрела**
перевернутой дугою
тень от Синего моста —
там совсем уже другое
состояние — и стоя
вижу новые места
[Кривулин, 1990: 37].

Логический порядок слов предполагает чисто глагольную интерпретацию слова *мрела*[4]: *сиреневая тень от Синего моста мрела перевернутой дугою.*

Реставрация перфекта в единстве обозначения субъекта, его действия и качества ярко представлена у Бродского. Перфектная результативность глагола совмещена с сильной субстантивацией формы *сказал* и вовлечением в существительное его падежной парадигмы и фразеологизованного окружения:

> "И он ему **сказал**"
>
> <...>
>
> "Один **сказал** другой **сказал** струит"
>
> <...>
>
> "И он **сказал**". "Но раз **сказал** — предмет,
>
> То так же относиться должно к он'у".
>
> <...>
>
> "Где? В **он-ему-сказал'е** или в он'е".
>
> <...>
>
> "Лишь в промежутках **он-ему-сказал'а**".
>
> <...>
>
> **сказал'ом**, наподобие инцеста".
>
> <...>
>
> И Он Сказал носился между туч
>
> <...>
>
> "О как из существительных глаголет!"[5]
> [Бродский, 1992-II: 112–127].

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4 Ср. глагол в стихотворении О.Мандельштама "На высоком перевале ...":

И бесстыдно розовеют
  Обнаженные дома,
  А над ними неба **мреет**
  Темно-синяя чума [Мандельштам, 1995: 211].
Интертекстуальная перекличка стихотворения Кривулина со стихотворением Мандельштама несомненна, что следует из тематической и ритмической общности текстов.

5 Анализируя эту поэму Бродского, К.Проффер обращает внимание на то, что вся поэма — это диалог, не содержащий сопроводительных слов "он сказал", эти слова как бы вынуты из поэмы и все сосредоточены в приведенном фрагменте, где они сами становятся героями поэмы [Проффер, 1986: 138].

Аналогичная окказиональная субстантивация глаголов с большой степенью сгущения встречается и у других авторов. Всё это говорит о том, что категория бытийности приобретает особое, принципиально важное значение, и действие, состояние стремятся выразить себя через существительное, причем кратчайшим способом — не суффиксальным словообразованием, а частеречной трансформацией:

Есть племя *покинул* и племя *вернул*:
покинулы скорбно толпятся у ямы,
вернулы в парадный встают караул,
не зная друг друга, но слыша тамтамы.

Я осень *покинул* оставил в цвету
кустарщины пестрой туземных ремесел,
кладбищенский парк под дождем, на ветру
стонал и качался — и вот, я их бросил.

Я зиму *вернул* оглянул в белизне
лавин горностаевых, виснувших с неба
в отсчете секунд на стерляжьей блесне,
на струнах дрожащих гриппозного снега.

И ты между ними бродила, *верна*
тому, кто *вернул*, и тому чуженину,
кого ты вернула, — так вот он я, на
меня! Если только *покину* покину.

Но как это сделать! *Покинул* мне жаль
сменял их, "Прошанье славянки" по слуху,
мне спевших, глядевших кто в землю, кто вдаль, —
на стойких *вернул*, победивших разлуку.

Безумье мечтать, что верну я *верну*.
Пусть так — но хотя бы никто чтоб не сгинул,
я вытвердил, как чужеземец в плену,
за именем имя *вернул* и *покинул*.
[Найман, 1995: 95].

В этом тексте большинство окказиональных существительных типа *покинул, вернул* стоит в форме родительного падежа множественного числа женского рода или общего рода (от *покинула, *вернула). В пользу общего рода говорит большое количество узуальных существительных той же структуры: *воображала,*

*вопила, задирала, зазывала, запевала, зубрила, ловчила, надое-
дала, обдирала, обжирала, обирала, подгоняла, подлипала, подпе-
вала, приставала, притворяла, прихлебала, страшила* и др. Вмес-
те с тем, контекст позволяет трактовать слова типа *покинул, вер-
нул* и как аналитически употребленные формы именительного па-
дежа единственного числа мужского рода: курсив функциональ-
но аналогичен кавычкам, обычно оформляющим такие конструк-
ции.

В стихах А. Левина превращение глагола в существительное
включено в тексты, темами которых, собственно, и является суб-
стантивация: любой референт способен быть представлен субс-
танцией:

Когда **Упал**, ударившийся оземь,
восстал опять, как древний **Победил**,
за ним возникло маленькое **Тише**,
шепча свое опасное **сказать**.

Когда **Упал** в сиянии косматом
повел **Никто** в загробное **Ура**,
за ним росло клубящееся **Тише**,
твердя свое отравленное **но**.

Когда **Упал** взлетел и, озаренный,
ушел один к небесному **темну**,
за ним стояло выросшее **Тише**
и лысых звезд касалось головой.
[Левин, 1995: 191];

За окном моим летали
две веселые **свистели**
Удалые **щебетали**
куст сирени тормошили.
А по крыше магазина
важно **каркали гуляли**
и большущие **вопили**
волочили взад-вперед.
Две **чирикали** лихие
грызли корочки сухие,
отнимая их у толстых
косолапых воркутов.

А к окошечку подсели

две **кричали-и-галдели**

и стучали в батарею,

не снимая башмаков.

[Левин, 1995: 24].

Проанализируем последний пример. Почти все преобразованные формы (кроме *летали* из заглавия "Разные летали" и *гуляли*) — глаголы звучания: *свистели, щебетали, каркали, вопили, чирикали, кричали, галдели* (ср. узуальное, но редко употребляемое слово *свиристели*, во множественном числе омонимичное глаголу)[6]. Временный предикат превращается в субъект, и звуки становятся именами. Изменение устраняет специфически глагольные значения времени и вида, но при этом сохраняет значение динамики, заложенное в глагольных основах: динамика освобождается от частных признаков. Возникают значение конкретности и одушевленности. Появляется потенциальная промежуточная форма **гуляль* или **гуляля* (с немаркированным грамматическим родом).

На восприятие форм влияют словообразовательные ассоциации - слова на *-аль*[7]. Это могут быть отглагольные существительные мужского рода со значениями лица и деятеля — *враль, коваль, строгаль*, существительные женского рода — *удаль, печаль, невидаль, падаль, капель, *усталь, жаль* (все они генетически тоже отглагольны, хотя в современном языке их глагольность почти не ощутима); слова на *-аля* — существительные женского рода, обозначающие животных, птиц: *цапля, гуля* (!), *косуля, козюля* со значениями лица: *краля, пискля, мямля, рохля, роднуля, капризуля, чистюля, грязнуля* (преимущественно экспрессивные оценочные, некоторые из них образованы от глаголов — *пискля, мямля*, некоторые от прилагательных — *роднуля, чистюля, грязнуля*).

В результате окказиональное включение слов *свистели, щебетали, каркали, вопили, чирикали, кричали, галдели* в класс существительных актуализирует эти многочисленные парадигмати-

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[6]   Ср. также:

И я свирел в свою свирель,

И мир хотел в свою хотель [Хлебников, 1986: 626].

[7]   Из словообразовательных ассоциаций наиболее очевидны однокоренные слова, и далее они не рассматриваются.

ческие связи и коннотации слов, входящих в перечисленные ряды. Значение признака легко включается в окказиональные слова, потому что форма прошедшего времени когда-то его уже имела, поскольку была кратким причастием.

Противоположно направленный процесс — активизация глагольных признаков у прилагательного — также представлена в современной поэзии многочисленными примерами: *Фонтаны сохлые забили* [Шварц, 1994: 89], *Под ногами топлый плот* [Шварц, 1995: 7], *Промерзлый домовой нас поцелует в лоб* [Шварц, 1995: 70], *Видим — на льдине живой воробей / Оледенелый* [Шварц, 1995: 11], *в оледенелой стране оленей* [Лосев, 1996: 62], *судьбина улетелого зверька* [Левин, 1989: 80], *Онуфрий квас жует протухлый* [Эрль, 1989: оп. 114; без паг.], *в сохлой шкурке двойной арахис* [Кублановский, 1993: 200], *В саде камневом, охладелом* [Юрьев, 1991: 151], *Меж деревьев гиблых вьется сизый дым* [Миронов, 1993: 76], *роща вздохнет онемелая* [Кенжеев, 1992: 78], *пеницилл, мукор плеслый* [Круглов, 1993: 46], *Ослеплый грешок — канва, а расплата — каемка* [Голынко, 1995: 569], *Усмотрит днесь воскреслый фараон* [Волохонский, 1994: 36], *Это дикий камень-тень, / Камушек отшелый* [Булатовский, 1995: 20], *Тропою в деревню, где слыл пропалым мужиком* [Соколов, 1990: 174], *Приятель мой, мутант неотверделый* [Щербина, 1994: 11], *по колдобинам набухлым / затрясет меня в рыдване* [Строчков, 1994: 182], *нога это нож заблестелого лезвия* [Суриков, 1996: 3].

Сохранению и усилению глагольности в этих и подобных случаях способствует приставка, несущая видовое значение. Наличие глагола с той же основой, который, несомненно, указывает на общность прилагательного с этой частью речи:

Он сказал: Земля **простыла**
<...>
И снова по земле горячей
Простылой тенью уходил
[Мартынова, 1991: 205].

В данном случае форма *простыла* способствует олицетворению, поскольку глагол *простыть* получил в языке устойчивое переносное значение 'простудиться'. Но после восприятия формы

простылой к значению 'простудиться' добавляется этимологическое значение 'промерзнуть; застыть насквозь, полностью'.

Возможным условием реставрации глагольных свойств у прилагательного на -*л* является его синонимия с современным причастием, обычным при нормативном употреблении:

Туда, в голодный нуль,
в заглот, за житом бывше-человечьим —
нас, **гиблых** ради —
Он себя вомкнул,
а нам утраты и оплакать нечем [ср.: *погибших*]
[Бобышев, 1992 (а): 29];

Природа обновляет вид:
Сад распуститься норовит,
И сыроежка в хвое **палой** [ср. *опавшей*]
Раскрыла зонтик небывалый
[Крепс, 1992: 32].

В обеих цитатах глагольность усиливается еще и благодаря дефразеологизации прилагательных — ослаблению синтагматической зависимости, которую они имеют в нормативных сочетаниях *гиблое дело, палые листья*. Расшатывание синтагматики приводит к расширению значения и к оживлению этимологических связей прилагательного с глаголом. Этимологизация, усиливающая глагольность форм, осуществляется и другими способами, например, сближением родственных слов в контексте или перемещением ударения:

Что прошло, то и прошлое — пусть.
Стал я будущее ворошить.
... И все мучаюсь, и казнюсь,
Как неправильно буду жить
[Вишневский, 1992: 263];

Я зажигаю свет, и проступает стыд,
как тайнопись, меж строк **постыдных и постылых**
[Яснов, 1990: 32];

Это довольно **пошло**,
но дело мое **пошло**:
вначале в кровать дамаста-
прокруста вписался точно,
похрустывая аллитерацией ...
[Кальпиди, 1991: 186];

Нет, ничего не запомнил, но **гнилую** воду под серыми
железно-закатными теми вратами запомнил
и выкатил обод, так тихо прошедший
по краю рифленого камня
[Аристов, 1992: 48].

П. М. Бицилли привел обширный материал возобновленного причастного употребления краткой формы на -л в текстах XVI — первой половины XIX вв. [Бицилли, 1996: 341–352]. Он объяснил это влиянием языка русской канцелярии, который отразил в своей структуре элементы просторечия, а также трудностями освоения иноязычных грамматик при переводах [указ. соч.: 343, 350]. По мнению Бицилли, "эта форма в более ранний период истории русской литературы не употреблялась в причастном значении, и поэтому невероятно, чтобы случаи ее употребления в таком значении в конце Московского периода и в XVIII в. были результатом некого переживания ею ее истинной первоначальной функции" [указ. соч.: 349–350]; "После того как сознание образованных русских людей достигло своей зрелости, форма на -л как причастие окончательно исчезла из языка" [указ. соч.: 350]. Ущербность краткой формы причастия на -л Бицилли видел именно в ее грамматической неопределенности, которую предстояло, но было нелегко преодолеть.

Картина, которая складывается в современной поэзии, побуждает сделать вывод именно о переживании формой ее первоначальной функции. Вслед за, казалось бы, окончательным разграничением глагола и прилагательного начинает осваиваться тот семантический потенциал, который был свойствен причастию, объединяющему свойства этих частей речи. Видимо, современное сознание настоятельно требует активизации тех грамматических средств, которые могут выразить значение неопределенности.

Рассмотренный материал показывает, что во многих случаях именно поэзия языковой деформации хранит те свойства слова и формы, которые утрачены общеупотребительным языком и постоянно создает условия для их активизации. Отступление от нормы и актуализация мофолого-синтаксической неоднозначности в подобных случаях приводят к появлению грамматического тропа. Метафора и возникает всегда при нарушения категориальных границ [Арутюнова, 1990: 81]. Обратим внимание на то,

что в случаях с глаголами прошедшего времени и прилагательными на *-лый* форма метафоризируется архаизацией грамматической структуры, а не опережением эволюционных процессов.

Грамматический троп в рассмотренных текстах тесно связана с лексическим: возращение прилагательному глагольности ведет к делексикализации — расширению значения, что является действенным средством борьбы с языковой энтропией (главным делом поэтов). Расширение значения М. Л. Гаспаров называет седьмым тропом — антиэмфазой [Гаспаров, 1986]. Более широкое значение, чем современное, извлекается в данном случае из прошлых языковых состояний.

В заключение приведем высказывание В. Строчкова — одного из самых ярких и лингвистически интересных поэтов русского пост-модернизма — автора, разрабатывающего метод поэтической полисемантики: "Все объекты и явления нашей Вселенной проявляют себя принципиально многозначно <...> Что же до языка этого нового искусства, то он представляет собой, в сущности, некий метаязык, свободно оперирующий всем комплексом предыдущих языков, используя их в качестве слов в своих метавысказываниях" [Строчков, 1994: 377; 382].

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The transformation of parts of speech as a trope in contemporary Russian poetry (the correlations between the derivations of historical perfect)

The postmodernistic view of the contemporary world, in which no more the world itself nor language represents the system of binary oppositions, is expressed in Russian poetry: for example, in the metaphorization of grammatical forms in which the homonymy of form-generating language elements becomes activated, and the contexts that create morphological and syntacitical ambiguity are generated. The evolution of form becomes explicit as a compositional device.

The author of this article bases her analysis of this last notion on the examples of the correlations between verbs and adjectives that are

derived from perfect. The analysis of poetical texts by different authors
shows that on the one hand, the attributive features are attached to verbs;
and on the other hand, that the features of verbs become activated in
adjectives. The homonymy of verbs and adjectives is used as a poetical
device. In all that can be seen the "return" of language forms to their
original functions. The contemporary poetical language attributes the
traits of metalanguage.

Sõnaliikide transformatsioon kui troop tänapäeva vene luules (endise perfekti tuletiste vastastikused seosed)

Tänapäeva postmodernistlik maailmavaade, mille kohaselt ei maailm ega
keel ei kujuta endast enam binaarsete opositsioonide süsteemi, väljendub
vene luules, näiteks, grammatiliste vormide metaforiseerumises: aktivi-
seerub vormimoodustavate keeleelementide homonüümia, luuakse kon-
tekste, millistest tuleneb morfoloogiline ja süntaktiline kahemõttelisus.
Vormi evolutsioon kui selline saab eksplitseeritud kunstilise võttena.

Viimast tendentsi analüüsib artikli autor perfektist tulenenud vormi-
de — tegu- ja omadussõna — vastastikuste seoste näitel. Erinevate au-
torite luuletekstide analüüs näitab, et ühelt poolt omistatakse tegusõnale
atributiivseid tunnuseid ja teisalt, — omadussõnas aktiviseeruvad
tegusõna tunnused, tegusõna ja omadussõna homonüümiat kasutatakse
kui poeetilist võtet. Kõiges selles võib näha keelevormide "naasmist"
esialgsete funktsioonide juurde. Tänapäeva luulekeel omandab metakeele
jooned.

Nabokov's selftranslations: interpretation problems and solutions in Lolita's Russian version[*]

Bruno Osimo

Following Harold Bloom's logic, according to which every interpretation is a misinterpretation, and every reading is a misreading, one could infer that any translation is a mistranslation. According to Bloom, however, misreading is caused by the unconscious wish of the author to overshadow her/his predecessors, her/his literary "fathers"[1]. Mistranslation, on the other hand, is not necessarily caused by unconscious wishes, but rather by conscious impotence: it is impossible **to understand** all that an author wants to transmit with her/his text, and it is impossible to **transfer** all that you have understood into another language leaving the T.L.[2] reader with the same opportunities of comprehension/incomprehension and interpretation as the S.L.[3] reader.

In this sense Nabokov's work has a double function: first, it is useful to show the subjectiveness and imperfection of the literary translation process; its second, more constructive, function is to help to find a translational method able to earn acceptable solutions.

Nabokov has translated some of his own works, mainly from Russian into English and vice versa. *Lolita*, in particular, was translated into Russian. This novel therefore has two original draftings. This material was analyzed to verify, in the light of the most important

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[1] Bloom 1974 and 1975.
[2] Target language.
[3] Source language.

authority (the author), the interpretative hypothesis of Nabokov's translators into other languages.

Literary translation, or "poetic" translation in a broad sense, forces the translator to draw arbitrary and not always verifiable interpretative hypotheses. It is the very exceptional fact that a writer did translate himself, and the verification consequently possible, that allows to infer that usually, when such a test is impossible, the translator's choices are arbitrary.

Nabokov's translations and his method

Beginning from 1940, after the first twenty — Russian — years of Nabokov's life, and after the second twenty years, at Cambridge, Berlin, and Paris, begins the third period of twenty years, in the United States. This move brings about a fundamental change: the use of English, instead of Russian, for literary production.

This is a painful change: «My private tragedy, which cannot, indeed should not, be anybody's concern, is that I had to abandon my natural language, my natural idiom, my rich, infinitely rich and docile Russian tongue, for a second-rate brand of English».[4] The laceration caused by this separation, which brought about also the writing of some of the best Nabokov's works, and of course of the by far most famous one, **Lolita**, was a constant trait of the whole second part of the writer's life: of the American period and the of the Swiss period. Still in 1966, in an interview with Herbert Gold published on «The Paris Review» in October 1967, to the question about his worse flaw as a writer, he answered:

> The absence of a natural vocabulary. An odd thing to confess, but true. Of the two instruments in my possession, one — my native tongue — I can no longer use, and this not only because I lack a Russian audience, but also because the excitement of verbal adventure in the Russian medium has faded away gradually after I turned to English in 1940. My English, this second instrument I have always had, is cannot conceal poverty of syntax and paucity of domestic diction when I need the shortest road between warehouse and shop. An old Rolls-Royce is not always preferable to a plain Jeep[5].

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[4]   Nabokov 1973, p. 15.

[5]   Nabokov 1973, p. 106.

Nabokov's style colouring, his vivid metaphors explain very well how he lived the trauma of the adoption of a new language for the creation of fiction and poetry. It's self-evident that all self-disparaging references to his English style are exaggerated. Nabokov is very demanding, to himself and others alike, and unmercifulness guiding his literary judgement and criticism is but the other face of this medal.

This "transport", "translation" of himself into America was a process not lacking an accurate methodologically painstaking preparation: in the Forties and in the Fifties he published many articles **on** translation. Nabokov's conception of reality expands to literature and translation: in both cases it's fundamental scientific interest in the detail.

> During my years of teaching at Cornell and elsewhere I demanded of my students the passion of science and the patience of poetry. As an artist and scholar I prefer the specific detail to the generalization, images to ideas, obscure facts to clear symbols, and the discovered wild fruit to the synthetic jam. [...] in a work of art there is a kind of gradual merging between the two things, between the precision of poetry and the excitement of pure science[6].

This precision of the detail, if applied, would produce dramatic terminological confusion, with effects on hermeneutics too. Let's take as example the well-known Čehov's drama Višnëvyj sad, widely known as "The cherry-tree garden". The "vìšnja" after which the drama is named is *prunus cerasus*, or "sour cherry", a sort of wild cherry, not the usual cherry-tree (*prunus avium*), which in Russian is called "čeréšnja". It's not a negligible detail: unlike cherries, sour cherries are *wild* fruits, they're sour and are used only for jams and syrups, a fact referred to by the very text of the drama[7]. Both the Italian "visciolo" and "vìšnja" derive from the Greek word "býssinos", meaning "crimson". In the drama, one could argue, trees and men are alike made wild, and men have lost memory of old-time ways to prepare and preserve sour cherries, but they didn't learn any other method, they can appreciate the beauty of this sour-cherry tree plantation, but they can't keep its property, and abandon it to the axes

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[6]   Nabokov 1973, P. 7–10.

[7]   Čehov 1978, Vol. 13, P. 206.

of emerging capitalists. The way the drama is analysed is very different.

In the 1959 article **The Servile Path,** Nabokov concentrates on the "Problems of Flora", explaining the importance of precision when a translator has to do with plant names. Whenever a T.L. word is not misleading because it points to many different plants, «the translator is entitled to use any available term so long as it is exact»[8].

It follows a long dissertation on **čerëmucha,** a tree present in Puškin's work for which Nabokov coins a word, "racemosa", from the scientific name *Padus racemosa*, because in English there's not a term indicating precisely that tree.

It is from this attention to the detail, from this aversion towards generalisations, towards trivializations that the distant attitude towards any social or political message present, more or less explicitly, in a literary text is born. In the original language, however, the reader can easily avoid didactic literature. It's more difficult with translated literature. In this case the original text is transfigured in such a way that it becomes unrecognizable, even if «The only object and justification of translation is the conveying of the most exact information possible and this can be only achieved by a literal translation, with notes»[9].

In 1955, in an essay named **Problems of translation,** it is formulated the Nabokovian definition of "literary translation". The only translator's aim has to be «to produce with absolute exactitude the whole text, and nothing but the text». «The term "literal translation" is tautological, since anything but that is not truly a translation but an imitation, an adaptation or a parody»[10]. Nabokov believes that generally speaking translators are inaccurate and embellish and insert their own material without any justification[11]. Moreover, they don't know «Russian life of the 1820s»[12]. The time indication is evidently aimed at the translators of Puškin and Lermontov.

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[8]   Nabokov 1959, P. 104.

[9]   Nabokov 1959, P. 104.

[10]   Nabokov 1955, Pp. 506–507.

[11]   The Russian term is **otsebjàtina,** deriving from **ot sebjà** [from one's self], with the derogatory suffix **-tina.** It means «one's words inserted in another's text».

[12]   Nabokov 1955, P. 506.

In 1958 Nabokov prepared an English version of Lermontov's classic **A Hero of Our Time.** His Foreword is an opportunity to state his view of translation.

> In the first place, we must dismiss, once and for all, the conventional notion that a translation 'should read smoothly', and 'should not sound like a translation' (to quote the would-be compliments, addressed to vague versions, by genteel reviewers who never have and never will read the original texts). In point of fact, any translation that does **not** sound like a translation is bound to be inexact upon inspection; while, on the other hand, the only virtue of a good translation is faithfulness and completeness. Whether it reads smoothly or not depends on the model, not on the mimic[13].

Form this statement the radical new conception of the author-reader relationship is clear: if the standard reader is not enough equipped to digest a literary text, that's not a good reason to feed him/her on homogenized food with a "literary flavour". On the contrary, the translator has to help him/her taste the real thing thanks to copious footnotes and explanations.

