PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BY OTHER MEANS: A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF U.S. MILITARY MESSAGES IN POLISH NEWS OUTLETS

MA Thesis

Supervisor: Eoin McNamara, MSc

Tartu 2018
DECLARATION

I, Leslie Gibson, have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced. The word count is 23,828 excluding references, appendices, and required documents.

........................................................................................................................................

/ signature of author /

The defence will take place on ............................................... / date / at ..................... / time /
........................................................................................................ / address / in auditorium number ...................... / number /

Opponent ............................................................................. / name / (............... / academic degree /),

............................................... / position /
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BY OTHER MEANS: A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF U.S. MILITARY MESSAGES IN POLISH NEWS OUTLETS

Leslie Gibson

Abstract

The United States military’s global presence presents a unique opportunity to engage foreign publics in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. This thesis identifies the message the U.S. military seeks to convey to Poland through public diplomacy activities, and how this message is perceived in Polish news outlets. This case also creates linkage between the military and public diplomacy, an actor and a strategy that can seem contradictory. Through interviews with government officials and the application of a two-step methodology of content and qualitative discourse analyses to Polish news articles, this thesis finds that Polish news outlets favorably perceive U.S. military public diplomacy, and that the message of reassurance and deterrence is conveyed through the activities. The military and public diplomacy are compatible in practice and the combination can result in an effective strategy to communicate with foreign audiences. By applying constructivist assertions to concepts of perception and soft power that traditionally fit into other theoretical fields, this thesis contributes to the development of military public diplomacy as a salient academic topic that can offer insight into future cases of militaries conducting public diplomacy.

Key words: public diplomacy, military public diplomacy, U.S. military, Poland, reassurance, deterrence, constructivism, perception, soft power
SUMMARY

The United States military’s global presence presents a unique opportunity to engage foreign publics in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. In the current Euro-Atlantic security environment on NATO’s “eastern flank,” the U.S. military’s presence allows opportunities to engage with publics in Eastern Europe to enhance its image and convince allies of U.S. commitment to their security. Despite the increasingly important role the military has in Poland, however, the military and public diplomacy still seem to represent a contradiction to policymakers and academics, which is evident in the lack of clear Department of Defense definitions and relevant academic literature. This thesis identifies the message the U.S. military seeks to convey to Poland through public diplomacy activities, and how this message is perceived in Polish news outlets. This case also creates linkage between the military and public diplomacy, an actor and a strategy that can seem contradictory. Poland is selected from the countries on the eastern flank for this thesis, as Poland hosts the largest number of U.S. troops and the U.S. Army Europe’s Operation Atlantic Resolve headquarters. The U.S. military’s posture in Poland also represents a case of military public diplomacy in a fellow NATO ally country, which is understudied in academic literature and can offer insight into how effectively the military engages with its allies. The U.S. military public diplomacy events and Polish news articles from spring 2014 to summer 2017 are examined and represent a critical time frame in U.S. defense posture on NATO’s eastern flank and in Poland. The resources available to determine the military public diplomacy strategy, curate articles from the diverse Polish media landscape, and conduct research during a limited time frame narrow the scope of this thesis, making the results representative, but not all encompassing.

Two research questions structure the methodology and empirical data analysis: 1. What is the primary message U.S. military public diplomacy is communicating to Poland? and 2. How is U.S. military public diplomacy received in Polish media? On a theoretical level, public diplomacy literature is lacking in supporting theories to answer these questions, which makes a constructivist framework a potentially valuable way of approaching
military public diplomacy. The first question requires examining official U.S. government policies through supporting data from interviews with government representatives and documents. To answer the second question, a sample of Polish news articles is drawn from a range of sources and broken down through content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis, a two-step methodology that allows multiple perspectives into what the articles mean. This thesis finds that Polish news outlets favorably perceive U.S. military public diplomacy, and that the message of reassurance and deterrence is conveyed through the activities.

Military public diplomacy fits into neither hard power nor soft power neatly, yet occupies a combination of the two that can be answered by analyzing perceptions and images. The results of the thesis have practical implications for convincing policymakers of the potential added value of the military in conveying a message. Additionally, constructivism proves a valuable theoretical construct to create a linkage between perception and soft power to apply to military public diplomacy. Rather than positioning concepts within realist and liberalist schools of thought as in conflict with constructivism, this case shows the compatibility among the theoretical frameworks to answer questions regarding military public diplomacy. This linkage can benefit the academic field of public diplomacy, and shows that the military is a valid actor that should be considered more seriously in public diplomacy literature. Other cases of militaries conducting public diplomacy can adopt constructivist assertions to identify its messaging strategies and their effectiveness.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 8

CHAPTER I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................................... 11
1.1. CONSTRUCTIVISM AS A FOUNDATION FOR ANALYSIS .................................... 11
1.2. PERCEPTION (AND MISPERCEPTION) ..................................................................... 12
1.3. SOFT POWER, HARD POWER, SMART POWER? ............................................... 15
1.4. CONCEPTUALIZING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ......................................................... 17
   1.4.1. Where Does Public Diplomacy Fit? .............................................................. 20
1.5. MILITARY PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ........................................................................ 23
1.6. (RE)ASSURANCE AND DETERRENCE .............................................................. 30

CHAPTER II. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................... 36
2.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...................................................................................... 36
2.2. EMPIRICAL DATA .............................................................................................. 38
2.3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ..................................................................... 42
   2.3.1. Content Analysis ...................................................................................... 42
   2.3.2. Qualitative Discourse Analysis ................................................................. 45
2.4. RESEARCH DESIGN LIMITATIONS .................................................................. 47

CHAPTER III. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND .................................................................. 49
3.1. PROPAGANDA, CULTURAL OFFENSIVES, AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ............... 49
3.2. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS ............................ 51
3.3. BOOTS ON THE GROUND IN POLAND: U.S. MILITARY PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES ...... 53

CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 56
4.1. WHAT IS THE PRIMARY MESSAGE THE U.S. MILITARY IS COMMUNICATING TO POLAND? ... 56
   4.1.1. Reassurance and Deterrence .................................................................... 56
   4.1.2. Toys to Show Off and Folks in Uniform ..................................................... 58
   4.1.3. A Favorable Audience ............................................................................ 60
4.2. HOW IS U.S. MILITARY PUBLIC DIPLOMACY RECEIVED IN POLISH MEDIA? .......... 62
   4.2.1. Results of Content Analysis .................................................................... 62
   4.2.2. Results of Qualitative Discourse Analysis ................................................. 70

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 77

REFERENCE LIST ............................................................................................................. 79

APPENDIX I. CODEBOOK ............................................................................................. 86

APPENDIX II. CODING INDEX ....................................................................................... 89

APPENDIX III. QUALITATIVE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ARTICLES ............................... 95
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CA – content analysis
DoD – Department of Defense
DoS – Department of State
EDI – European Deterrence Initiative
ERI – European Reassurance Initiative
IIA – Inform and Influence Activities
OAR – Operation Atlantic Resolve
PD – public diplomacy
QDA – qualitative discourse analysis
USIA – U.S. Information Agency
INTRODUCTION

The U.S. military maintains an extensive presence across the world at overseas bases, in conflict zones, and in potential hotspots. The global nature and scale of the United States’ defense posture make the military a serious actor in pursuing the country’s foreign policy objectives. In order to secure the operational environments related to U.S. foreign policy, the military regularly practices in public diplomacy – that is, engaging with foreign publics through outreach and targeted communication channels, otherwise known as public diplomacy. While the Department of State oversees traditional public diplomacy, the military is uniquely poised to engage with audiences during foreign deployments and rotations, making its role in public diplomacy efforts crucial to effectiveness. In the current Euro-Atlantic security environment on NATO’s “eastern flank,” the U.S. military’s presence allows opportunities to engage with publics in the region, especially in Poland, to enhance its image and convince allies of U.S. commitment to their security. Despite the increasingly important role the military has in Poland, however, the military and public diplomacy still seem to represent a contradiction to policymakers and academics, which is evident in the lack of any clear definitions to date, either by the Department of Defense itself or in the relevant academic literature.

The aim of this thesis is to connect the military and public diplomacy rather than framing the two as incompatible. By analyzing both the U.S. military’s messages and the ways in which they are perceived in news outlets, this thesis will contribute to the empirical literature public diplomacy empirical literature and show that military public diplomacy is a salient concept. Poland is selected from the countries on the eastern flank for this thesis, as Poland hosts the largest number of U.S. troops in the region, and is home to the headquarters of U.S. Army Europe’s Operation Atlantic Resolve. The U.S. military’s posture in Poland also represents a case of military public diplomacy in a NATO member an understudied type of case that can offer insight into how effectively the military engages with its allies. U.S. military public diplomacy efforts and news articles from spring 2014 to summer 2017 are examined and represent a critical time frame in U.S. defense posture on NATO’s eastern flank in general, especially in Poland. The resources
available to determine military public diplomacy strategy, curate articles from the diverse Polish media landscape, and conduct research during a limited time frame narrow the scope of this thesis, making the results representative, but not all-encompassing.

Two research questions structure the methodology and empirical data analysis: first, what is the primary message communicated to Poland by U.S. military public diplomacy, and second, how is U.S. military public diplomacy received in Polish media? On a theoretical level, the public diplomacy literature lacks relevant theories to answer these questions, making a constructivist framework a potentially valuable way of approaching military public diplomacy. To answer the first, official U.S. government policies are [have been] examined through supporting data from interviews with government representatives as well as through document analysis. To answer the second question, a sample of Polish news articles are drawn from a range of sources and broken down through content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis, a two-step methodology that allows multiple perspectives into what the articles represent.

This thesis is divided into four main sections. The first provides a theoretical foundation for analysis by using a constructivist framework to understand how perceptions, images, and soft power affect public diplomacy and subsequently military public diplomacy and its messages. The second chapter provides an overview of relevant empirical data and the methodology used to analyze the research questions and includes an outline of limitations. An empirical background follows the methodology chapter and explains why the U.S. military is in Poland while situating specific public diplomacy events in the general context of relations between the United States and Poland. The empirical data is analyzed and discussed in the fourth chapter, which presents and discusses the main findings of this thesis. Finally, a conclusion summarizes the findings of the empirical analysis and theoretical contributions.

The findings of the analysis show that the U.S. military seeks to convey a message of reassurance to its NATO allies – while simultaneously deterring Russian aggression –
through its public diplomacy events and that this message is perceived favorably in Polish news outlets. These results also reveal/demonstrate an important linkage between the military and public diplomacy, while underscoring that the military plays a key role in communicating a state’s message to foreign audiences.
CHAPTER I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Public diplomacy is a foreign policy strategy that focuses on engagement with foreign audiences and is typically understood as a way of increasing a state’s soft power. Policymakers and academics see the military’s role in foreign policy strictly as ensuring security, yet the military adds a different dimension to public diplomacy. A framework for understanding the U.S. military’s message and how it is perceived is constructivism, which argues that the contexts that produce ideas, behaviors, and interests are socially constructed. These create images of a state that determine how others frame its behavior. The range of perceptions that result from certain actions can either effectively contribute to a state’s soft power or damage the state’s reputation and credibility. Controlling how an image is perceived requires strategic planning and implementation, which is where public diplomacy fits into a state’s foreign policy projection. How the military contributes to managing perceptions through the respective government’s public diplomacy strategies will be explored through the following chapter on the theoretical conceptualization of these topics.

1.1. Constructivism as a Foundation for Analysis

Constructivism, at its core, argues that social relations (and how these relations are formed) shape the world and form the foundation for how foreign policy decisions are implemented and perceived. The characterization and perception of the U.S. military’s public diplomacy in Polish media rely on a complex web of social structures that builds up images of all actors involved. These images lead to the actor’s behavior and how that behavior is perceived. One of the leading constructivist scholars, Alexander Wendt, asserts that “constructivist theorizing tries to show how the social structure of a system makes actions possible by constituting actors with certain identities and interests, and material capabilities with certain meanings” (1995, p. 76). In the context of international relations, a state is associated with a range of identities that influence how others interact with the state as well as how the state forms its interests and behaves according to these interests.
These social structures and the embedded web of shared ideas and behaviors within an international system result either in an image, a representation or impression, of a specific actor. Constructivist thinkers assume that these images, or socially-constructed “webs of meaning and practices,” can be stable but tend to be subject to change (Hurd, 2008, p. 300). In other words, actor images and behaviors are not fixed: they can fluctuate depending on the nature of other interactions among actors. In addition to the fluctuating meaning of the contexts that determine images, constructivist scholars maintain that the social structures that compose these webs of shared meaning and practices include material resources, but that these materials obtain their power through social behavior and action (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). Realist scholars, such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, regard the military as a material capability that the state uses to project power; however, this is overly simplistic as it ignores what the military’s image means and how these constructed images subsequently affect others’ perception of a state’s military capabilities.

Recognizing the absence of explanations for the military’s image in public diplomacy in traditional schools of thought, this thesis relies on constructivism – the assertion that the world is socially constructed – as the most relevant theoretical concept to answer the research questions and puzzle. This thesis proposes that the fluctuating intersubjective meanings that define how actors interact can show how the military constructs its message and how that output is perceived by the Polish news media.

1.2. Perception (and Misperception)

A world constructed from such social interactions relies heavily on perception, or how an actor regards and understands the other(s). In this thesis, perceptions are at play in two stages in particular: understanding the input – what the U.S. military’s views as the core public diplomacy message – and analyzing its reception in Polish news outlets. Robert Jervis pioneered the development of perception as a theoretical concept in the second half of the 20th century and provided insight into misperceptions that also play a significant role in international relations, especially in war and in attempts to deter adversaries from war. Typically, perception as a concept fits into the theoretical field of liberalism and explains how misperception guided foreign policy decisions, especially during World War
II and the Cold War. Constructivism, in contrast, gained more saliency in academia in the late 20th and early 21st centuries as it adapted a way of framing international relations using social structures as a basis. There is an ongoing debate about whether these two frameworks are in conflict, or whether constructivism as a way of thinking – as opposed to a theory – can add value to traditional schools of thought. This thesis takes the position that constructivist assertions, such as the fluid nature of images, can answer questions about perception previously unanswered in realist approaches. It does not argue, however, that the two theoretical frames are incompatible, but simply holds that in the context of this thesis, constructivism does add value to understanding perceptions of U.S. military public diplomacy in Polish media.

Despite the difference in theoretical categorization, similarities between how perception and socially-constructed images are formed call for a new way of approaching certain topics. Constructivist thinking implies that states and other agents are constituted with certain images that in turn affect actor behavior. Similarly, in Jervis’ words, “in determining how he will behave, an actor must try to predict how others will act and how their actions will affect his values” (Jervis, 1968, p. 454). These predictions are based on what a state is imagined to be. This shows that both concepts assert that how a state is imagined affects the ways in which others base their interactions. Another similarity between perception and constructed images becomes evident: both assume that actors engage in subjective interpretations of the world around them that are fluid. Socially-constructed images of a state are subject to change based on fluctuating interpretations, just as perception depends on changing circumstances and interactions. Perception, similar to images of an actor, is neither rational nor based on hard facts, but instead relies on interactions and how these interactions leave impressions on actors. This does not mean that an actor’s perception is irrational or false, just that it relies on a range of sources – many at the personal level of individual policymakers – that influence the understanding and interpretation of another. Jervis asserts that perception (and misperception) results from three sources that contribute to levels of “perceptual thresholds.” These three sources are:
1) An actor’s beliefs about the present domestic political structure;
2) Previous experiences;
3) And views of international relations and international history (1968).

These sources differ for both key actors at the center of this thesis: the U.S. military (representing the United States) and Polish media (representing Poland).

The U.S. domestic political system is based on a set of guiding – democratic – values. These domestic values have steadily been transferred into foreign policy in the form of presidential doctrines, for example, that leave the world with various impressions of the United States, both positive and negative. This feedback creates a certain self-image in the United States, as well as influences how actors external to an interaction perceive the U.S. For the United States, perceptions of not only Poland and NATO but also Russia play a role in the formation of its military public diplomacy message in Poland. Past experiences in international history, especially in the Cold War, as well as the current geopolitical climate also impact the way the United States perceives Russia and Poland. Since the United States believes Russia’s image is one of an aggressive actor based on historical expectations, then its suspicion of Russia frames its perceptions. On the other hand, if the United States views Poland as a reliable and staunch NATO ally, its behavior and messaging will reflect such impressions.

Poland, although ideologically aligned with the United States in many ways, is a unique actor with a different domestic political system and set of previous experiences. Poland’s domestic discourse that promotes a strong, secure, and free Poland can explain its current dedication to protecting NATO’s eastern flank from Russian aggression. Decades of Soviet oppression during the Cold War heavily influences this self-image. Since Poland views the United States as a reliable guarantor of security against Russia, its reception to U.S. behavior will be accordingly favorable. To Warsaw, past experiences and current relations, such as the strong defense relationship and the symbols of commitment the U.S. continues to deliver to Poland, constitute its the image of the United States. Poland will perceive the United States military based on what they expect from the United States: if Poland expects
a strong message of solidarity from the U.S., the more likely Poland will perceive what the U.S. military does as consonant with expectation of solidarity. These social contexts based on expectations and perceptions are relevant in answering both research questions this thesis seeks to answer. The first relates to the U.S. military’s message: how the U.S. perceives international actors creates and maintains this message. The second question aims at understanding perception directly: how the media views the message.

