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**Securitization of energy relations by Poland, Latvia, Denmark and Sweden: the
building of Nord Stream 2**

MA thesis

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SECURITIZATION OF ENERGY RELATIONS BY POLAND, LATVIA, DENMARK AND SWEDEN: THE BUILDING OF NORD STREAM 2

Hanna Rutkowska

Abstract

Over the past years, discussion concerning enhancing the security of supply and avoiding the fragmentation of EU gas market have a dominated place on the agenda of the European Commission, chaired by Jean-Claude Juncker. In this light, the proposal of the new pipeline, Nord Stream 2 has raised a couple of controversial questions. It led to a new tension within an EU-level regarding forming the two blocs, respectively supporters and opponents of the gas project. The thesis aims to provide the analysis of the four Member States that have voiced against the building of the pipeline. The chosen countries consider the Nord Stream 2 project as a political tool which might divide the EU inside and ensure the Russian dominance in the European energy market. In such a situation, the particular Member States stands on blocking it to prevent the inevitable consequences. The research outlines the common stance on the gas offshore by analysing the speech acts of Member States' political leaders. According to the Copenhagen School, the thesis disputes the degree of securitization which can be gained in the particular energy issue. Primarily, the study delves into the initial stage of the securitization known as a securitising movement. Hence, the securitising actors, their speech acts and referent objects are the essential elements of analysis. Functional actors such as Russia and Germany are included in the research as well. Overall, the findings confirm the political significance of the energy relation in the context of the construction of the pipeline and its effect on the further escalation of securitising movement.

Key words: Nord Stream 2, energy relations, the EU, securitizing movement, Copenhagen School.

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1. Introduction

“I have never seen a commercial project to be so hotly debated by the top leaders of the EU, on so many occasions and for such a long time” (Taylor, 2018).

By this statement the Vice-President of the European Commission for the Energy Union, Maros Šefčovič referred to the current situation on the energy issue, Nord Stream 2 (NS2). The idea of its building became an attractive deal among the Member States of the European Union (MS EU) after the North Gas Pipeline is known as Nord Stream 1 (NS1) firstly delivered a gas supply to Europe from Russia. In 2012 the engineers with scientists examined the option to construct the third and fourth strings of gas offshore in the Baltic Sea and came with the conclusion that NS2 might become operational in the future. Three years after, in June at the International Economic Forum in Saint Petersburg, there was made an official announcement regarding the construction of the gas pipeline. Presented as a purely commercial project, the offshore has raised some questions at the public debates, becoming a controversial issue within the European Union(EU) level.

The reason for the contradiction partly lies in the energy situation of the EU. While the Union has a high level of dependence on imports, 43% of natural gas mostly delivered from Russia in 2017 (European Commission, 2018). Consequently, ensuring the security of energy supply and its diversification have become an internal direction of the EU policy. Firstly, the energy issue was brought up to the EU public debates in 2009 in the context of the discussion on The Third Energy Package which legally bound the main principles of the internal energy market. In 2014, the European Commission (EC) adopted the European Energy Security Strategy which increased the attention to the EU dependency on Russian gas supply. Furthermore, the creation of Energy Union and its primary objectives became a substantial step towards improving renewable energy and energy efficiency. On the background of last updates about the EU, the proposal of the building of NS2 seems to be controversial.

The ongoing project, as well as Nord Stream 1, will be located in the Baltic Sea by passing through the territorial water and Exclusive Economic zone of Russia, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany. It will consist of twin lines and double the capabilities of the first pipeline up to 55 billion cubic meters per year which in terms means it will provide 26 million of households by gas (Espoo, 2017). Using the same technologies as first two strings, its impact on the environment might be seen insignificant. The set date of gas transmission via a new pipeline is the end of 2019 when a transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine will be expired. A sole shareholder of this project is Gazprom, who is owned mainly by Russia. The Member States that consider this project as a commercial venture, actively support it. Accordingly, German, Austrian, Dutch and French companies had agreed to co-finance this pipeline by 50% of its total cost (Ibid.).

Despite the fact that NS2 is mostly similar to NS1 in its description, it is brought up to open the debate about the EU-Russia gas relationship among the Member States of the European Union. The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) were the first expressed their opposition towards this project. Correctly, in 2016 eight of them had sent a letter to the President of the European Commission to show they disagreement to build NS2 and called to block the ongoing project by the EU legislative tools. However, the EU institution does not have a mandate over the gas project, and merely the Member States should take a final decision (European Commission, 2017, November 8). Up to the present time, there might be traced the division inside the EU concerning this issue. Whereas Finland and Germany had already granted a permit for the construction of Nord Stream 2 through their Exclusive Economic Zones and territorial waters, Denmark and Sweden took a stance against their involvement in this project. Hence, CEECs together with some Nordic countries put on the agenda the question of pipeline's controversial nature.

To trace what unified the CEECs and Nordic states on this issue, the research question is - *how do the particular Member States, especially Poland, Latvia, Denmark, and Sweden, interpret the building of NS2?* The preliminary objectives of MA thesis can be summed up as follows: (1) to scrutinise the relevance of the theory

of securitization towards the energy domain; (2) define what the referent objects of securitization in are the context of the construction of NS2; (3)and to which extent the energy issue can be securitised.

The research will follow the comparative analysis within the scope mentioned above four countries. In detail, it will use the most different system design, which will help to analyse the interpretation of the gas pipeline by the individual countries with the different backgrounds. Besides the fact that the selected states have an exit to the Baltic Sea where might run NS2, it was crucial to take not only countries from CEE block that are the first active opponents but also to overcome Nordic states. This criteria thus exposes the comparative analysis of securitization among the different Member States. The spatial context of the empirical study captures the events from the end of 2015 till March 2018. The starting date is guided by the official announcements of the building of NS2 in June 2015. However, as a project is not completed yet and the political debates among the EU Member States are extensive, the research overcame the events until March 2018.

Regarding the theoretical framework, the thesis applies to the frame of the Copenhagen School (CS). Whereas the notion of security might have an independent context, the scholars of the School argue that it is about the survival of something depending on different realms in which an existential threat claims. Energy concern has been considered as an issue that can be threatened in a particular context. To justify why the specific theory was chosen, it should be taken into the fact the nature of energy security. It is characterized by the intersubjective feature which also has securitization theory (Szulecki, 2017). Second, to pick up this concept was guided by the primary question of this research: to delve into the interpretation of a gas project. The theoretical frame pays attention to the process of securitization rather than on security as a phenomenon. It may be considered that to secure is the focus of theory, in other words, the process how the threat is constructed. Due to the aim of the research, the approach will help to trace the process of securitising movement, not what security is.

While the School includes two stages of securitization, securitizing movement and successful securitization/deseuritization, the research will base on the former one. The reason why only the first stage will be examined in the analysis is the issue is still unresolved. The proponents of the Copenhagen School stand out the critical elements of a securitising movement such as securitising and functional actors, speech acts of the former and referent objects that will be a core in the empirical part of the research. Since securitization theory distinguishes five different dimensions, which does not include an energy sector as a separate sector, the thesis will elaborate within a synthesis of environmental and dominance of political areas. This approach will give a more comprehensive look at different arrows of the securitization process in the particular case study.

The structure of thesis proceeds as follows. The first chapter contains the overview of the securitization theory proposed by the scholars of the Copenhagen Research Peace Institute. While the first subchapter describes the main elements of the concept and their nature, the second one outlines its limitation and reviews of the researchers who examined this concept. The next chapter bases on the methodology of the research and operationalisation of dependent and independent variables. The third chapter, an empirical part, contains the analysis of the speech acts by the securitising actors, description of functional actors and discussion of findings. The latter one gives the insight how the theory applied to the empirical part by the results. The thesis ends up with a general conclusion of the research.

2. Theoretical framework: the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School

As the notion of securitization has a range of different interpretations in the science, this work elaborates meaning of this phenomenon by following the Copenhagen School. A new framework for security studies has taken its beginning from the publication in 1983 of *People, States and Fear* by Barry Buzan. Afterwards together with Buzan, his colleagues at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, moved beyond the classical security complex theory and published several research papers about the process of the securitization in the international relations. The first and primary book of the co-founders of the CS is *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), which sets out the importance of a security issue and its nature outside of the military sector. Hence, the proponents of the CS redefined the meaning of security, connected it close with the logic of survival.

At large, a core of the School derives from the constructivism and the critical approach in the security studies. The essential principle of constructivism is that “people act toward objects, including others actors, by the meanings that objects have for them” (Wendt, 1992: 396). Wendt argues that self-help, as defined by the realists (Waltz), derives not from anarchy instead from the social interaction. Mostly, it has been institutionalised and characterised by the process. Following the perception of constructivism and its intersubjective idea of international relations, the security concept is a socially constructed, which does not have a constitutive nature (Jackson, Sorensen, 2006).

Beyond the constructivism, another root of the CS derives from Schmitt's concept of the political. As Carl Schmitt put it, the political is the realm of an exception in his political theory. Similarly to this assumption, the frame of securitization theory presents a security as “a danger and the exceptional character of security” (Buzan, Hansen, 2016: 217). Despite, this common point does not lead these theories to the

same epistemological frame. Schmittian perception of enemy-friend derived from Hobbes's ideas, while the proponents of the CS follow a socially constructed nature of the security. Thereby, regarding the existential threat as an integral part of the Copenhagen School, it reveals on Schmitt's understanding of the "politics" which was characterised by exclusion and enmity (Williams, 2013).

Regarding the structure of the CS, the central notions are securitization and desecuritization which accommodate the framework to identify how an issue involves mentioned above processes. Traditionally, through the prism of this concept, the security can be presented as 'a call to defend a not-yet-existing social order' (Wæver, 1995: 74). It is deemed that moving issues into a security frame is different from those that would ensure if handled in a non-security mode. As set out by the proponents of the concept, in the international relations an issue becomes a security issue, not because of an objective threat to the state, but rather an actor has defined something like an existential threat. Importantly, this process follows the key condition in practice such as 'the capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats' (Williams, 2003). The epistemological platform, thus, connects with the speech act analysis, which was first discovered by John Austin in his series of lectures (1962) known as the concept of "performative utterances" and later developed by Ole Wæver (1995).

In detail, the theory presents the five key sectors of security: military, environmental, economic, societal and political. Beyond this clear division, the frame of the CS does not exclude the synthesis of these spheres. Traditionally, the military realm strongly institutionalised, and a state is the most important in a sense it is presented by governments or political elites who have a right to use the power (Buzan et al., 1998). Furthermore, the environmental domain is characterised by two distinct agenda such as political and scientific, which are mainly interdependent. Societal is based upon the concept of identity and claims that a threat is presented regarding the survival as a community (Ibid.). The economic sphere deals with political features as prevails in the public debates and its nature derives from liberalism. Finally, the political domain is an extensive one and usually overlaps with other mentioned

realms. Still, all these sectors can be synthesised as securitization theory does not exclude the cross-sectoral dynamic.

Moreover, the proponents of the CS distinguishes four levels of securitization regarding units: global, non-regional subsystemic, regional and local. Taking into account the two ways of classification by sectors and units, Buzan stands with the idea that “units do not exist in sectors, sectors exist in units as different types of security concerns” (Buzan et al., 1998: 168). In other words, the actors can refer to the different perceptions of the threat at the same time such as economic, military and political etc. Derived from the classification; it can be seen that the CS does not frame the energy security as a sector. The reason is the lack of entirely separated values from economics and its nature which has a multidimensional scope within various actors and directions. Accordingly, the research will tie into the synthesis of environmental and political spectrums within the dominance of latter.

2.1. The structural elements of the Copenhagen School

As it appears from the theory, the issue is considered being securitised in the case when the particular audience recognises it as such. The central idea of securitization is not a sign referring to something more real, it is the expression itself which is well-known as an act. The security act is not defined ‘by uttering the word security, rather the definition of an existential threat requiring emergency action and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience’ (Buzan et al.1998: 27). It is important to mention that scholars of the CS divide a nature of the issue in three dimensions such as non-politicised, politicised and securitised. The initial stage is non-politicized in the sense that a topic does not include in the agenda of public debates. Commonly, this issue is a concern of private sector and does not have enough importance to be discussed in the political spectrum. Contrary to this issue, the politicised point is considered in the public debate, which can be solved by the government or other political institutions of its competence (Buzan et al. 1998). In this case, Waever gives an example of a topic of gender which moves from non-politicized to politicised scopes (Waever, 2003).

