

DISSERTATIONES RERUM POLITICARUM  
UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS

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**HOLGER MÖLDER**

Cooperative security dilemma –  
practicing the Hobbesian security culture  
in the Kantian security environment

Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu

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Supervisor: Prof. Eiki Berg, University of Tartu, Estonia

Opponent: Assoc. Prof. Alexander Astrov,  
Central European University, Budapest

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

ANZUS	The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
BALTBAT	Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion
BALTDEFCOL	Baltic Defense College
BALTNET	Baltic Air Surveillance Network
BALTRON	Baltic Squadron
BALTSEA	Baltic Security Assistance
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPG	Comprehensive Political Guidance
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EDC	European Defense Community
EDF	Estonian Defense Forces
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
FPDA	Five Power Defense Arrangements
FYROM	Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross domestic product
GWAT	Global War against Terrorism
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
ID	Intensified Dialogue
IPAP	Individual Partnership Action Plan
IPP	Individual Partnership Plan
IR	International relations
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
OCC	Operational Capabilities Concept
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAP-DIB	Partnership Action Plan in Defense Institution Building
PAP-T	Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PMF	Political-Military Framework
TEEP	Training and Education Enhancement Plan
UN(O)	United Nations (Organization)
UNSC	United Nations Security Council



UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

# INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and a new security environment in Europe influenced the overall development of International Relations (IR) theory. In 1990s, during a societal change in the international system, many IR scholars concluded that rationalist theories like neo-realism and neo-liberalism, which dominated during the Cold War, cannot effectively explain the forthcoming societal formation and the analysis of processes taking place in international relations requires a more comprehensive approach. Increasing trends of globalization and mutual interdependence between nation-states have made difficult to define the new post-modern security environment through traditional doctrines.

Critical IR theories<sup>1</sup> challenge empirical foundations of rationalist theories. The emergence of constructivist schools fostered discussions about security culture (or strategic culture), and security identity instead of traditional security approaches related to power management. Security has acquired a more comprehensive meaning and since then it is not defined only through military power. Accordingly to Michael Barnett (2000, 162), the constructivist approach defines how ideas define international structure, how this structure defines the interests and identities of states and how states and non-state actors reproduce this structure. By Jack Snyder (2004), constructivism argues that international politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities. These normative regulations can promote the development of collective understandings about sovereignty, human rights and international justice in the international society.

Recently Richard Ned Lebow (2008) sketched guidelines for cultural theory of international relations, paying attention to irrational motives driving the formation of international order like appetite, spirit, fear and reason (habit), which are able to influence different logics of cooperation, conflict and risk-taking – general paradigms arranging relationship between Us and Others. . By Lebow (2008, 91), the appetite-based world intends to generate satiation through wealth, the spirit-based world intends to create esteem through honor, and the fear-based world intends to create security through power.

The post-Cold War world has paid more attention to various risks and threats, which do not depend only on fears coming from a presumable nuclear war or large-scale conventional attacks between the great powers. These tendencies have led to a conclusion that the world is not surveyed anymore solely by objective categories as national interests or balance of power and the importance of subjective categories like cultural identity has grown. Constructivism recognizes that “culture and ideology provide people with identities that offer meaning, order and predictability to their lives,” (Lebow 2008, 16).

Security is not necessarily the ultimate goal for international actors as realists claim but can be closely related to irrational motives of which the fear is

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<sup>1</sup> Broader definition of critical security studies includes constructivism and post-structuralism (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 206).

probably the most powerful. Fear-based societies are more worried about their security needs than others. They handle security as their first concern and would become influenced by preparations for a likely conflict with their potential adversaries. Security is not a rational paradigm as rationalist schools tend to argue but in practices security is often related to the constructed feelings of insecurity. Actors, which feel themselves insecure, make efforts to increase their security and cause insecurity-related misperceptions among others. These misperceptions create security dilemma, which may be an irrational paradigm forced by cultural motives, if the security culture emphasizes conflict as a normative behavior between actors.

The dissertation examines security from the cultural point of view. Differently from the mainstream constructivism, this study claims that security is not only a normative phenomenon and a manifestation of a constructed security identity but there may be powerful motives, which are often irrational and refer to the specific cultural environment. For example, a culture of fear forces misperceptions against Others and is able to produce security dilemmas. Cultural interpretation of security is in contrast with the rationalist schools relying on universal regularities. Security cultures are used as a medium to study why international systems but also actors within the system behave like they do while ensuring their security needs and how this process is influenced by norms, values, beliefs, narratives and identities, practiced by actors.

As a point of departure, Alexander Wendt (1999) has identified three phenomena (ideal types) that have influenced the development of European political culture: anarchy of Thomas Hobbes, rivalry of John Locke and co-operation of Immanuel Kant. These three phenomena create premises for four ways of constructing security relations between international actors and their engagement into the prevailing international system: Hobbesian war, Lockean rivalry, Kantian collective security and Kantian security community. The current study basically follows a more simplified approach, distinguishing conflict-favoring Hobbesian/Lockean cultures from the cooperation-favoring Kantian culture. As the main focus is the examination of security dilemma, the distinction between conflictual and cooperative security cultures seems to be more appropriate. The main flows of constructivism, Wendt among others, discuss political and security cultures in an evolutionary way – they are global, homogenous, and evolving progressively. The examination of international system through history indicates that within the system, there may exist security environments, which practice other cultures than the culture of the system.

This study analyses the role of international systems in the modern and post-modern society and examines how various security cultures have influenced the development of international order. The cultural development of the international system is not necessarily progressive from the Hobbesian culture to the Kantian one, but there would be the Hobbesian challenges and even reverse waves, which can destabilize or replace the Kantian system. Within the international society, stable systems may alternate with unstable systems and the Hobbesian systems may alternate with the Kantian systems. For example, the

Kantian Versailles system has been followed by the Hobbesian Cold War system. The co-existence of different cultures may produce instability for the whole international system and such instability may generate classical security dilemmas (if the system is generally conflict-based) or cooperative security dilemmas (if the system favors cooperation).

The Westphalian Peace Accord of 1648 has settled a first modern international system widely recognized by major international actors at that time, reinforcing regulative norms and principles of international law into the international behavior. Diplomacy hand in hand with international law became to play a role of norm-makers for the international society. The preceding pre-modern world, or as Lebow (2008) described them – warrior-societies, would be characterized by the Hobbesian concept of the state of nature – the war of all against all deriving from natural rights. In the state of nature, any actor has a right to do anything in preserving its own liberty or safety.

Modern and post-modern international systems have been cultural manifestations dominated by the political cultures of the European/Western origin. The interference of other powers than European to the international system has made first steps only in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and even after that Europe (later the West) has been culturally dominant in setting international norms. The post-World War I international systems, although previously dominated by the Western political culture, have been already global systems where international actors operated within a system involving different regions and cultural environments.

International contacts strengthened in the 18<sup>th</sup>–19<sup>th</sup> century with the scientific and technological revolution. During the next centuries the first makings of the global international system can be identified. Since the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the prevalence of the Hobbesian/Lockean culture in international relations has been rotated with the prevalence of the Kantian culture. Even if the modern society as a whole was dominantly a Hobbesian/Lockean society, the elements of the Kantian culture strengthened their influence to the international system after the end of the World War I. The creation of the first collective security arrangement, the League of Nations, in 1920s was an unsuccessful attempt to introduce the Kantian international system into the overwhelmingly Hobbesian/Lockean society. The system got entangled with numerous unsolved security dilemmas. Many major powers stayed away from the League of Nations or worked against its principles, which made the system unstable. Long-term consequences of instability led to the breaking out of the World War II.

The post-World War II international system, the Cold War, offered a more stable system under the Hobbesian/Lockean security culture with some elements of the Kantian culture (e.g. collective security arrangements: the United Nations, CSCE) being implemented. The Cold War bipolarity required the implementation of a managed balance of power policy and the Hobbesian war was replaced with the Lockean rivalry, which was capable to produce more stability where national interests of actors have been regulated by the requirements of a system. The system being seemingly stable, however, maintained its

conflictual nature, where in the long-run, two sides of bipolar system intended to prevail over each other. The ostensible stability of the Cold War came not from the competitive character of the system where actors seek *status quo* but from the deterring power of other side, preventing the use of power against each other. Moreover, a deterrence-based competition often just covers a hidden conflict (i.e. Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan etc).

This work, however, refers to the Hobbesian war and the Lockean rivalry as to two subcultures of the same basic culture and often refers to the term of the Hobbesian culture (or the Hobbesian/Lockean) in connection with the unified basic culture. There are different drivers for all three cultural environments identified by Alexander Wendt: conflict for the Hobbesian culture, competition for the Lockean culture, and cooperation for the Kantian cultures. Nevertheless, while analyzing the paradigms as security dilemma, it will be more manageable if the number of goals is reduced to two variables – conflict and cooperation. The competition manifests a stabilized formation of conflict where the risk-taking is minimized.

The end of the Cold War marks a breakthrough in the ruling international system from the overwhelmingly Hobbesian/Lockean modern society to the Kantian post-modern society. A modern security system was characterized by the Hobbesian security culture of competing nation-states. The post-modern system, however, is influenced by the Kantian security culture, shifting towards global community of states. A transition from modern to post-modern system led to a cultural clash, which stems from different cultural practices and narratives used by modern and post-modern actors within the system.

The Westphalian concept of national sovereignty bases on two basic principles: recognition of territorial integrity of states and recognition of the rule that external actors have no right to interfere into the domestic matters of states. These principles have been prevailed throughout the modern society, as long as the last modern international system, the Cold War bipolarity, ended. The transition from the modern society to the post-modern one indicates the cultural change in security-related behavior of the international system. The nature of post-modern society follows the logic of Kantian principles and the recognition of supranational principles (e.g. human rights, liberal democracy), which post-modern does not entirely fit with the concept of national sovereignty prevailing in the modern society. The conflict between the logic of modern society and the logic of post-modern society may produce cooperative security dilemmas.

The primary goal of the dissertation is to contribute to the International Relations theory while examining the conflict between different security cultures, particularly between the Hobbesian/Lockean and the Kantian ones. Following the cultural approach, this dissertation claims that cultural motives of international actors may be as powerful as other motives and the emergence of security dilemma may indicate the cultural conflict between international actors. If international actors practice the Hobbesian security culture in the Kantian security environment, this may lead to a situation defined as a *cooperative security dilemma*, where security- and defense-related cooperation between

some actors may construct tensions and mistrust among other actors located outside of these cooperative frameworks. This thesis argues that *the introduction of the Hobbesian security culture into the Kantian security environment may cause the cooperative security dilemma*.

*Security dilemma* is a term traditionally used in the International Relations theory in order to describe uncertainty and misperceptions of international actors that would lead to the pre-conflict situation. Irrational motives like honor, appetite, habit and fear may cause distinct understandings of security and finally produce security dilemmas. *Dilemma* represents a choice between different options. The dilemma does not necessarily lead to conflict, and in order to escape the dilemma, it may just require the implementation of appropriate measures that would ensure better security to the whole system. That leads to the security dilemma management also analyzed in the course of this study. Among other measures, the management of cooperative security dilemma may require the implementation of appropriate security architecture, able to meet the security standards of the contemporary post-modern society.

Uncertainty and misperceptions between actors traditionally characterize the Hobbesian/Lockean security environment. Conflictual societies (like Hobbesian or Lockean) may treat a security dilemma as a normative phenomenon. Under the certain circumstances, a security dilemma may also emerge in the Kantian security environment. A cooperative security dilemma is a post-modern security phenomenon that may indicate the presence of either an integration dilemma or an identity dilemma, which have diverse origins. The emergence of a cooperative security dilemma may be caused by cultural paradigms that may introduce misperceptions between different cultural identities.

In the Kantian environment, a security dilemma usually emerges through interactions with other security environments but it may also describe possible misperceptions, which would occur within the Kantian environment. Cooperative security dilemma may take a shape of an integration dilemma – the cultural identities of actors are close, but their security preferences differ from each other, which prevents further integration. Another manifestation of cooperative security dilemma is an identity dilemma, which lies on distinct security identities.

In the framework of this study, the main argument is tested by special case-studies. The integration dilemma is analyzed on the basis of so-called '*Baltic Balance*' describing the post-Cold War security environment in the Baltic Sea region, and particularly focusing to Denmark's opt-out from the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and Finland's relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The security understandings from the Hobbesian security environment did not disappear in the Kantian environment and the habit seems to be a leading motive causing the integration dilemma in the region. The identity dilemma is examined through the development of Estonia-Russia relationship in the post-Cold War era. The strong appearance of ethno-nationalism and a culture of fear related to the Hobbesian security culture

strongly disadvantage the introduction of Kantian principles into the Estonia-Russia relationship.

Structurally, the study is divided to the theoretical part, which settles theoretical guidelines for further analysis; the empirical part, which observes the development of research environment; and the analytical part, which includes case-studies, on the basis of which the argument is examined. The second chapter gives an overview of the nature of the research problem, builds the research task and the argument, describes the methodological guidelines of this work and explains sources and structure of the research. Methodologically, the research focuses on the agent-structure analysis, where security cultures operate as agents and their interactions with structures (i.e. international system and security environments) may cause the emergence of cooperative security dilemmas. .

Chapters III-V present theoretical foundations of the study. Chapter III introduces basic security cultures, which proceed from political cultures identified by Wendt. The main objective here is to define descriptive features of each basic security culture. Since the first modern system emerged, the Western political cultures traditionally draw guiding motives for international systems. These motives, essentially determining the nature and general principles of the system, have taken two general directions, each of them related to one or another basic security culture.

Chapter IV gives an overview about international systems and describes international regimes practiced by different security cultures. This chapter explains differences between the Hobbesian/Lockean and the Kantian security architecture. The Hobbesian/Lockean one is represented by interest-based coalitions that operate within the anarchical world order (e.g. military alliances). The Kantian culture introduces cooperative security practices for consolidating universal peace (e.g. security communities, collective and cooperative security arrangements). Chapter V presents theoretical principles of security dilemma.. This thesis ties the concept of security dilemma with their cultural environments and makes distinction between a classical security dilemma in the Hobbesian security environment and a cooperative security dilemma in the Kantian security environment. The latter is examined through its two variations – the integration dilemma and the identity dilemma.

The sixth chapter constitutes the main empirical part of the dissertation and takes a closer look at the development of international system in the post-Westphalian era. Polarity and stability are important factors influencing the development of international systems. Unstable polarity brings to the fore the Hobbesian culture and causes the state of war between international actors. Stable polarity refers to the Lockean culture associated with rivalry. The Kantian culture promotes non-polarized systems. First Kantian security communities emerged into the post-modern international system, while the European Union is moving towards an amalgamated security community and NATO started to implement the principles of pluralistic security community.

The Global War against Terrorism provoked the Hobbesian challenge to the Kantian system and weakened the stability of the liberal society.

Chapter VII examines security dilemmas of the post-modern society. The Hobbesian challenge in 2000s is highlighted by the Iraqi operation, which refers to the case where the cooperative security dilemma between the Kantian international system and the Hobbesian actor Iraq ended with the Hobbesian conflict in the Kantian international system. The introduction of the Kantian principles during the transition from the dominantly Hobbesian/Lockean modern society into the Kantian post-modern society has been examined, using the example of NATO partnership strategy, which aims to manage potential security dilemmas in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and its neighborhood.

Next two chapters (IX–X) scrutinize special cases where different variations of cooperative security dilemma are manifested. The integration dilemma in the Nordic countries is influenced by the modern concept of Nordic Balance, which has been transferred to the post-modern Baltic Balance. Some countries (i.e. Denmark and Finland) experience difficulties in accepting more comprehensive post-modern understandings of security. The Estonia-Russia dispute may be applicable to the manifestation of identity dilemma. Estonia as a member of the European Union and NATO has been supposed to follow the Kantian security culture. Russia, at the same time, continually follows the criteria of the Hobbesian security culture. Moreover, there is an internal conflict between different security cultures within the Estonia society, where the official Kantian line is followed by instant attacks from the followers of the Hobbesian security culture. Therefore, the identity dilemma may also evolve into the classical security dilemma, depending on cultural motives of actors.

The transition from one security culture to another would be complicated and reverse waves may influence positions of dominant security culture in the international system. The cooperation-oriented Kantian security environment may still retain security dilemmas involving the Kantian and the Hobbesian actors. Case studies demonstrate that cooperative security dilemma may emerge if the Hobbesian and the Kantian security cultures interact with each other. The transition from the Nordic Balance to the Baltic Balance would confirm if the insecurity is not a problem for certain actors, they would prefer to keep their traditional security models. The important motives in fostering the Hobbesian conflict between Estonia and Russia are ethno-nationalism and culture of fear, which can hinder the using Kantian methods in security dilemma management.

The cultural approach to international relations may give a broader focus to the examination of traditional system-related issues of international relations including international security. The desire to find universal explanations how the international system works and which way international actors can manage their security issues, may not give us correct answers. Different actors may have distinct motives and many of these motives are not necessarily rational ones. This study intends to build bridges between traditional concepts of security



studies (i.e. security dilemmas) and critical security studies, while examining cultural paradigms in various security environments.

## 1.1. Definitions

This study will use multiple terms that would be relatively close while referring some aspects but also have some differences making them distinguishable from each other.

**Environment**<sup>2</sup> applies to the area in which specified actors operate, thus it can affect their activities. The borders of environment are imaginable and flexible and may change depending on circumstances. The cultural environment includes independent actors, institutions and other forces that affect the basic values, behaviors, and preferences. The political environment includes all laws, agencies, and groups that influence or restrict individuals or organizations.

**Security environment** applies to the area in which security of actors are interdependent from each others.

**Security architecture** would be defined as a set of social interactions (i.e. institutions, security regimes) practiced within a certain security environment.

**International system** comes into force when states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions to cause them to behave as parts of a whole (Huntington 1997, 54).

**International society** exists when states in an international system have common interests and common values, conceive themselves to be bound by common set of rules, share in the working of common institutions and have a common culture or civilization (Huntington 1997, 54).

**International regime** is a social institution, a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge (Krasner 1983, 2).

**Security community** is a group of states or other actors whose members neither expect nor prepare for the use of force in their mutual relations (Buzan and Little 2000, 442).

**Security complex** consists of group of states whose primary security concerns link together that their national securities cannot be considered apart from one another (Buzan 1991, 193).

**Security culture** is a set of social beliefs and values in a certain cultural environment that shapes a collective identity in security matters based on accepted norms, beliefs and values.

**Strategic culture** is a set of social beliefs and values actors practice towards the international system.

**Security dilemma** is a two-level strategic predicament in relations between states and other actors, with each level consisting of two related lemmas (or

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<sup>2</sup> The definition of environment has been constructed on the basis of definition presented in <http://www.allbusiness.com/glossaries/political>.

propositions that can be assumed to be valid) which force decision-makers to choose between them (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 4).

**Security paradox** is an outcome of security dilemma and refers to a situation in which actors provoke an increase of mutual tension in order to improve their own security (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 9).

**Cooperative security dilemma** is a situation where some states tend to cooperate in decreasing their security fears, but it could decrease the security of these states and others if any country remained outside of the cooperative security arrangements (Mölder 1998, 10).

**Classical security dilemma** is a situation where an increase of one state's security can decrease security of others (Jervis 1978, 169).

## 2. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM: CULTURAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Up to the very end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, practically all mainstream security analyses examined their subject primarily through the military dimension. According to the prevalent realist paradigms, nation-states sought to increase their power, wealth and security (King 2006, 258). International actors are tied with rational choices while pursuing their national interests in an anarchic environment. Modern strategies emphasized the Hobbesian concepts like balance of power, balance of threats, bandwagoning, ally-seeking, coalition-building, arms racing and other similar doctrines, which focused on the conflict management in the polarized world. These concepts presumed that motives of international actors are always similar.

In his book “The Clash of Civilizations. Remaking of World Order”, Samuel Huntington turned about the basic principles of international relations, in which a security dimension has always had a significant role. Huntington (1997) gave heed to cultural influences as principal driving forces in the human society. He stood against the underestimation of cultural factors to the progress of international society and gave a boost to the counterarguments against the prevailing traditions in the International Relations theory, claiming that:

In the scholarly world, the battle has thus been joined by those who see culture as a major, but not the only, influence on social, political, and economic behavior and those who adhere to universal explanations, such as devotees of material self-interest among economists, of ‘*rational choice*’ among political scientists, and of neo-realism among scholars of international relations (Harrison and Huntington 2000).

Simultaneously, emerging post-structural theoretical schools (e.g. constructivism) have taken a close look to the cultural self-identification and focused on social arrangements that base on values, beliefs, norms, and identities and examine social phenomena (e.g. sovereignty, security, cooperation) as social constructions where social identities and interests are interrelated (i.e. Wendt 1994, Katzenstein 1996, Wendt 1999). The cultural approach has appeared in the works of many constructivist writers, paying attention to organizational cultures, national cultures and global norms as manifestations of cultural factors establishing shared identities or dividing lines (i.e. Kier 1997, Berger 1998, Finnermore 1996, Risse-Kappen 1996, Wendt 1999, Friedeking 2003, Rousseau and van der Veen 2005). Hopf (2002) establishes adherence of states to international norms as a point of interest in constructivist security studies. Lebow (2008) made a step further while building original principles for a cultural theory of international relations and examining the interactions between international relations and cultural motives that would shape a nature of international relations. He uses the notion of “paradigms of politics” for exploring the

variations of world governance as well as observing the development of world order over time influenced by core impulses of the human psyche – spirit, appetite and reason. The values and practices are influenced by the shifting calculations of appetite, the conflict-prone sentiments of fear and the restraining impulses of reason (Lebow 2008, 60).

Cultural interpretation of international society contrasts with the rationalist schools relying on universal regularities that predominated in the theory of International Relations during a long time, the whole modern society. The unexpected end of the Cold War, however, has demonstrated that the main rationalist theoretical schools, neo-realism and neo-liberalism, failed to foresee changes in international environment and rationalist theories were unable to interpret consequences of change (Katzenstein 1996, 2; see also Risse-Kappen 1996; Buzan and Hansen 2009, 192–7). Security as a social phenomenon cannot exist outside of its cultural environment, which influences a choice of measures international actors use in order to guarantee their security. Cultural perspective gives us a more comprehensive framework for the examination of security issues than rationalist theoretical schools and game theory would be able to offer.

Culture itself is a unique phenomenon in the history of mankind. Culture reflects to relationships among individuals within groups, among groups, and between ideas and perspectives; culture is concerned with identity, aspiration, symbolic exchange, coordination, and structures and practices connected with relationships (e.g. ethnicity, rituals, heritages, norms, meanings, beliefs) (Rao and Walton 2004, 4). Among constructivist writers, Jack Snyder (2002, 7) states that *culture* is “a shared knowledge or [a set of] symbols that create meaning within a social group, determining whether behavior in the absence of a common governing authority is bloody or benign”. Katzenstein (1996, 6) settles that „culture refers to both a set of evaluative standards (e.g. norms, values) and cognitive standards (e.g. rules, models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another”. Alexander Wendt identifies culture as a subset of social structure, which bases on shared ideas (Wendt 1999, 249).

As culture is practically interfered to all major aspects of the human life, it is also deeply involved in the political life. Political culture has become a contestable and fashionable method to examine behavior of states. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) defined the concept of political culture in the early 1960s as “a subset of beliefs and values of a society that relate to the political system”. The paradigms of one or another political culture have influenced the development of basic principles of international relations since first international systems emerged, in order to regulate interactions at the inter-state level.

Recognition of cultural differences indicates the existence of self-identification between Us and Others. Others are those who are different. This does not mean necessarily an evaluative assessment. John Stuart Mill (1859 cited in Lebow 2008, 476) has noted that “it was a grave error to suppose that the same

international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between civilized nations and barbarians”. Cultural environments affect not only for incentives for different kinds of state behavior but also basic characters of states – what we call ‘*state identity*’ (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 33). Fundamental differences in beliefs and values constituting identities would form misperceptions between different political entities, and the substance of international relations emphasizes the need for certain agreements between nations. The multicultural environment requires the establishment of norms accepted by all international actors.

At the same time, a mainstream constructivism, while focusing on the construction of particular identity, does not recognize heterogeneity of irrational motives, which may produce instability within the international system. In his “A Cultural Theory of International Relations”, Richard Ned Lebow (2008) provides a framework that allows examining international relations through cultural paradigms and describes the determining role of cultural motives to the international society and how these motives are able to rule societies. Lebow (2008, 7) recognizes a significant role of irrational motives shaping behavior of international actors and pays attention how international orders are influenced by lack of consensus between norms and behavior.

This study examines cultural approach in the light of development of modern and post-modern international system and focuses on cultural deviances that may produce security-related dilemmas between international actors. As the goal is to present a systemic approach, and the cooperative security dilemma indeed refers to systemic deviances, the introduction of various elements capable to produce security dilemmas mutually interacting in the framework of this study – security cultures, international systems and regimes, has been unavoidable. The security dilemma has been analyzed through cultural paradigms as it may appear through cultural misperceptions.

## **2.1. Introduction of the research task**

Culture can be examined on a very broad basis – “a focus on culture is necessary to confront the difficult questions of what is valued on terms of well-being, who does the valuing, and why economic and social factors interact with culture to unequally allocate access to a good life,” (Rao and Walton 2004, 4). Concerning international relations, all these factors described by Rao and Walton have met the same relevance in untangling key problems of the subject. The main research task of this study focuses on the examination of interrelations between international systems and cultural environments. Accordingly to this study, variances within and between different cultural environments may cause a phenomenon, which the International Relations theory defines as a security dilemma. In this study, a security dilemma has been treated as a culture-related paradigm appearing in a specific cultural environment. The

cultural environment determines possible social interactions to be used for managing security dilemmas.

The use of environments and paradigms in this study decreases the impact of rationalist factors on the results, determining the range of space, actors and interactions between them. Thomas Kuhn (1996) defines paradigms as a set of practices that determines: 1) what is to be observed and scrutinized; 2) the kind of questions that are supposed to be asked and probed for answers in relations to this subject; 3) how these questions are to be structured; 4) how the results of scientific investigation should be interpreted. Kuhn recognized that paradigms can evolve in progressive way but constituted scientific advances can be judged by paradigm's own standards (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 43). The environment is the object of study where paradigms operate and different environments can react to the paradigms in various ways.

This study intends to advance the theoretical implications of the concept of security dilemma and test these implications in distinctive cultural environments. Security culture is a specific manifestation of political culture, which applies to beliefs, norms and identities operating in the specified security environment. Security environment constitutes a testing area where the relevance of cultural motives, besides norms and identities, can be examined in relation with possible misperceptions stimulating security dilemmas.

The concept of the security dilemma, one of the most used terms in the International Relations theory and traditionally related to the anarchical international system, was first introduced by the American political scientist John Herz and the British historian Herbert Butterfield in the early 1950s and in its classical interpretations it refers to a situation where international actors perform misperceptions against security-related actions of others in the anarchical security environment. Later, the variations of security dilemma have been often used in explaining misperceptions-induced problems in the variety of areas: structural security dilemmas, perceptual security dilemmas, imperialist security dilemmas, deliberate security dilemmas, inadvertent security dilemmas, tight security dilemmas, regular security dilemmas, loose security dilemmas, deep security dilemmas, knotty security dilemmas and so forth (Collins 2004, 28).

The current study is involved in the examination of another specified variation of security dilemma – a cooperative security dilemma and claims that distinct security environments can produce distinct security dilemmas. First time I settled problems stemming from the cooperative security dilemma in my master's thesis "The Security Dilemma in The Baltic Sea Region and Its Impact on the Regional Security and Defense Cooperation" (Mölder 1998). While the latter examined mostly state-induced problems related to the cooperative security dilemma, the current work concentrates on searching interrelationships between cooperative security dilemma and its cultural surroundings.

Differently from the classical interpretation of security dilemma related to the Hobbesian/Lockean security environment, the cooperative security dilemma may emerge in the Kantian security environment. The dissertation argues that cooperation and complex interdependence between some international actors

may cause security dilemmas for other actors if there are no appropriate cooperative mechanisms settled for these actors. The cooperative security dilemma implies that the Hobbesian security culture can still influence the progress of the Kantian security environment and present a reverse challenge to the Kantian security culture. Also, if the Kantian international system faces with the Hobbesian cultural environments, the system would become unstable.

The dissertation claims that international security environments depend on its cultural surroundings, and produce regulative constructions based on mutually agreed and accepted beliefs, norms, and identities – international regimes by which an international system is able to act. Security cultures influence the implementation of international regimes, depending on which culture dominates in the particular environment. As interactions may take place between distinctive cultural environments, international regimes may include elements of various cultures.

The cooperative security dilemma would manifest through two variations – the integration dilemma and the identity dilemma. Both variations of a cooperative security dilemma refer to a situation where security cooperation between actors in the security environment is inhibited. Cooperation between states in the same cultural environment may be complicated due to their different institutional affiliation. An integration dilemma arises when countries in the *same* security environment share similar values, norms and identities but belong to *different* security institutions. These institutions may compete with each other and thus produce instability. There might also be significant controversies in identities or values that may construct obstacles for security cooperation. An identity dilemma occurs when the countries in the *same* security environment share *different* values, norms and identities.

The dissertation examines interdependence between cooperative security dilemmas and their cultural environments.. In the case of integration dilemma, parties of cooperation identify themselves as ‘Us’, but there are obstacles making difficult to achieve full integration. In the case of identity dilemma, there are no shared identities while parties identify themselves as ‘Others’ in arranging relationship with each other.

## **2.2. The argument**

I argue that the cooperative security dilemmas are caused by the introduction of the Hobbesian/Lockean security culture into the Kantian security environment. This study uses as a point of departure the distinction made by Alexander Wendt (1999) regarding the manifestation of western political cultures and their relevance to one or another international system. By Wendt, there are three basic cultures (or ideal types), which have alternately dominated in the western security environment and the influence of which is analyzed in the context of this study – the Hobbesian war, the Lockean rivalry and the Kantian com-

munity. If these cultures interact with each other in a certain environment, security dilemmas may appear.

The current work does not make distinction between the Hobbesian and the Lockean culture, as both of them prioritize conflict and competition between international actors and proceed from similar points of departures regarding cooperation. The Hobbesian/Lockean culture emphasizes distinctive identities and conflict as a natural pattern of behavior between international actors, while the Kantian culture is oriented to emphasize cooperation and shared identities able to produce a stable peace in a security environment.

Following the argument, the cooperative security dilemma is dependent on paradigms that apply to the various cultural environments. All three manifestations of security culture regard to paradigms determined by Thomas Kuhn (1996): what is the purpose of such construction – can culture influence interactions and changes in the research environment; who determines the research environment – is there a difference between relevant discourses presented from the Hobbesian/Lockean or the Kantian point of view; why such distinction would be important – is cultural environment important for managing existing security dilemmas?

The development of international system since modern times indicates that the progress from the Hobbesian/Lockean culture to the Kantian one has not been stable and irrational motives of international actors would produce reverse challenges to the Kantian system and in the long run even destabilize the whole system. In fact, international systems are multicultural entities. There may be the Hobbesian security environments within the Kantian system. If security environment becomes unstable and distinctive security cultures compete with each other, security dilemmas may occur – classical security dilemmas in the Hobbesian/Lockean system and cooperative security dilemmas in the Kantian system.

### **2.3. Research methodology**

Methodologically, this study lies on the agent-structure analysis as the study examines interactions between international actors and systems. The study intends to identify how the concept of security dilemma works in different cultural environments. International actors in their turn may influence, which security culture will dominate over the valid international system. The agent-structure analysis enables to refer to the question how to conceptualize the relationship between international actors and international systems. There would be mutual influence between the agent and the structure, where social interactions performed by the structure may produce new patterns into the self-identification of an individual actor. Besides that every agent can contribute to the patterns used by the structure.

Constructivism itself includes several methodological variations and various practices used in order to verify the associations of international relations.



Critical constructivism rejects positivist methods and ontology (Frederking 2003). Onuf (2002, 126) in his turn settles the ontology as a key element for research. Conventional constructivism uses norms and ideas as variables that cause actions (Katzenstein 1996, Wendt 1999, Frederking 2003). Lebow (2008) uses agent-structure methodology in explaining cultural implications to the international order, implying that structural conditions may produce cooperation, conflict or risk-taking by actors.

The agent-structure analysis was introduced to the IR theory by Alexander Wendt. Wendt (1987, 337–8) establishes two basic ways how agency could relate to structure:

- Human beings and their organizations are purposive actors whose actions would reproduce or transform the society in which they live;
- Society is made up of social relationships which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors.

Social structures are the result of intended and unintended consequences of human actions, just as those actions presuppose or are mediated by an irreducible structural context. This understanding of agent-structure relationship is made possible by conceptualizing each from the start as ontologically dependent upon the other, by conceptualizing agents in terms of internal relations that define them as such, and conceptualizing social structures as existing only through the medium of the agents and practices that they constitute (Wendt 1987, 360).

Depending on the research task, the study pays attention to the following subjects, tightly connected with its theoretical framework: security cultures (as agents), international systems, regimes and security architectures (as structures) and security dilemmas (interactions between agents and structures). The concept of security dilemma has been examined by means of structures – international systems take into account international regimes and doctrines actors use in order to operate within a system. The agents, security cultures, shape patterns of international regimes and security architectures, which are produced by international systems. The development of international system has been analyzed through interactions between security cultures and international systems since the first modern international system, the Westphalian system, has been constructed.

This study particularly focuses on changes in prevailing cultural patterns characterizing the whole system, which may produce distinct cultural environments. The international system is a product of the surrounding cultural environment. At a first glance, a cultural background of international systems would be easily contested as these two subjects, a culture and an international system, have seemingly been not related to each other. A closer look to the development of international system, however, would testify the influence of various cultural factors e.g. competing values, beliefs and identities to the system management. Social interactions of states and other international actors impact the structure of international system (Wendt 1992, 1999). These interactions may cause various dilemmas including security dilemmas, which would

destabilize the whole system. As the result of these interactions, the international system is able to change.

A cooperative security dilemma is a problem caused by the agent-structure relationship in the Kantian security environment. If the security culture of international actor differs from the security culture of the system, generally (identity dilemma) or in security preferences (integration dilemma), interactions involving agents with different cultural backgrounds may produce security dilemmas that would destabilize international structures. Nevertheless, structural conditions may foster the activity of agents. For example, if the valid international system becomes unstable, the actors may face with difficulties in predicting actions of others.

Spread of ideas or norms shaping shared identities in the framework of the international system, requires intercultural communication (Price and Tannenwald 1996; Finnemore 1996). A security dilemma may come into force from a possible miscommunication between actors. In the polarized anarchical system, characterized by the Hobbesian culture, these miscommunications may lead to the emergence of classical security dilemma. In the non-polarized Kantian system, however, a cooperative security dilemma may rise if there are cultural misinterpretations of the requirements of the system. The contrasting identities may cause the identity dilemma. Even in the case of shared Kantian cultural identity, different evaluations regarding the valid international system or security architecture still may set off the integration dilemma. Therefore, the analysis of cultural paradigms (including a security dilemma as a cultural paradigm) may contribute to the international system assessment, giving a more comprehensive framework for analyses examining why international actors are affected in construction of motives, intentions and capabilities of others and which results these constructions may give.

## **2.4. Sources of the study**

Within the discipline of International Relations, scholars tend to define their theoretical positions. While following the cultural theory of international relations, the positions adopted here come close to the constructivist positions, which allow applying for culture-based factors as identities, values and norms. The cultural theory is methodologically a constructivist theory though criticizing some fundamental sources of a mainstream constructivism. However, while mostly relying on constructivist methodology, this study nevertheless aims to build up communication lines involving all major schools of the International Relations theory. These theoretical schools manifest certain security cultures, by which they would be able to construct specific cultural environments for justifying their theoretical guidelines. The realist tradition of the International Relations theory follows guidelines of the Hobbesian/Lockean security culture, and the liberal tradition is a manifestation of the Kantian security culture.

This study relies on a qualitative assessment for identifying, how the concept of security dilemma works in different cultural environments. Special case studies have been used in testing the argumentation set up within the framework of this dissertation. Qualitative methods are traditionally used within social sciences “where the goal of research is to explore people’s subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to those experiences,” (Moore 2007). These methods usually rely on small number of approaches, giving a ‘thick description’ of each subject or case. Thick description as a method of social sciences has been promoted by Clifford Geertz (1973) and focuses to explaining and understanding the behavior of actors within the context in which it takes place.

The argumentation used for explaining intentions of international actors indicates the influence of political cultures to shaping security-related understandings. The structural and materialist orientations of neo-realism and neo-liberalism strove to remove identity from the equation, even though identity had played a central (but often implicit) role in many traditional realist and liberal theories (Rousseau and van der Veen 2005, 687). While realist studies are concentrated on power considerations, liberal and constructivist schools argue that a shared sense of identity may have reduce the influence of misperceptions caused by security-related activities of others (Rousseau and van der Veen 2005, 686). Ted Hopf (1998) sees a shared identity as a potential mechanism that reduces the possibilities for emerging of security dilemma. These arguments indeed emphasize the role of cultural perceptions and misperceptions in handling security issues.

The cultural theory does not deny progressive virtues of cooperation over a conflict. However, the examination of international system during the modern and post-modern societies testifies that the development of system is not necessarily progressive and cultural motives may often be irrational and not rationally calculated, promoting instability and reverse challenges to the international system. What the mainstream constructivism has often avoided to handling, are possible changes of systems. Stable systems alternate with unstable systems and the Kantian systems alternate with the Hobbesian/Lockean systems. The post-modern system generally follows the Kantian tradition, but at the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century the system experienced the Hobbesian challenge and became unstable.

The Hobbesian war, the Lockean rivalry and the Kantian society identified by Alexander Wendt (1999) manifest the ideal types of basic security cultures and determine the relevance of security dilemma in the various security environments. These cultural types may be classified as conflict-oriented cultures (the Hobbesian war, the Lockean rivalry) and cooperation-oriented cultures (the Kantian society). Nevertheless, concerning the post-modern security environment, cooperation-oriented cultures live frequently together with conflict-oriented cultures, which can destabilize the whole system and are able to produce security dilemmas. While the classical security dilemma fits with the

modern society of nation-states, the cooperative security dilemma is related to the functioning of cooperative frameworks of the post-modern society.

Modern and post-modern international systems have traditionally been dependant on the western political cultures. The international system has been transferred from the European system into the “real” international system during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when actors outside of Europe (primarily the United States and Japan; Russia and Turkey should be considered being semi-European powers) entered into the international arena. However, the influence of western cultures to the system has been maintained. Therefore, the Euro-Atlantic security environment is a main area, where the research has been conducted.

Security cultures can influence the building up of appropriate security architecture for the particular security environment. Security arrangements require normative agreements between the parties in order to fulfill their tasks. By Brian Frederking (2003, 364), global security arrangements are established on beliefs about the world (e.g. the nature of security), norms about social relationships (e.g. the appropriateness of the use of force), and identities about self and other (e.g. enemy, rival, citizen, friend). Beliefs, norms, and identities valued by the security arrangement are products of one or another security culture. If the cultural background of security arrangement is different from the cultural origins of the valid system, this may also produce a security dilemma.

In different environments, the emergence of security dilemma depends on contrasting patterns that may cause the situation where misperceptions and uncertainty may appear. The culture matters in creating communication lines that would produce security-related understandings. Cultural misunderstandings often lead to misperceptions against the possible behavior of others. Security dilemma reflects strategic choices stemmed from misperceptions related to Other's potential behavior. Are intentions of international actors defensive or offensive? Possible reactions depend on their cultural environment. In the context of the Hobbesian war, every actor is possibly interested in conquering other actors if power between actors is not balanced. In the context of the Lockean rivalry, every actor is interested in damaging competing powers if threats between actors are not balanced. In the context of Kantian society, every actor is interested in stable peace.

In its classical treatment, a security dilemma is closely related to the realist school, mainly as a part of game theory, a mathematical model that represents a range of rational choices in the context of anarchic international systems of the Hobbesian war or the Lockean rivalry. The realist school tends to answer to the question [what?] but often failed to explain – [who?]. Therefore the range of possible answers to the question [why?] has been intentionally decreased by the realist logic. Critical security approach gives a broader focus to the definition of security dilemma, while different cultural environments would treat security dilemmas in their own ways.

This thesis follows a definition of security dilemma established by Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler (2008, 4):

The security dilemma is a two-level strategic predicament in relations between states and other actors, with each level consisting of two related lemmas (or propositions that can be assumed to be valid) which force decision-makers to choose between them.

These two levels constitute a dilemma of interpretation (how to identify motives, intentions, and capabilities of others?) and a dilemma of response (how to resolve the dilemma?). This study examines these predicaments in the cultural context. The construction of identity is a one central element in order to make strategic predicaments. The construction of identity is related to a subset of beliefs and values and would be used in identifying dilemma-related oppositional categories like Us and Others or friends and foes. These oppositional categories are able to constitute insecurity-related motives like fear, which are powerful forces in constructing security dilemmas.

### 3. SECURITY CULTURE: NORMS AND IDENTITIES

The basic concept of *strategic culture* has been developed already in 1970s. In analyzing Soviet deterrence policy, Jack Snyder has found that Soviet reaction to certain problems differed from similar behavior of Americans and rational-choice paradigms and game-theory did not give appropriate results. The Americans and the Soviets represented separate subsets of beliefs and values that in their turn created different norms determining their patterns of behavior. That leads to a conclusion that different political entities may also constitute different cultural entities and different nations may have their particular strategic cultures. Snyder (1977, 8) defined strategic culture as „the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior” that members of a strategic community may share with regard to their strategy.

Strategic culture is defined by categories like geography and resources, history and experience, political structure and defense organization (Macmillan and Booth 1999, 365–6; Howlett and Glenn 2005, 121). It has been applied to the ways by which various countries, regions, and institutions examine their security policy options. Alistair Iain Johnston (1995) defines strategic culture as “an ideational milieu which limits behavior choices”, and which is settled in a certain political, social or institutional environment by the shared assumptions and rules. It is “an integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation, structures, languages, analogies, metaphors)” that imposes long-lasting preferences for that strategic environment. Colin Gray defines it as “the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, transitions, habits on mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particularly geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience” (Gray 1999, 51).

A classical definition of strategy refers to the integrated application of means to achieve desired ends. As Michel Foucault stated (Foucault 1972, 69–70), strategies are regulated ways of practicing the possibilities of discourse. Strategy consists of variety of options that treat objects systematically (e.g. delimitating them, regrouping or separating them, linking them together, making them derive from one another), arrange forms of enunciation (e.g. choosing them, placing them, constituting series, composing them into great rhetorical unities), or manipulate concepts (giving them rules of their use, inserting them into regional coherences, constituting conceptual architectures). All in all, strategic culture is a manifestation of a certain cultural lemma. There are goals to be achieved and choices that determine behavior of political entities in a definite milieu. These choices are often limited by cultural restraints including historical experiences, collective memories, friend-foe constructions and other similar surroundings. Cultural surroundings may cause institutional limitations and evoke political implications that would finally lead to a situation where problem-creating paradigms may appear, a security dilemma among others.

The Cold War has established an illusion of a very stable framework of international relations where the concept of security has been equated with military security (Möller 2007, 10). In the Hobbesian cultural environment, the use of force (for any reason – threatening, deterrence, balancing powers etc) was among main arguments in order to achieve strategic goals. Strategic culture is closely related to the military culture and these two terms should not be confused. According to Anthony King (2006, 259), a military culture refers to distinctive practices by which military groups perform together and is related to three sets of capabilities: physical (material assets); moral (organizational cohesion of the military and will to fight); and conceptual (strategic orientation). Of course, military culture is one of special proceedings in connection with a strategic culture as a military strategy is a part of national strategy. In the context of security culture, a military culture is only one cultural paradigm shaping a security environment among others.

The current work prefers, instead of *strategic culture*, the usage of the term *security culture*, which gives a more comprehensive definition to the field been examined in the course of this study. Within a strategic culture, security needs of actors determine the choice of appropriate strategies. Therefore, it would be more correct to identify strategic cultures as national, state-related, cultures and security cultures as social cultures. Multidimensional paradigms like security would more precisely forward manifestations of culture, while action-directed paradigms, strategy among others, are narrowed by a range of choices. Security refers to a status, whilst strategy is closely related to gains. Besides that, strategic culture fits better with the modern society and the Hobbesian security environment – in the anarchical environment states will goal relative gains corresponding to their national interests. In anarchy, states have to establish their strategic goals and shape patterns that would enable to achieve these goals. Within the framework of international system, strategic cultures would characterize national responses to the security culture of the system.

There does not exist a unified understanding about commonly agreed definitions what constitutes security. Security is an ultimate goal of every political entity, allowing to executing their political actions and avoiding possible threats. It is influenced by changing perceptions and misperceptions, beliefs and disbeliefs, learning and unlearning of one's own and others' interests and capabilities that often base on historical and political judgments (Möller 2007, 9; Walker 1997, 67). There are different understandings of identifying security that would lead to distinctive cultural practices international actors use in order to grant their security requirements. Security policies are manifestations of security cultures as they convey change and continuity in a certain cultural environment.

The Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures are subsets of social values, which derived from the Western civilization and can be generally identified as political cultures (Wendt 1999, 250). In a particular field of security, they may be applied as security cultures, involving all paradigms somehow related to security. Therefore I define it as: a *security culture is a set of social beliefs and*

*values in a certain cultural environment that shapes a collective identity in security matters based on agreed norms, beliefs and values.* Strategic culture would be, however, a subculture within a security culture: when security culture is a set of all measures that are practiced for the purpose of security, strategic culture identifies goals that would be intended to achieve for that purpose and *is a set of beliefs and values actors practice towards the international system.* Security culture should answer to the questions: who they are, and why they behave as they use to behave. Strategic culture gives a response to the question, what these actors are expected to do, and how actors should behave for the purpose of being secure.

Security culture depends on the cultural-institutional context and collective identity of actors, explaining their security behavior and interactions with the remained part of international society through variables like norms, beliefs, identities, values, and principles (Wendt 1992, Katzenstein 1996, Frederking 2003). By social interactions like culture or identity, constructivist scholars are able to demonstrate how domestic politics and international society are inter-related to each other in practicing mutually respected normative structures (Klotz 1995, Finnemore 1996, Katzenstein 1996, Risse et al 1999). Norms, beliefs and identities set up values. *Norms* characterize collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors. There may exist regulatory norms, which describe standards of appropriate behavior, and constitutive norms, which are connected with the identities of actors (Katzenstein 1996, 5). *Beliefs* are shared understandings of the world, norms are shared understandings of appropriate action, and identities tell agents who they are and who others are. *Principles* in their turn constitute normative categories of values (Lucarelli 2002, 13).

*Identity* is another important element settling a proper environment for describing cultures. As Lebow noted (2008, 474), in philosophy, political science and politics an identity construction is closely followed by the creation of categories like 'Us' and 'Others'. Mead noted that "the 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitude of others; the 'Me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes" (Mead 1934, 175). Collective identities define 'Us' and delineate the boundaries against 'Others' (Wendt 1994, Risse-Kappen 1996). Identity is constructed on the basis of evaluative and cognitive feelings that determine the relationship of 'Me' (or 'Us' in the case of collective identity) with 'Others'. Culture form certain characteristics as for self-identification as for identifying others as well. People can identify themselves by political, ideological, religious, racial or national characteristics. Acquired identity is partly a spontaneous feeling, which inspires emotions and loyalties; partly it is imposed on people from outside their own group (Kellas 1991, 15).

Social identity theory suggests that people join and maintain groups for varied and often reinforcing reasons (Tajfel 1981; Lebow 2008, 478). Samuel Huntington (1997, 126) noticed that people tend to distance from other people with different ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions. Socially constructed identities may have multiple representations that would be used in different cultural environments. The Basque identity matters in the Spanish



cultural environment. The Spanish identity matters in the Western cultural environment. The Western identity matters in the global cultural environment. Therefore actors may simultaneously carry multiple social identities that may be variously adopted in different cultural environments. Basque may also be Spanish, European or Westerner for others depending on which conditions they interact with each other.

Alexander Wendt (1999, 343) identifies four variables conditioning the collective identity: interdependence, common fate, homogeneity and self-restraint. All these factors may lead to a situation where actors are interested in the establishment of a distinguishable cultural identity. Interdependence refers to dynamic interacting patterns that would force entities or individuals to share mutually agreed norms. It has been tied with two related factors – sensitivity and vulnerability (Keohane and Nye 1977; Wendt 1999, 344; Kroll 1993, 331). Sensitivity is connected with possible controlling mechanisms joining actors together. Vulnerability refers to possible consequences of ending relationships. Common fate urges the construction of collective memories that would promote feelings such as an awareness of ‘being in the same boat’ (Wendt 1999, 349). Homogeneity is another important factor in collective identity formation where actors would categorize others as being like themselves (Wendt 1999, 354). Self-restraint relies on the principle ‘respect for difference’ (Wendt 1999, 363).

These factors identified by Wendt are certainly powerful features determining collective identity but is it enough? Some motives forcing common identities may not represent normative categories like interdependence, common fate, homogeneity and self-restraint would be. However, every collective identity is a product of complex dependent variables. Similar cultural backgrounds may refer to much comprehensive definition of collective identity. The identity construction is dependent on its cultural environment. In certain contexts, the Basque identity may be a part of Spanish identity. Other contexts construct the Basque identity as a separate or even an opposite identity. Some theorists argue that the intercultural nature of international affairs may reduce the effects of social constructions and thus create context-bound complex identities (Knudsen 2007, 16). The environment may create interdependences, common fates, homogeneities and self-restraints that form commonly accepted normative practices.

Alexander Wendt (1999) distinguishes three basic cultures (ideal types) that have influenced world politics and international systems – the Hobbesian war, the Lockean rivalry and the Kantian security communities (see table 1). These basic cultures influence the security-related behavior of actors and would be therefore identified as basic security cultures. Wendt describes these cultures as cultures of anarchy, but there are some arguments for contesting this specification.

The Hobbesian culture is oriented towards maintaining anarchy and its doctrines seek power: bandwagoning, coalition-building, arms racing. The Lockean culture intends to stabilize anarchy by balancing, ally-seeking, or neutrality among other actions. The Kantian culture intends to escape from anarchy.

Cooperation presumes that the impact of anarchical order will be decreased in favor of world society and absolute values. While the Hobbesian culture proceeds from the culture of fear, then the logic of Kantian security culture presupposes the implementation of measures creating trust between international actors.

