

KATS KIVISTIK

Relevance, Content and Effects  
of Left-Right Identification in Countries  
with Different Regime Trajectories





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To my father and mother



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## LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

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2. Freire, André, and Kats Kivistik. 2013. "Western and non-Western meaning of the left-right divide across four continents." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18(2): 171–199.
3. Freire, André, and Kats Kivistik. 2015. "Authoritarian legacies and mass left-right regime support in new democracies: The Baltic States and Southern Europe compared." *Comparative European Politics*, 12 October.
4. Freire, André, and Kats Kivistik. 2016. "Regime transition, value conflicts and the left-right divide at the mass level: The Baltic States and Southern Europe compared." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 49 (4): 293–311.
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## Author's contribution

Articles 1–4: The author developed the theoretical and conceptual framework in collaboration with the lead author, collected the majority of the statistical data, carried out individual-level data analysis, wrote the first draft of the theoretical part and the results section and helped with revising the articles for publication.

Article 5: The author of the dissertation is the sole author of the article.



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## INTRODUCTION

“Left” and “Right” are among the most widely-used labels to describe government policies, parties, ideologies and political attitudes the world over. The terms “Left”, “Right” “leftist” and “rightist” are frequently used in public discourse – in newspapers, on TV and on the Internet. In parallel, the usefulness of this ideological heuristic is frequently challenged in the context of new democracies, the large number of extreme rightist parties, the more diverse identities of citizens and “catch all” or populism-oriented political parties. Therefore, the question of the relevance and content of Left-Right Identification (LRI) is more acute than ever before – do the terms of “Left” and “Right” make sense politically or should we use new labels which are more suitable for reflecting the present political landscape?

One prominent reason why scholars doubt the universal applicability and relevance of the terms “Left” and “Right” lies in the different regime trajectories of today’s democracies. Specifically, it is hypothesized that post-communist societies have profoundly different understandings of Left and Right compared to citizens in old democracies or in those new democracies that were established after the fall of right-authoritarian regimes. In the newly-democratised countries in Eastern Europe of the 90s, the content and meaning of Left and Right did not fit neatly into Western conceptual categories (Kitschelt 1995, Rockey 2009, Jost et al. 2009, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010, Jou 2010a). Unlike in Western Europe, support for innovative views and reforms (see Evans and Whitefield 1998, Sitter 2002, Lauristin 2007, Aspelund et al. 2013) and social tolerance (See Lauristin 2007, Jou 2010a) is associated in Eastern Europe with the Right, not with the Left. To understand how serious and permanent the deviations which occur in post-communist countries are and whether Left and Right are useful terms in general, my dissertation focuses on LRI in new democracies and tries to clarify how countries’ past political trajectories and democratic experience affect LRI.

The aim of the dissertation is to study the relevance, content and effects of LRI. The content of LRI is studied in terms of as the value content of LRI – which values (or value conflicts) do the labels Left and Right carry. The relevance of the construct is assessed in several ways. First, self-positioning on the LR scale refers to the general recognition of LRI. Second, clear value content of LRI – strong association between values and LRI – suggests that the concept is relevant, as it shows that LRI has a clear and strong meaning. Third, the relevance of LRI is assessed in terms of the explanatory power of the concept: LRI is relevant to the extent that it constitutes a useful tool for explaining other political phenomena. In sum, when people identify themselves on the LR scale, when their LR positions are associated to their values, and when their LR positions are affecting their political behaviour, then we can regard the concept as relevant.

In order to evaluate whether LRI is a relevant concept and whether there is any universal value content of LRI, this dissertation attempts to answer the following questions: which values determine LRI in new and consolidated democracies; whether these differences in the value content of LRI are explained by reference to the new democracies' authoritarian past, or some other country specific factors; and whether or not these differences disappear during a country's democratic experience and political development. By answering these questions, my dissertation contributes to current research of political attitudes in three ways. First, it covers LRI in countries with very different political and cultural background, and enables thus to evaluate the relevance of the concept and to identify a common core in value content of LRI. Second, it covers new democracies from the beginning of the transition over the decades and therefore allows to study how the content of an abstract concept like LRI has developed over the years, and contributes thus to the understanding of more general process of political socialisation. Third, it examines the effects of country-level variables, especially a country's democratic experience and authoritarian background, and therefore improves our empirical understanding of how contextual factors affect LRI.

The purpose of the introductory chapter is to introduce the concept and history of LRI, to point out the most important findings and contradictions in the literature of the field about the content and effect of LRI, and to discuss the contribution of the five empirical studies constituting this dissertation to the research in ideological identification and political behaviour. The chapter consists of six sections. The first explains the history and relevance of the concept of LRI. The second section introduces the main individual and macro level determinants of LRI that are examined in the empirical articles, and the third outlines the main effects of LRI. Following this, the scope and purpose of the dissertation are explained, the data used and methods employed are briefly summarised and then the most relevant findings of the five empirical studies are discussed. The chapter ends with conclusions and looks to the future of LRI research.

## **History and Relevance of Left-Right Identification**

The Left-Right dimension has been seen as a simplifying tool which facilitates political communication by enabling parties to transmit information on policy and issues and which decreases the costs of voting for individuals by giving them an orientation tool; it meanwhile also enables us to compare societies and parties in a meaningful way (Zechmeister 2006, Weber 2012). Thus, being aware of ideological labels, voters can make reasonable political decisions and choices much more quickly and easily (Downs 1957, Converse 1964, Laponce 1981, Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, Hinich and Munger 1994, Thomassen and Schmitt 1997, Weber 2012).

Although the concept is commonly referred to in both academic research and in everyday political discussion and the labels are used almost everywhere in the world, its meaning varies (Huber and Inglehart 1995:110, but also Zechmeister 2006, Zechmeister and Corral 2013, for instance) and its positioning as the most relevant dividing political line has therefore been questioned, especially since the 1960s (Kitschelt & Hellemans 1990, 210; see also Kriesi et al. 2006; Hellwig 2008). Besides, if the concept is too complex, it may lose its value and purpose in facilitating political communication by enabling parties to transmit information on policy and issues and by decreasing the costs of voting for individuals by giving them an orientation tool (Zechmeister 2006, Mair 2007, White 2012). In order to understand the conceptual confusion, it is beneficial to give a brief overview of the history of the labels Left and Right.

### **History of the concept**

The history of the Left-Right concept dates back to the French Revolution, where it first referred to delegates' seating in the National Assembly – those who sat on the president's right (nobility) and those who sat on his left (the Third estate) (Gauchet 1992: 242–5 via Rosas and Ferreira 2013). Representatives on the Right supported the monarchy and opposed change, while representatives on the Left stood for increased rights for the lower classes and favoured change (Laponce 1981). Until the early 20<sup>th</sup> century the labels were mainly used for describing seating in the legislature, but later on Left and Right started to be associated with people's political beliefs (Gauchet 1992: 1953–9 via Rosas and Ferreira 2013). The first value conflict associated with the LR distinction was political or social in nature – Right seeking to maintaining the status quo and Left demanding change (Bartolini 2000: 9).

The industrial revolution and the emerging classes – capitalists and workers – led to the increase in state support for the poorer population. Left and Right started to reflect the conflict between classes and over equality – Left represented the lower classes' desire for greater economic equality, whereas Right marked the higher classes' acceptance of natural inequality (Bobbio 1996). For many authors (headed by Bobbio 1996, also Rosas and Ferreira 2013) the main criterion for distinguishing between Left and Right is equality – Left being always more egalitarian than Right, although the level of aspired equality can vary.

With the passage to the post-industrial age in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, several researchers headed by Ronald Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990) have argued that a new cleavage has appeared in advanced democracies – a cleavage between materialist and post-materialist values, where materialist values embody an emphasis on law, order, authority and material well-being, and post-materialist values imply concern for the environment, self-expression, and equal rights for minorities. According to Ronald Inglehart (1990), this cleavage will replace the economic conflict defining the conflict between Left and Right;

according to others (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Knutsen 1995, Potter 2001, Freire 2006a), this cleavage emerges beside the economic and diversifies the meaning of Left and Right.

### **Use of the concept**

From the widespread use of the terms “Left” and “Right” and from the finding that most citizens are able to take a position on the LR scale, which has been widely confirmed in both old and new democracies (among others see Dalton 2006, Geser 2008, Jou 2010a, Weber 2012), we can conclude that people are familiar with the concept<sup>1</sup>. Political actors and parties also define themselves predominantly in terms of Left and Right in their programs and manifestos and position themselves in comparison to other parties’ positions on the LR scale. There is no surprise that the heuristic value of LRI for parties and voters as being one of the best predictors of voting choice has been consistently confirmed (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, Gunther and Montero 2001, Knutsen 1997, Saiegh 2015). In order to make a choice between parties, people have to know both their own position and that of the different parties.<sup>2</sup>

That said, LRI is not always a good predictor of politics. For instance, it does not necessarily explain coalition building and program-policy linkage as well as it could. Imbeau et al. (2001) find that the average correlation between party program and policy is close to zero and Tavits and Letki (2009) report that in post-communist countries even the contrary relationship between program and policy in terms of Left and Right hold. There are, however, also scholars, such as Savage (2012), who claim that LRI has an effect on government formation, even in Eastern Europe when we take into account the distinct value content of LRI there. This case, where LRI does explain a political process when we consider its value content, is a good example of how knowing the value content of LRI improves our understanding.

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<sup>1</sup> The question of whether people are actually familiar with the LR scale has been addressed by several authors. For instance, Dalton (2006) and Jou (2011) have highlighted contradictory results, such as very high levels of self-positioning hand in hand with low levels of value content in East Asia. Also, many authors have included political sophistication variables like education, political interest, age or vote to test whether positioning on the LR scale generally, or on centrist positions in particular, reveals genuine ideological positions or reflects ignorance instead (Freire and Belchior 2011, Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, Jou 2010a, Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Zechmeister 2006). These issues are addressed at some length in the first publication of my dissertation.

<sup>2</sup> The heuristic value of LR has lately found systematic use in political compasses and voting advice applications, which allow people to measure their positions and compare the results to political parties, being usually reduced to the LR scale. Despite the fact that it is mostly young and less politically educated citizens who let the results of political compasses influence their voting decisions (Ladner et al 2012, Vassil 2011), political compasses definitely have considerable educational and indicative effect in shaping people’s understanding of Left and Right as well as of parties’ positions on this scale (Kamoen et al 2015).

In comparative political science, LRI performs several important functions. First, most formal models of voting behaviour (Downs 1957, Kedar 2005) are constructed by relying on the conflict between Left and Right. Reducing complicated political conflicts and landscape to just one dimension enables us to make analytical inferences that would otherwise be unthinkable. Second, this simplified tool gives us the opportunity to compare individuals, parties and countries taking into account the development of society as well as specific periods. Comparison without simplification would be impossible as there would otherwise be too many factors to consider. Third, LRI helps us to understand underlying conflicts and polarisations in the society should we agree with the position that LRI encompasses the most relevant conflicts in society (Inglehart 1984, Knutsen 1997).

### **Diversity of the concept**

There are several other distinctions and values attributed to Left and Right in addition to the aforementioned – economic, social and post-materialist values. For instance, a conflict between authoritarian and liberal values is often attributed to Left and Right (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Laver and Budge 1992, Freire 2008), although Bobbio (1996) would suggest that liberal vs. authoritarian values are good for distinguishing between different Lefts and Rights, just not between Left and Right (Rosas and Ferreira 2013: 9). Laver and Budge (1993) have associated Left with globalism and internationalism; Geser (2008) confirmed the association between Left and environmental sustainability and gender equality; Evans and Whitefield (1998) and Jou (2010a) related the LR dimension with nationalism; Evans and Whitefield (1998) have also found attitudes towards ethnic minority rights related to LRI; and Weber and Salis (2015), among others, have confirmed the association between LRI and attitudes towards the West and immigration.

In addition to a variety of conflicts and distinctions that have claimed to characterise the LR dichotomy, there are also conflicting empirical examples and contradictions in how values determine LRI. As the concept originates from France and is most frequently applied in the context of developed Western Europe countries, the studies about LRI in Western Europe generally arrive at similar results, although tendencies vary somehow even there – the importance of religion depends on society, for instance. However, scholars stress the circumstances in which understanding of LRI develops under conditions of democratic pluralism (Noël and Thérien 2008) and ideological polarisation (Markowski 1997), and, therefore, in newly emerged democracies LRI may be less meaningful. Moreover, as expected, the findings from new democracies in several regions with a different political background are clearly different from or even contradict those confirmed in Western Europe. Still, scholars generally agree that although LRI is less familiar and less anchored in values, it is applicable in new democracies (Dalton 2006, Jou 2010a, McAllister and White 2007).