And, the last dimension is securitised in the scope of which the issue demands the emergency actions beyond the established rules within the political system (Emmers, 2016). Notably, any item can shift to mentioned above dimensions, which in term means that non-politicised topic can become the securitised issue if it follows all conditions within the frame of the CS. The securitization domain is characterised by an intersubjective structure., which involves not only the securitising actors but also presents the functional actors and the audience. At the same time as securitization is ahead of politicisation known as its intensification, it can be even considered as an opposed process. Politicization marks an issue open for public debate and might be solved under the existing system. However, a securitised point requires the extra actions to deal with it. In other words, it is out of the realm of the political system as at this level there are not powerful enough tools to block a threat. Hence, securitization is in the frame of emergency as a more urgent task than others issues.

Emphasizing a specific rhetorical structure of securitization, including survival, Weaver stresses about the priority of action and urgency, which functions as a tool for finding a security action in other sectors beyond the scope the military-political dimension (Waever, 2003). The securitization functions as a phenomenon to shift the existential issue from one level to another. Through the prism of the CS, 'an issue is dramatised and presented as an issue of supreme priority; by labelling it as security; an agent claims a need for and a right to treat is as an extraordinary issue' (Buzan et al.1998: 26). On that ground, one of the critical targets of the securitization theory is to answer the question how the issue has become securitised and accepted by the audience.

Besides mentioned above three dimensions, the CS also points out two main stages of securitization, which should be adhered to make it succeed. At the first stage persons or subjects with a legitimate power put on the agenda the issue which can be seen as an existing threat to the referent object. Generally, the initiator of this movement can be 'state or non-actors such as trade unions or popular movements' (Emmers 2016: 170). In the traditional perspective, all acts of securitization involve the political decisions and flow out from the political and social actions. The second

stage is completed only in case if audience shares the view of the securitising actors on a specific issue as a threat and extraordinary measure are handled to prevent a threat.

In the context of the case study, the securitization will be analysed from the initial stage of energy relations, economic sphere to a logic of survival, applying to the question of the construction of NS2. Thus, it can be possible to trace how the issue has shifted from the politicised context to the securitised scope. According to these stages of the securitization, the perception of the gas pipeline as a threat derives from the EU Member States which are securitising actors. Nonetheless, there is no evidence which proves the implementation of the second stage: NS2 is the ongoing project, followed by the debates among the EU MS.

As it has noted above, an integral part of the process of securitization is a speech act: “it is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one” (Wæver 2004: 13). To begin with, John Austin (1962) and John Searle (1969) elaborated the speech act theory. The former pointed out that making a statement or giving a description is mostly similar to performing an act, making a promise or giving a warning. The idea of Austin’s concept is to describe the reality by uttering certain statements without a judgement what is true and false. Thereby, the researcher underlined the importance of the so-called “felicity conditions” by the uttering a performative sentence. In other words, these conditions are characterised by the situation when the speaker indicates a speech action where some convention exists. In substance, there are a certain person and circumstances, in which the speaker performs the act in a specific way to point out his/her future tasks. As follows, with this intention, a hearer reacts to it in a certain way (Oishi, 2006). Consequently, Austin highlights the importance of performative utterance which lies not in “true conditions”, but rather “felicity conditions” (Stitzel, 2007: 361).

Furthermore, the speech acts are various in forms such as illocutionary, locutionary and perlocutionary usages. More attention in Austin’s theory is devoted to the illocutionary act than to the locutionary and perlocutionary acts. This particular usage has been characterised by asking/answering a question, giving some

information or a warning, announcing a verdict/intention. (Austin, 1975). Notwithstanding, the scholar identifies the specific problem which might appear in analysing this type of speech acts. In fact, a couple of different senses of expression are vague enough “in what way are we using it” that can reflect locutionary act or perlocutionary acts (Ibid, 99p.). The perlocution has, in turn, the common consequences and emphasises the effect on the hearer or reader. From Austin’s perspective, thus, the speech-act theory is a performative dimension in any use of language, in which to say something is to do something.

The professor of the University of California, John Searle further developed the speech act theory. According to Searle’s concept, there are two types of the principles of behaviour such as regulatory and constitutive. The former reflects the regulation of existing forms of a behaviour, in contrary to the latter one, which constitutes an act of the existence that is logically dependent on the rules. Thus, the primary hypothesis of his book is “speaking a language is performing acts” according to constitutive rules, which takes into account the difference between merely uttering sounds and performing speech acts (Smith, 2003: 9). Comparing with Austin’s concept, it can be concluded that Searle also pointed out the conventional force of the speech acts. Moreover, he went further in his research and examined the nature of (incomplete) speech act of predication which Austin did not mention.

Upon Weaver's arguments, the utterance might be accepted as the primary reality, in which the word “security” is an act (Waever, 1995). Although a successful speech act is a combination of language and society, the instinct features of speech is a group of some community which authorises and recognises that speech. Essentially, it requires referent objects in the sense of things which would be existentially threatened. While a state or its authority uses “security” in the speech acts, it shifts particular issue into a specific area and thereby, claims a special right to take the actions (whatever they mean) which are necessary to block the potential threat. (Ibid.). The external aspect of a speech act has two special conditions: one is a securitising actor, who must be in the position of authority, another condition has to

deal with a threat. Still, Waever defines that sometimes the speech act might be failed. The condition of this unsuccessful process occurs when “the securitizer is raising the stakes and investing some risk of losing sovereignty to fence a specific challenge” (Waever, 1995: 61). In the post-structuralist usage of the speech act theory, the meaning of the particular speech act is equally constituted by its possible success and failure - one is not primary and the another is derived.

As to the study case, the speech acts explicitly cover in which dimensions the project reflects a threat. In substance, the attention pays on the speech acts of the EU Member States as the securitising actors, their actual context and explicit meaning. It should be noted that speech acts also comprise a non-verbal communication such as slapping someone on the back can be an act of aggression or congratulation, albeit, this research will look at merely a verbal communication as the selected data are in a written form.

Traditionally a securitization comprises referent object, securitizing and functional actors which will be analyzed below. The Copenhagen School sets out a clear line of distinguishing between securitizing actor and analyst. A security issue comes from the securitizing actor, not from an analyst, thus, the former decides whether something can be presented as an existential threat. Nonetheless, the key role of analysts is to find a sense of actor’s speech acts (Buzan et al.,1998). The area of their competence also includes the judgement of political announcements which then might widespread among the audience. While being an influential unit in the process of securitization, analysts do not have the power to declare an issue as an urgent one because it requires the specific measures. Thereby, the main function of analysts is to review the speeches of the securitizing actor.

The notion of securitizing actors can also be confused with a referent object in the analysis of securitization process. Simultaneously, a state might be considered of both an object and an actor (Waever, 2003). The scholars of the CS suggest drawing a clear line between the referent objectives and actors. Since some politicians or governments talk on behalf of the state, these actors follow the imposed discursive rules, and speak in a sense of identity, nation (Buzan et al, 1998). Although, it is

bare to consider that the nation is acting (Ibid.). On the whole, having a complex and both-sided nature, to identify the securitizing actors is an important element for an appropriate research of securitization.

To be a securitising actor does not mean to utter “security” or “threat”. Albeit, the frame of the CS distinguishes two substantial principles which the securitizing actors have to follow. The first one is well-known as internal and linguistic-grammatical which includes the rule of the act. The second principle is more external which have to maintain an initial context “from which the act can be made” (Balzacq, 2005: 172). In words of the CS, while security is ascertained by actors, a frame of security is subjective (Buzan et al., 1998: 31). Nevertheless, even following these principles there is no guarantee that the speech act which is uttered by the securitizing actors will be succeeded: “Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer, but by the audience of the security speech act” (Buzan et al. 1998: 31). Consequently, the essential concern of securitizing actors is to give the feeling of the common fear which the audience would share. As has been mentioned above, we cannot talk about a complete subjective nature as a security issue is not something that agents determined alone. More importantly, the process of securitization also requires the interaction between actors with the audience to determine something as a threat. It might be underlined that securitization is more likely intersubjective and socially constructed, which in turn means it lays neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects (Ibid.).

The securitising concept identifies securitising actors as the legitimate leaders, who have power over the people within the determined territory. Since a state composed of a set of political institutions such as a legislature, executive and military forces, these units take the legal decisions (Wilson, 1996). For this reason, securitising actors, particularly political entities, have the competence to start the process of securitization by being a general voice of security. With this intention, in the case study, the securitising actors are politicians of the EU Member States who give the speech acts and raise the question of security threat in the media. For instance, Latvian Prime Minister, Polish Member of the European Parliament, Lithuanian

deputies, Swedish armed forces chief are presented in the case study as securitising actors who claimed a threat on behalf of their countries. Besides the securitising actors, there are also scientists, experts in the field of political science and energy, which can be counted as analysts. Their speech acts and opinion articles give an understandable explanation of what actors uttered such as Espoo reports, Riley's articles about the construction of the pipeline (Buzan et al., 1998).

Functional actors are one of the separate units of the securitization, although they are not securitising actors. Principally, it should be noted that they are not referent objects because of having a different nature and the roles in the process of securitization. The critical feature of these actors is that they can influence the dynamic of securitization. Depending on the issue which might be securitised, they can be presented by private companies, NGOs, etc. Regarding the case study, Gazprom on behalf of Russia and Germany are the functional actor stimulate the building of the pipeline and in the meantime gives some dynamic to the process. On the one hand, Russia and Germany can be considered the significant countries directly involved in the constructing of NS2 and do not make any efforts to securitise the project and energy relations. Presenting the pipeline as a purely commercial venture, they insist on implementation of the gas project on time.

As has been mentioned above, security has the distinct meanings within being varied in forms. At any rate, the Copenhagen School relies on "security" which means survival in the face of existential threats. The question what defines an existential threat is not the same across different sectors. Markedly, the existential threat is rightly interpreted in connection with the referent object (Buzan et al. 1998). The referent object is an entity which is threatened and has a legitimate right to survival. In other words, the referent object is that to which one can point that it should survive. Individuals or groups, as well as issues such as national sovereignty, environment, economy, can be defined as the referent objects in the speech acts of the securitising actors (Emmers, 2016).

Together with proponents, Buzan acknowledged that a size/scale is an essential variable in determining what makes up a successful referent object of security. They

distinguish three levels such as middle, system and micro. Among these types, the middle one is considered being the most fruitful generator of referent objects (Buzan et al.,1998). This conclusion derives from the key feature of a referent object to establish security legitimacy, which bureaucracies, political regimes seldom hold it. Then, in some sense, merely a state has the legitimacy to be security referent. Consequently, it might have seen that the state-centric position predetermines in the Copenhagen School. To reject this fact, its proponents argue that security is an area of the competing actors in which the state is privileged in the historical dimension as the actor who usually handles with security, thus, the theory is bottomed on the state-dominated field instead of on a state-centric approach (Ibid.).

As the referent object has been a state, in this research the construction of the pipeline is presented as an existential threat to the national interests of the EU Member States, those who pointed out the projects as a threat. With this in mind, the agents such as Poland, Latvia, Sweden and Denmark labelled NS2 as an issue of supreme priority. Besides, some of these states, specifically Poland, Latvia and Denmark, has marked that the gas project can threaten the goals of the EU energy policy. Although the reality does underline that not all Member States assume the transmission pipeline as a threat: neither Germany nor Finland presents the pipeline as a threat to gas supply instead they accept the project as a beneficial commercial deal.

One of the distinct features of successful securitization is the extraordinary measures which have been characterised by being beyond the normal politics. This assumption derives from the idea that an ordinary politics follows the permanent rules without any exceptions. The proponents of the CS ascertain that an exceptional nature of the issue determines the successful securitization (Floyd, 2015: 4). Regarding spatial time, the exceptional measures should be handled immediately with all existing efforts and legitimate power. The adaptation of these acts require the clear determination what can be considered as an enemy and can be different, depending on the context and circumstances (Emmers., 172). Moreover, the scholars of the CS

brings out that under the extraordinary measure can be understood regarding actions that should block further development of threat (Buzan et al., 1998).

Using the notion of the extraordinary measures, there is raised the question what might perceive as an ordinary scope. Following Waever's idea, the theory is structured upon institutional history less than a rhetorical nature, hence, in the theoretical dimension, there is a clear division between two notions unlikely to the practice (Waever, 2003). It is important to clarify that in the securitising move the extraordinary measures is unnecessary, rather a cornerstone of this process is a speech act. In contrast, the successful securitization lays down on an implementing of the exceptional measures as the consequence of the audience acceptance. However, after the utterance of a speech act by securitising actors, there is still a choice to decide in which way the existential threat should be addressed whether it might be standard a legislative procedure or the extraordinary measures (Emmers, 2016). For that reason, there are a lot of securitised issues, but not the whole successful securitization. Since the existential measures are imposed, the last step of an entire process of securitization is the effects on inter-units relations (Buzan et al., 1998). All changes which occur after breaking the rules can have a wide range of consequences which might increase the tension in relations between the particular parties. The CS does not pay enough attention to this area as its fundamental purpose is to explore how some issue shifts toward the securitised spectrum.

