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MA thesis

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Economic growth and foreign policy of regional powers – a case study of Turkey in the Middle East

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between economic growth and the foreign policy of regional powers. It is a single case study of Turkey in the Middle East region. This thesis uses the regional level of analysis and explores different conceptualizations of regions in international relations. Mainly it focuses on the regional security complex theory formulated by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever.

Hypothesis for the analysis is that economic growth experienced by regional powers enables them to spend more resources to increase their capability of power projection. Increased amount of resources together with the desire to strive for regional hegemony, pushes regional powers to adopt a more active and asserting foreign policy in their own region.

The conducted analysis about Turkey reveals that economic growth correlates strongly to the amount of available resources Turkey has for conducting foreign policy. To analyze Turkish foreign political engagement and activity in the region, press releases from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs were used. The analyze based on them indicated that during the years following a fast economic growth Turkish officials undertake more trips to countries in the Middle East and the number of mentioning of Middle East countries in press releases increase. That indicates that economic growth correlates positively with regional foreign political activity. Qualitative analysis of the press releases reveals that Turkey has adopted a more assertive and critical foreign policy towards Iraq, Syria and Egypt compared to 10 years ago. Therefore, the hypothesis of this thesis is considered to be true.

Keywords: regional power, economic growth, foreign political activity, Turkey, Middle East

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Introduction

The dream of most people involved in the field of international relations is to find explanations for the behavior of states. Because of that there are a countless number of writings dedicated to finding that out and this thesis is one of those many works. Exploring the theoretical behavior of states is fascinating because it gives us a clue to predict the future actions undertaken by countries in the world. That gives this field of research a practical value. As the world around us is complex, it is never possible to find a grand theory that perfectly explains the behavior of all states in all cases. Therefore, there is always work to be done at analyzing the behavior of different groups of states in various foreign political situations.

The aim of this specific thesis is to explore the behavior of regional powers in the developing world. To do that, the case study of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa region is used. Distinct features of regional powers in the developing world include the fact that they have more power projection capabilities than other states in the region and that they are still experiencing a rapid economic growth. This thesis posits that the foreign policy of such states is affected by their economic growth and that makes them behave in a specific manner. The underlying logic here is that those states will have more resources to spend for their foreign policy as their economy develops. The increase of resources together with the general shift in regional balance of power and the neorealist principle of states trying to maximize their own power pushes developing regional powers to adopt a more active and assertive foreign policy in their own region. In the long term such states should attempt to achieve regional hegemony.

Theory wise this thesis subscribes to the opinion that regional level of analysis is important in international relations. That means most states don't interact with each other on the global level, but regional. To define regions and the behavior of states inside of them, this thesis primarily relies on the regional security complexes theory created by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever which says that states are bound to specific regions based on common threats and interactions. In addition to that, it is assumed that inside of regions most of the foreign principles of global level of analysis apply. Most notably, the neorealist principle of states trying to maximize their own power to increase their own safety and wellbeing is considered to apply in regions as well. With

a few exceptions, international relations in regions can be observed like a miniature version of international relations on the global level.¹

The research done in this thesis has some limitations like always. This thesis uses the example of Turkey in the Middle East as the basis of analysis. The world around us is not uniform and therefore there are various different types of regions and regional powers. Some of the regions of the world are multipolar like the Middle East and others are not. Some regions include states that are world superpowers, some are more focused on hostile interactions than others. Regions differ and therefore, it is impossible to make sweeping conclusions about the behavior of every single regional power based on the analysis of Turkey. The findings of this thesis apply better for regions and states that are similar to the Turkey and the Middle East than to the ones that are completely different. In addition to that, this thesis mainly uses the principles of neorealism. That does not mean other theoretical approaches would automatically be invalid and couldn't explain the world equally as good.

The topic of this study is significant, because it enables to explore the behavior of regional powers in the developing world. In general the IR literature and analysis is focuses on developing world countries and the global level of analysis. Therefore, this thesis deals with an area that is still relatively underexplored. In addition to that it is possible to see the impact developing regional powers have on the affairs of the world from simply turning on the television. Turkey and the Middle East in particular are involved in many present day crises and are especially worth analyzing.

This thesis consists of 3 different parts. In first of them, theoretical background about the covered topics is presented. That part is mainly about the theoretical ideas regarding regions and different types of existing regional orders. While a literature overview is presented, this thesis mainly relies on the works of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. In addition to dealing with regions, a brief overview about neorealist theory and how states act according to it is presented. At the end of the theoretical part a hypothesis for analysis is phrased.

¹ Most importantly, global level superpowers have the possibility to intervene into regional matters and adopt the role of balancers

Second part of this writing deals with methodology. An overview of advantages and disadvantages of using a single case study is given. The Middle East region is defined and conceptualized based on theories and case selection of that region and Turkey as a regional power is justified. Final section of methodology deals with conceptualizing and operationalizing the hypothesis laid out in the theoretical part.

The largest section of the thesis is devoted for the actual analysis of Turkey in the Middle East. First of all Turkish standing relative to other states in the region is found out. Then the question about by how much the material resources of Turkey have increased in the recent years is looked into. Finally Turkish foreign political activity in the region is analyzed by using the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' web page and connection between foreign political activity and economic growth is found.

Theory

Regional level of analysis

It is possible to distinguish different levels of analysis when studying international relations. In 1959 Kenneth Waltz identified 3 of them in his book “Man, the State and War”. Those were the individual, the state and the system levels. Out of those 3, the system level analysis has become the most common as that has been favored by the dominant neorealist school of thought that largely ignored the other levels. (Soltani, Naji, & Ekhtiari, 2014, p. 167) In the recent decades, the spectrum of approaches to studying international relations has broadened and there have been various claims that the system level analysis may not be the best for explaining what is truly happening in the world and new levels of analysis have appeared.

The 2003 publication Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security” has brought a lot of attention to the regional level of analysis and has made it part of mainstream international relations studies. The recent spark of interest in regional analysis has a lot to do with the end of Cold War. During that time period world was described as a bipolar system with two competing superpowers. Struggle between USA and Soviet Union was seen as the defining element of international system and the role of smaller states was primarily to ally one of the two primary actors. As the conflict between the superpowers was intense and they had the ability to project their power across the globe, regional disputes between smaller states became strongly polarized and had a high level of involvement by USA and Soviet Union. Therefore, regional conflicts were often not seen as something distinct, but rather as a part of global clash between the superpowers.

When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, situation in global politics shifted dramatically. Gone was the period where intense global rivalry shaped the world and instead of bipolarity, a unipolar USA dominated and system developed². Together with the disappearance of the global conflict, regional theories of international relations gained traction. (Mehmetcik, 2015, p. 137)

During the post-Cold War era there, has been less interference into regional matters by global actors. Russia as the successor state of Soviet Union was considerably weakened and was simply

² Although there are various claims that by nowadays a multipolar system has emerged or is presently emerging

unable to support its' allies in faraway places. USA on the other hand had won the global conflict and therefore, did not have to assert its' influence as strongly as before because for a while there was no competitor for their hegemonic role in the world. That meant the intense polarization of the world ended and weaker states of the world started to have other options than to align their foreign policy according to the demands of one or the other of the global powers.

The decrease of interest of global powers to what is happening in different regions of the world has opened a door for regional actors. Essentially, the end of Cold War brought with it a power vacuum in various places across the globe where it is increasingly possible for local states to assert influence in their nearby area without facing strong opposition from global actors. (Buzan, 1991, pp. 434-435) Before the 90s, regional actors' ambitions could have been easily overridden by the desires of their global allies or be put aside out of fear of intervention by the opposing superpower. At the present day both of those are less likely to happen and regional powers have reached a new level of independence in their foreign policy. (Buzan & Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 2003, pp. 10-11) Therefore, the regional actors have overtaken global actors in being the most important players in shaping the pattern of international relations in much of the world and it is worth to pay more attention to why and how they act. As the global level of analysis of international relations mostly ignores regional powers, it has lost a big part of its' analytical power and opened up a place for various regional theories to emerge.

Regionalist approach has many advantages over global systematic level theories. Robert E. Kelley has brought out 5 major claims that advocates of regionalism are often bringing out for its' usage. (Kelly, 2007, pp. 199-200)

First of all, geography places practical limitations upon the behavior of states. Most forms of threat are not global in nature and can travel only a relatively short distance. Because of that states are more concerned about what is happening close to them than at the other side of the globe. Furthermore, a large majority of states in the world have very limited capabilities to project their power across large distances and therefore can really not fully participate in global matters. Those states are ignored by global level of analysis even though they may be relevant actors on a regional level.

Secondly, when systematic theories acknowledge the existence of regional actors, they do it from a one-sided perspective. It is usually assumed that a global power exerts a strong level of influence on regional actors, but not vice versa. That is often not the case in reality, exemplified by the fact that even though USA is a global power with strong interests in the Middle East region, their policy is strongly influenced by Israel – one of the regional actors. Therefore, the role of regional actors can't be diminished into just obeying the orders of global powers.

Thirdly, regional analysis has a normative side. It enforces the view point that smaller states of the international system are also valuable and deserve their existence. By rejecting the sole focus of global powers, it condemns the idea of (neo)imperialism.

Fourthly, it has become noticeable more difficult for the global powers to project their power around the world. While regional analysis still assumes that global level actors can meddle with the regional level and influence what is happening there, interventions by great power have become increasingly ineffective. Although USA for example has the strongest army in the world and should have an upper hand in any conflict they face, it has largely failed to carry out successful foreign policy in different corners of the world. The Iraq invasion by USA did not bring the desired long term results and the events unfolding in the Middle East seem to be out of USA's control.

Lastly, while most regionalist scholars accept the existence of grand theories of international relations, they reject the notion of those theories applying strictly uniformly everywhere in the world. Often global theories simply fail to accurately describe what is happening in parts of the world. When a grand theory and reality markedly differ from each other, regionalists usually prefer to adapt the grand theory or opt for using a deductive approach to the local situation and make new theoretical generalizations.

Regions in international relations

When speaking about regions in international relations, there is a need to define what exactly constitutes a region. There is no universally accepted answer to that problem and various authors conceptualize the term differently. It is generally agreed on that regions in the sense of international relations are not exclusively defined by geography.

William Thompson has brought out 4 other principles that most international relations scholars use to define regions. (Thompson, 1973, pp. 98-101) First of all, regions must have some sort of intense and regular interaction between the states that are in the region. Secondly, regions do have some geographical basis – they are formed by states located close to each other, but are not necessarily defined by common geographical features. Thirdly, actors of a region should themselves recognize the existence of the region as a distinct area. Lastly, regions can't encompass only one state. For there to be interaction, a minimum of 2 different actors should be included in a region. Notably, these principles leave a lot up for interpretation and do not determinate how to exactly split the world into different regions. To determinate concrete regions of the world, one needs to find answers to questions like how strong an interaction do states need to have between themselves to be grouped into one region, what types of interaction are relevant and how to measure them.

Arguably the most influential IR approach to regions is the regional security complex theory of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. According to them world is divided into 9 distinct regions that are bound together by common security interactions. As most security threats can travel only a limited distance, countries are generally not overtly concerned about threats stemming outside of their own region. They depict regions as territorially compact forms of anarchic communities where states compete with each other and have complex patterns of enmity and amity. Feelings of hostility and friendship are largely dependent on the historical relations, different ideologies, religions and ethnic groups and political systems of the countries. Due to that alliances inside a region are not solely based on power calculations. In general Buzan and Wæver think that most neorealist system level theories can be adapted and downscaled to the regional level. Therefore, principles like balance of power apply to regions as well. The theory of regional security complexes assumes that no state can be part of more than one region and even though global powers sometimes intervene in distant places, they are seen as out of region actors who do not shape the polarity of specific regions. (Buzan & Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 2003) According to them a region can be found by drawing arrows of security concerns on a map and seeing based on that how groups of countries are linked together. (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 45)

Douglas Lemke shares some of the ideas of Buzan and Wæver, but bases his approach of regions on downscaling power transition theory. Similarly to them, he believes that security interactions

are more intense between geographically nearby states and that security is basis for defining regions. Unlike them, he does not emphasize strongly on long lasting patterns of enmity and amity between counties in the same region. He instead focuses mainly on the common sources of threat and power of states. Theoretically his approach to delimiting regions is looking at the power projection capabilities of countries. If a state loses more than half of its' power projection ability across the distance required to reach another state's capital, the two states are considered to be in different regions. (Kelly, 2007, pp. 211-212) That means similarly to Buzan and Wæver's regions, his regions are geographically compact. According to Lemke's criteria of power projection, 23 different regional systems or hierarchies as he calls them exist. (Lemke, 2002, p. 49) In each of those hierarchies states are supposed to function in a similar way as in the global hierarchy of states. The main difference being that one state can be a great power in its' regional hierarchy while being a fairly insignificant power in the global hierarchy.

David A. Lake takes a rather different approach to regions. He rejects the notion that regions have to be geographically compact or that history matters in formation of regions. According to him regions are solely the creations of specific sources of threats. All states that share the same source of threat are included to be in one region. The word region itself simply indicates an area that spans anything less than the whole world. Therefore, countries that are geographically distant to each other can form common security regions – for example USA can belong to the same security region with Middle Eastern countries based on common threat of ISIS. As Lake's regions are centered on specific security threats, one state can belong to more than 1 region at a time and there is no definite number of regions in the world. (Lake, 1997, pp. 49-51)

Like other areas of international relations, regional analysis is opened to critical theories. Many of the critical scholars do not think that global theories of international relations can be easily adapted to regional level and support deductive approaches in creating new regional theories. Third World scholars for example has brought out the fact that many regions of the world consist of rather weak and undeveloped states that have completely different security realities compared to developed countries. For the developing world countries existential security threats are often not external like potential attacks from neighboring states, but internal like secessionist and irredentist movements or terroristic acts. These internal issues are supposedly worrying enough for weak states that they do not have much capability to fight between each other. According to

this type of critical theory, regions are not bound together by external security threats, but rather by elites of states with similar internal threats forming alliances to maintain their domestic order. Therefore, regions like Southeast Asia are formed by the cooperation of unstable autocratic regimes that try to bolster the sovereignty of individual states in the area. (Kelly, 2007, pp. 212-215)

Perhaps the most extreme approach to regions has been brought out by Peter J. Katzenstein. According to him, regions are not autonomous areas formed by regional actors, but are rather created by the global hegemon as a tool to spread its' power. He believes that USA as the current global hegemon has split world into 6 different regions based on self-interest. In important regions USA relies on node states like Germany in Europe or Japan in Asia that are allied to them and coordinate regional development that benefits USA. The usage of local actors is supposed to mask the direct intrusion by the superpower and make the projection of power more acceptable to smaller states. Therefore, Katzenstein believes that regions do not function independently and analyzing them without strongly considering the influence of the global hegemon is not meaningful. (Katzenstein, 2005, pp. 37-43).

The brief review of region theories of international relations reveals that there are many different ways how to conceptualize regions that are often mutually exclusive. Therefore, a choice has to be made about which exact approach to use to study regions. Out of the previously described ideas of how to conceptualize regions, the author of this thesis agrees mostly with Buzan and Wæver's. That is because for regions to be something meaningful, they should correspond as much as possible to intuitive perception to regions. Therefore, approaches where regions are depicted to have no geographic or cultural/historical basis (Lake's approach) are not preferable. Neither are critical theories used to conceptualize regions as they often assume that regions are either not a meaningful level of analysis or they rely overly on deductive theories. Buzan and Wæver have the most holistic way of depicting regions while splitting the world into seemingly appropriate sized parts.

Regional order

Not all regions of the world are similar to each other and there are various ways how to describe different regions. According to Buzan and Wæver regions come in two main types– centered and standard. A centered region is one where a great power is present. That means one of the states in

the region has clearly superior capabilities compared to others and dominates the region. In those kind of regions the interactions between states is strongly linked to the global power. Centered regions tend to be relatively stable as no other country has a meaningful chance to challenge global power. The region itself is essentially turned into the “backyard” of the global power and the states instead of it do not have a lot of autonomy. It is also rather difficult for great powers to intervene in a region that is centered on another great power.

Standard regions are the ones that do not have any global powers located in them. Due to that there is usually no single state that can control the region and countries inside such regions have generally more chances to conduct independent foreign policy than states in a centered region. The nature of standard regions is largely shaped by the individual actors inside them who often rely on outside global powers to help them against their regional adversaries. Therefore, standard regions are anarchic and rather prone to conflicts.

It is possible to separate three different types of standard regions: uni-, bi- and multipolar ones. In unipolar regions there is one state that is a lot more powerful than the others. Unlike in centered regions that country is not a global power and therefore outside global powers have the possibility to intervene in the region. Two regional powers form a bipolar region. Those regions are a lot like downscaled versions of the world during the Cold War era and are prone to forming opposing regional alliances. Having more than 2 roughly equally powerful states present in a region creates a multipolar region. They are similar to Westphalian world and are the most conflict prone and anarchic out of all regions. Inside them complex patterns of alliances that often shift can develop. (Buzan & Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 2003, pp. 52-59)

As according to Buzan and Wæver regions are shaped by the regional powers inside them, it is necessary to conceptualize them. Their definition of regional powers is rather basic – a regional power is simply a state that defines the polarity of their region, but is not powerful enough to be a great power nor is seen to be influential on the global scale. (Buzan & Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 2003, p. 37)

Detlef Nolte has analyzed various approaches to regional powers and lays out a clearer definition of them. First of all, a regional power needs to have self-conception of being one. That means the state must have the actual desire to take the leadership role. Secondly, the state needs to possess

enough resources. Those are for example military equipment, money and population. Lastly, a regional state must be able to have real impact on regional matters. Therefore, states that seem to be strong on the thesis, but never manage to succeed in their regional goals can't be thought about as a regional power. (Nolte, 2010, p. 893)

Structural realism and behavior of states

As already mentioned before, Buzan and Waever believe that broadly speaking, it is possible to downscale global level theories to regional level of analysis. The current thesis uses the neorealist idea that all states try to maximize their power and expands on it in explaining why that pushes developing regional powers to attempt achieving regional hegemonic status.

According to the realist school of thought, all states want power. Earlier writers of classical realism like Hans Morgenthau explained that search of power with human nature. They simply believed that every single human being has a desire for power that carries over to the behavior of states. Newer structural realist theories on the other hand claim that states seek to increase their power due to the nature of the international system. According to them, the anarchic nature of the world means that states have no higher institution or power to help them in the times of need. Therefore, countries can only rely on themselves and it is easier to defend itself when one has more power. (Mearsheimer, 2013, p. 72)

The main point of disagreement among the structural realists is the question about how much power should a country seek. Offensive realists, like Mearsheimer for example, believe that a state can never have enough power and therefore all countries should always seek ways how to maximize their power. Defensive realists like Waltz on the other hand claim that there is a certain threshold above what a country should not attempt to increase its' power. Surpassing that, opposing balancing blocks against the state are ought to appear and the security of the country worsens. (Slaughter, 2011, pp. 4-5)

Out of the two structural realism schools, offensive realism seems more appropriate for regional analysis. Defensive realism assumes that balancing blocks form against a potential hegemon, because that is the only way how that country could be stopped from dominating the world. On regional level, things are a little bit different. If a country would become a regional hegemon, it would become a global level actor, but would still have opposition from other global powers.

Therefore, their power would not be unchecked and they could not assert total dominance. While that does not mean there is no balancing against countries that try to achieve regional hegemony, it does mean that it occurs in a lesser extent than balancing on the global level. Countries that have achieved hegemony (for example USA and Russia) in their own region demonstrate that often times balancing does not happen and nearby states opt for bandwagoning behavior instead. Because of that, offensive realism seems to be better at explaining how regions act than defensive realism.

States do not attempt to project their power equally all over the world. Rather they try to focus on their own region. Mearsheimer has stated for example that while global hegemony would be ideal for a state, it is in fact an unattainable goal. The main reason for that is the difficulty of projecting one's power over geographical obstacles. Regional hegemony on the other hand is something that is possible to achieve and therefore, states have the principal goal of achieving that status. He goes as far to saying that all states are revisionist until they achieve regional hegemony and at that point they become status quo powers. (Snyder, 2002, p. 159)

Although according to this theory, all states of the world try to increase their level of influence and should therefore take up an active and rather offensive foreign policy, in reality that doesn't always happen. To assert dominance over nearby states, one needs to have enough resources for it. Without sufficient resources, all sorts of attempts at increasing a states' influence or trying to achieve hegemony are futile and states as rational actors ought to take a more passive and defensive foreign policy. Therefore, the amount of resources as state has and their foreign policy activeness are closely related.

