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Master's Thesis

Eda Ahi

(RE)CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS: FINLAND, ESTONIA, RUSSIA

Supervisor: Prof. Viacheslav Morozov

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I have written the Master's thesis independently.

All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of literature and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

Eda Ahi, 14.05.2015

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Opponent: Thomas Linsenmaier

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(Re)construction of National Security Discourse in the Context of the Ukrainian Crisis: Finland, Estonia, Russia

Author: Eda Ahi

Supervisor: Prof. Viacheslav Morozov

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MASTER'S THESIS

This Master's Thesis provides a hypothesis-generating comparative case study that focuses on the structures of three national security discourses in the context of the Ukrainian crisis: Finnish, Estonian and Russian. More specifically, it looks at the official (presidential and governmental) articulations concerning the crisis situation in Ukraine and its impacts on national and European security. Drawing upon poststructuralist security theories, most importantly the securitisation theory, the main aim of the thesis is to better understand the connection between security policy and national identity in the selected cases, in order to subsequently propose hypotheses for further research.

After explaining the theoretical framework, the an analysis of the discourses at two levels – national and European – demonstrates that the structural pattern of the selected national security discourses is somewhat counter-intuitive. Although the Finnish and the Estonian case initially seem to share a number of common features, at deeper levels, the two discourses differ significantly. At the same time, a closer look reveals the underlying structural similarity of Estonian and Russian security discourses. Namely, the two tend to be more polarised and use antagonisation, protagonisation and historisation, whereas their Finnish counterpart remains relatively neutral with regard to the Ukrainian crisis. The findings confirm that the link between policy and identity is relatively stable and cannot be seen as one-to-one. Instead, it is embedded into wider structures of memory. Finally, hypotheses for further research are suggested.

Keywords: *national security, national identity, securitisation, poststructuralist IR, Ukrainian crisis*

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1. INTRODUCTION

This Master's Thesis is a hypothesis-generating comparative case study that focuses on the structures of three national security discourses in the context of the Ukrainian crisis: Finnish, Estonian and Russian. More specifically, it looks at the official (presidential and governmental) articulations concerning the crisis situation in Ukraine and its impacts on national and European security.

It has widely been noted that the Ukrainian crisis that broke out in the common neighbourhood of the EU and Russia in autumn 2013 has accentuated the differences between the Western and Russian understanding of security policy. Moreover, the ways how countries perceive and articulate the reasons and the nature of the Ukrainian crisis, but also the possible responses and solutions to it, has elucidated and/or further emphasised the internal differences within the EU and NATO. Thus, it is understandable that in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, a significant number of studies have focused on an analysis of EU-Russia relations (e.g. Haukkala, 2015; Makarychev & Yatsyk 2015), as well as on those between Russia and the US (e.g. Kamp, 2014). Also, a considerable amount of studies has concentrated on Russian policy towards Ukraine and its motivations for invading the neighbouring country, mostly from a realist perspective (e.g. Bock et al., 2014; Götz, 2015), but not only (e.g. Lindley-French, 2014; Tsygankov, 2015), and also on the EU policies towards Ukraine (e.g. Delanoë, 2014; Pridham, 2014). In addition, the relation of the phenomenon of Novorossiia to Russian nationalism has been subjected to research (Laruelle, 2015). The Ukrainian crisis has been studied with focus of new forms of warfare (e.g. Allenby, 2015), but also the traditional military power, with specific emphasis on the nuclear dimension (e.g. Fitzpatrick 2014).

This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature on the Ukrainian crisis by offering a comparative poststructuralist reading of national security debates on the situation. While there is a growing body of research aiming to explain Russian policies towards Ukraine in the context of the crisis, these often seem to emphasise the difference between Russia and the Western countries. I argue that this is not always the case – while a comparison between Russia and the EU as a whole seems to easily correspond to the presumption of difference, a

comparison of Russia to European national discourses, especially in the security realm, can give another result (see also Lamoreaux, 2014). Furthermore, elucidating the structures of national security discourses facilitates further research for explanations of the internal discrepancies of the larger blocs of countries, such as the EU. In addition, choosing to analyse national security discourses in the context of the Ukrainian crisis may be particularly fruitful due to the geographical and symbolic proximity of the conflict zone.

While security studies have traditionally focused on the state, the conceptualisation of security has been significantly widened since the late 1980s. Poststructuralist IR has played a considerable role in the matter, introducing relevant theoretical perspectives such as securitisation theory (Buzan et al., 1998; Aradau, 2004; Balzacq, 2005), ontological security (Mitzen, 2006) or mnemonical security (Mälksoo, 2015). In these approaches, the focus has gradually shifted away from the state as the principal object of security studies. In fact, poststructuralists argue that national security is not only about physical security of the state, but can be extended to other issues if it meets the criteria of securitisation. Moreover, poststructuralist approach holds that policies are speech acts, that is discursive acts. Thus, in the context of emerging geopolitical debates regarding the Ukrainian crisis, this thesis aims to offer a somewhat alternative explanation to the current understanding of security, and subsequently policies, of the states. Accepting national security policies as a given, without an analysis of how threats come to life, in other words are constructed, can lead to inadequate political responses. Hence, a critical analysis of national security discourses is necessary for a detailed understanding of how motives of states are articulated. Subsequently, this allows the policy community to find ways to provide answers to their policies.

The selection of cases has been motivated by their relevance in terms of meaningful patterns of similarities and differences. Estonia and Finland share a significant number of the former – e.g. both are small in size and population, both are member states of the European Union and have a small defence budget in absolute terms as compared to Russia. Russia, on the other hand, can in many ways be seen as an opposite to the other two cases. Nonetheless, when the focus of the comparison is shifted to the official articulations of these countries on the security issues in the context

of the Ukrainian crisis, it does not appear to follow the same logical pattern. Namely, Estonian national security debate on the Ukrainian crisis differs from its Finnish counterpart, whereas some preliminary similarities concerning the structure of the articulations can be detected between the Estonian and the Russian case. This offers ground for a fruitful poststructuralist analysis of national security discourses that looks for explanations to the somewhat surprising pattern of differences and similarities in the structure of the discourses. In fact, this thesis argues that the results of an analysis of the structures of the three national security discourses is counter-intuitive.

The main aim of the thesis is to better understand the connection between security policy and national identity in the three countries, by drawing on poststructuralist security theories, and subsequently propose possible generalizations beyond the selected cases by generating hypotheses for further research. The main research questions that stem from the aim are:

- 1) How are national security and national identity linked in the national security discourses of Finland, Russia and Estonia in the context of the Ukrainian crisis?
- 2) Which generalizations do the cases in questions suggest regarding the connection between national security policies and national identity?

The aim is achieved by completing the following research tasks: collecting data from the official governmental and presidential websites of the three cases, using poststructuralist discourse analysis, specifically securitisation theory, to identify structural patterns in the discourses, comparing the structural patterns and, finally, generating hypotheses for further research.

The research design follows the principles of poststructuralist research proposed by Lene Hansen (2006). It is a multiple-Self (Russia, Estonia, Finland) one-moment (the context of the Ukrainian crisis) one-event (national security discourse) study of official national security discourses. The choice of official discourse as an object of study stems from the poststructuralist argument that national security discourses are most significantly shaped on the level of political elites, especially the government. The empirical material includes official press releases, speeches and interviews published on the governmental and presidential websites of the chosen countries. According to Hansen's (2006) criteria for data collection, speeches, due to their wide audience and

political relevance, are the most useful data for analysing official discourse. Thus, particular attention has been given to analysing longer speeches, but also interviews published on the official websites. The data has been collected according to the time frame of the study: from mid-August 2013 until March 2015. Although the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis is usually dated to November 2013 when the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, put an end to preparations for signing the EU Association Agreement, a number of significant events preceded the outbreak of the crisis. Thus, the preceding months might be significant in terms of outlining the discursive structures.

The theory chapter of the thesis provides a conceptualisation of security, national identity and the more specific term of national security using the poststructuralist framework, particularly securitisation theory. In addition, it explains the basics of poststructuralist discourse analysis, outlines the research design that mainly draws upon Lene Hansen's recommendations is outlined and explains data collection. The empirical part of the thesis is divided into two larger chapters: construction of threats to national security and that of threats to European security. This follows the logic of Wæver (2002) who claims that national security cannot be fully studied without taking into account its regional element. In the first among the empirical chapters, construction of threats to national sovereignty, to territorial integrity and to the principle of non-intervention is discussed. The chapter argues that there are significant structural similarities in Estonian and Russian discourses, whereas their Finnish counterpart differs from them. In the second empirical chapter, construction of threats to European security (and through it) is discussed in two sections that address values and stability in Europe (geopolitical threats and threats stemming from radicalism). The chapter argues that the cases conceptualise European security system rather differently, however, more structural similarities, such as a strong polarisation, can be found between the Russian and the Estonian case, whereas Finland is very much different from its counterparts. Finally, concluding remarks are presented, alongside making generalisations and providing hypotheses for further research.

2. THEORY, METHOD, CONCEPTS

Respecting the reluctance of the poststructuralist approach to make a strict distinction between theory and method and define 'theory' in 'traditional' ways (see Hansen, 1997, pp. 384; Klein, 1994), theory and method are presented as intertwined in this chapter and not divided into strict sections of 'theory' and 'method'. First, I discuss the general meaning of the concept of security within the context of poststructuralist security studies, alongside some of the main basic premises of the poststructuralist perspective. Second, I conceptualise "national identity" and attempt narrow down the general concept of security in order to show how the problematic notion of 'national security' is conceptualised in this study. This also involves linking it to (or rather merging it with) the level of regional, specifically European security. Subsequently, I outline the classification of structural tendencies used in the empirical chapters. Third, I explain the basic premises of poststructuralist discourse analysis. Fourth, I outline the research design according to the main principles of poststructuralist research design. Lastly, I explain the principles of data collection.

2.1. THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY IN POSTSTRUCTURALISM

In order to give a better explanation of the concept of 'security' as it is applied in this study, it is first necessary to provide a brief overview as to the basic principles of poststructuralist approach to the social world. Importantly, poststructuralist theory that provides the broader theoretical framework for this study, mainly stems from structuralist tradition. Thus, contrary to a widespread belief, poststructuralism does not mean 'anti-structuralism' (Wæver, 2002, pp. 23). More specifically, poststructuralism emerged as a radicalisation of structuralism by authors who were at the time (late 1960s) seen as structuralists, such as Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault (*ibidem*). In addition to arguing against the structuralist view of stability in language, poststructuralist thought has heavily problematised the rational (both idealist and realist) perspective for the presumption of objectivity and the desire to meet the methodological and epistemological standards of natural science (Hansen, 1997, p. 371). Nonetheless, it is important to note that poststructuralism is not the only perspective that engages in critical-reflexivist research and critique of realist and liberalist perspectives. This has

also been done by related perspectives such as Critical Theory (e.g. Hoffmann, 1987), constructivism (e.g. Krachetowil, 1989; Wendt, 1987, 1999) and feminism (e.g. Weber, 1994). (Hansen, 1997, pp. 372-3; Wæver, 1997)

However, the main aspect that distinguishes poststructuralism from other critical perspectives, is the core understanding of language as a system that is not determined by an outside 'reality'. This understanding stems from structuralist linguistics that followed Ferdinand de Saussure's groundbreaking ideas. Saussure (1960) argues that the meaning of the words is not inherent in them, but merely a result of social conventions – in other words, signs are arbitrary. In addition, Saussure makes a distinction between *langue* and *parole* – the former is the structure of language (the network of signs that give meaning to each other), the latter is a situated language use. Furthermore, in this view, *parole* must always draw on *langue*. Although poststructuralism stems from structuralism in terms of accepting the idea that meanings are attributed to signs not through their relations to reality, but through internal structures (networks) of signs, it argues against another basic premise of structuralism that stipulates a view of language as a stable, unchangeable structure, and affirms that signs change according to context (Laclau, 1993). Hence, the sharp distinction between *langue* and *parole* is dissolved (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 8-12). As a result, language (and discursive) structures are seen as fixed in a specific moment, but at the same time inherently unstable (Hansen, 2006, pp. 20-1; Hansen, 2011, p. 361).

This poststructuralist view of language is subsequently expanded to all social practices, including security – security does not exist prior to but *in* language as a discursive practice (cf. Walt, 1991). This allows poststructuralism to meet one of its principle aims in the realm of security studies: to broaden the understanding of 'security' (see Buzan & Hansen, 2009, cf. Knudsen, 2001; Shah, 2010). Importantly, poststructuralists attempt to challenge the widespread understanding of security as purely 'national security' by exposing the structures of security discourses in a wider array of issues (e.g. see Sjøstedt, 2008; Vuori, 2010).