Regarding the case study, to define the extraordinary measures is irrelevant to some extent. The European Commission, as well as the Member States, can adopt the extraordinary measures which would cause the cancellation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Denmark and the European Commission took the first step to handle the extraordinary measures. Thus, on November 8, 2017, the institution proposed to amend the Gas Directive (2009/73/EC) to ensure the transparency and efficiency of all pipelines. However, to identify most of the extraordinary measures is possible only in the speech acts of securitising actors regarding the proposal as the discussion on NS2 continues, and there is no visible evidence to assume that the extraordinary measures will be implemented.

Beyond the securitising and functional actors, and the referent objects, an essential role in the process of securitization plays the audience which is an observer and a decider of the whole process. At large, a securitised issue is a consequence of the negotiations between actors and audience (Buzan et al., 1998). In the light of the CS, this structural element emphasises the intersubjective nature of the securitization (Waever, 2003). In essence, the successful securitization happens when the audience is convinced in the existence of threat and support the implementation of extraordinary measures to reduce the possibility of danger. A particular group of people who agree on a specific speech act presents an appropriate audience (Buzan et al. 1998). Commonly, Buzan and Waever understand the politicians, military officers as the audience. Thus the scope of the CS is not extended on the broader units such as the population of a state, because even its rejection of recognising a potential threat can lead to the successful securitization (Emmers, 2016). With this in mind, the securitising actors should convince mentioned above elites and or state institutions to move the politicised issue on the securitised scope (Ibid.). Albeit it depends on the context in which the existential threat occurs, for instance, in case of national security, the population/citizens are the critical audiences.

Concerning the research, the European Commission and the other EU Member States that are not the securitising actors can be considered as the audience which can accept the fact that a referent object is threatened. In case this condition would be fulfilled, an emergency measure can be imposed. Contrary to this, if the European Commission does not accept the existence of a threat, it will be impossible to legitimise extraordinary action and thereby, since here we can talk only about debates in economic and somehow political scopes (Buzan et al. 1998). It underpins that a securitising movement can more likely characterise the process of securitization in the dimension of NS2 as in the current situation there is no specific legal frame of acceptance of a threat by the European Commission rather the attempt to challenge a further development to construct the pipeline. In particular, the essential functions of the European Commission has its President, Jean-Claude Juncker. Albeit he has also given speech acts on the construction of NS2 as well as

the Vice-President of the European Commission, Maroš Šefčovič, and thus, they can be the securitising actors by the meantime.

Derived from the mentioned above elements, the process of securitization seems to be one of the other ways of an intense politicisation. The successful securitization postulates an existential threat, then raises a question of emergency response, and lastly undertakes actions to prevent a specific threat. All these stages should not be presented in the single dimension of the best possible way to handle some issue; contrary they appear in case when an issue impossible to handle in a political context. Consequently, the Copenhagen School also covers the possibility of desecuritization such as a flip side of securitization: “the more security, the less insecurity and vice-versa” (Waever, 2003: 12).

As Buzan highlighted, desecuritization is a consequence of a long-range option in which an issue does not anymore threaten, and actors do not have any countermeasure (Buzan 1998:29). Thereby, by shifting threats into challenges and security into ‘normal politic’, it has been characterised as the process of desecuritization. A vast array of analysis argues that desecuritization does not apply to the question of security or a presence of an existential threat. Since the nature of this process can be examined, it is limited in the further research as there is not the object of systematic analysis (Waever, 2003). Notwithstanding, desecuritization can play a beneficial role as it functions by introducing an issue anew into a politicised dimension, which in turn means that any attempt to secure can be avoided by desecuritising the issue (Emmers, 2016). Given this discourse, the securitization theory does not have a function to determine what “security should be/not be” rather it reveals the key question — “what does security do”(Taureck, 2006).

By analysing upon these notions, in the particular case study, to determine the position of the construction of NS2 either it is a securitised or desecuritised issue will be partly irrelevant as the point remains unresolved and securitising actors continue to make the speech acts. The ongoing pipeline is intensively discussed within an EU level to the extent in which particular MS such as Poland, Latvia, Denmark and Sweden are trying to shift the issue from a rational political aspect into a securitised

dimension. Thereby, it should be concluded that project is involved in the process of securitization, but talking about its consequences either success or failure is much too early.

2.2. Criticism and limitation of the Copenhagen School

Beyond a comprehensive and structured basis of Copenhagen School, there are a series of limitations set out by other scholars who examined the different aspects of the concept of securitization in their works. To begin with, Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause, known as founders of Critical Security School (CSS), clarify the limitation of Copenhagen School, firstly, of its attempt to distinguish the state and society. While the concept of the securitization uses the dual dimension of the security such as state security, which applies to sovereignty and societal security under which identity is the primary concern, proponents of the CSS disagree on this classification of security. They argue that society is in the risk to be wrongly understood as this notion cannot be synonymous with an individual nor with a state (Krause, Williams, 1996: 243). Thereby, the incorrect labelling of security types creates some gap in the interpretation of security.

Furthermore, the root of criticism lies on the basis of Copenhagen School - the speech-act theory. The scholars of CSS gave a couple of reasons why the latter damages the concept of securitization. First and foremost, a speech act limits the security agenda, which in turn means it puts some restrictions in the theoretical dimension at the same time as the nature of security is unlimited (Ibid.). Moreover, it follows a conclusion of the Copenhagen School that not all acts of an utterance can be socially active and only the individual actors can be powerful to make a reasonable statement. For this reason, a creation of the particular conditions of successful speech act by Buzan and Waever provoked the limitation of the concept of securitization by defining actors and analysing the speech acts.

In the same direction, Mat McDonald and Thierry Balzacq examine the weaknesses of a speech act concept of the Copenhagen School. To begin with, McDonald states that a form, context and nature of an act are narrow. First and foremost, a limited

way means that it focuses merely on a speech act of dominant actors, neglecting other modes of the acts which do not have a legal basis. Following the language, the images, bureaucratic practices and physical actions are out of the Copenhagen School (McDonald, 2008). Since the framework of visual securitization developed by Lene Hansen will be a useful tool to go beyond language and test new aspects (Hansen, 2011). From analysing only the speech act of significant actors, there is a missing linkage how the marginal actors can challenge a labelled threat to security. Consequently, this limitation creates a normative implication which in terms prevents an in-depth analysis of a case study.

A context of the act has a place in the analysis since a moment of intervention, and, thus, a range of substantial processes is beyond the scope of the securitization theory. While a threat is determined entirely without any attention to the way in which “security can be understood in the particular context”, the nature of an act is narrow (Ibid., 564). The conditions of performing the speech act are neglecting, as the proponents of the School focus on the form and context. Thus, the strict requirements in which securitization occurs are under-theorized. As McDonald argued, whereas Buzan and Waever pointed out “the facilitating conditions” and audience as the elements of the securitization, they did not tightly incorporate them to the theory (McDonald, 2008). Accordingly, the scholar suggests concentrating on the context in which one security issue overcomes others by underpinning mentioned above elements to the theory.

As well as McDonald, Thierry Balzacq, a Francqui Research Chair recognizes the external context as the leading dimension to explore in-deep the process of securitization. The articulation cannot be an appropriate tool to describe the security in reality as the process overcomes different aspects. Nevertheless, the researcher points out that “felicity condition” as compulsory requirements of success especially reduces the meaning of security in real life. For this reason, he acknowledges that a better way to investigate the securitization is to use the pragmatic approach which implies to the context, the psycho-cultural actions of the audience, and the interaction between speaker and listener (Balzacq, 2005). The essential difference between the

his proposed method and speech-act frame of analysis is that a former uses different artifacts to pursue that a threat exists, controversy, the latter creates the universal principles of utterance, which by themselves restricts the scope of the process of securitization.

Furthermore, the scholar pays significant attention to the role of the audience which is the main element in occurring the successful securitization. In Balzacq's view, the School disregards this part in terms it does not explain in detail the target audience for the speech acts of securitizing actors. By his criticism "...although the CS appeals to an audience, its framework ignores that audience, which suggests that the CS opts for an illocutionary view of security yielding a 'magical efficiency' rather than a full-fledged model encompassing perlocution as well" (Balzacq, 2005: 177). Hence if perlocution act does not comply with the guideline of realization of an illocutionary one, Austin's theory of speech act on which is based the CS is insufficient to handle with "discursive politics of security" (Ibid.). Therefore, the pragmatic act of security is a comprehensive option which prevents a language limitation of theory and give a detail insight a threat in the linguistic scope.

The idea of adding externalism in the securitization theory is also tightly connected with criticism of Holger Stritzel, a professor at the King's College London. While the concept of the CS includes three essential elements such as a speech act, securitizing actors, and audience, it does not give an appropriate clarification of the interaction between actors and audience (Stritzel, 2007). The strict split of these two units has led to the general relationship which being analysed only in the context of the securitizing attempt. In substance, the theory avoids the analysis of a potential audience and all elements of any power of non-decision (Ibid.). Thus, Stritzel suggests building a sufficient background of the existence of a social sphere. Moreover, the scholar brings out a range of contradiction which are partly explicit in reading the securitization theory. A division between the securitizing actors and referent objects as a static element makes the concept less dynamic and more conditional. Another example of this feature is a permanent concentration on the speech act events as a cornerstone of the CS. Stritzel highlights that Waever had tried

to use the approach of internationalism to improve theory by investigating its negative-side effects. Notwithstanding, Waever's improvement made the theory more complicated to understand, and as a result, it is less applicable to an empirical case to get a comprehensive analysis.

For that reasons, Stritzel sets out the critical areas in which the frame of the CS can be improved. Firstly, a strategic-relational approach is a relevant tool to integrate socially linguistic discourse and to go further in analyzing a construction of threats through the constructivism prism (Ibid.). Likewise, an appropriate investigation of the social and political structure behind privileged actors will give a comprehensive overview to understand the nature of a threat. Finally, a sufficient link between the text and the more extensive discursive practices will add to the theory the socio-linguistic contexts; thereby, the method will be fulfilled by externalism for a more coherent reading of securitization.

Besides mentioned above limitation, a couple of questions raised to the distinct feature of the Copenhagen School, the European frame of security concerns by Pinar Bilgin and Juha A. Vuori. Referring to the core of the Aberystwyth School (the Welsh School), the above object the process of desecuritization as such. Mainly, Bilgin explains three reasons why it is more relevant to use politicizing security instead of desecuritization (Bilgin, 2013). Respectively, the strategic, ethic-political and analytical dimensions are narrow meanings. Assuming from the beginning that the Copenhagen School is limited how state authorities use security, politicizing security deepens the notion security in this context and can handle with its militaristic understandings (Ibid.). Moreover, Bilgin examined the securitization theory by analysing Turkey's way of accession to the European Union. By his research, the notion of security in the frame of the CS described from a Western European perspective. As such, Waever had applied to social security as a response to some objection of the European integration, and later this concept was discussed in the analysis of European cases. Accordingly, Bilgin brings out that securitization cannot be used outside the EU-wide framework as it has a substantial limitation to deal with the peripheral states of the international relations (Bilgin, 2011).

The line of controversy about a standard frame of securitization is also presented in Vuori's criticism. Meanwhile, at the international stage, there are the diverse political systems. However, Buzan and Waever took into account merely a democratic society to analyse the process of securitization. Their concept follows the democracy as an integral part of politics and, thus, the securitization is limited beyond the community where it has a no-EU perception of democracy. In totalitarian social systems, to determine any other state as an enemy is in the scope of "normal politics", hence, in this sense, the speech act can be derived from other objectives than "legitimizing the breaking rules" (Vuori, 2008: 69). This difference in societies also depends on various core values, historical backgrounds and perception of the international relations. As a result, Vuori tries to combine the philosophical and linguistic dimensions of speech act's approach to apply a notion of securitization in non-democratic systems.

In sum, after the creation of a new framework of security studies by the proponents of CS, this theory has been examined by some researchers who came with substantial criticism. Firstly, the limitation reveals to a speech act concept which is limited in a form, nature and context. Secondly, the critical scrutiny reflects to the externalism of the theory regarding a broad background and insufficient link between actors and audience. And last, but not at least, the Eurocentric approach is the main frame of the securitization concept that makes it weak in many cases beyond Western dimension. For instance, to trace the process of securitization within the non-democratic community will raise the questions i when it can be considered the breaking rules, who has a legitimate power to claim threat and so on. Therefore, whereas the theory has various arrows of criticism regarding its structure and frame, the empirical part will be based on its cornerstone, the speech act approach which will help to gain a better understanding what security does in the context of the Nord Stream 2 project.

