

DISSERTATIONES DE MEDIIS ET COMMUNICATIONIBUS
UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS

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TIIU KREEGIPUU

The ambivalent role
of Estonian press in implementation
of the Soviet totalitarian project



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CONTENTS

LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS	6
AUTHOR’S CONTRIBUTION TO CO-AUTHORED ARTICLES.....	7
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	8
INTRODUCTION.....	9
1. SETTING THE PROBLEM.....	14
1.1. Studying the Soviet press in Estonia – historiographical overview	14
1.2. Theoretical framework for contextualizing the Soviet press: Soviet society as a totalitarian project.....	19
1.3. The Soviet concept of journalism and its implementation in Estonia	27
1.4. The Soviet press as a tool for the distortion of Estonian history and the nation’s collective memory	32
1.5. Research questions.....	35
2. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES	37
2.1. Methods and theoretical approaches.....	37
2.2. Empirical sources.....	39
3. FINDINGS	44
3.1. The Soviet press as a tool of the Communist Party in implementing the totalitarian project in Estonia	44
3.2. The Soviet press as a tool of introducing Soviet history concept and deforming collective memory in Estonia	52
3.3. Opportunities of the Estonian press to resist ideological pressure and practices of challenging the Soviet control system.....	54
4. DISCUSSION	57
CONCLUSIONS	61
REFERENCES	64
SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN	75
PUBLICATIONS	81

LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

This dissertation is based on the following original publications which are enlisted in chronological order and will be referred to in the dissertation with respective Roman numerals.

Study I

Kreegipuu, T. (2007). Eesti kultuurielu sovetiseerimine: Nõukogude kultuuripoliitika eesmärgid ja institutsionaalne raamistik aastatel 1944–1954 [The sovietization of the cultural life in Estonia: The goals and institutional system of the Soviet cultural politics in years 1944–1954]. In Tannberg, T. (Koost). *Eesti NSV aastatel 1940–1953: Sovetiseerimise mehhanismid ja tagajärjed Nõukogude Liidu ja Ida-Euroopa arengute kontekstis* [Soviet Estonia 1944–1953: Mechanisms and consequences of sovietization in Estonia in the context of development of Soviet Union and East Europe]. Eesti Ajalooarhiivi toimetised 15 (22). Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 352–388.

Study II

Kreegipuu, T., Lauk, E. (2007). The Soviet Coup-d'État in the Estonian Communist Press: Constructing History to Reshape Collective Memory. *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, 4(4), 42–64.

Study III

Kreegipuu, T. (2009). Eesti NSV trükiajakirjanduse parteilise juhtimise üldised põhimõtted [The general principles of Communist Party rule over the Estonian Soviet press]. *Ajalooline Ajakiri*, 1/2, 155–178.

Study IV

Lauk, E., Kreegipuu, T. (2010). Was it all pure propaganda? Journalistic practices of “silent resistance” in Estonian Soviet journalism. *Acta Historica Tallinnensia*, 15, 167–190.

Study V

Kreegipuu, T. (2011). Parteilisest tsensuurist Nõukogude Eestis. [Party censorship in Soviet Estonia]. *Methis*, 7, 26–40.

AUTHOR'S CONTRIBUTION TO CO-AUTHORED ARTICLES

Study II: The author is responsible for collecting and analyzing the empirical material for this article. The author is partly responsible for gathering the material for historical background and theoretical overview and also for writing the first draft.

Study IV: The author's contribution includes collecting, organizing and gathering the archival material for this article. The author is partly responsible for gathering the material for historical background and for writing the first draft.

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INTRODUCTION

The Soviet press in Estonia as a research field encompasses different aspects of society from politics to everyday life. Studying the press in its political and social contexts helps to understand Soviet propaganda and power mechanisms and society in general in a historical perspective, but also as a context to post-Soviet developments in Estonia. Therefore, the press and media in Estonia during the Soviet period (years 1940–41; 1944–1991) have evoked the interest of many researchers and have been studied from various aspects, e.g. censorship, discourses in press etc. However, lots of research is yet to be done to uncover the so far unanalysed facets of the Soviet Estonian press and to discover new information from sources that have not been accessible (e.g. archive documents) or not even collected and systematized (e.g. memories).

My thesis focuses on the roles of the Soviet press in Estonia and its ambivalent position in society in mediating the power and people. In the Soviet Union, the press was subjected to supervision and control of Communist Party (CP) administratively, economically and ideologically. The appearance of newspapers and journals, institutional system and principles of work in editorial offices were standardized all over the Soviet Union. The Estonian press was integrated to the All-Union centralized media system and subjected to All-Union rules and regulations. Behind the uniform appearance, form and ideological colouring some differences still existed. For example, the newspapers published during the early 1960s, the period of de-Stalinization and liberalization, were not as aggressively ideological as the ones of the late 1940s and 1950s. Another aspect to be considered is that despite the constant Party control over the press, all publications were not regarded ideologically equally important, and control over the ‘less important’ press was slightly milder. The main features, however, like the dominance of political ideology, censorship and dependence from the CP were immutable. So was the general aims of the press – to support and legitimate the Soviet power and to form public opinion for supporting the course of Party ideology.

The press in Estonia during the Soviet occupation was a typical example of the Soviet press – ideological, propagandistic and strictly censored. However, this propagandistic press was surprisingly popular among Estonian people, at least during the 1970s and 1980s according to studies carried out in the Department of Journalism of Tartu University (Vihalemm & Kõuts 2004, 66–67). The studies also prove that people were not interested in ideological and political topics, but issues like family, home, everyday life, cultural topics etc. (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997a). The fact that the press, which was inevitably subjected to the dominance of political ideology, was still popular among the readers (who were not actually interested in Soviet politics or other ideological topics), evoked my interest to study what were the alternative roles and functions the Soviet press performed in Estonia. The ambivalent function of simultaneously fulfilling the prescribed propagandistic duties and developing journalistic prac-

tices of ignoring or even resisting these duties is the central focus of my Studies included in current thesis. The Studies, analysing the mechanisms of political and ideological control, censorship and CP supervision over the Estonian press (Studies I, III, V) and journalistic practices of ignoring or overstepping the rules (Study IV) extend over the whole period of Soviet occupation in Estonia. The findings and conclusions on Estonian Communist Party's (ECP) and *Glavlit*'s power practices reflect the years 1940–1985 as they are based on archive documents from this period. The studies on alternative journalistic practices are mostly an outcome of analysis of sources from the 1960s and 1970s as the period of the 'revival of the press' and its aftermaths (Lauristin, Vihalemm et al 1993a, 1993b). Consequently, the general time frames of my research are set from 1940 until 1985 with the reservation that not all phenomena are studied equally systematically throughout those decades. My studies do not follow a chronological principle, but concentrate on general principles and practices exercised by the controlling mechanisms (Studies III, V) and they also focus on the characteristic aspects of specific periods: the 1940s and 1950s as the introductory period of Soviet power mechanisms and media system in Estonia (Studies I, II) and the 1960s–1980s as the period of development of alternative practices (Study IV). Contextually, I rely on the earlier periodizations of the history of the Soviet regime and media in Estonia (particularly the ones presented in Høyer, Lauk, & Vihalemm 1993 and Kurvits 2010), which well serve as the general temporal framework for my study. They proceed from political-ideological changes and roughly distinguish four periods: the first Soviet occupation in 1940/41, the Stalinist era 1945–1955, the Khrushchev's reforms ("Thaw") 1956–1968 and the period of Stagnation 1969–1986.

To research the ambivalent role of the Soviet Estonian press, I have distinguished two different aspects: the aims of the CP and realization of them. Following the assumption that the goals were not always achieved despite the all-embracing Soviet power and control mechanisms, I proceed from the framework of the *totalitarian project* as conceptualized by John Gray (Gray 1996). Adopting this concept I agree that the goals of the Soviet regime were totalitarian – the immutable endeavour to achieve a total political, economic, social, cultural and mental control. On the other hand, the Soviet regime never became completely totalitarian. For example, regardless of the constant ideological pressure, complete social and mental control was never achieved. The Soviet press was established to perform as an agent of the totalitarian project being simultaneously the subject of the same project. This fact reflects the ambivalent position of the press and journalists: although the main function of the Soviet press was to serve as a propaganda tool, it still had other additional functions (e.g. information or entertainment); the prevalence of ideological topics in the newspapers does not implicitly prove that the press and journalists had sincerely and entirely adopted the Soviet ideology. Furthermore, my research demonstrates that the strictly supervised and controlled press served, to a certain extent, as a tool of cultural 'silent resistance' in Estonia. As an introduction and context, I

have included in my thesis an article about sovietization of the cultural life in Estonia, describing the principles and power mechanisms of sovietization not only within the cultural sphere, but also in Estonian society in general (Study I). This study explains some background aspects of researching the Soviet press, such as the peculiarities of Soviet-period information sources and the overwhelming importance of ideology and propaganda in society. The latter helps to understand the position of the press in Soviet society as a ‘collective propagandist and agitator’ as formulated by a Leninist dogma.

The Soviet press as a propaganda tool in hands of the CP is under observation in Studies III and V. Both articles are based on archival documents of the Estonian CP (ECP) and the Estonian censorship administration (ESSR *Glavlit*), and demonstrate how the press in Estonia was supervised and controlled. Study III analyses general principles of the control system as well as the practical mechanisms as they appeared in the documents of the Central Committee of ECP, its Bureau and its Propaganda and Agitation Department – the leading Party institutions in the Estonian SSR. This study proves that the press was under constant attention and surveillance, especially during the 1940s and early 1950s when the Soviet media system in Estonia was built up and the ideological principles were introduced. Later on, both control and supervision gradually became more bureaucratic and formal – a great deal of effort was spent on administrative and routine issues, whereby serious discussions about the press were either almost totally absent or not documented. In addition to general supervision, the ECP also exercised censorship by controlling ESSR *Glavlit* but also through independent censorship work. Study V analyses the ECP’s and its leading institutions’ censorship activities. This study explains the general mechanisms of censoring the press, and the Party’s role in exercising censorship using colourful examples of ‘ideological errors in the press’ found in the archives of the ECP CC and *Glavlit*.

Everything from the appearance to the contents of the newspapers and journals published in Estonia was prescribed by the CP. The press was supposed to give an idealistic picture of the Soviet reality in the present and the future, and to prove the superiority of the Communist regime. In addition the press was supposed to give the ‘correct’ interpretation of the past as well. Estonian history was rewritten according to the Marxist history approach accentuating certain ideological dogmas. Forming a new shared understanding of the past was a part of rebuilding the identities and constructing a new entity – the ‘Soviet people’, a social construction consisting of so-called *homo sovieticus* – loyal and devoted Soviet citizens sharing the Communist worldview. To achieve this ambitious aim the education system as well as the press had to fulfil various tasks. Study II analyses the practice of distorting Estonian history with the help of the press, using the construction of one of the Soviet historical myths, the so-called ‘June myth’ as an example. This article, co-authored with Professor Epp Lauk, examines the discursive methods and strategies of representing the events of June 21, 1940 in *Rahva Hää* (*People’s Voice*) (organ of the ECP CC) during

1945–1960. Combining the analysis of press texts with the results of the studies on Estonian collective memory (Wertsch 1998; 2002) I demonstrate the failure of the implementation of the Soviet history concept. The constructed myths (including the ‘June myth’) and schemes of interpretation, which dominated in so called ‘official history’ were so over-ideologized, often strange and evidently tendentious that they were accepted only formally. Instead of the true adoption of the official history, alternative ‘unofficial’ histories developed in private spheres (Study II).

The analysed archival documents prove that the Soviet press system did not always work as it was prescribed by the CP. A fairly limited, but still remarkable number of ‘ideological errors in the press’ in the documents and reports of the ECP CC and *Glavlit* prove that there were always journalists and editors who, whether accidentally or intentionally, overstepped the regulations of censorship or diverged from the correct ideological course. In order to discover the possible motives behind specific cases, but also to get a wider picture about how journalists themselves perceived their roles and conformed to the Soviet media system, I have also used memories of journalists and editors (published biographies and autobiographies, memoirs and interviews). Memoirs are used in Studies III and V as complementary sources in addition to official documents. Memories of the journalists play a slightly more significant role in Study IV, which focuses on the journalistic responses and the development of alternative roles. In this study, co-authored with Professor Epp Lauk, we have outlined some typical strategies that journalists and editors used to withstand the ideological pressure. As a result of this research, we have differentiated two types of ‘strategies of silent resistance’ on discursive and editorial levels. The findings of this article are definitely incomplete since neither the archival documents nor the memoirs are ‘perfect’ sources. The official documents do not reflect the ‘strategies’ so much but errors and mistakes that caught the attention of censors and party officials. Among these errors might also be accidental mistakes resulting from ignorance or negligence of journalists and editors. The memoirs of journalists are indeed selective and subjective. To avoid the danger of misinterpreting the sources or overestimating the intentional resistance to the Soviet regime, the ‘strategies’ are outlined on the basis of the cases where the power challenging moment is apparent and which are validated by the other sources. The practice of ‘silent resistance’ in the Soviet press is a topic that deserves further research by widening the empirical basis and methodological approach. Studies included in my doctoral thesis deal with different aspects of the functions and roles of the Estonian Soviet press. The thesis relies mostly on archival sources, press texts and published memoirs, and therefore, cannot give a complete and final explanation or model of the multiple roles the Soviet press played in Estonia. As already indicated, especially the alternative journalistic practices and different patterns of conforming to constant control and supervision should be studied further. My methodological approach (which includes critical document analysis and discourse analysis) enables me to depict the

inscribed role of the Soviet press, and the peculiarities of the Soviet media system that made it possible to deviate from this role. The sources and approaches used in the thesis also enable me to characterize the most typical journalistic practices of ignoring or challenging control and supervision of the authorities. However, they do not allow me to present the whole gallery of these practices nor to reveal the motives behind them.

I. SETTING THE PROBLEM

I.1. Studying the Soviet press in Estonia – historiographical overview

The first examples of Estonian press historiography go back to the beginning of the 20th century. The systematic academic historical study of press and journalism in Estonia, however, started in connection with the beginning of journalism education at the University of Tartu in 1954 (about general trends in Estonian press historiography see e.g. Lauk 1997, Kurvits 2010).

The first studies on the Soviet press in Estonia were conducted in the 1950s and 1960s. The earliest Soviet press studies are students' research papers and graduation theses, which analysed topics and styles of Soviet newspapers and journals. For example, use of humour and satire in Estonian Soviet newspapers, coverage of economic or educational issues, development of journalistic styles and genres etc. have been studied.¹ Even if these early works suffered from a narrow scope of topics and were methodologically quite limited, they offer interesting ideas and nuances even from today's perspective, as well as lots of colourful examples from Soviet period press texts.

One of the most popular methodological approaches in historical studies during the Soviet period was statistical analysis. Many historians preferred to deal with numbers and statistical facts as a less ideological field than to compose explanatory narratives and interpretation schemes. Therefore topics like agricultural history and demography were studied by analysing and publishing considerable amounts of archive documents; narrative and explanations were subjected to historical statistics. Symptomatically the historical-statistical approach was applied in studies of Estonian press and journalism history as well. Articles and booklets focusing on statistical overviews, numbers and tables were quite popular. For instance, in 1971, an overview *25 aastat nõukogude Eesti trükisõna (1940–1965) [25 years of Soviet Estonian printed materials (1940–1965)]* was published, which contains lots of tables and graphs picturing the massive growth of print runs of books and periodicals during the Soviet period (Püss 1971). Several statistics oriented articles can be found in *Fakt. Sõna. Pilt. [Fact. Word. Picture.]*, a series published by the Department of Journalism at the University of Tartu since 1964.²

Another way of dealing with numbers and empirical facts was the sociological approach. Sociology as an academic discipline was accepted and supported in the Soviet Union only for a short period – from 1965 until the early 1970s. During those years, active empirical sociological research including

¹ The students' works are available at the University of Tartu, Institute of Journalism and Communication, see: <http://aki.ut.ee/webpage/id/101>.

² E.g. Vol. no. 11, 1985 includes overview articles about the sociological and statistical surveys conducted at the University of Tartu in the 1970s and 1980s.

sociological media studies was started in Estonia, which was continued even after the clamp down on sociology in Soviet Union in general in the 1970s (Vihalemm 2001, 79). In Estonia, it was possible to continue sociological research because the Party control was looser compared to the control exercised over the studies on the Russian language central press in Moscow or Leningrad. This exceptional development of Estonian media research in the 1970s and 1980s could be explained by the differences within the hierarchical Soviet media system (described in Chapter 1.3.) but also by the different levels of control over research centres, topics, etc. (Vihalemm 2001, 81–84). As a result, several empirical studies were conducted, lots of data collected and analyses written – e.g. the first in-depth overview on the Soviet local press *Rajoonileht ja lugeja* [*Local paper and its reader*] (Lauristin, Vihalemm, Uus, & Peeegel 1987). This book analyses city and county newspapers on the levels of topics, audiences, etc. and includes also a historical overview.

Research on the Soviet press and its history changed drastically in connection with political and social changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The collapse of the political control system, the abolition of censorship and the consequent democratization of society opened new perspectives for academic journalism studies and historical research.

The end of the Soviet regime enabled the opening of state archives in Russia and Estonia during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The process of ‘declassifying’ the so far secret documents of Soviet institutions began in Estonia in 1987 (Kibal et al 2005, 138–139). As a result, archive research boomed and a vast amount of significant documents were published. Among them were documents (reports, records, letters, notes, etc.) of security institutions (NKVD, KGB), governmental institutions and the ECP. Several documents have been published in Estonian journals *Akadeemia* and *Tuna* and also as separate collections of documents, published by the National Archives of Estonia and its branches (the Estonian Historical Archives and Estonian State Archives). The documents of the ECP, ministries and central institutions of the Soviet state are preserved in the Estonian State Archives. In the series of the Archives, called *Ad fontes* many documents of Estonian security institutions (various departments of the KGB) have been published.³ The latest publication of the mentioned series is dedicated to the dissident movement in the period of 1972–1987, and includes documents of the KGB as well as the letters, notes and proclamations of the Estonian dissidents (Pesti 2009). Publications like these help to understand the ideological pressure and peculiarities of the Soviet society and power mechanisms in general.

Similarly to Estonia lots of Soviet period archival documents have been published in Russia. For example, the documents of security institutions and the Party concerning mostly Stalinist repressions and arrests were published in the

³ E.g. *Ad fontes* volumes 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 14 presenting Estonian KGB documents of 1954–1958 – see: Jürjo 1997–2005.

series *Rossiia XX vek. Dokumenty* (published since 1997 by the international foundation *Demokratiya*, editor-in-chief Jakovlev). Many publications are focused on specific topics, e.g. intelligentsia and cultural politics (Jakovlev 1999) or censorship (Maksimenkov 2005). During 2003–2008, three volumes of decrees of the Presidium of CPSU CC of 1954–1964 were published (Fursenko 2003–2008).

