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**SECURITIZING SOCIETAL RESILIENCE?
CASE OF LATVIA'S COMPREHENSIVE
STATE DEFENCE SYSTEM**

MA thesis

Supervisor: Heiko Pääbo, PhD

Tartu, 2020

I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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ABSTRACT

Due to Latvia's geopolitical location and its particular understanding of the security environment it is located in, the state has since the war on Ukraine perceived hostility and threats to its security. While among the possible threats and threatening entities is a state with a great disbalance of power against Latvia's defence capabilities, Russia, there has been a need to improve and develop the deterrence policy against possible threats and crisis, including a potential war situation. Through the lens of securitization theory developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, also known as the Copenhagen School, this thesis examines whether an attempt has been made at securitizing societal resilience in the framework of the Comprehensive state defence system of Latvia, and if so, what aspects of societal resilience are given prevalence to and why. The overall conclusion is that an attempt to securitize societal resilience through implementing the Comprehensive state defence system in Latvia has taken place. The aspect of societal resilience that is given prevalence according to the argumentation of policymakers is ensuring engagement of a wide spectrum of private and public actors in state defence. By emphasizing this aspect of societal resilience, it, in turn, ensures the achieving of another societal resilience objective, which is the willingness of society members to defend the state.

Keywords: Securitization theory, Latvia, total defence, societal resilience

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INTRODUCTION

In the 21st century, states all over the globe have to tackle challenges, often different to those that were present only twenty years ago. Diseases, hybrid warfare, environmental problems all have the capability of endangering the peaceful existence and co-existence of countries. With completely novel challenges, there has been an increasing need to come up with new solutions for problems, even though policymakers and heads of state may lack solutions due to challenges such as resource scarcity, lack of public support, imminence of threat, and others. There are countries that face threats which call for action within the limited leeway of free choice.

As countries find themselves looking to improve their security and defence capabilities, often the best examples are found by looking at countries similar in sizes and located in similar geopolitical surroundings. That has evidently been the case of Latvia, having looked towards its neighbours to find examples on how to maximise its defence capabilities in the situation where the odds are stacked against it, - having very limited defence capabilities, limited human resources, limited monetary resources, a society that is incohesive and does not necessarily always share the same norms and values, information channels and sentiments towards state defence, an overwhelmingly more powerful and oftentimes hostile neighbouring state right across the Eastern border, however being a part of a collective defence organization, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The aforementioned situation is not unique – states have consequently, throughout the history, found themselves faced with a threat from a disbalanced power situation. Singapore, Sweden, Israel Estonia, Finland and Switzerland have all at one time or another found themselves faced with a similar situation, seemingly impossible to solve due to an overwhelmingly stronger adversary in military capabilities. Nevertheless, the 20th century brought about a possible solution to this dilemma – the principles of total defence, a strategy for small states to use, regardless of whether the state is part of a collective defence structure or not. Quite the contrary, by employing total defence principles, the particular state can only gain an advantage to its defence capabilities, and therefore security. Total defence is a mechanism that small states can employ to increase

their defence capabilities against existing or potential threats from powers that are militarily stronger.

The present research deals with such a case. After the beginning of the war in Ukraine, countries in Europe, especially those directly neighbouring Russia, grew wary of Russia's hostile intentions in the region. While the majority of these countries, including Latvia, have no way of competing against Russia's military capabilities, other solutions were to be found, and in the present case, starting from 2016 Latvian policymakers started assessing what could be done domestically, in addition to the guarantees provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to defend itself against Russia or any other adversary or crisis situation that may present itself at any given time in the future. According to Dr.sc.pol. Toms Rostoks, senior researcher at the Security and strategic research centre of the Latvian National defence academy, due to the insurmountable disbalance of power that Russia has over Latvia, "[Latvia] would have to play the best game of its career to be able to successfully deter or defend itself against Russia (Rostoks, 2020)"; but to even attempt playing the aforementioned game, Latvia has to have done its utmost best effort to implement total defence principles into its defence policy domestically, which is why the author observed that a potential securitization effort is being carried out on the Latvian defence policy, and in particular, towards the societal resilience component of the Latvian adaptation of total defence principles.

The present study therefore concerns itself with the efforts of Latvia to implement total defence principles into its defence policy, the name of the effort being the Comprehensive state defence policy. The argumentative structure of the need to implement a new approach to defence policy stemmed is believed to have stemmed from a securitization attempt, which this study will aim to prove and detect. Therefore, the main conceptual framework of this study is securitization theory, a theoretical framework developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, also known as the Copenhagen School. This study aims to view the conceptual phenomenon of societal resilience embedded into the Latvian Comprehensive state defence system that is being developed by looking through the lens of securitization theory.

The study is guided by the following research question:

Has there been an attempt to securitize societal resilience through implementing the Comprehensive state defence system in Latvia, and if so, what aspect of societal resilience is given prevalence and why?

In providing the answer to the research question, the study is structured into six main parts. The first three parts, - conceptual and theoretical framework of security and securitization theory; a Comprehensive state defence system – the concept of total defence and its components; and defining societal resilience, - provide the reader with the general theoretical background of the concepts used in the study, as well as introduce the reader with the relevant academic writings by the academics producing research on these theoretical concepts. The chapter on security and securitization theory will lay out the basic theoretical foundations of this study and introduce the reader with the basic assumptions underlying the understanding of the concepts of security and insecurity, while the chapter on the Comprehensive state defence system will provide an insight into academic research on the total defence principles adapted for the Latvian case. The theoretical part will be concluded with the authors' provided definition and elaboration on societal resilience.

The empirical part will be based on the theoretical structures laid out by the former part of this research and will aim to discover whether or not there has been an attempt to securitize the need for strengthen societal resilience in Latvia, and if so, which aspect or aspects of societal resilience have been given salience in the Latvian context and why. The study is concluded with a discussion of the findings.

1. Conceptual and theoretical framework of security and securitization theory

1.1. Security and its conceptual development in security studies

The key theoretical framework of this study is securitization theory, which builds upon a particular understanding of the concept of security in international relations. Therefore, before studying securitization theory in detail and using it to analyse the conceptual phenomena of societal resilience observed in the Latvian Comprehensive state defence system, the concept of security itself needs to be introduced to the reader.

The concept of security is understood in different ways by those who study it, namely academics, and the concept of securitization came about as a result of an important shift in security studies. According to Toms Rostoks (2010), the concept of securitization was developed as a direct result of the influence of social constructivism on international relations theories in the 1990s. Before the shift, the relevant definition of security studies Stephen M. Walt proposed to be used was “*the study of threat, use and control of military force*” (Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988 in Walt, 1991, p.3), which thereby implied a relatively narrow understanding of what security, and consequently, threats to it, are.

There were authors who expressed caution over the turn in result to an increasing influence of social constructivism: Walt (1991) highlighted the possible danger of expanding security studies beyond a reasonable scope, also called the “Wide” Versus “Narrow” debate (Buzan et al., 1998). Proponents of broadening of the scope of study of international relations provided support of incorporating non-military issues such as poverty, drug abuse, environmental and economical threats, identity issues and transnational crime into the security studies agenda (Buzan et al., 1998; Walt, 1991). While the debate was fruitful to the further development of the discipline, one of which being an updated understanding of security (a result of which is the creation of securitization theory), one of the main arguments against the widening was that by broadening the array of subjects of security studies, the intellectual coherence of the discipline would be broken down and its most essential components lose importance and meaning (Buzan et al., 1998). Whether this is the case is up for interpretation, however

with the coming about of securitization, security as well as threats to security became interpretive and subjective to the perceptions of its referent objects.

Having introduced the background developments to securitization studies in the relevant decade when securitization theory was put forward, it is now appropriate to offer the understanding of the concept of security in the framework of this research. Scholars Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, also known as the Copenhagen School, first put forward securitization theory as an analytical framework to researching security in their book, "Security: A New Framework For Analysis" (1998). Security in the context of international relations is said to primarily concern survival (Buzan et al., 1998). Therefore, according to the Copenhagen School, what constitutes threats to security are usually perceived to be threats that are capable of directly endangering the survival, also existence of a referent object.

The designated referent objects according to are usually the state, the government, the territory or society (Buzan et al., 1998). Nevertheless, the referent objects can also be other elements of statehood. In security, the extraordinary circumstance that has put at stake the very existence of the referent object must be stopped at all costs, which allows for special measures to be taken. Threats can arise in various sectors of statehood, most often in the military and political sector. If a threat is posed to the state in the military sector, the referent object is nearly always the state itself, but can also be security complexes bound together by geography or allyship (Buzan et al., 1998). If there is a threat posed to the political sector of the state, there are several possible referent objects. According to Buzan et al, most often the referent object will be sovereignty, hence a threat will be considered as anything that questions the legitimacy, governance, recognition, as well as ideology of the state. Moreover, Barry Buzan and his co-authors (1998) challenge our traditional understanding of existential threats by recognizing supranational actors being the referent objects. For an institution such as the European Union, processes of integration are of vital importance to its existence.

Although, according to a traditionalist understanding to security, threats to security would be presumed to most often arise in the military and political sectors, there are certain circumstances under which other sectors of statehood can be existentially threatened. Buzan et al. stipulate that a security threat in the economic sector can threaten to cease the existence of the state as a whole. The societal sector is also one that can take

up certain threats to the survival of the state. However, this sector is one where the definitions concerning the survival of certain statehood elements are far vaguer than, for example, in the obvious case of a threat towards the military sector. Referent objects in the societal sector can be, for example, identity and religion.

In the case of the identity, states are different from one another as in what constitutes an existential threat. Barry Buzan and his fellow authors (1998) argue that identity per se is not something easy to grasp or palpable. It cannot be easily observed, therefore defined, how identity can be threatened or cease to exist. It allows for the question of what makes us “us”, namely in the case of a threat to identity, how much outside influence or deviance from a perceived norm would be perceived as a security threat. An illustrative example put forward by the Copenhagen School (1998) is migration. While migration flows can very obviously provide the labor market of a country with human resources and help aid a population decline, it can nevertheless deliver an array of problems that will require solving, for example illegal migration, human trafficking, border smuggling and increased crime rates. Although the aforementioned are indeed palpable problems and can be identified through a statistics agency of a particular country (if monitored), oftentimes countries focus on non-palpable challenges such as perceived threats to ideology or culture of a particular country when an influx of migrants representing another culture arrive and become members of society, which are difficult to view in quantifiable terms.

Security for the most part is subjective. There are situations in which certain issues pose an obvious threat to cease the existence of the state altogether, most evidently threats to the military sector, be it nuclear or other types of threats. Nevertheless, it stems from securitization theory that threats are socially constructed. The mentioned examples illustrate how threats to security cannot be universally understood and accepted the same way across sectors. According to Buzan et al. (1998), security is therefore a ‘move’ that escalates or frames a particular issue into the extraordinary realm of politics and breaks the usual chain of action for extraordinary measures to be taken. In securitization theory security is seen as not being an objective condition but rather security issues are the end result of a specific social process of something being secured from something that threatens it (Michael Williams, 2003). Ole Waever summarizes it in the following way:

“What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (...). By uttering “security” a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to us whatever means are necessary to block it.” (Waever, 1995, p.55).