Perception is not just about liking or disliking another state, but a complex array of expectations and contexts that construct certain meaning and fluctuate over time. Actors will perceive another actor based on what it expects from that actor, and frame its actions on this perception. Favorable perceptions and maintaining favorable perceptions matter in being an effective actor. A range of factors like its overall attractiveness to another – also known as soft power – determines the formation of a favorable perception.

1.3. Soft Power, Hard Power, Smart Power?
Image again plays a key role in solving part of the puzzle of this thesis: the connection between the military and public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is often associated with the concept of soft power or “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.” A state’s culture, political values, and foreign policies, as well as – acknowledged more recently – economic capabilities form the basis for attraction (Nye 2004, p. 94; 2011). Examples of U.S. soft power include the image of the Statue of Liberty welcoming immigrants, the globalization of American rock music, and the innovation in Silicon Valley. Public diplomacy does not equal soft power, and vice versa. Soft power is attraction, while public diplomacy is an influence strategy that fits into generating a state’s soft power. The examples of soft power mentioned are merely assets the United States holds that contribute to its appeal, rather than government strategies created to improve the country’s image. Hard power, in contrast to soft power, relates to the use of resources like military capabilities to project power, yet “sticks and carrots” are not mutually exclusive. Joseph Nye further develops concepts of power by dubbing the strategic use of hard and soft power as “smart power.” Yet smart power, the
combination of military capabilities and soft elements, does not explain military public diplomacy. Military public diplomacy is a separate influence strategy than just power projection through just the military (element of hard power) or just public diplomacy (element of soft power). Military power traditionally fits into the realist schools of thought yet how the military acquires an image, significance, and meaning should be examined through a constructivist framework. Power is based on how states perceive others, which is founded on webs of meanings and images that define what power is and who holds it. A constructivist assertion such as “meaning, through social contexts, endows material capabilities with power,” shows that the military is more than just a tool to coerce behavior – it is also an instrument of influencing perceptions. Military public diplomacy reflects this, as the military’s image depends on others’ perceptions of its tangible assets, such as soldiers and heavy military equipment.

Imagery and perception form the basis for attraction, something that is founded on interactions between actors. Soft power alone in itself is not sufficient to improve an actor’s image in the eyes of another actor, but instead builds upon existing perceptions that actor holds. If a mismatch exists between perception and how a state projects its power, the attempt to attract and convince another state will not be effective. Attraction – soft power – is not a strategy in itself. Designing instruments to achieve soft power requires an actor to understand its image, and then use soft and hard power tools to either improve or maintain this image. The United States’ soft power potential effectiveness will be influenced by the sources of perception discussed – its domestic political system, past experiences, and international relations and history. The United States will not be attractive to audiences with negative perceptions of American influence. As a strategy, soft power is not enough to convince these averse audiences. For example, for a state such as Afghanistan with past experiences of an American invasion, Hollywood movies are not enough to attract audiences to support a given U.S. cause. As a strategy, public diplomacy, is more effective as it can identify elements of how the audiences perceive the United States and plan engagement to address issues and apply cultural awareness.
The military is a public diplomacy instrument in accruing soft power, yet it does not explain military public diplomacy in the way traditional diplomacy can be nested under the soft power concept. Nye identified the influential role of the military in generating soft power through officer exchange programs, joint training exercises, and aid programs that combine the “aura of power” associated with the military’s hard power capabilities with the soft power element of people-to-people contact (2004, p. 106). Soft power also plays an important role in the use of force: “soft power supports the exercise of military and hard economic powers, and arrogant or unjust use of hard power can erode soft power” (Hocking, 2005, p. 32). However, an aura of power is not a strategy, and these events require concerted amplification to message within a certain context. In the case of Poland, the U.S. military does not aim to generate attraction, but instead uses public diplomacy to address and evaluate Polish concerns of an existential threat from Russia with strategies to maintain favorable perceptions.

Soft power is power through attraction – which can be a more passive action – while public diplomacy involves government intention: strategic planning and agenda-setting to foster this attraction. The definitions and conceptualization outlined in subsequent sections reveal that military public diplomacy activities are not only aimed at creating a soft attraction, but instead are strategically crafted as a way of securing operational environments that enhance the United States’ national security. As discussed, images and perceptions, as well as other elements such as a state’s cultural resources and values, constitute soft power. The following sections conceptualize public diplomacy and military public diplomacy, which is the key topic under study for this thesis, in attempts to distinguish characteristics of (and bridge the confusion in categorizing) military public diplomacy.

1.4. Conceptualizing Public Diplomacy
As images are a key element of soft power, they prove logically relevant in conceptualizing public diplomacy. “Interests, values, identities, memories, and geostrategic contexts shape how we think about public diplomacy” and are socially-constructed
contexts by which “states, associations of states, and nonstate actors understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; manage relations; and influence opinions and actions to advance their interests and values” (Gregory, 2008, p. 276). In other words, the socially-constructed contexts directly influence how a state strategizes its public diplomacy policies.

Laying the foundations for public diplomacy and contributing academic concepts is necessary to develop the concept of military public diplomacy, as it draws upon traditional models of public diplomacy and overlaps with a variety of fields. A problem that arises in using a case that focuses on government and academic language is the discrepancy between words and phrases in common use and those same words and phrases in academia. The following section includes definitional elements of public diplomacy and builds upon those to develop a holistic understanding of military public diplomacy in order to best conceptualize the term for this thesis and form the basis for empirical analysis. While this thesis does not attempt to align with a certain dictionary, whether academic or governmental, empirical data such as interviews with officials revealed that the terminology used matters, especially in the military. Public diplomacy as a theoretical field is underdeveloped, and does not fit neatly into traditional international relations, diplomacy, communication, or public relations theories. Public diplomacy as a term and official practice gained relevance in academia in the Cold War as the U.S. and Soviet Union engaged in “cultural offensives.” However, this context no longer captures the full nature of public diplomacy, not least military public diplomacy; accordingly, this thesis seeks to add a more complete on modern public diplomacy.

United States public diplomacy, according to the Department of State, is intended “to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world” (Department of State, 2018). This State Department definition includes a specific goal – to enhance national security. Similarly, the U.S. military’s principal aim is to secure the country and its national
interests. These identified goals of two key government actors contribute to the image of the United States: how the country sees itself affects how others perceive its behavior.

Defining public diplomacy as a concept within academic literature proves more challenging. Eytan Gilboa (2008) outlines the process of defining public diplomacy, and what early definitions lacked in explaining public diplomacy. The questions surrounding who the actors are and what they do are two points of difficulty in reaching a consensual definition. There is no universal academic definition because of disagreements in the differences between strategic communications and public diplomacy, an argument about whether public diplomacy is simply public relations, and the assertion that the information age has brought a new form of public diplomacy (Banks, 2011). This thesis adopts Michael McClellan’s (2004, para. 5) definition of public diplomacy as “the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural and educational programming by an advocate country to create a public opinion environment in a target country or countries that will enable target country political leaders to make decisions that are supportive of advocate country's foreign policy objectives.” McClellan’s definition is holistic, as it identifies the actor, actions, goals, and target, answering the problematic questions. However, as it is still a wordy definition, it can be summarized as: a country’s strategy to conduct information, cultural, and educational programming to create favorable foreign public opinion to that country’s foreign policy.

After defining the term, outlining public diplomacy practices and actor responsibilities reveals the complexities in identifying where the military fits into the public diplomacy model. Bruce Gregory characterizes public diplomacy operations through “actions, relationships, images, and words in three time frames: 24/7 news streams, medium-range campaigns on high-value policies, and long-term engagement” (2008, p. 276). This description matches Nye’s (2004) outline of the three dimensions of how public diplomacy is implemented: daily communication, strategic communication, and the development of lasting relationships. A classic example of U.S. public diplomacy may include: daily social media posts in the host country’s language, outreach events planned in minority
communities, and promoting cultural and educational exchanges. These activities are all based on interactions that lead to meanings that become embedded in others’ perceptions of the United States. While these activities contribute to the United States’ attractiveness to – or its soft power in – a certain community or audience, these activities involve a level of strategic planning to reach certain goals of enhancing the country’s image that make the conditions globally more favorable to American national security. They also require a sustained level of commitment to maintaining positive impressions, as factors exogenous to public diplomacy can influence the image of the United States. These characteristics are true for military public diplomacy as well, even though the way in which the U.S. military implements public diplomacy differs from the standard public diplomacy model.

Important in the evaluation of a foreign policy strategy like public diplomacy is public opinion, or the collection of individual attitudes. Public opinion polls gained importance during the Cold War, when American pollsters began surveying foreign publics about perceptions of the U.S., among other indicators. Public opinion is a crucial element of the strategic planning and evaluation of public diplomacy, as evidenced by Gallup and Nielsen’s consultancy of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. In the context of military public diplomacy, what public opinion reveals is how Poland perceives the American military. This public opinion in turn shapes how leaders direct troops to interact with local audiences and which elements of the military are promoted.

1.4.1. Where Does Public Diplomacy Fit?
Public diplomacy lacks a defined scholarly field and does not neatly fit into other fields, leaving room for a constructivist framework to contribute to its theoretical development. As previously discussed, an actor’s socially-constructed image leads to perceptions that lead to public diplomacy strategies. Although public diplomacy has become a standard foreign policy tool for many states, it seems to assimilate concepts from a range of fields, such as communications, marketing, public relations, and diplomacy theories. Most public diplomacy research is historical, with particular emphasis devoted to examining the Cold
War period. Contemporary research expands past Cold War paradigms, however, U.S. public diplomacy research largely focuses on the post-9/11 era and the war on terrorism. Cold War-era theoretical examinations of public diplomacy utilized, for example, media and political communication, psychology, and public opinion research. Additionally, academic research topics on public diplomacy, in many cases, fell into two categories: U.S. Information Agency and institutional activities, and the struggle of ideologies between the U.S. and USSR (Gregory, 2008, p. 281). The most relevant and recent research on military public diplomacy includes work by Matthew Wallin (2015) and Haluk Karadag (2017), yet neither focuses on specific cases similar to the U.S. military in Poland. The concepts described below, offer elements that can contribute to the underdeveloped concept of military public diplomacy. It also adds another perspective of public diplomacy relations between NATO allies with favorable public opinion environments, as opposed to traditional studies of public diplomacy that focus on more hostile or adversarial environments.

*New Public Diplomacy Concept*

One of the leaps made at the turn of the century strived to develop “new public diplomacy” as a concept to replace traditional academic constructs of public diplomacy. Jan Melissen (2005) defines a “new public diplomacy” to distinguish public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy in response to the decentralization of information through developments in communications technology. What is lacking in McClellan’s earlier-presented definition of public diplomacy, is the vagueness of where non-government actors fit as agents of public diplomacy. Melissen argues that non-state actors have an important role in public diplomacy activities, however, many of these non-state actors in democratic countries are endowed power through governments, either through funding or cooperation. Other characteristics of new public diplomacy include the blurring of differentiation between public affairs and public diplomacy and the trend that information flows are no longer a one-way communications effort but a bilateral process of engaging in dialogue. Developments in the information age have undoubtedly affected military public
diplomacy, but what the “new public diplomacy” fails to explain is how and where the military fits into the model.

Public Relations, Marketing, and Communications Theories
Public relations theories can offer theoretical guidance to public diplomacy and have done so in many cases (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, & Kendrick, 2013). Concepts and theoretical frames in public relations, such as relationship management theory and persuasion theories, can help explain public diplomacy strategies and how engagement is approached as relationship management and as a means to influence. The key difference in public relations and public diplomacy is that public relations primarily concerns the individual affairs of a company or organization, while public diplomacy concerns policies and legislation. Some see public diplomacy as an application of marketing principles to government communication with foreign audiences (Melissen, 2005). Nation-branding strategies to appeal to foreign audiences, for example, reflect marketing theories applied to the field of international relations. In the case of nation-branding, public diplomacy is employed to accrue soft power, i.e. to attract, rather than send a certain message. Nation-branding also focuses on attracting others to visit, invest in, and engage with a certain country, whereas public diplomacy is focused on convincing another state to align with its foreign policy. Additionally, in terms of how public diplomacy is implemented, theories involving communications and public relations theories are valuable. Communications theories applied to international relations, however, focus primarily on the role of media. Political communications theories better evaluate linkages between media coverage and policy. Theories of political communication represent potential opportunities to extend the research presented here.

Diplomacy and Military Diplomacy Theories
Diplomacy focuses on relationships between representatives of states or international institutions, while public diplomacy’s purpose is to persuade a foreign public – not necessarily political institutions – in order for the foreign country to advocate on behalf of the actor’s foreign policies. Melissen argues that existing definitions of diplomacy identify
its main purpose as resolving international difficulties peacefully, with its principal agents accredited representatives of sovereign states who manage international relations through negotiation (2005, p. 5). What diplomacy studies fail to capture is that roles and actions are not as clearly delineated in public diplomacy activities as they are in traditional diplomacy. Public diplomacy, while an element of the larger diplomacy umbrella, differs in its definition: its agent is a country, but rather than official accredited diplomats, public diplomacy can be carried out more with more informal representatives. For example, in U.S. public diplomacy, embassies establish American Corners that host open spaces of resources related to American culture. These American Corners are not aimed at achieving political dialogue at a state-to-state level, but rather to promote the United States in a more publicly-accessible setting. Additionally, reactions to the global information age leave diplomacy studies moving toward a more collaborative model, one that requires public diplomacy and the engagement of these informal representatives. Within diplomacy literature itself, concepts of military diplomacy include gunboat diplomacy and coercive diplomacy. Gunboat diplomacy is the “use of limited naval force for political objectives” and has its theoretical roots in bargaining, signaling, and force theories (Mandel, 1986, p. 59). In this thesis’ case, the U.S. military is not engaging in acts of force to achieve political objectives in Poland. The U.S.–Polish relationship is one of strong bilateral ties between NATO allied countries, as opposed to cases of gunboat and coercive diplomacy where relations are more antagonistic and sometimes violent. The specific case under study is a non-traditional form of public diplomacy and diplomacy, bridging elements of various theoretical frameworks to explain the diplomatic aspects of international relations.

1.5. Military Public Diplomacy

Non-violent methods to pursue security-related foreign policy goals characterize military public diplomacy. This thesis seeks to connect the concept of military public diplomacy to certain theoretical frameworks and concepts. Building upon explanations of perception and images in public diplomacy and its relatively underdeveloped theoretical field, a conceptualization of military public diplomacy is presented. A better empirical understanding of U.S. military public diplomacy in Poland will focus on what military
public diplomacy is and how it is implemented. The military imagines its responsibility as one of defending national security and projects this self-image abroad through military interventions, troop deployment, and peace-building operations. Its responsibility to national security also influences how the government shapes messages to convey to foreign audiences: each message must have some relevance for improving the state of American security. As the United States executive branch (which includes both, the Department of Defense and Department of State), is designed to implement presidential administration policies, an important element of both U.S. traditional and military public diplomacy is to coordinate and disseminate the same general message in order to prevent information fratricide. This separation of responsibilities but alignment of messages explains the complexity of the language sometimes used in official contexts.

For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to note that the U.S. military utilizes working definitions that may differ from how public diplomacy and related topics are defined in academic literature. However, interviews and conversations with officials revealed that public diplomacy is regularly used to describe certain U.S. military activities. As one of the central focal points in this thesis, clarifying the concept of military public diplomacy, especially differentiating it from public diplomacy, military diplomacy, and traditional diplomacy, is necessary. This section will develop the concept using frameworks and definitions of the aforementioned concepts. A key point of divergence from other conceptual public diplomacy frames is that – whereas traditional U.S. public diplomacy can involve actors at various levels – U.S. military public diplomacy focuses on the military as the actor utilizing public diplomacy tools. Military diplomacy can be seen as a broader umbrella for military public diplomacy, but focuses on more activities related to information gathering and psychological operations, for example. Military diplomacy is “a set of non-combat activities of military and civilian forces of the ministry of defense focused on the pursuit of foreign-policy objectives that are part of the overall state diplomacy” (Pajtinka, 2016, p. 183). The agents involved are members of the defense department, either civilian or servicemen, as well as officials with the power to execute
security and defense policy. Erik Pajtinka (2016) outlines the five functions of military diplomacy:

1) Gathering and analyzing information on the armed forces and the security situation in the receiving state
2) Promotion of cooperation, communication, and mutual relations between the armed forces of the sending and the receiving state
3) Organization of the working visits of the representatives of the defense authorities and of peaceful stay of the military units of the sending state in the receiving state
4) Support of business contracts with arms and military equipment between the sending and the receiving state
5) Representation of the sending state and its armed forces at official ceremonies and other official events in the receiving state

Military public diplomacy is an element of military diplomacy, in that it contributes to non-violent relationship building between the armed forces and other actors, however, not all identified functions are an appropriate characterization of military public diplomacy. Most applicable to understanding military public diplomacy is the second characteristic – to promote cooperation and communication – that improves the perception of the military in the eyes of the receiving state. For example, the United States uses military exercises to work on NATO interoperability at the military-to-military level; this cooperation leads to greater cohesion among allied militaries. Military public diplomacy, however, also focuses on the foreign “public” aspect rather than focusing on the armed forces of a receiving state, making this concept mostly disregarded in military diplomacy studies. This further leads to the inability to classify military public diplomacy as either hard or soft power.