3. Methodology and data

Due to the research question of this paper, the dependent variable of the study is *the securitization of the energy relation*, and, the independent is *the changes in the geopolitical environment* which influence on the former phenomenon. The direction of influence will be determined by represented further research. A method focuses on the examining the similarities and differences among states in the context of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 project and the research follows the case-oriented approach.

To provide a clear linkage between independent and dependent variables, the empirical part of the research follows comparative analysis. This method distinguishes two types of comparisons such as ‘large-N’ and ‘small-N’ where N is a number of countries, depending on the scope of countries and the level of abstraction (Landman, 2000). Regarding the research question which is underpinned by the four EU Member States, the comparison of few countries might be considered as ‘small-N’ type, particularly, ‘small-4’. The method of comparing few countries also has own classification, found on similarities and differences. These methods are known in the science as ‘most similar systems design’(MSSD) and ‘most different systems design’(MDSD). The core target of the former is to define the differences among similar units, despite the latter one which takes different units to tend their similarities. In this research, there will be used ‘most similar system design’ (MDSD), which logic sets out in a given initial difference among systems within a similar outcome (Meckstroth, 1975: 137). Thus, there is chosen four EU Member States such as Poland, Latvia, Denmark and Sweden which have the different backgrounds, but all of them have a common aim in terms of the construction of the transmission pipeline (Table 1). The chosen method will help to find out why relatively distinct MS are striving to block the building of the second branch of Nord Stream, as a comparison will draw the key explanatory factor.

Table 1. Case selection with a most different system design.

<i>Criteria/ Countries</i>	Geopolitical location	Historical background	Accession to the EU	NS2 as a threat
Poland	Central-Eastern Europe	Polish United Workers' Party (communist bloc)	New MS (enlargement 2004)	Yes
Latvia	Central-Eastern Europe	Part of the USSR	New MS (enlargement 2004)	Yes
Denmark	Northern Europe	Social Democratic Party	Old MS (1973)	Yes
Sweden	Northern Europe	Social Democratic Party	Old MS (1995)	Yes

Source: author's own elaboration.

3.1. Operationalization and conceptualization of variables

The independent variable is presented by the geopolitical changes, which in turn means the political alteration such as the increasing tension with Russia. The EU-Russia relations have gotten worse by the political events after annexation Crimea in 2014. In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the EU has adopted a series of sanctions, ending bilateral cooperation and freezing EU assets of individuals close to the regime. Up to now, EU sanctions against Russia remain in place and will be on the agenda of the EU foreign policy as long as Russia will be willing to contribute to the solving the conflict. The High Representative of the European Union of Foreign Affairs/ Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini announced that Russia cannot be seen as a strategic partner of the European Union (David, 2014). According to the latest Brussels' policy, a current mistrust between the EU and Russia is a substantial obstacle to their future relationship.

Beyond the deterioration of EU-Russia relations, the explicit changes are related to the revision of the EU policy in the energy dimension. The initial impact was made

by Gas Directive (2009/73/EC) and Gas Supply Regulation 2010, which declared the diversification of gas supply. Pursuant to Articles 36 (e) of Gas Directive 2009/73/EC to obtain security of supply by “the contribution of the infrastructure to the diversification of gas supply”, the several EU Member States see a direct breach of the legal basis by implementing the project. They underlined that a new pipeline is a threat toward the European energy policy and their national interests such as an energy supply and a territorial security.

Furthermore, the creation of the Energy Union became the crucial strategy of the EU energy policy. It aims to provide a well-diversified and competitive gas market through implementing of the Southern Gas Corridor, the development of a liquid gas hub in the Mediterranean and promoting its access among the EU Member States (European Commission, 2017, November 8). The European Commission insists that the particular objectives are incompatible with the construction of the pipeline as the strategic priorities of the Energy Union would not be met. The construction of NS2 would undermine the current functioning of energy market and the EU Member States would be more insecure by pumping gas from the one biggest supplier (Barnes, 2017). Under these circumstance, the particular changes in the geopolitical environment is determined as the independent variable in this paper which provoked the beginning of the process of securitization by the several EU Member States.

Securitization which composed of securitizing movement is presented as a dependent variable in the research. The energy relations, particularly NS2 as an example of energy relations between Gazprom on behalf of Russia and the Member States of EU are the object by which this process will be inticates. To trace the key aspects of this phenomenon, there are chosen countries which have the different backgrounds in some aspects, nonetheless, all of them has tried to present the the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as a threat to the national, as well as the EU, interests.

Firstly and foremost, the difference found in the geographical location of the Member States. Sweden and Denmark are included to the northwestern European territory known as Scandinavia, however, Poland and Latvia are the part of Eastern Europe. Despite the different location of these Member States, all of them have the

exit to the Baltic sea which explains the reason why these four EU MS have some concerns towards building of the new pipeline.

This geographical location influences also on one more difference known such as the historical background of states. During the last 20th century both countries, Poland and Latvia were tightly connected with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). After the World War II (WWII), in 1952 Poland officially claimed the creation of the People's Republic of Poland under imposed communist regime. At the meantime, in conformity with the Welles Declaration of 1940, Latvia was included as one republic to USSR. The communist regime with a high level of dependency on Russian energy supply made two countries similar to each other. Regarding Sweden, this state took the position of non-participant in the WWII and over 40 years the government was chaired by Social Democratic Party by replacing on coalition of liberal and right-wing. Denmark was an independent state with a short term of Nazi occupation during 1940. After the WWII, the state followed a membership policy by being a founding member of the United Nations organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Community. Regarding the political parties, the Social Democrats chaired the government until 1972 in Denmark. As a result, while Latvia and Poland were under the pressure of a communist regime, Sweden and Denmark were separated from any Russian influence.

Lastly, the spatial frame of countries' accession to the European Union is distinct among particular countries. Poland and Latvia joined the EU during the enlargement in 2004, in contrast to Denmark and Sweden, which are relatively "old" Member State (respectively 1973 and 1995). This fact significantly influenced on the integration of social, economic and security areas. The democracy as an important requirement of the EU accession was weakened by the communist past in Poland and Latvia. In reference to the theory of Europeanization (Risse et al., 2001) at the late 1990 and beginning of 2000s Poland and Latvia had started their way of changes to decrease the degree of "misfit" between European-level processes, policies and institutions, although Denmark and Sweden were already the powerful Member States of the EU.

In turn to the common magnitude, since the beginning of the discussion on the construction of the gas project, the four EU Member States have voiced against its implementing. Meanwhile, criticism of the pipeline construction derives from different motives of the Member States, all of them are united by a common aim to securitize the gas project. After the Nord Stream 1 project was successfully completed, Polish and Latvian authorities had made a public statement of the importance of the security of energy supply of the EU and a threat to this issue which derives from the new proposal of the continuation of the pipeline. Besides this assumptions, Poland also argued against the offshore as its construction does not consider the Russian-Ukrainian war. Regarding Sweden and Denmark, initially, they were more unlikely to block the gas pipeline. Nevertheless, from 2015 both countries have insisted on the assessing this construction by the European Commission to be sure in its compliance with the key objectives of the European energy policy (Gotkowska and Szymański, 2016).

The motives of the opposition among these Nordic Member States is a concern about the defence issue, in particular, the use of their territories (Lang and Westphal, 2017). As has been noted above, the route of the pipeline will be located in the Baltic Sea at a distance away from countries. Although this distance is sufficient enough from Poland and Latvia, the gas offshore would pass via the exclusive economic zones of Sweden (500 km), Denmark and the latter's territorial waters. Thus, the political leaders have called attention to their national territories which would be challenged by exercising of the gas pipeline. Whereas states do not have a jurisdiction to challenge the construction of the project based on the Law of the Sea, they referred to the European Commission which also has a limited rights under the Gas Directive 73/2009/EC. Overall, all the chosen Member States have own reasons to consider NS2 as a threat to the security of energy supply and national sovereignty. In the empirical part there will be analysed how these four states have interpreted it in their speech acts.

3.2. Data Collection

A large part of the analysis will be based upon the speech acts of the securitizing actors which are taken from international as well as national news agencies, respectively EU Observer, Politico, Reuters, The Financial Times, Energy Post, The Local etc. In addition, there will be provided with some speeches of politicians from the national broadcasting, for instance, Latvian Public Broadcasting (Lsm.lv), Sweden Radio (Sveriges Radio). To illustrate the background of particular utterances, the analysis will use the official reports concerning the gas pipeline, where there are presented the argumentation of pros and cons of the pipeline, accordingly issued by Nord Stream 2 AG, Espoo. Moreover, the official documents of the European Commission such as press releases, directives (mostly Gas Directive (2009/73/EC), Gas Regulation (EC) No 994/2010), announcements of the President of the European Commission and a number of Commissioners will be an integral part to maintain the context of the speech acts. The opinion of analysts and scientists will be taking into account to draw a comprehensive background of motives to securitize the energy relations in the case of NS2. Consequently, the overall data are justified by the aim to provide a content analysis of speech acts to see how particular countries interpret the construction of the transmission pipeline.

4. Empirical Analysis

The project Nord Stream 2 reveals on the relations between the Member States of the European Union and Russia. In the technical scope, the transmission pipeline, as well as Nord Stream 1, will comprise two parallel 48 inch lines, which is around 1,200 km. NS2 will run from Russia, Ust-Luga to the North German coast near Greifswald (see Figure 1, Espoo, 2017). The current plan of the gas project would allow Russia to bypass Ukraine, Poland and Belarus as the transit routes, which in turn makes Russia more independent in the supplying natural gas than ever before. Gazprom would have a possibility to choose the direction in which it could flow gas supply.

Regarding the environmental issue, scientists have the controversial opinions towards the effect of NS2 on the Baltic Region. The experts who worked on Espoo Reports underlined that there would not be ‘significant or lasting impacts to the Baltic Sea, the onshore environment or local communities’ (Ibid.). In general, their estimation within the environmental criterion approved the secure and sustainable construction of the gas offshore. Nevertheless, some European environment scientists disprove this statement. The line of criticism was devoted by Polish experts, who refer to the low level of “reliable impact on fauna and flora” in the particular waters (ClientEarth, 2017, June 7). Likewise, Latvian and Danish scientists see an imminent danger of natural resources by the building of NS2. These assumptions towards the gas project firmly confirm the disagreement within environment scope.

Overall, by being one of the central gas deals for both sides, the EU and Russia, NS2 would ensure the secure and reliable gas supply and as a result, would more interconnect these two international actors. Still, in the light of the arrangement of the second branch of Nord Stream in the Baltic, some Member States of the European Union has raised a meaningful amount of questions and contradictions. Despite the apparent profit from this project, the flexibility of Gazprom’s supply and Russian-German partnership invoked the intention discussion with a fear of the EU vulnerability in the upcoming future. Therefore, upon the purpose of the research, the

empirical part will analyze the speech acts of the EU politicians to trace the interpretation of NS2 as a threat.




Figure 1. The route of Nord Stream 2. Source: Gazprom.com. Available at: <http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/built/nord-stream2/>

4.1. Nord Stream 2 towards a securitized domain

After North European Gas Pipeline has flown its first gas supply to the EU MS in 2011 and 2012, the discussion on Nord Stream 2 became a significant issue within an EU level. In the beginning, the proposal of the additional pipeline in the Baltic Region had seen as a purely commercial venture, presented by Gazprom. Subsequently, this non-political issue has been shifted to the political scope by the EU MS who actively discussed the gas supplier of this project and its current relations with the EU. After the contest on the building of NS2 in June 2015, in September of the same year, Gazprom and German gas companies signed an agreement to construct the Nord Stream 2 pipeline by the end of 2019. Later on, five European energy companies such as Uni-per, BASF/Wintershall, OMV, Engie and

Shell had agreed to maintain the financing of the pipeline which comprises 50% of all projects, meanwhile, the other part of the plan belongs to Gazprom. Since the decision to set up the second branch of Nord Stream was announced, the EU MS brought to the table this project as a political issue. According to the frame of CS, this deal became to appear on the agenda of public debates in the European Commission and working parties. Under these circumstances, at that moment NS2 was handled within the political scope by the bilateral relations between Russia and the EU.

As has been mentioned above, the CEE countries, specifically Poland and Latvia, were one of the first actors who evaluated all benefits and at the meantime, potential threats of the project. Thus, by the end of 2015, the active opposition of NS2 became to appear in the national news agencies. Initially, the main line of criticism was derived from the goals of Energy Union and then was tightly underpinned by the concerns of national security. Hence, the securitizing actors have put on the agenda contradictions between energy security and offshore gas at the national level. They also raised the question on the EU security, both in the energy and political contexts. Thus, after 2015 the Member States of the EU extensively had discussed the gas project in the context of increasing their insecurity. With this intention, it can be concluded that authorities of the EU MS attempt to move the issue in the area of urgency.