This definition illustrates well how security is viewed within securitization theory. Language is argued to be the element that frames and constitutes security, therefore allowing security to be constructed every time it is spoken of. What constitutes a state of security to a particular actor, or a state of in-security when faced with a threat, depends on its understanding and perception as to what security is in relation to it.

1.2. The concept of securitization and securitization theory

Being the core analytical tool of this study, the concept of securitization and its respective components will be elaborated upon. Securitization and its theoretical framework were first introduced by what is called the Copenhagen school, namely scholars Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. Securitization theory, as argued by Michael Williams (2003), is “one of the most innovative, productive, and yet controversial avenues of research in contemporary security studies” (p. 511). Traditionally security and more generally security studies is predominantly a field of work for realists and neorealists, however securitization has provided the field of security studies with a theory that encompasses elements of social constructivism, allowing for the subject to be viewed in much broader terms of analysis.

As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde note, securitization can be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. They argue for a scale of sorts: an issue can be placed anywhere from being non-politicized, where it is not part of the public debate and governmental concern, to politicized, where an issue would be part of public policy and would require a political decision to be taken on it, and most extremely, to securitized, where an issue is being portrayed as posing a security threat so to successfully combat it,

emergency measures have to be taken that do not comply with the usual political procedure. It is worth to take note that that the Copenhagen School suggests any issue can be put anywhere on this scale, and the classification of issues is fairly, if not completely subjective – it depends on the actor that is dealing with the issue, and its audience. Buzan et al. put forward several illustrating examples to support this argument – for example, Iran politicizes religion, while the United States of America do not; the former Soviet Union securitized culture, while states such as the United Kingdom and France do not.

“(…) the exact *definition* and *criteria* of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.”, Barry Buzan et al. (1998, p.25) claim. Securitization is a phenomenon that cannot be studied only with indicators; instead, how the phenomenon of securitization can be studied is to examine the discourse produced by the actor we suspect is securitizing an issue. According to the authors of securitization theory, if an argument has the specific rhetoric and semiotic structure as to claim the presence of an existential threat and by avoiding it aiming to circumvent usual political and structural procedures the actor would otherwise have to obey, “we are witnessing a case of securitization” (1998, p.25).

Securitization and securitization theory is a framework of analysis that places importance on the use of language, language structures and semantics. ”When an issue is securitized, the language surrounding it is used specifically to portray it in a way that clearly proves an existential threat to the referent object, therefore dealing with it must take precedence before all else: “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here, or will not be free to deal with it in our own way) (Buzan et al., 1998)”” is an explanation of the analytical structure that is used in securitization. Thus, when studying the phenomenon of securitization, attention must be paid to whether the actor aiming to securitize has used specific language when talking about the issue that demands unusual means to be used in solving the issue and usual political procedure to be circumvented.

By looking through the lens of securitization theory, we can observe how securitizing actors use the power of language to portray perceived threats in such a way that enables the persons handling the issue to employ means not readily available to them. However, according to Buzan et al. (1998) in Emmers (2014), the existence of a threat is

not an objective reality, but rather it is brought into existence by using specific language that articulates the issue. Balzacq et al. (2015) explain that security threats do not need to reflect the objective and material circumstances of the world by basing their claim on the differing reactions of states regarding environmental hazards and the phenomenon of migration. Instead, security threats are said to be the mirror of policy makers' subjective worldview.

Securitization theory has several key units of analysis. Buzan et al. (1998) and Balzacq et al (2015) put forward several core concepts of the theory. There are referent objects – entities which are perceived or portrayed to be existentially threatened and have a legitimate claim to survival. Traditionally these are states and their respective nations in a subtler way, regional organizations or entities that are bound together in some other way, for example the European Union or the Baltic Sea region countries, North Atlantic Treaty organization and its members as a whole, a set of countries that are working together for a common goal that is of vital importance to them, et cetera. Referent objects can also be more specific – it can be a particular societal group that is perceived to be existentially threatened, for example women systematically suffering at the hand of domestic violence, or the genocide against Rohingya people in Myanmar.

There are securitizing actors – agents that have the capability to claim something, namely the referent object, existentially threatened by making a securitizing move. In principle, any societal entity, whether it be a governmental institution, the Prime Minister or the President of State, an environmental agency, an international or local non-governmental organization or local neighbourhood societies can make claims over a referent object being existentially threatened. Nevertheless, the distinction that has to be made here is whether the actor has the capability to gather enough attention and momentum around its claim to be reckoned with. While governments and heads of state have at their disposal various tools that can be employed to tackle the adversarial issues threatening referent objects having rallied enough support, other actors such as local non-governmental institutions most likely lack resources or capabilities to do so. Buzan et al. (1998) support this argument by stipulating that size is a crucial variable in determining if a referent object is successful. At the micro level, the example being neighbourhood society, while it can speak “security” and make claims about something being threatened, it is unlikely that it will be heard, therefore will not be taken action upon. In this manner,

larger and more capable securitizing actors have a much larger chance of being taken seriously and successfully arguing their case, therefore being acknowledged as securitizing actors.

Securitization theory also recognizes functional actors who are capable of greatly distorting dynamics in the sector that is threatened, but they are neither referent objects nor securitizing actors themselves. A functional actor holds some sort of power or influence in a situation where the securitizing actor claims something to be existentially threatened. An example of this might be an international organization providing its independent reviews on topics such as environmental safety or nuclear monitoring; it may be a firm working unsustainably and exploiting its overseas workers, thereby exacerbating an already present economic or health crisis.

While the Copenhagen school in its original 1998 writing included only these three components of securitization theory, academics have added other units of analysis to the theory: according to Balzacq et al (2015) there is also the referent subject, which is the entity that threatens the existence of the referent object, and an audience that has to be convinced that extraordinary measures in the case of this threat are justified, context, and the adoption of distinct policies.

Lastly, it is also important to make the distinction between securitization and a securitizing move – in assessing whether something has been a securitizing move, the reaction of the audience is usually not assessed (Uhlig, 2015). On the contrary, if assessing whether a successful case of securitization has been made, the audience and its reaction is very relevant: not only does the society sanction a securitizing move, but it also provides moral support and the necessary legislative means (for example, a vote) to enable the action deemed necessary (Balzacq et al., 2015).

As this chapter has explained, how various actors view security and what constitutes the absence of it, insecurity, depends on the actor itself, on how it self-reflects and its world view. According to the Copenhagen school, through the lens of securitization theory, we can view security not as merely a noun but rather a verb, acknowledging that actors have the capability to not only observe security or, on the contrary, the absence of it, but rather be actively engaged in “doing” security, using specific language surrounding an issue, claiming absolute importance of taking particular actions to ensure its survival, thereby ensuring its security. Within the framework of this

study, the lens that securitization theory offers can help view the concept of the Latvian Comprehensive state defence system as a constructed entity, bringing some issues to light and giving lesser importance to others, simply putting existing measures into new context, but issuing other, non-classical security components, as vital, too, such as societal resilience and the various elements it contains, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

2. A Comprehensive state defence system – the concept of total defence and its components

As this study views the conceptual phenomenon of societal resilience as embedded into the Latvian Comprehensive state defence system that is being developed by looking through the lens of securitization theory, the concept of a total defence strategy (or comprehensive state defence system) needs to be explained and elaborated upon. The framework of total defence is the basis upon which the Latvian Comprehensive state defence system is being created. Total defence is a mechanism that can aid small states in increasing the defence capabilities against military threats from militarily stronger or larger powers. Its underlying presumption was that if the adversary was sure that the whole society would defend their country and resist aggression, it would deter the aggressor seeing as engaging militarily would end up being costly and bloody (Bērziņa, 2019).

In the world as we see today, the line between peace and war has become very thin since both state and non-state actors continuously employ an integrated combination between military and non-military means to achieve their political and military goals (Bērziņa, 2018). Threats can be posed by various actors – only several decades ago, wars were mainly conducted by state actors, while the world today is observing a much more diverse range of actors that can participate in conventional and unconventional warfare – non-state actors such as paramilitary groups, armed civilians, terrorist organizations, groups receiving state-lead backing but refusing to acknowledge ties with any particular state, and the likes all pose a great variety of threats to various sectors of state, or the existence of the state altogether. To efficiently tackle both conventional and hybrid threats, countries need to adapt a holistic view on defence by seeing the benefits of the participation of the whole society, and a complex view on the functionality of the society in the long-term and in short-term crisis situations. A total defence strategy is meant to adjoin all sectors of society – both state and local governments, private business and private citizens, non-governmental organizations and other civic actors and structures – in creating a mechanism that can work together successfully and all know their respective roles in face of threat and before it.

The concept of total defence was first developed in the twentieth century as a means of mobilizing the whole state, not only the military sector but also the public and private sector, all generations and sectors of society, to be willing, ready and capable to defend their state from rivals, and thereby sending a powerful message as a deterrence strategy. Rostoks (2019) argues that within the concept of deterrence there is a significant importance on the state-society relations, because external adversaries regard the readiness of people to defend their country as a dissuasive factor. While the total defence concept lost its momentum in the aftermath of the Cold War, the Russian occupation of Crimea sparked renewed interest in the concept (Bērziņa, 2019), particularly given the fact that the conflict took place right on Europe's border. Russia's behaviour on the global scale made states that are part of collective defence alliances or rely in their defence capabilities on pooling resources with others, wary that their current strategies may come in short if they became a target of a real military threat. Therefore, as Bērziņa argues, the return to total defence concept is largely due to pragmatic examination of the asymmetry of military capabilities and the ever-present need to deter Russia. The peculiarity of the total defence concept, which works for many European states, lies in that it can be used by non-aligned states keen on keeping their neutrality as well as states which rely their defence capabilities on collective defence principles. Kepe and Osburg (2017) consider that an approach that engages all of society in national defence could, indeed, improve both the defence and deterrence capabilities of a state, given that the primary goal in such cases would be to deter the adversaries' will to engage in aggression.

The concept of total defence has several core elements, but the precise execution in the form of a concrete strategy differs from state to state. To give an example, Total Defence concept in Singapore, which is one of the most widely known total defence examples in the world, consists of 6 pillars – military, civil, economic, social, digital and psychological defence (Singapore Civil Defence Force, 2020). According to the Singaporean government, the domains are defined in the following way: psychological defence refers to all members of society being committed to working for bettering the countries' future, and confidence in a good future for the whole nation; social defence concerns harmonious working and living together of all Singaporean nationals; economic defence is a pillar that comprises efforts from the government, businesses and industry representatives in working hard and supporting the well-being and development of

economy (this includes effort on the individual level which is exceptionally commended); digital defence requires all individuals to be active in fighting against cyber threats; civil defence describes planning ahead for emergency situations in the framework of safety, basic needs and infrastructure of the whole society; and finally, military defence, which means having strong military forces that are able to deter threats and aggression and protect the country in case of attack, as well civilians are expected to supported the military.