The following examples provide an overview of the existing variance in LRI. In Asian societies the proportion of people who locate themselves on the LR scale is the highest, ranging between 96 and 99 percentage of the population, but the meaning of the concept is rather ambiguous for people, as many conventional values, including, for instance, economic ones, are not clearly related to LRI (Dalton 2006). In some countries outside of the developed Western world, in South Africa and Algeria, for instance, equality is related to LRI, but contrary to the conventional understanding – people on the Right, not the Left, support equality (Rivero 2004). The most often emphasised contradiction is found in post-communist democracies, where in several societies the innovative and liberal values are related to the Right, not the Left (Evans and Whitefield 1998), and the same applies to post-materialist values, in case they are related at all (Dalton 2006:14).

As even conflicting meanings have so frequently been attributed to Left and Right, Kitschelt and Hellemans (1990) and Knutsen (1995) have differentiated four theories about the use of Left and Right – the transformation theory, the persistence theory, the pluralisation theory and the irrelevance theory. According to the transformation theory, the content that is first associated with Left and Right can be replaced by some new content, for instance, post-materialist values can replace the values related to economic conflict. The persistence theory considers the first and main content as permanent – some new values can take their place on the dimension, but they are reflecting the same conflict<sup>3</sup>. This means that although post-materialist values can be linked to Left and Right, the main conflict between Left and Right is still economic by nature and post-materialist values are clearly associated with the economic Left.

According to the pluralisation theory, which encompasses arguments from the transformation and persistence theories, the first, economic conflict still exists but its importance might decrease slightly as it is accompanied by new content (values, conflicts). According to that theory, Left and Right have more than one meaning and those meanings might not totally overlap. Flanagan (1979, 1980, 1987) differentiates the economic and cultural content (post-materialism) of Left and Right, where economic and cultural Left do not have to occur only hand in hand with each other but where there is also possibility that cultural Left and economic Right are combined, for example. The fourth, the irrelevance theory, is the most extreme, challenging the relevance and usability of the whole concept in changed conditions – according to this approach, Left and Right as an intrinsically economic conflict died with the end of industrial age and the post-industrial era is described by different conflicts, e.g. materialist *versus* post-materialist values, etc.

I will use these four theories as assisting tools or starting points for assessing the relevance and value content of LRI. The content of LRI is studied mainly through the values which determine LRI, and, in addition, three theories –

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<sup>3</sup> Kriesi et al. 2006: two (economic and cultural) dimensions are related and therefore only one dimension exists.

pluralisation, persistence and transformation – can reveal more about the nature of LR identification. The relevance is evaluated in several ways. First, recognising that the terms “Left” and “Right” allow one to position oneself on the LR scale shows whether the concepts make sense in the most superficial way. Second, strong LR value anchoring as strong relationship between values and LRI is also a sign that the concept is relevant, as it shows that LRI has a clear and strong meaning. And third, though more directly, even studying the effect of LRI can show us whether the concept is useful.

## **Determinants of Left-Right Identification**

In order to evaluate the relevance and content of LRI, the articles of the dissertation examine various factors that determine LRI. This section provides an overview of the most important individual and country level factors which have been considered as determinants of LRI and which will be addressed in the empirical studies constituting the dissertation<sup>4</sup>. Both the factors that influence individuals’ ability to position themselves ideologically and the factors that explain individuals’ ideological positioning on the Left-Right dimension are examined, although the focus is on the latter.

LRI is usually divided into three components – social structure, values and partisanship (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, Huber 1989, Knutsen 1997, Freire 2008, Weber 2012, Medina 2015), which can be further divided into two components – symbolic<sup>5</sup>, which includes social structure and partisanship, and ideological, which includes values, attitudes and issues priorities (Weber 2012). I rely on those distinctions, first addressing the symbolic component – social structure and partisanship – and then the ideological component on the individual level and thereafter focusing on country-level influences. It is important to specify that, when studying the content of LRI in this dissertation, the ideological component of LRI is central; the symbolic component rather helps us to understand more specifically the ideological content of LRI.

There are also some other factors, like basic personal values (Piurko et al 2011, Caprara et al 2006), personality traits (Fatke 2016, Bakker 2016, Gerber et al 2010, 2011), genetic (Alford et al 2005, Hatemi et al 2014) and cognitive factors (Hibbing et al 2014, Dodd et al 2012, Oxley et al 2008), which scholars have related to LRI, but as I have to limit the scope of the research I only cover factors that fall beyond the usual scope of political science study of factors.

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<sup>4</sup> The findings from the articles that constitute this dissertation are presented in later sections, even if they have been published chronologically earlier compared to some of the findings that are presented in this section.

<sup>5</sup> Partisanship and social structure give symbolic meaning to LRI in referring to political parties or social groups but they do not constitute the idea-level content, even though they are more closely associated to LRI than values are. (Weber 2012: 10–11)



## **Left-Right Identification and the Symbolic Component: Social Structure and Partisanship**

This subsection introduces how several social demographic aspects and people's social and political identification influence their LRI. People's social position and their social identification is one of the most common factors taken into account in studying most of the phenomena in political and social sciences, and ideological identification is no exception. Even though studies confirm decreasing (Franklin et al 1992) or weak (Eijk et al 2005) structuring effect of social structure on LRI, especially in new democracies (Innes 2002, Sitter 2001), there are scholars (Whitefield 2002: 191, Van der Brug 2010: 602) who argue that when new post-communist countries and Western democracies are compared, social factors have a comparatively similar strong effect.

Religiosity is considered as an important factor in reinforcing conservative and traditional moral values; hence religious people should incline to the Right end of the ideological spectrum. The effect of religiosity on LRI is found almost everywhere (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Geser 2008: 28, Weber 2012: 114, Medina 2015: 785). It is strong in Eastern Europe (Geser 2008: 28), but rather weak in some other less developed societies outside of Europe, like African and Arab societies (Dalton 2006: 16). Moreover, when almost all people are religious in a society, as is the case in Latin America, the relationship between religiosity and LRI is weaker as there is less variance in the level of religiosity (Geser 2008: 28). The importance of religiosity structuring ideological identification can be seen also as a pre-modern and passing phenomenon, but present developments in international and also in national politics, like terrorism and migration, suggest that the formative influence of religiosity and beliefs on our judgement and worldview continues to be relevant. Inglehart (1990) has also mentioned the probable increasing effect of religiosity in replacing the declining importance of class and party identification. As religiosity may even gain more importance in everyday politics, the effect of religiosity in structuring LRI in a rightist direction is considered throughout this dissertation.

Income and class are other factors that affect a person's LRI and can be directly related through both social and economic values. More well-off people are interested in preserving the existing system, including the unequal distribution of resources, while those who are less well-off want to change the system in order to equalise the allocation of resources and improve their economic status. The tendency that people with higher income and higher social status incline to the Right and less fortunate people incline to the Left is confirmed in most studies in Western Europe (Geser 2008, Jou 2010a).

In the case of post-communist and other former authoritarian countries, the effect of status can be absent because during the authoritarian period the economic differences between citizens were more or less eliminated and therefore its structuring effect may have been lost. Another explanation for weak predicting power is offered by Evans and Whitefield (1993, 1998) which suggests volatility of new party systems as a possible cause. However, most studies tend

to confirm at least some relationship between socio-economic status and LRI in new democracies, albeit somewhat weaker and less stable (Jou 2010a among many).

Some studies (Jou 2010a: 39) have confirmed that people with a higher income and a better social position are also more able to identify themselves ideologically, but this is partly a mediatory effect as higher income and position often goes hand in hand with better education, with more resources for attaining information and with greater political interest. There are also differences between elite and mass understanding (Zechmeister 2006) which can be related to a person's social status but as the focus of the present study is on the macro level I do not address these differences here.

An individual's age can affect LRI in various ways – as a direct effect of age, or as an effect of cohort or life cycle. As a straight predictor of LRI, the general tendency is that older people incline to the Right, supporting the status quo and already existing inequalities as they have accumulated some possessions during a lifetime, while younger people lean to the Left, challenging the existing order. The same tendency can be explained also socio-psychologically – although personal traits do not change greatly over time, there is evidence that conscientiousness, which is related to conservative views (Gerber et al 2011, though not everywhere according to Fatke 2016), increases over time and openness to experiences, which is related to liberal views (Gerber et al 2011, though not everywhere according to Fatke 2016), decreases over time (Srivastava et al 2003). The famous quote “If you are not a liberal at 25, you have no heart. If you are not a conservative at 35, you have no brain”<sup>6</sup> illustrates the common relationship between age and LRI in similar way.

In case of post-communist countries older people have been found to hold, though not always and everywhere, rather leftist views (Jou 2010a: 72–73). Here are at least two possible explanations. First, older cohorts were socialised under communist rule and remain faithful to their leftist views (offered also by Jou 2010a: 73), while at the same time younger cohorts are opposed to the former system and therefore have rightist views. Second, as a contrast to Western democracies where older people have gathered more wealth and are economically more secure compared to younger people, in post-communist countries older cohorts are economically disadvantaged – small pensions and no property – and therefore incline more to the Left than younger cohorts. More precise studies in order to confirm which explanation is more likeable are still to be undertaken.

The effect of age on the ability to identify ideologically has also been tested and as one might expect, all other aspects kept constant, usually older people are more aware of political terms including “Left” and “Right”. This is because they have had more time to become familiar with the terms during their life. The exception here again is regime change, after which young people may

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<sup>6</sup> For more about this quote see the following page:  
<http://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/02/24/heart-head/>

acquire new information and adjust to the new situation more quickly (Freire, 2006a). the findings do not clearly confirm those expectations, however – there is a missing or weak relationship between age and ability to identify ideologically, although there is some truth in the statement that in some more mature democracies older people are more able to locate themselves on the LR dimension (than younger people) and in some new democracies younger people (rather than older people) are more able to do likewise (Geser 2008: 33, Jou 2010a: 39–40).

The life cycle effects are generally found to be not worthwhile examining in research of LRI and their possible effect can be similar to those mentioned earlier – older people tend to be more conservative and rightist as they are less open to new things or because they have more assets to lose, or they incline to the Left if their socio-economic status is low, as it has been in post-communist countries. Despite the fact that in case of age the assumptions cannot be so clear, its direct effect, but not cohort or life cycle effect, on LRI is studied throughout the empirical articles of this dissertation.

If we proceed with the understanding that well-off people tend to incline to the Right and less well-off people incline to the Left, then more educated people should hold rightist views as generally better education leads to a better job and to a higher status in society. However, contrary to that expectation, most studies in Western societies confirm the opposite – more educated people hold leftist views (Jou 2010a: 71, Geser 2008: 21). At the same time, studies on new democracies and Eastern Europe affirm the positive relationship between higher educational level and the Right (Jou 2010a: 72–73, Geser 2008: 21). One potential explanation is given by distinguishing between the cultural and economic capital of education (see Achterberg and Houtman 2006, Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004). When education is perceived as cultural capital, educated people as more liberal incline to the Left; when it is perceived as mainly economic capital and pursued for practical economic causes, educated people as better equipped for the future incline to the Right.

Although the effect of education is a tricky one as it can affect LRI in both ways, it goes hand in hand – as do other characteristics related to political sophistication like political interest, political knowledge and media exposure – with a person's ability to identify ideologically and with better understanding of the concept. The tendency that more educated and more politically-interested people are better able to identify themselves ideologically is repeatedly confirmed (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 209, Evans, Heath & Lalljee 1996:106, Freire and Belchior 2011), although the effect of education and political interest is stronger in developed Western societies compared to other regions (Geser 2008: 22). A trend that values and issues are more anchored in LRI among educated and politically-interested people is also confirmed (Zechmeister 2010: 5–6, Freire and Belchior 2011). Similarly to ability to identify ideologically, the latter applies more clearly in developed democracies (Geser 2008: 32). As education plays an important and conflicting role in affecting people's understanding of ideology, the effect of education is

considered in most empirical articles but is more central in those which address the ability to identify on the LR scale and the relevance of LRI.

Place of residence has in the past had a stronger effect on LRI in less developed societies in the context of less mobility; today it is related to Left and Right rather indirectly through other socio-demographic factors. Rural populations tend to be older, less educated, less wealthy and more religious, and hence they usually hold rightist views compared to urban populations. The effect of residence is confirmed in Western developed societies (Jou 2010a: 71); in new democracies, however, town size does not have the same effect (Jou 2010a: 72) and compared to other socio-demographic factors it is not found to be important, especially if other factors are included in an analysis (Jou 2010b: 104–5).

