Σημειωτική

Труды по знаковым системам

Töid märgisüsteemide alalt

36.2

University of Tartu

Sign Systems Studies

volume 36.2

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Translation and semiotics

Translation semiotics is on its way to becoming a discipline on its own. The present special issue does not aim to merge different ways of thinking about translation but instead to widen the field of thought and to highlight those keywords that would help us to understand translation activity better and to perceive the boundaries of translation semiotics.

The identity of translation semiotics as a discipline that has evolved in the contacts between translation studies and semiotics (of culture) can first be understood via mutual influences. Translation studies has already long ago turned to semiotics, and semiotics in its turn has made use of the concept of translation. It is natural that in the beginning, such processes bring about simplified treatments and terms become metaphorical. At the same time such metaphors enrich academic and critical thinking and have a significant role in the development of science.

Besides mutual contacts between two disciplines sometimes also the transdisciplinary aspect is important. The history of humanities and social sciences has always been accompanied by the fusion of historical sources: the same ideas have contributed to very different approaches. On the other hand new approaches look to history for support, or even receive their initial impulses for development from historical re-reading of certain authors or sources. Changes in the interdisciplinary field are accompanied by new historical relations, or in other words, overwriting of disciplinary histories.

A pioneer of translation semiotics and semiotranslation is Dinda Gorlée whose translation semiotics is based foremost on the deep familiarity with Charles Sanders Peirce's legacy but is also enriched with later authors in translation studies and semiotics (Roman Jakobson, Jiří Levý, Juri Lotman and others). While Peirce is already a "conceptualized" source for translation semiotics, the translation-focused re-reading of Jakobson has just only begun, and in the present issue almost all authors cover different aspects of his re-reading. Elin Sütiste creates an overview of the encyclopedic aspect of Jakobson's

academic reception, focusing on the translation-related observations regarding his legacy. Peeter Torop draws attention to the distinction between communication and autocommunication in Jakobson's works and relates this distinction to Lotman's semiotics of culture. This relation also refers to an important aspect of the social appreciation of translation activity.

Since Peirce was an important author for Jakobson both implicitly and explicitly, their relation is of special interest for translation semiotics, and Bruno Osimo continues Gorlée's work in comparing these two authors. Edna Andrews and Elena Maksimova offer an extended model of the communication act, based on the fundamental principles given in Jakobson, Sebeok and Lotman, in order to specify important moments of the translation process. Silvi Salupere focuses on the concept of translation in the works of Lotman and thus introduces a metaphorical use of the concept of translation in translation semiotics. A fundamental principle of Lotman's semiotics of culture is regarding culture as an educating system. Translation as a certain type of texts of culture takes part in this process of educating bearers of culture, and as an example of this process, George Rückert analyses the educational aspects of translation activity in the period of Romanticism.

Looking at the contributions to this special issue against a wider background, it is not very trivial that Jakobson's terms — inter- and intralinguistic and intersemiotic translation — are used to characterize the different sides of a single translation process. The understanding of the psychological and semiotic mechanism of the translation process will depend on the understanding of the hierarchical relations between these three aspects. Besides treating these three ways of translating separately, the analysis of their relatedness and the projection of this entire term complex onto Jakobson's whole legacy has therefore become perhaps even more important. Thus a reason has arisen to revise Jakobson's terminology.

Jakobson's communication model that is well known also in translation studies acquires a somewhat new meaning when we remind ourselves that for the creator of this model communication meant not only interpersonal, but also intrapersonal communication. Also in Lotman's semiotics of culture the differentiation between communication and autocommunication is relevant: in this view, culture is continuously analyzing, describing, educating, developing itself, and for that purpose, creating autocommunicative or self-models for itself.

These models are directed at generalizing the current situation in culture, explaining the necessity of change in culture, and developing theoretical possibilities — as today's theoretical model can already tomorrow be functional and practical. The entering of translations into culture and translation culture as an integral part of culture works according to the same principle. There are translations that support the existing situation and thus so to say belong to the culture's own repertoire, and then there are translations whose aim is to innovate culture. And of course there are also entirely "alien" translations that demonstrate the culture's capacity for translation and may acquire real contact with this culture only decades later. Translation activity is thus not only the mediation of natural languages and texts, but involves also creation of description languages and, with the help of this metalingual activity, organization of the relations between the own and the alien in culture.

The aim of this special issue is, on the one hand, to conceptualize disciplinary translation semiotics by expanding its boundaries, and on the other hand to bring to our attention such new relations in the history of science that may give new impulses to our contemporary science. By expanding the boundaries and revising history we can move towards disciplinary synthesis and begin talking more systematically of the disciplinary identity of translation semiotics.

Translation studies is a discipline studying translation and translating, and can define its identity facing the intersection between translation and translating. This intersection is the process of translation. If the object of translation studies is this process of translation, it can be analyzed and described. From the ontological viewpoint, the methodology of translation studies is based on the fact that no translation is fundamentally a unique text but one of many possibilities to render the original text. Original's singularity is thus in contrast with translation's plurality. From the epistemological viewpoint, this plurality requires a conceptual explanation or justification, which can be provided only by a theoretical model of translation process (see Torop 2007).

Besides translation's plurality, that is, the fundamental variability of translation texts, an important influence in the development of translation studies has been the movement towards "semioticalness" in the approach to language, the recognition of the semiotic nature of language. From the viewpoint of history of science, this means turning

to history in search of innovation, as it is Jakobson's understanding of translation as being of interlinguistic, intralinguistic and intersemiotic kinds that makes possible the widening of the notion of language in translation studies and the broadening of the methodological perspective of this discipline. Methodological interpretation of Jakobson's translation types brings also semiotic thought into translation studies and draws understanding of translation closer to understanding of communication in general.

Let us recall that for Jakobson the linguistic and semiotic aspects of communication are interrelated. An integrated science of communication in Jakobson's opinion contains three disciplinary levels: "1) Study in communication of verbal messages = linguistics; 2) study in communication of any messages = semiotics (communication of verbal messages implied); 3) study in communication = social anthropology jointly with economics (communication of messages implied)" (Jakobson 1967: 666). Jakobson in another article distinguishes only two sciences from a semantic point of view — a science of verbal signs or linguistics and a science of all possible signs or semiotics (Jakobson 1974: 99). The interest of contemporary translation studies in the semiotic and cultural problems involved in translation is a good example of how the filtration of some disciplines in others starts to influence disciplinary identities.

The movement of translation semiotics towards disciplinarity is related, on the one hand, to understanding the relevance of translation in classical semiotics, and it is characteristic that translation has entered the research interests of scholars studying Ch. S. Peirce. Translation and mediation processes are the general basis for understanding semiosis and thus the notion of translation is acquiring increasingly greater concreteness in semiotic methodology. On the other hand, semiotics and especially semiotics of culture realize the need for discerning and typology of translation processes. Translation semiotics itself can be regarded as a discipline that deals with mediation processes between various sign systems, and, on the macro level, with culture as a translation mechanism. Against this background, we can see the relevance of discerning various translation processes: semiotic aspects of ordinary interlinguistic translation (for example, problems of the semiotic coherence of the text), metatextual translation, in- and intertextual translation, and extratextual translation. This means that Jakobson's tripartition is not sufficient for discerning the cultural

variety of translation processes, although it has provided its conceptual basis. The ontology of translation semiotics rests on the recognition that culture works in many respects as a translation mechanism and that mediation in culture involves both communication and autocommunication. This means that translation semiotics is an important instrument in interpreting communication processes as cultural autocommunication. Culture translates itself to itself in order to constitute and keep its identity. The epistemology of translation semiotics is based on the distinction of sign systems' hierarchies, translatability and translation capacity, and the comparison with intertextual, transmedial and intersemiotic processes in culture. As such, translation semiotics responds to the interests of both translation studies and semiotics of culture, while at the same time shaping its own disciplinary identity.

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Semiospheric transitions:
A key to modelling translation

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Abstract. Lotman's contribution to semiotic theory, anthroposemiotics, the study of artistic texts and defining the relationship between language and culture represent some of the most powerful work produced within the Tartu–Moscow School of Semiotics. The importance of translation is one of the central principles that unites all of Lotman's work. In the following paper, we will consider Lotman's definition of translatability in the context of (1) the definition of semiospheric internal and external boundaries and the importance of crossing these boundaries, (2) the role of no fewer than two languages as a minimal unit of semiotic meaning-generation, (3) culture text-level generation of collective memory, and (4) the ever-present tension in the communication act. In our concluding section, we will offer an extended model of the communication act, based on the fundamental principles given in Jakobson, Sebeok and Lotman, in order to specify important moments of the translation process.

> *Ситуация, когда минимальной смыслопорож-
> дающей единицей является не один язык, а два,
> создает целую цепь последствий. Прежде всего,
> сама природа интеллектуального акта может
> быть описана в терминах* перевода, *определение
> значения — перевод с одного языка на другой,
> причем внеязыковая реальность мыслится так
> же, как некоторый* язык.

J. Lotman (1992a: 16)[1]

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[1] A situation in which the minimal meaning-generating unit is not one language, but two, creates a whole chain of consequences. First of all, even the nature of the intellectual act could be described in terms of the *translation*, a definition of meaning as a translation from one language to another, whereas extra-lingual reality may be regarded as yet another type of *language*.

Lotman's contribution to semiotic theory spans over four decades and has fundamentally changed the direction of structuralist approaches to the field of anthroposemiotics. In particular, it is Lotman's later works on the semiosphere and communication act models that are central to his contribution to a theory of translation. The focus of the following discussion will be to present the key concepts from Lotmanian theory that are pertinent to defining the translation-based properties of different types of communication and the generation of new meanings within the semiosphere.

Semiosphere and its boundaries

The Lotmanian focus on the analysis and construction of semiotic space required the development of a structural framework within which the process of the exchange of information, as well as degrees of information exchanged, could be explicated not only at the individual sign level, but at the system-based, network level. Such a space, which is a prerequisite for the semiotic act itself, was named the *semiosphere* (Lotman 1990: 123–124; 1992b: 12–13). The fundamental concepts associated with Lotman's semiosphere are:

(1) *heterogeneity* of the space, where the languages of the semiosphere are represented as a continuum that includes extremes of mutual untranslatability and complete mutual translatability (Lotman 1990: 125; 1992a: 14–16; 1992b: 11–24);

(2) *asymmetry* at multiple levels, including the internal structures, centre versus periphery and metalinguistic structures (Lotman 1990: 124–127; 1992a: 25–30; 1992b: 16–19);

(3) *binary distinctions* of internal and external spaces where these binary oppositions are pluralities (1990: 124; 1992b: 13–17);

(4) *boundedness* as the primary mechanism of semiosis where the boundaries themselves are most often defined as multiplicities of internal and external bilingual filters and membranes that facilitate permeability and fluidity and accelerate semiotic processes (Lotman 1990: 131–140; 1992b: 3–16);

(5) development of metalanguage is an inevitable resolution of a high level of organization of the semiosphere and facilitates self-description and the achievement of a higher level of organization,

especially in the core, central areas, which directly affects the rate of dynamic development and processing of new information (Lotman 1990: 128; 1992b: 16–17). Semiospheric space is in constant flux, but the rates of change are defined relative to the various internal subspaces of the semiosphere itself.

There is often a question about whether or not the spaces beyond the boundaries of a specific semiosphere are "non-semiotic". In fact, the semiotic paradigm would argue that while the perspective from within a particular semiospheric space may often cast the spaces beyond the boundary as chaotic and unorganized, all spaces that may potentially engage with and be perceived by the semiosphere are by definition *semiotic*. Following Uexküll, non-semiotic spaces, if they were to exist, would necessarily be closed systems, which are static and always unknowable. While Lotman himself does use the term "non-semiotic" (*несемиотическое*), we would suggest that Lotman is more focused on what he calls "foreign (or "other") semiotic" spaces (*иносемиотическое*) and its relationship with semiotic space (Lotman 1992b: 14). In fact, Lotman himself rejects similar terms in later works (cf. *инокультурность* is substituted for *некультурность*) in his work, "Theses Towards A Semiotics of Russian Culture" (Lotman 2002: 235–236).

One of the defining aspects of Lotman's semiosphere that is central to the current discussion on translation is the important role that **bilingual filters**, as components of the internal and external boundaries of the semiosphere, play in allowing a particular semiospheric space to come into contact with distinct and separate multiplicities of "foreign" semiotic spaces (Lotman 1992b: 13). It is the summation of bilingual translation filters that allows for the generation of new information, as well as the recycling of information from the past within the potentially infinite boundaries of internal semiotic space. And it is precisely the crossing over of internal and external semiospheric boundaries of multiple texts, which often appear to be untranslatable at first blush, that brings the most powerful realizations of new meanings within the semiosphere itself.

Signification and communication in action

The inevitability of translation at all levels of semiotic space is one of the central operating properties of Lotman's theory. In fact, the importance of translation for the generation of meanings and as a fundamental part of perception itself are tenets common to both Lotman's anthroposemiotic theory and Uexküll's biosemiotic theory of the *Umwelt* (Uexküll 1982). When we recall Lotman's definition of the semiosphere

> the semiotic space necessary for the existence and functioning of languages, not the sum total of different languages; in a sense the semiosphere has a prior existence and is in constant interaction with languages...a generator of information. (Lotman 1990: 123, 127)

it is imperative to remember that the minimal meaning-generating unit is *at least* **two** languages (Lotman 1992a: 16). By rejecting the possibility of semiotic space based on a single language, Lotman calls for a communication act that structurally reflects this minimum requirement. Lotman selects Jakobson's communication act model of six factors and six functions (Jakobson 1987 [1960]: 66–71) as the starting point in building the mechanism for communication within the semiosphere (see Figure 1). Jakobson's model is a dynamic representation of the minimum number of factors and functions that

CONTEXT
(REFERENTIAL FUNCTION)

ADRESSER   MESSAGE   ADRESSEE
(EMOTIVE F-N)   (POETIC F-N)   (CONATIVE F-N)

CONTACT
(PHATIC F-N)

CODE
(METALINGUAL F-N)

R. Jakobson

Figure 1. Jakobson's communication act model of six factors and six functions (adapted from Jakobson 1987: 66–71).

are present in each and every speech act; each of these factors and functions are in a hierarchical relationship defined by constant internal renegotiation of dominance within each individual act.

For Lotman, all communication, as well as any and all cultural acts, are semiotic and as such, require some form of translation in order for meaning to be potentially generated. By using Jakobson's model as a basis for describing the communication act with the modification of (at least) **doubling** the factors and functions, Lotman demonstrates the inherent diversity of the minimal meaning-generating units of the semiosphere.[2]

One of the consequences of Lotman's doubling of the fundamental features of the communication act is the central role played by translation from the simplest level of the communication act to the most complex level of semiospheric metatexts (Lotman 1992a: 16). There can be no communication act of any sort as a singular event; rather, all individual communication acts are dialogic in essence and require translation both as an internal mechanism of signification, as well as an external mechanism of signification and communication. However, while such an approach guarantees translation mechanisms, it does not guarantee the achievement of a coherent, meaningful result:

[...] non-comprehension (conversation in languages which are not fully identical) reveals itself to be just as valuable a meaning-making mechanism as comprehension.[3] (Lotman 1992a: 16)

Defining collective memory

Semiotic approaches to the study of culture are often preoccupied with the construction and maintenance of the *non-hereditary collective memory* that is central to the definition and identity of cultural spaces and their languages. It is interesting to note that one may now find similar trends in the cognitive sciences and the study of human memory. Steven Rose, for example, consistently points out the

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[2] Sebeok (1991: 29) also contributes a modification to the Jakobsonian commu-nication act model where the factor of *context* is doubled and is given both **within** the communication act and **surrounding** the entire event.

[3] [...] непонимание (разговор на неполностью идентичных языках) пред-ставляется столь же ценным смысловым механизмом, что и понимание.

importance of the interaction between collective and individual memory systems: "Individual our memories may be, but they are structured, their very brain mechanisms affected, by the collective, social nature of the way we as humans live" (Rose 1992: 60).

Collective memory is a mechanism for self-preservation and cultural propagation. Lotman's perspectives on the importance of oral and written culture texts as the basis for collective memory make an important contribution to our understanding of the role of language in this equation. Specifically, Lotman points out how written texts and the process of writing shift the burden of memory from the individual to an external symbolic system that is collectively maintained, while oral texts places a greater burden on individual memory systems (Lotman 1990: 246–247). In essence, language becomes the symbolic *condenser* between the varying levels of semiosis, as well as different segments of the time axis (Lotman 1990: 110). By combining the forces of collective memory and collective intellect, Lotman is able to construct a model of culture in which knowledge is maintained and transferred through time, and the actualization of codified information, as well as new information, are guaranteed (Lotman 1992b: 200, Andrews 2003: 157).

Tension and the communication act

Lotman's contribution of the importance of *tension* and *explosion* as important mechanisms of dynamic change within the semiosphere also play a central role in defining the individual level of speech acts and communication. Specifically, Lotman points to (1) the tension given in the asymmetric roles of the participants of the communication act and (2) the intersection, not identity, of the codes and memories implemented in communication acts (Lotman 1992a: 12–14). Lotman clearly explains the problem of two contradictory *tensions* that is produced in any given communication act:

> [...] whilst a specific intersection between these spaces is admitted, at the same time an intersection between two contradictory tendencies appears: the struggle to facilitate understanding, which will always attempt to extend the area of the intersection, and the struggle to amplify the value of the communication, which is linked to the tendency of maximally amplifying the difference between *A* and *B*. Thus, in normal lingual communication it is necessary

to introduce the concept of tension, some form of resistance, which the spaces *A* and *B* use to oppose one another. (Lotman 1992a: 14)[4]

Lotman goes on to argue that the "translation of the untranslatable turns out to be the carrier of highly valuable information" («перевод непереводимого оказывается носителем информации высокой ценности») (Lotman 1992a: 15). One could argue that Lotman creates a relative category of *untranslatability*, where in the end, everything is potentially translatable; however, extracting information and new meanings from these less accessible textual spaces increases the value of the content of the utterance. Furthermore, Lotman continues to remind us that the semiotic process does not guarantee a veridical outcome. Misunderstanding and breakdown in communication are as important as successful transmissions (Lotman 1992b: 18, Andrews 2003: 47–48).[5] As mentioned above, "misunderstanding [...] is as valuable a meaning-generating mechanism as understanding" (Lotman 1992a: 16).

Translation, translatability and the communication act model

Roman Jakobson's famous work entitled "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation" (Jakobson 1971 [1959]: 260–266) is often cited in works dealing with translation theory. Jakobson's triad of primary translation modes includes **intralingual**, **interlingual** and **intersemiotic**. The central points of his work include a focus on code-based categories, both grammatical and lexical, and the impossibility of generating true equivalences in the translation process (Jakobson 1971: 261–265).

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[4]   [...] допускается определенное пересечение этих пространств и одновременно пересечение двух противоборствующих тенденций: стремление к облегчению понимания, которое будет постоянно пытаться расширить область пересечения, и стремление к увеличению ценности сообщения, что связано с тенденцией максимально увеличить различие между *А* и *В*. Таким образом, в нормальное языковое общение необходимо ввести понятие напряжения, некоего силового сопротивления, которое пространства *А* и *В* оказывают друг другу.

[5]   Lotman's autocommunication (*автокоммуникация*) also plays a significant role in the generation of new meaning. For a thorough discussion of this phenomenon, see Andrews (2003: 28–33).

Lotman's doubling of the minimal kernel of the communication act also impacts the distinction between *intralingual* and *interlingual* translation, where *intralingual* moves toward (or even merges with) *interlingual* since there is no longer the option for only *one language* to exist; rather, the semiosphere requires at least two language. We may understand these languages on a variety of different levels: (1) the languages of the internal spaces of the semiosphere and the surrounding languages and spaces in which the semiosphere is embedded; (2) the fundamental distinction of I–I and I–s/he models of communication. As we mentioned in the previous section, Lotman often mentions spaces of untranslatability within subsections of the semiosphere:

> Semiotic space appears before us as the multi-layered intersection of various texts, which are woven together in a specific layer characterized by complex internal relationships and variable degrees of translatability and spaces of untranslatability.[6] (Lotman 1992a: 42)

Once again, it is necessarily the case that the internally distinct and bounded areas within the semiosphere are always potentially translatable. However, Lotman is reminding us that in the diachronic view of cultural spaces and texts, there may indeed be pockets of information that are no longer accessible to the contemporary cultural space due to a breakdown in knowledge of the codes of those internal spaces.

In order to contextualize the above discussion into a practical realization that can facilitate the translation process itself, especially with regard to the different types of *cultural, semiotic and semiospheric transpositions* that obligatorily occur within any cultural space, the authors propose a model that fully develops the notion of a minimum of two sets of factors and functions. By envisioning more than one **addresser, addressee, context, contact, code and message** (AACCCM), the notion of producing a target text (TT) with its own unique set of factors (that are necessarily different from the factors given by a source text (ST)) allows us to focus on the realistic outcomes of the translation process by reiterating the fact that each

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[6] Семиотическое пространство предстает перед нами как многослойное пересечение различных текстов, вместе складывающихся в определенный пласт, со сложными внутренними соотношениями, разной степенью переводимости и пространствами непереводимости.

type of source text is generated from a specific set of factors (AACCCM), which must be **recreated** as a new set of features, including a different internal hierarchy, in any derived target text.

The fundamental goals of this hybrid communication act model include (1) minimizing the differences between the ST and TT, (2) reinforcing the importance of the **dynamic**, not static, entities that generate any text or communication act, and (3) demonstrating that communication acts are always present as textual *ensembles*.

The outline below is an example of how shifting internal hierarchies (where one or more factors may be dominant) between ST and TT may yield different types of translation:

1. **Source Text [ST]** (consisting of *addresser, addressee, context, contact, code, message [AACCCM]*) with an emphasis on *doubling of the CODE* results in a **Target Text [TT]** dominated by a maximal source-culture bias, often resulting in *literal* translation. (In other words, the focus of the translation process is to preserve the original code (C_1) of the ST as much as possible in the new (and different) code of the TT (C_2). The bias is to keep C_2 (the **dominant** factor of the TT) as close to C_1 as possible.)

2. ST (**AACCCM**) with an emphasis on *doubling of the CODE and MESSAGE* results in a TT characteristic of *faithful* translation. (Here, code and message are dominant factors in generating the TT.)

3. ST (**AACCCM**) with an emphasis on *doubling of the CODE, MESSAGE and ADDRESSER* results in a TT characteristic of *balanced* translation.

4. ST (**AACCCM**) with an emphasis on *doubling of the CODE, MESSAGE, ADDRESSER and ADDRESSEE* results in a TT characteristic of *idiomizing* translations.

5. ST (**AACCCM**) with a *doubling of all six factors* yields a TT dominated by maximal target-culture bias, often resulting in *free* translation.

Thus, the hierarchy of the factors of the communication act and the **doubling effect** directly impact the type of translation that will result.

Such a model of translation, which is an extension of the Jakobson/ Lotman models, makes a strong argument with regard to the importance of cultural information within a text and how it is nonsensical to attempt to speak of a text that is devoid of cultural information.

Lotman's contribution to the study of the interaction of language and culture and the structural mechanisms that define this interaction have significantly changed the field of semiotics not only in terms of the discipline itself, but in its ability to provide principles of analysis that are relevant across those disciplines that are engaged in elucidating the dynamic and complex interactions between language and culture.

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Перемещение в семиосфере:
ключ к моделированию процесса перевода

Научные труды Ю. М. Лотмана затрагивают множество важнейших тем в области теории семиотики, в изучении и анализе художественного текста и в определении соотношения языка и культуры. Центральную роль в лотмановских работах играет концепция перевода, как объединяющий принцип его теории семиосферы. В данном анализе рассматриваются определения перевода и переводимости в контексте семиотической отграниченности (особенно учитывая специфику «семиотической границы»); многоязычность семиотического пространства и, в том числе, пространства, в которое погружена сама семиосфера; роль коллективной памяти и минимальные составляющие коммуникативного акта. В заключение предлагается моделирование разных типов перевода, основанное на базовых принципах коммуникативного акта, описанного в работах Якобсона, Себеока и Лотмана.

Semiosfäärilised ülekanded: võti tõlke modelleerimiseks

Juri Lotmani teadustööd hõlmavad paljusid semiootika teooria, kunstiteksti uurimise ja analüüsi ning keele ja kultuuri vahekorra määratlemisega seotud teemasid. Semiosfääri teooriat ühendaval tõlke kontseptsioonil on Lotmani töödes keskne roll. Artiklis vaadeldakse tõlke ja tõlgitavuse mõisteid semiootilise piiritletuse kontekstis (eelkõige "semiootilise piiri" spetsiifikast lähtuvalt), samuti semiootilise ruumi mitmekeelsust, kollektiivmälu rolli ja kommunikatsiooniakti minimaalseid osiseid. Pakutakse välja mudel erinevate tõlketüüpide eristamiseks, mis põhineb kommunikatsiooniakti neil alusprintsiipidel, mida on kirjeldanud oma töödes Roman Jakobson, Thomas Sebeok ja Juri Lotman.

Roman Jakobson and the topic of translation:
Reception in academic reference works

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Abstract. The article describes and analyses connections established between Roman Jakobson's scholarly legacy and the topic of translation in a selection of academic reference works. The aim in doing so is twofold: first, to look beyond the conventionalised image of Jakobson as an influential scholar for several disciplines, such as translation studies, linguistics and semiotics, and to provide an overview of the actual reception of his ideas on the level of general academic knowledge as presented by scholarly reference works in these fields. Another aim is to find out whether and how Jakobson's ideas on translation are seen to relate to his other ideas concerning language and communication. It appears that — while there also exist some differences field-wise as well as among individual reference works — the general reception of Jakobson is based predominantly on just two of his articles (out of his overall legacy of several hundred works) and to a large extent ignores the inner logic of Jakobson's thought as it manifests in his different works (i.e. there are few connections made between his ideas expressed in his different works).

Introduction

Roman Jakobson seems to have had a somewhat uncanny ability to predict some future developments of the sciences he was involved or interested in. At the Symposium on Structure of Language and its Mathematical Aspects in the year 1960 Jakobson made the following statement: "Besides encoding and decoding, also the procedure of recoding, code switching, briefly, the various facets of translation, is becoming one of the focal concerns both of linguistics and of

communication theory" (Jakobson 1971 [1961]: 576). This statement proved to be prophetic, to the point that about a decade after Jakobson's pronouncement there emerged a special field for studying the "various facets of translation" — modern translation studies.

Jakobson has acquired the status of a highly influential scholar for many disciplines, including linguistics, semiotics, as well as translation studies; there have been written volumes discussing and elaborating Jakobson's works. However, on the first glance it seems that surprisingly little has been written on how Jakobson's general views on language and communication relate to his ideas on translation — which could be relevant for a better understanding of Jakobson's contribution to all the fields concerned.

The aim of the present article is to test this impression and to describe and analyse connections established between Jakobson and the topic of translation, focusing on a selection of works that by their definition strive for a balanced, wide and full coverage of a subject — articles in academic reference works[1]. Since the primary interest behind this article is to find out whether and how Jakobson's ideas on translation are seen to relate to his other ideas concerning language and communication, the focus here is on articles dealing with Jakobson and translation in encyclopedias representing three disciplines: linguistics, semiotics, and translation studies; my aim has been to consult three encyclopedias from each field.

Overview of the material

As to the choice of encyclopedias, two principles have been followed: to consult such reference works that (1) are considered representative of the field and (2) are comparable with respect to the time of their publication. Thus, in regard to publication time, all three fields are represented by encyclopedias from 1990s to 2000s. As to the principle of representativeness, the field of translation studies currently offers only two general and comprehensive encyclopedic reference works — Baker (1998) and Kittel *et al.* (2004). Due to this, the aim of con-

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[1]   These are mostly encyclopedias, although among actual titles there are also two "international handbooks" and one "encyclopedic dictionary". For the sake of brevity, in the following I will refer to all of them as "encyclopedias".

sulting three encyclopedias from the field cannot be met in translation studies. In semiotics, general reference works are not very numerous either; of these Sebeok (1994 [1986]), Bouissac (1998), and Posner *et al.* (1997–2004) have been chosen here on the grounds that these works are well established in the field and although being composed under the supervision of one or more editors, the articles have been written by an extensive group of contributors (for instance, Winfried Nöth's excellent *Handbook of Semiotics* (1995) has been left aside on the grounds that it represents essentially one man's view of the discipline). Of the three fields, linguistics is the most established and this is accordingly reflected also in the large number of reference works ranging from student-oriented one-volume works to scholarly multivolume publications. Of this variety, three works of several volumes have been chosen for the present article: Bright (1992), Asher (1994), and Brown (2006).

With regard to encyclopedias of linguistics and semiotics, the procedure was to locate articles written on Roman Jakobson and articles written on the topic of translation, and the next step was to ascertain which of these articles relate Jakobson and the topic of translation, i.e., which articles on Jakobson contain mentions of the topic of translation, and which articles on translation contain references to Jakobson. The data are displayed in the tables below.

Table 1 presents the data for linguistics encyclopedias.

Table 1. Number of articles on Roman Jakobson (R.J.) and on the topic of translation (TR; in white cells on the left side), articles relating Jakobson and the topic of translation (in grey cells on the right side), and articles not relating Jakobson and the topic of translation (in the right end column of the table) in linguistics encyclopedias.

LINGUISTICS	On R.J.	On TR	Total	On R.J. incl. TR	On TR incl. R.J.	Relating R.J. & TR	Not relating R.J. & TR
Bright 1992	1	1	2	0	0	0	2
Asher 1994	1	11	12	0	4	4	8
Brown 2006	2	17	19	0	1	1	18
Total	4	29	33	0	5	5	28

As is shown in the Table 1, in Bright's (1992) encyclopedia of linguistics there is 1 article on Jakobson (abbreviated as "R.J." in the table) and 1 article on the topic of translation (abbreviated as "TR" in the table), but neither does the article on Jakobson contain any mention of the topic of translation (referred to as "art-s on R.J. incl. TR" in the table) nor does the article on translation contain any mention of Jakobson (referred to as "art-s on TR incl. R.J." in the table). In Asher's (1994) encyclopedia there is 1 article on Jakobson and 11 articles on translation; among the latter, there are 4 that also mention Jakobson and thus relate the two subjects. In Brown's (2006) encyclopedia there are 2 articles on Jakobson (more precisely, one is on Jakobson's theory of sign) and 17 articles on the topic of translation. Among the latter there is one that mentions also Jakobson. To sum up: in all three linguistics encyclopedias, of the 4 articles focusing on Jakobson none contain any references to the topic of translation, and among the 29 articles focusing on the topic of translation there are all together 5 that contain references to Jakobson. Among the three linguistics encyclopedias there is one (Bright's) that does not connect Jakobson and the topic of translation at all.[2] In other words, of the total 33 articles that could, in principle, connect Jakobson and the topic of translation, the majority — 28 articles — do not do that. Only a small segment, 5 articles (about one-seventh or 15% of all the articles) connect the two subjects. Later below, a closer look will be taken at these 5 articles that make a connection between Jakobson and the topic of translation.

Table 2 shows the data for semiotics encyclopedias.

In Sebeok's (1994 [1986]) encyclopedic dictionary, there is 1 article on Jakobson (that also mentions the topic of translation) and 1 article on the topic of translation (that also mentions Jakobson). Bouissac's (1998) encyclopedia contains 2 articles on Jakobson (more precisely, one is focused on Jakobson's model of communication) and none on the topic of translation. Neither of the 2 articles on Jakobson mentions the topic of translation. The handbook by Posner *et al.* (1997–2004) contains 1 article on Jakobson (that also contains a mention of the topic of translation) and 1 article on the topic of translation (making reference also to Jakobson). Thus, among the

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[2]   Of course, this conclusion applies only within the limits of articles observed here.

three semiotics encyclopedias there is one (Bouissac's) that does not make any connection between Jakobson and the topic of translation; furthermore, this encyclopedia does not contain any entry on the topic of translation at all. On the contrary, the other two semiotics encyclopedias (Sebeok's and Posner's) contain articles on translation as well as on Jakobson, with both articles on translation referring also to Jakobson, and both articles on Jakobson referring also to the topic of translation. All together, of the 6 articles that could, in principle, connect Jakobson with the topic of translation, two-thirds (or 66%) take this opportunity. Later below, a closer look will be taken at the 4 articles in semiotics encyclopedias that make a connection between Jakobson and the topic of translation.

Table 2. Number of articles on Roman Jakobson (R.J.) and on the topic of translation (TR; in white cells on the left side), articles relating Jakobson and the topic of translation (in grey cells on the right side), and articles not relating Jakobson and the topic of translation (in the right end column of the table) in semiotics encyclopedias.

SEMIOTICS	On R.J.	On TR	Total	On R.J. incl. TR	On TR incl. R.J.	Relating R.J. & TR	Not relating R.J. & TR
Sebeok 1994	1	1	2	1	1	2	0
Bouissac 1998	2	0	2	0	0	0	2
Posner *et al.* 1997–2004	1	1	2	1	1	2	0
Total	4	2	6	2	2	4	2

Table 3 presents the data for translation studies encyclopedias.

While in encyclopedias of linguistics and semiotics Jakobson and translation form just two topics among a great variety of subjects, in the case of translation studies encyclopedias the situation is somewhat different as all articles deal by definition with the topic of translation. Thus it can be said that all 112 articles in Baker's (1998) encyclopedia and all 106 articles in the handbook by Kittel *et al.* (2004) deal with the topic of translation. There are no articles dedicated specifically to Jakobson in neither reference work; however, 11 articles in Baker's encyclopedia and 24 articles in the handbook by Kittel *et al.* contain

references to Jakobson. In other words, of the total of 218 articles in the two translation studies encyclopedias all together 35 or about one-sixth (16%) connect Jakobson with the topic of translation. Later below more attention will be paid to these 35 articles in translation studies encyclopedias that connect Jakobson with the topic of translation.

Table 3. Number of articles on Roman Jakobson (R.J.) and on the topic of translation (TR; in white cells on the left side), articles relating Jakobson and the topic of translation (in grey cells on the right side), and articles not relating Jakobson and the topic of translation (in the right end column of the table) in translation studies encyclopedias.

TRANSLATION STUDIES	On R.J.	On TR	Total	On R.J. incl. TR	On TR incl. R.J.	Relating R.J. & TR	Not relating R.J. & TR
Baker 1998	0	112	112	0	11	11	101
Kittel *et al.* 2004	0	106	106	0	24	24	82
Total	0	218	218	0	35	35	183

To sum up what has been said so far: of the three sets of encyclopedias, semiotics encyclopedias, although containing the least number of articles on the topic of translation (2 articles), has the largest percentage (66%) of articles that connect Jakobson and the topic of translation.

Neither linguistics nor translation studies encyclopedias contain such articles on Jakobson that would also refer to the topic of translation. However, both sets of encyclopedias have articles on translation, including a small section of such (15–16%) that also mention Jakobson. Table 4 brings together the general data in all three sets of encyclopedias.

Table 4. The overall number of articles on Jakobson and on the topic of translation (left-hand column), articles connecting Jakobson with the topic of translation (middle column), and articles not connecting the two subjects (right-hand column) in linguistics, semiotics, and translation studies encyclopedias.

	Total No of art-s on R.J. and/or on TR	Total No of art-s relating R.J. & TR	Total No of art-s not relating R.J. & TR
LINGUISTICS	33	5	28
SEMIOTICS	6	4	2
TRANSLATION STUDIES	218	35	183
Total	257	44	213

Thus, it can be said that in the three sets of encyclopedias, of all the articles on Jakobson that could in principle refer also to the topic of translation and of all the articles on translation that could in principle refer also to Jakobson (all in all 257 articles), the great majority (213 articles, that is 83%) do not connect the two topics and only a fairly small segment (44 articles, that is 17%) does that. In the following discussion, only the last portion, that is, only the articles where some kind of connection is made between Jakobson and the topic of translation will be examined more closely. This also means that out of the initial three reference works in linguistics and semiotics, now only two encyclopedias are left from either field. Linguistics is represented by the total of 5 encyclopedia articles, semiotics by 4, and translation studies by 35 articles in which some relation between Jakobson and the topic of translation has been established.

1. Connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation in linguistics encyclopedias

In this section, a closer look will be taken at the details and nature of connections established between Jakobson and the topic of translation in linguistics encyclopedias. Summary of this data is presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Number of articles and references to Jakobson in linguistics encyclopedias. "OLA" = *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (Jakobson 1966 [1959]); "LaP" = *Linguistics and Poetics* (Jakobson 1971 [1960]).

LINGUISTICS	No of articles					No of references				
	Art-s referring to "OLA"	Art-s referring to "LaP"	Art-s referring to R.J.'s other works	Art-s with general ref-s to R.J.	Total no of art-s referring to R.J.	Ref-s to "OLA"	Ref-s to "LaP"	Ref-s to R.J.'s other works	General ref-s to R.J.	Total ref-s to R.J.
Asher 1994	4	1	0	0	4	6	2	0	0	8
Brown 2006	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	2
Total:	5	2	0	0	5	7	3	0	0	10

The left side of the table shows how many articles in the linguistics encyclopedias connect Jakobson and the topic of translation, and the right side of the table shows how many times such a connection is made.[3] This means that, for example, in one encyclopedia article there may occur more than one reference and to more than one work of Jakobson (which also explains why the numbers on the left side of the table need not add up).

The 5 articles that make a connection between Jakobson and translation are all from among those that focus on the topic of translation, not on Jakobson; 4 of them are from Asher's (1994) encyclopedia, 1 from Brown's (2006) encyclopedia. In these 5 articles, Jakobson's name comes up in total 10 times; all these 10 references and allusions[4] are made in relation to Jakobson's two articles: *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (Jakobson 1966 [1959]; abbreviated as "OLA" in Table 5; all together 7 references) and *Linguistics and Poetics* (Jakobson 1971 [1960]; abbreviated as "LaP" in Table 5; all together 3 references). There are no other references to Jakobson or to any of his other works. As can be seen in Table 5, the majority of connections (8 out of 10) established between Jakobson and the topic of translation are made in the 4 articles of Asher's encyclopedia (1994), and most of these connections are related to references to Jakobson's article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (6 references out of the total 10).

1.1. References to *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* in articles on translation in linguistics encyclopedias

In the articles on translation in linguistics encyclopedias, Jakobson's work *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* is referred or alluded to in the following cases:

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[3] It needs to be spelled out that the connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation both in the articles examining some topic related to translation and in the articles dedicated to Jakobson's contribution are made mainly via references or allusions to Jakobson's works.

[4] Here and in the following I will make a distinction between referring (*resp.* reference) and alluding (*resp.* allusion): "allusion" indicates instances where the author of an article mentions and/or describes another author's idea(s) without giving explicit information of the source (even if the source author's name is mentioned). "Reference" implies that the specific source (the work in which the idea referred to can be found) is also included. In the table, for the sake of brevity only the word "references" is used, although this includes allusions as well.

(a) Recording Jakobson's observation with regard to the nature of interlingual relations and differences among languages (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 236): "As Jakobson (1959: 236) has cogently pointed out 'languages differ essentially in what they *must* convey and not in what they *may* convey,' and this characteristic is of cardinal importance in translation". — 1 reference (Catford 1994: 4743).[5]

(b) While describing Walter Benjamin's ideas on translation, alluding to Jakobson's idea that poetry is by definition untranslatable (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 238). One example: "[…] 'poetic principle' which prompted Jakobson to say that only creative transposition, not translation was possible where 'poetic art' is concerned" (Hyde 1994: 4729). — 2 allusions (Hyde 1994: 4728, 4729).

(c) When discussing the topic of equivalence, alluding to Jakobson's treatment of the saying "*Traduttore, traditore*" (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 238): "But as translatability is effected by attempts at equivalence, one can only judge its limits through Roman Jakobson's exegesis of the tag, *Traduttore, traditore*: what are the values the translator is forced to betray in a given text." — 1 allusion (Kelly 1994: 4681).

(d) Referring to Jakobson's distinction between three kinds of translation (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 233):

> Translation is thus characterized as 'interlingual translation' or 'translation proper.' This can be clearly distinguished from 'intralingual translation' or 'rewording' ('interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs in the same language') and from 'intersemiotic translation' or 'transmutation' that is, 'interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems' (Jakobson 1959: 233). (Wilss 1994: 4751)

— 1 reference (Wilss 1994: 4751).

(e) Referring to Jakobson's concept of "equivalence in difference" (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 233–234). One example:

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[5] Where possible, actual quotes from articles showing the connection between Jakobson and the topic of translation will be included. However, due to the limits of space, in the case of longer discussions my resumes will be provided instead.

> Creativity is presumably a combination of original transfer strategies in one or more translation-relevant textual domains, coupled with a seasoned feeling for contextually determined 'dynamic equivalence' in Nida's (1964) sense or 'equivalence in difference' in Jakobson's (1959) sense. (Wilss 1994: 4750)

— 2 references (Wilss 1994: 4750; Malmkjær 2006: 414–415).

To sum up, the topics in Jakobson's article *On linguistic aspects of translation* referred to in the articles of linguistics encyclopedias include

(1) Jakobson's view on the question of translatability, especially with regard to the dominance of the 'poetic principle' (3 allusions);

(2) One of Jakobson's central topics throughout his oeuvre — invariance in variance, here in the form of 'equivalence in difference' (2 references);

(3) Jakobson's often-quoted observation that the differences among languages with respect to what they must express are greater than differences with regard to what they may express (1 reference); and

(4) Jakobson's distinction between three kinds of translation (1 reference).

1.2. References to *Linguistics and Poetics* in articles on translation in linguistics encyclopedias

In linguistics encyclopedias, 3 connections out of the total 10 between Jakobson and the topic of translation are established via references to Jakobson's article *Linguistics and Poetics*, which is referred or alluded to in the following instances:

(a) In connection with discussing literary translation, alluding to Jakobson's concept of 'poetic principle' (Jakobson 1971 [1960]: 358). One example:

> His [= Sapir's — *E. S.*] interesting confusion is very germane to literary translation, since it may be described as a structuralist reading of '*parole*' as if it were '*langue*.' By means of a process rather like Jakobson's 'poetic function' […] the principle of equivalence has been shifted from the axis of selection to the axis of combination […]. (Hyde 1994: 4729)

— 2 allusions (both at Hyde 1994: 4729).

(b) Mentioning Jakobson's model of communication (Jakobson 1971 [1960]: 353) when discussing the dimensions of communication that the translator needs to be aware of: "His [= Nida's — *E. S.*] list of components of the communicative act is strongly reminiscent of Jakobson's enumeration of the factors involved in verbal communication (Jakobson, 1960: 66) [...]". — 1 reference (Malmkjær 2006: 412).

Although there are only three mentions of one of Jakobson's most famous works *Linguistics and Poetics* in the articles of linguistics encyclopedias, they evoke the two ideas that have been central in drawing so much attention to this article:
   (1) Jakobson's concept of poetic function (2 allusions), and
   (2) his model of communication (1 reference).

1.3. Summary: connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation in linguistics encyclopedias

The connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation in linguistics encyclopedias can be summed up as follows:

(a) In linguistics encyclopedias, there are all together 5 articles that contain in total 10 references/allusions to Jakobson. In these 5 articles, Jakobson himself is nowhere the figure of focus; his ideas are paid attention to in the context of discussing some other issue.

(b) The 5 articles in linguistics encyclopedias refer/allude to two of Jakobson's works: *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (1966 [1959]) and *Linguistics and Poetics* (1971 [1960]).

(c) Jakobson's contributions that have been judged relevant to refer/ allude to in relation to translation include
   (1) the poetic function and its influence on translatability (5 references/allusions);
   (2) the issue of 'equivalence in difference' in communication (2 references);
   (3) the observation with regard to the differences among languages: what they must express and what they may express (1 reference);
   (4) Jakobson's communication model (1 reference); and

(5) the distinction between three kinds of translation (1 reference). Half of the references/allusions (5 out of 10) deal with the issues of (the translatability of) texts in which poetic function is dominant. In sum, it can be said that although only two works (albeit of central importance) of Jakobson's extensive oeuvre have been used, the references/allusions in the 5 articles do not focus on just one or two ideas but instead give a rather broad overview of Jakobson's contribution.

2. Connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation in semiotics encyclopedias

In this section, a closer look will be taken at the details and nature of connections established between Jakobson and the topic of translation in semiotics encyclopedias. Summary of this data is presented below in Table 6.

Among the 4 articles (data on the articles is presented on the left side of Table 6) that make a connection between Jakobson and the topic of translation, 2 focus on Jakobson (Waugh, Rudy 1998; Eco 1994) and the other 2 focus on the topic of translation (Lambert, Robyns 2004; Schogt, Toury, Niklas 1994). In the articles focusing on the topic of translation, there are all together 9 references to Jakobson (data on the references is presented on the right side of Table 6). In the articles focusing on Jakobson but bringing up also the topic of translation, there are all together 8 references to his works in the contexts of discussing translation-related issues (in other words, articles focusing on Jakobson deal with a variety of topics besides translation but references to Jakobson's works in these contexts are not taken into account here). While there is in total only 1 reference to Jakobson's article *Linguistics and Poetics*, all 4 articles make at least 2 references each to *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation*, and 3 articles out of 4 refer also to some other Jakobson's works. There are no such general or unspecified references to Jakobson's ideas whose source would be difficult to identify. All in all in these 4 articles connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation are made 17 times, of which more than half (9 out of 17) are related to his article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation*.

Table 6. Number of articles and references relating Jakobson and the topic of translation in semiotics encyclopedias. "OLA" = *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (Jakobson 1966 [1959]); "LaP" = *Linguistics and Poetics* (Jakobson 1971 [1960]).

SEMIOTICS		No of articles					No of references				
		Art-s referring to "OLA"	Art-s referring to "LaP"	Art-s referring to R.J.'s other works	Art-s with general ref-s to R.J.	Total no of art-s referring to R.J.	Ref-s to "OLA"	Ref-s to "LaP"	Ref-s to R.J.'s other works	General ref-s to R.J.	Total ref-s to R.J.
Sebeok 1994	Art. on R.J. incl. TR	1	0	1	0	1	2	0	2	0	4
	Art. on TR incl. R.J.	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	3	0	6
Posner *et al.* 1997–2004	Art. on R.J. incl. TR	1	0	1	0	1	2	0	2	0	4
	Art. on TR incl. R.J.	1	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	3
	Total:	4	1	3	0	4	9	1	7	0	17

2.1. References to *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* in articles on Jakobson and translation in semiotics encyclopedias

In the encyclopedia articles focusing on Jakobson, *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* is referred to in the following cases:

(a) Pointing out Jakobson's inspiration in Charles S. Peirce's notion that the essence of a sign is its interpretation, that is, translation by some further sign, which in other words means that translation is regarded as an essential aspect of semiotic activity, since *signatum* of a sign is that which is interpretable, translatable and can be regarded as Peircean interpretant (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 232–233). One example: "[…] Jakobson demonstrates that to interpret a semiotic item means to 'translate' it into another item […] and that this translation is always creatively enriching the first item (1959), this continuous creativity being the main result of Peirce's 'unlimited semiosis'." (Eco 1994: 407). — 3 references (one at Eco 1994: 407, two at Waugh, Rudy 1998: 2262).

(b) In the context of explaining Jakobson's general views on the nature of sign, referring to his distinction between three kinds of translation (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 233):

> He […] insisted that a widened definition of translation — as the interpretation of one sign by another — was an essential aspect of semiotic activity: intralingual translation (paraphrasing), interlingual (translation proper), and intersemiotic (transmutation from one semiotic system to another) […]. (Waugh, Rudy 1998: 2262)

— 1 reference (Waugh, Rudy 1998: 2262).

In the encyclopedia articles focusing on translation as their topic, *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* is referred/alluded to in the following cases:

(a) Discussing (in most cases with some criticism) Jakobson's distinction between three kinds of translation (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 233). One example: "When considering seriously Roman Jakobson's distinctions between various concepts of translation, we need to add several further distinctions […]" (Lambert, Robyns 2004: 3600). — 2 allusions (both at Lambert, Robyns 2004: 3600), 2 references (Lambert, Robyns 2004: 3604; Schogt, Toury, Niklas 1994: 1113).

(b) Pointing to Jakobson's (report of Boas') observation that the degree of translatability is lower when translating into a system that makes a certain obligatory differentiation from a system that does not make it than vice versa (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 235–236). — 1 reference (Schogt, Toury, Niklas 1994: 1115).