By analysing the examples of defence policies of other countries known to employ total defence principles such as Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Israel, researcher Ieva Bērziņa (2019) puts forward her own classification of four overarching dimensions (or pillars) that every total defence strategy uses, in one way or another. Total defence, or comprehensive state defence system, consists of four main structural dimensions: military, civilian, informational and psychological. Even though the present study is most concerned with the psychological dimension of the concept, the reader will be introduced with the conceptual framework in its entirety as to get a full grasp on the main principles guiding total defence.

The first and arguably the most important dimension – military dimension – is the basis of all successful total defence examples around the world – Switzerland, Israel, Singapore, Finland and others (Bērziņa, 2019). This concerns the conventional military aspects of a country, such as troops, artillery and weapons stocks, trainings, response time in attack, and others. Militarily enlisting as much population as possible is deemed key to offsetting the discrepancy between larger adversaries that are more populous in terms of inhabitants. Bērziņa (2019) puts forward an illustrative quote by Levi Eshkol, the former prime minister of Israel, that was broadcasted during the Six-Day war in 1967: “In these days the entire nation is an army, all of Israel is a frontline. Each and every one of us, wherever he may be, and at all times, is in duty bound to consider himself responsible or the defence of Israel”. Not only this quote is illustrative of the compulsory military training as an integral instrument to a successful defence strategy according to total defence principles, it also expresses the general sentiment behind the total defence concept, too: all society members must feel responsible and act as such in the face of threats, and signal that clearly to the adversary. Although increasing state military capabilities is a crucial component of state defence, it is by no means a security guarantee

on its own, especially when, as it is the case of many European states, the main security threat comes from a state with a disproportionately bigger military capability, therefore the total defence concept consists of three more dimensions to ensure a holistic approach to state security.

The second dimension, civilian dimension, is one that requires a lot of crucial input from all sectors of society, since it involves planning and preparation in case of real warfare. This dimension is very palpable: it concerns having working infrastructures and mechanisms in place in case of a looming threat or actual warfare, keeping in mind that nowadays threats can also be not purely military but cyber, economic or hybrid. The civilian dimension is crucial on many fronts: it mainly concerns itself with holding critical infrastructure in place, namely the energy sector, health services, food, water, a working financial and economic system, transportation and others that are especially vital in case of warfare.

According to the Organization on Economic Cooperation and Development (2019), the key to establishing a resilient critical infrastructure is successful cooperation between infrastructure operators from both public and private sectors, since it has become more challenging to effectively respond to complex shock events in an increasingly digital world that is tied together interdependently. The importance of defending critical infrastructure is argued by Oleksandr Sukhodolia in Bērziņa (2019) when he identifies the war in Eastern Ukraine as an “infrastructural war” being used to influence the population and cause great harm to the functionality of the society, which in turn allows for increasingly more damage to be done by the adversary. Other examples put forward by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (2019) of severe damaged caused to critical infrastructure include the Great East Japan Earthquake, cyber-attacks on the Ukrainian electricity grid, and Hurricane Harvey in the United States of America.

The third dimension, namely informational dimension, concerns itself with topics such as public opinion, disinformation and strategic communication. The popular saying of “winning hearts and minds” can be of use here: the 21st century has seen a surge of targeted disinformation and propaganda (while a surge of civic society “fact-checkers” can be observed, too), and as it was observed in the 2014 war in Ukraine and the

annexation of Crimea, minds, and in turn, hearts of society can easily be turned with a specifically crafted set of tools. Albeit a popular culture example of sorts, Pomerantsev (2015), a Soviet-born British journalist, illustrates in his article the influence information has on society – “The first thing Russian militias do when they take a town in East Ukraine is seize the television towers and switch them over to Kremlin channels. Soon after, the locals begin to rant about fascists in Kyiv and dark U.S. plots to purge Russian speakers from East Ukraine. (...) This is even before the bombs start falling on them: “Information war is now the main type of war,” says the Kremlin’s chief propagandist Dmitry Kieselev, “preparing the way for military action”.

The role of strategic communication bears significant importance in the context of total defence. Holtzhausen and Zerfass (2013) in Frandsen and Johansen (2017) offer a comprehensive definition of the term: “Strategic communication is the practice of deliberate and purposive communication that a communication agent enacts in the public sphere on behalf of a communicative entity to reach set goals”. According to Bērziņa (2019), strategic communication is a comprehensive approach that is a centrally coordinated and highly intelligent, specifically crafted long-term strategy which is being carried out by competent structures able to perform the task. Responding to potentially harmful disinformation, increasing media literacy and taking into account the critical role of media in informing society is crucial since, as argued by Stephen J. Flanagan et al. (2019), informational activities and propaganda has great capability of undermining trust in the government and political institutions, as well as fostering ethnic and social tensions, thereby weakening the state.

The fourth dimension of total defence is the psychological dimension. Psychological defence means mobilizing the collective will and capabilities of the society by it having a mindset to protect their country at all costs. Countries that employ the total defence strategy as a pre-emptive defence mechanism to deter threats pay special attention to psychological defence, the core concept of which is the readiness of inhabitants to defend their country, argues Bērziņa (2018). To develop the psychological dimension of the total defence strategy, a country must audit itself on civil engagement indicators such as trust in government institutions, patriotism and civic activity, as well as participation levels in elections; these indicators must be relatively high as to indicate how likely it is that a large part of society would be willing to contribute to the defence

of their country, whether it be through volunteering in the military, participating in peaceful resistance efforts, offering their personal skills or resources to help deter the adversary, or otherwise actively participating in state defence.

There are different potential obstacles to developing the psychological defence dimension that are present in societies. A very important obstacle present in many European societies is high mistrust levels in the government and feelings of “us versus them”, us being the society and them being the political elite from whose decision-making process the society is feeling detached. Distrust in the government and political institutions that most associate with the concept of state itself can lower the societies’ motivation to participate in state defence (Bērziņa, 2018). Another drawback of this “gap” between state institutions and society is that adversaries can exploit it by targeted disinformation and propaganda, thereby lessening trust levels even more and creating large divisions in society. According to Kepe and Osburg (2017), among factors that contribute to low levels of civic participation are also a divided information space, which in turn foster different historical memories and interpretations of history, and different cultural and political identities. Furthermore, poor socioeconomic conditions, high inequality levels in society, lack of access to education and high corruption levels are all contributing factors to low levels of trust in the government and patriotism.

This chapter has provided the theoretical framework behind total defence systems being employed in various states in the world today. As this study aims to establish what aspect (or aspects) of societal resilience is given salience in the attempt to securitize it and attempt to explain the reasoning behind it, the term of societal resilience needs explaining. As societal resilience is viewed in the framework of this study as an “umbrella” term comprising various elements of both informational and psychological dimensions, as well as other elements not mentioned in the theoretical framework put forward by Ieva Bērziņa, the concept deserves a separate elaboration which is provided in the next chapter.

3. Defining societal resilience

While the reader has been introduced with the concepts of securitization theory and total defence, it is now appropriate to introduce the concept that ties the aforementioned phenomena together within the framework of this study, and that is the concept of societal resilience, the securitizing of which this study aims to establish. A glimpse on the contents of what can be summarized under societal resilience has been offered in the previous chapter dealing with total defence and its components, however it is necessary to define, as precisely as possible, what is meant by societal resilience within the framework of this study, and therefore, what constitutes a resilient society and why would that be deemed necessary in the context of this case study.

The concept of societal resilience means various things in different contexts. Etymologically, for a material to be deemed resilient, it needs to be shock-proof, being able to quickly rebound and recover, returning to its initial state. Keck and Sakdapolrak (2013) observe that while initially resilience was viewed in terms of persistence of ecological system functions, the continuous studying of resilience in various settings has evolved into what can be characterized by the principles of “persistence, adaptability and transformability (Keck and Sakdapolrak, 2013, p.6)”. As argued by Jermalavičius and Parmak (2012), an increase in academic interest in resilience came after several major events on the global scale, such as 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the 2006 tsunami in Indonesia. Both events changed the thinking on resilience not only in the particular countries that they took place in, but also challenged the thought process on national security to any other observer state, whether their particular states and societies would successfully endure hardships, and, as stated by Buzzanell (2010) in Jermalavičius and Parmak (2012), in the cases of a significantly changed environment, to successfully adapt to the new circumstances and to ultimately arrive at a state of “new normalcy” (Buzzanell, 2010).

Long (2008) in Jermalavičius and Parmak (2012) defines societal (or social) resilience as the “ability of a nation-state to preserve the cohesion of society when it is confronted by external and internal stresses caused by socio-political change and/or violent disturbances (Long, 2008)”. Jermalavičius and Parmak (2012) compare the


definition to that of a neighbouring concept, community resilience, defined the following way: “[...] a community’s inherent capacity, hope and faith to withstand major trauma, overcome adversity and to prevail with increased resources, competence and connectedness (Landau, 2007, in Jermalavičius and Parmak, 2012)”. Community members, like those of society of a particular state, have something in common – while society members of a particular state have their place of living in common, community members may have as their common element adherence to certain norms or values, therefore the two terms and, in turn, their definitions can be compared to one another.

There is lack of consensus evident among researchers and policy makers in Latvia regarding psychological defence and societal resilience and the correct use of terminology when referring to concepts falling under these “umbrella” terms. While researcher Ieva Bērziņa argues that societal resilience only pertains to being able to quickly rebound from shock, therefore cannot be applied to the whole spectrum of other psychological defence issues that societies deal with, Māris Andžāns refers to Jermalāvičius and Parmak (2012) in arguing that societal resilience should be the term used when speaking of overarching issues of patriotism, psychological defence abilities, knowledge to battle disinformation, media literacy, successful strategic communication channels, and the likes. Policy maker, Director of Crisis management department in the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia (hereinafter – Ministry of Defence), Vitālijs Rakstiņš, agrees with Andžāns in so that psychological defence is too narrow a term to describe all the necessary actions that need to be taken in order to for society to achieve a state of resilience.

In the framework of this study, taking into account the available academic literature and the spoken opinions of researchers working in the field of security studies, preference has been given to the term “societal resilience”. How this study refers to the term “societal resilience” has been illustrated in Table 1 (see next page) drafted by the author. To explain, the term “societal resilience” within the framework of this research covers both psychological and informational dimensions put forward by Bērziņa (2019), as well as a non-exhaustive list of various elements that other authors such as Jermalāvičius and Parmak (2012), Kepe and Osburg (2017), Rostoks (2019), Wither (2020) and Andžāns (2019) have put forward in their writings as characteristics of resilient societies.

