

DISSERTATIONES RERUM POLITICARUM
UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS

3

DISSERTATIONES RERUM POLITICARUM
UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS

3

HEIKO PÄÄBO

Potential of Collective Memory Based
International Identity Conflicts
in Post-Imperial Space

Comparison of Russian Master Narrative with
Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian Master Narratives



TARTU UNIVERSITY
PRESS

Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu

Dissertation has been accepted for the commencement of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (in Political Science) on January 20, 2011 by the Council of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Education, University of Tartu

Supervisor: Andres Kasekamp, University of Tartu, Estonia

Opponent: Nils Muiznieks, University of Latvia

Commencement: 10 March 2011

Publication of this thesis is granted by the Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu and by the Doctoral School of Behavioural, Social and Health Sciences created under the auspices of European Union Social Fund.



European Union
European Social Fund



Investing in your future

ISSN 1736-4205

ISBN 978-9949-19-586-2 (trükis)

ISBN 978-9949-19-587-9 (PDF)

Autoriõigus Heiko Pääbo, 2011

Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus

www.tyk.ee

Tellimuse nr 60

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	7
INTRODUCTION	8
CHAPTER 1: International Identity Conflicts and Collective Memory	20
1.1. What Is Collective Memory?	21
1.2. Nation and Nation-building	25
1.3. Collective Memory and National Identity	32
1.4. National Memory as Political Memory	43
1.5. Identity and International Relations	52
1.6. International Identity Conflict and National Memory	57
1.7. Research Design and Methods	66
CHAPTER 2: Analysis of the Estonian Master Narrative	83
2.1. Estonian Narrative of Origin and Main Identity Markers	83
2.2. Character of the Estonian Narrative and its Schematic Templates ...	96
2.3. Images of Self and Other in the Estonian Master Narrative	105
2.4. Historical Key Events in the Estonian Master Narrative	121
CHAPTER 3: Analysis of the Ukrainian Master Narrative	128
3.1. Ukrainian Narrative of Origin and Main Identity Markers	129
3.2. Character of the Ukrainian Narrative and its Schematic Templates .	143
3.3. Images of Self and Other in the Ukrainian Master Narrative	153
3.4. Historical Key Events in the Ukrainian Master Narrative	170
CHAPTER 4: Analysis of the Georgian Master Narrative	179
4.1. Georgian Narrative of Origin and Main Identity Markers	180
4.2. Character of the Georgian Narrative and its Schematic Templates ...	194
4.3. Images of Self and Other in the Georgian Master Narrative	203
4.4. Historical Key Events in the Georgian Master Narrative	221
CHAPTER 5: Comparative Analysis of the Russian Master Narrative	229
5.1. Russian Narrative of Origin and Main Identity Markers in Comparative Analysis	230
5.2. Character of the Russian Narrative and its Schematic Templates in Comparative Analysis	246
5.3. Comparative Analysis of the Russian Image in the National Master Narratives	257
5.4. Comparative Analysis of the Russian Historical Key Events	274
5.5. Concluding Analysis	286
CONCLUSIONS	295
BIBLIOGRAPHY	305

SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN	321
CURRICULUM VITAE	330
ELULOOKIRJELDUS.....	333

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I remain indebted to several colleagues, friends and institutions who have supported and helped me to conduct this study. First, I want to thank my supervisor Prof. Andres Kasekamp from the University of Tartu who has given me good and relevant feedback about my dissertation. The critical questions that he has raised helped me to move further my research focus and make it more precise and plausible. I am very grateful to Prof. Dr. Jochen Franzke from the University of Potsdam who supported my research at the Potsdam and Berlin Free University, and Mr. Thorsten Kohlisch for the support in arranging my studies in Germany. I express my gratitude also to my colleagues and former students from Georgia, Ukraine and Russia who helped me to get a better understanding of historical studies in their countries and also to find proper empirical materials. I am very thankful to my friends and colleagues with whom I have discussed my research topic and who have given me different ideas and paid my attention to potential shortcomings. However, I am fully responsible for all mistakes and misinterpretations in this research.

The University of Tartu's EuroCollege offered me the possibility to focus on my research during the time when it was the most needed and also it supported me financially to organise the research visits to each country of my case studies. The Archimedes Foundation offered me a scholarship that enabled me to conduct my study at the University of Potsdam. Without this institutional assistance it would have been very difficult to finalise my research.

Last but not least, a special great thanks to my partner Reshat Shaban and the rest of my family who patiently lived with and made possible this research by encouraging me and offering strong emotional support.

INTRODUCTION

‘The collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. For the Russian people it became the real drama.’¹

Vladimir Putin, President of Russia,
Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation
April 25, 2005

‘Today Ukraine and Ukrainians of the whole world begin to commemorate the 75-th anniversary of a most terrible catastrophe, the famine known as Holodomor of 1932–1933. [...] Holodomor is much more than our pain and wound. It is a black hole in our history, the black hole that could devour not only Ukraine itself but any slightest hope for life as well.’²

Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine
Address on the Mykhaylivska Square, November 24, 2007

‘As citizens of Georgia, we are heirs to a great land and a rich legacy – but not to an easy life. Our geography and our history teach us that our road is difficult.’³

Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia
Inauguration speech, January 28, 2008

‘We have to keep this in mind now and always. The price of our independence was our blood and the road to restoration of our independence demanded even more victims. That is why every one of us who can lead their life in free Estonia today is obligated to preserve the memory of these who lost their life for our freedom.’⁴

Toomas Hendrik Ilves, President of Estonia
The 60th anniversary commemoration conference of the March deportation
March 25, 2009

All four presidents present the difficult past of their nations in their speeches. The above statement by the Russian President constructs national mourning and

¹ Author’s translation ‘...*крушение Советского Союза было крупнейшей геополитической катастрофой века. Для российского же народа оно стало настоящей драмой*’, Vladimir Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Kremlin, Moscow, April 25, 2005, President of Russia: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml, retrieved 22.05.2009

² Victor Yushchenko's address at the 75th anniversary commemoration of Holodomor victims, on Mykhaylivska square, Kyiv, November 24, 2007, Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine: <http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/8299.html>, retrieved 22.05. 2009

³ Mikheil Saakashvili, Inauguration Speech, Tbilisi, Parliament of Georgia, January 28, 2008, President of Georgia: <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=1&sm=1>, retrieved May 22, 2008

⁴ Toomas Hendrik Ilves, speech at the 60th anniversary commemoration conference of the March deportation, Museum of Occupations, March 25, 2009, President of the Republic of Estonia: <http://www.president.ee/en/duties/speeches.php?gid=126385>, retrieved 22.05.2009

portrays the Russian people as victims of the collapse of the Soviet Union that dissolved the country and divided its peoples. Statements made by the Estonian and Ukrainian presidents commemorate the victims of the past terror and connect this past with the present. At the same time they warn people not to forget the event and to emphasise its importance today as well as in future. The President of Georgia victimises the entire past of Georgians and calls people to learn from the past that this small but brave nation has always faced challenging times. Although the focuses of these statements are different, they all have something similar. All the national leaders aim to strengthen national unity by using traumatic moments of the national past combining the past, present and future. They are all good examples of how the national elite uses the national collective memory in political discourse. Only different past experiences make these statements vary.

Russians, Estonians, Ukrainians, and Georgians have had a relatively long period when their national histories were intertwined and they have also many shared historical moments. The most recent, and at the same time also one of the most penetrating memories for all of these nations, is related to the event that Russian President V. Putin victimises in his speech to the parliament: the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1989 the Cold War was declared to have ended and two years later the Soviet Union officially terminated its existence. The biggest state in the world was dissolved and 15 new states appeared on the world map. Russia became the successor state of the Soviet Union by taking over its obligations and rights and at the same time it also had to combine its earlier imperial and Soviet past to build one comprehensive national memory suitable for a new political system. All the other new states had their titular nations that all have their own story to narrate about their past and they started keenly to build-up their states and nations, simultaneously integrating them into world politics. Having different historical experiences, the active nation-building started in all countries and their national elites were challenged by complex process of (re)definition of the national identities that should to fit to the changed geopolitical realities. This process developed with difficulties where national memory had a crucial role in identity formation.⁵

The neglected national pasts, rewritten national narratives and suppressed memories sprang up after the collapse of the Soviet regime and every ethnic group wanted to liberate the national memory from the earlier suppression to construct it suitable for new realities and national identities. Often this process has created strong clashes and interethnic conflicts. The struggle over the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn⁶, declaring the Holodomor as genocide against the

⁵ Niven, Bill. On the Use of Collective Memory, *German History* Vol. 26 (3), 2008, pp. 427–436, p. 427

⁶ See Brüggemann, Karsten, Andres Kasekamp. The Politics of History and the War of Monuments in Estonia, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 36 (3), 2008, pp. 425–448; Pääbo, Heiko. War of Memories, explaining Memorials War in Estonia, *Baltic Defence and Security Review*, Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 5–28; Münch, Felix. *Diskriminierung durch Ge-*

Ukrainian nation⁷, conflict over the territorial integrity of Georgia⁸ or glorifying the victory in the Second World War as holy and untouchable⁹ are just the tip of the icebergs. National leaders of these nations actively involve history into politics and the national identities are more and more constructed in the way that causes identity clashes. Instead of disappearing and being only an initial emotional outburst after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process seems to intensify and the statements or political decisions in one country are gradually perceived hostile in the other.¹⁰ Therefore the identity conflicts in the space of the former Soviet Union deserve much more attention and especially the role of the collective memory in these conflicts. It is also the reason why I am interested in understanding a broader background of the increasing involvement of the national pasts in political struggles.

Frequent involvement of memory in the current politics is usually seen only as the issue of post-Soviet transformation and establishment of Newly Independent States (NIS).¹¹ Thereby it is defined as symptoms of the post-Soviet trauma or of a young nationhood that will disappear when the new nations mature and eventually become less nationalist. It is impossible to deny the importance of this aspect and the newly established nation-states have often

schichte? Die Auseinandersetzung um den "Bronzen Soldaten" im geschichtspolitischen Diskurs des postsowjetischen Estland, Marburg: Tectum-Verlag, 2008

⁷ Marples, David R. Ethnic Issues in the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 61 (3), 2009, pp. 505–518, or since April 2009 semi-annual Holodomor Studies journal

⁸ Gachechiladze, Revaz. National idea, state-building and boundaries in the post-Soviet space (the case of Georgia), *GeoJournal*, Vol. 43 (1), 1997, pp. 51–60; Toft, Monica D. "Multinationality, Regions and State-Building: The Failed Transition in Georgia", *Regional & Federal Studies*, Vol. 11 (3), 2001, pp. 123–142

⁹ Wertsch, James V. *Voices of Collective Remembering*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Wertsch (b), James V. Collective Memory and Narrative Templates, *Social Research*, Vol. 75 (1), 2008, pp. 133–156

¹⁰ Celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War in Moscow (2005), conferring the title of Hero of Ukraine posthumously to the leader of UPA Roman Shukhevych (2007), transfer of the statue of Bronze Soldier from the centre of Tallinn to Military cemetery (2007), rehabilitation of Ukrainian Hetman I. Mazepa (2009) etc

¹¹ Rosenberg, Tina. *The Haunted Land: Facing Europe's Ghosts after Communism*, New York: Vintage, 1995; Minow, Marth. *Between Venegance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1998; Corbea-Hoisie, Andrei, Rudolf Jaworski, Monika Sommer (eds). *Umbruch im östlichen Europa Die nationale Wende und das kollektive Gedächtnis*, Wien, München, Innsbruck, Bozen: Studienverlag, 2004; Fritz, Regina, Carola Sachse, Edgar Wolfrum (eds). *Nationen und ihre Selbstbilder. Postdiktatorische Gesellschaften in Europa*, Wallstein Verlag: Göttingen, 2008

the tendency to antagonise their neighbouring nations.¹² However, reality shows that the international identity conflicts are rather intensifying than decreasing. Therefore I argue that this point of view is too narrow to explain current relations in the former Soviet Union because it does not provide sufficient explanation for the growing identity clashes in this realm. The framework of the post-soviet nation-building is too narrow and I propose in my research to replace it with the framework of the post-imperial nation-building. According to the Russian collective memory the Soviet Union was not something separate or anomalous in the Russian past. It is defined as one form of Russian statehood or even more precisely as just another form of the Russian Empire, thus the Soviet Union and Russia are seen as interchangeable units.¹³ Moreover, former Soviet republics don't consider their experience with Russia only as a Communist experience, but Russia as an actor is perceived through the entire mutual history, i.e. since Russia has interacted with these nations. Therefore I have chosen the post-imperial framework for my study and I will test how well this paradigm can explain the intensifying identity conflicts.

The relations in the post-imperial space between a former centre and colonies can be conflicting or dependent from the earlier centre. I claim that the character of the relations in the post-imperial space depends on national identities of the parties involved rather than on rational thinking. In other words, the parties can understand that they will benefit more by cooperating but a strong potential of the identity conflict can often outweigh the rational arguments. Therefore to understand the ideational factors, which surround these bilateral relations between the former centre (dominating nation) and former dependent territories (dominated nations) one should focus on national identities and particularly on national memories, which are the crucial engines of formation of national identity.¹⁴ To study this subject it is necessary to make an interdisciplinary study, which combines international relations, nationalism and memory studies. For all of these fields identity is an important research variable. By developing its research programme the Constructivist school has brought identity as one important factor in international relations and Constructivist scholars have dedicated several works to the importance of identity in international relations and how its construction influences international relations but also how international relations influence identity construction.¹⁵ Nationalism studies focus on identity construction mostly as internal ethnic group identity formation and their interest hardly reaches to the field of international

¹² Brubaker, Rogers. Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutional Account, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 23 (1), 1994, pp. 47–78, pp. 61–71

¹³ Solchanyk, Roman. *Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition*, Rowan & Littlefield Publisher: Lunham, 2001 p. 14

¹⁴ Smith, Anthony. D. *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 16

¹⁵ See works by Alexander Wendt, Iver B. Neumann, Friedrich Kratochwil, John G. Ruggie, Peter Katzenstein and others

relations. Nationalism and memory studies are more connected and collective memory is considered as one of the most important elements in a nation-building process. Collective memory studies claim that memory and identity are mutually constructive.¹⁶ Although these three disciplines focus on identity construction, there is not a very clear connection established between these three fields. The politics of memory in International Relations is a new approach gaining more popularity.¹⁷ Therefore the aim of my study is to combine these three fields, which are related but not very well interlinked and with my study I aim to contribute to developing an interdisciplinary research programme of the memory studies. Thus, my research focuses on collective memory and particularly on the role of national master narratives in the international identity conflicts.

The study is divided into five parts. In the first chapter I develop the theoretical framework of my study where I introduce and combine the above-mentioned three approaches for the following analysis. This chapter is divided into seven sections that start by introducing research fields. Thereafter I combine them into one research framework to provide the background for my research. In the first section I discuss what collective memory is by giving an overview of the concept. There are two main study traditions of the concept. The first one focuses on collected memory – aggregated individual memories that form a group memory.¹⁸ The other approach of collective memory sees it as a group based constructed and shared subjective perception of the past that gives meaning for the group in the present. In my research I follow the tradition of the second approach and I focus on mediated memory as institutionalised cultural memory of a social group that an individual has not experienced himself but it is mediated from generation to generation.¹⁹ The importance of memory is its ability to keep a social group together. I'm interested in a more precise concept and therefore I define mediated cultural memory as a top-down political memory related to power and constructed mainly by leaders of groups.

In the second section I define the concept of nation. Nationalism studies are divided into four schools according to their definition of nation.²⁰ I introduce briefly each of the approaches and I base my research on the Ethno-symbolic approach because it is the most relevant concept for combining nation construction with ethnic elements of a nation. Thereafter I introduce the process

¹⁶ Gillis, J. R. Memory and Identity: The history of a relationship, in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, Gillis, J. R. (ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 3–40, p. 3

¹⁷ Onken, Eva-Clarita. The Baltic States and Moscow's 9 May Commemoration: Analysing Memory Politics in Europe, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 59 (1), 2007 pp. 23–46, p. 25

¹⁸ Olick, Jeffrey K. Collective Memory: The Two Cultures, *Sociological Theory*, 17 (3), 1999, pp. 333–348, p. 338

¹⁹ Assmann, Aleida. Transformations between History and Memory. *Social Research*, Vol. 75 (1), 2008, pp. 49–72, p. 52

²⁰ Smith, A., 1999 pp. 3–19

of nation-building. At the end of this part I define two nation-building concepts: civic and ethnic nation-building. In my research the latter is more relevant.

In the following part of my first chapter I establish the connection between collective memory and identity where I focus on the context of a nation-state. I analyse the nexus between memory and identity on the individual level and extend it to collective one. In this part I define also the content of national memory and how national memory is related to national identity. The mutual constitutive character of this nexus raises the next question how the memory is mediated from generation to generation. In this section I add one additional factor for identity construction – space, which combined with time, is an important element in my research because it forms a particular identity marker – chronotope. Thereafter I define how a national memory works in society. It is mainly mediated by narratives that form the national past as one comprehensive and coherent story.²¹ It leads to my focus on narratives and their role in identity formation.

Thereafter I focus on national memory as a political memory because my research focuses on top-down collective memory. First I explain political malleability of a national memory. In this section I discuss the relationship between the agent and structure of collective memory: I assume that national memory is defined by the political elite but on the other hand the political elite should also consider the national memory that frames their perception of the past. Therefore, I differentiate conscious and subconscious national memories and my research focus will be on how political elites form the subconscious national memory. This approach raises inevitably a question of how a malleable national memory is related to history. Therefore I present briefly the debate over this question. I support the approach that assumes that there is no difference between history and memory but they are overlapping and mutually constitutive phenomena and therefore the division that memory is malleable and history is not constructs artificial borders between them.

Until this point my research combines nationalism studies with memory studies. In the following part I introduce the identity focus in the international relations studies. Thus, in this part I give a brief overview how the Constructivist School differs from the other International Relations approaches by considering identity as an important research variable. I show also how identity matters in international relations according to the Constructivist approach. Thereafter I discuss functions of the past in international relations and how it is related to images and perceptions that form the identity-based actions in International Relations. This facilitates establishing a connection between earlier defined national memory and International Relations discipline. The nexus is based on the self-other relationship that frames the identity construction in a nation-state as well as in the international relations. Collective

²¹ Smith, Roger M. *Stories of peoplehood: The politics and morals of political membership*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 64–65

memory is crucial in both cases because it defines how the past is used in current relations.

My research aim is to understand how collective memories mediate the incompatibility of the shared past and how it is transferred to current relations. Therefore I focus on international identity conflict. First, I define the concept of international identity conflict and the role of national memory in international identity conflict. I determine the role of national elites and variety of national narrative types used in this process. I define also different aims of the usage of national memory in foreign policy. In this part I construct my argument: the post-imperial space includes nations having significant shared history but dissimilar roles in the past and therefore the differently perceived common heritage causes the biggest potential for international identity conflicts. This potential is also the main study object of my research.

In the last section of the first chapter I describe my study methodology. To assess the potential of the international identity conflict I analyse national master narratives. It offers a general framework of how a nation comprehends its past. Defining the similar medium of master narratives I analysis history textbooks. This approach is justified because history textbooks have the biggest influence on the state population and they are used the most as the state socialising instruments. Therefore the analysis of textbooks enables to compare different national master narratives and thereby to assess the potential of identity conflicts.

The main aim of my analysis is to offer an analytical framework for the analysis of national master narratives in the post-imperial space and thereby to assess the potential of the international identity conflicts. I set criteria of the analysis that allows me to assess to what extent they are relevant to analyse the potential of international identity conflict in post-imperial space. In addition, my aim is also to compare three different cases of former dominated nations related to former dominant nation. With this comparison the plausibility of the earlier defined elements is proved and their differences explained.

In my research I will focus on six following elements of narrative analysis:

- 1) Nation's narrative of origin
- 2) National identity markers, including chronotope
- 3) Character of narrative
- 4) Schematic narrative template
- 5) Images of self and significant other
- 6) Interpretations of commonly shared history

Based on these elements of analysis I define three research theses that are supported by testable assumptions. To fulfil the aims of my research the testing of the theses will show the relevance of the analytical category and as well how the cases differ from each other.

- 1) The national master narratives of the former dominant nation and dominated nations are mutually antagonistic:
 - a. narratives of origin support contradicting characters and roles that construct mutual incompatibility;

- b. the narrative of the former dominant nation has an assimilative character towards the dominated nations, narratives of dominated nations have dissimilative character towards former dominant nation;
 - c. interpretations of key events have opposing character in national master narratives;
 - d. denials of the other nation's history key events exist in master narratives.
- 2) Antagonistic master narratives deny key elements of the 'Other's' identity:
- a. main identity markers are opposing and thereby they create mutual denials of these identity markers;
 - b. chronotope of the identity is overlapping – the chronotope of former dominant nation includes the territories of dominated nations, though the latter reject it;
 - c. image of former dominant nation is presented as negative and threatening by dominated nations and their self-image is victimised;
 - d. self-image of former dominant nation is heroic and glorifying and it whitewashes its negative images of the past events.
- 3) Schematic narrative templates of dominated nations are similar and differ significantly from the templates of the former dominating nation.

My research idea occurred when I taught Russian history in the classroom where I had students from different countries that have been part of the Russian Empire/USSR. The hot debates in the class showed that there are many contradictions between youth who has no direct connection to the past events, except they belong to their respective nation. Therefore my case studies are chosen from the former Russian Empire. As I have concluded above, in my research I do not differentiate the Soviet period from the earlier Russian Empire but I consider them as the continuous process of the Russian statehood. Therefore I analyse entire master narratives and I do not focus on a particular historical period. It is important to conduct this comprehensive comparative study because there is not any other research that includes geographically so broad and heterogenous region in one comprehensive comparative master narrative analysis. In my study I analyse how the national collective memory is constructed and mediated by the national master narratives and how it is conflicting with the Russian master narrative. Thereby I can also assess the potential of identity conflict between the nations and Russia. I have chosen three most representative cases of the conflicting bilateral relations in the space of former Russian Empire: Estonia, Ukraine, and Georgia. I chose these three countries because they all have had a relatively strong resistance movement in the Soviet Union and after the collapse of the Union they have chosen a foreign policy, which aims at independence from Russia. In addition, during the last decade all of these three nations have had serious conflicts with Russia.²² Therefore it allows me to assume that in all these cases the relations with Russia have some stronger factors that escalate international conflict than only

²² The relocation of the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn (2007), the Russian-Ukrainian gas and history disputes (since 2005), and the Russo-Georgian War (2008).

incompatibility of interests. The second, third and fourth chapter analyse respectively the master narratives of Estonia, Ukraine, and Georgia. All of these chapters follow the same structure: narrative of origin and identity markers, character of narrative and schematic narrative templates, images of self and significant other (Russia), and historical key moments.

Estonia is chosen as one of the Baltic states to assess the potential of identity clash with Russia.²³ Estonians consider themselves living on this small territory on the Eastern rim of the Baltic Sea since the end of the last Ice Age and therefore this territory has crucial meaning for the national identity. However, through history the territory has been conquered by different external powers. The Estonian nation-state was first established only in 1918. In the beginning of the Second World War the Soviet Union silently liquidated Estonian independence and the following 50 years is defined in the Estonian master narrative as the Soviet occupation. In 1991 Estonia restored its independence and already since the national reawakening in the end of the 1980s the Estonian national elite has reconstructed the national identity that dissimilates Estonians from Russians. Therefore also the foreign policy of independent Estonian government had univocal Western orientation. Estonian and Russian relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union have had its ups and downs but have mainly been characterized by mutual distrust and tensions.

Ukraine was the second biggest nation in the former Russian Empire and it is one of the closest kin nations for Russians. It is one of the biggest European countries. The early history of Ukrainians and Russians is overlapping and thereof it is already a significant incompatibility in the Ukrainian-Russian relations.²⁴ The subsequent history eliminated Ukrainian statehood and it became a dependent territory of Lithuania and Poland till the middle of 17th century when Ukrainian Cossacks managed to establish an independent Cossack Hetmanate that is defined as the first modern Ukrainian state. However, Russia took partly control over this territory and Ukrainians were divided by different authorities. The Russian Revolution and Civil Wars offered an opportunity for the Ukrainian national elite to restore national independence but it was liquidated by the Bolsheviks. Ukraine declared itself again independent in 1991. Ukraine has struggled internally over the formation of one accepted national identity that has been reflected in its foreign policy. After the Orange revolution in 2004 Ukraine was more orientated to Europe and transatlantic institutions, which also caused intensified tensions in relations with Russia. After the last Presidential elections (2010) Ukraine restored a more pro-Russian approach in its foreign policy and thereby decreased motivation to use memory clashes in politics. Nevertheless, the identity conflict has not vanished.

²³ Berg, Eiki, & Ehin, Piret. *Identity and Foreign Policy. Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2009

²⁴ Plokhy, Serhii. *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008

Georgia is one of the South Caucasian nations having the most hostile relations with Russia. Georgia has a long and rich national history and Georgian statehood goes back to many centuries before Christ. However, the history of the Georgian nation is full of conquests and domestic conflicts. Being one of the first officially Christian nations, religion has played important part in the formation of Georgian national identity. In the 12th–13th century the Georgian kingdom became a regional empire by conquering the entire South Caucasus. The following invasions ended Georgia's heyday and it became the subject of the strengthening neighbours' conquests and internal fights that divided the country into small dependent states. Russia annexed these territories by the beginning of the 19th century. During the Revolution and the Russian Civil War Georgia managed to establish independent state almost for three years before it was conquered by the Bolsheviks. In 1991 Georgia declared independence. After the changes in the political elite in 2003 (The Rose Revolution) Georgia chose a firm orientation to Europe and the US. Correspondingly, Georgian relations with Russia have gradually worsened, culminating with the short August War in 2008.

In the fifth chapter I analyse the Russian master narrative based on the same analytical categories. The Russian case study is introduced comparatively with the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian ones. Thereby I test also the above-presented research theses and assess the differences among these three case studies. Similarly to Ukraine, Russian statehood stems from Kievan Rus. After the Mongol conquest of the Russian territories Moscow became the heart of new Russian state. Since the 16th century Russia started to expand its territories first to the East and later also to the West and the South. By the beginning of the 20th century Russia was one of the biggest empires in the world. The Revolution and the Civil War dissolved the Empire but it was to a large extent restored by the Bolsheviks in the form of the Soviet Union. After defeating Nazi Germany in the Second World War, the Soviet Union became one of the two superpowers in world and controlled more territory than Russia had ever in the past. However, in 1991 the USSR was dissolved and Russia was faced with new realities. Russian relations with its previous territories have been varied and the most conflicting ones can be defined with the Baltic states, Ukraine and Georgia. That has been also my criterion for choosing these cases for my analysis.

To sum up the introduction, it is necessary to define the limitations of this study. The first important aspect is that my research is not focusing on the finding of the historical truth. I assume that each nation has its own way how to narrate its past and therefore I do not open a Pandora's Box of defining the "historical truth". Analysing the historical controversies I try to be as neutral as possible and instead of judging them right or wrong I accept the understanding given by national narrative. As well as defining how the historical events are presented in the text (e.g. glorifying, victimising) I do not claim that a particular event is framed "wrongly" but my interest is to understand how a nation frames it in its national master narrative. In addition, I try to show where conflicting

elements in the national master narratives become minefields for the identity conflict. I have to admit that being a member of a nation analysed in my research I may have some unconscious biases. Therefore this research could include some unintended subjectivities that are impossible to avoid. Another aspect related to the subjectivity is the subjective character of the text analysis itself.²⁵ Therefore by setting my research agenda I may neglect some other elements that are also presented in the analysed text and overrepresent the categories of analysis that I have considered important.

Second, in my research I have focused on the general understanding that is based on the text analysis of the history textbooks. From each country I chose one set of the school textbooks to take it as the empirical example. I am aware that in all countries there are more than one set of history textbooks (especially in the cases of Russia and Ukraine) and inside these different textbooks some focuses or emphases may differ. Nevertheless, I did not intend to make a comparative analysis of history textbooks within one country – that would be a topic for another study. It would blur my study focus and the discussion would be related more on domestic differences than international dissimilarities. Therefore based on the consultation with my colleagues from each country I tried to choose the history textbooks that are relatively broadly used at schools. All of them are approved by the Ministry of Education of the respective country. Therefore I do not give any number values but all the comparative data is based on the percentages to show indicative shares that make the data comparable.

Third, my research is assessing the potential of the international identity conflict and is not necessarily corresponding to current conflicts between the nations. In other words, the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 does not immediately mean that these two nations have the highest potential for identity conflict. There are several other factors that trigger war between nations. My research assumes that the potential for international identity conflict can be used by the national elites and dependent on their interests and willingness the potential of identity conflict will be transferred to the bilateral relations. According to my approach, subconscious collective memory enables national elites to trigger the conflict but they are not able to control it later.²⁶ Therefore my research is not analysing the conflict and its development but the presettings of identity conflicts by assessing which of these nations has the highest potential.

Thus, my study aims to define the research agenda that combines three study fields: international relations, nationalism studies and memory studies. By this combination I will focus on the potential of the international identity conflicts

²⁵ Fairclough, Norman. *Analysing Discourse. Textual analysis for social research*, Routledge: London, New York, 2003, p. 15

²⁶ He, Yinan. Remembering and Forgetting the War. Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950–2006, *History & Memory*, vol. 19 (2), 2007, pp. 43–74 p. 291

that determine which elements of the national master narratives have importance for the identity conflicts. This study is also important because it sets the analytical framework for the identity conflicts in the post-imperial space that is not broadly used in the analysis of the former Russian Empire. In addition, the comparative analysis of the diverse regions and nations and their historical master narratives also increases the significance of this study.

CHAPTER I: International Identity Conflicts and Collective Memory

The importance of collective memory as a study object in the Social Sciences and Humanities has recently been increasing. It is caused by the technological development that changes the understanding of memory functions in the science, and the earlier main focus of the memory studies, the Holocaust is waning as communicative memory and it is becoming a cultural one.²⁷ In addition, the end of the Cold War opened the opportunity for Eastern Europeans to review their histories and discuss crimes against humanity that were taboo during the Soviet era.²⁸ All this has increased the interest of scholars from different disciplines to analyse collective memory. However, memory studies as a discipline is a multidisciplinary field and there is not a coherent theory or methodology of memory studies. Alon Confino claims that it is a fragmented research-field lacking critical reflection on method as well as missing a clear definition of approaches and study object. *'It is largely defined now in terms of topics of inquiry.'*²⁹ Collective memory as a study object occurred first in sociology, but it combines psychology, history, anthropology, and political science. In political science the main focus is on collective units (institutions, states, nations etc) and analysing *'how memories are used and abused for political action and formation of group identities.'*³⁰

In my research I focus on the unconscious political use of memory (political memory) in the context of a nation state and international relations. More precisely, I analyse the potential of international identity conflicts based on national history master narratives. First, I define the concept of collective memory and narrow it down to the political memory. Then I explore the concept of nation and nation-building process to understand in which context national collective memory works. Subsequently, I determine relations between memory and identity formation and analyse it in the context of a nation-state. It gives sufficient background to integrate this analysis into International Relations theory and discuss the role of identity formation in this study field to define a framework for the analysis of international identity conflicts and the role of national memory in these quarrels. My research focuses on the potential of

²⁷ Müller, Jan-Werner. Introduction. The power of memory, the memory of power and the power over memory, in *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, Jan-Werner Müller (ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 1–35, pp. 13–14

²⁸ Judt, Tony. The past is another country: myth and memory in post-war Europe, in *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, Jan-Werner Müller (ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 157–183, p. 172

²⁹ Confino, Alon. Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 102 (5), 1997, pp. 1386–1403, p. 1387

³⁰ Assmann, A., 2008, p. 56

international identity conflict and therefore the primary focus is on the main factors of this conflict – national memory and national history master narratives – that can intensify or ease the conflict. My research analyses a particular space of these conflicts: post-imperial space. At the end of this chapter I introduce my research design and study methodology.

I.1. What Is Collective Memory?

Collective memory as a concept in the social sciences was first defined by French sociologist and philosopher Maurice Halbwachs in his work *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (1925). Halbwachs claims that people's memory works only in the context of social framework, which is the main source for people to 'determine and retrieve their recollections.'³¹ He does not see any possibility to analyse individual's memory without the social one and therefore he claims that collective memory dominates over the individual one, the individual memory gets meaning only from the collective memory.³² Also Jan-Werner Müller claims that memory is crucial object in social theory because all consciousness is mediated through memory.³³ Therefore collective memory is one of the most important channels for the analysis of collective units, their perceptions and understandings.

On the other hand, Amos Funkenstein argues that a group is not able to have a memory because '*consciousness and memory can only be realized by an individual who acts, is aware, and remembers. ... Remembering is a mental act, and therefore it is absolutely and completely personal.*'³⁴ Therefore collective memory is not a group remembering but a social phenomenon that gives meaning to the past for a group. Susan Sontag adds that '*collective memory is not remembering but stipulating: that this is important, that this is the story about how it happened ... that lock the story in our minds.*'³⁵ She underlines that it is a group members' intersubjective perception of the past. Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam conclude that remembering, as any other act, is individual but the use of the concept of collective memory is justified as a metaphor.³⁶ Wulf Kansteiner disagrees that it is only a metaphorical expression but he sees collective memory as a result of shared communication about the past and it is a

³¹ Halbwachs, Maurice. *On Collective Memory*. Lewis A. Coser (ed). Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1992, p. 43

³² Halbwachs, 1992, pp. 167–169

³³ Müller, 2002, p. 1

³⁴ Funkenstein, Amos. *Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness, History & Memory*, Vol. 1, 1989, pp. 5–26, p. 6.

³⁵ Sontag, Susan. *Regarding the Pain of Others*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003.

³⁶ Gedi, Noa and Yigal Elam. *Collective Memory – What Is it?, History & Memory*, Vol. 8, 1996, pp. 30–50, p. 35

linchpin for an individual to be a part of this social group.³⁷ Rafael F. Narvaez adds that ‘[c]ollective memory is not only about remembering (the past) or about social order and action (the present), but, critically, it is about how social groups project themselves toward the future.’³⁸ Aleida Assmann, trying to compromise, claims that larger social groups and institutions cannot have memory but that they construct it themselves to build up their identity.³⁹ Jeffrey Olick concludes this debate by distinguishing between two different research cultures: collected memory and collective memory. The collected memory research focuses on ‘*the aggregated individual memories of members of a group*’ and in this case individuals are central and remembering is conducted only by individuals, alone or as a group.⁴⁰ Collective memory research culture denies a narrow psychological approach and takes a broader sociological one, claiming that also social groups can have memory like they have identity, which is more than only aggregated individual subjectivities.⁴¹ Therefore collective memory is a group-based constructed subjective perception of their past to give a meaning for the group existence and project their future. In my research I follow the collective memory research culture.

Collective memory is a general term for different concepts. When Halbwachs presented this concept he mainly considered oral collective memory as shared by smaller social groups, e.g. family, neighbourhoods. Jan Assmann defines this memory as communicative memory, which is ‘*based exclusively on everyday communications*.’⁴² Oral memory is a short one and it endures three or four generations.⁴³ Therefore Assmann introduces an additional concept – cultural memory. He claims that in comparison with communicative memory cultural memory is distanced from everyday life therefore transcendent and it has its fixed points. ‘*These fixed points are fateful events of the past, whose memory is maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance)*.’⁴⁴ Communicative social memory can be transferred to the more durable cultural memory by institutionalization of the memory.⁴⁵ Therefore also Bill Niven calls the

³⁷ Kansteiner, Wulf. Finding meaning in memory: A methodological critique of collective memory studies, *History and Theory*, Vol. 41, 2002, pp. 179–197, p. 188

³⁸ Narvaez, Rafael F. Embodiment, *Collective Memory and Time, Body & Society*, Vol. 12 (3), 2006, pp. 51–73, p. 67

³⁹ Assmann, Aleida (b). Memory, Individual and Collective, in *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 210–224

⁴⁰ Olick, 1999, p. 338, see more pp. 338–341

⁴¹ Olick, 1999, pp. 341–342, see more pp. 341–343

⁴² Assmann, Jan, John Czaplicka (translator). *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity, New German Critique*, Vol. 65, Cultural History/Cultural Studies (1995), pp. 125–133, p. 126

⁴³ Assmann, J., 1995, p. 127

⁴⁴ Assmann, J. 1995, p. 129

⁴⁵ Assmann, A. 2008, p. 56

communicative memory as a primary memory and the cultural one as the secondary, mediated memory.⁴⁶ A. Assmann adds that cultural memory is mediated memory that ‘*is backed up by material media, symbols, and practices which have to be grafted into the hearts and minds of individuals.*’⁴⁷ Avishai Margalit has similar distinction calling the first one as common memory that is involuntary bringing together people who have experienced the same episode or event. The second one is voluntary and it is transmitted through retelling and reproducing.⁴⁸ In current research the focus is on the secondary, mediated memory that is institutionalised and therefore also it carries the function to transfer the main set of cultural tools of a society, making it more open for manipulations. In other words, mediated memory is the main framework that keeps together a social group and defines its identity.

According to J. Assmann cultural memory is a crucial part for the identity formation and it maintains and preserves the cultural meanings that are important for particular society.⁴⁹ It also offers particular social framework for individuals to understand the surrounding world. Halbwachs claims that individuals are able to retain personal impressions only in the framework of general patterns that are sustained in the social group where he or she belongs. Therefore memories are overtaken by individuals as ready stereotypes that are restored in the group’s collective memory.⁵⁰ However, cultural memory is not only as a store but it is a complex network that never maintains past as the same but it is constantly producing the past to accommodate it to the current needs of the present.⁵¹

It is also important to underline that cultural memory is memory which is objectivised and institutionalised and it is transformed from generations to generation, including ‘*everyday and specialized knowledge, the art and even the language itself, as well as skills and customs.*’⁵² However, J. Assmann stresses that every particular society gives this concrete meaning. Carole Crumley argues that memory is transferring information from individuals to group and from generation to generation. She emphasises that memory facilitates the transfer of ‘*behaviours and attitudes to others in various contexts but especially through emotional and practical ties.*’⁵³ While J. Assmann underlines the importance that the memory is changeable and each generation defines its own

⁴⁶ Niven, 2008, p. 436

⁴⁷ Assmann, A. 2008, p. 55

⁴⁸ Margalit, Avishai. *The Ethics of Memory*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 50–58

⁴⁹ Assmann, J. 1995, pp. 130–132

⁵⁰ Gedi, Elam, 1996, p. 43

⁵¹ Jedlowski, Paolo. Memory and Sociology. Themes and issues, *Time and Society*, Vol. 10 (1), 2001, pp. 29–44, p. 30

⁵² Jedlowski, 2001, p. 33

⁵³ Crumley, Carole. Exploring Venus of Social Memory, in *Social Memory and History: Anthropological Perspectives*, Maria G. Cattell and Jacob J. Climo (eds), Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2002, pp. 39–52, p. 40

particular meaning for the symbols, values, norms, attitudes combined in memory, Crumley emphasises that memory transfers unconsciously these values from one generation to another and the new generation inherits them unconsciously. Cultural memory can be analysed as constantly changing social knowledge that carries values and attitudes from previous generations to the new ones. At the same time, each generation is living in a new environment and the knowledge from the earlier generations will be accommodated to the new environment and the new milieu attributes different meanings to the existing knowledge as well. Thus, I conclude that cultural memory is a cumulative process, which is reshaped by each generation according to its needs.

The next question is how these needs can be delineated. In the current study the needs are defined through the political dimension, thereby identifying memory relations with power. It narrows down the concept 'cultural memory' to 'political memory'. I define political memory as the collective memory that is functioning according to the needs and demands of power relations. I combine it with A. Assmann's definition, which says that political memory is a top-down memory and is contrary to the communicative social memory '*explicit, homogenous, and institutionalised*'.⁵⁴ Paloma Aguilar and Carsten Humlebæk differentiate homogenous political memory from the heterogeneous social memory by a criterion that political memory serves some certain political aims.⁵⁵ Therefore analysing political memory the scholars focus on the questions: who makes whom memorise what, and why.⁵⁶

Gedi and Elam claim that political memory reflects societal needs and therefore it is important to analyse how these needs are defined. They are pessimistic about the possibility for equal access of all social memories to construct the best and most accurate memory but they assume that the more powerful social groups take the dominating position and start to speak on the behalf of the society and therefore also having power to form the social memories according to their understandings.⁵⁷ Thus, the political and social elite become a memory agent to form it according to their interests.⁵⁸ Political elites use social institutions to internalise and cultivate the memories in line with their political aims in society. Since individuals perceive and interpret the surrounding world based on stereotypes and the framework formed by collective memory, they take over the framework formed by the dominant groups. Through a successful socialisation process they accept it as undisputable principles. Therefore political memory is defined in the framework of power structure where the dominating elite form relevant memories to cohere the

⁵⁴ Assmann, A. 2008, p. 56

⁵⁵ Aguilar, Paloma, Carsten Humlebæk. Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy. The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War, *History & Memory*, Vol. 14, (1–2), 2002, pp. 121–164, p. 123

⁵⁶ Burke, Peter. History and Social Memory, in *Memory: History, Culture and the Mind*, Thomas Butler (ed), Blackwell Publishers: New York, 1989, pp. 97–113, p. 108

⁵⁷ Gedi, Elam, 1996, p. 39

⁵⁸ Gedi, Elam, 1996, p. 42

collective memory by legitimising its existence. This approach is called Presentism.

An alternative approach argues that some past is unavoidable and it is not possible to control only by the dominating group and one can see it as bottom-up memory studies.⁵⁹ This differentiation is also relevant in the context of the memory transfer between generations. Similarly to cultural memory, political memory is durable through different generations and based on external symbols and shared representations. While Presentism focuses mainly on memory agents who are reshaping the memory in a particular society, the alternative approach is more focused on the transition of the memory. However, memory agents are also influenced by memory and they are not able to establish a totally new collective memory but they can change focuses and meanings.⁶⁰ Therefore it is not possible to differentiate these two levels of analysis entirely. However, these different approaches are important to define the study focus. In my research the first approach is more relevant because the analysis is focused on the nation-state defined national collective memory, which is defining the national identity. Therefore I assume that politics is an important force to construct the past and mould collective memory.⁶¹ The second approach is more relevant for the analysis of internal memory contest, which exceeds my research focus.

1.2. Nation and Nation-building

In the previous part I discussed the general concept of collective memory and narrowed it down to political memory that is an important instrument to define how and what political communities remember. In the current world the most common political group that the individuals identify themselves with is nation. Therefore first I define nation and give a brief overview of the debate in nationalism studies on the origin of nations and conclude this part with explaining the process of nation-building.

The concept of nationhood can be divided into two main notions: civic nation and ethnic nation. The first originates from the French rationalist school and according to it nation is '*a modern political community that could not be*

⁵⁹ Olick, Jeffrey K., Joyce Robbins. Social Memory Studies: From "Collective Memory" to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices, *Annual Reviews of Sociology*, Vol. 24, 1998, pp. 105–140, p. 128

⁶⁰ Paloma Aguilar and Carsten Humlebæk have analysed in their article *Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy. The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War* how Spanish political elite was changing according to the political regime the Spanish national memory and how they had to take into account the earlier meanings by reshaping the memory for the new regime.

⁶¹ Heisler, Martin O. Challenged Histories and Collective Self-Concepts: Politics in History, Memory, and Time, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 617, 2008, pp 199–211, p. 201

seen separately from the state institutions'.⁶² The latter is based on the German romanticists' approach where nation is seen as '*a natural entity with deep roots in the past*' and it is a cultural community, which expresses its national will through state institutions.⁶³ In nationalism studies there are four main approaches regarding the origin of nations.

- 1) **'Primordialist' approach** argues that the foundation of national sentiment is its '*kinship, ethnicity and genetic bases of human existence*'⁶⁴. It is the core of nation around which the nation is built and nation is a natural organism that exists in the background until the moment of its rebirth.⁶⁵ Therefore nation is not constructed but it is an enduring community, which has its shared common past and culture, living in a historical homeland and having common economic, educational and judicial systems.⁶⁶ In other words, nations have common traditions, norms and shared past – according to some authors even the same genetic base⁶⁷ – and they attach themselves to a certain territory. The 'Primordialist' approach states that nationalism is a social movement as well as '*an instrument of transmission of the myths, traditions, language, and historical memory that constitute and help to maintain the 'feeling of oneness', or national identity.*'⁶⁸ The 'Primordialist' approach define nation as a determined phenomenon.
- 2) The **'Perennialist' approach** is similar to 'Primordialism. This school denies the biological source of the nation but the scholars see nations as perennial collective actors.⁶⁹ This approach dominates often in political use and it has been an important source for creating overwhelming national history narratives that define the origin of a nation in an ancient times.
- 3) The third approach is offered by the **'Modernists'** or **'Constructivists'** who claim that nations are '*constructs of historical, industrial, and communicative developments (i.e. the invention of mass media, print, and the spread of ideas).*'⁷⁰ Modernists claim that nation as a concept started only during the French Revolution era when '*the ideal of sovereignty of the people was fused with the drive to cultural homogeneity, to forge self-determining nations of co-cultural citizens*'.⁷¹ Nationalism is seen as an ideology '*which holds that*

⁶² Janmaat, Jan Germen. Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of the Nation in Ukraine's History Textbooks, *European Education*, vol 37 (3), 2005, pp. 20–37, p. 21

⁶³ Janmaat, 2005

⁶⁴ Smith, A., 1999, p. 4

⁶⁵ Smith, A., 1999, p. 4

⁶⁶ Smith, Anthony D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 93–117

⁶⁷ See more *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, Pierre L. van den Berghe (1981)

⁶⁸ Budryte, Dovile. *Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet Baltic States*, Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate 2005, p. 16

⁶⁹ Smith, A. 1999, p. 5

⁷⁰ Budryte, 2005, p 16

⁷¹ Smith, A. 1999, p. 6

*the political and national unit should be congruent.*⁷² This approach is more relevant for analysing the role of collective memory in the nation construction. It assumes that national sentiments are constructed by the political elite and therefore opens the analysis of different sources of nation-building.

- 4) The fourth alternative is called the **'Ethno-symbolic' approach**, which tries to overcome of the 'Modernist' shortcomings. According to this school, the ethnic group is the foundation of the nation and nationalism but it accepts that the national character should be constructed. However, the construction has some historical sources. The 'Ethno-symbolic' approach defines nations as *'historical phenomena, not only ... that they are embedded in particular collective pasts and emerge ... through specific historical processes, but also because ... they embody shared memories, traditions, and hopes of the populations designated as parts of the nation'*⁷³ Moreover, the 'Ethno-symbolic' approach observes that most nations are based on ethnic ties, which are an important resource for the process of nation-building. *'For ethno-symbolist, what gives nationalism its power are the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritage and in the ways in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias.'*⁷⁴ In other words, 'Ethno-symbolists' see that nation is based on national sentiments that need to be evoked plus continuous internalisation of these values. Smith refers to his earlier definition of the 'ethnie' as *'a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among élites.'*⁷⁵ An important aspect of this definition is the shared historical memories and myths of common ancestry, which Smith defines as ethno-history that includes *'long-term relationship between national past, present, and future'*.⁷⁶ For this approach the main focus is on the nexus between shared collective memories and collective cultural identities.⁷⁷

All of the above-described approaches define nationalism as an ideology that helps to integrate and to mobilise the masses as well as to define the national self. Thus, it is the key instrument of nation-building in a nation-state. The dispute is over the origin of this ideology – is there some prehistoric national consciousness that is evoked during the modernisation process or does the modern society construct this consciousness that can be called the process of

⁷² Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford : Blackwell, 1984, p. 1

⁷³ Smith, A. 1999, p. 10

⁷⁴ Smith, A. 1999, p. 9

⁷⁵ Smith, A. 1999, p. 13

⁷⁶ Budryte, p. 21

⁷⁷ Smith, A. 1999, p. 10

nation-building? The first two of these schools originate from the German romanticists' approach of ethnic nation but they are both strongly deterministic and therefore they are not able to provide a sufficient framework for my research. The 'Modernist' approach, which is based on the French rationalists' approach, offers the way to analyse nations as political constructions but it neglects the impact of earlier past and ethnic elements that help to understand the national collective memory and its work. In my research I take the middle ground approach, the 'Ethno-symbolic' one, which tries to combine both sides – agreeing that national identity is constructed but for its construction the earlier past of an ethnic group and its cultural elements are used. In addition, this approach is focused on relations between national collective memory and national cultural identity. In my study I concentrate on the political dimension of this nexus and I analyse how the national collective memory is used by the political elite for national identity formation in a nation-state context.

Nation-building is the process that evokes national sentiments and helps to construct national identity. William Bloom explains nation-building based on identification theory, defining nation-building as '*the process whereby inhabitants of a state's territory come to be loyal citizens of that state*'.⁷⁸ In other words, the state population associates themselves with the state where they live and the entire population becomes a social group that individuals identify themselves with and therefore they are loyal to their group and state, which is the institutionalised symbol of the group. Nation-building aims to create solidarity among its population to enable responsibility among them to use it for building up state institutions and achieving its political aims.⁷⁹ This solidarity creates among the state population imagined community feeling, which is a crucial element in political strategy for mass mobilization.⁸⁰ Therefore the nation-building is constructing psychological relationship between the masses and the state. It should be achieved internally (the state itself is not challenged by any internal group) and internationally ('*a clear political solidarity in relation to the external environment*').⁸¹

Robert A. Wilson claims that the nation is the most important social group for individuals and also usually their primary identification in the current world.⁸² Bloom agrees that the easiest way to achieve the loyalty of masses to

⁷⁸ Bloom, William. *Personal Identity, national identity and international relations*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990, p. 55

⁷⁹ Spinner-Halev, Jeff. Democracy, Solidarity and Post-Nationalism, *Political Studies*, Vol. 56 (3), 2008, pp. 604–628, p 605

⁸⁰ Jureit, Ulrike. Imagination and Kollektiv. Die "Erfindung" politischer Gemeinschaften, in *Politische Kollektive. Zur Konstruktion rassistischer, nationaler und ethnischer Gemeinschaften*, Ulrike Jureit (ed), Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2001, pp 7–20, p. 14

⁸¹ Bloom, 1990, p. 58

⁸² Wilson, Robert A. Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis, *Cognitive Processing*, Vol. 6 (4), 2005, pp. 227–236, p. 233

the state is to use national sentiments as a source of loyalty. However, the fact of belonging to a nation itself does not increase the loyalty to a state but it should be evoked. *'This evocation will come about if symbols of the state – be they individuals, ideas, or rituals – present a mode of behaviour or a set of attitudes the adoptions of which will enhance identity and psychological security.'*⁸³ Spinner-Halev adds that *'[n]ational identities are rarely created anew; they are made up of elements that already exist, stitched together a national identity through political process.'*⁸⁴ National identity includes often several components from national cultures but it is not coinciding with it fully because the latter is much broader and less clear than national identity markers.⁸⁵ Thus, nation-building in a nation-state focuses on evoking national consciousness and combining the state and nation symbols to establish broad national solidarity and loyalty of nation members towards the nation-state. It is also in accord with the 'Ethno-symbolic' approach that claims that nationalism as the driving force for the nation-building derives its power from the shared past and ethnic heritage that should be evoked and organised by the national elite. Thus national identity can be defined as nation-wide solidarity where the individuals identify themselves with a nation, which is formed based on ethnic origin and institutionalised by a state they feel loyalty to.

On the other hand, it is not sufficient to define national identity as an individual's feeling of belongingness to a nation with a feeling of solidarity with other nation members and loyalty to the state. In addition national identity as any other identity has the function of constructing borders. Political communities of similar individuals with imagined and institutionalised perceptions establish imaginary borders between them and those who are considered as others or foreigners.⁸⁶ Michael Billig claims that in the case of national identity:

*'not only do the members have to imagine themselves as nationals; not only do they have to imagine their nation as a community; but they must also imagine that they know what a nation is; and they have to identify the identity of their own nation.'*⁸⁷

It means that the feeling of solidarity and loyalty is not sufficient but it is also important that the individuals acknowledge what is the meaning and significance of being a member of this nation and that they share these values and understandings.

Every social group has certain identity markers that define the border between group members and the others and it is the grounds for group

⁸³ Bloom, 1990, p. 61

⁸⁴ Spinner-Halev, 2008, p. 606

⁸⁵ Spinner-Halev, 2008, pp. 607–608

⁸⁶ Jureit, 2001, p. 7

⁸⁷ Billig, Michael. *Banal Nationalism*, London: Sage Publications, 1995, p. 68

solidarity, which makes the group act for common goals.⁸⁸ Identity markers do not only include the in-group related elements but often describe out-groups to strengthen its solidarity.⁸⁹ Duncan Bell adds that recognition of ‘*oneself as a member of a particular nation ... and to be recognized by others as such, is a perquisite for the formation of the inside/outside, self/other, us/them boundaries.*’⁹⁰ Individuals within a national group can differ from each other but they are immediately able to differentiate the third as Other or external.⁹¹ ‘We’ image is produced through the mirror-image towards the Other⁹² and the self-image is presented as a positive one and the Other-image is presented different, often as negative, especially in the case of the significant Other.⁹³ This process where the ‘*ascribing identity to the Self through the often negative attribution of characteristics to the Other*’ is called otherization.⁹⁴ Therefore to understand national identity it is not sufficient to study the identity itself but also to understand the role of the Other. Jakob Tanner adds that since the 19th century when nationalism became the main force for constructing collective identities us-consciousness unified societies against the Other, the stranger who was perceived as an enemy.⁹⁵ Thus, national identity is more than a psychological state of an individual. It is an intersubjective understanding of political community, defining who insiders are and who outsiders are. In this process national history is the main source for defining national identity markers that are used to draw the borders between different nations and thus also has significance for international relations. Therefore national memory as the crucial source of national identity markers is also the main focus of my research.

The above-mentioned two different understandings of the concept of nation also define two different types of nation-building. Nation-building based on the French rationalists’ civic nation concept aims at the unification of entire population of the state and it does not emphasise so much ethnic origin. The

⁸⁸ Spinner-Halev, 2008, pp. 607–608

⁸⁹ Scherif, Muzaffer, Scherif, Carolyn W. Sherif. *Groups in Harmony and Tension. An Integration of Studies on Intergroup Relations*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953

⁹⁰ Bell, Duncan S. A. „Mythscapes: memory, mythology, and national identity“, *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 54 (1), 2003, pp. 63–81, p. 64

⁹¹ Sarasin, Philipp. Die Wirklichkeit der Fiktion. Zum Konzept der imagined communities, in *Politische Kollektive. Zur Konstruktion rassistischer, nationaler und ethnischer Gemeinschaften*, Ulrike Jureit (ed), Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2001, pp. 22–45, p. 36

⁹² Jureit, 2001, p. 9

⁹³ Bryant, Chad. Whose Nation? Czech Dissidents and History Writing from a Post-1989 Perspective, *History and Memory*, Vol. 12 (1), 2000, pp. 30–64, p. 34

⁹⁴ Holliday, Adrian, Martin Hyde and John Kullman. *Intercultural Communication. An Advanced Resource Book*, London, New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 180

⁹⁵ Tanner, Jakob. Nation, Kommunikation und Gedächtnis. Die Produktivkraft des Imaginären und Aktualität Ernst Renans, in *Politische Kollektive. Zur Konstruktion rassistischer, nationaler und ethnischer Gemeinschaften*, Ulrike Jureit (ed), Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2001, pp. 46–67, p. 49

other option based on the German romanticists' concept of ethnic nation aims at unification and institutionalisation of an ethnic group.⁹⁶ The civic nation concept is more often used in Western Europe where the development of a state and a nation went hand in hand by establishing defined territorial unit constructed around a certain ethnic group. In this process other ethnic groups were fused into the state and therefore also the nation-building has aimed at the unification of the entire population where loyalty towards the state has been more important than ethnic solidarity. The ethnic nation concept is more common in Central and Eastern Europe where the national consciousness of ethnic groups developed before they could institutionalize their nation as a sovereign state because they belonged to different multinational empires.⁹⁷ Therefore the nation-building in this region aimed rather at the ethnic group's right for existence than unification of the population on a certain territory. Miroslav Hroch describes the national movements in the region as follows:

*Its goals covered three main groups of demands, which corresponded to felt deficits of national existence: (1) the development of a national culture based on the local language, and its normal use in education, administration and economic life; (2) the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration, initially in the form of autonomy and ultimately (usually quite late, as an express demand) of independence; (3) the creation of a complete social structure from out of the ethnic group, including educated elites, an officialdom and an entrepreneurial class, but also – where necessary – free peasants and organized workers.*⁹⁸

The character of the nation-building has been rather protective one and it has created a hostile image about the external Others. Therefore the relations between the nations and ethnic groups in Central and Eastern Europe are often full of distrust and thus, also securitized.⁹⁹ By deconstructing national collective memory and national identity it is possible to understand the reasons of these threats and distrust.

⁹⁶ Martínez-Herrera, Enric. From nation-building to building identification with political communities: Consequences of political decentralisation in Spain, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, 1978–2001, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 41, 2002, pp. 421–453, p. 234

⁹⁷ Smith, Anthony D. State Making and Nation-Building, in *The State: Critical Concepts*, John Hall (ed), London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 59–89, pp. 67–68

⁹⁸ Hroch, Miroslav. From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation Building Process in Europe, in *Mapping the Nation*, Gopal Balakrishnan (ed), London: Verso, 1996, pp. 78–97, p. 81

⁹⁹ Kymlicka, Will. Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: West and East, *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, Issue 4, 2002, p. 20; The securitization means that the policy maker has claimed to use extraordinary means to deal with this issue. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wild. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996, p. 24

1.3. Collective Memory and National Identity

In the first part I concluded that collective memory has an important role for identity formation. I also defined the concept of nation and concluded that to understand the nation-building processes it is important to analyse the national identity markers. National collective memory is the main source of the national identity markers and therefore I continue with the nexus between national memory and national identity.

In defining the concept of collective memory the debate about the functioning of individual and collective memory was also noted. First, I start with the individual level to understand better memory functioning. James Booth claims that memory is the crucial source for an individual's identity by unifying an individual's life through time and presenting its continuity.¹⁰⁰ Individual life is full of different events and the individual tries to form it as a comprehensive whole by giving different meanings for them and also forgetting some events depending on present needs. However, memory is offering a source to reflect who the individual is and how the person fits to the defined identity. Therefore memory has a central role for an individual to identify oneself. One can observe a similar function of the memory on the group level. Friedrich Kratochwil emphasises that similarly to the individual level also on the group level memory combines past, present and future to define group's identity.¹⁰¹ Halbwachs defines collective memory as '*the glue that holds the social group together*' and it defines the meanings and actions for the social group and through it also for the individual.¹⁰² Therefore for the understanding of group's identity it is crucial to comprehend how the group perceives its past.¹⁰³

National identity as one of the collective identities is defined by national collective memory¹⁰⁴. Pierre Nora defines the concept of cultural memory of a nation, '*which, as a network of symbols, values, rites, and local traditions provides the cohesive cement of a society.*'¹⁰⁵ He also adds that it is a process of reproducing the past in the present acting on nation and makes the nation to

¹⁰⁰ Booth, W. James. The Work of Memory: Time, Identity and Justice, *Social Research: An International Quarterly of the Social Sciences*, vol 75, no 1, 2008, pp 237–262, p. 239

¹⁰¹ Kratochwil, Friedrich. History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the 'Second' Great Debate and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12 (1), 2006, pp. 5–29, p. 16

¹⁰² Narvaez, 2006, p. 58

¹⁰³ Kratochwil, 2006, p. 16

¹⁰⁴ A. Smith defines it as ethno-history, which is '*ethnic members memories and understanding of their communal past or pasts...[s]uch a mode of historical discourse has three facets: it is multi-stranded and contested; it is always subject to change; it is globally uneven*' Smith, 1999, p. 16

¹⁰⁵ Assmann, A. 2008, p. 60

act.¹⁰⁶ In other words, similarly to any other collective identity also the national one needs a glue that keeps the nation together and makes it to act and national cultural memory has this function. It is also important to add that this national memory is institutionalised and internalised by a state into society. Therefore I define national collective memory as commonly shared memories by the members of the nation that are institutionalised by a state and defining where the nation comes from and what it is. Thereby it provides cohesion for the nation and prescribes its actions.

National collective memory defines national identity that includes national continuing characteristics and commonly shared values, its perceived strengths and weaknesses, as well as its hopes and fears. It also includes national reputation and its conditions for existence, as well as institutions and traditions which are valued.¹⁰⁷ Two different types of collective memories were defined above: primary memory and mediated memory. In the context of national memory, Müller defines the first as ‘mass individual memory’, which is ‘*recollection of events which individuals actually lived through*’ and the latter as ‘national memory’, which is ‘*a social framework through which nationally conscious individuals can organise their memory*’.¹⁰⁸ Differently from the mass individual memory, national memory is more open for political manipulations and used for policy legitimisation. In my study I focus on the second concept because it is the mediated memory, which is the source for national identity and it forms the national consciousness and solidarity.

National memory combines representations of ‘*the “spirit”, the “psyche”, of a society, a tribe, a nation.*’¹⁰⁹ It is the set of different traditions, experiences and practices relevant for the existence of a society by transferring the shared understandings and set of values not only among the group members but also through different generations. National memory carries the memories of the national past and preserves national traditions, customs, and values. Smith argues that these elements give meaning for nation to exist in present as a state and defining its national identity.¹¹⁰ In other words, national memory binds the nation to one specific social group that is institutionalised as a state and shares common identity. Thus, national identity can be seen as a form of political

¹⁰⁶ Berliner, David. The Abuses of Memory: Reflections on the Memory Boom in Anthropology, *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 78 (1), 2005, pp. 197–211, p. 201

¹⁰⁷ Kelman, Herbert C. The Place of Ethnic Identity in the Development of Personal Identity: A Challenge for the Jewish Family’, in *Coping With Life and Death: Jewish Families in the Twentieth Century*, Peter Y. Medding (ed), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 3–26, p. 16

¹⁰⁸ Müller, p. 3, see also Snyder, Timothy. Memory of Sovereignty and sovereignty over memory: Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, 1939–1999, in *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, Jan-Werner Müller (ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 39–58, p. 39

¹⁰⁹ Gedi, Elam, 1996, p. 35

¹¹⁰ Smith, A. 1999, pp. 11–15

memory.¹¹¹ Similarly to Gedi and Elam's conclusion that political elite defines the social memory in a nation-state, national memory is defined by the national elite and it is a crucial tool for nation-building because it defines national identity markers. In other words, it locates the national memory in the central place in the formation of national identity.¹¹²

Nations are projected in history and the modern nations are seen as the final result of a long historical process. This 'Perennialist' assumption is challenged by the 'Constructivist' school with the argument that '[n]ations are not self-contained entities, but are fluid and under constant influences from outside'.¹¹³ Ernest Renan connected the past and present in his definition of nation by saying that on the one hand, a nation lives together because of its 'rich legacy of memories' and on the other hand, these people share the desire to continue live together to maintain this heritage.¹¹⁴ In other words, present solidarity among the members of nations is linked to the past heritage. Therefore a nation is constructed through history where 'the past and present are linked in one collective group ... it is a two-dimensional group, operating simultaneously in the past and the present'.¹¹⁵ However, the nation is more a belief that people share than a result of historical research.¹¹⁶ In this context Graham Smith defines three levels of national identity formation based on the collective memory. On the first level will be defined how identity will be built – on common experiences or common ancestry¹¹⁷. The second level aims to enroot these identified traits by rediscovery of common past of the nation or certain periods like the Golden Age of the nation. The third level establishes concrete borders between different individuals by claiming who we are (sharing common heritage) and who are not us (do not share it).¹¹⁸ The 'Ethno-symbolic' approach also underlines that shared memory is the source of national identity construction and border-drawing between national Self and Others.

Similarly to J. Assmann's proposition about the cultural memory, Renan claims that the memories of the past heritage of a nation are defined in present.

¹¹¹ Assmann, Aleida (A). *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit. Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik*, München: C.H. Beck, 2006, p. 36

¹¹² Ashuri, Tamar. The nation remembers: national identity and shared memory in television documentaries, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11 (3), 2005, pp. 423–425

¹¹³ Hálfðanarson, Guðmundur. Þingvellir. An Icelandic "Lieu de Mémoire", *History & Memory*, Vol. 12, 2000, pp. 4–29, p. 6

¹¹⁴ Renan, Ernest. „What is nation?“, in *Becoming Nations: a Reader*, Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 42–56, p. 52

¹¹⁵ Hálfðanarson, 2000, p. 9

¹¹⁶ Hálfðanarson, 2000, p. 14

¹¹⁷ Common experience goes together with the civic concept of nation; common ancestry does with ethnic concept.

¹¹⁸ Hansen, Imke. Belarussische Identitäts- und Geschichtskonstruktionen im öffentlichen Raum, in *Nationen und ihre Selbstbilder. Postdiktatorische Gesellschaften in Europa*, Regina Fritz, Carola Sachse, Edgar Wolfrum (eds), Wallstein Verlag: Göttingen, 2008, pp. 233–252, p. 234

Memory works as interaction between forgetting and remembering to form a commonly shared framework of the past.¹¹⁹ It means that every nation defines itself by what they remember and what they forget and it defines what the nation is.¹²⁰ Thus, similarly to the individual memory, the collective one is malleable. Like an individual reconsiders his own past depending on life developments, the collective memory is also reviewed constantly depending on current events and political needs.¹²¹ Therefore the relationship between memory and identity is not only one-sided. John R. Gillis claims that memory and identity are mutually constitutive objects. Not only memory defines identity but also identity defines memory. Memory as identity is nothing entrenched but as identity so memory is subjective representation and construction of reality and people revise memory to better suit their identities.¹²² This mutually constitutive nexus can be observed in the context of the nation-state. On the one hand, national memory defines national identity, but on the other hand, national memory is interpreted through the national cause.¹²³ In other words, national memory gives meaning for the nation, defining its past existence, how the nation is related to the surrounding world today and also prescribing its future developments. On the other hand, these memories that are used for national identification are influenced by the current nationalist ideology aiming at the strengthening national identity. Therefore national remembering is not a spontaneous process that occurs itself but it is evoked and forged according to the present needs of the national elite. Thus, national memory and national identity are mutually constitutive phenomena.

Halbwachs argues that the memory gives the individual the meaning of being (identity) and it is understood through the collective level by giving meaning also for the social group and draws the lines between 'us' and 'them'.¹²⁴ Collective memory is the way how an individual identifies oneself with a group because the group perceives the past in the same way. By identifying oneself with a group and merging one's own past with the group's, an individual will remain related with the social group, which defines individual's worldview, which is forged by the shared perceptions and understandings of the group.¹²⁵ This is the source of loyalty and solidarity towards one's own group and it defines the individual's view towards Others. Thus, memory helps individuals to define the world they live in.¹²⁶ Collective memory is an

¹¹⁹ Todorov, Tzvetan. *The Uses and Abuses of Memory*, in *What Happens to History. The Renewal of Ethics in Contemporary Thought*, Howard Marchitello (ed), New York, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 11–22, p. 12

¹²⁰ Renan, 1996, p. 52

¹²¹ Kratochwil, 2006, p. 17

¹²² Gillis, 1994, p. 3

¹²³ Hálfdanarson, 2000, p. 13

¹²⁴ Narvaez, 2006, p. 58

¹²⁵ Halbwachs, Maurice. *The Collective Memory*, New York: Harper & Row Colophon Books, 1980, pp 25–26

¹²⁶ Gillis, 1994, p. 3

important tool for an individual to define his own being and it binds the individual to the social group. Individual identity is understood only through the social group, and it defines the main identification boundaries for the individual for understanding his past, present and future. In the framework of the nation-state national identity is the main instrument how individuals define the surrounding world and how the borders between 'us' and 'them' are established. Here national memory is working as a '*powerful cohesive force ... it demarcates the boundary between Them and Us, delineating the national self from the foreign, alien Other.*'¹²⁷ An individual who is sharing the similar understanding of the past and identifying oneself with a national group will draw these borders based on the national division lines, which are defined by national memory. It means that individuals interpret the events and phenomena through the national context they identify with.

National memory as cultural memory maintains and transfers these cultural and political meanings – in other words identity markers – that define the nation. It is the basis for the second function of memory to unify the nation in a single and coherent group and define the boundaries with others. National memory as any other collective ones has the character of inheritance that makes it work as the cement of society.¹²⁸ Therefore national memory is '*passed from generation to generation, transmigrating across multiple historical contexts.*'¹²⁹ Though the meanings are reconsidered and redefined by each generations and the substance of the national memory is influenced by the present context, individuals have to adopt its main values and meanings to identify with the national group. A. Assmann claims:

*'Each "we" is constructed through shared practices and discourses that mark certain boundaries and define the principles of inclusion and exclusion. To be part of a collective group such as the nation one has to share and adopt the group's history, which exceeds the boundaries of one's individual life span.'*¹³⁰

Therefore national memory is adopted by learning and it forms national identity, which requires internalisation of national memory.¹³¹ For this purpose national memory should be institutionalised and it defines certain symbols, narratives and activities of commemoration that help to set the group (us) apart from the others (them).¹³² Even though the symbols do exist then shared collective memories would wane together with the community that experienced the

¹²⁷ Bell, 2003, p. 70

¹²⁸ Booth, 2008, p. 251; Kratochwil, 2006, p. 16

¹²⁹ Bell, 2003, p. 70

¹³⁰ Assmann, A. 2008, p. 52

¹³¹ Assmann, A. 2008, p. 52

¹³² Hálfðanarson, 2000, p. 5

memorised event.¹³³ The function of national memory as a political memory is to transfer these meanings and redefine them and thereafter to internalise it in the society to keep the memory as a cement of the nation-state.

In addition to the time, which is expressed as collective memory, space is another identity marker. Environment has crucial part in identity and memory construction. Agents as based on the memory and identity, shape surroundings for remembering, which strengthens their identity.¹³⁴ Joël Candau claims that memory is ‘topophilic’ because it is related to certain places and objects. All events remembered are usually related to some certain locations that become site of memories and it is the ground for the group identity that remembers it.¹³⁵ Changing the space includes also rewriting of the past, thus changing its memory, and it leads to the change of identity.¹³⁶ In the context of national identity, territory has crucial role. In the case of ethnic nation, territory is one of the key elements that defines the nation and legitimises its existence.¹³⁷ For a member of a national group a territory where they live is their traditional homeland, which defines their collective identity and expresses their symbolic right to include it their cultural self-definition.¹³⁸ ‘*The desire for this land, and the identification with it, served as the basis for national solidarity and definitions of national collectivities*’.¹³⁹ Meaning of a territory as their historical homeland comes from their collective memory, which was constructed to justify the existence of a national group in this particular space. It gives them the right to establish certain identity related symbols in this space. Therefore one can say that also space is an important element for identity formation and together with time they form a mutually influencing triadic nexus that is especially important in the context of post-imperial space defined in the section 1.6.

After defining the key elements of the national identity, my analysis continues with functions of national memory. National memory is a secondary memory, which is mediated by cultural tools that are provided in the national context and they shape individuals’ speaking and thinking in the way that they reproduce the national memory.¹⁴⁰ Peter Burke defines five main channels how

¹³³ Hynes, Samuel. *The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War*, London: Allen Lane, 1997, p. 206

¹³⁴ Schleifman, Nurit. Moscows Victory Park. A Monumental Change, *History & Memory*, 13 (2), 2001, pp. 5–34, p. 6

¹³⁵ Tamm, Marek, Saale Halla. Ajalugu, poliitika ja identiteet: Eesti monumentaalsest mälumaastikust, in *Monumentaalne konflikt. Mälu, poliitika ja identiteet tänapäevases Eestis*, Pille Petersoo, Marek Tamm (eds), Tallinn: Varrak, 2008, pp. 18–50, p. 21

¹³⁶ Hodgkin, Katharine, Susannah Radstone. “Introduction: Contested pasts”, in *Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory*, Katharine Hodgkin, Susannah Radstone (eds), London, New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 1–21, pp. 12

¹³⁷ Smith, A. 1999, p. 14; Smith, A. 1991, p. 93

¹³⁸ Kapralski, Sławomir. Battlefields of Memory. Landscape and Identity in Polish-Jewish Relations, *History & Memory*, 13 (2), 2001, pp. 35–58, p. 35

¹³⁹ Hålfdanarson, 2000, p. 20

¹⁴⁰ Wertsch (b), 2008, p. 139

the collective memory is mediated.¹⁴¹ I specify these channels in the context of nation-state.

- 1) **Oral traditions as oral channels** – they can be seen as the communicative memory that has an impact on the national public discourse in the nation-building process.
- 2) **Written channels** – history books and other writings or records that try to define the national past and discuss different events in the framework of national master narrative. They are the most used channels. Written channels are not only memory acts but they try to convince people and form their national memory.
- 3) **Visual channels** – visual objects like photos, pictures, movies, documentaries that try to depict the national past and retell the national story. Today they are very influential channels.
- 4) **Action channels** – different commemoration activities and rituals that are organized to strengthen national consciousness and thereby to shape national identity.
- 5) **Space channels** – marking national territory with different symbols (erecting memorials, naming and mapping the territory etc) helps to strengthen national identity.

All these channels are used in public sphere to mediate and thereby to internalise national memory. Public discourse is important field to analyse the work of these channels. Michel Foucault (1969) claims that ‘*discourses are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak*’.¹⁴² Therefore public discourses are not only using the symbols and signs maintained in the collective memory, but also construct its meaning and thereby construct the national identity. In other words, nation is a discursive formation.¹⁴³

National memory functions through national history narratives that carry on memories of a national group that reproduce national identity and provides explanations for the past events and their connections with present, also providing prescriptions for the future.¹⁴⁴ Narrative is an intrinsic social phenomenon in all societies that aims to translate knowing into telling. It has concrete structure with the starting point, middle part and ending.¹⁴⁵ It is also

¹⁴¹ Burke, Peter. *Kultuuride kohtumine. Esseid uuest kultuuriajaloo*, Tallinn: Varrak, 2006, pp. 56–58; compare with the memory realms or sites proposed by Nora, symbolic, functional, monumental and topographic sites. See more from Nora, Pierre. „General introduction: between memory and history“, in *Realms of Memory*, vol. 1, Pierre Nora (ed), New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 1–20, p. 20

¹⁴² Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, London, New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 54

¹⁴³ Brennan, Timothy. The national longing for form, in *Nation and Narration*, Homi K. Bhabha (ed), London, New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 44–70, p. 46

¹⁴⁴ Smith, R. 2003, pp. 64–65

¹⁴⁵ White, Hayden. The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in *On Narrative*, W. J. T. Mitchell (ed), Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981, pp. 1–23, pp. 1–2

important to underline that narrative is not only a story about what happened but it gives also explanations and draws conclusions by offering assessments.¹⁴⁶ Therefore there are three different analytical categories: 'fabula', 'story' and 'narrative text'. The first is a set of logically and chronologically related events. The second forms from 'fabula' a functional narrative by

*'the arrangement of events in a sequence which can be different from their actual chronological order, providing the social agents of actual events with 'distinct traits' which transform them into characters and 'focalizing' the story in terms of a particular 'point of view'.*¹⁴⁷

And the third one is related to the medium where the story is presented by having different characters of performance and agenda settings.¹⁴⁸ Therefore narrative consists of the events that should not be all chronologically presented but it forms a coherent story and organises the events sequence based on the medium it is presented in and the reason why the story is told.¹⁴⁹ My main research focus is on the second category (story) presented in different countries in similar medium.

National history master narratives contributes to nation-building by narrating a story, which depicts the nations as a unified group moving through history, even in the case if it does not fully correspond to the reality.¹⁵⁰ Michel-Rolph Trouillot claims that narratives distort the life even if the evidences they use are truthful.¹⁵¹ Therefore narrative constructs a subjective image of continuity of the nation through one comprehensive connected story of past, instead of showing it as random and separate events.¹⁵² Heisler adds that these narratives 'narrate origins; and, more important, they mark the path the collectivity [nation] has traveled in history to become what it is now, or what it seems to stand for to many or most of its members.'¹⁵³ National master narratives connect the past events, national memory as social framework gives specific meaning for them that is adopted by members of the nation and thereby enables them to identify themselves with the national group. Therefore it is also important to underline

¹⁴⁶ Munslow, Alun. *Deconstructing History*, London, New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 175

¹⁴⁷ Fairclough, 2003, p. 83

¹⁴⁸ Fairclough, 2003, p. 83–84; Smith, Barbara Herrnstein. Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories, in *On Narrative*, W. J. T. Mitchell (ed), Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981, pp. 209–232, p. 210

¹⁴⁹ White, 1981, p. 19

¹⁵⁰ Zerubavel, Yael. *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 7

¹⁵¹ Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. *Silencing the Past: Power and Production of History*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1995, p. 6

¹⁵² Tamm, Halla, 2008, p. 19

¹⁵³ Heisler, 2008, p. 203

the zero point¹⁵⁴ of the national narrative that defines the main memory cult of this society.¹⁵⁵ National narratives define also the key values and norms that a nation identifies with and promotes them.¹⁵⁶ Thus,

‘interpretation of ‘the past’ can be described as shaping historical events into a meaningful narrative framework, based on shared symbolic systems, values and memories that are reaffirmed as they are represented. These representations provide the scaffolding for a shared ... political, cultural and social discourse – the site of national identity.’¹⁵⁷

National narrative ‘tells itself about itself ... indicate and form its self-image – its collective identity or sense of collective self.’¹⁵⁸ It has only an external relationship to the others.¹⁵⁹ Tanner states that ‘us’-perception is the central task of the history.¹⁶⁰ The national narrative provides an overview of the past of a collective, national ‘us’ thereby defining its character and identity. Thus national identity and national narratives become inseparable because narratives construct the identity by defining the differences and boundaries between the national group and Others.¹⁶¹ Therefore national narrative can be defined as the backbone of national memory that is adopted by all individuals who are nationally conscious. The national narrative is the main cohesive element for constructing a national identity and thus of particular interest for national memory analysis. Therefore national narratives are the main study object in my research.

National master narratives present the nation as a unified unit with its destiny and interests.¹⁶² The destinies of nations can vary but there are some general characteristics common for the national narratives. The self-image constructed by the national narrative is positive and heroic.¹⁶³ Bloom claims that national prestige is the strongest force that strengthens the national identity and thereby it enables to mobilise the masses.¹⁶⁴ Therefore also the positive self-image in the national narrative is crucial. ‘It is this mechanism that ensures the

¹⁵⁴ The national starting point defined by narrative as the moment when nation was born

¹⁵⁵ Debray, Régis. Marxism and the national question, *New Left Review I*, 105, 1977, pp. 25–41, p. 27, cited in Brennan, 2003, p. 51

¹⁵⁶ Smith, R. 2003, p. 64

¹⁵⁷ Ashuri, 2005, p. 424

¹⁵⁸ Heisler, 2008, p. 203

¹⁵⁹ Booth, 2008, p. 242

¹⁶⁰ Tanner, 2001, p. 60

¹⁶¹ Bennington, Geoffrey. Postal politics and the institution of the nation, in *Nation and Narration*, Homi K. Bhabha (ed), London, New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 121–137, p. 132

¹⁶² Hálfðanarson, 2000, p. 7

¹⁶³ Walzer, Michael. *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*, Notre Dame and London: Notre Dame University Press, 1994, p. 42; Smith, R. 2003, p. 160

¹⁶⁴ Bloom, 1990, p. 84

*conditions of possibility for the idealisation of the group's own self the uncontaminated ground on which it is possible to construct the ideal image of the nation.*¹⁶⁵ However, in the past there have been periods and events that conflict with the positive self-image. In this case the narrative is forgetting the events and forming national identity around the point of silence that makes the nation a 'collection of people who have resolved to stay silent about the same thing'¹⁶⁶. The alternative is that the narrative personalises the past crimes, thereby purifying the anonymous nation from the negative image.¹⁶⁷ Thereby the ideal image of the nation stays unmolested and it can be the source for national prestige that increases loyalty to the state.

On the other hand, construction of national identity is a relational process where Self needs also Other that is the mirror-image to Self. The substance of the Other is constructed in the way that Other is something that Self is not.¹⁶⁸ In the national narrative the Other is often depicted through the negative image as much as Self is positive. Tanner claims that these kinds of narratives were important especially in the 19th century when nations were united towards Others as enemies. Olick claims that in the contemporary world these unifying narratives are more often challenged by multiculturalism that provides alternative narratives and therefore nation-states continue offering these narratives more cautiously.¹⁶⁹ However, nationalising states¹⁷⁰ that are building up their nation-state often choose the above-described national narrative because it helps to strengthen the newly established national identity and form loyalty towards the state.

A newly established state does not have a long history to narrate but the history of a nation can be created as a story that dates back to ancient times.¹⁷¹ It

¹⁶⁵ Robins, Kevin, Asu Aksoy. Deep nation: the national question and Turkish cinema culture, in *Cinema and Nation*, Mette Hjort and Scott MacKenzie (eds), London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 203–221, p. 206

¹⁶⁶ Sibony, Daniel. *Le 'Racisme' ou la Haine Identitaire*, Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1997, p 248, cited in Ashuri, 2005, p 427; see also Feige, Michael. Rescuing the Person from the Symbol. "Peace Now" and the Ironies of Modern Myth, *History & Memory*, Vol. 11 (1), 1999, pp. 141–168, p. 143

¹⁶⁷ Bryant, 2000, pp. 42–43

¹⁶⁸ Neumann, Iver B. *Uses of the Other. 'The East' in European Identity Formation*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, p. 17

¹⁶⁹ Olick, Jeffrey K. *The politics of regret : on collective memory and historical responsibility*, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 192

¹⁷⁰ Rogers Brubaker defines nationalizing state as 'the state as an "unrealized" nation-state, as a state destined to be a nation-state, the state of and for a particular nation, but not yet in fact a nation-state (at least not to a sufficient degree); and the concomitant disposition to remedy this perceived defect, to make the state what it is properly and legitimately destined to be, by promoting the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, or political hegemony.' *National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe*, *Daedalus*, Vol. 124 (2), 1995, pp. 107–132, p. 114

¹⁷¹ Spinner-Halev, 2008, p. 609

narrates about the ancient origins of the nation that has heroically fought against external suppressors, who often are the negative, significant others, to implement the nation's historical duty to live freely and to be sovereign.¹⁷² The suppressed violence in the past can often lead to the victimisation of the nation¹⁷³ that is highlighted in the national narrative. Sometimes victimisation is considered even more strengthening of national identity than glorifying past narratives.¹⁷⁴ On the other hand, victimisation can in many cases become grounds for national hostility towards the significant Other and impact on present relations.¹⁷⁵ These narratives can also securitize the Others as Kymlicka has claimed. Petr Pithart claims that the strong polarisation and enemy images in national narratives can come from fear of dealing with its own past¹⁷⁶ and therefore instead of trying to construct a more complex narrative it applies simple black and white patterns.

National memory becomes collective because nationally conscious individuals are sharing the same narrative tools that are '*provided through formal education, public holidays, family discussions, the media, and so forth.*'¹⁷⁷ In other words, national memory functions therefore on individuals unconsciously where the national discourse is expressed by the individuals by the cultural tools that are internalised by state institutions.¹⁷⁸ James Wertsch distinguishes two different levels of narrative organisation:

- 1) **Specific narratives** – stories that narrate about specific events and explain their significance in the entire national narrative. '*Events involved in specific narratives are uniquely situated in space and time, and they may have occurred during one's own lifetime or in earlier periods.*'¹⁷⁹
- 2) **Schematic narrative templates** – is a general narrative plot that offers a framework for different events, carrying the same meanings for the entire national narrative. They '*produce replicas that vary in their details but reflect a single general story line.*'¹⁸⁰

Specific narratives are case based, trying to tell a story about the event that happened. Wertsch adds that on the national level specific narratives usually

¹⁷² Hálfðanarson, 2000, pp. 14–15

¹⁷³ Minow, 1998, p. 147

¹⁷⁴ Ingimundarson, Valur. The Politics of Memory and the Reconstruction of Albanian National Identity in Postwar Kosovo, *History & Memory*, vol. 19 (1), 2007, pp. 95–123, p. 99

¹⁷⁵ Williams, Brian Glyn. Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya. The Role of Memorialization and Collective Memory in the 1994–1996 and 1999–2000 Russo-Chechen Wars, *History & Memory*, Vol. 12 (1), 2000, pp. 101–134, p. 107

¹⁷⁶ Bryant, 2000, p. 47

¹⁷⁷ Wertsch (b), 2008, p. 139

¹⁷⁸ Olick, 1999, p. 342

¹⁷⁹ Wertsch (c), James V. The Narrative Organization of Collective Memory, *Ethos*, Vol. 36 (1), 2008, pp. 120–135, p. 122

¹⁸⁰ Wertsch (c), 2008, p. 123

narrate mid-level events that ‘*typically involve groups operating in an extended, but clearly identified setting.*’¹⁸¹ In other words, mid-level events narrated in the context of collective, usually political, group are usually the most convenient for national narratives. Although events are narrated in the context of a political group also individuals occur but these narratives depersonalise individuals and construct a story that enhances these values necessary for national coherence.¹⁸² Schematic narrative templates provide a broader framework for the specific narratives and therefore they are also more abstract than the narratives first level. However, they are not universal archetypes but they can differ from one social group to the other.¹⁸³ Schematic narrative templates are transparent in the sense that individuals using them are not able to understand the power of these narrative templates to form the story. ‘*It is as if we look through them without recognizing their power to mold how we think or speak about the past. Instead ... people often insist that they are simply reporting what “really happened.”*’¹⁸⁴ Thus, schematic narrative templates are used unconsciously.¹⁸⁵ National identity is formed based on the national memory and also national space. These three phenomena are mutually constitutive. They are transferred through the generations but always redefined based on the present needs. National history narratives combine these elements into one coherent story that is presented in the form of a master narrative that strengthens national identity. Therefore national history narratives are inculcated by the nation-states in its population and it makes them politically motivated.

I.4. National Memory as Political Memory

National memory is a political memory that a nation-state socialises among its population. The above-mentioned definition of a nation by Renan underlines the subjectivity of national memory and its malleability. Thus also national history narratives can be defined as subjective stories of the national past that the national community is retelling it in the present.¹⁸⁶ As was noted above, national memory is defined by the national elite and the malleability of national memory is best observed by analysing the national history master narratives. In this

¹⁸¹ Wertsch defines the events that are ‘concrete’ (*involving particular, identifiable individuals acting in a limited, local setting*), ‘mid-level’ and ‘abstract’ (*vaguely defined happenings involving unspecified actors and settings*). Mid-level events are between concrete and abstract ones. Wertsch (c), 2008, p 127. See more Wertsch, 2002, pp. 155–159

¹⁸² Feige, 1999, p. 145

¹⁸³ Wertsch (c), 2008, p 124

¹⁸⁴ Wertsch, James V. National narratives and the conservative nature of collective memory, *Neohelicon*, 34 (2), 2007, pp. 23–33, p. 30

¹⁸⁵ Bartlett, Frederic C. *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 45

¹⁸⁶ Ashuri, 2005, p. 424

section I define how national memory becomes part of a political process and how it is formed by the political/national elite. I also discuss its impact on national elite as well as on the entire national body.

The function of national narratives is to provide coherent stories of the past, *'which serve to give an identity to a collectivity such as the nation, to bind it together and legitimate policy decisions taken on its behalf.'*¹⁸⁷ Telling a coherent story of the nation's past, it shows what the nation remembers and what it has forgotten, thereby enabling to understand who this nation is. Therefore it is important to analyse national narratives in the context of power relations and dominance.¹⁸⁸ Kansteiner proposes that collective memory should be conceptualised

*'as the result of the interaction among three types of historical factors: the intellectual and cultural traditions that frame all our representations of the past [transmitted earlier cultural/political memory], the memory makers [national elite] who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, and the memory consumers [nation] who use, ignore, or transform such artifacts according to their own interests.'*¹⁸⁹

In my research I define national memory as a top-down political memory. It is therefore important to explain how the national elite constructs national memory and through it also using national identity to gain state citizens' loyalty.

National memory is constructed through shared discourses and it can be seen as intersubjective understanding of the national past. *'National memory ... is constituted by different, often opposing, memories that, in spite of their rivalries, construct common denominators that overcome on the symbolic level real social and political differences to create an imagined community.'*¹⁹⁰ Bloom introduces a concept of nation-state ideology. He states that every nation-state has its ideology, which is virtually unquestioned and it is normal to protect it.¹⁹¹ Hereby ideologies are defined as *'representations of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation'*.¹⁹² Therefore national memory is a construction of social discourse that *'performs ... the totalization of the national will'*¹⁹³. Several scholars of memory studies agree that collective

¹⁸⁷ Gildea, Robert. Myth, memory and policy in France since 1945, in *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, Jan-Werner Müller (ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 59–75, p. 59

¹⁸⁸ Bell, 2003, p. 74

¹⁸⁹ Kansteiner, 2002, p. 180

¹⁹⁰ Confino, A. 1997, pp. 1399–1400

¹⁹¹ Bloom, p. 73

¹⁹² Fairclough, 2003, p. 9

¹⁹³ Bhabha, Homi K. DissemiNation: time narrative, and the margin of modern nation, in *Nation and Narration*, Homi K. Bhabha (ed), London, New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 291–322, p. 311

memory can be defined as ideology.¹⁹⁴ National memory as ideology aims at legitimisation of state institutions, symbolising national cohesion and socialisation of its population as members of the nation.¹⁹⁵ Combining these approaches I claim that every nation-state has its commonly shared ideological understanding of national past, which defines the framework that nationally conscious individuals identify with.

National memory is a malleable phenomenon and it is often defined by the national elite. Therefore national memory is a form of political memory where the remembering and forgetting are motivated by the political aims where it helps strengthen the national identity.¹⁹⁶ *'States have created or fortified national sentiments through national school systems, military service, national health service, symbolic actions, and the eradication of regional cultures, inculcating the idea that all their citizens have something in common.'*¹⁹⁷ This kind of use of national memory is common practice in the nation-building process. The aim of nation-building is to mobilise the masses and to gain their loyalty for state actions. Therefore the use of past in this process aims at national integration and it is defined by the power securing and legitimisation, trying to enhance the population's loyalty to the state.¹⁹⁸ In other words, citizens' loyalty is achieved through the use of national memory to provide legitimacy for state policies domestically and internationally.¹⁹⁹ National memory legitimises existing state institutions, their historical roles and representation.²⁰⁰ It provides a concrete framework for this legitimisation, which

¹⁹⁴ Susan Sontag in her book *Regarding the Pain of Others* (2003) claims that collective memory includes events and memories that a certain social group gives importance. Therefore collective memory can be defined as group ideology. German historian Reinhart Koselleck claims that collective memory is nothing else than ideology because collective memory is defining the group that defines collective memory. He says that there are 6 Ps who define the memory: Priests, Professors, PR-specialists, Politicians, Poets, Publitsists. All of them are part of a national elite and therefore also power related. Tamm, Marek interview with Reinchart Koselleck, September 2003, published in *Kuidas kirjutatakse ajalugu? Intervjuuraamat*, Tamm, Marek (ed), Tallinn: Varrak, 2007, pp. 109–124, p. 115; In his study on the French political history Robert Gildea concludes that it is not possible to differentiate collective memory from the ideology. Gildea, Robert. *The Past in French History*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, p. 44

¹⁹⁵ Misztal, Barbara A. *Theories of Social Remembering*, Maidenhead, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2003, pp. 47–48

¹⁹⁶ Wilson, 2005, p 232; Kocot, Rafał. Einleitung, in *Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Die Politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerung in Mitteleuropa*, Julian Pänke, Gereon Schuch, Malte Brosig, Rafał Kocot, Axel Olearius, Piotr Stankiewicz (eds), Berlin: Nomos, 2007, pp. 13–15, p. 14

¹⁹⁷ Hålfdanarson, 2000, p. 22

¹⁹⁸ Tanner, 2001, p. 51

¹⁹⁹ Müller, 2002, p. 26; Bloom, 1990, p. 58

²⁰⁰ Dienstag, Joshua Foa. "The Pozsgay Affair": Historical Memory and Political Legitimacy, *History & Memory*, Vol. 8 (1), 1996, pp. 51–66, p. 60

is structured by coherent and comprehensive national master narratives, portraying the present situation as the only feasible outcome of the past developments. These national narratives increase the patriotism²⁰¹ (loyalty), which helps to mobilise the people to sacrifice themselves on the behalf of the state²⁰², to enhance the national pride by glorifying narratives or to warn for the potential threats to increase the national solidarity.²⁰³ In other words, national narratives facilitate the legitimisation of the state policies that enhance national identity.

The political elite plays a crucial role in the construction of national narratives²⁰⁴ because they possess the necessary power resource²⁰⁵ and it also legitimises their position in the society.²⁰⁶ Trouillot claims that power not only constructs but also defines the interpretation of the history narratives.²⁰⁷ Therefore the interpretation of facts and evidence in the national narratives is the national elite's exercise of power.²⁰⁸ It makes the national elite the main agent of construction of national narratives. However, it is important to underline that redefining of the national memory is a cumulative process and therefore also national narratives are not only constructed by the national elite but the elite have to take into account the earlier set of meanings, which are transmitted by the national memory. Therefore the national elite is influenced by these meanings and they can redefine and construct them only in their own context.²⁰⁹ Wretch claims that *'instead of being some sort of steady-made attribute of individuals or groups, collective remembering turns out to involve an array of complex relationships between active agents and the narrative tools they employ'*.²¹⁰ Therefore the construction of national narratives is influenced by the memory (past) and politics (present), where on the one hand, the national elite is redefining the past based on the present needs and on the other hand, the past sets a certain framework for the elite that they can use for legitimisation of their policies.

In the case of successful nation-building the nationally conscious individuals accept certain "historical truths" collected in the national memory and presented by national narratives without disputing them. Therefore the national elite can

²⁰¹ Olick, Robbins, 1998, p. 116

²⁰² Feige, 1999, p. 146

²⁰³ Bloom, 1990, p. 84; He, 2007, p. 55; Spinner-Halev, 2008, p. 620

²⁰⁴ White, 1981, p. 13

²⁰⁵ Brown, Keith. Archive-Work. Genealogies of Loyalty in a Macedono-Bulgarian Colony, *History & Memory*, Vol. 20 (2), 2008, pp. 60–83, p. 65

²⁰⁶ Smith, R., 2003, pp. 42–43

²⁰⁷ Trouillot, 1995, p. 29

²⁰⁸ Munslow, 1997, p. 171

²⁰⁹ Deighton, Anne. The past in the present: British imperial memories and the European question, in *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, Jan-Werner Müller (ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 100–120, p. 101

²¹⁰ Wertsch, 2002, p. 148

frame different policies to give it the desired meaning that individuals would indisputably accept it.²¹¹ Thereby the legitimacy for the political actions is secured. On the other hand, forming this legitimacy, the national elite is also strengthening the dominating national narratives, internalising beliefs and meanings carried on by national memory and thereby also fortifying national identity. Therefore the nation-state uses its institutions to internalise the national memory, which enhances the national identity, into its society.

Here it is important to distinguish two different levels of collective memory, which could be drawn back to '*Aristotle's distinction between anamnesis, or conscious and deliberate acts of recollection, and mneme, unconscious memory that comes unbidden to the surface*'.²¹² Jonathan Frankel differentiates two terms: 'collective subconscious' and 'collective conscious', where the first is beyond our control and the second susceptible for changes and manipulations.²¹³ In other words, unconscious collective memory influences people in the way that they are not able to acknowledge it. Conscious collective memory means that the elite defines consciously new values and perceptions in collective memory. Unconscious collective memory has been consciously defined at some point²¹⁴ and transmitted through generations becoming unconscious. In this process, the function of national elite is to review these meanings and to give them new significance, which corresponds to the present²¹⁵ and thereby also to forge more coherent national identity²¹⁶. Bell claims that this process functions in the 'mythscape', which can be defined as '*the discursive realm, constituted by and through temporal and spatial dimensions, in which the myths [narratives] of the nation are forged, transmitted, reconstructed and negotiated constantly*'.²¹⁷ However, constructing the national memory the national elite is usually not fabricating narratives but they use existing national memory framework to redefine and retell the existing memories in a new coherent way suitable to the present situation.²¹⁸ In this process the national elite is influenced by present events and their own political agendas and it connects the conscious memory with the unconscious one.

By constructing the narratives, the political elite have to consider the deepness of national memory. Wertsch defines deep memory in sense that it works unconsciously, holds emotional resonance and is the foundation for

²¹¹ Olick, Jeffrey K., Daniel Levy, "Collective Memory and Cultural Constraint: Holocaust Myth and Rationality in German Politics", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 62 (6), 1997, pp. 921–936, p. 923

²¹² Till, Karen E. *Memory Studies*, *History Workshop Journal*, 62, 2006, pp. 325–341, p. 337

²¹³ Gedi, Elam, 1996, p. 32

²¹⁴ Gedi, Elam, 1996, p. 32

²¹⁵ Heisler, 2008, p. 205

²¹⁶ Spinner-Halev, 2008, p. 612

²¹⁷ Bell, 2003, p. 75

²¹⁸ He, 2007, p. 48

national identity.²¹⁹ Hereby, there are two types of narratives in political use: the ones which are strongly related to deep memory and the others which are loosely connected with it. As much the first ones work unconsciously then they are more powerful and efficient in legitimising policy.²²⁰ Therefore the national elite aims at internalisation of certain values, understandings and perceptions into the national subconscious that makes people believe in them as the undisputable truth. Yanan He adds that the success of the ruling elite in this process is influenced by the coherence of the elite and ability to control the institutional tools for memory construction.²²¹ Therefore in non-democratic regimes the elite has a better possibility to direct this process, but also in democratic ones the national elite is forming national narratives and aiming at keeping the nation-state ideology coherent.²²² David Apter claims that the nation state itself is based on the mythological narratives or ‘mytho/logic’.²²³ His view is also supported by Timothy Brennan who claims that nations are mythical by themselves.²²⁴ Thus, the process is a universal phenomenon in the nation-states but different political regimes may use different instruments to internalise the national master narratives into their societies.