Those articles in semiotics encyclopedias that focus on Jakobson refer to his article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* foremost in connection with discussing
(1) Jakobson's views on sign and meaning (3 times); but also
(2) Jakobson's distinction between three kinds of translation (1 reference).
On the other hand, the articles that focus on translation refer/allude most to
(1) Jakobson's distinction between three kinds of translation (all together 4 times), but also to
(2) Jakobson's discussion of the issue of translatability between languages with significant differences in their grammatical structures (1 reference).

2.2. References to *Linguistics and Poetics* in articles on Jakobson and translation in semiotics encyclopedias

In the 4 articles in semiotics encyclopedias that connect Jakobson and the topic of translation, *Linguistics and Poetics* is briefly referred to only once (in an article focusing on the topic of translation), with regard to the concept of communicative-linguistic functions (Jakobson 1971 [1960]: 353). The reference is made in the context of discussing various types of translation processes and the impact that different text-types may have on translation process: "The only thing that may be said to remain invariant is the basic communicative-linguistic functions (e.g. Jakobson 1960), and even this does not go without its problems" — 1 reference (Schogt, Toury, Niklas 1994: 1118).

2.3. Other references to Jakobson in semiotics encyclopedias

Besides references/allusions to *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* and *Linguistics and Poetics*, 3 articles out of 4 (one article focusing on the topic of translation, two focusing on Jakobson) in semiotics encyclopedias refer also to some other work of Jakobson's (all together 7 works). The references are made in the following contexts:

(a) Discussing Jakobson's general understanding of linguistic meaning (referring to *Co je poesie?* originally published in 1934[6]), especially as based on Peirce's notion of sign, including the view of meaning of a sign as Peirce's interpretant (referring to Jakobson, Fant, Halle 1988 [1952], *Preliminaries to Speech Analysis*), as that what is interpretable or translatable into a further sign (referring to Jakobson 1985 [1977], *A Few Remarks on Peirce, Pathfinder in the Science of Language*, p. 251), and Jakobson's view of Peircean approach as "the only sound basis for a strictly linguistic semantics" (referring to Jakobson 1985 [1976], *Metalanguage as a Linguistic Problem*, p. 118). — 4 references to Jakobson's various works (two at Waugh, Rudy 1998: 2262; two at Eco 1994: 407).

(b) Commenting on Jakobson's observations on the varying degrees of explicitness of information in different languages (referring to Jakobson 1971 [1939], *Signe zéro*[7]) with regard to translation: "Jakobson (1966b) points out that it is more difficult to start from the undifferentiated language, because it does not give the necessary clues to make the compulsory choice in the target language." — 1 reference (Schogt; Toury; Niklas 1994: 1109).

(c) Pointing out Jakobson's notion of *communication* which encompasses semiotics, so that "communication of any messages" equals semiotics (with the corollary dependence of the term *translating* on the definition of communication — referring to Jakobson 1971 [1969], *Linguistics in Relation to Other Sciences*, p. 666):

If "communication" is regarded on its face value, that is, as requiring *intention* on the part of the addresser, then a communication approach reduces the reference of the term *translating* in its general sense. If, however, *communication* encompasses *semiotics*, so that "communication of messages" equals it (e.g., Jakobson 1971j: 666), then the communication terms are (more or

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[6] What is poetry? (Jakobson 1981 [1934]).

[7] The zero sign.

less) tantamount to the semiotic ones, thus interchangeable and translatable into them. (Schogt, Toury, Niklas 1994: 1115)

— 1 reference (Schogt, Toury, Niklas 1994: 1115).
(d) Making use of Jakobson's distinction between the 'acoustic aspect' (that is heard and has therefore intersubjective, social significance) and 'articulation' (i.e. the production, the 'motor phenomenon' that is merely a physiological prerequisite of the acoustic phenomenon) of sound (reference to Jakobson 1978, *Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning*, p. 5–6). Toury uses these terms metaphorically to describe his view of translations as foremost facts of the receptor system, which gives them their functional identity and in a way conditions their coming into being. — 1 reference (Schogt, Toury, Niklas 1994: 1121).

To sum up, those 2 articles in semiotics encyclopedias that focus on Jakobson refer to his works (other than *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* and *Linguistics and Poetics*) in connection with the nature of sign and meaning — and by extension thus also translation (all 4 references).

In the one article focusing on translation, references to other works of Jakobson are made in the contexts of (1) discussing translation difficulties as related to differences among languages (1 reference); (2) using communication terms in describing the process of translating (1 reference); (3) describing — and promoting — a shift in the way translations have been studied (1 reference).

All together, articles in semiotics encyclopedias refer to 9 of Jakobson's works (including *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation*, *Linguistics and Poetics* as well as other works) in connection with the topic of translation.

2.4. Summary: connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation in semiotics encyclopedias

The connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation in semiotics encyclopedias can be summed up as follows:
(a) In semiotics encyclopedias there are all together 4 articles that make a connection between Jakobson and the topic of translation in total 17 times.

(b) The 4 articles in semiotics encyclopedias refer/allude to in total 9 works by Jakobson: *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (Jakobson 1966 [1959]), *Linguistics and Poetics* (Jakobson 1971 [1960]), *Co je poesie?* (Jakobson 1981 [1934]), *Signe zéro* (Jakobson 1971 [1939]), *Preliminaries to Speech Analysis* (Jakobson, Fant, Halle 1988 [1952]), *Linguistics in Relation to Other Sciences* (Jakobson 1969), *Metalanguage as a Linguistic Problem* (Jakobson 1985 [1976]), *A Few Remarks on Peirce, Pathfinder in the Science of Language* (Jakobson 1985 [1977]), *Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning* (Jakobson 1978).

(c) Those articles that focus on Jakobson, not on the topic of translation, all speak of Jakobson's notions of sign and meaning as being intimately related to translation (the view inspired by Peirce), making up more than a third of all references (7 out of 17). The topic of sign and meaning was important for Jakobson and appeared in several of his works; in semiotics encyclopedias there are references to 5 articles with regard to this topic.

(d) Articles that focus on translation connect Jakobson with the topic of translation foremost via Jakobson's distinction between three kinds of translation (all together 4 times), while there is only 1 reference to this distinction in an article on Jakobson. This supports the impression that in Jakobson's overall legacy this distinction does not come forth as one of his top significant contributions while in the context of discussions on translation, this tripartition is one of Jakobson's central additions to the field. At the same time, in the 2 articles on translation (Schogt, Toury, Niklas 1994 and Lambert, Robyns 2004) this distinction is discussed at greater length than in most other encyclopedia articles and is also subjected to criticism.

(e) In addition to the above, in articles focusing on translation, Jakobson and the topic of translation are connected by making use of Jakobson's terms and ideas when
  (1) Discussing the issue of translatability in the case of languages with different grammatical structures (2 references);
  (2) Approaching translation process in general communication terms (1 reference);
  (3) Regarding translations as forming a semiotic system of their own (1 reference);
  (4) Mentioning Jakobson's functions of communication (1 reference).

All in all it can be said that in those articles (in semiotics encyclopedias) whose focus is Jakobson himself, the topic of translation is touched upon mostly in relation to Jakobson's notion of sign and meaning; in other words, translation is seen as a semiotic mechanism. The only reference to the distinction between three kinds of translation in an article on Jakobson is also related to his overall widened definition of translation as an essential aspect of semiotic activity. In articles where translation is the central topic, Jakobson is most referred to in connection with his distinction between three ways of interpreting a verbal sign, but also with regard to some of his ideas on language and the interrelations between languages, not emphasizing specifically the semiotic basis of his thinking.

3. Connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation in translation studies encyclopedias

In this section, a closer look will be taken at the details and nature of connections established between Jakobson and the topic of translation in translation studies encyclopedias. Summary of this data is presented below in Table 7.

In the two translation studies encyclopedias, there are no articles dedicated specifically to Jakobson; references to him are made in the context of discussing other topics. In the two encyclopedias, there are in total 35 articles (data on the articles is on the left side of Table 7) in which all together 58 references/allusions are made to Jakobson (data on the references and allusions is presented on the right side of the table). 11 articles (with the total of 22 references) are from Baker's encyclopedia (1998), 24 articles (with the total of 36 references) are from the handbook by Kittel *et al.* (2004). Two-thirds of all the articles (23 out of the total 35) refer to Jakobson's *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation*, making up half of all the references (29 out of 58). A quarter of all the references (14 out of 58) in the total of 11 articles are to *Linguistics and Poetics*, the greater share of these (11) being provided by Kittel *et al.* (2004). There are 3 articles in which all together 5 references are made also to Jakobson's other works, and there are 8 articles in which all together 10 general or unspecified references to Jakobson are made.

Table 7. Number of articles and references relating Jakobson and the topic of translation in translation studies encyclopedias. "OLA" = *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (Jakobson 1966 [1959]); "LaP" = *Linguistics and Poetics* (Jakobson 1971 [1960]).

TRANSLATION STUDIES	No of articles					No of references				
	Art-s referring to "OLA"	Art-s referring to "LaP"	Art-s referring to R.J.'s other works	Art-s with general ref-s to R.J.	Total no of art-s referring to R.J.	Ref-s to "OLA"	Ref-s to "LaP"	Ref-s to R.J.'s other works	General ref-s to R.J.	Total ref-s to R.J.
Baker 1998	7	3	2	3	11	11	3	4	4	22
Kittel *et. al* 2004	16	8	1	5	24	18	11	1	6	36
Total:	23	11	3	8	35	29	14	5	10	58

3.1. References to *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* in translation studies encyclopedias

The article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* is referred/alluded to in the following cases:
(a) Discussing or mentioning Jakobson's distinction between three kinds of translation (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 233), implying a widened definition of translation as such. For example:

> I know of no research that looks specifically at the phenomena of intralingual or intersemiotic translation. We do have classifications like Jakobson's, which alert us to the possibility of such things as intersemiotic and intralingual translation, but we do not make any genuine use of such classifications in our research. (Baker 1998: xvii)

— 2 allusions (Baker 1998: xvii; Robinson 1998: 183) and 10 references (Eco, Nergaard 1998: 219–220; Pym, Turk 1998: 275; Gorlée 2004: 55; Henschelmann 2004: 390; Hermans 2004b: 196; Lenschen 2004: 430; Mueller-Vollmer 2004: 151; Schäffner 2004: 107; Schreiber 2004: 273; Van Gorp 2004: 63).
(b) Referring to the notion of "equivalence in difference" formulated by Jakobson (1966 [1959]: 233–234). One example:

> Roman Jakobson (1959) is largely in favour of translatability because he sees translation as operating within languages as well as between them (and between different semiotic systems): 'equivalence in difference' is thus described as the basic problem 'of *every* language' [...]. (Pym; Turk 1998: 275)

— 3 references (Pym, Turk 1998: 275; Henschelmann 2004: 390; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2004: 304).
(c) Pointing to Jakobson's view that language in its general mode (that is, on its 'cognitive level') allows (and even requires) translation (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 234). One example:

> Es wird also zwischen Übersetzbarkeit im denotativen und im konnotativen Bereich unterschieden. Dort, wo Sprache in *denotativer Funktion* auftritt, wird die Möglichkeit der Übersetzbarkeit uneingeschränkt bejaht. [...] (Auch für Jakobson 1959, 234 gilt: 'All cognitive experience and its classification is conveyable in any existing language.'). (Koller 2004: 189)

> Distinction is thus made between translatability with respect to the denotative and with respect to the connotative range. In cases where language in *denotative function* arises, the possibility of translatability is affirmed without

reservation. [...] (This also applies to Jakobson 1959, 234: 'All cognitive experience and its classification is conveyable in any existing language.')[8]

— 2 references (Brotherston 1998: 211; Koller 2004: 189).

(d) Recording Jakobson's views on interlingual relations and translatability (Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 236). One example:

> It [= Jakobson's dynamic translatability — *E. S.*] also hinges on a dynamic view of natural languages as evolving entities: for Jakobson, 'languages differ essentially in what they *must* convey and not in what they *can* convey' (ibid.: 264). (Pym; Turk 1998: 275)

— 4 references (Schreiber 2004: 270; Gémar 2004: 741; two at Pym; Turk 1998: 275).

(e) Referring to Jakobson's view of poetry (or the sphere of the dominance of the poetic function, as in the case of pun) as being "by definition untranslatable" and requiring therefore "creative transposition" (Jakobson [1959]: 238). One example:

> As a form of complex and self-conscious discourse, both exploiting and exposing the verbal medium it uses to the hilt, wordplay has often been seen as a paradigm of poetic language: "The pun [...] reigns over poetic art, and whether its rule is absolute or limited, poetry by definition is untranslatable" (Jakobson 1959, 238). (Delabastita 2004b: 602)

— 4 references (Delabastita 2004a: 872; Delabastita 2004b: 602; two at Connolly 1998: 171).

(f) Referring to the article in general (not explicating any exact segment or idea in the article because of which it is being mentioned). Two examples:

> During this early period, the overall orientation was also largely pedagogical, with few — if any — descriptive studies and little or no attempt at developing theoretical models (Jakobson 1959 is a notable exception). (Baker 2004: 288);

> Originally, scholarly interest in translation was actually more of a sideline cherished by disciplines that had been firmly established in the academe long before translation studies made their first academic appearance in the middle of the twentieth century. Among them philosophers [...], and more recently linguists (Brower 1959/1966; Jakobson 1959/1966 [...] concerned themselves with aspects of translation. (Neubert 2004: 229).

— 4 references (Gentzler 1998: 168; Baker 2004: 288; Chesterman 2004: 94; Neubert 2004: 229).

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[8]   Here and in the following, translations from German are mine — *E. S.*

To sum up, the topics in Jakobson's article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* referred to in the articles of translation studies encyclopedias include

(1)   Jakobson's distinction among three kinds of translation (12 references out of the total 29);
(2)   Jakobson's views on the issue of translatability (translatability as a normal condition of communication within and between languages, which at the same time does not need to be "total" translatability — hence also Jakobson's notion of "equivalence in difference" (9 references);
(3)   Jakobson's views on poetry/poetic function, which appears as an exception to the general translatability postulate (4 references);
(4)   General references to the article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (4 references).

These general references try to give an overall idea of the article, to set it in context, and to relate Jakobson's contribution in it to other disciplines and other approaches to translation prevalent at the time of the article's publication.

3.2. References to *Linguistics and Poetics* in translation studies encyclopedias

The article *Linguistics and Poetics* is referred to in the following cases:
(a) Mentioning Jakobson's model of communication or some aspect of it: (some or all six) factors of communication or functions of language (Jakobson 1971 [1960]: 353, 357). One example: "The author's communicative intention is closely related to text functions — e.g. referential, expressive, conative, phatic and poetic (Jakobson 1966)." (Švejcer 2004a: 240). — 1 allusion (Hermans 2004a: 124) and 3 references (Mason 1998: 32; Švejcer 2004a: 240; Švejcer 2004b: 382).
(b) Discussing Jakobson's view of poetry and specifically poetic function or the concept of "poeticalness" (Jakobson 1971 [1960]: 356ff). For example:

The pun "projects the principle of equivalence [...] from the axis of selection into the axis of combination", thereby "promoting the palpability of signs" and "deepening the fundamental dichotomy of signs and objects" (Jakobson

1967, 302–3), fully satisfying Jakobson's famous description of the poetic function. (Delabastita 2004b: 601–602)

— 8 references (Albrecht 2004: 247–248; Delabastita 2004a: 872; Delabastita 2004b: 601–602, 602; Nikula 2004: 663; three references at Gorlée 2004: 56).

(c) Referring to the article in its entirety as an example of Jakobson's and his colleagues' effort at "isolating and cataloguing, in a variety of languages, the specific formal features that distinguish literary expressions from normal ones" (Gentzler 1998: 168) and as an example of "how a structurally-oriented close textual analysis can also account for stylistic choices" (Eco; Nergaard 1998: 219). — 2 references (Gentzler 1998: 168; Eco; Nergaard 1998: 219).

The references made in translation encyclopedias to Jakobson's article *Linguistics and Poetics* can be regarded as forming two large sets:

(1) Centring around Jakobson's notions of "poeticalness" or "poetic function", whether explicitly (as in quoting Jakobson's definition of "poetic function") or mentioning issues related to it (such as literary expressions, stylistic choices) (10 references out of 14);

(2) Referring to Jakobson's communication model, in most cases foregrounding his distinction between different language functions (4 references).

3.3. Other references to Jakobson in translation studies encyclopedias

In addition to *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* and *Linguistics and Poetics*, all together 5 references (out of the total 58) in 3 articles (out of 35) are made to Jakobson's other works:

(a) Referring to Jakobson's article *Co je poesie?* (Jakobson 1981 [1934]) as an example of Jakobson being a representative of Russian Formalism and Czech structuralism, whose one aim was the distinguishing of literary expressions from 'ordinary' ones. — 1 reference (Gentzler 1998: 168).

(b) Emphasising Jakobson's work in poetics and his early contribution to theory of poetry translation:

> Demands by members of the Prague School around 1929 for elaborating the
> principles of a synchronic description of poetic language [...] were already
> being addressed in a number of important publications by Roman Jakobson
> (1896–1982), including "O cheshskom stikhe"[9] and "Základy českého
> verše"[10] [...]. In parallel with the development of a structural theory of poetic
> language, attempts were also made to develop a theory of the translation of
> poetry. [...] Among other significant studies in this area, mention should be
> made of Jakobson's essay "O překladu veršů"[11]. (Kufnerová 1998: 380)

— 3 references (all at Kufnerová 1998: 380).

(c) Mentioning Jakobson's work co-written with Morris Halle, *Fundamentals of Language* (Jakobson, Halle 1956):

> It has been generally agreed, though, that the tropes at the centre of the figural
> space are metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. They are related and
> connected, although the relations and connections are not completely clear.
> Jakobson and Halle (1956) claim that synecdoche is reducible to metonymy.
> (Pisarska 2004: 522)

— 1 reference (Pisarska 2004: 522).

All these 5 references to Jakobson's works other than *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* and *Linguistics and Poetics* relate to his work on poetics, verse and poetic language, among them one reference to his early work on verse translation.

Besides references to one or another particular work of Jakobson, there are also as many as 10 references (in all together 8 articles) to Jakobson or his ideas in general, that is, none of his works is mentioned specifically:

(a) Emphasising Jakobson's work in poetics. One example: "Their [= Augusto and Haroldo de Campos' — *E. S.*] view of translation privileges form over content and favours the introduction of new forms into the target language. For these views, they draw on Walter Benjamin, Roman Jakobson and Ezra Pound." (Barbosa; Wyler 1998: 332). — 2 references (Gentzler 1998: 168; Barbosa; Wyler 1998: 332).

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[9]   O cheshskom stikhe = "О чешском стихе — преимущественно в сопоставлении с русским" (On Czech verse, mainly in comparison with Russian — Jakobson 1979 [1923]).

[10]   *Základy českého verše* (Prague: Odeon, 1926) or *Foundations of Czech verse* is a revised version of Jakobson 1979 [1923].

[11]   On the translation of verse (Jakobson 1979 [1930]).

(b) Sketching briefly the significance of Jakobson's contribution to translation studies against its context: "Traditionally, translation scholars (pre-Jakobson) attempted to imagine and define what literary translations *should be*." — 1 reference (Gentzler 1998: 167)[12].

(c) Showing Jakobson's (among others) significance for some theories in translation studies: "In the early 1970s, Itamar Even-Zohar, a scholar from Tel Aviv, developed the polysystem model on the basis of his work on Hebrew literature. Its roots, however, lie in the writings of the late Russian Formalists Jurij Tynjanov, Roman Jakobson and Boris Ejkhenbaum." — 1 reference (Shuttleworth 1998: 176).

(d) Presenting Jakobson as an important thinker on language and an influential figure in the history of semiotics and linguistics. Two examples:

A sign possesses the characteristic ability not only to represent meaningfully something else, [...] but also to be decoded, understood and interpreted as such. This is merely another way of stating the Scholastic *aliquid stat pro aliquo* (something stands for something else) formula [...], which has been used as a definition of the semiotic sign from Augustine to Roman Jakobson. (Gorlée 2004: 54)

It [= the question of the possibility of transfer — *E. S.*] has been posed by every serious translator and thinker on language from Dante to Luther, from Erasmus and Dryden to Proust [...], from Horace to Walter Benjamin and Roman Jakobson. (Steiner 2004: 3)

— 4 references (Gorleé 2004: 54; Steiner 2004: 3; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2004: 304; Mueller-Vollmer 2004: 142).

(e) Pointing to and explaining the structuralist approach to translation. One example:

Translation "may be broken down into a doing interpretive of the *ab quo* text and a doing productive of the *ad quem* text" (Greimas/Courtès [1979] 1982, 352). Saussure's binary oppositions [...], Louis Hjelmslev's dichotomies [...], Jakobson's binarism (code/message, selection/combination, metaphor/metonymy) and Yury Lotman's distinctions [...] are reconstructed into a literal sense, which becomes a structure, which is never equivalent. (Gorlée 2004: 57)

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[12] Although no specific reference is given here, it can be assumed that the allusion is to Jakobson's article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* as this is usually considered to contain his main contribution to translation studies.

— 2 references (Gorlée 2004: 57; Weitemeier 2004: 889).

The 10 references that point to Jakobson in general and not specifically to any one of his works show the extent to which the knowledge of Jakobson, his works and main ideas is presupposed by the authors of these articles. Some of the total 10 references point to Jakobson's lifelong preoccupation with questions of poetics and indicate his innovative approach to describing literary translations, some emphasise Jakobson's importance as a thinker on language and related issues, whereas others are a bit more specific and refer to some of Jakobson's more well-known ideas (e.g. "equivalence in difference") or his general views (e.g. dualism, binarism).

3.4. Summary: connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation in translation studies encyclopedias

The connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation in translation studies encyclopedias can be summed up as follows:
(a) In translation studies encyclopedias there are all together 35 articles that make a connection between Jakobson and the topic of translation in total 58 times.
(b) The 35 articles in translation studies encyclopedias refer/allude to in total 7 works of Jakobson: *O cheshskom stikhe* (Jakobson 1979 [1923]), *Základy českého verše* (originally published in 1926), *O překladu veršů* (Jakobson 1979 [1930]), *Co je poesie?* (Jakobson 1981 [1934]), *Fundamentals of Language* (Jakobson, Halle 1956), *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (Jakobson 1959), *Linguistics and Poetics* (Jakobson 1960).
(c) In these 35 articles, the 58 connections made between Jakobson and the topic of translation take the form of referring or alluding to Jakobson in the contexts of discussing various translation-related topics. Half of all the references (29 out of 58) are to the article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation*, nearly one quarter of all the references (14 out of 58) are to the article *Linguistics and Poetics*, and the rest 15 references are either to other works or to Jakobson in general.
(d) About one-fifth of all connections between the topic of translation and Jakobson (12 references out of 58) in translation studies encyclopedias is established through references to Jakobson's

distinction between three kinds of translation — intralingual, interlingual and intersemiotic — set forth in his article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation*. Although mentioned more times than any other idea or concept of Jakobson, this tripartition is rarely discussed at any length and is instead referred to rather briefly, in some cases not even spelling out all three possibilities but mentioning only one or two.

(e) Other connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation are developed through two main topics:

   (1) Jakobson's views on literary creation, poetics (the sphere of the dominance of the poetic function; all together 19 references); and

   (2) His principal views on language (including his concept of linguistic sign, model of communication, and concept of "equivalence in difference"; all together 13 references).

Both of these large topics are manifested in various ways, and references to these are made in order to illuminate some issues either relating to the questions of general translatability of natural languages or more generally various semiotic systems, or relating to the questions of translatability in texts with the predominant poetic function.

There are 4 references to the article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* which do not specify why exactly the article is being mentioned, but which nevertheless also connect Jakobson with the topic of translation. In addition, a rather large part of all the references (10 out of the total 58) to Jakobson is formed by such references that do not mention any of his works or even ideas in particular, but presume the reader's familiarity with the person and his contribution. Most of these unspecified references present Jakobson as a major figure in the history of linguistics or point to his contributions in the study of poetics.

Conclusions

In the encyclopedias of linguistics, semiotics, and translation studies, connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation — both in the articles examining some topic related to translation and in the articles dedicated to Jakobson and his contribution — are established

via references or allusions to Jakobson, his ideas and works. Because of this, the task of this article formulated as the description and analysis of the connections between these two subjects becomes in most cases rephrased as the reception of Jakobson's ideas with regard to the topic of translation. In the three sets of encyclopedias, there appear some similarities but also differences with respect to which aspects and works of Jakobson's overall legacy are considered relevant for the topic of translation.

Main topics and viewpoints

In general, there appear to be three main topics that form the basis for creating connection between Jakobson and the issue of translation in the encyclopedia articles considered here:
(1) Jakobson's distinction between three kinds of translation,
(2) his views on language in general, and
(3) his views on language use with the predominant poetic function.
However, in different encyclopedias there appear some differences with regard to the specific topics chosen as relevant from among Jakobson's oeuvre for discussions on translation.

In *linguistics encyclopedias*, the topic of translation is approached mainly through Jakobson's views on poetics and language: half of the references have to do with (the translatability) of texts with the predominant poetic function; other references are mostly related to questions of features of (natural) languages that enable or affect their translatability.

In *translation studies encyclopedias*, about one-fifth of all connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation is established through references to his distinction between three kinds of translation. Although mentioned more times than any other idea or concept of Jakobson, references to this tripartition are generally rather brief and sometimes even fragmentary (i.e., do not mention all three possibilities but only one or two of them). Other connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation are developed through two main topics: Jakobson's views on such language use where the poetic function is predominant (and its effects on translation) and some of his principal views on language.

One feature that distinguishes articles in translation studies encyclopedias from those in linguistics and semiotics encyclopedias are general, unspecified references to Jakobson in which no specific work or idea of his is mentioned. Such references seem to presuppose the reader's familiarity with the person and his contribution.

In *semiotics encyclopedias*, the nature of connections established between Jakobson and the topic of translation depends to some extent on whether the article focuses on Jakobson or on the topic of translation. Thus, in articles whose focus is Jakobson, the topic of translation enters the general discussion mainly by way of Jakobson's views on language and communication as semiotic phenomena, especially Jakobson's view of meaning as a semiotic or rather, a translational process. Such references make up more than one-third of all the references to Jakobson in semiotics encyclopedias.

In articles focusing on the topic of translation, Jakobson's name comes up most often in connection with his distinction among three kinds of translation (about one quarter of all connections), including two lengthier treatments and also criticisms of this distinction. In the articles in which the central topic is translation, not Jakobson, semiotic issues are somewhat more on the background, so that there are also a few references to some of Jakobson's ideas on language and the relations between languages without emphasising specifically the semiotic basis of his thinking.

Besides greater emphasis on Jakobson's overall semiotic attitude towards issues of language and meaning, Jakobson's reception in semiotics encyclopedias differs from that in linguistics and translation studies encyclopedias also by the fact that articles in semiotics encyclopedias make use of less ideas in *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation*, and none of them mentions the problem of poetic translation and creative transposition that is referred to in several articles in linguistics and translation studies encyclopedias. What is the reason behind this? In his article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* Jakobson seems to draw a rather firm line between "ordinary" translation (which mostly refers to metalinguistic operations carried out with regard to the cognitive level of language, in which "language is minimally dependent on the grammatical pattern" — Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 236) and "poetic" translation or creative transposition (which implies such use of language in which grammatical categories "carry a high semantic import" (*ibid.*) or, in other words, in which the poetic

function is the dominant function). Since from Jakobson's several works (including *Linguistics and Poetics*) we know that Jakobson in fact regarded language functions as forming a hierarchy in each act of communication, that is, all factors and functions are at least potentially present in each act of communication, it would lead us to think that Jakobson could not have drawn an absolute and impenetrable line between "ordinary" and "poetic" language use and, by extension, also translation. Although this issue is not explicitly pondered upon in the majority of articles in any encyclopedia studied here, there is one article that briefly comments on this: writing about wordplay translation (in a translation encyclopedia; Kittel *et al.* 2004), Dirk Delabastita quotes Jakobson's famous line, "Poetry by definition is untranslatable" but goes on to clarify that "Jakobson's argument need not be taken at face value (e.g. one might want to object to its underlying, rather static equivalence-based view of translation and therefore of translatability), but it remains a powerful statement of a widely held conviction" (Delabastita 2004b: 602). Delabastita there-fore seems to belong among such readers of Jakobson who do not fall for his (seemingly?) strong polarisation of "ordinary" and "poetic" translation. However, as Delabastita mentions, this polarisation, as expressed also by Jakobson's quote, expresses a "widely held conviction". That this may indeed be so is illustrated by two other, identically worded interpretations of the same line: "[…] it is this fact that lies at the root of *Jakobson's resolute belief* that poetry is by definition untranslatable" (Hyde 1994: 4728; my emphasis — *E. S.*) and "Roman *Jakobson's resolute belief* that poetry is by definition untranslatable […]" (Connolly 1998: 171; my emphasis — *E. S.*). Thus, both Hyde's article on literary translation in a linguistics encyc-lopedia (Asher 1994) and Connolly's article on poetry translation in a translation studies encyclopedia (Baker 1998) display the conviction that Jakobson indeed firmly believed in the irreconcilably opposite nature of "poetic" translation and "ordinary" translation. This inter-pretation is extended also to another well-known thought expressed by Jakobson: "[…] 'poetic principle' which prompted Jakobson to say that *only creative transposition, not translation was possible where 'poetic art' is concerned*" (Hyde 1994: 4729; my emphasis — *E. S.*) and "Roman Jakobson's resolute belief that poetry is by definition untranslatable led to the […] approach that *only 'creative trans-*

position', rather than translation, is possible where poetic art is concerned" (Connolly 1998: 171; my emphasis — *E. S.*).

Other articles that also deal with issues pertaining to literary or poetic translation do not foreground the opposition of "poetic" vs. "ordinary" translation — although they do pay attention to the topic of "poeticalness" or the dominance of the poetic function in verbal art (Gentzler 1998; Kufnerová, Osers 1998; Delabastita 2004a; Gorlée 2004; Nikula 2004). It is interesting to note, however, that the question of the specificity of artistic expression with regard to translation is nowhere emphasised in the articles of semiotics encyclopedias (Eco 1994; Schogt, Toury, Niklas 1994; Waugh, Rudy 1998; Lambert, Robyns 2004) — which must be at least partly due to the fact that artistic translation is not the central focus in these articles, but probably also due to the more general tendency of semiotics not to polarise artistic and "ordinary" expressions but to regard these rather as operating on a gradational scale.

"Popular quotes" and other highlights

Among various references to Jakobson's works and thoughts there stand out a few recurring quotes or quote-like references which seem to have acquired the status of scholarly catch-phrases and which also characterise the three main topics mentioned above. The most "popular" lines are the following:

"Equivalence in difference" (reference to Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 233; appears all together 5 times);

"The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination" (reference to Jakobson 1971 [1960]: 358; appears 4 times);

"Languages differ essentially in what they *must* convey and not in what they *may* convey" (reference to Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 236; appears 3 times);

"Poetry is by definition untranslatable" (reference to Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 238; appears 3 times);

"Only creative transposition", not translation, is possible where poetic art is concerned (reference to Jakobson 1966 [1959]: 238; appears 2 times)

That we are dealing here with indeed popular lines is evidenced not only by their recurrences in different articles, but also by some comments attributed by the authors referring to them. For example:

> Auch der *häufig angeführte Satz* Roman Jakobsons, "The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination" […]" (Nikula 2004: 663; my emphasis — *E. S.*);
> Also *the frequently stated sentence* of Roman Jakobson […] "The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination" […]"

> "Languages differ essentially in what they must convey and not in what they may convey" […] — *diese oft zitierte Erkenntnis* R. Jakobsons ist von zentraler Bedeutung für das Verhältnis von Übersetzung und Interpretation" (Schreiber 2004: 270; my emphasis — *E. S.*);
> ""Languages differ essentially in what they must convey and not in what they may convey" […] — *this often-quoted insight* of R. Jakobson is of central importance for the relationship of translation and interpretation."
> As Roman Jakobson […] *has famously argued*, the pun epitomizes the poetic function of language […] (Delabastita 2004a: 872; my emphasis — *E. S.*).

Expressions like "*häufig angeführte*" (frequently stated), "*oft zitierte*" (often quoted) and "famously argued" clearly point to the fact that they characterise some phenomena that are supposed to be familiar to a large audience. Of course, repeating such lines in reference works only adds to their already established fame. However, without a critical stance towards such catch-phrases they run the risk of becoming petrified and unproductive slogans.

In addition to the famous quotes and near-quotes, the encyclopedia articles considered here reflect also the popularity of the tripartite division of translation types and the schemes of communication factors and functions introduced by Jakobson. The terms used by Jakobson (1966 [1959]: 233) for designating three kinds of interpreting a verbal sign — intralingual, interlingual, and intersemiotic translating — appear each approximately 20 times within the body of all articles studied here. Some authors' comments on the tripartition also reflect its status, for example:

> A second group of typologies is based on the nature of the code-switch, such as Jakobson's *frequently quoted* […] distinction between intralingual, interlingual and intersemiotic translation. (Lambert, Robyns 2004: 3604; my emphasis — *E. S.*)

The only typology, *which has gained some currency* (e.g., Jakobson 1959), has been worked out in terms of the *relations* (differences and similarities) between the basic types of the two codes [...] (Schogt; Toury; Niklas 1994: 1113; my emphasis — *E. S.*)

Jakobson's definitions [of three types of translation — *E. S.*] *have long been treated as a point of departure for subsequent discussions of translation.* (Eco; Nergaard 1998: 219–220; my emphasis — *E. S.*)

All current work on intersemiotic translation [...] *has its origin in Roman Jakobson's (1896–1982) remarks on the three kinds of 'interpreting a verbal sign'* (Gorlée 2004: 55; my emphasis — *E. S.*)

[...] Jakobson's *celebrated semiotic division of three kinds of translation.* (Hermans 2004b: 196; my emphasis — *E. S.*)

While these comments reflect the wide popularity of Jakobson's distinction between three kinds of translation, some of them also criticise it. For example, although Lambert and Robyns (2004: 3604) say the distinction is "frequently quoted", they add that it is also "highly artificial". The typology is also criticised by Toury who points out that "this typology is afflicted with the traditional bias for *linguistic* translating" and anyhow "such a typology is far from satisfactory" as among other faults it does not take into account the fact that texts are usually organised in several codes, not just one code (Schogt, Toury, Niklas 1994: 1113). Hermans, while speaking of Jakobson's "celebrated semiotic division", refers to and draws on Derrida's (probably almost as famous) critique of this division (Hermans 2004b: 196). Thus, to sum up the attitudes that the encyclopedia articles display towards Jakobson's distinction between three kinds of translation, it is evident that the distinction is widely known and often quoted but at the same time it has also provoked discussion and in some cases also critique.

Jakobson's other very well-known theoretic models are those of communication factors and functions (Jakobson 1960: 353, 357). Apparently since these are not explicitly related to the topic of translation, they are also mentioned much less in the encyclopedia articles considered here, with individual functions getting different amount of attention and with poetic function being the one most often referred to (all together, other functions are each mentioned 3–5 times, poetic function 10 times; if we add to the latter its near-synonyms such as "poeticalness", "poetic principle" etc., the number of

references is almost doubled). Still, the wide knowledge of Jakobson's communication models can be illustrated by the following example:

> The widely used terminology of 'source' and 'target' text betrays a teleological conception of translation, *possibly influenced by Roman Jakobson's communication schemata* showing a message travelling from a sender to a receiver [...]. (Hermans 2004a: 124; my emphasis — *E. S.*)

The above quote reflects also the fact that from among many authors starting with Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver who have written on communication and proposed their communication models, it is Jakobson who appears to have been instrumental in introducing this line of thought into humanities, including translation studies.

Jakobson's bibliography

Of the total 257 articles written either on Jakobson or on the topic of translation in the eight encyclopedias considered here, 213 articles (83%) do not make any connection between the two subjects. Some connection is established in 44 (17%) articles out of 257. Considering the huge variety of issues and names that can be associated with the topic of translation as well as Roman Jakobson's enormous legacy and contributions to so many fields, 17% seems like a rather large amount. In these 44 encyclopedia articles, there are all in all 87 instances in which some connection between Jakobson and the topic of translation is established, with references or allusions to all together 13 works of Jakobson.

Thus, as can be seen in Table 8, in linguistics encyclopedias there are references to 2 of Jakobson's articles; in semiotics encyclopedias, attention is paid to 9 of Jakobson's works, and in translation studies encyclopedias, there appear references to 7 of Jakobson's works:

Table 8. Jakobson's works referred to in linguistics, semiotics, and translation studies encyclopedias and the respective number of references.

Jakobson's works referred to in linguistics, semiotics and translation studies encyclopedias					
LINGUISTICS		SEMIOTICS		TRANSLATION STUDIES	
Title	No of ref-s	Title	No of ref-s	Title	No of ref-s
On Linguistic Aspects of Translation (1959)	7	*On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (1959)	9	*On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (1959)	31
Linguistics and Poetics (1960)	3	*Linguistics and Poetics* (1960)	1	*Linguistics and Poetics* (1960)	14
		Co je poesie? (1934)	1	*Co je poesie?* (1934)	1
		Preliminaries to Speech Analysis (1952)	1	*O cheshkom stikhe* (1923)	1
		Signe zero (1966)	1	*Základy českého verše* (1926)	1
		Linguistics in Relation to Other Sciences (1971)	1	*O překladu veršů* (1930)	1
		Metalanguage as a Linguistic Problem (1976)	1	*Fundamentals of Language* (1956)	1
		A Few Remarks on Peirce, Pathfinder in the Science of Language (1977)	1		
		Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning (1978)	1		
	10		17		50

The number of Jakobson's works to which references are made is not in correlation with the number of articles referring to them in one or another set of encyclopedias: while semiotics encyclopedias contain the smallest number of articles (4) in which connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation are made, they include the largest number of works by Jakobson (9). Translation studies encyclopedias contain 35 articles in which Jakobson is related to the topic of translation, yet they refer in total to fewer works by Jakobson (7) than articles in semiotics encyclopedias. Linguistics encyclopedias with their 5 articles in which connections between Jakobson and the topic of translation are established regard only 2 of his works as relevant for discussing translation issues.

The complete bibliography of Jakobson's works (Rudy 1990) lists 686 titles (not including reprints). Thus, the 13 works of Jakobson to which there appear references in the 44 encyclopedia articles considered here, amount to slightly over 2% of Jakobson's entire legacy of 686 writings.

Over half of all the connections (47 out of 87) between Jakobson and the topic of translation are made via references and allusions to Jakobson's article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* and about one-fifth of all the connections (18 out of 87) are made via references and allusions to the article *Linguistics and Poetics*. This means that more than two-thirds of Jakobson's entire reception in encyclopedias of linguistics, semiotics, and translation studies (65 references out of 87) are based on the significance attributed to Jakobson's two articles, which makes only 0,3% of his entire written legacy. Contrary to the general positive impression left by the overall proportion (17%) of articles making some connection between Jakobson and the topic of translation, this figure — well under 1% — seems small.

Besides these two most popular works, articles in linguistics and semiotics encyclopedias refer also to 11 other works by Jakobson (all together 12 references), which amounts to 1,6% of the entire legacy of Jakobson's writings. (In addition to references to specific works of Jakobson, there are 10 connections made between Jakobson and the topic of translation that do not point to any specific work of Jakobson but to him or his ideas in general.)

In other words: nearly nine-tenths of all connections (77 out of 87) between Jakobson and the topic of translation in the encyclopedia articles considered here are made via recourse to Jakobson's 13 works

that make less than 2% of his entire written legacy, and the majority of these nine-tenths are made by referring to just two of his works that makes 0,3% of all of Jakobson's written works.

The last numbers are modest to say the least. Together with the overall impressions left from the present study, they suggest some final conclusions, also for further discussion:

1. Since such a small part of Jakobson's entire legacy is represented in encyclopedia articles considered here, there rises a doubt that they paint a rather limited and superficial picture of Jakobson and his contribution. This doubt is further strengthened by the fact that most of Jakobson's reception relies overwhelmingly on just two of his works, but also by phenomena like "popular quotes" that are repeated from article to article. We are left with an impression that a great part of Jakobson's legacy is not actually used, it is not even really known.

2. At the same time, as encyclopedias are by their nature collections of general knowledge, they cannot be expected to provide very thorough reflections on any subject. Therefore it would be informative to study more closely the reception of Jakobson with regard to his ideas on translation in the body of more specialised academic literature: articles, monographs, collections etc. This would reveal to what extent general academic reference works are representative of the actual scholarly reception of Jakobson.

3. One conclusion of the present study is the confirmation that at least on the level of academic reference works, authors writing about Jakobson's ideas with regard to translation make surprisingly few connections between his ideas expressed in his different works, including his two most popular articles. For instance, except for a couple of instances in which a connection is made between Jakobson's view of poetic function (as discussed in his article *Linguistics and Poetics*) and poetic translation (regarded as basically impossible and requiring creative transposition instead, as discussed in *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation*), no encyclopedia article considered here pays further attention to the possible relations between the topics discussed in these Jakobson's two most famous articles; neither is the division of translation types further interpreted in terms of his communication model or vice versa. We are left with an impression that this direction of study has simply remained unexplored, but also that the inner logic

of Jakobson's overall thought with respect to the topic of translation may also be worthwhile to be examined closer.[13]

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Роман Якобсон и перевод: рецепция
в академических справочниках

Статья описывает и анализирует те связи между Романом Якобсоном и темой перевода, которые выявляются в академических справочниках. Цель статьи двоякая: во-первых, рассмотреть повнимательнее ставшее уже штампом представление о Якобсоне как влиятельном ученом в области многих дисциплин, в том числе переводоведения, лингвистики и семиотики, и изучить его реальную рецепцию на уровне академических справочников. Во-вторых, — выяснить, связывают ли вообще и каким именно образом якобсоновское понимание процесса перевода с его взглядами на язык и коммуникацию. Выясняется, что в рамках рассмотренных источников рецепция Якобсона ограничивается в основном двумя статьями (при том, что наследие Якобсона исчисляется несколькими сотнями работ!), и при этом авторы не обращают особого внимания на внутреннюю логику якобсоновской мысли.

Roman Jakobson ja tõlkimine:
retseptsioon akadeemilistes teatmeteostes

Artikkel kirjeldab ja analüüsib seoseid, mida loovad akadeemilised teatmeteosed Roman Jakobsoni ja tõlkimise teema vahel. Artiklil on kahetine eesmärk: esiteks, heita lähem pilk juba stambiks muutunud ettekujutusele Jakobsonist kui mõjukast teadlasest mitmete distsipliinide, sealhulgas tõlketeaduse, keeleteaduse ja semiootika jaoks ning käsitleda

tema tegelikku retseptsiooni akadeemiliste teatmeteoste tasandil. Teine eesmärk on välja selgitada, kas ja kuidas seostatakse Jakobsoni arusaamu tõlkimisest tema vaadetega keelele ja kommunikatsioonile üldisemalt. Selgub, et — ehkki valdkonniti ja teatmeteoste endi vahel esineb ka erinevusi — vaadeldud teatmeteoste tasandil põhineb Jakobsoni retseptsioon ülekaalukalt tema kahel artiklil (kogu Jakobsoni pärand hõlmab mitusada tööd). Samuti ei pöörata sellel tasandil suuremat tähelepanu Jakobsoni mõtte sisemisele loogikale, see tähendab, vähe võetakse arvesse võimalikke seoseid Jakobsoni erinevates töödes väljendatud ideede vahel.

Jakobson:
Translation as imputed similarity

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Abstract. Jakobson, in his essays, has tried to insert Peirce's typology of signs (icon, index, symbol) in his own binary logic, in which every feature of a text may be considered or dismissed either with a 0 or with a 1 (absent, present). In so doing, he used the features "similarity *versus* contiguity" and "imputed *versus* factual", and discovered that the notion of "imputed similarity" was not covered by Peirce's triad. Hence the search for it. In this article, whose ideological basis and quotations are mostly from Jakobson's essays, the author tries to show that the notion of "translation" may be the missing link. Starting from Peirce's main triad, and its initial incomprehension among Western scholars influenced by Saussure, the interpretant is then viewed as the subjective, affective component of sign and its interpretation. Syntax, considered in Peircean and Jakobsonian terms, is iconic. The evolution of meaning, characterizing all communication, is possible thanks to construction and thanks to metaphoric and metonymic connections. In the last part of the article, cultural implications of communication — and translation — are considered.

1. Peirce's triad

Western-European linguistics, in the 20th century, starts from the arbitrary relationship between sign and object presumed by Saussure. This was an easy way to get rid of a difficult problem, namely, the 'black box' part of semiosis. When the word is a pure symbol (i.e. it has no features of the icon, or of the index), how does it link to the meanings that are subjectively or culture-specifically attributed to it?

How does a culture (i.e. a person, or a group) 'decide' that such a sound pattern is connected to some specific phenomenon? Maintaining that such a link is arbitrary is a (too easy!) solution, even if more than one previous scholar had warned against such a simplification:

> The essential precondition of the envisaged inquiry had been posited by an earlier French thinker, Joseph de Maistre: "Ne parlons donc jamais de hasard ni de signes arbitraires". (Jakobson 1971b: 722)

So, if we want to reconstruct what happened in European linguistics in 20th century having in mind the broader picture, and why today we have to work hard to collect missing pieces partly from the East and partly from the West, we have to consider that we were culturally dominated by what Saussure's students had left us, in the form of two dogmas:

> When postulating two primordial linguistic characters — the arbitrariness of the sign and the linearity of the *signans* — Saussure attributed to both of them an equally fundamental importance. (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 357)

Charles Sanders Peirce had lived and written thousands of pages on the subject, but nobody in Europe had read his works, that were mostly unpublished in the U.S. as well. Linguistics, in Western Europe, was still considered a discipline far from communication theory (which did not exist) or semiotics (not yet 'discovered'). Nobody here — in contrast to Filipp Fedorovich Fortunatov in Russia, for example — attempted to consider linguistics as an exact science — maybe based on a mathematical model of communication —, which could have explained the workings of signification in general, and signification of verbal signs as a particular case.

> We deal with language as a universal invariant with respect to varied local languages which are variable in time and space. In the same order of things, semiotics is called upon to study the diverse systems of signs and to bring out the problems which result from a methodical comparison of these varied systems, that is to say, the general problem of SIGN: sign as a generic notion with respect to the particular classes of signs. (Jakobson 1985d [1975]: 199)

Hence the very hard effort of Jakobson, who tried to popularize Peirce's thought, which he had got acquaintance with thanks to a very

adventurous life characterized by many geographical moves, the last of which was to the United States. And thanks to a very peculiar scientific curiosity and thirst for knowledge. In a century now known to history for the demolition of communication barriers, it seems almost unthinkable that, to be able to have a syncretic view of the thought in one's own scientific field, one should have to 'travel through science', explore most libraries and lists of references and discover here and there what was written and was not yet spread to the rest of the world. But looking at Jakobson's biography, it really seems his case. In his approach to scientific writing, Jakobson is very different from such scholars who aspire to be understandable only by their colleagues in the strict sense of the word — he explains and translates terminologies:

> Peirce [...] makes a clear-cut distinction between the "material qualities", the *signans* of any sign, and its "immediate interpretant", that is, the *signatum*. Signs (or *representamina* in Peirce's nomenclature) offer three basic varieties of semiosis, three distinct "representative qualities" based on different relationships between the *signans* and *signatum*. This difference enables him to discern three cardinal types of signs. (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 346)

Maybe to be more understandable in Europe, maybe because he did not like neither Saussure's (*signifiant, signifié*) nor Peirce's terminology, maybe because he wanted to show the tie with Medieval thought in philosophy of language, Jakobson uses the Latin words *signans* (Saussure's 'signifiant' and Peirce's 'sign') and *signatum* (Saussure's 'signifié' and Peirce's 'object'). Since both Latin terms are participles, they could be — partially — intended as present participle of the verb "sign" ("signing") and past participle of the verb "sign" ("signed"), but in English the interference of the historically secondary meaning of "subscribe" would perhaps be too strong. Signs may be objects, i.e. tangible things:

> This use of things as signs, which the Czech inquirer into this peculiar form of communication, I. Osolsobě, has labeled "ostension", may be illustrated by the exhibition and compositional arrangement of synecdochic samples of shop goods in show windows or by the metaphoric choice of floral tributes. (Jakobson 1971i [1968]: 702)

In the following excerpt from Jakobson's article from 1965, the three types of signs in Peirce's system are explained. Please note that, in

doing so, Jakobson has in the foreground the notion of "distinctive trait": every type of sign is described first of all according to the dichotomies factual/imputed and similarity/contiguity. The latter is fundamental in Jakobson's thought, since it is at the center of his studies on aphasia and on metaphor and metonymy. Quotations within the quotation are — of course — from Peirce[1]:

> 1) The *icon* acts chiefly by a factual similarity between its signans and signatum [...]. 2) The *index* acts chiefly by a factual, existential contiguity between its signans and signatum, and "psychologically, the action of indices depends upon association by contiguity" [CP 2.306] [...]; Robinson Crusoe found an index; its *signans* was a footprint in the sand, and the inferred *signatum*, the presence of some human creature on his island [...]. 3) The *symbol* acts chiefly by imputed, learned contiguity between signans and signatum. This connection "consists in its being a rule" [CP 2.292] and does not depend on the presence or absence of any similarity or physical contiguity. (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 347)

In another, subsequent, article, Jakobson makes clear his way of systematizing Peirce's signs according to the two dichotomies. It looks as if Jakobson's cooperation with Peirce — had they lived at the same time and in the same place — would have produced great results, since Jakobson has a closer attention to systematization and clarity of expression, to the translation of the metalanguage, to didactics.