The documents reflecting supervision and control over the media in Soviet Estonia most evidently can be found in the collections of ECP and ESSR *Glavlit* preserved in the Estonian State Archives. The collection of the ECP documents includes thousands of archive records, only a few of which have been studied and even less published so far. Among the published ones a volume of documents of the Bureau of the ECP CC of the years 1944–1956 is compiled and commented by Kaljo-Olev Veskimägi (Veskimägi 2005). The minutes and shorthand notes of Bureau meetings, published in this book, include interesting information about the Estonian press. Veskimägi has also investigated the collections of Estonian *Glavlit* and published a thorough book about Soviet censorship in Estonia with lots of colourful examples from literature and press (Veskimägi 1996). Soviet censorship has evoked the interest of media researchers as well. After gaining access to the documents, several studies concerning Soviet press censorship have been published (Maimik 1994; Maimik 1996; Lauk 1999; Aesma 2005).

Since working with Soviet-era archive documents might appear quite confusing (see Chapter 2.2.), the researchers need to become familiar with background information and primarily learn the principles and structure of the power institutions headed by the ECP. Here, helpful tools are the handbooks about the structure and organisation of the ECP published by the Kistler-Ritso Estonian Foundation, which supports Soviet studies (Tarvel 2000; Tarvel 2002; Liivik & Nugin 2005).

The other side of the coin as to how society was responding to control and power has also evoked the interest of Estonian historians. For example, the adaptation to the Soviet ideology, and mechanisms of conformity have been studied concerning artists, writers, composers and intelligentsia in general (Sarapik, Kalda, & Veidemann 2002; Sarapik & Kalda 2005; Karjahärm & Sirk 2007). Conformity with the regime remains a highly intriguing topic worthy of studying, particularly in the instance of journalists.

The drastically enlarged source basis and possibilities to research so far restricted topics, represents an expansion of media history studies after the end of the Soviet regime. Another change was the spread of different new (at least novel in post-Soviet Estonia) methodologies and theoretical approaches. Still media history remained a bit more conservative than other branches of media studies in Estonia. Probably the new sources and opportunity to compose narratives free from Soviet ideology was already challenging enough, as no radical methodological turns in media history approaches occurred during the early nineties. The traditional narrative chronological approach was carried on. This

was, however, done under completely different circumstances and in open-minded atmosphere without the pressure of Soviet ideology. As a result of a decades-long work of Estonian media researchers, two overviews of the press history were published: a chronological survey on the Estonian press from its beginning (in the early 19th century) until 1900 (Peegel et al 1994) and a thematically composed book covering the developments in Estonian press and journalism during 1900–1940 (Lauk 2000). The development of chronological media history studies has stopped, although there is still no complex overview focusing on the history of media in Estonia during the periods of World War II and Soviet occupation.

Another trend in media research since the 1990s is comparative approach – viewing media history in Estonia in a broader social and international context. In 1993, a comprehensive book analysing Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian press and media history comparatively was published (Høyer, Lauk, & Viha-lemm 1993). So far this book is the only one, which also includes complex overview of Estonian media and press during the Soviet occupation. Another example of comparative approach is a collection of articles that analyses Central and Eastern European media under Soviet and Nazi regimes of the 1930s and during the onset of the Cold War in the 1940s and 1950s (Mertelsmann 2011). Characteristic to the research on the Soviet media seems to be focusing on certain specific aspects or periods. One of the most studied periods is, for example, the stage of transition – the late 1980s and early 1990s, the years of dissimilation of the old media system and the construction and development of new ones (Lauristin 1997; Lauristin & Viha-lemm 1997b, Viha-lemm 2002). At the same time, other periods like the 1960s and 1970s have not yet been studied systematically from the post-Soviet perspective. However, there are some earlier empirical studies on this period, which analyse audiences, topics etc. (as already referred above). From the perspective of my research topic, the most striking ‘hole’ in the research on the Estonian Soviet press is lack of studies focusing on the position and roles of the press, media and journalists in society and society-media relationships. The gaps in the studies on the Soviet period, despite growing research interest, seem to be a common problem in Estonian history research. For example, as pointed out by Estonian historians (summary of academic discussion in: Tammela & Liivik 2010), some periods like the first decade of the Soviet occupation in Estonia (1944–1954) have been studied in many aspects (see Mertelsmann 2003; Tannberg 2007a) whereas systematic academic research on political and social developments of the 1960s and 1970s is still missing.

In spite of the lack of a systematic overview on the media system and press in Estonia during the Soviet occupation, many interesting studies focus on different specific aspects and topics. For example, development of journalistic styles and genres has been studied from new perspectives, applying discourse analysis (Harro 2000; Lauk 2005a; Lauk 2005b; Mõistlik 2007). Among new topics that have attracted the interest of researchers as the object of critical

study is the practical functioning of the Soviet press in Estonia – e.g. editorial practices in Estonian Radio (Pärl-Lõhmus 1997; Lõhmus 2002).

Another increasingly popular trend in media history is the biographical approach, a turn of interest towards biographies, memoirs and ‘life stories’. As Sheila Fitzpatrick, a scholar focusing on the mental aspects and everyday history of the Soviet society notes, the recording of oral histories and gathering of memories and family histories, diaries, and personal correspondence from the general public has been one of the most useful initiatives of *perestroika* period in Russian historiography enabling to disclose many aspects of the hidden Soviet past (Fitzpatrick 2000, 4). In Estonia, collecting the memories of ‘common people’ or of some specific groups (e.g. deported people) and writing (auto)biographies is increasingly popular. Among the numerous published ‘life stories’ are autobiographies of journalists and editors (e.g. Hiedel 1995; Pilt 2006; Lillemäe 2008). Researchers at the Institute of Journalism and Communication of the University of Tartu have collected, edited and published three volumes of autobiographical life stories of Estonian journalists – *Eesti ajakirjanike elulood I–III* (Pallas & Uus 2004; Pallas et al 2006; Pallas & Uus 2009). As a result of this corpus of work, a relatively strong empirical basis has been laid for applying biographical method in studying the history of the media. So far the memories and biographies have been used in Estonian academic research mainly by folklorists and ethnologists (Jaago 2001; Kõresaar 2003; Kõresaar 2004). For example, Ene Kõresaar has analysed life stories from the perspective of collective memory, looking for biographical syncretism (Kõresaar 2004). Biographies and memories have been used for studying the role of individuals in the development of Estonian journalism (Aru 2008) and the process of professionalization (Pallas 2000; Lauk & Pallas 2008). A methodologically different and fresh approach is presented in the Bachelor’s thesis of Marian Männi (2008) who analyses memoirs of Estonian journalist Tõnis Braks using a methodological approach based on Tom Wengraf’s model that offers four components as the basis of a biographical study: history (the lived life), narrative, context and subjectivity (Wengraf 2000).

By today, many aspects of the Soviet period have been studied and new facts and documents discovered thanks to the easing of access to archival sources. New methodological approaches have been introduced and applied. However, numerous gaps still exist. The aim of my study is to fill at least partly one of these gaps – to analyse and discuss the ambivalent role of the Estonian Soviet time press.

1.2. Theoretical framework for contextualizing the Soviet press: Soviet society as a totalitarian project

Compared to the Western world, Soviet society was inflexible, holding on to its most salient features like one-party rule, command economy, communist propaganda and censorship. However, a single and solitary explanation scheme for describing this seemingly stable society does not exist. Scholars have applied different approaches from *totalitarian* to *modernistic* and *revisionist* ones. My aim is not to give a systematic and holistic overview on Soviet society and its media system and therefore, I would avoid any specific normative approach. Instead of applying any of the existing models, I prefer to look at the Soviet society as a ***totalitarian project***.

The term *totalitarian project* has been used by many authors to characterize the Soviet Union, but also Nazi-Germany and Fascist Italy (Gray 1990; Goldfarb 1991; Arnason 1998). John Gray, in criticising the model of traditional totalitarianism, has formulated one of the most compact concepts:

“The totalitarian project is constituted by a single objective – that of merging state and society in a new order from which the conflicts of interest, purpose and value which are found in all historic societies have been extirpated. /.../ The totalitarian project is the project of suppressing civil society – that sphere of autonomous institutions, protected by a rule of law, within which individuals and communities possessing divergent values and beliefs may coexist in peace” (Gray 1996, 157).

This framework coincides very well with my research focus and questions, helping me to explain the ambivalent role of the Soviet press in Estonia. The press was supposed to assist the Soviet regime to fulfil the ultimate totalitarian goal – to achieve complete control over society at every level. On the other hand, the project experienced many difficulties in fulfilling the totalitarian aims, which were never entirely achieved. Taking into consideration my research focus, methods and purposes, the advantages of applying the ‘project approach’ instead of the ‘model approach’ have three main aspects.

Primarily, the *project approach* enables me to make a distinction between the goals and the realization of expectations of the ‘project managers’ – the CP *nomenklatura* – by describing both the principles and utopian ambitions, and the unclear outcomes and sometimes ineffective power practices. It should also be noted that unlike a quite common interpretation of large ‘social projects’ as being self-conductive without clear outcomes and leaders (e.g. Habermas’ (1997) ‘unfinished project of modernity’), I see the Soviet totalitarian project as being supervised and managed by certain actors – the CP and its leaders. The Soviet totalitarian project was not immutable throughout the existence of the Soviet state. The original Marxist and Leninist Communist utopia was gradually losing its ideological strength and degenerated into a ‘really existing socialism’

(Walicki 1997; Waliki 2001; Linz 2000). However, the totalitarian project was never entirely abandoned despite its modifications and ideological degradation, and is still productive in describing the later phases of Soviet society. Even if the practices were losing their idealistic motives, and relied instead on habitual norms and bureaucratic practices, the totalitarian ambitions continued in many aspects (Walicki 1997), for example the domination of the CP and constant censorship.

Secondly, conceptualizing Soviet society as a project refers to a constant process, to various ideological, political, social changes and transformations in the Soviet system. Therefore, the *project approach*, as opposed to the rigid framework of ‘totalitarian society’, which is more difficult to apply to processes, enables me to better explain the different opportunities and practices the Soviet regime offered during the changes in the social, political and ideological spheres.

Thirdly the *totalitarian project* is a sufficiently wide framework for combining the different aspects discussed in my articles. Furthermore, the *totalitarian project* could even be interpreted as an umbrella covering different projects in Soviet society – ideological, political, economic, cultural, educational, mental etc. – since totalitarian ambitions reached every sphere of society. In my studies, I focus mainly on the ideological, social and mental projects seeing them all as parts of a larger totalitarian project. In addition, the different projects were also mingling. For instance, the ideological project was reflected in every other project; the mental project as an attempt to change the people’s mentalities was a precondition for success of other projects etc. In my thesis, I use the term in its wider meaning and specify its sub-fields only when necessary.

To explain more clearly the distinctions I see between *totalitarianism as a model* and *totalitarianism as a project*, I will describe the model of totalitarianism through its typical features: the suppression of the ‘civil society’ and the consequent ‘closed society’.

Since the 1960s, *totalitarianism* became one of the most influential paradigms of Soviet studies in the Western world. The term itself has been coined already in 1923 by Giovanni Amendola who used it to express the monopolization of power and the transformation of Italian society through the creation of a new political religion (Baehr 2010, 10). In the 1930s, during the rise of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, the concept of totalitarianism obtained new dimensions being applied in academic research for analysing dictatorships. The classic model of totalitarianism as a framework to understand the autocratic regimes that had emerged before World War II was taking shape in the 1950s and 1960s in the context of the onset of the Cold War. The classic, most influential and also the most frequently encountered concepts are those of Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1973) and Friedrich and Brzezinski (Friedrich & Brzezinski 1956; Friedrich 1969).

The approach of Hannah Arendt has evoked many discussions, in which most scholars emphasize that Arendt’s model of totalitarianism is highly idealistic, philosophical and theoretical. The approach of Friedrich is more

empirical and comparative. In specifying his concept, Friedrich presents six distinguishing features of totalitarian societies:

“They are to recall what by now is a fairly generally accepted set of facts: (1) a totalitarian ideology; (2) a single party committed to this ideology and usually led by one man, the dictator; (3) a fully developed secret police and three kinds of monopoly or more precisely monopolistic control; namely, that of (a) mass communications, (b) operational weapons, and (c) all organizations including economic ones, thus involving a centrally planned economy. /---/ We might add that these six features could if greater simplicity is desired lie grouped into three, a totalitarian ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police and a monopoly of the three major forms of interpersonal confrontation in industrial mass society” (Friedrich 1969, 126).

These characteristics listed by Friedrich are the central ones appearing in all classical concepts of totalitarianism. Indeed, the accents of different authors vary, but the central element, the core of the classic concept is explicitly the idea of *total domination*. As noted by David Roberts, Friedrich handles the totalitarian society as a static system, where top-down total domination is primary, whereas for example Arendt sees total domination not as an end in itself, but as a tool of implementing and confirming the ideology (Roberts 2006, 7–8). Juan J. Linz, discussing the classic concepts and trying to formulate the distinctive feature that differentiates a totalitarian society from other nondemocratic societies emphasizes the importance of an exclusive and autonomous ideology. Additionally, Linz points out two other important characteristics of totalitarianism – a monistic centre of power and citizen participation in political and social tasks together with an active encouraging mobilization. According to Linz, when active participation is replaced by passive obedience and apathy, society is losing its totalitarian nature and degrading into authoritarianism (Linz 2000, 70).

The ‘totalitarian socialization project’ can also be viewed as suppression of the *public sphere* understood as its traditional concept that comprises existence of certain social structures, political functions and characteristic features like *rational-critical discourse* and *openness to popular participation* (Calhoun 1992; Habermas 1996). In the Soviet Union, everything that Habermas had pointed out as vital elements of the *bourgeois public sphere* – political diversity, freedom of press, private autonomy (family, private property) and human rights (Habermas 1996, 83) – was either damaged or completely demolished. The public sphere in its traditional meaning was suppressed (at least its political functions were missing). On the other hand, when giving the term of public sphere a wider dimension, e.g. using the term of *produced public sphere* phrased by Habermas, Estonian public life under the control of CP can be, and has been, also viewed within the framework of this wider concept of public sphere (Lauristin, Vihalemm et al. 1993b). This type of an artificially created public sphere missed the basic features of the traditional model listed above. In order not to confuse the terms, I would rather proceed from the classic concept

of public sphere and stick to the approach that views Soviet society as a system suppressing (not 'producing') it.

Blocking the emergence of the classic public sphere was the general, maybe the most important aim of the totalitarian project. This was inevitable in order to repress and hold back one of the most dangerous enemies of the Soviet totalitarian project – civil society –with its liberal market values and community involvement (Ray 2007). In post-World War II Central and Eastern Europe, where the independent non-state organizations were entirely swallowed up by Party state and planned economy, the existence of civil society became problematic (Ehrenberg 1999, 176). Nevertheless, the term *civil society* has been used to describe Eastern and Central Europe under the Soviet rule and by some authors, even the Soviet Union (Buchowski 1996; Hann & Dunn 1996; Brinton 2002). Thereby the meaning of the concept was altered – civil society was seen as pushed into the private or small 'secure' space between the regime and the individual, where dissent against the regime occurred (Brinton 2002). Chris Hann (2005, 203) even claims, relying on his personal memories, that in Eastern European dissident discourse civil society became a slogan, reified as a collective homogenised agent, combating a demonic state.

Alfred Evans outlines three distinctive arguments of historians who support the theory of emergence and flourishing of civil society in former Soviet Russia. First, some scholars have asserted that the economic modernization and industrialization of the Soviet Union had formed an educated population and a complex social structure as the basis for the gradual transition to a more pluralistic political system. Second, by the 1970s, some scholars contended that 'proto-interest groups' presented their demands within the limited, but expanding pluralism of the Soviet political system. A third argument came from those who focused on trends among the creative and scientific intelligentsia in the post Stalinist years and hoped that the currents of dissatisfaction and dissidence that began to widen in the 1960s, foreshadowed the beginnings of civil society (Evans 2006, 28–29). As a consequence, many scholars have expressed the opinion that the elements of civil society, or at least the potential for it to emerge, existed under the Soviet regime. Putting these aspects and processes within the framework of the totalitarian project it can be argued that simultaneously with openly conducted and implemented Soviet totalitarian project(s), alternative tendencies opposing the project(s) of power and developing *contra-projects* existed. In the Soviet Party state, contra-projects were certainly not welcomed nor tolerated; the goal was not to build up a critically thinking and active civil society, but to construct a *closed society* instead. A closed society, as explained by Karl Popper and George Soros is characterized through strict supervision and control of the ruling class, censorship over intellectual activities, and continuous propaganda aimed at moulding and unifying the minds of the governed people (Popper 2005; Soros 1990). A closed society was supposed to support the power system, legitimize the Party state and suppress alternative or dissent voices. The latter aspect is closely associated with constant attempts to

mobilize the citizens for active participation in totalitarian societies (Linz 2000), whereas the ultimate goal of the leaders was not only to get people to tolerate the system silently, but to educate them in the spirit of the CP ideology and to turn them into loyal and active Soviet citizens.

The efficiency of constructing a closed society as well as the suppression of the civil society and public sphere has been seriously questioned, at least in the historical perspective. As already mentioned, totalitarian projects were not always successful. Complete control over society was never achieved and therefore, the idea of total domination (as expressed in the classic concepts of totalitarianism of Arendt and Friedrich) is also problematic. Another criticism of the classic concepts concerns their too theoretical and a-historical approach that ignores the developments and changes in Soviet politics, the ideological climate and society (Siegel 1998; Keep 2005; Roberts 2006).

If at all, totalitarianism might be used to characterize the Soviet Stalinist society, but even so with considerations. For example John Keep, having distinguished between three different sets of phenomena to the application of Stalinism: the ruling Party's 'totalizing aspirations', the mechanisms of rule and the extensive controls over society, comes to the conclusion that the term 'totalitarian' is relevant only for the first set – the CP's 'totalizing' aspirations (Keep 2005, 98–99). Other studies also point out that the Stalinist system involved far more dimensions than just top-down control and argue that even during the Stalinist period of terror and harsh ideological pressure society was not 'perfectly controlled' (Patrikeeff 2003; Shukman 2003).

While the effectiveness of the practical functioning of Soviet power mechanisms, not to mention the control over the society in reality, are under question even in occasion of the Stalinist period, the application of the (classic) totalitarianism paradigm is even more questionable in the case of the post-Stalinist decades of the Soviet regime. As David Roberts (2006, 7) argues: *“/---/ much of what it seemed to connote in these classic early works seemed to melt away with historical research, which made it clear that totalitarianism, as it had come to be conceived, was not remotely realized anywhere”*. Even Friedrich whose model of totalitarianism has been characterized as more practical and empirical than Arendt's normative and philosophical concept, has been criticized as over-estimating the totalitarian ruler's capacity of exerting total control over society. For example, von Beyme indicates that proceeding from this incorrect premise had lead Friedrich to the wrong assumption that totalitarian regimes were stable and their demise could be brought about only through military interventions by foreign powers (von Beyme 1998).