In official Department of Defense documents, the term “public diplomacy” is referenced inconsistently in comparison to Department of State public diplomacy documents that explicitly define the term. Many Department of Defense activities fit the previously discussed definition of public diplomacy, and interviews and conversations with officials reveal that it is used in vernacular. For example, the 2009 DoD Report on Strategic
Communication delegated responsibility for “strategic communications, public diplomacy, and public affairs” to an organizational board for the purposes of “providing strategic direction for Department of Defense efforts related to strategic communications and public diplomacy; and setting priorities for the Department of Defense in the areas of strategic communications and public diplomacy” (p. 2). In the DoD dictionaries from 2010-2017, public diplomacy is explicitly defined as:

“1. Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. 2. In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations” (Department of Defense, 2017, p. 192)

In the 2018 DoD dictionary removed “public diplomacy” with the rationale of “not used” and instead placed into a separate document designated as “Peace Operations.” The dictionary instead uses DSPD or “defense support to public diplomacy” (Department of Defense 2018, pp. 288, 387). The inconsistency in official publications is most likely to maintain the division of responsibilities between the State and Defense departments, as well as to create deniability if an activity strays from what is considered public diplomacy as the operational environment changes. For simplicity and consistency’s sake, however, this thesis uses the term “military public diplomacy.” Matthew Wallin, in search for a better understanding of military PD, outlines the terminology difficulties of military public diplomacy and provides a definition: “military communication and relationship building with foreign publics and military audiences for the purpose of achieving a foreign policy objective” (2015, p. 2).

The U.S. military uses the broad term “Inform and Influence Activities” (IIA) to categorize subdomains such as public affairs, civil affairs, information operations, and strategic
communication, which serves as an umbrella to military public diplomacy activities (Wallin, 2015). IIA also includes “military deception” and “cyberspace operations,” but this thesis will not exhaustively outline activities unrelated to public diplomacy (U.S. Department of the Army, 2013). Public affairs must be distinguished from public diplomacy for the purpose of this thesis, since these terms are sometimes used interchangeably in the military. Public affairs, according to traditional definitions, is aimed at domestic audiences, while public diplomacy seeks to influence foreign publics. However, the U.S. military defines public affairs as “communication activities with external and internal audiences” with audiences defined as “a broadly-defined group that contains stakeholders and/or publics relevant to military operations” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015, p. GL-4-5). By this terminology, U.S. military public affairs can target both domestic and foreign audiences. Additionally, due to developments in communications technology these audience division lines are becoming blurred. A U.S. Army Europe social media post in English about troops in the Baltic states can be intended for citizens of the United States, but has the reach potential of audiences with access to the same social media platform.

Other activities under IIA also contain elements of public diplomacy. Information operations, under the purview of the U.S. military, is the use of information-related capabilities to “influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. v). Civil affairs (CA) or civil military operations (CMO) “encompass the activities of a commander performed by designated CA or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation” (ibid, p. III-21). Strategic communication is “focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the
actions of all instruments of national power” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 2-4). These four domains – public affairs, information operations, civil affairs, and strategic communication – under IIA reveal the overlap with the definition of military public diplomacy: “military communication and relationship building with foreign publics and military audiences for the purpose of achieving a foreign policy objective.” These terms and activities defined according to the military are important in analyzing the interviews with government officials and key documents related to the U.S. military in Poland.

In practice, U.S. military public diplomacy is carried out through notable activities, including but not limited to: humanitarian aid, international staff training, and territorial support (Karadag, 2017). Humanitarian assistance programs are primarily related to disaster relief. A recent example of humanitarian assistance is the deployment of U.S. troops stationed in Japan to aid in tsunami disaster relief, resulting in positive media coverage and increased favorable public opinion of the United States (Karadag, 2017, p. 78). Military staff training programs and international exchanges, known in the U.S. as the “International Military Education and Training Program” or IMET, are also significant and include activities like officer exchanges between military academies in respective countries. Territorial support equals infrastructure support through activities like construction projects, such as the U.S. army engineering corps building roads near the Tapa military base in Estonia. A key military public diplomacy activity, military exercises, can appear to be a paradox. They emphasize the hard power side of a military and its readiness to defend or respond to conflict while also highlighting softer elements like intercultural friendship and cooperation, and building interoperability. U.S. military exercises, either under the NATO umbrella or of a joint nature with allies and partners, highlight these exact dimensions and prove to be opportunities to communicate with foreign audiences about U.S. troop presence and activities rather than just the tactical element of practicing for combat. Realistically, these exercises do not represent a force large enough to defend from full-fledged attacks but instead send signals and can either build or weaken credibility. The reach of joint exercises has the potential to send a set of messages to different target audiences in the host country, home country, other
allied/partner countries, and adversaries, as well as to external actors that observe certain activities and make assumptions about other actors.

As military public diplomacy involves the coordination of a message, discussing propaganda is an important note as critics of public diplomacy and other communication methods tend to call efforts government propaganda. Because the military engages in a diverse range of IIA, the controversy arises when military activities like psychological operations (psyops) – analyzing enemy behavior and planning communication efforts to influence an adversary’s emotions and behavior – are conflated with military public diplomacy activities. Since IIA as a category is a broad umbrella that includes more covert actions like “military deception,” making the distinction between different areas of operations leads to some generalizations that all IIA are propaganda. While propaganda and public diplomacy’s historical roots and original purposes are hardly indistinguishable, contemporary public diplomacy cannot be confused with propaganda. David Welch (2013, p. 24) defines propaganda as a deliberate effort to influence audience opinions through communication ideas and values for a specific purpose, “consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly.” While this definition does appear similar to that of public diplomacy, propaganda differs from other forms of persuasion because it is simplistic, didactic, and aims at persuasion, not truth (Baines & O’Shaughnessy, 2014, p. 2).

Propaganda comes in subtle and explicit forms and can be a force for both good and bad. It does retain, however, a negative historical connotation associated with Goebbels’ infamous Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda in Nazi Germany, to name an example. Propaganda is also heavily dependent on perception based on a unilateral stream of communication. PD, in contrast, relies more on engagement rather than a one-way flow of information and, in the case of U.S.-Polish relations, is perceived more often in a positive light. Distinguishing propaganda versus public diplomacy is relevant to this case (asis revealed in the interviews), since an element of U.S. military public diplomacy is targeting the spread of Russian disinformation and fake news – operations that aim at
persuasion not truth and do not emphasize relationship-building. All communication methods contribute to the perception of an actor and managing perception proves crucial to achieving foreign policy goals. Although disinformation, or the deliberate spreading of false information, is not necessarily the same as propaganda, it is relevant in this case because of Russia’s efforts to falsify stories of military presence on its western borders. In Poland, Russian disinformation and propaganda efforts can severely jeopardize the United States’ image, creating a need for public diplomacy to be strategically positioned to counter false narratives.

The U.S. military utilizes public diplomacy as an instrument to maintain the perception of U.S. credibility as a way to counter narratives linked to Russian disinformation and fake news. There is also a relevant historical context as a source of perceptions: how does prior U.S. behavior in assuring and deterring affect current Polish perceptions? The United States has a great stake in how Polish media perceives its message: if its credibility is weakened through false information, recovering the confidence of allies will prove more challenging and its Russia deterrence strategy will be less cohesive. Additionally, the assimilation of information into a set of preexisting beliefs in Poland requires the maintenance and constant development of the U.S. military’s message to adapt to changing contexts (Jervis, 1982). Media plays a key role in the pick-up of this message, in combination with other actors, such as civil society and government.

1.6. (Re)Assurance and Deterrence

In addition to the U.S. public diplomacy activities discussed, the U.S. military assigns specific messaging strategies depending on the audience. The first research question this thesis attempts to answer relates to the U.S. military’s primary message communicated to Poland. The following section will introduce the concepts of reassurance, assurance, and deterrence, and discuss how these apply to the military public diplomacy activities. Effective messaging in all cases requires strategic planning to ensure that there is a consistency between how the message is communicated and how it is perceived. A mismatch can occur because of various factors – cultural misunderstandings, language
barriers, and human error – and requires that strategies to communicate are developed in a way that predicts any potential misperception of a message and attempts to mitigate it in advance. According to current official statements, the U.S. military’s increased presence in Poland and other eastern flank NATO allies is intended to reassure its allies and deter its adversaries. Evidence of this narrative can be found in government documents and rhetoric, notably in U.S. President Obama’s announcement of the European Reassurance Initiative – later to be known as the European Deterrence Initiative – in 2014. These two strong narratives that the United States seeks to convey require an academic evaluation of the concepts of reassurance, assurance, and deterrence. Forms of assurance/reassurance and deterrence should be seen as a package: one does not exist without the other.

Deterrence as a concept has received more attention in academic literature, with assurance’s importance in empirical research emerging at the end of the Cold War. Deterrence “seeks to prevent an undesired action by convincing the party who may be contemplating such action that its cost will exceed any possible gain” (Stein, 1991, p. 432). Amir Lupovici builds upon three waves of deterrence theory by arguing that deterrence is a social construction and that “discourse is an important aspect of understanding this strategy” (2010, p. 706). Although deterrence originally fit in the realist school of thought, Lupovici argues that the “fourth wave” of deterrence belongs in an intersubjective context and is characterized by four themes recognizing that:

“(i) deterrence can be learned, (ii) socialization processes affect the practices of deterrence, (iii) deterrence is affected by social constructions, and (iv) deterrence can be studied as a discourse that consists of speech acts” (2010, p. 712)

In the context of relationships with adversaries – and allies – deterrence strategies are dependent on rules, such as military doctrines, that are founded on learning and socialization of certain practices, knowledge, and ideas. Discourse and interactions construct the reality in which actors can communicate and understand such reality (Lupovici, 2010). Deterrence in this constructivist sense can explain how the United States balances the narrative of communicating security to its NATO allies while simultaneously not conveying escalatory rhetoric directed at Russia. Perception and misperception are
related to deterrence, as how Russia perceives or misperceives the U.S. intentions can either make the deterrence message more or less effective, respectively.

If an actor identifies an adversary to deter, the chances are that actor also has allies to assure – or convince – of its intentions. As a concept, assurance is underdeveloped and is found primarily in deterrence literature. There also exists discrepancy in vernacular use of assurance and in academia. Ted Knopf attempts to create a generic definition of assurance: “a strategy that seeks to influence another actor’s behavior by alleviating the perceived source of insecurity and/or giving the actor a greater sense of security” (2012, p. 378) The four variants Knopf (2012, p. 376) describes assurance as a: “component of deterrence, measure directed at allies, strategy directed at potential adversaries, and tool for preventing nuclear proliferation.” Knopf clarifies the measure directed at allies as “alliance commitment” and further outlines the points of confusion surrounding academic and policy usage of assurance versus reassurance. Assurance in its earliest usage referred to aspects of deterrence of adversaries as opposed to security alliances. During the Cold War, the United States attempted to deter the Soviet Union from acting aggressively, but also to “satisfy the allies about the reliability and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence” that became known as “reassurance” (Yost, 2009, p. 755).

Reassurance proves the most problematic term and is defined in academic literature as “a strategy of demonstrating non-aggressive intentions to an adversary as a way of compensating for the potential of deterrence and reducing the changes of unintended conflict” (Lebow, 1983). Knopf separates reassurance and deterrence as alternative strategies to the other (2012). This is puzzling, as reassurance in its contemporary usage by the U.S. government is directed at NATO allies, while in academic definitions, it targets adversaries. Military and State Department public diplomacy are used as tools of what they identify as reassurance in this thesis case, yet public diplomacy targeted at allied countries can also be a measure of deterrence, both implicitly and explicitly. It is not, however, a “component of deterrence” or “deterrence-related assurance.” This type of assurance is used in strategies directly addressing an adversary, not an ally. The “alliance commitment”
type of assurance, or “alliance-related assurance” is also not all-encompassing, as the U.S. military seeks to satisfy allies and deter simultaneously with many of the same messages and its narratives are not stand-alone concepts (Knopf, 2012, pp. 380-381).

Emerging in Bush-era policies – the Quadrennial Defense Review in particular – the U.S. defense strategy included plans to: “assure allies of the U.S. commitment to them, dissuade other actors from acquiring threatening new military capabilities, to deter aggression, and to decisively defeat those who engage the United States in hostilities.” This strategy distinguished “assure” as a term referring to allies, as opposed to a concept of deterrence, which is outlined in the strategy to “dissuade” and “deter.” However, references to assurance are almost always linked to strategies of deterrence: “the ability to assure was defined as function of the perceived ability to deter” (Yost, 2009, p. 756). This linkage is logical: without the presence of a potential adversary to deter, there is no present need for assurance strategies. The interconnectedness between the two concepts in academia and the two narratives in U.S. policy allow this thesis to assume that Lupovici’s constructivist interpretation of deterrence is applicable to assurance as well. The shift in how assurance and deterrence are discussed in national policy allows this case to provide insight into messages that are not directly related to Cold-War thinking and techniques. For the purpose of this thesis, assurance and reassurance will be used as strategies directed at Poland and deterrence as a strategy directed at Russia, aligning with current official U.S. government use.

While the contemporary Euro-Atlantic security landscape is drastically different from that of the Cold War period, the two actors – NATO and Russia – are still involved in the adversarial geopolitical situation. The echoes of the Cold War can provide lessons for the modern case of assurance and deterrence in U.S. strategy in Poland: mutually assured destruction and the space race are clearly not as relevant, yet assumptions about how to convince Europeans and Russians of credibility are certainly still salient. The hidden layers of the two narratives of reassurance and deterrence will be explored, as assurance strategies can have underlying deterrence messaging, and deterrence strategies also imply assurance.
The way that the Polish public, in particular, perceives the message originating from Washington represented in U.S. military public diplomacy can reveal if the message is effective.

For consistency, this thesis will adopt “reassurance” as the term to use in the case of the U.S. military in Poland, as it is the term used in the most relevant official statements and documents on the European Reassurance Initiative and Operation Atlantic Resolve. The question – one this thesis seeks to explore – arises of whether Poland is convinced of the United States’ reassurance and deterrence narratives. “Alliance-related assurance is in the eye of the beholder” and if Poland believes that having troops deployed on its soil is a way of guaranteeing U.S. alliance security, the perceptions of reassurance will be represented (Hopf, 2012, p. 383). Public diplomacy to a foreign audience involves the construction of a message in a domestic setting, such as U.S. military planning, and the construction of perception in the foreign audience. Public diplomacy thus faces a problem in ensuring that what is intended to be communicated is interpreted in the intended way (Rasmussen, 2009). Understanding the effectiveness of the public diplomacy message requires determining how the message is presented and structured in the foreign audience. Perception management as a strategy is a recognition of this need to create persuasive communication to target foreign audiences. Balnaves, Hemelryk Donald, and Shoesmith define perception management as “conveying or denying selected information to foreign governments, intelligence systems, leaders, or audiences in order to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning” (2009, p. 127). While this definition can sound more like manipulative and thus more applicable to strategies directed at actors the U.S. considers more adversarial, it is an important concept for understanding how the military approaches Polish audiences. While not attempting to achieve a goal that negatively impacts Poland, the U.S. military does use perception management to convey a convincing message, one that ultimately relates to U.S. national security.

Though the U.S. military can narrow its message and control for competing messages to a certain extent, perceptions in receiving media are multi-faceted: this leads to the
complicated uncovering the layers of how a message is perceived. In this specific thesis case, U.S. military public diplomacy events take place in small towns and are reported differently in local media than in national media. Local, regional, and national media each have their own subcategories that provide context for how the public diplomacy message is perceived. For example, for a single U.S. military public diplomacy event, a local newspaper could report on the economic value of hosting U.S. troops, a regional news outlet might perceive U.S. presence as a boost to regional tourism, and a national paper may focus on the hard security value of NATO troops and equipment on Polish soil. Additionally, perceptions are “focused, filtered, and fantasized by a host of mediators, the press, entertainment programming on television, movies, popular magazines, songs…” (Balnaves, Hemelryk Donald, & Shoesmith, 2009, p. 130). This means that perceptions of U.S. military in Poland are influenced by an array of contexts and the discourses manifest into the particular rhetoric that is used to portray U.S. presence in Poland and shape the perceptions of readers. These discourses found in Polish media are analyzed using the qualitative methods of discourse analysis and content analysis.