**Table 1:** Three ideal types of political cultures

<b>Cultures</b>	<b>Hobbesian</b>	<b>Lockean</b>	<b>Kantian</b>
Environment	anarchy	anarchy	community
Systemic requirements	conflict	conflict	cooperation
Motives	fear	fear/appetite	appetite/honor
Positioning with others	enmity	rivalry	cooperation
Social interactions with others	war	competition	friendship
Polarity	polarity	polarity	Non-polarity
Stability	unstable	stable	Stable/unstable
Doctrines	coalition-building, arms-racing, bandwagoning	balancing, neutrality ally-seeking	Peace, complex interdependence

Frederking (2003, 367) ties basic security cultures with global security arrangements, which may be more or less institutionalized considering security practices in different regions (e.g. the Hobbesian war in the Middle-East, the Lockean rivalry in South Asia (i.e. between India and Pakistan), and the Kantian security community in Europe). Indeed, relationship between international systems and security cultures is multifaceted. While the global system generally practices, for example, the Kantian culture, regional sub-systems or specified security environments can follow the Hobbesian or the Lockean cultures.

Besides these basic cultural patterns characterizing Wendt's classification, every international actor may have its own specific cultural identity that influences its behavior in relation with other actors, sets its strategic goals and presents its beliefs and values. Security environments are interdependent from international systems. At the same time, international system may include various security environments that would practice distinctive security cultures. International systems are traditionally rooted to the cultural traditions of Western hemisphere. The Western civilization has traditionally been the only one, which has been an expressed a global ambition for a long time. There is only a little influence of non-Western cultures to the development of international systems and the influence of other cultures has been limited to regional subsystems.

Security may be closely related to identity of actors. Rationalist IR traditions tend to ignore cultural factors. Being secure is a core function of security, which

requires an appropriate strategy for achieving an aforementioned status. How 'Us' and 'Others' would interact with each other? Do they promote conflict or prefer to cooperate? Cultural motives cannot be underestimated in this respect. The main difference between the Hobbesian, the Lockean, and the Kantian culture is, regarding to the collective identities, that while the Hobbesian and the Lockean culture emphasize differences between cultures, the Kantian culture, at the same time, aims to build bridges between them. Alexander Wendt (1999, 298) notes that „a world populated with Kantian states would view other states as friends rather than enemies or rivals.” The Hobbesian actors tend to refer to the Kantian actors as contestants in the international anarchy.

People may construct their understandings of threats through cultural paradigms. They may treat representatives of other cultures as friends, rivals, or enemies accordingly to their cultural identifications. Security cultures while settling general understandings of security have influenced the development of strategies and tactical methods, by which every international actor intends to establish its safety. Culture matters in constructing guidelines for defining international systems as the international system expects that there are commonly accepted normative regulations.

### **3.1. The Hobbesian culture**

Until the end of the previous century, the system of international relations has been mostly dominated by the Hobbesian culture. The basic principles of the Hobbesian culture come from the works of the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). In his book *Leviathan* of 1651, Hobbes established an idea that the world lives in constant anarchy with unregulated relationship. There exists a war of all against all (*bellum omnium contra omnes*), and the only way to avoid violence is to impose absolute power. Therefore, Hobbes and his disciples assumed that states always seek ways to maximize their power in the anarchical environment.

In Alexander Wendt's (1999, 268) description, the Hobbesian culture bases on three assumptions: 1) states are dealing with others states, beings like themselves; 2) these other beings are enemies, and thus threat to the life and liberty to the self; 3) states use war, threats, surrenders, balance of power against others. The enmity is a natural relationship practiced in the Hobbesian culture, and, therefore, war is referred as a normative political category. According to Clausewitz (1873) "war is a continuation of politics by other means", by which armed forces have been used in order to sustain the diplomatic interests of the states (Holsti 1996, 2).

The Hobbesian culture departs from the concept of state of nature, which prompts conflicts relying on three guiding principles – competition, diffidence and glory. Therefore, states and their national interests dominate in the international arena, international institutions do not play an independent role in the international system, collective interests for peace and stability do not exist, and

consequently, states interrelate with each other by power capabilities. All these paradigms constitute basic principles of the realist school of IR theory and the Hobbesian security culture, deeply connected with the realist tradition, follows a self-centered and competitive perspective of the international society.

*Self* and *other* paradigms are strongly manifested within the Hobbesian culture. The Hobbesian culture aims to impose the will of self regarding the interests of others. The *other* in the Hobbesian culture is an actor who “does not recognize the right of the *self* to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore will not willingly limit its violence toward the self” (Wendt 1999, 260). The Hobbesian culture identifies ‘*others*’ as perpetual enemies that must be surrendered to power. In the Hobbesian security environment, the enemy is threat to your existence and therefore has no right to exist. Survival in hostile environment needs greater military capabilities. Therefore, temporary alliances against enemies in order to increase such capabilities are accepted. The conflict is a natural part of international affairs, and all conflicts can be resolved only by use of force (Wendt 1999: 299–302; Frederking 2003, 368).

Accordingly to the Hobbesian culture, national interests are the most powerful drive in international relations. States may seek the maintenance of status quo position, but threats coming from the anarchical international environment force them to behave on the principle ‘kill or to be killed’ (Wendt 1999, 262). The main driving force is self-help, and alliances are formed because they might increase national capabilities against others in order to achieve advantages between different powers. These alliances may be offensive or defensive, depending on the requirements to increase of power or to balance of power.

The Hobbesian culture produces and reproduces enemy identities over time (Wendt 1999, 274). The offensive realism is probably the most capable school to describing the Hobbesian culture as they are oriented towards maximizing power in international relations and deny the *status quo* intentions of states. John Mearsheimer (2001) fixes general understandings that would characterize the nature of the Hobbesian culture: 1) the international system (of states) is anarchical; 2) states are rational actors; 3) the primary goal of states is survival; 4) all states possess some offensive military capability; 5) states can never trust the intentions of other states. The intentions of competing power are always qualified as hostile, oriented towards threatening or surrender of others. The instant competition where all actors are interested in maximizing their power produces instability of the valid international system. Reference to a situation whether the anarchic international system values stability characterizes the Lockean cultural environment and will be discussed in the next subchapter.

Ideologically, the Hobbesian culture is closely related to the nationalism and the rise of nation-state in 18<sup>th</sup>–19<sup>th</sup> century. Accordingly to the general guidelines of the Hobbesian culture, a nation-state is a highest governing body in the international anarchy and national interests are promoted by force and competition. Nationalism as an ideology came into focus with the French Enlightenment. During the French Revolution, nationalism has acquired a new political

meaning. French revolutionary nationalism, however, defined 'the nation' through citizenship and did not make ethnic distinctions (Kellas 1991, 27–28).

Political definition of nationalism caused a Central European reaction to the idea of universality derived from the French revolution, giving birth to the ethno-nationalism. A German-originated ethno-nationalist ideology looked to cultural elements (particularly language) as the defining characteristic of the nation and is connected with writings of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), a German poet and philosopher. There are structural causes among others in defining the ideological principles of nationalism. Some European nations (like Germans or Italians at that time) sought for their national identity with their intentions to establish nation-states as political-cultural entities. Other nations (French, British, Spanish among others) were interested in preserving their nation-state and creating of national identity based on existing nation-states.

The subject of nationalism, a people, must be autonomous, united, and express a single national culture (Hutchingson, Smith 1994, 4–5). The emergence of a certain ethnic or cultural identity may be related to enmity against other cultural identities. Nationalism corresponds well to the feelings oriented towards self-others competition in the Hobbesian environment because as an ideology it refers to the cultural conflict within a determined environment. The nationalist movements can destroy status quo of the existing system of nation-states, if they are seeking for total independence. In the Hobbesian environment, which is prone to instability, this means that new international actors will enter to the anarchic international society and valid lines of force should be reviewed.

Security within the Hobbesian security culture is a competitive zero-sum affair in which security dilemmas are particularly acute not because of the offence-defense balance but because of intentions attributed to others (Wendt 1999, 265). These intentions may evoke irrational paradigms like *culture of fear*. The latter is an important manifestation of the Hobbesian culture. Culture of fear increases the role of instability and anxiety in the social discourses and relationships. These emotions may be deliberately used on the behalf of political gains. Zbigniew Brzezinski has noted that a culture of fear “obscures reason, intensifies emotions and makes it easier for demagogic politicians to mobilize the public on behalf of the policies they want to pursue” (Brzezinski 2007). Culture of fear has been often practiced in making international systems unstable. As Brzezinski (2007) noted, the global war against terrorism has been used in destabilizing the post-Cold War liberal society of and in evoking challenges to the Kantian international system.

By Lebow (2008, 90), a fear is one of general motives shaping international relations, settling security as a goal and using power as an instrument. In interstate relations, a fear is an emotion, which demands that security is guaranteed through the direct acquisition of military power and the economic well-being is a tool for establishing such a power requirement. Therefore, culture of fear can be identified as a core element of the Hobbesian security culture. Fear is able to produce security dilemmas, classical dilemmas in the Hobbesian environment and cooperative dilemmas in the Kantian environment,

where the Kantian culture meets the Hobbesian one. Later in this work, while examining the role of fear in the Estonian and Russian societies, there can be found evidences how the fear prevents the recognition of the Kantian security environment by actors and keeps alive the Hobbesian security culture with its security dilemmas.

In general, as the Hobbesian culture as well the Lockean culture can use similar doctrines in order to apply for greater extent of security within an international system. While the Hobbesian culture practices offensive goals, the Lockean culture is oriented towards using defensive goals in realizing national interests of actors in the self-help system of anarchy. Nevertheless, the Hobbesian doctrines (e.g. coalition-building, bandwagoning, arms-racing) maximize power capabilities of actors. While bandwagoning, weaker states joining a stronger power simultaneously increase capabilities of that power. Coalition-building may also destabilize a valid international system, maximize capabilities of certain actors and cause a security dilemma. The Hobbesian doctrines may also apply to the Lockean security environment depending on circumstances. Similarly, the Lockean doctrines (e.g. balancing, ally-seeking, neutrality) may frequently occur in the Hobbesian security environment.

### **3.2. The Lockean culture**

The Lockean culture can be distinguished from the Hobbesian culture in some details, but their basic principles are quite similar. As the Lockean culture as well the Hobbesian one represents the anarchical international society, proceeds from the state of nature and is manifested by competing nation-states. Thomas Hobbes wrote its *Leviathan* in a 17<sup>th</sup> century England under the circumstances of civil war causing insecurity, force, and survival. A half century later, John Locke saw a more stable England and argued that “although state of nature” lacked a common sovereign, people could develop ties and make contracts, and therefore anarchy was less threatening” (Nye 2009, 4). Hobbes assumed that individuals and the state have made a social contract in order to survive in the anarchic environment. Locke, again, has stressed on a contract between individuals in order to set up a sovereign (Holsti 1996, 46). In the context of international relations, stable systems may mitigate negative effects of anarchy. Alexander Wendt (1999, 279) points correctly out that the Westphalian system is not a classical Hobbesian system. There have been made multiple successful and unsuccessful attempts in order to stabilize the international system and to produce widely recognized patterns of behavior. Wendt (1999, 282) has distinguished at least four principles of rivalry: 1) states must behave in a status quo fashion towards each other’s sovereignty; 2) there are fewer risks, the future matters more, and absolute gains may override relative losses; 3) threats are not existential and allies can be more easily trusted; 4) if disputes go to war, rivals will limit their own violence. The Hobbesian world stresses on changing and conflictual nature of international relations, whereas in the

Lockean world states are interested in a stable international system. Therefore, the Lockean culture could refer to the stabilized Hobbesian security environment, in which a status quo is more valued than an increase of power.

In the Lockean culture, the actors identify each other as rivals, not enemies. The right of other powers to behave as they behave is recognized if there is no threat to your sovereignty and security (Wendt 1999, 279). The Lockean world recognizes the autonomy of others to practice their own cultures, and thus, to develop their own systems of beliefs, norms, and values. Actors would build up their security on relative capabilities by creating interest-based alliances and performing deterrence-based defense against competing powers. If deterrence does not avoid hostile attacks from your rivals and your sovereignty is in danger, the use of force is acceptable (Wendt 1999: 299–302; Frederking 2003, 368).

Moreover, both cultures, the Hobbesian one and the Lockean one, identify a relationship with 'Others' through polarization, which may end with a classical security dilemma instead of a cooperative security dilemma. While the Hobbesian culture tends to characterize unstable polarity, the Lockean culture refers to the stable polarity. The Cold War was probably the most successful manifestation of the Lockean culture, though elements of the Hobbesian culture and the Kantian culture were also represented. The Western world competed with the Soviet-led communist bloc, but the direct conflict between the opposing poles has been avoided. Another historical period that would be identified under the domination of the Lockean culture was the first four decades of the Concert of Europe, where the great powers succeeded in coordinating their activities in order to prevent direct military conflicts between the European powers and hold up a status-quo regime.

Theoretically, the Lockean rivalry corresponds to the principles of defensive realism in the neo-realist theoretical school. Defensive realists argue that the offense-defense balance favors the defender, which may have a greater possibility to achieve security (Glaser, Kauffman 1998). A founding father of the neo-realist school, Kenneth Waltz, has contributed a lot to the examination of international system under the anarchy. While classical realists connect causes of war with the human nature, similarly to the Hobbesian culture, neo-realists explain a war as an effect of the anarchy, where polarity is manageable by a stable balance of power within an international system (Waltz 1979).

The Lockean culture, similarly to the Hobbesian one, highlights the interests of national security over other paradigms shaping international relations and pays much attention to the power projection. However, the neo-realists cover the term 'power' as only one influential factor among other entities of international relations (Waltz 1979, 191–192; Knudsen 2007, 25). There may be different purposes forcing international actors to maximize their capabilities, not only the purpose to do harm to your rival. Classical descriptions often emphasize the offensive or aggressive nature of balancing power because of their orientation to military confrontation (Knudsen 2007, 24). The term balancing refers more to neutralizing capabilities of potential adversaries, not

maximizing its own power (like in the case of bandwagoning), therefore it can be described as mostly the Lockean doctrine with power neutralizing not power maximizing purposes.

In the context of this dissertation, the Lockean culture in its main substance is not particularly distinguished from the Hobbesian culture and is treated as a part of the latter one, being a stable-system manifestation of the Hobbesian culture. The enemy of the Hobbesian culture and the rival of the Lockean culture are different branches of the same tree. These cultures both refer to the international anarchy, but they may have different objectives, depending on the recognition or non-recognition of other cultural entities. The Hobbesian war is a culture of natural anarchy, whereas the Lockean rivalry is a culture of systemic anarchy. Therefore, this dissertation would rather argue that the Lockean culture is a subculture of the Hobbesian culture and may be treated as stabilized or systematized concept of the Hobbesian culture. The leading paradigms of these cultures, the Hobbesian enmity and the Lockean rivalry, both lie on competition and antagonism. These cultures are clearly distinct from third major security culture, the Kantian culture that will be examined in the next subchapter.

### **3.3. The Kantian culture**

The Kantian culture is a relatively new one compared with the Hobbesian/Lockean culture. During a long period, non-violence and cooperation of mutual interest have seemed to be classified as the utopian ideas, not working regarding the international system. The principles of a Kantian security culture were developed for the first time by German philosopher Immanuel Kant in his essay from 1795, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (Kant 1795; Wendt 1999; Frederking 2003). Kant proposed a peace program established on following principles:

- “No secret treaty of peace shall be held valid in which there is tacitly reserved matter for a future war”;
- “No independent states, large or small, shall come under the dominion of another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation”;
- “Standing armies shall in time be totally abolished”;
- “National debts shall not be contracted with a view to the external friction of states”;
- “No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another state”;
- “No state shall, during war, permit such acts of hostility which would make mutual confidence in the subsequent peace Impossible: such are the employment of assassins (percussores), poisoners (venefici), breach of capitulation, and incitement to treason (perduellio) in the opposing state”;
- “The civil constitution of every state should be republican”;
- “The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states”;



- “The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality”.

In comparison with works of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, Immanuel Kant proposed in his essay a totally different cultural approach, in which the general principles of conflict and competition are replaced with the principles of cooperation and friendship (Wendt 1999). Kant has settled an idea about the federation of liberal states and stipulated a war-free federation of states, which values the maintenance of human rights, endeavors to create a perpetual peace, and respects the supremacy of international law.

Since the narrower or wider community of the peoples of the earth has developed so far that a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the world, the idea of a law of world citizenship is no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence also of perpetual peace. One cannot flatter oneself into believing one can approach this peace except under the condition outlined here (Kant 1795). In his essay, Immanuel Kant has established general principles that would lead to an international society valuing peaceful relations between actors: peace among representative democracies, economic interdependence, and international law (Russett 1998, 370). Kant assumed that shared values non-aggressive towards fellow members within the international society may cause the emergence of common identity, which forms a basis for the Kantian security culture.

Indeed, Immanuel Kant was not the first political philosopher aiming to establish a concept of peaceful environment, where a war as a widely recognized instrument of international politics has been denied and stayed outside of the normative regulations between international actors. Earlier, one of the leaders of the Czech Hussite party Georg von Podiebrad and French writer and cleric Charles-Irénée Castel Abbé de Saint-Pierre among others also proposed ideas about creating a widely recognized international organization for maintaining peace in the wider security environment and would be considered as forerunners of the Kantian culture.

The logic of Kantian culture, which emphasizes cooperation instead of conflict, contrasts with the logic of Hobbesian/Lockean culture. The Kantian culture is associated with friendship-oriented security regimes and arrangements (e.g. security communities, collective and cooperative security arrangements). The concept of liberal democratic security communities follow the idea of Immanuel Kant – if a powerful and enlightened people form a republic, they should enter into an agreement with other similar republics, and gradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation of republics would extend further and further (Kant 1795; Cohen and Michalka 2002, 22). There is a fundamental difference between an ally in the Hobbesian/Lockean military alliance and a friend of the security community. In the alliance, members feel threatened by similar threats or powers and unite for rational reasons in order to maximize their power. A security community is established on the basis of

collective identity, where similar values and beliefs would support the *Us*-feelings of community.

Complex interdependence is one stabilizing mechanism characterizing the Kantian security environment. Interdependence, as mentioned before, is also one important driver of collective identity building (Wendt 1999, 343). As Keohane and Nye (1977) mentioned, complex interdependence can be described by multiple channels connecting societies, absence of hierarchy among issues and absence of use of military force against each other. Stable peace is another fundamental cornerstone of the Kantian culture and it can be maintained through appropriate international regimes. For example, the institutionalization of Kantian security communities may consolidate shared values and norms, strengthen complex interdependence and stabilize peace between its members.

Despite its overall positive program, the principles of the Kantian culture appeared into practice just more than a century later Immanuel Kant described them in his essay and the Kantian international system firstly emerged after the end of World War I, when the world after a long-time experience of destructive effects of great powers' competition intended to build up the environment resting upon other values and thus minimizing the possibilities for another major war breaking out. The "Fourteen Points" of the US President Thomas Woodrow Wilson could be treated as a follow-up to the Kantian peace program. The League of Nations was a first collective security arrangement that followed the Kantian principles in arranging its organization and activities. However, due to inability to accept these principles by all nations, the first Kantian international system did not succeed.

The release of World War II and the Cold-War security environment indicated the victory of the Hobbesian/Lockean security culture, although some Kantian principles of the international society have been maintained throughout the Cold War. Following the end of the Cold War, the Hobbesian arrangement of international relations marked by fear and competition began to lose its position to a Kantian conception premised on trust and cooperation. In the 1990s, Europe started to introduce a post-modern security system closely related to the Kantian security culture returning more vigorously, which encouraged a cooperative relationship of mutual interdependence between international actors and moved away from bi- or multipolar systems (see also Cooper 2003). The conceptual structure of the Kantian system has been maintained up to present-day. The concept of security communities may still perfectly fit into the post-modern security environment, though the Kantian culture experienced setbacks during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, especially under the Bush's presidency of the United States.

Universal peace still seems to be the most desirable international regime, and for that reason states for time to time try to organize systems that follow the principles of the Kantian culture, even though the history of humankind may lead to a conclusion that a unified global community seems to be unachievable, at least in the current stage of human development. The universal international regime that bases on cooperative security is necessary for awakening a Kantian

culture at the global level (Wendt 1999, 301). In the next phase these regimes should be developed into the Kantian communities as “a world of mature, overlapping security communities may also provide perpetual peace between states” (Bellamy 2004, 188). The initial step could be made with regional security communities, striving for regional peace in a smaller security environment or complex. A chain of regional security communities may once be transferred to the universal security community.

### **3.4. Summary**

This chapter defines and describes security cultures and their basic types. Security culture is a specific manifestation of political culture, which applies to beliefs, norms, narratives and identities, by which actors frame its security-related strategies and behavior, whereas culture is an agent, which operates in a certain environment (or structure). The study relies on classification of Alexander Wendt, identifying three ideal types of political cultures – the Hobbesian war, the Lockean rivalry and the Kantian security community. First two of them are conflict-oriented systems, which work with polarity and would be defined as subcultures of the unified Hobbesian/Lockean culture.

The Kantian culture emphasizes a non-polarized environment. Therefore, this study while referring to security cultures does not make distinction between the Hobbesian culture and the Lockean one. Consequently, the Hobbesian and Lockean cultures operate in the similar polarized environment, which is oriented to conflict and competition between international actors and there is no distinction between the Hobbesian and Lockean security cultures, using similar doctrines for interactions with other actors. Political cultures are related to distinctive IR traditions, which tend to apply for certain cultural environments. The Hobbesian and Lockean cultures are manifested by realists, particularly the Hobbesian culture by offensive realism and the Lockean culture by defensive realism. The Kantian tradition is supported by the liberal school of IR theory.

The valid international system determines guiding principles of international relations followed by majority of international actors and cultural paradigms are able to influence the functioning of the system. The modern and post-modern international systems are dominated by western political cultures. There is mutual influence between cultures and environments where they operate. Different security cultures may operate in the same environments, which can produce security dilemmas among actors.

## **4. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

While the previous chapter defines basic characteristics of political and security cultures influencing international relations, the present chapter deals with environments where security cultures operate. It gives an overview of basic principles, which enable to describe international systems and international regimes. An international system is a governing body that has an ability to arrange relations between different political, social, and cultural arrangements. International regimes are mechanisms by which international system is able to arrange norms for interactions within its framework. The chapter considers the influence of political and security cultures to the formation of security architecture in the certain environment and establishes an argument that different types of security regimes and arrangements forming security architecture are rooted to one or another type of security culture.

By Hedley Bull's classical definition, an international system comes into force „when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions to cause them to behave as parts of a whole“ (Bull 1977, 9–13). There should be a little bit more than a state of nature – interstate relations within the system must be somehow regulated, which refers to the presence of norms and regimes supporting interactions in the system and accepted by actors. An international system itself as a self-regulative structure is not a cultural entity, though various political cultures can influence the development of a system. In its turn, the system has an ability to shape the cultural environment within its framework. Modern and post-modern international systems have been influenced by the Western political cultures, and therefore can be identified as dominantly Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian systems.

There has been a discussion in the International Relations theory about the possible influence of the international system to the behavior of actors. Classical realists (e.g. Singer) realize that an international system is a subsystem-dominant where international actors affect the functions of the system. Neo-realists (e.g. Waltz) argue that the structure of the system directs the behavior of actors (Buzan and Little 2000, 39). Kenneth Waltz (1979, 91) does not specify, which kind of interactions or how many actors is required for a system to exist. Neo-realism explains the influence of international system primarily at the strategic level, while arguing that units within the system are independent (Buzan and Little 2000, 18).

Robert Jervis (1997, 28) defines systems through interconnections and emergent properties. He mentions:

... in some cases the concepts we apply to a system (e.g. polarity) cannot be applied to the units that compose it, and in other cases the description of a unit, such as a state being non-aligned, an actor being centrally positioned, or a person playing multiple roles, only makes sense in systemic terms (Jervis 1997, 15).

The current approach favors the mutual influence between actors and the system. National security cultures (strategic cultures) should enrich a basic security culture that dominates over the system and a basic culture in its turn influences the development of national security cultures.

The date of 1648<sup>3</sup> is a conventional starting point used by the majority of IR scholars for marking the emergence of international systems. The Westphalian Peace Accord was a first significant attempt to regulate international relations in the larger environment by commonly accepted norms and by means of international law and diplomacy. First international systems were primarily the European systems. Outside of the area of Western influence, the pre-modern state of nature continued to arrange international affairs. Therefore, it might be discussed, did the first system emerge later (e.g. the creation the League of Nations), where the system applied more to the status of “international” and did not pretend to regulating spheres of influence between the European powers.

In historical and sociological terms the connection between the Westphalian Peace Accord and the first modern international system has been often criticized (Rosenberg 2005, 17). Certainly, this is not a conscious act to start the system but rather a sort of breaking-point, where interactions between international actors became so intensive, due to that interstate regulations were required. Breaking-points would be described by a change and they are conventional terms for a period, during which a transition from one status to another takes place. The changes between international systems<sup>4</sup> have usually been violent, featured by major war activities. The change from the modern society to the post-modern society with its conventional date of 1991 would be described as a rare example of peaceful change.

In the modern society, the international system has been a system of nation-states. The system of nation-states is tied with the concept of *sovereignty*. This concept emerged during the Age of Enlightenment and has been further developed by nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers and embedded states as main actors of the international system and has settled a legal basis for the state justified the pursuit of national interests (Lebow 2008, 475). The logic of the Kantian culture presumes that international actors would be willing to decrease their sovereignty on behalf of the universal peace. In the post-modern society, the influence of non-state actors to the system has been increasing though a system of nation-states has been maintained as a core of the system.

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<sup>3</sup> In accepting a conventionally used date of 1648, this study examines modern and post-modern societies, and does not analyze pre-Westphalian international systems, which applied for smaller regional environments.

<sup>4</sup> See also table 9, p. 96

Tilly (1990, 162) concludes that “states form a system to the extent that they interact with each other regularly, and to the degree that their interaction affects the behavior of each state”. They would be described through various characterizing paradigms like: the sovereign equality (all states are treated equally and they have each an equal vote); the differential responsibilities (states or groups of states are treated differently and their position within a system is represented on the basis of their relative wealth, military power, trade capabilities or any other distinctive characteristic of interest); regionalism (regions are prioritized and determine positions within a system). These paradigms are realized by treaties, resolutions, decisions, declarations and understandings that characterize principles of the international system (Katz Cogan 2009, 212–3).

International systems are simultaneously political, cultural, and legal manifestations of its cultural environment. Realist and liberal schools come respectively from the Hobbesian or the Kantian political culture. Liberals and constructivists emphasize that as political preferences of states as well their national interests depend on multiple variables including the type of domestic society and political culture practiced there (Nye 2009, 50). Classical realists (e.g. E. H. Carr, H. Morgenthau) suppose that states are self-interested power-seeking rational actors, who are interested in maximizing their security and survival in the anarchical security environment. Neo-realists argue that, because of the nature of international system, states will have a little choice in defining their national interests (Nye 2009).

Liberal school of the International Relations theory seeks mechanisms that could minimize the use of war and other conflict-oriented behaviors in international relations. Accordingly to liberals, states will gain from interstate cooperation and agreements (e.g. international law, human rights, and institutionalization). Liberal schools emphasize the positive role of international organizations in establishing cooperation-oriented international regimes and complex interdependence between states as main international actors. It is characteristic to rationalist schools of IR theory that they tend to favor one cultural environment over others.

The post-structural traditions of the International Relations theory, while taking into account social structures like norms, values, beliefs and identities, make intercultural approaches possible. Constructivists aim to examine and explain the actions taken by international actors on the basis of their cultural identities that guide interactions between these actors. Several authors (i.e. Wendt 1992, 1999, Katzenstein 1996, Frederking 2003, Lebow 2008) conclude that the particular identity of the international system to which actors belong profoundly affects its structure and the behavior of international actors within a system.

International systems existentially depend on two dependant paradigms: polarity and stability. Polarity implies that there are competing antagonistic subsystems within a system. Polarized systems coincide with the principles of the Hobbesian/Lockean security culture. There are some paradoxes that would describe the principles of interaction in polarized systems. The first paradox

indicates that a smaller number of competing subsystems has theoretically better possibilities to establish a more stable system, as pointed out by the neo-realist theoretical school (Waltz 1979). A unipolar (hegemonic) system usually tends to be more stable than a bipolar system, and a bipolar system generally tends to be more stable than a multipolar system. However, this argument usually works in the purely theoretical security environments. The stability within the system may change by actions taken by major powers. The Soviet invasion to Afghanistan in 1979 in the long-run caused the crash of the Cold War system and the invasion of the US-led coalition to Iraq in 2003 destabilized the post-modern Kantian system.

Stable systems are able to control interactions within the system and preserve status quo over a long period. Unstable systems are more fragile to conflicts, and this may lead to a major conflict ending with a change of system. As Deutsch and Singer (1964, 390) have stated, “stability may, of course, be considered from the vantage point of both in the total system and the individual states comprising it”. Stability of subsystems (e.g. states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations) can influence the stability of the total system. There are various factors that may be related to the overall stability of system: political, financial, security and defense, demographical, but also cultural among others. If the international system is able to maintain its stability, there are fewer probabilities for a large-scale war broken out (Deutsch and Singer 1964, 390–91).

Under the prevalence of the Hobbesian culture, a modern international system has experienced bi- and multipolar systems. Polarized systems can stabilize a system of states by establishing balancing elements to the Hobbesian cultural environment, such as a balance of powers or a balance of threats. The Kantian security culture excludes polarity as the main principle in designing international systems and aims to establish a non-polarized system, here to be called a liberal society. Three-dimensional classification of international system (multipolarity, bipolarity, non-polarized society) corresponds to some extent to the categories presented by Alexander Wendt in examining the development of international system: the war of Thomas Hobbes – multipolarity; the rivalry of John Locke – bipolarity; and the security community of Immanuel Kant – society (Wendt, 1999; Frederking 2003).

**Table 2:** Three-dimensional classification of international systems

Hobbesian war	unstable multipolarity or bipolarity
Lockean rivalry	stable multipolarity or bipolarity
Kantian security community	stable or unstable liberal society

Stable multipolarity is a situation where major powers intend to create a stable international order that enables to establish an environment controlled by multi-lateral consensus of great powers (i.e. the Concert of Europe between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and later France). Unstable multipolarity is a situation where major powers are not interested in regimes maintaining status quo, there may emerge competing powers challenging the system, and conflicts or even wars between powers may take place. In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the international order created by the Concert of Europe, began to vanish, and the unstable multipolar system caused several international conflicts regarding the system (i.e. the Crimean war, the Italian wars of independence, the Austro-Prussian war, the Franco-Prussian war).

Stable bipolarity reflects a situation where the system is balanced by two international communities (i.e. the Cold War). The stable bipolar system can minimize the possibility for a major conflict by forming the system by bilateral agreements between leading powers. Unstable bipolarity, however, seems to be the most threatening system where two competing rivalries are not able or to not intend to use balancing doctrines in the system management and at least one of them is interested in achieving an hegemonic status (i.e. situations before the World War I and the World War II in Europe).

Stable liberal society refers to a situation where the international system follows shared values and cooperative regimes will be used in the conflict prevention. A liberal society becomes to be unstable in a situation where some actors may be interested in changing the system or actors may become offensive in defending the shared values. The negative consequences of instability appeared as in the Versailles system as well in the system of post-modern society after the Iraqi invasion. Instability within a Kantian system may lead it into the replacement of the Kantian system with the Hobbesian system.

The European history has demonstrated that whenever the international order launches into an unstable bipolarity system, there is a high risk that a major war will break out. Antagonistic feelings and hostility may be developed to the point where misperceptions and rivalries most likely will ultimately lead to war. Unstable multipolarity is, of course, also a threatening system, where hotbeds of tension may evolve into wars and international conflicts. Nevertheless, because of multiple numbers of systemic actors, these wars and conflicts may be limited, not involving the whole system.

Systems based on difference in values and competitiveness in beliefs and identities cannot consistently guarantee peace and stability. The Cold War *long peace*<sup>5</sup> was untruthful. In fact, there was an eternal conflict between two competing powers that often escalated into minor conflicts (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan etc). Under cover of fictitious peace and stability, hidden proxy war went on, and only nuclear deterrence helped to avoid a theoretically justified World War III.

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<sup>5</sup> Long peace is a term often used for the Cold War, because of the absence of a major war between the two superpowers during the forty-five years (Saperstein 1991)



International systems are able to produce international regimes by which they aim to maintain stability of the system. The traditional meaning of international regime “is a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge” (Krasner 1983, 2). Katzenstein sets that international regimes are social institutions that mitigate conflict in a decentralized international society of states (Katzenstein 1996, 22). International regimes base on mutual consent and recognition of all actors, which participate in the framework of these social structures. International regimes help to create universal norms that reduce the possibility of conflicts and foster intercultural communication and mutual understandings. International regimes are cultural manifestations products of political cultures and different cultural environments can produce their own regimes. Regimes may be also intercultural if they regulate interactions between different cultural environments. The prevailing culture of the international system to great extent determines the framework of regimes practiced within the valid system.

Regime theory derives from the liberal tradition of the International Relations theory and argues that international regimes can affect the behavior of states, making cooperation desirable within an international system. Immanuel Kant (1795) settled in his essay prospective mechanisms for future international regimes. In certain cases, successful international regimes may cause new collective identities. For example, the European Union emerged from a set of international regimes that tied community members together stronger and stronger. Globalization has shaped the post-Cold War international environment especially through the cultural paradigms emerging in the Western hemisphere. A large number of communication tools among actors have made possible the enhanced complex interdependence between the European countries and the institutionalization is becoming a natural part of the contemporary European political culture. The importance of state sovereignty has been decreased regarding the post-modern society, though not completely abandoned (see Cooper 2003).

There are norms and regulations that should be followed by all members of the international society. What concerns the Kantian international systems, the failure to comply with commonly accepted norms may cause the involvement into internal affairs of a single actor, whereas “the concept of state sovereignty cannot be a screen behind which mass violations of human security can take place with impunity, even within otherwise recognized international boundaries” (Cohen 2002, 8). The greater role of international control and the recognition of principles common to all humanity makes an important distinction why the Kantian international system refers to be also called an international society – states in an international system have common interests and common values, conceive themselves to be bound by common set of rules, share in the working of common institutions and have a common culture.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> See definitions pp. 18–19.

The Hobbesian and the Lockean culture, following the realist traditions of the International Relations theory and settling an international conflict as a norm of interstate relations, explain international regimes as temporary agreements between actors, which is dependant on power considerations (i.e. hegemonic stability theory).<sup>7</sup> Accordingly to realists, international actors may settle norms for the consolidation of their relative power in the framework of these arrangements. Every actor is interested in their own relative gains and goals to maximize its interests in determining the content of the regime as much as it would be possible (Hasenclever et al 1997).

Security regimes are international regimes that regulate security related interactions within a certain security environment. The Hobbesian war and the Lockean rivalry overwhelmingly characterize leading principles of the modern society, describing social formations that emerged up to the end of the Cold War. The ideal type for building security regimes for the post-modern system of states should stem from the concept of a Kantian security community. The Kantian security regimes following the principles of democratic peace and cooperative security may enhance security and defense cooperation between actors and in that way they can reinforce a greater interoperability among international actors.

Security architecture would be defined by a set of social interactions (i.e. institutions, regimes) practiced within a certain security environment. If there are misconnections between the security architecture and the security environment dominated by one or another security culture, this would make possible the emergence of security dilemmas. In that case, the valid security architecture does not produce security and would destabilize the whole system, if there are misperceptions and mistrust between actors. Security cultures can introduce their own structures characterized by norms, values, beliefs and identities related to that particular culture. Even in the polarized international system, states may join one or another bloc not for achieving gains against the opposite bloc threatening their individual security but they may believe a similar collective identity with a particular arrangement (Wendt 1999, 301).

Military alliances and coalitions fulfill requirements of the Hobbesian/Lockean security culture. Security architecture of the Cold War system included military alliances as well as collective security arrangements. The latter is, however, a manifestation of the Kantian security culture, first signs of that (the League of Nations) emerged after the World War I. The unstable Kantian society of the Versailles system introduced some Kantian elements into the international practice and these elements have been maintained by the Hobbesian/Lockean Cold War system. The Kantian security arrangements use cooperative methods in order to build up appropriate security structures: security communities, cooperative security arrangements, and collective security arrangements.

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<sup>7</sup> Hegemonic stability theory indicates that the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single nation-state is the dominant world power, or hegemony (Goldstein 2005, 107).

**Table 3:** Security structures

	<i>Security community</i>	<i>Cooperative security arrangement</i>	<i>Collective security arrangement</i>	<i>Military alliance</i>
<i>Method of communication</i>	Complex interdependence	Cooperation	Cooperation	Cooperation
<i>Value sharing</i>	Yes	No	No	No
<i>Driving force</i>	Common identity	Peace and stability	Peace and stability	Common interests
<i>Security regimes</i>	Collective defense	Promoting stability	Collective security	Collective defense and/or collective security

Cooperation within the Hobbesian/Lockean cultural environment stems from similar interests that would overcome natural enmity between actors. States do not intend to establish security regimes creating peace and stability but gather against possible threats from competing power. They join together into the security arrangement because they feel to being threatened by same security threats. Military alliances usually do not emphasize the role of common identities or shared beliefs and values.

Military alliances may be offensive or defensive, according to their purposes – do they operate either in the Hobbesian cultural environment or in the Lockean one. If alliances have been set up to destroying competing powers, these arrangements follow the principles of the Hobbesian security culture. The alliances established before the World War I and the World War II (e.g. the Entente, the Central powers, the Allied powers, the Axis powers) were structurally offensive military alliances. At the same time, defensive military alliances are instituted under the circumstances of the Lockean culture, where powers are primarily interested in maintaining status quo between competing powers. The Cold War-time security institutions (e.g. NATO, CENTO, SEATO, the Warsaw Pact Organization) were primarily defensive military alliances that aimed to prevent the possible military attack from the competing power.

The Cold War rivalry has been manifested by two oppositional ideologies that forced actors to join one or another military alliance. The coalition-building in NATO or in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) during the Cold War followed the Hobbesian/Lockean principles, though both of these arrangements also carried a type of common identity. NATO held ideals of the Western democracy and the WTO represented the communist ideology. Cold War alliances like NATO or the WTO could be simultaneously also to define as hegemonic security communities<sup>8</sup>, created in other motives than promoting

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<sup>8</sup> Hegemonic security communities base on non-democratic values and identities (Mölder 2006, 11).

democratic peace. These alliances, indeed, stressed on differences in cultural paradigms, and can be at least theoretically identified as security communities, because structurally security communities do not have to be necessarily the Kantian security communities.

The post-modern society introduced new Kantian security structures, which appeared primarily into the European security environment: security communities and cooperative security arrangements. NATO is moving towards being a pluralistic security community, and the European Union, establishing much comprehensive cooperative framework, is moving towards being an amalgamated security community. Cooperative security arrangements are created by the Kantian security communities in order to enhance zones of peace and stability into other cultural environments. There are certain elements in principles of security communities concerning the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the South American Defense Council. However, as these institutions are lacking of cultural unity and complex interdependence, they would be still identified as defensive military alliances or regional collective security arrangements. Within the Kantian culture, peace and stability in a certain environment may be guaranteed by security communities or special regional institutions. Cooperative security regimes focusing on regional or sub-regional cooperation may offer stable peace for countries in the Kantian security environment.

There may exist different levels of security environment – global security, regional security, national security. The post-modern security environment, which means a more globalized and interdependent world, does not entail the end of regional security. In the global security context, Europe, for instance, is just like an apartment in a big house with many rooms. Apartments and rooms are respectively regions and sub-regions in the big house to be called ‘global security’. According to this analogy, the house manages a general security system, but every apartment contributes to the house’s security, and every room again has its particular link to the apartment’s security.

International security system may consist from different security environments, which have their particular needs and interests. Regional security, which applies to the security environment in the particular area, is influenced by security concerns of all regional players. Buzan (1991, 193) introduces a regional security complex, which consists of “group of states whose primary security concerns link together that their national securities cannot be considered apart from one another”. Regional security complexes refer to security environments in the given geopolitical context (i.e. the Balkans, Baltic Sea, Nordic area, Black Sea, Adriatic Sea etc.).

The concept of regional security complexes is close to the concept of regional security environments. While Buzan remains at the interstate level, the current study operates with multilevel security environments – global and regional. Regional security environments are interested in achieving or maintaining peace and stability in a certain area. The kind of interdependence characterizes all actors that form a security environment. There are some

paradoxes that make regional security environments important players outside of the global international system. For example, actors may operate collectively within relatively autonomous smaller environments, if there is a demand for regional peace (e.g. the African Union in Darfur, the American Organization in Haiti).

In the post-modern system, the concept security environment offers more opportunities to define a subject. International actors, which operate in a certain environment, may be states but not only. Various institutions or other non-state actors may have their specific security concerns in such environment. Moreover, security environment may not include just geographically determined regions, because actors outside of the region can be also involved in regional security matters.

#### **4.1. The Hobbesian security architecture**

The Hobbesian political culture manifests the eternal fight for survival between nations. The international conflict is not idiosyncratic only to the international system, but the system may reflect the influences of intrastate conflicts if these different identities do not reach an agreement. The traditionally evoked instrument for reaching such an agreement has been the power, a core driver within the Hobbesian system. Polarity is probably the most important feature characterizing the Hobbesian security environment. By the Hobbesian point of view, all nations are interested in maximizing their power. More power means at the same time more security.

Within the Hobbesian international system, nation-states are the main international actors of the system. Nation-state is a type of state where political system and state interests proceed from interests of one socially constructed and itself ethnically identifying group, called a nation. A nation may be constructed on the basis of a leading ethnic group, a dominant nation, or it may be a manifestation of several ethnic groups, forming a multinational state (Mölder 1997). Nation-states refer to some ethnic or cultural identities that may be in conflict with other ethnic or cultural identities. The concept of nation-state does not exclude an existence of other ethnic or cultural identities in the territory of the nation-state, but their rights are delegated from the dominant-nation. The attributes of the nation-state (legislative, executive, judicial power) are controlled by the dominant-nation. The dominant-nation has the power, and others, weaker identities, should obey it.

In sum, a nation-state as an organism describes the requirements of the Hobbesian security culture. If nation-states are not able to enforce unipolar hegemonic regimes, they may join into alliances and thus to establish international systems based on bipolarity or multipolarity. Ally-seeking and coalition-building are security regimes often used in the Hobbesia/Lockean environment, favoring doctrines like balance of power, bandwagoning, or balance of threats.

Accordingly to the realist paradigms, states have basically two choices in coalition building – they may align with a weaker side, that is the balancing power, or choose the stronger side, that is the bandwagoning (Waltz 1979; Walt 1985). Bandwagoning refers to a situation when a weaker state will decide to join a stronger coalition or power in order to increase her capabilities. Thus, it may create an opposite trend, leading to the creation of hegemonic structures. In the polarity-based international system, if one competing power increases its capabilities, this may increase possibilities for offensive actions against weaker powers, following the logic of the Hobbesian culture. In that case, bandwagoning may also create a security dilemma.

By balancing, states intend to create stability between competing powers in the polarized international system. In the realist tradition of the International Relations theory, an international actor (state) joining a weaker coalition can increase capabilities of this coalition and also to counter the influence of stronger coalition. There may be different reasons why international actors would decide to behave in such way. A weaker state may attempt to build up a coalition against a stronger competing power, or she might aim to increase power of a weaker coalition for a stabilization of the international system.

In reaction to the classical realist doctrine of balance of power, Stephen M. Walt (1985, 8) has proposed a neo-realist challenge, the *balance of threat theory*, in which countries “will not balance against those who are rising in power but do not display offensive intentions“. According to the concept of balance of threat, states induce the coalition-building by threats they perceive from other states. By Walt (1985), states generally prefer to balance competing powers, though weaker actors may decide in favor of bandwagoning. States evaluate factors like aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions.

Military alliances are typical arrangements of the Hobbesian/Lockean security cultures, in which states join with balancing or bandwagoning purposes. The accession to alliance is a rational choice made by actors, where the value-sharing is not a necessary precondition. States may choose also a neutrality option, but in this case the success of neutrality regime depends on recognition of opposing powers of the polarized system.

#### **4.1.1. Alliances**

The alliance is much older than the history of modern international system and may perfectly fit with the principles of the state of nature, described by Hobbes (1651). First military alliances arose already during the Hellenic period. During the Peloponnesian War, the League of Delos (Athens and her allies) and the Peloponnesian League (Lacedemonia/Sparta and her allies) established a sort of local bipolarity in the Ancient Greek security environment. The Melian Dialogue of Thucydides, a classical cornerstone of the realist tradition in the International relations theory, describes the coalition-building in the Hobbesian

security environment where power was the most commonly used argument in the alliance formation. Alliance is the only cooperative arrangement, which descends from the state-centered Hobbesian culture. Stephen Walt notes the difference between alliances and collective security arrangements on the level of inclusiveness and exclusiveness:

An alliance is not a collective security agreement. A collective security arrangement is an inclusive institution: it commits the members to oppose any act of aggression, even one committed by one of its members. By contrast, alliances are exclusive institutions: they entail a commitment to support the other members against states outside the community. Although members of an alliance may also be part of a collective security organization and may engage in other forms of security cooperation, failure to keep these concepts distinct can lead to misleading analyses and muddy policy-making (Walt 1997, 158).

The role of exclusiveness and inclusiveness also refers to distinctive cultural paradigms distinguishing the Kantian collective security arrangements from the Hobbesian alliances. An alliance is a divisive organization that applies to polarized international systems. Alliances rely on conflict and competition, collective security arrangements aim to produce a stable peace and stability within the system. In the Us-Others scale, the driving forces of building military alliances came from negative associations (i.e. enmity and rivalry) against others. There are visibly defined ‘Others’ and there is fight for survival under way in the alliance-building.

If nation-states are interested in increasing their capabilities and maximizing power, they may start an arms-racing competition with potential enemies or rivals. The arms-racing would be dangerous for internal policy of any state if it is carried through by their own capabilities and therefore states may intend to find appropriate partners, the national interests of them are moving towards the same direction. They may start a coalition-building, which plays a central role in the formation of alliances, or they may start an ally-seeking, looking for powers and coalitions with similar interests. The most common purpose in the coalition-building or ally-seeking is a wish to balance power of others or manage with threats coming from competing powers. There is always an option for bandwagoning – to become an ally of a potential rival or enemy.

**Table 4:** The alliance-formation

<i>Environment</i>	State of nature
<i>Precipitating conditions</i>	Cognitive misperceptions towards competing powers (fear, hatred, rivalry etc)
<i>Doctrines used for maximizing power</i>	Coalition-building, ally-seeking, arms-racing
<i>Doctrines used against competing power</i>	Balancing, bandwagoning

Alliances symbolize confronting interests in the polarized world and sometimes this opposition has been value-based, for example between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War – “... the creation of pro-democracy and pro-liberalism norms within NATO was a deliberate attempt to mark it out from its neighbor, the Warsaw Pact” (Bellamy 2004, 56). Certainly, the alliances may follow certain ideologies that would influence their value-building, though this is not a general rule to follow. Previously, even if liberal democracy has been always ideologically connected with NATO identities, this was not a consolidated norm for all allies regarding their membership for many years. Many NATO allies – Portugal, Greece, and Turkey survived long periods where democracy in these countries was highly questionable. Spain was probably the first country where the successful democratization was accompanied by NATO membership in 1986.

Typical alliances active today are, for example, ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, the United States) and Five Powers Pact (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, the United Kingdom). These institutions have been created during the Cold War, into the Hobbesian/Lockean cultural environment. The Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) has been signed on a bilateral basis in 1971. As settled in the basic documents, the five states will consult each other in the event of aggression or military threat to Malaysia and Singapore. The FDPA still provides defense-related cooperation and military exercises between allies.

The Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty was concluded in 1951 and entered into force in 1952. The roots of the treaty follow Stephen Walt's concept of the balance of threat. Australia and New Zealand, surviving the Japanese military attacks during the World War II and feeling threatened by Japan, refused to finalize a peace treaty with Japan, if they do not have security guarantees from the United States. The parties of treaty committed to use their military capabilities if an armed attack in the Pacific area would endanger the peace and safety of any of them. In 1986, after New Zealand started a process to declare its territory to being a nuclear-free zone, with the result the United States suspended the treaty with New Zealand. Somehow this also reflects the cultural conflict in the Cold War environment, where the Kantian practices of New Zealand did not fit with the Hobbesian practices of the United States.

Nevertheless, the treaty obligations are still valid between the United States and Australia and Australia and New Zealand. Security alliance between the United States and Australia is still active. For instance, Australia participated in the 2003 Iraqi operation and contributed to the US National Missile Defense System. In the Kantian security environment, alliances may change their profile and became the Kantian institutions, in which NATO has been the most successful case.



#### 4.1.2. Neutrality

Neutrality is a security regime widely practiced in the Hobbesian/Lockean cultural environment. It means that some states would see as their best security guarantee if they stay outside of the military alliances and coalitions and favor independent defense. Especially small states without strong military capabilities have seen a potentiality of this regime in distancing themselves from the games between great powers. Characteristically to the Hobbesian doctrines, the neutrality may arise only within the polarized international systems. Some countries may intend to escape negative consequences of the Hobbesian systems, and avoid traditional alliance-oriented security choices like balancing or bandwagoning. Despite its seemingly high potential to avoid security risks, neutrality has not proven itself as an effective security formation.

In practice, the neutrality has been frequently ignored by great powers and it relies on the willingness of other states to respect it (Gärtner and Sens 1996, 195). In the course of armed conflict, if the territory of neutral state is needed for military or other purposes for fighting powers, the neutrality may not help to preserve the sovereignty. For example, the neutrality of Belgium was disregarded during the World War I as the World War II as well. Also, Estonia experienced neutrality without any success before the Soviet annexation in 1940. Therefore, taking into account negative experiences during the war regarding the reliability of neutrality option, many small countries – like Denmark, Belgium, and Netherlands among others – abandoned it after the World War II and joined NATO.

Various factors, like a geopolitical location, difficult terrain or a strong military capability may influence the durability of this regime. In some cases, the neutrality option has worked successfully. Countries like Switzerland have a long tradition of being neutral in case of military conflicts. However, geopolitical reasons (e.g. terrain, peripheral location concerning major conflicts, economic capabilities) have played an important role in the success of the neutrality of Switzerland. During the Cold War, neutrality has been practiced in some western countries near to the “iron curtain” – Sweden, Finland, Austria. In addition to that, a communist country Yugoslavia, an active participant in the Non-Aligned Movement,<sup>9</sup> was *de facto* a neutral country. Neutrality may be a much expensive security regime than any collective formation. Countries have to establish their own independent defense capability, which is not a cost-effective, especially with limited resources available.

The neutrality option does not necessarily decrease perceptions and misperceptions against others. Even at the peacetime, a state declaring it neutral may experience insecurity regarding the possible intentions of other international actors. Finally, a constant insecurity may provoke the emergence of security dilemma. Countries which practiced neutrality during the Cold War (e.g.

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<sup>9</sup> Organization of states, which consider themselves not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc, established in 1961.

Sweden, Finland, Austria) were not less threatened by the Soviet bloc than NATO member-states and they had to increase their military capabilities for self-defense.