It is possible to describe in a series of footnotes any modulations and rhymes of the text as well as all its associations and other special features [...]. I want translations with copious footnotes, footnotes reaching up like skyscrapers to the top of this or that page so as to leave only the gleam of one textual line between commentary and eternity.[14]

A good translator, in Nabokov's opinion, shouldn't show courage just in not sticking to the "imbecile reader"'s tastes, as postulated by some publishers: he/she must be brave enough even with respect to the educated reader, to the purist, to the critic. In fact, as he underscores in Lermontov's foreword, to the requirements of precision he «must sacrifice «a number of important things — good taste, neat diction, and even grammar (when some characteristic solecism occurs in the Russian text)»[15].

The translation, or we'd better say the edition, for which Nabokov hoped to be remembered is Puškin's *Evgenij Onegin*. It was hard work, lasting from 1958 to 1964. Even in this case the foreword is a

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[13] Nabokov 1955, P. 506.

[14] Nabokov 1955, P. 512.

[15] Lermontov 1984, P. xiii.

precious theoretical document. The fatal question whether poetry can be translated is posed, and answered, stating that there are three types of versions: paraphrastic versions, unusable to scholars; lexical or constructional versions, useful as a parallel text; and literal versions, consisting in «rendering, as closely as the associative and syntactical capacities of another language allow, the exact contextual meaning of the original. Only this is true translation»[16].

When Nabokov wonders whether it is possible retain rhymes while translating poetry, «The answer, of course, is no. To reproduce the rhymes and yet translate the entire poem literally is mathematically impossible»[17]. The translator's role is humble, he can't dare to correct, embellish, edit anything. «Pushkin has likened translators to horses changed at the post houses of civilization. The greatest reward I can think of is that students may use my work as a pony»[18].

In the Foreword to *Onegin* Nabokov analyses the role of Russian translations from English, German, and French at the end of the XVIII-beginning of the XIX century in the reception of Western culture and literature by the Russian reader. In most cases translations are the only link to Western culture, and for that reason their heavy unfaithfulness influences Russian literature so much that quotations, references and hints are based on the Russian version, in total ignorance of the original. «The ignoble Russian adaptations of popular European novels were read only by the lower classes, while, on the other hand, the admirable melodies of Žukovskij's versions of English and German poems won such triumphs for Russian letters as to make *negligible* the *loss* Schiller or Gray *suffered* in adaptation»[19].

Of course, the «suffered loss» is «negligible» to the eyes of the XIX century reader, not to Nabokov's, as can be clearly understood by his hyper-literal view of translation. Nabokov calls them «adaptations» rather than translations. Everybody, from the country lady to the hussar, used to read English and German texts in French. The various influences, bad and good, are thus rather to be ascribed to the authors of these free versions. «In consequence, Shakespeare is really Letourneur, Byron and Moore are Pichot, Scott is Sufauconpret, Sterne

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[16] Pushkin 1964, Vol. 1, P. viii.

[17] Pushkin 1964, Vol. 1, P. ix.

[18] Pushkin 1964, Vol. 1, P. x. There's a pun: «pony» means «small horse», and, in American English, «crib».

[19] Nabokov 1959, P. 97. Italics added.

is Frenet, and so on. In *Eugene Onegin* there are numerous references to foreign books; but one should constantly bear in mind that what Pushkin and his Tatiana Larin read is not the real Richardson but the French versions by the monstrously prolific Abbé Antoine François Prévost [...][20]».

The problem posed by Nabokov is complex and serious. While it is clear that the translator, with his interpretations and mistakes, influences the reader of his/her translation, it's not as much clear that sometimes he/she influences literary production too. «Thus a paraphrast, while betraying one poet, misleads the other»[21]. A paraphrast (as Nabokov calls "free" translators) betrays the poet he translates, thus misleading the poet quoting from the translation. In the melting pot of literary influences, translation-paraphrase has the same status as the original. However, being different from the original while stating its equivalency, it results in a funny phenomenon: a text's influences are ramified, and on some authors mistranslations have an influence higher than the original.

In the same edition there is a practical example of the "Eugene Onegin" Stanza. Nabokov himself composed a poem that, in its rhythmic and rhyming structure, is a model of Onegin's stanza, while its content reflects his work on the translation:

> What is translation? On a platter
> A poet's pale and glaring head,
> A parrot' screech, a monkey's chatter,
> And profanation of the dead. [...][22]

Lolita

How the idea — or perhaps we should say the need — to translate "Lolita" into Russian was born is explained in an interview given in 1964:

> I trained my inner telescope upon that particular point in the distant future and I saw that every paragraph, pockmarked as it is with pitfalls, could lend itself to hideous mistranslation. In the hands of a harmful drudge, the

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[20]   Nabokov 1959, P. 98.

[21]   Nabokov 1959, P. 100.

[22]   Pushkin 1990, Vol. 1, P. 9.

Russian version of Lolita would be entirely degraded and botched by vulgar paraphrases or blunders. So I decided to translate it myself[23].

We have analysed four versions: 1) the English original, published in 1955 (E); 2) the Russian version by the author, published in 1967 (R); 3) Bruno Oddera's Italian version, published by Mondadori in 1959 (I_1; 4) Giulia Arborio Mella's Italian version, published by Adelphi in 1993 (I_2). Giulia Arborio Mella, as she explained in a lecture given on October 25, 1995 at the Scuola Superiore per Interpreti e Traduttori del Comune di Milano, could consult both Dmitrij Nabokov and Serena Vitale, who helped her in resolving some ambiguities of the English text comparing it to the Russian one. However, this comparison was not regular.

Lolita (English text)

1.

Lolita, light of my life, fire of my loins. My sin, My soul. Lo-lee-ta: the tip of the tongue making a trip of three steps down the palate to tap, at three, on the teeth. Lo. Lee. Ta.

She was Lo, plain Lo, in the morning, standing four feet ten in one sock. She was Lola in slacks. She was Dolly at school. She was Dolores on the dotted line. But in my arms she was always Lolita. Did she have a precursor? She did, indeed she did. In point of fact, there might have been no Lolita at all had I not loved, one summer, a certain initial girl-child. In a princedom by the sea.[24] Oh, when? About as many years before Lolita was born as my age was that summer. You can always count on a murderer for a fancy prose style. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, exhibit number one is what the seraphs, the

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[23] Nabókov 1973, P. 37–38. If you consider the scandal caused by the publication of Lolita, considered for years a pornographic, nearly incestuous novel, it might be interesting Nabokov's attitude towards his Lolita, very similar to the attitude of a father preoccupied by his daughter initiation to life: he's worried that his creature might end up in unreliable hands, and be «degraded and botched by vulgar paraphrases».

[24] In E. A. Poe's poem Annabel Lee more than once there appears a «kingdom by the sea» and «winged seraphs of heaven». *Poems*, London, Penguin, 1975, P. 89.

misinformed, simple, noble-winged seraphs, envied. Look at this tangle of thorns.

2.

I was born in 1910, in Paris. My father was a gentle, easy-going person, a salad of racial genes: a Swiss citizen, of mixed French and Austrian descent, with a dash of the Danube in his veins. I am going to pass around in a minute some lovely, glossy-blue picture-postcards.

He owned a luxurious hotel on the Riviera. His father and two grand-fathers had sold wine, jewels and silk, respectively. At thirty he married an English girl, daughter of Jerome Dunn, the alpinist, and grand-daughter of two Dorset parsons, experts in obscure subjects — palaeopedology and Aeolian harps, respectively. My very photogenic mother died in a freak accident (picnic, lightning) when I was three, and, save for a pocket of warmth in the darkest past, nothing of her subsists within the hollows and dells of memory, over which, if you can still stand my style (I am writing under observation), the sun of my infancy had set: surely, you all know those redolent remnants of day suspended, with the midges, about some hedge in bloom or suddenly entered and traversed by the rambler, at the bottom of a hill, in the summer dusk; a furry warmth, golden midges.

Lolita (russkij tekst)

1.

Lolita, svet moej zhizni, ogon' moih chresel. Greh moj, dusha moja. Lo-li-ta: konchik jazyka sovershaet put' v tri shazhka vniz po nëbu, chtoby na tret'em tolknut'sja o zuby. Lo. Li. Ta.

Ona byla Lo, prosto Lo, po utram, rostom v pjat' futov (bez dvuh vershkov i v odnom noske). Ona byla Lola v dlinnyh shtanah. Ona byla Dolli v shkole. Ona byla Dolores na punktire blankov. No v moih ob''jat'jah ona byla vsegda: Lolita.

A predshestvennicy-to u neë byli? Kak zhe — byli ... Bol'she skazhu: i Lolity by ne okazalos' nikakoj, esli by ja ne poljubil v odno

dalëkoe leto odnu iznachal'nuju devochku. V nekotorom knjazhestve u morja (pochti kak u Po)[25].

Kogda zhe èto bylo, a? Priblizitel'no za stol'ko zhe let do rozhdenija Lolity, skol'ko mne bylo v to leto. Mozhete vsegda polozhit'sja na ubijcu v otnoshenii zatejlivosti prozy.

Uvazhaemye prisjazhnye zhenskogo i muzhskogo pola! Èksponat Nomer Pervyj predstavljaet soboj to, chemu tak zavidovali Èdgarovy serafimy — hudo-osvedomlennye, prostodushnye, blagorodnokrylye serafimy ... Poljubujtes'-ka na ètot klubok ternij.

2.

Ja rodilsja v 1910 godu, v Parizhe. Moj otec otlichalsja mjagkost'ju serdca, lëgkost'ju nrava — i celym vinegretom iz genov: byl shvejcarskij grazhdanin, polufrancuz-poluavstriec, s Dunajskoj pro-zhilkoj. Ja sejchas razdam neskol'ko prelestnyh, gljancevito-golubyh otkrytok.

Emu prinadlezhala roskoshnaja gostinica na Riv'ere. Ego otec i oba deda torgovali vinom, brilliantami i shelkami (raspredeljajte sami). V tridcat' let on zhenilsja na anglichanke, dochke al'pinista Dzheroma Dunna, vnuchke dvuh Dorsetskih pastorov, èkspertov po zamyslo-vatym predmetam: paleopedologii, i Èolovym arfam (raspredeljajte sami). Obstojatel'stva i prichina smerti moej ves'ma fotogenichnoj materi byli dovol'no original'nye (piknik, molnija); mne zhe bylo togda vsego tri goda, i krome kakogo-to tëplogo tupika v temnejshem proshlom u menja nichego ot neë ne ostalos' v kotlovinah i vpadinah pamjati, za kotorymi — esli vy eshchë v silah vynosit' moj slog (pishu pod nadzorom) — saditsja solnce moego mladenchestva: vsem vam, navernoe, znakomy èti blagouhannye ostatki dnja, kotorye povisajut vmeste s moshkaroj nad kakoj-nibud' cvetushchej izgorod'ju, i v kotorye vdrug popadësh' na progulke, prohodish' skvoz' nih, u podnozh'ja holma, v letnih sumerkah — gluhaja teplyn', zolotistye moshki.

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[25] «Nearly» as in Poe, for the difference between «princedom» and «kingdom».

Lolita (Italian version by Bruno Osimo)

1.

Lolita, luce della mia vita, fuoco dei miei lombi. Peccato mio, anima mia[26]. Lo-li-ta: la punta della lingua compie un percorso di tre passetti[27] giù per il palato, per battere, al terzo, contro i denti. Lo. Li. Ta.

Era Lo, semplicemente[28] Lo,[29] di mattina, alta[30] cinque piedi (meno nove centimetri e[31] con un calzino solo). Era Lola in pantaloni lunghi[32]. Era Dolly a scuola. Era Dolores sulla linea tratteggiata dei moduli[33]. Ma tra le mie braccia era sempre:[34] Lolita.

Ce n'erano state prima di lei?[35] Eccome, se ce n'erano state ... Dirò di più[36]: non ci sarebbe stata nessuna Lolita, se in una lontana estate[37] non avessi amato una primigenia ragazzina. In un principato sul mare (quasi come in Poe).

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[26] In R, the inversion of the standard adjective-name order («grech moj») suggests aa similar inversion in the T.L.

[27] R: «tri šažka», diminutive reproducible in Italian but inexistent in English.

[28] E: «plain», interpreted by I_1 as «null'altro che» (nothing but). Russian «prosto» suggesst «semplicemente» (simply), as I_2 does.

[29] This comma, blocking the reading, is present both in R and in E, and is therefore reproduced in I. (I_1 la riporta, I_2 no.)

[30] E: «standing». I_1 translates «diritta nella sua statura di...», while I_2 «ritta nel suo metro ...». But R has «rostom v ...», a direct indication of height.

[31] The conjunction was added on the basis of the Russian text. The comma in I_1 is an addition not justified by the originals.

[32] E: «slacks», but R has «v dlinnyh štanah», suggesting «lunghi» (long) in the T.L. too, differently from I_1 and I_2.

[33] E: «on the dotted line»; I_1 translates «sulla linea punteggiata dei documenti». I_2: «sulla linea tratteggiata dei documenti». From R it's clear that they're «blanki», "blanks".

[34] The colon was added on the basis of the Russian original.

[35] Russian text suggests a plural subject.

[36] R: «Bol'še skažu»: R is therefore different from E. In Italian we opted for the Russian expression, very similar to the Italian one.

[37] R: «v odno **dalëkoe** leto»: this addition, lacking in E, can be expressed in the T.L.

Questo, quando? All'incirca tanti anni prima della nascita di Lolita, quanti ne avevo io quell'estate. Potete sempre contare su un assassino per quanto riguarda una prosa intricata. Signore e signori della giuria[38], il reperto numero uno è ciò che invidiavano i serafini di Edgar, i malinformati, semplici[39] serafini dalle ali nobili. Osservate questo intrico di spine.

2.

Sono nato nel 1910, a Parigi. Mio padre si distingueva per il cuore tenero, i facili costumi — e tutt'un'insalata di geni[40]: era[41] cittadino svizzero, mezzo francese e mezzo austriaco, con una venatura di Danubio[42]. Ora distribuirò alcune deliziose cartoline celeste lucido[43].

Possedeva un albergo di lusso sulla Rivière. Il padre ed entrambi i nonni commerciavano in vino, brillanti e sete (metteteli in ordine voi)[44]. A trent'anni si è sposato con un'inglese, figlia dell'alpinista Jerome Dunn, nipote di due pastori del Dorset[45], esperti in materie astruse[46]: paleopedologia e arpe eoliche (mettetele in ordine voi). Le

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[38] E: «Ladies and gentlemen of the jury». I$_2$ translates only «Signori della giuria», but in Russian the rhetorical emphasis on the listing of the two sexes is self-evident: «Uvažaemye prisjažnye ženskogo i mužskogo pola!».

[39] E: «simple». I$_1$ and I$_2$ translate «ingenui», but the Russian «prostodušnyj» has a more positive connotation: literally «simple soul».

[40] E: «a salad of racial genes». I$_1$ has it literally: «una insalata di geni razziali». I$_2$ prefers a milder metaphor: «una macedonia di geni razziali». But the author in R keeps the English metaphor: «celyj vinegret iz genov», allowing the omission of the redundant «razziali».

[41] The verb was added on the basis of R.

[42] E: «with a dash of the Danube in his veins». R is instead «s Dunajskoj prožilkoj», with a pun based on «prožilka» that, as in Italian, means both «nuance» and «vein».

[43] E: «some lovely, glossy-blue picture-postcards». I$_1$ translates: «alcune belle cartoline illustrate, dai cieli di un turchino lucido»; I$_2$ adheres more to both originals: «alcune splendide cartoline di un azzurro smaltato». R is: «neskol'ko prelestnyh, gljancevito-golubyh otkrytok».

[44] The English «respectively» becomes in Russian «raspredeljajte sami».

[45] E: «two Dorset parsons». I$_1$: «ecclesiastici del Dorsetshire» I$_2$: «parroci del Dorset»; R: «Dorsetskich pastorov».

[46] As rightfully chooses I$_2$: R is in fact «zamyslovatye».

circostanze e la causa della morte della mia fotogenicissima madre furono piuttosto originali (picnic, fulmine); allora avevo solo tre anni, e, a parte qualche caldo anfratto nel passato più buio, di lei non mi è rimasto nulla[47] negli avvallamenti e nelle cavità della memoria, dietro i quali — se ve la sentite ancora di sopportare il mio stile[48] (scrivo sotto sorveglianza[49]) — tramonta[50] il sole della mia infanzia: conoscerete senz'altro tutti[51] questi resti aromatici[52] del giorno che stanno sospesi insieme ai moscerini sopra una qualche siepe in fiore, e nei quali ti imbatti[53] d'un tratto passeggiando, ci passi attraverso, ai piedi di una collina, nel crepuscolo estivo — un tepore vellutato, moschini dorati.

Comparison of the texts

In many cases comparing the English with the Russian text allows to determine the correct interpretation of some English expressions. For example, «the tip of my tongue taking a trip of three steps **down** the

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[47] I$_1$ proposes «più nulla rimane di lei», a nearly literal translation of E like in R, while I$_2$, with «nulla di lei persiste», lifts the register. «Subsists» is not aan averyday word, of a low register, but «ostalos'» is very simple, compared with other possibilities: uderžalos'; sochranilos'; sbereglos'. In this case it's possible that Nabókov meant to make a slight style change in the Russian version.

[48] In I$_1$ and I$_2$ the hint to the intricate prose style is lost, and the reader is therefore puzzled by this meta-narrative comment, difficult to understand.

[49] «sotto sorveglianza» exists in the same form both in English and Russian, therefore, being used in both originals, it's a forced solution in Italian too. I$_1$ has «in osservazione»; I$_2$ «sono guardato a vista», elegant but not literal.

[50] R has a historical present, possible in Italian too.

[51] I$_1$ and I$_2$ use the indicative form: «certo, conoscete tutti» and «certo voi tutti conoscete». The R adverb «navernoe» suggest a less certain chance, a probable possibility, similar to the one expressd by «conoscerete senz'altro».

[52] I$_1$ chooses «olezzanti», I$_2$ «odorosi»; but «redolent» means «having a pleasant odor», and the validity of this definition in the context is confirmed by «blagouchannye».

[53] As in English you don't appreciate the difference between singular and plural «you», while in Russia this difference is clear, the Italian version can treasure that information.

palate». I_1 translates the latter as «**sul** palato», and I_2 does the same. The hypothesis is that the preposition «down» here means «along», movement through a place, along a surface in this case. Checking with R, we find «**vniz** po nëbu», indicating the Nabokovian interpretation of «down» as «below».

In the case of «four feet ten», from the Russian text we learn an author's preference: R doesn't convert into centimetres or other units, leaving the measure in feet («pjat' futov»), even if in Russian they are one more, minus two **veršok,** a Russian measure worth 4,4 cm. (For precision's sake, the total is 143,6 cm, versus 147,32 of the English original. I_2 gives this measure («nel suo metro e quarantasette»), while I_1 miscounts («un metro e cinquantotto»). It's not clear what were Nabokov's intentions as to the new height. Maybe, after counting, he has removed an extra **veršok.**

The phrase «there **might** have been no Lolita» is translated in I_1 «**forse** Lolita non sarebbe esistita affatto», while I_2 prefers «non ci sarebbe stata **forse** nessuna Lolita». In both cases, «might» is interpreted as eventuality, which induces both Italian translators to insert «forse» to mitigate the firmness of «non ci sarebbe potuta essere». But R is: «i Lolity by ne okazalos' nikakoj», that is to say, «might» has a conditional, not eventual, meaning.

It can happen that a willingly non-standard expression by the author is unwillingly standardised by the translator. It' what happens with «a certain **initial** girl-child»; I_1, maybe owing to the harsh combination of «iniziale» and «fanciulla», prefers «una prima fanciulla»; I_2 on the contrary "restores" the literal meaning, resulting in «una certa iniziale fanciulla»; consulting R, both interpretations result different from Nabokov's: «odnu iznacal'nuju devocku»; the adjective translated as «primigenia» is much more imposing than «iniziale», thus giving much more importance and solemnity to the phenomenon-girl-child.

The presence of a comma is sometimes enough to change the meaning of a sentence. The inner narrator exclaims: «Oh when?» Without any comma between the two words. Both I_1 and I_2 translate: «Oh, quando?». However, the Russian text, creating a new paragraph, explains: «Kogda že èto bylo, a?», from which we infer that we have to do with a, albeit inner, dialogue. «Oh, quando?», sounds a little bit

artificial in comparison, difficult to imagine pronounced by a real speaker. We opted for a more clear-cut: «Questo, quando?»

The answer to this rhetorical answer is rather complex (as later confirmed by the narrator): E: «**About** as many years before Lolita was born as my age was that summer». **About** was translated: I_1 «Press'a poco» ..., but I_2 completely omits the sense of approximation, interpreting maybe «about» as a state in time, as «in»: «Tanti anni prima ...» The R version however proves that the author is not willing to omit this nuance: «Priblizitel'no ...»

The world «fancy» is a very interesting example of semantic ambiguity: «You can always count on a murderer for a **fancy** prose style». In a common Webster's dictionary, looking up the entry «fancy» as adjective, you find 6 definitions: 1. «based on fancy; capricious; whimsical; fanciful; 2. higher than real value; extravagant; 3. made or added to please the fancy; ornamental; decorated; not plain; elaborate; 4. of superior skill; intricate and difficult; 5. of superior quality and therefore more expensive; 6. bred for some special feature or excellence of type: said of animals. Let's see how Italian translators have chosen their sense. I_1 speaks of «stile fanta-sioso», maybe choosing the definition 1. I_2 speaks instead of «prosa ornata», where «ornato» is obviously meant as «elegant», closer to the definition 3. R solves the puzzle: «v otnošenii zatejlivosti prozy»: in other words not a positive quality, but a metanarrative self-ironical comment by the narrator, a typical example of Nabokov's playful attitude towards the reader.

A translator may be doubtful about the original register of a statement. But «darkest» and «temnejšem» don't have any «fancy prose» connotations: they are common and neuter adjectives. We therefore opted for «buio», differently from I_1 who has «nelle più fitte tenebre del passato» and I_2 who has «nel passato più tenebroso». These two solutions belong to a decidedly higher register.

«Hollow» literally means «cavity», as «vpadina», while «dell» means «small valley», like «kotlovina». It's a further prove of the narrator's willingly intricate style. I_1 reacts with «tra le vallette e le colline dei ricordi», a literal version, however with a misunderstanding as to the word «colline» [hills]. I_2 decidedly simplifies: «negli anfratti della memoria». R has: «v kotlovinah i vpadinah pamjati», that is a

word-by-word version of the English text, so it is justified an extreme literality in another T.L. too.

Even in the case of «furry», as before with «fancy», the comparison with the Russian text is extremely telling. Being translated into Russian as «gluhaja», meaning «deaf» also in an acoustical sense, the only semantic intersection of the two words lies in the acoustical-tactile sphere: hence «vellutato». The two preceding Italian versions read «un tepore di pelliccia», which doesn't make much sense in a summer sunset.

As to the various references to Poe, the Russian version gives a neat indication that Nabokov wants to help the non English-speaking reader to understand them, explicating them. That indication is therefore applicable to the Italian reader too.