I share the opinion that the above described classic totalitarianism model is not appropriate to characterize neither Soviet society in general nor the Soviet press in Estonia. My research, proceeding from historical contexts and Soviet power practices, focuses not only on the aspirations of the CP and ideological leaders, but also on the practical functioning of the system (including the examples of journalistic resistance to the controlling forces). I subscribe to John

Keep's argument in hinting at public opinion often disbelieving the propaganda and the intelligentsia producing manuscripts 'for the drawer' (Keep 2005, 98). I also subscribe to James Wertsch's the notion of 'internal emigration' referring to individuals who did not vent their opinions in the public sphere, but created an inner existence standing apart from their public life (Wertsch 2002, 140). I, therefore, stay with the claim that the totalitarian aspirations were never completely achieved in Estonia.

The major part of my research (Studies **I, III, V**) focuses on the Soviet power institutions controlling and guiding the Soviet press (Estonian CP, *Glavlit*). Therefore I would not use the modern concepts of totalitarianism (e.g. Shlapentokh 2001, Roberts 2006) either, as in my opinion that would presume a wider approach encompassing larger variety of social, political, economic and cultural aspects than covered in my studies. Instead of a complex model of totalitarianism I would prefer to use the term *totalitarian project*, as framed above. The press could be seen as a tool of the totalitarian project – subjected economically, politically and ideologically to the CP and handled as a propaganda vehicle. On the other hand, the project met many difficulties in fulfilling the totalitarian aims, which were never achieved completely. The concept of totalitarian project combining both aspects – the ambitious, aggressive aspirations of the communist rulers and their execution in reality – enables conceptualizing the Soviet society in general and characterizing the versatility of the Soviet press within it.

The totalitarian paradigm has been the most influential for explaining the Soviet press and journalism as a primary tool of Soviet propaganda. The press, which was the CP's 'sharpest weapon' (Lendvai 1981, 17), was according to this approach, deprived of most of the functions it has in a democratic society. According to Denis McQuail in democratic societies the mass media

“ /---/ provide an arena of debate and a set of channels for making policies, candidates, relevant facts and ideas more widely known as well as providing politicians, interest groups and agents of government with a means of publicity and influence. In the realm of culture, the mass media are for most people the main channel of cultural representation and expression, and the primary source of images of social reality and materials for forming and maintaining social identity” (McQuail 2010, 4).

In the Soviet society these aspects – acting as a *free* arena for *critical* debates, offering possibilities for any kind of *open* self expression, were discarded. Conceptualizing the Soviet media, which operated under completely different conditions and performed specific functions, has been a challenge for Western and post-Soviet authors for decades. The first serious attempts in the Western world to frame the Soviet press theoretically go back to the times of the Cold War. Similar to society, the Soviet media were also labelled as totalitarian. The Soviet media system was opposed unambiguously to the Western system, seen as its antipode. This concept proceeded from an influential book *Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert et al 1956). The four theories of the press (authoritarian,

libertarian, social responsibility and Soviet Communist theories) can actually be drawn together into two fundamentally different models – Western liberal and Soviet totalitarian. The book analyses and compares not only the press, but also other media, and the authors use the concept of a ‘system’ viewing all mass media in a particular society as a whole. This was a significant turn in historical media studies stimulating scholars to look for greater generalisations and comparisons between different media systems (Bastiansen 2008). In spite of the significant influence of the concepts of Siebert et al. (1956), the four theories have also faced severe criticism. First of all – in representing a bipolar world-view of the Cold War, the four models are deeply normative jumping to over-large generalisations. On the other hand the models entail a sharp opposition: positive characteristics are grouped on one side (the libertarian and the social responsibility theories), while negative traits characterize the other side (the authoritarian and the Soviet theories of the press). These two related processes of normativization result in a polarized classification reflecting the Cold War dichotomy, instead of exploring the functioning of media systems in different societies (Jakubowicz & Sükösd 2008, 25–26). The third aspect that is probably the most criticized is the overly theoretical and philosophical approach, the long distance of the concepts from real practices and examples (Nerone 1995, Nordenstreng 1997). Hallin and Mancini, the authors of the most recent significant analysis of media systems, have pointed out that

“/---/ the focus on ‘philosophies’ of the press /---/ points to what we see as a key failing of Four Theories of the Press. Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm did not, in fact empirically analyse the actual functioning of media systems and social systems. They looked neither at the actual functioning of media systems nor at that of the social systems in which they operated /.../ nor was their analysis actually comparative” (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 9–10).

The criticism of Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s (1956) normative models inspired scholars to look for alternative explanation schemes to conceptualize Soviet journalism. Since the 1970s, several studies in the West were published, which step over the constraints of the totalitarian model and reveal new aspects (Hopkins 1970; Mickiewicz 1981; Remington 1988). They paid more attention to the practical side of Soviet journalism and the actual functioning of the Party controlled media. Even within the limited conditions of research and without access to direct sources, the Western studies of the 1970s and 1980s reveal many interesting aspects of the Soviet media system. Instead of strictly contrasting the Western and Soviet media systems researchers have found many similarities between them. Natalia Roudakova (2008) has used the terms *modernization* and *development framework* to draw together those authors who have negated the top-down guided and strictly controlled Soviet media model and assume that the Soviet press was a modern bureaucratic communication operation, resembling in some ways other modern mass persuasion systems (psychological warfare, political advertising, marketing, public relations) while differing from them in other ways. However, Roudakova finds that the moderni-

zation model underestimates the multiple roles, experiences and activities of Soviet journalists and suggests instead a *model of political activism* that conjoins entitlement and empowerment of the press and journalists (Roudakova 2008). Roudakova's suggestion indicates another aspect in the development of the Soviet media research – a widened view on the role of Soviet journalists. Instead of viewing them as dutifully fulfilling the forced tasks of the propagandist and agitator, she also sees them as the mediators in the communication processes between the power and the public. Like Roudakova, other authors have claimed that the journalists working in the Soviet system were not just passive messengers or Party propagandists, but active communicators, who participated in or even shaped politics. For example Thomas Wolfe, analysing and describing Soviet journalism during the 1960s, views Soviet journalists as *agents of government*, proceeding from the Foucauldian term of governmentality (Wolfe 2005, 16–17). The role of Soviet journalists as *social activators* forming public opinion and stimulating people to be active Soviet citizens was even a part of the official Soviet journalism theory (Prohorov 1988, 23–24). Indeed, the Soviet ideologists' expectations about 'activating the public' were clear – journalists had to motivate people to support the Soviet power and to teach them to act as loyal Soviet citizens. In reality, many journalists interpreted their role as an activator differently: sometimes challenging rather than supporting the Soviet system. The interpretation of the role of Soviet journalists as participators in social and political matters, however, cannot be applied to the Soviet media in general. The interpretation could be associated with certain periods (e.g. the referred to 1960s as a relatively liberal Khrushchev period) or certain media channels (e.g. youth and cultural press as being less strictly controlled). Proof that many Soviet journalists were at least potentially political and social activators was the breakdown of the Soviet society and control systems. As soon as the control over the media was eased, journalists started to demolish the *closed society*. Now the press could start fulfilling its role as the "pre-eminent institution of the public sphere" (Habermas 1996, 81) and launch the process of opening up the closed society. As Yassen Zassoursky claims, the Soviet case has proved historically that the press and media had been the most important vehicle of the open society (Zassoursky 2002, 427).

However, in spite of the rigidity of the regime and extent of control, the Soviet Union was not a completely closed society. Indeed, any truly 'closed' society has not existed in world history. Popper's models of *closed* (as well as the one of *open*) societies were ideal types than existing forms of society (Jarvie 2003, 73; Notturmo 2003, 43–44).

Sovietization of Estonian economics, politics, culture and society served the ultimate goal of turning Estonia and Estonians into a loyal part of the Soviet Union and building up a closed society which would live in coherence with the rest of the empire (Study I). The process of 'closing' the society by isolating people from everything non-Soviet in time and space and by launching ideological pressure for imposing the Socialist worldview, largely failed in Estonia.

A sincere and universal devotion to the Soviet state and ideology was not achieved because in Estonia, several cultural resources of resistance were preserved throughout the Soviet occupation (Ruutsoo 2004). The press played a significant role in preserving these resources. In spite of the enormous control system and constant ideological pressure, the Soviet regime never managed to turn the Estonian press as a whole into a perfect vehicle of Soviet propaganda (Studies IV, V).

My approach to the Soviet press in Estonia is to observe and analyse it as a versatile item: on one hand as a subject and object of the totalitarian project, being subordinated to political and ideological surveillance and tasked with fulfilling the goals of the project; on the other hand, I analyse the press as a phenomenon reaching beyond the project, sometimes contributing to the contra-projects of cultural resistance to the Soviet regime.

1.3. The Soviet concept of journalism and its implementation in Estonia

Immediately after the annexation of Estonia to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940, the press in Estonia was subjected to Communist ideology and the principles and rules of Soviet journalism. The traditions of Estonian journalism were thoroughly severed. During the summer and autumn of 1940 all Estonian newspapers were closed down or taken over by the Soviet authorities. Only a few journals continued publishing, but had to adopt the ideologically ‘correct’ line and content (Maimik 1994; Lauk 2011). Printing and publishing was centralized under the *ENSV Riiklik Kirjastuskeskus [State Publishing Centre of ESSR]*. Censorship began in the summer of 1940, when a branch of the Soviet censorship office in Estonia (ESSR *Glavlit*) was established on October 23, 1940 with Olga Lauristin as the leader (Veskimägi 1996, 53, 123). During 1940–1941 and after World War II, all journalists who had worked in the independent Estonian press and did not collaborate with the Soviets were fired (many of them were arrested, deported or executed). New people were employed from amongst those who demonstrated loyalty to the new regime (Lauk 2008, 196–197). The press was turned into a *party press* and as many as 10% of the ECP members, mostly without any journalistic experience or skills, started working as journalists and editors-in-chief (Veskimägi 1996, 84). After World War II the construction of the Soviet media system in Estonia continued.

Sovietization of the press was a part of imposing Moscow’s control mechanisms on Estonian society (Tannberg 2007b). While the press in Estonia was subjected to strict control, the press had to fulfil the role of a *mechanism of control* by criticizing ‘harmful’ ideas and activities and dragging ‘erroneous and destructive’ cases into the public for common resentment.

The Soviet media system with all its attributes and characteristics (institutions, publishing process, journalism education, ideological principles, jour-

nalistic practices, etc.) was an enormous structure. My thesis does not aspire to give a complex analysis of this system or its implementation in Estonia, but mostly deals with the CP control and censorship over the press and cases of resistance to the ideological pressure.

To contextualize my studies, in current chapter, I will describe the main building blocks of the Soviet media system and the Soviet concept of journalism: overwhelming propaganda, Leninist principles of the press, centralization and hierarchical nature of the Soviet media system, constant censorship over the press, the CP's leading role in the Soviet media system, and linguistic peculiarities.

The main role of the Soviet press was derived from a Leninist idea that “a newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective organiser” (Lenin 1961). This statement became a core of the Soviet journalism concept – the media's primary function and purpose was to propagate the ideology of the CP and to legitimate and strengthen the power of the Party and its leaders (Study V). According to the Soviet concept, the press was supposed to “*spread economical, scientific-technical, cultural and political propaganda and to inculcate communist morality, scientific-atheist worldview and fight against bourgeois ideology*” (Skulenko 1987, 42–50). The press as *propagandist* and *agitator* was expected to educate people in the spirit of communism, to spread the Party's ideology and educate the Soviet people to be loyal Soviet citizens. This task was a real challenge, as the Soviet Communist ideology was strange to Estonian people in the 1940s. In the newly annexed ‘republics’ of the Baltics, an active *cultural revolution* – severe ideological propaganda, campaigns, destruction of old cultural traditions and ties – was started in order to change the mentalities of the people. The intelligentsia and the media – film, radio and press – were regarded as the main pillars of the cultural revolution (Study I).

The ideological propagandistic tasks of the press were to be fulfilled by following certain rules – the so-called *Leninist principles* of the press. These principles are not directly accountable to Lenin, but derived from the Leninist-Marxist theory of journalism. Therefore the number and selection of principles listed by authors may vary, although they usually emphasize six principles: *party-mindedness* (*партийность*), *high level of ideology* (*идейность*), *truthfulness* (*правдивость*), *popular orientation* (*народность*), *criticism and self-criticism* (*критика и самокритика*) and *mass character* (*массовость*).⁴ Sulev

⁴ Translating those dogmatic Soviet terms is problematic as the words reflect neither the real meanings nor the practical implementation of the principles. I have used English phrases following the translations of Mark Hopkins (1970) and Brian McNair (1991). When differences occurred, I chose the translation that seemed the most appropriate. However, for ‘*партийность*’, I chose ‘party-mindedness’ as the translations of Hopkins (‘party orientation’) and McNair (‘partiality’) were too narrow and inaccurate. How this and other terms were interpreted and put into practice in Soviet reality is described in chapter of Findings (see 3.1.).

Uus, Estonian journalist and lecturer of journalism at the University of Tartu during both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, has added one more category – *transmitting information quickly (operatiivsus)* (Uus 1970, 35–36). This addition is, on one hand, logically derived from the general Soviet journalism concept – the Soviet press was supposed to react quickly and efficiently to every problem. On the other hand, the combination of limited access to information, censorship and multiple controls had the effect of slowing down than speeding up the editing and publishing processes. The prominence afforded by Sulev Uus in a textbook for the University students may be interpreted as encouragement for future journalists to take initiative and write on everyday issues, not always wait for official decisions and solutions.

Another variation of the Leninist principles is given in a textbook of Soviet journalism published in 1988, which lists nine principles: *party mindedness, popular orientation, democratism, mass character, patriotism, internationalism, humanism, truthfulness and objectivity* (партийность, народность, демократизм, массовость, патриотизм, интернационализм, гуманизм, правдивость и объективность) (Prohorov 1988, 144).

Prohorov's variation includes the six main principles appear headed, as ever, by the most important – *party mindedness* – that allegedly embraced all the other principles. Indeed the Soviet author Ryaboklatsh stated *party mindedness* should not and could not be artificially separated from the other principles (Ryaboklyatsh 1955, 4). The overwhelming importance of the CP in controlling and supervising the press was always present both at institutional and personal levels. A Party unit existed in all editorial offices. The more important the periodical was, the greater the proportion of its staff had to be members of the CP (Lauristin & Vihalemm 1993b, 186).

Everyone working in the media throughout the Soviet Union was familiar not only with the six basic principles but also their general interpretation. Working journalists and editors knew that the principles carrying noble values like following the truth, protecting democracy, objectivity etc. were not to be followed literally or freely interpreted. The 'correct' interpretation scheme for these principles was prescribed by Party ideologists and censors. For example, *truthfulness* meant that press had to picture the 'flourishing Soviet reality' – the ideal of the socialist society instead of reflecting the real situation of economic problems, social troubles etc. Typical interpretation schemes and practices of their implementation in controlling and guiding the press are reflected in the documents of the Bureau of the ECP CC (see chapter 3.1.).

In order to put the Soviet journalism concept to work, a hierarchical centralized Soviet media system was developed. Lauristin and Vihalemm (1997a) explain that after the rigid Stalinist period with nearly total control a model of five levels of control and canonization of the Soviet press had taken shape by the early 1960s. This model – that exposed not only the hierarchies of newspapers and journals, but also the levels of importance of topics, genres and authors, proved that the Soviet media system was an organized mechanism.

Being subjected to the control and guidance of the CP and *Glavlit*, the media system was also designed to be a self-conductive mechanism. The press of higher levels of ideological importance with the all-Union party press on the top (at the peak of the newspapers' hierarchy was *Pravda* – the organ of the CPSU Central Committee) was entitled to guide, teach and even control the newspapers and journals on the lower levels (Study III).

Despite centralization, a unified appearance and general ideologization, the Soviet press was not totally homogeneous. Within the standardized system, the ideological control was not so tight over the newspapers and journals on lower levels of control, e.g. the cultural and youth press (Study III, IV). These publications were not allowed to publish on very important political (i.e. ideological) topics, at least not before the central newspapers had published the material; on the other hand they were less strictly controlled. In general, all of the public print and press in the Soviet Union remained continuously censored throughout the whole Soviet period (Studies III, IV, V). The everyday censorship work was done in publishing houses, editorial offices, different governmental and security institutions, and above all by the CP and *Glavlit*. The CP and security organs (KGB) have been called the *brain* of the Soviet censorship system and *Glavlit* the executive hand (Lauk 1999). The CP, which set the ideological principles and censorship rules, also acted as the *censor of censors* controlling the everyday work of *Glavlit* (Study V).

Party control and supervision over the press was practiced mainly using administrative tools, such as decisions, decrees and other ordering, punishing or declarative directives of censoring authorities. The so-called *power of directives* meant that the Party documents were not only important ideological guidelines for all people in Soviet society, but they were also used for initiating persecutions. For example in 1946, a severe ideological campaign against the press and intelligentsia was launched after the CPSU CC issued a decree criticizing cultural magazines. Practices of constructing negative exemplary cases and punishing people involved in them to warn the others, were carried out throughout the period of Soviet rule and all over the Soviet Union including Estonia (Studies I, IV).

Party directives, many of them published in the press, were written in an ideological and declarative language. This language, full of Soviet ideology, hollow expressions, dogmas and specific vocabulary has been called, referring to Orwell's 1984, *Soviet Newspeak* (Thom 1989). Newspeak penetrated every sphere of the Soviet public life, while the press was supposed not only to adopt it, but also to promulgate it among the readers. Political discourse dominated in the Soviet press. In the more orthodox Party press (the newspapers on higher levels of ideological importance) a significant part of all newspaper space was filled with non-journalistic texts like Party decisions, speeches of Party leaders, etc. Especially during the early years of the Soviet occupation, these non-journalistic and purely ideological texts were dominating in all newspapers. Since the 1960s along with political texts and articles written in pure Soviet

ideological discourse, journalistic discourse was developing and becoming increasingly widespread in the local and cultural press of Estonia (Study IV). Journalistic discourse emerged mainly as an effort of professionally minded journalists, while ideological propagandistic texts remained primary and had to prevail over everything else.

As already mentioned, the Soviet press system allowed some differences – all the newspapers and journals were neither equally ideologically important nor equally strictly controlled. The strength of control and ideological pressure largely depended on the general shifts in Soviet politics and changes among the power leaders. During the ‘softer’ periods like the 1960s, moderate deviations from the rigid ideological line in the press were tolerated. The generations of journalists educated at the University of Tartu, where the studies of journalism were started in 1954, played an extremely important role in these new developments. Epp Lauk points out that allowing an Estonian-language journalism programme at the University of Tartu was kind of mistake of the ideological supervisors of the time, who underestimated the importance of the mother tongue as a means of national survival and maintenance of a spirit of opposition to the ruling regime (Lauk 2008, 197).