Mearsheimer has brought out 2 different types of resources a state possesses that are relevant for their search of hegemony – economic and military resources³. Economic power shows the wealth of a country has and includes both the size of the economy and size of population. Notably, population size is important because it directly affects the amount of things a state is able to produce. Military resources on the other hand are related to the amount of weapons, machines, military personal and technology a country has. Military and economic resources are related in

³ He calls economic resources latent power and military resources military power. The current thesis opts to use the word resources to avoid confusion between terms power as resources (for example military power) and power as a state (for example regional power).

the way that a state can shift their economic resources into military ones. Essentially that means that to buy modern military equipment, a state needs sufficient amount of money. Those 2 types of resources combined determinate the capability of a country to gain international power and influence. (Mearsheimer, 2013, pp. 72-73)

The author of this thesis believes that by extending the logic of structural realism, it is possible to say that the foreign policy of developing regional powers should become more active and aggressive in time and that they are the states that in practice pursue hegemony the most. By definition regional powers are states that have a relatively large amount of resources compared to the other countries in their region. That means they already have some capacity to dominate over nearby states. (Flemes, 2007, p. 11) As the developing world regional powers are experiencing rapid economic growth, the resources they have to spend on achieving foreign policy goals only increase in time. By the logic of structural realism, as the capabilities of those states continue to grow, they should start asserting more influence in their region and their foreign policy should become more active and dominating. In the long term that should result in regional powers vying for the status of regional hegemon.

The main hypothesis of this thesis is that economic growth allows regional powers to increase their material power projection capabilities and that creates a situation where the regional powers become increasingly active and assertive in their foreign policy. To confirm the hypothesis a connection between economic growth and foreign political activity is looked for. The case study used for analyzing is Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa region.

Methodology

Single case study

The research design of the current thesis uses a single case study. Compared to the other possible choices of conducting a large N statistical research or a small N comparative analysis, a case study has both strengths and weaknesses. While large N research excels and making generalizations that are applicable to a large amount of cases, a single case analysis allows observing a single occurrence of a phenomenon closely and make more nuanced claims about it.

The main point of a case study is not to solely analyze a specific selected case. Instead of that a case study analyses a larger phenomenon by simply selecting one single well defined case to exemplify it. (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 18) Therefore, the current thesis is not mainly about Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, but rather about developing regional powers' foreign policy in their respective regions and Turkey is just a case used to exemplify that behavior of that group of countries.

According to Bennet and George there are 4 main advantages of a case study. They are a large degree of conceptual validity, the possibility to derive new hypothesis, exploration of causal mechanics and modeling complex cases. (George & Bennett, 2004, pp. 19-22)

Case studies can assure a high level of conceptual validity. As there is only one case to observe, a researcher can choose concepts and indicators to fit their chosen theory as well as possible. Therefore, it can largely ignore the problem of travelling concepts where the meaning of something is different in various cases based on the cultural background. For example, concepts like democracy are rather context dependent and democratic governments in USA, Rwanda and Russia would differ a lot from each other. As a single case study does not have to lump together cases that have a large variation, it is protected from conceptual stretching.

Secondly, case studies are valuable for developing new theories. Often times a researcher posits a hypothesis about a phenomenon, but finds that to be false. While large N statistical analysis may prove or disprove a hypothesis, it does not have the ability to really spot causal links that were not specifically looked for. In a case study however, it is possible to spot things that were

not explicitly looked for and generalize new theories based on those findings. Therefore, a case study allows to find potential new hypotheses which may later be further tested by different research designs.

Thirdly, a case study is better at explaining the exact causal mechanics of a case than a purely statistical analysis is. While a statistical analysis may find correlation between different phenomena occurring, it is not the same as giving a causal explanation. A case study can closely examine contextual factors and therefore identify the exact causality together with finding out potential intervening variables which a statistical study could not discover.

Lastly, a case study is better for modeling complex phenomena. For example that approach allows accommodating for equifinality, complex interaction effects and path dependency. The more complex a relationship between 2 phenomena is the more difficult it is to study it with statistical analysis as the number of statistical calculations rises exponentially and the findings become harder to interpret. Case studies on the other hand allow keeping things simple and bring more clarity to complex interactions.

Single case studies have trade-offs compared to statistical analysis as well. They are mainly about lack of representativeness, inability to measure the strength of variables and the bias of case selection.

As case studies are based on a single case, it is often impossible to claim that everything found in such type of research applies in all similar cases. The main premise of a case study is that cases do differ from each other in many ways and that context matters. A case study usually sacrifices generalization for explanatory richness. Therefore, findings of a those study can't be automatically generalized to apply in a larger group. (George & Bennett, 2004, pp. 30-32) To find out if the discoveries made in a case study are truly representative, a statistical large N study should follow it.

While case studies are good at identifying causal relationship between different phenomena, it is not very useful for assessing the strength of them. A case study is useful for finding new variables to explain complex cases, but often fails to find out which of the variables is the most

important. When statistical studies can run correlations and bring out numerical values to assess the relative importance of different variables, a case study often has no objective way in measuring the strength of causality. (George & Bennett, 2004, pp. 25-27)

Finally, a case study is particularly prone to selection bias. As in single case studies, the researcher has only picked one study case, it may happen that this particular case is simply not representative of the phenomena being researched at all. Furthermore, a case may be selected with the intention to get some specific desired result and that may lead the researcher in only looking at the factors which he already believes to be true. The problem of case selection bias is partially mitigated by the fact that case studies do not claim to be highly representative of a large number of cases and acknowledges its' limited explanatory power. (George & Bennett, 2004, pp. 22-25)

The current thesis has chosen to use a case study analysis because the matter of developing world regional powers foreign policy behavior is difficult to analyze in a large N study. Firstly, the amount of such states in the world is rather low and therefore, there may be insufficient amount of cases for a proper large N statistical research. Secondly, various regions of the world are rather different from each other and therefor the behavior of states inside of them is highly context dependent. A single case study can accommodate for the context dependence a lot better than a larger statistical study.

The author of this thesis considered conducting a small N comparative analysis between different regional powers. That idea was mainly rejected due to the fact that such work falls outside of the scope of the master's thesis as it would require a lot more time and resources than currently available. A comparative analysis could be something to consider conducting in the future.

Middle East as a region

For the purpose of the thesis, Middle East is defined close to how Buzan and Wæver their Middle East Security Complex. According to their approach, it is a region that contains 3 smaller subregion inside of it. Those are the Maghreb formed by Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya; the Levant formed by Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria; and finally the Gulf formed by Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Notably, they do not include Turkey as part of the Middle East region, but rather opt to have it as

an insulator state between Europe and Middle East that truly does not belong to either of them. (Buzan & Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 2003, p. 189) The author of this thesis has a different opinion and includes Turkey in the Levant subregion of the Middle East. That is caused by the fact that the main Turkish security threats stem from the other actors in the Middle East, for example ISIS at the present day.

When looking at the Middle East region and what unites it, one can easily notice the prevalence of different conflicts. The most important of them being the Arab-Israel conflict where all of the Middle Eastern states have been involved in one way or another. In the Gulf region Iran and Iraq and Saudi Arabia have all been at odds against each other and are participating in a long lasting power struggle. In Maghreb the most prevalent case of enmity has been the dispute between Morocco and Algeria about the territorial claims to Western Sahara. None of these cases have been strictly speaking conflicts between 2 states, but rather regional matters. (Buzan & Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 2003, pp. 190-193). Recent events like the Syrian civil war or the wave of Arab revolutions have become new examples of how security of Middle East states is connected. Many of the states there support one or another side in the Syrian civil war and states close to Syria have to deal with the influx of refugees escaping from the country while the Arab Spring events managed to overthrow governments from Tunisia to Yemen.

To determine the regional powers in the Middle East, it is easiest to look at the amount of material power different states have. For that a table with 5 different indicators is used here. Military expenditure and military personnel show the military capabilities of the state. Nominal GDP indicates how strong a country is economically while size of the population shows the long term demographic situation of a state and is required both for a strong economy and military. Finally, a national material capabilities indicator from Correlates of War dataset is included that sums up 6 different indicators and show how large share of world's material (militaristic) capabilities a certain country possesses.⁴

The following table below reveals that there are 4 states in the Middle East that share roughly an equal amount of capabilities. Those 4 states are Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. All of them have their strengths and weaknesses in different areas. Egypt has the largest population of

⁴ Those 6 different indicators are total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of a state (The Correlates of War Project, 2007)

the region and therefore, has a lot of long term potential to become more powerful. On the other hand their level of spending on military is rather low compared to the others. Iran has the largest military of the region, a sizable economy and population, but lacks in military expenditure as well. Saudi Arabia has around 40% of all military expenditure of the region and spends more than triple the money on military than any other state in the region. Compared to the other leading powers, their population is smaller and that may hamper them in the long term. Turkey has the largest economy and the third biggest population in the region. In addition to that they have a large number of military personnel and decent military funding. That makes Turkey probably the state in the region with the largest material capabilities which is also indicated by the Correlates of War dataset. They are closely followed by Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt by that order. All other states of the region already have a far smaller material power base than those 4 and therefore could not be considered to be regional powers.

As brought out by Nolte, material capabilities do not solely determinate regional powers, but self-identification of states and their influence on the region matter as well. It is likely that all 4 already mentioned states have both the self-identification and the influence required to be regional powers. Analyzing that in detail falls outside the scope of this thesis and from now on it is considered that Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are the regional powers of the Middle East.

Table 1 Material power resources of Middle Eastern countries

Country	Population in millions (World Bank, 2014)	Nominal GDP in billion USD (World Bank)	Military expenditure in billion USD (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014)	Military personnel in thousands (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014)	National Material Capabilities % of world total (The Correlates of War Project, 2007)
Algeria	38.93	214.06	11.86	138	0.53%
Bahrain	1.36	33.87	1.43	11	0.04%
Egypt	89.58	286.54	4.96	469	0.97%
Iran	78.14	415.34	12.72	545	1.35%
Iraq	34.81	220.51	9.52	227	0.52%
Israel	8.22	304.23	15.91	168	0.36%
Jordan	6.61	35.83	1.27	101	0.14%
Kuwait	3.75	175.83	5.82	16	0.13%
Lebanon	4.55	45.73	2.12	72	0.08%
Libya	6.26	41.12	3.30	76	0.18%
Morocco	33.92	107.01	4.05	201	0.45%
Oman	4.24	81.80	9.62	42	0.12%
Qatar	2.17	211.82	1.88	12	0.09%
Saudi Arabia	30.89	746.25	80.76	225	1.09%
Syria	22.16	40.41	2.50	308	0.45%
Tunisia	11.00	47.00	0.91	35	0.08%
Turkey	75.93	799.54	22.62	515	1.43%
United Arab Emirates	9.09	401.65	22.76	51	0.30%
Yemen	26.18	35.96	1.72	67	0.16%
<i>Average</i>	<i>25.67</i>	<i>223.39</i>	<i>11.35</i>	<i>172.58</i>	<i>0.45%</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>487.79</i>	<i>4244.45</i>	<i>215.72</i>	<i>3279</i>	<i>8.47%</i>

Case selection

Bent Flyvbjerg has bought out different reasons why a specific case can be selected to be the object of analysis of single case studies. Those include the case being an extreme, critical or paradigmatic example. According to him, extreme cases are the cases that stand out the most out of all cases by strongly exemplifying the researched phenomenon. While they may not be the

most representative, they vividly illustrate strong causal connections and are useful for getting ones' point across and often give the most new information during analysis. Critical cases on the other hand are the cases which are the most or the least likely to confirm to a hypothesis. Those cases can confirm that a hypothesis should work in practically all instances or irrefutably falsify the chosen presumptions. The last strategy for choosing a case is picking the paradigmatic case. Those are the cases that are supposed to be the most significant examples of some phenomenon. A paradigmatic case should simply be determined to be a relevant example by both the scientific community and the population at large. Assessing what is significant and relevant is largely about intuition and therefore can't be rationally explained, but those cases simply feel "right" to analyze. (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 230-233)

The current thesis has chosen the Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and Northern Africa as a case to analyze as it is both an extreme and paradigmatic case of a regional developing power adopting a more active and aggressive line of foreign policy. The extreme nature of the case comes from the rather sudden change of Turkish foreign policy. For a long time the country followed Atatürk's principle of non-intervention that was exemplified by the slogan "peace at home, peace in the world". Largely due to that, Turkey refused to take part in military conflicts and notably even refused help for their NATO allies in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Since then the country has adopted new policies. They have started to take a lot more interest in regional matters and have been active for example in solving the Arab Spring crises and have participated in military actions on the territory of Syria and Iraq.

Turkey and its' foreign policy in the Middle East can also be considered a paradigmatic case.. Due to the turbulent actions constantly happening in that region, Middle East has for a long time been in the consciousness of the general population and heavily theorized about by the academia. Turkish foreign policy actions are relevant to what is happening in region and the world at large and intuitively feel like something that is important to research. Therefore, the selection of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East can be justified with both being an extreme and a paradigmatic case.

Although the Middle East has several regional powers, Turkey has the best claims out of them for achieving regional hegemony. That stems from mainly 2 reasons. First of all Turkey has

strong historical connections to the whole region. The Ottoman state as predecessor for modern Turkey used to control most of the territory that is called the Middle East in the present day. That gives them a special status in regional affairs and has made it possible for Neo-Ottomanism to emerge (an ideology that supports active Turkish greater foreign political engagement across the former territory of the empire). (Onar, 2009, pp. 11-12)

Due to those historical connections, Turkey has also developed interests in what is going on in Middle East in its' entirety. While other states in the region do try to exert their influence, they are mainly interested in neighboring states. For example, Iran has a very active foreign policy in the Gulf subregion, but doesn't really intervene much in Northern Africa. Turkey on the other hand attempts to gain the upper hand in the whole region and therefore has a broader scope of foreign policy.


Secondly, as illustrated by the table 1, Turkey simply has the most material capabilities in the region. They have the highest GDP in Middle East which gives them the possibility to invest in capacity to project both hard and soft power. The large population size enables them to continue their quick economic growth in the future as well as get enough manpower for their army. A big strength of Turkey compared to the other states in the long term is that Turkish economy is rather developed and mainly relies on the production of goods and creation of services. Therefore, their economic model is sustainable in the long term.

The main Turkish competitors in the region like Iran and Saudi Arabia are economies relying heavily on the export of natural resources (mainly oil and natural gas). The prices of these resources are first of all highly volatile and the economic standing of those countries overtly relies on the global market prices of oil and natural gas. Furthermore, at some point easily accessible sources of those resources will end. That means the economic model of those countries is not sustainable in the long term and for example if the market prices of natural resources drop, they will struggle to keep up their military. That makes Turkey a better candidate for a potential regional hegemon in the future.

Conceptualization and operationalization of the theory

The hypothesis set forth in the thesis is that developing regional powers adopt a more active and aggressive foreign policy as time passes. Such behavior is caused by their economic growth that allows them to spend more money on resources needed for an active foreign policy. Increased amount of resources combined with the basic structural realist theory about states wanting to achieve hegemony leads them to more dominating foreign policy. As outlined before, states are the most concerned by security threats stemming from inside their own region and therefore, their increase of foreign political activity will focus on their own region. This causal relationship is possible describe with the following arrow diagram.

Figure 1 Relations between variables



In the current case economic growth is the independent variable, increase of capabilities is the intervening variable and activation of foreign policy is the dependent variable. That means economic growth brings forward an increase of capabilities which then causes a state's foreign policy to become more active.

There are different ways how to measure the economic state and the economic growth of a country. Usually the economic growth of a country is considered to be the increase in a nation's total output. (Kuznets, 1947, pp. 26-27) Traditionally that is measured by using the gross domestic production (GDP). GDP is usually measured by taking all of the final expenditures of a state and therefore, essentially measures spending. Instead of GDP it is also for example possible to use GDI – gross domestic income that measures the earned income of the state and its' inhabitants. (Fixler, Greenaway-McGrevy, & Grimm, 2015, pp. 1-2) . Besides that things like the governmental debt and the per capita earnings can be used for indicating the health of a state's economy. In this thesis, the chosen way how to measure economic growth is using GDP. The reason for that is that GDP is the most widely used measurement of economic growth and

therefore the most accepted. It is also possible to find historically reliable data about that measurement better than for other potential measurement choices.

Increase of capabilities encompasses in itself the increase of different resources needed for a state to pursue an active foreign policy. That includes in itself both the conventional military based “hard power” capabilities and the capabilities for conducting “soft” economic based foreign policy.

Hard power capabilities have to do with a state being able to coerce others into acting in a desired way. The most obvious way how to use hard power is through military invasions or simply threatening other states with the use of military. Therefore, hard power of the state is power in the most classical sense. Soft power on the other hand is not about coercion of states, but rather about persuading other states in a diplomatic way to do ones’ bidding without the use of direct force. Soft power resources are the resources which allow a state to persuade others in such way. Those resources are mainly economic in nature, but can also be cultural or ideational. Soft and hard power do not have to exist in separation, they are often used together by states trying to influence other countries. (Wilson, 2008, pp. 114-115)

To operationalize a state’s capabilities a set of indicators will be used. To assess the traditional hard power capabilities, increase of military resources will be analyzed. For that the amount of military expenditures, the size of military personnel and the Composite Index of National Capability will be used. The Composite Index of National Capability is an index developed by J. David Singer for the Correlates of War dataset and its’ aim is to measure how big share of world’s material capabilities does a state possess. It includes the following 6 subindicators: the population, the urban population, iron and steel production, primary energy consumption, military expenditure and military personnel of a country. The Composite Index of National Capabilities is used as one of the indicators in this thesis as it is one of the oldest and most respected indicators that aims to measure the capabilities of all states in the world. Looking at military expenditures and the size of a country’s army are the most common ways how to measure military power. (Hart, 1976, pp. 289-290) As soft power centers around money and financial resources, indicators used to explore the increase of soft power resources are the change of GDP and the change of trade volume between Turkey and other countries in the region.

Activization of foreign policy is conceptualized as a state increasingly taking part in international matters. That means having direct involvement in shaping of the events happening around them and taking an active and strong stance about various international issues. The indicators used in the thesis to measure the activity of a state's foreign policy are the number of foreign visits conducted by state officials that exemplifies a direct desire to influence policy of other states and the international community at large and the number of mentioning of other states in press releases. A country that often writes in press releases about events happening abroad and taking a stance in them is a country that can be said to have a more active foreign policy.

The quantitative data used in the analysis will be gathered from different sources. The basic data about population, GDP and economic growth of a state is collected from the World Bank databank. There are several reasons for choosing that databank. First of all, it is possible to get data about different indicators needed for the current thesis from there. That is preferable from gathering data from many different places as that reduces the potential chance of inconsistencies in data. Secondly, World Bank is a trusted and respectable data source and therefore, it can be trusted to be accurate. Lastly, it has a relatively small amount of missing data holes and therefore enables to have better analysis. The Composite Index of National Capability is gathered from the latest 4.0 dataset released in 2007 by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. That institute has conducted research into military capabilities for a long time and has a favorable reputation about having as accurate as possible data. Information about Turkish foreign trade volume is gathered from the Turkish Statistical Institute as they are an official state agency of Turkey and have the most detailed and accurate information about Turkish foreign policy. Finally, the press releases used to determine Turkish foreign political activity are gathered from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' web site. Press releases published at the ministry's web site is selected as a source of information for analysis as those writings reflect the official stances of the government about a large quantity of international matters.

Research design

The empirical part of this thesis will be split into two halves. In the first part of the analysis the change of Turkish military capabilities and economic power will be looked at and compared with other states in the region. It will be done as a quantitative analysis. The second half of the analysis will use Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' press releases to see if the state's foreign

political activity has increased. It will be done mainly in a quantitative way, but elements of qualitative analysis will be used on that part as well.

Using quantitative analysis enables to find out the relationship between economic growth as the independent variable, increase of capabilities as the intervening variable and activation of foreign policy as the dependent variable and see if the hypothesis holds true. Numerical data allows drawing of clear conclusions and reduces the bias that stems from subjective interpretation of events. Quantitative analysis is especially useful in showing the link between economy and material capabilities as both of them can be easily measured in numbers.

In the second part of the analysis some qualitative methods are being used as well. In addition to determining the level of Turkish foreign political activity in the region, this thesis attempts to find out more about Turkish relations with other states in the region. Through analyzing the press releases in a qualitative way, it is possible to see if Turkey has changed its' foreign policy towards other states and if it has become more aggressive or not.

The time period covered by this thesis is 2002 to 2015. That time period is chosen because 2002 was the time when major changes in Turkish foreign policy slowly started to take place. During the elections of that year Justice and Development Party (AKP - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) together with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power. The historical results of 2002 elections left all former parliament parties outside of the new parliament as they failed to get enough support to surpass the electoral threshold and AKP managed to form an absolute majority. That event marked the beginning of the time when AKP has controlled the Turkish foreign policy. At first they followed the “zero problems” policy under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoglu that as the name indicates, was peaceful and even rather passive. (Elver, 2010) That policy was dropped rather soon and a more active and forceful Neo-Ottomanism approach replaced the “zero problems” policy. (Zalewski, 2013) The first term of Erdoğan rule could be described by him seeking legitimization to his political agenda and attempts to move closer to the European Union which resulted in rather peaceful foreign policy. Starting from his second cabinet in 2007, Turkish foreign policy shifted towards using more hard power and taking active stances in the region. Due to that, it should be possible to see a change of foreign political activity during the time period between 2002 and 2015.