Jermalāvičius and Parmak (2012) argue that societal resilience and fostering it into the society within the context of national security a complicated and rather intangible process. Societal resilience can be described as a particular state of being that society can achieve by taking various precautions, for example by incorporating education on statehood matters in various education levels, both for schoolchildren and adults, and taking measures to ensure a strong and stable state governance that the society feels trust in as well as taking necessary steps to lower corruption on all decision-making levels and work towards achieving transparent governance. Yet, societal resilience can also be seen as a by-product of investments that the government as well public and private actors have made into the society (Jermalāvičius and Parmak, 2012), such as willingness to defend the state, patriotism, resilience during crisis, and resilience towards disinformation.

Table 1. Societal resilience.



While possessing these elements can characterise a resilient society, the list is neither exhaustive nor rigid. For example, the Finnish comprehensive defence concept uses the term “psychological resilience in crises” which incorporates in itself several

strategic targets, for example the safety of education and research capabilities that are deemed necessary to preserve essential educational knowledge. A target such as the aforementioned one is not included into the societal resilience structure put forward in Table 1 of this research due to it being a country-specific target that can generally be a characteristic of societal resilience in the framework of that particular country, illustrating that the list is not exhaustive and can be supplemented with other characteristics and targets, not necessarily country-specific.

As well, the opposite regarding characteristics of societal resilience put forward in Table 1 can also be argued to be true. A resilient society does not necessarily have to possess all of the mentioned characteristics or take the mentioned actions for it to be deemed resilient – resilience is not directly measurable. Although a lot can be found out through public opinion polls, societal resilience faces the ultimate test in the face of threat or crisis, and unless that happens, it is challenging to assess without a real-life situation at hand. While on several criteria a state may perform well, as well opinion polls may show readiness to defend the state and trust in the government and in the states' future, among other topics, upon a real-life situation the society can react differently than in hypothetical scenarios, also vice versa.

Having had elaborated upon what societal resilience is meant by in the framework of this study, the further chapters will deal with how societal resilience is incorporated within the Comprehensive state defence system of Latvia and understood by policy makers and researchers dealing with total defence issues in Latvia.

4. Research design and methodology

The present thesis is a case study of Latvia. The next chapters will deal exclusively with the question of the Comprehensive state defence system as the total defence concept is called in the context of Latvia. As laid out in this study, the key theoretical framework through which the assessment of the Comprehensive state defence system and the argumentation around it will be evaluated, is securitization theory. Through following the theoretical framework of securitization, this study is guided by the following research question:

1. Has there been an attempt to securitize societal resilience through implementing the Comprehensive state defence system in Latvia, and if so, what aspect of societal resilience is given prevalence and why?

The phenomenon of securitization of societal resilience in the Comprehensive state defence system of Latvia, the reasoning for adopting the system, and what aspect (or aspects) of it is emphasized, is examined in several steps. First, a content analysis of several primary sources is conducted. There are several main documents released to the general public that are directly concerning the Comprehensive state defence system, and overarching policy documents not derived from the new defence strategy: Informative report “Regarding implementing a comprehensive state defence system in Latvia” by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia (2018) and Informative report “Regarding progress in implementing a comprehensive state defence system” (2020); Law on State Security (2000) and specifically the amendments made to it in 2018, The National Security Concept (2015) and The National Security Concept (2019) explain the developments in expanding the scope of state security of Latvia and establishing a contextual pattern to what the state regards as being the most urgent and pressing challenges to state security.

To establish whether there has been an attempt to securitize, according to the Copenhagen school, the argument must follow a specific semantic structure: the language used in the argument is chosen so that an existential threat to the referent object is declared as needing to be paid special attention and this challenge to be solved. Therefore, documents produced by the legislation-drafting body in the sphere of defence, namely the

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia, offer insight into the specific formulation around the arguments used in proving the necessity of adopting a deterrence policy approach of Comprehensive state defence system, and implementing it in practice. Moreover, the documents reveal, in part, the argumentation around what policy makers have chosen to emphasize, due to which a need for a Comprehensive state defence system is uttered. In addition, more relevant contextual information surrounding the development of a national defence strategy is be offered.

Secondly, five semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected persons related in professional capacity to the Comprehensive state defence system. First, two officials of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia were interviewed: Vitālijs Rakstiņš, Director of the Crisis management department which the unit responsible for coordinating the creation and implementation of the comprehensive defence system; and Ilze Andžāne, Head of the Defence Policy and Strategy Section at the Defence policy department, a unit responsible for creating general policy orientation of state defence. These persons were selected to observe the structure of securitization theory, therefore to be able to identify whether the policy makers in this case can be regarded as securitizing actors that have both resources and capabilities to make a securitization attempt towards a referent object identified from the policy documents.

As well, two researchers from the Security and strategic research centre of the Latvian National defence academy were interviewed: Dr.sc.pol. Ieva Bērziņa, Senior Researcher, and Dr.sc.pol. Toms Rostoks, senior researcher. The interviewed researchers, especially Bērziņa, have been strongly involved into producing the academic research that is the basis of creation of the defence plan (Ministry of Defence, 2019). Although, according to securitization theory, researchers in this case cannot be regarded as securitizing actors since they are not legislators and have only the ability to “speak”, not to “act”. Nevertheless, their opinions are strongly taken into account within the framework of this case study, as they have been closely involved with the Ministry of Defence in the crafting of a Latvian total defence approach and by doing so, indirectly influenced the drafting of policy documents, and can therefore speak upon the underlying argumentation and assumptions they have had and employed into their work regarding the Comprehensive state defence system.

An additional researcher was interviewed from the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Dr.sc.pol. Māris Andžāns. To do so was suggested by one of the researchers from the Security and strategic research centre of the Latvian National defence academy, arguing their suggestion the following way: a researcher from the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, which is a think-tank independent from state and military budget (not the case with the Security and strategic research centre whose sole financing comes from the state military budget) and regularly conducts research on domestic and foreign policy issues, including security and defence, is able to express his opinions, be they more critical or praising, more freely regarding state defence plans or security than those working within the Latvian defence structures.

The interviews were carried out in Latvian, as the author of this thesis speaks Latvian and all of the interviewees speak Latvian as their main language, too. Even though, presumably, all of the interviewees speak English too, their working language, especially in regards to Latvian domestic policy, is Latvian, therefore it is more likely to receive accurate answers directly describing the information they work with on a daily basis. Previously drafted questions were used in conducting the interviews; the questions were sent to all interviewees in advance. The questions differed slightly, depending on whether the interviewee was a policy maker or a researcher¹. The rationale behind it was to tailor the interview in such a way that serves the most purpose in receiving wholesome answers about the interviewee's sphere of competence.

For example, policy makers were asked in what capacity their institution was involved in crafting the Comprehensive state defence system, and whether the drafting of a Comprehensive state defence system encountered circumventions from ordinary political process/legislative order (for example, mandating faster responses from other involved actors and institutions; no need to harmonise documents with other involved actors; right to assign obligatory tasks to other involved actors or institutions; an assigned specific task from Prime Minister or President) that would speak on the specific status or importance of the political document. That was done in order to both receive the unique perspective that only a policy maker from the Ministry of Defence possesses as the drafter of legislation and an institution that fully knows the motivation behind the creation of the Comprehensive state defence system, not only on behalf of their respective department

¹ Both interview questionnaires are available in Latvian and English in the Appendix.

but also the coordinated policy of the Minister and the State Secretary, therefore is well-versed to speak on it.

Among the questions that were asked solely to researchers, were the question of whether the interviewee has researched the topic of total defence, and what has been the input the interviewee has provided specifically to policy makers, or in general, in the crafting of the Comprehensive state defence system. Although two out of three researchers responded that they had not participated in the Latvian Comprehensive state defence system crafting, all had carried out some amount of research regarding total defence, and also were fully competent to answer the rest of the questions on total defence altogether, societal resilience, psychological defence and deterrence, and the challenges and threats they see that Latvia is faced with, which are nonetheless important in the framework of this research.

The vast majority of questions were asked identically to both policy makers and researchers. Among these questions were ones that asked for the interviewees' opinion on the importance of total defence in the framework of deterrence policy, how important do they find societal resilience matters, what type of threat do they see arising from a problematic and non-developed societal resilience, and whether they think that the need to develop societal resilience is the reason why Latvia is crafting a Comprehensive state defence system. As it can be observed, the questions are somewhat confining the interviewees to the structures of securitization theory: it was attempted to determine if either of the interviewees, especially policy makers, acknowledge a specific referent subject that is posing an existential threat to the referent object; also an attempt was made to discover whether the political and legislative process in this case was in some way unusual, identifying circumvention or violation of usual procedure.

The third part of the study deals with the media content surrounding the Comprehensive state defence system. This is done in order to determine what messages the possible securitizing actors have conveyed to the public through mass media channels, and what is the general media debate about the comprehensive state defence system. That will be done to evaluate how much activity there is in the media regarding the phenomenon, in order to establish to what extent the possible securitizing actors have made moves to influence the general public thought on the topic through media, and what is in fact the current public thought on the issue as portrayed in the media.

There are some limitations that need to be identified that can possibly be present in this research. First, this type of research allows for a large possible degree of subjectivity as the author is the sole person analysing and interpreting all sources of information: documents, interviews and media debate. The author has been aware of this degree of subjectivity at all times, nevertheless the replicability of this study is therefore problematized. Moreover, as the vast majority of documents on Latvian state defence, and more specifically, the Comprehensive state defence system, is in Latvian (with a few exceptions of documents that have been officially translated by the State language centre of Latvia), the author conducted all the translations, which can allow for subjective interpretation. A similar issue with translations can present itself regarding the interviews of policy makers and researchers in Latvian – all of the interviews were conducted in Latvian, but the information included in this study was translated into English. There can be some human error present in translation as well imprecise translation of colloquialisms or sayings. However, the author has aimed to preserve to the best of her ability both the general thought and the precise argumentation that was voiced in Latvian.

Another limitation regarding the interviews that needs to be identified is that the interviews were not completely rigid. All of the interviewees were up to elaborating and sharing their knowledge, and did not confine themselves to short answers. Even though all of the standard questions were always asked, often what the interviewee said prompted the author to ask follow-up questions which happened in an organic manner during the interview, which in turn allowed the speaker to reveal some more information that was indirectly useful for the present research². As a spoken-word semi-structured interview that allows for certain amount of leeway in its structure, this shortcoming is to be expected, however this needs to be identified as a possible limitation to the studies' replicability.

Finally, an unfortunate limitation this research encountered was that it was carried out during the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020. The pool of professionals that work with the questions of Comprehensive state defence system in Latvia is very narrow – there are two main policy makers and planners in the Ministry of Defence, and there is only one researcher involved in the drafting and participating in all the working groups. Even though there are more professionals in both the Ministry of Defence and other

² All of the interviews are recorded and transcribed into Latvian. Recordings and transcriptions are made available upon request.

governmental institutions that are either directly or indirectly involved in some capacity in the work regarding the Comprehensive state defence system concept and ideally the author would have wanted to interview them, the potential interviewees either did not respond to the requests to be interviewed, presumably because of unavailability, or had to decline due to an increasingly large amount of work because of COVID-19. If this research was to be conducted again after the end of the pandemic, it can be assumed that there could be more interviews gathered from involved persons.

