Objektiivsuse teema Wilhelm Dilthey vaimuteadustefilosoofias
Kuupäev
2014-10-28
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Abstrakt
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) on üks esimestest ja mõjukamatest teoreetikutest, kes seadis endale ülesandeks tuua välja see eripära, mis iseloomustab teadmise vorme ja kujunemise viise humanitaarteadustes, mis olid tema eluajal alles välja kujunemas ja võitlesid selle eest, et leida tunnustamist akadeemilise maailma legitiimse osana. Objektiivsuse teema all tema vaimuteadustefilosoofias on silmas peetud suhteid mõistete objektiivsus ja juhtimine vahel. Väitekirja eesmärgiks on kõigepealt eristada need erinevad tähendusaspektid, milles Dilthey kasutab mõistet objektiivsus, nagu ka eksplitseerida seda, milliseid tähendusi võimaldab tema õpetuse kontekst omistada mõistele juhtimine. Teiseks rekonstrueerida probleemid ja kontekstid, milles need tähendused tema mõttearenduses esile kerkivad. Kolmandaks esitada ja kriitiliselt hinnata lahendusi, mida ta leidis probleemidele, mida ta objektiivsuse-teemaga seoses püstitas. Neljandaks tuua välja vaimuteaduste objektiivsuse ja ühiskonna juhtimise vahelise seose käsitusi, mis on tema kontseptsiooni raames mõeldavad, kuid mida ta ise ei ole eksplitseerinud. Uurimistöö viis järeldusele, et Dilthey arutlustesse objektiivsuse teema üle on kätketud mitmeid erinevaid tähendusi, milles ta kasutab mõisteid (objektiivne) reaalsus, tunnetuse objektiivsus ja ühiskonna juhtimine. Täheldasin nelja erinevat konstellatsiooni, mis ajalooliselt üksteist välja vahetades neist tähendustest moodustuvad. Kaks esimest neist toetusid tema veendumuse kohaselt ebarahuldavatele kontseptsioonidele selle kohta, milles seisneb objektiivsus nii ontoloogilises kui ka epistemoloogilises mõttes. Neile vastukaaluks andis ta kõne all olevatele mõistetele uue tähenduse ning kujundas välja uue käsitluse seostest nende tähenduste vahel. Seejuures on tema käsitluse rõhuasetused aja jooksul nihkunud, nii et võib rääkida kahest erinevast tema poolt loodud kontseptsioonist, mis toetuvad nende tähenduste seosele. Dilthey mõttearendused viivad järeldusele, mida kaasajal võiks formuleerida selliselt, et absoluutselt kehtiv tunnetus on võimalik vaid „jumala silma” vaatekohalt. Kui siduda teaduslik objektiivsus sedalaadi üldkehtivusega, siis tuleks tunnistada, et objektiivne vaimuteaduslik tunnetus pole võimalik. Selleks, et õigustatult väita, et objektiivsuse taotlemine on vaimuteadusliku tunnetuse mõttekaks sihiks, oleks tal tulnud püüeldavas objektiivsuse ideaalis asendada absoluutse kehtivuse nõue nõrgema, nimelt formaalse ja relatiivse üldkehtivuse nõudega. Püüdsin näidata, et kohati ta seda teebki, kuid ta ei ole selles mitte alati järjekindel olnud, ning et vaimuteadusliku teadmise objektiivsuse niisugune käsitus annaks hea aluse Dilthey ühele põhilisele seisukohale, mille sisu ta ise aga lähemalt avanud ei ole – nimelt, et vaimuteadusliku teadmise üldkehtivusest sõltub see, kuivõrd saavad need teadused teoks teha oma missiooni olla vahendiks, mille abil on võimalik ühiskonda mõjutada või koguni juhtida.