Neutrality has lost its relevance within the post-modern Kantian security environment because of the decrease of polarity between great powers. Only few countries tried to re-establish this concept but mainly as a transitional relict from the Cold War bipolarity not suitable to the current international system. For example, under the Kuchma's presidency in 1990s, the Ukraine developed foreign policy stressing neutrality between Russia and the West. This concept reflected the continuing bipolarity in Russia-Western relationship and was based on two pillars: 1) the Ukraine holds its independence, having "a special partnership with Russia"; 2) the Western support for such a partnership is needed (Binkowski). However, these attempts remain marginal in the post-modern society and small states would benefit more security through the membership (or partnership) in security communities, and therefore tend to favor cooperative security options to the neutrality in the Kantian security environment.

## **4.2. The Kantian security architecture**

According to Immanuel Kant (1795), the republican countries should foster cooperative ties on behalf of the non-polarized international society, which principles form a basis for the Kantian security architecture. There may be three options for establishing a stable peace through the Kantian security architecture: 1) *security communities* practicing collective defense and interdependence in order to guarantee peace and stability for community members; 2) *collective security arrangements* for collective actions in order to guarantee peace and stability within an international society; 3) *cooperative security arrangements* for promoting security cooperation and enhancing zones of peace and stability outside of the security communities. All the Kantian security arrangements have their specific obligations on behalf of the stable and peaceful security environment. Collective security arrangements unite international actors against violations of human rights and international law. Security communities are communities of friendship that aspire for collective identity and protect their members against outside aggression. Cooperative security arrangements help to promote cooperative ties with neighboring areas. Democratic peace and cooperative security constitute the most essential international security regimes by which international actors operate within a framework of the Kantian international system.

The Kantian security culture promotes absolute values, such as human rights and international law and encourages the use of principles of democratic peace and cooperative security in establishing widely respected security regimes for the international society. Institutionalization offers a way to consolidate the Kantian security regimes and thus direct the international system towards the Kantian society. The Kantian security arrangements: security communities,

collective and cooperative security arrangements identify actors as fellow citizens, who are obliged to uphold agreed-upon rules of behavior. In these arrangements, security is based on multilateral commitments to use force against those who do not keep their international obligations (Frederking 2003, 368). At the same time, the use of force in the Kantian international system is somewhat exceptional and has some parallels with the behavior that civil societies practice against criminals for punitive purposes. The use of force is allowed by a collective decision against these international actors who behave as outlaws, and do not respect internationally acknowledged norms of the world society.

Differently from the Hobbesian/Lockean security environment where the anarchic world order has been regarded as a norm, the Kantian culture aims to escape from the anarchy. So far there does not exist such a global community that corresponds to the norms of the Kantian security community, the Kantian international system aspires to build up a stabilized anarchic society where the preconditions for major conflicts are minimized. The introduction of principles of pluralistic security communities and a high-level institutionalization presents the current post-modern European security architecture as a system close to what Barry Buzan called a “*mature anarchy*”. Though in 1990s the Euro-Atlantic region started to establish pluralistic security communities, the anarchical international system is still present, the Kantian security culture is not overwhelmingly accepted, and cooperative security dilemmas still endure. As Buzan (1991, 77) explains:

A mature anarchy would be a highly ordered and stable system in which states would enjoy a great deal of security deriving both from their own inner strength and maturity, and from the strength of the institutionalized norms regulating relations among them.

This system may characterize the period of transformation from a modern society to a post-modern society. The mature anarchy establishes an environment, which would have all necessary conditions for the peaceful change – defined as “the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force” (Deutsch 1957). Nevertheless, mature anarchy may include various cultural environments and still experience some effects of the Hobbesian culture.

A security community, where the use of war against other community members is prevented, is probably the most desired security structure for maintaining peace and stability. The international society of the Kantian security communities is a step towards universal peace, aimed by Immanuel Kant. In the practices of the Kantian culture, security communities are for those who identify themselves as friends and are ready to implement cooperative relationship based on shared values and collective identities. There should exist trust and we-identification between community members (Frederking 2003, 368). Every

member of community is obliged to follow rules of their community and all conflicts are intended to resolve peacefully.

The end of the Cold War, which brought along the end of bipolar world order, once again gave a boost to the spread of liberal values in Europe, while “in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American-European alliance succeeded in stabilizing the region, ensuring its peacefulness and projecting liberal-democratic norms” (Laursen et al. 2005, 44). This process can be characterized as a breakthrough of peaceful change: an attempt to install a Kantian security culture into the Euro-Atlantic region. The re-established Kantian society opened an opportunity for building up security communities based on Kantian values. Changes in the international system also promoted the cultural challenge for security and defense organizations.

The post-modern international system evoked two security communities in Europe, expressing liberal democratic values – NATO and the European Union. NATO has been the pre-eminent security organization in Europe, founded already before the development of the concept of security community. The EU has been the main format for the non-war community in the post-modern security environment and probably cultivates the principles of real security community in terms of identity and the non-imaginability of war (Waever 1998, 6). In the current international system, these communities are accompanied by collective security arrangements like United Nations Organization (UNO) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

#### **4.2.1. Democratic peace**

Democratic peace refers to an environment where states or institutions share liberal democratic values with the absence of using war for dispute resolution against other members of security arrangements, considering that “even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with non-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another” (Doyle 1983, 61). The mainstream of IR scholars uses the democratic peace as a security paradox – an unintentional outcome of security practices, not as an international regime (Doyle 1983; Bremer 1993). This study positions the democratic peace to the role of international regime that works in the Kantian security environment. As a regime, it carries two paradigms – liberal democracy and universal peace, which may form a connection that is able to unite international actors sharing these values according to the requirements of the Kantian society.

Liberal democracy gives fundamental patterns of behavior to the Kantian social arrangements and would be defined as *a social order which possesses values like free elections, free market economy, institutionalization, international law, civil control over armed forces, individual and civil liberties, division of powers, tolerance against other cultures and principles of human security* (see also Zakaria 2003, Dahl 1989, Held 1995). The orientation

towards peaceful solutions is a natural part of the Kantian security culture. Michael Doyle notes that Kant's republics do not tolerate war as a recognized policy mechanism in relations between member-states of the Kantian security arrangements, assuring that "Kant's republics are capable of achieving peace among themselves because they exercise democratic caution and are capable of appreciating the international rights of foreign republics; at the same time Kant's republics remain in a state of war with non republics" (Doyle 1986, 286).

State of war that may occur in social interactions with non-democracies does not necessarily refer to the aggressiveness of the Kantian culture and peaceful solutions in crisis management are always preferred to the military involvement. In cases, where peaceful measures cannot avoid the outbreak of violence, the Kantian society may use also active measures in crisis management. The Kantian security environment rests on the willingness of international actors to accept basic principles of the Kantian security culture. Human rights and international law are over-cultural rules of the international society that should be respected by all international actors not depending on their cultural background. The abolishment of principles of human rights and international law by any international actor may lead to situation where the Kantian society would decide to react against the violation of rules.

International peace operations are type of collective security practices, by which the Kantian society may react against the violence of widely respected norms like human rights and/or international law. These operations are definitely manifestations of the Kantian security culture, widely practiced after the World War II, but especially in the post-modern society. There would be many faces peace operations can take. International peacekeeping has a long tradition and it is probably the best known type of peace operations. Peacekeeping has been carried out usually in a post-conflict situation, where international forces have been settled to guarantee peace and stability without use of force. Peacekeeping forces observe and monitor the situation in the post-conflict area and assist former adversaries to maintain peace and keep agreements they may have signed.

During the last two decades, peace-building and peacemaking operations have been widely carried through. Peace-building corresponds to the initial phase of the post-conflict situation, including peace-oriented measures like assisting in conflict resolution, guaranteeing human rights and rule of law, integration of former combatants into civil society, initiating principles of liberal democracy and security sector reform in the war-torn society. Peacemaking operations may include also peace enforcement and refer to a situation where there is the international need to end a conflict and start negotiations for rebuilding of civil society.

The development of international regimes based on democratic peace led to institution-building and promotion of collective and cooperative security tools and arrangements. In the post-modern European security environment, democratic peace has testified itself as one of the most capable international regimes

in avoiding military conflicts and building up consolidated peace and stability in many security environments. Democratic peace-based cooperative security regimes, which include shared liberal democratic values and a shared economic system, have been most effectively practiced through the activities of post-modern European security communities – NATO and the European Union (Michalka 2002, 31).

The contemporary European security environment has met various favorable preconditions for establishing the Kantian security regimes, which follow the principles of democratic peace. Similar cultural background helps to practice commonly accepted and respected norms, based on shared beliefs and values. The security communities of the region draw their unusual strength from one main factor: they consist of consolidated liberal democratic states. Besides moving towards being consolidated as security communities, NATO and the European Union have developed dense networks of cooperative security arrangements that foster spread of democratic peace to larger security environment (Michalka 2002, 64).

#### **4.2.2. Cooperative security**

In its wider definition, international actors will be engaged under cooperative security regimes in achieving collectively their long-term security goals on behalf of a stable peace. Olav Knudsen (2007, 177) describes mechanisms of cooperative security and states that:

Cooperative security is to gradually seek to build trust establishing a framework of relations of mutual trust within which cooperation for mutual gain can develop. As long as cooperation proceeds the way the parties expect, this experience reinforces itself and the need for cooperative security fades into the background, leading ultimately to the emergence of long-term mutual trust that signifies a security community.

Former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans (1994) constitutes that cooperative security is oriented to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism.

These characteristics would make a cooperative security to being an elemental Kantian security regime. Although collective security has the same origins with cooperative security, and both of them stem from the Kantian security culture, there is a slight difference between collective and cooperative security-related behavior. The collective action intends to solve a problem. The cooperative action intends to build up something that corresponds to common interests for consolidated peace regimes. The main difference between cooperative and collective security regimes lies on that, while cooperative security intends to establish zones of peace and mutual trust between international

actors, collective security, at the same time, establishes a framework of international actors against the violation of commonly accepted rules and behavior.

Clive Archer (1994, 119) states that, “cooperative security is a security arrangement where security is maintained by consensus. Here the emphasis is less on identifying an aggressor and more on identifying problems that can lead to conflict and then attempting to resolve them collectively”. According to Cohen (2002, 10), “cooperative security is a strategic system which forms around a nucleus of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or informal alliances and institutions characterized by shared values and practical and transparent economic, political, and defense cooperation”. Michalka (2002, 35) states that “cooperative security is activity among states to lessen the likelihood of war, or its consequences should it occur, that is not directed at any specific state or group of states”. All these definitions will lead to conclusion that cooperative security is related to the Kantian security culture and does not qualify to the Hobbesian security environment.

The most important goal of cooperative security measures is to build a sort of interdependence between international actors interested in the maintenance of stable peace in a certain security environment. Cooperative security regimes may require the engagement into collective and cooperative practices that can promote mutual interdependence between security partners. Besides, cooperative security regimes would be used in order to building up democratic security and defense systems, carrying security sector reforms and promoting security-and defense-related training and education. Of course, it may include also some active measures, specifically characteristic to collective security regimes like the participation in international peace operations, though it is not a main driving force of cooperative security.

Collective security, another manifestation of the Kantian security culture, is a more pretentious international regime. The collective security tradition is rooted in an aspiration to think of interests beyond those of the nation and its allies and to consider those of international society as a whole – on a regional, if not a global basis. The hallmarks of the collective security tradition include a desire to avoid grouping powers into opposing camps, and a refusal to draw dividing lines that would leave anyone out (Yost 1998, 10). Cohen puts it, collective security “looks inward to attempt to ensure security within a group of sovereign states” (Cohen 2002, 6). Collective security has been often treated as an international regime that is able to make compromises between polarized and non-polarized systems (Claude 2006).

Institutionalization proceeds from the Kantian culture. International organizations may create largely recognized commitments for stable peace for a security environment instead of a confusing set of bilateral treaties. In addition, collective security arrangements indicate that member states take responsibilities for maintaining peace will not attack each other, and they will rise in defense of a member state if attacked. It seems to be true that collective security works more effectively under the circumstances of stability. If the international system becomes unstable, the collective security efforts tend to fail. Referring to

the Inis Claude's hypothesis (Claude 1962), that collective security has attained mechanisms, which can prevent wars by deterrence, while considering that states are usually rational subjects avoiding defeats. David Yost (1998) has noted a historical paradox connecting the rise of collective security with changes in international systems:

Interest in collective security (or, in attenuated form, a concert of the major powers) may be greatest following the end of general war, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the two World Wars, or the Cold War. Yet the aspirations to establish such arrangements for preventing future wars or major-power confrontations are usually accompanied by a reluctance to acknowledge the probability of future polarities and power competitions.

Another security regime used by the Kantian security culture is collective defense, which is tightly related to the general principles of the Kantian security communities, looking for outward defense of its members from external aggression (Cohen 2002, 6). Collective defense is a security regime, where participants within a framework of treaty or international organization commit themselves to support another participant, if it is attacked outside from the organization (or treaty). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a best known organization that has practiced collective defense through its existence. The Article V of the Washington Treaty calls on member-states to assist fellow members in the case of attack. This principle came into practice after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.

Collective defense and collective security regimes, used within the Hobbesian/Lockean Cold War system, proceed from the Kantian principles of the preceding Versailles system, which did not disappear with the change of system. This indicates that the Cold War system, though Hobbesian/Lockean by motives, has also maintained some elements from the Kantian culture. Collective security organizations (UN, CSCE) followed the Kantian tradition making unite both sides of the bipolar system for consensual purposes. NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization pretend to be hegemonic security communities, because their internal interdependence was more complex than usually within the framework of military alliances.

In comparison with collective security and collective defense, cooperative security has both, inward and outward functions in creating zones of peace and stability. Cooperative security is able to establish permanent links between actors and environments with different cultural background, if they are interested in retaining the Kantian international system. Within a larger framework, cooperative security may obtain functions that promote and protect human rights, maintain peace and stability within a common space, protect against outside aggression, and promote stability in other areas in preventing conflicts using political, informational, economic, and/or military means.



### 4.2.3. Collective security arrangements

Collective security arrangements entered into the international system after the World War I, since the employment of the League of Nations. According to Inis Claude, these arrangements facilitate peaceful settlements of disputes; prevent forces and defending states against armed attacks by supplementing and reinforcing each other (Claude 1984, 245). In the Kantian international system, collective security arrangements should guarantee the maintenance of international peace by using collective actions against violators. The introduction of collective security arrangements changed previously valid principles of international systems that intended to create balancing regimes between major powers. The League of Nations and the United Nations Organization have been typical collective security arrangements. However, the veto-powers of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization follow the concert-like establishment of the international relations, which corresponds to the Hobbesian security environment.

Collective security arrangements bring all members of the international community together in response to aggression from any quarter; the potential threat is unnamed, but, should it materialize, all members of the organization should be prepared to take collective action against the aggressor, regardless of any alliance links they may have with aggressor (Archer 1994, 119).

Collective security arrangements may accept any country as a member-state that is willing to contribute to its goals and activities. Common interests for international peace force the implementation of rules and norms to be followed and a value-sharing is not a necessary precondition for accession. That makes a coalition-building into the collective security arrangements similar to the military alliances. In general, a collective security arrangement may include members of opposing military alliances if the sphere of mutual interests is identified. Therefore, collective security arrangements may apply to a larger security environment and can be able to settle in the requirements of the polarized international systems.

The Cold War had a very clear buildup of security architecture consisting of polarity-oriented alliances (NATO, the Warsaw Treaty Organization) and cooperation-oriented collective security arrangements (UN, CSCE). David Yost indicates that collective security arrangements would be distinguished from alliances because of the absence of the principle of collective defense as “collective security, particularly in its traditional sense, was conceived as an alternative to the formation of alliances for collective defense” (Yost 1998, 8). The present-day collective security arrangements like the OSCE and the United Nations were established during the modern international system. These organizations promote common actions for aiming peace and stability within the system. The disadvantage of collective security arrangements is that different and sometimes divisible values, beliefs and identities practiced within their

framework would make it difficult to achieve common goals, which makes the OSCE and United Nations quite ineffective in resolving confrontations if interests of major powers are involved. Many functions of collective security arrangements would be carried by the Kantian security communities as the experience of NATO and the EU has demonstrated in the post-modern security environment.

#### **4.2.4. Security communities**

The idea of Western security communities has been developed in the middle of the Cold War in 1950s by the American political scientist Karl Deutsch. Security communities are social arrangements able to promote stable cooperative international regimes and introduce zones of peace and stability. Buzan and Little (2000, 442) define a security community as a group of states or other actors whose members neither expect nor prepare for the use of force in their mutual relations, which represents the core ideals of the Kantian security culture.

The concept of security communities, first developed by Karl Deutsch (1957), requires a consolidated liberal democratic society and stable peaceful relationship between members of community for existing. Karl Deutsch, identifying pluralistic (between states) and amalgamated (within states) security communities, has constructed his concept on the basis of self-recognition of political units, though these units do not “necessarily have to constitute a nation nor must their territory be that of a nation-state” (Möller 2007, 25). This brings his idea closer to Benedict Anderson’s (1983) conception of an imagined community (See also Adler 2005, 183–206).

Karl Deutsch, following Immanuel Kant’s ideas on peaceful change towards unions where disputes are resolved peacefully, has “distinguished between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities: while both have dependable expectations of peaceful change, the former exists when states formally unify, the latter when states retain their sovereignty” (Adler and Barnett 1998, 5). Waever (1998, 101) turns attention to an intentional ambiguity between amalgamation and plurality that could be often find in the rhetoric of security community makers and arrives at conclusion that “Deutsch is still caught in a dichotomy such as domestic/international, inside/outside and hierarchy/ anarchy – here called amalgamated/pluralistic security communities”. Under the circumstances of post-modern institution-building, the noticeable difference between pluralistic and amalgamated security communities even hardly exists, because of the different logic of the post-modern state (see Cooper 2001, Cooper 2003).

At the institutional level, Deutsch’s characteristics of amalgamated security communities, however, apply to the requirements imposed by the post-modern security arrangements, which does not identify security community solely in military terms but as a complexly interdependent unit practicing a stable peace in interstate relations. The European Union, as a real phenomenon of the post-

modern international society and the Kantian security culture, corresponds to a greater or lesser extent to all ten elements of criteria, established by Karl Deutsch for amalgamated security community, even if nation-states would remain to being important international actors within a community.

Despite its positive ideals, many scholars often regard to the concept of the security community as merely a conditional “imagined community” – a political community that is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson 1983). The Western security community, described by Deutsch (1957), is naturally an imagined community: it has doctrinal rather than normative characteristics that make its involvement in the establishment of international regimes fictional. The concept was born in the Hobbesian world where security communities have been examined as abstract imagined entities without any practical outcome to be systematically realized.

Recently, several authors have expanded the concept of security communities (e.g. Adler and Barnett 1998; Williams 2001; Bellamy 2004; Adler 2005; Adler 2008). In most cases, contemporary theorists continue to define a security community in Deutsch’s traditional sense as an imagined community of values rather than an institutionalized political body. At the same time, a security community does not need to be necessarily an imagined community, if the members of one or another community have decided to reach a stable peace through practices (Adler 2008). In the post-modern international system, which is the Kantian system, security communities should be institutionalized formations of countries, which share common values, unified norms and similar identity and exclude the use of force in conflict resolution within the community (Mölder 2006, 10).

Therefore, an institutionalized approach for security communities refers to situation, where “institutional actors became promoters of liberal-democratic norms in order to respond the double security challenge of the end of the Cold War: their own international identity and legitimization and possible instability and war in their neighborhood” (Lucarelli 2002, 9). Institutionalized security communities share commonly accepted principles, norms, values and decision-making procedures among members. If a security community expands to areas with different identities or competing values, it will be difficult to maintain its consistency.

Institutionalization enables to consolidate peace and complex interdependence through commonly agreed norms. In the context of post-modern society, the European Union and NATO – sharing values, norms, and identity and practicing peaceful relations between their members – should be defined as institutionalized security communities. Security communities have different cultural origins compared with alliances. While alliances perfectly fit to the anarchy of the Hobbesian world, security communities are valuable instruments in hands of the Kantian world. Whereas the former are inclusive institutions, since they are designed to deal with threats among members, alliances are exclusive because they deter and defend against external threats (Wallander and Keohane 1999, 92).

There is a complexity of norms and rules the Kantian security community should follow in its practices: 1) shared identity, 2) complex interdependence, 3) democratic peace. Holsti (1996, 148) declares that if “member states share common norms, values, political institutions, and a high degree of economic and other forms of interdependence,” then, succinctly, a zone of peace has a foundation in the relations of states, and a security community rests on the social foundations of community between individuals and societies. Shared identities, values and meanings, many-sided and direct interactions, and a reciprocity exhibited by communities express some degree of long-term interest and perhaps even altruism, which does not exist in the Hobbesian security environment, which makes a clear distinction between two directions in the Western security culture (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Bellamy 2004, 31).

The existence of shared beliefs, norms and identities is presumed in order to guarantee many-sided interdependence between community members. Democratic peace, a voluntary engagement where is no intention to go to war against each other between community members, constitutes one of the main principles of the Kantian security communities. Archer (1994, 119) notes that member-states of security community have become so interdependent that there is no longer any expectation of the use of force or the threat of the use of force in their mutual relations. Complex interdependence leads to a recognition of common identity (Michalka 2002, 62). Alex Bellamy stated that “if an identity can be generically understood as the understanding of oneself in relationship to others it follows that a community’s identity is predicated on relationship on others” (Bellamy 2004, 43). Besides enhanced cooperation in security and defense areas, also an economic interdependence plays a high role in the process of unification and consolidation of the community.

Present-day security communities are theoretically and empirically pluralistic security communities. The present-day NATO clearly corresponds to the definition of the pluralistic security community as it is made up of shared liberal democratic values, stable consolidated peace, constant ties between member-nations and collective and cooperative interactions with allies and partners. Pluralistic security communities have been identified on the basis of 1) shared liberal democratic values and common identity; 2) complex interdependence between community members; 3) principles of democratic peace; 4) partnership strategy and cooperative security arrangements; 5) collective defense and collective security mechanisms for crisis situation. NATO although a political-military organization, at the same time, it is not purely a military institution and promotes civil-military cooperation and integration of the military into civil society.

The European Union, contrariwise, made a step further and it may be discussed whether it is gradually moving towards an amalgamated security community now. Institution-building does not necessarily mean a structural unification and a loss of state and/or national identity. Even amalgamated security community may exist without a federative institutional arrangement, if a confederative framework between nation-states allows to build-up a

consolidated complex interdependence in the peaceful environment. Deutsch noted ten characteristics for describing what he called an amalgamated security community: 1) similar values (political ideologies but also economic and religious values); 2) the formation of a common sense of us; 3) similar lifestyles; 4) group of leading actors (so to avoid that the logic of the balance of power prevail); 5) high economic growth; 6) positive expectations with respect to the advantages of integration; 7) intensive transactions and communication; 8) widening of the leading elites; 9) stable links among the elites of different states; 10) high geographical mobility of the population (Deutsch 1957, 6).

Collective defense is one of perfect examples where reciprocity and an altruist behavior would appear in the Kantian security environment. There is a difference between alliances and security communities that concerns the implementation of collective defense as a security regime. In the Hobbesian security arrangements, collective defense is an interest-based security regime, because in the anarchic international order, nation-states are more independent political entities, which may switch from one alliance to another. Therefore, in the framework of military alliance, the commitment to collective defense must be clearly declared and presumably fixed by the treaty or agreement. Within the Kantian security communities, the principle of collective defense is practically unavoidable because of increasing complex interdependence between actors.

The principle of collective defense has been firstly written in the main document of NATO, the Washington Treaty, but at this time when the treaty was signed, NATO should be identified as a military alliance, which means that the requirement should be agreed between the parties of the treaty. If nations form a security community, it would be impossible to imagine that attack against one community member does not influence the security and stability of other members. For example, if somebody decides to attack a member of the European Union, this actor must consider a possible reaction from other EU members, despite the fact that the principle of collective defense as the obligation is not fixed in the EU documents.

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998, 50–55) examine three phases in the evolution of security communities – nascent, ascendant and mature phases. In the initial nascent phase governments do not explicitly seek to create security community and they begin to consider how they might coordinate their relations in order to increase their mutual security. In the ascendant phase, dense networks and new institutions and organizations that reflect tighter military coordination and cooperation will be created. In the mature phase, non-war community will be more or less institutionalized.

While examining the development of the Western liberal democratic security communities, it is possible to conclude that NATO experienced the nascent phase in the period of 1991–1999, up to the valid Strategic Concept has been admitted at the Washington Summit of 1999. After the Washington meeting, NATO entered into the ascendant phase, which characterizes NATO current transformation in strengthening coordination and cooperation between member-states but also with partner organizations and states.

The European Union has entered into the ascendant phase in 2003 with the European Security Strategy been adopted. The European Security Strategy identifies the threats facing the Union, defines its strategic objectives and sets out the political implications for Europe. Another important step towards maturing security communities has made in March 2003, when two security communities, NATO and the European Union, have concluded a Berlin Plus agreement, which created a cornerstone for NATO-EU cooperation, coordination of actions, and common use of forces and capabilities.

**Table 5:** Three phases of security communities

<i>Phases</i>	<i>Activities</i>
Nascent phase	Negotiations, cooperation, institutionalization started
Ascendant phase	Instant regimes, cooperation and interdependence, institutionalization in transition
Mature phase	Common identity, stable peace, complex interdependence, institutionalization completed

Liberal democracy expands the range of options for stable peace and benefits for all, but it may not be a necessary precondition to begin or to continue cooperative security regimes (Michalka 2002, 31). Although the existence of security communities has often been connected with the required settlement of liberal democratic values, theoretically, security communities can also exist within the Hobbesian/Lockean security environment. There may exist other security communities relying on values other than liberal democracy, which may also be persuasive forces for forming a shared identity and make the existence of security communities created by the Hobbesian regimes and based on non-democratic values and identities possible.

During the ideologically divisive Cold War, NATO was not only an interest-based military alliance but corresponded to some criteria assigned to security communities. Such security arrangements would be called hegemonic security communities. For example, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, although a military alliance by some paradigms, has met criteria to being identified as a security community, though based on Marxist values instead of liberal democratic ones and dominated by the hegemonic Soviet Union. Hegemonic security communities can produce stability similarly to the Kantian security communities. They are built up on the forces and capabilities used by the hegemonic power in order to hold the community together. War within any kind of security community should be excluded if the identity and values constructed to hold this community together does not change. The conflict may arise when one member of the community tries to change its identity in a way that is not acceptable for the hegemonic power (like Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 etc).

#### 4.2.5. Cooperative security arrangements

Zone of peace is a type of international regime in decreasing possibilities for conflicts between international actors. Security communities themselves constitute a type of zones of peace, where the possibility for war launching out has become unthinkable in mutual relations. However, the conflict-free area may be extended by appropriate social arrangements and security regimes. For the Kantian security communities, cooperative security arrangements seem to be proper means for developing zones of peace in the neighborhood areas. Cooperative security arrangements that promote interdependence and cooperation in the larger area than spread of shared values might allow, have proved themselves as the effective mechanisms in establishing zones of peace between potential adversaries.

While security communities are value-sharing arrangements, it still remains open, how to communicate with 'others' in guaranteeing a stable peaceful environment with different identities existing. Every security community has to be aware of developing stability not only within the community but also having an effective neighborhood policy. Cooperative relationship is a measure used to mitigate the potential effects of international conflicts. Keohane (1984) establishes that "cooperation should not be viewed as absence of conflict, but rather reaction to conflict or potential conflict". The establishment of cooperative security arrangements may compensate for the need for value sharing in order to join communities. Knudsen (2003, 2007) argues that cooperative security regimes reflect the attitudes of former or potential adversaries to the present or future relationship between them in seeking to shift from a more to a less conflictual mode. These attitudes may be granted through cooperative practices, in some cases through establishing security communities.

Cooperative security arrangements are institutionalized or non-institutionalized formations of countries that are interdependent on security communities. Three main characteristics describing cooperative security arrangements would be: 1) these arrangements are oriented to resolve problems, not to defend against identified aggressor; 2) in developing cooperative security relationship, common norms are more important than common values and common values are more important than common identity; 3) cooperative security arrangements are formed around security communities, with their initiative and assistance. Partners in cooperative security arrangements do not possess similar guarantees for their defense as, for example, members of security communities will have. Nevertheless, they cooperate with each other using cooperative security regimes, which increase trust among actors, and therefore military conflicts between cooperation partners are rare or these enmities usually emerged at previous times.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> For example, between NATO/PfP partners Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Karabakh region.

The appropriate partnership strategy is an important element for security communities in intercommunicating with their neighborhood and creating stability zones beyond their borders. NATO and the European Union both have been active developers of cooperative security relationship. Cooperative security fostered intercultural contacts and it is an important measure for avoiding the emergence of security dilemmas. The partnership strategy of the Western security communities follows six basic criteria: 1) adherence to the principles of democratic peace; 2) introduction of liberal democratic values; 3) promotion of security- and defense-related cooperation; 4) enhanced communication between allies and partners; 5) implementation of assistance programs in building up defense systems and conducting security sector reforms; 6) joint participation in peace operations.

Zones of peace require mutual consensus in holding peace. This does not exclude the possibility for conflicts with those, which stay outside of the regime. Kalevi Holsti (1996, 148) argues that “in zones of peace, militarized conflicts may break out from time to time but capabilities are not targeted toward fellow members of the zone and operational war plans do not include conflict hypotheses against the same members”. The present-day security communities, NATO and the European Union, may establish stable peaceful relationships within their frameworks and with security partners from cooperative security arrangements, but they may still find themselves in the conflict with those, which have not been committed to peace and stability and would destabilize the larger security environment – as it has been experienced in the case of Serbia during the regime of Milosevic or the regime of Taliban in Afghanistan. The mutual interest in maintain the Kantian security environment is a precondition for developing cooperative security regimes through cooperative security arrangements.

### **4.3. Summary**

The chapter focused on structural elements, giving an overview about the environment, where security cultures operate. This study claims that cultural paradigms influence the emergence of international structures, which operate in a certain (political, cultural, security etc) environment. International system constitutes a self-regulative framework where international actors interact with each other and one or another culture can dominate over the system. International systems manifest have traditionally the Western political cultures and there may emerge polarized, anarchical and competitive the Hobbesian/Lockean systems or non-polarized and cooperative the Kantian systems. Polarity and stability are variables, which can characterize international systems. Security cultures can influence the operating principles of security-related behavior of international systems and produce international regimes, by which international actors operate within the system.

Security architecture is an instrument of the international system in order to regulate security-related interactions between international actors within the



system. Structures that constitute security architecture are related to particular security cultures. Military alliances proceed from the needs of Hobbesian/Lockean security culture. Security communities, collective security arrangements and cooperative security arrangements are developed by the Kantian security culture. Security regimes practiced within the system are also related to various security cultures. Neutrality option is connected with the Hobbesian/Lockean culture and democratic peace and cooperative security are practiced within the Kantian security culture.

The post-modern security system introduced the Kantian security communities, which simultaneously developed on the basis of the European Economic Community (later the European Union) and a Western military alliance – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Complex interdependence, common identity and value-sharing factors are together with the principle of democratic peace distinctive to the contemporary liberal democratic security communities in Europe. Karl Deutsch, while elaborated the concept of security communities, made a distinction between pluralistic and amalgamated security communities. The post-modern international society with a high level of interdependence and the decreasing role of nation-states does not require a profound distinction in this respect.

Cooperative security arrangements validate peace-oriented international regimes and may be effectively used in resolution of security dilemmas, while mitigating incoherence, introducing principles of a Kantian security culture and consolidating zones of peace and stability in the neighborhood. Through such instruments, Europe may be able to manage the negative consequences of cooperative security dilemmas which accompany with the cultural diversity within the Kantian system. Later, chapter six focuses on consequences of transferring from one international system to another. The change of the system may also entail a cultural change accompanied by conflicts between different cultural environments.

For now we have identified agents (security cultures) and structures (systems, environments and regimes, in which security cultures operate), it would be a time to take a closer look to the products, which may emergence by interactions between agents and structures – security dilemmas. This study claims that security dilemmas may be intercultural paradigms, which take place in different cultural environments and reflect how one or another culture reacts to its environment.

## 5. SECURITY DILEMMA

This chapter focuses on a possible appearance of security dilemmas into the international security environment and its cultural origins. The chapter treats the security dilemma as a social paradigm, which may appear in a situation where international actors are trying to interpret the behavior of others. The security dilemma has been among the central issues in the International Relations theory. Herbert Butterfield (1950) describes the security dilemma as a manifestation of the Hobbesian fear that actors have of each other (see also Roe 2000, Booth and Wheeler 2008). The culture of fear, stemming from the Hobbesian security culture, produces situations where the security dilemma may easily appear.

Traditionally, the security dilemma has been related to negative expectations that international actors may feel against each other: fear, uncertainty, misperceptions, and mistrust among others, which play a general role for constructing security dilemmas in the Hobbesian environment. Cooperative security regimes may decrease the appearance of security dilemmas but if there will appear an interaction between the Hobbesian and the Kantian security cultures, cooperative security dilemmas may emerge in the Kantian security environment.

In the realist tradition, a security dilemma has been tied with rational calculations the actors must consider in order to find an appropriate model for interpreting intentions of potential adversaries. Realism treats a security dilemma accordingly to the game theory, in the context of which the actors must solve a formula that is valid for every security environment. This study intends to consider the possible relationship between a security dilemma and security cultures practiced by international actors, including the question – do different security culture practices lead to one or another form of a security dilemma? As Jack Snyder (1977) noted the different understandings of threats concerning a nuclear dilemma between the Americans and the Soviets, the international relations experience a number of different patterns used in a similar situation in interpreting the behavior of other actors. The Hobbesian and Kantian security cultures practice different calculations in this respect, and a security dilemma might be a cultural dilemma if it refers to interactions between different cultural entities.

The notion of a '*security dilemma*' has been discussed by Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler (2008) in a recent book, "The Security Dilemma. Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics". Indeed, it is a phenomenon that greatly influenced security-related academic discussion at least during the last fifty years, since John Herz and Herbert Butterfield used this term first in order to describe a situation wherein two or more states may face the conflict because of their security concerns and misperceptions towards each other. Booth and Wheeler (2008, 9) distinguish security dilemmas from '*security paradoxes*'. The former requires a *choice* between different options. Whereas the latter is an *outcome* of security dilemma: it refers to a situation in which actors provoke an

increase of mutual tension in order to improve their own security. Arms racing, for instance, could be seen as a classical manifestation of a security paradox. Actors attempt to increase their military capabilities in order to achieve advantages over their potential adversaries.

The emergence of a security dilemma may suggest: 1) a lack of interaction between actors in the security environment; 2) the emergence of mutual distrust; 3) the system of dispute regulation does not work or works inappropriately. A dilemma always involves a difficult choice between equally balanced alternatives (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 4–6). As treated in its classical manner, a security dilemma often leads to negative choices, raising tensions between competing powers. Much less attention has been paid to the management of security dilemmas, but the Hobbesian culture treats mistrust between actors as an inescapable part of international relations that makes mutually acceptable solutions for all sides hardly applicable.

The concept of security dilemma is also of potential use in non-traditional issue-areas, such as economic, social (i.e. the war on drugs), environmental security and ethnic conflicts (Krause and Williams 2003; Huysmans 2002; Posen 1993; Roe 2001). Security may involve with different sectors – military, political, economic, environmental, societal sectors. As security is dependent on a sum of various factors, there is potentially ground for military, political, economic, environmental and societal security dilemmas. Barry Posen (1993, 93) tied the security dilemma with group motives in a situation where “they find themselves responsible for their own security” (see also Booth and Wheeler 2008, 73; Collins 2000, 18–19). Such self-responsibility indicates the presence of collective identity as a driving force in shaping relations between Us and Others.

An ethnic conflict, for example, follows similar patterns as in the case of an international conflict. Moreover, the ethnic conflict always refers to the cultural dilemma as ethnic groups represent different cultural identities. In the Yugoslavian conflict of 1990s, the most violent actions were connected with remarkable differences in identities: the Orthodox Serbs against the Catholic Slovenians and Croatians in the initial phase, and later even more violent attacks involving the Orthodox Serbs against the Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars. Ignatieff (1993, 23–24) argues that the Yugoslavian conflict clearly corresponds to the outcomes of ‘Hobbesian fear’ as “when people are sufficiently afraid, they will do anything”.

Differences in values have been a traditional source of distrust, as they can cause contrasting understandings between different cultures. Barry Posen brings distrust forward as a main source to encouraging competition and weakening cooperation. Cooperation among states aiming to mitigate competition can be difficult because “someone else’s cheating may leave one in a militarily weakened position and all fear betrayal” (Posen 1993, 28). At the same time, Posen cannot escape from the Hobbesian logic, stressing on worst-case-scenarios, where an action causes a reaction (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 73).

The processes of unification (e.g. globalization, institutionalization, complex interdependence) may decrease positions of cultural identities, including religious, national, and ethnic ones. Different groups may feel themselves in losing their beliefs and values, and this refers to insecurity. In the context of cultural dilemmas, this may cause persistent feeling of insecurity, which may spark violent counteractions. For instance, the global war against terrorism has been evoked by the fear of some Muslim groups to lose their identity, which, in their turn, caused a reaction from the Western civilization wishing to defend their values.

Distrust as a driving force is not necessarily an offensive paradigm. Kalevi Holsti (1996, 9) indicates sources of the concept of security dilemma, where states create and deploy armaments in order to defend them against potential aggression, but thus they may create suspicion among their neighbors, which may presume that these new capabilities may be used in offensive purposes. The cultural dilemma between the Hobbesians and the Kantians can be illustrated through the dilemma between distrust and cooperation.<sup>11</sup> The Kantians, exceeding distrust and cooperating for common goals, may achieve more gains than the Hobbesians emphasizing fear against intentions of others. At the same time, the Kantian mechanisms may not work if they stand against the Hobbesian environment.

Robert Jervis defines a security dilemma as a situation in which “an increase of one state’s security decreases security of others” (Jervis 1978, 169). This may be called as a classical definition to a security dilemma. The general motive of the classical security dilemma is a fear, which relates it to the Hobbesian security environment. The culture of fear is among primary instruments actors reinforcing their national interests may use in destabilizing international systems. In this context, culture matters again.

**Table 6:** Security dilemmas and the cultural environment

	<i>Kantian vs. Kantian</i>	<i>Kantian vs. Hobbesian/Lockean</i>	<i>Hobbesian/Lockean</i>
<i>Existence of security dilemma</i>	Cooperative (integration dilemma)	Cooperative (identity dilemma)	Classical

In the Hobbesian/Lockean security environment, international actors are forced to follow a principle of self-help in managing their security problems. Distrust and misperceptions against others are typical driving forces in the Hobbesian environment and in order to transcend security dilemmas, actors use power-

<sup>11</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau imposed paradigms close to the security dilemmas with the example of stag hunt, in which hunters not related to each others must overcome the dilemma between distrust and cooperation (Holsti 1996, 8).

related doctrines like balancing, bandwagoning, neutrality, coalition-building, and ally-seeking among others.

The security dilemma varies between its classical manifestation and cooperative security dilemma depending on its cultural context. In the Kantian security system, we may face the cooperative security dilemma – as some states tend to cooperate in decreasing their security fears, it could decrease the security of these states and others if any country remained outside of the cooperative security arrangements (Mölder 1998). Various cooperative security dilemmas may affect interactions between international actors in the Kantian security environment or between the Kantian and the Hobbesian security cultures. The identity dilemma may reflect the cultural dilemma between representatives of the Kantian and the Hobbesian culture in the Kantian security environment. Misperceptions in the Kantian security environment may indicate to the integration dilemma, where the Kantian actors may follow the Hobbesian logic in arranging their security and defense system.

## **5.1. Realist tradition**

The realist paradigms and the Hobbesian culture have had a great impact to the concept of security dilemma. Already Thucydides argues in his Melian Dialogue “what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta” (Williams 1994, 184). It reflects misperceptions that might take place if states behave in the Hobbesian spirit, whereby countries in a “state of nature” are said to exist in a state of permanent war (Hobbes 1651). Thomas Hobbes stipulated that mistrust is a natural and inescapable feature of international society. Fear and misperceptions caused by actions of ‘others’ have traditionally been dominant motives for producing security dilemmas in the Hobbesian environment.

The classical concept of the security dilemma as elaborated by John Herz (1950) and later developed by Robert Jervis – an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others (Jervis 1978, 169) – is one of the most referenced security terms in international relations, especially within realism. The connection of the security dilemma with the Hobbesian culture of fear has been widely examined by the realist tradition of International Relations theory. Herbert Butterfield (1950, 35) tied it with the nature of actors and paid less attention to the environment the security dilemma would take a place. The Hobbesian fear against others and their intentions is by Butterfield the catalyst of security dilemma.

John Herz (1950, 3) as well refers to the human nature that enforces mutual suspicion and a mutual dilemma to attack first and survive or to handle a risk to be destroyed. He states that in the context of anarchy, international actors are lacking a coherent organizational unity at higher level that leads to insecurity and further on to the security dilemma. “Groups living in such a constellation must be and usually they are, concerned about their security from being

attacked, subjected, dominated or annihilated by other groups and individuals” (Herz 1950, 157). Herz recognizes the possibility to transcend the security dilemma by increasing trust and cooperation between them, but the overcoming of fear requires the establishing of dependence between groups or within groups. Although some authors (i.e. Booth and Wheeler 2008, 25) have questioned the relationship of John Herz with the realism, especially because of his underestimation of power-seeking intentions of international actors, his study gave certainly a boost to the realist schools in analyzing behavior of states in the anarchical security environment.

Robert Jervis (1976) connects the emergence of security dilemma directly with the anarchic environment. His crucial point reflects the inability of international actors to separate offensive intentions from defensive ones and which one of these strategies has an advantage over other. Jervis established two models that would explain the motives of other states in realizing their possible hostile or friendly intentions. The spiral model predicts that state behavior is driven by insecurity and fear and therefore it is close to Butterfield’s interpretation of the Hobbesian war (Jervis 1976, 58–113; Booth and Wheeler 2008, 45). This constitutes a competitive model of security dilemma, where the risk of war is increasing because of the increase of mistrust and the danger of war increases because of the increase of destructive capabilities (i.e. arms-racing).

The second model of Jervis, the deterrence model follows Herz’s assumptions that anarchy is something more than just a mutual fear (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 47). The deterrence model has a defensive orientation against the possible aggression and bases on two constructions build up to prevent offensive intentions of others: 1) the potential aggressor must believe that the deterrence will be implemented; 2) the cost of aggression must outweigh the expected gains (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 47). The deterrence model stems from the Cold War security environment, where the stability bipolar international system has been overwhelmingly established on mutual deterrence.

In their assessment of the security dilemma, realists stress the primacy of political-military competition between states (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 37). The competition causes fear and uncertainty. Mearsheimer (2001, 33) argues that powerful states, if they experience insecurity in the valid environment, will behave in offensive manner in order to ensure their survival in the anarchic conditions, and this forces their intentions “to become the most powerful state in the system”. Waltz, however, expects that states are generally interested in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the international system, not to maximize their power as the first concern (Waltz 1979, 126). The basic argument of the realist tradition takes the form of two general propositions: (1) states are rational, self-interested actors seeking gain and glory; (2) international anarchy – the absence of an authority to regulate the use of violence among states – renders states fearful of one another in the sense that at, any time, violence can be used against them (Keohane 1995, 66).

The realist tradition has often experienced weak points, while identifying the presence of security dilemma, as they do not produce solutions that may escape,

transcend or mitigate the negative effects of these paradigms. In their view, the security dilemma is a natural phenomenon of international politics. Therefore, realists tend to meet the difficulty in finding lasting solutions to military conflicts.

## **5.2. Liberal tradition**

Another major school of International Relations theory, the liberals, has often omitted the study of the security dilemma in their work. The liberal tradition becomes distinct from the realist tradition, as it applies to the Kantian environment as normative – an ideal status of international society. The realist tradition, contrariwise, takes the environment as it is, not intending to improve it.

According to liberals, institutionalization can mitigate the manifestation of the security dilemma, and security institutions should seek to decrease distrust and misperceptions, while creating mechanisms that facilitate peaceful resolution of potential disputes and conflicts. Keohane and Wallander (1999, 94) explain that:

Institutions meant to cope with security threats will have rules, norms and procedures to enable the members to identify threats and retaliate effectively against them; institutions meant cope with security risks will have rules, norms, and procedures to enable the members to provide and obtain information and to manage disputes in order to avoid generating security dilemmas.

This might be agreed if we were to stay firmly within the stipulated institutional framework and do not deal with outsiders of these frameworks. Though institutionalization can create stability among participating states, it may at the same time create distrust among outsiders (Väyrynen 2000, 158). Neoliberals argue that states are rational egoists with static identity, and they do not cooperate because of shared values, which make their argument not persuasive (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 195). The liberal tradition, as it is characteristic to positive schools, does not foresee multicultural nature of international society, where cultural motives practiced by international actors may vary.

The security paradox is that the he Kantian security environment would avoid classical security dilemmas, but there may develop cooperative dilemmas. For example, liberal states may feel insecurity because of threats coming from weak states or failed states. Sørensen (2007) settles the category of positive and negative liberties: does a path to a liberal world order the removal of negative obstacles including oppression, poverty, ignorance and tyranny, or every actor in the international society has the autonomy to decide about their domestic regimes. This choice leads to a set of dilemmas: an insecurity dilemma, an intervention dilemma, and a value dilemma. These dilemmas are related to the manifestations of other cultures and how the liberal world should interact with those.

Sørensen (2007) notes that instead of a security dilemma, the actors may face the *insecurity* dilemma – states (or other social structures) feel themselves in being insecure because of misperceptions against the behavior of other actors. In the post-modern security system, the classical security dilemma is fading, but it “has not led to world dominated by peace and cooperation” (Sørensen 2007, 358). Insecurity is not solely a characteristic of interstate relations, but includes also much larger societal spheres (e.g. global society, civilizations, institutions, transnational bodies etc), being an important driver, which leads a world society from one conflict to another.

Although the security dilemma is not among the main paradigms of the liberal tradition, they cannot ignore its possible influences. As mentioned in the previous chapters, even the Kantian security culture is able to take active measures against the violations of human rights and international peace. The Kantian world would face the intervention dilemma – is the intervention morally justified in promoting liberal democracy or has every actor a right to self-determination about its society’s progress. When are peace operations applicable and justified? The intervention dilemma can be expanded to the ‘*value dilemma*’: “to what extent should insiders be left alone to solve their own problems and to what extent can they be manipulated and pushed in the right direction through the intervention of outsiders” (Sørensen 2007, 371).

Although the emergence of classical security dilemmas can be excluded in the Kantian environment, these dilemmas may still develop through interactions with the Hobbesian security culture. Insecurity dilemma, intervention dilemma and value dilemma mentioned by Sørensen refer to ‘Us-Others’ relationship between distinctive political and security cultures and indicate the actuality of cooperative security dilemmas. The Kantian security environments may exist together with the Hobbesian security environments and their mutual interactions may still cause a problem not solved by the theory. Consequently, the liberal school as well the realist school meet difficulties in transcending security dilemmas.

### **5.3. Constructivist tradition**

The concept of the security dilemma has been also analyzed by constructivist thinkers. Alexander Wendt presumes that the end of Cold War bipolarity and the Kantian security environment established does not necessarily entail an end to the security dilemma between states. He describes the security dilemma as “a social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions” (Wendt 1992, 396; Collins 2004, 28; Glaser 1997, 196). Glaser (1997, 197) notes a fundamental difference between the realist and the constructivist approach to the security dilemma: while Jervis and other realists pay attention to international anarchy – a material condition – constructivists like Wendt define the security dilemma as rooted in a particular conception of the international “social structure”.



The most effective mechanism for mitigating security dilemmas is according to the constructivist school if actors will pursue to change their identities (Wendt 1999; Booth and Wheeler 2008, 93). If there are norms understood, agreed and implemented by all international actors, there is a much stable and much cooperative security environment. While realists and liberals tend to work with fixed identities, the constructivists are able to foresee the identity change that facilitates to practice different behaviors and strategies by same actors (Wendt 1999, 135). The Kantian environment can force the actors operating there to become adherent to the Kantian practices.

For example, from 1870 till 1945, the competition between Germany and France (as between Germany and the United Kingdom as well), greatly influenced the stability of the European security environment and was a catalyst for a set of international conflicts. The identity change after the World War II has led to strategic partnership, where the military conflict between these two seems to be impossible. This move refers to a change in cultural identities, and this process will be finalized by security cultures practiced by both Germany and France coming closer and closer to each other.

The critics against Alexander Wendt rests on postulates that he does not recognize the decisive role of uncertainty in shaping patterns of behavior based on conflict and cooperation between international actors (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 95). Copeland (2000, 203) criticizes Wendt because Wendt's analysis, as he argues, failures to say "when peaceful gestures should be taken at face value, and when they should be discounted as deceptions". The Hobbesian security environment settles the anarchy as a normative category. The stabilization of the system, however, may decrease uncertainty and produce a more secure environment. Cooperative environments are able to produce stable relationship between actors.

By the constructivist views, social processes and an international community are able to transform security policies of actors (Adler and Barnett 1998). The constructivism assumes that actors and environment are interdependent and can mutually influence the establishment of normative categories. The Hobbesian environment establishes uncertainty as a social norm. The Kantian environment endeavors to seek for common identities and the Kantian doctrines deal with the minimizing the negative effects of uncertainty to the actors. One system, the Hobbesian system, fights for survival in the anarchy. Another system, the Kantian system, intends to transcend the anarchy.

Important contribution of Wendt to the concept of security dilemma implies that he values the decisive role of the identity construction and recognizes the fact that identities can change. The Kantian security environment is able to produce the Kantian identities among actors, and thus to transcend potential identity dilemmas. The main pitfall of Wendt, again, is that he identifies the Kantian culture as a culture of anarchy, similarly to the Hobbesian culture, and underestimates distinctive logics of these cultures. Anarchy is a main catalyst in producing uncertainty. The Kantian culture, in fact, intends to escape the anarchical order through establishing value-sharing environments. Their inter-

actions with the Hobbesian environments may still produce cooperative security dilemmas.

#### **5.4. Cooperative security dilemma**

Cooperative international regimes (i.e. institutionalization), however, may well exclude certain actors from its framework and develop misperceptions against it. In this way, while pursuing a security community with countries sharing values and common identity, it may lead to a cooperative security dilemma regarding to others: even as some states cooperate in order to decrease their security fears, this decreases the security of these same states and that of others should they be excluded from the cooperative security arrangement (Mölder 1998, 11).

The cooperative security dilemma grows in the Kantian security environment, where the Kantian principles may contrast to the Hobbesian norms and understandings, which would create similar feelings with a classical security dilemma. At the same time, sources of the cooperative security dilemma vary noticeably from the classical one. What makes such a distinction being important? The classical security dilemma is a state-centric Hobbesian concept, which applies to anarchical international order. The cooperative security dilemma, however, applies to international *systems*, which maintain different cultural environments within a system. The post-modern system applies to be one such system, characterized by the Kantian culture and a high-level institutionalization.