The overall case of the U.S. military’s public diplomacy in Poland requires thinking about the message and its reception in media as a process with multiple phases. Audience persuasion occurs at two stages and with two actors: the U.S. military carrying out public diplomacy (input) and the Polish media conveying it to audiences (output). The input – or message of reassurance and deterrence – and the perceptions it creates are explored through the methodology.
CHAPTER II. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The previous chapter presented a theoretical and conceptual foundation for the study of U.S. military public diplomacy in Poland. The methodology will build upon constructivist assertions of fluctuating and intersubjective meanings that contribute to state images and perceptions. As the research questions require extracting meaning from certain data, relevant methods were selected to best meet this case’s needs. The methodological framework for this thesis is based on an empirical research design encompassing three methods: interviewing, qualitative content analysis, and qualitative discourse analysis. The following section covers the methodological framework, including research questions, empirical data, and research design. Limitations of the methodological framework are also discussed.

2.1. Research Questions

Military and public diplomacy seem like a contradiction: one deals with hard power and security strategies, while the other emphasizes engagement with foreign publics to strengthen a nation’s foreign policy. Linking hard and soft power in a compatible, not separate way proves complicated. This case study reveals that this contradiction is not present in practice and that military public diplomacy is a valid concept that deserves more academic attention. The thesis attempts to connect the puzzling concepts into a working concept that can contribute to understanding how an agent other than a department tasked with foreign affairs can conduct public diplomacy on behalf of a country. This thesis also has practical implications that address the effectiveness of the United States military PD activities. Instead of analyzing the military’s public diplomacy strategy and its reception separately, this research design links message input and media output by thoroughly analyzing both to answer the larger question “is the U.S. military’s public diplomacy effective in Poland?” For the United States, a better understanding of the connection between the military and public diplomacy, and its ability to influence perceptions will contribute to smarter policies. In order to solve this puzzle, the following research questions are introduced to frame the methodological approach.
1. What is the primary message U.S. military public diplomacy is communicating to Poland?

This “message” is not necessarily identified as speech or other written texts, but also through action and practice. Message in this case, broadly speaking, is a narrative communicated to an audience. The subcomponents of this question evaluated with interview data include not only the big picture of the core message, but also the sub-elements that go into the implementation in a certain audience setting. Military public diplomacy is defined in the theoretical framework, using both academic foundations and U.S. official definitions to develop the concept. In this research question, Poland includes the general public, government, and military as the audience under study and does not make distinctions between these segments. Further research into messaging can reveal differentiation, however, the study’s length of time and the inability to access and research classified and sensitive information limit the author’s ability to delineate. To analyze the message of U.S. military public diplomacy, data from interviews with U.S. officials and experts as well as official documents are examined and used to explain the message.

2. How is U.S. military public diplomacy received in Polish media?

“Polish media” in this thesis references the reception and perception of U.S. military PD in Polish news outlets. This is answered through a two-step analysis to extract certain meaning from content and discourse. For the scope of this thesis, the question does not attempt to answer how media outlets frame or position this debate within national discourse. While further media studies could reveal trends such as how sources on the political spectrum frame PD events, this thesis only examines whether the Polish media is receiving the intended message from the U.S. military and how it is represented in articles. A selection of news articles from Polish media is analyzed using content and discourse analysis methods.
2.2. Empirical Data

To answer the research questions guiding this thesis, the most relevant empirical data was identified and gathered. These sources of data include interviews with U.S. government officials, official U.S. documents, and Polish news articles. The time frame to gather the empirical evidence is from April 2014 to June 2017. Spring 2014 marks Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the beginning of a concerted strategy of messaging reassurance and deterrence in the post-Cold War era. Saber Strike 2017, a U.S.-led military exercise, took place in June 2017 in Poland and is an appropriate cut off point considering the scope of this thesis. During this time, the United States elected a new president with campaign rhetoric that contradicted certain U.S. policies related to military presence in the region. However, U.S. President Trump’s administration has not shifted U.S. military posture in Poland significantly and will not be the central focus of this thesis, as the obvious difficulties in studying his rhetoric and actions in real time will only add confusion to the thesis rather than clarity.

Interviews

To answer the first research question – what is the primary message U.S. military public diplomacy is communicating to Poland? – interviews are used as the primary empirical data. Four interviewees participated in the research: two from the Department of Defense and two from the Department of State. As the two departments have differing structures and assignments, both can offer diverse but official viewpoints. Participants were contacted and selected for their experience with the U.S. military public diplomacy, especially in Poland. The State Department employees are directly affiliated with political-military affairs in NATO allied countries, including Poland, and the Department of Defense officials had taken part in U.S. military outreach and PD campaigns. While it may appear odd to select State Department officials to offer perspective on U.S. military public diplomacy, these officials are formally trained in public diplomacy and specifically military affairs. Their jobs are to understand and complement DoD efforts in order to avoid committing “information fratricide” or the unintended mismatch of messages originating from different agencies in the same government.
Interviews involve prior preparation and participants, representatives of the U.S. government, mostly stuck to official talking points, however, interviews are more spontaneous than scripted speeches and press releases. The interviews conducted for this research are anonymized, giving participants more freedom and candor to speak off the record about the U.S. military’s message. For a more thorough and holistic analysis, additional participants could have been interviewed, yet time and resources limited the author’s ability to conduct more interviews. All of the interviewees are from the United States and speak English natively, meaning that words hold the same meaning across all participants. Each participant represents government institutions, making the reliability of his or her responses dependent on what is considered appropriate to share publicly by the government. As the purpose of the interviews was the discover the U.S. military’s message in Poland, government interviews are appropriate as they align with the official policy.

*Official Documents and Publications*

To supplement interview data, official documents and publications were examined to give more context for certain points brought up during interviews, as well as to identify if any discrepancy existed between official policy talking points and what the interviewees said. This data is available open source from government websites, including the Department of Defense and its subsites, such as U.S. Army Europe, the Department of State, and the White House. These documents are not used in the methodologies used to analyze Polish media, but rather are examined to support the interview data. U.S. Department of Defense releases are especially helpful, as these can show the development of the references to public diplomacy and the way the term is treated in official documents. All of the material is open source and available to the public, which implies that this thesis will miss certain relevant and important information due to the sensitive nature of certain policies and strategies related to U.S. national security.
The news articles taken for analysis include selections from across the political spectrum and from several outlets. As public favorability of the United States and NATO in Poland is high, Polish media is typically positively inclined toward U.S. presence in Poland. The Polish media landscape is, however, highly partisan on a political field dominated by two opposing parties: the current ruling Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość or PiS) and the former ruling party the Civil Platform (Platforma Obwyatelska or PO) (Dzieciolowski, 2017). In 2017, Poland ranked 54th in Press Freedom, down from 47th in 2016 and 18th in 2015. (Press Freedom Index, 2017). Although the media landscape has faced political interference and partisanship, U.S. military presence and NATO membership are standard non-partisan issues, barring some exceptions. The high levels of partisanship and close media-government relations in Poland are important to keep in mind when analyzing how outlets in Polish media receives a message, however, they will not be the main focus of this thesis as it does not seek to understand whether the message is received differently based on political leanings of various outlets. This thesis curated articles from seven newspaper outlets and their respective websites as a sample of Polish media: Do Rzeczy, Newsweek, Polityka, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, Fakt, Gazeta Wyborcza, and Rzeczpospolita. This selection represents three weeklies and four dailies, respectively, across the political spectrum and includes more serious publications, such as Gazeta Wyborcza, as well as tabloid-style outlets, like Fakt. The aim of selecting a variety of outlets is to obtain a representative sample of the Polish media landscape. It is not intended to be all-inclusive of the diversity of media in Poland as such a task would require significant time and resources, but to capture a snapshot of how Polish news outlets perceive U.S. military public diplomacy.

To examine responses to direct events of U.S. military public diplomacy, certain cases were selected across the time frame. They are meant to be representative and do not encompass of all U.S. military public diplomacy activity, as such a task would require more resources to reach the appropriate personnel and curate relevant media. These cases are the arrival of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in 2014, Operation Dragoon Ride 2015 and
2016, the arrival of EFP troops in January 2017, and Saber Strike 2015 to 2017. These cases were selected to focus on media coverage of high-profile events that also receive international media attention. Smaller events, such as U.S. soldier community outreach events, would be covered more thoroughly in regional papers while these events from 2014 to 2017 were more often reported on at the national level. These events are discussed in more detail in the empirical background section.

To find relevant articles related to the aforementioned events, several terms and their Polish variations (due to case and conjugation changes) were used. A total of 103 articles were initially located using the search queries for the five news sites. This number was reduced to 76 during the precoding process to remove articles that were duplicates or near identical, as well as pieces that only included a small fragment discussing the U.S. military in the context of a different topic. To search for articles related to Dragoon Ride, the following search keywords included: “dragoon ride,” “rajd dragonów,” “marsz drogowy” (road march), and “marsz dragonów.” To find additional articles related to Dragoon Ride, search results for “konwój amerykańskich żołnierzy” (American soldier convoy) were combed. As NATO and other military exercises are typically referred to in the original language (English), “Saber Strike” was the primary term used. For articles related to the 2014 Airborne Brigade arriving in Poland, keywords included: “173 grupa bojowej” (173rd combat group), “173 Brygada Powietrznodesantowa” (173rd Airborne Brigade), and “podniebni żołnierze” (sky soldiers). By searching “brygada pancerna” (armored brigade), articles covering the arrival of EFP U.S. troops appeared, as well as articles related to the other events used to select cases. Finally, to ensure thoroughness, “Europejska Inicjatywa Wzmocnienia”/“European Reassurance Initiative,” “Atlantic Resolve,” and “Amerykańscy żołnierze” (American soldiers) were used to search for additional articles that may not have appeared in the event-specific keyword searches. A challenge with certain keywords proved to be the variation in how certain events or phrases are translated into Polish, if translated at all. For example, Operation Dragoon Ride can appear as “Dragoon Ride,” “rajd dragonów,” or a Polish variation that describes a road march: “marsz drogowy.”
Additionally, Polish has various case endings and verb aspects that can result in missing relevant articles.

Table 1. Sampled Articles from Polish News Outlets (Online Versions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Source</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Article Hits</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do Rzeczy</td>
<td>dorzeczy.pl</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dziennik Gazeta Prawna</td>
<td>gazetaprawna.pl</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fakt</td>
<td>fakt.pl</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>gazeta.pl</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsweek</td>
<td>newsweek.pl</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polityka</td>
<td>polityka.pl</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeczpospolita</td>
<td>rp.pl</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3. Methodological Approach

The first state of the methodological process involved analyzing the interview data to answer the first research question. The second research question required a two-block analysis entailing content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis, which are elaborated and operationalized below. These methodologies support theoretical framework of this thesis that adopts elements of constructivism.

2.3.1. Content Analysis

Content analysis (CA) involves making inferences from text and speech using a specific set of procedures (Hermann, 2008) or “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 24). Content analysis as a concept dates back to the first attempts
at analyzing communications, however, the content analysis formalized as methodology only occurred within the past seven decades.

This thesis utilizes content analysis as a methodology because the research question requires extracting meaning from communications: the Polish media’s perception of the U.S. military’s public diplomacy message. The research question meets Klaus Krippendorff’s (2013, p. 38) requirements for content analysis: it is believed to be answerable using text analysis, it allows for a set of possible answers, it references currently unobtainable phenomena, and it allows for validation. The materials used are representational of the thesis subject, intended to communicate meaning, and are replicable due to the coding procedures used (see Appendix I). The content analysis in this thesis is qualitative in nature, as the research question aims to evaluate perception rather than something that lends itself to be quantified, such as whether there is more or less of certain language in media. As perception implies the presence or absence of particular themes, the analysis is more qualitative (Hermann, 2008, p. 155). Its qualitative nature also lends itself to the constructivist theoretical framework that shapes this thesis: deciphering meaning from text in given contexts means understanding the constructed context and how the perceptions are informed by such context.

Context is an integral part of content analysis, and “context is always constructed by someone” (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 31). In CA, context encompasses all of the author’s knowledge and relates the texts to the specific research question. The texts taken from Polish media were not published to be analyzed by someone studying U.S. military public diplomacy, and these texts may carry a variety of different meanings for different analysts. This means that the very act of the author framing a research question and obtaining text for CA is placing the analysis in a specific context. CA in this thesis is deductive, which starts with something to look for: perception. This means that the analysis itself is not fully objective, however, the content used in analysis does not react to the researcher so the data itself is examined objectively.
Operationalization

Coding – or the process of classifying to create categories – the articles requires several cycles of recoding and recategorizing. A code assigns meaning from data to larger portions of text; it summarizes the essence of meaning. Coding makes the subjective meaning more explicit and transparent by assigning such meaning through words. The process of coding (and recoding) involves labeling sections of text, which lead to categories of codes that develop into conceptual themes (Saldana, 2009). A code, however, is different than a theme: codes are labels, categories are families of codes, and themes are families of categories or an outcome of the process of coding. The unit of analysis for this content analysis will be articles, as the selection is too large for smaller units, such as sentences, words, or paragraphs to be used.

The coding procedure was conducted in two cycles: the first cycle involved an initial coding the articles and the second required recoding each article based on an evaluation of the first cycle (Saldana, 2009). The purpose of coding multiple times is to check the coders’ own subjectivity as well as account for missed codes that could have better answered the research question presented. Coding utilized deduction, meaning that the analysis started with a set of predefined themes, keywords, and concepts to identify within the sources. The second cycle took insight gained from thorough readings of each article and the first coding cycle to develop more sophisticated codes to answer research question one. Three dimensions can categorize the six codes used in the second and final coding cycle: article position, message perception, and threat perception. The first two codes evaluated the article’s position: the topic of discussion and attitude. Code one classified articles depending on the public diplomacy event discussed. These included the 2014 arrival of the 173rd Airborne Brigade (A), 2015 and 2016 Operation Dragoon Ride (B), 2015-2016 Saber Strike exercises (C), and the arrival of Enhanced Forward Presence Troops (D), as well as a combination of those events (E). The second code analyzed the articles according to the attitude toward U.S. military activity or presence: in favor (A), positive (B), neutral (C), negative (D), and against (E). Rather than coding for the article tone as a whole, the code applied to how the U.S. military was discussed. Code three to
five coded for the U.S. military’s message to Poland: what is the main message received from the U.S. military’s activities, what is the value of U.S. military activity or presence, and were the number of U.S. troops or type of military equipment deployed to Poland? The message code was broken into six subcodes: U.S. reassurance (A), deterring Russia (B), NATO reassurance (C), U.S. reassurance and deterrence (D), NATO reassurance and deterrence (E), and other or none (F). These distinctions were made to code the article according to the message that appeared prominently within the article. If the article consistently used the United States without mentioning NATO, the code was either A or D, whereas if NATO appeared more consistently as the actor, C and E were applied. Some articles did not mention aspects of deterrence like protecting NATO’s east or preventing Russian aggression, which explains the divisions between only reassurance and the combination message of reassurance and deterrence. The fifth code identified if the article discussed (A) the number of U.S. troops present, (B) the type of U.S. military equipment present, (C) both, or (D) not present. The final code (6) analyzed the article’s threat discussion: was Russia mentioned, either explicitly or implicitly, as a threat to Poland? These codes, definitions, and relevant examples are included in a codebook in the appendix and accompany the final coding index of the 76 articles.

2.3.2. Qualitative Discourse Analysis

The selection of articles used in the content analysis was reduced to seven from 76 for a qualitative discourse analysis (QDA) to further develop answers to research question one. A range of articles were chosen to represent four key U.S. military public diplomacy events and the seven various news outlets. The articles were randomly sampled using criteria from the first code to create four separate sample pools. The final articles represent the proportion of media coverage of the four public diplomacy activities: three on the arrival of EFP troops, two reporting on Dragoon ride, one on Saber Strike, and one on the arrival of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Because weeklies typically publish fewer articles than daily newspapers, two weekly news articles are represented in the QDA compared to five daily articles.
Meanings that are socially produced are called representations, which are reproduced through language and become institutionalized and normalized over time (Neumann, 2008, p. 61). Discourses, or representations, are these “systems of meaning-production that fix meaning, however temporarily, and enable actors to make sense of the world and to act within it” (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, p. 4). QDA has a web of theoretical influences and is present as a research methodology especially in fields such as linguistic studies (Gee, 1990). The language of discourse is not only about communication techniques or description, but a “social practice” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 4). Based on this assumption of discourse, we can assume that discourses as social practices constitute a socially-constructed world. Discourse analysis is qualitative in nature, which is why henceforth it will be referred to qualitative discourse analysis (QDA).

QDA involves a three-step process: delimiting the identified discourses to a manageable range, identifying the representations within the discourse, and uncovering layering within the discourses (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, p. 8). QDA is suited for “how” research questions, and thus is an appropriate method to answer research question two: How is U.S. military public diplomacy received in Polish media? After conducting a content analysis on article selections from Polish media, the research QDA applied to a smaller selection of articles. The discourses in this specific case are the articles from various Polish newspapers and online portals, representing a spectrum of Polish media. The particular QDA approach applied to a selection of Polish articles is based on Fairclough’s methodology of media analysis to determine how media output is perceived. Media analysis attempts to answer three questions about the article:

1) How does the article represent the world (i.e. certain events)?
2) What identities are set up for the actors in the story?
3) What relationships are established between those involved in the story?

