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dc.contributor.advisorCohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja
dc.contributor.authorVaus, Sander
dc.contributor.otherTartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituutet
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-10T11:38:20Z
dc.date.available2014-06-10T11:38:20Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10062/41670
dc.description.abstractIn this essay I will defend Stephen Stich’s pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation. The most striking feature of his view is that it doesn’t place truth center-stage as a criterion of a good cognitive system. In fact, he argues that having true beliefs is of little value, both intrinsically and instrumentally, and what we should really want is to have beliefs that allow us to attain the things that we actually value. This view is contested by Hilary Kornblith, who argues that even if truth is not something we value intrinsically, then it is always of instrumental value for attaining the things that we actually want to attain. For him, truth plays a pre-eminent role in cognitive evaluation, and placing value on truth is thus pragmatically preferable.en
dc.description.urihttp://tartu.ester.ee/record=b2693313~S1*estet
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherTartu Ülikoolet
dc.subject.otherbakalaureusetöödet
dc.subject.othertunnetusteooriaet
dc.subject.othermõtlemineet
dc.subject.othertõdeet
dc.titleThe normativity of truth in cognitive evaluationen
dc.typeThesisen


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