National narratives are also defined as myths due to their subjective character and political malleability. Myth is defined as a fictional and functional narrative that grounds people’s beliefs and perceptions.²²⁵ In other words, myth is a holy story of the past that legitimises the present actions.²²⁶ It is not just a story but it is instrumental and it provides explanations by defining right and wrong based on the social set of norms and values.²²⁷ Therefore the function of national myths or narratives is to structure social memory.²²⁸ Usually myths consists of continues stereotypical events or issues²²⁹ and they structure the existing events of the past that is suitable for the present needs. Therefore ‘[t]he process of constructing myth out of historical evidence always entails selective remembering and forgetting, accentuating favorable parts of the narrative and, in general, bringing the disorganized and self-contradictory historical facts to

²¹⁹ Wertsch (b), 2008, p. 142

²²⁰ Gildea, 2002, p. 74

²²¹ He, 2007, p. 47

²²² Feige, 1999, p. 142

²²³ Apter, David E. The New Mytho/logics and the Specter of Superfluous Man, *Social Research*, Vol. 52 (2), 1985, pp. 269–308

²²⁴ Brennan, 2003, p. 47

²²⁵ Andriolo, Karin R. Myth and History: A General Model and Its Application to the Bible, *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 83 (2), 1981, pp. 261–284, p. 265

²²⁶ Leach, Edward. Anthropological Approaches to the Study of the Bible during the Twentieth Century, in *Structuralist Interpretations of Biblical Myth*, Edward Leach and D. Alan Aycock (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 7–32, p. 8

²²⁷ Norris, Christopher. *Deconstruction*, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 37

²²⁸ Till, 2006, p. 330

²²⁹ Burke, 2006, p. 60

*fit the simplistic narrative structure of political myth.*²³⁰ Thus, myths have a similar function and meaning as national history narratives and therefore in my research I do not differentiate between national narratives and myths. However, I prefer to use the term narrative due to the confusing connotations of the notion ‘myth’.

In memory studies several authors define politically instrumental national narratives as national myths and therefore some authors consider national memory as a set of national myths. Timothy Snyder defines national memory as the set of national myths, which helps a nationally conscious person to understand the past and current demands.²³¹ It means that national memory includes narratives, which help people to relate themselves to the external world. Furthermore, Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser define myth as a current political justification which uses earlier historical experiences or refers to historical antecedents.²³² It means that national myths are always politically loaded and they are used consciously for implementing political agenda. Therefore ‘[r]emembering the past is not a simple act of recording historical events, but a process of constant reconstruction of these events in light of present social and political changes.’²³³

Gildea also defines these narratives as myths but differentiates them from the fictional stories or fairy-tales because these narratives have historical grounds but they reproduce history according to political needs.²³⁴ Therefore narratives differ from other fictions because it uses materiality of socio-historical process that provides the framing for the narrative.²³⁵ Ann-Sofie Dahl adds that the core of myth is a set of beliefs that has been considered as truth, though not the entire myth is true.²³⁶ It means that myth is located between the reality and social constructions. The most appropriate definition for the function of political myth in the nation-state is given by Antonia Varsori who claims that political myth consists of ‘values, beliefs, and perceptions of a society, mainly based on the experiences of its members and on historical realities, which exert some influence on the decision-making process as well as on the attitudes of public

²³⁰ Feige, 1999, p. 143

²³¹ Snyder, 2002, p. 50; Timothy Snyder, *The reconstruction of nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999*, New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1999, p. 10

²³² Heuser, Beatrice and Cyril Buffet (A). Introduction: Of Myths and Men, in *Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations*, Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (eds), Oxford: Berghahn, 1998, pp. vii-x, p. ix

²³³ He, 2007, p. 65

²³⁴ Gildea, 2002, p. 59

²³⁵ Trouillot, 1995, p. 29

²³⁶ Dahl, Ann-Sofie. The Myth of Swedish Neutrality, in *Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations*, Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (eds), Oxford: Berghahn, 1998, pp. 28–40, p. 31

*opinion towards this society's relations with these of other countries*²³⁷. Thus political myths can be defined as narratives in the context of nation-states. Müller agrees that national narratives are instrumental and subjective and therefore there is partly similarity with the concept of myth that is defined as a fictional story but he claims that national memory is more than just revoking national clichés.²³⁸ Therefore national memory can be defined as a politically instrumental combination of reality, interpretations of reality and beliefs based on these perceptions that functions through national narratives (myths) to form coherent national identity.

Defining national memory as malleable and politically manipulated understanding of the past immediately raises the question of its relationship with history and historiography. Is it a fabrication of history? Should one separate national memory from national history? How they are connected? In memory studies and among historians there are different opinions how memory and history are related. One school of scholars define memory and history as opposing phenomena, another school sees them as mutually constitutive and even coinciding ones. Halbwachs understands history as an universal phenomenon, which includes all different memories of humanity; collective memory is biased and group specific.²³⁹ Therefore he defines history as a rather negative concept because it severs collective memories from their social framework and it causes some loss of their meanings.²⁴⁰ He also claimed that collective memory is limited by time and space²⁴¹ however history combines all memories over generations. Thus collective memory has irregular and fluid boundaries, which is related to current thoughts but history looks to the past from the distance and therefore clearly systematised.²⁴² French historian Nora develops this difference between memory and history even further. He claims that they are opposing phenomena. Memory is a constantly evolving process, which is partial and selective, collective and absolute, in contrast history is a representation of the past, which is analysing and critical, trying to see the past objectively.²⁴³ David Lowenthal makes also similar distinction between the history and heritage (memory). He claims that the '*History seeks to convince by truth, and succumbs to falsehood. Heritage exaggerates and omits, candidly invents and frankly forgets, and thrives on ignorance and error.*'²⁴⁴ Unlikely history, memory is

²³⁷ Varsori, Antonio. Is Britain Part of Europe? The Myth of British "Difference", in *Haunted by History. Myths and International Relations*, Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (eds), Oxford: Berghahn, 1998, pp. 135–156, p. 135

²³⁸ Müller, p. 28

²³⁹ Halbwachs, p. 74

²⁴⁰ Assmann, A. 2008, p. 60

²⁴¹ Confino, 1997, p. 1392

²⁴² Misztal, 2003, p. 101

²⁴³ Nora, Pierre. Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Memoire, *Representations*, 26, 1989, pp. 7–24, p. 8

²⁴⁴ Lowenthal, David. Fabricating Heritage, *History & Memory*, Vol. 10 (1), 1998, pp. 5–24, p. 7

influenced by the present social needs and thus easily changeable. National memory does not aim at presenting objective truth of the national past but offers one single interpretation, which actualises the past and historicises the present.²⁴⁵ This approach agrees that the memory is related to history by using historical facts for constructing its narratives (myths) but they differentiate subjective, socially (politically) manipulated, collective memory and objective, truth-seeking, history.

I support the other school, which does not distinguish history and memory but claims that they are connected or the same. Already Friedrich Nietzsche claimed that history is a product of memory and therefore it is also an object of recalling and forgetting.²⁴⁶ Trouillot adds that history is both ‘*what happened*’ and ‘*what is said to have happened*’ and the border between these two aspects is very fluid.²⁴⁷ Therefore history functions as any other recollection of memories by offering different narratives about the past. Since the 1970s several authors of history theory try to show that it is not possible to find historical truth.²⁴⁸ Hayden White claims that there is no reason to differentiate history narratives from the other narratives because they are as much fictional as explored.²⁴⁹ Jean-Claude Schmitt adds that all historians interpret history in the context of their own time and space and therefore there is no objective history.²⁵⁰ Also Burke claims that it is possible to differentiate historians who are better informed and who treat sources more accurately but it should be always taken into account that each historian writes the text in a specific social framework.²⁵¹ Michael Confino agrees that by studying the past scholars unavoidably use their present consciousness, which includes memories, which are formed by contemporary society.²⁵² In addition, Roger Chartier finds that not only interpretation and writing of history, but also its reading and learning are possible

²⁴⁵ Djordjevic, Ljubica. Der Mythos vom Amselfeld in der serbischen Politik. Die politische Instrumentalisierung des kollektiven Gedächtnisses, in *Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Die Politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerung in Mitteleuropa*, Julian Pänke, Gereon Schuch, Malte Brosig, Rafał Kocot, Axel Olearius, Piotr Stankiewicz (eds), Berlin: Nomos, 2007, pp. 17–23, p. 20

²⁴⁶ Kratochwil, 2006, p. 15

²⁴⁷ Trouillot, 1995, p. 2

²⁴⁸ Tamm, Marek interview with Carlo Ginzburg, December 1999, published in *Kuidas kirjutatakse ajalugu?* Intervjuuraamat, Tamm, Marek (ed), Tallinn: Varrak, 2007, pp. 97–107, p. 103

²⁴⁹ White, Hayden. *Tropics of Discourse Essays in Cultural Criticism*, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 82

²⁵⁰ Tamm, Marek interview with Schmitt, Jean-Claude, May 2004, published in *Kuidas kirjutatakse ajalugu?* Intervjuuraamat, Tamm, Marek (ed), Tallinn: Varrak, 2007, pp. 171–177, p. 172

²⁵¹ Burke, 2006, p. 55

²⁵² Confino, Michael. Some Random Thoughts on History’s Recent Past, *History & Memory*, Vol. 12 (2), 2000, pp. 29–55, p. 32

only in certain social frameworks.²⁵³ History and memory are interdependent phenomena where history gets the meaning in the context of memory and on the other hand memory is shaped by history studies.²⁵⁴ Thus, memory and history are not opposing phenomena but interactive ones, both are discovered as constructed past representations – ‘*memory has a history and that history is itself a form of memory*’²⁵⁵. This approach is called ‘mnemohistory’, which analyses memory in the historical context and deconstructs its hidden agenda²⁵⁶ or deconstructs the existing national memory.

To conclude, one can say that national memory aims to strengthen national identity to enhance the loyalty of the population and to increase solidarity among the national group. Political elites use national memory for legitimisation of their policies and present social structure by producing and reproducing national narratives,²⁵⁷ which are simplified and subjective but coherent and unifying stories of the national past. This process aims at internalisation of these narratives of the past that they become part of unconscious national memory, which means that people believe in them as historical truth. It is the national history that is taught and remembered by a nation-state to internalise it in a society. Therefore national history remembers in the present to emphasise some past events relevant to strengthening national identity.²⁵⁸ It is not possible to separate national history from national memory; they are strongly interlinked and it is possible to understand them only in the context of a particular nation-state.

I.5. Identity and International Relations

In my study, I combine identity formation on two levels: external and internal. In previous parts I conceptualised the internal nation-state identity formation and its importance relations with national memory. In this section, I define first identity as the study object in the discipline of International Relations, giving background for international identity conflicts (Section 1.6).

Identity as the study object in International Relations is a relatively recent phenomenon and it became an independent variable with the advent of the Constructivist approach. As Realism and Liberalism held their debates in the rationalist paradigm, identity as an abstract and vague concept has been only a background issue for these scholars, often considered as a given or exogenous

²⁵³ Tamm, Marek interview with Chartier, Roger, May 2002, published in *Kuidas kirjutatakse ajalugu?* Intervjuuraamat, Tamm, Marek (ed), Tallinn: Varrak, 2007, pp. 33–51

²⁵⁴ Assmann, A. 2008, p. 63

²⁵⁵ Assmann, A. 2008, p. 62

²⁵⁶ Assmann, Jan. *Moses the Egyptian. The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 10

²⁵⁷ Chartier, 2002, p. 45

²⁵⁸ Kratochwil, 2006, p. 15

variable that is not so important in International Relations.²⁵⁹ The Rationalist approach prefers ‘to explain International Relations as simple behavioural approach to the forces of physics that act on material objects from the outside.’²⁶⁰ Therefore identity has not been accepted as an independent source of actions in International Relations.²⁶¹ The Realist school considers power as the central force and as the main study object in anarchical international relations. The Liberalist school focuses on cooperation and sees it as the solution to escape from the anarchy trap. But both schools have neglected identity formation of actors. The Constructivists try to fill this gap and deal with ‘ideational factors, including culture, norms, and ideas, social efficacy over and above any functional utility they may have, including a role in shaping the way in which actors define their identity and interests in the first place.’²⁶² Iver B. Neumann defines the significance of the study of identities in International Relations, saying that ‘identity formation has been foremost among the common concerns of social theory for years and years’ and therefore it is a natural development that International Relations study focuses more on this issue.²⁶³ Next, I explain briefly how identity formation matters in international relations.

The Constructivist school assumes that the ‘material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.’²⁶⁴ In other words, this school presupposes that in international relations, understandings and perceptions internalised by social agents construct the social reality and makes the actors act towards Others based on these meanings. However, it does not deny the existence of the material world. Adopting these assumptions, Alexander Wendt proposes a model which explains identity formation in international relations. He claims that the system of international relations is socially constructed and the rules, norms and understandings in this system are intersubjective.²⁶⁵ It means that the entire system of international relations is based on these perceptions and there is nothing given externally. Intersubjective understandings are social knowledge that ‘persists beyond the lives of individual

²⁵⁹ Fofanova, Elena; Viatcheslav Morozov. Imperial Legacy and the Russian-Baltic Relations: From Conflicting Historical Narratives to a Foreign Policy Confrontation?, in *Identity and Foreign Policy. Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*, Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin (eds), Ashgate: Farnham, 2009, pp. 15–31, p. 17

²⁶⁰ Adler, Emanuel. *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations*, London, New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 91

²⁶¹ Kahler, Miles. Rationality in International Relations, *International Organization*, 52 (4), 1998, pp. 919–941, p. 924

²⁶² Ruggie, John G. *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on international institutionalisation*, Routledge: London, 1998, pp. 3–4

²⁶³ Neumann, 1998, p. 1

²⁶⁴ Adler, 2005, p. 92

²⁶⁵ Wendt, Alexander. Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics (1992), reprinted in *International Theory. Critical Investigation*, Der Derian, James (ed), MacMillan: London, 1995 pp. 129–177, pp. 134–135

*social actors, embedded in social routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and workings.*²⁶⁶ This concept is based on the Herbert Blumer's statement that '*people act toward things [including other actors] on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them ... the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows ... these meanings are handled in and modified through, an interpretive process used by the person with the things he encounters*'²⁶⁷ Thus, these meanings, acquired as knowledge, define the social reality for individuals and define how they should act in this reality. Wendt extends this logic of an individual's behaviour to the collective actors as states in international relations.²⁶⁸ Therefore also national collective memory can be defined as an intersubjective understanding of national past that prescribes to the nation how to act in the present and future and how to relate toward 'Others'.

Wendt defines state as a collective actor but on the international level he assumes that states act as unitary actors, having a clear identity related to other states. In my research I share the same assumption, however, the identity that is formed for the state is the result of the domestic nation-building process and international relations provide background that has significant impact on this process. Wendt focuses on collective meanings among states in international relations, saying that '*[s]tates act differently towards enemies than they do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not*'.²⁶⁹ Therefore these images matter in international relations and one should study the perceptions that the state has as a collective body and these perceptions are based on the collective memory. Proposing a model of identity formation, which assumes that states have not interacted before, Wendt concludes that the incentives how to behave comes from domestic sources.²⁷⁰ He notes that it is only theoretical and in reality history, security or insecurity impacts the interaction as well as identity formation. Hereby I agree with Wendt that the surrounding international system is essential but in my research I emphasise the importance of the past and domestic source. Therefore national memory analysis offers the necessary link to connect this study. Thus, the interaction between the states always includes the impact of previous experiences and perceptions of current relations. In other words, the beliefs of actors play a significant role in the construction of the framework of the relations, which defines their identities.

²⁶⁶ Adler, 2005, p. 96

²⁶⁷ Blumer, Herbert. The Nature of symbolic interactionism, in *Communication Theory*, C. David Mortensen (ed), New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007, pp. 102–120, pp. 102–103

²⁶⁸ He admits that it is only suggestive analogue and the identity formation in mass should be studies more thoroughly. Wendt, 1995, p. 167

²⁶⁹ Wendt, p. 135

²⁷⁰ Read more about two actors – ego and alter from Wendt, p. 141

In identity formation perceptions and beliefs of the actor play a crucial role because the state behaves towards others based on the meanings it has about them. Robert Jervis claims that actors behave according to that how they perceive and understand surrounding world therefore several misunderstandings and misperceptions can occur. He claims that if '*even the messages that seem unambiguous not only to the sender but also to disinterested observers are not likely to be interpreted as expected if the perceiver's cognitive predispositions are strong and different from these of the sender.*'²⁷¹ Thus, every actor in international relations acts according to the beliefs they have and based on the beliefs they interpret the world and other actors' behaviour. Jervis states that images are the decision maker's '*beliefs about the other that affect his predictions of how the other will behave under various circumstances*'.²⁷² He emphasises that just as important as material resources are also the actor's beliefs about the other states.²⁷³ Therefore national memory as a source of these beliefs has a crucial role in the international relations.

Jervis claims that the beliefs have domestic and historical sources. He says that the image of the country can alter only partly and it is dependent on the past, e.g. '*[a] nation that has always coveted a part of its neighbor's territory will find it difficult to convince others that it has renounced this desire.*'²⁷⁴ Heuser and Buffet add that these images are used in foreign policy decision-making very often to predict other states' behaviour and these images are reluctant to change.²⁷⁵ Thus, there are expectations about the country based on its earlier behaviour²⁷⁶ and these expectations are formed by the experiences that are stored and formed by the national memory. It is important to underline that history matters in the formation of the beliefs and perceptions about other actors. Earlier experiences form certain images and beliefs that are implemented in the international relations. The Constructivist approach in International Relations also underlines the importance of beliefs in the formation of identities of agents or actors in international relations. In addition to beliefs, Andrew Ross claims that it is also important to include emotions among to the study objects.²⁷⁷ It means that the existing beliefs and perceptions of the other form

²⁷¹ Jervis, Robert. *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Columbia University Press: New York, 1989, p. xix; Although his analysis is written in the rationalism paradigm and his main focus is on the issue how an actor can use its image as a foreign policy tool, he draws an important conclusion by explaining the importance of the perceptions and images in the international relations.

²⁷² Jervis, 1989, p. 5

²⁷³ Jervis, 1989, p. 12

²⁷⁴ Jervis, 1989, p. 14

²⁷⁵ Heuser, Beatrice, Cyril Buffet. Conclusions. Historical Myths and Denial of Change, in *Haunted by History. Myths and International Relations*, Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (eds), Oxford: Berghahn, 1998, pp. 259–274; p. 273

²⁷⁶ Jervis, 1989, p. 28

²⁷⁷ Ross, Andrew A. G. Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12 (2), 2006, pp. 197–222

certain emotions for the decision-makers and therefore emotions can also be significant variable in the foreign policy analysis.

Although Jervis stresses the importance of images and perceptions in international relations he is not analysing how these factors influence on identity formation and which impact identity formation has on international relations. Wendt states that from these interactions and beliefs, images occur certain '*role-specific understandings and expectations about self*' what he defines as identities. Identities can vary, depending on the interaction partner but they are always relational, depending on the Others.²⁷⁸ It is also important to underline that '*one can only form a sense of one's self through one's social interactions with others*'.²⁷⁹ Here I can draw an important conclusion that identity formation is a relational process and another actor is always needed to form it. However, this approach focuses on the external factors of forming the state identity and an explanation for Self-Other relationship is lacking.

Neumann developed the concept of identity formation further. Similarly to Wendt, he defines identity formation as a relational process but he develops more in depth the Self-Other relations. Based on Emmanuel Lévinas theory and other scholars he calls "Eastern excursion" he relates the question of identity formation to the conceptual pair of Self/Other. He claims that it is crucial to have a stranger so that self could identify himself and to draw border between self and other. '*One is for the other what the other is for oneself; there is no exceptional place for the subject*'.²⁸⁰ Therefore the relation between self and other is the key for state identification and International Relations studies should focus on this relational pair by analysing how this border is built between Self and Other and what is the meaning of the Other because it is as crucial as Self identity. David Campbell, who borrowed from Benedict Anderson the concept of 'imagined communities' about nations, claims that all states are 'imagined communities' who need narratives of selves.²⁸¹ Neumann adds that meaning about Other is constructed in the way that Other is something that Self is not.²⁸² Therefore it is important to deconstruct the identity formation to see how the borders exist between actors in the international relations. Neumann argues that the study field of international relations scholars in identity formation should be the question – how do the social borders '*come into existence and are maintained*'?²⁸³ He also suggests that the identity formation process should be analysed parallel in the states, which are at the same stage of the process.²⁸⁴ It is an important connecting point between the

²⁷⁸ Wendt, 1995, p. 141

²⁷⁹ Greenhill, Brian. Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International Politics, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 14, 2008, pp. 343–368, p. 345

²⁸⁰ Lévinas, Emunuel. *The Levinas Reader*, 1989 cited in Neumann p. 17

²⁸¹ Neumann, 1999, p. 26

²⁸² Neumann, 1999, p. 17

²⁸³ Neumann, 1999, p. 35

²⁸⁴ Neumann, 1999, p. 36

international relations and memory and nationalism studies. The level that Neumann suggests to include is the internal nation-building where this relational pair exists. I explained above how each nation (Self) needs a relational Other to build up its identity. The Other is defined through the national memory and the earlier experiences with other nations become an important source for constructing these intersubjective understandings or perceptions of the Other. These perceptions can facilitate the bilateral relations but they can be also grounds for conflicting relations, which can be defined as identity conflict. Therefore national identity formation has importance in international relations.

Identity formation is an important issue in international relations and it is connected to the nation-state identity formation because the relational pair Self-Other becomes a bilateral issue between two nations. As Jervis and the Constructivist school underlines, beliefs and images, and even emotions, of actors play crucial role in these relations. I claim that these beliefs and images that are used in the policy formation are defined by national memory that includes the narratives of self- and other-images. Including the earlier experiences with the Other the national narrative forms clear images and beliefs that are grounds for the expectations for the other actor behaviour and thereby also prescribes some policies that are legitimised already by these narratives. Therefore the national memory is also an important study object in the context of international relations. In my research, I analyse how the images presented in the national narratives can be catalysts of identity conflicts.

I.6. International Identity Conflict and National Memory

International relations form an arena for nation-states' identity formation, which can also create conflicts or hostilities among the nations. In this part I explore occurrence of identity conflicts and question how national memory is related to these conflicts in the international relations context. I combine the international level with the national one, examining the impact of national memory on international and bilateral relations and foreign policy decision-making. At the end of this part I define this nexus in the post-imperial space, my research focus.

Jeffrey Seul claims that intergroup comparison causes competition between groups and each group wants to enhance their identity.²⁸⁵ Putting it in the context of international relations and nation-states identity construction, the comparison between states can be defined as the process how states try to enhance their national prestige as an important factor in strengthening national identity and also improving their international position. Therefore other nation-states become the relational Others and national identity construction includes

²⁸⁵ Seul, Jeffrey R. "Ours is the Way of God": Religion, Identity, And Intergroup Conflict, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36 (5), 1999, pp. 553–569, p. 557

these comparative relations with the others. National memory provides a general framework for this process and it also determines the image of the other that is constructed.²⁸⁶

Among nation-states incompatible interests is often the reason for the conflict, but Seoul claims that this conflict will not occur when there is not an identity competition between these nations.²⁸⁷ In the opposite case, Henri Tajfel and John Turner consider that when another external group is preventing or trying to impede a social group's positive self-image the conflict occurs and even in the case when there are not incompatible interests.²⁸⁸ It '*creates a situation where almost any reinforcement of the definition of self ... automatically implies a negation of the other's constitutive narrative of self, and thus, is perceived as a hostile act.*'²⁸⁹ Therefore national memory can become an important source of international identity conflict thus it has strategic nature in politics.²⁹⁰ There are several reasons how national memory can cause international identity conflicts:

- 1) **Unevenness of national histories** – A. Smith claims that the reason of national identity conflicts is related to the unevenness of national histories. He pointed out that some nations have better documented past than others and therefore '*[t]his unevenness of ethno-historical cultural resource is itself a source of national competition and conflict, as less well endowed communities seek to attain cultural parity with the better endowed.*'²⁹¹ Therefore the comparison with the other creates the competition and it may lead to the identity quarrel.
- 2) **Quarrel of national histories** – Heisler claims that disagreements between national histories are perceived as a critique of the normative foundation of nation's identity.²⁹² Like Smith puts it, '*[w]here there are clashing interpretations of ancestral homelands and cultural heritage ... normal conflicts of interests are turned into cultural wars, and moral and political crusades replace everyday politics.*'²⁹³ Also Olick and Joyce Robbins

²⁸⁶ Liu, James H., Denis J. Hilton. How the past weighs on the present: Social representations of history and their role in identity politics, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 44, 2005, pp. 537–556, pp. 544–545

²⁸⁷ Seoul, 1999, p. 557

²⁸⁸ Tajfel, Henri, John C. Turner. The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (eds), Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 1986, pp. 7–24, p. 23

²⁸⁹ Ehin, Piret, Eiki Berg. Incompatible Identities? Baltic-Russian Relations and the EU as an Arena for Identity Conflict, in *Identity and Foreign Policy. Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*, Berg, Eiki, Piret Ehin (eds), Farnham: Ashgate, 2009, pp. 1–14, p. 9

²⁹⁰ Hamilakis, Yannis, Jo Labanyi. Introduction. Time, Materiality, and the Work of Memory, *History & Memory*, Vol. 20 (2), 2008, pp. 5–17, p. 14

²⁹¹ Smith, A. 1999, p. 17

²⁹² Heisler, 2008, p. 200

²⁹³ Smith, A. 1999, p. 9

confirm that national history writing has a crucial role in the identity quarrels. *‘Professional historians have often provided political legitimation for nationalism and other more reconstructive identity struggles.’*²⁹⁴ Therefore different interpretations given by national narratives can lead to international identity conflict, especially in the case when two or more nations share the same history.

- 3) **Images of the Other in national memory** – Jervis claims that history is an important source, which influences the state image because other actors interpret the state’s behaviour based on the earlier experiences. These previous experiences are interpreted through the framework of national memory, which aims at strengthening self-image and defines the Other’s role in the national past. However, as already discussed above, national memory is not an objective shared history but it projects the history from the perspective of the nation. It is a national representation of its history and it explains how the world has come to be the way it is and in addition it justifies the nation’s responses to occurring challenges.²⁹⁵ In other words, it is a collective understanding that provides the nation with explanations and reasoning *‘why things are as they are and indications as to how they should use their material, abilities and power.’*²⁹⁶ Collective memory is also the source of beliefs, which help to interpret the surrounding world and interpret the policies of other actors. Based on the internal nation-building process external actors have a priori some certain meanings, which are not even discussed. These meanings are constructed by national history as undisputable truths. Therefore national history is often only the collective memory of conflicts between different national groups.²⁹⁷ These collective memories define a negative image of the Other and it also forms the basis for hostile relations with the Other.²⁹⁸

To sum up, history and culture can motivate conflict with others as well as solidarity inside the nation²⁹⁹ and thereby enhance national identity. Thus, national memory can have a crucial impact on the bilateral relations and therefore it is important to analyse the impact of national memory on the bilateral relations.

Collective memory analysis has different levels. Eva-Clarita Onken offers memory analysis on three levels: domestic, bilateral and supranational level.³⁰⁰ In my research the second, the level of bilateral relations is the most relevant. Bloom argues that successful nation-building facilitates to mobilise masses in relation to international environment. By demonstrating that the national identity is threatened or would be enhanced through a policy masses would be

²⁹⁴ Olick, Robbins, 1998, p. 110

²⁹⁵ Liu, Hilton, 2005, p. 538

²⁹⁶ Adler, 2005, p. 92

²⁹⁷ Liu, Hilton, 2005, p. 550

²⁹⁸ Williams, 2000, p. 104

²⁹⁹ Smith, A. 1999, p. 9; Liu, Hilton, 2005, p. 544

³⁰⁰ Onken, 2007, p. 25

mobilised to support it.³⁰¹ Bloom claims that the most influencing element for enhancing national identity is national prestige – ‘*an increase in prestige is synonymous with any circumstances that enhance national identity; a decrease in prestige is any circumstance that devalues national identity.*’³⁰² It is also related to identity conflicts because national prestige is connected with the positive self-image and different images and interpretations on the international level lead to the protection of the positive self-image and thereby also national prestige. Therefore it is connected with hostility towards the other and it is defined as the national interest.³⁰³ Thereby it is made to legitimise the foreign policy that the elite has chosen to follow.

National memory functions through national narratives. National elites construct different national narratives for their aims to legitimise their policies, thus different narratives about the same events exist in different countries and this can lead to the international conflicts.³⁰⁴ However, it is important to underline that this process is a two-way street: by using national identity in the foreign policy the national elite can manipulate or trigger national memory but in the same way the latter can influence state decisions.³⁰⁵ Y. He claims that the national elite starts usually national history disputes by introducing new accents in the national history narrative but by a successful internalisation process the national elite is not able to control them.³⁰⁶ Thus on the one hand, national identity and memory are important foreign policy resources that can be manipulated by the government, and on the other hand, foreign policy can be a tool for strengthening national identity.³⁰⁷ Therefore, the national elite forms different narratives that can cause international identity conflicts or construct hostile relations with the Other. It is possible to define three different types of these narratives³⁰⁸:

- 1) **Self-glorifying narrative** – it supports national pride and constructs a positive self-image of the nation to narrate about its virtue and wisdom and present a heroic picture of the national past. It also includes victimisation narratives that give grounds for national pride because of heroic survival.
- 2) **Self-whitewashing narrative** – it eliminates historical events that can harm national pride. The positive national self-image is protected either by being

³⁰¹ Bloom, 1990, p. 79

³⁰² Bloom, 1990, p. 84

³⁰³ He, 2005, p. 55

³⁰⁴ He, 2005, pp. 43–45

³⁰⁵ Bloom, 1990, p. 80

³⁰⁶ He, 2005, p. 45

³⁰⁷ Bloom, 1990, p. 89

³⁰⁸ He, 2005, p. 45, she is naming these narratives myths but for coherence of my work I call them narratives; Ustinova, Anastasia. Nicht Sklave der Geschichte sein. Ein außergewöhnliches Interesse am Vergangenen stört manchmal die Gestaltung der Gegenwart, in *Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Die Politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerung in Mitteleuropa*, Julian Pänke, Gereon Schuch, Malte Brosig, Rafał Kocot, Axel Olearius, Piotr Stankiewicz (eds), Berlin: Nomos, 2007, pp. 45–50, p. 46

silent about these events or personalising them. Thereby it diminishes or erases national wrongdoings. In some cases it tries to justify why these actions were taken.

- 3) **Other-maligning narrative** – the two previous narratives were related to the self-image, this one is related to the image of the Other. It aims to show the other nation as the negative character and correspondingly improve its own nation's image. This narrative is important in the case of contradicting historical events and it supports two previous narratives by making the Other responsible for wrongdoings and presenting own nation as a victim.

These different types of narratives are also related to the relational process of identity construction that was described above where the self is projected as positive and the other as negative. Therefore each nation has these narratives included in their national narrative and the national elite use them in foreign policy. As these national narratives are different and often contradicting by their character, then they also provide the basis for the international conflicts or at least hostility towards other nation³⁰⁹, which become identity conflicts. Analysing how much these narratives are used in national master narratives enables us to assess the potential of international identity conflict. This analysis offers a basis for the further ones which assess how much they are referred to in the foreign policy of respective countries and thereby transferred into the international conflicts.

To sum up the role of national memory in bilateral relations I define the following functions of national memory.³¹⁰

- 1) **Legitimation of policy** – as national memory is used in general by the political elite to legitimise their policies, then the same applies to foreign policy.³¹¹ Governments can gain domestic support for its foreign policy decisions by stressing symbols, which are important for national identity. Müller claims that foreign policy is not only legitimised internally but also internationally by using memory. He offers two possible methods: First, politicians casting around historical analogues and based on these examples they try to explain the decision they make. Second, politicians legitimise their decision based on the earlier experiences.³¹² In both cases national memory is used consciously but it is based on the unconscious memory, which offers the ultimate source of truth to provide arguments for rationale the policies.³¹³ It is easier to achieve domestically because the socialisation

³⁰⁹ Jacobsen, Carl Gustav. Myths, Politics and the Not-so-New World Order, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 30 (3), 1993, pp. 241–250, p. 241

³¹⁰ These functions are presented in the theoretical framework to offer comprehensive understanding of memory functioning but it exceeds the focus of my current research.

³¹¹ Bloom, 1990, p. 89

³¹² Müller, 2002, pp. 26–27; p. 10

³¹³ David Chuter explains how the internalised memory of some earlier event becomes important value criterion for the future decisions. Therefore the unconscious use of political memory is also important for the legitimisation of the policies. Chuter, David.

level is the same; internationally the used symbols should be internationally accepted or combined with the international set of norms. It is also important that the narratives provided by the politicians can be connected with the narratives that function in other countries.³¹⁴ Therefore a successful international campaign often internalises some certain images in the international public discourse.³¹⁵

- 2) **Nation-building through foreign policy** – in initiating international memory and identity conflicts the national elite is usually motivated by domestic reasons. These issues will be raised when the elite feel internally insecure and they aim to reach domestic harmony and national cohesion.³¹⁶ Bloom says that government can use foreign policy to mobilise national identity dynamics and it can stay under government control but after mobilisation it may start to influence government policies.³¹⁷ Therefore using foreign policy as a nation-building tool may lead to a situation where the government is not anymore able to control the process. *‘[E]ven when elites find it no longer cost-efficient to continue pursuing the “history issue,” the population is unlikely to put such disputes aside merely because it has been instructed to.’*³¹⁸ It means that the offered narratives have become internalised in the subconscious of the nation. National collective memory is an important factor for strengthening national identity and therefore unresolved issues in the past may easily occur in the agenda of current politics.³¹⁹ Foreign policy, which aims at declaring historical truth, victimisation of a nation or resolving frozen conflicts, are very crucial elements to mobilise the masses and strengthen national identity because it deals with symbols, which are either enhancing national pride or recalling threats that may harm national prestige and also positive self-image. Bloom claims that national prestige is one of the most important elements to mobilise masses. Foreign policy, which strengthens national prestige, is implicitly a nation-building element and it finds strong support by the masses. National memory defines the elements which are important for national pride and these issues become undisputable in foreign policy. Any external policy or position (e.g. alternative approach) that is going against these symbols is considered as a threat to national identity. *‘National memory is a means of organising the past such as to preserve the dignity of the group with which we identify, and thus bolster our prides as individual*

Munich or the Blood of Others, in *Haunted by History. Myths and International Relations*, Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (eds), Oxford: Berghahn, 1998, pp. 65–79

³¹⁴ Angoustoures, Aline. The Spanish Civil War. “Betrayal“ by the Bourgeois Democracies, in *Haunted by History. Myths and International Relations*, Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (eds), Oxford: Berghahn, 1998, pp. 53–64

³¹⁵ Jacobsen, 1993, pp. 243–245

³¹⁶ He, 2005, p. 51; Djordjevic, 2007, p. 20

³¹⁷ Bloom, 1990, p. 89

³¹⁸ He, 2005, p. 67

³¹⁹ Müller, p. 9

human beings.³²⁰ In most of the cases the use of national memory in foreign policy as tool for nation-building is conscious behaviour. In this case, decision-makers can use national memory to mobilise the masses to support the government or to compensate for current low international position by focusing on the glorious past, projecting it as a new aim of foreign policy.³²¹ But nation-building as foreign policy can become an unconscious one as well if the government loses control over this process and the internalised narrative starts to dominate in the society. In this case, people, including decision-makers, see unconsciously history only through the lenses of national memory and therefore people protect unquestionably the “right” position because they are socialised to accept it as the truth. These foreign policy issues would be securitized because it is perceived as a threat to national identity.

As follows from the above classification, we can define the function of national memory in bilateral relations on two levels: conscious and unconscious use of the memory. I define conscious use of the collective memory in the case when the national elite consciously uses the symbols of the past to legitimate their policy or strengthen their support among masses. I define unconscious use of collective memory in foreign policy as behaviour which is determined by the beliefs which are defined by national memory. Current memory studies have often focused on the conscious use of collective memory but the unconscious memory use is not studied very carefully.³²² Thomas Berger defines unconscious use of national memory in foreign policy as the element of political culture, which defines the topics in foreign policy and sets the values for decision making. He concludes that it is very difficult to define the impact of national memory in foreign policy and therefore often memory studies deal with more easily operationalised concepts.³²³ In my research I deal with unconscious use of collective memory in foreign policy context. The international identity conflicts can be explained by the internalised national memory that is taken by people as the undisputable truth. On the one hand, they can determine the policies of national elite and legitimise them because people do not question them. On the other hand, these clashing ‘truths’ are also important sources for international identity conflicts in case they are consciously used by the national elite. Therefore my research assesses the potential for identity conflict in unconscious memory that can be used consciously by national elite for political aims.

³²⁰ Snyder, 2002, p. 55

³²¹ Müller, pp. 9–10

³²² Etheridge, Brian C. The Desert Fox, Memory Diplomacy, and the German Question in Early Cold War America, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 32 (2), 2008, pp. 207–238, p. 211

³²³ Berger, Thomas. The power of memory and memories of power: the cultural parameters of German foreign policy making since 1945, in *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, Jan-Werner Müller (ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 76–99, p. 81

International identity conflicts in post-imperial space is a particularly interesting case because people, living together for decades or even longer in one political unit, start to reframe their identities as separate nations. They share lots of common memories about the past; however by the dissolution of the empire these memories can differ significantly from one country to other.³²⁴ The history of nations is reviewed in the context of dissolution of the empire because the former centre has influenced the historical narratives of the colonised nations as well as by presenting the dominant nation as more powerful than the conquered ones and the conquest as a natural process.³²⁵ In other words, dominant nation has used asymmetric power relations to assimilate the dominated nations and submitted itself to the dominant history narrative.³²⁶ Therefore by the dissolution of the empire also different interpretations of history occur. The common past is not possible to be denied but it is seen by dominated nations as the awkward and undesired past and the future is projected based on the pre-imperial past.³²⁷ Thereby the new states will challenge the former history narrative and they will introduce new heroes and enemies, giving different interpretation of the common past. The dissolution of empire will change the ‘us’ and ‘they’ relations and usually this process leaves exclusively linear opposition between colonisers and colonised.³²⁸ National master narratives are constructed in the way that the significant Other (former dominant nation) becomes the main negative character of the story and it represents repressions and totally opposite characters of positive self-image. Therefore the only option for the nation is to emancipate itself from imperial suppression and to establish an independent state.³²⁹ On the other hand, the history narrative of the dominant nation is totally opposite and they see their role as a positive actor.³³⁰ Thus, national memory strengthens the national identity, but on the other hand, it constructs strong borders between former countrymen and today’s

³²⁴ Hamilakis, Labanyi, 2008, p. 10

³²⁵ Buettner, Elizabeth. Cemeteries, Public Memory and Raj Nostalgia in Postcolonial Britain and India, *History & Memory*, Vol. 18 (1), 2006, pp. 5–42, pp. 7–8

³²⁶ Feichtinger, Johannes. Habsburg (post)-colonial. Anmerkungen zur Innercolonisierung in Zentraleuropa, in *Habsburg postcolonial Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis*, Johannes Feichtinger, Ursula Prutsch, Moritz Csáky, Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag, 2003, pp. 13–31, p. 19

³²⁷ Hawley, John C. Introduction: Voice or Voices in Post-Colonial Discourse?, in *Critical Studies 7, Writing the Nation: Self and Country in Post-Colonial Imagination*, John C. Hawley (ed), Amsterdam, Atlanta: Rodopi, 1996, pp. x-xxvii, p. xii

³²⁸ Feichtiger, 2003, p. 15

³²⁹ Guðmundur Hálfánarson (2000) shows in her research how Icelandic national narrative is constructing negative other from Danes, pp. 14–15; similar analysis is made about the Slovak national narrative against Hungarians, Elena Mannová, Das kollektive Gedächtnis der Slowaken und die Reflexion der vergangenen Herrschaftstrukturen, in *Habsburg postcolonial Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis*, Johannes Feichtinger, Ursula Prutsch, Moritz Csáky, Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag, 2003, pp. 189–196

³³⁰ Ustinova, 2007, p. 48

neighbours.³³¹ Therefore the potential for the identity conflict in the post-imperial space should be very high because both parties (dominant nation and dominated nations) challenge their history narratives and therefore also impede the construction of positive self-image.

In the case of former continental empires it is also important to underline the impact of space. It is a particularly important issue in post-imperial relations because controversy is determined in the collective memories of the former centre and periphery. Sławomir Kaprański defines the time and space nexus as ‘chronotope’³³² that

‘means real but symbol-laden and often mythologized place in which events important for the construction of a group’s identity either actually happened according to the group’s vision of the “viable past” or are symbolically represented by – for example – monuments, the very arrangement of space, and its social functions.’³³³

He continues by saying that when different communities transform a territory a chronotope of their identities then it leads to the conflict between these communities.³³⁴ Kaprański was focusing mainly on certain locations but I extend this concept to state territories, which are presented in the national master narratives as historical homeland/territory. Smith claims that territory is a crucial identity factor for a nation therefore it is also important to consider it in the context of former empire how the space is defined in the national narratives because it is one additional factor for international identity conflict. I claim that if the former centre continues to use the old imperial history narrative, which has a centripetal function, then it leads immediately to conflict with the former periphery because they have constructed their identity based on a national narrative that has centrifugal function. Therefore two antagonistic narratives lead to the identity conflict.

To conclude, national memory in the international relations context has an important role in international identity conflicts. National memory defines the framework for national identity and it functions through national history narratives, which include not only the story of the national past but also constructs images of Self and Other that form peoples beliefs about the surrounding world and other nations. These beliefs play a crucial role in

³³¹ Kocot, Rafał. Schluß, in *Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Die Politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerung in Mitteleuropa*, Julian Pänke, Gereon Schuch, Malte Brosig, Rafał Kocot, Axel Olearius, Piotr Stankiewicz (eds), Berlin: Nomos, 2007, pp. 51–52

³³² Means nexus between time and space. It was used first in the Theory of Relativity by Einstein but Mikhail Bakhtin brought this concept to the literature studies by using it as a metaphorical concept. See more M. M. Bakhtin Forms of time and of chronotope in the novels, in *The Dialogic Imagination by M. M. Bakhtin*, Michael Holquist (ed), Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002, pp. 84–259

³³³ Kaprański, 2001, p. 36

³³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 37

international politics and therefore they are also manipulated by the national elites. National narratives can be often contradicting and it may lead to the identity conflicts between the nations. An especially fruitful area of research is the former empire where the identity conflict is almost prescribed because of the antagonistic characters of national narratives.

I.7. Research Design and Methods

My research analyses national master narratives in the post-imperial space. I explore the potential of the identity conflicts based on national memories. Therefore I focus on the unconscious use of national memory, which offers a set of beliefs and perceptions that influence the national elite and defines the potential to trigger an international conflict between nations. It is difficult to operationalise the impact of unconscious national memory on the political process, therefore I focused on the potential that is possible to assess based on the critical analysis of national master narratives. Master narrative can be defined as ‘Hegemonic Collective Memory’ that guides individuals’ recollections of memories and is ‘*created and sanctioned by the central institutions of the state*’.³³⁵ Based on narrative theory these narratives have two functions: descriptive function to narrate a story of the nation, to show it as united actor, and evaluative function to give interpretations and assessments to the events and actors in the national history to construct certain beliefs and perceptions.³³⁶ Therefore the national master narrative is a key focus in my study because by analysing these narratives it is possible to assess the antagonism of the narratives, which determine potential for the international identity conflicts.

National master narrative is internalised through different channels in the society. I have focused on education because it is the key channel of socialisation of societal values, beliefs and norms. A. Assmann claims that education is a specific form, which adopts cultural memory in the modernising society by aiming at the sharing and internalising knowledge, which is important for survival in this society.³³⁷ Also national history master narratives are internalised through this socialisation.³³⁸ Thus schools have an important role for promoting national identity and values, norms and beliefs on which the

³³⁵ Goldberg, Tsafir, Dan Porat and Baruch B. Schwarz. “Here started the rift we see today” Student and textbook narratives between official and counter memory, *Narrative Inquiry*, Vol. 16 (2), 2006, pp. 319–347, p. 320

³³⁶ Goldberg, Tsafir, Baruch B. Schwarz, Dan Porat. Living and dormant collective memories as contexts of history learning, *Learning and Instruction*, 18, 2008, pp. 223–237, p. 226

³³⁷ Assmann, Aleida. *Arbeit am nationalen Gedächtnis. Ein kurze Geschichte der deutschen Bildungsidee*, Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 1993, p. 8; p. 10

³³⁸ De Cillia, Rudolf, Martin Reisigl, Ruth Wodak. The Discursive Construction of National Identities, *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 10 (2), 1999, pp. 149–173, p. 153

state is based.³³⁹ Since the foundation of the nation-states, they have used school systems and school textbooks as instruments for national socialisation by internalising certain understandings and beliefs that persist for the lifetime of individuals. Therefore the preparation of the curricula and textbooks can be seen also as an ideological process.³⁴⁰ However, the offered history narrative works as a transparent framework that individuals do not acknowledge and the narratives from the textbook are taken as objective truth because they ‘*are impersonal and sound objective, therefore putting ideas and beliefs above the criticism*’³⁴¹. Therefore the school history textbooks are important source to define the state master narrative and my research focuses on history textbooks. The educational system plays a crucial role in transmission of national memory and thereby it plays a key role in national identity formation. It is one of the major influences on young people’s identity formation and how the young generation relates itself to the surrounding world.³⁴²

*‘The powerful link between history and memory is especially salient in the educational system, which is responsible for implanting knowledge and values in the younger generation. The successful completion of this task, it is assumed, will turn young people into loyal citizens and will help instill a shared identity’*³⁴³

Although formation of national identity is a crucial task for the new state, it is not a finite process because every new generation should be socialised to adopt into this society and also the changes in international environment may bring changes that challenge the national identity.³⁴⁴ Therefore school is one of the primary socialisation institutions and individuals are socialised by the national memory first in the school and this narrative tools are maintained for entire life. In this process, ‘*textbooks play a dual role: on the one hand, they provide a sense of continuity between the past and the present, transmitting accepted historical narratives; on the other, they alter ... the past in order to suit contemporary needs.*’³⁴⁵ In other words, analysing school history textbooks

³³⁹ Weinstein, Harvey M., Sarah Warshauer Freedman, Holly Hughson. School voices. Challenges facing education systems after identity-based conflicts, *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, Vol. 2 (1), 2007, pp. 41–71, p. 43

³⁴⁰ Podeh, Elie. History and Memory in the Israeli Educational System. The Portrayal of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in History Textbooks (1948–2000), *History & Memory*, Vol. 12 (1), 2000, pp. 65–100, pp. 66–68

³⁴¹ Olson, David R. On the Language and Authority of Textbooks, in *Language, Authority and Criticism: Readings on the School Textbook*, Suzanne De Castell, Allan Luke and Carmen Luke (eds.), London: Falmer Press, 1989, p. 241

³⁴² Weinstein et al, 2007, p. 48; p. 52

³⁴³ Podeh, 2000, p. 65

³⁴⁴ Bloom, 1990, p. 71

³⁴⁵ Podeh, 2000, p. 66

presents the transmitted knowledge of the earlier generations but also creates an understanding of current political setting of national memory.

The educational system has an important role in formation of identity conflict.³⁴⁶ It is possible to define two types of functions in history textbooks: dissimilation, aiming at the construction of border between the self and other, and assimilation, aiming at the erasing border between social groups and unifying people.³⁴⁷ History textbooks do not include only the narrative of national past but they also include the description of the Others, which constructs their images.³⁴⁸ These images are internalised into the subconscious of the young generation and these images form attitudes and beliefs towards Others. The stereotypes are transmitted from generation to generation via school history textbooks.³⁴⁹ When the Self-Other images are presented very antagonistically then a strong identity conflict may occur.³⁵⁰ Therefore it is important to analyse national history textbooks to define the potential of identity conflict.

My research case study is the former Russian empire, which was officially named an empire by Peter the Great in 1721³⁵¹ and in different forms has lasted until the present. Based on Russian collective identity we can see that the Soviet Union was only a part of Russian history, or even more precisely just another form of Russian empire, therefore '*such notions as the Soviet Union and Russia often were and remain interchangeable*'³⁵². Furthermore, the former Soviet republics do not consider the experience with Russia only as a Communist experience – though it plays a crucial role in the current collective memory of these nations – but Russia is perceived as a significant actor through the entire common history. Therefore I define the collapse of the Soviet Union as the dissolution of an empire and I analyse the potential of the identity conflict not in post-Soviet but in the post-imperial context.

In the former Russian empire I have chosen three most representative cases for the conflicting identities: Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine. I chose these three countries because they all have had relatively strong opposition movement in the Soviet Union and their current identity formation is based on the strong otherization of Russia and it is also expressed in their foreign policies. All three

³⁴⁶ Smith, Alan, Tony Vaux. *Education, Conflict and International Development*. London: DFID, 2003, p. 60

³⁴⁷ De Cillia et al, 1999, p. 151

³⁴⁸ Podeh, 2000, p. 66

³⁴⁹ Podeh, 2000, p. 69

³⁵⁰ Yiannis Papadakis analyses in his article how the narrative changed in new Turkish Cypriot textbooks and deescalated the conflict between two communities that was earlier having strong antagonistic narratives. Narrative, Memory and History. Education in Divided Cyprus A Comparison of Schoolbooks on the "History of Cyprus", *History & Memory*, Vol. 20 (2), 2008, pp. 128–148

³⁵¹ Officially Peter the Great took the title Emperor after the Great Northern War (1700–1721) where Swedish domination in the Baltic Sea was destroyed. Dukes, Paul. *The making of Russian absolutism, 1613–1801*, London, New York: Longman, 1997, p. 75

³⁵² Solchanyk, 2001, p. 14

countries have some controversial historical issues with Russia and Russia is perceived as the biggest external threat. Estonia chose the Western orientation since restoration of independence in 1991. Georgia and Ukraine had undefined positions after the collapse of the USSR but they have been rather recalcitrant partners for Russia. After the reshuffling of the political elites and national reawakening respectively in 2003 and 2004 both countries have defined explicitly pro-Western orientation. After recent serious tensions with Russia, Georgia continues its chosen policy but Ukraine tries to accommodate more into pro-Russian approach. In my research I define the potential of these conflicting relations with Russia by comparing the national history narratives of three respective with the Russian one.

In the following part I explore earlier research in my study field. Several researches have concluded that history has a crucial role in how people perceive their past and present. History methodology has attracted several scholars to understand how history teaching is manipulated by the present needs and how it has changed through the time.³⁵³ It has led to the conclusion that memory is defined by political needs and it has also brought international relations scholars to analyse impact of memory on world politics and bilateral relations.³⁵⁴ The main significance of this research has been to demonstrate how history narratives create negative images of other nations and create hostile attitudes towards them³⁵⁵ or in the more intense cases how memory has triggered identity conflicts that have led to wars and bloodshed in different regions of the World³⁵⁶. Scholars have concluded that history textbooks have been as the main site of these memory manipulations.³⁵⁷ The idea that the school history textbooks have an influence on the international conflicts and therefore that history curricula should be more internationalised started already in the 1920s

³⁵³ Voss, James F., Mario Carretero (eds). *Learning and Reasoning in History. International Review of History Education*, London, Portland, Oregon: Woburn Press, 1998; Stearns, Peter N., Samuel S. Wineburg (eds). *Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History: National and International Perspectives*, New York, London: New York University Press, 2000

³⁵⁴ Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (eds). *Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations*, Oxford: Berghahn, 1998; Eder, Klaus, Willfried Spohn (eds). *Collective Memory and European Identity: the Effects of Integration and Enlargement*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005; Liu, Hilton, 2005; He, 2007.

³⁵⁵ Kapralski, 2001; Mannová, 2003; Hálfdanarson, 2000.

³⁵⁶ Wilmer, Franke. *The Social Construction of Man, the State, and War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in Former Yugoslavia*, New York, London: Routledge, 2002; Rotberg, Robert I. (ed). *Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History's Double Helix*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006; Williams, 2000.

³⁵⁷ Dickinson, Alaric Keith, Peter Gordon, Peter John Le. *Raising Standards in History Education: International Review of History Education*, New York, London: Routledge, 2001; look more in it Porat, Dan. *A Contemporary Past: History Textbooks as Sites of National Memory*, pp. 36–55

after World War 1.³⁵⁸ Today scholars have conducted several studies to explore the connection between identity conflicts and educational curricula and have reached the conclusion that education has a crucial impact on the new generation's perceptions³⁵⁹ and that the entire society should be considered in the design of new less hostile curricula³⁶⁰. History textbook analyses have been conducted in various countries and regions. These analyses show that in some countries there are more debates on national identity construction and internal memory (e.g. USA where different lobby groups and minorities try to influence the curricula formation) than in others (e.g. Japan, Iran where the curricula is strongly controlled by the governments), but in general, history textbooks include a strong master narrative and its alteration is a slow process.³⁶¹ Other studies are comparative either focusing on one particular event (e.g. World Wars) and analysing how this event is pictured by different nations³⁶² or

³⁵⁸ In 1921, the European Committee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace discussed how the history, geography and civic education textbooks presented international conflicts and cooperation, in 1932, an international conference in The Hague discussed history teaching to create better understanding between the nations and in 1946, the General Conference of UNESCO adopted resolution to improve the nations mutual understanding through history and civic education textbooks. Since this moment several similar resolutions and researches has been undertaken by international organisations. Gasanabo, Jean-Damascène. *Fostering Peaceful Co-Existence Through Analysis And Revision Of History Curricula And Textbooks In Southeast Europe*, Preliminary Stocktaking Report, UNESCO, 2006

³⁵⁹ Perlmutter, David D. Manufacturing visions of society and history in textbooks, *Journal of Communication*, 47 (3), 1997, pp. 68–81; Bush, Kenneth D. & Diana Saltarelli. *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Peacebuilding Education for Children*, Florence: Innocenti Research Centre, United Nations Children's Fund, 2000; Smith, Vaux, 2003; Tawil, Sobhi, Alexandra Harley (eds). *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion*, Geneva: International Bureau of Education, 2004

³⁶⁰ Weinstein, Warshauer Freedman, Hughson, 2007, pp. 41–71

³⁶¹ Francis, Daniel. *National Dreams: Myth, Memory, and Canadian History*, Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 1997; Montgomery, Ken. Banal Race-thinking: Ties of blood, Canadian history textbooks and ethnic nationalism, *Paedagogica Historica*, Vol. 41 (3), 2005, pp. 313–336; Moreau, Joseph. *Schoolbook Nation: Conflicts Over American History Textbooks from the Civil War to the Present*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005; Barnard, Christopher. *Language, Ideology and Japanese History Textbooks*, London, New York: Routledge, 2003; Schissler, Hanna, Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal (eds). *The Nation, Europe, and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition*, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005 (includes case studies from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Russia, and the United States); Ram, Haggay. The Immemorial Iranian Nation? School Textbooks and Historical Memory in Post-Revolutionary Iran, *Nations and Nationalism*, 6 (1), 2000, pp. 67–90; Riad Nasser. Exclusion and the making of Jordanian national identity: an analysis of school textbooks, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol.10 (2), 2004, pp. 221–249.

³⁶² Hein, Laura Elizabeth, Mark Selden (eds). *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States*, Armonk, New York: An East Gate

focusing on some cases of identity conflict, e.g. Israel-Palestine³⁶³, Cyprus³⁶⁴, Balkan conflicts³⁶⁵, or trying to detect how the enemy image has been formed.³⁶⁶ There are also several analyses on reconciliation and how the common history textbooks can improve current bilateral relations, notably the German case.³⁶⁷ Some comparative analysis analyse how a certain regional

Book, 2000; Crawford, Keith, Stuart J. Foster. *War, Nation, Memory: International Perspectives on World War II in School History Textbooks*, Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2007

³⁶³ Goldberg, Porat, Schwarz, 2006; Goldberg, Schwarz, Porat, 2008; Podeh, 2000; Al-Haj, Majid. National Ethos, Multicultural Education, and the New History Textbooks in Israel, *Curriculum Inquiry*, 35 (1), 2005, pp. 47–71

³⁶⁴ Related to recent history textbooks reforms in the Northern Cyprus the new history books have increased the interest of scholars to analyse this case. Papadakis, 2008; Vural, Yücel, Evrim Özuyanık. Redefining Identity in the Turkish-Cypriot School History Textbooks: A Step Towards a United Federal Cyprus, *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 13 (2), 2008, pp. 133–154; Karahasan, Hakan, Dilek Latif. *Textual and Visual Analysis of the Upper Secondary School Cyprus History Textbooks. Comparative Analysis of the Old and New Cyprus History Textbooks*, Post Research Institute: Nicosia, 2010

³⁶⁵ Höpken, Wolfgang (ed.). *Öl ins Feuer? Schulbücher, ethnische Stereotypen und Gewalt in Südosteuropa/Oil on Fire? Textbooks, Ethnic Stereotypes and Violence in South Eastern Europe*, Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1996; Gasanabo, 2006; Baranovic, Branislava. History Textbooks in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Intercultural Education*, Vol. 12 (1), 2001, pp. 13–26; Torsti, Pilvi. How to deal with a difficult past? History textbooks supporting enemy images in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, Vol. 39 (1), 2007, pp. 77–96.

³⁶⁶ Coman, Paul. Reading about the Enemy: school textbook representation of Germany's role in the war with Britain during the period from April 1940 to May 1941, *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, Vol. 17, (3), 1996, pp. 327–340; Carretero, Mario, Liliana Jacott, Asunción López-Manjón. Learning history through textbooks: are Mexican and Spanish students taught the same story?, *Learning and Instruction*, 12, 2002, pp. 651–665; Janmaat, Jan Germen. The ethnic 'other' in Ukrainian history textbooks: the case of Russia and the Russians, *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, Vol. 37 (3), 2007, pp. 307–324

³⁶⁷ Georg-Eckert-Institut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung/Association des Professeurs d'Histoire et de Géographie. Deutschland und Frankreich. Raum und Zeitgeschichte. Empfehlungen für die Behandlung im Geschichts- und Geographieunterricht beider Länder/La France et l'Allemagne. Espace et Histoire Contemporaine. Recommandations pour l'enseignement de l'histoire et de la géographie dans les deux pays, Frankfurt/M: Diesterweg, 1988; Riemenschneider, Rainer. Verständigung und Verstehen. Ein halbes Jahrhundert deutsch-französischer Schulbuchgespräche, in *Verstehen und Verständigen*, Hans-Jürgen Pandel (ed), Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1991, pp. 137–148; Georg-Eckert-Institut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung. *Gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission: Empfehlungen für die Schulbücher der Geschichte und Geographie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in der Volksrepublik Polen*, Frankfurt/M: Diesterweg 1995; Rainer Riemenschneider, Transnationale Konfliktbearbeitung. Die deutsch-französischen und die deutsch-polnischen

identity is formed by using the history textbooks from the different countries in the region as case studies.³⁶⁸ Thus, analysis of history school textbooks has different angles and it is possible to analyse the master narratives of particular nations or also comparative case studies. In the case of identity conflict, history textbook analysis is often used and this analysis has had also strong political impact in the case of reconciliation or escalation of the conflicts.

In the following, I introduce earlier studies of my case studies: Russia, Estonia, Ukraine and Georgia. The research focuses of these four cases has been different and my research is one of the first comparative comprehensive master narrative research in the space of former Russian Empire.³⁶⁹ In general, memory studies have been earlier more focused on Western Europe, having the Holocaust and World War 2 as particular research interests. Central and Eastern Europe became a study focus only after the collapse of the Soviet Union because during the Soviet regime it was impossible to conduct these studies. Therefore, several researches have dealt with the post-totalitarian and post-Soviet memory work where the main focus has been the question how to return from the totalitarian Soviet memory to the pluralistic memories suitable for democratic regimes.³⁷⁰ Rudolf Jaworski concludes that although Central and Eastern European countries have democratised, the memories of these nations have not become more pluralistic but rather have moved from the Soviet memory to the unequivocal national memory, which produces inevitably competing history narratives that lead to the bilateral conflicts.³⁷¹ Several researchers try to explore this phenomenon and explain the clashing memories

Schulbuchgespräche im Vergleich, 1935–1997, *Internationale Schulbuchforschung*, 20, 1998, pp. 71–80

³⁶⁸ Maier, Robert (ed.). *Nationalbewegung und Staatsbildung. Die baltische Region im Schulbuch*, Frankfurt/M: Diesterweg 1995; Pingel, Falk (ed). *Macht Europa Schule? Die Darstellung Europas in Schulbüchern der Europäischen Gemeinschaft*, Frankfurt/M: Diesterweg 1995; Pingel, Falk. *The European Home: Representations of 20th Century Europe in History Textbooks*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2000; Mehan H. B., S. A. Robert Thinking the Nation: Representations of Nations and the Pacific Rim in Latin American and Asian Textbook, *Narrative Inquiry*, Vol. 11 (1), 2001, pp. 195–215.

³⁶⁹ Russian scholars have made a comparative textbook analysis that included history textbooks from 12 former USSR republics. However, this study has very strong political bias. See more, A. A. Danilov, A. V. Filippov. *Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств*, Gosudarstvennyj Klub: Moscow, 2009

³⁷⁰ Rosenberg, 1995; Minow, 1998; Corbea-Hoisie, Jaworski, Sommer, 2004; Fritz, 2008

³⁷¹ Jaworski, Rudolf. Geschichtsdenken im Umbruch. Osteuropäische Vergangenheitsdiskurse im Vergleich, in *Umbruch im östlichen Europa. Die nationale Wende und das kollektive Gedächtnis*, Andrei Corbea-Hoisie, Rudolf Jaworski and Monika Sommer (eds), Innsbruck, Wien, München, Bozen: Studien Verlag, 2004, pp 27–44, p. 35

in the region.³⁷² Considering the bloody outcomes of this process, then the biggest focus on the clashing identity conflicts is the South Eastern Europe.

In the case of Former Soviet Union there are few general studies that explore the nexus of memory, historiography and formation of national identities in this space and its impact on the bilateral relations.³⁷³ The central nation of the former Soviet Union studies is certainly Russia as the successor state. Many scholars have agreed that Russia has been faced with an identity challenge after the collapse of the Soviet Union and several studies are dedicated for Russian nation-building and identity search.³⁷⁴ It has been a particular interest of scholars who study Russian foreign policy from the Constructivism perspective.³⁷⁵ These studies conclude that in Russia identity formation and

³⁷² Feichtinger, Johannes, Ursula Prutsch, Moritz Csáky. *Habsburg postcolonial Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis*, Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag, 2003; Pänke, Julian, Gereon Schuch, Malte Brosig, Rafał Kocot, Axel Olearius, Piotr Stankiewicz (eds). *Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Die Politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerung in Mitteleuropa*, Berlin: Nomos, 2007; Samerski, Stefan (ed). *Die Renaissance der Nationalpatrone: Erinnerungskulturen in Ostmitteleuropa im 20./21. Jahrhundert*, Köln: Böhlau, 2007

³⁷³ Kuzio, Taras. History, memory and nation building in the post-soviet colonial space, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 30 (2), 2002, pp. 241–264; Solonari, Vladimir. Creating a “People”: A Case Study in Post-Soviet History-Writing, *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, Vol. 4 (2), 2003, pp. 411–438; Tsygankov, Andrei P. *Pathways After Empire: National Identity and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-Soviet World*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001; Rick Fawn (ed). *Ideology and National Identity in Post-communist Foreign Policies*, London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publisher, 2003.

³⁷⁴ Barkey, Karen and Mark Von Hagen. *After empire multiethnic societies and nation-building: the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997; Tolz, Vera. Forging the nation: National identity and nation building in post-Communist Russia, *Europe-Asia Studies*; Vol. 50 (6), 1998, pp. 993–1022; Kolstø, Pål. *Political Construction Sites: nation building in Russia and the post-Soviet states*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000; Hunter, Shireen T. (ed). *Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004; Billington, James H. *Russia in Search of Itself*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004; Tolz, Vera. A Search for a National Identity in Yeltsin’s and Putin’s Russia, in *Restructuring Post-Communist Russia*, Yitzhak Brudny, Stefani Hoffman, Jonathan Frankel (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 160–178; Kolstø, Pål, Helge Blakkisrud. *Nation-Building and Common Values in Russia*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.

³⁷⁵ Russian foreign policy discourse analysis by Hopf, Ted. *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*, Ithaca, New York and London: Cornell University Press, 2002; Tuminez, Astrid S. *Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy*. Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, she concludes that Russian difficulties in the nation-building process conclude in the more aggressive foreign policy; Prizel, Ilya. *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Zimmerman, William.

foreign policy are strongly connected and the use of history in the foreign policy exists consciously and also unconsciously. In the Russian social mind Europe has played the role of significant Other that influences Russian foreign policy behaviour. This identity relation has been also studied by many authors trying to define successes and failures of Russian integration to Europe.³⁷⁶ Also the role of identity and history in the relations with the former Soviet republics has been studied and the authors conclude that these relations have a heavy historical burden, though several authors believe that there are tendencies that this burden starts to slowly vanish.³⁷⁷ To understand the bilateral relations with Russia in the post-Soviet space it is crucial to study Russian national memory and how it is organised. Wertsch has dedicated several studies related to the narratives in Russian collective memory by defining two different ways how narratives are organised and bases his theory on sociological research made among different age groups in Russia.³⁷⁸ He claims that these patterns come from the history textbooks and although there has made significant changes in the history textbooks after the collapse of the Soviet regime, the main narrative templates of current Russian history corresponds to the Soviet historiography.³⁷⁹ There are also some other comparative analysis of Russian post-Soviet history textbooks

The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993–2000, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, and O’Loughlin, John, Paul F. Talbot. Where in the World is Russia? Geopolitical Perceptions and Preferences of Ordinary Russians, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 46 (1), 2005, pp. 23–50, all three studies analyse the role of perceptions in Russian foreign policy; Bagger, Hans. The Study of History in Russia during the Post-Soviet Identity Crisis, *Scando-Slavica*, Vol. 53 (1), 2007, pp. 109–125, he concludes that historiography is strongly used in current Russian foreign policy and Putin has the most brought it in the foreign policy decisions.

³⁷⁶ Neumann, Iver B. *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations*, London, New York: Routledge, 1996; Neumann, 1998; Tsygankov, Andrei P. *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006; Hofmann, Michael. *Russia and Its Changing Perceptions of the EU*, GRIN Verlag, 2007; Kassianova, Alla. Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 53 (6), 2001, pp. 821–839.

³⁷⁷ Estonian case is analysed in Wertsch (b), 2008; Baltic states are analysed by Morozov, Viatcheslav. Russia in the Baltic Sea Region. Desecuritization or Deregionalization?, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 39 (3), 2004, pp. 317–331; Williams, 2000, the case of Chechnya; Ukrainian case is analysed by Tolz, Vera. Rethinking Russian-Ukrainian relations: a new trend in nation-building in post-communist Russia?, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 8 (2), 2002, pp. 235–253.

³⁷⁸ Wertsch, 2002, Wertsch, 2007, Wertsch (b), 2008; Wertsch (c), 2008; Wertsch, James (a). Blank Spots in Collective Memory: A Case Study of Russia, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 617 (1), 2008, pp. 58–71.

³⁷⁹ Wertsch, James V. Revising Russian History, *Written Communication*, Vol. 16 (3), 1999, pp. 267–295

that analyse how these textbooks contribute to the Russian nation-building by reaching the conclusion that the school curriculum is strongly controlled by the state and the control has increased during Putin era.³⁸⁰

The second case study of my research is Estonia. This country has strongly used Russia as the negative Other in its identity formation. Estonian foreign policy has aimed at finding ways to emancipate from Russian dependency. Therefore Estonian foreign policy is analysed by many authors in the framework of identity formation. There are studies, which focus clearly on the confrontation between Estonia and Russia by reaching the conclusion that the root of the conflict is deeply integrated into the identity formation.³⁸¹ Other authors analyse Estonian foreign policy towards Western institutions (the EU, NATO) and reach the conclusion that it is influenced by the Russian threat and Estonian identity construction.³⁸² Several authors also claim that the integration into the European and transatlantic structures should influence on Estonia to change its strong identity confrontation with Russia.³⁸³ Thus, identity as a

³⁸⁰ Zajda, Joseph, Rea Zajda. The Politics of Rewriting History: New History Textbooks and Curriculum Materials in Russia, *International Review of Education*, Vol. 49 (3–4), 2003, pp. 363–384; Zajda, Joseph. The new history school textbooks in the Russian Federation: 1992–2004, *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, Vol. 37 (3), 2007, pp. 291–306; Ustinova, 2007; Sherlock, Thomas. *Historical Narratives In The Soviet Union And Post-Soviet Russia*, Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2007

³⁸¹ Aalto, Pami. *Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia*, London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003; Berg, Eiki, Piret Ehin (eds). *Identity and Foreign Policy. Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2009; Misiunas, Romauld. National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic States, in *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, F. S. Starr (ed.), Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994; Merritt, Martha. A Geopolitics Of Identity: Drawing The Line Between Russia And Estonia, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 28 (2), 2000, pp. 243–262; Aalto, Pami. Revisiting the Security/Identity Puzzle in Russo-Estonian Relations, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 40, (5), 2003, pp. 573–591; Petersoo, Pille. Reconsidering otherness: constructing Estonian identity, *Nations and Nationalism* 13 (1), 2007, pp. 117–133; Ciziunas, Pranas. Russia and the Baltic States: Is Russian Imperialism Dead?, *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 27, (3), 2008, pp. 287–307

³⁸² Kuus, Merje. European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, (1), 2002, pp. 91–108; Berg, Eiki. Local Resistance, National Identity and Global Swings in Post-Soviet Estonia, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54 (1), 2002, pp. 109–122; Miniotaite, Grazina. Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A Decade of Transformation in the Baltic States, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 16 (2), 2003, pp. 209–222; Lehti, Marko, David James Smith. *Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.

³⁸³ Mälksoo, Maria. *The Politics of Becoming European: A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries*, London: Routledge, 2010; Feldman, Gregory. Shifting the perspective on identity discourse in Estonia, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 31 (4), 2000, pp. 406–428; Astrov, Alexander. Does Estonia Need Foreign Policy?, *Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003/Eesti välispoliitika aastaraamat 2003*, Andres

research focus has been strongly presented in the Estonian case but the collective memory as an important variable in the Estonian relations with Russia has been less studied. There are some anthropological and historical studies of local or individual memories³⁸⁴ but only the escalation of tensions in the Baltic-Russian relations related to World War II (2004–2005) and the monument conflict in Estonia (2007) has increased political scientists interest in the role of political memory in the Estonian-Russian relations.³⁸⁵ Though memory studies have become more popular, history textbooks analysis is not

Kasekamp (ed), Tallinn: Eesti Välispoliitika Instituut, 2003, pp.115–130; Mälksoo, Maria. Enabling NATO Enlargement: Changing Constructions of the Baltic States, *Trames: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 8 (3), 2004, pp. 284–298; Noreen, Erik, Roxanna Sjöstedt. Estonian Identity Formations and Threat Framing in the Post-Cold War Era, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41 (6), 2004, pp. 733–750; Viktorova, Jevgenia. Conflict Transformation the Estonian Way The Estonian-Russian Border Conflict European Integration and Shifts in Discursive Representation of the “Other”, *Perspectives. Central European Review of International Affairs*, vol. 27, 2006/2007, pp. 44–66; Mälksoo, Maria. From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The Baltic States in the Enlarged Europe, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37 (3), 2006, pp. 275–297; Noreen, Erik. Threat Images and Socialization: Estonia and Russia in the New Millenium, in *Security Strategies, Power Disparity and Identity: The Baltic Sea Region*, Olav Knudsen (ed.), Farnham: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 97–123.

³⁸⁴ Tulviste, Peeter, Werstsch, James V. Official and unofficial histories: The case of Estonia, *Journal of Narrative and Life History*, Vol. 4 (4), 1994, pp. 311–329; Gross, Toomas. Anthropology of collective memory: Estonian national awakening revisited, *Trames: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 4 (6), 2002; Anepaio, Terje. Reception of the topic of repressions in the Estonian society, *Whose Culture?*, *Pro Ethnologia* 14, 2003, pp. 47–66; Rausing, Sigrid. *History, memory, and identity in post-Soviet Estonia: the end of a collective farm*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004

³⁸⁵ Astrov, Aleksander. *Самочинное сообщество: политика меньшинств или малая политика?*, Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2007; Brüggemann, Karsten. Estonia and its Escape from the East: The Relevance of the Past in Russian-Estonian Relations, in *Representations on the Margins of Europe: Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States*, Tsypylma Darieva and Wolfgang Kaschuba (eds.), Frankfurt/M: Campus Verlag, 2007; Feest, David. Histories of Violence: National Identity and Public Memory of Occupation and Terror in Estonia, in *Representations on the Margins of Europe: Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States*, Tsypylma Darieva and Wolfgang Kaschuba (eds.), Frankfurt/M: Campus Verlag, 2007; Tamm, Marek. History as Cultural Memory: Mnemohistory and the Construction of the Estonian Nation, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 39 (4), 2008, pp. 499–516; Petersoo, Pille, Marek Tamm (eds). *Monumentaalne konflikt. Mälu, poliitika ja identiteet tänapäevases Eestis*, Tallinn: Varrak, 2008; Burch, Stuart, David J. Smith. Empty Spaces and the Value of Symbols: Estonia's 'War of Monuments' from Another Angle, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 59 (6), 2007, pp. 913–936; Onken, 2007, Wertsch (b), 2008; Brüggemann, Kasekamp, 2008; Pääbo, 2008; Münch, 2008. Also *Journal of Baltic Studies* has dedicated a special issue for Memory and Democratic Pluralism in the Baltic States - Rethinking the Relationship (Vol. 41, Issue 3 2010).

developed much in Estonia, there are only few studies related to the Estonian identity formation and critical analysis of history discourse.³⁸⁶

The third case study, Ukraine is a distinct case. On the one hand, the identity conflict between Ukraine and Russia is the strongest because Ukraine and Russia share the same origin. On the other hand, Ukraine is still searching for its identity and it makes the Ukrainian identity formation process vulnerable. Various authors have conducted studies to understand how Ukraine has constructed its separate roots as Ukrainian scholars claim. The Russian position is that Ukrainians are not a totally different nation from the Russians and Ukrainian attempts to establish a sovereign nation are considered as a hostile activity towards Russia.³⁸⁷ Another significant other for Ukraine is Poland and there are also several studies made to analyse the shared past of Ukraine and Poland and its different perceptions in both countries.³⁸⁸ Being located between Russia and Poland has also given Ukraine a vague identity strongly related to the foreign policy dimension – either to be a part of Europe or closer to Russia. Ukrainian attempts to move closer to Europe have increased the negative signals from Russia that can be explained as part of the Russian-Ukrainian identity conflict. Some scholars have also analysed Ukrainian search for identity

³⁸⁶ Aleksahhina, Margarita. Historical discourse in the legitimation of Estonian politics: principle of restitution, *Human Affairs*, Vol. 1, 2006, pp. 66–82; Ahonen, Sirkka. Politics of identity through history curriculum: narratives of the past for social exclusion - or inclusion?, *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, Vol. 33 (2), 2001, pp. 179–194; Kukk, Kristi. Vene küsimus eesti ajalookäsitluses, in Vene impeerium ja Baltikum: venestus, rahvuslus ja moderniseerimine 19. sajandi teisel poolel ja 20. sajandi alguses I, Tõnu Tannberg and Bradley Woodworth (eds), *Acta et Commentationes Archivi Historici Estoniae, Eesti Ajalooarhiiv: Tartu*, 2009, pp. 191–206; Pääbo, Heiko. From an Eastern outpost in the West to an Western outpost in East: Transformation of Estonian Master Narrative, in *Cultural and Social Transformations after Communism: East Central Europe in Focus*, Barbara Törnquist-Plewa and Krzysztof Stala (eds), Lund-Malmö: Sekel, 2011

³⁸⁷ Anatol Lieven. *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 1999; Solchanyk, 2001; Arel, Dominique, Blair A. Ruble (eds). *Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006; Plochy, 2008; Kuzio, Taras. National Identities and Virtual Foreign Policies among the Eastern Slavs, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 31 (4), 2003, pp. 431–452; D'Anieri, Paul. Nationalism and international politics: Identity and sovereignty in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 3 (2), 1997, pp. 1–28; Kuzio, Taras. Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 33 (1), 2005, pp. 29–58.

³⁸⁸ Snyder, 1999; Snyder, 2002; Kasianov, Georgiy. The burden of the past. The Ukrainian-Polish conflict of 1943/44 in contemporary public, academic and political debates in Ukraine and Poland, *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Vol. 19 (3 & 4), 2006, pp. 247–259; Copey, Nathaniel. Remembrance of Things Past: the Lingering Impact of History on Contemporary Polish-Ukrainian Relations, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 60 (4), 2008, pp. 531–560

and its relations to Ukrainian foreign policy.³⁸⁹ In addition to the external strong factors for Ukraine identity formation, there is also internal debate about Ukrainian identity. There are several studies about Ukrainian nation-building and memory work in this process where different aspects as self- and other-images, victimisation, forming new heroes and other issues are analysed.³⁹⁰ Ukrainian history textbooks have been analysed with different focuses and scholars have concluded that the strong nationalistic and exclusive narrative has changed to a more open and inclusive one;³⁹¹ some studies even show that the history curriculum is strongly debated by the teachers in the regions³⁹². This tendency also shows that Ukraine is still searching for its identity.

Of all the case studies Georgia is the one that has got the least attention by scholars with an interest in identity. Most of the Georgian foreign policy analyses are written in the framework of the Rationalist schools. Primarily Georgia is discussed in the context of strategy or conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.³⁹³ There are very few researches related to identity and memory

³⁸⁹ Prizel, 1998; Wolczuk, Kataryna. History, europe and the “national idea”: the “official” narrative of national identity in Ukraine, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 28 (4), 2000, pp. 671–694; Weber, Alexandra. *Europe's Influence on Ukrainian State Building – A Struggle for Identity Between Europe and Russia*, GRIN Verlag, 2007; Madsen, Michael D. *A Fragmented Ukraine: Part of the West or Apart from the West?*, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA, 2007; Yakovenko, Andriy. *Ukraine's Search for its Place in Europe: The East or the West?*, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA, 2007

³⁹⁰ Yekelchik, Serhy. *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004; Dietsch, Johan. *Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture*, Lund: Media Tryck, Lund University, 2006; Marples, David R. *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007; Kuzio, Taras. National identity in independent Ukraine: An identity in transition, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 2 (4), 1996, pp. 582–608; Kuzio, Taras. Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine. Defining the “Other”, *Ethnicities*, Vol. 1 (3), 2001, pp. 343–365; Kuzio, Taras. National Identity and History Writing in Ukraine, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 33 (1), 2005, pp. 29–58; Himka, John-Paul. War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora, *Spacesofidentity.net*, Vol. 5 (1), 2005, pp. 9–24.

³⁹¹ Janmaat, 2005; Janmaat, Jan Germen. History and National Identity Construction: The Great Famine in Irish and Ukrainian History Textbooks, *History of Education*, Vol. 35 (3), 2006, pp. 345–368; Janmaat, 2007; Rodgers, Peter W. (Re)inventing the Past: The Politics of 'National' History in the Ukrainian Classroom, *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 6 (2), 2006, pp. 40–55; Sereda, V. Polish and Ukrainian school history textbooks' impact on the formation of Polish-Ukrainian ethnic stereotypes, *Lviv University Papers, Ser. Hist.*, vol. 35/36, 2000, pp. 387–398

³⁹² Rodgers, Peter W. Contestation and negotiation: regionalism and the politics of school textbooks in Ukraine's eastern borderlands, *Nations and Nationalism*, 12 (4), 2006, pp. 681–69

³⁹³ Bertsch, Gary K., Cassady B. Craft, Scott A. Jones, Michael Beck. *Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, London, New

impact on the Georgian foreign policy and its relations with Russia. In these studies there is indicated some certain impact of culture and identity on Georgian foreign policy and after the Rose Revolution, similar to Estonia, the drive to separate itself from Russia and focus on the Western/European identity.³⁹⁴ A similar situation is also with analysis of the Georgian history textbooks: few analyses exist that underline that the history narrative is too much retrospective, glorifying the ancient time when Georgia had great kings and a strong army.³⁹⁵ Although Georgia has been in ethnic conflicts and in military confrontation with Russia, there is a lack of studies that try to analyse this confrontation from the identity conflict perspective.

Earlier research shows that the collective memory impact on foreign policy is important and that the analysis of history textbooks offers a good basis to understand the identity clashes between different nations. However, there are only a few studies that analyse master narratives in the former Russian empire, though previous research shows that these relations with Russia are heavily burdened by history. Russia, being the successor state of the Soviet Union and also crucial player in the world politics, has been studied the most. Also the Ukrainian case has been studied more due to the strong identity clash with Russia. The Estonian case has been studied in the context of identity formation and the clash of the master narratives has been taken as a priori assumptions in these studies, therefore there is also lacking a critical analysis of history discourse in the Estonian case. Georgia as another small nation has got less attention from identity and memory studies. This dissertation tries to fill these gaps and offer a comprehensive and comparative analysis of national history master narratives as the source of international identity conflicts.

York: Routledge, 2000; Hopf, Ted. Identity, legitimacy, and the use of military force: Russia's Great Power identities and military intervention in Abkhazia, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 31, 2005, pp. 225–243; Lynch, Dov. *Why Georgia Matters? Chaillot Paper Nr 86*, 2006, Paris: Institute for Security Studies; Allison, Roy. Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to 'coerce Georgia to peace', *International Affairs*, Vol. 84 (6), 2008, pp. 1145–1171; Lanskoj, Miriam, Giorgi Areshidze. Georgia's year of turmoil, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 19 (4), 2008, pp. 154–168; Asmus, Ronald. *A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West*, Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2010

³⁹⁴ Jones, Stephen. The role of cultural paradigms in Georgian foreign policy, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 19 (3), 2003, pp. 83–110; Gail W. Lapidus. Between Assertiveness and Insecurity: Russian Elite Attitudes and the Russia-Georgia Crisis, *Journal Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 23 (2), 2007, pp. 138–155; Mühlfried, Florian. Celebrating Identities in PostSoviet Georgia, in *Representations on the Margins of Europe Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States*, Tsypylma Darieva, Wolfgang Kaschuba (eds.) Frankfurt/M: CampusVerlag, 2007

³⁹⁵ Duthilleul, Yael. Curriculum and Standards in Georgia, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998; Godson, Roy, Dennis Jay Kenney, Margaret Litvin, and Gigi Tevzadze. Building societal support for the rule of law in Georgia, *Trends in Organized Crime*, Vol. 8 (2), 2004, pp. 5–27; Razmadze, Maya. Abgründe des Goldenen Zeitalters Sowjetvergangenheit in Georgiens Schulbuch, *Osteuropa*, Vol. 60 (8), 2010 pp. 91–104

Defining my research questions, I am aware that there is not an objective text analysis. Fairclough claims that every text analysis is limited and partial because the research questions are motivated by the scholars' subjective interests to find out something particular from the text.³⁹⁶ My research aims to define the potential of the international identity conflicts in the former Russian empire space and to assess it through the institutionalised national memory that is the best reflected in the school history curricula. It is important to define this potential because it offers grounds for the other identity conflict analyses that are focused more on the foreign policy decision-making. As the overview of the earlier studies showed, a comprehensive comparative analysis in this field is lacking.

The analysed master narratives construct the unconscious memory and I aim to deconstruct this memory to understand what these antagonistic elements are that construct people's understanding about themselves and the surrounding world. In my research I assess the potential of identity conflict by the following elements:

- 1) **Nation's narrative of origin** – it shows how a nation understands its origin and who this nation is and how it has developed from ancient times to the current nation state. Incompatible narratives of origin of nations lead to identity conflict. Therefore the main questions are: What is the origin of the nation? What are the main elements emphasised by the narrative of origin?
- 2) **Identity markers, chronotope of identity** – identity markers are the particular elements, which are stressed and thereby they construct the understanding that it defines the nation. In addition, through the past the territorial extent of the nation has changed and it will be assessed which territories are shown by the narratives as the nation's natural territories or as its historical homeland. Opposing identity markers and overlapping chronotope lead to identity conflict. Therefore the main questions are: What are the key elements that combine this nation together through the history? How the historical homeland and its borders are defined in the master narrative? How the historical homeland is placed on the bigger map? How the maps used in the textbooks construct the borders of the homeland and its regional location?
- 3) **Character of narrative** – shows how the nation includes or excludes the other from the national past. It will be assessed in the terms of the assimilative or dissimilative character of the narrative. The mutual use of assimilative and dissimilative narratives leads to identity conflict. Therefore the main question is: To what extent does the national master narrative use assimilative and dissimilative statements?
- 4) **Schematic narrative template** – offers a particular pattern how certain events are told in the master narrative of a nation. On the one hand, it provides a certain framing of the events. On the other hand, it can define the

³⁹⁶ Fairclough, 2003, p. 15

pattern of behaviour for the national elite.³⁹⁷ Thereby it helps to define the character of the master narrative as well the Self-image. The opposing types of the schematic narrative templates leads to incompatibility and thereby also to the identity conflict. Therefore the main questions are: What are the schematic narrative templates that are used in the national master narrative? What is their character and which image do they mainly mediate?

- 5) **Images of self and other** – they show how national narratives deal with the complex issues from the past and how the images of Self and Other are constructed in historiography, in other words it constructs the stereotypes of self and other. It will be assessed in the categories of self-glorifying (glorifying or victimising), self-whitewashing (personalising or justifying), other-maligning narratives (threatening or shifting responsibility). The strong negative image of the other constructs hostile relations towards this nation and thereby identity based conflicts. Therefore the main questions are: How the Self is described by the master narrative, assessed on the scale positive, negative, and neutral? To what extent glorifying, victimising, justifying and personalising elements about Self are used in the master narrative? How is the Self presented in the textbook images? How the Other is described by the master narrative, assessed on the scale positive-negative? To what extent other-maligning elements are used?
- 6) **Commonly shared history** – each narrative has an explaining and assessing function, both play a crucial role in understanding what happened in the past and how it should be judged. Strongly contradicting interpretations of the commonly shared history lead to identity conflict. Therefore the main questions are: What are the most important events in the national history? What is their meaning in the history narrative? Is the significant Other related to these events? Which role does the significant Other play in these events? How is it related to the image of the significant Other?

Considering these elements of the potential of identity conflict and placing it in the framework of post-imperial space, I test the following theses that are supported by testable assumptions:

- 1) **The national master narratives of the former dominant nation and dominated nations are mutually antagonistic:**
 - a. narratives of origin support contradicting characters and roles that construct mutual incompatibility;
 - b. the narrative of the former dominant nation has an assimilative character towards the dominated nations, narratives of dominated nations have dissimilative character towards former dominant nation;
 - c. interpretations of key events have opposing character in national master narratives;
 - d. denials of the other nation's history key events exist in master narratives.
- 2) **Antagonistic master narratives deny key elements of the 'Other's' identity:**

³⁹⁷ Wertsch, 2002, p. 96

- a. main identity markers are opposing and thereby they create mutual denials of these identity markers;
- b. chronotope of the identity is overlapping – the chronotope of former dominant nation includes the territories of dominated nations, though the latter reject it;
- c. image of former dominant nation is presented as negative and threatening by dominated nations and their self-image is victimised;
- d. self-image of former dominant nation is heroic and glorifying and it whitewashes its negative images of the past events.

3) Schematic narrative templates of dominated nations are similar and differ significantly from the templates of the former dominating nation.

To test my theses I analyse national history textbooks that are approved by the national ministries of education. This confirmation shows that it includes the accepted understanding of the national history. In Russia national history is offered in curriculum in the 6th-9th grades, in Ukraine in the 7th-11th grades, and in the case of Estonia and Georgia it is offered at the high school level. I combine quantitative and qualitative analysis of the textbooks. Quantitative analysis focuses on clearly measurable elements: volume of certain events presented in the books, character of the narratives (assimilative or dissimilative), usage of different narrative elements by representing Self and Other, and number of maps and their categorisation. Qualitative analysis will focus on the less clearly identifiable elements like narrative of origin, schematic narrative templates, and assessments of key events. Special attention is on the maps because maps play a crucial role in the process of construction of the chronotope in people's minds. The results of quantitative analysis are incorporated into the qualitative analysis to form a comprehensive analysis.

In the next chapters I analyse Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian textbooks separately. First I will define the narrative of origin that explains the origin of the nation and how it has developed into a nation-state. Thereafter I determine the nation's key identity markers. Subsequently the character of narrative and schematic narrative templates are analysed, assessing them on the scale assimilative-dissimilative as well their self-image elements. Thereafter I focus on Self and Other images and analyse the different narrative elements for their image construction. The last part of the chapters deals with key events in the national past and also includes the role of the Other in these events, which helps to conclude the commonly shared history assessments. The last chapter is a comparative analysis of the Russian master narrative with the previous case studies. This comparison enables to test the research theses and assumptions.

CHAPTER 2: Analysis of the Estonian Master Narrative

The history of Estonian statehood is relatively short. Estonia has been under German, Danish, Polish, Swedish and Russian rule. Estonians established an independent nation-state in 1918 by seceding from the Russian Empire. Estonia stayed a sovereign subject of international relations till 1940 when the USSR took control over Estonian territory. Estonia restored its independence in 1991 when it started to implement independent policies domestically and externally. Estonia's foreign policy priority became to achieve membership in European and transatlantic institutions, which was completed in 2004 by joining the European Union and NATO. Since restoration of independence Estonia has also restored its national memory and Estonian national history narrative is fully exchanged from the old Soviet narrative to the national one, which is strongly influenced by the Estonian master narrative from the 1920–1930s.³⁹⁸

In the current chapter I analyse the Estonian history master narrative and its components relevant for international identity conflict. The master narrative is analysed based on the history textbooks for high schools. Estonian history is divided between two textbooks: Estonian history till the end of 19th century³⁹⁹ and Estonian history in the 20th century⁴⁰⁰. First I analyse the Estonian narrative of origin and Estonian key identity elements, including the chronotope. The second section focuses on the character of Estonian narrative and defines the main schematic narrative templates. The third part covers the Self and Other images and the narrative elements that are used to construct these images. The final part discusses Estonian key events and analyses role of Russia(ns) in these events.

2.1. Estonian Narrative of Origin and Main Identity Markers

Narrative of origin explains how the nation was formed and how it reached its ultimate goal – its nation-state. In this process several key elements of the national identity are also defined. These elements are also important for further analysis by defining the action of the Others' related to these elements as friendly or hostile.

The Estonian master narrative claims that Estonians are one of the oldest nations in Europe and that they have lived in their lands longer than the most of

³⁹⁸ Ahonen, 2001, p. 182; Pääbo, 2011

³⁹⁹ Laur, Mati, Ain Mäesalu, Tõnu Tannberg, Ursual Vent. *Eesti ajalugu I: Muinasajast 19. sajandi lõpuni. Õpik gümnaasiumile*, Tallinn: Avita, 2005

⁴⁰⁰ Pajur, Ago, Tõnu Tannberg. *Eesti ajalugu II: 20. sajandist tänapäevani. Õpik gümnaasiumile*, Tallinn: Avita, 2006

the European nations. Recently older version of the national origin of Estonians has changed and during the 1990s a revised narrative of national origin has become dominant. The earlier version explained that the origin of the first settlers in Estonia is not known and Estonians came together with other Baltic-Finnic tribes from the East, the Urals 5 000 years ago. The correction of the narrative extends Estonians' settlement in this territory by 6,000 years. This explanation confirms Estonians' connection with the historical homeland by claiming that ancestors of the Estonians have lived on their lands already 11 000 years. However, the narrative admits that the first settlers are not directly Estonians but they are one and the most significant part of Estonian ethnicity. This explanation also admits that Estonian ethnicity is influenced by other neighbouring nations – *'other kin tribes in the East as well as Germanic and Baltic tribes in the following periods of the Pre-history and intensive contacts with Germans, Latvians, Swedes, Danes, Poles and Russian in the Historical period.'*⁴⁰¹

This narrative of origin strongly confirms Estonian nativeness in the Estonian territories and this setting also legitimises the existence of the Estonian state on that basis. The second aspect related to this narrative of origin is Estonians' connection with the East is rejected. This explanation is probably related to an aim to prove its belongingness to the West that is also deductable in the further parts of the master narrative. In addition, it defines one of the most important characteristics of the Estonian nation – immobility of settlement. Estonians have arrived on their historical territory when the ice retreated and since that moment they have been influenced by the surrounding tribes and nations, which have reached the Estonian territories or with whom Estonians had contacts. It also gives grounds for differentiation between native people and migrating nations.

The second aspect of the narrative of origin is related to the nationhood of Estonians. Estonians did not have any independent state before the 20th century and therefore the aim of the master narrative is to explain why Estonians did not form any state institutions earlier period than the 20th century and how current statehood is a natural development of the Estonian nation. The master narrative claims that the Estonian statehood development was destroyed by the Germanic invasion in the beginning of the 13th century where after heroic fighting Estonians were forced to surrender and the state formation was given to the external forces, who did not consider the interests of Estonians. Though Estonians did not manage to establish a state, there are several references to the possible elements that proved that Estonians were in process of state formation. The period before the German conquest relies only on archaeological findings and few written sources of neighbouring nations. It gives broad space for interpretation and these speculative elements are presented in the textbooks. In

⁴⁰¹ Translated by the author *'nii idapoolsete sugulaste kui ka germaani ja balti hõimudega järgnevatel muinasaja perioodidel ning tihedad kontaktid sakslaste, lätlaste, rootslaste, taanlaste, poolakate ja venelastega ajaloolisel ajal.'* Laur et al, 2005, p. 16

this matter the development of social stratification is connected with the formation of the early state institutions and the village and community leaders are called ‘kings’.⁴⁰² Thereby the master narrative shows the situation that the Estonian tribes were moving towards a unified Estonian state. The single reference from the *Heinrici Cronicon Lyvoniae* (the beginning of the 13th century) that the Estonian elders had annual councils in Raikküla is presented as a proof that Estonians were preparing to establish a unified nation.⁴⁰³

The late formation of the Estonian state is related to the peaceful environment of Estonians. According to the narrative, there were not any bigger aggressions against the Estonians till the Viking Age (800–1050). It is proved by the fact that there were only a few strongholds in Estonia by that time and the lack of weapons in the Estonian graves. The narrative concludes that there was no need for them. Later period brings more permanently settled strongholds and also some written sources tell that Estonians fought for their independence. It is the turning point when Estonians are presented as a unified group protecting their homeland for external invaders. Therefore the first attempt by Russians is named the first Independence War (1030–1061).⁴⁰⁴ The narrative explains that Estonians were well organised and managed to expel the external invaders. It constructs the implicit understanding that the need for political organisation was related only to the external threat. Alas, it did not exist in Estonia for a long period and Estonians met the German invasion unprepared in the 13th century.⁴⁰⁵

The failure in formation of its independent nation makes Estonians not an independent historical actor. However, the national narrative tries to emphasise the elements, which demonstrate that Estonians were not fully suppressed by the external conquerors but they were also partly included in the new state institutions and there were some continuity of Estonian earlier institutions and political traditions.⁴⁰⁶ This process culminates with the last big rebellion (Uprising of St. George Night, 1343–1345) against the German nobility, which

⁴⁰² The first strongholds in Estonia are related to leaders who have managed to establish control over some certain territories, Laur et al, 2005, p. 21; in later periods the stronghold settlements were the power centres for the local leaders who could govern several villages, *Ibid.*, p. 27; the richest landowners were elected as community leaders and most likely their position was already hereditary, *Ibid.*, p. 32

⁴⁰³ Laur et al, 2005, p. 32

⁴⁰⁴ Laur et al, 2005, p. 29

⁴⁰⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 50

⁴⁰⁶ In 1226 Pope established a buffer state between Danish and German territories and this state also based on the Estonians leaders authority, Laur et al, 2005, p. 51; Liver payment traditions had its roots in the Pre-History period, *Ibid.*, p. 52; Estonians participated in the military operations, which were organized as joint efforts under German guidance, *Ibid.*, p. 53; Centre of Tartu bishopric was established in the same place of Estonians earlier settlement, *Ibid.*, p. 55; Estonians belonged to the urban elite (p. 55) and also were part of the nobility (p. 52).

is explained as the Estonian leaders' last attempt to liberate the nation.⁴⁰⁷ According to the narrative the failure of the rebellion ceded inclusion of Estonian leaders in power structures and the division between the ruling elite and the ruled population becomes an ethnic one.⁴⁰⁸ This part of the narrative tells about Estonians' will to be free nation and defines continuity between the independent Estonian tribes and later Estonian society. Some references to Estonians as a united force are presented in the further narrative but Estonians stay mainly in the role of subject of external powers.⁴⁰⁹

The subject-status narrative continues till the 19th century with one small exception from the end of the 17th century where glorified Swedish government is presented as an authority, which initiated reforms that would lift Estonians from the subjugated status to an independent force but the situation was reversed by the Russian conquest of the Baltic provinces in 1710 and thereby the emancipation of Estonians was delayed.⁴¹⁰ The narrative defines Estonians as a political force who aims at self-government only after the agrarian reforms in the 19th century. According to the national narrative, the participation in the rural self-government was an important precondition for the future independence.⁴¹¹ From that moment Estonians as a nation strengthened and they moved towards independent nation-state.