> The division of signs [...] is actually based on two substantial dichotomies. One of them is the difference between contiguity and similarity. The indexical relation between *signans* and *signatum* consists in their factual, existential contiguity. The forefinger pointing at a certain object is a typical index. The iconic relation between the *signans* and the *signatum* is, in Peirce's terms, "a mere community in some quality" [CP 1.558], a relative likeness sensed as such by the interpreter, e.g. a picture recognized as a landscape by the spectator. We preserve the name *symbol* used by Peirce for the third class of signs [...] no factual proximity is required between the noun *car* and the vehicle so named [...] the symbol "may be termed an imputed quality" [CP 1.558], according to Peirce's felicitous expression of 1867. (Jakobson 1971i [1968]: 699–700)

A translation process, leading from sign to object, concerns all types of signs. In semiotics, verbal language is not the center, the Ptolemaic

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[1]   References to Peirce's works, added in square brackets in this and following quotes, are mine — *B.O.*

Earth around which all other sign systems rotate, as in semiology —
except for metalanguage whose object language is verbal language.
However, the workings of words (i.e. verbal symbols) are one of the
main sources of Peirce's reflections on signs:

> The predominant task of symbols in our verbal (and not only verbal) creativity
> could be considered the mainspring of Peirce's doctrine, but I hate to use the
> label "doctrine", for the thinker himself categorically declared that for him
> science was not doctrine, but inquiry. (Jakobson 1985f [1977]: 253)

The reluctance to use the word "doctrine" is part of the attempt to
build a view of linguistics as an exact science. In any case, the
distinction between imputed and factual relationship, and between
similarity and contiguity, must not be taken as an absolute divide: in
most cases, if not in all cases, signs have some traits of more than one
of these features. As in every other field, there is no purity; it is rather
a question of nuances, of more or less insisted qualities.

> It is not the presence or absence of similarity or contiguity between the
> *signans* and *signatum*, not the purely factual or purely imputed, habitual
> connection between the two constituents which underlies the division of signs
> into icons, indices and symbols, but merely the predominance of one of these
> factors over the others. [...] "It would be difficult, if not impossible, to
> instance an absolutely pure index, or to find any sign absolutely devoid of the
> indexical quality" [CP 2.306]. Such a typical index as a pointing finger carries
> dissimilar connotations in different cultures; for instance, in certain South
> African tribes the object pointed at is thus damned. (Jakobson 1971g [1965]:
> 349)

Connotation, in this passage, looks like an affective component of
signs, culturally subjective in an individual or group sense. Were the
signs arbitrary, there could not *be* any affective component. Affects
play a role in signification from the moment when the sign triggers the
interpretant within the interpreter. And, since every individual has a
different life with different experiences, the apperception of everyone
is different; hence, emotions linked to signs (connotation) are
idiosyncratic.

> Peirce's concern with the different ranks of coassistance of the three functions
> in all three types of signs, and in particular his scrupulous attention to the
> indexical and iconic components of verbal symbols, is intimately linked with
> his thesis that "the most perfect of signs" are those in which the iconic,

> indexical, and symbolic characters "are blended as equally as possible" [CP 4.448]. Conversely, Saussure's insistence on the conventionality of language is bound to his assertion that "The entirely arbitrary signs are the most appropriate to fulfill the optimum semiotic process." (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 349)

In Saussure's opinion, it would seem, optimization of semiosis means abstraction from human reality (unaffective symbolism) and from emotions. His hypothesis of semiosis is devoid of any affects, which actually are the glue of acquisition of knowledge. The strength of memory is directly proportional to the intensity of affect linked to memorization. In Peirce's opinion, by contrast with Saussure, perfect semiosis is a mixture of all the types of signs:

> Peirce does not at all shut signs up in one of these three classes. These divisions are merely three poles, all of which can coexist within the same sign. The symbol, as he emphasized, may have an icon and/or an index incorporated into it. (Jakobson 1985f [1977]: 253)

Thus the "purity" of signs is impossible at the practical level. Moreover, according to different parameters, there are different subspecies of signs. For example, there are different types of icons:

> The correspondence in order between the *signans* and *signatum* finds its right place among the "fundamental varieties of possible semiosis" [CP 5.488] which were outlined by Peirce. He singled out two distinct subclasses of icons — images and diagrams. In images the *signans* represents the "simple qualities" [2.277] of the *signatum*, whereas for diagrams the likeness between the *signans* and *signatum* exists "only in respect to the relations of their parts" [CP 2.282]. (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 350)

Saussurean dichotomy and Peircean trichotomy are irreconcilable: they are two different views that lead from the same examples to different conclusions. The combination of the two views, if not "carefully handled", generates confusion because they refer to the same entities with different terms and to different entities with the same terms. A practical expression of this kind of confusion is the example used by Saussure to illustrate something that in Peircean terms would be the object, for Jakobson an iconic symbol, and for Saussure something completely different:

As to the icon, it is able to present [...] a sample of a given species of trees in a certain part of the year — a maple tree during the warm season, as in Saussure's illustration [...]. If the meaning of such an icon is generic, its generic sense is achieved through a synecdochic device of a *pars pro toto*; the icon becomes an 'iconic symbol'. (Jakobson 1971e [1959]: 268)

If one stressed too much the individual, idiosyncratic level of se-miosis, of meaning extraction or production, there could be doubts about the possibility of mutual understanding. But the social animals that men are express themselves through the ability to conjecture what could be the sense of a given contextualized sign for someone else, for the projection that everyone of us makes of the expected, supposed, general other:

When considering even the apparently simplest processes going on in language, it is necessary to keep in mind the force of unconscious generaliza-tion by the action of which a people subsumes all the phenomena of its mental life under certain general categories. (Baudouin de Courtenay, quoted in Jakobson 1985g [1978]: 149)

Such a generalizing projection is possible because we store in our mind a lot of information concerning the world. In this storage, we also keep what we did not understand and what we forgot we had understood. This is of great help when we try to guess about the rest of the world, or about the future:

"*habit*, i.e. unconscious memory" and on the other hand, "unconscious *oblivion* and incomprehension (forgetting of what was not consciously known and incomprehension of what could not be understood consciously); such forgetting and incomprehension constituting not something inconsequential and negative". (Baudouin de Courtenay, quoted in Jakobson 1985g [1978]: 150)

Of course, many tasks stand ahead in the systematization of signs and their typology. One is that, applying the two aforementioned dichoto-mies, a fourth kind of sign should emerge, as Jakobson promptly warns: imputed similarity.

However, the interplay of the two dichotomies — contiguity/similarity and factual/imputed — admits a fourth variety, namely, imputed similarity. Precisely this combination becomes apparent in musical semiosis. The intro-versive semiosis, a message which signifies itself, is indissolubly linked with the esthetic function of sign systems and dominates not only music but also

glossolalic poetry and nonrepresentational painting and sculpture. (Jakobson 1971i [1968]: 704–705)

To these examples of Jakobson's, one might add some particular actualizations of onomatopoeia, if one thinks of the verbal representation of the sounds of animals. Dog barking, for example, is different in every language: if in English dogs woof, while in Italian bau bau, in French ouah ouah, in Russian gav gav, and in Chinese wang wang, all these must be imputed similarities. But how could we name the fourth kind of sign? My proposal would be "homopoiesis", since it is a similarity (hence the root "homo-") that is creatively attributed (imputed). It sounds like an oxymoron at first, but, if you think of the mentioned examples, it is something that we do.

Jakobson, however, has another idea of imputed similarity: the device or, according to Russian Formalists, *priem*, that is every artifice or method or mechanism or figure used by writers (speakers) to modify the 'normal', unaffective way to express something:

The "artifice" is to be added to the triad of semiotic modes established by Peirce. This triad is based on two binary oppositions: contiguous/similar and factual/imputed. The contiguity of the two components of the sign is factual in the *index* but imputed in the *symbol*. Now, the factual similarity which typifies *icon* finds its logical foreseeable correlative in the imputed similarity which specifies the *artifice*, and it is precisely for this reason that the latter fits into the whole which is now forever **a four-part entity of semiotic modes**. (Jakobson 1985d [1975]: 215; my emphasis — *B. O.*)

Following his hint, one might propose that the fourth kind of link, or imputed similarity, is free association: a similarity that initially holds true only for the person who proposes it, that is imputed by him. Eventually, such a similarity is shared by listeners/readers, who come to see the object from a fresh point of view. This discovery of Jakobson's has a great potential, a potential that, however, was not yet fully displayed.

Another problem linked to sign typology that Jakobson leaves us to solve is the polymorphous nature of semiosis:

the linearity of the *signans* [...] has been shaken by the dissociation of phonemes into distinctive features. With the removal of these fundamentals, their corollaries in turn demand revision. Thus Peirce's graphic and palpable idea that "a symbol may have an icon [and/] or [...] an index incorporated into

it" [CP 4.447] opens new, urgent tasks and far-reaching vistas to the science of language. (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 357)

Since, with the permission of Saussure, we may consider the non-linear nature of the sign, there is room to imagine that any sign, according to what parts of it are put into light — iconic, symbolic, indexical, affective — may bear different senses.

2. Syntax, paradigm

Sentence construction is another field that Jakobson approaches with a scientific attitude. Starting from some of Peirce's observations on the diagrammatic nature of verbal language, he tries to continue on his path:

"algebra is but a sort of diagram", and "language is but a kind of algebra" [CP 3.419]. Peirce vividly conceived that "the arrangement of the words in the sentence, for instance, must serve as *icons*, in order that the sentence may be understood" [CP 4.544]. (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 350)

The representation of the syntactic system through a diagram becomes a translation process, and the way to trace sign relations (icons) in the connection between parts of the systems, icons that are superimposed onto the network of lexical meanings:

Such linguistic properties as the connectedness of linguistic entities with each other and with the initial and final limit of the sequence, the immediate neighborhood and distance, the centrality and peripherality, the symmetrical relations, and the elliptic removal of single components find their close equivalents in the constitution of graphs. The **literal translation** of an entire syntactic system into a set of graphs permits us to detach the diagrammatic, iconic forms of relations from the strictly conventional, symbolic features of that system. (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 351; my emphasis — *B. O.*)

Within every single word, too, morphemes have a similar iconic structure, so that part of the meaning of a word must be tracked in the iconic combination of morphemes it describes:

Not only the combination of words into syntactic groups but also the combination of morphemes into words exhibits a clear-cut diagrammatic

character. Both in syntax and in morphology any relation of parts and wholes agrees with Peirce's definition of diagrams and their iconic nature. (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 352)

Jakobson's great discovery (only in part derived from selection and combination in Saussure) of the two main types of connection between words — syntagm and paradigm — has conspicuous consequences for translation as well. Let us start again from the Western-European background on which Jakobson has built his powerful construction:

It is noteworthy that Saussure's classification had recourse to morphological criteria only, while syntax was actually laid aside. This oversimplified bipolar scheme is substantially amended by Peirce's, Sapir's, and Whorf's insights into wider, syntactic problems. In particular, Benjamin Whorf, with his emphasis on the "algebraic nature of language". (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 353)

This Saussurean oversimplification is a typical example of the consequences of hyper-specialization that — in every culture where it is promoted — tends to make scholars lose sight of the overall picture. Focusing on a single aspect of language — words, in the given example, as if they could exist in a standalone situation — deprived research of the necessary context. Having in mind the interrelation between oral and written speech, and always considering that oral speech is ontogenetically and phylogenetically the former, is a good way to avoid such a mistake.

In an article of 1956 we can already see the whole exposition of the two principles of verbal language, albeit with a slightly different terminology:

Any linguistic sign involves two modes of arrangement. 1) Combination. Any sign is made up of constituent signs and/or occurs only in combination with other signs. This means that any linguistic unit at one and the same time serves as a context for simpler units and/or finds its own context in a more complex linguistic unit. Hence any actual grouping of linguistic units binds them into a superior unit: combination and contexture are two faces of the same operation. 2) Selection. A selection between alternatives implies the possibility of substituting one for the other, equivalent to the former in one respect and different from it in another. Actually, selection and substitution are two faces of the same operation. (Jakobson 1971c [1956]: 243)

What is stated here is fundamental for the understanding of speech: the translation of language into speech has these two channels, through which the speaker's mental content must pass. This has obvious and well-known implications on the side of the study of brain functioning. Nevertheless, it has broad implications for the very semiotic theory based on Peirce's main triad formed by sign, interpretant, and object, too.

> These two operations provide each linguistic sign with two sets of interpretants, to utilize the effective concept introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce: there are two references which serve to interpret the sign — one to the code, and the other to the context, whether coded or free, and in each of these ways the sign is related to another set of linguistic signs, through an alternation in the former case and through an alignment in the latter. (Jakobson 1971c [1956]: 244)

If we agree with Jakobson that there are two possible *types* of logical link of a word with another, and we apply this notion to Peirce's schema of the logical development of — both inner and outer — speech, the picture we obtain is rather new. If Figure 1 was the former schema, then we obtain something like this new way of representing the lines of translation of meaning (Fig. 2).

			↗	object 1
sign	→	interpretants	→	object 2
			↘	object 3...

Figure 1. Schema of the logical development of speech in Peircean terms.

|				
			↗	object P1
		paradigmatic interpretants	→	object P2
	↗		↘	object P3...
sign				
	↘		↗	object S1
		syntagmatic interpretants	→	object S2
			↘	object S3...

Figure 2. Translation of meaning when applying the two Jakobsonian types of logical links between words to the Peircean schema.

That pours light on the different outcomes of semiosis, both on the verbal front and on the front of reasoning. If this is the situation from the point of view of inner working, it has consequences on the outer form of speech as well:

> The development of a discourse may take place along two different semantic lines: one topic may lead to another either through their similarity or through their contiguity. The metaphoric way would be the most appropriate term for the first case and the metonymic way for the second, since they find their most condensed expression in metaphor and metonymy respectively. (Jakobson 1971c [1956]: 254)

Metaphor is the trope of similarity, since a metaphor is a simile without the explication of the "missing link". And metonymy is the trope of contiguity, since instead of the more immediate word, another one is used that is connected to the first by a logical link of context. From the two different mental principles, also different forms of text are originated:

> The principle of similarity underlies poetry; the metrical parallelism of lines, or the phonic equivalence of rhyming words prompts the question of semantic similarity and contrast; there exist, for instance, grammatical and anti-grammatical but never agrammatical rhymes. Prose, on the contrary, is forwarded essentially by contiguity. Thus, for poetry, metaphor, and for prose, metonymy is the line of least resistance and, consequently, the study of poetical tropes is directed chiefly toward metaphor. (Jakobson 1971c [1956]: 258–259)

This assertion alone breaks the walls between psychology, linguistics, and textology. And, to all of this, we have to add personal style and idiosyncrasies: the style of a text, consequently, can be analyzed in terms of mental connections:

> In manipulating these two kinds of connection (similarity and contiguity) in both their aspects (positional and semantic) — selecting, combining, and ranking them — an individual exhibits his personal style, his verbal predilections and preferences. (Jakobson 1971c [1956]: 255)

Even if syntax is a chain, a line, and is therefore bi-dimensional, preventing deviations on a third dimension — as in a hypertext, for example — the normal, horizontal development of a sentence is nonetheless characterized by stylistic devices, above all by word

markedness: every word can be marked, from a semantic or syntactical point of view:

> Any syntactic structure is a member of a transformational chain and any two partially synonymous constructions display an interrelation of markedness and unmarkedness. For example, in English the passive is marked in relation to the unmarked active mood. (Jakobson 1985c [1972]: 90)

In a time when Chomskian "trees" dominate over the whole linguistic universe, Jakobson implicitly argues against them. Speech, more than its "bare intelligence content" (what is described by tree graphs) has many nuances of meaning produced by the choice of different "synonyms", different syntactical forms, different kinds of markedness:

> it is still opportune to recall that the code is not confined to what communication engineers call "the bare intelligence content" of speech, but that likewise the stylistic stratification of the lexical symbols and the allegedly "free" variation, both in their constitution and in their combination rules, are "foreseen and provided for" by the code. (Jakobson 1971f [1960]: 573)

This paragraph introduced us to the nexus between inner speech and outer forms of expression. There were many hints at the possibility of development of meaning: this will be the topic of the next paragraph.

3. Evolution of meaning and invariance

The mechanism of signification is based on the translation of a sign into an interpretant into an object. Being translation, obviously it is characterized by a partial loss and a partial invariance. And, as all translation processes, it implies also that the result will have new meanings, will add potential meanings to the process. So every passage of information, every logical passage, implies a change of information:

> The *Metalogicus* by John of Salisbury supplied Peirce with his favorite quotation: "*Nominantur singularia, sed universalia significantur*". How many futile and trivial polemics could have been avoided among students of language if they had mastered Peirce's *Speculative Grammar*, and particularly its thesis that "a genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning" and

that this meaning in turn "can only be a symbol", since "*omne symbolum de symbolo*". A symbol is not only incapable of indicating any particular thing and necessarily "denotes a kind of thing", but "it is itself a kind and not a single thing". (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 358)

Jakobson repeatedly refers to Peirce's repeatedly referring to John of Salisbury: every single sign refers to many objects; every one of these objects, in its turn, can be seen as a sign referring to many objects. Signification (and decoding) is a multiple-choice process that, as Jiří Levý (1967) used to say about translation, has a single input and several possible outputs. Every interpretant is a diamond dissecting light into many different rays and colors and directions. The logical line of the speaker's (writer's) mind chooses given signs having in mind a given meaning, but the logical line of the listener's (reader's) mind chooses given meanings having in mind a given interpretation. In this way — through what can be named a continuous "mis-understanding" —, meanings evolve:

> This interplay of universals and particulars, which is often underrated by linguists, has for ages been discussed among logicians and philosophers of language. (Jakobson 1985c [1972]: 90)

Specification and generalization thus play a fundamental role in the evolution of meaning, with the peculiarity that their main explicit features do not imply any semantic change at all: specification should only condense, synthesize the general meaning of a sign, and generalization apparently extends, amplifies the meaning to many more objects, but, *apparently*, without changing it. These two mechanisms, that are key in interlingual verbal translation, too, are continuously at work in normal semiosis:

> Peirce's semiotic doctrine is the only sound basis for a strictly linguistic semantics. One can't help but agree with his view of meaning as translatability of a sign into a network of other signs and with his reiterated emphasis on the inherence of a "general meaning" in any "genuine symbol" [CP 2.293], as well as with the sequel of the quoted assertion: A symbol "cannot indicate any particular thing: it denotes a kind of thing. Not only that, but it is itself a kind and not a single thing" [CP 2.301]. (Jakobson 1985b [1956]: 118)

When we use a single word to communicate with the outer world, it is as if we went around with a tray full of mugs, it is as if mugs (possible

meanings of the single word) came only in sets of many mugs. One mug (special nuance of a word) is the one that interests us in the given chronotopic context, but the other ones are inseparable, and go around with it. When we stop at a table to deliver our tray (word), we put down our tray having in mind one particular mug (acceptation), but our receivers, sitting at the table, since we (inevitably) give them a lot of mugs with different drinks (acceptations), may decide that they prefer to interpret our word as composed of some other drink, and we, senders, don't always realize that. (And, of course the effect is maximized if we go around not with a single word, but with a text composed of many words.) Maybe this also is imputed similarity?

> Our word "always bears a greater amount of information than our consciousness is able to extract from it, since at the basis of our words lie our unconscious linguistic sets". (A. E. Sherozia, quoted in Jakobson 1985g [1978]: 161)

Metaphor and metonymy, figures of speech in general, and different kinds of imputed similarities are not therefore peculiar to artistic texts, they are simply the fundamental mechanisms of meaning construction, together with generalization and specification.

> The metaphor (or metonymy) is an assignment of a *signans* to a secondary *signatum* associated by similarity (or contiguity) with the primary *signatum*. (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 355)

One mechanism of modification of sense is what Jakobson calls "lexical tropes". A message contains the word "star", and this word has a primary meaning — in the physical sense — and (among others) a secondary meaning (that of a very well known person). Such a duplicity allows potential decoders to opt for one or the other of the two considered meanings, producing the (mis-)understanding that modifies the sense of the text and producing the evolution of meaning.

> A partial similarity of two *signata* may be represented by a partial similarity of *signantia*, as in the instances discussed above, or by a total identity of *signantia*, as in the case of **lexical tropes** [my emphasis — *B. O.*]. *Star* means either a celestial body or a person — both of preeminent brightness. A hierarchy of two meanings — one primary, central, proper, context-free; and the other secondary, marginal, figurative, transferred, contextual — is a characteristic feature of such asymmetrical couples. (Jakobson 1971g [1965]: 355)

This continuous translation process of semiosis is due to the continuous change of context: in every context, a more or less slightly different subcode is used. And every time that a text moves from one context to the next, there is a reciprocal adaptation of the text to the context and of the context to the text. And the text is read (decoded) in a more or less slightly different light:

> The *convertible code* of language with all its fluctuations from subcode to subcode and with all the current progressing changes which this code is undergoing, is to be jointly and comprehensively described by the means of lingusistics and communication theory. An insight into the dynamic synchrony of language, involving the space-time coordinates, must replace the traditional pattern of arbitrarily restricted static descriptions. (Jakobson 1971f [1960]: 574)

During such a passage from one context to another, it may well happen that specification and generalization work in the direction of translating words into terms and vice versa. This also is a mechanism of meaning-changing:

> The ways in which *per translationem* a *nomen* turns in discourse into a *terminus* were intently explored, with many still valid and suggestive linguistic finds, and with a rigid delimination of *suppositio formalis* (object language) and different varieties of *suppositio materialis* (metalanguage), neatly discerned by Shyreswoode. (Jakobson 1985e [1975]: 195)

An ingenuous reader could think that, even if we agree with the existence of such a meaning-changing mechanism, there are however words for which that mechanism doesn't occur: proper names. They are very peculiar words that, having been attributed to someone or something in particular, cannot be subject to variance. Our temporary delusion soon faces disillusionment in Jakobson's words:

> Even in proper names the "sign design" always has a broader meaning than any single "sign instance". The context indicates whether we speak about Napoleon in his infancy, at Austerlitz, in Moscow, in captivity, on his deathbed, or in posthumous legends. (Jakobson 1971e [1959]: 268)

Communication and evolution of meaning through translation are at work in any kind of intrapersonal (thought) and interpersonal relation. Therefore, the point in this case — as in the case of interlingual verbal translation — is to find the means to define the invariant: what

remains of the original intended message in the final effective message.

> [...] replying to the question of invariance: [...] "the word and its meaning are both general rules" [CP 2.292]. (Jakobson 1985f [1975]: 252)

Interlingual verbal translation and general semiosis have a very similar course, and they can be used for a reciprocal checking of the other's functioning. Here we see how in Jakobson's (and Shannon's) opinion the invariant can be defined:

> The semiotic definition of a symbol's meaning as its translation into other symbols finds an effectual application in the linguistic testing of intra- and interlingual translation, and this approach to semantic information concurs with Shannon's proposal to define information as "that which is invariant under all reversible encoding or translating operations", briefly, as "the equivalence class of all such translations". (Jakobson 1971f [1960]: 578)

Jakobson himself sees the affinity between tropes (metaphor and metonymy) and usual meaning production in "normal" (non-artistic) texts. The shared part between Jakobson and Shannon is the existence of a part of meaning that is expressed, and another part that is not expressed, and may be — arguably — guessed in different ways by different decoders:

> Each and every sign is a *referral* (*renvoi*) (following the famous *aliquid stat pro aliquo*). The parallelism alluded to by the master and theoretician of poetry, Gerard Manley Hopkins, is a referral from one sign to a similar one in its totality or at least in one of its two facets (the *signans* or the *signatum*). One of the two "correspective" signs, as Saussure designates them, refers back to another, present or implied in the same context, as we can see in the case of a metaphor where only the "vehicle" is *in praesentia*. (Jakobson 1985d [1975]: 215)

In this process of decoding, the presence/absence of elements means that what is absent in the text must be present in the context. Such problem of presence involves the referral to different times. Peirce attributes to the three types of signs the three different times (symbol–future, index–present, icon–past). Jakobson holds that the artifice [*priem*], as a fourth dimension of signification, is a bridge over times:

> "Parallelism" as a characteristic feature of all artifice is the referral of a
> semiotic fact to an equivalent fact inside the same context [...]. This [...]
> allows us to complement the system of times which Peirce includes in his
> semiotic triad [...]. The artifice retains the *atemporal* interconnection of the
> two parallels within their common context. (Jakobson 1985d [1975]: 216)

Translation is, therefore, transportation of a text from one context into
another. And, on the other side, communication is the ability to decide
what is necessary to express and what can be taken/given for granted
since it is suggested by the context, with all the consequent problems
of redundancy and loss. This is the subject of the next paragraph.

4. Cultural basis of translation

What is lacking in the thought of some very well-known linguists,
before Halliday at least, — like, for example, Saussure and Choms-
ky — is the effort to take into account a fundamental component of
speech, or, the main difference between speech and language: context.
That may have been the consequence of a too narrow, specialized
approach to the subject. In other words, it is the consequence of
linguistics meant as a science that can exist without considering all the
semiotic and psychological aspects implied in verbal language:

> Peirce denies (in the same way as the Gestalt psychologists) the possibility of
> speaking about constituents without analyzing the structural relation between
> the constituents and the whole. (Jakobson 1985f [1977]: 252)

A correct (complete) setup of the problem implies the contextual,
cultural dimension, as any translator can testify. As we have seen in
the previous paragraph, not only classical — interlingual, verbal —
translation, but also every act of signification, every intra- and inter-
personal communication is transportation of a text from a context into
another. But, since the text is not a thing, but it is a living being that
has a mutual relationship with the environment in which it lives,
changing its environment means changing its reaction to it, like a
sheep passing from a cold winter to a hot summer, with the con-
sequent change of contextual covering.

For this reason, considering the context is fundamental even when
speaking of the most elementary principles of communication and

translation, i.e. semiosis. Even Peirce — quoted by Jakobson — speaks of a selective interpretant, whose difference from the "usual" interpretant is that the context ("reality") contributes to its significance:

> Signs are viewed by Peirce as equivalent "when either might have been an interpretant of the other" [CP 5.569]. It must be emphasized again and again that the basic, immediate, "selective" interpretant of any sign is "all that is explicit in the sign itself apart from its context and circumstance of utterance" [CP 5.473], or in more unified terms: apart from its context either verbal or only verbalizable but not actually verbalized. (Jakobson 1985b [1956]: 118)

Peirce writes:

> We have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation. [CP 4.536]

It is clear that in natural language, in speech, we have to consider above all the dynamical object, since the immediate object is mostly an abstraction.

The explicit (written, spoken) text is but a minimum percentage of the message that must be completed by contextual information. Since the context does not 'suggest' which parts of it should be considered in single occurrences of text, there are the well known to translators problems of misunderstanding due to the different contextualization of the utterance:

> The probabilistic aspect of speech finds conspicuous expression in the approach of the listener to homonyms, whereas for the speaker homonymy does not exist. When saying /sʌn/, he knows beforehand whether "sun" or "son" is meant, while the listener depends on the conditional probabilities of the context. For the receiver, the message presents many ambiguities which were unequivocal for the sender. The ambiguities of pun and poetry utilize this input property for the output. (Jakobson 1971f [1960]: 575–576)

Creativity is, thus, basic for communication, for understanding, for translating. Such creativity is partly conscious and partly unconscious. A good translator (communicator) — and a good semiotician — uses

a generous dose of creativity in inferring, conjecturing possible inter-
pretive keys:

> "any linguistic compromise occurring between peoples speaking different
> languages" inevitably involves "a certain portion of conscious creativity" [...]
> unconscious (*nieświadome*) psychical processes also have the capability of
> becoming conscious (*uświadomianie*), but their potential consciousness is
> actually identifiable with the unconscious (*nieświadomość*). (Jakobson 1985g
> [1978]: 152; Jakobson's quotations are from Baudouin de Courtenay)

Between unconscious and conscious use of language there is a
relationship similar to the one existing between language and meta-
language, translation (semiosis) and reflections on translation (semio-
sis). Everybody can translate (code/decode) aconsciously, without
realizing why, for whom, to what aim, without being able to explain
why s/he has made given choices. From this wild state, 'translators'
can grow to a conscious state from which they can observe the 'wild
life' of their being translators in a natural state and detach from it to
observe it as an object, something 'other':

> the influence of the consciousness [on language] can and does impede the
> development of a language; it counteracts the influence of unconscious
> forces — forces which by and large promote a more rapid development of
> language — and does so precisely for the purpose of making language a
> common instrument for the unification and mutual comprehension of all
> contemporary members of a nation, and its forebears and descendants, as well.
> (Jakobson 1985g [1978]: 151)

Every consideration about speech (language in context) must neces-
sarily account for the environmental variables. Since invariance is a
key notion in semiotics/translation, to speak about it one must con-
sider the three directions in which, according to Jakobson, a speech
can be contextually different: explicitness/implicitness, historicization/
modernization, and formality/informality.

> Any verbal code is convertible and necessarily comprises a set of distinct
> subcodes or, in other words, functional varieties of language. Any speech
> community has at its disposal 1) more explicit and more elliptic patterns, with
> an orderly scale of transitions from a maximal explicitness to an extreme
> ellipsis, 2) a purposive alternation of more archaic and newfangled dictions, 3)
> a patent difference between rules of ceremonial, formal and informal, slovenly
> speech. (Jakobson 1971h [1967]: 667)

It does not make any sense to study speech in isolation, to study language as an abstract discipline that has nothing to do with everyday reality. That is not communication, it is an abstraction that can be used to exercise the mind as a game.

> First, every single constituent of any linguistic system is built on an oppo-
> sition of two logical contradictories: the presence of an attribute ("marked-
> ness") in contraposition to its absence ("unmarkedness"). [...] And second, the
> continual, all-embracing, purposeful interplay of invariants and variations
> proves to be an essential, innermost property of language at each of its levels.
> (Jakobson 1985c [1972]: 91)

The point in speech is not the structure of an utterance, the primitive meanings of the signs implied, the Chomskian 'deep structure' of a sentence. Such proceedings do not help research on translation in any way, as no summary of a work of art can be a substitute for its proto-text. What the professional translator (and the semiotician) strives to understand, and mostly cares for, is the form of expression of a given content:

> These two dyads — markedness/unmarkedness and variation/invariance —
> are indissolubly tied to the be-all and end-all of language, to the fact, as
> Edward Sapir [...] put it, that "language is the communicative process par
> excellence in every known society". (Jakobson 1985c [1972]: 91)

The key word for a translator is "variation": of the thousand of thousands ways to say something, in how many ways it is possible to describe the single variation chosen by the given author in the given passage. And, by shifting the context, in what way can we try to preserve some kind of invariance in the passage?

> It is the context-sensitivity of a natural language at *all* levels that provides it
> with a unique abundance of free variations. The dialectical tension between
> invariants and variables, which in their own way also appear to be pertinent,
> ensures the creativity of language. (Jakobson 1985c [1972]: 89)

In the first years of Soviet power, someone felt the need to change names of things so that they could reflect their 'objective' state. Jakobson cites the case of the 'rise' and the 'setting' of the sun, and the people who had proposed a revision of the vocabulary. The change of context in question, in this case, is not the physical context, but human knowledge of the physical context. Jakobson explains the superfluity of

such a linguistic change by quoting (implicitly) Peirce and his view of interpretation as translation, of interpretant as translatant:

> In the first years of the Russian revolution there were fanatic visionaries who argued in Soviet periodicals for a radical revision of traditional language and particularly for the weeding out of such misleading expressions as "sunrise" or "sunset". Yet we still use this Ptolemaic imagery without implying a rejection of Copernican doctrine, and we can easily transform our customary talk about the rising and setting sun into a picture of the earth's rotation simply because any sign is translatable into a sign in which it appears to us more fully developed [CP 5.594] and precise. (Jakobson 1971d [1959]: 262)

In other words, we are able to speak about the 'rise' and the 'setting' of the sun without being forced to the dogma of words since we are able to translate them. If cultural context influences the way one speaks, on the other hand the linguistic code influences the way one must express oneself. Explicitness and implicitness are not only part of the cultural context at large; they are part of the linguistic code as well.

> Languages differ essentially in what they *must* convey and not in what they *can* convey. [...] Naturally the attention of native speakers and listeners will be constantly focused on such items as are compulsory in their verbal code. (Jakobson 1971d [1959]: 264–265)

In any natural language we can express absolutely everything, since there are infinite combinations of signs. (Or, to be more exact, the number of possible combinations is given by the number of words raised to the same number power: a quantity so high that, for any human — mortal! — being, to all practical purposes, results higher than the combinations one has time to try in a lifespan.) If this is still considered not enough, Jakobson suggests thinking of the opportunity to create words.

> All cognitive experience and its classification is conveyable in any existing language. Whenever there is a deficiency, terminology can be qualified and amplified by loanwords or loan-translations, by neologisms or semantic shifts, and, finally, by circumlocutions. (Jakobson 1971d [1959]: 263)

For this reason, the different structure of languages is not an insurmountable obstacle in interlingual translation, it implies the rendering of senses that in one language are expressed by grammatical categories though paraphrases or other lexical means:

> If some grammatical category is absent in a given language, its meaning may be translated into this language by lexical means. Dual forms like Old Russian *brata* are translated with the help of the numeral: 'two brothers'. It is more difficult to remain faithful to the original when we translate into a language provided with a certain grammatical category from a language lacking such a category. [...] In order to translate accurately the English sentence *I hired a worker*, a Russian needs supplementary information. (Jakobson 1971d [1959]: 263–264)

If from a narrowly linguistic — lexicalistic — point of view such a problem can be a real problem, from a semiotic point of view it is trivial: what in a language is expressed by lexical means, in another language is expressed by grammatical means, in a sort of intersemiotic translation. Semiotics adds one more scientific dimension to the study of verbal communication. And, as Jakobson shows, in such a semiotic approach the notion of "translation" is absolutely central. It is not linguistics that studies translation, as some scholars of the old lexicalist school have been thinking for more than half a century; it is translation that studies semiotics, including linguistics. Maybe translation is an imputed similarity as well?[2]

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Якобсон: перевод как предполагаемое сходство

Якобсон пытался в своих эссе вместить пирсовскую типологию знаков (икона, индекс, символ) в рамки собственной бинарной логики, в которой каждый признак текста может быть рассмотрен как 0 или 1 (наличие, присутствие). В ходе этого он пользовался парами признаков «сходство vs смежность» и «предполагемое vs существующее» и пришел к выводу, что пирсовская триада не покры-

вает понятия «предполагаемого сходства». Отсюда и его поиски отсутствующего понятия. Данная статья основывается в основном на работах Якобсона и пытается показать, что именно понятие перевода является этим отсутствующим звеном.

Исходя из основной триады Пирса и ее первоначальной интерпретации западными учеными соссюрианского толка, интерпретанта здесь рассматривается в качестве субъективного и аффективного компонента знака и его интерпретации. Синтаксис, рассмотренный в терминах Пирса и Якобсона, является иконическим. Развитие значения, являющегося основой любой коммуникации, возможно благодаря конструкциям и метафорическим и метонимическим связям. Последняя часть статьи рассматривает культурные импликации коммуникации и перевода.

Jakobson: tõlge kui oletatav sarnasus

Jakobson on oma esseedes üritanud Peirce'i märgitüpoloogiat (ikoon, indeks, sümbol) mahutada enda binaarsesse loogikasse, kus igat teksti-tunnust võib iseloomustada vastavalt kas 0 või 1-ga (puudub, olemas). Selle käigus on ta kasutanud tunnustepaare "sarnasus versus külgnevus" ja "oletatav versus faktiline" ning on jõudnud järeldusele, et Peirce'i triaad ei kata "oletatava sarnasuse" mõistet. Siit lähtuvad ka tema otsingud antud mõiste leidmiseks. Käesolev essee, mille ideeline alus ja viitestik pärineb suuremalt jaolt Jakobsoni esseedest, üritab näidata, et just tõlke mõiste on siinkohal puuduvaks lüliks. Lähtudes Peirce'i põhitriaadist ning sellest, kuidas Saussure'i-mõjulised Lääne teadlased seda algselt tõlgendasid, käsitletakse tõlgendit (interpretanti) siin märgi ja selle tõlgenduse subjektiivse ning afektiivse komponendina. Süntaks on Peirce'i ja Jakobsoni mõistetes ikooniline. Kommunikatsiooni kui sellise põhijooneks olev tähenduse areng on võimalik tänu konstruktsioonidele ning metafoorsetele ja metonüümsetele seostele. Artikli viimane osa käsitleb kommunikatsiooni (ja tõlke) kultuurilisi implikatsioone.

Jakobson and Peirce:
Translational intersemiosis and
symbiosis in opera

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Abstract. Metalinguistic operations signify understanding and translation, specified in Jakobson's varieties of six language functions and his three types of translation. Both models were first presented in the 1950s. This article is rooted in Jakobson's models in connection with Peirce's three categories. Bühler's three functions with qualitative difference anticipated, perhaps not accidentally, Jakobson's distinctions indicating qualitative difference within literary forms and structures as well as other fine arts. The semiotic discovery, criticism and perspective of elements and code-units settle the numerical differences as well as the differences in realistic messages and conceptual codes. Jakobson's intersemiotic translation is updated in vocal translation, which deals with the virtual reality of opera on stage, reaching a catharsis of the operatic mystique. The word-tone synthesis of opera (or semiosic symbiosis) will demonstrate the typological unification of verbal and nonverbal languages.

Jakobson's translational paradigm

Language — that first and supreme tool which *homo* (man and woman) as a fabricator of linguistic and cultural projects shapes to communicate, to teach, and to command — employs as two essential tools visual (graphemic) features for fixing within written texts, and sonic and tactile features (words, looks, gestures) used in oral interpreting. Both spoken and written messages, plus the accompanying paralanguage, can be translated semiotically, and equally referred to

nonverbal languages. All current work about the different combinations between linguistic and non-linguistic texts — Jakobson's intersemiotic translational work — is rooted in his own almost classical diagram about the three kinds of "interpreting a verbal sign" distinguished as divided but correlated forms of translation:

1) Intralingual translation or *rewording* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language.
2) Interlingual translation or *translation proper* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language.
3) Intersemiotic translation or *transmutation* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems. (Jakobson 1959: 233)[1]

Jakobson's threefold division of translational expressions in literary (poetic) form gives the term translation extralinguistic horizons (Gorlée 1994: 147–168; 1997: 240–244; 2005b: 34–35) beyond "translation proper" (Jakobson 1959: 233). The wider phenomenon including "unconventional" forms of translation is either supported by non-semiotic translation theoreticians (e.g., Sager 1986: 331) or often rejected as being non-empirical (e.g., Koller 1992: 82ff.). The pros and contras will, with an ongoing wider acceptance of semiotic methodology, lead to a generalized acceptance of Jakobson's three types of translation.

Jakobson's diagrammatical structure represents a sign that reflects the relational structure of translations. In the 1950s, intralingual, interlingual, and intersemiotic translations were new theoretical possibilities of understanding a text-sign. Intralingual translating is "the replaced and replacing entities being functions of two variants within one and the same natural language, whether free (e.g., in a definition) or bound (i.e. belonging in two complementary subsystems of that language, such as two registers, two historical layers, or two stylistic types)" (Toury 1986: 1113). It is exemplified by the rewording of summaries and paraphrases, including the re-interpreting, re-editing, amplifying, condensing, parodying, commenting, restyling, rephrasing, and retextualizing form

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[1]   The triadic division of *On linguistic aspects of translation* (1959) had already been anticipated by Jakobson and introduced in brief terms in his inaugural address to a conference of anthropologists and linguists at Indiana University in 1952 (Jakobson 1971b: 566). See note 10.

and contents of original source texts.[2] Interlingual translation is "the two codes being two different, independent natural languages" and inter-semiotic translation is "the two codes being two different sign-systems, whether one of them is verbal or not" (Toury 1986: 1113). Intralingual translation is a monadic activity, due to its one-language-oriented equi-valences of flexible code-units. Intralingual translation, the conventional translation proper, is dyadic, since it involves two-language-oriented-ness (or three-or-more-language-orientedness). It stands for a kind of warfare or conflict, embodying a contradiction between Saussurean *langue* and *parole*. Interlingual translation is a re-encounter between textual and verbal "reality" in the colloquial sense of the human orientation to reality. The "intermediate" interlingual translation is not as close or clear as intralingual translation, nor as ambiguous or unclear as the understanding of meaning in intersemiotic translation. Inter-semiotic translation is sequentially triadic (or more complex), since it involves the union of intermedial translations into an embedded one.[3]

The differences between intralingual, interlingual, and inter-semiotic translation are time/space differences without any internal habitat, but still based on the mood, fashion, and taste of the social consensus (responding to Peirce's finite and infinite community). The central presence is abstracted from the intuition, perception or cognition of the translator, but no objective reality (that is, the concept of appearance of the outside world) is available (Gorlée 2004b: 224–225). The process and effect of the translator is subjective and ego-centric. The translation is free and multi-purpose; it could be per-formed in any present in changeable time, or located in any time. Meanwhile, translation is restricted by cultural — commercial, political, and religious — values and forces, which inform the translators about the yes/no choices that must be made, and by the

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[2] For example: translating encyclopedia items and articles on cloning and DNA to school children; explaining Nazi propaganda to modern readership; clarifying Biblical text in modern terms; and transposing dialect into normalized language. Examples abound in daily and scholarly life.

[3] The three kinds of translation were rather narrowly defined by Jakobson, who was still unconcerned with reverse or inverse operations during the remainder of the 20th century. Now, in the 21st century experimentations with intermedia and multi-media art became common as artists searched for new expressions. In Jakobson's original terms, the translation of non-linguistic into linguistic text-signs, and the translation of nonverbal signs by means of other nonverbal signs of the same or different language (or "language") is lacking.

rules and strategies established by the community in the background. In Jakobson's types of translation we speak of all possible changes, exchanges, and interchanges in time, tenses, and temporal-spatial differences, in order to deal with their free effects on the act(s) of translating text-signs.

Jakobson's 1959 overview of the target text in his types of translation proposed new multimedia effects in the language, still to come. Later, in 1968, Jakobson remarked on the semiotic capabilities of the mixed medium, language:

> The exceptionally rich repertoire of definitely coded meaningful units (morphemes and words) is made possible through the diaphanous system of their merely differential components devoid of proper meaning (distinctive features, phonemes, and the rules of their combinability). These components are semiotic entities *sui generis*. The signatum of such an entity is bare otherness, namely a presumable semantic difference between the meaningful units to which it pertains and those which *ceteris paribus* do not contain the same entity. (Jakobson 1971a: 707)

Regarding the freedom and lack of freedom of intersemiotic translation, involving codified parts and elements of language, Jakobson added:

> A rigorous dualism separates the lexical and idiomatic, totally coded units of natural language from its syntactic pattern which consists of coded matrices with a relatively free selection of lexical units to fill them up. A still greater freedom and still more elastic rules of organization characterize the combination of sentences into higher units of discourse. (Jakobson 1971a: 707)

The flexible radius of intersemiosis was performed and discussed in the focus of Jakobson's symbiosis of painting, film, and other art forms along with expressions in literary form. For Jakobson, language held center stage.

Jakobson's broader situation of translation generates imitations of all kinds and genres, with direct and true (mimetic) and indirect and feigned or manipulative (non-mimetic) insights for the new target readership. His translational overview was anticipated by Auerbach's classic volume *Mimesis* (1957; German edition 1946, English translation 1953) examining the use of mimetic representation in Western literature. The concept of mimesis was borrowed from visual arts including painting, sculpture, dance, pantomime, and the visual side of acting and theater (e.g., light, decorations, costume, make-up,

gesture and tone of voice). The portrayal of reality is pictured using fragments from literature — from the adventures of Odysseus, the sagas of Roland, Pantagruel, Don Quijote and Sancho Panza to modern writers such as Zola and Virginia Wolf — which Auerbach criticized (or questioned) about their literary mimesis.

Auerbach's *Mimesis* is characterized as a chronological approach as mentioned in Maran's article (2003: 203), yet Auerbach's focus of the discussions of realism and lack of realism is equally causal, rhetorical, poetic, and typological. Literary iconicity (Nöth 1990: 348–349) focuses on the realistic imitation (not the real thing) of different aspects of human inward and outward reality, seen through the daily, intellectual, social, economical, religious, and other conceptions of reality to attract support in the form of faith or belief in the poetic imagery. Auerbach's *Mimesis* includes examinations of meaningful memory-pictures of persons with love and hate, friendship and hostility, their milieu and surroundings, and even dealt with fanciful dreams and fantasies. Taken from Jakobson's classification, Auerbach's description can be considered a transposition in language or, better yet, a translation of the real thing.[4]

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[4] Auerbach was born in Berlin (1892) into a Jewish family and studied Romance languages at German universities. In his early work, he was sad and depressed by the fate of European civilization (Dirda 2007). *Mimesis* was his classic (pre-semiotic) manual about classical and modern realism written by in Istanbul, where he lived as a Jewish emigré during World War II. He designed and proceeded this significant study in Turkey, where as he wrote in the epilogue of *Mimesis*, "the libraries are not well equipped for European studies. International communications were impeded; I had to dispense with almost all periodicals, with almost all the recent investigations, and in some cases with reliable critical editions of my texts" (Auerbach 1957: 489). Auerbach's intellectual situation was startling, but "[s]ome guiding ideas began to crystallize, and these I sought to pursue" (1957: 489). Auerbach survived the Holocaust and emigrated to United States, where he published his semiotic history of the literary sign in "'Figura'", the title enclosed with quotation marks (Auerbach 1959: 11–76) as a comprehensive folding of outline, imprint, copy, allegory, prefiguration and other terms to show the authenticity of the "art of hinting, insinuating, obscuring circumlocution, calculated to ornament a statement or to make it more forceful or mordant" (Auerbach 1959: 27). His mercurial story resembles Jakobson's geographical and political "alienation" from his native Eastern Europe, and was in those days a sad but general "policy" for the Jewish intelligentsia. Auerbach's biography anticipates the modern literary criticism of the later Barthes and the schismatic and doctrinal unity of structural semiotics.

Intersemiotic translation is the decentering of verbal language to transpose it into nonverbal languages (Gorlée 1997: 240–244; 2005b: 38–42),[5] and in those days new project of the productive implications, both theoretical and practical, of general semiotics for humanistic studies. Intersemiosis was understood by Jakobson to refer to the one-way metalingual operation in which linguistic signs are creatively transposed or recodified into nonlinguistic codes and elements. Jakobson's famed passage of 1960 artistic examples reads:

> We can refer to the possibility of transposing *Wuthering Heights* into a motion picture, medieval legends into frescoes and miniatures, or *L'après-midi d'un faune* into music, ballet, and graphic art. However ludicrous may appear the idea of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in comics, certain structural features of their plot are preserved despite the disappearance of their verbal shape. The question whether Blake's illustrations to the *Divina Commedia* are not adequate is a proof that different arts are comparable. The problems of baroque art or any other historical style transgress the frame of a single art. When handling the surrealist metaphor, we could hardly pass by Max Ernst's pictures or Luis Buñuel's film, *The Andalusian Dog* and *The Golden Age.* (Jakobson 1960: 350–351)

The creative side of intersemiotic recoding presupposes the improvised desire and free will (on the part of the receptor) translations from the meaning of written signs of a verbal language into a language in a mixed, metaphorical manner of speaking; see visual languages (e.g., plastic arts, painting, sculpture, computer language, architecture, and photography), kinesic languages (e.g., ballet and pantomime), auditive languages (e.g., music and song) and intermedial languages (e.g., cinema and opera).