Gender differences in ideological leanings are not so evident but there is a weak tendency of women to hold leftist views. That can be explained as follows: women being economically, and frequently also politically, disadvantaged have more reason to challenge the existing inequalities (Jou 2010a: 71–72) and they rely more on state welfare, for child care and family allowance, and therefore prefer a generous social state. There is, however, also an alternative explanation for why in some cases or countries women lean to the Right – they are more religious and share more conservative values. In one's ability to identify ideologically, gender differences are more evident, although not universal (Jou 2010a: 41, Geser 2008: 33). Men are more able to position themselves ideologically than women and, surprisingly, differences between the genders are equally existent in older as well as in younger democracies. The differences can be explained by the circumstances in which men have been historically more involved in public affairs and politics, and women's right to vote was established comparatively recently and is still not applied worldwide. The effect of place of residence and gender are controlled in most of the empirical articles in this thesis, but, as their part in affecting LRI is rather marginal and not important in context of current study, I do not delve more in depth here.

Partisanship is the most important political identification related to LRI. The relationship between party identification or party choice<sup>7</sup> and LRI is a reciprocal one – people may support a certain party and form their ideological position from their party preference or they may have certain ideological beliefs and choose the party who most reflects those beliefs. The changes in ideological and partisan identification can take place also simultaneously and the direction of causality is often unclear. Reciprocal causality between party identification and LRI is understudied, but this endogeneity problem is emphasised by Sani (1974) and Medina (2015) and addressed by Belanger and Aarts (2006) and Lewis-Beck and Costa Lobo (2011), for example. In this subsection, I only address the effect of party identification on LRI; the reverse influence is covered hereinafter.

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<sup>7</sup> Party choice is considered as a proxy for a party identification when survey data on party identification are not available.

Party identification or party choice has been regarded as one of the main components of LRI ever since the publication of a study by Inglehart and Klingemann (1976). Although strength of effect of party identification varies by country and over time and later studies show a rather declining effect of partisan component (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 232), it has an important role in how people identify themselves ideologically (Huber 1989, Knutsen 1997, 1998, Freire 2006a, Medina 2015), especially among less sophisticated citizens (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976) and in political systems with fewer parties (Knutsen 1997:199–200, 210) and higher ideological polarisation (Medina 2015: 786). Knutsen (1998) claims that the declining effect can be explained by people's increasing tendency to position themselves, more and more, towards the centre of the ideological spectrum.

Party identification and ability to identify ideologically are also related. People with strong party preferences tend to place themselves on the LR scale more frequently (Freire and Belchior 2011, Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Zechmeister 2006). Again, it is difficult to evaluate whether they are just two co-existing phenomena – better informed and more sophisticated people tend to identify themselves ideologically and on a party basis more often; either that, or they have a mutual effect – people with clear party preferences have a better understanding of the ideological concept and people who are aware of the ideological concept can derive their own preferences more easily. In case of the ability to identify ideologically we can treat party identification as one variable among others reflecting the person's sophistication. In the empirical studies of this dissertation, party identification is mostly incorporated as a determinant in studying relevance (as ability to locating oneself on the LR scale), not content of LRI, because in large N studies coding and interpreting of all parties' positions on LRI would not be cost-effective.

### **Left-Right Identification and the Ideological Component: Values**

The decreasing effect of social structure factors occurs in parallel with the increasing effect of values on the LR dimension. Values play the central role in forming the ideological content of Left and Right and therefore they are at the focus of this dissertation as the best communicators of the content of LRI. Values are important in explaining ideological positioning in both new and old democracies (Huber 1989, Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, Knutsen 1997, Jou 2010a, Weber 2012) but are more anchored to Left and Right in the latter (Jou 2010a: 174–6). The variety of values that has been found to be associated with LRI is extensive; I therefore focus here on the most essential values. Many scholars (Benoit and Laver 2007, Kriesi et al. 2006, Jost et al. 2003, Choma et al. 2010) find that LRI is determined above all by two types of values – economic (equality and competition) and social or cultural (conservatism *versus* liberalism) – in nature and I therefore start with those.

Starting from the industrial revolution LRI has been most frequently associated with economic values – people who support equality in economic terms, state intervention and wealth redistribution hold leftist views, and people who support natural inequality, the private market and a minimal state hold rightist views (Lipset 1954, Downs 1957, Huber and Inglehart 1995, Evans, Heath and Lalljee 1996). The effect of economic values on LR ideology has been confirmed in developed Western countries (among others, Weber and Saris 2014, Geser 2008, Corbetta et al 2009) as well as in newer democracies (Kitschelt et al 2010, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009, Geser 2008, McAllister and White 2007, Markowski 1997, Medina 2015, Freire 2015). Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2010) have even argued that economic values are more central to determining LRI in East and Central Europe than in Western Europe.

In general, economic values are less anchored in LR ideology in new democracies compared to older democracies as the use of ideological dimension takes some time (Aspelund et al 2013, Thorisdottir et al 2007, Kitschelt et al 1999), but the association is still there right after the democratic transition. There are only a few cases when economic values have found not to be related to LR ideology, for instance in East Asia (Dalton 2006: 13). In the case of Latin America, some authors (Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009) have found that the dimension of deregulation and privatisation reflects the issues of economic policy better than the traditional “taxes *versus* spending” dimension and the weak relationship between economic values and LRI in Latin America may therefore be partly attributed to measurement issues.

In a very small number of cases there is also some confusion as to which way economic values are related to Left and Right, for instance citizens in Honduras and citizens with low level of political knowledge in Mexico and Uruguay do support a bigger role for the state and Right ideology at the same time (Zechmeister and Corral 2010: 5), which is contrary to the conventional relationship. However, cases where economic values are associated with the Left and Right contrary to the ordinary manner are rather exceptional and not worthy of a detailed treatment here. All empirical articles study the relationship between economic values and LRI, in order to evaluate the relevance of LRI in measuring how strong the economic value content is or to explore the content in measuring how strongly and in which way values and LRI are related. Moreover, although the findings are not unidirectional, the general assumption is that in societies where political discourse of Left and Right is more developed, economic values form an important part of LRI. I also expect that those who support state intervention and wealth redistribution incline to the Left universally.

The second most frequently confirmed values constituting the LR dimension are social values. Social values can be characterised as involving a conflict between authoritarian and liberal values or a conflict between religious/moral values and less rigid views, like tolerating abortion, homosexuality, etc. This means that liberal and tolerant people hold leftist views and authoritarian and more morally-rigid people hold rightist views (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Laver and Budge 1992, Norris and Inglehart 2004, Freire 2008). Social values

have been associated with LRI in older Western democracies (Lewis-Beck and Lobo 2011, Noelle-Neumann 1998) as well as in new democracies (Evans and Whitefield 1995, Mészáros et al 2007, Geser 2008, Szczesbiak 2008, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009, Freire 2015), and in some countries, like the Netherlands, they may become even more important than economic values over time (Vries et al 2013).

In spite of the assumption that in new democracies social values might not have similarly strong effect on LRI compared to older democracies because authoritarian regimes discouraged religious practice, research assures the opposite. Although in the case of Eastern Europe several findings confirm that the association between social values and LRI is in conflict with the conventional Western pattern, there is a clear effect – authoritarian values and intolerance go hand in hand with the Left, not with the Right there (Jou 2010a: 87, Lauristin 2007: 53, Kitschelt 1992). Vachudova and Hooghe (2009: 206) have reached the same result in analysing party policy positions – economic Left was related to traditional cultural values and economic Right was related to social liberalism.<sup>8</sup> Similarly to economic values, social values are included in the empirical analyses and I expect that generally liberally-minded people incline to the Left, but consequently from conflicting findings I also assume some variation between countries, which I hope to explain by involving country factors.

Third, since the 1970s scholars (led by Ronald Inglehart) have argued that in advanced democracies a conflict between materialist and post-materialist values has merged (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Knutsen 1995, Potter 2001). The studies confirm that generally post-materialist people tend to hold leftist views, and this tendency holds both in advanced and in new democracies, like Latin America, for example (Dalton 2006). In Eastern Europe and in Africa the relationship is frequently found to be the opposite – post-materialist people incline to the Right (Dalton 2006:14) and in East Asia the findings are even more controversial and depend on specific issues – in considering post-materialist values generally and gender equality, the East Asian population is similar to the Western population, in environmental issues the reverse relationship applies – more environmentally-friendly people incline to the Right (Dalton 2006, Geser 2008). Many scholars (Jou 2010a, Geser 2008: 25–6, Jurkynas 2003: 36–8, for instance) have also found no relationship between materialist/post-

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<sup>8</sup> The conflict between supporting change *versus* maintaining the status quo can be treated as overlapping with social values or as a part of the conflict between liberal and conservative values, thus confirming the deviant nature of LRI in post-communist countries. Markowski (1997: 223) confirmed that in post-communist societies change could often mean moving away from the Left and from equality and not in the direction of it. Recent studies show that Eastern European countries vary widely in how support for change is related to LRI. The association is like that in the West – those who support change incline to the Left – as in Slovenia and Croatia; the opposite is true in Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and the relationship is absent in Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania, and varies in Poland, Romania and Ukraine (Aspelund et al 2013).

materialist values and LRI in new democracies, especially at the beginning of the democratic period and especially in Eastern Europe. This is explained by the tendency that post-materialist values start to spread in economically more advanced societies – also Jou (2010) confirmed that post-materialist values influence LRI more in wealthier societies. Post-materialist values are included in the empirical articles of this dissertation and I expect them to structure LRI when societies are socio-economically developed.

In addition, conflict between materialist and post-materialist values can be treated as overlapping with social values as new social movements have fought for liberal values and social justice and their opponents defend traditional/authoritarian values. Several authors (Jou 2010a: 15, Kriesi 2010: 683, Freire 2015: 47) argue that materialist/post-materialist values overlap substantially with liberal/authoritarian values (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, Kitschelt 1995). Flanagan has criticised the Inglehart scale since 1979 (Flanagan 1979, 1980, 1987), arguing that it measures rather the difference between authoritarians and libertarians and he concludes that there is a change afoot from authoritarian values towards libertarian ones in Western Europe (Flanagan and Lee 2003). Based on this overlapping nature between materialist/post-materialist and liberal/authoritarian and social values, I expect materialist/post-materialist values to have a similar effect on LRI as social values have, with the exception of socio-economic development, which should affect more the importance of the materialist/post-materialist dimension.

The fourth type of values worth outlining is that related to support for democracy. Many authors led by Moreno (1999) have outlined that common conflicts are overshadowed or less apparent in new democracies because of the specific conflict between those who support the new democratic system and those who preferred the previous authoritarian regime. This tendency has been found in new democracies irrespective of their authoritarian past, in Southern Europe (Moreno 1999), East Asia (Lin et al 1996, Shin and Jhee 2005), Latin America (Dalton 2006) and in Eastern Europe (Evans and Whitefield 1998, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 1999, Jou 2010a, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010). The direction in which democratic values are related to LRI varies depending on the former authoritarian regime – in societies coming from a right-authoritarian regime, those who support democracy incline to the Left (in Southern Europe and Latin America), and in societies coming from a left-authoritarian regime, those who support democracy incline to the Right (Eastern Europe). This kind of a relationship is interpreted as an initial reaction to the former regime as the previous authoritarian regime is related to the Right in former right-authoritarian countries and to the Left in former left-authoritarian countries (Dalton 2006: 16). East Asia, where different studies refer to a different direction of relationship, is exceptional again (Shin and Jhee 2005: 390, Dalton 2006: 16). However, unlike other values, conflict over supporting or not supporting the democratic turn is considered as a passing conflict, which appears in new democracies but is not characteristic to consolidated democracies (Linz and Stepan 1996, Lin et al 1996, Jou 2010a, Shin and Jhee 2005). There are several



findings indicating that democratic values could lose their importance after some transition period in democracies (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010, Evans and Whitefield 1998, Kitschelt et al 1995, Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2012). The findings on the existence of democratic conflict are somewhat ambiguous – democratic conflict is still present even after a decade or more in some post-communist countries, but rather missing from the beginning of democracy in other countries (more details in Jou 2010b, Jou 2010c, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009). The overall trend is that with passage of time from the establishment of democracy these values cease to affect LRI to a significant degree in new democracies (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010, Evans and Whitefield 1998, Kitschelt et al. 1995). Democratic values are studied in most of the empirical articles with the expectation that their role in affecting LRI in new democracies is temporary and that they do not constitute LRI as such.

