

Σημειωτική

Peet Lepik



**Universals in the Context
of Juri Lotman's Semiotics**

Tartu Semiotics Library 7

Tartu Semiotics Library 7

Edited by
Taru Vuorisalo

Journal of Semiotics
and Cultural Studies

Volume 1
Number 1
2012

On the Semiotics of
Cultural Studies

1

2012

Tartu Semiootika Raamatukogu 7
Тартуская библиотека семиотики 7

**Universaalidest Juri Lotmani semiootika
kontekstis**

Peet Lepik

**Об универсалиях в контексте
семиотики Юрия Лотмана**

Пээт Лепик

University of Tartu

**Universals in the Context of Juri
Lotman's Semiotics**

Peet Lepik

Appendix: Three lectures by Juri Lotman

Tartu 2008



Translated by Tiia Raudma

Edited by Silvi Salupere

Series editors: Peeter Torop, Kalevi Kull, Silvi Salupere

Address of the editorial office:

Department of Semiotics
University of Tartu
Tiigi St. 78
Tartu 50410, Estonia

<http://www.ut.ee/SOSE/tsl.htm>

This publication has been supported by
Estonian Culture Endowment and the Estonian Ministry of Culture

Cover design:
Rauno Thomas Moss

Cover: Photograph of the scale model used by artist Mati Karmin in his
design for the memorial to Juri Lotman in Tartu

Copyright University of Tartu, 2008

ISSN 1406-4278
ISBN 978-9949-11-831-1

Tartu University Press
www.tyk.ee

Table of Contents

Foreword	11
Introduction	14
1. Universals in connection with the interpretation of magic in Juri Lotman's semiotics	23
1.1. Points of departure for the interpretation of universals	23
1.2. Two opposing interpretations	31
2. Specifics of mythological and magical semiosis	40
2.1. Basic terms	40
2.2. Mythological semiosis	50
2.3. Magical semiosis	53
2.3.1. The epistemological status of magic	53
2.3.2. Magical procedure	54
2.3.3. <i>Agens</i> as a mythological structure	55
2.3.4. <i>Agens</i> as a magical structure	57
2.3.4.1. <i>Phenomenon of the magician</i>	57
2.3.4.2. <i>Problem of magical effect</i>	59
3. Antithesis in culture and sign-creation	62
3.1. Determining the viewpoint	62
3.2. Semiosis forms the culture type	66
3.2.1. The antithetic dominant of <i>semiosis</i>	68
3.2.1.1. <i>Complementarity of the antithetic cultural space</i>	72
3.2.1.2. <i>Principle of symmetry</i>	75
3.2.1.3. <i>Symmetrical reduction</i>	79
3.2.1.4. <i>Mirror projection</i>	82
3.2.1.5. <i>Enantiomorphic symmetry</i>	85
3.2.2. Autocommunication of culture: antithetic self-reflection	87
3.2.2.1. <i>Antithesis as a secondary code of autocommunication</i>	89

4. The uniqueness and universality of magic in culture	92
4.1. Viewpoint and tasks.....	92
4.2. Paradox of magic in culture.....	92
4.3. Magic outside "folklore" (Selection of critical glances).....	98
4.3.1. Characteristics of "magical" behaviour in a child's ontology.....	99
4.3.2. Magic as everyday spontaneous behavioural practice.....	100
4.3.3. Connecting magic with the characteristics of natural language.....	102
4.3.3.1. <i>Defining magical function using terms from the act of linguistic communication.....</i>	102
4.3.3.2. <i>Magicality of verbal representation.....</i>	106
4.3.3.3. <i>Magicality of the substance of language.....</i>	109
4.3.4. Cultural-semiotic interpretation of magic: Juri Lotman's points of departure.....	113
4.3.4.1. <i>Structure-typological viewpoint.....</i>	113
4.3.4.2. <i>Phenomenological viewpoint.....</i>	122
4.3.4.2.1. <i>Phenomenological correlates of Edmund Husserl.....</i>	122
4.3.4.2.2. <i>Universality and uniqueness of the reproductive communication of the intellect (using magicality as an example).....</i>	134
4.4. In conclusion on the analysis of magic in the "Lectures".....	142
5. Universal forms of the reproductivity of intellect.....	145
5.1. Terminological classification of reproductivity.....	145
5.2. Constitutive reproductivity.....	147
5.2.1. Phenomenon of vertical isomorphism.....	148
5.2.2. Phenomenological criticism of Aleksandr Pyatigorski's viewpoint.....	151

5.2.2.1. "Ontologization" of the research method.....	153
5.2.2.2. "Naturalizing" the object of the analysis	159
5.2.2.3. Semiotics changing into "almost philosophy"	164
5.3. The analytical and generative forms of the reproductivity of the intellect.....	166
5.3.1. The analyticality of reproductive behaviour.....	166
5.3.1.1. Ritual and ritualizing reproductivity	169
5.3.1.2. Reproductivity of ritual communication	175
5.3.2. The universal, generative functions of ritual	180
5.3.2.1. Ritual and code text.....	196
5.3.2.2. The concept and structure of code signal.....	203
5.3.2.3. Code text and code signal	213
Summary	218
Appendix: Juri Lotman. Semiotics of personality and society	225
References	245
Index	266

FOREWORD

The monograph you are holding would definitely never have been written if I had not happened upon some notes made of the lectures given by Juri Lotman in the late autumn of 1967 (these notes have now been published, in a complete form and for the first time, in the Appendix to this book). Although the notes are declarative, and even occasionally incomplete (as notes always are), the ideas from these guided my curiosity throughout many decades, and helped to eventually find the answer to the question that arose for me as a university student during the study of magic tales: why do children not tire of listening to the same magic tale, over and over again? How can this particular interest by children towards fairytales as a genre be explained? No satisfactory answer to this question was forthcoming from the study of folklore at the end of the 1960s.

Beyond the physical lines of the notes of the "Lectures" I could see the concept that a person's magic, religious, as well as a play and artistic communicative relationship with someone/something is a specific intellectual operation, which has an apriority and universal nature. This idea was most intriguing. Ways of resolving this question that was tormenting me gradually began to become clear to me in the course of delving into Juri Lotman's semiotics, but I nevertheless felt for a long time like someone who knows the tune of a song but cannot find the words.

The following pages do indeed reflect the path taken in search of these words. Taking into account the words that have already been published, it can be said that this process has lasted for the last eight years.

I have given presentations at about ten international conferences on the topics contained in the first three, of the total, five

chapters, and the first four chapters have also been published, in varying forms (Lepik 2000; 2001a; 2001b; 2001c; 2001d; 2001e; 2001f; 2002a; 2002b; 2003; 2007a; 2007b). In the final two chapters — which play a key role in this book and where both have been written in 2006–2007 (the standpoints in the latter chapter are now being published for the first time) — I believe I have found the words that I have sought.

In analyses dedicated to Juri Lotman one can observe various attempts to universalize his culture semiotic theory. Whereas the attitude of the first monograph dedicated to Lotman was to proceed from the synthesis of literature and semiotics (Shukman 1977), in one of the more recent monographs it is indeed the problems of language and communication that hold a central place. Secondary modelling systems have been compared with universal language, together with the same type of examinations done by Umberto Eco (Andrews 2003: 16; see also Andrews 1999). Lotman's cultural semiotics has been synthesized over the years with ethnology by Portis-Winner, who sees universality through the concept of semiosphere: "Lotman's concept of semiosphere unites all the aspects of cultural semiotics, all heterogenic semiotic systems or "languages", which constantly change and which, in the abstract sense, have a certain number of qualities that unite them." (Portis-Winner 2002: 63; see also Portis-Winner 1999).

The purpose of this work is not the systematic analysis of the studies dedicated to Juri Lotman. It is only important to ascertain that the concept of universals, in the meaning and in the sphere of implementation that is the focus of my book, has not been covered in earlier studies. Nevertheless, some methodological attempts at generalization have been attempted. Thus there have been studies of the use of terms by Lotman (Kim Su Kwan 2003), the importance of Lotman in the transition from static to dynamic cultural analysis has been emphasized (Merrell 2001, Źyłko 2001, Eco 2000), and this has been done in a general methodological mode of culture theory (Rastier 2001), in a mode of cultural ecology (Arán and Barei 2002) and a trans-

disciplinary mode (Machado 2003). These works clearly indicate, however, that Lotman's scholarly heritage also provides a reason to seek such generalizations that are not immediately apparent or that have found only implicit expression.

Since the bases for compiling the book have been the articles that have been written over eight years (with the aim of eventually preparing a monograph), terminological nuances can be found in the earlier texts (the material for Chapters 1–3), which may diverge from the wording of the later chapters. In reviewing the texts, I nevertheless made the assessment that these diversions were within the limits of synonymy, and decided not to lapse into such details whilst creating the whole. Chapter 5 has grouped these certain contradictions under a common denominator.

In preparing this monograph, and organizing it for publication, I have been provided with invaluable support and assistance by the Department of Semiotics at the University of Tartu. I am particularly grateful to Professor Peeter Torop and Professor Kalevi Kull, and to Silvi Salupere, Irina Avramets, and the translator of this book, Tiia Raudma. I have also received great assistance from Anne Saagpakk in the preparation of the manuscript.

The book itself, however, could not have been published without the financial assistance provided to me by the Estonian Ministry of Culture and the Estonian Culture Endowment. I am very grateful to them.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this monograph is to describe the communicative algorithms of the intellect, and their textual equivalents, as sign-creating universals. Although the author was indeed inspired by one specific exotic section in the lectures of Juri Lotman, is appropriate to begin with the admission that the Tartu professor had a constant interest in universal signifying processes throughout his creative career. In universality (*resp.* “stability”), he has seen one of the fundamental characteristics of culture:

Culture represents the most complete mechanism — created by humanity — from amongst those that change entropy into information. It is a mechanism that must preserve and transmit information, but at the same time must continue to increase its volume. Becoming continually more complicated internally, and self-development, are its laws. This is why culture must simultaneously signal its own stability as well as dynamism — it must be, and at the same time, must not be a structure. Only in such conditions can it fulfil all the tasks that the collective has determined for it. (Lotman 1970h: 104)

In implementing the criteria of Porphyrios’s eternally durable classification, it could be claimed that Juri Lotman treats universals in the spirit of moderate nominalism or conceptualism. In other words it means that a Person in this conception is an object to whom a collection of characteristics is attributed that is common to all single individuals, which expresses the understanding of *any person whatsoever*. A Person is identical to this collection of characteristics. Universals or general concepts (in contrast to radical nominalism) do not exist here only as names, signs, “making the air shake”, as medieval scholars ironically said, but universals, being products of the intellect, are forms of perception that are prior to experience. In other words, it could be said that they express certain capacities of the human

intellect, which constitute a definite system of algorithms. The universal algorithms find signified expression in the variety of human activity, primarily of course in communication — as in speech reality.

The treatment here of the concept of ‘universal’ distances itself from the approaches of the logical treatment of universals (e.g. Armstrong 1989), the linguistic treatment (e.g. Greenberg, Osgood, Jenkins 1970), the cognitive-linguistic treatment (e.g. Lakoff 1990 [1987]), the ethnological treatment (e.g. Kluckhohn 1970 [1962]) and the psychoanalytical treatment (e.g. Freud 1938 [1906]), but also from analysis in the spirit of Carl Jung’s archetypes of collective non-consciousness (Jung *et al.* 1964). Proceeding from the nature of Lotman’s culture concept it may be claimed that the presence in communication processes of universal characteristics that are intrinsic to intellect depends on the context — or in a wider sense, on the nature of the speech reality. It follows from this that universals are definitely not phenomena that are statistically determined. In speech reality, the algorithms of the intellect may also change into numerous textual variations. And these can be supported by universals that lack intellect-based apriority. The latter are outside the focus of this analysis.

In his studies, Lotman has described various cultural universals: for example, the function that structures the beginning and end of cultural texts, the generative difference between communication and autocommunication, the semiosphere, the importance of honour and fame (in Russian culture), the “vertical” isomorphism of the intellect, text and culture, etc. This book concentrates on describing the universal characteristics of the intellect, as the apriority mechanism that stores, organizes and transmits information. Of these characteristics, five universal communicative functions (algorithms) of the intellect, which are textually realized as mythological, magical, religious, antithetic and metaphorical code signals, are examined more closely.

The constructive components of the concept of code signal are (1) the phenomenological concept of the intellect; (2) the

category of code text; (3) the category of ritual, and (4) treating text as a signal.

1. In Lotman's words, intellect is the ability to command language, to store, organize and mediate signified information, as well as to carry out algorithmitized operations for the transformation of information, and to produce new information. Lotman has dedicated — to the detailed analysis of this concept — the articles "Culture as a collective intellect, and the problems of artificial intelligence" (1977), "The phenomenon of culture" (1978), and "Brain – text – culture – artificial intelligence" (1990).
2. Code text is described as a text type in the works of Vladimir Toporov, Juri Lotman and other scholars of the Tartu–Moscow school of semiotics, where the formal characteristics (code) dominate to the detriment of substantive characteristics (textual semantics), and which have the character of formalizing and forming (cultural) memory. Toporov introduces the "St Petersburg text", as a concept of code text, and indicates the system of time-space and other constant characteristics — common thread in the St Petersburg-themed belletristic, from Pushkin to Dostoyevski (on whom Toporov particularly focuses) up to Bitov.
3. The next important constitutive characteristic of code signal is the genetic and structural link of code signal with the concept of ritual, when the latter is treated as an integral system of communication codes and functions — between the profane and sacral worlds. Lotman reached the systematic analysis of the concept of ritual in the final years of his scholastic activity, when he published the article, "Dynamics of culture" (1992), which is fully dedicated to the place of ritual and rituality in the cyclical and historical world scene, and in the development of the intellect.

4. Treating text as signal reduces text to an elementary concept, or to a behavioural act that can be interpreted pragmatically, which is directed to a *listener* located in exactly the same chronotype and/or in exactly the same situational space. Signal does not presume feedback, nor does it require translation — otherwise it would not fulfil its task. The foundation for the formal analysis of the communicative functions of text in the Tartu–Moscow school of semiotics was laid by Aleksandr Pyatigorski in his weighty article “Some general observations on text as a variety of signal” (1962). He developed this topic further together with Lotman in the article “Text and function” (1968), which also is of considerable significance.

The monograph attempts to open up the apriority and universal character of code signals, and to describe their characteristics in verbal and other behavioural texts.

The Latin word ‘*contextus*’ means connection and linkage. Therefore, the widening of our topic proceeds from the title of the monograph, “*Universals in the Context of Juri Lotman’s Semiotics*”: code signals are projected onto the integral system of Lotman’s semiotics, where the constitutive axis is already other universals, without which it is not possible to interpret these universals that I call code signals. What I mean by “other universals” is primarily the vertical isomorphism of culture, through which the analogy of the principles of structure and functioning, as well as mutually exchangeable functionality, is attributed to intellect, text and culture. Such an analogy of the principles of structure and functioning is postulated by Lotman on the basis of four basic characteristics, which are the semiotic heterogeneity, memory, the self-reproduction of meanings, and the existence of a communication-regulative selection block of all three phenomena.

Mythological, magical, and other relevant code signals are speech phenomena, and therefore it is not magic, religion, etc

that will be analyzed in this book but magicality, religiosity, metaphoricality, etc, as the base structures of semiosis and communication. They are base structures due to their prominent role in the reproductive processes in communication.

Juri Lotman, as already noted in the Foreword, "sketched" in his last lecture (see Appendix) a schema with six elements, of which those relevant to us are the magical, religious and artistic functions (and the play-function that is structurally isomorphic with the latter). In later articles (together with Boris Uspenski), and to some extent in other contexts, there was an analysis of antithesis, and a particularly thorough analysis of the universality of mythological semiosis — without hardly using the term "universality". Therefore, all the elements of the system that will be examined here have been looked at by Juri Lotman, but for various reasons these five elements were not linked into a system.

There are also good reasons for this, which should now be mentioned.

Although Lotman defined the concept of the intellect, and the theoretically fundamental ideas of the vertical isomorphism of intellect, text and culture, he did not call 'magicality', 'religiosity', 'antitheticism' or 'metaphoricism' as algorithms of the intellect, not in his original schema or even later (the exception was 'mythological', which he analysed, together with Uspenski, as a cognitive phenomenon, on the basis of features that are characteristic of logic). This is somewhat odd if we consider that his analysis of the intellect, and many other concepts that he used in semiotic discussions, attuned him to develop his thinking in this direction.

Having engrossed myself in Lotman's works as a whole I can now presume that Lotman did not finish his examination of the reproductive processes of the intellect (including the universals of the intellect), apparently due to the fact that innovation had become the dominating motive in his work, as well as Prigogine and the bifurcation processes.

As to the “abandoned” universals, it seems that Lotman had not formulated a deductive viewpoint, a common basis, which would have linked these intellectual phenomena into a system. One (very important) attempt to construct such a whole was the wording of the semiosphere-concept, but this remained a “long-distance view” as regards the more detailed observation of the internal text processes. (For more detail, see Voigt 1995: 197–198.)

And this led to the idea which I wished to prove, and this is that all five intellectual algorithms, as code signals, are a sign-creating system, where ritual and rituality are the ancient textual equivalents. All code signals, as became apparent, are explicitly exhibited in ritual and form a system of communicative functions. It is most important here to note that it was delving into the structure of ritual in particular that permitted the author to answer the question: what guarantees the durability of code signals as the constructive elements of culture (and in a narrower sense, of communication).

In order to be able to prove this I needed to answer six important questions:

(1) whether, besides the “semiotic functions”, which formed the 1967 schema, there were other functions that could be treated as belonging to the same group?; (2) what is it in culture that gives birth to the repertoire of functions indicated by Lotman?; (3) are there common characteristics for these functions, and if there are, what are they?; (4) do the texts that fulfil these functions form a systemic whole, and what characterizes this system?; (5) what are the sources for this wholeness? and (6) what guarantees the constantly on-going reproductivity of communicative functions (i.e. continuing in the active memory of culture)?

The study of cultural universals does not hold the promise of praise for any scholar, since carrying out such a task is associated with uncomfortable theoretical complications and moves inconveniently across an open interdisciplinary field of study. In the course of the writing, the author had to resolve, in addition to semiotic issues, also linguistic, folkloric, ethnological, philoso-

phical, cultural-historic and communication-theoretical problems. For example, one central field of study outside semiotics was the determination of the roots of Juri Lotman's semiotic conception, in the course of which the important influence of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, on the work of the Tartu professor became apparent.

The author freely admits that it is only a theoretical model that is being offered to the reader, which would require further theoretical and empirical documented analysis (including the field of the implementation of the model). Nevertheless, I believe that in the heuristic sense this system of ideas does have an implementation field, and theoretically this should open a certain new perspective for the cultural-semiotic interpretation of texts. Code signals in cultures are ritualizing text-generators. This opinion can be illustrated by an analysis of advertising, which would summarize the ideas of the monograph.

The structure of this work is as follows:

Chapter 1 (Universals in connection with the interpretation of magic in Juri Lotman's semiotics) looks at Juri Lotman's two interpretations of magic, which are mutually exclusive. Chapter 1 also examines Lotman's understandings of universals and the place of his "Lectures" schema in the context of Lotman's entire cultural-semiotic views. Chapter 2 (Specifics of mythological and magical semiosis) is dedicated to systematic description of the concept of magicity in the way that the author of the monograph understands this phenomenon. There, magicity and mythologicality are compared and differentiated, based on the analysis by Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski on the specifics of mythological sign-creation. Chapter 3 (Antithesis in culture and sign-creation) concentrates on the analysis of the antithetic communicative function and of its universal signifying forms, which is compared with the analysis by Lotman and Uspenski, in which antithesis is interpreted in a somewhat different, more general context. The dominant place of antithetic communicative structures in the political ideology of totalitarian societies is also characterized. In Chapter 4 (Uniqueness and universality of

magic in culture) there is a return to the concept of magic but in a context that is as wide as possible, in order to, on the one hand, compare Lotman's viewpoint with the other possible customary interpretations of magic (magicality), and on the other hand, to describe those methodological sources, from which Lotman's viewpoint on communicative functions proceeds. In this connection, I discovered that Lotman's basic semiotic terms bore a close relationship with the phenomenological views. Apparently, the intuitive determinations characteristic of Lotman, and structures built on essence (intellect, vertical isomorphism, monad, semiosphere), are characterized by closeness to Husserl's philosophical views. Chapter 5 (Universal forms of the reproductivity of intellect) is the longest of the thesis, and its content is central. Here the material from the previous chapters is synthesized, and a detailed analysis of the concept of code signal is carried out. The genetic kinship relationship of code signal with ritual thus becomes clear, as well as the dependence of the structure of the code signal on the character of the communication between the sacral and profane sphere. The system of shifters is also described, which ensures the stability of code signals.

In the structure of the work, it is the final two chapters, which were prepared during the last two years, that are perhaps the most substantial. The first chapters are dedicated to the study of magicality and antithesis, since Juri Lotman's analysis of these two topics has been rather scant. Religiosity has proved to be little-studied (by both Lotman and this author), and this is a pity. Nevertheless, the author believes that the logic of the study as a whole, and the analogy with the structure of the four sister-algorithms, should describe sufficiently clearly the place of this phenomenon in the "third", sign-world of culture.

The system of concepts, which the author uses in the study of code signals, is associated with the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics, into which environment, the author — due to the views that he holds — dares to also include himself. This general

attitude is expressed in the nature and terminology of the analysis, and naturally also in the choice of selected references.

UNIVERSALS IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF MAGIC IN JURI LOTMAN'S SEMIOTICS

1.1. Points of departure for the interpretation of universals

As an introduction, some light needs to be shed on those points of departure that provided the bases for the first phase of Juri Lotman's universals-quest. A narrower goal is to assess the implementation of these points of departure using the example of the interpretation of magic. This task is particularly interesting for three reasons. Firstly, Juri Lotman has two conceptual schemata for magic, one of which was completed in 1967 (referred to as Mg 1; see Appendix, Lecture IV), and the other (Mg 2) was published fourteen years later (Lotman 1993a [1981]), and the interpretation of magic in Mg 2 is notably different to Mg 1. Secondly, Mg 1 is one of the first attempts in the universalistic interpretation of culture in Juri Lotman's semiotics, and, thirdly, Mg 1 has never been published.

Mg 1 is actually a fragment of notes taken during the series of lectures held at the University of Tartu, to be more precise — the fourth lecture of the series, which has rather a loose association with the first part of the lecture series (except for the first lecture). In the fourth lecture, Lotman is feeling his way regarding the possibilities of creating a universal typology of texts and text functions. One of the “building blocks” for this typology is indeed magic.

However, we need to begin with the central concept of *universal* and *universality*. According to the topic of this monograph, I shall attempt to shed light upon this concept in the way it was expressed in the semiotics of Juri Lotman, at the time

of the creation of the Tartu–Moscow school. A detailed theoretical analysis of universalities in Lotman's work presumes systematic study of all the relevant writings by the scholar and his co-authors.

The ideas and conceptual principles of Juri Lotman's semiotics are dynamic, hard to grasp and to define. Regarding our present topic, we can see that although the universality theme is present in some form or another throughout Lotman's semiotic heritage — either as an important motive, background or facet — no monographs with information on the development of this topic have been published by him. There are also no other authors who have written a monographic critique of Lotman's universals-analysis. These other authors of course include Lotman's co-authors, primarily Boris Uspenski, Vyacheslav Ivanov and Aleksandr Pyatigorski, together with whom, or having being directly inspired by whom, the Tartu professor has written cultural semiotic works, where the universalistic treatment dominated or was substantially represented.¹

At the Second summer school of semioticians in August 1966 at Kääriku, Juri Lotman formulated for the first time the need for a description of the universals of culture and the compilation of an applicable "cultural grammar" (Lotman 1966b: 83)². In the

¹ One of Juri Lotman's co-authors, Boris Uspenski, in his thorough theoretical work on the problem of universals, has remained within the limits of linguistics (Uspenski 1963; 1965; 1970). In implementing universalistic analysis in cultural semiotics, the joint work of Juri Lotman with Boris Uspenski, which began in the 1970s and lasted for years, is particularly noteworthy: Lotman and Uspenski 1971; 1973; 1975; 1994 [1977]; 1982. With Aleksandr Pyatigorski he published in this context an important analysis of the semiotic relationship between text and function (Lotman and Pyatigorski 1968). The work by Vyacheslav Ivanov regarding the reflection of the psycho-physiological functions of the left and right brain hemispheres in the basic codes of culture (Ivanov 1978a) was extensively developed by Juri Lotman in his later articles (Lotman 1983; 1984; 1990 and elsewhere).

² Summer schools were held in the University of Tartu sports camp at Kääriku from 1964 onwards. The fourth summer school in 1970 turned out to be the last: it was closed due to a joint effort by officials of the KGB and the Estonian SSR communist party.

introduction to the compendium of the summer school's presentations, the organizers indicated the need to differentiate with particular attention "those most general elements whose universality may make clearer the common description of the various modelling systems ..." (Zamechaniya 1966: 4-5). The need for such a task was argued by Juri Lotman in his 1967 article "On the Problem of Cultural Typology". The article was published in Volume III of the "Sign Systems Studies" (Lotman 1967b). In the editor's foreword to the collection, Juri Lotman wrote of a methodological foundation for a cultural grammar (Lotman 1967a). In this foreword he sets out his understanding of cultural universals in radical opposition to Hegel's philosophy of history. Hegel postulated that the concept of world is realized at each stage of its development in only one national culture, which at that moment, from the standpoint of the world's historical process, is unique. But a unique phenomenon, argues Juri Lotman, can have no special feature — describing uniqueness requires the unavoidable contrast of at least two systems. Indeed, this is the origin of the defectiveness of the Hegelian concept of history: in emphasizing uniqueness, Hegel even makes all the differences between the epochs absolute. Everything that is not a difference in the comparison of epochs is left unmarked, because it cannot be noteworthy. Lotman postulates that — because of this very misconception — it is important in principle to not deny the existence of other, possible non-human civilizations. Only the imagined viewpoint of a culture external to the Earth enables the understanding that human culture has common characteristics that encompass it as a typologizing whole. "That which is common to all epochs and civilizations — such a neutral element, not containing information, changes human culture to a source of information of its specifics" (Lotman 1967a: 6). In the course of such study, it is unavoidably apparent that some of the typological characteristics of culture are characteristic for whatever human culture, but some do not suit the common typology. These "most general characteristics", which unify cultures and are characteristic for

human culture as a whole, are described by Lotman, in his methodological introduction, as cultural universals (Lotman 1967a: 6).

In the already mentioned second publication of the same collection, Juri Lotman states directly that the task of cultural typology is

(1) the description of such *basic types of cultural codes*, which form the basis for the “languages” of the various cultures and their comparative characteristics; (2) the determination of the *universals of various cultures of humankind*, and — as a result — (3) the creation of a *unified system* of the typological features of the basic codes of cultures and a *general structure of the universal features of human culture* (Lotman 1967b: 31, emphasis and numbering — P. L.]

The described logic of research, in the opinion of Juri Lotman, would enable the creation of a “cultural grammar”, and this would “hopefully lay the foundation for moving on to the construction of a structured history for culture” (Lotman 1967b: 34).

The object and the subject of this program, from the standpoint of the history of the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school, has rather a unique place.

Regarding the object of the research, the program can be described as a call to turn away from the specific genre, compositional or other narrow semiotic problems, of literature, folklore (myth) or religion, to the study of the major and general issues of culture — to *cultural semiotics*. (Nevertheless, the “special attention” of the second summer school was concentrated on texts, and limited to the examination of single problems (see Zamechaniya 1966: 4).) At first glance it seems that the cultural semiotic subject matter (text = culture) was primarily (?) the personal field of interest for Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski. Cultural semiotics became the common basic problem for the Kääriku group in 1970, when the work of the fourth summer school was concentrated on studying the “unity of

culture” — cultural semiotics *par excellence* (Predlozheniya 1970: 3; cf. Chernov 1988: 13). Three years later, “Theses” was indeed published, which was considered the policy document for the school (Ivanov *et al.* 1998 [1973])³, and where cultural semiotics, which studies a “certain unity” of a person’s informational activity, is termed a science that analyses the “functional correlation of different sign systems” (Ivanov *et al.* 1998: 61). (It should be added that the introductory paragraph 1.0.0. of “Theses”, which is quoted here, is to a great extent in accordance with both the content and wording of the aims of the Fourth summer school, which were probably prepared as an introduction to the summer school compendium by Juri Lotman. This wording hints at the attempt to interpret cultural semiotics in a universalistic key.)

In the 1966–1967 policy positions, Lotman treats universals with untypical maximalism and with laconic conviction⁴. The field and methods of his research into universals changed repeatedly over the years, “grammatical” rigidity was replaced by a more flexible and dynamic approach, but the discovery of the “mechanisms” of culture, whereby human cultures are similar, remained a common subject in Juri Lotman’s scientific works to the end of his life.⁵

³ “Theses” — and this was not coincidental — was not published in the Soviet Union (not even in Tartu), but in the space of one year in Poland, The Hague, and Paris. The Brezhnev reaction had accelerated.

⁴ To date, Lotman had examined / was examining two universalistic problems: the aesthetics of sameness and difference in an artistic text (Lotman 1994a [1964]: 222–232), and the structural role of beginning and end in cultural texts (in culture) (Lotman 1966: 69–74). Boris Uspenski, and Aleksandr Pyatigorski, who joined him in 1967, moved in the direction of cultural typological “invariant schemas” (Zamechaniya 1966: 4) with their personological analyses (Uspenski 1966; Pyatigorski and Uspenski 1967).

⁵ Lotman was fond of the term “mechanism” — this is apparent in his many works. As a concept this word expresses for him a generally algorithmized, interlinked system, which is complete, autonomous and understandably — universal. This concept also tends to “ignore” the semiotic border between language (code) and speech (text).

The starting point for universalistic research is for Lotman clearly associated with Ferdinand de Saussure's holistic language concept. This expressed the hope of also discovering in other modelling systems a stable identity for grammatical categories which is characteristic of natural language: "A system, which is not organized in this way, *is not* a language, this means that it cannot be used for the preservation and transmittal of information." Such a feature of secondary modelled systems, in Juri Lotman's opinion, makes it possible to speak of the existence of the "universal constants" of language (code), which guarantee its identity (Lotman 1967a: 6).

These methodological points of departure lead Lotman (together with some colleagues) to treat object-language and meta-language as phenomena of one and the same level, or (as characterized, after the fact — and as self-criticism — by Aleksandr Pyatigorski) "to the *naturalization* of culture, to treating culture as "nature"" (Pyatigorski 1994: 326). (In Juri Lotman's eyes, this rebuke became rather a challenge, but the description of its later fate cannot be included here. (For more detail, see 5.2.2.)

The most extensive "naturalized" analysis of the universal constants characteristic of culture during the period under observation is presented in the article "The Problem of Signs and Sign Systems, and the Typology of Russian Culture, 11th–19th Centuries" (Lotman 1970e) and "The Semiotics of the Individual and Society" in Lecture IV (incl. Mg 1). In the former, the various types of Russian culture are examined as the historically changing realization of various cultural codes. In every culture, some (few) of the codes always become dominant. The dominance phenomenon is explained by Lotman, saying that "the communicative systems are also modelling systems and a culture, in constructing a model of the world, also creates a model of itself" (Lotman 1970e: 12–13).

In the second universalistic analysis, which is Lecture IV, Juri Lotman proceeds from the understanding that text and the immanent rules (code) that determine its structure are not

sufficient to decipher the text, or are even useless (cf Lotman 1966a: 84–85). He introduces the phenomenon of function, which can change the meaning of the text completely. In Mg 1 he interprets culture as a collection of social functions. This however means leaving the immanent structure of the text. Lotman provides certain functions a universal status (see Appendix, Lecture IV). Function:

- is a permanent abstract construct which survives the texts (as is language in relation to speech)
- is autonomous regarding text
- is realized in texts and also in intertextual communication as a relationship between *speaker* and *listener*. This is interpreted via expressive and illocutive terms, which permits the treatment of the *speaker-listener* relationship as mutual positioning
- is consequently typologically describable. However, space and time features are considered by Lotman as those “most general of elements, whose universality may simplify the common description of various modelling systems” (Zamechaniya 1966: 4–5; Lotman 1966a: 85–91; Lotman, Pyatigorski 1968).

Juri Lotman, in his Lecture IV, has thus interpreted magic, religion, science and art as social functions, which are realized topologically and communicatively. The noted functions as abstract constructs are of a universal nature, which generate cultures, and span the historic and geographical boundaries of cultures. Functions live longer than texts, and may in principle adapt to any text whatsoever. I consider this schema by Juri Lotman as a theoretical idea with great potential (despite the fact that in my opinion the religion and magic concepts in Lecture IV have been imprecisely treated).

The uniqueness of the 1966/1967 program is also apparent in another fact, which appears for the first time soon after Mg 1 was completed. On closer inspection, it can be seen that neither in the Third Summer School compendium (Summer School III, 1968)

nor in the Fourth Summer School compendium (Summer School IV, 1970), in the introduction (see Predlozheniya 1970: 3–5) or in the compendium articles, including Juri Lotman's, are the terms *universalism*, *cultural universal*, *human culture* or the *basic code(s) of human culture* used any more.⁶ In the 1973 "Theses" these terms are also missing; in the place of *human culture* there is consistent emphasis on the heritage of Slavic culture. The word *universal* appears in "Theses" only once — in the description of the reconstruction of Slavic texts there is an off-hand comment that the highest purely semantic level being reconstructed "is in the final analysis transferable to the language of certain universal notions" (Ivanov *et al.* 1998 [1973]: 74). In Mg 2, there is a comparison of the Russian and the western European legal systems (the latter being based on the Roman tradition), and here there is also no rising to the level of "humanity".

In this development logic, which may initially seem paradoxical, there are a number of converging facts. At first glance they seem to indicate that Juri Lotman was distancing himself from the study of universalism. But it is more likely that this was a quite sudden change to a more moderate position, but after a certain delay subsequent to the completion of Mg 1.⁷ Lotman did not want to follow in the footsteps of those scholars who use "impressionism" on a higher level of research as a replacement for the precise study of text on an elementary level

⁶ The adjective *universal* does however appear once in one of Juri Lotman's notes on the correlation between number and the types of culture, from which he says one can conclude that the paradigmatic structure of culture "encourages the transformation of number into a universal symbol of culture" (Lotman 1968: 107). By the way, in the Summer School III compendium there is no Foreword. Such an introduction (usually worded by Juri Lotman) usually emphasized the general goals and unifying concepts.

⁷ To some extent we need to take into account that the planning and writing of two monographs on artistic texts (Lotman 1970d; 1972) in 1969–1971 apparently did not permit him to dedicate himself to the systematic study of the more general problems of culture.

(Lotman 1969b: 480). He distances himself clearly from static models which had acquired a bad reputation in structuralism, and emphasizes that the internal and contextual (incl. energetic and dialogical) correlations of cultural texts demand a very thorough multi-level analysis of both the static and dynamic structures. The dynamics of the text ends up in conflict with the principle of “grammatical unity”, which results in Lotman starting to search for more abstract universalistic features for texts (culture) (Lotman 1969b: 478–480).

In his article “On the Metalanguage of a Typological Description of Culture”, Lotman undertakes an analysis which is in accordance with such criteria. He describes the typological features of the universal space models of culture (Lotman 1969a).

1.2. Two opposing interpretations

In the analysis of Mg 2, magic is already treated in the form of such a typological model, where the magical function is a higher-level text in relation to text(s) — in a way, a metatext (Lotman 1993 [1981]). In the case of Mg 1, as I have already indicated, text and function were observed as phenomena on the one and same level: culture in such a case was transformed into a collection of functions, and the text(s) were derived from this (those) function(s) as elements of the same level (cf. Lotman, Pyatigorski 1968: 75).

If Mg 1 and Mg 2 are compared, not according to the method of study of culture, but according to the subject for the study of which the method is being implemented, then one is surprised by the fact that Mg 1 and Mg 2 contradict each other to a great degree.⁸ But it is not possible to accept, without some reservations, the content of either interpretation of magic.

⁸ Of course one needs to take into account, in the following comparison, the problems associated with a text critical assessment of the lecture notes in manuscript form.

Mg 2 is characterized by four features. These are: "bilateralism" (1) (i.e. both the parties in the magic act are in the roles of both subject ("speaker") and object ("listener")). The parties enter into a "contract" relationship (2), which is characterized by "compulsoriness" (3) — both parties use force regarding the other (in a certain sense), and the "equivalence" (equilibrium) of conventional, signifying relationships (4) (Lotman 1993a [1981]: 345).

In both Mg 1 and in Mg 2 there are the basic attributes of magic: the *subject* and *object* of the magic act, *communication* between them, its *signification* (*decipherability*), the *act* and a certain *power*, the might which ensures the magic of the act.

As opposed to the "bilateralism", and the equilibrium of the "equivalent" exchange in Mg 2, the magical situation for Mg 1 is *unilateral*. One of the parties "thinks" that he is not able to "influence in a practical way" the other: he expects "an unexplained gift". He does create a "correlation" between himself and the "inexplicable power" "with some kind of act" in order to "deserve" it, but his hope is accompanied by an "opinion" that the intangible power cannot be influenced. This is reminiscent of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in criticizing James Frazer's understanding of magic remarked that "the expression of a wish in magic is *eo ipso* the expression of its fulfilment". As Wittgenstein claims, an opinion may be "flawed" (therefore also deserving of suspicion). But a "religious symbol" (I would add here the magic index as well), "is not based on opinion" (Tambiah 1999 [1990]: 58–59).⁹ It is clear that placing a magic act in a rational context is not justified.

The force controlling a magic situation, making something happen — the *agens* — is Mg 1's *speaker*, the "unknown power", in Lotman's terminology. The subject of the magic (the individual) is the *listener*. Lotman believes that a magic situation

⁹ The manuscript by Ludwig Wittgenstein about James Frazer's concept of magic was published by Stanley Tambiah in his monograph (see Tambiah 1999 [1990]: 54–64).

occurs only if the *listener* is not in control of the legitimacy, which is the basis for the *speaker* to “give” something that is “unexplainable”. With his schema, Lotman deviates from the established traditions of the interpretation of magic (not to mention — although in the future perspective! — from his own Mg 2¹⁰) (Frazer 2001 [1890]: 35–52; Jakobson 1968 [1960]: 355; Nöth 1986: 391–392; 1990: 147–148). Juri Lotman’s claim that “to be a listener was not a remnant from the past” (Mg 1) is indeed applicable to religion but not to magic. Magic is the performative act of a subject (Tambiah 1999: 58–60), where the content is always the object being influenced indirectly (communication) and/or instrumentally, and which is “manipulation” with certain “supernatural” phenomena (Clark 1997: 282–283; 214–215).

In seeing the *listener* in the subject, Lotman is partially right. As can be seen further on, the subject has both a *listening*-function as well as a *speaking*-function; the listening-function is associated with the mythological structure of the magic *agens*, but the performative speaking-function with the *agens*’s magic act itself. And the listening connects the *agens* with “history” — with the *patrum more*¹¹ ritualized norms which the subject of the magic act must be able to use.

This is the reason why, in analyzing magic, confusion can easily occur in defining the concept of the *magician*. One must also take into account that the concept of *magician* is on the one hand associated with something from the beyond, non-human (this is in accordance with Lotman’s “unknown power”), but on the other hand, psychologists, culturologists and semioticians have indicated something that can be summarized by Tambiah’s conclusion on Wittgenstein’s analysis of Frazer: “Wittgenstein is claiming that ‘civilized’ man has within him the same

¹⁰ In one even later work (1992b:20), Lotman nevertheless accords the role of *speaker* to the *listener* described in Mg1: he indeed presents the hypothesis that the historical origin of speaking (beginning to speak) is associated with the magical act.

¹¹ *patrum more* (Lt) — ancestors.

symbolizing and ritualizing tendencies as the 'primitive'. This is synchronic and not an evolutionary posture". (Tambiah 1999: 60).

Who is it then that can in a magical situation fulfil the role of an *agens*? Can it only be a power, which is from the beyond or "designated" in the beyond, or can it be any actant who steps into such a role? In my opinion, one can find an answer to this question in Boris Uspenski's detailed study which is dedicated to the history of the formation of the structure and functions of Russian expressive phraseology (the Russian *mat*¹²). The cultural function of magic as *agens* became more profane and "democratic", analogously to the way in which the fertilization of the Earth-Mother by the Heavenly-Father (Lightning God), ended up as a ritual with magic functions associated with the antagonist of God — the dog. Subsequently, the ritual was degraded even further — into obscenity. Functionally, all actants on a microcosmic level have a magic role (Uspenski 1994a: 99–104)¹³ On the level of behaviour, the magic features of the Russian *mat* are easily apparent, particularly to the "stranger". And also the person turning on the television may end up immediately, as a victim of advertising, in the manipulating field of "magicians" (cf. Nöth 1990: 151–152).

Juri Lotman also contrasts magic and science as *listener* and *speaker* texts, emphasizing the procedural features of the speaker text. The procedural feature, however, is a determining characteristic of both structures, as has been consistently claimed in culture studies, since the time of Tylor and Frazer (Frazer 2001 [1890]: 54, 66; Malinowski 1998 [1925]: 76, 85–86; Hoebel 1966: 470). The argument has only been about the magical procedures' *causality–non-causality, genuineness–falseness,*

¹² It should be added as explanation that the lexemes *mat*' = mother and *mat* must be kept separate. The latter signs in Russian a certain paradigm of expressive obscene expressions which have received their name from expressions where the object is *mother*.

¹³ Boris Uspenski refers directly to magic relations on *one* level (Uspenski 1994 [1983, 1987]: 103).

naturalness–supernaturalness, rationality–esotericity (Lévy-Bruhl 1925: 42; Frazer 2001: 887–888; Malinowski 1998: 70–71 et al.).

The *path*-model, on which Juri Lotman bases his analysis of science, is analogous with magical proceduralism. For example, the individual progress of a Sufi for unification with God is indeed termed the *path* (ar. *tariqa*). This word also designates the concepts of *method* and *procedure*.¹⁴ The *path* is a step-by-step series of increasingly esoteric procedures (instructions) directed towards oneself, where each step is associated with carrying out ritualized acts (procedures) intended to achieve a certain goal. The relationship between the act and its goal does not formally differ at all from the structure of any other magic act¹⁵ (Arasteh 1970). Oswald Spengler does not err when he considers Islam to be a thoroughly magical culture!¹⁶

It is also questionable to differentiate between magic and religion according to the formulae “it is being done to me”–“I am being given the truth”. *Giving the truth* may simultaneously be *being done to me*. And *being done to me* could also mean *giving the truth*. The observed confusion or inconsistency of Juri Lotman (and many other authors) in the identification of the (verbal) activity of magic (the subject) is associated with the fact that the structure of the *agens* is being looked at as being one-sided. It is usually not thought, as there was already reason to indicate previously, that a magician (subject = “speaker”) in

¹⁴ Franz Rosenthal, referring to al-Ghazali, writes “The views of various kinds of Islamic religious thinkers do not essentially differ amongst themselves regarding that which relates to practical methods and procedures (*tariq al-ama*)”(Rosenthal 1978 [1970]: 177).

¹⁵ Haljand Udam indicates that “in the Semitic tradition, which also includes Islam, the word of God (*logos*) is grammatically in the imperative form and not a neutral noun” (Udam 1992: 125). According to Roman Jakobson’s semiotic magic-schema, conatives are the elements that create the linguistic structure of magic (Jakobson 1968 [1969]: 355). (By the way: the Sufis have understandably never described their views as “magic”.)

¹⁶ It should however be noted that Oswald Spengler made his conclusions on the basis of other characteristics.

command of the *agens* is simultaneously engaged in two communicational relationships. (For more detail, see Chapter 2.) As the actant of the mythological structure of the *agens*, he is definitely associated with *getting*. Bronislaw Malinowski already indicated that the magician appeals to “ancestors and the heroes of culture from whom the magic has been *gotten*” [my emphasis — *P. L.*] (Malinowski 1998: 74). But this is only one side of the magic procedure. The denominator of the other side could be considered to be *I am doing* and here the *agens* is manifested as an effective power. Such a purposeful performative activity has been described on the linguistic level by John Austin (Austin 1962). Following his lead, this was brought into the description of magic by Roman Jakobson (Jakobson 1968 [1960]; see also Chapter 2).

The dominant structural element of Mg 2 is considered by Lotman to be *contractuality* (Lotman 1993a [1981]: 345). One must firstly note that *contractuality*, *bilateralism* and *equivalency*, as features characterizing magic are partially overlapping mutual concepts. It seems that the characterization of magic using particularly these features has tended to be influenced by the attempt to construct, for the comparison of Mg 2 and religious “self-sacrifice” a symmetric (4–4) and antithetic model (*bilateralism* (in magic) *contra unilateralism* (in a religious relationship); *equivalency*—its lack; *being mandatory*—its lack; *contract—unconditional (self-)sacrifice*) (Lotman 1993a: 345–346). But it is perhaps more important that contractuality does not unfortunately seem to be a compulsory feature of a magic act. Even using an intuitive assessment, one may be certain that the majority of magic texts are not contracts (with the devil). The opposite is also not confirmed by the tradition of magic study. In his article, Lotman does not argue the justification of this feature in the formal structure of magic as a universal relationship. He even avoids such a postulation of the question, and indeed takes the analysis of magic into a narrower framework — to the comparison of the contractuality based on Roman law with the religious spirit of Russian Orthodoxy, being

the opposite of contractuality. The interpretation of contracts in the Russian cultural space could be considered most successful, original and interesting. The whole concept of the article seems indeed to be constructed on this analysis. The treatment of the Roman emperor cult as a magic-“contractual” system does however create serious objections.

As a point of departure, it must be stated that in the name of, on account of and because of religion, contracts have always been made in every culture. Certain social issues, such as the propagation, propagating, assessing etc of various confessions must be differentiated from the formal structure of religious communication. If a contract (say with the devil) can be considered an immanent structural feature for certain types of magical acts, then someone’s contract with Roman authorities regarding the recognition of the emperor cult can only be considered a political instrument for the propagation of the emperor cult.

If the basis for the assessment of the emperor cult is taken from the court recordings of the Christian martyrs’ cases, and the bureaucratic formalism of the emperor cult, which the Christians have always used for the promotion of the virtues of Christianity, then one could truly be left with an impression of the contractuality of Roman emperor worship. The court recordings of the martyrs’ cases are often compiled with an emphasis on the opportunity to be set free. The pattern is as follows: All you need to do is to “sign” / “bring a sacrifice to the sacrificial altar” / “swear in the name of the god-like spirit of the emperor” / “sacrifice before the portrait of the emperor”, by which you recognize the superiority of emperor worship (to Christianity), and you will save yourself and walk free! (Stauffer 1966 [1952]: 205–207). “Thus the emperor worship was essentially not so much a matter of faith, as a matter of public order and discipline, a civil obligation for civilians and a service obligation for soldiers,” is also Ethelbert Stauffer’s summarization (Stauffer 1966: 203).

The above conclusion must not lead us astray! Those people who had contact with the Stalinist cult remember all too well that in addition to the "service obligation" to worship Stalin, there was also a religious relationship which was strange and powerful, and which was responsible for the formation of the entire culture. This also was clearly the case in Rome.¹⁷ This connection can be seen in Ethelbert Stauffer's book, and from Juri Lotman's own assurance on the universality of the religious function. This is why it is not possible to agree with the conclusion drawn in Lotman's 1981 article that Roman emperor worship was not a religious but a magic system.

It is known from history that at least Caligula, Nero, Domitianus and Commodus actually considered themselves to be gods. Caesar's successor Octavianus received the additional name of *Divi Filius* (*son of god*). Henceforth the Roman emperor is called "Lord, our God", and he is considered, as is documented by Stauffer, the "bringer of grace", "godly Saviour". Miracles are associated with the emperor, including the emperor "going to heaven" (Stauffer 1966: 201–202). In the throne room, "the gathering greets the 'countenance of the most holy emperor' as if it were a revelation from another world. When he opens his mouth, all listen as if to a voice from the heavens. This is how the senate procedures become procedures for the worship of a god. There is a kind of parliamentary liturgy." Announcements of imperial orders in the provinces were preceded by proclamations such as "the godly decision by our godly lord commands" or "the heavenly regulations of the godly command thus order" or "the godly mercy of the all-holy emperor does will". In all the major towns of the country imperial temples were erected with statues and altars in front of them, where sacrifices and incense were brought to the portrait of the emperor (Stauffer 1966: 202–203).

¹⁷ Besides Tacitus, many other authors have drawn attention to such a connection, see for example: Wissowa, G. *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (2. Aufl.). München, 1912.

These features permit a description of the Roman emperor worship as also (or primarily?) a religious system which, according to all its characteristics, suits the “self-sacrificing” religious model constructed by Juri Lotman.

In conclusion, it could be said that the universalistic schema used in Juri Lotman’s treatment of magic provide many promising analysis opportunities. But their specific implementation in the context of Mg 1 and Mg 2 bears some traces of deformation of the object of research.

SPECIFICS OF MYTHOLOGICAL AND MAGICAL SEMIOSIS

2.1. Basic terms

The conflicting ways of approaching the concept of magic (not only in Lotman's works) presume a systematic examination of this concept.¹ Taking the schema sketched by Lotman as a basis, 'magic' is constructed here as a sign-creating concept — being thus in accordance with criteria that could also be the foundation for the semiotic interpretation of the other algorithms of the intellect. The conceptual schema from which the author proceeds is initially worded in the implementation of the analysis of magic and antithesis (the latter being examined in the following chapter). In Chapters 4 and 5, this schema should acquire a more systematic and argued aspect as a deductively constructed model.

The author admits that magic, as the choice of example subject for this analysis (not taking into account the contradictions in the previous chapter) was most subjective — this was inspired, as mentioned in the Foreword, by Lotman's intriguing idea of treating magic as an intellectual instrument.

¹ Considering the topic and research goals of this monograph, a systematic overview of the history of the study of magic, and the various conceptions of magic, will not be provided here. However, the author has familiarized himself with these in order to produce the following analysis of the content, using mainly the following sources: (Betz 1987; Cassirer 1966 [1925]; Clark 1997; Eliade 1995 [1963]; Eliade 1998 [1958]; Frazer 2001 [1890]; Gurevich 1972; Hill 1987; Hoppál 2003 [2002]; Leach 1991 (1971); Mauss 2000 [1904]; Lévi-Strauss 1967 [1958]; Malinowski 1965 [1935] I and II; Malinowski 1998 [1925]; Meletinski 1976; Middleton 1987; Tambiah 1968; Tambiah 1999 [1990]; Turner 1983 [1973].

The choice of antithesis as the second example subject was the result of much more rational deliberations (see Chapter 3 for more detail).

The author proceeds from the fact that myth and magic are different things. A person who is familiar with writings on the topic knows that this claim is not at all trivial. Various authors over the years have associated the one and same characteristics sometimes to myth and then to magic. For example, in his analysis of “magical semiosis”, Barend van Heusden writes that “the magic world is filled with particulars and with relations of similarity. Animals, men, landscapes, the weather, all are related on the basis of similarities.” (Heusden 1997: 123). Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s participation law is on occasion interpreted as “radical magical oneness” (Undusk 1994b: 702–703). But Maurice Leenhardt, a professional anthropologist, interpreted the same law “as the central feature of the ‘*mythical sensibility*’” (cited by Tambiah 1999: 106; italics — *P. L.*). Juri Lotman, Boris Uspenski and Zara Mints justifiably emphasize mythological identification as the main determining characteristic of mythological thought (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 282–288; Lotman and Mints 1981: 37). More examples of such contradictions could be described.

Consistency in differentiating between myth and magic is even more important for reasons of content, which are more profound than reasons of term usage. It is clear to all that myth and magic are closely intertwined, for example, in the folklore genres. However, this fact has tended to overshadow the probability that both myth and magic have a different origin and can be reduced to certain elementary, universal, but different, semiotic operations *resp.* cognitive structures (schemata). There is very little research reference material published on this issue. One of the more recent hints in accordance with this discussion logic has been written by Stanley Tambiah: “There are cognitive structures and processes associated with learning and memory that are known to be universal, and others that can be or might be isolated in the future as universals” (Tambiah 1999: 112).

The universality of the magical and mythological semiotic (cognitive) structures in the hypothesis is supported by linguistic culture-semiotic and psychology based research.

Psychologists have discovered that in ontogenesis a child undergoes certain definite stages in its speech development (sign creation). Already in its first weeks of life, a long time before the child learns, in its second year, "to represent an object which is absent or an event which is not perceived" by means of icons and symbols, "indexes (including the 'signals' involved in conditioning) already play a role" (Piaget 1970: 717). The child does not yet feel itself to be a separate subject regarding objects: the outside world is comprised of "egocentric" objects. (For J. Piaget's comments on this also see Uexküll 1986: 127). Jean Piaget has elsewhere compared a child's initial indexical semiosis, which precedes representational designating operations, with a magical act (Piaget 1951). The manifestation of magical perception in ontogenesis is also claimed by W. LaBarre (LaBarre 1979: 61).

E. Winner, A. K. Rosenstiel and H. Gardner, who have studied experimentally the way children begin to comprehend metaphors, call the first stage of this process "the magic stage". But in these authors' work, which is quoted by Jüri Allik, there is (yet again!) a description of magic as if it were myth, because there is talk of the identification of guards with a rock in the interpretation of the sentence "The prison guard was a hard rock" (Allik 1981: 106). The magic stage of semiosis has been described by Roman Jakobson using linguistic terminology. He suggests that the initial stage of language development has a deictic nature. In this case, sentences formed by a child refer only to directly perceived objects, resulting in a verbal act in that particular situation (Jakobson 1985b: 94–95).

But a child undergoes yet another important semiotic stage while young. According to Henri Wallon and Roman Jakobson, the acquisition of language does not begin with the constitution of isolated objects — nomination, but through the apposition of objects. Creating opposition pairs belong to the child's first

logical operations (Wallon 1945; Jakobson 1971a: 649). A more abstract sign creation stage in a child's ontogenesis is introduced by speech imitation and identification activity, for which the semiotic designator is understandably the icon. The iconic stage of semiosis is associated in particular with mythological cognition. This becomes apparent, for example, when a child does not differentiate between a common noun and a proper noun. In communication it is noted that the child listening to unfamiliar speech does not attempt to adapt to it or to acquire what it hears but tries to *assimilate* the unfamiliar speech with its point of view and with the answer which it had just given to its partner (Piaget 1994: 124). "As imitation becomes differentiated and interiorized in images, it also becomes the source of symbols and the instrument of communicative exchange which makes possible the acquisition of language" (Piaget 1970: 717).