If music, painting and dance movements may be considered for "study", they are essentially private sensations, expressed publicly to the environment but in and of themselves asserting nothing from a semiological viewpoint. Their performance (see the mixed "narrative" of a sculpture, a film, or an opera) consists of a mixed iconic-indexical sign-event. Thereby a distinction between the sign and its object is drawn, providing a represented meaning and a cultural norm. The

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With help from Auerbach's *Mimesis* I wrote about signs of magic in *Don Quijote* (Gorlée 1988).

[5] My explanation develops the argument in Gorlée (2004a: 55–56) and is a brief excursion to work of specialists in intersemiotic translation: Plaza (1985, 1987, 1991) and now the work of Torop (1995, 2000, 2003).

source (language) signs and the different target signs (of "language") must be intuitively sensed and cognitively interpretable, thus pre-supposing codes of communication and hence general signs. This procedure of observing artworks must somehow be built on an amalgamation in language of meaningful sounds and sound sequences, corresponding to morphemes, words, word combinations, sentences, paragraphs, and other endocentric and exocentric elements of verbal language, thus enabling their mutual transcodification into the metaphorical similarity of iconic and indexical "engineering" of artistic expressions. The intersemiotic artist searches for the purity of the verbal and nonverbal signs and attempts to transpose them into modernity, in different times and spaces. This intersemiotic discovery is a phenomenon for scholarship to (self-)question the center of the poetic sign and its accessories and the intermedial languages vs. extramedial languages, that is from inside to outside the sign itself to their environment.

The semiotic status of various nonverbal languages and their equivalences with verbal languages presents problems. The function of the linearity of speech and script must also be defined in the variety of different arts, because written and oral texts are interpreted as unduly narrowing the field of artistic frames. This narrowing presents a distinction and succession of items which in the finished message of painting, architecture, and sculpting is presented all together in the combined sign, Peirce's "emotion of the *tout ensemble*" (CP 1.311). By surfing to the narration in drama, film and opera we jump from the whole to details, and have a complex series of close-up, medium, and long shots. The chainlike sequence of *dramatis personae* in written texts is segmented and transposed into different time-space units and sequences (Merrell 1992). Linguistic features are essentially arbitrary and basically conventional(ized) from one language to another, this linguistic process is also true for the perception of music, while the outward manifestation of other arts, such as painting and sculpture, is free to be inspected or neglected at will.

Naming and grouping verbal texts and the basis of the classification of verbal arts should also be considered (Munro 1969). In verbal arts the content is primarily addressed and dealt with, not the medium, materials and instruments. Instead of a written text-sign, we employ a variety of processes and techniques in other arts, the nature of the products so as to form a mode, system, or organization in space

and time, functioning as a fused mode of participation. The resulting intermedial groups and divisions overlap and we see that some arts are classed together in certain skills, some arts are not. Indeed, in written texts different genres such as aesthetic, moral, spiritual, or other value quality are implied. To explain the fusion of intersemiotic translation, the intertwined functions of source and target texts should be studied in a holistic framework. This transdiscipline is found in transdisciplinary (that is, semiotic) doctrine and terminology. It offers the artist and investigator a commonness of one comprehensive terminology and one set of concepts (somewhat differing in the semiotic schools of Bloomington, Paris, and Tartu) and brings the language and arts together.

One common feature shared by musical and poetic language alike is the role of repeated projection of paradigmatic (that is, structural) equivalences upon the syntagmatic (that is, serial) chain of signs. In music, the organic synthesis of synchronism and progression produces melody, harmony, as well as polyphony, both in language concorded with music, as well as other arts. Another feature is that the arts are constantly overlapping, merging, and redividing, so that new artistic forms emerge and disappear. This happens in a postmodern style, in which different art forms abound (such as the symbiosis of literature and poetic art combining in visual poetry). New subdivisions appear, such as the computerized union of the visual, auditory, and tactile media, thereby marginalizing the increased reliance and confidence of verbal texts into other "untouchable" arts. The decline in literary form and the augmentation of pictorial and symbolic events makes a revolutionary shift from traditional browsing through the fragments of the book towards the continuous narrative of the computerized code without real pages, and moving towards squinting the momentous glance as exemplified in the observation of performances of theater and opera.

The following common characteristic is that all nonverbal codes enumerated above are artistic codes (plastic, musical, and so forth). The translation of natural languages into artificial languages concerning both the acoustic, optical, and tactile fields (such as computer language, Morse code and the Braille system) is an extended speech procedure involving units with only a single articulation. Such code units must, in the strict sense, be considered non-signs, because they are typically based on one-to-one equivalence. Lacking interpretive

freedom on the part of the new target receiver, non-signs fall outside the scope of intersemiotic translation as it is approached here: that is, as generating Peircean interpretants which, somewhat paraphrasing Peirce's definition, are equivalent to the primary, verbal signs, or possible more developed secondary (that is, translational) signs (CP 2.228), giving a creative chance to the mood and taste of the spectators and audiences.

The partnership between the verbal and musical arts (the aim of this essay) is heralded by the earlier Prague School and hinges upon Jakobson's concept of "poeticalness" (Jakobson 1960) in language: the pre-eminence of the poetic function (emphasizing the message as such, for its own sake) over the referential (focusing on the cognitive, informational aspect of language). While the poetic function finds its purest manifestation in poetry, yet without being confined to it, poetry is for Jakobson primarily (but not exclusively) a "figure of sound" (Jakobson 1960: 367): it contains musical elements which are unresistant to seeking a further expansion outside music. These elements include: sound texture, metrical pattern, rhyme structure, alliteration, and phrasing. Together they form what Jakobson called the "internal nexus between sound and meaning" (Jakobson 1960: 373), characteristic of poetic language as opposed to referential language. Jakobson stated that "[i]n referential language the connection between signans and signatum is overwhelmingly based on their codified contiguity, which is often confusingly labeled 'arbitrariness of the verbal sign'" whereas sound symbolism is "founded on a phenomenal connection between different sensory modes, in particular between the visual and auditory experience" (Jakobson 1960: 372).

Language-music notations and scores are one example. In other arts or crafts other rules and heterogeneities are encountered. The scheme on multimedia communication provided by Hess-Lüttich gives a comprehensive survey of channels of multimedial transmission, modes of structure, and the codes of systemic organization. In multimedia communication, the channels include light wave, soundwave, biochemical, thermodynamical, electro-magnetic, and transmissive nature; the senses are acoustic, olfactory, gustatory, haptical, and optical; the modes are icons, symbols, indices, including symptoms and impulses; and there are verbal, paraverbal, nonverbal, socioperceptive, and psychophysical codes (Hess-Lüttich 1986: 576). The

semiotic notion of intersemiotic engineering causes the creative fusion of lingual and other arts to form a collaborative union providing

> [...] parallelism and alternation, equivalence and opposition, necessity and contingence, compatibility and incompatibility, the result of which being potentially redundant or elliptical, unequivocal or ambivalent, analytical or synthetical, systemic or probabilistical, dynamic or static, coherent or para-doxical, spontaneous or strategic, convergent or divergent, etc. (Hess-Lüttich 1986: 576)

In conjunction with Jakobson's initial remarks, Plaza's work (see note 5), based on Peirce's works, offers a lucid and ludic approach to intersemiotic translation, where intercode is a poetic art or craft, based upon iconicity, and spreading out into indexicality and symbolism. The essential iconicity means that the intersemiotic translation represents its verbal object by virtue of any inherent similarity between them. The quality of this similarity is concerned with the new code and its special characteristics. Rather than endow the investigator with a determinate civic virtue and hence become a virtual-reality drama, the intersemiotic displacement lacks imitation and possesses artistic mimesis.[6] Plaza called this process transcreation, where the frozen language becomes playfully alive into some heuristically fertile examples, such as cinematic sequences, film shots, pictorial ideograms, and the *I Ching*. The discussion about intermedial transcodification has been continued by Torop's explanation of intersemiosis as associate from Lotman's school (Torop 1995, 2000, 2003). The theoretical saga discussing inter-semiotic translation has hardly begun and opens up valuable possibi-lities for new ideas and ideals of further research.

Translational-theoretical issues are commonly dealt with by the "traditional" scholars and will develop further from Jakobson's innovative "linguistics and poetics", concentrating not only upon language-only texts and steered clear of the vast and heterogeneous problem area formed by partially verbal phenomena such as comic strips, theatrical performances, lyrics, and libretti, and to some extent the variety of picture-books — all of them visual-narrative narratives, now "popular" in scholarship. Hailing from Jakobson's times, transla-tion studies have moved away from Bible translation and the classical authors and shifting towards new literary domains such as folktales,

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[6]   Returning to Auerbach's "mimesis", as previously mentioned, including note 4.

detective novels, Western novels, nursery rhymes, among many other forms of popular literature, which were traditionally considered scholarly inferior, almost an infatuation with trash. The canonical text, once a closed system for academic scholarship, has become an open model and subject to examinations in scholarship and elsewhere (about textual canonicity, see Scholes 1992; Gorlée 2004: 31).

Jakobson's and Peirce's metalanguage functions

Jakobson's intersemiotic commitments follow his constitutive functions of language. He argued that their difference is quantitative, not qualitative — so that art is more complex and a less tractable realm than biology. Jakobson presented both models in the 1950s. His cardinal structure of language functions was exposed with not only definitions but also examples. Jakobson pairwise correlated his functions to Bühler's functions, and here an attempt is made to correlate them to Peirce's categories, though they are not identical with them, neither in number nor in ideas and concepts. Peirce's categorical triad supplements the interaction of Firstness (moodscape), Secondness (worldscape), and Thirdness (mindscape), and is categorized in verbal texts as well as in nonverbal texts, where textual typology creates different creative and doctrinaire maneuvering of the triadic elements of the expressions. Peirce's functions are not in balance, but are continually shifting. This is also true for Jakobson's text typology (discussed in this subchapter), which is also expressed in different media and codes, both linguistic and non-linguistic messages, and refers to cultural messages.[7]

Peirce's three categories symbiotically join together aspects of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.[8] Peirce's three-way categorio-

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[7]   The analogy must not be pressed too far. Lotman's mechanism of semiosphere retraced Jakobson's functions to generate his continuum of linguistic messages, see Andrews 1999.

[8]   Peirce confessed, tongue-in-cheek, that he might be suffering from a disease called "triadomania", namely "the anticipated suspicion that he [Peirce] attaches a superstition or fanciful importance to the number three, and he indeed forces the division to a Procrustean bed of trichotomy" (heading of CP 1.568). The triadic paradigm was found by Peirce in all kinds of phenomena which run the whole gamut from the history of theology, science, physics, biology, and mathematics to

logy stated that "First is the conception of being or existing independently of anything else; Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction with, something else; Third is the concept of mediation whereby a first and a second are brought into a relation" (CP 6.32). Firstness consists only of pure potentiality (CP 1.422), which is "predominant in the ideas of freshness, life, spontaneity, freedom" (CP 1.324). Firstness stands for unanalyzed, instantaneous and immediate feeling or emotion. Firstness is direct "suchness", a basic assurance of Peirce's "maybe" (or "maybe not") dependent on nothing else beyond its own qualitative understanding of the sign, which is understood intuitively. Firstness is undivided and undividable oneness, without thought and without analysis. Firstness is experienced in the feeling of acute pain, an electric shock, a thrill of physical delight, the sensation of redness or whiteness, the piercing sound of a train whistle, a penetrating odor, or any other phenomenon which urges total attention without anything else. It is an instantaneous shiver of feeling of the timeless present that runs through the inquirer's human experience, including the mind of the text-user and translator.

Firstness means undividable oneness, but Secondness is dynamic motion, offering the specific "here and now" assurance of otherness, of two-sided consciousness. Secondness thinks about details of many-sided actuality; it sets events into action and reaction as a response to a stimulus, which may cause a change of state from Firstness to movement. Secondness is "hard fact" and "brute opposition" as found in stimulus and response, chance and resistance to change. The existential idea of hitting and getting hit is a Second, since it deals with the forces of the world around us. A Second is the true sign of reality. We experience it in making a phone call, opening a door, kicking a football, etc. Within Seconds, we orientate ourselves in time and space and live past experience in the present. Firstness was "a mere idea unrealized" and Secondness "the cases to which it applies" in reality (CP 1.342). Yet Thirdness is the regularity of feeling and action by general rules providing ultimately logical explanations. All intellectual activity is a Third. It provides order, law, and habit that create their own references for mental growth in the future. Peirce's "habituality" defines the set of

the truth in his theory of signs. Peirce's categories are the focus of my work about translation theory; see Gorlée 1994: 40ff., Gorlée 2004b: 153f.) and other publications.

previously formed habits, change of habits, and adoption of habits which control the changing activity of human experience with respect to its response to logical stimulus. This is Peirce's "would-be" for the mind of the sceptical text-user and translator.

Thirdness involves bringing "soft" states of pure irregularity and chance of Firstness and the real events and experiments of Secondness together in a "hard" communal and mutual companionship. This doing-and-making process is the hardening laboratory of Peirce's translation. Translation is an evolutionary experiment; its human activity (action of the human sign) manipulates a "sign *in actu* by virtue of its receiving an interpretation, that is, by virtue of its determining another sign of the same object" and Peirce concluded that the ideal of translation creates "[t]wo propositions when either might have been an interpretant of each other" (CP 5.569). Translation involves a pre-existent text-sign which produces a potentially infinite network of interpretant text-signs. In real time and space, the translated interpretants share relevant properties with their primary text-sign, but also can be radically different from it, or take an intermediate position and stand in an existential or physical connection to it. The source text and target text experiment with the space of knowledge between text-internal and text-external reality ("reality", as discussed), between the creative tension and mutual constraints of the object of the translating and translated texts. In its different stages, translation moves from the intuitive Firstness of moodscape (image), through the Secondness of real worldscape (diagram), to the Thirdness of mindscape (metaphor). In this conscious and subconscious processuality, going from remembrance and perception to anticipation, translation creates for itself more and more referential freedom and space for the creative and doctrinaire maneuvering of meanings. Translation creates both self-referents and referents.

Whereas Firstness rests on the idea of independence and Secondness is the idea of opposition, Thirdness rests on the idea of the complexities of relationship (CP 1.297), a complex friendship with its ups and downs to work on. Among the categorical characteristics of Thirdness are therefore mediation, thought, laws, rules, and habit (CP 1.345f., 1.405f.), all terms meant in the Peircean sense. These symbolic terms are always infinite, borderless, and never fixed. Peirce argues that the dynamical aspects of Thirdness change according to different forms and structures of "reality". Peirce's habit-change is a

"modification of a person's tendencies" of statement or habit of ideas, force and strength (CP 5.476 f.). The translation formulates the conclusion (CP 5.491). The state of feeling (perception and re-perception) then changes; the action(s) and reaction(s) can also be changed, so as to embody (a) new sign(s) and (a) new meaning(s). This is called habituality, the repeated support of new habits. Semiosis or forceful sign-activity changes with time and space; it entertains successively new doubts, new beliefs, and new persuasions. Under duress of new circumstances a habit-formation cycle is regenerated. The distinctive habits of individuation and classification associated with it fit back into the renewed semiotic process of learning.

The functions of the categories are not in balance; they shift continuously. Each function or factor is multifunctional, their activity moves from one category to the next, extending or narrowing down the meaning of the message.[9] This contrast of openness and fixedness determining the addresser and the addressee is also true for Jakobson's text typology, which is expressed at face value and in different media and codes, both linguistic and nonlinguistic message. Jakobson's (1960: 353ff.; 1980: 81ff.)[10] six interactive textual functions supply all the information supported by a message initiated by an addresser, whose destination is an addressee. A good deal of what is communicated, and not communicated, in the text-message depends on the message itself, the code, and the context understood by addresser and addressee.

Briefly synthesizing Jakobson's divisions (without reference to literature), a message (with Jakobson's poetic or aesthetic value of the functions) is the adequate and instructive text-phenomenon, which as

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[9]   Peirce spoke of genuine signs and degenerate signs. This contrast was used by Peirce in two senses. On the one hand, both indexical and iconic signs are considered degenerate with respect to symbolic, fully triadic signs, so that the only sign to be genuine or pure sign is the Third, all of the terms of which are equally Third. On the other hand, both Thirds and Seconds have degenerate forms. In a degenerate Second the Secondness partakes of Firstness. A Third can be degenerate in two degrees. The first degree of degeneracy is found in a Third involving Secondness, whereas the second of degeneracy is found in a Third partaking of Firstness (Gorlée 1990).

[10]   Continuation of note 1: Jakobson's functions of messages from his closing statement at a conference on style in 1958 in Bloomington, IN (1960: 353 ff.) were anticipated in his presidential address to the Linguistic Society of America in 1956 (later published in Jakobson 1980: 81 note).

a cultural text is interesting, puzzling, or disquieting to the addressers. The message is the primary focus of attention, and constitutes the self-focusing palpable sign triggering a response in the audience. It may be a poetic or non-poetic textual wholeness reflecting the pleasure or enjoyment (or depending on the genre, displeasure and alienation) which addressers get from creating social effects through language. Good examples of affecting (and thereby manipulating) the addressees are literary expressions (poems, novels, theater plays), including letters, newspaper articles and advertisements; however, a weather report or a shopping list is rarely kept for later reading. Figures such as sound patterns, diction, rhyme, verbal puns, marked collocations, neologisms, as well as features in other media keep the addressees' eyes and ears open towards understanding the phonemic and graphemic features and visual and sonic qualities of the cultural text.

The addresser or sender (Jakobson's degrees of emotive or expressive value) is not always a person, but often an agent or anonymous voice (like in videoclips) directing a direct expression of his or her emotion or mood to the intended addressees. The addresser's focus lies in connotative fiction, imagination, and aesthetics, both real and fictive. The addresser can be explicit or hidden, that is implicit, when there is no intentional addresser and the message concentrates on the intentions of the context. The context (Jakobson's referential value) contrasts with the addresser's connotation and reflects the denotative content of the message, its cognitive subject-matter. Cultural context is the meaningful reference to the surrounding world and answers the questions, commands, and instructions of the language-user to determine the realism of the message, anchoring the message deictically in real time, space, and events. Content makes sense to the addressee(s) or receiver(s), which may be one person to a multitude.

The addressees (Jakobson's conative value) specify the narrative story of the bodily, behavioral, and psychological influences of the message of the addressers. The message can have a rhetorical value (in love letters, political propaganda, and advertisements). The addressees are subject to a variety of tricks and stratagems of the message to trigger, through its subtle and artistic persuasion, certain behaviors and sensations in the addressees. The contact (Jakobson's phatic value) is the neutral communicational channel, which can be oral, visual, electronic, etc. It offers the informative mindset of the message to possible addressees. The tricks to keep the textual business

alive between addresser and addressee are the phatic usefulness of an attractive communication for the parties, working through symbols, myths, and ritualized formulas. No harmonious contact means mis-communication, a failure to contact. The primary attention is not on the channel but on the contact between addressee and addresser; other channel agents are gestures in phatic greetings or signs of sympathy with no content.[11]

The metalingual code (Jakobson's glossing value) deals with the formal and normal facts of the orientation towards language or a lin-guistic system (or subsystem) used in the message. The same linguistic and cultural code (dialect, idiolect, speech, numbers, sym-bols, pictorial concepts, sound formation) must be used by both parties (addresser and addressee), otherwise there is a mishap in inter-pretation. The correct metalanguage is the synthesis of understanding and translation, distinctive and significative activities which are both conscious (intelligent) and unconscious (intuitive) (Gorlée 2004b). Metalingual operations involve, as discussed by Jakobson (Jakobson 1960, particularly 1980, and otherwise), the understanding of lan-guage as a normal element of life and, subsequently, the sophisticated transposition of translation (in case of rewording, translation proper and transmutation). Translation is defined as the controversy between known and unknown (source and target) texts, the analytic decisions and selections (doing-and-making operations) of the translator, the confrontational-creative attention of the translation with a new reproductional and modificational nature, and the irreversible destiny of the original text, lodged away in a temporary state of forgetfulness (Popovič 1975: 12–13).[12]

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[11] The phatic signs return to Malinowski (1923, used is a 1969 ed.) and are further discussed in Derrida's *The Postcard* (1987, tr. 1980).

[12] In 1956, Jakobson referred the "traditional model of language" (1980: 83) to Bühler, certainly to contrast with his own new model. Bühler's *Sprachtheorie* (1990 [1934]) model was confined to three functions: addresser (*Ausdrucks-funktion*), addressee (*appellative Funktion*) and context (*darstellende Funktion*) (Bühler 1990, transl. from 1934). Jakobson built on Bühler's person-oriented model, integrating the "first person of the addresser, the second person of the addressee, and the 'third person,' properly — someone or something spoken of" (Jakobson 1980: 83) Bühler focused on the technical definition of understanding the speech of the receptor(s) listening to the utterer(s), whereas Jakobson's model expanded Bühler's model into a comprehensive structural model, integrating the aesthetic, metalingual and phatic side of speech use. Bühler's model was

Metatextuality, the common denominator of Jakobson's text-manipulative activities, is rooted in the metalinguistic function, in tandem with the other communicative functions of language. A meta-lingual text in Jakobson's sense is a verbal text that refers to itself or identifies the code (or sub-code) being used. In translation, this functional modality operates in at least two ways. On the one hand, it exemplifies the fundamental Thirdness of language, its conventional, arbitrary, and hence rule- and culture-bound relation to the possible object in reality; this gives room for manipulative semiotics, i.e., the usage of language with an ideological bias, in which the sign disengages itself from extra-linguistic reality and is granted a referential mobility permitting it to even be used as antithetical and self-referential artifices. On the other hand, metalanguage shows language's capacity for Firstness, i.e., the (degree of) similarity with reference to form, or shape, pattern, or otherwise, between the antecedent text-sign and its consequent interpretations and/or paraphrases, as well as with reference to all text-signs involved and their object in extra-linguistic reality. Through this blend of Thirdness and Firstness through Secondness (the actual instances of the act of translation), the rule for the transformation of the text into its translations is progressively reformulated, thereby becoming steadily more determined. The rule of transactional relativity transpires thus in a constantly moving system, a semiosic adventure.

Jakobson's cardinal functions of language can be pairwise attached or matched to the triad of Peirce's categories, though they are not identical to them and their correlation is interactive and may vary upwards and downwards with the communicational instantiations and textual network. Peirce's Firstness is embodied in the emotive force to introduce sensual expression in the addresser's (sender's) personal(ized) message. Firstness is manifested in the addresser's arbitrary and possible *entrée* to build the poetry of the desired text. The textual desire must be associated with a regular or relevant language-code utilized by addresser, which we hope is also understood by the addressee. The text must embody cultural (anthropological, sociolo-

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qualitative, whereas Jakobson built a quantitative model. Jakobson's expansion gave rise to scholarly controversies, since Jakobson's new functions of language were "borrowed" from pre-World War II sources, like Mukařovsky with regard to his poeticalness and Malinowski with regard to phatic communication (see articles published in Eschbach 1984).

gical, psychological) values codified in the meaning-potential of the actual message. These cultural clues can be open or hidden. Every generation has, consciously and subconsciously, its own emotional, stylistic and intellectual level. Firstness is dominated by addresser (emotive/expressive value), in the degenerated (debilitated) company of channel, context and code (phatic, referential and metalingual values), in that order.

Secondness is embodied in the adequate and instructive verbal-poetic design of the message in order to function as live communication, as a significant cultural event. Secondness is about something (the topic of the message) and reflects in the narrative an actual message-text, which must be common to the world of both addresser and addressee. The meaningful contextual worlds at hand for both parties (addresser and addressee) generate a realism (real or fictive) of time, place, objects, and cultural events. A common language is understandable for the parties. Secondness is inquired to create a common intertextual world (also real or fictive) with its own possibles and impossibles in order to create unity out of chaos. Secondness is dominated by the message (poetic value) supplemented with de-generated context, code and channel (referential, metalingual and phatic values) in that order.

Thirdness is expressed in the fragile and subtle understanding of the message by possible, actual and virtual audiences (addressees or receivers) with mutual understanding of a definite time and place in all types of language and "languages" used in the message. Thirdness also includes within this community the specific codified actions, interests, and values to reflect the ideology of the addressees in the (non)verbal message. Verbal language can be partially or totally superceded by nonverbal languages. Adding to the creative poetics, the phatic usefulness transmogrifies the message into many text-signs through ritualized formulas to keep communication working and attractive for a sufficient number of addressees in the future. Thirdness is dominated by the addressee (conative/appellative value) and degenerate code, channel, code and context (metalingual, referential and phatic values), in that order.

The Jakobson-Peircean model with combined quantity and quality values results as in Figure 1.

Firstness	addresser ⟷ (emotive)	channel ⟷ (phatic)	context ⟷ (referential)	code (metalingual)
↕	↕			
Secondness	message ⟷ (poetic)	context ⟷ (referential)	code ⟷ (metalingual)	channel (phatic)
↕	↕			
Thirdness	addressee ⟷ (conative)	code ⟷ (metalingual)	channel ⟷ (phatic)	context (referential)

Figure 1. The Jakobson-Peircean model with combined quantity and quality values.

The interactivity of the qualities and quantities results from the dynamics of practice, and is invisible in theoretical models: the shifting of the qualities of legal messages differs from an epistolary novel and from perfume advertisements. In order to test the distinguishing character of an autobiography, we see its differences with a biography, since the author of an autobiography writes his or her own life line and a biography composes the life of someone else (following Lotman 1990). Both autobiography and biography struggle against our forgetfulness, rescuing feelings, actions and thought from our laziness and inertia; Lotman spoke of "mnemonic" signs (Lotman 1990: 21, 27). The signs of an autobiography are "hidden" and provide, to the viewpoint of the writer, a meaningful account of the intimacy, occupation and field of endeavor of himself or herself (First, Second, Third). An autobiography is a personal diary, responding in itself to Firstness, while the biography is a shift to Secondness. An autobiography rests on an emotive background; the addresser writes a personal account with artistic and dramatic qualities (Firstness). The scholarly qualities (Lotman's mnemonic functions) are still weak. An autobiography has a single protagonist, the hero (heroine) of one's own social construction. The biography records the life of the same hero, but is a written account meant for commercial publication, it is not naive but official. The writer attends to his own poetic narratives using key questions asked of the individual. This happens in personal reviews or correspondence or, when the hero is no longer living, by questioning and interviewing family, relatives, friends and colleagues

about the clues of written accounts or memories, souvenirs, pictures, etc. The author of a biography attempts to construct his (or her) narrative genre reflecting a "new" self about someone else's otherness. The biography includes his or her dramatic, social, and emotional life, according to "new" cultural coordinates. The scholarly qualities are emphasized in the shift to the function of metalanguage. Thirdness is crucial for the referential and expressive value of understanding the intersemiosis to get the message across. The addressee depends on metalanguage, but within intersemiosis the message between sender and receiver can equally focus on other nonverbal "language" elements.

Symbiosis of signs in opera

One of the advantages of Peircean and Peirce-derived scholarship is its generality. The general ideas, vocabulary and concepts about general signs enable the investigators to deal with linguistic and non-linguistic texts or messages alike. A written text, as semiotically defined and described in Gorlée 2004b: 17–30, informs the reader differently than the textuality of non-written languages, notably in the media evolution in narrative discourse, where we experience a loss of information (Moulthrop 1991). The general nature of semiotics makes it possible to classify a variable and hence virtual sign system[13] such

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[13]   Peirce already liked the term "virtual" and anticipated virtual reality, defining it in 1902 in connection to virtual vision. He described it locally as "A virtual X (where X is a common noun) is something, not an X, which has the efficiency (*virtus*) of an X" (CP 6.372). The ambiguity of the word rests on that "it has been seriously confounded with "potential", which is almost its contrary. For the potential X is of the nature of X, but is without actual efficiency. A virtual velocity is something not a velocity, but a displacement; but equivalent to a velocity in the formula, "what is gained in velocity is lost in power" (CP 6.372). In the same year (1902), Peirce defined interpretation including translation as "the sign should, actually or virtually, bring about a determination of a sign of the same object which is itself a sign" so that "there is a virtual endless series of signs when a sign is understood" (MS 599: 30). Virtual reality creates an interpretant-sign at runtime efficiency (that is, the pulsant speed of generating a new or renewed interpretant or meaning). Peirce added: "So Milton asks whether the angels have virtual or immediate touch. So, too, the sun was said to be virtualiter on earth, that is, in its efficiency" and he concluded "Virtual is sometimes used to

as the variety of intersemiosis in operatic signs. The narrative element in opera is a speculative fiction, since it is unclear what is an element, a fragment, and the whole document of opera in itself and its performance.[14]

Finally, let us conclude this essay with some remarks about the signhood of opera. Opera serves as one example of both possible and virtual representation, since operatic "reality" consists in originally cryptic messages which are then enacted on stage. The performance of opera is stylized fictionalized stimulation and enjoyed as such, since modern opera-going audiences enjoy the emotional tension produced by the dramatic harmonies of singing and acting, the vivid orchestration, and theatrical hocus-pocus (Gossett 2006, reviewed by Rosen 2006). The theatrical vision of operatic libretti and its re-enactment on stage form the ultimate multimedia art-form, as an intermedial synchronization of music and drama (Reiss 1971).[15] Together with other forms of multimedia art, such as theater, cinema, television, ballet, musical, circus, yet different from their specific communication, opera is multichanneled and polysensual communication, and

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mean pertaining to virtue in the sense of an ethical habit" (CP 6.372). Peirce stated that the interpretant is not there intellectually, but only in its emotional and bodily value and following an aesthetic, beauty-oriented significance that recommends itself to be perceived by future thought. This development from aesthetics to ethics and logic corresponds to Peirce's First, Second and Third, as well as to Jakobson's distinction, and is no real division. However, a division is appreciated in Greimas's virtualization in narrative semiotics which "corresponds to the act of positing subjects and objects prior to any junction (or, inversely, of purely and simply suppressing this relation)" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 371).

[14]   Operatic signs are exemplified in semiotic terms in Hosokawa (1986), also based on the semiotics of theater (Übersfeld 1977). Gorlée (1996 and particularly 1997) discusses the semiotic theory and analysis of Wagner's music drama, *Das Rheingold,* the beginning opera (*Vorabend)* of the *Ring* cycle. Vocal translation of art songs and hymns is approximated in Gorlée (2002, 2005a, 2005b).

[15]   Reiss (1971: 49–52) introduced the notion of automedial text as a type of mixed text added to ordinary types. She followed Bühler's typology: *inhaltsbetonte, formbetonte*, and *appellbetonte* text types (1971: 32 ff.), yet without mentioning Jakobson. The automedial text was propagated by the author (Reiss 1977), reformulated by her into operative text (Reiss 1976: 34 ff.) and in semiotic terms (Reiss 1980), but was never adopted within text- and translation studies. Fortunately, the recent English translation (Reiss 2000) of the German Reiss (1971) makes parts of her early work understandable for an "international" audience.

makes a highly aesthetic rule-governed synchronization of different media of artistic expression. Designed for the ear and the eye (or the eye and the ear, depending on which genre), opera emphasizes the acoustic medium in the form of vocal and orchestral music, together with verbal discourse codified in the libretto. In addition to music, opera highlights visual drama, placed and presented on the operatic scene in the visual-dramatic curtains, lights, movements, gestures, costume, make-up, scenery, and other scenic effects.

The variety of artistic signs in opera produces automedial types. The written signs are not meant to be read but to be sung or recitated in the course of the acoustic and dramatic exposition of the operatic performance. This is true for opera (and opera-like genres such as operetta, oratorio and musical) but also for different but similar literary-gestural genres of intersemiosis, where nonverbal discourses are supposed to be central or rudimentary as opposed to verbal language and the artistic element is degenerate to prepare for Secondness and Thirdness, as found in political speeches, scholarly lectures, and Bible fragments or prayers used liturgically (Gorlée 2005b). The triadic claim of the analysis follows Peirce's interactive categories — Firstness (moodscape), Secondness (worldscape), and Thirdness (mindscape) — to pursue the background of the operatic act, in the act itself, or in its dramatic effect.

To greatly simplify (or oversimplify) a complex textual matter as we experience operatic technology today, an *a priori* analysis of operatic signhood highlights the following elements of the operatic arena. Jakobson's emotive or expressive function (addresser), the metalingual and conative or appellative values (code and addressee) are the dominant cultural codes, present in the arts of the vocal technique and the interaction of the real (historical or modern) moodscape of the message of the opera visible on stage. Firstness comes to the fore in the poetic modalities of the singing by different singers (aria and especially lyrical and expressive arioso) and the choral singing, in order to "tell" the narrated myth. The singing gestures (Secondness) are an ornamental device but far more radically they are a functional requirement for the "reality" of opera lovers, although the Firstness of music is still commonly the cultural center of the operatic performance, and the signs of Secondness and Thirdness relapse into essential Firstness.

The (authentic or translated) languages of the sung text in native or foreign text are supposed to be understandable for the addressees. Often, the sung language is mysterious or not understandable through the music.[16] Many opera singers sing in foreign languages. As a bizarre example, Plácido Domingo has a for him natural Spanish accent in his Wagner pronunciation — a sign of foreignness to the German language, is it to be neglected or given a significance? The non-Italian audience has a hard time understanding Italian text, especially when sung. When the sung language is a linguistic mystery for the opera-goers, theaters are provided with computerized video-tapes (supertext, surtitles and subtitles) for projecting captions in the native language as an aid for foreign operas (Rich 1984). If such linguistic aid is not available, the phatic attention of opera lovers is focused away from the language and on to the non-verbal languages used in the performance, namely the aesthetic and artistic characters and designs, transforming and mediating the original libretto into, for the audience, new and exciting transpositions of the story — yet with unchanged music, which is in itself understandable for all listeners.

The Firstness flows over into the performance of Secondness. The addresser is not merely the composer, but the director (impresario) of the renewed opera as first and privileged addressee of the composer (Miller 2001). The opera is meant for a new audience (the real addressees) and the performance and dramatic qualities of the context have changed into modernity. The performed opera is a work of a director, appointed to shift the poetic qualities of the opera, which is often thought of as an archaic piece, to a modern performance. The operatic form and structure presented is now a cryptic outline of the action, available in libretti, score books, and codified dance procedures. These are basic frameworks but the written guides are in desperate need to be expanded on stage to attract as meaningful act of communication the target addressees.[17] The moodscape of the designed

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[16] As previously mentioned, see the problems of vocal translation in Gorlée (1996, 1997, 2002, 2005a, 2005b) with an extensive bibliography.

[17] Peirce's term was "further developed" when "the sign is interpreted in a sign in your mind", adding that "The whole function of the mind is to make a sign interpret itself in another sign and ultimately perhaps in an action or in an emotion. But the emotion is an idle thing unless it leads to an action. The action is an idle thing unless it produces a result which agrees with a sign through a sign. The whole problem is of signs" (MS 1334: 44). This means that the operatic sign

operas come to light in the engaged star singers, the orchestra, the chorus, the chosen decoration and ornamentation, etc.; as well as in the directional message of the operatic setting itself: the choice of costumes, composition, rhythmic patterns, sound and light structures, lyrical passages in arias, duets, ensemble singing as well as their orchestral counterparts. Sometimes scenes or actions can be changed (see the case of the two endings in *Turandot*, one unfinished by Puccini and, after his death, finished by Alfano) or left out. The fragmentary and organized codes require from the singers and chorus a definite temporal and spatial order for the represented operatic events, including movement and gestures of singers and chorus, and the director can make a variety of changes of all kinds — yet the iconic imagery (Gorlée 2005: 66–88) must stay more or less the same or equivalent.

The originally free drama of the opera transpires in the renewed dramatic narrativity of the poetic function and encounters a new referential value from the design. Quoting some sceptical examples: *Madama Butterfly* displays the love of Cho Cho San for an Englishman, Consul Sharpless, and the story could not be located outside Japanese etiquette; a dislocation would be a nonsensical for the opera goers — and certainly for Puccini; Wagner's *The Flying Dutchman* displays scenes from a sailor's life, and the opera must be displayed next to the sea to illustrate the long, flowing melody of the stormy waves; and Mussorgski's *Boris Godunov* is rooted in Russian religious music and iconography during czarism, which can not displaced by "alien" imagery from a later epoch. The examples are socially- and politically-toned: Von Weber's *Der Freischutz* and Wagner's *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg* could easily tone down the German patriotism to please today's political agenda; Mozart's *Die Entführung aus dem Serail* is a comic opera, part play and part song; this "musical" takes place at a Turkish castle under Pasha Selim, while the harem guard Osmin is made drunk so that the lovers can escape. The charm of the *Singspiel* can today become hazardous, where Muslim rules are not violated but respected and a change of text and scenery to an "intercultural opera" can be a necessary requirement for a success of the opera. A transposition can affect the narrative plot

develops *itself*, whereas the director is a silent but hard-working go-between (like an interpreter and translator) of the self-generating sign. See the argument about signs and their own consciousness in *Signs Grow* by Merrell (1996).

construction, versificational techniques, and the musical counterpoint, where the source of beauty and aesthetic experience must function in the values today. The performance is the poetic duty of the director, leading the total production of the opera. He (or she) anchors the opera with a new and spectacular show of a flowing pattern of movement of grace and color, and an actual plot or story.

The Firstness and Secondness flow over into the performance of Thirdness in word-and-tone symbiosis. Opera is an essentially un-realistic genre and produces a kind of virtual reality on stage. The artistic poetry seems to neglect the fable, that is, the discourse with recognizable characters, in order to elaborate on the emotions of stock characters appropriate to their words on stage. Yet the informative and situative phatic elements still dominate in recitatives, including similar song forms, such as *Sprechgesäng*, arias, chorus, as well as speaking parts in spoken dialogue and other moments where the narrative within song takes central stage in music and libretto. Yet the un-realistic thematic and fictive composition differs from the utilitarian in that it is not necessarily suited for any use in the real world. Barthes heralded in 1973 the new opera as a "total spectacle" of theatricality, where he would enjoy "an opera as free and as popular as a movie theater or a wrestling arena: you could go in and out according to your mood, you'd spend part of your evening taking a 'hit' of opera ..." (Barthes 1985: 186). The novel temporal and spatial fictions in the media-rich futurological artistic arena follow these new paths. The new opera in the digital era provides computer-enhanced instruments and synthesizers following virtual opera coextensive with rock, video and film projects. An opera in the imaginary future is no longer a physical or conventional happening in a theater. It no longer has real actors or singers, no real objects on stage, but is provided with sophisticated computer technology for reproducing sound and image. Virtual opera is an imaginary experiment (Thirdness) where the orchestra is replaced by a new combination of acoustic, amplified, and wired instruments and the audience moves around through a three-dimensional acoustic space along walkways listening to musical and non-musical fragments (Malitz 1992).[18] The virtual reality game speaks of the hyperreality of opera, its holographic projection, digital synthesizers, and operatic multimedia computers where the whole

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[18] For a theory of the concept of "fragment", see Gorlée (2007).

opera has disappeared and we only listen in cyberspace to computer fragments. The operatic cyberspace describes the simulated "reality" of the parts of opera we enjoy; by worldwide computer networks we hear more violent and realistic hallucinations than offered now in real opera. Neither reality, nor "reality" but pure illusion.[19]

The aesthetic contemplation of opera (Secondness) is contrasted with its representative form of dramatic enlivenment (Thirdness) as emphasized in scenery and machinery on stage, facing the opera *aficionados*. This co-occurs in Jakobson's addressee's function in its conative/ appellative qualities in association with the phatic quality of fiction, imagination and aesthetics. Opera offers sung dialogue to induce further action, ritualized requests, threats, commands, and instructions that possess real consumer appeal. This attraction happens by accepting the cosmic truths of human life and development, both mythic and contemporary, of opera, describing the Greek *epos*,[20] the fusion of epic poetry and musical pathos, in which we seem to take part as addressees. The opera offers an emotional tension for entertainment, which in phatic terms is called the center of vibratory suspense. The catharsis happens by listening and seeing the operatic performance. It produces in the addressees desire, fear and pity, which liberate them from their common reality and displace them into the opera's scenic reality. Catharsis consists in the glossary of word-and-tone romantic or tragic qualities, the operatic mystique, fairytaleness, dramatic suspension, and moral atavism, and its dramatic effect signifies a moral cleansing of the (spiritual or mythical) life of the opera lovers.[21] Catharsis is the principle of Peirce's infinite semiosis, meaning an "inner song to sing against despair" (Shipley 1972: 50).

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[19]   Gibson coined the name of cyberspace in his famous novel *Neuromancer* (Gibson 1984); see Rheingold's *Virtual Reality* (Rheingold 1991) and (already mentioned) Moulthrop 1991.

[20]   Shipley (1972: 139) mentioned classical Greek "*epos*" meaning "word", then a "speech or tale" and a "song", and subsequently "a heroic poem" and "heroic poetry" advancing the later epics of the Middle Ages (*Beowulf*, the *Song of Roland*, the *Nibelungenlied*, etc.) irrespective of classical models.

[21]   This general classification matches Peirce's triplet of tone, token, and type (corresponding to qualisign, sinsign, and legisign and Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness) (Freadman 1993: 89f.). For tone, e.g., CP 4.537, 8.363, token CP 3.360, 4.537, 8.363ff., type CP 4.537, 8.363. Peirce wrote in his *Logic Notebook* (1865–1909), on a handwritten memo written on 8 July 1906, that "A *Tone* as that whose accidental being makes it a sign. A *Token* or that whose accidents of

A strain of music or mindscape is an individual semiotic reality, including an ideology involved in the categorical elements. It is firstly a moodscape, a sensation-seeking sign, then a worldscape showing musical reality and suggesting the dynamism of chaos and leading to some order. In the Peircean kaleidoscope, the so-called mindscape is more than to be taken by the listeners (addressees or receivers) as an expressive conception of the holding-over of a note, chord, and melody together with word, phrase, and myth from one tuned melody of completeness to the next. The design and direction of the opera could develop a Freudian, Marxist, feminist, or any other ideological dimension or specific outlook. Peirce would say that the meaning of the opera "grows"[22] when put on stage.

The whole generation after Wagner is formulated by his new concept of *leitmotivs* with their harmonic rather than linear develop- ment (Gorlée 1997: 249) and associated with a specific idea, concept, mood of individual. Examples are from Wagner's *Die Walküre*, the *Motiv-Tafel* of e.g., musically recognizable *Entsagung-*, *Fluch-*, *Nibelungenhass-*, *Schicksal-*, *Sturm-*, *Unruhe-*, and *Verzweiflungs- motiv* (list of tables in Wagner 1908: intro). In concert with words *leitmotivs* equally express condensed feeling, such operatic signs were transformed into powerful musical phrases or fragments, which, once introduced, were repeated many times during the opera, modified by

existence make it a sign. A *Type* or that thought upon which makes it a sign" (MS 339C: 499). This triad pertains to notational systems as written signs: a tone embodies material properties, a token signifies the condition of their action, a type is a significant form produced affecting musical notation: the pictorially symbolic and graphic system of arbitrary signs indicating pitch, duration and song (or score). In music, the triad tone, token and type affect the categorical elements of expression, tempo and nuance with rhythms, harmony and tune.

[22] Peirce used the botanical term of growth as such and in general terms, including fine arts. For some examples: CP 2.302, 5.594 and applied by Peirce in the "cosmological or secular character of philosophy" (CP 1.177) stating that philosophy applied to other arts has an "architectonic character" (heading of CP 1.176). Peirce added that "philosophy is a thing that has to grow by the fission of minute parts and not by accretion is due the necessity of planning it out from the beginning. Of course, every painting likewise has its composition; but composition is not a very weighty problem, except in that kind of painting which is accessory to architecture, or is, at any rate, very public in its appeal. Indeed historical painting is one of those exceptions which go to prove the rule that in works which aim at being secular, rather than individualistic, the preliminary business of planning is particularly important and onerous" (CP 1.177).

modulation and interpretation to explore the full meaning-potential of the poetic-melodic-harmonic universe in all its proportions and depth. Consequently, the fragment and the continuous can no longer be neatly delimited in the Wagnerian discourse, where a dissonance and a delay of the tonal resolution and identity of motives remain "in the air", a clue of the intertextuality and intermediality of Wagner's melos. The worldscape kind of music and poetic transitions allude to an interwoven thread of replicating motives and themes in order to build the argumentative development of the whole opera.

The semiotic viewpoints used in this article are the basic framework of my work on the translation of opera libretti, lyrical art songs, and church hymns (Gorlée 1996, 1997, 2002, 2005b), introduced by a theoretical model (Gorlée 2005a) dealing with the unresolvable paradoxes of the word-tone symbiosis to serve the modernity of translationese. The originally free drama of the opera transpires in the renewed dramatic narrativity of the poetic function and encounters a new referential frame from the design which would deserve further investigation. Jakobson's functional models have been linked with Peirce's categories and applied to the tonal and musical relevance for the audiovidual artforms and the intralingual, interlingual, and intersemiotic translations. To resolve these riddles of transposing from one language and culture to another, new translational paradigms are articulated, giving rise to reborn ideas and a renewed culture, re-adapting operatic signs in terms of emotion, time and circumstance and stimulated artistically, dynamically, and scholarly.

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Якобсон и Пирс: переводческий интерсемиозис и симбиоз в опере

Метаязыковые операции обозначают понимание и акт перевода, как они определены Якобсоном в его моделях шести языковых функций и трех типов перевода, которые обе были созданы в 1950-е годы. Настоящая статья основывается на этих моделях Якобсона, связывая их с тремя категориями Пирса. Три основывающиеся на качественном различии функции Бюлера стали предшественниками (скорее всего не случайно) дистинкций Якобсона, которые указывают на квантитативные различия между формами и структурами различных видов искусств. Семиотическое открытие, критика и перспектива рассмотрения элементов и единиц кода так же устанавливают квантитативные различия, как и различия между реалистичными сообщениями и концептуальными кодами. Якобсоновскому понятию интерсемиотического перевода дает новое содержание анализ вокального перевода, который занимается виртуальной реальностью на оперной сцене. Синтез слова и звука (или семиозисный симбиоз) в опере демонстрирует типологическую унификацию вербальных и невербальных языков.

Jakobson ja Peirce: tõlkeline intersemioos ja sümbioos ooperis

Metakeelelised operatsioonid tähistavad arusaamist ja tõlkeakti, nii nagu neid on määratlenud Jakobson oma kuue keelefunktsiooni ja kolme tõlketüübi mudelis, mis mõlemad pärinevad 1950ndatest aastatest. Käesolev artikkel tugineb neile Jakobsoni mudelitele, seostades neid Peirce'i kolme kategooriaga. Bühleri kvalitatiivsel erinevusel põhinevad kolm funktsiooni olid (võib-olla mitte juhuslikult) eelkäijaks Jakobsoni eristustele, mis viitavad kvalitatiivsetele erinevustele erinevate kirjandus- ning ka teiste kaunite kunstide vormide ja struktuuride vahel. Kvantitatiivse erinevuse ning erinevuse realistlike sõnumite ja kontseptuaalsete koodide vahel määrab semiootiline avastus, kriitika ning vaatepunkt, mis eristab keeleelemente koodiühikutest. Jakobsoni intersemiootilise tõlke mõistele pakub uut sisu vokaalse tõlke analüüs, mis tegeleb ooperliku müstika kaudu katarsisesse jõudva virtuaalse reaalsusega ooperilaval. Ooperi sõna-heli süntees (ehk semioosiline sümbioos) osutub nähtuseks, mis ühendab verbaalsed ja mitteverbaalsed keeled tüpoloogiliselt.

Translation as communication and auto-communication

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Abstract. If one wants to understand translation, it is necessary to look at all its aspects from the psychological to the ideological. And it is necessary to see the process of translation, on the one hand, as a complex of interlinguistic, intralinguistic, and intersemiotic translations, and on the other hand, as a complex of linguistic, cultural, economic, and ideological activities. Translators work at the boundaries of languages, cultures, and societies. They position themselves between the poles of specificity and adaptation in accordance with the strategies of their translational behaviour. They either preserve the otherness of the other or they transform the other into self. By the same token, they cease to be simple mediators, because in a semiotic sense they are capable of generating new languages for the description of a foreign language, text, or culture, and of renewing a culture or of having an influence on the dialogic capacity of a culture with other cultures as well as with itself. In this way, translators work not only with natural languages but also with metalanguages, languages of description. One of the missions of the translator is to increase the receptivity and dialogic capability of a culture, and through these also the internal variety of that culture. As mediators between languages, translators are important creators of new metalanguages.

