The content and implications of nativist claims. A philosophical analysis
Failid
Kuupäev
2021-11-29
Autorid
Ajakirja pealkiri
Ajakirja ISSN
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Kirjastaja
Abstrakt
Tihti kuuleme, kuidas teadlased on avastanud, et mõni inimese või muud liiki organismi tunnus on kaasasündinud, geneetiline, päritav või loodusliku valiku tulemus, et organismi geenid kannavad mingi tunnuse kohta informatsiooni jne. Niisuguseid väiteid nimetan „nativistlikeks“ ja neid ühendab see, et nende kõigi sõnul on ühel või teisel organismi tunnusel olemas olulised seesmised ja sünnipärased põhjused. Nativistlikud väited on olulised. Nad vormivad meie üldist arusaama iseendast, sellest, mis meile on hea ja võimalik. Nad mõjutavad ka praktilisi otsuseid. Näiteks on teada, et teatud geenivariandid tõstavad nii mõnegi haiguse põdemise riski, ning sellel on kasvav mõju tervisehoiupraktikatele. Paljud arvavad sedagi, et laste hariduse korraldamisel peaks arvestama asjaolu, et kognitiivne võimekus on suurel määral pärilik. Tõendeid agressiivse käitumise ja geenide seose kohta on arvestatud kergendava asjaoluna karistuse määramisel. Niisiis on oluline nativistlike väidete sisu ja järelmeid õigesti mõista. Doktoritöös analüüsingi filosoofiliste teooriate ja mõistete abil eri tüüpi nativistlike teooriate sisu. Mida tähendab, et miski, näiteks mõni psühholoogiline kalduvus, on kaasasündinud? Mida tähendab, et intelligentsus on 50% pärilik? Mis mõttes (kui üldse) kannavad geenid organismi tunnuste kohta informatsiooni – on geenid ometigi nii erinevad meile tuttavamatest informatsioonikandjatest nagu ajalehed, e-kirjad, salakoodid ja helifailid. Töö rõhutab kahte asjaolu. Esiteks, oma töös näitan, et erinevates teaduslikes kontekstides võivad sõnad nagu „kaasasündinud“, „geneetiline“ ja teised taolised tähendada väga erinevaid asju. Seega võivad kindla nativistliku väite järelmid ühes teaduskontekstis märkimisväärselt erineda mõne teise nativistliku väite järelmitest mõnes teises teaduskontekstis. Teiseks, oma töös selgitan, miks näiteks kaasasündinud, päritavate, geneetiliste põhjustega tunnuste kujunemine ja olemus võivad erinevatel ja ootamatutel viisidel sõltuda organismi keskkonnast ja kogemustest. Näitan, miks mõne sellise mõiste tähendus, mida kognitiivteadlased peavad kaasasündinuks, sõltub vägagi sellest, millises keskkonnas organism üles kasvab. Ja et ka 100% päritav tunnus saab siiski olla ka sotsiaalselt konstrueeritud.
We often hear how scientists have discovered that a certain human trait – or a trait of another type of organism – is innate, genetic, heritable, inherited, naturally selected etc. All these claims have something in common: they all declare a trait to have significant organism internal (for instance genetic) causes that are present in the organism at its birth. I call claims like these “nativist claims”. Nativist claims are important. They shape our overall understanding of what we are, what we can do and what is good for us. They also impact our practical decision making. For instance, we know that certain types of genes increase the risk of certain diseases, and increasingly this has an effect on healthcare practices. Many people believe that in the matter of children’s education we should consider the fact that many cognitive abilities are highly heritable. Associations between genetics and aggressive behavior have been taken to be alleviating circumstances in criminal sentencing. It is therefore important to correctly understand the content and implications of nativist claims. In this doctoral thesis I analyze, by philosophical means, the content of different kinds of nativist claim. What does it mean that some psychological tendency is innate? What does it mean that intelligence is 50% heritable? How (if at all) do genes come to carry information about the traits of an organism – they are nothing like the information carriers familiar to us, such as newspapers, e-mails, secret codes, and audio files. The thesis emphasizes two things. Firstly, I demonstrate, that in different scientific contexts these words can mean very different things. Therefore, the implications of a certain nativist claim in one scientific context can be remarkably different from another nativist claim’s implications in some other scientific context. Secondly, I explain how the development of innate, heritable and genetically caused traits can be determined in different and often unexpected ways by our environment and experiences. I demonstrate that the content of a concept that is considered innate by cognitive scientists can be determined by what the organism that possesses the concept has experienced. I also show that even a trait which is 100% heritable can at the same time be a socially constructed trait.
We often hear how scientists have discovered that a certain human trait – or a trait of another type of organism – is innate, genetic, heritable, inherited, naturally selected etc. All these claims have something in common: they all declare a trait to have significant organism internal (for instance genetic) causes that are present in the organism at its birth. I call claims like these “nativist claims”. Nativist claims are important. They shape our overall understanding of what we are, what we can do and what is good for us. They also impact our practical decision making. For instance, we know that certain types of genes increase the risk of certain diseases, and increasingly this has an effect on healthcare practices. Many people believe that in the matter of children’s education we should consider the fact that many cognitive abilities are highly heritable. Associations between genetics and aggressive behavior have been taken to be alleviating circumstances in criminal sentencing. It is therefore important to correctly understand the content and implications of nativist claims. In this doctoral thesis I analyze, by philosophical means, the content of different kinds of nativist claim. What does it mean that some psychological tendency is innate? What does it mean that intelligence is 50% heritable? How (if at all) do genes come to carry information about the traits of an organism – they are nothing like the information carriers familiar to us, such as newspapers, e-mails, secret codes, and audio files. The thesis emphasizes two things. Firstly, I demonstrate, that in different scientific contexts these words can mean very different things. Therefore, the implications of a certain nativist claim in one scientific context can be remarkably different from another nativist claim’s implications in some other scientific context. Secondly, I explain how the development of innate, heritable and genetically caused traits can be determined in different and often unexpected ways by our environment and experiences. I demonstrate that the content of a concept that is considered innate by cognitive scientists can be determined by what the organism that possesses the concept has experienced. I also show that even a trait which is 100% heritable can at the same time be a socially constructed trait.
Kirjeldus
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Märksõnad
nativism, philosophy