5. Latvia's Comprehensive state defence system and societal resilience

1.1.5.1. Comprehensive state defence system – a new part of Latvian deterrence policy

As the study aims to provide all relevant information regarding the Comprehensive state defence system of Latvia, the reader will now be introduced with the main chronological developments on its implementation. As well, this part of study will present other major documents adopted during this time that are relevant in the context of the changing thought about security and defence reflected by the actions of policymakers.

The idea of adopting a Comprehensive state defence system in Latvia arose for the Ministry of Defence as a reaction to the 2014 war in Ukraine, albeit with a significant delay since it was first incorporated into legislation in 2016, namely the adoption of the State defence concept. According to Vitālijs Rakstiņš, Head of Crisis management department at the Ministry of Defence, an internal (ministry-wide) and military sector analysis was conducted, which resulted in a formal process of drafting the concept of a Comprehensive state defence system. Researchers were consulted, in particular Dr.sc.pol. Ieva Bērziņa, who synthesized the available academic literature on the topic of total defence and the good practice examples of other states, especially those neighbouring Latvia, and produced academic literature to be handed to policy makers to have a political science basis for crafting the Comprehensive state defence strategy and its main principles.

Moves on implementation of a total defence approach that could be observed publicly by the general society started in 2018, when the State Secretaries meeting was introduced with the Informative report "Regarding the adoption of a comprehensive state defence system in Latvia" prepared by the Ministry of Defence. According to the Informative report (2018), the State defence concept which was adopted in 2016 first laid out the duties that the state has in relation to a state defence system. Although there was already a State defence concept in place from the year 2003, due to the changed geopolitical environment and the hostility of Russia in Ukraine (State defence concept, 2016) there was apparently need to reassess the changed circumstances and current defence capabilities of Latvia.

The Informative report of 2018 includes an objective to be achieved by adopting the Comprehensive state defence system: to summarize, its purpose is to increase the willingness of society to defend the state as well as ensure that the state is prepared for crisis situations, including maintaining the essential state functions such as a working government, energy sector, healthcare, state economy and vital infrastructure, psychological resilience, maintaining of foreign relations and defence capabilities.

To achieve this marked objective, the Ministry of Defence created specific implementation plans for short-term, mid-term and long-term, which were elaborated upon in the Informative report “Regarding the adoption of a comprehensive state defence system in Latvia” (2018) assessed in 2019 by the Cabinet of Ministers. The Comprehensive state defence system therefore is not static and it cannot be said that it is already adopted. Rather, it is a continuous and ever-evolving process that results from viewing state defence holistically and every actor fulfilling their assigned role both currently and for the years to come. There are, nevertheless, various palpable objectives to be achieved, the majority of which are in relation to the strengthening of state military capabilities, among which the role of society is emphasized, as every private citizen and institution is expected to take their part in resisting an attack and participating in a resistance movement in case one is ever needed. The Informative report of 2018 outlined the major principles of the Comprehensive state defence system, its objectives, tasks and expected results, as well as concrete steps to gradually implementing the system.

In 2020, another Informative report “On the progress of implementation of the comprehensive state defence system” was presented to the Cabinet of Ministers. As the title suggests, the report gave an overview on the achieved progress in implementing the state defence system, what actions have been taken by both the institution coordinating the implementation, the Ministry of Defence, and what has been the involvement and specific actions taken by other involved actors such as governmental and non-governmental institutions. There were several main tasks that the Informative report highlighted: the creation of a Working group that consists of all members of the Cabinet of Ministers (except the Prime Minister) and the director of the State Chancellery; improved understanding of ministries about the principles of comprehensive state defence; each ministry carrying out a board game exercise for working during crisis or war; all ministries carrying out evaluations regarding implementing the Comprehensive

state defence system in their spheres of competence; for the first time, the annual exercise for overcoming threats to state “KRISTAPS” welcomed members of the private sector; and finally, introducing statehood education in schools to schoolchildren and to the general society.

There are several other documents that are connected to the concept of Comprehensive state security system. First of all, as it was highlighted by Ieva Andžāne, Head of the Defence Policy and Strategy Section at the Defence policy department at the Ministry of Defence, the National Security Concept of 2019, a document reworked with every incoming government and remaining in force for the working term of it, for the first time included as one of its main priorities the implementation of the Comprehensive state defence system. It was marked by the policymaker Andžāne as a significant step. The documents’ main purpose is to outline the current security situation in the state and reflect on the states’ main threats, and provide overarching recommendations for policy planning in the rest of policy areas and especially in the area of national security. The National Security concept of 2015 did not mention anything connected to the Comprehensive state defence system, mainly because apparently this specific type of deterrence mechanism had not crossed the minds of policymakers. Moreover, the National Security concept of 2015 does not mark as any of its priorities the engagement of wider society into state defence activities; from the document it is to be understood that in 2015, state defence is still understood in more narrow terms of military capabilities, strengthening the work of institutions working with topics relating to national defence, and the likes.

In 2018, another development in legislation happened: there were several amendments made to the Law on National Security. The amendments include a new provision on Comprehensive state defence system; it is quite ambiguous still and allows for this concept to be developed. Also, the amendment includes a new provision which lays out the rights and duties of the general society during war or a military invasion. While the duties are to abide the tasks set out by the National defence, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter – NATO) or the European Union military forces and to not cooperate with the enemy force, the rights include showing civic resistance, including armed resistance, and to show all types of support to the official military structures that carry out the duties of ensuring the safety of the Latvian country.

1.2. 5.2. Securitizing societal resilience

The reader has been introduced to the chronological developments of the Comprehensive state defence system, as well as the context regarding other major national security legislation surrounding the creation and implementation of the new principles of state defence, therefore now a synthesis of all the analysed information will be offered to answer the main research question that is guiding this study.

As securitization theory is the main theoretical framework that aids to view the Comprehensive state defence system through a theoretical lens, several key units of analysis are used to establish whether this shift on thinking security in Latvia can be regarded as a case of securitization. As illustrated in Table 2 (see below), this Latvian case fits the particular structure of securitization theory units of analysis.

Table 2. Units of analysis in securitization theory.

| Unit of analysis | Comprehensive state defence case |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Referent object | Latvia |
| Securitizing actor | Ministry of Defence, Minister of Defence |
| Referent subject | Russia |
| Functional actor | NATO |
| Adoption of concrete policies (yes/no) | Yes |

According to the analysed documents and interviews, there is no other referent object present than the state of Latvia. According to Buzan et al. (1998), threats can arise in various sectors of statehood such as military, political, economic and others. If a threat in the military sector is posed toward the state, the referent object according to the authors is nearly always the state itself, which is also the case here. Neither the documents nor the interviewees mention any other possible threatened party; it was not mentioned that any narrower part of statehood is threatened in particular. As the nature of the threat as it is perceived and construed by Latvian policy makers allows the threat only to be

understood as posed to the whole Latvian state by targeting the whole existence and sovereignty of the state, the referent object unit of analysis is logical. While the structure of the argument present in this study of societal resilience being securitized may be misleading as to stipulate that societal resilience is the referent object that is threatened, this is not the case, as societal resilience is to be achieved as a solution to the existential threat that is perceived to be posed to Latvia, therefore it may be regarded as a part or result of an adopted policy, and also the lack of it is argued to be the reason why Latvia may be prone to existential threats, however that will be elaborated upon later in this part of research.

As regards the securitizing actor, the case might not be as obvious, but also is not very puzzling. As the legislative process of the Latvian state is so that the initiators and the driving force of the policy documents, legislation and amendments to it are ministries under whose specific provision the issues are, the securitizing actor in this case can be either the Ministry of Defence or the Minister of Defence. While it may seem like the two are equal and should not be differentiated between, following the media debate surrounding the Comprehensive state defence system and its implementation showed that this concept has outlived a change of minister. Raimonds Bergmanis was Minister of Defence from 2015 – 2019, and since the first initiatives regarding adopting a total defence approach arose around 2016, it was before the time of current Minister of Defence Artis Pabriks, who has been serving from 2019. Governmental institutions can possess a good institutional memory and carry out a successful knowledge transfer when governmental structures can carry on developing and implementing certain legislations even though ministers change, given that the officials in charge of policies remain in office, unless that specific governmental constellation initiates very large changes to policy direction. Evidently this has not been the case here. Moreover, the policymakers were asked a question during the interviews on whether their institution is the sole policymaker within drafting and implementing of the Comprehensive state defence system, and the answer was affirming, that the Ministry of Defence is the sole coordinator of the effort and drafts the according legislation. Therefore, it can be argued that the securitizing actor is the Ministry itself, not the person fulfilling the role of Minister of Defence.

To continue, the referent subject in this case is Russia. While the author initially expected that the Comprehensive state defence system would be instated as an “umbrella” policy, covering all and any threats that are currently posed to Latvia without mentioning any one specific threat, this is not entirely the case. The logical build and coherence of all available national defence policy documents follow the same argumentation and emphasize Russia’s activities in the international realm and towards Latvia specifically as being both threatening both at the present, and possibly in the future, but to a much more severe degree.

To give an illustrative example, the Informative report “Regarding the implementation of the Comprehensive state defence system in Latvia” refers to Russia’s current foreign policy being aggressive and creating serious security risks for the whole Europe. The argument is strategically placed in the very start of the document, in that way preparing the reader to understand that whatever solutions are offered in the rest of the document is a response to the articulated threat of Russia. The National Security concept of 2019, which is, as previously explained, one of the most important documents influencing national security policy direction for the upcoming years while that particular government is in place, mentions Russia 66 times; to put in perspective, the word “hybrid” that is used in contexts of hybrid threats and hybrid war is uttered 12 times, “terrorism” – 62 times, “migration” – 5 times, and “radicalization” – 13 times. Evidently no issue is perceived by Latvia as more pressing and threatening than Russia. The part where the Russian threat is most elaborated upon is the Chapter 3, Changes in the international security environment that influence Latvian national security, where the first two most pressing threats are called out to be hybrid threats and Russian foreign policy activities which is a direct military threat to Latvia’s security. Also, in an informative seminar on Comprehensive state defence system on 22.02.2019. led by Vitālijs Rakstiņš and Ieva Bērziņa that the author attended, Russia was constantly uttered as the main security threat.

This claim is also supported by argumentation revealed in the interviews with the Latvian security researchers and policy makers. On the same question of main reasons why Latvia should implement total defence principles as part of its deterrence policy, Toms Rostoks immediately invokes the argument of Latvia having very limited military capabilities that would not be enough to defend Latvia in case of a Russian military attack; Ieva Bērziņa stipulates that the whole idea of Latvia adopting total defence principles

stemmed from Russia's war against Ukraine, and argues that the main reasons for Latvia to adopt total defence principles is its geographical location (relating to Russia) and Latvia's neighbouring state, Russia; Māris Andžāns replies to the same question with claiming that the main reason is Latvia's external security environment and Russia as its main wide spectrum threat source. Policy makers Vitālijs Rakstiņš and Ieva Andžāne also refer to the change in security policy direction of the state stemming directly from the events in Ukraine in 2014, and while not directly referring to Russia in their interviews, they base their arguments upon the aforementioned policy documents.