The beginning of the 20th century is described as a turbulent period where Estonians tried actively to implement the claims for national autonomy but due to their weakness they failed and the political nationalism was replaced by a cultural one.⁴¹² According to the narrative it was the last failure and in the second turbulent period at the end of the First World War Estonians acted more decisively: Estonian territories were unified in one administrative unit⁴¹³, this unit got autonomy, which was implemented by Estonians and national military units were formed.⁴¹⁴ All these elements are presented as necessary conditions for forming an independent state. Having these preconditions, the independent nation-state was established at the next historical juncture when the national leaders realised that the gained autonomy is not sufficient to protect Estonian

⁴⁰⁷ The region where the rebellion occurred is connected with the assumption that the local Estonian leaders had bigger rights there and therefore higher ability to organise the resistance.

⁴⁰⁸ Laur et al, 2005, p. 56

⁴⁰⁹ Reference is made to the Estonian potential political preferences during the Livonian War where delegation of Estonian peasants declared their will to belong to the Swedish Kingdom, Laur et al, 2005, p. 85

⁴¹⁰ Swedish king declared reduction and returned the nobility lands to the state. By implementing reforms in the state property the peasants' (Estonians') rights increased significantly. After the Russian conquest the restitution was declared and the number of state estates decreased significantly, Laur et al, 2005, p. 106

⁴¹¹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 139

⁴¹² Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 14

⁴¹³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 21

⁴¹⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 22–23

national interests.⁴¹⁵ However, the declared independence needed to be defended from the historical enemies from the East and the West. After a victorious war of liberation Estonians finally achieved the rightful and natural position – the independent nation-state.

The period of independence is described as the age of Estonian-oriented developments and a success story that fully satisfied Estonian national interests and as the only natural form of existence for Estonians.⁴¹⁶ This ultimate status of Estonian nation was annihilated by the Soviet occupation imposed on Estonians. Though the occupation was implemented without resistance, the national narrative confirms that Estonians did not approve the occupation; resistance was absent due to the national leaders who did not express the will of the nation.⁴¹⁷ The key moment in this narrative is the year 1944 when Estonians managed to restore a national government and the Estonians soldiers fought against the Soviet troops to stop the restoration of the Soviet occupation. Therefore this struggle is called as the last Independence war.⁴¹⁸ The failure in the war resulted in the fifty-year Soviet occupation that is presented as the age of repressions and exploitation of Estonia and Estonians. Russian conquest again enslaved the Estonian nation. The reforms in the 1980s offered Estonians a new opportunity to eliminate historical injustice and restore their independence. Using a turbulent moment Estonians restored their independence that satisfies the best Estonian national interests and it is the only rightful position for the Estonian nation.⁴¹⁹

The narrative of origin of nation emphasizes Estonians' strong will to be independent and to fight against external suppressions. The status of being the subject of other nations is portrayed as either dangerous for Estonians or as an era of instability that does not enable to protect the Estonian national interests and therefore the only suitable solutions for Estonians is to live in an independent nation-state. The lack of earlier independent Estonian state is compensated by the narratives that partly showed the continuity of ancient Estonians life in the foreign structures and also the maintenance of Estonian national elements that were important to form a modern nation in the 19th century. Developments towards the independent nation state are presented as the only solution to maintain the nation and protect its interests.

Estonian identity markers are divided into four groups: cultural, political, economic and demographical ones. The most important aspect of the Estonian national identity is the **Estonian language** and it has a key role in the national narrative. In the context of cultural history the development of the Estonian language is narrated as the first usage in the church services⁴²⁰ and thereafter its

⁴¹⁵ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 26

⁴¹⁶ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 64

⁴¹⁷ There was small resistance of the military units to the organisers of the Soviet coup, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 79; Forest brothers resistance, *Ibid*, p. 82, 112–113;

⁴¹⁸ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 90

⁴¹⁹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 147, 154

⁴²⁰ Laur et al, 2005, p. 76

development as a written language of religious texts with culmination of the translation of the Bible into Estonian in 1739.⁴²¹ Also an important part is dedicated to the first non-religious writings in Estonian (first journal, newspapers, and literature). The master narrative also emphasizes the Estonian language specifically by showing that it was considered as an exotic and interesting subject for foreigners.⁴²² However, the progress of the language on a large-scale starts only with the national awakening when Estonians themselves take charge of their language development. This process culminated in the independent Estonian nation-state where the extensive use of the language was the grounds for the development of Estonian high culture.⁴²³ The master narrative dedicates an important part to threats to the Estonian language that are experienced under the Russian rule⁴²⁴ and the Estonians' active resistance against imposed Russian language.⁴²⁵ Therefore the only acceptable status for the Estonian language was the official language, which was possible to achieve only in the context of a sovereign state.⁴²⁶ Language as cultural phenomenon becomes an important political aim in the national narrative. Therefore the language issue is also currently politicised in Estonia.

Another important cultural identity marker is **education**. According to the narrative, Estonians have always had a desire for knowledge and they are smart people who are open for technological developments.⁴²⁷ The master narrative also focuses on the development of Estonian educational system, by emphasising the importance of establishment of the primary school network in Estonia⁴²⁸ as well as the foundation of the university in Tartu⁴²⁹. The emphasis

⁴²¹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 81, 124

⁴²² Laur et al, 2005, p. 117, p. 150

⁴²³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 61

⁴²⁴ First Russification started in the end of the 19th century and starting from the primary education everything was in Russian, hindering the cultural development of Estonians, Laur et al, 2005, p. 155; Second Russification process started in the end of the 1970s when Estonian language was more and more pushed out from the public use and education, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 109–110

⁴²⁵ In the Revolution of 1905 Estonian movements demanded the broader use of Estonian language, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 9, p. 11, p. 15; Estonians mobilised intellectuals and youth for the protection of the language in the beginning of the 1980s, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 110–111.

⁴²⁶ Autonomous Estonian government in 1917 declared Estonian language as the official one and education was given in Estonian, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 22; during the restoration of Estonian independence Estonians demanded the law of Estonian language that declared it the official one in Estonian territory, that was achieved in 1989, *Ibid.*, p. 143, p. 146

⁴²⁷ Estonian shamans were famous among neighbouring nations, Laur et al, 2005, p. 36; Estonians took fast in use the modern war technology in the independence war (1206–1227) that helped them to drive out for a short period German and Danish invaders, *Ibid.*, pp. 48–50;

⁴²⁸ The Estonian people education goes back to the school that was formed to teach the village school teachers near to Tartu by B. G. Forselius in 1684, it helped to cover

on a high level of literacy among Estonians is an important aspect in the national narrative.⁴³⁰ Therefore the teachers of the village and parish schools became an important part of the national awakening movement and together with the Estonian language the Estonian school was important source of the national identity.⁴³¹ Parallel to the language issue education in Estonian language became a part of political demands. The independent nation-state extended the national educational system and Estonia became the language of tuition from the primary school to the university that was approved by the majority of Estonians who are characterized by ‘*big desire to become educated and thereby to improve their life standard.*’⁴³² According to the master narrative a setback for Estonian education is related to the Soviet period where the quality of education decreased.⁴³³ Therefore similarly to the language the logical conclusion of the national narrative is that the strong desire of knowledge that characterises Estonians is only possible to satisfy in an independent Estonian nation-state.

The third identity marker of the cultural category is **traditional culture**, where singing plays a crucial role. The Estonian master narrative claims that Estonian traditional culture had a strong connection to the ancient Estonian

Southern Estonia with the school network already by the end of the 17th century, Laur et al, 2005, p. 117

⁴²⁹ University of Tartu was established in 1632 by Swedish king, university was closed in 1710 when Russia conquered Estonian territories and it was reopened only in 1802, Laur et al, 2005, p. 119; The first Estonian enrolled at the university in 1805, Laur et al, 2005, p. 146

⁴³⁰ In addition to the school network the Moravian Church (Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine) movement in Estonia contributed strongly to increase the Estonians’ literacy level, p. Laur et al, 2005, p. 121; in the end of the 18th century South Estonians literacy rate (reading skills) was equal with other Protestant countries, though writing skills were rare, *Ibid*, p. 124; the only school for parish teachers in the Russian Empire was established in Estonia in 1828, it helped to increase the reading skills among Estonians almost to the 100% in the 1880s, writing skills 30–40%, *Ibid*, p. 147

⁴³¹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 150

⁴³² Translated by the author ‘*suur soov saada haridust ja lootus seeläbi paremale elujärjele jõuda*’, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 64; Similar characteristic is mentioned when the community of emigrated Estonians is depicted by claiming that they set priority their children education, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 133

⁴³³ Although in the Soviet era several reforms were made that should make the education more accessible for broader masses and the number of students increased the narrative considers that it rather decreased the quality by forced system and strong ideological focus, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 130; during the Soviet time the number of higher educational institutions increased but there is underlined the ideological subjects at the university, *Ibid*, 131; it is also interesting to emphasise that in the part where the science development is described in the independent Estonia there is underlined that several scholars on the international level worked at the university (*Ibid*, p. 63), about the Soviet universities there is not mentioned any (*Ibid*, p. 131).

traditions, which remained till the early modern era relatively unchanged.⁴³⁴ The changes in the form of the national culture occur in the 18th century when it modernises and takes the forms, e.g. choral singing, which is practiced till the present.⁴³⁵ The important role of Estonian traditional culture and its practice is in the period of national awakening where the tradition of song festivals and active cultural and social movements was established.⁴³⁶ Both become important identity markers in the national narrative and continuity symbols of Estonian identity. The national narrative explains that Estonian culture was formed and maintained in the civic movements till the independent nation-state, which enabled Estonians also to develop Estonian high culture. However, traditional national culture continued to be actively practiced also during the independent nation-state where the singing festivals had important place.⁴³⁷ During the Soviet period, practicing of national culture in the rural communities continued till the end of the 1950s when the traditional rural community was destroyed and the high culture became more dominant.⁴³⁸ Nevertheless, Estonian singing festivals were one of the most important symbols of Estonian identity also during the Soviet era.⁴³⁹ The importance of singing occurs also related to the restoration of Estonian independence in the end of the 1980s. This period is named as singing revolution that brought together more than 100,000 people to Tallinn to sing together national songs and to unite Estonians to demand autonomy and later independence.⁴⁴⁰ This part of narrative is connected to a further described aspect of Estonian identity – peaceful nation. The narrative claims that Estonians used cultural means to fight for their national interests and it underlines the importance of the cultural category in Estonian identity.

The fourth aspect of the culture as the identity marker is the religion. Estonians are identified as a Protestant nation, however, the role of the church and religion in the national narrative is presented as a rather marginal one. Though Estonians were actively in contact with Christian nations the forceful Christianization of Estonians marginalised its role in the society because it was perceived as the symbol of surrender and loss of freedom.⁴⁴¹ Although the national narrative presents Estonians' reluctance to accept Christianity and emphasises its incorporation into the ancient pagan rites, it concludes that it changed significantly Estonians' worldview.⁴⁴² However, the completion of Estonians' Christianisation is defined as the 18th century related to the Moravian

⁴³⁴ Laur et al, 2005, p. 67

⁴³⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 121

⁴³⁶ Laur et al, 2005, p. 153

⁴³⁷ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 66–67

⁴³⁸ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 128

⁴³⁹ National narrative depicts the song festivals as the main national mass events that were allowed to organise during the Soviet era. Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 128

⁴⁴⁰ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 142–143

⁴⁴¹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 41

⁴⁴² Laur et al, 2005, p. 68

Brethren movement in Estonia that was actively and voluntarily attended by Estonians.⁴⁴³ Thereby the narrative shows the reluctance of Estonians to accept the foreign power and desire to decide independently that can be also considered as important element for the independent nation. Nevertheless, religion does not play an important role in the national narrative. It is mentioned only in the context of the Soviet occupation where Estonians considered the Lutheran Church as one relatively independent source of spiritual opposition. Nevertheless, the Soviet regime succeeded to estrange Estonians from the church.⁴⁴⁴ By showing the Estonians' ambiguous relations to the religion the narrative defines Estonians as a **secular nation**.

In the political category Estonians are defined as a **democratic nation** that demands equal opportunities for everybody. Ancient Estonian society is described by the narrative as a society where everybody had equal opportunities and also in contrast to the neighbouring nations Estonian women were treated equally with men.⁴⁴⁵ Also later developments in the Estonian society underline Estonians' democratic character, e.g. Moravian Church movement became popular among Estonians because it offered equal opportunity to everybody to express their ideas.⁴⁴⁶ Democratic demands in politics and Estonians are presented identical when Estonians had a chance to participate in the political process starting from the parish self-government⁴⁴⁷ till the revolutionary demands in 1905 and participation in the Russian State Duma⁴⁴⁸. Democracy is also well integrated into the nation's narrative of origin where Estonians are presented as the one who tried to find legal and democratic framework to declare the independent nation-state but the non-democratic forces (Bolsheviks, German Reich) created obstacles for Estonians to use these methods.⁴⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Estonians succeeded to establish their independent state where the earlier approved democratic principles were implemented more intensively than in many other countries.⁴⁵⁰ The political crisis in the beginning of the 1930s and the turn to the authoritarian regime does not correspond to the narrative of the democratic nation therefore this development is presented as an alien one related to the extraordinary times⁴⁵¹ and it is linked with certain persons by providing also the proof about the serious opposition to the authoritarian regime⁴⁵². The policies of the authoritarian regime are shown not as the

⁴⁴³ Laur et al, 2005,p. 121

⁴⁴⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 130

⁴⁴⁵ Laur et al, 2005,p. 33

⁴⁴⁶ Laur et al, 2005,p. 121

⁴⁴⁷ Laur et al, 2005,p. 135, pp. 138–139

⁴⁴⁸ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 8–10, p. 14

⁴⁴⁹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 22, p. 24, p. 27, p. 30

⁴⁵⁰ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 40, p. 51;

⁴⁵¹ Estonians supported authoritarian solutions only because of the political instability and world economic crisis, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 48;

⁴⁵² Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 52, p. 54

successful ones due to the regime type but for other reasons.⁴⁵³ The narrative claims that Estonians were united against the Soviet occupation, which contrasted strongly to the Estonian traditional understanding of polity and therefore Estonians used all opportunities in the USSR to demand democratic principles. Gorbachev's reforms in the end of the 1980s offered Estonians a chance to return to their traditional polity and to restore the independent nation-state that is based on the democratic principles and for its protection Estonia has joined the alliance of democratic nations.⁴⁵⁴ This element in the national narrative shows the connection with the current political regime to legitimise it.

Another aspect of the political category is related to the military dimension. Estonians natural character is presented as a **peaceful nation** that does not have any expansionist intentions. On the other hand, Estonians are presented as brave soldiers who fulfil their duty well.⁴⁵⁵ There is not any significant Estonian expansion mentioned in the Estonian narrative and mainly Estonian soldiers' bravery is related to the defensive wars when Estonians had to protect their homes or fight for their freedom. The culmination of this aspect is presented in the Estonian Independence War (1918–1920) where Estonians did not only liberate their country but also assisted Latvians to fight for their freedom and supported the troops of Russian Whites. However, the narrative claims that Estonians' fighting morale was lower when they fought on foreign soil.⁴⁵⁶ Also the Second World War includes references to the Estonian soldiers' bravery and high motivation to fight for the independence as well as the later struggle by the Forest Brothers. The identity marker of peaceful but good soldiers is related to the present Estonia, where Estonian soldiers have actively participated in the peacekeeping operations in different countries since 1995.⁴⁵⁷ This element of Estonian national identity demonstrates Estonians' need to protect their country for foreign invasion but on the other hand, to confront imperialist policies and to produce peace.

The economic category of Estonian identity markers is related to two aspects: **rural life style** and geographical location. The national narrative presents Estonians as a nature-orientated nation⁴⁵⁸ whose traditional life style is a rural community.⁴⁵⁹ Estonia is also presented as a traditional agricultural

⁴⁵³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 53, p. 56

⁴⁵⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 158

⁴⁵⁵ In the Pre-historic period Estonians did not have any major conflicts, the relations are described as friendly ones with the neighbours, Laur et al, 2005, p. 18, p. 34; at the same time Estonians are described as good mercenaries in the other nation armies (*Ibid*, p. 28) and good soldiers in the armies recruited by German knights (*Ibid*, p. 53).

⁴⁵⁶ Except the battles in Latvia against the Germans in the Landeswehr War, this was considered as the joint enemy with Latvians. Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 36

⁴⁵⁷ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 162

⁴⁵⁸ Ancient Estonians are described as who were strongly connected to the nature and respected the nature where they lived, Laur et al, 2005, p. 38

⁴⁵⁹ Traditional rural society was established in Estonia in the 5th–9th century, Laur et al, 2005, p. 25;

country where cultivation gave the main income for the people⁴⁶⁰ and the social division in the society made the Estonians the peasant class⁴⁶¹. Therefore the ‘hunger for land’ became the primary questions of the newly established independent Estonian state, which managed to gain Estonians’ loyalty by radical land reform which distributed the land among the population based on more equal principles.⁴⁶² Also the independent Estonia focused on the agricultural production instead of intensive development of industry in the 1920–1930s.⁴⁶³ The traditional rural community and agricultural production was destroyed by the Soviet occupation that targeted its main repressions against the peasants and forced them into the collective farms.⁴⁶⁴ It resulted in the bigger urbanisation of Estonia and Estonians lost their traditional connection with the land and nature.⁴⁶⁵ Therefore the restoration of Estonian independence brought painful reforms in the agricultural sector.⁴⁶⁶ The Soviet period is also connected to the strong pollution of the Estonian environment and the first mass movement against Moscow was an environmentalist movement.⁴⁶⁷ The national narrative shows that the Estonians’ traditional life style had been destroyed violently but the nation has managed to maintain the connection with the nature.

The second aspect of the economic category is related to Estonia’s geographical location and represents Estonia as a **maritime nation**. The master narrative underlines Estonian location on the East-West trade routes, which is also important element of current Estonian economy. The references to the transit trade and its beneficial influence on the local population income are presented already from the pre-historic periods when Estonians were also good sailors.⁴⁶⁸ On the other hand, this is also considered as the main reason why Estonian lands were conquered in the 13th century.⁴⁶⁹ The conquest of Estonia pushed Estonians out of the maritime trade but gave the opportunity for the local population to benefit from the trade flow that was conducted by the foreign merchants.⁴⁷⁰ Therefore the ports of Estonia are important identity markers in the national narrative because they have improved the economic situation of the Estonian population. In addition to the ports, navigation is also important element of Estonian identity and it is presented parallel to the trade

⁴⁶⁰ Laur et al, 2005,p. 30, p. 53, p. 74, p. 104

⁴⁶¹ Laur et al, 2005,p. 52

⁴⁶² Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 64

⁴⁶³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 46

⁴⁶⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 114

⁴⁶⁵ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 129

⁴⁶⁶ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 159

⁴⁶⁷ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 140

⁴⁶⁸ Laur et al, 2005,p. 31

⁴⁶⁹ Laur et al, 2005,p. 44

⁴⁷⁰ Laur et al, 2005,p. 53, p. 76

developments.⁴⁷¹ Active overseas trade and navigation together form an element of identity of a maritime nation.

The demographical category is related to the Estonian national composition. The master narrative defined the uprising of St. George Night as the watershed when social stratification was formed based on the ethnic division.⁴⁷² The lower class was Estonians and the upper one Germans, this division remained till the beginning of the 20th century. At the same time, the national narrative includes several condemning elements of Estonians who progressed socially, quickly Germanised and forgot their national roots.⁴⁷³ This behaviour is considered as betrayal of national origin. On the other hand, this division helped Estonians to maintain their old traditions and values.⁴⁷⁴ Estonia is presented as an exceptional case of German colonisation where the local population remained a homogeneous group.⁴⁷⁵ According to the national narrative the **homogeneity of Estonians** have been twice in danger when due to the periods of great wars the Estonian population was on the edge of extinction and the foreign rulers tried to increase the population by encouraging migration to Estonia. However, the immigrants were quickly Estonianised.⁴⁷⁶ Therefore also Estonian population was mainly Estonian, e.g. 95% in the end of the 18th century.⁴⁷⁷ The relatively homogeneous population also has created significant tolerance towards national minorities that was defined in the first constitution of Estonian Republic⁴⁷⁸ as well as by the law of cultural autonomy, unique in Europe⁴⁷⁹. The relative homogeneity of the population was interrupted by the Soviet period where Estonian population was not able to integrate the large masses of immigration.⁴⁸⁰ Therefore the national composition of Estonians has also strongly changed during a short period. Thus, the national narrative confirms the Estonians identification based on the ethnic principle and at the same time it also securitises current minorities by referring to the difficulties of the continuity of Estonians.

One of the important identity markers is also **national chronotope**, which defines the territory of the nation, what is understood as their historical space and how they are related to other territories. In addition to the text elements, I also observed how Estonia is located on the maps that are used in the history textbooks. The Estonian narrative of origin claims that Estonians have always

⁴⁷¹ Navigation became important economic sector for Estonians in the 19th century and professional navigation increased the mobility of Estonian sailors, Laur et al, 2005, pp. 141–142

⁴⁷² Laur et al, 2005, p. 56

⁴⁷³ Laur et al, 2005, p. 52, p. 70, p. 96, p. 145, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 7

⁴⁷⁴ Laur et al, 2005, p. 67

⁴⁷⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 64

⁴⁷⁶ Laur et al, 2005, p. 95

⁴⁷⁷ Laur et al, 2005, p. 96

⁴⁷⁸ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 40

⁴⁷⁹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 59–60

⁴⁸⁰ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 124–125

lived on their current territory, though the Southern border was more in the South till the Livonian War when the Estonian population significantly decreased and Estonian border moved more to the North where it is even today.⁴⁸¹ Therefore there are not big changes in the national territory. The difference between the Estonian territory before the Second World War and current Estonian territory is mentioned, however it is not underlined.⁴⁸² Thus, the text is giving clear understanding that Estonia is today in its natural borders.

The Estonian national master narrative claims that Estonia belongs to Europe and is located on the border of Western culture.⁴⁸³ Therefore it is also important to analyse which bigger region the Estonian master narrative locates its territory. The maps in the textbooks can be divided into 4 groups: only Estonia, Estonia as a part of Baltic Sea Eastern rim, Estonia as a part of Northern Europe, and Estonia as a part of Russia. The biggest number of maps shows Estonia alone and Estonia as a part of Baltic Sea Eastern Rim.⁴⁸⁴ Estonia alone is mainly shown in the periods when Estonians have been independent. It is related to the period prior to the German conquest in the 13th century and mainly in the 20th century. It is also important to note that the Estonian map is presented alone when it is related to the population changes or the Estonian national awakening. The map for the Soviet period clearly differentiates Estonian territory from the rest of the Soviet Union.⁴⁸⁵ Estonian maps about the earlier periods include often other regions as well and the current borders are not drawn on the map. Therefore also most of the maps about Estonia in the period 13th-19th century include also Latvian territories because historically these territories have been strongly connected.

Estonia in the bigger region shows predominantly the Baltic Sea region and thereby Estonia presents itself as a part of Northern Europe. The Baltic Sea region is the main focus of the early history by presenting that Estonian developments were similar with the rest of the Northern Europe.⁴⁸⁶ Also maps about the Northern crusades and trade relations include Estonia firmly in

⁴⁸¹ Laur et al, 2005,p. 95

⁴⁸² Even in the chapter of the Independence War and Peace Treaty there is mentioned that Russia demanded territories, which are considered as native Estonian ones and that the heavy negotiation brought suitable border for Estonia. Estonian bigger territory is shown on the maps (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 70, p. 76, p. 83, p. 91) and the loss of these territories is mentioned only in the caption of the map that shows the administrative changes in Estonia during the Soviet period. Nevertheless, there is mentioned that Estonia lost 5% of its territory (*Ibid*, p. 102).

⁴⁸³ Laur et al, 2005,p. 50

⁴⁸⁴ Both 13, Estonia alone (Laur et al, 2005,p. 29, p. 32, p. 49, p. 95, p. 143, p. 152; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 12, p. 34, p. 71, p. 76, p. 83, p. 91, p. 102), Estonia as a part of Eastern Baltic Rim (Laur et al, 2005,p. 35, p. 52, p. 58, p. 84, p. 85, p. 86, p. 88, p. 89, p. 98, p. 102, p. 129; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 18, p. 132)

⁴⁸⁵ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 102

⁴⁸⁶ Laur et al, 2005,p. 7, 17

European history.⁴⁸⁷ A map showing incorporation of Estonia into the Russian empire is related to the Great Northern War where Estonia is shown as a part of European history but marked differently as a territory that was given Russia.⁴⁸⁸ Estonia as a part of Russia is the least shown. Three maps are related to the Livonian War that show Estonia partly belonging to Russia but as much it is the period when the territories were changed very frequently between different powers then it creates understanding of very short Russian rule.⁴⁸⁹ Estonia as a part of the Russian Empire is also shown already in the above-mentioned map of the Great Northern War, as well as Russian administrative units and the First World War defence lines in the Baltic Eastern Rim.⁴⁹⁰ However, in both cases Estonia is primarily shown as the part of the Baltic Sea Rim and only implicitly Estonia is shown as a part of the Russian Empire. Thus, the chronotope of Estonia is overlapping with current Estonian territory. There are no claims for bigger territory and it is showing a clear difference between Estonian territories and Russian ones and tries to connect Estonia with Northern European developments.

The Estonian narrative of origin defines Estonians as people who have lived 11,000 years in their historical homeland. Though Estonians did not manage to form their nation-state before the 20th century the national narrative shows that it is the only suitable form of existence of Estonians because it is protecting the best the most of important identity elements of Estonians. Key elements of Estonian national identity are related to cultural category and thereby cultural sphere is politicised in the national narrative. On the other hand, the national narrative provides negative examples how the external powers (mainly Russia/the USSR) have destroyed Estonians' traditional way of living and disarrange the ethnic composition by challenging existence of the nation. Estonian chronotope is compatible with current territory and it locates Estonia in Northern Europe.

2.2. Character of the Estonian Narrative and its Schematic Templates

Character of narrative defines to what extent a nation includes the others in its national past. In this section I focus on the Estonian narrative related to one significant other, Russia(ns). The master narrative constructs understanding how the nation has been related to the other nations and which connections can be considered as natural ones due to the inveterate historical developments.

⁴⁸⁷ Laur et al, 2005,p. 45, 73

⁴⁸⁸ Laur et al, 2005,p. 92

⁴⁸⁹ Laur et al, 2005,pp. 84–86

⁴⁹⁰ Laur et al, 2005,p. 129; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 18




Chart 2.1. Character of the Estonian Narrative

Estonian master narrative has a clear dissimilative character related to Russia as a state and Russians. 73% of the assessed statements in the analysed history textbooks mediate the meaning that Estonians are separate from Russia(ns). 27% of statements explain Estonian and Estonians connections with Russia(ns) (See Chart 2.1.). However, the general character of the Estonian master narrative shows that Estonian and Russian connections are rather random and exceptional than an intrinsic phenomenon.




Chart 2.2. Assimilative Elements in the Estonian Narrative

Assimilative character of Estonian national narrative can be divided into four different aspects: Estonian and Russian geographical inclusiveness, Estonians cooperation with Russians, Estonia historical connections with Russia, and Estonia as conditionally part of Russia (See Chart 2.2.). The most frequently used statements that have assimilative character are related to the historical connection between Estonia and Russia. According to the national narrative the historical connection between Russia and Estonia is established only in the 18th century when Estonian territories were conquered by the Russian Emperor. The narrative claims that during the 200 years when Estonia was a part of the Russian Empire several policies were implemented that tried to connect Estonian lands with Russia and Russian developments had an impact on Estonia.⁴⁹¹ By the establishing Estonian independence Estonia moved away from the Russian sphere of influence and only the strengthening of the USSR increased Estonian dependency from Russia, culminating with the Soviet occupation in 1940–1991.⁴⁹² It increased Estonians' connection with Russia and tried to separate Estonia from the Western civilisation.⁴⁹³ However, historical connections between Estonia and Russia are rather a late historical development and presented as obstacles for Estonians' traditional connections with other nations.

Elements of the master narrative related to the Estonians' cooperation with Russians is describing the relations as between equal partners who were working for the same goal. In addition to earlier trade relations⁴⁹⁴ also the military cooperation is mentioned in the Estonian independence war in the 13th century.⁴⁹⁵ Estonian cooperation with Russians is also described in political struggle, e.g. Estonian Socialist movement was established in cooperation with Russian one⁴⁹⁶ or Estonians-Russians' victory in the Tallinn elections that pushed out the Germans' government⁴⁹⁷. Also the cooperation in the dissident movements during the Soviet era⁴⁹⁸ and Russians support to the Estonian independence in the end of the 1980s is mentioned⁴⁹⁹. However, the cooperation between the Estonians and Russians is presented as rather seldom and exceptional cases that have not developed any stronger bond.

⁴⁹¹ Catherine II urged the Baltic nobility to cooperate more with Russia and to be a loyal to Russia, Laur et al, 2005, p. 101; railway connected Estonia more with Russia, *Ibid*, p. 128; opening of the University of Tartu made it important academic centre in Russia, *Ibid*, p. 146; unrest in 1905 in Petersburg influenced developments in Tallinn, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 9; Estonia was as one of the most industrialised regions in Russian Empire, *Ibid*, p. 15; Estonians resettled to other regions of Russian empire, *Ibid*, p. 16

⁴⁹² Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 76, p. 80

⁴⁹³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 131

⁴⁹⁴ Laur et al, 2005, p. 73

⁴⁹⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 48

⁴⁹⁶ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 9

⁴⁹⁷ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 8

⁴⁹⁸ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 115

⁴⁹⁹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 160

Related to the establishment and restoration of Estonian independence Estonia is presented as a conditional part of Russia with autonomous rights.⁵⁰⁰ Some geographical connectivity is mentioned with Russia but it is related to the period where current Russian territories were not inhabited with Russians or Slavic tribes.⁵⁰¹ Therefore, Estonian assimilative elements in the master narrative related to Russia are rather weak or presented as conditional ones. Thus, the historical connection with Russia is presented as a historical exception that has hindered the development of intrinsic relations. Therefore also the majority of the Estonian master narrative has a dissimilative character related to Russia(ns).




Chart 2.3. Dissimilative Elements in the Estonian Narrative

Dissimilative elements of Estonian national narrative are mediated implicitly and explicitly. Implicit statements focus on claiming that Estonia is a natural part of the European realm. Explicit statements claim that Estonia and Russia are different and they do not belong together (See Chart 2.3.). Both are often used, however the explicit elements are a little more frequent in the national narrative (57%). Implicit statements claim that Estonia has similarities with Northern European and European developments that include Estonia into the

⁵⁰⁰ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 19, p. 22, p. 143

⁵⁰¹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 8, p. 15

European cultural space.⁵⁰² More frequently used implicit elements are the statements that show historical connections with Europe and Nordic countries. Historical connections with Northern Europe, and thereby also with the rest of Europe, are established already in the pre-historic period.⁵⁰³ It is also important to mention that the history narrative stresses the Estonians support of Sweden in the Northern War when Russia conquered the Estonian territories.⁵⁰⁴ Thereby the narrative creates the implicit understanding that Estonians became a part of Russia against their will. Also references to the Estonian folklore that express the Estonians' dreams that Sweden would expel Russia from Estonian lands⁵⁰⁵ gives an implicit meaning that the Russian conquest was an undesired development for Estonians. After the Russian conquest Estonian connections with its historical partners have not been broken and the national narrative depicts Estonia as the bridge between Europe and Russia.⁵⁰⁶ When Estonia became independent then active relations between Europe and Estonia are demonstrated.⁵⁰⁷

Intensive connections with Europe create an understanding that Estonia is a part of Europe, thus not a part of Russia. In general, Estonian history is presented as a part of European history and Estonia is described as an undisputed part of Europe culturally⁵⁰⁸, economically⁵⁰⁹, and in the period of independent state also politically⁵¹⁰. The history narrative claims that even when Estonia became a part of the Russian Empire its connections with European culture did not disappear.⁵¹¹ Therefore Estonia has been and is a historical part of Europe.

The explicit dissimilative character of the Estonian national narrative claims that Estonia and Russia are different and Estonia is presented as separate from Russia; sometimes even when Estonia belonged to the Russian polity Estonia has been shown as something alien inside Russia. The narrative part, which deals with earlier history, challenges former history studies which claimed that Estonian culture has Slavic or Russian influence.⁵¹² When Estonia became part

⁵⁰² Similarities with Northern Europe and Germany start already with ice-age, which is the starting point for the Estonian history, Laur et al, 2005, p. 7; similarities are claimed to be with other Nordic countries in the life style (Laur et al, 2005, p. 21, 106) and beliefs (Laur et al, 2005, p. 26, p. 36)

⁵⁰³ Laur et al, 2005, p. 21, pp. 22–23, p. 28

⁵⁰⁴ Laur et al, 2005, p. 92

⁵⁰⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 93, p. 100

⁵⁰⁶ Laur et al, 2005, p. 101

⁵⁰⁷ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 46, p. 65

⁵⁰⁸ Laur et al, 2005, p. 50, p. 122, p. 146

⁵⁰⁹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 73, p. 144; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 32

⁵¹⁰ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 158, pp. 160–161

⁵¹¹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 120

⁵¹² A type of tombs used in the South East Estonia was earlier believed to be borrowed from Slavic tribes, narrative explains that it was used already before Slavs reached to the Estonian neighbourhood, Laur et al, 2005, p. 25; Words related to Christianity has

of Russia then the Baltic autonomy inside the Empire is emphasised that made Estonia different from the Russian developments⁵¹³, as well as political developments are considered different in Estonia and in Russia⁵¹⁴. The differences in the societies culminate with the present state where the differences in interpretations of history are claimed to be the main reason of bad relations with Russia.⁵¹⁵ The master narrative also shows Estonia as not an historical region of Russia, though Russia has tried to conquer Estonian territory.⁵¹⁶ When Estonia was ruled by Russia (both, the Russian Empire and the USSR) Estonia is shown as a rather different region inside Russia. Therefore Estonia and Russia do not form a conceptual unit but Russia is shown as the other, which used different policies towards Estonia and Estonia is rather an exploited subject.⁵¹⁷ Estonian national narrative also pays special focus on the process of secession from Russia. It is a key part of Estonian narrative of origin because Estonia established and restored independence by seceding from Russia. Both these processes include several elements which show that Estonia cannot be a part of Russia because they do not belong together and the only possible solution is separation.⁵¹⁸ A key element is the moment when Russia recognises this process by giving *de iure* recognition to Estonian independence.⁵¹⁹ Therefore the explicit statements of the Estonian master narrative clearly show that Estonia and Russia do not belong together because their historical experiences are different. Periods when Estonia was part of the Russian polity can be considered as an historical mistake that has been corrected.

Schematic narrative templates offer the general framework for mediating different past events. It gives a general understanding how the national narrative is constructed and thereby also defines the character of the master narrative and shows the national self-image. In the case of Estonia four main schematic

been believed to be borrowed from Slavic languages, narrative claims that it is not very likely, p. 41

⁵¹³ Laur et al, 2005, p. 101, p. 106

⁵¹⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 9

⁵¹⁵ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 163

⁵¹⁶ Russian attempt to conquer Estonia in the 11th century is claimed not to be the ground that Estonia belongs to Russian historical sphere of influence, Laur et al, 2005, p. 35; Estonia was located on the border of Russian principalities and the border was not moved during the Middle Ages, *Ibid*, p. 62; Russia was pushed out from Livonia during the Livonian War (1558–1582/3), *Ibid*, p. 88; Russia and Sweden concluded Kärde peace treaty (1661) where Russia promised to give Estonian lands forever under Swedish control, *Ibid*, p. 89; Brest-Litovski Peace Treaty left Estonia for Russia but Russians were pushed out by Germans, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 30; Estonia rejected all the proposal that would tighten relations between Estonia to the USSR, p. *Ibid*, p. 52

⁵¹⁷ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 9, pp. 14–16; p. 137, p. 153

⁵¹⁸ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 9, p. 19, pp. 21–22, p. 26–27, p. 33, p. 37, p. 43, p. 144, p. 149, p. 150, p. 151, pp. 153–154

⁵¹⁹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 37, p. 156

narrative templates are determined: 'Period of Light vs Period of Darkness', 'Persistent Move towards Independence', 'Interregnum as Historical Moment for Independence', and 'Heroic Survival'. The narrative template '**Period of Light vs Period of Darkness**' gives the main reasoning for the existence of independent nation-state in Estonia. This template was introduced during the national awakening period by C. R. Jakobson who presented in his patriotic speeches the concept of Estonian Periods of Light (ancient Estonians living free), of Darkness (Estonians living under Germans' rule), and of Dawn (Estonian national awakening).⁵²⁰ This narrative template has a clear pattern:

1. Initial situation: Estonians lived peacefully and happily in freedom, which satisfied the most their national interests;
2. It is changed by external forces, which conquer Estonian territory and bring unjust suffering for Estonians;
3. Estonians manage to restore their rightful status by liberation.

This schematic narrative template justifies the need for Estonian independent statehood and also defines the dissimulative character of the national master narrative. The initial situation is the period before the German conquest in the 13th century and the period thereafter till the 19th century is the Darkness or 700 years of Slavery that is changed by the national awakening and establishment of Estonian independence in 1918. The new Period of Light is independent Estonia (1920–1940), which defined the life in Estonia according the needs of Estonian nation and the Soviet occupation is the new Period of Darkness, which enslaves Estonians. The restoration of independence marks the new Period of Light for Estonians. Thus, the narrative template of 'Period of Light vs Period of Darkness' is the main setting of the narrative of origin by claiming that Estonian nation's only rightful position is independent nation-state.

The second narrative template '**Persistent Move towards Independence**' is partly related to the previous narrative template but it is more specified to the process of 'restoring the rightful status of Estonian nation'. This schematic narrative template defines the pattern for establishing independent statehood:

1. Initial situation: Estonians are governed by a strong external power and Estonian national self-awareness is low;
2. During the process of national awakening the national elite manages to mobilise the people to increase the national self-awareness;
3. By the weakening of external power Estonians start to seek to increase their self-government with autonomy demands;
4. Indecisive and contradicting reactions by the external power leads to unstable situation of the Estonian nation;
5. National elite by using the disorder declares independence, which is the rightful status of Estonians and satisfies their national interests.

This pattern is used for the narrative of the Estonians' 20th century history. The establishment of independence is connected to the national awakening in the

⁵²⁰ Laur et al, 2005,p. 154; See more about the use and development of this narrative template in Hvostov, Andrei. *Mõtteline Eesti*, Tallinn: Vagabund, 1999

19th century, which is considered as the precondition for the independent nation-state. The weakening of Russian central power during the First World War leads to the Estonians' claim for the national autonomy. Thereafter the central government becomes more reluctant and the Bolsheviks' coup in Petrograd in October 1917 leads to the decision that Estonia should be an independent nation-state to save the nation. A similar template is used for the restoration of Estonian independence in 1991. The national re-awakening takes place in the end of the 1980s and the national elite starts to demand national autonomy. Negative but indecisive reaction in Moscow increases support for the national independence, which is restored as the reaction to the hardline Communists' coup in Moscow. In both processes a similar way of movement is deducible that makes to assume that on the one hand, the formation of independent statehood is presented by the similar pattern. On the other hand, it allows to assume that the decisions of the national elite are unconsciously influenced by the same schematic narrative.

Related to the last aspect the third narrative template, '**Interregnum as Historical Moment for Independence**', is even more deducible among the expectations of Estonian national elite. This narrative template is more specific than previous ones by defining the pattern of decision making in the context of disorder that Estonians use to form independent state. The same pattern is used in 1918, 1941, 1944 and 1991.

1. Initial situation: Instability of the political situation endangers Estonian national interests;
2. The interregnum due to the change of powers provide a moment for the Estonian national elite to declare independence;
3. Independence is declared and Estonians await its recognition by international powers.

This pattern is used the first time in 1918 by the declaration of independence. The Bolsheviks' coup created a situation in Estonia where the national future was in danger and it made the national elite look for opportunities to declare independence. It occurred when the Bolsheviks retreated from Estonia and German troops entered Estonia. Estonians used the few days of interregnum to declare independence.⁵²¹ In 1941, the Soviet repressions and reforms were targeted to destroy the Estonians' traditional life style and the German attack in June 1941 offered an opportunity for Estonians to liberate their lands from the Soviet troops and to restore the independence but it was recognised neither by the German occupation forces nor by other states.⁵²² In 1944 when the German troops withdraw from Estonia and the Red Army advanced, the Estonian national elite used the short interregnum in Tallinn and formed the national government. The Soviet authorities did not recognise it and established its repressive regime to rule Estonians.⁵²³ In 1991, Estonia was moving towards an

⁵²¹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 27–31; p. 43

⁵²² Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 84

⁵²³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 93–95

independent state but the coup in Moscow created a situation where the hardline Communists wanted to prevent it. The internal struggle in Russia established for Estonians an historical moment where the national elite restored independence, which was also quickly recognised by other states.⁵²⁴ In all of these cases the decision makers tried to use the similar historical moment to give a legal ground for the Estonian independence. This template facilitates explaining the processes that the national elite was facing but on the other hand, one should also consider that the national elite was influenced by the earlier experiences and they looked for the moment that offers the same situation.

The previous schematic narrative templates are related to the glorifying part of the narrative. The fourth narrative is related more to the victimising elements and linked to the moments of history where Estonians were the subject of other powers. The narrative template '**Heroic survival**' mediates the following scheme:

1. Initial situation: Estonian lived peacefully in a stable society;
2. Strengthening of an external power leads to the invasion and a bloody period of war;
3. Estonian people suffer an enormous loss of population and the nation is on the edge of extinction;
4. Though Estonians are enslaved the Estonians manage to reproduce and to maintain the nation.

This narrative template is presented in the cases of all bigger wars that Estonian territory has experienced. In the 13th century an increase of interest of German merchants led to the ancient Estonian independence war. Manpower is claimed as one of the main reasons why Estonian lost the war against German invaders.⁵²⁵ However, Estonians managed to maintain their nation. In the 16th century Muscovy strengthened and it was interested to conquer the weakening Livonia. The war that lasted 25 years reduced the population by half, but demographic growth recovered rapidly during the 17th century.⁵²⁶ In the beginning of the 18th century the Great Northern War together with plague and famine decreased the Estonian population again by half.⁵²⁷ Estonians were once more on the edge of extinction but during the following century the population doubles again. The First World War also brought extraordinary human losses for Estonians.⁵²⁸ The Second World War is also narrated by the similar

⁵²⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 155–156

⁵²⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 50; Authors claim also that the Estonian population increased during 300 years since 13th century only twice in comparison to the beginning of 13th century due to the devastating war, *Ibid*, p. 64

⁵²⁶ Laur et al, 2005, p. 94

⁵²⁷ Laur et al, 2005, p. 95

⁵²⁸ Around 100,000 Estonians were mobilised, 10,000 were killed and many others were taken captive and could return home only later. Authors claim that Estonia experienced so big human loss during so short period first time. Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 18; Although Estonians became independent after the end of the First World War, the

template. During this War Estonian population decreased almost by 25% and the nation stayed under the rule of the Soviet Union.⁵²⁹ This human loss was substituted by the increase of immigration from Russia to Estonia that threatened the existence of Estonian nation.⁵³⁰ However, Estonians managed to maintain their nation during the Soviet period. This victimising narrative template is mediating the idea that national survival is one of the important aims of the Estonian nation and on the other hand, it also creates dissimulative character of the national narrative.

The Estonian national narrative has a dominantly dissimulative character related to Russia(ns). It shows that Estonians are different from Russians and that belonging to the Russian empire has been as a historical mistake. The schematic templates of national master narrative also support the dissimulative character and they include glorifying as well victimising templates. The Estonian narrative templates provide patterns to support Estonian narrative of origin to construct the understanding that Estonian independence is possible in the context when big powers in Estonia's neighbourhood are weak and on the Estonian lands there is an interregnum that offers a historical moment for Estonians to exercise their right to be an independent nation. However, this independence is related to the recognition given by other nations. The victimising template defines the possible threat that Estonians as a nation have experienced when regional powers are strong and they have clashing interests in the region. Therefore, the master narrative concludes implicitly that the only solution for Estonians is to be an independent nation.

2.3. Images of Self and Other in the Estonian Master Narrative

The Estonian master narrative includes two significant Others – Germans and Russians. In this chapter I analyse how the Estonian self-image is related to Russia(ns). The images of Self and Other in Estonian history textbooks are strongly value-loaded and give either positive or negative connotation about the object (See Chart 2.4.). Estonians are depicted as positive characters of the master narrative and Russians as rather negative characters. The share of Russians is smaller in the narrative because Germans have a significant role in the history narrative before the 20th century. The dissimulative character of the Estonian master narrative towards Russians brings Russians in the narrative as significant Others only since the 18th century.

narrative is presented in the way that the World War and the latter Independence War are not related. Therefore I conclude that the narrative template is also used by this war.

⁵²⁹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 95

⁵³⁰ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 125




Chart 2.4. Images of Self and Other in the Estonian Narrative

Estonians' Self image is mainly a positive one and Estonians are characterised by either glorifying or victimising elements. The negative image is presented in the way that the nation tried whitewash from the past 'mistakes' by personalising these mistakes or justifying the Estonians' deeds (See Chart 2.5.).




Chart 2.5. Narrative Elements about the Estonian Self-Image

It is interesting to note that although a major part of the Estonian master narrative is narrating about the period when Estonians were not independent the biggest share of Estonian positive image is mediated by glorifying elements, not by victimising ones. The negative image is also more presented as justification

than personalising the misdeeds. It shows that the self-image is presented about Estonians more as a coherent group and that this group of people has managed to gain glory more by their successful deeds than through suffering.




Chart 2.6. Glorifying Elements about the Estonian Self-Image

Glorifying narratives about Estonians are describing the national self as skilful, famous or notorious, the best in some certain field, rich or economically successful, victorious, politically successful, and having special status (See Chart 2.6.).

The biggest share of the glorifying elements narrates about Estonian success in military, political and economic terms. Narrative elements, which underline the military success or heroic behaviour, cover $\frac{1}{4}$ of the glorifying narratives, which is a significant number to consider that Estonians had their nation-state only in the 20th century. The majority of these elements are a part of the master narrative that talk about the 20th century events, though an important part is also dedicated to the Estonian victories in the ancient period before the German conquest and the independence war against Germans in the 13th century.⁵³¹ Before the 20th century it includes only few references to the Estonians victorious or heroic behaviour⁵³² but the establishment of the independent state

⁵³¹ Stories about Estonian victories over Swedes (Laur et al, 2005,p. 27) and Russians (*Ibid*, p. 29) before Germans started to conquer the Estonian lands. Though Estonian independence war in the 13th century was not successful then the narrative is talking about Estonians relative strength in comparison with other nations (*Ibid*, p. 46) or how well Estonians managed to defend themselves for the invasion (*Ibid*, pp. 46–48, p. 51).

⁵³² Mainly related to the Livonian War in the 16th century (Laur et al, 2005,pp. 86–87) or some smaller peasants revolt (*Ibid*, p. 108)

and the War of Liberation in 1918–1920 establish a narrative type about the victorious or heroic Estonians who fight against the external power. The War of Liberation glorifies Estonians that they managed to free Estonia from Bolsheviks⁵³³ and also to fight successfully in North-West Russia and Latvia⁵³⁴. Special attention is given to the Landeswehr War against the Germans in 1919 as the revenge for the 13th century Independence War⁵³⁵. It has been the most successful war for Estonians and therefore the victorious elements are easy to present. The later statements underline more the heroic resistance to the Soviet power, first in the Second World War⁵³⁶ but also resistance movements like the Forest Brothers⁵³⁷ or non-violent movements⁵³⁸. The independence restoration process focuses mainly on the heroic peaceful resistance to the Soviet regime and it can be defined as a bloodless independence war where heroic resistance led Estonians to victory.⁵³⁹

Similar elements are related to political success. These elements occur only in the 20th century part of the master narrative. The narrative describes Estonians as successful, first taking over power in the local governments⁵⁴⁰ and succeeding with political demands⁵⁴¹ that culminated with autonomy and later independence⁵⁴². National independence is presented as a triumph itself⁵⁴³ and during the Soviet period the peaceful actions like the Letter of 40, Baltic Appeal or exile Estonians' lobby are presented as Estonian political achievements.⁵⁴⁴ Also Estonian communities abroad, which managed to maintain the language and establish active communities, are presented as a success because they have maintained Estonian culture and language.⁵⁴⁵ Similarly to the heroic and victorious elements in the master narratives the restoration of independence is presented as a long story of success⁵⁴⁶, which culminated with the successful nation-state, which joined the EU and NATO⁵⁴⁷.

Economic success and wealth of Estonians is presented as an almost continuous process since the pre-historic period till the present. The early period tells about the rich villages in Estonia, wealthy peasants and successful trade

⁵³³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 29, p. 33, p. 36

⁵³⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 34

⁵³⁵ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p., pp. 34–35

⁵³⁶ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 76–77, p. 79, p. 82, p. 85, p. 88, p. 91–94

⁵³⁷ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 82, pp. 100–102, p. 112

⁵³⁸ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 108, pp. 110–112, p. 115, p. 131

⁵³⁹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 140–149, p. 156

⁵⁴⁰ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 14,

⁵⁴¹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 14–16

⁵⁴² Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 19–22, p. 27, p. 31, p. 37

⁵⁴³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 41, p. 43, p. 54, p. 64, pp. 66–67

⁵⁴⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 110–111, pp. 116–117

⁵⁴⁵ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 132–135

⁵⁴⁶ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 143–156

⁵⁴⁷ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 158–159, pp. 160–161

and transit.⁵⁴⁸ The period when Estonia belonged to the Russian Empire or was a part of the USSR, Estonian economic success is mediated by the statements, which show that Estonia was more developed and richer than the other Russian regions.⁵⁴⁹ In this way Estonians are clearly differentiated from Russia, even it has been a part of Russian empire. The more developed economy gives implicit understanding that Estonia does not belong together with Russia. Estonian economic successes are also presented in the independent periods, which are assessed as the only periods when Estonian economy produced national benefit.⁵⁵⁰

The other elements underline that Estonians have been somehow special to enhance national pride. A particular aspect is the statements that show that Estonians are skilful and able to gain success by intellectual power.⁵⁵¹ After the German conquest in the 13th century Estonians remained mainly on the lower level of social hierarchy and therefore the national narrative tries to underline the significance of Estonians by showing that they were also partly integrated into the higher social status to increase the importance of Estonians.⁵⁵² Thereby the narrative aims at increasing national pride and the importance of Estonians in the history. The national awakening defines Estonians as an acknowledged political actor and national pride is supported by the elements that are related especially to Estonian culture and its success that continued also during the independent nation-state.⁵⁵³ In political terms the special status is defined mainly by the independent nation-state, which is defined as a very democratic regime and having very broad rights for the minorities.⁵⁵⁴ In the context of the Russian Empire or the USSR the special status that differentiated between the Estonian territories and the rest of the Russian state are stressed.⁵⁵⁵ Another aspect of increasing national pride is being famous or notorious depicted in the master narrative. About the pre-historic period the Estonians or Estonia are connected with several legends and myths that show the importance of Estonia

⁵⁴⁸ Laur et al, 2005, pp. 30–32, pp. 52–53, p. 73

⁵⁴⁹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 142, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 15–16; pp. 106–107, p. 120, pp. 122–124, p. 148

⁵⁵⁰ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 43, pp. 158–159

⁵⁵¹ It starts already with the pre-historic period, which claims that Estonians were smart and they were known by their skills among other nations (Laur et al, 2005, p. 15, p. 28, p. 36, p. 67). In the latter period it shows that Estonians managed to learn quickly and achieve success in the field they worked in (*Ibid*, p. 48, p. 117, p. 124, p. 142, p. 147).

⁵⁵² In the Medieval Estonia the Estonian elite integration into the German nobility and the connection of the old traditions into the new administration (Laur et al, 2005, pp. 51–52, p. 55, p. 56).

⁵⁵³ Laur et al, 2005, p. 150, p. 152, p. 156, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 58, p. 61, p. 63, p. 65

⁵⁵⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 40, pp. 59–60

⁵⁵⁵ Baltic autonomy in the 18th century (Laur et al, 2005, p. 101, p. 106), Special treatment in the Soviet period, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 102, p. 106

in the European cultural space.⁵⁵⁶ In the later period there are references to famous persons that are related to Estonia and thereby the importance of Estonia is increased. Another aspect, which makes Estonia particular, is the statements that claim that Estonia is the most special or one of the most special cases. These aspects are related to the archaeological findings⁵⁵⁷, economic developments⁵⁵⁸ or political particularities⁵⁵⁹. By these elements national pride emphasised and thereby also national identity strengthened.




Chart 2.7. Victimising Elements about the Estonian Self-Image

Victimisation affects national pride by constructing the understanding that the nation has managed to survive and achieve statehood, although throughout history there has been many obstacles. Estonians have not been independent during most of their history and therefore victimisation is one important element of the self-image. The victimisation can be divided into the following subthemes in the master narrative: annihilation or repressions of Estonians, unfair treatment, Estonians' weak or inferior position, and Estonians' failures and misfortune. The biggest share of the elements is related to the annihilation

⁵⁵⁶ Laur et al, 2005, p. 20, pp. 27–28, p. 48

⁵⁵⁷ Laur et al, 2005, p. 19, p. 28

⁵⁵⁸ Estonia is one of the most Northern territories where agriculture has been the most important economic sector, Laur et al, 2005, p. 30, p. 104; or Estonia was one of the best in the Russian Empire and the USSR, *Ibid*, p. 141, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 15, pp. 106–107, p. 120, p. 124

⁵⁵⁹ Estonian democracy was one of the most liberal by its time, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 40, pp. 59–60

and repressions, other elements are more or less equally presented (see Chart 2.7).

Annihilation and repressions of Estonians underline the heroic survival of the nation. The history narrative before the 20th century is mainly focusing on the annihilation of Estonians by wars and famines.⁵⁶⁰ The 20th century is related first to the political fight and the independence war victims⁵⁶¹ but the significant part of the victimisation is related to the Second World War and the Soviet repressions. The war destruction and human losses show that Estonia was heavily devastated and most of these losses were made by the Soviet regime.⁵⁶² The Soviet repressions are explicitly shown in quantitative data.⁵⁶³ In addition to the human losses the Soviet era is also presented as the period that destroyed the Estonian economy, environment, traditional life style, culture, and demographic situation.⁵⁶⁴ The strong emphases on the Soviet repressions and victims show the deep wound that they have maintained in the national memory and it also defines strongly the younger generations' attitude towards the other, Russia.

Other victimising elements are related to unfair treatment and failures. A significant part of these elements are related to the period before the 20th century where Estonians were exploited by the German nobility in the villages and German city administration in the towns, and by the Russian rule there were added central governmental taxes that made the situation even worse for Estonians.⁵⁶⁵ Also the Estonian economic development during the period when it was ruled by Russia is shown as the result of the exploitation of Estonians.⁵⁶⁶ Estonians are seen as victims as the result of disproportional relations. The weak position of Estonians is shown in culture, manpower, economics, politics, and military.⁵⁶⁷ Estonians failures could be considered as a rather negative

⁵⁶⁰ Laur et al, 2005, p. 64, pp. 94–95, p. 116

⁵⁶¹ Revolution in 1905, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 10, p. 13; The First World War, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 18, Independence War, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 29, p. 36

⁵⁶² Once there is mentioned that in the Nazi repressions most of the victims were Estonians, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 86; Soviet victims are related to the Estonians soldiers mobilised to the Red Army, *Ibid*, pp. 88–89, and destructions and the annihilation of the Estonian independent government that the Red Army made, *Ibid*, pp. 92–94; the total amount of human losses in Estonia is estimated 280,000 people, all the infrastructure and economics destroyed and without independent state Estonia was occupied by the USSR, *Ibid*, p. 95

⁵⁶³ In 1941 – 10 000 persons, (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 82), in 1944–1945 – 30 000 persons (*Ibid*, p. 113), in 1949 – 20 722 (*Ibid*, p. 114).

⁵⁶⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 124–129, p. 132–133

⁵⁶⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 56, p. 64, pp. 66–67, p. 72, p. 93, p. 104, p. 114; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 9

⁵⁶⁶ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 15, pp. 120–121

⁵⁶⁷ Estonian ancient culture is less known because there are no sources due to the domination of external powers (Laur et al, 2005, p. 36, p. 79); Estonians couldn't resist to Germans due to small population, (*Ibid*, pp. 49–50), Estonians were weaker positions in towns in comparison with Germans (*Ibid*, p. 55, pp. 144–145); Estonians had weaker

element of the national self image but these which are analysed here are related to the failures where Estonians have been shown as weak and it is rather misfortune or someone else's fault why they have failed. Mainly these failures are related to the military losses where Estonians have lost due to the too strong opponent or Estonian allies made them to fail.⁵⁶⁸ Also some failures are presented as the result of the Soviet regime that made Estonians suffer.⁵⁶⁹ Victimising elements are all related to the external powers and therefore it constructs the understanding that Estonians have been successful since they have managed to survive these historical events and the independent nation-state is the only solution for Estonians.

The negative self-image in the Estonian master narrative is mainly presented by the justifying elements. Thereby the national body is shown as a whole and the deeds that can be categorised as negative ones are presented with some justification that shows them less negative. There are four main subcategories how the national narrative justifies Estonians' actions in the history: giving reason, claiming it as moral, defining it as natural phenomenon, marginalising. Reasoning is the most used element in the national narrative. In the narrative, which is related to the history before 20th century, these elements are random and few, e.g. Estonians' aggressive acts are explained by mutual relations or traditions.⁵⁷⁰




Chart 2.8. Justifying Elements about the Estonian Self-Image

political position related to the dominant nations (Germans or Russians), Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 8, p. 31, p. 85, p. 98, p. 105; Estonia has been militarily weak in comparison to Russia and Russia has used this situation (Laur et al, 2005,p. 84, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 74)

⁵⁶⁸ The first examples are related to the independence war against Germans in the 13th century, Laur et al, 2005,pp. 46–50, the second one to the 20th century, the Independence War and the Second World War, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 32, p. 57, pp. 92–93

⁵⁶⁹ In agriculture, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 120, p. 124, and education, p. 130

⁵⁷⁰ Laur et al, 2005,p. 28, p. 35, p. 112

In the 20th century rationalisation is related with three main issues that can be considered as a national shame: the authoritarian coup, ‘silent capitulation’ in 1939–1940, and collaboration with the Nazis. The formation of the authoritarian government is mainly explained with the economic crisis and political instability. People expected that if this period will pass under a stronger leader then they will eventually return to democracy.⁵⁷¹ Silent capitulation is explained with asymmetrical power relations and that Estonia could not find support from other countries.⁵⁷² Collaboration with the Nazis is presented first as a reaction to the Soviet repressions and later as the only option to stand against Soviet re-occupation.⁵⁷³ By presenting these explanations the master narrative shifts the responsibility of the nation and justifies these decisions with particular circumstances that Estonians could not control.

Justification through moral or natural argument is less used. Estonians behaviour in the world economic crisis and in the conditions of occupation is compared with other developments and presented as a natural outcome.⁵⁷⁴ Estonian attacks on neighbouring nations and the betrayal of German forces in the early Middle Ages is justified with the Estonians’ reluctance to accept Christianity and by these actions Estonians were true to their freedom and old belief.⁵⁷⁵ Estonians’ aggression against the German nobility and land reform in 1919 is justified with the claim that Germans have been unfair with Estonians and their actions restored historical justice.⁵⁷⁶ Estonians’ actions towards Russian officials and later Russian White Army in Estonia or the collaboration with Nazis are justified with the necessity of national interests.⁵⁷⁷ Thus, the Estonian narrative is presenting moral justification from the perspective that deeds, which bring benefit for one’s own nation, are moral.

The Estonian national narrative also includes some marginalising elements that try to show the Estonians’ deeds less harmful or not clearly proved.⁵⁷⁸ On the other hand, Estonians try to show that negative historical developments were not so harmful than in other places or Estonians tried to do their best to avoid the worst outcome.⁵⁷⁹ Some developments are marginalised with the positive out-

⁵⁷¹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 48, pp. 50–51

⁵⁷² Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 57, pp. 73–74, p. 78

⁵⁷³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 84–87, p. 90

⁵⁷⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 46, p. 48, pp. 107–108

⁵⁷⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 40, p. 53

⁵⁷⁶ Laur et al, 2005, p. 56, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 9, p. 13, 42

⁵⁷⁷ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 22, p. 36, p. 93

⁵⁷⁸ Polygamy among ancient Estonian tribes is not sufficiently proved (Laur et al, 2005, p. 33), or the ship looting is presented either as a tradition or legend of other nations (*Ibid*, p. 64); Estonians sacrificed people but predominantly enemies (*Ibid*, p. 40); Estonians destroyed the manor houses but it was made as a part of war and it is presented as a gallows humour (*Ibid*, p. 93)

⁵⁷⁹ The authoritarian government is presented as less authoritarian than in other countries and it had also its positive aspects (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 53, p. 55, p. 61), Estonian local officials were heavily controlled by the Nazi administration and

come that justifies the difficult and costly process.⁵⁸⁰ The master narrative includes partly personalising the deeds that may harm national positive self-image. Personalising of some actions are related to certain social groups that are presented as different behavioural model than the rest of Estonians⁵⁸¹ or clearly presented certain persons⁵⁸² who have made mistakes or wrong decisions. Thereby the national narrative whitewashes the Estonian nation and strengthens the Estonian positive national self-image, which upholds stronger national identity.

In the following I analyse how the Estonian master narrative presents the image of Russia(ns). Russian negative image dominates and the positive one is very infrequent in the text and even these aspects are rather conditionally presented (See Chart 2.9.).




Chart 2.9. Russia(ns) image in the Estonian Master Narrative

Estonians preferred rather to escape to Finland than become soldiers in German army, as well Estonians tried to hid Jews but they did not succeed (p. 84, pp. 86–87).

⁵⁸⁰ Internal struggle among the Estonian national elite during the restoration of national independence is presented with more democratic outcome (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 144), also difficult reforms in the end of the Soviet era aimed new and successful economy (*Ibid*, p. 149)

⁵⁸¹ Ugandi people collaborated with Germans against Russians (Laur et al, 2005,p. 46), social mobilisation made Estonians to forget their language and origin (*Ibid*, p. 52, p. 70, p. 92, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 7); only few workers organised looting of manors in 1905 (*Ibid*, p. 12); Socialists and Bolsheviks preferred socialist ideas to the national one but later Socialist realised that national one are more important (*Ibid*, p. 23), some politicians did not think about nation but self-interests, some politicians supported authoritarian regime (*Ibid*, p. 32, p. 36), June Communists collaborated with the Soviet government but they were few (*Ibid*, p. 81)

⁵⁸² C. R. Jakobson who expected too much from Russians as support for Estonian national struggle (Laur et al, 2005,p. 154); K. Päts and J. Laidoner who made the authoritarian coup and lead the silent surrender of Estonia (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 52, p. 79); H. Mäe collaborated with Nazis by forming the Estonian puppet administration (*Ibid*, p. 85).

The Russian positive image is mediated mainly by two elements: benefits or assistance of Russia(ns) for Estonians and personalisation of positive effect of Russia on Estonian developments. There are also few positive qualities of Russians, e.g. military bravery and success (See Chart 2.10).⁵⁸³ Russian positive impact on Estonian economic development has been underlined in several historical periods.⁵⁸⁴ It is also related to Estonian identity element that claims that Estonia is an important transit or trade region in the East-West trade. Also the master narrative claims that when Estonia became part of the Russian Empire in the 18th century it brought a longer period of peace that let the Estonian population to reproduce.⁵⁸⁵ Russians are also presented in the Estonian master narrative as a counterweight to Germans, though only till the beginning of 20th century when Estonians managed to take over the dominant position in the Estonian administration.⁵⁸⁶ In the Soviet period a few central policies were considered as having positive effect on the Estonian national cause but they are mainly overshadowed with the negative impact, personalised or the positive impact is shifted to Estonians.⁵⁸⁷




Chart 2.10. Russian Positive Image in the Estonian Master Narrative

⁵⁸³ Laur et al, 2005, pp. 91–92

⁵⁸⁴ Laur et al, 2005, p. 31, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 42

⁵⁸⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 96

⁵⁸⁶ Russians supported Estonians against German invaders in the 13th century, though Russian assistance is considered as their attempt to control Estonian lands (Laur et al, 2005, pp. 47–49); Russian municipality reform introduced in the end of the 18th century gave opportunity for Estonians to enter to the town administration, though it increased the central government control in Estonia (*Ibid*, pp. 102–103); Russians did not return Estonian peasants to German landlords when they escaped to Russian lands and became Orthodox (*Ibid*, p. 108); Estonians and Russians established joint election coalition that defeated the Germans (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 8)

⁵⁸⁷ Rehabilitation is considered as a positive policy but it is considered as a modest change in the Soviet policies (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 106, p. 115); Moscow decided to change the Conservative K. Vaino with Reform-Communist V. Väljas that accelerated the liberation process (*Ibid*, p. 142); Russian Federation and its leader B. Yeltsin supported the Baltic republics independence (*Ibid*, p. 153)

The Russian positive impact for Estonia and Estonians is also often personalised. There are five persons who are shown as positive historical figures and represent the Russian administration. The Russian Governor General in Riga George Browne who wanted to ease the hard situation of Estonian peasants⁵⁸⁸, Governor General Paulucci who supported the emancipation of serfs⁵⁸⁹, Russian Emperor Alexander I who emancipated the serfs⁵⁹⁰, Estonian Communist Party chief Ivan (Johannes) Kabin who balanced between Estonian and Moscow's interests⁵⁹¹, and Boris Yeltsin, who supported the independence of the Baltic republics in 1991⁵⁹². It is also interesting to note that three of them have a non-Russian origin and name. Thus in total only two Russian historical persons had a positive impact on Estonia. However, both of them have a crucial role for the Estonian national development: emancipation of serfs and restoration of independence.




Chart 2.11. Russian Negative Image in the Estonian Master Narrative

The Russian negative image in the Estonian national narrative is mainly related to threat elements: security threat, threat to the culture and language, hostilities and repressions and also being against Estonian national interests (See Chart 2.11.). Russians or Eastern Slavs as a security threat is presented in the Estonian national narrative since the moment when Slavic tribes moved more to the North. It caused the Baltic tribes' migration that forced Estonians and other Finno-Ugric tribes to move further north.⁵⁹³ The conquest of Tartu and Southern

⁵⁸⁸ Laur et al, 2005, p. 102, 108

⁵⁸⁹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 129

⁵⁹⁰ Laur et al, 2005, p. 134

⁵⁹¹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 105–106

⁵⁹² Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 153, p. 155

⁵⁹³ Laur et al, 2005, p. 27, p. 29 (a map of ancient Estonian fortifications that are mainly lined towards East by showing that main threat came from East), pp. 34–35

Estonia by Yaroslav the Wise is presented as the first Estonian independence war.⁵⁹⁴ However, the relations with Russians during this period is shown as symmetric ones and therefore also not as a permanent source of insecurity.⁵⁹⁵ Russia as a security threat occurs again in the national narrative in the 16th century when Russia started the Livonian War and destroyed the medieval confederation of Livonia.⁵⁹⁶ Although Russia did not manage to capture Estonian territories, the Russian threat remained until the Great Northern War when Russia conquered Estonian lands.⁵⁹⁷ Being a part of the Russian Empire, Russia no longer presented a military threat, however there are some economic and social threats related to Russia(ns).⁵⁹⁸

Russia as a security threat activates again in the beginning of the 20th century when the Bolsheviks fought against the Estonian Republic.⁵⁹⁹ Although the narrative uses mainly the term Bolsheviks and not Russians then it concludes that Estonians started to see Bolsheviks as '*the tools of Russian occupation*',⁶⁰⁰ which equalises Bolsheviks with Russia. Although Estonians were successful in this war, the security threat from Russia (the USSR) did not disappear and for the independent Estonia the main security threat was Russia that also tried to undermine Estonian sovereignty.⁶⁰¹ Russia or the USSR (these two names are used parallel in the textbook) as the security threat is in focus in the narrative when Estonia was forced to accept the Soviet military bases and later was occupied by the Red Army.⁶⁰² The narrative shows the threat that forced Estonians to accept the Soviet ultimatum. Security threat elements are also related to the reoccupation of Estonia in 1944 and restoration of the Soviet government that is depicted as a heavy burden for Estonians.⁶⁰³ Being a part of the USSR, Russia as military threat disappears though it is presented on the other levels. Security threat occurs when the Baltic republics were restoring their independence and Moscow tried to stand against it with all means, also by using the military. It culminates in the narrative with the August putsch in

⁵⁹⁴ Laur et al, 2005,p. 29

⁵⁹⁵ Laur et al, 2005,pp. 34–35

⁵⁹⁶ Muscovy as a security threat is presented already in the end of the 15th century when Russian troops raided in Estonian lands (Laur et al, 2005,p. 63); Livonian War is presented as Russian interest to control Livonian territories, which was governed by weakened small states (*Ibid*, pp. 83–86)

⁵⁹⁷ Laur et al, 2005,p. 89, p. 90, p. 92

⁵⁹⁸ Russia used criminals in building military port Paldiski in Estonia (Laur et al, 2005,p. 97), Petersburg was a serious competitor for Estonian ports (*Ibid*, p. 111)

⁵⁹⁹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 29, pp. 31–34, p. 36

⁶⁰⁰ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 33

⁶⁰¹ Narrative claims that Russia was interested liquidate Estonian independence and therefore they were not interested in the normal relations with Estonia, Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 43–44

⁶⁰² Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 56–57, p. 64, pp. 72–76

⁶⁰³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 92, p. 98, p. 101

1991⁶⁰⁴ and finally the security threat is liquidated with the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia in 1994⁶⁰⁵. This narrative element constructs understanding that Russia is the biggest security threat for Estonians due to its ambitions to dominate over Estonian territory.

Russia as the security threat constructs the picture of Russia permanently striving to conquer Estonia but the other negative elements about Russia narrate what it means to be under Russian rule. Cruelty and repressions made by Russia present the devastation that Estonians had to experience when Russians established power over Estonian lands. The first significant repressions are narrated related to the Great Northern War when the population of Tartu was deported to Russia and the town destroyed.⁶⁰⁶ Being in the Russian empire Estonians were unhappy with the military levy.⁶⁰⁷ Russian troops were used against Estonians when they demanded their rights.⁶⁰⁸ The Estonian master narrative reports the cruelties of the Bolsheviks⁶⁰⁹ and it establishes a general understanding of the roots of repressions when the Soviet occupation was implemented. Half of the elements that depict Russian/Soviet government repressive policies are related to the Soviet policies in Estonia after occupation. It describes how the Soviet regime devastated the land and implemented terror against Estonians.⁶¹⁰ The Estonian narrative even concludes that there were more victims of the Soviet terror than of the Nazi one.⁶¹¹ Also the narrative tells about the fight against the Estonian resistance movement that was suppressed by the Soviets.⁶¹² Repressive policies construct the negative understanding of Russian policies and strengthen the enemy image of Russia.

The Estonian national culture and language are key elements of the national identity. In the context of the Russian Empire these identity elements have been endangered. The first biggest clash between Estonian culture and Russian policies occurs in the second half of 19th century when first the Orthodox Church tried to attract Estonians to convert and later the implementation of Russification policies lead to the underdevelopment of the language and culture.⁶¹³ The narrative also presents the contrast between independent Estonia and Estonia under Russian rule by concluding that Estonian culture could develop normally only in the context of sovereign statehood.⁶¹⁴ During the

⁶⁰⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 151–156

⁶⁰⁵ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 159

⁶⁰⁶ Laur et al, 2005, p. 92

⁶⁰⁷ Laur et al, 2005, p. 97, p. 137

⁶⁰⁸ Laur et al, 2005, p. 111; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 10, p. 12

⁶⁰⁹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 20, p. 26, p. 64

⁶¹⁰ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 82–83, p. 85, p. 88, pp. 91–92, p. 102, p. 105, pp. 113–114, p. 136

⁶¹¹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 86

⁶¹² Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 112, pp. 114–115, p. 117

⁶¹³ Laur et al, 2005, p. 120, p. 147, p. 149, pp. 154–155; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 15–16

⁶¹⁴ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 58, p. 62

Soviet occupation Estonian culture and language were threatened by a new wave of Russification that ejected Estonian from the public use and forced to take over Russian cultural values and norms. It led to the degradation of national culture, language and education.⁶¹⁵ This element of the national narrative constructs Russia clearly as an identity enemy for Estonians.

Russia is not only depicted as the enemy of Estonian national identity, but on the political level Russia is presented as a strong opponent of Estonian national interests. By conquering the Estonian lands the Russian government already implemented several policies that were against the Estonians' interests.⁶¹⁶ The Russian central government's reluctance to develop Estonian national institutions and the Bolsheviks direct acts against Estonian autonomous government demonstrate that Russia was not able to accept Estonian national interests.⁶¹⁷ It accelerated also Estonians declaration of independent state where Estonians could implement their national will. In the narrative the situation changes in 1940 when the USSR forces Estonia to accept the ultimatum that establishes the Soviet government, which is directly against the Estonian national interest.⁶¹⁸ It is a clear black and white pattern in the national narrative because Russia eliminated the highest status of the nation – the independent nation-state. Therefore also the results of the Soviet occupation are dominantly negative and as opposed to Estonian national interests.⁶¹⁹ Estonians' attempts to restore sovereignty found strong resistance in Moscow and the Soviet government tried to block this development.⁶²⁰ However, Estonians managed to

⁶¹⁵ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 81, pp. 109–110, p. 122, p. 124, p. 126, pp. 130–131

⁶¹⁶ Russia implemented immediately restitution policy for the reduction lands that made the Estonian peasants' situation harder (Laur et al, 2005, p. 101, p. 106); Russia tried to attract Estonians by promising to protect them but it was not true (*Ibid*, p. 108); Estonians had to pay more taxes by implementing Russian central government taxes (*Ibid*, p. 131, p. 137); Russian merchants ruined the competition by offering cheaper goods (*Ibid*, p. 113), Russians closed the University in Estonia (*Ibid*, p. 119), Russian officials were not able to understand the particularities of Estonians (*Ibid*, p. 155)

⁶¹⁷ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 22–24, p. 27

⁶¹⁸ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 78–79

⁶¹⁹ Economy went down, cultural values were destroyed and significant repressions started against the national elite (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 81); national military units were liquidated and Estonians were sent to serve the army around the USSR (*Ibid*, pp. 102–103); Estonia lost some territories to Russia (*Ibid*, p. 102); Estonian needs were preferred to Moscow needs and it destroyed the Estonian economy (*Ibid*, p. 109); Estonian economic structure and its cornerstone – agriculture – was destroyed by the Soviet policies (*Ibid*, pp. 118–120, p. 123); enforced industrialisation lead to the destruction of traditional life style, massive immigration and ecological crisis (*Ibid*, pp. 120–121, p. 123, p. 125)

⁶²⁰ Moscow tried to change the constitution to hinder the autonomy of Soviet republics, when Estonians increased their autonomy Moscow wanted to change the Estonian authorities (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 145); Discussion about the Nazi-Soviet Pact was delayed and finally when it was condemned then made declaration that the Baltic republics membership in the USSR is not related to that (*Ibid*, p. 147); Moscow resisted

restore their independence and the opposing relations continued on the bilateral level.⁶²¹ Thereby the national master narrative defines Russia as the main historical opponent of Estonia who tried to do everything to resist Estonian independence.

Russia is also depicted as an exploiter of Estonia. When Estonian territory was conquered by Russia then it received significant autonomy at first. However, later Russian central government was interested in limiting these special rights that was finally made and Russian officials were installed.⁶²² A similar process takes place also in the Soviet era when the leaders of the Estonian Soviet Republic who cared too much about the Estonian developments were replaced with obedient Moscow puppets.⁶²³ This pattern constructs the understanding that Russia was not interested in local developments but only in its own benefit. A similar description is related to the economic developments. In the period of the Russian Empire as well as the Soviet era the Estonian economy was exploited for the interest of Russian general development, though it helped also to develop local economies.⁶²⁴ Also Estonians suffered military exploitation that required Estonians to pay ‘*the most hated blood levy*’, which recruited Estonians to fight in Russian army in the wars that were not related to the Estonians’ interests.⁶²⁵ Thus, national narrative constructs the image of Russia as colonial centre that exploited Estonia in different ways and therefore also it has been against the independence of Estonia.

The Russian negative image is supported by the narrative element that shifts responsibility for shared deeds. As the Estonian master narrative is mainly dissimilative towards Russia then there are not many aspects where the responsibilities are shifted. The main aspect is related to the Bolsheviks government in 1918, which is declared as a Petrograd, later Moscow puppet government.⁶²⁶ The same element is used also about the first Soviet government in 1940 and later Soviet governments, which all are defined as only the executor of Moscow policies.⁶²⁷ Thereby the Estonian national narrative whitewashes

to the Estonian independence declaration and tried to organise referendum for the support of the USSR (*Ibid*, p. 150, p. 153)

⁶²¹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 163

⁶²² Already Catherine II was interested in limiting the autonomy (Laur et al, 2005, p. 101). However, it was implemented in the end of the 19th century as a part of Russification policy (*Ibid*, p. 128, p. 155; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 9)

⁶²³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 104, p. 106, p. 109, p. 124

⁶²⁴ Laur et al, 2005, p. 155; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 15–16, p. 42, pp. 120.121, pp. 123–124, p. 140

⁶²⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 137; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 9, p. 17, pp. 102–103

⁶²⁶ Everything was decided in Petrograd, Estonian Bolsheviks did not decide anything (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 24); Moscow wanted to give a civil war dimension for this fighting but they were directly under control of Moscow (*Ibid*, p. 32)

⁶²⁷ Soviet troops and activists organised coup in Estonia, organised election where only Communists were elected and they asked membership in the USSR, even Estonian Communist Party was merged with the central Soviet Union Communist Party to

Estonian collaborators from the responsibility for the Soviet repressions and policies and shifts the responsibility for all misdeeds to Russia. In addition Estonian master narrative includes also several negative qualities of Russians to underline Russian negative image. In this way Russians are described as not very skilful or well-educated⁶²⁸, not very reliable allies⁶²⁹, cheaters⁶³⁰, badly organised and outdated government, later non-democratic government⁶³¹, militarily weak⁶³².

The Estonian master narrative presents Estonians as mainly positive actors in the history and therefore also the negative elements are presented in the way that they are justified or personalised. The biggest share of the Estonian narrative is glorifying Estonians, to a lesser extent there is also victimisation of Estonians. However, the glorification elements are stronger with the emphasises on independent Estonia. The significant others in the Estonian master narrative are mainly Germans and Russians. The latter are presented mainly as negative ones and the historical controversy is underlined through different elements that form the understanding that Russia is the historical security threat for Estonia. On the other hand, the negative image of Russia constructs the understanding that Estonian national interests are in danger when Russia controls Estonian territory, therefore the only solution is to stay separate from Russia that also corresponds to the dissimilative character of Estonian master narrative.

2.4. Historical Key Events in the Estonian Master Narrative

The master narrative includes the key events of the nation that are considered as the most important moments for national development. In this context, it is important to observe the meaning of these events assessed in the master narrative and the role of the significant other in these events. In this section I compare the importance given different events in the textbooks and thereafter explain the meaning of the events and analyse the role of the Other, Russia(ns) in these events.

control better Estonian Communists (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 79–81); Estonian Communists were directly under Moscow control and they only implemented Moscow policies, even the mass deportation in March 1949 was conducted under Moscow control (*Ibid*, pp. 98–99, p. 103, p. 114)

⁶²⁸ Estonian wise men were better than Russian ones (Laur et al, 2005, p. 37), Communist Party members were badly educated, only when Estonians joined it then the quality increased (Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 98)

⁶²⁹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 50

⁶³⁰ Laur et al, 2005, p. 112

⁶³¹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 113; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 8, p. 12, p. 20, p. 26, p. 40

⁶³² The places where Russian military failures are described, Laur et al, 2005, p. 90; Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 29, p. 82

Estonian national history is 11,000 years long, though majority of this period belongs to the pre-history. In this part I focus on the events of the historical period that starts with the Middle Ages.⁶³³ The Middle Ages and Early Modern Era are significantly underrepresented in the Estonian history narrative. On the one hand, it is related to the lack of sources of the history, but on the other hand, Estonians were subjects of other nations during this period and therefore also less important for the national narrative. The only almost proportional share of the time period and textbook volume is related to the Modern Era when Estonians as modern nation was formed (See Chart 2.12.).




Chart 2.12. Representation of History Periods in the Estonian Textbooks

The main focus is made on the 20th century because on the one hand, the 20th century is the most relevant part of the modern nation history and it offers significantly more sources for the study. On the other hand, it is the period when the most important key events took place in the Estonian history and Estonians were an independent actor in the historical scene. In the scale of 800 years of history the 20th century is significantly overrepresented. To understand the representation of the 20th century events I compare the representation of the 20th century events in the textbook and their time periods (See Chart 2.13.). The most underrepresented in this period is the Soviet Estonia (1945–1986), the share difference is –13%⁶³⁴, also the restoration of independence and current

⁶³³ This time periodization is given in the introduction of the textbook. Pre-historic period is has only few written sources and it is studied mainly based on the archaeological excavations, Historical period includes mainly written sources, Laur et al, 2005,pp. 10–11

⁶³⁴ The textbook share is 26% but the time period is 39% therefore the Soviet period is underrepresented in the textbook by –13%. To assess the under- and overrepresentation of the periods I compare the gap between the time scale share and textbook share.

Estonia is slightly underrepresented but it is mainly due to the underrepresentation of current Estonia that is included in the other parts of school curriculum.⁶³⁵ The most overrepresented period of the 20th century is the Second World War that includes also the loss of independence and establishing of the Soviet occupation (share difference 11%). It is the most turbulent and also controversial period of Estonian history. Although the key events of the formation of the independent nation-state are in the first half of the 20th century it is only slightly overrepresented.




Chart 2.13. Representation of the 20th Century History in the Estonian Textbooks

The key events of Estonian history are also mainly in the 20th century, however there are also some highlights in the earlier period. In the following I explain the meaning of these events in the Estonian master narrative and include the role of Russia(ns) in these events. The key moments of Estonian master narratives before the 20th century cover 31% of the total amount of the crucial events; 20th century events cover 69% (See Chart 2.14.). The main focus is made on the independent statehood and the biggest share of the events is covered by the restoration of the national independence in 1987–1991. Of key importance is also the establishment of independence, which together following War of Liberation (1918–1920) have the same share with the restoration of the independence. The transformation of the peasants into a modern political nation, which includes the emancipation of serfs, national awakening and Revolution in 1905, covers similar share with two previous categories. All these three categories can be considered as the glorifying moments of the national history. A little smaller share is given victimising events, the loss of independence, the

⁶³⁵ By excluding the last 15 years of independent Estonia the restoration of independence is overrepresented by the 7% of share difference

20th century events are represented more than the 13th century Independence War. Also the Soviet repressions have a key part of the victimisation elements in the master narrative. A failed uprising and two devastating wars on Estonian soil get less attention due to the fact that the first is a national failure and the latter are wars where Estonians were not participating as independent actors.




Chart 2.14. Share of the Estonian History Key Events in the Textbooks

The Independence War (1208–1227) is the historical turning point that linked Estonia firmly with European space by ‘*establishing border between Eastern and Western Church, which in general terms exists even today*’.⁶³⁶ Russians are not so strongly related to this event, the narrative is mentioning their support to Estonians to fight against Germans. However, the conclusion is made that Russian support was unreliable and egoistic because they were interested in conquering the Estonian lands themselves.⁶³⁷ The Uprising of the St. George Night (1343–1345) is considered as the epilogue of Estonian independence war. That was the last time when Estonians tried to liberate themselves and thereafter the ethnic division between Estonians and Germans was fastened by the social stratification. It led to the deactivation of Estonians for the centuries.⁶³⁸ Russians and Russia were not involved in this event; it is the only Estonian history key event when Russia is not involved. Two following wars are presented as a Russian attempt to conquer Estonian lands. The Livonian War ended independent statehood in Estonia (though not governed by Estonians) and divided Estonia between Poles and Swedes. Russians were defeated and

⁶³⁶ Author translation ‘*väljakujunenud ida- ja läänikiriku piir püsib üldjoontes tänapäevani*’, Laur et al, 2005, p. 50

⁶³⁷ Laur et al, 2005, p. 48. P. 50

⁶³⁸ Laur et al, 2005, p. 56

expelled from Estonia.⁶³⁹ The Great Northern War is another attempt where Russians were successful and since that moment Estonia became a part of the Russian Empire for 200 years.⁶⁴⁰

The next key moment for the Estonian nation is the emancipation of serfs that is the starting point for establishing an entrepreneurial peasantry. The reforms that increased the peasants' self-government gave the important experiences for Estonians to move further to the independent statehood.⁶⁴¹ The national awakening was related to the reforms in the Estonian villages and in the middle of 19th century the modern understanding of the Estonian nation was formed and Estonian national mobilisation achieved.⁶⁴² The cultural mobilisation led to the political mobilisation and formation of the political demands by Estonians to protect their culture and to demand democratic rights in the Revolution of 1905. The idea of the Estonian national autonomy was also mentioned first time in 1905.⁶⁴³ These three key events can be defined as the formation of modern Estonian nation and its political mobilisation that was precondition for the national independence. The role of Russia and Russians in these events was ambiguous. The emancipation of serfs is presented as the idea of Russian Czar Alexander I. It means that the role of Russia is positive but it is rather personalised. The role of Russia in the national awakening process is in total considered as negative one. In the beginning the Russian central government did not consider it as a dangerous tendency and saw it rather as a counterweight to the Baltic Germans, but later they started to act against the Estonian national movement and launched large-scale Russification, which is defined as clearly hostile step against Estonian national achievements.⁶⁴⁴ The Revolution in 1905 is presented already as resistance to the Russian government, which also introduces the mainstream character of the master narrative about the 20th century events. The Revolution culminates with the bloodshed and unjust punishment operations in Estonia by Russian troops.⁶⁴⁵

The establishment of independence and restoration of independence both include strong otherization from Russia and Russians. Both events are the culminations of the national fight for the independence and in both cases the opposing force is Russia. However, in both cases Estonians are victorious and they manage to achieve their ultimate goal. Russia is also the enemy in other 20th century key moments: loss of independence (1939–1940), war in 1944, and Soviet repressions. All these events have the meaning of national catastrophe, which eliminated the only possible form of existence of Estonian nation. In the two first cases the Russian role is presented by a similar pattern: powerful Russia imposes its will on Estonians. In the case of the 1939–1940 Estonians

⁶³⁹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 88

⁶⁴⁰ Laur et al, 2005, p. 92

⁶⁴¹ Laur et al, 2005, p. 139

⁶⁴² Laur et al, 2005, p. 153, p. 156

⁶⁴³ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 11, p. 21

⁶⁴⁴ Laur et al, 2005, pp. 154–155

⁶⁴⁵ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 10, p. 13

were relatively peaceful and they did not resist. In the case of 1944 Estonians knew what Soviet rule meant and they resisted till the last moment but they had to surrender. Both these historical turbulences have constructed a very negative image of Russia and caused a national trauma for Estonians. The third case underlines even more the necessity of separation from Russia and deepens the national trauma and victimisation of Estonians. The submissiveness of Estonians in 1939–1940 is rejected by the presentation of strong resistance (passive or active) to the Soviet regime and the massive repressions against Estonian nation during the Soviet regime.⁶⁴⁶ These three events consist of almost 30% of the Estonian national narrative key events and therefore also play a major role in constructing the negative image of Russia and Russians.

Thus, the major focus of the Estonian master narrative key events is related to the development of national self-determination and liberation. Events start with the conquest of Estonian lands by external powers and give an overview how Estonians have managed to survive and move towards formation of modern nation and independent state. Russia, the significant other that has been included in almost all key events, has a strong negative image: aggressor or opponent for Estonians. Although in the earlier period the strong negative character of Russia is less presented than the narrative key focus, the 20th century, presents very strong confrontation between Estonia and Russia. That supports the understanding that Estonia and Russia are different and they should be separate.

The Estonian master narrative defines the long 11,000 years continuity of Estonians living on their historical lands. Different external powers, and especially Russia, that have ruled Estonians have been against the Estonian national interest and therefore the only natural way of existence for Estonians is their independent nation-state, which is the current state. National master narrative defines also Estonian identity markers that the nation-state can protect. They are determined mainly through cultural elements (language, education, traditional culture) but the narrative also underlines the democratic elements of Estonian society and ethnic homogeneity. Estonian master narrative is strongly dissimilative towards Russia and Russians and draws the border between Estonia and Russia. It is also underlined by the Estonian chronotope that locates Estonia in Northern Europe. The connection with Russia is shown in conditional terms and Estonia is never shown as a part of the entire Russian empire, only as a region that is connected with North West Russia. Therefore the national master narrative shows that Estonia as a part of the Russian state has been an historical anomaly that is fortunately eliminated. The experience of living in the Russian state has influenced the will to establish an independent nation-state.

⁶⁴⁶ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 113

The master narrative constructs the images of self and others. The Estonian self image is mediated mainly through the glorifying elements and the victimising aspects are mainly related to the Soviet period, which can be defined as the major national trauma. Therefore also the image of Russia(ns) is predominantly negative by underlining the security threat from Russia and negative consequences that Estonians have had due to the Russian rule. In other words, the Russian image is heavily mediated through the other-maligning elements. The negative image of Russia(ns) is underlined by the key moments of the national history where Russia(ns) have been involved and the assessment to their role as rather negative or strongly negative. Thus, the only suitable solution for Estonians is to separate from Russia and to establish their independent nation-state that is currently achieved.

CHAPTER 3: Analysis of the Ukrainian Master Narrative

Ukraine is one of the biggest European countries by its territory and its population. Ukrainian statehood is relatively old, having its heyday in the Middle Ages. On the other hand, the Ukrainian statehood narrative is the most controversial with Russia because the origin of the state is the same for both – Kievan Rus. Its medieval statehood was ended by external conquests and Ukrainians tried to establish their modern statehood first in the 17th century but Ukrainian lands were conquered by the Poles and Russians, later also by the Austrian Empire. Therefore the second attempt of establishing modern statehood occurred only at the end of the First World War but also this attempt was not successful and Ukrainian lands were incorporated into the Soviet Union. Finally, in 1991 Ukraine declared its independence and the new era of Ukrainian statehood began. Due to the internal political clashes and Russian pressure, the political orientation of Ukraine has been ambiguous, but mainly the orientation has been integration into the European and Transatlantic institutions. The European direction was declared clearly after the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004. After the last presidential elections (2010) Ukrainian foreign policy has become more pro-Russian. Ukrainian national memory has been always strongly suppressed by Moscow because it challenges the origin of Russians. Being under Russian domination the Ukrainian understanding of their past was denied by the Russian authorities who created the understanding that Ukrainians are part of the Russian nation. Therefore Ukrainian collective memory is presented in the context of Ukrainian statehood only after the declaration of independence in 1991.⁶⁴⁷

In this chapter I analyse the Ukrainian national history master narrative based on Ukrainian history textbooks. The Ukrainian national history curriculum is divided into five parts: from ancient times till the end of Middle Ages (7th form), the Early Modern Era (8th form), the Late Modern Era (9th form), 1914–1939 (10th form) and 1939–present (11th form).⁶⁴⁸ Firstly, I analyse

⁶⁴⁷ Turchenko, Fedir G., Petro P. Panchenko, Sergiy M. Timchenko. *Новейшая история Украины, часть вторая, 1939–2001* <The Newest History of Ukraine, Second part, 1939–2001>, Kyiv: Geneza, 2001, p. 367

⁶⁴⁸ Lyakh, Roman, Nadezhda Temirova. *История Украины. Учебник для 7-го класса* <History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 7th form>, Kyiv: Geneza, 2003; Vlasov, Vitaliy. *История Украины. 8 класс* <History of Ukraine. 8 form>, Kyiv: Izdatel'stvo A.C.K., 2002; Turchenko, Fedir G., Valeriy M. Moroko. *История Украины, конец XVIII–начало XX века. Учебник для 9 класса* <History of Ukraine, from the end of the 18th century till the beginning of 20th century. Textbook for 9th form>, Zaporozhie: Prosvita, Kyiv: Geneza, 2002; Turchenko, Fedir G. *Новейшая история Украины, часть первая, 1914–1939* <The Newest History of Ukraine, First part, 1914–2004>, Kyiv: Geneza, 2004; Turchenko, Fedir G., Petro P. Panchenko, Sergiy M. Timchenko. *Новейшая история Украины, часть вторая, 1939–2001* <The Newest History of Ukraine, Second part, 1939–2001>, Kyiv: Geneza, 2001

the narrative of origin of the Ukrainian nation, showing how the identity of the Ukrainian nation is differentiated from the Russian one. I define the key elements of the Ukrainian nation as they are presented in the national master narrative; this part also includes the chronotope of Ukraine. Thereafter I assess the general character of the Ukrainian master narrative and define the schematic narrative templates used in the master narrative. The third part of this chapter will focus on the analysis of Ukrainians' self-image and the image of their significant other, Russia(ns). The final section concludes the analysis of the Ukrainian master narrative by defining its historical key moments and the role of Russia(ns) in these events.

3.1. Ukrainian Narrative of Origin and Main Identity Markers

In this section I analyse the Ukrainian narrative of origin starting from the different cultures influencing the Ukrainian nation and defining its path of statehood. Thereafter I discuss the controversial issue of the common Ukrainian-Russian heritage and the development of a separate Ukrainian nation that is the basis for the modern Ukrainian state. In the second part of this section I will define the main identity markers presented in the master narrative.

The Ukrainian narrative of origin aims to construct continuity between the early settlements in Ukraine and present day Ukrainians. Therefore the first part of Ukrainian national history is presented as the history of Ukrainian territories.⁶⁴⁹ The most important early cultural influence for current Ukrainians is presented by the Trypillian culture⁶⁵⁰, which is the first developed civilisation in current Ukrainian territory. The connection is established by the cultural elements. *'Traditions of Trypillian painters from generation to generation were passed by Ukrainian folk masters. Variants of the decorative motifs of this distant era we find today in the Ukrainian embroidery, carpets, and ceramics.'*⁶⁵¹ In addition to the Trypillian culture Ukrainian lands were also influenced by the Cimmerians, Scythians, Sarmatians, and Greeks before the Slavic tribes appeared in the Ukrainian territories.⁶⁵² The Ukrainian national

⁶⁴⁹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 4

⁶⁵⁰ Cucuteni-Trypillian culture is a Neolithic archaeological culture that was located in the Dniester-Dnieper region 6–3 thousand years BC. This was relatively highly developed culture that had big populated settlements, first urban settlements in Ukraine, the biggest had the population up to 25,000, Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 16

⁶⁵¹ Author's translation *'Традиции трипольских маляров из поколения в поколение передались украинским народным мастерам. Варианты декоративных мотивов той далекой эпохи сегодня находим в украинских вышивках, коврах, керамике.'*, Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 15

⁶⁵² The first experience of statehood in Ukraine is connected with Scythian tribes' union that was destroyed after 339 BC, Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 24; Greek cities on the

narrative concludes that all previous nations on the territory of Ukraine were assimilated by the later nations and thereby also have their input in the development of the Ukrainian nation.

The ethnic origin of the Ukrainian nation is related to the Slavic tribes that appear around the end of the 2nd and beginning of the 1st millennium BC. There are controversial understandings where the historical location of the first Slavic tribes was, but the Ukrainian version underlines that the border of the Slavic tribes' initial homeland is located in the current Western Bank of Ukraine⁶⁵³, thus constructing the understanding that Ukraine is the cradle of the Slavic nations. The proto-Ukrainians are defined by the Zarubintsa culture and the ancient state of Antes.⁶⁵⁴ The medieval state of Ukraine is related to Kievan Rus that was the union of the Eastern Slavic tribes, which started to form in the 7th century. The Ukrainian narrative defines a direct connection between Kievan Rus and the Ukrainian nation by claiming that '*Kiev State is the cradle of the Ukrainian nation, which was a direct successor of its culture*'.⁶⁵⁵ Thereby Kievan Rus is considered as the heyday of Ukrainian statehood, which at its peak reached from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and was one of the leading countries in European politics.⁶⁵⁶ After the fragmentation of Kievan Rus and the conquest by the Mongols in the 13th century, the successor of the Kievan state is considered the Halych-Volhynia state⁶⁵⁷ that carried independent Ukrainian statehood till the middle of 14th century, which is defined by the Ukrainian master narrative as the end of the period of princedoms.⁶⁵⁸ The issue of Kievan Rus succession is the reason of the main dispute between Russian and Ukrainian collective memory because both nations claim the Rus state as the origin of their statehood.

Ukrainian statehood was liquidated by the conquest of Lithuanians and Poles that subjugated Ukrainian lands. However, the Ukrainian nobility managed to maintain significant autonomy and in the middle of 15th century they even managed to restore Ukrainian-Belorussian statehood and thereafter to keep its

Black Sea coast had strong influence on the later statehood development of the local population, including Slavs, *Ibid*, p. 38

⁶⁵³ Slavic tribes' historical homeland is on the territory that is bordered by the Middle Vistula and Carpathians in the West, the Middle Dnieper in the East, the Pripjat River in the North, and the Middle Dniester and Southern Bug in the South, Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 40

⁶⁵⁴ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 40, Antes had big state that reached from Don to current Romania and Balkans that disappeared from the historical sources after 602 AD, *Ibid*, p. 44, p. 46

⁶⁵⁵ Author's translation '*Киевское государство является колыбелью украинской народности, которая стала прямым преемником его культура*', Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 52

⁶⁵⁶ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 52

⁶⁵⁷ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 102

⁶⁵⁸ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 125

significant autonomy.⁶⁵⁹ The last revolt by the Ukrainian nobility against the Polish-Lithuanian state was in the beginning of the 16th century and thereby the Ukrainian nobility as the source of Ukrainian statehood is exhausted.⁶⁶⁰ The next chapter of Ukrainian statehood is opened by the Cossacks that are one of the key Ukrainian identity markers. The formation of free frontier defenders, Cossacks, and the liquidation of all the autonomous rights of Ukrainians and the start of intensive Polonisation by the Union of Lublin (1569), led to the Cossacks uprisings in the first half of the 17th century, which culminated with the formation of independent Cossack Hetmanate in 1649.⁶⁶¹ The national master narrative defines the Cossacks revolts as the national liberation movement and the Polish-Cossacks War in the middle of the 17th century as a national-liberation war.⁶⁶² Thus, the Ukrainian nation and the Cossacks are equalised and the Cossack Hetmanate is the new form of Ukrainian statehood, the first attempt of the modern Ukrainian statehood. According to the national master narrative, the new Cossack Hetmanate combined the old traditions from Kievan Rus, experiences from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the particular military democracy of the Cossacks' society.⁶⁶³ Also, the first Constitution in the Modern Era is related to the Cossack Hetmanate.⁶⁶⁴ The national master narrative constructs a direct connection between Kievan Rus and Cossacks' state by underlining that the Hetmanate was the first form of a modern Ukrainian nation-state.