The goals established by the Kantian society call for a peaceful solution of conflicts and promotion of liberal democratic values and principles. The establishment of stable and consolidated international structures (i.e. liberal democratic security communities) may facilitate the management of misperceptions arising within traditional anarchical system of states proceeding from the Hobbesian culture. Emanuel Adler (2008, 220) reaches the conclusion that cooperative measures (i.e. cooperative security, security communities, institutionalization) would help the replacement of security dilemmas and deterrence with security community practices. While institutionalization usually works in mitigating classical security dilemmas, it requires the establishment of restraint mechanisms in order to cope with cooperative security dilemmas.

In the Kantian security environment, international regimes based on democratic peace and cooperative security could transcend mutual mistrust and misperceptions. Huth and Allee (2002, 34) concluded that “democratic peace depends on the presence or absence of military conflicts between states, and the continued stalemate or settlement of international disputes”. The reliability of democratic peace and cooperative international regimes depends on stability of the Kantian international system. If misperceptions occur between norms, beliefs and identities practiced within the Kantian system, the establishment of

democratic peace as an international regime tends to fail and we are facing the emerging cooperative security dilemma.

The cooperative security dilemma manifests mismatches between competing security cultures and structures, which development is influenced by cultures. The proper functioning of security architecture largely depends on its internal stability. Therefore, the security architecture must correspond to the requirements of its particular security environment. The Kantian security arrangements may meet difficulties in the Hobbesian security environment and the Hobbesian alliances may destabilize the Kantian security environment.

Cooperation between states in the same security environment may be complicated by differences in institutional affiliation or significant controversies in identities or values. An integration dilemma arises when countries in the *same* security environment share similar values, norms and identities but belong to *different* security institutions. An identity dilemma occurs when the countries in the *same* security environment share *different* values, norms and identities. In the cultural prospective, the integration dilemma is easier to overcome, because shared values, norms and identities favor further integration up to the joining into security community. The identity dilemma, however, requires non-institutionalized mechanisms that could facilitate mutual cooperation and enhance complex interdependence.

The Kantian security environment in Europe produced by the post-modern international system could not avoid the emergence of cooperative security dilemmas. There are at least two important cases, which illustrate the presence of a cooperative security dilemma in the current European security environment:

- The NATO and EU enlargement dilemma (identity dilemma);
- The Euro-Atlantic security dilemma (integration dilemma).

The first consequences of a cooperative security dilemma emerged in Europe with the enlargement of NATO and the European Union. The enlargement has been connected with the question of cultural self-identification. Various misperceptions rose with the community-building developing further. Where are the margins of the Western cultural influence? Can former allies of the Soviet Union now freely rejoin the Western community? Politicians feared that the expansion could create new divisions, with NATO members on one side, a humiliated and threatened Russia on other side, and an insecure area in between (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 195; Booth and Wheeler 2008, 161). The emerging dilemma here indicates that the Hobbesian cultural understandings may survive, while promoting the Kantian environment.

Moreover, security options practiced in Europe during the Cold War (NATO, neutrality, the WTO) have created another cooperative security dilemma that stems from simultaneous existence of two liberal democratic security communities in the Euro-Atlantic security environment. The imagined division between the East and West continually impacted security preferences of several actors. Nations sometimes preferred to maintain their Hobbesian fears, even if they were prepared to join the Kantian environment.

Cooperative security dilemmas developed among the Kantian actors and in their relationship with the Hobbesian actors. Former neutral countries (e.g. Sweden, Finland, Austria) entered into the European Union without significant hesitations but, at the same time, they have been very careful in considering their possible NATO membership. The social construction of NATO as the Western military alliance created to promote certain interests through competition with other alliances in the Hobbesian environment is still alive. The fear of the rebirth of Russia and reconstruction of the Cold War international system is still popular among some Eastern European countries as well in Russia.

#### **5.4.1. Integration dilemma**

The integration dilemma is probably the mildest form of cooperative security dilemma, because it is an organizational, not a value dilemma. International actors, affected by the integration dilemma, share the same cultural environment. Therefore, such a dilemma may be somehow unlogical and hardly definable. In the framework of integration dilemma, international actors, while sharing the Kantian values, may use the Hobbesian practices in some areas. By motives, it is more related to tradition and habits than it could be caused by traditional source of security dilemma – fear. Anders Wivel (2000, 335) has settled the integration dilemma for the case where:

On the one hand, state autonomy is challenged by supranationality as a consequence of membership and the state may fear being entrapped in the process, but on the other hand there is a risk of abandonment in the sense of forsaking the benefits of integration, such as increased economic prosperity and prestige.

All in all, the integration dilemma symbolizes the trap of constructed obstacles, which often rest on fears about losing national sovereignty while joining into security communities. There may be a dilemma between the benefits of system and the sovereignty of individual states. For example, when France left NATO military command in 1966, this action caused some mistrust and competition between France and some other NATO nations, particularly with the United States. At the same time, there were no differences between France and the rest of NATO regarding their values, norms and identities that might have reinforced the cultural break between them.

During the Cold War, Austria, Finland, and Sweden divorced from their cultural Western heritage and stayed neutral (Huntington 1997, 126). In the current European security architecture, Austria, Finland, and Sweden continually prefer to stay outside of NATO, although there are no cultural differences in value-sharing or identity-sharing. The co-existence of Kantian security communities, NATO and the European Union, in the same security environment seems to be an historical paradox, which is not likely to be solved in the near future and we witness the construction of another long-lasting integration dilemma that is able to survive conceptual changes in the security systems. The

Euro-Atlantic integration dilemma is probably the most powerful integration dilemma in the post-modern international system.

Dissonance in the US involvement in European matters and in the European commitment to the US global strategy can produce undesirable instability in the Euro-Atlantic security environment. The security culture of the United States tends to be more exclusive and oriented to the exportation of liberal democratic values than is the case with her European allies, who practice a more inclusive security culture and are more oriented to defending such values. According to Joylan Howorth (2005), there was the dilemma of how to combine the EU ideals of effective multilateralism with the US's ongoing desire unilaterally to pre-empt further terrorist attacks. There are also different geopolitical interests between the United States and Europe. The United States practices a more global approach to security than European nations. The US security interests in the Pacific area are no less important than similar interests in Europe.

At the same time, many European allies consider the United States' military presence in Europe to be a primary security guarantee for the region. Joseph Nye (2008) notes although the United States is a leading military power, her power encounters several limitations. Even the United States cannot be always ready for unilateral actions and may benefit from security communities. NATO offers a dependable mechanism that allows a connection between the US military strength and the European security needs. Therefore, NATO primary tool is not only to offer benefits of collective defense to other member-states but to link the United States and Europe directly by joint defense actions (Heurlin and Rasmussen 2003, 46).

The Euro-Atlantic integration dilemma brings to the fore fundamental differences in the logic of integration between the European Union and NATO. In the security community perspective, the European Union has an integrationist ideology, but NATO does not (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005, 30). The value-based ideological unity underpinning the European Union is stronger than the common security identity of NATO, where the interest-based approach to global security strongly evolved on the basis of the US's exclusive security culture after 2001. That trend somehow influenced the integrationist unity in NATO and highlighted differences in cultural practices between euro-centrists and trans-Atlanticists. If institutionalization and complex interdependence fail, pluralistic security communities are destined to remain mere dreams, never becoming reality. Therefore, NATO-EU cooperation is essential for the further development of the post-modern security environment in Europe, and resolution of the Euro-Atlantic security dilemma largely depends on the coordination of activities between these communities, in order to escape the integration dilemma.

In the 1990s, the United States played a decisive role in peace-making in European conflict areas like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Richard Holbrooke (1995, 2) stated that "the United States has become a European power that has gone beyond traditional imperatives of America's commitment to Europe". The Euro-Atlantic security dilemma strengthened under the George

W. Bush administration in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, while the United States has made a gradual movement towards the Hobbesian security culture, especially through such practices like the Global War against Terrorism and the Iraqi operation. This cultural shift destabilized the Kantian post-modern international system and made the cooperative security dilemma among the NATO allies more visible. Simultaneously, the Euro-Atlantic integration dilemma made a movement towards the identity dilemma as different cultural paradigms manifested.

#### **5.4.2. Identity dilemma**

An identity dilemma indicates the presence of fundamental normative differences among actors within the Kantian environment, especially regarding their security cultures and security identities, which makes the building-up of communitarian relationship between them impossible. The Middle-East and Europe, for example, represent different security cultures practiced in their regional security complexes. While Europe corresponds to the requirements of the Kantian security environment, the Hobbesian fears rule in the Middle-East (Frederking 2003, 367). Europe has recognized the abuse of force in conflict resolution. Security environment in the Middle-East still strongly relies on different national interests that do not deny the use of military power in achieving their goals.

Enlargements should not influence basic values and the regulation of security communities. The enlargement of NATO and the European Union in the 1990s and 2000s was a typical indicator of an identity dilemma. Security communities should be careful in taking existing conflicts into their organizations and presume that potential members would solve their disputes before the accession.<sup>12</sup> The viable extent of enlargement has been an important consideration for both the European Union and NATO in maintaining their organization accordingly to the principles of Kantian security communities. Therefore, in the case of the enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the institution must be careful in order to maintain the core values of Kantian security culture and countries wishing to join must demonstrate their ability to accept these criteria in order to avoid the introduction of conflicting values.

While the integration dilemma occurs among the Kantian actors, the identity dilemma appears between the Kantian and the Hobbesian actors. The whole Kantian community might potentially become unstable, if the elements of the Hobbesian culture will be introduced into the Kantian environment. Sørensen (2007, 367) notes that some regimes endorsing liberal democratic values “are autocratic and repressive; many countries are very far from respecting these values in their own domestic realms”. Therefore, political decisions about

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<sup>12</sup> For example, the dispute between Macedonia and Greece prevented Macedonia’s membership in NATO in 2008.

enlargements, which are not in accordance with shared beliefs, norms and identities, can pose a serious threat to the effectiveness of a security community. If a security community expands to areas with different identities or competing values, it may introduce a set of problems affecting its ability to maintain its value-based foundations. This was the reason why, for example, collective security organizations instituted under the Cold War system, like the United Nations Organization and OSCE, never developed into security communities. For the same reason, the League of Nations failed to act as a security community in the first half of the twentieth century.

During the Bush administration, the United States has approved a more Hobbesian approach to the world politics, and the Euro-Atlantic integration dilemma simultaneously obtained some features of identity dilemma. The Hobbesian-Kantian dispute within NATO strengthened after enlargements in 1999 and 2004. In general, as the core in values, beliefs and identities did not change, it still remained to being the integration dilemma, although some movements also may indicate the presence of cultural conflict becoming noticeable. Julianne Smith (2006, 18) notices internal division in NATO concerning the future enlargement:

There are two opposing groups in NATO. First of them is concerned about joining security consumers from unconsolidated democracies with NATO and advocates criteria, consequences and limits for new aspirants. Other group, led by the United States, has much positive approach for enlargement and this group considers willingness to participate in military operations as a main factor when considering accession.

The terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 has tested the development of the post-modern society, and the Global War against Terrorism revealed on the differences in security cultures of the United States and her European allies. The military attack against Iraq in 2003 has not been carried out by post-modern pluralistic security communities, but in a “modern” fashion by way of an old-fashioned coalition comprising the United States and her closest allies. The Euro-Atlantic unity, which is based on a common commitment to liberal democratic values, started gradually to fracture, despite the fact that those underlying values remained intact.

In Europe, the gap strengthened between the trans-Atlantic nations, recognizing the United States as a world hegemon in traditional Hobbesian means, and the euro-centric nations, recognizing the United States as a security partner, which would be more suitable for the Kantian security environment. In 2003 US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld raised the issue of new polarities in Europe, distinguishing new trans-Atlantic members of the European Union and NATO (“New Europe”) from euro-centric nations like France and Germany, which he called “Old Europe” (US Department of Defense 2003). From “old members” of NATO, Pax Americana, the US dominated world, was more favored in the United Kingdom and Denmark.

Pax Americana became highly popular especially in some new democracies in the Central and Eastern Europe. These societies have a long-time experience in living hegemonic security communities and Pax Americana would represent an opposite type of hegemonic security communities, where democratic principles are maintained but a streamline for 'fair' ideology is present. The United States under the Bush's administration has been a strong supporter of NATO further enlargement, but the logic of enlargement became sometimes closer to the military alliance than the security community. Many new members applied for special relationship with the United States as they see the United States' military power as a main guarantee for them against from possible attacks from neighboring countries, namely keeping in mind Russia's possible aspiration to re-establish itself as a superpower.

The identity dilemma is also a dilemma about recognition or non-recognition of other cultural environments and their rights to exist. In the Hobbesian context, which stresses competition, rivalry, or even enmity, there would be much harder to achieve such agreements that allow co-existing of different cultures without fear and misperceptions. In the Kantian context, cooperative regimes like promotion of mutual interdependence and cooperative security may establish zones of stable peace even between different cultural environments.

The example of the Euro-Atlantic dilemma and its development in 2000s indicates that the integration dilemma has an ability to become into the identity dilemma, if the cultural environment experiences a change and becomes unstable that is demanding to take it seriously. The change of identity does not take always the progressive shape from the Hobbesian environment to the Kantian one, but there may also appear reverse waves of cultural change. In the case of identity dilemma, however, will be important to practice peaceful and cooperative measures in interacting with other cultural environments and thus still avoid the emergence of classical security dilemmas.

## **5.5. Managing security dilemma**

Security cultures influence mechanisms that enable to managing security dilemmas. Classical security dilemma stems from the Hobbesian war or the Lockean rivalry, anarchical international systems, where a fear is a general motive for international actors. In the Hobbesian cultural environment, the effects of security dilemma would be mitigated by a balance between powers and threats, but it remains to exist as a normative part of its cultural environment. The management of classical security dilemma requires a rational behavior of international actors if they are interested in the stability of the system. Culture of fear, a general motive producing security dilemma, would make difficult the security dilemma management, as it is not a rational paradigm.



**Table 7:** Security dilemma in the Hobbesian/Lockean security environment

<i>International system:</i>	anarchy
<i>International actors:</i>	states, alliances
<i>Type of security dilemma:</i>	classical
<i>Methods of management:</i>	balancing, bandwagoning, coalition-building, ally-seeking, arms-racing

There may be slight doctrinal differences between the offensive Hobbesian environment and the defensive Lockean environment what concerns methods used against security dilemmas. In the Hobbesian environment, actors seek to maximize their power. In the Lockean environment, actors seek to avoid a situation where one power becomes superior with others, destabilizes the system and unbalances the power. In general, both cultural environments, the Hobbesian and the Lockean, recognize conflict and competition as a driving force of the system.

The cooperative security dilemma stems from the Kantian security environment, which started to arise after the World War I. Although the Versailles system has been intended to be the Kantian system, the majority of sub-systems remained to be influenced by the Hobbesian culture. A majority of security dilemmas within the Versailles system were classical security dilemmas. Therefore, the system was not able to avoid conflicts between the Hobbesian actors, the system became unstable and failed when the World War II broke out. The failure of the Kantian Versailles system caused its replacement with the Hobbesian/Lockean system.

The Cold War international system included some Kantian elements, but the system as a whole was polarized and culturally the Hobbesian system. The Cold War collective security arrangements (the United Nations, CSCE) came from the Kantian cultural environment, which led to a many-sided international system. The stable bipolarity, which reflects the Lockean environment, has been reached accidentally because of the balance of powers and threats achieved but the stability of the bipolar system maintained the Hobbesian conflict alive. The security dilemmas of the Cold War were dominantly classical security dilemmas, which required the Hobbesian/Lockean doctrines for their management. The replacement of the Cold War system with the Kantian post-modern system was a result of the fall of the one sub-system caused mainly by its internal weaknesses.

**Table 8:** Security dilemma in the Kantian security environment

<i>International system:</i>	institutionalized environment
<i>International actors:</i>	security communities, collective security arrangements, cooperative security arrangements
<i>Type of security dilemma:</i>	cooperative security (i.e. integration or identity dilemmas)
<i>Methods of management:</i>	complex interdependence

The promotion of mutual interdependence and value-oriented institutionalization has, indeed, been demonstrated to avoid the emergence of a classical security dilemma – for example, the case of interstate relations in Western Europe after the World War II. These experiences were practiced with the whole system after the transformation from the Hobbesian/Lockean system to the Kantian system. Sørensen (2007, 362) states that “the classical security dilemma is either irrelevant among post-modern states or in sharp decline among modernizing and democratizing states”. Nevertheless, as the post-modern system maintained the Hobbesian cultural environments, the classical security dilemmas did not completely disappear.

Cooperative security dilemmas would be managed by international regimes that increase trust, interdependence and partnership between actors. Robert Jervis (1978) has recognized in his “Cooperation under Security Dilemma” the positive outcome of cooperative international regimes in overcoming security dilemmas, claiming that states are able to construct norms determining their behavior and thereby become less uncertain of each other’s intentions (See also Collins 2004; Booth and Wheeler 2008). Cooperative regimes are able to establish stable interconnections between partners and, in the long run, this can mature into mutual interdependence.

Theorists discussing the security dilemma have usually referred to the Hobbesian anarchy and paid less attention to other cultural environments. The establishment of mechanisms that would reduce misperceptions among security dependants can be different depending on the cultural environment. In the Kantian environment, complex interdependence is one of the most effective tools used against security dilemmas, which can be described by multiple channels connecting societies, absence of hierarchy among issues and absence of use of military force against each other (Keohane and Nye 1977). The Kantian international systems can regulate potential distrust by establishing regimes based on commonly accepted norms, values and procedures. First, liberal democracies can be institutionalized into security communities where member-states share same values. Second, zones of peace and interdependence can be extended into peripheral neighborhoods by establishing cooperative security arrangements.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Kantian security communities could be prospective mechanisms to overcome mistrust and the sense of unsafety, the potential sources of security dilemmas. As the global liberal democratic security community seems to be unreachable in the near future, the

institutionalization of security communities in some Kantian environments might nonetheless mitigate the effects of possible misperceptions and polarities. Adler and Barnett (1998, 4), following the idea of Karl Deutsch, have maintained that such a community is able to create a stable peace in the circumstances where members of community are willing to defend their values against external threats and they are able to attract other states with progressive ideas offering security and welfare. Cooperative international regimes and arrangements are appropriate mechanisms in hands of the Kantian security communities, which can enlarge zones of peace and thus transcend the identity dilemmas.

## **5.6. Summary**

This research follows a thesis that security dilemmas are dependant on their cultural environments. Security dilemmas can emerge through interactions between the agent (security culture) and the structure (security architecture), in the situation where the cultural environment and the structural environment mismatch. A classical security dilemma appears in the Hobbesian security environment and a cooperative security dilemma applies to the Kantian systems. Although cooperation may generally mitigate the effects of security dilemmas, this study argues that, depending on circumstances, cooperation may also be a catalyst of a security dilemma, causing misperceptions and mistrust between countries, which stay outside of cooperative frameworks.

The cooperative security dilemma is a cooperation-induced security dilemma and may take the forms of integration dilemmas or identity dilemmas, depending either on conflicting interests or identities. The cooperative security dilemma usually occurs, if the Kantian security culture interacts with the Hobbesian/Lockean security culture. The integration dilemma refers to the Kantian environment, in which the security preferences of actors do not match with their cultural environment. The identity dilemma emerges, if different cultural environments exist within the same system. In certain situations, depending on cultural changes, integration dilemmas can be transferred into identity dilemmas and identity dilemmas can be transferred into classical security dilemmas.

A typical situation introducing the cooperative security dilemma is when the Hobbesian actors interact with the Kantian international system. The next chapter gives an overview about the development of modern and post-modern international systems. International systems would manifest various political and security cultures and the transition from one system to another may also manifest the cultural transformation. Unstable systems can easily produce security dilemmas between actors, which in the final stage may lead to the change of system.

## 6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE POST-WESTPHALIAN ERA

This chapter examines the development of the international system after the Treaty of Westphalia was concluded in 1648. Traditionally, this date has been used in order to mark the beginning of the modern international system. The modern international system started to follow political objectives for strengthening the international society and attempted to establish multinational agreements for arranging a stable international order (Holsti 1996). An international system is a self-regulative framework, in which international relations are arranged through multilateral normative regulations, including diplomatic procedures and international law among others. Up to now, the *international systems* have been primarily the Western systems, produced by the Western political cultures, emerged in the European cultural environment, and followed paradigms related to one or another culture.

Political cultures manifested in Europe follow two opposing narratives. The Hobbesian narrative tells us that the world is evil and national interests will determine the behavior of states. The Kantian narrative reinforces the streaming to the world society and expects to build up more stable and interdependent society through extensive cooperation and institutionalization. The chapter focuses on important changes in the development of the modern and post-modern international systems. The development of international system is not necessarily progressive but there may take place reverse wave that can destabilize the system or lead to a change of the system. In the Hobbesian environment, changes between the systems tended to be violent and accompanied by major wars. Last two decades, characterized by a peaceful change from the dominantly Hobbesian modern society to the Kantian post-modern one, are explored more thoroughly.

Though a system establishes normative categories for international relations, it may still be a multicultural entity. Within the systems, there may exist actors or environments, which are not influenced by the prevailing political culture, but they may follow other cultural paradigms, characteristic to their particular environment. The post-modern international system is the Kantian system, but it includes multiple environments, which proceed from the Hobbesian-Lockean culture. Intercultural interactions within the system can produce security dilemmas. In the Hobbesian security environment, classical security dilemmas take place. The Kantian security environment in general aims to transcend security dilemmas, but while interacting with the Hobbesian security environments, cooperative security dilemmas may occur. In the long-run, security dilemmas may destabilize the whole system and at the final stage may cause the change of system.

Again, Europe is the heart of phenomenon we call today the Western culture<sup>13</sup> and through its history, the international system has been dominantly a European system. According to Huntington (1997, 50), “European Christendom began to emerge as a distinct civilization in the eighth and ninth century”. Moreover, the European cultural environment has enlarged outside of its margins and “Europe is not only a region, but also an idea” (Bartlett 1993, 15). Margins, rules, norms and identities regarding the functioning of international system have been set up in Europe. Therefore, the political culture, which dominates over the European cultural environment, simultaneously dictates its values, beliefs and identities to the whole system. Samuel Huntington (1997, 46) characterized the Western civilization consisting of three different components – Europe, North America and Latin America. However, two of them – North America and Latin America – have their cultural roots in Europe, as they are overgrown from the European Christendom. There are several shared features characterizing the Western civilization besides the geographical location – Christianity, mostly Indo-European linguistic background (with minor exceptions), common history, and most recently also a democratic statehood.

Three general paradigms (agents) have been examined in connection with the international system – stability, polarity and the prevailing (security) culture. There are certain dependent paradigms that would characterize the position of one or another culture regarding to the valid international system. The security dilemma is one of them. In the Hobbesian system, nation-states are major international actors. Therefore, the Hobbesian systems are influenced by a set of classical security dilemmas, stemming from interstate misperceptions. The Kantian systems can be described by the strengthening trend of institutionalization, which especially by the liberal school of IR theory should avoid the emergence of security dilemmas. In the Kantian environment, classical security dilemmas have been replaced by cooperative security dilemmas, which are connected with interactions between the Hobbesian and the Kantian security cultures.

The table below describes the development of international systems since 1648, including how stability, polarity and culture have been regarded to the particular system.

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<sup>13</sup> Or otherwise, the Western civilization is the environment, where the Western culture spreads.

**Table 9:** History of International System<sup>14</sup>

<b>Modern International System 1648–1991</b>		
1. Westphalian order 1648–1815	unstable multipolarity	Hobbesian culture
2. Concert of Europe 1815–1914		
a) 1815–1854	stable multipolarity	Hobbesian/Lockean culture
b) 1854–1871	unstable multipolarity	Hobbesian culture
c) 1871–1914	unstable bipolarity	Hobbesian culture
3. World War I 1914–1919		
4. Versailles system 1919–1939		
a) 1919–1936	unstable liberal society	Kantian culture
b) 1936–1939	unstable bipolarity	Hobbesian culture
5. World War II 1939–1945		
6. Cold War 1945–1991	stable bipolarity	Hobbesian/Lockean culture
<b>Post-modern International System 1991–</b>		
a) 1991–2003	stable liberal society	Kantian culture
b) 2003–	unstable liberal society	Kantian culture

There have been at least four major changes regarding the development of the international system since 1648. Each formation of the international system has been dominated by one of the major political cultures – the Hobbesian, the Hobbesian/Lockean or the Kantian one. Depending on the success of the particular system to hold the international order and to avoid major conflicts between great powers, the system would be described as stable or unstable. The Hobbesian international systems have traditionally been changed through the results of major wars. The Westphalian system proceeds from the consequences of Thirty Years' War in the Holy Roman Empire and the Eighty Years' War between Spain and Netherlands. There are plenty of evidences confirming that changes regarding the international system usually take place after major wars. The Napoleonic wars, the Crimean war, the French-German War of 1871, the World War I, and the World War II have caused changes in the international system. The only exception here was the Cold War, which ended by a peaceful change.

Moreover, accordingly to the table at least eight breaking points have occurred, which symbolize whereas the system has become stable or unstable. The term '*breaking point*' can be described not by a single action, but as Michel Foucault (1969) argued, it refers to gradual change in logic how people tend to understand things, determining the boundaries of thought in a certain period. Every breaking point does not necessarily mean the change of the system, but there might appear minor challenges to the functioning of system.

<sup>14</sup> In the table, the Lockean culture has been treated as a subculture of the Hobbesian culture. The table was firstly published in Mölder (2007, 125–6).

Particularly the English school of International Relations theory uses the year of 1648 as the key date of the emergence and self-definition of the distinctive international system and the international society imposing themselves on the rest of the World (Buzan and Little 2000, 402). Earlier systems would be described as pre-modern systems, which generally operated as semi-organized sub-systems under the circumstances of state of nature (Hobbes 1651).<sup>15</sup> Since the Westphalian Peace Accord was concluded, the international order remained more or less unstable for more than a century. After the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, the major European powers agreed upon the first stable international system, the Concert of Europe, which operated under supervision of four-five great powers. Nevertheless, in the long-run the consensus was not maintained, disputes between great powers led to the war (i.e. the Crimean case of 1854) and the system became unstable.

A competition between powers, which is a natural part of the Hobbesian system, may produce disbalances among the powers and lead to a conflict. The Concert of Europe finished with a long-time unstable bipolarity. The instability of the system was accompanied by the colonial ambitions of the European powers, which strengthened mutual competition among them and caused security dilemmas against each other's intentions. Unsuccessful attempts to balance competing European powers preceded the World War I.

The World War I, the most destructive conflict at that time, gave rise to the change of cultural paradigms of the international system. The ambition to establish the first Kantian liberal society with the Versailles system, however, failed due to the competing Hobbesian security environments strengthened within the system. The Versailles system has programmed the cooperative security dilemma with Germany, a potential great power at that time, which has been charged and suppressed after the World War I by winners of the past war dominating over the system. The Hobbesian ambition strengthened in Germany and after their settlements with other ambitious Hobbesian powers, first of all Italy and Japan, this led to a situation of unstable bipolarity between two antagonistic blocs before the World War II. The Kantian system failed because of strong pressure from the Hobbesian powers and the inability of the system to produce consolidated cooperative frameworks.

The Cold War was the first stable rivalry being established. The major war between ideological rivals has been succeeded to avoid. However, the stability of the system was not intentional and the Hobbesian conflict was avoided primarily by the balance of power between two antagonistic blocs. Moreover, some Kantian principles from the Versailles system have been maintained with the Cold War system. The United Nations was a similar coordinating body for the system as the League of Nations was to the Versailles system. At the same

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<sup>15</sup> Hobbes wrote that "during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man" (*Leviathan*, chapter XIII). The state of nature would describe the pre-modern society.

time, the UN Security Council constituted a concert-like organization, giving special rights for the control of the system to five great powers.

The Cold War system simultaneously included the Kantian and the Hobbesian cultural paradigms. However, as the Kantian system is not a polarized system and bipolarity was clearly perceivable in the Cold War system especially concerning its security-related behavior. The Cold War system may also be connected with the Lockean political culture, at least at the first glance as a competition between polarized subsystems is clearly visible and the Cold War bipolarity favored maintaining status-quo between two blocs. The study classifies stable polarized systems as the Hobbesian/Lockean systems. Similarly to the European Concert, status quo regimes in the Cold War system have rather been reinforced by unintentional balances between powers, not by the logic of the system.

In the second half of 1980s, the Cold War system started to break down and since the 1990s it was replaced by the post-modern Kantian society. The year 1991 marks a culmination of change because of two important challenges – the reunification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The world entered into the post-modern society, which stands for second attempt to establish the international system that corresponds to the principles of Kantian liberal society. In the post-modern world, the polarities between powers did not emerge and at least initially, the whole international society has demonstrated a certain solidarity against the Hobbesian challenges of some actors, for example during the Gulf War.<sup>16</sup>

In the 2000s, there was a major challenge to the Kantian system – when the global war against terrorism started up, the Kantian system becomes unstable. After the Iraqi invasion in 2003, the competition between the Hobbesian culture and the Kantian culture has shown up in shaping the current international system. The history of the international system testifies that since the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Kantian systems have been alternated with the Hobbesian systems, and the dynamics of the system has not been progressive but followed by the competition between different cultural environments. More detailed overview about the changes of international systems will be given in next subchapters.

## **6.1. The modern society 1648–1990**

Historically, the beginning of modern international system in Europe has been connected with the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The period preceding 1648 experienced several mostly regional sub-systems, but their difference with the modern society might be connected with the '*internationality*' of modern arrangements. As Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2000) noted, pre-modern states were able to establish relationships with other

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<sup>16</sup> The Iraqi action was initially supported only by Jordan but later they withdrew their support.



statehoods in their neighborhood, and commonly agreed norms often regulated interactions between those political entities. The ancient Greek society, for example, has been a significant example here. In general, the pre-modern society can be described in the Hobbesian terms as a state of nature and it has been often defined as the age of empires, where the latter were aggressive bodies in the best Hobbesian means, ready to enlarge intemperately (Gilpin 1981, Toynbee 1960, Joannés 2004). Nevertheless, some ancient civilizations (notably the Greek and the Maya society) resisted empire and built up the system of city-states (Buzan and Little 2000).

The Treaty of Westphalia<sup>17</sup> was the first attempt to enforce an international regime, defined by norms agreed by all parties of the Treaty. The treaty was concluded after the first modern diplomatic congress gathered, which resulted in treaties of Osnabrück (15 May 1648) and Münster (2 October 1648) ending respectively the Thirty Years War in Germany and the Eighty Years War between Spain and Netherlands. The Treaty of Westphalia finished religious wars between the Catholics and the Protestants and made peace between two leading dynasties in Europe, the Habsburgs and the Bourbons. The treaty recognized the right of Imperial States<sup>18</sup> to determine religious preferences in their own states accordingly to the Peace of Augsburg of 1555. The Protestants and the Catholics were equal and the Calvinism was recognized as a religion. Also, the independence of the Netherlands, Switzerland, Savoy, Milan, Genoa, Mantua, Tuscany, Lucca, Modena and Parma from the Empire was formally recognized by the parties of the Treaty. The Westphalian order was a classical multipolar Hobbesian system, in which number of great powers within the system was changing over time, which made the whole system predominantly unstable.

The next international system, the Concert of Europe, initiated by Prince Metternich<sup>19</sup> and others in 1815, established a great powers-dominated and regulated multipolar system with an intention to use collective security measures for the establishment of commonly accepted values and principles in Europe. As the Concert was a result of the Napoleonic wars, initially the system was dominated by winners, members of the anti-Napoleonic Quadruple Alliance. Since 1818, France also joined with the decision-makers. The main benefit, states achieved from the concert of Europe, was stability. In the Hobbesian environment, however, national interests outweighed possible benefits, achieved by cooperation, and various misperceptions started to destabilize the system. The system was a rational power projection, which underestimated irrational motives of international actors. Great powers established the system

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<sup>17</sup> Sometimes also the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), ending the Franco-Spanish War (1635–59) are considered as parts of the Peace Accord.

<sup>18</sup> An entity in the Holy Roman Empire with a vote in the Reichstag or Imperial Diet

<sup>19</sup> In this case I do not want to underestimate the roles of Lord Castlereagh or even Alexander I Tsar of Russia in establishment of the system but rather indicating that Congress of Vienna was chaired by Metternich.

with the advice of demographers and militaries, who did not take into account the cultural factors (Holsti 1996, 53). While security dilemmas appeared into inter-power relationship, the whole system became unstable.

In 1823, the Great Britain opposed the invasion to Spain that created the first rift between partners in the system. In 1854, with the beginning of the Crimean War, the system turned for first time against one of the partners, Russia, and entered into a period of unstable multipolarity, where a variety of conflicts between major powers in Europe continued. In 1854, with the beginning of the Crimean War, the system entered into a period of unstable multipolarity, while turned for the first time against one of the governing powers, Russia. The period after the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 is characterized by the creation of alliances, where Germany and Austria-Hungary composed one side of the emerging rivalry, and France with Great Britain, the other side.

The unification processes in Germany and Italy brought new influential actors to the international arena. Germany, which replaced Prussia among great powers, became a powerful actor in the European security environment. After the unification process was completed, also Italy had played a significant role in international politics, participated in Congress of Berlin in 1878, and joined with Germany and Austria-Hungary to the coalition of Central Powers. The most influential powers in the Versailles system were the United Kingdom and France. In some place, Germany, Italy and Japan<sup>20</sup> also had a considerable influence to the system, though they would be more recognized in demolishing the system.

The international system of the 19<sup>th</sup> century endorses claim from the realist tradition that story of international politics has been written in terms of the great powers (Waltz 1979, 72). The modern society was predominantly controlled by international systems where the interests of great powers, clashes and agreements between them, dictated the stability of systems. It should be considered that the 19<sup>th</sup> century systems included only the Hobbesian environments, which somehow still influences the study of international relations and understandings stemming from the study. The Westphalian Order did not establish system-centered great powers and should be described as a “true Hobbesian systems” where powers permanently competed and fought for their position within the system. The special status of great powers have been implemented by the Concert of Europe, by which given powers acquired a right to control the system.

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<sup>20</sup> Permanent members in the Council of League of Nations.

**Table 10:** Great powers and international system in the modern society

<i>International system</i>	<i>Great powers</i>	<i>Leading institution</i>
Westphalian order 1648–1815	Various changeable competing powers	
Concert of Europe 1815–1914	United Kingdom, Austria, Prussia (from 1871 – Germany), Russia, France, France (from 1818), Italy (from 1870)	
Versailles system 1919–1939	United Kingdom, France, Italy (1919–1937), Japan (1919–1933), Germany (1926–1933)	The League of Nations
Cold War 1945–1991	Superpowers: United States, Soviet Union; Great powers: United Kingdom, France, China (from 1971) <sup>21</sup>	The United Nations

After the First World War, the first though inconsistent cultural shift was made concerning the international system. There was a real chance to establish a system of states similar to the principles of federation imagined by Immanuel Kant. Instead of a balance of power mechanisms employed by the Congress of Vienna, the new system used the principle of self-determination in remaking post-war Europe (Holsti 1996, 53). The US President Woodrow Wilson published his Fourteen Points providing the basic values for the birth of the League of Nations – the first collective security arrangement representing liberal democratic values. Following this spirit, the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 condemned war as a legal instrument for dispute resolution.

However, attempts to build up a global security community failed. The United States, although one of the initiators of the new arrangements, never joined the League. The Versailles system was not able to introduce shared values, characteristic to the Kantian society, and failed dramatically in building a liberal world order. The competing Hobbesian environments became powerful, destabilized and later destroyed the system. Since 1936, when Germany denounced the Locarno Treaty<sup>22</sup> and militarized Rhineland, the Kantian system came to an end and, similarly to the period before the First World War, the world order once again entered a system of unstable bipolarity, which led to a major war. There were influential preconditions for the failure besides the growing revanchism of Germany, because “the League’s collective security

<sup>21</sup> 1946–1971 Taiwan (the Republic of China) *de jure* was the fifth superpower – member of the UN Security Council.

<sup>22</sup> The Locarno Treaties were seven agreements formally signed in London on December 1 1925, in which the European powers and the new states of Central and Eastern Europe sought to secure the post-war territorial settlement, in return normalising relations with defeated Germany.

system presumed a global security community – a group of states with a clear common identity. The League failed because it could not develop its identity” (Michalka 2003, 44). There were beliefs, some norms, but common identity seemed unachievable.

Since the Versailles system, the world order retains a central institution, which coordinates international relations on the level of system – the League of Nations. The United Nations continued to execute the role of the League of Nations in the new Cold War international system. The Cold War system was theoretically controlled by five powers, permanent members of the UN Security Council. In practical terms, two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union controlled the system, where the United Kingdom was a stable ally of the United States, France was somehow unstable ally of the United States, and China was an independent power, ideologically (culturally) close to the Soviet Union, but since 1960s their foreign policy has been outside of the Soviet influence.

Although the political framework of the Cold War system maintained some Kantian elements, security culture of the system was predominantly Hobbesian in the conditions of polarized system. The collective security arrangements (UN, CSCE) were the Kantian actors, which ineffectively performed within the Hobbesian security environment, if there was not an agreement for conflict resolution between superpowers. Many international conflicts (e.g. most notably Vietnam, Afghanistan, the Middle-East among others) have not been resolved by the system because of direct or indirect involvement of superpowers. During the Cold War bipolarity, the security architecture followed the Hobbesian logic. NATO was a traditional military alliance that symbolized common aspirations of western European countries to uphold the democratic frontline against their Soviet-led opponents. It was balanced by the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which included the Soviet Union and her allies. The security dilemma between them was a true manifestation of the Hobbesian classical security dilemma.

The bipolar international system of the Cold War was able to control major activities of international actors. The stability of the system created an illusion of the world that operates on the basis of rational choices. However, the ideological rift between two communities has given a certain peculiarity to the Cold War system. Previous systems were homogenous systems, which have been polarized by rational interests of actors in maximizing their power capabilities. The ideological opposition has added a specific cultural motive to the system. The contemporary history has demonstrated that the appearance of powerful ideology can split or destabilize valid international systems. The national socialism of Germany challenged the Versailles system, the Marxism of the Soviet Union and China challenged the Cold War system and most recently the neo-conservatism of the United States challenged the post-modern system.

## 6.2. The Kantian challenge in 1990s

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the decline of the Soviet Union, the international system experienced another change and entered into the Kantian cultural environment often called a post-modern society. The post-modern challenge in 1990s changed cultural paradigms that led international affairs during the whole modern society. After the World War I, the Kantian systems started to compete with the Hobbesian systems, but never achieved a dominant status in international politics. The post-modern system in 1990s was the first stable Kantian system. The principles of the Kantian security culture accepted by main international actors<sup>23</sup> of the system contradicted the realist expectations of Europe's quick return to the 19<sup>th</sup> century Hobbesian environment with balance of power politics (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, 64).

At the beginning of the post-modern society, the world was in a situation where nearly half of the countries had accepted democratic principles of government (Huntington 1991, 25–26).<sup>24</sup> Democratic challenges in 1980s-1990s characterize the majority of the international society, not only Europe. For example Latin-America, once dominated by military dictatorships, became mostly democratic continent for 1990s with minor exceptions. For that reason, Francis Fukuyama wrote his famous “The End of the History and The Last Man” (1992), stressing on the fatality of progressive development of the international society. The western world triumphed the victory of liberal democracy over the other competing ideologies, the communist ideology in the first place, while “the remarkable transformation – through which a majority of all people now live in states with some sort of political democracy – represents the inexorable triumph of Western and indeed American values,” (Shaw 2001, 630).

The dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization considerably decreased the direct conventional threat to the Western society. When the Cold War ended, there was no need for a traditional military alliance, striving to balance great powers. While the Hobbesian systems relied on stable or unstable polarities between actors within the system, the new international system abandoned traditional realist dogmas, goaled the liberal democratic society and remarkably changed global understandings of the substance of threats. According to Richard Haass (2008), the present-day (post-modern) security culture is not characterized by polarization as it has been frequent in the modern society but the current international security environment can be described by dispersal of power between different centers, which requires global cooperation and integration between centers for ensuring security. These centers may force

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<sup>23</sup> First of all, the Western democracies – the United States, Canada, and Western Europe were involved into the peaceful change from modern society to the post-modern one.

<sup>24</sup> By Huntington (1991, 25–26), 45.4% of total states, which is comparable with the year of 1922 and the beginning of the first Kantian system (45.3%).

different cultural approaches that may produce in their turn cooperative security dilemmas.

The rivalry of the Cold War has been overcome by the new societal arrangement values a conflict prevention and an establishment of cooperative security regimes. The post-modern society has taken a broader approach to security, focusing on complex interdependence between states, institutionalization and consolidation of principles of democratic peace. The European Union has followed a security culture that emphasizes a shared identity and accepts norms and values of the Kantian security community. Robert Cooper (2000) has noted that main characteristics of the European Union could be described by the new post-modern system of states, including:

- The breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs;
- Mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance;
- The rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of rules of behavior, rules that are self-enforced because all of the EU states have an interest in maintaining the rule of law;
- The growing irrelevance of borders.

Cooper (2000, 19–20) claims that security in the post-modern society is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability

The important executive role of the Kantian principles of the international system has become visible and “the continued salience of international institutions after the end of the Cold War is quite evident from an examination of state strategies” (Baldwin 1993, 288). NATO has been quite successful in adjusting to the post-modern security environment and has started to establish cooperative relationships with its former opponents. The European Union, on the other hand, was born on the basis of the European Economic Community, whose member-states gradually started to create more comprehensive cooperative framework. Their security cooperation was framed within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which since 1999 also includes a defense dimension, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Eastern European countries applied to the EU accession, after the Copenhagen criteria have been laid down in 1993.

Ole Wæver (1998, 91) argues that both insecurity and security became a main motive of integration in Europe. Institutional cooperation helped to overcome mutual misperceptions of individual European nations towards each other’s intentions and to avoid distrust caused by international anarchy. The culmination of the Kantian international system was probably in 1998–1999. For this time, NATO and the European Union have made a significant progress towards establishing security communities. The UK-France summit of Saint-Malo would be considered to being a starting-point of the ESDP and NATO experienced the first enlargement to the Eastern-European countries, accepting membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Furthermore, the Washington summit of NATO adopted a new strategic concept, which follows the Kantian principles towards the international society and launched the Membership Action Plan for countries intending to join NATO.

According to Sonia Lucarelli (2002, 14), NATO and EU contribution to the expansion of the Western European democratic security community are:

- The development of shared identities and meanings around shared liberal-democratic values;
- The establishment of many-sided and direct relations amongst the states and their societies;
- The establishment of democratic institutions of government.

Emmanuel Adler (2005, 190) has settled general principles in distinguishing community members and partners – “It is not enough to behave like us, you have to be one of us” – and the status of partnership provides a probationary vacuum for those countries, interested to join the community. In the first stage, they have to demonstrate their ability to accept the values of the community, and therefore, a type of ‘quarantine’ would be advisable to establish.

The post-modern international system allowed to build up the Kantian security architecture in Europe and its immediate neighborhood, including liberal democratic security communities (EU, NATO) establishing a common identity among its members; cooperative security arrangements (PfP, WEU/EU partnerships) that focus on security cooperation between security communities and their neighboring environments; and collective security arrangements (UN, OSCE) for conflict prevention and joint actions in stabilizing peace. Despite the fact that special collective security arrangements (UN, OSCE) seem to be less effective mechanisms because of their multicultural membership, these institutions belong to the Kantian security environment.

**Table 11:** Post-modern security architecture in Europe

<i>Security communities</i>	NATO; EU
<i>Cooperative security arrangements</i>	PfP; MD; ICI; NUC; NRC; Barcelona Process; EU Neighborhood Policy etc
<i>Collective security arrangements</i>	UNO; OSCE

In 1990s, liberal democracy has been the main incentive stimulating on value-shared international regimes in the Euro-Atlantic security environment. The overwhelming majority of European states started to follow liberal democratic values, and at the time of writing, major international conflicts at least in the Western and Central part of Europe are resolved or moving towards resolution.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, the introduction of the Kantian international system did not exclude the co-existence of the Hobbesian actors and environments within the system. The Gulf War, the Yugoslavian conflicts, the Afghanistan operation

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<sup>25</sup> With the exception of some areas in the former Soviet Union, especially in the Caucasus. However, there is a problem with shared liberal democratic values, and therefore it cannot be considered as the Kantian security environment.

manifest violent interactions between the Kantian and the Hobbesian environments.

In 1990s, the Kantian security environment has been successfully introduced in Europe. While entering into the post-modern international system, one of the immediate objectives of the European institutions was the engagement of Central European countries with the rest of Europe. Gradually this trend shifted to the former Soviet Union. The Eastern European region from the Baltic countries to the Balkans was considered to present an important cooperative security dilemma for the European security communities until the enlargement processes advanced in 1999, in 2004, and later. In order to secure stable zones of peace in their neighborhood, the European security communities decided to establish comprehensive cooperative security regimes in the previously Soviet-influenced territory of Central and Eastern Europe, including ethnically and the culturally divided Balkans and the former Soviet republics. Many of these countries are now full members of the EU and NATO.

By the efforts of the EU and NATO, the last violent conflict area in the “core of Europe” – the Balkans – is more or less pacified, has started to democratize and is currently engaged in post-conflict peace-building.<sup>26</sup> With minor exceptions in the former Yugoslavia (especially the ambiguous Kosovo case), this cooperative security dilemma is today approaching resolution. Democratization of Serbia and effective conflict resolution in multicultural Bosnia and Herzegovina may well prove to be key elements in the consolidation of peace in the region.

There remain environments in the European neighborhood and beyond, which are mistrustful to the Kantian security culture and hold cooperative security dilemmas actual. Greater (or larger) Middle East, which includes areas from Morocco and Mauritania to Afghanistan and Pakistan, represents a foremost security concern for the Kantian international system in the near future, as the region is marked by recurrent violence and instability. Besides the Middle-East, Africa poses another potential security dilemma for Europe, as it is still an unstable continent with huge amounts of potential global and regional security risks. Therefore, the European Union in particular, but lately also NATO, has started to make efforts towards enhancing cooperative security initiatives into the African continent.

There are countries, which submit challenges to the Kantian international system and their strategic culture towards the system has remained the Hobbesian – i.e. North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Venezuela among others. Currently, the Western security communities pay a lot of attention to the establishment of cooperative relationships with other countries especially in the European neighborhood, keeping in mind the Neighborhood Policy and the Barcelona Process of the European Union and NATO cooperative security initiatives – the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The Partner-

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<sup>26</sup> There are some areas of frozen conflicts, still waiting for international solution (i.e. North Cyprus, Transnistria, Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia)



ship for Peace (PfP) process, launched by NATO in 1994, has been the most comprehensive project to overcome discontinuity between Eastern and Western side of Europe.

Security partnership between Russia and the European security communities (EU, NATO) always keeps in mind the complexity of the situation. Russia has not been keen to adapt the post-modern security concept and has officially stated that she has no intention to become a full member either of the European Union or NATO. Nevertheless, the involvement of Russia in cooperative security arrangements is the only way to resolve the identity dilemma between Europe and Russia. Otherwise, if security cooperation with Russia proves unworkable and Russia remains completely outside of cooperative security arrangements, a Cold War style rivalry may yet resume. At the same time, Russia is already a part of NATO and EU cooperative security arrangements.

The European Union concluded a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Russia in 1994, which came into force in 1997. In Russia-NATO relationship, the Cold War rivalry sometimes still appears. The start of cooperation in 1990s was promising though misperceptions occasionally took part. In 1997, Russia and NATO signed a Founding Act on their bilateral relations, which started a process forming permanent mechanisms of communication between Russia and NATO in order to promote mutual understandings and avoid misperceptions in various security issues (Wilhelmsen 2002, 21). A Permanent Joint Council was established in 1997, and was replaced by the NATO-Russia Council in 2002.

The post-modern international system offers suitable conditions for promoting the Kantian security culture, building-up liberal democratic security communities and establishing cooperative relations with other environments. The international peace-building is a promising process produced by the Kantian system. The conflict management in the Kantian environment is not only a punitive action against violations but includes post-conflict strategies and practices. The Kantian security environment relies on the success of security communities and their ability to produce cooperative security regimes. The European Union is a phenomenon that was able to end traditional conflicts between the European powers and established a stable cooperative framework stimulating not only peace but also complex interdependence among them.

### **6.2.1. The European Union moving towards an amalgamated security community**

The building-up of pluralistic security communities in Europe started in 1948, just few years after the restoration of a stable international system, when five countries – Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – signed the Brussels Treaty and created the Western Union. Nevertheless, the successful foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 became an actual starting point for closer integration of

Europe and the implementation of the idea of Immanuel Kant. In 1957, the institutionalization process in Europe continued with the creation of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. Since 1967, these three institutions formed the European Communities, later transmitted to the European Union.

In 1950, the Prime Minister of France Rene Pleven has proposed a plan for creating the European Defense Community (EDC).<sup>27</sup> The Pleven's initiative aimed to involve the Western European countries, particularly West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg in uniting their military capabilities and for creation of a pan-European military force as an alternative to Germany's accession NATO. These capabilities would help to stand against military threats from outside, primarily from the Soviet Bloc. The proposal for the establishment of the European Defense Community and later the European Political Community in 1952, failed after the French Parliament did not ratify the treaty.<sup>28</sup> The idea of the European Defense Community was a little bit more than just evolving another traditional military alliance. By the Pleven's plan, the Pan-European military force would comprise from national components and only the German contingent would subordinated to the EDC because of the fear that the German militarism will return, whereas other national contingents would report to their national governments. The EDC would have joint budget, arms, institutions, and procurement.

The Western European Union was created in 1954 by seven Western European states – the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. The organization of WEU corresponds to the principles of Karl Deutsch's pluralistic security community. Although the WEU is best known as a defense and security organization, the main purpose of the WEU was not only to cooperate in a defense sector but this institution also intended to promote social, economic, and cultural collaboration. In 1950s, the main objective WEU was the control of the rearmament of West Germany (Laursen 1996, 172). However, the institution has played only a minor role because of increasing importance of NATO, especially after West Germany joined the Alliance in 1955.

In 1984 the Foreign Minister of West Germany Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Italian colleague Emilio Colombo, initiated the plan, which advocated closer integration of the European Union, including enhanced cooperation in various areas including security and defense sectors and moving towards a federalist union. After the failure of the Genscher-Colombo initiative to enhance defense cooperation between members of the European Communities, the WEU began to play more active role. In 1987, the WEU declared that the member-states

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<sup>27</sup> France, the Western Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg

<sup>28</sup> It is amazing if we in parallel refer to the failure of the European Constitution in France in 2005. France though often considered being the main advocate of the European community, not once opposed initiatives that may bring Europe to closer federation again.

intend to assume their responsibilities in a greater role of defense (Laursen 1996, 173). In 1992, the WEU adopted the Petersberg tasks, making a decision to deploy military capabilities and resources to conduct peace operations under the authority of the WEU (i.e. humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and crisis management tasks).