The Copenhagen school also suggests cases of securitization can have functional actors that are neither referent objects nor securitizing actors, but have the capability of greatly distorting the security dynamic of the particular case. Therefore, the author looked at possible actors complying with this definition in this case, and suggests that a functional actor in this case could be NATO. While a lot of the security guarantees that Latvia possesses stem from it being part of this particular collective security constellation, total defence strategies according to Bērziņa (2019) are widely employed as deterrence mechanisms in Europe especially because of the fact that employing comprehensive defence principles is compatible with being part of collective defence structures. Rostoks provides an illustrative example to the interplay NATO membership and Latvia adopting a Comprehensive state defence system has:

“If a military conflict arises with Russia, the most likely scenario is that Russia at least partly achieves its political and military goals here in Latvia, and afterwards NATO forces work to “push” Russia out. We are acknowledging the fact that there will not be several brigades or divisions of NATO soldiers here on the spot that will defend us; therefore, there will be a certain amount of time, be it several days or weeks, when the result of the situation will be completely unclear. The society will have a reason to leave Latvia, simply to run. The objective [of the comprehensive state defence policy] is that it does not happen, thereby giving an opportunity to our NATO allies to help us. I assume that NATO allies would find it peculiar, going towards the Baltic states, that they would encounter hundreds of thousands of people flocking towards Poland. If we will be united

and consolidated, and 100% sure that we have to defend our country, it will make the choices of our NATO allies much easier.³ (Rostoks. 2020)”

Therefore it can be stipulated that even though NATO membership already provides security guarantees through its collective defence capabilities, adopting Comprehensive state defence principles does not conflict with the existing defence mechanisms, including being part of NATO’s collective security structure, but rather focuses on developing Latvia’s own deterrence and defence capabilities and resilience building in anticipated crises and military conflict situations thereby multiplying Latvia’s defence capabilities, regardless of being part of security collectives.

To assess whether a securitization attempt has been made, it is suggested by Buzan et al. (1998) to view whether the adoption of concrete policies has been made. In the present case of Latvia, one can argue with confidence that concrete policies have been codified in form of law and/or other documents bearing legal power, such as the Law on State Security and the amendments made to it, and the two Informative reports that essentially implement the Comprehensive state defence system and report on its implementation process; judging by the documents, progress is being achieved.

Moreover, there are several other implemented actions or policies that have been introduced as a direct result from the documents related to the Comprehensive state defence policy: the Informative report “Regarding progress in implementing a comprehensive state defence system” (2020) reveals several new measures that have been implemented. There were several measures that were highlighted as being most profound and important, and illustrating the progress of the policy implementation. First, creation of a working group gathering all ministers of the Latvian government except for the Prime minister, and the Director of the State Chancellery is highlighted. The core task of this

³ “Tas izskaidrojums ir tāds, ka NATO klātbūtne šeit ir tāda, ka ja sākas militārs konflikts ar Krieviju, tad visticamāk Krievija no sākuma šeit puslīdz sasniedz savus politiskos un militāros mērķus, un tad NATO mēģina Krieviju izspiest ārā no šejienes. Līdz ar to mēs rēķināmies ar to, ka šeit uz vietas nebūs vairākas brigādes vai divīzijas ar NATO karavīriem, kuri mūs aizsargās, tāpēc būs kaut kāds brīdis, tās var būt dažas dienas, tās var būt dažas nedēļas, kad iznākums būs ļoti, ļoti neskaidrs, ka cilvēkiem būs stimuls doties projām no šejienes, vienkārši bēgt. Mērķis ir panākt, lai tas nenotiek. Tādējādi arī dodot iespēju, pamatojumu mūsu NATO sabiedrotajiem mums palīdzēt. Jo es pieņemu, ka no NATO sabiedroto puses būtu dīvaini skatīties uz to, ka viņi dodas virzienā uz Baltijas valstīm un vairāki simti tūkstoši cilvēku dodās Polijas virzienā. Ja mēs būsim saliedēti, vienoti un 100% pārliecināti par to, ka mums ir jāaizstāv sava valsts, tad tas padarīs izvēles arī vienkāršākas mūsu NATO sabiedrotajiem.”, Toms Rostoks. Quote translated from Latvian by the author.

working group is to ensure the implementation of the Comprehensive state defence system at the highest decision-making level, and to also give strategic guidelines for the implementation of the defence system and coordination of taken actions throughout all government sectors. Also, each ministry was given a task to carry out exercises in form of “war games” on the strategy that were to be implemented in its work during crisis or war. All ministries were to conduct thorough evaluations regarding implementing the Comprehensive state defence system in their spheres of competence, what responsibilities the respective ministries would undertake in the implementation of the new total defence principles. There was a larger spectrum of participants than usual in the annual exercise for overcoming threats to state “KRISTAPS”, and the participants represented different sectors in addition to the governmental sector, such as private businesses and non-governmental organizations. Schools and schoolchildren were introduced to education on statehood matters, there were summer camps organized, and school staff in all regions of Latvia were educated on comprehensive defence matters in the framework of informative seminars. There was also a crisis exercise specifically catered to the representatives of the finance sector. Therefore, the securitization attempt can be deemed to have had a actual policy impact.

The scholars of the Copenhagen school have argued that while there are several key units of analysis to be used in assessing securitization attempts, the main way to study securitizing moves is to study it directly, taking it at its face value, evaluating the rhetoric used when speaking of the particular issue, and assessing what potential resonance this type of argument could make. Regarding the structure of the argumentation and wording used by policymakers in surrounding the Comprehensive state defence policy, it can be argued that the specific language structure used by policymakers around the issues of the total defence concepts and societal resilience in general can be assessed as pressing and emphasizing the severity of the threatening situation. The main policy documents, National Security concept and the Informative report that opened up the discussion about Comprehensive state defence system, both use the same sentence:

“[...] the level of threat to Latvia has reached such level of complexity that national defence using only military means is not sufficient anymore because it does not encompass all aspects of hybrid threats.” (National Security concept, 2019; Informative

report “Regarding implementing a comprehensive state defence system in Latvia” by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia, 2018).

It is said in the report that hybrid threats are posing increasingly more novel challenges towards statehood spheres such as information technologies and the cyber domain, functioning of civic society and others. The argumentation that the reader can observe in this particular quote reveals the message that policymakers are sending through the documents: what the state is currently doing in terms of defence is not sufficient to tackle the threats currently posed to Latvia and that can result in grave dangers to the Latvian state in general, therefore there are new measures that need to be taken in order to successfully deter those threats. Therefore, it can be observed that policy makers are using argument structures that claim a presence of an existential threat, which in turn point to the presence of securitization.

Thereby this study has determined that the securitization theory structure has been followed, and it has been established that there has been an attempt made to securitize the need for societal resilience by positioning the lack of it as opening the door to security threats from Russia, an actor that has already exhibited hostility towards the Latvian state. Nevertheless, as this study aims as its research question to examine what aspect (or aspects) of societal resilience have been emphasized to the general public in this process of securitization, the arguments of policymakers and researchers voiced in the interviews and elsewhere, as well as the surrounding media debate need to be explored.


It is now necessary to refer back to Table 1 of this study that outlined what exactly is meant by societal resilience within the framework of this research. For the convenience of the reader, the table is offered here again (see next page). The Informative reports on the Comprehensive state defence system offer examples of policy directions that are set out to form the framework of a comprehensive state defence, which are the following:

2. Development of military capabilities and improving of strategy;
3. Fostering of cooperation between the private and public sector regarding national defence;
4. Educating on matters of statehood in Latvian schools, and education of society;
5. Civil defence and catastrophe management;
6. Psychological defence;

7. Strategic communication;
8. Resilience of economy against crises;
9. Strengthening of law enforcement and security agencies;
10. Cyber defence, et cetera.

It is important to review this list taking by looking at it through the lens of societal resilience and its components. What one can immediately observe from the examples of comprehensive state defence is the many examples of societal resilience: fostering of cooperation between different public and private actors, thereby encouraging all entities, be it public or private, to take part in state defence; education on matters regarding statehood starting from early age; psychological defence; strategic communication and cyber defence. Since the list is deliberately left non-exhaustive, there may be more examples of societal resilience that the state aims to strengthen and develop.

Table 1. Societal resilience.



The Informative report of 2020 produced by the Ministry of Defence provides an explanation over what the main aim of adopting a comprehensive state defence framework is for the Ministry of Defence, which is to ensure the participation of all society members into planning for crisis, since the end aim of the Comprehensive state defence system is to confirm that every institution, business, household and individual knows his role and necessary actions to be taken in the case of crisis and war (Ministry of Defence, 2020). It is one of the aims mentioned within the framework of societal resilience: to be able to engage as many society members in state defence as possible in every possible capacity is not only beneficial in palpable terms, meaning more resistors in case of war and practical help towards the professional military, but to also, in result, ensure that every person participates in state defence in any possible way, therefore feels a sense of agency towards the defending of their state, and is less likely to abandon it in case of crisis.

To illustrate this point, Vitālijs Rakstiņš told in the interview conducted with him that at the start of 2020 the Ministry of Defence managed to invite archbishops and other prominent figures of the church to speak about the Comprehensive state defence system and the role that the church has in state defence. In the seminar led by the Ministry of Defence in 22.02.2019. regarding Comprehensive state defence system dedicated to governmental institutions, Rakstiņš argued that the church, and religion in general, can give solace and peace to people both in peace times and in times of crisis, therefore its role is not to be underestimated. The policymakers at the Ministry of Defence, according to Rakstiņš, have aimed to cover all actors potentially participating in state defence: in the largest state defence exercises, the largest commerce businesses, such as representatives from the energy, banking and telecommunications sector, businesses ensuring natural gas supply to the state, along with non-governmental organizations and other actors.

The interviews with other policymakers and researchers reveal various different argumentations about how the specialists working on questions of total defence view the necessity to bring societal resilience to the forefront and actively develop it. Māris Andžāns critically argues that the Latvian cohesion policy as part of psychological defence along with media politics, seemingly being under the provision of the information dimension of societal resilience, has been failing, and these are the most urgent aspects

that need to be worked on and developed to achieve societal resilience in terms of state defence. Andžāns arguments his claim by saying that it is of utmost importance for people living in Latvia to have fundamental consensus about major security issues, which, he deems, is not necessarily the case. He remarks that societal cohesion questions and questions of divided information space have always been perceived as rather touchy; it has been thought best not to “touch” these issues of an incoherent, divided society, that everything would, in time, improve and be alright due to changing of generations, but that has apparently not been the case. Andžāns regards psychological and information dimensions of comprehensive state defence to be of most importance to Latvia as a small state needing to employ all tools that it has in its provision, and to improve them, he argues, would, in turn, lessen security risks posed to Latvia by Russia.