The Cossack state soon became the issue of dispute between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovite Czar and ended with the division of Ukraine between these two states. The subjugation of Ukraine is defined as the misinterpretation of the alliance agreements from the Russian side. Later, Russia, by maintaining the Ukrainian statehood in the form of limited autonomy in the Muscovite Czarism, used the weakness of the Ukrainian state and forced the Hetmans to sign the agreements that gradually liquidated the Hetmanate's autonomy.⁶⁶⁵ This process culminated with the liquidation of the Hetmanate in

⁶⁵⁹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, pp. 168–169

⁶⁶⁰ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 170

⁶⁶¹ Vlasov, 2002, p. 129

⁶⁶² Vlasov, 2002, p. 110

⁶⁶³ Vlasov, 2002, p. 137

⁶⁶⁴ Vlasov, 2002, p. 235, p. 237

⁶⁶⁵ The first agreement between Hetmanate and Muscovite Czarism was made in 1654, Treaty of Pereyaslavl that is defined by the Ukrainian national master narrative as the confederative alliance between two equal states (Vlasov, 2002, p. 151); Hetman Vyhovsky had to give up some power to be approved as Hetman in 1658 (*Ibid*, p. 161), Hetman Yurii Khmelnytsky made in 1659 a new Treaty of Pereyaslavl (*Ibid*, p. 168), Slobodischenskoe agreement in 1660 (*Ibid*, p. 169), Moscow Articles in 1665 (*Ibid*, p. 173), Gluhiv Articles in 1669 (*Ibid*, p. 180), Konotop Articles in 1672 (*Ibid*, p. 182) and Kolomak Articles in 1687 (*Ibid*, p. 215). Hetmanate was subjugated to the Little Russia College (*Ibid*, p. 247), thereafter the position of Hetman was briefly restored in 1725 and with the new agreement in 1728 Cossack Hetmanate was already fully subjugated

1764 and thereby also the end of the first modern Ukrainian statehood.⁶⁶⁶ The national idea of Ukraine was carried by the Cossack nobility (*starshina*) that were not politically active but established important national-cultural prerequisites for the national awakening movement.⁶⁶⁷ The national awakening movement was promoted by the national intellectuals who managed to formulate the first political demands of Ukrainians, including national independence, by the end of the 19th century.⁶⁶⁸

The opportunity to form an independent Ukrainian state occurred at the end of the First World War when the Russian Empire collapsed and the Ukrainian national elite used this moment to declare national independence on 9 January 1918.⁶⁶⁹ Due to external aggression by the Bolsheviks and Polish government, Ukrainian statehood was eliminated on 23 November 1921.⁶⁷⁰ However, the facts of declaring independence in 1918 as well as the attempts to declare independence during the Second World War and thereafter resistance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) are underlined by the narrative of origin as the key events that continued the Ukrainian statehood idea.⁶⁷¹ After the end of the UPA fight in the middle of the 1950s, the idea of statehood was carried by the Ukrainian dissidents who were mainly intellectuals.⁶⁷² The dream of Ukrainians to live in an independent state was achieved 1991.⁶⁷³ Thereby the national master narrative develops the concept of Ukrainian national statehood from Kievan Rus till the current Ukrainian state. The idea of statehood is carried by different social groups: Ukrainian princes, Cossacks, national intellectuals, national political elite, UPA, national dissident movement and national political elite who finally accomplished this idea in the form of the current independent Ukrainian nation-state.

Another important issue that the Ukrainian narrative of origin focuses on is the unification of Ukrainian lands. There are two factors that undermine

under Russian domination (*Ibid*, p. 252). The Hetman position was liquidated again in 1734 and the last Hetman was appointed in 1750 whose power was constantly limited (*Ibid*, pp. 254–257) and in 1764 his position together with Hetmanate liquidated (*Ibid*, p. 260).

⁶⁶⁶ Vlasov, 2002, p. 260

⁶⁶⁷ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 77

⁶⁶⁸ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 238, p. 241, p. 287

⁶⁶⁹ Turchenko, 2004, p. 95; The Western Ukrainian National Republic was declared in Lviv on 10 November 1918 and on 22 January 1919 Ukrainian republics unified, *Ibid*, pp. 143–144

⁶⁷⁰ Turchenko, 2004, p. 193

⁶⁷¹ Transcarpathian Ukraine declared its independence a little before the Second World War started, on the 15 March 1939 but was immediately occupied by Hungary, Turchenko, 2004, p. 354; 30 June 1941 Western Ukrainians declared independence in Lviv, Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 28–29, pp. 121–122

⁶⁷² Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 170

⁶⁷³ On 24 August 1991 Ukrainian Supreme Council declared independence of Ukraine and it was confirmed on the national referendum 1 December 1991, Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 286–287

national unity: internal struggles and external powers. The strong state should be internally united and the positive examples of this unity are the period of the Ukrainian medieval heyday during Yaroslav the Wise in the 11th century. Kievan Rus was at that time one of the strongest countries in Europe.⁶⁷⁴ The need of unification is also underlined during the fragmentation of the Kievan Rus in the second half of the 12th and in the beginning of the 13th century. The symbol of necessity of national unification is presented by the Tale of Igor's Campaign, which underlines the importance of the common operations against the external enemies.⁶⁷⁵ Therefore the national narrative also praises Halych-Volhynia because it is the power that managed to restore national unity.⁶⁷⁶ The importance of internal unity and the baneful results of disunity are mediated by the two examples in Ukrainian history that both lead to the elimination of the Ukrainian statehood. The Period of Ruin (1657–1687) when the Cossacks internal fight led to the total destruction of the country, division of the country between external powers and subjugation of the newly established independent Hetmanate to the Muscovite Czarism and Poland.⁶⁷⁷ The second attempt to form the modern Ukrainian nation-state had the similar fate where the internal clashes between the Ukrainian national elite led to the bloody wars where the external powers divided the Ukrainian state and eliminated its independence.⁶⁷⁸ Therefore these events are considered as the '*lesson to future generations of fighters for the independence of Ukraine*'⁶⁷⁹. The national narrative shows that the lessons were learned in the case of the UPA fight as well during the formation of independent Ukrainian nation-state in 1991; however, internal unification has been fragile.

Another dimension of the Ukrainian unification is related to the external powers that have tried to separate Ukrainian territories. The issue of the division of Ukrainian lands by external powers occurs when Ukrainian lands were surrounded by expanding political powers. In the beginning of the 16th century Ukrainian lands were divided between five nations: Muscovy, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary and Moldavia.⁶⁸⁰ The formation of the independent Cossack Hetmanate aimed also at the unification of the Ukrainian lands but the following internal fight and the active involvement of neighbouring states lead to the crucial division of Ukraine. The Truce of Andrusovo (1667) divided Ukrainian lands between the Muscovy and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth without considering Ukrainian national interests.⁶⁸¹ The later division of Poland included some more Ukrainian lands in the Russian Empire but the very

⁶⁷⁴ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 87

⁶⁷⁵ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 107

⁶⁷⁶ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 145

⁶⁷⁷ Vlasov, 2002, p. 176, p. 221

⁶⁷⁸ Turchenko, 2004, p. 222

⁶⁷⁹ Author's translation 'урок следующим поколениям борцов за независимости Украины', Turchenko, 2004, p. 222

⁶⁸⁰ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 175

⁶⁸¹ Vlasov, 2002, p. 176

Western regions (Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia) were under control of the Austrian Empire.⁶⁸² This is one of the most important turning points for Ukrainian national unity and the national narrative in the following periods shows that Ukrainians aimed to form one unified state that was achieved on 22 January 1919.⁶⁸³ However, after the collapse of the independent Ukrainian state in 1921, the Ukrainian lands were divided even more: among the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia.⁶⁸⁴ The final unification was achieved during the Soviet Era when the Western Ukrainian territories were unified with the rest of Ukraine. It is considered as an important historical moment in Ukrainian history, though the methods of this unification are not condoned.⁶⁸⁵ The final territory that was unified with Ukraine was the Crimean peninsula that is defined as historically tightly connected with Ukraine territory.⁶⁸⁶ However, this unification is not defined as the historical moment of unification of Ukrainian lands and it is presented as the result of the centralised colonial policy of Moscow. In addition, the same region is presented as a Russian tool to undermine Ukrainian national integration.⁶⁸⁷ The national narrative presents as a one of the most successful achievements of the 1990s that Ukraine has managed to maintain its national unity, though there has been very difficult socio-economic developments.⁶⁸⁸ Thereby the master narrative also includes the internal and external factors of disunity in the one successful result.

The third important aspect of the Ukrainian narrative of origin is the common root with Russians. Above was already mentioned that the Ukrainian master narrative defines Ukraine as the cradle of all Slavic nations. Though the genetic and linguistic similarities are mentioned with Western and Southern Slavs, the understanding as the different kin nation is clear.⁶⁸⁹ More complicated is the question of the formation of Eastern Slavic nations. The Russian master narrative has for a long time denied the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation and presented them as the younger brothers of Russians and the policies of the Russian government have been perceived by Ukrainians as the Russians' attempts to make Ukrainians into "real Russians". Therefore the Ukrainian national master narrative by narrating the origin of the Ukrainian nation is constructing the understanding that the immediate successor of Kievan Rus, the common heritage of Eastern Slavs, is Ukraine. The Ukrainian master narrative claims that Kievan Rus is Ukraine-Rus because the main centre of Kievan Rus was located on the current Ukrainian lands. Therefore Ukrainians are the unconditional successors of Kievan Rus. At the same time it is noted that

⁶⁸² Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 5

⁶⁸³ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 390; Turchenko, 2004, p. 39, p. 144

⁶⁸⁴ Turchenko, 2004, p. 331

⁶⁸⁵ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 9

⁶⁸⁶ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 129

⁶⁸⁷ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 307–308

⁶⁸⁸ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 398–399

⁶⁸⁹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, pp. 46–47

'Belarusians and Russians also have direct relevance to the heritage of Kievan Rus, because their lands belonged to its territory'.⁶⁹⁰ Thereby the Ukrainian master narrative defines first the territorial argumentation of Kievan Rus as the main part of Ukrainian national history.

The connection between Kievan Rus and Ukrainians is also established by cultural argumentation. It is claimed that Ukrainian culture inherited from Kievan Rus its culture that was continued by Halych-Volhynia because it directly controlled the old Kievan territories.⁶⁹¹ Halych-Volhynia combined the Kievan Rus heritage with the Western and Southern European cultures and created a unique Ukrainian culture.⁶⁹² The master narrative makes a clear distinction between Russians and Ukrainians. It claims that *'[t]he people also called themselves Rusyns – a word formed from the Rus. (Also Belarusians were called by this name. Russians in these days were called Muscovites.)'*⁶⁹³ Thus, the Ukrainian and Russian cultures are defined as different and separate, though the origin of these cultures is similar. The cultural argument is supported also by the development of Ukrainian language, which has roots in Kievan Rus and during the 14th-16th centuries, original Ukrainian language developed.⁶⁹⁴ The difference of the Ukrainian and Russian languages is also underlined by the Ukrainians' intensive struggle for education in their national language because due to the lack of Ukrainian schools the educational level of Ukrainians was very low in comparison with Russians in the 19th century.⁶⁹⁵ Thus, the national narrative of origin defines a clear distinction between Ukrainians and Russians, and the Russian policies to assimilate Ukrainians and make them "real Russians" is defined as one of the biggest repressions against the Ukrainian nation. Therefore the independent Ukrainian nation-state is presented as the immediate successor of ancient Kievan Rus but it does not lead to the assimilative character towards Russians, but the differences between Ukrainians and Russians are clearly underlined.

The national master narrative also defines the main national identity markers. The Ukrainian identity markers can be divided into four groups: culture, Cossack spirit, socio-economic markers, and chronotope. The most important identity marker of Ukrainians is the **Ukrainian culture** that has developed through history and formed the unique Ukrainian nation. The master

⁶⁹⁰ Author's translation *'белорусы и россияне имеют также непосредственное отношение к наследию Киевской Руси, поскольку их земли входили в ее состав'*, Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 153; the master narrative uses the name of Muscovites and Muscovite Czarism till the formation of Russian Empire in the beginning of 18th century.

⁶⁹¹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 109

⁶⁹² Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 128, p. 151

⁶⁹³ Author's translation *'Народ же называл себя русинами - словом, образованным от Русь. (Так же назывались и белорусы. Россиян в те времена называли московитами).'*, Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 183

⁶⁹⁴ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, pp. 141–142, p. 184

⁶⁹⁵ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 378

narrative underlines that the development of Ukrainian nation is parallel to the development of Ukrainian culture. The formation of a separate Ukrainian nation was finalised in the 14th-15th century and thereafter the cultural development of Ukrainian lands supported the unique developments of Ukrainians.⁶⁹⁶ It is also underlined that the loss of Ukrainian statehood weakened the national development but the Ukrainian nation put its energy in the formation of their national culture.⁶⁹⁷ Thereby the national culture is defined as the main source of Ukrainian identity. The national master narrative also underlines that the formation of modern Ukrainian state was supported by Ukrainian culture and the level of Ukrainian culture capacitated the formation the independent Ukrainian state.⁶⁹⁸ The Russian authorities aimed to eliminate the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture and tried to assimilate and to form one Russian nation since the establishment of Russian domination over the Ukrainian lands.⁶⁹⁹ The Ukrainian national movement started from the cultural activities of national intellectuals and developed from the cultural demands to the political demands that resulted in the independent Ukrainian state. Therefore the Ukrainian national culture had an important political role in the formation of the Ukrainian nation and constructing the identity to establish the otherness towards Russians. In three particular fields Ukrainian culture has a significant political dimension that has also led to the national autonomy or independence of Ukraine. These fields are Ukrainian language, education in the national language and Ukrainian religion.

Ukrainian language developed from the Old Slavic language that during the 13th century merged from the Dnieper dialect and South Western dialect and during the 14th-16th century it formed a separate Ukrainian language.⁷⁰⁰ This can be also defined as the main dividing line between the earlier Eastern Slavic tribes and modern Eastern Slavic nations. The master narrative shows how the Ukrainian language is the direct successor of the Old Slavic language and how the written Ukrainian language took over the Old Church Slavic use in the books that was called old-Ukrainian.⁷⁰¹ Thus the national master narrative constructs the direct connection between Kievan Rus and following Ukrainian states. The formation of the modern Ukrainian language is defined with the end of the 18th century when the modern Ukrainian literature was written in this language.⁷⁰² Although other neighbouring Slavic nations have denied the existence of a separate Ukrainian language it is presented as one of the main Ukrainian identity sustainers. When Ukrainians were under Polish rule then the

⁶⁹⁶ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 183

⁶⁹⁷ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 186; Vlasov, 2002, p. 84

⁶⁹⁸ Vlasov, 2002, p. 92, p. 217, p. 264

⁶⁹⁹ Vlasov, 2002, p. 246

⁷⁰⁰ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 142; p. 184

⁷⁰¹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 187; Vlasov, 2002, p. 65, p. 84, p. 88

⁷⁰² Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 53

main confrontation was the Ukrainian language and Orthodox religion.⁷⁰³ When Ukrainian lands were conquered by Russia then the Ukrainian language was denied as a separate language and it was renamed as a regional dialect.⁷⁰⁴ The use of Ukrainian language in public was eliminated, weakening the Ukrainian national identity and thereby facilitating the merger of the Ukrainian nation into the stronger Russian state.⁷⁰⁵ Therefore the declaration of the state language in 1989 that claimed Ukrainian to be the national language is also a significant symbol of strengthening the national identity.⁷⁰⁶ Thus, the national master narrative shows that the important Ukrainian identity marker has been threatened by the external actors and it is at the same time the key identity marker to differentiate Ukrainians from the two main significant others who both deny the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation and they tried to assimilate this ethnic group. Therefore the Ukrainian language is defined as the soul of the nation⁷⁰⁷ and it is strongly securitised and politicised identity marker.

An identity marker closely related with language is **education**. The master narrative constructs the understanding that Ukrainian society has highly valued education and the tradition of the education has its roots in the Kievan Rus.⁷⁰⁸ The first schools in Ukraine are considered to have been established by Grand Prince Vladimir in the 10th century.⁷⁰⁹ Popular education starts in Ukraine in the 17th century that is related to the strengthening of Cossacks and Ukrainian resistance to the Polish Catholic domination. During one century Ukrainian religious organisations have managed to develop successfully the broad educational network accessible to all social groups.⁷¹⁰ It is important to underline that it was accessible to all social groups because it is in line with Cossack principles and different from the later Russian Empire where education was not accessible for poorer social groups.⁷¹¹ The most significant institution was Kyiv Mohyla Academy, which has carried the Ukrainian national idea and at the same time, it was also the only Orthodox higher educational institution in

⁷⁰³ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, pp. 190–191; Vlasov, 2002, pp. 10–11, p. 66, pp. 76–78, p. 87; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 98, p. 109, but also during the 20th century, Turchenko, 2004, p. 332

⁷⁰⁴ This concept was defined by M. Pogodin in 1856 and it defined the Russians' understanding about Ukrainians for many generations, Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 196–197

⁷⁰⁵ Vlasov, 2002, pp. 242–243; Turchenko, Moroko, pp. 13–14, p. 109, p. 113, pp. 207–208, p. 257, p. 287, p. 362, p. 378; Also Bolsheviks (with a small exception of the brief Ukrainisation policy in the 1920s) denied the use of Ukrainian and it was defined as the counterrevolutionary language, Turchenko, 2004, p. 98

⁷⁰⁶ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 256

⁷⁰⁷ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 53, p. 363

⁷⁰⁸ Vlasov, 2002, p. 85, p. 217; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 259

⁷⁰⁹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 142

⁷¹⁰ Vlasov, 2002, pp. 87–88, p. 217, pp. 265–267

⁷¹¹ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 256

the Eastern Europe and unique in the entire world.⁷¹² The loss of the statehood also undermined the Ukrainian educational system. The Ukrainian master narrative draws a clear conclusion that the Russification of the educational system led to the decrease of the literacy rate among Ukrainians.⁷¹³ It is also interesting to note that developments of education made by Russians/Bolsheviks are shown not as achievements for the Ukrainian nation but achievements that were necessary for the colonial power.⁷¹⁴ Therefore the Ukrainian master narrative connects the politicised Ukrainian language issue with the educational issue and education in the Ukrainian language is the main demand of the national liberation movements, in the 19th century as well in the 20th century, on the territories under Russian rule, as well as under Austrian, Polish, Hungarian, Romanian or Czech rule.⁷¹⁵ Education in Ukrainian is an important symbol for the Ukrainian national identity.

The last cultural identity marker is **Ukrainian religion**. It is a more complex identity marker because Ukraine is religiously divided and therefore it is also a less emphasised identity marker than the previous two. The Christianisation of Kievan Rus in 988 established in the Ukrainian territories the Orthodox Church and it was the main identity marker until Polish rule. The Polonisation policy included mainly the conversion to the Catholicism and changing the official language to Polish. It created resistance among the Ukrainian nobility and the protection of Orthodox Church was one of the key issues.⁷¹⁶ The division of Ukrainians by religion was established by the formation of the Greek-Catholic (Uniate) Church in 1596.⁷¹⁷ Although the national master narrative shows that the Greek-Catholic Church was not adopted broadly and it was considered as alien. However, in the 19th century its role changes in the Ukrainian master narrative and it becomes the main source of national awakening movement in Western Ukraine.⁷¹⁸ The Greek-Catholic Church has this role also during the Soviet era when it is considered as the important source of the Ukrainian resistance movement.⁷¹⁹ Therefore the national master narrative adopts this Church as one of the Ukrainian national Churches.

⁷¹² Vlasov, 2002, p. 88, p. 218

⁷¹³ The access to the schools was limited for Ukrainians because they were taught there in Russian and the literacy rate in the 18th century was twice as high than in the 19th century, Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 253–254, p. 256, p. 351, p. 378

⁷¹⁴ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 108–109, p. 151, p. 252; Turchenko, 2004, p. 206

⁷¹⁵ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 90, p. 254, p. 257, p. 285, p. 364, p. 379; Turchenko, 2004, p. 205, pp. 332–333, p. 351; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 158–161

⁷¹⁶ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 190; Vlasov, 2002, pp. 10–11

⁷¹⁷ Union of Brest subjugated the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Orthodox believers to the Roman Pope; it also liquidated the Ukrainian Orthodox Church hierarchy, Vlasov, 2002, p. 12. However, it was not adopted by many Ukrainians, *Ibid*, p. 78

⁷¹⁸ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 91, p. 130, p. 396

⁷¹⁹ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 257

The situation is more complex with the Orthodox Church. Although the Greek-Catholic Church was established to replace the Ukrainian Orthodox Church it was maintained and restored with the help of Cossacks.⁷²⁰ On the other hand, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was threatened by the Moscow Patriarchate that tried to subjugate the Ukrainian Church under its domination.⁷²¹ Therefore the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was between two major powers' pressure and it became the strong supporter of the independent Ukrainian state.⁷²² The master narrative connects the independent Ukrainian state and independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church as two mutually supportive units and the liquidation of the independent Ukrainian Church by Russians is defined as the elimination of the key institution of Ukrainian national self-determination.⁷²³ Therefore also the independent Ukrainian state was eager to establish the Ukrainian Autocephaly Orthodox Church that would not be connected with Moscow. The master narrative shows the resistance of the Russians to the Ukrainian religious independence and it is presented parallel to the political independence issues. The Soviet repressions were harsher against the clergy of the Greek-Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephaly Orthodox Church than among the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that was subjugated to the Moscow Patriarch.⁷²⁴ Thereby it also constructs the understanding that Moscow was interested in keeping all possible institutions under its domination to control Ukrainian society. Therefore independent Ukraine in 1991 was interested in establishing the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church that would be the symbol of a united Ukrainian nation.⁷²⁵ However, this attempt failed and the history master narrative is also not emphasising the key role of one Church in Ukraine but rather the freedom of religions and it presents Ukraine as the multireligious nation.⁷²⁶

Cossack spirit is one important Ukrainian identity marker that defines the socio-political order of Ukraine. The Ukrainian master narrative defines Ukrainians as a unique Cossack nation that developed during the end of the 15th century and reached its culmination in the 17th century.⁷²⁷ On the one hand, the Cossack spirit is related to **braveness and the military society** that is defending the borderlands of its homeland. These aspects are underlined in the several

⁷²⁰ Vlasov, 2002, pp. 46–47

⁷²¹ In 1458 Ukrainians managed to restore their subjugation to the Constantinople Patriarch and to escape from the Moscow domination, Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 189

⁷²² Vlasov, 2002, p. 123

⁷²³ Vlasov, 2002, p. 208

⁷²⁴ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 70–71

⁷²⁵ In 1992 was established Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchy but Moscow Patriarchy did not accept it and continued to exist separately and soon also the Ukrainian Autocephaly Orthodox Church split from the united Church and currently there are three Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 368–370

⁷²⁶ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 372, p. 400

⁷²⁷ Vlasov, 2002, p. 25

victories and praising of the strength of the Ukrainian Cossack army. However, this dimension has less relevance for the current Ukrainian statehood that is defined as a peaceful and friendly nation.⁷²⁸ The Cossack spirit is relevant in this case only for the defence function of the nation. On the other hand, the Cossack spirit also defines important socio-political order related elements. Cossack society is a **free society** that is governed by **democratic principles** and where the **equality principle** is the main criterion in determining of social structure. Therefore the democratic regime of the Ukrainian state is mediated mainly by the Cossack society. However, the roots of the democratic principles in the Ukrainian society reach back to the ancient Slavic tribes.⁷²⁹ The Cossack spirit has been also used to explain the difference between Ukrainians and Russians. Ukrainians are presented as more rebellious and freedom loving while Russians were more accepting of the existing social exploitation in the society.⁷³⁰ It is notable that Ukrainian scholars underlined the difference of social order between Russians and Ukrainians where the former were defined as an autocratic nation and the latter as a democratic nation due to the development of their national histories.⁷³¹ The third important aspect is equality in the Cossack society where the social hierarchy was based more on merit than inherited positions. Therefore also the Ukrainian statehood has traces of these characteristics. Already the first Ukrainian Constitution from the beginning of the 18th century included these elements.⁷³² The attempts to establish the independent state of Ukraine in the beginning of the 20th century also was based on democratic and egalitarian principles and therefore the socialist ideology was acceptable among many Ukrainians, though it does not mean that they approved the domination of the Bolsheviks who are represented as the alien or Russian colonialist Socialism.⁷³³ The new Ukrainian state is defined strongly by the national master narrative as a democratic state that has the roots in the national past.⁷³⁴ Therefore the Ukrainian national narrative derives from the Cossack past of Ukraine the important elements of current socio-political order – egalitarian democracy.

The socio-economic elements of the identity markers are related mainly to the **agricultural nature of society**. The Ukrainian master narrative praises the fertile black soil of Ukraine that has defined agriculture as the main activity for Ukrainian society since the beginning.⁷³⁵ It also has given Ukraine the name of

⁷²⁸ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 399

⁷²⁹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 60

⁷³⁰ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 69

⁷³¹ N. Kostromarov in his lectures in the middle of the 19th century, Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 68

⁷³² Vlasov, 2002, p. 235; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 70

⁷³³ Turchenko, 2004, p. 55, p. 114, p. 179

⁷³⁴ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 324–327

⁷³⁵ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 17

European or Russian breadbasket.⁷³⁶ According to the national master narrative, Ukrainians are mainly connected to husbandry not to the nomadic pasturing nations that also have settled on the Ukrainian lands.⁷³⁷ The national master narrative also underlines that agriculture has been the main field of activity for the Ukrainians and even on their national territory they were the ones who were dealing with this field and other economic fields were for other nations.⁷³⁸ In this respect also one of the main differences between Ukrainians and Russians is defined where the former rather preferred to emigrate from the Ukrainian lands to continue with agriculture but Russians were easily leaving from their villages and moved to the cities to work in the industries.⁷³⁹ Another important difference between Ukrainians and Russians is related to landownership – Russians prefer more collective ownership when Ukrainians prefer **family farm-based ownership**.⁷⁴⁰ Therefore the forced industrialisation and collectivisation during the Soviet Era are also depicted as an anomaly targeted against the Ukrainian nation who suffered a lot due to the unbalanced development of economy. However, the new image of Ukraine is based more on the **industrial state** than an agricultural state where agriculture has still important role.⁷⁴¹ By glorifying the industrial strength of Ukraine the master narrative underlines also the irreversibility of the changes that were made during the Soviet period.

The last identity marker analysed in this chapter is the **chronotope of Ukraine**. Ukrainian territories are firstly defined by the national master narrative since Kievan Rus times: Kyiv, Pereyaslav, Chernigiv-Seversky, Volhynia, Podolia, Eastern Galicia, Transcarpathia, and Northern Bukovina.⁷⁴² These territories are defined as the centre of development of Ukrainian culture and therefore also as the Ukrainians' historical homeland. The Cossack Hetmanate included three Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth voivodeships: Kyiv, Chernigiv and Bratslav.⁷⁴³ This territory was smaller than the historical Ukrainian homeland and the Western Ukrainian territories were under Polish domination. At the same time Ukrainian settlements moved also more to the East where Sloboda Ukraine was established that includes current Kharkiv, Sumy, Luhansk, Northern Donetsk regions of Ukraine and also partly

⁷³⁶ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 180, p. 297; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 96–97

⁷³⁷ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 14, p. 18, p. 22, p. 41

⁷³⁸ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 41, p. 132; Vlasov, 2002, p. 202, p. 209; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 82, pp. 165–166, p. 190, p. 306, p. 388

⁷³⁹ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 179, p. 358

⁷⁴⁰ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 145; Vlasov, 2002, p. 210; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 145, p. 177; especially the private ownership is underlined during the Stolypin's (*Ibid*, p. 356, p. 409) land reform and Soviets' Collectivisation (Turchenko, 2004, p. 44, p. 100, p. 157, p. 251).

⁷⁴¹ Turchenko, 2004, p. 283, p. 350

⁷⁴² Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 141, p. 183

⁷⁴³ Vlasov, 2002, p. 163

Voronezh, Kursk and Belgorod regions of contemporary Russia.⁷⁴⁴ Since the 19th century the Ukrainian territories were divided between Austria and Russia: the latter controlled Right Bank (Kyiv, Podolia, Volhynia) and Left Bank of Dnieper and Sloboda Ukraine (Chernigiv, Poltava, Luhansk), and Novorossiia (Southern Ukraine: Yekaterinoslavl, Kherson, Tauria); Austria dominated in Bukovina, Galicia and Transcarpathia (after the formation of Austrian-Hungarian Empire it became part of Hungary).⁷⁴⁵ Therefore the unification of Ukrainian lands has been also an important part of the master narrative. The Southern territories of Ukraine (Novorossiia) are defined as historical Ukrainian territory that was emptied during the Crimean Khanate and the settling of Ukrainians on these territories is defined as the restoration of Ukrainian settlements in South.⁷⁴⁶ The Crimean peninsula itself is defined as a historically connected territory and the Slavic population there is marked since the 3rd century.⁷⁴⁷ However, it is not defined as part of the Ukrainian national homeland. The Ukrainian master narrative explains the expansion of the Ukrainian territory and the majority of the expanded lands were unsettled, therefore Ukrainians are considered as the first settlers of these territories that also facilitates the connection of these lands to the Ukrainian chronotope. It is also broader than its contemporary borders, mainly including territories in current Poland and Russia. However, no direct claims for these territories are presented in the national master narrative. At the same time, the maps presented in the history textbooks (since the 19th century) include two borders: current Ukrainian borders and Ukrainian ethnic borders.⁷⁴⁸ And the latter is always broader than the first one.

The Ukraine master narrative mainly avoids underlining Ukraine's belonging to some bigger unit. There are two main options that are sometimes used in defining Ukraine's location in the broader context. Defining Ukraine as belonging to Europe and under Russian influence is equally mentioned, however, the narrative rather underlines the Ukrainian cultural and economic connection with Europe and Russia is presented mainly in the cases when Ukrainian developments are compared with the rest of Russian/Soviet Empire. The maps that are used in the analysed textbooks mainly focus on Ukraine and Ukraine is not very often shown as a part of some bigger unit.⁷⁴⁹ Therefore Ukraine is mainly focused on the showing its original location and its national

⁷⁴⁴ Vlasov, 2002, p. 203

⁷⁴⁵ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 5–6

⁷⁴⁶ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 127

⁷⁴⁷ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, pp. 56–57

⁷⁴⁸ In the three history textbooks were 18 maps, 12 of them had marked these two borders

⁷⁴⁹ Only three maps show Ukraine belonging in some bigger unit, two of them as part of Russian Empire (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 41, p. 178) and one map shows Ukraine divided between the Austrian and the Russian Empires (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 157)

territory. It can be also explained that Ukraine is a big country and therefore it can present itself as the separate unit, which belongs to Europe.

The Ukrainian narrative of origin combines the history of the territory with the history of the ethnicity. The Ukrainian nation is defined as the combination of different nations settled on the Ukrainian territories during the ancient times. However, the dominant core of the Ukrainian nation is Slavic origin Ukrainians. The narrative of origin constructs understanding that Ukrainians have through the centuries tried to establish their unified nation-state and the idea of the national liberation and unification is carried by different social groups that have changed through history: from the Ukrainian princes to Cossacks, from Cossack nobility to Ukrainian intellectuals, from intellectuals to the political movement, etc. Therefore the roots of Ukrainian statehood reach back to Kievan Rus and Ukrainians are the immediate successor of this state. This claim challenges the Russian narrative of origin and therefore the Ukrainian master narrative also defines its arguments to support the concept of 'Kievan Rus is Ukrainian Rus'. The master narrative defines the Ukrainian national identity markers where the most important ones are related to the Ukrainian culture (language, education, religion) but also the Cossack spirit and strong focus on agriculture. The Ukrainian chronotope is larger than the Ukrainian current territory and it is mainly defined by the ethnic borders.

3.2. Character of the Ukrainian Narrative and its Schematic Templates

In this section I analyse the Ukrainian master narrative related to Russians. Poland/Poles as a second significant other are left out of the focus of the analysis. As it was already mentioned in the previous section the Ukrainian master narrative tries to define Ukrainians as a separate nation from Russians. Therefore also its character is to a larger extent dissimilative, only 26% of the assessed text elements expressed the assimilative understanding with Russia(ns) (See Chart 3.1.). The Ukrainian master narrative often uses comparisons with Russia and mostly the elements that show the Ukrainian vantage is presented by the assimilative elements. Dissimilative elements are mainly mediating the understanding that Russia is different from Ukraine. It is mainly related to the aim of the Ukrainian master narrative to construct a separate and strong Ukrainian national identity.




Chart 3.1. Character of the Ukrainian Narrative

Assimilative elements of Ukrainian master narratives can be divided into four groups: political, administrative, economic and cultural connections with Russia/Russians (See Chart 3.2.). Most of the assimilative elements are related to the political connection between Ukraine and Russia. First, Russia is seen as the important counterpart to Polish domination. It is related to the earlier period when the Ukrainian nobility was looking for support from Muscovite Czardom⁷⁵⁰ as well as to the Western Ukrainian lands where in the beginning a pro-Moscow approach was dominating among the national movement and Russia was seen as the liberator of Slavic nations⁷⁵¹. These aspects are supported by the cultural elements that have an assimilative character.⁷⁵² Another aspect of assimilative political elements is related to Ukrainian statehood. First, the process of gradual annexation of Ukrainian lands includes the assimilative elements that show that Ukraine became a part of Russian Empire⁷⁵³ and thereafter the gradual development of declaring Ukrainian independence where in the beginning the dominating approach supported the autonomy of Ukraine in the framework of democratic and federative Russia⁷⁵⁴. In addition, some political connectivity is also expressed by the demonstrating

⁷⁵⁰ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, pp. 169–170, p. 174; Vlasov, 2002, pp. 59–61, p. 132

⁷⁵¹ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 224, p. 237, p. 328

⁷⁵² Same religion (Vlasov, 2002, p. 146), cultural proximity (Turchenko, Morko, 2002, p. 284)

⁷⁵³ Vlasov, 2002, p. 148, p. 151, p. 168, pp. 172–173, p. 180, p. 182, p. 186, p. 188, pp. 215–216

⁷⁵⁴ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 302, pp. 306–308, p. 370, p. 407; Turchenko, 2004, p. 43, p. 50, p. 57, p. 61, p. 63

the cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian political movements and Russian political activists organisations in Ukraine.⁷⁵⁵




Chart 3.2. Assimilative Elements in the Ukrainian Narrative

Ukrainian administrative connection with Russia is mediating that Ukrainian lands were part of Russian empire. First, it tells directly about the incorporation of Ukrainian territories by the Muscovy/Russian Empire.⁷⁵⁶ But administrative connectivity is also mediated by showing the impact of Russian reforms and internal developments on Ukraine.⁷⁵⁷ By these reforms also the cultural connection was constructed between Ukraine and Russia.⁷⁵⁸ In addition, this category includes elements, which compare Ukrainian developments with the rest of Russia and underlines Ukrainian advantages.⁷⁵⁹ This aspect is also presented where the economic connectivity⁷⁶⁰ as well as the cultural connectivity⁷⁶¹ between Ukraine and Russia is mediated. On the other hand,

⁷⁵⁵ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 197, p. 217, p. 347, p. 351, p. 371; Turchenko, 2004, p. 44

⁷⁵⁶ Vlasov, 2002, p. 175, p. 240; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 5–6, p. 12, p. 47, p. 127; Turchenko, 2004, p. 6, p. 41

⁷⁵⁷ Russian/Soviet reforms (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 142, p. 149, p. 357; Turchenko, 2004, p. 152, p. 259, p. 305, p. 316), Russian revolution (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 333, p. 340, p. 344, p. 347; Turchenko, 2004, p. 35, p. 52); involvement in the Great Patriotic War (Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 13, p. 15, p. 35, p. 61, p. 63)

⁷⁵⁸ Turchenko, 2004, p. 257, p. 260, Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 182, pp. 377–378

⁷⁵⁹ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 206, p. 333, Turchenko, 2004, p. 243

⁷⁶⁰ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 35, p. 159, p. 168, p. 175; Turchenko, 2004, p. 226, pp. 270–271, p. 288; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 152, p. 312, p. 397

⁷⁶¹ Turchenko, 2004, p. 318; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 113

economic connectivity is also demonstrated by the infrastructural and active economic relations between Ukraine and Russia.⁷⁶² Some elements construct the understanding that Ukraine was a part of the Russian economy.⁷⁶³ By these elements Ukraine is presented as part of Russian Empire/Soviet Union and demonstrates its natural position in this structure. However, the cultural elements are the least assimilative because Ukrainian culture is one key identity marker that constructs the difference between Russians and Ukrainians.

Dissimilative elements in the Ukrainian master narrative are implicit that show Ukrainian connection with other regions/states or explicit that show Russia as a separate or different actor. The latter ones are dominating, showing Ukrainian and Russian political distance, reluctance to cooperate or resistance to Russian domination. Cultural difference with Russia and as well as Russia as the other and different in comparison with Ukraine is presented in the master narrative (See Chart 3.3.).




Chart 3.3. Dissimilative Elements in the Ukrainian Narrative

The most dominant dissimilative elements in the Ukrainian master narrative construct the understanding that Ukraine is a politically separate actor. These elements explain that Ukraine is the direct successor of Kievan Rus and it is

⁷⁶² Vlasov, 2002, p. 133, p. 210; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 161, p. 163, p. 187, p. 167

⁷⁶³ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 40, p. 75, p. 135, p. 152, p. 168, p. 172, p. 282, p. 332; Turchenko, 2004, p. 7, p. 248, p. 238; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 3, p. 91, p. 245

more connected with its heritage than Russia.⁷⁶⁴ However, the majority of these elements narrate about the Ukrainian independence struggle and they show how the idea of Ukrainian independence was carried and supported by Ukrainian national leaders and the Ukrainian nation. A significant part of these elements show the alliance agreement between Ukraine and Russia as a treaty between equal sovereign actors and the reluctance of Ukrainian leaders to accept the changes that started to eliminate the independence of Ukraine.⁷⁶⁵ Combined with the resistance arguments⁷⁶⁶, the national master narrative underlines that Ukrainians have not happily agreed with Muscovite Czarism but it was rather out of necessity and the latter used the difficult situation of Ukraine to impose its will on Ukraine. Another significant part of these elements show the development of Ukrainian national idea during the 19th century⁷⁶⁷ and the Ukrainian national elite's fight for Ukrainian independence at the end of the First World War till the early 1920s.⁷⁶⁸ It is noteworthy that partly Ukraine is presented as independent actor also during the period when Ukrainian nation was not unified and it was subjugated to the other nations.⁷⁶⁹ This focus is related to the national master narrative that is mediating the history of the nation instead of political institutions. The Ukrainian master narrative also deals with the complex issue of the Ukrainian internal struggle and by the dissimilative elements it is underlined that even though internal unity in Ukraine was missing, most of the political forces did not support the subjugation by Russia or any other external dominant power.⁷⁷⁰ Ukrainians' will to have their independent nation-state and the process of its formation have an important role among political dissimilative elements.⁷⁷¹ Particularly important are statements that underline Russian recognition of Ukrainian independence.⁷⁷² Therefore

⁷⁶⁴ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 96, p. 128, p. 153

⁷⁶⁵ Vlasov, 2002, p. 145, pp. 147–150, p. 161, p. 165, p. 168, p. 171, p. 180, p. 207, p. 235, p. 238, p. 244, p. 256

⁷⁶⁶ Ukrainian Cossacks fought against Muscovites, Vlasov, 2002, p. 28, p. 46, pp. 166–167, p. 179, p. 198, pp. 224–226, p. 229, p. 231, p. 241; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 53

⁷⁶⁷ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 52, p. 90, p. 137, p. 210, pp. 213–214, p. 229, p. 231, p. 236, p. 238, pp. 241–242, pp. 283–284, p. 303, p. 306, p. 308, p. 320, p. 331, p. 341, pp. 351–352, p. 408

⁷⁶⁸ Turchenko, 2004, p. 30, p. 49, p. 52, p. 58, p. 60, p. 62, p. 66, p. 85, p. 95, pp. 108–109

⁷⁶⁹ Vlasov, 2002, p. 135; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 10, p. 18, p. 23, p. 60, p. 178, p. 291; Turchenko, 2004, p. 14, p. 19, p. 30, p. 104; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 9, pp. 120–121

⁷⁷⁰ Turchenko, 2004, p. 115, pp. 123–125, p. 129, p. 220, p. 222

⁷⁷¹ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 3, pp. 28–31, pp. 46–49, pp. 76–77, p. 80, p. 172, pp. 212–213, p. 233, p. 254, p. 270, p. 273, pp. 276–277, pp. 282–283, pp. 285–286, p. 289; pp. 300–301, p. 328; pp. 385–386, p. 394

⁷⁷² Turchenko, 2004, p. 110, p. 114, p. 196; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 290, pp. 385–386

these dissimilative elements mediate that Ukraine has been and should be an independent state as it is today.

The other group of dissimilative elements mediate the understanding that Russians are different from Ukrainians. It is related to the Ukrainian process of forming a different identity from Russians and to show that Ukrainians are a different nation.⁷⁷³ These dissimilative elements also underline different interests that Russians and Ukrainians have had through history and how it has constructed quarrels between these two nations.⁷⁷⁴ Therefore Russia is shown as a colonial power in Ukraine and it tries to exploit and assimilate Ukrainian lands.⁷⁷⁵ These elements are used to show that Ukrainians have had different experiences than Russians and they have behaved differently and, therefore they should be considered as different nations.⁷⁷⁶ In other words, this group of dissimilative elements reject the earlier dominant understanding that Ukrainians and Russians are the same nation and therefore they should belong to the same polity. They support the previous group of dissimilative elements that show that Ukraine has been a separate political actor and this group adds the argumentation why Ukraine should be independent and why it should not to be together with Russia.

Ukrainian culture is one of the most important identity markers and therefore also it is used to underline the cultural difference between Ukrainians and Russians. The arguments show that Ukrainian culture was the direct successor of the Kievan Rus culture that in interaction with European culture developed by different path than Russian culture.⁷⁷⁷ Therefore the national master narrative also shows that the Ukrainian cultural elite tried to maintain their national

⁷⁷³ Arguments related to the Medieval Rus (e.g. Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 139, p. 160, p. 183; Vlasov, 2002, p. 83) and arguments in the 19th century national awakening process (e.g. Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 199, p. 206, pp. 210–211, pp. 224–225, p. 286, p. 365; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 38–39, p. 352); Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 362

⁷⁷⁴ Independence vs domination (e.g. Vlasov, 2002, p. 70, p. 135, p. 147, p. 162, p. 168, p. 207; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 18–21, p. 51, p. 229, p. 341; Turchenko, 2004, p. 19), economic interests (e.g. Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 35, p. 139, p. 163, p. 296; Turchenko, 2004, p. 247), socio-political movements (e.g. Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 59 p. 66, p. 197, pp. 301–302, pp. 332–333; Turchenko, 2004, p. 29, p. 46, p. 56, p. 77)

⁷⁷⁵ Assimilative policies (e.g. Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 7, p. 74, p. 153; Turchenko, 2004, p. 7, p. 297; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 81, p. 200) and exploitation of Ukraine (e.g. Vlasov, 2002, p. 241; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 39, p. 138, p. 156, p. 160, p. 167, p. 291, p. 334; Turchenko, 2004, p. 104, p. 243; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 101–102; p. 129; p. 163)

⁷⁷⁶ Vlasov, 2002, p. 89; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 135, p. 149, p. 167, p. 299, p. 332, p. 356, p. 358, p. 407; Turchenko, 2004, p. 19, p. 71, p. 75, p. 287, p. 324; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 143; p. 177, p. 237, p. 250, p. 265; Turchenko, 2004, p. 255, p. 262

⁷⁷⁷ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 52, p. 152; Vlasov, p. 267, p. 277; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 66, p. 114, p. 165, p. 179, p. 218, p. 253, pp. 380–381, p. 390; Turchenko, 2004, p. 262

uniqueness and develop its particular national culture.⁷⁷⁸ On the other hand, Ukrainian cultural activities led to demands that were suppressed by Russian authorities and created more resistance among Ukrainians.⁷⁷⁹ Here the development of an independent Ukrainian Church and its attempts to resist the domination of the Moscow Patriarchy has an important role.⁷⁸⁰ Thereby the master narrative constructs the understanding that the independent Ukrainian Church tried to preserve the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture and to avoid Russian culture domination that was established when the church lost its independence.⁷⁸¹ The above described dissimilative elements also mediate the resistance to Russian domination as the natural consequence of Russian assimilative and exploitative policies towards Ukraine that denies Ukrainian national existence.⁷⁸²

The implicit dissimilative elements of the Ukrainian master narrative are the least used. They usually show that Ukrainians belonged to another polity than Russians and therefore they also have different historical experiences. Mainly the difference between Ukrainians and Russians is mediated by the Polish-Lithuanian state.⁷⁸³ Russians are hardly mentioned in the context of Kievan Rus, only when it is explained why Ukrainians have a stronger connection with Kievan Rus than Russians do. Another and most significant group of implicit dissimilative elements construct the understanding that Ukrainians are part of Europe. The cultural connection with Europe is mainly underlined in the period of the Russian Empire, the political connection before the Russian domination and after declaration of independence in 1991, but Ukraine as a part of the European economy is presented through all Ukrainian history.⁷⁸⁴ These

⁷⁷⁸ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 54, p. 68, p. 70, pp. 196–197, p. 211, p. 228, p. 347, p. 371; Turchenko, 2004, p. 160, pp. 164–165, pp. 169–170, pp. 179–180; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 221, p. 225, pp. 366–367, p. 399

⁷⁷⁹ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 44, p. 46,

⁷⁸⁰ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 189; Vlasov, 2002, p. 168, p. 237; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 215–217, p. 264; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 70, pp. 368–369

⁷⁸¹ Vlasov, 2002, p. 208, p. 211

⁷⁸² Against the Russian Czarist government and Russian White Generals (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 76, p. 145, p. 335, p. 406; Turchenko, 2004, p. 29, p. 81, pp. 170–171), against the Bolsheviks (Turchenko, 2004, p. 101, pp. 154–155, p. 161, p. 192, p. 227, pp. 230–231, p. 238, p. 266, p. 291) and Soviet regime (Turchenko, 2004, p. 239, p. 271, p. 341, p. 348; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 26, p. 55, pp. 58–59, p. 81, pp. 105–107, p. 171, p. 279, p. 289)

⁷⁸³ Vlasov, 2002, p. 28, p. 46, p. 163, p. 169

⁷⁸⁴ Politically (e.g. Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, pp. 53–54, pp. 154–155; Vlasov, 2002, p. 70, p. 233; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 407; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 76, p. 354, p. 356, pp. 386–387, p. 391), culturally (e.g. Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 128, p. 151, p. 185, Vlasov, 2002, p. 64, p. 73, p. 101, pp. 106–107; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 62, p. 66, p. 121, p. 130, p. 275), economically (e.g. Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 133, p. 156; Vlasov, 2002, p. 210, p. 245; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 32, p. 40, p. 160, p. 180; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 277–278, pp. 282–283; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 90–91, p. 151, p. 343, p. 353)

elements facilitate the argumentation that Ukraine and Russia are different culturally, politically and socially and therefore the Ukrainian nation has the right to national self-determination that it finally achieved in 1991.

Schematic narrative templates are used to mediate particular events in the national history. These elements are used to arrange different events by the same narrative tools and they create the understanding of historical repetition to underline a particular fate of the nation. In the case of Ukraine it is possible to present four schematic narrative templates: Immortal Idea of National Liberation, Fatality of Internal Conflicts, Exploitation and Discrimination of Ukrainians, and Famine as the Policy against Ukrainians. The first of these has clearly a glorifying meaning and the three others have a strong victimising character.

The schematic narrative template **Immortal Idea of National Liberation** is related to the main concept of Ukrainian statehood and Ukrainians' struggle for national independence.

1. Initial situation: Ukrainian state is weakening and it is conquered by external power;
2. Ukrainian national elite resists the external power till their resources to resist will end;
3. A new social group will arise in the Ukrainian society that will resist external domination;
4. This fight will move the Ukrainian liberation movement to a new stage.

This narrative template expresses the strong will of Ukrainians to live in an independent state and it is supporting the general national narrative from the first loss of independence till the current Ukrainian statehood. Kievan Rus was conquered by Mongols and later Lithuanians and the Ukrainian nobility resisted till the beginning of 16th century.⁷⁸⁵ Their role as leaders of national liberation was taken by Cossacks who fought for independent Ukraine and achieved the independent Cossack Hetmanate. However, it was soon divided by Poland and Russia and the Cossack nobility continued their fight till the end of 18th century where they were assimilated by the Russian nobility. Before the assimilation they gave a basis for the national cultural liberation movement that included people from different social classes.⁷⁸⁶ The national cultural elite was working to create a national awakening among Ukrainians and to work with the educational-cultural field but due to suppression by the dominating powers the cultural struggle was not sufficient and it moved to the political demands by the end of the 19th century.⁷⁸⁷ The national political elite managed to establish a Ukrainian independent state but it was liquidated by the Bolsheviks and Poland and a new organisation was established in Western Ukraine that started to fight for the national independence.⁷⁸⁸ After the Soviet Union annexed the Western

⁷⁸⁵ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 170

⁷⁸⁶ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 77

⁷⁸⁷ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 309

⁷⁸⁸ Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, Turchenko, 2004, p. 342

Ukraine the UPA, based on the Western Ukrainian nationalist organisation, carried on the Ukrainian liberation fight till it was suppressed in the middle of 1950s.⁷⁸⁹ Ukrainian dissident movements continued the struggle until the beginning of 1980s. With the policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the USSR the masses of the Ukrainian society continued the Ukrainian liberation struggle that culminated with the current independent Ukrainian nation-state.⁷⁹⁰ The use of this schematic narrative template constructs the understanding that Ukrainians have always stood for their national independence and in Ukraine there are always some social groups who take the leading position in this fight that leads to the final goal – national independence.

All the other schematic narrative templates are victimising. The narrative template **Fatality of Internal Conflicts** underlines the importance of unity among the national elite.

1. Initial situation: Ukrainians are dominated by some external power but there is strong national resistance;
2. Ukrainian national resistance movement achieves success and Ukraine is liberated from external domination;
3. Strong disagreement about the further developments of the country occurs among the national forces and this disunity of Ukrainians is supported by external intervention;
4. Ukrainian national forces start to fight against each other, thereby weakening the country and the external power conquers the Ukrainian lands.

This narrative template mediates an important lesson for the further generations that too strong internal conflicts will lead to the loss of national independence. Partly this schematic narrative template is also related to the end of the Kievan Rus and Halych-Volhynia where the internal fights between the principalities and nobility lead to the easy conquest by Mongols or Poles, Lithuanians. However, it is more related to the Cossack Hetmanate that managed to liberate itself from Polish domination but due to the internal fights it was finally divided and lost its independence. The same pattern is used to mediate the events in 1917–1921 when the national political elite managed to declare independence but due to internal conflicts it was conquered and divided by the Bolsheviks and Poland. In the case of the liberation fight during the Second World War the Ukrainian Nationalist Organisation and UPA managed to overcome the internal conflicts and to form internal unity. A similar solution is related to the current Ukrainian state where according to the master narrative after the independence mainly the Communist Party tried to create internal turbulence and hinder the state-building process and socio-economic reforms. However, also in this case by the new constitution the internal stability was achieved.⁷⁹¹

⁷⁸⁹ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 77

⁷⁹⁰ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 229

⁷⁹¹ The analysed textbook by Turchenko, Panchenko, and Timchenko is published in 2001 and therefore it tries to show also Ukrainian President L. Kuchma as rather positive actor.

The third schematic narrative template, **Exploitation and Discrimination of Ukrainians** is related to the domination of external power over Ukrainian lands.

1. Ukrainians are conquered by a new dominant power;
2. The new dominant power treats Ukraine as its colony and therefore exploitation and discrimination of Ukrainians is implemented in political, economic, and cultural spheres;
3. Ukrainians try to resist the exploitation and discrimination but they are weakened by the colonialist policies and they fail;
4. The dominant power enjoys benefits from Ukraine and aims at the assimilation of Ukrainians.

This schematic narrative template shows the result of the loss of Ukrainian national independence and it underlines that any external power is not facilitating Ukrainian national development. External powers only use Ukrainian lands and people for their selfish benefit and at the same time also deny for Ukrainians any of their national rights. This schematic narrative template is used partly about the Mongol yoke that started in the 13th century. However, it is mostly focused on the modern period. By the Union of Lublin in 1569 Poland established its control over Ukrainian lands and it started active policies of Polonisation and economic exploitation of Ukraine. During the second half of the 17th century Russia started to gradually eliminate Ukrainian independence that culminated in 1764 with the liquidation of the Ukrainian Hetmanate and it started active Russification and economic exploitation of Ukrainian lands. Austrian rule in Western Ukraine is shown as economically exploitative but culturally not so suppressive. However, Ukrainians are discriminated by the local elite, Poles, Romanians and Hungarians, and the Austrian government is not protecting Ukrainians. A similar pattern is used to show the Soviet regime in Ukraine and Western Ukrainian lands under Polish, Romanian and Czechoslovakian control. All the dominant nations, to a larger or smaller extent, exploited Ukrainians who were culturally and politically discriminated. The Second World War when the Nazi occupation was established is shown as the most brutal regime that tried to eradicate the Ukrainian nation. Therefore this schematic narrative template mediates the threats that Ukrainian nation will have if they do not manage to maintain their national independence.

The fourth schematic narrative template, **Famine as the Policy against Ukrainians** is related to the first half of the 20th century and mainly to the policies of the Soviet regime.

1. Initial situation: There is poor harvest in Ukraine and there are difficulties to survive the winter;
2. The dominant power is using exploitative policies towards Ukraine and it takes even the last harvest from the Ukrainian peasants to sell it abroad to increase the income of dominating power;
3. The dominant power takes all from Ukraine and it does not give any assistance, which leads to massive famine in Ukraine;

4. Millions of people die due to the famine and thereby dominant power manages to weaken resistance among Ukrainians.

This schematic narrative template is mediating the most brutal examples of exploitation of Ukrainians. During the first half of the 20th century Ukrainian lands experienced four times massive famine: 1902–1903, 1921–1923, 1932–1933 (*Holodomor*), 1946–1947.⁷⁹² The famine in the beginning of the 20th century is fitting to the pattern the least and it is shown more as a careless exploitation of Ukraine but the three following famines that were implemented by the Soviet regime is defined as a policy targeted against the Ukrainian nation and especially the *Holodomor* as the genocide of the Ukrainian nation. These three famines also destroyed the resistance of Ukrainian peasants to the Soviet reforms and it opened the country for further exploitations. This schematic narrative template mediates the most victimised historical events in the Ukrainian national past.

The character of the Ukrainian national master narrative is mainly dissimilative and it tries to show that Ukrainian nation is different from Russians, especially underlining the different historical developments of these two nations. Thereby it also constructs the understanding that Ukrainians have the full right and even necessity to have an independent nation-state. The Ukrainian master narrative uses the assimilative elements mainly to show Russia as an ally for a stronger enemy or to show the Ukrainian vantage in comparison with the rest of Russian territories. Dissimilative elements underline the resistance of Ukrainians to the Russian domination and they also mediate that Russia has used all possible methods to eradicate the understanding of Ukrainians as an independent nation. However, it is assessed as unsuccessful policy and the existing nation-state is presented as the verification for that. The Ukrainian master narrative includes mainly victimising schematic narrative templates where only one has a glorifying function and it shows the immortal spirit of national liberation. The others show the difficulties to establish internal stability in Ukraine and that instability will lead to the liquidation of the independence. As well, the schematic narrative templates mediate the domination of external powers in Ukraine by the underlining the most tragic events in the beginning of the 20th century. Thereby the schematic narrative templates also include dissimilative character.

3.3. Images of Self and Other in the Ukrainian Master Narrative

In this section I analyse the Ukrainian self-image and Russia(ns) are taken as the significant other. The Ukrainian master narrative has also Poland/Poles as significant others but this analysis will focus only on the Ukrainian and Russian

⁷⁹² Respectively: Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 297; Turchenko, 2002, pp. 232–233; *Ibid*, p. 294–298; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 93–96

images in the Ukrainian master narrative. The Ukrainian master narrative dominates by the positive self-image, which is covering 2/3 of the analysed narrative elements (See Chart 3.4.). Negative self-image is relatively small, not reaching even to the 10% of the analysed narrative elements. The Russian image is the opposite, mainly mediated by the negative elements and positive elements are very marginal. Neutral elements about Russian other and Ukrainian self are also very marginal.



Chart 3.4. Images of Self and Other in the Ukrainian Narrative




Chart 3.5. Narrative Elements about the Ukrainian Self-Image

The Ukrainian master narrative includes mainly positive elements of self-image. The biggest share of these images is related to glorifying elements that cover over 50% of all elements but also victimising elements of self-image have a

significant role in the Ukrainian master narrative by covering slightly fewer than 40% of self-image elements. In total, positive elements of self-image cover almost 90% of self-image elements. Negative self-image is relatively marginal covering only 1/10 of the assessed self-image elements (See Chart 3.5.).

The Ukrainian master narrative glorifies all main fields of Ukrainian life: political, economic, military, and cultural. The dominating part of glorification is political successes but also cultural heritage of Ukrainians is highly praised. In the same extent the military victories and successful military operations are underlined. To a smaller extent the Ukrainian economic development is presented. The master narrative also shows the Ukrainian nation as a significant or successful nation in comparison with other nations. In addition, close to the victimisation elements, the Ukrainian master narrative also underlines the Ukrainians' success to survive in difficult conditions (See Chart 3.6.).




Chart 3.6. Glorifying Elements about the Ukrainian Self-Image

Political successes of Ukrainians that are mediated by the glorifying elements underline the Ukrainian importance in the international level and its heydays of independent statehood, which is mainly related to Kievan Rus.⁷⁹³ Political success stories include also two most important aspects of the Ukrainian

⁷⁹³ International importance and heyday of Kievan Rus (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 52, p. 63, pp. 69–73, p. 79, pp. 82–83, pp. 85–87, p. 96, p. 99, pp. 154–155); international importance and heyday of Halych-Volhynia (*Ibid.*, p. 102, p. 109, p. 111, pp. 121–124); Cossacks (Vlasov, 2002, p. 47, p. 127, pp. 134–136, pp. 154–156, pp. 160–161, p. 195, p. 199, p. 226, p. 233, p. 241; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 52); Ukraine in 20th century (Turchenko, 2004, p. 30, pp. 109–110; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 79, p. 82, pp. 385–387, pp. 389–392)

narrative of origin – unification of Ukrainians⁷⁹⁴ and successful national liberation movement⁷⁹⁵ that culminates with the declaration of independent Ukraine⁷⁹⁶. Related to the previous aspect also successful reforms and state-building or achievements in the national liberation struggle (e.g. education in Ukrainian, broader use of Ukrainian language) are glorified as political success in the Ukrainian master narrative.⁷⁹⁷ A special place in the political success stories is for the Ukrainian Church that together with the rest of the society has fought for independence and denied the subjugation to external powers.⁷⁹⁸ Also Ukrainian Cossacks as a particular part of Ukrainian national identity are glorified and they can be defined as outstanding example of the Ukrainian national liberation movement.⁷⁹⁹

⁷⁹⁴ Kievan Rus (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 74); Cossacks (Vlasov, 2002, pp. 178–179, p. 181, p. 185, p. 217, p. 221); unification of Ukrainian political forces (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 303, p. 341; Turchenko, 2004, p. 13, p. 39, pp. 50–51, pp. 141–142, p. 144; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 84, p. 260)

⁷⁹⁵ Maintenance of state institutions under Lithuanian domination, (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 164, p. 167; Vlasov, 2002, p. 8); resistance to the Polish domination (Vlasov, 2002, p. 10, pp. 113–114, p. 117; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 97–99, p. 104, pp. 249–250, pp. 320–321, pp. 328–329; Turchenko, 2004, p. 333, p. 340); resistance to the Russian domination (Vlasov, 2002, p. 231, p. 238, pp. 248–249, p. 253; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 55, pp. 61–62, pp. 210–212, p. 303, p. 335); national awakening and national political movements (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 54, pp. 66–67, p. 70, p. 77, pp. 92–94, p. 200, p. 203, p. 206, p. 210, pp. 213–214, pp. 225–226, p. 228, p. 230, pp. 236–237, p. 287, p. 297, p. 317, pp. 371–372; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 201–202, p. 342; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 254–255, p. 259, p. 274, p. 279, pp. 366–368); resistance to Bolsheviks and Soviet regime (Turchenko, 2004, p. 86, p. 132, p. 138, p. 179, p. 182; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 164–165, pp. 206–210)

⁷⁹⁶ Formation of Cossack Hetmanate (Vlasov, 2002, p. 137); demands and declaration for autonomy or independence of Ukrainian (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 241–242, p. 284, pp. 302–303, pp. 323–324, p. 341, p. 352, Turchenko, 2004, pp. 48–49, p. 57, p. 76, p. 77, p. 95, pp. 143–144, p. 218, pp. 357–358; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 3, pp. 28–29, pp. 46–47, pp. 276–277, pp. 285–286, pp. 288–290, p. 321)

⁷⁹⁷ Successful reforms in Kievan Rus (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 82); Cossack Hetmanate (Vlasov, 2002, p. 206, p. 210, p. 235, p. 237); education in Ukrainian (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 206, p. 236, p. 252, p. 257, p. 322, pp. 347–348, p. 351, p. 379); reforms of Ukrainian Central Rada (Turchenko, 2004, p. 80, pp. 120–121, pp. 204–205); Reforms during Soviet Era (Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 143, pp. 179–180, p. 256); reforms of current Ukraine (Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 301, pp. 307–308, p. 318, p. 324, p. 333, p. 362)

⁷⁹⁸ Importance of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine (Vlasov, 2002, p. 8); the role of Church in the independence fight in the 17th century (*Ibid*, pp. 46–47, pp. 70–72, pp. 74–78, p. 81, p. 123); Greek-Catholic Church in national movement (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 91, p. 329, p. 399; Turchenko, 2004, p. 337; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 211), Ukrainian Autocephaly Orthodox Church (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 397; Turchenko, 2004, p. 264, p. 258)

⁷⁹⁹ Vlasov, 2002, pp. 18–19, p. 25, p. 31; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 129

Ukrainian national culture is an important national identity marker and it is the second most glorified part of Ukrainian national past. The master narrative glorifies the high level of Ukrainian culture and underlines its uniqueness.⁸⁰⁰ Already by defining the Ukrainian identity markers the importance of Ukrainian language and its education was mentioned. The positive self-image is also mediated by the glorifying elements of these two aspects, in addition the high level of Ukrainian science.⁸⁰¹ The Ukrainian master narrative praises also Ukrainian literature and arts and thereby constructs the understanding that the Ukrainian culture has been always highly developed and has brought glory for the nation.⁸⁰² The culture related glorifying elements conclude by underlining the high level of cultural achievements made in Ukraine or by Ukrainians and thereby showing that Ukrainian culture has an important place in the world civilisation.⁸⁰³ As culture is one of the key identity markers then it is also an important source to enhance national pride and therefore it is presented frequently in the analysed textbook, being an important part of national master narrative.

Military success can be divided into expansive wars and defensive wars in the Ukrainian master narrative. Most of the expansive wars were made during Kievan Rus and also the Cossack Era and it seems that though these successes are glorified then the master narrative is not underlining the importance of

⁸⁰⁰ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 43, pp. 84–85, p. 151, p. 152, p. 160, pp. 185–186, pp. 190–191; Vlasov, 2002, p. 66, p. 92, p. 108, p. 217, p. 264, p. 279; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 66, p. 384; Turchenko, 2004, p. 214–215, pp. 254–255, p. 264, p. 267; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 118, p. 380, p. 399

⁸⁰¹ Language (Vlasov, 2002, p. 65, p. 85; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 198, p. 205); Education (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 142, p. 187; Vlasov, 2002, p. 73, p. 83, pp. 86–88, p. 259, pp. 265–267, pp. 272–273; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 81, p. 91, pp. 108–109, p. 192; Turchenko, 2004, p. 26, p. 207, p. 259, p. 315, p. 317); science (Vlasov, 2002, p. 270; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 99, pp. 110–111, pp. 257–260, p. 380–381; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 208–209, p. 260, p. 318; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 110–111, pp. 162–163)

⁸⁰² Literature, theatre (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, pp. 144–145, p. 186; Vlasov, 2002, p. 73, p. 89, p. 97, pp. 270–271; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 53, p. 108, p. 112–113, pp. 229–230, pp. 264–267, p. 392; Turchenko, 2004, p. 213, p. 261, p. 263), architecture and painting (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 83, p. 150, p. 188; Vlasov, 2002, p. 67, pp. 101–103, p. 106, p. 276; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 118, p. 122, p. 273, p. 388, p. 392; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 214–215, p. 323), music (Vlasov, 2002, p. 94, p. 99; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 119, p. 122, pp. 268–269, p. 391; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 166); cinematography (Turchenko, 2004, p. 264; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 224)

⁸⁰³ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 36, p. 146; Vlasov, 2002, p. 95; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 114, p. 121, p. 243; Turchenko, 2004, p. 215; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 110–111, p. 379, pp. 381–382

expansion.⁸⁰⁴ More important are the defensive wars which can be defined either as defence of the country⁸⁰⁵ or liberation of the country⁸⁰⁶. The last category also includes Ukrainian resistance to the exploiting external power.⁸⁰⁷ In this framework, the defensive wars dominate 9:1 in comparison with the expansive wars. Therefore the national master narrative stresses the defensive character and Ukrainians' spirit to fight for their freedom.⁸⁰⁸ Glorified elements are also used when the narrative describes the strength and quality of Ukrainian soldiers and army.⁸⁰⁹ Therefore the Ukrainian master narrative constructs the image of Ukrainians as successful soldiers who defend their land bravely and thereby also the important national identity marker Cossack spirit is praised.⁸¹⁰ The other categories of glorifying elements are less frequently used. Economic development of Ukraine praises general good development of Ukrainian economy⁸¹¹ and underlines the main fields of Ukrainian economy. Initially

⁸⁰⁴ Slavs and Kievan Rus conquest (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 45, p. 61, pp. 69–73, p. 77, pp. 82–83, p. 96), Cossacks' conquest (Vlasov, 2002, p. 28, pp. 43–45, p. 46, p. 141, p. 143)

⁸⁰⁵ Early population in Ukraine (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 22); Kievan Rus and Medieval Ukraine (*Ibid*, p. 65, p. 70, pp. 75–76, p. 92, p. 107, p. 114, p. 120, p. 160, p. 165, pp. 173–174; Vlasov, 2002, p. 21), Cossacks' defence (Vlasov, 2002, pp. 48–49, p. 166, p. 188, p. 195, p. 200); Ukrainian National Republic (Turchenko, 2004, pp. 94–95); Second World War (Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 15)

⁸⁰⁶ Liberation of Halych-Volhynia (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 112); Cossacks' liberation fight (Vlasov, 2002, p. 28, p. 30, pp. 32–34, pp. 35–38, pp. 55–57, pp. 57–58, pp. 59–61, p. 111, pp. 116–117, p. 121, p. 124, p. 129, p. 142, p. 152, p. 179, pp. 220–221; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 20–21, pp. 46–47); Ukrainian National Republic (Turchenko, 2004, p. 108, pp. 112–113, p. 150, p. 165, pp. 167–168, p. 171); Second World War (Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 49, p. 54, p. 61, pp. 74–76, p. 109); UPA (Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 55, p. 58, pp. 76–77, pp. 104–105, p. 121)

⁸⁰⁷ Rebellion against Lithuanians (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 168, p. 192), peasant rebellions (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 179; Vlasov, 2002, p. 52; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 45, pp. 46–47, p. 49, p. 76, pp. 86–88, p. 90, p. 105, p. 185, p. 321; Turchenko, 2004, p. 35, p. 101, p. 154, pp. 159–160, p. 185, p. 199, p. 291, pp. 348–349); partisan resistance (Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 25, pp. 30–31, pp. 44–45, pp. 47–48)

⁸⁰⁸ Liberation wars' share of total military victories is 39% and people's revolts' one 28%, which underlines that Ukrainians did not passively accept external expression.

⁸⁰⁹ High quality of Cossack army (Vlasov, 2002, p. 40, p. 42, p. 45, pp. 131–132, p. 193); Sichovykh Riflemen (Turchenko, 2004, p. 14, p. 26, p. 38); Ukrainian national troops (*Ibid*, p. 52, p. 57, p. 148)

⁸¹⁰ Military success glorifies the most Cossacks (36%), in comparison: peasants' resistance (19%), Kievan Rus and Medieval Ukraine (17%), Ukrainian National units (12%), UPA (8%), other (8%)

⁸¹¹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 19, p. 49, p. 140; Vlasov, 2002, p. 257, pp. 261–262; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 146, p. 156, p. 282; Turchenko, 2004, p. 266, p. 274, p. 328; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 154–155, p. 178–179

agriculture has the key position⁸¹² but in the 20th century industrial achievements⁸¹³ dominate over the agricultural ones. Thereby the shift from an agricultural country to an industrial country is underlined and the agricultural sector is more victimised. In addition, also the level of handicraft and trade is praised by the national master narrative but these fields are rather marginal.⁸¹⁴ The master narrative underlines the hardworking spirit of Ukrainians that has made the economic development possible.⁸¹⁵ The Ukrainian narrative emphasises Ukrainian uniqueness and advantages over other nations and thereby promotes national pride.⁸¹⁶ In addition, national pride is also supported by the heroic survival of the Ukrainian nation and mainly there is underlined that the Ukrainian nation managed to maintain the national identity and develop the culture though there were huge obstacles.⁸¹⁷ It is on the border of the glorifying and victimising elements but qualifies as glorifying because it explicitly emphasises the heroic result of the nation.

A significant part of the Ukrainian self-image is mediated by the victimising elements. They can be divided into six different categories. Three of them are related to the domination of external powers: exploitation and discrimination of Ukrainians, cultural discrimination, repressions and violence against

⁸¹² Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 40, p. 47; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 3, p. 32, p. 44, p. 97, p. 146, p. 168, p. 172, pp. 175–177, pp. 179–180, p. 294, p. 296, p. 312, p. 318, pp. 356–358; Turchenko, 2004, p. 249, p. 251; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 63, p. 196

⁸¹³ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 35, p. 75, p. 83, p. 128, p. 159, p. 282; Turchenko, 2004, p. 7, p. 226, p. 247, p. 270, pp. 277–278, pp. 282–283, pp. 88–91, p. 104, pp. 122–123, pp. 149–151, p. 312

⁸¹⁴ Share of agriculture and industry both has more than 40%, trade and handicrafts less than 20%

⁸¹⁵ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 171; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 88–91, p. 196, p. 245

⁸¹⁶ Ukrainians being the first (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 18, p. 30; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 333; Turchenko, 2004, p. 288; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 387–388), Ukrainians having the most (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 16, p. 22, pp. 115–116, p. 144; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 12, p. 180, p. 312, p. 352; Turchenko, 2004, p. 4, p. 243; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 287, p. 356, pp. 398–399), special location (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 58, pp. 154–155, Vlasov, 2002, p. 199; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 60; Turchenko, 2004, p. 4, p. 10, p. 176; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 16)

⁸¹⁷ Ukrainians managed to survive and maintain their culture (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 118; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 52, p. 63, p. 70, p. 108, p. 257, p. 286, p. 317, p. 369; Turchenko, 2004, p. 3, p. 205, p. 208, p. 332, p. 324, p. 329; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 3, p. 71, p. 113, pp. 120–121, pp. 223–224), Ukrainians managed to develop the economy (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 32, p. 316; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 3); Ukrainians continued their fight for their rights (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 316, p. 335, p. 349; Turchenko, 2004, p. 104; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 327)

Ukrainians. But there are also political failures mediated by victimising elements and as well the national tragedies are presented (See Chart 3.7).



Chart 3.7. Victimising Elements about the Ukrainian Self-Image

The biggest share of victimising elements is related to external powers and Ukraine's role as a colony. These elements are mainly used in the schematic narrative template Exploitation and Discrimination which is narrating about the policies of dominating external power and shows Ukraine as the victim of external power's policies. The biggest share of the victimising elements is related to the economic exploitation of Ukrainian lands and people and social discrimination of the Ukrainian nation. Economic exploitation is expressed by the hindering Ukrainian socio-economic development for the interest of external power and also describing the colonial relations between Ukrainian lands and central territories of dominating power.⁸¹⁸ By the colonial relations Ukrainian lands were used to make them provide the raw materials and produce centre-

⁸¹⁸ Impeded economic development (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 118, p. 171; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 33, pp. 74–75, p. 79, p. 128, p. 156, p. 159, p. 172, p. 180, p. 190, p. 281, p. 291, p. 294, p. 404, p. 405; Turchenko, 2004, p. 229, p. 234, p. 275, p. 278, pp. 283–284, p. 302; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 19, pp. 97–98, pp. 150–151, pp. 202–203); colonial relations (Vlasov, 2002, p. 7, p. 32, p. 245, pp. 254–255; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 5, p. 14, p. 18, p. 21, pp. 27–28, p. 39, p. 45, p. 80, pp. 82–83, p. 111, p. 127, p. 135, p. 138, pp. 144–145, p. 156, p. 158, p. 161, pp. 178–179, pp. 185–188, pp. 191–192, p. 194, p. 237, pp. 282–283, pp. 296–299, pp. 313–314, p. 404, p. 405; Turchenko, 2004, p. 7, pp. 13–14, p. 33, pp. 110–111, p. 189, pp. 249–250, p. 276, p. 287, p. 327, pp. 334–336, pp. 345–346; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 13–14, pp. 96–97, p. 123, pp. 131–132, pp. 194–197, p. 230, p. 245)

needed goods, as well as the human resource exploitation is underlined and shown how Ukrainians were used for the military interest of external powers. Ukrainian social discrimination tells about the Ukrainians underrepresentation in the social and political institutions and Ukrainians' exclusion from the higher classes of the society.⁸¹⁹ Because of this, Ukrainians had difficulties to form their national liberation movement and to achieve their national right to be a sovereign nation-state. Another particular part of discrimination of Ukrainians is cultural discrimination that aimed to construct a new identity for Ukrainians. The most aggressive in this policy has been Russia (79% of the cultural discrimination cases)⁸²⁰ that totally denied the existence of Ukrainian nation and wanted to make Ukrainians 'real Russians' but also Poles (18% of the cultural discrimination cases)⁸²¹ have implemented heavy Polonisation policies and discrimination of Ukrainians based on language and religion.

External powers are also related to the violence and repressions that are used against the Ukrainian nation and they are mainly mediated by the victimising elements. They narrate about the external threats and invasions of the Ukrainian lands.⁸²² A particular place has also looting of the Ukrainian territories where the enslaving of Ukrainians by the Crimean Tatars has special meaning.⁸²³ The later period is mainly narrating about the massive violent repressions against Ukrainians and here the most dominating are the Soviet repressions (54% of all repressions cases) that have left a deep traumatic memory in the national collective past.⁸²⁴ These invasions and repressions are also part of the national

⁸¹⁹ Underrepresentation of Ukrainians (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 192; Vlasov, 2002, p. 8, p. 11, p. 262; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 7, p. 14, p. 23, pp. 60–61, p. 185, p. 188; Turchenko, 2004, p. 6, p. 9, pp. 345–346, p. 350–351, p. 357; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 60, p. 81, p. 101–102, p. 253); social exclusion (Vlasov, 2002, p. 113; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 22, p. 39, p. 51, p. 80, pp. 165–166, p. 168, p.171, pp. 316–317, p. 409; Turchenko, 2004, p. 7, p. 243, p. 304)

⁸²⁰ Vlasov, 2002, pp. 242–243, p. 246, p. 264, p. 279; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 4–5, pp. 13–14, pp. 108–109, p. 113, p. 151, p. 207, p. 214, p. 252, pp. 253–257, p. 259, p. 263, p. 285, p. 287, p. 351, pp. 362–365, pp. 378–380, p. 388, p. 397, p. 408; Turchenko, 2004, p. 98, p. 203, p. 205, pp. 207–208, p. 216, p. 259, p. 267, p. 312, p. 315, pp. 316–320, p. 323; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 69–71, pp. 158–161, p. 163, p. 173, p. 177, p. 185, p. 200, pp. 215–220, p. 225, p. 237, p. 241, p. 256, p. 258, p. 307, p. 375

⁸²¹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 161, p. 191; Vlasov, 2002, pp. 11–12, p. 54, pp. 68–70, pp. 73–74, p. 79, p. 83, p. 110, p. 112; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 90, p. 93; Turchenko, 2004, p. 193, pp. 332–335, p. 357

⁸²² Early invasions to Slavs' territories (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 46, p. 58, p. 60, p. 93, p. 105); Mongol invasion (*Ibid*, p. 113, p. 115, p. 120, p. 133, p. 149)

⁸²³ Crimean Tatars' invasions (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 173; Vlasov, 2002, p. 8, pp. 15–16, p. 100, p. 102)

⁸²⁴ Polish repressions (Vlasov, 2002, p. 111, p. 143, p. 200; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 321; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 6, p. 85), Russian repressions (Vlasov, 2002, pp. 188–189, p. 200, p. 229, p. 230, pp. 242–243, p. 260; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 340, p. 344; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 19–20, p. 24, p. 29, p. 38), Austrian

tragedies⁸²⁵ but they narrate also about the bigger social catastrophes⁸²⁶ that have crucial impact on Ukrainian people. It is interesting to note that the post-Soviet economic transformation is also narrated by using these victimising elements.⁸²⁷ However, the national master narrative concludes that though there are difficult times in the independent Ukraine then it is the best result that Ukrainian nation has achieved.

Political setbacks show Ukrainians' political failures that are related to the loss of national independence, this is considered as very big national failure.⁸²⁸ In addition, there are also some victimising elements that show the division of Ukrainian nation and weakness of Ukrainian national movement to push through its agenda.⁸²⁹ Instead of trying to justify these events Ukrainians are rather shown as the victims of the system where they had to operate. The post-Soviet political transition is also mediated by the victimising elements to show the complex situation that the national elite had to face.⁸³⁰ Also some crucial military losses are presented as the victimised cases.⁸³¹ A specific aspect that Ukrainian master narrative underlines is the lack of international support to the Ukrainian statehood that has led to the loss of independence.⁸³² Thereby the

repressions (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 105; Turchenko, 2004, p. 20, p. 26); Soviet repressions (Turchenko, 2004, p. 76, pp. 93–96, p. 153, p. 157, pp. 182–184, p. 199, p. 202, p. 231, pp. 271–273, pp. 281–282, pp. 292–293, pp. 295–296, p. 301, pp. 308–309, p. 311, p. 321, pp. 324–325; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 8, pp. 12–13, pp. 38–39, p. 42, p. 45, pp. 58–59, p. 71, p. 83); Nazi repressions (Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 15, pp. 21–23, p. 29, p. 31, p. 56, p. 75)

⁸²⁵ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 192; Vlasov, 2002, p. 27, pp. 144–145; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 295; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 232–233, p. 297, pp. 328–329; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 61–62, p. 76, pp. 93–95

⁸²⁶ The Ruin (Vlasov, 2002, p. 178, p. 191, p.219), national division (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 69, p. 373; Turchenko, 2004, p. 219), socio-economic crisis (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 179, p. 291, p. 295; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 3–4, p. 35, p. 225, p. 356), failure to establish independent stat, Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 219; Chernobyl (Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 240, pp. 357–356)

⁸²⁷ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 339–341, p. 344, p. 346, pp. 351–352, pp. 357–359, p. 361, p. 383, p. 392, pp. 397–398

⁸²⁸ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 125, p. 169; Vlasov, 2002, p. 5, p. 12, p. 141, p. 163, pp. 168–169, pp. 181–182, p. 215, p. 245, p. 247, p. 252, p. 258; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 74; Turchenko, 2004, p. 193, p. 354

⁸²⁹ Disunity of Ukrainians (e.g. Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 96, p. 175; Vlasov, 2002, p. 3, pp. 170–171, p. 176, p. 184, p. 190, p. 196, p. 199; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 130–131), weakness of national elite (Vlasov, 2002, p. 231, p. 240; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 88, p. 192, p. 203, p. 205, p. 223, p. 225, p. 328; Turchenko, 2004, p. 37, p. 66, p. 82, p. 93, p. 217, p. 348)

⁸³⁰ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 301, pp. 304–306, p. 333, p. 335, p. 376

⁸³¹ Vlasov, 2002, p. 50, pp. 58–61, pp. 139–140, p. 143

⁸³² Cossacks (Vlasov, 2002, p. 16, p. 126, p. 176, p. 210), Ukrainian National Republic (Turchenko, 2004, p. 108, p. 135, pp. 148–149, p. 192); UPA (Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, p. 48, p. 76)

process of establishing Ukrainian statehood is also strongly victimised and instead of using the justifications the failures are rather victimised.

The Ukrainian negative self-image has a relatively small share in the Ukrainian master narrative. It is mainly mediated by the justifications that explain why some certain events happened. As was claimed above, many national failures are mediated by the victimisation and also the biggest share of justifications underline that Ukrainian national leaders were not able to find sufficient support and therefore some certain decisions were made. Also weakness is presented as a justification. On the other hand, also marginalisation elements and explanations that the taken decision was the only possible solution are used. It condemns also the personal interest (Chart 3.8.).




Chart 3.8. Justifying Elements about the Ukrainian Self-Image

Low support justifies the decisions of national leaders who had to retreat from their achieved positions and thereby also impeded the national liberation fight.⁸³³ Also the national leaders' dilemmas and decisions to cooperate with an ally that is not beneficial for Ukraine because it was in current situation the lesser evil.⁸³⁴ The external involvement that undermines the national leaders' positions is also explained by low support.⁸³⁵ A particular part of the low support elements are used to justify the Ukrainians low will to fight against the

⁸³³ Vlasov, 2002, p. 29, pp. 33–34, p. 122; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 136–137, p. 148, p. 193; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 121

⁸³⁴ Vlasov, 2002, p. 70, p. 115, Turchenko, Moroko, 2001, p. 341; Turchenko, 2004, p. 188

⁸³⁵ Vlasov, 2002, p. 122, pp. 126–127, p. 144, p. 170; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 221–222

dominant power.⁸³⁶ A similar way to justify the events is also the argument that the national leaders were for various reasons too weak to continue fighting.⁸³⁷ Therefore the national master narrative shows that the failures are related to the exogenous factors but not the lack of support for the national liberation idea. The negative developments in the national past are also justified by showing that in these conditions the result was the only option. It is justifying the aggressive behaviour of Ukrainians⁸³⁸ but it is used even more to explain the failures⁸³⁹ or underdevelopment⁸⁴⁰. A similar category is the marginalisation of the negative developments by showing that this event was not so important⁸⁴¹ or that the negative outcome has better long-term impact for the national history⁸⁴². Some marginalisation elements also try to show the negative outcomes as the normal practice of that particular time period.⁸⁴³ Similarly to marginalisation, emphasising the personal interest is also a clear argumentation why some failures happened in the national past. Mainly personal interest is used as justification to explain national disunity.⁸⁴⁴ Betrayal of the national liberation struggle is also an often used argument showing that some persons placed personal interest over the national cause.⁸⁴⁵

The Ukrainian master narrative has also some personalising elements to whitewash the nation from the national failure or negative acts and to show some certain person or a group of person responsible for these events. However, it is not a very common method used by the Ukrainian master narrative. Personalising is used to show political failures: disunity of the nation,⁸⁴⁶ surrenders and defeats⁸⁴⁷ or lack of support to the national government⁸⁴⁸. This

⁸³⁶ Vlasov, 2002, p. 231; Turchenko, Moroko, 2001, p. 63, p. 104, p. 199; Turchenko, 2004, p. 66, pp. 104–105; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 212

⁸³⁷ Leaders had disadvantage (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, pp. 71–72, p. 111, Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 136, p. 212; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 104–105); Ukrainian nation was weakened by external enemy (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 159, p. 164, p. 131, p. 237; Turchenko, 2004, p. 83, p. 167)

⁸³⁸ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 68, p. 91; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 327; Turchenko, 2004, p. 110, p. 142, p. 342; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 105–106

⁸³⁹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 103; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 103, pp. 224–225; Turchenko, 2004, p. 150; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 6, p. 38, p. 369

⁸⁴⁰ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 169, p. 171, p. 179, p. 378; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 302, pp. 352–353, p. 395, pp. 395–397

⁸⁴¹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 65, p. 85, p. 140, p. 230; Turchenko, 2004, p. 147

⁸⁴² Vlasov, 2002, pp. 59–61, p. 124; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 327

⁸⁴³ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 41; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 47, p. 342; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 49

⁸⁴⁴ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 103, p. 114, p. 170; Vlasov, 2002, pp. 4–6, p. 175; Turchenko, 2004, p. 166; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 400

⁸⁴⁵ Vlasov, 2002, p. 36, p. 58, p. 173, p. 194; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 52; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 183–184

⁸⁴⁶ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 89, p. 91, p. 163

⁸⁴⁷ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 85, pp. 120–121; Vlasov, 2002, p. 29, p. 152, p. 165

⁸⁴⁸ Turchenko, 2004, p. 67, p. 73, p. 84, p. 114, p. 139

element is also explaining the collaboration with external power or betrayal of the national movement and thereby it shows that the nation's desire has been to achieve the national freedom but some individuals preferred personal interest to the national one.⁸⁴⁹ To a smaller extent also some violent deeds are explained by the personalisation and thereby the master narrative shows that this was rather exceptional behaviour of a person not the general national character.⁸⁵⁰ It is interesting to observe that the personalising is used about the individual leaders mainly from the earlier time but in the 20th century the personalising is defining a certain group of people.

The image of the significant other, Russia/Russians in the Ukrainian master narrative has a mirror reflection to the Ukrainian self-image. The self-image elements were mainly mediating the positive image of Ukrainians; in the same extent the image elements of the significant other mediate the negative image of Russia/Russians. The share of positive other image is marginal as well as the neutral image elements (See Chart 3.9.).




Chart 3.9. Russia(ns) image in the Ukrainian Master Narrative

Russian positive image in the Ukrainian master narrative can be divided into three categories: successful cooperation with Ukrainians, benefits for Ukrainians and Russia as a powerful actor in international level. The biggest share is related to the benefits from Russia for Ukrainians where the major share is related to the

⁸⁴⁹ Ukrainian nobility and Cossacks (Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 168; Vlasov, 2002, p. 115, p. 173, p. 227, p. 229; Turchenko, 2004, p. 117); Ukrainian political elite (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 225, p. 307); Bolsheviks and Communists (Turchenko, 2004, p. 46, p. 239, p. 289, p. 307, p. 311; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 145, pp. 186–187, p. 239, p. 250, p. 294)

⁸⁵⁰ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 68, p. 78, p. 91; Vlasov, 2002, pp. 188–189; Turchenko, 2004, p. 118

reforms in Russia that has increased the well-being or autonomy of Ukraine.⁸⁵¹ To some extent there is also shown that the cooperation with Russia has been successful and Russians have supported Ukrainian national interests.⁸⁵² Russian positive image is also mediated by showing Russian strength in the international sphere.⁸⁵³ However, it is rather limited because the Russian strength usually led to the domination over Ukrainians and it has rather negative connotation in the Ukrainian master narrative.

Russian negative image is dominating in the Ukrainian master narrative and it is related to the threat to Ukrainian nation and its national interest, exploitation and discrimination of the Ukrainian lands and people, or underlining Russian negative qualities (See Chart 3.10.). Mostly the national master narrative shows the threat related to Russians and also significant part has the exploitation and discrimination of Ukrainians because Russian national identity has not accepted the separate Ukrainian national identity and there is strong identity clash between two nations. Russian negative qualities are less underlined as well as shifting responsibilities.




Chart 3.10. Russian Negative Image in the Ukrainian Master Narrative

⁸⁵¹ Autonomy and reforms in the Czarist Russia (Vlasov, 2002, p. 202, p. 250, p. 255; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 142, p. 146, p. 282); reforms in Soviet Union where the Khrushchev's reforms are especially underlined (2/3 of all Soviet positive impact on Ukraine), (Turchenko, 2004, p. 206; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 7–8, p. 128, p. 131, pp. 137–138, p. 145, p. 149, p. 177, p. 193)

⁸⁵² Mainly related to the Cossack Hetmanate in the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian alliance (e.g. Vlasov, 2002, p. 147, p. 151, p. 153, p. 188) but also Russo-Ukrainian cooperation of the political movements (e.g. Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 371), Second World War (e.g. Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 36) or Yeltsin's forces during the Putsch in Moscow in 1991 (*Ibid*, p. 285)

⁸⁵³ Vlasov, 2002, p. 230; Turchenko, 2004, p. 19; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 35, p. 156

The biggest share of the negative image of Russia in the Ukrainian master narrative is related to the political and military threat coming from Russia. It is divided into three aspects: violence and repressions, military threat and political antagonism. Violence and repressions executed by Russians have the dominant share in this group. The Russian violence and repressions in Ukraine can be divided into three groups. The first group is illustrating the subjugation of the Cossack Hetmanate, mainly by Peter the Great.⁸⁵⁴ The second group shows the repressions against Ukrainian national movement and Ukrainian peasants in the Russian Empire.⁸⁵⁵ The last, and at the same time also the most dominating group, mediates the Soviet terror starting with the Bolsheviks' terror, culminating with the Stalin's one and ending with the late Soviet repressions.⁸⁵⁶ Thereby also the Soviet repressions have the strongest impact on Ukrainian national memory and it has caused a serious national trauma. Although the violence and repressions that are associated with Russia are dominating in the negative image of Russia the military threat from Russia has a relatively marginal part in the master narrative. It is mainly related to the Muscovite invasion of the Cossack Hetmanate and the Bolsheviks organised civil war in Ukraine where it is underlined that the military forces came from Russia and that the Bolsheviks' government was subjugated to Moscow.⁸⁵⁷ More broadly has been shown the political antagonism between Russians and Ukrainians and Russian policies that have been obstacles for the Ukrainian national interests. The master narrative shows that none of the Russian political forces has supported the Ukrainian nation-state that is separate from Russia and that Russians have done all to undermine independent Ukrainian statehood. This starts from the liquidation of the independence of the Cossack Hetmanate and this policy continues even today.⁸⁵⁸ Thereby the Ukrainian master narrative

⁸⁵⁴ Vlasov, 2002, p. 181, p. 188, p. 227, p. 229, p. 239, pp. 242–243, p. 260; covers 9% of Russian repressions in the Ukrainian master narrative

⁸⁵⁵ Against national movement (e.g. Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 44, p. 63, p. 69, pp. 371–372, p. 380; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 13–14, p. 20, p. 24, p. 29, p. 38, p. 65); against peasants (e.g. Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 46–48, p. 335); covers 18% of Russian repressions in the Ukrainian master narrative

⁸⁵⁶ Bolsheviks' terror (Turchenko, 2004, p. 95, pp. 97–101, p. 153, p. 158, pp. 160–161, p. 175, p. 180, pp. 182–185, p. 199–200, p. 205, pp. 216–217, p. 227, p. 231, p. 233, pp. 253–254); Stalin's terror (Turchenko, 2004, p. 265, pp. 272–273, pp. 281–282, p. 290, pp. 292–296, p. 300, p. 308, p. 310, p. 319, pp. 324–325; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 7–8, pp. 38–40, p. 53, pp. 58–59, p. 61, p. 70, p. 74, p. 83, p. 92, p. 95, pp. 104–106, p. 109, p. 112, pp. 114–118, p. 123, p. 146); later Soviet repressions (*Ibid.*, pp. 171–172, pp. 206–207, p. 209, p. 211, p. 255); covers 72% of Russian repressions in the Ukrainian master narrative

⁸⁵⁷ Muscovite Czarism against Cossack Hetmanate (Vlasov, 2002, p. 159, p. 162, pp. 167–168, p. 179), Soviet Russia against Ukrainian National Republic (Turchenko, 2004, pp. 90–94, p. 126, p. 132, p. 167, pp. 169–170)

⁸⁵⁸ Russian policies against Cossack Hetmanate (Vlasov, 2002, p. 147, p. 149, p. 151, p. 161, p. 168, pp. 170–171, p. 176, pp. 185–186, p. 198, p. 211, p. 244, p. 253, p. 257, pp. 259–260); Russian social and political movements reluctance to accept Ukrainian

constructs the understanding that Russian national elite has never accepted Ukrainian independence and when Russian domination has been implemented in Ukraine then it has always been done violently and brought huge number of innocent victims among Ukrainians.

The negative impact of Russian domination is also mediated by the discriminative and exploitative character of Russian rule. The negative image of Russians is even more underlined with Russian denial to accept Ukrainians as a separate nation and the policies that different Russian governments have implemented to eliminate Ukrainian national identity are emphasised to demonstrate the threat that is coming from Russia. The denial of education in Ukrainian, the use of Ukrainian language in public and undermining Ukrainian culture have given ground for the Ukrainian master narrative to show the serious threat from Russians who deny the Ukrainian national identity and want to make them 'real Russians'.⁸⁵⁹ The Ukrainian master narrative constructs the understanding that Russia has treated Ukraine as a colony and the economic relations have been built to serve the interest of Russia and make Ukraine to serve Russian economy.⁸⁶⁰ Even the investments and developments that have made by Russia in Ukraine are presented as the objects of Ukrainian economic exploitation.⁸⁶¹ In addition to the economic exploitation also the exploitation of Ukrainian human resource is underlined.⁸⁶² Therefore the image of Russia is

independence (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 13, p. 51, p. 60, p. 137, p. 302, pp. 309–310, p. 341; Turchenko, 2004, p. 10, p. 42, p. 48, p. 57); Russian Whites and Bolsheviks antagonism to the Ukrainian national independence (*Ibid*, p. 60, p. 66, p. 73, p. 86, p. 177, p. 180, p. 204, p. 220, p. 255, p. 267); later Soviet government resistance to the Ukrainian statehood (*Ibid*, p. 354; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 179, p. 284, pp. 288–289, p. 297); current Russo-Ukrainian relations (*Ibid*, pp. 306–308, p. 390); Moscow Patriarch reluctance to accept Ukrainian autocephaly (*Ibid*, p. 257, p. 369)

⁸⁵⁹ Against education in Ukrainian (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 108–109, pp. 252–254, p. 259, p. 348, p. 351, p. 364, p. 154; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 216–217), against the public use of Ukrainian language (Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 206–207, pp. 211–212, p. 285, p. 287, p. 349, p. 359, pp. 364–365; Turchenko, 2004, p. 39, p. 320; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 216–217, p. 382), cultural undermining and formation of 'real Russians' (Vlasov, 2002, p. 228, p. 246, pp. 264–265; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 5–6, pp. 12–13, p. 74, p. 113, p.127, pp. 196–197, p. 199, p. 205, p. 263, p. 286, pp. 362–363, p. 370, p. 397; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 6–7, p. 19, p. 29, p. 89, p. 98, pp. 169–170, p. 238, pp. 312–313; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 200, p. 225)

⁸⁶⁰ Vlasov, p. 245, p. 257, p. 262; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 15, p. 17, p. 28, p. 32, p. 35, pp. 38–39, p. 39, pp. 44–45, p. 75, p. 128, p. 156, p. 167, p. 180, p. 282, p. 291, pp. 296–299, p. 404; Turchenko, 2004, p. 226, p. 243, pp. 283–284; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, pp. 101–102, p. 272

⁸⁶¹ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 161; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 161, pp. 230–231

⁸⁶² Vlasov, 2002, p. 224, pp. 254–255; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 21

selfish and exploitative. Thus, the Russian image as dominating power is mainly mediated by the negative narrative elements.

The Ukrainian master narrative uses also to some extent shifts responsibilities. It is used to explain the interethnic tensions in Ukraine, e.g. Jewish pogroms.⁸⁶³ However, the majority of the shifting responsibility elements are used to talk about the Soviet government.⁸⁶⁴ The master narrative constructs the understanding that the Ukrainian Bolsheviks' government and later the Ukrainian Communist Party elite was totally under the Moscow control and they only implemented the orders given from Moscow. Therefore they did not express the will of Ukrainian nation. In some places there is underlined that the Ukrainian party elite was even eager to intensify the policies more than demanded from Moscow to find the approbation from the Russian masters.⁸⁶⁵ Thereby the national master narrative separates the Ukrainian nomenklatura from the Ukrainian nation and they are often shown as a part of the Russian colonial policy. Therefore also the border between the national elite and the Soviet regime is relatively blurred and it facilitates making Russia, as the dominant power in the Soviet regime, responsible for the negative consequences.