Nevertheless, censorship, CP ideology and supervision remained the pillars of the Soviet media that were not even properly shaken until the period of *glasnost* and the breakdown of the Soviet regime. Then, the potential of the Estonian press to play an active role in the other spheres, as opposed to supporting the Soviet power, became clearly obvious. Peeter Vihalemm (2002, 26) argues:

“/---/ along with the traditional network of cultural associations, the media was the most important social mechanism used for the political breakthrough in the Baltic societies. Ironically enough, the Leninist concept of media as ‘a collective propagandist and organiser of the masses’ was implemented in full against the regime created by the Communist Party”.

Several examples (e.g. Estonian local newspapers and the cultural press since the 1960s) prove that the press did not function as a perfect propaganda weapon in the hands of the Party, but at different times deviated from this task in various ways (Study IV). As Thomas Wolfe argues, *“the Soviet press was by no means the kind of perfectly orchestrated machinery of persuasion depicted in totalitarian antiutopian fiction like Orwell’s 1984”* (Wolfe 2005, 31).

1.4. The Soviet press as a tool for the distortion of Estonian history and the nation's collective memory

One of the most ambitious Soviet totalitarian projects was the mental one: an attempt to change people's worldview and to mould them into loyal Soviet citizens. John Gray has seen the stupendous plan of remaking the identities of the people within the Soviet power sphere as the core of the whole totalitarian project (Gray 1996, 157).

The remaking of identities always involves destructive as well as constructive tasks: destruction of the old behavioural schemes, values and traditions, which are seen as potentially dangerous to the new power, and to found a new worldview, supportive of the new regime, as the only possible and true way of thinking. In the Soviet Union the process of remaking the identities started from the very beginning of the Soviet state through constant ideological education. This was done by raising the 'Communist awareness' and campaigning in favour of Soviet, and against pre- and non-Soviet, traditions and social phenomena. The initial Marxist ideal of a perfect citizen in the classless Soviet society was an ennobled selfless human being (Brom 1988). Along with the gradual de-idealization of the Soviet regime and society simultaneous with de-Stalinization during the late 1950s and early 1960s (Walicki 1997, 7–8), the concept of Soviet people (*советский народ*) took a more pragmatic form contrary to its previous idealistic and sporadic visions. Although the phrase '*Soviet people*' was launched by Khrushchev in the early 1960s the theoretical concept was formulated as late as in 1971 during the 24th Congress of the CPSU. According to this concept the Soviet people were: "*a new historical, social and international community of people sharing the common territory, economics, socialist culture, unified and popular state and unifying goal of building the communism*" (Bol'shaya sovetskaya... 1976, 25).

The process of constructing an entity of the 'Soviet people' from the multinational Soviet population included many aspects (ideological education grounding the feelings of collectivism and internationalism, illusions about the happy and prosperous present and future and the glorious past of the Soviet society, etc.). In its scope, this process is comparable with traditional nation-building processes, since one of the crucial elements of the formation of the 'Soviet people' was typical for the formation of nations – the search for a common understanding about the past by constructing a new Soviet history concept. Construction of a common past as an integral element of national consciousness and solidarity has been emphasized as an important aspect of nation-building processes in many studies of nationalism (Study II). Thereby, the methods of constructing a 'useable past' have been determined by political regimes. The more dominant the state is, the more state-centred the grounding of new rituals and pushing back the old ones appears to be (Misztal 2003, 56–57). The state-centred practices of introducing new rituals have also been described in the

classical concept of *inventing traditions*. Similarly to Hobsbawm and Ranger's (1983, 9) description, practices, such as legitimizing power institutions, socializing groups, inculcating beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour were applied in the Soviet society since its very beginning. The idea that everyone living under the Soviet regime should abandon old religious and national beliefs and traditions, and should participate in Soviet rituals was introduced long before the concept of the *Soviet people* was formulated (about introducing the Soviet rituals see e.g.: Lane 1981; Petrone 2000; Rolf 2000).

The ethnically miscellaneous entity of the *Soviet people* can be viewed as a kind of an artificial community (referring to Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) created top-down by the state. The construction was actually so artificial and strange that it caused critical and ironic reactions by contemporary Soviet intelligentsia and dissidents. The most famous response was the coining the term of '*homo sovieticus*' by Aleksandr Zinoviev, Russian expatriate philosopher and author who created a grotesque prototype of Soviet man in his novel *Gomo sovieticus* [*Homo Sovieticus*], which circulated in *samizdat* since 1982 (Zinoviev 1991). According to Ibor Brom (1988) Zinoviev's *homo sovieticus* is fragmented, atomized, reified, alienated, exploited and dehumanized man who is capable of irreversible submission, enslavement, aggression and destruction. Later on the term received many ambivalent interpretations, sometimes losing its dark sides and original ironical meaning. In my thesis, I use the concept of *homo sovieticus* as it is generally understood today – as an individual under the influence of Soviet ideology, who is sharing the dogmas and prescribed principles without any deeper analysis or critical contemplation and behaving as a loyal Soviet citizen.

As the 'Soviet people' missed most of the traditional unifying factors (ethnicity, culture, religious and national customs, etc.), the glue that was supposed to unite people as the 'Soviet nation' became a shared understanding about the past. The concept of Soviet history – a Marxist approach to historical development with fixed dogmas and emphasis on certain 'great moments' in the history of the Soviet state and CP – was quickly worked out and put to serve the *Soviet cultural revolution* (or in other terms – the *totalitarian cultural project*). Using history for political purposes is a quite universal common practice (Olick and Robbins 1998, 117). However in the Soviet Union use and misuse of history in ideological purposes was extraordinarily massive. A leading Marxist historian of the 1920s Pokrovski, declared that "history is not a science but an ideology" (Fitzpatrick 2002, 24). The end of the NEP-politics and the beginning of the Stalinist repressions was accompanied by intolerance against every history interpretation that differed from the Marxist one, and during the early 1930s all the non-Marxist historians in the Soviet Union were forced to remain silent. Construction of the Soviet concept of history was based on the Marxist materialist scheme, and was considered ideologically so important that even Stalin turned his attention to problems in the Soviet historiography (about constructing the Soviet concept of history see Study II, Wertsch 2002, 72–86; Ivanovs 2005;

Banerji 2008). The official history was supposed to replace national approaches to history and to deform the collective memory of people. *Collective memory* in my research, is understood not as a distinct field incompatible with history, but as a mediated action, learnt from various sources and being mixed with history as a discipline (for more see Study II).

In Estonia, the Soviet authorities made a great effort to terminate the national history concept and present the past according to the Marxist approach. Demolition of the education system and academic history research traditions, and destruction or classification of documents and other sources was completed relatively quickly. Erasing people's memories and deforming collective memory was much more difficult. In the private sphere, 'histories' (or more precisely – the reflections of collective memory) different from the one taught in schools and presented in Soviet books and the press, were told and spread. Instead of adopting the new officially promulgated concepts and interpretations, the Soviet history concept was often questioned or even denied as a forceful set full of strange dogmas, interpretation schemes, distortions and lies (Study II).

One of the most efficient means to transmit the Soviet history concept was the media. This was not a unique practice specific to Soviet society. Indeed, the role of the media, in how and what people remember is considered to be a crucial factor that influences the status of memory in contemporary societies (Misztal 2003, 22).

The press as 'the first draft of history' is not just reflecting, but also carrying social memory and can be seen as 'a form of memory' performing as a 'memory agent' (Kitch 2008; Zelizer 2008). To what extent the press as a memory agent can operate and whose memory it actually presents depends on social conditions and the political regime. In democratic societies, the press publishes different, even opposing historical narratives and controversial concepts being able to record a wide spectrum of current events – as historical evidence for the future. The more the democratic freedoms are limited, and the press controlled by the authorities and censorship, the more restricted is the ability of the press to record history accurately (Anthonissen 2003). In the Soviet Union, the press was supposed to present exceptionally the one, ideological and Soviet power-supporting history. History as one of the ideologically most important topics (especially the history of CPSU, but also the history of the Soviet Union including Estonian history under Soviet rule) was systematically presented on the pages of the Estonian newspapers. The press as a quick and everyday propaganda tool was used to introduce and spread the history concept constantly, especially during the first years of the Soviet occupation when the 'ideologically correct' Estonian history books were yet to be published (Study II).

Study II presents an example of how the press was used for introducing the official history concept, by analysing the formation of the *June myth* (how the official interpretation of the Soviet *coup d'état* on June 21, 1940 was created and constantly altered according to the alterations in the Soviet ideology) in the leading Soviet Estonian daily *Rahva Hää*. Studying how the press was used,

which linguistic and discursive means were applied in order to fulfil one element of the *totalitarian project* – the identity building of *homo sovieticus* – helps to understand the concept and practices of the Soviet press in Estonia.

I.5. Research questions

The aim of my thesis is to analyse the roles and practices of the Soviet Estonian press. On one hand the press was a tool of the *totalitarian project*. As a part of the centralized hierarchical all-Union Soviet media model, its primary task was to propagate the ideology of the CP, legitimize its power, and educate the people in order to form the identity of *homo sovieticus*. My research deals with the CP supervision and censorship over the press. Research based on the documents of the ECP and ESSR *Glavlit* seeks for explanations of how the Soviet journalism concept and supervision mechanism were implemented and Party control exercised. The thesis also looks at the ‘other side of the coin’ – the real functioning of the Soviet journalism concept and the reflections of ideological pressure and control in the everyday work of journalists.

Three main questions express the aim of my thesis:

I Which role was reserved for the press in carrying out the totalitarian project in Estonia?

- What were the aims of the *totalitarian project* and its sub-projects and the tasks of the press in achieving them? (Studies I, III)
- Which principles and practical mechanisms were applied to control and supervise the press in the Soviet society? (Studies III, V)
- Which control mechanisms of Soviet journalism were put into practice in Estonia? How was the Soviet censorship system working in the press? (Studies III, IV, V)
- What were the power relations between different institutions governing and controlling the Soviet press in Estonia? What was the role of the Estonian Communist Party in this control and supervision system? (Studies III, V)

II How was the press used to introduce and propagate the Soviet history concept in Estonia in order to reshape the Estonian collective memory? (Study II).

- What was the expected role of history and collective memory in Soviet Estonian society?
- Which were the basic concepts of the Soviet history imposed in Estonia since 1940s? How was this concept expected to legitimize and secure the Soviet power in Estonia?
- How was the Soviet press used to construct and spread the Soviet history concept? Which discursive means and mechanisms were used to show and

teach the people the ‘proper’, officially accepted history and to reshape the collective memories?

III Which opportunities were available for the press and journalists in Estonia to resist or ignore the Soviet ideological pressure? How successful were the practices of using these opportunities?

- Which weaknesses and shortcomings appeared in the Soviet media system and its controlling mechanisms? (Studies **III**, **IV**, **V**)
- Which practices and strategies of resisting or challenging the constraints of the Soviet media system and control were found and used by Estonian journalists and editors? How successful were the attempts at deviating from the purely ideological and political course? (Study **IV**)

2. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

2.1. Methods and theoretical approaches

The research of the Soviet press in Estonia is a diverse academic field encompassing different disciplinary areas. Press history has evoked the interest of both historians and media researchers, but also attracted many scholars from other disciplines – literature, political sciences, sociology, etc. The research focuses and methodologies of scholars depend on their specific research interests and reflect the developments within the academic disciplines they represent. For example historians tend to stress more the political (or economic, cultural, etc.) contexts or focus on some specific historical processes viewing media as an object within it (e.g. journalists as victims of Stalinist repressions – see Karjahärm & Luts 2005; press and journalism under the Soviet censorship and control system – Veskimägi 1996, or the Soviet press as an object and subject of the Soviet cultural politics in the 1940s – Kreegipuu 2005).

Along with the theoretical and methodological broadening of media studies, media histories published in Estonia have become increasingly media-specific. Instead of a narrative chronological overview *on* the development of journalism and media, the researchers have turned their interest towards developments *in* journalism. Since the expansion of research opportunities in the early 1990s, versatile media studies with a historical perspective have been published analysing, for example, the development of genres, process of professionalization, etc. (see Chapter 1.1.). Since the breakdown of the Soviet ideological limitations in academic fields, researchers can openly stress the importance of political, social and cultural contexts and its critical consideration in the press and media histories. This so-called ‘social historical media history’ approach was developed in the West in the 1950s and 1960s, gaining more popularity in the 1970s (Djerf-Pierre 2002; O'Malley 2002). Analysing media history not as a story or process *per se*, but emphasising the significance of the social factors and viewing the development of the media in coherence with the general trends and processes in the society is also an influential contemporary approach in media history (e.g. Briggs & Burke 2002; Chapman 2005). For the first time, in the 1990s, the Estonian press was analysed through wider perspectives (e.g. Høyer, Lauk, & Vihalemm 1993; Lauk 1997 – see Chapter 1.1.).

In my studies, I have tried to contextualize the Soviet press in Estonia as a phenomenon within the framework of cultural, political and social background factors. I start with using traditional history research tools – critical document analysis and consideration of primary sources – and proceed to the level of wider social contexts in explanations and comparisons. For example, in Studies **III**, **IV** and **V** the orders, restrictions and guidelines of the ECP or *Glavlit* are analysed within the context of contemporary ideological shifts and peculiarities of the Soviet media system. The cultural, linguistic and even personal aspects concerning the work of journalists and editors have been taken into con-

sideration as well. Thereby my historical approach has a media-centred focus. The aim of historical document analysis is not just to compose a narrative about the Estonian Soviet journalism or to represent the institutional system, which controlled and supervised the press, but also to characterize the developments in journalism. My studies analyse the practices in editorial offices (Studies III, IV) in creating a ‘silent opposition’ to the regime as well as the use of political discourse as tool of constructing the Soviet concept of Estonian history (Study II).

Especially the latter aspect presupposes close reading and examination of Soviet newspapers and journals and use of textual analytical methods. Doing this, researchers come across a peculiar Soviet language full of ideology, military glossary, exaggerations and slogan-like expressions, the so-called ‘Soviet newspeak’ (Thom 1989). As Michael Smith (1998, 38) has shown, specifically the press was the main tool for developing a Communist language to communicate with people from the very beginning of the Soviet state.

“The Soviet press became the privileged medium of mass communication in the 1920s, a ground for mass democracy and regime legitimacy, a field of discourse between the party centre and its agents, surrogates, and affiliates beyond. Through the press, the Bolsheviks began to develop a communist language for optimal communication between the vanguard and the people. /.../ party editors called on journalists to shape their messages and styles to better reach the mentalities of different readers /.../ All this meant, in practice, that the Soviet regime had to begin to translate its alien communist party idiom into the everyday language of the average Russian”.

In reality, the goals of ‘touching the reader’ and developing a popular language in the press were not achieved, because the newspaper language remained unattractive to readers, impersonal, boring, difficult, and full of clichés and propagandistic slogans. The ideological political discourse became dominant over the journalistic discourse. In Estonia this domination was unshakeable until alternative discourses gradually started to appear on the pages of less-controlled newspapers in the late 1960s. Appearance of different discourses, but also the development of both, dominating ideological, and alternative (non-political) journalistic discourses can be successfully analysed using the discourse analytical methods. For example, my research in Study II describes and analyses the development of the official Soviet concept of Estonian history as a typical example of Soviet ideological discourse with canonized expressions and narrative schemes. Proceeding from methodologies of discourse analyses (Fairclough 1992; Chilton & Schäffner 1998; van Dijk 1998; Wodak 2002; van Dijk 2006), I analysed the discursive construction of one specific event – the Soviet *coup d’état* of June 21, 1940. Discourse analysis enabled to bring forth typical discursive and linguistic strategies applied in ideological texts published in newspapers. The discourse analytical methods also disclose the hollowness and falseness of the Soviet ‘newspeak’, the striking strangeness of ideology in Estonian language texts, working rather against than in favour of the Soviet regime. Analysis of the discourses in newspapers of different periods allowed com-

paring the developments and demonstrating the development of alternative discourses in some of the more liberal newspapers, e.g. *Edasi [Forward]* or *Sirp ja Vasar [Sickle and Hammer]* since the end of 1960s (Studies IV, V). Discourse analysis of these less controlled newspapers on the lower levels of the Soviet hierarchical media system enabled me to find cases of intertextuality (mixed discourses, see Fairclough 1992) and various journalistic practices of resistance to the ideological pressure.

In my studies and analyses I have tried to avoid normative narrative schemes. As already argued above, the normative models have many limitations and do not allow seeing the development of the media and press in all its diversity. Therefore, besides totalitarian and liberal narratives (called also progressive or affirmative narratives) radical narratives, questioning the constant progressive linear development, have also spread (Curran 2002; Conboy 2004).

Instead of following a certain narrative scheme, my thesis proceeds from research focuses and the ambivalence of the research object. Thus, the elements of one or another narrative scheme may appear in different studies. My aim is to achieve a balance between different approaches. For example Studies I, III and V, based on the ECP and *Glavlit* documents, include inevitably the elements of *totalitarian narrative*, as the press is described as an object directed and controlled by the power institutions. The more the alternative sources (e.g. memories) in addition to the official texts are used (as in Study IV) the more the elements of *liberal narrative*, reflecting the attempts to resist the control and pressure, occur.

The methodological and theoretical approaches of my studies are closely connected to the sources I have used.

2.2. Empirical sources

My studies have grown out of the historical research analysing the Stalinist cultural politics in Estonia, based on archival documents of the ECP (Kreegipuu 2005). A large part of my research is continuously based on the historical critical analysis of archive documents within their political, social and cultural contexts. To understand and analyse the systems controlling and guiding the Soviet press in Estonia, I have worked with the records of the two main leading power institutions – the Central Committee of the ECP (ECP CC) and Estonian SSR *Glavlit*. The documents of the ECP CC are preserved in the Branch Office of the Estonian State Archives (Party Archive) – ERAF (F 1 – collection No. 1). To find out, which were the mechanisms and practices of control and guidance over the press in ECP, I studied the agendas, minutes and shorthand notes of the meetings of the leading institution of the ECP CC – its Bureau. Extremely helpful tools for a research like this are the archived session records of the ECP CC Bureau for almost the whole Soviet period (with a few gaps). The session records from 1940–1954 have been published (Tannberg 2006), the remainder

are available in ERAF. With the help of those lists, I navigated through all the available documented meetings of the ECP CC Bureau 1940–1985, and picked out the relevant (from my research interest: concerning the press) minutes, shorthand notes or decrees for closer analysis. In addition to the ECP CC Bureau, the documents of other ECP sub-organisations were analysed (e.g. those of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the ECP CC, City Committees in Tartu and Tallinn and of the ECP *Glavlit* organisation). As the editorial offices of every newspaper also had ECP sub-organisations, I have also used some of their materials (e.g. the documents of ECP sub-organisations of editorial offices of *Edasi*, *Rahva Hääl*, *Sirp ja Vasar* and *Noorte Hääl*).

In addition to the CP records, another substantial source of documents is the archives of the ESSR *Glavlit* located in the Estonian State Archives, ERA (F R-17 – collection No. R-17).