> Having examined the first two pages, it emerges clearly that the comparison with the Russian version by the author offers much more clues, very useful to prepare a translation into another language. The comparison with I_2 is very important because this translation — apart from the constant consultation of the Russian version — was prepared in optimal conditions: with Dmitrij Nabokov's assistance, by a very competent and motivated translator, by a publisher well-known for its precise preparation of the texts. It is therefore meaningful that the comparison with the Russian version gives nonetheless further elements to solve the various puzzles. A similar comparison was done with the translations of **Camera Obscura — Laughter in the Dark,** but we haven't enough space to relate about that here.

Many interesting elements have emerged. The possibility to consult **two** originals has meant many differences:

Denotative meaning of a word: The comparison allowed to improve the approximation with which the denotative meaning of a word is interpreted in a given context. The translator, having two words both chosen by the author to mean the same, examines their semantic spectra and looks for semantic intersections: his/her interpretation can therefore be more accurate.

Connotative references: the system of connotative references of the original text was already transposed in another language by the author. In doing so, some links were lost, and new links were created. The author's method gives rise to a set of clues that are useful to the translator to enact her/his translating strategy.

Syntax: the two S.L. sentences, with their construction, were examined to find out whether they were standard constructions or had dislocations or upsettings of any kind. The presence of the same syntactic structure in both S.L. sentences has justified its re-construction in Italian.

Register: sometimes Italian literary translators' style tends to elevate the S.L. register. Having two original texts, we could verify the author's choices as far as register is concerned, not being influenced by those solutions which sound more obvious in the cultural context of the T.L.

Elements typical of the source culture: the cultural competence of the S.L. reader is different from that of the T.L. reader, and the translator should fill the gap between these differences, either in the text or in the metatext. When the author himself translates his own text, this allows the translator into another T.L. to follow a cultural mediation strategy similar to the one chosen by the author. We saw that, for example, in the case of the references to E. A. Poe: for the English-speaking reader there is no facilitation, while for the Russian one it is deemed necessary.

The presence of two original texts changes the way the translator perceives the text. A literary text, «open» by definition, is transferred into another language, in which some semantic "doors" are shut, while others, not present in the original text, are opened. A new text is born, which in common with the original text has a part inversely proportional to the quantity of meanings not caught by the translators.

Literary translation is a continuous and continuously verified challenge, an unperfectible process of approximation. The bigger the approximation, the best the translation. Translations meant as creative transpositions are obsolete and have provoked much damage and Babel's confusion. We saw that examining, through Nabokov's eyes, the literary influences on Puškin, who happened to read the English Classics in French «transfigurations».

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Автоперевод Набокова: интерпретационные проблемы и решения в русской версии "Лолиты"

Статья посвящена проблемам набоковского автоперевода.

Отмечается, что русский вариант "Лолиты" зачастую уточняет и дополняет английский текст, поэтому перевод "Лолиты" на другие языки должен осуществляться на основе дополнительного анализа двух оргинальных текстов: их денотации (исследование пересечений семантических спектров эквивалентных слов), коннотации, синтаксиса, стилистических регистров, стратегии культурной медиации, избранной писателем при автопереводе. На основе подобного скрупулезного анализа автор статьи вносит свои коррективы в имеющиеся итальянские переводы "Лолиты".

Nabokovi autoritõlge:
interpretatsiooni probleemid ja
lahendused "Lolita" venekeelses versioonis

Artikkel käsitleb Nabokovi omatõlke probleeme. Rõhutatakse, et "Lolita" venekeelne variant tihti täpsustab ja täiendab ingliskeelset, seetõttu tuleb "Lolita" tõlkimisel teistesse keeltesse tugineda *kahe* originaalteksti võrd-levale analüüsile. Tekstidevahelisi seoseid lahatakse kirjaniku poolt oma-tõlkes tehtud valikute põhjal nende denotatsiooni (ekvivalentsete sõnade semantiliste spektrite lõikumised), konnotatsiooni, süntaktika, stilistika, kultuurilise mediatsiooni aspektidest lähtuvalt. Taolise analüüsi põhjal pakub artikli autor välja omapoolsed täiendused ja parandused olemas-olevatele "Lolita" itaaliakeelsetele tõlgetele.

Опыты аналитического чтения
"Русские ночи" В. Одоевского, "Усомнившийся Макар" А. Платонова

Елена Григорьева

Предлагаемые заметки представляют собой результат двух опытов аналитического чтения двух совершенно различных текстов. В некотором смысле и подходы к этим текстом должны считаться совершенно различными: в случае с "Русскими ночами" Одоевского — это попытка выяснения определенных структурных закономерностей при помощи оперирования ранее выработанной на другом материале схемы, в случае с "Усомнившимся Макаром" — скрупулезное следование "букве" текста. Тем не менее, как кажется, есть нечто объединяющее эти два анализа — стремление к пристальному "вчитыванию" в текст, некоторое предпочтение, даже доминирование текста над интерпретационным усилием. Отсюда обширные выписки из Одоевского и ограничение материала непосредственного анализа несколькими абзацами Платонова. Принципиальная позиция автора настоящих заметок состоит в представлении **процесса** интерпретации именно в качестве **процесса**, а не законченного результата интеллектуального усилия, по сути уже внеположенного самому тексту. Задача, разумеется, герменевтического порядка, в чем автор вполне отдает себе отчет.

Оба анализа тесно связаны с проблематикой, в значительной степени инспирированной размышлениями Зары Григорьевны Минц еще в то время, когда автор настоящих заметок начинал свои занятия в семинаре под ее руководством. В первой части это интерес к поискам "третьего" элемента в пограничной ситуации неоромантиками (см. в частности совместную работу: Минц, Мельникова 1984) — тенденция, которую в настоящей работе я прослеживаю на материале позднего романтизма Одоевского, на-

прямую в этом случае восходящая к Шеллингу. Что касается второй части, творчество Андрея Платонова всегда интересовало Зару Григорьевну, что находило отражение в ее лекциях, в которых она прослеживала генетические и идеологические связи Платонова и Федорова, Федорова и Циолковского. К сожалению, замысел Зары Григорьевны написать работу о Николае Федорове остался неосуществленным. Я не старалась, разумеется, восполнить невосполнимое, но, однако, несмотря на то, что я работала с материалом так сказать низших уровней, я постаралась не забывать и о более широком идеологическом и культурном контексте, определившем сдвиги в том числе в языковом сознании писателя, начальным представлением о котором и интересом к которому я обязана Заре Григорьевне. Настоящая публикация является заведомо неполноценной попыткой выразить безмерную любовь и благодарность своему Учителю.

"Русские ночи". Идеология хронотопа

Выбор для анализа романа в новеллах "Русские ночи" кн. Одоевского обуславливается тем, что, с нашей точки зрения, это произведение фиксирует следующий (условно — "последержавинский") кризис в эмблематическом сознании, а именно, — кризис уже распавшейся эмблематической пары, или — пары эмблематического типа.[1]

Неудовлетворенность эмблематическим типом отношений в романтизме приводит к тому, что уравновешенная парность (которая может трактоваться и как оппозиция) сочетаний любого типа, их автоматическая переводимость друг другом, разлагается. В варианте литературы это прежде всего сказывается в том, что **слово** (даже поэтическое) перестает выражать **вещь** или **мысль**

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[1] Не имея возможности подробно обсуждать в данной работе структуру и функцию эмблемы, отсылаем всех заинтересованных к моим работам: Григорьева 1989, а также Григорьева 1997. Здесь нам важно подчеркнуть, что эмблема в том числе трактуется нами как сочетание пространственного (изображение) и временного (слово) элементов, образующее жесткую мнемоническую структуру по переводу с одного типа языка на другой.

(т.е. **образ** — ср. "Невыразимое подвластно ль выраженью" Жуковского).

В системе образов наиболее очевидно это разложение на 'демонического' героя и 'толпу', которые опять-таки друг друга не понимают (т.е. их слова непереводимы друг другом), причем, толпа далее дробится до бесконечности на 'маленьких людей'.

В варианте Вл. Одоевского мы застаем момент острой неудовлетворенности этим распадом и попыток нащупать некую связующую основу. При этом, как мы увидим, его не удовлетворяет именно самый принцип двоичности, 'вилочной структуры', как мы сформулировали этот принцип, — огромная часть рассуждений Одоевского посвящена поиску 'третьего', некоего связующего разрозненные элементы принципа. Это закономерно, поскольку преодоление автоматичности перевода возможно только внесением некоего 'третьего' элемента в имеющуюся пару.[2]

Разлагаясь по 'вилочной' схеме, эмблема, дробясь на элементы, образует в каждом новую эмблему, иначе эти элементы вовсе не обладали бы признаком стабильности. Так памятник, отделяясь от 'временного' индивидуума, приобретает возможность движения, а следовательно — временного экзистирования. Кукла становится автоматом, тень получает дар речи и т.д. И обратно: смертный, временный индивидуум у Державина получает свой 'истукан', и самая пирамида (символ монолитной незыблемости хранимой памяти в классической эмблематике) делится на погреб и беседку[3], что свидетельствует об осознанности, эксплицированности принципа хранения. До абсолютизации отделенности, доведения ее до логического конца, как это произошло под пером Ф. Сологуба, еще довольно далеко.[4] Еще даже лермонтовский Демон — дух, изгнанный отовсюду, вовсе лишенный

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[2]   Мы рассуждали об этом феномене в связи с умножением дублирующих друг друга описаний в случае с рисунками и пояснениями к рисункам и стихам Державина. Григорьева 1989.

[3]   Реальное сооружение в имении ближайшего друга Державина архитектора Н. Львова.

[4]   Имеется в виду рассказ Ф. Сологуба "Маленький человек", "пространственно" реализующий идею "маленького человека" предшествующей литературной традиции. См. также Григорьева 1987.

'места'[5], оставляет видимые следы — его слеза прожигает камень, который потом долго показывают заезжим визитерам. И мысль о том, что "мысль изреченная есть ложь" высказана достаточно многословно.

Но предпосылкой к поискам связующего элемента для кн. Одоевского несомненно является констатация распада взаимообуславливающих связей, дающих ощущение полноты, законченности жизни, искусства, науки.

Так уже в программном "Введении" он декларирует задачу установления и обнаружения связи между вещественным и духовным для всех поколений неудовлетворенного человечества:

> "Во все эпохи душа человека стремлением необоримой силы, невольно, как магнит к северу, обращается к задачам, коих разрешение скрывается во глубине таинственных стихий, образующих и связующих жизнь духовную и жизнь вещественную."[6]

В этом же "Введении" показательны и эпиграфы: из Данте, начальные стихи "Комедии" которого фиксируют серединность, пограничность состояния человека, когда утрачивается ясность окружающего мира, и, чтобы как-то выразить себя в этой неясности, человек должен говорить притчами — отсюда цитата из Гете, определяющая одновременно и жанр "Комедии" Данте по Одоевскому и само последующее произведение Одоевского.

И далее, когда Одоевский рассуждает о символах истории и символах духа поэта, становится ясно, что речь идет именно о принципиально пограничном состоянии поэта, однако всегда оперирующего только односторонним средством — символом, за которым неясно, что стоит:

> "В глубине внутренней жизни поэту встречаются свои символические лица и происшествия; иногда сими символами, при магнетическом свете вдохновения, дополняются исторические символы, иногда первые совершенно совпадают со вторыми; [...] такая встреча есть случайность, могущая быть и не быть, ибо для души, в ее естественном, т.е. вдохновенном состоянии, находятся указания вернейшие, нежели в пыльных хартиях всего мира. [...] Но — увы! и те и

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[5] Понятие 'места' нами употребляется в согласии с мнемонической терминологией — см. Yates 1966.

[6] Одоевский 1975: 7. Далее все ссылки даются на это издание в тексте статьи с указанием на страницу.

другие хранят внутри себя под несколькими покровами заветную тайну, может быть недосягаемую для человека в сей жизни, но к которой ему позволено приближаться. Не вините художника, если под одним покровом он находит еще другой покров. [...] Древняя надпись на статуе Изиды: "никто еще не видал лица моего" — доныне не потеряла своего значения во всех отраслях человеческой деятельности." (8)

И далее при подобном предварении, говорится о том, что все изображаемые в новеллах жизни являются ответами-вопросами друг на друга, т.е. по сути 'эмблемами' друг друга:

"Еще несколько слов о форме того сочинения, которое называется "Русскими ночами" и которое, вероятно, наиболее подвергнется критике: автор почитал возможным существование такой драмы, которой предметом была бы не участь одного человека, но участь общего всему человечеству ощущения, проявляющегося разнообразно в историко-символических лицах; словом, такой драмы, где бы не речь, подчиненная минутным впечатлениям, но целая жизнь одного лица служила бы вопросом или ответом на жизнь другого."(8)

Причем, как станет ясно в дальнейшем, эти 'эмблемы' неудовлетворительны в целом и неудовлетворителен каждый элемент в отдельности, не достигший 'эмблематической' полноты.

"Ночь первая" дает уже более детализированный вариант принципа отделенности — во всех проявлениях культуры.

Эта отделенность фиксируется в первую очередь для природы и цивилизации или, во фразеологии того времени, Просвещения. Тонкая перегородка стекла отделяет холод и стихию от роскошной бальной залы. Это чисто 'петербургский' комплекс мотивов, что становится явным в новелле "Насмешка мертвеца", когда вода врывается в такой же зал с явными аллюзиями на всемирный потоп — наказание за грехи человеческие (впрочем, питерские наводнения всегда вызывали подобные ассоциации). Причем, грехи отягощаются видимыми знаками определенного положения в иерархии — так ордена и драгоценности тянут на дно. Подобное наказание неизбежно по мысли Одоевского при развитии цивилизации, поскольку, хотя Просвещение и создает защиту для людей от грозной стихии, впрочем довольно непрочную, но оно же, отделяя человека от природы, создает предпосылки к разрушению естественных связей между людьми:

"Зачем мятутся народы? Зачем, как снежную пыль, разносит их вихорь? [...] Зачем общество враждует с обществом и, еще более, с каждым из своих собственных членов? Зачем железо рассекает связи любви и дружбы? [...] Являются народы на поприще жизни, блещут славою, наполняют собой страницы истории и вдруг слабеют, приходят в какое-то беснование, как строители вавилонской башни, — и имя их с трудом отыскивает чужеземный археолог посреди пыльных хартий". (10)

Общество отчуждает человека и одновременно в обществе торжествует крайний индивидуализм:

"Здесь общество изгоняет гения, явившегося ему на славу. [...] Время и пространство обращены в ничто, пирует воля человека, а общество страждет и грустно чует приближение своей кончины" (10–11).

Просвещение, и, что особенно важно, оформленное в петербургских мотивах, превращает и общество, и человека в машину, причем все это на фоне разрыва коммуникации — друг с другом (смешение языков), с окружающим миром (ослепление), <или — ?> и, как следствие этого разрыва, — гибель:

"Здесь, в стоячем болоте, засыпают силы; как взнузданный конь, человек прилежно вертит все одно и то же колесо общественной махины, каждый день слепнет все больее и больее, а махина полуразрушилась. [...] Везде вражда, смешение языков, казни без преступлений и преступления без казни, а на конце поприща — смерть и ничтожество. [...] Смотри — душа твоя обратилась в паровую машину. Я вижу в тебе винты и колеса, но жизни не вижу!" (11)

Излюбленный мотив повторяется неоднократно — уже Фауст рассказывает притчу о человеке слепом, глухом и немом от рождения, т.е. почти лишенном всех средств выражения и коммуникации, не владеющем ни образом, ни словом. Притча заканчивается восклицанием:

"Кто мы, если не такие же глухие, немые и слепые от рождения?" (15)

Это — выраженное радикально отрицание 'деэмблематизации' мира. Две новеллы о художниках в "Русских ночах" строятся на обсуждении — дискредитации возможности полноценного бытияв связи с повержением органов коммуникации с миром.

Бетховен глохнет, Бах слепнет к старости. Приобретая в одном, художник непременно теряет в другом.

Кроме того, новеллы о художниках образуют внутри себя пары по нескольким признакам. Так, новеллы о Пиранезе и Бетховене посвящены проблеме принципиальной нереализованности: первая — в архитектуре, вторая — в музыке.

Грандиозные замыслы Пиранезе (соединить Везувий с Этной, срыть Монблан) очевидно коррелируют с планами и трактовкой симфоний Бетховена:

> "Я придумал симфонию, которая увековечит мое имя; напишу ее и сожгу все прежние. [...] Я построю ее на хроматической мелодии двадцати литавр; я введу в нее аккорды сотни колоколов.
>
> [...] В финал я введу барабанный бой и ружейные выстрелы. [...] Тысячи музыкантов, покорные моему взмаху, двенадцать капельмейстеров, а кругом батальный огонь, пушечные выстрелы..." (80–81).

Оба связывают свое творчество с Микельанджело — признанным монументалистом:

> Пиранезе: "Великий Микель-Анджело, поставивший Пантеон на так называемую огромную церковь Св. Петра в Риме, в старости был моим учителем" (31).
>
> Бетховен: "Сравнивают меня с Микель-Анджелом. [...]Так и я!" (83).

Сходство налицо и в том, что в определенном смысле музыка Бетховена тоже существует только на бумаге, как и архитектура Пиранезе причем аналогия с Пиранезе здесь подкреплена упоминанием 'темницы' — при первой встрече художник поразил рассказчика изображением казематов и пыток:

> "И все это тщетно! Да и к чему это все? Зачем? живешь, терзаешься, думаешь; написал — и конец! к бумаге приковались сладкие муки создания — не воротить их! унижены, в темницу заперты мысли гордого духа-создателя (83).

Последнее опять возвращает нас к основной проблеме — нереализованности. Для Пиранезе невозможность умереть кроется именно в том, что пространственность его архитектурных планов не может исполниться. Мы уже имели случай говорить о том, что пространство образа вычерпывает пространственность времени — так устроены "Медный всадник" и "Каменный гость"

(см. Григорьева 1997), — в случае с Пиранезе явление зеркально противоположное:

> "Я узнал теперь горьким опытом, что [...] каждое здание, каждая картина, каждая черта, невзначай проведенная по холсту или бумаге, служит жилищем такому духу. Эти духи свойства злого: они любят множиться и терзать своего творца за тесное жилище. Едва почуяли они, что жилище их должно ограничиться одними гравированными картинами, как вознегодовали на меня ... Я уже был на смертной постели, как вдруг ... [...] Едва я стал смыкать глаза вечным сном, как меня окружили призраки в образе дворцов, палат, домов, замков, сводов, колонн.
>
> Все они вместе давили меня своею громадою и с ужасным хохотом просили у меня жизни. С той минуты я не знаю покоя; духи, мною порожденные, преследуют меня: там огромный свод обхватывает меня в свои объятия, здесь башни гонятся за мною, шагая верстами; здесь окно дребезжит передо мною своими рамами. Иногда заключают они меня в мои собственные темницы [...], допытываются, зачем осудил я их на жизнь неполную и на вечное терзание, — и наконец, изможденного, ослабевшего, снова выталкивают на землю." (32–33).

Если бы пространство развилось вполне, оно бы получило и временное бытие, и тогда временное существо могло бы исчезнуть, в противном случае, оно становится вечным несамостоятельным элементом эмблемы — и в этом его трагедия по Одоевскому.

Если проблема невоплотимости пространства, выраженная в нереализованной, плоскостной архитектуре, делает Пиранезе бессмертным, то невоплотимость времени в варианте музыки убивает Бетховена.

> "От самых юных лет я увидел бездну, разделяющую мысль от выражения." (82).

Музыка как абсолютизация души — бессмертного времени — не может воплотиться в грубой материи:

> "Тонкое ухо мое стало грубеть: еще в нем оставалось столько чувствительности, что оно могло слышать ошибки музыкантов, но оно закрылось для красоты; мрачное облако его объяло — и я не слышу более своих произведений. [...] Хочу выразить — все исчезло: упорное вещество не выдает мне ни единого звука, — грубые чувства уничтожают всю деятельность души.(82).

Снова недовоплощенность, недоведенность до реализации, но здесь в варианте явного распада — разрушения эмблематической пары:

> "О! что может быть ужаснее этого раздора души с чувствами, души с душою! Зарождать в голове своей творческое произведение и ежечасно умирать в муках рождения! ... Смерть души! — как страшна, как жива эта смерть!" (82).

Здесь вновь снимается оппозиционность пары: Пиранезе живет 'мертвой жизнью', Бетховен умирает 'живой смертью'.

Как можно заметить, эти две новеллы образуют некую пару нереализуемой 'эмблемы': не воплощено ни пространство, которому не хватает времени, ни время, которому не хватает пространства. Жизнь одного героя здесь действительно ответ на смерть другого, что также образует пару, которую на основании вышесказанного можно считать 'эмблематической'. Но, поскольку эти две жизни разведены по разным новеллам, эта 'эмблема' явно дискредитированная, разорванная.

Новелла "Себастиан Бах" противопоставляется "Последнему квартету Бетховена" по признаку 'реализация — не-реализация' так же, как новелла о Пиранезе "Импровизатору", и вместе две новеллы о Пиранезе и Бетховене противостоят по этому же признаку "Баху" и "Импровизатору".

Бах, в отличие от Бетховена, сумел вполне реализовать свою музыку. Причем усилия по этой реализации мотивно оформляются в отчетливых попытках преодолеть разорванность в паре элементов 'эмблематического' типа.

Вся история юности Баха повествует об усилиях по преодолению невоплощенности. Бах начинает с того, что читает музыку глазами (отчего и слепнет к старости, т.е. первый шаг на пути к воплощению цельности становится первым шагом на пути к ее утрате) — это еще неполноценная музыка без звука, без оплотнения (по сути — 'бетховенская стадия'), но увидеть то, что он слышал, — это уже шаг к воплощению, которое здесь достаточно очевидно понимается как достраивание до пары эмблематического типа. При этом характерно сопоставление сочетания звуков с графической записью нот с иероглифами, хотя по сути они ими не являются, более того, в каком-то смысле эти явления противоположны (иероглиф никак не указывает на звучание, произнесе-

ние слова, в то время, как нотная запись призвана указывать именно на это):

> "Часто Себастиан заслушивался, когда брат его медленно, задумываясь на каждой ноте, принимался разыгрывать эти заветные произведения. Однажды он не утерпел и [...] попросил Христофора позволить ему испытать свои силы над этими иероглифами. [...] Себастиан был в отчаяньи; и днем и ночью недоконченные фразы запрещенной музыки звенели в ушах его; их докончить, разгадать смысл их гармонических соединений — сделалось в нем страстию, болезнию. [...] Кто опишет восторг его? мертвые ноты зазвучали пред ним; то, чего тщетно он отыскивал в неопределенных представлениях памяти, — то ясно выговаривалось ими. Целую ночь провел он в этом занятии, с жадностью перевертывая листы, напевая, ударяя пальцами по столу, как бы по клавишам." (109).

Бах начинает переписывать ноты и таким образом делает еще один шаг к воплощению (но это предание бумаге — еще только фаза Пиранезе). Наиболее полное описание попыток установить связь в разорванной паре — это описание первого опыта общения юного Баха с органом. Орган — огромное пространственное образование — не звучит до тех пор, пока в него не вдохнули дух, т.е. время:

> "Перед ним и клавиши [...]; он бросается, сильно ударяет по ним, ждет, как полногласный звук грянет о своды церкви, — но орган, как будто стон гневного мужа раздался, испустил нестройное созвучие по храму и умолкнул. Тщетно Себастиан брал тот и другой аккорд, тщетно трогал то одну, то другую клавиатуру, тщетно выдвигал и вдвигал находившиеся вблизи рукоятки, — орган молчал, и только глухой костяной стук от клавишей [...]. Он помыслил, что бог наказывает его за святотатство, и что органу суждено навсегда молчать под рукой." (112).