### **Left-Right Identification and Country Level Variables**

In a few cases previous research has confirmed differences between countries' population's LRI, especially in people's ability to position themselves on the LR dimension, but probable direct and interactional effects of country and other macro level factors which are already briefly referred to earlier in this section are not sufficiently studied. The need for research that includes macro level variables besides individual level variables is also expressed by several authors (such as by Jou 2010a: 182, and Geser 2008: 18).

This dissertation focuses on LRI in democratic countries and the comparison between old, long-consolidated democracies and new democracies is one of the most important aspects in studying development of ideological identification. Level of democracy as a ground for comparing countries LRI – old *versus* new democracies, Western Europe *versus* Eastern Europe, or different regions, etc. – is common (among others Dalton 2006, Geser 2008, Jou 2010a), but studies which investigate the age of democracy itself as a predictor are rather rare. As Weber (2010: 7) put it, however, it is not the time of democratic experience but the time to get used to and to understand the political concept that is important here. We can expect that with the switch to democracy it would take some time for residents to get used to the new political system and landscape, and several studies confirm this – a population's ability to locate themselves on the LR dimension increases within democratic experience (Jou 2010a, Dalton 2006, Freire 2006b, and more precisely Freire 2008: 198), although citizens of new democracies are surprisingly good and quick at locating themselves ideologically after the collapse of the authoritarian regime (McAllister and White 2007, Dalton 2006). The ability to identify ideologically may also be expressed in the clear anchoring in LRI of values and social structure – at the beginning of the new democratic regime people do not relate specific values, issues and parties with the ideological dimension, but after some learning period they do, although in this case the party system also plays an important structuring role

(Jou 2010d, Freire 2008, Freire 2015). The effect of democratic experience as part of the development of political discourse will be addressed in all the empirical studies of this dissertation.

The democratic development of a society is directly related to the legacy of the authoritarian system that preceded the democratic system. Legacies of authoritarian regimes are a rather rarely studied field, but a few scholars, Pop-Eleches and Tucker, for instance, have started to examine the nature of authoritarian legacy in more detail<sup>9</sup>. There are also some findings from former research about post-communist countries worth emphasising here. First, studies confirm that although the ability to locate oneself on the LR dimension might be slightly lower among the populations from post-communist societies compared to Western European democracies they are familiar with the concept (Jou 2010a, Dalton 2006 among many). The assumption that longevity or severity of authoritarian rule might result in a lower ability to identify ideologically is also disproved by Jou (2013: 285–6).

Second, some specific tendencies and deviations from Western democracies have been confirmed in post-communist countries. Economic conflict is reflected on the LR dimension in a similar way to Western democracies (those who support equality and redistribution are leftist), although the association is weaker (Dalton 2006, Jou 2010a, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010), but the conflict between liberal and conservative values or between supporting a change *versus* maintaining the status quo is often related to LRI in contrast to the West – conservative values and maintaining the old system are associated with the Left, not the Right. The direction of the association varies across countries and over time, but it is broadly adopted that post-communist populations deviate somewhat from the conventional understanding of Left and Right (Jou 2010a, Kitschelt 1992, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010). The cause for the deviance is usually seen hidden in historical circumstances – in Western Europe democracy originated from monarchies; in post-communist countries democracy was preceded by a system whose official ideology was extreme Left, communism, and as a reaction to the old system in the West the change and liberalism was related to the Left, while in post-communist countries it was related to the Right.

There are mainly two issues that have been raised concerning the authoritarian background of new democracies. First, a need to consider more precisely the effect of authoritarian background on LRI, for instance by Jou (2008, 2010: 24); and second, the longevity of the effect of authoritarian background, raised again by Jou (2008). Recent findings from post-communist countries have confirmed a changed, now positive link between social liberal values and leftist views in Estonia (Kivistik 2016), which may refer to the fact that perceptions of Left and Right can change over time. Although Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2010) have not examined change in the value content of Left and

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<sup>9</sup> For a discussion about possible authoritarian legacies see Pop-Eleches (2007), Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2010) and Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2011).

Right in detail, but ideological positioning in post-communist countries, they have found that the understanding of LRI in post-communist space approaches Western European understanding as political and economic institutions converge. The Left becomes less despised by educated and democratically-inclined people and Western style social democratic parties and far-right parties become more popular. At the same time, Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2016) found that people in post-communist countries tend to have anti-Left bias and people from former right-wing authoritarian countries tend to have anti-Right bias; but as anti-Right bias disappears through learning after a while – as the average position of the population on the LR dimension corresponds to (neutral) Western countries – anti-Left bias still exists and is especially remarkable among younger cohorts in post-communist countries. At the same time, older cohorts in post-communist societies have been rather neutral and comparable to their Western counterparts since the democratic transition.

In new democracies with a right-wing authoritarian background – in Latin America where the authoritarian background is less continuous (Jou 2010a), and especially in East Asia – LRI is frequently less structured and more dubious compared to Western developed societies. However, unlike in the case of post-communist countries, clear deviations from or contradictions to Western meaning of Left and Right are not observed (Jou 2010a, Dalton 2006, Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2012).

Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2010) have also argued that in the case of post-communist societies an individual's experience during the transition was a more important factor affecting ideological identification than authoritarian legacy itself. The winners of the transition, usually the young, educated and democratically engaged people were rightist, and scholars assume that that this trend will disappear after some democratic experience (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010: 26).

Considering notable differences between post-communist, other newly democratised and long consolidated Western European countries, the authoritarian legacy of new democracies is at the focus of the dissertation. The main assumption is that the (ideological) authoritarian legacy affects how people in new democratic societies understand the concepts of Left and Right and that usually it can be explained through opposing the former authoritarian system together with its ideology.

In addition to political development, the economic and social development of society can also affect LRI. The level of socio-economic development of a society is associated with LRI mainly in two ways. First, as more educated people identify themselves on the LR scale more often at individual level, there is good reason to expect that education has a similar compatible effect also at the country level. Thus, social development translated into the educational level of population should bring with it people's ability to identify oneself on the LR dimension – in more developed societies LRI is more relevant.

Second, a considerable number of scholars support Inglehart's claim that economic development and improving economic conditions lead to a value shift

to post-materialist values and this shift has already occurred in Western Europe and other most developed societies. Therefore, in socio-economically more developed countries conflict between old materialist and new post-materialist values has appeared. Studies on less developed countries show a tendency that post-materialist values are yet not related to LRI there (Rivero 2004, Jou 2010a, Geser 2008) whereas in more developed Western European countries they are (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Knutsen 1995, Potter 2001). There has been a debate whether the new conflict replaces the old one or whether it will be absorbed into LR conflict. Empirical evidence supports rather a claim about the emergence of post-materialist values in developed Western democracies and usually indicates that new value conflict will be reflected as an additional one on LRI, instead of replacing the old value conflict (Jou 2010a, Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Knutsen 1995, Freire 2006a). Because of those two reasons – affecting the ability to identify ideologically and leading to post-materialist values – the socio-economic level of societies is included in the empirical studies of this dissertation.

In addition to the political and social development of societies, the influence of parties and the party system on LRI is worth pointing out. Although frequently the quantity of parties is deemed an important aspect in political research, Dalton (2008) argues that the quality of the party system or party (ideological) polarisation is more important here. In a polarised party system parties are distributed over an ideological dimension so that citizens are able to differentiate their stances clearly, and this facilitates citizens' positioning on the LR dimension (Dalton 2008, van der Eijk, Schmitt & Binder 2005, Jou 2011). Instability associated with new party systems is also emphasised as a reason for a lower level of LR recognition by citizens in new democracies (Gunther and Kuan 2007, Freire 2006a, Mainwaring and Torcal 2005). In addition, values and issues are more clearly related to LRI when a party system is well developed – polarised and with well-established partisan identities with low level of volatility (Zechmeister and Corral 2013, Freire 2008). In Latin America, Zechmeister and Corral (2013: 688) have found that even the meaning of Left and Right is dependent on polarisation – when polarisation is high, a limited role for the state is related to the Right, but when polarisation is low it is related to the Left, which suggests that higher polarisation leads to a better conceptual understanding of LR ideology (confirmed also by Huber 1989). Several studies (Dalton 2008, Lachat 2008, Van der Eijk, Schmitt and Binder 2005, Freire 2015) have also found that ideological voting is stronger in the context of higher polarisation. Party system related factors – party polarisation and clarity of party alternatives – are examined in the present dissertation in order to examine their effect on people's ability to identify ideologically and on value anchoring in LRI.

## Effects of Left-Right Identification

In order to evaluate the effects of LRI I will study how LRI affects other phenomena in the political landscape. LRI is a central concept in political science, playing an important role in many situations and it has been seen to affect a variety of political phenomena. LRI predicts the choice of party in elections and support for coalition and government, but often also support for the democratic system in general. The LRI of a person is also an indicator of their preferences in everyday politics and public discussion – whether it is immigration and refugee issues, budget and tax issues, foreign policy or moral issues. As this dissertation, however, is focused on studying the determinants of LRI, and just one empirical article concerns the effect of LRI, only the most important effects of LRI are presented in the following section.

The effect of LRI is covered in most voting studies and those studies confirm LRI as being one of the major predictors of voting, with leftist citizens voting for social democrats, etc. (Franklin et al 1992, Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, Gunther and Montero 2001, Hix 1999, Knutsen 1997, Van der Eijk et al 2005). The psychological approach to voting behaviour especially established that ideological identification on the LR scale orientates and anchors voting (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Percheron and Jennings 1981, Fleury and Lewis-Beck 1993). Rational choice theory has also suggested that ideology enables individuals to reduce the costs associated with a need to learn about different policy proposals; and thus, LR ideology becomes a centrepiece of competition between parties to win the support of voters (Downs 1957, Listhaug et al. 1994).

The effect of the ideological identification may vary, for instance, in new democracies, where the political landscape and party identities are less developed and citizens' ideological preferences are less structured, so the impact of LRI on voting is weaker. Empirical studies are controversial – in the Latin American case some scholars (Seligson 2007, Azpuru 2010) have found a significant relationship between LRI and party choice, while others have questioned this (Echegfalteraray 2005, Weyland 2003). LRI also noticeably affects voting in post-communist countries, especially among older cohorts, but again as usually, East Asia is distinctive in demonstrating very low levels of LR voting (Jou 2010a: 155–6, 178). Moreover, although voting is a central part of politics and political science and is clearly affected by LRI, the effect of LRI on voting is not studied in this dissertation as the aim of this dissertation is related to wider concepts which are relevant in the case of new democracies, such as support for democracy.

In addition to vote choice, LRI, or more widely LR ideology, can also predict the issue preferences at the individual level and the policy preferences of government at the national level. Although this dissertation does not study how LRI affects issue preferences, the main assumptions and findings in this area are worth pointing out as LRI facilitates the adoption of a position on more specific political issues, being cost effective in terms of time and energy. There is a wide range of issues that has been linked as being at least partly predictable from the

ideological position of people, among many, foreign policy, immigration, taxation, etc. Thereby, right-wing people are more militant than left-wing people (Martini 2012<sup>10</sup>) and more negatively disposed towards immigrants (Hix and Noury 2007, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), although Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014: 244) highlight the need for more thorough studies on the latter.

Todosijević (2004: 426) confirmed in the Hungarian case that although there exist differences in the strength of the relationship between LRI and political preferences at the elite and mass level, and though among the elite the explanatory power of ideological identification is higher, LRI clearly predicts preferences on political issues among the entire population.

In addition to a clear link between LRI and political preferences there is an alternative way to evaluate whether citizens' ideological preferences have any impact on policy – congruence between positions held by publics and government. Jou (2010: 164) confirmed that generally, with few exceptions (Spain and Czech Republic in this case), government positions weakly reflect people's positions, but the impact is less robust in post-communist countries compared to Western Europe.<sup>11</sup>

The effect of LRI that will be empirically examined in this dissertation is support for democratic principles and the democratic system as these reflect the acceptance of the new system and the existence of democratic political capital, which are critical to new democracies to survive. LRI is associated with several attitudes, such as support for democratic principles, satisfaction with democracy and satisfaction with life. The claims presented here overlap at least partially with those presented in the previous section on determinants.

First, democracy as a principle is universally approved and supported in established democracies, but in new democracies support for democracy is not so prevalent (Ehin 2007, for instance) and especially in the early years after transition in post-communist countries (above all leftist) people are less attached to the principles of democracy (Kivistik 2007: 61). The relationship between LRI and support for democracy occurs in most other new democracies (Moreno 1999, Shin and Jhee 2005), although only in case of Arab countries is its nature similar to that found in post-communist countries (Dalton 2006).