It is such stages in a child's ontogenesis that Juri Lotman associates with the development of speech functions in culture: "It could be surmised that the initial function of speech was on the one hand associated with magic, but on the other hand with the fixing of basic repetitive behavioural gestures" (Lotman 1992b: 20). This latter — mythological function — has been thoroughly investigated in the work by the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school. (See for example Pyatigorski 1965; Lotman and Uspenski 1973). Juri Lotman claims that

the world of a child's consciousness — which is primarily mythological — does not, and also does not have to, disappear from the mind structure of an adult. This continues functioning as a generator of associations and as one of the active *modelling mechanisms* [italics mine — P. L.], which, if ignored, make it impossible to comprehend adult behaviour". (Lotman 1978: 8)

There is reason to think that — from the standpoint of culture — both myth and magic belong amongst those semiotic systems which Vyacheslav Ivanov has called "archaic semiotic systems with great modelling capacity" which in the later stages of their

development "may change into sign structures without denotata" (Ivanov 1978b: 201).

It should be noted that giving up the treatment of myth and magic as "outdated", "marginal" and "primitive" mental and cultural phenomena have not progressed with equal success for either of them. A noticeable boost has been given to the study of the general applicability of mythological thinking and the mythological worldview, primarily through the research done by Claude Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes. After them, other authors, including Peeter Tulviste, have also confirmed the universality and endurance of mythological thought. P. Tulviste writes about the culturally dependent animism present in the thinking of children and adults (Tulviste 1984: 105–112).

Whereas — as a result — the understanding of the universality of mythological thinking is generally accepted — then, regarding the universality of magical cognitive operations, as far as I know, no systematic treatments have been published. However, reference should be made to Winfried Nöth's article, which briefly analyzes the magic function of advertising. The magic of advertising is identified with metaphoricalness. But this conclusion seems to deserve an explanation, because such an identification does not seem to be obligatory in each and every case (Nöth 1990: 151–152).

The proposed hypothesis presumes the implementation of the following restrictions. Historical, ethnological, genre and text (composition) analysis is excluded, and there is concentration on analyzing the semiotic — to be more precise, the semiotic — structure of the mythological and magical act, in accordance with Charles S. Peirce's cognitive paradigm of semiosis.

However, as one more restriction, it should be emphasized that the following analysis is deductive and theoretical, and is not induced from a possible analysis of a large amount of text. At the same time the treatment is inter-disciplinary because mythological and magical semiosis is treated more broadly in the context of: developing the semiotic theory of Charles S. Peirce (Uexküll 1986; Nöth 1994c, 1997, 1998, 1999) and presumes (further)

semiotic treatment in the context of cognitive linguistics (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1990b); rhetoric (Lotman 1981a; Foucault 1994 [1966]; Eco 1997a; Tambiah 1999 [1990]); ritual (Erikson 1966; Lorenz 1966; Eliade 1992 [1957]; Toporov 1973; Tambiah 1999); and topological argumentation, primarily symmetry (Abramyan 1981; Leyton 1992; Ivanov 1998 [1978]; Nöth 1998, 1999).

In order to delimit the specifics of myth and magic, and before beginning a phenomenological analysis of myth and magic, it is appropriate to define both magic and myth as behavioural acts.

The *magical behavioural act* is the inspiring of the *agens* concealed in the word or spell or act used by the magician to change or achieve or declare something. The inspiration of the power is associated with a sacral (and rhetoric) precedent, to which is ascribed a teleological status. (Cf. the following performatives: "I declare war on X!" or "I declare a *holy* war on X!" The latter sentence is magical, the former is not — unless the pronoun "I" replaces a sacralized *agens*.)

The *mythological behavioural act*, in the words of Aleksandr Pyatigorski, can be defined only negatively:

There is no such *specific* behavioural type which we could call mythical². This should be interpreted in such a manner that mythical texts (both texts in the direct meaning of the word as well as behavioural texts) are born from within cult, artistic or scientific behaviour — in other words, from *within* other kinds of behavioural types. (Pyatigorski 1965: 39)

From this we may conclude that as (behavioural) texts, myth and magic may be structurally associated, but, in mythological semiotic analysis, one should in this case unavoidably proceed from the magical text.

² This author (as opposed to A. Pyatigorski) would use the term *mythological* to denote the abstract concept; the term *mythical* expresses for us the ontological items of a specific myth.

Semiosis could be briefly described as sign creation and comprehension, the nature of the relationship between a signifier (which Charles S. Peirce calls a *representamen*) and the signified (in Peirce's terminology — an *object*³). This relationship is cognized in the *interpretant* as an "idea 'created in the mind of the Interpreter'" (CP 8.179; Nöth 1997: 787). Peirce treats semiosis as a unified triad. The representamen, *resp.* feeling⁴ represents the firstness of the sign; the object *resp.* volition represents the secondness of the sign; the interpretant *resp.* cognition expresses thirdness, which in turn mediates between the secondness and its firstness (CP 5.66; Nöth 1994c: 6–7).

Within the context of this theoretical schema, Charles S. Peirce associates a number of important qualities with the semiotic triad. He thus associates the representamen with iconicity. Firstness (denoter) is a category expressing immediacy and non-differentiated qualities; it is the material quality of a mental sign (CP 5.291; Nöth 1994c: 6). The icon(icity) also represents an experience belonging to the past. The object (signified) represents indexicality in the semiotic triad, and expresses the two-way mutual effect between itself and the other, the First and the Second. The temporal equivalent of indexicality is the present. The interpretant (thirdness) is expressed by symbolicity, which is a category of communication, representation and semiosis. The symbol makes thought and behavior rational (Nöth 1994c: 7). Its mode of existence is the future and potentiality (CP 4.447; Jakobson 1996b: 169). Cognition is a category determining the semiotic process of the triad, to the extent that the effect of the sign is cognitive (CP 5.484). But

³ This relationship is conditional and only indicates the fact of the semiosis process as such. The possibility of the complementarity of Saussure's and Peirce's process of sign-creation is the source of lively debate even today. One of the newer examples of the fervour of this discussion was published quite recently: Mikhail Lotman 2002. Atomistic versus holistic semiotics. — *Sign Systems Studies* 30.2: 513-527.

⁴ Ch. S. Peirce's *feeling* can actually denote both sensation as well as perception.

semiosis cannot be reduced to cognition only, semiosis presumes the entire triad (Nöth 1997: 785). At the same time, Charles S. Peirce claims that the most complete signs are those where iconic, indexical and symbolical features are as evenly represented as possible (CP 4.448).

Charles S. Peirce's sign concept also presumes that iconicity, indexicality and symbolicity may occur in the form of independent sign types, which means that the qualities consequently dependent on the triad may come to dominate one against the other, and therefore be in a dynamic relationship. It should, however, be added that symbolicity, in the wider meaning of the term, is considered by Charles S. Peirce to be a dominant quality of semiosis, but his interpretation of its meaning is radically different from Ferdinand de Saussure's treatment: Peirce emphasizes the fundamental iconicity of any symbol whatsoever. In contrast, Ferdinand de Saussure defends the thesis of the arbitrariness of language signs and denies the dependence of language on the psycho-physical, figurative, experienced or any other non-linguistic perceptive or cognitive factors (cf. Saussure 1959 [1916]: 111–112).

Charles S. Peirce is convinced that "every thought is a sign" (CP 5.253).

Since thinking and hence cognition, according to Peirce (CP 5.283), is only possible by means of signs, the interpretant of a sign functions itself as a sign. In the endless chain of semiosis, cognition is thus a 'thought-sign [---] translated or interpreted in a subsequent one' (CP 5.284). The sign created in the mind of the interpreter is 'an equivalent sign, or perhaps an even more complete sign' (CP 2.228). (Nöth 1997: 787)

The term *schema* has been borrowed from Immanuel Kant. This has been brought into use in cognitive linguistics (Lakoff 1990b; Johnson 1987: 18–40; they used *image schema*) and semiotics (Nöth 1994c: 12–13; Daddesio 1995: 134–141; Nöth 1997: 787–788), importantly via Jean Piaget's genetic epistemology. Jean

Piaget used two terms: *schema* (pl. *schemata*) and *scheme* (pl. *schemes*).

A *schema* is a schematized image (e.g. the map of a town), whereas a *scheme* represents what can be repeated and generalized in an action (for example, the schema is what is common in the actions of 'pushing' an object with a stick or any other instrument). (Piaget 1970: 705, 719)

As regards the content of the concept, *scheme* would be more precise in these circumstances. From the semiotic viewpoint these two terms can be combined: both denote an iconic replacement relationship (representation) — on the level of perceptive similarity, and on the level of reflexive (abstract) similarity. (This combination is indeed realized in the Estonian term 'skeem'.)

Schemata as "building blocks of cognition" (Nöth 1997: 787) can be treated, in the context of Charles S. Peirce's semiotics, as signs, which regarding modelling semiosis function as visual icons. Many researchers have also drawn attention to the observation that schemata have a use which anticipates and goes beyond the cognitive field of natural language (Piaget 1970: 717; Daddesio 1995: 137; Nöth 1998: 55).

Winfried Nöth notes three semiotic implications in the account of the role of schemata in cognition (Nöth 1997: 787–788):

- Schemata are networks of interrelations in endless semiosis, "according to which the interpretant of the sign has always been embedded in a network of previous and subsequent acts of cognition or knowledge".
- Schemata are sources stored in memory for the formation and interpretation of new cognition (semiosis).
- Schemata are a set of relations, which are valid in the mind of the interpreter in the form of habit or

generalization, and which are central from the standpoint of semiosis as a cognitive process. Such habits are “final” and “ultimate” logical interpretants. They indicate the final phase of semiotic interpretation, where cognition has become a “tendency [---] to behave in a similar way under similar circumstances in the future”. (CP 5.487; CP 8.332).

What is important in these conclusions is the significance of structural associations in schemata. Following in the footsteps of G. Lakoff and M. Johnson (Lakoff 1990; Johnson 1987), we treat them as iconic, topological and rhetorical universals. However, we do believe that schemata form hierarchies and that the metaphor, to which G. Lakoff and M. Johnson reduce all schemata, is itself *one* of the possible second stage schemata. Here, a mythological schema, for example, which in principle excludes the bilingual ambivalence of the metaphor, could compete with metaphoric semiosis. G. Lakoff’s and M. Johnson’s approach should be expanded by also adding a cultural viewpoint: schemata form dynamic associations according to the culture, where some schemata dominate and others retreat (but do not disappear!). A cultural viewpoint also enables the problem of the dead and current metaphor to be raised, which G. Lakoff and M. Johnson seem to avoid, but which, from the semiotic viewpoint, has a structuralizing, and therefore culture typological importance.

The implementation of the cognitive and intellect-based paradigm in the analysis of myth and magic therefore presumes the description of myth and magic as cognitive structures and schemata, which in the semiotic context means the analysis of mythological and magical semiosis. This results in the need to determine the formal characteristics of mythological and magical semiosis.

2.2. Mythological semiosis

Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski, in their reconstruction of mythological consciousness — or to be more precise: of the formal logical structure of mythological consciousness —, analyze the logical relationship between the subject and predicate, and from this draw three important conclusions.

For mythological consciousness:

- the objects in the world are indivisible into features: each object is treated as an integral whole (mythological consciousness only divides objects into parts);
- the world comprises of objects which do not form a hierarchy in the form of classes or categories — all objects are of the same order. Parts are the same as the whole, and the concept of logical hierarchy does not belong to this type of consciousness in principle (but valuational hierarchies are also very general);
- all objects in the world are unique (the concept of the multiplicity of objects presumes their inclusion in certain general groups, and such an occurrence means the existence of a meta-descriptive level and would be in conflict with the previous feature (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 283–284).

As an example, Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski compare two sentences: 1) *the world is matter*, and 2) *the world is a horse*. The predicate in the first sentence is an abstract construct, which belongs to a specific meta-language. The subject *world* in the second sentence, however, refers to a predicate which is in the logical sense of the same order as itself (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 282). Therefore, it could be said that mythological consciousness, or, in a broader sense, the mythological mind (as opposed to the non-mythological), is basically mono-linguistic.

Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski also derive a common denominator for the formal logical and semiotic features of mythological cognition, which is iconic identification and

suchness. In the cognitive plan this means that understanding in one case indicates translation, but in another case (as in the mythological mind) — recognition or identification (cf. Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 282–283). The authors, based on Roman Jakobson's writings (Jakobson 1972: 96–97), draw an intriguing conclusion which summarizes their analysis. They claim that in a mythological world there is a quite unusual type of semiosis, which can generally be reduced to *the naming process*: the sign in the mythological mind is analogous to a proper noun (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 284). The proper noun becomes an object, which is indivisible from the object, and is in this sense unique.

It could be said that *the maximally abstracted general meaning of a proper noun retreats to a myth*. It is particularly in the area of proper nouns where the word and denotatum become one, a feature which is so characteristic of mythological imaginings. (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 286)

If the identification relation between a proper noun and its object can actually be considered a model of mythological semiosis, then it would be justified to ask: can this model be treated as a certain image schema (see Nöth 1994c: 12–13), which in the cognitive process would have a wider usage extending beyond “primitive” consciousness?

If the answer to this hypothetical question was “yes”, then another question could be posed: which formal elements of the semiotic process would comprise this schema?

The universal parallel in semiosis of the proper noun transfer relationship is understandably the iconic (signifying) firstness of the relationship between the representamen and object. Of course, it cannot be concluded from this that all iconic semiosis could also be mythological. This would be absurd, because according to the cognitive paradigm, iconicity in language is a very wide concept, reflecting the various manifestations of the perceptive, cognitive and physical activity of a person.

Yet the answer to the second question seems in fact to be concealed in a certain form of the iconic specificity of the sign.

And it seems to me that Winfried Nöth was on the path to this answer in his articles on recent years' research on iconicity and symmetry (Nöth 1998; Nöth 1999).

Winfried Nöth brings out the two vital aspects of iconicity. These are:

1. To begin with — endophoric iconicity, which determines such relationships of *signans–signans*, which are due to a mutual iconic mapping of linguistic forms, concealed within the text (*parole*) or language (*langue*) system itself (Nöth 1999: 614). Let us also remember that, according to Charles S. Peirce's determination, the icon belongs to the individual's past experience, and that the Tartu–Moscow school treats any statement as a time-space phenomenon (Lotman 1969a; Ivanov 1978a: 130; Uspenski 1989a: 66–70; 1989b: 18–30).

Endophoric iconicity is differentiated from exophoric iconicity, which points to “beyond the given expression plane either to a different expression form or to the content plane of language” (Nöth 1994b: 107). But they are mutually complementary in the sense that each iconicity is an internal phenomenon of a certain language, which means that it must *eo ipso* also have certain similarities in form, on the basis of signification, syntagmas, etc. These two forms of iconicity in cognitive schemata accentuate the similarity in some way or another in sign-creation (in semiosis).

2. The second important aspect, which must be considered in the description of mythological iconicity as a cognitive schema, is the so-called genuine icon phenomenon (Nöth 1999: 616; cf. CP 2.276). Winfried Nöth writes:

... a genuine icon fulfils its semiotic function “by virtue of a character which it possesses in itself [...and it] does not draw any distinction between itself and its object. [...] It is an affair of *suchness* [italics — *P. L.*] only” (CP 5.73–74). Sign and object hence merge in one identity (Santaella 1995: 143). The genuine icon is thus an autoreferential or self-representing sign, as Randselle (1979: 57) has called it. The icon is its own object, it refers to itself

(cf. also CP 2.230). In the words of Peirce, it is a sign “by virtue of its being an immediate image, that is to say by virtue of characters which belong to it in itself as a sensible object, and which it would possess just the same were there no object in nature that it resembled” (CP 4.447). (Nöth 1999: 616)

It is not possible here to delve into details (for the implementation of these characteristics, see Table 1 in 5.3.2.) but it can be claimed that the previous discussions permit the deliberations of Vyacheslav Ivanov to be seen in a new light, as regards semiotic systems with great modelling capacity that in the passage of time began to circulate as signs that have no denotatum (Ivanov 1978b: 201).

2.3. Magical semiosis

2.3.1. The epistemological status of magic

As we know, Jean Piaget believed that in the formation of logical thought, logic replaces the mythological, magical and other “pre-logic” cognitive structures in a child’s thinking. It follows then, that in the mind of an adult (in a civilized society) magical cognition should not exist. It is difficult to agree with such a position.

Formal logical criteria have dominated in the semantic analysis of magic. Whichever way one looks at it, these criteria assert that the epistemological “shift” and illusion of the magic act are the basic characteristics of magic. The described logical contradictions between magic and “reality”, however, do not permit the vigour of magic in various cultures (including in contemporary cultures) to be satisfactorily explained. A much more fruitful direction of research began with Malinowski, and has later been based on the language philosophy of Wittgenstein and Austin, on the pragmatism of Peirce, and the rhetoric of Burke. This treats magic primarily as a social, language and

cognitive (Wittgenstein) act, from which its pragmatic features are derived (Tambiah 1999: 82–83).

This path takes the researcher to the formal structure of magical semiosis, and permits the treatment of magic as an act of sign creation.

2.3.2. Magical procedure

In order to find the required accent to study magical semiosis, let us compare magic with a miracle. The effect of magic may indeed be a miracle (miraculous), but cultures tend to term as miracles, in the direct sense, such phenomena where “there is no sign used as a means of this obtaining supernatural effect” (Nöth 1990: 146). A miracle is indeed a miracle in the sense that it explicitly exists, but the details of its creation are concealed. The effect of magic, however, is associated with a perceivable procedure (act, spell) which is perceivable by the senses (cf. Tambiah 1968: 148).

Procedure in magic is a designating act, and it is isomorphic with semiosis. W. Nöth analyzes two features whereby magical semiosis differs from “normal” semiosis. In his opinion, 1) in magic, there is an attempt to have a practical and immediate effect (not via the addressee as in a “normal semiosis”) on a non-semiotic world, and 2) in magical communication, the message is directed to the “strange” receptor, the physical or organic object which is not in principle able to decipher the sign code of the message (Nöth 1990: 147–148). It seems that these criteria are too narrow and also imprecise. Magical semiosis can indeed be pointed at the non-semiotic world of objects, but magical semiosis may also be personal. Winfried Nöth’s criteria, for example, exclude the diverse forms of autocommunicational magic. Various esoteric doctrines (e.g. Sufism) have been described as a “path” consisting of stages, where each stage is actually, regarding its structure, an isomorphic procedure with a magical act pointed at the addressor itself. In this way, the stages of magical acts develop, which, all in all, serve to achieve a

finalist effect. The object of a magical act may also be another individual or group of individuals, directly (i.e. an addressee, as the object of magic, who in principle is able to decipher the signs).

Taking this into account, magical procedure should be defined as a semiotic act, where the participants believe that the spell being used (or act) is capable of guaranteeing the effect that is thereby produced, although they usually can never directly follow or sense that effect. In other words, the effect of magic (*resp.* believability) is guaranteed by the expressive structure of the procedure. (Sesame, which opened before Ali Baba's eyes, is an artificial fairytale style (metaphoric) processing of magic, which is generally not suitable for describing the relationship between magical procedure and effect.) In the case of effect, it is important — and this is also emphasized by Winfried Nöth — that the line between the naturalness/supernaturalness of the effect is very relative and shifting (Nöth 1990: 145–146). This of course is so if we remain within the framework of semiotic theory in the functional interpretation of magic.

Now we could ask: what are the formal characteristics of magical semiosis, and how do they ensure the high status, cultural longevity and universality of the magical procedure?

The magical procedure is associated with the phenomena of *agens* (= the force that makes things happen) and the magician. The sources of *agens* must be sought from the past; the effect caused by the magician is expected as a result of a procedure — i.e. in the future. This two-directional orientation of a magic act was already noticed by Bronislaw Malinowski — see Tambiah 1999: 74.

2.3.3. *Agens* as a mythological structure

The magic formula (spell, etc.) used by the magician, and the non-verbal acts accompanying it, conscientiously repeat that which has already been repeated ((innumerably) many times) previously. From the viewpoint of semiosis, this is an iconic

relation — to be more precise, the suchness between the *representamen* of a *genuine icon* and the object. A repetitive archaic formula, as described by Charles Peirce, is an immediate object, an object “such as the sign it substitutes for. It is a signified object and therefore — an idea” (CP 4.536).

In describing the iconic semiosis of the *agens* as an image schema, the text of the spell (+ act) used in procedures should be treated as the proper name form of appearance of the *patrum more*. In other words, the magic spell and its object preserved in tradition merge into a proper name.⁵ As became clear in the treatment of mythological semiosis, the proper name semiosis is the basic feature of mythological image forms.

This leads to the conclusion that, in magical procedures, there is a clash between two schemata (and texts) which differ in structures — the mythological and magical. Such a conclusion has interesting cultural-historical and typological connotations, which we will not be covering here. But the conclusion is also an additional example to the one cited by Aleksandr Pyatigorski, i.e. that mythological (behavioural) texts do not occur separately but merge into texts of other behavioural types (“texts”). (As clarification, we should add that a mythological text cannot carry an independent, endophorically generated meaning because it is, in its structure, monolingual, but a monolingual system cannot create a meaning in itself (Lotman 1978: 5).)

The *agens*, as a mythological schema, is characterized by two features, both of which raise the status (authority) of the magical procedure which occurs in the present, thereby strengthening the belief in the effectiveness of the magical effect:

1. The *agens* as a power making things happen is valued not so much based on the events of the future but of the past. In other words: it is not so much a prediction of the future that is sought from the present, but more the revelation of “initial” (past) times (cf. Uspenski 1989 XXIII: 20).

⁵ *patrum more* — ancestors; in this semiotic process they and the spell also become identical.

2. The *agens* as a mythological structure is actually a part of an even more fundamental system, and is governed by the following logic: only that exists which is sacral, and sacral is that which is part of the Cosmos (Uspenski 1989 XXIII: 21). Therefore, the creation of the universe by the gods is a paradigmatic example of magical creation (Eliade 1992: 57). Magic just as traditional ritual in general can be interpreted via the micro- and macro-cosmos' irrefutable unity, making this unity explicit.

2.3.4. *Agens* as a magical structure

2.3.4.1. Phenomenon of the magician.

Agens, however, is simultaneously a magical structure as well, since it is realized in the present form through the creative act of the magician and is generally directly perceived by the senses.

Historically and typologically the role of the magician can be related "to the mythical heroes and ancestors who wielded the magical power in question and with whom the magician himself becomes identified" (Tambiah 1968: 190). This genealogical and/or corporative association is confirmed in various archaic or (more) contemporary initiation rites, which are meant to celebrate the belonging together of magician and *agens*, and therefore to guarantee a high level of social authority.

The role of the magician can be fulfilled by persons who have dedicated themselves to magic, but also by those who (arbitrarily) take the role of the demiurg. Such persons could be prophets, priests, witches or miracle workers, whose role could be taken over by, for example, a charismatic dictator or a public idol. If we proceed from Vladimir Propp's idea, and treat the magician as a text function, where the question *what?* and not the questions *who?* or *how?* is important (Propp 1969 [1928]: 23–24), then it could be added that in principle the role of the magician could be taken by anyone, if this "who" wishes to take

the role of mediator for the *agens*. (Compare, for example, the smashing of a champagne bottle on the bow of a ship, which is a genuine magical procedure, and where the person certainly does not have to be a "magician".)

These discussions seem to indicate that the procedural role of the magician, as the executor of the procedure in the structure of a magical act, becomes second-rate compared to *agens* as the initial power in making things happen. This lower importance, however, is superficial and results from the interpretation of the causality inappropriate to the causal rationalism of the magical structure. In order to explain this thesis, here is a longer quote from Boris Uspenski.

It is true that causal relations in the cosmological consciousness do not tie the present and the future: they primarily tie a certain initial state (the past, which is the starting point) simultaneously with both the present and the future. This indicates that the present and the future are indirectly tied — via that initial, integral, all-encompassing condition.

According to this understanding, everyday events occurring in the present do not call up the future; but these could be perceived as *omens* of the future. Indeed, both that which takes place in the present, and also that which will happen in the future — *both* [italics — *P. L.*] manifest themselves as the reflection or symbolic image of the same initial condition, as the sign of this initial condition. (Uspenski 1989b: 20)

It may now be concluded that in the context of the magical procedure, the magician is the manifestation of the longevity of the *agens* — therefore, regarding his role, actually equivalent to the macro-cosmic functions of the *agens*, with the latter term used in Propp-style.

The magician is simultaneously a function of both mythological and magical structure. On one hand, it is a constant function and is the same as a number of cultural precedents stored in the genuine icon. On the other hand, it stages a magical rite, as a result of which (i.e. in the future!) the desired effect must appear

for the recipient of the magic (the recipient can also be the magician himself).

2.3.4.2. Problem of magical effect.

A magical procedure is a creative act. We are not using the term here in an aesthetic, social or emotional meaning. The procedure is creative in the sense that it is a signifying act. For this reason, let us first look at the linguistic and semiotic form of a magical procedure.

The grammatical equivalent of a spoken spell accompanying magic acts is the direct speech of the *agens* in the form of *auto-referent performatives* (*conative statements*).

The auto-referent performative (*performa* (Lt.) — to create) is a reflexive message expressed in the first person indicative present in direct speech, which must be equivalent to an action (cf. Tambiah 1968: 188), for example: “I curse...”, i.e. which is not limited to describing an action (“He cursed ...”) or naming the act (“They will be cursed...”).

The meaning of a conative message (*conatus* (Lt.) — effort, striving) was introduced to the theoretical description of magic by Roman Jakobson. Jakobson defines, via a conative reference (i.e. a vocative and imperative reference directed to the addressee), the magical function of language: “Thus the magical, incantatory function [of language — *P. L.*] is generally changing an absent or inanimate ‘third person’ into an addressee of a conative message” (Jakobson 1968 [1960]: 355). (Jakobson’s use of “generally” is entirely appropriate because the addressee of magic does not necessarily have to be “inanimate” and in the “third person”. And, as already indicated, magical communication may also occur in the form of auto-referent performative.)

Regarding semiosis, the performatives and conatives of the magical spell are classified as indices. To be more precise, they are also signals, because they have either an inspiring, obligating, conditional, causal, or some other direct or commissive function.

A magical procedure is a joint structure: it is divided into mythological and magical semantic fields. In the mythological context, the spell fulfils the role of a genuine icon — that which it signifies is the direct object stored in (cultural) memory, an object “such as the sign it substitutes for”. In the magical context, the spell is an index regarding the source (i.e. *patrum more*), whose object (signified) is the sacral *agens*. Regarding the aim of the procedure (*resp.* future) the spell is a signal which, using John L. Austin’s terms, results in a “perlocutionary effect” occurring in the object. (The meaning of perlocutionary effect is any kind of deformation of the state of the object (*resp.* addressee).) As a rule, the perlocutionary effect is not explicitly given in a magical procedure. The epistemological (philosophical) explanations of this have always resulted in the conflict between the natural and supernatural, mythological and rational worldviews.

The semiotic treatment of the perlocutionary effect presumes the taking into account of a magical act as a structural whole.

A magical effect, as already noted, is a creative act. Any creation at all is in the semiotic meaning a crossing of the border of a certain semiotic field (Lotman 1970d: 282). Crossing the line means the birth of a new semiotic field and a new language: crossing the line is a translation in the semiotic plane and creates a semantic and topological distance. The translation in this case is done into an unknown language. In the structure of a magical procedure this is expressed indirectly (but generally always) in the phenomenon of the indetermination of the language of the spell, in the fact that the language of magic as a rule differs from everyday language, or is even undecipherable. Problems related to this issue have been thoroughly researched by Umberto Eco in his theory on sacral languages (Eco 1997a; 1997b [1993]). For us here it is important to refer to his understanding that the level of language comprehension does not influence the believability of the effect of the magic act; the effect seems to be even more believable (“real”) when the language is indeterminate. If you are a ship’s captain, and not an occasional bystander, and you are

watching the champagne bottle shattering on the bow of the ship which will take you out to the open sea, do you see this act with real consequences as a magical act or as an act of polysemantic metaphorical pleasure?

ANTITHESIS IN CULTURE AND SIGN-CREATION

3.1. Determining the viewpoint

In its most general form, *antithesis* (if we proceed from Webster) means opposition, contrast, or also the rhetorical contrast of ideas by means of parallel arrangements of words or statements; in dialectics *antithesis* marks the second stage of a dialectic process.

Observing the occurrence of antithesis in culture it becomes apparent that setting opposites, contrasts and oppositions appear in all spheres of the self-description of a person (and culture). Based on results of biosemiotic research it is even indicated that the identification of *self* in relation to *other* is the most ancient and also the first (semiotic) opposition in living organisms in general (Sebeok 1989; Bickerton 1990). Based on language-history data, Boris Porshnev claims this same oppositionality, but postulates the opposite primacy of grammatical persons: the *they-(he)/concept* existed before the *we-(I)/concept*, which means that one initially identified *oneself* according to the *other* (Porshnev 1979 [1966]: 81).

There is a voluminous heritage on antithesis. The manifestations of antitheses have provided enduring interest for linguists ((binary) oppositions, zero-feature, etc — Bally 1932; Ivanov 1973; Jakobson 1985f [1975]; Saussure 1959 [1916]; folklore scholars (the polar placement and symmetry of persons and events — (Abramyan 1983; Meletinski 1976; Olrik 1909); analytical and social psychologists, and psychoanalysts (mirror stage of ontogenesis, universal dualism of spiritual experiences, “us”–“them” phenomenon, negative identity) — Lacan 1977 [1937]; Porshnev 1979 [1966]; Jung 1994 [1930]; biosemioticians and

cyberneticians (invader; asymmetry of brain hemispheres, identification mechanisms of the “foreigner”) — Erikson 1966; Ivanov 1978a; Jacob 1974), cultural anthropologists and semioticians (dual cultural models, anti-behaviour, anticulture) — Abramyan 1981; Jakobson 1971b [1967]; Lévi-Strauss 1967 [1958]; Lotman and Uspenski 1994 [1977]; Nöth 1994a; Pyatigorski 1992; Uspenski 1994b [1985]); and — last but not least — ideologues, political scientists and sociologists (Marxist theory of class struggle, dualism of (political) ideology (in totalitarian societies), negative identity) — Lenin 1946c [1902]; Lenin 1948b [1913]; Lenin 1950b [1920]; Stalin 1935a [1924]; Shils 1958; Sowell 1987; Wodak 1989; Donskis 1995; Russell 1979.

Juri Lotman, in his semiotic works (often together with Boris Uspenski), has treated antithesis as a universal characteristic of cultural models and the structure of sign-creation. Antithesis, as we already know, is not the only universal that Lotman has studied. Nevertheless, the author of this monograph is of the opinion that in order to delve deeper into the problems of universals, the examination of antithetic structures is a most suitable topic for a number of reasons.

Of course, the primary reason is that the heritage of the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school contains quite extensive research on antithesis on the basis of cultural subjects (although primarily Russian) (Lotman and Uspenski 1971, 1982, 1994 [1977]; Uspenski 1994b [1982]); secondly, due to the “flowering” of totalitarianism in European culture, this topic has been extensively, vividly and quite recently documented, throughout the whole of the past century; thirdly, because many of the potential readers of this book have personally experienced the antithetic flowering of totalitarianism; the fourth reason follows on from the first three: the author hopes that the analysis of antithesis creates a more usual or “handy” instrument for delving into the details of the formal structure of Juri Lotman’s universals.

The way that antithetic sign-creating and text models take root in cultures has been documented, particularly vividly and in a way familiar to Europeans, in Soviet political ideology. A century ago, Lenin declared ideology to be a generic concept in "intellectual culture". He adopted the concept 'ideology' from Marx, but distorted its content beyond recognition.

Marx terms, as ideological forms, the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophical forms of the superstructure of the antagonistic class society, whereby people are aware of breakthroughs in the economic conditions of society, and where their class struggle finds expression. It is also no accident that Marx does not include science amongst the ideological forms of the superstructure, since he emphasizes that "just as it is not possible to judge someone by what they think of themselves" it is also not possible to judge an historical epoch on the basis of the self-awareness of that epoch (Marx 1980 [1859]: 101). In examining the substance of ideology, Marx and Engels call ideology the "synonym of the idealistic treatment of history", the intellectual product of the "ideological estate" that is unavoidably created in the course of the distribution of work. In their definition, ideology is an "illusionary consciousness" that "distorts reality" since the characteristics of the phenomenon under study are derived from the "concept" that is accorded to this phenomenon. "People and their relationships turn out to be upside down just like in the *camera obscura*" (Marx and Engels 1965, 10: 83, 87; 11: 113, 135–136). Marx also states the *functional* similarity of ideology and religion: "Criticism of religion releases man from illusions, so that he can spin around himself and his true sun" [i.e. around the "world of people" and society — *P. L.*] (Marx 1955 [1844]: 414–415). Furthermore, religion is considered by Marx to be a "general theory" of the "distorted" world in (German) ideology, an "encyclopaedic compendium", with a "logic" and a "moral sanction" therein (Marx 1955 [1844]: 414; Marx and Engels 1958 [1845]: 19–20). It just cannot be concluded for this that Marx treats ideology as a sub-concept of religion since religion is one of the ideological

forms of the superstructure, as are the political, legal, moral, etc forms. In addition, Marx differentiates between the “holy” and “non-holy” forms of expression of the bourgeois worldview that cause “self-alienation” (Marx 1955 [1844]: 415). However, Marx also sees in the self-reflection of bourgeois society the dominance of certain characteristics of religion, which he believes are the basic characteristics of all types of ideology.¹

Following on from Marx and Engels, Lenin also sees the forms of the socialist superstructure as “ideological”, but in quite another key. In his infamous article titled “Party organization and party writings” he postulates the unavoidable subordination of literature (implicitly of the entire “intellectual culture”) to the criteria of “ideology” (Lenin 1947 [1905]). “Ideology” is declared to be a generic concept of intellectual culture. With his dichotomy of ‘two cultures’ — “the culture of the oppressors and the oppressed in the one culture”, he formulates this concept’s *non plus ultra* (Lenin 1948b [1913]: 8–9). Therefore: “either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle way” (Lenin 1946c [1902]: 355–356).

It was absolutely logical and “natural” that the implementation of ideological antitheses moved from the sphere of “intellectual culture” into politics, into political texts: “Our basic task is also to set up our truth in order to counterbalance bourgeois ‘truth’, and to force recognition of our truth” (Lenin 1950c [1920]: 339). This task was formulated as a memorable slogan by Vladimir Mayakovski, who had sunk to the level of court bard: “И песня //И стих — / это / бомба и знамя, //И голос певца / подымает класс //И тот / кто сегодня / поет не с нами, // Тот — / против нас” (Mayakovski 1958: 122).²

¹ Considering how consistent Marx was in proceeding from materialistic monism, his strict opposition to theogonic or Hegelian monism is neither accidental nor unexpected.

² Irina Belobrovtsseva kindly drew my attention to the existence of these verses in the poem “Mister ‘Artist of the People’”: “And the song / And verse / Are / a bomb and a flag // And the bard’s voice / shall inspire the class // But he / who today sings not with us — // Against us / he is”.

3.2. Semiosis forms the culture type

As is known, the Tartu–Moscow school semioticians define culture as a semiotic system occurring between a person and the world, where the information transmitted by a person is processed and organized (Lotman and Uspenski 1984: X). This system can be observed as both an abstract model of reality (or as a world picture or culture language) as well as its realization in sign structures (Lotman 1969a: 463).

Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski claim that in culture semiotics it is not possible to limit oneself to the functional analysis of culture as a sign system. Citing Michel Foucault's similar approach (Foucault 1994 [1966]) they place importance *in culture* on the nature of the relation of culture to the *sign, signification and sign-creation*, as a basic factor forming culture type. In their opinion, it is important to observe how in culture the relationship between the level of expression and the level of content of a sign is interpreted. On the basis of this relationship they differentiate between two culture types. For one of these, the symbol is suitable for the illustration of the type of relationship of the content and the expression, but for the other, it is a ritual (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 151–152).

In the first, conventional, arbitrary relations dominate between content and expression, as with symbols generally. Giving something a name in a culture, as the manner of expressing content, is not at all primary — the expressed content is important. In the second culture type — we would also include Soviet culture here — the relationship between manner of expression and content for a sign is generally seen as the only option. The form of expression is indivisible from the content as in a ritual. Content dictates definite limits on expression, and vice versa (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 151–152). Soviet culture apparently belongs to just this culture type. Solzhenitsyn has written somewhere of a locomotive driver who was executed on the spot because he had wrapped his sandwich in a newspaper that was decorated by a picture of Stalin. The Soviet culture type

is centred on (“correct”) naming, on the right “shell”. A “wrong” name is the same as “foreign” content. Here we need to remember the re-naming of streets, squares, institutions, etc during the Soviet occupation. At the end of the 1930s, all Soviet citizens named Trotsky very quickly changed their name (generally it was sufficient to add an “i”: Troitsky) ... Jaan Undusk writes of Stalin’s years in power:

It was often the case that people were not in love with communism, which they had not yet started to believe in, but rather with the word ‘communism’, which everyone had acquired, it was on everyone’s lips and between their teeth: ‘Two shining names [Lenin, Stalin]/ in the love of the people / have united in one word: communism.’ (Aleksei Surkov: *To the Leader of the Peoples*. Liberal translation). (Undusk 1994a: 1881)

Compare this with Stalin’s oath on the occasion of the death of Lenin: “There is nothing higher than the name of party member in this party, whose founder and leader is comrade Lenin” (Stalin 1947: 46).

Culture as a whole can be interpreted either as a mechanism which creates a collection of texts or as texts — as a realization of culture. In determining culture type, taking into account the self-assessment of culture in this issue, as indicated by Lotman, is very important. In the first case, the model is a textbook as a collection of rules generating text. Such a culture is aware of itself as a system of rules creating texts: one can only speak of precedent, if there is a rule which describes it. (European classicism can be brought as an example.) In the second case, the textbook as chrestomathy or a catechism is the model — texts, citations, collection of questions-answers (Lotman 1970g: 36, 47; see also Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 152–153; 1994 [1977]: 245). Such a culture is aware of itself as a culture of norms — a collection of “correct” texts; here the rules are reflected as the sum of precedents.

Being oriented to expression (nomination), Soviet culture also reflects itself as the Correct Text. The content of culture, looking

from the viewpoint of the self-reflection of culture, has been served up (pre-determined); for comprehending the text one has to learn the corresponding relationship between content and expression. (The path to comprehend culture is similar to the philological analysis of texts (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 152).) It could be added that western political scientists and the Soviet intelligentsia (who were able to decipher precedents) could unerringly interpret the near future of the state on the basis of signs, which had a definite meaning as words do in a dictionary. For example, the order of listing of CPSU Politburo members in an article or the way they were lined up at the Lenin mausoleum during parades unambiguously expressed changes, which had occurred (were in the process of occurring) in national politics. Soviet culture ritualized behaviour. The dominance of text as a precedent and its authoritative expression over the content of the text and the rules that generate content is also illustrated quite well by the citation convention which developed in the USSR. In the case of "the classics of Marxism-Leninism" (i.e. Marx, Engels, Lenin and (up to 1953) Stalin) — as opposed to all other authors — there was no requirement to tie a citation to specific research (article), in which the "classic" expressed the cited thought. It was sufficient to refer only to the volume and page of the (collected) works. The year of publication for the volume was also not mentioned. In the case of Marx and Engels, no differentiation was made between them: it was always a case of "Works" by K. Marx and F. Engels. The reader had to be completely satisfied by the *graphical fact* of a citation to an authoritative content and "container".

3.2.1. The antithetic dominant of semiosis

The clash of the two different culture types as sketched here with another ("foreign") culture demonstrates an interesting difference. The culture which is aware of itself as a collection of rules, and is a culture oriented primarily towards content, sees the

other culture as a *non-culture*. But a culture which is aware of itself as a collection of normative texts and is oriented towards expression treats foreign culture as *anticulture* (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 154–155).

Firstly, a few remarks on terms. The concepts and spelling of non-culture (or non-text) and nonculture (or nontext) must be kept separate. The latter pair of terms refers to ‘nature’, which *eo ipso* is not culture (text) (Lotman 1970a: 7)³

The Tartu–Moscow school semioticians have termed as non-culture the “sphere” which functionally is a culture but which does not (currently) fulfil its rules (see Lotman 1970a: 7). It “does not seem to exist” and falls outside (is forgotten) or is excluded from (due to the low(er) level of authority) the limits of a specific culture. Non-culture is subjectively made equivalent to chaos, entropy (in the system *organized–nonorganized*). From the viewpoint of a scientific meta-language, this is of course another culture (or another culture type). For a person outside the culture, as a rule, the non-culture could simply be a different sort of culture. Culture does indeed function on the background of non-culture and has a complicated relationship with it, through the processes of forgetting/remembering and de-semiotization/semiotization (Lotman 1970a: 8; 1970b: 78–79; Lotman and Pyatigorski 1968: 84–88)⁴.

³ The spelling of the terms ‘nonculture’ and ‘non-culture’ has created confusion, as regards meaning, in the publication of quite authoritative texts. For example, in the English translation of “Theses of Culture Semiotics”, section 4.0.0.a ‘non-text’ (*не-текст*) has been translated as “nontext” (“we should distinguish the nontext from the ‘antitext’ of a given culture”), and this mistake has repeated in all the numerous reprints known to me (Lotman, Uspenski *et al.* 1975 [1973]; Ivanov *et al.* 1998); the basis for the Tartu publication was the text published in the collected works: “Structure of Texts and Semiotics of Culture” (The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1973). There is also inconsistency in the spelling of the term anticulture, but the graphic image here (with a hyphen or without) does not denote content differences.

⁴ In Theses of Russian Culture Semiotics, compiled by Lotman a year before his death, he wrote the sentence: “The concept of ‘noncultural manner’ (*некультурность*) and ‘outside-cultural manner’ (*внекультурность*) should be permanently removed from the scientific vocabulary and replaced with

Anticulture and non-culture are separated from culture by a border, which has a direct association with the orientation of culture towards either expression (and text) or content (and rules). The border in the system *culture–anticulture* is inflexible, “insuperable”. The border between culture and non-culture, however, is hazy, gradated, smoothly transitional (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 154, 157). If one uses the concepts from formal logic, then it should be permissible to speak in general terms of anticulture as contradictory opposition (opposition occurs in a form expressing mutual exclusion in a yes/no or and/or type); non-culture, however, is represented by contradictory opposition (the elements expressed are the extreme type concept of one and the same gender concept, for example *distant–close*).⁵

In the opposition pair *culture–non-culture*, culture is aware of itself as a productive source, which in a normal distribution process forms culture from the non-culture sphere. It could be claimed, becoming historically more specific, that the culture type characteristic of the western European scientific era, is mostly able to be interpreted by proceeding precisely from a semiotic model oriented to content and rules (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 154, 157).

A most unusual situation develops, however, in the system *culture–anticulture*. The semantics of this can be expressed through the opposition pair *correct–incorrect*, which has to be interpreted as coinciding the antithesis *true–false*. Here the culture is not only differentiating itself from ‘chaos’,

‘other-cultural manner’ (*инокультурность*) (Lotman 1994b: 416). These terms, however, have been used here by Lotman in a completely different axiological context, i.e. to encourage the valuing of Russian culture policy and the modern paradigm of cultural self-awareness, in the context of world cultural integration. Emphasizing this aspect does not annul, in my opinion, the heuristic meaning and implementation potential in culture theory of the concepts of ‘non-culture’ and ‘nonculture’.

⁵ In interpreting antithesis as an element of culture code, the comment by Ludwig Wittgenstein — saying that although contradictory truth is impossible, contradiction is still not pointless, in a symbolic (therefore, in a semiotic) plane — should be kept in mind (Wittgenstein 1996 [1921]: 92–95).

'nonorganized' or 'entropy', but is apposite to a "sphere preceded by a negative sign". "A "culture with a negative sign" is perceived as a "special kind of mirror reflection" of culture, "where the connections remain, but become the opposite" (see Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 154–155). Culture separates itself from anticulture with a definite border and closes in on itself. If the spread of culture to non-culture areas occurs (as already indicated) as the expansion of knowledge to areas of non-knowledge, then the transfer of knowledge to the anticulture sphere is from the viewpoint of culture only possible as "victory over lies" (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 157). In the Theses on the Semiotic Study of Culture it is formulated as follows: "A difference must be made between culture non-text and anti-text: a statement which is not preserved, and a statement which is destroyed" (Ivanov *et al.* 1998: 4.0.0.a).

Unfortunately, the relevant theoretical discussions on the formal characteristics of anticulture by Lotman and Uspenski are restricted to the summary description cited above. In other publications, these authors concentrate on the documentation of anticulture manifestations on the basis of material on older Russian culture. (Lotman and Uspenski 1975: 168–254; 1993 [1976]; 1994 [1977]; Uspenski 1994b [1985] etc).

The conception by Lotman and Uspenski of antithesis in culture definitely provides a justification for concluding that Soviet (or totalitarian) ideology is not the unique domination sphere of antithesis and that anticulture has a wider manifestation space than Soviet culture. But even more important is the fact that antithesis is seen as an attribute of the reflection of culture and self-reflection, within the framework of a certain definite semiosis type.

Such an approach permits, in my opinion, postulation of a question on the treatment of antithesis as a mechanism of culture as intellect, which produces certain types of texts. Antithesis should be able to be interpreted as an invariant operational "schema" of culture as "intellectually operating entity" (one of

many schemata), if proceeding from Immanuel Kant's (1902 [1790]: 221–223) conceptual and theoretical tradition.⁶

My task, within the framework of the present chapter, is to describe antithesis as the characteristics of an intellectual mechanism, and their appearance in the self-reflection of Soviet culture. I will restrict myself to observation of the topological and (auto)communicative characteristics of antithesis as an intellectual schema, based on the theoretical paradigm of the Tartu–Moscow semiotics school.⁷

3.2.1.1. Complementarity of the antithetic cultural space.

Every linguistic statement describes a space-time process (Ivanov 1978a: 130). The speaking subject (or certain culture system) is observable in time-space coordinates⁸. But “one needs to differentiate between the space structures of the worldview and the meta-language that describes it. In the first case, the space characteristics are attributed to the object being described, in the second, to the describing language”. In the words of Juri Lotman, a clear homeomorphism still dominates between the space characteristics of object and meta-languages, because “one of the universal peculiarities of human culture, possibly connected with the anthropological features of human conscious-

⁶ The main positions on the aspects of culture as intellect, which are emphasized, are reflected in Juri Lotman's works (Lotman 1973a; 1977a: 9, 13, 16–18; 1992a: 29–30, 32–33). It is also important that Lotman postulates on the basis of the four main characteristics (semiotic heterogeneity, memory, self-propagation of meanings and existence of a selection block) of an individual text and culture as intellectual objects, as their analogy of structure and functioning principles.

⁷ I am interested here in typological special characteristics, which means that the real variance of the phenomena under analysis has been knowingly set aside.

⁸ These localization problems of the coordinates have been examined on the linguistic lexical and form level by many authors, including Roman Jakobson in his shifter theory (1972 [1971]), René Thom on the basis of a topological model for natural language (1975) and Juri Lotman in his theory on plot and event (Lotman 1970d: 280–289).

ness, is the fact that the world view inevitably acquires features of spatial characteristics" (Lotman 1969a: 463). Therefore, a space can be defined as a collection of possible interpreted characteristics (Ivanov 1978a: 41).

The viewpoint of the bearer of the text, its spatial characteristics, provides the culture model with an orientation (Lotman 1969a: 465). The orientation of the culture subject is understandably dependent on estimation. Lotman differentiates between the inner, limited, and external, open space, of a culture world picture, and the applicable orientation from the inside out or from the outside in (Lotman 1969a: 465–477). Such a classification principle may be justified in the case of the self-descriptions of various world pictures, including in the system *culture–non-culture* (see Figure 1; compare also Ivanov *et al.* 1998 [1973]: 1.1.2 and 1.2.0). However, it should not be applicable for the system *culture–anticulture* (see Figure 2). A culture surrounded by *non-culture* is a space with hazy borders: it develops smoothly into an amorphous and so-called borderless environment. In the system *culture–anticulture*, the anticulture elements are in one to one topological accordance with culture elements, because, as is known from logic, the members of binary opposition are in a conditional relationship. This means that the existence of one member of some opposition notes the actualization of its opposite in (culture) consciousness, although this opposite may be formally unspecified⁹. Since the repertoire forming culture is in the self-description of the system *culture–anticulture* dually arranged and regulated by strict borders, then the anticulture (or "outside" the culture) space is not seen as an open

⁹ This important characteristic of binary oppositions has been repeatedly referred to in his analysis of linguistic systems by Roman Jakobson (Jakobson 1985g [1976]: 70; 1985f [1975]: 144).




Figure 1. The system culture–non-culture.¹⁰




Figure 2. The system culture–anticulture.

¹⁰ n-c — a culture that is rejected as regards “culture”, that is irrelevant, forgotten, etc; nc — the sphere of nature and facts that has not been transformed into signs.

space¹¹. Here we have two closed culture areas, which (ideally!) are separated by an uncrossable (impenetrable) border. The border blocks — this is repeatedly emphasized — such activity by “them” directed at “us” which could deform “us”.

But still — indeed paradoxically — the self-reflection of the Soviet system was at the same time inseparable from anticulture. Determining the basic values of culture on the level of self-reflection could not occur without being aware of (or making them explicit) the anticulture elements — of course if one did not risk varying from the language of the system. Therefore, culture and anticulture form a complementary pair, regarding functioning — they are in their own way Siamese twins. Anyone doubting this should read any official self-description on the first and last page in a Soviet culture publication (the exception of course confirms the rule).

The features characterizing complementarity make it necessary to take a minor theoretical detour in order to briefly examine the principle of symmetry itself since all following paradigms are connected, in one way or another, with the symmetrical manifestations of semiosis.

3.2.1.2. Principle of symmetry.

As an introduction to the following discussions, the place of symmetry in the humanities needs to be examined since, as noticed by one of the founders of geochemistry and biochemistry, Vladimir Vernadski, already about 75 years ago:

The principle of symmetry has penetrated and will continue to penetrate many more realms of study in the 20th century. [---] This principle will incontestably and diversely encompass the

¹¹ Semioticians describe the basic analogy of such systems with dual phonological codes. Every phonological differential feature (or element of a mythological or other system) is equal and opposite to another differential feature (symbol) or a certain series of features (symbols) in the paradigm (or syntagma) under observation (Ivanov 1978a: 96).

phenomena of life and cosmic universe. (Vernadski 1975 [1920–1927]: 23)

The range of forms of *symmetry* and their manifestations is surprisingly wide. The most elementary understanding of symmetry can be found in the empirical truth that symmetrical things, images and phenomena are mutually invariant, i.e. they are similar with respect to certain relations and/or characteristics. Restrictions based on congruence (correspondence in size and shape) could be added to invariance. The sequence of invariant and congruent images on some straight or curved line creates *translative symmetry* (an ornament); the positioning of images that correspond to the same criteria on a circle yields in *radial symmetry*. Naturally, the same stands for the translation of the spatial equivalents of plane images.

But some symmetrical phenomena cannot be subordinated to the restrictions based on congruence. When looking into a mirror, nobody questions the symmetry between him and his image. Yet there is no congruence here: if we fit the mirror image to the original image, it does not correspond with it — the right side has changed into the left side and vice versa (compare this also with the reflection of the letters b/d or p/q). Such a type of symmetry is called *inverted or enantiomorphic or mirror symmetry*. Mirror is not the only means of achieving mirror symmetry. For instance, a butterfly's wings are enantiomorphic, too. Vernadski has emphasised that there exists a deep dissimilarity between the frozen symmetry of crystalline polyhedrons of inanimate nature and the complex (largely unexplained so far) dynamic symmetry of living organisms, one manifestation of which is just the phenomenon *of left and right*, meaning the very persistent dominance of enantiomorphic symmetry in the organic environment (Vernadski 1975: 56–57).

Whereas the reflection of a human face can never be congruent with its original, Winfred Nöth points out that enantiomorphic congruent symmetry can still exist. For instance, the right and left sides of capital letters 'A' and 'O' are —

naturally, in case of some certain fonts — both enantiomorphic and congruent. Such reflective symmetry is called *bilateral symmetry* (Nöth 1994c: 48).

Still another type of symmetry — *antisymmetry* — can be found besides translative, radial and mirror symmetry. We should distinguish between the reflective and translative forms of this type (Nöth 1994c: 98). Figurally symmetrical things (translation) can have (accentuable) contrasting additional characteristics, such as the case of black and white chessmen. But the phenomenon of the colour of human skin has caused antisymmetrical psychological and social collisions. The contrary scale of values — the contradictory oppositions *yes/no* or *and/or*, which can symbolically be expressed by *plus-minus* valuations — is also of an antisymmetrical nature.

Hermann Weyl has correctly written, “the idea of symmetry can by no means be exhausted with spatial objects.” Its “synonym is harmony.” Harmony becomes apparent in correlation, congruousness, proportionality, correspondence or accordance and measure. All these words can be brought back to a German word, *Ebenmass*. Weyl conceives this as “what, according to Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, a virtuous man has to strive for in his actions, and what is described by Galen in his treatise *De temperamentis* as a state of spirit, which has equally been removed from both extremes” (Weyl 1968 [1951]: 35, 36).

In the most general sense, symmetry, as explained in commonly used reference works, denotes “the quality of an object formed of elements of some set (e.g. an algebraic equation formed of variables x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) to transform into itself in case of a number of transformations different from the identity transformation of the set” (EE IX, 1996: 90). Or as defined by M. A. Melvin: symmetry is a quality to remain unchanged in the course of one or several different operations (Melvin 1960: 481). The essence of symmetry is repetition in a very broad sense of the word: physical, including topological (also gravitational) or rhythmical, tonal, mathematical, psychological (e.g. emotional),

evaluational, phonological and semantical repetition — a very wide range of repetitive variations.

We are now interested in the question as to whether and how the sign-creation process of symmetry manifests itself.