The Ukrainian master narrative also includes several negative qualities of Russia. The most dominating among them is the underdevelopment of Russia. This aspects show that Russia is politically underdeveloped and not corresponding to international standards.⁸⁶⁶ It also shows that socio-economic developments in Russia are relatively poor and therefore it has had also its impact on Ukrainian developments.⁸⁶⁷ The negative image of underdeveloped Russia is also supported by the showing Russians' military defeats that are often related to the underdevelopment.⁸⁶⁸ Another negative image of Russia is constructed by showing that it has been cunning and selfish, trying to change the international agreements according to its will. Therefore Russia has not been a reliable partner. This aspect is mainly related to the gradual annexation of the Cossack Hetmanate where Russia is presented as treacherous partner, which

⁸⁶³ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, pp. 12–13, p. 340; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 137–138

⁸⁶⁴ Turchenko, 2004, p. 44, pp. 88–89, pp. 98–100, p. 126, p. 152, pp. 155–156, p. 175, pp. 184–185, p. 230, pp. 236–237, pp. 239–240, p. 243, p. 276, pp. 306–307; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 14, p. 81, p. 183, pp. 183–187, p. 197

⁸⁶⁵ Turchenko, 2004, p. 232, p. 289, p. 311; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 94

⁸⁶⁶ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 19, p. 48, p. 54, p. 153, p. 224, p. 301, pp. 378–379; Turchenko, 2004, p. 45, p. 103, p. 356; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 138, p. 374

⁸⁶⁷ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 76, p. 81, p. 128, p. 139, p. 143, p. 146, p. 289; Turchenko, 2004, p. 33; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 112, p. 191, p. 193, p. 196, p. 201, p. 234, pp. 292–293

⁸⁶⁸ Vlasov, 2002, p. 190, p. 216, p. 239; Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 29, p. 62, p. 139; Turchenko, 2004, pp. 23–24, p. 33, p. 201; Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p.

was willing to conquer Ukrainian territories instead of offering partnership for Ukraine.⁸⁶⁹ Also the Bolsheviks and Russian Whites behaviour can be defined as cunning in the Russian Civil War where they tried to use the Ukrainians to gain more support to fight against each other.⁸⁷⁰ Thereby the Ukrainian master narrative mediates the message that Russia is a treacherous partner and therefore one should be careful when interacts with Russia.

The Ukrainian master narrative constructs a very strong positive self-image where the most dominant part is mediated by the glorifying elements. However, also the victimising elements have significant part in the master narrative. It creates the understanding that the Ukrainian nation has managed to survive and maintain its national identity, which is the foundation for the current Ukrainian nation state. It can be also defined as the greatest national achievement. Very important place has also the cultural development of Ukrainian nation, which has supported the national identity. The alternatives to national independence are not acceptable because they have created many sufferings for the Ukrainian nation that are mediated by the victimising elements. The negative self-image is rather marginal. The Russian image in the Ukrainian master narrative is strongly negative and it is underlining the threat that comes from Russians. The denial of separate Ukrainian national identity by all significant political forces in Russia and the Russian domination that has led to the elimination of Ukrainian national identity is clear evidence that Russia is a serious threat for Ukrainians. Russia is presented as a selfish nation that is interested in subjugation of Ukrainians and their exploitation. All the possible means to reject the Russian discriminative and exploitative policies have brought massive repressions and violence for Ukrainians. Therefore the master narrative underlines that Ukraine should be careful in its relations with Russia.

3.4. Historical Key Events in the Ukrainian Master Narrative

For understanding the emphasis of the national history I first compare the historical periods and the extent of their representation in the analysed textbooks that defines the importance of these periods in the national collective memory. Ukrainian national history is divided into five periods: ancient Ukraine, Ukrainian Middle Ages, Ukraine in the Early Modern Era, Ukraine in the Modern Era, and Ukrainian Recent History. The first period covers the history of Ukrainian lands from the first humans till the Slavic settlements in Ukraine in the beginning of the 5th century. In my analysis I do not cover this period because it does not include Ukrainian ethnic history. The Ukrainian Middle Ages start with the first Slavic settlements, culminate with the period of Kievan Rus and this period ends with the Union of Lublin in the middle of the

⁸⁶⁹ Vlasov, 2002, p. 135, pp. 148–149, p. 154, p. 207, p. 239

⁸⁷⁰ Turchenko, 2004, p. 81, p. 125, p. 176

16th century. The Early Modern Era is mainly related to the Cossacks' period and Ukrainians fight against two main external enemies: Poles and Russians (Muscovites). The Modern Era in Ukraine starts with the 18th century when was the last serious attempt of the Cossack Hetmanate to liberate itself from Russian domination and ends with the beginning of the First World War (1914). The Recent History of Ukraine starts with First World War and lasts till the beginning of the 21st century (in analysed textbooks the year 2001).⁸⁷¹




Chart 3.11. Representation of History Periods in the Ukrainian Textbooks

The Ukrainian master narrative is presented in the history textbooks based on gradual growth (See Chart 3.11.). The first period that covers the biggest time span is the least covered in the textbook and each period closer to the current period is presented more. The share of overrepresentation is also growing based on the same principle. It can be explained by the accessibility of the sources. On the other hand, it is more relevant for the current nation. The availability of the earlier sources is more limited than availability of the current sources. As well as the earlier periods are looser connected to the current statehood and the later periods are more and thereby also their importance is bigger for the master narrative. The two last periods also cover the formation of modern Ukrainian nation and its attempts to form national independence, which finally has culminated with the independent Ukraine in 1991.

Recent History is the period that is the most overrepresented and it covers almost half of the history curriculum in Ukraine. Recent History is divided into eleven different periods where the periods related to the national independence and two World Wars where Ukraine was an important battlefield are over-

⁸⁷¹ Lyakh, Temirova, 2003, p. 4

represented and the periods related to the Soviet domination underrepresented (See Chart 3.12).⁸⁷²




Chart 3.12. Representation of the 20th Century History in the Ukrainian Textbooks

The most overrepresented periods are related to the Ukrainian revolution in 1917 and short attempt to establish the Ukrainian National Republic (1918–1920).⁸⁷³ These periods are the culmination of the national liberation movements of the 19th century and at the same time they are also full of the wars on different fronts that increase the number of events narrated in the textbook. Also the period related to the Ukrainian National Republic carries an important function in the master narrative to explain why the national movement was not able to establish the independent nation-state. The independence movements in the end of the 1980s and the current Ukrainian state are only slightly overrepresented because these events are more evolutionary than the first period of establishing independence.⁸⁷⁴ Also both World Wars are slightly overrepresented.⁸⁷⁵ Ukraine was an important battlefield in the First World War and it

⁸⁷² The share of time period is not giving 100% in total because some periods are partly overlapping therefore the time period is calculated 87 years. The scale is also not considering the history of Western Ukraine (1920–1939) because it does not fit to the general periodization of the Ukrainian Newest History and it is also relatively marginalised in the textbooks (covers less than 4% of the textbooks and it is the most underrepresented part of Ukrainian Newest History, -19.4%).

⁸⁷³ The revolution overrepresentation in the textbook is 7.8% and Ukrainian National Republic 12.3%

⁸⁷⁴ The forming independence in the end of the 1980s is overrepresented by 2.10% and the current Ukraine only by 1.1%

⁸⁷⁵ The First World War is overrepresented by 0.4% and the Second World War by 2%

also was the catalyst for the national revolution. The Second World War includes also the unification of Ukrainian lands and the attempt to form an independent Ukrainian state and it is also defined as the biggest devastation in the country after the period of Ruin (1657–1687).⁸⁷⁶ The underrepresented periods are related to the Soviet era where the least underrepresented deal with the establishment of the Soviet regime, which also includes nation-related key events, and the stable periods in the Soviet regime are the most underrepresented.⁸⁷⁷ Therefore the national master narrative in the textbooks clearly underlines the national independence periods.




Chart 3.13. Share of the Ukrainian History Key Events in the Textbooks

The Ukrainian master narrative key events are relatively equally divided between Recent History and earlier periods (See Chart 3.13.). It corresponds also to the general share of the master narrative presented in the analysed history textbooks. The key events of earlier periods in the Ukrainian master narrative are related to Ukrainian statehood. The earliest statehood in Kievan Rus and its direct successor Halych-Volhynia has the function of statehood origin. In the first section of this chapter (3.1.) the continuity of the Ukrainian statehood issue was explained and therefore the heydays of these two states

⁸⁷⁶ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 120

⁸⁷⁷ Before the war the New Economic Policy (NEP) period is the least underrepresented because it also includes the period of Ukrainisation that is important element for the national memory –2.1%, the Modernisation that includes also the main victimisation object Holodomor is underrepresented by –2.8%. The rebuilding of Ukraine after the Second World War also includes the fight against UPA, underrepresented by –4%. The Destalinisation and the Stagnation periods are underrepresented respectively by –6.3% and –16.2%

have the meaning of glorious past of Ukrainian statehood.⁸⁷⁸ Russians are hardly mentioned in this context and it explains why Ukrainians have maintained Kievan Rus traditions more than Russians and how Russian statehood traditions differ from Ukrainian ones.

The second group of key events is related to one of the Ukrainian identity markers, the Cossacks. The period in the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century when Cossacks as a social class was formed include also two important agreements that became the catalyst for the Ukrainian liberation movement: Union of Lublin (1569) that gave the Ukrainian territories under direct Polish control and Union of Brest (1596) that formed Greek-Catholic Church that was a compromise between the Orthodox and Catholic Church and became a tool for the Polonisation of Ukraine. This period includes Poles and Tatars as the significant others and therefore Russians have a marginal role in this period. The Cossack Hetmanate can be considered another key moment for the national master narrative because it is related to the new attempt to establish an independent Ukrainian state. This event can be divided into three events: liberation war led by B. Khmelnytsky (1648–1657), the period of Ruin (1657–1687) and late Hetmanate (1687–1764). The first period has significance because during the liberation war the independent Cossack Hetmanate was established that is considered as the first modern statehood of Ukraine. In this period Russians (Muscovites in the history textbook) have a rather positive role as a significant ally to fight against the main external threat, Poles. Although their treacherous behaviour, defined as the selfish friendship that prepared for annexation of Ukraine, is presented several times. The second period, Ruin, is one of the most tragic periods in the national past where due to the internal fights the land was divided and devastated. In this period Muscovite Czarism has a rather negative role because it is gradually eliminating Ukrainian independence and facilitating the disunity of the country by active intervention into the internal affairs of the Hetmanate. Muscovite Czarism also confirmed the division of Ukrainian lands between Muscovites and Poles. The third period includes the last attempt of the Ukrainian Hetmans (I. Mazepa and P. Orlyk) to restore Ukrainian independence and the latter also issued the first Ukrainian Constitution that is important for the national statehood.⁸⁷⁹ This period also includes the liquidation of the Hetmanate in 1764. The role of Russia is in this period very negative and starts with the brutalities of Peter the Great in Ukraine and ends with the liquidation of the Ukrainian statehood by Catherine the Great. Therefore the period of Hetmanate presents Russians as negative actors in the Ukrainian national past.

⁸⁷⁸ The heyday of Kievan Rus start with Princess Olga reign in 945 and end with Vladimir II Monomakh's son Mstislav in 1132 when Kievan Rus became disunited. Halych-Volhynia heydays start with their unification in 1199 and end with the disunity and conquest in the middle of the 14th century.

⁸⁷⁹ Pacts and Constitutions of Rights and Freedoms of the Zaporizhian Host (1710), Vlasov, 2002, pp. 234–137

The next important historical moment is the development of the Ukrainian national movement in the 19th century and the revolution in 1905. The master narrative presents them as a continuous evolutionary process and therefore they are considered as one event in this analysis. This is one of the key events and that also covers the biggest share in the master narrative. The national awakening formed the modern Ukrainian nation and therefore it has a crucial meaning in the national master narrative. The cultural movement transformed during the end of the 19th century into a political movement that participated successfully in the Russian Revolution 1905. The role of Russia and Russians in this event is also a very negative one and this establishes the identity quarrel between Russians and Ukrainians. Russians are presented as the ones that deny the existence of Ukrainians and who try to suppress by different means the key elements of Ukrainian national identity. Therefore Russians are presented as repressors. The master narrative defines clearly that all Russian socio-political movements shared a similar view about Ukrainians and therefore Ukrainians do not have any hopes for national freedom in the framework of the Russian state.

The First World War has a key meaning for Ukrainians because a big part of the Eastern front was moving back and forth in Ukraine. On the one hand, the war destruction has important victimising meaning for Ukrainians but on the other hand, the moving of borders also brought Ukrainians in the Austro-Hungarian governed Western Ukraine together with the Russia governed Ukraine. It also became a catalyst for the Ukrainian national movement that led to the declaration of national independence. The role of Russia is in this event as repressor and brutal force that tries to eliminate Ukrainian national identity. The Russian repressions in the Western Ukraine are underlined to confirm this image of Russia. On the other hand, Russia is also presented as underdeveloped and therefore weak military power that strengthens the negative image of Russia even more.

The second crucial key event is related to the Ukrainian revolution in 1917 and the short Ukrainian independence in 1918–1920. This event is defined by the national master narrative as the key event in the Ukrainian statehood, which provides the evidence for Ukrainians' ability to form an independent nation-state. This period is very turbulent and full of wars and therefore its meaning is parallel to the glorification also the victimisation of the Ukrainian nation. The role of Russians is again strongly negative because among three fronts where Ukrainian fought for their national independence two were held against Russians (Bolsheviks and Russian Whites). Therefore this key event also underlines that none of the Russian socio-political groups would accept the Ukrainians' right to self-determination and all of them tried to eliminate Ukrainian independent national identity. This event again underlines the brutality of the Russian terror, implemented by both the Bolsheviks and Russian Whites. The culmination of this event is the elimination of the independent Ukrainian state and division of Ukrainian lands between Poland and Russia's dependant Soviet Ukraine. Thereby the negative role of Russians is emphasised even more.

The Ukrainisation policy and Famines are two different faces of the Soviet regime. The Ukrainisation policy in the 1920s had an important impact for the development of national sciences in Ukraine. It was the first time after the Cossack Hetmanate when there was state support to research Ukrainian history, language, traditions and the use of Ukrainian language was promoted on the state level. Therefore it is considered as the golden period of Ukrainian cultural development. The role of Russia is presented in this historical event as rather positive but at the same time also cunning because it is considered the Bolsheviks' attempt to find support among Ukrainians. The other face of the Soviet regime is the policy of famines (1921–1923, 1932–1933 (*Holodomor*), and 1946–1947). These famines have the strong victimising meaning for Ukrainian collective memory. The most crucial is the *Holodomor* that is even defined as genocide against the Ukrainian nation. However, by these events the resistance to the Soviet policies is ended in Ukraine and the earlier socio-economic structure totally changed. Therefore it has crucial meaning for the Ukrainian nation. The role of Russia is a clearly negative one because it is defined as the central governmental targeted policy against Ukrainians that resulted with the millions of Ukrainians' deaths. Therefore these two key events in the Ukrainian master narrative have opposing meaning for Ukrainians and also the role of Russia is very controversial.

The Second World War also has double meaning for Ukrainians. It carries a great glorifying meaning but at the same time also a deep victimising one. The Nazi occupation is defined as the most brutal one in the conquest of territories and therefore the liberation from the Nazi occupation is considered as a great victory. As well the unification of the Ukrainian lands in 1939 and the attempt to establish independent state in Lviv in 1941 has an important and positive meaning for Ukrainians. The huge human losses and heavy destruction of Ukrainian lands where the war front rolled over twice with massive battles carries the victimising meaning for Ukrainians. The role of Russians has also double meaning: on the one hand, Ukrainians and Russians are shown as allies who were fighting together in the Great Patriotic War to liberate the country from the Nazi yoke. At the same time the brutal Soviet terror that started after the liberation has a strong negative connotation. The Second World War is also closely connected with the other key event in the master narrative: UPA. The master narrative shows it as the only national force in Ukraine fighting against all external enemies and aiming to establish independent Ukrainian state. It is defined as one of the important and glorious milestone in the history of Ukrainian statehood. It was fighting also against the Soviet regime and therefore the role of Russia in this historical key event is clearly an enemy one. The master narrative defines that the war between Soviet power and UPA was brutal and it was accompanied with lots of victims and repressions against Ukrainians. The final suppression of this fight only strengthens the negative image of Russia because it is shown as brutal and as well as the one that eliminated Ukrainian hope for independent statehood.

The last two key events are related to the Ukrainian independence and have together also an important share in the master narrative. The first event, recovery of independence, has clearly important glorifying meaning because it shows that the Ukrainian nation, despite of heavy repressions through their history, managed to reach their ultimate national goal and avoid any victims in the process. Therefore it has key importance in the general national master narrative. The role of Russia is mainly negative because Moscow tried to impede the independence process in Ukraine. On the other hand, the Yeltsin-led democratic movement has a positive meaning in this process because it resisted the hardline coup in Moscow and thereby facilitated the Ukrainian independence process. The post-Soviet Transformation in Ukraine carries rather a victimising meaning in the master narrative because the difficulties that people had to face and the economic downfall in Ukraine. However, all these difficulties are considered as the impact of the Soviet system and therefore also manageable. The role of Russia in this process is quite episodic but still rather negative. It is shown that Russia is not able to accept the independent Ukraine and tried to intervene in its internal affairs and to limit Ukrainian sovereignty.

The Ukrainian master narrative is gradually increasing the amount of representation of the history as it moves closer to the present. Therefore it also emphasises the Recent History, which covers almost 50% of the history curriculum. The periods that are related to the Ukrainian independence are overrepresented in the Recent History and the periods of the Soviet domination underrepresented. The key events are also divided almost equally between the Recent History and earlier history. The key events mainly are related to the Ukrainian statehood in different periods and they carry glorifying as well victimising meaning for the Ukrainian nation. The role of Russia and Russians in these events is dominantly negative and Russia is presented as one of the main enemies of Ukrainian statehood. Although there are also some positive elements in the Russian role in the Ukrainian key events, even these aspects are presented as temporary or Russian hopes to gain Ukrainian support for its own interest.

The Ukrainian master narrative combines the history of the Ukrainian lands and Ukrainian nation and it narrates about the long statehood experiences of Ukrainian nation. The narrative of origin challenges the Russian narrative of origin and therefore the strong identity clash is defined already in the narrative of origin. The Ukrainian master narrative also shows that Ukrainians have always fought for their national independence and the leading role in the national independence struggle has been carried through history by different social groups. The national master narrative defines the Ukrainian key identity markers as mainly related to culture (language, education, religion) but also the Cossack spirit and the agricultural character of the society are important identity

markers. The chronotope of Ukraine is slightly wider than current Ukrainian lands but claims for the larger territory are absent.

The Ukrainian master narrative has a strong dissimilative character towards Russia and Russians. It underlines that Ukrainians are an ethnically distinct group from the Russians because they have different historical experiences and therefore they have formed separate nations. Therefore also the Russian image in the Ukrainian master narrative is very negative and Russia is presented as the main enemy of Ukrainian national identity. Russia is also shown as the enslaver who exploits the Ukrainian nation and the land and it is brutal in implementing its yoke over Ukrainians. At the same time Russia is portrayed as the underdeveloped society that has also impeded the developments of Ukrainian nation. Ukrainian self-image is strongly positive where the glorifying elements dominate but the victimising elements have also a significant part in the narrative. The schematic narrative templates are used mainly to mediate the victimising elements. However, they carry a strong dissimilative character.

The historical key events in the Ukrainian master narrative correspond to the previous conclusions. They also focus on the Ukrainian statehood and elevate it as the most important part of the national history. The key events have also glorifying and victimising ratio divided similarly as the self-image elements in the master narrative. The role of Russia in the Ukrainian master narrative key events is mainly negative and corresponds totally to the image of Russia(ns) in the image construction elements.

CHAPTER 4: Analysis of the Georgian Master Narrative

Georgia is a small country located in the South Caucasus. Georgia is defined as a cradle of human history in Eurasia and on its territory different civilisations has developed through the long history. Its history of statehood is relatively long reaching back to the ancient times and culminated in the Middle Ages being a regional great power. However, Georgians have been also conquered by various empires: Persians, Romans, Greeks, Arabs, Seljuks, Mongols, Ottomans and Russians. Modern Georgian independent statehood was established as the result of the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1918 but this independence period was short. Already in 1921 the Bolsheviks took control over the Georgian territory and the following year it became one of the founding members of the USSR. Georgia restored its independence in 1991 when the country aimed at quick international recognition and domestic state-building. Since then Georgia has faced a civil war and secessionist conflicts. These made Georgia take into account the Russian factor and it was one of the reasons why Georgia reluctantly agreed to become a member of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). However, in its foreign policy Georgia aims to integrate into Western political structures. Currently Georgia is one of the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) countries and it is trying to achieve membership of the EU and NATO. Georgia is the only country of the selected case studies that has been at war with Russia recently (2008). Georgian national memory has been suppressed during the period of the Russian Empire. The Soviet Era replaced it with the Marxist-Leninist approach. Only with the restoration of independence did Georgians start to establish anew their extensive national history narrative.

In this chapter I analyse the Georgian master narrative based on history textbooks. Georgian national history teaching is divided into two parts: from the ancient times till the end of the 19th century and the 19th and 20th century.⁸⁸⁰ This division also coincides with the Russian factor: Georgian history before belonging to the Russian Empire and Georgia in the Russian Empire/the USSR. Firstly, I analyse the complex and contradicting narrative of origin of the Georgian nation and I define Georgian national identity markers, including the chronotope of Georgia. Then I assess the general character of the Georgian master narrative and determine the schematic narrative templates used in the master narrative. The third section of this chapter focuses on the analysis of Georgians' self-image and image of significant other, Russia(ns). The final part

⁸⁸⁰ Vachanadze, Merab; Vakhtang Guruli, Mikhail Bakhtadze. *История Грузии (с древнейших времен до 1801 года) Учебник для X класса русской школы* <History of Georgia (from the most ancient times till 1801). History textbook for X form of Russian-language schools>, Tbilisi: Artanudzhi, 2002; Vachanadze, Merab; Vakhtang Guruli. *История Грузии (XIX–XX века) Учебник для IX класса* <History of Georgia (XIX-XX century). History textbook for IX form>, Tbilisi: Artanudzhi, 2004

concludes the analysis of the Georgian master narrative by defining its historical key events and the role of Russia(ns) in them.

4.1. Georgian Narrative of Origin and Main Identity Markers

The Georgian narrative of origin starts with the statement that in Georgia, ‘*The most ancient residents of Eurasia lived in Dmanisi*’.⁸⁸¹ With this statement Georgia is located at the starting point of human history on the entire Eurasian continent. It is a crucial element of the Georgian master narrative that defines the very long time framework of the Georgian history. However, the master narrative is not building up direct linkage between the Eurasian oldest hominids and current Georgian nation and the question of the origin of Georgians is discussed separately. It does not offer one conclusive explanation for this issue. Therefore also the textbooks offers different explanations starting with religious myth about Noah and his descendents and ending with a scientific explanation about the origin of the nation.⁸⁸² The textbook concludes that though there are controversies in the narrative of origin Georgians have lived on their territories since very ancient times. Therefore it offers broad space of interpretation of ancient sources and their connection with the Georgians’ first statehood.⁸⁸³ The oldest statehood of Georgian tribes is related to two names: Diaokhi and Colchis.⁸⁸⁴ The latter is considered as one of the most important source of

⁸⁸¹ Author’s translation ‘В Дманиси жили древнейшие жители Евразии’, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 12

⁸⁸² According to the religious myth mediated by Georgian chronicles from the 9th century claims that Japheth’s grandson Targamos was the ancestor of all Caucasian nations and his son Kartlos ancestor of Georgians. Ancient Greeks considered that Georgians came from the Iberian Peninsula. Scientific explanation is claiming that Caucasian languages are kin languages and Georgians moved to the South Caucasus during the period 14th-8th centuries B.C. Alternative approach claims that 5,000–6,000 years ago Middle East, Northern Africa and Southern Europe were populated by kin tribes that were pushed out by the Indo-European tribes. The ancestors of Georgians were Hurrians (Khurites) of Subartu, who were split over the region. The strongest tribes were Mushki and Tabal who formed later Urartu and thereafter Colchis and Iberia states on the territory of current Georgia. This theory also underlines the kinship between Georgians and Basques. Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 17–18

⁸⁸³ Some authors consider that the oldest Georgian tribe mentioned in the historical chronicles is Kaskians from North-East Anatolia and Black Sea coast. ‘*Together with Kaskians there lived also Tabal and Mushki who were most likely the ancestors of Georgians*’ author’s translation < Рядом с касками жили тубалы и мушки, которые, вероятно, были грузинами.>, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 21

⁸⁸⁴ In 1112 BC first time Diaokhi is mentioned in an Assyrian chronicle, the state is mentioned till the 760s BC in the Urartu chronicles, thereafter Colchis (mentioned first time in the Urartu chronicles related to the raid in 750–748 BC) together with Urartu take control of Diaokhi lands. Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 21

Georgian statehood and significant connection with the ancient Greek states as well as European civilisation.⁸⁸⁵

Another important aspect is related to the unification of Georgians and the formation of a unified state. This process is one of the key questions of the national master narrative. The main division of the country goes along the Western and Eastern territories. In the West there was Colchis and later Lazica-Egrisi state. In the East the most powerful state was Kingdom of Iberia (Kartli).⁸⁸⁶ The name of the current Georgian state is related to the East Georgian state Kartli.⁸⁸⁷ Although these Georgian states were under the influence or vassals dependencies of Persia and Rome (later Byzantine) they are presented as relatively independent actors in international politics who used struggles between great powers to fight for their independence. In the early Middle Ages the ancient Georgian states disappeared. According to the national master narrative the formation of new Georgian states started by the end of the 8th century and the fight for national unification started in the 9th-10th century.⁸⁸⁸ The necessity of national unification is defined by two main arguments: security and socio-economic well-being of the nation.⁸⁸⁹ Georgia was unified during the reign of David IV the Builder (Agmashenebeli) (1089–1125) who liberated Georgia from external domination. In addition, he enlarged Georgian territory by conquered neighbouring countries.⁸⁹⁰ The period of united state lasted one century and it reached its peak during the reign of Queen Tamar (1184–1213) when Georgia controlled the biggest territory in its history, being one of the strongest nations in the Middle East.⁸⁹¹ The master narrative demonstrates that the unification of the land is crucial for a strong and well-developed country.⁸⁹²

⁸⁸⁵ The Greek legend of Golden Fleece is about rich and powerful Colchis, archaeological excavations prove that in West Georgia there was 14th–12th centuries BC strong union of Georgian tribes. Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 22; In the 8th century BC Colchis was considered not as an union of the tribes but as a strong and significant state, which was destroyed by Cimmerians and Scythians, *Ibid*, p. 23; in the later period Greeks had important colonies on the territory of Colchis and thereby the active interaction of Georgian and Greek culture was established, *Ibid*, p. 26

⁸⁸⁶ Kartli (Iberia) was established in the end of 4th century and beginning of 3rd century BC and it became a relatively strong country in the 1st–2nd centuries, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 34–35

⁸⁸⁷ Georgian name in its language is *Sakartvelo*, which includes the main root of the name Kartli.

⁸⁸⁸ Kartli was the centre of attack of Arabian invasion and therefore also the most devastated. The states were formed in the East (Kakheti, Hereti), in the West Abkhasia and Tao-Klarjeti, in central part the Emirate of Tbilisi. In one or another way all these Georgian political forces were fighting for the unification of Georgia in the 9th-10th centuries, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 69–71

⁸⁸⁹ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 72

⁸⁹⁰ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 94

⁸⁹¹ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 111

⁸⁹² It is the period of the economic growth and high level cultural development, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 102–106

It contrasts with the situation in the 13th century when Georgian unity started to fade. The main reason of this process is the Mongol invasion that first divided the country into the Eastern and Western parts and later already into three parts.⁸⁹³ The unity of Georgia was restored by George V the Brilliant who according to the master narrative ended the Mongol Yoke, restored a strong central government and unified the country as well restored its international reputation.⁸⁹⁴ However, it did not last long. The later invaders weakened Georgia again and the country was divided into four parts that fragmented even further.⁸⁹⁵ According to the master narrative, the division of the lands was hastened by the Peace of Amasya (1555) that divided Georgia between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia.⁸⁹⁶ This period in Georgian history is presented as the era of socio-economic downfall and period when the Georgian nation was under the threat of extinction.

The new stage of unification started with the 18th century when Georgian kingdoms tried to form a defensive alliance and several cooperation agreements were signed.⁸⁹⁷ According to the master narrative this process continued in the 19th century when the modern nation was formed by the national movement. It was focused mainly on resistance to the Russian colonial power and protection of Georgian culture and nation.⁸⁹⁸ The Russian Empire conquered former Georgian territories in the South Caucasus and brought together Georgians

⁸⁹³David VI Narin wasn't able to resist to Mongols and moved to Kutaisi where he became the king of Imereti (Western Georgia) in 1259, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 116; in 1266 Samtskhe became as separate unit from Georgian state and the kingdom was divided into three parts, *Ibid*, p. 117

⁸⁹⁴ Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 120–122

⁸⁹⁵ First in the end of the 14th century Tamerlane invaded several times Georgia, later Turcomans. In the middle of 15th century Persia and Ottomans reached the region and facilitated the disunity of the country. In 1490 was agreed that Georgia will be divided into four parts: kingdoms of Imereti, Kartli and Kakheti where ruled three different kings of Bagration dynasty and Atabaghty of Samtskhe where ruled Djakeli dynasty, *Ibid*, 130; during the 16–17th century from the kingdom of Imereti separated dukedoms of Odishi, Guria and Abkhazia, which had independent policies, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 167

⁸⁹⁶ According to this treaty Persians had the Eastern Georgia and Eastern part of Samtskhe-Saatabago and Turkey had free hands to conquer the Western Georgia. According to the national master narrative this treaty became barrier of the unification of Georgia, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 141

⁸⁹⁷ During the rule of father Teimuraz II in Kartli and his son Irakli II in Kakheti these two kingdoms were practically unified. In 1758 Teimuraz II, Irakli II and Solomon I of Imereti made mutual assistance agreement. Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 180–181; in 1773 Imereti and Kartli-Kakheti made new agreement of mutual assistance and the latter convinced Odishi and Abkhazia not to join Ottomans' forces against Imereti, *Ibid*, p. 186; in 1789 nobility of Imereti offered unification of Kartli-Kakheti and Imereti but it was rejected, year later was signed Treaty of kings and dukes of Iberia by Kartli-Kakheti, Imereti, Odishi and Guria, *Ibid*, p. 189

⁸⁹⁸ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 3

under one dominant power.⁸⁹⁹ According to the master narrative this unification facilitated the formation of unified Georgian state. Nevertheless, it emphasises that these territories were all under Russian colonial power that was the main obstacle for Georgian national development.⁹⁰⁰ Therefore the Georgian national movement fought for national independence. It was achieved on May 26, 1918. The new independent nation had to gain international recognition⁹⁰¹ and at the same time to fight for its territorial integrity but in 1921 it was again occupied by Soviet Russia.⁹⁰² By the formation of the USSR (1922) Georgia was first involuntarily included into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, which in 1936 was divided into national republics, whose borders are officially maintained until today.⁹⁰³ The national master narrative also underlines that the Georgian territorial integrity was undermined by the Soviet regime, which formed illegally autonomous areas inside the Georgian territories.⁹⁰⁴ Therefore the restoration of independence in 1991 brought new challenges for the Georgian unity. Secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia pushed the question of integrity of the Georgian national territory

⁸⁹⁹ By the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) Russia got from Ottoman Empire Samtskhe-Javakheti; in 1830 Russia took control over Singilo, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 19–20; during the Russo-Turkish war 1877–1878 Russia conquered also Adjara and other South-Western Georgian territories and it brought together Georgians under Russian domination, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 49–50

⁹⁰⁰ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 50–51

⁹⁰¹ Georgia was recognised by the Entente nations in 1920 and several other nations did, including Soviet Russia (May 7, 1920); however, Georgia failed to get membership in the League of Nations, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 93

⁹⁰² Turkey conquered Adjara according to the Russo-Turkish agreement in 1918 but Georgian Moslems demanded unification with Georgia and achieved it, Georgians also fastened their positions in Samtskhe-Javakheti, defeated Armenians who wanted to take Tbilisi and big part of Georgia and had to fight in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to keep these territories together with Georgia, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 90–91; pp. 98–99

⁹⁰³ Georgian representatives in the Soviet establishment protested to the formation of unified Transcaucasian Federative Republic but they were stigmatised as national-deviationists and the protests was rejected, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 103

⁹⁰⁴ According to the master narrative the formation of the autonomous units inside Georgia served the interests of Russia. Therefore in May 1921 Moscow forced Georgia to recognise the Abkhazian SSR that joined Georgia and practically acted as an autonomous republic in West-North Georgia; in the same year Moscow formed from the region of Samachablo South-Ossetian Autonomous Province; in 1921 Soviet Russia and Turkey signed agreement where Turkey gave Russia Adjara with condition that Russia will remain its religious and cultural autonomy, thereafter Russia formed there Adjara Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. According Georgian master narrative all these formations of autonomous territories were illegal and not justified, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 102

onto the agenda.⁹⁰⁵ In addition, Georgians also had to focus on the internal conflicts that are common practice according to the master narrative.⁹⁰⁶

Another important aspect of the Georgian narrative of origin is the protection of the statehood and Georgians' resistance against the external invaders. In other words, it is strongly linked to the maintenance of the statehood and showing the continuity of the Georgian state from the early times to the present. Although during the majority of its history Georgian state has been dependent on some external great power, Georgian statehood was maintained and external powers ruled the country through local elites, keeping Georgian kings and princes on their earlier positions. Therefore the majority of the Georgian narrative is related to the fights of Georgian kings who tried to decrease the dependency from the external powers and to establish full independence. According to the national narrative Georgia was conquered by Persians and Romans who were fighting for domination in the Caucasus but Georgia remained relatively independent, being totally independence during some periods.⁹⁰⁷ Rome was later replaced by Byzantine and the competition of the great powers in the Caucasus continued. The Arab conquest in the 7th century destroyed the existing system of Georgian statehood and the formation of new states started at the end of the 8th century. These states fought for national independence and it was achieved by the formation of unified state by David IV the Builder. The Mongol conquest in the 13th century started again the period of dependency, though the local rulers stayed in power.⁹⁰⁸ The restoration of independence during George V the Brilliant is one of the positive examples of the successful resistance against external invaders. Although in the later periods there are several Georgian kings and rulers who have had to some extent success against external invaders, Georgia remained under the control of Persians and Ottomans who used Georgia as a battlefield for their own power struggle. In the middle of the 18th century Kartli-Kakheti and Imereti managed

⁹⁰⁵ The national narrative is clearly defining that the resistance to the Georgians was supported by Russia, however Georgia tries to find peaceful solutions to these conflicts, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 132; p. 134

⁹⁰⁶ In 1993 between the supporters of the President and military coup government embarked civil war, in 1994 there was general anarchy in the country, which was taken under control after introducing new constitution in 1995, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 134–135; Internal power struggle has been one of the main topic also in the earlier period of Georgian history when the dominant noblemen have challenged the power of kings, it is also one reason of the disunity of Georgian state.

⁹⁰⁷ Pharasmanes II of Iberia managed to resist to the Roman dominance and extend its territories even to the Roman provinces in Caucasus, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 35

⁹⁰⁸ The peace treaty with Mongols in 1243 incorporated Georgia into the Golden Horde but kings stayed on power, later Mongols approved the kings in Georgia and it lead created disunity of the country, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 114–119

to restore independence.⁹⁰⁹ The national narrative portrays the period since the 15th century as continuous fight for national independence.

During the 18th century the Georgian states were fighting against the Ottoman and Persian conquerors and they tried to find some powerful ally to support their fight because the country was not able to survive any bigger wars. According to the national narrative the only option for national survival was the alliance with Russia, who later abused the signed agreements and liquidated independent state institutions in all Georgian states.⁹¹⁰ According to the national narrative, by this step Russia eliminated Georgian statehood with peaceful means. Something that Persian and Ottoman Empires did not manage by bloody wars through the centuries.⁹¹¹ Therefore the reaction of Georgians to Russian domination was extremely rebellious. Although the annexation of Georgian lands was peaceful the national narrative presents the following 19th century as a continuous fight of the Georgian nation for the restoration of their national independence. Thus the development of national movement is presented as Georgians' conscious activity towards national independence.⁹¹² The national narrative defines the declaration of independence in 1918 as the culmination of the national development where Georgians '*again won the right to independent control of their fate and became one among the free and equal nations of the*

⁹⁰⁹ Aleksander I (1412–1442), Luarsab I of Kartli (1527–1556), Bagrat III of Imereti (1510–1565), Simon I of Kartli (1556–1611), Teimuraz I of Kakheti; in 1748 Kartli-Kakheti last time paid tribute to Persia, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 180; in 1767 the Ottoman Empire had to recognise the independence of Imereti, *Ibid*, p. 185

⁹¹⁰ In 1783 Russia and Kartli-Kakheti signed Treaty of Georgievsk, which established this Georgian state as protectorate of Russia, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 187–188; in 1800 Russian Emperor Paul I signed manifest of termination of Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti and its incorporation into Russian empire. Kingdom of Imereti was annexed to Russia in 1810. Principalities of Mingrelia, Abkhazia and Guria went under Russian control but the local dynasties maintained first their old position, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 5; However, in 1829 the rule of Gurian dukes was terminated, in 1857/1867 the same happened in Mingrelian Principality, in 1864 in Abkhazia. In 1833 Principality of Svaneti became Russian protectorate and it was terminated in 1857, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 25–26

⁹¹¹ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 191

⁹¹² The political resistance in Kakheti (1802), uprisings in Kartli mountain region (1804), Kakheti (1812) and Imereti, Guria (1819–1820) are considered the first stage of national movement to restore the national independence, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 15; the second stage of the national movement is the conspiracy of 1832 which had already proper programme for the restoration of the Georgian independence that followed in the 1860s by Ilya Chavchavadze and Terdaleulni movement as the new stage of national movement, which aimed at protection of Georgian culture and language, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 18, p. 45; the Revolution in 1905–1907 brought some autonomy in Georgia and in 1917 the National Interparty Council of Georgia started to prepare first the autonomy claims in democratic Russia and after the Bolsheviks' coup in Russia declaration of independence, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 82–83

world'.⁹¹³ The short period of independence has also a crucial meaning for the national master narrative. Therefore the assessment to the Soviet occupation is very painful. The reaction of Georgians to the Soviet regime is presented similarly to the period of Russian empire, which is a continuous resistance to Russian dominance.⁹¹⁴ The master narrative underlines that '*the fact of occupation of Georgian by Soviet Russia was not recognized ... All of that had important meaning in the fight for restoration of national independence of Georgia*'.⁹¹⁵

The resistance to Russian domination culminated during Gorbachev's *perestroika*. In 1988 Georgians demanded restoration of the treaty with Russia (1920) that recognised Georgian independence, also acknowledgement of the Soviet occupation and Georgian forcible Sovietisation in 1921 and the replacement of the Soviet troops with the NATO units.⁹¹⁶ In 1990 the Supreme Council of Georgia declared the act of Sovietisation of Georgia as occupation and at the same time the Supreme Council cancelled Georgian participation in the treaty that established the USSR in 1922. The following year an absolute majority of Georgians voted for the restoration of the independent state based on the declaration of the independence in 1918. Thereafter Georgia restored its independence and started to implement independent policies once again. The master narrative defines the declaration of independence in 1918 as the restoration of independence and thereby it connects the Georgian independent nation-state with the Georgian kingdoms and principalities from the 18th century and with the great unified Georgian kingdom from the 12th-13th century. Thereby the national master narrative presents the principle of continuity of Georgian statehood.

The national master narrative also defines the main identity markers. The main activist of Georgian national awakening in the 1860s, Ilia Chavchavadze, wrote in 1860: '*The ancestors bequeathed to us three treasures: homeland, language and religion. Defend and preserve them for posterity – our sacred duty*'.⁹¹⁷ This defines three important key elements: territory, language and

⁹¹³ Author's translation 'вновь завоевал право самостоятельно распоряжаться своей судьбой и встал в один ряд со свободными и равноправными народами мира', Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 86

⁹¹⁴ In 1921 uprising in Svaneti, 1921–1922 partisan uprising in Kakheti and Khevsureti; nation uprising in 1924, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 104–106; in 1941 students resistance, *Ibid*, p. 122; 1956 peaceful meeting of Georgians that was violently suppressed by the Soviet troops, *Ibid*, pp. 125–126; the Perestroika period brought new Georgians' demands and the last bloody event was April 9, 1989, *Ibid*, 129

⁹¹⁵ Author's translation 'но факта оккупации Грузии Советской Россией не признали... Все это имело немаловажное значение в борьбе за восстановление государственной независимости Грузии', Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 98–99

⁹¹⁶ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 129

⁹¹⁷ Author's translation '*Предки завещали нам три сокровища: родину, язык и религию. Отстоять их и сохранить для потомков – наша священная обязанность*', Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 43

religion. **Religion** and the **Georgian Orthodox and Apostolic Church** are key institutions in Georgian history since the conversion to Christianity. This identity marker is strongly integrated into the narrative of origin and the Georgian Church is the symbol of existence of the Georgian nation. The master narrative emphasises in various ways that the Georgian Church has been the key institution in Georgian society that has followed the nation's path and offered the spiritual nutrition for the people when there has been difficult times.⁹¹⁸ Therefore becoming a Christian nation in the 4th century is a pivotal moment for Georgians.⁹¹⁹ The impact of Church and religion is very strong in the Georgian history. On the one hand, it was the main developer of Georgian culture that maintained the particularity of the Georgian nation through history.⁹²⁰ On the other hand, it also played an important role in spreading Georgian influence in the region and to determining Georgian foreign policy decisions.⁹²¹ The master narrative underlines the important role of Georgia in the Crusades and latter European alliances against Ottomans, where Georgia was considered as an important actor in the East.⁹²² Religion was also one of the key factors why Georgians tried to ally with Russia to get protection from the Islamic powers, Ottomans and Persians.⁹²³ On the other hand, Georgians are also presented as the protectors of the true Orthodox religion who did not support deviations from the 'correct path'.⁹²⁴

According to the narrative, the Georgian Church symbolises developments of the Georgian nation and state. It underlines the independence of Church. The

⁹¹⁸ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 70; p. 107; p. 136; p. 138; p. 201; Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 8; p. 51

⁹¹⁹ It is defined as the grandiose event of Georgian history, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 36; in 326 the king of Kartli declared Christianity as the state religion in his country, in Egrisi Christianity was well spread already before the first Council of Nicaea in 325, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 46–47

⁹²⁰ Georgian monasteries became the most powerful instruments of the development of Georgian culture and education, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 53; Culture was developed by the Church and monasteries, *Ibid*, p. 82; The first 14 books printed in Tbilisi print house, 11 were religious ones, *Ibid*, p. 176

⁹²¹ Being in the Christian nation alliance with Rome and later Byzantine was more convenient for Georgia. Being the dominant Christian nation on the Caucasus also increased Georgian influence in the North Caucasus, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 47; p. 74; p. 108; Georgia demanded from Egypt safety of Christians in its territory, *Ibid*, p. 127

⁹²² Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 91; p. 111; p. 121; p. 127; p. 129

⁹²³ Russia was an Orthodox country and therefore also considered as the best possible ally to protect Georgians in the Caucasus, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 144

⁹²⁴ Monophysite was supported politically by Persian rulers and Georgians decided to accept the Diophysitism that led to the Church Schism between Georgia and Armenia. It is defined in the master narrative as the saving of Georgian church as well as Georgian nation, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 108; in the Council of Ferrara-Florence Georgian Church representatives strongly resisted to the unification of the Churches and finally they did not sign the final accord, *Ibid*, p. 127

Autocephaly of the Georgian Church was achieved in the second half of the 5th century. This is considered as a key moment of Georgian Church history.⁹²⁵ Also unification of the Church has importance in the national narrative. It is presented as the predecessor of the state unification.⁹²⁶ The disunity of the state started earlier but also the Church was divided into the two parts. However the narrative underlines that the disunity of the Church played a crucial role in the weakening Georgian state.⁹²⁷ Thus the unification of the Church is also the symbol of the unification of Georgian nation. The Georgian Church was also the object of external suppressions. The master narrative shows how the Islamic rulers have tried to force Georgians to convert to Islam but Georgians stayed loyal to their Church and religion.⁹²⁸ Thereby the master narrative defines religion as the key identity marker of Georgians. After annexation of Georgia by Russia also the independence of Georgian church was terminated. The narrative defines it as a hostile action against the Georgian nation where ‘[r]ussification of the Georgian Church deprived the Georgian nation of spiritual food’.⁹²⁹ The Georgian Autocephaly was restored in 1917 a little before the restoration of national independence. The Soviet regime’s policies implemented parallel to the social repressions also violated the Church. The master narrative connects the political developments and national movements closely to the Georgian church and thereby Church and nation are indissoluble and religion is the key identity factor of Georgian nation.

The second important identity marker for the Georgian nation is their culture. As was mentioned above, Georgian culture has been strongly related to the Georgian Church. In addition, Georgian education and science, and the Georgian language are two significant identity markers related to the Georgian culture. **Georgian language** is defined as unique and different from most European languages⁹³⁰, thus Georgians are unique. The Georgian written

⁹²⁵ Officially Georgian Church was independent but the Catholicos of Kartli was approved by the Patriarch of Antioch till the 760s, thereafter Georgian Church was totally independent till the 19th century, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 108

⁹²⁶ Western Georgian bishops unified around Abkhazian Catholicos and in the 10th century he decided to submit to the Catholicos of Mtskheta (Kartli). In this way the Church of Georgia was united, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 109

⁹²⁷ In the 15th century Western Georgian Catholicos became independent from the Mtskheta Catholicos, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 137–138

⁹²⁸ Individual heroic deeds of Georgian rulers who were captured by the Islamic rulers who tried to force them to convert and thereby also to force Islamisation in Georgia have special attention in the national narrative, e.g. Argveti martyrs David and Konstantin, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 63; Shalva Ahaltshiheli, *Ibid*, p. 113; Simon I, *Ibid*, p. 142; Luarsab II, Ketevan, *Ibid*, p. 158; Teimuraz I, *Ibid*, p. 163; Vakhtang VI, *Ibid*, p. 175

⁹²⁹ Author’s translation ‘Руссификация церкви Грузии лишила грузинский народ духовной пищи’,

⁹³⁰ Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 18–19

language is very old, dating back to the 3rd century BC.⁹³¹ The Georgian language has a particular role also in the Georgian Church that is the main developer of the Georgian language.⁹³² However, in the later period also secular texts were translated into Georgian that helped introduce different cultures to Georgians.⁹³³ The importance of the Georgian language is also underlined by the fact that at the universities Moscow and Petersburg students from the Caucasus were taught in Georgian.⁹³⁴ Together with the Georgian Church the language had a key function in the national movements in the 19th century because due to the Russification policies the use of Georgian language decreased significantly. Therefore the language issue became an important mobilising force in the national movement.⁹³⁵

The importance of the Georgian language for nation identity is also stressed by the examples of Islamised Georgians who have maintained their connection with Georgian mainly through the language.⁹³⁶ The politicisation of Georgian language is related to the national movements in the 19th century that was the unifying force against external suppression. Independent Georgia in 1918 elevated Georgian to the state language that was maintained even during the Soviet period.⁹³⁷

Georgian education and science are also an important identity factor. The master narrative underlines that education has had a crucial role in Georgian society.⁹³⁸ The earlier education in Georgia was related to the Church and Monasteries where Georgian education was not developed only in Georgia but also in Georgian monasteries abroad.⁹³⁹ In addition, Georgians were educated

⁹³¹ The 11th century Georgian chronicler claimed that Georgian alphabet is related to the king Pharnavaz I of Iberia, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 30; the oldest maintained Georgian writing is from the AD 430s, *Ibid*, p. 65

⁹³² Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 65; p. 83

⁹³³ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 106, p. 173; the first printed book in Georgian was the Italian-Georgian dictionary, p. 171

⁹³⁴ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 27

⁹³⁵ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 43, p. 54, p. 70

⁹³⁶ In the 17th century Persian Shah Abbas I forcefully deported 200,000 Georgians to Persia where they were Islamised but maintained the language and consider Georgia their homeland, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 157; South-West Georgians were Islamised but the Georgian language was that kept them close to their historical homeland and saved for full assimilation, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 49

⁹³⁷ In the Georgian Constitution (1921) Georgian language had a separate paragraph, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 89, p. 94; in 1978 Soviet regime wanted to change the Georgian constitution and thereby to remove the paragraph, which was related to Georgian as state language, Georgians rebelled and the changes wasn't made, *Ibid*, p. 127; Russification in the schools undermined education in the earlier stages but at the university level the expansion of Russian language was successfully resisted, *Ibid*, p. 139

⁹³⁸ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 66, p. 104, p. 196

⁹³⁹ Significant educational centres abroad were the Monastery of the Cross in Jerusalem, Iviron Monastery in Athos, Petritsoni Monastery in Asenovgrad (Bulgaria), Black

abroad. The importance of scientific work is highlighted by the master narrative: the first important works are related to the theological issues and Georgian historiography dates back to the 11th century.⁹⁴⁰ External invasions destroyed many of important educational centres; however Georgians managed to restore them.⁹⁴¹ Russian rule is depicted by the national narrative as damaging because it replaced the ancient Georgian education with its own educational system.⁹⁴² Thereby also the educational issues are important part of the national movement.⁹⁴³ During the short period of independence the national university was opened in Tbilisi and higher education was available inside the country for the first time in Georgian history.⁹⁴⁴ This institution became an important centre of national science.⁹⁴⁵ Therefore the main development of Georgian science is related to the Soviet period and it is presented as the maximum result that Georgians were able to do in the Soviet environment.⁹⁴⁶ The master narrative shows the importance of education in Georgian culture and its high development to strengthen national pride. Also other fields of culture are emphasised by the master narrative; however, they are less politicised than religion, language and education. Therefore the latter are also important identity markers in the context of international identity conflict.

The national narrative also defines the Georgian field of activities that can be considered as identity markers. The most important field of activity for Georgians has been **agriculture** and the national narrative defines Georgia as a traditional agricultural land.⁹⁴⁷ Special attention is paid to wine-production and vineries. Wine-production is always underlined as a special field of activity where Georgians have the highest level of skills.⁹⁴⁸ The master narrative

Mountain Monastery in Syria and Georgian monastery in Sinai, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 104

⁹⁴⁰ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 7

⁹⁴¹ The most devastating period was in the 16th-17th centuries, the situation started to change in the 18th century and new schools were opened, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 171, p. 196

⁹⁴² Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 27

⁹⁴³ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 44

⁹⁴⁴ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 94

⁹⁴⁵ Kartvelology was developed already in the 19th century but the opening of national university developed this field further. Georgian science has been initially related mainly to the humanities and with opening of national university also natural sciences started to develop actively.

⁹⁴⁶ The narrative claims that the development in the independent state would be higher but even though the important studies were made, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 112

⁹⁴⁷ Cult of ox is very old in Georgia and master narrative concludes that it proves that Georgia is an agricultural land since ancient times, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 42

⁹⁴⁸ Already in the period of ancient Colchis the wine-production is emphasised and concluded that the trade relations with Greek states did not include wine because it has been Georgian own production, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 26; Georgia has been traditionally famous by its grapes which were grown in all region, in total there were 500 different sort of grapes, *Ibid*, p. 102; it is also interesting to notice that the

emphasises the particularity of Georgian society in the period when industrialisation started and capitalist relations were established. Georgian nation had a strong attachment to rural life and agriculture.⁹⁴⁹ The independent Georgian state appreciated the importance of land and the land reform managed to eliminate the cleavages in the rural community that also facilitated national economic growth.⁹⁵⁰ On the other hand, the Soviet reforms in Georgia after the occupation have destroyed totally the existing agricultural structure and were also responsible for the economic decline.⁹⁵¹ Another important field of activity that depicted as traditional activity of Georgians is the handicrafts where special attention is given to goldsmiths. The specific tradition of goldsmiths is traced back to the Golden Fleece that Argonauts came to find in ancient Colchis.⁹⁵² The high level of goldsmiths is also mentioned through the later period of the history that shows its importance and thereby also can be considered as one of the identity markers.⁹⁵³

The Georgian master narrative pays great attention on the Georgian military history. Georgia's location has attracted lot of external invaders and the internal relations among the nobility have formed the picture of the Georgian past as a bloody and belligerent legacy where the survival of Georgian nation was only possible due to the **great art of war** that the Georgians possessed. The master narrative focuses mainly on the defensive wars when external invaders conquered Georgia and the most of the heroic pictures are related to the liberation war. However, there are also examples of Georgians' successful conquests or raids, but the focus of the narrative is not on conquering wars.⁹⁵⁴ Homage is paid to Georgian soldiers who have fought in the other armies.⁹⁵⁵

description of devastation of external invaders or later Russian punishment troops the destroyed vineyards are always mentioned in the list, thereby the special wine cult in Georgia is mediated.

⁹⁴⁹ The Georgians did not have national bourgeois because most of these enterprises were taken by foreigners. Also the Georgian working class had particular strong attachment to the rural society and the agriculture still gave the bigger income. According to the national narrative Georgians did not have pure worker class but they were more worker-peasants, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 41

⁹⁵⁰ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 92

⁹⁵¹ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 110

⁹⁵² Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 22

⁹⁵³ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 14, p. 25, p. 39, p. 43, p. 87, p. 102

⁹⁵⁴ Conquest of Ganja and Armenian territories, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 94; Georgians' raid to Persia in 1210, *Ibid*, p. 99; Re-conquest of Ganja in the beginning of 12th century, *Ibid*, p. 110

⁹⁵⁵ In the end of the 10th century David III Kouropalate of Tao sent 12,000 Georgians that helped the Byzantine king to win his enemy, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 75; in 1503 Ruler of Ardabil Ismail got significant support from Georgians and it made him to win the battle against Turcomans and later he established in Persia Safavid dynasty on power, *Ibid*, p. 139; in the beginning of the 18th century Georgian played crucial role in the Persian army fighting against Afghans, *Ibid*, p. 175; in the Second World War

Therefore the national master narrative constructs an image of skilful warrior, which is an important Georgian identity marker. This image has been also significant in the national awakening process. In addition, this image includes the strong leader that facilitates the formation of strong centralised government in the country.

Another national characteristic that is mediated by the national master narrative is the **tolerance** of Georgian society. This element constructs the understanding that Georgia is a multinational society and the peaceful relations in this society are '*possible to explain by the indigenous tolerance that Georgians have related to the other nations*'.⁹⁵⁶ The master narrative shows that the Georgians' tolerance has its roots already in the period of Colchis⁹⁵⁷ and in the later periods Georgian kings have also shown very tolerant attitude towards other religions and nations.⁹⁵⁸ The Russian government has changed the demographic situation in Georgia and therefore also different practices were implemented.⁹⁵⁹ According to the master narrative Georgian tolerance was several times challenged because Russia was interested in creating interethnic conflicts but Georgians managed to maintain peace and there were not any ethnic- conflicts in Georgia.⁹⁶⁰ None of the Georgian minorities had any complaints against the Georgian independent government. The national narrative presents the case of secessionist movements as the result of Russian conspiracy against the Georgian state to hinder the formation of independent state institutions.⁹⁶¹ Thereby the secessionist movements do not have any genuine reason for separation from the Georgian state.

According to the master narrative, the **Georgian chronotope** is clearly larger than its current borders. However, the master narrative does not construct any historical claims to these territories.⁹⁶² During its heyday Georgia was a

Georgian soldiers participated in all most important battles where they fought heroically, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 121

⁹⁵⁶ Author's translation '*можно объяснить природной толерантностью грузин по отношению к другим народностям*', Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 9

⁹⁵⁷ Good relations between Georgians and Greek colonists are assumed that differently from the Northern coast colonies the Greek colonies in Georgia did not have any defensive alliance, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 26

⁹⁵⁸ Georgian were generous with Moslems after liberating Georgia from Moslem rulers, *Ibid*, p. 92; Egyptian ruler was pleased that Georgians did not suppress Moslems, *Ibid*, p. 127; relations between Mountain people and Georgians living in the valleys were cooperative and mutually supportive, *Ibid*, p. 164; Independent Georgian army included soldiers and officers from different nationalities, all nations were also represented in the Constitutive Assembly, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 92

⁹⁵⁹ Russia started to bring other nations to Georgia that could increase interethnic conflicts, Russians repressed Moslems, including Georgian Moslems that made them to resettle in Turkish territories, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 9

⁹⁶⁰ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 9, p. 92

⁹⁶¹ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 90; p. 132; p. 134

⁹⁶² It is interesting to note that the analysed textbooks do not include any maps about Georgia, all the historical space is mediated only by the text and naming historical

regional empire that controlled the territories in the entire South Caucasus but the national narrative is not defining these lands as the Georgians' historical homeland. The historical territory of Georgia includes mainly the kingdoms and principalities that were annexed by the Russian Empire: Kingdoms of Kartli-Kakheti, and of Imereti, Principalities of Mingrelia, Abkhazia, Guria and Svaneti. Later Russia conquered also Samtskhe-Javakheti (1829), Saingilo (1830), and Adjara, Shavsheti, Klarjeti, Imerkhevi, Kola-Artaani and Oltisi (1878). All these territories are defined as return of Georgian historical lands that constructs the understanding that these territories compose the historical homeland of Georgians. Current Georgia is smaller than the historical borders of Georgia and these lands that are outside of current Georgia belong mainly to Turkey or Azerbaijan that have been lost due to the agreements made by Russia. A critical aspect today is also Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, which have declared independence but the national narrative is defining these territories as historical Georgian lands where Abkhazians and Ossetians settled in later and that the autonomous structure of these territories has been the result of Russian colonial policies.

Georgia's regional location is foremost South Caucasus (later Transcaucasia⁹⁶³). However, the narrative constructs strong connections also with Europe (via Greeks, Romans and later Christianity) and the Middle East. The master narrative shows that Georgia is politically and culturally a European country that was separated from Europe by the Ottomans conquests.⁹⁶⁴ However, the relations with European countries continued even thereafter. The narrative locates Georgia geographically to the Middle East because Georgia has had most of the interaction with Southern neighbours from the Middle East. Connections with Northern neighbours are not presented as often, they are mainly rare and exotic and the intensive interaction with Russia starts only when Russia annexed Georgian territories.

The Georgian narrative of origin defines Georgians as one of the oldest nations in the Caucasus who have a very long experience of statehood and a rich civilisation. The history of Georgian statehood is constructed as continuing development from the unification of Georgian states to the great Georgian empire and thereafter disunity of the Georgian state that was ended with the annexation of Georgia by Russia. The narrative of origin constructs strong a connection between earlier statehood and current Georgian state. The master narrative defines also the main identity markers that are mainly related to Georgian culture. The key identity marker is the Georgian Orthodox Church but also Georgian language and education have important role in the identity formation. Georgians are identified as a mainly agricultural society where

regions. Chapter about current Georgia is defining Georgia by its official borders that are recognised by most of the states in the world.

⁹⁶³ Transcaucasia (Закавказье) has clear connotation of Russian Empire where it means that it is another side of Caucasus

⁹⁶⁴ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 128

special focus is on wine production. Georgian identity markers are also a strong military dimension and as well as a tolerant and multinational society. The Georgian chronotope is bigger than its current borders but there are not any claims for lost territories. However, it strongly condemns secessionist movements.

4.2. Character of the Georgian Narrative and its Schematic Templates

In this section I analyse how Georgia defines its relations with one of the significant others, Russia(ns). The Georgian master narrative has a strong dissimilative character related to Russia and Russians. 73% of the assessed statements in the analysed history textbooks construct the meaning that Georgia and Russia are different and should be separate. 27% of the assessed statements construct the meaning that Russia and Georgia have similar aims and they should act together (See Chart 4.1.).




Chart 4.1. Character of the Georgian Narrative

It is also important to note that Russia(ns) occur in the Georgian narrative very randomly before the 18th century which shows that the historical contacts between Russia and Georgia have been rather limited. Russia is more important since the 18th century when it expanded more actively towards the Black Sea and Caucasus region. The character of the master narrative before the

annexation in the beginning of the 19th century is more inclusive towards Russia(ns) than in the period when Georgia was under the Russian rule.⁹⁶⁵

Assimilative elements in the Georgian master narrative are related to four different aspects: Russia as ally, personal connections with Russia, cultural connections with Russia and Russian political influence. The most dominant aspect is related to Russia as ally, which is from the period when Russia and Georgian states were both independent units and their relations rather symmetric (See Chart 4.2.). Georgian Russian official relations start from the end of the 15th century when Kakheti sent to Moscow first delegation to seek ally against Moslem invaders.⁹⁶⁶ The dynamics of the allied relations between Russia and the Georgian states is characterised mainly by the different embassies that Georgian kings and princes sent to Russia but usually these delegations failed to gain any significant support.⁹⁶⁷




Chart 4.2. Assimilative Elements in the Georgian Narrative

⁹⁶⁵ 71% of all assimilative statements are related to the period before the Georgian annexation in the beginning of the 19th century, 29% of the assimilative statements are related to the period when Georgia was part of Russian polity. The ratio between assimilative and dissimilative statements before the annexation is (54:46). 22% of all dissimilative statements are related to the period before the annexation in the beginning of the 19th century and 78% of the dissimilative statements are from the period after the annexation. The ratio between assimilative and dissimilative statements after the annexation is (12:88).

⁹⁶⁶ Alexander I of Kakheti sent to envoys to Moscow in 1483 and 1491 but did not get any real support, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 144

⁹⁶⁷ The first initial agreements in 1587/1589 between Russia and Kakheti did not bring any real activities because Russia was too weak to resist to the Ottomans and Persians, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 147; during the 17th century Georgian king Teimuraz looked for assistance three times from Russia but Russia was not able to offer it, as well other Georgian rulers did not achieve anything more than just some sympathy from Russia, *Ibid*, p. 158, pp. 162–163, p. 165; p. 167

However, the narrative shows that both sides were interested in the alliance. Therefore not only weakening Georgian states looked for assistance against the Moslem invaders but also Russia saw Georgians as opportunity to strengthen its position in the Caucasus.⁹⁶⁸ Therefore the master narrative shows mutual interest but these interests turned to be antagonistic when Russia became the most powerful player in the Caucasus and the Georgian states were not able to escape from the “desired” alliances with Russia and it became Russian occupation.⁹⁶⁹

Alliance with Russians is also related to reunification of the Georgian territories with Georgian mainland that were under Russian rule. The master narrative is telling the common struggle that the Russian army and Georgian militia made to liberate these territories from the Ottoman domination.⁹⁷⁰ The unification of the Georgian lands is shown as the active policy of the Georgians who used support Russian. Russia is depicted as an ally in the Georgian master narrative when Georgia has a more serious external threat or when Georgia has needed to fight with its other external enemies. The situation changes immediately when Georgians and Russians are together without additional powers, then the narrative character changes to dissimulative.

The other assimilative statements are related to some personal relations of Georgian royal families with Russian dynasties that can symbolise positive cooperation between Georgia and Russia. However, they are personalised.⁹⁷¹ Broader assimilative statements show implicitly the connection between Russia and Georgia, the most important among them is the political influence. These

⁹⁶⁸ Already the first agreement made between Russia and Kakheti is shown as mutually supportive where both sides had equal benefits, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p.147; also the master narrative shows that Russian support to Georgia became active only in the 18th century when Caucasian region became Russian real interest, *Ibid*, p. 176. However, Georgians are presented as one tool that Russians tried to use in the Caucasus and there was not any significant assistance for Georgians.

⁹⁶⁹ Master narrative constructs the understanding that Russia never gave assistance to Georgia when Georgia needed it but only when it was useful for Russia, at the same time Russia tried to weaken Georgian states by letting Ottomans and Persians loot their territories so they would not later be able to resist to annexation by Russia, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 188, p. 190

⁹⁷⁰ The participation of Georgian troops in the war against Ottoman empire in 1828–1829 when was taken Samtskhe-Javakheti, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 19–20; Georgians were also fighting with Russians in the Russo-Turkish war in 1877–1878 that liberated Adjara and other South Western Georgian territories from the Ottomans’ rule, *Ibid*, p. 50

⁹⁷¹ The Georgian master narrative has a strong personalised character and therefore these personalised relations can be translated also as interethnic relations. However, the number of these relations is not very large and all of them are from the period before the 19th century. The first husband of Queen Tamar was Russian prince Yuri Bogolyubsky; King Irakli I of Kartli was a close friend of Russian Czar Alexis I; Peter the Great had close relations to the Georgian princes Archil and Alexander, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 97, 166, p. 168, p. 177

statements do not define strong connections but they show that the developments in Russia had an impact on Georgian ones as well.⁹⁷² Thereby it synchronises two national histories and implicitly constructs a connection between these two nations. The narrative shows cultural similarity between the two nations, mainly due to the Orthodox Church that is presented as the main factor to define the alliances.⁹⁷³ From the later period the influence of Russian culture is also mentioned; however, it is not underlined.⁹⁷⁴

Dissimilative elements towards Russia(ns) in the Georgian master narrative are mainly explicit and show that Georgia and Russia are separate units and connections between them are not the result of long historical relations. However, there are also implicit elements in the Georgian master narrative that present Georgia as being a part of other regions. In total, the dissimilative elements can be divided into five different categories: Georgia as part of another region, Georgians reluctance towards Russians, Russian failure to build up an alliance with Georgians, Russia as different society, and Russia as separate actor (See Chart 4.3.).




Chart 4.3. Dissimilative Elements in the Georgian Narrative

The implicit elements in the Georgian master narrative are not so strongly presented but the lack of Russia in the earlier periods of Georgian history shows low importance of Russia in the Georgian narrative. As the Georgian

⁹⁷² Rural municipality reform in Russia was implemented also in Georgia; some of Georgian political parties were connected with Russian ones, like Narodniks; Bloody Sunday in St Petersburg in 1905 sparked the revolution also in Georgia; the ideological education in the Soviet Georgia prepared the generation who were rather Soviet citizens than Georgian ones, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 34, p. 47, p. 60, p. 111

⁹⁷³ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 129, p. 144

⁹⁷⁴ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 31

chronotope locates Georgia geographically in the Middle East but culturally and politically in Europe then the same elements are transferable also to dissimilative character of the Georgian narrative. The most important aspect is Georgian relations with Europe that implicitly leaves out Russia for whom Europe is the main significant other.⁹⁷⁵ However, the majority of dissimilative elements are explicit in the master narrative.

The most significant part of the dissimilative elements try to show that Georgians were not satisfied with Russian policies, as well as that there was reluctance among the Georgians to cooperate with Russians. Also the Russian disability to be a reliable ally for Georgia can be defined as a dissimilative statement. The narrative tells about the Georgians' will to cooperate but at the same time in many places it underlines that Russia was reluctant or not able to give this assistance that Georgians expected.⁹⁷⁶ The period before annexation by Russia presents disagreements inside Georgian society about cooperation with Russia.⁹⁷⁷ Also the key agreement that launched the process of the annexation, the Treaty of Georgievsk is presented as the only option that the King of Kartli-Kakheti had and therefore he had to accept '*the big diplomatic mistake. Its consequences were fatal not only for Kartli and Kakheti, but for all Georgia*'.⁹⁷⁸ By this conclusion the master narrative sets a tone for the following period when Georgia is under Russian rule. After the first wave of resistance to the Russian rule the national movement is depicted as the conscious preparation for the national liberation movement from repressive Russian rule.⁹⁷⁹ The declaration of independence in 1918 is shown as natural act but Russia is depicted as the power that is not able to leave Georgia independent and tries through the support of the secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to restore its control over Georgian lands that is not supported by Georgians.⁹⁸⁰ A similar pattern is used about the Soviet period, which is full of strong resistance to Soviet rule and the restoration of the national independence

⁹⁷⁵ The Georgian master narrative underlines intensive cooperation with Greek civilisation and it also tries to show that socio-economic developments were closer to European than Asian ones, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 25, p. 41; active diplomatic relations with Europe and presenting Ottoman conquest of Constantinople as the main disjunction of traditional relations between Europe and Georgia, *Ibid*, pp. 127–128, p. 139, p. 142, p. 176

⁹⁷⁶ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 144, p. 147, p. 158, p. 163, pp. 184–185

⁹⁷⁷ Queen Tamar was not willing to marry with Yuri Bogolyubsky but the noblemen convinced her to do it, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 97; the majority of Georgian noblemen were against King Vakhtang VI action to support Peter the Great's conquest of the Eastern Caucasus, in 1790 Georgian leaders united to cooperate but other rulers did not join the Treaty of Georgievsk, in the end of the 18th century small part of nobility only supported the unification with Russia, *Ibid*, p. 177, p. 189, p. 190

⁹⁷⁸ Author's translation 'большим дипломатическим заблуждением. Его последствия оказались губительными не только для Картли и Кахети, но и для всей Грузии.', Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 188

⁹⁷⁹ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 3, p. 4, pp. 11–18, p. 20, p. 23, p. 56, p. 62, p. 82

⁹⁸⁰ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 83, p. 90

as the natural development of Georgian nation and again Russia tries to use Abkhazia and South Ossetia to maintain its control over Georgia.⁹⁸¹ Thereby the Georgian master narrative constructs a clear understanding that Russian domination should be avoided.

The Georgian master narrative constructs also the understanding that Russia is different from Georgia and when Georgia has been under Russian control then, though the Russian government tried to eliminate the borders between Russia and Georgia, the Georgian narrative presents Russia as another actor. The reforms that Russia implemented in Georgia are presented as hostile towards Georgians and that they aimed to eliminate the differences between Georgian society and Russian society. The main threat presented by the master narrative is assimilation of the Georgians. That is also the main reason why Georgians rebelled against Russian rule.⁹⁸² Russia as a separate actor is shown when the narrative talks about the economic relations between Georgia and Russia, as well the political relations and Russian influence on Georgian political movements.⁹⁸³ In the master narrative related to the independent Georgia the acts that politically create the borders between Russia and Georgia are stressed.⁹⁸⁴ The Soviet period is shown as an imposed and reluctant participation of Georgia in Russian politics.⁹⁸⁵ Thereby the Georgian master narrative shows that Georgia and Russia have been different and though Russia has tried to make Georgia similar to Russia and assimilate it then Georgians managed to maintain their distinctiveness and therefore also they have right for their national self-determination.

In the case of Georgia there are four main **schematic narrative templates**: Unification is Strength, Liberation of the Nation and Empire, Rebellious Spirit of the Nation, and Sacrificing Leader. The two first are clearly glorifying and narrate about the formation of the Georgian nation-state. The two latter ones have strong glorifying elements, but at the same time include victimising elements.

⁹⁸¹ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 99, pp. 104–106, p. 111, pp. 122–123, p. 126

⁹⁸² Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 6–7, p. 9, p. 22, p. 29, p. 45, p. 101

⁹⁸³ In the economic relations trade with Russia is described, showing that Russia is a separate unit from Georgia, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 37–38, 121; about the political influence Narodniks are shown as important movement in Russia but not in Georgia, in the Social-Democratic movement the European influence dominated over Russian one, *Ibid*, pp. 47–48

⁹⁸⁴ The Treaty of Moscow (1920) confirmed the Georgian secession from Russia and that the occupation of Georgia (1921) was not recognised, also the illegalities of the war conducted in Georgia in 1921 when Russia did not declare war but showed it as a civil war, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 93, pp. 96–100

⁹⁸⁵ The narrative claims that the war between Germany and the USSR 1941–1945 was for Russia as the Great Patriotic War but for Georgians it was not and they were forced to participate in this war, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 121

The schematic narrative template **Unification is Strength** is dealing with one of the key issues of the narrative of origin – unification of Georgian nation under one leader.

1. Initial situation: Georgians are disunited and nation is divided by different leaders that causes continuous civil war;
2. The external threat makes the internal situation even more complicated;
3. One strong leader manages to subjugate other leaders and thereby to destroy the external threat;
4. Unity of the nation leads to overall development of the nation.

This narrative template underlines the necessity of unity in the country that is the only solution to create conditions necessary for free development. The unification of Georgia has been one of the main issues in the master narrative. This narrative template is used related to different periods in Georgian history starting with Pharnavaz I of Iberia⁹⁸⁶, Vakhtang Gorgasali⁹⁸⁷, Bagrat III of Georgia⁹⁸⁸, culminating with David IV the Builder (1073–1125)⁹⁸⁹ who established strong Georgian state in Caucasus. The same narrative template is also related to the later Georgian kings like George V⁹⁹⁰ but also about the independent Georgia in the 1990s where Eduard Shevardnadze restored peace.⁹⁹¹ This narrative template underlines unity that is the key for the national independence.

The narrative template **Liberation of the Nation and Empire** is related mainly to the Russian empire because it liquidated Georgian statehood. In the other cases it is less deductable and more related to the next schematic narrative

⁹⁸⁶ Pharnavaz I (3rd century BC) won his opponent Azo in the several battles, external support was used by both leaders. After forming unity of Georgian tribes he implemented centralised government and also Georgian alphabet is related to him, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 29–30

⁹⁸⁷ Georgia was under Georgian domination, Vakhtang I (5th century AD) decided to unify the nation, liquidate the rebelling nobility, at the same time Persia was trying to suppress Georgia, he managed to establish internal unity and resisted successfully against the Persians, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 49–50

⁹⁸⁸ Bagrat III (end of 10th century and beginning of 11th century), he managed to unify most of the Georgian lands, resist successfully the Ganja emir and was first king who was called king of Georgia, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 76–77

⁹⁸⁹ When he came to power the Georgian Kingdom was very weak, strong internal conflicts, Seljuks attacked Georgia but he managed to unify all the country, fight successfully with external enemy and enlarge the Georgian territory over all South Caucasus. With his reign starts Georgian heyday, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 88–93

⁹⁹⁰ George V the Brilliant (1286–1346) he managed to restore the unity in the country, end the Mongol yoke and to restore the Georgian old strength, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 120–122

⁹⁹¹ After restoring independence the military made the coup and removed the President from the power, in 1993 started civil war, before that Abkhazia and South Ossetia separated from Georgia, Russia supported their actions, Shevardnadze came to power and restored the stability in the country, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 132–137

template. This narrative template talks about Georgians' strong will to live in an independent country and the malevolence of the empire.

1. Initial situation: Georgians have managed to establish their independent state but they are alone face to face with several big powers, empires;
2. Georgia left alone is occupied by one of the empires and by liquidating Georgian state institutions it starts to assimilate the Georgian nation;
3. Georgians do not accept this policy and start to revolt and the empire suppresses Georgians' freedom fight;
4. Finally Georgians manage to restore their independence but the empire is not willing to accept it and starts to organise secessionist movements in Georgia.

The Georgian history about the period of being a part of Russian polity is presented exactly by this cycle. During the 18th century Georgian states were consolidating and trying to liberate themselves from Persian and Ottoman domination, looking for external help when left alone, Georgians were occupied by Russia. It liquidated Georgian statehood that led to Russification. Strong Georgian resistance emerged and it culminated finally with the declaration of independence. Russia did not want to accept it and organised secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia was left alone and the Soviet Russia and Turkey tried to conquer the Georgian lands. Finally Soviet Russia occupied Georgia, started forceful sovietisation and it was met with strong resistance by Georgians that culminated with restoration of independence. Russia did not want to accept it and started to organise secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This narrative template shows that the external occupation is not tolerated by Georgians and they try to restore their own statehood by every means. Although it creates difficulties for Georgians, independence is the only acceptable solution for them.

The third narrative template is also partly glorifying and similar in its meaning with the previous one, but it has a victimising ending. **Rebellious Spirit of the Nation** is similarly with the previous one narrating about the Georgians' resistance to external domination.

1. Initial situation: Georgians are conquered by an external power that starts to exploit the nation;
2. Georgians do not accept the exploitation and they organise resistance;
3. Resistance is successful and the invader's troops are destroyed;
4. Invader sends stronger troops that devastate the land and suppress Georgian resistance though they fight bravely until the last drop of blood.

This narrative template is used to narrate about the periods when Georgia has been dependent. All failed revolts end with the same victimising ending and it leads to a next revolt, e.g. the Revolt of Egrisi⁹⁹², rebellion against Arabs⁹⁹³,

⁹⁹² In the 6th century Western Georgian state Egrisi used the Persian to liberate from Byzantine domination but it started Persian domination, they were fighting against Persian successfully but they had to return to the Byzantine domination, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 54–56;

against Mongols⁹⁹⁴, against Persians⁹⁹⁵ and Ottomans⁹⁹⁶. The same narrative template is also used to tell about the revolts against Russians.⁹⁹⁷ This narrative template shows that Georgians are not willing to accept external power and they are fighting for their national independence. At the same time it also emphasises the destruction that the external powers wrought on Georgia.

The fourth narrative template is personalised. The narrative template **Sacrificing Leader** narrates about Georgian leaders who instead of letting the nation suffer sacrifice themselves and save the nation.

1. Initial situation: an external power has implemented its yoke over Georgians;
2. Georgians revolt but fail and their leader is under the wrath of the external power;
3. The Georgian leader has option to follow own interest or to be punished personally and thereby to save the nation;
4. The leader stays loyal to the nation and is punished by the external power.

This narrative template is not so often in use but it occurs time to time to show the respect towards Georgian leaders who saved the nation.⁹⁹⁸ Also the narratives, which talk about the forced Islamisation and the Georgian leaders' resistance to this conversion and cruel punishment thence,⁹⁹⁹ can be explained by this narrative template because the leader of the nation has symbolic meaning of the conversion and thereby the rejection of leaders to convert is applauded by the master narratives. On the one hand, this narrative template

⁹⁹³ In the end of the 8th century Georgian were not able to accept Arabs' domination and rebelled, Arabs sent new troops and Georgian revolt was punished, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 63–64

⁹⁹⁴ In the middle of the 13th century Georgian kings rebelled against Mongols, they won the first battle but after Mongols brought new army they had to obey them again, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 116–117

⁹⁹⁵ In the 16th century Georgians were actively fighting against Persians who managed to suppress the resistance and it started again; in the beginning of the 17th century Persian Shah Abbas I made several devastating raids to Georgia to suppress the rebellion, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 140–143, pp. 155–157

⁹⁹⁶ In the middle of the 16th century King Vakhtang III of Imereti fought against Ottomans; In the end of the 16th century Ottomans were fighting with Simon I; Fight over the Samtskhe Saatabago in the first half of the 17th century, Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 148–149; pp. 142–143; pp. 169–170

⁹⁹⁷ Revolt in Kartli (1802), Kakheti (1812), Imereti, Guria (1819–1820), Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 12–15; as well also about Georgian resistance in the 1921–1922, 1924 to the Soviet regime, *Ibid*, p. 104–106

⁹⁹⁸ David Ulu and Sargis Djakeli in the 1260s, Demetre II the Self-sacrificing in 1289, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 117

⁹⁹⁹ The best known examples are King Luarsab II of Kartli and Queen Keteven who were captured by Persian Shah Abbas I and forced them to convert to Islam. They rejected it because they knew that it would weaken the importance of Christianity in Georgia and both were killed. Later Georgian Church canonised them, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 158

victimises the leader but on the other hand, it also glorifies him/her and creates a heroic pattern of behaviour.

The Georgian master narrative has a strong dissimilative character towards Russia(ns). Although there are historical moments where Georgia was interested in cooperation with Russia the dominant position of Russia has constructed the master narrative that condemns Russian policies and creates barriers between Russians and Georgians. The Georgian schematic narrative templates are well related to the Georgian narrative of origin that underlines the necessity of unity and Georgian resistance to the external domination. The dissimilative character is also reflected in the Georgian schematic narrative template.

4.3. Images of Self and Other in the Georgian Master Narrative

In this part the images of Self and significant Other in the Georgian master narrative are analysed. It includes different significant Others, most important are Turks, Persians/Iranians and Russians. The two first nations are dominating in the narrative till the 18th century, thereafter the significance of Russia increases and the two last centuries of Georgian history are mediated through the framework where Russia is Georgia's relational other. Therefore the Georgian self-image dominates by covering more than 75% of the assessed narrative elements.

The Georgian narrative is very strongly loaded by assessing epithets and therefore the images of self and other are clearly presented on the positive-negative scale. The self-image in the Georgian master narrative is mainly positive and corresponds to the same ration of negative image of the other. Positive other and negative self have much smaller share in the Georgian master narrative (See Chart 4.4.).




Chart 4.4. Images of Self and Other in the Georgian Narrative

The elements of positive image of Georgians cover more than 80% of the self-image. The Georgian positive image is presented mainly by the glorifying elements that underline Georgian heroic deeds and successes, which corresponds to their historical independent statehood. Victimisation of Georgians is less used and parallel to the glorifications. Negative image is usually whitewashed by justifications; to a lesser extent it personalises wrongdoings (See Chart 4.5).




Chart 4.5. Narrative Elements about the Georgian Self-Image

The Georgian master narrative glorifies all aspects of the Georgian past. The most dominant is general success that Georgians have achieved; the military braveness of Georgians and the rebellious spirit of the nation are also glorified. Significant part of the self-image is also dedicated to the cultural glorification of Georgians. Other aspects are less decorated by the glorifying elements (See Chart 4.6.).




Chart 4.6. Glorifying Elements about the Georgian Self-Image

The most glorifying aspects in the master narrative are connected to Georgians' success-stories, which are mainly related to the Georgian statehood but also to the Georgian church. The statehood related successes vary from glorifying the strength and power of Georgian state,¹⁰⁰⁰ successful conquests of additional territories¹⁰⁰¹ to unification of the nation and restoration of the independent nation-state.¹⁰⁰² Political successes are also related to the domestic reforms in the independent Georgian state.¹⁰⁰³ The Georgian Church presents a parallel to

¹⁰⁰⁰ The strength and might of Colchis (Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 22–23, p. 27), Kartli (*Ibid*, pp. 33–35), Lazica-Egrisi (*Ibid*, p. 36, p. 50) or the mighty and power of unified Georgian state during David IV the Builder and Queen Tamar (*Ibid*, pp. 92–93, p. 99, p. 101, p. 105, p. 111).

¹⁰⁰¹ Georgian conquest of Armenian lands (Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 34–35), Ossetians and the most of the South Caucasus by David IV the Builder (*Ibid*, p. 90, pp. 92–93, p. 97, p. 99)

¹⁰⁰² Mostly after the Georgian heyday but before it is related to Vakhtang I Gorgosali (Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 49) who fought against Persians and also that Georgia managed to maintain its local authorities under Persian domination (*Ibid*, p. 52, p. 57, 58) and liberation war against Arabs (*Ibid*, p. 62) thereafter it focuses on the unification of Georgia (*Ibid*, pp. 70–73, p. 76, pp. 88–90, p. 92, p. 100). The period after Georgian Empire the glorifying elements are related to the Georgian success in the fight against Mongols (*Ibid*, p. 116, pp. 119–122), Tamerlane (*Ibid*, p. 124), Persians (*Ibid*, p. 140, pp. 179–180) and Ottomans (*Ibid*, p. 140, p. 142, p. 168). In the 20th century the declaration of independence and international recognition have been glorified (Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 83, p. 85, p. 86, p. 93) as well the restoration of independence and active integration in the international system (*Ibid*, p. 131, pp. 137–138).

¹⁰⁰³ The reforms of David IV the Builder (Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 90, p. 95, p. 101), Alexander I of Georgia (*Ibid*, p. 126), Levan of Kakheti (*Ibid*, p. 150), Archil of Kakheti

the Georgian state and therefore also the success-stories of the Church are depicted by glorifying elements.¹⁰⁰⁴ The majority of the success-stories are related to the glorious Georgian past before the 18th century.¹⁰⁰⁵ The period when Georgia was occupied by Russia/the USSR is mediated by less glorifying elements, mainly related to the national movements and some successful resistance, including the restorations of independence.¹⁰⁰⁶ Also the period of independence in the 20th century has been relatively short and not full of success-stories that keep the usage of glorifying elements the least for that period.¹⁰⁰⁷

Military successes have an important place in the positive Georgian self-image and these are mediated by glorifying elements. The glorification is used from the first Georgian statehood¹⁰⁰⁸ till the Second World War¹⁰⁰⁹ where Georgian soldiers are described as extremely courageous and successful fighters. The defensive wars are more glorified than the conquering wars.¹⁰¹⁰ However, Georgian conquests during its heyday in the 12th–13th century are

(*Ibid*, p. 165), Levan II of Dadiani (*Ibid*, p. 168) but also reforms of independent Georgia (Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 86, p. 92, p. 135)

¹⁰⁰⁴ Starting with conversion to the Christianity in the 4th century (Vachanadze et al, p. 36) that continued with the declaring Autocephaly of Georgian Church (*Ibid*, p. 50, pp. 107–108), successfully defended Georgian positions in the Schism with Armenian Church (*Ibid*, p. 59, p. 108) and unification of Georgian Church is glorified as the symbol of unification of Georgian nation (*Ibid*, p. 109). Also important success is considered the restoration of Autocephaly of the Georgian Church in 1917, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 82

¹⁰⁰⁵ They cover 70% of the Georgian glorifying elements

¹⁰⁰⁶ Also here are important the unification of Georgian lands (Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 20, pp. 49–50) but the main emphases is on glorifying the national movements who managed to protect the Georgian language and culture (*Ibid*, pp. 42–43, 46–48, p. 51, p. 54, p. 56). Successful resistance to the Soviet power that led to the restoration of the independence has been also glorified (*Ibid*, pp. 128–131). In total they cover less than 20% of glorifying elements.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Slightly over 10% of the glorifying success-stories.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Successfully fought of Mushki, Diaokhia, Colchis, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 21, p. 23

¹⁰⁰⁹ It is the last war where Georgians participated in significant numbers. However, it is defined as not a Georgian war and the Georgian nation is presented as victim of being involved in the war. The narrative underlines that Georgian soldiers participated bravely in all important battles, as well in the partisan war, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 121–122

¹⁰¹⁰ Starting with fight against Romans (Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 32), and continuing with defensive war against Persians (*Ibid*, p. 52, pp. 54–56, p. 141, pp. 156–157, p. 159, pp. 160–161, p. 181, p. 190), Byzantine (*Ibid*, p. 52, p. 60, p. 79), Arabs (*Ibid*, p. 61), Seljuks (*Ibid*, p. 80, p. 88), Khawrezm (*Ibid*, p. 113), Mongols (*Ibid*, p. 123), Tamerlan (*Ibid*, pp. 123–124), Turkomans (*Ibid*, p. 164), Ottomans (*Ibid*, pp. 142–143, p. 148, p. 182, pp. 185–186; Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 5, p. 50, p. 68), Russians (Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 13–15, pp. 19–20, p. 47, p. 83) the master narrative plays homage to Georgian soldiers.

glorified as well.¹⁰¹¹ Georgian soldiers who have fought bravely in other armies have got glorifying epithets in the master narrative.¹⁰¹² Since there have been many wars on Georgian territory where its own troops have participated, then all victories are glorified but also most of the losses are underlining that the Georgian soldiers fought bravely till the end. This aspect of the Georgian positive self-image constructs militancy as one of the Georgian identity markers. Similarly to courageousness, Georgians' rebellious spirit is glorified in the master narrative. The master narrative constructs the image of Georgians that they never accepted the domination of others and they used every situation to resist their yoke. In this part it is related to the previous element that underlines braveness but also peaceful resistance is glorified.¹⁰¹³ By glorifying the Georgians rebellious spirit the master narrative constructs the understanding that Georgians are a freedom-loving nation and the only possibility for the Georgians is an independent nation-state.

A very important part of the glorifying elements in the master narrative is dedicated to Georgian culture. It is also one of the most significant identity markers and therefore the master narrative emphasises the greatness of Georgian culture that is ancient and has developed through the centuries, even during the most complicated times. The narrative stresses that Georgian culture can develop successfully only in an independent nation-state. Although it is highly developed, external powers have limited its free development.¹⁰¹⁴ Georgian culture is glorified as influential in the Caucasus region.¹⁰¹⁵ A significant part is dedicated to the role of religion and thereby it stresses the Georgian Church as one of the key identity markers.¹⁰¹⁶ Also secular culture has its importance in the national master narrative and the developments in science, literature, architecture, art and cinematography. All are glorified and presented as unique and extraordinary and creating a distinctive Georgian civilisation.¹⁰¹⁷ Thereby national culture is also a key element of the Georgian national identity.

¹⁰¹¹ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 91–94, p. pp. 97–99, p. 110

¹⁰¹² David III Kuropalates of Tao's army successfully supported the Byzantine Emperor, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 75; Georgian soldiers in Persian army, *Ibid*, p. 139, p. 155, p. 175; Georgian soldiers in the Russian army Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 68, pp. 121–122

¹⁰¹³ Most of the peaceful resistance is related to the period when Georgia was under Russian rule, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 11–12, p. 18, pp. 44–45, p. 53, p. 60, p. 70, p. 105, p. 111, pp. 122–123, p. 126, p. 127, pp. 129–130

¹⁰¹⁴ Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 104–106; Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 94–95, p. 112; p. 143

¹⁰¹⁵ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 123, p. 197; Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 27

¹⁰¹⁶ After the Christianisation of Georgia Christianity played crucial role in developing the culture, churches and monasteries became the main cultural and educational centres and not only in Georgia but also abroad the Georgians monasteries played important role, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 53, pp. 65–68, pp. 82–84, p. 104; p. 118; p. 133

¹⁰¹⁷ Science: Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 118, p. 172, p. 190, pp. 197–198, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 28, pp. 71–72, pp. 74–77, p. 94, pp. 113–114, pp. 139–140; literature: Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 84–85, pp. 105–106, p. 134, pp. 171–172, p. 196, p. 199,

Other glorifying elements are not so frequent but they stress important aspects in the master narrative. The richness glorifies the natural resources of Georgia and its socio-economic successes.¹⁰¹⁸ The successful development of Georgia is related to the unification and Georgian heyday in the 12th-13th century¹⁰¹⁹ and in the later times during the longer peaceful periods.¹⁰²⁰ Successful economic development is related to independence in the 20th century.¹⁰²¹ In other words, economic growth and wealth is correlated with the unified and peaceful Georgia. Significance of Georgians is related mainly to its old civilisation starting from the first hominids in Georgia and developing together with the first civilisations in the Middle East.¹⁰²² Another aspect is related to the Georgian importance in history that is mediated by glorifying elements.¹⁰²³ A specific aspect is personalised heroic deeds that have also a victimising aspect included.¹⁰²⁴ However, they are constructed rather to glorify these national leaders and to strengthen national pride.

Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 28–30, p. 32, p. 70, p. 115, p. 117, p. 123, p. 140, p. 142; architecture: Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 86, p. 106, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 77; art: *Ibid*, pp. 77–78, p. 142; cinematography: *Ibid*, pp. 77–78, pp. 118–119, p. 143

¹⁰¹⁸ Georgian climate and nature are rich and suitable for agriculture, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 4; findings of copper, gold, *Ibid*, p. 14, p. 22; well developed cities and handicraft in earlier times, *Ibid*, p. 39, p. 42, p. 43, p. 87

¹⁰¹⁹ The period of unification of Georgia brought economic growth, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 82, economic development was high since David IV the Builder, *Ibid*, p. 90, pp. 102–104

¹⁰²⁰ The period of reign of Rostom Khan was peace and development of economics (Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 162, p. 194) and Archil of Kakheti (*Ibid*, p. 165), Irakli II of Kartli-Kakheti (*Ibid*, p. 195)

¹⁰²¹ Successful land reforms facilitated economic development, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 92; end of the civil war and stabilisation of the political sphere brought economic development to the land, *Ibid*, p. 136

¹⁰²² Oldest hominids in Eurasia, Vachanadze et al, p. 12, old civilisations in Georgia and their connections with other old civilisations, *Ibid*, p. 12, pp. 20–23

¹⁰²³ Geopolitical importance: Georgian trade routes (Vachanadze et al, p. 28), lock of Caucasus mountains (*Ibid*, p. 117); Georgian political importance: reception of Pharasmanes II of Iberia in Rome (Vachanadze et al, p. 35), Georgian delegates in European courts (*Ibid*, p. 139), influence of April 9, 1989 on international developments, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p.130

¹⁰²⁴ Mainly they are related to rejection of conversion to other religions and many of these persons are also canonised, some of them are just national heroes because of the brave deed: Vakhtang I Gorgosali (Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 50), brothers David and Konstantin of Argveti (*Ibid*, p. 64), Abo (*Ibid*, p. 64), Shalva Ahaltsiheli (*Ibid*, p. 113), Tsothe Dadiani (*Ibid*, p. 115), Sargie Jagueli (*Ibid*, p. 117), Demetre II (*Ibid*, p. 118), King Konstantin I and his court (*Ibid*, p. 126), Simon I (*Ibid*, p. 142), Priest Theodore (*Ibid*, p. 156), Luarsab II and Ketevan (*Ibid*, p. 158), king Teimuraz (*Ibid*, p. 163), Vakhtang VI (*Ibid*, p. 176), Princess Mariam (Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 8), Duchess of Mingrelia (*Ibid*, p. 25), Duke of Svaneti (*Ibid*, p. 26), Ilia Chavchavadze (*Ibid*, pp. 75–76), Catholicos-Patriarch Ambrose (*Ibid*, p. 105), Zhuli Shartava (*Ibid*, p. 134)

In addition to the glorifying elements also victimising elements construct positive self-image of Georgians. It narrates about the national sufferings but still managed to survive and to restore independence. The Georgian victimisation elements can be divided into four groups: annihilations and repressions, looting and conquest of Georgia, external factors cause suffering, and Georgia was left alone (Chart 4.7.). Due to the long external domination and numerous wars in Georgia the annihilations, repressions and looting and conquests dominate heavily in the master narrative.




Chart 4.7. Victimising Elements about the Georgian Self-Image

The external powers, which have conquered Georgia, have implemented different policies to exploit Georgia and to make it pay tribute.¹⁰²⁵ It is presented as a heavy burden that Georgian had to carry. Another aspect is related to the destruction of Georgian traditional society that is mostly implemented by Russia.¹⁰²⁶ This group of victimising elements includes different repressions by external powers to suppress the Georgians' resistance and again the Russian/Soviet repressions have a significant part in this aspect.¹⁰²⁷ In total, the

¹⁰²⁵ Persian yoke: Vachanadze et al, p. 26, p. 54, p. 179; Arab yoke: *Ibid*, p. 62, Mongol yoke: *Ibid*, p. 114–116; Ottoman yoke: *Ibid*, p. 152, p. 178, the Second World War mobilised 700,000 Georgians, 300,000 of them were killed, economic exploitation of Georgia, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 121, p. 123

¹⁰²⁶ Persian policies: cultural expansion (Vachanadze et al, p. 107), resettlement of Turcomans in Georgia and destruction of local agriculture (*Ibid*, p. 164); Ottomans introduced their administrative system in some Georgian territories (*Ibid*, p. 151); Russification policy (Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 7, p. 9); Sovietisation of Georgia (*Ibid*, pp. 108–110)

¹⁰²⁷ Persian repressions: Vachanadze et al, p. 48, p. 52, Arab repressions: *Ibid*, p. 69, pp. 71–72, Russian/Soviet repressions: limitations for research (*Ibid*, p. 9; Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 3), political repressions (*Ibid*, pp. 6–7, p. 10, pp. 12–13, p. 61, p. 103, p.

Russian repressions and destructions cover almost half of all these victimising elements. Annihilation is also mediated by the general description of the socio-economic situation during the war periods in Georgia and later also Soviet policies.¹⁰²⁸ All these aspects show that the Georgian nation has suffered heavily and in many times the nation has been at the edge of extinction.

A second group of victimising elements that have significant role in the Georgian master narrative is related to conquests and lootings in Georgia. In the narrative the loss of independence is not so strongly lamented but the invasions and plundering in the country are described very colourfully. The master narrative draws a conclusive path of the invasion starting with attacks against ancient Colchis by Cimmerians and Scythians¹⁰²⁹ and going through most of the significant invasions by Rome, Persians, Byzantine, Khazars, Arabs, Seljuks, Mongols, Tamerlane, Turcomans, Persians, Ottomans and culminating with the liquidation of Georgian states by the Russian empire.¹⁰³⁰ All these conquests are violent and bring a lot of destruction for Georgia, except the Russian annexation that peacefully subjugates the country. Thereby the latter is also victimised more.

106, p. 112, p. 124, p. 125, p. 129), economic repressions (*Ibid*, pp. 108–110), cultural repressions (*Ibid*, p. 9, p. 52–53, p. 78, p. 112, p. 114, pp. 124–125, p. 139)

¹⁰²⁸ Cimmerian and Scythian conquest was the main obstacle of economic development (Vachanadze et al, p. 25); period of Arabian-Khazars wars that devastated Georgia (*Ibid*, 63); Mongols internal wars destroyed Georgian lands (*Ibid*, pp. 117–120); Attacks of Tamerlane devastated the land and destroyed the normal development for a long period (*Ibid*, p. 125); Period of the 13th-15th century had destroyed Georgian socio-economic structure (*Ibid*, pp. 131–133); Difficult economic situation also made hard times for the Georgian art (*Ibid*, p. 135); Persian invasions in the beginning of the 17th century destroyed Eastern Georgia, (*Ibid*, p. 157); the 17th century the socio-economic situation in Georgia was catastrophic, heavy decline of population (*Ibid*, p. 169); the 16th-17th century as the most difficult period in the history, economic downfall and heavy population loss, cultural centres did not work (*Ibid*, p. 171, p. 173); by the end of the 18th century Georgian population was decreased to 700,000–800,000 people that made the survival of the nation questionable, (*Ibid*, p. 187); period of the 16th-18th century were the most difficult times if the country (*Ibid*, p. 194, p. 197, pp. 201–202); under Russian rule the survival of Georgian nation was even more questioned (Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 6); Russian repressions made Georgian Moslems to move Turkey and Russians resettled other nations to Georgian lands (*Ibid*, p. 9); socio-economic situation in the Soviet times very difficult, economic downfall (*Ibid*, p. 108, pp. 125–128)

¹⁰²⁹ Vachanadze et al, p. 23

¹⁰³⁰ Roman (Vachanadze et al, p. 32), Persian-Byzantine war (*Ibid*, p. 47, p. 52, p. 56), Arab, Khazars (*Ibid*, pp. 60–63, p. 69, p. 73), Seljuks (*Ibid*, pp. 80–81), Mongols (*Ibid*, pp. 111–112, p. 114), Tamerlane (*Ibid*, pp. 123–124), Turcomans (*Ibid*, p. 127, p. 130), Persians (*Ibid*, pp. 140–141, p. 157, p. 190), Ottomans (*Ibid*, p. 148, p. 150), Dagestanians (*Ibid*, pp. 175–176, p. 184), Russians (*Ibid*, p. 188; Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 3–5, pp. 24–25)

Other victimising elements are less frequently used; however, the elements that show that Georgia was left alone without external support have important meaning. The master narrative shows that Georgia has faced strong external threat but though it sought external support there was not any other nation who would assist Georgia and often it leads to the conquest of Georgia. This element is used to narrate how Georgia was looking for support against Ottomans and Persians in Europe and in Russia.¹⁰³¹ But it is also used to explain why Georgia was not able to resist to Russia in the beginning of 19th century and also during the independence in 1918–1921.¹⁰³² It presents Georgia as a small country in whose fate nobody was interested and this brought devastating consequences for Georgia. In other words, it assumes that Georgia was not able to control its own fate and it has done all that a small country can do against a big power. There are also few victimising elements that show that Georgia suffered due to external influence that Georgia was not able to control.¹⁰³³ However, these are less used in the master narrative.

