Private member’s bills in parliament – a comparative study of Finland and Estonia
Date
2011-10-19
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Abstract
Parlamendisaadikute poolt algatatud seaduseelnõud moodustavad parlamentaarsetes demokraatiates reeglina kogu seadusloomest väikese osa. Enamikes sellistes süsteemides domineerivad seadusandluses seadusandliku võimu üle tegelikult valitsuse algatatud eelnõud. Sellest hoolimata on saadikud üsna aktiivsed eelnõude esitajad. Antud uuringus on vaatluse all Eestis 1999-2007 esitatud 328 ja Soomes 2003-2007 esitatud 665 sellist eelnõud. Eesti puhul võeti antud perioodil seadustena vastu 37.9% ja Soomes 4.5% neist eelnõudest. Seega esineb selge vastuolu madala edukuse ja suure algatamise sageduse vahel. Nende numbrite taustal tekib küsimus miks saadikud nii ebaratsionaalselt käituvad ja kulutavad oma aega eelnõude esitamiseks, mis suure tõenäosusega kunagi midagi reaalselt reguleerima ei hakka, sest need kas hääletatakse maha või jäävad toppama menetlusprotsessi teatud faasi ja aeguvad koos parlamendikoosseisu ametiaja lõpuga. Doktoritöö sisuks on saadikute esitatud eelnõude esitamise, sisu ja menetluse põhjalikum vaatlemine ja statistiline analüüs, mille abil püütakse anda vastus nii antud vastuolule käitumises kui ka hinnata selle võimalikke tagajärgi eelnõude sisule ja menetlemisele täiskogus. Põhiline seletav mehhanism mille kehtivust testitakse on personaalse hääle soodustamine valimissüsteemi poolt, mis motiveerib poliitikuid individualistlikult käituma tagasivalimise tõenäosuse suurendamiseks. Personaalse hääle efekt ilmnes selgelt esitamise puhul ehk saadikud kelle valimisel on see suurema tähtsusega on aktiivsemad saadikute eelnõude esitajad Eelnõude enda sisu ja hilisem menetlusprotsess sõltub aga reeglina algataja kuulumisest kas koalitsiooni või opositsiooni ridadesse. Valimissüsteemi sisene variatsioon seega struktureerib käitumist eelnõude esitamise sagedus näol, samas ei ole efektid nii tugevad, et avaldaksid mõju seadusloome etappides, mis järgnevad eelnõude esitamisele.
The share of private member’s bills (PMB) in overall legislation in parliamentary systems tends to be small. As a rule, the executive tends to dominate over the legislative branch in initiating legislation. Regardless of this, members of parliament (MP) tend to be quite active sponsors of legislation. This study analyses 328 such PMBs from the period of 1999-2007 in Estonia and 665 bills from 2003-2007 in Finland. The success rate of these bills was 37.9% and 4.5% in Estonia and Finland respectively. The high number of sponsored bills stands in marked contrast to the low number of passed ones. This raises the question why MPs engage in apparently irrational behavior of using their limited time to sponsor a large number of bills that will most likely never be passed. The thesis scrutinizes the sponsoring, substance and the legislative process of these bills with statistical methods and through this explains the apparent contradiction in behavior. The primary explanatory mechanism focuses on the personal vote notion, which captures the degree to which individualistic behavior of MPs is rewarded by the electoral system. The results show that the degree of the personal vote explains PMB sponsorship frequency, i.e. MPs who operate in a setting that is comparatively more rewarding towards individualistic behavior sponsor these bills in greater numbers. The substance of the bills and their fate in the legislative process depends however on the coalition or opposition status of the MP and not on the personal vote level of the sponsor. Variance within an electoral system therefore structures behavior in parliament; on the other hand, the effects are not strong enough to influence substantive parts of the electoral process that follow the initiation of a bill.
The share of private member’s bills (PMB) in overall legislation in parliamentary systems tends to be small. As a rule, the executive tends to dominate over the legislative branch in initiating legislation. Regardless of this, members of parliament (MP) tend to be quite active sponsors of legislation. This study analyses 328 such PMBs from the period of 1999-2007 in Estonia and 665 bills from 2003-2007 in Finland. The success rate of these bills was 37.9% and 4.5% in Estonia and Finland respectively. The high number of sponsored bills stands in marked contrast to the low number of passed ones. This raises the question why MPs engage in apparently irrational behavior of using their limited time to sponsor a large number of bills that will most likely never be passed. The thesis scrutinizes the sponsoring, substance and the legislative process of these bills with statistical methods and through this explains the apparent contradiction in behavior. The primary explanatory mechanism focuses on the personal vote notion, which captures the degree to which individualistic behavior of MPs is rewarded by the electoral system. The results show that the degree of the personal vote explains PMB sponsorship frequency, i.e. MPs who operate in a setting that is comparatively more rewarding towards individualistic behavior sponsor these bills in greater numbers. The substance of the bills and their fate in the legislative process depends however on the coalition or opposition status of the MP and not on the personal vote level of the sponsor. Variance within an electoral system therefore structures behavior in parliament; on the other hand, the effects are not strong enough to influence substantive parts of the electoral process that follow the initiation of a bill.
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Keywords
parlamendid, Eesti, Soome, õigusloome, parlamendiliikmed, seaduseelnõud, võrdlevuuringud, parliaments, Estonia, Finland, legislation, parliamentarians, bills of law, comparative studies, , , , , , , ,