Semiosis or sign-creation can be defined as “several types of relations between *signans* and *signatum*” (Jakobson 1985d [1970]: 323). Below, we shall examine only the iconic forms of manifestation of these relations. But besides the iconic relations between *signans* (signifier) and *signatum* (signified object of the ontological reality), which are of exophoric or referential character, it is possible to describe the relations between *signans* and *signatum* within the discourse as a paradigmatic iconicity (cf Nöth 1994b: 107). Here lies the possibility for the so-called endophoric iconicity in the form of phrases, repetition of lexemes, anaphors, parallelisms, references within texts, etc.

Charles S. Peirce has defined the iconic relation between *signans* and *signatum* as an “elementary coincidence based on a certain characteristic” (cited from Jakobson 1985d: 322). The repetitiveness of coinciding elements both at exophoric and endophoric levels creates either a symmetrical or an antisymmetrical relation. Since this is a signifying relationship, at least one of the repetitive elements, or their relationship, is directly, or imaginarily as, a sensual phenomenon. This aspect lends semiosis its spatial dimensions. (We already indicated that in a wider context every linguistic utterance can be conceived as a spatial-temporal act (Ivanov 1978a: 130), and that man’s worldview that is marked with signs “unavoidably has the characteristics of space” (Lotman 1969a: 463).) The spatiality of semiosis is structural for at least two important reasons. First, semiosis is an intentional act, which is unavoidably related to the existence of a point of view; the space-designing character of the point of view becomes actual especially in case of communicational (including autocommunicational) semiosis. Second, semiosis has some certain forms, where *signans* and *signatum* or *signans* and *signans* are positioned reflexively (e.g. in a palindrome) and have semantical polarity.

Analysing symmetrical forms of semiosis we should keep apart two levels of analysis, which are, on the one hand, the spatial-symmetrical structure of semiosis and, on the other hand, metalanguage-models, describing these structures.

The iconic relations between the signifier and the signified can be revealed in the suchness of the so-called "genuine icon," where the sign and its object merge into a single identity, creating the so-called 0-symmetry (Nöth 1999: 616). Roman Jakobson pointed out that iconic symmetry can be expressed by "conditional suchness" (*условное сходство*) which characterises the relations between *signans* and *signatum* in music and, for example, also in abstract art (Jakobson 1985d: 327). Mirror projective relations between *signans* and *signatum* create antithetical iconicity; and finally: the metaphor, in which the *signans* creates a simultaneous parallel connection with two *signatums*, provokes a topologically and semantically symmetric positioning (Jakobson 1983 [1965]: 113). ("In reality" the two *signatums* can be totally different from each other.)

Following the symmetrical repetition schemes of semiosis at the level of metalanguage-models, we can state that the forms of symmetry expressing 0-symmetry, "conditional similarity", and other forms expressing identity (congruence), are characteristic to a mythological worldview (cf. Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 282–293; Lotman and Mints 1981: 35–41). Antithetical symmetry has been dominant in Russian (Lotman and Uspenski 1994 [1977]) and Soviet Russian culture. Baroque, symbolist and aestheticised worldviews mostly are based on metaphorical semiosis.

3.2.1.3. Symmetrical reduction.

On the dual field of the system *culture-anticulture*, with a closed binary structure, the mutually reserved places of the opposition pairs change the bilaterally symmetrical places on the topological plane of the system to be bilaterally symmetrical and semantically antisymmetrical. The language of this system does

not recognize a *non-culture*, which is neutral and ruins the symmetry. *Non-culture* is reduced to either culture or anticulture¹². Such a black-white reduction in Soviet culture presumed the “vigilance” of the (self)consciousness, regarding both “us” and “them”. Foreign cultural figures were classified as (potential) enemies or “friends” (ours — *наши*); in the USSR all letters from foreigners were checked as a rule; all foreigners visiting “us” were restricted in where they could go etc, etc. Within the culture, those young people who did not belong to communist youth organizations were called “nonorganized youth” (Soviet functionaries’ slang!) and they had difficulties in being admitted to higher education institutions, and in getting certain jobs. These same official understandings were used to assess people who did not attend parades or go to vote: “If you’re not for us, you’re against us” ... Those against (real and fabricated) were marked as “(bourgeois) nationalists”, “opportunists”, “revisionists”, “liquidators”, “traitors”, etc. And these were in essence treated as a part of “them” — the anticulture:

It cannot be an accident that the Trotskists, Bukharinists and nationalist saboteurs, in fighting against Lenin, against the Party, reached the same point as the Menshevik and Social revolutionary parties — they became agents of fascist spy organizations, became spies, saboteurs, murderers, wreckers, traitors of the fatherland. (Lühikursus 1951 [1938]: 326)

In addition, the polarizing elements of anticulture, on both sides, are subject to yet another symmetrical reduction principle: all anticulture elements become synonymous with each other and so do culture elements. Two translatively symmetrical sequences (which understandably are mutually semantically anti-symmetrical) are created. The opposite pairs forming this sequence are in a certain context semantically interchangeable:

¹² As a parallel example, reference could be made to the 16th century old-Ukrainian grammar, where all “orthodox” languages were referred to as the one language (Lotman and Üspenski 1971: 156).

“each opposite pair can be treated as the translation of the basic opposition *beneficial–non-beneficial*” (Ivanov 1978a: 96). Vyacheslav Ivanov associates this *semiosis*-mechanism with the mythology of “elementary” societies¹³. But the recently analyzed understandings of Lotman and Uspenski regarding signs in culture types oriented to rituals allow the interpretation of Ivanov’s conclusion in a much wider context. For example, in the consciousness of Russian Old Believers, ‘paganism’, ‘heresy’, ‘Catholicism’, and even everything ‘new’ was reduced to a semantically translative ornament, with the secondary axiological common term ‘Satanism’ (Lotman and Uspenski 1994 [1977]: 232). In an analogous way, Peter the Great was called the Anti-Christ because he adopted the title of emperor; but for the Old Believers, ‘emperor’, ‘Rome’ and ‘Anti-Christ’ formed a semantically levelled ornament, where ‘satanic’ (sinful) became the content value dominant (Lotman and Uspenski 1993 [1976]: 203). In the self-descriptions of the Soviet system antithesis: *lawfully progressive (good)–lawfully reactionary (bad)* begins to replace (suffocate) all other conceivable terms of the two paradigms. In the self-consciousness of Soviet culture definite assessment clichés are created on the level of the noted main opposition (and its secondary opposite pairs *flourishing–deterioration, luxuriance–languishing*, etc) (cf. Yakimovich 1998: 342–343), which results in the primary semantics of culture reality being reduced or becoming secondary, e.g. “It is time to end the decaying view [of capitalists — *P. L.*] that there is no need to interfere in production” (Stalin 1935d [1931]: 446). The issue of whether there is a need or not, that is not offered to the reader as the primary issue: the primary issue is to put an “end” — to the “decay” (capitalism)!

¹³ Within the context of this conclusion, it is important to denote that also on the level of an intellectual procedure, we still have a *semiosis* that is mythologized (produces identity). This phenomenon occurs as is noted by A. Olrik — in the form of stage duality and of twins in the “epic laws” of magic tales (Olrik 1909: 5–7).

3.2.1.4. Mirror projection.

The appearance of antithetic semiosis in the topology of culture space would not be complete without looking at the reflexive or mirror projection. As we know, Sigmund Freud formulated projection as the transfer of the individual's sub-conscious aggression to the outside world, i.e. to other people(s) (Freud 1938 [1906]: 854–856). A mirror projection, in our opinion, is a “me” (“us”) described by defining a negative (often also reflected as aggressive) “other” (“others”) as an antithesis — i.e. via the “others”. Hedrick Smith, in his book “The Russians”, refers to the fact that after an aviation accident in the Soviet Union, there always followed a month of reports in the official press about air accidents in America, West Germany, Taiwan and wherever — but somewhere else. The same logic applies to health epidemics, price increases, crime, harvests, setbacks, water shortage, jailing of political prisoners (Smith 1976: 368). This example is particularly interesting because a projection precedes the mirror projection. Firstly, “our” problems are transferred to “them” and then a mirror projection antithesis is created: for “their” drought we have the 0-feature — “no drought”.

A chrestomatic example of mirror projection is provided by Marx, who dreamt thus:

Socialism is man's *positive self-consciousness*, which is no longer mediated by the negation of religion [Sic! — *P. L.*], just as *real life* is man's positive reality, which is no longer mediated by the negation of private property *via Communism*. (Marx 1977 [1844]: 127)

A mirror projection cannot possibly be confined only to being a tool of ideological propaganda, as initially may be assumed (although it is that as well!). There is reason to believe that mirror projection has in the self-regulation of culture a universal role. It is also apparent that the mirror projection begins to dominate just in dual semantically antisymmetrical culture systems. These claims are supported on the one hand, as we

already know, by Porshnev's research results, which indicate that historically the *them-concept* was created much earlier than the *self-reflecting our-concept* (Porshnev 1979: 81). This is supported by Cassirer's claim that pointing at one's body occurred before the use of pronouns. (cf. Ivanov 1978a: 137). On the other hand, in contrast to many other cultures, mirror projection has been recurrently characteristic of Russian culture, in particular. It could even be said that this comprises the formative axis of Russian culture. 'New' has never been seen in Russia as the continuation of the 'old' or as an innovation, dependent on the 'old', but still and always as the negation of the 'old', as its radical abandonment (*отталкивание*), even as the justification of its destruction or as its destruction. See Lotman and Uspenski 1994 [1977], 1993 [1976]; Uspenski 1994b [1985]). Such an antibehaviour refers back to its sacramental forms in pagan rituals: it was presumed that in the world beyond the grave, all connections are opposite — right is left, truth is the opposite, if there is night, then here it is day, etc (Uspenski 1994b [1985]: 321).

In another context and with less strict limitations, the same phenomenon is observed by Toomas Gross (1996: 1723–1735). He describes the positive reinforcement of this 'me' as occurring due to the depiction of the 'other' (foreigner) as negative, and in the role of this 'other' can be the individual, culture, and also "an even wider formation". Gross mentions as examples the apposition of barbarians to Romans, and setting opposite America or Western Europe to communist regimes. The 'other' is defined merely by placing it outside one's own system. Gross, however, does not differentiate between the 'not-me' and the 'anti-me' as the 'other'. I should stress that, in Soviet culture, the 'anti-me' as the 'other' (together with the mirror projection procedure) is explicitly represented in the infamous "self-criticism" ritual, which is "one of the most dynamic forces in the development of society, as a special form of uncovering dissension.[---] Party members are obligated to implement this

and to apply for the removal of the deficiencies" — i.e. creating antithesis from one's own negative side! (ENE IV, 1972: 189).

Examples of the described antithetic schema variation can be found without difficulty in Soviet ideological self-descriptions. The hackneyed display of capitalist countries' social situation via unemployment, non-free medical services, "rampant" prostitution, or the exploitation of workers, was of course directed primarily (and implicitly) to the antithesis born from a mirror projection: in the USSR we of course did not have unemployment or prostitution, and free medical services were of course also guaranteed... In regard to exploitation or other matters, then the semantics of both this and other analogous signs ends up in the realm of translative symmetry and reducing primary semantics. Meanings are determined by the basic opposition *regressive–progressive* (see 3.2.1.3). Reflexive projection was extensively used in art. As a classical example, V. Mayakovski's "Verses about the Soviet passport" deserve quoting. The situation imagined by the poet occurs on the border of the US. The Soviet passport, described as the "duplicate" of the "priceless ship ballast" for the Soviet person, is described through the attitude of the official in a mirror projection manner. The attitude is expressed cumulatively on the level of four antitheses, of which the last has even the form of a mythologized hyperbole: "Берет — / как бомбу, / берет — / как ежа, // как бритву/ обоюдоострую, / берет, / как гремучую, / в 20 жал // змею / двухметроворостую". And then, right at the end, the *our-side* of the antithesis is exhibited — together with the content of the "duplicate" "Читайте, / завидуйте, / я — гражданин // Советского Союза" (Mayakovski 1956: 242).¹⁴

¹⁴ "Takes it — as if it were a bomb, /takes it / as if it were a hedgehog, // as if it is a dual blade. // Takes it / as if it were a rattlesnake / with 20 fangs, // a snake / twenty meters long; Read, / be envious / I am a citizen // of the Soviet Union".

3.2.1.5. Enantiomorphic symmetry.

Mirror projection, as we have seen, indicates the index aspect of the semiosis of the negative 'other' and the positive 'me' ('us'). Using the concept of the mirror, however, is simultaneously associated with the iconic similarity relationship of the poles of antithesis¹⁵. This interplay between the similarity and difference relationship has been called the equivalence paradox ($A = A$ and $A \neq A$) (Levin 1988: 9), which is indeed the content of enantiomorphic symmetry. In such a paradox the fact emerges that anticulture is not nonculture or non-culture; it is also not culture, yet — as became apparent in the earlier discussion regarding the complementarity of the *culture-anticulture* system (see 3.2.1.1) — it is still also, as anticulture, simultaneously culture! In other words, it could also be stated: every affirmation has a concealed negation. (cf. Ivanov 1978a: 42.) Expressing this statement in topological terms, it could be claimed that if we describe two objects separately that are mirror-symmetrical, looking at both of them from the outside, we could then affirm that when placed on top of each other they would coincide. However, if we look in a mirror (in other words, describe both objects from the position of one object), then if the objects are placed on top of each other, the right side of one object becomes the left side of the other object, and vice versa. This "understanding and observation paradox" has been thoroughly described by Kant (1982 [1783]: 43–46; 1964 [1768]: 369–379). The reversal of right/left in enantiomorphic symmetry implies also the reversal of other base positions affecting the physical and ethical world (Levin 1988: 11). Jacques Lacan has even claimed that already in the so-called mirror stage (between the 5th and 18th month of life), the child recognizes its body in a mirror

¹⁵ The universality of the mirror mechanism in culture, space and on the molecular level is emphasized by J. Lotman (1984: 20–21). In the Tartu–Moscow semiotics school the mirror is termed "a semiotic machine for describing a foreign structure" (Redkollegiya 1988: 5).

as being inverted and opposite to itself, an external (foreign) 'other' (Lacan 1977 [1937]: 1–4).

Mirror symmetry is explicitly apparent in, for example, the Christ–Anti-Christ pair or in the medieval carnival antitheses. In Russia, the old pagan culture was the unavoidable prerequisite of culture as such. According to this schema, such a “new culture”, which always saw itself as the negation and complete destruction of the “old” actually became a powerful impetus for preserving the “old”, covering the inherited texts and preserved behavioural forms, but turning these functions upside down, mirror symmetrically (Lotman and Uspenski 1994 [1977]: 226). The same can be seen in Soviet culture, for example in turning upside down the semantics of the red corners (*красный угол*) (in the “old” culture — icon corner, in the “new” — an intimate room decorated with the picture of the Party leader and meant for carrying out ideological (including anti-religious) events. The symbolic substitution of religious passages of the cross on Red Square with demonstrations by the workers carrying portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin is also mirror symmetrical, as well as the symbolic replacement of the nobility with “the conscience, wisdom and honour of the working class” — the communist party. The pair of opposites formed by the czar's autocracy and “democratic centralism” (Leader's autocracy) is of course also enantiomorphically symmetrical. And so enantiomorphic symmetry rises to organize the culture on supra-segmental levels of texts (cf. Nöth 1994b: 101).

Attention, however, has been directed towards the disappearance of asymmetrical culture systems, these becoming transformed into symmetrical ones, and vice versa — i.e. towards the internal dynamics of culture systems. Generally, a person tries to avoid mirror symmetry to the benefit of symmetry (Abramyan 1981: 77, 85–86). The model for this tendency is the handshake — right hand with right hand! If we bring an example from Soviet culture, then we notice a strange but constant regularity in the political sympathies of Soviet dictators. Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, etc for some reason generally managed

to get on remarkably well with (from a Soviet viewpoint) right-wing leaders: in the US with the Republicans, in the UK with the Conservatives and in Germany with the Christian Democrats. But with left wing and “weak” leaders there were continual conflicts.

3.2.2. Autocommunication of culture: antithetic self-reflection

A viewpoint causing mirror symmetry has two important features: an individual looking into a mirror is relating to himself; and he sees that of himself, which, without looking in the mirror, he does not see. During self-observation (self-admiration or self-hatred), the “me” is transformed into the “other” for oneself. This feature of a mirror is expressed of course in enantiomorphic symmetry. In Renaissance period art, the female figure denoting pride was often supplied with a mirror, in which Satan was reflected (Hall 1997: 169–170). The allegory for triviality could be a naked woman, who looks into a mirror whilst combing her hair, in the presence of the figure of Death (Hall 1887: 545). Initially, it may seem that autocommunication in the worldview of an individual has a facultative meaning. But proceeding from the presumption of the analogy with the individual and collective intellect, Lotman brushes this understanding aside with a simple argument. If, instead of the concept ‘individual’ we use the concepts of the addresser and the addressee, it could be claimed that in describing the communication, within the borders of some national culture, for example, the area covered by the concept of addresser is just about the same as covered by the addressee. But if we observe human culture, then — “remaining within the limits of the experience which is at least historically real” — the concepts of addresser and addressee coincide, and communication must be interpreted, within the limits of human culture, as autocommunication (Lotman 1970a: 15).

In the system *culture–anticulture*, autocommunication is central, the function forming the structure. This claim is

supported by the domination of the complementarity of self-reflection (see 3.2.1.1), mirror projection (3.2.1.4) and mirror symmetry (3.2.1.5) in the system *culture-anticulture*.

As regards content, autocommunication is a paradoxical phenomenon (Lotman 1973b: 228): the subject passes on a message to someone who already knows it anyway. Therefore, there is no mnemonic purpose in the message transfer. This means that autocommunication must have another important role, regarding culture. In claiming that a person uses words in order to *organize his individuality*¹⁶, Lotman emphasizes that in transferring a message to oneself, the 'me' itself is transformed: "the 'me' reorganizes its individuality" (Lotman 1973b: 228). Here it should be added that also a collective individual could feel the need to look itself in the face, in order to become aware of what it is, for itself and for others. In Soviet culture, such autocommunication became a genre of its own, in the form of party programs, report speeches, slogan issues created for the May and October celebrations, etc. The gems of this genre are understandably the canonic "Short Course of the History of the CPSU" and the "Stalinist" constitution (Konstitutsiya 1937). Readers who are familiar with these understand that in this genre a clear enantiomorphic symmetry dominates. But in contrast to the classical *us-them* model, here the plus and minus sides have reversed. Phenomena that exclude, conceal or condemn, subconsciously or consciously, the 'me' ('us') become the enantiomorphic projection of oneself, which we indeed recognize in the all possible publications of commands etc in the *culture-anticulture* type systems.

In the self-reflection of Russian culture, where observing oneself has always been of primary importance, and the most fundamental, regarding the observation of the outside world (Lotman 1994b: 407), anticulture is indeed mostly sought from within culture. Russian culture has not seen itself as an

¹⁶ A person's behaviour is dependent on how he names himself. A person for example could announce: "I am not yet a scoundrel" (see Appendix, Lecture I).

evolutionary process but as a duel between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’. Together with Marxist world revolution theory, an “external” antithetic area was indeed born alongside the internal enemy, as a “capitalist system”, but Soviet Russian culture’s autocommunication contaminated and levelled out both of them in imagining a common enemy (in the spirit of Figure 2): “За все — // за войну // за после // за раньше // со всеми // с ихними // и со своими // мы рассчитаемся в Красном реванше...” (Mayakovski 1956: 78).¹⁷

3.2.2.1. Antithesis as a secondary code of autocommunication.

Culture, as is claimed by J. Lotman, has a tendency, in the typological plane, to be either a communicative or an autocommunicative system (Lotman 1973b: 242–243). In the system *culture–anticulture*, as became clear above, autocommunication is the fashionable method of information exchange.

Autocommunication encourages the transformation of texts into metatexts. In the internal speech system “words and pictures become indices” (Lotman 1970c: 165). This important observation was developed by Lotman into the autocommunication secondary code idea, which in summary is as follows (see Lotman 1973b: 232–240). Text, which in autocommunication, does not provide us with new information, but transforms a self-picture of ‘me’, restricted to simply translating the existing information into a new system of expression, circulating in a functional way as a code, not as a message¹⁸. For example, if a reader of “Anna Karenina” cries out (or thinks): “Anna — that’s

¹⁷ “For everything — // for the war // for that which will come // for that which was before, // with all them (enemies), // with theirs // and with ours // we will settle the scores in a Red revenge ...”.

¹⁸ A code is “a presentation of information in such a form which is suitable for the transmission of the message on a certain information channel” (Ivanov 1978a: 130).

me"¹⁹, then this makes the text of Tolstoy's novel a model for the reconsideration of the life of the reader. The *me-me* system is different from the *me-you* system due to word reduction: the words become the signs of the words, the indices of the signs. Tolstoy's text thus acquires a new (i.e. additional) role — this becomes the index and code of 'my' worldview. "Reading" an initial notification in the key of another code creates a situation where the elements of the initial text are interpreted as belonging to a further, syntagmatic construction that has been entered from the "outside". J. Lotman limits himself in differentiating the alternate code, by noting repeated, ornamental, rhythmic constructions: it is — in his opinion — these that begin to govern the associations of the addressee. Asemantic texts, which have thoroughly organized syntagmatically, become the initiators of our associations: the more emphatic the syntagmatics, the more associative it is! The reader understands such a text only if he knows it in advance. Of course, information exchange oriented to autocommunication cannot avoid clichés. On the contrary: autocommunication has inclined to change texts into syntagmatic clichés.

I would add that such a system is familiar to everyone due to magic tales. On the level of natural language the magic tale of course has semantics; as a culture phenomenon the magic tale, however, is pure syntagmatics — i.e. a secondary code. A magic tale does not contain any new information for anyone — everything is known in advance. This was understood superbly by A. Olrik, who at the beginning of the century claimed to be researching the "biology" of fairytales (Olrik 1909: 1).

As can be concluded from the analysis of translative reduction (3.2.1.3.), complementarity (3.2.1.1.) and projection and mirror projection (3.2.1.4, 3.2.1.5.), antithesis acquires in the structure of enantiomorphic autocommunication a secondary semantic and

¹⁹ It is said that G. Flaubert commented on Madame Bovary: "Emma — that's me". Even Tolstoy is said to have identified himself with Natasha from "War and Peace".

syntagmatic role. And it reorganizes the primary semantics of the message that is reflected. In a mirror projection text, the primary content of a message retreats in face of the logic of antithesis. Antithesis, dominant in the system *culture–anticulture*, starts to produce, as a semantic and syntagmatic superstructure, a certain type of text. Therefore, antithesis is not merely a rhetorical trick, the emotional reaction of an individual, a logical operation or a manifestation of subconscious aggression. Antithesis is a constructive element of culture, Lotman would say: *порождающий механизм*. The autocommunication model of culture contains both the self-reflection as well as the base algorithms to comprehend the mirror reflection. Antithesis also belongs to these universal algorithms, retreating in some and rising to dominate in other culture systems, including Soviet culture.

An approach, which examines in depth the autocommunication of culture and the different forms of symmetry, offers an intriguing aspect in the future treatment of antithesis in (meta)rhetoric. The analogy with the many manifestations of culture enantiomorphics and the asymmetric functionality of the brain hemispheres is very intriguing in this relationship.

THE UNIQUENESS AND UNIVERSALITY OF MAGIC IN CULTURE

4.1 Viewpoint and tasks

The understanding of the mutual inversely proportional logic of development for magical and scientific discourse in the modern world has been an illusion. As is seen below, this fact has been tentatively explored, to a certain degree, by psychologists, culturologists, philosophers and linguists. Juri Lotman has analyzed magic as a communication algorithm, which has a universal cultural source and a specific semiotic structure. In the fourth chapter, magic is placed into a wider interpretational and methodological context, in order to create a basis for the description of the algorithms of the intellect as a complete system. The author attempts to reconstruct important structuralistic points of departure that have been inspired by phenomenology, on which rest the semiotic views of Lotman regarding magic (and also other universals).

4.2. Paradox of magic in culture

On Planet Earth, there have surely lived no peoples who had not carried out special (verbal) acts that had become fixed in tradition, and which were believed to possess esoteric power, thus producing change in the environment or in a person (people) (including in the person carrying out the act). James George Frazer categorized such acts into two groups, according to the nature of the mediation of the power: contagious magic — where

the magical effect is achieved on condition that the things (and/or beings) that have been in contact at some time preserve their mutual connection and influence regardless of distance, and homoeopathic magic — where the effect of the magical act is constructed on the cause-effect association or imitation, or on the unavoidable (predetermined) oneness relationship of the two processes (Frazer 2001 [1994]: 35–36).¹ Frazer was interested from which operations, defective according to formal logic, a magical effect was derived. Thus, J. G. Frazer (as also did many researchers after him) sought to analyze magic within the framework of the “scientific” paradigm (i.e. the science of positivistic interpretation). The author of this monograph, proceeding from the ideas of the Tartu–Moscow school of semiotics, has attempted to determine magic in quite a wider context.

The place of magic in modern culture has been provocatively paradoxical when considering two facts that are obvious, but mutually contradictory.

Educated persons — in Europe, at least continuously for the last two hundred years — have been accustomed to consider magic as “superstition”, “a phenomenon of the past” that is out of place in a scientific world, a “product of primitive thought” that no longer has a place in civilized societies. This standpoint is absolutely universal. Yet, despite this, and even in spite of this, all more or less educated persons could quite easily be convinced that magical acts are an inseparable part of their everyday lives, often without themselves actually being aware of this, or without them necessarily turning to a magician (sorcerer ~ shaman ~ healer ~ witch ~ wise authority) to acquire such a service. In certain circumstances every person himself acts as a magician — and does so as a matter of course!

Examples can be found close at hand. The realm of homoeopathic magic includes the casting of molten lead into water to find out one’s luck for the coming year, seeking fortune by

¹ For an attempt at a systematic analysis of magical semiosis, see Chapter 2.

counting the petals on lilac flowers (and a whole series of other acts/taboo associated with numbers (e.g. "13")). These include cursing and swearing², spitting over the left shoulder (to ensure that the words just spoken do not come to nothing), misfortune brought about by encountering a spider in the morning (avoiding this by killing the spider), the taboo regarding shaking hands across the threshold, the ritualized presentation of political slogans (in Stalin's state, for example, every commemorative speech had to end with the obligatory magic formula "Long Live Comrade Stalin!"). Forms of address such as "Jätku leiba!" (coming across someone eating — "May your bread not run out") or "Kivi kotti!" (wishing someone luck with a difficult task — "Put a rock in your bag") are also magical acts. Memories of autosuggestion, for example: "If I get across the road before the train whistles, I'll get good questions in the exam" ~ "he/she" will not leave me" etc, can be recalled by almost every person. And then there are the astrological calendars... Following the example of rulers from ancient eastern lands and Europe, there are not a few modern leaders who make their plans based on such calendars — not to mention the numbers of ordinary citizens.

The notable everyday manifestations of contagious magic are acquiring and carrying around talismans, or affixing a horseshoe to the wall of the (farm) house. As J. Frazer in his "Golden Bough" indicated, it is also quite usual to find characteristics of homoeopathic magic in contagious magic (Frazer 2001: 34). Examples of such a symbiosis are various acts to exorcise evil spirits, carrying a dead person out of the house — feet first, burning a national flag, the bridal wreath game, the taboo on breaking a mirror, the cult of mascots or throwing a milk tooth on top of the oven for the cricket (in Germany, it is thrown behind the oven for the mouse (Frazer 2001: 47).

A separate issue to be examined is the magical repertoire associated with religious liturgy. The procedures therein with

² For more details on the magical and religious roots of swearing, see Uspenski 1994a [1983, 1987].

magical roots are all in accordance with the formal laws on similarity and/or contact, as described by J. Frazer. Bronislaw Malinowski has compared a magical act and a sacramental transformation of substance:

take certain utterances in the Holy Mass, those which within the appropriate context transform bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Our Saviour. Take again the verbal act of repentance in the Roman Catholic confession of sins, or again the sacramental act of Absolution administered verbally by the Father Confessor: here words produce an actual change in a universe, which, though mystical and imaginary to us agnostics, is none the less real to the believer. (Malinowski 1965 [1935]: 55)

The above list can naturally be extended with the act of baptism, tying marriage partners with rings, all kinds of consecration ceremonies, etc. The major religions have taken over contagious and homoeopathic magic from pagan customs. For example, there is still a contagious magic function in the baptism ritual, since water in mythology marks the beginning of everything, and symbolizes the mother's lap (Averintsev 1991: 62). The ring, as well as yarn, have since ancient times been symbols of ties. The association of marriage with circles and rings is an ancient phenomenon. During the marriage ceremony the members of the clan stood in a circle: those who married did not form separate families but were members of the "greater family". An oath of loyalty was sworn whilst standing in the circle (Hoffmann-Krayer 1987 [1935/1936]: 703, 713). In the early versions of epic folklore examples can also be found of rings that bring about love (Geissler 1955: 29, 180).

In disputing the seriousness of this list — that is far from complete — the "rationalists" could claim that:

- 1) the initial, *resp.* pagan meaning of a original magical act has very often become dimmed, changed, been metamorphized or has disappeared completely, and
- 2) the old meaning may indeed be known but the truthfulness of the magical effect is no longer believed, and the magical

formula are spoken, and the magical procedures are carried out, as a mere formality, or automatically.

Therefore, from the standpoint of those disputing the viability of magic, the abundance of magical elements in memory, thought and behaviour, should not be accorded any culturally generative significance.

In cultural analysis there is indeed a dominating tendency to euphemize/metamorphize and/or marginalize magic. Since the enlightenment era, the realization of this trend has been particularly powerfully assisted by two “engines” — science and religion. For example, even Frazer declared that magic was “science’s blood relation”, adding however that magic was “inevitably fallible and barren, and if it should ever become true and fertile, then magic would be magic no longer, but science” (Frazer 2001: 55). In the positivism paradigm, the understanding that the truthfulness quality is reserved only for science and “scientific” became a viable and accepted fact.

The mass of religious texts also sets itself against magic. On the one hand, as is known, procedures borrowed from magic have been extensively entered into the dogmatics of Christianity (as illustrated by the above examples); on the other hand, however, there is a dominating tendency to ignore magic as a “superstition”, or to marginalize magic as a cultural relict.³

Considering the struggle between science and religion, magic’s days should have been numbered long ago. This, however, has not happened. Magic has turned out to be a unique phenomenon in culture because it has strangely managed to

³ During the Middle Ages, the opposition between religion and magic was even described using iconic means of expression that emphasized contradiction. For example, a prayer that was called satanic was considered to be a Christian prayer, read backwards, and speaking backwards was called “witches’ talk”. The Hebrew-language texts of Jews, and the Arabian-language texts of moslems, (that are indeed read from right to left) could be viewed as texts from Hell, holding magic power. (Lotman 1998: 69). (It could be appropriate to note that the logic of thought of the medieval clerics is in exact accordance with the characteristics that J. Frazer accorded, in particular, to homoeopathic magic.)

survive in varied forms, without it being supported in the modern era by any substantial institutional factor.⁴ And that is not all. In the cultural processes that have occurred during the last half-century, it is even possible to note a certain renaissance for magic, since — particularly in the European cultural area — a sudden increase of interest can be noted regarding magical texts and acts (for example, astrology, or fantasies and esotery in the style of the Potter phenomenon) in all possible forms. Lotman, too, had already indicated 20 years ago that we “have been witnesses in the 20th century to the forceful advance into European civilization by archaic and primitive cultural texts” (Lotman 1981b: 11).

Much more intriguing, however, is the accordance of magic to such texts, such communication, which by its genre and/or its function, does not permit itself to be identified in any way with genuine magic. This heuristically interesting fact appears in Ernst Cassirer’s discussion, when in analyzing the features of the creation of modern political myths, he dares claim the following:

But if all ordinary technical means have failed, there still remains the *ultima ratio*, the final argument, which consists in a negation and reversal of all our usual modes of ratiocination and argumentation. We cannot solve the Gordian knot, but we can cut it. The magical word has not lost its power. But it must be used in the right way, at the right moment, and by the right man. All our efforts would be in vain if it were not possible to concentrate them to one point — in the same way in which in primitive society the collective power of the tribe is condensed and embodied in the person of the sorcerer, who commands the powers of nature, and who, as a medical man, knows the remedies for all evils. (Cassirer 1979 [1945]: 250)

Here Cassirer interprets magic as the rhetoric instrument of political propaganda. But he has not been the only author who

⁴ The continued vitality of magic interests already astounded Edward Tylor, the anthropology professor from Oxford who was the first to scientifically examine magic (*cit.* Gross 1997: 2519).

has examined the semantics and pragmatics of magic in a much wider context, compared to the folklore tradition.

4.3. Magic outside “folklore” (Selection of critical glances)

This section has two basic interdependent goals:

Firstly, to provide a selective overview of the substance that, in science, has been connected with magic, but that lies outside folklore⁵, and

Secondly, to seek the reasons that have fed the vitality of the magical “substance” in culture.

The overview of the non-folklore interpretations of magic does not pretend to completeness. The author has merely sought here to mark the areas of transition of magic. The primary task of this chapter is the analysis of the culture semiotic interpretation of magic in Juri Lotman's “Lectures”. In other words, according to the task at hand, the author will attempt to reconstruct those theoretical points of departure that have made it possible (or that have turned out to be insufficient) to interpret magic as a systematic and universal intellectual phenomenon.

Analyses that claim to be systematic, and that argue in substance against the (folkloristic) cliché of magic regarding its “genreness”, history and intellectual marginalization, are not great in number. In general, the forms of manifestation of magic, outside chrestomatic magical spells, etc, have been observed in four areas — the psyche of children, the everyday behaviour of people, natural language and cultural language.⁶

⁵ Here it should be emphasized that it is indeed difficult if not unproductive to precisely set the boundaries for folklore itself. These “boundaries” are created by a non-folklore determination of the research topic.

⁶ Semiotics deals with sign systems, which the Tartu–Moscow School of Semiotics treats as languages. The most basic elements of a language are an alphabet and rules, which permit the subsequent formation of meaning-bearing units (words, sentences, texts) for saving, organizing and mediating information. With some simplification it can be said that two types of languages are able to be differentiated: natural languages and second level languages

4.3.1. Characteristics of “magical” behaviour in a child’s ontogeny

The folkloristic, traditionally “genristic”, sovereignty of magic (and also mythology) was seriously undermined for the first time by Jean Piaget’s developmental psychology experiments (see Piaget 1951 [1927]). Piaget divides a child’s development into four stages, of which the first are, according to his terminology, the “magic” stage (ends at the age of 5–6) and the “mythological” stage (ends at the age of 7–9). The magic in a child’s psyche is said to be characterized as “animistic” (sensing everything as being alive) and “artificiality” (subordinating the environment or environment being subordinate to human manipulation). *Self* and *non-self* are merged in a child of that age, which permits the things (they have the characteristics of being alive) of the surrounding world to be controlled, directed and commanded according to one’s will and selected distance. In a later work, Piaget has further said that the child creates an indexical sensory dependency connection between itself and the thing *in praesentia* (Piaget 1970: 717). The child does not yet feel itself in relation to things as an independent subject: it has not yet learnt to use conventional signs to operate with things outside its field of vision. Roman Jakobson agrees with Piaget, claiming that the initial stage of a child’s linguistic development

(which, in the first place, using the means of a natural language also form complicated hierarchical systems beyond the natural language). These languages have also been termed by the Tartu–Moscow school as “secondary modelling systems” or cultural languages. Proceeding from everyday understanding, a natural language is the mother tongue of a person (of a certain people). But a “pure” mother tongue is an abstraction since language used in each specific situation unavoidably ends up in contexts that are subordinate to the rules (codes) of another/other language(s). Secondary languages can be classified in different ways and/or they can be examined from various aspects. It is possible to differentiate between legal, ideological, artistic, etc languages, and naturally to analyze the specific features of communication in these other languages — as is done, for example, by Juri Lotman through his interest in magic and religion.

is of a "deictic nature" (Jakobson 1985b [1969]: 94–95). The topics of magical perception in a child's development, and the according of words with magical power in ontogeny, are also covered by Bronislaw Malinowski (Malinowski 1936: 318–325, see below) and Weston LaBarre (LaBarre 1979: 61); the topic of "egocentric objects" in the early stage of a child's psychic development is discussed, proceeding from Piaget's experiments, by Thure von Uexküll (Uexküll 1986: 127).

However, Jean Piaget formulated a restriction (too hastily, apparently), according to which the features characteristic of the early stages of thought were meant to disappear after the formation of logical thought in the child.

4.3.2. Magic as everyday spontaneous behavioural practice

Bronislaw Malinowski's examination of "spontaneous magic" is fundamentally important in the analysis of the "non-genre" manifestation of magic. Having studied this issue in a traditional Melanesian community, B. Malinowski registers an "astounding similarity" between a magical ritual (spell) and a "spontaneous ritual". He considers the latter as the "true source of magical belief". A spontaneous ritual takes place, in Malinowski's opinion, in a situation where a person's fear or other similar emotional (illusionary) experiences or stress find a behavioural output, which, for this person, has a function in the *ad hoc* resolution of a certain (crisis) situation. (However, the border between spontaneous and magical rituals has not been unambiguously determined by him.) (Malinowski 1998 [1925]: 80–81).

In a work that was completed about ten years after the indicated study, B. Malinowski provides a more detailed theoretical interpretation of this general explanation, connecting the creation of a spontaneous ritual (spontaneous magic) with the specific features of the formation of verbal communication in

hominoids (phylogenetic aspect) and children (ontogenetic aspect).

Malinowski proceeds from the position that there is no point explaining the objectives and causes of verbal speech in traditional societies using logic or philosophical speculations. It would be just as pointless to proceed from the immanent grammatical structure of a language. The fundamental basic form of grammar, and language as a whole, have themselves developed from the "use of language" (Malinowski 1936: 327). The usage situations during the most plastic developmental stages of the language have left particularly noticeable traces in the language. But language is also the instrument for commanding such situations. This produced Malinowski's very general and very expansive determination of magic (that covers both spontaneous and ritualized magic): "The word acts on the thing and the thing releases the word in the human mind. This indeed is nothing more or less than the essence of the theory which underlies the use of verbal magic" (Malinowski 1936: 323, 328). This is a functional interpretation, which proceeds from the role of language (magic) that is interpreted in a socio-psychological way. Words (sounds) that for a hominoid and/or in a child's early life initially express only joy or dissatisfaction, regarding the lack or presence of someone/something, begin to be connected with the result — for a child due to the obligated presence of a carer (carers) — which may be achieved via the carer(s) with the help of sounds/words. "A name has the power over the person or thing which it signifies", words become "active power" that can be used so that persons and things materialize (and they do appear!), and to produce changes in the surrounding environment (and they do occur!) (Malinowski 1936: 320–321). This discussion also claims to clarify the logic of the evolutionary formation of magic rituals, on the basis of spontaneous magic, as understood by Bronislaw Malinowski.

The observations made on the Trobriand Islands encouraged Malinowski to state that the child, having grown to adulthood, continues to believe in the power of the word. (Malinowski 1965

[1935]: 64–65]. The analysis logic of Malinowski permits him to subsequently draw a heuristically important conclusion that the forms of linguistic communication that are born in primitive language usage situations, regardless of their surface multiplicity, are one and the same in all human languages (Malinowski 1936: 328).

With his studies, Bronislaw Malinowski takes an important step in the dismantling of the genristic limitation of magic. He accords magic an ordinary, “everyday” status, deriving magic from the universal characteristics of social communication that arise *ad hoc* and from the language that “forms” them.

4.3.3. Connecting magic with the characteristics of natural language

4.3.3.1. Defining magical function using terms from the act of linguistic communication.

Roman Jakobson finds a correlation, to the psycho-semiotic interpretation of magic in the works of Jean Piaget, in the form of the magical function of language. Magical function is defined, in addition to the six functions of language (expressive (emotive), conative (appellative), cognitive (referential), phatic, meta-linguistic and poetic functions), as the systematic element of language⁷ (see Figure 3).

According to Roman Jakobson, the magical function of language is changing the “missing or inanimate ‘third person’ to the addressee of the conative (appellative) message” (Jakobson 1968 [1960]: 355–357) This latter standpoint could be illustrated, for example, by the formula: “Pain to the crow [= to it], illness to the magpie [= to it], and you [or: X] will get well!”⁸

⁷ Jakobson does not mention the issue of the pragmatic criteria for the presence of the magic function in speech.

⁸ To be precise, it should be added that in the summarized list of communicative functions, Jakobson indeed no longer mentions the magic function (the author is




Figure 3. Functions of linguistic events (F) and their orientation.

Jakobson's schema proceeds from the tradition constructed with structuralism, where the relationships between the elements, and the system to which the elements belong, are considered to be more important than the language elements themselves (Jakobson 1996a [1974]: 181). In his description of inter-element relationships, however, it can be observed how R. Jakobson exits from the system of the formal characteristics of natural language and enters the field of phenomenological analysis. For example, in the case of conative function, there is emphasis on the fundamental insubordination of transmitted imperative sentences to true/false control (Jakobson 1968 [1960]: 355). R. Jakobson does not mention the fact, however, that in the assessment of magical effect this criteria is particularly important. In the determination of poetic function, R. Jakobson also uses the external characteristics of the grammar of natural language.⁹

silent as to whether this is because it is a sub-variant, with limited validity, of the conative function, or whether there is some other reason).

⁹ R. Jakobson defines poetic function as a linguistic behaviour act that comprises of "projecting the equivalence principle [with which the elements of language are united into a paradigm — *P. L.*] from the selectional axis to the combinational axis" (Jakobson 1968: 358). In other words, the selectional axis should be understood as a paradigm comprised of equivalent language elements (e.g. adjectives), of which the language user, in a certain position of the (speech) text, at a certain time, can use only one element (e.g. an adjective),

Nevertheless, the communication schema of Roman Jakobson contains important deficiencies (see also Chapter 2).

It should first be noted that not recognizing the magical *effect* in defining the magical speech act is not coincidental as regards this author. Mikhail Lotman has justifiably indicated that R. Jakobson's linguistic communication act is in itself transmitting a completed text: "According to R. Jakobson, the *addresser*, taking into account the *context*, formulates a *message* with the help of *language*, which he transmits via a *contact* to the *addressee*."

Actually, as claimed by M. Lotman, the communication act is an act of translation, in the course of which the

text transforms the language, the addressee [in this context, the object of the magical act — *P. L.*], determines [the character of — *P. L.*] the contact of the addresser and addressee, transforms the addresser himself [---] and ceases to be identical with itself. (Lotman, Mikhail 1994: 595)

Algirdas Greimas and Joseph Courtés also emphasize that R. Jakobson's functions examine "only" the informative aspects of communication (Greimas and Courtés 1982 [1979]: 37).

To continue, the addresser and addressee of the magical communication in Roman Jakobson's schema are not precisely determined. For example, the addressee of Kalev's wise advice "may the winds guide your way / ... may the gentle breezes teach [you] / may the heavenly stars give [you] wisdom" in the Estonian epic is still Kalevipoeg (Kalev's son)¹⁰. The "breezes" and "heavenly stars" — the so-called "missing third person" — are still also addressees (for Kalev), but in the functional sense (for Kalevipoeg), i.e. in the context of magical *effect* they are still

which in a sentence or verse — i.e. on the poetic text combination axis, however, in contrast to an element of a non-poetic text, begins to "behave" as associative with some other language element located in its surroundings (as for example words behave with each other in rhyming or rhythm schemes or in parallel verses); at the same time, the mutual associativity of words (sentences) in a non-poetic text is "zero" or close to zero.

¹⁰ "Tuuled juhtigu sul teeda, / Õhud õrnad õpetagu, / Taevatähed andku tarkust" (Kreutzwald 1961 [1857–1861]: 64).

addressers (= mediators), whose role is to amplify the power contained in the spell by Kalev (= sorcerer). On the semiotic plane, to Kalevipoeg they are indices mediating/expressing/amplifying old Kalev. It should be noted that a spell as a whole, together with "third persons", is indeed easily available as a ready instrument, as a *patrum more* (cultural memory) formula for the sorcerer (= in Kalev's memory), and Kalev (actually Kalev's spirit) is its commander, embodier and forwarder (in the eyes of Kalevipoeg!).

It is also not possible to agree with Roman Jakobson's opinion that in the role of an addressee being presented in the "third person" there can only be "missing" or "inanimate" actants. For example, in the formula "May God have mercy upon you", it is not essentially correct to treat God as "missing" or "inanimate". In the formula "Curse you!" the addressee can, as a rule, be actually within the communication field.

Jakobson has also left unaddressed (except in the case of expressive function) the phenomenon of autocommunication, whereby the addressor is changed into the addressee as well, together with all the resultant functional peculiarities.

An intriguing question that unavoidably arises in the case of Jakobson's language functions pertains to the common foundation of the functions under observation. In the message, the contact-creating or meta-linguistic function has a clear lexical expression. But the expressive function of a message may not have a direct analogy that can be grammatically or lexically determined, and the emotional load becomes clear indirectly, via analysis on the basis of the context. Of the two verbally and grammatically analogous formulae, one lacks a magical function merely because in the cultural memory (*patrum more*) there are no traces of this formula being used in such a function. And this is not a linguistic or even a communicative fact, but a cultural fact that does not fit the system of linguistic concepts. Although Jakobson's famous (and very valuable) definition of poetic function (that has been cited above) does open up the basic intertextual mechanism for the creation of metaphoricality (=

semantic ambivalence), it is still too narrow because it does not cover the referentive (cognitive and contextual) and emotive aspects of the message that connect the actants. These aspects do not need to be connected to intratextual associativism and combinationality, but they nevertheless may enrich the semantic ambivalence (metaphoricality) of the message.

This leads us to a new question (which Roman Jakobson has also left unanswered): do magical and poetic functions exhaust the repertoire of communicative functions that are definable on the basis of the formal characteristics of language?

Despite all this criticism, it is necessary to emphasize that the idea by Roman Jakobson to treat magic as a linguistic behavioural act, and to associate poetic function with the transfer of the paradigmatic characteristics of natural language to the syntactic axis of language, has a high scientific value.

4.3.3.2. Magicality of verbal representation.

Whereas to Roman Jakobson magical function was one of the many functions of language, the Japanese writer Toshihiko Izutsu published a concept some years before Jakobson (Jakobson apparently had not read this), where a magical origin was accorded to language as a whole:

all speech may, in a certain sense, be regarded as a magical act, though, of course, this magical nature is embodied in actual uses of speech in many degrees of intensity, varying from genuine verbal magic through many grades of half-conscious, half-unconscious [---] in every bit of speech [---] and almost in every one of the words we use. (Izutsu 1956: 48)

In contrast to Jakobson, for whom language was above all a communicational system, Izutsu claims (following on from Susan Langer and Ernst Cassirer) that the most important and original function of human language is actually representation. Magic is said to have its beginnings in the deep, inalienable and dynamic quality of language, and also of the human mind, of presenting/replacing reality by using symbols (Izutsu 1956: 105–

107). Magic is said to have seeped into every phase of linguistic behaviour even before the professional sorcerer began to implement these behavioural forms in magical acts (Izutsu 1956: 49, 103).

In verbal magic, Izutsu differentiates three levels: (1) the fundamental magic of meaning, (2) the practice of magic, (3) spontaneous magic (Izutsu 1956: 49).

The fundamental magic of meaning is said to be concealed in the semantic constitution of words, and is expressed in the very nature of symbols to conjure up something in our minds (Izutsu 1956: 60). This “something” of fundamental magic, or the power to create a “connotative meaning” for symbols can be seen, in turn, as four components in Izutsu’s theoretical schema. The first of these is “referential” (i.e. cognitive or conceptual), and the second is the “intuitive” component. This second is something between the referential and the third component — the so-called “emotional” component. Izutsu writes about the intuitive component as follows:

besides the well-known functions of directly referring to the ‘things meant’ and of arousing feelings and emotions [= third component — *P. L.*], [language] has a certain power of making the ‘things meant’ real and alive once again at the level of linguistic expression. (Izutsu 1956: 64, 76)

The fourth component with connotative meaning is the structural component. This operates as patterns of speech and patterns of thought, and connects non-language elements of reality, thereby determining “traditional habits of thought” (Izutsu 1956: 90). The multiplicity of planes in magical connotations inevitably leads Izutsu to the conviction that, for example, in modern times, “the language of law and the language of ethics cannot satisfactorily be explained if we leave out of account the magical contexts out of which they arose, and with which they remain most closely connected” (Izutsu 1956: 38).

Considering the particular interest by Toshihiko Izutsu in the proto- and supra-linguistic manifestations of magic, “the practice

of magic", as "standardized magic", in other words — the traditional repertoire of magic (as it is expressed, for example, in the chrestomatic acts and formulae noted at the beginning of the monograph) remains emphatically secondary for this author (Izutsu 1956: 108).

Izutsu considers the *locus classicus* of his concept to be the third level of verbal magic — that he, following Bronislaw Malinowski, calls "spontaneous magic". In his opinion, the kernel of spontaneous magic is the so-called "mental evocation" — the most fundamental act of verbal magic,

which may modify even the most colourless words and particles in a very peculiar way and transform them in a moment into something charged with mysterious power. [---] It seems [---] true that all words [---] are capable as symbols of 'evoking' in the mental system of the hearer the picture, the image, the concept (simple or complex), the emotion, the reasoning, or whatever else it may be, which is occupying the mind of the speaker. (Izutsu 1956: 49–50, 60, 124)

Izutsu also uses another term — "structural evocation" as a synonym for the former. Spontaneous reactions are considered by T. Izutsu to be the key to open the hidden mechanism of our linguistic behaviour in general.

Toshihiko Izutsu emphasizes that he has borrowed the idea of spontaneous magic from Bronislaw Malinowski (Izutsu 1956: 109). (He does not, however, comment further in his monograph on Malinowski's relevant standpoints). The standpoints of Izutsu, which on the philosophical plane depict a symbiosis of neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, are still completely different from the views of Malinowski. For Izutsu, metaphysics is entirely concealed in the "structured" "pure schemata" of natural language and thinking, which hold a substantive and "tremendous power" as regards the behavioural and semantic reactions of people (Izutsu 1956: 90). In the empirical functionalism of Malinowski, spontaneous magic is presented as a psycho-physical reaction provoked by the environment, which

ensures the stability of the relationship between the individual and the environment.

Nevertheless, there are also clear common features between the concepts of Izutsu and Malinowski. In both, the everydayness, universality and durability of magic are postulated, which for T. Izutsu are guaranteed by the immanent semantic structure of language, and for Malinowski by the universal social functions of language usage, which even the “omnipotent purification of the scientific use of language” has not managed to destroy (Malinowski 1936: 328).

4.3.3.3. Magicality of the substance of language.

The notions of Toshihiko Izutsu, whereby magic is understood as the substantive manifestation of language and mind, have found certain parallels in Jaan Undusk’s theoretic schema of language substance (Undusk 1994b).

Language substance, according to this analysis, is the “fading”, “falling silent” of the spoken voice in language itself (*resp.* “voiced, worded silence”) or, from another aspect, the negation of the sign system in language itself: for example, “the person praying from his heart is not reciting the prayer to himself, but is receiving it. Thus does falling silent occur — with the words still continuing”. By equivalencing language substance with the concept of silence in language, Undusk claims that substance is concealed “at the base of every language element” (Undusk 1994b, 3: 473–475, 480).

Magic is said to be the expression of language substance: “It is as if the whole world of a person’s perceptions, senses and mental pictures is weighed down by magical pressure.” The word (= magical word), in the opinion of J. Undusk, is a connecting bridge between linguistic and non-linguistic existence — a magical word has “both a linguistic (one end of the bridge) as well as a [conditionally] non-linguistic aspect (the other end of the bridge)”. Conditionally, because this other end as well — and

that is the substance — “is inevitably worded” (Undusk 1994b, 4: 693–694).

As previously said, there are common elements in the analysis of magic by T. Izutsu and J. Undusk, and it is important, from the viewpoint of the semiotic treatment of magic, to examine these critically.¹¹ Both authors:

- treat as magical (potentially) all language as a whole, which is questionable from the viewpoint of both magic and language;
- classify magic, as regarding its substance, as belonging to the representational, non-communicative phenomena; the manifestation of magic in a communicative act (in dialogue) is, in their opinion, of secondary importance;
- proceeding from the above, they also consider the pragmatic, practical side of magic to be secondary.

For Izutsu, the magical act in language is concealed in the substance of language itself (resp. in the internal power) and he does not generally analyze this via communication or autocommunication, or even via the causal concepts connected to these (Izutsu 1956: 48–50, 60, 124). Jaan Undusk does claim in passing that “the words ‘effect’ and ‘to affect’, in their more general functions, cannot be completely [*? P. L.*] ignored when talking about magic” (Undusk 1994b, 4: 704). Nevertheless, T. Izutsu and J. Undusk deviate conceptually from the analysis tradition in the treatment of magic that was practised by James George Frazer, Bronislaw Malinowski, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah and many other scholars, for whom natural language is a communicative instrument for pragmatically interpreted magical acts.¹² In negating the

¹¹ A more detailed analysis of the differences in the notions of T. Izutsu and J. Undusk falls outside the framework of this analysis. For more information on the semiotic analysis of the magical act, see Chapter 2.

¹² Using the terms of John Langshaw Austin’s speech acts, magic can be described as a perlocutive speech act — a verbal act that has an objective with

“rationalistic causality” of magic in favour of magical “identification” (Undusk 1994b, 4: 704), J. Undusk has also ignored the teleological interpretation of causality that in accordance with the analysis by Austin. Boris Uspenski has worded it thus:

It is true that causal relationships in cosmological consciousness do not connect the present and the future: they primarily connect a certain original state (the past, which is the point of departure) simultaneously with both the present and the future. Therefore, it is indicated that the present is connected with the future, not directly but through a mediary — via this original integral, all-encompassing state.

According to such a notion, constantly occurring present events do not give rise to the future; but they can be perceived as omens of the future. Indeed, both that which takes place in the present, as well as that which happens in the future, manifest themselves as a reflection, or symbolic image, of one and the same original state — as a sign of the original state. (Uspenski 1989: 20)

To continue, both authors:

- are not interested in analyzing the mutual typological relationship between the magical and mythological speech act in language. In the light of how tightly magic and mythology are interwoven (both have their own texts in culture that have distinct structural characteristics, but with mutually diffused boundaries¹³), such an approach is analytically incomplete;
- interpret magic via characteristics that the Tartu–Moscow School of Semiotics scholars, amongst others, have considered — and in the opinion of this author, justifiably — to be either characteristics of mythological semiosis (this refers to J. Undusk’s approach) or characteristics that can be applied also to other

certain consequences in view, but at the same time also a linguistic form that anticipates them. (cf Austin 1962: 101–107, 117–118).