Thus, all poststructuralist thought is based on the notion that security should be analysed as a discursive practice that is simultaneously also a political practice, whereas there is no clear division between the two (Hansen, 1997, p. 376). Deriving from the linguistic roots of poststructuralist thought is the general idea that security should be

seen as a speech act (see Huysmans, 2011). As Wæver (1995a, p. 55) notably states, ‘/.../ security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act’. Thus, by ‘speaking security’ something is done, just like in betting or promising (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 26; see also Austin, 2000). Nonetheless, it is hereby important to keep in mind that in order to ‘speak security’, in other words to transform something into being a security issue, one does not necessarily need to pronounce the word ‘security’ – the mechanisms can work in a more subtle and sophisticated way and still lead to the same result. Moreover, there can be several political reasons for not pronouncing the word. Most often, the state gets to articulate what is seen as a ‘real threat’. Therefore, security practices are often a part of political and material struggles within the political elite. (Hansen, 1997, pp. 376-8)

Nevertheless, poststructuralism does not completely deny the realist view according to which ‘security’ is necessary for the state, it simply understands this necessity differently from the realist perspective. Contrary to the traditional understanding of security, according to which a state has to be protected from the external threats, Campbell (1992, p. 55) argues that states *need* ‘threats’ because their identities depend on them. In other words, threats and insecurity are not just potential ways of undermining the state, they also constitute it (Buzan et al, 1998; Hansen, 2006; cf. Balzacq, 2005; Floyd, 2010). Nonetheless, whilst more positivist perspectives often see ‘security’ as something positive, poststructuralists ask whether this is always true (e.g. Aradau, 2004; cf. Roe, 2012). They suggest that all issues do not need to be securitised – possibly there are other means of dealing with them. Instead of a further securitisation of issues, poststructuralists propose their occasional desecuritisation which means moving the issues farther from the realm of security, into the realm of politics. (Wæver, 1995; cf. Roe, 2012; see also Mälksoo, 2015)

Whilst poststructuralism has often been very critical of other, more positivist approaches, its basic principles have continuously been an object of critique. For instance, poststructuralism has been criticised for the lack of connection with ‘reality’ and the inability to distinguish between real and false/perceived threats that might subsequently be mistreated or ignored (Hansen, 1997, pp. 382-4). Nonetheless, the fact that the threats are constructed through discursive practices does not imply that these should be treated as ‘false’ (ibidem) – poststructuralism does not deny the existence of

the 'material', it just affirms the material character of every discursive structure (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 108). What it does deny, though, is the existence of an 'extra-discursive', 'objective' social reality. Therefore, it is mistaken to claim that poststructuralism is an ideational enterprise (Wæver, 2002, p. 22). Also, interestingly enough the poststructuralist approach to security has been criticised for using radical othering in terms of opposing itself to 'traditional approaches', whereas the approach claims to aim at exposing such practices (Miller, 2010, p. 645).

Despite the significant amount of criticism (but also thanks to it), it is a useful and elaborate approach to security issues for several reasons. Instead of putting the emphasis on 'objective' and 'external' variables or mixing discursive with 'real', the approach works exclusively within the discursive field and elucidates the discursive structure of security practices. This helps us to understand how and why we understand security in a particular way and attribute specific meanings to it. Moreover, a closer analysis reveals how cases that appear to be very different, to the extent of confrontational relationship based on radical otherness, actually have very similar discursive structures. In addition, another advantage of poststructuralist perspective to security is that it can make politicians and academics aware of the choice they make when they place something into the security realm, that is 'speak security' – security (threat) is not an objective matter, but rather a way to frame a specific issue. Understanding how the national security of one's own state and those of the others are constructed contributes to deliberately creating adequate policies.

2.2. DECONSTRUCTING THE LANGUAGE OF SECURITY

This study relies on the securitisation theory as a tool to unlock the national security discourses and show how their threats are constructed vis-à-vis the national identities they articulate. This section aims to discuss the development and previous applications of the securitisation theory.

As is widely known, the term was coined by Ole Wæver and initially developed by the so-called Copenhagen school. The introductory section of this chapter briefly pointed out how the poststructuralist understanding of the construction of a security issue (a threat) is strongly linked to the speech act theory (see also Huysmans, 2011; cf. Balzacq, 2005), but did not explain the exact ways in which the process functions. In fact, by the act of 'speaking security', a particular issue is highlighted as something

extraordinarily important and placed into an area where extraordinary means can be used, that is, securitised. Framing an issue in security terms means that it is presented as a point of no return – it implies that if the issue is not given full priority at once, then 'we will not be here to tackle the other more mundane matters' (Wæver, 1996, p. 108). The presentation of a specific issue as a security issue implies that it is a matter of 'survival' – if the Self does not act immediately against the threat, it will be 'too late'. This demonstrates the self-referentiality of security discourses: instead of acting upon a 'real threat', there must be a successfully constructed threat that has to be tackled by 'us', by the Self. Nonetheless, securitisation is not a one way street – it contains the party that securitises, or speaks security, but the act is complete only when accepted by the audience. In addition, there is always a referent object – the object that is presented as being threatened (which is very often the state) (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 32-7).

One of the principal aims of this theoretical framework has been to give way to a broader understanding of security since it allows to conceptualise security in other terms than the traditional 'military' or 'state security' view. Indeed, the theory has well contributed to the spillover of 'security' into realms and disciplines other than security studies. Just to give a few examples, it has been applied in order to research the resets of the Atomic Scientists' so-called Doomsday Clock (Vuori, 2010), organised crime (Stritzel, 2012), migration (Kaya, 2012), HIV and AIDS (McInnes & Rushton, 2011; Sjøstedt, 2008). Its applications have also extended to the realm of energy security (Christou & Adamides, 2013), discrimination of minorities (Olesker, 2014) and environmental security (Stetter et al., 2011).

However, at the same time, the theory has provoked intense debates and as a result, there is an extensive body of meta-theoretical literature on the concept itself and its applications, some stemming from explicit critique, some expanding the concept and its usage. For instance, it has been questioned whether securitisation should always be depicted as a negative issue and a question has been raised as to the normative aspects of securitisation (Floyd, 2011). Securitisation has been criticised for being too narrow (McDonald, 2008), for underestimating the central concept of the 'audience' (Balzacq, 2005) and for being unable to tackle new emerging security issues (Aradau, 2006). Nonetheless, most of the critique has also included or led to solutions and responses, further extending the concept and the theory. Thus, one can say that securitisation has

offered a remarkably long-lasting terrain for academic debate, which is still ongoing.

As already pointed out, this study uses securitisation theory as a methodological tool in its more 'traditional' sense, which in my view is particularly useful to make sense of and elucidate the main referent objects that the national security discourses articulate.

2.3. LINKING SECURITY AND IDENTITY

In this section, I conceptualise the central concepts of identity and national security in order to further outline the preliminary link between the two and propose a number of analytical categories applied in the empirical chapter of this thesis.

2.3.1. THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY IN POSTSTRUCTURALISM

This subsection discusses the concept of (national) identity by drawing upon constructivist and poststructuralist literature on the issue. Particularly, it outlines the features that are characteristic of the poststructuralist approach that underlies this study. It can be seen as an introduction to the subsection on national security that follows, since national security and identity are presented as intertwined in the analysis.

The role of identity in the IR discipline varies depending on the theoretical framework adopted in analysis (Aydin-Düzgit, 2013, pp. 524-6). While it is considered to be rather marginal in realism and liberalism, it is central in poststructuralist and constructivist works (*ibidem*). As Sjöstedt states (2013), since the publications of influential constructivist works on identity and security (e.g. Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1996), identity has been viewed as one of the key concepts in constructivist accounts on international security issues. In fact, identity concerns the way actors perceive themselves and others (Wendt, 1999). Identity constructions have been viewed as determining states' interests and security policies (Sjöstedt, 2013, pp. 147-8).

Discussions of the concept of identity rarely overlook the extensive work of Alexander Wendt. The core idea of his work is that identities are not given but transformed, and also sustained, through intersubjective processes (Wendt 1996, 1999; see also Zehfuss, 2001). Moreover, identities provide the basis for interests (Wendt, 1992). Thus, the 'anarchy' of the international system depends on the conceptions of the security actors have and on how they construct their identities in relation to others (Zehfuss, 2001, pp. 319-21). Nonetheless, the concept of identity in the Wendtian sense

is seen as rather problematic (Zehfuss, 2001; Epstein, 2013, cf. Jackson, 2001). Some of the relevant critique stems from Wendt's conceptualisation of identity is multifaceted and interestingly also contains the 'corporate' aspect of identity which is considered to be 'exogenously given' (Wendt, 1999, p. 328; Zehfuss, 2001, pp. 320-3).

As Epstein (2013, pp. 504-5) argues, identity provided constructivism with the possibility to loosen the givens of rationalism, but at the same time assumes a poststructuralist perspective and critiques Wendt's undoubtedly relevant position for perceiving identity as a 'given', thus falling back onto the naturalist model in terms of identity. In Wendt's work states are seen as natural, this in turn guarantees their 'realness'. Instead of a search for universals, a more poststructuralist view of identity conceptualises it as completely contingent.

In fact, poststructuralists argue against a conceptualisation of identity as a variable in foreign policy, since identity is 'constitutive' of foreign policy (Campbell, 1992; Hansen, 2006; Aydin-Düzgit, 2013). Nonetheless, the argument against causality (cf. Guzzini, 2011) does not imply a lack of structure – just like language, identities are highly structured and at the same time inherently unstable (Hansen, 2006, pp. 20-1). They are constantly (re)constructed in discourse, whereas language is seen as constitutive of social reality (Aydin-Düzgit, 2013, p. 525). Furthermore, identities are ontologically interlinked with foreign policies (Hansen, 2006, p. 21). While identities are articulated as a legitimisation for the policies proposed, they are also (re)produced through these very articulations in discourse (Hansen, 2006, pp. 21- 6). Also, particular state identities are constructed and positioned vis-à-vis one another through foreign policies – this constructs a particular reality where certain policies become possible (Doty, 1993, p. 305). Importantly, poststructuralist security studies has analysed the connection between security and the construction of national identity and shown how security is one of the most important practices through which states construct their identity (Hansen, 1997, p. 375).

While social constructivist argue that identities are not necessarily constructed through difference, but also have a pre-social corporate aspect to them, poststructuralists conceptualise identity as always relational, i.e. constructed through difference. Derrida argues that language is a system of differential signs and meaning is created through a number of juxtapositions (Derrida, 1978). Identity is seen to be created in the same way,

through two simultaneous processes – the positive process of linking and the negative process of differentiation (Hansen, 2006, pp. 18-21). For instance, security practices contribute to constructing a national Self and point out the difference between itself and the Other (Campbell, 1992, p. 55, see also Neumann, 1996). Nonetheless, it is also suggested that the conversion of difference into otherness by established identities should be problematised (Connolly, 1991) – one should abstain from concluding too easily that the only relationship of otherness is radical and consider other forms of difference (Hansen, 1997, p. 390). For instance, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, pp. 127-34) suggest a distinction between the logic of equivalence that divides the discursive space into two clear camps and the logic of difference that simply serves to structure social space. Therefore, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Other does not always take radical forms, as it did, for example, during the Cold War in which the security practices operated according to the logic of equivalence (Hansen, 1997, p. 391; see also Milliken, 2011; Doty, 2006) In other words, antagonisms are not seen as the main source of meaning – on the contrary, simple dichotomies are not very informative, it is rather differentiated systems of difference that should be preferred (Wæver, 2002, p. 24).

Thus, although this thesis does not state that the link between national identity and security policy as causal, it does attempt to outline the 'positive' processes of linking and the 'negative' processes of differentiation in each discourse, as well as discuss the levels of radicalism of these processes.

2.3.2. THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

In this thesis, I have chosen to concentrate on a specific security discourse – that of national security. The concept is characterised by a strong symbolic meaning and has powerfully been highlighted in the political discourse during the Ukrainian crisis. As already mentioned in the previous section, poststructuralist security studies see the concept of national security as rather complicated and problematic. In effect, a characteristic suggestion of poststructuralism is that national security should not be idealised (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26) Nonetheless, in case of a valid conceptualisation, it is suggested that foreign and security policy can be explained by a structural model of national discourses (Wæver, 2002). I will further outline a conceptualisation of 'national security' applied in the context of this study.

First, as Walker (1990) points out, the meaning of security is tied to historically

specific forms of political community – national security has achieved a prerogative as *the* concept of security. Of course, this does not imply that the state is the only possible kind of political community that can 'have security', but it is still important to note that due to historical reasons, in the current context 'security' is most often linked to 'the state'. Moreover, as Lene Hansen (2006, p. 34) notes, 'the underpinning of the concept of 'national security' is a particular form of identity construction – one tied to the sovereign state and articulating radical form of identity – and a distinct rhetorical and discursive force which bestows power as well as responsibility on those speaking within it' (see also Campbell, 1992). Thus, in addition to being connected to identity, the concept of national security is closely linked to that of sovereignty. Sovereignty, on the other hand, is usually seen as the ultimate test for the state. (Wæver, 1996, pp. 115-20; see also Wæver 1995b; cf. Werner & de Wilde 2001) Furthermore, the identity – foreign policy linkage is sealed by a focus on security (in the sense of high politics) (Wæver 2002, p. 26), which makes security discourses particularly useful for studying the link between national identity and foreign policy.