Empirics

First of all, it is important to analyze whether Turkish capabilities to project power throughout the Middle East have increased in the recent times. Broadly speaking it is possible to speak separately about “soft” and “hard” power capabilities. Soft power consists of resources needed to achieve one’s desire in a peaceful way. That means mainly by diplomacy and economic coercion. The most important resource here is money as that is needed both to fund one’s diplomatic efforts and for providing other states incentives to change their policy in the desired way. (Nye, 2008, pp. 95-96) Hard power on the other hand has to do with the army and the ability to project’s ones military power when it is needed. Therefore, it is mainly about technology, weapons and the soldiers using them. To see how Turkey has improved its’ possibilities to project power in the Middle East region it is useful to look what the figures say about both economy and military.

Turkish economic power

Economic power can be used to increase a state’s power in different ways. Most importantly, achieving military supremacy requires money. Buying new military equipment, maintaining a standing army and undertaking foreign operations are all activities that require a lot of financial resources. Without a strong national economy, it is difficult for states to undertake those activities and their military strength will likely suffer. The importance of economy in military matters is likely to become even more important in the future due to the high cost of modern military technology and weaponry.

Secondly, money can be used to achieve state’s goals in a peaceful manner. Successful diplomacy needs finances to maintain effective foreign missions, aid programs and cultural exchange projects that all increase a state’s soft power. Furthermore, to reach desired diplomatic agreements it is often needed to coerce other states through providing them economic benefits (for example in the form of directly handing them money, giving it in the form of aid or preferential trade agreements) .

Lastly, strong trade relationships between two countries make them increasingly codependent of each other. Through export it is possible to make other countries dependent of the exported products and goods (especially if they are natural resources). On the other hand, large volumes of import can make other countries financially dependent on the country that imports their goods.

The best way how to measure a country's economic strength is to look at its' gross domestic product and how it changes in time. In the case of Turkey it is possible to observe a relatively rapid (by western standards) and stable economic growth in the recent years. Since 2002, the Turkish economy has grown almost constantly. It only declined in 2009 when it shrunk by 4.8% and that was caused by the global economic crisis. On other years the economic growth has been at average around 5% per year, being the highest in 2004 at 9.4% and lowest in 2008 at 0.7%. (World Bank) According to the World Bank data, Turkish gross domestic product at market prices was 232.5 billion USD in 2002. By the year 2014 it had increased to 798.4 billion USD. During the time period between 2002 and 2014, Turkish gross domestic product more than tripled in dollar value. (World Bank)

Table 2 Turkish GDP change in Lira (%)⁵

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Turkey	6.2	5.3	9.4	8.4	6.9	4.7	0.7	-4.8	9.2	8.8	2.1	4.2	2.9

The previous data indicates that Turkish economic power has grown considerably in the recent years. To achieve a dominant place in regional affairs, it is not only important to increase one's power, but to also do it quicker than the other states. Therefore, it is needed to analyze how Turkish economy has done relatively to other Middle Eastern countries.

Generally speaking, the whole Middle Eastern region has seen a quick economic growth since 2002 with most countries at least tripling their gross domestic product at market prices between then and the present day. Percentage wise, the largest gains have been made in Qatar, Iraq, Oman, Algeria and United Arab Emirates – the states that profit extensively from the export of natural resources (primarily oil). Those states are relatively small in the terms of population and had a relatively small economy to begin with. When looking at the increase of GDP in absolute terms, the picture is rather different. Turkey has managed to increase its' GDP more than any other state in the region, closely followed by Saudi Arabia while Iran and UAE have also managed to increase their GDP by more than 200 billion USD. Therefore, Turkey has gained an economic advantage over other regional states in the recent years. It be noted however, that the

⁵ Table compiled according to World Bank data

regional economic balance has only changed minimally. While in 2002 Turkish made up 18.6% of the region's economy, in 2014 their share had increased only to 18.8%.

Table 3 Gross domestic product change of Middle Eastern countries⁶

Country	GDP in 2002 (billion USD) ⁷	GDP in 2014 (billion USD) ⁸	GDP Increase between 2002 and 2014 (billion USD)	GDP Increase between 2002 and 2014 (%)
Algeria	56.8	213.5	156.7	375.9
Bahrain	9.6	33.9	24.3	353.1
Egypt	87.9	286.5	198.6	325.9
Iran	128.6	425.3	296.7	330.7
Iraq	36.6	223.5	186.9	610.7
Israel	121.1	305.7	184.6	252.4
Jordan	10.2	35.8	25.6	351
Kuwait	47.9	163.6	115.7	341.5
Lebanon	20.1	45.7	25.6	227.4
Libya	26.3	41.1	14.8	156.3
Morocco	49.8	110	60.2	220.9
Oman	21.6	81.8	60.2	378.7
Qatar	23.5	210.1	186.6	894
Saudi Arabia	214.6	746.2	531.6	347.7
Syria	21.6	40.4	18.8	187
Tunisia	23.1	48.6	25.5	210.4
Turkey	232.5	798.4	565.9	343.4
United Arab Emirates	109.8	399.5	289.7	363.8
Yemen	10.7	36	25.3	336.4

Beside gross domestic product, it is also worth to analyze the trade volume between Turkey and other Middle Eastern states. Like explained before, trade relations create codependence between states. In most cases the partner with smaller economy will become more dependent on the larger partner (Hirschman, 1969, pp. 24-26). As Turkey has the largest economy in the region, Turkey could potentially use its' trading relations against smaller states as a political weapon.

⁶ Table compiled according to World Bank data

⁷ GDP at market prices. 2004 data in the case of Iraq

⁸ GDP at market prices. 2007 data in the case of Syria and 2013 data in the case of Yemen

Turkish foreign trade with Middle Eastern countries saw a large increase between 2002 and 2015. In 2002 Turkish exports to those countries combined was worth around 5 billion dollars while Turkish imports were valued at 3 billion USD. By 2015 Turkish exports had increased to 36.5 billion USD and imports to 16 billion USD. Therefore, Turkey has started to export around 7 times more goods to the region while importing about 5 times more from countries in the Middle East. (Turkish Statistical Institute) The largest export markets of Turkey in the region in 2015 were Iraq, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia while Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel sent the most goods to Turkey. When comparing 2002 and 2015, it is possible to see that Israel has lost relative importance as a trade partner to Turkey. That is likely caused by the recent worsening of relations between those 2 countries.

Table 4 Turkish foreign trade⁹

	Export 2002 (millions of USD)	Export 2015 (millions of USD)	Import 2002 (millions of USD)	Import 2015 (millions of USD)
Algeria	514.3	1826.3	557.9	740.5
Bahrain	16.9	225.4	19	104.5
Egypt	326.4	3126.1	118.2	1215.9
Iran	334	3664.6	921	6096.3
Iraq	829.1	8555.3	41.7	296.5
Israel	861.4	2698.4	544.5	1672.5
Jordan	116.7	834.8	18.4	127.9
Kuwait	139	482.6	26.5	141.4
Lebanon	187.3	722.7	41.9	67.2
Libya	165.1	1420.3	41.8	195.8
Morocco	138.3	1337.9	68.3	710.6
Oman	31.4	324.9	0.1	60.2
Qatar	15.6	423.1	10.7	361
Saudi Arabia	554.6	3473.1	120.8	2117.2
Syria	266.8	1524.1	314.8	51.5
Tunisia	121.1	819.2	71.8	144.1
UAE	457.3	4681.5	100.8	2008.7
Yemen	119.4	395.8	0.3	11
Total	5194.7	36535.8	3018.3	16122.8

⁹ Table compiled based on Turkish Statistical Institute's data

A notable change can be seen when looking at the importance of Middle East and North Africa as Turkish trading partners. In 2002 trade with that region made up around 8.8% of all Turkish imports and about 9.1% of the exports. In 2015 the region had a share of 8.1% of all Turkish imports and 27.5% share of all of the exports. (Turkish Statistical Institute) Therefore, Middle East and North Africa have maintained their importance to Turkey as an import market, but have become a much more significant export market for Turkish goods.

Increase of trade with the region means two things for Turkey. On one hand their foreign policy priorities are likely to follow trade patterns. The more countries trade with each other, the more invested they are in having friendly relations and maintaining stability. Therefore, to protect own trade interests, Turkey is likely to adopt a more active role in the Middle East to safeguard the stability of the region. On the other hand stronger economic ties also mean that Turkey will have more opportunities to project its' soft power capabilities in the region for whatever goals the state desires to achieve.

Turkish military power

Military power is definitely one of the most important things a state needs to achieve an internationally dominant position. Most obviously, military power is needed to solve conflicts in a violent manner when diplomacy fails to work and to protect ones' own state against enemies. Even when conducting international diplomacy, having military power is important, as it gives a state a better starting point at negotiations and increase credibility of threats and demands they make. (Robert J. & Kelly M., 2009, pp. 1-3)

As military is important for the survival of the state, it is notoriously difficult to find reliable data about it. All countries want to keep at least some parts of the information regarding their military secret. Otherwise they could reveal vital information to ones' enemies. Therefore, there is often a need to use estimations made by experts and researchers when speaking about militaries of different countries. As Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries have problems with the lack of transparency in governance, estimates about those countries can be a bit off the mark. While estimates are not perfect, they are made by experts who know what they are doing and therefor still give a good general picture about military capabilities of countries. This study uses the estimates of military spending done by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute as they

have reliably assessed military spending by different countries for a long time and have as few as possible data holes in their databases.

Military spending is the easiest indicator to use as a proxy of state's military power. (Tellis, Bially, Layne, & McPherson, 2000, p. 136) Like any approach it has its' own weak sides. That approach assumes that every country uses money with the same efficiency and that states' military equipment turns obsolete fairly quickly due to the advancement of technology. In reality that is not necessarily the case, but there aren't much better ways how to compare military power than that.

In 2002 Turkey was the third biggest military spender in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia and Israel. Turkey ranking in military spending in 2014 remains the same while United Arab Emirates replace Israel as the 2nd biggest spender on military. During the time period Turkish military spending has increased around 2.5 times, which is a little below the average in the region. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014) By looking at the increase of military spending in absolute terms, Turkey has the biggest increase after Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Therefore, it seems that as time passes, Turkey gains an upper hand against states like Iran, Iraq and Egypt, but may fall behind rich Gulf states in military power.

Turkish military spending as a percentage from GDP has changed a little over the time. In late 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey spent around 4% of its' GDP for military. Due to the 2001 financial crisis, that level of spending started to decrease rapidly until 2006. Since then Turkish military spending level has stayed around 2% of the GDP. (Yentürk, 2014, pp. 14-15) Therefore, the economic growth of Turkey and the increase of its' military spending have been strongly linked in the recent years.

Table 5 Military spending of countries in the Middle East¹⁰

Country	Military spending in 2002 (millions of USD) ¹¹	Military spending in 2014 (millions of USD) ¹²	Increase in the time period (%)	Increase in the time period (millions of USD)
Algeria	2101	11862	565	9761
Bahrain	443	1433	323	990
Egypt	2831	4961	175	2130
Iran	3244	12719	392	9475
Iraq	614	9516	1550	8902
Israel	9949	15908	160	5959
Jordan	522	1268	243	746
Kuwait	2822	5824	206	3002
Lebanon	907	2121	234	1214
Libya	453	3302	729	2849
Morocco	1475	4050	275	2575
Oman	2491	9623	386	7132
Qatar	761	1877	247	1116
Saudi Arabia	18502	80762	437	62260
Syria	1103	2495	226	1392
Tunisia	345	906	263	561
Turkey	9050	22618	250	13568
UAE	5354	22755	425	17401
Yemen	737	1715	233	978

Second indicator that is often used to represent a state's military power is the size of its' armed forces (that includes both the military and paramilitary type forces). The manpower of a state shows how large force a country could send out to fight in the case of an actual military conflict. Even though weaponry and technology are becoming increasingly important in modern warfare, it is not possible to win a direct conflict without having enough soldiers.

¹⁰ Table compiled based on SIPRI data

¹¹ Iraq's data from 2004

¹² Iran's data from 2012, Kuwait's data from 2013, Qatar's data from 2010 and Syria's data from 2011

The amount of military personnel is connected with the population of the state and therefore usually doesn't change rapidly. Between 2002 and 2013 Turkish military personnel has dropped from 664800 to 612800 which means a decrease of slightly less than 10%. (World Bank) Other states of the region have mostly maintained a stable amount of soldiers. The exceptions here are Iraq and Syria as they have lost most of their army in recent violent conflicts. As those 2 states are direct neighbors of Turkey, it is possible to say that the balance of military power has somewhat shifted in Turkish favor.

Table 6 Military personnel of states in the Middle East¹³

Country	Military personnel in 2002	Military personnel in 2013	Change
Algeria	317900	317200	-700
Bahrain	20900	19460	-1440
Egypt	773000	835500	62500
Iran	560000	563000	3000
Iraq	432000	177600	-254400
Israel	169500	184500	15000
Jordan	110200	115500	5300
Kuwait	22100	22600	500
Lebanon	84800	80000	-4800
Libya	76500	7000	-69500
Morocco	246300	245800	-500
Oman	46100	47000	900
Qatar	12400	11800	-600
Saudi Arabia	215000	251500	36500
Syria	427000	178000	-249000
Tunisia	47000	47800	800
Turkey	664800	612800	-52000
UAE	41500	63000	21500
Yemen	136500	137900	1400

There is a strong relationship between the economic situation in Turkey and the amount of some power projection resources Turkey has. Most notably the amount of money Turkey has and the amount of money it spends on military is strongly linked. During every year that Turkish GDP grew, the military spending increased as well. When the Turkish economy shrunk (measured in USD) in 2009 and 2014, so did the military spending. A regression analysis made based on the


¹³ Compiled based on World Bank data

table below indicates that at average the increase of Turkish GDP by 58,6 billion USD increased military spending by 1 billion USD. The linear regression has an R-squared of 0,97 that indicates a very strong link between military spending and GDP. On the other hand economic growth and the size of Turkish military seem to be unlinked as while the Turkish economy keeps growing, the number of military personnel decreases.

Table 7 Turkish GDP and military spendings

Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Military spending (billion USD)	9.1	10.3	10.9	12.1	13.4	15.3	17.1	16.4	17.9	17.3	18	18.6	17.8
GDP (billion USD)	232.5	303	392.2	483	530.9	647.2	730.3	614.6	731.2	774.8	788.9	823.2	798.4

Table 8 Relation between GDP and military spendings



In conclusion it is possible to say that neither the economic nor militaristic balance of power in the Middle East have changed a lot between 2002 and 2015. Turkey was and still is the largest economic power in the region, but has not increased its' lead by a lot. One thing that has changed is that Turkey has started to export considerably more goods to other states in the region and that may increase Turkish soft power capabilities. Turkey has not managed to achieve supremacy in

the region militarily wise either and is relatively as strong now as in 2002. The most important development has been that Iraq and Syria – 2 states bordering Turkey – have become noticeably militarily weaker. That may allow Turkey to project its’ power in the territory of those states more easily, but also possess a security risk due to Iraq and Syria failing to maintain stability in their own states. There is a strong link between Turkish military spending and its’ economic growth, but such connection does not exist between economic growth and the number of military personnel.

Turkish activity in the Middle East

In addition to having strong military and enough economic resources, a country that desires to become an important actor in regional matters, also has to be active in its’ region. Having a lot of resources without using them does not help a state to achieve a leading role in its’ region, but actively taking a stance in regional matters and using those resources to assert one’s own influence in the region does. Therefore, it is worth to look into how Turkey has conducted its’ foreign political activity in the Middle East region and if anything has changed in the recent years.

There is no straightforward way of measuring how actively a state conducts its’ foreign policy. Foreign policy encompasses a wide spectrum of activities in itself, starting from simply committing a speech act about some topic to signing trade agreements to undertaking hostile activities like invasions or creating sanctions. This thesis is going to use two methods of measuring general foreign political activity. First of them is measuring visits made by state officials to foreign countries. Foreign visits by state officials are important as during them diplomacy is conducted and different types of agreements are signed. Frequent visits to a specific foreign country show that relations with that state are being prioritized and that there are enough relevant topics between the 2 countries to discuss. During foreign visits it is possible for state officials to actively shape the relations between countries in question and therefore to assert their state’s foreign political influence.

Second thing that will be analyzed is the political statements made by the foreign ministry of Turkey regarding other countries. There are many events happening all over the world daily, but not everything is considered to be important enough to give opinion about. Therefore, there is always some sort of selection about what specific events a state should take an official stance on

and what events are not overly important. An active foreign policy inside of a region means that a state prioritizes events happening inside their own region and takes political stances about regional matters. It could be hardly said that for example Turkey has an active foreign policy towards another country if that state is never mentioned by the Turkish foreign policy establishment.

To find out where Turkish officials are conducting foreign visits to and what countries are the spoken about in the Turkish foreign political communication, official press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' web page are used.¹⁴ Turkey publishes press releases in Turkish and in English, but for this thesis only the ones written in English are used. Ministry of Foreign Affairs' press releases are a reliable source about Turkish foreign policy for several reasons. First of all, they are published by the foreign ministry and therefore always reflect the official stances and policy adopted by the Turkish government. That differs from for example analyzing the speech acts or travel destinations of a single politician as politicians have the tendency to sometimes express their own personal opinion or go against the official policies of the state.

Secondly, the ministry of foreign affairs only publishes press releases about the most important events and visit. Before publishing press statements the ministry actually has to consider what is important in relations to Turkish foreign policy and what is not. Therefore, the press releases ignore everything that does not matter for the Turkish foreign political establishment. That mechanic acts as a sort of a filter removing everything unimportant. Not every visit by the prime minister or president is important and a lot of visits by lower level officials can be considered important based on the context. Using the press releases by the ministry means that they have done the work of separating important from the meaningless.

Lastly, using official press releases offers a large, but finite amount of material to analyze. The number of press releases is large enough to enable meaningful analysis based on them, yet clearly delimitate so there are less questions about what to include in the analysis and what to leave out.

¹⁴ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?248a41bb-6744-4d91-91f7-500bd7a2cac1>

The press releases used in the analysis come from the years between 2007 and 2015. Before the year 2007, the number of press releases given out by the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs in English was too low to enable a meaningful way to analyze them quantitatively. In the years between 2007 and 2015, the number of press releases in English total at 1993. The number of press releases varies yearly and ranges from 86 in 2011 to 399 in 2014. It is worth noting that the difference in number of press releases in English stems from two different factors. Turkey has started posting press releases more frequently in their web site in general – that means they are taking a stance in more international topics than before. Secondly, it seems that the ministry of foreign affairs does not publish all of their press releases in both Turkish and English. As time has gone on, the percentage of press releases being published in both languages has increased from around 60% to nearly 100%. The only year when there is a noticeably small amount of press releases translated into English is in 2011 when only 26,9% of the press releases appear in English. The following year for example already 97,3% of the ministry’s press releases were translated. The number of press releases analyzed by year is brought out in the table below.

Table 9 Number of press releases¹⁵

Year	Press releases in English	Press releases in Turkish	% of press releases translated into English
2007	139	184	75.5
2008	153	223	68.6
2009	135	247	54.7
2010	149	298	50
2011	86	320	26.9
2012	287	295	97.3
2013	337	347	97.1
2014	399	407	98
2015	308	318	96.9
Total	1993	2639	75.5

Visits by Turkish state officials

To analyze visits conducted by the Turkish state officials, English language press releases from 2007 to 2015 were used. At first press releases that contained the word “visit” in their title were

¹⁵ Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web site

looked for. Out of those only the press releases that indicated that a Turkish state official visited another country were included in the analysis (the press releases that were about a foreign official visiting Turkey were disregarded as they do not show activity from the Turkish side).

By using this method, 173 suitable press releases were found. Out of those 33 were about Turkish officials visiting various Middle East countries and 140 about visits to other parts of the world.¹⁶ That meant at average visits to the Middle East made up 19.1% of all of the visits reported by the press releases. There was a general trend of increasing number of reported visits to both the Middle East and to the whole world as time moved on. While in 2007 only 7 foreign visits were reported, in 2013 already 38 were noted. In 2010 there was no press release where the headline indicated a Turkish state official visiting another country in the Middle East, in 2013 and 2014 there were 9 such reports a year.

Table 10 Visits by Turkish officials¹⁷

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Total visits	7	17	10	8	7	23	38	34	29	173
Visits to the Middle East	3	2	1	0	2	4	9	9	3	33

As previously stated, the number of total press releases given out by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a great yearly variation. Therefore, one must also account for that and look at the number of visits to the Middle East as a share from all of the press releases and as a share from all of the reported foreign visits. At average during that time period around 1,7% of all press released were about visits to countries in the Middle East. That share was the highest in 2013 at 2,7% and lowest in 2010 at 0% (as there were no reported visits to the region). Out of all foreign visits the highest share of visits were made to the Middle East in 2007 when 42,9% of the visits went to the region and the lowest share was seen again in 2010. When using a regression analysis to explore the correlation between time and visits to the states in the Middle East, no significant and strong linear correlation was found.

