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dc.contributor.advisorSirkel, Riin, juhendaja
dc.contributor.advisorLott, Toomas, juhendaja
dc.contributor.authorHallap, Mark
dc.contributor.otherTartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskondet
dc.contributor.otherTartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondet
dc.contributor.otherTartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituutet
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-10T10:51:21Z
dc.date.available2015-09-10T10:51:21Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10062/48412
dc.description.abstractIn Plato’s Socratic dialogues the Meno and the Euthyphro, all attempts at answering Socrates’ “What is the F?” question are rejected, but some answers are rejected in a peculiar way. Socrates complains that Euthyphro’s first answer, and Meno’s first and third answers, provide “too many” things for the F. This thesis considers several competing suggestions for why Socrates rejects these answers. The following suggestions are argued to be unhelpful: (1) that Socrates’ interlocutors provide particulars instead of universals, (2) that Socrates makes an assumption that examples cannot be known before you know the definition, and (3) that the interlocutors offer too narrow definitions. None of these explains why Socrates says that there are too many things provided. Finally, the author argues that the answers are rejected because Socrates assumes there is only one explanation for why F things are F.en
dc.description.urihttp://www.ester.ee/record=b4501644*estet
dc.language.isoetet
dc.publisherTartu Ülikoolet
dc.subjectantiikfilosoofiaet
dc.subjectPlatonet
dc.subject.otherbakalaureusetöödet
dc.titleLists in the Meno and the Euthyphroet
dc.typeThesiset


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