The concept of security is most often used when referring to the nation state. In my opinion, Wæver's (1996) analysis reveals an interesting point that is of high (social) relevance in the context of this study: namely, he argues that the distinction between state and nation is usually not reflected upon – 'national security' is simply the common name for the 'security of the state'. While this difference has been widely noted and addressed in academia, as I further show, this does not always seem to be the case in 'everyday' political discourse. Moreover, Wæver suggests that when we consider the concept of 'national security' (or more specifically, state security), it becomes evident that the 'state' and the 'security' are inseparable in the concept – they are already present in each other. However, Wæver (*ibidem*) further argues that the confusion between 'state' and 'nation' in 'national security' can be avoided by distinguishing between the securitising actor and the referent object. He points out that keeping this distinction in mind can be useful, for instance, in showing how certain regimes point at 'the security of the state', when in reality the regime itself is threatened.

The poststructuralist approach therefore suggests that one should judge whether the nation or the state is seen as the referent object. In addition, Wæver (2002, pp. 22) argues that many IR theories fail to explain 'in a systematic way – beyond historical

narrative – why the same cultural and historical background can sustain highly contradictory foreign policies’. Thus, poststructuralist approach can be seen as a suitable perspective to achieve a shift towards more fully respecting the contingent, self-producing meaning systems of different actors.

In order to provide a clearer distinction between the different ‘securities’ of a state or a nation and an explanation to ‘highly contradictory foreign policies’, the important concepts of ontological security and mnemonical security have been introduced. The idea of ontological security suggests that in addition to physical security, or the security of the ‘body’, i.e. the territory, of the state, states also seek ontological security, i.e. the security of Self. Thus, states seek security in routinising their relationships with others. This, in turn, may lead to the possibility of conflict between physical and ontological security – for the sake of maintaining the ontological security of routine, states may neglect their physical security, i.e. these two are not directly connected. (Mitzen, 2006) Mnemonical security can be seen as an extension and supplementation of the ontological security theory in IR. It deals with the securitisation of historical memory as a means of securing certain ‘memories’ and delegitimising others. In other words, mnemonical security is ‘the idea that distinct understandings of the past should be fixed in public remembrance and consciousness in order to buttress an actor’s stable sense of self as the basis of its political agency’ (Mälksoo, 2015, p. 2).

As to its location in the exterior-interior dichotomy, ‘national security’ can be seen as located on the very border of the national and the international. Buzan and Wæver (2003) suggest that due to the inherent nature of security dynamics, national security should not be seen as self-contained – at the regional level, national securities of the states are closely enough united and cannot be separated from each other. Thus, the national and the regional levels should be studied together in order to understand the security concerns of states. Moreover, usually there is more security interaction between neighbouring states and, hence, regional security level is characterised by durable patterns of amity and enmity and power relations that provide ground for a meaningful analysis.

Hence, I find it useful to apply in this study, with some modifications, the concept of layered discursive structure suggested by Wæver (2002), in order to group security issues in the empirical chapter. One of the advantages of the layered structure is that it

can specify change within continuity (Wæver, 2002, p. 31). The central categories of such layered structure are nation/state and Europe, it stems from the presumption that the 'national' cannot be separated from the 'international' and therefore these two levels should be studied together (cf. Bull, 1977). Thus, the layered framework does not suggest that distinct discourses are located on either of the levels, but simultaneously on both. I believe that this approach is particularly useful for an analysis of national security discourses in the context of the Ukrainian crisis that has brought forth articulations concerning European security system as well as explicit articulations on national security (which are very difficult to separate).

The reason for selecting state/nation and Europe as central categories is that these are the forms the 'we' take (Wæver, 1990, cf. 1992). Thus, the advantage of addressing discourses through state/nation is that they turn out to be particularly useful 'lenses of identity' through which to enter the European debates in specific national contexts. (Wæver, 2002, pp. 24-5) The analysis is thus focused not simply on 'who' we are, but on the ways one conceives this 'we' through the articulation of different layers of identity in complex constellations of competition and mutual definition. (ibidem) Also, it is necessary to keep in mind that the first layer consists of the basic constellation of state and nation – the question as to how the two are tied together should be asked in order to better understand the 'European level' (ibidem). The structure of this study emanates from the presumption that in all cases selected for the analysis, there is a 'national' and a 'European' level that can be seen as intertwined. I am well aware that when applying this approach, the Russian case may seem problematic at first glance, especially compared to the other two countries that are members of the European Union. Nonetheless, I argue that if Europe is conceptualised as a common geographical space of Russia and the countries of the EU (that is, the main focus is not put on the EU or Europe as a political community) where, importantly, the Ukrainian crisis takes place, the European level of analysis brings more substance to the analysis of national security discourses. This choice is also reflected by the structure of the empirical part of the present thesis.

2.3.3. LINKING THE CONCEPTS

To start off, I briefly summarise the main points concerning the link between security and identity. First, identities are ontologically interlinked with policies (Hansen, 2006,

p. 21). While identities are articulated as a legitimisation for the policies proposed, they are also (re)produced through these very articulations in discourse (ibid., pp. 21- 6). As already pointed out, security is one of the principle practices through which states construct their identity (Hansen, 1997, p. 375). At the same time, identity is constructed not simply through asserting what the Self is through the positive process of linking, but simultaneously through the negative process of differentiation (Hansen, 2006, pp. 18-21). In other words, it is secured by drawing borders between inside and outside, asserting who or what is the enemy. At the same time, one would be mistaken to state that identity needs to be secured and be free of threats – it is actually almost the other way around. Namely, in order to strengthen the sense of Self, a national identity needs threats to persist and reaffirm itself.

The empirical part aims to go beyond analysing the discourses merely content-wise and simply comparing 'the surfaces' in order to elucidate their underlying structural patterns. Thus, I look at a number of structural tendencies through which a national Self, but also the Other, is constructed. This means that while two discourses may seemingly present opposite views, the structural tendencies beneath the surface can actually be the same. The tendencies are as follows: polarisation, neutrality, protagonisation, antagonisation and historisation.

Most evidently, discourses reflect different degrees of polarisation between Self and Other. The presence of polarisation refers to a logic of equivalence, rather than that of simple difference – more polarised discourses suggest that identity construction is based on a distinction between positive and negative parties, rather than just pointing to differences in a more neutral manner. In the official security discourses, the Self is usually placed on the positive side of the axis and its policies and positions are thereby legitimised. Nonetheless, in other, more 'political' realms, and especially in marginal and oppositional discourse, the Self may well be placed on the negative side of the spectrum.

Neutrality can be seen as the opposite of polarisation, a lack of thereof. In case of neutrality, which almost never manifests itself in a complete sense, a discourse does not distinguish between negative and positive entities. While a more neutral discourse may draw attention to negative and positive tendencies situation-wise – for instance, military presence may be seen as negative –, it abstains from pointing at specific states

or other entities as directly positive or negative. Thus, in case of neutrality, a discourse reflects a logic of difference rather than the logic of equivalence, whereas the positive process of linking prevails in identity construction.

The degree of protagonisation and antagonisation in the discourses can be seen as directly linked to the presence of polarisation. Protagonisation reflects a high level of (symbolic) involvement of the Self in a particular issue. It implies presenting the security issues explicitly through the lens of (national) Self, even if a particular threat logically concerns another state, thus personalising the issues and making the Self central in the discourse. Protagonisation often involves heroisation, an attribution of (often inherent) positive characteristics to Self, that in its radical form are presented as symbolic and on the verge of being absolute. Antagonisation, on the other hand, concerns depicting a specific Other not simply as a potential threat to, but a straightforward enemy of Self, and often accompanies strong forms of polarisation. Thus, it can be seen as a particularly intense manifestation of othering.

Historisation can be seen as an auxiliary discursive tool that serves to enhance and legitimise processes of linking or differentiation in identity construction. Thus, meanings attributed to Self and Other are fortified/reaffirmed through historical links that serve as 'proof' or confirmation of a certain meaning. For instance, it can emphasise an antagonisation through extending an enemy image to the past, often to the extent of 'eternalising' it or enhance a protagonisation by comparing threats projected towards another state to those that a past Self has faced. Its wider aim is to legitimise certain mnemonical perspectives, whereas delegitimising others.

To sum up, I look into the above tendencies in the empirical chapters to make sense of how security discourses are constructed and how national identity and security policies are linked within them. Hereby, it is necessary to keep in mind that these tendencies structure the social world in the national security discourses, whereas discursive structures simultaneously condition possible policies, legitimise them and reproduce particular kinds of identities.

2.4 POSTSTRUCTURALIST DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

This research project applies poststructuralist discourse analysis as the main method. While discourse analysis has become rather popular in social sciences, especially since the late 1980s, the concept has various definitions and different applications (Jorgensen

& Phillips, 2002, p. 1). Therefore, it is necessary to bring clarity to what is meant by discourse analysis in the context of this study. A particularly important aspect to keep in mind is that in discourse analysis, theory and method are strongly intertwined (ibid., p. 4).

Most of the discursive approaches are similar in terms of their social constructionist premise that stems from structuralist and poststructuralist linguistics (ibid., p. 3). Namely, in most of the cases the word 'discourse' implies the idea that language is structured according to various patterns that people's articulations follow in specific domains of social life. Thus, it could generally be defined as 'a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world). (ibid., p. 1)

In this thesis, I apply the perspective offered by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) that is considered to be the 'purest' poststructuralist approach to discourse. It is based on the poststructuralist idea that discourse is constitutive of the social world in meaning. Due to the instability of language, this meaning can never be permanently fixed. Thus, discourses are constantly being transformed through contact with other discourses, through a discursive struggle. (see also Torfing, 2005)

Poststructuralist approaches to discourse are especially keen to cite Foucault's definition of discourse, which suggests that discourse is 'a system of dispersion between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices' that form 'a regularity' (Foucault, 2004). Also, as Jens Bartelson (1995) puts it: 'a discourse is a system for the formation of statements.' Thus, one may conclude that discourse analysis looks for the rules that establish what can be said and what not. According to Wæver (2002, p. 29), discourse forms a system which is made up of a layered constellation of key concepts. Moreover, he suggests that it is not just an empirical registration of a coincidental pattern, but also the other way around: as Foucault insisted, discourse is the precondition for statements.

As for the empirical aspect, Wæver (2002, pp. 26-27) stresses that poststructuralist discourse analysis works on public texts – in this study those representing the official discourse have been specifically chosen. He further claims that poststructuralist discourse analysis does not attempt to guess the hidden thoughts or motives of the actors, but quite the contrary – rigorously staying at the level of discourse becomes a huge methodological advantage in policy realms where much is

hidden, such as foreign or security policy. Thus, the main interest is not in what is really believed by decision makers or the whole population, but in the codes that are used when actors relate to each other. (ibidem)

Furthermore, it is necessary to be conscious about not sliding between discourse and perceptions/thoughts. In this way, Wæver (2002, p. 27) suggests, what is often presented as a weakness of discourse analysis (how can one know that what is said is really meant and is not only a rhetoric?) can be turned into a methodological strength when one sticks to discourse as discourse.

In the context of this study, it is crucial to stress that according to poststructuralism, structures within discourse do not simply establish what can be articulated or not, but also condition possible policies – interests cannot be based outside of a discursive structure (ibid., p. 30). In a specific political culture there are certain basic concepts, figures, narratives and codes, and only on the basis of these codes are interests constructed and transformed into policies. A structured analysis of domestic arena can thus explain and elucidate the structure of foreign and security policies and also outline what conditions them. As Wæver (2002, p. 26) affirms, 'finding and presenting in a systematic way patterns of thought in a specific country will always be helpful in making the debates and actions of that country more intelligible to other observers. /.../ Explaining how political thought makes sense in a specific country makes it easier for foreign observers in particular to understand the country.' Thus, although not every single decision fits the pattern to be expected from the structures used in the analysis, 'there is sufficient pressure from the structures that policies do turn within a certain, specified margin onto the tracks to be expected'. (ibid., p. 28)

2.5. RESEARCH DESIGN

Lene Hansen (2006, p. 65) suggests that in order to make full use of poststructuralist discourse analysis one has to make the following important choices when outlining a research project:

- 1) whether it is more profitable to stick to official discourse or to expand the scope to include 'the political opposition, the media and marginal discourse;
- 2) whether one needs to examine the discourse of one Self or multiple Selves;

- 3) whether one should select one particular moment or a longer development;
- 4) whether it is necessary to study one specific event/issue or multiple events;
- 5) which material should be selected for a reliable analysis (see next section).

In order to meet the aims of this research project, I have chosen to conduct a discourse analysis that concentrates on official discourse. Since 'national security' is the central concept of this analysis, I assume that 'the state' (but also 'the nation') is the referent object of securitisation. Hence, as Wæver notes, the securitising move is made most probably by political elites – security matters are a question of emergency and survival.

Second, I have opted for a multiple-Self research design. Again – I believe this fits the research aims and helps to elucidate the patterns of difference and similarity in the discursive structures of the cases. As Lene Hansen points out, the cases should be chosen so that it is 'politically and analytically pregnant' – thus, the cases can be selected according to what is the most common discourse or what are the most radical ones. I would say the selection for this study meets both options: at first glance, the cases represent in a rather radical way a wider array of national security discourses (in Europe) related to the Ukrainian crisis.