The status of translation and the translator have changed from one historical era to the next, and at the beginning of the 21st century we are confronting the need for a complex understanding of both of them. At the core of this complex understanding is the universality of translation. The universality of translation comes from its connections with thought processes. As Juri Lotman affirms, "the elementary act of thinking is translation" (Lotman 2000: 143). And he proceeds to emphasise that "the elementary mechanism of translating is dialogue"

(Lotman 2000: 143). The irreducibility of dialogue to mere communication in a language common to the dialogue's participants is very important. For Lotman everything begins with the need for dialogue: "[…] the need for dialogue, the dialogic situation, precedes both real dialogue and even the existence of a language in which to conduct it" (Lotman 2000: 143–144).

The need for dialogue can be viewed either at the level of comprehensive theoretical understanding or at the level of the deep-seated mechanism of individual behaviour. In the theory of communication, the need for dialogue is tied in a complementary way both to the needs of an audience, which can be studied in the theory of mass communication (McQuail 2000), and to various personal needs (self-understanding, enjoyment, escapism) and social needs (knowledge about the world, self-confidence, stability, self-esteem, the strengthening of connections with family and friends) (Fiske 2000: 20). Any form of identity also depends on the need for dialogue. At the core of personal, national, or social identity is the recognition of the boundary between self and other. The boundary not only divides but also unites and thus participates in dialogic processes. To a large extent dialogue within the boundaries depends on dialogue at the boundaries.

Translators work at the boundaries of languages, cultures, and societies. They position themselves between the poles of specificity and adaptation in accordance with the strategies of their translational behaviour. They either preserve the otherness of the other or they transform the other into self. By the same token, they cease to be simple mediators, because in a semiotic sense they are capable of generating new languages for the description of a foreign language, text, or culture, and of renewing a culture or of having an influence on the dialogic capacity of a culture with other cultures as well as with itself. In this way, translators work not only with natural languages but also with metalanguages, languages of description. One of the missions of the translator is to increase the receptivity and dialogic capability of a culture, and through these also the internal variety of that culture. As mediators between languages, translators are important creators of new metalanguages. That is why a contemporary understanding of translation activity presupposes not merely a complex approach — the science of translation also has a need for innovation in the methodology for understanding the translation process.

What does translation process mean from the methodological viewpoint? As I have put it before elsewhere it is a process that takes place within a translator's mind, but also within language, culture, and society. A cognitive, linguistic, cultural or social process can take place between minds, languages, cultures and societies, but it can also take place within a single mind, language, culture or society. Inevitably, all these processes have to be described in very different description languages (metalanguages), and it would be very difficult to create disciplinary unity in these analyses and descriptions. Therefore, the translation process has to be brought closer to its beginning and to its end. The process of translation happens between two messages or two texts. In the beginning there is the original and at the end there is the translation. The original and the translation are simultaneously both the beginning and the end of the process as well as the cause and the result of the process. (cf. Torop 2007: 353).

Focusing on the process of translation as the main object of research in a science of translation makes it possible to typologize translations as the principle means of transmission of one set of languages-texts-cultures by another. But it does not negate the necessity of also seeing other parameters in the process of translation, in the first place economic and ideological aspects of translation that are in turn associated with professional ethics or with the professional ethics of the translator. The practice of translation is even more complex, and the behaviour of the translator and the quality of his work do not depend solely on his linguistic or literary abilities. The translator is simultaneously a mediator, creator, producer, manager, critic, and sometimes ideologue. All of these roles make up various aspects of cultural behaviour and can be correlated to the entire textual corpus of a culture. An actualization of the various cultural and social roles of the translator reflects the general effort of analysts toward a complex understanding of the phenomenon of translation in the processes of culture.

From the point of view of culture, translation and translation studies are two sides of same phenomenon. Each culture develops in its own way, has its own technological environment and its own traditions of analyzing culture texts. A culture's capacity for analysis reflects its ability to describe and to understand itself. In the process of description and understanding, an important role is played by the multiplicity of texts, by the interrelatedness of communication with

metacommunication. The multiplicity of texts makes it possible to view communication processes as translation processes. But besides immediate textual transformations, the analysis of these transformations — that is, their translation into various metalanguages — has a strong significance in culture. Both in the case of textual transformations and their translations into metalanguages, an important role is performed by the addressees, their ability to recognize the nature of the text at hand, and their readiness to communicate. Just as in translation culture, there is also an infinite retranslation and variation taking place in translation studies. In order to understand different aspects of translation activity, new description languages are constantly being created in translation studies, and the same phenomena are at different times described in different metalanguages. And just as in culture, also in disciplines studying cultural phenomena, variance has its limits and at some point an invariant is needed in order to organize the variance (cf. Sütiste, Torop 2007: 189–190).

Diversity and methodology

When the diversity of actual translation activity takes a form different from the diversity of scientific approaches to that activity, then one can speak of a methodological crisis, of the hybridization or creolization of scientific languages. A new, comprehensive approach in the science can provide one way out of the given situation. Another way is a review of the history of the discipline and a search there for the lost unity within that discipline. The works of Roman Jakobson provide such a critical point for the history of translation science. Although Jakobson wrote about translation, he was not a translation theorist. He saw translation within the framework of his understanding of the processes of communication, and without this background it is difficult to understand correctly his specific meditations on translation activity.

Jakobson first demonstrated his model of verbal communication (Fig. 1) in 1956 in his article, *Metalanguage as a linguistic problem* (Jakobson 1985a [1956]).

CONTEXT
(REFERENTIAL FUNCTION)

ADRESSER   **MESSAGE**   **ADRESSEE**
(EMOTIVE F-N)   (POETIC F-N)   (CONATIVE F-N)

CONTACT
(PHATIC F-N)

CODE
(METALINGUAL F-N)

R. Jakobson

Figure 1. Jakobson's model of communication.

On the one hand, the given model ties its components to various functions of language: "Language must be investigated in all the variety of its functions" (Jakobson 1985a [1956]: 113). On the other hand, along with the various functions of language, it is also important for Jakobson to distinguish two principle levels of language — the level of objective language and the level of metalanguage: "On these two different levels of language the same verbal stock may be used; thus we may speak in English (as metalanguage) about English (as object language) and interpret English words and sentences by means of English synonyms and circumlocutions" (Jakobson 1985a [1956]: 117).

The actualization of the concept of metalanguage as "an innermost linguistic problem" (Jakobson 1985a [1956]: 121), which emerges from Jakobson's logic, is important for an understanding of the psychological as well as linguistic and cultural aspects of the functionality of language.

He begins from the metalinguistic aspect of the linguistic development of a child: "Metalanguage is the vital factor of any verbal development. The interpretation of one linguistic sign through other, in some respects homogeneous, signs of the same language, is a metalingual operation which plays an essential role in child language

learning" (Jakobson 1985a [1956]: 120). But the development of a child corresponds to the development of an entire culture. For the development of a culture, it is important that the natural language of this culture satisfy all the demands for the description of foreign or of new phenomena and by the same token ensure not only the dialogic capacity but also the creativity and integrity of the culture, its cultural identity: "A constant recourse to metalanguage is indispensable both for a creative assimilation of the mother tongue and for its final mastery" (Jakobson 1985a [1956]: 121). In this way, the above-mentioned role of translators as creators of new metalanguages (languages of description and languages of dialogue) is vitally important for a culture. The very concept of metalanguage turns out to be important both at the level of scientific languages and at the level of everyday communication.

If in his 1956 article Jakobson associates the introduction of the concept of metalanguage with the name of Alfred Tarski, then in his article *On linguistic aspects of translation*, published in 1959 (Jakobson 1971a [1959]), he introduces a new aspect and points to the name of Niels Bohr, who brought out the complementarity of an object-language and its metalanguages. From complementarity comes a more flexible approach to the translatable, since natural language manifests itself as a universal means of communication: "All cognitive experience and its classification is conveyable in any existing language" (Jakobson 1971a [1959]: 263). Complementarity also extends to the definition of types of translation. The concept of interpretation becomes generalized: "We distinguish three ways of interpreting a verbal sign: it may be translated into other signs of the same language, into another language, or into another nonverbal system of symbols" (Jakobson 1971a [1959]: 261). As a result, it is possible to speak of three types of translation: intralingual translation or *rewording*, interlingual translation or *translation proper* and inter-semiotic translation or *transmutation.*

If the matter concerns poetic translation or translation of the untranslatable, then Jakobson applies the concept of transposition:

> Only creative transposition is possible: either intralingual transposition — from one poetic shape into another, or interlingual transposition — from one language into another, or finally intersemiotic transposition — from one system of signs into another, e.g., from verbal art into music, dance, cinema, or painting. (Jakobson 1971a [1959]: 266)

In sum, alongside objective language and metalanguage arises the complementary pair — interpretation and transposition. This complementarity leads to still another — the complementarity of code-units and of the message as a whole. Jakobson stresses that in inter- and intra-linguistic translation it is usually not possible to speak of a full equivalence between code-units, "while messages may serve as adequate interpretations of alien code-units or messages" (Jakobson 1971a [1959]: 261). The translator works simultaneously with the code-units of languages and with complete messages, with a plan of expression and content, with object- and meta-language, and the division not only into three types of translation but also into two simultaneous translation processes comes precisely from this understanding:

> [...] translation from one language into another substitutes messages in one language not for separate code-units but for entire messages in some other language. Such a translation is a reported speech: the translator recodes and transmits a message received from another source. Thus translation involves two equivalent messages in two different codes. (Jakobson 1971a [1959]: 261–262)

Dominant and integration

The (chrono)logical expression of the next stage in Jakobson's thought is the 1968 article *Language in relation to other communication systems* (Jakobson 1971d [1968]), two points from which we would like to distinguish in the context of the present article. One of these aspects traces back to an old talk given in 1935 and first published in 1971 — *The dominant*. The concept of the dominant is significant for the description of translation practice, since underlying various descriptions of the method of a translation or a translator is a determination of that element or level of the text considered most important by the translator. The type of textual integrity also depends on the selection of the dominant for translation, since the authorial dominant underlies the integration of elements in the entire text. Jakobson sums up the research in the following way: "The dominant may be defined as the focusing component of a work of art: it rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components. It is the

dominant which guarantees the integrity of the structure" (Jakobson 1981 [1935]: 751).

From the point of view of contemporary translation practice and of theoretical or critical thought on this practice, the distinction underlined by Jakobson between communication and information is significant: "[…] we must consistently take into account the decisive difference between *communication*, which implies a real or alleged addresser, and *information* whose source cannot be viewed as an addresser by the interpreter of the indications obtained" (Jakobson 1971d [1968]: 703). Thus, translations that deprive the original of authorship, age, natio- nality, or genre become simply information about the original. The same can be observed on the narrative level, when various points of view in the text are not distinguished, or are mixed-up or reconcep- tualized (for details see: Levenston, Sonnenschein 1986).

The second aspect of the above-mentioned article flows from the first. The integrating dominant presupposes the existence of an hierarchy in the structure of the message (text). But the process of communication is also viewed hierarchically by Jakobson, so that a comprehension of his model of communication has to rest not so much on a statistical, theoretical basis as on a dynamic, empirical one. Jakob- son in his article calls for a consideration of the specificity of each act of communication and correspondingly sees in the act of communication an hierarchy not only of linguistic but also of semiotic functions:

> The cardinal functions of language — referential, emotive, conative, phatic, poetic, and metalingual — and their different hierarchy in the diverse types of messages have been outlined and repeatedly discussed. This pragmatic approach to language must lead mutatis mutandis to an analogous study of the other semiotic systems: with which of these or other functions are they endowed, in what combinations and in what hierarchical order? (Jakobson 1971d [1968]: 703)

The linguistic and semiotic aspects of communication are interrelated. An integrated science of communication in Jakobson's opinion contains three disciplinary levels:

> 1) Study in communication of verbal messages = linguistics; 2) study in communication of any messages = semiotics (communication of verbal messages implied); 3) study in communication = social anthropology jointly with economics (communication of messages implied). (Jakobson 1971c [1967]: 666).

In another article, Jakobson distinguishes only two sciences from a semantic point of view — a science of verbal signs or linguistics and a science of all possible signs or semiotics (Jakobson 1985b [1974]: 99). Against this background, it is important to remember the universality of the concept of translation. Many processes in the sphere of contiguity between linguistics and semiotics become prominent precisely in translation. We find a direct comparison in the article, *Linguistics and communication theory*: "The semiotic definition of a symbol's meaning as its translation into other symbols finds an effectual application in the linguistic testing of intra- and interlingual translation" (Jakobson 1971b [1961]: 578). But very often Jakobson makes use of the concepts of verbalized, non-verbalized, and verbalizable, whereby verbalizable signifies translatability into verbal messages (see for example Jakobson 1971c [1967]: 663).

Models of communication and auto-communication

In respect to the last important aspect for the understanding of the concept of translation in Jakobson's work, it is necessary to point to the interrelation of internal and external communication:

> When speaking of language as a communicative tool, one must remember that its primary role, interpersonal communication, which bridges space, is supplemented by a no less important function which may be characterized as intrapersonal communication. [...] While interpersonal communication bridges space, intrapersonal communication proves to be the chief vehicle for bridging time. (Jakobson 1985b [1974]: 98)

Linguistically, this means that problems of interlinguistic and intralinguistic translation largely coincide; psychologically, it means that the mechanisms of communication and auto-communication, or dialogue with other and dialogue with self, also largely coincide. And in the context of Jakobson it follows that we stress once again the homogeneity between internal and external in relation to the person or culture.

It is eminently logical that Jakobson's model of communication has inspired researchers to apply it even to those fields of communication about which Jakobson himself wrote more rarely and with which social anthropologists and economists, in his opinion, should be

occupied. The transformation of Jakobson's model proposed by I. Even-Zohar appears thus (Fig 2.; Even-Zohar 1990: 31).

CONTEXT
INSTITUTION

ADRESSER   MESSAGE   ADRESSEE
PRODUCER   **PRODUCT**   **CONSUMER**
WRITER   READER

CONTACT
MARKET

CODE
REPERTOIRE

I. Even-Zohar

Figure 2. Even-Zohar's transformation of Jakobson's communication model (Even-Zohar 1990: 31).

On the one hand, Even-Zohar was one of the first translation theorists to introduce the concept of the market into the problematic of translation. Along with the market, the publisher as the consumer or as the representative of the consumer of a translation becomes important. The translation itself from an economic point of view becomes a saleable commodity, and the price of this commodity will play a role in its consumption. But the translation as a new text for the receiving culture is often in need of advertisement, or presentation to future readers. This means that along with the new book as a verbal text, various forms of advertisement also enter the culture. In this way, the verbal text receives its visual or audio-visual image. Pedro A. Fuertes-Olivera and his co-authors also attempt to understand advertising communication on the basis of Jakobson's model (Fig.3; Fuertes-Olivera *et al.* 2001: 1293).

CONTEXT
REALITY
PRODUCT / SERVICE

ADRESSER
ADVERTISER

MESSAGE
TEXT
ADVERTISEMENTS AS PART
OF ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN

ADRESSEE
TARGET
AUDIENCE

CONTACT
CHANNEL
WRITTEN / SPOKEN / DIGITAL

CODE
ADVERTISING LANGUAGE + IMAGES / SOUND etc

P. A. Fuertes-Olivera

Figure 3. Fuertes-Olivera *et al* transformation of Jakobson's communication model (Fuertes-Olivera *et al.* 2001: 1293).

Both models fit Even-Zohar's assertion that if Jakobson's model arises from the speech event, then his own version takes as its basis the socio-semiotic (cultural) event (Even-Zohar 1997: 19). Above we showed the special significance for Jakobson of the metalinguistic function. It is characteristic that also for Even-Zohar the main function is tied to a code, although he has replaced metalanguage with the concept of repertoire. Repertoire depends on both the institution and the market. That is why the concepts of addresser and addressee are conjoined in the concept of repertoire: "There may be a repertoire for being a 'writer', another for being a 'reader', and yet another for 'behaving as one should expect from a literary agent', and so on" (Even-Zohar 1990: 40). In a revised version, the author distinguishes the concepts of active and passive repertoire:

'Repertoire' designates the aggregate of rules and materials which govern both the *making* and *handling,* or production and consumption, of any given product. [...] In the case of making, or producing, we can speak of an *active operation* of a repertoire, or, as an abbreviated term, an *active repertoire.* In the case of handling, or consuming, on the other hand, we can speak of a

passive operation, or a passive *repertoire.* The terms suggested here are for convenience only; the repertoire is neither 'active' nor 'passive', but can be used in different modes in two different circumstances, as described above, namely, in an event where a person produces something, in contradistinction to an event where a person 'deciphers' what others produce. (Even-Zohar 1997: 20)

Ideology, economy and translation

In the repertoire, economic and ideological problems are conjoined, and against the background of Jakobson's model this means that economic and ideological metalanguages can become actualized in the description of translation. In this case it is appropriate to speak of the inter-discursivity of metalanguages. From the application of this model for the description of advertising communication comes the problem of the intersemiotic nature of metalanguages, since a verbal text can enter a culture and exist there with the support of non-verbal elements of the texts.

There also exists an interesting attempt to unite these two aspects in the concepts of the exogenic and endogenic parameters of translation (*les paramètres exogènes, les paramètres endogènes*). Entering into the composition of exogenic parameters are economic (*la paramètre économique*), cultural (*la paramètre culturel*), and ideological (*la paramètre idéologique*) parameters (Guidère 2000: 11–30). The composition of endogenic parameters is also three-fold: "*d'abord, la différenciation du texte publicitaire au niveau scripturaire; ensuite, sa particularité sur le plan iconographique; enfin, sa spécificité proprement sémiotique*"[1] (Guidère 2000: 32). The possibility of differentiating three levels of culture — lexiculture (*la "lexiculture"*), iconoculture, (*l'"iconoculture"*) and ideoculture (*l'"idéoculture"*) — also emerges from the given approach (Guidère 2000: 267–276).

Problems of ideology and economics are difficult to view in isolation, since the concept of the market already combines in itself aspects of both the local and the global market (Apter 2001). The confluence of the economic and the ideological is especially characteristic of

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[1] "[…] firstly, the differentiation of the advertisement text at the level of composition; then, its peculiarity at the level of iconography; finally, its purely semiotic specificity".

mass literature. For example, researchers into the translation of mass literature have introduced among other things the concepts of collective translation (team translation), standardization (of theme, language, style, size, weight), the ignoring of authorial idiosyncrasies ("Commercial production ignores the so-called sacredness of the author"), commercial calculations (definite market, deadlines, no revision), selection of texts (reuseability), the repeated publication of old translations (the recycling strategy), marketing strategies (special translation as a euphemism for "contains many cuts"), and pseudo-translations (Malmkjær *et al.* 2000: 244–247).

Along with neutralized texts in response to the pragmatic laws of mass culture, there are also ideological laws at work in culture. One example of the manifestation of such laws is the emergence within a repertoire (or market) of a particular local culture and a global (mass) culture and the attempt to establish an intermediate market and repertoire, for example, in the European community. Michael Cronin associates this with the concepts of micro-cosmopolitanism and of the negentropic translational perspective:

> What we would like to propose is precisely a way of thinking about trans-
> lation and identity which is grounded in cultural negentropy. This *negentropic*
> *translational perspective* is primarily concerned with the 'emergence of new'
> cultural forms through translation practice and the way in which translation
> contributes to and fosters the persistence and development of diversity.
> (Cronin 2006: 129)

The ideological problems of translation activity have become important both on an empirical and on a theoretical level (compare: Calzada Pérez 2003). The introduction of an author into a culture is already ideologically and politically colored. The channels through which an author enters a culture by means of translation can be divided into two groups — the channel of authorized discourse and the channel of unauthorized discourse. Iona Popa includes in authorized discourses "the *exportation* channel and the *promoted* writer, the *official* channel and the *authorised* writer, and the *patri-monial* channel and the *canonised* writer" (Popa 2006: 206). Adjoined within unauthorized discourses are "the *semi-official* channel and the *banned* writer, the *parallel* channel and the *clandestine* writer and, finally, the *direct and in transit* channels and the *exiled* writer" (Popa 2006: 206).

The image of the author has an effect not only on the audience but also on the text of the translation. And in this sense translations do not only convey the original — "translations construct or produce their originals" (Hermans 1999: 95). The ideological aspect of translation activity is one of the factors that includes translation within the process of the autocommunication of a culture. Theo Hermans has expanded the boundaries of the understanding of the phenomenon of translation with the help of the concept of ideology:

> Paradoxically, this ideological slant is precisely what makes translation interesting as a cultural and historical phenomenon. If it were a matter of technical code-switching only, translation would be as a photocopier. Translation is of interest because it offers first-hand evidence of the prejudice of perception. Cultures, communities and groups construe their sense of self in relation to others and by regulating the channels of contact with the outside world. In other words, the normative apparatus which governs the selection, production and reception of translation, together with the way translations are conceptualized at certain moments, provides us with an index of cultural self-definition. It would be only a mild exaggeration to claim that translations tell us more about those who translate and their clients than about the corresponding source texts. (Hermans 1999: 95)

Translation in conflicts

At the beginning of the present article we wrote about the needs that are satisfied in the process of communication. Translation theory has led in its development to problems of conflict, to problems not only of professional ethics but of the mission of the translator. The mentality of conflict-events for the mass-media audience also depends on translators. On the one hand, translators, like journalists, can turn out to be politically engaged, because they work for a concrete channel of the mass-media, and this also means the representative of a particular position. Mona Baker affirms on this point: "Contemporary wars have to be sold to international and not just domestic audiences, and translation is a major variable influencing the circulation and legitimation of the narratives that sustain these activities" (Baker 2006: 2). On the other hand, the translator, even in the service of a single channel, can have an influence on the mentality of the process of communication, and it is even possible to say that "translation and interpreting are essential for circulating and resisting the narratives

that create the intellectual and moral environment for violent conflict in the first place, even though the narratives in question may not directly depict conflict or war" (Baker 2006: 2). The role of the translator becomes even more responsible when he is embedded among information sources about events or among journalists who are writing about these events (Palmer 2007: 15). In such a situation of translating an original, the motives and interests both of the source and of the translator come into play.

Of course, it is possible to distinguish between "hard" and "soft" conflicts. Hard conflicts are public events and immediately attract attention to themselves as a lack of information or an error by the translator. Soft conflicts are more latent and do not provoke stormy reactions in response:

> In a translational context, soft conflicts often derive from cultural differences in value systems, social conventions and ways of thinking. If the target culture is dominant, then the translator will have to handle the target text carefully to minimise potential problems of miscomprehension, cultural discomfort or resistance on the part of the receiver. Notwithstanding the fact that the source text may appear to be purpose-free, the translating act and target text are purpose-bound, and any translation must fulfill specific functions. Cultural discomfort, uneasiness or misunderstandings and unnecessary hatred or enmity are to be minimized in the target version. (Tang 2007: 141)

In soft conflicts, an interweaving of the ideological and psychological aspects of the translation is unavoidable. For an understanding of the specifics of a translation activity, it is necessary to attempt to discriminate those ideological aspects in the text of the translation that trace back to the editorial board of a particular publication or to the editing of the mass-media. And that makes it appropriate to distinguish the method of the translation from the method of the translator. The method of the translation signifies, on the one hand, the general rules or traditions of translation for a particular type of text, the overall understanding of what makes a high-quality or low-quality translation. It includes on the other hand those social, economic, and ideological norms to which the selection of texts and authors for translation is subordinated in a given society, the editing and the publishing of translations. The method of the translation and the method of the translator can turn out to be in conflict, but they may also come together when the translator works above all for a customer and not for the author of the original.

For example, depending on the motives of the translator or publisher, one and the same translation text may enter into various repertoires and have various artistic or ideological dominants. Douglas Robinson writes, for example, about translation in a post-colonial context:

> Translation plays three sequential but overlapping roles in postcolonial studies: as a channel of colonization, parallel to and connected with education and the overt or covert control of markets and institutions; as a lightning-rod for cultural inequalities continuing after the collapse of colonialism; and as a channel of decolonization. Thus tabulated, three roles mark separate stages in a utopian narrative that informs much of postcolonial studies: from a colonial *past* taken as harmful; through a complex and conflicted *present* in which nothing seems easy or clear-cut; to a decolonized *future* taken as beneficial. (Robinson 1997: 31)

In this way, the mentality of a certain historical era is realized in the translation and may depend both on the translator and on the publisher. It is also possible that the type of publication (book jacket, preface or postscript, illustrations, etc.) is found to be in contradiction with the method of the translator, and in this case it is necessary to speak of the translator's ambivalence.

It is necessary to speak of ambivalence as well in connection with the prestige of the translator's profession in the contemporary world. The American view of the translator's profession is intriguing:

> [...] translation professionals have long had an image problem. The portrait of translators derived from most reference books is not flattering — you might find that the Italians coined the catch-phrase *traduttore, traditore* (translator, traitor). Purchasers of language services are often unaware of the skill needed to recast text in a foreign tongue — the typical response to a translation request in many US corporations used to be: 'Get a secretary to do it'. Translation is often thankless; ask a dozen marketing managers for their experience, and their only memories will be of translation errors. A professional translation does not enjoy praise — it merely avoids criticism. (Sprung 2000: xii)

But a certain ambivalence is observable as well in attempts to define more precisely the limits of the translator's professional ethics in the framework of translation theory. It turns out that there is no single, universal ethic comparable to the Hippocratic oath in medicine.

Professional ethics

Andrew Chesterman has made a very serious attempt at a transition from communication to autocommunication, from various ethical models to a unified understanding of the professional ethics and likewise moral identity of the translator. In his opinion, the concepts of the ethics of translation and the translator that exist in translation theory come down to four basic models. The first model is the ethics of representation, at the core of which lies fidelity to the original: "The ethical imperative is to represent the source text, or the source author's intention, accurately, without adding, omitting or changing anything" (Chesterman 2001: 139). The second model is the ethics of service. Here translation is "a commercial service, performed for a client. […] A prime quality of good translator-servants is thus loyalty; they are loyal above all to the client, but also to the target readers and to the original writer" (Chesterman 2001: 140). The third model is the ethics of communication, within the framework of which "the ethical translator is a mediator working to achieve cross-cultural understanding" (Chesterman 2001: 141). The fourth model is norm-based ethics, the observation of which guarantees the acceptability of the translation. The concept of trust is important here: "[…] if translators behave in predictable, norm-conforming ways, it is easier to trust them — and the profession as a whole" (Chesterman 2001: 142). In the author's opinion, these models are too heterogeneous and rely too little on the qualitative indicators of translation practice.

By way of compensation, Chesterman proposes an ethics of commitment, which rests on a practical evaluation of translation activity: "It is thus also a virtue, supporting the striving for excellence, the wanting to be a good translator" (Chesterman 2001: 147). An awareness of duty is very close to an oath, and Chesterman calls for us to imagine an oath for translators, or a Hieronymic oath. He first proposes nine points for this oath with the following key concepts for the comprehension of the professional ethics of translators: commitment, loyalty to the profession, understanding, truth, clarity, trustworthiness, truthfulness, justice, striving for excellence (Chesterman 2001: 153). Understandably, these keywords are not only bearers of ethical principles — the identity and the self-awareness of translators depend on them as well. Returning to the problem of the dialectical situation, it is possible to say that the enumerated keywords are

important elements of the language of the dialogue in which translators sense a need or demand, a dialogue which takes place between translators and contemporary society and without which it is difficult to find in society a common understanding on questions of the status of the translator's profession.

Self-description and self-modelling

Research in the field of translation ethics well illustrates the efforts of one area of culture toward self-understanding and self-description. Self-description is a process of autocommunication, and its result can be a self-modelling that fixes the dominants, the principles of unification, and the generative language of self-description. Lotman defined self-modelling (*автомодель*) on the basis of a culture as a whole. "Self-modelling is a powerful means for the 'end-regulation' of a culture, attributing to it a systematic unity and largely defining its quality as a reservoir of information" (Lotman 1970: 420). Lotman sees in culture three types of realization of self-modelling: (1) self-modellings of culture that strive toward a maximal approach to real existing culture; (2) self-modellings that are distinct from the practice of culture and are counted toward the changing of that practice; (3) self-modellings that exist as an ideal self-awareness of the culture distinct from the culture as such (Lotman 1970: 420).

The movement in the direction of a Hieronymic oath is the creation of a self-modelling of the second type, counting toward the change of existing practices. But if we return to the problem, not of the translator, but of the translation, then it is possible to observe behind the dynamic of development two parallel self-modellings and correspondingly two types of metalanguage. And the mixture of these metalanguages illustrates the deep internal bond between processes of thought and metacommunicative processes in culture, and an understanding of this unity traces back to the work of Jakobson. His differentiation of interlinguistic, intralinguistic, and intersemiotic translation is an attempt at the modelling of internal speech. Nikolai Zhinkin has shown the code-transitions within internal speech and the coexistence of verbal and representational codes. He has also extended the results of the analysis of internal speech to the processes of understanding: "understanding, that is, the reception of messages,

should be viewed as translation from one language into another. Moreover, a language of representation must be one of these languages, since the first, perceived step toward the knowledge of reality is made up of them" (Zhinkin 1998: 161).

It is possible to say that the formation of self-modelling of the first type — that is, maximally reflecting reality — takes place in an understanding of the mechanisms of translation. And it is logically consistent that this model is found still in the process of formation and that translation theory only makes an approach toward this problem. The semiotics of culture clarifies the difficulty of this process, where the comparability of personality and of culture as a collective personality is important. In this way, if the three types of translation outlined by Jakobson reflect the simultaneity of three processes in the psychological process of translation, then the same simultaneous process takes place in culture. Communication is not thinkable without metacommunication, and a translation as a secondary text is only one of many possible metatexts of one and the same original (Popovič 1976). All of these metatexts can be typologized on the basis of Jakobson's classification. And the result is that the entire culture can be conceived of as a process of translation.

The creative and mediating processes operating in culture can be treated as a communicative, metacommunicative and autocommunicative complex. Any creator, while creating his/her work, communicates both with the audience and with himself/herself. The same happens with culture as a collective creator. All the texts of different cultural spheres and all the advertisements, reviews, annotations, translations, studies, screen and stage adaptations, and lectures make up culture as a whole, offering, as an integrated unity, to the society a possibility for self-control and learning, balance between mass and elite culture, but also enforcing certain official or average ways of perception and understanding.

On the one hand, understanding a text means juxtaposing this text's all possible forms of existence in culture. The intensive growth of audiovisual and hypermedial experience of culture has created a new problem also for the analyst. The sign systems of perceptual processes influence understanding more and more, and even for understanding a novel in culture only verbal experience is not sufficient any more. A computer game, a comic strip or a film created on the basis of one text are all part of this text's mental whole in culture, and the analyst cannot ignore this fact.

On the other hand, all the metatexts that have emerged in culture form a process of a text's translation into culture and recognition in culture. From the point of view of culture as a whole, this process is autocommunicative, since in order to explain a phenomenon, culture searches for description languages that are suitable to it. Being autocommunicative, culture tries to increase the quantity of information in itself, to raise its quality and to change itself through this.

The association of problems of translation simultaneously with communication and metacommunication indicates both the naturalness of the complex approach to translation activity and the multi-levelled nature of communication processes in culture. That which on one level of culture manifests itself as a process of communication and a dialogue between addresser and addressee can be seen on a deeper level as the autocommunication of culture and a dialogue of the culture with itself. It is very important axiologically to see both levels, since autocommunicative processes increase the coherence of a culture, support its identity, and do this with the help of self-modellings. The wealth of a culture is not only in the diversity of texts and events, but also in the diversity of self-modellings of various types in various parts of the culture.

If one wants to understand translation, it is necessary to look at all its aspects from the psychological to the ideological. And it is necessary to see the process of translation, on the one hand, as a complex of interlinguistic, intralinguistic, and intersemiotic translations, and on the other hand, as a complex of linguistic, cultural, economic, and ideological activities. Then it is also easier to approach the translator, perhaps the most important cultural figure of our time. In the logic of the development of translation theory from the concept of fidelity to the original, equivalence, and adequacy, through the concept of acceptability and useability, toward various overarching theories, a communicative understanding of translation has been realized. The analysis of the activity of the translator along with communicative activity and autocommunicative activity opens a new perspective for the understanding of the phenomenon of translation and compels us to study more seriously the axiological and moral problems of translation.[2]

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Перевод как коммуникация и автокоммуникация

Желая понимать перевод необходимо видеть все его аспекты от психологического до идеологического. И необходимо видеть процесс перевода, с одной стороны, как комплекс интерлингвистических, интралингвистических и интерсемиотических переводов, с другой же стороны как комплекс языковой, культурной, экономической и идеологической деятельности.

На границах языков, культур и обществ работают переводчики. По стратегии своего переводческого поведения они помещаются между

полюсами спецификации и адаптации. Они или сохраняют чуждость чужого или превращают чужое в свое. Тем самым они перестают быть простыми посредниками, так как в семиотическом смысле они способны генерировать новые языки для описания чужого языка, текста или культуры и обновлять культуру или влиять на диалогоспособность культуры как с другими культурами, так и с самим собой. Таким образом, переводчики работают не только с естественными языками, но и с метаязыками, языками описания. Одна из миссий переводчика увеличивать восприимчивость и диалогоспособность культуры, а через них и внутреннее разнообразие культуры. Будучи посредниками между языками переводчики являются важными создателями новых метаязыков.

Tõlge kui kommunikatsioon ja autokommunikatsioon

Tõlke kui sellise mõistmiseks on vajalik käsitleda selle kõiki tahke, psühholoogilisest ideoloogiliseni. Ühtlasi tuleb tõlkeprotsessi vaadelda kui keelesisese, keeltevahelise ja intersemiootiliste tõlgete kompleksi ning samaaegselt kui lingvistiliste, kultuuriliste, majanduslike ja ideoloogiliste toimingute kogumit.

Tõlkijad töötavad keelte, kultuuride ja ühiskondade piiridel. Vastavalt oma tõlkekäitumise strateegiatele, asetavad nad end kahe pooluse — spetsiifilisuse ja kohandamise — vahele. Nad kas säilitavad Teise teisesuse või muudavad ta Endaks. Sel moel lakkavad nad olemast pelgad vahendajad, kuivõrd semiootilises mõttes on nad võimelised võõra keele, teksti või kultuuri kirjeldamiseks looma uusi keeli ning oma kultuuri uuendama või mõjutama kultuuri võimet teiste kultuuride või iseendaga dialoogi astuda. See tähendab, et tõlkijad ei tööta ainult loomulike keeltega, vaid ka metakeelte, st kirjelduskeeltega. Üks tõlkija missioonidest ongi kultuuri vastuvõtlikkuse ja dialoogivõime ning nende kaudu kultuuri sisemise mitmekesisuse suurendamine. Keelte vahel seisvate vahendajatena on tõlkijad olulised uute metakeelte loojad.

Translation as sentimental education:
Zhukovskij's *Sel'skoe kladbishche*

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Abstract. Vasilij Zhukovskij's *Sel'skoe kladbische*, a translation of Thomas Gray's *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard*, occupies a special place in Russian literary history. First published in 1802, it was so widely imitated by later Russian poets that it came to be regarded as a "landmark of Russian literature", not only at a boundary between two cultures (English and Russian) but also at a boundary within Russian culture itself — the transition from Neoclassical to Romantic aesthetics. Zhukovskij's translation of Gray can be read as the end result of a long process of personal education in the sign system of Sentimentalism, in both its European and its Russian variants, which then reproduced itself in an impersonal way within his culture as a whole. Zhukovskij did not merely reinscribe Gray's poem into Russian. Rather, he used it to deploy the developing Russian Sentimentalist (Karam-zinist) style within a wide range of lyric registers, thereby providing models for other Russian lyric poets. In this sense, his work exemplifies Juri Lotman's dictum that "the elementary act of thinking is translation" — it made it possible for Russian poets to think within an entirely new, though by no means foreign system of signs.

In December 1802, a translation of Thomas Gray's *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard* entitled simply *Sel'skoe kladbishche* [Village Graveyard] was published in the Moscow journal *Vestnik Evropy*. It was the first complete translation of the English original into Russian verse, though not its first appearance in Russian culture. The *Elegy* had been popular throughout Europe for half a century — its famous conclusion, called the *Epitaph*, was especially admired — and at least six Russian translations of various kinds had already been made (Levin 1970: 274–275). This one, however, was different. It brought

its creator, a nineteen-year-old graduate of the Moscow University Nobleman's Pension named Vasilij Andreevich Zhukovskij, almost overnight fame. Only one year after *Sel'skoe kladbishche* appeared in print, Nikolai Karamzin — the editor of the *Vestnik Evropy* and the leading figure in Russian literature at the time — was habitually alluding to its verses "as if to a passage by Lomonosov or Derzhavin known to everyone" (quoted in Etkind 1973: 57–58).

The young translator went on to make a brilliant career, first as Karamzin's successor at the *Vestnik Evropy*, then as a celebrated literary figure in St. Petersburg salons, and eventually as a pedagogue to the imperial family, becoming tutor to the future Tsar Liberator Alexander II. Zhukovskij's career as a translator, but also as an original poet, editor, theorist, and pedagogue — and even as an informal literary impresario, mentor to figures like Pushkin and Gogol — made him the key figure in the Russian assimilation of European Romanticism. This in turn assured a special place for *Sel'skoe kladbishche* in the narrative of Russian literary history. Nearly a century after the translation was published, the symbolist Vladimir Solov'ev in a footnote to one of his poems called it "the origin of truly human [istinno-chelovecheskoj] poetry in Russia" (Solov'ev 1974: 118). The scholar V. N. Toporov in 1981 named it a cultural "event" and went on to outline four reasons for why it should be placed among the primary sources of the Russian lyric (Toporov 1981: 207–208).

The chicken-and-egg problem of *Sel'skoe kladbishche* and Russian Romanticism has been a feature of critical thinking on the translation at least since Belinskij in the 1840s. All modern scholars agree that *Sel'skoe kladbishche* cannot be considered a "Romantic" work by a strict definition of the term, for the simple historical reason that the theory of Romanticism — including simply the word "Romantic" — became current in Russia only two decades later. Toporov, for example, rather brusquely dismisses the question of Zhukovskij's Romanticism in the poem, "both from a synchronic and from a diachronic point of view" (Toporov 1981: 211). Yet such was the influence of *Sel'skoe kladbishche* both on its original audience and on the self-styled Russian Romantics of the 1820s that in retrospect it came to be seen not only as the origin of Zhukovskij's career but of an entirely new literary period. "Despite all efforts at greater precision," Toporov concedes, "it would hardly be possible to find in Russian poetry a

work that put down such a clear boundary between itself and that which preceded it" (Toporov 1981: 241).

As a translator, then, the young Zhukovskij was something more than a cultural mediator. He was an artist who through the medium of translation actively renewed his own culture and enlarged its dialogic capacity not only with other cultures but also with itself. Translators work at the boundaries between languages, cultures, and societies. But in doing so, they also shape the boundaries *within* their own languages, cultures, and societies, boundaries between discourses, idioms, and historical eras. As Peeter Torop notes:

> One of the missions of the translator is to increase the receptivity and dialogic capability of a culture, and through these also the internal variety of that culture. As mediators between languages, translators are important creators of new metalanguages. (Torop 2008: this volume)

The way in which *Sel'skoe kladbishche* simultaneously invites reflection on both the translator as an artistic personality and the translation as an impersonal artefact makes it especially interesting from the semiotic point of view. On the one hand, Zhukovskij himself habitually called it "my first printed poem", although this was not in fact the case. Clearly his selection of the *Elegy* and his treatment of the text had great personal significance for his development as an artist (Zhukovskij 1999: 437). On the other hand, *Sel'skoe kladbishche* — endlessly imitated by later Russian poets — achieved its status as a "*pamiatnik russkoj literatury*" (landmark of Russian literature) at the boundary between Neoclassical and Romantic aesthetics in a way that was quite beyond its creator's personal intentions or control. The text of the translation thus not only stands at a nexus between two cultures (English and Russian) and at a nexus within a single culture (Russian Neoclassicism and Romanticism) but also identifies the personal development of its creator with the impersonal development of his culture as a whole. The German word *Bildung* is perhaps more expressive here than the English word *development*, combining as it does the concepts of "development" with those of "education" and "formation". Zhukovskij's translation of Gray can be read as a kind of "*Bildungsgedicht*", the end result of a long process of personal education, which then reproduced itself in an impersonal way within Russian-speaking culture as a whole. In this sense, it virtually

exemplifies Juri Lotman's dictum that "the elementary act of thinking is translation" (Lotman 2000: 143).

Gray's *Elegy* and Sentimentalism

Zhukovskij's choice of Gray's *Elegy* to translate can be placed within the semiotic context of European Sentimentalism as a generalized phenomenon. Never as clearly defined nor as comprehensively theorized as the subsequent Romantic movement, the Sentimentalist trend began in the first half of the 18th century among fashionable English novelists, poets, and moral philosophers — Richardson, Fielding, Young, Thomson, Warton, and Sterne, to name a few — who treated certain themes with a distinctive new style and tone. The fashion was later taken up on the Continent at different times and in different ways that reflected the local traditions. The Irishman Laurence Sterne gave the movement its name with his *Sentimental Journey* in 1768, although his own take on the movement was already decidedly tongue-in-cheek.

The Sentimental heart was inclined to excrescences of feeling and to easy tears bordering on self-indulgence. The Sentimental writer revelled in mortality and lost love, in the wildness of nature, in the contrast of nocturnal and twilight scenes to the blazing sun of the Enlightenment. The success of Edward Young's *The Complaint, or Night Thoughts on Life, Death, and Immortality* (1742–1745) gave rise to a popular school of "graveyard poets", such as Thomas Parnell or Robert Blair, who braided stylized landscapes and sepulchral imagery into a loosely-constructed philosophical meditation. Their muse was pensive Melancholy, the cloistered inhabitant of shadows and ruins, hailed by a singer "whose strenuous tongue", as the young poet Keats would sarcastically put it, "can burst joy's grape against his palate fine".

The popularity of the elegy as a poetic genre, while indebted above all to the "graveyard poets", grew out of the overall Sentimentalist trend. In antiquity, the term "elegy" was originally applied to a verse form and only later used to designate a poetic occasion: the *elegeia* or lament. In the Neoclassical tradition, the well-developed pastoral elegy lent the genre a series of conventional motifs: a procession of mourners, an invocation to the gods, symbols of fertility and rebirth,

and so on. In the vernacular tradition, however, the term "elegy", while it continued to mean a lament occasioned by death or love, came to be more and more loosely applied to any poem with a reflective-meditative content and a particular kind of consoling warmth. The vernacular elegy attained artistic unity not through an arrangement of compulsory motifs but rather through the construction and maintenance of an intimate, heartfelt tone.

The English poet Thomas Gray (1716–1771) was a Cambridge scholar, well-versed in both the Classical and the vernacular traditions. His *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard*, first published in 1751, could trace its pedigree to Milton's *Lycidas*, the great model for the pastoral elegy in English. But neither Milton nor the ancient poets would have dreamed of composing an elegy for the common man. Gray's innovation lay in the fact that he married the "high" genre of the Neoclassical elegy to a deeply populist sensibility, conferring its dignity on ordinary people and by extension on a growing audience of middle-class readers. His experiment was one of those rare poems that have immediate success both in educated circles and among the general public. A tradition exists that in 1759 the ill-fated British General Wolfe read it to his troops before the Battle of the Plains of Abraham. The *Elegy* quickly ran through eleven editions, creating variant texts that bedevil scholars to this day (Weinfield 1991: 1–10).

Despite its immense popularity and influence, the *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard* never received unanimous acclaim from English critics. Its only obvious formal merit was its so-called "elegiac stanza" — an iambic pentameter line (the workhorse line of English poetry) set in quatrains rhyming ABAB. Gray's elegiac stanza is self-contained, balanced, and symmetrical, with each stanza expressing a single complete thought. Every line within the stanza corresponds to a grammatical period. The lines are sparingly enjambed and only rarely even catalectic or hypermetric. Their imagery is "paratactic", one image displacing the other in a formal and rather monotonous procession. The most famous stanza provides a good illustration for the whole:

> The boast of heraldry, the pomp of pow'r,
> And all that beauty, all that wealth e'er gave,
> Awaits alike th' inevitable hour.
> The paths of glory lead but to the grave.
> (Gray 1966, ll. 33–36)

In fact, the poem is an exemplary mid-18th century work with an abundance of conventional rhetorical devices — the personification of abstractions, for example — and with little feeling for the natural flow of English speech. No less an authority on the subject than William Wordsworth, in his preface to *Lyrical Ballads*, singled out Gray as a poet for whom metrical composition and everyday speech were irreconcilable (Wordsworth 1969: 162–163). The Anglophone critical consensus on the poem was perhaps first articulated in the late-19th century by Matthew Arnold, who argued that "Gray, a born poet, fell upon an age of prose" (Arnold 1961: 328). Arnold admired Gray's work but believed that it owed its success to extra-poetic factors. The modernist critic I. A. Richards expanded on this point when he called the elegy "perhaps the best example in English of a good poem built upon a solid foundation of stock responses" (Richards 1929: 253).

The consensus of the English critics points to why the *Elegy* had enormous success in translation. It creates its most original effects through a translatable "message" that is not strongly tied to an untranslatable "music". The concepts are unironic and easily paraphrased, the images unambiguous and clear. Yet the work on the whole is distinctly "poetic", not solely because it plays on stock responses, but because it covers an extraordinary range of lyric registers. Scholars are divided on which edition of Gray was translated by Zhukovskij (cf. Toporov 1981: 295–7 and Zhukovskij 2000: 50–59). However, the version that appears in the Oxford Complete Poems (Gray 1966: 37–43) is sufficient to make the point: in thirty-two stanzas, generally grouped into sets of three or four, the content ranges from landscape painting (ll. 1–16) to an imaginative flight of fancy (ll. 17–28); from gentle entreaty (ll. 29–40) through a wistful meditation (ll. 41–56) to a political diatribe so highly-charged that it anticipates the Shelleyean sonnet (ll. 57–72); from introspective psychological analysis (ll. 73–92) to Neoclassical pastoral tableau (ll. 93–116), concluding in the related but different genre of the *Epitaph* (ll. 117–128). Each set of stanzas sounds a new lyric register, while the poem as a whole buoyantly maintains its elegiac tone, the imagery supporting the train of thought, and vice versa. Shakespearean actors claim that they love to play Hamlet because the role gives them so many opportunities to act. The same might be said of translators and the *Elegy*, since the work contains so many of the expressive possibilities available to the lyric poem.

Zhukovskij and the Karamzinist style

Since Zhukovskij was still a teenager when he translated Gray, his high level of hermeneutic sophistication, first in the selection and then in the treatment of the text, must be attributed at least in part to the influence of others — and above all to Karamzin. The great nineteenth century scholar A. N. Veselovskij once called Karamzin "the organizer of our literary sentimentalism" (Veselovskij 1999: 46). Emerging from Moscow pietist and Masonic circles around the time Zhukovskij was born, Karamzin was influenced through the 1780s by figures like the *Sturm and Drang* poet Jakob Lenz who were challenging the French-dominated Neoclassical Enlightenment. He immersed himself in what would later be known as "pre-Romantic" literature — Rousseau and his epigones, the graveyard poets, the German *Kraftgenies* and *schöne Seelen* — and toward the end of the decade embarked on a one-year tour of Western Europe, where he made excellent use of his time, meeting with figures like the philosopher Herder. He returned to a post as editor of the *Moskovskij zhurnal*, where in the early 1790s he published the first of his *Pis'ma russkogo puteshestvennika*, travel letters in the tradition identified with Sterne. Around the same time, he published a series of original tales, the best-known of which, a Werther imitation called *Bednaya Liza*, confirmed his reputation as the leader of a new direction in Russian literature.