Working with official Soviet documents, some specific features of Soviet-time sources are worthy of note. Study I reveals the most important of them as:

Firstly – all of these texts are deeply imbued with Soviet ideology. Even practical working documents of the CP are full of ideological, often hollow expressions and slogans. In fact the ideologization of the official and public language usage was universal in every sphere of the Soviet society. Françoise Thom describes the Soviet Communist language as a *wooden language* that lacks real content, includes very little information and serves the function of being a vehicle of ideology (Thom 1989, 13–15). Therefore researchers should be attentive to recognize the typical ideological schemes and constructions, and look for the contents and information behind the dogmas and canonised expressions. As Veskimägi has argued, the deciphering of the Communist rhetoric deserves more attention than just the translation of a Party decision (Veskimägi 2005, 346). The peculiarities of CP texts as specific constructions full of expressions hiding the reality behind dazzling, bright and beautiful phrases has been also described by other historians working with Party documents (e.g. Tarvel 1999; Kuuli 2005).

Secondly, access to many Party documents has been restricted, as they were not meant for public use. The classification and difficulties of accessing many archives was characteristic to the Soviet archives system throughout its existence with just a minor easing of the restrictions during the first half of the 1960s (Kibal et al 2005). On the other hand, restricting the access to documents of Party and governmental institutions was so common that the stamp ‘classified’ or ‘classified completely’ does not necessarily mean that the documents include anything especially important or mysterious. In many cases, the classified documents are very superficial or even falsified (Pavlova 2002, 8). For example, although all the protocols and shorthand notes of ECP CC Bureau were classified, there are still some issues that were ‘more secret’, and documented and preserved in ‘special files’ (e.g. issues of deportations, personal questions etc.).

The third general aspect of Soviet official documentation is that a great amount of it (even minutes and shorthand notes) is very laconic and declarative, important information is often missing or might be falsified. To understand the messages the documents contain, they should be initially 'located' on the map of institutional bureaucracy. It is very important to know why and for whom the document was composed, if it was meant for 'official' or public use, for Party officers or the 'common people' etc. (Ohmann 1999, 63).

For example, the ECP CC Bureau protocols are strikingly laconic and bureaucratic reflecting mostly the agenda and decisions made. This is explained by the fact that although the meetings were very long with many different issues in agenda, the protocols were kept relatively short and easy to follow. Veskimägi, having studied the ECP CC Bureau documents, has pointed out that the Bureau meetings could last for several hours (on occasion even several days) as the list of issues on the agenda was lengthy, numbering on average more than 2000 per year during 1944–1956 (Veskimägi 2005, 21). On the other hand, the issues on the agenda were usually carefully prepared and often had already been decided on before the meeting, therefore there was not much to discuss or write down in the protocols. A bit more information about backgrounds and processes of decision making can be found from the shorthand notes reflecting the discussions and opinions of Bureau members, but unfortunately not very often. Indeed, the questions of if and to what extent the protocols and shorthand notes reflect what was really discussed or said during the meetings, remains arguable. However, at least during the first years of the Soviet occupation, when the Estonian Soviet institutions were under tight control and the 'constant care' of controllers from Moscow (Estonian Bureau of CPSU CC operating during 1944–1947 and 2nd Secretary of ECP CC appointed directly from Moscow until Stalin's death in 1953), it is unlikely that the ECP CC Bureau dared to falsify the documents. It would have been complicated as the representatives from Moscow Bureau (members of the referred Estonian Bureau) were usually participating in the Bureau meetings; they missed only ten ECP CC Bureau meetings out of 233 during 1944–1947 (Tannberg 2007b, 237). During de-Stalinization the control over the ECP CC Bureau was no longer so tight (the Estonian Bureau was dispelled in 1947), but Moscow control over the ECP CC and its Bureau documentation remained.

One more important aspect to remember while working with the official sources of the Soviet era, is the so-called telephone law – the practice of giving orders, guidance and answers by telephone so that no written evidence remained (Tannberg 2007a, 100). Therefore, there are many 'omissions' in the documents, which means that lots of reasons or outcomes of processes cannot be traced back.

In addition, not all the documents have been kept in the archives – lots of them, especially the censorship materials, were not meant for long-time preservation and were destroyed during the Soviet period. Others were destroyed or removed from Estonian archives and sent to Russia during the collapse of the

Soviet institutional system. For example, when the ESSR *Glavlit* was disbanded in 1990, most of the censorship documents from the period of 1974–1990 were sent to Moscow, and they are no longer available to Estonian researchers (Maimik 1994, 91). The bureaucracy of the Soviet system had produced so many papers that even today the Estonian archives have not been able to completely systematize and organise the former Party archives. Many important documents are kept in Russian archives – the central archives in Moscow and Leningrad. Unfortunately access to Russian archives is limited, since 1993, but especially after the passing of the Archival Law of 2004, the Russian archives have been gradually closed again (Kibal et al 2005, 140).

Taking into consideration all those peculiarities of Soviet-time official texts and documents, alternative sources should also be looked for and used. Excellent empirical bases for revealing the ‘other side’ – responses and reactions to the orders, guidelines and restrictions by Party officials and censors – are the memoirs and biographies of journalists and editors (e.g. Ojamaa 1990; Hiedel 1995; Pallas & Uus 2004; Pallas et al 2006; Pilt 2006; Lõhmus 2006 – memoirs of Juhan Peegel; Lillemäe 2008; Pallas & Uus 2009). Biographical sources have their own specific aspects that researchers should take into account: subjectivity, selectiveness, contradictions with other sources, appearing patterns of blaming or justification, etc. However, biographical texts become a rich and useful material for a historian able to critically analyse narrated stories against their historical backgrounds and in comparison with other sources. Balancing the individual life stories with other narratives and alternative sources, the general tendencies and possible explanations can be disclosed. According to Rutt Hinrikus, the coordinator and researcher of the project *Estonian biographies* (an initiative of collecting biographies of Estonian people from different generations, social groups, etc.), Estonian biographies describing the Soviet period focus on the relationships between an individual and society, describe the traumatic experiences of Stalinist times and various strategies of survival (Hinrikus 2003, 534).

Soviet newspapers and journals are also important sources. As public texts, they reflect the Soviet *newspeak* described above. However, not all newspaper or journal texts are equally uniform in their form and ways of expression. Examples from different newspapers or journals (national *versus* local, cultural and youth press *versus* ECP CC’s publications) and different periods, express the differences resulting from either the ideological importance of the publication, or the ideological shifts of the period. In my studies I have not systematically analysed the newspaper or journal texts as a primary foundation of my research. Instead I have used two different approaches. In Study II, concentrating on the development of the Soviet concept of Estonian history, I have analysed thematically selected texts on the *coup d’état* on June 21, 1940 in *Rahva Hääl*. On the basis of these texts the discursive strategies of constructing, fixing and distributing the scheme and narratives of the Soviet Marxist history were analysed. Another aspect of these texts is that they represent ‘anniversary

journalism'. Anniversary journalism has been considered as one of the main agents in identity building, bringing the community together and mediating the memory by bridging the mental gaps between generations (Zerubavel 1989; Edensor 2006; Harro-Loit & Kõresaar 2010). Therefore analysis of anniversary articles is an appropriate way of exposing the strategies and methods of constructing the Soviet history applied and promulgated by the CP ideologists.

In Studies **III**, **IV** and **V** the newspaper and journal texts were second range sources. The press texts as examples of challenging the system, violating the orders and restrictions of the CP and/or *Glavlit*, were found by following the hints given in the Party and *Glavlit* documents. Some of the intriguing examples from newspapers *Edasi* and *Sirp ja Vasar* were found at random as well, but in cases like this today's researcher has to be extremely careful not to overestimate the 'hidden messages' or misinterpret the texts. To position a text as a practice of challenging the system or an act of resisting the constraints of censorship may be a slippery slope. In retrospective it is not easy to differentiate an accidental misprint from replacing letters or deforming a picture on purpose, or to separate the ideologically devious expressions and articles written clumsily due to the lack of skills and knowledge, from the intentional practices of playing with ideological discourse. Therefore, I have preferred to use the examples where the intentional use of practices or occurrence of 'ideological errors' was confirmed by alternative sources like archival documents or memories of journalists.

Newspapers and journals from the Soviet period remain an interesting and probably inexhaustible database as their gallery of texts, approaches and examples is rich. Knowing the background, analysing the press texts critically and taking into consideration other sources as well, many new interesting academic discoveries are possible.

3. FINDINGS

3.1. The Soviet press as a tool of the Communist Party in implementing the totalitarian project in Estonia

The implementation of the totalitarian project in Estonia was started right after the beginning of Soviet occupation in Estonia in 1940s when every sphere of Estonian society was subjected to the rule and control of Soviet power institutions, headed by the CP. During the first post-war years, the basic principles, methods and practical mechanisms of ideological propaganda were set, by which the press was expected to play extremely important role (Study I). The Soviet press was subjected to the Party in all aspects; everything from the name of the newspaper to the conditions of hiring and firing the staff was decided by the Party institutions (Studies III, V). Other authorities and public institutions, above all the *Glavlit* and *KGB* were also in command of the press. The press, situated into the network of different institutional order-lines, was thus under multi-level control. For example in Estonia about 20 copies of every newspaper and journal were to be sent to different controlling institutions at local and central (Moscow) levels before printing (Maimik 1996, 104).

In Estonia, the most important Party institution governing the press (as everything else in society) was the ECP CC and its Bureau. The everyday work of controlling and guiding the press was assigned to the ECP CC Propaganda and Agitation Department. The common knowledge about the activities of the ECP CC in the sphere of the press is that it exercised direct daily control over all kinds of media, demanding work plans and monitoring them, commenting on the content of articles and programmes, and adjudicating errors and complaints (Høyer, Lauk & Vihailemm 1993, 186). Being more interested in details of how the ECP CC and its highest echelon – Bureau – were doing their everyday work, I have studied the agendas, minutes and shorthand notes of the meetings of the Bureau of 1940–1985 (ERAF collection No. 1, series 4). Among these documents, along with those reflecting common practices and routine work, striking examples of the Bureau's reactions to problems and 'ideological errors' came to light. In general, the documents show how the Bureau tried to put the press to work in order to achieve control over society (how successfully is questionable as discussed below).

As appeared from archival documents, depicted mostly in Studies III and V, the CP supervision over the press was divided into two broad spheres: administrative and ideological. Comparing the time spent and quantity of the issues on the agenda, the administrative work (such as starting and closing newspapers and journals, determining volumes, prices and circulation numbers etc.), clearly dominated the ideological work (formulating and sending out guidelines, discussing the 'political and ideological errors' etc.). Analysis of the ideological work, especially the debates and decisions about the ideological

cases of censorship enables the disclosure of the much wider spectrum of Party supervision over the press than viewing the administrative, often routine work. The documents dealing with the ideological work reflect routine practices of the Bureau in dealing with ideological cases: discussing them in the meetings, making the decisions and punishing the editors or journalists (Study III). On the other hand, the cases that reached the highest level of decision making also reveal the responses and attitudes of the journalists and editors who had deviated from the 'correct ideological course' (Studies III, IV, V).

The administrative and ideological practices of Party supervision and control were based on the basic principles of Soviet journalism. These principles offer a suitable scheme for systematizing the findings from the ECP CC Bureau documents (presented in Table 1).

The third column of this table is a condensation of the most common practices that are reflected in the ECP CC archives. Possibly lots of routine or, on the contrary, extraordinary practices were not documented at all, as usually the minutes are very brief and the shorthand notes do not reflect all cases or background of the decisions. However, the amount of cases dealing with the topics connected with the press proves that the Bureau constantly controlled and guided newspapers and journals as the tools of realizing the totalitarian project. To explain how this was practiced, some explanatory comments are necessary.

- ***Party-mindedness***

Most of the practices of the Bureau in guiding the press were connected to the organs of the ECP CC – the Estonian language newspaper *Rahva Hää* [*People's Voice*], the Russian-language newspaper *Sovetskaja Estonia* [*Soviet Estonia*], the journal *Eesti Kommunist* [*Estonian Communist*], which was established for Party propaganda in 1944 as *Propagandist*, and later published in 1945–1952 under the name of *Estonian Bolshevik*. These publications, unlike the rest of the Estonian press, were regularly discussed at Bureau meetings. The most frequent discussed topic at the Bureau was examining and affirming the plans of ECP CC newspapers and journals. The frequency this topic was discussed was monthly from 1944–1966 and then, as the process became more formal, declined gradually to annually (Study III). The Bureau was worried about the 'formal bureaucratic approach to the question of plans and reports'. Still the Bureau would not (or could not) undertake more serious means than composing the declarative reprimanding decrees, letters and guidelines to the editorial offices or their Party units ordering to put the plans and orders into practice quickly and effectively.

Table 1. The practices of implementation of the Leninist principles of the Soviet journalism by the Bureau of the ECP CC.

Leninist principles*	General practices of the principles	Practices reflected in documents of Bureau of ECP CC
Party-mindedness (<i>партийность</i> ; <i>parteilisus</i>)	All newspapers and journals were the “organs” of the CP.	The Bureau guided and controlled all the press in Estonia; the newspapers and journals of the ECP CC directly, rest of the press through the Party’s sub-institutions.
	CP directed and controlled the press ideologically and economically through giving orders, guidelines; prohibiting and punishing if necessary.	The supervision of the Bureau on two levels: <u>routine work</u> (approving and monitoring the work-plans, reports, composition of editorial staff, circulation numbers, etc.) and <u>case-based work</u> (discussing “ideological mistakes”, certain newspapers etc.).
	Editors and journalists were expected to be members of the CP (at least editors-in-chief of all-republican press).	Editors-in-chief of the central press were included in the ECP CC <i>nomenclatura</i> . The Bureau nominated, hired and fired editors-in-chief and organized meetings and courses to editors and journalists for ideological education.
	A CP unit was founded in editorial offices of every publication.	CP units of editorial offices were under the supervision of the Bureau (the Bureau affirmed the plans, controlled the reports etc.)
High level of ideology (<i>идейность</i> ; <i>ideelisuus</i>)	Party-ideology was the most important feature in the content, form and appearance of the press; ideological slogans and symbols.	The Bureau was following the execution of the <i>ideological directives</i> of the ECP CC, CPSU CC and other important institutions by the Estonian press. The Bureau gave <i>ideological contents</i> to the press by formulating decrees etc.
	The CP set the principles of ideological censorship and also did the practical censoring work.	The Bureau of the ECP CC worked as a censor in ideological matters controlling <i>Glavlit</i> and supervising the CC Propaganda Department, but sometimes problematic cases were also discussed at Bureau meetings.
Popular orientation** (<i>народность</i> ; <i>rahvalikkus</i>)	All printing and publishing in the Soviet Union <i>belonged to the people</i> – i.e. was nationalized and controlled by the CP.	The Bureau controlled and distributed the economic resources in the publishing process and press in general (including amount of paper, sizes of salaries, honorariums, etc.).

	Everyone in the Soviet Union was supposed to have a newspaper or journal <i>of their own</i> – a publication for every social group.	All changes in the settings of newspapers and journals published in Estonia were decided at the Bureau considering regional and social principles. (The decision of starting or closing a publication needed to be coordinated with Moscow).
	The press had to be easily accessible for masses of people.	The Bureau confirmed the volumes, circulation numbers and prices for the whole press in Estonia and controlled the subscription campaigns.
	The press was showing close contacts with the audiences. Every newspaper had to have a net of correspondents and staff working with them.	The Bureau controlled whether and how the editorial boards worked with the correspondents and letters sent to them. The Bureau also organized so-called <i>conferences for the readers</i> to educate the audiences of the press ideologically.
Truthfulness (<i>правдивость; tõepärasus</i>)	The press was supposed to present <i>socialist reality</i> (the ideal Soviet society) instead of what really existed. Press was to be <i>close to real life</i> – i.e. to seem realistic, not too philosophical.	The Bureau was demanding from the press the presentation of an ideal picture of reality. Lots of information was hidden, some topics (e.g. foreign news, life of Estonian refugees) were distorted or forbidden.
	Access to information was restricted, the press could only use controlled information channels (TASS and ETA).	The Bureau regarded the cases when information from the TASS was misprinted or misinterpreted as serious ideological errors. The problems of the local information agency ETA were discussed many times.
Criticism and self-criticism (<i>критика и самокритика; kriitika ja enesekriitika</i>)	Newspapers were obliged to criticize everything <i>ideologically wrong, anti-Socialist, harmful to the Soviet regime</i> , etc. in the society and the press.	The Bureau closely watched all critical notes about the Estonian SSR printed in central press (especially in <i>Pravda</i>) and demanded responses to the criticism (if anything was done or not was controlled by the Bureau as well). The Bureau demanded that Estonian newspapers with <i>Rahva Hää</i> on top should be similarly <i>critical</i> .

Source: Agenda, Minutes and Shorthand notes of ECP CC Bureau of 1945–1985 (ERAF collection No. 1, series 4).

*As already explained in chapter 1.3., translating the principles into English is problematic, therefore the respective terms in Russian and Estonian are presented in brackets after the term in English.

** For the reason that the practices implementing and reflecting the principles were often intermingling and overlapping, I have without explaining the sixth principle of ‘mass character’ included pertinent practices under the principle of ‘popular orientation’.

In addition to routine matters, the Bureau's documents also reveal more intriguing cases of 'ideological mistakes' in the press. The more problematic publications were those not subjected to the ECP directly – e.g. the cultural weekly *Sirp ja Vasar* [*Sickle and Hammer*] being the organ of the ESSR Ministry of Culture or *Noorte Hää* [*Voice of Youth*] being the organ of the ESSR *Komsomol*. Both these newspapers were repeatedly discussed at Bureau meetings, being accused of a low ideological level and insufficient attention towards the appearance of political mistakes. The representatives of the respective institutions were often called to the Bureau meetings, mostly to provide explanations, but also to listen to the charges, to admit to the mistakes and to face the punishments (usually *Party-punishments*, i.e. warnings, reprimands and other bureaucratic means).

Understanding that guidance and control was easier through the Party's sub-organisations, the CP recruited editors and journalists. In fact, the CP membership was more an obligation than a choice for leading journalists and editors-in-chief of the all-Republican press. In some cases editors managed to evade this pressure in order to preserve at least some independence from the Party (Studies III, IV, V).

- ***High level of ideology***

The ideological pressure on the press was especially intense during the initial years of the Soviet occupation in Estonia – the second half of the 1940s. Since the decree of the CPSU "On the journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*" of August 14, 1946, a series of ideological attacks against the intelligentsia and press were launched all over the Soviet Union, including Estonia (Studies I, IV). Soon afterwards, on August 28, the Bureau of the ECP CC issued a decree "On improvement of the ideological work" with a plan of practical measures.⁵ According to this plan the major 'ideological work' was to be done by the press and journalists as 'workers on the ideological front'. The plan foresaw organization of special meetings and courses on ideological topics and propaganda work for journalists, and obliged the Propaganda Department of the ECP CC to discuss as quickly as possible the working plans of all Estonian newspapers, contents of journals, working practices in editorial offices etc.