Both satisfaction with democracy and satisfaction with life reflect people's general satisfaction. In mature democracies satisfaction and ideological identification should be linked as follows – leftist people are more satisfied with life and the political system when leftist parties are governing, and the opposite is true when rightist parties form a government. However, empirical findings confirm the rather weak tendency of rightist people being more satisfied with democracy (Anderson and Singer 2008, Lühiste 2014). Anderson and Singer (2008: 583) believe that the reason why rightist people tend to be more satisfied

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<sup>10</sup> He tested an impact of ideology in US and used liberal-conservative dimension.

<sup>11</sup> Congruence between parties' ideology and government policy is also well studied (see Imbeau et al 2001 for overview), however post-communist countries show contradictory results again (Tavits and Letki 2009).

with democracy could be a result of leftist citizens being less likely to accept authority and the status quo than rightist ones.

In new democracies, a stronger association between LRI and satisfaction has been found. In post-communist societies, leftist people are the dissatisfied ones and rightist the satisfied ones, and several authors have suggested that satisfaction in those societies is not related to government ideology and policy but to the individual experience of winning or losing with democratic transition (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010). When European countries from both camps are included into the analysis, a weak link between rightist views and satisfaction with democracy manifests (Lühiste 2014: 794).

Curini et al. (2014: 144) challenge previous research in finding a curvilinear relationship between LRI and life satisfaction – those who locate themselves as extreme leftist or rightist are more satisfied than centrists. They also discover that centrists are more satisfied with life the closer they are to their government in ideological manner, but citizens with more extreme views are rather more dissatisfied the closer they are to their government. It means that when most people prefer convergence between the views of government and their own, extremists might prefer a feeling of isolated ideological purity.

In this dissertation, I rely on earlier findings from new democracies and expect, as previously pointed out, that association between LRI and support for democracy is noticeable after the collapse of the authoritarian regime but loses its importance over time.

## **Scope and Contribution of the Dissertation**

The objective of the dissertation is to examine both country and individual level determinants of LRI and the effect of LRI in countries with different political trajectories in order to evaluate the relevance and content of LRI. This dissertation is composed of five empirical research articles which try to fill the gaps and extend the research in two ways – in encompassing a larger variety of countries into one study by doing longitudinal comparative studies and in broadening a circle of factors by focusing on country level variables.

Studies on LRI have so far focused more on individual level variables – be it social demographics, values or party identification – and covered one or few rather similar countries in a study. There are, of course, exceptions, like Dalton (2006) and Jou (2010), who have studied a larger variety of countries, but they have been confined to a comparison of country correlations. This is largely a result of lack of data – there exist no comparable survey data about longer periods and a variety of countries which include enough relevant variables for studying LRI. However, it at least partially also reflects the state of the art of political science research, where new analytical and statistical methods like multilevel regression analysis have rather recently been introduced and therefore the corresponding research is only starting to become more popular in recent years (Zechmeister and Corral 2013, for instance). The reason for more

combined research may also be inspired from the introducing of more interdisciplinary studies and the engaging of factors from different research fields.

To increase the variety of countries in an analysis, my research approaches LRI in two different ways. Some of the dissertation's articles include many (new) democracies the world over and sacrifice an in-depth analysis for a general comparison when using worldwide surveys. In other articles, instead of including only countries from the same region, a few countries from very different contexts are compared by exploiting the data of the origins of various surveys. Thus it is possible to consider context and country factors and much better understand the possible reasons for differences.

This dissertation covers several other country level factors and individual level factors as well, but the main focus and contribution is the examination of the effects of a country's democratic experience and the authoritarian background on LRI. Studying the development of LRI in new democracies is one of the best ways to study the relevance (whether LRI makes sense everywhere), and content of LRI (whether there exists clear meaning of it), and for evaluating which theory best describes LRI. For this, in the study of different new democracies it is necessary to cover as long a period of time as possible. There may be several criteria or relevant characteristics of new democracies that may affect the development of LRI, but the main criterion for this research – having an authoritarian background – was chosen based on the results of the last two decades of research. This emphasises post-communist countries' deviation in LRI (Kitschelt 1995, Rockey 2009, Jost et al 2009, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010, Jou 2010a), which has cast some doubt on the universality and usefulness of the labels of "Left" and "Right". For comparison, this dissertation also includes long consolidated Western democracies.

The contribution of my dissertation's publications is three-fold:

1. First, the publications that constitute this dissertation study LRI in countries with very different political and cultural background and evaluate how the use and content of LRI varies across countries. In doing so, the dissertation evaluates the **relevance of the concept** and seeks to identify a **common core in value content of LRI**, and it also contributes to theoretical understanding of LRI by assessing the appropriateness of four proposed theories in explaining LRI.
2. Second, the publications examine how an abstract concept like LRI is learned by people and **how the content and meaning of it has developed over the years**, and contribute thus to the understanding of more general process of political socialisation and concept-construction.
3. Third, the publications introduce and examine the **effects of country-level variables**, which have to date been understudied and therefore improve our empirical understanding of how contextual factors affect LRI.

In studying the relevance and the content of LRI this dissertation tries to evaluate among other things which theory – irrelevance, transformation, persistence or pluralisation – best applies to LRI. Relevance is operationalised in



two ways – as LR recognition through ability to locate oneself on the LR scale and as LR value anchoring through strength of values anchored to LRI. The content of LRI is operationalised through a nature of relationship between values and LRI. The publications about the relevance of LRI which are part of this dissertation can confirm or reject the irrelevance theory and studies about value content of LRI can give some evidence for supporting one of those three remaining theories about the nature of LR identification. Besides, one study treats LRI as an independent variable by studying its effect on support for democracy/democratic values; by doing so it can indirectly also confirm the relevance of the concept.

The dissertation consists of five publications (see Table 1), four of which treat LRI as dependent variable and one as independent variable, which address the following research questions:

1. The first study explores *the relevance of LRI* by studying which individual and macro level variables explain LR cognition and the cognition of party LR positioning on five continents.
2. The second study explores *the relevance and content of LRI* and studies which values and macro level variables explain LRI on four continents.
3. The third study explores *the effect of LRI* and studies how LRI explains support for democracy in new democracies.
4. The fourth study explores *the relevance of LRI* and studies whether LR anchoring on values at the mass level is more dependent on LR party system polarisation, clear LR government alternatives and important cross-cutting cleavages or authoritarian legacies in new democracies.
5. The fifth study explores *the content of LRI* and studies which values are related to LRI and how it is affected by the ideology of the former authoritarian regime and democratic longevity in new democracies.

**Table 1.** Topics, dependent variables and main expectations of the publications

	I	II	III	IV	V
Topic	Relevance of LRI	Relevance and content of LRI	Effect of LRI	Relevance and content of LRI	Content of LRI
Dependent variable	(1) Ability to place oneself on LR scale,  (2) Ability to place parties on LR scale	LR self-placement	(1) Support for democratic principles,  (2) support for democratic regime/system,  (3) trust in institutions	Relationship between LR self-placement and values	LR self-placement
Independent macro variables	Democratic longevity social development party size (2 biggest)	Democratic longevity clarity of party alternatives West vs other societies	Authoritarian past	Authoritarian past LR governmental alternation party polarisation	Authoritarian past democratic longevity
Main expectations	(a) Sophisticated (educated, politically-interested, informed, older, with party identification) people better recognise the terms LR  (b) People in socially and democratically-developed countries and in more polarised party systems better recognise the terms LR	(a) Support for the law and order, traditional moral values, greater individual initiative in the economy, privatisation, reduced taxes and materialist values is positively related to the Right  (b) Democratic development and greater clarity of party alternatives is positively related to the greater value anchoring of LR (c) Non-Western value conflicts reveal more in countries outside West (Asia, Africa, Latin America)	(a) In countries with different authoritarian background the direction of relationship between support for democracy and LRI is reverse  (b) Ideological polarisation is strengthening impact of LRI on support for democracy  (c) Support for democracy is higher among younger, educated, with higher income people, urban residents and ethnic majority representatives  (d) Differences in support for democracy disappear over time	LR anchoring in values is greater in more polarised LR party systems and in greater LR government alternatives	(a) Impact of economic values on LRI strengthens over time  (b) Influence of social and post-materialist values on LRI is reverse in post-communist societies but that will change over time  (c) Democratic values have an influence on LRI after democratic transition but it disappears over time

The aim of the first publication is to examine how individual level sophistication factors and country level factors, which should increase people's understanding of political and abstract world, affect people's recognition of LRI. The study encompasses a rather limited number of countries but the sample contains great variability in terms of democratic and social background, from the US to Mozambique. The study explores the first exposure to LRI – whether people locate themselves on the LR scale when asked, and thus reflects the relevance of LRI. Though people may locate themselves on the scale without having clear opinions on ideological terms and locating might be a result of socially-desired behaviour, for example, empirical evidence confirms that recognition levels of LRI are generally higher in advanced democracies<sup>12</sup>.

Therefore, an ability to locate oneself on the LR scale can be treated as a measure for the relevance of LRI. If the expectations of the study are met (more sophisticated people in more developed societies locate themselves on the LR scale), we have a reason to expect that over time in more democratically developed societies and among more sophisticated citizens the concept of LR is more, rather than less, recognised and thus relevance of it should rather increase.

The relevance of LR identification is also studied in other publications (II, IV), where it is operationalised as value anchoring in LRI. Here again, the focus is on macro level factors – how authoritarian background and democratic transition explain the strength of relationship between values and LRI. These studies enable us to examine whether the relevance of LRI is more affected by the legacy of the past, by politicisation of the issues or by democratic development as such. Furthermore, the aim is to demonstrate that LRI can be relevant among countries with a different level of democratic experience and with different cultures, and that the relevance of LRI should not be questioned only because LRI does not carry similar conflict or content everywhere, but rather its value lies in describing the most important political/value conflicts in societies.

The content of LRI is examined the most in-depth in two publications (II, V) and in less detail in one more (IV). These studies focus on the value content of LRI and address three aspects of it. First, they examine how values that are associated with LRI in Western consolidated democracies, i.e. “Western template” values, are manifested around the world (II) and especially in new democracies (V). Second, they explore which values besides “Western template” emerge outside of Western countries and among new democracies. Third, they explain how country level factors, like democratic development, authoritarian background (V), and clarity of LR party alternatives (II, IV) influence the value content of LRI. In studying the content of LRI, we can evaluate which of three theories describes value content the best – whether the value content of LRI is persistent, transforming or diversifying. Better comprehension of the content of the concept enables us to take advantage of the simplifying and predictive power of LRI as pointed out by Savage (2012).

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<sup>12</sup> Here the most deviating cases are East Asian societies, which demonstrate higher levels of LR recognition than any other society.

One publication (III) does not address the relevance and content of LRI directly but studies the effect of LRI on support for democracy and addresses the relevance of LRI, as an important factor in explaining regime support, indirectly. The importance of the last phenomenon – sufficient level of democratic support for establishing the new regime – is highlighted especially in case of new democracies, where the popular support is generally lower compared to developed democracies (Lühiste 2008, Mishler and Rose 1996). The publication explores the effect of authoritarian legacy on the impact of citizens' LRI on regime support by comparing three countries with a communist legacy and three countries with right-wing authoritarian legacy over a 20–30 year period.

## **Data and Methods**

First, the most important methods used by political scientists to measure LRI are shortly introduced and thereafter the methods and data used in this dissertation are introduced.

There are different ways in political science research to measure Left and Right. To measure the placement of parties on the LR scale, three main methods are used. First, expert surveys on party positions (the first study using those surveys was undertaken by Castles and Mair 1984, also Benoit and Laver 2007, Wiesehomeier 2010, just to mention a few), which let national experts to assess the parties' locations on the Left-Right scale, are common. Second, coding party election manifesto content for categories, distinguishing these characteristics by Left and Right (used by Laver and Budge 1992, Budge 1994, Klingemann et al 1994, Jahn 2010, for example) can be undertaken. In the frame of this method the most popular and leading approach is the Party Manifesto Group coding scheme, which contains a considerable number of party manifestos over time and across countries. And third, the surveys, such as the European Social Survey, where people are requested to evaluate the parties' locations on the LR scale, are also used to make judgements about parties' ideological identification (used by Le Gall and Berton 2013, for instance).