¹⁶ All press releases referring to foreign visits by Turkish officials are listed in annex 1

¹⁷ Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' web site

Table 11 Share of visits to the Middle East¹⁸

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average
% of visits to the Middle East from all visits	42.9	11.8	10	0	28.6	17.4	23.7	26.5	10.3	19.1
% of press releases to Middle East from all press releases	2.2	1.3	0.7	0	2.3	1.4	2.7	2.3	1	1.7

Looking at the states Turkish officials have been reported to visit, a few general trends emerge. The most popular countries to visit are Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. All of them are relatively influential and powerful countries in the region. Therefore, it is likely that these states have an important place in Turkish foreign policy and also get visited more often than other states because of that. Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar and Tunisia were also visited relatively often compared to the other states. However, no visits to Algeria, Israel, Morocco or United Arab Emirates were deemed important enough to make a separate press release about. Most of those states happen to be rather far away from Turkey and are not major geopolitical players in the region. No visits to Israel could be explained by the hostile relations between the two states. From the following chart it is possible to see that the number of visits by Turkish officials to states in the region have become more frequent as time passes. A large increase of activity is seen especially since 2012. The only 2 countries where the majority of reported visits happened before 2012 were Egypt and Lebanon.

¹⁸ Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' web site

Table 12 Number of visits to Middle East countries by year¹⁹

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Algeria										0
Bahrain			1				1	1		3
Egypt	1									1
Iran						1	2	1		4
Iraq	1						1	2		4
Israel										0
Jordan							1	1		2
Kuwait	1						1		1	3
Lebanon	1	1				1				3
Libya								2		2
Morocco										0
Oman		1					1			2
Palestine							1			1
Qatar							1	1	1	3
Saudi Arabia	1				1	1	1	2		6
Syria							1			1
Tunisia					1			2		3
UAE										0
Yemen			1			1			1	3

General mentions in press releases


To analyze the general interest of Turkish foreign political establishment in countries of the Middle East, press releases from 2007 to 2015 will be analyzed again. This time all of the English language press releases that explicitly mentioned the name of another country (or a demonym stemming from the name of a country) in the Middle East in their title were selected. That means press releases mentioning vague geographical regions or cities were left out of the analysis. Out of the 1993 press releases written between 2007 and 2014, 496 of them fulfilled the stated criterion.²⁰ Around a quarter of all Turkish Ministry of Foreign affairs press releases in English were directly about countries in the Middle East. The largest share of press releases concerning the Middle East countries was seen in 2012 when 31,3% of the writings were about countries in that region. The lowest interest in the region was found in 2010 when only 13,4% of the press releases were about the Middle East. In general there is a rather noticeable positive correlation between time and the share of press releases mentioning Middle Eastern countries in

¹⁹ Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' web site

²⁰ All such press releases are named in annex 2

the title. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Middle East in general has become more written about and therefore more important for Turkish foreign policy establishment.

Table 13 Correlation between the share of press releases about Middle East countries and time



Looking at mentions of individual states in the region, Iraq is clearly the most popular country. It is mentioned a total of 96 times and it was the most mentioned Middle Eastern country in 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2014. Therefore, it can be said that Iraq has had an important place in Turkish foreign policy for the entirety of the analyzed period. Second most mentioned country by Turkey was Israel at 67 mentions. Israel together with Lebanon were the most mentioned countries in 2008. Similarly to Iraq, Israel was often written about during the entire time period. Third most mentioned state by Turkey was Syria. Unlike the two most popular states, Syria was not high in Turkish agenda during the entire time period. It was the most written about state in 2012 and got many mentions after that year, but was not written about much before 2012. That had to do with the escalation of Syrian civil war in 2012 which was an important event for Turkey. Libya and Yemen were the only other countries mentioned more than 40 times. Both of those countries became a focus of Turkey after 2012 and most of their mentioning regards the civil conflicts happening in those states.

On the other hand there were several countries that weren't even mentioned at average once a year. Those countries are Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar and United Arab Emirates. Noticeably those countries all have a rather small population and low level of

power compared to other states in the region. While some of those states like Algeria and Morocco were involved in the Arab Spring protest, it was simply not enough to get the attention of Turkish foreign policy establishment – Algeria for example was not even mentioned once during 2010-2012 when Algerian protests took place.

Table 14 Mentions of Middle East countries by year²¹

Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Algeria	2	1					1	1	1	6
Bahrain			1		1	1	2	2	1	8
Egypt	1				1	6	12	8	10	38
Iran	3	1	3	6	1	5	7	6	2	34
Iraq	12	4	6	3	1	16	26	20	8	96
Israel	1	11	3	10	2	20	6	7	7	67
Jordan		1	1				2	1	1	6
Kuwait							2	1	2	5
Lebanon	1	11	1			3	7	1	2	26
Libya					3	2	7	14	15	41
Morocco					1	1				2
Oman		1					1	1		3
Palestine	6		1	3	1	14	3	8	3	39
Qatar							2	1	2	5
Saudi Arabia	2				1	3	1	1	6	14
Syria		5				26	13	10	3	57
Tunisia		2			1	1	2	8	4	18
UAE		1			1			1		3
Yemen			4			9	8	11	14	46
Total	28	38	20	22	14	107	102	102	81	514

In addition to simply finding out the frequency of mentions of different states in the Middle East, an analysis was conducted about the attitude of Turkey towards other states in the region. For that methodology was adopted from Stefano Braghiroli and Irena Fiket. (Braghiroli & Fiket, 2012, pp. 113-114) Turkish attitude towards other states in the region was taken as a variable ranging on a 3 point scale from 1 (positive attitude) to -1 (negative attitude)

²¹ Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' web site

For every press release, it was determined if the general attitude of message was positive, neutral or negative towards the country that was written about. In case of countries that were undergoing a civil war (for example Syria and Iraq) the opinion expressed towards the reigning government of the state was viewed.

A press release was determined to have a positive tone if it included words or phrases that indicated Turkish government's approval with the course of events happening in the mentioned country. Such words and phrases were for example "welcome" (as in No:124 - 11 July 2008 "We welcome the establishment of the national unity government in the framework of the agreement that was reached among the Lebanese groups in Doha last May"), being pleased (as in No: 271, 10 October 2015 "We are very pleased that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2015 was awarded to the civil society group, the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet."), "congratulate" (as in No: 364, 26 November 2014, "We congratulate the people of Tunisia, who went to the polls for the first time in order to directly elect the President of the Republic, for their successful passing the test of democracy.") and calling something a "significant step" (as in No: 372, 03 December 2014, "We consider the holding of elections in Bahrain for the Council of Representatives and municipalities which constitute the most important basis of political participation in the country as a significant step taken towards national dialogue, reconciliation and reform."). In addition to these types of words and phrases, a press release was considered to have a positive tone if it explicitly characterized another state or its' inhabitants in an overtly positive manner that emphasizes good relations between Turkey and the state in question.. Such characterization was for example the phrase "friendly and brotherly" (as in No: 210, 21 July 2015 "Turkey is in solidarity with friendly and brotherly Algeria in its fight against terrorism.)

Press releases were determined to have a negative tone if they included words or phrases that indicated Turkish government's disapproval with the course of events happening in the mentioned country. Those phrases for example included "deeply concerned (as in No: 33, 1 February 2012 "We are deeply concerned by the sharp escalation of the Syrian Administration's acts of violence against its own people and the consequent loss of lives."), strongly condemn (as in No: 252, 13 September 2015, "We strongly condemn the intrusion of the Israeli security forces into Haram Al-Sharif in the morning hours of 13 September clashing with the Muslim groups inside and blocking the entry of the Muslims for a certain period of time by using force."

and protest (as in No: 115, 31 May 2010 “We protest in the strongest terms the use of force by the Israeli Defense Forces against the civilians from many countries who want to transport humanitarian assistance to the people in Gaza...”) It is worth noting that a press release was considered to have a negative tone only if such words and phrases were directed against the government of a foreign country. That means the press releases where Turkey condemned terrorist attacks against civilians were not automatically considered to have a negative tone towards the countries where the attacks happened. Those press releases were considered to have a negative tone when the local government was blamed about not stopping the attacks that happened.

Press releases were considered to be neutral in two different cases. In the first instance, the press releases were either very short or just passingly mentioned the name of a country. In such cases there simply wasn't anything that indicated an opinion about the mentioned country. For example the entire text of press release No: 217, 3 August 2013 was “H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey will pay a visit to Iran to attend, on behalf of H.E. Mr. Abdullah Gül, President of the Republic of Turkey, the inauguration ceremony to be held in Tehran on 4 August 2013 for Dr. Hassan Rouhani who won the Presidential Elections in Iran.” Secondly, press releases were considered neutral when they included mixed positive and negative opinions towards a country.

For further analyzing, press releases that carried a positive tone were given the value of 1, neutral press releases the value of 0 and negative press releases the value of -1. Then a yearly average score of press releases for every country and year combination was taken. A score of -1 to -0,34 was determined to signify Turkey having a negative opinion towards a state, -0,33 to 0,33 indicated a neutral opinion and 0,33 to 1 was a sign of friendly relations between Turkey and another state. (Braghiroli & Fiket, 2012, pp. 113-114) Based on that a table was compiled that shows how Turkish relations with other states of the region have changed in time.²²

²² All press releases together with a rating of tone given to them can be seen in annex 2

Table 15 Attitude of Turkey towards countries in the Middle East by year²³

Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Algeria	0.5	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	1	0.5
Bahrain	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	0.5	1	0	0.43
Egypt	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	0.83	-0.5	0.13	-0.4	-0.1
Iran	0.33	0	0.67	0.33	0	0.2	0.43	0.33	0.5	0.35
Iraq	0.17	0.5	0.33	1	0	0.81	0.46	0.5	0.29	0.48
Israel	-0.5	-0.27	-1	-0.5	-1	-0.9	-0.86	-0.79	-1	-0.7
Jordan	N/A	1	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.5	0	0	0.33
Kuwait	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.5	0	0	0.17
Lebanon	0.5	0.364	1	N/A	1	0.33	0.14	1	1	0.43
Libya	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.67	1	0.57	0.571	0.07	0.37
Morocco	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.5
Oman	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0
Palestine	0.17	N/A	0	1	0	0.14	1	0.88	0.67	0.46
Qatar	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0.5	0.2
Saudi Arabia	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0.33	0	1	0.67	0.43
Syria	N/A	0.2	N/A	N/A	N/A	-0.8	-0.5	-0.73	0	-0.6
Tunisia	N/A	0.5	N/A	N/A	0	0	1	1	0.75	0.78
UAE	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	-1	N/A	0
Yemen	N/A	N/A	0.75	N/A	N/A	1	0.88	0.91	0.43	0.76

In general Turkey seems to have mainly positive relations with majority of the states in the region. The only two countries that had most press releases indicating a negative Turkish opinion were Israel and Syria. Israeli actions warranted a negative reaction by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the entire observed time period. Most of the negativity was concerning Israeli actions in Palestinian territories. Turkey frequently condemned the use of force against Palestinian civilians and protested against the illegal Israeli settlements being built.²⁴ On the other hand, the same press releases often mentioned Palestine in a positive light and depicted Palestinians as victims of oppressive Israeli occupation.

²³ Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' web site

²⁴ For example No: 235, 8 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Operation Initiated by Israel against Gaza and No: 354, 13 November 2014, Press Release Regarding Israel's Aggressive Acts in Jerusalem and its Illegal settlement activities

In the case of Syria things were a little bit different. The country didn't get much attention from Turkey until 2012 and before that year, Syria was depicted in a neutral or even somewhat positive way (for example in statements concerning the Syrian-Israeli peace talks).²⁵ However, since 2012 and the escalation of Syrian civil war, the opinion of Turkey towards the Syrian government sharply declined. Instead of the previously neutral to positive stance, Turkey started to harshly criticize the actions of al-Assad and voiced their support for the toppling of the government.²⁶ The rhetoric concerning Syria changed starkly and the traditional Turkish foreign policy line of non-involvement was dropped.

Other countries that saw a decline of relations with Turkey were Egypt and Iraq. Before 2013, Egypt was mostly written about in a positive light. For example in 2012 many of the press releases were about the democratic elections in Egypt and welcoming the new administration of Mohammed Morsi.²⁷ Since the 2013 Egyptian *coup d'état* relations between the two countries have deteriorated and the actions undertaken by general el-Sisi's government are mostly condemned by Turkey.²⁸

Iraq was the most mentioned state in the Middle East in all of the press releases. Most of those mentioned Iraq in a neutral or a positive way and a large share of the writings were about the Turkish government condemning terrorism against the "brotherly" people of Iraq.²⁹ In 2014 a lot of the press releases also welcomed political developments in Iraq.³⁰ However in 2014 and 2015 Turkey also started criticizing Iraq for not allowing Turkish forces to carry out attacks against the Kurds in Iraq. The Iraqi government was accused of taking no actions against PKK and therefore helping the terrorist organization.³¹ Due to that Turkey started to adopt a noticeably more aggressive and critical stance towards Iraq.

²⁵ For example NO:136 - 30 July 2008, Press Release Regarding the Fourth Round of the Indirect Peace Talks Between Syria and Israel Under the Auspices of Turkey

²⁶ For example No: 74, 19 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the Interim Government by the Syrian National Coalition

²⁷ For example No. 25, 24 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Elections for the People's Assembly Held in Egypt

²⁸ For example No: 192, 4 July 2013, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Egypt

²⁹ For example No: 326, 21 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq

³⁰ For example No: 268, 12 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the Latest Political Developments in Iraq

³¹ For example No: 220, 31 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Statement of the Iraqi Government about Turkey's Operations towards the PKK Targets

On the other hand Turkey was very positive about the governments of Tunisia and Yemen. In the case of Tunisia, Turkey welcomed the democratic reforms undertaken by the country since 2013.³² Reforms in that country were highlighted as beneficial to the entire region and the support of Turkey to the government of Tunisia was often repeated. In the case of Yemen most of the press releases were either about terrorist attacks conducted in that country or about the civil war.³³ Turkey has clearly taken a stance that supports the side of the government in the ongoing conflict and therefor mostly expressed support to the government forces and condemned all of the terrorist attacks against Yemeni government and “brotherly” people.

Libya, Iran, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are rest of the states that were mentioned more than 25 times and all of them received neutral to positive reactions from Turkey. Press releases about Libya roughly fell into 2 types. In first of them, the press releases reported about terrorist attacks where Turkey offered its’ condolences in a rather neutral way and urged all parties to seek peaceful resolution to their conflict.³⁴ The second type of press releases welcomed political advances made by the government in national reconciliation and democratization.³⁵ Iran likewise was mentioned in many neutral press releases about terrorist attacks happening on its’ territory.³⁶ The positive messages were mainly about reaching a deal concerning Iran’s nuclear project, but also for example welcoming the selection of Hassan Rouhani as the new president of Iran.³⁷ Lebanon was mainly mentioned in 2008 both in a positive light regarding elections and formation of a new unity government and in a more neutral way urging all of the parties of clashes happening in Lebanon to maintain peace³⁸. Saudi Arabia had the most mentions of state visits happening between Turkey and any other country in the region. Press releases concerning those visits however were often short and only stated that bilateral relations are going to be discussed.³⁹ Many press releases also mentioned terrorist attacks happening in Saudi Arabia.⁴⁰

³²For example No: 31, 28 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the New Tunisian Constitution

³³ For example No: 303, 23 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Yemen

³⁴ For example No: 69, 20 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in the Libyan City of Qubbah

³⁵ For example No: 170, 27 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the New Libyan Government

³⁶ For example No: 191, 18 October 2009, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in Iran and

³⁷ For example No: 101, 17 May 2010, Press Release Regarding the Agreement on Iran's Nuclear Programme No: 172, 16 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Presidential Elections in Iran

³⁸ For example NO:95 - 29 May 2008, Press Release Regarding the New Government in Lebanon andNo: 181, 24 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Fighting in the Lebanese City of Sidon.

³⁹ For example No: 163, 9 July 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Saudi Arabia

Compared to other state in the region, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia were more likely to be called “friendly” and “brotherly”.

Other states in the region received a relatively low amount of mentions and therefore, it is difficult to make sweeping conclusions about Turkish foreign policy changes regarding those states. Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates each got an average of less than 1 mention per year. Press releases about those states were usually rather short and neutral or somewhat positive in tone. Out of those states only the United Arab Emirates received strong criticism by Turkey. In 2014 UAE was criticized for supporting the military coup in Egypt and making statements against Turkey supporting democratic uprisings in the region.⁴¹ That may indicate Turkey adopting a more hostile stance against the United Arab Emirates, but it is not possible to reliably determinate it based on only 1 press release.

⁴⁰ For example No: 167, 30 May 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Against a Mosque in Saudi Arabia

⁴¹ No: 306, 27 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates

Table 16 Attitude of Turkey towards states of the Middle East⁴²

Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Algeria	+	+	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	=	=	+	+
Bahrain	N/A	N/A	=	N/A	N/A	=	+	+	=	+
Egypt	=	N/A	N/A	N/A	+	+	-	=	-	=
Iran	+	=	+	+	=	=	+	+	+	+
Iraq	=	+	+	+	=	+	+	+	=	+
Israel	-	=	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jordan	N/A	+	=	N/A	N/A	N/A	+	=	=	+
Kuwait	=	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	+	=	=	=
Lebanon	+	+	+	N/A	+	+	=	+	+	+
Libya	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	+	+	+	+	=	+
Morocco	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	+	=	N/A	N/A	N/A	+
Oman	N/A	=	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	=	=	N/A	=
Palestine	=	N/A	=	+	=	=	+	+	+	+
Qatar	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	=	=	+	=
Saudi Arabia	=	N/A	N/A	N/A	=	+	=	+	+	+
Syria	N/A	=	N/A	N/A	N/A	-	-	-	=	-
Tunisia	N/A	+	N/A	N/A	=	=	+	+	+	+
UAE	N/A	=	N/A	N/A	+	N/A	N/A	-	N/A	=
Yemen	N/A	N/A	+	N/A	N/A	+	+	+	+	+

In conclusions it is possible to say that in the time period between 2007 and 2015 Turkish relations with most of the states in the Middle East have not changed much. However, Turkey has become more hostile towards Syria and Egypt and has started to publish critical messages directed at those 2 states. Therefore, it is possible to say that the rhetoric of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has become somewhat more aggressive towards at least some of the state in the region.

Economic growth and activity in the region


In the theoretical part of this thesis a hypothesis about the connection of economic growth and level of foreign political activity of a state was made. It was theorized that the more a country's economy grows, the more active it will become in foreign policy. Therefore, the connection between GDP growth and the 2 indicators used to measure Turkish activity in the region (share

⁴² Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' web site

of visits to the Middle East and the share of mentioning of Middle East states) will be explored here.


The following graph shows the covariance of Turkish economic growth and the share of Turkish press releases mentioning visits to states in the Middle East in their title. The visits made by the officials are represented on the graph with a delay of 1 year. That is done because reacting to the economic situation of the state takes time and adjustments in the foreign policy can't be done instantly. The graph clearly shows that the economic growth in the previous year and the number of visits done by the Turkish officials have a strong connection. Notably the economic regression of 2009 is followed by a decrease of foreign visits in 2010 and as the economic growth picks up in the following years, so do Turkish officials become more active in travelling.

Table 17 Economic growth and share of visits to the Middle East




Running a simple linear regression analysis between those 2 variables shows that at average 1% of economic growth increases the share of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' press releases mentioning visits to countries in the Middle East by 0,13%. The correlation between those 2 variables is rather significant and has an R-squared of 0,41. That means roughly 41% of the variance in visits to Middle Eastern countries could be explained by the economic growth of Turkey.

Table 18 Economic growth and visits to the Middle East



Likewise, when graphing the percentage of Foreign Ministry’s press releases mentioning states in the Middle East with Turkish economic growth with a 1 year delay, a covariance can be seen. The share of writings about states in the Middle East dropped considerably after the 2009 economic crisis and reached its’ highest peak in 2011 after two years of strong economic growth.


Table 19 Economic growth and mentions of Middle East



Linear regression analysis between those 2 variables shows that there is a positive correlation. For every 1% of economic growth, the frequency of Middle East countries being mentioned in

the press release titles of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased by 0,64 percentage points. The R-squared of this correlation is 0,17 which indicates a 17% explanation power of the chosen model.

Table 20 Economic growth and the share of press releases mentioning Middle East states



The correlation between economic growth and the indicators of foreign political activity seem to confirm the hypothesis that countries with faster economic growth are becoming more active in their regional foreign policy. Or at least such hypothesis holds true in the case of Turkey.

Analytical findings

During the period between 2002 and 2015 Turkish economy has grown considerably and together with that military spending have grown as well. As the entire region of the Middle East is developing quickly, Turkey has not managed to increase the amount of power project capabilities the state has compared to other countries in the region. The general pattern of power in the region is quite similar to what it was in the beginning to the century. Notable changes are the weakening of Iraq and Syria.