Это как бы 'бетховенская' фаза невоплощенности, за которой следуют прямо-таки физические усилия по преодолению этой невоплощенности:

> "Бросился к мехам; сильною рукою он приводил их в движение и потом опрометью бегал к клавиатуре, чтобы воспользоваться тем количеством воздуха, которое не успевало вылететь из меха, пока он добегал до клавиатуры; но тщетно, — не вполне потрясенные трубы издавали лишь нестройные звуки, и Себастиан обессилел от долгого движения." (112).

При этом для Одоевского оказывается весьма существенным то, что орган среди всех музыкальных инструментов наиболее приближается к произведению архитектуры — и в этом смысле Бах как бы соединяет невоплощенные мечты Пиранезе и Бетховена:

> "Здесь огромные четвероугольные трубы, как будто остатки от древнего греческого здания, тянулись одна над другой, а вокруг их ряды готических башен возвышали свои остроконечные металлические колонны. [...] Вдруг он смотрит: четвероугольные столбы подымаются с мест своих, соединяются с готическими колоннами, становятся ряд за рядом, еще ... еще — и взорам Себастиана явилось бесконечное, дивное здание, которого наяву описать не может бедный язык человеческий. Здесь таинство зодчества соединялось с таинствами гармонии; над обширным, убегающим во все стороны от взора помостом полные созвучия пересекались в образе легких сводов и опирались на бесчисленные ритмические колонны. [...] В стройных геометрических линиях воздымались сочетания музыкальных орудий; [...] разноцветные завесы противозвучий свивались и развивались пред ним, и хроматическая гамма игривым барельефом струилась по карнизу." (112–113).

Таким образом, освоив орган как инструмент воплощения своих творений, Бах вполне достигает 'эмблематической' целостности в своей музыке — и, надо заметить, что Бах был любимейшим композитором Одоевского. Но, при этом, он все равно что-то упускает. И не только потому, что законченность его искусства лишает совершенства человеческую личность. В конечном счете Бах, как и его старший брат, не может допустить существования иного и в музыке. Весьма характерно, что это 'иное' полагается Одоевским в итальянской музыке, что как бы намекает на противопоставление 'немецкой', 'скульптурной', а в трактовке Одоевского даже 'архитектурной', устремленной ввысь (вертикаль), линии в развитии музыки[7] и 'итальянской', чувственной, пребывающей на земле (горизонталь).

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[7] Думается, что вообще многие особенности и проявления немецкой культуры коренятся в экстраординарных пространственных свойствах немецкого языка. Так, например, теория музыкальной драмы Рихарда Вагнера в качестве побудительного мотива очевидно имеет невозможность совместить 'скульптурность', отдельность немецкого слова с нерасчлененностью музыкально — речевого потока в традиции итальянской оперы. См. Вагнер 1978: 540–624.

Баху в недооценке одной из линий инкриминируется та же односторонность языка, что и в раздробленной на специальные области науке:

> "Воображение его, изнывая, искало звуков, единственного языка, на котором ему была понятна и жизнь души его и жизнь вселенной, но тщетно: одряхлевшее, оно представляло ему лишь клавиши, трубы, клапаны органа! мертвые, безжизненные, они уже не возбуждали сочувствия." (131–132).

И поэтому его душа также, как его сознание, утрачивает цельность:

> "Окруженный вечной тьмою. [...] Половина души его была мертвым трупом!"(131)

Как можно заметить, это напоминает обратное течение 'вилочного' процесса раздвоения: от пары каждый раз отсекается одна из ее составляющих, т.е. этот процесс может быть охарактеризован как процесс 'деэмблематизации' или 'вилочой деструкции'.

'Эмблема' даже в самом совершенном ее варианте не может служить адекватной моделью мира и человека. Это положение становится особенно очевидным при анализе с этой точки зрения новеллы "Импровизатор", составляющей явную оппозицию к "Себастиану Баху" по принципу 'шутовство — высокое искусство'. Искусство Киприяно представляет собой дьявольский, механический фокус. Впрочем, в этом ракурсе искусство Баха тоже не лишено механических элементов, но, разумеется, не дьявольского свойства, скорее наоборот, но тем не менее (ср. определение органа в качестве "чудно устроенной машины" (112).)

Импровизатор — Киприяно — начинает с того, с чего и Пиранезе, и Бетховен, и Бах — с попыток выражения, воплощения мысли, на этот раз в слове. Его усилия и страдания при этом невыносимы: с одной стороны, мысль теряется во мгле неосознанного — она неуловима; с другой — грубая материя настолько косна, что почти неподвластна никаким трансформациям духом. Ситуация разорванной 'эмблематической' пары в рафинированном виде. Человеческая личность, изнывая от бессилия, пытается увязать части пары:

> "В те дни редко тусклая мысль, как едва приметная звездочка, зарождалась в его фантазии; но когда и зарождалась, то яснела медленно и долго терялась в тумане; уже после трудов неимоверных

достигала она какого-то неясного образа; здесь начиналась новая работа: выражение отлетало от поэта за мириады миров; он не находил слов, а если и находил, то они не клеились; метр не гнулся; привязчивое местоимение хваталось за каждое слово; долговязый глагол путался между именами; проклятая рифма пряталась между несозвучными словами. Каждый стих стоил бедному поэту нескольких изгрызенных перьев, нескольких вырванных волос и обломанных ногтей. Тщетны были его усилия!" (87).

Это последнее "тщетны!" сопровождает всех художников "Русских ночей". Характерно, что попытка увязать мысль и слово, зафиксировать их друг за другом приводит к так сказать 'визуализации' этих усилий в виде "вырванных волос" и "обломанных ногтей" — мнемоническая функция подобных приписываемых образов, в том числе в варианте "зарубок на теле" культурно типична и имеет прямое отношение к мнемонической "эмблематизации" в самом широком смысле (ср. 'эмблематическую' интерпретацию анекдота о Ниагарском водопаде: Григорьева 1997: 431).

И тогда Киприяно прибегает к услугам одного из типичных романтических магов. Дар мага сопровождается на первый взгляд странным условием, в котором, разумеется, и кроется философский подвох, состоящим в том, что Киприяно при свободном владении выражением будет еще и все видеть, и все понимать. (В свете 'эмблематической' парности это, впрочем, вполне логично). И вот вместо титанических усилий по переводу одного элемента на другой импровизатору это дается автоматически:

"В одно мгновение высокое таинство зарождения мысли показалось Киприяно делом весьма легким и обыкновенным; чертов мост с китайскими погремушками протянулся для него над бездною, отделяющую мысль от выражения, и Киприяно заговорил стихами." (93).

Это по сути дела констатация механичности, автоматичности перевода элементов друг на друга в сочетании 'эмблематического' типа. Киприяно владеет словом и видит вещественность до самого дна — оба элемента налицо. Характерно, что это видение выражается в видении атомарной структуры. Киприяно при этом как бы превращается в хитрую машину ('черный ящик' информационного процесса, который здесь весьма показательно предстает как некая 'мясорубка') — по одну сторону у него разлагается

материя, по другую изо рта вырываются стихи. Он отделен и от того, и от другого, он принципиально изображен выпавшим в промежуток между тем и этим, причем, этот промежуток явно стремится к нулю. Вещественность разлагается против его воли и при этом гонит, вытесняет его из мира — вытесняет именно в момент превращения материи в слово (во время):

> "Зрение, слух, обоняние, вкус, осязание, чувства, все нервы его получили микроскопическую способность, и как в известном фокусе малейшая пылинка, малейшее насекомое, не существующее для нас, теснило его, гнало из мира; щебетание бабочкиного крыла раздирало его ухо; самая гладкая поверхность щекотала его; все в природе разлагалось перед ним, но ничто не соединялось в душе его: он все видел, все понимал, но между им и людьми, между им и природой была вечная бездна; ничто в мире не сочувствовало ему" (94).

Личность человека здесь оказывается как бы не при чем — процесс автоматизирован. Не случайно Одоевский упоминает "китайские погремушки" — далее в беседах Фауста мы находим рассуждение о китайской культуре как выразившей все в формах, в то время как сущность сгнила, рассуждение, сопровождаемое к тому же кивком на философов 18 века.

В конечном итоге подмена человека машиной, эмблемой приводит к атрофии его естественных человеческих внутренних механизмов:

> "От долговременного борения расшаталось здание души его; поломались тонкие связи, которыми соединены таинственные стихии мыслей и чувствований — и они распались, как распадаются кристаллы, проржавленные едкою кислотою; в душе его не осталось ни мыслей, ни чувствований: остались какие-то фантомы, облеченные в одежду слов, для него самого непонятных" (96).

Как можно заметить, в сильно облагороженном варианте то же происходит и с Бахом. Киприяно видит только грубую материю, Бах — высшую гармонию, но они оба инструменты, только в разных руках. Если Киприяно — 'китайская погремушка' в руках дьявола или кого-то весьма на него смахивающего, то Бах — орган, исполненный божественной гармонии.

> "Словом, он сделался церковным органом, возведенным в степень человека" (125).

А орган, согласно Одоевскому, — наполовину инструмент, машина, а наполовину — организм:

> "Воздухопроводы, которые, как жилы огромного организма, соединяли трубы с несметными клавишами, чудно устроенную машину" (112).

В "Импровизаторе" и последующем диалогическом обсуждении проблематики этой новеллы отчетливо проступает проблема недостаточности парной структуры в процессе 'эмблематического' перевода. Ряд метафор, демонстрирующих принцип троичности, непосредственно следует за "Импровизатором" и как бы предваряет "Баха".

Это например рассуждение о мире животных и мире растений, где два этих мира представлены в варианте загадки, 'вопроса — ответа' 'эмблематического' типа:

> "Мне всегда жизнь животных представлялась ответом на жизнь растений, а человек судией между ними" (97).

Но, как можно заметить, здесь вводится 'третий' — судья, человек. И рассуждение-сравнение 'пирамида-огонь-человек':

> "Кажется под символом огня скрывался другой, более глубокий — человек. Посмотри на пламя: в нем есть темная, холодная часть — произведение грубых испарений горящего тела; в нем есть более светлая, где пламя похищает жизненную стихию из атмосферы; эта часть лишь окисляет металлы; между обеими частями есть точка — одна точка; но здесь сильнейшая степень жара, которому ничто противостоять не может" (98).

Здесь мы вновь видим схему двух стихий, 'расходящихся-сходящихся' к точке. И мысль о том, что, чтобы "сравнить обе мерки [...] надобно еще третью мерку.'"(98) И далее в обсуждении вопроса о переводе природы на язык живописи:

> "Живописец, срисовывая с натуры, — лишь питается ею, как человеческий организм питается грубыми произведениями природы. Но как происходит этот процесс? Вещества, принимаемые нами в пищу, подвергаются живому брожению; лишь тончайшие их части остаются в организме и проходят чрез несколько живых превращений, прежде нежели обратятся в нашу плоть" (99).

Здесь исключительно важна метафора органического процесса — не просто 'измельчение' (как у Киприяно), а переваривание, пе-

реплавка. Это становится очевидно в анекдоте о Бенвенуто Челлини и его неудачливом с точки зрения Одоевского подражателе:

"Однажды Бенвенуто Челлини, отливая серебряную статую, заметил, что металла мало; боясь, что отливка не удастся, он собрал все домашнее серебро: кубки, ложки, кольца и бросил в горнило. Какой-то художник [...] вспомнил догадку Бенвенуто [...], но опоздал: она не успела растопиться — и когда форму обломали, художник с отчаяньем увидел, что из груди Венеры выглядывало дно кастрюльки, над глазами торчала ложка, и так далее ..." (99).

Несомненно, что эта дискуссия непосредственно имеет отношение к критике 'эмблематичности' как механического процесса — Арчимбольдо, не задумываясь, отлил бы подобную скульптуру. Думается, что подобному замыслу могли бы позавидовать также представители поп-арта (например, Ники де Сен-Фаль). По мнению Одоевского же:

"Беда художнику, если внутреннее его горнило не в силах расплавить грубую природу и превратить ее в существо более возвышенное" (99),

что по сути дела является очередным примером извечного различия между "Как делать стихи" и "Когда б вы знали, из какого сора ..."

Это как бы фиксация, осознание или, если угодно, возврат к 'державинской' стадии распада эмблемы. Здесь вновь требуется авторское усилие, осознание, деавтоматизация перевода, авторская аксиология, скрепление элементов при помощи авторитета индивидуума, но на новом этапе, философски осознанном. Согласно Одоевскому, разрозненность неприемлема, но объединение должно осуществляться органически, а не механически. 'Измельчение', 'дробление' необходимо, но не в варианте микроскопа, а в варианте пищеварения.

Все произведение Одоевского пронизано идеей усилия по удержанию, слиянию распавшихся элементов друг с другом. Дискредитируется и отдельно взятая форма (в пределе — Китай), и отдельно взятая вещественность (в пределе — Мальтус), и механическое соединение всего со всем ("Импровизатор"), и даже вдохновенное соединение, но пренебрегающее личностью в ее естественных проявлениях (Бах). Именно поэтому странный суд в первом из финалов якобы инкорпорированной в текст романа

рукописи инкриминирует каждому из героев неполноту, при этом сам судья признает неуловимость, невыразимость индивидуума.

Индивидуум в понимании Одоевского должен не разделять, но интегрировать, впитать в себя все элементы (ср. ссылку на Шеллинга, о том, что разница между мыслью и выражением должна свестись к нулю (140)).

И в этом смысле примечательна и закономерна трактовка Одоевским петровских преобразований в России. Петр предстает в этом процессе одновременно как механик-часовщик и врач-естествоиспытатель, а весь процесс разительно напоминает усилия Баха по вызыванию к жизни органа:

> "Был на сем свете великий естествоиспытатель, по имени Петр Великий; ему достался на долю организм чудный [...]. Он нашел в нем размеры огромные, силы исполинские, крепкие, закаленные зубчатые колеса, прочные упоры, быстрые шестерни — но этой огромной системе сил недоставало маятника; оттого мощные элементы этого мира доходили до действий, противоположных существу их. [...] Великий знаток природы и человека не отчаялся; он видел в своем народе действие иных стихий, почти потерявшихся между другими народами: чувство любви и единства, укрепленное вековою борьбою с враждебными силами; видел чувство благоговения и веры, освятившее вековые страдания; оставалось лишь обуздать чрезмерное, возбудить заснувшее. И великий мудрец привил к своему народу [...]. Прививка была сильна [...], и новая, горячая кровь полилась в широких жилах исполина; все чувства его пришли в деятельность; ... и т.д." (181).

Соответственно, 'односторонний', согласно Одоевскому, Запад также нуждается в прививке — организации, но не механической, а посредством новой личности — нового Петра или, по крайней мере, в ходе естественного развития. Таким образом, идеи славянофильства вписываются в более общую идею, концепцию информационного процесса, построенную на осознании распада пары 'эмблематического' типа и попытки восстановления ее на новой — органической — основе. Характерно, что в указании на необходимость этой интеграции кн. Одоевский обращается к авторитету Петра, положившему начало веку 'панэмблематизации' в России.

Спотыкающаяся проза:
"Усомнившийся Макар" Андрея Платонова

Прежде чем приступить к подробному, я бы даже сказала — микроскопическому, анализу трех абзацев прозы Андрея Платонова, я бы хотела очертить некий круг теоретических проблем, так сказать, идеологию данного предприятия.

Исследователи неоднократно обращались к анализу языка Платонова. В первую очередь здесь следует упомянуть работы Толстой-Сегал,[8] исключительно много проясняющие в специфике платоновского нарратива. Наиболее близкой, однако, к нашим разысканиям оказалась работа М. Бобрик (Бобрик 1995), рассматривающая с исключительно лингвистических позиций языковые нарушения в прозе Платонова. Ее статья представляет собой практически полный каталог лингвистических казусов в языке Платонова. Тем не менее наш опыт прочтения Платонова не может считаться ни вторичным, ни бессмысленным. Во-первых, поскольку мы делаем акцент на **сплошном** рассмотрении непрерывного повествования (в силу этого нам и пришлось ограничиться несколькими абзацами), а не на анализе демонстративной выборки примеров, а во-вторых, мы считаем, что чисто лингвистический анализ здесь является определенным сужением проблемы. Для нас было важнее рассмотреть именно традиционно-логические (или: культуро-логические) сдвиги внутри повествования. В этом мы скорее ориентировались на работы Р. Барта (в первую очередь, разумеется, "S/Z" — Барт 1994), значение которых для настоящих заметок трудно переоценить. Поэтому представляется уместным предварить собственно анализ некоторым теоретическим вступлением.

Очевидно, что существуют одновременно две тенденции в языке художественной прозы, которые могут быть условно охарактеризованы, как нейтрализующая тенденция — язык старается быть незаметным, предоставляя возможность другим функциям текста говорить собою, и аттрактивная — язык пытается

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[8] В первую очередь см.: Толстая-Сегал, Е. О связи низших уровней текста с высшими. (Проза Андрея Платонова). *Slavica Hierosolymitana.* *1978. Vol. 3*: 89–109. См. также: Seifrid, Th. Against Matter. On the Language of Andrej Platonov's "Kotlovan". *Slavic and East European Journal. 1987. Vol. 31. N 3*: 370–387.

привлечь внимание именно к себе, описывая в первую очередь самого себя. В конкретном произведении, разумеется, нельзя говорить о наличии только одной тенденции, однако пожалуй, все же можно — о преобладании одной из них. Как явствует из заглавия нашей статьи, мы будем иметь дело именно со второй из названных тенденций.

Здесь возникает следующая проблема: каким именно образом язык обращает на себя внимание, что заставляет увидеть его. Как представляется, этот вопрос нуждается как в расширении, так и в углублении. Расширение предполагает постановку вопроса в более общем виде: что вообще заставляет обращать на себя внимание в литературном произведении. Как представляется, это имеет отношение к проблеме дискретности-недискретности дискурса. Данная оппозиция соотносится с разделением композиции и текста Барта (Барт 1989: 414–415), однако, с ним не совпадает.

Очевидно, что так сказать "физическое тело" любого текста дискретно — оно состоит из фиксированных (или иным другим способом выраженных) знаков (данное понятие я употребляю здесь не в строго терминологическом значении) и промежутков, лакун между ними. Литературный текст, как и вообще речь, складывается из слов (или значащих элементов, если мы говорим вообще о любом высказывании, но для нас сейчас это различие не существенно), отделенных одно от другого. Вне этого отделения не представляется возможным понимание. Последнее существенно — понимание, т.е. возможность интерпретации (о несовпадении понимания и интерпретации чуть ниже), неосуществимо вне дискретности. Восприятие же, в отличии от понимания, очевидным образом нейтрально по отношению к дискретности. Это как бы Lebenswelt, если воспользоваться выражением Гуссерля, — непосредственный поток жизни дискурса. При этом, разумеется, одна только дискретность понимания не обеспечивает. Необходим так сказать встречный поток, восстанавливающий некое единство (я подчеркиваю — не не-дискретность) континуума. Таким, несколько парадоксальным образом, понимание рождается на стыке противонаправленных интенций: дробящей дискурс и восстанавливающей его единство, соответственно, интерпретации и восприятия ('восприятия', поскольку это не то же самое восприятие, что восприятие = Lebenswelt, хотя оно и совпадает с ним по всем параметрам, кроме того, что оно пост-рефлексивно).

Другими же словами, можно говорить об интенции, требующей остановки внимания, привлекающей это внимание — аттрактивной, и интенции, нейтрализующей усилия интерпретации.

Дискурс недискретен, он не имеет лакун. Интерпретация восстанавливает лакуны "физического тела" текста, тем самым превращая его в это "физическое тело". (Другой вопрос, что интерпретация сама имеет тенденцию тут же становится дискурсом, недискретным для его восприятия, однако, сейчас нас это занимать не будет.)

В качестве иллюстрации настоящих положений приведу один забавный пример из "Понедельник начинается в субботу" бр. Стругацких. Герой там отправляется на велосипеде времени в будущее, но только не реальное, а литературное, т.е. по сути дела в тексты, где он с удивлением и смущением замечает странно одетых людей:

> "То и дело попадались какие-то люди, одетые только частично: скажем, в зеленой шляпе и красном пиджаке на голое тело (больше ничего); или в изящных туфельках на босу ногу. Окружающие относились к ним спокойно, а я смущался до тех пор, пока не вспомнил, что некоторые авторы имеют обыкновение писать что-нибудь вроде "дверь отворилась и на пороге появился стройный мускулистый человек в мохнатой кепке и темных очках"." (Стругацкий, Стругацкий 1992: 140.)

Здесь ясно видно, что понимание текста без затруднений проскакивает подобные разрывы, в то время как интерпретация — обращение внимания — восстанавливает, если не все, то во всяком случае всегда совершенно неизбежные, стыки между его элементами, будь то слова или более крупные единицы. Это характерно, разумеется, не только для литературного дискурса. Высказывание: "Они поженились и у них родилась дочь" предполагает автоматическое проскакивание через отсутствие элемента "прошло 9 месяцев". Характерно, что "проскакивание" предполагает именно "проскакивание" чего-то само-собой-разумеющегося, т.е. чего-то, являющегося или ставшего привычным с точки зрения здравого смысла и логики, литературной традиции прочтения или просто традиции прочтения, в конечном итоге, тоже логики. Так, заполнение лакуны элементом типа "прошло 3 месяца и ..." пусть на короткий момент, но все же остановит внимание и потребует некоторого усилия типа: "т.е. как —

а–а ...", разумеется, в том случае, если предшествующий контекст не подготовил уже нас достаточно к подобному повороту событий. Т.е. здесь налицо усилие, направленное на то, чтобы заставить "смысл циркулировать" (выражение М. Ямпольского — см. Ямпольский 1993: 78). Можно сконструировать простейшие варианты подобных высказываний (типологически весьма близкие к строению прозы Платонова), абсурдность которых поверяется не лингвистически, а так сказать, при помощи здравого смысла: "Они поженились, и пошел дождь", или более тонкий, предложенный М. Л. Гаспаровым: "Они поженились, и у них не родилась дочь". От воспринимающего здесь требуется преодоление зияния между элементами, восстановление или установление логико-семантической связи.

То, что я предпочитаю говорить о нарушенных **логических** (вернее даже о культуро-логических), а не, скажем, стилистических или лингвистических связях для меня принципиально, поскольку это подчеркивает внеуровневый характер лакун и обрывов. И самая интерпретация вслед за пониманием не может ограничиться одним каким-либо уровнем в своей деятельности, хотя, вне всякого сомнения, деление на уровни является одним из способов остановки внимания — интерпретации.

Теперь, возвращаясь к функциональным различиям языка художественного текста, можно заметить, что нейтрализующая тенденция связана скорее с восприятием, неотрефлектированным "проскакиванием" лакун, в то время как аттрактивная связана скорее с интерпретацией, рефлексивной паузой, т.е. с "физическим телом" текста.

Анализируя новеллу Бальзака, Ролан Барт выделяет некие не очень формальные "единицы чтения" — "лексии" (Барт 1994: 24), отделяемые друг от друга переводом дыхания, т.е. остановками, определяемыми согласно почти физиологическому параметру, вернее, согласно принципу, в котором соединяются семантический и физиологический параметры. "На одном дыхании" читаются тексты, где действие цепляется за действие — детективы, в которых, как правило, действие движется интенцией заполнения первичной, зачинной лакуны (загадка — отгадка).