The shift to this stage can be characterised by the utterance of MS political leaders who claimed the project as the existential threat to the particular referent objects such as energy relations and national security. The primary reason which explains why this issue was framed in the securitized domain is a fear of dependency on Russian gas supply. Considering the last years of Russian policy at the international stage, the MS cannot see the shared deals with the country against which they imposed sanctions. In 2015 the European Commission, chaired by the new President, Jean-Claude Juncker, adopted the creation of the Energy Union which was one of the flagship initiatives of the current College. On the agenda of the EU energy policy, it was put the future diversification of energy supplier, the high level of supply security

and less dependency on energy imports (European Commission, 2017, September 17). According to these aims, Nord Stream 2 has looked a less attractive project among the EU Member States. Although, Germany and its well-known friends such as Austria, France, the UK and Netherland supported at one the gas project, the CEE countries and some Nordic countries, Sweden and Denmark, outset a discontent about the gas pipeline. The statement that NS2 would jeopardise the European energy market became the critical pitfall in the discussion of its implementation.

In general, from the beginning of the public debate, the active opponents of NS2 were Poland and Latvia. Afterwards, Denmark and Sweden made the official announcements which declared the strong opposition to strained the future energy relations with Russia. These debates and criticism are the first stage of the process of securitization, which is known as the securitizing movement. Up to the present, the gas project remains on this level since there is no evidence of the successful securitization. The situation seems like the debate is still ongoing, the extraordinary measures by the European Commission are in the process of discussion, and the speech acts of the securitizing actors try to continue to persuade the audience in the danger of the future gas offshore.

4.2. Speech acts of the securitizing actors

4.2.1. Poland

The geopolitical and historical dimension had made Poland mostly dependent on Russian gas supply. During the last century, Poland had mainly got a gas supply from Russia through Orenburg and Yamburg pipelines. After the collapse of USSR, already in 1997, Poland has become a transit territory of Yamal pipeline, which provides a natural gas from Serbia to Germany. The permanent dependence on Russian gas supply formulated the primary goal of Polish energy policy - to diversify gas suppliers (Wojcieszak, 2017: 87). In 2006, the state also supported the NATO proposal of solidarity between countries, in turn, to help each other when the gas supply is in danger. Nowadays Poland adheres two directions of its policy such as

the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and the idea of building the pipeline with Norway for receiving gas resources. As follows, in 2016, Poland opened its first LNG terminal at the Baltic Sea port of Swinoujscie and in June 2017 Poland signed with Denmark a memorandum to ensure the gas supply from the North Sea to Poland. For that reasons, it can be considered that Poland figured out the clear alternatives of NS2 to follow own energy priorities.

Taking into account aforementioned Polish situation, there is a risk to lose the status of a transit country as Yamal gas pipeline would decrease its delivery of natural gas to the EU. Secondly, Poland would become highly dependent on German gas supply which initially is Russian. Importantly, the Ukrainian crisis in which Poland blames the Russian involvement seems to be one more reason for Polish discontent. These assumptions became the primary catalysers of the Polish government to raise the question of the potential threats that would derive from the implementation of the gas project. The political leaders of the country were the first one active opponents of the project to make its position clear for the European community and Russia.

Since the countries officially agreed on the construction of NS2 in 2015, the Polish authority has put on the agenda this gas project as a threat to energy supply and political objectives of the EU. In April 2016, the former Prime Minister of Poland and current Chair of the Industry Committee of the European Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, came out with a conclusion that “Nord Stream 2 and Energy Union cannot co-exist” (Beckman, 2016, April 14). In essence, his statement underlines the discrepancy of the core objectives of the Energy Union with the gas pipeline. As set out in 2015, the Energy Union Package has to ensure the MS in the affordable, secure supplies which at the same time will help the EU to meet the Framework for Climate and Energy. These principles derive from the critical aim of the EU policy to increase the diversification of energy sector by finding new sources. While the ongoing project has the same supplier such as Russia, the Polish politician stressed this would not be compiled with the goal of Energy Union such as diversification of gas supply.

Furthermore, in October 2016, the Polish Minister for European Affairs, Konrad Szymanski, wrote the opinion article for the Financial Times, where declared that:

“Together with eight other EU member states (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia), and with the tacit support of a couple of others, Poland has opposed Nord Stream 2 since Gazprom first announced it in 2015. It undermines European solidarity and the Energy Union, the EU’s flagship project.” (Szymanski, 2016, October 21).

This official announcement is an explicit rejection of Poland to set up NS2. Once again his claim refers to the Energy Union, which objectives are not compatible with the construction of NS2. Konrad Szymanski underlines the legal base which should be adhered by adopting to construct the gas offshore by all MS. Another referent object of securitization reveals on European solidarity and unity in his utterance. The gas pipeline will instead divide the MS than secure energy supply to the EU. As well as in that article the Polish Minister for European Affairs compared this project with “a Trojan horse capable of destabilising the economy and poisoning political relations inside the EU” (Ibid.). From here, NS2 is portrayed as a distraction within an EU-level in terms it might generate mistrust among the Member States. The Polish politician thus brought out with a conclusion that pipeline takes the form of internal threat which at first glance has merely a significant economic and energy benefits whereas it hides a potential security problem toward the European unity. Despite the mentioned above utterance, a particular expression towards the gas project focuses on fear of political tensions between European countries.

The line of the criticism of NS2 has been followed by the current Polish Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki. He refers to the principle of diversification which should be followed in all projects of energy supply, and NS2 cannot be the exception of rules. In February 2018, the Prime Minister stressed that:

“Nord Stream 2 violates the principle of diversification that underpins in the EU's energy security.... That is why we [Poland] conduct active activities as well as support the activities of European institutions aimed to block the construction of NS2”¹ (Gazownictwo, 2018, February 21).

With attention to the energy policy concerns, the Prime Minister also emphasises how the principle of diversification will be kept to take the extraordinary measure such as blocking of the pipeline. Substantially, the solution should derive not only from the initiatives of Member States but also should it involve the EU institutions to the extent to which they can act based the principle of shared competence according to Art. 4 of TFEU (TFEU, 2008, Art 4). Still, as has been mentioned above, the European Commission does not have a mandate to negotiate over Nord Stream 2 as it is the Intergovernmental Agreement and the proposal to amend Gas Directive 73/2009/EC might be seen as the first step to handle this issue by the Commission. Furthermore, by the end of his speech act, he underlines that this project not only might challenge one of the preliminary objectives of the Energy Union, diversification, but it also contradicts the current Brussels political stance on Ukrainian conflict. A further using of Baltic Sea would change the status of Ukraine as a transit zone, “Russia can escalate the conflict in any way, attack the entire country”² (Gazownictwo, 2018, February 21). Thus, in one speech act, NS2 is simultaneously presented as a threat towards two referent objects, securitization of energy supply and the objectives of EU foreign policy.

Polish Prime Minister also tightly ties the political environment of the EU with the energy issue and NS2. During the visit by U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson,

¹ Original version: “Nord Stream 2 narusza zasadę dywersyfikacji, która leży u podstaw bezpieczeństwa energetycznego UE.... Dlatego prowadzimy aktywne działania, jak i wspieramy działania instytucji europejskich, mające na celu zablokowanie budowy Nord Stream 2”. Author's own translation from the original in Polish language. Available at: http://gazownictwo.wnp.pl/mateusz-morawiecki-nord-stream-2-narusza-zasade-dywersyfikacji,317949_1_0_0.html

² Original version: ”.....Rosja może w dowolny sposób eskalować konflikt, zaatakować cały kraj.” Author's own translation from the original in Polish language. Available at: http://gazownictwo.wnp.pl/mateusz-morawiecki-nord-stream-2-narusza-zasade-dywersyfikacji,317949_1_0_0.html

Mateusz Morawiecki had announced that an extraordinary measure should be implemented through the jurisdiction of US, “we [Poland] want the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to fall under the US sanctions bill...which includes, among others, sanctions against Russia” (Reuters.com, 2018, January 29). To analyze this statement, it should be taken into account an external dimension of the EU policy. As the Polish authority understands the complexity of discussion on the transmission pipeline in Brussels, it started to ask help the external actors such as the US. In general, the US supports the Polish opposition and accepts the argument that NS2 can be a severe threat to the EU energy security. Nonetheless, up to now, there is not any evidence of acts neither attempts by the US towards halting of the construction of the gas project.

A month before, in January 2018, there was held the discussion between Polish and Swedish governments about the alternative Polish option such as Baltic Pipe. In the interview for Polish newspaper "Dziennika Gazety Prawnej", Mateusz Morawiecki noticed that proposed pipeline is an important gas project which should be implemented in the nearest future “... we want real activities to start with this strategic investment of infrastructure [Baltic Pipe] as soon as possible”³ (Gazownictwo, 2018, January 29). Mainly, the project should provide Norwegian delivery gas to Poland via Denmark. Mateusz Morawiecki concludes that this pipeline for Poland does not have any significant challenges which would not threaten the political and energy aspects at the internal and external stages in comparison with NS2. Thus, following the principle of diversification, the Baltic Pipe would avoid the monopoly of Russian gas on the Polish energy market and make it less vulnerable in relations toward Germany. For the state, this proposal is an alternative to the second branch of Nord Stream and can be seen as a rational decision to prevent the potential threats.

³ Original version: “Zależy nam, aby jak najszybciej rozpoczęły się realne działania związane z tą strategiczną dla nas inwestycją infrastrukturalną”. Author's own translation from the original in Polish language. Available at: http://gazownictwo.wnp.pl/mateusz-morawiecki-nord-stream-2-jest-niebezpieczny,316256_1_0_0.html [Accessed 12 March 2018]

In general, the speech acts of the most potent part of Polish authorities such as former and current Polish Prime Minister, Polish Minister for European Affairs are the official announcements which have made and continue to make specific steps towards the process of securitization. The referent objects cover some issues such as European unity, the supply of energy, political objectives of foreign policy and environment. As all of them have a different context of expression, the critical concern of the Polish authority remains the same, to cancel the building NS2.

4.2.2. Latvia

Being a former state of the Soviet bloc, by and large, Russia has been a significant supplier of energy for Latvia. The Joint Stock Company “Latvijas Gaze” had been over 20 years a leading regulator of gas supply in Latvia, owned by companies such as Russian Gazprom and European Marguerite Fund and Uniper Ruhrgas International. Still, since December 1, 2017, Gaso, emerged from the initiative of “Latvijas Gaze”, has had the licence to distribute the tariffs of natural gas. These two companies operate on Russian natural gas, which makes Latvia entirely dependent on Russia at least until 2030. For that reasons, the current energy policy of Latvia focuses on other possibilities to diversify the energy supply. The first LNG terminal in Klaipėda, in Lithuania, is an option for Latvia to achieve its objectives. Although in August 2017 Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia could not reach an agreement on joint LNG market (Baltictimes.com, 2017, August 31).

It may be considered that Latvia like Poland has the same concerns of the energy policy which induce against the construction of NS2. Since the beginning of the discussion on the future development of the gas project, the Latvian politicians have raised an issue about the involvement of the northwestern port of Ventspils and its two terminals, Noord Natie and Eurohome Latvija. The state would benefit EUR 25 million in total by involving in the construction of NS2 (Baltictimes.com, 2017, April 23). Nonetheless, Latvian authority opposed the financial offer by the consideration that pipeline is a part of geopolitical dimension rather than an economic issue with a high profit. At first, at the end of 2015, Latvian officials have

made the public announcements against the future gas project. In particular, the former Latvian Prime Minister, Laimdota Straujuma, identified the specific obstacles which would be appeared in the construction of NS2. In her speech act, she brought out with a conclusion that continuation and support of the most significant energy supplier, Russia, is not a logical choice to stand with the primary targets of the EU energy policy. Laimdota Straujuma declared that “Europe should be more consistent in its wish to become energy independent from Russia” (EurAsiaDaily.com, 2015, November 2). The statement reveals the lack of rationality and the central line of Brussels’ decisions in the context of the events when the European Commission presented the objectives of the Energy Union. Hence, from this perspective, gas supply from Russia cannot be outlined in one frame with the EU energy policy, notably its directives and proposals.

A same line of criticism is traced in the utterance of Minister of Finance, Dana Reizniece-Ozlo, in 2015. The underlying message is also about the incompatibility of the EU policy with the gas offshore, “With the right hand we are writing an energy strategy, while with the left one we are building Nord Stream 2” (Ibid.). As she noticed, her audience is the European politicians, who should consider the primary aims of the European energy policy when they will give consent to implement NS2. The speech act does not have an explicit expression in a term of threat, although the Minister of Finance mentioned the referent object such as the energy strategy which can be damaged by the construction NS2. As a result, the obstacles of the EU policy should be solved by the MS within overcoming the fundamental contradictions, one of which is the gas offshore.