After the end of Cold War bipolarity, the European Union started to embody the Kantian principles of democratic peace, “by adopting Immanuel Kant’s recipe for perpetual peace: representative democracy; international law and organizations i.e. enlargement of existing institutions by new members; and the development of free trade” (Lucarelli 2002, 4). The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) created an opportunity to move forward in security community-building in Europe. The gradual enhancement of complex interdependence describes in its best way how the introduction of the Kantian security culture helps to transcend security dilemmas in the European Union. By the Copenhagen criteria of 1993, the European Union elaborated a mechanism to define, which countries would be eligible to access the European Union. The Copenhagen criteria followed the Kantian tradition of the European political culture, establishing a set of liberal democratic norms to be adapted:

Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Presidency Conclusions, 1993).

The fact that NATO has adopted the principle of collective defense and the EU has not, has sometimes been interpreted mistakenly. Indeed, the Treaty of Washington fixes the principle of collective defense as a security guarantee from the organization to its members. A claim that NATO membership would be more trusted applies to the Hobbesian security environment, which maintained anarchical order, and does not matter in the Kantian security environment. In 1949, NATO was a military alliance in the Hobbesian security environment.

These countries, which have formed a security community, follow the principles of collective defense even if these principles are not fixed in its basic documents, because these countries have become so independent of each other that any attack against one member of the community seriously influences the security of any other member of community. The security community presumes a higher level integration and interdependence than in the framework of the military alliance. The attack against any member of the European Union seems to be unthinkable without any reaction from its co-members. The logic of Kantian security communities can take some principles as obvious. For

example, NATO and the European Union are not obliged to involve in the Yugoslavian crisis management but they did.

The criteria through which Deutsch identified the amalgamated security community have been generally fulfilled by the European Union, though the Union still maintains its structure based on nation-states. The European Union experiences a wide political, economic, and social stability that the world history has never seen. Similar political, economic, and religious values, the formation of a common sense of us, close lifestyles, intensive transactions and communication, stable links among the elites of different states, and high geographical mobility of the population (Deutsch 1957, 6) – all these criteria have been achieved to greater or lesser extent already in the current stage of integration.

In the post-modern political environment, the European Union and the Western European Union started to promote programmed cooperation with neighboring countries. The Western European Union, similarly to NATO, established a cooperative framework that allowed non-members to participate in the WEU security initiatives. Besides the member countries, WEU established a special status for associate members, observers and associate partners. Associate members were members of NATO but not of the EU. Observers included non-NATO countries that were members of EU and Denmark, practicing the opt-out from the joint defense policy. Finally, associate partners included countries that do belong neither to NATO or the EU, but would be identified as aspirant nations that would apply for the membership in the future.

In 1995, the European Union initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process), which established a comprehensive framework for arranging political, economic and social relationship with Mediterranean countries. The Barcelona Process was followed by similar initiatives: New Neighbors and Wider Europe. Since 2007, the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument merge together. However, the EU Neighborhood Policy does not include those partners, which applied to the membership (Croatia, FYROM, Turkey, Iceland), members of European Economic Area (Liechtenstein, Norway)<sup>29</sup> or have a membership perspective (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro).<sup>30</sup> What is important here is the fact that different EU partnership schemes are theoretically functioning as cooperative security arrangements.

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<sup>29</sup> Switzerland, Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican have a similar status through bilateral treaties.

<sup>30</sup> Kosovo is also listed by the EU's Commission as a potential candidate, though it is not recognized by all member-states.

### **6.2.2. St.Malo meeting and the birth of the CSDP**

The experience of the European Union, reaching to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)<sup>31</sup>, has shown that comprehensive cooperative framework is incomplete without a security dimension. Therefore, considering multi-level ties between the EU members, the development of the CSDP was a rational outcome of comprehensive and complex integration. The European Union has been forced to set going the long-time process moving towards adapting principles that are characteristic to the amalgamated security community. After launching a security dimension, the European Union overgrew from the political and economic community to the security community. At the same time, the military capability of the European Union is much weaker than that of NATO. Therefore, as some members have seen the strengthening of the security pillar as the impairment of NATO military capability, the military dimension has been not commonly welcomed in the EU. These misperceptions have been tightly connected with the particular position of a security guarantee the United States has achieved in the European security environment during the Cold War.

The United States remains to being the biggest military contributor to NATO. The military weakness of the European Union and its dependence from the contribution of the United States in security and defense affairs enables for NATO to play continually an important role in the European security environment (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005, 28). However, in 1990s, the United States actively promoted the idea of the European Security Identity (ESDI) in the NATO framework. The idea of the European Security and Defense Identity has been emerged during the Bosnia crisis and NATO military intervention to that area. Misbalance between military capabilities of the United States and NATO European allies and a wish from the US side to decrease their military presence in Europe caused the discussion about the establishing a kind of the European pillar within NATO.

The ESDI initiative and the increasing role of the European states in promoting NATO military capabilities have been actively discussed in 1994–1996, before the establishment of the EU political and military structures and integration of the Western European Union (WEU) to the European Union. At the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, the ministers made a conclusion that the WEU will be play more significant role in the European security architecture and would replace tasks omitted to the ESDI. Through the WEU, the EU members achieved the access to NATO military capabilities.

A British-French summit of Saint-Malo in 1998 has made a significant step towards the consolidation of the European security community. The St. Malo Declaration set up that the European Union ought to have the credible military capability able to conduct autonomous actions. Parties recognized the need of the EU to play its full role in international stage.

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<sup>31</sup> Previously known as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)

In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU (Declaration 2002).

This was a starting point of the common defense policy and, at the same time, the initial step to introduce the European Union as a liberal democratic security community. In June 1999, the European Council decided to incorporate the WEU within the European Union. In the same year, the EU member states signed the Helsinki Headline Goal, a first military capability target that would be capable to build up rapid reaction forces and implement the full range of Petersberg tasks.

The important step in mitigating possible negative effects of parallel existence of similar security communities in Europe has been made in 2002 when NATO and the EU reached the Berlin Plus Agreement. The European Union has achieved the right to use NATO assets in the EU-led peace operations. The whole package also included a security agreement, planning capabilities and consultation mechanisms among others. Since 2002, there may exist the Western subsystem of the post-modern international system, which includes two cooperating security communities. The European Security Strategy of 2003 defines strategic objectives and security implications for the European Union. Since then the intensions to strengthen the Kantian security community within the EU framework have taken a clearer vision.

### **6.2.3. NATO as a pluralistic security community**

Besides the European Union, the present-day NATO also complements Deutsch's idea of the Kantian security communities, though not directly corresponding to the full set of criteria. Historically, NATO has been often seen as a symbol of the Cold War. During the Cold War, there was a widespread consensus among IR scholars that security meant most of all a national security, which was interested in survival of state in the Hobbesian state of war (Hampson et al 2002, 14). In 1949, the parties of the Brussels Treaty mentioned here in the previous subchapters together with Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the United States formed the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO acquired a capacity for further developing a security community in the mid-1980s, after democratic governments came into power in Greece and Portugal and liberal democratic Spain joined NATO. Since 1978, with the only exception of Turkey from 1980 to 1983, liberal democratic regimes have prevailed in NATO countries (Doyle 1983).<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Michael Doyle (1986) points out the liberal regimes, which have been established in Greece (1975), Portugal (1976), Spain (1978). Spain joined NATO in 1982. Political parties are allowed in Turkey again in 1983.

The Berlin Wall, a symbol of the Cold War, which set a visible border-line between the East and the West, was dismantled after November 9, 1989. This action symbolizes not only the reunification of Germany but also the reunification of Europe. Central and Eastern European countries returned to the Western civilization from where they were removed for fifty years. The Kantian security environment in Europe immediately required new appropriate mechanisms to be established. NATO started to review its principles and withdraw from the Hobbesian vision of a polarized world in the early stage of the break period. Already at the July 1990 London Summit Meeting, NATO invited Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with the Alliance (Barany 2003, 10).

Since 1991, a gradual development towards the institutionalized security community began. The Washington Summit of 1999 made a turn towards the comprehensive security model: "The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension," (The Alliance's Strategic Concept 1999). New members have to accept liberal democratic values in order to access the Alliance. The Membership Action Plan, which prepares countries for future NATO membership, has established normative criteria for applicant countries that closely resemble Deutsch's characteristics for security community, though sovereignty of states will be maintained.

The present-day NATO is more than just a traditional Hobbesian military alliance with national interests forcing its members to cooperate in balancing or bandwagoning against potential rivals or enemies. NATO succeeded in uniting principles of collective security and collective defense and has taken more responsibility in acting like a collective security organization. As mentioned by David Yost, "collective security, particularly in its traditional sense, was conceived as an alternative to the formation of alliances for collective defense and distinctions between concepts of collective security and collective defense can be helpful and illuminating in understanding NATO problems and prospects and the general challenge of organizing a peaceful international order in Europe" (Yost 1998, 8).

In the post-modern society, NATO is a political-military organization that intends to use capabilities of member nations against various civil or military threats, not identifying a potential aggressor by name but by actions against the Kantian principles of the security environment. Besides military missions, a post-Cold War NATO has participated in several civil missions. For example, in 2006 NATO launched the earthquake relief operation in Pakistan. Post-conflict peace-building in Afghanistan faces the same importance as fighting with guerillas of Taliban. The meaning of security is becoming broader than a traditional military security, as Hampson (2002, 14) said: "post-modern security communities recognize security in terms of human security." Among numerous other variations, the concept of human security may be defined in terms of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security (Hampson et al 2002, 18). Human security has also become a more important

factor within the NATO context, which strengthens its new identity being not just a military alliance, but also a political-military institution. Three conceptions of human security – rights/rule-of-law, safety of people, and sustainable development – are marked by different understandings about what constitutes the main threat to human security (Hampson et al 2002, 32).

Four phases in transition from the military alliance to the pluralistic security community could be distinguished. The period 1991–1999 was a transition period from military alliance to the pluralistic security community, wherein three different phases – a nascent phase, an ascendant phase and a mature phase – can be distinguished in security community formation (Adler and Barnett 1998, 49–57). Within NATO framework, the nascent phase corresponds to the years 1991–1994, when first cooperative security initiatives were initiated. The years 1994–1999 describe the ascendant phase of NATO as a security community, when cooperative security arrangements and other similar initiatives (i.e. Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and bilateral cooperative bodies for cooperating with Russia and the Ukraine) were established. In 1999, NATO has adopted a new strategic concept that corresponds to the post-Cold War security environment and started to take a form of a mature security community.

Since 1991, NATO has instituted such cooperative frameworks for neighboring countries by way of the North Atlantic Partnership Council (from 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) as the first arrangement. These experiences have proved themselves as largely successful: there is almost no evidence of armed conflicts between security partners since the establishment of a formal cooperative relationship. The Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008 might well be an exception, but the source of this conflict might be found precisely in the absence of a post-modern approach to security. This conflict was not between the Kantian and Hobbesian security cultures but was born in the Hobbesian environment on the basis of a classical security dilemma. It may be explained by a move from the cooperative security dilemma to the classical security dilemma. Such transformation may occur if the establishment of the Kantian security culture fails.

NATO is hardly going to set up an amalgamated security community, at least in the predictable future. Nevertheless, a successful introduction of cooperative security regimes still gives a clue to define NATO as pluralistic security community. In this respect, NATO partnership has been even more important challenge for the enhancement of zones of peace and stability than the consolidation of mutual ties through institution-building within the community. It would be complicated to preserve the internal peace within the community if the surrounding neighborhood remains unstable and prone to conflicts. Buzan and Little (2000, 354) identify the creation of conflict-free zones as a central issue in peace-building, where the main dilemma to resolve is “how the zone of peace and zone of conflict relate to each other”. Cooperative security arrangements can be focused as a prospective model for security communities in order to interact with the neighborhood, to stabilize peace outside of the borders, and to overcome possible security dilemmas.



#### **6.2.4. The Washington Summit 1999**

The Washington Summit of 1999 was a breakpoint in NATO internal developments after the Cold War, which established the Kantian communitarian principles to the NATO guiding policies and the institution entered into the mature phase of liberal democratic security community. The Summit can be called historical breakpoint not only because three Eastern European countries – Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – joined the alliance just before the Summit. NATO revised Strategic Concept of 1999 characterizes the conceptual change in the institution's development process, when polarity-based guidelines from the Cold War have been replaced with the fundamental security tasks relying on security, consultation, deterrence and defense, crisis management and partnership (Comprehensive Political Guidance 2006).

Since 1991, NATO started to perform a partnership strategy, which introduced the principles of democratic peace<sup>33</sup> to its neighboring areas and promoted security-related cooperation and interdependence between allies and their security partners. Practicing the Kantian strategies, which a democratic peace certainly is, was an essential element in the breakthrough of cooperative security initiatives in the 1990s. At the Washington Summit, NATO launched the Membership Action Plan that established consolidated democracy as a norm for accession to NATO, which also means a serious movement towards self-identification as the Kantian security community. This program helped for aspirant countries, which aimed the future membership, to focus their preparation processes accordingly to norms NATO expects to fulfill from its prospective members.

The valid Alliance's Strategic Concept indicates the important role of NATO cooperative security arrangements in order to guarantee peace and stability in the current security environment. The document enhances the task to promote peace and stability in the wider area, not only keeping in mind the defense of NATO territory:

The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, the Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organizations; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect

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<sup>33</sup> Following Michael Doyle's consideration: "even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with non-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with one another" (Michael Doyle 1983, 61), this means introduction of democracy and peaceful behaviour to its neighbourhood.

its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area (The Alliance's Strategic Concept 1999).

There are several features that would characterize NATO as the pluralistic security community after the Washington summit. For example, NATO changed its military command structure from geographical to functional. According to the new structure, the Allied Command Operations is responsible for all NATO-led operations and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) coordinates the transformation of NATO military capabilities and the promotion of interoperability between national assets committed to NATO. The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) launched at the Washington Summit, was one of the first efforts made in reorganizing NATO military capabilities and increasing the interoperability between existing military and non-military capabilities.

These improvements of military capabilities should facilitate NATO participation in international peace operations and make NATO assets to be more suitable mechanisms for operating in the Kantian security environment. The targets NATO intended to reach included humanitarian assistance, force protection, high-intensity combat, effective and efficient deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, survivability in a wide range of environments including chemical, biological, terrorist or electronic attacks, and the ability to maintain effective command and control and communication links. NATO decided to be more effectively engaged in crisis management efforts, including crisis prevention and crisis response that indicates the increasing role of collective security tools.

Collective defense remains to being an important tool in hands of NATO. In the Kantian security environment, this mechanism would be used against any possible threat that may occur against any member of the community. At the same time, NATO has to enhance its contribution in facing against asymmetric threats like terrorism or spread of weapons of mass destruction. The globalization process highlighted more universal treats to the international society than national interests of Hobbesian powers, which started to demonstrate their strength.

### **6.3. The Hobbesian challenge in 2000s**

As indicated before, the years of 1998–99 were probably the point of culmination for the stable liberal society of the post-modern international system, while the building of the Kantian international society reached its maximal strength. Collective security measures have been successfully used in stabilizing the situation the former Yugoslavia. The European Union succeeded in building up of complex interdependence within its framework and started to promote security and defense dimension through the ESDP/CSDP. NATO, while adopting a new strategic concept, started to enlarge to the Central and East

European countries and to promote liberal democracy through the Membership Action Plan.

Just few years later, after the attack to the United States by the Islamic terrorists in 2001, and the Iraqi invasion in 2003, the Kantian society has experienced difficulties vis-à-vis the returning Hobbesian political culture, which caused the Hobbesian challenge to the prevailing Kantian international system. This challenge did not change the system, the polarized world did not return, but remarkably influenced the stability of the Kantian system. The attack on the United States, organized by then relatively little-known terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, has evidently promoted this rivaling direction towards clash of civilizations, once described by Samuel Huntington in his another important work "The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking World Order" (Huntington 1997). The world became unstable and it has a certain influence to the stability of the international system.

The Iraqi operation of 2003, initiated by some Western powers, caused divergence in opinions within the community – does the world return to the Hobbesian world, characterized by permanent clashes and polarities or continues the gradual change towards the Kantian world, characterized by cooperative efforts to build-up a non-polarized international society. Samuel Huntington (1991) made an important challenge about waves of democratization. Third wave of democratization, by Huntington, started in 1974, when after the end of authoritarian leadership in Portugal, about thirty countries gradually turned towards democracy. Huntington also notices that waves of democratization tend to be replaced with reverse waves after some time. The Hobbesian challenge to the Kantian international system at the threshold of the 21<sup>st</sup> century would testify Huntington's theory of reserve waves, transferred to international system.

In 1990s, the movement towards the Kantian society was clearly visible in the Euro-Atlantic security environment, which formed a core of the valid international system. It is notable that the principle of collective defense and NATO Article Five has been used for the first time<sup>34</sup> not in its traditional manner of understanding, against a clearly identified enemy, but as a means of collective security and at first glance, the events of September 11 stimulated cooperation and unity between countries sharing liberal democratic values. The Global War on Terrorism was not a classical war between rival states or coalition, but a large-scale military response to the asymmetric attack that would destabilize the whole international system. It also stimulated the need for cooperative security, as the threat of terrorism is one of the greatest present-day problems, uniting members of NATO and their partners. Moreover, the strengthening of liberal democratic values and cooperative security has been held in even higher esteem, a fact indicated by the NATO and EU enlargements of 2004.

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<sup>34</sup> After the terrorist attack against the United States in 2001

At the same time, first signs of returning to the Hobbesian world started to show up and various misperceptions caused by the international terrorism seriously hit the further progress of the Kantian society. Although the unity of international liberal society has reached to the top in 2001, and the defensive actions against international terrorism, including military operations in Afghanistan, have been widely approved by the international society, these actions also weakened the commitment to the Kantian society and the emerging culture of fear made a direction towards cultural change especially in the United States. In such situation, the Hobbesian enmity and the Lockean rivalry can easily return.

The Hobbesian prevalence in the international system for a long time has made difficult for many theorists to accept the Kantian society, to which they have used to refer as a utopian.

For some, mostly North American writers, disagreements between Western European states over the appropriate institutional configuration for Europe reflects the states' concerns about their relative power. Other saw in the European project a desire to continue the age-old practice of balancing power whilst others caricatured post-Cold War Europe as being led by a 'benign unipolar' hegemonic power – the United States (Bellamy 2004, 65).

Polarized constructions of the international systems remained popular among the realist scholars as well as among the neo-conservatives, a neo-Marxist group with a remarkable influence to the politics of Bush administration. The foreign policy of the United States became to be more and more influenced by the emerging trend of neo-conservative approach to the world politics, which emphasizes a perpetual fight for hegemonic world. Through the political influence of the United States, the neo-conservatives had tools for changing the cultural paradigms of the valid international system.

The Iraqi operation of 2003 has been probably the most serious challenge to the Kantian security environment. The Kantian processes characterizing the Western community like institutionalization and interdependence continued to progress but the whole system was gradually moving towards instability due to disagreements between the United States and some of her allies. The so-called Bush Doctrine brought up the following principles: the idea of pre-emptive or preventive military action; the promotion of democracy and regime change, and a diplomacy tending towards unilateralism, a willingness to act without the sanction of international bodies such as the United Nations Security Council or the unanimous approval of its allies, which, however, by American neo-conservative scholar and writer Robert Kagan rather manifests traditional cornerstones of the US policy than promotes a new concept in American foreign policy (Kagan 2007, 2).<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> The Bush Doctrine describes the foreign policy of the US administration implemented after the elaboration of National Security Strategy of the United States in 2002. By this strategy, the United States has a right to take actions against states that would be identified as supporters of the international terrorism. The Bush Doctrine has been on of cornerstones of the neo-conservative approach.

Robert Jervis (2004, 121) notes that “under the Bush doctrine the United States is not a status quo power. Its motives may not be selfish, but the combination of power, fear, and perceived opportunity leads it to seek to reshape world politics and the societies of many of its members”. The hegemonic foreign policy of the United States may lead to the situation, where they acquire an essential military predominance, but simultaneously this may weaken trust of security institutions they belong, first of all NATO. Thus, in the long run, it may bring about the failure of liberal democratic security communities and the emergence of hegemonic security communities, leading up to the restoration of polarized rivalry and the Hobbesian security environment.

Although the post-modern society has maintained its Kantian organization, the Hobbesian challenge in 2000s seriously harmed liberal democratic security communities like the European Union and NATO. The revival of the Hobbesian security culture with its conflict-oriented paradigms was able to promote Hobbesian security environments within the Kantian international system and produce a set of classical security dilemmas. The neo-conservatives wished to create the illusion that the humankind lives in the unipolar world under the US hegemony and the United States as the greatest military power has an ability to guide the developments in world politics. They refer to the fact that there are no counter-balancing powers and the United States is the only superpower in the current international system (Kagan 2007). This argument primarily relies on military arguments, emphasizes the military power of the United States and underestimates economical factors.

Nevertheless, particularly the Iraqi case and the recent developments in Afghanistan do not support this illusive view of unipolarity. The world economic crises at the end of 2000s, was by many factors the reaction of the system to its destabilization. The military power of the United States was not supported by their economic resources, which led to a crisis, if their military involvement in the international conflict management has progressed. The Obama administration following the Bush’s one in 2009 has revoked the Hobbesian paradigms promoted by neo-conservatism and supported the return to the Kantian principles in international relations. Nevertheless, at the moment is still too early for examining, will the Kantian system continue or there would appear a more serious Hobbesian challenge in the near future. The change of cultural paradigms is not a quick process, if the system should be stabilized and the whole process is influenced by a deep economic crisis.

The Hobbesian challenge during the last decade evoked the cultural conflict between the Hobbesian and the Kantian security cultures, described by viable cooperative security dilemmas. The integration dilemma between trans-Atlantic and euro-centric poles of the European Union and NATO has made both security communities to greater extent unstable and vulnerable against attacks. The identity dilemma between the neo-conservative approach and the liberal approach has also got strength. Besides that, the Hobbesian security environments within the Kantian system continually produced classical security dilemmas able to provoke international conflicts.

### **6.3.1. The role of the neo-conservative challenge in the United States in destabilizing the Kantian international system**

It is arguable that the Hobbesian challenge to the Kantian system was caused by cultural motives, which was a result of the ideological change in the United States. In analyzing sources of the destabilization of the Kantian post-modern system, there can be found many irrational and emotional motives, caused by the change of cultural paradigms in the US foreign policy at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, after the attack in September 11, 2001, which moved security again to the top of agenda (Lebow 2008, 440). Previously, the United States was a leading power in forming the Kantian world society, and therefore the ideological and cultural change in the United States influenced and destabilized the whole system.

The neo-conservatism is a neo-Trotskyite ideological movement that idealizes perpetual fight for the world (though democratic) revolution and objects the US hegemony in the world. It stems from the political movement, which emerged in 1930s among some American leftist intellectuals. A new ideology started to appear in 1960s, and coalesced as an influence group in 1970s. Later they turned ideologically from left to right but retained their Marxist structure. The Neo-conservatism as ideology strengthened after the presidential elections in the United States of 2000 and greatly influenced the ideological stanchions of George W. Bush's administration.

Neo-conservatives borrowed many ideas from the Trotskyite revision of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Francis Fukuyama (2006, 4), once connected with the neo-conservatives, manifests that "in the formulation of the scholar Ken Jowitt<sup>36</sup>, the neo-conservative position ... was, by contrast, Leninist; they believed that history can be pushed along with the right application of power and will. Leninism was a tragedy in its Bolshevik version, and it has returned as farce when practiced by the United States". According to Irving Kristol, neo-conservative postulates in foreign policy issues are: patriotism as a necessity; world government as a terrible idea; statesmen should have the ability to accurately distinguish friend from foe; protection of national interests both at home and abroad; and the necessity of a strong military (Kristol 2003).

If defined through political culture they performed, the neo-conservatism is a Hobbesian movement as they do not believe that different civilizations can make peace and prefer to use power in order to establish peaceful settlements. Their ideas are declared in 1997 in the declaration called "The Project for the New American Century". The general idea of the project was establishing a unipolar world under the United States' domination (Project for the New American Century 1997). By the common Hobbesian origin, they seem to be close to the realism.

The neo-conservative ideology favors the return to the US-led hegemonic security community and describes liberalism as a generally utopian ideology,

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<sup>36</sup> Ken Jowitt is an American political scientist known from his anti-Wilsonian stance.

which is similar to the realist challenge in 1930s, when British historian E. H. Carr wrote his famous “The Twenty Years’ Crisis” (Kagan 2007). As Carr (1964) explained, “the whole cardboard structure of utopian thought” has to bring down as fixed and absolute standards cannot be real in the world of competing national interests. Similarly to realists, the neo-conservative approach to international relations evokes hegemonic world in its traditional Hobbesian means without recognizing possibility of universal peace and setting national interests above the universal peace. Apparently, the realist school has remained to the opposition with neo-conservative trends at least in most cases. The US hegemony promoted by neo-conservatives contrasts with the claims of realists for the balance of powers.

The raise of patriotism, strong critics towards the United Nations (standing against world government), identifying enemies and promoting polarity (distinguishing friend from foe), placement of the US interests over global interests (protecting national interest),<sup>37</sup> preferring the use of military power in conflict regulation (strong military) – this all characterizes changes in the US foreign policy by the Bush Doctrine initiated by neo-conservative strategists. In addition to the non-existent consensus in Iraqi operation, the negative attitude expressed by the United States towards international institutions or agreements (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol or International Criminal Court) has been a clear sign that institutionalization is not faring very well currently.

Gradually, neo-conservative ideas about the necessity of world hegemony started to influence some other societies, especially those, which were affected by the Hobbesian security environments or the liberal democracy was still not consolidated in their societies. The neo-conservative challenge strengthened the positions of the Hobbesian security culture not only in the United States, but also in the wider area without the long-time experience of liberal democracy and where nationalist attitudes were strong enough. Powers like China or Russia started to use polarities between the West and the rest on behalf of their national interests for increasing their influence in world affairs. Israel attacked South Lebanon in 2006, which created instability in the Middle-East region. The conflict between Russia and Georgia over the territory of South-Ossetia in 2008 refers to be a result of classical security dilemma, taking place in the Hobbesian security environment.

For example, the politics of Vladimir Putin in Russia has many similarities with the neo-conservative ideology because their international policy also proceeds from national interests in the first place. The opposing role of Russia to NATO is still somehow controversial. On the one hand, Russia and NATO have established cooperative relationship. The majority in NATO does not consider Russia as their enemy. On the other hand, some Central and East European countries, especially Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland have conti-

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<sup>37</sup> i.e. in environmental issues like the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – the United States signed but refused to ratify it because it would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.

nually prioritized the Russian threat as a considerable risk for their sovereignty that makes their bilateral relationship with Russia very close to the Cold War opposition between the East and the West. This has caused a situation where “the West’s relations with Russia are increasingly marked by a mix of cooperation and competition” (Asmus, Holbrooke 2006, 9).

The cultural conflict kept standing various security dilemmas, as classical dilemmas as well as cooperative dilemmas. The Iraqi operation indicates how the identity dilemma may be transferred into the Hobbesian conflict. The Gulf War of 1990 was the Kantian response to the Hobbesian behavior of Saddam Hussein against Kuwait. The Iraqi operation of 2003 was the Hobbesian response to the identity dilemma between the Kantian international system and Iraq as the Hobbesian actor. By the neo-conservative approach, the role of enmity was given to different actors often representing other civilization than Western. On January 29, 2002, the US President George W. Bush firstly used an expression – the axis of evil for six countries – Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Cuba, Libya, Syria – identified as enemies of the international society (Bush 2002).

Later, after the ousting of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, Libya started to change its policy towards the Western world: normalizing relations with the United States and the European Union, abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programs and paying compensations to the families of Pan Am flight 103 as well as UTA flight 772. At the same time, the conflict between the United States and Venezuela, followed by controversial steps of Hugo Chavez to balance the US power, is becoming more topical at least in the American continent. Also, Sudan has been often added to the club of axis of evil due to her involvement in the Darfur crisis and a lack of willingness to work with the international society for resolving the conflict.

After the presidential elections of 2008 in the United States, the new Obama administration came to power and this would be the end of the neo-conservative influence to the US foreign policy. Ideological movements emphasizing nationalism and using a culture of fear as a political instrument are able to destabilize international systems if they are able to enter to the power projection. Polarized constructions proposed by neo-conservatism have made the world more unstable. In this respect, Lebow (2008, 439–443) compared the influence of George Bush’s Neo-conservatism to the international system with the influence of Adolf Hitler’s National Socialism in destabilizing the valid world system.<sup>38</sup> Hitler’s ideological movement destabilized the Kantian Versailles system and the neo-conservatism destabilized the post-modern system. The identity dilemmas of the Kantian environment started to change back to classical security dilemmas of the Hobbesian environment.

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<sup>38</sup> There are of course differences in two ideologies themselves, and practices those ideologies used and the similarity of two ideological movements first of all concerns their methodological treatment of the world politics, which is deeply Hobbesian in both cases.



## 6.4. Summary

The chapter gives an overview about the development of international system during the last five and half centuries, from the modern society to the post-modern society. A historical overview from the modern society to the post-modern one explains changes in international systems and their connection with prevailing political cultures (regarding security issues – security cultures) over the time. The political cultures overriding the modern society have been predominantly the Hobbesian cultures. The post-modern society has been predominantly the Kantian system. The international system may follow one political/security culture, but some actors and environments may proceed in their behavior from the principles of another culture. If such interactions take place between the Kantian system and the Hobbesian actors/environments, a cooperative security dilemma appears.

International systems have been primarily the Western international systems, dominated by the Western political cultures. The West (or the Western civilization) refers to the European cultural environment. Some semi-European powers (the United States, the Soviet Union) have also greatly influenced the development of international system. The international systems are positioned in agent-structure relationship accordingly to the approach, where the West is the core of the system and international actors take their positions within the system through interactions with the Western core.

There are factors that have an impact to the international systems – stability and polarity. The Hobbesian/Lockean systems emphasize polarization between distinct powers, while the Kantian systems are streaming towards the unified world society. The Lockean systems refer to the stable Hobbesian systems where majority of actors are interested in maintaining their status quo more than in streaming towards higher status within the system. The Hobbesian systems are polarized system, where various powers compete with each other. The instrument, both the Hobbesian and the Lockean systems use, tend to be similar, therefore the systems themselves should be defined as the Hobbesian/Lockean, and where the maintaining of status quo and the stability of system is connected with the balance of powers.

Referring to the Kantian security environment, security communities would be appropriate institutions for the post-modern security architecture. In the post-modern European security environment, there are two emerging Western security communities sharing liberal democratic values – NATO and the European Union. However, due to the Hobbesian challenges, the Kantian security environment has met difficulties in its organization. Every security community has to be aware of developing stability not only within the community but also having an effective neighborhood policy towards the Hobbesian environments. The establishment of cooperative security arrangements may compensate the need for shared values in order to join communities.

The political and ideological change in the United States accompanied with the terrorist attack in 2001 initiating the global war against terrorism has

strengthened cultural misperceptions among allies and between allies and partners and pursued cooperative security dilemmas. As the result of political and cultural changes and the increasing trend of polarization, the whole international system became unstable. The next chapter analyzes security dilemmas in the Kantian security environment, including those, which occur between the Kantian system and the Hobbesian actors. Contrasting cultural environments may provoke cooperative security dilemmas in the Kantian system.

## 7. SECURITY DILEMMAS IN THE KANTIAN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Different kinds of security dilemmas – classical security dilemmas between the Hobbesian actors, integration dilemmas between the Kantian actors and identity dilemmas between the Kantian and Hobbesian actors, still exist within the Kantian post-modern security system. The Kantian international system still includes the Hobbesian security environments. Interactions within and between security environments may cause misperceptions depending on cultural paradigms appearing in one or another environment. There are the Hobbesian actors that appear in a security dilemma situation with the Kantian system (most notably Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, to some extent Russia, China etc).

**Table 12:** International interventions within the Kantian post-modern system

	<i>Forces involved</i>	<i>UN mandate</i>	<i>Cultural type</i>
Kuwait	Coalition vs Iraq	UNSC resolution no. 678 (29.11.1990) 12–2 (Cuba, Yemen) -1 (China) <sup>39</sup>	Kantian
Somalia	UN vs Somalia	UNSC resolution no. 794 (03.12.1992) 15–0–0.	Kantian
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NATO vs Yugoslavia	UNSC resolution no. 1031 (15.12.1995) 15–0–0. IFOR authorized.	Kantian
Kosovo	NATO vs Yugoslavia	UNSC resolution no. 1244 (10.06.1999) 14–0–1 (China). KFOR authorized.	Kantian
East-Timor	UN vs Indonesia	UNSC resolution no. 1264 (15.09.1999) 15–0–0.	Kantian
Afghanistan	Coalition vs Afghanistan/ Taliban; NATO vs Taliban	UNSC resolution no. 1386 (20.12.2001) 15–0–0. ISAF authorized.	Kantian
Iraq	Coalition vs Iraq	UNSC resolution no. 1483 (22.05.2003) 14–0–1 (Syria). US and UK recognized as occupying powers.	Hobbesian
Sudan	AU vs Sudan	UNSC resolution no. 1564 (18.09.2004) 11–0–4 (Algeria, China, Pakistan, Russia). AMIS authorized.	Kantian
Lebanon	UN vs Israel	UNSC resolution no. 1701 (11.08.2006) 15–0–0. Expanded mandate to UNIFIL.	Kantian
Somalia	AU vs Somalia	UNSC resolution (21.02.2007)	Kantian
South Ossetia	Russia vs Georgia		Hobbesian

<sup>39</sup> Resolutions of UN Security Council supporting invention with number of nations, which favored the resolution, were against it or were absent in voting.

The table 12 includes only major conflicts taking place during the post-modern system, which influenced the development of the system. The table demonstrates that the role of systemic conflicts between the Kantian system and the Hobbesian actors has been increased and the role of interstate conflicts has been decreased. Some interstate conflicts have been transferred from the interstate level to the system level, if the Kantian institutions of the valid system have been intervened into the conflict management. The difference between the Kantian conflicts and the Hobbesian conflicts depends on involvement of the United Nations and other Kantian mechanisms in the conflict resolution. For example, the international mechanisms like IFOR (later SFOR; EUFOR), KFOR, and ISAF have been authorized by the UN Security Council. The Iraqi operation of 2003 was recognized by the UNSC.

The emergence of the Hobbesian environments and the ability of the Kantian system to manage these Hobbesian challenges would describe the position of cooperative security dilemma in the post-modern society. The violent cases in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan requiring the reactive response from the international system against actors destabilizing the system manifest cultural disagreements between the Kantian international system and the Hobbesian actors. In most cases, the system has been able to enforce actions against the violations of international order. In some cases, for example concerning the 2008 South Ossetia war, the international society still faces difficulties because of the involvement of one of veto-powers of the UNSC. Also China has sometimes remained reluctant to the efforts of international society in conflict management.

Failed states (e.g. Somalia) may also constitute a security dilemma for the international society. Ethnic clashes are powerful arms in destabilizing peaceful environments and producing international crises. According to the table 12, nine conflicts represented in the table have predominantly ethnic origin and only three of them have been caused by the aggression of one state against another state (the Gulf War, East Timor, Iraq in 2003). Moreover, the Iraqi case has also the ethnic dimension as there has been ethnic dilemma between the Shia Arabs, the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds, which strengthened tensions among cultural entities after the invasion. The national intensions of ethnic groups and violent reactions against them by the nation-states would destabilize not only certain states having problems with ethnic minorities but larger security environments.

Security dilemmas between the Kantian system and the Hobbesian actors may appear in multiple formations. One of the most dangerous security dilemmas with serious consequences if not resolved can be the nuclear dilemma. The nuclear dilemma concerning North Korea has been one of the most intriguing international problems raising tensions not only in East Asia but also globally. The nuclear dilemma with Iran is another problem concerning the international society. Iran is developing its nuclear capabilities, which raises a dilemma for other countries especially in the conflict-prone Middle-East, can Iran achieve a nuclear weapon and use it in destabilizing the whole system. There is also the Iraqi case, analyzed in the next subchapter, which used a myth of its nuclear

capability in deterring the international society from interference to her domestic matters.

The post-modern security dilemmas manifest ethnic and cultural dissonances, which refers to the nationalist ideology, which is able to destabilize the system and reinforce the Hobbesian powers. Another important feature of the post-modern security dilemma is a culture of fear, which may appear with the nuclear dilemma. If some nations fear the international involvement or intervention to their domestic affairs, they may start reproduce paradigms of their nuclear capabilities or intentions to move that direction. The international society, however, can take their intentions as threats to peace and stability, valued by the Kantian systems. The Iraqi operation of 2003 presents a case when the identity dilemma between Iraq and the international society (represented by the UN and its Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) ended with the Hobbesian conflict, arising from the classical security dilemma.

### **7.1. The Iraqi operation – a litmus test for the Hobbesian return to the international system**

The major hit to the development of the Kantian international system was given in 2003, when the US-led coalition of willing invaded Iraq. The latter event was widely criticized by some allies and partners in NATO and EU, indicating the presence of divergences in the Western community in several international issues. After 2003, the reinforcement of national interests began dominate over global peace and “the “schism” over Iraq threatened the West with strategic decoupling of the Europe and the United States” (Krastev 2006, 2). The operation in Iraq was a breaking point of the neo-conservative offensive in changing the Kantian international system to the Hobbesian one that led to the polarization of Western world and setback to the establishment of trans-Atlantic security community of the Kantian means. The influence of the Iraqi invasion to the international order was remarkable. Many Hobbesian powers (i.e. Russia, China) gathered the courage to build up polarities and rivalries within the international system.<sup>40</sup>

In the post-Cold War Europe, the gap strengthened between nations, recognizing the United States as a world hegemonic power, and nations, recognizing the United States as a security partner (see also Mouritzen 2006, 138–9). The neo-conservative ideology uses trans-Atlanticism in destabilizing the system and divided Western security communities between trans-Atlanticists (notably the United Kingdom, Poland and Denmark) supporting the hegemonic approach to global security and euro-centrists (France, Germany, Belgium, and later Spain) that preferred to follow previous course of gradual

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<sup>40</sup> For example, the nuclear issue in Iran, developments around Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia etc.

development towards the Kantian society through the reinforcement of international regimes based on democratic peace. Besides the integration dilemma between trans-Atlantic nations and euro-centric nations, there have been signs about the evolving identity dilemma between the Hobbesian and Kantian cultures within the Euro-Atlantic security communities.

The table below (the table 13) demonstrates the rift between trans-Atlantic and euro-centric trends in the Western security communities. Majority of the European Union did not participate in the Iraqi operation or withdraw their forces for the year 2006. The United States has had a constant support only from the United Kingdom, Denmark and the majority of new Eastern European members (with the exception of Slovenia, never participated, and Hungary, withdrawn in 2005). There was also a remarkable support to the operation from the former Soviet republics (except Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) and the Pacific countries. Many Asian and Latin-American partners participated in the operation, but the support from the Islamic countries was practically non-existent with minor exceptions. The official statement of the White House named 49 countries as members of coalition of willing in Iraq, though 16 of them never participated in the operation with troops (Operation of Iraqi Freedom 2003). Besides that, some participating nations have not been named in the coalition list (Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Moldova, New Zealand, Norway, and Thailand).

The Iraqi operation revitalized the Hobbesian coalition, where a military coalition has been set up in order to complete the task that corresponds to the interest of coalition members. Coalition of willing introduces a new type of security arrangements that is close to the Hobbesian military alliances. It tends to be not a permanent security arrangement, but is assembled for certain operations. This formula has been previously used in Afghanistan in its initial phase. However, regarding Afghanistan, the majority of international society supported the invasion. The table 13 indicates the gap between trans-Atlantic and euro-centric sides of the Western community, which deepened the integration dilemma in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and added also an identity dimension to the Euro-Atlantic security dilemma. The Iraqi operation separated the trans-Atlantic states of NATO from the euro-centric ones, and caused a split within the community. The involvement of countries in the Iraqi operation most adequately represents the border-lines between trans-Atlanticists and euro-centrists in NATO.

The catalyst of the Iraqi operation was a security dilemma concerning the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), allegedly developed by the regime of Saddam Hussein. Initially, the WMD dilemma was an identity dilemma between Iraq and the international society. The Iraqi regime used accusations against it in developing the WMD capability in deterring other actors (e.g. international society and its neighboring countries) against the possible punishment. By using the Hobbesian deterrence, the Iraqi regime succeeded in provoking a classical security dilemma. The non-preparedness of Iraq for cooperating with the United Nations and its ambivalent behavior also favored the subsequent invasion. The

Hobbesian reaction from the United States and her allies to such behavior produced the destabilization of the whole international system. The mutually promoted culture of fear facilitated to evoke the further conflict.

**Table 13:** Participation in coalition of willing in Iraq

<b>Iraqi invasion in 2003:</b>
NATO members in 1991: the United States, the United Kingdom (2003–2009), Denmark (2003–2008)
NATO members from 1999: Poland (2003–2008)
Others: Australia (2003–2009)
<b>Iraqi operation, troops withdrawn before 2008:</b>
NATO members in 1991: Spain (2003–2004), Portugal (2003–2005), Netherlands (2003–2005), Italy (2003–2006), Norway (2003–2006), Iceland (2003) <sup>41</sup>
NATO members from 1999: Hungary (2003–2005)
NATO members from 2004: Lithuania (2003–2007), Slovakia (2003–2007)
Others: New Zealand (2003–2004), Honduras (2003–2004), Nicaragua (2003–2004), Dominican Republic (2003–2004), Philippines (2003–2004), Thailand (2003–2004)
<b>Iraqi operation, troops withdrawn after 2007:</b>
NATO members in 1991: United States, United Kingdom (2003–2009), Denmark (2003–2008),
NATO members from 1999 – Poland (2003–2008), Czech Republic (2003–2008)
NATO members from 2004 – Romania (2003–2009), Bulgaria (2003–2008), Latvia (2003–2008), Estonia (2005–2009)
Aspirant nations – Albania <sup>42</sup> (2003–2008), FYR Macedonia (2003–2008)
PfP nations <sup>43</sup> – Georgia (2003–2008), Azerbaijan (2003–2008), Kazakhstan (2003–2008), Moldova (2003–2008), Ukraine (2003–2008), Armenia (2005–2008), Bosnia-Herzegovina <sup>44</sup> (2005–2008).
Others: Australia (2003–2009), El Salvador (2003–2009), Republic of Korea (2003–2008), Mongolia (2003–2008), Japan (2004–2008), Singapore (2003–2008), Tonga (2004–2008).
<b>Named by the White House as members of coalition, never participated:</b>
Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Costa Rica, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Panama, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan
<b>NATO and EU members, never participated in the coalition</b>
NATO members: France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia, <sup>45</sup> Croatia <sup>46</sup>
Non-NATO members: Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Malta, Cyprus <sup>47</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Iceland (NATO member in 1991) also provided 2 troops from May 2003, the date of withdrawal is unknown

<sup>42</sup> Member of NATO from 2009

<sup>43</sup> Excluding the aspirant nations (the MAP nations)

<sup>44</sup> Joined PfP in 2006

<sup>45</sup> Member of the EU and NATO from 2004

<sup>46</sup> Member of NATO from 2009

<sup>47</sup> Malta and Cyprus are the EU members from 2004

The closure of Operation Iraqi Freedom was announced on 31 August, 2010. The decision of Obama administration to leave Iraq for the year 2010 corresponds to another cultural shift that follows the Kantian principles of the international system. For the year 2009, the majority of allies in the coalition of willing have left it. The status of remaining forces, which will leave in 2011, has changed and they will stay by a bilateral agreement and their involvement to domestic matters will be limited. Also a special NATO Training Mission, which has been established by the request of the Iraqi Government and under the UNSC resolution 1546 in 2005, continues to educate the Iraqi security forces and provides assistance to the state-building in Iraq. The cooperative measures used by NATO in state-building of Iraq, correspond to its partnership strategy and respective practices through various programs, which has proved itself as a coherent method in promoting peace and stability.

## **7.2. The Kantian response to a security dilemma – the example of NATO partnership strategy**

The partnership strategy performed by the Western liberal democratic security communities demonstrates abilities to establish bridges between the Hobbesian and the Kantian cultural environments, to transcend cooperative security dilemmas and to establish zones of peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. In the post-modern system, the partnership strategy decreased the number of potential security dilemmas in the Euro-Atlantic security environment. This subchapter discusses NATO partnership strategy, aiming to increase the transparency, mutual confidence and capacity of joint actions with the participation of NATO and its partners.

The promotion of cooperative security tools and various partnership initiatives constitutes an important part of NATO new strategic movement, started in 1991 and intensified in 1999. In the Kantian security environment, NATO has confronted the cooperative security dilemma beyond the option for enlargement, while a cooperative security can be identified as a reliable option for transcending cooperative security dilemmas. The instruments exploited by NATO in promoting its cooperative security arrangements for its neighborhood – democratization of society, interoperability of armed forces with NATO and joint participation in NATO-led operations as the most important ones – correspond to the requirements of the Kantian society.

The development of cooperative security initiatives “served NATO primarily as a political tool for maintaining order” (Kamp 2006, 3), while offering a tailored solution between quick enlargement and maintaining stability. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept indicates the need to promote cooperation and dialogue with other states and international organizations in order “to enhance peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area”(The Strategic Concept 1999). Through its cooperative security arrangements NATO intended to promote security- and defense-related cooperation with partners in three important areas:



- Establishing permanent contacts with countries in the neighborhood;
- Initiating democratic reforms in security and defense sectors of partner countries;
- Participating in international crisis resolution.

NATO cooperative security arrangements should be distinguished from the community-building as it is based more on stimulating cooperation between different security environments than emphasizes similar identities and values. Countries aiming to join NATO must demonstrate their commitment to the common identity requirements. NATO partnership enhances peace, stability, and cooperation in the wider area.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), founded in 1991, was the first step towards partnership between NATO allies and countries that had remained outside of Western civilization during the Cold War. The primary tool of NACC was to offer the dialogue between NATO and its former rivals from Central- and Eastern Europe. At the beginning of 1994, a new qualitative step was made with the launching of Partnership for Peace Invitation and Framework documents. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program is NATO best-known and most developed cooperative security initiative that “crosses the boundary between members and non-members” (Bellamy 2004, 82). The PfP, being not simply a waiting room for those countries wishing to join NATO, promotes partners’ own cooperative security options and provides a communicative framework, in which the common interpretation for normative criteria is constructed (Michalka 2002, 51; Lucarelli 2002, 35).

Alex Bellamy (2004, 82) counts the benefits of PfP: it would facilitate NATO enlargement; allow NATO neighbors to establish their own relationship with the Alliance within an institutional framework that permitted different degrees of integration and cooperation; export alliance’s common values through programs encouraging democratic and transparent defense management; promote cooperation between Central and East European states by encouraging such states to lead PfP projects and exercises; and give non-NATO members access to NATO military and political bodies, offering a degree of consultation. Through the PfP framework, NATO has stimulated initiatives that are not only intended to raise military capabilities of partner countries but also to orientate their defense leadership towards democratization.

In 1995, NATO launched its first cooperative security arrangement for the Mediterranean area and the Middle East – the Mediterranean Dialogue. Mediterranean Dialogue, which was initiated simultaneously with the Partnership for Peace Process. Since the issue of prospective membership was excluded in the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), the development of the program has taken place more slowly. As a cooperative security arrangement, the MD involves Israel and the moderate Arabian regimes in the area – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania. Over the last couple of years, the trend has been to develop cooperation between the PfP and the MD partners through common participation in partnership activities. The Mediterranean Dialogue still remains similar arrangement as NACC – mostly dialogue with some

practical cooperation. Recently, countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue started to participate in the activities of PfP. Their involvement in NATO-led operations is still almost non-existent with minor exceptions like Morocco's participation in the Balkans' operations (Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo). However, discussion about the involvement of Mediterranean countries into the operation "Active Endeavour" may also be an option for their involvement in the future.<sup>48</sup>

In 1997, NATO established distinctive partnership with two most powerful partners and started enhanced bilateral cooperation 16+1 with Russia and the Ukraine. In 1997, simultaneously with the launching of Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) were also instituted. Through the creation of separate bilateral institutions, NATO emphasizes cooperative partnership with these countries. In 1999, a special program for the countries of Western Balkans has been initiated – SEEI (South East Europe Initiative). For now, a significant progress in democratization of Western Balkan countries has been made, and most of them are close to become NATO members soon.

In 2004, The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was launched at the NATO Summit in Istanbul. This initiative was developed because of the need to establish stability in the wider Middle-East area, full of existing and potential conflicts. First three countries joining the ICI were Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, contributors to the US-led Iraq operation. From June 2005, the United Arab Emirates also participate in the Initiative. Consultations have been held also with Saudi Arabia and Oman. Besides that, NATO has developed a set of bilateral relationships with countries outside of the Euro-Atlantic area and partnership existing formats – so-called contact countries<sup>49</sup> (e.g. Australia, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Argentina, China) (Shea, 2004).

After the enlargement in 2004, NATO gradually started to establish links between different cooperative security initiatives and practiced joint meetings with participation of all partners from various bi- and multilateral cooperative security arrangements. Today, NATO cooperative security arrangements include the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council together with the Partnership for Peace Program with twenty two partner nations involved, the Mediterranean Dialogue with seven cooperation partners, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and some more specific cooperative security initiatives like the NATO-Ukraine Council, the NATO-Russia Council and the South Eastern European Initiative.

Initially, NATO cooperative security initiatives intend to promote military capabilities of the partner countries, in order to ensure their interoperability for joint participation in international peace operations with NATO forces. Now, NATO cooperative security initiatives focus primarily on enhancement of cooperation and

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<sup>48</sup> Exchanges of Letters for ensuring partner's contribution to this operation have been signed between NATO and Georgia, Israel, Morocco, Russia and Ukraine [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_7932.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm)

<sup>49</sup> Previously the term triple-nons has been also use for countries that are not NATO members, EAPC/PfP partners and Mediterranean Dialogue partners.

interdependence between the Allies and their partners in a number of areas, including 1) partnership (i.e. IPAP); 2) joint participation in international peace operations (i.e. PMF, PAP-T); 3) military interoperability (i.e. PARP, OCC); 4) training initiatives (i.e. TEEP); 5) defense reform initiatives (i.e. PAP-DIB)<sup>50</sup>.

Joint participation in international peace operations emphasizes common interest in peace and stability. Military interoperability would benefit to joint actions, as it refers to the ability of diverse systems and organizations to work together. Training initiatives are probably the most important contribution from allies to their partners, offering the enhancement of professional capabilities, but also the understanding about principles of liberal society and the Kantian security culture. Defense reform initiatives are connected with the democratization of partner societies. The promotion of civil-military cooperation in partner countries is also among the top priorities, by which “NATO was able to use the communicative frameworks to change the partners’ conception of civil-military relations” (Lucarelli 2002, 35).