Toms Rostoks provides a slightly different perspective. He finds it logical that due to Latvia having limited military capabilities, the state would want larger rates of participation in state defence based on the principles of volunteerism. Latvia, he argues, needs its inhabitants to be better equipped to fight the disinformation emerging from Russia or other sources. If the Baltic societies would be resilient and sent a message to Russia that they definitely do not want to be a part of it, Rostoks stipulates, then most likely Russia would not want to violently incorporate those 6 million people into its territory, thereby it would become a good strategy of deterrence.

He also informs about unofficial information that he has received about Russia making public thought polls in territories that it might have some interest in, that such polls had been conducted in Eastern Ukraine, and that such polls might have also been made in Latgale, the Eastern-most region of Latvia closest to Russia. If these opinion polls, were they real and had they happened, were to show the society in Latgale or in Latvia in general as being patriotic and willing to defend its state by all means, the message sent to whoever might have requested such a poll would be that this might not be a successful territory to venture into, Rostoks argues. In any case, he says, he is not sure about the particular effect societal resilience and its different dimensions have on deterrence of threats, mostly because Latvia does not know how the adversary thinks about it. Nevertheless, in his opinion there are only good effects that can come out of adopting policies that improve Latvia’s societal resilience: better coordination between state institutions so that all ministries are responsible for questions of state defence; better

cooperation and trust mechanisms between the state and society as that is stipulated to be a large problem in Latvia; private business sector equipped for times of crisis, and other benefits.

Ieva Bērziņa, the main researcher providing academic information for the policy makers working with the Comprehensive state defence system, argues that successful deterrence policy starts with the societies' attitude towards its country, and the society willing to protect it in case of threat or war in whatever shape or form; the most relevant aspect of societal resilience, argues Bērziņa, is the thinking and attitude towards the country, and the strong wish for the country to be saved and preserved. She stipulates that successfully functioning psychological defence mechanisms are of the utmost importance: in case of Latvia having to defend itself against a much bigger and powerful adversary, participating in resistance would mean immense casualties, which mean that the society members would quite literally have to be ready to give up their lives in order to protect their country. To add, Bērziņa and Zupa (2020) in their research regarding the will to defend the country have established that only 31% of Latvian inhabitants would defend the country with weapons – however, upon conducting in-depth interviews, pacifist motivations against weaponry were uncovered, even though the interviewees would be determined to defend their country by all other means, by this illustrating that such statistics regarding the will to defend state and patriotism can be problematic taken at face-value.

Among other aspects that are problematic within the Latvian society in the framework of state defence, Bērziņa also emphasizes in her interview the problematic of opinion polarization depending on the language used in family settings, either Latvian or Russian – while there are questions on which there is consensus among both language groups, there are many questions, especially regarding state defence, where both language groups have distinctly differing opinions, which is not wrong in a democratic society per se, but she observes completely different world views and information intake channels, which is magnified on purpose by the activities carried out by the Kremlin. Bērziņa argues that for the Comprehensive state defence system to work properly, the society should be cohesive.

Ilze Andžāne, however, does not emphasize one dimension of the Comprehensive state security system over any other. She argues instead that to achieve psychological

resilience, a successful cooperation between various actors, especially government agencies, is crucial, therefore invoking again the argument of all possible actors having their role in state defence. It is also remarked by her that especially during peace times, the state should work towards developing the societies' will to defend the state. Andžāne also stipulates that an underdeveloped psychological dimension of the Comprehensive state defence system poses a threat in the framework of challenges posed in the information space, since she argues that it is very closely linked with the norms and values of society, civic engagement and understanding about security processes in the world, internationally or locally.

To supplement the discussion by various experts in this chapter, the author explored the media debate surrounding the issue of a Comprehensive state defence system being implemented in Latvia. As observed, the discussion going on in the media is rather informative and explanatory over new measures that have been introduced, and has not caused large waves of controversy around the newly implemented Comprehensive state defence system. This could also be explained by the fact that the Informative reports on the Comprehensive state defence system have only been presented and discussed in the Cabinet of Ministers and not Saeima. There is only one article that gives insight on the positions of parties towards the Comprehensive state defence system: thoughts vary and not all of the parties are completely behind the idea. Two parties, Saskaņa and Zaļo un zemnieku savienība are against the necessity to implement the new defence principles without providing an elaborate argumentation (Ia.lv, 2018).

Most of the articles regarding the new Comprehensive defence system report on the newest developments and do explanatory work over what it is (Ism.lv, 2019, lvportals.lv, 2020, delfi.lv, 2020). There are several news articles from regional media, mainly also doing explanatory work and reporting on their regional schools participating in the activities offered by the Ministry of Defence (eliesma.lv, 2019, bauskaszive.lv, 2018, jaunpvsk.lv, 2019). It is also apparent from the media publications that the Ministry of Defence, and more specifically its Minister of Defence Artis Pabriks, has done a large amount of explanatory work to educate the society regarding the new defence principles: when there is an article referring to some new development or task to be carried out, there is always a quote or video from a press conference or an interview added by Pabriks.

In one of the opinion pieces, however, Pabriks avoids the question of whether all Latvian society members are loyal enough to participate in state defence, to which he responds by arguing that only military structures are the sole professionals in state defence and people will have no choice but to trust them (Ism, 2019), suggesting that this is still a touchy subject which the Ministry of Defence would rather avoid if it can. Another very recent article where Pabriks is quoted is a recent one regarding the COVID-19 pandemic where he argues that the present crisis again reiterates the need for a comprehensive approach to defence. While maintaining the successful functioning of critical infrastructure is essential in such cases, Pabriks claims that a crisis like the present requires the involvement of each and every member of the society while also averting cyber threats of disinformation, maintaining critical medical supplies and logistics channels and maintaining the working functions of large commerce businesses (lvportals, 2020, sargs.lv, 2020).

The Latvian diaspora is also informed about the new developments in defence policy via its main information channels, such as Latviesi.com: the particular article refers to a public polling research regarding state defence matters and trust towards government agencies. The article is neither critical nor providing praise, simply referring to the research and, in the end, adding that the implementation of the Comprehensive state defence system will not be a short-term effort, rather its successful implementation will be dependent on a deeper societal transformation process that asks of participation of all citizens (latviesi.com, 2020).

There have also been several opinion pieces published in the digital media that speak critically on the newly adopted defence principles: Edvīns Šnore, member of Saeima, member of the National Alliance party, refers to newly produced research in the United States which argues that the Baltic states have weak military defence capabilities. He refers to experts that have expressed distrust in NATO's capabilities to implement the promised defence capabilities in all 29 member states. Šnore criticizes the idea of a Comprehensive state defence approach in Latvia, quote, "if the majority of men have never held a weapon in their hands" (Edvīns Šnore, 2019), and he would seem more content with the Latvian defence policy if Latvia followed the examples of its neighbouring Baltic states and reinstated mandatory conscription.

There are other critical opinions expressed about the newest developments in defence policy, for example originating from the Russian sites such as sputniknews.lv and rt.com. Mainly opinion pieces have been written about the National security concept of 2019; among the most illustrative sentiments the reader can find information that Latvia is perpetually fighting the so-called Russian spies, and by accepting the new security concept the “spy mania has gained an official name to further supplement the existing Russophobia. Obviously, within the reality of the Latvian government institutions, no other threats exist (sputniknews.lv, 2019)”. Another marginal opinion is voiced by Aivars Lembergs, one of the so-called Latvian “oligarchs” and Head of City council of Ventspils, who has voiced criticism over engaging all citizens in state defence, building shelters and spending resources on it; he also finds it peculiar that it has consistently been said that Latvia does not face any threats but the Comprehensive state defence system prepares the Latvian society and all other sectors against a real war situation (ventspils.lv, 2018).

It has been shown that the media debate on the topic of Comprehensive state defence system, albeit limited, is not homogenous. The majority of articles found are purely informative and refer to the information produced by the Ministry of Defence, but there are also several marginal articles providing criticism over the new defence concept, mainly coming from sources used to produce and perpetuate Russian disinformation.

6. Discussing the findings and conclusion

6.1. Main findings

Upon examination of the arguments and opinions surrounding societal resilience within the conceptual framework of the Comprehensive state defence system, there are several conclusions that the author has arrived to. The conclusions will now be presented to the reader.

First of all, by following the theoretical structure of securitization theory set out by Buzan et al. (1998), the author has arrived to an unambiguous conclusion that the present case of societal resilience has, indeed, been an attempt of securitization. The key units of analysis match the structure of the argument when applied to this case, and an existential threat to the referent object, namely Latvia, has been uttered by the securitizing actors, in this case the Ministry of Defence along with the current (and past) Minister of Defence. The structure of the argument therefore contains urgency and the uttering of an existential threat that begs for new policies and change in policy to be adapted, which, according to the Copenhagen school, is a securitizing move.

The further question of which aspects of societal resilience have been emphasized more in terms of necessity to implement was also assessed, however different types of information sources produced different answers. The analysis of documents in terms of societal resilience and the aspects that have been emphasized in its framework or given more salience was rather unambiguous. Informative report “Regarding progress in implementing a comprehensive state defence system” (2020) by the Ministry of Defence provides an explanation very similar to what has been voiced by representatives of the Ministry, including Minister himself, over what the main aim of adopting total defence principles and applying it to national defence policy is, which is to ensure the participation of all society members into planning for crisis, since the end aim of the Comprehensive state defence system is to confirm that every institution, business, household and individual knows his role and necessary actions to be taken in the case of crisis and war (Ministry of Defence, 2020). It is, according to Table 1 put forward by the author, one of the aims of the framework of societal resilience: to be able to engage as many members of society in defence activities as possible, and to do so with every civilian in every

possible capacity. Another conclusion that the author arrived at is that it is not only beneficial in palpable terms, meaning more non-peaceful participants in case of active warfare and practical help given to official military units, but it also, in result, ensures that every member of society is willing to participate and participates in defending their state in any way possible, and is less likely to flee without trying to defend their homeland. The aforementioned is also the response to the research question posed to this research, as this particular research path has allowed the author to arrive at this conclusion. Since this study follows closely the structures of securitization theory, securitizing actors are deemed those who have the capability of claiming something an existential threat, or in this case, assign particular importance to an element of societal resilience.

It was not suspected by the author, but even though all of the interviewees work in the sphere of defence and operate upon the same academic and practical knowledge, as well as the same policy planning documents, their assessments towards societal resilience and its components were not that unanimous among all the interviewees. A rift was also evident in the answers of policy makers versus researchers. While the researchers heavily emphasize throughout all three interviews the divided information space, insufficient society cohesion achieved in Latvian society and the low levels of trust of society towards the government and parliament, policymakers make no such remarks and instead focus on including each member of society, among them private citizens, large businesses, businesses working with elements of critical infrastructure, non-governmental organizations and other government institutions, in state defence, especially in messages conveyed through the documents, for example the Informative reports of 2018, 2019 and 2020. Even though in the interviews, and in the seminar the author had the chance to attend, policymakers emphasize societal cohesion and trust towards the government and its structures, the documents obviously give salience to civic engagement into defence affairs and the will to defend the state.