Several methods are used to measure the LRI of the population as well. First is the most popular method, which is also used in this dissertation, is measuring LRI by survey question asking people to place themselves on the LR scale, usually on a 10-point or 11-point scale. This question is included in most surveys carried out in the world – e.g. World Values Survey, European Value Study, European Social Survey, European Election Study, Barometer studies, national electoral surveys, etc. Second, the most frequently used method to study citizens' ideological identification is use of open-ended questions where people are requested to define the labels “Left” and “Right” (used by Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). There are also some less common methods for studying the content of Left and Right. One of them is the q-method, which is used by Elizabeth Zechmeister (2006), for instance. All of those methods have also been used to measure elites' ideological positions, and the results show that

compared to the masses, the elites' understanding of the terms of Left and Right is more profound (Freire and Belchior 2013).

All five empirical publications constituting this dissertation combine individual level survey data with country level data. The data and methods are presented in Table 2 below. The surveys in use are the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) from 1992–2007 (I, II), the World Values Survey/European Value Study from (WVS/EVS) 1990–2014 (III, IV, V), and “The Political culture of Southern Europe – A Four Nation study” (1985) (III, IV). To measure country level variables, data from Polity IV (I, II), Freedom House index (V) (for age of democracy) and the Freedom House index of overall press freedom (for freedom of press) (I) are used. Other country level variables – party size, level of education in a country (I), clarity of party alternatives (II) and party polarisation (IV) – are composed from survey data.

The first two publications (I, II) include both new and consolidated democracies from all over the world – Africa, America, Asia and Europe. The remaining three publications (III, IV, V) include only new democracies: the first two (III, IV) include six countries from South and East Europe – Greece, Portugal, Spain, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania – and the third one (V) includes a larger variety of countries from around the world – South and East Europe, East Asia and Latin America.

All five empirical studies use regression analysis, but there are also important differences among them, especially at the macro level of the analysis. Most of the studies, except the first, which uses logistic regression analysis, use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. Four studies (I–IV) report country-specific regression results, while the fifth study (V) includes all countries in the same analysis. In addition, the first two studies (I–II) apply two-step hierarchical regression employing regression coefficients from the first (individual level) step as dependent variables in the second (macro level) step. The third study (III) compares the OLS regression results of six countries, taking into account their different context and background.

In the fourth study (IV), principal component analysis (PCA) is applied to create value factors that will afterwards be related to LR identification. The level of value anchoring of the LR identification in each country, measured as explanation power ( $R^2$ ), is treated as a dependent variable at the second level of the analysis, where the influence of authoritarian legacy, party system polarisation and governmental alternation on LR value anchoring will be analysed.

The fifth study (V) uses OLS regression analysis for every 5-year period, distinguishing countries by their authoritarian background and multilevel OLS regression analysis with three-way interactions with macro level variables to control the robustness of the results.

**Table 2.** Data and methods of publications

	I	II	III	IV	V
<b>Data</b>	Comparative National Elections Project I–III (years) 14 countries from five continents	Comparative National Elections Project I–III 13/ 6 countries from four continents	World Values Survey/European Value Study 1990–2008, “The Political Culture of Southern Europe – A Four Nation Study” (1985), 6 countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania)	World Values Survey/European Value Study 1990–2008, “The Political Culture of Southern Europe – A Four Nation Study” (1985), 6 countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania)	World Values Survey/European Value Study 1990–2014 approx. 30 countries
<b>Method</b>	Two-step hierarchical regression, logistic regression for each country at the individual level. Regression coefficients from the first step are considered as dependent variables in the second step.	Two-step hierarchical regression, OLS regression for each country at the individual level. Regression coefficients from the first step are considered as dependent variables in the second step.	Multivariate OLS regressions for each country at the individual level.	Multivariate OLS regressions for each country at the individual level and at the macro level. Principal component analysis (PCA) for creating value factors.	OLS regression analysis at the individual level and multilevel regression analysis with three-way interactions with individual and macro level variables included.

## Main Findings

First, I will give a brief overview of the main findings of each article separately and then I will present the major findings on the *relevance, content and effect of LRI*.

The main findings from the study “*Mapping and Explaining the Use of the Left-Right Divide*” (I) confirm that LR recognition (for people and for parties) is more socially and politically determined at the individual level in long consolidated democracies and in countries with more freedom of press. There are reasons to expect some convergence between countries when younger democratic regimes (from non-Western parts of the world) will be more consolidated, when there will be more freedom of the press, and when the level of social development will be higher.

The main findings from the study “*Western and non-Western meanings of the Left-Right divide across four continents*” (II) confirm that in addition to lower level of LR anchoring on the Western template of values, outside Western Europe and North America (excluding Argentina, Uruguay and Portugal), ‘western values’ also have an opposite impact compared to that which they have in the West. The analysis also confirms that democratic experience (as age of the democratic regime) is more important than party polarisation in affecting the value anchoring.

The main findings from the study “*Authoritarian legacies and mass left-right regime support in new democracies: the BS and SE compared*” (III) show that the relationships between LR self-positioning and regime evaluations are important after democratic transition. Rightist people in the Baltic States share more negative evaluations of the previous regimes and more support for the democratic regime, and the reverse applies to South European countries. In addition, the associations remain significant – although they are weakening – for the evaluation of authoritarian regimes, but almost completely disappear in terms of diffuse democratic support during the democratic period.

The main findings from the study “*Regime transition, value conflicts and the left-right divide at the mass level: The BS and SE compared*” (IV) suggest that the importance of right-wing voter alignments and political parties in the Baltic States, especially in Estonia and Latvia, and the notable importance of left-wing voter alignments and political parties in Southern Europe can be treated as legacies of different authoritarian pasts. The analysis also confirms that although the type of authoritarian legacy was important in affecting LR anchoring, the type of democratic transition, and especially the political alliances and party-politicisation of the issues during the regime’s formative years, were even more important.

The main findings from the study “*Influence of Authoritarian Background on Value Content of the Left-Right Identification in New Democracies, 1994–2014*” (V) confirm that the value content of LRI is developing and changing in new democracies. While initially, attitudes towards democracy shape LRI, support for democracy becomes detached from ideological orientation after a

few decades from transition. Economic values constitute ideological identification, with a few exceptions, in a similar manner in new and old democracies, and the conflicting effect of social liberal and post-materialist values on LRI among societies with different authoritarian background disappears over time.

**The relevance of LRI** was studied in several publications. The first study confirmed that individual level sophistication factors have an impact on LR recognition everywhere, except that the impact of sophistication factors is greater in more democratically and socially developed countries. The latter result could refer to more reflective LR positioning in those countries and to more “false centrists” in democratically and socially less developed countries. In countries with more press freedom, education has a stronger impact on LR recognition and in more educated societies the person’s age has a stronger influence on LR recognition. Macro level factors, like age of democratic regime and freedom of press, also enhance the overall level of LR recognition in a country.

The findings from the other studies about relevance of LR identification (II, IV) are two-fold. In comparing the Baltic States with Southern European countries, the results confirm that authoritarian legacy affects positioning on LR dimension – right-wing identification is predominant in the Baltic States, and the opposite is notable in Southern Europe. However, value anchoring in LRI is more affected by the nature of the democratic transition – in countries with more polarised party systems and with bigger clarity of LR, government alternatives values are more clearly associated with LRI. The study encompassing countries over the world confirms that both issue politicisation and age of the democracy have a clear positive effect on value anchoring in LRI, but the impact of the latter is even greater. The current results refer to a trend that relevance of LRI in terms of being closely associated with values increases with democratic development and therefore also in present new democracies the relevance of LRI is expected to grow in the future.

The studies about **the value content of LRI** reflect a large variability across countries. Although “Western” values are associated with LRI in most of the countries, the association is stronger and clearer in Western consolidated democracies. In new democracies, especially with a communist legacy and those farther from Western influence, the direction of the association in some cases even contrasts with the conventional Western one. Some examples of such deviations include: in former communist Baltic States, post-materialist values constructed a value factor with socio-economic Right values in the first decade of democracy in 1996–99 (IV); people supporting equal distribution in wealth incline to the Right in several countries – Uruguay, Argentina, South Africa; and those who support public enterprises incline to the Right in countries like Chile, Hungary and Mozambique (II). It is also worth mentioning that association between LRI and economic values is more stable and varies less across societies than the association between LRI and social values. The less stable association between the latter can at least partially arise from using different survey questions and from the trend that social values which are



acceptable (or where conflict may appear) can strongly depend on societies' other developmental aspects, such as the level of education.

Besides contrasting associations, LRI has some untraditional value content in less developed democracies. For instance, LRI is clearly related to support for democracy in most new democracies after a democratic transition (V). Another study (II) shows that we can find values, like openness to foreign influence (although this has an effect also in the US) in Argentina, accepting conflicts in South Africa, and supporting secular law and communitarianism in Mozambique related to rightist ideological positions. This means that in less developed democracies there are wider circle of values, which may constitute an important value content of LRI.

An inclusion of country level factors has proven to be valuable. First, an effect of authoritarian background on value content of LRI is confirmed in two studies (IV, V). Findings confirm that authoritarian background, or to be more precise, the ideology of the former authoritarian regime, does not influence so much the strength of association between values and LRI as a direction of the same. In particular, in former communist countries socially tolerant and post-materialist people incline to the Right after democratic transition in contrary to their counterparts in former right-authoritarian or long consolidated democracies. The same contrast is evident in support for democracy. However, when we include age of democracy in an analysis, we see that after about twenty years of democracy these differences mostly vanish, and economic and social values are related to LRI in such way that economic liberalism and social conservatism go hand in hand with the Right (IV, V). In more developed societies post-materialist values complement economic and social ones in diversifying the value content (V). In general, the age of the democracy helps along "Western" – economic and social – values anchoring in LRI. Thus, generally, we could conclude that there is persistent value content of LRI which is economic and a bit lesser degree social in nature, but the content can be diversified by some less central values, such as post-materialist ones. At the same time, it is worth underlining that although democratic development tends to go hand in hand with economic development and social development and lead to similar understanding of LRI, these processes may unfold at different speeds and we cannot expect similar value content of LRI in every society.

Incorporating party-level factors, such as LR governmental alternation and party polarisation (IV) or the clarity of party alternatives (II), has proven to be valuable as well. The findings confirm that the level of polarization and the clarity of party alternatives have a significant impact on LRI, because values and issues are more clearly related to LRI when a party system is polarised and the government can be composed of either leftist or rightist parties. Some (see e.g. Dalton 2006) have argued that democratic development favours less extreme parties and ideological positions, which means that parties converge in the middle of the LR scale. This tendency taken together with the finding that polarisation affects value anchoring in LRI predicts the decreasing relevance of LRI, which goes against my earlier expectation regarding a continuous

democratisation process. It would, then, be interesting to see whether LRI has lost its relevance in a decade or two from now.

The publication about the **effect of LRI** (III) shows that in cases of evaluation of authoritarian regimes and of democratic diffuse support, authoritarian legacy has a significant impact. In the Baltic States, support for democracy and criticism of the authoritarian regime come more from the Right, and in Southern Europe, more from the Left. However, after a 20–30 year period the relationship almost disappears in support for democracy, but remains slightly significant, but still really weak, in evaluation of the authoritarian regime. The study proves that LRI is an important factor in explaining support for democratic regime at the beginning of democratic period. The results for the six analysed countries tend to confirm also the tendency that in more ideologically polarized countries the association between LRI and support for democracy is stronger.

The empirical studies of this dissertation confirm that concept of LR is develops and changes in several ways in new democracies, and the end result is LRI being more relevant and understanding of it being more similar across different societies. Hence, they confirm that there is a vivid process of socialisation and concept-construction in play, but unfortunately they do not enable a deeper explanation of why and how this process occurs – is it the result of lifelong learning or replacing cohorts, which is the role of institutions, including parties, etc? Therefore, concerning political socialisation and the development of the concept, the present results provide a solid starting point by raising many questions for future research to address.

## Conclusions

The objective of the dissertation was to examine the country and individual level determinants of LRI and the effect of LRI in countries with different political trajectories in order to evaluate the relevance and content of LRI. To study the relevance and value content of LRI, this dissertation used four theories – irrelevance, transformation, persistence or pluralisation – as a tool, assessing which of them best applies to LRI. In addition, I extended the research in two ways – in broadening the circle of factors by focusing on country level variables and in encompassing a larger variety of countries in one study.