The Latvian politician and Member of the European Parliament since 2009, Krisjanis Karins, has underlined the potential threats at the national level by the involvement of Latvian port in this gas deal. As has been mentioned before, NS2 can be seen as resources of profit for Latvian companies. At the same time, MEP underlines its temporary asset which would be paid by the security of supply for Latvia and the EU (Ibid.). In his speeches, the main line of criticism refers to the contradictions between the pipeline with goals of the Energy Union, “The project does not fit Europe’s

Energy Union's goals and principles agreed upon by EU member states" (BNN.com, 2018, February 1). As well as Polish authorities, Latvian MEP highlighted the direct influence of the second branch of Nord Stream on the future escalation of Ukrainian war. With this in mind, the referent objects which might be threatened by NS2 are the objectives of EU energy policy and foreign affairs in Brussels, including the conflict in Ukraine and sanctions.

Besides MEP, one of the Latvian authorities is the current Foreign Minister, Edgars Rinkevics, who also can be considered as a securitizing actor. He has repeatedly emphasised in his speeches that NS2 is a threat towards the unity and solidarity of the Baltic Region. The Foreign Minister considers the Latvian involvement incompatible in relations to the Baltic neighbours as it would generate an aggravation among them. In April 2017 Erdgas Rinkevics stressed about this concern and other inevitable consequences of the gas project by declaring:

"Latvian permission to use its territory would cause a split among partners in the region and would threaten these joint projects and Latvia's credibility in its foreign policy efforts within NATO and the EU. Latvia and the other Baltic countries have constantly emphasised the Nord Stream project's inconsistency with EU energy policy principles, as well as the threat this project poses to the EU as a whole..." (Baltictimes.com, 2017, April 23).

The context of his utterance also refers to the EU energy policy and its particular objectives. As outlined earlier by other securitizing actors, the weakness of pipeline lies in its major shareholder, Russian Gazprom, which might not ensure future diversification of energy supply to the EU Member States. He calls the construction of the pipeline as a "geopolitical project" which is presented more in the political scope rather than in economic dimension (Lsm.lv, 2017, June 30). Apart from this, Latvian Foreign Minister mentioned about the environment concern which is usually not at the top of agenda. In general, the environmental assessment of NS2 was published by Russia in 2017, which stated that it would take into account the aim of

carbon dioxide emission reductions. However, as highlighted before, the European scientists have an opposite opinion, standing tightly with the objectives of Paris Agreement like the 5-year ambition cycle aimed to reduce green gas emissions. According to the opinion of Erdgas Rinkevics, he sees the negative effect of NS2 on the environmental dimension of EU policy by saying, “And lastly we have to look at environmental risk. No matter how sophisticated the technologies, this too has to be looked at with all due seriousness” (Ibid.). The referent object is an impact on an environment that might be threatened by implementing of NS2. For this reason, the Latvian Prime Minister underlined several damaged issues which directly move the gas project from the political to a securitized scope in his speeches.

As has been shown, Latvia has mainly the same stance of referent objects on the building of pipeline as well as Poland. Firstly, Latvian politicians expressed a fear towards the objectives of the EU energy policy which can be threatened by NS2. Furthermore, the division among the MS can be seen as a big challenge for Brussels. Under these circumstances, the division means the formulation of two blocks such as the active supporters who perceive NS2 as a commercial project with high profit and the opponents who see this project as an existential threat towards various referent objects. Besides, securitizing actors conclude that NS2 contradicts the foreign policy of Brussels as it would change the priorities in the context of Ukrainian war. As a whole, since Latvian authority does not resist the fact that its companies can profit from their direct involvement in the project, it does not predict a meaningful benefit from this deal. On the contrary, it may have the inevitable negative consequences for the state, Baltic Region, and the EU.

4.2.3. Denmark

Denmark became the first Nordic country who had joined the European Community after a public referendum in 1972. The population voted by 63.3% in favour to become the part of the EC. Since 1 January 1973, Denmark has officially been an active member of the European Union. Located in the Northern part of Europe, the country does not have any boundaries with Russia in comparison with Latvia or even

Poland which is close enough to Russian territory. Regarding the gas situation in Denmark, despite Poland and Latvia, the country is self-sufficient and independent enough from imported gas. It is the only one MS in the EU which is a net exporter of natural gas to other countries (Energinet, 2017: 5). Since 1987, the Tyra platform, located in the North Sea, is the primary resource from which the gas is provided to Danish consumers. Danish Underground Consortium owns this large condensate field and yet, operated by Danish oil and gas company, Maersk Oil. However, the question related to the security of gas supply in Denmark has been raised in 2017 when was adopted decision to make the reconstruction of Tyra in the period 2019-2020. This arrangement, in turn, will temporary shut-down the supply of natural gas to Denmark as well as Sweden. Under these circumstances, the solution was found in the way that gas will be provided from German and Danish gas storage facilities.

Derived from facts mentioned above, it can be considered that Denmark stands in a completely different position towards the gas supply unlike Poland and Latvia, where the supplier remains Russia. Nonetheless, Danish authority has also put the efforts to cancel the building of NS2. First, it is provoked by the route of the pipeline which would run via 139 km of Danish territorial water as well as it was in case of the Nord Stream 1 project. Secondly, being the active proponents to keep sanctions on Russia, Danish authority sees the sharp contradictions between Brussels' policy and the ongoing project (Herszenhorn, 2017, July 2).

The first official speech acts of Danish officials concerning NS2 was given in late 2016, where the government raised a question about the route of the pipeline. Up to that time, the Danish position was mainly relied on the jurisdiction of the European institutions to decide whether the transmission pipeline has a place in the future of the European Union. In February 2017, Danish Foreign Minister, Anders Samuelsen, answering on the question about the Danish stance on NS2, stated that: "This is not a question only for Denmark but for the European Union." (Carbonnel, Eckert, 2017, March 24). Moreover, during the summit of EU leaders in March 2017, Danish

Minister also presented NS2 as a case about the responsibility of EU institutions rather than a challenge of separate countries, notably Denmark (Ibid.).

The controversial nature of gas offshore from the Danish side was underlined by the former Prime Minister of Denmark and ex-Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. He brought out with the statement, “Denmark is completely right to have concerns about Nord Stream 2, a Russian political project, a danger to European security, and a reversal of all the EU's good work on energy security” (Rettman, 2017, December 1). In fact, “a Russian political project” pays attention to the crucial role of Russia to implement this project. In other words, it is an evident for Danish politicians that an initiative to construct the second branch of North gas pipeline sets out mainly from the Russian political environment. Likewise, he emphasised the importance to make a thoughtful decision as it is tightly connected with the EU security in the energy context. Thus, the energy security as a referent object means the instability of significant supplier, Russia, which can not be considered as a reliable strategic partner in the current situation. Furthermore, a line of the opposition to the building NS2 is led by the Social Democratic party whose members repeatedly declared that the pipeline is not an issue of the European neither Danish policies. Nick Hækkerup, a member of the Danish Parliament and spokesman of Foreign Affairs, explained the core arguments of criticism by declaring:

“...in a situation where the Russians are acting aggressively and where Danish soldiers are about to be stationed in the Baltic countries in order to balance the situation, then of course we have to weigh in how it [Nord Stream 2] fits our foreign policy interests.” (Kirk, Rettman, 2017, October 11).

In this case, looking at the recent political situation which draws Russia as an aggressor towards Ukraine, NS2 is out of the EU scope. The comment illustrates that it is impossible to see the compatibility between the implementation of NS2 and the principal goals of the EU, one of which sets out to ensure the future security in the Baltic region. Hence, the conclusion of this speech act follows the assumption that

Brussels have to account for all actions and goals to avoid the EU policy divergence. The referent object of this speech, thus, is the objectives of Danish foreign policy interests that would be threatened by the decision to construct the second branch of Nord Stream.

Following a turn of events over the past year, in April 2017, Nord Stream 2 AG had applied for permission in Denmark, and since that time the Danish Energy Agency has been responsible for assessing the impact of NS2 on behalf of the Danish State. In general, until October 2017, the core criteria which was taken into account was merely an environmental impact. In turn, it was clear that only the threat to the environment can be a reason for rejection to set NS2. Based on that situation, the Minister of Energy, Utilities and Climate, Lars Christian Lilleholt, repeatedly underlined that the reason why Denmark does not have any legislation tool to decline NS2. She claimed that “Denmark is currently unable to involve foreign policy, defence policy and security policy aspects when dealing with applications for pipelines...” (Ibid.). Nonetheless, the turning point of the Danish decision about Nord Stream 2 became the discussion to pass a new law, which brings to the forefront a detailed evaluation of the pipeline also on the ground of foreign, security and defence policies. In a sense, the legal basis for this decision is the ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (UNCLOS) under Article 79 (para 4), which constitutes that “Nothing in this Part affects the right of the coastal State to establish conditions for cables or pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea” (UN General Assembly, 1982). Consequently, whereas Lars Christian Lilleholt did not come up with the final decision, this new legislative amendment includes in its scope NS2 which had been submitted before.

It should be added that the Danish Minister called attention to the sting of events which dramatically changed over the past years and has a negative impact on the bilateral relations between Russia and the EU. Her utterance derives from the assumption about the current political situations which cannot lead to the stable ties between two international actors. Moreover, after the decision to adopt the new law, the Minister had also specified the jurisdiction of Danish authority to change the

approach of assessing the construction of the pipeline. In other words, nowadays there is a legal frame which takes into the consideration the security aspects of Denmark concerning construct NS2. This is followed by:

“Political conditions in the world also change. And I am very pleased that the parliament and government now have the opportunity to involve security, defence and foreign policy aspects when dealing with such an application.”

(Kirk, Rettman, 2017, October 11).

All in all, the rhetoric among the Danish politicians about the new gas pipeline has been actively discussed over the last year. After the much-debated question, the government had adopted a law towards the territorial water, which entered into force on January 1, 2018. It can be considered as a direct act of Danish policy to ban the building of NS2 via 139 km of its territorial water. To conclude, in the speech acts of Danish authorities the referent objects are the EU foreign policy interests, that should be protected and taken into account during the negotiation of this deal. Secondly, as it is difficult to trace the explicit expression of national interests as a threat in the speech acts, the extraordinary measures such as an implementing of a new law gave evidence. To a large extent, Denmark is alarmed by the future Russian intervention in its territorial water as it is a question of security concerns which is an essential priority in Danish policy.

4.2.4. Sweden

The history of Swedish membership in the EU started in January 1995, when the country officially joined Europe. In fact, after four years of negotiations and public voting in 1994, the Nordic countries became even a more meaningful part of the EU policy. Drawing upon the historical background, Sweden, as well as Denmark, had none any substantial connection with Russia contrary to Poland and Latvia. The benchmarks of the last century show that neutrality and principal of non-participations in any blocs were the fundamental concerns of Sweden during the

WWII and afterwards. Thus, it brings to the conclusion that Russia did not affect Sweden in any way. Apart from this fact, analysing the Swedish gas market over the last decade, the consumption of natural gas in Sweden had rapidly decreased, and up to now, the Swedish energy is composed only 3.5% of natural gas. Furthermore, the current direction of Swedish energy policy is mainly concentrated on the renewable energy. The gas to Sweden flows running from the North Sea off the coast of Denmark and Germany, at large, via Danish territory. As a result, Denmark is a primary Swedish partner of the natural gas. Currently, the energy policy of two countries put their efforts on the further harmonisation of national gas operators: Swedegas and Energinet have to ensure the security of gas supply and balance their gas markets (Swedegas.com, 2017, September 5). Besides the cooperation with Denmark, Sweden also has one gas storage facility that is operated by Swedegas in Skallen. In general, both countries are tightly connected concerning the gas flow which is provoked by their geographical locations.

Nonetheless, despite the fact that the country is less vulnerable to gas supply and the environmental criteria is the only one question in the adopting this particular gas project, in the last two years, there was expressed a meaningful amount of criticism towards NS2. Principally, the concerns of Swedish authorities derive from the concern to ensure the security of national territory rather than the goals of energy policy. In substance, the projected pipeline would run in parallel to Nord Stream 1 via Swedish strategic island, Gotland and port of Karlshamn. For this reason, it will be a big business deal as Karlshamn will earn around \$11.3 million (Carbonnel, Eckert, 2017, March 24). Thereby, after it was announced that Gazprom agreed with European companies to construct the pipeline in 2015, the Swedish authorities started to express potential obstacle for its implementation.