¹³ For more detail, also see Chapters 2 and 5.

manifestations of semiosis (this can be seen in T. Izutsu's schemata). Indeed, the capability concealed in the semantic construction of symbols "of conjuring up something in our minds" (Izutsu 1956: 60) can be both magical and mythological, but not only! As regards the specifics of the mythological sign creation process, Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski have described this using intellectual operations. According to these operations, as already said previously, objects in the mythological context are treated: firstly, as being on the same level (they are not placed in a hierarchy, in the logical sense (incl. according to the extent of the concept)); secondly, as not being divided according to characteristics (the objects are wholes) and thirdly, as single objects (a large number of the objects would presume meta-description, which would operate with characteristics and would therefore be hierarchical). Lotman and Uspenski illustrate the mythological object (sign) with the phenomenon of the proper noun. All Marys (as names) are single, single-characteristic and single-level phenomena, identified with their bearer. If we claim that Mr X is a person, we include him in the class of living beings bearing certain characteristics; but if we say that he is Person, then Person functions as a proper noun and is identified with X to be a *unique integral whole* (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 282–285).

Without commenting on these standpoints, Jaan Undusk has presented an analysis where mythological identification is called a "magical oneness bridge". According to this, the identification of the word with the object, according to Undusk, is the "magical fading" of the word in the object (for example, in the case of a proper noun and the person or object bearing it). He proceeds from the fact that "in a magical act, one thing becomes identical with another, and acts identically with it" (Undusk 1994b, 4: 701). Identification, however,

proceeds from substantiality as the “common part of all things” (Undusk 1994b, 3: 467)¹⁴;

- the question is not posed as to whether and under what conditions the “connection” between linguistic and non-linguistic being (substance) (J. Undusk), or the connotative meaning of symbols or “mental evocation” (T. Izutsu), may be non-magic, i.e. possess some other linguistic or semiotic quality. The lack of an answer to this question annuls in principle the possibility of differentiating the *culture-typological* specifics of magic (*resp.* mythology) in the two texts under observation. Something on its own has no meaning in the semiotic sense.

4.3.4. Cultural-semiotic interpretation of magic: Juri Lotman’s points of departure

4.3.4.1. Structure-typological viewpoint.

Juri Lotman, too, has interpreted magic using characteristics, which can in no way be placed within the framework of the ethnographic or narrowly scientific treatment of magic. In the lecture cycle titled “Semiotics of the Personality and Society” that was carried out in 1967 at Tartu University, he sketches a scheme of communicative relationships, which on the one hand is fragmentary, unexpected and even questionable, but on the other hand is fundamentally novel. This scheme also turns out to be the point of departure for the later analysis of numerous semiotic problems; here can also be found “beginnings” that were never further developed (see Appendix, Lecture IV).

In the “Lectures”, J. Lotman describes magic as a communicative function, which has a structural, organic status of a personality in social relationships as a whole. The magical

¹⁴ It should be added that, as regards the depiction of mythology as magic, there are others who think as does J. Undusk (e.g. see Heusden 1997: 123).

function, according to his scheme, is one of the components amongst many other social functions.

The social relationships presented by J. Lotman have been depicted in the lecture in the form of the following scheme (the style of the note-taker has been preserved, but the scheme has been extended with the elements in the square brackets that could be added since they are explicitly mentioned in the non-scheme part of the text, or are contained implicitly; the fifth communicative function "Play and art" does not exist in the scheme in the notes; this is added in the later part of the lecture):

[Function and texts of the
speaker]

I Practice

I do [something]

[No signification,
consequently no text]

III Science

I seek the truth (Procedure!)

[Function and texts of the
listener]

II Magic

Something is done to me

IV Religion, belief¹⁵

I am given the truth

[**V Play and art.** Two behaviours = two signified meanings, and also the functions of *speaker* and *listener*, simultaneously.]

The fact that here J. Lotman analyzes text and function (which is an element of the code) on the one row, so to speak, is not surprising. In a joint article, published some years after the "Lectures", J. Lotman and B. Uspenski clarify that "in certain cases the one and the same cultural elements may circulate [---]

¹⁵ Here attention should be paid to the circumstance that it would perhaps have been more precise to call this "religious" sign type and its relevant function something else, for example, a submissive function (*submissus* (Lt) — submissive, subservient, mild), but the author abandoned this due to the desire to preserve the terminology used by Juri Lotman.

as both text and rules” (as a language), and they bring taboo as an example — which in one situation is a text reflecting the moral experience of a collective, but in another, a functional collection of magical rules that are used to dictate a certain way of behaving (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 153).

All social functions are described in J. Lotman’s scheme on the level of text (speech) as the mutual positioning between *speaker* and *listener* or *listener* and *speaker* — and are registered from the *me*-position.¹⁶ In addition to the magical function, the religious and scientific (epistemological) communicative functions also belong to this integral system, and the fourth one, the non-signified practice of *me*, which contrasts, as a non-signified positioning, with signified activity-acts. It is, however, astonishing that in Lotman’s scheme there is no analysis of the mythological function (and text), in addition to the magical function. This is strange, in particular because already in 1964 Lotman had started to use the concept of the aesthetics of sameness (Lotman 1994 [1964]: 223–226), which in substance rests upon these formal criteria that are formulated in the 1973 article (together with B. Uspenski) in the analysis of mythological semiosis (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 282–288). Compared to the refined analysis in 1973, J. Lotman describes in 1964 the mythological nature of the aesthetics of sameness merely in passing (describing extra-textual connections in artistic creation), and indirectly — he does not even use the concept ‘mythological’ (although the phenomena that J. Lotman characterizes belong to the medieval mythological cultural space). Nevertheless, as can easily be concluded, the features that are used by Lotman to determine the aesthetics of sameness coincide in substance with just those features of mythological

¹⁶ The term ‘positioning’ is used here to actualize the formal semiotic features of signification, as formulated by A. Pyatigorski. As is known, Pyatigorski considers signification to be a ‘characteristic’ of a thing acting as a sign, which is expressed as “being dual”, “having a position” (spatial determination) and “being able to be projected” (from the past/present) to the future (Pyatigorski 1973: 187–189).

semiosis that Lotman, together with Boris Uspenski, began to analyze thoroughly six years later.¹⁷

Juri Lotman treats function as a social role of text, which serves certain specific needs of the collective that has created the text. Using such an approach it is possible to describe culture as a collection of certain functions. Function here is a "pure construct", in the sense of which a given text may be interpreted, or "in relation to which some features of a text can be examined as features of the function".¹⁸ In addition, as Lotman indicates in the "Lectures", the connection between function, and the text that is serving it, is a weak one, in the context that a scientific text, for example, may acquire a religious function, and a religious text may in turn begin to circulate as a scientific text, etc.¹⁹ Nevertheless, as J. Lotman emphasizes in the "Lectures", the social functions of texts in culture may be independent and

¹⁷ Juri Lotman indicates that, for art that is subordinated to the aesthetics of sameness, identification with certain stereotypes of consciousness is characteristic, whereas these stereotypes are treated as "essences"; the versions that is identified with these essences only exists to the extent that they are identical to the stereotype — to be "one and the same", one. For example, it could be claimed that the representations of the Virgin Mary, John the Baptist, and other figures in the Bible, are not the creation of the artist but of God Himself, and that later images, as copies, could be treated as repeat appearances of godly creation. (The medieval artist, before he could start painting a holy picture, had to even undergo a ritual cleansing act.) Therefore, all the Marys, just as all the Johns, are in both cases identifiable as *One*. They are, as regards the original image, *of the same level, integral wholes* (their characteristics are not sovereign as regards the whole — the concept of originality was in principle condemnable — and a part is perceived as something that is the same as the whole). All copies can only be differentiated from the original stereotype as regards the modality of the stage of sameness. (These characteristics (although not using the term 'aesthetics of sameness') have been analyzed by Juri Lotman in Part II of his Lecture II (see Appendix), and also in numerous later writings, of which the closest to the "Lectures" is Lotman 1970e: 17, 18, 21–22).

¹⁸ Function is defined in this way in the joint article published a year after the lectures (Lotman and Pyatigorski 1968: 75).

¹⁹ The circulation of scientific truths as having a religious function had already been previously described by Marcel Mauss (Mauss 2000 [1904]: 180).

constant — compared to the variety and short life spans of texts. However, as believed by Lotman, a single text, in any one situation, can have only one function at a time.

In addition to his four-fold system, Juri Lotman also derives a fifth type of function, which finds expression through play and artistic texts. The common basis for both (compared to the explicit four-fold system of the scheme) is the two-plane feature (having multiple meanings) of the communicative relationship, which is expressed in a play situation — analogous to art. For example, if a child does not relate to the striped fabric draped across a chair as a tiger (because he recognizes it as his mother's dressing gown) or, vice versa, if he thinks the chair is a tiger and breaks out in tears, then no play communication takes place at all. Play and art presume that the observer (participant) simultaneously considers the occurrence both real — this is the role of the *listener* (the chair is in reality a tiger) and unreal — this is the role of the *speaker* (the chair is conditionally imitating a tiger). But both these meanings must actualize together. The peculiarity of this two-meaning relationship “reveals itself in metaphor”;²⁰ “but this [peculiarity — *P. L.*] has a much more general character,” explains J. Lotman in an article published in the same year as the “Lectures” took place (Lotman 1967c: 133–134, 139–140).²¹

²⁰ J. Lotman also says in the “Lectures” that allegorical circumlocution does not carry two meanings — “it means only one thing for all readers” (Appendix, Lecture IV). This apparently should be understood to mean that no reader, for example, would perceive the bear in Krylov's fable, who uses a rock to attack the fly sitting on his master's brow, as being a wild animal, but merely as a criminally stupid person — and only as such.

²¹ Juri Lotman is probably thinking of those manifestations of metaphorism that extend beyond art (in its narrow meaning). In addition to the standpoint of Lotman that a text can have only one function at a time in any specific situation, it should be said that it is in particular an artistic text that can turn out to be an exception, since it is already polyfunctional by its nature. It is said that Lope de Vega fainted during a mass in church whilst listening to the organ music, at the very point that depicted the crucifixion of Christ. Lotman claims in the “Lectures” that this is a case where the artistic function of the text is substituted by another — by the religious function. But in the opinion of this author this is

The epistemological togetherness of magic with science and religion in the scheme in the “Lectures” is not actually original, because already Edward Tylor, closely followed by James George Frazer, had believed that the world could be explained with the help of magical, religious and scientific “ways of thinking”.²² In addition, it seems that the understandings of Juri Lotman regarding the communicative structure have been directly influenced by Aleksei Lossev, who in his well-known tract “The Philosophy of the Name” describes the relationship of the subject with the “thing in the mind” (*вещью в разуме*) as an “energetic” relationship, and claims that every meaning of a thing has an energy that is inseparable from it, and that the subject of the relationship, “having been energetically loaded” (*будучи энергично-оформлен*), “begins independently to use this energy itself, in realizing (*воплощая*) it actively in itself and in other things”. This also means that the subject of the relationship (according to Lotman’s scheme, he is then the *listener* in relation to the “thing in the mind”) knows the name of the object of the relationship (this should then be a spell, for example) and “the nature of this name is magical (Lossev 1993a [1927]: 763).²³

only one of the possible interpretations; according to another interpretation — and this is permitted by the polyfunctional postulate of art — an artistic text may metaphorically carry, simultaneously with an artistic function, some other function as well — in this case, a religious function.

²² For more detail on the critical analysis of Edward Tylor’s and James George Frazer’s positions, see (Gross 1997: 2519, 2522). Tylor and Frazer base their arguments on the positivistic criteria of truth for magic and religion. Juri Lotman departs from their field of influence, claiming in the conceptualistic spirit that faith is also truth, “but it is presumed that someone [has] it, who is to provide it” (Appendix, Lecture IV).

²³ It should be added that Aleksei Lossev — in his work from the 20s that did not get beyond manuscript form, and which Juri Lotman was not able to use in printed form — already treated the name as both a magical and a mythological phenomenon, and the same also has been essentially done by Lotman (together with Boris Uspenski), independently (?) from A. Lossev. For example, Lotman has described somewhere the burning down of Zimoveiski stanitsa, and its complete “relocation” from one bank of the Don to the other, and its subsequent

The five-fold functional integral system of Juri Lotman nevertheless raises a legitimate and fundamental question, and this is: on the basis of which epistemological, cultural, structural and sign-creating criteria do these five (three) (textual) functions in particular form a typological whole that exhausts the *speaker* ~ *listener* ways of relating (*resp.* ways of interpreting the world) (and do they actually form it)?; what is the common basis for these functions?

In addition to the above, one, completely unexpected, feature of the structure in Juri Lotman's scheme should be emphasized: the *me* (= subject) of the magical relationship is given the role of *listener*. According to Lotman, the *listener* in a magical act is not "in principle [---] capable of actually influencing anything", he "just receives", whereby he "does not know the grounds on which it is given". It seems, however, that the *listener* is also carrying out some speaking-related cautious acts as regards the speaker: the *listener* (as the "dependent" party) "creates a connection between himself and this situation [= speaker — *P. L.*] with some kind of an act in order to deserve the arrival of this unexplained gift" and to "demonstrate his trust regarding this unknown force" (Appendix, Lecture IV). As a result of the changing (exchanging) of the *speaker*–*listener* roles, the content of the concepts of the sorcerer and of the recipient (object) of the magical act in Lotman's scheme becomes less clear. Actually, the magical act acquires a dialogical expression. This (here it is still secondary) line is developed by Lotman in his contractual interpretation of magic, which has already been discussed in Chapter 1 (see also Lotman 1993a [1981]: 345). In this, the functions of *speaker* and *listener* are even equivalenced, since the magical relationship is a "mutual", "contractual" relationship, where the parties are "equivalent" (Lotman 1993a: 345).

renaming — this is indeed a thoroughly magical manipulation! Thus, Catherine II, in destroying the birthplace of Pugachov, had attempted to also *destroy* Pugachov's name. (cf A. Lossev 1993 [manuscript from the 1920s]: 877–880).

Addressing the *listener* as the subject of magic differentiates the magic-concept of Lotman not only from E. Tylor, J. Frazer and B. Malinowski, but also from the results of the research of M. Mauss, E. Tambiah, and many other distinguished scholars.²⁴

Juri Lotman holds the surprising opinion that the subject of a magical relationship coincides functionally with the subject of a religious relationship (both are *listeners!*), and the magical *listener* is contrasted with the *speaker* of a scientific (epistemological) relationship — all this cannot help but remind one of Oswald Spengler's interpretation of religion and magic. In the words of Spengler, the cornerstone of "all the religions of magical culture" (i.e. world religions) — therefore the source of Europeans' world view — is the central thesis of the teachings of St Augustus about the spirit and flesh of men, the frailty of all earthly things before God. In the opinion of Spengler, German-Catholic spirituality differs sharply from "magical cultural" spirituality; and primarily because this contrasts the submission strivings of an individual with the attitude to life of the Faustian individual, which is self-knowing and guided by individual will. (According to Juri Lotman's terminology, the Faustian person is a *speaker*.) For the eager-to-submit magic-person, magic-kind and magical religiosity, the "will" and "purpose" of a person, in the interpretation of Spengler, is merely the "action of Godness" that flows into a person (Spengler 1991 [1922]: 39–40).

As the reader can confirm, based on the numerous examples described above, the character of an authentic magical repertoire does not generally support the classification of the subject of a magical act as the *listener*. The exceptions to this rule are only those cases where the magical act is a contract (= *me for you, you for me* relationship) — but such cases do not predominate²⁵, or if the magical act is autocommunicative (for example, magical formulae and acts used for (re)attuning oneself), or where the

²⁴ Mauss 2000: 114, 116–118; Tambiah 1999: 69.

²⁵ This is also illustrated by the examples.

formula is elliptic — for example, in a relationship with astrological calendars, where the procedure generally is reduced to the mediation/finding of information (in various ways) on the transfer of power concealed in the mutual relationship between objects in the micro- and macro-cosmos — on conditions determined by calendars.²⁶ This is essentially an identification process guided by a hidden power. The situation here can certainly be described by: object of the act = recipient = *listener*, to whom — as Lotman says — “is given”, be it as a newspaper snippet or reported by a radio announcer.²⁷ Incidentally, it is also disputable whether the circumstance described by Lotman in the “Lectures”, where the taxi driver who is running late and tries to increase his speed by pressing hard with his feet against the body of the vehicle, can be considered, from the viewpoint of a magical procedure, to be a *listener* text (Appendix, Lecture IV).

At the same time, one must completely agree with the standpoint of J. Lotman (and also with O. Spengler) in that, typologically, the subject of religious communication is indeed in a submissive role, and is a devoted *listener*.²⁸

As regards the method, Oswald Spengler and Juri Lotman both treat the magical and religious submission-relationship of the *listener* with the *speaker* in different ways — the former in a historical-philosophical (and diachronic) manner, and the latter in

²⁶ Such an indexical semiosis is categorized by Roman Jakobson into the class of “involuntary indices” (*непреднамеренные индексы*): the source of this information cannot be considered to be the addresser of the transmitted message (Jakobson 1985d [1970]: 325).

²⁷ In principle, the addressees of magic (magical act or formula) could be *me* (in the case of an autocommunicative relationship), *you* (for example, “Damn you!”) or *him +you*, e.g. “Pain to the crow, to the magpie [---] — our child will (~you will) get better!” Whereas the role of *him*, delegated by the sorcerer, can be played by a *third* (person) who commands/amplifies/mediates the power, e.g. “May God grant you~him~me health!” The third person (God) here is simultaneously in the role of the *listener* as well as the *speaker*. (And is not *only* the addressee, as would R. Jakobson have believed!)

²⁸ That to which the listener submits in the framework of a religious relationship is a separate — and very important — semiotic topic, which is outside the framework of this chapter.

a semiotic (and structural-typological) manner. It is important to state that the *listener* and/or *speaker* of Lotman cannot be derived from the ethnic or cultural-historic context (as with Spengler), but they also cannot be seen inductively as development-psychological or social empirics (as with Jean Piaget and Bronislaw Malinowski). They are also not reduced to representations of natural language, as with Toshihiko Izutsu and Jaan Undusk. J. Lotman has called the *listener-speaker* or *speaker-listener* relationships social (i.e. cultural) functions, and has treated them in his scheme, as a whole, in the spirit of the structuralism proceeding from Ferdinand de Saussure, of semiotics and the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.

It is indeed from this synthesis in particular that the heuristic value of Lotman's scheme, including magic, springs forth.

4.3.4.2. Phenomenological viewpoint.

4.3.4.2.1. Phenomenological correlates of Edmund Husserl.

Roman Jakobson has productively synthesized the structuralistic method of Ferdinand de Saussure and the phenomenology that proceeds from Edmund Husserl; the results of this synthesis are also reflected in the work of the Tartu–Moscow semiotics school.²⁹ The task of this examination is indeed to indicate the importance of phenomenological influences in the foundations of the scientific ways of thinking of Juri Lotman, and also in the

²⁹ Whether the influence of phenomenology on the school proceeds directly from Husserl, or from Husserl via the interpretations of Jakobson, or from both authors in turn, the analysis of this question is outside the framework of this monograph. The influences of Edmund Husserl, as the founder of transcendental-phenomenological epistemology, on R. Jakobson, has been thoroughly studied by Elmar Holenstein (see Holenstein 1976a [1974]: 2–5, 47–51; 1975 (in particular!); 1977). The school must also be aware of another mediator of phenomenology — Gustav Shpet, whose Russian-language interpretation “Phenomenon and Thought”, which was remarkably competent as regards Husserl, was published already in 1914 (Shpet 1996).

interpretation of magical communication in the scheme of the "Lectures".

As an introduction, Ernst Cassirer should be quoted, since in giving a general assessment of Husserl's phenomenological method, he has accented some of his basic ideas, which are also important in the context of this examination. Cassirer writes:

It is one of the fundamental achievements of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology to have sharpened once again our perception of the diversity of cultural 'structural forms' and pointed out a new approach to them, departing from the psychological method. [...] Husserl's own development makes it increasingly clear that the task of phenomenology, as Husserl sees it, is not exhausted in the analysis of cognition but calls for an investigation of the structures of *entirely different objective spheres*, according to what they 'signify' and without concern for the 'reality' of their objects. [...] Such an investigation should include the mythical 'world', not in order to derive its specific actuality by induction from the manifold of ethnological and ethnic-psychological experience, but in order to comprehend it in a purely ideational analysis. (Cassirer 1966 [1925]: 12; emphasis — *P. L.*)

For Husserl, the study of "different objective spheres" is not possible outside of the *ego* through which they are manifested.³⁰ For Husserl, "departing from the psychological method" therefore presumes phenomenological reduction, or *epoche*, which should be interpreted as the avoidance of the natural and inductive interpretation of experience to the benefit of the immediate beholding of things³¹.

³⁰ "Besides the world, which has acquired in me, and through me, a purpose and force of validity, in no other world is it possible for me to live and think, no other world can I experience, value or make my own" (Husserl 1987: 22).

³¹ "*epochē* [Gr. 'avoidance' — *P. L.*] is a radical and universal method whereby I understand myself as purely *me* together with the pure life of my consciousness, in which and thanks to which the whole objective world is for me, and in a way that is particularly for me." (Husserl 1987: 22). The "pure life" of consciousness presumes that the pure *ego* does not pose questions to itself regarding the existence or non-existence of things in the ontological sense.

However, the object of consciousness, remaining identical with itself throughout the flow of the experience, does not enter the consciousness from the outside, but is concealed in the subjective process as an intentional [directed to something or someone — *P. L.*] effect produced by the synthesis of consciousness. (Husserl 1987 [1931]: 44)

As with intentionality for Husserl, the phenomenon of communication (dialogicality) also becomes a central problem for the Tartu–Moscow semiotics school.

Naturally the systematic nature and clear boundaries of the “subject of consciousness” is not innovative as regards language-theoretical structuralism. What is indeed new is the Husserlian concentration on the observation of reduced subjectivity, placing emphasis on the fact that the “object [---] exists only as a correlative to consciousness [---] [and that — *P. L.*] an object is only brought to a philosophically adequate degree of evidence when not only its context — the system in which it is embedded, but also the subject in which both are constituted, is included in the elucidation”. Holenstein has emphasized that Husserl contrasts with the scholars of *gestalt* (who, by excluding the subject, restrict themselves to the analysis of image-background-dualism), and that his method is also not in concordance with those structuralists who do not move outside the framework of the phoneme–morpheme–context of oppositions (Holenstein 1975: 71).

It should be added that in concentrating on the subject, Husserl was not just keeping in mind the individual subject but also the collective subject (see Husserl 1987: 87). For the Prague structuralism school (and through this, for the Tartu–Moscow semiotics school), the inclusion of the collective subject was also not novel. Pyotr Bogatyryov and Roman Jakobson pointed out already in the 1920s that folklore can be compared to the mother tongue, where the system is automatically learned, and which, as

a phenomenon of social memory, acts as a strict collective “censor” (Bogatyryov and Jakobson 1971 [1929]: 374–375).³²

The “intentional work” of consciousness is seen by Husserl as two spheres. The first of these he calls *phenomenological reduction*. Through this a “world view” (*Weltvorstellung*) is formed, which means that the phenomenal objects of the “existing” world are constituted, described and examined categorically, in accordance with its phenomenologically provided structure. In this position, the phenomenologically-meditating *me* (*individual*) is treated as a “non-participating observer [*unbeteiligter Zuschauer*], who contemplates himself and everything that is objective, which has been closed within him, and which is there for him in the manner that it is there for him” (Husserl 1987: 38–39, 69, 148]. This is a noematic world³³. A noema is not a “thing in itself”, but a thing that is thought, towards which intention is directed. A thing that is thought is brought into consciousness either via its “certainty”, “possibility”, or other modes of being (*Seinsmodis*), or as a mode of being of temporal subjectivity (present, past, future) (Husserl 1987: 38).

When this system of epistemological concepts is transferred to the language of the Tartu–Moscow school of semiotics, it could be claimed that the world of text and culture as signified objects is generally equivalent to a phenomenologically reduced object. In accordance with this conclusion, the scheme of Juri Lotman in his “Lectures” can also be treated as the worldview of *me*, which for the “observer” is the spectrum of cultural relationship types. This spectrum has been presented in the scheme as an integral (?) paradigm, which is formed by five communicative syntagma — potential texts (including magical text).

³² In parallel with this we have the discussions by E. Husserl about the “universe of concordance” (*kompossibles Universum*) as the collective world of the “others”, which the *me* can only “discover”, not “create” (*schaffen*) (Husserl 1987: 144).

³³ *noēma* (Gr) — (item of) thought.

But, as already mentioned, Edmund Husserl looks at intentionality on two levels. In addition to phenomenological reduction (the validity of which he does not question), a new aspect is introduced in the later writings of the philosopher. The world as the "natural being" (*natürliches Sein*) of the *other* is preceded by the "being of the pure *ego* in the form of the more original being", which is therefore the point of departure for the intentional work (of the consciousness), and "which are accompanied by its *cogitationes*". These cover the modes of *cogito* (thought) itself — "for example, the ways of perception, remembering, bringing into consciousness (*Bewußtseinsweisen*)", "together with their modal special features". The acts in this sphere are described by Husserl in the terms of consciousness itself — noetically³⁴ (Husserl 1978: 38, 147). The natural sphere of being is secondary as regards its "validity of being" (*Seinsgeltung*), and always presumes a transcendental being in the form of pure *ego*.³⁵ A pure *ego* is the "substratum of habitual peculiarities" (*Substrat von Habitualitäten*) of the *ego*:

If I place myself completely outside this life and avoid the presumption that the world exists in any form whatsoever, if I direct my glance solely at this life as cognition of the world, then I become my own master as a pure *ego*, together with the pure flow of my *cogitatione*. (Husserl 1987: 22–23, 69)³⁶

These intellectual acts were termed *transcendental reduction* by Husserl.

³⁴ *noesis* (Gr) — comprehension, thought.

³⁵ The concept of 'transcendental' content has been taken over by E. Husserl from Immanuel Kant. Kant terms as transcendental "any cognition that does not deal insomuch with objects as with our *way of cognizing objects*, insofar as this must be *a priori* possible" (Kant 1960 [1781]: 83 — emphasis by P. L.). This *a priori* means that the way of cognizing must precede the experience (in order for the cognition of experience to be made at all possible).

³⁶ In the context of this analysis, we are not only interested in those spheres of pure *ego* that are "absolutely unique" (Husserl 1987: 100), but also in those which can be treated as analogues of the *other* in the pure *ego* (see Husserl 1987: 118, 123–131).

The pure intentional flow of such “ways of cognition” is also described by Husserl as a communicative act “constituting” the ‘other’ and “sympathizing” (*Einfühlung*) with the ‘other’ (Husserl 1987: 96–97).

In the system of concepts of the Tartu–Moscow semiotics school, the approximate equivalent of the pure *ego* of Husserl is the intellect, *resp.* mind, as the concept of the “thinking object”. And just as with Husserl’s concept of pure *ego*, Juri Lotman’s concept of the intellect is also inseparable from the communicative nature of the relationship between *me* and the *other*.

The systematic treatment of the intellect, which is for Juri Lotman a central category, is actually accomplished by the Tartu professor ten years after the “Lectures” (Lotman 1977a; 1978) and later in summary form (Lotman 1992a). But the beginnings of the relevant search, as demonstrated here, already reach back to the 1960s. Although Lotman does not use the term ‘intention’, and initially also not the term ‘intellect’, the communicative relationship in the scheme in the “Lectures” has been presented using characteristics which — using Husserl’s terminology — can be treated as “pure” “habitual” “intentions” of the thinking object. Juri Lotman accords three basic features to the intellect as a “thinking object”. These are the capabilities of the intellect:

firstly, to collect and mediate information (the intellect possesses communicative and memory mechanisms). It has language skills and is able to form correct sentences; secondly, to carry out algorithmic operations for the regular transformation of these messages; thirdly, to form new messages. (Lotman 1978: 3)

The thinking modes of the noetical thinking object are explicated in the scheme in the “Lectures” by four types of communicative relationships — algorithmic operations. These are the magical or religious reciprocal placement of the *listener–speaker* (II–IV), and the “scientific” or play (“artistic”) placement of the *speaker–listener* (III–V). These placements are depicted by certain formal characteristics of the relationship, which for Lotman proceed

from the motivational objectives of communication, and characterize the categories of communication — in contrast to Roman Jakobson, who in his communication scheme concentrates on the analysis of the components of communication³⁷. But both authors have in common the claim to treat the features of communication as universally valid. Inspiration for this could also derive from phenomenology.

Edmund Husserl attempted in the study of the pure *ego* to describe the “universal connections of the mental constitution” (*universale Zusammenhängen der seelischen Konstitution*) (Husserl 1987: 147). This meant the analysis of *eidos*³⁸ on the level of the *ego* — the analysis of the universal laws of essence (*universale Wesengesetzlichkeiten*). Husserl wrote that *eidos*

comprises all possibility-variants [*alle reinen Möglichkeitsabwandlungen*] of my actual *ego*, and the *ego* itself as a possibility. Eidetic phenomenology, therefore, studies the universal *a priori*, without which the me and the transcendental Me is not even “imaginable” [*erdenklich*]. (Husserl 1987: 73–74)

These ideas have continuously inspired Juri Lotman. In the second half of the 1960s (at the same time as the “Lectures”), he formulates the tasks for the study of the “common system of the universal characteristics” of the culture of mankind — the “grammar of culture”. Lotman expresses the attempt to analyze the “universal semiotic constants”, which would characterize all cultures (culture as a whole), and further — on a less general level — the various types of culture (Lotman 1966; 1967a: 5–6;

³⁷ It is true that Roman Jakobson also thoroughly characterizes the “poetic” category of communication (and also the magical, but in passing), but he derives both of these from the linguistic form of communication, and sees the problems of motivation as secondary. The differences of this approach are demonstrated by the terminology: instead of *speaker* and *listener*, R. Jakobson uses the terms of *addresser* and *addressee*. The first pair of opposites primarily accentuates speech, and the second — language (using information theory terms).

³⁸ *eidos* (Gr.) — form, appearance. Generality, which is provided through contemplation, and only available through contemplation. (Husserl 1987: 73).

1967b: 31, 34). Lotman differentiates similar constants of “essence” in his aesthetics of sameness (Lotman 1994a [1964]: 223–226)³⁹. In linguistics, Roman Jakobson had already raised and also solved similar exercises, proceeding from the same methodological source (1985a [1938]: 102–104; 1985c [1970]: 390–393, 414; 1985e [1972]: 312–314)⁴⁰. But it should be added that R. Jakobson has also relied substantially on one other source. And these are the semiotic studies of Charles Sanders Peirce, which had been completed already half a century previously and where their most influential interpreter for a long period was indeed R. Jakobson. He refers to the “idea of invariantness that is of key importance” in the semiotics of Peirce:

The rational need to discover an invariant concealed amongst numerous variables, the issue of connecting variables with relevant constants, which would not be influenced by any changes — this idea is the foundation of Peirce’s entire sign theory. (Jakobson 1996b [1977]: 167)

Roman Jakobson (see Holenstein 1976b: 232), but later also Juri Lotman, have to a certain degree “rearranged” Husserl’s accentuations: both semioticians, instead of studying the “absolute” transcendental invariants, concentrate on the description of sign-creation types (semiosis types), of their dynamics and constancy criteria that are revealed in speech reality (Jakobson in language and Lotman in culture; the latter often together with Boris Uspenski). The analysis of single elements is replaced with the analysis of the invariance of the communicative relationship between the elements (see Jakobson 1968 [1960]; Lotman 1994a [1964]: 223–230; 1967c; Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 154–158; 1973; 1975: 173). The definition of magicality, religiousness and other relationships in the

³⁹ See also Footnote 54.

⁴⁰ Elmar Holenstein indicates that Jakobson is one of those linguists for whom the “problem of universals has taken over the central position” (Holenstein 1975: 75).

“Lectures” via the social functions of the *listener* and *speaker* illustrates the importance of such aspirations.

There is another important concept that connects the semiotics of Juri Lotman with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, in which the dual-layered nature of the *me*-contained reduced world is clearly reflected. This is the concept of the monad. The monad has been used by Lotman and Husserl as a phenomenologically reduced worldview (as text), on the one hand, but on the other hand the monad can also be observed as a transcendently reduced mode(s) of thought (as intellect).

The concept of the monad was borrowed by Husserl from the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.⁴¹ The monad for G. W. Leibniz is a simple substance, *entelechy*⁴², which finds expression as *autarky*⁴³ — as an independent targeted force, which is the source of activity within the monad. All changes in this self-centred monad are due to its “internal principle” — external reasons do not manage to influence the monad: it develops without entering into relationships with other monads — it lacks “windows”. The ability for perception is characteristic of every monad, but this is directed at the monad itself.

Monads form hierarchies. A monad that has united with a body creates a compound substance or live substance. The monad is the soul of the latter and it possesses memory. All the monads differ from each other and undergo internal change. Nevertheless, if by God’s will, monads have been “correctly constructed”, they have common characteristics. Every monad is the “living mirror of the world” and copies the structure of the entire universe. Souls act in accord with the laws of final reasons, aims and means that have a universal validity. When the soul

⁴¹ “Monad [*monas*] is a Greek word, which denotes a unit or that which is integral” (Leibniz 1982: 404). The term itself is derived from the vitalistic tract by Lady Conway (1692), with which Leibniz was familiar. Edmund Husserl has himself admitted acquiring the concept of the monad from Leibniz (Husserl 1987: 69).

⁴² *entelecheia* (Gr) — accomplishment.

⁴³ *autarkeia* (Gr) — being satisfied with oneself.

risers to the level of the intellect, then the monad acquires the quality of the spirit. The spirit has the ability of self-cognizance — apperception⁴⁴ (Leibniz 1982a [1718]: 404–406; 1982b [1721]: 414, 416, 422, 424, 427).

Edmund Husserl calls the worldview of the *ego* a monad, in other words that noematic “item of thought” (in J. Lotman’s terminology — the text), which the *ego* beholds — in itself! And, understandably, the worldview thereby covers the “entire real and potential life of the consciousness” — therefore, also the *aims* and *means* of the *ego*, with which, and in the name of which, the (textual) worldview is constructed and/or interpreted, therefore, also pure *ego* — the constructive beginning of memory (Husserl 1987: 69–70).

The act of interpreting the world is also the autocommunicative self-interpreting process of the *ego*. E. Husserl postulates that self-interpretation is

created, firstly as self-interpretation [*Selbstausslegung*] in the direct sense, which demonstrates systematically how the *ego* constitutes itself as possessing a self-essence [*Eigenwesen*], an *ego*, existing in itself and for itself, and, secondly, as self-interpretation in the broader sense, which further demonstrates how the *ego*, due to its own nature, constitutes in itself something “other”, “objective” and consequently generally everything that ever has for him, in the *Ego*, existential status as non-*Ego*. (Husserl 1987: 88)

Lotman starts to explicitly use the ‘monad’ concept himself only in the 1980s. It receives a developed form in the concept of the semiosphere as an interactive world of monads (see Lotman 1984, 1993b; cf the parallels of Husserl 1987: 109–110⁴⁵) Juri Lotman’s concept of monads had probably also been influenced

⁴⁴ *ad* (to) + *perceptio* (perception) — apperception (< Lat). G. W. Leibniz’s term regarding how the spirit perceives its internal states.

⁴⁵ Elsewhere, Edmund Husserl writes: “The first being in itself [*an sich erste Sein*], which forestalls any kind of objectivity in the world, and indeed on which this objectivity stands, is transcendental intersubjectivity, the world of monads that unite into various forms” (Husserl 1987: 160; see also 109–111).

by the works of Pavel Florenski, of which Lotman undoubtedly was aware. It is particularly pertinent to refer to the extensive analysis by Florenski of the magicality of the word, where the concept of "targeted", *resp.* "creative force", is discussed. In connecting magicality with the influence effect of the word, Florenski claims that on the one hand the word is closed with "no exit" (cf Leibniz's window metaphor of the monad!) becoming a "powerless and unreal subjectivity"; but on the other hand, the word is a "signal", a certain "energy". As soon as the word enters a "living speech stream", it "comes to life" and is filled with internal strength and meaning⁴⁶ (Florenski 1999 [1920?]: 231, 233, 239). The claim by Florenski that a work of art is simultaneously both *ergon* (text) as well as *energeia* (language *resp.* creative intellectual force) (cf Lotman, M. 1994: 596) directly reflects the phenomenological ideas of Husserl. Juri Lotman also treated the relationship between "creative force" and "final product" analogously — in the spirit of constant dynamicity (the mutual and hierarchical exchanging of the roles of *ergon* and *energeia*) and dialogicality. When Mikhail Lotman writes that for Juri Lotman "*energeia* is primarily a characteristic of text and not of language" (Lotman, M. 1994: 596), then M. Lotman, it seems to me, surely does not wish to claim with this sentence that language *resp.* code in the semiotics of J. Lotman cannot fulfil the *energeia* function, or fulfils it always in a "secondary" manner.

The concept of 'monad' is already implicitly concealed in the scheme in Juri Lotman's "Lectures". The relationship between magicality and religiosity has been inspired by the "targeted force" that is accorded to the *speaker*, and the opposing placement of *listener* and *speaker* can be reduced to an autocommunicative worldview of *me*. The "construction" of the

⁴⁶ It could be mentioned in passing that, in accordance with structuralism and of course the semiotics of Juri Lotman, Florenski also proceeds from the communicativeness of the word: a word has a "dual [двухсторонняя] direction: firstly, away from the speaker [---] and secondly, from the outside world to the speaker, into him as the perception of the speaker" (Florenski 1999: 230).

worldview or the intellectual algorithm is, in one case 'magicality', and in the other case 'religiosity' — if these concepts are interpreted as semiotic analogues of 'signification' (*знаковость*) in the spirit of Aleksandr Pyatigorski. In both cases the *listener* (= *me*) is the autocommunicative partner of the imagined "unknown force", or God. In either case the *speakers* are "targeted forces" that determine the mutual semiotic placement of the actants — "the thought-generating structures" (*смыслопорождающие структуры*) (cf Lotman 1993b: 369)⁴⁷.

Juri Lotman's discussion about the meaning and extent of autocommunication in culture also seems to have grown directly from the spirit of the monadology of Leibniz and the *epoche* of Husserl. Autocommunication, as he claims, depends on the character of the definition of the actants. If the addresser is a single individual A, then the number of his relationships with another single individual or individuals, the addressee B, is on average greater than the number of the individual's autocommunication $A \leftrightarrow A_1$. Therefore, $A \leftrightarrow B > A \leftrightarrow A_1$. But if, for example, a collective national culture (C) is placed in the role of addresser, then its number of relationships with another national culture (D) or cultures is apparently approximately equal to the number of culture-internal autocommunicative *us*-relationships: $C \leftrightarrow D = C \leftrightarrow C_1$. However, in imagining mankind as a whole E as the addresser, J. Lotman came to an unexpected, but inevitable, conclusion: the role of the *other* (*them*) F that is located outside *us* disappears; all communication (while extraterrestrial civilizations have not been discovered) in this case

⁴⁷ As to whether the religious or magical relationship of the *listener* is autocommunicative is understandably dependent on the signifying character of the semiosis. If the targeted force representing the *speaker* can be perceived through the senses, then this is naturally a "usual" act of communication; if it appear in the imagination of the *listener*, then it can be said that the *listener* is communicating with his memory, so the relationship becomes autocommunication. Therefore, for Juri Lotman the *me* can be both the *speaker* as well as the *listener* — within the boundaries of the same monad, at the same time.

is reduced without exception to autocommunication — $E \leftrightarrow E!$ (Lotman 1970d: 15).

Understandably such autocommunicative relationships in the transcendental *me* and *us* vividly illustrate the deviation from Kantian dualism by Edmund Husserl, also followed by Juri Lotman and Roman Jakobson. Edmund Husserl has worded his “breakthrough” into the transcendental world with memorable expressiveness:

Every conceivable thought, every conceivable being, be it called immanent or transcendental, falls into the sphere of transcendental subjectivity, in which the thought and being are constituted. It is pointless to strive towards a universe of true being [*wahren Seins*] as something that is located outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible understanding [*Erkenntnis*], possible self-evidence [*Evidenz*], and unite these two universes with each other but only externally, via strict laws. Both of them are interconnected as regards their essence [*wesenmäßig*], and that which is interconnected as regards its essence that is also concretely one [*konkret eins*], one in the absolute concreteness (*Konkretion*) of transcendental subjectivity. [---] For this reason the genuine theory of cognition is substantial only as a transcendental-phenomenological theory, which instead of operating with inconsistent inferences about some so-called fundamentally non-cognizable “things in themselves” [*Dinge an sich*], ranging from their apparent immanence to apparent transcendentality, deals solely with the systematic clarification [*Aufklärung*] of the knowledge performance, in which this must become thoroughly comprehensible as an intentional performance. (Husserl 1987: 86–87)

Juri Lotman provided a meaningful title to his relevant article: “Culture as the subject, and as the object of itself” (Lotman 1993b [1989]).

4.3.4.2.2. Universality and uniqueness of the reproductive communication of the intellect (using magicality as an example).

All the characteristics of intellect as known in the works of Juri Lotman are either directly or indirectly communicative. The

relationships between *listener–speaker/speaker–listener* in the scheme in the “Lectures” are also communicative. Autocommunication is one type of communication, and, as was seen in the previous section, it is directly connected to the magical and religious semiotic placement of the *listener–speaker*. Therefore, it is expected that on the one hand we find out which general formal characteristics can be seen as the root of the specifics of magical communication, and, on the other hand, ascertain the formal criteria based on which Lotman differentiates autocommunicative (*me–me*) relationships from inter-subjective communication that are both characteristic of the intellect.

The posed questions presume some introductory restrictions and/or details, and these now follow.

Since Lotman has not analyzed in detail the formal characteristics of magical semiosis in the “Lectures”, all that follows must be seen as a reconstruction. Furthermore, this reconstruction is forward-looking, because the works on which the argumentation can be based have mostly been written after the “Lectures”. It must also be admitted that the area of modes of thought, towards the semiotic analysis of which Lotman has always shown interest, was not developed by him into a complete concept, and also remained theoretically fragmented. In addition to the extensive analyses of the mythological, poetic and antithetic operations of the intellect (Lotman 1967c, 1970d; Lotman and Uspenski 1973, 1971, etc) there were no other monographic analyses of algorithms of the intellect.⁴⁸

Communication acts — which, considering the aforementioned could also be treated as intellectual acts — are divided by Juri Lotman into two basic classes. One class includes those in the process of which new information is created (new texts). Lotman has postulated that every truly new text is born due to

⁴⁸ In the article that was published in the same year as the “Lectures” on the isomorphism of the reduced structures of play and art, there is a description of the ambivalence of practical but also intellectual behaviour as an algorithm with which the simultaneous “flickering together” of at least two meanings is generated (Lotman 1967c: 132–133).

“faulty” communication — a new text can be created in contact with semiotically foreign cultural languages. The text created in such a collision is unpredictable since it is the result of an inadequate translation: the *listener* just does not have the code (rules) for carrying out the translation. Great inventions, however, adds Lotman, have indeed mostly been born according to just this kind of logic. This is why Lotman has called “new” texts (potentially) “purposefully faulty” (1977a: 6–8, 13, 16; 1978: 3–6; 1992a [1990]: 26–27).

Juri Lotman classifies, as the second class of intellectual operations, those communicative acts whose sole or unique function and/or output is reproduction (see 1977a: 4, 10, 14–15, 18; 1978: 3–6; 1992a: 25–26). The addresser and addressee of the text share to a great degree one and the same language in the coding and decoding of the message.⁴⁹ This class of operations logically, and perhaps also historically, belongs to the primary class of operations (just consider, for example, natural language (mother tongue) as an instrument of communication!). (The creation of new information in every communicative situation (and communication on every level) cannot be presumed or even be possible.)

And it is particularly on this second class of operations that the following analysis is concentrated.

Juri Lotman's scheme of (auto)communicative relationships in his “Lectures” is undoubtedly a description of acts of reproductive communication: a religious, magical, artistic or play relationship with the *other* or with oneself is not conceivable without sharing a *common* mode of thought⁵⁰.

⁴⁹ The complete adequacy of information exchange is naturally an illusion. Reproducing and innovative communication are actually in a complex and intertwined mutual relationship. Reproducing does not necessarily mean total and mechanical copying. Reproducing communication can also be a communication that merely mediates a (automated) common code, or a common code which conceals a content that is in conflict with it.

⁵⁰ Let us illustrate this with an example that Juri Lotman himself brings from L. Tolstoy's “Childhood”. The narrator complains that he can't play with his friend because the latter refuses to accept the rules of the game: “I know too

The magical act is a vivid and extreme example of reproductive communication (essentially autocommunication, in Juri Lotman's "Lectures"), since here the linguistic "privacy" of the *listener* and *speaker*, and the inadequate decoding of the message, is excluded. Otherwise, the fatalness of the magical act's "targeted force" would be unimaginable, and there could be no question of magical communication. In general, magic is a motivationally and grammatically imperative (directly or indirectly) act, and as regards time and space, a single and final (beyond truth or untruth) act.⁵¹ This act presumes that the addressee (real or imaginary) is forced in the decoding of the message to use, word for word (*resp.* use automatically) the code offered by the addresser.⁵² Juri Lotman does not actually speak of imperativeness directly, but he too emphasizes the "trust" of the *listener* towards the *speaker*, i.e. putting himself on the same "wave length" as the *speaker* (Lotman 1973b: 229). The imperativeness of magic is directly emphasized by Lotman's close colleague Boris Uspenski and also by Edmund Leach (Leach 1991 [1971]: 30). Uspenski (similarly to Leach) has compared the magic effect to the involuntary reflex that follows a hammer tap to the knee.⁵³ Therefore, the autocommunicative magical act for Lotman is *a priori* reproductive: the *listener*

that you can't get a bang out of a stick, let alone shoot birds with it. It's just a game. If we think like that then there's no way we can play at all" (Lotman 1967c: 134).

⁵¹ According to the rules of logic, a sentence in the imperative cannot be questioned as to whether what has been said is true or untrue.

⁵² It is inconceivable that, for example, in the magic formula "Varesele valu, harakale haigust (pain to the crow, illness to the magpie) [---] — meie (our) Mari saab terveks (will get well)!" the words "varesele" and "harakale" could be interchanged, or arbitrarily replaced by the words "varblasele (sparrow)" and "hanele (goose)", although here even assonance would be preserved. Although there can be variations to the formulae these too are fixed in irrefutable tradition, indisputable unanimity, memory clichés. And the latter can even have sacral force.

⁵³ This standpoint was expressed by Boris Uspenski in a conversation with the author of this monograph in Tallinn on 10.09.2002.

reacts to something that he knows in advance (Lotman 1973b: 228).

Now we could ask (seeking theoretical arguments that justify the scheme in the "Lectures"), in addition to the aforementioned, whether Juri Lotman has analyzed in reproducing communication such characteristics or elements which could characterize in more detail intellectual algorithms, including primarily the location of actants in magical communication? An answer to this question was touched upon by Lotman in his article on "primariness" and "secondariness" in modelling communication systems.⁵⁴

Juri Lotman has postulated that in the communication period prior to mankind's verbal language there probably was an unusual system of exchanging equivalent meanings: certain "spontaneous", "non-organized" signals could be exchanged, which could have been symptoms of some psycho-physiological situations. Such means of expression carried in communication the function of an elemental code. Or to be more precise, it was merely a common mechanism of communicating that could not yet mediate information, because only such a message can be informative that does not repeat that which the addressee already knows. Lotman concludes from this that

from the very beginning there have been two semiotic situations: in the first there is originally a communication mechanism, but there is basically no communication content; in the second there is originally content, but the communication mechanism [i.e. a common understanding ensured by algorithms — *P. L.*] is basically missing. Actual speech [- - -] should apparently be considered to be a compromise between these systems, and an oscillation. [---] Later on, something that is individual in a communication system, and something that is general, can develop from these two systems. (Lotman 1974: 224–225)

⁵⁴ The term *modelling* expresses the iconicity of signified analogues of certain objects in the semiotic context. A model is an analogue that expresses similarity.

The spice in the previous discussion is the added by Lotman fact that ethnographic and archaeological studies have discovered not one social group where in addition to the natural language there has not already existed “secondary” ones as well — “religious, aesthetic and other” modelling systems. Implementing the logic of Lotman, it should thus be possible to conclude (*resp.* presume) that magical, religious or artistic communication — each one of them must have had “from the beginning” its own specific elemental “communication mechanism”, all of which can be treated as “original” invariant algorithms of the intellect.

Therefore, a magical algorithm, as an autocommunicative mechanism, can be treated as a monad that has a memory, and where the *listener-speaker* relationship is regulated by a definite text-regulating internal principle.

It must be admitted that a magical monad with such characteristics is also related to another “monadological” concept of Lotman’s — i.e. code text. According to his determination, code text [*текст-код*] is a “syntagmatically organized whole”, where the code competes with, or even dominates, to the detriment of semantic content — of “textuality”. Code text is the “ideal example” of the construction principles of a certain text type, but it is in the form of text. Lotman categorizes, for example, magic tales (*волшебная сказка*) and detective novels as texts with this kind of rigid structure that in real communication tend to asemantism (Lotman 1981b: 6). True, in the case of a magical act, it would be better to use, instead of ‘code text’, the term ‘code scheme’ or ‘code signal’ since in the case of a magical formula it is a matter of very brief, one-time act directed to a certain addressee, a text which in some cases may have completely lost its original content⁵⁵. For example, in the expressive Russian phraseology — in the so-called Russian “mat”, the Russian “triple” (as code signals) have long since lost

⁵⁵ A certain code text may contain many various code schemes (*resp.* code signals) — e.g. a magic tale. This is why the concept of code text should be differentiated from code signal.

their archaic magical meaning and function. (see Uspenski 1994a: 56–84). Also, a contemporary native Russian does not as a rule interpret these formulae word for word, i.e. according to the dictionary.⁵⁶ This cursing can result in an effect that astonishes strangers: the play effect of the imperative subjugation of a partner = strange “fraternization”, which is nothing less than the intuitive sharing of the common metaphorized magical code. The example of Russian expressive phraseology also confirms the fact that in changing the semantics of a text, the syntagmatic mechanism that connects the actants may be preserved as an intellect-based algorithm. It has a high level of modelling ability.⁵⁷

Of course, there remains the fundamental question: which formal mechanisms in the code text with a high level of modelling ability are intellect-based (noetic) and which mechanisms are text-based (noematic)? Lotman did not presume to begin to resolve this issue.

As indicated earlier, in his “*Lectures*”, Lotman treats magical communication as autocommunication: the *listener* communicates in his imagination with the imaginary *speaker*, and his placement as regards that *speaker* expresses trust. This is why it is interesting to ask, whether and how these characteristics find expression in the magical intellectual mechanism — i.e. on a noetical level.

The characteristics of autocommunication have been analyzed by Juri Lotman in two monographic articles (Lotman 1970c; 1973b). There Lotman restricts himself to the analysis of the functional categories of autocommunication. He analyzes mnemonic (that which is saved in memory) and inventive autocommunication. In the case of the latter communication category, the *me* enters into the communication channel the additional code for the transformation of the information already

⁵⁶ In certain circles in Russia, the “expressive phraseology” may, as is known, form in certain situations an amazingly large share of interaction.

⁵⁷ The high modelling ability of poetry is also associated by Juri Lotman with the transformation of text into code (Lotman 1973b: 241).

known to him, or for raising its status (Lotman 1973b: 228–229).

An additional code, therefore, can be used to change a message, which is in the *memory* of the *me*. And an additional code itself is also obtainable from the *memory*. This fact is fundamentally important in the analysis of magical (auto)communication, but this is mentioned nowhere in the discussions by J. Lotman on magic. Yet it is clear that in magical acts, the formula circulates in a ritualized, even sacralized, form, and that these are accorded irrevocable power.

The intellect-based structure of a magical act as a code signal can indeed be described on the basis of these characteristics. The ritualization and sacralization of communication can be considered additional code because semiotically both include indexical factors: at the moment of (auto)communication, a targeted force is unleashed as an impulse via the cultural memory.

The examination of the other formal characteristics of autocommunication in Juri Lotman's articles is identical, in the vital aspects, with the analysis of the asemantic communication mechanism of the intellect (looked at earlier). Here too Lotman draws attention to the syntagmatic nature of autocommunicative text. He draws parallels with the phenomenon of internal language [*внутренняя речь*] formulated by Lev Vygotski (Lotman 1973b: 232–233). Internal language, as he indicates, is according to the studies by Vygotski a mute, silent language, which is characterized by the lack of vocalization. Lotman claims that the main difference between the autocommunicative *me–me* system and the inter-subjective *me–him* system is indeed the fact that in the first case the words tend to become signs of words, and indices of signs — to be reduced to certain formal ways of connection. The autocommunicativity of the magical and religious *he–me* relationship emphasizes the indexical syntagmaticity of the *speaker* and *listener* relationship.

4.4. In conclusion on the analysis of magic in the "Lectures"

To summarize the above analysis the following should be emphasized.

- It is apparent from the 1967 "Lectures" that Juri Lotman had shaken himself loose from the tradition of interpreting magic where magic was reduced to an element of ethnographic, psychological, sociological or linguistic paradigm⁵⁸. Lotman has interpreted magic as a cultural-semiotic phenomenon.
- The cultural-semiotic viewpoint is for him purposely systematic. In the context of structuralism, magic is an autocommunicative function between the *listener* and the *speaker*, which can be observed from the position of *me* = *listener* and in a series of other communicative functions between *listener-speaker* or *speaker-listener*.
- The magical function in the communication scheme in Lotman's "Lectures" can be treated as a type of designating relatedness, but it also has a phenomenological characteristic of relatedness — 'magicality'. Magicality as a characteristic of relatedness (according to Edmund Husserl's terminology). Via a 'worldview' it can be made explicit in a signified manner in a text between *listener-speaker*. The motivational (intentional) placement between *listener-speaker* (according to Husserl's terminology — mode of thought of the pure *ego*) also finds an outlet in this. Similarly to the specifics of mythological thought, in which case the "identification of isomorphic elements takes place on the level of the objects themselves, not of the names" (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 302), Lotman also treats

⁵⁸ The universal metaphoric structure, and mutual kinship, of play and artistic semiosis also cannot possibly be satisfactorily explained via traditional inductive analytical models of evolutionary or social experience.

the magical act “ontologically”: according to him, neither magical nor mythological semiosis are merely methodical acts of semiotic description — they are also intellect-based algorithms.