Negative aspects of the Georgian national self is presented by justifying and personalising elements. Although Georgian master narrative has a strong personalising approach in general, the justifications are more used than personalising mistakes in the past.




Chart 4.8. Justifying Elements about the Georgian Self-Image

Most of the justifications bring some explicit reason why something happened: Georgia was too weak, ruler wanted to protect Georgia or others made Georgians to fail. There are also some marginalising elements (See Chart 4.8.).

¹⁰³¹ E.g. Vachanadze et al, p. 129, p. 141, p. 166, p. 170, p. 176, p. 178

¹⁰³² Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 5, p. 17, pp. 97–98, p. 105

¹⁰³³ Changes of the trade routes (Vachanadze et al, p. 129), bordering with the Ottomans Empire (*Ibid*, p. 129), Treaty of Amasya that confirmed the division of Georgia by Persia and Ottomans (*Ibid*, p. 141), bordering with Persia (*Ibid*, p. 151)

The justifications that either Georgia was too weak to resist or Georgia had made something to defend the nation have been the main justification elements in the master narrative. The weakness of Georgia as a justification is mainly presented as a result of some earlier wars or enemies' superiority and therefore Georgia was not able to defend itself or to resist invasion.¹⁰³⁴ In some cases there are also other reasons that show why Georgia was too weak to resist.¹⁰³⁵ Most of the arguments related to weakness are connected to military resistance but few also to political resistance.¹⁰³⁶ Justification elements that explain that Georgia had to defend itself are also connected to the low will of resistance and readiness to obey external rulers.¹⁰³⁷ Only few justifications are given to Georgian aggressive policies towards other nations because the expansion of Georgia is rather glorified by the national narrative.¹⁰³⁸ Therefore by these

¹⁰³⁴ Armenia minor attack to Kartli that was weakened by the internal wars lead to the conquest of Southern territories, Vachanadze et al, p. 31; Georgia was too weak to resist to the strong Byzantine Empire and therefore it returned the lands given David III Kuropalates of Tao, *Ibid*, p. 76; Georgia was weakened by Khwarezm Empire to resist to Mongols, *Ibid*, p. 114; in the 16th century disunited Georgia was not able to resist to the powerful enemies like Ottomans or Persians, *Ibid*, p. 139; Ottomans managed to win Simon I because they were too strong, *Ibid*, p. 143; Georgians lost Battle of Marabda (1625) because Persian army outnumbered Georgian one, *Ibid*, p. 160; Kartli-Kakheti was weakened by Persians and therefore they could not resist the Russians, *Ibid*, p. 190; in 1921 Soviet and Georgian troops were not equal and also Turkey threatened with invasion that lead the government to emigrate, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 98

¹⁰³⁵ Cimmerians were successful against Colchis because of the used cavalry, Vachanadze et al, p. 23; King Vakhtang I Gorgosali was too young to be able to control the political developments and it led to the internal conflicts, *Ibid*, p. 48; Georgians planned to participate in the Crusades but their participation was disturbed by invasions, *Ibid*, p. 111, p. 113

¹⁰³⁶ King of Imereti was forced to become protectorate of Russia, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 4; Dukes of Abkhazia realised that they are not able to resist to Russia and agreed with liquidation of the state institutions, *Ibid*, p. 26; Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was made, though Georgian delegates were against but their opinion was not taken into account, *Ibid*, p. 102; Georgia was weakened by the civil war and wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia forced it to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, *Ibid*, p. 137

¹⁰³⁷ King of Kartli Amazasp III agreed to become Persian vassal to avoid the conquest, Vachanadze et al, p. 36; to defend their lands for Byzantine Lazs decided to cooperate with Persians, *Ibid*, p. 54; to maintain the local governance Kartli king decided to surrender to Arabs, *Ibid*, p. 61; peace with Mongols was the only way to maintain the unified Georgia, *Ibid*, p. 114; Bagrat V had to cooperate with the Golden Horde because Tamerlane was not willing to conclude an agreement and Georgia needed support, *Ibid*, p. 122; Kakheti accepted vassal dependency to develop the country, *Ibid*, p. 144, pp. 146–147; Vakhtang VI converted formally to Islam to return to country and liberate it, *Ibid*, p. 176; Russia threatened Mingrelia with external threat and it allowed Russia to intervene its internal affairs, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 4;

¹⁰³⁸ Georgians conquered again Ganja because their example could undermine the empire, *Ibid*, p. 110; Georgia used weapons against Abkhazians and Ossetians only

justifications the master narrative mainly constructs the self-image of rebellious nation and low will to resist is explained by weakness or necessity to defend the nation from bigger devastation.

Georgian failures are also mediated by the explaining it with an external factor that Georgians could not control. Mainly these are faults of others: either untruthful allies who did not fulfil their commitments¹⁰³⁹ or the enemies who used dishonest methods to fight against Georgians¹⁰⁴⁰. Thereby the failure of Georgians was not related to their bad qualities but the others made Georgians to fail. Some negative moments of Georgian narrative are also hidden by marginalisation of these elements. Either the emphasis is made on something else that covers the negative aspect¹⁰⁴¹ or the activity is shown as not so important¹⁰⁴². Thereby the negative aspects of the self-image are diminished and the positive self-image dominates.

when territorial integrity was questioned, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 93; Georgian troops went to Abkhazia to protect people there but they were quickly involved into the war activities, *Ibid*, p. 134

¹⁰³⁹ Georgian lost the battle against Persians because the Huns did not deliver sufficient assistance, Vachanadze et al, p. 50; Georgians tried to get help from Khazars but they couldn't, *Ibid*, p. 64; Kipchaks did not support Georgians because Khwarezmians convinced them not to help Georgians, *Ibid*, p. 114; Russians had to protect Georgians but they did not and let Persians loot the country, *Ibid*, p. 190; Georgia did not become the member of the League of Nations because the Great Britain was against it, *Ibid*, p. 93

¹⁰⁴⁰ Due to the betrayal Khwarezmians managed to conquer Tbilisi, Vachanadze et al, p. 113; Persians managed to conquer Tbilisi because king was at funerals, *Ibid*, p. 140; Persians used Eastern night to attack Georgians, *Ibid*, p. 142; Georgians lost the battle against Persians because of betrayal, *Ibid*, p. 181; Russian Viceroy of Caucasus Vorontsov attract Georgian nobility to support Russian domination, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 23; Turkey influenced on the results of referendum in Adjara and it claimed that region should stay under Turkish authorities, *Ibid*, p. 90; Russia tried to use Abkhazia to make it to separate from Georgia and thereby weaken Georgia, *Ibid*, p. 91

¹⁰⁴¹ Mushki were destroyed in battle but it shows that they were unified, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 21; Kids were sacrificed to ancient gods but it was stopped by the king, *Ibid*, p. 42; the level was not so high in Georgian music but there were some developments, *Ibid*, p. 80; demonstration to protect Stalin memory was mainly because to protect Georgians for repressions, *Ibid*, p. 125

¹⁰⁴² Georgians' looted Persian territories but it was common during that period, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 99; Kartli was not actively involved in the fight against Persia because the suppression was not so heavy, *Ibid*, p. 48




Chart 4.9. Personalising Elements about the Georgian Self-Image

The Georgian narrative has a strong focus on personalisation and therefore also the failures or past mistakes are easy to mediate by showing a particular person or group responsible for it. In the case of groups it underlines always that it was a small group that shows that they are a rather exceptional phenomenon. The personalisation of the wrongdoings is mediated by various elements (See Chart 4.9.). One important aspect is collaboration with external forces and also betrayal is close to this category. The collaboration with external forces has been in the earlier period related to the domestic struggles.¹⁰⁴³ The narrative presents some people from the later period as collaborators of the dominating power.¹⁰⁴⁴ There are also few cases of betrayal and some traitors defined by the national narrative.¹⁰⁴⁵ Often collaborative behaviour is explained by the personal benefits that were achieved.¹⁰⁴⁶ Therefore the master narrative condemns this

¹⁰⁴³ Azo and Pharnavaz used external aid to fight against each other, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 29; Saurmag I Iberia used Dzurduks to suppress resistance, *Ibid*, p. 31; some Georgian nobility used external aid to fight in the domestic conflicts, *Ibid*, p. 41

¹⁰⁴⁴ Mainly related to the Russian regime, either Georgian nobility who were attracted to collaborate by Russian Viceroy of Caucasus Vorontsov (Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 23) or Georgian Bolsheviks who collaborated with the Soviet Russia (*Ibid*, p. 108) or some Georgian writers (*Ibid*, 2004, p. 139).

¹⁰⁴⁵ Some Georgian nobility who went to negotiations with Mongols instead to fight against them and made the king to stop the fight, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 117; Kahaber Korganshvili who betrayed Simon I and Persians managed to win him, *Ibid*, p. 142; significant Georgian resistance plan in 1832 was betrayed by Iese Palavandishili, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 17

¹⁰⁴⁶ Liquidation of Kartli by Persians brought personal benefits to the high nobility, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 57; Kakheti peaceful and obedient policy was implemented for the rulers' narrow personal interests, *Ibid*, p. 144; Samtskhe-Saatabago atabey let the Ottoman troops moving to other Georgian states to pass his lands to stay on power, *Ibid*, p. 148, p. 151

behaviour and it is a contrast to the glorified heroes who sacrificed themselves for the nation.

The Georgian master narrative also personalises Georgian internal conflicts by showing that they are clashes between strong individuals. The national master narrative tries to show that the nation is united for the one certain goal to move towards the well-being of the entire nation and therefore internal struggles can be fatal for this joint movement. Personal conflicts have more significant meanings when they have been the threat for national unification¹⁰⁴⁷ but also some clashes are related to particular event¹⁰⁴⁸. Also some wrong decisions are personalised by making a single person responsible for national failures. These mistakes are mainly related to the defeats that have occurred after an important decision.¹⁰⁴⁹ Other decisions that are implicitly considered as mistakes are related to retreat and thereby it shows that the decision made did not correspond to the nation will but was a personal opinion.¹⁰⁵⁰ Thereby the national master narrative eliminates the questionable decisions as a general nation's will.




Chart 4.10. Russia(ns) image in the Georgian Master Narrative

¹⁰⁴⁷ Samtskhe-Saatabago separatism from Georgia is shown as the result of Kvarqvė Jakeli behaviour (Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 129) or King Luarsab I was not able to find the support from other Georgian leaders to fight against common enemy (*Ibid*, p. 140), also the disunity of Georgian Church is personalised (*Ibid*, p. 130). The disunity in the Georgian national movement in the 19th century is also mediated by personalisation, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 46, p. 55

¹⁰⁴⁸ Fight against Ottomans, Georgians lost the battle because there were internal clashes and many men left the battle field, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 148

¹⁰⁴⁹ Battle of Garnisi was lost due to the wrong decision made by Ivane Mkhargdzelı, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 113; Vakhtang VI trusted too much Russian Emperor Peter the Great and was left alone, *Ibid*, p. 177; Irakli II hoped that Russia helps Kartli-Kakheti against external enemies but he was wrong, *Ibid*, p. 188

¹⁰⁵⁰ David III Kuropalates of Tao returned his lands to Byzantine, hoping to get more time, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 76; Georgian leaders did not make any conclusions from the first Mongol invasion, *Ibid*, p. 112; losses to the Adzhi Chalab undermined the power of Irakli and Teimuraz, *Ibid*, p. 181; Dukes of Svaneti and Abkhazia decided not to resist to Russia and it made Russia to liquidate these principalities, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 25–26

The Russian image is dominantly negative and the positive or neutral image is mainly related to the period when Georgian and Russian relations were not very frequent (See Chart 4.10.). 65% of positive image is mediated by narrating about the period before the annexation of Georgian territories and a little less than 80% of negative image is mediated about the period after the annexation. Thereby it constructs a clear understanding that Russia is positive actor if it is separate and far away from Georgia. By approaching Georgia and controlling Georgian territories Russian negative qualities start to dominate. The positive image can be divided into two main categories: cultural aspect and military successes. Cultural dimension is mainly related to the Orthodox religion but also later to Russian cultural impact on Georgia.¹⁰⁵¹ Military success presents Russia as the main threat to the earlier Georgian external enemies in the Caucasus, including the successful operations together with Georgians to reunify the historical Georgian territories.¹⁰⁵² There are also some references to positive political developments in Russia.¹⁰⁵³ However, the positive image of Russia(ns) is limited in the Georgian master narrative and the elements that construct Russian negative image are dominating.

¹⁰⁵¹ Russia as the protector of the Orthodox Church and therefore important ally for Georgia, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 129, p. 144; foundation of the first Georgian settlement in Moscow, which became important Georgian cultural centre, *Ibid*, p. 168, p. 197; Russian Viceroy of Vorontsov paid attention on Georgian culture, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 23; being a part of the Russian Empire introduced in Georgia Russian and European culture that made Georgian culture to benefit, *Ibid*, p. 27

¹⁰⁵² Russia activates its policies in North Caucasus and it increased Ottomans' and Persians' concerns, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 146; Russian agreement with Kakheti could ease the invasion from the North Caucasus, *Ibid*, p. 147; Russia had the biggest advantage in the Black Sea and Caucasian region because it was the strongest country, *Ibid*, p. 187; Russian and Georgian troops defeated successfully one of the major Dagestan leaders Omar Khan in 1800, *Ibid*, p. 190; Russo-Turkish War ended with full victory of Russia, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 5; Russia fought in the beginning successfully in Caucasus, in the Balkans it was more successful, *Ibid*, p. 19; Russian success in the Russo-Turkish war (1877–1878), *Ibid*, p. 50

¹⁰⁵³ Russia implemented successful internal reforms that strengthened the state, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 146; Russian revolution in 1905 formed the ground for the further reforms and started democratisation, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 63




Chart 4.11. Russian Negative Image in the Georgian Master Narrative

On the one hand, Russian negative image is related to Russian hostile policies towards Georgia that Georgia experienced during the Russian/Soviet occupation. On the other hand, the negative qualities are also underlined where the main focus is the Russian weakness and unreliability. To some extent shifted responsibilities are used to show Georgia as the defenceless puppet in Russian hands (See Chart 4.11.).

Russia as the security threat for Georgia is mainly related to the liquidation of Georgian independent statehood.¹⁰⁵⁴ It has happened twice and in both cases the pattern is same: powerful Russia and weakening Georgia have asymmetric relations and Russia aims to erase Georgian states and assimilate them. There are also few references to the general Russian expansionist policies that present Russia as threat for its neighbouring territories, including Georgia.¹⁰⁵⁵ Therefore

¹⁰⁵⁴ Starting from the first attempt by General Tottleben to undermine Georgian statehood that is assigned to the Russian general plan to liquidate Georgian statehood (Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 182) the liquidation of all independent and semi-independent Georgian kingdoms and principalities: Kartli-Kakheti (*Ibid*, p. 191, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 3–4), Imereti (*Ibid*, pp. 4–5), other Georgian principalities (*Ibid*, p. 5, p. 23, pp. 25–26). Also liquidation of Autocephaly of the Georgian Church is underlined, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 203. About the Soviet occupation, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 3, p. 83, p. 97, p. 98

¹⁰⁵⁵ In the 15th century Russia unified its territories and started to expand towards South, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 129; Russia annexed Crimea and started to dominate over the Black Sea region, *Ibid*, p. 187; Russian bloody wars in Chechnya and Dagestan, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 17; Soviet Russia occupied Armenia and Azerbaijan, *Ibid*, p. 96, the USSR occupied Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, *Ibid*, p. 120; Russia supported secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and made all that this conflict would be more serious, *Ibid*, p. 132.

Russia is presented as an antagonist force for Georgian national interests and the master narrative is demonstrating how Russia has tried to create obstacles for the Georgian nation on its way to its ultimate goal – independent and unified nation-state. Russian antagonism starts already with the first mentioned contact between Russian and Georgian courts in the 13th century¹⁰⁵⁶ and continues in the end of the 18th century when Russia tried to weaken Georgian states and gradually took over Georgian realms.¹⁰⁵⁷ Later Russia was against Georgian national movements.¹⁰⁵⁸ The Russians' reluctance to accept Georgian independence in the 20th century is also underlined and showed that Russia did all to stop Georgian independent policies and undermine its territorial integrity.¹⁰⁵⁹ Thereby Russian and Georgian national interests are presented as antagonistic ones and Russia is defined as the main aggressor against Georgian state in the modern period.

In addition, the master narrative portrays the situation being under Russian domination. This picture tells about the repressions and hostilities against Georgian people, Russification of Georgian culture and language, and exploitation of Georgian lands. The majority of the repressions are related to Russian reactions to Georgian uprisings that were bloodily suppressed by the Russian Empire and as well as by the Soviet regime.¹⁰⁶⁰ It describes also the reactionary Russification policies and also the Soviet repressions against the peasantry and national elite.¹⁰⁶¹ Thereby a repressive image of Russia is constructed to show most of the period of the Russian domination in Georgia was an active struggle between true Georgian nationalists and repressive Russian authorities who tried to assimilate and to liquidate Georgians. Assimilation policy has also created strong threat for Georgian culture that has been one of the key elements of the national identity. The master narrative

¹⁰⁵⁶ Georgian court very quickly realised that Queen Tamar's husband Yuri Bogolyubsky was not suitable and he tried twice to return his rights but not successfully, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 97

¹⁰⁵⁷ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 188, p. 191; Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 5, p. 6, p. 8, p. 25

¹⁰⁵⁸ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 22, p. 57

¹⁰⁵⁹ Russia gave Turkey the South Western Turkey, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 84; Russia avoided to recognition of Georgian independence and also its restoration, *Ibid*, p. 93, p. 96, p. 131; Soviet power illegally dismissed Georgian state institutions and repressed Georgian nationalists, *Ibid*, p. 100, p. 128; Russia supported the secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, creating autonomous units in Georgia undermined its territorial integrity that was used in the 1990s, p. 96, pp. 101–103, p. 129, p. 134; Russia forced Georgia to become member of CIS, *Ibid*, p. 137

¹⁰⁶⁰ Russian atrocities against Georgians during the Empire period, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 8, pp. 12–15, pp. 17–18, p. 20, pp. 23–24, p. 47, pp. 60–61, p. 64; Soviet atrocities against Georgians, *Ibid*, p. 104, p. 106, pp. 125–126, pp. 129–130

¹⁰⁶¹ Repressions of Georgian Church and clergy, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 9, p. 62, p. 109; Russian reactionary policies, *Ibid*, p. 3, p. 47, p. 52, p. 54, p. 76; Soviet repressions against national elite, *Ibid*, p. 3, pp. 100–102, p. 106, p. 109, pp. 111–112, pp. 124–125; Soviet repressions against Georgian peasantry, *Ibid*, pp. 109–110

shows how the Georgian culture has been threatened by Russification and destruction. The most important institution that has been threatened by Russian policies was the Church, which lost its Autocephaly and was Russified.¹⁰⁶² Also the Georgian tradition of education was eliminated and Georgian language marginalised in public use.¹⁰⁶³ All this has impeded the development of Georgian culture that *'in spite of the Great Power policies of Moscow ... has successfully developed.'*¹⁰⁶⁴ Thereby Russia has tried to destroy the Georgian national pillars that makes Russian image immediately hostile for Georgians.

The master narrative shows that Russian authorities did not care about local development. The master narrative uses broadly colonial concept about the Russian policies and claims that the earlier Turkish and Persian yoke was replaced by the Russian one that did not create any better conditions for Georgians.¹⁰⁶⁵ There are described the obligations that Georgians had to carry and what led to the people's uprising, which are brutally suppressed.¹⁰⁶⁶ In conclusion, the narrative claims that all these policies were against the will of Georgians and aimed to benefit Russia.¹⁰⁶⁷ Therefore the period of the Russian domination in Georgia is also presented in the master narrative as the period when Georgians were not responsible for these policies.¹⁰⁶⁸ Thereby the master narrative is shifting all the responsibilities to Russia and the participation of Georgians in the Russian occupational authorities is marginalised. In addition, Russia is made responsible for the conflicts of current Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) as the result of selfish colonial policies and tools to maintain control over Georgians.¹⁰⁶⁹ Therefore Georgia struggles with the legacy of the Russian colonialism today.

Russian negative qualities are predominantly weakness and unreliability. There are also few other bad characteristics mentioned but they are marginal.¹⁰⁷⁰ Weakness and unreliability are both mainly related to the unsuccessful attempts to form alliances with Russia and to gain Russian assistance against Georgian external enemies. Before the 18th century the main reason that is given to

¹⁰⁶² Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 203, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 8, p. 27

¹⁰⁶³ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 7, p. 22, p. 27, p. 29, p. 43, p. 45, p. 52, p. 70, p. 110, p. 112, p. 139

¹⁰⁶⁴ Author's translation *'Несмотря на великодержавную политику Москвы, грузинская культура успешно развивалась.'*, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 143

¹⁰⁶⁵ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 5–7, pp. 9–10, p. 18, p. 20, p. 23, p. 34, p. 72, p. 76

¹⁰⁶⁶ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 9, pp. 12–13, p. 15, p. 23, p. 35, p. 43

¹⁰⁶⁷ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 43, p. 45, p. 65, p. 101, p. 108, p. 125

¹⁰⁶⁸ Already the Treaty of Georgievsk as shown as Russian initiative, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 187, p. 190; after the takeover of Georgian principalities that maintained in the beginning their own rulers are present them as executors of Russian will, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 4, p. 25; Soviet takeover is also presented as purely implementation of Moscow rule, *Ibid*, pp. 100–102, p. 110

¹⁰⁶⁹ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 132, p. 138

¹⁰⁷⁰ Russians inability to understand the Georgians, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 44, p. 130; underdevelopment of Russia, *Ibid*, p. 59, p. 128

explain Russian reluctance to assist Georgia is Russian weakness in comparison to the Ottoman and Persian empires.¹⁰⁷¹ There is also mentioned Russian weakness in other contexts where Georgia has not been directly involved but implicitly mediates the same meaning.¹⁰⁷² After the Russian annexation the weakness of Russia is related to the reunification of Georgian lands and Russian failures in the Caucasus to capture these historical Georgian territories.¹⁰⁷³ Russian unreliability and renegading behaviour mediates the understanding that Russia was not interested in the fate of Georgia and therefore Russia did not assist Georgian states.¹⁰⁷⁴ When Russian interests in the Caucasus grew, then Russia tried instead of assisting Georgia to undermine its statehood and also gladly let the Georgians' enemies weaken Georgians¹⁰⁷⁵ and thereafter took over the Georgian lands without any bloody war.¹⁰⁷⁶ Thereby the Russian image is an untruthful and selfish ally that instead of assistance creates more sufferings for Georgians.

The Georgian master narrative constructs a strong positive self-image that is mainly glorifying the heroic deeds and cultural achievements. The complicated history has also created many possibilities to victimise the national past where the period of Russian rule has relatively strong overrepresentation. Georgians' negative self-image is mainly related to the weak will to resist to the external invaders and it is often justified either by the need to protect the nation or by the weakness of Georgia. Thereby also a strong image of rebellious nation is constructed that mediates the understanding that Georgians have through the history loved freedom and therefore they should live in their independent nation-state. The image of the significant other, Russia, is strengthening this understanding because Russia's predominantly negative image is demonstrating the repressions that a dominating power can make to Georgians. Thereby the master narrative has constructed a strong negative image of Russia(ns) that is antagonistic towards Georgians' national interests and have during their domination heavily repressed and exploited Georgians. At the same time the Georgian master narrative shows that Russians are also unreliable partners that have not assisted Georgia when needed. On the contrary, they have used Georgia for their own interests and thereby Russia becomes one of the main security threats for Georgia. According to the master narrative Russia has tried to undermine Georgian national integrity throughout history and to use this colonial legacy also in current politics to resist the Georgians' ultimate goal – to be an independent and unified nation.

¹⁰⁷¹ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 144, pp. 146–147, p. 178

¹⁰⁷² Russian weakness against Mongols, Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 112, p. 114, p. 122; Russian weakness in the Livonian War, *Ibid*, p. 146; Russian loss in the Battle of Narva, p. 177

¹⁰⁷³ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 20–21, p. 33, pp. 49–50

¹⁰⁷⁴ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 144, p. 158, p. 163, pp. 177–178, pp. 181–182, pp. 183–185

¹⁰⁷⁵ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 182, p. 185, pp. 188–191,

¹⁰⁷⁶ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 11

4.4. Historical Key Events in the Georgian Master Narrative

In this part I define the significance of different historical periods in the Georgian master narrative based on the analysed history textbooks. Thereafter I determine the historical key moments in the Georgian national history and the role of (Russians) in these events. The Georgian history textbooks do not offer clear periodization of the national history. Due to the old tradition of history writing the Georgian master narrative is constructed based on the reign of different Georgian kings and these smaller periods compose centuries that are presented as the historical periods. Some broader periods are offered by the history of the Georgian Church that I use in my study to make periodization of Georgian history.

The Georgian master narrative starts from the first hominids of Eurasia but in my analysis I start the periodization from the Ancient Georgia (6th century BC – 3rd century AD) where the Georgians’ statehood has been documented. The Christianisation of Georgians starts the period of Early Middle Ages that also includes the High Middle Ages (4th-12th centuries), the Georgian heyday, being the regional empire. The Late Middle Ages (13th-15th centuries) that starts with the Mongols’ invasion and ends with the partition of Georgia. The Early Modern Era (16th-18th centuries) ends with the Treaty of Georgievsk and end of the independence of the Georgian states. The late Modern Era (1800–1917) starts with annexation of Georgian territories and ends with the First World War. The 20th century starts with establishment of an independent state and according to the analysed history textbooks ends with the year 2001.




Chart 4.12. Representation of History Periods in the Georgian Textbooks

The earlier periods are underrepresented in the history master narrative and it is explainable by the limited sources that cover this period. It is interesting to notice that Early and High Middle Ages have significant part in the history textbook but it is mainly due to the period of High Middle Ages when Georgia was regional empire and that is considered as Georgian historical heyday.¹⁰⁷⁷ The main accent of the Georgian master narrative is made on the Modern Era. The period of Early Modern Era is relatively less emphasised than the Later Modern Era, which is even more represented in the history textbooks than the 20th century. It is the period of Georgian national awakening, which has a crucial part in the Georgian master narrative. The 20th century is also less represented due to the relatively strong underrepresentation of the later Soviet Era after the Second World War in the history textbook.¹⁰⁷⁸

Focusing on the Georgian Modern and Latest History the gradual growth of the share of the history is observed in the period of the Early Modern Era (16th-18th centuries). Significant focus is increasing in the beginning of the 19th century when the Georgian territories were annexed by Russia and there was strong resistance to the Russian authorities. However, it is still relatively less represented in comparison with the history of the second half of the 19th century when Georgian national awakening started and what is considered by the master narrative as the most fruitful period of Georgian national culture. The period of the independent state of Georgia (1918–1921) is also strongly overrepresented and it is the key period of entire 20th century. The first half of the Soviet Georgia is more represented than the later one because it also includes the resistance movements against the Soviet regime and description of the repressions. The later Soviet period is strongly underrepresented and the main emphasis is made on the restoration of independence and current Georgia.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Early Middle Ages and High Middle Ages of Georgia last in total 900 years. The Early Middle Ages covers 700 years (26.9%) and High Middle Ages 200 years (7.7%), in the textbook the Early Middle Ages cover 14.1% and High Middle Ages 6.3%. Thereby the High Middle Ages are only slightly underrepresented (-1.4%) when the Early Middle Ages (-12.8%). Thereby the High Middle Ages is also more represented than the Late Middle Ages (-2.4%).

¹⁰⁷⁸ Period of 1945–1985 (the restoration of the independence is separated), it is 8.0% of the focused time period (1500–2001), in the history textbook it covers only 4.4% (more than half is dedicated to the Georgian culture), the rest of the 20th century periods are all either overrepresented or proportional to the time span.




Chart 4.13. Representation of the 20th Century History in the Georgian Textbooks

Georgian key moments of the national master narrative are related more to the periods before the 20th century. 40% of the key events cover the period before the end of the 18th century when Russia was not an important actor in Georgian history and one third of the key events cover the 19th century; the 20th century is represented by 27% of the key events (See Chart 4.14). The focus of the Georgian master narrative on the earlier past can be explained by the long documented history of the nation and also that the Georgians' historical heyday has been in the Middle Ages. However, the significance of the Georgian national movement and the independent Georgia have crucial meaning in the master narrative because they are important elements of the narrative of origin and main linkages for the formation of the modern Georgian nation and statehood, which thereby is also connected to the glorious past.




Chart 4.14. Share of the Georgian History Key Events in the Textbooks

The Russian factor is very limited in the key events of the first 40% of the events; however these are important for the Georgian nation. The conversion to Christianity of Georgians (beginning of the 4th century) is considered as one of the key events that starts the development of Georgian civilisation. This event is definitely one of the main identity markers for Georgians.¹⁰⁷⁹ The role of Russia(ns) is not mentioned related to this context.

The second key moment of the Georgian master narrative is the period of Georgian heyday (11th–12th centuries) when the Georgian state has its biggest territorial extent and it formed a regional empire. This period is the main source of Georgian glorious past and it is presented as the period of success and highest development of the nation. Covering almost the biggest share of the master narrative key events in the history textbooks it is also the main anchor that fastens Georgian history narrative to the Middle Ages. The role of Russians in this period is very marginal and it is related to the unsuccessful marriage between Queen Tamar and Russian prince Yuri Bogolyubsky who was expelled from the Georgian Court due to his bad behaviour that led to some internal resonance in Georgia when he tried to restore his rights at the Georgian Court.¹⁰⁸⁰

The rest of the key events before the end of the 18th century are related to different invasions of the Georgian lands. The most important of these invasions

¹⁰⁷⁹ See section 4.1 where the importance of the Christianity and the Georgian Church for the national identity is discussed.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 97

is the Mongol yoke (1220–1327) that destroyed the Georgian Empire and subjugated it to an external power. It is also a historical turning point when the significance of the Georgians starts to fall and the earlier might is not restored anymore. The role of Russians is also limited and it is mentioned only in the context of the Mongol invasion where it is shown that Russia was disunited and weak.¹⁰⁸¹ Two other significant invasions are made by Tamerlane (1386–1403) and Persian Shah Abbas I (1613–1625). The eight invasion of Tamerlane ended the restoration of earlier Georgian might and impeded the development of the country for a long period.¹⁰⁸² Therefore it is one of the victimising key events of the Georgian master narrative. Russia(ns) do not play any role in this part of the master narrative. The invasion by the Persian Shah Abbas I is related to the Georgians' resistance to Persian domination; Georgians managed to resist and finally Abbas had to accept the rebellious King Teimuraz I on the Kartli-Kakheti throne. Therefore this event is carrying both victimising and glorifying elements. The role of Russians is also briefly mentioned when King Teimuraz sent a request for assistance to Russia but he did not get any support.¹⁰⁸³ Thereby Russian image as unreliable ally is underlined in this context. Also the division of Georgia into four states (1490) is one of the key moments of Georgian earlier history and the division of the Church helped to confirm this division. In this event, Russia does not have any role.

The period when Russia becomes the significant other is related to the end of the 18th century. First key moment is the liquidation of the Georgian statehood that starts with the Treaty of Georgievsk (1783) and continues till the first half of the 19th century. It is an important victimising series of events because the Georgian statehood that managed to survive different external dominations was liquidated. Russia has in this key event the role of main enemy that treacherously weakened the Georgian states and thereafter started to liquidate them without any bigger war.¹⁰⁸⁴ Therefore this key event is one of the major sources of Russian negative image in the Georgian master narrative. The image of Russia before this event has been not very hostile but with the liquidation of the statehood Russia became the main enemy for the Georgian nation. This image is also deepened by the next series of key events: national resistance to the Russian rule. This key event is mediated in the way to show that Georgians did not accept the Russian domination and fought for the restoration of the independence. Thereby it emphasises two aspects: continuity of the Georgian statehood from the earlier times till the later declaration of the independence and Georgians' reluctance to accept Russian rule. The image of Russia in this event is as a brutal colonial power that violently suppressed the resistance of a small but brave nation. Thereby the negative image of Russia is deeply cultivated by the national master narrative.

¹⁰⁸¹ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 112, p. 114

¹⁰⁸² Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 125

¹⁰⁸³ Vachanadze et al, 2002, p. 158

¹⁰⁸⁴ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 5

Two following key events are mediated mainly by the glorifying elements. The first one is the national movement that is shown as the successor of the earlier national resistance and that it aimed the national independence. It is the period of Georgian national awakening and formation of the modern Georgian nation. The national movement was based on Georgian culture and this period is also assessed as the most important period of Georgian culture.¹⁰⁸⁵ The active development of the Georgian language and other fields of culture have formed a strong commonly shared national understanding that later has been crucial for establishing the independent nation-state. The role of Russia in this context is similar to the previous one because Russian reactionary policies repressed the national movements and therefore the clear antagonism between Russians and Georgians is shown. Russian aggressive and hostile image is deepened even more.

The culmination of the modern Georgian nation is the declaration of independence and formation of the nation-state. This is a short but strongly overrepresented key moment of the Georgian nation. It is shown as the will of all Georgian society (national minorities included) that managed finally to liquidate the historical error – domination of Russia.¹⁰⁸⁶ The master narrative describes this period as one of positive reforms where the national economy and culture developed successfully. The main obstacle of the young and successful state was Russia that first undermined Georgian territorial integrity¹⁰⁸⁷ and finally treacherously conquered the Georgian Republic and illegally started to sovietise the country.¹⁰⁸⁸ The role of Russia is presented as criminal force that against the free will of the Georgian nation eliminated their ultimate national achievement and forced Georgians to live according Russian rules that are not suitable for Georgians. The following resistance to the Soviet regime is presented as the verification that Georgians did not accept the domination of Russia and at the same time to show the cruelty of the Soviet regime. These two events are mediating the meaning that Georgian nation is eager to live in the independent nation-state and that the Russian rule is aggressive and dangerous for Georgian nation.

The Second World War is presented as the event that should not to be a part of Georgian history but the Soviet regime involved Georgians involuntarily in this war.¹⁰⁸⁹ There were not any fighting on Georgian territory but the war is an important key moment in Georgian history because the disproportionate involvement of Georgians in this war.¹⁰⁹⁰ This event is mediated mainly by the

¹⁰⁸⁵ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 74

¹⁰⁸⁶ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 86

¹⁰⁸⁷ Giving with the peace treaty Adjara and other South Western Georgian territories Turkey, initiating and supporting the Abkhazian and Ossetian separatists, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 90–91

¹⁰⁸⁸ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 98–101

¹⁰⁸⁹ Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 121

¹⁰⁹⁰ 700,000 Georgians were mobilised in the army and it caused death of almost 300,000 Georgians, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 121, p. 123

victimising elements and it is an example of the exploitation of Georgia. In addition, it mediates implicitly the meaning that a heavy repression against Georgian nation was implemented with the war that demonstrates the hostile attitude of Russia towards Georgia and also Russian careless attitude towards its colonies that have to only be ready to serve the Russia(ns). Thus, the negative image of Russia is also underlined by this key event.

Restoration of the independent nation-state has a crucial meaning in the Georgian master narrative because it is the symbol of restoration of historical justice. It is also a glorifying moment because it is a symbolical victory over the old enemy, Russia. The role of Russia in this context is antagonistic – it tries to resist all Georgian efforts to restore their own state. The bloody events of the April 9, 1989¹⁰⁹¹ are presented as Russian unexplainable aggression against Georgians. In the entire restoration process it is the key element, which is shown as the last moment of Russian repressions against suffering Georgians. Current independent Georgian state has had many difficulties: civil war, internal instability, and secessionist wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Therefore the desired independence did not bring immediately the success but a lot of problems. The national master narrative shows these difficulties relatively neutrally and at the same time it underlines the negative impact of the significant other, Russia. The secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are related to the Russian ambitions to keep Georgia under Russian control. Again this key event stresses the Russian-Georgian antagonism and Russia as the security threat.

The Georgian master narrative emphasises the period of the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century where Georgian national movement managed to restore national independence. It is the crucial period for current Georgian nation-state. However, the key events of the Georgian master narrative are related not only to this period but there is also a significant accent on the earlier times where the main key moment is Georgian heyday when the country had its widest extent and Georgia was an important regional power. The role of significant other, Russia is marginal and some rather negative references are made about it. It changes with the annexation of Georgia by Russia. It is the starting point of the Georgian-Russian antagonism that lasts till the present. The very negative Russian image is mainly related to this period and Russia plays always a negative role in the Georgian key events in the 19th-20th century. Therefore a negative image of Russia is deeply cultivated into the Georgian collective memory.

The Georgian master narrative defines very long roots of Georgian history, which starts with the first hominids in Eurasia and continues with long civilisation on the Georgian lands. The master narrative combines the ancient

¹⁰⁹¹ Soviet troops were used to dissolve the peaceful mass demonstration in Tbilisi, several people were killed and other injured, Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, p. 129

states as a part of Georgian long history of statehood. Of key significance is the Georgian Empire in the 11th-12th centuries when the country had its largest territory. The later states, including the Georgian statehood in the 20th century are shown as legitimate successors of that glorious Georgian state. The main Georgian identity markers defined by the master narrative show that Georgians are a pure Orthodox nation which has a rich culture and unique language that has formed a specific Georgian civilisation. On the other hand, the master narrative shows Georgians as a tolerant nation towards other nations and confessions who live in Georgia, which is rich by successful agriculture and especially wine-production. At the same time important identity markers are also the braveness and rebellious spirit of the nation, not accepting the domination of any external power and who are ready to defend always their homeland. Therefore the last external power Russia, which has dominated over Georgians two last centuries, has also a particularly negative image in the Georgian master narrative.

The strong dissimilative character of the Georgian master narrative is showing that Russia has a marginal role in Georgian history and though Georgians were looking for cooperation with Russians, it was unsuccessful and ended with treachery. Instead of mutually beneficial cooperation Russia annexed Georgian lands and started to assimilate it. However, the process was not successful and Georgians have maintained their national identity. The schematic narrative templates also support the dissimilative character of the nation, which underline the importance of the independent Georgian state and the necessity to resist to external powers. Therefore the Georgian self-image is also mainly glorifying its kings and princes who have fought against strong external enemies and managed to maintain the Georgian nation and its unique civilisation. The numerous wars have also created several moments of the past that are mediated by the victimising elements that underline the difficult fate of the nation and its heroic survival. The main negative elements about national self are related to the low will of resistance and internal conflicts that had lead to the treason. These are mainly personalised or explained by weakness or need to defend the nation. The image of Russia(ns) in the Georgian master narrative is very negative and it constructs strong Georgian-Russian antagonism where Russia has presented as the main obstacle in the implementation of Georgian national will. Russian negative image is especially focused in the Georgian master narrative key events, which during the last two centuries are based on the Georgian-Russian antagonism.

CHAPTER 5: Comparative Analysis of the Russian Master Narrative

Russia is the largest country by its territory in the world and it occupies a huge landmass in Eurasia. Therefore it is defined as a Eurasian state that had created many internal identity debates in Russia – is Russia a separate civilisation or European nation. In comparison to the previous case studies Russia is the dominating nation; therefore also its national master narrative is based not on explaining the formation and preservation of the national self-being but rather on the maintenance of world power. Russian statehood was established in Kievan Rus and from its heyday to its disunity Russian history parallels the Ukrainian one. In the 14th century the unification of Russian lands around Moscow started and it established the centralised power structure in Russia. The conquest of non-Russian lands in the Volga region in the 16th century established the tradition of territorial expansion in Russia that reached its final extent in the beginning of the 20th century. The power struggle with its Western neighbours defined Russia's strong position in world affairs by declaring Russia as an Empire in 1721 after the successful Great Northern War. Russia's position in world politics has strengthened and weakened during following centuries but it maintained its position as a world power until the First World War that ended with the collapse of the Russian Empire. The Communists restored the old Empire in the new ideological framework that offered Russia to become an industrial state that was able to resist the other world powers and dominate directly or indirectly over a significant part of the globe. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 weakened again Russian's position and currently Russia is struggling for the restoration of its earlier status.

The development of Russian historiography reflects the development of the Russian state and Russian history writing has contributed significantly to provide the continuous narrative and explanation for Russian uniqueness and necessity for the power position. Also the ideological turns in the 20th century have crucially influenced the construction of the national master narrative. The totalitarian Soviet historiography was the most under the state control and thereby also the most manipulated by the power. The *glasnost* policy in the end of the 1980s started to discover the hidden chapters and falsification and thereby to merge the earlier historiography to the Soviet one. The struggle for the Russian past is still not over and the more liberal master narrative from the 1990s has during recent years been overshadowed by partial restoration of the Soviet narrative. However, the main character of the Russian master narrative has not changed so significantly but the change is more related to removal of ideological framework and therefore also in the accents in the master narrative. In the current chapter I analyse the Russian master narrative according to the same analytical model implemented in the previous chapters and I compare the results of the previous chapters with the Russian case analysis to draw my main

conclusions and test the research theses and assumptions. Russian national history teaching is divided into four parts: from the ancient times till the end of the Middle Ages (6th form), the Early Modern Era (7th form), Modern Era (8th form), and Recent History (9th form).¹⁰⁹² Firstly, I focus on the Russian narrative of origin and compare it with the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian narratives of origin. Thereafter I define the main identity markers of the Russian master narrative and I bring parallels from the previous case studies to understand the potential of identity conflict. The chronotope of analysed case studies has a particular place in this part. The following part focuses on the general character of the Russian master narrative and I compare it with the assimilative and dissimilative elements of the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives. Also the narrative templates used will be compared and the different characters and images that they mediate will be assessed. Thereafter I define the Russian self-image in its master narrative and compare it with the Russian image in the abovementioned case studies' master narratives. I compare the usage of different images to assess how much the national master narrative image construction depends on the historical dependency roles. The final part concentrates on the Russian master narrative key events and I will analyse to what extent they overlap with the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian key events, and in the case of overlapping events how the role of Russia is presented in these events as well as how Russian interpretations differ from the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian understanding of the national past and the Russian role in it.

5.1. Russian Narrative of Origin and Main Identity Markers in Comparative Analysis

In this part I define and compare the Russian narrative of origin with the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian narratives of origins to test my assumption

¹⁰⁹² The Russian history textbooks analysed in this chapter are particular because they focus on Russian state as well as peoples' history. I decided to take the history textbooks making particular emphasis on the peoples of Russian state because it facilitates a better understanding of the role of analysed nations (Estonians, Ukrainians and Georgians). Danilov, Aleksandr A., Kosulina, Lyudmilla G. История государство и народы России, 6 класс <History. State and the peoples of Russia, 6th form>, Moscow: Prosvetshchenie, 2007; Danilov, Aleksandr A., Kosulina, Lyudmilla G. История государства и народов России, 7 класс <History of State and Peoples of Russia, 7th form>, Moscow: DROFA, 2006; Danilov, Aleksandr A., Kosulina, Lyudmilla G. История государства и народов России, XIX век, 8 класс <History of State and Peoples of Russia, 19th century, 8th form>, Moscow: DROFA, 2006; Danilov, Aleksandr A., Kosulina, Lyudmilla G. История государства и народов России, XX век, 9 класс, часть 1 <History of State and Peoples of Russia, 20th century, Part 1, 9th form>, Moscow: DROFA, 2006; Danilov, Aleksandr A., Kosulina, Lyudmilla G. История государства и народов России, XX век, 9 класс, часть 2 <History of State and Peoples of Russia, 20th century, Part 2, 9th form>, Moscow: DROFA, 2006

1.a. *'narratives of origin support contradicting characters and roles that construct mutual incompatibility'*. In the second half of this section I analyse the main Russian identity markers that are underlined in the Russian master narrative and I compare them with the three other nations' identity markers to test my assumptions 2.a. *'main identity markers are opposing and thereby they create mutual denials of these identity markers'* and about chronotope as a particular identity marker 2.b. *'chronotope of the identity is overlapping – the chronotope of former dominant nation includes the territories of dominated nations, though the latter reject it'*.

The Russian narrative of origin is similar to the Ukrainian one. Firstly, it is focused on the territory of Russia and thereafter it merges gradually with the history of the Russian nation. Similarly to the Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives, the development of social order is presented parallel to the early settlements in Russian territory. The oldest human settlement in Russian territories is found in the Northern Caucasus 700,000 years ago.¹⁰⁹³ The narrative of origin is not establishing a direct connection between the first human settlement and later Russian nation. The master narrative shows that Russian territory has been through history multinational and therefore all the different peoples who have lived in Russia have contributed to the development of Russian civilisation.¹⁰⁹⁴ The first statehood experience of nations living in Russian lands is related to the Greek settlements in the Northern Black Sea Coast (7th-6th century BC) and Scythians' state in Crimean peninsula.¹⁰⁹⁵ In addition to the Greeks and Scythians, the Russian lands have had statehood experiences also by the Turkic people from Mongolia to the Northern Black Sea.¹⁰⁹⁶

The ethnic history of Russians starts with the settlements of Indo-European tribes *'speaking in one language, having many common features in the external appearance.'*¹⁰⁹⁷ By the time the Indo-European tribes separated from each other and first, 2000 BC Baltic-Slavic group was formed and thereafter Baltic group separated from the Slavic one 500 BC.¹⁰⁹⁸ Slavic languages also started to separate and the Western, Southern and Eastern Slavic language groups were formed. The latter ones lived in the territory *'from the Lake Ilmen to the steppes of the Black Sea coast and the Eastern Carpathians to the River Volga'*.¹⁰⁹⁹ The Russian narrative of origin claims that the two most numerous Eastern Slavic tribes were the Ilmen Slavs and Polans in the Dnieper basin.¹¹⁰⁰ Thereby the

¹⁰⁹³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 10

¹⁰⁹⁴ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 8

¹⁰⁹⁵ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 21, p. 24

¹⁰⁹⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 25–26

¹⁰⁹⁷ Author's translation 'говорящих на одном языке, имевших во внешнем облике много общих черт', Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 29

¹⁰⁹⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 30

¹⁰⁹⁹ Author's translation 'от озера Ильмень до Причерноморских степей и от Восточных Карпат до Волги', Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 30

¹¹⁰⁰ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 36

Russian master narrative defines the Eastern Slavic settlement broader than the Ukrainian one and it also underlines that in the Northern part of Eastern Europe the Slavic population played a crucial role. The Slavic statehood starts according to the Russian master narrative dissimilarly to the Ukrainian one only in the 9th century.¹¹⁰¹ However, Kievan Rus is the starting point for both nations, but for Ukrainians it is the heyday, while for Russians it is the first stage for the later statehood developments. At the same time, the Russian narrative of origin also underlines other peoples' contribution in the Slavic/Russian statehood that gives the multinational character already to the first Russian state experience.¹¹⁰²

One particular issue that is related to the Russian Medieval period is the unification of Russian lands. Similarly to the Ukrainian and Georgian narrative of origin, the Russian one also underlines the need for the unity of the nation that is the prerequisite for national strength. The formation of Kievan Rus is mediated by this necessity by narrating how the Slavic and Finno-Ugric tribes were unified by the Vikings Rus first in the Northern part of the Slavic territories and thereafter also by liberating Kiev and other Southern territories from Khazar domination.¹¹⁰³ The unified Eastern Slavic tribes formed a strong medieval state that managed to construct the unified Russian identity.¹¹⁰⁴ And even when the power struggle led to the disunity of the Russian lands then the strong unified identity based on the same language, religion and culture was never lost by the Russian people.¹¹⁰⁵ The Russian narrative of origin shows that disunity leads to the national catastrophe (Mongol-Tatar Yoke) and therefore the nation appreciates highly the national unity that protects them from the external invasion. The unity of the Russian people has been later also challenged by external enemies but they have never been successful and the external enemies are expelled with the heroic joint effort of Russian people.¹¹⁰⁶

The unification argument is also related to the following developments of the Russian territories. The Russian master narrative explains moving the centre of Russian lands from Kiev to Moscow with the fact that life in the Kievan lands was too dangerous due to the continuous external attacks and people moved gradually more to the North-Eastern regions, which were protected by nature from invasions from the Great Steppe. Though they integrated with the local peoples in these areas they maintained their earlier Russian identity.¹¹⁰⁷ Therefore the North-Eastern principality Vladimir-Suzdal became gradually the political and religious centre of Russian lands and the Russian narrative of

¹¹⁰¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 40

¹¹⁰² Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 38

¹¹⁰³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 45–47

¹¹⁰⁴ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 77

¹¹⁰⁵ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 113

¹¹⁰⁶ Interregnum in the beginning of 17th century and Polish-Swedish invasion, Napoleonic invasion, Great Patriotic War – all of them underline that external enemies assumed that Russia can be weakened by supporting its disunity but all of them failed.

¹¹⁰⁷ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 115–116

origin claims dissimilarly to the Ukrainian one that Vladimir-Suzdal became the direct successor of the Kievan Rus¹¹⁰⁸. Among the North-Eastern Russian princes Moscow rose as the strongest one that managed to compete successfully with its main competitors and also to fight against the external enemies among whom Mongol-Tatars were the most significant.¹¹⁰⁹ According to the Russian narrative of origin, the strengthening of Moscow's position among the Russian principalities and the important victory in the Battle of Kulikovo created an understanding among Russians that submission to Moscow and national unity is the key prerequisite for a strong Russian state. Therefore Moscow managed to unify all Russian lands that were under Mongol domination and to end their yoke over Russia. The unification of Russian lands and the formation of a centralised unified Russian state were achieved by the beginning of the 16th century.¹¹¹⁰ It is important to underline that in the Russian master narrative the unification argument is also used to explain the merging of Ukrainian and Belorussian lands with Russian lands in the 17th and 18th century. Although it is admitted that through history the South Western Russian people spoke different dialects and being under other domination lost connection with the "true" Russian culture and language that led to the formation of Ukrainian and Belorussian nations, they have still strong commonly shared identity.¹¹¹¹

The unification of Russian lands gave significant impetus for the next stage of development of the Russian state – its territorial expansion. According to the Russian master narrative the conquest of Kazan in 1558 was the first non-Russian land that was conquered by the Russian Czar.¹¹¹² The first expansion of Russian territories was targeted to the East because the Russian state was not strong enough to fight with powerful European opponents. Siberia was barely populated and therefore hardly any resistance and Russia brought this huge territory under its control mainly peacefully by establishing its settlements there. This way Russians reached the Pacific Ocean by the end of the 17th century.¹¹¹³ In the West, Russia was the most interested in unifying the remaining Russian lands and gaining access to the Baltic Sea. These aims were achieved during the 18th century and early 19th century by establishing the Russian Western border.¹¹¹⁴ Access to the Baltic Sea opened a new stage of

¹¹⁰⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 124, p. 155, pp. 166–167

¹¹⁰⁹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 180–184

¹¹¹⁰ The territories in current Ukraine and Belorussia are mentioned as Russian lands that stayed under Lithuanian control, Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 224–226

¹¹¹¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 166–167

¹¹¹² Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 22

¹¹¹³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 112

¹¹¹⁴ Ukrainian Left Bank was unified in 1667 and confirmed in 1681, Zaporozhian Sich in 1686 (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 110–111); after the great victory over Sweden in 1721 Russia got lands in the Baltic Sea Eastern Rim (*Ibid*, p. 167) and by the Polish partition (1772, 1793, 1795) Russia got most of the Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainians lands (*Ibid*, p. 240); after short war against Sweden and the Napoleon

Russian history. It became the Russian Empire and one of the biggest European powers. It opened the row of Russian international successes and also defines Russia's important role in the current world. Similarly to the West, in the South the Russian aim has been to reach to the seas and to safeguard its Southern borders. Access to the Black Sea was achieved in the 18th century and expansion of the Russian Southern border to a safe distance was achieved during the 19th century.¹¹¹⁵ Thereby Russia became a huge Empire, second largest after British Empire. Size gave Russia also significant power in international relations. The Russian master narrative presents the expansion of the Russian Empire as a natural development where the expansion either happened voluntarily, merging the territories, or by conquest out of necessity.

The Russian narrative of origin deals also with the issue of the territorial losses. The successful expansion of the Russian Empire has developed without bigger setbacks and most of the territories that Russia conquered stayed under its control. However, the 20th century offers historical moments when Russia has lost several of its territories and also the current Russian state is smaller than the Russian Empire during its heyday. Therefore the Russian narrative of origin should also explain this situation that is an unusual phenomenon in the context of the Russian master narrative. The first territorial loss happened already in the beginning of the 20th century as the result of the Russo-Japanese War.¹¹¹⁶ However, the more significant loss of territories occurred as the result of the First World War and Russian revolutions in 1917. On the one hand, the subsequent Russian Civil War enables the usage of the disunity argument, which is proved by the fact that shortly after the Bolsheviks achieved the decisive victory over their opponents, majority of lost territories were merged again with the Soviet Russia in the form of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, external intervention during the Russian Civil War offers the other explanation why not all lost territories were not returned.¹¹¹⁷ Thereafter the argumentation of the expansion has been used again to justify the Soviet expansion to restore the old Russian borders.¹¹¹⁸ The great victory in the Second World War made the Soviet Union extend its influence over further territories and Russia's might was stronger than ever before. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of

invasion to Russia in 1812 and Vienna Congress Russia got also Finland and Duchy of Warsaw (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 20, p. 31)

¹¹¹⁵ By annexing Crimea peninsula in 1783 Russia established itself as the Black Sea power (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 236–237); the conquest of Caucasus ended in 1864 when the mountain tribes were suppressed after half a century intensive fight (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 85); the first territories in Kazakhstan were subjugated to Russia already in the 1730s but the conquest of Central Asia started in 1860s and it was ended in 1881 (*Ibid*, p. 168); in the Far East the first agreement between China and Russia to establish border was in 1689 but it was reviewed in 1860 giving significant territories to Russia and with Japan in 1875 (*Ibid*, pp. 169–170)

¹¹¹⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 29

¹¹¹⁷ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 165–166

¹¹¹⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 244

significant territories are explained by the opportunism of the national leaders who used the weakness and disunity in the centre to come to the power. However, the conclusion is that soon the national leaders realised the necessity to remain close to Russia and thereby implicitly it is shown that Russia still has special rights in these states.¹¹¹⁹ In addition, the decisive policy by the Russian president Putin to strengthen control over the semi-independent federal subjects can be also understood through the national unity argument.¹¹²⁰

Analysing the Russian narrative of origin in comparison with previous case studies then there are some similarities and notable differences. All of the narratives of origin start from the first human settlements, but only in the Estonian case the first human settlements are directly connected with the current nation. This is due to the late continuous human settlement in Estonian lands because of the Ice Age. Therefore the Estonian master narrative expresses the strongest attachment to their historical homeland. The Georgian master narrative takes the title of cradle of Eurasian human population and the master narrative integrates the general development of human society as the first chapter of Georgian history. The long Georgian national history also strengthens the Georgians' attachment to their historical homeland. The Ukrainian and Russian narratives of origin have a similar approach with the Georgian one and they start with the territorial history from the first human settlements on their lands and they also integrate the general development of human society in their national master narrative. However, the first states in their national territory are not related to the ethnically Ukrainians or Russians and therefore in their narratives of origin a gradual transition from the territorial history to the ethnic history exists. Both use also the argument that different nations have contributed to their national developments but due to the still existing multiethnic character of the state the Russian narrative of origin uses this argument stronger than the Ukrainian master narrative does. Therefore the Russian master narrative has also more an assimilative character than all three previous cases.

The Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian narrative of origin also include the national unity dimension. All national master narratives set national unity as the prerequisite for the strength and well-being of their national society. Also the unity of the nation is the main criterion to assess the national ability to resist an external invasion. The Ukrainian and Georgian cases have been less fortunate and therefore internal disunity has caused several times the loss of the independence. In the case of Russia, the once lost internal unity has given a good lesson and in the other periods the nation has managed to maintain its unity against external enemies. Therefore in the case of Russia the unity aspect is more related to the glorifying elements and in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine to the victimising ones. Another important aspect that exists in the Ukrainian and Georgian cases is the division of the nation between different

¹¹¹⁹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 188–189

¹¹²⁰ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 191–193

dominating powers that facilitates the internal disunity. In the case of Russia this dimension is not so visible and therefore the unity is related to the ability to keep control over the dominated territories. In other words, the unity aspect in the narrative of origin in Ukraine and Georgia is related to the national survival, in the case of Russia it is more related to maintaining territories.

The Estonian, Georgian and Ukrainian cases all include a strong argumentation for national independence. The Estonian case is different because in the past there has not been any Estonian state before the 20th century and therefore the national master narrative brings examples that build up the logical argumentation for the formation of the independent Estonian nation-state. In the case of Ukraine and Georgia, both have had earlier statehood experiences and therefore the argumentation is focused on the restoration of independence and to show the strong resistance to the external conquerors. Thus the Estonian master narrative underlines the subject status of Estonians that is defined as the main obstacle for the organisation of the national resistance movement, except the 20th century when the nation already have had experience of independence. In the case of Georgia and Ukraine the attempts to restore their independence are underlined in the master narrative and therefore also the revolts in the national history are mainly connected to the national liberation fight. This dimension is hardly presented in the Russian master narrative but some similarity is related to the unified national fight against the external invasion, which ends with the enemy failure and Russian victory. On the other hand, the necessity of Russian expansion is difficult to fit into the Estonian and Ukrainian master narratives. To some extent it is possible to compare with the Georgian master narrative that explains the formation of the Georgian empire in the Middle Ages. However, it is complicated to construct a mutual understanding between Estonia, Ukraine and Georgia with Russia because the roles of the nations in their national master narratives are presented differently.

In addition, the Russian narrative of origin has also a crucial clash with the Ukraine one due to the same derivation. In addition to the previous dimension, the Ukrainian and Russian identity conflict is also related to the interpretation clash: both nations claim to be the direct successors of Kievan Rus. When the Russian narrative of origin focuses on explaining why the centre of Kievan Rus moved to Vladimir-Suzdal and finally located in Moscow, then the Ukrainian narrative of origin claims that the origin of Rus culture remained in Ukraine and Ukrainians are its direct successors. It also creates a different understanding of the formation of three separate nations: Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians. The Russian narrative of origin claims that ancestors of Ukrainians and Belarusians stayed under foreign influence and thereby they started to differentiate gradually from Russian culture preserved in Moscow. However, they maintained the common Russian identity. The Ukrainian narrative of origin claims that the Moscow state was established based on the Golden Horde traditions and therefore they deviated from ancient Kievan Rus culture. Therefore the historical separation facilitated the separation of the nation that started already in the 12th century. Thus, the Russian and Ukrainian narratives of

origin have one more additional dimension for creating an identity clash in comparison with the Estonian and Georgian cases.

Russian identity markers can be divided into five groups: power-related, socio-economic, demographic, cultural, and chronotope. The most important identity markers in the Russian master narrative are political ones. Both of them are related to **strong power** that is defined as an important character of Russian society. The first power dimension is related to the Russian international role that defines Russia as a **World Power**. The Russian master narrative mediates the development of Russia's international position that has a clear aim – to be respected in the world because of its might. The master narrative shows how Kievan Rus gained its international respect by first challenging the main power Byzantine and thereafter by adopting the existing norms and firmly integrated into the existing international relations system Kievan Rus became a European power.¹¹²¹ Also the development of Moscow underlines the importance of power. The master narrative claims that Moscow became the Russian centre due to its power and wisdom to use it wisely.¹¹²² By establishing unity of Russian lands the Russian leaders aimed to increase its international status by developing first from the principality to Czardom and thereafter to Empire.¹¹²³ The Russian master narrative also underlines how Russia has developed from European power to world power and thereafter the Russian struggle to keep this position as the only proper one for the Russian nation.¹¹²⁴ It is important to

¹¹²¹ Since the beginning of the 10th century Kievan Rus managed to force on Byzantine agreements that favoured Kievan Rus (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 51–53); the Christianisation of Kievan Rus is underlined as the key factor that increased the Russian international status (*Ibid*, p. 62, pp. 65–66) that was well supported by Yaroslav the Wise's strong military forces and clever diplomacy (*Ibid*, p. 74)

¹¹²² The Russian master narrative tells a story how Moscow was in the beginning only a tiny principality that started gradually to increase its might by subjugating neighbouring territories (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 173, p. 175, p. 255; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 3)

¹¹²³ Ivan III ended the Mongol Yoke (1480) and started to call himself autocrat (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 226) thereafter Ivan IV was crowned as Czar and thereby also his status was equalised with the other European leaders (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 14–15); by the victory in the Great Northern War Peter I was declared the Emperor of Russia and Russia became Empire in 1721 (*Ibid*, p. 168)

¹¹²⁴ The master narrative shows the development since Peter I how he first made Russia great European power by establishing Russian navy and reforming its army by making it as one of the strongest in Europe (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 163, p. 183) that was continued by his successor and during Catherine II Russia by expanding its territories became one of the World power (*Ibid*, p. 242, p. 264, p. 281), which was culminated by Russian domination over European affairs in the first half of the 19th century after the Napoleon's defeat (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 3–4, p. 262); the second half of the 19th century is defined as the period when Russia had to defend its might position among the many competitors (*Ibid*, p. 170, p. 224). Also the 20th century developments glorify the increase of Russian power in the international level that is achieved by the persistent diplomacy and great military power that culminates with the

emphasise that the majority of these developments were achieved by the use of Russian military and diplomatic powers that are the main character of the Russian might. Therefore also all periods of weakening in the Russian past are defined as negative experiences and something unnatural for the Russian status and thereby also as national disgrace.¹¹²⁵ Thus, the weakness of Russia should be eliminated and Russian might restored in the international relations.

The second dimension of power is related to the internal power in Russia and it is supported by the unity of nation aspect in the narrative of origin. The Russian master narrative defines the **strong centralised power** as one of the main characters of the Russian past and the main foothold for the Russian great power position in world politics. The master narrative emphasises that Russia can be unified, strong and powerful only when the nation is subjugated to the centralised power and that Russian leaders have aimed at the developing of the centralised and authoritarian system that facilitates keeping together the huge and populous state and strengthening the nation against the external enemies.¹¹²⁶ However, the national master narrative also condemns the autocracy and shows the people's aim to liberalise the state and increase the democratic experience in the country.¹¹²⁷ But all these attempts have led to the collapse of the Russian

victory in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War and established the USSR (Russian) position as super power (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 39, p. 41)

¹¹²⁵ The first sign of weakness is portrayed by the Crimean War, which led to the significant reforms in the country and thereby also the restoration of the might (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 116, p. 178), The second crucial Russian defeat was the Russo-Japanese War and soon also the First World War that led to the collapse of the Russian Empire, which was restored by the Bolsheviks and by the collapse of the Soviet Union the weakness was liquidated by Putin's reforms, thereby Russia in the 20th century has been twice very weak but both times restored its position (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 29, p. 92, p. 167; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 164, p. 197)

¹¹²⁶ The centralised system of Kievan Rus (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 51, p. 57, p. 72, p. 74, p. 96); the Russian dukes learned from the Mongols the centralised political system and it was accepted also by the population because it helped to strengthen the nation (*Ibid*, pp. 159–160) and after the unification of the Russian lands Moscow duke started to centralise the state (*Ibid*, p. 226, p. 228, p. 230; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 16) and since the first Romanovs the Russian system was the highly centralised state that also led to the success in the international level by Peter I (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 100, p. 180, p. 183). During the 19th century Russia was unlimited absolute monarchy where the sovereignty belonged not to people but to the Emperor (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 39) and instead of limiting the power the Emperors saw the only solution for the internal stability by strengthening the autocracy that was defined as the one of the Russian statehood pillars (*Ibid*, p. 53, p. 67; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 6). Also the Bolsheviks regime was established as the party dictatorship, which led to the totalitarian regime, which was necessary to implement the grandiose reforms and modernisation of Russia (*Ibid*, p. 186, p. 216). The centralising policies of Putin are also approved as the tools for the strengthening the nation and its position in the international affairs (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 190)

¹¹²⁷ The first attempt was before the enthroning of Anna Ivanovna but it failed (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 205); thereafter the Decembrists' revolt that also failed (Danilov,

state¹¹²⁸ and therefore implicitly the master narrative constructs the understanding that Russian might is possible only in the context of the strong centralised power.

Russian socio-economic identity markers identify Russia as an **industrial nation**. Although agriculture used to be the major economic sector in Russia the national master narrative is not underlining the importance of this sector but it shows significance of the other sectors as trade and handicraft in the earlier periods.¹¹²⁹ Since the first development of industry in Russia the national master narrative emphasises its importance and it is shown as one key element of Russian development. The agricultural sector and its slow and unassertive reforms are presented as the symbol of underdevelopment and the main obstacle of progressive industrialisation.¹¹³⁰ Therefore also the massive industrialisation implemented by Stalin is defined as a great achievement that outweighs its social cost.¹¹³¹ And the forced industrialisation in the Soviet republics is shown as the great symbol of the progress¹¹³² and the post-Soviet deindustrialisation in Russia as a national tragedy¹¹³³. This Russian identity marker is probably related to the Soviet narrative of the industrial working class as the source of progress.

The demographic identity marker of the national master narrative underlines Russian society's **multinational character**. The national master narrative defines Russians as an open society that interacts with many different cultures

Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 51). The following social movements in Russia marginalised the moderate liberals and created clash between radical conservatives on power versus radical revolutionaries challenging them (*Ibid*, p. 154). Also the Revolution in 1905 ended with relatively modest results (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 57)

¹¹²⁸ The decentralising elements in the Kievan Rus lead to its disunity and thereby also to the collapse and conquest of the state by Mongols (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 108–109). Also the liberal revolution in Russia created chaos that culminated with the Civil War and disintegration of the Russian state (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 163) as well as the liberalisation policies by the Gorbachev led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberalising experiences by Yeltsin rather to the oligarchic chaos and international weakness (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 164, p. 175, p. 179, p. 189)

¹¹²⁹ Kievan Rus (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 42–43, pp. 82–83, pp. 125–128), unification of the Russian lands (*Ibid*, pp. 202–205, p. 240; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 7–10)

¹¹³⁰ First manufactories appeared in Russia in the end of the 16th century and it started the development of Russian industrial production (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 93–94). However, the restructuring of the economics started with the Great Northern War in the beginning of the 18th century (*Ibid*, pp. 170–173) and since this moment the industry is presented as the more developing sector in Russia (*Ibid*, p. 224–225; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 9, pp. 59–60, pp. 149–151, pp. 200–201; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 10–13)

¹¹³¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 208–209, p. 246

¹¹³² Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 227–229; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 57, pp. 113–115

¹¹³³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 169

and is also open for different cultural influences.¹¹³⁴ The Russian master narrative stresses the uniqueness of the Russian culture and civilisation that has developed as the result of many different nations that have contributed to its successes.¹¹³⁵ Therefore the master narrative presents other peoples in the Russia as a firm part of Russian society who together with Russians have had similar experiences and together contributed in the development of one homeland – Russia.¹¹³⁶ The Russian national policies are presented as the serious dilemma for the central government that had to balance between the central and minority nations' interests.¹¹³⁷ It is also important to note that the Russian national master narrative shows the expansion of the Russian state as much as possible as a peaceful process where Russian community successfully integrated local nations.¹¹³⁸ Therefore the Russian master narrative underlines on the one hand the Russian inclusive character and tolerance, and on the other hand, ethnic plurality of Russian society as a deliberate and natural result.

Similarly to the other cases, **Russian culture** is another important identity marker. The abovementioned multinational dimension is strongly integrated into this aspect and Russian culture is presented as a unique **Russian civilisation** that also includes the Russian power dimension.¹¹³⁹ The Russian master narrative presents Russian civilisation as one important pillar of the world civilisation.¹¹⁴⁰ Although the national master narrative emphasises its multinational character, it also defines the core – Eastern Slavs – and the other nations that have contributed in the developments of Russian culture.¹¹⁴¹ Russian culture has one cultural key identity marker that is strongly integrated into the political dimension – **the Russian Orthodox Church**. The Russian master narrative presents this institution as the symbol of Russian power on the international level¹¹⁴² as well as an important support for the formation of a

¹¹³⁴ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 33, p. 44, p. 116, p. 176; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 24

¹¹³⁵ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 8, p. 28, p. 38, p. 98, p. 241, p. 253, p. 255, p. 279; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 3,

¹¹³⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 45; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 27, p. 86, p. 123, p. 143, p. 145, p. 229, p. 281; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 3; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 34, p. 166; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 114

¹¹³⁷ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 48, p. 192; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 32, p. 227, p. 262; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 229; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 86

¹¹³⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 36, p. 38, p. 116; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 111; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 8

¹¹³⁹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 8, p. 38, pp. 65–66, p. 166, p. 241, p. 255; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 58–59, p. 138, p.199; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 217; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 82

¹¹⁴⁰ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 105; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 252–254, p. 264; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 102–107, pp. 109–114, p. 237; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 73, p. 76; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 84, p. 182

¹¹⁴¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 78, p. 97, p. 113, p. 192

¹¹⁴² Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 65–66, p. 208; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 46, p. 62; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 181

strong unified Russian state, though under state control and thereby also representing Russian state interests¹¹⁴³. Therefore the Orthodox Church is also strongly politicised.

Russian territory has an important meaning for Russian identity because it is the largest country in the world. Therefore also the Russian **chronotope** is a key Russian identity marker. Russia defines itself as Eurasian country that is located in Europe and Asia and thereby forming its unique civilisation.¹¹⁴⁴ Thus, Russian master narrative does not try to present itself as a part of some bigger region but it itself forms a chronotopical unit in the world. Therefore all the maps in the analysed textbooks do not present Russia as part of some other unit.¹¹⁴⁵ However, it is important to note that the focus of Russia lies in the European part of Russia.¹¹⁴⁶ The Russian chronotope also has an expanding character that integrates successfully conquered territories as a part of its chronotope.¹¹⁴⁷ The initial Russian homeland is defined by the territory '*from the Lake Ilmen to the steppes of the Black Sea coast and the Eastern Carpathians to the River Volga*'.¹¹⁴⁸ The growth of the territory is presented as a natural process or as the necessity of the state and thereby the territories from the Baltic Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, and Far East become part of Russian chronotope.¹¹⁴⁹ By the collapse of the Russian Empire the indepen-

¹¹⁴³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 64–65, p. 155, p. 178, p. 181, p. 184, p. 202, p. 208; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (s), p. 15, p. 21, pp. 115–116, pp. 180–181; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 77, p. 225; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 22

¹¹⁴⁴ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 5; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 3, p. 138; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 4; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 4

¹¹⁴⁵ In total there were 54 maps in the textbook, only 3 (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 247; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 176; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. I) showed territories that were not part of Russian lands, the rest all showed Russia as entirely or part of Russia.

¹¹⁴⁶ 42% of the maps depict European Russia (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 36, p. 56, p. 92, p. 112, p. 142, p. 169, p. 210, p. 229; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 33; p. 65, p. 75, p. 79, p. 96, p. 121, pp. 188–189, pp. 238–239; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 62, p. 199; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. II, pp. IV–V, p. VI–VII; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. II, p. III) and only 4% of the maps show Asian Russia (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 147; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. III) and 13% of the maps present entire Russia (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 276–277; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 6; internal side of the covers of Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. IV–V; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. VI–VII, p. VIII). Leaving out the period when Russia did not control the Asian part then European Russia is depicted twice as often as the entire Russia.

¹¹⁴⁷ Finland and Poland have a little exceptional position because both territories had significant autonomy and also the differences between Finland and Poland exist due to the liquidation of Polish autonomy and its belonging to the Soviet bloc.

¹¹⁴⁸ Author's translation 'от озера Ильмень до Причерноморских степей и от Восточных Карпат до Волги', Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 30

¹¹⁴⁹ Baltic Sea Eastern Rim since 11th century partly connected, in the beginning of the 13th century till 18th century apart from Russia and since this period again part of Russia; Caucasus since the end of the 18th century till 1864 was Caucasus merged;

dence of some territories is presented as historical error that the nations living in these lands realised and formed again one unit with Russia where they naturally belong.¹¹⁵⁰ A similar understanding is also mediated by the collapse of the Soviet Union where the Commonwealth of the Independent States is presented as the special framework for cooperation between Russia and Former Soviet Republics. In other words, the Russian master narrative claims that these territories are historically strongly connected with Russia and therefore they are not able to manage without Russia.¹¹⁵¹

To compare the Russian chronotope with the chronotopes of Estonia, Ukraine and Georgia then they are explicitly overlapping. First, none of the three case studies recognise their belonging to the Russian geopolitical space as the bigger regional unit. Estonia defines itself clearly as part of Europe and particularly Northern Europe. Georgia has an ambiguous position on the European border where the nation is defined culturally as a European but geographically Georgia is defined as a Middle Eastern country. The Ukrainian master narrative does not attach Ukraine so strongly to some particular region but it is rather presented as an independent region that belongs to Europe. Therefore the Russian master narrative that presents these nations belonging historically to the Russian geopolitical region sharply contradicts the other national master narratives. Also there is a contradiction of the chronotope of the territories. The Estonian master narrative shows that Estonia became part of the Russian empire only during the Great Northern War and Estonians left the Empire at the first opportunity. The Russian master narrative shows Estonia as dependent territory since the period of Kievan Rus and only the conquest of the Teutonic Order in Estonia pushed the Russians out.¹¹⁵² Thus, the Russian master narrative defines the Estonian disintegration from Russia as the result of the Western invasion that expelled Russian influence from its historical region but the Estonian master narrative defines belonging to the Russian Empire as a

Central Asia was merged in the second half of the 19th century; Siberia was merged with Russia during the period of the end of the 16th century till the end of the 17th century; Far East 1860–1914 and 1945 the Kuril islands.

¹¹⁵⁰ About the formation of the Soviet Union the textbook wrote ‘*Besides, the idea of belonging to a single great power lived in the minds and spirits of the peoples populates the lands of the former Russian empire*’ (Author’s translation “К тому же идея принадлежности к единному великому государству жила в умах и настроениях народов, населявших бывшую Российскую империю”), Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 166; about Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland there is mentioned that these nations became under the European influence and except Finland the rest of the territories were gained by the Second World War.

¹¹⁵¹ The reason to disintegrate from Russia was the opportunism of the nationalistic leaders but they soon realised their mistake, Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 189, p. 194

¹¹⁵² Estonian territories are shown as under Kievan Rus control on the maps in Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 36, p. 56, p. 92, p. 112. In total Russian maps of the analysed textbooks show Estonia at least partly under Russian influence 55% and separate from Russia 45%.

historical error. Ukrainian lands are defined by the Russian master narrative as the Russian historical homeland. The Ukrainian master narrative defines the Ukrainian lands as their own territory and Russian lands those which were in the North (Novgorod) and North-East (Vladimir Suzdal). Also the subjugation of the Ukrainian lands in the 17th and 18th century is defined by Russia as the natural process of the unification of Russian lands and the Ukrainian master narrative defines it as Russian annexation of the Ukrainian lands.¹¹⁵³ Therefore the chronotope related identity clash is even stronger between Ukraine and Russia. The Russian master narrative defines also the Caucasus, including Georgia, as part of its chronotope though during a shorter period than the Estonian or Ukrainian lands. However, since the 19th century when these territories were merged to Russia the master narrative shows them as a firm part of the Russian chronotope.¹¹⁵⁴ The Georgian chronotope also rejects this approach and shows the relatively short period of being in the Russian empire as a historical anomaly.

The other main Russian identity markers are also opposing the Estonian, Ukrainian or Georgian identity markers. The strong power and Russia as the world power is very clearly perceived by the three dominated nations as a threat to their national self-being and therefore it challenges the warrior identity marker of these nations that has in all three cases mainly been a defensive one. This aspect clashes especially strongly with the Georgian warrior spirit because it is more independent identity marker than Ukrainian Cossack spirit, which includes also other dimensions. At the same time, Russian expansive external power directly opposes Estonian peaceful nature. The weakness of Russia that undermines Russian world power, and therefore for Russians a negative phenomenon, is perceived by the three dominated nations as the opportunity to defend their nation and therefore considered as a rather positive situation. Also the internal dimension of power is contradictory. In the Estonian and also Ukrainian master narrative one key identity marker is the democratic character of their national communities. Therefore the Russian identity marker of strong centralised power contradicts their identity marker and the political order that is defined as natural and beneficial for Estonians and Ukrainians causes crucial problems for the Russian political system. And on the other way around, the strong centralised Russian political system hinders Estonians and Ukrainians to organise their society according their traditions. It is important to mention that the Georgian master narrative neglects this aspect.

Socio-economic identity markers contradict as well. The Russian master narrative that defines Russia as an industrial nation opposes the other three nations who define themselves as traditional agricultural nations. Therefore also the intensive industrialisation that is a positive phenomenon for the Russian

¹¹⁵³ In total Russian maps of the analysed textbooks show Ukraine as Russian lands or at least partly under Russian influence 90% and separate from Russia 10%.

¹¹⁵⁴ In total Russian maps of the analysed textbooks show Georgia at least partly under Russian influence 67% and separate from Russia 33%.

master narrative finds very painful and negative response in the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives. The Russian identity marker 'industrial nation' can find the biggest comprehension in the framework of the Ukrainian master narrative, which admits that Russian policies managed to industrialise Ukraine and it is not seen only as a negative result as the Estonian and Georgian master narratives present it. However, similarly to the Estonian and Georgian cases, the Ukrainian master narrative sees this process as part of the Russian colonial policies that aimed to destroy their national self-being and exploit their lands. Therefore it clashes with the Russian understanding that industrialisation policies have developed these territories and provided the increase of the people's well-being.

The cultural and demographic identity markers also strongly contradict with the Russian identity markers. The Estonian master narrative defines clearly an opposite society to the Russian multinational one. Therefore there is a direct identity clash between Estonia and Russia that is supported by the intensified migration policies during the Soviet time that destroyed the Estonian ethnic homogeneity. Ukrainian and Georgian identity markers do not emphasise the homogenous society as the Estonian one but also they do not share the similar understanding with the Russian master narrative. The Georgian and Russian identity markers of multinational and tolerant society could be similar and supportive but the balancing policies that according to the Russian master narrative the central government in Russia had to follow are interpreted by the Georgian master narrative as the policies that instigated ethnic conflicts in Georgian lands. There is not a direct confrontation with the Ukrainian identity markers in this aspect, but the related Russian cultural identity marker, which talks about the Eastern Slavic core, creates the contradiction with Ukrainian identity that aims at constructing an independent Ukrainian cultural identity.

All three dominated nations do not share the Russian understanding of the shared cultural space as one Russian civilisation where all nations have contributed to its development. They see Russian culture as the opponent to their cultures because it has tried to subjugate their cultural particularities by intensive Russification policies and undermined their main cultural identity markers: especially language and education but also other cultural spheres. In the case of Ukraine, this dimension is the strongest presented because the Russian identity construction has for a long time denied Ukrainians' separate identity. Religion as one identity marker plays also important role in the identity clashes with Russia. Estonia with its Lutheran Church and low religiosity has not perceived the religious dimension as important part of the identity clash. In the case of the Orthodox Church where all other three nations belong to the identity clash is much more important. From the Russian perspective their Orthodox "brothers" Ukrainians and Georgians should openly accept the Russian Orthodox Church because they belong to the same religious group. However, the contradiction exists. Ukrainian fragmented religious space has decreased the importance of this dimension in the identity clash with Russia but the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is still a significant symbol

for Ukrainian independent identity. In the case of Georgia, where the independent Georgian Orthodox Church is one of the most important identity markers, religious identity clash is much more sensitive. Therefore the dominating Russian understanding of the shared common Russian civilisation undermines the most important identity markers for Estonians, Ukrainians and Georgians.

The Russian narrative of origin constructs the 700,000 years old history of Russian lands and defines Russians as the Indo-European Eastern Slavs who have carried on the tradition of Kievan Rus. The narrative of origin also underlines the necessity of national unity that is defined as the prerequisite for the strong state that is able to resist to external enemies and expand its territories. Therefore weakness leads to the loss of territories that is defined as a negative historical development. In comparison with the case studies of the dominated states, Estonia, Ukraine, and Georgia, it is possible to conclude that the Russian narrative of origin has a more assimilative character and also the meaning of national unity is used more for the necessity to maintain power while the Ukrainian and Georgian case is defining it as the national survival. Also Russian national strength is focused on the ability to expand its territories and challenge other world powers while Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian national strength is aimed at an independent nation-state. In addition, there is a conflicting understanding of their origin between Ukrainians and Russians. Therefore I conclude that my assumption 1.a. *'narratives of origin support contradicting characters and roles that construct mutual incompatibility'* is proved and this dimension constructs the mutual antagonism between former dominating and dominated nations.

The main Russian identity markers are strong power in the international system as well as strong centralised power of the state, industrial nation, multinational population that has contributed to form one Russian civilisation. The Russian chronotope is defined still mainly by its old borders. All these identity markers are strongly opposed by the identity markers of the Estonian, Ukrainian, and Georgian cases. The strong power internationally is defined as a threat for their national self-being and they prefer to see Russia as weak that undermines Russian identity marker. The strong centralised power opposes the Estonian and Ukrainian democratic identity marker. The industrial nation clashes with the agricultural nation identity marker in all three cases of the former dominated nations. Also the multinational population directly clashes with the Estonian homogenous identity marker and undermines also the Georgian and Ukrainian understanding of peaceful and stable ethnic relations. The multicultural Russian civilisation is in direct contradiction to the independent national cultures that are the most important identity markers for these three nations. Therefore I conclude that my assumption 2.a. *'main identity markers are opposing and thereby they create mutual denials of these identity markers'* is confirmed and the identity markers of the former dominating nation oppose the identity markers of former dominated nations and thereby they also deny their parallel existence. The chronotope of Russia overlaps clearly with the

Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian chronotopes and includes these territories as Russian historical lands that construct one Russian historical geopolitical region. Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian chronotopes present their national territories as independent units and attach their territories to the other historical geopolitical regions. Therefore also my assumption 2.b. *‘chronotope of the identity is overlapping – the chronotope of former dominant nation includes the territories of dominated nations, though the latter reject it’* is proved and the overlapping chronotopes intensify the international identity conflict.

5.2. Character of the Russian Narrative and its Schematic Templates in Comparative Analysis

In this section I focus first on the character of Russian narrative and to what extent it includes Estonians, Ukrainians and Georgians. Unlike the analysis in the previous chapters these nations are not significant others for Russians but the analysis will show how much the Russian master narrative mediates the assimilative elements related to these nations that consider Russia as one of their national significant others. Thereby I will test my hypothesis 1.b. *‘the narrative of the former dominant nation has an assimilative character towards the dominated nations, narratives of dominated nations have dissimilative character towards former dominant nation’*. In the second half of this section I define the main schematic narrative templates used in the Russian master narrative to mediate the repeatable patterns in the national history and how the key moments are similarly narrated by the national history. Thereby I test my research thesis 3 *‘schematic narrative templates of dominated nations are similar and differ significantly from the templates of the former dominating nation’*.

The comparative analysis of the narrative of origin already concludes that the Russian narrative is more inclusive than the three previous cases. Therefore the general character of the Russian master narrative towards Estonians, Ukrainians and Georgians is also strongly assimilative (90% of the assessed statements) and only to a very small extent does it use some dissimilative elements (See Chart 5.1.). Thereby the Russian master narrative constructs the understanding that all these three nations are a firm part of Russian history and each of them has a role in developing the Russian multinational civilisation. However, the role of these three nations has varying extent and ways that the Russian master narrative defines them as part of the Russian national history. Ukrainians as the second largest nation in the Russian Empire and also one of the closest kin nations for Russians is significantly more mentioned than Estonians or Georgians who are often defined as part of Russia in the territorial terms. In the following I analyse the used assimilative elements by each nation separately and compare them with their character of the narrative towards Russians.




Chart 5.1. Character of the Russian Narrative towards Estonians, Ukrainians and Georgians

Ukrainians are the most mentioned ethnic group in the Russian master narrative. Therefore also the **assimilative elements** used to show Ukrainians as a part of Russian history is significantly bigger than those used about Estonians and Georgians. The Russian master narrative does not underline so often Estonians or Georgians as individual nations but about them is usually used the Baltic provinces/Baltics (Pribaltika) or Transcaucasia (Zakavkaz'e) that assimilates more the territory than the nation. As it was concluded in the analysis of the Russian chronotope then Estonian lands have been defined significantly earlier as part of the Russian lands than Georgian ones and therefore also more assimilative elements are used about Estonians than Georgians (See Chart 5.2.). I defined also a category where the assimilative elements were used about at least two of the analysed nations to differentiate how much the Russian master narrative focuses on the individual nations and how much it presents them as one of the many in the bigger group.




Chart 5.2. Share of Assimilative Elements about Other Nations in the Russian Narrative

The assimilative elements about Ukrainians have different aspects that are used. One group of the elements present Ukrainian territory as historical Russian land and the establishment of Russian power is defined as restoration of its historical rights.¹¹⁵⁵ There are also some elements that carry more the territorial meaning that underline that Ukrainian administrative connectivity with Russia by presenting it as one province of the huge Russian state.¹¹⁵⁶ Another group of the assimilative elements that are used in the Russian master narrative define the political connection between Russia and Ukraine and emphasise the cooperation between these two nations.¹¹⁵⁷ Also the cultural similarity and mutual impact is stressed by the Russian master narrative to show the strong cohesion of two nations.¹¹⁵⁸ To conclude, 95% of the assessed elements in the Russian master narrative have assimilative character towards Ukrainians and 5% of the assessed elements dissimilative ones. Thereby the Russian master narrative emphasises Ukrainians' ethnic and cultural proximity to Russians and it constructs the understanding that these two nations as well as Ukrainian lands are a significant part of Russian history and they belong together.

¹¹⁵⁵ As much Ukrainian and Russian master narrative start with the territorial history then the ancient history is clearly overlapping and the first states in the Ukrainian territories are presented as ancient history of Russia and Kievan Rus and Kiev as first chapter of Russian history (e.g. Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 11, pp. 21–22, pp. 24–25, p. 30, pp. 41–42, p. 49). It gives also to ground to the following elements that are used either to show that Russia lost its historical territories to Lithuania/Poland (e.g. *Ibid*, p. 163, pp. 165–166, p. 170, pp. 224–225, p. 254) or that Russia managed to restore its control upon its historical lands (e.g. Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 101, pp. 112–113, p. 211, p. 235, p. 240; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 21, p. 134, p. 143, pp. 144–145).

¹¹⁵⁶ E.g. Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 97, p. 145, pp. 224–225; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 56, p. 76, p. 149, pp. 201–202, pp. 250–251; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 12, p. 38, p. 126, p. 204, p. 212; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 68

¹¹⁵⁷ Particular importance is made on the unification of the Ukrainians lands with Russia in the 17th century by showing it as Ukrainians' deliberate act (e.g. Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 109–110, p. 142, p. 164; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 76). But Ukrainian political attachment to Russia (e.g. Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 100–101, p. 125, p. 155, p. 158, p. 193, pp. 242–243; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 7, p. 141, p. 210, p. 220, p. 274; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 31, p. 71; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 99, p. 147, p. 150, p. 157; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 144) and cooperation between two nations (e.g. Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 187, p. 191; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 22, p. 41, p. 47, p. 49; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 158, pp. 225–226) is also shown in other context.

¹¹⁵⁸ There is ethnic dimension (e.g. Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 77, p. 82, pp. 166–167, p. 254; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 107, p. 151; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 7, p. 42, p. 102, p. 138, p. 206) as well direct cultural impact (e.g. Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 127–129, pp. 150–151; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 110; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 61); also some representatives that Ukrainian history defines as Ukrainians are defined as Russians without making any reference to Ukraine like N. Gogol or A. Kuindzhi (e.g. Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 110–111, p. 242; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 17)

The Ukrainian master narrative has opposing character and only 26% of the assessed elements supported assimilative character. The Ukrainian master narrative does not share the same understanding about the Ukrainian lands and it does not define them as one of the Russian lands because it rejects Russia as the direct successor of Kievan Rus. However, the administrative connectivity of Ukrainian lands with Russia also exists in the Ukrainian master narrative. The Russian master narrative also emphasises more the Ukrainian political and cultural connectivity with Russia than the Ukrainian master narrative does. The Russian master narrative has neglected Ukraine's economic connection with Russia and these aspects are rather mediated by the administrative dimension to show Russia's territorial cohesion. Thus, the Ukrainian master narrative does not deny the historical connection with Russia but it is less important than in the Russian master narrative and it is not shown as a natural historical development but rather as historical necessity.

Assimilative elements used about Estonia in the Russian master narrative mainly explain the Russian historical right to this territory as well as showing the necessity to control Estonian lands.¹¹⁵⁹ However, often the Russian master narrative does not differentiate Estonia from the other Baltic territories and it is referred to as the Baltic provinces. Also a significant part of the assimilative elements are used to show Estonian and other Baltic provinces administrative attachment to Russia where their economic dimension is stressed, thereby constructing the understanding that the economic development of these provinces was due to the Russian factor.¹¹⁶⁰ To some extent the political connectivity between Estonia and Russia is also expressed but it has less important meaning than the previous ones.¹¹⁶¹ To conclude, 80% of the assessed elements in the Russian master narrative have assimilative character towards Estonians and 20% of the assessed elements dissimilative ones. Thus the Russian master narrative constructs the understanding that Estonian territory is a historical part of Russian lands and it had significance for Russian development and Russia has developed this area.

Like the Ukrainian case, also the Estonian master narrative has opposing character and only 27% of the assessed statements had assimilative character. The first bigger denial is, similarly to the Ukrainian, to reject Estonia's

¹¹⁵⁹ The Russian main argument to show its historical rights in Estonia is the establishment of Yuryev (Tartu) in 1030 (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 73) and it gives the ground to define Estonia at least partly Russian sphere of influence and the Germans invasion in the 13th century is shown as invasion to the Russian lands (e.g. *Ibid*, p. 145, p. 148; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 26). Therefore together with the necessity to get access to the Baltic Sea also the historical arguments are used and conquest of Estonian lands is shown as liberation of Estonian lands (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 62, p. 166–167, p. 176)

¹¹⁶⁰ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 217, p. 225; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 14, p. 76, p. 151, p. 201; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 8, p. 56, p. 86, p. 147, p. 172; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 113–115, p. 147, p. 152

¹¹⁶¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 147, p. 150; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 5

historical belonging to Russia and the Estonian master narrative underlines that the historical connection between Estonians and Russians occurred only in the 18th century when Estonian lands were conquered by Russia. Therefore when the Russian master narrative shows that Russia restored its power in Estonian lands, then the Estonian one portrays this as an anomaly in the general Estonian historical development. Administrative connectivity is also presented in the Estonian master narrative but it is shown as a temporary and not desired result for Estonians and it is not connected to the meaning of progress as the Russian master narrative does. The Russian master narrative does not emphasise the cooperation between Estonians and Russians as the Estonian narrative does but this is probably due to its marginal meaning for the Russians' own narrative.

The Russian master narrative's assimilative character towards Georgians emphasises mainly the good cooperation between two nations and the deliberate act of the Georgians to subjugate themselves to Russians.¹¹⁶² Georgian lands are a little more mentioned separately than Estonian ones but also Georgia is often included in the group of Transcaucasia. The Russian master narrative also presents Georgian lands as a Russian administrative unit and thereby also incorporates them into the big Russian territory.¹¹⁶³ To conclude, slightly over 80% of the assessed elements in the Russian master narrative have assimilative character towards Georgians and slightly below 20% of the assessed elements dissimilative ones. Georgian master narrative supports similarly to the Estonian and Ukrainian ones only 27% the assimilative character and alliance seeking, which covers the major part of assimilative elements, is shown as the necessity and the only option. The Georgian master narrative neglects the administrative connectivity with Russia but the Russian master narrative is leaving out the Georgian personal connections with Russia as well as neglecting the cultural connections.

The assimilative elements that include at least two of these nations mediate the understanding that they are a part of the big Russian realm. On the one hand they show the borders of the Russian chronotope by showing that these territories have been part of Russia.¹¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, they stress that these nations have been also contributors to the Russian great civilisation.¹¹⁶⁵ By these elements also Russian historical processes are presented as overwhelming and

¹¹⁶² Georgians seeking the alliance with Russians before the 18th century to show the Georgians interest to be part of Russia (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 63, p. 143, p. 278; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 18, p. 227) but also the Russian-Georgian cooperation in 20th century (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 151; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 189)

¹¹⁶³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 262; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 50, p. 94, p. 135, p. 206; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 90

¹¹⁶⁴ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 279; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 4–5, p. 54; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 5, p. 8, p. 88, p. 119, p. 149, p. 165, p. 222; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 8–9, pp. 34–35, p. 37

¹¹⁶⁵ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 5, p. 72, p. 240, p. 245; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 66, p. 171; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 73, p. 86

inclusive for these three nations.¹¹⁶⁶ The Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian national narratives do not reject the general Russian societal developments but there is more reluctance to accept the emphasis made on the territorial connectivity and the cultural dimension that is strongly dissimilative for their national master narratives.

Dissimilative elements in Russian master narrative are marginal covering only 10% of the assessed statements. The Russian master narrative includes strongly the three nations analysed in the previous chapters and it constructs the understanding that these nations have been historically together, they have the same historical experiences and they share the same fate. Therefore also the dissimilative elements are hardly visible in the master narrative. The Russian master narrative admits that Ukrainians are a different nation from Russians.¹¹⁶⁷ Also to some extent the master narrative shows that Ukrainians, Estonians or Georgians have had some regional particularities¹¹⁶⁸ or that political forces independent from Russia has taken control in these countries or Russia recognising the independence of these countries¹¹⁶⁹. However, the master narrative frames it as a temporary situation or underlines assimilative elements in the narrative.

The Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives have a dominantly dissimilative character (73–74%). They have different accents but they all construct a clear understanding that the history of these three nations is not strongly connected with Russia and they do not belong to the Russian historical space even though they have a shared history. The implicit understanding that constructs the connection with some other historical region is the most dominating in the Estonian case. The Georgian case stresses the active resistance to Russian domination and thereby constructs the understanding that Georgians did not accept belonging to the Russian realm. Similarly the Ukrainian case emphasises the Ukrainians' reluctance to accept Russian domination and the Ukrainians' long fight for their national autonomy and independence. Estonia who experienced 20 years of independence between the two world wars does so strongly stress this dimension but Ukraine and Georgia both did not manage to maintain their national independence and therefore this aspect is also more stressed in the national master narrative. In addition all three countries also underline the differences and present Russia as other/different in their master narrative.

¹¹⁶⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 51, p. 86, p. 105, p. 127, p. 129, p. 261; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 40, p. 49, pp. 166–167; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 30–31, p. 55, p. 57, p. 116

¹¹⁶⁷ E.g. Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 166–167, p. 254

¹¹⁶⁸ E.g. Ukrainian peasants were free 130 years longer than Russian ones (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 219, p. 273), in Estonia was serfdom abolished earlier than in Russia (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 33), Georgians managed to maintain Georgian as official language in their Soviet constitution (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 225)

¹¹⁶⁹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 147–148, pp. 150–151, p. 166; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 153, p. 156, p. 184, p. 196

The character of the national master narratives in Estonia, Ukraine and Georgia is similar and though they make different stresses the meaning is the same – they have dissimilative character towards Russia. The Russian master narrative has opposing character and instead of underlining differences with its assimilative character it underlines that these three nations are part of Russian history belonging to the historical Russian realm and contributing to the development of Russian civilisation. The analysis of the history textbooks shows that Russian master narrative is 90% assimilative and 10% dissimilative in comparison with the Estonian and Georgian cases (both 27% assimilative and 73% dissimilative) and Ukrainian case (26% assimilative and 74% dissimilative). Thus, my hypothesis 1.b. *‘the narrative of the former dominant nation has an assimilative character towards the dominated nations, narratives of dominated nations have dissimilative character towards former dominant nation’* is confirmed.

In the following section I define the **schematic narrative templates** in the Russian master narrative and thereafter compare them with the templates in the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian cases. In the case of Russian master narrative it is possible to present also four schematic narrative templates: Triumph over Alien Forces¹¹⁷⁰, Gathering the Territories, Unity is Power, and Great Reforms. All of them have strong glorifying connotations though there are also some victimising elements combined to the template to strengthen glorifying elements.

The schematic narrative template **Triumph over Alien Forces** is showing the strength of the Russian nation that united is able to resist external enemies.

1. Initial situation: *‘... Russian people are living in a peaceful setting where they are no threat to others ...[;]*
2. *[It is disturbed by t]he initiation of trouble or aggression by an alien force, or agent ... [;]*
3. *[It brings for Russia a] time of crisis and great suffering ...[;]*
4. *[It is o]vercome by the triumph over the alien force by the Russian people, acting heroically and alone¹¹⁷¹*

This narrative template shows how the Russian nation has always managed to resist external enemies and by national unity they have managed to expel the external invaders. At the same time, it also underlines the Russian peaceful character but which turns to be a great defence for the nation during the external invasion. This narrative template is used by almost all external invasions. In the case of the Mongol-Tatar invasion the period is longer, reaching over several centuries, but in the other cases it is narrated about one certain war. During the Time of Troubles Russians lost their capital to Poland but the people organised

¹¹⁷⁰ This schematic narrative template was first time presented by James V. Wertsch in his book *Voices of Collective Remembering*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002

¹¹⁷¹ Wertsch, 2002, p. 93

resistance and expelled the enemies.¹¹⁷² The next bigger invasion of Russia was conducted by Napoleon who also managed to capture Moscow but again to the people's resistance he was defeated and Russia liberated also the rest of Europe from his domination and Russia became a European and world power.¹¹⁷³ Also the Russian Civil War had a significant external invasion and the ability of the Bolsheviks to mobilise the Russian population led to the expulsion of the enemy and the formation of the Soviet Union.¹¹⁷⁴ The most glorified victory over external enemy is the Great Patriotic War where the Soviet Union was attacked by Nazi Germany and the front reached close to Moscow. However, by the joint effort of the Soviet people the enemy was decisively defeated and Russia became one of the global superpowers.¹¹⁷⁵ Thereby the Russian master narrative constructs the understanding that Russians are a peaceful but strong nation and when someone attacks Russia then the nation manages to organise its defence and it leads to a great victory and strengthening of the Russian international position, which is an important identity marker.