Since the question of Karamzin's "Sentimentalism" involves many of the same literary-historical problems as the question of Zhukovskij's "Romanticism", we will have to make do with the inadequate remark that Karamzin was largely indifferent to the philosophical pressures that opposed Sentimentalism to the Enlightenment in the West. Karamzin's "Sentimentalism" took the form of a literary-stylistic revolution: he encouraged a new generation of writers to develop a refined "salon style" that would allow them "to write as they speak" and "to speak as they write". The second injunction was as important as the first, since Karamzin conceived of the spoken language not only as the point of departure, but also as the object of reform. The new style need not even be particularly "sentimental" in the heartfelt sense, but only the source for new expressions of sentiment, new turns-of-phrase, new imagery and themes. Not coincidentally, Karamzin was the most important translator of his generation, working from almost all the major modern European languages.

Among his most important accomplishments in the 1790s was the *Panteon inostrannoj slovesnosti*, a library of translated literature, the very existence of which had world-historical implications for the development of Russian high culture. The school that sprang up around Karamzin aspired to an ideal language and an ideal life approved by Sentimental taste and feeling. A swarm of Karamzinist imitators began to publish in popular household journals like *Priyatnoe i poleznoe preprovozhdenie vremeni* [*The Pleasant and Useful Passing of Time*], which were soon overflowing with Youngian conceits and Ossianic imagery.

Zhukovskij met Karamzin while still a student at the Moscow University Noblemen's Pension. The university preparatory classes at the Pension, founded in the 1770s by the poet Mikhail Heraskov, a prominent Mason, were an unusual blend of autocratic conservatism and Western-influenced religious ideals. The boys learned respect for tradition through the study of Lomonosov and Derzhavin — masters of the Neoclassical *pohval'naya oda*, or civic-laudatory ode — yet they also read the pietist reflections of the German pastor Christoph Christian Sturm, whose *Betrachtungen über die Werke Gottes im Reiche der Natur* had been translated in part by Karamzin. Zhukovskij enrolled at the Pension in January 1797 and soon had success both in academic and in social pursuits. His instructor in philology, Mikhail Nikitich Bakkarevich, taught him verse composition in the style of the *pohval'naya oda* but also encouraged him to explore the Karamzinist innovations, at first not so much in formal verse as in various types of lyrical prose: meditations, landscapes, or psychological descriptions (Petrunina 1987: 48). Zhukovskij's best friends, the brothers Andrei and Aleksander Turgenev, were the eldest sons of Ivan Petrovich Turgenev, at one time rector of Moscow University. The Turgenev brothers were so *schwärmerisch* about the German *Sturm und Drang* that they were known at the Pension as *zapisnye nemtsy*, or "inveterate Germans". Their home was a meeting place for prominent intellectuals, above all the Masonic thinkers who brought a pre-Romantic influence into Russian culture.

By the autumn of 1797, the teenage Zhukovskij had published his first two works in *Priyatnoe i poleznoe preprovozhdenie vremeni*: the poem *Maiskoe utro* and the Youngian prose fragment *Mysli pri grobnitse*, both inspired by the sudden death that spring of his half-sister (and foster mother). Despite its hopeful title, *Maiskoe utro*

already expressed the trademark melancholy of Zhukovskij's early style. Glutting his sorrow on a May morning — like Keats on a morning rose — the sorrowful young poet yearned for another, better world beyond the grave:

Жизнь, мой друг, бездна	Life, my friend, is an abyss
Слез и страданий ...	Of tears and suffering ...
Счастлив стократ	Happy a hundred-fold
Тот, кто, достигнув	Is he who, having reached
Мирного брега,	The peaceful shore,
Вечным спит сном.	Sleeps an eternal sleep.[1]
	(quoted in Petrunina 1987: 48)

The accompanying prose fragment is perhaps most remarkable for its highly-developed rhetorical style, unusual in a novice writer: Zhukovskij's philology instructor Bakkarevich doubtless understood that prose allowed for greater freedom of expression than verse. Several critics have remarked on the rhetorical facility of the passage, its effectiveness in conveying the onset of night:

Уж ночь раскинула покров свой, и сребристая луна явилась в тихом своем велелепии. Морфей помавает маковою ветвию, и сон с целебною чашею ниспускается на землю. Все тихо, все молчит в пространной области творения; не слышно работы кузнечика, и трели соловья не раздаются уже по роще. Спит ратай, спит вол, верный товарищ трудов его, спит вся натура. (quoted in Petrunina 1987: 48–49)

Already the night has extended its cover, and the silver moon has appeared in its silent majesty. Morpheus nods with his poppy wand, and sleep from his healing chalice pours down upon the earth. All is quiet, all keeps silent in the spacious realm of creation; inaudible the work of the grasshopper, and the trills of the nightingale no longer resound within the grove. The plowman sleeps, the bullock sleeps, faithful companion of his labours, all of nature sleeps.

The parallel structure of the first two sentences sets up a syntactic pattern that is retarded and hushed in the third sentence by the double repetition of falling silence (*vse tiho, vse molchit*). The repetition in the final sentence (*spit ... spit ... spit*), with its inverted poetic attributive (*vernyj tovarishch trudov ego*), is characteristic of Zhukovskij's early rhetorical style as exemplified in the *Elegy*.

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[1]   Here and in the following the translations from Russian are mine.

The boy developed quickly under the influence of Bakkarevich, absorbing in equal measures both the Russian Neoclassical tradition and the new Karamzinist trend. His work on the *pohval'naya oda* resulted in a bold "declamatory" style appropriate to public reading. In December 1797, for example, he read a commencement ode of his own composition in which he lauded the autocracy of Paul I.

О Павел! О монарх любезный!	*O Pavel!* O beloved monarch!
Под сильною твоей рукой	Beneath your mighty hand,
Мы не страшимся бурь, ненастья:	We fear not storm, nor foul weather:
Спокойны и блаженны мы.	Blessed and calm are we.

<div align="right">(Zhukovskij 1999: I, 23)</div>

The oratorical culture of the Pension encouraged this overstated attack, with powerful rhythms and a heavy use of apostrophe and descriptive epithets (*lyubeznyj*, *sil'noyu*, etc.). Meanwhile, the young poet continued to publish in *Priyatnoe i poleznoe preprovozhdenie vremeni*. The commencement address he delivered at the age of fifteen in December 1798 already contained a fully-developed system of sentimentalist clichés, imported wholesale into Russian with the disdain for reality characteristic of the Karamzinist epigones:

Посмотрите на сего доброго, честного поселянина, окруженного многочисленным семейством. Как он доволен! Желания его умеренны, и счастие обитает в его хижине. С пришествием дня выходит он на делание свое, и с бодростью, с удовольствием, принимается за работу. Когда же силы его начнут слабеть и востребуют подкрепления, он возвращается домой; жена и дети встречают его, и с нежностью приемлют в обьятия. Умеренный обед, приправленный дружеством и любовию, утоляет его голод; после краткого отдохновения, снова принимается он за работу, и перестает трудиться тогда, когда солнце перестает освещать землю. Ночь наступает, — сон его тих и корот, и совесть, молчащая в душе его, засыпает с ним вместе. Так приходит его день, так пройдет и жизнь его. Время рукою своею убелит власы его и покроет чело морщинами. Смерть, сия предвестница его блаженства, тихими шагами приблизится к нему, и он с улыбкою непорочности бросится в ее обьятия. (quoted in Etkind 1973: 66)

Behold this good, honest villager, surrounded by his numerous family. How happy he is! His desires are moderate, and fortune dwells in his hut. With the arrival of day he goes out to his affairs, and with cheerfulness and satisfaction applies himself to his work. When his powers begin to wane and demand fortification, he returns home. His wife and children greet him and receive

him with tenderness in their embrace. A moderate lunch prepared with friendship and love alleviates his hunger; after a short rest he applies himself anew to his work, and he ceases to labour when the sun ceases to shine upon the earth. Night falls — his sleep is quiet and brief, and his conscience, keeping quiet in his soul, drops off to sleep along with him. As his day passes, so passes his life. The hands of time whiten his hair and cover his brow with wrinkles. Death, the herald of his bliss, approaches him with quiet steps, and with a smile of chastity he casts himself into her embrace.

The Russian peasant, rarely a virtuous figure even in the best of lights, devotes himself in this stylistic system to cheerful labour and temperate joys in the bosom of his loving family. The young Zhukovskij made no attempt to reflect the realities either of the Russian colloquial language or of Russian life, but fully in the spirit of the Karamzinist epigones directed both language and life toward a sentimentalized and thus presumably a "Europeanized" ideal. Even death is described as the "herald of bliss", an image from the Youngian churchyard. As Veselovskij put it, Russian reality has become "folk life seen from the window of the manor house" (Veselovskij 1999: 49).

Zhukovskij's talent as a translator developed concurrently with his rhetorical gifts. He practiced translation in both directions, honing his skills in exercises assigned for the purpose of linguistic training, initially in French and later in English and German. A letter Zhukovskij and a classmate posted to the Neoclassical poet Derzhavin on New Years Day 1799 documents a particularly successful translation from Russian into French:

Kind sir! Your works, it may be, do just as much honour to Russia as the victories of [Catherine's Field Marshal] Rumyantsev. Reading with admiration "Felicity," "Monument to a Hero," "The Waterfall," and such, we so often turn to thoughts of their immortal creator and say: "*He is a Russian, he is our contemporary*". Captivated by the rare, inimitable beauties of your ode "God", we have made bold to translate it into French, and we present our translation to your judgment. Forgive us, kind sir, if the rude brush of copyists deformed [*obezobrazila*] the superb painting of a great master. In order to retain all the power, all the sublimity of the original, it is necessary to have your great spirit, it is necessary to have your ardent pen. (Zhukovskij 1985: 204)

The letter is remarkable on three counts. The first is Zhukovskij's recognition of the importance of literature to Russia's sense of national identity, not only through his comparison of Derzhavin to a

military field-marshal covered in glory, but more tellingly through his expression of delight at Derzhavin's greatness, specifically as a contemporary Russian. The second is Zhukovskij's recognition of the *fact* of linguistic deformation: he sees translation in Neoclassical terms as the rude copying of an ideal work. But the third point follows closely upon this: he invokes the translator's spiritual affinity with the original author ("it is necessary to have your great spirit") and thereby anticipates the Romantic aesthetics of genius. He was already constructing a self-styled, quasi-Romantic interpretive philosophy on an essentially Neoclassical foundation.

The high point of Zhukovskij's career at the Pension came shortly after these pieces were written, when the headmaster made him chairman of the "Society of Pupils". At weekly Wednesday meetings, the boys discussed their favourite works, read and critiqued their own compositions, compared translations, and put together an anthology entitled *Utrennaya zarya*, or *The Dawn*. Although Andrei Turgenev was already a student at the university, the members included several other figures who would influence Zhukovskij's personal life and literary career: Aleksander Turgenev, A. F. Merzlyakov, the brothers Andrei and Petr Kaisarov, and Aleksander Voeikov, who would later marry Zhukovskij's niece. The little circle attracted the attention of Karamzin, among others, who occasionally dropped in on its meetings.

Zhukovskij and the *Elegy*

Zhukovskij graduated from the Pension in 1800 and after an unhappy stint at the Main Salt Bureau began to earn his living as a translator for Moscow booksellers. He composed his first unpublished attempt at Gray's *Elegy* in 1801 and his second, successful attempt in May-September 1802. Both were strongly influenced by Andrei Turgenev, whose original *Elegiya*, almost certainly written in friendly competition, was published by Karamzin in the *Vestnik Evropy* in July 1802. From a strictly hermeneutic point of view, both Zhukovskij and Turgenev understood that the genre of the vernacular elegy remained undeveloped in Russian lyric poetry in comparison with the *pohval'naya oda*. But where Turgenev attempted an "original" work, Zhukovskij took the more cautious approach of translating a well-

established model of the genre. His genius consisted in selecting the model with just the right combination of features: strong enough semantically to exemplify the genre, but weak enough poetically to shed its verbal texture without also losing its most powerful effects, exactly the consensus that was later reached by the English critical tradition. The critic S. S. Averintsev notes that the mature Zhukovskij habitually looked for this combination of strength and weakness in an original: a work which "having a sufficiency of meaning in itself, did not attain perfection and as it were awaited the translator in order finally to realize it" (Averintsev 1996: 138–139). In this sense, Zhukovskij was not so much interested in transmitting Gray's *Elegy* to a Russian audience as he was in using it to deploy Karamzinist techniques through the widest possible range of lyric registers — in this way perfecting his "sentimental education".

The opening stanza in Gray, for example, sounds the first of its lyric registers: landscape painting or *paysage*. The dimly-illuminated pastoral setting is a trademark of the Sentimentalist style that Zhu-kovskij had already carefully studied in prose. The young poet chose a verse form close to but not identical with the English "elegiac stanza". He used iambic quatrains rhyming ABAB, but he replaced the pentameter with a hexameter line strongly articulated into two equal hemistichs, a line better suited to the natural rhythms of the Russian language. Moreover, he gave the lines alternating feminine and masculine endings, a technique rare (because quite difficult) in English but common in Russian. The respective opening stanzas are below. The italics are mine.

> The Curfew tolls the knell of *parting* day,
> The *lowing* herd wind slowly o'er the lea,
> The plowman homeward plods his *weary* way,
> And leaves the world to darkness and to me.
> (Gray 1966, ll. 1–4)

> Уже бледнеет день // скрываясь за горою;
> *Шумящие* стада // толпятся над рекой;
> *Усталый* селянин // *медительной* стопою
> Идет, задумавшись, // в шалаш *спокойный* свой.
> (Zhukovskij 2000, ll. 1–4)

Gray's mid-18th century discursive style is relatively unadorned. Of the nine nouns in his opening stanza, only three are provided with epithets,

and only one — through the idiom "weary way" — with a simple adjective. Each line corresponds to a grammatical period. Zhukovskij by contrast provides four of his seven nouns with adjectives, interpolates an image in place of "weary way", and enjambs the final sentence. In contrast to the spare discursive style of the original, he deploys both the powerful "declamatory" rhythms of the *pohval'naya oda* and the facile descriptive resources of the Karamzinist style. His interpolation in the third line — *medlitel'noj stopoyu* ("*stopa*" in Russian can mean "metrical foot") — not only replaces a wooden cliché but brilliantly announces the slowing of the verse in imitation of the villager's slow homeward tread. This rhythmic effect occurs in the final line, with forward movement suggested by the enjambed verb placed in the first iamb *(idet)*, retardation by the inserted past participle *(zadumavshis')*, and dead halt by the rhetorical inversion of adjectives and noun *(shalash spokoinyj svoj)*. Zhukovskij maintains the present tense because it supports the intimate elegiac tone, but he throws out the striking final image, with its lyrical "me". As Toporov among others has shown, the elision results in a self-consistent pattern of deformation: Zhukovskij transfers the semantic force of the poem from a largely irrelevant narrator to the villager himself (Toporov 1981: 229ff; Etkind 1973: 58–64).

The traces of Zhukovskij's oratorical and philological training in this opening stanza and throughout the poem exemplify the overall transition within Russian literature from Neoclassical to Sentimentalist and by extension to Romantic poetics. A thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this essay and in any case has been made many times. Commentators delight in gathering examples of the conventional adjective-noun combinations that Zhukovskij deployed from the Karamzinist lexicon (for example, Etkind 1973: 60). A harvest of the first four stanzas provides: *tumannyj* sumrak (l.5), *mertvyj* son (l.6), *unylyj* zvon (l.8), *dikaya* sova (l.9), *drevnij* svod (l.9), *polunochnyj* prihod (l.11), *bezmolvnoe* vladychestvo (l.12), and grob *uedinennyj* (l.15). Favourite epithets of the Karamzinist school appear throughout the poem in various combinations and grammatical constructions: *mertvyj* and *chuvstvitelnij*, of course (four and three times), but also *spokoinyj, nezhnij, unylyj, tomnij,* and *tihij* (twice each). Some of these expressions figure into the following stanzas, which demonstrate how Zhukovskij both deformed his original and remained remarkably faithful to its imagery and tone:

Beneath those rugged elms, that yew-tree's shade,
Where heaves the turf in many a mould'ring heap,
Each in his narrow cell for ever laid,
The rude Forefathers of the hamlet sleep.

The breezy call of incense-breathing Morn,
The swallow twitt'ring from the straw-built shed,
The cock's shrill clarion, or the ecchoing horn,
No more shall rouse them from their lowly bed.
(Gray 1966, ll. 13–20)

Под кровом черных сосн и вязов наклоненных,
Которые окрест, развесившись стоят,
Здесь праоцы села, в гробах уединенных,
Навеки затворясь, сном непробудным спят.

Денницы тихий глас, дня юного дыханье,
Ни крики петуха, ни звучный гул рогов,
Ни ранней ласточки на кровле щебетанье –
Ничто не вызовет почивших из гробов.
(Zhukovskij 2000, ll. 13–20)

The second stanza here contains an exemplary concatenation of stylistic features. The first three words (*Dennitsy tihij glas*) can almost be taken to illustrate the epochal transition as a whole: a favourite Karamzinist epithet, *tihij*, is inserted as a modifier into the highly-poeticized noun-cluster *dennitsy glas*. Zhukovskij's style is a mixture of Sentimental and Neoclassical diction (in this case an emotive adjective framed by two faintly archaic nouns) as a technique for insinuating intimacy while at the same time elevating tone. The repetition that follows — in the inverted poetic attributive *dnya yunogo dyhan'e* — recalls the style that Zhukovskij mastered in his Youngian prose fragments. The same can be said of the parallel structure in the next three lines (*ni ... ni ... ni ... nichto*). The final line of the stanza compresses the semantic thread "rude forefathers of the hamlet sleep" = "them" into the substantive adjective *pochivshij* (lit. "those who have fallen asleep"). Elsewhere Zhukovskij deploys the opposite technique, expanding Gray's laconic injunction to "Ye Proud," for example, into the famous periphrasis: *A vy, napersniki fortuni osleplenny* (l. 37). All of these rhetorical techniques are not only characteristic of Zhukovskij's interpretive facility but exemplify the overall Karamzinist style.

Conclusion

By the mid-1810s, a critique of the Karamzinist sign system led by the philologist Aleksander Shishkov — a critique that included many forceful attacks on Zhukovskij himself — would begin to shape the Russian literary language toward a new synthesis. It was in this period that we can properly begin to speak of a Russian Romantic Movement. The French translation theorist Antoine Berman once called the Romantic period the "fascinating origin" of modern literary consciousness (Berman 1992: 1). If *Sel'skoe kladbishche* stands today at the "fascinating origin" of modern Russian poetry, however, it does so not by virtue of a "Romanticism" that it imported wholesale from abroad, but rather by virtue of a "Romanticism" that distilled organically within Russian culture out of its dialogue with other cultures. Zhukovskij's accomplishment in *Sel'skoe klabishche* was not merely to reinscribe Gray's elegy into the sign system of the Russian language. It was to deploy the Karamzinist idiom within the widest possible range of lyric registers as a model for other Russian poets working in the style. In this sense, it exemplifies Lotman's dictum that "the elementary act of thinking is translation" — the translation made it possible for Russian poets to think in an entirely new idiom. Consider this remarkably successful stanza:

> Взошла заря — но он с зарею не являлся,
> Ни к иве, ни на холм, ни в лес не приходил;
> Опять заря взошла — нигде он не встречался;
> Мой взор его искал — искал — не находил.
> (Zhukovskij 2000, ll. 121–4)

Stripped of unnatural poeticism, strikingly modern, it already anticipates the fully- naturalized Russian verse of the Pushkin era. It was in this way that Zhukovskij's "sentimental education" became identified not only with Karamzin and his school at the turn of the 19th century but with an overall and ongoing project of cultural *Bildung*. The nineteen-year-old translator of the *Elegy* thus not only fulfilled the Karamzinist imperative for Russian poets "to write as they speak" and "to speak as they write" but provided a sophisticated model for new languages of description, languages later imitated and assimilated by generations of Russian poets.

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Перевод как воспитание чувств:
Сельское кладбище Жуковского

Сельское кладбище Жуковского, перевод *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard* Томаса Грея, занимает особое место в русской литературной истории. Впервые перевод был опубликован в 1802 году и

вызвал такую волну подражаний у более поздних русских поэтов, что его стали считать «верстовым столбом русской литературы», который обозначил не только границу между двумя культурами (русской и английской), но и границу в самой русской литературе, — переход от классицистской эстетики к романтической. Перевод Жуковского можно читать как конечный итог процесса его личного штудирования знаковой системы сентиментализма (как европейского так и русского), который позднее воссоздался (уже «имперсонально») в его родной культуре заново. Жуковский не просто переложил произведение Грея на русский язык, он пользовался переводом как рабочим средством, развивая русский сентименталистский (карамзинский) стиль на более широкой шкале лирического регистра, создавая таким образом пример для всех русских поэтов. В этом смысле перевод Жуковского является прекрасной иллюстрацией знаменитого высказывания Юрия Лотмана «перевод является элементарным актом мышления» — его перевод позволил русским поэтам думать в совершенно новой, но все же не в чужой знаковой системе.

Tõlge kui tundekasvatus: Žukovski *Sel'skoe Kladbištše*

Vassili Žukovski *Sel'skoe Kladbištše*, tõlge Thomas Gray teosest *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard*, asub vene kirjandusajaloos erilisel kohal. Teose esmatrükk avaldati 1802. aastal ning leidis hilisemate vene poeetide seas nii laialdast jäljendamist, et seda hakati pidama "üheks vene kirjanduse verstapostiks", mis ei tähistanud mitte ainult kahe kultuuri (vene ja inglise) vahelist piiri, vaid ka piiri vene kultuuris endas — üleminekut neoklassitsistlikult esteetikalt romantilisele. Žukovski Gray-tõlget võib lugeda kui ühe üksikisiku sentimentalismi märgisüsteemi (nii euroopa kui vene) tudeerimise protsessi lõppsaadust, mis siis hiljem ennast tema kodukultuuris tervikuna taaslõi. Žukovski ei pannud Gray luuleteost lihsalt vene keelde ümber. Ta kasutas tõlget kui töövahendit, rakendamaks vene sentimentalistlikku (karamzinistlikku) stiili kõige laiemal võimalikul lüüriliste registrite skaalal, luues nii eeskuju kõigile vene poeetidele. Selles mõttes on Žukovski tõlge heaks illustratsiooniks Juri Lotmani kuulsale lausele "tõlge on elementaarseim mõtlemise akt" — ta tõlge võimaldas vene poeetidel mõelda täiesti uues, ent ometi mitte võõras märgisüsteemis.

О понятии «перевод»
в трудах Юрия Лотмана

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Abstract. **The notion of "translation" in the works of Juri Lotman.** The present article deals with the concept of "translation" and other related concepts ("re-codification", "exact translation", "adequate translation", "equivalence", "transformation") in the works of Juri Lotman, demonstrating among other things possible relations with the ideas of Roman Jakobson and Louis Hjelmslev. Two main areas of research have been distinguished where the concept of "translation" clearly stands out. First are Juri Lotman's works on structural poetics, where he discusses mainly the specifics of translating artistic texts. The other is his articles on the typology of cultures where translation is seen as a dialogue, the principal operational mechanism of culture.

Искать имя Ю. М. Лотмана в справочниках по переводу — занятие бесполезное. В числе теоретиков перевода мы его не найдем. В то же время, «перевод» и близкие к нему термины в трудах Лотмана занимают важное место, зачастую образуя некий «контрапункт» его теоретических изысканий.

Можно выделить два «пика» в динамике появления слова «перевод» на страницах трудов Лотмана. Первый связан с увлечением Лотмана структуралистской поэтикой, с появлением «трилогии», куда входят «Лекции по структуральной поэтике: Введение. Теория стиха» (1964), «Структура художественного текста» (1970) и «Анализ поэтического текста: Структура стиха» (1972). Рассмотрение их в качестве трилогии вполне оправдано,

так как вторая монография[1] является доработанным и допол-
ненным вариантом первого, а третья книга на ту же тему была
предназначена для «студентов, преподавателей вузов и учителей-
словесников». При сравнении этих трех книг наибольшее число
текстовых совпадений наблюдается в первой и третьей.

Второй пик связан с размышлениями над феноменом куль-
туры, над ее типологическими характеристиками. Если в «трило-
гии» слово «перевод» появлялось преимущественно в своем, так
сказать, классическом, литературоведческом значении, то в
группе текстов «второго пика», культуролого-типологического,
«перевод» используется Лотманом в более обобщенном смысле.
Вообще, хронологическое разделение тут неправомерно, так как
на временной оси эти тексты сосуществуют, идут параллельно.[2] К
тому же Лотман постоянно «цитирует» самого себя, одни и те же
мысли повторяются с разными вариациями во множестве работ
(особенно это касается «сквозных» тем и понятий, а к таким,
несомненно, относится и «перевод»).

Важно то, что в обоих случаях Лотман для разъяснения своих
основных положений пользуется понятием перевода, и в силу
разности контекстов это понятие получает разное содержание.
Именно эти изменения мы и попытаемся в дальнейшем просле-
дить.

Перевод — перекодировка

В рамках «трилогии» правомерно рассматривать случай приме-
нения термина «перевод» наряду с «перекодировкой», т. к., если в
«Лекциях по структуральной поэтике» (в дальнейшем ЛСП)
встречается только «перевод» (кончается эта книга главой
«Проблема стихового перевода»), то в «Структуре художествен-

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[1]　Для специалистов, как охарактеризовал это издание М. Л. Гаспаров
(Гаспаров 1994: 11).

[2]　Мы решили исключить из данного обзора «Тезисы к семиотическому
изучению культур» (Иванов и др. 1998), т. к. нельзя с уверенностью сказать,
какие мысли тезисов принадлежат конкретно Лотману, а какие — его
соавторам. В то же время именно здесь можно найти такие понятия, которые
напрямую связаны с нашей темой (трансляция, трансформация, транспо-
нирование).

ного текста» (СХТ) главенствует «перекодировка». В «Анализе поэтического текста» (АПТ) употребление обоих слов сходит на нет, что можно объяснить тем, что в АПТ доля теории — меньшая, чем в двух других книгах, главное внимание тут направлено на конкретный анализ стихотворного текста.

Сразу нужно оговориться, что говоря о переводе (т. е. пытаясь его теоретически осмыслить; случаи «ненаучного» использования нами не учитывались), Лотман имеет в виду стихотворный перевод, так как в «трилогии» именно поэзия является объектом его исследования. В то же время многие теоретические предпосылки Лотмана безусловно касаются и применимы к художественному тексту как таковому.

Важными составляющими структуральной поэтики Лотмана являются понятия структур содержания и выражения; с этими понятиями неразрывно связаны и рассуждения Лотмана о точном и адекватном переводе, о чем пойдет речь ниже.

В структуре выражения основную роль играет фонологическая структура языка:

> Все фонемы языка воспринимаются во взаимной соотнесенности, в системе, которая в стихе становится структурой содержания [...]. Поскольку национально-своеобразная фонологическая структура текста становится в поэзии основой конструкции понятий, непереводимо-национальная природа сознания выражается в поэзии с значительно большей силой, чем в нехудожественном тексте. (Лотман 1964: 109)

Дальше он подтверждает свою мысль, утверждая, что лексико-семантическая значимость фонем и морфем в поэтической речи значительно выше, чем в непоэтической, поэтому в поэтической речи «структура выражения становится структурой содержания» (там же, 110). Это обстоятельство связано и с вводимым Лотманом термином «архисема», который

> образован по аналогии с «архифонемой» Трубецкого для определения на уровне значений единицы, включающей все общие элементы лексико-семантической оппозиции. «Архисема» имеет две стороны: она указывает на общее в семантике членов оппозиции и, одновременно, выделяет дифференцирующие элементы каждого из них. (Лотман 1964: 102)

Как архифонема, так и архисема являются конструктами, т. е. архисема не дана в тексте непосредственно. Архисема является

единицей структуры содержания, но ее появление невозможно «вне данной языковой структуры выражения» (там же, 110).

Исходя из вышесказанного, получается, что для Лотмана в поэтическом тексте основное ударение падает на структуру содержания, которая как бы «втягивает» в себя и структуру выражения.

Более подробно вопросы, касающиеся перевода, освещаются в СХТ. Первые четыре главы книги, где даются теоретические предпосылки изучения структуры художественного текста, являются новыми по сравнению с ЛСП. Изменился и применяемый метаязык. В интересующем нас смысловом поле появились два термина: «перекодировка» и «перевод». Причем именно «перекодировка» вводится как термин, с множественными объяснениями. Сдвиг этот можно объяснить тем, что под влиянием теории информации в структуралистских трудах разделение «код — сообщение» заменило основополагающую соссюрианскую дихотомию «язык — речь». Как объясняет сам Лотман:

> язык выступает как некоторый код, при помощи которого воспринимающий дешифрует значение интересующего его сообщения. В этом смысле, позволяя себе известную степень неточности, можно отождествлять разделение системы на «речь» и «язык» в структурной лингвистике и «сообщение» и «код» в теории информации. (Лотман 1998: 25)

В СХТ (возможно, что под влиянием Ельмслева, на которого имеется ссылка) вместо «структуры выражения» и «структуры содержания» Лотман теперь пользуется преимущественно «планом/системой выражения» и «планом/системой содержания»[3] (справедливости ради надо сказать, что «план выражения» один раз встретился и в ЛСП (Лотман 1964: 109)).

«Перекодировка» (так же, как в ЛСП «перевод») соотносится с системой как выражения, так и содержания. Ср: «Перекодировка одной системы выражения в другую (напр. звуковой в графическую)» (Лотман 1998: 46), или:

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[3]   Истоки отождествления «системы» и «структуры» можно найти уже у Фердинанда де Соссюра, который в своем «Курсе общей лингвистики» повсеместно пользуется словом «система», имея в виду именно то, что в структурализме стали называть «структурой» (это отчетливо видно хотя бы по предметному указателю к «Курсу» — см.: Соссюр 1977: 684–685).

Чрезвычайно плодотворная в большинстве случаев и возникающая в связи с интердисциплинарными проблемами перекодировка с одного языка на другой или раскрывает в одном, как прежде казалось, объекте объекты двух наук, или ведет к созданию новой области познания, с новым, ей присущим метаязыком. (Лотман 1998: 30)

В этом высказывании можно увидеть сходство с «интралинг-вистическим переводом» Романа Якобсона.[4]

Утверждая сразу после этого, что «естественный язык в приципе допускает перевод» (там же, 30), Лотман проводит более или менее четкую грань между «языком» (художественного текста, культуры, мира) и «естественным языком». Это разделение в более поздних текстах становится четче.[5] Различение это видно и на фоне фундаментального для ТМК понятия моделирующей системы:

6.1.3. Как система систем, базирующаяся, в конечном счете, на естественном языке (это и имеется в виду в термине «вторичные моделирующие системы», которые противопоставляются «первичной системе», то есть естественному языку), культура может рассматриваться как иерархия попарно соотнесенных семиотических систем, корреляция между которыми в значительной степени реализуется через соотнесение с системой естественного языка. (Иванов и др. 1998 [1973]: 26)

Далее перекодировка напрямую связывается с проблемой содержания:

При перекодировке между определенными парами элементов, разными по своей природе, будут устанавливаться соответствия, причем один элемент в своей системе будет восприниматься как эквивалентный

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[4] «Внутриязыковой перевод, или переименование — интерпретация вербальных знаков с помощью других знаков того же языка» (Якобсон 1978: 17).

[5] Вспомним известное высказывание Лотмана: «Фактически подмена термина «язык» термином «код» совсем не так безопасна, как кажется. Термин «код» несет представление о структуре только что созданной, искусственной и введенной мгновенной договоренностью. Код не подразумевает истории, т. е. психологически он ориентирует нас на искусственный язык, который и предполагается идеальной моделью языка вообще. «Язык» же бессознательно вызывает у нас представление об исторической протяженности существования. Язык — это код плюс его история» (Лотман 1992: 13).

другому в его системе. Подобное пересечение двух цепочек структур [имеются в виду план выражения и план содержания — *С. С.*] в некоей общей двуединой точке мы будем называть знаком, причем вторая из цепочек — та, с которой устанавливается соответствие, — будет выступать как содержание, а первая — как выражение. Следовательно, проблема содержания есть всегда проблема перекодировки.[6] (Лотман 1998: 46)

Прямое указание на статью Якобсона, где приводится известное разделение трех типов перевода (интер- и интралингвистический и интерсемиотический) позволяет провести сравнение между этим разделением и предлагаемой Лотманом классификацией разных типов перекодировки, тем более, что тут имеются семантически похожие элементы: внутренние/внешние у Лотмана, интра- и интер- у Якобсона. При ближайшем рассмотрении не так все просто и однозначно.

Лотман выделяет **внутреннюю перекодировку**, в которой участвуют:

семиотические системы, претендующие на универсальность, которые принципиально не допускают подстановки значений из структуры другого рода. Здесь мы будем иметь дело с реляционными значениями, возникающими в результате выражения одного элемента через другие внутри одной системы. (Лотман 1998: 47)

В схеме Якобсона этому, на первый взгляд, соответствует интралингвистический перевод. Но в качестве примеров Лотман приводит здесь математические выражения и непрограммную и не связанную с текстом музыку, т. е. никак не «лингвистические» системы, что скорее напоминает однопланновую семиотику или символические системы Л. Ельмслева, тем более, что приведенные примеры совпадают:

[...] могут ли быть определены с этой точки зрения как семиотики, например, так называемые символические системы математики и логики или некоторых видов искусства, например музыки. [...] Термин **символические системы** предполагается использовать для таких структур, котоые могут быть интерпретированы (т. е. которым может быть подчинен материал содержания), но которые не являются двупла-

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[6] В сноске Лотмана среди прочих авторов указывается и статья Романа Якобсона «О лингвистических аспектах перевода» (Якобсон 1978 [1959]).

новыми (т. е. при наличии которых принцип простоты не позволяет нам энкатализировать форму и содержание). (Ельмслев 1960: 367, 368)

Внешняя перекодировка (в которой «эквивалентные элементы образуют пары, объединяемые в знаки. [...] эквиваввлентными оказываются разнотипные структуры») разделяется, в свою очередь, на **парную внешнюю перекодировку**, где происходит «сближение двух рядов [цепочек плана выражения и плана содержания — *С. С.*] — наиболее распространенный случай образования значений в естественных языках» (Лотман 1998: 48). Приведенный Якобсоном интерлингвистический перевод[7] здесь рассматривается как один из примеров такой перекодировки, где «эквивалентными оказываются разнотипные структуры»:

> Хотя трудно установить принципиальную разницу между такими видами перекодировки, как перевод звуковой формы в графическую или с одного языка на другой, с одной стороны, и дешифровка содержания, с другой, однако очевидно, что чем дальше отстоят взаимоуравниваемые в процессе перекодировки структуры друг от друга, чем отличнее их природа, тем содержательнее будет сам акт переключения из одной системы в другую. (Лотман 1998: 48)

Таким образом, однотипными оказываются как операция перекодировки со звуковой формы на графическую (т. е. в рамках плана выражения), так и перевод с одного языка на другой, что очередной раз служит для нас доказательством того, что «перевод» здесь понимается как просто пере-вод.

Наконец, во вторичных моделирующих системах наблюдаются и **множественные внешние перекодировки,** характеризующиеся:

> сближением не двух, а многих самостоятельных структур, причем знак будет составлять уже не эквивалентную пару, а пучок взаимоэквивалентных элементов разных систем. (Лотман 1998: 48)

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[7] «Межъязыковой перевод, или собственно перевод, — интерпретация вербальных знаков посредством какого-либо другого языка» (Якобсон 1978: 17).

Тут можно уловить сходство с интерсемиотическим переводом Якобсона[8], а также с многоплановыми (коннотативными) семиотиками Ельмслева (особенно, если принять во внимание, что речь здесь идет о «вторичных моделирующих системах»):

> Итак, представляется правильным рассматривать коннотаторы как содержание, для которого денотативная семиотика [ею может быть естественный язык — *С. С.*] служит выражением, и обозначать это содержание и это выражение как **семиотику**, именно **коннотативную семиотику**. (Ельмслев 1960: 373)

На первый взгляд туманное утверждение:

> планы выражения и содержания (если не касаться вопроса об их обратимости) *более или менее* естественно выделяются при перекодировках третьего типа. Остальные же случаи (внутренние и множественные внешние) по сути дела, не поддаются подобной интерпретации. (Лотман 1998: 48)

подтверждает нашу мысль, что влияние Ельмслева здесь более существенно, чем влияние Якобсона. Для Лотмана важнее подчеркнуть семиотический аспект перекодировки, а не переводческий.

Проблема перекодировки для него настолько важна, что впоследствии он возвращается к ней снова, теперь уже в связи с проблемой эквивалентности:

> Перекодировка органически связана с проблемой эквивалентности. Вопрос этот приобретает особое значение в связи с тем, что эквивалентность элементов на различных уровнях является одним из основных организующих принципов поэзии и, шире, художественной структуры вообще. (Лотман 1998: 56)

Перекодировка элементов одного структурного уровня средствами другого в художественных структурах называется «внутренной семантикой» (Лотман 1998: 83). Лотман заново определяет «внутреннюю перекодировку», уточняя, что внутренней она является с точки зрения данного уровня и что «ее можно

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[8] «Межсемиотический перевод, или трансмутация, — интерпретация вербальных знаков посредством невербальных знаковых систем» (Якобсон 1978: 17).

рассматривать как частный случай построения текста по синтаг-матической оси», а также то, что она подчинена «временной последовательности» (там же). Это подтверждает сделанное выше предположение, что тут главенствует именно план выра-жения.

Трансформируется и понятие «внешней перекодировки», которая уже не разделяется на два подвида и является частным случаем «построения текста по парадигматической оси (оси эквивалентностей)» (Лотман 1998: 83), т. е. на первое место выходит план содержания.

Весьма интересной и многообещающей выглядит предло-женная Лотманом система определения эквивалентности пере-вода. Сначала проводится подробный анализ фонологического уровня стиха (примером служит четверостишие Цветаевой). Лот-ман выявляет фонологическую упорядоченность текста, распо-лагая в таблице пары слов по возрастанию мощности (совпадение фонем в сегменте) (Лотман 1998: 90–92). Далее предлагается составить подобные таблицы и на следующих уровнях (грамма-тическом, лексико-семантическом, интонационном, синтакси-ческом и др.) так, чтобы получилась

> наиболее объективная картина связанности элементов в тексте. Видимо, наибольшая связанность на одних уровнях и наименьшая на других создают наиболее выгодные условия для возникновения вторичных значений. Этим мы, во-первых, получаем критерии степени орга-низованности текста (что может быть очень полезным при **определении эквивалентности перевода** [выделено мною — *С. С.*], поскольку величина мощности перекрещивающихся подмножеств переводного текста неизбежно будет расходиться с оригиналом, однако степень та же, что и в подлиннике, связанности семантических сегментов может достигаться за счет регулировки конструкции других уровней). (Лотман 1998: 93)

Конечно, такая программа очень трудоемкая и на практике труд-новыполнимая. Все же, первые попытки уже имеются. Нам кажется, что наиболее близко к реализации такого подхода к определению эквивалентности перевода подошел Михаил Лео-нович Гаспаров (Гаспаров 2001 [1975]).

Рассуждения Лотмана о «перекодировке» и «переводе» в СХТ привлекли внимание и Ренаты Лахманн в ее статье о ценностных аспектах семиотики культуры Лотмана:

В одном месте, подчеркивая роль «перекодировки», [Лотман] даже говорит о возможности установления однозначного смысла художественного текста путем перевода его содержания на нехудожественный язык. (Лахманн 1995: 13)

Упомянутая цитата Лотмана выглядит так: «Следовательно, строго однозначное определение значения художественной модели возможно лишь в порядке перекодировки ее на язык нехудожественных моделирующих систем» (Лотман 1998: 77). Нам кажется, что тут смысловое ударение падает на «строго однозначное», а не на «перекодировку». И что Лотман имеет в виду, что в художественной модели сосуществуют разные значения, которые «мерцают», «создавая игровой эффект». При перекодировке на нехудожественный язык мы получаем лишь одно из возможных значений, и при этом всегда остается «непереведенный» остаток (там же).[9] Неправомерной представляется и замена «языка нехудожественных моделирующих систем» Ренатой Лахманн на «нехудожественный язык». Ведь в таком случае высказанная на следующей странице мысль Лотмана:

художественные и нехудожественные модели обладают разной величиной измерений. Перекодировка дву- или многоплановых художественных текстов на любой одноплановый нехудожественный язык[10] не даст отношения однозначного соответствия. (Лотман 1998: 78)

опровергает интерпретацию Лахманн[11]. Наоборот, этим примером мы хотим подчеркнуть, что тексты Лотмана по многим параметрам близки к художественным, и поэтому позволяют многочисленные интерпретации на нехудожественном (научном?) языке.

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[9] Хорошо иллюстрирует мысль Лотмана приведенный им же пример: «Вероятно, все исторически имевшие место истолкования «Евгения Онегина», если к ним прибавить те, которые еще возникнут, [...] будут составлять область значений пушкинского романа в переводе на нехудожественный язык» (Лотман 1998: 78).

[10] Интересный вопрос о том, каким может быть этот «любой одноплановый нехудожественный язык» остается за рамками настоящей статьи.

[11] Тем более, что в упомянутой статье Лахманн содержится множество интересных наблюдений и конструктивной критики, касающихся лотмановского понимания эквивалентности, перекодировки, структур выражения и содержания.

Итак, наиболее насыщенным текстом по интересующему нас вопросу оказалась СХТ. В третьем тексте трилогии, АПТ, «перекодировка» встречается только два раза и ничего нового к вышесказанному не прибавляет, а слово «перевод» появляется только в его повседневном значении, без теоретической рефлексии. В то же время, именно тут имеется ссылка на классику переводоведения — книгу И. И. Ревзина и В. Ю. Розенцвейга «Основы общего и машинного перевода» (Москва, 1964), — но только как на один из источников, откуда можно почерпнуть «знание основных положений современного языкознания», необходимое «для понимания дальнейшего материала» (Лотман 1972: 21). Тем не менее, у нас есть все основания предполагать, что как эта книга, так и другие издававшиеся в 1960-е годы публикации по тематике (машинного) перевода были доступны Лотману и вопросы эти обсуждались в рамках ТМШ (среди наиболее увлеченных этой тематикой можно назвать Вячеслава Вс. Иванова и Исаака Ревзина). Несомненно это влияние чувствуется в размышлениях Лотмана над вопросами эквивалентности, точного и адекватного перевода.

Точный – адекватный перевод

Впервые различие между точным и адекватным переводом вводится Лотманом уже в ЛСП:

> самый точный перевод поэтического текста воспроизводит лишь структуру содержания в той ее части, которая обща у поэтической и непоэтической речи. Те же семантические связи и противопоставления содержания, которые возникают в результате семантизации структуры выражения, заменяются иными. Они непереводимы, как непереводимы идиомы в структуре содержания. [...] Поэтому применительно к поэтическому тексту правильнее говорить не о точном переводе, а о стремлении к функциональной адекватности. (Лотман 1964: 110)

Лотман здесь не уточняет, что он имеет в виду под «точным переводом» (в противопоставлении «адекватному»). Нам кажется, что в СХТ, где Лотман говорит о разной природе эквивалентности во вторичных моделирующих системах и в структурах первичного (лингвистического) типа, можно найти ответ на этот

вопрос. Итак, в естественном языке (ведь именно это имеется в виду под «структурами первичного типа»)

> эквивалентными (на семантическом уровне) считаются элементы, однозначные по отношению к общему денотату, ко всей семантической системе в целом и к любому ее элементу, ведущие себя одинаково в одинаковом окружении и, как следствие, поддающиеся взаимной перестановке. При этом необходимо учитывать, что значительно чаще, чем полная семантическая эквивалентность, с которой в основном будет иметь дело переводчик, а не человек, производящий семантические трансформации в пределах одного языка, встречается семантическая эквивалентность на определенном уровне. (Лотман 1998: 56)

Таким образом именно «полная семантическая эквивалентность», т. е. однозначность по отношению к «общему денотату» составляет суть понятия «точного перевода» для Лотмана.

Много места отведено вопросам «точного перевода» в одной из программных статей Лотмана «Феномен культуры» (1978). Если присмотреться, то налицо сходство с только что приведенной цитатой из ЛСП: опять говорится о плане содержания и выражения, вновь сопоставляются точный и адекватный переводы:

> Представим себе два языка, L1 и L2, устроенные принципиально столь различным образом, что **точный перевод** [выделено мною — *С. С.*] с одного на другой представляется вообще невозможным. Предположим, что один из них будет языком с дискретными знаковыми единицами, имеющими стабильные значения, и с линейной последовательностью синтагматической организации текста, а другой будет характеризоваться недискретностью и пространственной (континуальной) организацией элементов. Соответственно и планы содержания этих языков будут построены принципиально различным образом. [Эта мысль является сомнительной, не видно ни одной очевидной причины, почему должна быть **принципиальная** разница в планах содержания. — *С. С.*] В случае, если нам потребуется передать текст на языке L1 средствами языка L2, ни о каком точном переводе не может идти речи. В лучшем случае возникнет текст, который в отношении к некоторому культурному контексту сможет рассматриваться как адекватный первому. (Лотман 2000с: 569)

Но еще больший интерес представляют изменения. Прежде всего нужно обратить внимание на понятие «язык», под которым тут имеется в виду не естественный язык, а «язык» в более широком,

семиотическом смысле (как Лотман, например, говорит о «языках культуры»). В то же время, описание языка L1 соответствует пониманию естественного языка, а язык L2 может быть, например, каким-нибудь визуальным языком или музыкальным, где трудно выделить дискретные единицы.

Но можно интерпретировать это и таким образом, что только при переводе с одного дискретного языка на другой дискретный язык можно говорить о «точном переводе», т. к. в таком случае перевод осуществляется на уровне дискретных знаков. Когда же мы имеем дело с недискретным языком, где главенствует «текст», и где на первом месте структура содержания, где все семантизируется, то и о переводе тут можно говорить только на уровне всего текста. Это функциональный подход, результатом которого будет адекватный перевод.

Такая трактовка подтверждается следующей цитатой:

> Невозможность точного перевода текстов с дискретных языков на недискретно-континуальные и обратно вытекает из их принципиально различного устройства: в дискретных языковых системах текст вторичен по отношению к знаку, то есть отчетливо распадается на знаки. Выделить знак как некоторую исходную элементарную единицу не составляет труда. В континуальных языках первичен текст, который не распадается на знаки, а сам является знаком или изоморфен знаку. (Лотман 2000c: 572)

Представляется, что здесь содержание понятия «точного перевода» Лотмана близко к тому, что в переводоведении называется «буквальным переводом».[12]

В книге «Внутри мыслящих миров» прежние идеи предстают перед нами в более изысканно-научной формулировке:

> вообразим трансформацию типа «сценарий (или художественное словесное повествование) — кинофильм» или «либретто — опера». При трансформациях этого типа текст с определенным количеством координат смыслового пространства превращается в такой, для которого

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[12] Здесь уместно привести определение еще одного участника ТМШ, Пеэтера Торопа, который в то время усиленно занимался теорией перевода, разработав оригинальную типологию перевода (на материале именно стихотворного перевода): «Точный перевод является автономным аналитическим перекодированием, т. е. план выражения подлинника является не просто доминантным — им перевод и исчерпывается.» (Тороп 1982: 17).

мерность семиотического пространства резко возрастает. Аналогичное явление имеет место и при превращении словесного (нехудожественного) текста в художественный. Поэтому как между элементами, так и целостностью художественного и нехудожественного текстов невозможно однозначное отношение и, следовательно, невозможен взаимно-однозначный перевод. Возможны лишь условная эквивалентность и различные типы аналогии. (Лотман 1996: 188)

Обозначенные здесь пространственные аналогии начинают играть заметную роль в определении перевода в качестве центрального механизма культуры.

Перевод как основной механизм культуры

Разработка семиотической теории культуры начинается в статьях Лотмана конца 1960-х — середины 1970-х гг. и оформляется в книге «Внутри мыслящих миров» (впервые вышла на английском в 1990 году). Динамику развития лотмановской мысли хорошо описал Игорь Чернов:

Если выход на теорию культуры первоначально был связан с осмыслением механизма функционирования культуры, то в дальнейшем рассмотрение явлений литературы и искусства, быта и поведения через культурологическую призму позволило создать единую концепцию семиотического механизма культуры, ее обобщенную модель. (Чернов 1997 [1982]: 9)

Важной составляющей этой модели становится именно перевод. Сначала он декларируется как аналог типологического сопоставления культур:

[...] типологическое сопоставление представляет собой **аналог акту перевода**: между двумя различными текстами устанавливается эквивалентность и вводятся определенные правила соответствия. (Лотман 2000a [1970]: 455)

В дальнейшем перевод становится аналогом акта коммуникации:

Таким образом, акт коммуникации (в любом достаточно сложном и, следовательно, культурно ценном случае) следует рассматривать не как простое перемещение некоторого сообщения, остающегося адекватным самому себе, из сознания адресанта в сознание адресата, а как перевод

некоторого текста с языка моего «я» на язык твоего «ты». (Лотман 2000b [1977]: 563)

Исследуя феномен культуры, Лотман выражается более конкретно, утверждая, что именно «структура условно-адекватных переводов может выступать в качестве одной из упрощенных моделей творческого интеллектуального процесса» (Лотман 2000c: 570).