In September 2016 the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation of Sweden received a request concerning the permission of the building of the gas pipeline. As a consequence, the Swedish authority has raised the question of gas project and its future at the level of political debates. The distinguishing feature of the Swedish discussion is the multidimensional environment regarding the local authorities,

specifically the Municipality of Gotland, and Karlshamn and central government. One of the first officials in Sweden who provided the speech act with criticism on NS2 was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström. Whereas in the political system of Sweden a municipality may decide whether or not to permit to use their territories, the Minister, on behalf of the government, pointed out that the pipeline is a threat to the national defence policy in that current situation:

“The government can’t control decisions that fall within municipal self-government. The municipalities decide on renting ports. The government sees the use of the ports as affecting Swedish defence policy interests negatively, though our overall assessment is that the project is difficult to stop.” (Thelocal.se, 2016, December 14)

Nonetheless, she also made a clear point that despite the government’s opinion and its concern of defence policy, the Swedish authority had none jurisdiction to stop the construction of the gas project. Thus, the existential threat such as the building of NS2

Under those circumstances, Hans Wallmark, the spokesperson of the defence policy from the right-centre opposition, identified the reluctance and weakness of the Swedish government in the light of adopting a decision towards NS2, “I [Hans Wallmark] think it has been handled worryingly badly. This could have been done several months ago. I think the government is dragging its feet...” (Ibid.). Given this point, the government requires more power to ensure the security at the national level despite the regional authorities for whom the economic profits usually prevail. Therefore, the discussion on the implementation of the gas project and its threat has raised one more question on the division of power between the government and region power.

With this intention, the Minister of Defence, Peter Hultqvist underlined the Swedish defence concerns which could be threatened in case Sweden will permit to use Swedish islands as a base for the construction of NS2. Accordingly, to his speech,

“The use of the ports would affect Swedish defence interests in a negative way, and we have informed the municipalities about that...” (Reuters.com, 2016, December 13). It also said about the importance to notify the local authorities about the potential threat when they will give the green light on the implementation of the gas offshore. In other words, the Swedish Minister stressed that the security of state which is usually the primary concern at the national level, cannot be out the scope of municipal control.

Regarding the authorities in Gotland, the chairman of the Council Committee, Tommy Gardell, replied to the position of the Minister of Defence by declaring “We're going to say no to leasing the port to Nord Stream” (Thelocal.se, 2016, December 16). This utterance made up the national defence of great interest to Swedish policy which should be taken into account without prejudice. It can be seen that the municipality put the national security above the local profit, which partly underlines the power of central government under these circumstances. As a result, it rejected the offer of Nord Stream 2 AG to use its territory and lost a chance to earn from the project.

However, despite the opposition of Gotland's authority, it did not change the upcoming events which happened in the context of Karlshamn Municipality. On January 30th, 2017 Radio Sweden made a report in which stated that Swedish government found the meaning with municipalities and do not see the obstacles to concentrate a part of the pipeline's construction on the Swedish port (SverigesRadio.com, 2017, January 30). The Foreign Minister estimated this decision as the consensus, which was reached by both sides: “If Karlshamn chooses to proceed this will not threaten defence policy interests...[municipalities] have been receptive to the information they have received from the government.” (Reuters.com, 2017, January 30). As follows, the port of Karlshamn is involved in the gas project despite all criticism of government towards NS2. By and large, this decision derives from the specific internal structure of Sweden within the municipal units.

On the whole a clear division of the government and municipalities, contradictions between regional powers show that a threat has to a great extent a biased nature and

it is not recognised by the authorities at all levels in Sweden. In fact, the Swedish authorities determined the referent object as a defence concern which is the core issue of foreign policy. On the contrary, Poland, Latvia, Denmark also mentioned the European energy policy as a potentially threatened point. Mostly, up to the present time, despite the decision of Karlshamn Municipality, the Swedish politicians, as well as Danish, has relied on the jurisdiction of the European Commission to block the pipeline.

4.3. Functional actors

Whereas the primary role of functional actors is to influence the dynamic of securitization, Russia can be considered as a significant functional actor in the particular case study. The immense steps of the functional actor can be traced from the beginning of the proposal to implement the gas project. Since 2012 an initiative to double the capacity of Nord Stream by building two more stings was actively put on the agenda of debates by CEO of Gazprom. Consequently, the proposal on behalf of Russia turned on the official decision in 2015 during the negotiations between the European companies and Gazprom during the Business Forum in Vladivostok.

One of the primary reason why Russia tries to win the support for the implementation of this project is its dependence on the European energy market. It can be explained by the EU-Russia relationship which is to the great extent interdependent regarding consumer-deliver in the energy domain. Albeit the Russian economy is mostly depending on the exports of crude oil than natural gas, the income of latter plays a crucial role in the industrial development in Eastern part of Russia (Goldthau, 2016: 16). Up to the present time, Russia delivers natural gas to Europe through four ways routes (Figure 2) as Yamal pipeline (Belarus, Poland), Nord Stream 1 (the Baltic Sea), Blue Stream (the Black Sea and Turkey) and Urengoy-Uzhgorod (Ukraine). This what puts Russia on the position of high dependency on the transit countries which can be decreased by the implementation of NS2. Thus, the ongoing project seems like a valuable tool to diversify the routes of

gas delivering to the EU which means that Russia will become even less vulnerable from the transit countries.



Figure 2. Pipelines for Russian gas in Europe. Source: Center for the European Reform. Available at: <https://www.cer.eu/insights/nord-stream-2-more-hot-air-gas>

Moreover, the future pipeline would ensure the dominance of Gazprom in the European gas market. As nowadays the EU uses one-third of gas imports from Russia, the pipeline will bind up the EU with Russia as tight as it is possible in the current situation. It might mainly mean that the position of Russia as a major supplier of the EU Member States will be inevitable in the upcoming years. Thus, the Russian strategy towards natural gas includes the construction of NS2 as a project that arguably can gain its two primary aims such diversification of export efforts and

ensure the dominance in the European gas market. Drawing on these benefits, Russia makes an efforts to influence the public discussion on NS2 and to prove its advantages. While at stake there lie the future relations with EU and a significant income for Gazprom, there are issued a meaningful amount of reports which stresses the high importance of the gas pipeline for the EU as well as for Russia. During the official meeting and giving the interviews Gazprom on behalf of Russia attempts to convince the EU institution and the Member States that the implementation of Nord Stream 2 will ensure the security supply and double the capacity of gas supply to Europe. From this perspective, it can be seen that Russia is a reliable partner for the EU and the project is not more than merely a commercial venture.

In this manner, Alexey Miller, the deputy chairman of the Gazprom, expressed his confidence of the implementation of the ongoing project. He pointed out that “A special regime for the Nord Stream 2 project is of course unnecessary. Nord Stream 2, as far as technical concepts are concerned, is the same as Nord Stream 1. It will go along the same corridor.” (KyivPost, 2017, June 30). It can be considered that Gazprom’s chief does not see any contradictions concerning NS2 as has the same characteristics as NS1. In fact, two new strings of gas offshore will be run in parallel to NS1 and, thus, the running of the pipeline cannot be blocked by the technical reasons. Furthermore, Alexey Miller has admitted this deal as a quite good business deal for the EU, not only for Russia in terms, it will ensure gas supply for an extended period (Financial Times, 2016, June 16). On the whole, his speech acts might give an expression that the construction of NS2 is in the process and there is no a solid background to block it.

Similarly, Alexander Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Management Committee in Gazprom underlined the overstated assumption about NS2 as a threat. He made it clear that the criticism of the EU Member States does not have any substantial evidence and “the risks for Nord Stream 2 are hypothetical” (Farchy, 2018). Moreover, as it has been noted before, in the Environmental Impact Assessment, it is declared that the pipeline cannot be blocked by its potentially damaging impact on flora and fauna in the particular region. Because of it will not

dramatically affect the environment in the Baltic Sea (Nord Stream 2 AG, 2017). As a proof, the scientists came to the conclusion that the usage of the same technologies as in case of Nord Stream will ensure the protection of nature and will have a minimal impact on the environment. Therefore, the chairman of Gazprom and the official reports constitute their statements with apparent confidence that the offshore pipeline will be in service without any postponed deadline, at the end of 2019.

As a matter of fact, Russian authority declares that allowing NS2 to be processed will not impede the competition in the EU energy market. Vice versa the project will increase a competitive situation between Russian export and the LNG on an equal footing. Consequently, in media coverage its position focus on merely the commercial benefits of the gas project, whereas to avoid any discussion politically. In the Russian news agencies, NS2 appears as a business deal with a significant future income without any detrimental effects. In February 2018, Sergei Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of Russia, has emphasised that it might be seen the exclusively commercial, beneficial aspect of this project (Shcherbak, 2018). As a result, Russian political leaders together with Gazprom's main present this project particularly in the economic dimension beyond the political scope.

According to the case study, Germany also can be considered as a functional actor too. Firstly, it derives from the fact that Germany is not a securitizing actor regarding active support to build NS2. Secondly, this Member State, as well as Russia, considers that the objectives of the project are limited only by the commercial purposes. From German view, neither the EU energy security nor the national security might be threatened by the implementation of the gas project. The pipeline's proponent stands by a strict principle of division between political and economic aspects in this case, albeit sometimes it raises the question of transit zone regarding Ukraine (Harper, 2018).

As long as the discussion on NS2 has put on the agenda, Germany takes a cautious approach to comment this issue. With the intention of the commercial benefits, two German companies such as Wintershall and Uniper agreed to sign a financial agreement with 10% each to invest the project. As NS2 will turn Germany is indeed

a gas hub in Europe, the political leaders point out about this project only under the economic spectrum. The former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, is an advocate of gas offshores via the Baltic Sea. In the past, he was a proactive supporter of Nord Stream and run for the head of the shareholders' committee of Nord Stream AG, and in 2016 he became a manager of Nord Stream 2 (Noak, 2017). Thus, being in favour of these projects during the whole time of the discussion, he denies all politicisation issues which might put the questions of legal basis and the potential possibility of cancellation of Nord Stream 2. Despite, it should be noted that his position towards the gas pipeline cannot be seen as the official German announcement slightly it somewhat influenced the dynamic of public debates in Germany.

Dismissing the political side of the gas project, the Social Democratic Party in Germany tried to win support among the EU to implement the project. The political leaders of party argue that NS2 can be perceived as an economic deal to ensure the security of gas supply. As maintained by the fact that it will double the capacity of NS1 to flow the natural gas to the EU, Social Democrats see the meaningful pros of a project that should be realised at the set date. The situation slightly changed after Bundestag election in September 2017, when Social Democrats went into opposition. Still, Germany is in favour to build the gas pipeline and is willing to permit to run Nord Stream 2. Indeed, the voice of the current German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, can be considered as the official state's position about the ongoing pipeline. During the meeting with Polish Prime Minister, she stressed that “We think this is an economic project. We are also for energy diversification...” (King, 2018, February 16). Therefore, the German stance on NS2 is to convince the other Member States that the gas offshore has merely the economic objectives.

It should be noted that besides Russia and Germany, Austria, France, Netherlands also can be perceived as the functional actors in the context of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The investment of their companies in the building of gas offshore and avoiding a discussion on NS2 in the political frame can be considered as their consent to construct it. In June 2017, after the United States State approved the

sanctions against Russia, the former Federal Chancellor of Austria, Christian Kern with the former German Foreign Minister Gabriel Sigmar announced their discontent with this decision. In fact, they highlighted the importance of NS2 as the further step in the EU energy development “We cannot, however, accept the threat of illegal extraterritorial sanctions being imposed on European companies that are participating in efforts to expand Europe’s energy supply network!” (Federal Foreign Office, 2017, June 15). Following this stance on the gas project, at the end of February 2018 during the meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, the Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz on behalf of Austria had expressed the support to the building of the ongoing project. Being entirely dependent of Russian gas, the country sees the reasonable benefits such as the ensuring of gas supply in the future. Nonetheless, the positions of “German friends” to influence the views of the Member States who against this project and the public debates is less noticeable (Reuters, 2018, 28 February). The official claims of the political leaders are limited in the media coverage which does not allow to make the further assumptions.

Overall, the dynamic of public debates derives from the countries-supporters that will benefit the most from exercising the gas project. As these states are included in the different blocs such as Germany is one of the most potent MS in the EU and Russia is an enemy to Europe over the past few years, both of them have the same point of view concerning the construction of the gas pipeline. Still, this division of blocs can explain the crucial difference in motives. In case Russia perceives the offshore as a “strong political weapon” to mitigate the relations with the EU and to some extent control it, the German objectives lead on state’s benefits regarding profit and its transformation to a gas hub in the EU. Therefore, to affect the dynamic of securitizing movement and to change the opinion of opponents, Russia and Germany use the similar frame of statements to implement this project by presenting NS2 as a commercial venture beyond the political scope. Moreover, Germany also strives to convince that this project applies to the Third Energy Package in the matter of ensuring the diversification of gas supply.