In summary, the QDA determined how the article construct representations, identities, and relationships. These will show how the U.S. military is imagined in Polish media, indicating whether its message is effectively conveyed.
2.4. Research Design Limitations

In terms of validity and reliability of interviewing as a form of qualitative data, the interviewer’s biases must be taken into account. The interviewer’s interactions influenced interviewees’ responses as a participant. To ensure a high degree of validity, the interviewer used the research questions to structure the interview questions, meaning that the questions addressed the research puzzle this thesis aims to solve. To ensure reliability, the core questions remained the same for each interviewee so that the interviews could be replicated by a different researcher. The interviewees were informed in advance that their identities would remain anonymous, giving them an extra degree of candor that would not have been present if speaking on the record in their official capacities. Further research into U.S. military public diplomacy could include former government officials or those with outside expertise in the field, as non-government talking points could be discussed.

All sources are either newspapers (weekly or daily) and their respective online portals. Television is a major source of news for most Poles with over 70% of the population watching the largest networks (TVN and TVN24), however, curating a selection of materials from these outlets was improbable given the time and resource restrictions (Dzieciolowski, 2017, p. 27). Content and discourse analysis on video clips and newsreel also adds another dimension to content and discourse analysis that would complicate the process. While examining regional media outlets would prove useful as certain U.S. military public diplomacy events take place in smaller towns outside of Warsaw and key cities, again the resource and time restrictions do not allow for this examination. For more specific and narrowed insight, a particular case in one region could provide more insight into how local audiences perceive U.S. military public diplomacy. A more expanded study of how regional Polish media or how TV/radio perceive the U.S. military’s message would be possible using the same methodology used in this study. Less-than-perfect search functions on the newspapers and online portals also may have resulted in missing certain articles. For example, a news outlet like wSieci does not allow searches for key terms, making scanning past issues the only way to find articles and an inappropriate method for
In terms of content analysis, coding is an approximate measure of generalizing information, meaning that there is a data cost associated with losing some detail in analysis. Coding is also the most subjective element in CA, and involves inserting a level of personal involvement, as “all coding is a judgement call” that involves subjectivities and predispositions (Saldana, 2009, p. 7). Additionally, the most effective and precise coding involves multiple coders and more cycles of recoding. Under the scope of this thesis, the independent nature and time constraints limited the full potential of the coding process. Like coding, QDA is a subjective process that begins with the researcher’s own influences, making objectivity improbable. To combat subjectivity in both processes, multiple readings and background research helped approach the texts with more facts rather than impressions. Language added another challenge to methodology both for content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis: the author’s Polish level is B2, which means that some search terms may have led to overlooking certain articles as well as misinterpreting during the coding and QDA process. The author consulted with native Polish speakers to verify certain information in Polish and supplemented translations with additional resources. In the future, running a Polish-language version without English translation for content analysis could prove more insightful, as naturally some meaning is lost when translated into a second language.
CHAPTER III. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND

The following sections introduce an empirical background to give both the theoretical discussions and methodological approaches more real-world context. Public diplomacy’s history will be discussed, as its historical context that played a role in shaping the methods and messages of current U.S. (military) public diplomacy. The contemporary security environment will be given a brief overview, as the situation in Ukraine and U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia relations are not the primary focal points but the Euro-Atlantic landscape is the setting for this case. U.S.-Polish relations are also important to discuss, given that most public diplomacy research focuses on more adversarial relationships, rather than a strong allied relationship with deep historical ties. Additionally, key U.S. military events that are used to define the collection of empirical data are described. The purpose of these backgrounds is to provide context for the methods that analyze related interviews and texts.

3.1. Propaganda, Cultural Offensives, and Public Diplomacy

U.S. public diplomacy’s history is important in evaluating the case study of the U.S. military and Poland, as historical cycles reveal that the attention given to public diplomacy reflects perceptions of external threats. Recognized in the World Wars, public diplomacy, albeit in other words, became a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. In the early to mid-20th century, however, distinction between propaganda and public diplomacy was neither necessary nor clear. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson began normalizing the phrase “public diplomacy” in reference to his Fourteen Points, and in the post-World War era, its usage became associated with international information and propaganda. New methods of contacting publics, such as the presence of radios in American homes and TV sets across the world, created a vulnerable space that required a strategy. U.S. entry into WWII saw a shift to a “cultural offensive” seen with the establishment of the Office of Wartime Information and the Office of Strategic Service.

The Cold War reignited government efforts to engage in public diplomacy in addition to military power projection. The U.S. Information Agency – established in 1953 that became
part of the State Department in 1999 – identified the necessity of messaging to foreign 
publics. Because of the conflation with what we now know as propaganda, in 1965 the 
USIA recognized the official need for a term and thus enshrined the phrase into U.S. policy 
(Cull 2006). In the post-Cold War era, until the war on terror in the early 2000s, public 
diplomacy seemed to be waning in its importance to U.S. power. The U.S. Information 
Agency, following the Cold War, became a branch of the State Department’s 
organizational structure, led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs.

Renewed attention to U.S. PD efforts arose after September 11, 2001, when the 
government saw a need to communicate the U.S. message to foreign publics and as the 
international community increasingly criticized U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, the 
information age has led to an explosion of information. The government now has had to 
reconcile that too much information can lead to too little attention, and re-strategize to 
effectively communicate to foreign publics. Without the ability of the government to 
control information flows, how an actor’s reputation is formed and thus its credibility is 
increasingly reliant on strategic planning of communication to foreign publics (Nye, 2004). 
Modern public diplomacy, facilitated primarily by the State Department, includes a range 
of activities including globally-branded initiatives, such as American Corners, 
ShareAmerica, and the Fulbright Program.

The historical cycles of U.S. public diplomacy reflect links to conflict and external threats, 
such as in response to World War II, during the Cold War, and post-9/11 and the war on 
terrorism (Gregory, 2008). Heightened international tension equaled increased attention to 
public diplomacy and cultural promotion efforts. While this thesis focuses on U.S. 
(military) public diplomacy, it is not a set of activities or foreign policy strategy limited 
solely to the United States. Melissen argues that public diplomacy, in general, is 
reactionary. Increased public diplomacy efforts, for example, followed a drop in positive 
foreign perceptions of the U.S. after the Iraq invasion (2005, p. 7). The U.S. is not isolated 
in this reactionary characteristic of public diplomacy: Poland used PD to improve its image
for EU leaders as a reliable partner willing to compromise in order to gain EU accession (Ociepka & Ryniejska, 2005). This reactionary nature is important to note as the U.S. messaging to Poland and other NATO allies has gained renewed attention as a strategy to combat Russian disinformation. While not a direct conflict with the United States, international tension following the Russian annexation of Crimea reflects this reactionary cycle of emphasizing PD.

U.S. military public diplomacy has followed a less obvious historical trajectory as did USIA, later State Department public diplomacy. One critical juncture has become apparent in the development of U.S. military PD: the post-9/11 era ushered in a new focus on the military acting as an agent of information and communication to foreign publics, especially in the Middle East. While lines between the State Department and Defense Department are distinct in many ways, in some cases the military is better positioned to conduct public diplomacy, such as in war zones and high-tension areas. The Defense Department, with more than three million employees, also can utilize more manpower than the State Department, with 74,000 employees. Contemporary examples of U.S. military public diplomacy include port visits in Southeast Asia and female engagement teams in Iraq (Wallin, 2015).

3.2. Security Environment and U.S.-Polish Relations

The Russian Federation’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 resulted in direct responses from the U.S. government, primarily in the form of Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) and its funding framework called the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), renamed later as European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). Poland is a key player in this security order, as it lies in Central Europe at the heart of NATO. Because of its antagonistic history with Russia, the Soviet Union, and now Russia again, Poland has a longstanding distrustful view of Russia. Pew’s Global Attitudes Project (2017) reveals that only 21% of Poles have a favorable view of Russia, compared to an even lower 12% in 2014 immediately after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and 34% in 2007. Poland reacted negatively to the invasion of its neighbor Ukraine, with whom it shares a complex yet overall positive relationship.
While frustrations over immigration from Ukraine cloud some positive perceptions of Ukrainians in Poland and are exacerbated by anti-immigration Law and Justice party narratives, the government remains staunchly anti-Russian, pro-NATO, and pro-U.S. presence.

U.S.-Polish relations are especially strong, owing to a long history of bilateral relations. Defense relations with Poland deepened after Poland’s admission to NATO in 1999, especially with Polish participation in U.S.-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In June 2014, President Obama announced the European Reassurance Initiative at a joint press conference in Warsaw on the 25th anniversary of Poland’s freedom from Soviet rule (Obama & Komorowski, 2014). His announcement included notice of increased equipment and troop pre-positioning, rotational army and air force personnel, and partnerships with non-NATO countries also subject to Russian pressure, such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The $1 billion President Obama pledged in 2014 to “bolster the security of our NATO allies” grew to $6.5 billion for the 2019 fiscal year to increase troop presence, increase exercises and training, enhance prepositioning, improve infrastructure, and build partnership capacity (U.S. European Command Public Affairs Office, 2017). As reflected in official White House and Department of Defense statements, the U.S. defense posture in Poland and CEE is directly related to NATO. Though the relationship is without complications and diplomatic tussles, President Obama’s choice to announce new assurance and deterrence strategies in Warsaw proved both symbolic in affirming the bilateral and U.S.-NATO commitments. In 2017, U.S. Army Europe relocated its OAR division-level headquarters to Poland in another display of commitment.

President Trump’s erratic campaign and his presidency marked by inconsistency between action and rhetoric have not markedly affected Polish perceptions of the United States. Poland maintains high levels of public support for the United States, with 73% viewing the U.S. as favorable, and only 15% as unfavorable though confidence in Trump as a president is low in Poland (57% in 2017) (Wilke et. al., 2017, p. 17, 24). In fact, favorability in Poland about the United States only dropped one point, 74% to 73%, from Obama to
Trump (ibid., p. 22). Support for NATO remains high with 79% viewing NATO favorably, and 7% viewing NATO unfavorably (Stokes, 2017, p. 6). From 2015 to 2017, Polish faith that the “U.S. would use military force to defend a NATO ally if it got into a serious military conflict with Russia” increased eight points from 49% to 57% (Wilkes, 2017, p. 9). Overall, support for NATO among its allies is highest in Poland (tied with the Netherlands) and Polish favorability of the United States is the highest in Europe. These global attitudes numbers are presented to provide a background to the context in which U.S. military public diplomacy operations as one of general positive attitudes.

An issue in U.S.-Polish relations for over a decade has been the question of U.S. bases on Polish soil (Strosin, 2012). This is also a factor that plays a role in how the U.S. military currently approaches deploying troops to Poland. While the Polish government – both parties – have pushed for hosting a military installation, the issue is controversial for a number of reasons. First, the U.S. has significant military installations in Germany, Poland’s neighbor, and establishing new bases is an investment and dramatic shift in U.S. defense posture in Europe. Second, the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 allegedly rules out the permanent basing of NATO troops on Russia’s western border. Even a discussion of a potential base aggravates Russian concerns of U.S. influence on the European continent. The United States has, however, deployed temporary troops to Poland both before and after 2014. In 2018, Poland signed a deal to purchase the U.S.-produced anti-missile Patriot defense system. This places permanent military equipment on Russia’s borders and has already resulted in criticism from Moscow. What is important to note about the relationship between Poland and the United States is that Poland is not caught in the crosshairs of U.S.-Russian tension but rather plays an active role in shaping NATO and U.S. defense posture and the reaction to such policies.

3.3. Boots on the Ground in Poland: U.S. Military Public Diplomacy Activities
As the timeframe of this thesis spans four years (2014-2017), several examples of U.S. military public diplomacy in Poland were identified to help narrow the selection of relevant articles for content and discourse analysis. These events are the arrival of the
173rd Airborne Brigade (April 2014), Operation Dragoon Ride (March 2015), Operation Dragoon Ride II (June 2016), Saber Strike military exercise (2015-2017), and the arrival of U.S. troops for NATO’s EFP (January 2017). An important note is that although some military PD events are NATO-related, they are relevant to the thesis discussion as NATO is an element of the military’s messaging and the framework for United States defense posture in Europe.

On April 24, 2014, the first contingent of U.S. troops arrived in Poland from the 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Vicenza, Italy. As only 150 troops landed in Poland to conduct the first of a series of (now) continuous exercises meant to reassure NATO allies, the event was symbolic rather than a tactical display of the willingness to engage in direct military conflict. Department of Defense spokesman John Kirby denied that it was purely symbolic: “Any time you put troops on the ground and doing exercises, in this case for a month at a time, it’s more than symbology. The kind of work that we’re going to be doing is real infantry training. And that’s not insignificant” (Montgomery, 2014). Although not the first military exercise or NATO-related activity in Eastern Europe, the deployment of the 173rd to Poland and the Baltic states represented a reaction to Russia’s actions. The non-permanent deployment continues criticism from Moscow, who views U.S. presence, even on a rotational basis, as violating the NATO-Russia founding act of 1997.

Operation Dragoon Ride I and II represent a key U.S. military public diplomacy activity. Dragoon Ride began in March 2015 as a way to capitalize on troop movement by transforming a routine convoy of U.S. military equipment and soldiers into an outreach event. The Ride in 2015 left Estonia and crossed Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Czech Republic, finishing in Vilseck, Germany, where the U.S. has a permanent military installation. The reverse occurred in June 2016 when the Ride left Germany towards Estonia. In various locations along the route, the convoy paraded through towns and villages and allowed for local residents to interact with the Stryker armored vehicles and soldiers. The side events that took place during Dragoon Ride are called “static displays,” which include military equipment – usually vehicles – being on display to the public.
In January 2017, as part of the NATO initiative decided during the 2016 Warsaw Summit called Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), a U.S.-led battlegroup arrived in Poland. Poland is the EFP host country for U.S. troops, with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania hosting the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany, respectively. Although this event is affiliated with NATO’s EFP, this proved a key opportunity for U.S. military public diplomacy, as Poland is the host nation for U.S. troops specifically. Approximately 1,000 U.S. soldiers from the 3rd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (3/2CR) deployed to Orzysz, Poland, supplemented by 350 troops from contributing countries (U.S. Mission Poland, 2017). This deployment is part of a larger posture that will rotate through Eastern Europe.

Saber Strike is also a noteworthy event for U.S. military public diplomacy. Saber Strike is a U.S. Army Europe-led joint military exercise that began in 2010 and involves Poland and the three Baltic states (U.S. Army Europe, 2018). Exercise Saber Strike focused primarily on the Baltic states in 2014 but refocused on the three states and Poland in 2015 and onwards. Although a military training exercise would appear to be unrelated to public diplomacy, the U.S. military and NATO allies use it as demonstrations to local publics through intensive social media campaigns and media engagement. Saber Strike is the umbrella operation for the road march from Germany through Poland and the Baltic states: Operation Dragoon Ride. Saber Strike also emphasizes the NATO element, as well as building partnership capacity, as it includes troops contributions from allied countries like Canada and partnership countries like Finland.

How Poland perceives these activities answers the question of whether the military is effectively conducting military public diplomacy. These four activities represent the United States reassurance and deterrence posture outlined in official documents, and the degree to which this is conveyed is analyzed in the following sections.
CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS

The following two-part analysis aims to determine the military’s input – its message – and its output – reception in Polish media. The first part reveals how the military’s self-image and its own views of Poland as a target audience shape its message. The second answers if Poland receives the image of the U.S. military through this messaging as credible. In other words, is the perception of the U.S. military favorable in Polish news outlets?

4.1. What is the primary message the U.S. military is communicating to Poland?

Empirical data taken from interviews and official documents support the answer to the first research question. The question will be broken down into smaller sections to analyze the various question components: what is the message, how is the U.S. military communicating, and how is the U.S. military communicating to a Polish audience in particular? The analysis finds that “reassurance and deterrence” can describe the core message, but that this is composed of other messages like NATO solidarity and cooperation. It is conducted through events like the ones outlined, and the visual and tactical military capabilities plan a role in conveying the message.

4.1.1. Reassurance and Deterrence

The public diplomacy activities and the military’s message are two components of U.S. military posture in Poland: the former involves action and the message is what the action means. Examples of what the U.S. military does to carry out public diplomacy include Operation Dragoon Ride and the arrival of the EFP troops. The overall message associated with these activities is, according to official statements, one of reassuring allies and deterring adversaries. Deterrence and reassurance are interrelated: one does not occur without the other. In the interviews and supplementary empirical data, these two concepts together prove to be the primary message, although in the case of Poland more emphasis is placed on communicating reassurance than displaying deterrence.

Operation Atlantic Resolve is the umbrella to the European Reassurance/Deterrence Initiative and related U.S. military activities, such as the public diplomacy events this
thesis examines. The official purpose of OAR “is a demonstration of continued U.S. commitment to collective security through a series of actions designed to reassure NATO allies and partners of America's dedication to enduring peace and stability in the region in light of the Russian intervention in Ukraine” (U.S. Army Europe, 2018). Reassurance directly appears, explicitly but also with the description of U.S. commitment to collective security. Deterrence is a less explicit message according to official statements: the focus instead is on a commitment to peace and stability related to Russia’s aggression rather than directly engaging to deter Russia from any further aggressive activity. This was further emphasized by the interviewees, who pointed out that “one of the smart things we’ve done in the last four years since Crimea is that we have not made this primarily about Russia in a direct way” (Interviewee 3, 2018).