Понятие «условно-адекватного перевода» тесно связано с пониманием мыслящего устройства, которое не «может быть одноструктурным и одноязычным: оно обязательно должно включать в себя разноязычные и взаимонепереводимые семиотические образования» (там же).

Указанная «непереводимость» (которая характеризуется «отсутствием однозначных соответствий»[13] между элементами структур разных языков (см., напр.: Лотман 2000d: 607)) коррелирует с «переводимостью», результатом которой и является «условно-адекватный перевод»[14]. Здесь крайне важно, что «механизм неадекватного, условно-эквивалентного перевода служит созданию новых текстов, то есть является механизмом творческого мышления» (Лотман 2000d: 608). Обращает на себя внимание то, что «адекватность» и «эквивалентность» стали синонимами.[15]

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[13] Вместо слова «перевод» тут предлагается использовать слово «трансформация», что косвенно доказывает изменение в понимании содержания понятия «перевод» (если присмотреться, то по сути следующее определение совпадает с тем, как раньше Лотман определял «точный перевод»): «Если между этими языками существует отношение однозначного соответствия, то получившийся в результате перевода T_2 нельзя считать новым текстом. Его вполне можно будет охарактеризовать как трансформацию исходного текста в соответствии с заданными правилами» (Лотман 2000d: 607).

[14] Ср.: «между структурами этих двух языков устанавливаются отношения условной эквивалентности» (Лотман 2000d: 607).

[15] Ср.: «Сущность процесса коммуникации представляется, таким образом, в том, что некоторое сообщение в результате закодирования-декодирования передается от посылающего к получателю. При этом самая основа акта в том, что второй получает то самое сообщение (или полностью ему по некоторым принятым правилам эквивалентное), которое передал первый. Нарушение адекватности выступает как дефект в функционировании коммуникационной цепи.» (Лотман 2000b: 559–560).

В книге «Внутри мыслящих миров» (которая во многом составлена из написанных раньше статей) вновь повторяются пространственные аналогии и подчеркивается творческий характер акта перевода:

> Самый факт возможности многократного художественного перевода одного и того же стихотворения различными переводчиками свидетельствует о том, что вместо точного соответствия тексту T_1 в этом случае сопоставлено некоторое пространство. Любой из заполняющих его текстов t_1, t_2, t_3... t_n будет возможной интерпретацией исходного текста. Вместо точного соответствия — одна из возможных интерпретаций, вместо симметричного преобразования — асимметричное, вместо тождества элементов, составляющих T_1 и T_2, — условная их эквивалентность. [...] Возникающий в этих случаях текст мы будем рассматривать как новый, а создающий его акт перевода — как творческий. (Лотман 1996: 15, 16)

В последней, итоговой книге Лотмана «Культура и взрыв» (1992) «перевод» вновь выступает в качестве основного понятия:

> Ситуация, когда минимальной смыслопорождающей единицей является не один язык, а два, создает целую цепь последствий. Прежде всего, сама природа интеллектуального акта может быть описана в терминах перевода, определение значения — перевод с одного языка на другой, причем внеязыковая реальность мыслится так же, как некоторый язык. (Лотман 2000e [1992]: 17)

Интересным и новым здесь оказывается появление «внеязыковой реальности», которая «мыслится так же, как некоторый язык». Далее у Лотмана появляется еще одна «реальность»:

> Семиотическое пространство предстает перед нами как многослойное пересечение различных текстов, вместе складывающихся в определенный пласт, со сложными внутренними соотношениями, разной степенью переводимости и пространствами непереводимости. Под этим пластом расположен пласт «реальности» — той реальности, которая организована разнообразными языками и находится с ними в иерархической соотнесенности. Оба эти пласта вместе образуют семиотику культуры. За пределами семиотики культуры лежит реальность, находящаяся вне пределов языка. (Лотман 2000e: 30)

Но и к этой «внешней реальности» имеется доступ в моменты взрыва, и мы опять можем говорить о своеобразном «переводе»:

Итак, внешняя реальность была бы, согласно представлениям Канта, трансцендентальной, если бы пласт культуры обладал одним-единственным языком. Но соотношения переводимого и непереводимого настолько сложны, что создаются возможности прорыва в запредельное пространство. Эту функцию также выполняют моменты взрыва, которые могут создавать как бы окна в семиотическом пласте. (Лотман 2000e: 30)

Центральное понятие семиотики культуры Лотмана — «семио-сфера» — также не обходится без перевода:

Структура семиосферы асимметрична. Это выражается в системе направленных токов внутренних переводов, которыми пронизана вся толща семиосферы. Перевод есть основной механизм сознания. Выражение некоторой сущности средствами другого языка — основа выявления природы этой сущности. (Лотман 1996: 254)

Заключение

Можно с уверенностью сказать, что тематика перевода занимала в работах Юрия Михаиловича Лотмана важное место уже начиная с его увлечения структуральной поэтикой в начале 1960-х. В 1977 году он выделяет среди прочих роль «художественного перевода»:

Исследования таких, казалось бы, сугубо гуманитарных сфер, как структура художественного текста, механизм **художественного перевода** [выделено мною — *С. С.*], природа метафорического сознания, с одной стороны, и различных форм семиотического моделирования мира: пространственных, мифологических и прочих моделей — с другой, изучение самой природы семиотического полиглотизма и асимметрии семиотических моделей, создаваемых человечеством на протяжении его истории, приобретают в свете сказанного совершенно новый смысл, включаясь в широкую общенаучную перспективу. (Лотман 2000b: 566)

Итогом этих размышлений стало понимание центральной роли перевода в мыслительной деятельности человека, его коммуникативной ценности:

Мы говорили, что элементарный акт мышления есть перевод. Теперь мы можем сказать, что элементарный механизм перевода есть диалог. Диалог подразумевает асимметрию, асимметрия же выражается, во-

первых, в различии семиотической структуры (языка) участников диалога и, во-вторых, в попеременной направленности сообщений. (Лотман 1996: 268)

Перевод осмысляется как основной инструмент семиотического исследования, и применение этого инструмента возможно во многих сферах науки. Например, говоря о возможности исторической науки, Лотман вступает в спор с Коллингвудом, который

предполагает снять антиномию между «миром Феодосия» и «миром историка» путем их полной идентификации. Путь семиотики противоположен: он подразумевает предельное обнажение различий в их структурах, описание этих различий и трактовку понимания как **перевода** с одного языка на другой. [...] Поэтому, в такой мере, в какой инструмент семиотического исследования есть **перевод**, инструментом историко-культурного изучения должна стать типология с обязательным учетом историка и того, к какому типу культуры принадлежит он сам. (Лотман 1996: 383) [Выделено мною — *С. С.*]

Итак, уже сама постановка Ю. М. Лотманом вопроса перевода (интерлингвистического и интеркультурного/интерсемиотического; точного, адекватного, эквивалентного и т. п.), а также пути разрешения им этого вопроса (вернее, вопросов), с одной стороны, отражают множественность, взаимопереплетение и, отчасти, неразрешимость тех проблем, которые стояли перед Лотманом: «свое» и «чужое», условия коммуникации и возможности диалога и т. д. С другой же стороны — предвосхищают целый ряд актуальных тем и проблем в семиотике перевода[16] последних 15 лет.[17]

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[16] Ср., напр., содержательную статью Э. Сютисте и П. Торопа, где, в частности, говорится: «Семиотика перевода как часть науки о переводе позволяла рассматривать проблемы переводимости по-новому, начиная с языковой картины мира и кончая функциями переводного текста как текста культуры» (Сютисте, Тороп 2006: 196).

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"Tõlke" mõiste Juri Lotmani töödes

Vaatluse all on "tõlge", sellega seonduvad ja seda täpsustavad mõisted Juri Lotmani töödes ("ümberkodeerimine", "täpne tõlge", "adekvaatne tõlge", "ekvivalentsus", "transformatsioon"; muuhulgas tuuakse välja võimalikud seosed Roman Jakobsoni ja Louis Hjelmslevi ideedega). Tuuakse esile kaks põhilist valdkonda, milles "tõlke" mõiste selgelt eristub. Esimene on seotud Juri Lotmani strukturaalse poeetika alaste uurimustega ja siin arutletakse eelkõige kunstiteksti tõlke iseärasuste üle, teine saab alguse kultuuritüpoloogiat käsitlevates artiklites, kus tõlget vaadeldakse kui dialoogi, põhilist kultuuri toimemehhanismi.

From semiosis to semioethics:
The full vista of the action of signs

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Abstract. How anything acts depends upon what it is, both as a kind of thing and as a distinct individual of that kind: "*agere sequitur esse*" — action follows being. This is as true of signs as it is of lions or centipedes: therefore, in order to determine the range or extent of semiosis we need above all to determine the kind of being at stake under the name "sign". Since Poinsot, in a thesis that the work of Peirce centuries later confirmed, the proper being of signs as signs lies in a relation, a relationship irreducibly unifying three distinct terms: a foreground term representing another than itself — the representamen or sign vehicle; the other represented — the significate or object signified; and the third term to or for whom the other-representation is made — the interpretant, which need not be a person and, indeed, need not even be mental. The action of signs then is the way signs influence the world, including the world of experience and knowledge, but extending even to the physical world of nature beyond the living. It is a question of what is the causality proper to signs in consequence of the being proper to them as signs, an *indirect* causality, just as relations are *indirectly* dependent upon the interactions of individuals making up the plurality of the universe; and a causality that models what could or might be in contrast to what is here and now. To associate this causality with final causality is correct insofar as signs are employed in shaping the interactions of individual things; but to equate this causality with "teleology" is a fundamental error into which the contemporary development of semiotics has been inclined to fall, largely through some published passages of Peirce from an essay within which he corrects this error but in passages so far left unpublished. By bringing these passages to light, in which Peirce points exactly in the direction earlier indicated by Poinsot, this essay attempts a kind of survey of the contemporary semiotic development in which the full vista of semiosis is laid out, and shown to be co-extensive with the boundaries of the universe itself, wherever they might fall. Precisely the indirect extrinsically specificative formal causality that signs exercise is what enables the "influence of the future" according to which semiosis changes the

relevance of past to present in the interactions of Secondness. Understanding of this point (the causality proper to signs) also manifests the error of reducing the universe to signs, the error sometimes called "pansemiosis".[1]

Contents

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[1] This essay was developed out of exchanges with Susan Petrilli in connection with her preparation of the Thomas A. Sebeok Fellow Plenary Lecture for presentation at the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, 17 October 2008, now published in the first "Sebeok Fellow Special Issue" of *The American Journal of Semiotics* 24(4): 1–48 (2008), which is why the two texts cross on various theoretical points.

In my book, *Basics of Semiotics* (1990; 2005), I examined the many parts and aspects of semiotics in its development as the "doctrine of signs", in order to sort out the basic notions. There are subdivisions of semiotics, to be sure; but there is no "higher order" of knowledge that is independent of the action of signs, not in the sphere of finite beings.[2] Having seen the parts in relation to the whole, here I would

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[2]   In an interesting terminological development, Susan Petrilli has spoken of semiotics as a "metasemiosis", not in the sense of going "beyond semiosis", but in the sense of establishing the sphere wherein semiosis becomes an explicit element within, a part of, conscious awareness — a term to mark that boundary between animals which use signs but do not know that there are signs, and semiotic animals: animals which, besides making use of signs, are able to come to know that there are signs and to study the implications of sign activity. There is some merit to this way of speaking, and I have used it myself in the Appendix to Ch. 6 in Deely 2005; but it is a usage that carries some rather serious dangers of creating misunderstanding. The mischievousness of this prefix "meta-" has a long history indeed.

On the positive side, inasmuch as semiotics is the name for knowledge acquired thematically by study of the action of signs, we may legitimately speak of "metasemiosis" as a singular process of semiosis itself wherein human animals go beyond the use of signs generically common to all animals (and to nature itself in its process of development toward a future with possibilities imprevisible within any synchronic horizon of the past as a network of dynamically interacting individuals or "substances") to recognize the existence of signs as a distinct form or mode of being, and to study the action of signs precisely as consequent upon that mode (for "as a thing exercises existence, so does it act upon and is acted upon by its surroundings" — *agere et pati sequitur esse*).

On the negative side, the use of "metasemiosis" creates a temptation to speak also of "metasemiotics", as if there were or could be for human animals a realm of knowledge independent of the use or action of signs, whereas in fact not even angels are capable of such a knowledge (Deely 2004b). The chief characteristic of such a usage (as I have actually explored at some length: see Deely 2008a:

like to present an attempt to see the whole of semiotics in relation to its parts, in three senses: first, in the sense of how we got to where we are today as students of the action of signs, the 20th century transition from semiology to semiotics proper; second, in the sense of considering the reach of the action of signs quite independently of human study or awareness of it, but perforce doing so from within anthroposemiosis and with the help of linguistic communication in particular; and third, in the sense of the ethical implications for human conduct that grow out of the awareness of sign-action, what Petrilli and Ponzio (2003; Petrilli 2003) have termed so felicitously "semioethics".

Semiotics is itself a manifestation or result of the action of signs — but then so is the whole of human knowledge. So one of the first questions I want to face in this essay is: why did it take human inquiry so long to find a focus in the action of signs, and even then, why did it take so much longer to get beyond that anthropocentric study of signs originally known as "semiology"?

1. Why so late?

To say that all knowledge is by way of semiosis is not the same as to say that there are nothing but signs in the universe.[3] Even though

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Section 14–14.5) is oxymoronicity. For just as all knowledge is by way of signs, so all knowledge of signs thematically developed — whether the signs studied be external human artifacts or events of nature, or the internal signs of cognition and cathexis — is "semiotics".

Of course, given the famous "arbitrariness" of linguistic signs, prodded by stipulation, conventionality can always step in. "Metasemiotics", one might say, is not the oxymoronic usage that Todorov suggested, nor the Humpty-Dumpty usage occasionally indulged by Ponzio, but simply that branch of semiotics restricted to the study of "metasemiosis" as the unique feature of anthroposemiosis which distinguishes the human use of signs. Yet "metasemiotics" thus narrowly specified would in effect be a throw-back to the Cartesian notion of *res cogitans*, prescissively separating human being from the larger world of animals and nature within which the action of signs determinately situates us. In the terms of Aquinas (e.g., see his *Summa*, Part I, Question 90, "Concerning the knowledge of the separated soul"), we would be inquiring into the semiosis possible for the individual human who has survived bodily death, in effect reducing "metasemiotics" to a version of Husserl's phenomenological "epoché". This is not the most promising side-path along the way of signs, though perhaps it has some theological interest.

³ See the Stjernfelt–Deely exchange: Stjernfelt 2006, Deely 2006b.

everything that we can come to know can also, and normally does, come to be a sign in various contexts (by reason of entering into further and various triadic relations), there is more to being than the being of signs.

In fact, the being of signs — *constituted*, as Peirce and Poinsot unknowingly agreed,[4] by the triadic relation unifying that relation's foreground support or "vehicle" with what it signifies to or for some third, and *grounded* in the equiprimordiality of the being of relations with the being of material individuals or substances — cannot exist independently of individuals as interacting, any more than those individuals can exist apart from their interactions or without provenating in and through their interactions intersubjective relations. Being in whatever mode and relation as a mode of being are coextensive (which is why signs can take us "everywhere in nature"[5]), but being is more than the being of relation; and even the being of relation is wider than the being of *triadic* relation. So all signs in their proper being are triadic relations, and all relations are suprasubjective respecting the being of individuals related, but not all relations are sign relations: whence "the universe is perfused with signs but does not consist exclusively of signs", as I would word a final formula for expressing this matter.[6]

But consider how important semiotics has come to show semiosis to be. Semiosis, the action of signs, is the key to how the future, by an indirect and indeterministic influence on the present, rearranges the relevance of the past; so that not only is semiosis at the heart of human understanding, but even the physical evolution of the early universe in the direction of being able to support life, together with the subsequent evolution of life itself, is no longer a pure question of chance and *vis à tergo* (as such authors as Dawkins[7] and Dennett[8] try to argue). All these processes of development as an "upward" movement in nature require to be understood as involving the action of signs in their proper and distinctive *relational* being as signs.

Yet if this be true, if semiosis is a basic process at work somehow in all of nature, and if indeed *all thought*, not just human intellectual

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[4] Poinsot 1632: *Tractatus de Signis* Book I, Question 3; Peirce 1904: CP 8.332.
[5] Emmeche 1994: 126.
[6] See Peirce 1906a: CP 5.448; Deely 1994: 160, Gloss 40 on ¶265.
[7] Dawkins 1976, 1989.
[8] Dennett 1995.

thought, is in signs, then how is it that semiotics — the awareness of semiosis — is such a late-comer in the theater and repertoire of human knowledge? And why, when the human animal finally did, in the mid-20th century, begin to start to commence to thematize the problem of how to understand the workings of signs — why did the majority so engaged see the project initially and almost exclusively in terms of human language and culture?

2. The difficulty of realizing the ubiquity of signs in human awareness and in nature

That which is closest to us is the most difficult to perceive. Nothing is closer and more intimate to the experience of all animals than the action of signs. Whence it is that the action of signs is among the things of which it is hardest for us to become thematically aware, and hence will be among the last that we will realize as providing an object of inquiry. Here I am only expressing a summary agreement in this matter with Charles Peirce (1901: CP 1.134):

> It is extremely difficult to bring our attention to elements of experience which are continually present. For we have nothing in experience with which to contrast them; and without contrast, they cannot excite our attention. [...] roundabout devices have to be resorted to, in order to enable us to perceive what stares us in the face with a glare that, once noticed, becomes almost oppressive with its insistency. This circumstance alone would be sufficient to render philosophical observation difficult — much more difficult, for example, than the kind of observation which the painter has to exercise. Yet this is the least of the difficulties of philosophy. [...] Quite the worst is, that every man becomes more or less imbued with philosophical opinions, without being clearly aware of it. [...] But even if they are right, or nearly right, they [i.e., the opinions thus arrived at inconsciently or quasi-inconsciently] prevent true observation as much as a pair of blue spectacles will prevent a man from observing the blue of the sky. [...] The more a man is educated in other branches, but not trained in philosophy, the more certain it is that two-thirds of his stock of half-conscious philosophical opinions will be utterly wrong, and will completely blind him to the truth, which he will gradually become unable so much as to conceive. [...] And by a beginner in philosophy I wish to be understood as meaning, in the case of an educated man, one who has not been seriously, earnestly, and single-mindedly devoted to the study of it for more than six or eight years. For there is no other science for which the

preparatory training requires to be nearly so severe and so long, no matter how great the natural genius of the student may be.

The problem is compounded by the fact that signs in their constitutive being as relations are invisible to sense, for the senses can be directly aware only of material objects that are related (sign-vehicles), not of the signs themselves (the triadic relations that make the material objects of sense-experience come to be called signs in the first place). Thoughts, that is, psychological states as sign-vehicles, are *even harder* to realize in terms of semiosis; for here *even the sign-vehicles* and not only the relations they support are not directly accessible to sense.[9] The semiosis most intimate to us is the most imperceptible element in the whole of our experience.

Aristotle made the point that not everything that appears to us an individual entity really is an individual, but everything that really is a natural unity within a species is a substance. Whence "substance" is a category of being that must be understood, but cannot be directly perceived as such by sense. The same is true of relations as suprasubjective realities, but even more so: for we can at least perceive and form direct images of individuals, even if not of substance as such; but we cannot at all lay before the eyes a visible analogue of what a relation is, only the consequences of changing relations. No wonder that the philosophers in general have had such a difficult time in realizing the singular reality of relations as the only form of mind-independent being which remains exactly what it is essentially even when circumstances render it mind-dependent! Everything that contributes to the difficulty in understanding the singular reality of relation as a mode of being contributes every bit as much to the difficulty in understanding what constitutes signs in their proper and distinctive being. For, since all signs have their proper being in relations, signs cannot be understood apart from relations, even though not all relations are signs: and relations are not the whole of being.

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[9]   "The word 'sign' when applied to the concept", grants Maritain (1959: 389), "does not exactly leap to the tongue", even though it marks a critical step forward in technical exposition.

2.1. Seeing the whole of being: subjectivity, suprasubjectivity, intersubjectivity, objectivity

Recall Aristotle's response to the idea that the whole of reality is simply One and the appearances of Many in this respect are illusory:[10] "The world is either one or many, but of the many each is one."

2.1.1. Subjectivity, at the base of intersubjectivity

It is not an illusion that there are irreducibly many different things in the world and not simply one substance with varying manifestations, he considered. But in order for there to be *many* there have to be several *ones*. Diversity, in other words, to be 'real', requires many ones; and these ones thus are subjectivities — things separate from one another, existing in themselves. Distinct natural units, true "individuals", are what Aristotle called substance. A substance is a *subject of existence*, the prime instance of subjectivity. Yet he also pointed out that subjectivity is only *relatively* and not *absolutely* independent, for in addition to substances with their characteristics or individuating accidents there are also *relations* without certain of which subjects of existence (however else they may vary) *could not exist at all*. Even substance is relative, not in the sense of *being* a relation, but in the sense of *needing relations in order to be*, so that, as Ratzinger has put it,[11] alongside substance, and interweaving substances into the universe as a whole, "relation is discovered as an equally valid primordial mode of reality". No substance can be without involving itself in relations; no relations can be independently of substances. Individuals are relational beings, but relations are not individuals.

So far so good, but a problem remains: as the 21st century goes forward, perhaps no word is more used and less thought about than "relation". However, it is crucial to semiotics that this cease to be the case, for a so-called "sign" of the sort one can hear or point to that fails to connect the signified to some third party fails *ipso facto*

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[10]   Aristotle c.348–347BC, *Metaphysics,* Book. III, chap. 4, 1001b6.

[11]   Ratzinger 1970: 132. See also Cobley 2004. And cf. Poinsot 1632: *Tractatus de Signis*, "Second Preamble", Article 1, esp. 80/1–11, where "distinguitur ab omni entitate absoluta" is understood as "distinguished from every subjective being" or "from the being of every subjectivity".

actually to be a sign.[12] Thus the sign has its being in a triadic relation, a relation connecting irreducibly three terms; but, while all relations are over and above the subjectivity of individual being, not all relations are triadic. The situation bears examination.

2.1.2. The being of relations: suprasubjectivity and intersubjectivity

The discussion of relations, if not of signs, begins in the time of Plato and Aristotle, and it is Aristotle especially who focuses the question of whether there is a mode of being properly called "relation" which is irreducible to substance with its inherent accidents.[13] Now "substance", as we have just indicated, means primarily an individual subject of existence (like you or me, like fido or a pet cat, like a rose bush or an elm tree), while "accident" means first of all the inherent or identifying characteristics which set off one individual from another. So the combination of substance + accidents in this sense means quite simply SUBJECTIVITY, everything that separates one thing from another.

By contrast, RELATIONS connect or unite otherwise distinct subjectivities. "Far or near", notes Poinsot,[14] "a son is in the same way the son of his father." Causality depends upon proximity; not so the pure relations which follow upon causal interactions. In the order of physical being, or 'nature' as what obtains prior to and independently of the advent of human beings, Aristotle's argument was that relations exist dependently upon the subjective characteristics of individuals, but in their being as relations they are not reducible to the subjectivities on which they depend: they are *over and above* those subjectivities, and precisely over and above those subjectivities as linking or joining them as *otherwise* separate. So one day your parents had sex, and you resulted. That activity on your parents part was thus *causal*, but the *relation* it gave rise to, linking you singularly to that man as father and that woman as mother, survived the causal activity that the relation in question presupposed but is clearly distinct from

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[12] See Deely 2001b; 2003.

[13] The Greek texts of Aristotle on this point of relation as a mode of being irreducible to the subjectivity of individuals related are cited and discussed in the Editorial Afterword (Deely 1985: 473–479, esp. notes 112, 113, and 114.

[14] Poinsot 1632: *Tractatus de Signis*, Second Preamble, Article 1, 85/8–12.

(clearly, because the relation obtains long after the causal activity in question ceased).

While substance and accidents thus are subjective, relations by contrast are **INTERSUBJECTIVE**, between subjects. So far, moreover, we are only considering the situation of relation in the order of the physical universe independently of the existence of any animals.[15] Note in particular that while there cannot be something *between* subjects (something "intersubjective") without that something being *over and above* the subjects related,[16] neither can there be something between subjects in this sense of "intersubjective" unless both subjects here and now exist. Intersubjectivity presupposes subjectivity at both "ends", so to speak, of the relation.

But what about one-sided relations, to subjects that may have once existed but don't exist here and now any longer, as is the case with someone's fascination with Napoleon? And even more problematic, what are we to say about relations to what has never existed — think of poor Ponce de Leon wandering about the Florida Keys in search of the Fountain of Youth, and the like.

2.1.3. How objects differ from things even when they are one and the same existent

So we come to the consideration of *objects* which may or may not be things, but cannot be objects except as terminating a relation from a knower (whether virtually, as in physiosemiosis and phytosemiosis, however, or actually, as in zoösemiosis and anthroposemiosis). To make headway here, it becomes necessary to realize that of the three components of a relation — the supporting base of the relation in subjectivity, or fundament; the relation itself, a suprasubjective mode of being; and the terminus of the relation, that to which the relation points and with which it connects the subject "in" or upon which the relation is founded — it is the *relation itself* that makes the fundament to be a fundament and the terminus to be a terminus.[17] Consider two triangles similar on the basis of their shape: the shape is subjective,

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[15]   See the "Editorial AfterWord" to Poinsot's *Tractatus*, Deely 1985: 472–475.

[16]   See the wholly italicized sentence on this point at below in subsection 2.1.4 (middle of third paragraph).

[17]   See Deely 2007b: 119–136, esp. 125–130.

part of the individuality of each triangle. Yet the shape of the triangle, whether considered as founding or as terminating a relation of similarity, remains unchanged in its subjectivity when the other triangular thing ceases to exist. Thus, for two triangles to be similar, there must be two triangles. But if one triangle is eliminated, the remaining triangle is no longer related thereto, nor is its unchanged shape the fundament or terminus of the no-longer-existing relation. This consideration, based on an example of a merely dyadic relationship, however, holds for the case of relations as relations, and hence also for triadic relations.

Enter animals. Animals are distinguished by having not merely a physical but also a psychological subjectivity. Psychological subjectivity is distinguished by *always* giving rise to relations of apprehension (both cognitive and cathectic, by the way); but these relations now are never dyadic, but always triadic, for their terminus stands as something revealed to or for the animal whose psychological state is in question. The direct terminus in the case of a triadic relation, however, is precisely a *significate*, an "object signified", as we say under the influence of modern philosophy — but then without realizing that the qualification "signified" here is actually redundant, *for there is no other kind of objectivity.* Whence, just as to every foundation or fundament corresponds a terminus, while it is the suprasubjective reality or character of the relation itself which makes a fundament as such or terminus as such, so a relation founded upon (or provenating from) psychological subjectivity will necessarily have an *objective* terminus (whether actually or virtually, as above noted), regardless of whether that terminus *also* has a subjective being or not.

So one lover looks for another after an earthquake, not knowing whether that other is alive or dead, any longer existent or not: if no longer existent, the lost one terminates the relation purely objectively; but if still alive, the lost one terminates the relation subjectively as well as objectively, the worry on the searching lover's part being *not to know which* (actually an all-too-normal condition among animal kind).

So we see that the essential being of relation is not necessarily **intersubjectivity** but much rather **SUPRASUBJECTIVITY**.[18] And suprasubjectivity, when grounded (or, rather, founded) in *psychological*

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[18] Deely 2004c.

subjectivity, is the cause of or reason for the difference between objects existing actually as object (whether that object be also a thing existing subjectively or intersubjectively), and things (which need not be objects in order to be). Objective relations differ from mere physical relations (such as relations between cause and effect) by involving thirds, irreducibly so; while in nature apart from animals 'thirdness' can be degenerate and virtual rather than actual. In the order of phytosemiosis actual thirdness may occur, but it is never purely objective. Purely objective reality as actual rather than virtual would seem to occur only in the world of animals, and is *recognizable* for what it is (thanks to "metasemiosis") only in the world of human animals — semiotic animals, as we now put it.

Now a dyadic physical relation of cause and effect, say, can as such be assimilated to an objective relation and so come to be known for what it is; but a sign relation *never reduces to a cause-effect relation*,[19] even when/if a cause-effect dyad is subsumed into a semiosic triad, as happens, for example, when clouds become for animals signs of rain.

2.1.4. Suprasubjectivity and objectivity in contrast to physical environment

All right. Now we come to the lifeworld of animals, the Umwelt, or "Objective World", where things not only exist "as they are 'in themselves'" (bumping an empty cardboard box in the dark will not likely hurt you, whereas bumping into the point of a sharp metal object normally will), but also exist, and most importantly, "as they are 'for the animal'." Thus the Umwelt is a 'creature of experience', a tapestry woven of relation existing suprasubjectively always, but intersubjectively only in part. And the relations generically specific to the Umwelt, moreover, are always triadic — always sign-relations, even when involving dyadic relations of cause-effect interactions.

Here we discover not only that objects differ from things in being necessarily rather than contingently involved in relations of awareness, but also that "*object*" — far from being a mere alternative or synonym for "thing" — *is simply a disguised way of saying*

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[19] See Poinsot's *Tractatus* of 1632: 137 note 4.

"something signified", or "significate" (this last being a term respecting which English dictionaries for some reason tend to be aversive). We discover also not only that all thought is in signs, but that so also is all sensation — while distinctively within cognition and irreducibly (or "irremediably") involving causal (dyadic "cause-effect") interaction between an animal's body and material bodies of the physical environment surrounding the animal's body — a matter of sign-relations.[20]

In the physical universe prior to life, it seems to me that we have only degenerate and virtual Thirdness, yet sufficient to move the environment through its physical causal interactions in the direction of introducing and supporting life. After the advent of life virtual third-ness becomes actual, yet remains in the order of intersubjectivities, i.e., relations as intersubjective, but three-way and not only two-way.[21] With the advent of animals thirdness becomes not only virtually but actually objective as well as physical. *The suprasubjectivity of relations, in contrast to and presupposed by intersubjectivity, emerges as the irreducibly essential nature of their singular being, inasmuch as intersubjective relations exist only under certain existential con-ditions which do not define the whole range of circumstances within which relations that are suprasubjective but yet not intersubjective can obtain.* Suprasubjectivity thus proves to be *presupposed by* intersubjectivity, but *not reducible to* intersubjectivity. And thirdness, the "reality" enabled by semiosis, while normally *involving* sensible things, yet is *itself* never directly sensible. *Thirdness presupposes* the *suprasubjective being* of relation as understandable but not directly perceptible (not even when it obtains intersubjectively as well). Only human animals with their root capacity for language as Sebeok identi-fies it,[22] traditionally termed *intellectus* or "understanding",[23] can

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[20] See the *Tractatus de Signis* (Poinsot 1632), Book I, Question 6, esp. 205/35–209/32, 211/29–212/34 and to a lesser extent 213/8–22. See further Deely 2008c: Chap. 6, on the distinction between first and second-level instrumental signs, the latter of which ("sign" as originally defined by Augustine in the late 4th century) is actually at a third level of signification respecting concepts.

[21] See Krampen 1986; Deely 1986.

[22] Though the point had many anticipations in Sebeok's earlier writings (e.g., 1963, 1978 *inter alia*), Sebeok introduced this notion of a "root sense of language" (in contrast with *linguistic communication*) most dramatically in his 1984 address of June 2 at Victoria College of the University of Toronto (Sebeok 1986). Thereafter it became a major theme of his thought on questions of "language". See Deely 2007a.

come to know that there are signs (whence arises the postmodern definition of human beings as *semiotic animals*).

In coming to know that there are signs and that their activity — semiosis — pervades nature, not only as humans are part of nature (the "semiological fallacy", as we might call it), but throughout the whole of nature, semiotic consciousness works a transforming effect upon human responsibility. Heretofore conceived primarily in cultural terms, as the responsibility each individual "as human" has for their own actions, or as the responsibility an individual has by reason of a position in society, it now becomes apparent that "human responsibility" extends to the whole of life, by reason of the fact that the consequences of human conduct affect the very conditions of survival not only for our own species but for all those other species as well with which our survival is bound up. A whole new vision of the "unity of nature" follows upon the acquisition of semiotic consciousness, wherein ethics itself is revealed to be a fundamentally semiosic phenomenon. Whence the appropriateness of the new term "semioethics" for the realization of the global impact and extent of the human exercise of responsibility in its species-specific conduct. We will return to this point in concluding this essay.

What needs to be emphasized at the present juncture is not yet the ethical implications of semiotic consciousness, but rather the manner in which the singularity of relation makes semiosis possible in the first place as an indirect influence of a future merely objective upon the present physically actual as well as partially objective (whether actually or virtually).

2.2. The singularity of relation as enabling thirdness

The most central point for being able to explain why signs in their distinctive action transcend nature/culture, objectivity/subjectivity, inner/outer, etc., is what can only be called the *singularity* of relations. This singularity consists in the indifference of relations, according to their own being as suprasubjective, to the various subjective and even intersubjective classifications or 'divisions' of being in terms of the

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[23]   See Deely 2002.

here-and-now reality of the physical environment.[24] The Latins distinguished: being as able to exist whether or not known, they called *ens reale*; being which depends on being known in order to be, they called *ens rationis*. Being as known, then, *whether ens reale or ens rationis*, is the considered meaning of *objective being* in its full actuality as objective. Thus "reality" as experienced and known is neither *ens reale* nor *ens rationis* preclusively or exclusively, but a *socially structured combination of both based initially, or "first of all", upon the bodily type of the cognitive organism*.

2.2.1. Objective world in contast to physical environment:
the Umwelt

As the doctrine of Umwelt reveals, all animal experience (including its human segment), while it consists objectively of both types of being (the stars, say, as illustrating *ens reale*, the city limits of Bari — or even the stars again, but now as constellations of the zodiac upon which astrologers depend! — as illustrating *ens rationis*), does not reduce simply to either type, but requires an interweave of both. Now experience has its being as a network of relations, what Sebeok so aptly dubbed "the semiotic web"; and the strands of these relations — the threads of the fabric of experience — reveal a pattern consisting of both mind-dependent and mind-independent objectivities together forming the public "realities" which individuals must negotiate as a whole.

But, and here is the key, relation is the only mode of being found in *ens reale* that can *also* be found with its essence whole and unchanged in the order of *ens rationis*; and *nothing but relations constitute the order of ens rationis through and through*. These are the strands of *pure* objectivity in that semiotic web we call "experience" (or Umwelt). True, we invent fictional "substances", such as Sherlock Holmes or Hamlet, which are indeed *ens rationis*. But their actual being as *public objects* is a pattern of relations modeled on our experience of individuals (i.e., actual substances) which are not fictional: the fictional objects in such cases *are not* what their models *are*, namely, subjective and intersubjective beings; yet the fictional

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[24] See the *Tractatus de Signis* (Poinsot 1632), Book I opening paragraphs, esp. 117/18–118/18, and (even more specifically) 118/1–10.

objects are, as "beings patterned after" something their models as subjectivities are not — namely and specifically, *relational* in their own *positive* being. By contrast, mind-dependent relations patterned on our experiences of intersubjectivity *are* in their positive being what their patterns are also. Whence *ens rationis* as a whole, in its full extent as contrasted with *ens reale*, includes at bottom *nothing but* "beings patterned after", pure relations; while pure relations are *also* found *intersubjectively* in the order of *ens reale* along with subjective being (along with individuals and the inherent characteristics of individuals). Objectivity, thus, the semiotic web of "the universe as experienced", is a mixture of subjectivity and suprasubjectivity, but of the suprasubjective elements some are *also* intersubjective and some *only* suprasubjective, the whole meanwhile remaining throughout (*as* suprasubjective, involving subjectivities and intersubjectivities objectified but never reducing thereto) public in principle.

2.2.2. The place and role of the Innenwelt

We see then that experience, in its difference both from the subjectivity of the individual experiencing (even while modifying and depending upon that subjectivity) and from the subjectivities and intersubjectivities found within the world of things objectively experienced as independent of the experiencing, along with the aspects of these objects which turn out to purely objective (like the false accusation of "being a spy", when it is false; or "being a witch"; etc.), is a suprasubjective network or web of relations founded upon the psychological states (the "*passiones animae*") of animals, subjective qualities of the individual animal, indeed, but consisting no less in the relations thence provenant incorporating within their termini as a whole *also* subjective characteristics of things in the environment along with some of the relations provenant therefrom *independently* of the qualities of the Innenwelt in its contrast with the Umwelt. Thus the suprasubjective web of relations both between Innenwelt and Umwelt and also within the Umwelt itself are, as relations, indifferent to the circumstances that make, for example, one and the same relation at one time "real" and another time "unreal", but "objective" equally in both cases. The line is not fixed!

Thus the suprasubjectivity of relations is the basis for the prior possibility of semiosis as an action of signs verifiable within the orders of *ens reale* and *ens rationis* alike, yes, but, far more importantly, verifiable as able to pass back and forth between the two orders with positive character as triadic relation unchanged. For triadic relations, while differing in their irreducible triadicity from (even when including) dyadic relations (of cause/effect, say), yet participate wholly and necessarily in the being definitive of every and all relation as relation, which is suprasubjectivity.

So the dinosaur bone, once actually related to a dinosaur in the order of *ens reale*, here and now has lost that relation, while yet continuing to exist as fundament therefor (and here and now a kind of "substance" or natural individual in its own right). And should the fossil bone fall into the hands of a trained paleontologist, the structure of the bone, itself a subjectivity, will yet be able to "tell its distinctive story", for the paleontologist on the basis or fundament of the bone will recreate as *ens rationis* the very same relation of bone to dinosaur which formerly (i.e., under other circumstances, the circumstances of *temps perdu*) was an *ens reale*.[25] The circumstances under which any given relation is formed, in short, are what determine whether the *relation itself* is *ens reale* or *ens rationis*. The social construction of reality as more than bare *ens reale* depends on this, the basis indeed of the prior possibility of semiosis, as I said above.[26]

2.2.3. Whence semiotics takes its "point of departure", finds its "proper standpoint"

It is the being of relation, thus, relation as a singularity within being, that provides the standpoint for the doctrine of signs as transcending the divisions of subjectivity and objectivity alike, inner and outer, nature and culture.[27]

Very interesting is the fact that relation viewed in the exclusive perspective of *ens reale* turns out to be the "least" form of being, *ens*

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[25] See the Editorial Afterword to Poinsot's *Tractatus*, Deely 1985: 475–476, and 502 note 147.

[26] And cf. *Tractatus de Signis* 60/26–44.

[27] And it is the privilege of Poinsot to have been the first to say this in opening his *Treatise on Signs*, 117/28–118/18.

minimum, the hardest to recognize at all as *reale*,[28] because admitting of no *direct* sensory instance, perception giving us related things but never relations as distinguished from related things: only intellect can make that separation. Language, in the secondary sense of verbal language (or, more generally, linguistic communication), turns out to depend upon this very ability of intellect to manipulate relations as irreducible to related things.[29]

Moreover, when we consider that finite being is more than *ens reale*, and far more the higher we ascend the semiosic (or "evolutionary") ladder from nonliving matter to living matter to animals to semiotic animals to semioethic animals. *Being*, finite being, does not reduce to *ens reale* but finds its highest reality among material creatures in the objective world of human existence and life — the Umwelt (or Lebenswelt, if you want to insist on the difference between semiosic animals and semiotic animals) which does irreducibly consist of a mixture or admixture of *ens rationis* with *ens reale*, particularly in the suprasubjective character of experience as presenting to us the world not only as it is but also as it could be and even *should* be, if we may speak so boldly. Which of course is the point at which ethics transforms into semioethics, in the sense that the latter presupposes the recent advantage of a community of inquirers having attained to semiotic consciousness (although even incognizantly "ethics" was really "semioethics" all along).

Ens minimum at the moment of the "big bang", but already then making communication possible and semiosis virtual — such is the singularity of relation. As matter complexified, forming star systems and planets on the way to introducing life, relations become increasingly important, till finally, at the human level, they virtually make possible *truly human life and personhood* by enabling and constituting the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity in social affairs. Interdependency is not only real already at the level of pure *ens reale*; but community and personhood transcend subjectivity

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[28]   Yet pure relation, this very *ens minimum* we are told (by Augustine and Aquinas), constitutes the being of each one of the three persons of the yet substantially one godhead, whose inner life consists of a communion of persons. Thus communication wherever it occurs, in the finite order or in God, consists in pure relations, so that what is least in the finite order of *ens reale* is greatest in the infinite being of God. Such an irony!

[29]   Deely 1980; 2002.

and intersubjectivity precisely by consisting in a network of now indeed of *semiosic* relations. From *ens minimum* in the "big bang", relations ascend to *ens magni momenti* in the living world, and *ens momentissimi magni* with the achievement of semiotic consciousness, "metasemiosis", at which point they enable (semio)ethics as the final whole of human existence, recognizing its responsibility not only for its own actions but for the whole of — precisely — the things in themselves making up the reality of the physical surroundings of the planet sustaining semiotic animals as part of the biosphere as a whole.

Again we shall return to this point in our conclusion.

3. The necessity of linguistic communication for developing any science, including the doctrine of signs

That part of semiotics which studies signs and the action of signs specifically in the realm of human culture has been called "semiology". For several generations of thinkers in the 1960s and after, semiology was thought to be the whole of the cenoscopic science of signs; and the primary focus of these "semiologists" was usually, among cultural artifacts, linguistic communication, called "language" and conceived in terms of the conventional or "arbitrary" aspect of the signifier/ signified (*"signifiant/signifié"*) connection, as emphasized in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure.[30]

The whole enterprise was largely misguided from the first, and the question I want to address is: Why would so many keen minds be led down a wrong path for so long? Peirce, outside professional circles of philosophers, was ignored by and large in the heyday of semiology, and it was not until the intervention of Sebeok in 1963, with his pioneering notion of zoösemiotics, that semiotics began to emerge not simply as an alternate name for what semiology was doing, but as the *proper name* for any doctrine of signs that aimed to take account of the full extent of semiosis, and not delude itself into thinking that only human beings make and make use of signs, and that only within the realm of culture properly speaking are signs truly at play as signs.

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[30] Saussure 1916. See Deely 2001a: Ch. 16, "Semiology: Modernity's attempt to treat the sign", 669–688.

3.1. Why did semiology precede semiotics when the need to study signs first became generally accepted?

Here I want to examine, or try to outline at least, the "common sense" grounds which enabled the semiology in the misguided sense — that is to say, semiology conceived not as a part within the larger whole of semiotics, but rather as the whole study of signs and sign action complete unto itself — to flourish so widely and for so long.

The first reason the Saussurean proposal for semiology had an immediate and general appeal, I suggest, is the engrained modern philosophical habit to think in terms of dyads. Sign/signified is an embedded way of thinking of signs by the 19th and 20th centuries, and words, such as dictionary items, are, by that same period, the principal example or instance of signs: there are words, and "what they mean" — signs, with their significates (although "significate", curiously, is a term to which dictionary-makers have been highly resistant).

Missing from this equation, however, is precisely *that on the basis of which* words *can* mean what they mean: the linguistic habits of the reader of the given dictionary. If I know nothing of English and see the word "crow" in an English dictionary, although the "meaning of crow" is spelled out right there before my very eyes, the word remains "meaningless" as far as I am concerned. On the other hand, if I am a so-called "native speaker" of English (never mind that there is no more such a thing as "native speaker" than one can be "born Christian") and I see the word "crow" in an English dictionary, I have no trouble at all seeing too "what the word means". What makes the difference? Neither the sign nor the signified, but a third factor, a background factor neglected in the purview of "common sense", namely, what Peirce calls the *interpretant*, the "third factor" on the basis of which a sign succeeds to direct our attention to whatever it is that is signified. In this case, of course, the interpretant is the habit-structure common to speakers of English. But interpretants are not limited to human animals (though linguistic interpretants are), and indeed, as Peirce famously said, need not even be mental. (But that is another story.)

If one looks only at the sign/signified dyad within language, the relation between the two appears indeed "arbitrary", "unmotivated" by anything intrinsic to the sign. But once one adverts to the consideration that, absent the habit-structure enabling the sign to signify, the

sign fails in its signifying function, the illusion of arbitrariness begins to fade. Of course the meaning of a word can begin in a stipulation; but a stipulation to succeed begets a habit among linguistic communicators, and unless that habit takes hold the stipulation goes a-glimmering. And even the attempt at stipulation that "X shall mean Y" presupposes in the consciousness of the stipulator awareness of Y, an awareness which he or she must communicate to another in discourse, on the basis of those singular psychological states that we call "concepts".

In Saussure all of this is blurred, for he himself conceived of *both* signifier and signified as psychological realities, rather than as external things, such as written words and material things known in their externality. That in Saussure and in semiologists generally the sign is conceived of dyadically and primarily (if not exclusively) linguistically is a simple matter of fact. As to "common sense", the dyadic idea of sign and signified seems evident, so to semiology the analysis of sign in terms of *signifiant/signifié* appears clearly as the path to be followed.

But it comes down to this, as far as I can see. We have already considered above the question of why the study of sign activity became so late a focal point of intellectual concern in philosophy's long history, even though nothing at all is more dependent upon the action of signs than that very history! When, in the early-to-mid 20th century, the question of the sign — what it really consists in and how does it act — finally did become a central focus of inquiry in the general intellectual culture, it took the initial form of "semiology" (i.e., a culturally centered, linguistically oriented study): in the first place, because "metasemiosis" occurs *only in that sphere*; and, in the second place, because *apart from linguistic communication* there is no entryway into that sphere as such, where alone the study of signs — any signs — becomes possible.

So there is again some "common sense" grounds for thinking that language as linguistic communication — the dominant and species-specific means of human communication which alone makes culture as distinct from and in some ways superordinate to (though more accurately assimilative and elevative of) animal social organization — is the main, if not the whole, show when it comes to the action of signs. But, as has so often proved to be the case with "common sense" (in scientific matters cenoscopic and ideoscopic alike), just as the

revolution of the sun about the earth turned out to be a zoösemiotic illusion within anthroposemiosis, so too has the impression that linguistic communication and human culture contains the whole story of the action of signs in the universe proven to be yet another anthroposemiotic illusion.

3.2. The linguistic approach, necessity and limitations

To study anything, we perforce take our departure from within anthroposemiosis. Anthroposemiosis transforms the animal Umwelt, a world of objects closed to the difference between objects and things, into a Lebenswelt, an objective world wherein human understanding can avail itself of an ability to investigate "the way things are", along which path what is first discovered is the most basic difference within objectivity so far as science is concerned. That most basic difference can be described thus. On the one hand are objects of experience which reduce to our network of social interaction as grounding our experience of them (much the way that the habit of speaking English underlies our ability to recognize words in dictionaries) — such as flags signifying cities, counties, or countries; the movement of the sun around the earth; or boundaries separating counties, states, or countries; and the like. On the other hand are objects of experience which do not reduce to our experience of them, such as rocks and stars, lions and tigers, and the physical world in general.

The medieval Latins, as we saw above, called the former *nonens*, also "entia rationis"; the latter they called *ens*, also "ens reale". Being interested above all in "reality" (*ens reale*), and deeming that mistakenly for the whole story of "how things are", they — the Latins — neither emphasized nor realized the point (at least not until, as the Latin Age drew to its end, Poinsot made the point explicit[31]) that whoever would study the being and action proper to signs required to establish a standpoint *superior to*, a standpoint *transcending*, the difference between *ens* (as *ens reale*) and *nonens* (as *ens rationis*). For while the question of signs perforce concerns a "mode of being" (the being proper to signs), that mode of being involves the singularity whereby relation *alone* among the modes of *ens reale* remains

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[31]   Poinsot 1632: opening paragraphs of Book I, Question 1, of his *Tractatus de Signis*.

unaffected in its positive structure as objectively terminating suprasubjectively regardless of changes of circumstances which make a relation as terminating one moment to have a terminus that exercises also a mind-independent existence and at another moment (often, needless to say, to the surprise of the knower) to have that same terminus but now possessed of existence only mind-dependently. The change affects only the subjective or intersubjective status of the terminus (i.e., its status in *ens reale*), not its objective status as significate. Not every terminus is a significate, but every significate is a terminus, regardless of its further status in the order of *ens reale*.