The choice of the cases has also been motivated by their relevance in terms of the reaction to the Ukrainian crisis, but most importantly, it follows the logic of MSDS/MDSS research design. The analysis is based on the presumption that two of the chosen cases – Estonia and Finland – are usually considered to be quite similar, whereas the Russian case significantly differs from the former two. Both Estonia and Finland are relatively small states in terms of their territory, population and economy, whereas Russia is one of the biggest states in the world. Both Estonia and Finland are relatively young as states, are members of the EU and are neighbours of Russia, whereas Russia is not a member of the EU and has a long history of statehood. Nevertheless, the discursive structures of the cases in national security matters in the context of the Ukrainian crisis do not follow the same outline. Although at first glance, there might be more content-related similarities between Finland and Estonia, the analysis points to structural similarities and differences. The structures of national security discourses of Finland and Estonia differ significantly, moreover, Estonian security discourse appears to share more similarities with its Russian counterpart. The analysis aims to discuss these similarities and differences in more detail.

Third, in temporal terms, this study has been designed as a one-moment study that concentrates on the period Ukrainian crisis. As Lene Hansen (2006, p. 65) notes, much of the poststructuralist discourse analysis has focused on analysing striking moments such as conflicts and wars. I argue that the Ukrainian crisis, a major conflict that takes place very near (physically and symbolically) to the chosen countries, could in a rather radical way elucidate the underpinnings of the discursive structures of national security, and thus, makes an interesting temporal context for the study. Although the starting date of the crisis can be set to late autumn 2013 and it reached its peak in winter 2014 with the Crimean crisis, its prelude can be seen as dating back to August 2013. This has been taken into account when selecting the data.

Fourth, the term 'event' is rather broadly defined by Lene Hansen – she suggests that a policy issue is usually chosen as the event. This study can thus be established as a one-moment study that concentrates on national security discourse and in a way, but only through the lens of national discourse and as a part of it, also on the European security discourse.

Thus, one may conclude that the research has been designed by reflecting upon all the possible choices proposed by Lene Hansen and therefore meets the basic criteria for a viable research design for a poststructuralist security analysis.

2.6. DATA COLLECTION

This section explains the collection of data for the research project. Lene Hansen (2006, p. 74) stresses that poststructuralist discourse analysis is characterised by an epistemological and methodological preference of the study of primary texts. In the case of official discourse, such texts can include official statements, speeches and interviews.

As a methodological principle, it is necessary to select the material according to two main considerations (Hansen, 2006, pp. 73-4):

- 1) the majority of texts should be taken from the time under study;
- 2) data collection should include key texts that function as nodes within the intertextual web of debate, but also a larger body of general material that sets a basis for a more quantitative view of the dominant discourses.

Furthermore, if the project concentrates on the time of study (as opposed to historical material), the material should correspond to three specific criteria: it should include clear articulations, be widely read and attended to and, finally, have formal authority (*ibidem*).

I have aimed to take all of these principles and criteria into account when selecting the data for this research project. The data has been taken from the official sources, more specifically from the presidential and governmental websites (Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers). In some cases, the websites provide keywords ('security' or 'national security') according to which respective data could easily be found. Nonetheless, that is not so in all cases – thus, in order to give more substance to the selection I conducted a 'manual search' in all cases, going through the lists of data and identifying data that concerned national security or the situation in Ukraine. In addition, the 'manual search' was also motivated by the idea of the Copenhagen School according to which the word 'security' does not explicitly need to be expressed in order to make something a security issue. The focus was set on policy speeches – according to Lene Hansen (2006, pp. 74-5), these are considered to be the most relevant and fruitful documents to analyse in terms of clear articulations, wide attention and formal authority. Also, priority was given to interviews published on official websites – interview is a good genre to explain one's policy positions. Although analysing the interviews published in the (unofficial) media could be problematic with regard to the focus on official discourse, I assume that publication on the official website transforms interviews into viable data reliably representing official discourse.

While official discourse is also transmitted through other media, I have deliberately opted for a more strict selection for several reasons. First, the information published on the official websites can in my opinion be considered to be "the purest" and thus the most reliable in terms of representing the official discourse. Other media sources can often distort official articulations by omitting parts of them, adding comments or changing the wording. Although other sources are important in terms of disseminating official discourses, they often draw on positions, press releases and speeches that are (also) published on the official websites. In addition, as already said, many of the interviews given to the press are later published on the official websites.

Altogether, the data set consists of 218 texts, which in my view is enough to also

provide the analysis with a more 'quantitative' quality, suggested by Lene Hansen. Nonetheless, the division of this material along the lines of the cases is somewhat problematic: Russia – 129, Estonia – 56, Finland – 33. This is due to the fact that Russian official sources provide a much larger set of data concerning national security. Nonetheless, the analysis shows that most of these texts are rather repetitive – as are those concerning the Finnish and the Estonian case. The nodal points and principal articulations of the texts can be identified rather precisely without much effort. Thus, from that I would conclude that the data sets may not be equal in terms of quantity, but they are in quality, as all of them give a substantial and rather stable insight to the structures of the national security discourses of the three countries. Moreover, the data sets are not perfectly equal in terms of their inner division. The main difference concerns the addresses of national Defence Ministers – while the website of the Finnish Defence Ministry provides a number of official addresses, its Estonian and Russian counterparts do not (only brief press releases are provided). Nevertheless, since discourse analysis concentrates on published material, the texts, and does not aim to provide an analysis of what the sources 'secretly think', I do not see this as a major deficiency, given that a country's official discourse consists of what is publicly available.

3. CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL-LEVEL THREATS

This chapter tackles the first level of the model proposed for foreign policy analysis by Wæver (2002). It attempts to identify the principle referent objects of threats that are constructed as directed towards the state or nation itself. Simultaneously, I discuss the relationship between ‘nation’ and ‘state’, as well as other processes of linking in constructing the Self of the discourses. Also, I address the question of how the Others are constructed in the discourses and assess whether the discourses rather tend to use a logic of equivalence or that of difference. The chapter is divided into three sections, according to the main security issues, all traditionally seen as characteristic of a (nation) state: right to self-determination, territorial integrity and the non-intervention.

3.1. RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The question of a group’s or a nation’s right to self-determination is one of the central issues of national security discourses in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. Both the Maidan movement and the Crimean case have provoked debates on the matter. I argue that Russia and Estonia approach this principle from a more fervid point of view than Finland, thus reaffirming and legitimising their polarised identity constructions.

In all security discourses, the most central issue regarding a nation’s or an ethnic group’s right to self-determination appears to be the question of Crimea and Maidan. Also, this issue is a good example for demonstrating the discrepancy between how different discourses ‘seem to be’ on the surface and how similar their underlying structures are. For Estonia, the most obvious referent object is the pro-European Ukraine that is largely connected to the Maidan protests and is seen as the entity whose right to self-determination is threatened: *‘People on Maidan died due to sniper bullets because they wanted their state to assume a European direction.’* (Paet 5.03.2014)

The Finnish position largely agrees with that of the EU and that of Estonia in terms of the positive meaning attributed to the Maidan movement, but at the same time tries to explain and understand Russia’s response to the Maidan movement:

‘The Euro-Maidan movement was mainly a genuine popular uprising representing ordinary people tired with the old system – people demanding something more accountable and better instead.’ (Tuomioja 19.11.2014)

'From Moscow, the prospective agreement with the EU looked like a step taken towards Europe and its social model and sphere of interest, and therefore seemed against the interests of Russia. So, when Ukraine's development took this turn via the Maidan protests, Russia drew its own conclusions and acted accordingly.' (Niinistö 10.11.2014)

In the Russian case, the referent objects are rather connected to the South East of Ukraine, the Russian-speaking population of the country and especially Crimea, whereas the Maidan movement is seen as resulting in a rise to power of far-right forces that jeopardise the right of minorities: *'Those so-called 'authorities' launched the scandalous law project concerning a revision of the language policy that directly repressed the rights of national minorities.'* (Putin 18.03.2014)

Thus, it first seems that Estonian and Finnish articulations are similar, while Russian discourse swaps meanings attributed to the parties and seems to demonstrate an opposite view. A closer look at the deeper structural patterns, on the other hand, reveals a different picture. Despite of seeming difference on the surface, Russian and Estonian discourses share a number of important structural similarities. Both discourses are polarised – they appear to be based on the assumption that the events of the Ukrainian crisis can roughly be described as a struggle between two parties, one of which is 'right' and the other one 'wrong' in its entirety. Finland, on the other hand, abstains from such a clear polarisation based on antagonistic assumptions and opts for a view that stems from the logic of difference rather than that of equivalence (e.g. Tuomioja 19.11.2014; Niinistö 10.11.2014). Rather, it appears to maintain a rather neutral position and emphasises a necessity of reconciliation between the parties. Russia and Estonia, although at times asserting that the conflict must be stopped, are keen to underline that nations, or often 'the people', have a right to determine their own path and fight for their rights.

While Finland remains rather distant in terms of the issue, Estonia and Russia demonstrate a high degree of protagonisation. Russia and Estonia clearly identify their Self with the party they hold to be right (Eastern Ukraine and Maidan respectively) and draw a link between their Self and the situation. Also, it is important to note that protagonisation is enhanced by historisation in both cases. Estonia sees Ukraine as fighting for the freedom to determine its own political course and compares it to its own

struggles throughout the history, especially so with regard to the annexation of Crimea (Ilves 23.06.2014; Rõivas 13.06.2014). Moreover, it is interesting to note that ‘the enemy’ is the same in both cases, which seems to make the issue even more personal for Estonia.

Much like its Estonian counterpart sees Maidan, Russian national security discourse depicts the events in Crimea as the attempt of the Crimean people to express their will to determine their political course of preference (Putin 17.04.2014 (1)). In Russian national security discourse the Self is obviously identified with the Crimean issue and more widely with Eastern Ukraine (cf. Brudny & Finkel, 2011). Moreover, Crimea is clearly depicted as a(n inseparable) part of Russia’s (historical) Self (Putin 17.04.2014 (1); 9.05.2014 (2); see also Shevel, 2011). For instance, Vladimir Putin explicitly claims that Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia – thus, a threat towards Crimeans (that is, Russians), can by no means be overlooked (Putin 18.03.2014).

Nonetheless, it is important to note that in both discourses, the right to self-determination does not simply imply determining the political course of one’s preference, but the ‘correct’ course, which in the Estonian case is pro-European and in Russian case pro-Russian (e.g. see Putin 18.03.2014; Paet 5.03.2014), thus adding to the polarisation. For both Estonia and Russia, negative forces, as opposed to positive forces, do not have a right to self-determination – what ‘they’ stand for is considered to be wrong. Thus, ‘positive’ rules and rights only apply to the ‘positive’ parties. Hence, through this ‘normative’ aspect, the positive parties are injected with additional meaningfulness, they represent a broader spectrum of values and can be seen as symbols and carriers of positive meaning in the two discourses.

Similarly, although the negative parties of the conflict are more narrowly presented as ‘separatists’ in the Estonian discourse (e.g. Mikser 2.09.2014) and as ‘far-right’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘fascist forces’ in the Russian discourse (e.g. Putin 4.03.2014), they are injected with additional meaning and act as symbols representing a wider array of enemies, i.e. radical Others, in both discourses, thus enhancing polarisation and antagonisation in the discourses. The negative parties of the conflict are seen as representations/reincarnations of historical and present enemies by the two countries. For instance, Estonia does not even question the fact that Russia is backing the

separatist forces, or rather, the Estonian discourse identifies separatists with Russia, to the extent that instead of addressing the issue of separatists, the emphasis is rather put on foreign armed forces (e.g. Mikser 2.09.2014; Rõivas 24.09.2014). In Russian view, the ‘fascist’ Maidan forces and the ‘far-right’ government of Kiev are supported by the West, more specifically by the US (e.g. Putin 4.03.2014; 4.06.2014). Although Russia does not explicitly state that Ukraine has been invaded by foreign forces, it does point at the fact that the Kievan extremists are trained by the US forces who are situated in Ukraine (e.g. Lavrov 28.07.2014). In addition, while Estonia underlines that Crimea has been annexed by Estonia’s (the Self’s) historical enemy whose aggressive nature ‘is hardly anything new’ (Rõivas 24.09.2014), Russian discourse mirrors it by pointing at the ‘fascist’ or ‘nazist’ government of Kiev that has seized power and prefigures a security threat to the peace-loving Crimeans (Putin 18.03.2014).