Turkish military strength is strongly related to the country's economic power. The share of military spending has constantly been around 2%. That means the growth in military expenditures stems mainly from the economic growth of the state and a continuing fast economic

growth could help Turkey to develop a stronger military than other states in the region. On the other hand, the size of active military personnel is not significantly affected by economic growth at all.

The thesis used Turkish foreign trade with other states of the Middle East as an indicator of Turkish soft economic power over those countries. The amount of exports of Turkey into Middle East countries has increased rapidly. The share of export Turkey sends to the region increased from 9,1% to 27,5%. That means Turkey has made other states of the region a lot more dependent on itself economically and due to that achieved a greater level of power and influence. Increase of exports into the region is directly fueled by the Turkish economic growth as exports to other parts of the world have not decreased.

Turkish activity in the Middle East region has increased in the recent years. More visits by the Turkish officials are conducted to states in the region and an increasingly large number of press releases given out by Turkey concern countries of the Middle East. Both of these indicators covariate and correlate strongly with Turkish economic growth. During the years after economic regression fewer visits are conducted to neighboring states and fewer statements are made about states of the Middle East. During economic hardship, the country simply has fewer resources to spend for foreign policy and spends more attention to solving domestic issues.

Out of the countries of the Middle East, states that are more powerful (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran) are paid more visits by the Turkish officials meaning that those states that could shape the future of the whole region are prioritized by Turkish foreign policy establishment. Likewise Turkey mentions those states more than others in their press releases as well. Turkey has stable and friendly relations with most of the states of the region. However, it is possible to see Turkey adopting more critical and assertive stance towards Syria, Iraq and Egypt in the recent year. That likely signifies Turkish attempts to gain greater influence in the region. Notably, both Syria and Iraq have lost relative power in the region compared to Turkey and therefor have become easy targets for Turkey to assert its' influence on.

The hypothesis of this thesis stated that economic growth of regional powers causes them to become more active and asserting in regional politics (through enabling them to increase the amount of resources they have for foreign policy). This hypothesis is true in the case of Turkey.

However, the impact of economic growth on foreign political activity is somewhat lower than expected. That stems from the fact that during the same time period other countries in the region had a similar level of economic growth and therefore, the balance of power in the region did not change much. Turkey shows clear signs in trying to take a more prominent role in the region, but they are still very far from getting close to hegemonic position.

Conclusions

The focus of the current thesis was on the relationship between economic growth and foreign political activity in the case of regional powers in developing regions. The hypothesis set out to be tested was that economic growth allows regional powers to increase the amount of resources they have for foreign policy and that enables them to take a more active and assertive role in regional politics. To analyze the hypothesis a single case study of Turkey in the Middle East region was used.

Theoretical part of the thesis dealt with conceptualizing regions in international relations. For that Barry Buzan and Ole Waever's theory of regional security complexes was used. According to that states are bound together in coherent regions based on common security threats and interactions. Inside those regions, basic principles of international relations apply. As posited by the neorealist theory, countries always try to maximize their power to defend themselves. Therefore, regional powers should strive to achieve hegemony in the long term. Economic growth simply allows them to gain enough resources to do that.

The second part of the thesis dealt with explaining the specific conditions of Middle East as a region. It was determined to be a multipolar region with Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia being the leading powers with Turkey being the best choice of country to analyze due to being both a critical and paradigmatic case. After that the methodology of the following analysis was laid out (single case study that mainly uses quantitative analysis).

In the analytical section of the thesis it was found out that the balance of power in the Middle East has not changed much in the recent years. Turkey used to have the most material capabilities in the region in 2002 and still has in the present day. While the economic growth helped Turkey to increase its' capabilities its' economy did not grow significantly faster than the economy of other regional states. Turkish economic growth and increase of its' military spending had a strong correlation.

Analysis of press releases of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that Turkish officials visit more foreign countries and write more about states in the Middle East when Turkish economy is growing quickly. Turkish foreign policy was focused on other states in the region that were in the competition for a leadership role with Turkey. The relationship between Turkey

and most other states did not qualitative change a lot in the last decade. However, Turkey has become more critical and assertive towards Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Iraq and Syria are the two states that have notably become less powerful compared to Turkey and therefore have been easy targets for Turkey to spread their influence on.

The thesis found that broadly speaking the presented hypothesis is true. The amount of resources a state has to use for foreign policy is indeed in positive correlation with the economic growth of the state. In addition to that Turkish foreign policy did become more active following periods the country experienced a fast economic growth.

Further analysis could be conducted in the topic that would test if the same hypothesis applies in the case of different regions of the world that have other internal power dynamics. A small N analysis could give information about how widely the findings of this thesis can be generalized on to other regional powers.

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Annexes

Annex 1: International visits by Turkish state officials

Location	Year	Middle East	Title
Egypt, Lebanon	2007	Yes	<u>NO:148 - 15 October 2007, Press Statements Regarding;visit of;;Ali Babacan, The Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Egypt and Lebanon on 17-19 October 2007 (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Greece	2007	No	<u>NO:171 -;25 November 2007, Press Release Regarding Visit of Ali Babacan, The Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Greece;(Unofficial Translation)</u>
Iraq	2007	Yes	<u>NO:153 - 23 October 2007, Press Release Regarding the Visit of The Foreign Minister; to Baghdad (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Macedonia	2007	no	<u>NO:49 - 20 March 2007, Press Release Regarding the visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey Mr. Abdullah Gül to the Republic of Macedonia on 21 March 2007 (Unofficial Translation)</u>
North Cyprus	2007	no	<u>NO:66 -;12 April 2007, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Abdullah Gül;to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.:(Unofficial Translation)</u>
Pakistan, Afghanistan	2007	no	<u>NO:38 - 23 February 2007, Press Release Regarding the visit of H.E. Abdullah Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Pakistan and Afghanistan;(Unofficial Translation)</u>
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait	2007	yes	<u>NO:149 - 19 October 2007, Press Statement Regarding the visit of Ali Babacan,The Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on 21-22 September 2007 (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Czech Republic	2008	no	<u>No:188 - 3 November 2008, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan to the Czech Republic (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Estonia	2008	no	<u>NO:105 - 12 June 2008, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan to the Republic of Estonia (Unofficial Translation)</u>

Finland	2008	no	<u>NO:70-9 May 2008, Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan to Finland (Unofficial Translation)</u>
India	2008	no	<u>NO:13 - 4 February 2008, Press Statement Regarding Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ali Babacan India (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Lebanon	2008	yes	<u>NO:87- 23 May 2008, The Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Lebanon (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Malaysia	2008	No	<u>NO:120 - 4 July 2008, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan To Malaysia for D-8 Summit</u>
Oman	2008	yes	<u>NO-58 25 April 2008 Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan To Oman (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Pakistan	2008	no	<u>NO:55 - 17 April 2008, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Poland	2008	No	<u>No:196 - 17 November 2008, Press Release Regarding the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan's Official Visit to Poland (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Russia	2008	no	<u>NO:24 - 18 February 2008, Press Statement Regarding visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ali Babacan to the Russian Federation (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Switzerland	2008	no	<u>No:167 - 9 September 2008, Press Release Regarding the Working Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali BABACAN To Switzerland (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Uganda	2008	no	<u>NO:108 - 17 June 2008, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan to Uganda for the 35th Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Ukraine	2008	no	<u>NO:17 - 12 February 2008, Press Release Regarding visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan to Ukraine (Unofficial Translation)</u>
Ukraine	2008	no	<u>NO:54 - 16 April 2008, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan to Ukraine (Unofficial Translation)</u>
United Kingdom	2008	no	<u>NO:51 - 12 April 2008, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan to United Kingdom (Unofficial Translation)</u>

United Kingdom	2008	no	<u>NO: 63 - 1 May 2008, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Babacan to UK (Unofficial Translation)</u>
USA	2008	no	<u>NO:97 - 2 June 2008, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan to the United States</u>
Afghanistan	2009	no	<u>No: 213, 18 November 2009, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Afghanistan</u>
Austria	2009	no	<u>No:49 - 14 April 2009, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan to Austria</u>
Belgium, Azerbaijan	2009	no	<u>No: 169, 1 October 2009, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Brussels and Nakhchivan</u>
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania	2009	no	<u>No: 187, 15 October 2009, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania</u>
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina	2009	no	<u>No: 233, 11 December 2009, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina</u>
Kosovo	2009	no	<u>No:7 - 12 January 2009, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan to the Republic of Kosova</u>
Phillipines	2009	No	<u>No:35 - 16 March 2009, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines</u>
Serbia and Montenegro	2009	no	<u>No:128, 21 July 2009, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Serbia and Montenegro</u>
Slovenia	2009	no	<u>No: 149, 27 August 2009, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Slovenia</u>
Yemen, Bahrain, Lithuania	2009	yes	<u>No:28 - 16 February 2009, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Foreign Minister Ali Babacan to Yemen, Bahrain and Lithuania</u>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2010	no	<u>No: 235, 19 October 2010, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Bosnia and Herzegovina</u>

Bulgaria	2010	no	<u>No: 62, 17 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Bulgaria</u>
Finland	2010	no	<u>No: 57, 11 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Finland</u>
Greece	2010	no	<u>No: 172, 6 August 2010, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Rhodes</u>
Ireland	2010	no	<u>No: 51, 5 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Ireland</u>
Italy	2010	no	<u>No: 245, 5 November 2010, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Italy</u>
Macedonia	2010	no	<u>No: 66, 24 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Macedonia</u>
Norway	2010	no	<u>No: 128, 11 June 2010, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Norway</u>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2011	no	<u>No: 35, 28 January 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Bosnia and Herzegovina</u>
Greece	2011	no	<u>No: 62, 04 March 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Greece</u>
Hungary	2011	no	<u>No:99, 10 April 2011, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Hungary</u>
Italy	2011	no	<u>No:142, 1June 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Italy</u>
Nepal	2011	no	<u>No: 47, 14 February 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Nepal</u>
Saudi Arabia	2011	yes	<u>No: 163, 9 July 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Saudi Arabia</u>

Tunisia	2011	Yes	<u>No: 50, 17 February 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of His Excellency Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Tunisia as the Chairperson of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe</u>
Austria	2012	no	<u>No: 84, 21 Mart 2012, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Austria</u>
Azerbaijan	2012	no	<u>No: 237, 13 October 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Azerbaijan on 15-16 October 2012 on the occasion of the 12th ECO Summit Meeting</u>
Belgium	2012	no	<u>No: 250, 6 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Brussels</u>
Belgium	2012	no	<u>No: 85, 21 March 2012, Press Release Regarding The Visit of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, to Brussels For Meetings With The EU</u>
Belgium	2012	no	<u>No: 14, 17 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Belgium on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of Turkey's Membership to NATO</u>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2012	no	<u>No: 123, 02 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey</u>
Canada	2012	no	<u>No: 220, 18 September 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu , Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Canada</u>
Estonia	2012	no	<u>No: 128, 9 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Estonia</u>
Finland	2012	no	<u>No: 291, 18 December 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Finland</u>
France	2012	No	<u>No: 176, 4 July 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to France</u>
Greece	2012	no	<u>No : 231, 9 October 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Greece</u>

Iran	2012	yes	<u>No: 2, 3 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey H.E. Mr. Davutoğlu to Iran</u>
Italy	2012	no	<u>No: 255, 10 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to the Republic of Italy on the of occasion of the 9th Turkish-Italian Forum</u>
Kosovo	2012	no	<u>No: 210, 7 September 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit to Kosovo of H.E. Mr. Mehmet Şimşek, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Turkey</u>
Lebanon	2012	yes	<u>No: 11, 13 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to Lebanon</u>
Macedonia	2012	no	<u>No: 293, 19 December 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Macedonia</u>
Moldova	2012	no	<u>No: 132, 11 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit to Moldova of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey</u>
Myanmar	2012	no	<u>No: 197, 8 August 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Myanmar</u>
Netherlands	2012	No	<u>No: 71, 05 March 2012, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey to the Netherlands</u>
Russia	2012	No	<u>No: 22, 23 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Moscow</u>
Saudi Arabia	2012	Yes	<u>No: 266, 22 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Chief of the General Staff Mr. Necdet Özel to Saudi Arabia</u>
USA	2012	No	<u>No: 39, 8 February 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to the United States of America</u>
Yemen	2012	Yes	<u>No: 240, 19 October 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Yemen</u>

Armenia	2013	No	<u>No: 327, 11 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Yerevan on 12 December 2013 on the Occasion of the 29th Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)</u>
Azerbaijan	2013	No	<u>No: 203, 16 July 2013, Press Release Regarding the Minister's Visit to Azerbaijan</u>
Azerbaijan	2013	No	<u>No: 166, 11 June 2013, Press Release Regarding Minister Davutoğlu's Visit to Azerbaijan to Participate in OIC Meetings on Palestine</u>
Belarus	2013	No	<u>No: 87, 28 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Belarus</u>
Belgium	2013	No	<u>No: 13, 21 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Brussels on the Occasion of the Trilateral Ministerial Meeting between Turkey and Belgium</u>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2013	No	<u>No: 129, 7 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Occasion of the Trilateral Consultation Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia</u>
Brunei, Singapore	2013	No	<u>No: 186, 29 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Brunei and Singapore</u>
Croatia, Montenegro, Albania	2013	No	<u>No: 262, 2 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu to Croatia, Montenegro and Albania</u>
Georgia	2013	No	<u>No: 85, 26 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to Georgia and the Trilateral Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia</u>
Germany	2013	No	<u>No: 135, 9 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Germany</u>
Germany, France	2013	No	<u>No: 65, 12 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit to Germany and France of H.E. Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey</u>

Germany, UK, Italy	2013	No	<u>No: 229, 20 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy</u>
Greece	2013	No	<u>No: 328, 11 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Greece</u>
Iran	2013	Yes	<u>No: 312, 25 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Tehran to Participate in the 21st Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and for Bilateral Contacts with Iranian Officials</u>
Iran	2013	Yes	<u>No: 217, 3 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Iran</u>
Iraq	2013	Yes	<u>No: 294, 9 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Iraq</u>
Jordan	2013	Yes	<u>No: 136, 10 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Jordan</u>
Kazakhstan	2013	No	<u>No: 122, 25 April 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Kazakhstan</u>
Myanmar	2013	No	<u>No: 296, 13 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Myanmar</u>
North Cyprus	2013	No	<u>No: 331, 13 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</u>
Oman, Kuwait	2013	Yes	<u>No: 281, 22 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to the Sultanate of Oman and Kuwait</u>
Pakistan	2013	No	<u>No: 333, 17 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Islamabad on the Occasion of the 16th Ministerial Council Meeting of the Developing 8 Countries (D-8) and Bilateral Contacts To Be Held with the Pakistani Officials</u>

Palestine	2013	Yes	<u>No: 121, 25 April 2013, Press Release Concerning the Prime Minister's Visit to Gaza</u>
Poland	2013	No	<u>No: 206, 22 July 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Poland</u>
Poland	2013	No	<u>No: 78, 21 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to the Republic of Poland</u>
Qatar, Bahrain	2013	Yes	<u>No: 309, 22 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H. E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Qatar and Bahrain</u>
Russia	2013	No	<u>No: 55, 5 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit to Moscow of H.E. Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey</u>
Russia	2013	No	<u>No: 4, 11 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Moscow</u>
Russia	2013	No	<u>No: 3, 8 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Moscow</u>
Saudi Arabia	2013	Yes	<u>No: 234, 27 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Saudi Arabia</u>
Serbia	2013	No	<u>No: 24, 31 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Serbia</u>
Slovakia, Hungary	2013	No	<u>No: 287, 29 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Slovakia and Hungary</u>
Somalia, Sudan	2013	No	<u>No: 44, 21 February 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visits of H.E. Mr. Bekir Bozdağ, Deputy Prime Minister and H.E. Mr. Cevdet Yılmaz, Minister of Development to Somalia and Sudan</u>
Switzerland	2013	No	<u>No: 270, 8 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu to Switzerland.</u>

Syria	2013	Yes	<u>No: 158, 29 May 2013, Press Release regarding the visits paid by delegations of the main opposition party CHP to Syria.</u>
UK	2013	No	<u>No: 58, 6 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to the United Kingdom</u>
USA	2013	No	<u>No: 299, 15 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United States</u>
USA	2013	No	<u>No: 6, 12 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to the USA</u>
Belgium	2014	No	<u>No: 40, 9 February 2014, Press Release Regarding Minister Davutoğlu's visit to Brussels</u>
Bosnia Herzegovina	2014	No	<u>No: 46, 11 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Bosnia and Herzegovina</u>
Brazil	2014	No	<u>No: 406, 26 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Brazil to attend the inauguration ceremony of H.E. President Dilma Rousseff</u>
Bulgaria	2014	No	<u>No: 65, 27 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Bulgaria</u>
France	2014	No	<u>No: 315, 09 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to France</u>
France	2014	No	<u>No: 249, 24 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to France</u>
Germany	2014	No	<u>No: 297, 17 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Germany</u>
Greece	2014	No	<u>No: 386, 10 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Thessaloniki on 12 December 2014, on the Occasion of the 31st Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)</u>
Iran	2014	Yes	<u>No: 388, 11 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Tehran</u>

Iraq	2014	Yes	<u>No: 397, 18 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Baghdad within the scope of the Second Meeting of the Turkey-Iraq High Level Strategic Council (HLSC)</u>
Iraq	2014	Yes	<u>No: 339, 04 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq</u>
Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia	2014	Yes	<u>No: 287, 8 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey</u>
Kosovo	2014	No	<u>No: 133, 30 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Naci Koru, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Kosovo</u>
Libya	2014	Yes	<u>No: 337, 03 November 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Special Representative Mr. Emrullah İşler to Libya</u>
Libya	2014	Yes	<u>No: 325, 20 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Special Representative Mr. Emrullah İşler to Libya</u>
Mexico	2014	No	<u>No: 117, 12 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mexico to Attend the Informal Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the "MIKTA" Initiative</u>
New Zealand	2014	No	<u>No: 349, 10 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to New Zealand</u>
North Cyprus	2014	No	<u>No: 149, 16 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to TRNC</u>
Russia	2014	No	<u>No: 400, 22 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Moscow</u>
Saudi Arabia	2014	Yes	<u>No: 341, 05 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Saudi Arabia</u>
Serbia	2014	No	<u>No: 193, 9 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Serbia</u>
Tanzania	2014	No	<u>No: 176, 29 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Tanzania</u>

Tunesia	2014	Yes	<u>No: 322, 17 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia</u>
Tunisia	2014	Yes	<u>No: 42, 10 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the Minister Foreign Affairs' Visit to Tunisia</u>
Ukraine	2014	No	<u>No: 346, 07 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E.Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Ukraine</u>
Ukraine	2014	No	<u>No: 70, 28 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the Working Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey, to Ukraine</u>
USA	2014	No	<u>No: 318, 10 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to New York for the United Nations Security Council Elections for non-permanent seats for the term 2015-2016</u>
USA	2014	No	<u>No:245, 20 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Working Visit of the H.E. Mr. Feridun H. Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to the United States</u>
USA	2014	No	<u>No: 195, 10 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to New York within the Framework of the Fourth Review Meeting of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy</u>
USA	2014	No	<u>No: 189, 7 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Working Visit of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the United States</u>
USA	2014	No	<u>No: 101, 2 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to New York</u>
USA	2014	No	<u>No: 78, 8 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to New York and Participation in the Summit of CARICOM</u>
Uzbekistan	2014	No	<u>No: 233, 8 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit by H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Uzbekistan</u>
Zambia	2014	No	<u>No: 230, 7 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zambia</u>

Austria	2015	No	<u>No: 279, 20 October 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Feridun H.Sinirlioğlu to Austria on the Occasion of the Commemoration Ceremony to be Held in the Memory of the Fallen Turkish Diplomats</u>
Azerbaijan	2015	No	<u>No: 296, 26 November 2015, Press Release regarding the visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Azerbaijan</u>
Azerbaijan	2015	No	<u>No: 251, 11 September 2015, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Feridun H.Sinirlioğlu to Azerbaijan</u>
Azerbaijan	2015	No	<u>No: 65, 19 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Azerbaijan</u>
Belgium	2015	No	<u>No: 307, 13 December 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Brussels</u>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2015	No	<u>No: 137, 29 April 2015, Press Release regarding the visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Bosnia and Herzegovina</u>
Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam	2015	No	<u>No: 84, 13 March 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam</u>
Croatia	2015	No	<u>No: 198, 8 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Croatia</u>
Germany	2015	No	<u>No: 49, 05 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Germany</u>
Kuwait	2015	Yes	<u>No: 19, 15 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Kuwait</u>
Kyrgyzstan	2015	No	<u>No: 209, 20 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Working Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the Kyrgyz Republic on 22-24 July 2015</u>
Kyrgyzstan	2015	No	<u>No: 107, 9 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the Kyrgyz Republic</u>
Latin America	2015	No	<u>No: 52, 06 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E.Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Latin America In Company of H.E. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</u>