Обратившись, наконец, к текстам Платонова, надо заметить, что у его повествования очень короткое дыхание, почти одышка, одышка прозы. Проза Платонова требует интерпретационных

остановок почти после каждого слова. Совершенно неслучайно платоновскую прозу почти не могут читать непрофессионалы. Одна из самых частотных жалоб, прошу поверить мне на слово, впрочем не настаиваю на научности данного утверждения, — это, что Платонов вызывает тахикардию.

Выбор конкретного текста для анализа и произволен (в том смысле, в котором случайная выборка экспериментального материала считается более объективной, — предполагаю, что любой текст Платонова при анализе даст схожий результат) и, разумеется, неслучаен. Известно, что рассказ "Усомнившийся Макар" (1929) явился в определенной степени поворотным не только для творчества Платонова, но и для всей русской литературы сталинского периода. Тотальные литературные гонения не в последнюю очередь были инспирированы (или явились удобным предлогом) именно рассказами Платонова "Усомнившийся Макар" и "Впрок" (1931). Характерна здесь литературная чуткость диктатора, распознавшего "что-то не то" в произведении, достаточно сложном для прочтения. Впрочем, как ни странно, советские руководители вообще отличались сверхчувствительностью, когда дело касалось любой формы искусства. Что в точности сказал Сталин по поводу "Усомнившегося Макара" доподлинно не известно, однако "безусловно лишь одно: были такие слова, возможно сказанные в узком кругу: "двусмысленное произведение", "двусмысленный рассказ"." (Чалмаев 1988: 22). Эта характеристика для нас исключительно значима, даже если она является мифом. (Легендарность в определенной степени всегда обобщение.) Действительно, двусмысленность, качание между разнообразными смыслами, когда неясно, на каком остановиться, одна из основных особенностей прозы Платонова. Приведу две цитаты, менее литературно чутких, чем Сталин людей, т.е. "прозевавших" Платонова и раскаявшихся только после окрика хозяина: "Л. Авербах так и написал: "Рассказ Платонова — идеологическое отражение сопротивляющейся мелкобуржуазной стихии. В нем есть двусмысленность, но наше время не терпит двусмысленности." /.../ А. Фадеев в письме Р. С. Землячке из дома отдыха в декабре 1929 года также повторил это слово "двусмысленный": "Меня ищут в РАППе, /.../ ищут в редакции (в "Октябре" я прозевал недавно идеологически двусмысленный рассказ А. Платонова "Усомнившийся Макар", за что мне поделом попало от Ста-

лина, — рассказ анархистский.)" (Чалмаев 1988: 23)[9] Характерно, что все эти замечания, при их негативности, разумеется, прямо соотносятся, и я бы даже сказала — декларативно инспирированы, уже самим заглавием рассказа: с тем только, что "усомнившийся" в критике превращается в "сомнительного".

В мою же задачу входит продемонстрировать, каким образом делается, осуществляется эта двусмысленность в "физико-семантической" реальности прозы Платонова. Поскольку я буду анализировать небольшой отрезок платоновского текста, я позволю себе привести его здесь целиком в целях оперативного удобства.

> "Среди прочих трудящихся масс жили два члена государства: нормальный мужик Макар Ганушкин и более выдающийся — товарищ Лев Чумовой, который был наиболее умнейшим на селе и, благодаря уму, руководил движением народа вперед, по прямой линии к общему благу. Зато все население деревни говорило про Льва Чумового, когда он шел где-либо мимо:
>
> — Вон наш вождь шагом куда-то пошел, — завтра жди какого-нибудь принятия мер ... Умная голова, только руки пустые. Голым умом живет ...
>
> Макар же, как любой мужик, больше любил промыслы, чем пахоту, и заботился не о хлебе, а о зрелищах, потому что у него была, по заключению товарища Чумового, порожняя голова.
>
> Не взяв разрешения у товарища Чумового, Макар организовал однажды зрелище — народную карусель, гонимую кругом себя мощностью ветра. Народ собрался вокруг Макаровой карусели сплошной тучей и ожидал бури, которая могла бы стронуть карусель с места. Но буря опаздывала, народ стоял без делов, а тем временем жеребенок Чумового сбежал в луга и там заблудился в мокрых местах. Если бы народ был на покое, то он сразу поймал бы жеребенка Чумового и не позволил бы Чумовому терпеть убыток, но Макар отвлек народ от покоя и тем помог Чумовому потерпеть ущерб.
>
> Чумовой сам не погнался за жеребенком, а подошел к Макару, молча тосковавшему по буре, и сказал:
>
> — Ты народ здесь отвлекаешь, а у меня за жеребенком погнаться некому ...
>
> Макар очнулся от задумчивости, потому что догадался. Думать он не мог, имея порожнюю голову над умными руками, но зато он мог сразу догадываться." (Платонов 1988: 93).

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9   Цитируются Авербах, Л. О целостных масштабах и частных Макарах. *На литературном посту*. 1929. Кн. 21–22: 164. Фадеев, А. *Повесть нашей юности. Из писем и воспоминаний*. М. 1961: 189–190.

Заглавие: задает сразу инерцию повествованию с пуантом — не "сомневающийся", а "*усомнившийся*", т.е. результат некоего процесса — "сомнения", при этом результат заведомо амбивалентный — то ли так, то ли не так. Кроме того, мы сразу получаем имя героя — *Макар*. Становится ясно, что все действие будет сверяться именно с этим героем. Это существенно, как мы увидим, в том числе для самых первых строк рассказа.

Зачин: "*среди прочих трудящихся*" — первый стык, первая остановка дыхания. Мы имеем здесь противопоставление: если есть '*прочие*', им должен быть кто-то противопоставлен — '*прочие*' и некто. Причем '*прочие*' — слово довольно сильное, оно включает в себя оттенок смысла отдаления ('прочь'), сильный вариант отделения. Вообще, это одно из излюбленных, ключевых слов Платонова — вспомним "*прочих*" "Чевенгура", обнаруживающее в себе смысловые обертоны неприсоединенности, выпадения именно из процесса дружного построения социализма. С другой стороны, в сочетании с '*трудящимися*' оно предполагает некоторую включенность в это число, причастность к этому сообществу, особенно в сочетании с "*среди*", т.е. внутри, посреди, в центре. Таким образом, уже первое же словосочетание заключает в себе довольно сильное противоречие — с одной стороны, выделенности, отделенности некоторого элемента, его противопоставленности чему-то, а с другой стороны — его однородности, включенности и причастности этому. Слова одновременно и притягивают и отталкивают друг друга. Противоречие вызревает внутри некоего монолита.

"*Трудящихся масс*" — второй стык, впрочем, считать их действительно не имеет смысла — почти каждое слово сочетается с каждым вполне парадоксальным образом. Если "*трудящихся*" как субстантив от причастия можно сосчитать по отдельности, соответственно, к ним вполне приложимо "*прочих*", поскольку семантически оно предполагает отдельность, то о '*массах*' этого уж никак не скажешь — понятие совершено не квантитативное. Вернее, это словосочетание предполагает некую почти сюрреалистическую картину — '*трудящаяся масса*' (нечто вроде "эротической машины" Де Сада), кроме того, их много: "*Среди прочих*"! Соответственно, выясняется, что не отдельный, единичный элемент противостоит такому же другому (заметим при этом, что и включается в качестве единичного), но некие киша-

щие жизнью массы — рои. Сравнение "трудящихся масс" с роями неслучайно — можно вспомнить "Любовь пчел трудовых" Коллонтай и вообще любовь большевиков к пчелам, подмеченную Дос Пассосом: "Странно, насколько часто они говорят о пчелах. Упорядоченность и сладость улья, кажется, произвела большое впечатление на русских этого времени." (Дос Пассос 1994: 460.)

И вот среди этих роев:

"*Жили два члена государства*" — очень сильный стык. "*Прочих масс*" и "*два*", причем, "*члена*", т.е. отдельных, считанных элемента. Но они сопоставлены с '*прочими массами*', соответственно, каждый из них отдельный, и тем не менее — целый рой — картина, подобная бесконечной делимости атома в сочетании с бесконечной множественностью космоса, который тут же и называется — '*государство*', слово, стоящее в достаточно сильной позиции конца синтагмы. Таким образом, естественнонаучная точка зрения смыкается с социальной, и в результате мы имеем космическую картину — государство как мироздание, каждый из элементов (членов, частиц) которого — '*трудящаяся*' (по аналогии — 'кишащая жизнью', поскольку "*жили*") '*масса*'.

Распространение (перечисление): "*нормальный мужик*" — следующий стык. Амбивалентность — что значит "*нормальный*"? Ср., если бы было 'обыкновенный'. "*Нормальный мужик*" — это 'обычный мужик'? 'Мужик, согласно определенной норме'? Тогда какой: социальной или общечеловеческой? "*Мужик*" в русском языке может значить и просто: 'человек', 'мужчина' и 'крестьянин', т.е. член социума. Причем "*нормальный*" предполагает новую амбивалентность: в каком смысле "*нормальный*" — в психическом или социальном, а также задает инерцию дальнейшего противопоставления в перечислении: 'норма' — 'отсутствие нормы': 'этот "*нормальный*"', а тот — не ... Забегая вперед, заметим, что этот стык еще острее: не 'а' (предполагаемое), а 'и' (сополагающее).

"*Макар Ганушкин*" — узнавание. Имя героя, вынесенное в заглавие, дает очень сильную остановку с распространением. Мы узнаем имя из названия и новое определение этого имени — "*Ганушкин*". Имя этой остановки: 'А, так вот, кто герой!', опускающее нас, разумеется, сразу в литературную традицию, которая здесь явственно противостоит политизированной окраске

лексики первой части фразы. Конечно, "Бедные люди", 'маленький человек' ("Я брат ваш ..."), его 'нормальность' подсвечивается теперь и 'очеловеченностью' (т.е. "*мужик*" в смысле 'человек' — как бы предложенное решение в качании альтернатив), но и, в силу традиции, 'обыденностью обывателя' (амбивалентность не снимается традицией — на последовательности вчитывания оттенков смысла я принципиально не настаиваю). Впрочем, последний оттенок характеристики противоречив с учетом традиции — "*мужик*" у Платонова, но 'чиновник' у Гоголя и Достоевского. Вписывание в традицию ставит под сомнение психиатрическую часть диагноза 'нормальности' у Платонова. Герои Достоевского этим **традиционно** не отличались. Кроме того, фамилия, при узнаваемом сохранении ритмической и грамматической схемы, изменена: не "Девушкин", а *Ганушкин*". Последнее при сохранении уменьшительности ('маленький' в любом случае) противостоит 'девичеству', застенчивости, нерешительности, мягкости первой фамилии. Это проявляется уже фонетически 'дев' — 'ган'. Литературный код здесь способствует эскалации амбивалентности: уменьшительный суффикс (еще и в сочетании с тем самым именем) нас как бы одновременно отбрасывает в литературную традицию, но, возвращая к первой части фамилии ('опознали, но ведь не совсем то'), тут же возражает ей. При этом русский семантический ореол слова "*Ганушкин*" (о прочих я намерено не упоминаю в силу неочевидности) — 'гоношиться', 'суетиться' не очень осмысленно, противоречит явной рефлексивности при видимом отсутствии внешней деятельности подобных героев Достоевского. Кроме того, указание "*мужик*", разумеется, в одной из своих ипостасей противостоит андрогинности героя Достоевского. Эта семантическая коннотация дает дополнительный оттенок смысла элементу "*нормальный*" — 'так вот какой мужик — нормальный!'

"*И более выдающийся*" — ни одна из коннотаций предшествующего комплекса не помогает избежать стыка — логического противоречия. Подразумеваемое противопоставление 'один — нормальный, другой — ненормальный' заменяется объединением: не 'а', а 'и', тут же провоцируя новое недоразумение: что же чему здесь противопоставлено? "*Нормальный*" и "*более выдающийся*". Логика нарушена здесь с одной стороны стилистически: существует некая норма — относительно ее нечто 'более

выдается', однако стилистически корректнее было бы сравнивать или 'нормальный' и 'более/менее нормальный', или 'более выдающийся и 'менее выдающийся'. Несколько споткнувшись о стилистическую некорректность, можно все же восстановить некоторую определенность в отношении к 'нормальному', т.е. в этом случае 'нормальный' значит 'обыкновенный', средний, ничем не "*выдающийся*". С другой стороны, памятуя о литературной и языковой традиции, при сомнительности психической 'нормальности' первого героя, можно задаться вопросом, чем именно 'более выдается' второй герой по сравнению с 'нормальностью' первого (учитывая и весь комплекс 'маленького человека'). Логика русского языка позволяет предположить здесь и еще большую ненормальность, и еще большую обыденность. Таким образом амбивалентность не снимается, скорее, возрастает — все более и более ... Так кто "*более выдающийся*"?

"*Товарищ Лев Чумовой*". Здесь характерно, во-первых, противопоставление "*мужик*" — "*товарищ*". Два слова-понятия противопоставляются прежде всего в общечеловеческом смысле: 'человек' — "*товарищ*". Налицо перевод характеристики отдельного элемента в характеристику отношений между элементами: "*товарищ*" — кому? ("Друг, товарищ и барт" — аналог французской формулы "Egalite, Liberte, Fraternite"). А с другой стороны, разумеется, слово "*товарищ*" предполагает и социально-политическую амбивалентность: "*мужик*" = 'крестьянин' (социальная характеристика) противостоит "*товарищу*" (характеристика политическая — ср. ставшую кличкой характеристику активистов большевистской революции и позже — представителей ее власти, а также ставшее почти бранным определение 'гражданин' — член государства, политически не оцененный — 'тамбовский волк тебе товарищ'). Таким образом, Макар в качестве '*мужика*' противопоставляется и исключается из политической системы круговой поруки. '*Трудящиеся массы*', делящиеся на '*членов*', оказываются вовсе неоднородными согласно различным дискурсивным кодам.

Имя — второе имя, появляющееся по ходу действия, которого, впрочем, нет в заглавии, что существенно. Герой — все-таки Макар. Однако, мы уже подготовлены: "*два члена*" — один "*нормальный*", а другой "*более выдающийся товарищ*". Здесь, на мой взгляд, взгляд аналитичного, но, впрочем, принципиально

субъективного (поскольку за что еще мы можем отвечать, кроме как за нашу субъективность) читателя, включается вполне злободневный для А. Платонова код — злободневно-политический. Словосочетание "*Товарищ Лев* ..." предполагает, на мой взгляд актуальную для Платонова фамилию (характеристика второго актанта уже подготовлена именно политически) — соответственно, '*товарищ Лев* Троцкий'. Таким образом, следующая за именем фамилия у Платонова резко политически иронична.

"*Чумовой*", т.е. сумасшедший (психопатологический код) отсылает к комплексу "*нормальный мужик*", соответственно, 'и' снова превращается в 'а' ('один нормальный, а другой — ...'). Литературный код: в сопоставлении с первым героем, отсылающим к Достоевскому, — "*Лев*" также 'достоевское' имя. Фамилия — вторая часть имени — резко переводит героя из разряда 'маленьких и мягких' в разряд 'грубых и буйных' (ход, отчасти подсказанный Достоевским: "Мышкин" — "идиот"), только в простонародно-сниженном варианте: '*чумовой*'. "*Ганушкин*" противостоит "*Чумовому*", как смягченный вариант сумасшествия сильному и как мелкий ('гоношиться, суетиться' — тихое помешательство, т.е. "*Ганушкин*" теперь подсвечивается еще и "Мышкиным"), безобидный, — сильному и грубому (буйному, грозному — здесь, читай, — "Рогожину"). При такой плотности аллюзий на Достоевского его словосочетание "Князь Лев Мышкин" (ср. "светлейший князь") превращается в устрашающий апокалиптический вариант: <Князь> *Лев* <Троцкий> *Чумовой* ("Князь Тьмы" — 'Князь Чумы'). Элемент "чума" может отослать нас к "Пиру во время чумы" в свете кодировки литературной традицией, во всяком случае, это самая литературно маркированная "чума" в русской литературной ментальности, но может и не отсылать — на этом трудно настаивать. Другое примечание: литературные отсылки, кроме употребленных во вступлении для характеристики героев, далее в ходе рассказа практически не играют никакой роли — они лишь задают инерцию расстановки оценочных акцентов.

На этом, пожалуй, зачин заканчивается, вернее, это 'нереализованный' или 'ложный' финал, типичный, как мы увидим, для Платонова.

Однако, я не упомянула еще об одном коде — это код фольклорный, предопределяющий новые обертоны амбивалентности.

Зачин в своем наиболее общем виде строится по вполне стандартной фольклорной схеме: *“Жили <были> два <брата>, <один умный>* [заменено на —] *“нормальный”, <а другой — дурак>* [заменено на —] *“более выдающийся”.* Фольклорная схема в силу ее архаичности и повторяемости всегда очень ощутима, соответственно, маркированы, фиксированы все ‘места’ в такой схеме.

Стандартный зачин: “В некотором царстве, в некотором государстве ...” У Платонова имеем: *“Среди прочих трудящихся масс”.* Элемент *“среди прочих”* выполняет семантически функцию элемента фольклорной схемы “в некотором” — в каком-то одном из ... “В государстве” отзывается в *“два члена государства”.* Выпало “царство”, оно замещено элементом *“трудящихся масс”,* что дает немедленную коннотацию с политизированной лексикой: ‘царство трудящихся’ или ‘господство трудящихся’. Далее выпадает элемент ‘были’ (‘жили-были’). Разумеется, если бы Платонов оставил жесткий фольклорный вариант, это слишком очевидным образом перевело бы его повествование в иной стилистический разряд, однако, это не означает, что его отсутствие неощутимо. (“Жить-то он жил, а вот быть-то его не было ...” — ‘жизнь’ как бы в отсутствии ‘бытия’ — процесс, преобладающий над сущностностью.)

Далее по фольклорной схеме: ‘два брата’. Элемент ‘братья’ замещается *“членами государства”,* что, конечно, весьма маркировано и тянет за собой оценочный шлейф: общечеловеческий, родственный тип отношений заменен государственным, безличным (*“член”* — только единица ‘членения’ — ‘административная единица’, как сказал бы Андрей Белый.) Кроме того, соотнесение этого выпадения с наличествующим элементом *“товарищ”* регистрирует лицемерие политического дискурса: *“товарищ”,* но не ‘друг и брат’.

Затем схема ‘один умный, а другой — дурак’ наполняется у Платонова соответственно, как уже было показано, с осложнением амбивалентностью.

Впору задаться вопросом, кто же все это написал — Платонов или литературный, политический, фольклорный дискурс. Язык или языки пишут за писателя или все же он эксплуатирует их по своему усмотрению. Думается, что и то и другое.

Однако, финал зачина (ощущение финальности связано в первую очередь с завершением фольклорной нормативной синтагмы) оказывается ложным — предложение не закончено, оно получает дальнейшее распространение: *"Лев Чумовой, который ..."* Ощущение стыка здесь возникает по причине нарушения логики нормативного повествования. У нас уже есть герой — Макар, даже мы уже, поколебавшись, признали его протагонистом. Чумовой составляет ему пару как тень свету. Оба получили равновесомые характеристики (*"нормальный мужик"* и *"более выдающийся товарищ"*). Но оказывается, что речь дальше продолжается именно о Чумовом, значит, он действительно *"более выдающийся"*, что здесь выражено в том, что он более достоин распространения повествования. Дискурс вновь начинает противоречить себе. Преимущество дальнейшего повествования противоречит 'уже-почти-упраздненной' амбивалентности характеристики (т.е., грубо говоря, ставшей отрицательной). Дальше — больше: *"который был наиболее умнейшим на селе"* — весь комплекс Чумового этой фразой переворачивается еще раз с головы на ноги. *"Более выдающийся"* получает здесь не просто подтверждение, а превосходную степень в квадрате формулировки *"наиболее умнейшим"*. (Разумеется, избыточность подобной конструкции сигнализирует очередной стык — единственное, что подвергает сомнению данную характеристику — зачем стык?). Сравнительная степень переходит в превосходную, совершенно подавляя первого героя этой пары, т.е. какая там амбивалентность! — уже и **сравнение** невозможно. *"Выдающийся"* также превращается в *"умнейшего"*, причем именно превращается — по сходству звучания, давая отсвет 'превосходности' слову *"выдающийся"*, которого в нем не содержится грамматически.

И, разумеется, это распространение совершенно взрывает фольклорную схему, которая, покачавшись, все же установилась — не 'первый умный, а второй — дурак', все наоборот — *"был наиболее умнейшим на селе"*. Дискурс опять солгал, слукавил и продолжает упорствовать в своей лжи и дальше.

"И благодаря уму ..." — снова про Чумового, причем утверждение уже в качестве простой констатации (больше никого не надо убеждать, даже как бы между прочим, в придаточном предложении — это общеизвестно и общепринято). Однако созвучие

"*Чумовой…благодаря уму*" приводит рацио и отклонение от него к общему знаменателю, вновь тем самым смещая оценки.

"*Руководил движением народа вперед*" — новый стык. "*Благодаря уму, руководил*" — снова избыточность логико-повествовательного, но и отчасти нормативно-этикетного, и политического характера. Зачем упоминать, что "*руководил*" именно "*благодаря уму*" — благодаря чему же еще? Это ставит под сомнение 'придаточность' фразы в запятых, придавая ей излишнюю педалированность и тем самым слегка дискредитируя.

"*Движением народа вперед, по прямой линии к общему благу*" — фраза странная, хотя вроде и политически, и логически респективная. Опять некоторая избыточность, лишний элемент: "*вперед, по прямой линии*", избыточность относительно языковой и политической нормы, не принятая в политическом дискурсе, как бы обнажающая его геометризм и схематизм. Политически корректно было бы: 'движением народа вперед к общему благу'. '*Линия*' здесь берется очевидно из словосочетания 'линия партии', нагромождая политизированную лексику, доводя тем самым ее до абсурда, тем более с утерей элемента 'партии' и добавлением излишнего элемента "*по прямой*". Это уже игры, трансформации, в приложении к сакральным текстам недопустимые.

"*Зато все население деревни …*" — амбивалентность семантики. Что значит "*зато*"? 'Но' или 'потому'? Дальнейшая фраза дает некоторые нити: "*Когда он шел где-либо мимо …*" — т.е. явно шел в стороне от народа, "*где-либо*" и вообще "*мимо*". Т.е. движение народа — "*по прямой*", а Лев Чумовой — "*где-либо мимо*" — противоречие логико-семантическое, ставящее под сомнение весь предшествующий постулат о руководстве и движении. При этом подчеркивается оппозиция "*все население*" и Чумовой, что заставляет сомневаться в элементе "*общее благо*". "*Все население*" как хор в греческой трагедии — бездействующий многоголосый (в отличии от Пушкинского 'безмолвствующего') комментарий.

"*Наш вождь шагом куда-то пошел …*" — снова языковая избыточность, подчеркивающая сверхзначимость события, тем самым ставящая его под сомнение на уровне дискурса. "*Наш вождь*", т.е. тот, который ведет народ, и было понятно куда, пошел "*куда-то*". Смысловые коннотации: 'неизвестно, куда пошел вождь'. При этом он отделен от народа, и его движение —

это "*где-либо*", вернее, теперь — "*где-либо*", принимаемое народом за "*куда-то*", т.е. за направленное движение. Вся фраза логически некорректная, а политически — совершенно невозможная, если свести в комплекс все семантические обертоны, получим: 'Вот тот, который нас ведет к общему благу, пошел себе куда-то'.