Recently, NATO partnership strategy started to introduce security sector reforms (SSR) in their cooperative security programs, primarily in the former Soviet bloc countries. These reforms reflect to the immediate need for successful democratization of their societies. Although the Soviet Union does not exist, the legacy of the past is still a destabilizing factor for the neighborhood of NATO. Georgia, the Ukraine and to some extent also Moldova have made some progress in enhancing partnership with the Western security communities, but the majority of former Soviet republics still experience reluctance in establishing liberal democratic regimes accordingly to the Western standards.

There is a three-dimensional range of political choices for security partners of NATO:

- To apply for membership;
- To remain partners through cooperative security arrangements;
- To establish bilateral contacts outside the cooperative arrangements.

In Europe, there are only a minimal number of countries, which are not connected with NATO framework either by membership or by cooperative security arrangements.<sup>51</sup> Among the EU members, only Cyprus did not join the PfP, having a dispute with Turkey over the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. NATO partners are countries with very different identity claims. According to Bellamy, contemporary NATO is open to any European state that fulfills military and political criteria. Previously, during the Cold War, NATO

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<sup>50</sup> Cooperative initiatives promoted through PfP framework – i.e. Planning and Review Process (PARP); Political-Military Framework (PMF); Membership Action Plan (MAP); Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC); Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP); Partnership Action Plan (PAP) mechanisms – incl. Individual Partnership Action Plan (I-PAP); Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T); Partnership Action Plan in Defence Institutions Building (PAP-DIB).

<sup>51</sup> Excluding such mini-states with pre-modern origin like Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino or Liechtenstein

was open to any North Atlantic area state that might contribute to its strategic assets (Bellamy 2004, 69). At the same time, after three post-Cold War enlargements, only small minority of current NATO partner countries is seeking membership. After Albanian and Croatian accession to NATO in 2009, there will be only few prospective applicants for the near future. Potential NATO members in future are partners engaged in the Membership Action Plan and the Intensified Dialogue.

**Table 14:** PfP members with intensified cooperation with NATO<sup>52</sup>

	<i>PfP</i>	<i>IPAP</i>	<i>Intensified Dialogue</i>	<i>MAP</i>	<i>NATO membership discussed</i>
FYR Macedonia	1995			1999	+
Georgia	1994	2004	2005		+
Ukraine	1994	2002	2006		+
Moldova	1994	2006			+
Montenegro	2006	2008	2008	2009	+
Serbia	2006		2008		+
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2006	2008	2008	2010	+
Armenia	1994	2005			–
Azerbaijan	1994	2005			–
Kazakhstan	1994	2006			–

At present, there is no significant difference in the involvement of Allies and Partners into NATO strategic plans except the participation in decision-making process. Partner involvements in NATO initiatives like NATO Response Force (NRF)<sup>53</sup> are widely discussed, and in March 2008, Finland as the first partner-nation, which joined the NRF. Today the Partnership for Peace program includes 21 partners that would be classified by their geopolitical and cultural origin (see also Simon 2004, 4–5):

- Six so-called advanced partners (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden, Switzerland);
- Three MAP partners (FYROM, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina);
- Three partners engaged in the Intensified Dialogue (Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia);

<sup>52</sup> Only partners participating in enhanced frameworks (ID, IPAP, MAP) are represented here.

<sup>53</sup> NATO multinational rapid reaction forces that is usable for collective defence, crisis management, and stabilisation operations. The NRF has been used in collective security and humanitarian purposes – the 2004 Olympic Games, the Iraqi elections, humanitarian relief to Afghanistan, humanitarian relief in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, and humanitarian relief in the earthquake disaster in Pakistan.

- Seven Caucasus and Central Asian partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan);
- Russia;
- Two East European partners currently not intending to join NATO (Belarus, Moldova).

The advanced partners Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta<sup>54</sup> and Sweden are the Kantian actors politically and militarily eligible to join NATO, but these countries experience a lack of political will for the membership in their societies and they prefer to arrange their security needs through the EU membership and NATO Partnership for Peace. Switzerland follows the same cultural paradigms but due to her neutrality tradition stays outside NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, Switzerland is an active cooperation partner to NATO.

The others meet more or less difficulties with the adaptation of liberal democratic requirements of NATO. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, although engaged in enhanced partnership with NATO through IPAP, have stated they have no desire to join NATO. Other Central Asian partners experience a serious lack of democracy in their societies, which excludes their involvement into the Kantian communities at least in the near future. The position of Serbia and Moldova towards future membership tends to be unclear, while both countries are affected with the consequences of frozen conflicts, Serbia in Kosovo and Moldova in Transnistria. The opportunity for Russia and Belarus to join NATO requires fundamental reforms in their societies, while these societies must transcend the Hobbesian origins of their security culture, which still use polarized paradigms in identifying the security environment in Europe.

There are some countries interested in joining NATO henceforth – the Ukraine, Georgia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, but possibly also Serbia and Moldova in the long run. Currently, the aspirant nations Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are probably the most serious candidates in seeking membership in NATO. Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina are actively working towards future NATO membership, joining the MAP recently. Macedonia was a potential candidate for accession in 2009 but her admission to NATO has been blocked by Greece because of the name dispute.

Georgia and Ukraine have negotiated for more intensive cooperation with NATO. In 2005, the Intensified Dialogue was reinvented for Georgia and the Ukraine claiming for future membership in NATO, but NATO still rejected to offer Membership Action Plan for them. Perhaps Georgia has currently the strongest NATO aspirations among the partner nation, but this country suffers from unsolved conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while these ethnically diverse territories demand secession. The unsolved ethnic conflicts led Georgia to military conflict with Russia in 2008. The Ukraine may have a prospective membership status, but her plans to join NATO are inconsistent as

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<sup>54</sup> Malta joined PfP in 1995, but left 1996. In 2008, Malta's involvement in the PfP has been reactivated.

the nation is internally divided between supporters and opponents of NATO and there is no clear consensus and political will to apply for membership.

### **7.2.1 Membership Action Plan**

The Membership Action Plan is an important element of NATO partnership strategy, which will be granted to applicants showing up interests to share liberal democratic values. Usually this is a preliminary stage preceding the accession to NATO. NATO partnership does not mean a waiting room for membership, but in order to accept potential candidates to NATO, there must be recognized a full commitment to the liberal democratic values from the aspirant's side. Otherwise, if the value-based accession will be rejected, NATO will lose its image as a pluralistic security community and by the logic of the Hobbesian security culture, it will collapse in internal jars soon or later. In order to accept any membership in NATO, there must be a full commitment to the liberal democratic values and NATO Membership Action Plan has proved itself as an effective mechanism for ensuring that.

The possible NATO enlargement has been widely discussed in 1990s, while NATO started a cooperative partnership with Central and East European countries. The "Study on NATO Enlargement", launched in September 1995, has set seven criteria for NATO enlargement:

- Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control;
- Fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation, and consensus building which characterize relations among current Allies;
- Promoting good-neighborly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non-members of NATO;
- Emphasizing common defense and extending its benefits and increasing transparency in defense planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defense policies;
- Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values and thereby curbing the countervailing tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines;
- Strengthening the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security, including through peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions;
- Strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic partnership (Yost 1998, 103–104).

In 1996, NATO started an Intensified Dialogue with 13 interested partner countries<sup>55</sup> most of them are member-nations today. The Intensified Dialogue, however, remained on the level of political consultations. Some of these nations (e.g. Azerbaijan, Finland) did not goaled the membership but preferred more comprehensive cooperation instead. The first Eastern European enlargement – Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – came through political decision that followed negotiations between NATO and potential candidates. There were no specified criteria candidate nations should fulfill in prior to accession.

The Membership Action Plan, launched in pivotal 1999, was a qualitative step forward. Although the next NATO enlargement in 2004 has been relied on a political decision as well in 1999 and the official rhetoric did not support connections between the accession to NATO and the Membership Action Plan, the practice has demonstrated that there is an unofficial requirement for aspirant nations to take part in the MAP program if they wish to move towards NATO accession. The MAP included all normative elements that have been expected to fulfill from potential candidates and by implementation of which seven qualified countries got the invitation in 2004 were selected from ten so-called aspirant-nations participating in the framework of Membership Action Plan.

NATO Membership Action Plan has been proved itself as an effective mechanism for reviewing the adoption and consolidation of liberal democratic values by aspirant nations. Unlike other partnership initiatives, the Membership Action Plan has been established for countries that decided to apply for membership.

The door to NATO membership under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains open. The Membership Action Plan (MAP), building on the Intensified, Individual Dialogue on membership questions, is designed to reinforce that firm commitment to further enlargement by putting into place a program of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership (Membership Action Plan 1999)

Principles presented in the political chapter of Membership Action Plan are in accordance with the NATO requirements for member states and would establish normative commitments for accepting principles of liberal democratic society. Aspirants would be expected 1) to settle their international disputes by peaceful means; 2) to demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and human rights; 3) to settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue good neighborly relations; 4) to establish appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces; 5) to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN; 6) to contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions and by promoting stability and

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<sup>55</sup> Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; Poland, Romania, Finland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Hungary

well-being; 7) to continue fully to support and be engaged in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace; 8) to show a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility (Membership Action Plan 1999).

Aspirant nations who participate in the MAP program are thoroughly watched, reviewed and assessed by NATO authorities on the basis of their annual progress report. Jeffrey Simon (2004) describes the Membership Action Plan as “a visible manifestation of the NATO “Open Door” (Article 10) policy with a clear set of Allied expectations from prospective members”. Norms established for future members are not solely military requirements but first of all emphasize the presence of consolidated democracy as a necessity. Constructing norms for accession makes NATO closer to being rather a security community than an alliance. Principles presented in the political chapter of Membership Action Plan are in accordance with the NATO requirements for member states. Thus, through assuming that the MAP is a litmus-test that establishes norms and determines values for prospective NATO membership, by those criteria NATO identifies itself as a pluralistic security community.

### **7.3. Summary**

The post-modern Kantian international system includes multiple Hobbesian security environments. Interactions between the system and the Hobbesian actors may constitute cooperative security dilemmas. The United Nations, the Western security communities and also the African Union has acted accordingly to the Kantian principles in transcending security dilemmas and resolving conflicts. Various factors including social problems, ethnic tensions with strengthening national sentiments or nuclear dilemmas reproducing a culture of fear may inflict the emergence of security dilemmas to the Kantian international system. The Iraqi invasion of 2003 testifies that the cultural environment can change, by which the identity dilemma may be transferred into the classical security dilemma.

The establishment of the appropriate security architecture, which corresponds to the cultural environment, would offer a solution for transcending of cooperative security dilemmas. In the Kantian international system, NATO and the European Union have been active developers of cooperative security. Since 1990s, NATO partnership has offered a strategy for transcending possible cooperative security dilemmas in its neighborhood. A set of cooperative framework has been launched, which increased stability of the Kantian society. Cooperative security arrangements (i.e. PfP, Mediterranean Dialogue and others) proved successful mechanisms overcoming possible mistrust and misperceptions between NATO members and their partners. Partnership initiatives deal not only with purely military issues, but they are actively involved in security and defense reforms in partner countries, by which democratic peace



can be achieved through extensive security cooperation between states with different institutional affiliation.

The following chapters examine particular manifestations of a cooperative security dilemma in the Kantian environment. There may exist a specific situation, where a cooperative security dilemma occurs between the Kantian actors, which apply to an integration dilemma. The Nordic countries experience a situation where they adapted the Kantian security environment but concerning the security architecture, they prefer to retain their Hobbesian preferences.

## 8. INTEGRATION DILEMMA AND THE BALTIC SEA REGION

The cooperative security dilemma may take place between the Kantian actors, if they determine their security preferences in the Hobbesian terms. This chapter focuses to the integration dilemma emerging in the Baltic Sea region regarding the position of both Western security communities, the European Union and NATO. The Baltic Sea region<sup>56</sup> hardly pretends to be a distinctive security community, but certainly constitutes a specific security environment, where security requirements of actors operating in this environment are interrelated.

If a regional security environment includes actors with different institutional affiliations, it might be a precondition for the emerging security dilemma, particularly an identity dilemma. Regional security cooperation may be one option to mitigate this dilemma. Anders Bjurner (1999, 17) has stated that “in the absence of developed institutional and administrative framework, sub-regional cooperation will depend on political support”. Institutionalization can considerably consolidate societies to overcome their political vulnerabilities. By Bjurner (1999, 17), institutional frameworks would assist to improve the implementation of decisions, coordination at all levels of cooperation, the provision of information and the preparation of joint meetings.

In the case of a cooperative security dilemma, the Baltic Sea region would offer a special interest because it maintains as the integration dilemma as well the identity dilemma. The Nordic countries, while generally accepting the Kantian principles of post-modern society, are not very enthusiastic to change their security and defense postures and find themselves within the integration dilemma. Russia, a key security player in the region, prefers to retain her modern Hobbesian understandings of security with national interests dominating over integrated cooperation and thus keeps the identity dilemma present.

The fact that the countries in the Baltic Sea region experience difficulties in adapting a post-modern security architecture has been recently noticed by several authors (e.g. Bengtsson 2000; Mouritzen 2001; Archer and Joenniemi 2003; Lehti and Smith 2003; Browning and Joenniemi 2004; Browning 2005; Mouritzen and Wivel 2005; Knudsen 2007; Browning 2007; Möller 2007; Galbreath 2008). At the same time, a mainstream of scholars avoids identifying the presence of a security dilemma in the region, partially because the region has been relatively stable and peaceful during a long period. As the integration dilemma in the Kantian security environment usually does not constitute major threats to anyone's security, it seems that the existence of such dilemma could be easily ignored.

Nordic and Baltic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, – form a core of the Baltic Sea region as a

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<sup>56</sup> Baltic Sea region geopolitically includes the following countries – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Poland, Russia, but also Iceland and Norway, which are geographically outside the region, but tied politically to the region.

specific security environment as their security interests are overwhelmingly tied to that particular region. There are other influential countries in the region such as Germany, Poland, and Russia which certainly have their own security interests and concerns in the Baltic Rim. The Baltic Sea region as we know it today was reborn after the Cold War with the trend of European integration and has involved at least four different levels of security environments with their intrinsic security concerns that enable a multilevel security analysis in northern Europe:

- Nordic region (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden);
- Baltic region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania);
- Nordic-Baltic region (Nordic and Baltic security complexes);
- Baltic Sea region (includes also Germany, Poland, and Russia).

Security environments experience perpetual changes. They are frequently constructed accordingly to the requirements of the system. In the Cold War system, the only viable specific environment at the Baltic Rim was the Nordic region. In the Cold War Nordic security environment, the concept of Nordic Balance was born, by which the actors operating within the environment constructed a balanced sub-system, where their security preferences were determined accordingly to the requirements of the bipolar international system. In the post-modern system, new actors appeared that caused the regrouping in security environments. The Baltic region, the Nordic-Baltic region and the Baltic Sea region are products of the post-modern international system.

Antti Kaski (2001) concludes that the Baltic countries constitute a joint complex relying on multifunctional interdependence as their primary security concerns are closely linked together. Kaski (2001, 158) argues that the concept of security complexes can contribute to the study of regional systems, as its comprehensive approach has predictive and normative power to provide suggestions for regional security.

Frank Möller (2007, 64) goes further and discusses the possibilities of the emergence of a distinguishable security community in the Baltic Sea region. He starts to search roots of security community at the domestic level and ties the development of security community with the multi-level cooperation between non-state actors, that way reducing the role of states in the community perspective. Möller (2007, 311) also gives up from identifying a security community as a value-sharing community and settles an option, where there might be a community without common identities, values, and norms, which lives with difference rather than reduces it, uses a conflict as a path to social change and recognizes different values as equally worthy.

Kaski and Möller, again, are entrapped with the regional context and underestimate relationship and mutual influence between regions and the system. Regional contexts seem to be constantly fixed, where the actors have a range of rational choices for mutual interactions. Möller's idea of community, which lives with differences, applies more to the international system, which may include various cultural environments. In such community or system, a cooperative security dilemma is programmed. There are basically two options

for further development – the process leading towards a common identity, where the actors intend to make agreements on norms being in effect or maintain differences, which would make the community potentially unstable.

Karl Deutsch (1957) used the example of Nordic countries in order to describe a pluralistic security community, because the possible disputes will be not resolved by war. The regional peace, lasting in the Northern Europe already more than a century, would seem a profitable experience for building up the models of security community. Pluralistic security communities, introduced by Deutsch, “are dependent on two qualities: 1) existence of like-minded political values within the community and 2) the ability of community states to uphold a dialogue with other governments and to anticipate other states’ future political, economic and social actions” (Lepik 2004, 49). However neither of described environments, the Nordic countries nor even the Baltic countries forms a distinctive security community, even considering that the security integration of the Baltic states with the same institutional affiliations theoretically allows to construct a prospective community model.

The advantage of the Baltic Sea region is that the region has been traditionally peaceful. Wars between Baltic Sea states have been rare during the last centuries and, if they occurred, were mainly caused by the global interests of the two major players in the region, Russia (the Soviet Union) and Germany. At the same time, the region includes a remarkable number of small states with their specific security concerns (Mölder 1998, 64). Today, there are only some potential conflict areas, but lesser predictability for the emergence of violence. The possible threats for the region include mostly asymmetrical threats like environmental issues, economic issues, migration etc.

Referring to the Nordic experience, Browning and Joenniemi conclude that Baltic Sea region is an ‘*asecurity community*’, where desecuritization of the region would be a main driver towards regional community (Joenniemi 1997, 202; Browning and Joenniemi 2004, 247). It leads to the conclusion that the area is developing towards a post-modern community in many fields except for security. However, there might be some doubts about the comprehensive reliability of this option. It is possible to drop the security argument only then if security is not on the agenda anymore. At the same time, some evidences indicate that security still remains an issue in the Baltic Sea area. For example, growing tensions between the Baltic countries and Russia could disturb the stability of all players in the Baltic Sea region and still call for multilateral solutions.

In the global security context, the Baltic Sea region is an indivisible part of the larger Euro-Atlantic security environment and its ‘post-modernization’ is closely related to similar processes in the EU and NATO. Far from being a ‘core region’, the Baltic Sea region rather constitutes a European sub-region (Hubel 2004, 283; Bergman 2006, 80). There is no evidence of an aspiration towards regional complex interdependence or regional peace. This does not mean that there are no such tendencies in the region but all those developments are connected with the European integration process not forming a distinctive

source. Therefore, the Baltic Sea region cannot be identified as an independent pluralistic security community neither does it represent a distinct security culture but rather manifests a constructed security environment where actors would be dependant on intensions of other actors in the region.

## 8.1. The Nordic dilemma

The realism has strongly influenced the political thought in the Northern Europe, especially in security matters. Therefore, the construction of balances has a long-time tradition here. During the Cold War, Norwegian political scientists Nils Ørvik, Arne Olav Brundtland and Johan J. Holst elaborated the concept of '*Nordic Balance*'. This follows the realist tradition within International Relations theory focusing on the reconciliation of northern Europe with the Cold War bipolar international system. The security orientations of Denmark and Norway have been tied with the Western alliance, while Finland's has been linked to the Soviet bloc, with Sweden standing in between these.

If the Soviet Union increased its pressure on Finland, the Nordic NATO members might be ready for a greater US/NATO military presence. On the other hand, such an increasing presence might lead to a Soviet call for closer cooperation with Finland (Øberg 1992, 25).

**Table 14:** Modern Nordic Balance

<i>Dominating orientation</i>	<i>Transatlantic orientation</i>	<i>Balanced (neutral) orientation</i>	<i>Soviet orientation</i>
Modern Nordic Balance	Norway, Denmark	Sweden	Finland

The Nordic Balance was aimed at supporting a relatively stable peace under the circumstances of the Cold War bipolarity. The Soviet Union was a key player in the region and other countries attempted to balance the Soviet power. Finland practiced a mild bandwagoning with the Soviet policies, Sweden stayed neutral and Norway and Denmark balanced the Soviet power with power of NATO. While entering into the post-modern system, Nordic countries experienced hesitations and misperceptions in adapting to the new security architecture. In sum, the Nordic Balance did not disappear with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but rather has been transferred from one system to another.

The Nordic experience has influence the development of security environments in the whole Baltic Sea region. Security has never played a significant role in defining the Nordic identity. According to Browning and Joenniemi (2004, 241), the Nordic area is "an example of a non-security-driven community, including some regional cooperation". The reason for starting an

intensive Nordic cooperation was not caused by similar security interests. The countries of the region are ready to cooperate and promote the Kantian society, but in security terms, the involvement of the Hobbesian fears hampering the development of regional security cooperation is still perceivable. What is important in the Nordic case, these fears are not directed against each other, but towards other key players in the region like Russia.

By Archer (2005, 20), the relative proximity of Russia is the main factor why the Baltic Sea countries are not eager to change their Cold War defense postures. Despite the fact that Finland's foreign and security policies are generally post-modern and follow the Kantian culture, they remain conservative in the defense area. Norway, having a border with militarized north-west Russia and the disputable Arctic Ocean, has also maintained certain carefulness in changing its defense postures. Sweden, again, has been quite modest to transfer its defense policy from the Hobbesian to the Kantian as there are no immediate incentives for that.

In security terms, the Nordic countries have preferred to maintain separate orientations. They have become accustomed to handling security issues carefully, preferring to maintain policy independence in this particular field and traditional practices of defense posture as strongly as possible. Corresponding to the post-modern security architecture, a Nordic region has gained three programmed integration dilemmas, inherited from security understandings of modern society:

- NATO members Iceland and Norway, though belonging to the European Economic Area, are not members of the EU. Norway twice refused to join the European Union. Nevertheless, Norwegians have developed cooperation with the EU in security and defense matters, participating in the European Union's Nordic Battle Group.
- Denmark is a full member of the EU and NATO, but though it does not participate in ESDP, the Danes reject the development of security and defense cooperation within the EU.
- Finland and Sweden are members of the EU but not of NATO. This seems to be connected to the security preferences of public opinion in these countries rather than to their opposition to the new security architecture. Both countries actively participate in NATO cooperative security arrangements, particularly the Partnership for Peace program.

Although the Nordic countries have chosen different paths along the European integration, their experience in mutual cooperation serves as a worthy exemplar for others. The Nordic Council, founded in 1952, filled the institutional vacuum for the Nordic states. There exists an intense and comprehensive network of cooperation in a large quantity of issues. At first glance, the Nordic area, with a long history of non-war, would perfectly fit the post-modern security architecture. During the last centuries, this area has been traditionally described as a region where stable peace has been successfully consolidated.

A long-term stable peace in the region tends to be unintended, a rather empirical than normative phenomenon. The Nordic integration has been neither

greatly institutionalized nor aimed at ensuring peace in the region (Browning and Joenniemi 2004, 240) and the Nordic Council accepted security as a acceptable issue for cooperation only after the end of the Cold War (Browning 2005, 189). Peacefulness in the area seems to be achieved incidentally without any need for enforcement or as Ole Waever (1998, 76) stated, without a powerful program for securing peace among the Nordic countries.

The Nordic states have experienced difficulty in readjusting to a more comprehensive and cooperative approach to security as implemented by post-Cold War security institutions (Archer 2005, 19). Slowly progressing defense postures of Finland and Sweden confirm that a modern Nordic Balance has rather been transformed into a new form than abandoned entirely. Finland and Sweden try to continually avoid membership in NATO in spite of their giving up of neutrality. Denmark, however, declines to participate in the security and defense dimension of the EU. This leads to a conclusion that the security policies of Nordic countries continue to follow a Hobbesian security pattern with NATO as a Western military alliance and the European Union as a non-security community.

## **8.2. The post-modern dilemma**

A post-modern security environment revitalized the Baltic Sea region. Analyzing trends in the Nordic-Baltic regional security complex, Dan Steinbock (2008, 199) has noted that the region practices various security options and comprises NATO members (Denmark, Norway and the Baltic nations) and no longer neutral but militarily non-aligned Sweden and Finland. He calls it a '*Northern Balance*'. In the context of the Baltic Sea regional security complex, it would be more correct to treat the '*Baltic Balance*' instead of Steinbock's suggestion.

The term '*balance*' itself indicates the presence of a security dilemma, as a security dilemma is a choice between balanced options (Booth, Wheeler 2008, 6). Therefore, both the Nordic Balance and the Baltic Balance definitely entail security dilemmas. The modern Nordic Balance represented a classical security dilemma and was greatly influenced by the presence of the Soviet Union in the neighborhood. The post-modern Baltic Balance applies not only to the Nordic countries, but to various security environments in the region. It is a result of the European integration and consequently represents an integration dilemma in the Baltic Sea region.

Likewise in the case of the Nordic Balance, different security orientations of the regional players give rise to the Baltic Balance, where countries of the region are divided into various groupings on the by their security preferences. Currently, Sweden and Finland are the members of the European Union and Norway and Iceland belong to NATO security community. Denmark has posed a cooperative security dilemma itself, being member of the EU and NATO, but excluding participation in the CSDP. Therefore, the Nordic balance still

continues to exist, though now not between the Soviet Union (or Russia) and the West as before, but between the EU and NATO orientations, embracing Sweden and Finland in one side and Denmark (due to its opt-out from the CSDP), Iceland and Norway in another. In the context of Baltic Rim, newcomers in the region such as Germany, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be positioned somewhere between them, and Russia, staying formally outside of regional integration, can still strongly influence the security preferences of other regional players.

The Nordic Balance could be distinguished from the Baltic one, as it has been a classical reference point of regional actors towards the great powers. The Baltic Balance manifests the reference of regional actors towards the European integration. There are at least five different trends characterizing the integration into the Western security communities in the Baltic Sea region.

- Sweden and Finland are EU members and NATO partners within the EAPC/PfP framework;
- Germany, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are EU and NATO members;
- Denmark is also EU and NATO member, but does not participate in the CSDP;
- Norway and Iceland are NATO members and have cooperative relationship with EU;
- Russia is the only country in the region that stays outside the EU and NATO, but has a cooperative relationship with both the aforementioned institutions.

Various affiliations testify to the presence of diverse security identities in the Baltic Sea region. Russia has always preferred regional cooperation as an alternative to NATO enlargement and prefers to establish the balance of power constructions into its neighborhood, which testifies her commitment to the Hobbesian world. The distinction has to be made between Germany and the Nordic countries on the one hand and Poland and Baltic countries on the other hand regarding their security preferences. Poland and the Baltic countries have been successfully integrated with the Western security communities. Nevertheless, they have maintained a more modern view to security and remained skeptical towards regional prospects in containing Russia's ambitions. These countries experience an internal dilemma between the Hobbesian and Kantian cultures, whereby their political choices may be influenced by both cultural options, depending on case.

The European integration and how the regional actors affiliate with it, determines the nature of Baltic Balance. Among the Nordic countries, it is also possible to distinguish a Transatlantic-oriented pillar and a European-oriented pillar, bringing about the integration dilemma. There would be the possibility of five total groupings based on complexity of security orientations of regional actors. Russia has been excluded here because she remains outside of the European integration, being more an outside player.



**Table 15:** Post-modern Baltic Balance

<i>Dominating orientation</i>	<i>Transatlantic orientation</i>	<i>Balanced-Transatlantic orientation</i>	<i>Balanced orientation</i>	<i>European orientation</i>
Post modern Baltic Balance	Norway, Iceland, Denmark,	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland	Germany	Finland, Sweden

The security mentality shaped by the Cold War excludes Finland and Sweden from NATO and Denmark from CSDP. Following a tradition, Denmark, Iceland and Norway prefer to connect their security guarantees with military assistance from the United States rather than by enhancing security and defense cooperation in the framework of the European Union. The remaining actors in the region such as Germany, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are members of NATO and the EU, and can be positioned in the middle of new Baltic Balance. Nevertheless, Poland and the three Baltic countries represent a strong trans-Atlantic link between NATO and the EU, and they tend to trust the US military capability more than the EU given because of their specific concern about Russia's intentions. This factor makes it difficult for them to become regional security balancers, though being represented in both security communities.

From amongst the Baltic Sea nations, only Germany has practiced a more balanced view towards both institutions, and participating actively within NATO and CSDP, represents the western European tradition of full integration here, as the "post-socialist burden" of Poland and the three Baltic countries produces anti-integrationist attitudes (Hubel 2004, 288). Of course, the Nordic countries are involved in the development of post-modern society and play an active role in further integration of democratic states in Europe. There are no identity factors that would make difficult to play an active role for them in the security-community-building. The main factor calling for emphasizing the distinction between Nordic countries and Germany in accepting post-modern values is security. For example, Sweden and Finland prefer to maintain a certain degree of independence in their security and defense policy. Germany at the same time is more open to cooperative security solutions as "Germany has foregone having its own General Staff in favor of NATO staff" (Cooper 2003, 166). Consequently, Germany follows more cooperative criteria in arranging its security systems than Sweden and Finland.

The slowness of change has been one of the most important indicators describing the Baltic Sea region in adjusting the post-modern Kantian society. Military doctrines like territorial defense or conscription<sup>57</sup>, popular among the

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<sup>57</sup> The Baltic Sea region has positioned in the unique position in Europe, as majority of countries here have maintained the compulsory military service (Denmark, Germany, Finland, Estonia, Norway, Russia; Sweden is going to abolish the mandatory service in next years; Latvia, Lithuania and Poland recently abolished conscription for the military)

Baltic Sea countries, correspond to the Hobbesian security culture. The Baltic countries have been a litmus test for the Kantian approach to the European security. Despite some success shown in their integration to the European structures, they express a significant identity dilemma within their societies where the nationalist orientation competes with the integrationist orientation and they are strongly influenced by the Hobbesian security culture of Russia.

The future of the Baltic Balance will depend on the overall ability of the Baltic Sea countries to become adapted with the post-modern approach to the European security architecture and the availability of comprehensive cooperative security options. The regional security policies practiced in the Baltic Rim confirm a constructivist approach to international relations, representing inter-subjective understanding of objective processes. The states adhere themselves to the norms of society not because of on-going self-interest calculation but because of self-identification with a particular society of states (Wendt 1999, 242). In this respect, the balance-oriented security behavior in the Baltic Sea region testifies Wendt's claims.

Moreover, there is no cultural dilemma between actors concerning the Baltic Balance, but there is the integration dilemma between the Kantian actors. The Nordic Balance and the Baltic Balance seem to be typical social constructions, by which self-constructed political preferences of the countries have been fitted into the theoretical model. Within the model of Baltic Balance, the security policies of Nordic countries continue to be divided between the NATO orientation and the EU orientation, similarly as they identified their orientations during the Cold War bipolarity. At the same time, other members of the Baltic Sea region are able to adapt more comprehensive security models and Russia remains to be an external influencer to the regional security and stability.

The overall European integration into the Kantian security communities has been only partially welcomed in the Baltic Rim. The region is split over the accession to NATO and the European Union. Norway, with the assistance of its economic success, twice has rejected the membership in the European Union. Only economic catastrophe at the end of first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century forced Iceland, traditionally positioned itself between Europe and North America, to make movement towards the EU membership, which probably allows them to join the EU for the year 2012. In the European Union, especially Denmark but somehow also Sweden, have been strong supporters of the independent policies within the community.

Sweden, together with Denmark and the United Kingdom, tends to form a skeptical side of the EU. Within the EU framework, Finland tends to have a more integrationist view than Sweden as she is more open to the EU initiatives (i.e. establishment of a single currency). Lee Miles (2005, 103) explains that Sweden is in the position of contributor in the EU framework, whereas Finland is more of a receiver. Despite the fact that discussions concerning their possible NATO membership have been liven up lately, the Finnish and Swedish societies have met difficulties in leaving the Cold War security architecture and are generally very cautious towards membership in NATO. Finland and Sweden

are not ready to accept NATO membership, although their cooperation with NATO is rather extensive. They are among the biggest security contributors concerning NATO partners participating in NATO-led crisis management operations. Sweden explains her conservative policy towards potential NATO membership on the basis of her traditional neutrality leading to a conclusion that Sweden has no military alignment needs (Karp 2006, 69).

Next subchapters focus on the cases of Denmark and Finland, examining the possibility of cooperative security dilemma among the Kantian actors. Even while actors may generally follow the Kantian security culture, their motives in understanding security may proceed from the Hobbesian culture. Denmark has been one of the strongest supporters of trans-Atlanticism in NATO, and refuses to participate in the security and defense pillar of the European Union. Although discussions about the possible NATO accession have been strengthened in recent years, the mainstream policies of Sweden and Finland have positioned themselves extremely carefully towards the possible membership. They compensate it with the active partnership through PFP but fears about the violating against realist dogmas force them to maintain the Hobbesian patterns especially in their defense policies.

### **8.2.1. Denmark and CSDP**

The Danish political culture tends to be anti-integrationist. Besides the United Kingdom, Denmark has been probably the most active EU member in establishing opt-out regimes. The initial rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 has led to the Edinburgh Agreement, by which Denmark acquired opt-outs in four areas: citizenship, economic and monetary union, defense policy and justice and home affairs. The security opt-out of Denmark initially stated that they are not obliged to join the Western European Union. Later, this opt-out has been transferred to their participation in the CSDP. Denmark does not take part in decisions, and does not act in common foreign and security policy where defense is concerned. Denmark also does not contribute troops to the EU missions and to the EU-led operations.

Miles (2005, 99) describes Denmark as a 'federo-sceptic' (not a euro-sceptic) state. They traditionally hold careful positions towards multilateral frameworks in international affairs and prefer to keep bilateral relationship with other powers. Lately the popularity of opt-out policies has been fallen and in 2011 Denmark plans to hold a referendum in opt-out policies. A poll in November 2007 found that 52% of Danes are for dropping the euro opt-out (39% against), 46% for dropping the defense opt-out (38% against) and 51% against dropping the judiciary opt-out (32% for) (Reid 2007). The experience in the European Union has shown that their commitment to opt-outs may decrease the opportunities to carry out Danish interests in many fields.

In their security policy practices, Denmark holds a strong trans-Atlantic position. Since 2001, Denmark, along the United Kingdom, was one of the

strongest supporters of the policy of G. W. Bush administration among the Western European countries. Denmark has contributed to the ISAF in Afghanistan, and together with the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland joined the United States in the Iraqi invasion of 2003 (Steinbock 2008, 200). Denmark's position concerning the current European security environment must strike a balance between giving up its sovereignty and maintaining its independence. Denmark wishes to maintain an '*apparent independence*' within the European security architecture (Rye Olsen and Pillegaard 2005, 340).

In the case of defense, Denmark has been negative or kept a low profile in relation to defense or defense policy in the European Union, and consequently plays no part in cooperation on the development of CSDP because of an opt-out from the Maastricht Treaty, which the Danish government was able to achieve at the European Council meeting in Edinburgh in December 1992 (Larsen 2000, 48; Rye Olsen and Pillegaard 2005, 340). The opt-out from the CSDP does not necessarily reflect their special security concerns as Denmark is also much less influenced by the proximity of Russia than its other Nordic neighbors, but rather it would be a follow-up of the Danish federal-skepticism, which aims to maintain independence in this area as much as possible.

It seems that Denmark has fallen into a trap of the integration dilemma described above. Danish authors are concerned that with the opt-out from CSDP, Danish influence on regional security issues will weaken (Rye Olsen and Pillegaard, 2000; Larsen, 2000; Wivel 2000). Danish hesitancy towards involving itself with the EU security dimension has implications for the Nordic dimension of the EU security options. With the opt-out policy, Denmark stays outside from the EU decision-making processes in the particular areas, opt-outs are practiced.

For example, concerning the EU Nordic Battle Group, the Danish opt-out from CSDP excluded Denmark from the project. Non-EU member Norway, at the same time, easily joined the EU Nordic Battle Group. Danish security policy has maintained a somehow ambivalent character. Among the Nordic states, Denmark was a forerunner in changing its defense postures after the end of the Cold War (Rieker 2004, 376; Heurlin 2001). At the same time it rather refers to a kind of self-isolation from the EU security community options than the commitment to the Hobbesian security culture. The CSDP is ignored, not opposed.

There have been discussions about the abolishing the defense policy opt-out, but due to policy of '*apparent independence*' and a relatively strong anti-European stance in the Danish public opinion rejecting the Maastricht treaty and Euro in referendums, this decision is still delayed, even if there is support from the Danish government. All in all, Denmark with its opt-out from the CSDP causes the integration dilemma in the Baltic Sea security environment, as the involvement of the region into the security and defense cooperation within the EU framework is deficient. The development of the European Union into the amalgamated (or even pluralistic) security community and thereby the building-up of the Kantian security architecture in Europe is not supported, which leads to the integration dilemma between the EU and Denmark.

### 8.2.2. Finland and NATO

Countries, which avoided NATO membership during the Cold War, sometimes continue to follow similar patterns in the new security environment. Finland accepted the EU membership in the 1990s, after the long-time practice of neutrality. However, Finland does not connect the EU membership with their traditional non-alignment policy as practiced during the Cold War. In this respect Finland has been able to adapt the new Kantian international system. The Finnish commitment to the Kantian culture has been clearly marked in the post-modern security environment. They have traditionally been very active promoters of peace and stability and in general, follow the Kantian paradigms regarding international affairs. The only exception here has been their national defense, where they prefer to retain the Hobbesian models.

The Finnish society has very carefully regarded to the possible membership in NATO, although there has been a quite lively debate about Finland's potential NATO membership in recent years. Many influential Finnish politicians have openly supported the accession to NATO. Strong pro-NATO feelings exist in the right-wing parties (i.e. National Coalition Party, the Swedish People's Party) and foreign policy experts (e.g. Martti Ahtisaari), while Social Democrats and other left-wing parties tend to oppose it. Former President Martti Ahtisaari has called a being full members of NATO and the European Union as a logical step in letting off the negative consequences of so-called '*Finlandization*' (Stenbock 2008, 204). Finlandization, the Cold War practice describing the influence of a powerful country to its small neighbor's policies, has been one of theoretical justifications of the Nordic Balance. Finlandization characterizes the Hobbesian security culture whereas a small country aligns itself with its powerful neighbor in order to maintain a certain degree of independence. In the Kantian society, which cannot favor polarity options, such doctrine is not logical.

Nevertheless, the NATO accession has remained to being a discussion topic primarily on the level of political elites, not achieving a wide public support. In 2005, only 23% of Finnish audience supported the membership in NATO, while 57% were against it (Clear majority of Finns... 2005). At the same time, Finland takes part in nearly all PfP subprogram's, being one of the most active NATO partner after joining the PfP in 1994. Finland provides forces to NATO missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo; together with Sweden, Finns participate in NATO Strategic Airlift Capability Initiative; they are also involved in the NATO Response Force.

Tomas Ries (1999, 5) has disentangled Finnish cautiousness towards NATO membership pointing out the following fears raised within Finnish security culture: membership damages Finland's special relationship with Russia; membership provokes Russia upsetting European stability; military non-alignment keeps Finland from the crossfire zone between Russia and the West; military non-alignment permits Finland to mediate international disputes; membership makes Finland a pawn of Western hegemony; NATO can no

longer deliver; EU membership is enough; membership draws the west into regional crises; membership makes Finland dependent upon the West; membership leads to developing the wrong kind of defense; membership costs too much; membership isolates people from defense; membership prevents the return of Karelia.

There is a lot of the Hobbesian fear still playing an important role in the Finnish security culture as well as misperceptions towards the Kantian security environment. Finland tends to support the maximization of independence in defense matters as much as possible. While Finland's security policy has adopted the Kantian security culture, its defense policy has maintained the Hobbesian core, emphasizing the traditional realist fears as abandoning a special relationship with Russia, enhancement of dependence on Western powers and the wrong kind of defense introduced by NATO. Clive Archer (2005, 20) notes that Finland, which shares a long-border with Russia, "has been slowest in changing its defense posture".

Finland's security culture still seems to recognize NATO as primarily the Hobbesian military alliance in the polarized world, which rests on a NATO-Russia opposition that makes it difficult to see the communitarian prospective of NATO. Therefore, Finland is ready to adopt the EU as the Kantian community but still hesitates to make similar steps towards NATO. The Finnish security and defense policy report seriously considers Russia's ambitions to restore its great-power status with recognition that NATO would be a threat for Russia. The governmental report cites the other report of the Parliamentary Security Policy Monitoring Group noting that "Finland is not a member in any military alliance but it closely cooperates with NATO and maintains the option of seeking membership in the organization" (Finnish Security and Defense Policy 2008).

Rieker (2004, 386) argues that the Winter War<sup>58</sup> experience and a vulnerable geopolitical position force the Finnish political leaders to use traditional (Hobbesian) security policy arguments. Recently there have been some changes in the Finnish security policy discourse. In 2008, the Finnish Defense Minister Jyrki Häkämies called Finland and Sweden to access NATO, because this action would increase military security in the Nordic region and would increase the influence of Nordic countries in NATO, which is continually the strongest security provider in the area. Also, NATO accession would enable to achieve substantial savings from joint procurement (Stenbock 2008, 210).

So far, Finland still struggles with the consequences of the Hobbesian international system. Relationship between Finland and NATO testifies the presence of integration dilemma, where both sides are willing to enhance cooperation between them, but there are no immediate plans for Finnish side to access NATO membership. As the security environment remains stable and peaceful, the integration dilemma is not a direct security concern. However, the establishment on consolidated Kantian security architecture in the Northern Europe is delayed.

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<sup>58</sup> War between Finland and the Soviet Union 1939–40

### 8.3. Managing the integration dilemma

Accordingly to the principles of the Kantian security culture, the enhancement of cooperation (i.e. cooperative security measures) and complex interdependence among actors should mitigate the influence of cooperative security dilemmas in the liberal society. The integration dilemma in the Baltic Sea region hardly leads to the re-emergence of classical security dilemma or facing serious interstate conflicts in the region. However, if the regional actors are involved into the conflicts outside the region, some tensions or misperceptions between them may raise.

Despite the security environment is at the Baltic Rim generally peaceful, it should be admitted that the region practices distinctive security cultures. This leads to the conclusion that “there is no basis at present for characterizing the Baltic Sea area as a zone of stable peace,” (Bengtsson 2000, 381). Russia continues to identify itself as the Hobbesian power, in positioning itself against Russia, some countries in the region also prefer to implement the Hobbesian security culture. At the same time, in some other areas the Baltic Sea countries follow the Kantian tradition. The most serious interstate dispute that still exists between Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Russia, concerns the existence of numerous Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia; the future of the Kaliningrad enclave; and an imaginary border dispute between Estonia and Russia and Latvia and Russia.

Since the region includes NATO members (Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland) and EU members/NATO partners (Finland, Sweden), there may be good preconditions for practicing NATO-EU cooperation. The EU Battle Group consisting of Sweden, Finland, Norway and Estonia could be one positive example of coordinative efforts between NATO and EU members. The political influence of the European Union is still a considerable guarantee in the region and especially in terms of human security the role of the European Union cannot be underestimated. The promotion of EU Northern Dimension has established alternative links for the further stabilization of the Baltic Sea area.

There have not been made significant efforts in establishing permanent cooperative security regimes for the region, but nevertheless examples of successful cooperative security initiatives do exist. Before the NATO enlargement of 1998, a defense cooperation link was established between Denmark, Germany, and Poland, while the Baltic countries joined this initiative at the next stage. The purpose of the initiative was initially to assist Poland in accepting NATO beliefs, norms and identities so as to be able to adopt NATO requirements. Later, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the process, making this regional cooperation project sustainable.

The example of the Baltic defense projects is probably the most successful cooperative security initiative in the region. The Baltic defense projects (e.g.

BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET, BALTDEFCOL, and BALTSEA)<sup>59</sup> have stimulated security- and defense-related cooperation not only in the region but included outside actors, including countries from other regions, which joined together in cooperative efforts in promoting defense capabilities in these countries. Just recently, the NATO Air Policing Initiative follows the example of previous projects with different NATO countries joining together for the task of air control in the Baltic countries. The model of the BALTSEA<sup>60</sup> was later transferred into other regions – South Caucasus, and the Balkans. The involvement of Kantian actors in the Baltic defense project favored the introduction of the Kantian security culture in these countries.

There are cooperative regimes, which enable to establish complex interdependence between the EU and non-members. The European Economic Area (EEA) includes Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, allowing these countries to be engaged in the EU single market without joining the EU. Switzerland is linked to the EU by bilateral agreement. Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland also joined the Schengen Agreement. Denmark with its opt-out policy has found itself been in a much difficult position for using cooperative security regimes and its participation within the ESDP is possible only through NATO-EU cooperative frameworks. Similarly, Finland, as other EU members staying outside of NATO framework, actively participates in NATO partnership initiatives but cannot participate in NATO decision-making-process.

Cooperative regimes like partnerships would be considered in mitigating the possible negative effects of integration-dilemmas. Also, comprehensive and complex cooperation and coordination of actions between the European Union and NATO would transcend the vulnerabilities of the integration dilemma. The integration dilemma is as principle easily manageable on the basis of common security culture where similar beliefs and values can foster the appearance of collective identity. The key elements for the success of the Baltic Sea security environment may overwhelmingly rely on shared liberal democratic values and of democratic peace generally followed around the Baltic Sea, which creates good conditions for a stable peace.

## **8.4. Summary**

Enduring cooperative security dilemmas make the Baltic Sea area a useful example for analyzing the adaptation of a post-modern security system to the regional security environment, which is pitted against a viable Cold War mentality. The integration dilemma is a variation of the cooperative security dilemma, while international actors in general practice the same security culture

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<sup>59</sup> Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, Baltic Squadron, Baltic Air Surveillance Network, Baltic Defence College, Baltic Security Assistance

<sup>60</sup> BALTSEA (Baltic Security Assistance) is a coordinating body for assistance to Baltic countries in carrying out their defence reforms.



but some consequences related to another security culture may influence their security understandings.

The Baltic Sea region is a peaceful security environment which includes the integration dilemma among the Kantian actors. Unintended peace only occasionally produces stability. Although major military conflicts seem to be unpredictable in the near future, a hodgepodge of institutions operating in the area, different security preferences and a lack of a comprehensive security forum dealing with specific regional security concerns do not support the apparent consolidation of peace in the Baltic Sea region.

The integration dilemma in the Baltic Sea region comes from the Cold War and is influenced by the concept of Nordic Balance. The security understandings in the Nordic and Baltic countries still proceed from Cold War realism, which is established on the doctrines of balancing and bandwagoning and the regional actors may have carefully watch that their political strategies do not change a geopolitical situation in the region. The integration dilemma is indirectly connected with misperceptions against the intensions of the Hobbesian power of the region, Russia, which forms the only significant identity dilemma in the Baltic Rim.

The Nordic Balance was a contestable social construction, which constructed obstacles for hindering the Nordic security and defense cooperation and made efforts to adapt security policies of the Nordic community with the Cold War balance of power. The Baltic Balance is a similar social construction that leads to the manageable integration dilemma in the post-Cold War security environment. Comparing the post-modern Baltic Balance with the modern Nordic Balance, we can observe an obvious similarity between the two. Denmark, Sweden and Finland continue to follow the balanced policy concerning the European security architecture.

The Kantian security environment favors integration and the Baltic Balance is not the optimal security agenda for the region. It is rather a transitional system in the post-modern security environment that illustrates the integration dilemma in a mature anarchy where interactions between the Kantian culture and the Hobbesian one intensively take place. The cases of Denmark and Finland indicate that the integration dilemma may cause some misperceptions between the Kantian actors though there are no fundamental controversies between Denmark and the EU and between Finland and NATO in their security and defense practices.

Due to the widely accepted principles of the Kantian culture in other areas, the post-modern security system is at least theoretically not unachievable in the Baltic Sea region. Structural transformation still offers applicable solutions for managing cooperative security dilemmas. If Finland and Sweden become more favorable towards NATO, if Denmark will join the ESDP and if Norway and Iceland seriously consider the EU membership, the region will become more visible in the post-modern European security architecture thus gaining stronger representation of regional security concerns within the European Union and NATO. At the same time, the unintended peace achieved in the region, is not a forcing factor for structural transformation.

## **9. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ESTONIA–RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP – BETWEEN THE IDENTITY DILEMMA AND THE CLASSICAL SECURITY DILEMMA**

The accession of some Eastern European societies to NATO and the European Union did not entail changes in cultural paradigms, at least not completely, and the Hobbesian fears especially vis-a-vis Russia still significantly influence their security cultures. This chapter examines the most vulnerable Hobbesian-Kantian dilemma in the Baltic Sea region concerning three Baltic countries and Russia. Mutual distrust between Russia and the Baltic countries is still highly recognizable. The chapter particularly focuses on the Estonia-Russia case. What makes this case particularly profitable to analyze, the security dilemma here is not only between the Kantian security culture practiced by the European security communities and Hobbesian one carried by Russia but there is a passionate internal dispute between the Kantian and the Hobbesian cultures within the Estonian society.

First glance to Estonia may give an impression of the country that is enthusiastically turning its face to Europe. Indeed, the return to the Western world has characterized the development of a small Northern European country during the last two decades. Since August 1987, when first public demonstration against the Soviet authorities was organized in Estonia's capital Tallinn, so-called Hirvepark meeting<sup>61</sup>, Estonia gradually achieved a positive image as a forward runner of democratization in the Soviet Union. After the restoration of its independence in 1991, Estonia's security policy preferences have been strongly pro-Western. The accession to the Western security communities (the European Union, NATO) has been set up as a main foreign and security policy goal and this goal remained priority throughout all national foreign and security policy documents up to 2004. All Estonian governments have supported integration with the European security structures as the best security option for their country.

The Western world, where Estonia has returned, has followed the Kantian cultural paradigms, which aimed to transcend completion, rivalry and polarity between international actors. Because of the Kantian security environment promoted by the West, some authors claim that Russian military threat disappeared from mainstream political debates by the late nineties (Kuus 2003, 11). These assumptions recognize the key role of Estonia's foreign policy makers in shaping security identity and tend to ignore a similarity in security cultures of Russia and the Baltic states in this respect including a greater influence of the ethno-nationalism to the identity-building.

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<sup>61</sup> The Hirvepark (Deer Park) meeting was a public meeting held by the Estonian dissident group MRP-AEG on 23 August 1987, at the 48th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

From NATO members, the Estonian security culture tends to be probably the most Hobbesian one (maybe Turkey can compete with Estonia in this respect) as modern security understandings tend to be very noticeable in the Estonian society. The strong ethno-nationalism and culture of fear makes the Estonian society prone for the Hobbesian misperceptions. Here might be some mismatches between the official policy and public discourses getting around in the society. The official discourse in foreign and security policy does not oppose the Kantian trends in the Euro-Atlantic area. Estonia contributes to NATO and the CSDP and has been an active promoter of cooperative security. Also, the official policy is much measured towards Russia comparing to opinions, which can be met in the Estonian mass media.