The consensus among interviewees is that the purpose of U.S. military public diplomacy is to “raise the visibility of NATO,” focusing on inter-alliance cooperation and amplifying that message to domestic, alliance, partner, and Russian audiences. This is evident with the “willingness to send millions of dollars of equipment and thousands of troops to NATO allies to show that we’re there for them.” (Interviewee 4, 2018). The U.S. approach has strategically attempted to control the narrative by focusing on the “we are NATO” message in contrast to narratives attempting to draw attention to the adversary – Russia (Interviewee 2, 2018). This strategy contributes to perception management: if NATO allies perceive the U.S. military as a force of peace rather than a force provoking Europe’s neighbor, publics and their respective governments are more inclined to view U.S. military posture favorably. While U.S. presence and activity in Poland and other NATO allies is framed domestically as a matter of national interest for the United States, communicating to foreign publics almost always attempts to emphasize the NATO element. “Allied solidarity,” as opposed to images of U.S. unilateral action, works in favor of the U.S. military, first by granting more credibility to have troops stationed in Europe and second by engaging other allies and partners to share the burden of ensuring “peace and stability.
In summary, the primary message the U.S. military seeks to convey to Poland is one of reassuring NATO allies of U.S. commitment through amplifying NATO solidarity while simultaneously deterring Russia from aggression. Deterrence is not a direct response to Russia, but the public diplomacy activities are rather “good things for our alliance” that boost NATO solidarity while simultaneously enhancing the message of deterrence (Interviewee 2, 2018). This balance is how the military manages to engage in tactical operations related to the security of Europe while not escalating rhetoric that could lead to conflict with Russia.

4.1.2. Toys to Show Off and Folks in Uniform

Constructivist scholars argue that material capabilities are embedded with meaning through social interactions and contexts, and this is shown through the military’s soldiers and equipment gaining meaning through public diplomacy events. While reassurance and deterrence as a package is the core message of U.S. military public diplomacy, how this message is conveyed includes the strategic use of tactical military exercises, equipment, and boots on the ground. The interviewees confirmed that the military has a much narrower set of topics to frame its public diplomacy in contrast to the State Department in this case. This limits the number of themes able to be communicated, but conversely allows the military’s material capabilities to become tools with which to amplify the narrower message. These highly visible assets represent a tangible component of the United States military’s image.

Official statements, press releases, images, and videos consistently center around the visuals of military exercises. For example, a video uploaded by U.S. Army Europe entitled “Saber Strike 2017” opens with firing a javelin, followed by a bomber flying overhead, soldiers in fatigues, and tanks rolling through a field. All of the interviewees, when asked how U.S. military public diplomacy is conducted, mentioned these types of military exercises and that “we’ve got a lot of toys to show off” (Interviewee 1, 2018). There exists an “allure of the life of a soldier” that the U.S. military captures well through its photo and video releases depicting “a man or woman in uniform with big, heavy, expensive
machinery” (Interviewee 2, 2018). The military considers “every soldier a diplomat” (Interviewee 4, 2018). This contrasts traditional models of public diplomacy, such as the methods the State Department uses to communicate American values to a narrow audience in a host country that include events like hosting American jazz bands or educational exchanges. The military instead focuses on what is “much more tactical, much more visible” than what is seen as softer and values based (Interviewee 2, 2018). The added value of military exercises and images of U.S. soldiers and equipment is the circulation that extends beyond a host country, especially as click-worthy images and videos that, for example, elicit associations with popular video games, are shared across platforms on social media. While other countries require more contextualization for sensitivities when bringing in the U.S. military, the use of tactical equipment and soldiers in uniform intentionally promotes the image of the military to evoke a sense of security. In Poland, few sensitivities about U.S. military presence are needed, giving the military flexibility to “show off” its capabilities.

The State Department initiates specific events categorized as public diplomacy, while the U.S. military takes existing events and amplifies certain elements to create public diplomacy. As an example of U.S. military public diplomacy, the Department of Defense interviewees used Operation Dragoon Ride as “one of the most brilliant things we came up with as a public affairs, public diplomacy, strategic communication initiative” (Interviewee 1, 2018). Dragoon Ride involved static displays of military equipment and soldiers interacting with locals. Images of Dragoon Ride frequently depicted images of young children holding an American flag as a Stryker rolls by or trying on a soldier’s helmet. These events “just have the coolness factor. Kids are attracted to that stuff, almost like it’s magnetic” (Interviewee 1, 2018). During the road march the U.S. military allowed journalists to participate and “we could see all the Polish citizens driving alongside the convoy, blowing kisses and stuff, and the journalists really could understand the enthusiasm that people had standing out there with American or NATO flags” (Interviewee 3, 2018). The January 2017 arrival of U.S. troops as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence also reflected the use of a tactical mission to amplify U.S. messages in media
without additional events designated solely as “public diplomacy.” A parade and opening
ceremony in Žagan, Poland, gathered media attention as the soldiers flown into Wrocław
arrived for the first – and symbolic – deployment of NATO troops to Poland as part of
EFP. While Poles and other alliance members, especially the Baltic states and others
concerned about future Russian aggression, were a key target to message, the domestic
factor also played a role: “For a domestic audience they filmed a commercial for during the
Superbowl about the soldiers connecting with their soldiers while watching the Superbowl.
That really, for a lot of Americans, raised awareness that we have all these soldiers in
Poland and put Zagan on the map” (Interviewee 3, 2018). Significant moments that result
from public diplomacy strategies like these generate attractiveness and influence how those
involved and those who observe perceive the U.S. military.

4.1.3. A Favorable Audience
As discussed extensively when conceptualizing military public diplomacy, definitions
within the U.S. government add another level of complexity to applying a theoretical
evaluation to a case like the military in Poland. Two of the four interviewees, each
representing a different department, used public affairs as the preferred term, while the
others used public diplomacy. One used strategic communication, public affairs, and
public diplomacy interchangeably. The two interviewees also emphasized that the military
is also responsible for “telling Americans” the story about the family and friends serving in
Poland, and gaining domestic support for the military. However, the interviewees
confirmed that public affairs is not solely directed at domestic audiences, but that it
complements State Department messaging to foreign audiences and can engage in its own
communication to a foreign public.

Because the U.S. military maintains a presence across the world, messaging to different
audiences requires an understanding of cultural context and other complexities. The
interviewees were quick to point out that Poland proves to be a receptive and enthusiastic
audience: “I think Poland is one of the easiest places to execute public diplomacy for the
U.S. military” (Interviewee 1, 2018). In contrast to Estonia and Latvia with Russian-
speaking populations, Poland’s homogeneity allows for the U.S. military to communicate with limited resources but still reach most of the population with the same message (Interviewees 1, 2, & 3, 2018). Additionally, the strong historical and defense relationships between Poland and the United States play a role in how the U.S. has strategically shaped the narrative directed at Poland. Polish public opinion of the United States is the most favorable in Europe. The message must also withstand scrutiny from external countries within or outside of NATO. Instead of making a Polish-specific message, U.S. military public diplomacy amplifies certain aspects of the primary message related to Poland, such as social media posts showing soldiers expressing how much they enjoy pierogi and emphasizing in statements that the United States is impressed with Poland’s capability to build barracks to accommodate so many troops. Overall, the characteristics of Polish audiences mean that U.S. military public diplomacy has less damage control to do than in other countries who are less inclined to appreciate U.S. soldiers or with hostile operational environments if something goes awry. Even media and the public discussing the road accidents that involved U.S. heavy equipment and soldiers “were not people criticizing the presence of U.S. soldiers – the overall tone was very positive” (Interviewee 1, 2018). Additionally, the government proves easy to work with and anti-Americanism is an outlier within the domestic political system (ibid).

What became clear from interviews and through U.S. government language is that U.S. military posture in Poland is not only related to enhancing Poland’s security, but also to U.S. national interests. Strong messages of reassurance and deterrence contribute to the overall global image of the United States. If the U.S. is able to effectively deter Russia through its military posture on NATO’s eastern flank, for example, other potential adversaries may also perceive U.S. deterrence as credible. Along those lines, how the media receives the message contributes to whether Poland perceives U.S. reassurance as a steadfast and reliable commitment. One of the lessons learned from conducting U.S. military public diplomacy is that the Polish media is more effective at communicating with the host nation than the military can with the resources available (Interviewee 2, 2018).
This means that the military counts on positive reception in media outlets to reinforce its message.

4.2. How is U.S. military public diplomacy received in Polish media?

Now that the empirical evidence outlined the U.S. military’s message, this section will analyze the results of content and qualitative discourse analyses to answer the second research question: How is U.S. military public diplomacy perceived in Polish media? Polish news outlets act as a medium to the Polish population as a whole, and although a variety of factors can influence perception, these outlets are still primary sources of accessible information. Based on the interviews, the Polish media appears to perceive U.S. military presence positively, and this section will provide evidence to support this claim.

4.2.1. Results of Content Analysis

After reducing the initial number of articles from over 103 to 76 using the keywords described in the methodology section, qualitative content analysis was applied to the remaining articles. As discussed in the methodological framework, the coding process involved two cycles: initial coding and recoding. An uneven distribution of articles from each source occurred that could be due to a range of factors. First are the limitations previously discussed in terms of potential language mistakes in keywords and queries. The second is the unreliable nature of many archival databases that initially precluded the use of certain news outlets and limited the ability to search. By using broader search terms and using different search databases, such as Google in addition to the news source’s own website, the effects of such limitations were mitigated to a certain extent. The articles from seven different Polish news outlets varied in length and style. Some websites primarily had authored articles on the topics used as search criteria, such as Rzeczpospolita, while others like Fakt published unauthored articles. While an extended study could explore how the news outlets and journalists use the articles to frame a media debate, this study focuses primarily on how the U.S. military’s message is received generally in Polish media.
Following the collection and sorting of the articles, the first state of CA involved an initial round of coding. The codes used in the first cycle, mostly descriptive, built upon the content and themes that emerged during the final stage of coding. The codebook defining the six codes used in the second cycle, as well as the coding index of all articles are included in the Appendix of this thesis. This section will present the coding results and analyze them to answer the second research question: how is the U.S. military’s message received in Polish media? The message that the CA attempts to identify is defined as the U.S. military amplifying U.S. reassurance and NATO solidarity while deterring Russia with credible posturing.

![Figure 1. U.S. Military Public Diplomacy Activity](image)

The logical first code categorized the articles based on the main topic related to U.S. military public diplomacy. Because the search queries involving using keywords related to specific public diplomacy events, the first code proved easy to identify in the articles. An uneven distribution of topics emerged as a result of this code. The majority, 41, of articles focused on the recent arrival of the U.S. troops as part of the Enhanced Forward Presence NATO mission in 2017. It also proved the only event that appeared in each of the seven sources. Mentioned by one of the interviewees as a hugely successful U.S. military public diplomacy event, it succeeded in grabbing headlines not only in January 2017 but in the months leading up to and following the troop arrival to Orzysz. The media hype
surrounding the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw that announced EFP or the significance of the number of U.S. troops deployed – larger than other previous deployments or rotations – can explain the high volume of relevant articles. In contrast to the arrival of the 173rd paratroopers in 2014 that served as a mostly symbolic rotation following the Russian annexation of Crimea, the troops in Poland represent a more significant show of force based on number and the extended commitment of EFP.

Operation Dragoon Ride, also discussed in the interviews as a highly successful public diplomacy event, received positive media attention: all of the articles discussed the event as a way of contributing to Polish security. All also focused on an element of U.S. reassurance, either reassurance alone or combined with a message of deterrence, showing that the perception of American tanks and soldiers passing through Polish towns represented the U.S. commitment to the Polish people. These articles also tended to include visuals or descriptions of community outreach, representing the people-to-people engagement found in public diplomacy strategies. Because the road march passed through regions and small towns, non-national news outlets could provide more insight, yet this analysis focuses on the perception at the national level.

![Figure 2. Attitude Toward U.S. Military Activity/Presence](image)

The attitude toward U.S. military activities and presence proved difficult to code for. As Polish is the author’s second language, picking up the nuances on tone and connotations on
certain words may have led to imprecise coding. However, multiple readings and translating certain phrases mitigated many of the issues. Overall the articles proved mostly neutral in tone, followed by smaller proportions of positive and favorable coverage. The fact that the articles represented neutral positions is to be expected: for pieces without strong partisan biases or debates, news outlets attempt to focus on presenting stories as a more neutral informant. Only two held negative attitudes about U.S. military presence: one related to soldiers abiding by Polish laws and the other about the possible negative economic outcomes from the U.S. deploying troops to Poland. Both of these articles were authored, indicating that the journalist took a position in the reporting. These were not against the U.S. military arriving in Poland, instead focusing on disadvantages. While those against the U.S. military presence could be found in more fringe news outlets or through other search criteria, no search query used to collect empirical data resulted in articles that argued against the U.S. military’s deployment to Poland. The fact that public opinion in Poland views the United States and NATO favorably can explain the lack of articles contra U.S. military presence. As the Polish government is also enthusiastic about the U.S. military, news outlets report on positive statements and quotes from politicians as well. Additionally, opinion pieces did not emerge as the primary format for the articles, limiting what attitude the pieces adopted.

The “message” dimension was explored with three main codes: the primary message received (3), value for Poland (4), and the inclusion of troop numbers and type of equipment (5).
The first cycle of coding combined U.S. reassurance and deterrence with NATO reassurance and deterrence, yet the coding process revealed that articles typically positioned one actor differently from the other. The reason for differentiation is based on the interview data on the U.S. military’s message. The U.S. military not only uses public diplomacy in Poland to amplify themes of what the United States is unilaterally doing for Poland, but also to promote the ideas of NATO solidarity and cooperation. Additionally, the interviews revealed messaging is designed to draw attention to NATO, not to Russia’s narratives. The separation of the core message into four codes is to identify which messages came through strongly. Some articles discussed the U.S. military presence with few or no mentions to NATO or Russia (U.S. reassurance), for example, while others focused on the cooperation among allies that would defend Poland from Russia (NATO reassurance and deterrence). All four of the codes reveal the U.S. military public diplomacy’s effectiveness in communicating reassurance and deterrence, as only 13% of the articles did not illustrate the message. Interestingly, no article positioned the debate as the U.S. military’s primary purpose to deter, showing that the U.S. military’s public diplomacy message conveyance is non-escalatory.
While reassurance and deterrence are the key narratives of U.S. public diplomacy, part of the events communicate added benefit to Poland. The fourth code aimed to determine how the article determined the value of U.S. military activities in Poland for the country. The interviewees asserted that the U.S. military aims to add value to Poland, primarily in terms of national security and the resulting 71% of sampled articles reveal that the presence of U.S. troops and their activity is perceived as benefiting Polish security. What is not present in official documents and statements, but was revealed in the interviews is that the U.S. military also uses the economic potential of U.S. presence to improve how the presence is perceived. This was also reported by articles, and is another dimension of a U.S. military public diplomacy event that can convince Polish citizens to support the presence. Even if a citizen does not agree with the security situation, the potential added value in economic terms is convincing. Several articles also placed the U.S. military public diplomacy event in the context of domestic politics, for example, whether or not former Prime Minister Beata Szydło was responsible for securing greater numbers of U.S. troops. No article argued that the presence would be a disadvantage to Poland through destabilizing relations with Russia.
As explored in the analysis of research question one, the tactical and visible elements of the U.S. military, or the “allure of the life of a soldier” and “toys to show off,” are core components of what the U.S. military communicates in its messaging strategy. The fifth code aimed to identify if articles included references to how many U.S. troops were deployed to Poland and the type of U.S. military equipment, in other words, is this element of what the interviewees believe is a part of the message received by Polish media? The results of the coding hint that the U.S. military is effective in making the imagery of soldiers and military equipment part of the message, and that the Polish public, as represented in media, responds to these symbols within public diplomacy. Over half mentioned both: some articles described in separate paragraphs the types of tanks and weapons brought by soldiers, while others referenced in less detail. Only 12% of the articles mentioned neither the number of U.S. troops nor the type of military equipment, although in some of the articles coded for “Not Present” the overall number of NATO (not U.S.) soldiers were included.
The final code related to how Poland’s threat perception within the articles discussing U.S. military public diplomacy activities. The U.S. military aims to make deterrence more of a secondary message, part of the larger reassurance narrative. As one interviewee pointed out, a great success is the military making its presence about allied solidarity not about provoking war with Russia. However, Russian aggression in Ukraine precipitated the U.S. military’s increased presence in Poland and is a dominant narrative in Poland domestically, as Ukraine’s immediate neighbor with its own history of Soviet aggression. The coding process sought to determine how Russia was perceived in the articles related to U.S. military public diplomacy and found that almost half did not mention Russia, while the other half either mentioned Russia explicitly or in more roundabout ways, such as emphasizing the security of NATO’s eastern flank or the potential for aggression from the East. Explicit mentions named Russia or the Kremlin, but rarely proved to be the central focus of the article.