- Magicality as an algorithm seems to belong, according to Lotman’s analysis, amongst those intellectual “mechanisms”, which have a characteristic that is *a priori* pre-verbal and sovereign as regards the language.
- Although Juri Lotman set full objectives in the mid 1960s for the study of cultural universals, his relevant attempts (including in the area of magic) still remained episodic and superficial, even incidental (except for everything that refers to the multiple-meaning of the play and artistic behaviour of the intellect, or the mythologicality that was analyzed by Juri Lotman together with Boris Uspenski). But this does not reduce the heuristic value of these attempts. The improvising scheme of the “Lectures” also turned out to be a rather important point of departure (preliminary sketch) for many central concepts in Lotman’s semiotics that were later further developed (for example, ‘intellect’, ‘auto-communication’, ‘algorithm’, ‘monad’, isomorphism of intellect, text and culture).
- The main deficiencies in the interpretation of magic by Juri Lotman could be the following.

1) Lotman has two interpretations of magic, which are substantially mutually contradictory, but their author has not commented on this fact, therefore it remained unresolved.

2) The content criteria of magicality (magical semiosis) have been indistinctly formulated in the 1967 scheme as opposed to the 1981 article, (which can hardly be considered the fault of the note-taking of the lecture). Lotman does associate the magical communication with the phenomenon of “influence”, but the “rules” of the influence are not clarified in the text of the “Lectures” (be the influencer either the *speaker* or *listener*) nor

the difference between magical influence and religious influence. All this remains incomplete and vague. Lotman also does not analyze the entire problem of the level of expression of magical semiosis.

3) The question is not posed in the "Lectures" as to why, and with which contextual or meta-linguistic additional criteria should the communicative relationship be in accordance, in order for the "inexplicable" act to acquire a magical function, where the *listener* does not know the "rules" under which it is to take place.

4) Essential questions remain unanswered in "Lectures": why the described system of algorithms is formed by those communicative functions in particular; are there more functions?

5) The *a priori* status of magical or religious semiosis in the "Lectures" would have presumed relevant justifications. Unfortunately they are missing from the notes of the "Lectures", and they did not come later either.

6) Hopefully, it has also become clear here that relinquishing his initial magic-idea was premature.

The further interests of J. Lotman split into two basic directions. On the one hand, from the universal algorithmized constants to the dynamic processes created in the collision of various languages — the study of the so-called "purposeful defectiveness". On the other hand, Lotman moved from this communicative act, viewed in isolation "as an original element of semiotics", to text and semiosphere as stating the primariness of dynamic wholes. In the study of magic this was manifested as "descending" from the level of the intellect — the *a priori* and universal pure *ego* — to the level of text (Lotman 1993a [1981]: 345, 347–348). The conditions of the magical "contract", as we have seen, already began to be determined here solely by social conventionalities, not the formal structure of the intellect.

UNIVERSAL FORMS OF THE REPRODUCTIVITY OF INTELLECT

5.1. Terminological classification of reproductivity

The analysis of the forms of reproductivity proceeds from the tradition of the culture-typological analysis of the Juri Lotman and Tartu–Moscow semiotic school, and attempts to reconstruct, and also to augment the ideas sketched, but not fully developed, by Lotman in his “Lectures” on the system of semiotic algorithms of the intellect.

Many concepts that Lotman used implicitly in his “Lectures” did not receive an explicit form until much later. This pertains primarily to the concept of the intellect. Let us look again at the three universal basic operations of the intellect, which are the ability:

firstly, to collect and mediate information (the intellect possesses communicative and memory mechanisms). It has language skills and is able to form correct sentences; secondly, to carry out algorithmic operations for the regular transformation of these messages; thirdly, to form new messages. (Lotman 1978: 3)

The term ‘algorithm’ was introduced by Juri Lotman into his discussions eleven years after 1967. The determination of intellect permits the derivation of a definition, according to which algorithms are semiotic constants that regulate the reproductive processes of the intellect — the constitutive, analytical and generative signifying operations of the intellect.¹

¹ At such a level, the algorithms of the intellect must be differentiated from the linguistic algorithms that the intellect commands: indeed, natural language, as a whole, can be treated as a hierarchy of “massive” algorithms (as a system),

The *a priori* vertical isomorphism of the intellect, text and culture is treated below as a constitutive reproductivity. The nature of the signified mnemonics of (auto)communication is differentiated as the analyticality of reproduction. The semiotics of the text-construction of the addressor is seen as the generativeness of reproduction.²

It needs to be remembered that the term 'signification' (*знаковость*) for the Tartu–Moscow semiotics school means the capacity of some (also abstract) thing to be a sign. As we know, signification can be described via three basic characteristics, which are the duality (*двоичность*), positionality and projectionality of the sign. Duality means that the sign substitutes for something else, or indicates something else; positionality expresses the space characteristics of the thing as a sign and the possibility of any change to the *locus* of the sign, and projectionality characterizes the capacity of a designated thing to precede in time the situation in which it is being used and/or be projected into a future situation or situations (Pyatigorski 1973: 188–189).

The classification of semiotic reproduction is conditional in the sense that the classes of the various algorithmized signifying operations are not mutually exclusive, but partially overlap. For example, it should not be forgotten that any communicative act whatsoever cannot be imagined without mnemonic and generative operations.

The system of algorithms that Lotman offered in the "Lectures" was made intriguing and heuristically weighty by the fact that the Tartu professor treated algorithms as intellect-based

whose complex paradigmatic and syntagmatic constants altogether can be sourced back to elementary rules, which are reproduced by those with a command of the language, but which lack the motivational quality that is external to natural language.

² In compiling this classification, we have been inspired by the work of Aleksandr Pyatigorski and Boris Uspenski, in which the "analytical model" and "generative model" of "signifying behaviour" (and communication is undoubtedly this) is constructed (Pyatigorski and Uspenski 1967: 11).

universals, which are realized in the magical, religious, artistic and even “scientific” act of communication between the *speaker–listener* or *listener–speaker*.³

In the course of the following discussion, the author will attempt to justify and defend the hypothesis, whereby the intellect-based communicative algorithms that are mediated via historical memory are a reproductive system. The thesis is also defended as to why this system contains, in addition to the named algorithms, also a mythological and antithetic communicative algorithm (some of these have been analyzed above in more detail). The following analysis permits all these to be treated as code signals, which *a priori* have a ritualizing (and sacralizing) function.

5.2. Constitutive reproductivity

All these cultural (intellectual) phenomena, the common foundation of algorithms and the issue of systematicness (not to mention the methodological background of this system), as well as the conditions which produce all such communication clichés — all this has not been systematically analyzed (or to be more precise: it has not been the primary objective of the semioticians in Tartu–Moscow school); nevertheless, in the scientific heritage of the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school (also that of Lotman), we can point out numerous heuristically weighty ideas as “starting points” for setting the direction for such issues (some will be covered below).

³ It is indeed unexpected that Lotman did not consider or comment (neither in the “Lectures” nor in his later works) this obvious fact that magic and science are related concepts as regards their development history (this was noted already by Edward B. Tylor and James G. Frazer), and they are also isomorphic as regards their semiotic structure. It is indeed for this latter reason that the examination of the scientific function of communication has been left out of this analysis.

5.2.1. Phenomenon of vertical isomorphism

One of the central methodological postulates of Juri Lotman's culture-semiotic system is the thesis of the so-called "vertical isomorphism" of the signifying structures of intellect, text and culture" (Lotman 1984: 14).⁴ The analysis of this topic is a common thread in Lotman's creative works from its beginning to its end (Lotman 1970a: 8–11; 1977a: 9–11, 13, 14; 1978: 16; 1984: 16; 1992a [1990]: 27–30; 1993b [1989]: 369). He also looks at isomorphism occurring in the mutual transformation of these phenomena (Lotman 1977b: 55–58; 1981c: 5–7; 1992a: 26), as well as in communicative (and in the same way in autocommunicative) operations, which are used to define the mutual isomorphic semiotic characteristics of intellect, text, as well as culture. This isomorphism proceeds from the four matching basic characteristics of three phenomena, which are their semiotic heterogeneity, the self-reproduction of meanings, as well as memory and the existence of a selection block (Lotman 1992 [1990]: 28–29).⁵

Intellectual operations can generally be divided into two opposing basic groups according to the nature of the (auto)communication taking place between, or in, these phenomena. On the one hand, the intellect(s), text(s) and culture(s) — all these three! — that have been placed (have positioned themselves) into the (auto)communication chain

⁴ Some explanations: 'verticality' is a metaphoric term; the 'container' metaphor could have been used just as easily — and Mark Johnson and George Lakoff have indeed implemented this in the classification of the metaphoricality of verbal image schemata (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 29–31; Johnson 1987: 126): intellect and text are culturally "internal" phenomena. That which Lotman calls 'verticality' could be perhaps expressed more precisely as pyramidity, where culture is the 'base' and intellect is the 'apex'.

⁵ (Auto)communicativity is characteristic to the intellect, text as well as culture, and it possesses both a "horizontal" and a "vertical" signified function — that guarantees the mutual reproductivity of all three. Lotman has described this in numerous studies (Lotman 1970c: 163–164; 1973b; 1977a: 13–15; 1977b: 55, 57–58; 1981b: 5–7; 1992a: 32).

produce innovative messages, i.e. “new” information. This new information is received when the addressee, who could also be the addressor itself, does not use (does not reproduce), in deciphering this message, the language (algorithms) that was used to code the message mediated by the addressor. On the other hand, every intellect, text and culture does hold memory mechanisms (it remembers), and commands languages in order to preserve in (auto)communication the adequacy (structural characteristics) of the message and to carry out possible transformation operations on the message on the basis of the conventional repertoire of the algorithms saved in the (cultural) memory, which are reproduced by both the addressee and the addressor (Lotman 1978: 3–6; 1992a: 25–26).

Therefore, on the one hand, the constitutive and communicative processes of intellect, text and culture have a dynamic and unpredictable, even “revolutionary” role, which produces “expedient faultiness” and “explosions” (Lotman 1978: 5; 1992c: 17). On the other hand, the functioning of intellect, text and culture is conservative, and can be reduced to the common part of the collective memory, and is oriented to preservation.⁶ In real (auto)communication these two halves of intellectual operations understandably complement each other and merge in complex hierarchical associations (Lotman 1977a, 1978, 1970c, 1973b).

It is important to note that during the various periods of Lotman’s semiotic work both of these intellect-based (auto)communication functions and operations are accented to a varying degree and in varying keys. In the second half of the 1960s, as we know, Lotman’s interest is concentrated on the reproductive processes of (auto)communication, which is primarily expressed in the attempt to determine the “universals of human culture” and the basic types of cultural codes to be used

⁶ It is indeed in such a context that Juri Lotman (together with Aleksandr Pyatigorski) also treats culture as a whole as One Text, which has all the characteristics of a designating explicit text (Lotman and Pyatigorski 1968: 80).

for the description of these languages (Lotman 1966: 83; 1967b: 31).⁷ By the second half of the 1970s, however, the innovative features and unpredictability of the (auto)communication processes had moved to the fore. The variability and dynamicity, which is characteristic of the person (*resp.* intellect), becomes the focus of debate (Lotman 1978: 13–14). In accordance with this, the understanding begins to dominate in Lotman's work that the addressee does not decipher the message with the aid of a code provided as a "package", but selects "freely" the language necessary for understanding. This freedom is of course supported by the abundance of the contextual conditions of the text and of the situational conditions of the communication, but also by the natural multilinguisticity of the text itself. From this proceeds the presumption of the unpredictability of (auto)communication as a translation process for a text. The text, in an inter-text or intra-text communication, is thus accorded the role of a generative factor, and the text becomes primary as regards the language. In a radical formation, this meant to Lotman that "language is not possible before text and outside text", as was summarized by Mikhail Lotman in his relevant analysis (Lotman, M. 1994: 595).

However, it should be noted that this standpoint of Juri Lotman should not be taken as absolute. The important thesis noted by Mikhail Lotman does indeed bring forth the originality of Juri Lotman's text semiotics (as Mikhail Lotman rightly emphasizes), but according to the characteristics of the intellect described by Juri Lotman, the innovativeness of communication must always be in a certain balance (in a complementary contrast) with the conservative, or conserving and reproductive (incl. cyclic) mechanisms of communication: real processes are "multi-planed and polyfunctional" (see, for example, Lotman

⁷ The interest in universals held by the Tartu–Moscow semioticians is also marked by the works of Lotman's closest colleague Boris Uspenski in the area of the typologization and classification of language universals (Uspenski 1965; 1970: 5–30) and the studies by Vyatsheslav Ivanov and Vladimir Toporov (Ivanov 1967: 37–39; 1968a: 276–287; 1968b: 10–12; Ivanov and Toporov 1974: 259–305).

1992b: 8, 21–22). Otherwise, culture and dialogue would collapse into an “effectively faulty” myriad of original and isolated monologues: “... setting language and speech [*resp.* text — *P. L.*] as opposites is absolute only in the conditional processing of description. In reality, however, they constantly exchange places with each other” (Lotman 1992b: 22).

The intellect is a phenomenologically reduced subjectivity, and is a wider concept than the psychological subjectivity of an individual (and of course also wider than language). According to the inverse relationship between language (code) and speech (text), both text and culture may also fulfil the mnemonic and generative role of the intellect. In producing vertical isomorphism, they may change places, and the intellect can be treated sometimes as the text of the *speaker*, then as the text of the *listener* (Lotman 1977a; 1978). Text and culture reproduce *a priori* the structural characteristics of the intellect. And vice versa! (see Lotman 1977b: 55–58; 1981c: 5–7).

Understandably, the algorithms that will be the topic of this analysis also submit to the logic of vertical reproduction.

5.2.2. Phenomenological criticism of Aleksandr Pyatigorski's viewpoint

The phenomenon of reproductive isomorphism, according to which text, culture and intellect can “behave” as “thinking” and mutually isomorphic phenomena, the functions of which in the communication chain are mutually exchangeable — this standpoint has resulted in interpretational misunderstandings. Aleksandr Pyatigorski's critique *post factum* regarding his and Juri Lotman's semiotics can undoubtedly be considered a marked manifestation of such misunderstandings (Pyatigorski 1994: 324–329).⁸

⁸ Aleksandr Pyatigorski can undoubtedly be considered one of the main figures in the Tartu–Moscow school of semiotics. His critique was published in the

Pyatigorski accuses the joint concept at the time of:

- 1) "ontologizing" the research method ("for example, the method of binary oppositions changed from being a workable method of description to almost the object being described as a law of nature");
- 2) "naturalizing" the research object. The ontologizing of the research method "was to take us unerringly" to a situation where "it became possible to speak of, for example, not only how I understand culture [---], but also of how a specific culture understands others or itself [---], where Lotman's idea of the *semiosphere* formed an utmost manifestation of this (already in the 1980s)";
- 3) declaring signification, as a characteristic of things, as being "almost philosophy", which then "definitely is no longer semiotics" (Pyatigorski 1994: 325–327; 1973: 187–188).

In this author's opinion, this criticism is superficial in the interpretation of the writings of Juri Lotman on semiotics. It seems as though the change in Pyatigorski's viewpoints had been influenced by the fact that he had in the interim moved to another philosophical space: perhaps his statements could be interpreted as a kind of (belated) goodbye signal to the traditions of continental philosophy, which had very substantially formed the views of the Tartu–Moscow school's semioticians, and his own views at the time.

The topics that Pyatigorski covered in his critical analysis of (himself) and Lotman are important topics, both on the semiotic and the philosophic plane. They concern the constructive basic fundamentals of Lotman's method. That is why these comments deserve a separate examination of the original sources, from which the vertical reproductive analysis of the *intellect – text – culture* system has been to a great extent derived in the semiotics of Juri Lotman.

5.2.2.1. “Ontologization” of the research method.

Juri Lotman and the Tartu–Moscow sign school as a whole have definitely been methodologically influenced in the interpretation of reproductive processes by new-Kantianism, and particularly by Husserlian phenomenology. Mikhail Lotman has written that Juri Lotman was a Kantian (Lotman, M. 1994: 594). This is quite correct, and in particular to the extent that the roots of the new-Kantians and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl also must be sought in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s dualism, however, is unacceptable to the new-Kantians and Husserl.

The influence of Husserl is not initially obvious in Juri Lotman’s semiotics, since they compete with the new-Kantian philosophical views. The crux of the matter is that the standpoint of the new-Kantians in certain fundamental basic questions are close to Husserl’s ideas or are indeed the same. Therefore, Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and other new-Kantians could have influenced Lotman in a certain sense to the same degree as did the phenomenology of Husserl.⁹

In this context it is initially important to emphasize that both the new-Kantians and the phenomenologists disconnect the factual level of reality (incl. Kant’s “things in themselves”) from the philosophic discourse. The Husserlians, as indicated previously, take world existence in brackets (*einklammern*), declare the validity of being (*Seinsgeltung*) as “secondary”, and thereby persistently reduce the world to a phenomenon that is internal to consciousness (phenomenological *epochē*) (Husserl 1987 [1931]: 22–23, 31). The world is reduced to transcendental intellectual structures (for Husserlians) or to transcendental

⁹ It is quite feasible that the philosophical viewpoints of Husserl could have also reached Lotman indirectly — primarily via Gustav Shpet, whom Husserl called one of his best students, but also via the works of Aleksei Lossev and Roman Jakobson. The latter invited Husserl to give a talk in Prague in 1935, and defended, already in 1916, Husserl’s concept of “pure” universal forms and relationships, setting these in opposition to the empiricism of new grammarians (Holenstein 1975: 61–63, 80).

“principles” (for Kantians).¹⁰ The idea of transcendentalism has been directly taken over by the new-Kantians and Husserlians from Kant, who has claimed that “for me, transcendental has never denoted the relationship of our cognition with things [“in themselves” — *P. L.*], but only with the capacity for cognizance [---]. I call transcendental every cognition that deals less with objects than with our *way of perceiving objects*, insofar as this must be possible *a priori*” (Kant 1982 [1783]: 55, 83; emphasis by *P. L.*). Husserl defines transcendentalism — although in a much wider manner — as “a character of immanent existence” that is constructed in the *ego* (Husserl 1993 [1950]: 1418).

But in addition to this, the Kantians and Husserlians release these intellectual structures, *resp.* the principles of the cognizance of objects, from all kinds of subjectivity, in the psychological meaning of this term. For them, subjectivity is “transcendental subjectivity”, which Husserl also contrasts to “objective subjectivity”. The latter applies to “animal subjectivity” (*animalische Subjektivität*) that is external to the phenomenal world (Husserl 1987 [1931]: 31).

As regards the ontologization of method specifically, the later understandings of Pyatigorski in this issue seem to proceed from the tradition of positivism — Lotman’s however from the understandings of Husserl as described here.

The concept of ‘ontology’ is associated by Husserl with science and philosophy.¹¹

¹⁰ *transcendens* (Lt) crossing boundaries. F. de Saussure sets *language* as opposite to *speech* on the basis of transcendentalism in particular: outside speech (*resp.* text), language is a phenomenon that cannot be captured by the senses — virtual (*virtualis* (Lt — apparent) — can be treated as being possible). On the same basis, ‘meaning’ should be seen as a language phenomenon, and ‘sense’ as a speech phenomenon.

¹¹ Husserl also counts philosophy as a science, which therefore excludes any confrontation between science and philosophy. He has even written a special monograph to argue this thesis — “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft” (1911).

We could [---] say that [---] all *a priori* sciences without exception [---] have their origins in *a priori* transcendental phenomenology. [---] This *a priori* system can thus also be characterized as systematic unfolding [*Entfaltung*] of the universal *a priori* or universal *logos* of all conceivable being, proceeded from the essence of transcendental subjectivity and therefore also intersubjectivity¹². This in turn means that the completely and systematically developed transcendental phenomenology would be *eo ipso* the true and genuine universal ontology.¹³ (Husserl 1987 [1931]: 159. Emphasis — *P. L.*)

The transcendental-subjective unfolding of being is, in Husserl's phenomenological system, a category with fundamental importance. Kant discovers in reality that which he himself inputs to the world with his own method: "As metaphysics, the sources of cognition of the intellect are not in the [real-world, ontological — *P. L.*] objects and in beholding them, but in itself [i.e. in metaphysics — *P. L.*]" (Kant 1982 [1783]: 147, 189)¹⁴. Thus: the dualistic conflict between the method (intellect) and the world (as *Erscheinung*) — on which Pyatigorski also bases his criticism. Husserl, in contrast to Kant, permits the "ontic facts" "to manifest" (*phainomai*) themselves, *resp.* open (sich entfalten).¹⁵ In addition to "unfolding" (manifesting), Husserl also uses, in describing this idea — and this is particularly important —, the concept of evidence (*Evidenz*) — "in the sense of [---] self-being-evident, being-present-as-one's-self" (Husserl 1993 [1950]: 1408).

¹² *logos* (Gr) — concept, reason. Here: ancient intellectual essence; general legitimacy.

¹³ *eo ipso* (Lt) — thereby.

¹⁴ "For sensuous perception represents things not at all as they are, but only the mode in which they affect our senses, and consequently by sensuous perception appearances (*Erscheinungen*) only and not things themselves are given to the understanding for reflection". "These objects are not representations of things as they are in themselves, [---] but sensuous intuitions, that is, appearances, the possibility of which rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in themselves to something else, viz., to our sensibility." (Kant 1982 [1783]: 51, 82).

¹⁵ *phainomai* is the origin for the Greek word *phainomenon*.

In interpreting the "unfolding" of ontological facts and the universal *logos* and/or the "being-present-as-one's-self" it should be remembered that in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological system the subject (*ego*) is not located in a world of objects, but, in the contrary:

anything at all existing for the *ego* is *constituting* in itself [i.e. in the *ego*]. [---] as a phenomenological *ego* I have changed into a *sheer observer of myself* and for me nothing is valid that I could not find indivisible from myself, except for my sheer life and [that which] is indivisible [---] from this [sheer life — *P. L.*]. (Husserl 1993: 1418, 1401; emphasis — *P. L.*)

The *ego* itself is "split into the observer and the observed".¹⁶ Consciousness is therefore object-centred and also "directed" (= intentional¹⁷). In other words, it could also be said that *ego* for Husserl is basically an autocommunicative phenomenon.

Parallels are apparent in the semiotics of Juri Lotman.

In order to differentiate the reduced sphere of *being-present-as-himself* — i.e. "that which is being observed", Juri Lotman uses the category of 'existing'. Lotman claims that a fact, which does not belong to any *system* or is not contrastable (comparable) with anything, cannot possess a meaning (Lotman 1970d: 48). In addition, the concept of 'existing' is signifying phenomenon and does not correspond with the biological or other such non-signified characteristics of factual existence.¹⁸ (Appendix, p. 227) The category of 'existing' in Lotman's semiotics, therefore, means being a part of a certain system, and this in some definite signified function.

Lotman himself has provided a vivid example of this. Tsar Ivan IV had the custom, when having an opponent executed, of

¹⁶ Such wording is used by Ülo Matjus in his commentaries on Husserl (Matjus 1993, 8: 1590).

¹⁷ Intentionality (Lt *intentio* — attempt, intention, striving), in the words of Husserl, is "being aware of something" (Husserl 1993: 1399).

¹⁸ In this analysis, there is a movement away from the problems of bio-semiotics, and the aspect being analyzed acquires additional nuances, which in the 1970s had not yet received any noticeable scholarly attention.

having all the family members of the victim also killed. This had shocked the British ambassador residing in Moscow. But in the legal system of the 16th century, the concept of an 'individual' 'existed' (*resp.* 'became apparent') for a western European and Russian in two completely different designated (= ontic) forms. The modern Englishman united his existential borders with his biological borders. In Russia, however, that had been unaffected by the legal system of the West, the individual of the 16th century could only be the family: an individual could not figure as a socially relevant unit in society — he was ontologically non-existent (Lotman 1984, see also Appendix).

The existence of binary oppositions, referred to by Aleksandr Pyatigorski, also finds expression as an intellect-based signifying structure. Countless antithetic constructions in cultural texts can be brought as examples of this, starting with the apposition of paradise and hell, or Christ and Anti-Christ (= Muhammad) in the self-reflection of various cultures. In the consciousness of the medieval European, Islam as an "obscene religion" that "succumbed to the passions" was the opposite of "moral" monogamy (Islam permits a man to be simultaneously married to four women.)¹⁹ etc, etc.

But the existence of binary and other similar structures in the intellectual memory of the "observer" is virtual and potential. These structures become "existing" from the moment when they join the (textual and/or behavioural) communication chain as "being under observation" (cf. Lotman 1992a [1990]: 26). It should be again emphasized that "being under observation" is primarily an intellectual phenomenon — and also an *ontological* object. Perception of the world of "being-present-as-himself" that exists according to Husserl's arguments "is motivated in my intentional life" (Husserl 1993: 1409). And the

substantial characteristic [---] of the ego is to continually form intentional systems, and to hold those already formed whose indices

¹⁹ For more details on the history of the binary (antithetic) apposition of Islam and Catholicism, see (Watt 1976 [1972]: 98–108).

are [...] the objects that have been considered, intended, assessed, handled, fantasized, and are fantasizable, etc, by the ego. (Husserl 1993: 1411)

Here we can see a circumstance that is noteworthy for us: antithetic (binary) constructions on the level of the "observed" (= (behavioural) text), and on the level of the "observer" (= intellect), are mutually isomorphic and reproductive. From the perspective of the "substantial characteristic" (the "universal *logos* of being") of the *ego*, binarity consequently has an *a priori* intellectual quality that anticipates communication and is reduced from the psyche. Such a conclusion is also supported by developmental psychological data: in starting to talk, a child does not start with naming objects, but with acquiring the contrasting of objects (Jakobson and Halle 1962 [1956]: 499–500). It can therefore be claimed, in accordance with Husserl's thought processes, that the contrasting of objects in the ontological and insighted "sphere that is able to be observed" of the *ego* is the index of the intellect's binary algorithm. "Phenomenological self-interpretation exists *a priori*, so this then is valid for every possible, conceivable *ego*, and for every conceivable being, that is, for all conceivable worlds" (Husserl 1993: 1418).

This analysis can be expanded with yet another important link. Namely, according to Juri Lotman (Lotman 1992a [1990]: 26), Roman Jakobson and other scholars, binary oppositions are also part of the "self-structure" characteristics of natural language. Jakobson has reached the conclusion that the phonological structure of all natural languages is recurrently binary (Jakobson and Halle 1962; 1971a [1961]: 637 jj). This is witness to the situation where the reproductive mutual antithetic communication of the "being observed" and the "observer" is also regulated by natural language as a "natural" stability mechanism.

To summarize, the conclusion can be drawn that from the viewpoint of phenomenological analysis, the reproaches by Aleksandr Pyatigorski — as regards "ontologizing" and "naturalizing" the method — are basically tautological since in

the phenomenological world of Husserl and Lotman method and world are not ontological opposites. In the ontologically reduced world, intellect, text and metatext (method) may — according to the logic of vertical isomorphism — mutually exchange places: they are in a complementary relationship (see 5.2.1.).

And yet another detail. In one of his early articles, Juri Lotman noted that according to the “fundamental principle of logic”, the “object language and the descriptive language (metalanguage) are hierarchically different levels in scientific description, which must not be confused: the object language cannot [in science! — *P. L.*] be its own metalanguage” (Lotman 1970f: 89–90). It must, however, be kept in mind that, for example, the binary oppositions of Lotman, referred to by Pyatigorski, are simultaneously structural elements of both the object language and the metalanguage. The concept of vertical isomorphism meant for Lotman that the problem of the ontological opposition of language and metalanguage, and philosophical and scientific analysis, was taken off the agenda (which certainly does not mean the denial of the “fundamental principle of logic” in different contexts of scientific discourse).

5.2.2.2. “Naturalizing” the object of the analysis.

The second reproach by Aleksandr Pyatigorski referred to “naturalizing” the object of the analysis.

Here also there is a certain terminological misunderstanding.

An object or thing in a phenomenological system can understandably only be an intentional or consciousness object. The term ‘intentional object’ can even be substituted with the term ‘intention’ and ‘intentionality’, which has the more precise meaning of reference of the consciousness to an object: “Rather the whole of intentionality is itself either the consciousness of evidence, this means possessing the *cogitatum* [the thing being cognized = the object — *P. L.*] as itself, or it is essentially [---] targeting self-giving [*Selbstgebung*], directed at this” (Husserl

1993: 1408).²⁰ But in addition to this Husserl emphasizes that the phenomenological 'object' is not a "complex of sensory information", which is used, for example, to construct the Gestalt-psychological "image" (Husserl 1993: 1400). An intentional object (thing), in a phenomenological system, possesses no "natural" characteristics of a natural and/or factual existence. Husserl's objects "are opened" in the cognition process via 'essentiality', which is caught in direct 'insight' via intuition.²¹ Thus, the "insight of essence has nothing in common with perception, remembering or "experiencing" in the form of similar acts; or with empirical generalisation, into which meaning the separately experienced individual existence has been included" (Husserl 2000 [1911]: 705, 707). In the insight of essence, the object of the intention is *eidōs* — the generality provided via the insight, and attainable only to the insight" (Husserl 1987 [1931]: 73); and the objects "being constituted as the community of thought-patterns". (Husserl 1993: 1405).²²

²⁰ 'Intentionalism', as a central concept in both communication and epistemology, was introduced to philosophy by Franz Brentano. This same approach is developed in his language philosophy study by John Langshaw Austin, who differentiates in communication the illocutive (determining an act) and perlocutive (opening the consequences of the deed) communicative relationship between the addressor and the addressee (Austin 1962: 99–107; 115–117). According to Lotman's semiotic-analysis logic, the opposite placement of the *speaker-listener* and *listener-speaker* in communication can be treated as a protoverbal conventional sign, or as a protoverbal sign-creation act, which have, for example, a perlocutive = indexical structure and which represents a certain relational algorithm. Lotman does not use the term 'intentionality'.

²¹ *intuitus* (Lt) — look, inner glance. Intuition is direct awareness that anticipates, or is opposite to, logical discussion, about the truth of some sentence or concept (Blackburn 2002 [1994]: 188) or the meaningfulness of an object of understanding. 'Insight' is synonymous with the term intuition.

²² *eidōs* (Gr) — form, sight, appearance. The term was first used by Plato in designating abstract forms and ideas. Already in 1929, Pyotr Bogatyryov and Roman Jakobson wrote about these same issues, carrying out analysis on the basis of natural language, saying that the typical product of naive realism "was [---] the thesis of young grammarians that the only real language was the individual language [---], that [---] the only genuinely reality is the language of

It is important to note here that both Immanuel Kant as well as the New Kantians do not recognize *intellectual intuition* in their philosophy.²³ But this is indeed the very basis, as we have seen, for the whole of Husserl's analysis of intention. "Associations of thought", and thus the *ego* itself, are "eidetic" structures. With this term, Husserl emphasizes the apriority, unity and even imagery of the constructions of essence:

The universal apriority pertaining to transcendental *ego* as such is a *form* of essentiality [*Wesenform*], which conceals in itself an infinite number of *forms*, the apriority *types* of the possible actualities and potentialities of life, *together with objects*, which in this universal *a priori* are constituted as actually existing. (Husserl 1987 [1931]: 76; see also 73, 77, 134, 139–142; emphasis — P. L.)²⁴

Husserl's intuitive essences are vividly illustrated by the concept of the monad, which also acquires a central role in Juri Lotman's semiotics.²⁵ With the term 'monad', Husserl denotes, on the one hand, that which is "substantially intrinsic to me", that "which I, in my complete concrete form, am in me" (Husserl 1987 [1931]:

one specific person at one specific moment, and that all else was somehow a mere scientific, theoretical abstraction. However, there is really nothing that is to a greater degree foreign to modern trends in language theory. [...] modern language theory also knows "*langue*", this means a "collection of habits that a certain collective has acquired in order to ensure understanding of speech"" (Bogatyryov and Jakobson 1971 [1929]: 369–370; the authors quote Saussure).

²³ Insight (*Anschaung*) does exist in Kant's philosophy but is empirical in nature, covering the *sensory* comprehension of objects, and pure insight is that which organizes *perceptions* into experiences regarding objects of time and space (Kant 1982 [1785]: 41–42).

²⁴ It is important to note here that for Husserl (as opposed to Lotman and Peirce) the intuitive objects of direct insight are not signs (in the sense of the dual construction of this concept). Both Lotman and Peirce seek the signified equivalents of these phenomena. See also: Nöth 1999: 616–617.

²⁵ For more detail on the origin and implementation of the concept 'monad', see also Chapter 4, p. 129–132; also: Husserl 1987 [1931]: 131–134; 142–144 and Lotman 1993b [1989]: 369–372.

107). On the other hand, the world is the organized association of monads, which also has a constitutive function:

My [---] *ego* [---] could only be a priori an *ego* that apprehends the world, belonging to an association of other similar *egos*, being a member of the association of monads that branches out from it. [---] for me it would not be possible to have any mass of monads without it being an *organized association*, either in an explicit or implicit form. From here it follows that this mass *constitutes* in itself an *objective world* [---], that it *acquires* in this world a form in time and space and realizes itself in this [---] using the force of the inevitability of being. (Husserl 1987: 142–143; emphasis — P. L.)

And it is particularly as such an “association of monads” that Juri Lotman has described the semiosphere (Lotman 1984), which he also calls a “semiotic universe” (Lotman 1993b [1989]: 369)²⁶. This space is filled by intellectual eidetic objects, where Lotman differentiates three classes: firstly, natural human consciousness (in the sense of the signifying algorithmized consciousness of a person), secondly, text, and thirdly, culture as collective intellect. These objects are hierarchically “passing-through” monads, which, as we observed previously, are, on the one hand, isomorphic according to structure, but on the other hand, mutually (innovatively) generative: an identity can be treated as text, and text (culture) as intellect (Lotman 1993b: 369; 1992a [1990]: 27–29).

This “sign-creating (semiotic) situation” in the semiosphere did indeed initiate Aleksandr Pyatigorski's criticism.

It seems, however, that the critic had not taken into account that in the phenomenological context, the information-exchange acts ((auto)communication) in the semiosphere, generated by the intellect *resp.* text, are neither “natural” (i.e. from nature) nor psychological — they are semiotic. Or to be more precise, the intellect, text and culture behave as “*semiotic identities*”, whereby the concept ‘identity’ here should be treated (or

²⁶ It is clear that it would have been quite impossible to quote Husserl here because of the censorship conditions.

actually: seen) as an eidetic object — as a monad and not as a metaphor in something belonging to play, artistic or — wider — aesthetic meaning²⁷, or as an “animal” or object in the “naturalized” sense.

The existence of a so-called “third world” created by sign systems, “located between” nature and the human psyche, was already indicated in 1632 in a penetrating and elegant manner by John Poinset in his “Tractatus de Signis”. Here we can read:

In discussing a sign in general, we cannot be restricted in our analysis to categories of that which exists independent of thought, or to categories of that which exists dependent on thought, because a sign is verifiable and it functions regarding both.²⁸

Therefore, Juri Lotman’s discussions on semiotic systems that are “capable of thought”, on another text that “can initiate” the “capacity for thought” for a text, on semiosphere as an “organism”, or on text and intellect as “semiotic identities” who/that have informational “inputs” and “outputs” — all these statements and concepts must be read, in the words of Lotman, as manifestations of a “semiotic [read: eidetic — *P. L.*] situation”, “which marks a leap from being in Nature to being in Culture”, since a “person does not just think but is also located in a thinking space” (Lotman 1993b [1989]: 369, 372; Lotman 1992a [1990]: 27–29). When Lotman writes about thought-capable text, he definitely does not mean that, if the intellect starts to fulfil the role of text in communication, it then stops being the intellect, and vice versa. Lotman has repeatedly emphasized that although text is a (live) organism, in order to “initiate” the processes that can take place within, it is always necessary to connect it into a

²⁷ Of course only in the case where the semiotic identity *resp.* text itself is not an artistic/play/aesthetic text, and in the case where semiotic processes that produce new information (“expedient faultiness”) do not dominate in the communicative act.

²⁸ This fundamental point of view for semiotic thought has not been forgotten. Walther von Wartburg has made an astute comment on this, and Boris Uspenski says in his recent monograph: “We talk about having command of a language, but actually it is language that commands a person” (Uspenski 2007: 144).

common “stream of current” together with the intellect. Nowhere has Lotman written that texts could “speak” to each other, independent of the intellect (Lotman 1992a [1990]: 27–28, 33; 1977a: 4, 9–10, 13).

5.2.2.3. Semiotics changing into “almost philosophy”.

Analysis of the essence of culture has undoubtedly been a constant and intense interest for Juri Lotman. Keeping this in mind, it seems that Aleksandr Pyatigorski is right when he blames Lotman for abandoning semiotics in favour of philosophy. It is nevertheless apparent that Pyatigorski, in making such a claim, does not take into account that a philosopher is still called upon to explain one substance via another substance, and he is not basically interested in the issue of which formal (signifying) means are used to sense, store, transform and communicate these substances; he is not interested what kind of signified relationships these substances mutually generate. In his analyses, Juri Lotman (and naturally semiotics in general) concentrates on the non-philosophical formal aspects of substances (and/or their essences), and expressively displays their signified abstract qualities of the abstract essences.²⁹

It should nevertheless be admitted that the semiotic instruments for the signifying analysis of essences have not always been properly developed and these could not have existed in the 1960s anyway (as with Lotman has become apparent in the case of magic, for example); but here too the heritage of Juri Lotman is comprised mostly of successes — for example, the description of mythological (together with Boris Uspenski) and artistic semiosis, and the signified nature of play (Lotman 1967c;

²⁹ The border between philosophy and semiotics, in the context of linguistic philosophy, may be hazy, but in general it is the case that the subject of philosophy can indeed be language, but the topic of research can only be the topics which are spoken in that language. Semiotics concentrates on language itself, on its form.

Lotman and Uspenski 1973). Let us also call to mind the witty panoramic attempt to categorize the Russian cultural epochs (Lotman 1970f). Here, Lotman typologizes the nature of culture via a signified substitution relationship (“It exists since it substitutes for something more important than itself”) and via the syntagmatic operation of linking the signs (“It exists because it is part of something that is more important than itself”), and creates, by mutually combining two formal characteristics, an analytical whole that passes through nine centuries! Such an analysis should actually be interpreted as “philosophy” changing into semiotics, not vice versa.

Another example. As we know, the age of enlightenment in France brought with it the modern understanding of public opinion and the citizen. This has had an important intellectual-historical and also philosophical meaning. Juri Lotman, in his analyses of the age of enlightenment, describes the purely semiotic nature of this fact (Lotman 1970f: 26–32; 1979: 270–276). It becomes apparent from Lotman’s analysis that the concept ‘person’, according to the enlightenment understandings, could not be expressed at all by signs (signifiers) that indicate the class, racial, cultural or other social type characteristics of the person. It was Nature that was to be the denoter of everything ‘human’. All the “human” indicated by the denoters — *person, group, ethnic identity, nation, mankind* — had therefore to be isomorphic with the qualities of Nature. In describing mankind, it was sufficient to describe *one* person. The individual, according to the formal characteristics of semiosis, could be significantly equivalent to all other conceivable individuals — be they beggars, kings or officials. Following on, it unavoidably proceeds that public opinion could not be defined as a collective decision. No one has the right to usurp this. This was equivalent, as regards birth and function, to the singular opinion of a single individual. This individual had the sovereign right to express it, equally with everyone else. Lotman’s semiotic interpretation, as regards the creation of the concept ‘citizen’ was derived from these formal characteristics.

Taking into account the above, it seems that the thesis about semiotics changing into philosophy is "almost" inaccurate.

5.3. The analytical and generative forms of the reproductivity of the intellect

The subject of following treatment is the semiotic analysis of reproductive signifying behaviour, on the basis of analytical and generative characteristics. As already stated, the idea for such a categorization has been borrowed (whilst admitting certain changes) from Aleksandr Pyatigorski and Boris Uspenski, who implemented this schema in the creation of personological models (Pyatigorski and Uspenski 1967: 7–29; see also 5.1.). They associate the analyticality of semiotic behaviour with the imagining and assessment of the "ideal situations" of behaviour, on the *past-future* axis of behaviour — i.e. with mnemonics, which, according to sagacious observation of the authors, may have a ritualizing meaning. They treat the conversion/converting of autocommunicative or intersubjective behaviour into signs of other behavioural activities as the generativeness of behaviour (*порождающее поведение*). According to Pyatigorski and Uspenski, the analyticality and generativity of behaviour has a collective character or a character that forms the *me* identity (Pyatigorski and Uspenski 1967: 11–15).

Therefore, to be more precise, the following sections will observe ritual and code signals, as the structure, repertoire of text and algorithms that are stored in the (cultural) memory, as well as the ritualizing (sacralizing) reproduction and generativity of the mnemonic baggage in the process of (auto)communication.

5.3.1. The analyticality of reproductive behaviour

Looking at the reproductivity characteristics of the intellect from the aspect of cultural history, it becomes apparent that

exchanging the cyclical time model for historical thinking created, as Juri Lotman has written, “a constant conflict” between the “repeatability” (reproductivity) of behavioural forms and “internal dynamics” (innovation) (Lotman 1992b: 6, 21). Understandably, innovation and reproduction, in these contexts, acquired the role of structurally dominant opposites.

The character of reproducing cultural phenomena depends on the orientation of the culture (intellect), (for example, it is possible to successfully block (collective) memory), on the storage mechanisms necessary for remembering (including the intellect-based algorithms that are of interest to us) and on the system of codes used to form memory patterns — texts.³⁰

Storage mechanisms and cultural codes are associated, on the historical plane, with the character of the information carriers. In considering communication that was pre-verbal and non-verbal, one cannot overlook the intriguing fact that man’s predecessor *homo sapiens* began to use words only about 100 000 years ago, but *homo habilis* who possessed memory and communicated with gestures and sounds had, by that time, inhabited the earth for already a few million years. An unavoidable and semiotically weighty question arises: how, and using what means (what sort of signs), did they communicate — in that eternity-seeming time before they started to speak?!

Let us illustrate this way of posing the question with at least one group of examples of pre-verbal-language topological semantics. The polite gesture used by contemporary humans as a greeting — right hand shaking right hand (shaking both hands for some peoples) — previously meant an agreement for avoiding aggression between the two greeters. People today are not aware

³⁰ In analyzing these aspects, one distances oneself from the historical, psychological and sociological problems of reproductivity, and reproductivity is viewed as a semiotic model, and memory and mnemonic operations as characteristics of this model. The semiotic model remains a “third world” “between” the real world (society) and the psychological world, and in this position it has a mediating and also constructive role regarding both — as was already believed by Poincaré.

that associating the characteristics 'right' and 'left' with men and women, respectively, has been "almost universal" (Ivanov 1968b: 11).³¹ However, the association of topological 'right' with positive characteristics and 'left' with negative characteristics has been clearly preserved (also in verbal-language semantics) — this must be considered universal and of course older than verbal language itself (Ivanov 1972: 114, 118).

Although it is not possible to return to the age when verbal language began to form (and, as already stated, that is also not the intention here), it can still be emphatically claimed that nothing comes from nothing: it is clear that verbal language must have unavoidably (either directly or indirectly) taken over elements from the store of non-verbal communication. Movements, mime, sounds, song and behavioural signification as a whole created this syncretic background, into which verbal language was eventually woven. It is particularly in this context that one must agree with Mikhail Bakhtin when he reproof to "most linguists", who "see in a statement only the individual combination of purely language forms (lexical and grammatical); any other kinds of normative forms remain practically unnoticed by them and are not studied" (Bakhtin 1979: 259–260).³² The sign-creating syncreticity (multi-layeredness and multi-languagefulness) of the information-exchange processes, referred to by Bakhtin, has been one of the basic characteristics of the structure of culture. This phenomenon that is much older than verbal language was probably first formed together with ritual and rituality. "Man", as aptly and laconically claimed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, "is a ceremonial animal" (Wittgenstein 1997 [1979]: 2537).

³¹ That this is an ancient universality is confirmed, for example, by Stone Age burials, where the women were laid on the left side, and men on the right. For many peoples, houses were divided into a left wing for the women, and a right wing for the men (Ivanov and Toporov 1974: 267–268).

³² It should be added, however, that in his attempt to determine the non-language "forms" of a statement, Bakhtin did not aim to reduce them to universally valid structures.

5.3.1.1. Ritual and ritualizing reproductivity.

The systematic analysis of archaic ritual is not the subject of this study. In this context we are interested in those formal aspects of ritual and rituality that connect ritual with modern discourse, and which, via algorithms of the intellect, have a universal characteristic.

Myths have explained to people who they are, as well as the world around them. Throughout the ages, myths have been, and are still today, called upon to confirm and hold perceptions of the world's (cosmic) order and the exemplars, which deserve to be remembered. The effectiveness of the myth was and is guaranteed by ritualized acts. Ritual is an instrument in society for the preservation, mediation and amplification of myths (see also Pyatigorski and Uspenski 1967: 23). For an individual, ritual is the "mechanism" whereby he is "dedicated into the memory of the group" (Lotman 1992b: 6).

Thus, the mythological model has a projective structural axis, which connects the original sources (*первоисточники*) of the past (from the time of creation), and the ideal original forms (*пробразы*), with the present and the future (Meletinski 1976: 169–171). The actant (be it either the individual or the group) reproduces acts that have their roots in the "stable semantic system" (in the cosmogonic ancient times) of the past. He also considers these events to be omen for both the present and the future (Uspenski 1989: 19–20. cf. also Eliade 1992 IV: 69). The teleological function of the past, which is borne for the participant in the ritual by the gods and *patrum more*, determines fate (future).

From the aspect of sign-creation, two mutually-contrasting constructive origins can be noticed in the structure of ritual. On the one hand, it can be said that symbols, i.e. the alphabet of ritual (gestures, single acts, the entire signifying repertoire) is characterized by meaningful diffusion. Victor Turner, who has systematically studied archaic ritual, claims that every ritual, as a complete system, has "a core comprising dominant symbols",

which is always repeated at any performance of the ritual, and which is characterized by “extraordinary ambiguity [---] Each symbol expresses many topics and every topic is expressed through many symbols” (Turner 1983 [1973]: 33, 36, 40). Other authors who have also studied ritual indicate the meaningful elasticity of the signified elements of ritual, as well as their ambivalence and abundance of homological analogies that has also become apparent in the newer forms of ritual (Leach 1991 [1971]: 43; Meletinski 1976: 165; Kolakowski 2004 [1982]: 192). The structural significance of the indeterminacy of signs in magic, as we already know, has also been specifically studied by Umberto Eco (Eco 1997a; 1997b). Is it possible to unambiguously formulate the semantic meaning of the code signals “Good luck!”, “Merry Christmas!”, “Damn you!”?³³ We generally do not even think about what these words themselves actually mean... Edmund Leach reminds us that the various Christian sects use exactly the same myths, and carry out exactly the same ritual acts, but they “disagree passionately” about what these rituals mean (Leach 1991 [1971]: 43).

From this it can be concluded that the meaningful multiplanedness of the signifying single elements of ritual is controlled by the function and rigid syntagmatic ordering of these very elements in ritual as a complete text.³⁴ Thus the magical function of the above-cited three utterances can be completely unambiguously determined. In ritual, it is syntax that rises to dominate!

³³ A more detailed discussion of the code signal is found in 5.3.2.3.

³⁴ Thus does Victor Turner also define ritual as the “sequenceness of activities covering gestures, words and objects [---]” (Turner 1983 [1973]: 32). Konrad Lorenz draws attention to the situation that, in the case of ritualized behaviour, both animals and people “stick slavishly” to the sequence of the activities (Lorenz 1966: 280); in the opinion of Erik Erikson, ritualized behaviour must contain the agreed activity (interplay) of at least two individuals, which is repeated with “considered intervals” and in “repeated contexts” (Erikson 1969: 712). But these repeats, in the paradigmatic plane, may “always be mildly varying” (Leach 1991 [1971]: 81).

These two constructive aspects are well illustrated by the example of the Eucharist sacrament of the Christian church that is familiar to all. It has all the characteristics of ritual, and at the same time it is a central element of evangelical discourse and the liturgy of the Christian church.

Theologians, logicians and empiricists have crossed swords for centuries over the Biblical texts from which one could possibly draw the conclusion that ‘bread’ and ‘the body of Jesus (Jesus Christ in the Eucharist)’ is the one and the same substance (Matthew 26: 26; Mark 14:22; Luke 22: 19). This was nothing curious for the Catholics who proceed in their interpretation from metalanguage, where the code presumes the existence of miracles. The rationalist Martin Luther, however, claimed categorically that the “Catholics’ ‘bread is flesh’ is completely absurd — bread cannot be flesh, and Jesus did not say ‘*panis est corpus meum*’ but ‘*hoc est corpus meum*’” (emphasis — *P. L.*). See Kołakowski 2004 [1982]: 184.³⁵ Using such a code, Martin Luther takes off the agenda the semantic problem of the transubstantiation, and even the transessentiation, of bread.³⁶

This declaration, however, is also meaningful in another context: Luther himself also identifies bread with the body of Jesus (Christ), but not because of the substance but because of the *function* in the structure of the Last Supper, which in turn is *syntagmatically* the homeomorphic analogy of Jesus’ death by crucifixion — *bread, wine, sacrificial lamb* and *Jesus* himself now form a functionally and syntagmatically identical paradigm of sacrificial gifts despite being semantically varying. But the opposite placement in the act of the sacrificer (sacrifice) and the recipient of the sacrifice, is rigid, lasting and topologically unambiguous. Therefore, THAT (as essence and function) =

³⁵ *panis est corpus meum* (Lt) — bread is my flesh; *hoc est corpus meum* (Lt) — this is my flesh.

³⁶ transessentiatio < *essentia* (Lt — character) — transformation of essence; transubstantiation — transformation of substance. The Aristotelean interpretation of the transformation of substance would presume the transformation of the essence + form (i.e. physical transformation).

SACRIFICIAL GIFT (as essence and function), which seems to be the subject as indicated by Martin Luther.

The accentuation of the level of expression and (syntagmatic) form, has been described by both Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski. They have juxtaposed rituals with symbols on the level of signification, and concluded that these should be treated as antipodes — if the character of semiosis is considered. The relationship of the level of expression of a symbol (as a single sign) with content is “relatively arbitrary”. Ritual, on the other hand, “provides content with form” (*формирует содержание*) and “this always presumes the issue of ‘correct signing’, ‘correct naming’. The world can be seen as a complete text comprising of signs with different characters, where the content has been predetermined, and it is only necessary to know the language in order to bring together the level of expression and the content” (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 152).

Here it can already be seen that the semantic variety and multi-layeredness of single symbols is always controlled by the rigid *complete structure* of ritual. This generally valid aspect of ritual has been analyzed by Leszek Kolakowski on the level of religion. In his words,

the language of myth, in a certain way, is closed or self-affirming [--]. Everything that is said in the language of religion is comprehensible only in the complete semiotic framework of holiness [---] religion is not a collection of claims, it is a sphere of cult, where comprehension, knowledge, relatedness to the ultimate truth [---] and moral dedication perform as the one act, where a later separation into classes of metaphysical, moral and other decisions may be useful but unavoidably distorts the original meaning of the cult. (Kolakowski 2004 [1982]: 191, 194)

Any ritual at all is an integral whole — a “single act”, monad, World. For example, the series of burial acts (regardless of the character of the belief) or behavioural acts in initiation rites, are — regarding the content of the text — completely monofunctional, enduring and unable to be re-categorized.

Ritual, as a world, has three basic topological characteristics (groups of characteristics).

1) ritual is a chain of acts, behavioural acts, which take place in the World that is divided into two spaces — opposite in the existential sense, which are separated by a common border, or as worded by Mircea Eliade — a “threshold” (Eliade 1992 [1957] I: 55–56; Leach 1991 [1971]: 34–35);

2) ritual acts are communicative — they have addressors and addressees. The addressor in a ritual can be either the *speaker* or the *listener*, or both the *speaker* as well as the *listener*;

3) the mutual relationship, placement, of the addressor and addressee in a ritual can be described as an act, whose signification is characterized by various types of positioning and projective characteristics of inter-actant behaviour. On the basis of these characteristics, it is possible to analyze the model that has been sketched here, describing the analytical, but also the generative characteristics of its operation.

The “basic role of ritual”, as emphasized by Juri Lotman, “is the organization of memory” (*организация памяти*) (Lotman 1992b: 6).

The basic characteristics of ritual deserve to be covered in more detail.

Ritual, as already stated, is a discourse that is oriented to the reproduction of myth; it is a “memory mechanism” (Leach 1991 [1971]: 38–40). Be the rituals reproducing myths of prehistoric creation, the sacrificial death of Jesus, the deeds of ancient heroes or rites honouring the heroes of the historic past — on each such occasion the reproductive event(s) are accorded irrefutability, immunity, majesty and authority, which may climax in holiness. In other words — the chain of the occurrence and operation of the described acts, as a syntagmatic whole, is surrounded by an aura of immunity, authority and sacrality.

The concept ‘sacral’ was brought into scholarly use by Émile Durkheim to characterize religious beliefs. He used this to contrast the religious world, as a closed system protected by

prohibitions, with the “profane” world. Thus it was he who divided the world into “sacral” and “profane” space (Durkheim 1965 [1912]: 52, 56).

The relationship between these two existential categories is also analyzed in a monograph dedicated to this topic by Mircea Eliade. In his work, he extends the sacral sphere of validity by including in the sacral concept other existential spheres that border religion.

According to his views, people from archaic societies tend to “live as much as possible in sacrality”. For Eliade, sacral reality was something that is indeterminate — “*ganz andere*”, which is external to the natural experience of a person, to the ability of a person to express it, and is in contrast to everything that is profane (i.e. “natural”). (Eliade 1992 [1957] I: 52–53)³⁷ Here Mircea Eliade indicates the difference regarding the signified characteristics between the sacral and profane spaces. Indeed, the contrast of sacral text (space) to the profane is often expressed, for example, through the indeterminacy of language: the *speaker* talks to the *listener* in a language incomprehensible to the latter (Tambiah 1968: 177–179).³⁸

As regards the concept ‘naturalness’, here Eliade means substantial, not culturally conventional naturalness.³⁹ Profane

³⁷ In describing these features of sacrality, Eliade has used the timeless work by Rudolf Otto, “Das Heilige” (1917).