4.4. Discussion of findings

Whereas the Copenhagen School stands out the securitizing actors in the form of bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, the analysis interprets mostly speech acts which are performed by the political leaders who speak on behalf of their governments and states. Firstly, Prime Ministers, Foreign, Defense, and Energy Ministers, members of the national parliaments are the main securitizing actors. Notably, in Swedish case, the municipality authorities are also appeared such as securitizing actors. However, at the same time, the Karlshamn Municipality might be distinguished like the functional actors as it permitted to use its territory. It can be seen that municipality extensively affect the dynamic of the process of securitization by shifting the issue from the securitizing movement to economic sphere. Accordingly to the theory, the empirical part did not include the utterances of other actors who do not have the legitimate power to claim an existential threat. Therefore, the empirical analysis focused merely on the securitizing actors who are the authoritative representatives.

Due to the analysis, the speech acts of the particular Member States are various in form and expression. The findings indicated that four countries distinguish the project as an issue of highest priority despite the fact that commonly, they did not use the word security in their speech acts. Instead, the securitizing actors uttered words such as “threat”, “Russian political project”, “environment risk” to characterise the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Based on the external aspects of the facilitating conditions, neither the relations between speaker and audience nor the features of a threat to facilitate/impede securitization can be measured and evaluated, as the audience and the future shifting from securitizing movement remains unaccounted. For this reason, the analysis disregards the measure of the influence of the speech acts on the relevant audience.

While the existential threat is clarified (Table 2, page 59), the question what might be threatened by the building of the gas project refers to the objectives of the European energy policy. Here it reveals on the creation of Energy Union and its primary goals

such as diversification of energy supply and increasing the renewable energy. Moreover, NS2 can be seen as a security problem regarding violating the provisions of Gas Directive 2009/73/EC and Security of Gas Supply Regulation and its updating in 2016. Whereas in the political sector the systemic referent objects are the core of the international order according to the Copenhagen School, in the study case it refers to the EU regulations which constitute the regional political order and the central directions of its policy. Specifically, by implementing this project, Poland, Latvia, Denmark see the overreliance on the one gas supplier, Russia, who might not be considered as an active partner in the current circumstances. While the latter one is not an inherent part of the theory, the analysis does not eliminate the option to include them in the political domain. As follows, the goals of the Energy Union and the principle of diversification can be perceived as the essential pillars of the regional political order which should be adhered to avoid the fragmentation of the EU.

Table 2. The elements of the speech acts.

Elements/ Countries	Referent objects	Extraordinary measures	Existential threat
Poland	-goals of the Energy Union -principle of diversification -European Solidarity - foreign policy of the EU in the scope of the Ukrainian crisis	-US sanctions -Baltic Pipe	NS2
Latvia	-goals of the Energy Union -Unity and solidarity of the Baltic States - the EU -environment	-not mentioned	NS2
Denmark	-Energy Security -EU foreign policy interests -national defense policy	-amendment to the law	NS2
Sweden	-national defense interests	-forbidden to leasing port	NS2

Source: author's own elaboration.

Poland and Latvia also brought out with a conclusion that a referent object is the goals of the current EU policy towards the Ukrainian war. In detail, their considerations derive from the recent Brussels policy which declared the extension of sanctions against Russia, imposed over the Ukrainian crisis. At that point, having a commercial deal with the state who stands on the opposite side of order which the EU maintains is a big challenge. In particular, bypassing Ukraine, this project can be seen as a respectively important tool for Russia to expand the war conflict. Apart from this, Brussels disregards the evaluation of inevitable consequences for Ukraine regarding losing the status of transit country and reducing the economic fees. Accordingly to the claims of securitizing actors, mainly Polish and Latvia politicians, the state that violated the principles of international law might not be seen as a reliable partner even though the German authorities present it as a purely commercial project.

Polish and Latvian authorities repeatedly underlined that the proposed gas pipeline would threaten solidarity and trust among the EU Member States. This assumption shows that the status of a referent object based on the European unity which in turn means that NS2 would cause the division between the Member States. Furthermore, as a consequence, it might challenge a further integration of the European Union. This defined object applies to the political sector of the theory which means the shifting of the securitization process beyond the state-centric security scope. Thus, while the security is declared on the name of the EU, it is an evidence of a regional level of the process of securitization.

Examining the speech acts of Denmark and Sweden the referent object is appealed to their defense policy, namely, goals which can be threatened by using their territory to construct the pipeline. In the main, using their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, the countries would be more reluctant as a sole shareholder of NS2, Gazprom, would have official permission to their territory, and ports in Swedish case. Furthermore, giving the green light to construct the pipeline will be considered as one more step to closer relations with Russia. However, both states are not satisfied with the future perspective of rapprochement. Denmark and Sweden feel

that their territory should be protected from the Russian interference there. In the comparison of the CS and the case study, securitizing actors claimed NS2 as a threat towards their priorities of defense policy. Therefore, the particular referent object can be characterised by the legitimate claim to survival as any threat towards the defense policy is closely tied to the sovereignty of the country and cannot be disregarded in the legal context.

As the Copenhagen School points out two distinct types of the referent objects within the scope of the environmental security such as environment itself and synthesis of environment and civilisation, Latvia referred to the former which can be existentially threatened. Importantly, the referent object shreds of evidence about the existential nature of security beyond the state. Whereas the securitizing actor neglected the extent to which technology can negative side-effects of the particular region, he called to take into consideration the environmental consequences. In the meantime, other securitizing actors does not mention this referent object which makes it less vulnerable in the context of the building of NS2. Thus, the environmental aspect of the securitizing movement is narrow enough in the particular case study.

By defining the referent objects, the securitizing actors clarified that there are the elements which might be threatened in case the Nord Stream 2 project will become operational. The analysis proves the trend of different referent objects by the selected countries. With this in mind, the Member States deduces the possibility of threatening the political, environment and energy issues. The unification of them in one context such as the building of the pipeline illustrates the higher probability of facilitating the further process of securitization. Regarding a right of survival, the goals of the Energy Union, the principle of diversification, imposed sanctions on Russia, the territorial sovereignty of Member States are legally binding in the EU structure and the national systems. As a result, their nature enables to legitimise an extraordinary measure beyond the ordinary politics in case of the successful securitization.

In turn to the extraordinary measures, the securitizing actors recommending them via their speech acts. The main aim of the proposed actions is to cancel the Nord Stream

2 pipeline. The Polish stance on the extraordinary measure can be found regarding the building of Baltic Pipe and further development of LNG terminals. Nonetheless, a definition of these actions in light of an extraordinary measure disregards the feature of the breaking rules and leaving the scope of typical politics. Furthermore, the Latvian authorities did not clarify which actions they will take beyond the usual politics to protect the referent objects. Similarly, the securitizing actors from Sweden did not declare any extra steps which a country would take. At the same time, both states pointed out the responsibility of EU institutions to implement the extraordinary measures.

In substance, Denmark can be considered as the first country among selected that had already handled an extraordinary measure to cancel the project. Passing the law in November 2017 to forbidden NS2 to run through the Danish territorial water on the security ground can be perceived as extraordinary Danish measure to block the gas pipeline. Nevertheless, a drawback of this determination lies in the legal basis of its adopting whereas the CS attributes this measure as the action beyond the scope of the normal politics (Ibid.). Moreover, to take an extraordinary step means the acceptance of securitized issue that can be traced only in the Danish environment, but not by any means in the EU. Thus, the Danish law might change the route of the gas pipeline and in this regard, will ensure national security. Despite, handling this extraordinary measure cannot be evidence to prevent threats within an EU level. In other words, NS2 would instead bypass Danish territorial water; still, this action would not cancel the gas project.

Moreover, the findings showed that the frame of functional actors is quite limited in the Copenhagen school as it does not present the detailed outline of its nature and structure. Albeit, in the particular case study, Russia and Germany as the primary functional actors affect the dynamic of the securitizing movement such as they present the gas project merely in the economic scope. In many ways, Germany has made the efforts to convince the securitizing actors, the Member States, in the safety of the projects and its profit. From the Russian side, Gazprom and the political leaders make sure the EU has the lack of evidence to declare NS2 as a threat to the

environment in the Baltic Region as there will be the insignificant effect on it. Therefore, while the role of functional actors is not well-developed by the proponents of securitization theory and the empirical part provides a limited analysis of them, this issue requires a further research.

Overall, the empirical part provided the analysis of speech acts of securitizing actors, referent objects, extraordinary measures and functional actors. It can be concluded that the referent objects elaborate within the different aspects and levels. The particular gas project is perceived as a threat towards the national as well as the EU policies. For this reason, the securitizing movement involves two levels, respectively national and regional. The latter relates to the sum of the national securities, which have attempted to prevent the threat towards an EU level. Moreover, taking into account the content of referent objects, the analysis disregards the economic domain as political and energy concerns dominate. The defined extraordinary measures characterise the limitation because of the frame of the Copenhagen School which does not provide the clear distinction between these actions and politics according to the rules (Buzan et al., 1998). While the proposed actions by Sweden and Denmark aim to prevent their involvement in the project at the national level, the Polish suggestion of the imposing the US sanctions on the project is an action to cancel the building at all. Finally, the analysis of functional actors has proven that they indeed affect the dynamic of the process by trying to shift NS2 from the securitizing move to the economic spectrum. However, to which extent they influence the process of securitization is unaccounted as the analysis follows merely a securitizing movement.

5. Conclusion

Answering the research question, the findings of thesis assess that all particular countries interpret the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as a current threat towards the EU as well as the Member States. Accurately, the research illustrated the securitization of NS2 across Poland, Latvia, Denmark, and Sweden by analyzing the speech acts of their authorities. Upon the objectives of the study, it has shown that particular energy issue is at the level of the securitizing movement. For this reason, the audience was excluded from the analysis as at the specific stage this actor does not involve. One can affirm that title of thesis widely applied to the securitization in the context of NS2 within underpinning the political significance. This assumption derives from the analysis of the speech acts and the nature of the referent objects. Mainly, the notion of securitization is appraised as the process, however, indeed not like the result.

Being the staunch opponents of having a gas deal with Russia, the countries underlined the various referent objects, which should be protected. This distinction can be explained by different backgrounds which generated by the specific state's concerns. However, mostly the referent objectives can be unified under the political dimension such as the goals of EU foreign policy, the unity of the EU and the sovereignty of Nordic countries. The energy objects that should be protected are the principles of the Energy Union and Gas Directive which are going beyond the scope of the political dimension. Besides, the Danish and Latvian authorities also marked the environment which might keep safe from the harmful impact in the case of implementation of the project. Importantly, the Swedish securitizing actors made an accent on the referent object in term of the national security, avoiding the claims of energy-related consequences. Altogether, the particular Member States understand NS2 as a threat regarding different referent objects. Still, all of them have one common aim, to block its construction.

A drawback of the theoretical framework is a lack of energy domain in its structure. While for this reason, the definition of referent objectives and extraordinary measures are not well-structured, the approach of a sector's synthesis elaborated the

broader spectrum within two levels, national and regional. Hence, in line with the limitation of theory, it extracted the multi-dimensional nature of the energy issue. Furthermore, the empirical part solely pertains to the speech acts of securitizing actors due to the aim of the research question. With this intention, the paper is limited in detail policy analysis of the particular Member States. The examination of functional actors falls short by estimating the degree of their impact on the discussion. Finally, the spatial time of research can be seen as an asset as well as the limitation. Whereas the process of securitization is ongoing, analysis cannot provide the final stage of securitization/desecuritization.

On the whole, up to now, the energy issue does not tend to shift to the level of successful securitization as traditionally it is profoundly a political concern and does not gain the area of urgency. Consequently, the gas pipeline is securitized to the extent of the first stage of the securitization process - securitizing movement. The findings revealed that the speech act approach of the Copenhagen School helped to explore the research question. Nonetheless, the mentioned above flaws found in the analysis narrow enough and biased concerning the European frame towards this project. The research also disregards the influence of the USA on the stance of securitizing actors and its critical concerns towards the ongoing pipeline. Albeit limited in scope, the paper induces the dominance of a political dimension in the energy issue and its effect to securitize it. The referent objects as a substantial part of analysis corroborated the different backgrounds of the selected Member States. Unlikely this, the official stance on NS2 as the Russian political tool for manipulation rather than an economic project made them form a bloc of opposition. Regarding the degree of speech acts' effectiveness, currently, as it has been mentioned, the European Commission put on the agenda of the question on the legal basis of the gas offshore and proposed the amendment to the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC on November 8, 2017, to ensure the transparency and competition between the gas companies (European Commission, 2017, November 8). Despite, this question remains unresolved, and it is still early to talk about acceptance by the audience.

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