Even more so, the media debate and the messages circulated around the media environment are also not unanimous. While speaking on the topics of total defence, Minister of Defence Artis Pabriks sometimes emphasizes the civil defence dimension, in other times, principles of volunteerism and the importance of letting the society exercise their free will in the defence of state. However, a major conclusion from following the media debate is that the Ministry of Defence, and especially the Minister of Defence has

invested a lot of work in explaining the principles of total defence, and in Latvia's case, the Comprehensive state defence system, to the society, including in schools, seminars both in larger cities and further regions of Latvia, so that all society members understand what Comprehensive state defence is, what their respective role into keeping their homeland safe is, and that they are important, even vital, to state security.

6.2. Conclusions

The present thesis is a case study of securitization of societal resilience in the framework of Latvian Comprehensive state defence system. The theoretical concept mainly employed in this case was securitization theory by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, also known as the Copenhagen School. The theoretical part offered the reader a literature review on the main concepts within this study, namely security and securitization theory, total defence principles and societal resilience. The empirical part of this research studied societal resilience within the framework of the Comprehensive state defence system of Latvia, and examined which aspects of societal resilience are given salience in wording structures of policy documents, interviews with policymakers and the media debate.

The research was guided by the following research question:

Has there been an attempt to securitize societal resilience through implementing the Comprehensive state defence system in Latvia, and if so, what aspect of societal resilience is given prevalence and why?

Through this research the author arrived at a conclusive answer: there has, indeed, been an attempt to securitize societal resilience through implementing the Comprehensive state defence system in Latvia. The aspect of societal resilience that is given prevalence according to policymakers is ensuring engagement of a wide spectrum of private and public actors in state defence, including non-governmental organizations, businesses working with elements of critical infrastructure, governmental institutions, and others. By emphasizing this aspect of societal resilience, it, in turn, ensures that every member of society is willing to participate and actually participates in defending their state in any way possible, and is less likely to flee without trying to defend their homeland, thereby

achieving another societal resilience objective, which is the willingness of society members to defend the state.

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Appendix

I Interview questions for policy makers (in Latvian)

1. Vārds, uzvārds:
2. Ieņemamais amats, pārstāvētā institūcija:
3. Vai Jūsu pārstāvētā institūcija nodarbojas ar politikas plānošanu un izstrādi saistībā ar Visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmu?
4. Vai esat ticis iesaistīts darbā pie Visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas koncepcijas izstrādes? Kādā kapacitātē?
5. Lūdzu, pastāstiet sīkāk, kāds ir bijis Visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas izstrādes process.
 - 5.1. Cik lielā mērā Jūsu institūcija ir iesaistīta?
 - 5.2. Cik lielā mērā citas valsts pārvaldes iestādes (vai citas institūcijas) ir bijušas iesaistītas? Kāda ir to loma?
 - 5.3. Kāda ir bijusi Visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas izstrādes hronoloģiskā gaita?
6. Vai Visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas izstrādes gaitā ir notikusi novirzīšanās no ierastās politikas plānošanas/likumdošanas kārtības (piemēram, tiesības pieprasīt ātrākas atbildes no citām iesaistītajām institūcijām; nav bijis jāsaskaņo izstrādātais ar citām iesaistītajām pusēm; tiesības uzlikt citām iestādēm obligāti izpildāmus pienākumus sistēmas ietvaros; saņemts uzdevums no Ministru prezidenta vai Valsts prezidenta; citi), kas liecinātu par politikas dokumenta īpašu statusu un svarīgumu?
7. Cik lielā mērā Visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas izstrādes gaitā tika veiktas konsultācijas ar pētniekiem?
8. Jūsaprāt, kas ir galvenie iemesli nepieciešamībai Latvijas gadījumā kā atturēšanas politikas instrumentu ieviest visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības principus?
9. Jūsaprāt, vai ir kāda vissvarīgākā no četrām visaptverošas aizsardzības dimensijām – militārā, civilā, informācijas, psiholoģiskā – valsts aizsardzības kontekstā? Ja jā, kura? Kādēļ?
10. Jūsaprāt, vai ir svarīgi sekmīgi darbojošies sabiedrības noturības (tai skaitā savstarpējās uzticības un saliedētības veicināšana sabiedrībā un attiecībās starp sabiedrību/indivīdu un valsti, noturībspēja krīzes apstākļos un gatavība aizstāvēt valsti) mehānismi valsts visaptverošas aizsardzības un valsts aizsardzības kontekstā kopumā? Cik tieši svarīgi? No 1 – 10 (1 – nemaz nav svarīgi, 10 – ārkārtīgi svarīgi).
11. Jūsaprāt, vai problemātiska un neattīstīta sabiedrības noturība var būt apdraudējums (vai rezultātā radīt apdraudējumu) Latvijas valsts eksistencei? Kādēļ?
12. Jūsaprāt, kas ir galvenie pastāvošie traucēkļi sekmīgai sabiedrības noturībai Latvijas kontekstā?

13. Jūsaprāt, vai nepieciešamība uzlabot valsts psiholoģiskās aizsardzības dimensiju ir iemesls, kādēļ Latvijā tiek strādāts pie visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas ieviešanas?

Appendix II

Interview questions for policy makers (in English)

1. Name, surname:
2. Position, represented institution:
3. Has your represented institution participated in policy making and policy drafting in relation to the Comprehensive state defence system?
4. Have you personally been engaging in the work for creation of the Comprehensive state defence system? In what capacity?
5. Please elaborate upon the creation of the Comprehensive state defence system.
 - 5.1. In what capacity is your represented institution engaged in this matter?
 - 5.2. In what capacity have other governmental institutions been engaged in this matter? What is their role?
 - 5.3. What has been the chronology of creating the Comprehensive state defence system of Latvia?
6. Has the drafting of a Comprehensive state defence system encountered circumventions from ordinary political process/legislative order (for example, mandating faster responses from other involved actors and institutions; no need to harmonise documents with other involved actors; right to assign obligatory tasks to other involved actors or institutions; an assigned specific task from Prime Minister or President; other) that would speak on the specific status or importance of the political document?
7. In what capacity have researchers been consulted in creating the concept of the Comprehensive state defence system?
8. In your opinion, what are the main reasons for Latvia needing to employ total defence principles as part of its deterrence policy?
9. In your opinion, is there one most important dimension from the four total defence dimensions – military, civilian, informational, psychological – within the framework of state defence? If yes, which one? Why?
10. In your opinion, are successful societal resilience mechanisms (trust building between state and society, and among society members, fostering of societal cohesion, societal resilience in case of crisis, readiness to defend the state) essential in the context of total defence concept and state defence policy? How important? On a scale of 1 – 10, 1 being – not important at all; 10 being – absolutely crucial.)
11. In your opinion, can problematic or underdeveloped societal resilience be a threat (or, in result, cause a threat) to the existence of Latvian statehood? Why?
12. In your opinion, what are the main obstacles to societal resilience in the context of Latvia?
13. In your opinion, is the need to improve Latvia's societal resilience the reason why a Comprehensive state defence system is being developed in Latvia?

Appendix III

Interview questions for researchers (in Latvian)

1. Vārds, uzvārds:
2. Ieņemamais amats, pārstāvētā institūcija:
3. Vai esat pētījis visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības jautājumus?
4. Vai esat ticis iesaistīta darbā pie Visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas koncepcijas izstrādes?
5. Lūdzu, pastāstiet, kāds ir bijis Jūsu ieguldījums Visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas koncepcijas izstrādē. Cik lielā mērā ar Jums vai Jūsu pārstāvēto institūciju tika veiktas konsultācijas? Kāds ir bijis (vai būs) Jūsu sniegtais ieguldījums?
6. Jūsaprāt, kas ir galvenie iemesli nepieciešamībai Latvijas gadījumā kā atturēšanas politikas instrumentu ieviest visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības principus?
7. Jūsaprāt, vai ir kāda vissvarīgākā no četrām visaptverošas aizsardzības dimensijām – militārā, civilā, informācijas, psiholoģiskā – valsts aizsardzības kontekstā? Ja jā, kura? Kādēļ?
8. Jūsaprāt, vai ir svarīgi sekmīgi darbojošies sabiedrības noturības (tai skaitā savstarpējās uzticības un saliedētības veicināšana sabiedrībā un attiecībās starp sabiedrību/individū un valsti, noturības spēja krīzes apstākļos un gatavība aizstāvēt valsti) mehānismi valsts visaptverošas aizsardzības un valsts aizsardzības kontekstā kopumā? Cik tieši svarīgi? No 1 – 10 (1 – nemaz nav svarīgi, 10 – ārkārtīgi svarīgi).
9. Jūsaprāt, vai problemātiska un neattīstīta sabiedrības noturība var būt apdraudējums (vai rezultātā radīt apdraudējumu) Latvijas valsts eksistencei? Kādēļ?
10. Jūsaprāt, kas ir galvenie pastāvošie traucēkļi sekmīgai sabiedrības noturībai Latvijas kontekstā?
11. Jūsaprāt, vai nepieciešamība uzlabot valsts psiholoģiskās aizsardzības dimensiju ir iemesls, kādēļ Latvijā tiek strādāts pie visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas ieviešanas?

Appendix IV

Interview questions for researchers (in English)

1. Name, surname:
2. Position, represented institution:
3. Has your represented institution participated in policy making and policy drafting in relation to the Comprehensive state defence system?
4. Have you personally been engaging in the work for creation of the Comprehensive state defence system?
5. Please elaborate on your involvement in drafting the Comprehensive state defence system. To what extent were you and your institution consulted? What input did you provide?
6. In your opinion, what are the main reasons for Latvia needing to employ total defence principles as part of its deterrence policy?
7. In your opinion, is there one most important dimension from the four total defence dimensions – military, civilian, informational, psychological – within the framework of state defence? If yes, which one? Why?
8. In your opinion, are successful societal resilience mechanisms (trust building between state and society, and among society members, fostering of societal cohesion, societal resilience in case of crisis, readiness to defend the state) essential in the context of total defence concept and state defence policy? How important? On a scale of 1 – 10, 1 being – not important at all; 10 being – absolutely crucial.)
9. In your opinion, can problematic or underdeveloped societal resilience be a threat (or, in result, cause a threat) to the existence of Latvian statehood? Why?
10. In your opinion, what are the main obstacles to societal resilience in the context of Latvia?
11. In your opinion, is the need to improve Latvia's societal resilience the reason why a Comprehensive state defence system is being developed in Latvia?