In summary, a content analysis of the articles reveals that the U.S. military’s message conveyed through public diplomacy events is received in Polish media. The United States is perceived as reliable guarantor of security for Poland, due to the Polish media, in general, viewing the military favorably and its messages of both U.S. and NATO reassurance and deterrence as credible. The code that factored how the articles presented
troop numbers and military equipment reveal that the military recognizes that its image associated with tactical and visible elements is an instrument that can be utilized to positively influence that image. The next stage of qualitative discourse analysis will go into more depth about how the message is perceived, answering questions about the effectiveness of the overall message.

4.2.2. Results of Qualitative Discourse Analysis

Seven articles from the content analysis selection were analyzed using qualitative discourse analysis that cover each military public diplomacy event. A close reading of the selected articles to “delineate the discursive elements at play” contributed to answering the second research question on how the media receives the U.S. military’s message (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, p. 103). The discourse analysis broke down the articles to understand how the article represents the event, what identities are set up for those involved, and what relationships are established between those involved (Fairclough, 1995, p. 5). It should be noted that the QDA process requires some level of analyst subjectivity and how the reader understands the context of the article.

_Gazeta Wyborcza_ published an article on April 23, 2014, when the 173rd Airborne Brigade arrived to Poland entitled “American soldiers fly to Świdwin air base.” The article is one of the first describing the beginning of U.S. symbolic actions and reassurance to Poland following the Russian annexation of Crimea in spring of that year. The article opens with the number of American soldiers arriving for a joint exercise and outlines former President Donald Tusk’s assurance that the troops coming to Poland from the United States would increase “if needed.” It later reiterates the possibility of increasing troop numbers and extending presence, framing the arrival of U.S. troops as a promise of long commitment rather than immediate reaction to Russia’s aggression.

The article establishes the relationships between various actors through the use of Tusk and U.S. Ambassador Stephen Mull’s quotes. U.S.–Polish relations are framed as “partnership,” “friendship,” and a relationship that both states can count on. In contrast, Russia’s actions are identified in Tusk’s words as a “confusion the east of the continent,”
which serves to minimize Russia’s influence as secondary and inferior to that of the United States. The article with a quotation that plays into domestic debate: Tusk reaffirms that Poland can no longer be regarded as a second-class member of the alliance. This represents an element of Polish identity: a fear that the West regards Poland as undeserving of its status in the EU and NATO. It seeks to appeal to the Polish pride in its contributions to the shared values that define the West: “freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights” to secure a “safe and free republic.” Overall, the article strongly represents U.S. reassurance and deterrence message communicated through the military in a symbolic display. The article also indicates that Poland, its government especially, is open to such signs of commitment, and perceives the United States as a friend and reliable partner.

“The cavalry are here. American troops ride through Poland” published March 22, 2015, in Newsweek covered the first iteration of Operation Dragoon Ride, one of the military’s key public diplomacy events. The article opens with a quote from the Minister of Defense informing Poland that “we can get used to the presence of American soldiers,” a statement that also appeared in the first article analyzed. The reason for the U.S. military presence is assumed in the article. Only towards the end is Russia mentioned, when it is described with negatively connotated words like “aggression” and “annexation.” This description’s language is charged with Polish historical memory, as it only gained independence from Soviet repression three decades ago after nearly a century.

The author (anonymous) turns the discussion of a single event to an ongoing domestic debate. The article posits a question: “Does this mean that from now on the American army will be permanently stationed in Poland?” This question integrates the discussions of a potential American base in Poland that have been a crucial topic in conversations about Polish national security. A U.S. military in base in Poland represents an element of Poland solidifying its image as westward-orientated while reaffirming a relationship with an actor Poland views as the counterbalance to its adversary, Russia. It also builds upon an element of Poland’s construction of its image alluded to in the analysis of the previous article: Poland’s desire to be seen as a first-class member of the NATO alliance. Hosting a base would reposition NATO strategic activities away from Brussels.
and more to its “eastern flank,” a move beneficial to Poland’s security, political clout, and economy.

Throughout the text, the article identifies the United States with associated imagery of soldiers and tanks. How the military is represented within the article aligns with what the military amplifies as part of the messaging strategy: the appeal of soldiers in uniform and military equipment. The photo that accompanies the article features a Stryker tank, representing one element of the military’s message that aims to display heavy military equipment as a means of reassuring Polish publics. It is supplemented by a description of the event as one that attracted high numbers of residents who all wanted selfies with soldiers and had positive comments: “I like everything. Even the guys from the military police. Their uniforms.” The article ultimately frames the event in what it means for Poland: “more” exercises, rotations, and NATO troops.

The second shorter article on Dragoon Ride appeared in Fakt on March 24, 2015, entitled “American soldiers arrive to Bialystok.” The subheading sets the characterization of the U.S. military throughout: “they were welcomed like saviors.” It continues with describing the scene of the tanks rolling into town with “crowds of Bialystok residents” arranging a “royal welcome” for the American soldiers. It even continues to describe the convoy of soldiers being “welcomed as though they were liberating the city.” The article sets up the relationship between the Polish residents and American soldiers as one of friendship, yet implies an imbalance, framing Poland as vulnerable to some sort of occupation and American soldiers as liberators. This echoes descriptive elements found in reporting on U.S. and other allied troops liberating parts of Europe after Nazi occupation.

The article identifies the reason for U.S. presence clearly, supplementing the imagery of the soldiers as “liberators,” with stating in the subheading that the residents see Americans the only hope to deter a Russian attack on Poland. The value of the U.S. military in Poland is perceived through a security frame, describing Dragoon Ride as a “symbol of a security guarantee for us.” The general tone of the article contrasts the more serious dailies and weeklies, like Newsweek and Gazeta Wyborcza, as Fakt is a tabloid-style news outlet. It uses more conversational descriptions, such as the depiction of
“crowds only like this on New Year.” To summarize, although the language is more sensational, it still appears to interpret the public diplomacy event as a sign of U.S. commitment to strengthening Polish security.

During the curation of articles for content analysis and subsequent qualitative discourse analysis, many articles reported on the Enhanced Forward Presence troops in the months following the Warsaw Summit and leading up to their January 2017 arrival. One of the only articles found framed the presence of EFP troops as a potential disadvantage to Poland was published in Gazeta Wyborcza by Joanna Dzikowska on November 9, 2016, titled “Americans under the shop won’t stick out. Who’s afraid of the U.S. Army in Świętoszów and Bolesławiec?”

The article initially uses narration to create the imagery of a Świętoszów, a Polish town, as calm, peaceful, simple, and small. The four paragraphs of description are followed by a sentence set to create contrast to the tranquil life of the Polish town: “in the beginning of the year they will live with a few thousand U.S. soldiers.” This sentence almost appears ominous as it is followed by a subheader and description of who the soldiers are and their purpose in Poland: “ready to fight.” The following subheader – “on a leash” – is followed by quotes from several residents that reveal indifference and opposition to the U.S. presence, including one that reveals a fear of being perceived as “run on an American leash.”

Another resident is pleased with the potential of receiving U.S. dollars, but “would rather do business with the Russians.” A different interview supplements the idea of Russians being preferred over Americans as the Russian people do not want war and the U.S. army’s presence potentially provokes an unwanted conflict. The quotations reveal a different relationship between Russia and Poland than the majority of articles related to U.S. military public diplomacy. One even says the U.S. soldiers are no better than the Soviets: “look what they’re doing in their other wars.”

Overall, the selection of quotations reveals the perception of the future arrival of U.S. troops as a nuisance at best and as destabilizing at worst. The image of the U.S. military as a symbol of reassurance and credible deterrence is contrasted by residents’ view
of the soldiers as detracting from Poland’s overall security. The author herself approaches the topic more neutrally than the interviewees and she distantly identifies the U.S. soldiers with language that describes the nature of EFP and facts such as where the training is located. The article’s overall theme of potential disadvantages of U.S. troop presence is likely to offer a different perspective to the media hype after the Warsaw Summit and the government’s own enthusiasm to receiving such a large symbol of U.S. commitment to Polish security.

On January 5, 2017, Marek Świerczyński from Polityka authored an article “The American army comes to Poland. And they’re staying for good.” The title again brings up an element of the debate on a permanent deployment of troops to Poland. Although the military routinely states that the deployments to Eastern Europe are rotational, not permanent stationing, the arrival of EFP troops clearly symbolizes something that is perceived as near-permanent U.S. commitment to Poland. The author opens with a positive frame of the event describing it “without a doubt, a historic moment” and throughout the article emphasizes that “history is happening.” Świerczyński makes points of comparison with the last time a significant U.S. troop presence was present in Europe. The distinction is that Poland is now at the forefront of European security as operations for all of NATO’s eastern flank will be headquartered in Poland. This alludes to a point of pride discussed in the analysis of previous articles that Poland aims to become a core actor in Euro-Atlantic security, not a second-class NATO member.

The U.S. military is identified through a lengthy description of the assets it brings to Poland as part of EFP. It details the logistics of EFP: the type of equipment, routes, locations of deployment, and travel information. Overall the description of the military creates an image of a credible force that “recognizes Polish weakness” and decides to “take care of it themselves.” The U.S. military and the U.S. government are framed differently within the article. The presence of the troops is explicitly framed to “defend and deter” while the author discusses the Republicans in the U.S. and the uncertainty of Donald Trump’s attitude toward NATO. U.S. politicians Lindsey Graham and John McCain are mentioned – two figures positively regarded in Poland because of their hawkish stance
towards Russia. While Trump’s skepticism of NATO is never an element of official military messaging, the military seeks to convey its reputation as a security guarantor, regardless of politics. This appears to have worked, as the mention of Trump is followed by an indication of the U.S. “absolute commitment” to Poland. This article, partly due to its authorship, takes a favorable approach to the arrival of U.S. troops. It provides a political analysis of the event and positions the argument as contributing to the strength of Poland and NATO.

The third article on the EFP troop arrival published in Rzeczpospolita by Janina Blikowska on February 2, 2017, is titled “The Lubuskie province counts on American soldiers to fuel the economy.” The lede paragraph sets the tone for the rest of the article: “thanks to the American army a Lubuskie town has a new chance,” which immediately sets up the U.S. military’s identity in a positive way. It continues asserting that not only will prosperity increase and infrastructure improve, but the U.S. army also brings a better atmosphere. In contrast to the majority of articles coded in content analysis that perceive the U.S. military as a security guarantor, the presence of U.S. troops is perceived as benefiting Poland’s economy. The image of the U.S. military is positive, as the author notes the welcoming celebration in Żagań and Skwierzyna and the already high numbers of employment. The relationship is set up as mutually beneficial to the residents of the town and the U.S. army. The town receives additional government spending to support infrastructure development and greater investment from soldiers spending their salaries locally. A Polish official also notes that the opinions of the residents are positive because they feel safer. In turn, the U.S. military receives a community atmosphere full of “cheerful, open people.”

While the focus of the article frames the presence of the U.S. soldiers as added economic value, the perception of the U.S. military also includes descriptions of “nice and friendly” soldiers who are open to learning Polish. This supplements an interviewee’s point that, in contrast to traditional public diplomacy, each soldier is an ambassador of the United States to a foreign community. The article also makes no allusions to Russia or the threat towards Poland’s eastern flank, but the assumption of threat is implicit that the military is there to secure Poland and make the residents feel safer. The piece is not
explicitly reflecting the U.S. military’s message, yet increases its overall effectiveness in achieving favorable perceptions because of the economic value analyzed.

Operation Saber Strike 2017 is covered by Maciej Nowakowski in Gazeta Wyborcza on June 17, 2017, in a piece called “B52s and B1s, the biggest bombers in the word in Mazury. NATO maneuvers.” The article is mostly detail-oriented in the beginning, outlining what exercise Saber Strike is and discusses the number of soldiers from each country and type of military equipment. The annual exercise is “nothing new in the Baltic” and helps militaries train to react quickly to threats on the eastern flank. While the cooperative nature of the exercise is mentioned, the relationship between various actors involved in the story is not established. Again, the image of the military is created through descriptions of military maneuvers and equipment, such as the strategic advantages of B-2 bombers with stealth technology. As the article describes training, such as rapid-fire drills and bomber flights, social media posts with videos and pictures are embedded to emphasize the visual element of the military exercise. In general, this article most likely appeals to those with an interest in tactical military operations and heavy equipment and weapons, as it provides no analysis of the exercise and what it means for Poland, apart from securing the eastern flank.

In summary, the qualitative discourse analysis builds upon the content analysis and confirms that the U.S. military is effectively communicating its message through public diplomacy. The photos that accompany each article are also worth mentioning. In each of the seven articles, military equipment and/or U.S. soldiers in uniform are depicted. Four show U.S. tanks, while others depict soldiers in fatigues on training fields or during a military exercise ceremony. While the selected articles are not fully representative of the Polish media landscape, they prove that the U.S. military is effectively communicating to the Polish public messages of absolute commitment in the face of potential Russian aggression.
CONCLUSION

This thesis sought to understand what the U.S. military seeks to convey to Poland through its public diplomacy activities, and how Polish news outlets perceive the message. Through a research process that involved field interviews and text analysis from both actors – the United States and Poland – the thesis was able to determine that the message of reassurance and deterrence the U.S. military aims to communicate to Poland is in fact received and perceptions in Polish news outlets are favorable. The selection of articles from a sample of Polish news outlets reveal that the U.S. military presence in Poland adds value not only in terms of security and safety, but also in economic benefits. The thesis also found that the image of the U.S. military plays an especially important role in public diplomacy. The military’s material capabilities, especially its visible and tactical assets, contribute to the design and emphases of public diplomacy activities. Heavy, expensive machinery and soldiers in uniform represent the U.S.–Polish friendship, the United States’ absolute commitment to Polish and NATO security, and provide an attractive visual for the military to boost (and for the Polish media to disseminate). In other words, this confirms the constructivist assertion that a state’s material capabilities become endowed with meaning that influence perceptions and behavior.

In addition to finding that the U.S. military’s public diplomacy effectively convinces Poland of the seriousness of America’s commitment to reassurance and deterrence, this thesis also demonstrates the important role of the military in conducting a state’s foreign policy. Rather than serving only as an instrument of power projection, the military also can conduct strategies to contribute to the United States’ soft power potential. Military public diplomacy does not fit neatly into the categories either of hard power or soft power, yet occupies a combination of the two that can be answered by analyzing perceptions and images. The results of the thesis have practical implications for convincing policymakers of the potential added value of the military in conveying a message.

Moreover, constructivism proves a valuable theoretical construct in creating a linkage between perception and soft power to apply to military public diplomacy. Rather than
positioning concepts from the realist and liberalist schools of thought in conflict with constructivism, this case reveals a degree of compatibility among these theoretical frameworks to answer questions regarding military public diplomacy. This linkage can benefit the academic field of public diplomacy, and shows that the military is a valid actor that should be considered more seriously in public diplomacy literature. Other cases of militaries conducting public diplomacy can adopt constructivist assertions to identify messaging strategies – and to analyze their real-world effectiveness.
REFERENCE LIST


Interviewee 2. (2018, April 3). Department of State. Personal interview.


Kratochwil, F. Constructivism: What it is (not) and how it matters. (2008). In D. della Porta & M. Keating (Eds.), *Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences* (pp. 139-161). Cambridge, UK: University Press.


## APPENDIX I. CODEBOOK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code and Subcode</th>
<th>Definition and When to Use/Not to Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category: Descriptive</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1: Event Discussed</strong></td>
<td>What is the topic of this article that is relevant to my thesis subject? It is not the topic of the article overall but one of the public diplomacy events chosen to sample articles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Airborne Brigade</td>
<td>In 2014, the 173rd Airborne Brigade arrived from Vincenza, Italy, following Russian aggression in Crimea. This was the first major U.S. symbol of reassurance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Dragoon Ride</td>
<td>Dragoon Ride is discussed in the interviews as one of the best military public diplomacy events in Poland and the Baltic states. Dragoon Ride is a roadmarch from Vilseck, Germany, to Tallinn, Estonia, and vice versa. Dragoon Ride is under the umbrella of the U.S.-led Saber Strike exercise but a separate event from live-fire drills, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Saber Strike</td>
<td>Saber Strike is a longstanding annual U.S.-led multinational military exercise in which Poland takes part that aims to improve interoperability and readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. EFP Troops Arrival</td>
<td>Enhanced Forward Presence troops from the U.S. arrived to Poland in January 2017 as part of NATO’s commitment from the 2016 summit in Warsaw.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Road Accident</td>
<td>Major public diplomacy failures have not been covered by the Polish media as such, but occasionally in the article sampling process, articles about road accidents involving deployed U.S. soldiers appeared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Combination</td>
<td>Subcode to use when one event does not appear as the primary focus of the article but two or more are mentioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category: Descriptive</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2: Attitude Toward U.S. Military Activity/Presence</strong></td>
<td>What is the general tone of this article toward the U.S. military and its PD activities in Poland? This code is applied to the attitude directed at the U.S. military, not the tone of the article as a whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. In Favor</td>
<td>The article is explicitly in favor of U.S. military PD activities and presence in Poland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Positive</td>
<td>The article is positively inclined toward the PD event, mentioning beneficial outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Neutral</td>
<td>The article reports more on facts than takes a strong position in favor or against. If an event is discussed in the context of a negative topic but it not</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
negatively positioned itself (vice versa with positive) then it is considered neutral.

d. Negative
The article is negatively inclined toward the PD event, mentioning negative outcomes.

e. Against
The article is explicitly against of U.S. military PD activities and presence in Poland.