At the same time, Finland does not appear to be preoccupied with the enemy image and the correctness/falseness of ‘the nature’ of the parties. Rather, it is worried about the about the conflict of interests between the parties. Moreover, it is concerned about the nature of the conflict, which has surpassed the ideational level and reached a ‘real’, armed-conflict-level (e.g. Niinistö 18.03.2014; 10.11.2014) that seems to be incompatible with Finnish discursive constructions of security. Indeed, it seems that Finland does not depict the events of the Ukrainian crisis as much as a threat to Ukraine’s right to self-determination, but rather to that of Europe as a whole – Europe is continuously articulated as a community of ‘peace’ and ‘cooperation’, threatened by the armed-conflict dynamics of the past, that were thought to have been surpassed a long time ago. Finland abstains from underlining the national aspect, but rather fears for the unity and peace within the continent. It fears that the security system of the EU can be further crippled by the crisis, and become an obstacle to Finland’s hopes of reinforcing the CSDP as an alternative to NATO. (e.g. Niinistö 29.04.2014; Stenlund 29.04.2014) Hence, for Finland the threat to self-determination is not directly projected towards some specific state, but rather to the European security system as a whole.

As for possible means to counter the threat, Russia and Estonia demand a solution from ‘the enemy’: the source of the threat is held responsible. In the Russian case it is the Ukrainian government that is obliged to provide more rights for the Russian-speaking population and abolish far-right and nationalist forces (e.g. Lavrov

13.02.2014; 30.03.2014). Estonian security discourse points at Russia as the party to be held responsible for hindering the self-determination of a pro-European Ukraine and subsequently the one that must provide solutions, e.g. guarantee the restitution of Crimea and withdrawal of troops from Eastern Ukraine (Ilves 6.06.2014). Additionally, possibly due to the high level of protagonisation, that is, almost making the Ukrainian issue 'our issue' by Estonia and Russia, from time to time the two discourses directly and indirectly suggest the necessity of personal intervention in the crisis (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014 (1); Putin 17.04.2014 (1)). Although Finland agrees that Russia, alongside Ukraine, is one of the parties that should take responsibility for providing a solution to the crisis, these claims are relatively mild, almost sympathetic, and do not contain any antagonisation (e.g. Stubb 3.09.2014). Moreover, Finland emphasises a need for an active dialogue between Ukraine and Russia (Stubb 12.03.2014), whereas Estonia rather advocates more radical measures such as punishing Russia via sanctions (Ilves 2.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014). Thus, while Finland prefers cooperation and peaceful dialogue as inclusive reconciliatory measures vis-à-vis Russia, its southern neighbour promotes (an almost absolute) exclusion and estrangement of the Enemy and denies the possibility of a peaceful reconciliation. The radical difference between the two is thus evident.

To conclude, Estonian and Russian discourses depict the issue of self-determination as more personal, whereas for Finland, it is a European issue rather than a national one. Russia and Estonia strongly polarise the issue and underline the inherent positivity and negativity of the parties, providing historical examples to justify their position. Although Finnish security discourse includes some mild polarisation, the articulations containing polarisation are balanced out with those that suggest a necessity for cooperation and reconciliation between 'positive' and 'negative' parties. Overall, Finland remains much more neutral than its Estonian and Russian counterparts.

3.2. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

This section aims to discuss another defining aspect of national sovereignty that emerges in all three security discourses: territorial integrity. As outlined in the previous chapter, the territory of a state is related to its 'physical' security. Thus, it is the palpable, well-defined, probably the most commonly emphasised aspect of the 'state' and usually considered to be of particularly high importance in security issues. The

question of territorial integrity has been quite acute in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, especially with regard to the annexation of Crimea by Russia. I further argue that in Russian and Estonian discourses, territorial security issues are not only seen as physical – for both, territory is a strong part of national identity and important in terms of reaffirming its Self. At the same time, I show that this is not the case with Finland, which remains relatively distanced as to territorial matters.

Both Estonian and Russian security discourses create a strong interlinkage between the nation (and its right to self-determination) and the territory, in other words, the discourses demonstrate an explicit sense of ownership of the territory of the relative state, to the extent that it becomes the territory of a nation, an integral part of national identity. At this point, it is perhaps useful to note that although in the Russian case, the question of nation and nationalism is infamously problematic, it seems to be rather uniform in terms of the Ukrainian crisis: all people(s) of Russia (and in some cases even all Russian-speakers) are presented as a part of the Russian nation (e.g. Putin 17.04.2014 (1)).

The Russian construction of the Crimean events is an almost perfect example of a successful securitisation. First, a historical area of Russia where compatriots reside is depicted as existentially threatened by an enemy whose terrifying nature is further augmented by historicisation. Thus, the mnemonical aspects of security enter the play. Namely, the enemy is far-right, or ‘fascist’. Moreover, as Russian authorities explain, due to the far-right regime, there is a serious threat of the historical Russian areas, symbols of Russian military glory, turning into NATO naval bases (Putin 17.04.2014 (1)). The level of protagonisation is obvious, whereas multidimensional acts of historicisation add cogency to the arguments. This, in turn, justifies the utilisation of extraordinary means to urgently counter the constructed threat. Subsequently to an ‘effective response’ to the threat, the overall security perception of the public is augmented. (see Hansen, 1997) Moreover, this is not just ‘some threat’, but a ‘real and tangible’ threat to a historical Russian territory that turns the classical narrative of a nation returning to its sacred ‘promised land’ upside down and mirrors it. In the Crimean case, a part of *homeland*, a sacred territory, returns to the nation:

’.../ Crimea and Sevastopol have returned to their homeland. /.../ The people living here strongly affirmed their will to be together with Russia. By doing so, they confirmed

their commitment to the historical truth and to the memory of our ancestors.' (Putin 9.05.2014 (3))

The previous passage suggests that 'the return of Crimea' is constructed not simply as the ultimate and most victorious example of the Ukrainian Russian-speaking population's self-determination. For Russia, Crimea is an integral part of its historical Self in its entirety, including its territory (e.g. Putin 18.03.2014; 17.04.2014 (1)). The return of Crimea is depicted as a manifestation of 'historical truth', thus serving to enhance mnemonic security. This suggests that Crimea is seen as a part of Russia that has been one all along, even while being officially part of the Ukrainian territory. At the same time, in Russian national security discourse Crimea is of utmost importance as the symbol of Russian military glory (Putin 26.06.2014) that was 'given away God knows why' (Putin 17.04.2014(1)). This once again confirms that for Russia, it is not only a triumph of the Crimeans' or Russian-speaking population's right to self-determination, but of Russians and Russia. Thus, it could possibly be one of the explanations for the interchangeable use of 'Russians' and 'Russian-speaking people' in the articulations that concern Crimea. In Russian discourse, the Self is utterly protagonised with regard to this issue.

Quite similarly to Russia, Estonian security discourse tends to link nation, territory and history and identifies to a certain point, although not as straightforward as Russia, with the Crimean issue. Whereas Russian security discourse claims to have perceived a threat to a historical Russian area, according to Estonian security discourse, Crimea is a part of Ukrainian territory: thus, the territorial integrity of Ukraine is threatened (e.g. Ilves 23.06.2014). As Russia points to historical enemies and personal experience, Estonia does the same. For instance, the President of Estonia has stated that in 1940 Estonians have experienced the same things that happened to Ukraine with reference to Crimea (Ilves 23.06.2014). Also, this aspect directly reaffirms the Estonian historical construction of Self and Other – 'annexation' is historically strongly connected to the Estonian 'Self' and to Russia as the enemy.

Although both Estonia and Finland use the term 'annexation' to describe Russia's actions in the peninsula (e.g. Ilves 23.06; Stenlund 29.04.2014), Finnish statements are characterised by a completely different degree of involvement/compassion and surely a different connotation. The following example

illustrates rather well the overall tone and intensity of the Finnish discourse concerning the Crimean matter:

'Finland has condemned Russia's actions both nationally and via the European Union. We have done so because of our values and our security. We know the history of our continent – we have seen enough of the justice of the stronger in Europe.' (Stubb 3.09.2014)

Finland calls Russia's actions 'justice of the stronger' that has been seen often enough in Europe, but does not resort to pointing out Russia's previous actions of the same character to illustrate its claims, nor does Finland use comparisons with other widely-condemned historical regimes or events. This is certainly not the case with Estonia that goes significantly further in condemning Russia's actions by repeatedly calling the annexation of Crimea an 'Anschluss' and Russia an aggressor (e.g. Ilves 24.09.2014; 14.11.2014). Also, the Estonian authorities point at the fact that the same excuse – a threat to compatriots abroad – was used by Hitler (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014):

Currently, over 80% of Russians support the annexation of Crimea via a military aggression, whereby the Anschluss of the territory is justified with the compatriots living there – exactly like in 1938, when Adolf Hitler annexed Sudetenland. (Ilves 2.09.2014 (1))

Whilst the weight of comparisons with Hitler's actions are most probably easily comprehensible to all European audiences, the question of compatriots gains even more relevance due to the Estonian context. Although the statement is not explicitly made at the official discursive level, using the word 'compatriots' gains troublesome resonance in the current Baltic context that is characterised by a high proportion of the Russian-speaking population (that is, 'compatriots'). The securitising move is enhanced by other articulations that include allusions to a possibility of Estonia facing the same fate as Ukraine (e.g. Ilves 23.06.2014; 2.09.2014 (1)). Interestingly, Ilves also emphasises the fact that a large part of the Russian population supports the country's unlawful actions, *'(m)oreover, antiliberal assaults of Western 'decadent tolerance', be it freedom of speech or the choice of partner, are gaining widespread support.'* (Ilves 2.09.2014 (1)) In a way, this can be seen as an expansion of the meaning of the term 'aggressor' – Russia is portrayed not simply as an aggressive and intolerant state, but an aggressive

state whose actions are backed by ‘its people’, thus making the *status quo* even more ‘hopeless’.

It is rather characteristic of Estonian national security discourse to merge the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ interchangeably when addressing security matters. Hence, similarly to what Russian security discourse reveals, this implies that territorial matters are not just connected to the state, but to the nation – a nation constitutes (and owns) the state. Due to the particularly strong, explicit and consistent linking of national identity and security matters in Estonian discourse, in the case of securitisation, territory ceases to be an administrative issue of the state, its meaning shifts and it becomes an issue of the nation, a question of national identity. Similarly to what the Russian security discourse reveals, there is a strong link between a nation’s right to self-determination and territorial issues in the Estonian security discourse. For Estonia, regardless of the fact that the Crimean population is mostly Russian(-speaking), Crimea is a Ukrainian territory and belongs to the Ukrainian nation (cf. the case of Ida-Virumaa in Estonia). As Estonian security discourse protagonises itself and historicises the Crimean issue, it becomes a question of Estonian national identity: the Ukrainian nation has been deprived of its territory, just like Estonia once was. On the other hand, this is also presented as a reminder to Self that threats still exist and serves as a legitimisation of the mnemonical security positions of Estonia. Moreover, merging nation and state in security matters also becomes clear through a recurrent use of ‘us’ to denote the whole nation in Russian and Estonian security discourses. The use of ‘us’ is much less frequent in Finnish discourse and does not refer as often to the Finnish state or nation, but to Europe or the EU. For instance, see the following examples:

*For **us** (the Western success-based values) are not enough. /.../ What is death? Death is terrible. No, together, even death is beautiful. /.../ This is where **our** we-feeling and family values stem from. Of course, **we** are less pragmatic, less calculating than representatives of other nations, but instead, **we** have a greater soul. (Putin 17.04.2014 (1))*

*Is **our** life here, **our** freedom worth defending and bringing sacrifices? Only **we** can answer this question. /.../ Yes, it is **our** country where **we** decide and make our own choices. For some, **we** have been to successful, too independent, too wilful, too*

*European, too non-Soviet. /.../ Now I ask: are **we** ready? Are **we** willing to put a greater effort into defending **our** freedom? (Ilves 23.06.2014)*

*It is clear that **we** have seen a harsh violation of collective and co-operative security in Europe. **Our** various institutionalized mechanisms have not been able to prevent the situation from escalating. /.../ Once the conflict has fully subsided – and I do hope that it will take place sooner rather than later – **we** must find ways to renew **our** commitments to common security in Europe. (Tuomioja 19.11.2014)*

To recap, in Russian and Estonian cases, the territorial issue of Crimea is strongly linked to national identity of the Self, an inherently personal one. This view is reaffirmed and enhanced by constantly pointing at mnemonical issues, providing examples from history to legitimise the positions. While Finland condemns Russia's actions in Crimea, it remains distant and abstains from protagonising itself in terms of the issue the issue, nor does it bring historical parallels.

3.3. PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION

This section discusses the threats to the principle of non-intervention with a state's internal affairs. I argue that in the more neutral Finnish discourse the principle is articulated as almost absolute, regarding all parties. In its Estonian and Russian polarised counterparts, on the other hand, it is suggested that the principle of non-intervention only applies to the negative parties, whereas the positive parties are allowed and must intervene. The issue is further expanded in the second section under the subsection concerning geopolitical threats.