Since the re-establishment of the independent state in 1991, the Estonian society has been swayed between two opportunities – 1) to build up an ethno-centric nation-state;<sup>62</sup> or 2) to develop a contemporary civil society accordingly to the Kantian trends of the Western civilization. Therefore, there has been an instant competition between two security cultures, the Hobbesian one and the Kantian one, influencing the development of national security culture. Various cultural paradigms practiced within the society can lead us into the twofold identity dilemma – first of them between Estonia and Russia, and the second one is an internal dilemma within the Estonian society. The twofold dilemma makes the security dilemma management to being complicated – together with the identity dilemma there might be also a classical security dilemma provoking the Hobbesian mechanisms for response.

The competition between different security cultures has split the Estonian society between the nationalists, idealizing an ethnic state, and the euro-centrists, favoring further integration with Europe. Such a split has been frequently met in the torn societies, for example in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russia between the ‘Westerners’ and the ‘Slavophiles’, where openness towards the values of the Western civilization competed with the isolationist tendencies.<sup>63</sup> The nationalist ideology is still viable in the Estonian society and shapes its understandings in many areas, including security. What is different in the Estonian society from the contemporary Western tradition that the term ‘*nationality*’ refers to the ethnic background not to citizenship and, therefore, the state’s primary concern should be to ensure the continuation of the Estonian ethnos (Kuus 2007, 71), which makes Estonia to be identified as an ethnic state and hence to be prone for ethnic conflicts.

The nationalist political culture is not a rare manifestation in the East European countries after the Cold War. The revitalization of nationalism in the

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<sup>62</sup> Nation-state is a type of state where political system and state interests proceed from interests of one ethnically identified group (dominant-nation) (Mölder 1997, 2026).

<sup>63</sup> By Huntington (1997, 139), a torn country has to met three requirements: the political and economic elite is generally supportive to the move; the public has to be at least willing about the redefinition of identity; the dominant elements of the host civilization have to be converted.

East European countries after the Cold War has created a breeding ground for the Hobbesian political and security culture there. The emerging trend of nationalism caused attempts to restore a status of great power in Russia, especially during the Putin's presidency. As the status of great power mates with the Hobbesian security environment, for that reason Russia has started produce the Hobbesian doctrines of balancing powers. Nationalist political culture has been highlighted in Mečiar's Slovakia, in Tudjman's Croatia, and in Milosevič's Serbia. Among the EU members, the most significant case of nationalist ideology has been seen in Poland under Kaczinsky's government.

Also, the West Europe has often experienced the nationalist reaction, wherein the most prominent case took place in 2000, when Jörg Haider's Freedom Party together with the People's Party formed a coalition in Austria, which caused tensions between Austria and the rest of Europe. In 2002, a French nationalist politician Jean-Marie Le Pen surprisingly finished second in French presidential elections. The policy of Kaczinsky's government certainly influenced the development of political culture in the Baltic countries where the nationalist tendencies have been strengthened.

The clash between the East European nationalism with the West European liberalism has evoked several cooperative security dilemmas, the identity dilemma between Estonia and Russia among others. There are primarily historical reasons, why the positions of nationalism are much stronger in Eastern European societies, including Russia having traditional misperceptions towards NATO, originated from the Cold War. Therefore, the identity dilemma between Russia and the West may be easily transferred into the classical security dilemma in the Eastern European security environment.

## **9.1. Baltic countries in the international arena**

The Baltic countries tend to be prone for the Hobbesian challenge to the Kantian international system. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have formally adapted the post-modern security architecture with the Kantian origin, becoming members in NATO and the EU. Despite their seemingly successful integration with the European structures, the commitment of Baltic states to the post-modern Kantian security culture is vulnerable. The strengthening of Russia that took place in the first decade of the twenty-first century has negatively influenced the Baltic-Russian relationship. Following NATO and EU enlargement, the Baltic countries have been expected to present more calm views towards Russia. However, this has not happen. Väyrynen (1999, 216) notes that due to historical reasons, the Baltic states securitize their relations with Russia, which causes that their relations with the West have been simultaneously translated into security terms. The tense atmosphere in their relations with Russia makes them more supportive of Cold War bipolarity and the Hobbesian security culture, whereupon Russia was commonly recognized as a major opponent to NATO.

A tense atmosphere in bilateral relations with Russia characterizes all three Baltic countries, though there are some differences in political aspects between the three. Estonia's relations with Russia found themselves at the lowest point after the annulment of the border agreement and the "Bronze Soldier" monument drama. Latvia has had more progress in her bilateral relationship with Russia, signing a border agreement in March 2007. At the same time, Latvia experienced serious economic difficulties during the global economic crisis, consequences of which could potentially increase ethnic tensions as Latvia has a large number of ethnic Russian population in her territory.

Lithuania owes just the small number of ethnic Russians living within its borders. After the restoration of independence, Lithuania granted citizenship for all permanent residents and the card of Russian minority, often increasing tensions between Russia and the Baltic countries, cannot be easily used against her. Although bilateral relationship between Lithuania and Russia did not survive major clashes as it does not suffer by the Russian minority problem, it maintains some tensions in the daily political discourse. Former President of Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus expressed views that refer to maintaining conflict with Russia if the latter does not follow the same values as the Euro-Atlantic countries, stating "the relationship of the international community with Russia should correspond to the level of Russia's readiness to commit to the international community" (President of the Republic of Lithuania 2008). There is a geopolitical vulnerability, because Lithuania is bordering with the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad (Bult 2006, 133; Budryte 2006, 68). The transit between Kaliningrad and the main territory of Russia has been solved by agreements. In 2002, Russia and the EU signed the *Joint Statement on Transit between the Kaliningrad Region and the Rest of the Russian Federation*.

The geopolitical situation in the Baltic security environment has changed, after the Baltic states joined NATO. Considering its military capability, NATO remains the most capable 'hard' security guarantee in the region, although the position of the EU is gradually strengthening. As the influence of the Hobbesian security culture to the Baltic security environment is still remarkable, a military security of actors matters. Larrabee (2005, 66) pointed out that the EU does not have the capability and the intention to defend the Baltic states in case they would stand against a serious military threat to their security and NATO, contrariwise, is the only considerable force to manage such situations.

As much the Baltic countries have misperceptions against Russia's intentions in the region, Russia mistrusts NATO intentions as well. The enlargement of European Union to the Baltic states has been received calmly by Russia. NATO enlargement, however, has caused some fears from the Russia's side, which still considers NATO as a military alliance directed against Russia. There are multiple manifestations of misperceptions regarding NATO enlargement to the Baltic states in the rhetoric of Russian officials. President Medvedev has said that no state can be pleased having representatives of a military bloc to which it does not belong coming close to its borders (Steinbock 2008, 206). Medvedev's words confirm the existence of cooperative security dilemma

between Russia and other countries in the region as Russia remains to be a sole actor outside of EU/NATO framework in the Baltic area.

Russian attitude vis-à-vis NATO as a military bloc hostile towards Russia is comparable to an earlier vision of the Soviet Union of a similar kind. At the same time, the memory-influenced policy of the Baltic countries helps Russia to maintain her modern understanding of security. The Baltic countries often criticize Russia's great-power behavior without offering a constructive solution for the existing security dilemma that may lead to the construction of Russia as an eternal enemy. Due to the often used Hobbesian rhetoric, the Baltic states have not been to very successful in using their membership in NATO and the EU for mitigating Russia's misperceptions and the security dilemma between Russia and the Baltic states may vary from the classical Hobbesian security dilemma to the cooperative identity dilemma.

The development of the Baltic (or Estonian) security identity has been recently discussed by Merje Kuus (2007), Maria Mälksoo (2009), Olav Knudsen (2007), Frank Möller (2007) and others. They overwhelmingly define the Baltic-Russia conflict as an identity dilemma between the Kantian culture of West and the Hobbesian culture of Russia, emphasizing the membership of the Baltic states in the Kantian institutions as a dominant factor determining their identity. The classical security dilemma between the Baltic countries and Russia seems to be underestimated. Merje Kuus (2003, 19–20) argues that “security in Estonia has been reconfigured from a narrow military issue into a broad and flexible category linked to culture and identity”. Toomas Riim (2006, 54) indicates that accession to NATO caused replacement of the national identity based on nation-state with the collective identity based on membership in the security communities.

There are other evidences confirming that the Kantian security culture, practiced by the Western security communities, does not fit with the Baltic misperceptions towards Russia, which may cause a certain degree of cautiousness regarding the political processes dominant in Europe. The Baltic states do not actively participate in forming the European identity but prefer to be positioned themselves as “the embodiment of the liminality in the European self-image” (Mälksoo 2006, 288). There exists a fear that the West does not understand Russia's aggressive intentions against the Baltic states and in its attempts to manage asymmetric threats (i.e. international terrorism) may overlook from the classical security threats proceeded from the Hobbesian enmity and rivalry of states. In the security-related discourse of the Baltic countries, the acknowledgement of the asymmetric threats has been to great extent connected with the influence of normative regulations set up by the Western security communities – NATO and the European Union.

Nevertheless, after the accession of the Baltic states to NATO and the EU, their confrontation with Russia rather strengthened than vanished. Frank Möller (2007) correctly points out that the main reason for these tensions comes from history. History frequently remains to be an influential player in interstate relations. The myths, narratives, and traditions constitute group beliefs that in their turn would construct ‘collective memories’ (Wendt 1999, 163). Collective

knowledge fostered by collective memory may create favorable conditions for the emerging conflict in the particular security environment. Alexander Wendt (1999, 162) realizes that collective knowledge depends on beliefs that induce the actors to engage in practices. A collective knowledge as a cognitive phenomenon often lies on self-reinforcing mechanisms, where distrust creates more distrust and trust is able to produce more trust (Bengtsson 2000, 383). Collective memory of the Baltic countries forms a much stronger association with possible threats coming from Russia and therefore, during their accession to NATO, “the recurrent representation of Russia as a threat to Baltic security had to be adapted to the modes prevalent in NATO representation of Russia as a partner” (Möller 2007, 310). The latter case indicates to the requirement of cultural change from the Hobbesian to the Kantian one, which needs to overcoming present security dilemmas.

Geopolitically, the Baltic states seem to be gruelingly defensible, caused by their proximity to Russian military ambitions and their small size. The assumed indefensibility of the Baltic states has determined the further development of their national defense systems (Dörfer 1997, 79). The security practices and the security-related political discourses of the Baltic states have often retained the Hobbesian background. Fears that NATO might renounce the principle of collective defense and there are no plans for defense of the Baltic countries against the potential aggression from Russia frequently sounded in the public debates of the Baltic countries. For example, the Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė called NATO to elaborate comprehensive defense plans for the Baltic states, indicating that other allies have acquired such plans, including their neighbor Poland (EarthTimes 2009). The instant claims towards NATO to be prepared against Russia’s attacks remember the Cold War rhetoric and indicate that not only the identity dilemma, but also the classical security dilemma between the Baltic countries and Russia does exist.

There are many cultural similarities between the Russian and the Baltic societies. Russian historian Leonid Mletchin (2007) claims that the Baltic countries wish to achieve self-confidence for performing as sovereign states in contrasting with Russia. They still live with their complexes – they fear to express freely; they fear to make fun of themselves; and they do not think highly of themselves. Russia, again, has been traditionally patronizing against small states and prefers to solve all possible problems among great powers like the United States, Germany and France. In addition, comparing with some other previous Soviet republics, Baltic states seem to be easier to criticize as these countries follow democratic principles and therefore would be more open for critics.

It is still unpredictable when the Baltic states will realize that their policy towards Russia is creating a conflict between their security identity and the EU one (Kvarnö and Rasmussen 2005, 91). The security cultures of the Baltic states cannot be identified unambiguously as the Kantian security cultures and the influences of the Hobbesian culture in their security-related discourses are recognizable, which would cause a variation how much the dilemma between the Baltic states and Russia is the identity dilemma and when it would be easily

transferred to the classical security dilemma. There may be some features of the classic security dilemma, though there are also characteristics of the cooperative security dilemma occurring between antagonizing identities.

## **9.2. Russia and the Kantian international system**

Russia's political and security culture appears to be tied with identity dilemma towards the Kantian international system. Russia sets herself outside of the post-modern security system and identifies herself as a competing power to NATO and the EU. Moreover, Russia sets herself as the Hobbesian power in the Kantian security environment and recognizes the current security architecture in Europe as a Hobbesian framework.<sup>64</sup> Russia is a leading nation in a separate security arrangement of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), established on the basis of former Soviet Republics. The establishment of CSTO still corresponds to the structure of hegemonic security community, where Russia's political and military influence has a considerable strength.

There are some historical paradoxes that make Russia's political intentions more difficultly to be predicted that can still cause troubles and misperceptions for her neighbors. Proximity to Russia, the only unconsolidated democracy in the region, still strongly influences the presence of various security dilemmas in the Baltic Rim. Russia is the only country in the Baltic Sea security environment not involved with the Kantian integration in Europe. A majority of Baltic Sea countries have common borders with Russia (Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland). Although no country in the region officially recognizes Russia as a security concern, in the daily security discourse the country is often named as a potential security threat, especially in the Baltic countries owing to their fundamental historical disputes with Russia. The Baltic countries have to balance themselves between the Kantian West and the Hobbesian Russia.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has gradually started to restore its positions as a great power at the European neighborhood. This trend has been followed by the Russia's increasing role as one of the biggest energy providers to Europe, which on the one hand, has facilitated Russia's prospects to strengthen its positions as a great power, but on the other hand, has decelerated internal democratization process. Edward Luttwak states that Russia is moving from unconsolidated democracy to autocracy (Kolga, 2006).

There are significant cultural divergences between Russia and the West, including their definition to liberal democracy. Russia's definition of democracy differs to some degree from the standard Western ideal of liberal democracy. The question, to which extent Russia shares democratic values, is still

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<sup>64</sup> There have been several initiatives made by Russia in 2000s, for example an initiative for All-European Security Pact, made by President Medvedev during his visit to Berlin in 2008.

[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=33701](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33701)



highly contestable as they tend to define international policy in the traditional Hobbesian terms keeping spheres of influence in a significant position of their security policy practices. Russia, though on some counts it may be considered a democracy, can nevertheless hardly pretend to be called a stable liberal democracy. Authoritarian tendencies in the country have strengthened during the second presidency of Vladimir Putin, during which time the economic situation of the country has improved due to high oil prices, and Russia has clearly shown its intent to restore its one-time position as a superpower.

Russia's suspicions towards the West and the Kantian international system make the system vulnerable for serious Hobbesian challenges. Russia has sometimes positioned her against the system, for example in the case of Serbia or Iran. Russia defended the regime of Milosevic against international condemnation due to the violation of human rights and developed a nuclear cooperation with Iran, which has intentions to develop a nuclear weapon.

The success of the particular security environment in transcending cooperative security dilemmas depend on that how successfully actors will be included to the regional security mechanisms. The cooperation within the Partnership for Peace program and the European Neighborhood policy offer some opportunities to overcome the problem in Europe and its neighborhood. However, holding stability in Europe seems anyhow to be impossible without interactive relationship and reliable communication procedures with Russia.

Regarding to the Baltic Sea security environment, there exists the identity dilemma between the Kantian actors and Russia, still trying to keep alive the Hobbesian security culture. Helmut Hubel points out that "despite all positive achievements during the 1990s, Russia's participation in Baltic Sea cooperation continues to be a major problem for developing balanced and stable interactions among partners" (Hubel 2004, 290). The durability of a security dilemma depends on measures used to cope with existing misperceptions. Russia, not being party to any pluralistic security community, may provoke security dilemmas vis-à-vis her neighbors. There is an option to maintain Russia as a permanent security concern by embedding security dilemmas between Russia and her neighbors. Another option is trying to find expedient ways that would make Russia co-responsible for regional security issues.

The associations of the Baltic countries related to Russia are fear-dominated, which makes difficult to manage a security dilemma between them. The confrontation between Russia and Baltic countries seems to be continuing. As already noted, the accession of the Baltic countries to the European security communities did not end the security dilemma between them and Russia.

However, the policies of the Baltic states, most notably of Estonia and Latvia, towards Russia seem to have somewhat changed after the EU-membership has been attained. Instead of continuing to normalize relations with Russia, a more confrontational policy line can arguably be identified... The irony of the argument is that the more confrontational political stance is fuelled and mirrored by Russian President Vladimir Putin's still more confrontational rhetoric in his

political stance towards the Baltic states and their membership of NATO in particular (Kvarnö and Rasmussen 2005, 190).

The dissonances in mutual communication may often lead to confrontation. Russia presents a cooperative security dilemma in the context of the Kantian international system as well as various security dilemmas in the context of multiple regional security environments. As a Hobbesian power, Russia intends to play a role of a security-architecture-maker as in Europe as well in the regional security environments. The Hobbesian constructions, similar to the good old Nordic Balance, can be awakened again if there will emerge polarized systems. There is a security dilemma for the West, how to manage relation with the Hobbesian security environments (i.e. Russia), either to establish cooperative partnership and dialogue or to lead towards confrontation?

Excluding Russia from cooperative security frameworks undoubtedly creates a classical security dilemma and we return to the Cold War security system of antagonistic security communities. During the Cold War, the US President Gerald Ford made his immortal remark that detente must be a two-way street (Address by President Gerald R. Ford 1975). However, if we identify Russia as a potential security destabilizer, causing problems that decrease security of others, there must be a solution for neutralizing such threat. There are possibilities for including Russia into the existing security architecture through cooperative security arrangements and/or regional security. Russia's integration into the Western security system cannot either be a one-way street, attempting to ignore their Hobbesian security preferences, but the solution can base on mutual interest for stable peace.

The era characterized by the Hobbesian rhetoric of Presidents Bush and Putin has followed by the new era where the Kantian discourse in international affairs prevails, promoted by President Obama and often supported by President Medvedev. The Kantian system is reviving from the Hobbesian challenge of 2000s but it is still vulnerable for further challenges. First of all, the economic crisis is recovering slowly after the great depression in 2000s and may still cause a return of the Hobbesian spirits especially in the United States.

### **9.3. Estonia between the Kantian and the Hobbesian security culture.**

Erik Männik (2005) describes Estonia's security environment as a dilemma – Estonia has to make choices when balancing between the short-term imminent concerns and long-term security gains. A significant part of the Estonian society<sup>65</sup> still recognizes unidentified threats from Russia to its sovereignty as a considerable if not the most important security risk. Therefore, similar misperceptions distinguishable in the Russia's political discourse towards NATO may be found from the Estonian political discourse in connection with Russia.

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<sup>65</sup> It is different from the Estonia's official position

For example, Major General<sup>66</sup> Ants Laaneots, when became a new Chief of Defense of Estonia at end of 2006, has stated in interview given to the Estonian newspaper “Eesti Päevaleht” that Russia is an unfriendly country that creates security problems for its neighbors (Kook 2006).

Therefore, the Cold War trends of bipolarity where the Western institutions opposed the Soviet Union (or currently its successor state Russia) seem to be more coherent for the Estonian society regarding its security concerns closely related to its historic memory and the Estonian security identity applies for being rather characteristic to the Hobbesian modern society than to the Kantian post-modern society.

The values expressed by the Western liberal democratic security communities and the Kantian security culture have irrefutably had a strong influence to the development of Estonia’s own security culture after the restoration of sovereignty. The consistence of the Estonian security culture includes adopted Western norms and values mixed with some irrational beliefs and proceedings from its controversial security identity, split between the Hobbesian and the Kantian understandings. The establishment of strong Kantian security communities in Europe and the promotion of cooperative security arrangements have always been of Estonia’s main interests.

However, following security- and defense related discourses in Estonia, the adoption of Western values does not appear to be so easily accepted within the society. Trends emphasizing non-alignment and carefulness towards the European institutionalization or referring to a special situation of Estonia between the Western and the Orthodox civilizations have been relatively competitive at least within some political movements. Anti-integrationism and non-alignment are closely related to the peculiarity of the Estonian ethno-nationalism.<sup>67</sup> The Estonian ethno-nationalism still refers to feature an ethnic nationalism of minority group and the Western definition of nation-state (where the term ‘*nation*’ is defined through citizenship) is quite new phenomenon attached to the Estonian society (Kuus 2007, 71–72).

A remarkable change has been recently taken place concerning the identification of the dominant-nation in the Estonian society. During the Soviet annexation, Russians and Russian-speaking people have met a special status reflection their leading position in the Soviet society though they did not constitute a majority in numbers in this particular area. Hence their leading role in the Soviet society has been clearly comparable with the role of dominant-nation within the nation-state. Their position has changed to being a minority group when sovereignty has been restored in 1991. Contrariwise, the Estonians have had just a little historical experience of being a dominant-nation – just in 1918–40 and since 1991. Therefore, ‘the lack of experience’ in adopting their roles within the society may force dissonances between ethnic identities.

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<sup>66</sup> From 2008, Lieutenant-General

<sup>67</sup> The term “ethno-nationalism” is used to distinguish ethnic nationalism from state-based patriotism (Kellas 1991, 3).

The anti-integrationist tendencies in the Estonian security and defense culture have their roots in orientation policy (bandwagoning) and neutrality practiced in Estonia's foreign relations before the World War II, while Estonia exercised mainly two security policy options. First, Estonia has decided to remain neutral in competition between great powers. Second, Estonia shaped its foreign policy following bandwagoning policies towards different great powers. The Estonian security policy in 1921–1940 proceeded prevalently from the Hobbesian culture. The political preferences varied between the British orientation and the German orientation with the French orientation and the Polish orientation also manifested.

The orientation policy relies on the realist doctrines of balancing and bandwagoning, whereas Estonia as a small state preferred to bandwagon with some influential powers (e.g. the United Kingdom or Germany) in hoping to balance other powers considered to being a threat to their security (in the first place, of course, the Soviet Union). Estonia's security policy was oriented initially towards the United Kingdom, but from the second half of 1930s this orientation moved towards Germany. In 1939, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Soviet Union and Germany, Estonia was forced to move into sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, which direction finally concluded with annexation in 1940.<sup>68</sup>

Since 1991, after the sovereignty of the Republic of Estonia over its territory was restored, Estonia had to rebuild its defense system from the scratch. Kai-Helin Kaldas (2006, 95) correctly pointed out that Estonia had basically three available security policy options at this time: 1) the neutrality option; 2) promoting regional cooperation with neighboring countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Finland); 3) integration with Western security institutions such as the European Union, the Western European Union, NATO. There was also an additional option for integration with the security system based on the cooperation between former republics of the Soviet Union. However, this was not in accordance with her foreign policy goals and thus may be considered as unacceptable for the majority of society as political leaders as well, except probably the local Russian minority interested in close cooperation between neighboring countries.

Examining the development of Estonian security culture in the post-Cold War era, post-modern trends favoring cooperative and collective security models have been dominated over the pre-war orientation policy and neutrality, but a strong influence of the Finnish military mindset to the evolvement of the Estonian security identity could be also identified, especially in setting up defense postures. These two parallel but sometimes controversial developments based on the Kantian values and the specific Finnish security culture have often promoted different understandings how to elaborate the most effective security

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<sup>68</sup> Besides major orientations described here, also some other options existed, for example French orientation (supported by former Foreign Minister Kaarel Robert Pusta), Polish orientation etc.

system for Estonia and sometimes these competing ideas have caused mis-perceptions in basic understandings while determining Estonia's security goals.

The nationalist ideology and the Hobbesian political culture follow similar logics, causing the ignorance towards other cultures. After the membership in the EU and NATO, the nationalist influence to the Estonian society has strengthened. Tanel Vallimäe (2009) has admitted the increasing influence of the nationalist ideology to the Estonian society.

The subject of nationalism has begun to generate a similar discomfort as in the course of the previous regime. There is an enhanced readiness to analyze the society through the matrix of provocateurs, ignorants, offenders and victims, which seems to be able to find the enemy everywhere. Surprisingly it appears that you can solve simultaneously a certain interpretation of history, as well as inter-ethnic issues.

In security terms, the Estonian nationalism highlights the independent defense, similar to the case of Finland during the Cold War, because the Western institutions cannot be trusted as they might be friendly towards Russia and do not understand the Estonian security concerns. By the nationalist political culture, Russia has to be seen as an eternal enemy of Estonia and NATO (as the European Union as well) can be partners of Estonia that would help to balance the Russian power. Idealizing the Hobbesian world order, the nationalist security culture tends to trust the military capability of the United State more than NATO or the EU capabilities, as there can be seen more potentiality to stand against Russia's inevitable aggression. The euro-centric political culture stems from the Kantian culture prevailing in the European Union and NATO and is oriented towards the closer integration with the European institutions and the Western civilization.

**Table 16:** Two security cultures in Estonia

	<i>Nationalist</i>	<i>Euro-centric</i>
<i>Basic culture</i>	Hobbesian	Kantian
<i>The ideal-type of the Estonian society</i>	Nation-state	Citizen society
<i>Relationship with the EU and NATO</i>	Partnership in the alliance of nation-states	Membership of community
<i>The international society should be</i>	Anarchy	Society
<i>Preferred international system</i>	Polarity	Stable liberal society
<i>Relationship towards Russia</i>	Enmity	Cooperation
<i>The most actual international problem</i>	Russia	Stable political, economic, social and security environment
<i>National priority</i>	Military security	Welfare society
<i>Preferred type of society</i>	Authoritarian	Liberal democratic
<i>The position of armed forces in the society</i>	Social class	Civilian control

As a result of competition between nationalist and euro-centric cultures, there are basically four general options for the contemporary Estonian society in shaping its strategic goals:

- The trans-Atlantic option: Favors participation in the European security communities; is supportive to the cooperative security options; emphasizes special relationship with the United States and trusts NATO military capabilities more than the EU political capabilities.
- The euro-centric option: Favors participation in the European security communities; is supportive to the cooperative security options; favors further integration to the European Union including federation or confederation.
- The anti-integrationist option: Is skeptic to participation in the European security communities; favors staying outside of the European Union; is rather skeptic to the cooperative security options; supportive to independent self-defense and self-help; tends rather to promote regional cooperation with countries with similar security concerns; trusts the United States military capabilities more than NATO.
- The eastern option: Is skeptic to participation in the European security communities; is rather skeptic to the cooperative security options; prefers to promote special relationship with Russia.

First two options are oriented to the further integration into the European security communities. Trans-Atlanticists tend to be more concerned with military threats and therefore they prioritize NATO membership over the participation in the CSDP. They also identify the United States as a major military power in the contemporary world and often treat the current international system as the unipolar Hobbesian system. Euro-centrists tend to pay more attention to asymmetric threats and less attention to identifying enemies than representatives of other options. They prefer more profound integration with the European institutions, especially with the European Union as mutually beneficial for both, the Europe and Estonia.

Anti-integrationism has been frequently influenced by the streams of the Estonian ethno-nationalism. Anti-integrationist and Eastern options tend to value the individual defense above the collective defense and regional security initiatives above other cooperative security options. By anti-integrationists, in the regional security environment, actors can ‘understand’ our security concerns. Anti-integrationists may consider the Baltic cooperation and cooperation with Finland as alternative to the European integration, are rather cautious towards the European Union, and they tend to take membership in NATO as a temporary necessity driving parallels with the Hobbesian military alliances and coalitions. Supporters of the Eastern option, mainly local ethnic Russians, foresee good-neighborly relationship with Russia as a main security guarantee for the country and tend to be also skeptic what concerns further integration with the European institutions, especially with NATO.

There may be also mixed groupings in supporting different options – trans-Atlantic-isolationist; isolationist-eastern; and trans-Atlantic/euro-centric directions. From the major political parties of Estonia<sup>69</sup>, the Reform Party (i.e. Ligi 2006, 2007), the Social Democrats (i.e. Mikser 2007) and the Greens (erakond Eesti Rohelised põhiseisukohad) tend to represent trans-Atlantic/euro-centric options. The Kantian security culture is in a dominant position in security policy preferences of these three parties. The Fatherland and Res Publica Union (i.e. Velliste 2006, Kõuts 2007) generally follows the trans-Atlantic-isolationist line; the Central Party (i.e. Savisaar 2006) is split between the isolationist and Eastern option, and the People's Union (i.e. J.Männik 2006, Tammsaar 2005) tends to be mostly anti-integrationist. These parties tend to follow the Hobbesian approach in general.<sup>70</sup>

There may be differences between the official trans-Atlantic/euro-centric approach to security emphasizing the further integration with the Western security communities and public expectations and understandings of security needs that would be influenced by anti-integrationist option. The conflict between the trans-Atlantic/euro-centric and anti-integrationist/nationalist security understandings conveys historical memory of many Estonians that consider forthcoming military conflict between Estonia and Russia inevitable, which often describes security-related discourses in Estonia.

The debate between nationalists and euro-centrists in the Estonian security-related discourse has been concentrated on some burning issues related to defense postures. The conscription issue has been very sensitive in this case, and the general discussion about the necessity of conscription has not been tolerated by the most of political movements. The attempts to increase civilian control over the military<sup>71</sup> have been fueled the public debate caused by a fear to diminish the role of militaries within the society. The increase of military expenditures to 2% of GDP has also received a remarkable support within the society, even despite the economic crisis.<sup>72</sup>

The trust towards collective defense and Western institutions has been often criticized by the Estonian nationalists. Trivimi Velliste, a long-time member of the defense commission of the Estonian Parliament, writes (2006) that thoughts war never returns to Estonia, even considering membership in NATO and the EU, are misleading. He refers to the historical experience and he claims such people who talk about universal peace of being Utopists (Velliste 2006). And

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<sup>69</sup> These parties are currently represented in the Estonian Parliament

<sup>70</sup> There may be slight differences between the programmed documents and public discourses from the representatives of political parties, therefore public opinions manifested by leaders of parties have the same relevance.

<sup>71</sup> For example, the initiative of President Ilves in 2007 to take out some military-related proceedings from the Estonian Constitution.  
[http://www.president.ee/et/meedia/ametlikud\\_teated.php?gid=94264](http://www.president.ee/et/meedia/ametlikud_teated.php?gid=94264).

<sup>72</sup> According to the polls 26% of population supports the increase of defense expenditures and only 14% wants these expenditures to be decreased (Avalik arvamus 2010).

lastly, the participation in international peace operations has also split the Estonian society, especially under the circumstances of economic crisis.

While NATO began to discuss about its future in the Kantian security environment, there was a fear emerging again among the Estonians that NATO will give up from the collective defense obligation and Article V of the Washington Treaty. Non-aligned and isolationist tendencies in the Estonian security culture reflect distrust against NATO and EU will and preparedness to defend Estonia in case of potential armed conflict with Russia. The nationalist security culture has been echoed by the retired military officer and writer Leo Kunnas, who became the most prominent shaper of the Estonian military mindset through his regular columns in the daily newspaper "Eesti Päevaleht," but the nationalist mindset has also influenced some other authors writing in security topics.<sup>73</sup>

Well-known US political scientist Edward N. Luttwak recommended to keeping alive security models close to the Finnish Cold War time independent defense and emphasized the special geopolitical position of Estonia (Kuimet 2006). Ethno-nationalist audience warmly welcomed it and Luttwak unconsciously became one of the most cited authors among the supporters of independent defense. Ethno-nationalists tend to be concerned about cooperative and collective security options and they rather emphasize the establishment of independent defense capability for Estonia instead of trusting NATO deterrence.

Keeping in mind the proximity of Russia and their possible imperialistic ambitions against Estonia, conscription and the establishment of so-called reserve army or mass army have been often seen as symbols of increasing will to fight in the armed conflict together with unidentified content of total defense. Estonian society frequently equates principles of total defense with the concept of 'armed people', similar to the Swiss model of national defense. Idea about 'militarized society' became highly popular.

The fear of the Russia's military attack, although not publicly discussed, is still alive in the Estonian society because of the past experience in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For that reason, the idea of highly militarized society, which is prepared against inevitable military attack, could easily attain popularity among the public opinion. Italian novelist Dino Buzzati has described such society very colorfully in his famous novel "The Tartar Steppe" – a society that lives in permanent expectation of attack.<sup>74</sup> At the threshold of parliamentary elections in 2007, some political movements decided to start a campaign against so-called "*palgaarmee*" – "mercenary army" as they called fully professional army. The only remarkable exception supporting professional army was a Reform Party, who won these elections.

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<sup>73</sup> i.e Kunnas 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e, 2008f, 2008g, 2008h, 2009; Helme 2007; Hvostov 2006; Kross 2005.

<sup>74</sup> Novel of Dino Buzzati „Il deserto dei Tartari” (the Tartar Steppe) was firstly published in 1940.



Ardent debates concerning the future developments of defense system have been intensified in 2006. Former Minister of Defense Jürgen Ligi, supporter of the professional system, has been often suspected in destroying the Estonian national defense. For example, leader of the Centre Party Edgar Savisaar charged Ligi with “secret movement towards mercenary army” (Savisaar 2006) after the proclamation of salary reform in the Estonian Defense Forces. Pro Patria and Res Publica Union performed similar accusations. Former head of defense and current member of the Estonian Parliament Tarmo Kõuts (2007) describes army based on conscription as the best guarantee for consolidation of democratic society, best option to handling present-day security threats, and the best option for strengthening connection between citizen and his country. He accused Ligi again in replacing armed forces based on will to fight with a defense system based on monetary relationship (Kõuts 2007).

The conscription issue has moved to being a central issue in building up of the Estonian defense system. Conscription should represent the will of nation to defend their country against external aggression and to participate in the national defense system. Moreover, the conscription enjoys a strong support among the population. On the basis of polls, 90% of population supports maintaining of conscription as a basis of the Estonian Army (Kivirähk 2004).<sup>75</sup> As in December 2006, the professional systems are supported by 19% of Estonian citizens and only by 13% of ethnic Estonians (Avalik arvamus ja riigikaitse 2006). In January 2010, these numbers were respectively 12% and 9%. At the same time only 25% of draftees eligible for military service will actually serve in the Estonian Defense Forces (Kuimet 2006), which trend makes system of conscription ineffective. Polls also show that younger and more educated part of population tends to have more supporters of professional system (Kivirähk 2004).

There are also views expressed mainly by foreign experts that support professionalism in the defense system. For example, another US expert Stanley Sloan recommends professional armies for the European countries, while Estonia should not worry so much about defending its borders but contribute more resources to the participation in international peace operations. The main source of the security will be connected with the NATO ability to create special units that will be able to fight under the different circumstances and small states are not able to create such units on their own (Paris 2007). Jürgen Ligi refers that conscription-based systems have been abandoned or in the process of abandonment in many countries with similar security situation to Estonia – Latvia, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Croatia, the Ukraine, Georgia etc. Directions oriented to the establishment of mass armies are especially dangerous in the present security situation where time, space and material became important (Ligi 2006).

According to the public opinion polls, the Estonian society is generally supportive towards the participation in international peace operations – 59%

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<sup>75</sup> In 2010, respectively 94% of population (Avalik arvamus 2010)

favors and 36% is against it (Avalik arvamus ja riigikaitse 2010). The Estonian participation in the Iraqi operation has been more or less supported by all major political parties except the Centre Party. The Estonian society, however, has been split between supporters and opponents. The Estonian involvement has been often explained by the requirement to get the US guarantees for helping Estonia in the case of Russia's attack. That indicates to the tendency in using culture of fear in justifying political decision-making. Recently, the criticism against the participation in the Afghanistan operation has been also strengthened. For example, retired Brigade General Urmas Roosimägi has openly criticized that Estonia has paid more attention to the participation in the Afghanistan than to other defense subjects, so wasting limited defense resources (Roosimägi 2009).

The establishment of civilian control over the military has been historically painful problem for Estonia, waiting a reliable resolution for a long time. In 1992, when Estonia adopted its new constitution, the armed forces have been subordinated to the President of the Republic, despite the fact that the President has no executive instrument to fulfill this task. Subordination of armed forces to the President followed previous constitution of 1938. During the authoritarian regime of President Päts, military played a significant social role in the Estonian society. Commander-in-chief of armed forces, General Johan Laidoner had in fact a second position in the country after the President because of his support to President Konstantin Päts in coup d'état in 1934. The absence of clearly defined links of subordination between civilian and military authorities responsible for the elaboration and implementation of the tasks of national defense caused a permanent conflict in civilian control issues between Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of Armed Forces that has been lasted more than decade.

Aspirations to NATO have clearly focused the issue of civilian oversight over the military. NATO established criteria for aspirant countries that include "a clear division of authority between the president and government in constitutions, amendments or through public law; parliamentary oversight of the military through control of the defense budget; peacetime government control of general staffs and military commanders through civilian defense ministries; restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness and accountability for the armed forces to be effective" (Simon 1995, 58). Civilian control presumes a strong professionalism among the militaries. Samuel Huntington (1957) characterizes contemporary military at the same meaning as medical doctor or lawyer. On the other hand, Trivimi Velliste (2006) has criticized some principles of civilian control – people who are prepared to die for their country have no right to make political statements. Mr. Velliste also refers to the situation in Denmark, where military have right to participate in the political life and even to be elected to the Parliament.

The public debate in the Estonian society indicates the presence of internal security dilemma. Different cultural identities may find themselves in a similar conflict as it might occur between international actors. In sum, the interstate

polarization may influence the stability of the Estonian society, where the anti-integrationist/nationalist side identifies the integration to the Kantian West as a betrayal of the principles of nation-state. There is a certain cultural overlap concerning neo-conservatives of the United States and nationalists of Estonia. Both follow the same criteria in defining the requirements of their society – patriotism is a necessity; world government is a terrible idea; statesmen should have the ability to accurately distinguish friend from foe; protection of national interests both at home and abroad is above all; the strong military is a necessity (Kristol 2003).

### **9.3.1. Internal and external influences in developing the Estonian security culture – the Estonian ethno-nationalism**

The influence of the Kantian political culture to the Estonian society was strongest in the years 1994–2004, when Estonia, aspiring to join the European Union and NATO, has to consider with the norms, values and practices adapted by these communities. After the accession to the EU and NATO, paradoxically, the Hobbesian nationalist political culture has got more power. There were, of course, external influences that favored the return of the Hobbesian principles to the Estonian security culture. First, the neo-conservative approach of George W. Bush administration in the United States greatly influenced Estonian political culture, as the United States has been identified as the ‘greatest friend’ of the Estonian independence. Secondly, Russia strengthened and started powerfully to use the Hobbesian practices in international relations, which forced Estonia, whose security is in many respect connected with the Russian one, also to move towards accepting the Hobbesian culture in untangling knots of the international politics.

The strengthening of the Estonian ethno-nationalism, as the reaction to the increase of nationalistic tendencies in Russia, has played a central role in this movement. The Estonian nationalism identifies itself through connection between ethnicity and territoriality and follows the ethno-centric principles of Johann Gottfried Herder (Kuus 2007, 71–77). Due to its strong ethno-nationalism, the Estonian society experiences serious difficulties in adopting the Kantian security environment prevailing in the contemporary post-modern Western Europe. Estonian security- and defense-related thinking tends to be still too excessively in the history, somewhere in the middle of 20<sup>th</sup> century. Fifty years behind the “iron curtain” has added a strong ethno-nationalist dimension to the evolution of the Estonian security culture.

History has deeply influenced the Estonian national identity, including its security identity. Therefore, different polarized formations with Russia appear to be more favorable for Estonia. The Estonian society prefers to oppose itself to Russia as much as possible hoping to resolve historical debates with the assistance of Western institutions, and often turning to the polarity-related arguments. Russia, at the same time, has frequently used this opportunity to

charge Estonian policy with proceedings from nationalism, which leads to the endless game about the historical truth between eternal opponents.

Though successfully joined with the Western institutions, Estonia still manages with the imagined requirement to prove itself as an independent country at first to itself and secondly to the rest of the world. It may easily lead to bipolar confrontation with Russia, as that country survives similar processes as Estonia. The similar practice of culture of fear can be called the '*Great Fear*' characterizes both Estonia and Russia, which makes these states and their security-related narratives somehow interdependent from each other (Mölder 2007, 140–143). Russia prefers to see Estonia as a frontline of NATO, still fighting the Cold War with Russia. Estonia lives under the fears of Russia's aggressive intentions to conquer and occupy the country as it has happened many times in history. Estonia can use the Russian example in describing permanent threats to the Western society. Russia can use the Estonian example for being convinced in NATO aggressive intentions against Russia. Undoubtedly, this is not a positive interdependence uniting societies together but interdependence powered by fear.

The roots of the '*Great Fear*' the presumed Russia's military threat strongly lie on the historical experiences. Russia's interest towards the Baltic Sea area has lasted for centuries, which has become a real threat after Novgorod and Pskov were united with Russia in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The '*Great Fear*' has been influenced by the irrational thinking that enables to make emotional factors dominative over rational solutions to transcend security dilemmas. There will emerge a '*moral panic*' – that occurs when a “condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests” (Cohen 1973, 9). If the culture of fear is empowered by populist politicians from both sides, it may lead to the eternal security dilemma between two countries. While transferred into sphere of emotions and irrational narratives powered by fear, these dilemmas are most complicated to manage.

There may be several reasons stemming from the Estonian ethno-nationalism and its nationalist political culture that may form suitable preconditions for the blooming of Great Fear. First of all, interactions between two nations through history are causing misperceptions against each other. The Soviet occupation, which ended with annexation and vigorous procedures how it was made, shaped the Estonian historical memory, which respectively influenced the formation of Estonian own security identity. Misperceptions may also come from the psychological environment. History of the Estonian nation includes hundreds of years being under the rule of other nations and only limited time of independent statehood, which has a strong impact to the evolvement of Estonian ethno-nationalism. The Estonian statehood refers rather to being ethnic state than being in accordance with legally defined the Western meaning of nation-state based on citizenship.

There are some influential factors, which might be called mythological. The role of irrational narratives and national mythology in the Estonian security- and defense-related thought is rather obvious. Public attitude to some defense-

related issues is close to being religious. For example, debates about conscription tend to exclude free and open discussions in that topic, because there is an obvious fear for introduction of a 'wrong kind of defense'. The Estonian defense-related narrative produces understandings that as many men as possible or as many arms as possible helps to create more reliable defense as political measures could do. This corresponds to the neo-conservative postulates that the strong military is the primary guarantee of national security.

The meaning of territory has been very important for the Estonians throughout their history. Land ownership has been a fortune that the Estonian peasants have received just in the 19<sup>th</sup> century after the long-time serfdom. This opportunity influenced the Estonian self-consciousness and the development of the Estonian society. The loss of Petserimaa County to Russia as a result of the World War II is a perfect historical example still painfully survived even if Estonia ethnically strengthened after that. The significant role of the territory also means that the occupation of the Estonian territory has been frequently treated as a main security threat against Estonia.

On the basis of these misperceptions, it would be concluded that irrational thinking might constitute a serious security risk as it often looks for popular and emotional solutions instead of reasonable ones.<sup>76</sup> Historian David Vseviov (2005) characterized Estonia-Russia relationship in the post-Cold War era as a 'triumph of unreality'. Irrational narratives just feed the 'Great Fear' that still causes competitiveness between different security options in Estonia. Many of these motives are related to neighboring Russia that makes good-neighborly relationship between those countries extremely complicated even if consolidated democracy wins in Russia in the future. Even democratic Russia may still be a great power.

Tensions in the Estonia-Russia relationship constantly appeared after the re-independence has been gained. Even during the Western-oriented Russian governments, bilateral relations can be described by the Hobbesian fears of enmity, rivalry and competition. In 2004, hence Estonia finally returned to the Western world and entered into the European Union and NATO, it seems that Estonia started to lose the idea of its existence and nationalist tendencies even strengthened in the society. The goal for what Estonia has been fought for many years, has been just fulfilled, which caused the revival of ethno-nationalism promoting irrational motives for the Estonian identity. Nationalist symbolism seems to offer cure for societal changes where myths and constructions of historic memory may fill vacuum between the current instability and glorious past. The parallels may be identified with similar processes that took place in

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<sup>76</sup> Irrational thinking has dominated over the rationality in cases of Argentina's behaviour in Falkland crisis in 1982 or Iraqi's attack against Kuwait in 1991, referring to the most extreme examples.

Russia where the strengthening of the country was accompanied with the wish to seek more powerful identity and return to sources of the Soviet Union.<sup>77</sup>

The nationalist paradigms often evoking in the Estonian society would make extremely complicated to follow the Kantian principles of the Western institutions, because there is always a fear that somebody would cheat you. The official line of the Estonian foreign policy still tends to follow more euro-centric than nationalist guidelines, hoping to find balances between two options. Deputy Undersecretary of MFA, Harri Tiido (2008), recognizes the risk to become a Russophobic so called 'one-issue country'. From time to time, there will appear a tendency to oppose itself to Russia in every single issue and to decide about friends and foes on the basis of their attitude towards Russia. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, Urmas Paet (2008), has noted that the extreme foreign policy towards Russia would be rather counterproductive and negotiations are more productive in solving problems than ultimatums. By accepting values of the Kantian security culture, which is practiced in the Western liberal democratic security communities, Estonia has an opportunity to decrease the influence of ethno-nationalism to its security culture and thus to avoid the Hobbesian security risks.

### **9.3.2. The influence of Finnish security culture**

Despite the fact that since 1991 Estonia's official security and defense policy has been a Western-oriented, anti-integrationist security options still retain their impact to the Estonian strategic culture. After the restoration of statehood, there has been a significant influence of the Finnish military culture to the Estonian one, especially in shaping the Estonian military mind. Hence the state sovereignty has been restored Estonia has had good and extensive military cooperation with former neutral countries. The security models of former neutrals Finland and Switzerland, which based on doctrines of independent defense, armed nation and their will to fight in the case of armed conflict, have been highly popular in Estonia especially in 1990s when the accession to NATO and the European Union has been frequently considered as an unrealistic goal.

As described in the previous chapter, the Finnish society has generally adapted the Kantian principles of post-modern international system, but prefers to keep its Hobbesian defense postures. Therefore, the Finnish strategic culture, especially her military culture, is still struggling with the influence of the Cold War Cold War non-alignment option. In security-related issues, the Finnish strategic culture favors the more Kantian approach, actively participates in international operations, in the CDSP framework and develops the active partnership with NATO.

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<sup>77</sup> For example, the re-establishment of the Soviet anthem as the Russian national anthem clearly symbolizes this tendency.

Henrikki Heikka (2005, 94) notifies the special role of Russia in the Finnish strategic culture, defining that “the basic dilemma of Finnish strategic planners in the post-Cold War years remained proximity to Russia, which maintained, by Finnish standards, a relatively large military potential in areas adjacent to Finland.” However, even if Finland indirectly recognizes security concerns stemming from Russia, she uses the Kantian methods in the security dilemma management through cooperation and consultation between the countries. In its military mindset, Finland has been reluctant for significant changes and much slower in progressing towards the Kantian postures.

The neighboring countries although have chosen different ways for interacting with the Western security communities. Estonia has favored accession to NATO, while Finland has decided to promote partnership with NATO without considering membership in the near future. The Finns also support the development of defense and security pillar of the European Union, though non-aligned defense options are still strong in Finland. Heikka (2005, 94) recognizes that “main documents on the Finnish grand strategy since the end of the Cold War reflect a consistent Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy, while retaining homeland defense, the hard-core of self-government, in Finnish hands.” Therefore, simultaneously practicing the Hobbesian security culture through independent defense postures and the Kantian security culture through participation in the CSDP and the NATO partnership, Finland similarly to neighboring Estonia faces the internal identity dilemma, balancing between two options in its strategic culture, one of them favoring NATO membership and another option favoring non-alignment.

The arguments of nationalist criticism against the official defense policy in Estonia are in fact close to the arguments presented in Finland in order to oppose the Finnish membership in NATO. Returning to some fears described by Tomas Ries in the case of the Finnish society (1999, 5): membership leads to developing the wrong kind of defense; membership costs too much; membership isolates people from defense; membership prevents the return of territories, some of those arguments have been used in Estonian defense-related circles favoring non-aligned options. The Estonian anti-integrationists also emphasize fears about the isolation of people from defense and the development of wrong kind of defense, which does not consider a special geopolitical situation of Estonia.

The Finnish strategic culture has deeply influenced the emergence of the Estonian security identity but it is just one pillar of many describing close relationship between two nations. Finland and Estonia have had historically close relationship since 19<sup>th</sup> century while the growth of Estonian and Finnish national self-consciousness finally led to the establishment of nation-states at the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century. Both countries achieved their independence from Russia after the collapse of Russian short-term democracy in 1917, when the

Bolsheviks came to power and Russia entered to the cycle of domestic wars.<sup>78</sup> During the World War II, both countries have had fallen under the imperialistic intentions from the Soviet Union with the major difference between the two that Finland was able to maintain its independence, but Estonia was not. Peeter Vihalemm (1997, 191) interprets special relationship that “relations with Finland have had a specific influence to the Estonian society depending on closeness in language and geographical neighborhood. Finland is clearly a dominant country in Estonia’s economic and cultural space as well as in the space of personal contacts”.

In 1990s, Finland has gained a leading position in the assistance to the Estonian Defense Forces (EDF), which lasted up to NATO launched the Membership Action Plan for Estonia among other aspirant nations in 1999. Finland was a main contributor to the Estonian military education and has educated many Estonian officers and non-commissioned officers. First Estonia’s non-commissioned officers graduated in the Lappeenranta Military School in December 1992. In 1994, first ten coming officers graduated from the Santahamina Military College in June 1994 and first two naval officers from the Finnish Naval Academy in 1996. Since 1998, a significant number of Estonian military leaders (including Lieutenant General Johannes Kert, Vice Admiral Tarmo Kõuts, Lieutenant General Ants Laaneots etc) have graduated in the special training course for the EDF leadership. In 1996, a special project for Estonia started, led by retired Lieutenant General Pentti Lehtimäki, in order to assist the rebuilding of the Estonian Defense Forces (Männik 2002).

There have been close relationships between the Finnish and Estonian military leaderships and the Finnish defense posture has been often taken as a suitable model for Estonia. These two countries, Estonia and Finland, are not only culturally close entities, but also their destiny during the last centuries offers many similarities. The geopolitical situation of both countries has been often considered to be quite similar, though both countries frequently practice different options in ensuring its political security. Estonia shares as Finland increasing concerns about possible negative developments in democratization in Russia and therefore wants to be ready for the worst scenario even if it cannot be foreseen in the near future. Trivimi Velliste has described Finland as a very similar country to Estonia by geopolitical situation, while expressing that Russia remains to being a primary security concern of both countries – small state and small nation, similar landscape and presumably same enemy (Velliste 2002).

Despite all these similarities, the anti-integrationism of Estonia has achieved a much stronger challenge than the Finnish one. The Finnish anti-integrationism relies more on tradition and is not influenced by the culture of fear as in the Estonian case. Currently, after Germany started to consider the abandoning of conscription, there has been probably three nations remained in Europe, being reluctant to changing their Hobbesian defense postures – Norway (which has

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<sup>78</sup> Finland achieved her independence from the Bolshevik government in 06.12.1917, and Estonia in 24.02.1918.



always been somehow anti-integrationist), Finland (which is in general Kantian actor) and Estonia (which struggles with the Hobbesian security culture). The influence of Finnish military culture has made difficult for Estonia to understand and accept the Kantian choices of her southern neighbors, Latvia and Lithuania, which abandoned conscription and tend to re-organize their defense systems accordingly to the Western practices, investing to professionalism instead of mass army and qualitative values instead of quantitative values.