## Category: Message

### 3: Primary Message from U.S. Military Activity/Presence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Message</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. U.S. Assurance</td>
<td>The article discusses the PD event in the context of the U.S. reassuring Poland and NATO’s eastern flank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Deterring Russia</td>
<td>The article discusses the PD event in the context of deterring Russia from further aggression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. NATO Assurance</td>
<td>The article discusses the PD event in the context of the NATO reassuring Poland and NATO’s eastern flank. Other NATO Allies are mentioned as contributing to assurance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. U.S. Assurance and Deterrence</td>
<td>The article discusses the PD event both as the U.S. reassuring Poland and Allies as well as deterring Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. NATO Assurance and Deterrence</td>
<td>The article discusses the PD event both as NATO reassuring Poland and Allies as well as deterring Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. None/Other</td>
<td>No clear message can be interpreted from the article OR another message is present that is not significant to this study.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Category: Message

### 4: Value of U.S. Military Activity and Presence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value of U.S. Military Activity</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Strengthens National Security</td>
<td>U.S. military PD will help Poland’s security. For example, training U.S. and Polish soldiers together will improve the army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Benefits Society and Economy</td>
<td>U.S. military PD will contribute to a better Poland in terms of social and economic benefit, such as spending dollars or hiring people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Destabilizes Region</td>
<td>U.S. military PD will strain relations with Russia and will harm Poland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Relates to Domestic Political System</td>
<td>U.S. military PD is important for domestic political reasons. For example, if the article discusses which government or party is responsible for ensuring U.S. troops come to Poland.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Category: Message

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5: Article Use of Including U.S. Troop Numbers or Type of Military Equipment</th>
<th>Does the article mention how many U.S. troops or what type of U.S. military equipment is present in Poland?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Troop Numbers</td>
<td>The number of U.S. troops present at an event or in Poland is mentioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Equipment Type</td>
<td>The type of U.S. military equipment is mentioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Both</td>
<td>Both the numbers of U.S. troops and the type of military equipment are mentioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Not Present</td>
<td>Neither numbers nor type are present in the article.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Category: Threat Perception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6: Threat to Poland – Is Russia Mentioned?</th>
<th>Is Russia mentioned in the article as a threat to Poland, either directly or indirectly?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Explicitly</td>
<td>Russia or Russians mentioned by name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Implicitly</td>
<td>Russia is referred to in other words than by name, such as the term “eastern flank” that is used almost exclusively to refer to NATO’s borders with Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No Threat</td>
<td>Russia is not considered a threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Not Present</td>
<td>There is no mention of Russia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX II. CODING INDEX

### SOURCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Title</th>
<th>Translated Title</th>
<th>Date (DD.MM.YY)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amerykanie nad Wisłą</td>
<td>Americans on the Vistula</td>
<td>18.01.17</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańscy żołnierze w drodze do Polski. Oficjalne powitanie w sobotę</td>
<td>American soldiers on the road to Poland. Official welcoming on Saturday</td>
<td>10.01.17</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańscy żołnierze wylądowali na lotnisku we Wrocławiu</td>
<td>American soldiers land at the Wrocław airport</td>
<td>07.01.17</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykański konwój już w Polsce. Powitanie na granicy</td>
<td>The American convoy is now in Poland. Welcoming on the border</td>
<td>12.01.17</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inauguracja polsko-amerykańskich ćwiczeń. Prezydent: To przelomowa chwila</td>
<td>The inauguration of the Polish–American exercise. President: This is a breakthrough moment</td>
<td>30.01.17</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilka tysięcy żołnierzy na manewrach Saber Strike w Orzyszu. &quot;Stanowią one gwarancję bezpieczeństwa Polski&quot;</td>
<td>A few thousand soldiers at the Saber Strike maneuver in Orzysz. “They are a guarantee of Poland’s security”</td>
<td>17.06.17</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macierewicz: Za tydzień amerykańska brygada pancerna będzie już w Polsce</td>
<td>Macierewicz: In a week the American armored brigade will be in Poland</td>
<td>06.01.17</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MON podaje przyczynę wypadku amerykańskiej ciężarówki</td>
<td>Defense Chief gives the cause of the accident with American heavy equipment</td>
<td>22.01.17</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierwszy trening Amerykanów. Abramsy strzelają na poligonie w Żaganiu</td>
<td>First training of the Americans. Abrams shooting on the training field in Żagan</td>
<td>18.01.17</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponad trzy tysiące amerykańskich żołnierzy już w Polsce</td>
<td>Around three thousand American soldiers are now in Poland</td>
<td>26.01.17</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FAKT

<p>| 250 amerykańskich żołnierzy już w Polsce | 250 American soldiers now in Poland | 07.01.17 | D | C | D | A | C | D |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24.03.15</td>
<td>American soldiers enter Bialegostok</td>
<td></td>
<td>B B A A D D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.03.16</td>
<td>An American brigade is coming to Poland! What does this mean for Poland?</td>
<td></td>
<td>D C D A C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.03.15</td>
<td>The American army drove through south Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>B C A E D D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.03.17</td>
<td>Without ice cream we’re not fighting – American soldiers in Poland!</td>
<td></td>
<td>D B F B D D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.10.16</td>
<td>NATO armored brigade enters Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>D C E A A A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.03.15</td>
<td>A Ford ran into an American convoy!</td>
<td></td>
<td>B B F E B D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.01.17</td>
<td>Macierewicz revealed the vision, when the Americans will enter Poland!</td>
<td></td>
<td>D C D A C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.10.16</td>
<td>Is NATO preparing for war?</td>
<td></td>
<td>D B E A D A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.12.16</td>
<td>Polish firm washes American dirt!</td>
<td></td>
<td>D C A B C B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.08.16</td>
<td>How the alliance helps Poland!</td>
<td></td>
<td>D A E A C D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.01.17</td>
<td>An accident of heavy equipment on the “death road.” On the scene, Americans</td>
<td></td>
<td>D C F E B D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.08.14</td>
<td>U.S. soldiers are coming to Poland!</td>
<td></td>
<td>D B D A C A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GAZETA PRAWNA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31.05.16</td>
<td>American soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment visit Tarnów</td>
<td></td>
<td>B C A A C D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.01.15</td>
<td>Invasion of green men from NATO: Thousands of soldiers on Polish training fields</td>
<td></td>
<td>C C C A B B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.01.17</td>
<td>Lubuskie: An American army convoy entered Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>D C A A C D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.01.17</td>
<td>Macierewicz: The American armored brigade will arrive to</td>
<td></td>
<td>D C D A C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stycznia</td>
<td>Poland January 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macierewicz: Saber Strike świadczy o sile i skuteczności NATO i USA</td>
<td>Macierewicz: Saber Strike testifies to the strength and efficiency of NATO and the USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macierewicz: W Polsce będzie stacjonowało 7 tys. amerykańskich i NATO-wskich żołnierzy</td>
<td>Macierewicz: 7000 American and NATO soldiers will be stationed in Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marsz Dragonów: Amerykańskie transportery zbliżają się do polskich granic</td>
<td>Dragoon Ride: American transports are approaching the Polish border</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierwsi amerykańscy żołnierze już w Polsce. To część pancernoj brygady, która wzmocni wschodnią flankę NATO</td>
<td>The first American soldiers in Poland. It’s a part of the armored brigade that will strengthen NATO’s eastern flank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siemoniak: Armia na wschodzie Polski zostanie wzmocniona</td>
<td>Siemoniak: The army on Poland’s east will be strengthened</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szefer BBN: 13 kwietnia powitanie batalionu NATO w Orzyszu</td>
<td>National Security Chief: A welcome for NATO in Orzysz on April 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szefer MON obserwuje ćwiczenia sojusznicze Saber Strike 17</td>
<td>Defense Chief observes allied exercise Saber Strike 17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waszczykowski: Pierwsi żołnierze brygady pancernoj USA w Polsce w najbliższych dniach</td>
<td>Waszczykowski: the first soldiers of the U.S. armored brigade in Poland in the coming days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GAZETA WYBORCZA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>31 tys. żołnierzy NATO ćwiczy w Polsce, jak nas bronić przed agresją Czerwonych</th>
<th>31 thousand NATO soldiers exercise in Poland, how to defend us from the Reds’ aggression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07.06.16 C C C A D D</td>
<td>07.06.16 C C C A D D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambasador USA w Polsce Stephen Mull skoczył ze spadochronem z polskimi żołnierzami</td>
<td>U.S. Ambassador to Poland Stephen Mull jumped with a parachute with Polish soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.09.16 A C A A B D</td>
<td>08.09.16 A C A A B D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykanie pod sklepem nie będą wystawać. Kto się boi US Army w Świętoszowie i Bolesławcu?</td>
<td>Americans will not stand under the shop. Who’s afraid of the U.S. Army in Świętoszów and Bolesławiec?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.11.16 D D F B C A</td>
<td>09.11.16 D D F B C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańscy żołnierze już w Polsce. W Żaganiu zabrzmiały dwa hymny</td>
<td>American soldiers are in Poland. In Żagan sounded two hymns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.01.17 D C A A C D</td>
<td>12.01.17 D C A A C D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańscy żołnierze przylecieli do bazy w Świdwinie</td>
<td>American soldiers fly to the base in Świdwin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>News Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.06.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.06.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.12.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.06.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.10.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.08.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.03.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.06.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newsweek</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Additional Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26.09.14</td>
<td></td>
<td>An American armored brigade arrived to Poland</td>
<td>Amerykańska kawaleria pancerna przybyła do Polski</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.03.16</td>
<td></td>
<td>American tanks are coming to guard Eastern Europe. The U.S. is sending an armored brigade</td>
<td>Amerykańskie czołgi przyjadą bronić Europy Wschodniej. USA wysyłają brygadę pancerną</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.03.15</td>
<td></td>
<td>The cavalry is here. American troops are driving through Poland</td>
<td>Przybyła kawaleria. Amerykańskie oddziały jadą przez Polskę</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.03.15</td>
<td></td>
<td>The government seeks an American base in Poland</td>
<td>Rząd zabiega o utworzenie baz amerykańskich w Polsce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.04.14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tusk: More U.S. soldiers can come to Poland</td>
<td>Tusk: Do Polski może przyjechać więcej żołnierzy USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.04.14</td>
<td></td>
<td>The U.S. sent soldiers to Poland</td>
<td>USA wysyła żołnierzy do Polski</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.06.16</td>
<td></td>
<td>We know where the NATO soldiers will be stationed</td>
<td>Wiemy, gdzie w Polsce będą stacjonowali żołnierze NATO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### POLITYKA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańscy żołnierze w polskich bazach wojskowych</td>
<td>American soldiers in Polish army bases</td>
<td>25.04.17</td>
<td>D B A D C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańskie wojska wjeżdżają do Polski. I zostaną na stałe</td>
<td>The American army is entering Poland. And they’re staying permanently</td>
<td>05.01.17</td>
<td>D A D A C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentagon: Amerykanie będą ćwiczyć w Polsce</td>
<td>Pentagon: Americans will train with Poland</td>
<td>23.04.14</td>
<td>A A D A C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierwszy batalion NATO dotarł do Orzysza. Opancerzonymi strykerami, w</td>
<td>The first NATO battalion reached Orzysz. Armored Strykers in difficult</td>
<td>31.03.17</td>
<td>D C F E B D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trudnych warunkach</td>
<td>conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańskie wojska w drodze do Polski</td>
<td>The American army is on the road to Poland</td>
<td>15.12.16</td>
<td>D C D A C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańskie wojska w Polsce to nowe miejsca pracy i rozwój usług</td>
<td>The American army in Poland and it’s new jobs and services</td>
<td>02.02.17</td>
<td>D A A B B D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańskie wojsko przejedzie przez Polskę</td>
<td>The American army is driving through Poland</td>
<td>22.03.15</td>
<td>B C A A B D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### RZECZPOSPOLITA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amerykanie jadą przez Polskę</td>
<td>Americans are driving through Poland</td>
<td>25.03.15</td>
<td>B B D A C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańscy żołnierze w Polsce muszą przestrzegać polskiego prawa</td>
<td>American soldiers in Poland must abide by Polish law</td>
<td>12.01.17</td>
<td>D D F D D D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańskie wojska w drodze do Polski</td>
<td>The American army is on the road to Poland</td>
<td>15.12.16</td>
<td>D C D A C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańskie wojska w Polsce to nowe miejsca pracy i rozwój usług</td>
<td>The American army in Poland and it’s new jobs and services</td>
<td>02.02.17</td>
<td>D A A B B D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerykańskie wojsko przejedzie przez Polskę</td>
<td>The American army is driving through Poland</td>
<td>22.03.15</td>
<td>B C A A B D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanadyjska piechota nad Pustynią Błędowską</td>
<td>The Canadian infantry over the Pustyn desert</td>
<td>05.05.14</td>
<td>A C A A C D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pancerne i rakietowe wzmocnienie flanki</td>
<td>Armor and rockets strengthen the flank</td>
<td>19.03.15</td>
<td>B C A A C B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pokaz sojuszniczej solidarności NATO z Polską</td>
<td>A display of allied NATO solidarity with Poland</td>
<td>20.03.17</td>
<td>F C E A C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajd kawalerzystów</td>
<td>Ride of the cavalry</td>
<td>30.05.16</td>
<td>B C C A C A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rekord Muzeum Powstania</td>
<td>Record in the Warsaw Uprising</td>
<td>03.01.16</td>
<td>B B F B A D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warszawskiego Museum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Województwo Lubuskie liczy, że amerykańscy żołnierze napędzą gospodarkę</td>
<td>The Lubuskie province counts on American soldiers to fuel economy</td>
<td>02.02.17</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Polsce przybywa żołnierzy USA</td>
<td>American soldiers arrive to Poland</td>
<td>26.03.14</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Żagań to nie tylko US Army</td>
<td>Żagan is not only the U.S. Army</td>
<td>02.02.17</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Żołnierze NATO poznają Mazury jako turyści</td>
<td>NATO soldiers get to know Mazury as tourists</td>
<td>05.07.17</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Żołnierze USA nie płacą za paliwo w Polsce</td>
<td>U.S. soldiers don’t pay for gas in Poland</td>
<td>12.06.16</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Żołnierze USA od 1 kwietnia będą chronić polską granicę wschodnią</td>
<td>U.S. soldiers will guard Poland’s eastern border from April 1</td>
<td>21.03.17</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX III. QUALITATIVE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ARTICLES

Format:
Source, Data
Polish Title, Translated Title
Author (if applicable)

Gazeta Wyborcza, April 23, 2014
“Amerykańscy żołnierze przylecieli do bazy w Świdwinie”; “American Soldiers fly to Świedwin air base”

Newsweek, March 22, 2015
“Przybyła kawaleria. Amerykańskie oddziały jadą przez Polskę”; “The cavalry are here. American troops ride through Poland”

Fakt, March 24, 2015
“Amerykańscy żołnierze weszli do Białegostoku”; “American soldiers come to Białystok”

Gazeta Wyborcza, November 9, 2016
“Amerykanie pod sklepem nie będą wystawać. Kto się boi US Army w Świętoszowie i Bolesławcu?”; “Americans will not stand under the shop. Who’s afraid of the U.S. Army in Świętoszów and Bolesławiec?”
Joanna Dzikowska

Polityka, January 5, 2017
“Amerykańskie wojska wjeżdżają do Polski. I zostaną na stałe”; “The American army is coming to Poland. And they’re staying for good”
Marek Świerczyński

Rzeczpospolita
February 2, 2017
“Województwo Lubuskie liczy, że amerykańscy żołnierze napędzą gospodarkę”; “Lubuskie province counts on American soldiers to fuel the economy”
Janina Blikowska

Gazeta Wyborcza, June 17, 2017
“B52 i B1, największe bombowce świata, nad Mazurami. Manewry NATO”; “B52s and B1s, the biggest bombers in the world in Mazury. NATO maneuvers”
Maciej Nowakowski
NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE

I, _____________________________________________________________

(author’s name)

(personal code _________________________________________________),

herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to:

_________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________

(title of thesis)

supervised by _________________________________________________________,

(supervisor’s name)

1. To reproduce, for the purpose of preservation and making available to the public, including for addition to the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of validity of the copyright.

2. To make available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of validity of the copyright.

3. I am aware that the rights stated in point 1 also remain with the author.

4. I confirm that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe the intellectual property rights or rights arising from the Personal Data Protection Act.

Tartu/Tallinn/Narva/Pärnu/Viljandi, _____________ (date)

__________________________________________ (signature)