The schematic narrative template **Gathering the Territories** mediates the understanding how the Russian empire has grown.

1. Initial situation: Russian centre has strengthened and the nation is strong but lacks some resources/has obligations;
2. It creates some problems that require Russia's full attention;
3. Firstly Russia tries peacefully to deal with occurred problems but there is opposing power that resists Russia;
4. Therefore there is a legitimate cause to start a war to enlarge Russian territories;
5. Russia is involved to the war and with successful campaigned the lands are attached to Russia becoming part of Russian great civilisation.

As already in the previous template was underlined, the Russian master narrative shows the nation as peaceful not as aggressively expansionist. Therefore this narrative template shows how the Russian territory was enlarged. The main necessity of the expansion of Russian lands has been access to the warm water seas and therefore expansion towards the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Caspian Sea is justified. Thereby the conquest of the Baltic Sea Eastern rim, Volga River and Crimea takes place. On the other hand, the necessity to unify the land is given as a just cause for Moscow's domination over the other Russian states, as well as expansion over Belarusian and Ukrainian lands. To defend its lands and people the Russian master narrative explains the conquest of Kazan, Siberia, and Central Asia. In addition, the Russian master narrative also includes the elements that show that Russia had obligations to incorporate the territories to protect these states from the other external enemy, e.g. Ukrainians against Poles, Georgians and Armenians against Ottomans and

¹¹⁷² Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 89

¹¹⁷³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 30

¹¹⁷⁴ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 153

¹¹⁷⁵ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 40

Persians. By using this narrative template expansion of the Russian Empire is presented as a natural process and clear necessity or Russian obligation.

The third schematic narrative template is **Unity is Power** that on the one hand shows the importance of national unity and the necessity for strong centralised government is, and on the other hand, it shows that Russia is able to overcome temporary weaknesses.

1. Initial situation: Russian central government has weakened due to domestic political struggle;
2. Therefore the Russian territories start to separate from Russia and Russian international status weakens and that brings external intervention;
3. Suddenly a strong leader appears and he starts to deal with the problems in the country;
4. Successful policies lead to the unification of the nation and the restored strong central government returns the strong international position.

This narrative template is used to explain the occurrence of Moscow as the centre. The disintegration of Kievan Rus and the Mongol invasion weakened Russia but Moscow managed to centralise its power and thereafter to unify also other Russian states that led to the end of the Mongol-Tatar yoke and establishment of Russian Czardom.¹¹⁷⁶ The Time of Troubles also weakened Russian central government and due to the external invasion Russia started to lose its territories. The first Romanovs who came to power as the result of this struggle managed to strengthen central power and create conditions for establishing the Russian Empire. Also the 20th century has two periods when Russia lost its unity and power and it managed to restore them both times.¹¹⁷⁷ First, the Russian Revolution and the following Civil War but the Bolsheviks' leadership saved Russia from these difficult moments and managed to restore Russian international power. Also the collapse of the USSR and disintegration of its territories and the subsequent Yeltsin era when federal subjects tried to increase their autonomy and Western involvement into Russian internal affairs which was followed by Putin's reign who managed to restore strong central power and order in Russia and restore Russian international status as a great power. Thus, this schematic narrative template constructs the understanding that strong centralised government establish in Russia unity that is necessary for achieving international might.

The fourth schematic narrative template **Great Reforms** is related to Russians' ability to survive great reforms that are necessary to develop the country to be on the same standard with other world powers.

1. Initial situation: Russia is underdeveloped due to the postponed reforms by earlier leaders;
2. Russian new leader understands the necessity of the reforms and he starts to forcefully implement gigantic reforms;

¹¹⁷⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 255

¹¹⁷⁷ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 197

3. The intensification of the reforms change life radically (in some cases they bring people suffering and require from them heroic efforts to implement the reforms);
4. By dedication and power the reforms are implemented and they contribute to Russian modernisation and it leads to strengthening its might.

This schematic narrative template deals with the major Russian dilemma how to organise Russian modernisation and how to reduce its underdevelopment in comparison to the “West”. Different great reformers have brought different levels of suffering for the people but all of them have changed the Russian people’s life. This narrative template can be found in reforms by Yaroslav the Wise who managed to unify the country and to reorganise it as a centralised state. Ivan IV implemented many reforms to reorganise its structure and increase its centralisation, but brought a lot of suffering for the nation. This pattern is more clearly visible in the great reforms made by Peter I who started to Europeanise Russia and by the huge efforts made by Russian people to make Russia one of the European powers. To a lesser extent, the reforms by Alexander I and Alexander II are defined as bringing suffering for the people but they create some setbacks. However, they have an important meaning for the country’s modernisation. In the 20th century the forced industrialisation by Stalin is presented as a similar huge reform that was necessary for the country’s modernisation but created great suffering.¹¹⁷⁸ The last important reformer was President Putin who is the person who managed to restore the order and stability in the country but with some sacrifices (War in Chechnya).¹¹⁷⁹ All these events show that Russian development and modernisation has a periodic character and a strong powerful leader is able to implement the reforms that are necessary for gaining international power but postponed by the earlier leaders. However, it glorifies Russian people who have managed to take the burden of intensified reforms and managed to implement them successfully and bring glory to the nation.

Comparing the Russian schematic narrative templates with the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian ones, the main difference is that Russian templates mediate more assimilative character than the others. All other three support rather dissimilative character by underlining the necessity to establish independence and separate from the dominating power. The Estonian and Georgian narrative templates include more dissimilative character: the Estonian ones focus on the opportunities for secession and the Georgian narrative templates emphasise national rebellion against the dominant power. The Ukrainian schematic narrative templates partly also deal with the idea of separation but it stresses more the hazardousness of the nation’s dependent status and thereby implicitly mediates the dissimilative meaning. In the Russian schematic narrative templates this dissimilative character is almost missing, only clear confrontation and the rebellion concept is mediated by the first

¹¹⁷⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 246

¹¹⁷⁹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 193

narrative template. And even in this template the unity of the nation includes some assimilative elements. All the other narrative templates have assimilative character, second and third underline it the most; the last one mediates it more implicitly.

It is also interesting to compare understandings of the nation's unity that is mediated by Russian, Georgian and Ukrainian schematic narrative templates. The Russian narrative template is focused on the necessity of national unity because it is the presumption for high national prestige on the international level and great power status. In the case of Georgia the concept is to some extent similar with the Russian one because it also underlines the necessity to unify the nation to strengthen its position but due to the size of the nation it does not aim at great power status in the region or world but at national self-determination. The Ukrainian narrative template that stresses the necessity for national unity is not dealing explicitly with the issue of strengthening the national position but it focuses on the maintenance of internal stability and formation of commonly shared understanding of the future of Ukraine. Therefore the Ukrainian narrative template is more different from the Russian one than the Georgian schematic narrative template.

To compare the images that are mediated by the schematic narrative templates of the national master narratives then the confrontation is less definable as it is in the case of the character of the master narrative. In the case of Russia all narrative templates mediate glorifying image but with victimising and justifying elements. The closest by the number of glorifying narrative templates is the Estonian case but it includes more victimising elements as well as one victimising narrative template with glorifying elements. The Georgian master narrative uses equally the glorifying templates with victimising elements and victimising templates with glorifying elements. The most different one is the Ukrainian schematic narrative templates that underline more victimising elements than other cases. Thus, the schematic narrative templates do not mediate so explicitly different elements and they are more related to the nation's individual past experiences.

To conclude this part of my analysis, I can confirm my assumption 1.b. that show the clear division between the character of master narratives of the dominating nation (Russia) and dominated nations (Estonia, Ukraine and Georgia). In the case of the schematic narrative templates the confrontation is not so obvious. The aspect of the narrative character in the schematic narrative templates was explicitly identified and thereby it also supports my assumption 1.b. However, the image that is stressed by the schematic narrative templates is not differentiating sufficiently in the case of the former dominant nation and dominated nations. The difference in the usage of the glorifying or victimising elements can be rather related to the focuses of the national master narratives as well as the nations' individual historical experiences. Thus, my research thesis 3 '*schematic narrative templates of dominated nations are similar and differ significantly from the templates of the former dominating nation*' found partial, but not sufficient confirmation.

5.3. Comparative Analysis of the Russian Image in the National Master Narratives

In the previous chapters I analysed the images of self and significant Other, Russia in the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives. In this chapter first I define the Russian self-image and subsequently I compare the extent of the usage of glorifying, victimising, personalising and justifying elements in all four cases. Thereafter I compare Russian self-images with Russian images constructed by Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives. Thereby I test my assumption 2.c. *'image of former dominant nation is presented as negative and threatening by dominated nations and their self-image is victimised'* and 2.d. *'self-image of former dominant nation is heroic and glorifying and it whitewashes its negative images of the past events'*. Estonians, Ukrainians and Georgians do not have the role of the significant other for Russians and they are marginal in the Russian master narrative. Therefore I do not focus on the images that the Russian master narrative has used about these nations.¹¹⁸⁰

The Russian self-image in the master narrative is similarly to the previous cases dominantly positive and it covers 73% of assessed Russian self-image elements (glorifying and victimising) in the master narrative. The negative self-image elements (justifying and personalising) cover 27% of self-image construction (See Chart 5.3.).




Chart 5.3. Narrative Elements about the Russian Self-Image

¹¹⁸⁰ In the analysis of the textbooks showed that although it tried to focus on the history of Russian peoples and state then the role of all three nations has been marginal in the history narrative and it covered only 5% of the assessed constructed images in the textbooks. However, 3/5 of their images were negative, positive covered 2/5 of their images.

The Russian positive self-image is dominantly mediated by the glorifying elements. The Russian master narrative glorifies the most power-related aspects: Russian political and military successes. Also Russian cultural achievements play an important role in the glorifying elements. The Russian master narrative glorifies less the national development and richness as well Russian uniqueness. An additional aspect that the Russian master narrative glorifies is Russian altruistic character and civilising nature (See Chart 5.4.).




Chart 5.4. Glorifying Elements about the Russian Self-Image

The most important dimension of the glorifying self-image is the political successes of Russia. The above analysis underlined the two most important parts of the Russian political dimension: strong state and international might. National master narrative elements that glorify the unified and strong centralised state start from the formation of the first Eastern Slav state till current Russia.¹¹⁸¹ An important aspect in this process is also successful reforms that support the development of the strong state.¹¹⁸² The other dimension that

¹¹⁸¹ Unification of Eastern Slavs and formation of their state (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 40, pp. 54–55, pp. 59–61, p. 71, p. 96, p. 115), rise of North Eastern Rus and Moscow as new power centre and unification of Russian lands under its control (*Ibid*, p. 118, p. 120, p. 125, pp. 158–159, pp. 173–175, p. 178, pp. 180–183, pp. 188–189, p. 219, pp. 224–225, p. 230), unified Soviet Union (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 23, p. 33, p. 57)

¹¹⁸² Reforms made by Yaroslav the Wise, Vladimir Monomakh in Kievan Rus (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 72, p. 94); reforms in Moscow ruled Russia (*Ibid*, p. 228; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 11, p. 16, p. 19, pp. 66–67); Reforms by Peter I the Great (*Ibid*, p. 159, p. 171, p. 182), reforms by Catherine II the Great (*Ibid*, p. 217), reforms by Paul I (*Ibid*, pp. 244–245), reforms by Alexander I (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 14–15, p. 36), reforms by Alexander II (*Ibid*, pp. 117–118, p. 122, pp. 126–128, pp. 133–134, p. 143, p. 190, p. 261), reforms by Stolypin (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 61–62, p.

underlines Russian international might has also significant role to glorify Russian self-image.¹¹⁸³ In this dimension supporting elements deal with the territorial enlargement¹¹⁸⁴ as well as the role of the Russian Orthodox Church that is defined more as a power institution than a cultural one¹¹⁸⁵. In addition to the political successes of the central government the people's revolt against the stagnated central power is also glorified and even not significant successes are stressed as important achievements.¹¹⁸⁶ However, this dimension is less presented in the national master narrative.

Russian military power is the main source of its international might therefore also its military successes are glorified in the national master narrative. The Russian master narrative constructs the image of Russians as brave soldiers who will fight courageously in all conditions and they prefer rather to die in battle than to surrender.¹¹⁸⁷ Usually the braveness is stressed in the battles where Russia has lost but to support the image of military power the brave character of soldiers compensates the defeat. Russian master narrative also glorifies the might of Russian army that is the symbol of Russian power.¹¹⁸⁸ The military

66), reforms by Bolsheviks and Soviets (*Ibid*, p. 110; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 101, p. 128, pp. 138–139, p. 143), Post-Soviet reforms (*Ibid*, p. 175, p. 178, p. 191, p. 195)

¹¹⁸³ Strong international position of Kievan Rus (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 74–75, pp. 154–155, p. 177), might of Moscow (*Ibid*, p. 242; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 14–15, p. 63); might of Russian Empire during Peter I the Great (*Ibid*, p. 168, p. 183), during Catherine II the Great (*Ibid*, p. 215, p. 235, pp. 241–242, p. 279, p. 281; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 3), during Alexander I (*Ibid*, p. 11, p. 262), during Nicholas I (*Ibid*, p. 88, p. 91, p. 100, p. 116); during Alexander II (*Ibid*, pp. 170–171, p. 177), during Alexander III (*Ibid*, p. 219, p. 224, p. 260), Soviet Union (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 172–175, p. 177, p. 238, p. 240; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 38–39, p. 41, p. 44, p. 93, p. 158), Post-Soviet Russia (*Ibid*, pp. 187–188, pp. 193–194, p. 197)

¹¹⁸⁴ Enlargement of Novgorod lands (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 126), enlargement of Moscow state (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 3, pp. 110–111), enlargement of Russian Empire (*Ibid*, p. 211, p. 236, p. 242, pp. 278–279; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 5, p. 31, p. 92, p. 169, p. 223), enlargement of the Soviet state (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 152, p. 171; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 37)

¹¹⁸⁵ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 208; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 62, pp. 117–118; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 148, p. 181

¹¹⁸⁶ Stepan Razin's revolt (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 125), Pugachev's revolt (*Ibid*, pp. 230–233), Decembrists (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 40, p. 51), later social movements and 1905 revolution (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 152; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 37, p. 39, p. 41, pp. 43–44, pp. 50–51, pp. 55–57, p. 70), Russian revolution 1917 (*Ibid*, p. 95, pp. 101–103, p. 153), resistance to Bolsheviks and Soviets (*Ibid*, p. 159; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 88, p. 117, p. 145, p. 147, p. 156)

¹¹⁸⁷ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 32–33, p. 135, pp. 137–138, pp. 140–141, pp. 186–187, p. 196, p. 211, pp. 228–229, p. 248; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 23; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 23, p. 25, p. 27, p. 81; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 25, p. 27

¹¹⁸⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 72; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 54, p. 156, pp. 162–163, p. 170, p. 215; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 29, pp. 52–53, p. 82, p. 131, p. 178;

successes also have improved Russian international status as well as successfully expanded its territory.¹¹⁸⁹ However, the master narrative appreciates more the heroic defence of the homeland.¹¹⁹⁰ In this context the biggest heroic deed is the great victory in the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945).¹¹⁹¹ Thereby the Russian master narrative constructs the image of heroic defender of peace and just cause.

The third important pillar of the glorifying elements of the Russian self-image is Russian culture that is great by its achievements and powerful to form a separate Russian civilisation. An important part of the Russian culture is its Christian heritage.¹¹⁹² The Russian master narrative claims that the unique Russian civilisation was established already by Kievan Rus and it has developed through history with contributions by all nations living on the Russian territories.¹¹⁹³ It is important to mention that also the cultural dimension includes the power aspect because many great works are related to successful wars.¹¹⁹⁴ Therefore it is also unique and forms a separate civilisation. The master narrative glorifies Russian authors and creation¹¹⁹⁵ as well as Russian inventive spirit that has contributed to the development of global civilisation¹¹⁹⁶.

Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 133; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 5, p. 34, p. 43, pp. 50–51, p. 90, p. 98, p. 119

¹¹⁸⁹ Improving international status (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 51–52, p. 63, p. 222, p. 123, pp. 212–214, p. 248; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 30, p. 37, p. 99, p. 163, p. 174, pp. 177–178), expanding the territory (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 55; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 22–24, p. 26, p. 38, pp. 112–113, p. 158, p. 162, pp. 211–211, pp. 236–240; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 21, p. 86, pp. 90–91, p. 94, pp. 165–168, p. 175; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 88–89, p. 151)

¹¹⁹⁰ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 57, pp. 72–73, p. 91, p. 145, pp. 147–151, p. 180, p. 205, pp. 216–217, p. 253, p. 255; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 37–38, pp. 77–78, pp. 84–85, pp. 88–89, p. 164, p. 167; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 23, pp. 25–26, pp. 29–30, p. 74, p. 89, p. 95, pp. 97–99, p. 145, p. 241

¹¹⁹¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 3; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 9–12, pp. 17–19, pp. 24–25, pp. 27–29, pp. 34–40, p. 46, p. 53, p. 60

¹¹⁹² Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 65–66, p. 99, pp. 122–124, pp. 196–197, pp. 247–248; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 52–55, pp. 131–132

¹¹⁹³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 97–98, p. 105, p. 115, pp. 131–132, p. 191, p. 255; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 59, p. 199, pp. 263–264

¹¹⁹⁴ Kulikov cycle of creation, Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 244; Great Patriotic War against Napoleon, Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 101–102, p. 107; Great Patriotic War (1941–1945), Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 20–22

¹¹⁹⁵ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 95, pp. 100–101, pp. 102–105, p. 113, p. 193, p. 245, pp. 246–247; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 56, p. 130, p. 133, p. 197, pp. 258–262, p. 266; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 69, pp. 109–114, pp. 238–249, p. 260; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 74–78, pp. 80–82, pp. 200–201, pp. 233–237; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 62–63, pp. 83–84

¹¹⁹⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 105; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 55, pp. 127–130, p. 138, p. 153, pp. 193–195, pp. 250–256, p. 281; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 69, pp. 102–105, pp. 234–237, p. 262; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 73–74, p. 196, p. 232, pp. 50–51; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 182

Thereby the Russian master narrative constructs the image of Russian culture as a multinational and successful phenomenon that makes every Russian person proud.

To a lesser extent, Russian richness and level of socio-economic development is glorified because it is more mediated by the victimisation as Russian social underdevelopment in comparison to Europe. The master narrative still stresses also some economic success and developments. The natural richness of Russia is glorified and shows Russia's natural might.¹¹⁹⁷ Russian general socio-economic developments are applauded as well by the national master narrative.¹¹⁹⁸ Having industrial nation as an identity marker then also first the development of Russian handicraft and later of Russian industry is glorified.¹¹⁹⁹ It is interesting to note that also economic developments are presented as part of developing a strong military power.¹²⁰⁰ Russian glorifying elements also emphasise Russian kindness and altruistic spirit that has facilitated significantly the development of other nations.¹²⁰¹ Therefore the Russian master narrative constructs the understanding that Russia is an important development centre and it has contributed a lot for the developments of its provinces. Also it shows that Russia has been ready to participate in the defence of the other nations.¹²⁰² Thereby the master narrative underlines the Russian generous spirit. The last aspect of the glorifying elements is related to the Russian particularity that also shows how special Russia is and why Russians can be proud of their nation.¹²⁰³

¹¹⁹⁷ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 30; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 63; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 77

¹¹⁹⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 40, p. 194; Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 95, pp. 174–175, p. 224, p. 281; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 65, pp. 210–211, pp. 250–251, p. 258; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 181; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 81, p. 105, p. 133, p. 192

¹¹⁹⁹ Russian handicraft (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 26, pp. 126–127, p. 202, p. 240; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 93), development of industries and industrialisation (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 94–95, pp. 171–172, pp. 224–225; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 60, p. 65, pp. 103–104, pp. 149–151, pp. 200–201, p. 261; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 10–11, p. 204, p. 206, pp. 208–209, p. 246; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 20, p. 197)

¹²⁰⁰ Industrialisation is one of the key element that has been intensively developed in Russia aiming at the military might, Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 170; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 104

¹²⁰¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 166; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 40–41, p. 141, p. 145, p. 273, p. 275; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 33–36, pp. 75–76, p. 86, p. 142, p. 168; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 170–171, p. 228; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 72, pp. 113–114

¹²⁰² Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 141; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 137–138, pp. 172–173, pp. 229–230; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 113, pp. 241–242; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 189

¹²⁰³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 5, p. 26, p. 87, p. 129; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 7, p. 9, p. 59, p. 152, p. 173, p. 233; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 4, p. 10, p. 36, p. 103,




Chart 5.5. Victimising Elements about the Russian Self-Image

The second group of the narrative elements that constructs the positive Russian self-image is related to the victimising aspects of the national past. The Russian national master narrative victimises the most the repressions and enslaving of the Russian people by the external enemies as well as by the Russian ruling elite. The underdevelopment and poverty of Russia that show the pitiful living standards of Russian people through the history also has a significant part. Aggressions by the external enemy and military defeats have an important role in the Russian master narrative. The issue of disunity is usually mediated by victimisation elements as well.

The Russian master narrative victimises most the exploitation of the Russian people and governmental repressions against Russians. The earlier period is more related to the external exploitation by Mongol-Tatars that is recalled as the one of the most tragic periods in the Russian past.¹²⁰⁴ But the master narrative also victimises the capturing of Russians and selling them to slavery by its South Eastern neighbours.¹²⁰⁵ However, the external enslavement of Russians is less presented than domestic exploitation. The Russian master narrative depicts the Russian past on two levels: central government and common people. While the central government deeds are often depicted by glorifying elements, the life of common people is shown as a heavy exploitation by the ruling elite and thereby it is also victimised.¹²⁰⁶ In addition, the master narrative victimises also the

p. 191, p. 208; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 7, pp. 9–11, p. 19; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 196

¹²⁰⁴ Mongol Yoke but also the master narrative, Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 155–157, p. 159, p. 191, p. 194, p. 254

¹²⁰⁵ Kazan khaganate, Central Asian states etc, Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 214; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 21; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 92, p. 164

¹²⁰⁶ The most victimised is the life of peasants in the serfdom and also after liberation because of heavy burden they had to carry, Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 5, p. 97, p.

repressive policies of the Russian government by showing that ordinary Russians suffered under its government as much as any other nation.¹²⁰⁷ In some cases it is even underlined that Russians suffered more than others.¹²⁰⁸ Thereby the Russian master narrative constructs the understanding that Russian government and Russian people are two different units and very often they are also opposed to each other. It is also important for using the personalising elements.

Due to the exploitive system, Russia has been strongly underdeveloped and its population impoverished. The master narrative defines that the underdevelopment of Russia started with the Mongol-Tatar Yoke. *'The North-Eastern principalities were brought back 50–100 years in their economic development. It was then when started the economic backwardness of our country from the Western European nations.'*¹²⁰⁹ Therefore the following master narrative has justification for the poverty and it is presented by the victimising elements. The master narrative on the one hand compares the Russian situation with Western Europe that is the most important significant other for Russia and concludes that the level of development in Russia has been much lower.¹²¹⁰ On the other hand, the master narrative also describes the poor economic situation and poverty among its population and the main reason for this was the system of serfdom that had influenced even after its liquidation.¹²¹¹ Also the underdevelopment of the Soviet social-economic system during the industrialisation and later failed reforms of Gorbachev and the following Post-Soviet Russian economic crisis

105, p. 173, pp. 175–176, p. 185, p. 195, p. 221, p. 226, p. 228, p. 271; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 3, p. 119, p. 123; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 38, p. 128, p. 159, pp. 213–215, pp. 48–49

¹²⁰⁷ Religious discrimination and repressions, especially against Old Believers (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 64–65; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 124–125, pp. 190–191), also other state terror before the Soviet regime (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 34–35, p. 124, p. 186, pp. 232–233; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 59, p. 69) and the Soviet terror (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 137, p. 154, p. 161, p. 182, p. 195, p. 197, p. 212, p. 221, p. 226, p. 231, p. 235; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 33, pp. 55–57, pp. 60–62, p. 78, p. 87)

¹²⁰⁸ Ukrainians were not serfs for long time, Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 273; Russian central budget took finances to develop more Caucasus, Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 34; positive discrimination of Central Asian people led to the discrimination of Russians, Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 170; in the Post Soviet Russia the national republics were more supported than Russian ethnic regions, Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 179

¹²⁰⁹ Author's translation 'В своем хозяйственном развитии северо-восточные княжества оказались отброшенным назад на 50–100 лет. Именно тогда началось экономическое отставание нашей страны от западноевропейских государств.', Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 254

¹²¹⁰ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 7, p. 128, p. 170; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 11, p. 234, p. 261; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 9, p. 11

¹²¹¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 11, p. 31, p. 43, pp. 68–69, pp. 91–92, p. 157, p. 216, p. 223, p. 256, p. 281; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 9, p. 38, pp. 60–61, p. 64, p. 116, pp. 144–146, p. 197, pp. 201–202, p. 259; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 57

are victimised by the Russian master narrative.¹²¹² Thereby the master narrative constructs an image of victimising elements that people lived in these poor conditions and underdeveloped society but still they were able to make heroic deeds presented by the glorifying elements.

The Russian victimising elements are also related to attacks by external enemies that caused devastation for the land and people.¹²¹³ These elements are mostly used in the case when the first part of the schematic narrative template Triumph over Alien Forces, which is showing the great suffering that Russian people had to experience before they started to resist the external enemies, is also used.¹²¹⁴ Other elements that the Russian master narrative victimises are the Russian military and political defeats that in addition to the personalising and justification also find occasionally victimisation as the unjust result.¹²¹⁵ Under this category can also be defined the collapse of the Soviet Union and the victimisation of the Russian loss of power and territories.¹²¹⁶ Another aspect that is victimising the Russian weakness is the Russian disunity and thereby caused weakening of the nation.¹²¹⁷ Thus, many moments of weakness in Russian history are mediated by the victimising elements in the master narrative because the weakness undermines the Russian main identity markers and the master narrative constructs the understanding that it is unjust treatment of Russia. However, in most of the cases Russia has also managed to overcome this situation and therefore also it mediated the understanding that the moments of weakness are a temporary phenomenon in the Russian past.

¹²¹² Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 204, p. 206, pp. 208–209; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 105–106, pp. 134–135, p. 137, pp. 166–169, p. 183, p. 187, p. 197

¹²¹³ Russian principalities attacked by the Steppe nations (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 70, p. 88, p. 90, p. 110)

¹²¹⁴ Mongol invasion (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 137–139, p. 144, p. 160, p. 205, p. 208, p. 217), Polish-Swedish invasion during the Time of Trouble (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 77–80, p. 84, p. 114), Napoleon invasion (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 22–23, p. 59), Crimean War (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 94–95), German invasion in the First and Second World Wars (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 88, p. 106; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 8–10, p. 15, p. 46, p. 51), Intervention during the Civil War (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 134–135)

¹²¹⁵ Russia defeated by Mongols (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 135, pp. 137–139), Russia defeated by Poland and Sweden in the Livonian War (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 37), Russia defeated by Napoleon (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 17, p. 21), Russia defeated by Japan (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 19) USSR defeated by Nazi Germany (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 13) but also the war losses (e.g. Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 85; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 25, p. 28, p. 31, p. 39, p. 89, p. 119; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 5, p. 39, p. 40, p. 161)

¹²¹⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 164, pp. 184–185, p. 196

¹²¹⁷ During Kievan Rus (Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 70–71, p. 91, p. 93, p. 107, p. 120, pp. 207–208) but as well in the 20th century which is the period of the biggest disintegration of Russia (Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 4, p. 108, p. 134, p. 145; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 177)

The negative Russian self-image is more mediated and whitewashed in the national master narrative than in the previous cases. The master narrative has to deal with the political and military as well as socio-economic mistakes and problems in the country that in the other cases Russia(ns) could be made responsible for. The negative image of Russia is mediated by personalising and justifying elements. In the case of Russia the personalising elements are more important. In general, the Russian master narrative has a strong personalising character and the history is narrated in a way that Russian rulers are the milestones in the national past. Therefore also historical mistakes and defeats are often mediated by these persons. In addition, the Russian master narrative also constructs the understanding that the political elite differs from the people and therefore responsible for these negative deeds are the people in power in Russia but not Russians as the nation. However, the dominating part of personalising is related to a concrete person (60%) and group or anonymous Russian/Czarist/Soviet government (40%). Personal responsibility is used more about the period before the Bolshevik coup in 1917 and group responsibility is used more during the Soviet Era (Stalin and to some extent Gorbachev as exceptions).

The victimising elements are mediated the most to explain the historical mistakes as well as defeats and disintegration in the Russian past. But they are also used to show persons or groups responsible for the violence, discrimination and exploitation in the Russian past. Thereby the negative policies in Russian past towards Russian population as well towards other peoples in Russian state are personalised. Thereby Russians are equalised to other nations and it constructs the understanding that all nations suffered similarly in the Russian polity and Russians were not preferred to the other nations (See Chart 5.6.).




Chart 5.6. Personalising Elements about the Russian Self-Image

The mistakes that the Russian master narrative personalises are mainly the assessment from today's point of view and how some decisions have influenced Russian developments. The mistakes made by Russian rulers lacking will to make reforms or making too modest reforms¹²¹⁸, economic failures¹²¹⁹, lack of strategic thinking in the foreign policy or some immoral agreements¹²²⁰, and miscalculations in the domestic politics¹²²¹. These mistakes can be defined as short-sightedness, selfish behaviour or the lack of courage to implement crucial decisions necessary for the country's development. Other mistakes are related to some particular defeat when the master narrative underlines that one or other person erred and it led to the Russian defeat.¹²²² The other defeats are not clearly defined as mistakes but the master narrative defines the defeat not as a Russian defeat but a particular person's defeat and thereby diminishes the meaning of the loss for the entire nation.¹²²³ The national disunity is also presented as a historical error and therefore internal conflicts in Russia are also often personalised: disintegration of Kievan Rus – Russian princes¹²²⁴, Time of Troubles – Russian boyars¹²²⁵, Russian Civil War – the Bolsheviks¹²²⁶, and President-Parliament power struggle – B. Yeltsin¹²²⁷.

The other part of the personalising elements is related to the power abuses of different Russian rulers. The biggest group personalises state violence and repressions against its population. It shows the Russian rulers' brutal used means to deal with their opponents¹²²⁸ or subjugate some territories to central

¹²¹⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 249; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 15, p. 39; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 31, p. 43, p. 101; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 70, p. 103, p. 131, p. 197

¹²¹⁹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 226; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 144, p. 170; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 75, p. 77, p. 137, pp. 165–166

¹²²⁰ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 175, p. 214, p. 248; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 21, p. 94; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 243; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 4, pp. 6–7, p. 96, pp. 159–162

¹²²¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 184, p. 206, p. 215; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 14, p. 132, p. 150, p. 155, p. 157

¹²²² Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 139; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 37; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 97; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 90–91; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 8, p. 13, p. 40

¹²²³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 89–90, p. 110, p. 135; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 40, p. 70, p. 83; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 20, p. 174; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 27, p. 161

¹²²⁴ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 51, p. 53, p. 59, p. 69, p. 91, p. 107

¹²²⁵ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 77

¹²²⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 130

¹²²⁷ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 172–173

¹²²⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 54, p. 69, pp. 207–208; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 13, p. 63, p. 66, p. 72, p. 117; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 49, pp. 152–153, p. 213; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 59, p. 103

government¹²²⁹. But it also narrates about the state terror already during the Ivan IV Terrible¹²³⁰ but mainly focused on the Red terror conducted by Bolsheviks and especially by Stalin¹²³¹. Another dimension is the Russian government's discriminatory policies towards its population. One group of the discriminatory policies are towards dissidents in the Russian society and the government or ruler's policies to avoid any opposing thinking.¹²³² Even more the personalising elements are used to explain the national policies in the Russian state.¹²³³ Thereby the Russian master narrative makes particular persons or ruling government responsible for the national discrimination and condemns it as not acceptable policy and therefore whitewashes the Russian nation for these policies. By combining with the previous aspect it strengthens the understanding that Russians suffered together with other nations. This understanding is also supported by the personalisation of exploitation of the Russian population by underlining that there was not any discriminative minority group in the society but the ruling elite abused the huge population for their own narrow personal interest.¹²³⁴

Another method to mediate negative events in the past is the justification to show the necessity of some particular policies or decision made in the past. The most used justifications are related to showing the made decision as the only option or as a necessity. In some cases the defeats are justified as the necessity to protect the bigger cause. Weakness or external pressure are also used relatively often to explain the failure. To some extent the Russian master narrative also tries to marginalise these events (See Chart 5.7.).

¹²²⁹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 221; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 220; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 81

¹²³⁰ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 34–35

¹²³¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 114, pp. 138–139, p. 144, pp. 155–156, p. 160, p. 164, pp. 184–185, p. 187, p. 193, pp. 197–199, p. 208, p. 213, pp. 219–221, pp. 223–224, p. 246; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 32, p. 52, p. 54, p. 59

¹²³² Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 180, pp. 192–194, p. 196, p. 259; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 71, p. 116, p. 231; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 64, p. 100, p. 142

¹²³³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 141, p. 190, p. 219, pp. 274–275; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 74, p. 77, p. 137, pp. 139–140, pp. 226–229, p. 232, p. 260; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 20, p. 22, pp. 66–67, p. 224; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 163

¹²³⁴ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 48–49, p. 71, p. 76, p. 175, p. 215, p. 219, p. 266; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 120; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 124, p. 125, p. 208, pp. 210–211




Chart 5.7. Justifying Elements about the Russian Self-Image

The biggest group of justifying elements rationalises processes or political decisions by showing that it was the only option¹²³⁵ or that a particular development could lead only to the result that happened in the Russian history and thereby normalising the event¹²³⁶. On the other hand, the Russian master narrative also uses the justification that it was necessity for the Russian state.¹²³⁷ The most often it is used for the territorial expansion where the master narrative shows that Russia did not desire to expand but the necessities forced the Russian government to make this step.¹²³⁸ Similar elements are the ones that explain Russian political or military defeats that were temporarily necessary or acceptable to support some better outcome or greater idea.¹²³⁹ However, not many defeats are justified in this way.

The Russian master narrative also mediates the past failures by justifying it them with temporary weakness. One group of explanations are related to the

¹²³⁵ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 119, p. 220; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 77, p. 182, p. 185, p. 213; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 124, p. 210, p. 216, p. 244; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 121

¹²³⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 108–109, p. 115, p. 254; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 14, p. 141, p. 172, p. 185; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 106, p. 140, pp. 162–163, p. 184; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 107, p. 118, p. 124

¹²³⁷ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 39, p. 126, p. 228; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 225; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 173

¹²³⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 24, p. 106, p. 179, p. 220, pp. 240–241; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 91, p. 137, pp. 164–165; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 86; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 6, p. 192

¹²³⁹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 45, p. 53, pp. 64–65, p. 164, p. 174, p. 188; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 73, p. 11, p. 153; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 177; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 103, pp. 142–143

military defeats justifying Russian defeats by an unequal position, bad preparedness or by some other factors that weakened Russia and led to the defeat.¹²⁴⁰ Another group of the justifying elements show Russians' temporary situation as a weak one that forces them to accept the solutions that they would not make when they would have their ordinary might.¹²⁴¹ The Russian master narrative also uses shifting responsibilities and thereby making some external power¹²⁴² or some general process not depending on the Russian policies responsible for its problems¹²⁴³. To some extent Russia also uses marginalisation of the negative impact of the past decisions. It is used to justify the national policies by showing that there was some discrimination but there was also something positive in this process.¹²⁴⁴ The same pattern is used regarding socio-economic underdevelopment in Russia.¹²⁴⁵ Also there are some negative images marginalised in the text only by briefly mentioning the issue and thereby showing its unimportance.¹²⁴⁶ Thereby the Russian master narrative constructs the understanding that the negative developments or phenomena in the Russian past are rather temporary ones and the impact of the discriminatory policies towards other nations is not so grave. Thus, it objects directly the possible accusations by the other nations towards Russia and facilitates to develop argumentation, which shows the positive aspects of the Russian domination or equalises Russians with all the other nations.

Comparing different self-image elements in all four case studies it is possible to conclude that all of them use glorifying elements the most (See Chart 5.8.). My assumption was that Russia as the former dominant nation uses more self-glorifying elements than the other nations who were dominated ones but it is interesting to conclude that the Russian master narrative does not use more self-glorifying elements than the other nations do. In this case, Estonia and Georgia use even more self-glorifying elements. The victimising elements are used the second most in all cases. However, the extent of their usage is different. In this

¹²⁴⁰ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 135; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 22, p. 29, p. 37, p. 85, p. 111, p. 158, p. 19, p. 97; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 26, p. 29, p. 88

¹²⁴¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, p. 57, p. 35, p. 83; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 170, p. 177, pp. 144–145; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 115–116, p. 169, p. 186

¹²⁴² Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 159–160, p. 107, p. 161, p. 211; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 33, p. 88, p. 91, p. 95, pp. 172–173, pp. 220–221; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 122, p. 136, p. 145, pp. 243–244; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 42, pp. 122–123, p. 161, p. 178

¹²⁴³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 95; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 154; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 30; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 125, p. 154, p. 168

¹²⁴⁴ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 51, p. 275; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), pp. 139–140, p. 142, p. 240, p. 260; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 226–227, p. 229; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 5, pp. 58–59

¹²⁴⁵ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 62, p. 219; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 45

¹²⁴⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 110, p. 159, p. 274, p. 278; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 34, p. 79, p. 262; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 244; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 3, p. 44, p. 91

case, the Ukrainian master narrative has the strongest self-victimising character and therefore in comparison to the others a significantly different case. The Georgian master narrative uses slightly more the victimising elements than Estonian or Russian ones. These two cases have similar usage of self-victimisation. The mediation of the negative image is the most visible in the Russian master narrative. In this respect the biggest difference is with the Ukrainian case, which has a strong positive self-image. The closest case to the Russian one is the Estonian master narrative. In this case the difference of the Russian case is that it uses more personalising elements than all the other cases. In contrast to the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives, the Russian master narrative also uses personalising elements more than justifying elements. The Georgian and Russian master narratives both have a strong personal focus but the personalising elements used for mediating of the negative image is significantly lower in the Georgian case. The most justifying elements are used by the Estonian master narrative, the Russian one is slightly lower. To a lesser extent the Georgian and Ukrainian master narratives also use justifications because they mediate a less negative self-image than the Estonian or Russian cases do. Thus, the usage of elements for self-image construction is not dependent on the former imperial relations.




Chart 5.8. Usage of Self-Image Elements in the Narrative (%)

A similar conclusion can be made by focusing on the period when these three nations were under Russian domination. The self-glorifying elements dominate and self-victimising elements are not the most significant self-image elements. However, there is a slight tendency that in all cases the share of the victimising elements increase in the national master narratives when it is mediating the periods when the nations were dominated by Russian power. In the case of

Ukraine the change is the most visible and in the case of Georgia it is the least. Therefore the Ukrainian master narrative victimises the most the national past that has been under Russian domination and this period has also the biggest attention in the master narrative. The Georgian one does it least because the national master narrative focuses more on the period when Georgia was not under Russian control. In the case of Estonia the change is proportional and it shows that the period of Russian domination is more victimised but it is not presented more than the other periods. Therefore there is only a slight tendency that the domination of the former empire is over victimised in the national master narratives of the dominated nations.

The Russian image in the master narratives of Estonia, Ukraine and Georgia mediate a strong negative character and they all have a similar share of Russian negative and positive images. In all cases the negative image of Russia covers slightly less than 90% of the Russia-related image elements. It contradicts strongly with the Russian self-image that deals with only slightly less than 30% of the negative image. Each nation has a little different focus on constructing the Russian negative image but on average more than 60% of the Russian image is related to the threat coming from Russia: violence, political, military and cultural threats. In addition, also the Russian image as exploiter and other negative qualities (unreliable, underdeveloped, and weak) has an important role in the master narratives. The least important is the element of shifting responsibilities (See Chart 5.9).



Chart 5.9. Russia as Other Image in the Narratives (%)

The general image of Russia in the three national master narratives contradicts the Russian self-image. The Russian self-image does not deny the violence in the Russian past but it is personalised and the master narrative shows that Russians suffered similarly to the other nations. The Russian master narrative also does not construct the understanding of antagonism between Russians and other nations of its empire but it has the assimilative understanding of the great

Russian civilisation where all its nations deliberately contributed. Therefore the political antagonism is hardly mentioned at all or defined the antagonism between Russians and nationalist groups in the other nations' societies that construct the understanding that they are a minority part of the nations. The Russian self-image also constructs the understanding that Russia is a powerful nation but it does not mediate the threat dimension since power is something to be proud of, not to be perceived as a threat. The cultural threat is mediated by the personalising elements mainly and it is shown as the policy of Russian rulers. On some occasions it is also justified as necessary for creating a better understanding between the nations in the Russian empire. The image of exploiter also strongly contradicts the Russian self-image that constructs the understanding that Russia is the crucial force that developed and civilised its peoples and that national territories' economic growth was thanks to the Russian factor. Therefore the Russian self-image constructs the understanding that Russia contributed more than it gained from the national regions. The Russian master narrative includes the image of underdevelopment that is either justified or victimised. Also the image of weakness exists and it is either personalised or victimised. However, the unreliability is strongly denied and Russian self-image presents Russia as nation who is responsible for its international obligations. In addition, it also constructs the understanding that Russia often has an altruistic spirit to defend the weaker ones. Thus, the average image of Russia as significant other contradicts strongly with the Russian self-image.

The Estonian master narrative mediates the most the threatening image of Russia (70%) where the most important aspect is the security threat coming from Russia. Also a significant aspect is the political antagonism, which constructs the understanding that Estonian and Russian national interests are opposing. Both categories are presented more than average usage of this image of Russia in all three categories. Also the image as exploiter is in the Estonian case overrepresented. All these categories have significance due to the understanding that Russian domination has been a historical deviation and the 20th century experience of maintaining national independence where the main opponent has been Russia/Bolsheviks.¹²⁴⁷ This picture contradicts the Russian self-image, which defines the establishing control over Estonian territory not as a historical error but as its correction. Therefore the Russian master narrative marginalises the antagonism between Estonians and Russians but mentions briefly that only nationalist forces were against Russian domination. Also the image of exploiter contradicts the Russian altruistic self-image and understanding that the Baltic republics' development started after they were merged into the Russian state.

In the case of Ukraine the usage of threatening image of Russia is almost similar to the average (61%). However, the dominating aspects in the image of

¹²⁴⁷ More than 80% of the political and military threat is related to the 20th century struggle between Estonians and Russians.

Russians are related to the Russian threatening image: violence and repressions against Ukrainian nation and cultural threat. They are used mainly due to the repressions of the 20th century against Ukrainian population and that Ukrainians lost quickly their national independence experienced longer period of Soviet repressions than Estonians. Also the cultural threat has a significant role because of the denial of the Ukrainian national identity by Russians and the suppressions of the national movements. The closeness of two national identities from the Ukrainian side deepens the image of threat and from the Russian side it supports the assimilative character. The Russian self-image rejects violence and it is either personalised or Russians are made victims as Ukrainians. In the case of the cultural threat it is marginalised and personalised as well by the Russian master narrative. Among the other bad qualities the most emphasised is underdevelopment that is also adopted in the Russian self-image. In this respect, it is not so strongly contradicting.

The Georgian master narrative stresses the least the threat image among the three cases (57%) but Russia as a threat is also dominating image for the Georgian master narrative. The master narrative mediates more than the average the violence related to Russians and repressions and Russian bad qualities. The reason for the overrepresentation of the repressions is related to the Georgian master narrative focus on the resistance to Russian domination in Georgia during the two last centuries when Georgia has been part of the Russian state. Therefore also there is a strong contradiction between the Russian self-image and the Georgian image of Russia. Among the bad qualities of Russia the most significant aspect is the unreliability of Russia. This strongly contradicts with the Russian positive self-image that presents Russians as an altruistic nation and a nation who stands for its international obligations. Thus, Russian and Georgian images contradict strongly.

To finish this part I can conclude that my assumption 2.c. *'image of former dominant nation is presented as negative and threatening by dominated nations and their self-image is victimised'* found only partial confirmation. The image of the dominant nation, Russia, is mediated mainly by the negative qualities where the threatening aspect has significant dominance. The second half of my hypothesis did not find confirmation and all nations independent from the imperial relations underline the most glorifying elements of self-image. However, there was found a slight tendency that all three nations victimised more than general the period when they were part of the Russian Empire/Soviet Union. My assumption 2.d. *'self-image of former dominant nation is heroic and glorifying and it whitewashes its negative images of the past events'* found confirmation and the glorifying elements are the most dominant in the Russian master narrative. However, their share is not bigger than other cases and in the case of Estonia and Georgia it was even lower. Therefore this part of the assumption found confirmation but it is not related to the dominant role in the former empire. The second part also found confirmation and the comparison to the negative images mediated by the three dominated nations' master narrative

proved that the Russian self-image is mainly contradicting almost with all aspects, except the weakness (temporary) and underdevelopment.

5.4. Comparative Analysis of the Russian Historical Key Events

In this section I first define the focus of the Russian master narrative and thereafter its historical key events. Thereafter I compare them with the Estonian, Ukrainian, and Georgian historical key moments to understand to what extent they overlap and how both sides understand them. I analyse the key events in Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian history related to Russia that do not overlap with the Russian key moments to see how much the Russian narrative differs from the national ones about these events. Thereby I test my hypothesis 1.c. *'interpretations of key events have opposing character in national master narratives'* and 1.d. *'denials of the other nation's history key events exist in master narratives'*.

Russian national history is divided into five periods: Early History, Middle Ages, Early Modern Era, Modern Era and Recent History. The first period is from the first human beings till the 9th century. The Middle Ages start with the formation of Kievan Rus and ends with the unification of Russian lands by Moscow. The Early Modern Era starts with the reign of Ivan IV who established a centralised state and last until Paul I; the Modern Era covers most of the 19th century from the reign of Alexander I till Alexander III. Recent History focuses on the 20th century starting with the last Russian Emperor Nicholas II till current Russia. In the following analysis the Early History is not covered because it is strongly underrepresented and it does not have much importance for the general Russian master narrative.

The Russian master narrative presented in the analysed history textbooks is based almost on gradual growth (See Chart 5.10.). The Modern Era is presented slightly less than the Early Modern Era but that is because of its short duration. However, the overrepresentation grows gradually and only the period of Middle Ages is underrepresented, Early Modern Era is proportionally presented, the Modern Era and Recent History are both overrepresented. Recent history is significantly overrepresented twice as much as the Modern Era. It shows that similarly to the Estonian and Ukrainian case the national master narrative focuses mainly on the 20th century events. In this respect only Georgia differs with the main focus on the 19th century because of the significant underrepresentation of the Soviet period.




Chart 5.10. Representation of History Periods in the Russian Textbooks

Unlike Estonia and Ukraine, Russia focuses less on the 20th century and its share is slightly over 1/3 of the curriculum. In the case of Estonia, it covered almost 60% and in Ukraine almost 50%. The difference focus of the national master narrative can be explained by the statehood experiences. The glorious Georgian statehood is in the Middle Ages, therefore the national history makes also a different focus on the earlier periods. The low importance of the Soviet period in the master narrative underlines the most the formation of modern Georgian nation. Therefore also the focus of national master narrative is different. Estonians did not have any statehood experience before the 20th century, hence the biggest emphasis is on the 20th century. Ukrainians have had earlier statehood experience and hence its focus on the 20th century is smaller than the Estonian one and the growth more proportional. Similar is the case with Russian master narrative where the growth is gradual and proportional but due to the continuous statehood the focus is less on the 20th century than the Estonian and Ukrainian master narratives.




Chart 5.11. Representation of the 20th Century History in the Russian Textbooks

The comparison of the periods in Recent History shows that the Russian master narrative makes two emphases: the first half of the 20th century, with the period starting with the First World War and ending with the Russian Civil War, is the most overrepresented period. It is the complex and controversial period when the Russian Empire collapsed and in addition to the Russian domestic battle it covers also the external invasion and restoration the power in the earlier Russian territories. It is similar to the Ukrainian and Georgian cases because the turbulent times offered a chance for establishing national independence and their termination. The second most overrepresented periods are Perestroika and the Second World War (the Great Patriotic War). The first of them is related again to the collapse of the Empire and the latter is the greatest victory of Russia and defines its Superpower status in the world. In the Estonian national master narrative the Second World War is the most overrepresented period due to the controversial elimination of Estonian statehood. The Second World War is also overrepresented in the Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives. Similarly the period of Perestroika is overrepresented in all cases. The Georgian and Russian master narratives pay also more attention to the formation of the Soviet Union and its modernisation but it is less underlined in the Ukrainian master narrative. To conclude this comparison then the general focuses of the 20th century history in all four cases are relatively similar and therefore it is important to compare the meanings of these key moments in their national master narratives.




Chart 5.12. Share of the Russian History Key Events in the Textbooks

In the Russian master narrative key events have a bigger share before the 20th century. However, the 20th century key moments cover 40% of all key events in the Russian master narrative (See Chart 5.12.). The Russian history key moments from the earlier period are mainly related to the reforms or national unity. Kievan Rus and its heyday mark Russian origin and therefore this strong unified principality has also important meaning for the Russian master narrative. The Mongol-Tatar Yoke has the meaning of degradation and the worst lesson of disunity of the nation. This is the period, which is defined as the reason for Russian underdevelopment as well as the main example for the future Russian polity and thereby also another pillar of Russian statehood. Considering also the long period of both of these key moments in the Russian past and their significance then they both share significant 10% of the key events.

The following unification of Russian lands under Moscow domination is the period that defines the centralised power in Russia. It ends the Mongol-Tatar Yoke, and restores the former Kievan Rus with the new power centre in Moscow. The reign of Ivan IV, Peter I and Alexander I they all have the importance of great reforms as well as the strengthening of Russia's international status. Ivan IV introduced important reforms to unify the country and he also started to conquer non-Russian lands (Kazan, Astrakhan). Peter I started modernisation and Europeanisation of Russia and also established the Russian Empire by making it a European power. Alexander I implemented several reforms to continue modernisation and he also fought against Napoleon successfully that made Russia the most powerful country in Europe and a world power. The great reforms in the 1860s-1870s were implemented by Alexander II and they liquidated serfdom, the main impediment to development. Therefore all these reforms have relatively similar importance and share in the Russian national master narrative. The Time of Troubles has a different meaning: it was

the period of Russian weakness and the future existence of Russia was in the question. The unification of the nation expelled the external invaders and made possible the rise of the Russian might in future.

In the 20th century the most important history key moment and also in entire Russian master narrative is the Revolutions in 1917 and following Russian Civil War. The Revolution in 1905 was the prelude for the 1917 and it changed Russia from the absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. The revolution in February liquidated the monarchy and failing to gain the people's support led the country to chaos, where the Empire's nations started to secede. In this chaos the Bolsheviks were the most successful at gaining the people's support and they managed to restore order and regain most of the Russian Empire's territories. The following Soviet Modernisation has again a key importance for the Russian past because during this short period by intensive efforts Russia became an industrial state. This is also defined as the most important preparation that enabled Russia (Soviet Union) to resist Nazi Germany and achieve its biggest victory of all history. Therefore the Second World War in the Russian national memory is the Great Patriotic War where the good (Russians and other Soviet peoples) fought against evil (Nazis) and Russian won this war thanks to their heroic deeds. This war is also defined as a just and liberating war.¹²⁴⁸ This war elevated Russia to the position of world superpower. The two last milestones in the Russian master narrative have a rather negative meaning. Gorbachev's reforms are defined as a big failure that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and to the disintegration of the state. The Post-Soviet struggle in Russia is also defined as a negative period when the state disintegrated, people suffered economic hardship and Russia's international position was very weak. This tragedy was ended by V. Putin who started to restore the strength of the state domestically and internationally.

Being part of the Russian Empire then Estonians, Ukrainians and Georgians have many commonly shared historical key moments. Georgians have them least due to the great importance of the period when Georgia was not influenced by Russia. Estonian and Ukrainian master narrative has defined more national key moments related to Russia (See Table 1).

The first shared historical key moment is Kievan Rus that is shared by Ukraine and Russia. In the earlier analysis (5.1.) I defined that there is a contradicting understanding who is the "true" successor of the Kievan Rus heritage between Russian and Ukrainian narrative of origins. Therefore this historical key moment has a clearly opposing character. In addition, both national master narratives also avoid mentioning the other nation in this context and they both show that in the later period the other formed as a different nation under external influence (Russians were influenced by Mongols vs Ukrainians who were influenced by Lithuanians and Poles) and therefore also deviated from their true origin. Thus, this historical key moment can be also defined as mutual denial.

¹²⁴⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 40

Table 1. Russian Historical Key Events Shared with Estonia, Ukraine, and Georgia

Russian historical key moments	Estonia	Ukraine	Georgia
Heyday of Kievan Rus		X	
Reign of Ivan IV	X		
Reign of Peter I	X	X	
Reign of Alexander I	X		X
Revolution 1905	X	X	
Revolutions and Civil War	X	X	X
Soviet Modernisation		X	
World War 2	X	X	X
Gorbachev's reforms	X	X	X
Post-Soviet Russia		X	X
Total share of the national key moments in the textbooks (72%)	72%	65%	38%

The reigns of three different Russian Czars have the meaning of important reforms and international might for Russians. For the three other nations these periods are related mainly to Russian expansion. The reign of Ivan IV has the meaning of aggression in the Estonian master narrative, though it showed also Russian weakness in the end. While the Russian master narrative defines the war as justified: Livonian cities impeded Russian trade and thereby its development, also the Livonian rulers did not pay the rent for Yuriev (Tartu) established by Yaroslav the Wise, though they have promised it.¹²⁴⁹ The Estonian master narrative defines the Russian reasons as illegitimate pretext to attack the weakening Livonian states and the first sign of Russian aggression towards Estonian lands.¹²⁵⁰ The reign of Peter I is related to the Estonian and Ukrainian key moments. The Ukrainian historical key moment is related to the third, last period of Ukrainian Hetmanate and Hetman Ivan Mazepa. The Russian master narrative defines the victory in the Great Northern War as the starting point of the Russian Empire and therefore a great victory that started from the Battle of Poltava (1709, Ukraine). In the Ukrainian master narrative it is the moment of the last attempt to restore Ukrainian lost independence and its final defeat by Russians. The behaviour of Hetman Mazepa who allied with Sweden is defined by Russian master narrative as treason that also gave reason to eliminate Ukrainian autonomy.¹²⁵¹ The Ukrainian master narrative defines Hetman Mazepa as one of the greatest national heroes who by smart diplomacy

¹²⁴⁹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 26

¹²⁵⁰ Laur et al, 2005, p. 84, p. 88

¹²⁵¹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 179

tried to restore national independence that was supported by Sweden. It also stresses the brutality of Russian troops and Russian destructive policies in Ukraine and the liquidation of autonomous administration of Ukraine as the culmination of the traitorous Russian policies to change the initial alliance agreement between Muscovy and Ukraine.¹²⁵² The Great Northern War for the Estonian master narrative is the crucial moment when Estonians were separated from the Europe by the Russian conquest. The Estonian master narrative underlines the brutality of Russian forces in Estonia and Estonians reluctance to accept the Russian domination.¹²⁵³ For the Russian master narrative it was liberation of the Baltic coast from the Swedes and the solution for the historical task for Russia to get the access to the Baltic Sea.¹²⁵⁴ Thereby it is also a justified and necessary action. The reign of Alexander I is defined as the period of liberal reforms by the Russian master narrative. The Estonian master narrative presents one example, the emancipation of Baltic serfs as one of the key events. For the Estonians it is a turning point for the national formation and thereby though by personalised way Russia has a positive image in this process.¹²⁵⁵ It coincides with the Russian interpretation of the key moment. The Georgian and Russian understandings of this period are much more contradictory. It is related to the annexation of Georgian lands. The Russian master narrative defines it just as a natural process that started with the Treaty of Georgievsk when the Eastern Georgian kingdom recognised Russian patronage over its territories and Russia defended Georgians from the Islamic nations.¹²⁵⁶ The Georgian master narrative stresses the Russian traitorous behaviour to disregard the agreement and to use it as pretext to take over the power in Georgia. The Georgian master narrative does not reject the relatively peaceful annexation but it underlines the following active resistance as evidence of the illegal Russian annexation and the Georgians' reluctance to accept Russian power.¹²⁵⁷ The Russian master narrative does not talk about the Georgian resistance. In total, most interpretations of these three key moments in Russian master narrative have strong opposing character with the Estonian, Ukrainian or Georgian interpretations. The only exception is the Estonian interpretation of the Alexander I reforms that coincides with the Russian. The Russian master narrative also denies the Georgian historical key moment of national resistance.

The Revolution of 1905 and the revolutions in 1917 and the following Russian Civil War are more controversial and also include stronger contradictions between the analysed national master narratives. The Revolution of 1905 according to the Russian master narrative is depicted mainly as the

¹²⁵² Vlasov, 2002, p. 231, pp. 242–247

¹²⁵³ Laur et al, 2005, pp. 92–93

¹²⁵⁴ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 166–167

¹²⁵⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 134

¹²⁵⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), p. 278; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (b), p. 18

¹²⁵⁷ Vachanadze et al, 2002, pp. 189–190; Vachanadze, Guruli, 2004, pp. 11–15

people's resistance to the autocratic government and it also briefly mentions that in the ethnic regions there was national dimension included.¹²⁵⁸ For the Estonian and Ukrainian master narrative it has the meaning of change from the cultural national movement to the political national movement. Therefore the national elite's activities are considered as the first political challenge to Russian domination. The Ukrainian master narrative emphasises the importance for Ukrainian politicians of participation in the Russian State Duma and represent the Ukrainian interests there.¹²⁵⁹ However, the national master narrative concludes that Ukrainians realised that there is no support for the Ukrainian national movement from any Russian political forces.¹²⁶⁰ Thereby it also cultivates contradiction. The Estonian master narrative underlines the brutal repressions against Estonians after the revolution where the Russian army played the key role.¹²⁶¹ Therefore both cases stress the opposing character with Russians.

The events 1917–1921 have in all four cases the most important meaning. However, the understandings are very contradictory. The Russian master narrative interprets this moment in the national past as the weakness that led to disintegration. The final decisive victory by the Bolsheviks enabled Russia to restore its power in most of its former territories. All other cases show that it was the moment when it finally was possible to liquidate the historical mistake, the Russian domination and the national movements executed their highest right to declare national independence. In the case of Estonia and Georgia it was also officially recognised by Soviet Russia but only Estonia managed to maintain it for the following 20 years. Therefore the national master narratives underline the nation-wide resistance to Russian power where Bolsheviks are portrayed as the representatives of Russian imperialism and local Soviet governments are defined as Russian puppet governments ruled from Moscow. The Ukrainian interpretation has a similar pattern but it deals also with the justification why the national forces did not find sufficient support in the Ukrainian lands that led finally to the liquidation of Ukrainian independence. The Georgian master narrative shows it univocally as the act of the Russians/Bolsheviks. The Russian master narrative emphasises the positive impact of the Civil War for the national minorities and states that it gave to these nations who have lost long time ago or never had the experience of the national self-rule but the peoples had in mind the understanding of the one unified Russian state and therefore they formed in 1922 the Soviet Union.¹²⁶² Dissimilarly to the Russian interpretation it is shown by the Ukrainian and Georgian master narrative as an enforced decision from Moscow. In the case of Estonia, this period has the most heroic moment when Estonians managed to protect their national independence

¹²⁵⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 50–51

¹²⁵⁹ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 352

¹²⁶⁰ Turchenko, Moroko, 2002, p. 341

¹²⁶¹ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 12–13

¹²⁶² Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 153, pp. 166–167, p. 150

in the Liberation War and Estonia became for the first time in history an internationally recognised nation-state, its rightful position. The Russian master narrative shows its independence as a wrongful act by Germans who gave power to the Estonian nationalist bourgeois government and that was protected by the European powers. Only later there is mentioned the peace treaty that gives some indication that there was a war.¹²⁶³ However, it can be defined as the denial of the Estonian Liberation War. Thus, the historical moment in 1917–1921 has crucial meaning for all nations but they have clearly contradicting interpretations and also partial denial of the key moments.

The Soviet modernisation has also importance for the Ukrainian master narrative. The Russian master narrative defines it as difficult but necessary and successful reform that has crucial meaning for Russian future might. The Ukrainian master narrative partly agrees that great efforts were made and Ukraine became an industrial nation but it emphasises more the heavy social cost of these reforms. *Holodomor* – the most tragic moment in the Ukrainian master narrative is related to the modernisation policies. The Ukrainian master narrative makes Moscow responsible for this catastrophe and it is defined as Stalin's policy targeted against the Ukrainian nation.¹²⁶⁴ The Russian master narrative denies the targeted policy against Ukrainians and it shows the big famine in the beginning of the 1930s as a result of the collectivisation where the central government neglected this issue and let millions of people all over the Soviet Union die.¹²⁶⁵ Therefore the Ukrainian and Russian interpretations have strong opposing character.

The Second World War or the Great Patriotic War has crucial meaning in the Russian master narrative. It is the victory over evil and demonstrates the multinational and nation-wide resistance to the mortal enemy. Therefore the victory in this war means for the Russian identity the liberation of Europe for which Russians paid a high price. The interpretations of the other master narrative do not share the same understanding. Among the three only the Ukrainian master narrative also names it as the Great Patriotic War. The Georgian master narrative defines it as a war where Georgians were pushed to fight for the Russian interests. The Estonian master narrative has an even more complex understanding due to the loss of its independence during this war. Therefore there are different aspects related to this opposing understanding with the Russian master narrative. The Estonian master narrative depicts the process as a struggle between two aggressors who agreed first to divide Eastern Europe and thereafter started to militarily force the little neighbours to accept the agreement. Therefore the established Soviet power in Estonia was illegal and did not express the people's will. Estonians were torn by the war and forced to fight by both aggressors. In the end of the war the Estonian national elite decided to use the German army to fight against the aggressive Soviet power.

¹²⁶³ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 172

¹²⁶⁴ Turchenko, 2004, p. 294

¹²⁶⁵ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 213

Therefore the Estonian master narrative defines the conquest by the Soviet troops not as liberation but as occupation.¹²⁶⁶ The Russian master narrative admits the MRP¹²⁶⁷ but it is presented as the only option for Stalin because there was not any international protection against German aggression. As well it gave a chance to restore the borders of the earlier Russian Empire. Also the Russian master narrative admits the involvement of the Red Army in the formation of the Soviet governments in Estonia but it stresses that the initiative to become part of the Union came from the Estonians. Therefore when Germany attacked the Soviet Union then Estonia was a firm part of the Union and also the events in 1944 as the liberation of Estonia where also Estonians strongly contributed.¹²⁶⁸ The Estonians' fight against the Red Army is defined as the nationalist collaborators and not as the national liberation war as the Estonian master narrative defines it.¹²⁶⁹ Therefore this key moment has clearly opposing interpretation in the Estonian and Russian master narratives.

The Ukrainian master narrative has partly a similar interpretation with the Russian master narrative, claiming that Ukrainians together with Russians contributed to this victory.¹²⁷⁰ However, there is also controversy between these two master narratives: the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's (UPA) role in the war. The Russian master narrative defines it as a small group of nationalists in Ukraine who used the German invasion to fight against the Red Army. The Ukrainian master narrative interprets them as the national liberation fighters and their initial connections with the Nazis as a part of policy to restore national independence. The Ukrainian master narrative shows clearly that the UPA fought at the same time against the Nazis and the Red Army and thereby it was the national liberation force that had broad support in Ukraine.¹²⁷¹ Therefore there is also strong contradiction between the Ukrainian and Russian master narratives. The least contradicting is the Georgian and Russian interpretation but the Georgian master narrative underlines the disproportionate Georgian contribution and careless Russian attitude toward the Georgian efforts that brought suffering for the people.

The end of the Soviet Union has also different interpretations in the Russian and other master narratives. The Russian master narrative defines Gorbachev's reforms as a great failure that led to the collapse of the Union albeit 76% supported the continuation of the Union. The opportunist leaders in the national republics are accused of the dissolution of the Union.¹²⁷² It is presented as a huge historical error that happened due to the coincidence of several crucial

¹²⁶⁶ Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, pp. 73–76, pp. 92–98

¹²⁶⁷ Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 where the Eastern Europe was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union

¹²⁶⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), pp. 243–244; Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 5, p. 30

¹²⁶⁹ Compare: Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 31 with Pajur, Tannberg, 2006, p. 95

¹²⁷⁰ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 61

¹²⁷¹ Compare: Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 31 with Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 49

¹²⁷² Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), p. 152, p. 154

mistakes made by the alienated central government and national republics. The Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narrative define this moment as a historical opportunity to restore their rightful position in the world. It is depicted as the great success of the national liberation movements and strong contradiction to Moscow's policies. It is important to note that Estonia and Georgia boycotted the Soviet referendum but it is not mentioned in the Russian master narrative. The Ukrainian master narrative explains the referendum results in the way that it demonstrated the people's will to become an independent nation.¹²⁷³ Therefore also this shared key moment has strongly contradicting understanding and partly also denial of the historical events. The following Post-Soviet period does not get much attention from the Estonian master narrative. Contrary to Estonian one, the Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives analyse this period more. In general, all three nations define it as very difficult times and therefore it is also victimised a lot. However, the conclusions about this period and interpretations of the role of Russia are clearly opposing. The Russian master narrative constructs the understanding that the dissolution of the Union was a big mistake that brought suffering to everybody and the nationalist leaders' anti-Russian rhetoric ended soon because they realised that they are not able to manage without Russia. The Ukrainian and Georgian master narrative admit that it has been a difficult period but the most important is the national independence and it will bring the positive solution for the national development. They also admit that the difficulties are partly related to the Soviet past and partly to the Russian involvement into their internal affairs to undermine their developments.

In the following I will compare the not shared historical key moments in the national master narratives where Russia has a certain role but not a significant one for the Russian master narrative. One of these historical milestones is the national movements in all three nations. The Russian master narrative admits that in the 19th century the nations in the empire started their national movements. Three nations in general define the Russian policies as hostile and discriminatory towards their national conscious. However, there are also some differences in the interpretations. The Ukrainian master narrative defines the contradiction the strongest because the policies started earliest in Ukraine and the Russian policies denied the existence of a separate Ukrainian language and culture. The Georgian master narrative also sees Russian policies as hostile towards Georgian national movements. The Estonian master narrative defines first the Russian role relatively neutral or partly even supportive and only during the intensive Russification policies the Russian role in the historical moment becomes threatening. The Russian master narrative mentions briefly policies and either it personalises them or admits that they were necessary to form a united Russian nation and civilisation. Therefore also this historical moment has contradictory understandings.

¹²⁷³ Turchenko, Panchenko, Timchenko, 2001, p. 283

Another shared historical moment between three nations is the Soviet repressions and resistance. The Estonian master narrative emphasises more the repressions, the Ukrainian and Georgian ones, the resistance. However, both include the same elements. The national master narratives depict this historical moment as historical unjust and unlimited violence against their nations aiming to eliminate the will of national self-being. Therefore it also has crucial meaning in the national master narrative. The Russian master narrative does not mention the active Georgian resistance and it is merged to the general Soviet repressions. In the case of Estonia and Ukraine the resistance movements and repressions against their populations are mentioned. However, the Russian master narrative admits that the nationalist movements in the republics made the Soviet government use the repressions against these nations.¹²⁷⁴ Thus, the national master narrative shifts responsibility and thereby justifies the repressions. Therefore also in these historical key moments controversial interpretations exist and in the Georgian case there is to some extent denial of the historical key moment.

In the case of Estonia also the Independence War in the 13th century has some contradictions with Russian master narrative. The Estonian master narrative claims that Estonians stopped the Russian invasion to Estonia in the 11th century and only in the 13th century the difficult situation made Estonians ask support from Russians. However, Russian support was not reliable as well as it was selfish, aiming at establishing their control over Estonian lands.¹²⁷⁵ The Russian master narrative mediates a different understanding and it claims that the Estonians were influenced by Russians since the 11th century and when in the 13th century Germans started to conquer and baptise Estonians then it was unjust because many Estonians were already baptised by Russians and Russians helped to protect Estonians' rights in their dependent territory.¹²⁷⁶ Therefore also this historical key moment in the Estonian national master narrative has opposing character.

In the Ukrainian national master narrative there are some more controversial topics related to the Russian role in their national past. One of the biggest misunderstandings is the Russo-Ukrainian alliance in the 17th century. The Ukrainian master narrative claims that it was an alliance between two sovereign and equal partners and that there was strong reluctance among Ukrainians to swear an oath to the Russian Czar.¹²⁷⁷ Russia increasingly intervened into Ukrainian internal politics with the aim of maintaining the conflict in the society to weaken Ukraine and impose its domination over Ukrainians. Therefore Russia is defined as treacherous and cunning, gradually forcing Ukrainians to abandon their independence. The Russian master narrative defines this treaty as Ukrainian acceptance of Russian domination and as long-desired reunification of two kin nations unanimously supported by Ukrainians. The later internal

¹²⁷⁴ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (d), pp. 58–59

¹²⁷⁵ Laur et al, 2005, p. 29, p. 50

¹²⁷⁶ Danilov, Kosulina, 2007, pp. 145–146

¹²⁷⁷ Vlasov, 2002, pp. 148–149

struggles brought pro-Russian forces to power but Russia tried to keep itself neutral in these fights. The liquidation of the Ukrainian autonomy in the 1764 is presented as the natural process of the Czarist government because of Mazepa's treason and equalising the Ukrainians' status with their brother Russians.¹²⁷⁸ In the Ukrainian master narrative the First World War is an important milestone when the Eastern and Western Ukrainians were brought together. The role of Russia in this process is shown as the conqueror of the Western Ukrainian lands and therefore made the unification possible but at the same time also as an evil government that brutally repressed Ukrainians. This element is not covered by the Russian master narrative. The Ukrainisation policy has a similar understanding in general: development of the national culture. The difference is the assessment of its impact. The Russian master narrative claimed that it led to the discrimination of non-Ukrainians and therefore also Russians and Jews suffered and they expressed their dissatisfaction. Thereby the termination of this policy is legitimised.¹²⁷⁹ The Ukrainian master narrative assesses the positive aspect of supporting Ukrainian culture but the liquidation of this policy also led to the elimination of the national cultural elite. Therefore also this aspect has a slightly opposing meaning.

To conclude this analysis, the understanding of the common shared past is very controversial. Although there are many shared historical key moments, the Russian master narrative has mostly opposing understanding to the Estonia, Ukraine or Georgian ones. Therefore my assumption 1.c. *'interpretations of key events have opposing character in national master narratives'* is confirmed. The controversial understanding also is supported by silence about some historical key events of the other nation. It increases the possibility of further misunderstandings in the common past. Therefore also my assumption 1.d. *'denials of the other nation's history key events exist in master narratives'* found proof. However, it is not very broadly used.

5.5. Concluding Analysis

The Russian master narrative constructs the understanding that Russia has been a powerful and strong country in the past and therefore it has right to have this position also today. The enlargement of Russian territories has happened in the past as historical opportunities or necessities and Russian culture is a multinational Russian civilisation. Therefore it also has a strong assimilative character. The Russian self-image mainly glorifies its past and it tries to whitewash its historical mistakes. In comparison to other nations' master narratives there are many contradictions that show the potential for the international identity conflicts. In the following I conclude my analysis by the conclusive assessment of my research thesis.

¹²⁷⁸ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (a), pp. 107–111, p. 142, p. 274

¹²⁷⁹ Danilov, Kosulina, 2006 (c), p. 171

My research was based on three research theses and two of them were divided into four assumptions. I present a comparative table for each of them and compare three different cases with the Russian case. Thereby I also assess, which of the cases has the highest potential for identity conflict.

Table 2. Assumption 1.a.

Narrative of Origin	Russia	Estonia	Ukraine	Georgia
Character	Assimilative	Dissimilative	Assimilative in the beginning, later dissimilative	Dissimilative
National unity	Control over territories	N/A	National survival	National survival
National independence	Together against external enemy	Formation of independent state, later liberation and restoration	Liberation and restoration	Liberation and restoration
Origin	Kievan Rus	N/A	Kievan Rus	N/A
Total	N/A	1	3	2

The assumption 1.a. ‘*narratives of origin support contradicting characters and roles that construct mutual incompatibility*’ has found confirmation. The Russian master narrative supports different character than the other cases and there are different historical roles that the narrative of origin mediates. That creates incompatibility between Russia and Estonia, Ukraine and Georgia. The biggest number of contradicting issues related to the Russian narrative of origin is in the Ukrainian one.

Table 3. Assumption 1.b.

Character of narrative	All three	Estonia	Ukraine	Georgia
Russia (A-D)	90–10	80–20	95–5	82–18
Towards Russia (A-D)	27–73	27–73	26–74	27–73
Total	N/A	2	3	2

The hypothesis 1.b. ‘the narrative of the former dominant nation has an assimilative character towards the dominated nations, narratives of dominated nations have dissimilative character towards former dominant nation’ has found confirmation. Russian master narrative has strong assimilative character towards all three nations and all three nations have dominantly dissimilative character towards Russia. The strongest conflict between the characters of the master narratives is between Russia and Ukraine because Russian master narrative has a stronger assimilative character towards Ukrainians than towards Estonians or Georgians.

Table 4. Assumption 1.c.

Historical key events	Estonia	Ukraine	Georgia
Same key events	72%	65%	38%
Kievan Rus	N/A	Opposing	N/A
13 th freedom fight	Opposing	N/A	N/A
Ivan IV	Opposing	Opposing	N/A
Hetmanate	N/A	Opposing, some similar	N/A
Peter I	Opposing	Opposing	N/A
Alexander I	Similar	N/A	Opposing
National awakening	Opposing, some similar	Opposing	Opposing
Revolution 1905	Opposing	Opposing	N/A
World War 1	N/A	Opposing	N/A
1917–1921	Opposing	Opposing	Opposing
Ukrainisation	N/A	Similar, some opposing	
Modernisation	N/A	Opposing, some similar	N/A
World War 2	Opposing	Similar, some opposing	Similar, some opposing
Soviet resistance	Opposing	Opposing	Opposing
1985–1991	Opposing	Opposing	Opposing
Post-Soviet period	N/A	Opposing	Opposing
Total	2	3	1

The assumption 1.c. ‘*interpretations of key events have opposing character in national master narratives*’ has found confirmation. Russian interpretations of the national key moments oppose to the Estonia, Ukrainian or Georgian interpretations and there are strong contradictions between the dominant nation and dominated nations. Therefore there are few similar understandings of the national turning points and it increases the potential for the international identity conflict. The biggest contradiction is between Ukrainian and Russian master narratives having misunderstandings over most issues. At the same time Estonian history key events overlap the most with the Russian ones and their contradicting character increases the potential for the identity conflict.

Table 5. Assumption 1.d.

Key event	Estonia	Ukraine	Georgia
Kievan Rus	N/A	Mutually	N/A
Georgian resistance	N/A	N/A	Russian narrative does not mention
Estonian Independence War	Partially	N/A	N/A
World War 1	N/A	Russian narrative does not mention	N/A
Georgian Soviet resistance	N/A	N/A	Russian narrative does not mention
World War 2	Mutually	N/A	N/A
UPA	N/A	Partially	N/A
Soviet referendums	Russian narrative does not mention	N/A	Russian narrative does not mention
Total	3	3	2

The assumption 1.d. ‘*denials of the other nation’s history key events exist in master narratives*’ found confirmation. The denial appears in different forms, it can be mutual denial that totally rejects the opposite position, being silent about the event or marginalising some elements in the event to a minimum or mentioning only part of the event. In general the master narratives do not deny each other historical key moments but they give different interpretations. However, in some cases there is also in some extent denial.

The first research thesis ‘*the national master narratives of the former dominant nation and dominated nations are mutually antagonistic*’ has found full confirmation and the Russian master narrative represents the dominating nation one. The Estonian, Ukrainian, and Georgian master narratives represent the dominated nations’ master narratives and therefore between these two types

of master narratives antagonism exists that increases the potential for international identity conflict.

Table 6. Assumption 2.a.

Russian Identity Marker	Estonia	Ukraine	Georgia
International power	Peaceful Nation	Cossack Spirit	Brave Warrior
Centralised power	Democracy	Cossack Democracy	N/A
Industrial nation	Agricultural	Earlier agricultural, now industrial	Agricultural
Multinational	Homogenous	N/A	Balanced multinational
Shared cultural space	Unique and different, low religiosity	Unique and different, separate Church institution	Unique and different, separate Church institution
Total	3	1	2

The assumption 2.a. ‘*main identity markers are opposing and thereby they create mutual denials of these identity markers*’ was confirmed. The Russian main identity markers mediated by the national master narrative have clear contradiction to the identity key markers for Estonians, Ukrainians and Georgians. Therefore the national master narratives emphasise the key identity marker, which are threatened by the significant other, Russia. The Estonian identity markers are the most contradicting, the Georgian and Ukrainian ones to a lesser extent, but the Georgian identity markers contradict slightly more than Ukrainian ones.

Table 7. Assumption 2.b.

Russian Chronotope	Estonia	Ukraine	Georgia
Russian borders	Since 11 th century	Original homeland	Since 18 th century
Russian geopolitical region	Europe, Northern Europe	Europe	Culturally Europe, regionally Middle East
Total	2	3	1

The assumption 2.b. *‘chronotope of the identity is overlapping – the chronotope of former dominant nation includes the territories of dominated nations, though the latter reject it’* was confirmed. The particular identity marker chronotope that defines the nation’s historical borders and its belonging to some particular region is clearly contradicting. Russia as the former dominant nation mediates a chronotope that forms its former Empire space as particular region. It is rejected by all three dominated nations. Russia also defines the borders of its homeland according to the borders of former Empire and therefore it also defines since when some territories belong to the Russian geopolitical space. In this context Ukraine has the strongest contradiction because Russia defines it as its original homeland. The Estonian case is more contradicting than the Georgian one because Georgian territories became part of the Russian empire later.

Table 8. Assumptions 2.c. and 2.d.

Image element	Russia	Estonia	Ukraine	Georgia
Glorifying	53	60	51	61
Victimising	20	20	38	24
Personalising	15	6	3	6
Justifying	12	14	8	9
Negative other	N/A	87	88	86
Threatening other	N/A	70	61	57
Total	N/A	3	2	1

The assumption 2.c. *‘image of former dominant nation is presented as negative and threatening by dominated nations and their self-image is victimised’* found only partly confirmation. The image of Russia in the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives has a clearly strong negative character and it is mediated mainly by the threatening (politically, militarily, culturally) elements. However, the second half of the hypothesis did not find confirmation and all nations use the most glorifying elements. The assumption 2.d. *‘self-image of former dominant nation is heroic and glorifying and it whitewashes its negative images of the past events’* found confirmation. The Russian self-image is mediated mainly by the glorifying elements. However, it is not bigger or different from the dominated nations. The Russian master narrative also actively deals with the whitewashing, more by the personalising than justifying elements.

The second research thesis *‘antagonistic master narratives deny key elements of the ‘Other’s’ identity’* found mainly confirmation. The Russian national master narrative includes the main identity markers that contradict the

identity markers of the dominated nations. Also the chronotope is contradicting. The national master narratives of the dominated nations about the image of the significant other use predominantly elements that the significant other does not use for its own self-image. Thereby the national master narratives mediate different images and the dominant negative image in the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives contradicts strongly to the Russian mainly positive self-image. Therefore the contradicting images in the national master narratives create identity antagonisms and thereby increase the potential of the international identity conflict.

Table 9. Research thesis 3

Schematic narrative template	Russia	Estonia	Ukraine	Georgia
Character	Assimilative	Dissimilative	Implicitly dissimilative	Dissimilative
Image elements	4 glorifying with victimising or justifying elements	3 glorifying with victimising elements, 1 victimising with glorifying elements	1 glorifying with victimising elements, 3 victimising (one with glorifying elements)	2 glorifying with victimising elements, 2 victimising with glorifying elements
Total	N/A	1	3	2

The research thesis 3 ‘*schematic narrative templates of dominated nations are similar and differ significantly from the templates of the former dominating nation*’ found only partial confirmation. The character of the schematic narrative templates used by the master narratives of the dominated nations is similar and different from that of the dominating country. However, the image elements supported by the schematic narrative templates do not differ so significantly, there is only a slight difference that shows that Russian master narrative uses little more glorifying elements and less victimising ones than the other cases.

Table 10. Potential of International Identity Conflict

Identity dimension	Estonia	Ukraine	Georgia
Narrative of origin (1.a.)	1	3	2
Character of narrative (1.b.)	2	3	2
Key events contradiction (1.c.)	2	3	1
Key events denial (1.d.)	3	3	2
Identity markers (2.a)	3	1	2
Chronotope (2.b)	2	3	1
Image elements (2.c., 2.d.)	3	2	1
Schematic narrative template (3)	1	3	2
Total	17	21	13

The potential of international identity conflict based on the national collective memory is relatively strong in all the cases analysed. The analysed aspects almost all revealed the contradiction between Russia as the former dominant nation and Estonia, Ukraine and Georgia as the former dominated nations. Comparing the different identity dimensions, Ukraine has the biggest conflict potential (See Table 10¹²⁸⁰). The Ukrainian identity has the hardest struggle to dissimilate itself from the Russian identity: they share a mutually contradicting narrative of origin and the shared past has the most opposing key events. The potential of Estonian-Russian identity conflict is lower. The Estonian master narrative should not dissimilate itself from Russia so strongly because there is to some extent acceptance of different identity. It is also proved by the Estonian identity markers that are more directly opposing to Russian ones and also a relatively strong denial of the key events by the national master narratives. In addition, the Estonian master narrative uses a strong threatening image about Russia. The potential of the Georgian-Russian identity conflict is the lowest among the three case studies due to the bigger share of the Georgian master narrative that is not related to Russia. Also the Russian master narrative focuses

¹²⁸⁰ In table the points are given based on the comparison of each identity dimension the strongest contradiction among three cases got 3 points, the second 2 and the least 1 point. The higher is the total sum the bigger is the potential of the international identity conflict.

less on the Georgian case. Nevertheless, there are clear contradicting elements in the Georgian and Russian master narratives about the common past.

The international identity conflict is mediated significantly by the national collective memories. Comparing the national master narratives enables us to understand the potential of this conflict. However, the high potential of the international identity conflicts do not immediately result in open conflict between the nations, but it indicates the flammability of the identity clashes. In the other words, the potential can be transferred to an international conflict when the contradictions in the national collective memory are cultivated by the political elite and thereby the identity contradictions will be politicised and thereafter even securitized.

CONCLUSIONS

This research has focused on the potential of collective memory based international identity conflict in the post-imperial space. It is an important topic because current politics offers us many examples how identity related issues are transferred into politics. The clashes over the past are the best examples of these conflicts. In the space of the former Russian Empire confrontations over the commonly shared history seem to have become regular phenomena and the nations establish more and more collective memory related institutions.¹²⁸¹ It shows that the potential of the collective memory based identity conflicts is more frequently institutionalised in politics. Therefore for a better understanding of these conflicts the potential of the identity conflict should be studied to comprehend its extent and essence.

The present study was conducted in the space of the former Russian Empire where the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives were juxtaposed to the Russian one to analyse the potential of the identity conflicts between these nations and Russia. The aim of my study was to determine a suitable research framework for the potential of the collective memory based international identity conflicts. Therefore I combined three disciplines: international relations, nationalism studies and memory studies and developed further the usage of memory studies in the discipline of international relations. My study also defined which elements of the national master narrative, which is the main foundation for functioning of collective memory, are the most relevant in the context of the post-imperial space. In addition, this study assessed which of the analysed case studies have the strongest potential for identity conflict. The importance of this study is also that it offers an alternative to the post-soviet framework of the memory studies in Eastern Europe and develops a more comprehensive post-imperial dimension. The study also benefits by using relatively different case studies in the analysis.

The first chapter presented the theoretical framework to understand the concepts used in current analysis. Therefore I first introduced the concept of collective memory that I defined as the group based commonly shared understanding of the group past. In my research I used the concept of mediated top-down political memory that is power related memory defined by the group elite.

¹²⁸¹ See Estonian President established Institute of Memory February 1, 2008 to analyse the Soviet past 1944–1991, President Ilvese eestvedamisel asutati täna Mälu Instituut, February 01, 2008, President of the Republic of Estonia:

<http://www.president.ee/et/ametitegevus/?gid=107836>, retrieved May 23, 2009. The Russian President established a Commission under the President of Russian Federation to Counteract the Attempts to Falsify History Detrimental to the Interests of Russia (Комиссия при Президенте Российской Федерации по противодействию попыткам фальсификации истории в ущерб интересам России) May 15, 2009, Указ Президента Российской Федерации О Комиссии при Президенте Российской Федерации по противодействию попыткам фальсификации истории в ущерб интересам России, May 15, 2009, #549, Moscow.

From nationalism studies I used the Ethno-Symbolic approach for definition of the nation and I defined the key role of the national collective memory in the process of formation a national identity. From the international relations theory I based my work on the Constructivist approach that defines the importance of identity in the international relations where it is formed based on the relational process of self-other. It also claims that the past has importance in defining these images that are crucial for identity formation. Therefore the national collective memory includes an important resource for image constructions internally as well as internationally. Thus the conflicting images in the national memory can be transferred to the international politics where they can become a source for international identity conflicts.

In my work I claimed that the national memory is a malleable phenomenon and it is formed by the society. Based on the top-down political memory approach it is defined by the national elite. On the other hand, the national elite are also influenced by the national memory that functions unconsciously. The national memory functions in the society by the national master narratives that provide a coherent and structured story of the nation's past. Analysing different national master narratives the potential of the international identity conflicts can be assessed. Therefore I focused my research on the analysis of the national master narratives that I defined based on the history school textbooks, which are instruments for socialising the new generations and thereby also mediates the politically malleable national memory. In my study I have focused on the six elements in the master narrative:

- 1) Nation's narrative of origin – defining the origin of the nation and defining its historical trajectory to the nation-state;
- 2) National identity markers – defining the most important elements in the past that define the current nation; chronotope defines the national space on the time scale;
- 3) Character of narrative – defines inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the national memory by using assimilative or dissimilative elements towards a particular other nation;
- 4) Schematic narrative template – defines the most used story telling framework and thereby also reflects the character and self-image;
- 5) Images of self and significant other – defines how the nation perceives national self and how the national significant other;
- 6) Interpretations of commonly shared history – defines the most important historical moments for the nation and as well it determines its meaning for the nation.

Based on these six aspects I developed three research theses and eight assumptions that I tested in my empirical cases to assess their relevance in comparison of the national master narratives in the post-imperial space:

- 1) The national master narratives of the former dominant nation and dominated nations are mutually antagonistic:
 - a. narratives of origin support contradicting characters and roles that construct mutual incompatibility;

- b. the narrative of the former dominant nation has an assimilative character towards the dominated nations, narratives of dominated nations have dissimilative character towards former dominant nation;
 - c. interpretations of key events have opposing character in national master narratives;
 - d. denials of the other nation's history key events exist in master narratives.
- 2) Antagonistic master narratives deny key elements of the 'Other's' identity:
- a. main identity markers are opposing and thereby they create mutual denials of these identity markers;
 - b. chronotope of the identity is overlapping – the chronotope of former dominant nation includes the territories of dominated nations, though the latter reject it;
 - c. image of former dominant nation is presented as negative and threatening by dominated nations and their self-image is victimised;
 - d. self-image of former dominant nation is heroic and glorifying and it whitewashes its negative images of the past events.
- 3) Schematic narrative templates of dominated nations are similar and differ significantly from the templates of the former dominating nation.

In my research I had four case studies: I analysed Russia and compared its master narrative with the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian ones. I have chosen these countries due to the most conflicting relations in the former Russian Empire space. In addition, all three nations have a national identity that has also developed more conflicting relations with Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union all three nations have been eager to move out from the Russian sphere of influence. On the other hand, all three nations have had different experiences in the past and their relations with Russia have developed along different paths. Therefore also their national master narratives mediated different meanings. Chapters two, three and four analysed Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives respectively. The fifth chapter analysed the Russian master narrative and also included its comparative analyses with other case studies.

The Estonian narrative of origin defines that Estonians have lived on its territories since the end of the last Ice Age and thereby constructs a strong connection between Estonians and their territory. It focuses on the issue of the Estonian statehood because till the 20th century Estonians were subjugated to other nations and they did not have their own state. Suitable for a nation-state master narrative it stresses Estonians' strong will to be independent and their hard struggle for their national liberty. The Estonian master narrative defines the main Estonian national identity markers: Estonian culture (language, education, and traditional national culture), rather secular nation, democratic principles, rural life style, maritime nation, and homogeneous nation. The Estonian chronotope defines Estonian current territory as its historical homeland and it does not extend its borders. It also locates Estonia in Northern Europe. The Estonian master narrative has a predominantly dissimilative character towards Russia(ns) and thereby it underlines the differences between Estonians and

Russians. Estonian schematic narrative templates focus on national independence, glorifying it and victimising its loss. One template also focuses on the survival of the nation that victimises the difficult past of the Estonians and glorifies their ability to survive. The Estonian self-image reflected in the master narrative is mediating mainly a positive image. The significant part of the image construction is mediated by glorifying elements but also victimising ones have their share. The Estonian master narrative also deals with the negative self-image, which is mainly mediated by justification elements. The image of significant Other, Russia(ns) is mediated mainly by negative elements where the dominant share has the threatening ones. The Estonian master narrative focuses on the 20th century due to the tendency to represent the periods of national independence and struggle for it more than other periods. Therefore also most of Estonian national key events are related either to establishing national independence or its defence/loss; some key events are also related to the major wars in Estonia. Russia(ns) have significant role in these key moments and they are related to all except one event. Thereby the Estonian master narrative constructs the understanding that Russia has been an important intruder in Estonian history but Estonians have always rejected them.

The Ukrainian narrative of origin starts with territorial history that gradually develops to ethnic history. The first statehood in Ukraine is not related to any Slavic nation but the first ethnic statehood is Kievan Rus and the Ukrainian narrative of origin pays significant attention to presenting arguments why Ukraine is the legitimate successor of Kievan Rus. Thereafter the narrative of origin deals with issue of the liberation fight and restoration of the national independence that is rightfully permanently established in 1991. Another issue in the Ukrainian master narrative is related to national disunity that has been the main obstacle to maintaining national independence, as well the division of the Ukrainian lands between the external powers. The Ukrainian narrative of origin also explains why the Russians are different from Ukrainians and how they have deviated from the common Eastern Slavic roots. The Ukrainian master narrative defines the main national identity markers: Ukrainian culture (including the language, education, and religion), Cossack spirit (braveness and military dimension, as well as Cossack democracy that include democratic and equality principles, free society), agricultural society where the private ownership has important meaning. The Ukrainian chronotope is slightly larger than its current borders. However, it does not present any claims to the territories left outside of the Ukrainian borders. The Ukrainian master narrative does not locate Ukraine explicitly into any bigger region but in general it mediates the understanding that Ukraine is a European nation. The character of the Ukrainian master narrative, similarly to the Estonian one, is generally dissimilative towards Russia(ns) and constructs a clear difference between these two nations. The Ukrainian schematic narrative templates mediate also the dissimilative character and they show that Ukrainians never give up for the national freedom and that external domination is fatal for the nation. Therefore the Ukrainian schematic narrative templates also include significantly many victimising elements. The

Ukrainian master narrative has a strong positive self-image where the glorifying elements dominate over the victimising ones. However, the master narrative uses relatively many victimising elements, especially in comparison to the other case studies. The Ukrainian master narrative deals less with the negative self-image and mainly these aspects are mediated by the justifying elements. The image of the other, Russians, has a strong negative image. The dominating share is the threatening character of Russia(ns) for Ukrainians. The Ukrainian master narrative also pays the biggest attention to the 20th century where similarly to the Estonian master narrative the historical moments of the national independence and struggle for it are emphasised. The Ukrainian national key events are related mainly to the earlier periods of Kievan Rus and Cossack Hetmanate and thereafter to the national awakening. The 20th century key events show the struggle for independence but also national sufferings. Therefore the national key moments also mainly include Russia(ns) and they are depicted as negative characters. Thereby the Ukrainian master narrative constructs the understanding that Russia is dangerous for the Ukrainian nation.

The Georgian narrative of origin defines Georgia as the cradle of Eurasian human beings, though the oldest human predecessors are not defined as Georgians. The narrative of origin provides different versions of the roots of Georgian nation and thereafter it focuses on the ancient states in Georgia that are defined as Georgian states. Thereby the master narrative constructs the understanding that the Georgian state is ancient. Another aspect mediated by the nation of origin, similarly to the Ukrainian one, is national unity that is essential for national security and well-being. At the same time, the Georgian narrative of origin also underlines the Georgians' resistance to the external powers and endless freedom struggle. The Georgian master narrative stresses also the Georgian main identity markers: Georgian Orthodox and Apostolic Church, Georgian culture (language, education and science, mainly humanities), agricultural nation (emphasising the tradition of vineyards), great art of war, and tolerant spirit towards other nations. The Georgian chronotope has larger borders than current Georgia but instead of stressing them as historical Georgia it emphasises the belonging of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the historical parts of Georgia. It locates Georgia culturally to Europe but regionally to Middle East. The character of the Georgian master narrative, similarly to the previous cases, is dissimilative towards Russia(ns), underlining the Georgians' reluctance to be together with Russians. The Georgian schematic narrative templates emphasise the Georgians' braveness to fight for their independence and on the one hand, they glorify these events, but on the other hand, they also victimise them by showing the results of its failures. The Georgian self-image is strongly positive where the glorifying part has the strongest share. Victimising elements are also important but less than in the Ukrainian case. The negative self-image is also mediated but less than in the Estonian case but more than in the Ukrainian one. Although the national history is strongly personalised the negative image is more presented by the justifications. The image of the other, Russia(ns) in the Georgian master narrative, similarly to the previous cases, is

predominantly negative, however it includes a little less threatening character than the previous ones and emphasises more the treacherous character. The Georgian master narrative emphasises most the 19th century, which is related to the Georgian national awakening and active resistance to the Russian domination. Also the Georgian master narrative has a stronger past focus than the other cases because of its longer history of statehood and Georgian greatness during the Medieval era. Therefore also the biggest share of the Georgian historical key moments is related to the periods before the 20th century. They focus on the great successes of Georgia but also on the national tragedies. Russia(ns) are therefore also less presented in the Georgian key moments. However, since the 19th century they play a key role, mainly as the antagonist power in the Georgian past. Therefore the Georgian master narrative constructs the understanding that Russia(ns) are one of the historical enemies for Georgia.

The Russian narrative of origin starts similarly to the Ukrainian and Georgian ones with the territorial history that gradually moves to the ethnic one. However, it maintains a strong multicultural dimension. Therefore it is also more assimilative than the three other cases that underline more the dissimilative elements. The Russian narrative of origin presents argumentation why it is the legitimate successor of Kievan Rus that it considers as the first stage of Russian statehood. It also pays significant attention to the unity of the nation that gives justification first to the unification of the Russian lands and also later to keeping the multinational Russian Empire together. In comparison to the other cases, the Russian narrative of origin has a strong assimilative character, trying to include all nations on its territory. All the other ones focus on separation and establishing independence from the Other. Also the national independence dimension in the narrative of origin is different: while in Russian one it is an important force for the unifying the people to expel the external enemies, then in the case of Estonia, Ukraine and Georgia it is presented as a liberation fight to restore independence. National unity is also perceived differently than in the Ukrainian, Georgian narratives. The Russian one defines it as the necessity to keep control over the big territories, but the latter define it as necessary for national survival. Thus, my assumption 1.a. has found confirmation and the Russian narrative of origin as the dominating nation's one supports opposing characters and roles to the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian ones as the dominated nations. Therefore it also creates incompatibility in their relations. Due to the clash over the heritage of Kievan Rus this dimension is the strongest represented in the Ukrainian case and the least in the Estonian one.

The Russian master narrative also defines the main identity markers in the Russian history: power (internationally and domestically), industrial nation, multinational society, shared cultural space. All these Russian identity markers have bigger or smaller opposing identity markers in the Estonian, Ukrainian or Georgian master narratives. The international power of Russia conflicts with all these nations: the Estonian understanding of a peaceful nation that resists external power expansion, Ukrainian Cossack military spirit that defends its freedom, and Georgian brave warriors who also defend their freedom. Therefore

internationally powerful Russia is a danger for the key identity markers of all three cases. Strong domestic power is also a conflicting identity marker. It opposes the Estonian democratic spirit and Ukrainian Cossack principles. Both are rejected in the case of the Russian strong centralised rule and in the case of their strengthening it leads to the weakening of the Russian power. Industrial nation also conflicts with the all others who mainly present themselves as agricultural ones. Only the Ukrainian identity marker also includes the industrial dimension. For Russia agricultural means underdevelopment, for the other nations it is important pillar of their national identities. Multinational society is directly conflicting with the Estonian homogenous one and it has also controversial understanding with the Georgian national tolerance. The cultural identity marker conflicts with all the cases: the Russian master narrative tries to show the other nations as part of a great Russian civilisation but these nations underline their national peculiarity and Russian culture as a serious threat to this identity pillar. In addition, the low religiosity in Estonia contradicts to the strong religiosity in Russia. And the same dimension in the case of Georgia and Ukraine contradicts to the understanding of the freedom of the national Churches. The chronotope of Russia constructs the understanding that these territories are historically related to Russia and especially in the case of Ukraine, which is defined as the historical homeland of Russians. Therefore it is overlapping. The Russian master narrative also locates these countries into the Russian historical geopolitical space that also contradicts with all three nations' understanding of their historical belonging. Therefore my assumptions 2.a. and 2.b. were confirmed and the main identity markers are opposing between Russia and other three cases and it causes mutual denials. Also the chronotopes are overlapping and Russian one includes these nations' historical territories which they reject. The strongest contradiction of all identity markers is between Estonia and Russia and the lowest is between Ukraine and Russia. In the case of chronotope the strongest is between Ukraine and Russia and the weakest one between Georgia and Russia.