Lithuania	2015	No	<u>No: 96, 31 March 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to the Republic of Lithuania</u>
Malta	2015	No	<u>No: 81, 07 March 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E.Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Malta</u>
Moldova	2015	No	<u>No: 95, 31 March 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Moldova</u>
Mongolia	2015	No	<u>No: 106, 9 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Mongolia</u>
Northen Cyprus	2015	No	<u>No: 294, 25 November 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</u>
Northen Cyprus	2015	No	<u>No: 163, 25 May 2015, Press Release regarding the visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</u>
Northen Cyprus	2015	No	<u>No: 12, 12 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</u>
Portugal	2015	No	<u>No: 213, 24 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Portugal on the occasion of Revealing the “Fallen Diplomats Monument” in the compound of the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon</u>
Qatar	2015	Yes	<u>No: 20, 16 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Qatar</u>
Romania	2015	No	<u>No: 172, 8 June 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Romania</u>
Russia	2015	No	<u>No: 253, 15 September 2015, Press Release Regarding the Working Visits of Foreign Minister H.E. Feridun H. Sinirlioğlu to the Russian Federation</u>
South Korea	2015	No	<u>No: 159, 18 May 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to the Republic of Korea to Participate in the Fifth MIKTA Foreign Ministers’ Meeting</u>

Turkmenistan	2015	No	<u>No: 25, 22 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Turkmenistan and the Trilateral Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan</u>
USA	2015	No	<u>No: 118, 16 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the USA</u>
USA	2015	No	<u>No: 67, 19 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the United States</u>
Yemen	2015	Yes	<u>No: 21, 16 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Yemen</u>

Annex 2: Press releases about countries in the Middle East

Year	Country 1	Tone	Country 2	Tone	Title
2007	Algeria	neutral			<u>NO:126 -;7 September 2007, Press Release Regarding the Assassination Attempt Against President of Algeria HE Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Algeria	positive			<u>NO:68 -;12 April 2007, Press Release Regarding the Condemning;Terror Attack;in Algeria (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Egypt	neutral	Lebanon	neutral	<u>NO:148 - 15 October 2007, Press Statements Regarding;visit of;;Ali Babacan, The Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Egypt and Lebanon on 17-19 October 2007 (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iran	neutral			<u>NO:56 - 30 March 2007, Press Release Regarding the 15 British sailors, who were taken into custody by Iran in the Persian Gulf on the grounds that they had violated the Iranian territorial waters.; (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iran	neutral			<u>NO:159 -;1 November 2007, Press Statement Regarding the visit of H.E. Manouchehr Mottaki, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to Ankara (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iran	positive			<u>NO:61 - 5 April 2007, Press Release Regarding;the decision to release 15 British naval personnel, who were taken into custody by Iran in the Persian Gulf. (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iraq	neutral			<u>A:22 - 15 March 2007;;Announcement Regarding the Fifth Donor Committee meeting of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI);in Istanbul on 20th March 2007. (Unofficial translation)</u>
2007	Iraq	neutral			<u>NO:43 - 7 March 2007, Press Release Regarding the Heinous Terrorist Attack in Hillah,Iraq (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iraq	neutral			<u>NO:54 - 29 March 2007, Press Release Regarding the;Bomb Attacks;Targeted Innocent Civilians in Telafer City in Iraq (Unofficial Translation)</u>

2007	Iraq	neutral			<u>NO:91 -;14 June 2007, Press Release Regarding the Destruction of Askariya Mosque in Iraq by a Terrorist Attack (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iraq	neutral			<u>NO:97 27 June 2007, Press Statement Regarding the decision taken during the Enlarged Ministerial Conference of the Neighboring Countries of Iraq Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iraq	neutral			<u>NO:104 - 13 July 2007, Press Release Regarding the Injured Iraqi Turkomans Brought to Turkey (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iraq	neutral			<u>NO:115 - 14 August 2007, Press Release Regarding the Humanitarian Aid to Iraq (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iraq	neutral			<u>NO:116 - 15 August 2007, Press Release Regarding the Suicide Attacks in Iraq;(Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iraq	neutral			<u>NO:131 -;12 September 2007, Press release Regarding Certain Expressions Used by Mr. Hoshyar Zebari, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iraq	neutral			<u>NO:143 - 9 October 2007, Press Statement Regarding the cholera outbreak in Northern Iraq(Unofficial translation)</u>
2007	Iraq	positive			<u>NO:77 - 18 May 2007, Press Release Regarding the Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq.:(Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Iraq	positive			<u>NO:122 -;29 August 2007, Press Release Regarding the Communiqué Released Jointly by the Iraqi Leaders;(Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Israel	neutral			<u>NO:164 -;8 November 2007, Press Statement Regarding the visit of President of the State of Israel Shimon Peres to Turkey;(Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Lebanon	positive			<u>NO:178 -;12 December 2007, Press Statement Regarding Brigadier Francois Hajj, Chief of Operations Department of the Lebanese Army(Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Palestine	negative			<u>NO:75 - 16 May 2007, Press Release Regarding the Ongoing Infighting Between the Palestinian Factions. (Unofficial Translation)</u>

2007	Palestine	neutral	Israel	negative	<u>No:81 - 24 May 2007, Press;Statement Regarding the Arrests of; High Level Palestinian Officials;During Israeli Operations (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Palestine	neutral			<u>NO:144 - 8October 2007, Press Statement Regarding the emergency humanitarian assistance needed for the Palestinian refugees.</u>
2007	Palestine	neutral			<u>NO:163 -;8 November 2007, Press Statement Regarding the Visit of ;President of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas to Turkey (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Palestine	positive			<u>NO:47 -;17 March 2007, Press Release Regarding the Newly Established National Unity Government in Palestine (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Palestine	positive			<u>NO:179 -;13 December 2007, Press Statement Regarding Palestine Donors Conference in Paris (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Saudi Arabia	neutral	Kuwait	neutral	<u>NO:149 - 19 October 2007, Press Statement Regarding the visit of Ali Babacan,The Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on 21-22 September 2007 (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2007	Saudi Arabia	neutral			<u>NO:162 -;7 November 2007, Press Statement Regarding the Visit of The King of Saudi Arabia to Turkey (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Algeria	positive			<u>NO:155 - 20 August 2008, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Algeria (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Iran	neutral			<u>NO:127 - 16 July 2008, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran Manouchehr Mottaki (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Iraq	neutral			<u>NO:8 - 25 January 2008, Press Release Regarding the bombing attacks that took place on January 23 and January 24 in the city of Mosul of Iraq.(Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Iraq	neutral			<u>No:179 - 4 October 2008, The attack by the PKK near the Turkish-Iraqi border has caused great outrage (Unofficial Tarnslation)</u>
2008	Iraq	positive			<u>NO:133 - 28 July 2008, Terror Attack in the Iraqi City of Kirkuk on 28 July.</u>
2008	Iraq	positive			<u>NO:143 - 9 August 2008, Press Release Regarding the Suicide Bomb Attack in Iraq</u>

2008	Israel	negative			<u>NO:7 - 21 January 2008, Press Release Regarding the Embargo Imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip(Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Israel	negative			<u>NO:33 - 29 February 2008, Press Statement Regarding the Attacks From Israel (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Israel	negative			<u>NO:40 - 12 March 2008, Press Release Regarding the Declarations of Israeli authorities to build 750 Housing Units in Givat Zeev Settlement (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Israel	negative			<u>No:197 - 18 November 2008, Press Release Regarding the Rocket and Mortar Attacks from the Gaza Strip to Israel (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Israel	neutral			<u>NO:12 - 4 February 2008, Press Statement Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Israel. (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Israel	neutral			<u>NO:38 - 7 March 2008, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Israel (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Israel	positive			<u>No:109 - 19 June 2008, Press Release Regarding the Ceasefire Between Israel and Hamas (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Jordan	positive			<u>NO:25 - 19 February 2008, Press Statement Regarding the visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Salahaddin Bashir to Turkey (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Lebanon	neutral			<u>NO:87- 23 May 2008, The Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Lebanon (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Lebanon	neutral			<u>NO:83 - 21 May 2008, Press Release Regarding the Agreement Among the Lebanese Groups (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Lebanon	neutral			<u>NO:73 -14 May 2008, Press Release Regarding Lebanon (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Lebanon	neutral			<u>NO:71 - 9 May 2008, Press Release Regarding Lebanon (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Lebanon	neutral			<u>NO:149 - 15 August 2008, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the His Excellency Mr. Michel Suleiman, the President of Lebanon, to Damascus</u>
2008	Lebanon	neutral			<u>NO:146 - 13 August 2008, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Targeted a Bus in Lebanon</u>

2008	Lebanon	neutral			<u>No:169 - 12 September 2008, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Lebanon (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Lebanon	positive			<u>NO:95 - 29 May 2008, Press Release Regarding the New Government in Lebanon</u>
2008	Lebanon	positive			<u>NO:89 - 26 May 2008, the Election of Mr. Michel Suleiman as the President of the Republic of Lebanon (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Lebanon	positive			<u>No:124 - 11 July 2008, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the National Unity Government Among the Lebanese Groups in Doha.</u>
2008	Oman	neutral			<u>NO-58 25 April 2008 Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan To Oman (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Syria	neutral	Israel	neutral	<u>NO-81 - 21 May 2008, Press Release Regarding the Indirect Peace Talks between Syria and Israel under the auspices of Turkey (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Syria	neutral	Israel	neutral	<u>No:106 - 16 June 2008, Press Release Regarding the Peace Talks Between Syria and Israel Under the Auspices of Turkey (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Syria	neutral	Israel	neutral	<u>NO:136 - 30 July 2008, Press Release Regarding the Fourth Round of the Indirect Peace Talks Between Syria and Israel Under the Auspices of Turkey</u>
2008	Syria	neutral	Israel	neutral	<u>NO:119 - 3 July 2008, Press Release Regarding the Third Round of the Indirect Peace Talks Between Syria and Israel Under the Auspices of Turkey (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Syria	positive	Lebanon	positive	<u>No:182 - 16 October 2008, Press Release Regarding the Joint Statement Between Syria and Lebanon (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Tunisia	neutral			<u>NO:85 - 23 May 2008, Press Release regarding the Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, H.E. Abdulwaheb Abdallah, to Turkey (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2008	Tunisia	positive			<u>BN:6 - 4 April 2008, Information Note Regarding a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Foreign Ministry Training Centers of Turkey and Israel</u>

2008	UAE	neutral			<u>NO: 64 - 2 May 2008, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (Unofficial Translation)</u>
2009	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 191, 18 October 2009, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in Iran</u>
2009	Iran	positive			<u>No:124, 15 July 2009, Press Release Regarding the Plain Crash in Iran</u>
2009	Iran	positive			<u>No:82, 29 May 2009, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Against a Mosque in the Iranian City of Zahidan</u>
2009	Iraq	neutral			<u>No:57, 24 April 2009, Press Release Regarding the Latest Terrorist Attacks in Iraq</u>
2009	Iraq	neutral			<u>No:26 - 14 February 2009, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Iraq</u>
2009	Iraq	neutral			<u>No:12 - 22 January 2009, Press Release Regarding the Official Visit of H.E. Mr. Hoshyar Zebari, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq</u>
2009	Iraq	neutral			<u>No:5 - 5 January 2009, Press Release Regarding the Suicide Attack in Iraq</u>
2009	Iraq	positive			<u>No:15 - 29 January 2009, Press Release Regarding the Provincial Elections in Iraq</u>
2009	Iraq	positive			<u>No:13 - 22 January 2009, Press Release Regarding Iraq becoming the 186th State Party to the Convention of Chemical Weapons</u>
2009	Israel	negative			<u>No: 242, 29 December 2009, Press Release Regarding the Israel's Announcement that New Settlement Units will be Constructed in East Jerusalem</u>
2009	Israel	negative			<u>No:133, 3 August 2009, Press Release Regarding the Eviction By the Israeli Police of Palestinian Families From Their Homes in the Sheikh Jarrah District of East Jerusalem</u>
2009	Israel	negative			<u>No:3 - 4 January 2009, Press Release Regarding the Ground Operation by Israel to the Gaza Strip</u>
2009	Jordan	neutral			<u>No: 138, 18 August 2009, Press Release Regarding the Working Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan H.E. Nasser Judeh to Turkey</u>
2009	Lebanon	positive			<u>No:93, 08 June 2009, Press Release Regarding the Elections Held in Lebanon</u>

2009	Palestine	neutral			<u>No:23 - 10 February 2009, Press Release Regarding the "International Conference to Support the Palestinian Economy for the Reconstruction of Gaza" in Cairo</u>
2009	Yemen	neutral	Bahrain	neutral	<u>No:28 - 16 February 2009, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Foreign Minister Ali Babacan to Yemen, Bahrain and Lithuania</u>
2009	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 166, 23 September 2009, Press Release Regarding the Actions of Violence in Yemen</u>
2009	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 156, 5 September 2009, Press Release Regarding the Turkey's Humanitarian Assistance to the World Food Programme for Yemen</u>
2009	Yemen	positive			<u>No:97, 18 June 2009, Press Release Regarding the Situation in Yemen</u>
2010	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 281, 15 December 2010, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Iran</u>
2010	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 165, 25 July 2010, Press Release Regarding the Meeting between Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim and Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki</u>
2010	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 161, 16 July 2010, Press Release Regarding the Suicide Attack in Zahedan, Iran</u>
2010	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 109, 24 May 2010, Press Release Regarding the Letter Submitted by Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with the Joint Declaration</u>
2010	Iran	positive			<u>No: 125, 9 June 2010, Press Release Regarding the UN Security Council Vote on Additional Sanctions against Iran</u>
2010	Iran	positive			<u>No: 101, 17 May 2010, Press Release Regarding the Agreement on Iran's Nuclear Programme</u>
2010	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 290, 21 December 2010, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the New Iraqi Government</u>
2010	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 68, 27 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the Parliamentary Elections in Iraq</u>
2010	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 50, 5 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the Parliamentary Elections To Be Held in Iraq</u>

2010	Israel	negative			<u>No: 288, 21 December 2010, Press Release Regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Delimitation Agreement Signed Between Greek Cypriot Administration and Israel</u>
2010	Israel	negative			<u>No: 134, 16 June 2010, Press Release Regarding the Israeli Raid Against the Freedom Flotilla</u>
2010	Israel	negative			<u>No: 132, 14 June 2010, Press Release Regarding the Investigation Commission of Israeli Raid Against the Freedom Flotilla</u>
2010	Israel	negative			<u>No: 115, 31 May 2010, Press Release Regarding the Use of Force by the Israeli Defense Forces Against the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla to Gaza</u>
2010	Israel	negative			<u>No: 56, 11 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the Israel's Decision to Build 1600 New Housing Units in East Jerusalem</u>
2010	Israel	negative			<u>No: 7, 12 January 2010, Press Release Regarding the Attitude of Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister During His Meeting With Turkey's Ambassador To Tel Aviv</u>
2010	Israel	negative			<u>No: 6, 12 January 2010, Press Release Regarding the Statement of the Israeli Foreign Ministry</u>
2010	Israel	neutral			<u>No: 263, 3 December 2010, Press Release Regarding the Forest Fires in Israel</u>
2010	Israel	positive	Palestine	positive	<u>No: 198, 1 September 2010, Press Release Regarding the Commencement of Direct Talks Between Israel and the Palestinians</u>
2010	Israel	positive	Palestine	positive	<u>No: 55, 10 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the Talks Between Israel and Palestine</u>
2010	Palestine	positive			<u>No: 65, 22 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the Attacks from Jewish Settlements on the Palestinian Villages in the West Bank</u>
2011	Bahrain	positive			<u>No:157, July 2 2011, Press Release Regarding The Reforms Envisaged to be Realized in Bahrain</u>
2011	Egypt	positive			<u>No:138, 29 May 2011, Press Release Regarding the Decision of the Egyptian Administration to Permanently Open the Rafah Crossing</u>
2011	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 28, 22 January 2011, Press Release Regarding the Meeting Between P5+1 and Iran in Istanbul on 21-22 January 2011</u>
2011	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 86, 30 March 2011, Press Release Regarding the Attack Against the Provincial Council in Tikrit (Iraq)</u>

2011	Israel	negative			<u>No: 29, 23 January 2011, Press Statement by the National Inquiry and Investigation Commission Instituted Upon Israel's Attack on the International Humanitarian Aid Convoy</u>
2011	Israel	negative			<u>No: 8, 11 January 2011, Press Release Regarding the the Demolition by Israel of the Shepherd Hotel in East Jerusalem</u>
2011	Lebanon	positive			<u>No: 160, 8 July 2011, Press Release Regarding the New Government Formed in Lebanon</u>
2011	Libya	neutral			<u>No:166, 13 July 2011, Press Release Regarding the 4th meeting of the Libya Contact Group</u>
2011	Libya	positive			<u>No: 77, 19 March 2011, Press Release Regarding the Developments in Libya</u>
2011	Libya	positive	UAE	positive	<u>No: 69, 12 March 2011, Press Release Regarding the Turkey-UAE Joint Humanitarian Assistance Operation for Libya</u>
2011	Morocco	positive			<u>No: 159, 8 July 2011, Press Release Regarding the adoption of a new constitution in Morocco</u>
2011	Palestine	neutral			<u>No:168, 20 July 2011, Press Release Regarding the "Palestinian Ambassadors' Conference" to be held in Istanbul on 23-24 July 2011</u>
2011	Saudi Arabia	neutral			<u>No: 163, 9 July 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Saudi Arabia</u>
2011	Tunisia	neutral			<u>No: 50, 17 February 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of His Excellency Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Tunisia as the Chairperson of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe</u>
2012	Bahrain	neutral			<u>No: 110, 19 April 2012, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated Against A Police Vehicle in Bahrain</u>
2012	Egypt	neutral			<u>No: 124, 02 May 2012, Press Release Regarding Developments in Egypt</u>
2012	Egypt	positive			<u>No: 294, 24 December 2012, Press Release Regarding the Constitutional Referendum Held in Egypt</u>
2012	Egypt	positive			<u>No: 194, 4 August 2012, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the New Government in Egypt</u>
2012	Egypt	positive			<u>No. 174, 24 June 2012, Press Release Regarding the Results of the Presidential Elections in Egypt</u>

2012	Egypt	positive			<u>No: 170, 16 June 2012, Press Release Regarding the developments in Egypt</u>
2012	Egypt	positive			<u>No. 25, 24 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Elections for the People's Assembly Held in Egypt</u>
2012	Iran	negative			<u>No: 196, 7 August 2012, Press Release Regarding Declarations Made by Iranian Officials</u>
2012	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 273, 27 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the Postponement of the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran</u>
2012	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 2, 3 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey H.E. Mr. Davutoğlu to Iran</u>
2012	Iran	positive			<u>No: 270, 26 November 2012, Press Release Regarding The Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran</u>
2012	Iran	positive			<u>No: 73, 05 March 2012, Press Release Regarding the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran</u>
2012	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 219, 14 September 2012, Press Release Regarding the Meeting of H.E. Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, with the Ambassador of Iraq in Ankara</u>
2012	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 13, 14 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attack Targeting Shiite Pilgrims Perpetrated in the Iraqi City of Basra</u>
2012	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 6, 6 January 2012, Press Release Regarding Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 290, 17 December 2012, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in Iraq</u>
2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 277, 30 November 2012, Press Release Regarding Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 251, 6 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Iraq on 6 November 2012</u>
2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 211, 10 September 2012, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 191, 23 July 2012, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>

2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 166, 13 June 2012, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 153, 4 June 2012, Press Release Regarding the Suicide Attack Perpetrated Against the Shiite Endowment in Baghdad, Capital of Iraq.</u>
2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 111, 20 April 2012, Press Release Regarding The Bomb Attacks Perpetrated In Different Cities Of Iraq</u>
2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 83, 20 March 2012, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 75, 08 March 2012, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Iraq (Tal Afar)</u>
2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 72, 05 March 2012, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2012	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 30, 28 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attack Perpetrated in Iraq on 27January 2012</u>
2012	Israel	negative	Palestine	positive	<u>No: 292, 19 December 2012, Press Release Regarding the Illegal Settlement Activities of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories</u>
2012	Israel	negative	Palestine	neutral	<u>No: 279, 2 December 2012, Press Release Regarding the Illegal Settlement Activities of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories</u>
2012	Israel	negative			<u>No: 261, 14 November 2012, Press Release Regarding Gaza Operation Launched by Israel Today</u>
2012	Israel	negative	Palestine	neutral	<u>No: 252, 8 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the Settlement Activities of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories</u>
2012	Israel	negative	Palestine	neutral	<u>No: 242, 20 October 2012, Press Release Regarding the Settlement Activities of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories</u>
2012	Israel	negative			<u>No: 235, 10 October 2012, Press Release Regarding Attacks Perpetrated by Israeli Extremists Against Sacred Sites</u>
2012	Israel	negative			<u>No: 218, 14 September 2012, Press Release Regarding Israel's Upgrading the Status of an Educational Institution in the West Bank into a University Status</u>
2012	Israel	negative	Palestine	neutral	<u>No: 206, 27 August 2012, Press Release Regarding the Israeli Illegal Settlement Activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories</u>

