Revisionary ontology: improving concepts to improve beliefs
Date
2018-05-14
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Abstract
Revideerivad ontoloogid (nende seas Peter van Inwagen, Trenton Merricks ja Peter Unger) paistavad kaitsvat tavamõtlemisega sobimatuid väiteid selle kohta, mis on olemas – näiteks väidet, et toole ja laudu pole olemas. Doktoritöös küsin, kuidas revideerivat ontoloogiat tõlgendada: mida revideerivad ontoloogid tegelikult teevad? Kaitsen “teoreetilist metalingvistilist vaadet“, mille järgi on revideeriv ontoloogia tavamõistete parandamine uskumuste parandamiseks. Erinevalt „praktilistest metalingvistilistest vaadetest“ on minu vaate kohaselt revideeriva ontoloogia eesmärk siiski uurida, milline maailm tegelikult on. Seda teemat – milline maailm tegelikult on – uuritakse aga, arutledes selle üle, millised on parimad mõisted maailma kirjeldamiseks, s.t millised mõisted peegeldavad maailma objektiivset struktuuri ehk „lõikavad maailma liigestest“. Idee ontoloogiast kui liigestest lõikava mõisteskeemi otsingust toetub Theodore Siderile. Doktoritöö originaalne panus seisneb eelkõige järgnevas.
(1) Kaitsen teoreetilist metalingvistilist vaadet süstemaatilisel moel, lähtudes selgelt määratletud ja põhjendatud adekvaatsustingimustest ning kaaludes, kuidas teoreetiline metalingvistiline vaade võrreldes alternatiividega nendele adekvaatsustingimustele vastab.
(2) Kaitsen uudset vaadet revideeriva ontoloogia episteemilise tähtsuse kohta: revideeriv ontoloogia võib parandada meie teoreetilisi uskumusi (mitte meie praktilisi uskumusi), parandades mõisteid, mida nende uskumuste moodustamisel kasutatakse. Teoreetilised uskumused on need, mida moodustatakse pelgalt episteemilise täiuse nimel, samas kui praktilisi uskumusi moodustatakse uskumuse kandja ja/või teiste inimeste mitte-episteemiliste eesmärkide teenimiseks.
(3) Näitan, kuidas see arusaam revideerivast ontoloogiast valgustab ka feministliku ja peavoolumetafüüsika suhet. Kaitsen vaadet, et vahel „feministlikuks soo-metafüüsikaks“ nimetatu (näiteks Sally Haslangeri ja Asta Sveinsdóttiri selleteemaliste kirjutiste) eesmärk on parandada mõisteid praktiliste uskumuste parandamiseks.
Revisionary ontologists (such as Peter van Inwagen, Trenton Merricks, and Peter Unger) appear to defend views that contradict ordinary beliefs about what there is. For example, they appear to argue that there are no chairs and tables. In my thesis, I ask how we should interpret such revisionary ontology: what are revisionary ontologists really doing? I defend the “theoretical metalinguistic view”, according to which revisionary ontologists improve ordinary concepts to improve our beliefs. In contrast to “practical metalinguistic views”, my account still allows that revisionary ontologists investigate what the world is really like. However, this issue – what the world is really like – is investigated by discussing which concepts are the best for describing the world, i.e. which concepts reflect the objective structure of the world or “carve at the joints”. The idea of ontology as the search for the joint-carving conceptual scheme draws on Theodore Sider. The original contribution of the thesis consists primarily in the following. (1) I defend the theoretical metalinguistic view in a systematic way, invoking clearly defined and motivated adequacy conditions and considering how well the theoretical metalinguistic view meets these adequacy conditions, compared to the alternative accounts. (2) I provide a novel account of the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology: revisionary ontology can improve our theoretical beliefs (as opposed to our practical beliefs), by improving the concepts used to form those beliefs. Theoretical beliefs are formed for the sake of intrinsically valuable epistemic excellence and practical beliefs are formed to serve the belief-bearers’ and/or other people’s non-epistemic interests. (3) I show how this conception of revisionary ontology illuminates the relationship between feminist and mainstream metaphysics. I argue that what is sometimes called “feminist metaphysics of gender” (for example, as practiced by Sally Haslanger and Asta Svensdóttir) is about improving concepts to improve practical beliefs.
Revisionary ontologists (such as Peter van Inwagen, Trenton Merricks, and Peter Unger) appear to defend views that contradict ordinary beliefs about what there is. For example, they appear to argue that there are no chairs and tables. In my thesis, I ask how we should interpret such revisionary ontology: what are revisionary ontologists really doing? I defend the “theoretical metalinguistic view”, according to which revisionary ontologists improve ordinary concepts to improve our beliefs. In contrast to “practical metalinguistic views”, my account still allows that revisionary ontologists investigate what the world is really like. However, this issue – what the world is really like – is investigated by discussing which concepts are the best for describing the world, i.e. which concepts reflect the objective structure of the world or “carve at the joints”. The idea of ontology as the search for the joint-carving conceptual scheme draws on Theodore Sider. The original contribution of the thesis consists primarily in the following. (1) I defend the theoretical metalinguistic view in a systematic way, invoking clearly defined and motivated adequacy conditions and considering how well the theoretical metalinguistic view meets these adequacy conditions, compared to the alternative accounts. (2) I provide a novel account of the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology: revisionary ontology can improve our theoretical beliefs (as opposed to our practical beliefs), by improving the concepts used to form those beliefs. Theoretical beliefs are formed for the sake of intrinsically valuable epistemic excellence and practical beliefs are formed to serve the belief-bearers’ and/or other people’s non-epistemic interests. (3) I show how this conception of revisionary ontology illuminates the relationship between feminist and mainstream metaphysics. I argue that what is sometimes called “feminist metaphysics of gender” (for example, as practiced by Sally Haslanger and Asta Svensdóttir) is about improving concepts to improve practical beliefs.