Впрочем, все же у народа есть некоторые подозрения 'куда', только не в варианте указания на место, а скорее, именно телеологического характера — 'что из этого будет'. Снова амбивалентный комментарий к "*общему благу*". Все было определенно: куда? — "*вперед*", зачем? — "*к общему благу*", как? — "*по прямой линии*". Теперь же: "*где-либо*", "*куда-то*", "*какого-нибудь*". "*Пошел, — завтра жди какого-нибудь принятия мер ...*" — несмотря на остающуюся неопределенность ("*какого-нибудь*") все же появляется и нечто предопределенное ("*принятие мер*"). Это сопоставимо с народными приметами: 'если то-то и то-то, то жди ...' С другой стороны, сказано, что будет "*принятие мер*", что вновь соотносится с элементом "*общее благо*", поскольку изначально именно это определяло функции Чумового. "*Меры*", вероятно к "*общему благу*" — будут приняты, но при этом движение "*куда-то*" предполагает, что "*меры*" будут приняты 'оттуда', т.е. дойдет один — народ останется на месте, что противоречит его движению "*по прямой к ...*" Кроме того, смена элемента "*общее благо*" на "*каких-нибудь мер*" (читай, 'еще неизвестно каких') выдает уже некоторое сомнение в положительности первого.

"*Умная голова, только руки пустые ...*" — аберрация на уровне логики сочетаемости фразеологии, вновь лукавство дискурса. В русском языке существуют фразеологизмы: 'умная голова' и 'с пустыми руками', а также — 'пустая голова' и 'умелые руки'. Платонов исключительно тонко использует отсутствие синтаксического контекста, переводя '*пустые руки*' в именительный падеж констатации, с тем чтобы совершенно перевернуть 'видимый' смысл всей фразы. "*Руки пустые*" — сегмент фразеологизма, неправильно употребленный, дискредитирует семантическую адекватность вполне корректного для русского уха элемента "*умная голова*", именно заставляя вспомнить о еще одной 'нормативной' 'пустой голове'.

Выражение "*голым умом*" подкрепляет амбивалентность употребления предшествующей фразеологии. Здесь снова видим ин-

версию — не 'голыми руками', что было бы привычнее, но "*умом*", т.е. опять 'голова' вместо 'рук' (или наоборот).

"*Макар же ...*" — наконец-то снова о Макаре. Мы столько раз споткнулись, что можно было и забыть о первом герое. Однако, нам вполне последовательно напоминают, причем в отделяемом определении (само собой разумеется): "*как и любой мужик...*", т.е. подтверждение 'нормальности' как 'обычности' — как все, а с другой стороны — "*же*" — подчеркивание отдельности от Чумового. Но далее следует вполне загадочная фраза: "*больше любил промыслы, а не пахоту ...*" Значит ли это в свете противопоставленности характеристик Чумового и Макара, т.е. народа, что Чумовой ее, пахоту, любил? В логике изложения — да, в логике дискурса — совершенно необязательно. Нам уже столько раз солгали, что можно и усомниться.

"*И заботился не о хлебе, а о зрелищах ...*" — обыгрывание известной античной формулы: плебс Рима требует и того, и другого, как известно. Что это означает в данном контексте? Макар почему-то сосредоточивается именно на чем-то эфемерном, так сказать, 'умозрительном' — на '*зрелищах*'. Соответственно, это противоречит нижеследующему "*заключению товарища Чумового*", что у него "*порожняя голова*". Вновь то, что говорится словами, не имеет никакого отношения к смыслу сказанного. Мы подготовлены тем, что "*пустая голова*" значит "*умные руки*" — но тогда почему "*зрелища*", а не "*пахота*"? Амбивалентность торжествует.

Далее: "*организовал <...> народную карусель, гонимую ветром ...*" — 'карусель из народа' или 'карусель для народа'? Разумеется, "*карусель*" — движение по кругу — противостоит движению "*по прямой*", к сожалению для Платонова, уже дискредитированному им же самим. Макар, "*не взявши разрешения*", является настоящим оппонентом Чумового, поскольку именно Макар берет на себя ответственность, устанавливает какие-то иные измерения для "*населения*" — в первую очередь, мифологические, циклические.

"*Гонимую кругом себя*" — явственное логико-языковое противоречие, усиленное употреблением нетрадиционной в подобном контексте формы "*кругом*" вместо 'вокруг', а также подсвеченным отчетливо 'мятежно'-романтическим определением '*гонимая*' вместо пояснительного придаточного оборота вроде 'кото-

рая была бы ...' (хотя в этой ситуации пояснения устройства карусели определение '*гонимая*' все равно было бы стилистически противоречиво). Разумеется, остается совершенно непонятным, каким образом, '*кругом*' чего все-таки должна двигаться карусель. Дальнейшее нагнетение 'революционно'-романтических аллюзий ('*ожидание бури*', '*отринутый покой*', '*тоска по буре*'), разумеется, анаграммирует неназванный '**мятеж**', стихийный ('*ветер*', '*туча*'), 'безмолвный' ("*молча тосковавшему по буре*") и бессмысленный, что выражается в нагромождении словесно-логических аберраций, в частности вокруг понятия '*покоя*'. С одной стороны "*народ стоял без делов*", т.е. по логике вещей находился 'в покое', но с другой стороны, в этом-то "*без делов*", как оказывается, и заключался 'мятеж' Макара, который "*отвлек народ от покоя*". 'Физическая' логика здесь противоречит политической ('*покой*' = нормальное течение жизни = '*дело*' или 'работа', т.е. оппозиция 'покой' — 'работа' в терминах физики оборачивается синонимией в политической лексике) и литературно-романтической ("Как будто в бурях есть покой ...").

Кроме того, вся сцена располагается на фоне фольклорной идиомы 'Куда Макар телят не гонял ...', что опять-таки способствует усилению ощущения двусмысленности и неразберихи. Виноват ли Макар, в том, что у Чумового сбежал жеребенок? С точки зрения Чумового — да

("*Если бы [...], но Макар ...*"), с точки зрения фольклорного дискурса — нет ('не гонял'), согласно логике 'анаграмматической' — да ("*Макар **Ганушкин**"* сооружает "*карусель **гонимую**"*, так же как *Чумовой руководит благодаря уму*).

Здесь мы позволим себе прервать детальный анализ, констатируя тем самым, с одной стороны, его принципиальную незавершимость (в силу субъективности каждого прочтения), а с другой стороны, — возможность воспроизведения намеченного алгоритма анализа (поскольку любой читатель-интерпретатор принадлежит культурно-языковому пространству, и в этом смысле безусловно объективен). Для демонстрации специфики строения платоновского текста проанализированный отрывок представляется достаточным. Как кажется, основой интерпретации повествования такого типа должно стать осознание того, что здесь любая попытка найти некую единственную логику закономерности обречена на провал заранее. Причем положение усугубляется тем,

что в неразрешимый 'диалог', так сказать, диалог 'бахтинского' типа, вступают не индивидуальные речевые позиции героев, а целые языковые области (представленные в нижнем пределе единицами уровня морфем), по-своему и противоречиво описывающие окружающий мир. В ситуации вовлеченности в определенный политический и идеологический дискурс подобное отсутствие 'единственно верного решения' оказывается фатальным, а судьба самого произведения и автора предрешенной, в особенности в России, где 'слово и дело' издавна и традиционно отождествлялись в процессе государственного строительства (см. Лотман, Успенский 1975).

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Analytical reading: «Russkie nochi» by V. Odoevsky. «Usomnivschijsja Makar» by A. Platonov

The following notes represent the result of analytical perusal of two completely different texts. To some extend the approach to these texts must be also regarded as completely different. In the case of «Russkie nochi» by Odoevsky this approach can be defined as an attempt to outline the certain structural regularities operating with ready-made analytical scheme of emblematic type of signification. In the case of «Usomnivschijsja Makar» the method is literal, word for word reading of intentionally limited piece of verbal text. Nevertheless there is something uniting these two analyses: that is certain intention of peering into or 'reading into' verbal text, some tendency of textual discrimination or dominating of written text over interpretative effort. The author consciously attempts to represent the process of interpretation namely as the **process** and not the final result of interpretative effort that is already alien to the text itself. With no doubt that is the task of hermeneutic kind .

Analüütilise lugemise kogemus: V. Odojevski "Vene ööd". A. Platonovi "Kahtleja Makar"

Esitatud tähelepanekud põhinevad kahe täiesti erineva teksti analüütilise lugemise kogemusel. Ka lähenemised kummalegi tekstile on erinevad: Odojevski "Vene ööde" struktuuri teatud seaduspärasuste väljaselgitamisel on rakendatud varem teise teksti alusel väljakujundatud skeemi, "Kahtleja Makari" puhul on aga tegemist teksti intentsioonist lähtuva täht-tähelise lugemisega. Ühendab eeltoodud meetodeid püüd võimalikult teksti "sisse minna", teksti domineerimine interpreteerimise suhtes. Siit lähtuvalt

ka ulatuslikud väljakirjutused Odojevski tekstist ja piirdumine Platonovi
jutustuse puhul vaid mõne lõigu analüüsiga. Ülesandeks on interpreteeri-
misprotsessi enese esitamine, interpretatsiooni kujutamine just nimelt
protsessina, mitte tulemusena, mis oma olemuselt on juba tekstiväline.
Autor annab enesele aru, et tegemist on hermeneutilise ülesandega.

Diachrony and synchrony
in writing Russian literary history[1]

Victor Terras

I

Anyone contemplating to write a narrative history of a national litera-
ture, that is, a work which is more than a mere chronicle, catalogue, or
collection of articles, loosely connected by their subject, will face sev-
eral questions. Empirically, such enterprise would seem to presup-
pose, at least, the existence of a national language and a cultural iden-
tity, as well as, almost inevitably, a certain amount of linkage to politi-
cal and social history. In the case of Russian literature, all of these
suppositions bear to be examined.

There is the question whether certain texts that have been tradition-
ally held to belong to Russian literature should not be considered a
part of Ukrainian or Belorussian literature. There is also the fact that
some works which have been conventionally dealt with as a part of
medieval Russian literature are composed entirely in Slavonic, the
language of the Slavic Orthodox Church, often by authors who were
not Russian, but Southern Slavs[2]. Slavonic, often called "Church
Slavonic", is based on ninth-century Bulgarian, a South Slavic lan-
guage. The Russian literature idiom is essentially a hybrid of East
Slavic and Church Slavonic.

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[1]   The following observations were inspired by Horst-Jürgen Gerigk's
thoughtful review of my *History of Russian Literature* in *Zeitschrift für
Schlavische Philologie* LV (1995/96), 2: 409–14. Professors Rimvydas Šilba-
joris of Ohio State University and David Danow of the University of Califor-
nia in Riverside also gave me valuable suggestions.

[2]   For example, Metropolitan Kiprian (1390–1406) and Grigory Tsamblak
(d. ca. 1420) were Bulgarian, Pakhomy Logofet (arr. In Russia ca. 1438) was
Serbian.

Since the 17th century the Russian literary language underwent drastic changes under the influence of contacts with the West, as a result of which it has incorporated important elements of Greek, Latin, Polish, German, French, and most recently, English vocabulary and syntax[3]. The Russian literary language is substantially different from the *koinē* of the uneducated. Russian oral poetry and prose, vigorously active well into the nineteenth century, has an idiom of its own, with some arhaic traits. There has been at all times some mutual influence between the language of literature, traditional folklore, and so-called "urban folklore", based on the *koinē* of the uneducated.

The term "literature" bears some preliminary examination. In Russian, a distinction is made between *literatura* and *pis'mennost'*, "writing". Existing histories of Russian literature begin by including many works that, if written centuries later, would be considered *pis'mennost'*, rather than *literatura*[4]. This is true of religious works: homiletics, hagiography, pilgrimages, theological and didactic texts, all of which continued to be produced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but are no longer dealt with in literary studies, unless they happen to have a bearing on *literatura*[5]. The same goes for historiography. Medieval chronicles are dealt with in every history of Russian literature, but historical works of the modern period are not, with a few exceptions, such as Pushkin's *History of the Pugachov Revolt*.

Problems arise even in connection with literature in the conventional sense, that is imaginative fiction, poetry, and drama. Belinsky distinguished between *poesy* (*poeziia*, in the sense of German *Dichtung*), *belles lettres* (*belletristika*), and *journalism*,[6] where the first means original creation, the second an adaption of *poeziia* to the tastes of a broad readership, an the third its application to specific topical issues. Belinsky considered all three important, each in its own way. His scheme leaves out oral poetry, and other types of popular

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[3]   In a way, the history of Russian literature may be percieved as a history of the Russian literary language.

[4]   The term *slovesnost'* covers all verbal expression, written and oral.

[5]   Such as, for example, *The Tale of his Travels and Pilgrimages ... by Parfeny, a Monk Tonsured at Holy Mount Athos* (Moscow, 1856), which Dostoevsky used in writing *The Brothers Karamazov*.

[6]   Belinsky's division may be compared to the American division of magazines into "art," "slick," and "pulp." His *belletristika* is, however, a notch higher than what is called *Trivialliteratur* in German.

literature, such as the chapbook (*lubok*), which served the entertainment and edification of the lower classes, and "yellow" or "boulevard" literature. It also leaves out religious literature, historiography, and metaliterary genres, such as esthetic and literary theory.

There are other important divisions in literature: censored and uncensored, a key issue in Russia, or even "approved" (*dozvolennaia*) and "disapproved" (such major critics as Osip Mandelstam[7] and Andrei Siniavsky suggest that all "approved" literature ought to be excluded from consideration as authentic art), literature with a "tendency" (which may be political, social, religious, etc.) and literature that bears no such message. A great deal depends on the reader addressed: the censor, the editor, the critic, the "in" reader, the general reader, etc. Literature addressed to a circle of *cognoscenti* turned, in Pushkin's lifetime, into a medium of political struggle, and into a branch of commerce, run by professionals.

Having recognized some of the problems that we face in defining our subject, a national literature, we face the problem of how to define "history".

Following the ideas of Herder, Schelling, and Hegel, various conceptions were developed in Russia, starting in the 1820a, which applied to Russia the notion that history, and hence the history of a national literature, is a goal-directed process, governed by certain "laws". The great critic V. G. Belinsky (1811–1864) percieved Russian literature as a vehicle of Russia's progress toward joining the nations of the West in their quest to realize the potential of the human spirit. Apollon Grigoriev (1822–1864), another major critic, corrected Belinsky's "westernizing" view by suggesting that the evolutionary process of Russian literature as a whole, as well as in the individual development of its major writers, pointed to an ever increasing role of native Russian elements and an elimination of foreign influences. Meanwhile, Slavophile theorists were claiming that Russia, and so Russian literature, should be going their own separate way in pursuing a world order based on the Orthodox Christian faith of the Russian people[8], while leftist ideologues, such as N. G. Chernyshevsky (1828–1889), advanced the notion that literature was primarily a tool of so-

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[7]   Mandelstam said so very plainly in his *Fourth Prose*.

[8]   Dostoevsky revived Gogol's idea that Pushkin was Russia's national poet, a great prophet of the Russian people who had pointed the way Russia was to take in the future, in his "Discourse on Pushkin" (1880) and elsewhere.

cial progress and enlightenment, and rejected any claim to literature's metaphysical calling.

Russian Marxists, such as G. V. Plekhanov (1856–1918), saw literature as a part of the superstructure of society and held that a writer's social class determined the content of his art. Finally, Soviet ideology percieved literature as "a truthful, historically concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development". What all these views of literature have in common is that they percieve literary history in organic, or even in determinist terms, taking for granted that literature is a function of the nation, percieved as an organism, and that it is organically linked to the other functions of that organism, viz. political movements, art, music, and culture at large[9].

Opposed to this organic and historicist conception of literature is one which was dubbed "esthetic" by its detractors in the 1860s and 1870s. Considering literature primarily an art form, *sui generis* among other arts, the "esthetes", such as Alexander Druzhinin and Vasily Botkin, concentrated on an analyses of its material, language, and the devices of its craft. They did not deny that literature had a social function, but stressed its autonomy. The key issue here was that the "esthetic" approach to literature, following the teaching of Immanuel Kant, denied the notion of progress in literature. Pushkin himself is on record to this effect[10]. In the twentieth century, the Russian Formalist School advocated an altogether new and different approach to literature and literary history, insisting that verbal art was, like other art forms, pursuing its own ends and that to link literature and literary history to political and social developments meant to ignore the very essence of verbal art[11].

Another attack on the organic and historicist conception of literature was launched by early twentieth-century Modernism. Primitivist and archaic tendencies in Futurism, the return to the great themes of Western literature in Symbolism, and the notion developed by the

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[9] The various predictions of these schools of thought have had a certain effect as self-fulfilling prophecies. Their ideas helped Russian writers to choose the path to Russia's future, as they would present it in their works.

[10] Alexander Druzhinin (1824–1864), Vasily Botkin (1811–1869), and Pavel Annenkov (1811–1887) were called "the esthetes" in the debates that went on in literary periodicals of the 1860s. For Pushkin, see note 18 below.

[11] The Formal School advocated an approach to art through its medium — language, in the case of literature.

Acmeist Osip Mandelstam, according to which verbal art should be viewed, not in terms of causality, or evolutionary theory, "not to speak of its vulgar appendage, the theory of progress", but in terms of memory, recognition, and other "connections"[12], all challenged the approach to literary history which had become standard in the nineteenth century.

What emerges from all this confusion is the simple fact that literature and literary history have been approached in different ways, depending on the reader with whom the writer of literary history identifies most. It stands to reason that a great deal depends on the literary historian's values and special interests. For example, N. G. Chernyshevsky's novel *What Is to be Done*? must be discussed on account of its considerable political impact, though it is generally agreed to have little or no esthetic merit. In some instances, a work of literature is important in different ways and it is up to the historian to choose what to emphasize. For instance, Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, a recognized masterpiece of historical fiction, was also "an important political event", as Konstantin Leontiev immediately recognized. It caused a debate regarding its historical accuracy, was challenged from the Left as well as from the Right, and eventually prevailed even against objective historical criticism in giving the Russian national consciousness an indelible, though biassed image of the period.

It also stands to reason that, even if we reject any large scale historical teleology of the kind Dostoevsky or the Marxists believed in, the writer of literary history is still left with the task of establishing cause-and-effect relations between authors, their works, historical events, readership, as well as a variety of literary relations of intratextual, intertextual, and metatextual nature. The degree of intentionality is probably as high in literature as in any human activity. Few will deny that the reverse feedback of literature on socio-political developments was greater in Russia than most anywhere else. Chernyshevsky, who felt that it was slight, still observed that, in Russia, with no other public forum available, literature was a factor *faute de mieux*. The fact that most authors address a reader whom they have in mind all along and stick to the contract that exists in the reader's mind, and theirs, regarding structure, as well as *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos* of their text,

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[12]   Osip Mandelstam, "On the Nature of the Word" (*O prirode slova*, 1922, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Washington: Inter-Language Literary Associates, 1971), 2: 242.

also accounts for a great deal of order, since the types of readers addressed are obviously limited.

The corollary of all these observations is that the literary historian, certainly in the case of Russian literature, must choose between radically curtailing his subject and its treatment, or making a series of compromises which vitiate his methodology. He must select authors and works to be discussed, either in detail or in passing, according to a principle by which their importance is graded. For instance, the role of *Trivialliteratur* may be huge in a work that concentrates on literature's social impact, while it will be ignored in a history that looks out for excellence in literary craftmanship, originality, psychological or philosophical depth.

The very organization of a history of Russian literature has depended on the author's political philosophy. For example, Pavel Sakulin, a member of the so-called sociological school of the 1920s, organized the chapters of his history by the author's social class: "gentry literature", "bourgeois literature", etc. Even if the historian has no immediate political bias, he still faces the task of assessing the space to be allotted to the diverse aspects of a given work and its reception. Depending on the literary historian's attitude, the emphasis may rest on the genesis and biographic and historical background of a work, or on its immediate effect in the literary marketplace, its place in the canon of national or world literature, or other criteria.

II

The literary survey that covers a short period in a more or less comprehensive way is the equivalent of the historical chronicle. In the 1830s and 1840s, and even into the 1850s, when a single reader could still read more or less every work of Russian literature that appeared and also cover all of the literary journals, critics like Belinsky and Grigoriev produced annual surveys of Russian literature, assessing the novelty, originality, social import, and esthetic merits of at least those works that seemed more important. These critics by and large did a remarkably good job: no major figure escaped their attention and no minor light was hailed as a genius. However, their judgment* was significantly corrected by posterity, for example, with regard to Gogol in the case of Belinsky, and Lermontov, in that of Grigoriev. In these

annual surveys, attempts were also made to indicate the direction Russian literature was taking and individual works were evaluated accordingly.

Surveys covering a somewhat longer period of time were also attempted. There is the remarkable essay, "An Extraordinary Decade" (1880) by P. V. Annenkov (1811–87), covering the 1840s in retrospect, though from a participant's viewpoint, and similar efforts by Alexander Herzen and Apollon Grigoriev. Beginning with the 1860s, it became impossible for a single critic to cover any period of Russian literature so completely.

These surveys, of course, do note the appearance of new authors, works, ideas, themes, and styles, as well as their relevance to Russian society, as the critic sees it. But basically, their method is that of the chronicler, rather than that of the historian. What is absent is a sense of continuity, direction, and anticipation. After 1860 Russian literature is too rich, too complex, and too heterogeneous to be presented synchronically as an organic whole, though efforts were made to find unity in polarities such as Realism: Symbolism, Passéism: Futurism, Decadence (a symptom of the decline of bourgeois culture): Social Realism (the harbinger of a new social order, to be brought about by revolutionary activity). But even these efforts could cover only a part of Russian literature. The fact seems to be that there are many good topics for synchronic study covering *parts* of Russian literature.

Literary groupings, schools, and movements, characterized by common views on their art and its mission, are well suited for synchronic study, especially if their works and other activities can be organized around some focal idea, person, or event. Often the focus of a literary school's essence is seen in its polar opposition to another, contemporary, school or movement. For instance, the essence of the period before the age of Pushkin and his Pleiade is focussed in the controversy of the Shishkovians and the Karamzinists. The essence of the schools of Russian modernist poetry may be conveniently defined by the key tenets of contemporary schools with whom they competed, say, Acmeism by its rejection of Symbolism.[13]

A long period of literary history may be synchronized by the prevalence of a certain intellectual climate and esthetic canon: the Age

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[13]   A rivalry between two directions or schools may be conducive to change through parody or travesty of the opposing style. Dostoevsky's romantic realism is a case in point.

of Reason paired with Classicism, the Golden Age of Russian Poetry coupled with idealist philosophy and romantic esthetics. Obviously, these periods, if treated synchronically as a single system, will be presented incompletely, since much of what happened during the period in question transcends the boundaries of the basic frame of orientation. The Age of Reason also experienced a widespread flowering of the occult and of the fairy tale, even in Russia. Byronic Romanticism was merely an episode in Pushkin's creation. Tiutchev, whose worldview is unquestionably romantic, uses a language that is closer to the eighteenth century. Lermontov, arch-romantic for the most part, shows an obvious tendency toward realism in some of his later poems ("Valerik", for example) and in his prose. It appears that a synchronic treatment of an epoch, such as the Golden Age of Russian Poetry, serves admirably as an icon of the great literature and the culture that generated it, but does not tell the whole story. Modernism covers much of the poetry and prose of the period preceding World War I, but a vast amount of non-modernist literature coexisted with Modernism — one only needs to mention the *Znanie* group, a bastion of oldfashioned social and psychological Realism, headed by Maksim Gorky.