The character of the master narrative in the case of Russia is strongly assimilative towards Ukrainians, Estonians and Georgians. It constructs the understanding that they are Russian peoples and a firm part of the unique Russian civilisation. It is clearly contradicting to the characters of dominated nations: Estonians, Ukrainians and Georgians. All three have predominantly dissimilative character towards Russia(ns) and they try to show that they are different from Russians and they do not belong together with Russia. Therefore my assumption 1.b. has found confirmation and the Russian master narrative tries to mediate more assimilative understanding while the other three cases mediate a dissimilative one. The biggest contradiction is between Ukraine and Russia where the Russian master narrative has a stronger assimilative character of the narrative towards Ukrainians than in the two other cases.

The Russian schematic narrative templates mediate the victorious and successive character of the Russian nation. It mediates the unifying elements that give it assimilative character. In general, it is mediating glorifying elements

of the self-images but it also includes several victimising elements. In comparison to the other cases then there is a clear contradiction in the case of the character of the master narrative: Russian ones mediate assimilative, the three other cases dissimilative aspects. The picture is not so clear in the case of the elements mediated. All three cases include at least one mainly victimising schematic narrative template as well, while in the Russian case all have main elements glorifying ones. Therefore my research thesis 3 is not totally confirmed but only partly and I cannot explicitly state the schematic narrative templates have so significant difference. The most similar with the Russian case is the Estonian one and the least similar is the Ukrainian one.

The Russian master narrative constructs a mainly positive self-image. The dominating elements of the self-image are related to the glorifying ones but also victimising elements have their visible share. The Russian master narrative also mediates the negative self-image that covers a bigger share than the other nations' ones. The Russian negative self-image is also more mediated by the personalising elements than the justification ones. The personalising is relatively easy to make in the case of Russia due to its strong individual focus in narrating the past. In comparison to the other cases, the positive self-image structure does not differ from the principle dominating-dominated nations. The glorifying elements are even more used in the Estonian and Georgian cases. The Ukrainian case is particular due to its larger share of victimising elements. The analysis concluded that there is a slight tendency that all three nations victimise more than average the period when they were under Russian domination. The negative image of Russia in the Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian cases is not corresponding to the Russian self-image. There is only small overlapping: temporary weakness and underdevelopment. In all other cases the Russian master narrative tries to justify or personalises and in some cases even rejects the images that the three nations' master narratives construct. The dominating negative image of Russia(ns) is approximately the same in all cases but the Estonian master narrative mediates the threatening image of Russia the most and the Georgian one the least. Therefore my assumption 2.c. found only partial confirmation related to the dominated nations' Other image. The part of assumption that was related to the self-image of the dominated nations did not find confirmation and it is not related to the earlier dependency roles in the former empire. My assumptions 2.d found confirmation and the dominating nation self-image is glorifying, though it is in all other cases as well and therefore I do not consider it something specific to the dominant role in the past. The second part of this assumption was confirmed and mainly the former dominant nation tries to whitewash its negative image; in some cases even rejecting it.

The Russian master narrative pays also more attention on the 20th century where the more turbulent historical moments are underlined – Revolutions and Civil War, the Second World War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian historical key moments focus either on the rulers who made great reforms and improved significantly the Russia's international position or the

moments where the state was collapsing and it was saved by the nation's great efforts. In comparison to the other cases, Estonia shares the most historical key moments (due to the focus on the 20th century) and Georgia shares the least (due to the low importance of the 20th century and focus on the earlier period when Russia was not involved in Georgian affairs). The interpretations of the commonly shared historical key moments are in general opposing and there are very few similar understandings. There is also to some extent denials of the each other's historical key events. Some of them are mutually denied, e.g. Kievan Rus (Russian-Ukrainian) or World War 2 (Russian-Estonian). But mostly there is partial denying by marginalisation of the other nation's historical key moment or the Russian master narrative is silent about these events. In total, my assumptions 1.c. and 1.d. found confirmation and the interpretations of the shared historical key events are opposing, as well as there are denials of the other nation's historical key moments in the master narratives. However, the latter is not so strongly visible. The strongest contradiction in this aspect is between Ukraine and Russia and the weakest between Georgia and Russia.

To conclude, the master narratives of the former dominant nation and dominated nations are strongly antagonistic and thereby they deny the key elements of each others' identities. Therefore the national master narratives in the post-imperial space carry a high potential for international identity conflict. Furthermore, the analytical framework that my research proposed for analysing the potential of international identity conflict found general confirmation and all the aspects defined enables assessment of this potential. There was only one exception: the self-image does not depend on the earlier dependency relations and there are other variables that influence its construction. Also the schematic narrative templates were less relevant indicators. In comparison of the three cases, the strongest potential of identity conflict is between Russia and Ukraine. It is mainly because of the shared historical roots and the following Russian domination that has rejected the Ukrainian independent identity. Therefore the potential for the identity conflict between Ukraine and Russia is also the strongest where the Ukrainian side tries to dissimilate from Russians and the Russian side mediates the assimilating elements. The potential of the Estonian-Russian identity conflict is also relatively strong and mainly due to the strongly opposing identity markers and contradicting interpretations of shared history. The potential for the identity conflict between Georgia and Russia is smallest among the three cases but it is mainly due to the large extent of separate history and the Georgian master narrative's lesser focus on the period when Georgia was under Russian domination. Nevertheless, the potential for the Georgian-Russian identity conflict increases when focusing only on this period.

The present research managed to combine three different disciplines to develop further the usage of memory studies in international relations research. It showed that national collective memories have an important role in international identity conflicts and that the post-imperial space has a particularly high potential for these conflicts. The study provides also an analytical framework that found confirmation as a relevant tool for assessing the potential of the

international identity conflicts. Therefore this framework can be used also for analysing other post-imperial spaces, e.g. former Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungarian Empire, to analyse to what extent the identity conflicts differ in these regions and thereby also to learn how to decrease the identity conflicts. This research provides the relevant comparative analysis also for further studies that analyse how the potential of the identity conflicts is transformed into the politics. Thereby this research facilitates deconstruction of the sources of international identity conflicts.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aalto, P. (2003). *Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia*. London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Aalto, P. (2003). Revisiting the Security/Identity Puzzle in Russo-Estonian Relations. *Journal of Peace Research*, 40 (5), 573–591.
- Adler, E. (2005). *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Aguilar, P., & Humlebæk, C. (2002). Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy. The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War. *History & Memory*, 14 (1–2), 121–164.
- Ahonen, S. (2001). Politics of identity through history curriculum: narratives of the past for social exclusion – or inclusion? *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 33 (2), 179–194.
- Aleksahhina, M. (2006). Historical discourse in the legitimation of Estonian politics: principle of restitution. *Human Affairs*, 1, 66–82.
- Al-Haj, M. (2005). National Ethos, Multicultural Education, and the New History Textbooks in Israel. *Curriculum Inquiry*, 35 (1), 47–71.
- Allison, R. (2008). Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to 'coerce Georgia to peace'. *International Affairs*, 84 (6), 1145–1171.
- Andriolo, K. R. (1981). Myth and History: A General Model and Its Application to the Bible. *American Anthropologist*, 83 (2), 261–284.
- Anepaio, T. (2003). Reception of the topic of repressions in the Estonian society. *Pro Ethnologia*, 14, 47–66.
- Angoustoures, A. (1998). The Spanish Civil War. „Betrayal“ by the Bourgeois Democracies. In C. Buffet, & B. Heuser, *Haunted by History. Myths and International Relations* (pp. 53–64). Oxford: Berghahn.
- Apter, D. E. (1985). The New Mytho/logics and the Specter of Superfluous Man. *Social Research*, 52 (2), 269–308.
- Arel, D., & Ruble, B. A. (2006). *Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Ashuri, T. (423–425). The nation remembers: national identity and shared memory in television documentaries. *Nations and Nationalism*, 11 (3), 2005.
- Asmus, R. (2010). *A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Assmann, A. (1993). *Arbeit am nationalen Gedächtnis. Ein kurze Geschichte der deutschen Bildungsidee*. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag.
- Assmann, A. (2006). *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit. Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik*. München: C.H. Beck.
- Assmann, A. (2006). Memory, Individual and Collective. In R. E. Tilly, *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* (pp. 210– 224). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Assmann, A. (Spring 2008). Transformations between History and Memor. *Social Research*, 75 (1), 49–72.
- Assmann, J. J. (1995). Collective Memory and Cultural Identity. *New German Critique*, 65, 125–133.
- Assmann, J. (1997). *Moses the Egyptian. The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- Astrov, A. (2003). Does Estonia Need Foreign Policy? In A. Kasekamp, *Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003/Eesti välispoliitika aastaraamat 2003* (pp. 115–130). Tallinn: Eesti Välispoliitika Instituut.
- Astrov, A. (2007). *Самочинное сообщество: политика меньшинств или малая политика?*. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press.
- Bagger, H. (2007). The Study of History in Russia during the Post-Soviet Identity Crisis. *Scando-Slavica*, 53 (1), 109 – 125.
- Baranovic, B. (2001). History Textbooks in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Intercultural Education*, 12 (1), 13–26.
- Barkey, K., & Von Hagen, M. (1997). *After empire multiethnic societies and nation-building : the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.
- Barnard, C. (2003). *Language, Ideology and Japanese History Textbooks*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Bartlett, F. C. (1995). *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bell, D. S. (2003). Mythscapes: memory, mythology, and national identity. *British Journal of Sociology*, 54 (1), 63–81.
- Bennington, G. (2003). Postal politics and the institution of the nation. In H. K. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* (pp. 121–137). London, New York: Routledge.
- Berg, E. (2002). Local Resistance, National Identity and Global Swings in Post-Soviet Estonia. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54 (1), 109–122.
- Berg, E., & Ehin, P. (2009). *Identity and Foreign Policy. Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Berger, T. (2002). The power of memory and memories of power: the cultural parameters of German foreign policy making since 1945. In J.-W. Müller, *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (pp. 76–99). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berghe van den, P. L. (1981). *The Ethnic Phenomenon*. London: Praeger.
- Berliner, D. (2005). The Abuses of Memory: Reflections on the Memory Boom in Anthropology. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 78 (1), 197–211.
- Bertsch, G. K., Craft, C. B., Jones, S. A., & Beck., M. (2000). *Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Bhabha, H. K. (2003). DissemiNation: time narrative, and the margin of modern nation. In H. K. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* (pp. 291–322). London, New York: Routledge.
- Bhabha, H. K. (2003). *Nation and Narration*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Billig, M. (1995). *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publication.
- Billington, J. H. (2004). *Russia in Search of Itself*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Bloom, W. (1990). *Personal Identity, national identity and international relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge Studeis in International Relations.
- Blumer, H. (2007). The Nature of symbolic interactionism. In C. D. Mortensen, *Communication Theory* (pp. 102–120). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Booth, W. J. (2008). The Work of Memory: Time, Identity and Justice. *Social Research: An International Quarterly of the Social Sciences*, 75 (1), 237–262.
- Brennan, T. (2003). The national longing for form. In H. K. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* (pp. 44–70). London, New York: Routledge.

- Brown, K. (2008). Archive-Work. Genealogies of Loyalty in a Macedono-Bulgarian Colony. *History & Memory*, 20 (2), 60–83.
- Brubaker, R. (1995). National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe. *Daedalus*, 124 (2), 107–132.
- Brubaker, R. (1994). Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutional Account. *Theory and Society*, 23 (1), 47–78.
- Brüggemann, K. (2007). Estonia and its Escape from the East: The Relevance of the Past in Russian-Estonian Relations. In T. Darieva, & W. Kaschuba, in *Representations on the Margins of Europe: Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States*. Frankfurt/M: Campus Verlag.
- Brüggemann, K., & Kasekamp, A. (2008). The Politics of History and the “War of Monuments” in Estonia“. *Nationalities Papers*, 36 (3), 425–448.
- Bryant, C. (2000). Whose Nation? Czech Dissidents and History Writing from a Post-1989 Perspective. *History and Memory*, 12 (1), 30–64.
- Budryte, D. (2005). *Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet Baltic States*. Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate.
- Buettner, E. (2006). Cemeteries, Public Memory and Raj Nostalgia in Postcolonial Britain and India. *History & Memory*, 18 (1), 5–42.
- Buffet, C., & Heuser, B. (1998). *Haunted by History. Myths in International Relations*. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Burch, S., & Smith, D. J. (2007). Empty Spaces and the Value of Symbols: Estonia's 'War of Monuments' from Another Angle. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 59 (6), 913–936.
- Burke, P. (1989). History and Social Memory. In T. Butler, *Memory: History, Culture and the Mind* (pp. 97–113). New York: Blackwell Publishers.
- Burke, P. (2006). *Kultuuride kohtumine. Esseed uuest kultuuriajaloost*. Tallinn: Varrak.
- Bush, K. D., & Saltarelli, D. (2000). *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Peacebuilding Education for Children*. Florence: Innocenti Research Centre, United Nations Children’s Fund.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wild, J. (1996). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Chartier, R. (2002, May). (M. Tamm, Interviewer)
- Chuter, D. (1998). Munich or the Blood of Others. In C. Buffet, & B. Heuser, *Haunted by History. Myths and International Relations* (pp. 65–79). Oxford: Berghahn.
- Cizianas, P. (2008). Russia and the Baltic States: Is Russian Imperialism Dead? *Comparative Strategy*, 27 (3), 287–307.
- Coman, P. (1996). Reading about the Enemy: school textbook representation of Germany's role in the war with Britain during the period from April 1940 to May 1941. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 17 (3), 327–340.
- Confino, A. (1997). Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method. *The American Historical Review*, 102 (5), 1386–1403.
- Confino, M. (2000). Some Random Thoughts on History’s Recent Past. *History & Memory*, 12 (2), 29–55.
- Copsey, N. (2008). Remembrance of Things Past: the Lingering Impact of History on Contemporary Polish-Ukrainian Relations. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60 (4), 531–560.
- Corbea-Hoisie, A., Jaworski, R., & Sommer, M. (2004). *Umbruch im östlichen Europa Die nationale Wende und das kollektive Gedächtnis*. Wien, München, Innsbruck, Bozen: Studienverlag.
- Crawford, K., & Foster, S. J. (2007). *War, Nation, Memory: International Perspectives on World War II in School History Textbooks*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

- Crumely, C. (2002). Exploring Venus of Social Memory. In M. G. Jacob J. Climo, *Social Memory and History: Anthropological Perspectives* (pp. 39–52). Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
- Dahl, A.-S. (1998). The Myth of Swedish Neutrality. In C. Buffet, & B. Heuser, *Haunted by History: Myths and International Relations* (pp. 28–40). Oxford: Berghahn.
- D'Anieri, P. (1997). Nationalism and international politics: Identity and sovereignty in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 3 (2), 1–28.
- Danilov, A. A., & Filippov, A. V. (2009). *Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств*. Moscow: Gosudarstvennyj Klub.
- Danilov, A. A., & Kosulina, L. G. (2006). *История государства и народов России, 7 класс* <History of State and Peoples of Russia, 7th form>. Moscow: DROFA.
- Danilov, A. A., & Kosulina, L. G. (2006). *История государства и народов России, XIX век, 8 класс* <History of State and Peoples of Russia, 19th century, 8th form>. Moscow: DROFA.
- Danilov, A. A., & Kosulina, L. G. (2006). *История государства и народов России, XX век, 9 класс, часть 1* <History of State and Peoples of Russia, 20th century, Part 1, 9th form>. Moscow: DROFA.
- Danilov, A. A., & Kosulina, L. G. (2006). *История государства и народов России, XX век, 9 класс, часть 2* <History of State and Peoples of Russia, 20th century, Part 2, 9th form>. Moscow: DROFA.
- Danilov, A. A., & Kosulina, L. G. (2007). *История государство и народы России, 6 класс* <History. State and the peoples of Russia, 6th form>. Moscow: Procveschchenie.
- De Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The Discursive Construction of National Identities. *Discourse & Society*, 10 (2), 149–173.
- Debray, R. (1977). Marxism and the national question. *New Left Review I*, 105, 25–41.
- Deighton, A. (2002). The past in the present: British imperial memories and the European question. In J.-W. Müller, *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (pp. 100–120). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dickinson, A. K., Gordon, P., & Le, P. J. (2001). *Raising Standards in History Education: International Review of History Education*. New York, London: Routledge.
- Dienstag, J. F. (1996). "The Pozsgay Affair": Historical Memory and Political Legitimacy. *History & Memory*, 8 (1), 51–66.
- Dietsch, J. (2006). *Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture*. Lund: Media Tryck, Lund University.
- Djordjevic, L. (2007). Der Mythos vom Amselfeld in der serbischen Politik. Die politische Instrumentalisierung des kollektiven Gedächtnisses. In J. Pänke, G. Schuch, M. Brosig, R. Kocot, A. Olearius, & P. Stankiewicz, *Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Die Politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerung in Mitteleuropa* (pp. 17–23). Berlin: Nomos.
- Dukes, P. (1997). *The making of Russian absolutism, 1613–1801*. London, New York: Longman.
- Duthilleul, Y. (1998). *Curriculum and Standards in Georgia*. World Bank: Washington, DC.
- Eder, K., & Spohn, W. (2005). *Collective Memory and European Identity: the Effects of Integration and Enlargement*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Ehin, P., & Berg, E. (2009). Incompatible Identities? Baltic-Russian Relations and the EU as an Arena for Identity Conflict. In E. Berg, & P. Ehin, *Identity and Foreign*

- Policy. Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration* (pp. 1–14). Farnham: Ashgate.
- Etheridge, B. C. (2008). The Desert Fox, Memory Diplomacy, and the German Question in Early Cold War America. *Diplomatic History*, 32 (2), 207–238.
- Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing Discourse. Textual analysis for social research*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Fawn, R. (2003). *Ideology and National Identity in Post-communist Foreign Policies*. London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publisher.
- Feest, D. (2007). Histories of Violence: National Identity and Public Memory of Occupation and Terror in Estonia. In T. Darieva, & W. Kachuba, *Representations on the Margins of Europe: Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States*. Frankfurt/M: Campus Verlag.
- Feichtinger, J. (2003). Habsburg (post)-colonial. Anmerkungen zur Innercolonisierung in Zentraleuropa. In J. Feichtinger, U. Prutsch, & M. Csáky, *Habsburg postcolonial Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis* (pp. 13–31). Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag.
- Feichtinger, J., Prutsch, U., & Csáky, M. (2003). *Habsburg postcolonial Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis*. Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag.
- Feige, M. (1999). Rescuing the Person from the Symbol. “Peace Now” and the Ironies of Modern Myth. *History & Memory*, 11 (1), 141–168.
- Feldman, G. (2000). Shifting the perspective on identity discourse in Estonia. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 31 (4), 406–428.
- Fofanova, E., & Morozov, V. (2009). Imperial Legacy and the Russian-Baltic Relations: From Conflicting Historical Narratives to a Foreign Policy Confrontation? In E. Berg, & P. Ehin, *Identity and Foreign Policy. Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration* (pp. 15–31). Farnham: Ashgate.
- Foucault, M. (2008). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. (A. M. Sheridan Smith, Trans.) London, New York: Routledge.
- Francis, D. (1997). *National Dreams: Myth, Memory, and Canadian History*. Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press.
- Fritz, R., Sachse, C., & Wolfrum, E. (2008). *Nationen und ihre Selbstbilder. Post-diktatorische Gesellschaften in Europa*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.
- Funkenstein, A. (1989). Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness. *History & Memory*, 1 (1), 5–26.
- Gachechiladze, R. (1997). National idea, state-building and boundaries in the post-Soviet space (the case of Georgia). *GeoJournal*, 43 (1), 51–60.
- Gasanabo, J.-D. (2006). *Fostering Peaceful Co-Existence Through Analysis And Revision Of History Curricula And Textbooks In Southeast Europe, Preliminary Stocktaking Report*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Gedi, N., & Elam, Y. (1996). Collective Memory – What Is it? *History & Memory*, 8, 30–50.
- Gellner, E. (1984). *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Georg-Eckert-Institut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung. (1995). *Gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission: Empfehlungen für die Schulbücher der Geschichte und Geographie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in der Volksrepublik Polen*. Frankfurt/M: Diesterweg.
- Georg-Eckert-Institut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung/Association des Professeurs d'Histoire et de Géographie. (1988). *Deutschland und Frankreich. Raum und Zeitgeschichte. Empfehlungen für die Behandlung im Geschichts- und Geographieunterricht beider Länder*. Frankfurt/M: Diesterweg.

- Gildea, R. (2002). Myth, memory and policy in France since 1945. In J.-W. Müller, *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (pp. 59–75). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gildea, R. (1994). *The Past in French History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gillis, J. R. (1994). Memory and Identity: The history of a relationship. In J. R. Gillis, *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (pp. 3–40). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ginzburg, C. (1999, December). *Kuidas kirjutatakse ajalugu? Intervjuuraamat*, 97–107. (M. Tamm, Interviewer, & M. Tamm, Editor) Tallinn: Varrak.
- Godson, R., Kenney, D. J., Litvin, M., & Tevzadze, G. (2004). Building societal support for the rule of law in Georgia. *Trends in Organized Crime*, 8 (2), 5–27.
- Goldberg, T., Porat, D., & Schwarz, B. B. (2006). “Here started the rift we see today” Student and textbook narratives between official and counter memory. *Narrative Inquiry*, 16 (2), 319–347.
- Goldberg, T., Schwarz, B. B., & Porat, D. (2008). Living and dormant collective memories as contexts of history learning. *Learning and Instruction*, 18, 223–237.
- Greenhill, B. (2008). Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International Politics. *European Journal of International Relations*, 14, 343–368.
- Gross, T. (2002). Anthropology of collective memory: Estonian national awakening revisited. *Trames: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 4 (6).
- Halbwachs, M. (1992). *On Collective Memory*. (L. A. Coser, Ed.) Chicago and London: Chicago University Press.
- Halbwachs, M. (1980). *The Collective Memory*. New York: Harper & Row Colophon Books.
- Hálfðanarson, G. (2000). Þingvellir. An Icelandic “Lieu de Mémoire”. *History & Memory*, 12, 4–29.
- Hamilakis, Y., & Labanyi, J. (2008). Introduction. Time, Materiality, and the Work of Memory. *History & Memory*, 20 (2), 5–17.
- Hand, S. (1989). *The Levinas Reader*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Hansen, I. (2008). Belarussische Identitäts- und Geschichtskonstruktionen im öffentlichen Raum. In R. Fritz, C. Sachse, & E. Wolfrum, *Nationen und ihre Selbstbilder. Postdiktatorische Gesellschaften in Europa* (pp. 233–252). Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.
- Hawley, J. C. (1996). Introduction: Voice or Voices in Post-Colonial Discourse? In J. C. Hawley, *Critical Studies 7, Writing the Nation: Self and Country in Post-Colonial Imagination* (pp. x–xxvii). Amsterdam, Atlanta: Rodopi.
- He, Y. (2007). Remembering and Forgetting the War. Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950–2006. *History & Memory*, 19 (2), 43–74.
- Hein, L. E., & Selden, M. (2000). *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States*. Armonk, New York: An East Gate Book.
- Heisler, M. O. (2008). Challenged Histories and Collective Self-Concepts: Politics in History, Memory, and Time. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 617, 199–211.
- Heuser, B., & Buffet, C. (1998). Conclusions. Historical Myths and Denial of Change. In C. Buffet, & B. Heuser, *Haunted by History. Myths and International Relations* (pp. 259–274). Oxford: Berghahn.
- Heuser, B., & Buffet, C. (1998). Introduction: Of Myths and Men., In B. Heuser, & C. Buffet, *Haunted by History: Myths and International Relations* (pp. vii–x). Oxford: Berghahn.

- Himka, J.-P. (2005). War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora“. *Spacesofidentity.net*, 5 (1), 9–24.
- Hodgkin, K., & Radston, S. (2007). Introduction: Contested pasts. In K. Hodgkin, & S. Radstone, *Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory* (pp. 1–21). London, New York: Routledge.
- Holliday, A., Hyde, M., & Kullman., J. (2004). *Intercultural Communication. An Advanced Resource Book*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Hopf, T. (2005). Identity, legitimacy, and the use of military force: Russia's Great Power identities and military intervention in Abkhazia. *Review of International Studies*, 31, 225–243.
- Hopf, T. (2002). *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
- Hroch, M. (1996). From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation Building Process in Europe. In G. Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation* (pp. 78–97). London: Verso.
- Hunter, S. T. (2004). *Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Hvostov, A. (1999). *Mötteline Eesti*. Tallinn: Vagabund.
- Höpken, W. (1996). *Öl ins Feuer? Schulbücher, ethnische Stereotypen und Gewalt in Südosteuropa/Oil on Fire? Textbooks, Ethnic Stereotypes and Violence in South Eastern Europe*. Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung.
- Hynes, S. (1997). *The Soldiers' Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War*. London: Allen Lane.
- Ilves, T. H. (2009, March 25). *Speech at the 60th anniversary commemoration conference of the March deportation*. Retrieved May 22, 2009, from President of the Republic of Estonia: <http://www.president.ee/en/duties/speeches.php?gid=126385>
- Ingimundarson, V. (2007). The Politics of Memory and the Reconstruction of Albanian National Identity in Postwar Kosovo. *History & Memory*, 19 (1), 95–123.
- Jacobsen, C. G. (1993). Myths, Politics and the Not-so-New World Order. *Journal of Peace Research*, 30 (3), 241–250.
- Janmaat, J. G. (2005). Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of the Nation in Ukraine's History Textbooks. *European Education*, 37 (3), 20–37.
- Janmaat, J. G. (2006). History and National Identity Construction: The Great Famine in Irish and Ukrainian History Textbooks. *History of Education*, 35 (3), 345–368.
- Janmaat, J. G. (2007). The ethnic 'other' in Ukrainian history textbooks: the case of Russia and the Russians. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, 37 (3), 307–324.
- Jaworski, R. (2004). Geschichtsdnken im Umbruch. Osteuropäische Vergangenheitsdiskurse im Vergleich. In A. Corbea-Hoisie, R. Jaworski, & M. Sommer, *Umbruch im östlichen Europa. Die nationale Wende und das kollektive Gedächtnis* (pp. 27–44). Innsbruck, Wien, München, Bozen: Studien Verlag.
- Jedlowski, P. (2001). Memory and Sociology. Themes and issues. *Time and Society*, 10 (1), 29–44.
- Jervis, R. (1989). *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jones, S. (2003). The role of cultural paradigms in Georgian foreign policy. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 19 (3), 83–110.

- Judt, T. (2002). The past is another country: myth and memory in post-war Europe. In J.-W. Müller, *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (pp. 157–183). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jureit, U. (2001). Imagination and Kollektiv. Die „Erfindung“ politischer Gemeinschaften. In U. Jureit, *Politische Kollektive. Zur Konstruktion rassistischer, nationaler und ethnischer Gemeinschaften* (pp. 7–20). Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Jureit, U. (2001). *Politische Kollektive. Zur Konstruktion rassistischer, nationaler und ethnischer Gemeinschaften*. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Kahler, M. (1998). Rationality in International Relations. *International Organization*, 52 (4), 919–941.
- Kansteiner, W. (2002). Finding meaning in memory: A methodological critique of collective memory studies. *History and Theory*, 41, 179–197.
- Kapralski, S. (2001). Battlefields of Memory. Landscape and Identity in Polish-Jewish Relations. *History & Memory*, 13 (2), 35–58.
- Karahasan, H., & Latif, D. (2010). *Textual and Visual Analysis of the Upper Secondary School Cyprus History Textbooks. Comparative Analysis of the Old and New Cyprus History Textbooks*. Nicosia: Post Research Institute.
- Kasianov, G. (2006). The burden of the past. The Ukrainian-Polish conflict of 1943/44 in contemporary public, academic and political debates in Ukraine and Poland. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 19 (3 & 4), 247–259.
- Kassianova, A. (2001). Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53 (6), 821–839.
- Kelman, H. C. (1999). The Place of Ethnic Identity in the Development of Personal Identity: A Challenge for the Jewish Family. In P. Y. Medding, *Coping With Life and Death: Jewish Families in the Twentieth Century* (pp. 3–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kocot, R. (2007). Einleitung. In J. Pänke, G. Schuch, M. Brosig, R. Kocot, A. Olearius, & P. Stankiewicz, *Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Die Politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerung in Mitteleuropa* (pp. 13–15). Berlin: Nomos.
- Kocot, R. (2007). Schluß. In J. Pänke, G. Schuch, M. Brosig, R. Kocot, A. Olearius, & P. Stankiewicz, *Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Die Politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerung in Mitteleuropa* (pp. 51–52). Berlin: Nomos.
- Kolstø, P. (2000). *Political Construction Sites: nation building in Russia and the post-Soviet states*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Kolstø, P., & Blakkisrud, H. (2005). *Nation-Building and Common Values in Russia*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Koselleck, R. (2003, September). (M. Tamm, Interviewer) Kuidas kirjutatakse ajalugu? Intervjuuraamat. Tallinn.
- Kratochwil, F. (2006). History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the 'Second' Great Debate and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory. *European Journal of International Relations*, 12 (1), 5–29.
- Kukk, K. (2009). Vene küsimus eesti ajalookäsitluses. In T. Tannberg, & B. Woodworth, *Vene impeerium ja Baltikum: venustus, rahvuslus ja moderniseerimine 19. sajandi teisel poolel ja 20. sajandi alguses I* (pp. 191–206). Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv.
- Kuzio, T. (2002). History, memory and nation building in the post-soviet colonial space. *Nationalities Papers*, 30 (2), 241–264.
- Kuzio, T. (2001). Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine. Defining the 'Other'. *Ethnicities*, 1 (3), 343–365.

- Kuzio, T. (2005). Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine. *Nationalities Papers*, 33 (1), 29–58.
- Kuzio, T. (2003). National Identities and Virtual Foreign Policies among the Eastern Slavs. *Nationalities Papers*, 31 (4), 431–452.
- Kuzio, T. (2005). National Identity and History Writing in Ukraine. *Nationalities Papers*, 33 (1), 29–58.
- Kuzio, T. (1996). National identity in independent Ukraine: An identity in transition. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 2 (4), 582–608.
- Kuus, M. (2002). European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39 (1), 91–108.
- Kymlicka, W. (2002). Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: West and East. *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* (4).
- Lanskoy, M., & Areshidze, G. (2008). Georgia's year of turmoil. *Journal of Democracy*, 19 (4), 154–168.
- Lapidus, G. W. (2007). Between Assertiveness and Insecurity: Russian Elite Attitudes and the Russia-Georgia Crisis. *Journal Post-Soviet Affairs*, 23 (2), 138–155.
- Laur, M., Mäesalu, A., Tannberg, T., & Vent, U. (2005). *Eesti ajalugu I: Muinasajast 19. sajandi lõpuni. Õpik gümnaasiumile*. Tallinn: Avita.
- Leach, E. (1983). Anthropological Approaches to the Study of the Bible during the Twentieth Century. In E. Leach, & D. A. Aycock, *Structuralist Interpretations of Biblical Myth* (pp. 7–32). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lehti, M. D. (2003). *Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Lieven, A. (1999). *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace.
- Liu, J. H., & Hilton, D. J. (2005). How the past weighs on the present: Social representations of history and their role in identity politics. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 44, 537–556.
- Lowenthal, D. (1998). Fabricating Heritage. *History & Memory*, 10 (1), 5–24.
- Lyakh, R., & Temirova, N. (2003). *История Украины. Учебник для 7-го класса <History of Ukraine. Textbook for the 7th form>*. Kyiv: Geneza.
- Lynch, D. (2006). *Why Georgia Matters? Chaillot Paper Nr 86*. Institute for Security Studies: Paris.
- Madsen, M. D. (2007). *A Fragmented Ukraine: Part of the West or Apart from the West?* Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA.
- Maier, R. (1995). *Nationalbewegung und Staatsbildung. Die baltische Region im Schulbuch*. Frankfurt/M: Diesterweg .
- Mannová, E. (2003). Das kollektive Gedächtnis der Slowaken und die Reflexion der vergangenen Herrschaftstrukturen. In J. Feichtinger, U. Prutsch, & M. Csáky, *Habsburg postcolonial Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis* (pp. 189–196). Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag.
- Margalit, A. (2002). *The Ethics of Memory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Marples, D. R. (2009). Ethnic Issues in the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61 (3), 505 - 518.
- Marples, D. R. (2007). *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Martínez-Herrera, E. (2002). From nation-building to building identification with political communities: Consequences of political decentralisation in Spain, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, 1978–2001. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41, 421–453.

- Mehan, H. B., & Robert, S. A. (2001). Thinking the Nation: Representations of Nations and the Pacific Rim in Latin American and Asian Textbook. *Narrative Inquiry*, 11 (1), 195–215.
- Merritt, M. (2000). A Geopolitics Of Identity: Drawing The Line Between Russia And Estonia. *Nationalities Papers*, 28 (2), 243–262.
- Miniotaitė, G. (2003). Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A Decade of Transformation in the Baltic States. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 16 (2), 209–222.
- Minow, M. (1998). *Between Venegance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Misiunas, R. (1994). National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic States. In F. S. Starr, *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Misztal, B. A. (2003). *Theories of Social Remembering*. Maidenhead, Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- Montgomery, K. (2005). Banal Race-thinking: Ties of blood, Canadian history textbooks and ethnic nationalism. *Paedagogica Historica*, 41 (3), 313–336.
- Moreau, J. (2005). *Schoolbook Nation: Conflicts Over American History Textbooks from the Civil War to the Present*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Morozov, V. (2004). Russia in the Baltic Sea Region. Desecuritization or Deregionalization? *Cooperation and Conflict*, 39 (3), 317–331.
- Munslow, A. (1997). *Deconstructing History*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Mälksoo, M. (2004). Enabling NATO Enlargement: Changing Constructions of the Baltic States. *Trames: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 8 (3), 284–298.
- Mälksoo, M. (2006). From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The Baltic States in the Enlarged Europe. *Security Dialogue*, 37 (3), 275–297.
- Mälksoo, M. (2009). *The Politics of Becoming European: A study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War security imaginaries*. London: Routledge.
- Mühlfried, F. (2007). Celebrating Identities in PostSoviet Georgia. rmt: T. Darieva, & W. Kaschuba, *Representations on the Margins of Europe Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States*. Frankfurt/M: Campus Verlag.
- Müller, J.-W. (2002). Introduction. The power of memory, the memory of power and the power over memory. In J.-W. Müller, *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (pp. 1–35). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Müller, J.-W. (2002). *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Münch, F. (2008). *Diskriminierung durch Geschichte? Die Auseinandersetzung um den "Bronzenen Soldaten" im geschichtspolitischen Diskurs des postsowjetischen Estland*. Marburg: Tectum-Verlag.
- Narvaez, R. F. (2006). Embodiment, Collective Memory and Time. *Body & Society*, 12 (3), 51–73.
- Nasser, R. (2004). Exclusion and the making of jordanian national identity: an analysis of school textbooks. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 10 (2), 221–249.
- Neumann, I. B. (1996). *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Neumann, I. B. (1998). *Uses of the Other. 'The East' in European Identity Formation*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Niven, B. (2008). On the Use of Collective Memory. *German History*, 26 (3), 427–436.

- Nora, P. (1989). Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Memoire. *Representations*, 26, 7–24.
- Nora, P. (1996). General introduction: between memory and history. In P. Nora, *Realms of Memory* (A. Goldhammer, Trans., Vol. vol. 1, pp. 1–20). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Noreen, E. (2007). Threat Images and Socialization: Estonia and Russia in the New Millenium. In O. Knudsen, *Security Strategies, Power Disparity and Identity: The Baltic Sea Region* (pp. 97–123). Farnham: Ashgate.
- Noreen, E., & Sjöstedt., R. (2004). Estonian Identity Formations and Threat Framing in the Post-Cold War Era. *Journal of Peace Research*, 41 (6), 733–750.
- Norris, C. (2002). *Deconstruction*. London and New York: Routledge.
- O’Loughlin, J., & Talbot., P. F. (2005). Where in the World is Russia? Geopolitical Perceptions and Preferences of Ordinary Russians. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 46 (1), 23–50.
- Office of the President of the Republic of Estonia. (2008, February 01). *President Ilvese eestvedamisel asutati täna Mälu Instituut <Lead by President Ilves today was established Institute of Memory>*. Retrieved May 23, 2009, from President of the Republic of Estonia: : <http://www.president.ee/et/ametitegevus/?gid=107836>
- Olick, J. K. (1999). Collective Memory: The Two Cultures. *Sociological Theory*, 17 (3), 333–348.
- Olick, J. K. (2007). *The politics of regret: on collective memory and historial responsibility*. New York: Routledge.
- Olick, J. K., & Levy, D. (1997). Collective Memory and Cultural Constraint: Holocaust Myth and Rationality in German Politics. *American Sociological Review*, 62 (6), 921–936.
- Olson, D. R. (1989). On the Language and Authority of Textbooks. In S. De Castell, A. Luke, & C. Luke, *Language, Authority and Criticism: Readings on the School Textbook* (pp. 233–244). London: Falmer Press.
- Onken, E.-C. (2007). The Baltic States and Moscow’s 9 May Commemoration: Analysing Memory Politics in Europe. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 59 (1), 23–46.
- Pajur, A., & Tannberg, T. (2006). *Eesti ajalugu II: 20. sajandist tänapäevani. Õpik gümnaasiumile*. Tallinn: Avita.
- Papadakis, Y. (2008). Narrative, Memory and History. Education in Divided Cyprus A Comparison of Schoolbooks on the “History of Cyprus”. *History & Memory*, 20 (2), 128–148.
- Perlmutter, D. D. (1997). Manufacturing visions of society and history in textbooks. *Journal of Communication*, 47 (3), 68–81.
- Petersoo, P. (2007). Reconsidering otherness: constructing Estonian identity. *Nations and Nationalism*, 13 (1), 117–133.
- Petersoo, P., & Tamm, M. (2008). *Monumentaalne konflikt. Mälu, poliitika ja identiteet tänapäevases Eestis*. Tallinn: Varrak.
- Pingel, F. (2000). *The European Home: Representations of 20th Century Europe in History Textbooks*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- Plokhy, S. (2008). *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Podeh, E. (2000). History and Memory in the Israeli Educational System. The Portrayal of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in History Textbooks (1948–2000). *History & Memory*, 12 (1), 65–100.
- Porat, D. (2001). A Contemporary Past: History Textbooks as Sites of National Memory. *International Review of History Education* vol. 3. In A. Dickinson, P.

- Gordon, & P. Lee, *Raising Standards in History Education* (pp. 36–55). London: Woburn Press.
- President of Russian Federation. (15. May 2009. a.). Указ Президента Российской Федерации О Комиссии при Президенте Российской Федерации по противодействию попыткам фальсификации истории в ущерб интересам России <Decree by the President of the Russian Federation about Commission under the President of Rus. Moscow.
- Prizel, I. (1998). *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putin, V. V. (2005, April 25). *Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation*. Retrieved May 22, 2009, from President of Russia: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml
- Pänke, J., Schuch, G., Brosig, M., Kocot, R., Olearius, A., & Stankiewicz, P. (2007). *Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Die Politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerung in Mitteleuropa*. Berlin: Nomos.
- Pääbo, H. (2011). From an Eastern outpost in the West to an Western outpost in East: Transformation of Estonian Master Narrative. In B. Törnquist-Plewa, & K. Stala, *Cultural and Social Transformations after Communism: East Central Europe in Focus*. Lund-Malmö: Sekel.
- Pääbo, H. (2008). War of Memories, explaining Memorials War in Estonia. *Baltic Defence and Security Review*, 10, 5–28.
- Ram, H. (2000). The Immemorial Iranian Nation? School Textbooks and Historical Memory in Post-Revolutionary Iran. *Nations and Nationalism*, 6 (1), 67–90.
- Razmadze, M. (2010). Abgründe des Goldenen Zeitalters Sowjetvergangenheit in Georgiens Schulbuch. *Osteuropa*, 60 (8), 91–104.
- Rausing, S. (2004). *History, memory, and identity in post-Soviet Estonia: the end of a collective farm*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Renan, E. (1996). What is nation? In G. E. Suny, *Becoming Nationa: a Reader* (pp. 42–56). Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press.
- Riemenschneider, R. (1998). Transnationale Konfliktbearbeitung. Die deutsch-französischen und die deutsch-polnischen Schulbuchgespräche im Vergleich, 1935–1997. *Internationale Schulbuchforschung* (20), 71–80.
- Riemenschneider, R. (1991). Verständigung und Verstehen. Ein halbes Jahrhundert deutsch-französischer Schulbuchgespräche. rmt: H.-J. Pandel, *Verstehen und Verständigen* (lk 137–148). Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus.
- Robins, K., & Aksoy, A. (2000). Deep nation: the national question and Turkish cinema culture. In H. Mette, & S. MacKenzie, *Cinema and Nation* (pp. 203–221). London: Routledge.
- Rodgers, P. W. (2006). (Re)inventing the Past: The Politics of 'National' History in the Ukrainian Classroom. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 6 (2), 40–55.
- Rodgers, P. W. (2006). Contestation and negotiation: regionalism and the politics of school textbooks in Ukraine's eastern borderlands. *Nations and Nationalism*, 12 (4), 681–697.
- Rosenberg, T. (1995). *The Haunted Land: Facing Europe's Ghosts after Communism*. New York: Vintage.
- Ross, A. A. (2006). Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions. *European Journal of International Relations*, 12 (2), 197–222.
- Rotberg, R. I. (2006). *Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History's Double Helix*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Ruggie, J. G. (1998). *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on international institutionalisation*. London: Routledge.
- Saakashvili, M. (2008, January 28). *Inauguration Speech*. Retrieved May 22, 2009, from President of Georgia: <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=1&sm=1>
- Samerski, S. (2007). *Die Renaissance der Nationalpatrone: Erinnerungskulturen in Ostmitteleuropa im 20./21. Jahrhundert*. Köln: Böhlau.
- Sarasin, P. (2001). Die Wirklichkeit der Fiktion. Zum Konzept der imagined communities. In U. Jureit, *Politische Kollektive. Zur Konstruktion rassistischer, nationaler und ethnischer Gemeinschaften* (pp. 22–45). Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Scherif, M. S. (1953). *Groups in Harmony and Tension. An Integration of Studies on Intergroup Relations*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Schissler, H., & Soysal, Y. N. (2005). *The Nation, Europe, and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Schleifman, N. (2001). Moscows Victory Park. A Monumental Change. *History & Memory*, 13 (2), 5–34.
- Schmitt, J.-C. (2004, May). (M. Tamm, Interviewer)
- Sereda, V. (2000). Polish and Ukrainian school history textbooks' impact on the formation of Polish-Ukrainian ethnic stereotypes. *Lviv University Papers, Ser. Hist.*, 35/36, 387–398.
- Seul, J. R. (1999). 'Ours is the Way of God': Religion, Identity, And Intergroup Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 36 (5), 553–569.
- Sherlock, T. (2007). *Historical Narratives In The Soviet Union And Post-Soviet Russia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sibony, D. (1997). *Le 'Racisme' ou la Haine Identitaire*. Paris: Christian Bourgois.
- Smith, A. D. (1999). *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, A. D. (1994). State Making and Nation-Building. In J. Hall, *The State: Critical Concepts* (pp. 59–89). London: Routledge.
- Smith, A. D. (1991). *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Smith, A., & Vaux, T. (2003). *Education, Conflict and International Development*. London: DFID.
- Smith, B. H. (1981). Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories. In W. J. Mitchell, *On Narrative* (pp. 209–232). Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Smith, R. M. (2003). *Stories of peoplehood: The politics and morals of political membership*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Snyder, T. (2002). Memory of Sovereignty and sovereignty over memory: Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, 1939–1999. In J.-W. Müller, *Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (pp. 39–58). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Snyder, T. (1999). *The reconstruction of nations : Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999*. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.
- Solchanyk, R. (2001). *Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition*. Lunham: Rowan&Littlefield Publisher.
- Solonari, V. (2003). Creating a "People": A Case Study in Post-Soviet History-Writing. *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 4 (2), 411–438.
- Sontag, S. (2003). *Regarding the Pain of Others*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Spinner-Halev, J. (2008). Democracy, Solidarity and Post-Nationalism. *Political Studies*, 56 (3), 604–628.

- Stearns, P. N., & Wineburg, S. S. (2000). *Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History: National and International Perspectives*. New York, London: New York University Press.
- Zajda, J. (2007). The new history school textbooks in the Russian Federation: 1992–2004. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, 37 (3), 291–306.
- Zajda, J., & Zajda, R. (2003). The Politics of Rewriting History: New History Textbooks and Curriculum Materials in Russia. *International Review of Education*, 49, (3–4), 363–384.
- Zerubavel, Y. (1995). *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition*. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.
- Zimmerman, W. (2002). *The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993–2000*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In S. W. Austin, *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (pp. 7–24). Monterey: Brooks/Cole.
- Tamm, M. (2008). History as Cultural Memory: Mnemohistory and the Construction of the Estonian Nation. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 39 (4), 499–516.
- Tamm, M. (2007). *Kuidas kirjutatakse ajalugu? Intervjuuraamat*. Tallinn: Varrak.
- Tamm, M., & Halla, S. (2008). Ajalugu, poliitika ja identiteet: Eesti monumentaalsest mälumaastikust. In P. Petersoo, & M. Tamm, *Monumentaalne konflikt. Mälu, poliitika ja identiteet tänapäevases Eestis* (pp. 18–50). Tallinn: Varrak.
- Tanner, J. (2001). Nation, Kommunikation und Gedächtnis. Die Produktivkraft des Imaginären und Aktualität Ernst Renans. In U. Jureit, *Politische Kollektive. Zur Konstruktion rassistischer, nationaler und ethnischer Gemeinschaften* (pp. 46–67). Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Tawil, S., & Harley, A. (2004). *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion*. Geneva: International Bureau of Education.
- Till, K. E. (2006). Memory Studies. *History Workshop Journal*, 62, 325–341.
- Todorov, T. (2001). The Uses and Abuses of Memory. In H. Marchitello, *What Happens to History. The Renewal of Ethics in Contemporary Thought* (pp. 11–22). New York, London: Routledge.
- Toft, M. D. (2001). Multinationality, Regions and State-Building: The Failed Transition in Georgia. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 11 (3), 123–142.
- Tolz, V. (2004). A Search for a National Identity in Yeltsin's and Putin's Russia. In Y. Brudny, S. Hoffman, & J. Frankel, *Restructuring Post-Communist Russia* (pp. 160–178). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tolz, V. (1998). Forging the nation: National identity and nation building in post-Communist Russia. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50 (6), 993–1022.
- Tolz, V. (2002). Rethinking Russian-Ukrainian relations: a new trend in nation-building in post-communist Russia? *Nations and Nationalism*, 8 (2), 235–253.
- Torsti, P. (2007). How to deal with a difficult past? History textbooks supporting enemy images in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 39 (1), 77–96.
- Trouillot, M.-R. (1995). *Silencing the Past: Power and Production of History*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Tsygankov, A. P. (2001). *Pathways After Empire: National Identity and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-Soviet World*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Tsygankov, A. P. (2006). *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

- Tulviste, P., & Werstsch, J. V. (1994). Official and unofficial histories: The case of Estonia. *Journal of Narrative and Life History*, 4 (4), 311–329.
- Tuminez, A. S. (2000). *Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Turchenko, F. G. (2004). *Новейшая история Украины, часть первая, 1914–1939* <*The Newest History of Ukraine, First part, 1914–2004*>. Kyiv: Geneza.
- Turchenko, F. G., & Moroko, V. M. (2002). *История Украины, конец XVIII-начало XX века. Учебник для 9 класса* <*History of Ukraine, from the end of the 18th century till the beginning of 20th century. Textbook for 9th form*>. Zhaporozhie; Kyiv: Prosvita; Geneza.
- Turchenko, F. G., Panchenko, P. P., & Timchenko, S. M. (2001). *Новейшая история Украины, часть вторая, 1939–2001* <*The Newest History of Ukraine, Second part, 1939–2001*>. Kyiv: Geneza.
- Ustinova, A. (2007). Nicht Sklave der Geschichte sein. Ein außergewöhnliches Interesse am Vergangenen stört manchmal die Gestaltung der Gegenwart. In J. Pänke, G. Schuch, M. Brosig, R. Kocot, A. Olearius, & P. Stankiewicz, *Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Die Politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerung in Mitteleuropa* (pp. 45–50). Berlin: Nomos.
- Vachanadze, M., & Guruli, V. (2004). *История Грузии (XIX-XX века) Учебник для IX класса* <*History of Georgia (XIX-XX century). History textbook for IX form*>. Tbilisi: Artanudzhi.
- Vachanadze, M., Guruli, V., & Bakhtadze, M. (2002). *История Грузии (с древнейших времен до 1801 года) Учебник для X класса русской школы* <*History of Georgia (from the most ancient times till 1801). History textbook for X form of Russian-language schools*>. Tbilisi: Artanudzhi.
- Walzer, M. (1994). *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*. Notre Dame and London: Notre Dame University Press.
- Varsori, A. (1998). Is Britain Part of Europe? The Myth of British „Difference“. In C. Buffet, & B. Heuser, *Haunted by History. Myths and International Relations* (pp. 135–156). Oxford: Berghahn.
- Weber, A. (2007). *Europe's Influence on Ukrainian State Building - A Struggle for Identity Between Europe and Russi*. GRIN Verlag.
- Weinstein, H. M., Warshauer Freedman, S., & Hughson, H. (2007). School voices. Challenges facing education systems after identity-based conflicts. *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, 2 (1), 41–71.
- Wendt, A. (1995). Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics (1992). In J. Der Derian, *reprinted International Theory. Critical Investigation* (pp. 129–177). London: MacMillan.
- Wertsch, J. V. (2008). Blank Spots in Collective Memory: A Case Study of Russia. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 617 (1), 58–71.
- Wertsch, J. V. (2007). National narratives and the conservative nature of collective memory. *Neohelicon*, 34 (2), 23–33.
- Wertsch, J. V. (1999). Revising Russian History. *Written Communication*, 16 (3), 267–295.
- Wertsch, J. V. (2008). The Narrative Organization of Collective Memory. *Ethos*, 36 (1), 120–135.
- Wertsch, J. V. (2002). *Voices of Collective Remembering*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- White, H. (1981). The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality. In W. J. Mitchell, *On Narrative* (pp. 1–23). Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.
- White, H. (1978). *Tropics of Discourse Essays in Cultural Criticism*. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Viktorova, J. (2006/2007). Conflict Transformation the Estonian Way The Estonian-Russian Border Conflict“ European Integration and Shifts in Discursive Representation of the “Other”. *Perspectives. Central European Review of International Affairs*, 27, 44–66.
- Williams, B. G. (2000). Commemorating “The Deportation” in Post-Soviet Chechnya. The Role of Memorialization and Collective Memory in the 1994–1996 and 1999–2000 Russo-Chechen Wars. *History & Memory*, 12 (1), 101–134.
- Wilmer, F. (2002). *The Social Construction of Man, the State, and War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in Former Yugoslavia*. New York: Routledge.
- Wilson, R. A. (2005). Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis. *Cognitive Processing*, 6 (4), 227–236.
- Vlasov, V. (2002). *История Украины. 8 класс <History of Ukraine. 8 form>*. Kyiv: Izdatel'stvo A.C.K.
- Wolczuk, K. (2000). History, Europe and the “national idea”: the “official” narrative of national identity in Ukraine. *Nationalities Papers*, 28 (4), 671–694.
- Voss, J. F., & Carretero, M. (1998). *Learning and Reasoning in History. International Review of History Education*. London, Portland, Oregon: Woburn Press.
- Yakovenko, A. (2007). *Ukraine's Search for its Place in Europe: The East or the West?* Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA.
- Yekelchuk, S. (2004). *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Yushchenko, V. (2007, November 24). *Address at the 75th anniversary commemoration of Holodomor victims*. Retrieved May 22, 2009, from Viktor Yushenko, President of Ukraine: <http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/8299.html>

SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN

Kollektiivse mälu põhise rahvusvahelise identiteedikonflikti potentsiaal impeeriumijärgses ruumis: Vene ajaloonarratiivi võrdlus Eesti, Ukraina ja Georgia ajaloonarratiividega

Käesolev uurimistöö keskendub kollektiivsele mälu tugeva rahvusvahelise identiteedikonflikti potentsiaali uurimisele postimperiaalses ruumis. Teema on oluline, kuna tänased arengud maailmas pakuvad mitmeid näiteid, kuidas identiteediga seotud küsimused kanduvad üle poliitikasse. Vastuolud, mis tulenevad mineviku erinevalt tõlgendamisest, on parimaks näiteks sellistest konfliktidest. Endise Vene impeeriumi territooriumil on muutunud sellised konfliktid järjest aktiivsemaks ning üha sagedamini loovad riikide valitsused institutsioone, mis tegelevad kollektiivse mälu. See näitab, et kollektiivsest mälest tulenevate identiteedikonfliktide potentsiaal on üha sagedamini muutumas institutsionaliseeritud poliitikaks. Selliste konfliktide sisust ja olemusest paremaks arusaamiseks on vaja tunda õppida nende võimalikkust.

Antud uurimus tegelb endise Vene impeeriumi ruumiga, kus kõrvutatakse Eesti, Ukraina ja Georgia ajaloonarratiive Venemaa omaga, et analüüsida identiteedi konflikte nende riikide ja Venemaa vahel. Uurimistöö põhieesmärgiks on välja töötada sobilik analüüsitud kollektiivse mälu seotud identiteedikonflikti potentsiaali hindamiseks. Selleks kombineerin kolm uurimissuunda: rahvusvahelised suhted, natsionalismi uuringud ja mälu uuringud. Minu töö teiseks eesmärgiks on määratleda, millised elemendid rahvuslikus ajaloonarratiivis, mille kaudu kollektiivne mälu funktsioneerib, on olulisimad postimperiaalses ruumis. Samuti hindan ma seda, milline kolmest juhtumianalüüsist omab kõige suuremat potentsiaali identiteedi konfliktiks Venemaaga. Antud uurimusega soovin pakkuda tõhusat alternatiivi enim levinud lähenemisele Ida-Euroopa mälu uuringutes, mis paigutab enamuse kollektiivse mälu või identiteetidega seotud konflikte nõukogudejärgse ühiskonna eripärade hulka.

Esimene peatükk annab ülevaate teoreetilisest raamistikust ning defineerib uurimuses käsitletavat alusmõistet. See algab ülevaatega kollektiivsest mälest ning antud uurimuses on see defineeritud kui ühiselt jagatud arusaam sotsiaalse grupi minevikust. Minu uurimisfookuses on ülevalt-alla funktsioneeriv poliitiline mälu, mis on seotud võimuküsimustega ning määratletud grupi eliidi poolt. Natsionalismi uuringutes tugineda ma etnosümbollikule definitsioonile rahvusest. Seetõttu omab ka rahvuslik kollektiivne mälu võtme rolli rahvusidentiteedi kujundamisel. Rahvusvahelistes suhetes olen võtnud oma uurimisobjekti analüüsiks konstruktivistliku koolkonna, mis rõhutab identiteedi olulisust rahvusvahelistes suhetes, kus see kujuneb enda-teise suhestumise protsessi tulemusena. Samuti pöörab see lähenemine tähelepanu minevikule, mis omab olulist rolli tänapäevaste riikide kuvandite tekkimisel, mis omakorda mõjutab identiteedi kujunemist. Sellest tulenevalt võib järeleda, et kollektiivne mälu on

oluline identiteedi kujundamise allikas nii siseriiklikult kui ka rahvusvaheliselt. Seetõttu võivad vastuolulised kuvandid rahvuslikus mälus üle kanduda rahvusvahelisele tasandile, kus nad muutuvad identiteedikonfliktide allikaiks.

Oma uurimuses ma väidan, et rahvuslik mälu on vormitav nähtus, mida kujundab ühiskond. Lähtudes ülevalt-alla toimivast poliitilise mälu definitioonist, on selleks vormijaks rahvuslik eliit. Teisest küljest mõjustab rahvuslik mälu ka rahvuslikku eliiti, kuigi alateadvuslikult. Rahvuslik mälu funktsioneerib ühiskonnas läbi ajaloonarratiivide, mis loovad ühise ja tervikliku pildi rahvuse minevikust. Erinevate riikide ja rahvaste ajaloonarratiivide võrdlemisel on võimalik hinnata rahvusvahelise identiteedikonflikti võimalikkust. Seetõttu keskendusin ma ka oma uurimuses rahvuslike ajaloonarratiivide võrdlusele, mille tarvis analüüsisin kooli ajalooõpikuid. Ajalooõpikute kaudu toimub uue põlvkonna sotsialiseerimine ja seepärast on õpikud ka huvitavaks analüüsimaterjaliks vormitava rahvusliku mälu uurimisel.

Antud töös keskendun ma järgmistele ajaloonarratiivi elementidele:

- 1) Rahvuse päritolunarratiiv, mis määratleb rahvuse pärimise ning selle kujunemisloo algusest tänapäevaseks rahvusriigiks;
- 2) Rahvuslikud identiteedielemendid, mis toovad esile olulisimad tähised rahvuse kujunemisloos, näiteks kronotoop, mis määratleb rahvusliku ruumi ajaloolises kontekstis;
- 3) Endakuvand ja olulise teise kuvand, mis näitavad, millisena tajub rahvas ennast ning millist rolli täidab tema loos rahvuslik teine;
- 4) Ühine ajalugu, mis näitab, millised olulised sündmused on toimunud rahvuse minevikus ning samuti millist rolli on oluline teine nende puhul mänginud.

Tuginedes nendele aspektidele, esitan kolm uurimisteesi, millest kaks toetuvad omakorda neljale eeldusele. Viimaseid testin oma analüüsis, et hinnata iga aspekti olulisust rahvusvahelise identiteedikonflikti võrdleval uurimisel post-imperiaalses ruumis.

- 4) Endise allutanud ja allutatud rahvaste ajaloonarratiivid on tugevalt antagonistlikud:
 - a. päritolunarratiivid toetavad vastuolulisi karakteristikuid ja rolle, mis loovad vastastikust mittemõistmist;
 - b. endise allutanud rahvuse narratiiv on üldjoones kaasav allutatud rahvaste suhtes, allutatud rahvaste narratiivid on üldjoones eristuvad allutanud rahvuse suhtes;
 - c. rahvuslikes ajaloonarratiivides on hinnangud ühistele ajaloolistele tähtsündmustele vastandlikud;
 - d. rahvuslikud ajaloonarratiivid eitavad vastastikku ajaloolisi tähtsündmusi.
- 5) Antagonistlikud ajaloonarratiivid eitavad olulisi identiteedielemente teise identiteedis:
 - a. peamised identiteedielemendid on vastandlikud ja seetõttu põhjustavad osalist vastastikust identiteedielementide eitamist;

- b. identiteedi kronotoobid on kattuvad – endise allutanud rahvuse kronotoop kaasab allutatud rahvaste territooriume, kuigi viimased on sellele tugevalt vastu;
 - c. endise allutanud rahvuse kuvand on esitatud negatiivsena ja ohustavana allutatud rahvaste narratiivides, enda kuvand on ohvristav;
 - d. endise allutanud rahva enesekuvand on kangelaslik ja ülistav ja see proovib kuvandit mineviku negatiivsetest tegudest puhtaks pesta.
- 6) Allutatud rahvuste skemaatilised narratiivivormid on sarnased ning erinevad oluliselt endisest allutanud rahvuse omast.

Oma uurimuses analüüsin nelja ajaloonarratiivi: Vene oma võrdlevalt Eesti, Ukraina ja Georgia omadega. Ma valisin need riigid kuna nende suhetes Venemaaga on kõige tugevamad konfliktid. Samuti on neil kõigil tugev rahvuslik identiteet, mis on arendanud veelgi konfliktsemaid suhteid Venemaaga. Pärast Nõukogude Liidu kokkuvarisemist on kõik kolm riiki püüdnud väljuda Venemaa mõjusfäärist. Samas on neil olnud erinevad minevikukogemused ja ka nende suhted Venemaaga on arenenud erinevat rada. Seetõttu vahendavad nende rahvuslikud ajaloonarratiivid erinevaid arusaamu ning tähendusi. Teises, kolmandas ja neljandas peatükis analüüsisin vastavalt Eesti, Ukraina ja Georgia ajaloonarratiive, viiendas peatükis Venemaa ajaloonarratiivi ning ka võrdlen seda kolme eelneva riigi omadega.

Eesti päritolunarratiiv väidab, et eestlased on elanud oma praegusel asualal alates viimase jääaja lõpust ja konstrueerib seetõttu tugeva sideme eestlaste ja nende territooriumi vahel. Päritolunarratiiv keskendub tugevalt Eesti riikluse küsimusele, sest eestlased olid kuni 20. sajandini allutatud teiste rahvaste poolt, omamata iseseisvat riiki. Narratiiv maalib eestlastest pildi kui rahvusest, kellel on olnud läbi aegade tugev iseseisvuspüüe, mis on väljendunud aktiivses vabadusvõitluses. Eesti ajaloonarratiiv määratleb ka peamised eestlaste identiteedielemendid: eesti kultuur (keel, eestikeelne haridus ja rahvakultuur), madal religioossus, demokraatlik elukorraldus, agraarne elustiil, mererahvaks olemine ja etniline homogeensus. Eesti kronotoop kattub praeguste Eesti piiridega ning regionaalselt paigutab ta Eesti Põhja Euroopasse. Venemaa ja venelaste suhtes kasutab Eesti ajaloonarratiiv eelkõige eristuvaid elemente, rõhutamaks erisusi eestlaste ja venelaste vahel. Eesti skemaatiline narratiivivorm keskendub tugevalt rahvuslikule iseseisvusele, kasutades kangelaslikke elemente vabaduse saavutamisest ja ohvristavaid jooni selle kaotusest jutustamisel. Üks narratiivivorm tegeleb rahvuse ellujäämise teemaga, mis ohvristab rasket minevikku ja esitab rahvuse püsimist kui tõelist kangelastegu. Eestlaste enesekuvand tugineb eelkõige positiivsetele elementidele. Kõige olulisem osa on kaetud kangelaslugudega, kuid päris sageli näidatakse ennast ka ohvrina. Negatiivse rahvusliku enesekuvandi puhul kasutatakse tavaliselt õigustusi. Olulise teise (Venemaa/venelaste) kuvand on vahendatud domineerivalt läbi negatiivsete aspektide, millest enim kasutatud on Venemaa kui ohuallikas. Eesti ajalooõpikutes domineerivad 20. sajandi sündmused, kuna see on rahvusliku iseseisvuse ning selle säilitamise eest võitlemise periood. Seetõttu peaaegu kõik Eesti ajaloo võtmesündmused on seotud kas iseseisvuse

saavutamise või selle kaotamisega. Ülejäänud võtmesündmused on suurimad sõjad, mis on aset leidnud Eesti territooriumil. Venemaal/venelastel on kõigis nendes sündmustes oluline roll, mis näitab, et Venemaa on olnud läbi ajaloo kutsumata sekkuja, kelle vastu eestlased on püüdnud võidelda.

Ukraina päritolunarratiiv ei seo nii tugevalt territooriumi ja etnilist gruppi, kuid alustades territoriaalsest ajaloost kandub see üle etniliseks ajalooks. Esimene riik Ukrainas ei ole seotud slaavlastega, kuid esimeseks slaavlaste riigiks on Kiievi Rus ja Ukraina päritolunarratiiv pühendab olulise osa selleks, et näidata, Ukrainat Kiievi Rusi legitiimse järeltulijana. Seejärel keskendub Ukraina päritolunarratiiv ukrainlaste vabadusvõitlusele, mis kestab kuni 1991. aastani. Teiseks olulisemaks teemaks Ukraina narratiivis on rahvuslik ühtsus, mille puudumine on üks-üheselt seotud iseseisvuse kaotamise ja Ukraina territooriumite jagamisega võõrvõimude vahel. Ukraina päritolunarratiiv esitab ka selge argumentatsiooni, miks tuleb ukrainlasi ja venelasi lugeda erinevateks rahvusteks, kuigi neil on ühtne ida-slaavi päritolu. Ukraina ajaloonarratiivi poolt esile toodud peamised rahvuslikud identiteedielemendid on ukraina kultuur (keel, ukrainakeelne haridus ja religioon), kasaklus (vaprus võitluses, demokraatlik ja võrdsusele tuginev vaba ühiskonnakorraldus), põllumajanduslik elustiil, milles rõhutatakse erataludel ja -omandil tuginevat külakorraldust. Ukraina krontoop on veidi suurem kui tema praegused piirid, kuigi ajaloonarratiiv ei esita mingeid eksplitsiitseid territoriaalseid nõudeid oma naabritele. Samuti ei paiguta Ukraina narratiiv rahvast otseselt kuhugi suuremasse regioonini, aeg-ajalt tehakse viiteid ukrainlastele kui eurooplastele. Sarnaselt Eesti ajaloonarratiivile väljendab ka Ukraina oma tugevalt eristumist Venemaast/venelastest. Ukraina skemaatilised narratiivivormid väljendavad samuti eristuvat joont, rõhutades ukrainlaste lõppematut vabadusiha ja välisrõhujate fataalsust ukrainlaste kui rahvuse jaoks. Sellest tulenevalt on ka Ukraina narratiivivormid rohkem ennast ohvrina näitavad kui teised analüüsitud juhtumid. Ukrainlaste enesekuvand on väga tugevalt positiivne, kus kangelaslikud elemendid domineerivad ohvristamise üle, kuigi viimane on võrreldes teiste juhtumitega tugevamalt esindatud. Ukraina ajaloonarratiiv kasutab vähem negatiivset enesekuvandit. Olulise teise (Venemaa/venelased) kuvand on sarnaselt Eesti narratiiviga tugevalt negatiivne ning Venemaa on samuti esitatud kui ohuallikas. Samuti keskendub Ukraina ajaloonarratiiv 20. sajandile, kus peatähelepanu on pööratud rahvuslikule vabadusvõitlusele, kuid tähtsal kohal on ka rahvuslikud kannatused. Samas olulisemad ajaloolised võtmesündmused asuvad samuti varasemas perioodis, milles peatähelepanu on antud Kiievi Rusile, kasakate hetmanaadile ja rahvuslikule ärkamisele. Seetõttu sisaldavad ka Ukraina ajaloo võtmesündmused oluliselt Venemaad/venelasi, näidates neid kui ukrainlaste jaoks rahvuslikku ohuallikat.

Georgia päritolunarratiiv määratleb oma territooriumi Euraasia inimajaloo allikaks, kuigi ajaloonarratiiv ei konstrueeri etnilist sidet esimeste inimolendite ja tänaste georgialaste vahel. Päritolunarratiiv pakub erinevaid lähenemisi georgialaste põlvnemisele ning seejärel keskendub riikluse ajaloole Georgia territooriumil, luues nende ja praeguse riikluse vahel selge seose. Ajaloo-

narratiiv rõhutab väga selgelt, et Georgia on väga pikaajalise riikluse traditsiooniga rahvas. Sarnaselt Ukraina päritolunarratiivile tegeleb ka Georgia oma rahvusliku ühtsusega, mis on defineeritud rahvusliku julgeoleku ja heaolu võtmena. Samuti rõhutab Georgia päritolunarratiiv georgialaste igikestvat vabadusvõitlust. Peamised Georgia identiteedielemendid on georgia õigeusk ja apostelik kirik, georgia kultuur (keel, rahvuskeelne haridus ja teadus, peamiselt humanitaaralad), põllumajanduslik elustiil (rõhutades viinamarjakasvatuse pikka traditsiooni), kõrge sõjakunst ja laiapõhjaline rahvuslik tolerants. Georgia kronotoop on laiem, kui praegune Georgia territoorium. Hoolimata sellest ei esita ajaloonarratiiv ekspiitiseid territoriaalseid nõudeid, kui rõhutab Abkhaasia ja Lõuna-Osseetia ajaloolist kuulumist Georgiale. Georgia kronotoop asetab georgialased kultuuriliselt Euroopasse ning nende riigi geograafiliselt Lähis-Idasse. Sarnaselt kahe eelneva riigi narratiiviga on ka Georgia ajaloonarratiivi iseloomuks tugev eristumine Venemaast/venelastest, rõhutades georgialaste vastumeelsust venelastega koosolemisel. Georgia skemaatiline narratiivvorm rõhutab georgialaste vaprust rahvuslikus vabadusvõitluses, kuid sealne ebaedu on vahendatud läbi ohvri rolli. Georgia enesekuvand on tugevalt positiivne, rõhutades eelkõige kangelaslikke aspekte oma minevikus. Esineb ka ohvristavaid elemente, kuid vähem kui Ukraina narratiivis. Negatiivse enesekuvandiga tegeleb Georgia ajaloonarratiiv vähem kui Eesti, kuid rohkem kui Ukraina. Kuigi Georgia üldine ajalookäsitlus on tugevalt isikustatud, on negatiivne enesekuvand vahendatud eelkõige läbi õigustamiste. Venemaa/venelaste kuvand kui olulised teised on sarnaselt Eesti ja Ukraina narratiividega domineerivalt negatiivne, kuigi sisaldab veidi vähem ohustavaid elemente ning rõhutab rohkem venelaste reeturlikku iseloomu. Georgia ajaloonarratiiv keskendub 19. sajandile, mis on rahvusliku ärkamise ning Vene valitsusele vastuseisu periood. Võrreldes teiste narratiividega vaatab Georgia oma tunduvalt rohkem kaugemas minevikku, kuna rahvuslik ajalugu on perioodiliselt pikem ning keskaegne Georgia oli võimas Kaukaasia impeerium. Seetõttu on ka enamuse Georgia ajaloolisi võtmesündmusi aset leidnud enne 20. sajandit. Võrreldes Eesti ja Ukrainaga, esinevad Venemaa/venelased Georgia ajaloolistes võtmesündmustes tunduvalt vähem. Kuigi alates 19. sajandist muutuvad nad domineerivaks Georgia ajaloonarratiivis kui peamine vastandlik võim. Seetõttu konstrueerib ka Georgia ajaloonarratiiv Venemaast/venelastest pildi kui ajaloolistest vastastest.

Vene päritolunarratiiv tegeleb sarnaselt Ukraina ja Georgia omadele esialgu territoriaalse ajaloo ja kasvab seejärel üle etniliseks ajalooks. Hoolimata sellest säilitab Vene päritolunarratiiv tugeva multikultuurilise mõõtme ning on seetõttu on ka tunduvalt rohkem kaasav kui kolm eelnevat. Sarnaselt Ukraina päritolunarratiivile tegeleb ka Vene narratiiv oma õiguse argumenteerimisega Kiievi Vene õiguslikule järjepidevusele, nimetades seda esimeseks venelaste riigiks. Vene päritolu narratiiv pöörab samuti olulist tähelepanu ühtsusele, kuid etnilise ühtluse asemel on olulisem territoriaalne ühtsus, mis legitimiseerib ka Venemaa hilisemaid territoriaalseid vallutusi. Võrreldes eelnevate juhtumitega, on Vene ajaloonarratiivil tugev kaasav iseloom, proovides näidata kõiki etnilisi

gruppe Vene territooriumil osana Vene riigist. Eelnevad kolm juhtumit proovivad vastupidiselt vastanduda ning eristuda oma olulisest teisest – Venemaast/venelastest. Samuti on rahvuslikes narratiivides erinevalt tajutav rahvuslik iseseisvus. Kui Vene narratiiv presenteerib seda kui vajadust olla tugev välise invasiooni vastu ning kaitsta territooriumit, siis Eesti, Ukraina ja Georgia puhul on see esitatud kui rahvuslik vabadusvõitlus taastamaks etnilist iseseisvust. Ka rahvuslik ühtsus on määratletud erinevalt, võrreldes Ukraina ja Georgiaga. Vene narratiiv toob seda esile kui olulist eeltingimust kontrollimaks oma suurt territooriumit, samas kui kaks viimast esitavad seda kui võtit rahvuslikule säilimisele. Seega minu eeldus 1.a. on leidnud tõestust, kuna Vene kui endise allutanud rahva päritolunarratiiv toetab vastandlike elemente võrreldes Eesti, Ukraina ja Georgia kui endiste allutatud rahvaste omadega. See võib tekitada ka vastastikust arusaamatust. Kiievi Rusi/Vene vastuolu tõttu on Ukraina ja Vene päritolunarratiividel vastuolupotentsiaal kõrgeim, Eesti ja Vene puhul on see vastuolu madalaim.

Vene ajaloonarratiivi poolt esile toodud peamised identiteedielemendid on võim (nii rahvusvahelises kui ka siseriiklikus tähenduses), tööstuslik rahvus, mitmerahvuseline ühiskond, jagatud kultuuriruum või unikaalne Vene tsivilisatsioon. Kõik need identiteedielemendid vastanduvad rohkemal või vähemal määral Eesti, Ukraina või Georgia omadega. Vene võimu rahvusvaheline mõõde vastandub Eesti arusaamaga rahuarmastavast rahvusest, kes astub vapralt vastu välisinvasioonile. Samuti vastandub see Ukraina kasaklusele, mis kaitseb ukrainlaste vabadust, ning Georgia sõdalastele, kelle ülesandeks on samuti seista rahvuse iseseisvuse eest. Seetõttu rahvusvaheliselt tugev Venemaa on oht kõigi kolme rahva olulisele identiteedielemendile. Samuti on vastanduv ka võimu siseriiklik arusaam. See on otseselt konfliktis Eesti ja Ukraina arusaamaga demokraatlikust riigikorraldusest. Mõlemad näevad tugevalt tsentraliseeritud ja ebademokraatlikus Vene riigis ohtu ning nende demokraatiapüüdlusesd omaokorda nõrgestavad Vene riiklikku tugevust. Rahvuse tööstuslik elulaad vastandub selgelt kolme teise rahvuse põllumajandusliku ühiskonnaga. Ainult Ukraina puhul on märgatav teatud määral aktsepteeritavust tööstuslikule mõõtmele. Vene ajaloonarratiivis on põllumajanduslik ühiskond alaarenunud ning seetõttu mittesoovituslik, teistele rahvustele on see oluliseks rahvusliku omapära säilitamisviisiks. Vene mitmerahvuseline ühiskond vastandub otseselt Eesti arusaamaga etniliselt homogeensest rahvast ja on vastuoluline ka Georgia rahvusliku tolerantsiga. Kultuurilised identiteedielemendid vastanduvad samuti. Vene ajaloonarratiiv üritab näidata, et kõik teised rahvad on osa suurest Vene tsivilisatsioonist, kuid teised rahvad rõhutavad oma rahvuslikku unikaalsust ning näevad Vene tsivilisatsiooni loomist pigem ohustava venestumisena. Lisaks võib tekitada Eesti nõrk religioosus arusaamatusi Vene tugevalt õigeuskliku identiteedielemendiga. Ukraina ja Georgia narratiivid väljendavad samuti religiooni olulisust, kuid konfliktseks elemendiks on rahvusliku kiriku iseseisvus ning Venemaa katse ühendada kõik õigeusklikud rahvad. Vene kronotoop on selgelt kattuv kolme teise rahva kronotoobiga, eelkõige Ukraina omaga, mida Vene

ajaloonarratiiv näeb kui vene rahva hälli. Vene ajaloonarratiiv defineerib kõiki kolme riiki kui osa Vene ajaloolisest ruumist, mis vastandub selgelt nende riikide enese geograafilise määratlusega. Seetõttu minu eeldused 2.a. ja 2.b. leidsid kinnitust. Tugevaim identiteedielementide vastuolu on Eesti ja Venemaa vahel ning nõrgim on Ukraina ja Venemaa vahel. Samas kronotoopiline kattuvus on suurim Ukraina ja Venemaa vahel ning madalaim Georgia ja Venemaa vahel.

Vene ajaloonarratiiv on tugevalt kaasav ukrainlaste, eestlaste ja georgialaste suhtes. See loob arusaama, et nad on osa Vene rahvast ning selle unikaalsest tsivilisatsioonist. See vastandub selgelt Eesti, Ukraina ja Georgia arusaamale ajaloolisest sidemest Venemaaga. Kõik nad loovad arusaama, et nad on Venemaast erinevad ning ajalooliselt ei kuulu nad Venemaaga kokku. Seetõttu leidis kinnitust ka minu eeldus 1.b., mille kohaselt endine allutanud riik proovib samastada endiseid allutatud rahvuseid, kuigi viimased rõhutavad just vastupidist seisukohta. Suurim vastuolu eksisteerib Ukraina ja Venemaa vahel, kus viimane eitab aeg-ajalt ukrainlaste kui iseseisva rahva eksistentsi. Vene skemaatilised narratiivivormid vahendavad eelkõige Vene rahva edulugusid ja võite, kuigi nad sisaldavad mõningal määral ka ohvriks olemist. Kuigi narratiivivormid vahendavad erinevaid lähenemisi: Venemaa kaasavat, teised eralduvat, siis narratiivivormid ei ole nii eristuvad. Kõikide puhul on tuvastatavad nii kangelaslikud jutumallid kui ka ensehaletsusega tegelevad lood. Seetõttu minu uurimistees 3 leidis üksnes osalise kinnituse ning see indikaator ei väljenda nii selget vastuolu erinevate rahvaste vahel. Skemaatilised narratiivivormid on kõige sarnasemad Eesti ja Venemaa puhul ning kõige erinevamad Ukraina ja Venemaa puhul.

Vene ajaloonarratiiv konstrueerib sarnaselt kõikide teiste juhtumitega eelkõige positiivset enesekuvandit. Samuti kasutatakse enim kangelaskuju konstrueerimist, kuigi ohvrirolli näitamine on ka aktiivselt kasutatud. Negatiivne enesekuvand esineb rohkem kui kolmes eelnevas narratiivis ning see on peamiselt vahendatud läbi isikut vastutavaks muutmise. Isikustamine on võrreldes teiste juhtumitega enim kasutatud jutustamisvorm ning seetõttu on ka lihtsam negatiivseid momente minevikus näidata kui personaalseid väärkäitumisi. Võrreldes teiste juhtumitega ei ole enesekuvandi struktuur erinev ning see ei sõltsu ajaloolisest rollist allutanud-allutatud rahvas. Kangelaslikke elemente kasutatakse isegi rohkem Eesti ja Georgia puhul kui Vene narratiivis. Ukraina enesekuvand on võrreldes teistega rohkem ohvrikuvandit kasutav. Samas on oluline märkida, et kolme rahva ohvrirolli kasutamise sagedus kasvab, kui narratiiv tegeles perioodiga, kus rahvus oli Vene võimu alluvuses. Venemaa/venelaste negatiivne kuvand Eesti, Ukraina ja Georgia ajaloonarratiivides on vastuolus Vene enesekuvandiga. Ainus aspekt, mis kattub, on seotud ajutise nõrkuse ja arengust mahajäämusega. Kõikide teiste kuvandielementide puhul Vene ajaloonarratiiv kas asendab rahvuse konkreetsete vastutavate isikutega või proovib õigustada ajaloolist käitumist. Mõningatel juhtudel aga Vene ajaloonarratiiv isegi eitab konstrueeritud kuvandit. Tugevalt negatiivne Vene kuvand esineb enam-vähem samas ulatuses kõigis kolmes

narratiivis. Samas on negatiivsed elemendid erinevalt presenteeritud kolmes narratiivis. Eesti ajaloonarratiiv toob kõige selgemalt esile, et Venemaa/venelased on oht ning Georgia narratiiv toonitab seda aspekti kõige vähem. Seetõttu minu eeldus 2.c. leidis ainult osaliselt kinnituse, näidates et olulise teise kuvand on domineerivalt negatiivne ning peamiselt esitatud ohuallikana. Samas ajaloolised rollid – alistanud-alistatud rahvas – ei mõjuta rahvuse enesekuvandi struktuuri. Minu eeldus 2.d. leidis kinnituse, kuigi samas ei ole kangelase rolli esitamine omane üksnes endisele domineerivale rahvale, vaid kõikidele. Samas allutanud rahva ajaloonarratiiv proovib ennast puhtaks pesta probleemsest minevikust ning teatud määral seda isegi eitada.

Vene ajaloonarratiiv pöörab sarnaselt Eesti ja Ukraina narratiividega rohkem tähelepanu 20. sajandile, kus on enim välja toodud revolutsioonid ja kodusõda, Teine maailmasõda ning NSVL-i kokkuvarisemine. Vene ajaloo võtmesündmused keskenduvad eelkõige tugevatele valitsejatele, kes viisid ellu olulisimad reformid, mis parandasid oluliselt venelaste elujärge. Samuti olulisemad sündmused, kus Vene rahva ühine jõupingutus päästis riigi kokkukukkumisest, on saanud rohkem tähelepanu kui teised sündmused. Võrreldes kolme teise narratiiviga, on Eesti ja Vene narratiivil enim ühiseid võtmesündmusi, kuna mõlemad keskenduvad enim 20. sajandile. Georgia narratiivis on aga kõige vähem ühiseid võtmesündmusi, kuna Georgia keskendub rohkem perioodile, mil Venemaa ja Georgia kokkupuuted olid suhteliselt minimaalsed või puudusid üldse. Hoolimata paljudest ühistest ajaloo võtmesündmustest, ei jaga Eesti, Ukraina ja Georgia enamuses hinnanguid, mida Vene narratiiv pakub. Teatud määral on isegi vastastikust ajaloosündmuste eitamist, nt. Kiievi Rus/Vene (Ukraina-Venemaa), Teine maailmasõda (Eesti-Venemaa). Siiski eksisteerib rohkem osaline eitamine või marginaliseerimine. Seega minu eeldused 1.c. ja 1.d. leidsid kinnituse, kuna ühise ajaloo tõlgendused on vastandlikud ning eksisteerib isegi sündmuste eitamist, mis on vähem märgatav. Tugevaim vastuolu eksisteerib Ukraina ja Venemaa vahel ning nõrgim Georgia ja Venemaa vahel.

Kokkuvõtvalt võib öelda, et endise domineerinud ja allutatud rahvaste ajaloonarratiivid on tugevalt antagonistlikud ning seetõttu nad ka eitavad vastastikku olulisi identiteedielemente. Seepärast on rahvuslikud ajaloonarratiivid endise impeeriumi ruumis tugevalt potentsiaalsed rahvusvahelise identiteedi konflikti allikad. Väidan ka, et minu töö alguses väljatöötatud analüütiline raamistik hindamaks rahvusvahelise identiteedi konflikti potentsiaali post-imperiaalses ruumis leidis üldjoontes kinnitust kui oluline vahend ajaloonarratiivide analüüsimiseks. Analüüsi käigus selgitasin välja, et kõik elemendid mudelis on olulised indikaatorid, välja arvatud rahvuse enesekuvand, mis iga rahvuse puhul omas sarnast struktuuri, sõltumata nende ajaloolisest rollist. Samuti skemaatilised narratiivivormid olid vähem olulised indikaatorid ning peegeldasid üksnes aspekte, mida teised indikaatorid tõid esile isegi selgemalt. Erinevate narratiivide võrdlemisel selgus, et kõige kõrgeim potentsiaal identiteedi konfliktiks on Ukraina ja Venemaa vahel, kuna neil on ühine pärinemislugu ning hilisem Venemaa domineeriv roll on proovinud eitada

ukrainlaste iseseisvat identiteeti. Seetõttu on ka vastastikku samaaegselt kasutatud rohkem eristuvaid (Ukraina) ja samastuvaid (Venemaa) elemente. Potentsiaal Eesti ja Venemaa identiteedi konfliktiks on samuti suhteliselt kõrge ja seda eelkõige vastanduvate identiteedielementide ja ajalointerpretatsioonide tõttu. Üllatava tulemusena oli madalaim potentsiaal identiteedikonfliktiks Georgia ja Venemaa vahel, kuid seda seletab eelkõige Georgia ajaloonarratiiv, mis tegeleb rohkem perioodiga, mil ta ei olnud Venemaa poolt kontrollitud. Samas kui analüüs keskendus üksnes sellele perioodile, mil Venemaa kontrollis Georgia territooriumi, kasvaks konfliktipotentsiaal oluliselt.

Käesolev uurimus suutis edukalt kombineerida erinevaid teaduslikke suundasid, et arendada edasi mälu-uuringute kasutatavust rahvusvaheliste suhete analüüsis. See näitas, et rahvuslikul kollektiivsel määl on oluline roll rahvusvahelises identiteedikonfliktis ja et selle võimalikkus on eriti kõrge impeeriumijärgses ruumis. Uurimuse käigus töötati välja toimiv analüüsiraamistik selle potentsiaali hindamiseks ning seda saab kasutada ka teiste samalaadsete juhtumite puhul, nt. Austria-Ungari või Ottomanide impeeriumi ruumis, kus rahvusvaheline identiteedikonflikt on madalam. Mõistes neid erinevusi, on võimalik leida meetodeid konfliktivõimalikkuse vähendamiseks. Käesolev uurimus pakub ka olulist alust järgnevateks uurimusteks, mis tegelevad küsimusega, kuidas see potentsiaal on muudetud konfliktipoliitikaks. Seetõttu võimaldab antud uurimus dekonstrueerida rahvusvahelise identiteedi konflikti allikaid ning seeläbi neid ka vähendada.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Name and Surname: Heiko Pääbo
Time and place of birth: 27.07.1979 Roosna-Alliku
Contact information: Riia 17-3, Tartu, Estonia; +372 52 290 35;
heiko.paabo@ut.ee
Current occupation: University of Tartu, EuroCollege, Russian and Eastern European Studies lecturer/University of Tartu, Faculty of Social Sciences and Education, Head of the Centre for Baltic Studies

Education:

2005 University of Tartu, Institute of Governance and Politics, PhD student
2004 University of Tartu, Department of Political Science, MA
2001 University of Tartu, Department of Political Science, BA

Working experience:

2005–2008 University of Tartu, EuroCollege, lecturer/research fellow
2004–2008 University of Tartu, Department of Political Science, acting instructor
2003–2005 Baltic Defence College, Academic Assistant for the Dean
2002–2005 University of Tartu, EuroCollege, contracted lecturer
2001–2003 University of Tartu, Department of Political Science, Academic Assistant
2000–2002 Tartu Youth House, Teacher
1999–2003 NGO Estonian Debating Society, Member of Council (2001–2002), Project Manager, Trainer, Member of Board (1999–2000)
1999–2002 Tartu Mart Reinik Gymnasium, Teacher

Research interests

International Relations: International Relations Theories, Geopolitics and Foreign Affairs of Russia, Politics of the Baltic states, Transition Studies
Identity and Memory Politics, History of Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and representation of the history in region

Main publications

- “From an Eastern outpost in the West to an Western outpost in East: Transformation of Estonian Master Narrative” in Törnquist-Plewa, Barbara; Stala, Krzysztof (eds) *Cultural and Social Transformations after Communism: East Central Europe in Focus*, Lund-Malmö: Sekel (2011, will be published)
- “Eesti-Vene identiteedikonflikti võimalikkusest: rahvuslike ajaloonarratiivide kokkusobimatuses” in Kasekamp, Andres; Toomla, Rein; Tüür, Karmo (eds) *Politica*, Tartu: University of Tartu Publisher, 2010: 84–111
- “Interactive Study Methods in a Multicultural Classroom: Challenges and Advantages” in Ehin, Piret; Gross, Toomas (eds). *Teaching in Multicultural Classroom*, Tartu: University of Tartu Publisher, 2010: 69–86
- *Great Power’s Dependency Policies in a Geostrategic Subregion. Measuring Capability of the USA Policies in Central America and Russian Policies in the Baltic States*, Saarbrücken: Vdm Verlag Dr. Müller, 2009
- “War of Memories: Explaining “Memorials War” in Estonia”, *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, Vol 10, 2008: 5–28
- “The Gap between the “Social Realities” and Policies: the Estonian Ability to Response to the New Security Threats” in Schröfel, Jodof (ed) *Political Asymmetries in the Era of Globalization*, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien: P. Lang, 2007: 165–175
- “Balti riikide geopoliitilise tähenduse ajalooline kujunemine”, Toomla, Rein (ed) *RSRi kogumik Maailm 2005*, Tartu: University of Tartu Publisher, 2005: 40–103
- Pääbo, Heiko; Tüür, Karmo „Eesti Venemaa-poliitika lähtealused” Toomla, Rein (ed), *RSRi kogumik Maailm 2005*, Tartu: University of Tartu Publisher, 2005: 195–230

Main Conferences

- “Analysis of National Master Narratives in Post-Imperial Space”, World War II and the (Re)Creation of Historical Memory in Contemporary Ukraine, Kyiv, September 2009
- “Explaining international identity conflict: clash of Estonian and Russian national master narratives”, Twenty Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Politics of Memory and Democratization in Europe, Riga, September 2009
- “Collective Memory Challenges in the Post-Soviet Interethnic Relations: the Case of Estonia”, WISC 2nd Global International Studies Conference What Keeps Us Apart, What Keeps Us Together?, Ljubljana, July 2008

- “Changing roles – Baltic States relations with Russia”, the 6th Convention of CEEISA “Global and Regional Governance – European Perspectives and Beyond”, Wrocław, May 2007
- “The Role of Non-Violent Resistance in Proclaiming Independence in Estonia”, Development of Democracy: Experience in the Baltic and Taiwan, Riga, August 2006
- “The gap between realities and policies: the Estonian response to asymmetric security threats”, International Symposium “Asymmetric Security Threats in the Era of Globalization”, Vienna, December 2005
- “Sõltuvuse mõõdistamine suurriiklikus poliitikas”, the 5th Annual Conference of Estonian Social Sciences, Tartu, November 2004
- “The role of EU New Members in Russian-European relations”, Actual Problems of Russian and EU relations, St. Petersburg, October 2004
- “The cooperation of border areas in transition: comparative study of the Estonian-Russian and the Russian-Finnish (Karelia) case”, Peipsi Cooperation Forum III, Tartu, August 2003
- “Väikeriikide välispoliitilise identiteedi kujundamine: Eesti Vabariigi ja Leedu Vabariigi 1990-ndate aastate näitel”, the 2nd Annual Conference of Estonian Social Sciences, Tartu, November 2001

Academic teaching

Courses on MA level

2010 State and Nation-Building in Russia
 2010 Historical Dynamics of European-Russian Relations
 2007, 2009 Baltic Sea States in the International Relation Systems
 2007 Challenges of Security, Modernization and Transition in the EU Neighbourhood Countries
 2007–2008, 2010 International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era
 2006–2007, 2009 International Relations in the Cold War Era
 2006–2007 History of Russian Empire (1700–1917)
 2005–2007, 2010 Political Transition in Central and Eastern Europe
 2005–2009 Foreign Policy of the Baltic States
 2005–2008 Social Science Concepts in European Studies

Courses on BA level

2005–2008 Political History of the Baltic States

ELULOOKIRJELDUS

Ees- ja perekonnanimi: Heiko Pääbo
Sünniaeg ja koht: 27.07.1979, Roosna-Alliku
Aadress, telefon, e-mail: Riia 17-3, Tartu; 52 290 35; heiko.paabo@ut.ee
Praegune töökoht: Tartu Ülikool Euroopa Kolledž, Venemaa ja Ida-Euroopa uuringute lektor/ Sotsiaal- ja haridus-teaduskond, Balti õpingute keskuse juhataja

Hariduskäik:

2005 Tartu Ülikool Riigiteaduste instituut, doktorant
2004 Tartu Ülikool politoloogia osakonn, MA
2001 Tartu Ülikooli politoloogia osakond, BA

Teenistuskäik:

2005–2008 Tartu Ülikool Euroopa kolledž, teadur/lektor
2004–2008 Tartu Ülikool Riigiteaduste instituut, õppeülesannete täitja
2003–2005 Balti Kaitsekolledž, akadeemiline assistent
2002–2005 Tartu Ülikooli Euroopa Kolledž, lepinguline lektor
2001–2003 Tartu Ülikool politoloogia osakond, õppetöö assistent
2000–2002 Tartu Laste ja Noorte Maja, väitlus- ja retoorika õpetaja
1999–2003 MTÜ Eesti Väitlusselts, nõukogu liige (2001–2002), projektijuht, avaliku kõne ja väitluse koolitaja, juhatuse liige (1999–2000)
1999 – 2002 Tartu Mart Reiniku Gümnaasium, väitlus- ja retoorikaõpetaja

Peamised uurimisvaldkonnad

Rahvusvahelised suhted: rahvusvaheliste suhete teooriad, Venemaa välis- ja geopoliitika, Balti riikide poliitika, siirdeuuringud, identiteedi- ja mälpoliitika, Venemaa, Ida- ja Kesk-Euroopa ajalugu ning nende representatsioonid

Olulisemad publikatsioonid

- “From an Eastern outpost in the West to an Western outpost in East: Transformation of Estonian Master Narrative”, Törnquist-Plewa, Barbara; Stala, Krzysztof (Toim.) *Cultural and Social Transformations after Communism: East Central Europe in Focus*, Lund-Malmö: Sekel (2011, ilmumas)
- “Eesti-Vene identiteedikonflikti võimalikkusest: rahvuslike ajaloonarratiivide kokkusobimatuses”, Kasekamp, Andres; Toomla, Rein; Tüür, Karmo (Toim.) *Politica*, Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2010: 84–111
- “Interaktiivsed õppemeetodid multikultuurilises klassiruumis: väljakutsed ja eelised”, Ehin, Piret; Gross, Toomas (Toim.). *Teaching in Multicultural Classroom*, Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2010: 69–86
- *Great Power’s Dependency Policies in a Geostrategic Subregion. Measuring Capability of the USA Policies in Central America and Russian Policies in the Baltic States*, Saarbrücken: Vdm Verlag Dr. Müller, 2009
- “War of Memories: Explaining “Memorials War” in Estonia”, *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, Vol 10, 2008: 5–28
- “The Gap between the “Social Realities” and Policies: the Estonian Ability to Response to the New Security Threats”, Schröfel, Jodef (Toim.) *Political Asymmetries in the Era of Globalization*, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien: P. Lang, 2007: 165–175
- “Balti riikide geopoliitilise tähenduse ajalooline kujunemine”, Toomla, Rein (Toim.) *RSRi kogumik Maailm 2005*, Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2005: 40–103
- Pääbo, Heiko; Tüür, Karmo “Eesti Venemaa-poliitika lähtealused” Toomla, Rein (Toim.), *RSRi kogumik Maailm 2005*, Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2005: 195–230

Olulisemad konverentsid

- “Analysis of National Master Narratives in Post-Imperial Space”, World War II and the (Re)Creation of Historical Memory in Contemporary Ukraine, Kiiev, september 2009
- “Explaining international identity conflict: clash of Estonian and Russian national master narratives”, Twenty Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Politics of Memory and Democratization in Europe, Riia, september 2009
- “Collective Memory Challenges in the Post-Soviet Interethnic Relations: the Case of Estonia”, WISC 2nd Global International Studies Conference What Keeps Us Apart, What Keeps Us Together?, Ljubljana, juuli 2008
- “Changing roles – Baltic States relations with Russia”, the 6th Convention of CEEISA “Global and Regional Governance – European Perspectives and Beyond”, Wrocław, mai 2007

- “The Role of Non-Violent Resistance in Proclaiming Independence in Estonia”, Development of Democracy: Experience in the Baltic and Taiwan, Riia, august 2006
- “The gap between realities and policies: the Estonian response to asymmetric security threats”, International Symposium “Asymmetric Security Threats in the Era of Globalization”, Viin, detsember 2005
- “Sõltuvuse mõõdistamine suurriiklikus poliitikas”, 5. Eesti Sotsiaalteaduste Aastakonverents, Tartu, november 2004
- “The role of EU New Members in Russian-European relations”, Actual Problems of Russian and EU relations, St. Peterburg, oktoober 2004
- “The cooperation of border areas in transition: comparative study of the Estonian-Russian and the Russian-Finnish (Karelia) case”, Peipsi Cooperation Forum III, Tartu, august 2003
- “Väikeriikide välispoliitilise identiteedi kujundamine: Eesti Vabariigi ja Leedu Vabariigi 1990-ndate aastate näitel”, 2. Eesti Sotsiaalteaduste Aastakonverents, Tartu, november 2001

Akadeemiline õppetöö

MA kursused

2010 Riigi ja rahvuse kujunemine Venemaal

2010 Euroopa-Venemaa suhete ajalooline dünaamika

2007, 2009 Läänemeremaad rahvusvaheliste suhete süsteemis

2007 EL naaberriikide julgeoleku, moderniseerumise ja siirdeprotsesside väljakutsed

2007–2008, 2010 Rahvusvahelised suhted külmasõjajärgsel ajastul

2006–2007, 2009 Rahvusvahelised suhted külma sõja ajastul

2006–2007 Vene impeeriumi ajalugu (1700–1917)

2005–2007, 2010 Poliitilised siirdeprotsessid Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopas

2005–2009 Balti riikide välispoliitika

2005–2008 Sotsiaalteaduste põhikontseptsioonid Euroopa uuringutes

BA kursused

2005–2008 Balti riikide poliitiline ajalugu (kaasõppejõud)

DISSERTATIONES RERUM POLITICARUM UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS

1. **Allan Sikk.** Highways to power: new party success in three young democracies. Tartu, 2006.
2. **Holger Mölder.** Cooperative security dilemma – practicing the hobbesian security culture in the Kantian security environment. Tartu, 2010.