2012	Israel	negative	Palestine	neutral	<u>No: 181, 05 July 2012, Press Release Regarding the Israeli Illegal Settlement Activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories</u>
2012	Israel	negative			<u>No: 161, 08 June 2012, Press Release Regarding the Israeli Settlement in the West Bank</u>
2012	Israel	negative	Palestine	neutral	<u>No: 125, 3 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Israeli Illegal Settlement Activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories</u>
2012	Israel	negative	Palestine	neutral	<u>No: 118, 25 April 2012, Press Release Regarding Israeli Settlement Activities in the Palestinian Territories</u>
2012	Israel	negative	Palestine	neutral	<u>No: 100, 06 April 2012, Press Release Regarding Israeli Settlement Activities in the Palestinian Territories</u>
2012	Israel	negative			<u>No: 87, 22 March 2012, Press Release Regarding Israel's Plans for the Settlements in West Bank</u>
2012	Israel	negative			<u>No: 76, 10 March 2012, Press Release Regarding Israel's Attacks Targeting Gaza</u>
2012	Israel	negative	Palestine	neutral	<u>No: 55, 24 February 2012, Press Release Regarding Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories</u>
2012	Israel	negative	Palestine	neutral	<u>No: 5, 6 January 2012, Press Release Regarding Israeli Settlement Activities in the Palestinian Territories</u>
2012	Israel	neutral	Palestine	neutral	<u>No: 264, 21 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the Ceasefire Agreement between Israel and Palestine</u>
2012	Israel	neutral			<u>No: 42, 14 February 2012, Press Release Regarding Attacks Against Israeli Missions</u>
2012	Lebanon	neutral	Syria	neutral	<u>No: 205, 25 August 2012, Press Release Regarding the Release of One of the Lebanese Citizens Kidnapped in Syria</u>
2012	Lebanon	neutral			<u>No: 11, 13 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to Lebanon</u>
2012	Lebanon	positive			<u>No: 241, 19 October 2012, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Which Took Place in Lebanon</u>
2012	Libya	positive			<u>No: 248, 1 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the Taking Office of the New Government in Libya</u>

2012	Libya	positive			<u>No: 182, 08 July 2012, Press Release Regarding National Congress Elections in Libya</u>
2012	Morocco	neutral			<u>No: 80, 16 March 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Saad-Eddine El Othmani, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Morocco to Turkey</u>
2012	Palestine	neutral	Israel	negative	<u>No: 21, 23 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Arrest of Mr. Aziz Dweik, Head of The Palestinian Legislative Council and Another Palestinian Parliamentarian by Israel</u>
2012	Palestine	positive			<u>No: 253, 8 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Riad Al-Malki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Palestine, to Turkey</u>
2012	Saudi Arabia	neutral			<u>No: 278, 2 December 2012, Press Release Regarding the Killing of an Assistant Military Attaché at the Saudi Embassy in Sana'a</u>
2012	Saudi Arabia	neutral			<u>No: 266, 22 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Chief of the General Staff Mr. Necdet Özel to Saudi Arabia</u>
2012	Saudi Arabia	positive	Iraq	positive	<u>No: 243, 26 October 2012, Press Release Regarding Our Citizens who went to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in transit through the Republic of Iraq</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 256, 12 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the Syrian Opposition Forming a New Structure</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 195, 4 August 2012, Press Release Regarding the Resolution on Syria Adopted by the UN General Assembly</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 190, 19 July 2012, Press Release Regarding the UN Security Council Being Unable to Pass a Resolution once again on Syria</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No:186, 13 July 2012, Press Release Regarding the Massacre Perpetrated Against the People of Tremseh Village in Hama by the Syrian Regime</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 185, 11 July 2012, Press Release Regarding Syria</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 173, 24 June 2012, Press Release Regarding the Steps Taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey in Respect of the Shooting Down of a Turkish Military Aircraft Off the Coast of Syria</u>

2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 160, 07 June 2012, Press Release Regarding the Increase in the Acts of Violence against the Civilian Population in Syria</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 152, 02 June 2012, Press Release Regarding the UN Human Rights Council Resolution on Syria</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 151, 30 May 2012, Press Release Regarding All Diplomatic Members of the Syrian Embassy in Ankara Being Asked to Leave the Country</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 147, 26 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Latest Attacks Perpetrated by the Syrian Administration Against Civilians</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 129, 09 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attack Carried Out Against the Convoy of UN Supervision Mission (UNSMIS) in Syria Today (9 May)</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 113, 21 April 2012, Press Release Regarding The Resolution on Syria Adopted by The United Nations Security Council</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 104, 14 April 2012, Press Release Regarding the Resolution on Syria Adopted by the United Nations Security Council</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 102, 10 April 2012, Press Release Regarding Syrian Regime's Failure to Fulfill Its Pledge in Accordance with Annan's Plan</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 101, 09 April 2012, Press Release Regarding the Opening of Fire to the Refuge Camps from the Syrian Side of the Border</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 69, 01 March 2012, Press Release Regarding the UN Human Rights Council Resolution on Syria</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 48, 18 February 2012, Press Release Regarding the Resolution on the Situation in Syria Adopted by the UN General Assembly</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 38, 4 February 2012, Press Release Regarding the UN Security Council Being Unable to reach a Decision on Syria</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No:37, 4 February 2012, Press Release Regarding the Latest Attacks Perpetrated by the Syrian Administration Against the People of Homs</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 33, 1 February 2012, Press Release Regarding the Escalation of Violence in Syria</u>

2012	Syria	negative			<u>No:28, 27 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Attack Perpetrated Against Mr. Abd-al-Razzaq Jbeiro, Secretary-General of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent</u>
2012	Syria	negative			<u>No: 26, 24 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Decision taken by the Arab League about Syria on 22 January</u>
2012	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 202, 19 August 2012, Press Release Regarding the Appointment of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi as the Joint Special Representative of the UN and the League of Arab States for Syria</u>
2012	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 133, 12 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Turkish Journalists Missing in Syria</u>
2012	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 57, 24 February 2012, Press Release Regarding the Appointment of Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as the Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the League of Arab States on the Syrian Crisis</u>
2012	Tunisia	neutral			<u>No: 7, 9 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tunisia to Turkey</u>
2012	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 285, 11 December 2012, Press Release Regarding the Murder of Chief Commander of Central Army Force of Yemen</u>
2012	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 240, 19 October 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu , Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Yemen</u>
2012	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 216, 13 September 2012, Press Release Regarding the Assassination Attempt Perpetrated in the Capital of Yemen, Sana'a</u>
2012	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 184, 11 July 2012, Press Release Regarding the Suicide Attack Perpetrated in Sana, the Capital of Yemen</u>
2012	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 143, 22 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Meeting of the Friends of Yemen in Riyadh</u>
2012	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 142, 21 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Suicide Attack Perpetrated in Yemen</u>
2012	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 74, 06 March 2012, Press Release Regarding the Attack Perpetrated by Al Qaeda in the city of Zinjibar in Yemen</u>

2012	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 63, 27 February 2012, Press Release Regarding the Suicide Attack Perpetrated against the Presidential Palace in Yemen</u>
2012	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 56, 24 February 2012, Press Release Regarding the Early Presidential Elections in Yemen</u>
2013	Algeria	neutral			<u>No: 12, 21 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated at the Gas Site in the In Amenas/Tiguentourine Region Located in Southeastern Algeria</u>
2013	Bahrain	positive			<u>No: 25, 31 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Call by the Government of Bahrain for the Revitalization of the National Dialogue Process in Bahrain</u>
2013	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 310, 23 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Relations Between Turkey and Egypt</u>
2013	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 269, 7 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Clashes in Egypt</u>
2013	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 228, 17 August 2013, Press Release on the Demonstrators Besieged at Al Fath Mosque in Egypt</u>
2013	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 211, 27 July 2013, Press Release Regarding Last Night's Intervention To Peaceful Civil Protesters in Egypt</u>
2013	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 195, 8 July 2013, Press Release Regarding the Deaths Occurred in Egypt After Shooting at Demonstrators.</u>
2013	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 192, 4 July 2013, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Egypt</u>
2013	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 22, 27 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Incidents Taking Place in Egypt</u>
2013	Egypt	neutral			<u>No: 291, 4 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Trial of the Ousted President of Egypt, Mr. Mohammed Mursi</u>
2013	Egypt	neutral			<u>No: 241, 6 September 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attack against the Minister of Interior of the Interim Government of Egypt</u>
2013	Egypt	neutral			<u>No: 226, 15 August 2013, Press release on Turkey's recall of its Ambassador to Egypt for consultations</u>

2013	Egypt	neutral			<u>No: 190, 3 July 2013, Press Release Regarding The Latest Developments in Egypt.</u>
2013	Egypt	positive			<u>No: 342, 24 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attack Perpetrated in Egypt</u>
2013	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 312, 25 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Tehran to Participate in the 21st Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and for Bilateral Contacts with Iranian Officials</u>
2013	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 289, 31 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif</u>
2013	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 217, 3 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Iran</u>
2013	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 200, 11 July, 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit to Turkey of the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs</u>
2013	Iran	positive			<u>No: 311, 24 November 2013, Press Release concerning the agreement on Iran's nuclear program reached in Geneva</u>
2013	Iran	positive			<u>No: 172, 16 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Presidential Elections in Iran</u>
2013	Iran	positive			<u>No: 110, 16 April 2013, Press Release regarding the earthquake in Iran and Pakistan.</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 334, 17 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq yesterday (16 December)</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 323, 5 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the Political Consultations at the Level of Undersecretaries of Ministries of Foreign Affairs between Turkey and Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 320, 1 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attack Against the Motorcade of the President of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, Arshad al-Salihi</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 298, 15 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in the Iraqi Cities of Karbala, Hafriyah and Kirkuk</u>

2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 285, 28 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 259, 30 September 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated in the Iraqi Cities of Irbil and Mussayab.</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 235, 28 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in Various Neighborhoods of Baghdad, the Capital City of Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 227, 16 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in Different Neighborhoods of Baghdad, Capital of Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 220, 11 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Blasts that took Place in Several Provinces of Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 214, 29 July 2013, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 201, 13 July 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in the Iraqi Province of Kirkuk, on July 12, 2013</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 183, 25 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 109, 15 April 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 15, 23 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attack Perpetrated in the Tuzkhurmatu District of Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 294, 9 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 283, 24 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari to Turkey</u>
2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 185, 28 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Decision to Remove Iraq from its Obligations Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.</u>
2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 167, 11 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in several cities of Iraq on 10 June 2013</u>
2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 144, 21 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in Iraq</u>

2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 141, 19 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 73, 19 March 2013, Press Release Regarding The Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 71, 14 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 43, 18 February 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attacks in Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 33, 8 February 2013, Press Release on the Terrorist Bomb Attacks in Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 9, 17 January 2013, Press Release Regarding Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in the Cities of Kirkuk and Tuzkhurmatu of Iraq</u>
2013	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 8, 15 January 2013, Press Release Regarding Suicide Attack Perpetrated Near the City of Fallujah of Iraq</u>
2013	Israel	negative			<u>No: 313, 26 November 2013, Press Release Regarding Israel's Decision to Establish New Settlements</u>
2013	Israel	negative			<u>No: 290, 1 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Furthering of Israel's Illegal Settlement Plans</u>
2013	Israel	negative			<u>No: 240, 6 September 2013, Press Release Regarding Israel's Actions toward the Holy Al Haram al-Sharif and Freedom of Worship of Muslims</u>
2013	Israel	negative			<u>No: 116, 22 April 2013, Press Release Regarding the Reports Claiming That Talks Will be Conducted between Israel and Turkey about the Use of Akıncı Air Base</u>
2013	Israel	negative			<u>No: 62, 8 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Entering of Israeli Forces to the Courtyard of Al-Haram Ash-Sharif</u>
2013	Israel	negative			<u>No: 41, 17 February 2013, Press Release Regarding the Decision by Israel for New Settlements</u>
2013	Jordan	neutral			<u>No: 136, 10 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Jordan</u>
2013	Jordan	positive			<u>No: 18, 25 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Elections in Jordan</u>

2013	Kuwait	neutral			<u>No: 35, 11 February 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit to Turkey by H.H. Sheikh Sabah Khalid Al-Hamad Al-Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait</u>
2013	Lebanon	neutral			<u>No: 225, 15 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Lebanon</u>
2013	Lebanon	neutral			<u>No: 218, 9 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Turkish Airlines Pilots Abducted in Lebanon</u>
2013	Lebanon	neutral			<u>No: 181, 24 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Fighting in the Lebanese City of Sidon.</u>
2013	Lebanon	neutral			<u>No: 151, 25 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Conflicts in the City of Tripoli, in Lebanon</u>
2013	Lebanon	neutral			<u>No: 84, 23 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Resignation of Prime Minister Mikati of Lebanon</u>
2013	Lebanon	neutral	Syria	negative	<u>No: 75, 19 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Air Strike Carried Out by Syria on Lebanon</u>
2013	Lebanon	positive			<u>No: 232, 23 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Explosions in Tripoli, Lebanon</u>
2013	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 266, 7 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attack against a Military Checkpoint in Libya</u>
2013	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 165, 10 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Clashes which took place in the city of Benghazi in Libya on 8 June 2013</u>
2013	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 36, 12 February 2013, Press Release Regarding the Participation of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu at the Conference on Support for Libya, which will be held in Paris.</u>
2013	Libya	positive			<u>No: 315, 27 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attack Against the Murad Agha Shrine in Libya</u>
2013	Libya	positive			<u>No: 275, 11 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Kidnapping of Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan</u>
2013	Libya	positive			<u>No: 140, 15 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the bombing in the Libyan city of Benghazi</u>
2013	Libya	positive			<u>No: 60, 8 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attack Perpetrated Against President of the General National Congress and Head of State of Libya</u>

2013	Oman	neutral	Kuwait	positive	<u>No: 281, 22 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to the Sultanate of Oman and Kuwait</u>
2013	Palestine	positive	Israel	neutral	<u>No: 222, 12 August 2013, Press Release concerning the initiation of talks between Palestine and Israel to prepare the ground for direct negotiations in the Middle East Peace Process</u>
2013	Palestine	positive			<u>No: 166, 11 June 2013, Press Release Regarding Minister Davutoğlu's Visit to Azerbaijan to Participate in OIC Meetings on Palestine</u>
2013	Palestine	positive			<u>No: 164, 8 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Inauguration of the new Palestinian Government</u>
2013	Qatar	neutral	Bahrain	neutral	<u>No: 309, 22 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H. E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Qatar and Bahrain</u>
2013	Qatar	neutral			<u>No: 233, 24 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Dr. Khalid bin Mohamed Al-Attiyah, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, to Turkey</u>
2013	Saudi Arabia	neutral			<u>No: 234, 27 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Saudi Arabia</u>
2013	Syria	negative			<u>No: 231, 21 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated by the Forces of the Regime in Various Neighborhoods of Damascus in Syria</u>
2013	Syria	negative			<u>No: 230, 21 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the Allegations on the Use of Chemical Weapons by the Regime in Syria</u>
2013	Syria	negative			<u>No: 187, 1 July 2013, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Syria</u>
2013	Syria	negative			<u>No: 126, 5 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Syria</u>
2013	Syria	negative			<u>No: 113, 19 April 2013, Press Release Regarding the Meeting at the level of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Syria</u>
2013	Syria	negative			<u>No: 74, 19 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the Interim Government by the Syrian National Coalition</u>

2013	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 280, 21 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the Ministerial Meeting On Syria</u>
2013	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 245, 14 September 2013, Press Release Regarding the Agreement Reached Between the United States and the Russian Federation Concerning the Chemical Weapons Possessed by the Syrian Regime</u>
2013	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 237, 3 September 2013, Press Release Regarding the Ministerial Meeting of Syria Bordering Countries to be organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on 4 September 2013</u>
2013	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 158, 29 May 2013, Press Release regarding the visits paid by delegations of the main opposition party CHP to Syria.</u>
2013	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 145, 21 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Meeting at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Syria in Amman</u>
2013	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 64, 10 March 2013, Press Release regarding an allegation about the stance of Turkey towards Syrians under protection in Turkey.</u>
2013	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 68, 13 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Formation of the New Government under the leadership of H.E. Mr. Ali Larayedh in Tunisia</u>
2013	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 32, 6 February 2013, Press Release Regarding the Attack Perpetrated in Tunisia</u>
2013	Yemen	neutral			<u>No: 248, 22 September 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in the Shabwah Governorate of Yemen</u>
2013	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 347, 30 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the Agreement signed for the Resolution of the Southern Question in Yemen</u>
2013	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 324, 6 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Against the Yemeni Ministry of Defense</u>
2013	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 319, 30 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the Assasination of Abdul-Karim Jadban, the Houthi representative at the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen</u>

2013	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 236, 1 September 2013, Press Release Regarding the Assassination Attempt against Yemeni Prime Minister Mohammed Salem Basindwa</u>
2013	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 76, 20 March 2013, Press Release Regarding Yemen National Dialogue Conference</u>
2013	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 34, 9 February 2013, Press Release Regarding the Setting of the Date for the Launching of the National Dialogue Process in Yemen</u>
2013	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 21, 26 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the News in Yemen Media</u>
2014	Algeria	neutral			<u>No: 253, 25 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Passenger Plane Belonging to Algeria Airlines that Crashed in Mali</u>
2014	Bahrain	positive			<u>No: 372, 03 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Elections in Bahrain</u>
2014	Bahrain	positive			<u>No: 74, 5 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attacks in Bahrain</u>
2014	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 370, 02 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt on 2 December 2014</u>
2014	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 307, 30 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Declaration Made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt on 29 September 2014</u>
2014	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 130, 28 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Verdicts of the Minya Criminal Court in Egypt</u>
2014	Egypt	neutral			<u>No: 87, 17 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Attack Perpetrated in Egypt on March 15</u>
2014	Egypt	positive			<u>No: 343, 06 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in 5-6 November 2014 in Egypt</u>
2014	Egypt	positive			<u>No: 220, 1 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Explosions in Egypt</u>
2014	Egypt	positive			<u>No: 52, 18 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the Attack against a Tourist Bus in Egypt</u>
2014	Egypt	positive			<u>No: 26, 24 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated in Egypt</u>
2014	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 373, 03 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attack Perpetrated on the Residence of the Iranian Ambassador in Sana'a</u>

2014	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 79, 9 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Political Consultations between Turkey and Iran</u>
2014	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 21, 20 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Against the Trade Attaché of the Iranian Embassy in Sana</u>
2014	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 1, 2 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran</u>
2014	Iran	positive			<u>No: 81, 12 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Third Trilateral Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran</u>
2014	Iran	positive			<u>No: 11, 13 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the Agreement on the Implementation of Iran's nuclear Programme</u>
2014	Iraq	negative			<u>No: 265, 11 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the Statements of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki</u>
2014	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 298, 18 September 2014, Press Regarding the Participation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United Nations Security Council Meeting on Iraq</u>
2014	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 295, 14 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Conference on Peace and Security in Iraq to be Held in Paris</u>
2014	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 208, 24 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Armed Attack Causing the Death of Iraqi Turkmen Front Executive Board Member Munir Kafili</u>
2014	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 194, 9 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Attack Perpetrated in the Iraqi town of Tuz Khormato</u>
2014	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 192, 9 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attacks in Iraq</u>
2014	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 44, 10 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2014	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 14, 16 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in Iraq</u>
2014	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 4, 7 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the Developments in Iraq</u>
2014	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 403, 24 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Iraq</u>

2014	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 397, 18 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Baghdad within the scope of the Second Meeting of the Turkey-Iraq High Level Strategic Council (HLSC)</u>
2014	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 371, 02 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Agreement Reached Between the Iraqi Central Government and KRG</u>
2014	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 339, 04 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq</u>
2014	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 326, 21 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2014	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 324, 19 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Appointments to vacant Ministries in Iraqi Government</u>
2014	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 290, 9 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the New Government in Iraq</u>
2014	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 268, 12 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the Latest Political Developments in Iraq</u>
2014	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 134, 1 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the Elections Held in Iraq</u>
2014	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 108, 9 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2014	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 38, 5 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 404, 25 December 2014, Press Release Regarding Israel's Illegal Settlement Activities</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 359, 20 November 2014, Press Release Regarding Israel's Illegal Settlement Activities</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 354, 13 November 2014, Press Release Regarding Israel's Aggressive Acts in Jerusalem and its Illegal settlement activities</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 342, 05 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the Violation of the Israeli Police against the Al-Aqsa Mosque</u>