³⁸ Keeping the sacral space separate from the profane is also indicated in the “speaking in tongues” found in the Bible, which was introduced to Christianity from gnosticism (see 1 Corinthians 14: 1–25). For everybody in the profane space the language of the speaker is incomprehensible. This can be understood only by an “other-wordly” listener. According to Paul, someone “speaking in tongues” “speaketh not unto men, but unto God: for no man understandeth him; howbeit in the spirit he speaketh mysteries” (1 Corinthians 14: 2).

³⁹ A vivid example of the latter is the Enlightenment-era ‘*naturalness*’, which was the opposite, with a plus-sign, of everything that was signified (i.e. cultural). ‘*Natural*’ was equivalent to everything that was “untainted” by signification, such as a child, animal, “simple” person, “honest” feelings (Lotman 1970e: 26–32). As a complete opposite of this, however, the modernists claimed that the only “natural” environment was the space created by people, which was set in contrast to Rousseau-like “naturalness”. The fact

naturalness as substantial naturalness contrasts with “other-worldly” transcendental substance as the “mysterious” opposite of naturalness. This should be interpreted such that the “world” (i.e. our world) is actually a universe where the sacral has already been manifested”; “therefore a breakthrough from one [substantial — *P. L.*] level to another has become possible and repeatable”. Following the steps of Rudolf Otto, Eliade associates the entire other-worldliness of sacrality with the “super-ample”, “powerful force”, before which people perceive their profound irrelevance (Eliade 1992 [1957] I: 52–53, 57). From the aspect of reproductive behaviour, there is another factor in Eliade’s analysis that is noteworthy: he asserts that *sacral* can be equivalent to “power” (*resp.* force), “continuity”, “activity” and even to “*reality*” (of course in the substantive and not social meaning!), and that this is the case in the eyes of both native tribes and “post-modern societies” (Eliade 1992 I: 53). The “healing power” of things and activity in ritual is also written about by Victor Turner (Turner 1983 [1973]: 40). Vladimir Toporov has noted a conclusion from Mikhail Yevzlin’s monograph “Cosmogonics and Ritual”, which is fitting to summarize this argument: “... ritual models nature, being in its own way an operational model, through which the world is controlled and managed” (Yevzlin 1993: 17).

5.3.1.2. Reproductivity of ritual communication.

Our next task is to describe the signifying behaviour (communication) that takes place in ritual.

In defining ritual activity, the determination formulated by Émile Durkheim is well-suited: a rite is an “instruction (rules of

that Charles Baudelaire titled his famous essay “In Praise of Cosmetics [i.e. ‘non-natural’ — *P. L.*]” was not of course a coincidence. Keeping on the same wave length, he also arrogantly mocks, in this essay, the French King of the time, saying: “Woe to him who, like Louis XV (who was a product of a not true civilization but of a returned barbarity), is capable of tasting only “simple nature”! (Baudelaire 1938 [1860]: 260).

conduct) on how a person should behave when encountering a sacral object" (Durkheim 1965 [1912]: 56). There should also be interest (by extending Durkheim's determination) in how the sacral objects themselves "behave" in such an encounter.

The original ritual is a group discourse that can be treated as an integral whole.⁴⁰ The behaviour of the actants (group) in a ritual is functionally identical, and this enables, by the relevant simplification of the model, the description of the ritual as (a chain of) behavioral act(s) of a single addressor, which can be interpreted as the one (and only one) text — and (in principle) even as one sign.

In order to be able to describe semiotically the ritual behavioural task formulated by Durkheim, the "instruction" needs to be translated into the language of communicative and signified categories, which we have already briefly encountered in other contexts.

In the semiotic description of ritual as a behavioural discourse, it needs to be considered that the addressor in ritual (who can be either *I* or *we*) is the generator of speech reality.

The nature of reality in ritual deserves to be determined more precisely.

'Objective reality' is used to mean that sphere of reality, which exists outside thought and speech. In the epistemological context, the relationship of subject — *ego ~ me* with its objective reality becomes important⁴¹. Semiotics "sees" reality through sign systems (via sign systems).

The world of signs knows basically three types of realities — virtual, actual and speech. Virtual reality is a reality that exists as a closed system of language (or cultural language) meanings. This reality cannot be changed by either single individuals or specific situations: the same words can be explained using different words from this self-sufficient system, or via the

⁴⁰ See also Leach 1991 [1971]: 43–44.

⁴¹ Husserl and other phenomenologists (as the reader already knows) have reduced this to an intellect-internal ontological phenomenon of objective reality.

internal rules of this system. But this also means that for the clarification of one's own thoughts, one does not need to carry objects around with one's self, as was done in the land of the Lilliput in Jonathan Swift's "Gulliver's Travels".

Actual reality is a world of denotata, which is designated by signs.

Speech reality is reality that is created in the *me* and *you* communication act, where the neutral, dictionary-like meanings of signs, as we all know from personal experience, are substantially transformed.⁴² This happens for various reasons, including those that are realized through the operations of the algorithms of the intellect that are examined here.

It should be added that virtual reality is understandably a source for speech reality, and vice versa (although with a much slower tempo).

Ritual is the egocentric recursive speech reality of *me* (*resp. us*). In the interest of the further analysis the aspects of this speech reality, it is essential to describe the sign-creating substrate, which "forms" the inter-actant communication in ritual. For this, we need to clarify the categorical repertoire of signs.⁴³ Signs can be divided into three categories, according to the character of the reference: informative, performative and formative signs (Uspenski 2007: 50–52).⁴⁴

The object of reference for informative signs is not speech (*parole*), but only language (*langue*) — the world of virtual meanings, a system of concepts. Reference excludes actual

⁴² In an actual speech act, *he* (*they*) can also be present, but with the mediation of some *me* (*us*). A separate *he* can only function in a potential speech act. In defining reality, the author has relied considerably on the new monograph by Boris Uspenski on the communicative space. See (Uspenski 2007: 9–10, 12, 14, 35–36, 56).

⁴³ The following classification was worded by Boris Uspenski (Uspenski 2007: 50–52).

⁴⁴ As stated previously, ritual as a complete text is treated here as one sign, and the group performing the ritual is treated as *one* actant. Such an approach is economic and semiotically justified for describing the communication model of ritual.

reality. An actant can of course also set its relationship with a real denotatum, which can be signified by, for example, the word 'tree', but this reference is mediated: what is being signified here, in the semiotic sense, is still the class of abstract meanings — in this case 'tree'.

In contrast, the reference of a performative sign is carried directly to the denotatum (incl. to some active act) of the actual reality (which can also be an imagined denotatum, to whom a real existence has been accorded). Denotatum is outside the sphere of abstract meanings. The meaning of a performative does not depend directly on language. A vivid example of this class of signs is indeed the proper noun: that designated by the proper noun is not a language phenomenon, but it also cannot be separated from the signifier — they are One. The signifier, often, has no meaning or sense.⁴⁵

Verbs that directly express action can also be performative (verbs in the narrow meaning of this term) (e.g. "...I swear") or utterances (e.g. "No Smoking!"), which start to bear the function of a name (Uspenski 2007: 51–52).

Formative signs, as determined by Boris Uspenski, do not set direct relationships with reality (with actual or virtual, language reality), but only via the speech act — in the communication process. The direct object of the reference, in such a case, is communication, the communicative relationship itself. In addition, the formative sign could be connected with the denotatum, i.e. with the actual reality, even without that relationship being mediated by linguistic expression — such are pronouns and deictic adverbs, for example 'here', 'now', and others that designate a formative relationship with actual reality in communication (Uspenski 2007: 51–52). A formative reference is oriented to the topological form of communication.

⁴⁵ The concept of 'meaning' here is called upon to designate the intra-language reference for an informative sign; the reference of 'sense' is formed in the communication act itself. (It is immediately obvious that the extent of both these concepts partially overlap.)

The topological dimension that is disclosed in communication exists for all formative signs.

The addressees of ritual — *you* (and *he (they)*) — may be god(s), spirit(s), *patrum more*, and also the actant himself: as the autocommunicative addressee⁴⁶. *I (we)* and *you* fulfil the role of: either *speaker* or *listener*, or both *speaker* and *listener* — either taking turns or simultaneously⁴⁷. Setting the relationships for the actants takes place in the World (in the monad), which is divided into the sacral and profane spheres, of which the actants are the signs. There is a border between the sacral and profane spheres, which separates the speaker(s) and listener(s) existentially, axiologically, topologically, and intellectually.

We will not continue further with the existential status (meaning) of signs: this is determined by their belonging to either the sacral or profane world, which we have already characterized.

The mutual relationship between these two spheres is axiologically “mapped” in the form of hierarchies that (symmetrically) contrast positive, neutral or negative values.

What is more concealed, but particularly interesting regarding the objectives of this work, is the topological nature of the signs (actants) in the world that can be explicated via ritual communication.

Let us first refer to the circumstance that it is just not possible to define axiological hierarchies by excluding topological parameters. The topological substrate in the text of rituals is also mediated by the structural characteristics of deictic and proper-noun signs⁴⁸. Pronouns are deictic signs (including personal pronouns that are particularly important from the communication aspect), which do not have a direct relationship with the objects that they signify, but only through the communication process.

⁴⁶ Recursiveness (*recurrere* (Lt) — to return) in ritual expresses a return to the one and the same motive and/or role for setting the relationships in the process of communication (cf. Eliade 1992, I: 57).

⁴⁷ Further details follow.

⁴⁸ *deiknynai* (Gr) — to refer to, affirm > *deiktikos* — able to refer to.

(For more detail, see Uspenski 2007: 12–13, 17.)⁴⁹ Deicticity is an “orientation machine”, which grammarizes and topologizes the mutual placement of actants (see also Merilai 1995, 10: 2090–2091). Therefore, *I* is topologically determinable, as a formative sign, regarding the method of placement, in relation to *you* (*him, their*) and the other spatial substances that can be fixed as pronouns (adverbs).

But, as has been said, the *speaker(s)* and *listener(s)* may also be connected, as proper nouns, which in the topological sense is a 0-distance: the sign fulfilling the function of a name (lexeme or act) is identified with the bearer of the name.⁵⁰

Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski have jointly declared that “in mythological consciousness the sign is analogous to proper nouns” and that “as a maximum abstraction, the general meaning of a proper noun will be reduced to myth” (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 284, 286) — and this in an existential, functional as well as in an intellectual sense.

In summarizing the above, it can now be asserted that the actual communication between the profane and sacral sphere in ritual is speech reality that takes place in the form of formative and performative semiosis.

5.3.2. The universal, generative functions of ritual

The description of the performative and formative communication of the actants of ritual, on the basis of referential

⁴⁹ The word *I* (and other personal pronouns) has no meaning whatsoever in language if it does not refer to a person (persons) who says (say) this about himself (themselves) in a speech situation, and who is (are) signified by the personal pronoun. The person saying “I” communicates automatically either with another (others) — with *you* as an actual or potential addressee, and/or with himself — in autocommunication. But *I*, as opposed to a name (e.g. Mary), can be determined only via a speech situation and not via an object, which is natural in the case of a name as a sign (Uspenski 2007: 86).

⁵⁰ In the mythological sphere of ritual, proper nouns have a clearly expressed unconventional character, through which their ontological nature is emphasized (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 286–287).

characteristics, casts light on the fact that the intellectual algorithms, which have been characterized in previous chapters as *a priori* intellect-based phenomena, have been explicated in the structure of ritual via certain sign-creating characteristics.

However, all the algorithms of the intellect also have their own specific role in the structure of ritual, and together they form a systemic whole.

Let us look at these functions (communication schemas) one at a time.

It could be claimed that the actant, in reproducing the instructions (text) of the *patrum more* in the ritual, is in the operational sense the profane sphere's listener, who identifies existentially with a certain role in sacral acts and adopts the mythological language of the sacral sphere. This is mediated by the (cultural) memory, and a name (names) is (are) given to the act in that language. When the Romans had the rising to the heavens of the soul of the emperor enacted as an eagle swooping from a fire into the expanse (the eagle had been previously tied by the feet to a log and the lit fire burned through the ropes), then the archaic language of ritual does not permit this to be considered a "trick" (neither then nor now). In ritual, the eagle was identified with the emperor — not only symbolically but also mythologically. Amongst the people who witnessed this scene there were enough of those who gave meaning to the event by using the mythological alphabet of the sacralized sphere (using the same alphabet according to which the number "13" or a black cat crossing one's path are even today considered to be unlucky).⁵¹ Ernst Cassirer has emphasized that ritual as an act does not depict or imitate events, facts, persons or ideas, but is indeed these events, persons, facts themselves. "In mythological thought there is no category of the ideal." The performance of a dancer in a mythological performance is not a game: the person dancing is indeed (for example) a god, he identifies with the god

⁵¹ Ethelbert Stauffer, who describes such scenes in his fascinating book, does not seem to consider this aspect (Stauffer 1966: 204).

(Cassirer 1966 [1955]: 38–39; see also Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 282–293). This is a process that characterizes performative reference. Yevgeni Bertels has described *ta'zije*, which is a good characterization of such a reference.⁵² The performance that is described takes place annually on the anniversary of the killing of Husain ibn Ali, the leader of the Shiites and nephew of the prophet Muhammad (Ali's assassins were Sunnites). After the performance described by Bertels, the troupe of actors had to walk through the town, where the people greeted the participants. Russian prisoners-of-war, however, were forced to play the roles of the Sunnite assassins (the ritual events were staged in the second half of the 19th century, the time of the extensive invasion of Central Asia by Russia). All the “negative” actors were beaten mercilessly by the audience during the procession (and this apparently happened every year) (Bertels 1924). The audience here, for their interpretation of the performance, understandably used the mythological alphabet: the Russian prisoner's “name”, due to the performance, became ‘*Husain's killer*'.

In the process of identifying with something mythologically, the actant may even transform into the name of the space in which it is performing.

When the Nenetz shamans carry out a ritual, they wear clothing where the headwear identifies with the Higher World (*nuw nyangi*), the gown with the Middle World (*jer nyangi*) and the footwear with the Under World (*ngilad nyangi*) (Hoppál 2000: 124)⁵³. The identification acts of the microcosmos (*I*) and the macrocosmos (*Expanse*) can be treated in the same performative key (see Segal and Senokossov 1970: 80; Gurevich 1972: 52–56; Meletinski 1976: 212).

⁵² *ta'zije* is a ritualized performance in Islamic culture for remembering certain sacral events.

⁵³ *nuw nyangi* — belonging to the heavens; *jer nyangi* — belonging to the Middle World; *ngilad nyangi* — belonging to the Under World (Nenetz language). (M. Hoppál has quoted the 1998 study by L. Lar titled “Шаманы и боги” (Shamans and Gods).)

Such mythological acts should be able to be termed analytical behaviour, based on the classification of Pyatigorski and Uspenski that was previously introduced. It should also be kept in mind that the sacral sphere, which is reproduced by the magician or any participant of the ritual, is a hierarchized space in the axiological and topological plane, which is divided into the relative steps of “higher and common sacrality” (Segal and Senokossov 1970: 80).⁵⁴

But any kind of ritual has always had a pragmatic purpose, as has been unanimously asserted by scholars: it is called upon to influence spirits, gods, forces of nature and people themselves — ritual as a whole is generally a magic (instrumental) act, which is carried out or inspired by an actant (or a collective) that has “entered” the sacral sphere of its memory.

It is then unavoidable that the addressor begins to fulfil the role of the *speaker*, at the same time as fulfilling the role of the *listener*. In this function it starts generating a behavioural text.⁵⁵ On the sign-creation plane, it also produces performative signs: a magical act — a behavioural, spoken or other kind of pointing act — is a name, the use of which thereby designates the indivisibility of the act, which is being signified, from the operation. Saying the word is equivalent to carrying out the signifying action (Uspenski 2007: 51). “Naming reality changes its nature and the character of behaviour.” Juri Lotman’s discussion (actually supposition), that “the original function of speech was associated with magic”, also proceeds from the generative character of performative signs (Lotman 1992b: 8,

⁵⁴ From this approach one can logically derive that mythological performative reproduction, in the existential plane, may also be the so-called zero-option: in carrying out ritualistic operations, the sphere of sacral existence is not always “entered”, and the operations are carried out as an everyday routine in the everyday profane rhythm. The more dangerous operations, and those that are marginal in some other sense, are generally sacralized. (See Malinowski 1926: 107–119; Segal and Senokossov 1970: 76–77).

⁵⁵ Cf. Mauss 2000 [1904]: 154. The standard for the magicality of ritual could be considered to be mythological cosmogony, which is the paradigmatic model for all kinds of creation and being (Eliade 1992, IV: 53–57).

20). These claims are in accordance with the information of Clyde Kluckhohn on the Navaho Native Americans, who, in order to participate in ritualistic acts, were all obliged to be aware of the secrets of sorcery. Otherwise they would be in danger of dying during the presentation of the ritual (cited by Segal 1970: 40). They were not observers.

A magical effect is created directly, irreversibly, automatically, and it is personalized. It is indeed the performativity of a magical act that creates a formal basis for the claim that "in folklore a person is automatically great, not thanks to other people, he is himself big and strong, he is capable of defeating the entire enemy force on his own (like Cuchulinn⁵⁶)" (Bakhtin 1987 [1975]: 96).

Therefore, mythological as well as magical acts have a performative role, on the sign-creation plane, in communication. It also becomes apparent that mythological and magical behaviour are partially overlapping concepts as regards structure. The differences in performance are indeed to do with the fact that the actant of a mythological act is the *listener* (this is a name-taking situation); the actant of a magical act is the *speaker* (this is a naming situation). Taking a name is an analytical mimetic act; whereas naming is a generative, irreversible performative act that implements *force*. But the use of *force* is often associated with the "amplifying" delegation of the role of *speaker* to a "third party".⁵⁷

The border-"problem" is also different. In a mythological act, the profane and sacral spheres merge and the border ceases to exist. The actant of a magical act inspires a new border.⁵⁸ A

⁵⁶ Cuchulinn — hero of Irish sagas.

⁵⁷ Compare here the Estonian or the Russian expressions: "Andku Jumal sulle (talle) tervist" (May God give you (him) health); "Õnn kaasa!" (Good luck!); "Бог в помощь!" ("God help us!"), etc. Here we have in all cases a (partial) delegation of the magical acts to a "third party".

⁵⁸ It should be noted that the primitive man who carried out a ritual was naturally not aware of the borders separating the spheres through abstract, categorical characteristics, but in the hierarchical form of existential and axiological values (see Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 283–284), and — *nota*

magical act presumes a border: the object that/whom is influenced/persuaded, is located “there”, or it is not seen, or emphasizes (if it is seen), the addressor of the magical act emphasizes the location of the object in relation to it in the “other” sphere. Even when the object of the magic act is *me* (in an autocommunicative act) — even then the magicity of a behavioural act is only possible if two, existentially, axiology-cally and topologically different parties are made aware of it.⁵⁹

This analysis permits observation of one more nuance — the secondary deictic characteristic of performative sign-creation. Boris Uspenski contrasts performative and deictic sign-creation on the basis of the direction of speech acts, which are said not to occur in the former case. It should be added, however, that we believe that a deictic structural characteristic could accompany a performative act — the signified image of this is the progression of the performance act, and the moves that transform these acts into a plot. The magical effect may be automatic (irreversible), but the act itself may be (and as a rule it is) lasting and semantically accented (in strict correspondence with the standard set by the *patrum more*)⁶⁰.

bene! — all this within the limits of the intellectual “abilities”, which have been given to humans, and the semiotic characteristics of which are being examined here.

⁵⁹ The important — autocommunicative — addressee of ritual as a collective magical act is the group (collective person) itself that is performing the ritual.

⁶⁰ For example, the progress of the rite may even contain (antithetic) asides (metaphors) that have a “misleading” effect: a magical initiation rite may include sex change role play, which Carl Jung has treated as an element of an initiation archetype, but which actually does not overturn the final effect of the signified act — the magical acquisition of sex (Jung *et al.* 1964: 128–132).

Mircea Eliade, however, has seen here a regular series of magical acts: “it is not possible to become a sexually mature man before one has experienced the co-existence of the sexes — androgyny; in other words: one cannot reach some kind of separate and definite realization of ways of being [the name cannot be taken — *P. L.*] before one has experienced a way of being, generally [i.e. before one has undergone the regulated sequence of name-allocation — *P. L.*]” (Eliade 1998 [1958]: 175).

And one more generalizing observation. A (profane) actant who “enters” a ritual act is, as already noted, simultaneously a *listener*, who reproduces the text stored in the (cultural) memory (= analytical act), and a *speaker* who generates text, influencing the gods, spirits and himself. It is noteworthy that the semiotic mechanism of such a dual role of *listener/speaker* is not at all marginal, i.e. ritual-specific. Boris Uspenski, in describing any kind of text-decoding process, has emphasized that “understanding” a text, i.e. the ‘meaning’ of a text as a “translation”, cannot be separated at all from the communication process, and, in addition, “understanding has the character of thought-creation”. It then follows from the meaning of this claim that “understanding [reproducing — *P. L.*] is analogous to modelling [generation — *P. L.*], understanding is realized through modelling”: in order to understand the text, the addressee must be capable of placing himself in the generating position of the addressor = the creator of the text (Uspenski 2007: 101, 112–113).⁶¹ There is nevertheless a difference between their roles: the reproducer (the one understanding) places himself in the role of the listener, whereas the generator (modeler) is in the role of the speaker.

The communication between the profane and the sacral in ritual is not limited to performative sign-creation, which is recurrently characteristic to ritual. The magical role of the addressor is supported by a religious submissive relationship to god(s), spirits, the authority of the *patrum more*. Belief in forces that are more powerful than man belongs by its very nature to ritual (Malinowski 1998 [1925]: 87–91; Wittgenstein 1997 [1979]: 2532–2534). Supernatural forces “demand ‘signs’ of

⁶¹ Traditionally, these communication processes have been analyzed by contrasting coding (activity of the addressor) and decoding (activity of the addressee). See, for example (Jakobson 1968 [1960]: 353). Boris Uspenski believes that there apparently is no special decoding mechanism present in the human brain. In the brain of the addressee there are only the means to identify the formal elements of language (message), which is not sufficient, however, for switching from form to content. (Uspenski 2007: 111–112).

submission” (Leach 1991 [1976]: 83). Most of the major religions have founded the fundamental teaching on communication between man and God on this structural characteristic of ritual behaviour (and have accented this): according to the words of Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, religion was born from the “absolute feeling of dependency directed to godliness” (cited by Cassirer 1997 [1944]: 138). Cf. “And unto Adam he [God] said: ... for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.” (Genesis 3: 17, 19). In Christianity, the submission of man to God has been formulated ontologically and (against the background of the bliss of the Garden of Eden) in the form of tragic imperatives: a sinner from birth, and the only way out (to God’s shining love) for man destined to die from his sinfulness is the way of submission: “...lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat and live for ever ... the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken” (Genesis 3: 22–23).

In religious acts, however, the *listener* may also place himself, in a way, in the role of a *speaker*. Following the spirit of those characteristics of magic that we have indicated previously: in order to achieve the mercy of the gods, the concepts of sacrificing to God (see Lotman 1992b: 13), and approaching God, have been brought into *religio* (into the knowledge that you depend on the gods) and into cults — “therefore, magic tricks” (Balthasar 1994 [1974]: 1900), which are echoed there in various kinds of symbolic acts. Both magical and religious instructions are provided (directed) by transcendental forces — a ‘*force*’ that is personified or identified (able to be identified) with the addressor (see also Malinowski 1998 [1925]: 87). In religious communication this *force* operates as a *speaker* in the function of an addressee who, in the process of ritual acts, is the communication partner for a submissive *listener*.

From the aspect of sign-creation, the created situation is utterly formative: the major religions have accorded verticality to the *me* and *you* (or *him*) communication. The mutual placement of the addressor (*listener*) and addressee (*speaker*) is

emphatically topological. Hans Urs von Balthasar claims, in justifying the analogy between Christian and non-Christian mystography that “with the best that there is in him [man — *P. L.*], he belongs ‘up there’” (Balthasar 1994 [1974]: 1901). Mircea Eliade has also concluded that “no world can exist without verticality” (Eliade 1992, VI: 69). This verticality also has axiological weight: “And he [Jesus — *P. L.*] said unto them [the Jews — *P. L.*]: “Ye are from beneath, I am from above; Ye are of this world [profane — *P. L.*], I am not of this world. I said therefore unto you, that ye shall die in your sins” (John 8: 23, 24).⁶² Religious communication in both pagan and Christian ritual is hierophanic — revelatory: “the sacral *reveals* itself to us — through an actual or imaginary *speaker* (Eliade 1992, I: 53, emphasis — *P. L.*). The addressor of the ritual transforms in the religious formative position into a *listener*, who believes and submits to the proclamations that are accorded to God.

The second manifestation of formative reference in the structure of ritual is the binary opposition of the sacral (*resp.* able to be sacralized) sphere to the profane sphere.⁶³ The (world) ‘*out there*’ — the (world) ‘*here*’, *them-us* and the numerous variations of such opposites (*yin-yang*, heaven–earth, the dead–the living, right–left, mythological twins, orphan–master’s daughter, etc are polarized (see Abramyan 1977: 72–73).⁶⁴ The organization of the world on the basis of polar characteristics is an ancient manifestation of universal classifications. Apparently

⁶² The dominance of this up-down vertical positioning in the topological relationships of the addressee–addressor in ritual must nevertheless be considered to be recent, and a phenomenon cultivated by the major religions. As asserted by Edmund Leach, the border that separated the sacral ‘other world’ from the profane sphere could be the sky, the sea, mountains, a forest or desert (Leach 1991 [1971]: 72).

⁶³ Antithesis has been analyzed in more detail in Chapter 3 of the book.

⁶⁴ The Chinese *yin* as the dark beginning is in turn divided into a series of mythological similarities, according to which everything female — the earth, moon, north, gloom, death, even numbers, etc are opposites of the light beginning — *yang*, which is similar to maleness, sky, sun, south, light, life, odd numbers, etc (Riftin 1982: 547).

this communicative operation — that is characteristic of the intellect — has found such an extensive culture-textual embodiment due to the natural need to contrast *chaos and cosmos* and the outside world beyond the horizon (foreign) to one's own world.

Archaic culture, as emphasized by Dmitri Segal, is antinomic both on the paradigmatic as well as on the syntagmatic plane. Every time a behavioural act affects one of the poles of a contrast, there is also indication of the other (Segal 1973: 39). The addressee of the reference in antithetic communication can be defined as the existential, axiological and/or topological antipode (mirror projection) of the addressor, and vice versa (Abramyan 1983: 136–137)⁶⁵. Outside this communicative contrast the antithetic characteristics of neither actant are relevant or they even retreat (e.g. the *us–them* concept). All this expresses the direction of the reference towards deictic and topological processes — i.e. formative sign-creation. But the formative reference between the two antipodes does not necessarily have to be entirely exclusive. For example, if with two opposite *fratrias*⁶⁶ one is depicted as the embodiment of negative values and the other as dominantly positive, then, for both of them it could be “hinted” that some value(s) from the other opposite pole is (are) also present.⁶⁷ Very rigid antithetic structures are relatively recent and are particularly apparent in the cultures located in Old and New Testament areas of influence (Segal 1973: 40, 42, 44) and, as seen in Chapter 3, in certain types of modern cultures.

The antithetic placements in rituals that are connected by formative reference may be existential (*‘this-worldly’ contra ‘other-worldly’*), calendar-based (everyday and solstice-time behaviour), functional (identity-change during carnival time), role-based (activity that in common practice symbolizes life may,

⁶⁵ Chapter 3 examines this formal phenomenon as a symmetrical reduction and mirror projection of Soviet ideology.

⁶⁶ *fratria* — association of tribes in the prehistoric period.

⁶⁷ In some cultures, for example the Navaho Native Americans, this “hint”, according to Clyde Kluckhohn, is even obligatory (see Segal 1973: 40).

in a shamanic act, denote death) (Segal 1973: 40–41), effect-based (white and black magic; every magical act can have a magical counter-act — Malinowski 1998 [1925]: 85), ontogenetic and social (a change of social status or sex that accompanies an initiation rite). One thing, however, is clear: antithetic formative reference is a recurring characteristic in the structure of ritual. The border between two opposite spheres may run between the profane and sacral, between two sacral spheres, or between a sacral sphere and one that could be sacralized. One of the poles of antithesis in ritual must be a sacral factor, or a factor that can be sacralized, of a positive value scale.

Formative reference in antithetic semiosis makes it possible to draw one more general (and somewhat problematic) conclusion. Culture scholars have noticed, whilst researching antithetic communicative placements, that archaic formative antinomy is not apparent just on a functional or pragmatic behavioural plane, but also on a more abstract cognitive level (Segal 1973: 39). We have already referred to Boris Porshnev regarding his information that the personal pronouns denoting *I* and *we* have appeared in language considerably later than the pronouns denoting *they* and *he* (Porshnev 1979 [1966]: 81). This brings us to the inevitable conclusion that the formative reference for the semantic identification of 'he' and 'they' could not have proceeded from *I* and *we*. What could have the person in the archaic era then have meant, semantically, with the use of *he* and *they*? There is only one presumed answer: the *he* and *they* of ritual was constructed as an enantiomorphic mirror projection of behavioural models that had taken root in the tradition of the actants of a sacral (holy) sphere. The referential object that was thus created as a negative sign could, in turn, be the antithetic basis for the formation of *I* (*we*). This is a presumption, but it does enable the explanation of both the secondariness and vagueness of the concepts of *I* (and *we*), and also the structural meaning of these performative acts in ritual, which we characterized above as the mythological identification act of the addressor of a ritual with the sacral sphere (with the *patrum*

more). Indeed, *I* and *we* probably lacked — for a long time — a separate identity from the *patrum more*.

We have hitherto characterized the mythological, magical, religious and antithetic functions of semiosis in the communication between the profane and sacral sphere of ritual. But there is yet one other form of reference, and its applicable function, which should be called metaphoric or figurative.

To delve deeper into this concept, let us proceed from one of the classification schemas of Roman Jakobson, which permits the characterization of figurativeness in a wider context and systematically. Jakobson adds figurativeness (metaphoricality) to Peirce's well-known triple reference system — icon/index/symbol — as a new, fourth element, and calls it artifice⁶⁸ (Jakobson 1985h [1975]: 215–216).

This step is supported by the following logic. Jakobson postulates that Peirce's triad actually combines elements of two binary opposing pairs. These base oppositions are, on the one hand: 'contiguous'—'similar' and, on the other hand: 'factual'—'imputed'. Having transferred this observation to Peirce's system, Jakobson concludes that the "contiguity" of the level of expression, and the level of content, of the sign is "factual" in the *index*; in the *symbol* the "contiguity" becomes "imputed". The "factual similarity" of the two components of the sign in the *icon* is converted into "imputed similarity" in the (creative) *artifice* (*resp.* metaphor). In addition, Jakobson draws attention to one of the topological peculiarities of the referential structure of metaphor, which is in accordance with the temporal characteristics of Peirce's reference scheme. In other words, Peirce links the icon with past experience, the index with present experience, and the symbol with future experience. Jakobson claims that reference, in such a system of characteristics, is

⁶⁸ Jakobson is actually talking about a figurative sign (reference act). Jakobson claims that he borrowed the term from Gerald Hopkins's "Poetic Diction" (1865), where Hopkins characterizes the figurativeness of parallelism (artificiality) in poetry. (A good illustration of this is the cumulative metaphoricism of the parallelism rows in Estonian runic verse.)

characterized by the atemporality of the artifice: the equivalent "parallel" components of metaphor are always located in a "common context" (and this even when it is elliptically implicated) (Jakobson 1985h [1975]: 215–216).

This observation by Jakobson deserves to be developed further. It could be claimed that all five types of the sign (functions) (mythological, magical, religious, antithetic and figurative) in ritual can be differentiated and described in the context of three semiotic paradigms, which are the category of reference (performative, formative, informative); form of reference (icon, index, symbol and artifice), as well as the communicational and existential mode of linkage of the components of the sign (similar–contiguous; factual–imputed). See Table 1 for a representation of this system.

This operational schema of communication lacks a very important feature, which characterizes the **analytical reproductivity** of the intellect, and which is present in the same way in all five types of ritual semiosis. (For this very reason it was also left out of the representation described in Table 1). The typology of signified communication in ritual is invalid without it. As previously stated, the addresser in ritual does not behave according to his own volition: his generative acts rest rigidly on certain mnemonic baggage, the authority of which is exhibited by ritual as a whole. This adds to the typological structure of communication one more sign-creating element – the "umbilical cord", which links the act to the sacralizable values of *patrum more*. In the language of reference categories, this is a case of **formative – autocommunicative – semiosis**, which is characterized by **genuine iconicity**. Typologically, this is mythological semiosis. As an example, it is particularly obvious how the analytical mnemonic semiosis of signs such as black, homosexual, jew, etc, and dependent behavioural precedents, are as often as not governed by formative sacralized icons, with the character of collective relicts, that have accumulated in (collective) memory. The durability of such relicts can often be measured in thousands of years...

In the context of the Table 1, the following needs to be said about metaphors in general and metaphors in ritual.

Table 1. Typology of signifying communication (in ritual).⁶⁹

Type and function of the sign \ Characteristics of semiosis	Category of reference	Form of reference	Communicational and existential form of linkage of the components of the sign ⁷⁰
mythological (Mt) ⁷¹	performative	icon (incl. genuine icon) ⁷²	factual similarity
magical (Mg)	performative	symbol ⁷³ (index, icon)	factual contiguity
religious (R)	formative	symbol	imputed contiguity
antithetic (Ant)	formative	icon as enantiomorphic symmetry ⁷⁴	factual complementarity and polar similarity ⁷⁵
figurative (metaphoric) (Mf)	formative and performative	artifice/symbol/	imputed similarity/ conditional similarity/ imputed contiguity ⁷⁶

⁶⁹ The table should be treated as an initial operational tool for organizing generative orientation. Actual processes are naturally more dynamic and may be intertwined.

⁷⁰ Linkage is described from the viewpoint of the linker.

⁷¹ The abbreviations Mt, Mg, R, Ant and Mf may be used in the following text in the manner indicated in Column 1.

⁷² See 2.2. for more detail on the genuine icon.

⁷³ A symbol is a syncretic reference form, which as a rule contains iconic and indexical elements.

⁷⁴ Enantiomorphic symmetry can be described as endophoric and/or exophoric iconicity. For more detail, see 2.2.

⁷⁵ Here is meant enantiomorphic similarity with a negative sign (see Chapter 3).

⁷⁶ Conditional similarity is valid for example in musical semiosis and also in abstract art. For more detail, see Jakobson 1985d [1970]: 327. In order to comprehend the metaphoric indeterminacy of sign-creation, reference needs to be made to the "formula of play" as expressed by Lotman, and referred to previously. Translated into the language of psychological concepts, this could also be expressed as: I know that $S \neq P$, but at the same time I believe that $S = P$.

Metaphor belongs to the system of tropes as one of the many mechanisms (functions) of "semantic indefiniteness".⁷⁷ A trope is created on the contact border between two languages and, as claimed by Juri Lotman, it is, in that context, "isostructural, with a creative consciousness".⁷⁸ A trope "comes to the fore in systems that are oriented to complexity, ambiguity and the inability to express the truth" (Lotman 1981a: 18).

In defining a metaphor, I will use as my basis John Searle's discussions that are in accord with the standpoints of Juri Lotman. Searle himself does not write about formativeness but, in essentially accenting the formativeness of the metaphor, Searle claims that the metaphor is a speech act, where the meaning of the utterance "S is P" becomes "S is R". In attempting to further explain the principles of what it is that can even connect "P" (in the statement "S is P") with "R", Searle lists the following possibilities:

- i) things that are P, according to definition, are R;
- ii) things that are P, are conditionally R;
- iii) things that are P, are said or are believed to be R;
- iv) things that are P, are not R nor are they similar to R-things and they are not believed to be R; nevertheless there remains the fact of our sensibility (due to either culture or nature), that we actually perceive this connection. (Searle 1979: 107–108)

Here Searle concludes that metaphors, which are not created on the basis of any "rules" or "principles", can also be products of our mental capacity.

Metaphors (and other tropes) have special relationships with ritual. We must begin with the observation that archaic ritual has rigid rules. Ritual is behavioural text with constant functions that is cyclically mediated. The events of a ritual take place (they are reproduced) in a sacred (*resp.* sacralized) sphere, from which a

⁷⁷ Lotman defines a trope as "two elements that hold meanings that are mutually incompatible, between which, in a certain context, an adequacy-relationship is formed" (Lotman 1981a:10).

⁷⁸ iso- <isos (Gr) — same, equal.

reverent, submissive distance is kept that is protected by taboos.⁷⁹ Multiple meanings and uncertainty on the pragmatic level of ritual are in principle excluded — “in mythological text itself, a metaphor as such is actually impossible” (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 293). Indeed, a magic act has the purpose and role encompassing the whole (the eagle flying out of the flames is the soul of the emperor — *factually*), a performative name is unique, and the enemy is the symmetrical antipode of the predictably sacralized standard.⁸⁰

But in addition to the cyclical worldview, a vectorial development also emerged. The need to remember ever increasing amounts of information “gave birth to the memory mechanism, which was artistic by its very nature” (Lotman 1992b: 20). This “artistic” (ambivalent, i.e. having the structural order of play) memory model (where, putting it simply, one sign has at least two simultaneous meanings) received an immense boost when man learned to separate the word, and the thing signified by the word, from each other. But the text with “indefinite” meaning stayed, in addition to the sacral ritual, as “chatter” in the profane sphere. Metaphorality could emerge on the border of transition from the sacral to the profane sphere. Here the different languages clashed, where one part was formed by collective and “legitimate” languages, and the other part by individual and occasional languages.

And even when the profane sphere with its “games, drinking-sprees and permissiveness” broke down the rigid borders of the sacral world, the initial result was the ritualization (i.e. legitimization) of profanity (ambiguity) itself (Lotman 1992b: 20). All this is particularly vividly seen in the medieval carnival

⁷⁹ If such a relationship does not exist, then it is a case of a practical act, which is not given a signified meaning.

⁸⁰ Clyde Kluckhohn, whose research is cited by Dmitri Segal, has also noticed in his studies on the Navaho that opposites are always constructed so that the antipode contains “at least one characteristic that is inherent to the opposite category” (Segal 1973: 40), which of course does not remove antithesis itself as a principle in the structuring of material.

culture, which has been thoroughly documented by Mikhail Bakhtin. In the Saturnalias and Christian passion plays, God and the emperor may be re-personified, "in play", as a slave, a criminal or a jester (Bakhtin 1987 [1975]: 106). But play or artistic quality (metaphorality), which is *a priori* a characteristic of human intellect, finally and irreversibly destroyed the borders between the sacral and the profane world, joined the other sign functions in ritual, and transformed ritual into art — in the form of folk legends, folk tales, heroic epics, dramatized passion plays. But this did not mean at all the complete disappearance of sacral language from ritual, as can be seen, for example, from the performance of *ta'zije* that took place one-and-a-half centuries ago.

These discussions are not being conducted for their own sake, but illustrate the fact that metaphor, as an intellectual algorithm, belongs as a type of sign and as a function of text, also of newer rituals, in a certain culturally dominant and traditional system, where it has a definite generative role in giving meaning to the world, in addition to the other semiotic and communicative algorithms — instrumental means — that have already been observed.

5.3.2.1. Ritual and code text.

Ritual is a polyfunctional discourse. It collects the heterogenic specific structural elements into a syncretic, monolithic, united whole. The code system that forms the structure of the ritual has been productive in the generative sense. In adapting to the triumph of profane culture, it has found itself new spheres of implementation.

Ritual as performance, together with its mythical plot has created a text type, which has had a lasting, reproductive effect in culture that has complemented and extended ritual. Here I have in mind code text, which was covered in another context in Chapter 4.

Juri Lotman has described the concept of code text rather sparsely. Except for recognizing that code and text are accented synchronously; that in communication each element of such a text can be treated as a paradigm that has been “subconsciously” stored in (cultural) memory, which “organizes” this memory, that code text, from its own viewpoint, is a monolithic syntagmatic whole, although it may be polyvalent in structure; and that it has in discursive processes a generative role, which appears, for example, in crime novels or in the exuberant production of the code in magic tales in the form of various text varieties — except for these features, he has not said anything else that is relevant⁸¹ (Lotman 1981b: 6–8).

The textual reproductivity oriented to code has also been described by other semioticians from the Tartu–Moscow school and by Lotman even earlier, without using the term ‘code text’. Analogous logic in analysis has been used by Isaak Revzin in studying crime novels (Revzin 1964: 38–40); Vladimir Toporov constructs St Petersburg text, implementing a methodology that is close to code text analysis (Toporov 1995b [1971/1993]: 194–195; 1995a [1972]: 279–281).

The body of text with the stories of Christian saints should also be added to the repertoire of code text, since it has the relevant characteristics for this genre. In the Islamic tradition, this is supported by the discourse depicting the “way” (*tarīqat*) of the sufis, which is no less voluminous. The path to Knowledge (= God) contains moving descriptions of submitting to Knowledge, absolute trust (*tawakkul*) in God, a repertoire of onerous practical

⁸¹ The Vladimir Propp methodology, referred to by Lotman in the case of the code-text nature of magic tales, was oriented towards deriving — from the various texts that Propp presents as variants of one text — the common code that is the basis of all the texts (Lotman 1981b: 6–7).

Such ideas, according to which the code in a magic tale is, in relation to the text, a sovereign and dominant element, should be sought from even earlier studies. (Propp actually transforms this code text into a metatextual description (Propp 1969 [1928]: 23–28).) I’m referring here to the descriptions by Axel Olrik of the epic laws of magic tales (Olrik 1909), and the type registers of folk tales (including Estonian folk tales) compiled by Antti Aarne (Aarne 1918).

and mystical devices (*tarīq-al'amal*) for reaching the goal, and consistent and strict opposition to the attractions of the profane world, in order to finally disappear, dissolve in Knowledge (*fana*^{*}), which leads to super-existence (*bakā*), into the embrace of eternity and the absolute, which a sufi may also experience before he has to leave this world.⁸²

What is noteworthy with code text is that the informational weight of the text drops to a minimum. In the functional sense the text circulates like a code, which the addressor and the addressee must know in order to understand each other. Code text does not add new knowledge, but generates a new text variant on the basis of a common code.⁸³ This is the way we should interpret medieval stories about saints, and also their genial topsy-turvy variation in the parody "Decameron", where the text enantiomorphically "copies" the (always commendable) strivings of the holy man in his tribulation-strewn path to heaven — although with the difference that Boccaccio's heroes have to "chase the devil to hell" in order "to get to heaven" (see Boccaccio 1957 [manuscript 1354], III–4 etc).

As we know, code is a collection of conventional rules and restrictions, which ensures the comprehension of the message in communication.⁸⁴ The concept 'code text', as has been said previously, connects the categories of code and text: in a communication process both code and text are structurally and functionally accented. This claim — that seriously affects the character of communication — deserves more detailed explanations.

The essence of the topic has been captured by Lotman in a completely different context, and already in 1971, when he was

⁸² One of the obvious examples to illustrate this topic is definitely Ibn Tufail's "Living Son of the Vigilant", translated and commented by Haljand Udam (Ibn Tufail 1992 [12th century]).

⁸³ As indicated by Lotman, information on such a transformation has an especially important place in autocommunication (Lotman 1973b: 238).

⁸⁴ Vivid examples of code are the Morse code alphabet or the grammatical system of any natural language.

looking at the process of “learning culture” (Lotman 1971: 167–170). Having an interest in how the way of learning in a culture depends on the character of the code of the culture, Lotman compared the process of learning culture with learning a natural language, and drew some conclusions from it that throw light on this set of problems.

Acquiring the mother tongue does not require a child to know any rules at all. These are replaced by texts. The child remembers what is said about something and, by copying the way it is said, begins to independently produce text. But to put together even the most elementary of foreign language sentences, the learner generally has to cram a whole series of rules. Of course, as we all know, in practice the learning styles are mixed: even in learning the mother tongue we cannot escape rules, and we can acquire a foreign language through a textual language environment. It is also important, that in learning any natural language — be it the mother tongue or a foreign language — the semantics and pragmatics (not to mention the modality and intellectual context added by the addressor and addressee) of the texts mediated by language remain external to language — being outside the border, a second-rate playground — as a sovereign and “closed” system⁸⁵.

Whereas two of the learning methods described here can be in principle implemented and combined for any natural language, it is different with culture. The method through which culture is (must be) learned, is dictated by the internal structure of culture itself. “Some cultures see themselves as a sum of certain precedents, ways of usage and texts, others as a collection of norms and rules. In the first case, right is that which exists, in the second case, that exists which is right” (Lotman 1971: 167). Hence the learning mechanism, the way of learning itself in the acquisition of culture, is not external to the language of culture,

⁸⁵ It was of course tiresome to study Russian in Soviet-era schools, when the textbooks overflowed with sentences such as “On the wheat fields of the Lenin kolkhoz the quarterly plan was exceeded”, but ideology still cannot (could not) deform the quite independent grammatical oneness of language.

but is itself also a part of culture. In this connection, one of the culture types presumes being supported by custom, by text, in the learning process, whilst the other — by rules, grammar, code. According to this, the World that is brought into culture is also given meaning. The code, which is brought into “text”-culture, is transformed into precedence, an example; precedence, however, having chanced into “rule”-culture, begins to function as grammar, code. The principle of “being a text-collection” or “being a rule-collection” changes into an implicit program that generates culture (*культурообразующая программа*). This question becomes particularly meaningful from the standpoint of the self-awareness of culture

when culture inputs self-concept into its memory. [---] The model of oneself in some culture generally brings to the fore in it certain dominants, on the basis of which a unified system starts to be constructed, which is to fulfil the role of this culture's text-autoreflexion, and the role of the self-deciphering code. (Lotman 1971: 170)

Ritual, I would dare to claim, is such a text type that definitely unifies in itself text, custom, precedence as well as grammar and the task of a self-deciphering code. This also means that mythological, magical, religious, antithetic and metaphoric signs, as well as functions in culture, can fulfil a certain unified autoreflexive and generative role as code elements.

According to the term, code text can also have such a role. Apparently, or perhaps most vividly, this parallelism can particularly be seen in magic tales. It is probably this that Eleazar Meletinski, Sergei Neklyudov *et al.*, had in mind when they wrote in their analysis of the semantics of magic tales that “globality is the specific characteristic of magic tales in particular”, since the magic tales as a genre “model the world as a whole” (Meletinski, Neklyudov *et al.* 1970: 9). In addition, the “skeleton” of reality — the code used to classify the world, is emphatically conventional, collective, traditional and rigid. And this is indeed what the term code text denotes.

The entire magic tale is constructed on semantic and/or syntactic contrasts: rich–poor, our–other, enantiomorphically connected “wise”–“foolish”, “home”–“forest”, third (attempt) and first+second (attempt) — this is the way the *Ant*-code is implemented.

Just about the whole progress of the story presumes unusual procedures, the use of miraculous formulas and uncanny means to achieve the aims, the intervention of a “third party” using “a force” (... *then the old woman took and blew the silver whistle, and ...; ... the eagle ordered the boy to drop the grain of sand — and it grew into a tall mountain...*) — this is the way the *Mg*-code is implemented.

The unconditional belief in / trust of helpers (“third party”); readiness to submit to all their wishes, commands and even punishments (... *it is just as well that you called me “my good woman”, otherwise...*). Without the mercy of a helper, all greater goals are unattainable. This is the way the *R*-code is implemented.

The functional identification of natural and supernatural behaviour: the miraculous (character) becomes “natural” and the natural (character) becomes miraculous; the identification of the activity of the characters with rigid, conservative syntactical rules, which as indicated by Axel Olrik, the addressee of the story already knows — the law of repetition (*Wiederholung*), law of the number three (*dreizahl*), stage duality (*szenische Zweiheit*), opposites (*Gegensatz*) and numerous other “magic tale laws” — this is the way the *Mt* code is personified.

The polysemantic parallelism of the miraculous and the ordinary; the “co-flickering” of the ordinary (unconditional) behavioural form and the conditional: the metaphorizable complementarity of poverty and wealth, misfortune and fortune, laziness and initiative, good and evil, etc: knowledge + destiny + belief that poverty is also simultaneously wealth, that misfortune conceals fortune (that is known in advance), etc, etc — this is *Mf* code.

All these five codes (*resp.* code elements), sign types and sign functions known from rituals are the constructive dominants, the constructive frame of the magic tale as a World.

Yet, it requires only some delving into the structure of saintly literature, romances of chivalry, or their literary processing, to notice the reproduction of code-textual dominants that are known from rituals. Cervantes, who parodied with inspiring wittiness the romances of chivalry (to be more precise, "Don Quixote" was more like a travesty), was generous in his use of the *R*-code, depicting Don Quixote's almost slave-like submission to his idealized notion of Dulcinea, raising the unpolished farm girl to the status of a saint⁸⁶; constant identification games by the characters, events and actions with what they actually are not; the identification of the structure of the entire novel (on a certain formal level) during the lifetime of Cervantes with the highly popular type of genre — the romances of chivalry (*Mt*); the constantly peculiar procedures that Don Quixote dreams up to achieve his miraculous aims, or that are implemented, using contagious wit, to make a fool out of Don Quixote (*Mg*); fighting "enemies", windmills, and the tragicomical opposition of Don Quixote's and the circle of knight's worldviews, the tragic contrast of Don Quixote's sacral world with the depressing but also comical vulgarity of profane everyday life (*Ant*); and of course an emphasized multi-planeness that permeates the entire novel, where the backbone is the figurative "dislocation" of the chivalry cult — the constant ambiguous and coinciding parallelisms of the text type and its parody (*Mf*). (Cervantes 1955 [1605–1615]).

⁸⁶ The code of the novel parodies the medieval cult of the lady as a cliché of the romances of chivalry, the roots of which in turn lie in the custom of *sufis* to depict their relationship with God in the form of highly sensual (not to say, erotic) poetry and rituals. In order to illustrate this, I refer to a Persian poet called Ansari (1006–1089) and his *rubaii* (the Estonian [approximate] translation by Haljand Udam is held by this author but not yet published): "Into my veins flowed love, we were joined. /Through his will, my transformation miracle was born. /My friend, with himself he filled me to the brim, /I even became him, although I bear my name." Ansari's friend here is God.

5.3.2.2. The concept and structure of code signal.

The sources for the concept of code signal are, firstly, the phenomenological concept of intellect, secondly, the dual-category of ritual and code text, and, thirdly, the treatment of text as a signal.

The phenomenological concept of intellect, in this context, does not require additional commentary (see 4.3.4.2.1., 5.1. and 5.2.1). However, the relationship of code signals with the concept of ritualized text, does deserve closer examination.

Code signal, the same as code text, is a related concept of ritual — on the semantic, syntactic as well as on the pragmatic plane. But as regards the capacity of the concept, it is narrower. It is probable that the formation of the structure of the code signal can be traced back to that beginning stage of the mythological language described by Juri Lotman, “when practical behaviour, and giving it signified meaning, was not yet differentiated”. An act could have become a receptive source for the semantics of a certain form of cultural behaviour (Lotman 1992c: 12). Indeed, this connection can be particularly clearly seen in certain very archaic deposits of cultural texts, such as in “expressive phraseology” or in other words — abusive language, which, as proven by Boris Uspenski’s observations, have deep magical, religious and mythological roots (Uspenski 1994a [1983, 1987]). An act (of abuse), and its given semantic meaning, have been inseparable, and presume real results — that has been the code signal. “Go to hell!” (let us not quote the “triples”), which nowadays we interpret metaphorically (figuratively), was probably a sanction of magical “force” that was clearly unambiguous in archaic cultures.

Insofar as the ‘*signal*’ of the code signal is text, then we should start with the concept of ‘signal’.

The term ‘signal’ already unambiguously betrays the fact that this is a concept expressing communication. A signal as a sign presumes contact that is direct, or interpreted as direct, and has the only possible interpretation. This means that the addressor

and addressee of the signal must be located in the one chronotype and the one "situative space" (Uspenski 2007: 33, 103). In this sense, the relationship created as a signal is causative (teleological), automatic and conventional (Leach 1991 [1971] 12–13). Signals do not presume feedback nor require translation; otherwise they would not fulfil their objective. For this reason, a signal does not have cognitive weight.

Aleksandr Pyatigorski implemented the concept of a signal in order to describe the functioning of text. The purpose of this approach was to reduce text to an "elementary concept", which essentially meant the elimination of the internal structure of text, the multiplicity of its elements, and of the observation of mutual functions. As such, the text can be interpreted as a behavioural act. In the communication process it is now possible to follow the character of the variants of communicative associations (*разновидности связи*) and of signalization that have been caused by text — as a signal, and which may also have non-linguistic (e.g. topological) characteristics (Pyatigorski 1962: 144–147).

Indeed, the concept of code signal must be treated in this very way. Juri Lotman, in sketching the magical, religious and artistic (play-specific) communicative relationships in his "Lectures", has actually proceeded from the criteria described above, but has not called these special forms of text code signals nor has he explored these characteristics in detail.

Next we will attempt to model the general characteristics of this category that is important for culture.

On the one hand, code signal is an element of the arsenal of culture codes, which has its roots in ritual; on the other hand, code signal is an intellectual phenomenon — an algorithm that *a priori* is manifest in the operations of the intellect. Therefore, code signal is an intellectual phenomenon that is formed into text.

Code signal, as a behavioural act (in the wider, semiotic meaning of the word) has the characteristics of a signal. Such a signal is realized in the topological form of "stage duality"

(*szenische Zweiheit*).⁸⁷ The actants of this duality are the addressor and the addressee, of whom the latter must indeed be located in the one speech reality with the addressor, and in the same chronotype, but does not necessarily have to be explicitly determinable (“Down with opportunism!”, “Let there be light!”).

An activity taking place in a sphere of primary reality (i.e. in a situation that presumes direct reaction) means that communication must take place between *me (us)* and *you*, or *him (them)* who has (have) been transformed into its (their) role, and whom can be considered to be the *listener* and *speaker*.⁸⁸ The addressor and addressee of a signal can perform both as *listener* and as *speaker*. (For example, the addressor can be, as we know, a *listener* in a religious code signal.)