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) was one of the first and most influential theorizers who set as his goal to reveal the specificity that characterises the forms and paths of development of knowledge in the humanities. The latter were still undergoing development during his lifetime and were fighting for their acknowledgement as a legitimate part of the academic world. The theme of objectivity in his philosophy of the human sciences refers to the relations between the concepts of objectivity and guidance. The purpose of this dissertation is to first distinguish the different conceptions of objectivity and guidance in Dilthey’s philosophy. Second, to reconstruct the problems and contexts within which these conceptions arise during the development of his thought. Third, to present and assess critically the solutions that he proposed for the problems that he raised within the context of the theme of objectivity. Fourth, to bring out the various approaches to the relations between the objectivity of human sciences and the guidance of society that can be provided within the framework of his conception, but which he himself did not explicate. This dissertation reaches the conclusion that there are several different concepts of (objective) reality, the objectivity of cognition, and the guidance of society contained within Dilthey’s discussions on the theme of objectivity. I distinguish four different constellations in Dilthey’s thought that are constituted by these concepts. According to his conviction, the first two rely on unsatisfactory conceptions of what objectivity is in both the ontological and the epistemological sense. Against these he provided new conceptions of ontological and epistemological objectivity. Moreover, the emphases of his approach shifted over time, so that we can propose that he developed two different conceptions based on the connections between these concepts. The development of Dilthey’s thought leads to the conclusion which today may be formulated as follows: absolutely valid cognition is possible only from a “God’s eye” perspective. If we connect scientific objectivity to this kind of universal validity, we must admit that objective cognition is impossible. The dissertation argues that in order to claim that the pursuit of objectivity is the meaningful goal for the cognition of the human sciences, Dilthey should have replaced, in his aspiration for the ideal of objectivity, the requirement of absolute validity with a weaker, that is, a formal and relative requirement for universal validity. I demonstrate that he in fact does this sporadically, and that his discussions on this theme do implicitly contain such a treatment of the objectivity of the human sciences, but that he is not always consistent in this, yet that such an approach to the objectivity of knowledge would provide a good basis for one of Dilthey’s primary claims, the substance of which he himself, however, did not open up more closely – namely that the extent to which knowledge derived from the human sciences can accomplish its task of being the instrument with which society can be influenced or even guided depends on the universal validity of this knowledge.
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) was one of the first and most influential theorizers who set as his goal to reveal the specificity that characterises the forms and paths of development of knowledge in the humanities. The latter were still undergoing development during his lifetime and were fighting for their acknowledgement as a legitimate part of the academic world. The theme of objectivity in his philosophy of the human sciences refers to the relations between the concepts of objectivity and guidance. The purpose of this dissertation is to first distinguish the different conceptions of objectivity and guidance in Dilthey’s philosophy. Second, to reconstruct the problems and contexts within which these conceptions arise during the development of his thought. Third, to present and assess critically the solutions that he proposed for the problems that he raised within the context of the theme of objectivity. Fourth, to bring out the various approaches to the relations between the objectivity of human sciences and the guidance of society that can be provided within the framework of his conception, but which he himself did not explicate. This dissertation reaches the conclusion that there are several different concepts of (objective) reality, the objectivity of cognition, and the guidance of society contained within Dilthey’s discussions on the theme of objectivity. I distinguish four different constellations in Dilthey’s thought that are constituted by these concepts. According to his conviction, the first two rely on unsatisfactory conceptions of what objectivity is in both the ontological and the epistemological sense. Against these he provided new conceptions of ontological and epistemological objectivity. Moreover, the emphases of his approach shifted over time, so that we can propose that he developed two different conceptions based on the connections between these concepts. The development of Dilthey’s thought leads to the conclusion which today may be formulated as follows: absolutely valid cognition is possible only from a “God’s eye” perspective. If we connect scientific objectivity to this kind of universal validity, we must admit that objective cognition is impossible. The dissertation argues that in order to claim that the pursuit of objectivity is the meaningful goal for the cognition of the human sciences, Dilthey should have replaced, in his aspiration for the ideal of objectivity, the requirement of absolute validity with a weaker, that is, a formal and relative requirement for universal validity. I demonstrate that he in fact does this sporadically, and that his discussions on this theme do implicitly contain such a treatment of the objectivity of the human sciences, but that he is not always consistent in this, yet that such an approach to the objectivity of knowledge would provide a good basis for one of Dilthey’s primary claims, the substance of which he himself, however, did not open up more closely – namely that the extent to which knowledge derived from the human sciences can accomplish its task of being the instrument with which society can be influenced or even guided depends on the universal validity of this knowledge.
Kirjeldus
Märksõnad
Dilthey, Wilhelm (1833-1911), filosoofid, saksa, 19. saj. 2. pool, 20. saj. algus, kontinentaalfilosoofia, humanitaarteadused, sotsiaalfilosoofia, objektiivsus, philosophers, German, second half of the 19th century, beginning of the 20th century, continental philosophy, objectivity