Similar decisions – setting ideological guidelines, giving assignments and obligations to journalists, were issued throughout the Soviet period. After the Stalinist years, the ideological attacks and campaigns launched by the Bureau became rarer and more tempered. However, the importance of maintaining the 'high level of ideology' was constantly emphasized in practically every press-related case of the Bureau.

⁵ Appendix to ECP CC Bureau protocol from August 28, 1946. – ERAF F 1 N 4 S 319 L 29–44.

- **Popular orientation**

The Soviet Union was governed according to the doctrine of ‘democratic centralism’ in every sphere. In guiding the press, it meant that the press system was a centralized hierarchical organism and democracy was expressed in the slogan “Every social group should have their own newspaper”. In reality, this slogan remained hollow – all newspapers and journals were quite uniform, the dominance of political ideology in form, topics and style was obligatory for every publication at least until the 1960s (Study I). In the 1940s and 1950s, however, even at the meetings of the Bureau sometimes voices appeared, which admitted that newspapers repeated each other and questioned if it was wise to cover the same topics (or even reprint the texts) in the all-Estonian and local press. For example when deciding to close down *Talurahvaleht* [*Peasants’ Paper*] in April 1951, the main argument in the Bureau’s report to the CPSU CC was that the newspaper had lost its audience, as it was just repeating the materials published by the all-Republican and local press.⁶ In fact, another aspect, not mentioned at the Bureau, was that mentioning ‘peasants’ was no longer appropriate in 1951. This social group was wiped out after years of mental and physical repressions (including the mass deportation of 1949); instead of *farms* and *peasants* the Soviet agriculture was built around *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes*. Symptomatically to Soviet hypocritical democracy, the fact that an entire social group was almost eliminated was not mentioned, the Bureau just regarded use this word as inappropriate for a newspaper title.

Gradually the variety of newspapers expanded. In parallel with the development of the hierarchy of newspapers and journals the differences between central and local press grew. The best example is Tartu County and the city paper *Edasi* where various different styles and genres were used and less political, more human interest and everyday topics were covered (Study III).

Another frequent issue concerning popular orientation discussed at the Bureau was the distribution of Soviet newspapers. To ensure that people would really buy and read the newspapers, their circulation numbers were large and their prices were very low. In addition to the regular examining and affirming of these numbers, the Bureau also organized campaigns for distributing the newspapers. Indeed, during the initial months of re-establishing Soviet power in Estonia, in November 1944, the Bureau decided that the CP county organisations must organize a “month of distributing the newspapers in villages” and arrange a campaign called “A newspaper for every family!” (Study III). During the ensuing years such massive campaigns were no longer organized, but promulgating and controlling the subscription and retail processes of the press was in the agenda of the Bureau time and again. The problem the Bureau had to face was that people were more interested in the local press, while the central newspapers, especially the ones not in the Estonian language (including

⁶ Report to CPSU CC secretary comrade Malenkov (appendix to ECP CC Bureau protocol from April 2nd, 1951. – ERAF F 1 N 4 S 122 L 96.

Pravda), were not read particularly eagerly. For example, the “worrying situation of subscribing *Pravda* in Narva, Kohtla-Järve and Tallinn” was discussed in 1967. The solution to the situation according to the decision passed by the Bureau was to “take much more decisive measures” and “to send comrade members of the ECP CC to the mentioned cities”.⁷

The clearest expression of popular orientation was demonstrating the close contacts with the readers. The Party tried to present the communicative role of the Soviet press as being bilateral. On the one hand, the press had to cover the topics close to the ‘ordinary working people’ and journalists were obliged to have direct contacts with their readers. To fulfil the latter task, ‘readers’ conferences’ were organized by the Bureau in order to bring together readers and journalists, but also to arrange ideological propagandistic education for both. At the same time the press had to attain its ‘popular’ face through involving their readers in journalistic work by building up a large net of correspondents (Study III). Problems with the net of correspondents like contacts being too infrequent or a small number of contacts per editorial office were often discussed at the Bureau, which accused the editorial offices of ‘unsatisfactory work with the correspondents’. It should be taken into consideration that the Bureau was making its conclusions mostly on the basis of reports and numbers sent by editorial offices that did not necessarily reflect the real situation. According to the memoirs of the journalists the ‘direct contacts’ were often fabricated, the ‘readers’ letters’ were edited thoroughly or sometimes even written by the members of the editorial staff, as the real problems or complaints in the readers’ letters could often not be published (Study III).

• *Truthfulness*

Truthfulness was probably the most strikingly hypocritical principle of the Soviet journalism concept. The task of the press was not to reflect reality, but to show a picture of the ideal ‘socialist reality’, i.e. to distort (and sometimes hide) the truth instead of following and presenting it. The ‘shortcomings’ described or ‘revealed’ in the press were often standardized and simplified cases brought up just as negative warning examples, but not the real problems or reasons for them. When journalists happened to dig too deep, and came close to uncovering the reasons for the problems instead of skimming the surface, the censors had to intervene. The Bureau frequently discussed the ‘mistakes’ and ‘distortions of reality’ in the press, the cases when journalists had often just reached too close to the truth. If the truth was not in coherence with the Soviet ideology (as often happened) and criticized the shortcomings of the Soviet regime and system, it was labelled to be an ideological mistake.

Information for publishing in the press had to come from accepted sources – the all-Union agency TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) and its

⁷ Protocol of ECP CC Bureau meeting from August 16, 1967. – ERAF F 1 N 4 S 3536 L 105.

local branch ETA (Estonian Telegraph Agency) in Estonia. All the international, central and republican information was to be taken from controlled channels like these, searching for and using the alternative sources was acceptable only in case of local news or problems. The Bureau constantly emphasized the importance of ‘selecting the sources carefully in order to forward the truthful picture of the reality’. Changing or shortening the information given by the TASS or ETA might sometimes result in serious consequences and even punishments. For example, when *Noorte Hää* shortened an announcement of the TASS on June 14, 1947, the Bureau considered it a “brutal political mistake” and the editor was punished with a reprimand.⁸

- **Criticism and self-criticism**

Criticism and self-criticism were important elements of the Soviet journalism concept. Through criticism the press was expected to help the Soviet regime to fight against ‘enemies’ of the Soviet state. While the background idea of the ‘critical press’ was definitely ‘to disclose hostile and detrimental elements’, journalists often used the ‘weapon’ of critique in favour of ‘the little man’ to help him to cope with his everyday life. For example, a journalist of the agricultural department of *Edasi* in the 1960s recalls:

“In these times, there were still many leaders of the collective farms and state farms whom the Party had appointed during the Stalin’s time, and who were ignorant and incompetent and did not manage with their jobs. I think my articles contributed to their removal. It was necessary to get rid of them in order to go further” (Kalm 2009, 182–184).

The principle of criticism and self-criticism appeared in the Bureau documents mostly in the cases of discussing mistakes and shortcomings in the press. Almost every time when *Rahva Hää* or any other publication was discussed and a decision made, the Bureau demanded ‘sharp Communist criticism and self-criticism’ from editorial staffs. The Bureau also demanded that all newspapers should answer to the criticism published about them on the pages of the other newspapers (Study III). An important aspect of the Soviet criticism principle was that the press could not criticize everything and everybody on an equal basis. It was definitely not allowed to criticize the leading power institutions and their leaders, nor the principles of the Soviet system. For example *Glavlit* put a ban on two articles that were to be published in the satirical journal *Pikker* in 1972. According to the report by Adams, the then head of the Estonian *Glavlit*, in those articles “the system of planning was criticized as a whole instead of aiming the critique against the low working discipline of the people and shortcomings that hold back fulfilling the plans”.⁹

⁸ Protocol of ECP CC Bureau meeting from August 18, 1947. – ERAF F 1 N 4 S 432 L 165–166.

⁹ Secret letter of A. Adams, head of ESSR *Glavlit* to ECP CC secretary V. Väljas from October 15, 1973. – ERA F R-17 N 13 S 90 L 8.

The example above leads us to another important feature of the control and supervising system over the Soviet press. In addition to the Party institutions, the press was constantly controlled by the censors of *Glavlit* who were actually doing most of the everyday censoring work. Similar to the CP, the censorship institutions constituted a multilevel hierarchical institutional system, having organisations at central and local levels (Studies III, V). But the Party, the so-called censor of censors dominated and guided *Glavlit* (Study V).

To conclude, the documents of the leading Party institution in Estonia, the Bureau of the ECP CC, clearly demonstrate how the Party supervised the press. The ideological party-minded press was supposed to help to build socialism in Estonia, to legitimate the Soviet power institutions, to ensure the regime and to educate the people to behave, act and think as loyal Soviet citizens.

3.2. The Soviet press as a tool of introducing Soviet history concept and deforming collective memory in Estonia

The axis of the Soviet ideological and mental totalitarian project launched in Estonia as a part of *Soviet cultural revolution* (Study I), was to change the values, norms and mental patterns behind them, to ground 'Communist awareness'. Everybody in Soviet society was expected to share a worldview based on a common understanding about not only the present, but also the past. Therefore, Estonian history was turned into an instrument of sovietization, just as in Russia before World War II and in the annexed territories and Eastern Europe under the socialist rule after the war (Study II). The entire Estonian history had to be rewritten to wipe out the national approach, the basic line of which had been to view Estonian history as a process towards independence, and which had presented the centuries long cultural connections between Estonia and Europe. According to the new Soviet Marxist approach, three basic concepts of Estonian history were imposed on historians: class struggle as a constructive force throughout the history, Russian-Estonian friendship and Estonian-German antagonism. All of those seemed strange and artificial in the context of previous historical knowledge and tradition in Estonia (Study II). Therefore, the Soviet ideologists a great deal of effort into promulgating the new history concept and persuading historians to write books according to the new perspectives. The ECP leaders, headed by Nikolai Karotamm until 1950, were pushing forward the process of publishing Soviet history textbooks, discussing the projects of books and forcing the authors to work quicker. Nevertheless, the pressure was not particularly effective. The first textbook written according to the Soviet scheme *Eesti NSV ajalugu [History of the Estonian SSR]* was not published until 1952, and only after a harsh 'cleansing of cadres of historians' in 1950 and replacing of the previous authors (a collective of historians headed by experienced professor Hans Kruus) with people who had come from Russia (Kuuli

2008). Historians who had been educated and had practiced in independent Estonia could not abandon all the national and professional values and principles and therefore, either resisted the Soviet history concept and were repressed or were silenced and gradually conformed. A way of coming to terms with the new demands was to delve into older history periods (archaeology) or focus on topics as apolitical as possible (demography, economics) and to add to the already familiar old traditional national narrative scheme some compulsory quotations or 'ideologically correct' assessments. It took years of ideological pressure and development of the Soviet education and academic systems to raise a new generation of Marxist or at least more pliable historians. Until that time, the Party ideologists had to write and speak on historical topics by themselves and look for the other voices and channels to promulgate the Soviet history concept. Newspapers as massive and widespread channels were found to be the most suitable devices of promulgating and fixing the Soviet history concept, to show people what was to be remembered and what was to be forgotten about recent and not so recent years.

Study II demonstrates the potential of the press in constructing a myth in Estonian Soviet history. The events of June 21, 1940 – 'voluntary' demonstrations and meetings, parades, speeches, taking over of the government, etc. – were represented in newspapers year by year, while a significant number of the texts, especially in the 1940s were written by Party functionaries and ideologists, not professional historians. The largest number of such articles was published in the ECP organ *Rahva Hää*. Along with typical anniversary articles – commemorative articles, historical overviews and memoirs – the event was also covered in editorials and articles on politics or economics, emphasizing 'the historical importance' of June 21. Gradually, over the years, the *June myth*, specific mythologized interpretation scheme with certain dogmas, exaggerations and falsifications, was formed. Analysing the mythologization of Soviet history several constructive but also destructive argumentation strategies appeared. Study II outlines the following discursive strategies: labelling; showing June 21 as an irreversible turn in Estonian history; exaggerating with numbers and facts in order to show the event as a massive and voluntary act of the Estonian people; the use of aggressive (often military) vocabulary and the creation of illusory historical continuity. A typical discursive strategy, used for constructing the June myth, was the use of different antagonisms, e.g. presenting the 'us-them' confrontation. Thereby, antagonism appeared at different levels – states or political systems; social structures (classes) and ideologies. These basic strategies together with a specific Soviet vocabulary and rhetoric (*newspeak*) that appeared in newspaper texts clearly reflect how the press was used to distort the historical narrative and constructing canonized texts.

Whether and to what scale the official history concept and myths represented on the pages of the press were actually reshaping the Estonian collective memory is a matter of discussion that cannot be analysed simply on the basis of Soviet newspaper texts. In general, researchers having analysed the memoirs

and biographies of Estonian people argue against the uniform acceptance of official Soviet history concept and point out the emergence of alternative histories and double-thinking that mixed public and private interpretations of the past (Wertsch 1998; Kõresaar 2004; Aarelaid 2006).

3.3. Opportunities of the Estonian press to resist ideological pressure and practices of challenging the Soviet control system

Although the Estonian press was turned into a part of all-Union Soviet media model, the Estonian press was not totally uniform throughout the entire period of the Soviet occupation. Due to the changes in Soviet journalism system and general ideological and political shifts, several variations in appeared. For example, relieving the ideological pressure and the relative loosening of censorship rules during the Khrushchev period was vitally important in the development of Estonian press. Journalists started to widen their roles and functions beyond the prescribed propagandistic-ideological one (Studies **III**, **IV**). Another set of factors enabling the Estonian press to broaden its functions resulted from local and national peculiarities, above all holding on to the Estonian language in the press as a resource of national resistance. On a more noteworthy aspect is that, compared to rest of the Soviet republics, Estonia was a bit more open to the West (after the Stalinist years) and certainly more oriented towards Western culture. Thanks to personal contacts (Estonian emigrants) and Western media channels that were partly accessible in Estonia (radio channels like *Free Europe* and *Voice of America* and Finnish TV) part of population was able to broaden the limits of knowledge and experience the Soviet regime had set, and develop critical thinking (Study **IV**). As a result, forcing the press to fulfil the totalitarian project was getting more and more difficult for ideologists and controllers. Even the extensive hierarchically regulated Soviet media system could not put the Soviet press to work in the desired directions effectively enough, largely due to the weaknesses of the media system itself as shown in my Studies **III**, **IV** and **V**.

The main feature that sometimes appeared as complicating or even harming the control and guidance system over the press was its massiveness. Primarily, the multiplicity of the institutions and growing bureaucracy made the system slow and sometimes ineffective (Study **III**). The institutional system controlling the media, giving orders to editorial offices and calling journalists and editors to account consisted of several Party and governmental organisations on local, republican and All-Union levels. The hierarchies and power-relations between these institutions were not always clear. The multiple order-lines were often overlapping and tasks given to the press might contradict each other. On one hand the system of double control put a lot of pressure on the press, on the other hand it left many loopholes in the system for the press to slip through (Study **V**).

As appeared from the studied documents, the hierarchical model, created for making control more efficient, simultaneously also undermined it (Study IV). A relatively looser control since the end of the 1950s and early 1960s gave rise to the development of an alternative discourse in the press and journalistic experiments with styles and topics as, for example, in the local newspaper *Edasi* (Study V) and the cultural press (*Sirp ja Vasar, Loomingu Raamatukogu [The Library of Looming]* – cases researched in Studies III and IV). Last but not least – one more possible ‘weak link’ in the Soviet media system was *the human factor*. How rigidly the rules were followed or interpreted depended a great deal on the personalities and worldviews of the censors as well as of the editors. Many journalists recall some relatively sensible or even helpful censors giving the editors and journalists hints how to manage within the borders of the censorship and warning them if the rules were too obviously violated (Studies III and IV).

Those weaknesses were used by Estonian journalists and editors quite successfully. The practices that did not support the power, but ignored or sometimes even questioned the supremacy of the ideology and the CP appeared in the official press in Estonia. There was no illegal press, at least not similar to *samizdat* in Soviet Russia and elsewhere (Study IV). Instead, the journalistic experiments and practices to introduce new topics, styles and focuses were applied in the framework of the official press, especially in publications placed on the lower levels of control in the media system. This trend can be also viewed as a certain journalistic *contra-project* that since the 1960s aimed at widening the functions of the press beyond the purely ideological and propagandistic ones and containing complex practices of ‘silent resistance’. In my studies III, IV and V, I have given many examples found in the ECP and *Glavlit* documents and the memoirs of journalists and members of editorial staffs. In Study IV two major groups of those practices are described: *discursive* and *editorial practises*. Among the discursive practices, the more frequent were: opposing the journalistic discourse to the political one and using *intertextuality* by mixing the two; *choosing the ‘right’ voice* acceptable to the censors; stressing *the individual perspective* instead of collective one; *purposeful alienation*; *use of Aesopian language* and *analogies* to hide the meaning between the lines or to transfer sensitive topics to the other contexts.

The *editorial practices* include various factors: the ‘*human factor*’, the ‘*time factor*’ as to leave the sensitive articles and topics to the last minute and the ‘*format factor*’ by using the fact that censorship was not equally strict and rigid throughout the entire press (Study IV). In addition, the editors managed to play hide-and-seek with the censors and take advantages of the shortcomings of the huge bureaucratic system described above. A characteristic example that ‘constant control’ was not necessarily so steady is that in February 1968, when *Edasi* was taken under closer supervision because the paper had irritated the control organs too much with its journalistic experiments, the newspaper was published without pre-publishing censorship. The newspaper issues did not

have the censor's label and, according to the memories of an old journalist working at the time in the editorial board, the censor was on her maternity leave and no replacement was found for a short period (Study V).

The last example proves once again that the Soviet media system, although rigid and strict, was not a perfectly functioning mechanism. Still, the basic principles of censorship were persistently strict and intolerant. At the same time, the variety of resisting practices, revealed in my studies, prove that not all journalist and editors were dutifully following the ideological demands. There were always journalists who tested the limits of the *permitted* and *prohibited*, who experimented with new styles and journalistic discourses (Study IV). Society welcomed those fresh tones and accents in the rather grey landscape of the Soviet ideological press system. The publications looking for alternative, more human and apolitical topics and ways of expression were very popular (Viha-lemm & Kõuts 2004). People learned to read 'between and behind the lines', looking for alternative messages among general ideological texts. This was a part of the common dual sense of reality, double-thinking and double-acting formed in Soviet Estonia during the Soviet occupation (Study IV).