The addressee is a structural element of code signal as text. For example, the *listener* of the magical code signal “Be damned!” and the content of the curse form a performative, indivisible whole — a name.⁸⁹

Regarding sign-creation, code signal — as the reader already knows from the analysis of the categories of sign-creation that are present in ritual — is either performative (in the case of *Mt* and *Mg*) or formative (*Ant* and *R*; *Mf* may combine both).

Topologically, both performatives represent the 0-distance — for example, a curse (*Mg*) or also a mythological performative. The Baltic Chain in 1989 was a chain of mythological acts hundreds of kilometres long, formed of individuals from three nations: each ‘*T* am holding ‘your’ hand as the *signans* (denoter)

⁸⁷ Axel Olrik, in studying fairytales, noticed already a hundred years ago that there are never more than two actors at one time participating in a fairytale discussion — strict *szenische Zweiheit* reigns (Olrik 1909: 5–6).

⁸⁸ Boris Uspenski uses the term ‘primary reality’ (*первичная реальность*) to denote the actual speech act that unites communication partners (Uspenski 2007: 86, 89).

⁸⁹ It should be added that Lotman has treated the inclusion of the addressee into the concept of text in a different context to the problem of the common memory of the addressor and the addressee; a common memory changes the addressee and its notion of its auditorium into a part of text (Lotman 1977b: 55–56; see also Uspenski 2007: 176).

of a sign was a sign of a name that, together with the *signatum*, formed a Name, with the content of *desire for freedom that ties me (an Estonian, an Latvian, a Lithuanian) with you (an Latvian, a Lithuanian, an Esthonian) and with you (a Lithuanian, an Estonian, an Latvian)*.⁹⁰

As is known, during the World War II battles the hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers who were sent to the front line, often to almost certain death, were generally inspired by the slogan “За Сталина, за Родину!”.⁹¹ This is a combination of magical self-sacrifice (*Mg*) and submission to the “Great Leader” (*R*), who actually did have the status of God — in the semiotic meaning — for the masses during the war.⁹²

Let us also look at an example of a second sign type — antithesis (*Ant*) — that also belongs to the formative sign-creation class.

The code signal “Долой эстонский фашизм!” that was extensively declared during the April unrest in 2007 was intended to mean that “fascism” is something that characterizes an Estonian as a typical fascist “element”.⁹³ Due to the symmetrical reduction typical of antithetic contrasts, there was a tendency — during these events — to see this “element” or substance in Estonians “generally”, or “attached” to every Estonian and every Estonian thing (for example, cheese or the railway...). According to the enantiomorphic structure of

⁹⁰ This sentence, understandably, is the interpretation of *signatum*. See below for the essence of *signatum*.

⁹¹ “For Stalin, for the Homeland!” (Russian).

⁹² This signal mechanism, in my opinion, casts light on one of the tragic miracles of the Second World War: this author is completely convinced that these signifying relationships of religious submission and magical sacrifice were very important factors in helping the Soviet side defeat Germany in the war. (But of course: who could have then, or could now statistically register these effects?...))

⁹³ “Down with Estonian fascism!” (Example of the anti-Estonian propaganda war carried out by official circles in Russia.) A much milder wording would have been “Down with fascism in Estonia!” which could be interpreted as a partial-decision (*some S are P*).

antithesis, such a determination of course contrasts automatically with the *us*-substance — that has the contradictory opposite “plus”-sign — of the addressor itself.

In addition to contradictoriness, however, there is another interesting structural dominant that draws attention. It stands out that fascism’s concept itself — that, which is discussed, that, as to what the word actually means (including whether or to what extent such a signified phenomenon has occurred in Estonia at all) — all this, as became apparent on the April “battlefield”, was not at all important. There was (is) absolutely no interest shown in this.⁹⁴ What turned out to be important was only the pragmatic purpose of creating a “plus”-whole as an opposite to “fascism” — the positive, “patriotic” image of “us” that unites people. But here too it remains completely unclear, as to what these words and this image actually signified ~ signify.

When we again cast a glance at the other examples of code signal that we have analyzed, an unexpected fact becomes apparent. It turns out that all the relationships of code signals bear the seal of the same semantic fuzziness. This fuzziness can be seen in the “cursing” (that is denoted by “... Damn! ” or, for example the call: “Long live...” the same could be asked about the human chain that crossed three countries (what is it that is operationally (specifically!) designated by holding hands in the context of the realization of freedom?); the concept of ‘fascism’ (regardless of the fact that the object of the reference was actually Hitlerism or National Socialism⁹⁵) — for the apparently 99 per cent of those who wanted to attach the word to Estonians — stayed a genuine “black box”; and what — for someone rushing to their death — was the actual and specific content of the slogan about Stalin, who was being treated as God? For the interpretation and comprehension of such types of expressions in

⁹⁴ It is true that there were a series of fakes, using absurd arguments, but these did not manage to add anything important to the presence of negation.

⁹⁵ The latter term has not been used by Soviet ideologues, or by subsequent groupings under their influence, probably due to the undesirable associations that could be created via the signifier ‘socialism’...

communication, attention needs to be drawn to another characteristic that Boris Uspenski accorded to a signal, and which, together with concept, has also become a new usage of code signal. A signal “in principle does not presume the creation of dialogue” and it “presumes a direct reaction by the addressee-party, which *is not comprehension* in the meaning denoted by this word”, since there is no mutual coordination of the experience of the actants, and the “conceptualization of reality that proceeds from this” (Uspenski 2007: 103, italics by *P. L.*). This matter, related to the structure of signalization, “permits” the signal to be semantically fuzzy (of course, not the traffic lights!). It would not be superfluous to add that in certain sign-creation situations, and of course primarily in code signals, this communication “error” becomes natural, necessary and even obligatory. Consider, in addition to propaganda wars, the wider aspect of ideological “processing”, advertising, religious and mystical rituals, and of course magic — the effectiveness of all these communication forms that are reducible to code signals “is fed” by the (mysterious) fuzziness of the meaning of signs, which does not exclude at all the completeness and precision of the pragmatic purpose of text as a whole. No rite is likely to escape this characteristic.

If we presume (and we do) that the structures of code signal and ritual are related, then this conclusion permits us to cast light on one contradiction that an attentive reader may notice in our analysis of ritual.

We have asserted earlier the existence of notional multiplaneness of ritual on the one hand; and on the other hand, however, we have described the rigidity of the structural elements of ritual. There is now reason to declare this contradiction to be imaginary. One of the important characteristics of the rigidity of ritual, and now we can also say — of code signal — is indeed semantic fuzziness. Fuzziness in ritual turns out to be conceptualized. The formal characteristics of rigidity, however, can be defined in terms of sign types, and of

the performance/formation of these, as well as of reference forms (see Table 1).⁹⁶

The notional fuzziness of code signals creates yet another question about what feeds this fuzziness. It is apparent from our examples that the semantic dominant of all the described communicative relationships is the sacral or sacralized sphere of the World ('our' patriotic being-free dream, the transcendental ominous pressure of becoming damned, *me* as a sacrifice to God etc). All these modalities are values of the sacral sphere that are in contrast to the profane sphere of culture. These objects of real or virtual reality, from the standpoint of the text of a code signal, are implicit: the text *refers* to these sacral fuzzinesses in the case of a name (naming) performatives, or implicitly, but also because of "analytical" pressure from the enduring conventional rules — in the case of formatives. This creates a legitimate question: are there formal indicators in the structure of code signals that are able to "form" and generate the sacralization of the dominants of the speech act?

In order to be able to answer this question, we need to make a communication-theoretical detour.

There is a class of elements in the codes of natural and other languages, where the meaning cannot be determined separately from the speech act (from the notification). For example, '*me*'

⁹⁶ The phenomenon of information fuzziness in communication cannot be narrowly reduced to a phenomenon of social psychology, rhetoric or cultural history. For example, Umberto Eco, with his exceptionally rich database, has attempted in his research (based also on the standpoints of Pico della Mirandola) to tie the Hebrew language, as the language of Adam and Eve, with the functions of Biblical language: "In order to use this sacral language more as an operational force than as a communication means, it was not even necessary to understand the [Hebrew — *P. L.*] language. [...] The more non-transparent it was, the brighter the aura from its "evocation" seemed, and the more its prescriptions avoided the intellectual powers (intelligences) of people, the clearer and more inevitable they became [must have seemed — *P. L.*] for the supernatural forces" (Eco 1997b: 51). There is reason to believe that although the connection pointed out by Eco definitely exists, it is probably secondary in relation to the other semiotic mechanisms.

cannot be anything else but a person (1) who says about himself: "me" (2). In essence, this is the case with a category that points to another message. This is a message in a message. Such a switching act of notification has also provided this category with a name — shifter⁹⁷. The colour *green* in a traffic light is a denoter for stopping traffic (index); 'green' itself in this context means nothing else at all (it does not refer to anything else) — there is no other message here. Some peoples (also the Sami, according to Vyacheslav Ivanov) have the custom whereby every person has his own unique song (Ivanov 1998: 554). Song is the *genuine icon* of such a person; although the actual singing of this song (as a speech act) unavoidably denotes the person for whom song is the name. Song here is also an *index*. Roman Jakobson, following on from the example of Charles S. Peirce, has claimed that shifters combine the functions of symbol and index. He has defined shifters as indexical (indicative) symbols (Jakobson 1972 [1957]: 97). Shifters, as has emphasized René Thom, have in the speech act a prominent role coordinating placements in time and space (Thom 1975 [1970]: 203–205). Following on from this theme, Roman Jakobson has especially examined verb categories (on the basis of Russian), and has described the shifterian nature of the categories of time and mode (Jakobson 1972: 100–109)⁹⁸.

In addition to these elemental grammatical categories, however, Jakobson introduces another, where its ability to be implemented seems as well to extend beyond the borders of the grammatical system of natural language. He calls this category: 'evidentiality'.⁹⁹ Evidentiality is a category of natural language and, as I presume — of cultural language too. Jakobson takes

⁹⁷ *shifter* — switching mechanism, switcher.

⁹⁸ Indeed: *I sit, I sat, I have sat* as signs expressing activity do not refer only to sitting as the location of a body (symbol), but also localize the time during which 'sitting' takes place.

⁹⁹ Jakobson provides the English word 'evidential' as a translation for the Russian-language term '*засвидетельствованность*'. (The presence of evidentiality in the grammar of natural language is illustrated by Jakobson using the example of the Bulgarian and Macedonian languages.)

into account three “facts”: the fact being actually transmitted (E^n)¹⁰⁰, the transmitting fact (E^s) and, in addition to this, the transmitted fact of transmitting a fact (E^{ns}) — i.e. “the information source denoting the fact that is being transmitted”. Therefore:

speaker E transmits a message about an event, based on the message of some other person [it would have been more precise perhaps to use here the word ‘source’ — *P. L.*] (on that which can be cited, i.e. on information that has been obtained from someone), on dreams (on information obtained via manifestations), on presumptions (on presumed data) or on one’s own past experience (on data drawn from memory). (Jakobson 1972: 101)

The source and data, which are “cited” or used by the addressor of a code signal, proceed from the sacralizable experience of *patrum more* that has been stored in memory.

Here it is necessary — proceeding from the communicative specifics of ritual (and code signal) — to augment Jakobson’s analysis. In the context of ritual (and therefore code signal), which is bidirectional in the sense that it links analytical and generative semiosis, it is not possible, in my opinion, to interpret a shifter as an “indexical symbol”. In the analytical “direction”, which in ritual (code signal) plays the E^{ns} function, it is not the case of a symbol. In this direction (in the case of all five code signals), it is a case of a formative operation, where the content, from the viewpoint of the addresser, is identification with the sacral sphere. Such a semiosis is expressed by a genuine icon. This is why shifters — if they are examined in the context of ritual semiosis — should be seen as text structures, of which one element — E^{ns} — is a genuine icon, and the other element is, respectively: in magical semiosis — an index, in mythological and antithetic semiosis — a genuine or endophoric icon, in religious (submissive) semiosis — a symbol, and in creative-reference (in metaphoric semiosis) — an icon and a symbol.

¹⁰⁰ The sign ‘E’ denotes fact; ‘n’ (from the English word ‘narrate’) denotes the topic of the message, and ‘s’ (= English word for ‘speech’) denotes the message itself.

It can therefore be said that the existential space of code signal is divided — topologically and operationally — into three spheres, which are the sacral denoting sphere (in memory), the profane everyday sphere of the addressor and the sacralizing (able to be sacralized) generative sphere. It could be said, topologically speaking, that the fact of evidentiality, which (usually) precedes a generative act, is the common structural characteristic of all code signals.¹⁰¹ Evidentiality connects all the code signals with the norms of the sacral space (*patrum more*) that can be reproduced. The code signals, therefore, are double shifters: firstly, via the shifteriality of *me (us)*, and, secondly, via the automatic reproduction of the sacralized codes of *patrum more*.

It can now be said that the signalization process in code signal raises, via evidentiality, the status of the profane addressor, activating its analytical and generative force.

The significance of code signals in communication seems to be supported by one circumstance that deserves attention. A magic tale, as illustrated previously, is an inexhaustible collection of code signals. As we have already emphasized, a magic tale — as a collection of code signals — contains no new information. Everything is known in advance — the characters, the trials and the happy ending are known by heart. But it is nevertheless the case that children can endlessly plead that the same story be read to them, over and over again. There is reason to believe that the magic tale with its repertoire of evidentially emphasized code signals, and the substantive imperativeness of its syntagmatic structure, is a dominant source for a child learning a culture. A child relates and attunes its *a priori* system of intellectual algorithms with text, which in turn is evidential to

¹⁰¹ The differences in time categories in mythological and historical consciousness have been studied in detail by Boris Uspenski. There Uspenski writes that in the mythological consciousness the past is simultaneously an omen for both the present and the future (Uspenski 1989: 20); a magical act annuls altogether the temporal succession of a magical act and effect formative and also the performative semiosis creates temporal and topological zero-distances.

the pragmatic repertoire of their implementation, as the sphere that encompasses the whole World... It is quite strange how a child is capable of intuitively comprehending the analytical and generative meanings of these mnemonic patterns. As already indicated in 3.2.2.1, asemantic texts that have been thoroughly organized syntagmatically, become the initiators of our associations.

Therefore: mythological, magical, religious, antithetic and metaphoric code signal are shifters, and sacralizing 'evidentiality', together with semantic indeterminability, are characteristic of the structure of code signals. Code signals are also probably the *a priori* algorithms of intellect.

5.3.2.3. Code text and code signal.

As we have seen, code signals are consistently represented in the structure of ritual. Insofar as code text also belongs to the unifying paradigm of code signal and ritual, then this parallelism dictates a need to mutually compare code signal and code text.

The two-part nature of the terms designating code signal and code text accents the circumstance that in both cases a signifying integrity is denoted where code and text (*resp.* signal) compete — i.e. the dominants of two beginnings. The dominant function of code means that neither of these text types generates new information, but the texts reproduce as versions of a certain proto-form. They are reproducing text types, and they are characterized by the rigidity of structure, whereby the structure itself here also has a reproductive nature. Hence both text types have a mnemonic, orientation-creating basic value that organizes (cultural) memory.

An important structural characteristic that makes code signal and code text similar is the evidential sphere that is considered sacralized *resp.* authoritative. The authoritative or sacralized actants (objects) of the evidential sphere are located, compared to the profane space, in separate spheres, where they have / they set

(have set) for themselves "game rules" that differ from the profane space.

Using the concepts of 'detective', 'third son' ('third attempt': right-hand path), 'forest', 'orphan' etc in speech indicates — i.e. "transmits the fact of transmission" — that the detective is (*should be*) Sherlock Holmes or Poirot, that the third son is a fool who turns out to be wise, that the third attempt = success, and turning right leads one to one's purpose, that a forest is a mysterious environment that indicates caution, but also wondrous possibilities, and that an orphan is the embodiment of defenceless goodness. Elmar Holenstein presents a curious example from the article published by Roman Jakobson in 1931, titled "Der russische Frankreich-Mythus", which illustrates particularly vividly how evidentiality "works" in an antithetic code signal. An uneducated farmer's son from northern Russia who was disappointed in the Bolsheviks was in Moscow at an agricultural exhibition, where he happened to see a camel for the first time in his life. He shouted in distress: "Those scoundrels, look at how they have mutilated that horse!" (Holenstein 1976a [1974]: 58). Similar antithetic evidential logic was also used by medieval Catholics, when in speaking of polygamy they thought of hell, and identified Muhammad with the Anti-Christ. Readers who have already familiarized themselves with the previous chapters do not need additional explanation regarding that behind the fact of evidentiality are in turn rigid formal structural characteristics (in this case derived from antithetic contradictoriness). (In one of Mark Soosaar's documentary films, a starving child deliberated thus: "If there is something elsewhere, then it must be paradise because our life here is hell.")

The difference between code signal and code text is initially apparent because the code text is a discourse with a developed script. It is characterized by the profusion and typological variety of code signals belonging to text (as we experienced when we looked more closely at magic tales or Don Quixote). Signal as a text represents a one-sided and one-time behavioural operation. Code text is dialogical, whereas code signal is monological. In

contrast to code signal, which has a maximum of two actants¹⁰², and one viewpoint that is directed to reality, code text is characterized by the abundance of characters and viewpoints.

It is also important that the relationship with reality is different for the actants that embody the viewpoints of both text types. The addressor of code signal is an actant who is in the space of speech reality: this is a case of *me-you*-(or a *he*- acting as a *you*)-relationship, which is described in the terms of “speech generation”. (For more detail, see Uspenski 2007: 36, 38). The deictical *me*-relationship also ties the addressor of the code signal with actual reality, i.e. with reality that is the substance of communication (see also Uspenski 2007: 12, 56).

It can therefore be said that code signal observes reality “from the inside”, whereas code text observes “from the outside”. This is why the addressee of code text as a discourse is indetermined. The addressee of code signal is an element of the structure of text.

Both code text as well as code signal are shifters, but code signal is a double shifter: firstly — via *me*; secondly — due to the evidential act, and thirdly — due to the time-topological coordinates of actual reality. The time-topological relationships of code text are mediated by the text-external viewpoint.

The sign-typological nature of the behaviour that proceeds from the viewpoint is also determined by the space of reality. The relationship of the code signal’s viewpoint with reality is mythological; the relationship of the code text’s viewpoint is metaphorical (artistic).

The cultural-historical and intellect-based connection of both code text and code signal with ritual necessitates the mutual complementarity of the texts that are denoted by these concepts. This can be illustrated with the example of advertising.

When advertising is treated as a communication type, the one-to-one concurrence of the structure with the formal characteristics of magic behaviour become apparent.

¹⁰² The actant may also be *one* collective (mass).

The provider of advertising (transmitter) is a company that takes upon itself the role of the magician. The company formulates a magical act in the form of an advertising clip, etc. This act is concentrated on formulae, which in the advertisement are associated with a brand — a trademark that is used to identify the products (ideas) of a certain company (*resp.* party). The brand is surrounded by a sacral aura: we all know what fatal accidents may befall those who dare to tamper with the holy form of the brand, or who attempt to besmirch its authority. But no advertisement can “work” without referring to the sacral space surrounding the (evidential) brand, and this reference, according to the deep conviction of the company, must be one of the basic factors in achieving the effect. The sensing of brand characteristics in advertising is functionally identical with a shifter-type temporal category in grammar. This is evidentiality.

The sole objective of a magical act is effect. Effect in advertising, just as in magic, is achievable through communication mechanisms, which have the sole purpose, not of the transmitted information reaching the brain of the consumer, but that it be realized in the form of an automatic purchasing reflex (voting, act). And for this, as we know, billions (even trillions) are spent throughout the world.

One component of this communication mechanism, as in magic, is the “third party”, whose ‘force’ is used to convince a person buy a product (adopt an idea). “Third parties” — and we cannot help but notice them when we are out on the streets — are the people decorating the advertising stands and building walls: David Beckham, Madonna, Erki Nool or someone else, on whose skin, or body, or by whom, etc, etc, the product being advertised is to achieve an effect-supporting “additional force”.

It is indeed interesting that the structure of advertising is connected to ritual as a text type in an even deeper way. All five communicative basic functions, and semiosis types, of ritual, are very obvious in the structure of advertising.

Advertising constructs a consumer’s relationship — that is devoted and excludes criticism — with the company, with His

Holiness and with everything that represents the company. Structurally, this relationship (placement) is isomorphic with the religious code signal. The unavoidable contrasting of the goods (ideas) being advertised with most of the “present”, “ordinary”, “previous” goods (ideas) is explicitly or implicitly antithetic. Every good advertising clip creates a blissful atmosphere that accompanies the purchase — the mythological effect of blending into the sacral sphere. There is no further need here to describe the magicity or figurativeness of advertising.

It can thus be concluded that advertising also bears the dominant characteristics of code text. This example should also unambiguously indicate the vitality and relevance of ritual and rituality in modern culture, and that the system of algorithms of the intellect may also take place effectively in text types that seem remote from ritual.

SUMMARY

The following summary does not aspire to present a statistical list of all the problems analyzed in the monograph, but concentrates on substantive dominants. Therefore, the following needs to be said about the analysis of universals and its context in the semiotics of Juri Lotman.

In the preceding pages, the author needed to find an answer to the question, as to what actually are the "communicative functions" of social texts, which Juri Lotman had in mind in the schema of his Fourth Lecture that is also published here. This quest immediately brought to the fore a number of fundamental questions: (1) were there any other functions, besides semiotic functions that formed a schema, which could be treated as belonging to the same sequence? (2) what kind of isomorphic signified characteristics belong to texts that bear such functions? (3) do texts that fulfil such functions form a systemic whole, and if they do, then what is the source that generates this wholeness? and also (4): what guarantees the reproductivity of these functions (i.e. their remaining in the reproductive arsenal of culture)?

Two of Lotman's ideas were taken as the point of departure for the discussion. In the Fourth Lecture he claims that social text and social function are "separate things": in society, social function has "its own life" and may be "very enduring". From this it could be concluded that Lotman's "social functions" are apriority phenomena, as regards to text. Secondly, Lotman did not tie his "functions" to any specific text type, with any culture or era, from which it proceeds that he accords such functions universality.

In analyzing the communication algorithms that bear these two characteristics, the author happened upon unexpected circumstances that had become apparent in Lotman's texts.

It became clear that Lotman had interpreted such functions everywhere as virtual, language (in the Saussure-like meaning of this term) phenomena. This was in accord with the fact that Lotman had not terminologically analyzed textual equivalents anywhere that were applicable to these functions (not taking into account the use of the concepts '*proper noun*' and '*myth*' in mythological analysis, or defining the concept of 'antitext' and 'anticulture'). This discovery is understandably also reflected in this monograph: in the first three chapters, the author has initially called code signals "universal algorithms", then "cognitive structures", then "schemas" and "imagination schema". (The latter term was borrowed from the research tradition of Lakoff and Johnson, but the author soon realized that the research paradigms of the Tartu-Moscow school did not coincide with the cognitive-linguistic empiricism that is represented by the Chicago school.)

It then became apparent that the schema in the "Lectures" remained the only attempt to determine the repertoire and systematicness of these algorithms, and that Lotman has not posed the question anywhere later on regarding the numerical value of the phenomena belonging to this schema (the necessity/lack of necessity of increasing/decreasing this number). He does begin, soon after the "Lectures", to study the mythological and antithetic communicative functions that belong to the same sequence as the elements of the schema (both together with Boris Uspenski, and occasionally in different contexts). In both cases, these analyses are characterized by the textual implementation field that has been thoroughly developed. In his independent activities, Lotman delves particularly thoroughly into the analysis of metaphoricality in the structure of artistic and play-quality texts, without dedicating himself there either to the study of 'metaphoricality' exclusively.

But it is not just the number of functions belonging to this repertoire that Lotman leaves open — he also does not raise the question anywhere, as to which semiotic common characteristics these functions possess in communication, and which text with common characteristics they do produce. Understandably there are problems that remain unresolved, which are associated with the system of functions, their generative source and mechanisms that generate reproductivity (all this is limited to only analyzing functions, proceeding either from the *listener* or *speaker*).

In the light of these facts, this author was forced to admit that — notwithstanding the significant ideas and intriguing start of the search for solutions in this direction of study, which is the determination of the formal common characteristics of the mythological, magical, religious, antithetic and metaphoric communicative algorithm — the search has stopped half-way.

Nevertheless, it should be immediately emphasized that many of the thoroughly researched semiotic concepts, without which it would not be possible at all to define the algorithms of the intellect and their applicable “social functions”, did exist in Juri Lotman's works (the reader also had the possibility to become acquainted with these). It is indeed a shame that the Tartu professor did not implement these himself (did not have the time to implement?). This is why the author wants to emphasize that this monograph is to a great degree an attempt to reconstruct a complete system in the form of a model, proceeding from Lotman's ideas, which actually could have been produced by Juri Lotman himself. My system proceeds from ideas that could be called the conceptual axis of Juri Lotman's semiotics.

Here I have in mind three fundamental categories, denoting phenomena which in culture have a universal character, and into which the reader had the opportunity to delve more deeply in the previous pages. It is indeed these that form the universal context that was taken into account in the titling of the monograph. These categories are ‘*intellect*’, ‘*vertical isomorphism*’, and the complementary, constitutive and generative role in culture of the innovative and reproductive processes of culture.

The idea of vertical isomorphism permitted the discovery of yet another aspect of Lotman's heritage — i.e. the phenomenological background for his semiotic system, which I examine in some detail. I was guided to this background, and the nature of Lotman's semiotic contacts, by one of Aleksandr Pyatigorski's three reproaches to Lotman in 1994. As the reader already knows, Pyatigorski believed that the "naturalization" of culture in Lotman's semiotics had resulted in a situation where it was possible to speak "not only of 'how I comprehend culture' (which has also been spoken of previously) but also of how one specific culture comprehends another culture or itself" (Pyatigorski 1994: 326). In again commenting on this misunderstanding between Lotman and Pyatigorski, I would like to draw attention to a new aspect, which could have caused the erroneous interpretation of Lotman's conceptual bases (this has also happened elsewhere). The crux of the matter is as follows.

When Lotman describes the issue of the mutual complementarity of intellect, text and culture, and the mutual exchangeability of functions, he definitely does not mean that, if the intellect starts to fulfil the role of text in communication, it then stops being the intellect, and vice versa. Lotman has repeatedly emphasized that although text is a (live) organism, in order to "initiate" the processes that can take place within, it is always necessary to connect it into a common "stream of current" together with the intellect. Nowhere has Lotman written that texts could "speak" to each other, independent of the intellect.

Lotman's standpoint, which Pyatigorski, in my opinion, has erroneously interpreted, creates an important contact with his semiotic concept and Eduard Husserl's analysis of intention that is independent of dualism and accents intuitiveness and "essentialism".

The key concept in the monograph is the five code signals. The code signal belongs to the category of universals. Universality as a concept in general is treated in the monograph as a phenomenon of speech reality: the universal elements of the

intellect and culture are characterized by functional and structural constancy, but they are variationally explicit in the speech processes.

The term '*code signal*', and its applicable concept, are derived from Lotman's concept of '*communicative function*', '*intellect*', '*code text*', and from the concept of '*signal*' defined by Pyatigorski. Code signal, in relation to speech and behaviour, is an apriority and universal intellect-based algorithm. It is a phenomenon that is constitutive (in the context of vertical isomorphism), reproductive (mediating cultural memory), communication-structure-determining (of the mutual placement of actants) and generative (sign-creating). The systematic description of the concept of code signal has been the principle goal of this monograph.

From the repertoire of code signals, the author has selected for closer observation the intellect's magical (two conceptual schemas!) and antithetic algorithms, and in describing their structures in some detail, has noticed in both structures the referential "bidirectionality", which can also be treated as an analytical (in the area of memory) and generative (in the area of sign-creation) functional characteristic of code signal.

This dual character of the structure of code signal became fully apparent to the author only when he discovered (through the concept of code text) that all five code signals form the basic functional structure of ritual.

Being a relict of ritual, code signal reproduces the basic characteristic of the structure of ritual — the obligatory interlinking of the profane and sacral worlds. In this context, every code signal is a so-called double shifter: as a signal it makes explicit the *me-you*-relationship; via '*evidentiality*' it must always be linked to the sacral sphere, which indeed gives the code signal the required authority and exclusivity. Code signal is a *ritualising* form of communication; and *ritual* has determined, historically and functionally, both the repertoire of code signals as well as the important characteristics of structure (partially via code text).

Therefore, there is reason to emphasize that in talking about the semantics of code signals, it is not possible to be limited to the analysis of the verbal meanings of a statement. The ritualized and sacralized semantic basic structure of code signal is apriority and intellect-based, and can be described via topological, generative and evidential reproductive characteristics manifested in communication and autocommunication. The intellect-based basic structure is probably older than verbal language, and it has developed relationships, of various levels of dependency, with verbal language, but such an analysis was not part of this study.

The author believes that in his examination of the concept of code signal he filled a certain gap in the intellect-analysis of Juri Lotman, and developed to completion this valuable idea that he initiated in 1967. He also hopes that revealing the intellect-based and ritual-based nature of code signals in the monograph will enable the better understanding of, for example, the uncritical communicative act of submission of the intellect may be an emotional burst or an intellectual operation, which has the name of a religious code signal. A metaphoric communication act may be a rhetoric speech act; but when this ambiguous message is evidentially connected with a sacral memory field, an aesthetic structure is created that has the value of a code signal. When Marcel Duchamp attached a pissuar to the wall of a Paris gallery, this metaphoric act acquired a sacral dimension via reference to those artistic manifests that contrasted the exposition of a pissuar to "profane" "other" "ordinary" art. Here it must be added that despite the thorough analysis of metaphor, this structural characteristic of metaphorical code signal has also not been described by Lotman. The author sees here a contact point between semiotics and aesthetics that has a promising future, and could be the point of departure for further study.

This hint permits the hope that these previous lines could be of some use to researchers and practitioners of communication theory, propaganda (including advertising), (social) psychologists, folklore scholars, and in the fields of rhetoric and of course aesthetics. Perhaps this book can help cool down the passions of

those people who in their attacks on religion and religiosity have not bothered to delve deeper.

For the description of Juri Lotman's own semiotics system, the problems examined here should create a new, spatial dimension. The author would like to hope that on these pages he has managed to reconstruct and realize some of Lotman's ideas that remained unimplemented by the leader of the Tartu–Moscow semiotics school. And this has been to a great degree possible due to the other masters of the Tartu–Moscow school, whose ideas I used in fulfilling this task.

APPENDIX

Juri Lotman

SEMIOTICS OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIETY ¹

[Lecture] I

17 Nov 1967

Semiotics deals with issues of signification and communication. But what is it, when we talk about man, that justifies us thinking about communication at all? To what extent is the concept of *me* connected to signification and communication?

The science of the 19th century created a conception of personality as a biological being. For us the boundaries of personality have been associated with the boundaries of the biological unit. On the other hand, the 19th century overturned the conceptions of man [being valid until then], and the boundary between man and beast became certain for us. This is the base for Darwinism.

¹ This lecture series was given at the end of 1967 at Tartu University on the initiative of students interested in social issues (particularly in sociology). These lectures (as with most of J. Lotman's lectures) have not been published. Of this series, the notes of only one listener (Marju Lauristin) have survived, and even this arrives for the first time on the reader's table after being transcribed by me, and in an incomplete state, since one of the four lectures was missed. I received the texts of the lectures in the summer of 1968 and rewrote them by hand, preserving completely the wording used by the note-taker, the abbreviations, language and punctuation. (The original text has been lost by the note-taker.) It should be said that an important part of the lectures has been reproduced by J. Lotman, with minor or major changes, in two works (Lotman 1967c and Lotman 1970e). This publication of the "Lectures" is a first edition, if one does not take into account the publication of an excerpt of the fourth lecture that was an appendix to an article (see Lepik 2002a).

The missing parts of word abbreviations and the words not included in the notes but necessary for understanding the text are added in square brackets. The footnotes are by the author.

However — classical natural science has not enveloped everything [in the animal kingdom]: for example suicide by animals, which hints [at that], that the unit is not a single animal but a population. Altruism amongst animals cannot be explained by the fight for an individual existence. There are cases (overpopulation) where animals cease reproducing. The concept of a biological being is unclear.

A single being cannot be made to coincide with an “atom” in a given system.

The understanding that a single being in human society corresponds with a being that possess clear boundaries is far from universal.

It is easy to be convinced that the concept of personality itself cannot be separated from the concept of communication.

On the other hand, this concept depends on the character of communication.


Approximately, there are 2 categories of communication:

- a) within an organism
- b) between organisms;

within [organisms] takes place signless [communication]

between [organisms] takes place sign [communication]

(Communicating with oneself via signs cannot be considered communication within an organism)²:



, i.e. $A_t - A_t^1$

Autocommunication proves to be an interesting and extensive category of communication. It is associated with memory.

² The ‘t’ in the scheme apparently denotes ‘message’, and the ‘t¹’ indicates that the reception (perception) of the message is always connected to the transformation (change) of this certain category.

It is clear that the personality is the joining of [its] certain states with the help of memory.

Man uses words to organize his self (to overcome pain, etc). My behaviour is to a great extent dependent on how I call myself.

Recognizing oneself: "I am not yet a villain".

The problem of "me" and the "other" is always a signified problem.

Moving within one culture we consider much to be "innate", "natural", etc. Much of what we consider natural proves to be a characteristic of speaking with oneself.

The problem of personality is a problem of language as the connection system between *me* and *you*.

Paradoxes.

Belief in the relativity of oneself, including the relativity of scientific language — otherwise it would be a case of religion.

"Russian justice" (12th century): killing the person who insulted one's honour — compensation was not demanded [from the killer]. A blow with the fist was worse than killing with a sword. With a sheathed sword — worse than with the blade.

"damage" — "personality"³

I killed a person but with the blow of my fist I insulted the clan.

Mayakovski: "to melt as a droplet into the masses" [approximate translation]. The right to a university education in the 1920s depended on social background. (A person existed as a part, just as in the Middle Ages.)

Existing is a vital element of self. But it is apparent that the concept of "existing" is itself signified and does not correspond to the concept of biological existence.

Hegel has "existing" peoples = [peoples], who are connected to the [developmental] processes of the world, and "non-existing" peoples.

³ The point of this apposition is unclear.

Existing means being connected. But being connected is itself also different. A person who in the Middle Ages did not belong to a fraternity did not exist at all, he was a zero. Killing an enemy was a deed, killing an outcast was not.

But this is not so in every culture. To the enlighteners existing meant being whole. Rousseau: it is the person himself who exists.

With the collective growing my part reduces, I become a part, [i.e.] nothing at all. $\frac{1}{\dots}$

In possessing a servant I am the slave of my servant, I am a fractional part, I do not exist.

To be a part, this has different meanings in different cultures — demeaning or solely justifying.

For the medieval person the other world — that is not directly provided to us — is very meaningful.

heaven
"us"


In principle, the whole world holds together just like an immense word, which has an expression (everything that we see) and content — meaning, purpose. We notice in the word that which is associated with meaning and do not notice anything else: Б б δ B.

In the Middle Ages: who "lives"? Only those who "represent". Which love is more valuable than others? That in which love itself means something. And this is all the more valuable the more removed it is from practical activity.

Explaining the behaviour of a person using economic reasons — this is undoubtedly correct in our language. But in the language of knights it is pointless.

But the sign is also a part. A part that has a relationship with the whole, not as a fragment, but as a representative: I represent in myself the whole: insulting me is not insulting a part, but insulting the whole.

The personality in the Middle Ages was not repressed, it either did not exist or represented its group in its entirety.

The world is constructed from parts, not: ○○○○○○○, but: , just like a matryoshka.

The whole is deeper than the part, but isomorphic with it. Moving from the part to the whole is movement in the direction of depth. With one word everything is said (for God).

The greatest range of rights was used by either the prince or the beggar.

During the time of absolutism [there was] another understanding: I exist only as a son of my state, I have only a part of the rights.

Thus we are convinced that the most basic, even habitual concepts — existing, benefit, etc, prove to be derived from that language which organizes the given association. We can imagine the history of social relationships as the history of languages, and the typology of social groups as the typology of languages.


[Lecture] II

We could imagine a social structure, which dictates social behaviour as a certain language. The activity of a person in society can then be imagined as talking; acts, imaginings become words, which can be assessed as right or wrong from the viewpoint of that language.

Any individual behaviour whatsoever is a certain linking with an organized association, which has rules of behaviour that are made explicit (legal, for example) or not made explicit, but which nevertheless exist. The feeling that rules have been violated betrays their existence.

Not only the violation of a rule, but also the freedom to follow the rules betrays the foreigner. ("You speak Greek too well!") Over-enthusiastic following of norms is equivalent to violation [of the norms].

Whereas linguistic communication was provided primarily by “comprehension”, then in social mechanisms the most important is “non-comprehension”. This is one of the most central social problems. One [and the same] mechanism [forms the basis] of comprehension and non-comprehension.



Living is a system of rules — [it includes] norms just as in language. Only in the environment of foreign living conditions does the ordinary seem unordinary

NB! — distorted interpretation of behaviour!

To comprehend the world, compare that world with some other. Contact itself presumes being able to speak not only a natural language, but also other languages, starting with the simplest, closely linked to natural language (gestures), to the very distant ones. The entire system of contacts, therefore, is multi-layered.

In his behaviour, man is similar to a polyglot. Behaviour is regulated by complex systems. The polyglotism of behaviour determines:

a) differentiation of associations — different behavioural styles in different situations and in different places.

Blok: [“]As soon as I pull on my cap and enter the tram, I want to start pushing.[“]


The situation forces upon [its own] language. But the thing is that any social behaviour whatsoever is speaking in many languages.⁴

Therefore, practical items are also almost always signs (a spade in practical life; a spade in a museum).

Cultural types in connection with types of meaning.

There are two types of meaning:

a) something has a meaning because it substitutes for something else.



b) $a + b = c$. Meaning is created through dependence between an element and its neighbours in the same row of elements; (We can change the semantic meaning if we substitute [values for the elements] $a = 5$ etc; but [in the second type] this is not necessary, we can express “a” via “b” [etc]). [Thus is created] *syntagmatic meaning*.

Just imagine⁵ the various types of cultural meaning⁵

⁴ In the notes, this is followed by half a blank page.

⁵ Here are obvious gaps in the notes. In the notes, the table presented by J. Lotman has not been reproduced clearly:

	Sem	Synt
Sem	+	+ -
Synt		- -

This is why the following table is presented as the version published in an article by J. Lotman in 1970, where the same typology of meanings is analysed. In the interests of ease of reading, it has also been slightly simplified here [See Lotman 2000 (1970): 401]. The “plus” and “minus” signs denote the existence or non-existence of “semanticity” and “syntagmaticity” in the cultural type.

1. semanticity + syntagmaticity -	2. semanticity - syntagmaticity +
3. semanticity - syntagmaticity -	4. semanticity + syntagmaticity +


There are four cultural types:

- | | |
|---|-----------------|
| 1. Medieval (semantic) | [cultural type] |
| 2. Syntagmatic | ["] |
| 3. Enlightenment (--) | ["] |
| 4. Semantic-syntagmatic -
(e.g. Hegelianity) | ["] |

[I. Medieval cultural type]


The whole world (and man) receives meaning through an essence that is external to him. In order to have meaning it is not necessary to belong to any kind of series of signs. In order to have meaning

- the sign must have a material expression (real world, man);
- every thing [must be] unique;
- the world does not hold together as a sum, but as a system of concentric circles



saint – sinner – soldier – slave

However, the world is not their sum but movement from a slave to a saint. In order to have meaning I do not have to form a group with another soldier, sinner, etc (although practically this is unavoidable). The theory divides the groups [into parts]:



It is interesting how practice and theory fight. (The theory–practice relationship is generally interesting.)

The monastery theory: keep away from the masses, remain alone, become yourself the expression of all. Medieval people strive for solitude that is the norm — to the hills, deserts, forests. In practice, this results in colonization (next to one cave springs up another, etc).

In the same way, a killing that is carried out by a group is not held in honour, whereas a duel is.

It seems to us that it is natural for man to strive towards the majority, but in various systems “belonging to the majority” is valued in various ways.

In the Middle Ages: striving towards the minority is the norm. It is proper to join the ranks of those who live worse.

It seems natural that man strives to be successful. But the concept of “success” depends on the language. In the Middle Ages, the highest reward was a death that was realized by following the rules (death in battle). Death at home in bed was equal to life. (In the Galicia–Volynia chronicles there is the scornful expression: “those lovers of life”.)

The success of a saint is concealed in the system of relinquishing, non-success — in the system of acquiring.

Meaningfulness increases at the cost of

- a) separation from the [common] row [or]
- b) reduction of the material part of the sign.

It is more valuable when the meaningfulness aspect is more important than the expressiveness aspect.

Such a type of cultural system does not only offer a system of meanings, but also provides a system of values. In connection with this, prescriptive standard behavioural norms are also created, which in every system are divided amongst two target groups:

- a) the group of people who carry out acts,
- b) the group of people who do not carry out acts.


Carrying out an act from the viewpoint of the cultural system

[This] could be interpreted as a series of prohibitions. Behaviour is a chain of prohibitions. It is interesting that in a given system there are always 2 groups of people:

- 1) those for whom the prohibitions are total;
- 2) those who have the right to violate prohibitions.

The groups can be differentiated according the strictness of the norms.

An action is that vital behavioural act that is used to violate a certain prohibition.



Normative everyday activities at home, no miracles occur. The witch chases you only to the borders of home, not crossing them. living

There are two types of heroes: "us" and "them".

The safer the home is, the more terrifying the forest. Build a wall between you and the "out there", and immediately the "there" starts seeming dangerous.

A hero can go "there" and return from "there".

Important social motive:

us	them
ours	theirs

The action is the violation of some kind of social prohibition, violating the borders.

In the Middle Ages:

behavioural act is an internal act

expression is an external act

The basic prohibitions apply to the system of internal acts.

II. Syntagmatic system

This is system of practical behaviour. (“Enough of our mystification!”⁶) There is the practice that in the Middle Ages had been promoted to theory. In a syntagmatic system only real practical life exists.

Since this is the only real situation, there exist people who form a chain.

The whole possesses meaning — progress, state, church.

Meaning is created via belonging.

That which exists separately has no purpose.

“We are building a theocratic state, but you want to know how the Earth rotates.” — That is pointless!

The first [= medieval] system did not introduce external time. The world as meaning was presented as it was, movement took place within it.

The second [= syntagmatic] system takes into account external time.

 open series

⁶ This quote and the following quotes apparently indicate quotes by Peter I.

Altruism is again demanded from an individual but in another sense:

useful is that which is beneficial to the whole. The majority is more valuable than the minority, it is victory to join the majority. Losing is equivalent to betrayal.

There is a biting description from the 14th century with the same story as in "Igor's Campaign". That which was heroic in the 12th century, now seems laughable ("Story about a battle on Pyana").

A person himself has no meaning, what is meaningful is his place in the system.

Grozny: "You, Your Majesty, you are just like a god — you create greatness out of (very) little."

Grozny to Kurbski: "I will not destroy the system but I will fill it with whatsoever I like."

Grozny identifies himself with the system.

Peter I explains the killing of his son, saying that he is "worthless".

Peter goes even further — he also brings himself into the system, he promotes the system to a principle driven by capriciousness.

Practice is declared, but the actual facts are pushed into the background and the system is emphasized. Bureaucracy is syntagmatics in its purest form — ranking. No question is raised about the right to fill a gap.

[Lecture III is missing]

Lecture IV

22 December, 1967

If we wish to use texts to study society or people, we must first clarify the nature of signs and the rules for their use (these depend on the culture types).

We are accustomed to easily being able to separate, for example, scientific texts from religious texts, etc. We act as if we know how to decipher them in different ways.

We study each of these different texts in different ways. We say that there are various types of signs:

natural language signs — we define these with the aid of grammar and dictionaries, or we compile these [i.e. a grammar, a dictionary];

myth — we assume that it is possible for us to create some kind of rules in order to clarify [= to interpret] the signs and grammar of mythological texts;

scientific text — but here we do not implement the ways of studying myth.

This seems to be quite obvious. But it is not really the case. We could, for example, take a scientific text and show that in certain situations it could function as a religious text.

Even an everyday phenomenon can acquire the features of myth, or other uncharacteristic features. (Penicillin may function not only as a medicine but also as a mythological unit — as the Redeemer.)

If we make some kind of scientific discovery and start to treat it as the redeemer in all situations, then the result is religion.

It does not suffice to know the text. One must know its function in society. Different texts may fulfil the one function. (A religious function could be fulfilled by sport, war, science, medicines, etc.) There is a certain interdependence between text and function, but this is not a linear one.

Social function must be differentiated from social texts! If we say that science has replaced religion, this generally means the replacement of texts, because the religious function has been preserved in society. (An article by a French doctor on the crisis in medicine: the relationship of the patient with the doctor must be religious. A critical relationship hinders the medical effect. It is difficult to be one's own doctor, teacher, adult. Here the relationship of trust [is valid], and this is not based on knowledge.)

[There are] a number of relationships of which some [are such where the individual is in a mutual relationship in the role of] a speaker, and others [where the individual is] in the role of a listener.

*NON-SIGNS*⁷

SIGNS

I. PRACTICE

II. MAGIC

I am doing something

*Something is being done to me*⁸

III. SCIENCE

IV. RELIGION, BELIEF

I am obtaining the truth (procedure)

am being given the truth

Therefore, we have four functions:

I [Practice]. My activity takes place in the sphere of practical activity, not of signs.

⁷ It is probable that the classification takes into account that the practitioner in acts without a signified function (I) always has a relationship with non-signified reality, while the scientist (II) — of course, if he is a natural scientist — has this relationship most of the time. In magical and religious relationships, the individual always deals with signified structures..

⁸ If something is being done to me, which I could just as well do myself, then this relationship is invalid (Note by J. Lotman).

II [Magic]. A situation where [you] yourself are in principle not able to affect anything in practice, you only receive. If you do not know the laws on the basis of which you are being given something (for example, [the unexplained appearance of a] taxi), a magical situation is created.

A person creates a connection between himself and this situation, and with the activity, in order to be deserving of the arrival of the inexplicable gift. A person does much, which cannot be explained on a conscious level, and [which is] practically useless regarding having an effect on things that cannot be influenced. (When the taxi is late, we try “to speed it along” [by pressing our feet against the body of the car]; NB! A ticket queue before a performance! [: pushing up against the person in front of us]) Magical function: I hope that something beneficial for me will happen, which [is] inexplicable to me and is something I cannot influence. The activity has a signified nature in order to demonstrate its trust regarding this unknown power.

III Science. It is assumed that as a result of some procedures, I am able to obtain the truth. Science begins where there is procedure. It is the start of formalism. If the procedure [is] incorrect, the result is not considered to be the truth. In science, it is not the truth that is that important, it is the way to the truth. The giver is unnecessary. Regarding giving, a critical attitude is dominant, [a scientific relationship is characterized by] a non-trusting relationship.

IV Belief. Religion. [This is] also truth, but it is assumed that this [is] held by someone who has to actually give it. The subject is not capable of getting it himself. *Truth here is an act of dedication*. Activity here has another meaning than it does in science. The giver comes to the fore, the one who is indispensable, and with whom a special relationship of trust is created. [The situation presumes the question:] What should I do in order that I will be given something?

Why is that people [generally] are unable to believe — as in God. This has various meanings. In the case of God, there is unlimited trust, which in principle cannot be controlled. (In the case of science, since [the scientist is] himself active, esotericism is inconceivable.) Regarding religion, it is a case of a giving situation, [whereas] the question is immediately raised: who are the ones to receive, and who do not. [There is] a need for a particular signified action, in order to be worthy.

I [Practice and] III [Science] are speaker [texts]; II [Magic] and IV [Belief] — listener [texts].

We can observe how, for example, a scientific text becomes a religious one, or even magical one, how it changes from a speaker text to a listener text.

We can therefore say that on the one hand there is a certain historic typology in action, where [in a certain era] certain types of texts dominate, for example [in cultural history] there are mythological periods, religious periods, scientific periods. [On the other hand, the functions under observation could be in a combination:] prayer — [can fulfil both] religious + magical [functions]; religious texts have certain scientific functions, etc.

To be a listener is not to be a remnant from the past. Science cannot fulfil all social functions. There are undoubtedly a number of texts, where a scientific approach can prove to be damaging. The reverse is also true: unlimited faith in some scientific concept gives it a religious function.

Previously [we observed instances, where] the text, in a certain function, always [has] the one meaning. The function of the text may change but it has only one function at a time.

There is a function, which is different from the four [previous] functions, which also has its own texts.

A text which is simultaneously in two languages has two simultaneous functions⁹:

[In] a **play situation** there are two behaviours (= text meanings) [initiated] simultaneously. The game can be ruined in two ways:

the children tend to see the chair covered in tiger stripe fabric as a genuine tiger — no play is initiated;

the adults are unable to imagine that the chair is a tiger — no play is initiated;

Art also unites at least two [behaviours simultaneously]

If art is interpreted as having a single meaning we are unable to comprehend it. We are then unable, based on this, to properly interpret society, for example.

Why does mankind need such a multiplicity of meaning?

NB! (Not to be confused with allegorical multiple meanings. For every reader, this means [only] one!) But in the theatre, each [element has] at least two [simultaneous] meanings. If we believed that there was real life on the stage, the enjoyment of art would disappear completely, [the performance] would become the same as peering through a keyhole.

In watching a movie, 1) we become involved just as if the events were real life, but 2) we do not interfere.

If we perceive the same text as being religious, we would have switched to the one behavioural system. When Lope de Vega lost consciousness when listening to a mass and imagining the sufferings of Christ, music was for him not art, but religion.

Religious attitudes are disastrous for both art and science!

Why do people play throughout life, and throughout history? This is studied by ethnographers (historians deal with “more serious” things, politics, for example!)

Animals start to play once there is non-instinctive behaviour. Amoebas do not play!

⁹ Here the note-taker is apparently mistaken: there is one function that is realized in the text at least as a structure with a double meaning.

Animals play in order to teach.

- 1) Play is the teaching of such behavioural types that are not provided for by the genotype, with the help of bio-information.
- 2) Play is the creation of emotional models.

The play function does not have to be filled by play texts.

Theatre is enough for one social group, others need war notices or gladiators.

In human society there exists a complicated system of play, where the functions of which are basically

- a) training
- b) conditional promising, solution.

Death is a non-codable system. Nevertheless, in war it has to be "coded", creating an emotional model to achieve victory over an unconquerable enemy.

It would be interesting to monitor in which epochs, for which social layers the need [is created] for a *happy end*. This need becomes the most frequent during catastrophic epochs!

(Chernyshevski: The gloom in literature demonstrates that the actual situation is improvable.)

Encouraging words are spoken to the hopelessly ill!

The happy end has a specific function — a fictitious solution, a play situation.

In which environment is there a love for "noble", "refined" literature?

The most idealizing literature is loved by whores.

The literary scholar and the sociologist have different approaches to a text:

literary scholar: which language is used by the author?

sociologist: into which language is it translated by the reader?

The reader *always* tends to translate an ambivalent, play text singly. The dual approach is characteristic of the author.

Single [interpretation] — “the message of thought”, “moral” etc — is characteristic of the reader. The reader expects one-sided answers.

This is a condition for art. There is no genuine writer who does not despise literature. Pushkin: [“]When such a tragedy is taking place under one’s eyes, who has time to think about the flea circus of literature?[”]

Art — it is a game to be taken seriously.

Art cannot be reduced to one function, but it must be able to be translated into it, although with some losses; and the reader must know that these losses exist, and that it could be the most important that ends up amongst the losses.

Art is different to play, because it has simultaneously multiple meanings as well as one meaning.

Only a multitude of meanings — this is a luxury.

Only one meaning — this is not art.

Non-art can also perform in the function of art, particularly if we approach a foreign culture, or, for example, are enthused by the poetics of the Gospel, or enjoy a conflagration from its aesthetic side.¹⁰

An absolutely habitual language is switched out of the cultural system.

The listener always demands the habitual; he is always annoyed by the speaker’s “philosophizing” (*умничание*). This is why every new system usually starts with a scandal, it is received as something indecent, until it becomes habitual, and therefore, banal.

This is why art always disturbs us. If it does not disturb us then it is not working. If Beethoven is “pleasant”, “non-disturbing”, then we are not actually accepting him any more.

Therefore, the state of the listener is a state of dissatisfaction with the speaker.

¹⁰ Here the author contradicts himself: the fact that Lope de Vega fainted did not necessarily mean that he stopped hearing the art in the music!

Art is always destined to cause scandal. Derzhavin knew there would be scandal when he rhymed "muse" with "arbuus (watermelon)".

Art is active on the background of an outdated form. The listener, however, tends to consider it faulty (*неправильностью*).

This occasionally leads to explosions (*икноборчество*¹¹). In various epochs, various opportunities arise for the listener to dictate his will.

If the *listener* and the *speaker* mutually ignore each other, no communication takes place.

¹¹ art looting, iconoclasm.

REFERENCES

- Aarne, Antti 1918. Estnische Märchen- und Sagenvarianten. Verzeichnis der zu den Hurt'schen Handschriftsammlungen gehörenden Aufzeichnungen. *FF Communications* 25.
- Abramyan, Levon 1981 = Абрамян Левон А. Типы симметрии и человеческое общество. — *Семиотика и проблемы коммуникации*. Ереван: Изд-во АН Армянской ССР, 77–88.
- 1983 = Абрамян Левон А. *Первобытный праздник и мифология*. Ереван: Изд-во АН Армянской ССР.
- Allik, Jüri 1981. Metafoorist psühholoogi pilguga. *Looming* 1: 102–113.
- Andrews, Edna 1999. Lotman's communication act and semiosis. *Semiotica* 126 (1/4): 1–15.
- 2003. *Conversations with Lotman: Cultural Semiotics in Language, Literature, and Cognition*. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press.
- Arán, Pampa Olga and Barei, Silvia 2002. *Texto/Memoria/Cultura. El Pensamiento de Juri Lotman*. Córdoba: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.
- Arasteh, A. Reza 1970. Patterns and processes of self-liberation in the Near Eastern Sufism: Art of rebirth. *Psychologia* 13: 5–11.
- Armstrong, David M. 1989. *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction*. Boulder, San Francisco. London: Westview Press.
- Austin, John Langshaw 1962. *How to do Things with Words*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Averintsev, Sergei 1991 = Аверинцев Сергей. О. Шпенглер. Закат Европы: Примечания. — *Самосознание европейской культуры XX века*. Москва: Изд. полит. литературы, 54–68.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail 1979 = Бахтин Михаил. Проблема речевых жанров. — Бахтин Михаил. *Эстетика словесного творчества*. Москва: Искусство, 237–280.
- 1987 [1975]. Aja ning kronotoobi vormid romaanis. — Bahtin, Mihhail. *Valitud töid*. Koost. P. Torop. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat. 44–184.