The concept of LRI is relevant because people in most countries are able to locate themselves on the LR scale; and even populations in new democracies, who are less familiar with the concept, associate this concept with certain values. LR should be considered relevant even though one's ability to place oneself on the LR scale, as well as the value content of LR, vary notably across populations and countries. The varying value content of LR (which values and how they are related to LR) depends on the level of democracy as well as on other cultural macro level and individual level factors. The current research shows that although there might be some additional value content/meaning attri-

buted to LRI as a result of passing through different phases in the development of a democratic society, there also exists a common core. In a country's path from authoritarian regime to democracy, support for democracy/democratic values will be added to the content of LRI; and with economic and social progress post-materialist values will be added to the content of LRI. However, we can highlight here two main conflicting dimensions determining the content of LRI in most countries, most of the time – support for economic equality *versus* accepting economic inequality (as economic Left and Right) and support for change *versus* support for tradition or the old system (as social Left and Right). Deviations from the general Western template, especially in post-communist countries, should not make us question the overall value of Left and Right as an ideological orientation tool: in new democracies, especially in those with a different path from Western societies, it takes some time to adopt this common understanding.

The findings from the five empirical studies of this dissertation certainly provide different opportunities for implications, but overall, persistence and pluralisation theories are more plausible, and in the long run the first is preferable. The value content of LRI can be considered persistent even despite the temporary diversifying value content of LRI which accompanies in the course of development of a new democratic society. We should understand, and it is worth emphasising, that LRI as concept is valid primarily in liberal democratic systems with free political competition, and, therefore, in undemocratic societies and in new democracies LRI does not strictly follow the logic of older consolidated democracies, as the circumstances – historical background and social structure – are different. People in less democratic societies need some time to adjust to the concept in the context of liberal democracy and that is especially true for former communist countries, which have taken a different political route. For example, if we would like to apply the concept – where Left supports changes for greater equality and Right supports maintaining natural inequality – in the context where inequality has been removed in communist society, for instance, then it seems obvious that LRI is not useful. However, the findings of this dissertation give us at least good reason to believe that in terms of LRI, its recognition and value content in new democracies, post-communist ones included, will be similar to consolidated democracies after a few decades of democratic transition.

In order to evaluate adequately the contribution of dissertation, it is important to keep in mind that it suffers from some deficiencies. First, data availability sets some limitations on the geographical and temporal scope and on available factors; therefore, one or two out of those three has to be sacrificed in order to arrive at a better analysis in one aspect. In all cases, the range of countries is limited to those that are available in datasets. In some cases (V) more than others, the explanatory power of the model is small as the number of factors included in the analysis is limited in order to increase the range of countries and survey years. Furthermore, in other cases (III, IV), the number of countries is limited in order to permit a deeper analysis and hence these studies suffer from their

inability to allow generalisations. Moreover, for more definitive conclusions about new democracies, especially about post-communist ones, a decade or more from now will likely give us more information about the final result of the political socialisation. And finally, we have to keep in mind that not all new democracies will follow the same path and end up as consolidated democratic societies; they may be stuck in transition for a long period or revert to dictatorship, and even in long-term democracies the quality of democracy can vary considerably.

Although the current and prior research has provided us with some knowledge about LRI, its determinants, content and effects, the concept is too broad, varies over time and across countries and is affected by far too many factors – on individual, institutional and country level – to be well predicted, at least for the present moment. The combining of individual and macro level variables, as well as factors from different research fields, has already received some attention and application, but there is enough room for further exploration. In order to arrive possibly at a complete understanding of how LRI as an abstract concept is constructed and is changing, future research should concentrate on more in-depth analysis, tracing the development of LRI, perhaps first limited to a single society. Further studies should include individual demographics, values and attitudes, the country's past, political system and culture, party system, action of parties and media, important events, as well as factors from psychology and other disciplines.

In addition, this dissertation clearly attempts to respond to the need for more longitudinal studies to assess the speed and scope of ideological change emphasised by Geser (2008: 35), for example, but does not touch some areas, like comparison of age cohorts. Cohort analysis in studies of LRI has been applied by a few authors (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2016, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010), but they have been limited to determining an effect on a position on the LR dimension and have not gone as far as examining generational effects on the value content of LRI.

Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2010) have studied in depth the effect of communist legacies and compared the effect of cohorts on LR self-positioning in post-communist countries. Although they are interested in the effects on positioning of the LR dimension and not on the value content of LRI, their results suggest that experience with communist rule is not as determining to LR self-positioning as is individual experience after transition – during the transition more successful people tend to locate themselves to the Right. The fact that early socialisation might not be so important in the formation of political values and attitudes is also detected in studies of the support for democracy (Mishler and Rose 2002). There is no reason to expect the exact same effect to be applied to the value content of LRI, but the generational effect is worthy of further study as this would enable us to evaluate whether a convergence of value content of LR with the Western template is a result of the replacing of older generations with newer ones, thus confirming the impressionable years or attitude

persistence approach, or whether it is a result of all citizens adapting the new concept through lifelong learning.

As a conclusion, although the terms Left and Right have been heavily criticised – scholars and politicians talk about those terms as no longer being useful – they are still the most widely-used concepts. Despite promotion of two rival tendencies for why the concept no longer matters – namely because everybody has moved into the centre or because everybody has moved to the far-Right – LRI research, this study included, shows that Left and Right are generally similarly understood and the relevance of LR can even increase when new democracies reach maturity. The concepts of Left and Right are not without utility; we simply have to remember that their use is somewhat context-specific.

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## SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN

### **Vasak- ja parempoolse enesemääratluse olulisus, tähendus ning mõju erineva režiimitrajektooriga riikides**

Vasak- ja parempoolsus on üleilmselt kasutatav mõistepaar poliitikate, parteide, ideoloogiate ja inimeste vaadete kirjeldamiseks. Vasak- ja parempoolsus on mõisteline tööriist, mis lihtsustab valijatel otsuste tegemist, aga annab võimaluse ka nii teadlastel, parteidel kui ka lihtsalt poliitikast huvitatutel poliitika-maastikul toimuvat mõtestada. Samas seatakse selle nende mõistete kasulikkus vaatamata nende populaarsusele tihti kahtluse alla, kaheldakse, kas neil mõistetel on selge ja üldmõistetav sisu või on tegemist tühjade siltidega, mida võib ükskõik milliste vaadete külge kleepida.

Kahtluseks on põhjust andnud mitmed paralleelsed nähtused. Esile on tõusnud paremäärmuslikud parteid, kelle kogu ideoloogiat ei anna tingimata allutada vasak-parem skaalale, ning ka üldisemalt võidutseb poliitilises retoorikas populism. Lisaks on kodanike identiteet mitmekesisistunud: inimeste staatus sõltub enamast kui päritolust või varast ja seetõttu võib vastandumise dimensioone olla rohkem kui üks. Viimaks, kommunismi kokku kukkumise järgsed noored demokraatlikud riigid, kus asetleidvad protsessid ei korda tingimata arenenud demokraatiates nähtut, on pannud teadlasi kahtlema paljude protsesside ja nähtuste universaalsuses, seejuures vasak-ja parempoolsuse vastanduse kasutatavuses. Aluse selleks on andnud leiud, et Ida-Euroopas on levinud arusaamad, kus liberaalseid vaateid ja reforme toetavad elanikud on parempoolsed, mitte vasakpoolsed. See ei sobi kokku klassikalise Lääne-Euroopa lähenemisega, kus sotsiaalne liberaalsus käib koos majandusliku vasakpoolsuse ehk suurema majandusliku võrdsuse toetamisega. Just Ida-Euroopa elanikele omased kõrvalekalded vasak-ja parempoolsuse tõlgendamisel on tõukeks selle doktoritöö kirjutamisele.

Väitekirjalt lähtub eeldusest, et vasak- ja parempoolsuse tähendus ja sisu on konstrueeritud ning see varieerub riigiti ja ka indiviiditi, ja proovib leida vastuse küsimusele, mis on täheldatud erinevuste põhjuseks ning kas vaatamata tähenduse varieerumisele võime rääkida siiski nende mõistete ühest universaalsest sisust. Doktoritöös vaadeldakse eelkõige noori demokraatiad, mille puhul küsitlusandmed võimaldavad analüüsida vasak- ja parempoolsuse kujunemist demokraatliku perioodi algusest peale. Kuna töö on inspireeritud post-kommunistlike Ida-Euroopa riikide eripäradest, siis on võrdluseks kaasatud ka neist erineva, endise paremautoritaarse režiimiga noored demokraatiad. Kahe grupi ajas võrdlemine võimaldab hinnata, kuidas sõltub vasak- ja parempoolsuse tähendus varasemast autoritaarsest taustast ning edasisest demokraatlikust kogemusest.

Töö peamine oletus on järgmine: vahetult pärast demokraatliku valitsemise algust alustatakse ühiskonnas poliitilise maastiku kujundamisega, sealhulgas vasak- ja parempoolsuse mõiste konstrueerimisega, kus selle mõiste sisu sõltub konkreetse ühiskonna taustast ja seal esinevatest olulisematest probleemidest. Seejuures omistavad endistes paremautoritaarse režiimiga demokraatiates inimesed vasakpoolsusele selliseid väärtusi nagu uuenduslikkus, liberaalsus,

vabadus ning avatus; endistes vasak-autoritaarse režiimiga demokraatiates seotatakse samu väärtusi aga kommunismile vastandudes parempoolsusega. Demokraatliku kogemuse kasvades ja poliitilise sotsialiseerumise tulemusena esialgsed erinevused aga kaovad.

Väitekirja koosneb neljast avaldatud teadusartiklist ja ühest veel avaldamata käsikirjast, mis põhinevad kõik indiviiditasandi andmete statistilisel analüüsil, kuhu on kaasatud lisaks indiviiditasandi teguritele ka riigitasandi tegureid. Kasutatud küsitlusandmed on pärit eelkõige kahest allikast: Võrdlev riiklike valimiste projekt (Comparative National Elections Project) ja Maailma väärtusuuring/Euroopa väärtusuuring (World Values Survey/European Value Study), kuid kahes artiklis on kasutatud ajalise dimensiooni laiendamiseks andmeid projektist "Lõuna-Euroopa Poliitiline kultuur: Nelja riigi uurimus" ("The political culture of Southern Europe – A Four Nation Study", 1985).

Neist kaks artiklit hõlmavad väga erineva arengutaseme ja kultuurilise taustaga riike üle maailma USAst Mosambiigini ning uurivad Võrdleva riiklike valimiste projekti andmetele toetudes elanike võimet ennast ja parteisid vasak-parem skaalal määratleda ning seda, millised väärtused seotakse vasak-parem vastandusega. Selgub, et Vasaku ja Parema eristamine kõnetab inimesi üle maailma. Kuigi võime ennast vasak-parem skaalale paigutada suureneb ühiskonna demokraatliku ja sotsiaalse arengu ning poliitilise võistluslikkuse tulemusena, suudavad ka juba vähearenenud riikide elanikud ennast sellele skaalale paigutada. Teiseks leiab kinnitust, et vasak- ja parempoolsusega seotavad väärtused ja hoiakud erinevad riigiti olulisel määral. Nii näiteks omistatakse Läänest väljaspool vähemarenenud ühiskondades vasak- ja parempoolsuse mõistetele hoiakuid, nagu konflikti aktsepteerimine, mitmekultuurilisuse pooldamine või riigi eestkoste toetamine.

Kaks järgmist artiklit keskenduvad kahest erinevast autoritaarse taustaga regionist, Ida-Euroopast ja Lõuna-Euroopast pärit riikide võrdlemisele. Uurimuses kasutatakse peamiselt Maailma väärtusuuringu/Euroopa väärtusuuringu andmeid, kuid paremaks ajaliseks võrdluseks ka Lõuna-Euroopa poliitilise kultuuri uurimuse andmeid. Ühes neist vaadeldakse seda, kuidas mõjutab vasak- ja parempoolse enesemääratluse väärtussisu riikide varasem autoritaarne taust ja demokraatliku poliitilise võitluse polariseeritus. Tulemused kinnitavad, et endistes vasakautoritaarsetes riikides kalduvad inimesed pigem paremale ning endistes paremaautoritaarsetes riikides pigem vasakule ning see, kui tugevalt vasak- ja parempoolsust väärtustega seotakse, sõltub parteide polariseerumisest. Teises vaadeldakse, kuidas mõjutavad vasak- ja parempoolsed vaated suhtumist demokraatiasse ning endisesse autoritaarsesse riigikorda. Kõigis kuues riigis on vahetult pärast demokraatliku korra loomist vasak- ja parempoolsed vaated demokraatliku (ja endise autoritaarse) korra toetamisega seotud. Seejuures pooldavad Balti riikides ehk endistes vasak-autoritaarse režiimiga riikides parempoolsed demokraatiat ning on autoritaarse korra vastu, ning Lõuna-Euroopa parem-autoritaarse taustaga riikides esineb täpselt vastupidine suundumus. Pärast paarikümneaastast demokraatlikku perioodi puudub uuritud riikides vasak- ja

parempoolsetel vaadetel demokraatliku korra toetamisega igasugune seos, kuid väga nõrk seos autoritaarse korra toetamisega jääb.