Nevertheless, viewing a national literature as an integral part of a nation's culture, as has been done by Iu. M. Lotman and his school, is correct and useful, provided that both "culture" and "literature" are carefully defined. And there is still the caveat of the *sui generis* nature and value of verbal art.[14]

Nor can it be denied that Mnemosyne, a poet's memory, can synchronize at will every line of poetry or prose created, orally or in writing, since the dawn of history. A literate reader, as he reads a poem or prose work, cannot avoid facing a rich subtext from the whole of his readings and other experience.

Reading a novel like *The Brothers Karamazov*, the well-read reader picks up literally hundreds of quotes, allusions and responses to a long list of Russian and Western writers, not to speak of the ubiquitous biblical references. While reading Dostoevsky, he remembers Shakespeare, Schiller, Goethe, Victor Hugo, to name only the most famous, and of course, Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenev, Nekrasov, and

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[14] See Yuri Lotman, "Thesis towards a Semiotics of Russian Culture", *Elementa*, 1994, 1(3): 219–227.

Tolstoi, again, to name only the most famous. Thus, every time our well-read reader reads a work of literature, he enters a vast hypertext of world literature, as did Dostoevsky, that "reader of genius".

It is a fact that some works live on forever.[15] Homer is to most of us, since we read him in childhood and were unaware of any historical facts, a contemporary of sorts, as he was to readers before us. Most works, even many that were very successful at their appearance, recede into the past, to be read only by literary historians. Some have a much longer life. Tolstoi's *War and Peace* is a case in point, as Ia.S. Lur'e's recent study *Posle L'va Tolstogo* (*After Tolstoi*, 1993) has once again demonstrated.

Individual authors whose works show little or no development may be treated sunchronically. Ivan Goncharov, for example, certainly a classic and a major figure even in a European context, did not change either his style or his philosophy in the course of his long life, though the times were changing, of course. But it appears that most major authors of Russian literature, such as Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoevsky and Tolstoi, changed significantly enough in the course of their lifetime to make a synchronic analysis of their *oeuvre* problematic.

Much of literary history, past as well as current, consists of more or less synchronic treatments of particular topics. What is missing in a history composed entirely of such pieces are the many connections which one keeps discovering between them, even if one is not looking for patterns of continuity.

III

A diachronic view of literary history implies a continuity of subject matter, coupled with qualitative change. The changes in Russian literature have been drastic and sudden, due to extrinsic factors, such as the reforms of Peter the Great and the Revolution of 1917. The changes in Russian literature directly resulting from contacts with the West are also radical. The role of political and ideological factors has

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[15]   The survival or even the "immortality" of a work of literature is not necessarily the result of esthetic or ethic excellence. A mere accident, such as that the work became a staple of literature for children, may be a reason for it as well.

been more prominent in Russia than nearly anywhere else. Therefore it is understandable that Russian critics, beginning with Belinsky, have tended to see Russian literary history as an organic process, with literature as a whole acting as an organ of the Russian nation.

In Russia, more than anywhere else, an ideological view of history has held sway. It may be said that both Marxist and Slavophile versions of a determinist view of Russian history have been proven wrong by history itself. However, this does not remove the actual presence of a certain teleological thrust in the development of Russian society and of Russian literature. Revolutionary ideas, imported from the West, caused Russian writers to produce works promoting revolutionary activities, and revolutionary activities, in turn, became the subject of works of literature. The same is true of the ideologies involving Russia's national mission as a savior of Christian civilization, also largely based on ideas imported from the West. It may be recalled that Apollon Grigoriev, perhaps Russia's most perspective critic, said that Russians, being unsophisticated barbarians, were want to live their philosophy — with disastrous consequences, as it turned out.

Assuming there is a link between life and literature, which does not mean that this link is strictly mimetic, and that Russian life is the Signified, Russian literature the Signifier, the rate of change is spectacular in both. Belinsky, a perspective critic, could not properly appreciate Derzhavin's poetry, mainly because Russian life had changed so much, and he actually faulted Pushkin's works for being "old" (*staro*!). Dostoevsky, a conservative, faulted his contemporaries Goncharov, Turgenev, and even Tolstoi, for writing about a Russia of the past, although their works were set in contemporary Russia. The radical Dmitry Pisarev dispensed with *War and Peace* by entitling his review "Oldfashioned Gentry" (*Staroe barstvo*).

As to the Signifier, the Russian language itself changed significantly under foreign influence. Russian versification was imported, first from Poland, then from Germany, as were all the genres of poetry, drama, and prose fiction, one by one. The esthetic sense reflected in Russian literature since the eighteenth century is likewise an import from the West. The popular taste, as reflected in folk poetry, is quite different.

The many changes in sensibility that may be observed in Russian literature of the modern period can be in part understood in the same terms as similar changes in the major literatures of the West, although

there are some instances where Russian conditions require a special explanation. Pushkin's early verse is classicist. "Ruslan and Liudmila" shows a sensibility that is Rococo rather than Romantic. Pushkin's discovery of Byron and Shakespeare is a turning point. For a brief period Pushkin is a Byronic Romantic, as in "The Gypsies", for example. But then *Eugene Onegin* and the later verse epics show a dominance of romantic irony and pointedly unresolved ambiguities. His "serene sadness" (*svetlaia pechal'*) links him to Romanticism at its existentially most profound. Finally, Pushkin's late prose was recognized by astute critics, such as Grigoriev and Rozanov, to be the real beginning of Russian realism. Looking at Pushkin's readership we get a different picture: the rebel, exiled for poems like "The Dagger", becomes a court poet, whose patriotic effusions on the occasion of the Polish uprising of 1830 elicit the indignation of his friends. Soon after his untimely death the poet becomes the target of progressive critics. Even Belinsky sees him mainly as a formal genius who lacks real substance; Dobroliubov deplores Pushkin's "lack of a proper education", which prevented him from making serious contributions to Russian literature; and the *shestidesiatniki* lampooned him as a frivolous poet of "little feet". (At the same time, some Slavophiles, as later the old Tolstoi, also found him immoral.) But then *pochva* and Dostoevsky revived Gogol's idea that Pushkin was Russia's national poet and a great prophet of the Russian people, who had pointed the way Russia was to take in the future. In the twentieth century, Pushkin became an ideal and a fetish to some (after all, he had dared to endorse Horace's "Odi profane vulgus" and declared that the poet was responsible only to his Muse), and worthless ballast to be thrown overboard from the ship of modernity to others. Soviet critics would grant him a place of honor as a poet who was "progressive for his age", while their émigré opponents would find a conservative and even a religious strain in him.

The question of continuity in Tolstoi has occupied critics for a long time. At the same time, it seems true that Tolstoi's style underwent significant changes: from the Clarism of *Childhood* and its eighteenth-century flavor, to the physiological sketches of the Caucasian and Sebastopol tales, on to the Walter-Scottian *War and Peace*; then *Anna*

Karenina, pure vintage psychological novel[16]; Tales for the People, stylized, with supernatural elements introduced as a concession to an alleged popular sensibility; polemic and ideological pieces of the last thirty years. Yet there is something about Tolstoi's Whole outlook on life and on his art that makes it unmistakably Tolstoian and gives it a unique quality of which his rationalism, moralism, reductionism, and even his use of estrangement (in extreme cases, making the reader believe that the viewpoint of an illiterate Russian peasant is the only avenue to truth) are seemingly necessary constituent elements.

Genre would seem to be a tractable subject of diachronic study, unless one tries to deal with the three basic genres: epic, lyric, drama. In this case, the situation is made complicated by the fact that genre-specific traits are often found in works that belong to other genres. Thus the "lyric verse epic" (*poema*) is a popular genre of modern Russian literature. Chekhov's plays have lyric elements. Dostoevsky's novels have been likened to Shakespearean tragedies. At times, a diachronic connection between successive forms can be established, for example, when the early Dostoevsky's novels are travestied versions of familiar romantic forms or, in the case of *Poor Folk*, of the sentimental epistolary novel. More often than not, new versions of the novel appear either due to foreign influence or in connection with extra-literary developments, as for example in the case of Chernyshevsky's *What Is to Be Done*? or Gorky's *Mother*, not to speak of the Socialist Realist production novel. M.M. Bakhtin's definition of the novel as an "open form" makes the pursuit of a continuity of the novel as a genre problematic, since we have no definition, save a negative one, of the subject.

As for more narrowly defined genres, such as novella, ballad, sonnet, etc. they are certainly well suited for diachronic study. They were all introduced in Russia under Western influence, but some significant changes were made in them by Russian authors. Chekhov's innovations in the technique of the short-story are a case in point.

There is no question that histories of the Russian theater, of Russian versification, and other well-defined parts of literary activity are possible and useful. Some themes may be suited for diachronic

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[16] Needles to say, later critics have made it a vehicle of new ideas. See, for instance, Amy Mandelker, *Framing* Anna Karenina: *Tolstoy, the Woman Question, and the Victorian Novel* (Columbus: OSU Press, 1993).

investigation. Themes like "superfluous man", "repentant nobleman", as well as various versions of the "new man" and "new woman" were themes that were recognized and consciously pursued from Belinsky to the populism of the 1870s. The revolutionary hero keeps appearing in various disguises since about 1860 and is a worn cliché by the time Gorky produces *Mother*. The comeuppance of the revolutionary hero is likewise the subject of many novels, especially of novels of the Katkov school.

The question of Russia's identity, her destiny, end her future is a theme that occupies many Russian writers and poets, from Tiutchev and Lermontov to Blok and Bely. The theme of "Russianness" may show up in widely different contexts, like "Here, there's a whiff of Russia, here it smells of Russia" (Pushkin, "Ruslan and Liudmila") or in the *troika* passage of *Dead Souls*.

The problem with a diachronic methodology is that it cannot grasp the whole system, unless one ascribes to it a teleology which depends on ideological premises. Experience indicates that a cultural system tends to change not as a whole, but through a series of particular events.

IV

To summarize the problems that arise in a search for a method to write a history of Russian literature, we have to begin by establishing that we are facing a dilemma: History registers change, yet insists that it is still dealing with the same subject. We must admit that there is much less linkage between so-called "Old Russian literature" and modern Russian literature than between the latter and Western literatures. Old Russian literature, too, is a part of an interliterary hypertext, but it is linked to the West only marginally and often indirectly, such as when both the Russian and the Western text originate from the same oriental source. There is, of course, the common Christian heritage.

The many changes in sensibility that may be observed in Russian literature of the modern period can be well understood in the same terms as similar changes in the major literatures of the West, though there are some instances where Russian conditions require a special explanation. For example, Gogol's Ukrainian tales are well under-stood in terms of romantic fiction a la Tieck and Hoffmann, as are some of his Peterburg tales, "The Portrait", for example. But as for

Dead Souls and some other of the Peterburg tales, like "The Over-coat", there were two different ways to read them even in Gogol's lifetime. Belinsky read them as indictments of the Russian social order and essentially truthful representations of Russian reality. Conservative critics, like Senkovsky, read them as humorous entertainment, a *tolle Welt* unrelated to Russian reality. Belinsky's view prevailed and through the good offices of Chernyshevsky, critical realism was dubbed the "Gogolian period of Russian literature". In the 1890s, Vasily Rozanov and some others reopened the debate, suggesting that the Russia of *Dead Souls* never existed and that Gogol's world was a fiction populated by soulless puppets — a notion Dostoevsky had anticipated in his "Petersburg Dreams in Verse and in Prose" (1861). Then, in the twentieth century, Gogol was recognized as a precursor of Modernism, the creator of an absurd, purely verbal world. It ought to be added that to some critics, Gogol has been a Christian writer, who recognized the vanity of earthly existence, while illuminated by faith.

There are some texts that have a long and extended life in history in the process of which they change their meaning: they are still the same, yet they are also different. It is not necessarily so that a short active life and little change in meaning suggests that the text is inferior. Ostrovsky and Chekhov are the mainstays of the Russian theater, yet only Chekhov has conquered the international stage and has experienced a variety of transformations.

Time in the history of literature moves at a different pace, for a variety of reasons. The split in Russian literature into Soviet and émigré literature caused some émigré writers to freeze in time, Ivan Buninbeing a case in point. But it caused others to move ahead at an accelerated pace, such as when Vladimir Nabokov became a modernist, and eventually an American writer. In Russia, the Revolution caused a brief flash of avantgarde experimentation and then a long period during which literature was frozen in a condition of total dependence on extrinsic controls.

All of this suggests that synchrony of literary form and content is independent of chronology: some texts are ahead of their time, others are in stride with it, still others are behind the times.

Thus, the difficulty in writing literary history may be reduced to these main points: A diachronic view will not allow us to cover the entire material at any given point in time, because changes usually

affect only certain parts or aspects of literature, in other words, because literature, like language, does not change as a whole, even though it gives the impression of being one. A series of synchronic surveys will make it difficult to understand the changes that have taken place relative to the preceding period. This means that we must try to find a way to combine both approaches if we want to maintain the unity of our subject and also perceive the changes in it. If synchrony is spatial and diachrony temporal, we must try to find a space-time continuum, or some other thirdness that will resolve the synchrony-diachrony dualism.

Assuming that Russian literature is the Signifier and Russian life or life at large in all of their manifestations the Signified, we minimize the dilemma by choosing an interpretant that is narrow enough to avoid the difficulties involved in the contradictions and intricacies of synchrony, as well of the unexpected and unaccountable changes of diachrony. This is precisely what ideologically based histories do, or what is the case when literature is viewed entirely and exclusively as verbal art, a phenomenon *sui generis* and independent of any ideology, or of any social, ethical, or philosophical criteria. But the cost of such narrowing of the historian's horizon seems too high.

The opposite solution is that of assuming the viewpoint of a memory that sees all literary phenomena (genres, schools, movements, themes, individual authors and their works, etc.) from all conceivable positions as well as panchronically, that is, through the eyes of a scholar who has immersed himself in the period and subject of his study, yet perceives these in all-embracing context of national and world literature. For example, with regard to Dostoevsky's first novel, *Poor Folk*, this will include all of the intertextual connections: the novel is a parody of the sentimental epistolary novel, both in its form as well as by virtue of many allusions to works from the period of Sentimentalism, such as novels by Jean-Jacques Rouseau, Samuel Richardson, N.-G. Léonard, F.-G. Ducray-Duminil, and others. It also parodies contemporary authors and styles and, specifically, engages in a polemic confrontation with Gogol's story *The Overcoat* which is contrasted to Pushkin's story *The Stationmaster*. The novel's immediate reception overlooked these elements, as it was seen as "the first Russian social novel" by Belinsky and was generally read as yet another expression of "sentimental humanitarianism" (Apollon Grigoriev), with Dostoevsky a champion of the "downtrodden". But then, in

view of Dostoevsky's subsequent works, a wholly different reading of the text emerged, as Dostoevsky the psychologist was shown to take interest in human suffering that was clinical rather than compassionate, or even worse, motivated by a cruel enjoyment of reliving the abjection and pain of his hero. Also, the question of divine justice and even that of the existence of God were shown to be quite different from what we learn from Dostoevsky's later works[17] .

The fact that the fate of the work depends on its reception creates yet another antinomy, that of author versus reader. We know, for example, how the Grand Inquisitor chapter of *The Brothers Karamazov* has been misinterpreted even by knowledgeable critics, whose reading is opposed to Dostoevsky's professed intent. The resolution of this antinomy must lie in the logic of the work itself. If it is sound, considering every aspect of its composition, only the intended reading will stand up in the long run.

This raises the point of expression, successful or unsuccessful, which may also be called the question of content vs. form. It seems wrong to relegate this question to a literary work's success with a broad readership. Yet successful expression seems to be a reasonable criterion in the historian's process of selecting works that matter. Dostoevsky said that in his novel *The Double* he had tried to express what seemed to him the most important idea he had ever tackled, but also that he had failed to give it the proper form. Critics are still arguing what this idea may have been. In *Notes from Underground*, Dostoevsky found the proper form for his idea — and this work is still as alive and fascinating today as it was when it appeared. In fact, it has gained in importance and has generated several major works in Russian and Western literature that ask the same questions. The thirdness that unites content and form must be expression, as Benedetto Croce taught. This means that we should judge a work not by the apparent excellence, or poor quality of its form, nor by the appeal of its idea, but by the degree to which it successfully expresses what its author wanted to say. This criterion is likely to produce a selection of works that had a firmer grip on the *Zeitgeist* and a clearer understanding of

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[17]　For useful observations on the hypertext created by memory, see Renate Lachmann, *Memory and Literature*: *Intertextuality in Russian Modernism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

its vagaries. It may also produce mostly works representative of the nation's mindset during the period in question.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to the historian of literature is the author or work that presents a singularity by virtue of a personal style, coupled with excellence and/or a significant position in the whole picture. Also, some authors and works seem to go against the flow of events, while artistically important enough to be considered. Alexander Pushkin is a case in point. The fact that, while everybody claims him to be their own, everybody also takes a different view of him, indicates that Pushkin simply does not fit into any scheme or pattern. In particular, he rejected the two ideas that were crucial for the view taken by most Russians of their literature, that of literature's social mission and that of its progress. Moreover, Pushkin seems to transcend time. Thus, Pushkin is a chapter of Russian literature all by himself.[18]

<div align="center">V</div>

What, then, are the desiderata for a history of Russian literature in view of above observations? First and foremost, a constant awareness of one's signified, signified, and interpretant. This point may be illustrated by the familiar difference between Karamzin's *History of the Russian State* and Polevoi's *History of the Russian People*. Karamzin defined his subject precisely: *gosudarstvo rossiiskoe*, where *rossiiskoe*, derived from *Rossiia*, pointedly refers to the state, not to the people (*Rossiia* is not a Russian word, but a loan from Latin). Polevoi's pretentious project was justly lampooned by Pushkin, for "the Russian people" (*narod* is not synonymous with *natsiia*, "nation"!) was a subject that invited equivocation, bias, and speculation, rather than factual historiography.

A panchronic vision, empowered by an allembracing memory which makes for Bergsonian *durée*, must cover the entire material at hand. This memory may remain latent whenever it is not needed to understand the phenomena observed, but must be activated often enough to establish connections that may be intraliterary, interliterary, metaliterary, or extrinsic to the literary process *per se*.

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[18]   For almost a century, Pushkin stood alone in all odf Russian literature defending the principle that art was its own end and that it did not "follow the universal laws of nature" ("Response to an Article by A. Bestuzhev", 1825).

An attention to the singularity of certain authors and works will have to depend, for the most part, on the historian's intuitive grasp of style or some other idiosyncracy that makes an author or a work stand out from the hypertext that surrounds them. A careful balance of the singular (or particular) and the universal must be kept.

Analysis of particular works should be aimed at recognizing expression, since literature is directed at a readership. However, the fact that readerships are varied in their attention, sympathies, tastes, and allover attitudes, the logic of a given work should be explained in terms of its intention and execution. Assuming that we do not believe in any absolute historical determinism, we should be ready to look for cause-and-effect, intent-and-result relations using our judgement from case to case.

In summary, writing literary history seems to be a precarious balancing act, where the risks of failure are at least as strong as the rewards of success.

Диахроника и синхроника
в истории русской литературы

В статье ставятся некоторые вопросы, возникающие в связи с составлением истории национальной, в частности русской литературы. Так, например, в историю русской литературы входят произведения, которые включаются также в истории украинской и белорусской литератур, а также произведения, написанные на церковнославянском языке, нередко авторами нерусскими, как Пахомий Логофет и Григорий Цамблак. Рамки собственно литературы также трудно определить, потому что в литературу древнего периода входят произведения, принадлежащие к жанрам, которые в новое время уже считаются составной частью богословия, церковной службы и историографии. Ряд вопросов возникает и при традиционной концепции литературы, состоящей, по В. Г. Белинскому, из поэзии, беллетристики и журналистики, что исключает фольклор, лубок, бульварную и "желтую" литературу. К тому же даже сравнительно узкое определение литературы В. Г. Белинского не различает литературу подцензурную от вольной, литературу "дозволенную" от недозволенной.

При описании истории русской литературы наблюдаются разные тенденции. Позиция славянофилов видит назначение русской литературы в проявлении русского национального духа и его христианской

соборности. Лидеры революционного движения воспринимают литературу как орудие распространения прогрессивных идей. В противоположность к этим "органическим" концепциям, в которых развитие литературы тесно связано с общественной жизнью, эстетическая критика и формальная школа считают, что литература следует своим законам и что ее следует изучать отдельно от политики и идеологии. Независимо от принятия той или иной позиции ясно, что историк литературы имеет дело с разными формами причинности и что его взгляд на литературу зависит от того, какие формы он считает центральными в литературном процессе: социально-политические, этические, моральные, эстетические, индивидуально-психологические, или конкретно-филологические.

Прототип синхронического подхода к истории русской литературы мы находим в ежегодних обозрениях русской литературы В. Г. Белинского, Аполлона Григорьева, П. В. Анненкова и других критиков. Литературное обозрение этого типа, соответствующее исторической хронике, может играть свою роль в трактовке определенных единиц литературного процесса, как литературные школы, течения, стили и т.д. Что же касается синхронического охвата некоторого периода, соединенного мировоззрением и эстетикой, как "просвещение/классицизм", "идеализм/романтизм", то ему противоречит факт, что одновременно с расцветом рационалистической философии и классицистической литературы наблюдается движение и в противоположном направлении. Интертекстуальный подход, основанный на факте, что всякий автор также и читатель национальной и мировой литератур, превращает всю литературу в безбрежный *гипертекст*. Начитанный читатель романа "Братья Карамазовы" то и дело встречает в его тексте цитаты, эхо и выдержки, а порой и полемику с произведениями Шекспира, Шиллера, Гете, Гюго, Пушкина, Гоголя, Тургенева и ряда других авторов.

Роль политических и идеологических факторов в развитии русской литературы очень велика. Качественные перемены в литературе зависят от событий в русской жизни, а также от новшеств в самой литературе, часто восходящих к влиянию литератур западной Европы. Например, версификация русской поэзии развивается под влиянием польской и немецкой стихосложных систем, и все жанры русской литературы следуют примеру литератур Запада. Диахронический подход к творчеству А. С. Пушкина указывает на ряд перемен в его содержании и форме под влиянием Запада, а также в связи с событиями в русской жизни. К тому же, перемены в интерпретации творчества Пушкина и других авторов, и в самом отношении к их

личности, наблюдаются и после смерти автора, а в случае Пушкина продолжаются и до наших дней.

Подходящим предметом диахроники является жанр, а в частности жанры, формально определенные, как, например, сонет и новелла. Трудности представляет жанр романа, который, по определению М. М. Бахтина, есть "открытая форма", то есть, отсутствие определенной формы.

Основной проблемой при составлении истории русской литературы является факт, что говоря о переменах и развитии, о новых формах и новых темах, в то же время считают, что речь идет все о том же предмете. Большая часть истории русской литературы, начиная с XVII-го века, объясняется западным влиянием, однако, начиная с эпохи Пушкина, русская литература все более отвечает требованиям русской жизни, иногда отрываясь от общеевропейских течений, иногда к ним возвращаясь.

Если принять взгляд, что в русской литературе отражается русская культура, русская жизнь, то трудности, связанные с обоими подходами, уменьшаются пропорционально тому, как сужается наша теория соотношения литературы и действительности. Узкий идеологический подход к истории литературы позволяет историку справляться с противоречиями и общей сложностью синхроники, а также с неожиданными и беспричинными переменами диахроники. То же самое можно сказать и о формальном, эстетическом подходе к литературе.