In all three discourses, non-intervention with Ukrainian issues is possibly the most evident referent object in terms of non-intervention matters. Nonetheless, again, the Finnish case can be distinguished from the other two in terms of its neutrality: the principle of non-intervention with Ukrainian internal policies is presented as being on the verge of absolute. Although positions made by Finland express explicit concern about Russia's interference with Ukrainian domestic affairs, such as supporting the separatists (e.g. Stubb 3.09.2014; Tuomioja 27.03.2014), it is repeatedly underlined that Ukraine should make decisions on its own, without direct interference from the European Union or Russia (e.g. Stenlund 29.04.2014, Stubb 12.03.2014). As an illustration of this tendency, I suggest the following passage:

'Defining the future of Ukraine belongs to Ukraine itself. /.../ A meaningful dialogue between Russia and Ukraine must be established. Relations with the EU, as well as relations with Russia, will both be important for Ukraine, also in the future.' (Stenlund 29.04.2014)

The passage demonstrates rather well the neutrality of Finnish articulations, which is twofold: first, Ukraine is expected to tackle the issue on its own, without any external interference from the EU or Russia, and second, Ukraine is advised to try and maintain good relations with both, despite the events in Crimea.

Estonia and Russia clearly differ from Finland in terms of the lack of neutrality in their articulations. Again, both discourses demonstrate a clear polarisation. In Estonian discourse, unsurprisingly, Russia is depicted as a violator of the principle, whilst the West is portrayed as a necessary facilitator of positive developments in internal affairs (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014). In Russian discourse the roles have been exchanged: the West has been injected with a negative meaning and Russia with a positive one. The West is very often depicted as a supporter of 'extremists' in Ukraine (Lavrov 19.02.2014; Putin 4.06.2014), whereas Russia is seen as the main contributor to positive solutions. It is explicitly affirmed by the Russian authorities that the EU Association Agreement was aimed to 'drag' Ukraine into the EU's sphere of influence, whereas Russia supports protecting the rights of Ukraine to make its own decisions (Lavrov 13.02.2014). According to Estonian authorities, Russia has interfered with the European integration of Ukraine with the intention of keeping Ukraine in its sphere of influence, is encouraging and supporting separatist movements and has even started the Ukrainian crisis (Ilves 2.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014). This allows one to conclude that – once again – both cases point at the opposition between a positive party of the conflict and its negative counterpart. Moreover, the articulations in both discourses demonstrate that the principle of non-intervention only concerns the negative party, whereas the positive party has the right to, or even *should* intervene.

In addition, a high level of protagonisation of Self concerning non-intervention with Ukrainian internal affairs can be detected in both cases. For instance, see the following example:

'There is a war going on in Ukraine. It was started by a country whose border is just a few hundred kilometres away from Tallinn.' (Ilves 8.09.2014)

The President of Estonia retains it necessary to point out that the state that started a war in Ukraine is very near to Estonia. Despite the fact that Finland is also a neighbouring state of Russia, it does not make any concerned statements of such kind and limits itself to troublesomely pointing out the proximity of the conflict zone, while successfully maintaining its overall neutrality (e.g. Niinistö 10.11.2014). Estonia, on the other hand, directly emphasises ‘the threat’ coming from Russia.

Likewise, Russia is keen to protagonise itself with regard to the issues concerning the principle of non-intervention in Ukraine. It is quite evident that Russian security discourse depicts Ukraine (especially its Eastern regions) as a part of Self. Russian authorities underline that Ukrainians and Russians are ethnically very close – moreover, it is explicitly said that they are the same nation (e.g. Putin 17.04.2014 (1); 18.03.2015). Additionally, Russian authorities emphasise their duty to protect Russian-speaking/Russian people (again, the terms are used rather interchangeably) in Ukraine (e.g. Putin 17.04.2014 (1)). Such statements articulate a close bond between the two countries and nations, one that goes beyond simply being friendly with each other. As already shown in the previous sections, Ukraine, especially its Eastern regions and Crimea, are a part of Russian national identity. Indeed, an intervention with the issues of the Self is not subject to the principle of non-intervention.

To sum up, regardless of the fact that Finland might seem to use a certain amount of polarisation when it condemns Russia’s support to Ukrainian separatists, it actually appears to condemn an intervention of any kind and from whichever party. Russia and Estonia, on the other hand, fully support the principle non-intervention as to the ‘enemy’, but suggest that ‘positive’ parties should intervene in order to guarantee that the principle is followed by the negative party.

4. CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN-LEVEL THREATS

According to the idea of a ‘layered’ framework for studying security, in order to more successfully analyse threats to national security, one should also include a more ‘general’, i.e. European level of national discourses. Studying this level becomes especially important considering the proximity of the conflict zone in Ukraine to the three countries in question. The Ukrainian crisis is taking place in Europe and its

implications to how the European security system is understood can hardly be underestimated. The objects of the threats that the European Self – as depicted by the national discourses – faces are discussed in two sections: values and stability. Hereby it is useful to remind that these issues are strongly intertwined.

4.1. VALUES

Although the question of common European values was widely discussed already before the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis and is sometimes listed among reasons of it, the issues concerning rather abstract nodal points, such as the failure of democratic principles, deficit of trust and a lack of unity, are central in the context of the Ukrainian events. The subsection argues that despite the fact that all three countries express their concern about the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the common values, the articulations in the cases demonstrate a significant difference. For Finland, the values in question are unexceptionally European, whereas Russia and Estonia tend to protagonise themselves, leaving an impression that the values are theirs, or at least that they are showing an exceptional example in terms of protecting and representing them.

First, three examples of articulations concerning the issue of values is worthwhile to be observed:

'.../ Our common values are trespassed upon.' (Niinistö 26.08.2014)

'There is a battle going on /.../ over values, but also over the meaning of human rights and democracy.' (Ilves 24.02.2014)

'A competition over values is going on.' (Lavrov 20.03.2014)

First of all, these three examples immediately reveal a fundamental difference between the Finnish security discourse and its Estonian and Russian counterparts. Namely, whilst according to the Finnish more passive construction, the common values have simply been 'trespassed upon', Estonia and Russia describe the situation as active: there is a 'competition' or even a 'battle' going on. Hereby the choice of words does not occur as occasional, but represents a recurrent position.

In the Finnish case, the analysis of the security discourse reveals that the common values referred to in the previous statement are first and foremost European (and not primarily Western) (e.g. Niinistö 13.05.2014). Nonetheless, the question as to who is the main trespasser still remains rather ambiguous and it is not specified who and what is meant by Europe. For instance, as to the Crimean case, Finnish authorities point

out that Russia has violated common principles, but at the same time it is emphasised that the Ukrainian authorities are the main party responsible for ending the crisis (e.g. Stenlund 29.04.2014). For Estonia and Russia, that of values is one of the major issues catalysing the Ukrainian crisis – it is explicitly pointed out in both discourses that the crisis is a *battle* over values. Such construction, in turn, once again exemplifies a high degree of polarisation concerning the security issues in the two discourses. For Estonia, the parties competing are Russia and the West, in Russian case – at first glance – they appear to be the same. Nonetheless, the Russian case is somewhat more complicated in terms of the actual signified. It is important to note that Russia often uses the signifiers ‘the West’, ‘NATO’ and ‘the US’ interchangeably, whereas the former two are most often used to denote (the political direction of) the US.

The polarisation in Estonian and Russian discourses is also similar in terms of making a radical distinction not simply between two parties, but one between the parties as representatives and protectors of positive and negative values – some articulations even refer to positive and negative values as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ ones and thereby not simply antagonise, but rather demonise the Other. For instance, the Russian discourse suggests that the US, that is depicted as the main enemy of positive (Russian) values, is ‘on the verge of good and evil’ (Lavrov 14.06.2014). The Estonian discourse mirrors its Russian counterpart: Russia is not only depicted as an enemy of the European values (that are depicted as ‘good’), but also explicitly (and repeatedly) described as some sort of a ‘force of evil’ (*sic!*) with whom all deals are excluded (Ilves 25.03.2014; 13.05.2014). For Estonia, Russia appears to be a historical enemy, one that cannot be transformed and is not only seen as a representative of the ‘evil’ forces in this specific case, but is almost evil by nature (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014; Rõivas 24.09.2014). Generally, Russian national security discourse suggests that the West is in decline first and foremost because it has neglected its traditional values and does not have anything sacred (Putin 4.03.2014).

The Self, on the other hand, is exclusively inscribed with a positive connotation in Estonian and Russian discourses. Both Russia and Estonia tend to highly protagonise themselves with respect to the issue, as opposed to Finland that abstains from mentioning itself in this context and rather discusses the European values as strictly European, thereby distancing itself from the possible ‘competition’ or ‘battle’ (e.g.

Niinistö 24.09.2015; 12.01.2015). As to Estonia, the Ukrainian crisis seems to have provided it with an opportunity to legitimise its continuous securitisation of the Russian issues. For example, Estonian authorities have emphasised that Estonia was among the few states that could foresee what Russia was capable of before no-one suspected anything of that kind (e.g. Ilves 6.06.2014; Rõivas 24.09.2014). The Ukrainian crisis has strongly brought forth the long-time personal opposition with Russia, which is one of the main foundations of Estonian national security discourse, also value-wise. Thus, this context offers grounds for the polarised structure of Estonian national identity to be reaffirmed and the securitisation of Russia to receive further legitimation. Russia is depicted as the embodiment of everything negative, untimely and corrupt, whereas Estonia is a *new* state with firm values, even more different from Russia than the other countries, especially some of the other ex-Soviet states (e.g. Ilves 1.05.2014). This can be perfectly illustrated with a rather provocative statement made by the President of Estonia during the Victory day parade, that even linguistically demonstrates an explicit confrontation between ‘us’ and ‘them’:

‘We are exactly what our neighbouring state considers to be an existential threat to itself. Estonia and Latvia are the countries that according to those people embody the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century.’ (Ilves 23.06.2014)

In terms of protagonisation, Russian security discourse demonstrates significant structural similarities with its Estonian counterpart. A clear border between the values of the Self and those of the Others is created. Russian nation is described as different from all the rest, but at the same time positively special. Vladimir Putin (Putin 17.04.2014 (1)) suggests that Russian people have a particularly strong gene pool and continues with a celebration of the nature of the Russian people who, according to him, have higher moral values than the Western people. Russia portrays itself as a protector of these values, possibly even the only one left (e.g. Putin 4.03.2014; 4.06.2014). As to democracy, Russian authorities claim that the democratic regime of Russia is a ‘normal democracy’ that just has its own specificities, as opposed to the the Western understanding of democracy which is described as ‘strange’ (Lavrov 9.04.2014). It is underlined that the Russian way is the correct one, albeit it somewhat differs from the rest – nonetheless, this difference is positive and makes Russia more special. These ‘Russian’ values seem to be portrayed as superior to the Western values, an integral

feature of the Self, correct and unchangeable (e.g. Putin 17.04.2014 (1)).

In addition, Estonian and Russian security discourses share the tendency of historicising the question of values, to the extent that they become inseparable from Self, but also the radical Other. For example, the President of Russia states that while Western people are individualist by nature, Russians are characterised by an inherent will to die for their Fatherland, as demonstrated by the history:

'And here are the deep roots of our patriotism. This brings us to mass heroism during military conflicts and wars. /.../ Of course, we are less pragmatic /.../ than representatives of other nations, but then we are characterised by a greatness of soul.' (ibidem)

Similarly to Russia, Estonia tends to merge patriotic values, the nature of the Estonian people and security within its national security discourse. Although the articulations may not be as bold as the Russian ones, the discourse still reveals that freedom, love for Fatherland and the will to sacrifice something for the sake of these is considered to be a positive historically inherent trait of Estonian people (e.g. Ilves 23.06.2014).

As already pointed out above, Finland does not emphasise the differences between Russia and the West, but is rather concerned about the mutual relationship – Finland underlines that 'Russia and the West have gone down a 'spiral of mistrust' (Niinistö 26.08.2014). Finnish national security discourse emphasises a necessity to also understand 'the other parties', whereby Russia is meant. Thus, one may conclude that according to Finland, there is no battle going on over values – there are just differences between Russia and the West, but these can be overcome. As Alexander Stubb, the Prime Minister of Finland puts it:

'Today, it would be fair to admit that Russia's political system will not turn into a European democracy like ours. /.../ I believe we can co-exist. We need not be alike to be good neighbours, or even strategic partners again.' (Stubb 29.09.2014)

This statement is also confirmed by the President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, who often points out that although the situation is serious, the EU must not take only its own interests into account, but also pay attention to other actors (e.g. Niinistö 26.08.2014). This permits one to conclude that Finland is rather worried about the mutual trust-based relations between Russia and the West. Russia is still seen as a neighbour that will

always exist and must therefore be interacted with in the best possible way (e.g. Stubb 12.03.2014; 29.09.2014). Once again it is worthwhile noting that Finland does not underline any differences concerning 'the nature' of any parties. It only seems to concentrate on relations and actions, not any particular characteristics – a pragmatic approach, as opposed to a patriotic/emotional one is strongly favoured. The articulations regarding the values seem to regard first and foremost not the national, but the common European identity.