Viimane, käsikirjaline uurimus toetub Maailma väärtusuuringu/Euroopa väärtusuuringu andmetele ning uurib, milliseid väärtusi seovad vasak- ja parempoolsusega inimesed erineva autoritaarse taustaga noortes demokraatlates ning kas demokraatliku kogemuse kasvades vasak- ja parempoolsuse väärtussisu muutub või mitte. See kinnitab, et leiab aset suundumus, et noortes demokraatlates vasak- ja parempoolne enesemääratlus areneb ja muutub. Pärast demokraatliku režiimi kehtestamist tähistavad mõisted Vasak ja Parema esialgu küllalt mitmekesisest väärtuste ringi. Autoritaarsest režiimist demokraatiasse üleminekul omistatakse vasak- ja parempoolsele vastandusele konflikt demokraatia pooldamise ja selle vastasuse vahel, kuid selle olulisus kaob pärast mõnekümneaastast demokraatlikku kogemust. Majandusliku ja sotsiaalse arenguga lisanduvad vasak- ja parempoolsele enesemääratlusele ka materiaalsete ja postmateriaalsete väärtuste telg. Endistes vasak-autoritaarsetes riikides esialgu ilmnev vastandlik seos sotsiaalse liberaalsuse ja parempoolsuse vahel aga kaob.

Väitekirja peamine järeldus on, et kuigi vasak- ja parempoolsuse tähendus võib varieeruda ja selle vastanduse võivad täita erinevad väärtused, on kõrvalekalded selle universaalsest tähendusest omased pigem noortele demokraatiatele, mistõttu võib väita, et vastuolulised arusaamad vasak- ja parempoolsusest on pigem ajutised ning üldiselt liigub vasak- ja parempoolsuse mõistete kasutamine suurema ühtsuse poole. Vasak- ja parempoolsuse universaalse olemuse võib kokku võtta Seymour Martin Lipseti jt (1954) sõnadega: “Vasaku all peame silmas suuremale võrdsusele – poliitilisele, majanduslikule, sotsiaalsele – suunatud ühiskondlike muutuste eest seismist; Parema all peame silmas traditsioonilise, enam või vähem hierarhilise ühiskonnakorra toetamist ja suuremale võrdsusele suunatud muutustele vastu seismist.” (p. 1135).



## **PUBLICATIONS**

## CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: Kats Kivistik  
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E-mail: kats.kivistik@ut.ee

### Education

2008 – ... University of Tartu, PhD Studies in Political Science  
2007 University of Tartu, MA in Political Science  
2003 University of Tartu, BA in Political Science

### Employment

2012 – ... analyst, Institute of Baltic Studies  
2010 – ... adjunct lecturer, Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu  
2007–2009 extraordinary assistant, Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu

### Teaching

#### *Courses taught:*

Public Opinion and Political Behaviour, spring 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, fall 2014, 2015  
Academic Writing and Speaking in Estonian, fall 2009–2016  
Qualitative Analysis, spring 2017  
Qualitative and Interpretive Methods in International Studies, spring 2017  
State and Society, spring 2016, 2017  
Electoral studies, spring 2009

#### *Courses assisted:*

Introduction to Political Philosophy, spring 2009, 2010  
Classics in Political Theory, spring 2012  
Introduction to Political Science, fall 2010, 2011, 2012  
Various lectures on political behaviour in Tbilisi State University in Georgia and in ISCTE in Portugal

### Publications

#### *Academic publications*

Freire, André, and Kats Kivistik. 2016. "Regime transition, value conflicts and the left-right divide at the mass level: The Baltic States and Southern Europe compared." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 49 (4): 293–311.  
Freire, André, and Kats Kivistik. 2015. "Authoritarian legacies and mass left-right regime support in new democracies: The Baltic States and Southern Europe compared." *Comparative European Politics*, 12 October.

- Freire, André, and Kats Kivistik. 2013. "Western and non-Western meaning of the left-right divide across four continents." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18(2): 171–199.
- Freire, André and Kats Kivistik 2013. "Mapping and Explaining the Use of the Left-Right Divide." *Brazilian Political Science Review* 7 (3): 61–89.
- Kivistik, Kats. 2016. "Eesti valijaskonna enese ja erakondade vasak- ja parempoolne määratlemine 2015. aastal." In *Riigikogu valimised 2015*, eds. Rein Toomla, Mihkel Solvak, and Alar Kilp. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Johan Skytte poliitikauuringute instituut, 64–86.

### ***Manuscript under review***

- Kivistik, Kats "Influence of Authoritarian Background on Value Content of Left-Right Identification in New Democracies, 1994–2014", submitted to *Journal of Comparative Politics* in July 2017.

### ***Non-academic publications***

- Kivistik, Kats 2017. "Keelteoskus, keelte kasutamine, kontaktid ja keeltega seotud hoiakud." In: *Eesti ühiskonna integratsiooni monitooring 2017*. Balti Uuringute Instituut, SA Poliitikauuringute Keskus Praxis.
- Kallas, Kristina, and Kats Kivistik 2005. "Kodakondsus ja poliitiline osalemine". In: *Eesti Ühiskonna Integratsiooni monitooring 2015*, eds. Raivo Vetik and Kristina Kallas. Balti Uuringute Instituut.
- Kristina Kallas, Kristjan Kaldur, Kats Kivistik et al. (composed by) 2014. *Uussisserändajate kohanemine Eestis: valikud ja poliitikaettepanekud tervikliku ja jätkusuutliku süsteemi kujundamiseks uuringuaruanne*. Tartu: Balti Uuringute Instituut/Riigikantselei.
- Kivistik, Kats (composed by) 2007. *Üliõpilaste sotsiaalsete garantiide kontseptsioon*, eds. Allan Päll and Maris Mälzer. Tartu: Guttenberg: Eesti Üliõpilaskondade Liit.

### **Conferences**

- 2013 7th ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, France
- 2013 Conference "Higher education – higher level learning", Tallinn, Estonia
- 2012 IPSA Word Congress of Political Science, Madrid, Spain
- 2012 Congress of Associação Portuguesa de Sociologia (APS), Porto, Portugal
- 2012 70th MPSA Annual Conference, Chicago, US
- 2010 3rd ECPR Graduate Conference, Dublin, Ireland
- 2006 AABS Conference, Washington, US
- 2006 BASEES Conference, Cambridge, UK

### **Further professional training**

- Political Psychology: Social Interaction in the Context of Attitudes and Ideologies. CEU Summer School in Political Psychology, Budapest, Hungary, 13–24 July 2015

Multilevel Regression Modelling. ECPR Winter School in methods and techniques, University of Vienna, Austria, 18–22 February 2013

Qualitative Comparative Analysis. ECPR Summer School in methods and techniques, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, July 29–August 13 2011

2nd Winter School on Methodological Issues in Comparative Electoral Analysis. Methods of Comparative Electoral Research Working Group, Warsaw, Poland, 7–10 February 2011

Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modelling. ECPR Summer School in methods and techniques, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, 2–14 August 2010

Multivariate Statistical Analysis and Comparative Cross-National Surveys Data. ECPR Summer School in methods and techniques, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, 30 July–15 August 2008

**Major research fields**

Public opinion, political behaviour, political psychology, political communication, political ideologies

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**Nimi:** Kats Kivistik  
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### Hariduskäik

2008 – ... Tartu Ülikool, Politoloogia doktoriõpe  
2007 Tartu Ülikool, Politoloogia MA  
2003 Tartu Ülikool, Politoloogia BA

### Töökogemus

2012–... analüütik, Balti Uuringute Instituut  
2010–... õppeülesande täitja, Skytte Instituut/Riigiteaduste Instituut,  
Tartu Ülikool  
2007–2009 erakorraline assistent, Riigiteaduste Instituut, Tartu Ülikool

### Õpetamine

#### **Loengukursused:**

Avalik arvamus ja poliitiline käitumine, kevad 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, sügis  
2014, 2015  
Eesti keele kirjalik ja suuline väljendusõpetus, sügis 2009–2016  
Kvalitatiivne analüüs, kevad 2017  
Qualitative and Interpretive Methods in International Studies, kevad 2017  
Riik ja ühiskond, kevad 2016, 2017  
Valimisuuringud, kevad 2009

#### **Assisteeritud loengukursused:**

Sissejuhatus poliitilisse filosoofiasse, kevad 2009, 2010  
Poliitilise teooria klassika, kevad 2012  
Sissejuhatus politoloogiasse, sügis 2010, 2011, 2012  
Loengud poliitilisest käitumisest Tbilisi State University's Gruusias ja ISCTE's  
Portugalis

### Publikatsioonid

#### **Akadeemilised publikatsioonid**

Freire, André, and Kats Kivistik. 2016. "Regime transition, value conflicts and the left-right divide at the mass level: The Baltic States and Southern Europe compared." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 49 (4): 293–311.  
Freire, André, and Kats Kivistik. 2015. "Authoritarian legacies and mass left-right regime support in new democracies: The Baltic States and Southern Europe compared." *Comparative European Politics*, 12 October.

- Freire, André, and Kats Kivistik. 2013. "Western and non-Western meaning of the left-right divide across four continents." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18 (2): 171–199.
- Freire, André and Kats Kivistik. 2013. "Mapping and Explaining the Use of the Left-Right Divide." *Brazilian Political Science Review* 7 (3): 61–89.
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### **Käsitlused**

- Kivistik, Kats. "Influence of Authoritarian Background on Value Content of Left-Right Identification in New Democracies 1994–2014", esitatud üle vaatamiseks ajakirja *Journal of Comparative Politics* juulis 2017.

### **Teised publikatsioonid**

- Kivistik, Kats. 2017. "Keelteoskus, keelte kasutamine, kontaktid ja keeltega seotud hoiakud." *Eesti ühiskonna integratsiooni monitooring 2017*. Balti Uuringute Instituut, SA Poliitikauuringute Keskus Praxis.
- Kallas, Kristina, ja Kats Kivistik. 2005. "Kodakondsus ja poliitiline osalemine". *Eesti Ühiskonna Integratsiooni monitooring 2015*, toim. Raivo Vetik and Kristina Kallas. Balti Uuringute Instituut.
- Kallas, Kristina, Kristjan Kaldur, Kats Kivistik jt. (koostajad) 2014. *Uussisse-rändajate kohanemine Eestis: valikud ja poliitikaettepanekud tervikliku ja jätkusuutliku süsteemi kujundamiseks uuringuaruanne*. Tartu: Balti Uuringute Instituut/Riigikantselei.
- Kivistik, Kats (koostaja). 2007. *Üliõpilaste sotsiaalsete garantiide kontseptsioon*, toim. Allan Päll ja Maris Mälzer. Tartu : Guttenberg: Eesti Üliõpilaskondade Liit.

### **Konverentsid**

- 2013 7th ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, Prantsusmaa
- 2013 Konverents "Higher education – higher level learning", Tallinn, Eesti
- 2012 IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, Hispaania
- 2012 Congress of Associação Portuguesa de Sociologia (APS), Porto, Portugal
- 2012 70th MPSA Annual Conference, Chicago, USA
- 2010 3rd ECPR Graduate Conference, Dublin, Iirimaa
- 2006 AABS Conference, Washington, USA
- 2006 BASEES Conference, Cambridge, Suurbritannia

### **Erialane enesetäiendus**

- Political Psychology: Social Interaction in the Context of Attitudes and Ideologies. CEU suvekool poliitilises psühholoogias, Budapest, Ungari, 13.–24. juuli 2015

Multilevel Regression Modelling. ECPR talvekool, Viin, Austria, 18.– 22. veebruar 2013

Qualitative Comparative Analysis. ECPR suvekool, Ljubljana, Sloveenia, 29. juuli – 13. august 2011

Methodological Issues in Comparative Electoral Analysis. 2. metodoloogia talvekool, Varssavi, Poola, 7.–10. veebruar 2011

Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modelling. ECPR suvekool, Ljubljana, Sloveenia, 2.–14. august 2010

Multivariate Statistical Analysis and Comparative Cross-National Surveys Data. ECPR suvekool, Ljubljana, Sloveenia, 30. juuli – 15. august 2008

### **Peamised uurimisvaldkonnad**

Avalik arvamus, poliitiline käitumine, poliitiline psühholoogia, poliitiline kommunikatsioon, poliitilised ideoloogiad

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