4. DISCUSSION

During the fifty years Soviet occupation in Estonia, the Soviet regime went through different stages of development. The decades of ideological and political shifts in CP politics include the repressive and extraordinary strict control of the Stalinist regime of the 1940s and early 1950s, the relatively liberal 1960s and stagnation of the 1970s, the liberal reforms of Gorbachev and finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s. During these decades, the Soviet regime maintained its basic principles of governing – constant ideological pressure and ultimate power of the CP. The learnt behavioural schemes did not necessarily reflect the real approval or adoption of the Soviet ideology by the people. The Soviet model of society in Estonia was ambiguous – on the surface, it was a well-regulated system with multiple Soviet institutions operating under the guidance of the CP and following the principles of Soviet ideology. However, the totalitarian project was not equally successful in every aspect. Although the economic, political and institutional systems were sovietized, the ideological achievements in the cultural and mental spheres were far less successful, if not a failure. It is easy to agree with John Gray who argues that “*whereas the totalitarian project succeeded in many instances, e. g. destroying civil society, it has nowhere forged a new humanity and the project turned out to be a stupendous failure in general*” (Gray 1996, 157). Indeed civil society in its classical format was suppressed under the Soviet regime. Instead of the public sphere being open for critical debates, a closed society was developed where the public initiative was suppressed and all freedoms, including the freedom of the press were seriously restricted. The ideological pressure and the terror of the Stalinist years definitely spread fear among the people, but did not much contribute to reaching a uniform ‘Communist awareness’ and forming a coherent and loyal entity of Soviet people. The failure of the totalitarian project appeared most clearly during the *perestroika* period when dissent voices became public and the potential of suppressed civil society was revived.

The ideological pressure caused different outcomes from collaboration up to resistance against the Soviet regime. The resistance involved a variety of practices ranging from the armed movement in the 1940s (e.g. in Ukraine, Lithuania, but also in Estonia) to mental confrontations (e.g. the dissident movements in the 1970s). Sometimes the resistance was neither aimed directly against the Soviet regime nor had any political ambitions, but its goal was to protect existing traditions and prevent abrupt and violent changes in social structures and institutions. The practices of ‘silent resistance’ in the Estonian press were mostly expressions of this kind of ‘structural resistance’ – journalists and editors tried to develop and maintain journalistic styles and conventions, and opposed the pressure for turning the press into a pure propaganda tool.

The main resource that helped to resist the Soviet ideological and mental pressure in Estonia was the Estonian language. The attempts at sovietizing the language – turning Estonian into Soviet *newspeak* full of ideology and specific

rhetoric – were not particularly successful. It has been claimed that the Estonian language was not receptive to Soviet vocabulary and ideological phraseology and that Soviet exclamations lost their earnestness when translated, and turned into parodies (Lauristin & Vihalemm 1993a, 26). In other words – the ideological expressions were so obviously strange and out of context that they could be easily discerned and ignored (Study I).

An additional aspect that diminished the chances of success for the totalitarian project in Estonia was the relative openness and orientation since the 1960s towards the West. The information, attitudes and values dripping through the iron curtain reduced the expected effects of the Soviet ideological propaganda.

As it appears, the most important elements of the totalitarian project – the mental suppression of people and educating *homo sovieticus* who would not only know the accepted norms and values, but also would follow them sincerely being genuinely loyal and devoted to the Soviet regime – was not achieved in Estonia. The failure of this Soviet experiment is also reflected by the findings of my studies dealing with the attempts at distorting the collective memory of Estonian people. Since the Soviet version of Estonian history was the only officially accepted interpretation (intensively promulgated in school education, history literature and the media) it was widely known among the Estonian population. Another question is to what extent this official version was adopted. The aggressive methods of propagating the new history concept caused remarkable antipathy let alone the obvious exaggerations, falsifications and simplification of presenting events and processes of the past. The attitude of the people towards the official history was ambivalent. The official history was not accepted as the only possible way of understanding the past. Alternative interpretations based on the collective memory and prohibited history books of the Independence period spread in the private sphere (Study II, Wertsch 1998; Wertsch 2002; Aarelaid 2006). The mission of carrying on the ‘true history’ was so strong that it appears in the attitudes of Estonian older generation even today. Rutt Hinrikus, collector and analyst of “Estonian life-stories”, has pointed out that the authors belonging to the generation born after World War II, see themselves as the historians of their generation with a strong mission of retaining the ‘historical truth’ (Hinrikus 2003, 210). The parallel history interpretations simultaneously contradicted and influenced each other (Wertsch 1998), while sometimes their elements mingled. For example, the generation having no personal memories from pre-Soviet times constructed its historical knowledge by taking something from the official history learned at school or read from public texts and mixing them with alternative stories heard at home. Therefore, I would not agree with John Gray who argues that the traditional identities of the people in the Soviet Union were in no way compromised by the decades of totalitarian indoctrination (Gray 1996, 248). The fact that traditional and national identities were not completely suppressed does not implicitly mean that the identities remained untouched. Although in general, the totalitarian

mental project failed, the constant ideological pressure did have its effects, mostly in the direction of a passive acceptance of the Soviet regime.

Similar to the other spheres of life, the press was under the 'constant care' of the Soviet authorities. The analysed sources, however, also revealed certain contradictions, insecurity and clumsiness within the massive multilevel and bureaucratic system of the mental control. The mechanisms of control and supervision over the press often operated slowly; the multi-fold and occasionally overlapping chains of command rather confused than strengthened the system. Although the Soviet censorship in Estonia remained immutable throughout the whole Soviet period (Veskimägi 1996, Zhirkov 2001), the shortcomings appearing in the guidance and control system provoked some journalists and editors to make use of those weaknesses, and to bypass the ideological pressure and censorship at least in some aspects. Knowing that the chains of command sometimes confused even the bureaucrats, playing the officials against each other or surpassing some links in the system, the most skilful journalists and editors were able to bypass some orders or restrictions. In many cases, testing the borders of allowed and forbidden and looking for opportunities to cheat the controlling eye caused serious consequences for the journalists. Therefore, the cases of challenging the control system were not particularly frequent. The findings of my studies reveal that the cases of 'mistakes and ideological errors in the press' described in the ECP and *Glavlit* archives are relatively rare. Indeed, the sources I have used do not reflect the complete gallery of used practices. The documentation of the controlling institutions only exposed the cases that were 'caught'. We do not know how many other cases of 'silent resistance' slipped by the eyes of the censors. Sometimes, editors and journalists also got punished for unintentional errors. Comparing the documents, gathering additional data from other sources and interviewing veteran journalists, however, enables to the creation of an outline of some typical practices used for expressing non-agreement with the ruling regime. Journalists challenged the controllers by using the imperfectness of the censorship mechanism, by enlarging the amount of journalistic discourse at the expense of political discourse and using the techniques of writing between the lines. Various discursive and editorial practices presented in my Studies confirm the earlier findings about journalists' adaptation to the incommodious conditions of the Soviet media system. Alongside a small group of conformists and *nomenclatura* journalists, a remarkable number of editors and reporters dared to test the limits of what was allowed, and what was not, without coming into an open confrontation with the system (Lauk 1999). Journalists tried to avoid a strong personal involvement in the system preferring apolitical topics and emphasizing general human and moral values (Lauk 2005a). In most cases, the main goal of journalists was not to attack the regime, but to avoid contributing to the propaganda journalism as much as possible and to follow their professional aspirations. An older generation journalist recalls in his memoirs:

“We made an abrupt change in our newspaper and introduced a policy of following the readers’ interests and not these of the authorities. This “heresy” did not, however, extend to a mutiny against the almighty totalitarian system. We were inspired by the natural aspiration of a professional journalist to make a good newspaper that people read, value and like” (Uus 2009, 231).

This quotation reflects that an ideological contribution was disfavoured among journalists, but they still had to obey the Party guidelines if they wanted to keep their jobs (Study IV).

The most important factor that caused the emergence of alternative journalistic practices was the maintenance of cultural resources of resistance. Instead of mechanically adopting the Soviet ideological thinking models and behavioural schemes, the so-called double-thinking (Aarelaid 2006) was developed. People learned not just to act, but also to think differently in public and private spaces. This kind of ‘double-thinking’ appeared in the press as well. As a result, the Soviet press in Estonia was not performing as a pure Soviet ‘brain-washing machine’ but was simultaneously a tool of cultural resistance as pointed out by many researchers (Lauristin & Vihalemm 1997b, 75; Ruutsoo 2004, 126).

As demonstrated in my Studies, analysis of the documents of the controlling institutions gives a lot of information on the practices of ‘silent resistance’ in the press. In order to get a more complete picture, it is necessary to expand the basis of sources including in-depth interviews with former journalists and editors. Another challenging way of researching journalistic practices of deviating from the ‘correct ideological course’ is a systematic analysis of journalistic texts.

CONCLUSIONS

My research confirms that the press in Soviet Estonia played simultaneously two rather contradictory roles: first, serving as a propaganda tool for strengthening the power of the CP and second, indirectly resisting the same power. Studying this phenomenon, the following three research questions are answered.

I Which role was reserved for the press in carrying out the totalitarian project in Estonia?

In the course of the sovietization of the Estonian society, the old press system was completely destroyed and replaced by a new, Soviet Estonian press. The totalitarian project could not have success without attempting to control people's minds. A hierarchical press system was built up for propagating Soviet ideology. At the same time, the hierarchical construction, as well as the CP's supervision, enabled quite efficient control over the content of the press (Study I, Study III). The press became simultaneously an object of the ideological manipulation (e.g. the attacks against 'non-ideological' press in the 1940s presented in Study I) and a means of Party propaganda and agitation (Studies III, IV). The concept of Soviet journalism was set by the CP according to so-called Leninist principles of the press (party-mindedness, popular orientation, high level of ideology, truthfulness, criticism and self-criticism, and mass character). In order to ensure that the Soviet press was fulfilling the expected role of the Soviet propagandist, an enormous network of controlling and supervising institutions was established with the CP and its apparatus at the top (Studies III, V). The most efficient tool for controlling the press was Soviet censorship, implemented through three main institutional lines: the state censorship administration (*Glavlit*), the CP and the security institutions. The *Glavlit's* censors carried out the everyday pre and post-publishing censorship, following the guidelines and orders given by the Party. In addition, the lists of state and military secrets composed by security institutions, guided the work of censors. The 'top censor', and the most important controller and supervisor of the press in Estonia was the ECP with its apparatus on central and regional levels up to the CP sub-organisations in editorial offices (Studies III, V). Thus the control over the press was multilevel – all national controlling institutions were subordinated to their equivalents on the All-Union level. This situation ensured that the control over the press was in general effective. No substantial alternative or illegal press in Estonia emerged (Study IV). Thus, the Soviet regime managed to create an ideological party-minded press that was used for implementing the totalitarian project. On the other hand, the effects of this brainwashing mechanism remained questionable. A certain silent cultural opposition developed inside the same system and was maintained by journalists and other intellectuals.

II How was the press used to introduce and propagate the Soviet history concept in order to reshape the Estonian collective memory?

An important part of implementing the Soviet totalitarian project was reshaping people's mentalities according to the Soviet socialist worldview. This stupendous project of rebuilding identities involved, among other elements, the distortion of collective memory. In my studies 'collective memory' is understood as a form of knowledge learnt from various resources, and not in confrontation with 'history' or 'historical knowledge' (Study II). A common understanding of the past is an important part of the collective memory of a nation and a basis for a shared spirit of opposition against the oppressor. Therefore, in Estonia after the annexation of 1940, a new version of the nation's history was created in accordance with the canons of Marxism-Leninism. During the initial years of the Soviet regime, when 'ideologically correct' history books had not yet been published, the press was playing an especially significant role in forming and propagating the 'correct' version of Estonian history (Study II). The Soviet concept of Estonian history was built up on dogmas such as the historical Russian-Estonian friendship and the eternal Estonian-German antagonism, the class struggle and the vanguard role of the CP in society. These elements were obligatory in every historical study or text whatever period or topic of Estonian past was concerned. Their function was to create 'historical bridges' between the Estonian and Russian history, and to prove that the Soviet regime in Estonia was historically not only the best but also legitimate. In addition to using ideological dogmas, details of some historical events were gradually changed to the extent that their descriptions rather presented myths than real events. One such myth was the 'June myth' about the Soviet coup d'état in Estonia on June 21, 1940, when the Estonian government was replaced by the Soviet one. This myth, emphasizing the 'revolutionary' character of the events and historical importance of the day, was gradually worked out in, and by, the press. In the annual anniversary articles in the newspapers, Party ideologists, historians and sometimes also journalists moulded a 'correct' ideological framework and narrative scheme for the June event. Using discourse analysis of the texts on the events of June 21, 1940 from the period of 1945–1960, Study II depicts several discursive strategies, such as polarization of 'us' *versus* 'them', use of exaggerations, inappropriate generalisations, falsification, tendentious selection of facts etc. The aim of all this was to demonstrate that June 21 pushed the 'bourgeois and degenerate' Estonia to a 'new way of development towards happiness and wealth', and also to prove that the Soviet power was legal and a voluntary choice of the Estonian people. On the contrary to the expectations of the Soviet ideologists, the 'June myth' along with several other myths and dogmas of the Soviet history was not adopted by the majority of the Estonian people. Instead, parallel 'unofficial' histories based on the common experience and memory were maintained and passed on to the next generations in the private sphere. However, the aggressive propaganda of the Soviet Marxist history concept was partly successful, as for example, James Wertsch (1998, 2002)

demonstrates. The younger generations, educated in the Soviet schools, when experiencing certain gaps in their knowledge of ‘what really happened’, filled these gaps with the details coming from the official version of history.

As my studies have not analysed nor measured the range of the effects of official Soviet history concept, I would not draw any further conclusions here.

III Which opportunities were available for the press and journalists in Estonia to resist or ignore the Soviet ideological pressure and control? How successful were the practices of using these possibilities?

The answers to the first two research questions demonstrate the overwhelming scope and all-penetrating character of the Soviet censorship system. At the same time, this system was far from perfect. One source of the shortcomings was the massiveness of the controlling mechanism. The multiplicity of institutions and large number of officials slowed down the operation and caused confusion as the power-relations between different institutions were not always clear and the chains of command often overlapped, sometimes even contradicted each other (Study **III**). Several journalists and editors learned how to make use of these shortcomings, how to play officials against each other and find the ‘loopholes’ in the censorship system. The hierarchical structure of the Soviet media system made it easier to control the publications, but also enabled circumventing the control on lower levels. In the cultural, youth and local press, which were less strictly controlled and particularly so from the 1960s onwards, the proportion of apolitical, journalistic discourse increased (Study **IV**). In addition, personal relationships or a ‘human factor’ played a role in undermining the strictness of censorship. Knowing the attitudes of the censors and having good personal relationships with some of them, the editors sometimes succeeded in publishing ideologically dubious material (Studies **III, IV, V**).

The documented cases of deviations from the ‘correct ideological course’ were not particularly effective – in fact, they represent failed attempts, which resulted in punishing the journalist, editors or censors. However, they witness the existence of a certain ‘silent resistance’. It is highly possible that many similar cases were not disclosed, since the limits between ideologically ‘correct’ and ‘wrong’ were not always easy to define even for the censors or Party ideologists. At least, journalists’ memoirs confirm this quite clearly.

The existence of the ‘silent resistance’ confirms that the Estonian press did not perfectly serve the ideological purposes of the totalitarian project, and in many occasions, even undermined it.

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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN

Nõukogude Liidu kokkuvarisemisest möödunud kahekümne aasta jooksul on nõukogude ajakirjandust Eestis uuritud mitme tahu alt. Uurimisvõimaluste avardades ning ajalise distantsi kasvades on laienenud allikaline baas (arhiividokumentide osaline avalikustamine, mälestuste kogumine ja kirjanemine jne) ning rakendatud erinevaid uurimismetoodikaid. Eesti uurijate töö tulemused näitavad, et ajakirjandus Eesti NSV-s, olles küll tugevalt allutatud kommunistliku partei kontrollile ja laiahaardelisele tsensuurile (Maimik 1994; Maimik 1996; Lauk 1999; Lauk 2005a; Lauk 2005b), ei olnud ometi pelgalt nõukogude propaganda tööriist, vaid omandas ühiskonnas ka alternatiivseid funktsioone. Alates 1960ndate aastate üldisest ühiskonna liberaliseerimisest, kujunesid nõukogude ajakirjanduses ideoloogilise ja poliitilise diskursuse kõrval välja alternatiivsed väljendusviisid, avarus käsitletavate temade ring (vt. Hoyer, Lauk & Vihalemm 1993; Harro 2000; Lauk 2005a). Need tendentsid avaldusid eeskätt kohalikes ajalehtedes, kultuuri- ja noorteajakirjanduses, mis selleks ajaks väljakujunenud ja Eestis tööterakendunud nõukogude ajakirjandussüsteemi hierarhilise mudeli kohaselt olid n-ö “vähemtähtsad” ja sellest tulenevalt ka vähem kontrollitud (Lauristin & Vihalemm 1997a). Vaatamata tsensuuriolude ja kontrolli jäigastumisele ning uusvenestuse survele 1970ndatel ning 1980ndate algul, ei muutunud trükiajakirjandus Eestis tervikuna enam kunagi täiesti ideoloogiliseks, nn inimlike temade käsitlemine ja alternatiivsete väljendusvõimaluste otsimine ning kasutamine jäi Eesti ajalehtedes ja ajakirjades püsima. Kõik see on andnud alust käsitleda ametlikku nõukogude ajakirjandust Eestis kultuurilise vastupanuressursina, mis aitas alal hoida rahvuskeelset kirjakultuuri ning kanda võimaluste piires edasi kultuuritraditsioone (Lauristin & Vihalemm 1997b, 75; Ruutsoo 2004, 126).