As to measures to counter the threat, Estonia does not consider a peaceful and friendly solution to this 'battle of values', nor does it express particular concern about the deficit of trust – Russia is seen as an actor that cannot be trusted anyway. The only way to overcome it is by effectively punishing the aggressor, the 'evil force' (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014; 26.09.2014). Whilst Estonia excludes all deals with the devil, Russia and Finland declare a will to overcome the differences and underline the need for acceptance (e.g. Putin 17.04.2014 (1); Stubb 29.09.2014). In the Russian case, this is articulated to a lesser extent, in the Finnish case it appears to be one of the most salient articulations. Nonetheless, it is important to note that for Russia, the reconciliation could possibly take place only between Russia and the member states of the EU, not with the US – the latter is depicted as constantly hindering the cooperation within Europe. Thus, since Europe is seen as a passive entity, as opposed to the US which is seen as a direct enemy, the seeming similarity does not go beneath the surface.

Overall, the analysis suggests that Russian and Estonian discourses are more keen than Finland to inscribe positive values to Self and negative ones to 'the enemy' and historicise this tendency, thus portraying the distinction almost as an inherent one. The context and the issue are particularly fruitful for reaffirming the constructions of national identity. The Finnish discourse does not protagonise its Self, but rather stays on the European level in its articulations. It explicitly offers to accept the differences between Russia and the West, nonetheless, again, suggesting that this need not hinder the cooperation between the two.

4.2. STABILITY

Threats to stability in Europe are possibly among the most salient concerns emerged in the security discourses in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. Articulations on the changing security situation in Europe have become very common, whereas stability is

very often considered to be the basis of the (former) European *status quo*. The section is divided into two subsections that tackle the principal threat constructions concerning the stability in Europe: geopolitical interests/ruining the balance of powers and radicalism in Europe.

4.2.1. GEOPOLITICAL THREATS

The Ukrainian crisis has brought to surface a number of acute geopolitical issues which are certainly not overlooked by any of the cases in question. This subsection argues that although Finland polarises the geopolitical issue more than the other threats hereby analysed, it mostly ‘filters’ threats and solutions to thereof through Europe and tends to generalise the matter. Russia and Estonia, on the other hand, meet the expectations based on the pattern revealed in the previous sections – while discussing the geopolitical threats to stability in Europe, they still manage to protagonise themselves in relation to the issue, so that the threat is not depicted as directed towards Europe, but a narrower national Self.

First, it is necessary to point out that in this particular issue, Finland demonstrates a much higher degree of polarisation than concerning other threats. Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja has repeatedly underlined the existence of two types of worlds: the world of interdependence (which has a positive connotation) and the world of power politics (which has a negative connotation) (e.g. Tuomioja 22.10.2014; 19.11.2014). The EU is seen as a representative of the former, whereas Russia is (although in a relatively mild manner) described as the representative of the latter. The current crisis is depicted as a struggle between the two worlds – the world of power politics is seen as the enemy. (ibidem) Nonetheless, the above being the clearest example of a polarised articulation, the nature of the rhetoric concerning Finland’s general threat constructions seems to be relatively neutral: rather than being concerned with a constant personification of its enemies, it still appears to see instability and conflict in general as the principal source of threat. This is emphasised by the constantly articulated need for collaboration, as opposed to punishment: Finland considers a peaceful dialogue with Russia and the resulting political solution to be the only feasible option (e.g. Stubb 12.03.2014; 3.10.2014). The construction of the situation, as opposed to a particular actor, as a threat is reconfirmed by the fact that even the presence of

NATO forces, a long-time partner to Finland, in the nearby region is depicted as a security threat:

'The general increase in tension can also be seen in the Baltic region, our neighbouring area. So far, this is more a question of the effects of the crisis rippling out into the Baltic region, rather than of the area becoming unstable itself. However, quite understandably, even this is being viewed as a cause for concern, since an active military presence in our neighbouring region – which was still an everyday fact of life in the 1980s – seemed to have become a thing of the past.' (Niinistö 10.11.2014)

Although Russia is occasionally depicted as a negative party in this issue, it seems to be considered a matter of the particular crisis, rather than a question of Russia's nature. In Finnish discourse, instability itself is the real enemy.

In Estonian and Russian discourses, on the other hand, the issue is almost unexceptionally polarised and antagonised. Both discourses suggest that a specific negative Other (or the enemy) and a positive Self can be identified with regard to the geopolitical matters in Europe, whereas the EU is rather depicted as a mere spectator than a real actor in the security realm – as opposed to the active positive Self. In the Russian case, the US is the principal malicious Other, whereas in the Estonian case it is Russia. As to Self, in the Russian case it is (obviously) Russia, while for Estonia, it is most often NATO (alongside Estonia itself).

In Russia's view, the source of the threat can be traced to the US-led West that is obviously playing geopolitical zero-sum games, hindering all possibilities for partnership and attempting to undermine the progress towards a more multipolar world (e.g. Lavrov 23.03.2014; 25.10.2014). More specifically, this source manifests itself through international organisations (especially the EU) and military alliances (particularly NATO) that hinder sovereign action of states and thus contribute to instability. With regard to this, it may be useful to remind that in Russian discourse the US is seen as the force shaping the values and actions of the West, as well as those of NATO. From the Russian point of view, Europe is as a mere puppet of the US, one that has lost its personal values, whereas the US is described as a double-faced liar of a country (e.g. Lavrov 14.06.2014). Overall, the US is openly described as the main advocate for unipolarity, spheres of influence, and hence, the actions of the US are seen as the main threat to stability in Europe by Russia (e.g. Putin 17.04.2014 (1); cf. Smith,

2013).

Russia condemns the existence of military alliances, especially the presence of NATO in Europe. The unacceptability of NATO, which is seen as the extension of the power of the US, has very often been articulated during the Ukrainian crisis. Hereby, Russia appears to insist that this very existence of NATO is almost directed against Russia (e.g. Lavrov 11.04.2014; Putin 4.03.2014). Nothing positive is associated with NATO in Russian security discourse. NATO is openly considered to be a liar, untrustworthy, outdated, aggressive and unwilling to collaborate (e.g. Lavrov 11.04.2014; Putin 17.04.2014 (1)).

According to Russia, the greatest manifestations and confirmations of the geopolitical ambitions of the West are the enlargement of NATO and the Eastern Partnership of the European Union (Lavrov 8.04.2014; 11.04.2014). Moreover, these threats are also considered to be the reasons triggering the Ukrainian crisis:

'The Ukrainian crisis is the result of the policy /.../ of the Western countries that is aimed to strengthen their own security on the expense of the others and expand the geopolitical sphere under their control.' (Lavrov 19.10.2014)

Hereby, it is also important to note that the US is considered to be behind both of the projects (e.g. Lavrov 11.04.2014).

Estonian security discourse turns the tables and points at Russia as the sole culprit in terms of playing geopolitical games, ruining the balance of powers and hindering progress in the European security system. Estonian authorities point out that the world is currently seeing an 'emergence of cynical geopolitics' (Ilves 26.09.2014), a 'revival of fascism, imperialist and racist geopolitical fantasies' in Russia (Ilves 2.09.2014). Russia is among else often being referred to as an 'aggressive neighbour' (Rõivas 24.09.2014), 'aggressor' and 'propagandist revisionist neighbour' who does not think that the European security order of the last 25 years should persist, but believes instead that 'tolerance is decadence' (Ilves 23.06.2014). Similarly to Russian discourse on the US, negative expressions referring to conducting power politics are very often used with reference to the enemy – e.g. 'might makes right', 'crude force' *et alia* (e.g. Ilves 1.05.2014; Rõivas 24.09.2014).

Both Estonia and Russia tend to augment such statements by bringing historical parallels. For instance, in the Estonian discourse Russia is compared to totalitarian

regimes such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin (Ilves 23.08.2014; 24.09.2014):

'Russia wants to re-establish the spheres of influence with its Stalin-like politics of violence and fear.' (Ilves 23.08.2014)

As for Russia, it openly considers the existence of NATO in the current security context to be incomprehensible and unacceptable – NATO is seen as an rudiment of the Cold War era (Lavrov 4.08.2014), which still acts accordingly (Lavrov 28.09.2014).

Additionally, both see the current moment as a certain point of no return, the moment of revelation when the Enemy exposes its true intentions. Russian security discourse repeatedly underlines that the relations between Russia and the West have reached a certain (negative) moment of truth (Lavrov 23.03.2014; 25.10.2014). Estonian national security discourse repeatedly describes the current security situation as 'the end of an era' (Ilves 6.06.2014; 2.09.2014). Estonian authorities grimly point out that the West has tried to build a 'world of eternal peace', but this has proven to be impossible. As Toomas Hendrik Ilves (6.06.2014) puts it:

'Love, peace and Woodstock are over. Altamont just happened.'

As to the possible role of the EU, the cases demonstrate different positions. Finland identifies with the EU and sees the EU as the most important guarantor of peace and security in Europe. Finland often suggests that Europe must start to put an emphasis on the CSDP that for a long time has been neglected. Finnish authorities stress that 'there is still hope' for a European security project and call for action to launch an active building of one. (e.g. Tuomioja 10.10.2014; 19.11.2014) The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEF) is also seen as vital, whereas the question of NATO is addressed with caution (e.g. Niinistö 12.01.2014; Haglund 15.09.2014).

Both Russia and Estonia describe Europe/the EU as being too weak to counter geopolitical threats, or in the Russian case, even to voice its opinion. Thus, even Estonia distances itself from the EU in security matters as the organisation's weak side. Moreover, in both cases it is believed that the Enemy is the source of weakness. In Russian security discourse, the EU is rather depicted as a set of dependent states that have given up their sovereignty and now follow (or even take orders) from the US (e.g. Putin 4.06.2014; 22.07.2014). In fact, the member states of the EU are regarded as objects/tools through which the US manifests and strengthens its positions – a set of

states that 'cannot even formulate a clear position' (Putin 17.04.2014 (1)):

'.../ Many countries of the Western world /.../ have deliberately given up a considerable part of their sovereignty. /.../ It is hard to negotiate with them, because they are afraid that Americans are eavesdropping on them. /.../ It is not a joke. /.../' (Putin 17.04.2014 (1))

Estonia agrees with Russia in terms of the EU being too weak and indecisive to counter the geopolitical threats that the continent is facing. According to Estonia, the EU is currently unable to provide viable measures to counter geopolitical threats of the continent, because its member states are too apprehensive of their relations with Russia (e.g. Ilves 6.06.2014; 2.09.2014) and overall tend to neglect national security issues. By countering the threats, Estonia means using deterrence and punishment – both directed towards Russia (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014; Mikser 11.09.2014).

Thus, quite interestingly, Estonian security discourse distances its Self from Europe. It is often emphasised that as to the security realm, Estonia is different from many European countries whose defence expenditures are not sufficient and that have been reluctant to join NATO (e.g. Ilves 23.06.2014). Paradoxically, although threats are constructed as extremely tangible and serious, also the sense of security appears to have become stronger throughout the crisis. It seems that the Ukrainian crisis has increased the Estonian 'we-feeling' in the security realm – the Self of Estonia has now truly become a part of a larger Self, whereas the membership of NATO has further been legitimised. For instance, just after the annexation of Crimea, the Minister of Defence explicitly stated: *'Today we are safer than ever.'* (Reinsalu 19.03.2014) This could be seen as an illustration of how the relationship between the ontological and physical security of a state can be contradictory – regardless of the fact that Estonia might sense a physical threat coming from Russia, it does not 'tune down' its statements and, instead, feels that its sense of Self, which maintains itself through routinised practices, has been strengthened.

As for the possible ways to strengthen security in Europe, both Estonia and Russia suggest a cooperation of European countries with an extra-EU actor, which in both cases is Self or strongly related to the Self in the particular issue. Simultaneously, the Self is depicted as the antipode of the Enemy and as a symbol of security. Thus, as a solution, Russia suggests a cooperation between European countries and Russia that

would establish stability in Europe and subsequently in the whole world:

'The historical experience demonstrates that attempts to isolate Russia have brought to serious consequences for all Europe and vice versa: active inclusion of our country into the matters of our continent have been accompanied by lengthy periods of peace and development.' (Lavrov 23.03.2014)

For Estonia, the transatlantic cooperation is the key to geopolitical stability in Europe. Therefore, according to Estonia, the presence of NATO in Europe should be further strengthened (e.g. Mikser 2.09.2014).

To sum up, the analysis of one of the most salient issues in the context of the Ukrainian crisis has once again demonstrated that the structural similarities and differences follow a pattern much like in the previously discussed issues. Although Finnish discourse demonstrates a visible degree of polarisation, it is still rather mild compared to that encountered in Russian and Estonian discourses. Interestingly, although a member of the European Union, Estonia appears to agree with Russia in terms of the EU alone being too weak and indecisive to counter the geopolitical threats. Thus, again, Finland rather depicts geopolitical threats through a more European prism, while Russia and Estonia project threats to their Selves and use them to reaffirm the constructions of their national identity.

4.2.2. RADICALISM

Although radicalism has become one of the main objects of securitisation already before the Ukrainian crisis broke out, the crisis has surely had a catalysing effect: once again radicalism is widely seen as a serious security threat to stability in Europe. I argue that by attributing negative radicalism to their Others and at the same time claiming to oppose it, Estonia, and in particular, Russia reaffirm their polarised identity construction, while Finland again remains relatively distant.

