Organisatsiooniline teovalitsemine – täideviija täideviija taga kontseptsioon teoorias ja selle rakendamine praktikas
Date
2011-02-16
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Abstract
Käesolev väitekiri tegeleb karistusõiguse dogmaatika ühe kesksema küsimuse, nimelt täideviija mõistega. Lihtsustatult öeldes tuleb karistusõigusdogmaatikal tegelda küsimusega, keda tuleb süüteo toimepanemise eest karistada kui täideviijat.
Käesoleva töö kirjutamise lähtealuseks on tõdemus, et nii teoorias kui ka praktikas toimub täideviija mõiste pidev laienemine. Täideviija ei ole mitte ainult see, kes paneb kuriteo ise toime, vaid järjest enam pööratakse pilk ka kaugemale, nn tagaseisjate ehk tegelike otsustajateni. Kaasaegne arusaam lähtub üha enam tõdemusest, et kuriteo toimepanemine ei sõltu mitte ainult konkreetsest üksikisikust, vaid süüteo paneb toime erinevate ülesannete jaotatusel põhinev kollektiiv. Kõige laiemalt määratletuna oleks täideviija seega ka isik, kes on vastutav teatud tagajärje põhjustamise eest ning seda sõltumata sellest, kas ta süüteokoosseisu realiseerimise mõttes ka tegelikkuses teo ise toime pani või mitte. Karistusõiguslikult etteheidetav tegu saab n.ö kollektiivseks loominguks, mis omistatakse üksikisikutele vastavalt nende osaluse ulatusele selles. Lisaks süüteo vahetule, omakäelisele täideviimisele otsib karistusõigus kriminaalpoliitilistel argumentidel seega ka süüteo täideviimise eest n.ö tegelikult vastutajat. Ka kuriteo toimepanemiseks käsu andja võib sellises kontekstis olla kuriteo täideviijaks.
Väitekirjas võetakse uurida, millised on selle täideviija mõiste laienemise lähtekohad, kas selline täideviija mõiste laienemine iseloomustab ka Eesti karistusõiguse teooriat ja praktikat, kas selline laienemine on õigustatud ja meie seadusandlust silmas pidades üldse võimalik.
The aim of the dissertation is to clarify the notion of a principal offender. In brief, one main goal for the theory of penal law is to figure out who should be punished for committing an offence as a principal offender. While writing this thesis the author took an assumption that in the theory and also in the practice the notion of a principal offender is continuously broadened. Nowadays the principal offender is considered to be not only the person who commits the offence himself, but also the one who makes decisions i.e. the person who is behind the offence. The contemporary understanding of the notion of a principal offender results from a recognition that often the commission of an offence does not depend on a sole person: the offence is committed by a group of persons acting accordance with a distribution of tasks. The broadest way to define a principal offender is to say that this is a person who is responsible for causing a certain consequence irrespective of whether he executed the act himself or not. The punishable act becomes a collective creation and is attributed to an individual in accordance with his participation in this act. Thus, because of criminal political considerations, the theory of penal law searches, in addition to a person who commits an offence himself i.e. directly, also for a person who is actually responsible for a commission of an offence. In this context a person who gave an order to commit an offence can be considered a principal offender. The author of the dissertation examines, what is the base for broadening the notion of a principal offender, can that kind of broadening also be seen in Estonian theory and practice of penal law, and is the broadening justified and even possible when Estonian legislation is considered.
The aim of the dissertation is to clarify the notion of a principal offender. In brief, one main goal for the theory of penal law is to figure out who should be punished for committing an offence as a principal offender. While writing this thesis the author took an assumption that in the theory and also in the practice the notion of a principal offender is continuously broadened. Nowadays the principal offender is considered to be not only the person who commits the offence himself, but also the one who makes decisions i.e. the person who is behind the offence. The contemporary understanding of the notion of a principal offender results from a recognition that often the commission of an offence does not depend on a sole person: the offence is committed by a group of persons acting accordance with a distribution of tasks. The broadest way to define a principal offender is to say that this is a person who is responsible for causing a certain consequence irrespective of whether he executed the act himself or not. The punishable act becomes a collective creation and is attributed to an individual in accordance with his participation in this act. Thus, because of criminal political considerations, the theory of penal law searches, in addition to a person who commits an offence himself i.e. directly, also for a person who is actually responsible for a commission of an offence. In this context a person who gave an order to commit an offence can be considered a principal offender. The author of the dissertation examines, what is the base for broadening the notion of a principal offender, can that kind of broadening also be seen in Estonian theory and practice of penal law, and is the broadening justified and even possible when Estonian legislation is considered.
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Keywords
dissertatsioonid, õigusteadus, karistusõigus, kuriteod