Minu doktoritöösse koondatud artiklid ja käesolev katustekst käsitlevadki **nõukogude ajakirjandust Eestis mitmepalgelisena – ühelt poolt kui ideoloogilist propagandarelva ning kommunistliku partei tööriista ning teisalt kui etteantud ideoloogilist kurssi eiravat või koguni sellele vastuastuvat ühiskondlik-kultuurilist nähtust. Eesmärk on arhiividokumentide (EKP ja ENSV *Glavliti* arhiivid) ja ajakirjanike mälestuste toel avada nõukogude ajakirjanduse erinevaid rolle, tutvustada nende eesmärke ja rakendamise viise ning diskuteerida rollide täitmise edukuse üle.**

Oma uurimisobjekti – nõukogude trükiajakirjandus Eestis – käsitlen *totalitaarse projekti* (Gray 1996) raamistuses. Selle eksperimendi puhul, mille lõppeesmärgiks oli totaalise kontrolli saavutamine terves nõukogude ühiskonna üle, on õigupoolest tegemist nn katusprojektiga, mille all võib eristada väiksemaid omavahel seotud ja sageli läbipõimunud projekte (nt majanduslikud, kultuurilised, ideoloogilised, poliitilised jne). Sellise projektipõhise lähenemise eeliseks on võimalus käsitleda nõukogude ühiskonda mitte veel totalitaarsena vaid sellesuunalises protsessis olevana. Oma uurimustes olen eristanud võimuorganite ja nõukogude ideoloogide eesmärke ning nende realiseerumist aja-

kirjanduspraktikas. Nõukogude ajakirjandus pidi aitama ülddist kontrolli kehtestavaid ja parteilist juhtimist rakendavaid projekte ellu viia pea kõigis valdkondades, olles ise seega nii totalitaarse projekti tööriist kui ka selle objekt. Tegelikuses ei saavutanud aga nõukogude režiim repressioonidele ja püsivale ideoloogilisele survele vaatamata ühiskonna üle kunagi täielikku kontrolli, ei suutnud muuta nõukogude kodanikke ühesuguse kommunistliku ilmavaatega lojaalseks *nõukogude rahvaks*. Ka ajakirjandus ei saanud ega jäänud üksnes leninlikku dogmat järgivaks “kollektiivseks propagandistiks ja agitaatoriks”. Seepärast ei pea ma klassikaliseks kujunenud lähenemist nõukogude ajakirjandusele kui totalitaarselt toimivale süsteemile (nt Siebert et al 1956) sobivaks. Avamaks paremini ka oma uurimisprobleemi teist poolt, olengi normatiivse mudeli asemel käsitlenud nõukogude ajakirjandust projekti kontekstis, mis püüdis küll (ja suuresti edukalt) totalitaarsete eesmärkide poole, kuid ei tähendanud veel totalitaarse süsteemi igakülgset toimimist ja rakendumist. Pigem tingisid jäik surve ja kontroll neile vastanduvate *kontraprojektide* väljakujunemist, näiteks keeleline-kultuuriline vastupanu ideoloogilise propaganda massilisele pealetungile, mille kandjaks Eestis osutus ka ajakirjandus (vähemalt alates 1960ndatest aastatest).

Käesolevasse töösse koondatud uurimused võib tinglikult jagada kolmeks. Ühelt poolt olen uurinud parteilise ajakirjanduse juhtimise peamisi rakendusemehhanisme ja -praktikad Eestis (uurimused **III**, **V**). Tuginedes EKP (Keskkomitee, selle büroo ja ajalehtede parteialgorganisatsioonid) ning tsensuuriametkonna ENSV *Glavlit*-i arhiivimaterjalidele, püüdsin üldiste printsiipide ja ideoloogiliste põhimõtete kõrval välja selgitada ka konkreetseid tegevuspraktikaid. Seejuures tuli arvestada üldise ideoloogilise tausta ja nõukogude aja allikate eripäradega, mida olen selgitanud esimeses doktoritöösse kaasatud artiklis (uurimus **I**). Teiselt poolt hakkas mind nõukogude ajakirjandusele ettekirjutatud funktsioonide analüüsimisel huvitama, kuidas püüti ajakirjanduse abil muuta inimeste maailmavaadet ja identiteeti. Konkreetsemalt keskendusin ajaloomälu ümberkujundamisele Eesti ajaloo nõukoguliku kontseptsiooni juurutamise teel, mida nõukogude võimu algaastatel Eestis tehti justnimelt ajakirjanduse vahendusel. Seejuures rakendasin ajakirjandusteksti analüüsimisel diskursusanalüüsi metoodikat, selgitamaks välja erinevaid ajaloomälu ümberkujundamisel rakendatavaid diskursiivseid strateegiaid (uurimus **II**).

Nõukogude ajakirjanduse n-ö teise poole valgustamiseks püüdsin välja selgitada, kuidas reageerisid ideoloogilisele survele ajakirjanikud ja toimetajad, kas ja kui võrd saadi, püüti ja osati püsivale tsensuurile ja ideoloogilisele survele vastu seista. Selleks analüüsisime arhiividokumentide ja ajakirjanike mälestustele tuginedes koos kaasautori professor Epp Lauguga erinevaid “vastupanustrateegiaid”, milles avaldusid kas nõukogude ideoloogilise surve eiramine või sellele lausa vastuhakkamine (uurimus **IV**).

Oma töö peaesmärgile olen lähenenud kolme uurimisküsimuse kaudu, millest tulenevad järgmised järeldused:

I Millises rollis nägi nõukogude võim ajakirjandust totalitaarse projekti elluviimisel Eestis?

Eesti sovetiseerimist, mida võib käsitleda ka üldise totalitaarse projekti vallandamisena, alustati kohe pärast Eesti annekteerimist 1940. aastal ning jätkati pärast taasokupeerimist 1944. aastal. Koos võimustruktuuride ülevõtmisega hävitati vanad ühiskondlikud struktuurid ning alustati massiivset ideoloogilist pealetungi. Just ideoloogiast kujuneski nõukogude võimu tugisammas, mis koos stalinistlike repressioonide ja terroriga pidi kiiresti läbi lõikama kõik varasemad traditsioonid ning toetama uute nõukogulike institutsioonide ja ühiskondlike struktuuride toimimist (uurimus **I**). Olulist rolli selles ideoloogilises kasvatus-töös pidi täitma ajakirjandus. Varasemad ajakirjandustraditsioonid katkestati, ajakirjandusväljaanded suleti või muudeti täiesti nõukogulikeks ning asuti üles ehitama nõukogulikku meediasüsteemi, võttes üle ühtse üleliidulise skeemi (uurimus **III, V**).

Ajakirjanduse kontrollimiseks rajati juhtimis- ja kontrollimehhanismide süsteem, mille eesotsas oli Kommunistlik Partei ja selle aparaat (Eesti tasandil oli tähtsaimaks institutsiooniks EKP Keskkomitee büroo). Ajakirjanduse parteiline juhtimine avaldus nii administratiivsel kui ideoloogilisel tasandil, peamiseks parteipoolseteks juhtimismehhanismideks olid otsused, määrused, suunised. Igapäevaselt aitas ajakirjandust kontrollida ning “õigel ideoloogiliselt kursil” hoida püsiv tsensuur. Selle elluviimiseks oli omakorda tööle rakendatud terve asutuste võrk eesotsas tsensuuriametkonna *Glavlit*-iga, mille ametnikud tegelesid igapäevaselt trükiste eel- ja järeltsenseerimisega, töötasid välja ning uuendasid tsensuurieskirju jne. *Glavlit* omakorda lähtus partei ja julgeolekuorganite käskudest ja ettekirjutustest, kes määratlesid tsenseeritava sisu ja kontrollisid omakorda tsensorite tööd. Ka tsensuuriküsimustes oli kõrgeima tasandi otsustaja partei, kes lisaks üldiste suuniste väljatöötamisele tegeles ka otsese tsensuuritööga (uurimus **V**). EKP KK büroo koosolekute materjalid tõendavad, et EKP KK Propaganda- ja Agitatsiooniosakonna kõrval, mille pädevuses tsensuuriküsimused üldiselt olid, arutati neid ka büroo koosolekutel. Korduv “ajakirjanduse ideoloogiliste vigade” kajastumine protokollides, karistuste määramine toimetajatele ja ajakirjanikele (või karistamise delegeerimine teistele ameti- ja parteiasutustele) büroo dokumentides näitab, et ajakirjanduse juhtimisele ja kontrollimisele pöörati Eesti NSV kõrgeima võimuorgani igapäevases töös märkimisväärselt suurt tähelepanu (uurimused **III, V**).

Ajakirjanduse kontrollisüsteem oli mitmetasandiline ja keerukas. Lisaks juba nimetatud parteile (ka iga väljaande toimetuse juurde oli rajatud oma partei algorganisatsioon), *Glavlit*ile ja julgeolekuorganitele, olid mitmed ajakirjandusväljaanded seotud veel teiste ametkondade või valitsusasutustega (nt *Noorte Hää* oli ELKNÜ väljaanne ja seega komsomoliorganisatsiooni juhtida ja vastutada). Seejuures oli parteilisel ja ametkondlikul juhtimissüsteemil mitu tasandit – kohalik, vabariiklik ja üleliiduline. Niisiis valitses ajakirjanduse juhtimises käsuliinide paljusid ja kohatine kattuvus (uurimus **III**). Sellises topeltkontrolli olukorras suudeti Eestis tagada, et kogu ajakirjandus oli vähemalt väliselt

muudetud süsteemi osaks, illegaalset ajakirjandust välja ei kujunenud (uurimus IV). Seega osutavad minu uurimused, et teatud määral totalitaarne projekt õnnestus. Eesti ajakirjandus inkorporeeriti hierarhilisse tsentraalselt juhitud nõukogude ajakirjandussüsteemi, suudeti luua selline ideoloogiline ja parteiline ajakirjandus, mis pideva ideoloogilise propaganda esitaja ja levitajana töötas totalitaarse projekti heaks. Omaette küsimus on, kas ja kuivõrd mõjusaks see propaganda osutus.

II Kuidas aitas nõukogude ajakirjandus kaasa Eesti ajaloomälu ümberkujundamisele ja nõukoguliku ajalookäsitluse juurutamisele?

Üheks osaks nõukogude totalitaarsest projektist oli ühiskonna vaimne tasalülitamine – püüe saavutada kontroll inimeste mõttemaailma üle. See tähendas omakorda rahvuslike identiteetide hävitamist ning uue “*nõukogude rahvuse*” konstrueerimist e nn “*homo sovieticuse*” kasvatamist. Üheks osaks loodava “rahvuse” identiteedist pidi olema minevikukäsitlus, mis tugineuks senise rahvusliku ajaloomälu asemel nõukogulikule ajalootõlgendusele. Viimase alustoeiks oli marksistlik ajaloo tõlgendusskeem iseloomulike ideoloogilise värvingu ning kindlate dogmadega. Näiteks Eesti ajaloo ümberkujundamisel said uue minevikutõlgenduse keskseteks kontseptsioonideks, klassivõitlus, põline eesti-vene sõprus ja saksavastatus (uurimus II). Kujundati välja ajaloomüüdid – teatud sündmuste ja nähtuste kujutamise kindlad mudelid ja ühesed tõlgendusskeemid. Üheks selliseks mütologiseeritud sündmuseks oli nn *juunipööre* –1940. aasta 21. juuni sündmused, mil Eestis seati ametisse nõukogude valitsus. Aja jooksul kujunes välja *juunimüüt*, millele oli iseloomulik nõukogude võimu kehtestamise demonstreerimine vabatahtliku, Eesti rahva poolt mitte ainult tervitatud vaid rahva aktiivsel osavõtul toimunud sündmusena (uurimus II). Selle müüdi kujundamise olulisemaiks vahendiks sai just ajakirjandus, kuna esialgu veel puudusid ajalooraamatud ja -õpikud, õigupoolest ajaloolasedki, kes oleks soovitud lähiajalooaga etteantud ideoloogilises raamistuses tegeleda. Oma artiklis analüüsisin erinevaid diskursiivseid strateegiaid ja argumenteerimistaktikaid, kuidas juunimüüti kujundati kõige selgemalt ideoloogilist diskursust esindavas ajalehes – EKP KK häälekandjas *Rahva Hää* (uurimus II). Seejuures võisid aastatel 1945–1960 ajaleheartiklid üksteisest märkimisväärselt erineda, tüüpilised tõlgendusskeemid ja ideoloogiline käsitlusviis juunisündmustest kujunesidki välja umbes 1960. aastaks. Siinkohal pidi ajakirjandus töötama totalitaarse vaimse-kultuurilise projekti agendina – aitama juurutada dogmaatilisi ja ideoloogilisi ajaloo tõlgendusskeeme, et kinnitada ja kindlustada nõukogude võimu parimust ja legitiimsust Eesti alal.

Samas jõudsin ajalehetekstide analüüsi kõrval teisi allikaid ja käsitlusi läbi töötades (nt Wertsch 1998; Wertsch 2002; Aarelaid 2006) järeldusele, et ei juunimüüdi ega nõukoguliku ajalookäsitluse levitamine tervikuna ei osutunud täielikult edukaks. Kõrvuti avalikult propageeritava ajalookäsitlusega kujunesid privaatsfääris välja nn “alternatiivsed” (“mitteametlikud”) rahvuslikke väärtusi ja tõlgendusi kandvad ajalood. Seega ei osutunud ajaloomälu ümberkujunda-

mise osas totalitaarne projekt edukaks. Kui ka ametlikud ja mitteametlikud ajalookäsitlused üksteist mõjutasid, nagu on väitnud James Wertsch (1998), ei tähendanud see kindlasti nõukoguliku ajaloo- ja minevikukäsitluse võitu rahvusliku üle. Selle asemel kujunes Eesti ajalookäsitluse vallas välja oma-moodi *ajalooline kontraprojekt* – nn “päris ajaloolise tõe” edasikandumine privaatsfääris ja suuliselt. Nõukogude ajakirjanduses sellele avalikult kohta ei olnud, kuid 1960.–1970ndate ajakirjandusest võib leida vihjeid ja viiteid faktidele ja tõlgendustele, mis ametlikus nõukogude ajalookäsitluses ei kajastunud, vaid peegeldasid pigem nn “mitteametlikku” ajalugu.

III Millised olid ajakirjanduse võimalused Eestis ideoloogilisele survele vastu seista ja mil määral see õnnestus?

Kahe esimese uurimisküsimuse osas jõudsin järeldusele, et ajalehed ja ajakirjad Eesti NSV-s esindasid nõukogude ajakirjandust, mis allutatuna partei kontrollile, levitas ja propageeris võimu ideoloogiat. Samas ilmnes, et hoolimata ajakirjanduse juhtimis- ja kontrollisüsteemi massiivsusest ja jäikusest, ei pruukinud oodatavad eesmärgid sugugi mitte alati realiseeruda. Paradoksaalselt ei toimunud süsteemi hierarhilisus ja topeltkontroll alati mitte seda tugevdava vaid vahel hoopis nõrgestavana. Massiivsusest tulenes kohmakus ja aeglus; aasta-aastalt kasvava bürokraatia tingimustes võis käsuliinide jälgimine ja järgimine mitte ainult asjaajamist tarbetult pikendada vaid ka probleeme ja vastuolusid tekitada (nt. juhtudel kui käsuliinid kattusid ja otsustusõigus ei olnud täpselt fikseeritud) (uurimus III). Hierarhiline ajakirjandussüsteem omakorda tingis olukorra, milles mõned ajalehed ja ajakirjad (nt. kohalik press, noorte- ja kultuuriajakirjandus) olid väiksema ideoloogilise kontrolli ja surve all. Kontrollisüsteemist tulenevaid nõrkusi ja/või võimalusi oskasid omakorda edukalt ära kasutada ajakirjanikud ja toimetajad (uurimused III, IV, V). Eriti alates 1960ndatest aastatest, kui ühelt poolt olid välja kujunenud ajakirjanduse juhtimis- ja kontrollisüsteemid ning teisalt ühiskonna üldiselt liberaalsema õhustiku tingimustes ideoloogilisem surve leebem, õppisid ajakirjanikud ja toimetajad kasutama mitmeid “vastupanustrateegiaid”. “Vastupanu” tähistab siinkohal mitte niivõrd otsest vastuhakku võimule vaid laiemat vastuseisu nõudele teha ainult ja puhtalt ideoloogilist ajakirjandust. Minu käsitlustes on vastuseisvatena režiimi nõuetele käsitletud ka püüet ideoloogilist survet ignoreerida või võimaluste piires tsensuurinõudmistest mööda hiilida selleks, et proovile panna ja arendada oma professionaalseid oskuseid. Suurem osa Eesti nõukogude ajakirjanikest olidki n-ö vaiksed kohanejad, kes ei püüdnud mitte niivõrd aktiivselt võimule vastu töötada vaid soovisid kohustusliku ideoloogiatoõ kõrval ajakirjandusse tuua ka alternatiivseid väljenduslaade ja apoliitilisi teemasid (Lauk 1996; Lauk 2005a). Käesolevasse väitekirja kaasatud vastupanustrateegiaid tutvustavas artiklis (uurimus IV) on eristatud kahte tüüpi strateegiaid: diskursiivseid ja toimetusklikke. Ühelt poolt kujunes välja alternatiivne ajakirjanduslik diskursus ning selle oskuslikule kasutamisele tuginevate diskursiivsete strateegiate (nt. intertekstuaalsus, metafooride ja allegooria kasutamine jne) rakendamine teatud

väljaannetes (nt *Edasi*, *Sirp* ja *Vasar*, *Noorte Hää*l, *Looming* jt). Teisalt õpiti ajalehtede ja ajakirjade toimetustes rakendama mitmeid toimetustuslikke strateegiaid – viise kuidas enda huvides ära kasutada tsensuuri- ja juhtimissüsteemi nõrkusi. Viimaste hulka võiks lugeda näiteks nn “inimfaktori” ärakasutamise, mis tähendas ühelt poolt erinevate tasandi ajakirjanduse valvurite (tsensorite, parteiideoloogide) omavahelistele vastuoludele apelleerimist ja teisalt seda, et ka ajakirjanduse kontrollijate pooltel töötas väga erineva maailmavaate ja väärtushinnangutega isikuid, kellest nii mõnedki püüdsid toimetajaid ja ajakirjanike abistada (uurimused III, IV, V).

Need arhiividokumentidele ja ajakirjanike mälestustele tuginedes formuleeritud “vastupanustrateegiad” ei anna veel tervikpilti kõigist võimalustest ja kasutatud praktikatest. Partei ja *Glavliti* dokumendid kajastavad ju üksnes neid juhtumeid, mis tsensoritele ja parteiideoloogidele silma torkasid, olles seega läbikukkunud vastuhakukatsed või siis tõelised (trüki)vead ehk juhuslikud toimetajate või ajakirjanike eksimused. Ka uurimustes kasutatud ajakirjanike mälestused võivad olla subjektiivsed ja selektiivsed. Seetõttu ei saa käesoleva analüüsi puhul teha kaugeleulatuvaid järeldusi ajakirjandusele ettekirjutatud rollist kõrvalekaldumise kohta ei selle ulatuse ega kavatsuslikkuse kohta. Sügavam erinevate strateegiate galeriid laiendav ja täiustav ning ajakirjanike võimalikke motiive tõlgendav analüüs vajaks kindlasti edasist uurimist, uute meetodite rakendamist ning täiendavate allikate kaasamist eesotsas omaaegse ajakirjandussüsteemiga seotud isikute süvaintervjuudega. Minu väitekirj keskendub põhimahus siiski nõukogude ajakirjanduse n-ö “ametlikule poolele” – parteilisele juhtimisele, printsiipidele ja tsensuurisüsteemile. Selle kõrval on esile toodud ka Eesti NSV-s enamlevinud ajakirjanduse alternatiivsed võimalused ja ideoloogilisele survele vastuseisev roll.

Lõppkokkuvõtteks tuleb rõhutada, et Eesti nõukogude ajakirjandus totalitaarse projekti objekti ja subjektina ning alternatiivseid rolle omandava mitmepalgelise ühiskonnanahtusena väärrib jätkuvalt edasist analüüsi ja uurimist avamaks uusi tahke nõukogude ajakirjanduse olemuse ja mõju mõistmisel Eestis.

PUBLICATIONS

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Additional publications on the topic of the PhD thesis

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2010 – tänaseni EAAS (Eesti Akadeemiline Ajakirjanduse Selts)

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