- Balthasar, Hans Urs von 1994 [1974]. Kristliku müstika piiritelu. *Akadeemia* 9: 1980–1913.
- Baudelaire, Charles 1938 [1860]. Moodsa elu maalija. — Aspel, A. (koost.). *Valik prantsuse esseid*. Tartu: Eesti Kirjanduse Selts, 251–262.
- Betz, Hans D. 1987. Magic in Greco–Roman Antiquity. — Eliade, Mircea (ed. in chief). *The Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. IX*. London: MacMillan Publishing Company, 93–97.
- Bertels, Jevgeni 1924 = Бертельс, Евгений. *Персидский театр*. Ленинград: Academia.
- Bickerton, Derek 1990. *Language and Species*. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Blackburn, Simon 2002 [1994]. *Oxfordi filosoofialeksikon*. Tallinn: Vagabund.
- Boccaccio, Giovanni 1957 [käsikiri 1354]. *Dekameron*. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus.
- Bogatryov and, Jakobson 1971 [1929] = Богатырёв Пётр, Якобсон Роман. Фольклор как особая форма творчества. — Богатырёв П. Г. *Вопросы теории народного искусства*. Москва: Искусство, 369–383.
- Cassirer, Ernst 1966 [1925]. *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, II: Mythical Thought*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- 1979 [1945]. The Technique of our Modern Political Myths. — *Symbol, Myth and Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer*. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 242–270.
- 1997 [1944]. *Uurimus inimesest: Sissejuhatus inimkultuuri filosoofiasse*. Tartu: Ilmamaa.
- Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de 1955 [1605–1615]. *Don Quijote La Manchast*. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus.
- Chernov, Igor 1988. Historical survey of Tartu–Moscow Semiotic School. — Broms, Henri; Kaufmann, Rebecca (eds.). *Semiotics of Culture: Proceedings of the 25th Symposium of the Tartu–Moscow School of Semiotics*, Imatra, Finland, 27th–29th July, 1987. Helsinki: Arator Inc, Publishers, 7–16.
- Clark, Stuart 1997. *Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Daddesio, Thomas C. 1995. *On Minds and Symbols. The Relevance of Cognitive Science for Semiotics*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

- Donskis, Leonidas 1995. Ideoloogia ja utopia: Kas utopismi lõpp? *Akadeemia* 10, 1: 2151–2167; 11, II: 2352–2372.
- Durkheim, Émile 1965 [1912]. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. New York: The Free Press.
- Eco, Umberto 1997a. Some remarks on perfect languages. — Rauch, I.; Carr, G. F. (eds.). *Semiotics around the World: Synthesis in Diversity*, Vol. I. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 45–56.
- 1997b [1993]. *The Search for the Perfect Language*. London: Fontana Press.
- 2000. Introduction. — Lotman, Yuri. *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, vii–xiii.
- EE 1996. Sümmeetria. — *Eesti entsüklopeedia*, 9. Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 88–90.
- Eliade, Mircea 1992 [1957]. Sakraalne ja profaanne. *Vikerkaar* 4, I 52–58; 5, II: 78–82; 6, III: 65–69; 7, IV: 65–70; 8, V: 73–80; 9, VI: 67–75; 10, VII: 58–63; 11, VIII: 65–70; 12, IX: 73–78.
- 1995 [1963] = Элиаде Мирча. *Аспекты мифа*. Москва: Инвест-ППП.
- 1998 [1958] = Элиаде Мирча. *Мефистофель и андрогин*. Санкт-Петербург: Издательство «Алетейя».
- ENE 1972. Kriitika. — *Eesti nõukogude entsüklopeedia*, IV. Tallinn: Valgus, 189.
- Erikson, Erik H. 1966. Ontogeny of ritualization in man. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*, series B, 251 (772): 337–349.
- 1969. The development of ritualization. — *The World Year Book of Religion, vol I: The Religious Situation*. London: Evans Brothers Ltd., 711–733.
- Florenski, Pavel 1999 [1920?] = Флоренский Павел. Мысль и язык. — *Священник Павел Флоренский. Сочинения в четырёх томах*, т. 3 (1). Москва: Мысль, 104–362.
- Foucault, Michel 1994 [1966] = Фуко Мишель. *Слова и вещи: Археология гуманитарных наук*. Санкт-Петербург: А-сэд.
- Frazer, James G. 2001 [1890]. *Kuldne oks: Uurimus maagiast ja religioonist*. Tallinn: Varrak.
- Freud, Sigmund 1938 [1906]. Totem and Taboo. — Brill, A. A. (ed.). *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*. New York: The Modern Library, 807–930.

- Geissler, Friedmar 1955. *Bräutwerbung in der Weltliteratur*. Halle (Saale): Niemayer.
- Greenberg, Joseph H.; Osgood, Charles E.; Jenkins, James J. 1970 = Гринберг Джозеф, Осгуд Чарльз, Дженкинс Джозеф. Меморандум о языковых универсалиях. — *Новое в лингвистике*, вып. V: Языковые универсалии. Москва: Прогресс, 31–34.
- Greimas, Algirdas Julien; Courtés, Joseph 1982 [1979]. *Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press.
- Gross, Toomas 1996. Mõistmisest ja teisest antropoloogias. *Akadeemia* 8: 1717–1737.
- 1997. Enne ja pärast Frazerit. *Akadeemia* 12: 2516–2529.
- Gurevitch, Aron 1972 = Гуревич Арон. *Категории средневековой культуры*. Москва: Искусство.
- Hall, James 1997 = Холл Джеймс. *Словарь сюжетов и символов в искусстве*. Москва: Крон-Пресс.
- Heusden, Barend van 1997. *Why Literature: An Inquiry into the Nature of Literary Semiosis*. Tübingen: Stauffenburg-Verlag.
- Hill, Donald R. 1987. Magic in primitive societies. — Eliade, Mircea (ed. in chief). *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, IX. London: MacMillan Publishing Company, 89–92.
- Hoebel, Edward Adamson 1966. *Anthropology – The Study of Man*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Hoffmann-Krayer, Eduard (Hrsg.) 1987 [1935/1936]. Ring. — *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens*, Bd. VII. Berlin und New York: Walter de Gruyter, 702–724.
- Holenstein, Elmar 1975. Jakobson and Husserl: A contribution to the genealogy of structuralism. *Human Context* 7: 61–83.
- 1976a [1974]. *Roman Jakobson's Approach to Language: Phenomenological Structuralism*. Bloomington and London: Indiana Univ. Press.
- 1976b. The structure of understanding. *A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature* 1: 223–238.
- 1977. Jakobson's contribution to phenomenology. — Armstrong, Daniel; Schooneveld, Cornelis H. van (eds.). *Roman Jakobson: Echoes of his Scholarship*. Lisse: Peter de Ridder Press, 145–161.
- Hoppál, Mihály 2000. Studies on mythology and Uralic shamanism. *Ethnologica Uralica* 4. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- 2003 [2002]. *Šamaanid Aasias ja Euroopas*. Tallinn: Varrak.

- Husserl, Edmund 1987 [1931]. *Cartesianische Meditationen: Eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologie*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
- 1993 [1950]. Pariisi ettekanded. *Akadeemia* 7: 1389–1424.
- 2000 [1911] = Гуссерль Эдмунд. *Философия как строгая наука*. — Гуссерль Эдмунд. *Логические исследования [и др. работы]*. Минск, Москва: Харвест; АСТ, 667–743.
- Ibn Tufail 1992 [12. saj]. *Elav ärganu poeg*. Tallinn: Olion.
- Izutsu, Toshihiko 1956. *Language and Magic: Studies in the Magical Function of Speech*. Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Philological Studies.
- Ivanov, Vyatcheslav Vs. 1967 = Иванов Вячеслав. Реконструкции и универсалии. — *Межвузовская конференция по порождающим грамматикам. Кязрику. 15–25 сентября 1967 г. Тезисы докладов*. Тарту: ТГУ, 37–39.
- 1968a = Иванов Вячеслав. Дуальная организация первобытных народов и происхождение дуалистических космогоний / Рецензия на книгу: А. М. Золотарёв. Родовой строй и первобытная мифология. *Советская археология* 4: 276–287.
- 1968b = Иванов Вячеслав. Об асимметричности универсальных семиотических оппозиций. — *III летняя школа по вторичным моделирующим системам. Тезисы. Доклады*. Тарту: ТГУ, 10–12.
- 1972 = Иванов Вячеслав. Об одном типе архаичных знаков искусства и пиктографии. — Мелетинский Елеазар (ред.). *Ранние формы искусства*. Москва: Искусство, 105–147.
- 1973. On binary relations in linguistic and other semiotic systems. — Bogdan, Radu J; Niiniluoto, Ilkka (eds.). *Logic, Language and Probability*. (Series: Synthese Library, Vol. 51.) Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, Publishing Company, 196–200.
- 1978a = Иванов Вячеслав Вс. *Чёт и нечёт: Асимметрия мозга и знаковых систем*. Москва: Советское радио.
- 1978b. The Science of Semiotics. *New Literary History: A Journal of Theory and Interpretation* IX (2): 199–204.
- 1998 [1978] = Иванов Вячеслав. Чёт и нечёт: Асимметрия мозга и динамика знаковых систем. — Иванов Вячеслав Вс. *Избранные труды по семиотике и истории культуры*, I. Москва: Школа «Языки русской культуры», 379–602.
- Ivanov, V. V.; Lotman, J. M. et al. 1998 [1973]. *Theses on the Semiotic Study of Cultures*. (Tartu Semiotics Library 1.) Tartu: Tartu University, 33–60.

- Ivanov and Toporov 1974 = Иванов Вячеслав, Топоров Владимир. *Исследования в области славянских древностей*. Москва: Наука.
- Jacob, François 1974. Le modèle linguistique en biologie. *Critique* 322: 197–205.
- Jakobson, Roman 1968 [1960]. Linguistics and poetics: Closing statement. — Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.). *Style in Language*. Cambridge Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 350–377.
- 1971a [1961]. Retrospect. — Jakobson, Roman. *Selected Writings I*. The Hague: Mouton, 631–658.
- 1971b [1967] = Якобсон Роман. Да и нет в мимике. — Jakobson, Roman. *Selected Writings II: World and Language*. The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 360–365.
- 1972 [1971] = Якобсон Роман. Шифтеры, глагольные категории и русский глагол. — *Принципы типологического анализа языков различного строя*. Москва: Наука, 95–113.
- 1983 [1965] = Якобсон Роман. В поисках сущности языка. — Степанов, Юрий (ред.). *Семиотика*. Москва: Радуга, 102–116.
- 1985a [1938] = Якобсон Роман. О теории фонологических союзов между языками. — Якобсон Роман. *Избранные работы*. Москва: Прогресс, 92–104.
- 1985b [1969]. The fundamental and specific characteristics of human language. — Jakobson, Roman. *Selected Writings VIII*. Berlin, New York, Amsterdam: Mouton Publishers, 93–97.
- 1985c [1970] = Якобсон Роман. Лингвистика в её отношении к другим наукам. — Якобсон Роман. *Избранные работы*. Москва: Прогресс, 369–420.
- 1985d [1970] = Якобсон Роман. Язык в отношении к другим системам коммуникации. — Якобсон Роман. *Избранные работы*. Москва: Прогресс, 319–330.
- 1985e [1972] = Якобсон Роман. Речевая коммуникация. — Якобсон Роман. *Избранные работы*. Москва: Прогресс, 306–318.
- 1985f [1975]. The grammatical buildup of child language. — Jakobson, Roman. *Selected Writings VIII: Contributions to Comparative Mythology*. Studies in Linguistics and Philology 1972–1982. Berlin–New York–Amsterdam: Mouton Publishers, 141–147.
- 1985g [1976] = Якобсон Роман. Звук и значение. — Якобсон Роман. *Избранные работы*. Москва: Прогресс, 30–91.

- 1985h [1975]. A glance at the development of semiotics. — Jakobson, Roman. *Selected Writings* VII. Stephen Rudy (ed.). Berlin, New York and Amsterdam: Mouton Publishers, 199–218.
- 1996a [1974] = Якобсон Роман. Структурализм и телеология. — Якобсон Роман. *Язык и бессознательное*. Москва: Гнозис, 181–184.
- 1996b [1977] = Якобсон Роман. Несколько слов о Пирсе, первопродвигателе науки о языке. — Якобсон Роман. *Язык и бессознательное*. Москва: Гнозис, 162–169.
- Jakobson, Roman and Halle, Morris 1962 [1956]. Phonology and phonetics. — Jakobson, Roman. *Selected Writings* I, 464–504.
- Johnson, Mark 1987. *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jung, Carl 1994 [1930] = Юнг Карл Г. *Проблемы души нашего времени*. Москва: Универс.
- Jung, Carl G.; von Franz, Marie-Luise; Henderson, Joseph L. et al. 1964. *Man and his Symbols*. London: Aldus Books and Jupiter Books.
- Kim Su Kwan 2003 = Ким Су Кван. *Основные аспекты творческой эволюции Ю. М. Лотмана: «иконичность», «пространственность», «мифологичность», «личностность»*. Москва: Новое литературное обозрение.
- Kant, Immanuel 1902 [1790]. *Immanuel Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft*. (Philosophische Bibliothek, 39.) Leipzig: Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung.
- 1960 [1871]. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Leipzig: Reklam.
- 1964 [1768] = Кант Иммануэл. О первом основании различия сторон в пространстве. — Кант, Иммануэл. *Сочинения в шести томах*, 2. Москва: Мысль, 369–379.
- 1982 [1783]. *Prolegomena igale tulevasele metafüüsikale, mis on võimeline esinema teadusena*. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat.
- Gluckhohn, Clyde 1970 [1962]. Universal categories of culture. — Tax, Sol (ed.). *Anthropology Today: Selections*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 304–319.
- Kořakowski, Leszek 2004 [1982]. *Religioon: Kui Jumalat ei ole olemas*. Tallinn: Vagabund.

- Kreutzwald, Friedrich R. 1961 [1857–1861]. *Kalevipoeg: Eesti rahva eepos*. Kogunud ja ümber töötanud Fr. R. Kreutzwald. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus.
- Lacan, Jacques 1977 [1937]. The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience. — Lacan, Jacques. *Écrits*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1–7.
- LaBarre, Weston. 1979. Species-specific biology, magic and religion. — Hook, R. H. (ed.). *Fantasy and Symbol: Studies in Anthropological Interpretation*. London, New York: Academic Press, 57–63.
- Lakoff, George 1990a [1987]. *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things. What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- 1990b. The invariance hypothesis: Is abstract reason based on image-schemas? *Cognitive Linguistics* 1: 39–74.
- Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark 1980. *Metaphors we Live by*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Leach, Edmund 1991 [1971]. *Culture and Communication: The Logic by which Symbols are Connected*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 1982a [1718] = Лейбниц Готфрид Вильгельм. Начала природы и благодати, основанные на разуме. — Лейбниц Готфрид Вильгельм. *Сочинения в четырёх томах*, I. Москва: Мысль, 404–412.
- 1982b [1721] = Лейбниц Готфрид Вильгельм. Монадология. — Лейбниц Готфрид Вильгельм. *Сочинения в четырёх томах*, I. Москва: Мысль, 413–429.
- Lenin, Vladimir 1946c [1902] = Ленин Владимир. Что делать?: Наболевшие вопросы нашего движения. — Ленин Владимир. *Сочинения*, 5, 319–494.
- 1947 [1905] = Ленин Владимир. Партийная организация и партийная литература. — Ленин Владимир. *Сочинения*, 10, 26–31.
- 1948b [1913] = Ленин Владимир. Критические заметки по национальному вопросу. — Ленин, Владимир. *Сочинения*, 20, 1–34.
- 1950b [1920] = Ленин Владимир. Задачи союзов молодежи. (Речь на III Всероссийском съезде Российского коммунисти-

- чешского союза молодежи 2 октября 1920 г.) — Ленин Владимир. *Сочинения*, 31, 258–275.
- 1950с [1920] = Ленин Владимир. Речь на Всероссийском совещании политпросветов губернских и уездных отделов народного образования 3 ноября 1920 года. — Ленин Владимир. *Сочинения*, 31, 338–348.
- Lepik, Peet 2000. Antikultuuri fenomen nõukogude kultuuris. *Akadeemia* 4: 718–754.
- 2001a. Myth and magic as semiotic phenomena. — Bernard, Jeff; Withalm, Gloria (eds.). *Myths, Rites, Simulacra. Semiotic Viewpoints: Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium of the Austrian Association for Semiotics / Angewandte Semiotic 18/19*, vol I. Vienna: ÖGS, 201–216.
- 2001b. L'antitesi come schema intellettuale nella cultura sovietica. — Calefato, Patrizia; Caprettini, G. Paolo; Colaizzi, Giulia (eds.). *Incontri di culture. La semiotica tra frontiere e traduzioni*. Torino: UTET Libreria, 192–201.
- 2001c. Müüdi ja maagia semiootiline spetsiifika. — Lepik, Peet (toim.). *Uurimusi müüdist ja maagiast*. Tallinn: TPÜ, 69–94.
- 2001d. Nõukogude kultuur ja ideoloogia. *Acta Universitatis Scientiarum Socialium et Artis Educandi Tallinnensis. Humaniora* A19: 9–16.
- 2001e. The semiotic specificity of myth and magic. An introduction. — Tarasti, Eero (ed.). *ISI Congress papers. Nordic-Baltic Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies. Part I*. Imatra: ISI, 363–378.
- 2001f. The semiotic specificity of myth and magic (An introduction to the topic). — *Congress Nonus Internationalis Fenno-Ugristarum 7.–13.8.2000 Tartu, pars VII: Dissertationes sectionum: Folkloristica et Ethnologia*. Tartu, 109–117.
- 2002a. On universalism in connection with the interpretation of magic in the semiotics of Juri Lotman. *Sign Systems Studies* 30.2: 555–576.
- 2002b. The anticulture phenomenon in Soviet culture. *Semiotica* 138 (1/4): 179–203.
- 2003. The anticulture phenomenon in Soviet culture. — Tarasti, Eero (ed.). *Understanding / Misunderstanding: Contributions to the Study of the Hermeneutics of Signs. Acta Semiotica Fennica XVI*: 501–521.

- 2007a. Maagia unikaalsus ja universaalsus kultuuris: Kultuuriseemiootilise tõlgendamise katse. *Akadeemia* 6: 1270–1296; 7: 1555–1586.
- 2007b. Universaalidest Juri Lotmani semiootika kontekstis. Tartu Semiootika Raamatukogu 6. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli kirjastus.
- Levin, Juri 1988 = Левин Юрий И. Зеркало как потенциальный семиотический объект. *Труды по знаковым системам XXII (Sign Systems Studies)*: 6–24.
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude 1967 [1958]. *Structural Anthropology*. Garden City – New York: Anchor Books.
- Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien 1925. *La mentalité primitive*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan.
- Leyton, Michael 1992. *Symmetry, Causality, Mind*. Cambridge Mass: The MIT Press.
- Lorenz, Konrad 1966. Evolution of ritualization in the biological and cultural spheres. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B*, 251: 273–284.
- Lossev, Aleksei 1993a [1927] = Лосев Алексей. Философия имени. — Лосев Алексей. *Бытие. Имя. Космос*. Москва: Мысль/Российский открытый университет, 613–801.
- 1993b [manuscript from the 1920s] = Лосев Алексей. Вещь и имя. — Лосев Алексей. *Бытие. Имя. Космос*. Москва: Мысль, 802–880.
- Lotman, Juri 1966a = Лотман Юрий. К проблеме типологии текстов. — Лотман Юрий (ред.) *Тезисы докладов во Второй летней школе по вторичным моделирующим системам: 16 – 26 августа 1966*. Tartu: ТГУ, 83–91.
- 1966b = Лотман Юрий. О построении типологии культуры. — Лотман Юрий (ред.) *Тезисы докладов во Второй летней школе по вторичным моделирующим системам: 16 – 26 августа 1966*. Tartu: ТГУ, 82–83.
- 1967a = Лотман Юрий. От редакции. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* III: 5–6.
- 1967b = Лотман Юрий. К проблеме типологии культуры. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* III: 30–38.
- 1967c = Лотман Юрий. Тезисы к проблеме «Искусство в ряду моделирующих систем». *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* III: 130–145.

- 1968 = Лотман Юрий. Семантика числа и тип культуры. — *III летняя школа по вторичным моделирующим системам: Тезисы*. Кязрику 10–20 мая 1968. Тарту: ТГУ, 103–109.
- 1969a = Лотман Юрий. О метаязыке типологических описаний культуры. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies) IV*: 460–477.
- 1969b = Лотман Юрий. О некоторых принципиальных трудностях в структурном описании текста. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies) IV*: 478–482.
- 1970a = Лотман Юрий. Культура и язык. — Лотман Юрий. *Статьи по типологии культуры*, I. Тарту: ТГУ, 6–11.
- 1970b = Лотман Юрий. К проблеме типологии текстов. — Лотман Юрий. *Статьи по типологии культуры*, I. Тарту: ТГУ, 78–83.
- 1970c = Лотман Юрий. О двух моделях коммуникации и их соотношении в общей системе культуры. — *Тезисы докладов IV летней школы по вторичным моделирующим системам*. Тарту: ТГУ, 163–165.
- 1970d = Лотман Юрий. *Структура художественного текста*. Москва: Искусство.
- 1970e = Лотман Юрий. Проблема знака и знаковой системы и типология русской культуры XI–XIX вв. — Лотман Юрий. *Статьи по типологии культуры*, I. Тарту: ТГУ, 12–35.
- 1970f = Лотман Юрий. О типологическом изучении культуры. — Лотман Юрий. *Статьи по типологии культуры*, I. Тарту: ТГУ, 86–102.
- 1970g = Лотман Юрий. Проблема «обучения культуре» как типологическая характеристика. — Лотман Юрий. *Статьи по типологии культуры*, I. Тарту: ТГУ, 36–48.
- 1970h = Лотман Юрий. Некоторые выводы. — Лотман Юрий. *Статьи по типологии культуры*, I. Тарту: ТГУ 1970, 103–105.
- 1971 = Лотман Юрий. Проблема «обучения культуре» как её типологическая характеристика. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies) V*: 167–176.
- 1972 = Лотман Юрий. *Анализ поэтического текста*. Ленинград: Просвещение.
- 1973a = Лотман Юрий. Знаковый механизм культуры. — *Сборник статей по вторичным моделирующим системам*. Тарту: ТГУ, 195–199.

- 1973b = Лотман Юрий. О двух моделях коммуникации в системе культуры. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* VI: 227–243.
- 1974 = Лотман Юрий. О соотношении первичного и вторичного в коммуникативно-моделирующих системах. — *Материалы всесоюзного симпозиума по вторичным моделирующим системам* I(5). Тарту: ТГУ, 224–228.
- 1977a = Лотман Юрий. *Культура как коллективный интеллект и проблемы искусственного разума*. Москва: Академия наук СССР.
- 1977b = Лотман Юрий. Текст и структура аудитории. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* IX: 55–61.
- 1978 = Лотман Юрий. Феномен культуры. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* X: 3–17.
- 1979. Grotkeski ja filosoofia maailmas: Järelsõna. — *Voltaire. Filosoofilised jutustused*. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 260–289.
- 1981a = Лотман Юрий. Риторика. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* XII: 8–28.
- 1981b = Лотман Юрий. Текст в тексте. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* XIV: 3–18.
- 1981c = Лотман Юрий. Семиотика культуры и понятие текста. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* XII: 3–7.
- 1983 = Лотман Юрий. Асимметрия и диалог. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* XVI: 15–30.
- 1984 = Лотман Юрий. О семиосфере. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* XVII: 5–23.
- 1992a [1990] = Лотман Юрий. Мозг – Текст – Культура. — Лотман Юрий. *Избранные статьи в трёх томах*, I. Таллинн: Александра, 25–33.
- 1992b = Лотман Юрий. О динамике культуры. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* XXV: 5–22.
- 1992c = Лотман Юрий. *Культура и взрыв*. Москва: Гнозис.
- 1993a [1981] = Лотман Юрий. «Договор» и «вручение себя» как архетипические модели культуры. — Лотман Юрий. *Избранные статьи в трёх томах*, III. Таллинн: Александра, 345–355.
- 1993b [1989] = Лотман Юрий. Культура как субъект и сама-себе объект. — Лотман Юрий. *Избранные статьи в трёх томах*, III. Таллинн: Александра, 368–375.

- 1994a [1964] = Лотман Юрий. Лекции по структуральной поэтике. — Кошелев А. Д. (сост.). *Ю. М. Лотман и Тартуско-московская семиотическая школа*. Москва: Гнозис, 10–263.
- 1994b = Лотман Юрий. Тезисы к семиотике русской культуры (Программа изучения русской культуры). — Кошелев А. Д. (сост.). *Ю. М. Лотман и Тартуско-московская семиотическая школа*. Москва: Гнозис, 407–416.
- 1998 = Лотман Юрий. Охота за ведьмами: Семиотика страха. *Sign Systems Studies* 26: 61–82.
- Lotman, Juri and Mints, Zara 1981 = Лотман Юрий, Минц Зара. Литература и мифология. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* XIII: 35–55.
- Lotman, Juri and Pyatigorski, Aleksandr 1968 = Лотман Юрий, Пятигорский Александр. Текст и функция. — *III летняя школа по вторичным моделирующим системам: Тезисы. Доклады: Кязрику 10 – 20 мая 1968*. Тарту: ТГУ, 74–88.
- Lotman, Juri and Uspenski, Boris 1971 = Лотман Юрий, Успенский Борис. О семиотическом механизме культуры. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* V: 144–166.
- 1973 = Лотман Юрий, Успенский Борис. Миф – имя – культура. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* VI: 282–203.
- 1975 = Лотман Юрий, Успенский Борис. Споры о языке в начале XIX в. как факт русской культуры («Происшествие в царстве теней или судьбина российского языка» — неизвестное сочинение Семена Боброва). *Труды по русской и славянской филологии*, XXIV. Тарту: ТГУ, 168–322.
- 1982 = Лотман Юрий, Успенский Борис. «Изгой» и «изгойничество» как социально-психологическая позиция в русской культуре преимущественно допетровского периода. («Свое» и «чужое» в истории русской культуры.) *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* XV: 110–121.
- 1984. Author's introduction. — Lotman, Juri; Uspenskij, Boris. *The Semiotics of Russian Culture*. Ann Arbor, IX–XIV.
- 1993 [1976] = Лотман Юрий, Успенский Борис. Отзвуки концепции «Москва — третий Рим» в идеологии Петра Первого (К проблеме средневековой традиции в культуре барокко). — Лотман Юрий. *Избранные статьи*, III. Таллинн: Александра, 201–212

- 1994 [1977] = Лотман Юрий, Успенский Борис. Роль дуальных моделей в динамике русской культуры. — Успенский Борис А. *Избранные труды*, I. Москва: Гнозис, 219–253.
- Lotman, Uspenskij et al. 1975 [1973]. *Theses on the Semiotic Study of Culture*. Lisse: The Peter de Ridder Press.
- Lotman, Mikhail 1994. Teksti taga: märkmeid Tartu semiootika filosoofilisest taustast. *Keel ja Kirjandus* 10: 592–597.
- 2002. Atomistic versus holistic semiotics. *Sign Systems Studies* 30.2: 513–527.
- Lühikursus 1951 [1938] = *Üleliidulise kommunistliku (bolševike) partei ajalugu: Lühikursus*. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus.
- Machado, Irene 2003. *Escola de Semiótica. A Experiência de Tártu-Moscou o Estudo das Cultura*. Granja Viana: Ateliê Editorial.
- Маяковский, Владимир 1956 = Маяковский Владимир. *Избранные произведения*. Москва: Изд-во детской литературы.
- 1958 = Маяковский Владимир. *Полное собрание сочинении в 13 томах*, 8. Москва: Гос. изд-во художественной литературы.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw 1926. *Myth in Primitive Psychology*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co Ltd.
- 1936. The problem of meaning in primitive languages: Supplement I. — Ogden, C. K.; Richards, I. A. *The Meaning of Meaning*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co Ltd., 296–336.
- 1965 [1935]. *Coral Gardens and their Magic, I: Soil-Tilling and Agricultural Rites in the Trobri and Islands*. London: George Allen and Unwin LTD.
- 1965 [1935]. *Coral Gardens and their Magic, II: The Language of Magic and Gardening*. London: George Allen and Unwin LTD.
- 1998 [1925] = Малиновский Бронислав. Магия, наука и религия. — Малиновский Бронислав. *Магия, наука и религия*. Москва: Рефл – бук., 19–91.
- Marx, Karl 1955 [1844] = Маркс Карл. К критике гегелевской философии права: Введение. — Маркс Карл, Энгельс Фридрих. *Сочинения*, I. Москва: Изд-во политической литературы.
- 1977 [1844] = Маркс Карл. Экономическо-философские рукописи 1844 года. — Маркс Карл, Энгельс Фридрих. *Сочинения*, 42. Москва: Изд-во политической литературы, 43–174.

- 1980 [1859]. Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Erstes Heft. — Karl Marx. *Ökonomische Manuskripte und Schriften 1858–1861: Text*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 95–245.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich 1958 [1846]. Die deutsche Ideologie. — Karl Marx; Friedrich Engels. *Werke*, 3. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 9–529.
- 1965 [1846] = Маркс Карл, Энгельс Фридрих. Фейербах: Противоположность материалистического и идеалистического воззрений. Фрагмент I главы «Немецкой идеологии» К. Маркса и Ф. Энгельса. *Вопросы философии* 10: 81–107, 11: 111–137.
- Matjus, Ülo 1993b. Edmund Husserl Descartes'i teil. *Akadeemia* 8: 1571–1603.
- Mauss, Marcel 2000 [1904] = Мосс Марсель. набросок общей теории магии. — Мосс Марсель. *Социальные функции священного*. Санкт-Петербург: Евразия, 105–232.
- Meletinski, Eleazar 1976 = Мелетинский Елеазар М. *Поэтика мифа*. Москва: Наука.
- Meletinski, Neklyudov *et al.* 1970 = Мелетинский Елеазар, Неклюдов Сергей, Новик Елена, Сегал Дмитрий. Вопросы семантического анализа волшебной сказки. — Лотман Юрий (ред.). *Тезисы докладов IV Летней школы по вторичным моделирующим системам (17–24 августа 1970)*. Тарту: ТГУ, 7–8.
- Melvin, M. A. 1960. Elementary particles and symmetry principles. *Reviews of Modern Physics* 32(3): 477–518.
- Merilai, Arne 1995. Artur Alliksaare luule pragmaatika: 1. *Akadeemia* 10: 2086–2111.
- Merrell, Floyd 2001. Lotman's semiosphere, Peirce's categories, and cultural forms of life. *Sign Systems Studies* 29(2): 385–415.
- Middleton, John 1987. Theories of magic. — Eliade, Mircea (ed. in chief). *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, IX. London: MacMillan Publishing Company, 82–89.
- Nöth, Winfried 1986. Semiotics of magic in children's folklore. — Deely, John (ed.). *Semiotics 1985*. Lanham: University Press of America, 390–400.
- 1990. Semiotics of magic. — Koch, Walter A. (ed.). *Aspekte einer Kultursemiotik*. Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr. Norbert Brockmeyer, 141–163.

- 1994a. Opposition at the roots of semiosis. — Nöth, Winfried (ed.). *Origins of Semiosis: Sign Evolution in Nature and Culture*. Berlin–New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 37–60.
- 1994b. Symmetry in oral and written language. — Čmejrková, Světlá; Daneš, František; Havlová, Eva (eds.). *Writing vs Speaking: Language, Text, Discourse, Communication: Proceedings of the Conference held at the Czech Language Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague, October 14–16, 1992*. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 97–110.
- 1994c. Semiotic foundations of the cognitive paradigm. *Semiosis* 73 (1): 5–16.
- 1997. Semiotic foundations of the cognitive paradigm. — Rauch, I.; Carr, F. G. (eds.). *Semiotics around the World: Synthesis in Diversity / Proceedings of the Fifth Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, Berkley 1994, Vol 2*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 785–788.
- 1998. Symmetry in signs and in semiotic systems. *Interdisciplinary Journal for Germanic Linguistics and Semiotic Analysis* 3 (1): 48–62.
- 1999. Peircean semiotics in the study of iconicity in language. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society XXXV* (3): 613–619.
- Olrik, Axel 1909. Epische Gesetze der Volksdichtung. *Zeitschrift für Deutsches Altertum* 51: 1–12.
- Peirce, Charles S. 1931–1958. *Collected Papers*, Vols 1–6, C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (eds.); Vols 7–8, A. W. Burks (ed). Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Piaget, Jean 1951 [1927]. *The Child's Conception of the World*. London: Routledge and Kegan.
- 1970 [1946]. Piaget's theory. — Mussen, Paul (ed.). *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology*, I. New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 703–732.
- 1994 = Пиаже Жан. *Речь и мышление ребенка*. Москва: Педагогика–Пресс.
- Piibel: Vana ja Uus testament* 1968. BFBS: Piibliseltsi väljaanne.
- Ryatigorski, Aleksandr 1962 = Пятигорский Александр. Некоторые общие замечания относительно рассмотрения текста как разновидности сигнала. — Молошная Т. Н. (ред.). *Структурно-типологические исследования: Сборник статей*. Москва: Изд АН СССР, 144–154.

- 1965 = Пятигорский Александр. Некоторые общие замечания о мифологии с точки зрения психолога. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* II: 38–48.
- 1973 = Пятигорский Александр. О некоторых теоретических посылах семиотики. — *Сборник статей по вторичным моделирующим системам*. Тарту: ТГУ, 187–191.
- 1992 = Пятигорский Александр. «Другой» и «свое» как понятия литературной философии. — Мальтс Анн (ред.). *Сборник статей к 70-летию проф. Ю. М. Лотмана*. Тарту: ТГУ, 3–9.
- 1994 = Пятигорский Александр. Заметки из 90-х о семиотике 60-х годов. — Кошелев А. Д. (сост.). *Ю. М. Лотман и тартуско-московская семиотическая школа*. Москва: Гнозис, 324–329.
- Ryatigorski and Uspenski 1967 = Пятигорский Александр, Успенский Борис. Персонологическая классификация как семиотическая проблема. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* III: 7–29.
- Porshnev, Boriss 1979 [1966] = Поршнева Борис Ф. *Социальная психология и история*. Москва: Наука.
- Portis-Winner, Irene 1999. The dynamics of semiotics of culture; its pertinence to anthropology. *Sign Systems Studies* 27: 24–45.
- 2002. *Semiotics of Peasants in Transition: Slovene Villagers and their Ethnic Relatives in America*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Predlozheniya 1970 = Предложения по программе IV Летней школы по вторичным моделирующим системам. — *Тезисы докладов IV Летней школы по вторичным моделирующим системам*. Тарту: ТГУ, 3–5.
- Propp, Vladimir 1969 [1928] = Пропп Владимир. *Морфология сказки*. Москва: Наука.
- Rastier, François 2001. Sémiotique et sciences de la culture. *LINX* 44(1): 149–166.
- Redkollegija 1988 = Редколлегия. К семиотике зеркала и зеркальности. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* XXII: 3–6.
- Revzin, Isaak 1964 = Ревзин Исаак. К семиотическому анализу детективов (на примере романов Агаты Кристи). — *Программа и тезисы докладов в летней школе по вторичным моделирующим системам, 19–29 августа 1964 г.* Тарту: ТГУ, 38–40.

- Riftin, Boris 1982 = Рифтин Борис. Инь и янь. — Токарев Сергей Александрович (ред.). *Мифы народов мира: Энциклопедия*, том I. Москва: Советская энциклопедия, 547.
- Rosenthal, Franz 1978 [1970] = Розентал Франц. *Торжество знания: Концепция знания в средневековом исламе*. Москва: Наука.
- Russell, James A. 1979. Affective space is bipolar. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 37(3): 345–356.
- Saussure, Ferdinand de 1959 [1916]. *Course in General Linguistics*. New York: Philosophical Library
- Searle, John 1979. Metaphor. — Searle, John. *Expression and Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 76–116.
- Sebeok, Thomas A. 1989. The notion 'Semiotic Self' revisited. — Deely, John (ed.). *Semiotics 1988*. Lanham: University Press of America, 189–193.
- Segal, Dmitri 1973 = Сегал Дмитрий. Антиномичность и архаическая культура. — *Сборник статей по вторичным моделирующим системам*. Тарту: ТГУ, 39–45.
- Segal, Dmitri and Senokossov, Juri 1970 = Сегал Дмитрий, Сенокосов Юрий. К типологии культур с точки зрения ритуала. — Лотман Юрий (ред.). *Тезисы докладов IV Летней школы по вторичным моделирующим системам*. Тарту: ТГУ, 76–81.
- Shils, Edward 1958. Ideology and civility: On the politics of the intellectual. *The Sewanee Review* 66: 450–480.
- Shpet, Gustav 1996 [1914] = Шпет Густав. *Явление и смысл: Феноменология как основная наука и её проблемы*. Томск: Водолей.
- Shukman, Ann 1977. *Literature and Semiotics: A Study of the Writings of Yu. M. Lotman*. Amsterdam: North Holland.
- Smith, Hedrick. 1976. *The Russians*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Sowell, Thomas 1987. *A Conflict of Visions*. New York: William Morrow and Co.
- Spengler, Oswald 1991 [1922] = Шпенглер Освальд. *Закат Европы*, т. 2. [отрывок] — *Самосознание европейской культуры XX века*. Москва: Изд. полит. литературы, 23–68.
- Stalin, Iosif 1935a [1924] = Сталин Иосиф. Об основах ленинизма: Лекции, читанные в Свердловском университете в начале апреля 1924 г. — *Вопросы ленинизма*. Москва: Партиздат ЦК ВКЛ(б), 1–74.
- 1935d [1931] = Сталин Иосиф. О задачах хозяйственников: Речь на первой Всесоюзной конференции работников социалисти-

- ческой промышленности 4 февраля 1931 г. — *Вопросы ленинизма*. Москва: Партиздат ЦК ВКП(б), 439–447.
- 1947 [1924] = Сталин Иосиф. По поводу смерти Ленина: Речь на II Всесоюзном съезде Советов 26 января 1924 г. — Сталин Иосиф. *Сочинения*, 6. Москва: Гос. изд-во политической литературы, 46–51.
- Stauffer, Ethelbert 1966 [1952] *Christus und die Caesaren: Historische Skizzen*. München und Hamburg: Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Summer School III 1968 = III летняя школа по вторичным моделирующим системам: Тезисы. Кязрику 10–20 мая 1968. Тарту: ТГУ.
- Summer School IV 1970 = Тезисы докладов IV летней школы по вторичным моделирующим системам. 17–24 августа 1970 г. Тарту: ТГУ.
- Zamechaniya 1966 = Замечания по программе занятия. — Тезисы докладов во Второй летней школе по вторичным моделирующим системам: 16–26 августа 1966. Тарту: ТГУ, 3–5.
- Žylko, Boguslaw 2001. Culture and semiotics: Notes on Lotman's conception of culture. *New Literary History* 32(2): 391–408.
- Tambiah, Stanley J. 1968. The magical power of words. *Man* 3(2): 175–208.
- 1999 [1990]. *Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Thom, René 1975 = Том Рене. Топология и лингвистика. *Успехи математических наук* XXX (1): 199–221.
- Торогов, Vladimir 1973 = Топоров Владимир. О космологических источниках раннеисторических описаний. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* VI: 106–150.
- 1982 = Топоров Владимир. Путь. — Токарев Сергей Александрович (ред.). *Мифы народов мира*, т. II. Москва: Советская энциклопедия, 352–353.
- 1995a [1971, 1993] = Топоров Владимир. Петербург и «Петербургский текст русской литературы» (Введение в тему). — Топоров Владимир Н. *Миф. Ритуал. Символ. Образ: Исследования в области мифопоэтического*. Москва: Прогресс/Культура, 259–367.
- 1995b [1972] = Топоров Владимир. О структуре романа Достоевского в связи с архаичными схемами мифологического мышления («Преступление и наказание»). — Топоров Владимир

- Н. Миф. Ритуал. Символ. Образ: Исследования в области мифопоэтического. Москва: Прогресс/Культура, 193–258.
- Tulviste, Peeter 1984. *Mõtlemise muutumisest ajaloos*. Tallinn: Valgus.
- Turner, Victor 1983 [1973] = Тэрнер Виктор. Символы в африканском ритуале. — Тэрнер Виктор. *Символ и ритуал*. Москва: Наука, 32–46.
- Udam, Haljand 1992. Seletusi ja lisandusi. — Ibn Tufail. *Elav ärgamu poeg: Filosoofiline jutustus*. Tallinn: Olion, 119–136.
- 1998. Totalitaarse võimu semiootilised praktikad. *Vikerkaar* 10/11: 138–144.
- Uexküll, Thure von 1986. *From Index to Icon. A Semiotic Attempt at Interpreting Piaget's Developmental Theory*. Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag, 119–140.
- Undusk, Jaan 1994a. Stalinismi müstilised ja maagilised märgid: Juhan Smuuli *Poem Stalinile* oma retoorilises ümbruses. *Akadeemia* 9: 1863–1889.
- 1994b. Keeelise substantsi põhikujundid. *Akadeemia* 3: 463–485; 4: 692–709.
- Uspenski, Boris 1963 = Успенский Борис. Universals of Language. J. H. Greenberg (ed.). Рецензия. *Вопросы языкознания* 5: 115–130.
- 1965 = Успенский Борис. *Структурная типология языков*. Москва: Наука.
- 1966 = Успенский Борис. Персонологические проблемы в лингвистическом аспекте. — *Тезисы докладов во Второй летней школе по вторичным моделирующим системам: 16–26 августа 1966*. Тарту: ТГУ, 6–12.
- 1970 = Успенский Борис. Проблема универсалий в языкознании. — *Новое в лингвистике*, вып. V: Языковые универсалии. Москва: Прогресс, 5–30.
- 1989a = Успенский Борис. История и семиотика (Восприятие времени как семиотическая проблема): Статья первая. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* XXII: 66–84.
- 1989b = Успенский Борис. История и семиотика (Восприятие времени как семиотическая проблема): Статья вторая. *Труды по знаковым системам (Sign Systems Studies)* XXIII: 18–38.
- 1994a [1983, 1987] = Успенский Борис. Мифологический аспект русской экспрессивной фразеологий. — Успенский Борис А. *Избранные труды*, II: Язык и культура. Москва: Гнозис, 53–128.

- 1994b [1985] = Успенский Борис. Анти-поведение в культуре Древней Руси. — Успенский Борис. *Избранные труды*, I. Москва: Гнозис, 320–332.
- 1994c = Успенский Борис. Предисловие к Избранным трудам. — Успенский Борис. *Избранные труды*, II: Семиотика истории. Семиотика культуры. Москва: Гнозис, 5–8.
- 2007 = Успенский Борис. *Ego Loquens: Язык и коммуникационное пространство*. Москва: Российский государственный гуманитарный университет.
- Vernadski, Vladimir 1975 = Вернадский Владимир. *Размышления натуралиста: пространство и время в неживой и живой природе*. Москва: Наука.
- Voigt, Vilmos 1995. In memoriam of 'Lotmanosphere'. *Semiotica* 105 (3/4): 191–206.
- Wallon, Henry 1945. *Les origines de la pensée chez l'enfant*. Vol I. Paris: Presses Univeristaires de France.
- Watt, William 1976 [1972] = Уотт Вильям Монтгомери. *Влияние ислама на средневековую Европу*. Москва: Наука.
- Weyl, Hermann 1968 [1951] = Вейль Герман. *Симметрия*. Москва: Наука.
- Winner, Ellen; Rosenstiel, A. K. and Gardner, H. 1976. The development of metaphoric understanding. *Developmental Psychology* 12: 289–297.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1996 [1921]. *Loogilis-filosoofiline traktaat*. Tallinn: Ilmamaa.
- 1997 [1979]. Märkused Frazeri "Kuldse oksa" kohta. *Akadeemia* 12: 2530–2548.
- Wodak, Ruth 1989. *Language, Power and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Yakimovich, Aleksandr 1998 = Якимович Александр К. Культура 20 века. — Левит С. Я. (сост.). *Культурология. XX век: Энциклопедия*, I. Санкт-Петербург: Университетская книга Алтейя, 339–346.
- Yevzlin, Mikhail 1993 = Евзлин Михаил. *Космогония и ритуал*. Предисловие В. Н. Топорова. Москва: Радикс.

INDEX

- Aarne, Antti 197
Abramyan, Levon 45, 62–63,
86, 188–189
Allik, Jüri 42
Andrews, Edna 12
Ansari, Abu 202
Arán, Pampa Olga 12
Arasteh, A. Reza 35
Aristotle 77
Armstrong, David M. 15
Austin, John Langshaw 36, 53,
60, 110–111, 160
Averintsev, Sergei 95
Bakhtin, Mikhail 168, 184, 196
Bally, Charles 62
Balthasar, Hans Urs von 187–
188
Barei, Silvia 12
Barthes, Roland 44
Baudelaire, Charles 175
Beethoven, Ludwig van 243
Belobrovstseva, Irima 65
Bertels, Jevgeni 182
Betz, Hans D. 40
Bickerton, Derek 62
Bitov, Andrei 16
Blok, Aleksandr 230
Boccaccio, Giovanni 198
Bogatyrkov, Pyotr 124, 160
Brentano, Franz 160
Brezhnev, Leonid 27, 86
Burke, Kenneth 53
Caesar, Julius 38
Caligula 38
Cassirer, Ernst 40, 83, 97, 106,
123, 181, 187
Catherine II 119
Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de
202
Chernyshevski, Nikolai 242
Clark, Stuart 33, 40
Cohen, Hermann 153
Commodus, Lucius Aelius
Aurelius 38
Courtés, Joseph 104
Daddesio, Thomas C. 47–48
Derzhavin, Gavriila 244
Domitianus, Titus Flavius 38
Donskis, Leonidas 63
Dostoyevski, Fyodor 16
Duchamp, Marcel 223
Durkheim, Émile 173, 175–
176
Eco, Umberto 12, 45, 60, 170,
209
Eliade, Mircea 40, 45, 57, 169,
173–174, 179, 183, 185, 188
Engels, Friedrich 64–65, 68
Erikson, Erik 45, 63, 170
Flaubert, Gustave 90
Florenski, Pavel 132
Foucault, Michel 45, 66
Frazer, James 32–34, 40, 92,
94–96, 110, 118, 120, 147
Freud, Sigmund 15, 82
Galen 77

- Gardner, H. 42
 Geissler, Friedmar 95
 al-Ghazali 35
 Greenberg, Joseph H. 15
 Greimas, Algirdas Julien 104
 Gross, Toomas 83, 97, 118
 Grozny, Ivan (Ivan IV, Ivan the Terrible) 156, 236
 Gurevich, Aron 40, 182
 Hall, James 87
 Halle, Morris 158
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 25, 65, 228
 Heusden, Barend van 41, 113
 Hill, Donald R. 40
 Hoffmann-Krayer, Eduard 95
 Holenstein, Elmar 122, 124, 129, 153, 214
 Hopkins, Gerald 191
 Hoppál, Mihály 40, 182
 Husserl, Edmund 20–21, 122–131, 133–134, 142, 153–159, 161–162, 176, 221
 Ibn Tufail 198
 Ivanov, Vyacheslav 24, 27, 30, 43, 45, 52–53, 62, 69, 71–73, 75, 78, 81, 83, 85, 89, 150, 168, 210
 Izutsu, Toshihiko 106–110, 112–113, 122
 Jacob, François 63
 Jakobson, Roman 33, 35–36, 42, 46, 51, 59, 62, 72–73, 78–79, 99, 102–106, 121–122, 124, 128–129, 134, 153, 158, 160, 186, 191–192, 210–211, 214
 Jenkins, James J. 15
 Johnson, Mark 45, 47, 49, 148, 219
 Jung, Carl Gustav 15, 62, 185
 Kant, Immanuel 47, 72, 85, 126, 153, 155, 161
 Khrushchev, Nikita 86
 Kim Su Kwan 12
 Kluckhohn, Clyde 15, 184, 189, 195
 Kolakowski, Leszek 170–172
 Kreutzwald, Friedrich Reinhold 104
 Krylov, Ivan 117
 Kurbski, Andrei 236
 LaBarre, Weston 42, 100
 Lacan, Jacques 62, 85
 Lakoff, George 15, 45, 47, 49, 148, 219
 Langer, Susan 106
 Lar, Leonid 182
 Lauristin, Marju 225
 Leach, Edmund 40, 137, 170, 173, 176, 187–188, 204
 Leenhardt, Maurice 41
 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 130–133
 Lenin, Vladimir 63–65, 67–68, 80, 199
 Levin, Juri 85
 Lévi-Strauss, Claude 40, 44, 63
 Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien 35, 41
 Leyton, Michael 45
 Lope de Vega 117, 241, 243
 Lorenz, Konrad 45, 170
 Louis XV 175
 Lotman, Mikhail 104, 132, 150, 153
 Luther, Martin 171
 Machado, Irene 13

- Malinowski, Bronislaw 34, 36,
40, 53, 55, 95, 100–102,
108–110, 120, 122, 183,
186–187, 190
- Marx, Karl 64–65, 68, 82
- Matjus, Ülo 156
- Mauss, Marcel 40, 116, 120,
183
- Mayakovski, Vladimir 65, 84,
89, 227
- Meletinski, Eleazar 40, 62,
169–170, 182, 200
- Melvin, M. A. 77
- Merilai, Aarne 180
- Merrell, Floyd 12
- Middleton, John 40
- Mints, Zara 41, 79
- Natorp, Paul 153
- Neklyudov, Sergei 200
- Nero, Claudius Caesar 38
- Nöth, Winfried 33–34, 44, 46–
48, 51–55, 63, 76–77, 79, 86
- Octavianus 38
- Orlik, Axel 62, 81, 90, 197,
205
- Osgood, Charles 15
- Otto, Rudolf 174–175
- Peirce, Charles Sanders 44,
46–48, 52–53, 56, 78, 129,
191, 210
- Peter I (Peter the Great) 81,
235–236
- Piaget, Jean 42–43, 47–48, 53,
99–100, 102, 122
- Pico della Mirandola 206
- Plato 160
- Poinsot, John 163, 167
- Porphyrios 14
- Porshnev, Boris 62, 83, 190
- Portis-Winner, Irene 12
- Prigogine, Ilya 18
- Propp, Vladimir 57–58, 197
- Pugachov, Yemelyan 119
- Pushkin, Aleksandr 16, 243
- Pyatigorski, Aleksandr 8, 17,
24, 27–28, 31, 43, 45, 56,
63, 69, 115–116, 133, 146,
149, 151–152, 154–155,
157–159, 162, 164, 166,
169, 183, 204, 221–222
- Rastier, François 12
- Revzin, Isaak 197
- Riftin, Boris 188
- Rosenstiel, A. K. 42
- Rosenthal, Franz 35
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 174,
228
- Saussure, Ferdinand de 28, 47,
62, 122, 154, 161, 219
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich 187
- Searle, John 194
- Sebeok, Thomas A. 62
- Segal, Dmitri 182–184, 189–
190, 195
- Senokossov, Juri 182–183
- Shils, Edward 63
- Shpet, Gustav 122, 153
- Shukman, Ann 12
- Smith, Hedrick 82
- Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr 66
- Soosaar, Mark 214
- Sowell, Thomas 63
- Spengler, Oswald 35, 120, 121
- St Augustus 120
- Stalin, Iosif 38, 63, 66–68, 81,
86, 94, 206–207
- Stauffer, Ethelbert 37, 38, 181
- Surkov, Aleksei 67


- Swift, Jonathan 177
- Tacitus, Publius Cornelius 38
- Tambiah, Stanley 32–33, 40–41, 45, 54–55, 57, 59, 110, 120, 174
- Thom, René Frédéric 72, 210
- Tolstoy, Lev 90, 136
- Toporov, Vladimir 16, 45, 150, 168, 175, 197
- Trotsky, Lev 67
- Tulviste, Peeter 44
- Turner, Victor 40, 169–170, 175
- Tylor, Edward 34, 97, 118, 120, 147
- Udam, Haljand 35, 198, 202
- Uexküll, Thure von 42, 44, 100
- Undusk, Jaan 41, 67, 109–113, 122
- Uspenski, Boris 18, 20, 24, 26–27, 34, 41, 43, 50–51, 56–58, 63, 66–71, 79–81, 83, 86, 94, 111–112, 114–115, 118, 129, 135, 137, 140, 142–143, 146, 150, 163–164, 166, 169, 172, 177–178, 180, 182–186, 195, 203–205, 208, 212, 215, 219
- Vernadski, Vladimir 75–76
- Voigt, Vilmos 19
- Vygotski, Lev 141
- Wallon, Henry 42
- Wartburg Walther von 163
- Watt, William Montgomery 157
- Weyl, Hermann 77
- Winner, Ellen 12, 42
- Wissova, Georg 38
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig 32–33, 53, 70, 110, 168, 186
- Wodak, Ruth 63
- Yakimovich, Aleksandr 81
- Yevzlin, Mikhail 175
- Żyłko, Bogusław 12

Σημειωτική

It is sometimes thought that the only people who think religiously are those who go to church and believe in God, that it is only quacks and good-for-nothings who deal with magic, or that metaphors are the sustenance of only poets and literature lessons, and that it is only children who are afraid of bogeymen or who crave to listen to magic tales.

But this is not the case at all, and this book attempts to explain why.

The roots of one possible explanation can be found in the semiotics of Juri Lotman. In his lectures – that are also being published for the first time as an Appendix to this book – Lotman has sketched the fruits that could have developed from these roots. The author of this book has taken it upon himself to examine more thoroughly the connections between the roots and the fruits. The author believes that the result of this examination is indeed in accord with the essence of the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics.



ISBN 978-9949-11-831-1