First, it is necessary to mention that Finland does not address the issue nearly as often as Estonia and Russia do. These rare articulations can be described by a relative neutrality and only concern separatists in Ukraine. Finnish discourse does not expand the issue of radicalism further from the context of the Ukrainian crisis. Also, it does not appear to accuse any particular states of expressing radical or nationalist sentiments. Nonetheless, it points out that Russia has encouraged the separatists in Ukraine:

'It is also evident that Russia has responsibility for the use of violence in Eastern

Ukraine where it has encouraged, financed and even armed the separatists who have occupied public buildings, terrorised their opponents and threatened the integrity of the country.' (Tuomioja 27.05.2014)

However, the passage is still characterised by a relatively mild wording – Finland does not suggest that Russia is the direct culprit, but rather a supporter of separatists.

Estonian and Russian security discourses, on the other hand, contain a significant amount of articulations concerning radicalism. Both are consider the Enemy to be the main source of threat that is antagonised. Russian national security discourse depicts Maidan protesters and the current Ukrainian authorities as far-right extremists and nationalists threatening the stability in Ukraine and in Europe (e.g. Lavrov 19.02.2014; 22.10.2014), while the Western countries are seen as the indirect culprits, the supporters of the radical forces (e.g. Putin 18.03.2014). Namely, Russia accuses the West of encouraging the 'anticonstitutional coup' in Kiev (e.g. Putin 4.03.2014). Nevertheless, the threat is sometimes seen as coming directly from particular Western countries: Russian authorities point out that some of Russia's neighbours', specifically the Baltics, are supporters of neonationalism (Putin 15.11.2014). In the Estonian case, primarily Russia, but also 'many European countries', are seen as the forces to hold guilty for the revival of nationalism (e.g. Ilves 26.09.2014). Nevertheless, Russia is seen as the main proponent of nationalism in Europe, one who is supporting far-right sentiments all over the continent (e.g. Ilves 24.09.2014). According to Estonia, Russia is breaking international law by supporting the separatist forces in Ukraine (e.g. Mikser 2.09.2014). Moreover, Estonia's articulations suggest that the country's authorities depicts Russia not just as a supporter of separatists, but rather the direct source of threat that uses separatists as a tool to realise its own interests (ibidem).

In addition, Russian and Estonian security discourses often tend to bring parallels with historical radicalism when describing the (actions of the) Other. Comparisons of contemporary nationalist forces to historical nationalist or fascist forces are very common in Russian security discourse (e.g. Lavrov 7.05.2014). At this point it seems useful to underline the negative connotation that 'fascism' has in Russian national security discourse. Fascism is the ultimate historical enemy for Russia, the 'greatest threat' in the European history, whereas Russia positions itself as the abolisher of fascism, a great power that managed to historically liberate Europe from this

ideology, and still affirms its responsibility to protect this mnemonical standpoint.

The Estonian case colourfully mirrors its Russian counterpart. Russia's actions are compared to historical nationalism in the Estonian national security discourse (e.g. Ilves 24.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014). In addition to comparing the annexation of Crimea to Hitler's actions, Toomas Hendrik Ilves repeatedly describes the bike-show in Sevastopol that used numerous historical references as a *Gesamtkunstwerk* in comparison to which *The Triumph of Will* by Leni Riefenstahl seems 'a liberal work of art' (e.g. Ilves 20.08.2014; 2.09.2014; 13.11.2014). Russia is depicted as the contemporary source for (negative) nationalism, repressions, propaganda, intolerance, imperialism and ideology (e.g. Ilves 23.06.2014; 26.09.2014).

Whilst the Enemy is responsible for encouraging radicalism, both discourses – Estonian and Russian – suggest that the solution should be provided by the positive force, in other words by Self. As to counteractive measures, Estonia primarily proposes imposing sanctions on Russia by the West (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014). Russia, on the other hand, underlines its duty to protect the threatened Russian-speaking population of Ukraine and affirms that it is willing to use military force to fulfil its task (e.g. Putin 4.03.2014).

To sum up, Russia and Estonia address the issue of radicalism significantly more often than Finland. Manifestations of radicalism are mostly linked to the Enemy in both discourses – this strong antagonisation serves to preserve a strong enemy image that is also linked to mnemonical issues. Finland, on the other hand, resorts to condemning Russia's support to separatists and does not antagonise the Other.

5. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, three national security discourses – Russian, Estonian and Finnish – were analysed. The moment of study was the Ukrainian crisis and only examples of official discourse were analysed. Most importantly, the aim was to better understand the connection between security policy and national identity in the selected discourses. The issues that emerged from the discourses were analysed comparatively, each section included all cases. In general, the analysis has shown that the cases may often seemingly 'speak the same language', but the structure behind the signifiers may speak a rather different one. The concluding section aims to first discuss the most salient issues emerging of the analysis and then, to generate hypotheses based on the findings.

Thus, the analysis at two levels – the national and the European one – concentrated on structural differences and similarities and revealed quite a consistent counter-intuitive pattern. Five principal structural tendencies were detected and analysed: protagonisation, polarisation, antagonisation, historisation and neutrality in terms of security issues. With regard to national security discourse, Russia and Estonia appear to be similar, whereas Finland differs from the former two. As previously pointed out, this is likely to be the case in which it is difficult to explain why similar actors opt for a different policy views and vice versa. This study assumes a poststructuralist view according to which policy and identity are interlinked in a non-causal relationship within a discourse. Also, it is useful to remind that a lack of causality does not imply a lack of structure.

The dominant difference between Finnish discourse on the one hand and its Estonian and Russian counterparts on the other lies in the observation as to where these discourses can be positioned on the neutrality-polarisation axis. The analysis showed that Estonian and Russian discourses consistently operate in the realm of the logic of equivalence, whereas their Finnish counterpart rather follows the logic of difference. In the former two, personalisation, polarisation, antagonisation and historisation occur much more frequently and intensively than in the Finnish case that instead demonstrates a high degree of neutrality in most of the issues. I believe it is fair to state that in these two discourses, polarisation very often reaches a radical level – i.e. we are actually presented with a number of examples and issues where straightforward antagonisation is used, whereas a positive image on the verge of absolute is attributed to Self. Moreover,

antagonisation reaches the extent of demonisation of the Other – the relationship of radical otherness is presented along the lines of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Whilst for Finland, the source of threat is most often connected to a rather actor-neutral ‘situation’, Estonian and Russian discourses tend to utilise strong polarisation and antagonisation in order to differentiate between the negative and positive parties who are depicted as symbols/protectors of a wider array of values and actors.

Interestingly, Russia and Estonia often merge ‘state’ and ‘nation’, even in the cases where the threat could logically be seen as directed against the physical security of the state, the identity of the nation is emphasised. This is well-reflected linguistically – the distinction between particular ‘us’ and ‘them’ is very clear in the articulations. Also, the ‘people’ are often emphasised and merged with ‘nation’ and ‘state’, thus implying that ‘people’ *are* the state and have a right to ‘decide their fate’, thus resulting in a very patriotic and emotional articulations. Russia and Estonia constantly personalise the threat and project it to a narrower Self, even when addressing the issues specifically related to the wider European context, thus protagonising themselves. Finland, on the other hand, depicts security matters through a more European lens and remains distanced even in case the issues are more related to national level. As a result, the ways to securitise issues in the discourses are strikingly different. For Finland, the referent object is rather the wider European identity, it does not project threats directly to the national Self. Thus, the intensity of securitising tone is quite low – for Finland, the survival of overall principles is at stake, not that of specific states or nations, let alone the narrower national Self. Also, the source of threat is a particular situation/event, rather than any specific entity. In the Estonian and Russian cases, securitisation is more straightforward – the discourses suggest that action must be taken immediately, since the survival of a national identity, of ‘the people’, depends on it. The sense of ‘everything being at stake’ is further augmented due to merging nation, state and territory in the construction of national identity. Also, the construction of threats is enhanced by drawing historical parallels as evidence confirming the severity of the threat and allusion to possible scenarios if action is not taken. In addition, both discourses consistently point at specific sources of threat that are also directly linked to historical constructions of ‘the enemy’. Simultaneously, the discourses claim to be able to protect the Self, thus augmenting the sense of security, legitimising security policy

and reproducing a polarised national identity through threat construction.

Although both Finland and Estonia are member states of the EU, they depict the potential role of the organisation very differently. As already said, Finland appears to approach the Ukrainian crisis as if on behalf of the EU, not as a narrower Self, a nation state. This also applies to possible solutions – Finland suggests a more effective intra-EU security cooperation as a measure to preserve security in Europe. Estonia, on the other hand, distances itself from the EU, claiming that in this specific security context the EU lacks unity and decisiveness in responding to the threats – similarly so to the viewpoint advocated by Russia. It seems that there is a discrepancy between the ‘European’ and the Estonian way to articulate security. Estonian security policy is very strongly linked to *national* identity, which seems to be more in line with the alliance-based intergovernmental logic of NATO. While according to Finnish articulations the European security system needs to be preserved for the sake of Europe, in Estonian articulations, a stable European security system is a means to preserve the narrower Self.

Importantly, the findings appear to confirm that the links between national identity and security policy, despite of their inherently changing nature, tend to be highly consistent and stable – security policies of states are not just specific to the contemporary context. Thus, the link between national identity and security policy is not one-to one, but embedded into deeper structures of memory that facilitate preserving a clearly outlined non-volatile national identity. The states continue articulating security issues according to the routinised patterns of relationships, especially those of enmity, while continuing to legitimise their mnemonic viewpoints. Although Ukraine is physically near to all three countries, it appears that this fact does not shape the discursive constructions nearly as much as mnemonic/symbolic proximity. Notwithstanding the short geographical distance, Finland still maintains its neutrality and distance. For Russia and Estonia, on the other hand, the Ukrainian crisis seems to be a particularly fruitful context for reaffirming their polarised constructions of national identity. Both Estonia and Russia keep rearticulating historical ‘arch enemies’ that contribute to a strong reaffirmation of the inherently positive nature of Self, simultaneously legitimising the security policies. Numerous historical parallels contribute to an image of an almost eternal enemy that is evil by nature and thus

unchangeable. At the same time, Finland's solid neutral identity constructions dictate what can be articulated in the context of the crisis – articulations stemming from the logic of equivalence are hence avoided. Identities are strongly reaffirmed through corresponding security policies, whereas policies are legitimised and justified through polarised 'historical' identity constructions. This seems to create a vicious circle of routine that is hard to break out of.

The findings, in turn, suggest several hypotheses on how to explain the relationship between policy and identity in national security discourses. Three hypotheses are suggested (these could be further tested on other cases):

H1: The more national identity is linked to the European identity in security discourses, the less polarised the security discourses tend to be.

Despite the fact that Estonia and Finland are both members of the EU, Finland has been a member of the EU for a longer period and has been integrated to a deeper level, possibly also in terms of identity. The analysis of security discourses revealed that Finland tends to see security issues, or at least position its Self in relation to these issues, through a 'European' perspective, while Estonia and Russia tend to be more 'national' and 'personal'. Although Estonia is a member of the EU, it clearly does not appear to primarily rely on the EU in terms of security issues and Russia, of course, does not belong to international organisations of such kind. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that a lack of nationalism in official discourse does not imply a lack of nationalism in other discourses. Also, under some circumstances, official discourse can become more nationalist due to a deeper integration into the EU. Namely, the analysis of Ole Wæver (1996) on European security identities showed that often, the more states integrated into the EU, the more nations expressed their nationalism.

H2: The more 'state' and 'nation' are intertwined in the concept of 'national security', the more defensive/aggressive the security discourse tends to be.

Estonia and Russia tend to often use references to 'nation' with regard to security, so that the physical security of the state is depicted as inseparable from that of a nation. Finland, on the other hand, refers to security more often as a common European matter.

At the same time, the two former appear to polarise, antagonise and protagonise the security issues much more often than the third case.

H3. *The more a specific issue is depicted as (historically) personal, the more defensive/aggressive the security discourse becomes.*

Russia considers Ukraine to be a part of (historical) Self and Estonia often brings historical parallels between itself and Ukraine, whereas Finland does not resort to such comparisons and personalisation. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to neglect the possibility of Finland to do it, for such cases do exist in the Finnish history (e.g. the case of Karelia).

As for further research, although official discourse provides a solid ground for studying national security, a comparison between more marginal discourses and the official national discourse could reveal other interesting dynamics, e.g. polarisation between the ‘internal’ discourses of a state. Also, an analysis of the evolution of these discourses over a longer time period could be studied.

Overall, the Ukrainian crisis seems to have brought forth the fundamental differences between the national security discourses in Europe and within the EU: in fact, some national security discourses appear to be more national than others, whereas others can be considered more European. Also, this analysis revealed a problematic question as to the role of *national* security discourses in the current context. If we presume moving towards a more Europeanised identity further becomes a common tendency, one gets the impulse to ask what are its implications with regard to the European security situation. As Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998, p. 29) put it, „national security should not be idealised“. Nonetheless, one is tempted to ask the question of whether without the idealisation (protagonisation, antagonisation etc.) a security discourse can be called *national* any longer.

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