### **9.3.3. Membership in NATO and EU**

Estonia has stated in its National Security Concept: “The probability of a military conflict breaking out, that would encompass all of Europe, or the threat of a conflict in the Baltic Sea region has been reduced to a minimum. Membership in NATO and the EU reduces the threat of war for Estonia even more” (National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia 2008). In some extent, this statement indicates that Estonia at least officially has adopted the Kantian principles of NATO and the European Union. Estonian official security policy follows a joint approach binding transatlantic and euro-centric options together and supports the European integration with maintaining strong trans-Atlantic link in NATO and the US military presence in Europe.

Prior to membership, the cooperation and further integration with NATO and the European Union has been held as a high priority for Estonia on the governmental level. For example, up to joining NATO in 2004, Estonia participated practically in all NATO cooperative security initiatives like NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council), Partnership for Peace, PARP (Planning and Review Process), Intensified Dialogue, EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), and Membership Action Plan etc. The importance of European Union in security matters has been just lately recognized with the evolution of CSDP (European Security and Defense Policy), thus NATO as security contributor has had approximately ten years in advance. However, the role of ESDP in the Estonian security culture is growing and Estonia has paid more attention for that participating in the EU Nordic Battle Group or being active in the European Defense Agency. The Estonian involvement in the UN and OSCE security initiatives has been qualitatively modest.

Similar strategic interests and movement towards NATO and EU membership has stimulated the development of the Baltic defense projects (i.e. BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET, BALTDEFCOL), which have played an important role in shaping the Estonian strategic culture. Since 1994, Estonia has been an active contributor to the international peace operations.<sup>79</sup> Estonia has becoming an importer of Western values, expressing a special interest to promote democracy and develop western-like security systems in the former Soviet

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<sup>79</sup> The Nordic countries have traditionally been very active participants in peace operations. This trend is followed by the Baltic countries.

republics, especially in Georgia and Ukraine. All these movements enable Estonia at least on the official level to identifying as a Kantian actor.

Polls show that the Estonian public opinion warmly welcomes accession to NATO. In 1992, 54% of Estonians<sup>80</sup> supported Estonian membership in NATO. In 2000, this number has been grown to 71% and in 2003; membership in NATO was supported by 76% of Estonians (Avalik arvamus 2000–2003). As in December 2006, membership in NATO was supported by 75% of the Estonian citizens, including 88% of ethnic Estonians and 44% of non-Estonians (Avalik arvamus 2006). For January 2010, the support ratings for the membership in NATO have been decreased but not substantially: 68% of citizens, 81% of ethnic Estonians and 39% of non-Estonians (Avalik arvamus 2010).

These polls simultaneously indicate that a belief about inevitable military attack against Estonia has been decreased among the Estonians. In 1992, 70% of Estonians have estimated the military attack against Estonia as highly probable. In 2000, the amount of Estonians presenting that opinion was decreased to 33% and in 2003 already 15% (among non-Estonians these numbers were accordingly 13% in 2000 and 8% in 2003) (Avalik arvamus 2000–2003). For January 2010, only 10% of citizens (Estonians and non-Estonians) believed into a large-scale military attack as being a major threat for the country (Avalik arvamus 2010). Consequently, when membership in NATO has become achievable, people started to feel themselves more secure.

These factors would give an argument for identifying the Estonian society overwhelmingly the Kantian society and at the first glance, there are no troubles for the Kantian security perspective. At the same time many public security- and defense-related discourses described in previous subchapters in the Estonian media emphasize the Hobbesian logic. Therefore, the internal dilemma between two cultures seems to be obvious and even if the Kantian paradigms are popular within the society, there are existing preconditions for a serious Hobbesian challenge. Further integration to the Western structures and European society is overwhelmingly supported within the Estonian society, but elements from the preceding modern international system are strongly rooted to the people's self-consciousness. A special concern is the relationship with Russia, where the negative developments have been dominated over the positive developments during the last years.

#### **9.4. Estonia-Russia dilemma**

The role of Russia in shaping Estonian security identity seems to be shockingly impressive. The presence of “Great Fear” characterizes Estonia's misperceptions against Russia during the entire period after the independence was restored. Similar misperceptions characterize Russia's attitudes towards NATO, which make mutual misperceptions very powerful in the Baltic-Russia security

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<sup>80</sup> ethnic Estonians

environment. Eiki Berg (2007) addresses this confrontation as mutually beneficial animosity that satisfies expectations and fears of the Hobbesian origin strongly manifested in both societies. Both sides seem to be interested in maintaining bipolar polarity and they are not prepared to take advancing steps in bilateral relationship, which controversy may lead to perpetual conflict.

Russia's policy towards Estonia is close to that Edward Luttwak has described as 'armed suasion' (Luttwak 2001).<sup>81</sup> Relying on its military power, Russia forces the culture of fear to in the opposite side, which forces them to use irrational security behavior and promise to create disadvantages to their integration process with the West. Demonstrations of military power near the border or bellicose accusations towards neighbor societies accompanied by emphasizing Russia's national interests and the concept of 'Near Abroad' just feed the 'Great Fear' in the Estonian society. The armed suasion illustrates the Russia-Georgia case in 2008, while the Hobbesian fears have produced the interstate armed conflict. Constant tensions over the South Ossetian territory have been easily transferred into the military activities.

There is a dilemma for Estonia, either to use the Kantian practices for mitigating bilateral tensions through enhancement of cooperative ties like Finland or to choose the Hobbesian way in raising its military capabilities. The general problem in defining so-called Russian threat lies in principal differences for approach – is this threat *Russia* as a country with specific possessive interests against Estonia or will potential threats come *from* Russia? Otherwise, will be accent given to country or threats – might Russia attack Estonia in any occasion or may threats stem from instability and unconsolidated democracy of the Russian society? If the threat is Russia as a country not depending on developments of their society, there is practically no solution for establishing good-neighborly relationship. Estonia takes Russia as enemy with aggressive intentions against it society, Russia, at the same time, refers to Estonia as a member of the military bloc unfriendly towards Russia. There will exist at least theoretical possibilities to solve the conflict, if the security approach also considers misperceptions that actions to increase the own security may cause to the others.

Russia will undoubtedly remain a potential creator for many essential security problems not only bilaterally between Estonia and Russia but also regionally, in Europe and at the Baltic Sea, where the Hobbesian culture practiced by Russia meets the Kantian patterns of the European actors. This danger requires effective policy measures to prevent a possible crisis. So far Estonia did not find convenient solutions for conflict prevention or even did not perform any noteworthy initiatives in making progress in the Russian direction. The constant fear may easily create other fears. If the Russian military attack against Estonia seems to be inevitable and this does not reflect to the official position of NATO that may lead to another misperception creating a security dilemma – are the

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<sup>81</sup> Using military strength in on behalf of state's interests without actual use of force (Luttwak 2001)

Allies indeed willing to defend Estonia? Frequently the Estonian society does not understand why the rest of the Western society does not evaluate the possible Russian threat as highly as the Estonian society and why NATO and the European Union currently highlight other threats than Russia's one.

The situation in the period of 2005–2007 in Russia-Estonia relationship with tensions gradually increasing differs from Latvia's policy towards Russia. Latvia has been very active in Eastern front, keeping in mind the activities of the Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga or border agreement signed in March 26, 2007 without any political statements. Estonia, on the contrary, has decided to hold an old-fashioned polarity between Estonia and Russia and is rather oriented to solve all bilateral problems through the European Union or using support from Washington. This model retains the 'Great Fear' as an important security drive within the Estonian strategic culture, but at the same time, Estonia may remain prone for Russia's armed suasion policy as her security will be more dependent on tensions between two countries.

There were general expectations that Estonia is moving towards self-identification with the dominating Kantian security culture of the Western civilization, after the accession to the Western security communities, the European Union and NATO, has been finally achieved in 2004. However, this prediction is more complicated as it seems at the first glance. The border issue between Estonia and Russia may appear as a strange representation in the rational theories of international relations as it characterizes in its best way the identity dilemma between these countries if not to say between two societies. In 2008, worst assumptions towards Russian political intentions seemed to be realized. History has been a great influencer the Estonian and Russian societies.

Different views to history, though having influenced the development of Estonian-Russian relations throughout the post-Soviet period, increasingly sprang up since 2005 when signing of border agreement failed and the Estonian President decided to not participate at the celebration of the World War II in Moscow while making references to historical reasons. These actions were fiercely reacted from the Russian side, which soon was accompanied by the "Bronze soldier" drama. There are certain similarities in the evolvement of security cultures in both countries – Estonia and Russia. Their involvement to the post-modern security environment is greatly influenced by external processes and the principles of the Kantian society are internally perhaps not completely accepted. Three issues manifest negative trends and culture of fear in Estonia-Russia relationship – the border issue, collective memories and the war of monument and finally Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008.

The still missing border agreement between Estonia and Russia has been among the central issues that has influenced bilateral relationship since 1991. Estonia and Russia first agreed upon the border treaty in 1996 and initialed it in 1999. The border agreement was finally signed on May 18, 2005 but a month later, Russia decided to revoke its signature (Bult 2006, 133–5). At the meantime, strong feelings against the border agreement also appeared in Estonia. Tõnis Lukas (2005), one leader of the nationalist-conservative Fatherland

Union, declared that Russia would be more interested in border agreement because they want to arrange their relations with the European Union and Estonia should wait with the signing procedures. In sum, the Estonian Parliament has unilaterally added the preamble to the agreement that ties it with the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920. Russia declared this action to being unacceptable for them and accused Estonia in owing land claims against Russia. Later, President Medvedev has declared that the border agreement remains to be a general issue that obstacle the improvement of bilateral relationship.<sup>82</sup>

Estonia's official memory from the Tartu Peace Treaty and World War II is significantly diverse from Russia's one. This makes conflict between two historical memories difficultly manageable and a certain degree of mutual will in living with differences would be advisable. In 2007, the Estonian government decided to relocate the 'Bronze Soldier', the Soviet World War II monument in Tallinn from its original location to the military cemetery. This action caused two-days ethnic riots in Tallinn and some other parts with a significant Russian population of Estonia. Moreover, it seriously damaged relationship between two countries. Estonian embassy in Moscow has been blocked by Russian activists. Frank Möller (2007, 239) notes that the "lack of information renders difficult the renegotiation of memories in the light of historical data and documents, and it facilitates the construction of what may be called an official national memory, integrated into or even forming the basis of the idea of the state". These official national memories can in certain situations interact with each other and thus form a high potential for conflict breaking out.

Third major issue negatively influencing the improvement of bilateral relationship between Estonia and Russia stems from armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 over disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Estonia has been one of the strongest supporters of Georgia in their democratization and moving towards the Western civilization. Estonia has been consistently supported Georgia in their disputes with Russia. The military attack against Georgia caused fears in Estonia that similar actions may be also conducted against their country. The Estonian society met some difficulties in distinguishing the Hobbesian society from the Kantian society, which caused some mistrust against security guarantees offered by NATO and the European Union.

Realism identifies the Russian threat to Estonia as a norm, which occurs between states in the Hobbesian anarchy. There are basically two responses Estonia can practice, either to balance the threat with other threats, for example by joining NATO, or to bandwagon with Russia in achieving benefits by constructed 'friendship'. They do not consider the change of cultural paradigms determining bilateral relationship.

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<sup>82</sup> Piirsalu, Jaanus. Venemaa presidendi nõudmine Ilvesele: Eesti muutku piirilepingu teksti. <http://www.epl.ee/artikkel/434005>.

## 9.5. Managing the identity dilemma

At the first glance, the identity dilemma with its fundamental differences (i.e. in culture, in values, in social norms) seems to be a more serious cooperative security dilemma than the integration dilemma. However, this does not mean that the identity dilemma is not manageable and it is not possible to find appropriate cooperative mechanisms that enable “to live with differences”. These mechanisms would aim first and foremost enhanced cooperation and complex interdependence between different cultures that enables to consolidate zones peace and stability.

The success of identity dilemma management would depend on implementation of the Kantian principles into the Hobbesian security environment. In certain security environments, which include both the Hobbesian and the Kantian actors, structural transformation would mitigate the influence of cooperative security dilemma. Booth and Wheeler (2008, 226) mention that “theories of structural transformation have been marginalized by mainstream academic International Relation scholarship” as dreamers, revolutionaries or unrealistic. Cooperative security arrangements can establish permanent links among actors with different cultural origin and thus decrease mistrust and misperceptions between them.

The positive solution for transcending identity dilemma between Estonia and Russia may appear on different levels. There may be bilateral solutions (e.g. the border agreement in the first place) and multilateral opportunities to manage the security dilemma through the European Union and NATO, but also regional mechanisms would be used in certain cases. First level of identity dilemma management is connected the European integration and the influence of Kantian security communities like the EU and NATO to the enhancement of cooperative security and confidence-building measures. The experience of the Western security communities in arranging their partnership strategies would be worthy to learn and implement also in transcending the Estonia-Russia dilemma. The partnership strategies of NATO and the EU have been able to mitigate possible conflicts between the West and its neighborhood. For the first step, Estonia needs to be self-identified as the part of West and to accommodate with practices of the Kantian security culture.

The positive impact of the European Union could be identified in the case of ‘War of Monuments’. The paradox here relies on the situation whereas the identity dilemma can be easily transferred into the classical security dilemma. For example, the Hobbesian practices performed by Estonia would correspond to Russia’s expectations towards NATO, which base on motives of NATO as the anti-Russian military alliance, which makes Estonia-Russia dilemma dependant on the developments of NATO-Russia dilemma. Positive developments in NATO-Russia relationship, again, can give a boost to Estonia-Russia relationship.

The second level of management should be at the regional level. Using the example of the Baltic Sea security environment, the major problem is that the

current security architecture in the region does not support a dialogue with Russia on regional security matters. The lack of multilateral mechanisms and procedures confirms that a cooperative security dilemma between Russia and the Kantian actors is unlikely to vanish in the near future. Attempts to solve regional security concerns through NATO or the European Union have remained relatively weak, because Russia has demonstrated no interest to use these channels to foster mutual interests. At the same time, the bilateral relationship with the greatest military power in the region would be unfavorable for the development of the Kantian security environment as it may create obvious misperceptions among others.

There are still problems creating regional misperceptions and security concerns in the Baltic Sea region – for example, a missing border agreement between Estonia and Russia, but also a planned gas-pipeline between Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea, which has also a specific security dimension. The development of the “Nord Stream” gas pipeline case indicates how the lack of appropriate regional security mechanisms can cause a situation where the security concerns of Baltic countries and Poland have been simply ignored and where bilateral discussions held on this issue have precluded attempts to achieve a consensual approach in the region. There is evidently a lack of regional arrangements that would be used in transcending the misperceptions related to Russia and the identity dilemma. The identity dilemma with its fundamental differences in culture, values, and social norms demands enhanced cooperation and complex interdependence that enables “to live with differences” in the consolidated zones of peace and stability.

The only institution in the Baltic Sea region that involves all countries of the regional security environment as member-states is the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), initiated by Denmark and Germany in 1992. This institution has been established in the spirit of medieval Hanseatic cooperation and includes twelve members (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and the European Commission) and seven observers (the Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, France, Netherlands, and Slovakia). The involvement of the European Union as a member and the United States as an observer makes the institution potentially powerful.

The CBSS has stimulated first of all infrastructural projects, market economy, economic cooperation, trade and investment, the fight against organized crime along with the promotion of political and democratic rights and educational cooperation (Bergman 2006, 80). The influence of this organization upon regional security issues is rather limited and the CBSS has not shown itself to be an effective mechanism to achieving consensus in these areas. The framing a CBSS as strictly a soft security institution derives from the realist security conception under which security is something exceptional and must be outside of an ordinary regional cooperation. Although the CBSS has promoted consultation and cooperation in some security-related fields, it seems to be ineffective

for resolving major security concerns, as the CBSS space of activities is restricted to “soft security” problems’ (Hubel 2004, 289).

The CBSS has a promising framework to overcome the cooperative security dilemma in the Baltic Sea region. However, as a real ‘asecurity community’, this institution prefers to evade the regional security dimension and does not make efforts to mitigate negative effects in this realm. Though practically no actor in northern Europe is interested in a regionally limited security organization, the regional security forum with the participation of Nordic countries, Baltic countries, Russia, Germany and Poland might be an additional possibility for dispute resolution in the Baltic Sea area. There are different evaluations for regional security threats and these differences may stem from different security cultures. The lack of communication between neighbor countries with different institutional affiliations may initiate a security dilemma and regional security forums may be used in order to overcome misperceptions that may cause security dilemmas.

Third level of identity dilemma management refers to bilateral level. This option would be perhaps the most complicated as there will be no international mediation and only the mutual trust would help to manage the dilemma bilaterally. The enhancement of economic and cultural relationship would give a positive impact in this respect. Also, bilateral actions and consultations handling mutual concerns (e.g. environmental, cross-border cooperation) may be used in building up mechanisms of mutual trust and interdependence.

The identity dilemma management between Estonia and Russia requires the Kantian mechanisms exploited accepted by both sides. The role of the European Union and NATO remains profitable in this respect as well as increasing bilateral cooperation and confidence-building. Nevertheless, some specific structural mechanisms in order to compensate the identity dilemma with Russia, which is more or less a security concern for all regional actors, is certainly advisable for the Baltic Sea regional security environment. The concern is, if Estonia identifies the security dilemma with Russia in classical terms, between the Hobbesian actors, her security becomes more dependent on Russia’s security situation.



## 9.6. Summary

The example of Estonia-Russia relationship is certainly an interesting case in security dilemma practices, as it includes the identity dilemma between Russia and the West as well the bilateral classical security dilemma. The internal security dilemma within the Estonia society between integrationists and anti-integrationists adds a specific dimension to this security concern.

Many countries in Europe (i.e. Estonia) still indirectly recognize Russia to be their prime security concern. At the same time, these countries rather prefer to preserve the dilemma, and the region has not been capable to elaborate reliable measures to transcend the identity dilemma with Russia. To this end, the establishment of appropriate regional frameworks should be considered. However, these mechanisms should not be used as an alternative to the current security architecture, but rather as additional cooperative security arrangements with the active involvement of NATO and the European Union. In the meantime, regional security cooperation within the CBSS or another similar framework may be also used to attempt to transcend existing cooperative security dilemmas.

While maintaining the Hobbesian security orientations stemming from the Cold War within the Kantian post-modern society, cooperative security dilemmas may easily appear. There is a significant influence of culture of fear that is able to hinder good-neighborly relations between Estonia and Russia. There should be mutual recognition concerning the existence of security dilemma in order to manage it. If countries are not able to establish cooperative frameworks regarding their relations, a cooperative security dilemma may easily rise as it can be seen through the current case of Russia and Estonia.

The positive solution for transcending identity dilemma between Estonia and Russia may appear on different levels. There may be bilateral solutions (e.g. the border agreement in the first place) and multilateral opportunities to manage the security dilemma (through the European Union and NATO). There may be also regional mechanisms that would be used in certain cases. The positive impact of the European Union could be identified in the case of 'War of Monuments'. At first, effective mechanisms should be applicable for overcoming a classical security dilemma. The paradox here relies on the situation whereas the identity dilemma can be easily transferred into the classical security dilemma. For example, the Hobbesian practices performed by Estonia correspond to Russia's expectations towards NATO. In the next stage, the identity dilemma would be manageable.

## 10. CONCLUSIONS

The nature of security dilemma is closely related to emotional motives like fear and appetite that manifest sense of insecurity and misperceptions. Cultural misperceptions emphasize confrontation between separate identities and therefore would be an inexhaustible source for producing security dilemmas. In the course of the current study, the argument – cooperative security dilemmas are caused by the introduction of the Hobbesian/Lockean security culture into the Kantian security environment – has been examined through various security environments, particularly in the Baltic Sea region. The intension of the author is to elaborate a systemic approach for exploring cultural interactions between the international system and security environments that would help to interpret the argument and its dependence on cultural paradigms.

Theoretically, the dissertation takes a cultural approach to international relations and in its organization stems from the critical security studies. Lately, many theorists (most notably Lebow, Katzenstein, Wendt, and Huntington among others) have noted interrelations between international structures and political cultures, whereas cultural paradigms deeply influence the development of structures. As point of departure, the study sets up two basic security cultures, which are instruments of political cultures, while operating in security environments and facing with security issues – the Hobbesian/Lockean one and the Kantian one. These basic security cultures are closely related to the types of political cultures, which are identified by Alexander Wendt (1999) – the Hobbesian war, the Lockean rivalry and the Kantian security community, in which the first two rely on the conflict of nature and the latter emphasizes the positive impact of cooperation between international actors.

These basic cultures would operate as ideal types. By Lebow (2009, 517), though real societies never correspond to ideal types, the ideal types would be useful instruments for analyzing processes by which societies reveal. This study makes a distinction between a security culture and a strategic culture, while concentrating on the first one of these. Alongside the security culture, which sets general patterns to behavior of actors, there are national responses of each actor to the international system, which would be defined as strategic cultures. The Kantian actors may often proceed from the principles of the Hobbesian or Lockean political culture while regarding to certain issues or vice versa, the Hobbesian actors may use the Kantian practices regarding to the international system. Therefore, the strategic cultures mostly cannot be identified single-valued paradigms as the Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian cultures.

During the research, the development of international system since the modern system established by the Westphalian Peace Accord has been examined. As Lebow (2009, 58) noted on the basis of aforementioned political cultures, Wendt and Hedley Bull posited three types of international systems, in which the political culture of the system depends on dominant cultural identities of actors and their reciprocal interactions. These international systems can change and during the change, prevailing cultural patterns will be replaced with

others. International systems have traditionally been the Western-dominated systems. Other actors can perform interactions towards the system and would be able to influence stability and polarity of the system, but up to now they have not been able to form competing systems to the Western-dominated systems.

The development of international system stems to some extent from two paradigms – stability and polarity. The influence of these factors to the whole system is related to the prevailing political culture. Usually, while systems become unstable, there would be a major conflict or disorder coming up. If one system changes to another system, security dilemmas may easily occur between actors practicing different cultures. The Hobbesian and Lockean systems are polarized systems, while the Lockean system refers to the stable Hobbesian system, where the actors are more interested in maintaining their *status quo* than increasing their power.

Since the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Kantian international systems alternated with the Hobbesian and Lockean systems. Since the first Kantian system, the Versailles system, emerged, there has been a constant competition between the Hobbesian/Lockean culture and the Kantian culture regarding their influence to the international system. The Kantian systems have survived multiple challenges and reverse waves from the Hobbesian culture, while the Hobbesian pressure to the Kantian system strengthens or, in the worst case, the Kantian system would be replaced with the Hobbesian one.

In practical terms, international systems tend to be multicultural, where other cultural environments would exist besides the prevailing culture. The study often uses the term ‘environment’, while describing interactions within the system. The environments should not be necessarily defined by geopolitical terms but they are constructed entities with fuzzy, flexible and imaginable borders, which may shift in time and space. The present-day international system is a global system, which simultaneously refers to a global security environment, and therefore requires that all actors can understand and accept the principles, by which the system operates for maintaining its stability. The Kantian principles of the valid international system do not mean that the global security environment applies to be a community of Kantian actors. However, there can be environments within the system which rely on the Kantian principles, as noticeable in cases of Europe and the Western security communities (EU, NATO).

The Kantian international system presents its specific requirements for actors operating in the Kantian security environment. The Kantian actors may intend to foster integration and complex interdependence within the system and form security communities on the basis of common identity. The Hobbesian actors tend to be anti-integrationists and regard to the further integration with mistrust and misperceptions. In case, where different cultural environments face with each other, for example the Kantian international system and the Hobbesian actors, the cooperative security dilemma may appear. There may be international actors that would be less related to the valid international system (i.e.

widely recognized actors North Korea, or internationally non-recognized actors North Cyprus, Abkhazia) but there are practically no totally isolated actors.

The outcome of security dilemma would be defined as a security paradox – actions that would raise security, at the same time produce insecurity (Booth and Wheeler 2008). Cooperation has traditionally been among the most effective treatments against security dilemmas. As much as cooperation is able to stop security dilemmas and decrease insecurity among some nations, it would simultaneously cause fears and misperceptions among other actors that would remain outside of cooperative frameworks. A sensibility of other actors heavily depends on the cultural environment – they must be sure that cooperation is not directed against others but highlights absolute gains. The creation of trusted environment would be a most difficult task for the international society.

The dissertation introduces a system-related analysis, in which security cultures operate as agents in certain security environments and mismatches between agents and their security environments may produce security dilemmas. In the Kantian security environment, where cooperation should be a norm for international behavior, would emerge cooperative security dilemmas. The cooperative security dilemma is a specific construction, which has been firstly introduced by the author in his master's thesis *The Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region and Its Impact on the Regional Security and Defense Cooperation* of 1998. In the current work, the concept of cooperative security dilemma has been advanced and examined through the cultural context. Interactions within the system, when actors with different cultural origin or even influenced by various security cultures are involved, may produce cooperative security dilemmas, which stem from the Kantian security environment and may take several variations, including the integration dilemma (between the Kantian actors) and the identity dilemma (between the Kantian and Hobbesian actors).

Dilemma itself means a choice between different options. In order to transcend or mitigate security dilemmas, there are various doctrines usable depending on their cultural surroundings. Within the Hobbesian/Lockean security environment, traditional power considerations have been practiced like balancing, bandwagoning, ally-seeking or coalition-building. The Kantian security environment requires other cooperative measures to be taking into use. The introduction of cooperative security, the enhancement of complex interdependence and the consolidation of zones of stable peace would be considered in the Kantian security environment for the security dilemma management.

The current study uses case studies for analyzing different types of cooperative security dilemmas, which prove that the mismatch between different security cultures may cause insecurity leading to the cooperative security dilemma. The integration dilemma indicates that even the same cultural environment may not avoid the emergence of cooperative security dilemma, if some security- or defense-related understandings of the Kantian actors originate from the Hobbesian cultural environment. The identity dilemma requires that the Kantian practices increasing trust and confidence among actors will be taken into use.

Otherwise, the identity dilemma may be transferred into the classical security dilemma.

The Kantian security culture flourished in the post-modern society approximately for ten years. The Hobbesian challenge to the Kantian international system led by the neo-conservative ideological stream increased instability in the global security environment during the Bush's administration of the United States. The history of the Iraqi case has testified, if the Kantian practices have been gradually replaced with the Hobbesian practices and the identity dilemma between the Kantian system and the Hobbesian actors can be easily transferred into the classical security dilemma between the Hobbesian actors, if cultural paradigms used in the dilemma management will change.

The post-modern international system is the Kantian system, which still includes the Hobbesian actors and security environments in its framework. Cooperative security dilemmas may overcome into conflicts between actors and the system, if the Hobbesian actors oppose themselves to the Kantian system. Interactions between the international system and Yugoslavia, the international system and Iraq, the international system and North Korea, and the international system and Sudan refer to cases by which the Hobbesian actors find themselves being in conflict with the Kantian system.

The management of cooperative security dilemma requires methods that would increase trust between the Kantian and Hobbesian environments. Cooperative security offers mechanisms for peace- and confidence-building. Since 1991, NATO has used a partnership as a method to enhance intercultural cooperation and interdependence between NATO and actors willing to cooperate with NATO. NATO partners may adapt the Kantian culture if they change their identities close to the Western liberal democracy and apply for a membership in the long-run. They may take option to remain just to being partners in NATO cooperative initiatives, which helps to enhance zones of peace and stability and stabilizes the Kantian security environment in Europe.

The integration dilemma in the Baltic Sea regional security environment indicates that constructions similar to the security dilemma may take place even by the Kantian actors, if they follow the Hobbesian models in arranging their security systems. The Baltic Sea security environment meets the integration dilemma, which does not support the management of regional security concerns. Some actors like Denmark and Finland though overall accepting the Kantian security culture, prefer to retain some obvious Hobbesian understandings, especially concerning the post-modern security architecture in Europe. The Hobbesian concept of the Nordic Balance has simply been transferred to the post-modern Baltic Balance, which emphasizes a split between trans-Atlantic and euro-centric nations in security- and defense-related issues. The influence of Russia, the only Hobbesian actor in the region, to the security- and defense-related choices of other regional actors seems to be obvious.

There are several factors, which do not support the Kantian political culture and may cause cultural misperceptions. The nationalism as an ideology follows the Hobbesian logic. While the Kantian logic emphasizes peace and coope-

ration, the logic of nationalism relies on conflict and competition between different entities and glorifies advantages of one nation in reference with others. The Us-Others differentiation is very important in case of nationalism. Another factor, which would support the Hobbesian logic, is a culture of fear. Fear is probably the most powerful motive for provoking security dilemmas.

The identity dilemma between Estonia and Russia, which is influenced by the constructions of historical memory into the present-day environment, can be easily transferred from the identity dilemma to the classical security dilemma, where the interstate dilemma between nationalist and euro-centric security options makes the Estonian society prone to the impacts of the Hobbesian security culture. A strong ethno-nationalism and a 'Great Fear' against Russia would be most powerful motives for self-identification of the Estonian society, which makes it receptive for the Hobbesian political culture. Therefore, Estonia though generally a Kantian actor and member of the Kantian institutions the EU and NATO, still pertains to the sphere of influence of the Hobbesian cultural environment and often shares same perceptions with Russia. The Russian ethno-nationalism and the culture of fear practiced in their society still retains misperceptions against the West and its institutions, especially NATO, still often defined as anti-Russian military alliance.

The dissertation concludes that security dilemmas are social constructions, which may be dependent on cultural misperceptions of actors. Cultural misperceptions may become especially powerful during the transition from one international system to another, during which the working procedures of systems will change. The mismatch between the Hobbesian culture and the Kantian structure (or vice versa) would also be a source for the cooperative security dilemma. The Hobbesian structures may destabilize Kantian security environment and the Kantian structures may not be understood in the Hobbesian environment.

For the cooperative security dilemma management, the consolidation of elements of the Kantian culture, especially the cooperative security and complex interdependence would be advisable. Partners should prefer cooperation to conflict, if they would be interested in decreasing their insecurity. Therefore cooperative measures should be as comprehensive as possible and offer a multiple level of cooperative frameworks depending on a willingness of partners to trust the Kantian environment. Otherwise the conflict-oriented measures of the Hobbesian/Lockean culture would become visible.

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## SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN

### **Koostöö-alane julgeolekudilemma – hobbesiaanliku julgeolekukultuuri toimimine kantiaanlikus julgeolekukeskkonnas**

Käesolev doktoritöö uurib koostöö-alase julgeolekudilemma tekkimist kantiaanliku rahvusvahelise süsteemiga seotud julgeolekukeskkondades. Väitekirj uurib julgeolekudilemma põhjuseid kultuuri vaatevinklist, lähtudes siinjuures eelkõige Richard Ned Lebowi kultuuridepõhisest käsitlesest, mille ta on esitanud oma raamatus *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. Nii nagu Lebow, kasutan ka mina selles töös uurimise alusena Alexander Wendti poolt välja toodud poliitiliste kultuuride ideaaltüüpe – Hobbes'i (hobbesiaanlikud), Locke'i (lokiaanlikud) ja Kanti (kantiaanlikud) kultuurid, mida Wendt omistab rahvusvahelistele süsteemidele.

Julgeoleku alases käsitluses on poliitilised kultuurid identifitseeritavad julgeolekukultuuridena. Julgeolekukultuur on sotsiaalsete uskumuste ja väärtuste kogum, mis kujundab toimijate julgeoleku alast kollektiivset identiteeti. Käesolev töö teeb vahet julgeolekukultuuril ja strateegilisel kultuuril, kus viimane väljendab toimijate strateegilisi valikuid antud julgeolekukeskkonnas. Uurimuse valdkonda (julgeolekudilemma) arvestades, olen Wendti mudelit lihtsustanud ja piirdunud kahe kultuuritüübiga (hobbesiaanlik-lokiaanlik vs kantiaanlik), mille vahel on kultuurilised erinevused selgemini eristatavad. Hobbesiaanlikud ja lokiaanlikud meetodid dilemma lahendamiseks on sarnased ning erinevad fundamentaalselt kantiaanlikest doktriinidest.

Modernsete ja postmodernsete rahvusvaheliste süsteemide aluspõhimõtted on olnud mõjutatud lääne poliitilistest kultuuridest. Kui vaadelda modernse rahvusvahelise süsteemi ajalugu alates Westfaali rahust (1648), siis võib selgesti täheldada poliitiliste baaskultuuride mõju kogu süsteemi arengule. Alexander Wendt on eristanud Thomas Hobbes'i, John Locke'i ja Immanuel Kanti tööde alusel poliitilise kultuuri ilminguid lääne ühiskondlikus mõtlemises, vastavalt siis hobbesiaanlik sõda, lokiaanlik rivaliteet ning kantiaanlik julgeolekukooslus. Kaks kultuuri – hobbesiaanlik ja lokiaanlik – tunnistavad konflikti paratamatust riikidevaheliste julgeolekualaste suhete mõtestamisel. Need kultuurid on ka põhiomadustelt teiste rahvusvaheliste toimijate suhtes vastanduvad (polariseeritud), mistõttu võib neid käsitleda ühe ja sama julgeolekukultuuri osadena.

Hobbesiaanlik kultuur vaatleb maailma lähtudes iseenese väärtushinnangu-test ja on lahutamatult seotud „meie” – „nemad” vastandusel põhinevate ideoloogiatega. Hobbesiaanlikust kultuurist tuleneb näiteks hirmukultuur, mis on olnud üks peamisi klassikalise julgeolekudilemma tekkemotiive. Lokiaanid erinevad Wendti järgi hobbesiaanidest selle poolest, et vastandumisel nad ei käsitle vastaseid kui vaenlasi, vaid kui rivaale ning tunnistavad vastaspoole õigust „elule ja vabadusele”, aga samuti nende õigust käituda nii nagu nad käituvad. Kantiaanlik julgeolekukultuur vastandub hobbesiaanlikule ja lokiaan-

likule kultuurile, kuna eelistab rahvusvahelistes suhetes koostööd konfliktile ning püüdleb rahumeelse ühiskonna poole, otsides samas kultuuridevahelist konsensust ja rõhutades üldinimlikke väärtuseid. Kantiaanlikud süsteemid on mittepolaarsed. Sellise julgeolekukultuuri instrumentide hulka kuuluvad demokraatlikul rahul ja koostööjulgeolekul põhinevad režiimid.

Küsimus, millele väitekirj peab vastuse andma on järgmine: *kas hobbesiaanliku kultuuri juurutamine kantiaanlikus julgeolekukeskkonnas võib põhjustada koostöö-alaseid (kooperatiivseid) julgeolekudilemmasid*. Julgeolekudilemma on üks sagedamini kasutatud mõisteid rahvusvaheliste suhete teoorias ning tavapäraselt on seda seostatud mõne rahvusvahelise toimija poolt tema julgeoleku kasvatamiseks ette võetud sammude võimaliku mõjuga teistele rahvusvahelistele toimijatele. Julgeolekudilemmat tema klassikalises tähenduses – ühe riigi julgeoleku suurenemine vähendab samal ajal teiste riikide julgeolekut – saab siduda hobbesiaanliku-lokiaanliku julgeolekukultuuriga ning realistliku traditsiooniga rahvusvaheliste suhete teoorias. Klassikaline julgeolekudilemma tekib anarhilises rahvusvahelises süsteemis, kus julgeolekuprobleemidega toimetulemiseks peavad riigid lootma eneseabile, kas siis sobivate liitlaste leidmisega rahvusvahelisel areenil või siseriikliku võimekust tugevdades.

Koostöö-alane julgeolekudilemma võib esineda kantiaanlikus süsteemis ja on iseloomulik situatsioonile, kus osa toimijaid teeb koostööd vähendamaks oma julgeolekuhirme, kuid see võib omakorda põhjustada olukorra, kus väljapoole neid kooslusi jäänud toimijad tunnetavad ohtu oma julgeolekule. Koostöö-alane julgeolekudilemma on autori arendus, mis esmakordselt leidis kajastamist 1998 aastal kaitsnud magistritöös “*The Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region and its Impact on the Regional Security and Defense Cooperation*”.

Käesolevas töös olen erinevaid julgeolekudilemmasid uurinud aga kultuurilistest mõjutajatest lähtuvalt, mis seostab klassikalise julgeolekudilemma hobbesiaanliku julgeolekukeskkonnaga ja koostöö-alase dilemma vastavalt kantiaanliku keskkonnaga. Koostöö-alase julgeolekudilemma juures olen eristanud kahte tema avaldumisvormi, mis võivad aset leida kantiaanlike toimijate vahel (integratsioonidilemma) või ka palju levinumalt hobbesiaanliku ja kantiaanliku kultuuri kokkupuute tulemusena (identiteedilemma). Teatud olukordades võivad toimijate kultuurilised määratlused muutuda – nii võib integratsioonidilemma üle kasvada teatud identiteedidilemmaks (nagu Euro-Atlandi dilemma seoses Iraagi konfliktiga) või siis identiteedidilemma klassikaliseks julgeolekudilemmaks (nagu me näeme Eesti-Vene suhete dilemmat mitme avaldumisvormi puhul).

Oma väitekirjas teen vahet rahvusvahelise süsteemi kultuuril ja tema erinevate toimijate ning julgeolekukeskkondade kultuuridel, mis võivad süsteemi kultuurist tervikuna erineda. Kahe kultuuri kokkupuutel võivad tekkida julgeolekudilemmad (mis on küll problemaatilised situatsioonid, kuid veel mitte konfliktised olukorrad – vt. Booth, Wheeler 2008). Konfliktne olukord võib olla julgeolekudilemma üks väljund, mida Booth ja Wheeler on käsitlenud julgeolekuparadoksina. Julgeolekudilemmad võivad mõjutada rahvusvahelise süsteemi stabiilsust. Kui süstem muutub ebastabiilseks, siis võib ta lõppkokkuvõttes

viia suurema konfliktini ja lõpuks omakorda süsteemi vahetumiseni. Töös olen kasutanud mõistet julgeolekukeskkond, kuna see on teoreetiliselt paremini konstrueeritav ning sobivam konstruktivistlikele ja kultuurilistele lähtekohtadele. Keskkonna piirid on varieeruvad ning ei lähtu niivõrd geopoliitilistest teguritest. Kantiaanliku rahvusvahelise süsteemi sees võivad paikneda hobbesiaanlikud keskkonnad (või ka toimijad) ja ka vastupidi. Toimijad võivad erinevates olukordades kuuluda ka erinevatesse keskkondadesse. Julgeolekudilemmat aga käsitlen kui süsteemi ja keskkondade (või ka üksikute toimijate) vastastikuse kokkupuute tulemusena tekkivat nähtust (kultuurilist paradigmat).

Struktuurse keskkonnana uurib töö rahvusvaheliste suhete süsteemi arengut ning analüüsib, kuidas erinevad kultuurilised lähtekohad on mõjutanud julgeolekuarhitektuuri kujunemist erinevates julgeolekukeskkondades. Julgeolekuarhitektuur on julgeoleku alaste suhete raamistik, mis on kujunenud rahvusvaheliste institutsioonide ja režiimide baasil. Erinevad julgeolekuarhitektuuri osised on seotud ühe või teise julgeolekukultuuriga. Sõjalised alliansid esindavad hobbesiaanlikku-lokiaanlikku kultuuri, samal ajal kui julgeolekukooslused ning koostööjulgeoleku ning kollektiivse julgeoleku alased korraldused tulevad kantiaanlikust julgeolekukultuurist.

Metodoloogiliselt põhineb töö toimija ja struktuuri analüüsil, kus julgeolekukultuurid on toimijad ning erinevad julgeolekukeskkonnad (rahvusvaheline süsteem või siis ka selle allsüsteem, erinevad julgeolekukeskkonnad, aga samuti süsteemis toimiv julgeolekuarhitektuur) moodustavad struktuuri, mille tegevust toimija mõjutab. Kultuuripõhist lähenemist rahvusvaheliste suhetele võib märgata alates 1990-st aastatest ning tähelepanu fookusesse tõusis see Samuel Huntingtoni tsivilisatsioonidevahelist konflikti kirjeldavate töödega (*The Clash of Civilizations* 1993, 1996). Samaaegselt on mitmed konstruktivistlikud teoreetikud arendanud kultuuri- ja identiteedipõhist analüüsi rahvusvahelistes suhetes (A. Wendt, P. Katzenstein, R. Lebow, T. Risse-Kappen, A. Kier, M. Finnemore jpt).

Juhtumianalüüsid annavad teoreetilistele lähtekohtadele praktilise väljundi, käsitlevad koostöö-alaste julgeolekudilemmade esinemist kaasaegses rahvusvahelises süsteemis ning vaatlevad seda, kuidas julgeolekudilemmad võivad kultuuriliste vahetumiste mõjul muutuda. Identiteedidilemma rahvusvahelise süsteemi ja Iraagi vahel arenes klassikaliseks julgeolekudilemmaks seoses hobbesiaanliku dimensiooni lisandumisega mõnede lääneriikide, eeskätt Ameerika Ühendriikide, käitumismustritesse. Julgeolekudilemma kantiaanliku lahendusmehhanismina on vaadeldud NATO partnerlustrateegia arengut külma sõja järel, kus erinevate kultuuriliste arusaamadega riike on üritatud kantiaanliku kultuuri põhimõtetega sobitada.

Integratsioonidilemma aspektist lähtuvalt on vaatluse all Põhjamaad, kus Taani väldib julgeoleku- ja kaitsekoostööd CSDP raames ning Soome ja Rootsi välistavad omakorda NATOga liitumise, selle töö järgi julgeolekukultuurilistel põhjustel. Kuigi nimetatud kolm riiki järgivad kantiaanlikku poliitilist kultuuri, siis kaitse- ja julgeolekuküsimuste lahendamisel on nad lähtunud hobbesiaanlikest/lokiaanlikest põhimõtetest. Kontseptuaalselt on Läänemere julgeolekukeskkonnas külma sõja ajal toiminud „Põhjamaade tasakaal” asendunud

„*Läänemere tasakaaluga*“, kus kantiaanlike toimijate julgeolekualast koostööd võivad teatud olukordades pärssida erinevad hobbesiaanlikust kultuurist pärinevad kultuurilised arusaamad.

Käesolev töö uurib ka Eesti ja Venemaa suhteid läbi kultuuriliste lähtekohade võrdluse. Kuigi Eesti ja Venemaa puhul võib täheldada identiteedidilemma esinemist, arvestades, et NATO ja Euroopa Liidu liikmena kasutab Eesti ametlik poliitika kantiaanlikku julgeolekudiskursust, siis laiemal pinnal võib rääkida kultuurilise konflikti olemasolust Eesti ühiskonna raames, kus kantiaanlikud seisukohad sageli vastanduvad hobbesiaanlike seisukohtadega, eriti, mis puudutab julgeoleku- ja kaitseküsimusi. Venemaa on oma julgeoleku- ja kaitsepoliitika elluviimisel ka külma sõja järgsel ajastul lähtunud peaasjalikult hobbesiaanlikest seisukohtadest. Seetõttu võib identiteedidilemma Eesti ja Venemaa vahel teatud tingimustes omandada klassikalise julgeolekudilemma mõõtmed.

Kokkuvõttes võib töö põhjal kinnitada kultuurilise dimensiooni mõju olemasolu julgeoleku- ja kaitsealaste suhete ning arusaamade väljakujunemisele. Kultuuridevahelised mittetajumised võivad põhjustada julgeolekudilemmasid, vastavalt klassikalisi julgeolekudilemmasid hobbesiaanlikus julgeolekukeskkonnas ning koostöö-alaseid julgeolekudilemmasid kantiaanlikus keskkonnas.

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# CURRICULUM VITAE

## Holger Mölder

**Date of Birth:** 13 January, 1962

**Place of Birth:** Kohtla-Järve, Estonia

### Education

From 2003    PhD student of Political Science at the University of Tartu  
1998        MA (International Security and Civil-Military Relations),  
              US Naval Postgraduate School  
1994        (Social Theory, *cum laude*), Estonian School of the Humanities

### Professional experience

1995-2009    Estonian Ministry of Defense

### Main research areas

International security, European security, NATO, regional security, cooperative security, security cultures; international conflict resolution; nationalism and ethnicity, ethnic conflicts, state and ethnicity.

### Main publications

- “The Cooperative Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea region”, *Journal of Baltic Studies* (2010, forthcoming).
- “Julgeolek kui kultuur: Eesti ja NATO arengud hobbesiaanliku ja kantiaanliku julgeolekukultuuri taustal” (“Security as Culture: the Developments of Estonia and NATO within the Conflict between Hobbesian and Kantian Security Culture), *Akadeemia*, 2009(9): 1679–95.
- “Managing Polarity – Post-Modern European Security Environment and Misperceptions in the Estonian Security Culture.” In Kasekamp, Andres (ed.) *The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2007*. Tallinn: Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, 2007: 121–46.
- “NATO Role in the Post-Modern European Security Environment, Cooperative Security and the Experience of the Baltic Sea Region.” *Baltic Security & Defence Review*. 2006(8): 8–37.

- NATO A ja O. (The NATO Handbook – authors M. Kolga, M. Maigre, M. Mälksoo, H. Mölder, T. Noorkoiv). Tallinn, Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 2004; Russian edition 2007.
- “Julgeolekupartnerlus vallutab maailma.” (“Security Partnership Seizes the World”). *Diplomaatia*, No 12, September, 2004.
- “Tänapäeva kriisid ja relvakonfliktid.” In *Riigikaitse õpik gümnaasiumidele ja kutseõppeasutustele*. (“Present-day crises and armed conflicts” in the studybook of National Defence for Estonian high schools with R. Loik and R. Helme), Tallinn: Eesti Kaitseministeerium 2003, second edition 2006.
- “21. sajandi julgeolekudilemma” (“Security Dilemma of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”) *Akadeemia*, 2001(12): 2467–86.
- “Natsionalism ja etnilisus tänapäeva maailmas” (“Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Contemporary World”), *Akadeemia*, 1997(10): 2024–44.
- “Minorities in the Estonian Defense Forces,” Materials of the symposium “Minorities and Armed Forces.” Vienna: Institut für Strategische Forschung, 1997: 101–6.

### **Main conference presentations**

- “The Evolution of NATO Partnership Strategy – Democratic Peace or Clash of Civilizations?”. Paper for the 6<sup>th</sup> Pan-European Conference on International Relations. Torino, September 2007.
- “The Evolution of NATO Partnership Strategy – Democratic Peace or Clash of Civilizations?”. Paper for the 6<sup>th</sup> CEEISA Conference. Wrocław, May 2007.
- “Can Democratic Peace Work as Regime? Resolving the Emerging Cooperative Security Dilemma in Europe” Paper for the 4th CEEISA Conference. Tartu, June 2006.
- “NATO Cooperative Security Arrangements and Resolving the Emerging Cooperative Security Dilemma Through Democratic Peace.” Paper for the ECPR General Conference. Budapest, September 2005.

### **Teaching experience**

- Tallinn University of Technology;
  - 2009, 2010 Theories of International Relations (MA level);
- University of Tartu;
  - 2005 Conflicts and Conflict Resolution (MA level);
  - 2007 Security of Africa and the Middle-East (MA level);
- Estonian Institute of the Humanities;
  - 1995 Nationalism and Ethnicity (BA level);
  - 2001 Theories of International Relations (BA level).

- Pedagogical Institute of Tallinn;
  - 2003, 2004 International crises and conflicts (courses for teachers of national defence – BA level).

### **Acknowledgements:**

- The Award of the Estonian Academy of Sciences for Student Works (under- and postgraduate): “Nation-state: theories, typologies and meanings” (1994).
- Crest of Merit (2nd class) of the Estonian Ministry of Defence (2002).

### **Contact information**

Institute of Government and Politics,  
University of Tartu  
Tiigi 78, 50410 Tartu  
Estonia  
E-mail: hmolder@ut.ee

# ELULOOKIRJELDUS

## Holger Mölder

**Sünniaeg:** 13 Jaanuar, 1962

**Sünnikoht:** Kohtla-Järve

### Haridus

2003            Tartu Ülikooli Riigiteaduse instituudi doktorant  
1998            MA (International Security and Civil-Military Relations), US  
                  Naval Postgraduate School  
1994            (Ühiskonnateooria, *cum laude*), Eesti Humanitaarinstituut

### Ametikäik

1995–2009     Eesti Vabariigi Kaitseministeerium

### Peamised uurimissuunad

Rahvusvaheline julgeolek, Euroopa julgeolek, NATO, regionaalne julgeolek, koostööjulgeolek, julgeolekukultuurid; rahvusvahelised konfliktid; natsionalism ja etnilisus, etnilised konfliktid, riik ja etnilisus.

### Peamised publikatsioonid

- “The Cooperative Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea region”, *Journal of Baltic Studies* (2010, ilmumas).
- „Julgeolek kui kultuur: Eesti ja NATO arengud hobbesiaanliku ja kantiaanliku julgeolekukultuuri taustal” *Akadeemia*, 2009(9): 1679–95.
- “Managing Polarity – Post-Modern European Security Environment and Misperceptions in the Estonian Security Culture.” In Kasekamp, Andres (ed.) *The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2007*. Tallinn: Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, 2007: 121–46.
- “NATO Role in the Post-Modern European Security Environment, Cooperative Security and the Experience of the Baltic Sea Region.” *Baltic Security & Defence Review*. 2006(8): 8–37.
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- “NATO Cooperative Security Arrangements and Resolving the Emerging Cooperative Security Dilemma Through Democratic Peace.” Paper for the ECPR General Conference. Budapest, September 2005.

### **Õppejõu kogemus**

- Tallinna Tehnikaülikool;
  - 2009, 2010 Rahvusvaheliste suhete teooriad (MA)
  - 2010 Rahvusvahelised suhted peale 1945 (MA)
  - 2010 Rahvusvaheliste süsteemide analüüs (MA)
  - 2010 Rahvusvaheliste konfliktide reguleerimine (MA)
- Tartu Ülikool;
  - 2005 Konfliktid ja nende reguleerimine (MA);
  - 2007 Aafrika ja Lähis-Ida julgeolek (MA);
- Eesti Humanitaarinstituut;
  - 1995 Natsionalism ja etnilisus (BA)
  - 2001 Rahvusvaheliste suhete teooriad (BA)
- Tallinna Pedagoogiline Instituut;
  - 2003, 2004 Rahvusvahelised kriisid ja konfliktid (riigikaitseõpetajate kursus).

### **Tunnustused:**

- Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia auhind üliõpilastöödele: “Nation-state: theories, typologies and meanings” (23.11.1994).
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### **Kontakt**

Riigiteaduste Instituut, Tartu Ülikool  
Tiigi 78, 50410 Tartu  
Estonia  
E-mail: [hmolder@ut.ee](mailto:hmolder@ut.ee)

# **DISSERTATIONES RERUM POLITICARUM UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS**

1. **Allan Sikk.** Highways to power: new party success in three young democracies. Tartu, 2006.