Противоположное решение вопроса состоит в принятии позиции всезнающей памяти, охватывающей все литературные явления (жанры, школы, движения, темы, авторы, произведения и т.д.) со всех возможных точек зрения и панхронически, то-есть, с позиции ученого, погруженного в предмет и эпоху, но в то же время воспринимающего их во всеобъемлющем контакте с мировой литературой и историей.

На практике историк вынужден идти на компромисс между этими крайностями.

Особую проблему представляет собою читатель. Нередко читатель дает литературному произведению интерпретацию, которая противоречит интенции автора. Согласно теории Б. Кроче, при анализе литературного произведения главный вопрос в том, удалось ли автору выразить именно то, что он хотел сказать своему читателю. Если согласиться с теорией Б. Кроче, история литературы должна концентрироваться на произведениях, в которых автору удалось должном образом воздействовать на читателя.

Громадные трудности предоставляют историку те немногие авторы, которых нельзя подвести под определенную категорию, авторы, которым в истории литературы посвящают отдельную главу. Это — авторы безвременные, всегдашние, как Пушкин и Гоголь.

Обобщая: идеальной историей литературы можно считать историю, основанную на всеобъемлющем панхроническом знании, но направленную на определенного читателя.

Diakroonia ja sünkroonia vene kirjanduse ajaloos

Artikkel vaatleb kahte erinevat võimalust kirjandusajaloo kirjutamisel, tuginedes arvukatele näidetele vene kirjandusest ja selle kirjanduse uurimise ajaloost. Vaagides diakroonilise ja sünkroonilise lähenemiste vooruseid ja puudusi, jõuab autor järeldusele, et ideaalseks võiks lugeda sellist kirjandusajalugu, mis tugineks kõikehõlmavale pankroonilisele teadmisele ja oleks samal ajal suunatud konkreetsele lugejale.

Некоторые особенности текстовой функции сказуемого

Елизавета Костанди

Подход к предложению, при котором функциональная сущность членов предложения рассматривается с точки зрения формирования структуры языкового события, обусловленной фокусом восприятия внеязыкового и моделирования языкового события, в последние десятилетия стал одним из основных в синтаксисе. Такая интерпретация позволяет выйти за рамки предложения, соотнести синтаксическую структуру с коммуникативно-прагматическими факторами и с текстовым уровнем. Некоторое время такой подход реализовывался прежде всего при анализе подлежащего, которое характеризовалось как выполняющее "упаковочную" функцию, как фокусировка события, как точка зрения на событие (Чейф 1982; Кинэн 1982). В настоящее же время все больше появляется исследований, в которых и сказуемое рассматривается с функциональной точки зрения, с учетом множества разнообразных коммуникативно-прагматических факторов. Некоторые коммуникативно-прагматические функции сказуемого нами также уже рассматривались в одной из предыдущих работ (Костанди 1996), основная мысль которой заключалась в том, что изменение типа сказуемого, как правило, связано с изменением фокуса восприятия внеязыкового и моделирования языкового события, отмечалась особая роль в этом составного сказуемого, обусловленная тем, что введение связки между субъектом и предикатом влечет за собой появление дополнительных коннотаций. Обобщая уже высказанные ранее наблюдения, следует отметить, что дополнительная "субъективность" составного сказуемого (связки) проявляется в двух основных аспектах, которые тесно взаимосвязаны и разграничены могут быть только достаточно условно.

Во-первых, в силу лексического значения связки в устанавливаемое в высказывании соотношение субъекта и предиката вносятся дополнительные коннотации (ср.: *мечтал вернуться, хотел уехать, любил поспать, соизволил написать, надумал приехать, желает знать, должен вернуться, рад увидеться, не в состоянии работать, имел мужество заступиться, задается целью рассмешить*). Именно этот аспект достаточно хорошо описан в существующей литературе (Лекант 1976), поэтому в данной работе нет необходимости его подробно рассматривать.

В значительно меньшей степени привлекала внимание исследователей другая особенность связочного компонента — содержащаяся в нем отсылка к субъекту, воспринимающему, моделирующему, оценивающему соотношение предмета (предикации) и его признака, отсылка к более широкому контексту, к различного рода пресуппозициям. Некоторые аспекты текстовой функции связки в определенном типе высказываний рассматривались С. Н. Туровской (Туровская 1998). В этой связи именно этому аспекту нами было уделено основное внимание в упоминавшейся выше работе (Костанди 1996).

В настоящей работе остановимся на некоторых особенностях использования разных типов сказуемого в тексте. Предварительно следует отметить, что сказуемое является одним из важнейших компонентов организации текста, поскольку предполагает в силу своих грамматических показателей, семантики и вытекающей из нее валентности динамику, сюжетность, развертывание текста и особенности отдельных типов сказуемого, конечно, соотносятся с этими его потенциально текстовыми свойствами.

Говоря об использовании разных типов сказуемого в тексте, также следует отметить, что типах текстов, в текстах, относящихся к разным стилям, в разных конкретных текстах использование разных типов сказуемого различается и количественно и функционально. Так, например, в ряде типов официально-деловых текстов практически не используются составные глагольные сказуемые с фазисной связкой, хотя и формальные правила и семантика такое использование допускают, однако оно противоречит прагматической направленности этих текстов.

Рассмотреть все особенности использования разных типов сказуемого с разными связками в тех или иных типах текстов с точки зрения их соотнесенности с коммуникативно-прагматиче-

ской направленностью текста в одной статье не представляется возможным, это нуждается в тщательном детальном изучении. Можно только отметить как общую закономерность то, что в текстах, более субъективно окрашенных, как показали наблюдения над материалом, используется большее число составных сказуемых, выполняющих более разнообразные функции.

Один из важнейших, на наш взгляд, аспектов проявления текстовой функции сказуемого — роль разных типов сказуемого в линейной и вертикальной организации текста, в формировании его структуры. Разумеется, говорить здесь о каких-либо правилах невозможно, речь может идти только о некоторых, зачастую очень слабо выраженных, тенденциях, проявляющихся в разных текстах в разной степени. Остановимся на одной особенности использования разных типов сказуемого в художественных текстах, которую можно обнаружить, обратившись к следующим примерам:

Прадеда Красовых, прозванного на дворне Цыганом, затравил борзыми барин Дурново. Цыган отбил у него, у своего господина, любовницу. Дурново приказал вывести Цыгана в поле, за Дурновку, и посадить на бугре. Сам же выехал со сворой и крикнул: "Ату его!" Цыган, сидевший в оцепенении, кинулся бежать. А бегать от борзых не следует. (И. Бунин. Деревня.)

Данный фрагмент является начальным абзацем текста, в первой части которого рассказывается о некотором событии, о ряде действий, последнее же предложение представляет собой своего рода заключение, вывод и одновременно основу для дальнейшего развертывания текста. Опираясь на предшествующий контекст и предполагая дальнейшее развертывание текста, составное сказуемое выполняет тем самым ретро-и проспективную функцию в организации связного текста. Аналогичную структуру имеет и следующий фрагмент:

Заводской гудок протяжно ревел, возвещая начало рабочего дня. Густой, хриплый, непрерывный звук, казалось, выходил из-под земли и низко расстилался по ее поверхности. Мутный рассвет дождливого августовского дня придавал ему суровый оттенок тоски и угрозы.

Гудок застал инженера Боброва за чаем. В последние дни Андрей Ильич особенно сильно страдал бессонницей. Вечером, ложась в постель с тяжелой головой и поминутно вздрагивая

точно от внезапных толчков, он все-таки забывался довольно скоро беспокойным, нервным сном, но просыпался задолго до света, совсем разбитый, обессиленный и раздраженный.

Причиной этому, без сомнения, было нравственное и физическое переутомление, а также давняя привычка к подкожным впрыскиваниям морфия, — привычка, с которой Бобров на днях начал упорную борьбу. (А. Куприн. Молох.)

В первых двух абзацах текста повествуется о ряде событий, последний абзац также является одновременно завершением предыдущего контекста и основой для последующего. Такое построение может встречаться и не в начале текста, как, например, в следующем фрагменте:

Тут же, об этот предел рукой подать, начинался хаос. Такой хаос царил на вокзале. Носовые платки и проклятия сходили здесь со сцены. Люди, мгновение назад почитавшие чуть что не пыткой естественное передвижение, здесь, ухватясь за чемоданы и картонки, бушевали у кассы, как угорелые набрасывались штурмом на обуглившиеся вагоны, осаждали ступеньки и, меченные сажей, как трубочисты, врывались в отделения, перегороженные горячею коричневой фанерой, которая, казалось, коробилась от жару, ругани и увесистых толчков. Вагоны горели, горели рельсы, горели нефтяные цистерны, паровозы на запасных путях, горели сигналы и расплющенные парами исходящие вопли далеких и близких локомотивов. Семеня своими вспышками, щекочущим насекомым засыпало на щеке машиниста и на кожаной куртке кочегара тяжкое дыханье растворенной топки: горели машинист с кочегаром. Горел часовой циферблат, горели чугунные перекаты путевых междоузлий и стрелок; горели сторожа. Все это находилось за пределами человеческой выносливости. Все это можно было снести. (Б. Пастернак. Апеллесова черта.)

Художественный прозаический текст характеризуется регулярным сочетанием статики и динамики, то есть компонентов, связанных с развитием действия, с сюжетностью, и более статичного фона, авторских отступлений, пояснений, оценок, выводов, компонентов текста, в которых возрастает степень субъективности, прагматизированности. Важнейшими признаками художественного текста являются также его многослойность, многоуровневость и ориентация на особое восприятие текста, при

котором, по словам Ю. М. Лотмана, происходит постоянная борьба между автором и читателем, в результате чего автор "навязывает" адресату "свою модель мира, свое понимание структуры действительности" (Лотман 1994: 220–221). Обращение к материалу показывает, что определенную роль в формировании этих свойств художественного текста и в организации связного текста играет и тип сказуемого. Приведенные выше фрагменты текстов разных авторов, разумеется, существенно отличаются друг от друга по целому набору индивидуальных признаков, однако обладают и некоторой общностью, заключающейся в том, что они имеют сходную структуру. Достаточно отчетливо выделяется часть текста, в которой на первый план выдвигаются повествовательный и описательный компонент и моделируется несколько более отстраненная, однако, разумеется, не полностью, точка зрения, присутствие субъекта речи не актуализируется, вторая часть, меньшая по объему, завершающая фрагмент, представляет собой определенный вывод, заключение к первой, ее оценку, тяготеет к метатекстовости. При этом в первой части преимущественно используются простые глагольные сказуемые (*затравил, отбил, приказал, выехал, крикнул*; *ревел, выходил, расстилался, придавал, застал, страдал, забывался, просыпался; начинался, царил, сходили, бушевали, набрасывались, осаждали, врывались, коробилась, горели, горели, горели, горели, засыпало, горели, горел, горели, горели, находилось*), во второй, совпадающей с последним предложением, во всех примерах используется сказуемое со связкой (*не следует бегать*; *было причиной*; *можно было снести*). Несомненно, в формировании данной структуры текста участвует целый комплекс языковых средств, однако и тип сказуемого является составной частью этого комплекса. При этом какие-либо формальные и семантические правила не предписывают использования составного сказуемого в заключительной части фрагмента, во всех случаях возможна трансформация предложения с заменой составного сказуемого простым: *Зря он побежал от борзых. Бессоницу инженера Боброва вызвало нравственное и физическое переутомление. Люди это выносят.* Однако при такой замене перед нами будет совершенно иной текст, исчезнет некоторая завершенность фрагмента, членение текста на составные части будет иным, иной бу-

дет коммуникативная значимость частей, изменятся коннотации, ослабится субъективный компонент.

Таким образом, можно говорить об определенном аспекте текстовой функции типа сказуемого, заключающейся именно в организации такой коммуникативной единицы, как текст; сочетание разных типов предиката соотносится с определенным членением текста. В приведенных выше примерах составное сказуемое маркировало заключительную часть фрагмента, однако может существовать и противоположная структура: составное сказуемое, в особенности составное именное, в сочетании с другими средствами задает фон, служит исходной точкой для последующего развертывания текста. Интересно отметить, что эти закономерности проявляются не только в прозаическом тексте (ср. использование разных типов сказуемого, например, в стихотворении О. Мандельштама "Воздух пасмурный влажен и гулок ...": *влажен, гулок, хорошо, нестрашно, понесу, взовьется, участвую, одинок, грянул, тяжелы, одурманены, позволь, позволь*), однако это требует, разумеется, специального рассмотрения. Отмеченые выше способы соотношения частей текста не являются единственно возможными, конкретных вариантов существует огромное множество, однако достаточно регулярно, как показывают наблюдения над текстами самых разных авторов, составное сказуемое соотносится с более прагматизированными частями текста. Думается, эта особенность проявляется и в следующем примере, где наблюдается постоянное переплетение повествования о некоторых действиях и оценки этих действий:

"Без сомнения, наше общество еще так дико (не то, что в Англии), что очень многие, — и в числе этих многих были те, мнением которых Алексей Александрович особенно дорожил, — посмотрят на дуэль с хорошей стороны; но какой результат будет достигнут? Положим, я вызову на дуэль, — продолжал про себя Алексей Александрович, и, живо представив себе ночь, которую он проведет после вызова, и пистолет, на него направленный, он содрогнулся и понял, что никогда он этого не сделает, — положим, я вызову на дуэль. Положим, меня научат, — продолжал он думать, — поставят, я пожму гашетку, — говорил он себе, закрывая глаза, — и окажется, что я убил его, — сказал себе Алексей Александрович и потряс головой, чтоб отогнать эти глупые мысли, — Какой смысл имеет убийство челове-

ка для того, чтоб определить свое отношение к преступной жене и сыну? Точно так же я должен буду решать, что должен делать с ней. Но, что еще вероятнее и что несомненно будет, — я буду убит или ранен. Я, невиноватый человек, жертва, — убит или ранен. Еще бессмысленнее. Но мало этого: вызов на дуэль с моей стороны будет поступок нечестный. Разве я не знаю вперед, что мои друзья никогда не допустят меня до дуэли — не допустят того, чтобы жизнь государственного человека, нужного России, подверглась опасности? Что же будет? Будет то, что я, зная вперед то, что никогда дело не дойдет до опасности, захотел только придать себе этим вызовом некоторый ложный блеск. Это нечестно, это фальшиво, это обман других и самого себя. Дуэль немыслима, и никто не ждет ее от меня. Цель моя состоит в том, чтобы обеспечить свою репутацию, нужную мне для беспрепятственного продолжения своей деятельности. (Л. Толстой. Анна Каренина.)

С переплетением двух линий, отмеченным выше, определенным образом соотносится и использование разных типов сказуемого: простого (*дорожил, посмотрят, вызову, продолжал, проведет, содрогнулся, понял, не сделает, вызову, научат, продолжал, поставят, пожму, говорил, окажется, убил, сказал, потряс, отогнать, определить, будет, не знаю, не допустят, не допустят, подверглась, будет, будет, не дойдет, не ждет, обеспечить*) и составного (*дико, будет достигнут, должен буду решать, должен делать, вероятнее, буду убит или ранен, убит или ранен, бессмысленнее, мало, будет поступок нечестный, захотел придать, нечестно, фальшиво, обман, немыслима*). Для линии повествования об Алексее Александровиче и цепи действий, которые он мог бы совершить, более характерно использование простых глагольных сказуемых, для линии, представляющей собой размышления, оценки, выводы самого Алексея Александровича, напротив, характерно использование составных сказуемых, в особенности — составных именных. Такое сочетание разных типов предиката в целом способствует построению связного текста, формированию многоуровневой, полифоничной структуры текста, еще более усложняющейся в результате использования глаголов определенной семантики, с помощью которых автор описывает речь, мысли, эмоции персонажа (*дорожил, продолжал, содрогнулся, понял, говорил* и т.д.), и глаголов, которые

употребляет другой субъект речи — сам персонаж (*посмотрят, вызову, научат, поставят, не допустят* и т.д.). Таким образом, соотносятся синтаксическое средство (тип сказуемого) и лексическое значение слов, образующих сказуемое. Аналогичное переплетение линий, в разной степени субъективно окрашенных, можно увидеть и в следующем примере:

— *Я верую!* — *шептала Маргарита торжественно,* — *я верую! Что-то произойдет! Не может не произойти, потому что за что же, в самом деле, мне послана пожизненная мука? Сознаюсь в том, что я лгала и обманывала и жила тайной жизнью, скрытой от людей, но все же нельзя за это наказывать так жестоко. Что-то случатся непременно, потому что не бывает так, чтобы что-нибудь тянулось вечно. А кроме того, мой сон был вещий, за это я ручаюсь.*

Так шептала Маргарита Николаевна, глядя на пунцовые шторы, наливающиеся солнцем, беспокойно одеваясь, расчесывая перед тройным зеркалом короткие завитые волосы.

Сон, который приснился в эту ночь Маргарите, был действительно необычен. Дело в том, что во время своих зимних мучений она никогда не видела во сне мастера. Ночью он оставлял ее, и мучилась она толко в дневные часы. А тут приснился. (М. Булгаков. Мастер и Маргарита)

В приведенном примере явно субъективно окрашенными, оценочными являются предложения с составным именным сказуемым (*сон был вещий, сон был действительно необычен*), определенную роль при этом играет и частичный синтаксический и лексический параллелизм этих предложений.

Таким образом, в целом мы видим, что тип сказуемого, в особенности составное сказуемое, его связочный компонент, выполняют определенные коммуникативно-прагматические функции в рамках предикативной связи, его действие может выходить за рамки предикативной связи и распространяться на все предложение или содержать отсылку к более широкому контексту или ситуации (Костанди 1996), участвовать в организации фрагментов текста или целого текста и, наконец, в формировании определенных типов текстов. Встает вопрос о том, чем обусловлены эти функции сказуемого и его разных типов. Можно предположить, что такая специфика составного сказуемого, т.е. сказуемого со связкой, в значительной степени определяется самим механиз-

мом членения сказуемого на составные части (попутно отметим, что при аналитическом выражении простого сказуемого отмеченные коммуникативно-прагматические особенности исчезают). Сам процесс членения уже предполагает дополнительные действия субъекта речи, следовательно, и дополнительную субъективность. Здесь можно провести некоторую аналогию, например, с однородными членами предложения, которые, являясь средством рематизации, меняют актуальное членение предложения, замена их обобщающим словом устраняет обязательность именно такого варианта актуального членения, ср.:

1. *Куда попадала эта струя, там листья бледнели, съеживались и увядали.* (ср.: *Куда попадала эта струя, там листья умирали.*) (В. Гаршин. Attalea princeps.)

2. *Я оставляю вас в покое: живите как хотите, ворчите друг на друга, спорьте из-за подачек воды и оставайтесь вечно под стеклянным колпаком.* (ср.: *Я оставляю вас в покое, живите по-прежнему.*) (В. Гаршин. Attalea princeps.)

3. *Я купил молоко, масло, хлеб, сыр, кофе.* \ *Я купил продукты.*

Как свидетельствуют примеры, разделение какого-либо компонента предложения на ряд составляющих делает эту часть предложения более коммуникативно значимой и, таким образом, связано с дополнительной субъективностью, прагматизированностью. Можно предположить, что это более общий механизм, характерный не только для, например, однородных членов предложения или составного сказуемого, но и затрагивающий всю языковую систему в целом: выделение составных частей это всегда выделение, осуществляемое кем-либо и, соответственно, уже даже на формальном уровне сигнализирующее о дополнительной субъективности.

Введение с использованием составного сказуемого связочного компонента ведет к "расслоению" предложения и текста. Если один член предложения, предикат, делится на две части, за каждой из которых закреплена своя основная функция, то эти части должны определенным образом связываться, соотноситься, появляется, с одной стороны, признак квантификации, с другой, направленности, процессуальности, а это также приводит к новым коннотациям, модальным изменениям, текстовым свойствам, которые на основе анализа другого материала и других признаков предиката рассматривает А. Тимберлейк (Тимберлейк, 1993).

Текстовые свойства составного сказуемого имеют, очевидно, еще одну причину, тесно связанную с названной выше. Связка в составном сказуемом либо практически лишена лексического значения (чистая связка: *Он умный человек. Книга интересная*), либо является полузнаменательной (*Он кажется умным человеком. Книга оказалась интересной*). В силу неполноты своего лексического значения связка изначально предполагает наличие присвязочной части. Предикат в целом, будучи лишь одним из главных членов предложения, требует наличия предмета предикации — подлежащего. Предикативная связь формирует предложение, которое, являясь коммуникативной единицей, обязательно, в свою очередь, предполагает наличие более широкого контекста, как речевого, так и внеречевого. В результате прослеживается цепочка реализации потенциальных текстовых свойств сказуемого, обусловленная постоянной отсылкой к более широкому контексту: связка — присвязочная часть — предикативная связь — предложение — текст — коммуникативная ситуация. Немаловажную роль играет и специфика отдельных типов составного сказуемого. Составным глагольным сказуемым может акцентироваться процессуальность при использовании фазисных связок или усиливаться модальный компонент при использовании модальных связок. Составное именное сказуемое тяготеет к большей статичности и тем самым в большей степени пригодно для выражения оценки, формулировки вывода. Эти свойства разных типов сказуемого могут участвовать, как в приводившихся выше примерах, в формировании определенных фрагментов текста, в структурировании текста.

Таким образом, простое и составное сказуемое и связка как часть последнего выполняют целый ряд коммуникативно-прагматических, текстовых функций. В настоящей работе был затронут прежде всего один аспект — роль составного сказуемого в структурировании текста, несомненно, требуется дальнейшее тщательное изучение самого разного материала с точки зрения использования в нем разных типов сказуемого. Художественный текст особенно ярко "высвечивает" потенциальные свойства языковых средств, зачастую позволяет увидеть их функциональные свойства, в меньшей степени проявляющиеся в других типах текстов. При этом, разумеется, каждый отдельный текст требует

специального анализа, в настоящей статье были отмечены лишь наиболее общие текстовые свойства предиката.

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On the peculiarities of the textual function of predicate

The role of different types of predicate in the organization of the connected text is considered in the article. It is marked, that the using of the different types of predicate depends in the quantitative and functional aspects on a type of a text, and the linguistic analysis of a literary text calls out a special interest. Correlation between a compound predicate and pragmatic parts of a text is obvious, a type of a predicate may be a sing of more or less intensively expressed pragmatics. It is emphasized in the article, that the functions of predicates are caused by their potential textual

characteristics and by role of mechanism of division in the language and speech.

Öeldise tekstilise funktsiooni iseärasustest

Artiklis on käsitletud erinevate öeldisetüüpide rolli seotud teksti organisatsioonis, selle struktureerimisel. Täheldatakse, et erinevat tüüpi tekstides erineb ka öeldisetüüpide kasutamine nii kvantitatiivselt kui funktsionaalselt. Erilist huvi pakub sellest seisukohast ilukirjanduslik tekst. Autor toob välja liitöeldise seose teksti enim subjektiivsete, pragmatiseeritud osadega. Liitöeldise kasutamine võib signaliseerida pragmatiseerituse astme muutumisest. Sellised predikaadi funktsioonid on tingitud tema potentsiaalsetest tekstilistest omadustest ja rollist, mida keeles ja kõnes mängib liigendumismehhanism.

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