2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 330, 28 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Illegal Settlement Activities of Israel</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 316, 09 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Prevention of Muslims from Entering the Al-Aqsa Mosque by the Israeli Forces</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 308, 02 October 2014, Press Release Regarding Israel's Illegal Settlement Activities</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 283, 1 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the New Illegal Settlement Activities of Israel in the West Bank</u>
2014	Israel	negative	Palestine	positive	<u>No: 273, 20 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the Disruption of Cease-fire Negotiations between Israel and Palestine</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 261, 4 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the Israeli Attack against UN School in Gaza</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 256, 30 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated by Israel against Gaza</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 247, 21 July 2014, Press Release Regarding Israel's Attack against the Shecaiyeh district of Gaza</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 243, 18 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Attack Perpetrated by Israel against Gaza</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 235, 8 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Operation Initiated by Israel against Gaza</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 186, 6 June 2014, Press Release Regarding Israel's Decision to Construct of New Settlement Units in the West Bank and East Jerusalem</u>
2014	Israel	negative			<u>No: 39, 7 February 2014, Press Release Regarding Israel's Decision to Construct New Houses in the Illegal Settlements in East Jerusalem</u>
2014	Israel	neutral	Palestine	positive	<u>No: 222, 1 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the three Israeli Youths Found Dead and the Latest Developments in Palestine</u>
2014	Israel	neutral			<u>No: 8, 11 January 2014, Press Release on Israel's Announcement of New Tenders for Illegal Settlements</u>
2014	Israel	positive	Palestine	positive	<u>No: 278, 27 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the Agreement Reached between Israel and Palestine on Declaring Unlimited Ceasefire in Gaza</u>

2014	Kuwait	neutral			<u>No: 292, 12 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Incident between an Attaché of the Kuwaiti Embassy and a Turkish Army Officer</u>
2014	Lebanon	positive			<u>No: 50, 16 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the Formation of the New Government in Lebanon</u>
2014	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 407, 28 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Air Strikes on Misrata and the Escalating Clashes in Libya</u>
2014	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 337, 03 November 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Special Representative Mr. Emrullah İşler to Libya</u>
2014	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 254, 25 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Repatriation of our Citizens in Libya</u>
2014	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 153, 20 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the Incidents Taking Place in Libya</u>
2014	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 123, 18 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Diplomats Kidnapped in Libya</u>
2014	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 75, 5 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Participation of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, in the Ministerial Conference on International Support to Libya to be held in Rome</u>
2014	Libya	positive			<u>No: 344, 07 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Libya</u>
2014	Libya	positive			<u>No: 325, 20 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Special Representative Mr. Emrullah İşler to Libya</u>
2014	Libya	positive			<u>No: 276, 24 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the Clashes and Air Strikes in Libya</u>
2014	Libya	positive			<u>No: 264, 8 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the Inauguration of Libyan House of Representatives</u>
2014	Libya	positive			<u>No: 257, 30 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Libya</u>
2014	Libya	positive			<u>No: 217, 28 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Elections to the House of Representatives held in Libya</u>
2014	Libya	positive			<u>No: 170, 27 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the New Libyan Government</u>

2014	Libya	positive			<u>No: 89, 18 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Bombing in the Libyan City of Benghazi</u>
2014	Oman	neutral			<u>No: 132, 30 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman, to Turkey</u>
2014	Palestine	neutral			<u>No: 227, 3 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Killing of a Palestinian Youth</u>
2014	Palestine	positive			<u>No: 385, 10 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Demise of Palestinian Minister Ziad Ebu Ayn</u>
2014	Palestine	positive			<u>No: 250, 25 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Assistance Provided by Turkey to Palestine</u>
2014	Palestine	positive			<u>No: 183, 2 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the National Unity Government in Palestine</u>
2014	Palestine	positive			<u>No: 18, 18 January 2014, Regarding the UN 2014 International Year of Solidarity with the Palestinian People</u>
2014	Qatar	neutral			<u>No: 258, 2 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the Working Visit of the Foreign Minister of Qatar to Turkey</u>
2014	Saudi Arabia	positive			<u>No: 341, 05 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Saudi Arabia</u>
2014	Syria	negative			<u>No: 294, 14 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Syrian Regime's Use of Chemical Weapons</u>
2014	Syria	negative			<u>No: 239, 15 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Appointment of the UN Secretary-General's New Special Envoy for Syria</u>
2014	Syria	negative			<u>No: 213, 27 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Shipping of the Chemicals out of Syria</u>
2014	Syria	negative			<u>No: 128, 24 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Syrian Regime's Decision to Organize Presidential Elections on 3 June</u>
2014	Syria	negative			<u>No: 94, 23 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Engagement of a Syrian Warplane Violating Turkey's Airspace</u>

2014	Syria	negative			<u>No: 61, 23 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the UNSC's Resolution on the Humanitarian Situation in Syria</u>
2014	Syria	negative			<u>No: 41, 10 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the Attack Against an UN Aid Convoy in the Homs Region in Syria</u>
2014	Syria	neutral	Jordan	neutral	<u>No: 137, 3 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the third "Ministerial Meeting of Syria Neighbouring Countries" to be held in Jordan</u>
2014	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 19, 19 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the Syrian National Coalition's Decision to Attend the Geneva II Conference</u>
2014	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 13, 16 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the "Ministerial Meeting of Syria Neighbouring Countries" to be hosted by Foreign Minister H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu in Şanlıurfa Harran Kökenli Container Temporary Protection Centre on 17 January 2014</u>
2014	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 402, 22 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Presidential Elections in Tunisia</u>
2014	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 364, 26 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the First Round of Presidential Elections of Tunisia Held on 23 November 2014</u>
2014	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 345, 07 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Tunisia</u>
2014	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 332, 28 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Parliamentary Elections in Tunisia</u>
2014	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 322, 17 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia</u>
2014	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 242, 18 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Attack in Tunisia</u>
2014	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 42, 10 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the Minister Foreign Affairs' Visit to Tunisia</u>
2014	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 31, 28 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the New Tunisian Constitution</u>
2014	UAE	negative			<u>No: 306, 27 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates</u>
2014	Yemen	neutral			<u>No: 309, 02 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Yemen</u>

2014	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 408, 31 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Yemen</u>
2014	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 396, 16 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Yemen</u>
2014	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 347, 08 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the Formation of new Government in Yemen</u>
2014	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 317, 10 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Yemen</u>
2014	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 303, 23 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Yemen</u>
2014	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 280, 30 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the New Developments in Yemen</u>
2014	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 269, 13 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the Increasing Acts of Violence in Yemen</u>
2014	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 238, 12 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Yemen</u>
2014	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 95, 25 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Yemen</u>
2014	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 32, 28 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the Conclusion of the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen</u>
2015	Algeria	positive			<u>No: 210, 21 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Ain Defla, Algeria</u>
2015	Bahrain	neutral			<u>No: 241, 31 August 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Bahrain</u>
2015	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 176, 16 June 2015, Press Release Regarding the Confirmation of the Death Sentence Issued for Egypt's Elected President Mr. Morsi</u>
2015	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 155, 16 May 2015, Press Release Regarding the Death Sentence Issued Against Mr. Mohamed Morsi, Elected President of Egypt</u>
2015	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 125, 22 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Sentencing of Mr. Mohamed Morsi, Former President of Egypt, to Imprisonment</u>
2015	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 108, 12 April 2015, Press Release Regarding Mass Death Penalty and Life-Term Sentences Issues in Egypt</u>

2015	Egypt	negative			<u>No: 32, 26 January 2015, Press Release Concerning the Incidents in Egypt on the Anniversary of the Tahrir Revolution</u>
2015	Egypt	neutral			<u>No: 295, 25 November 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terror Attack Perpetrated in Egypt</u>
2015	Egypt	neutral			<u>No: 193, 1 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terror Attacks in Egypt</u>
2015	Egypt	neutral			<u>No: 191, 29 June 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terror Attack Perpetrated in Egypt</u>
2015	Egypt	neutral			<u>No: 103, 3 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the 2 April 2015 Terror Attacks Perpetrated in Egypt</u>
2015	Egypt	positive			<u>No: 39, 29 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the 29 January 2015 Terror Attacks Perpetrated in Egypt</u>
2015	Iran	neutral			<u>No: 205, 14 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between the P5 + 1 and Iran Related to Iran's Nuclear Program</u>
2015	Iran	positive			<u>No: 102, 3 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Agreement on the Nuclear Program of Iran</u>
2015	Iraq	negative			<u>No: 303, 8 December 2015, Press Release Regarding the Training Activity by Turkey in Bashiqah, Iraq</u>
2015	Iraq	negative			<u>No: 220, 31 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Statement of the Iraqi Government about Turkey's Operations towards the PKK Targets</u>
2015	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 231, 13 August 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>
2015	Iraq	neutral			<u>No: 208, 18 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Iraq</u>
2015	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 203, 13 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Foreign Minister of Iraq to Turkey</u>
2015	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 169, 1 June 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Samarra, Iraq</u>
2015	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 120, 17 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Bomb Attack Perpetrated in Erbil, Iraq</u>
2015	Iraq	positive			<u>No: 42, 30 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq</u>

2015	Israel	negative			<u>No: 289, 19 November 2015, Press Release Regarding Israel's Approval for Construction of New Housing Units in East Jerusalem</u>
2015	Israel	negative			<u>No: 286, 12 November 2015, Press Release Regarding Israel's Advancement of the Procedures for Building New Settlement Units</u>
2015	Israel	negative			<u>No: 252, 13 September 2015, Press Release Regarding the Intrusion of the Israeli Police into Haram Al-Sharif</u>
2015	Israel	negative			<u>No: 186, 26 June 2015, Press Release Regarding the Denial of Entry and Deportation of Some Turkish Citizens from Israel</u>
2015	Israel	negative			<u>No: 146, 7 May 2015, Press Release Regarding Israel's Approval</u>
2015	Israel	negative			<u>No: 135, 27 April 2015, Press Release Regarding Israel's Tender Announcement for Construction of New Illegal Settlement Units</u>
2015	Israel	negative			<u>No: 40, 30 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Decision of Israel to construct New Illegal Settlement in the Occupied West Bank</u>
2015	Jordan	neutral			<u>No: 48, 04 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the Killing of Jordanian Pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh by the DEASH Terrorist Organization</u>
2015	Kuwait	neutral			<u>No: 188, 26 June 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Against a Mosque in Kuwait</u>
2015	Kuwait	neutral			<u>No: 19, 15 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Kuwait</u>
2015	Lebanon	positive			<u>No: 287, 12 November 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Lebanon</u>
2015	Lebanon	positive			<u>No: 11, 11 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in Lebanon</u>
2015	Libya	negative			<u>No: 148, 11 May 2015, Press Release Regarding the Dry Cargo Ship Attacked Off Tobruk/Libya</u>
2015	Libya	negative			<u>No: 89, 23 March 2015, Press Release regarding the Attacks Perpetrated in the west of Libya</u>
2015	Libya	negative			<u>No: 77, 28 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the Unfounded Allegations of Abdullah al-Thinni, Prime Minister of the Interim Government in Libya, on Turkey</u>

2015	Libya	negative			<u>No: 7, 07 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Threat Against Turkish Aircraft Using Libyan Airspace</u>
2015	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 306, 11 December 2015, Press Release Regarding the Ministerial Meeting on Libya</u>
2015	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 304, 8 December 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Libya, to Turkey</u>
2015	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 281, 26 October 2015, Press Release Regarding Latest Developments in Libya</u>
2015	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 260, 20 September 2015, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Libya</u>
2015	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 204 13 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Progress Achieved in the Libyan Political Dialogue Process</u>
2015	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 123, 20 April 2015, Press Release regarding the killings carried out by DEASH in Libya</u>
2015	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 69, 20 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in the Libyan City of Qubbah</u>
2015	Libya	neutral			<u>No: 26, 23 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Violation of the Ceasefire in Libya</u>
2015	Libya	positive			<u>No: 311, 18 December 2015, Press Release Regarding the Signing of the Libyan Political Agreement</u>
2015	Libya	positive			<u>No: 308, 16 December 2015, Press Release Regarding the Signing Ceremony of the Libyan Political Agreement</u>
2015	Libya	positive			<u>No: 60, 16 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the Killing of Egyptian Citizens in Libya by DEASH</u>
2015	Palestine	neutral			<u>No: 221, 31 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated Against a Palestinian Family in the West Bank</u>
2015	Palestine	positive			<u>No: 273, 13 October 2015, Press Release Regarding the Developments in the Occupied Palestinian Territories</u>
2015	Palestine	positive			<u>No: 249, 11 September 2015, Press Release Regarding the Resolution of the UN General Assembly to Hoist the Flag of the State of Palestine at its Headquarters</u>

2015	Qatar	neutral			<u>No: 141, 7 May 2015, Press Release Regarding the Preparatory Meeting of High-Level Strategic Committee of Turkish-Qatari Foreign Ministers</u>
2015	Qatar	positive			<u>No: 20, 16 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Qatar</u>
2015	Saudi Arabia	neutral			<u>No: 274, 14 October 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Turkey</u>
2015	Saudi Arabia	neutral			<u>No: 226, 7 August 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated against a Mosque in Saudi Arabia</u>
2015	Saudi Arabia	positive			<u>No: 277, 17 October 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated Against a Hoseyniyeh in Saudi Arabia</u>
2015	Saudi Arabia	positive			<u>No: 167, 30 May 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Against a Mosque in Saudi Arabia</u>
2015	Saudi Arabia	positive			<u>No: 162, 22 May 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Against a Mosque in Saudi Arabia</u>
2015	Saudi Arabia	positive			<u>No: 9, 08 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Saudi Arabia</u>
2015	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 312, 19 December 2015, Press Release Regarding the UN Security Council Resolution on Syria</u>
2015	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 267, 01 October 2015, Joint Declaration on Recent Military Actions of the Russian Federation on Syria</u>
2015	Syria	neutral			<u>No: 230, 11 August 2015, Press Release Regarding The Allegations on the Participation of Aerial Vehicles from Incirlik Air Base in an Operation Near the Town of Atma/Syria.</u>
2015	Tunisia	neutral			<u>No: 187, 26 June 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Tunisia</u>
2015	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 293, 24 November 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Tunisia</u>
2015	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 271, 10 October 2015, Press Release Regarding the Award of Nobel Peace Prize to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet</u>

2015	Tunisia	positive			<u>No: 86, 19 March 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Tunisia</u>
2015	Yemen	negative			<u>No: 53, 07 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the Political Developments in Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	negative			<u>No: 28, 24 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Situation in Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	neutral			<u>No: 101, 3 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Evacuation of Turkish Citizens in Aden, Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	neutral			<u>No: 88, 21 March 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated Towards Two Mosques in Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	neutral			<u>No: 22, 19 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Disturbances in Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	neutral			<u>No: 21, 16 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 263, 24 September 2015, Press Release Regarding the Suicide Attack Perpetrated at a Mosque in Sanaa, Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 243, 2 September 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack at a Mosque in Sanaa, Capital of Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 202, 10 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Humanitarian Ceasefire Declared in Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 175, 15 June 2015, Press Release Regarding the Participation of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the Extraordinary Meeting of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Foreign Ministers on Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 166, 27 May 2015, Press Release Regarding Turkey's Humanitarian Aid to Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 115, 15 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Developments in Yemen and the Resolution Adopted by the UN Security Council on Yemen on 14 April</u>
2015	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 104, 5 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Evacuation of Turkish Citizens in Yemen</u>
2015	Yemen	positive			<u>No: 94, 26 March 2015, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Yemen</u>

Lühikokkuvõte

Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärgiks on analüüsida majanduskasvu mõju arenevate regionaalsete juhtivvõimude välispoliitika aktiivsusele. Selle teostamiseks viidi uurimistöö käigus läbi üksikjuhtumil baseeruv uuring. Käsitletavaks üksikjuhtumiks valiti töö autori poolt Türgi näide Lähis-Ida regioonis.

Töö teoreetiline raamistik lähtub Barry Buzan and Ole Wæveri regionaalsete julgeolekukomplekside kontseptsioonist. Selle kohaselt on tähtsaimaks rahvusvaheliste suhte analüüsime tasandiks regioonid, mis on moodustatud ühiseid ohte tajuvatest riikidest, millel on tihe omavaheline läbikäimine. Buzani ja Wæveri käsitluse järgi on Lähis-Ida multipolaarne regioon, kus ei paikne ühtegi globaalset juhtivriiki. Regionaalse tasandil toimuva analüüsimiseks saab kasutada samu teooriad, mida kasutatakse globaalse tasandi rahvusvaheliste suhete uurimiseks. Käesolev magistritöö on võtnud aluseks neorealistliku käsitluse maailmast. Neorealismi üheks põhiliseks printsiibiks on riikide tahe maksimeerida enda võimu selleks, et parandada enda julgeolekut. Regionaalse analüüsi kontekstis tähendab see, et riigid üritavad saavutada ülemvõimu esmalt enda piirkonnas, sest just sealt tulenevad nende julgeolekule suurimad ohud.

Magistritöö keskseks hüpoteesiks on, et arengumaades regionaalsete juhtivvõimude kiire majanduskasv võimaldab neil kasutada üha rohkem raha oma välispoliitilise võimekuse tõstmiseks. Suurenenud kogus materiaalseid ressursse koos tahtega julgeolekukaalutlustel oma regionaalset mõjuvõimu suurendada, tekitab olukorra, kus regionaalsed juhtivvõimud hakkavad viljelema varasemaga võrreldes aktiivsemat ja jõulisemat välispoliitikat.

Hüpoteesi kinnitamiseks teostati analüüs Lähis-Ida regiooni ja Türgi kohta. Analüüsi käigus leiti, et aastate 2002 ja 2015 vahel on Lähis-Ida riikide jõudude tasakaal jäänud üldises plaanis varasemaga sarnaseks. Kuigi Türgi majandus on kiirelt kasvanud ja nad on suurendanud näiteks oma kulutusi sõjaväele, on sama moodi käitunud ka teised piirkonna riigid. Seetõttu pole Türgi suutnud enda suhtelist eelist teiste riikide ees märkimisväärselt suurendada.

Türgi sõjalistel kulutustel ja majanduskasvu vahel eksisteerib otsene seos. Kuna selle riigi kaitsekulutused on püsinud aastate vältel umbes 2% juures riigieelarvest, on kaitsekulutuste kasv tulenev üldisest Türki riigi suurenenud riigieelarvest. Türki majanduskasv on põhjustanud ka kolme kordse ekspordi kasvu Lähis-Ida riikidesse võrreldes sajandivahetusega. See omakorda muudab regiooni riigid endisest enam Türgist sõltuvaks ning suurendab Türki “pehmet” jõudu Lähis-Idas.

Uurimistöökäigus analüüsiti Türki välispoliitilist aktiivsust kasutades Türki välisministeeriumi kodulehel avaldatud pressiteateid ajavahemikus 2007-2015. Analüüsi käigus leiti, et Türki riigi esindajad on hakanud selle ajaperioodi vältel enam külastama teisi Lähis-Ida regiooni riike. Enim külastusi tehti Saudi Araabiasse, Iraani ja Iraaki – riikidesse, mis on koos Türgiga regiooni juhtivriigid. Lisaks suurenenud väliskülastuste arvule on muutunud sagedasemaks ka üleüldine Lähis-Ida riikide mainimine Türki pressiteadetes. Enim mainitud riikideks osutusid Iraak, Iisrael, Süüria, Jeemen ja Liibüa.

Pressiteadete põhjal tehtud analüüsi järgi võib väita, et Türki suhted enamiku regiooni riikidega on võrdlemisi sõbralikud. Negatiivses toonis käsitleti kogu antud perioodi vältel Iisraeli, millele heideti korduvalt ette Palestiina kodanike õiguste rikkumist. Vaadeldava ajaperioodi lõpus halvenes Türki suhtumine Süüriasse, Iraaki ja Egiptusesse. Türki valitsus hakkas toetama Süüria valitsuse võimult eemaldamist, mõistis hukka Egiptuses toimunud kindral al-Sisi poolt läbi viidud riigipöörde ja kritiseeris Iraagi valitsuse tegevusetust Kurdi terroristidega võitlemisel. Seega muutus Türki välispoliitika perioodi lõpul teiste riikide suhtes kriitilisemaks ja ennast kehtestavamaks.

Türgi välispoliitiline aktiivsus oli analüüsi järgi otseselt seotud riigi majanduskasvuga. Aastatel, mis järgnesid kiiret majanduskasvu, teostasid Türki riigiametnikud rohkem välisreise Lähis-Ida piirkonda ning suurem kogus pressiteateid mainis teisi regiooni riike. Seega leidis kinnitust uurimistöökäiguhüpootees, et regionaalsete juhtivriikide majanduskasv on seotud nende välispoliitilise aktiivsusega.

Türgi kohta teostatud uuring annab informatsiooni regionaalsete juhtivriikide käitumise kohta. Samas ei ole kõik maailma piirkonnad üksteisele sarnased ja uuringu tulemusi ei saa tingimata kõigile regionaalsetele juhtivriikidele laiendada. Tulevikus on väärt kaaluda järeluuringu

teostamist, mis käsitleks juhtivriikide välispoliitika seost nende majandus kasvuga ka teistsuguse ülesehituse ja võimujoontega regioonides.

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