Whence, while the being of signs is indeed a question of being, it is at the same time a question of *more than being*, for the "being of signs" as triadic relations precisely enables an *action of signs* that results in *nonbeing* as well as being. Deception among animals depends upon it, as does outright lying among human animals; but a future at variance with the limited possibilities of any given present in "ens reale" depends upon it too — and hence the very possibility of what has heretofore been called "evolution". Concerning the irreducibility of objective world (Umwelt) to the physical environment can well be applied a formula stated by Maritain in a different context:[32] "the paths of non-being, once one has, by a kind of inverted intuition, become conscious of it and of its formidable role in reality, are as difficult as those of being".[33] It took Sebeok's assimilation of the Umwelttheorie of Jakob von Uexküll[34] for semioticians fully to recognize that the objective world of animal experience is, in every case, a species-specific world composed of an interweave of mind-dependent and mind-independent relations in an ever-changing proportion and mixture.

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[32] Maritain 1966: 32.

[33] Precisely here is the place where semiotics assimilates the ethical insights of Emmanuel Levinas (e.g., 1974) that, in Petrilli's summary (2008: 203), "the being of social communication has an *otherwise than being*", where 'being' means *ens reale*. and 'otherwise than being' means above all the element of *ens rationis* essential to the constitution of every Umwelt in its difference from the physical environment.

[34] Cf. Deely 2004a.

3.2.1. What language as semiosis consists in

So, to "begin at the beginning", we perforce take our departure for the study of signs (as for anything else) from within anthroposemiosis; but insofar as anthroposemiosis is *semiosis*, our first question equally perforce has to bear on *what semiosis is*, for the linguistic communication upon which human animals so crucially and species-specifically rely is not an autonomous realm, as Analytic philosophers of the early and mid-20th century deluded their successors into thinking, but a question of one type of sign among (many) other types, including types which linguistic communication presupposes and depends upon.[35] So even if we wish and in some sense must begin with linguistic signs, among the first questions to be faced is "the place of linguistic signs among signs in general", as Todorov so well noted.[36]

Anthroposemiosis is semiosis first of all, but linguistic communication too "first of all", if by "first of all" we mean not merely the 'logically prior' but the *species-specifically distinctive*. The problem is to balance these two senses of "first". Let us, then, start where we must in order to communicate with others at the level of metasemiosis, with language.

Even though language is the indispensable entry and portal to full participation in any Umwelt as species-specifically human (that is to say, as consisting of a cultural environment capable of supporting inquiry both cœnoscopic and ideoscopic into the nature of things), to make of linguistic analysis the very substance of philosophy was among the final delusions of modernity, for the reasons first suggested by Todorov[37] and spelled out at length by Deely (2006a), namely, that language itself is, for all its grandeur and centrality to human identity, life, and culture, but *one system of signs among others*, one which achieves autonomy only *relatively* and while *remaining dependent* in the main on the elements of zoösemiosis without which even the highest achievements of speculative discourse in science and philosophy would implode.

What makes language in the sense of linguistic communication possible in the first place is the distinctive capacity of human understanding to objectify realities which cannot be reduced to

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[35]   Deely 1980.
[36]   Todorov 1978: 40. See Deely 2006a.
[37]   Todorov 1978: 40.

sensory instantiation. In short, the same ability which enables human animals to wonder whether God exists is the ability which enables them to manipulate relations in their difference from related things, and it is this ability to handle cognitively relations in their difference from related things that make possible stipulations of meaning exapting the biologically underdetermined human Innenwelt to express new potential arrangements which are and must often[38] remain invisible to direct sense perception of their "reality". Communication takes place in the realm of related things; but linguistic communication bears more on the relations themselves than on the things — often precisely in order to introduce arrangements different than what sense can directly manifest.

3.2.2. Demonstrating the inadequacy of linguistic analysis as an autonomous approach to philosophical questions

The development of semiotics as the doctrine of signs, that is to say, as a cœnoscopic rather than an ideoscopic science,[39] gives us one of the clearest reminders (if one still be needed) that, as far as science and philosophy are concerned in their proper dimensions as investigative of realities and explicative of the results of those investigations, the "meaning of a word" cannot possibly be either a simple stipulation of "what I want it to mean" (what we might call "the Humpty-Dumpty fallacy") or an exposure of its "use in a language" ("the Wittgenstein fallacy"); for both stipulation and established customs of use are at the service of something else, to wit, the very nature of the object of the investigation and the determination through that investigation of what in the object belongs to it independently of its relations to us, and what belongs to it precisely in consequence of the network of relations

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[38] An example of an exception would be would be an hypothesis concerning the existence of some previously unexperienced physical reality, the way that the planet Neptune was originally proposed theoretically and then actually observed by human eye. By contrast, a new system of government can be "put into place", but that system cannot be directly observed except in its "parts" — people and buildings — assigned to official status within the in-itself invisible system consisting "in itself" in pure relations. Dogs can bite Presidents, but not *as* Presidents!

[39] Bentham 1816 (esp. Appendix No. IV, the "Essay on Nomenclature and Classification", 1962 [1816]: 63–128); Peirce 1905: CP 8.199; Deely 2008c throughout.

mind-dependent as well as mind-independent into which it perforce enters as *object* — something existing at least in part as cognized or known — in contrast to the being proper to "things" as what are what they are whether or not they are a part of any finite consciousness.

Consider what a dead-end results when we take the linguistic expression or term "sign" as a dictionary item and make that ("its use in a language") as the point of departure as such for would-be semiotic analysis. Nothing in the nearly four half-page columns on p. 2820 of our 1971 edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary* (the latest electronic edition does not improve on this point) suggests anything like what has become common knowledge among semioticians today — thanks not to dictionaries but to the work of Poinsot and, more recently, Peirce in establishing the purely relational mode of being proper to signs in their distinctive being.

"In its genuine form", Peirce advises us,[40] "Thirdness is **the triadic relation** existing between a sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, **considered as constituting the mode of being of a sign**."

Indeed, we now realize that what the dictionaries heretofore all but exclusively treat under the entry "sign" are what semiotics today recognizes rather as but the vehicle occupying that one of the three positions involved in signification which presents something other than itself to or for some third. "Being a sign" in the dictionary sense of *sign-vehicle* is in itself not a sign at all, inasmuch as what occupies the foreground position in question within a triadic relation, namely, the *representamen* (to use Peirce's felicitous coinage) can on other occasions and in other contexts occupy instead either of the two other positions united in the sign's relation, namely, that of the *significate* (or "object signified", as we say redundantly) or that of the *interpretant*, the 'third' to or for whom the object signified is signified by the sign (vehicle).

But remove the triadic relation, the being formal and proper to the sign, and all three — representamen, significate, and interpretant — either cease to exist (insofar as they are purely objective realities) or at least fall back into the bare existence of things which have no necessary relation here and now to a finite knower in order to be as

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[40] Peirce 1904: CP 8.332, bold face added; Poinsot 1632: 1.3 155/25–29, again bold added: the irreducibly triadic relation "is **the proper and formale rationale** of a sign".

elements of the physical surroundings. Under such circumstances, nonetheless, where there may be no sign *actually* (i.e., fully as genuine Thirdness), yet there remains the representamen active as a sign *virtually*, as we will see both Poinsot and Peirce to say, e.g.:[41]

> while no Representamen actually functions as such until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and its Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually determining an Interpretant, nor even upon its actually having an Object.

In such a case, therefore, the "being of the sign" is a triadic relation only *virtually* rather than actually, and that being is, at least for the moment, and under the circumstances reduced (as it were) to such being as the representamen has in its interaction with the physical surroundings as one "thing" among other "things". As Peirce puts it,[42] the triadic relation itself, therefore, must, as virtual rather than actual,

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[41] Peirce c.1902/1903: CP 2.275; Poinsot 1632: 126/3–22 makes this same point as follows: "[...] sufficit virtualiter esse signum, ut actu significet. Et instatur manifeste in hac: B actu causat et producit effectum, ergo actu in re est causa; nam ipsa causa non existens in se, per virtutem a se relictam causat et formaliter causat, quia effectus tunc formaliter producitur. Sic existente signo et significatione virtuali formaliter ducit potentiam ad signatum, et tamen formaliter non est signum, sed virtualiter et fundamentaliter. Cum enim maneat ratio movendi potentiam, quod fit per signum, in quantum repraesentativum est, etiamsi non maneat relatio substitutionis ad signatum, potest exercere functiones substituentis sine relatione, sicut servus vel minister potest exercere operationes sui ministerii etiam mortuo domino, ad quem dicit relationem, et in qua formaliter consistit ratio servi et ministri." — "[...] it suffices to be a sign virtually in order to signify in act. This can be readily seen in an example: X in act causes and produces an effect, therefore it is in act really a cause; for when the cause in question no longer exists in itself, through the virtuality or efficacy it leaves behind, it causes and causes formally, because the effect is then formally produced. Just so, when a sign exists and by a virtual signification formally leads the mind to something signified [which no longer exists in fact], it is nevertheless not a sign formally, but virtually and fundamentally. For since the rationale of moving or stimulating the mind remains, which comes about through the sign insofar as it is something representative, even if the relation of substitution for the signified does not remain, the sign is able to exercise the functions of substituting without the relation, just as a servant or minister can perform the operations of his ministry even when the master, to whom he bespeaks a relation, and in which relation the rationale of servant and minister formally consists, has died."

[42] Peirce 1903: CP 1.542.

"consist in a *power* of the representamen to determine *some* interpret-tant to being a representamen of the same object";[43] or, as Poinsot put it, "it suffices to be a sign virtually in order to signify in act."[44]

Of course, as semiotics advances and becomes familiar to more and more individuals, larger and larger groups within the various lifeworlds of species-specifically human culture, the dictionaries themselves will change and reflect new usages of "semiotics and its congeners" which will indeed, at that future time, give "linguistic philosophers" a sufficient purchase to ply their wit and analytical cleverness in ways that have ceased to be semiotically obtuse (not at all because of their "linguistic method", note, but simply by virtue of the inevitable evolution of the language itself "in use". But we are not at that future point, far from it; and what we need to do rather is give creative linguistic expression *de novo* to the results of investigations of the *action* of signs precisely as revealing the *being* of signs to human understanding. This will involve, to be sure, stipulations — some new ways of speaking. And it will involve too taking account of established customs of "use in the language". But it perforce goes beyond both (*as does any properly philosophical analysis*).

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[43]   Peirce is speaking of "degenerate cases" from the standpoint of genuine Thirdness; but from the standpoint we are considering we might well call them "*pregenerate*" cases. Cf. Deely 1994: Ch. 7.

[44]   Poinsot, of course, had no idea whatever of the universe as an evolutionary development, yet his notion of semiosis points precisely in that direction once the myth of the celestial spheres has been exposed, which makes his remarks on the point at hand all the more interesting — Poinsot 1632: *Treatise on Signs*, Book I, Question 1, 126/3–22: "it suffices to be a sign virtually in order to signify in act. This can be readily seen in an example: X in act causes and produces an effect, therefore it is in act really a cause; for when the cause in question no longer exists in itself, through the virtuality or efficacy it leaves behind, it causes and causes formally, because the effect is then formally produced. Just so, when a sign [as representamen] exists and by a virtual signification formally leads the mind to something signified [which no longer exists in fact], it is nevertheless not a sign formally, but virtually and fundamentally. For since the rationale of moving or stimulating the mind remains, which comes about through the sign insofar as it is something representative, even if the relation of substitution for the signified does not remain, the sign is able to exercise the functions of substituting without the relation, just as a servant or minister can perform the operations of his ministry even when the master, to whom he bespeaks a relation, and in which relation the rationale of servant and minister formally consists, has died."

So, just as we have already noted, the task simply does not and cannot reduce to either or both of those two functions — stipulation and use — upon which "linguistic philosophy" as such (the "linguistic turn" of Analytic philosophy after the later Wittgenstein) completely depends. For the question is not that which the dictionary is designed to answer ("What is a sign viewed in terms of established usage?") but *what is a sign in its proper being*. Not only is the question of what the dictionary is designed to answer not yet the question that semiotics seeks to answer, but that very question of what the dictionary has to say is quite beside the point inasmuch as the semiotician, as Peirce put it,[45] is rather "in the situation of a zoölogist who wants to know what *ought to be* the meaning of 'fish' in order to make fishes one of the great classes of vertebrates". If it were up to the linguistic philosophers, we would not to this day have been able to learn that whales are not a species of fish; nor would we have learned that signs in their proper being cannot be seen with the eye!

4. In search of the broadest sense of sign

"Taking sign in its broadest sense," Peirce advises,[46] "its interpretant is not necessarily a sign"; and here our late-modern master of the transition to postmodernity begins to grope:

> we may take a sign in so broad a sense that the interpretant of it is not a thought, but an action or experience, or we may even so enlarge the meaning of sign that its interpretant is a mere quality of feeling. A Third is something which brings a First into relation to a Second. A sign is a sort of Third. How shall we characterize it?

Concepts, Peirce notes (1904 and elsewhere), if we go back to the Latins, have more than sufficiently been established as interpretants which *are* necessarily signs.[47] But what of those interpretants which *are not* necessarily themselves signs, or even "something mental"? What of the action of signs among plants, for example, where animal

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[45] Peirce 1904: 8.332.
[46] *Ibid.*
[47] See Doyle 1985, 2001, Deely 2007b: Ch. 12.

consciousness is not directly involved?[48] But Peirce goes even further than this, the extension of the action of signs to the whole of the lifeworld. "Who", he asks,[49] "is the utterer of signs of the weather?"

But he goes in this same manuscript even further still: there are cases, he tells us,[50] where "there must be a sign without an utterer and a sign without an interpreter".

In any such case, carefully note, Peirce is not speaking of the sign in its full sense as a triadic relation provenating from a representamen but rather of some version of "degenerate Thirdness", as he calls it, which is a representamen as such, i.e., a sign-vehicle, a 'reality' from which a triadic relation *would* provenate did but circumstances permit. For "if a sign has no interpreter", he remarks,[51] "its interpretant is a 'would be', i.e., is what it *would* determine in the interpreter if there were one."

4.1. Why Sebeok's final view of semiosis as co-extensive with life is not broad enough

This brings me to the nexus, the crucial node, of the musement I am placing before you with this essay: when Sebeok notes[52] that "life modifies the universe to meet its needs, and accomplishes this by means of sign action", while feeling at the same time "strongly drawn to Wheeler's suggestion[53] that the fundamental physical constants, the nuclear and cosmological parameters, and others, are constrained by the unbudging requirement that life evolve", is he not suggesting without realizing it that the development of the physical universe prior to the advent of life was itself a product of semiosis, even if that prior

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[48]   The realization that there is an action of signs among plants, "phytosemiosis", is rightly regarded as one of the main achievements of the later 20th century, and indeed the achievement which made the contemporary notion of *biosemiotics* possible: no life without the action of signs.

[49]   Peirce c.1907: Ms 318, ISP pages 205–206, a part of 318 that remains unpublished as of 2008 (see gloss on Peirce c.1907 entry in the References at the end of this essay).

[50]   Peirce c.1907: EP 2.404.

[51]   Peirce 1907: EP 2.409.

[52]   Sebeok 1985a: 21.

[53]   Cf. Wheeler 1977; also Whitaker 1988, and Barrow *et al.* 1988.

development, as Peirce suggested,[54] "cannot be fully revealed or brought to light by any study of the sign alone, as such. Knowledge of it must come from some previous or collateral source."

In short, even if we accept Sebeok's proposition that there is no life without the action of signs, we have still to ask if the converse of this proposition, "no signs without life", is also true? Sebeok, the principal architect of semiotics as overtaking and absorbing semiology as but a part of the doctrine of signs, was inclined so to think.

But we have to realize that Peirce had a still broader view, and Poinsot in this same line of thinking gave concrete indications of a philosophical nature[55] to suggest that while indeed semiosis is essential for living things to maintain themselves as living, there is also reason to consider that semiosis is essential to living things *not only in their present and actual existence*, as Sebeok recognized, *but also to the bringing about within the physical universe of the initial conditions which made life first proximately possible* and then actual — at which point semiosis passes from all 'grades of degeneracy' (or 'pregeneracy') to reveal its full and genuine form in the veritable conflagration of sign activity drawing ever more and more complex living systems into reality as nature begins its climb, certainly on this planet (as all but certainly on planets elsewhere) toward that unique form of life which not only makes use of signs but is able to recognize that there are signs: the life of the semiotic animal.

For with the human being emerges a consciousness which will bring with it, as we have seen, and for the first time in the finite universe, *responsibility*: responsibility for the future of the species of animal within which that singular consciousness emerges, but a responsibility which turns out to extend in principle to every other animal species as well, because the responsibility is rooted in a form of knowledge which alone is capable of envisioning the requirements of the biosphere as a planetary phenomenon and so of taking steps to bring civilization and culture into line with the requirements which, unless met, will destroy Gaia — the planetary whole of biosemioses upon which the flourishing of even human life depends.

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[54] Peirce c.1907: EP 2.404
[55] Deely 1994: Ch. 7.

4.2. Semiosis as cause no less than condition of life

I want to muse out loud, then, *pace* Sebeok, that the true interpretation of the formula or maxim "no life without signs" is the one that makes the action of signs coextensive with the living world, indeed, as biosemiotics has increasingly demonstrated, but avoids the possible error (the "quasi-fallacy", as we might put it)[56] of making the action of signs purely and simply a function of life. The most extreme form of the assertion that semiosis is a function *only* of life is no doubt witnessed in Short's blunder making the purposive behavior of animal life essential to the function of signs as signs.[57] But we have to wonder if even the broader and moderate assertion that life-science is coextensive with sign-science is not already a quasi-error. The text which I take as a focus for my play of musement on this particular occasion is the following one from Peirce:

> Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community. (Peirce 1904: CP 5.316.)

No doubt my musement here presupposes some form of the so-called "anthropic principle", according to which the universe is not indifferent to the existence of semiotic animals, but develops in such a way and along such lines as to become aware of itself precisely by bringing about the conditions necessary to sustain such a form of life.[58] This idea is new in the context of our understanding of the universe as a semiosic and evolutionary whole; but even in pre-evolutionary views of the physical world, the orientation of nature to

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[56] Recalling Sebeok 1985a: 20.

[57] Short 2007, *passim*; documented in Deely 2008b.

[58] "Incidentally," Sebeok reported (1985a: 21), "Bense 1984 came to the identical conclusion that the Anthropic Principle is a semiotic principle," although Tom confessed himself "at a loss to follow his dense yet exiguous argumentation."

the sustenance of life in its highest semiosic form was already a thesis explicitly held by Thomas Aquinas[59] among others.

What is new in our consideration is the light that the realization of how signs work in the universe — semiosis — throws upon the thesis that the material universe tends so to arrange itself as to bring about living things, and living things in turn tend to develop in the direction of semiotic animals. For *the action of signs follows upon the being of signs*; and the being proper to signs in their full and genuine form as triadic relations is not as such the substantial form of a living creature. Far from it. The being constitutive of signs in their proper being is a part of that tenuous network of relations without which such substances — living things — could neither emerge nor survive in the first place.

4.3. The crucial point over which Peirce and much semiotic development after him stumbled: the causality proper to signs as signs

Animals act with purpose. For that matter, so do plants, and even inorganic substances in their own way. "Purpose" applied to nature names an intrinsic finality which is observable in the behavior of "natural units" — that is to say, actual individuals in the sense Aristotle termed "substances". Many things that appear to "common sense" as "individuals" are indeed not individuals in the sense of *units of nature*. But whenever we succeed to isolate natural units, substances natural in the strict Aristotelian sense of "individuals", we always find that they act in determinate ways in given circumstances, and that these "determinate ways" lead to determinate developments and outcomes in the course of which chance can intervene to alter the outcome, but not to change the fact that every finite interaction of individuals in nature is involved with tendencies to outcomes which accumulate over time, and even incorporate the unexpectancies of chance interventions to move the universe as a whole to what we may perhaps describe as a "growth in time".

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[59]   Aquinas i.1259/65: *Summa contra gentiles* 3; developed in Deely 1969.

4.3.1. The action of signs vis-à-vis finality

So far we have described what might best be termed a "Darwinian universe", one that develops mainly by chance, diverting development away from status quo, yes, but purely "vis à tergo" ("force from behind") style. But notice that Waddington was alone right among the neo-Darwinians with his insistence on the role of the "epigenetic system" *in its contrast to* the "genetic system" as an "anti-chance factor", one in addition to, or alongside, natural selection as an anti-chance factor.[60] It is this second antichance factor in particular, along with chance, that opens the door to semiosis as an influence of the future (a "vis à prospecto"); for chance and finality alike entangle with the "information concerning possibility" that semiosis manifests or makes available, with the result of bringing about imprevisible states of affairs which (so to speak) conspire in the collectivity to first make the universe suitable for life, then to make living things actually occur and develop in the direction that will eventually allow the sign to become aware of itself through the reflection, the "metasemiosis", of semiotic animals.[61]

Thus purpose permeates nature, but through the interactions of individuals and collectivities of individuals. The action of signs is something else again, everywhere entangled with purposes, as also with chance, indeed, but distinct from both of them. When Peirce opined c.1902[62] that "all causation divides into two grand branches, the efficient, or forceful", that is to say, causality in the order of brute Secondness, "and the ideal, or final" his addition at this point equating "final" with "ideal" proved to be, not so much for himself as for his later followers, a near-fatal misstep; for final causality occurs in the entitative realm of subjectivity primarily and first of all, while ideal causality is over and above that order, actual in the objective world or Umwelt of animals, but virtual already in the inorganic realm as physiosemiosis as also in the organic world prior to animal awareness as phytosemiosis.

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60 See Waddington 1960, 1961; Deely 1969.
61 Deely 2008a.
62 Peirce c.1902: CP 1.211.

4.3.2. The crucial gap in Peirce's *Collected Papers*

Among the materials not to be found in the *Collected Papers*, where Peirce identifies the causality proper to signs as "ideal, or final causality", are the parts of his manuscript 283 of 1906 where Peirce qualifies his earlier equation of final with ideal causality as perhaps having been "a too wide concept" which "will do no harm whatever, *provided that a careful division of it be made*", whereupon he proceeds to show that the "careful division" in need of being made is precisely the later Scholastic division between final causality, whether intrinsic (teleonomy) or extrinsic (such as the purposive behavior of organisms), and *formal causality* as *extrinsic to a subject*, that is to say, as "objective", whether actually or only virtually.

The distinctions involved here take us well beyond the "four causes" — efficient, material, formal, and final — identified by Aristotle as essential to the analysis and understanding of physical change in the environment. Whereas Aristotle conceived his scheme of causes in relation above all to the physical environment of changeable being, the Latins not only took over this scheme in their *philosophia naturalis*, but extended its application to the *world of culture* and the *understanding of discourse*.[63] In order to achieve this extension of causality to include the world of culture as well as that of nature as independent of culture, they found it necessary to distinguish both formal cause and final cause as *extrinsic* as well as intrinsic;[64] and formal cause as extrinsic they found it necessary to *further subdivide* between exemplary (the causality at work in art), and *specifi-*

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[63]   This full extent of the Latin analysis of causality in original texts is laid out in Deely 1992: 66n5, and further discussed in Deely 1994: Ch. 6 and Deely 2001a. In this last work, consult the Index entry CAUSALITY (p. 864), and Chap. 10, esp. pp. 472–479). The *loci* for Poinsot's own complete analyses of causality are set out in the two notes and following.

[64]   The most reliable synoptic summaries of late Latin analyses of causality are laid out found in Poinsot's *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus* of 1631–1635. For efficient, material, intrinsic formal, and extrinsic exemplary formal causality, consult Poinsot 1633: Questions 10–13, 197a11–287b43 — where, however, extrinsic specificative formal causality ('objective causality'), the causality proper to signs, is mentioned only in response to an objection confusing it with exemplary causality 245a24–43, 247a7–14. See not following for the *loci* of his direct discussions of objective (extrinsic formal specificative) causality, the causality distinctive of semiosis as the action of signs.

cative (which they also termed 'objective').[65] This last subdistinction, i.e., of formal causality as *extrinsic* to a subject but *specificative* of a role or function to be performed, they were then able to demonstrate as the precise sort of causality needed to explain the *agere* that follows upon the *esse* of signs. Poinsot's analysis on this point, "Whether to signify, formally considered, is to cause something in the order of productive causality?",[66] stands to this day as the most historically authoritative discussion of this question in the literature of semiotics.

4.3.3. Signs as vehicles *versus* signs as signs

It is well to remember that the original notion of sign in general, as Augustine introduced it, was the common notion of sign as some material object which represents something other than itself in the eye of the beholder. Only gradually did the Latins realize that there are signs which are not objects first of all, namely, psychological states on the basis of which objects are presented interpreted as this or that. And only later still did they come to realize, as would Peirce after them, that what made material objects or psychological states alike be signs in the first place was their occupation of the foreground position of representing another within a triadic relation, whereupon Peirce concluded that what are commonly *called* signs are in reality but the vehicles of signification, while signs in their proper being are rather the triadic relations themselves without which signs in the common sense (something that can be seen or heard or touched) would not be signs at all. Signs in the common sense, the vehicles conveying a signification, he proposed to term rather *representamens*, in contrast to the triadic relation itself which functions as a pure medium of communication, and nothing more.

Thus there is an important difference between a sign in the *common sense* of a vehicle, and a sign in the *strict and technical sense*

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[65] The direct discussion of formal causality as extrinsic specification is to be found in Poinsot 1632, as follows: Q. 17, Arts. 5–7, 595b25–608b7; Q. 21, Arts. 4 and 5, 670a11–693a31; Q. 22, Arts. 1–4, 693a34–715a21; and further in his biological treatises of 1635, in the context of the discussion of cognitive organisms: Q. 6., Arts. 2–4, 177b1–198a16; Q. 8, Art. 4, 265b1–271b20; Q. 10, Arts. 1–5, 295b1–339a45; Q. 11, Arts. 1 and 2, 344b1–366b34.

[66] See Question 5, Book I, of Poinsot's *Tractatus de Signis* of 1632.

of the triadic relation under which that vehicle stands as means of conveyance. The former Peirce calls "the *body* of the sign",[67] or its "requisite vehicle";[68] the latter he calls "the *meaning* of the sign". For the vehicle or 'body' of a signification, as a subjective reality in its own right (even when it is only a characteristic of an individual, as in the case of a psychological state), functions more broadly in its own right than its bare function within a given semiosis. Within the semiosis, it is the triadic relation and only the triadic relation which provides the 'meaning' of the sign. Yet this meaning can be sustained or conveyed by various vehicles, for which reason Peirce contrasts the sign in its "body" to the sign in its proper being as triadic relation as comparatively "inessential", inasmuch as the content of the communication depends upon the latter and only incidentally upon the former.[69] Thus we note the crucial distinction between a sign-***vehicle*** and a ***sign***-vehicle: A *sign* as sign is a medium of communication — that and that only, existing as such (being a relation) suprasubjectively. A sign-*vehicle* is a medium of communication, indeed that, but *not necessarily only* that, for the reason that it has a subjective being along with the suprasubjective being it conveys objectively.

With this distinction in mind, see how Peirce moves toward Poinsot's demonstration that the causality proper to signs is as a specificative extrinsic formal causality:

A medium of communication is something, *A*, which being acted upon by something else, *N*, in its turn acts upon something, *I*, in a manner involving its determination by *N*, so that *I* shall thereby, through *A* and only through *A*, be acted upon by *N*. We may purposely select a somewhat imperfect example. Namely, one animal, say, a mosquito, is acted upon by the entity of a zymotic disease, and in its turn acts upon another animal, to which it communicates the fever. The reason that this example is not perfect is that the active medium is in some measure of the nature of a *vehicle*, which differs from a medium of communication in acting upon the transported object and determining it to a changed location, where, without further interposition of the vehicle, it acts upon, or is acted upon by, the object to which it is conveyed. A sign, on the other hand, *just in so far as it fulfills the function of a sign, and none other*, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium of communication. It is

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[67]   E.g., Peirce 1903: CP 2.222.

[68]   Peirce c.1902: CP 2.111.

[69]   E.g., Peirce c.1906a: CP 4.6: "One selfsame thought may be carried upon the **vehicle** of English, German, Greek, or Gaelic; in diagrams, or in equations, or in graphs: all these are but so many skins of the onion, its inessential accidents".

determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has [...] other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it. Thus, after an ordinary conversation, a wonderfully perfect kind of sign-functioning, one knows what information or suggestion has been conveyed, but will be utterly unable to say in what words it was conveyed, and often will think it was conveyed in words, when in fact it was only conveyed in tones or facial expressions. (Peirce 1906: EP 2.391)[70]

So, while animals, for example, have purpose, signs as signs do not. Signs convey what they convey, make of it what you can or will. The smoke of the volcano, does it signify only burning, or also the anger of the gods? Purpose is normally but always introduced into semiosis from without, from the entanglement of signs with the behavior of substances which are not but in spite of themselves become signs. Thus a given representamen as sign-vehicle, "just insofar as it fulfills the function of sign and no other function besides", represents an ideal limit seldom or never reached in semioses actually occurring among interacting natural individuals and groups of individuals. A sign as vehicle of communication is not a mosquito as transmitter of disease (or a vaccination shot as preventive of disease), though accidentally, by reason of the vehicle's properties as subjective in its own right having an existence which is more than can be reduced to its formal role as sign, it can *become* like a mosquito (or a vaccine)! But that is *per accidens* to the material status of the vehicle, not *per se* to its formal status as conveying the action of sign as sign.

4.3.4. Recognizing the "ideal limit"
in vehicles of communication

Thus, a sign, in the sense of sign-vehicle, risks or may risk to be mistaken for the material characteristics and causal capacities of that particular bodily type (cf. Deely 2003). So we must be quite careful and explicit in using the term "vehicle" or "sign-vehicle" for the representamen in semiosis that we are using the term only in the precise sense of fundament of the relation of signification grounded in

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[70]   As André DeTienne put the matter to me in an email exchange of Sept. 20, 2007: "A good sign disappears in the very moment that an information gets effectively conveyed".

the object as presented *formally* to, not as materially acting upon, the interpretant — even though the sign-vehicle as, say, a material body in its own right, exercises other modes of causality along with and independently of that causality definitive of semiosis precisely as such. By contrast with "sign" in the sense of the material or even psychological vehicle embodying the sign-relation as fundament, a sign formally considered "just in so far as it fulfills the function of a sign and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium of communication", thus (continuing Peirce from the 1906 MS 283):

> It is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it [that object which has determined the sign] to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind [the Interpretant] other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it.[71]

The sign as a sign is not a vehicle which *modifies* what it conveys, but rather one which *purely conveys*: and so it acts in the order of a formal cause rather than an efficient cause, yet not as an *intrinsic* formal cause, but rather as an *extrinsic* formal cause specifying its interpretant from without and indirectly, that is to say, *via* the sign.

If we wish to emphasize this formal element as what is essential to the sign as vehicle of communication, then, the sign:

> may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that anything possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of

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[71] Note that, in Peirce's own text, we are dealing with a matter of formal, not efficient, causality when it comes to the question of how signs actually accomplish communication in bringing about their "proper significate outcome". I emphasize this, because it gives us the means from within Peirce's writings to correct the actual main flaw in his semiotic, namely, the conflation of all ideal causality with final causality. In fact, it is just this flaw, uncorrected, which steers Short off the path to think that, if signs require final causality in the sense of purpose, this semiosis can only be fulfilled in the behavior of animals. Peirce did not think that final causality was extrinsically involved in semiosis, but inherently involved (because he saw it as the only alternative within ideal causality in contrast with efficiency), not by importation as Short proposes. But in Peirce's case this was a matter of confusion, and a confusion in the process of being overcome, resulting from an oversimplified notion — I am speaking here only concerning semiosis, not of the broader question of 'natural classes' — of ideal causality so far as concerns the action proper to signs. It is a pity that this was one aspect of the later Latin writings he did not come across in his many consultations.

the peculiar common quality of all our feeling, should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two, if not three, QUASI-MINDS, meaning things capable of varied determination as to forms of the kind communicated. [Peirce 1906a: MS793 from EP 2.544n22.]

Peirce then repeats, with the term "medium" substituted for "vehicle", the triadic formula which has been familiar and extensively discussed among the Latins from the late 4th century of Augustine's work to the early 17th work of Poinsot, but which Short's Analytic crowd never considered or heard of before the 1930s:

As a MEDIUM, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign is PASSIVE; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is ACTIVE, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby affected.

Now we are told the whole point of the reformulation (I add the SMALL CAPITALS for emphasis of the central point):

But at this point certain distinctions are called for. That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a FORM. It is not a singular thing; for if a singular thing were first in the Object and afterward in the interpretant outside the Object, it must thereby cease to be in the Object. The FORM that is communicated does not necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different thing, because its being is a being of the predicate. The Being of a FORM consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given circumstances, something would be true. The FORM is in the Object, entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is literally true of the Object. In the Sign the FORM may or may not be embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, in respect to the FORM COMMUNICATED, the Sign produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under favorable circumstances.

This may well be the most "scholastic" passage that Peirce ever penned.[72] Certainly it is one of the most scholastic passages, for

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[72] Houser *et al.* (EP 2.544n22) emphasize that "the conception of a sign as a Medium for communication becomes very prominent in Peirce's 1906 writings." I shall argue that this importance is itself a sign that Peirce was moving toward the

anyone who actually knows something of the scholastic development of semiotic among the Latins will instantly recognize in Peirce's entitative/representative distinction the clear echo of Poinsot, Scotus, or Aquinas distinguishing between *esse entitativum* and *esse intentionale*. The above remarks of Peirce on Form as extrinsically causing the sign respecting its object to produce or be inclined to produce an Interpretant, when viewed against a greater familiarity with the late Latin semiotic development than even Peirce had attained, show that in the late development of his semiotic Peirce was himself moving beyond the mistaken idea that teleology is as such (i.e., as 'final causality') proper to semiosis *in its own right*, and toward the idea that specificative extrinsic formal causality is rather the causality proper to the action of signs, as will become clearer in what follows.[73]

4.3.5. Tracing the error to its "common sense" source

But at least Peirce makes clear from where (besides from incomplete readings of his own writings!) arises the error of thinking — the source of the contrary to fact proposition — that final causality is the causality proper to semiosis. It is the point over which Peirce himself, and those who prefer being epigones to being semioticians in their own right with a responsibility for knowledge of sources in the development of their subject matter, seriously stumbled:

> a sign is ordinarily understood as an implement of intercommunication; and the essence of an implement lies in its function, that is, in its purpose together with the general idea [...] of the means of attaining that purpose. (Peirce 1906: EP 2.389.)

Thus a stop sign *has the purpose* of controlling traffic. But that purpose belongs to the stop sign from outside its being as sign. As a

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Scholastic recognition that what he called "ideal" causality involved a kind of formal causality (extrinsic formal causality) and not simply final causality: consult the references in notes 63–65 above. Certainly from this point of view the year 1906 is much more important than Short's identification of 1902 (60), "when the idea of final causation assumed explicit central importance in Peirce's philosophy."

[73] In particular, see notes 77 and 78, respectively, below.

sign, it can only formally represent to trafficants where their vehicle should halt movement; but the sign cannot *bring about* such a halt, nor does it itself *intend* to do so. The intention belongs to the legislators who are not stop signs: it is the purpose of a certain group of animals introduced into the action of the stop sign as sign from outside the triadicity in which alone the sign consists. And the sign itself is indifferent to the purpose to which it happens to be put! The same cry of a wolf which signifies to another wolf the prospect of sexual interaction signifies to the nearby sheep a danger to be avoided! The sign may be and normally is entangled with final causality, but not because it *has* a final causality. No. What it has is an objective formal specificative causality over and above its subjective being as vehicle *of* that specification.

4.3.6. Modeling "maybe"

But that specification which the sign vehicle conveys to its interpretant, lying beyond the subjectivity of the environment here and now, provides, in effect, a modeling of the possible future; and it is *that* virtual objectivity that engages irresistably the finalities and chance diversions at work in and among the subjectivities of nature, even inconsciently and preconsciently, but most strongly once awareness becomes part of the environmental scene.

5. "Rendering inefficient relations efficient"

How do signs act? According to Peirce,[74] their essential function as relative beings is "to render inefficient relations efficient."

Let us start where the action of signs is indeed most clear to us, in the structuring of the consciousness and experience of each of us as individual animals. How does the action of signs work in this sphere of reflective consciousness distinctive of animals — human animals — able to distinguish relations from related things, and hence to know that there are signs (i.e., in their proper being as signs — triadic relations, as Poinsot and Peirce separately and together have

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[74]   Peirce 1904: CP 8.332.

shown) in their difference from related things functioning as sign vehicles in the objective world of animals?

Here is the trajectory of these remarks: from the action of signs as working to transform an initially lifeless physical universe in the direction of being able to sustain living things, to continuing at work among those living things first brought about to increase and multiply them not only as individuals but also as species of increasing complexity and, with the emergence of animals, consciousness, but a consciousness which required the development of a biologically underdetermined Innenwelt in order to be able to model 'things' not reducible to sensory aspects of objects and hence in terms of pure relationships which, exapted, will become *linguistic communication* as a species-specifically unique channel of communication opening the door to the "world" of culture as over and above even though remaining as well inclusive of that partially objectified world of physical things that we call "nature".

5.1. Semiosis as an influence of the future

If "thought is what it is only by virtue of addressing a future thought which is more developed", as Peirce held,[75] and thought as *consisting* in signs is necessarily involved in semiosis, then, if semiosis is even contingently and, as it were, intermittently involved in the material interactions of physical things, then the physical environment is what it is (insofar as semiosis is involved) only by virtue of addressing a future state of affairs which is more developed, and one eventually, even though not initially, dependent on the thought of a community wherever a community of inquirers as semiotic animals has been able to constitute itself.

Now in human thought, how does the action of signs typically manifest itself? One principal way is by *guiding our behavior* in everyday affairs. I go to meet a friend, or go to a meeting to be chaired by a particular individual. Unknown to me, that friend, or that chair, is killed three hours before the scheduled meeting. I go there nonetheless, expecting to meet them in person. They are present to me as objects signified which are also things — or so I think even when the

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[75]   Peirce 1868: CP 5.316.

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"also" no longer obtains. My thought as sign vehicle presents them to me as objects signified, equally when they are and when they are no longer things in the physical environment able to be encountered "in person". Thus signs work *as an influence of the future upon the present, and the meaning of the past is shaped by that influence* of the future.

The future as signified or "expected" may or may not turn out to be the future as it will come actually to be experienced. But the future as experienced is nonetheless *partially shaped* by the *anticipated* future, even when the anticipations go awry. And there is no anticipation outside semiosis. Here we have been speaking of conscious semiosis; but it should be clear that anticipation is of the essence of the action of signs not only when conscious awareness is involved, but that the very possibility of conscious anticipation springs rather from the nature of sign-action which both precedes and surrounds consciousness, even when it also involves consciousness.

How, then, can all this work in the realm of inorganic nature? Not constantly, as in the realm of life. But why not intermittently, like a match struck to light a cigarette which sputters out before it flames sufficiently to achieve its purpose? As Peirce puts it,[76] "it may be that there are agencies that ought to be classed along with signs and yet that at first begin to act quite unconsciously." Thus two events in the order of brute secondness (causal interaction among physical things) bring about a new situation which, not at the moment, but at a future time when yet some third new situation comes about, give rise, for example, to a first living thing, or at least to a change of circumstance that makes the remote possibility of life more proximate than previously? At that moment when emerges the first living substance, of course, and only then, the flame of sign activity is true and properly lit. Intermittent sparks become now a conflagration.

But what about those moments leading up to that moment, those moments wherein the material interactions of things at the level of secondness yet bring about *a thirdness of possibility* (a "firstness of thirdness", as we might say) not at all possible prior to the specified interaction?[77] Such transitions, such "leaps", must have occurred,

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[76] Peirce c.1907: EP2.410.
[77] Here I am extending to the physiosemiosic order an observation that Peirce makes of the anthroposemiosic order (c.1906: CP 5.489): "It is not to be supposed that upon every presentation of a sign capable of producing a logical interpretant,

since otherwise an initially lifeless universe incapable of sustaining life would have *remained* lifeless and *remained* incapable of sustaining life.

Yet we know that there was de facto a development of the physical universe which made life *proximately* possible prior to the advent of life, and apart from which development life would have remained impossible. Life lay far in the future at the instant of the "big bang", yet all events thereafter occurred "as if" under the influence of that far future, in the sense of occurring (not in every individual occurrence, but in the aggregate) as preparatory thereto. In broadest strokes, we can say that life requires planetary systems, and planetary systems require stars; yet neither stars nor planets were present in the universe from the beginning. The future as proximately possible in this or that way depends upon the present state of things here and now; yet those things here and now by their interactions bring about further present conditions which *change the possibilities* of the future and, at the same time, the relevancies of the past; because it is always those "future possibilities" which determine in any given present state of affairs the relevance of the past thereto.

Thus semiosis, as the *virtual influence* of the future upon the present changing the relevance of the past, may well be the essence of the *action* of signs, as Peirce suggested as early as 1868,[78] even as the

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such interpretant is actually produced. The occasion may be either too early or too late. If it is too early, the semiosis will not be carried so far [...]. On the other hand," the occasion may come too late. (Here, then, is the proper place of chance in the process: central, yet not the very heart of the matter — cf. Deely 1969: 105–111.) In the extension, yet still following Peirce (now 1904: CP 8.332), "we may take a sign in so broad a sense that the interpretant of it is not a thought, but an action or experience, or we may even so enlarge the meaning of sign that its interpretant is a mere quality of feeling", with the *yet further* qualification (c.1907: EP2.410) that "it may possibly be that I am taking too narrow a conception of the sign in general in saying that its initial effect must be of the nature of feeling, since" — as we mentioned above — "it may be that there are agencies that ought to be classed along with signs and yet that at first begin to act unconsciously", as indeed must be the case wherever it is a question of physisemiosis, as in nature prior to the advent of life. See Deely 2008a.

[78] Peirce 1868: CP 5.316: "Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought

being of signs consists in triadic relations; and these relations enable a spiral of development whereby the future not only depends upon the present but *beckons* the present to draw upon the resources it has from the past in different ways than heretofore, until we reach a stage where the future exists as a state of consciousness in the awareness of animals able to envision that future according to alternatives neither given as such in nor reducible to sensation and sense perception: at that moment the human animal begins a line of development which — slow by slow — falls more and more under *its own control* of alternative possibilities, precisely as its understanding of the subjective constitution of its physical surroundings expands through especially the idioscopic developments of science in the modern sense, according to the saying of Aquinas that "the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension".

5.2. The transition within semiosis to semioethics

It is this species-specifically human and semiotic capacity to envision alternatives not reducible to the animal Umwelt of objects perceived simply as desirable (+), undesirable (−), or safe to ignore (0), which introduces into the lifeworld or *Lebenswelt* (the Umwelt as transformed by language and linguistic communication) the possibility of science, initially cœnoscopic, eventually idioscopic as well. That science is no different from the perceptual knowledge of all animals in

now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community." And as we know all thought to be in signs — thought being not only itself a semiosis but a particular semiosis, depending in its achievements on yet other semioses which are not thoughts (i.e., semioses whose interpretant "is not a thought, but an action" bringing about a thirdness even if only virtually, and semioses the "agencies [of which] ought to be classed along with signs and yet that at first begin to act quite unconsciously" — so it is necessary that thought reveal something of the essence of semiosis as such, something common to every semiosis, and I am suggesting that that quintessence of sign action is an influence of the future affecting the present and reshaping the relevancy of the past. There is not always the achievement of genuine Thirdness in semiosis — for example, when it is virtual but not yet actual — but there does seem always to be an influence of the future, which seems to be the meaning of Poinsot's formula (a formula which even Short 2007: 53–56 recognizes to be operative in Peirce's doctrine of signs). See further Poinsot 1632: 126/1–32; Peirce c.1902/1903: CP 2.275; Deely 1994: Ch. 7; 2008b.

being dependent upon the action and use of signs, but it differs from the perceptual knowledge of all other animals in being able to consider and reveal the "way things are" in their own subjectivity, their own constitution insofar as they are things existing whether or not cognized. Steel is stronger than cardboard not because either is known, but because of what each of them differently is in their subjective constitution as things of the environment; and that "is" requires recognition of the difference between objects as +, −, 0, and objects as sometimes and in various measures things existing — "things in themselves" in exactly that sense Kant falsely proclaimed to be "unknowable" — over and beyond our animal attitude towards them as +, −, 0.

It is the fact that no awareness can be achieved without the involvement of signs that remains inaccessible to animals unable to deal with relations in their difference as suprasubjective from things as intersubjectively related. For relations cannot be perceived, only related objects; but relations in their difference from objects related can be understood, and it is this possibility of awareness that distinguishes human understanding, for it is this awareness that is essential to modeling the world in ways that do not necessarily reduce to related objects in the order of material things accessible as such to sense; but it is this awareness which also introduces, as a consequence of its unique awareness, the ultimate inescapability of *responsibility*.

Thus, while all animals in making use of signs depend upon semiosis throughout their life, since signs in their proper being are not sense-perceptible vehicles but triadic relations knowable as such intellectually but not perceptually, only human animals are able to know that there are signs and not simply use signs. And since the study of signs presupposes the ability to know signs as such, i.e., in their difference from the vehicles of semiosic interactions, and that being proper to signs is revealed precisely through the action of signs (semiosis), the animal able to know signs in their proper being is most properly characterized in its distinctness as the *semiotic animal*, the animal which rises above bare semiosis by becoming conscious of that process upon which all knowledge and life depends, as well perhaps as the process of development which leads up to and initially makes life proximately possible in a universe initially both lifeless and hostile to life. Responsibility *for the continuance* of the possibility in

its actuality as an ascending development looms from the start as the horizon proper to the initial distinctiveness of anthroposemiosis.

6. A final frontier in terrestrial semiosis:
The semioethic animal

Metasemiosis, the consciousness that there are signs with the accompanying realization of our dependence upon signs in all that we know or can come to know (whence the oxymoronic character of "metasemiotics" proposed as a term of discourse), reveals thus that the consequences of actions must be taken into account in deciding what actions to perform. That is the beginnings of ethics. But ethics has traditionally been envisaged in terms of taking responsibility for individual actions, and its semiosic character and roots have remained concealed in the standard treatments heretofore. As science and technology have become central to the lifeworld of human culture, we have begun to see that ethics in the traditional sense is not sufficient for the good of the species of semiotic animals — or any other animals, for that matter, inasmuch as semiotic animals are no different from other animals in depending upon the surrounding conditions of their physical environment to thrive or even survive.

And thus the individual ethical consciousness of human animals to behave in ways conducive to the good of the individual precisely as a member of a community expands to realize that the human community is a biological reality as well as a cultural one, and depends like every biological community upon certain conditions being preserved or developed not just in the human world of culture but in the physical environment within which that world of culture exists and upon which the human world, like the Umwelt of every animal whatever, depends for sustenance. Thus the semiotic animal become *semioethical*, and ethics becomes *semioethics* as an acceptance of responsibility not only for individual behavior but also for collective behavior, and responsibility for the consequences of behavior not only within the culture but also within the biosphere apart from which, like language divorced from zoösemiosis, the cultural world simply implodes.

Global semiotics, in the human person, implies ethics; but ethics in the human person as semiotic animal becomes semioethics.

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От семиозиса к семиоэтике: широкая перспектива действия знаков

То, как что-либо действует, зависит от того, чем это «что-либо» является, причем, как от типа предмета, так и от определенной личности этого типа: *agere sequitur esse*, т.е. действие опосредовано бытием. Это справедливо как в случае знаков, так и в случае львов или сороконожек: следовательно, для того, чтобы определить диапазон или распространение семиозиса, нам необходимо прежде всего определить, к какому типу относится то, что называется «знаком». Еще Пуансо утверждал (а столетия спустя это подтвердили работы Пирса), что истинное существование знаков в качестве знаков заключается в отношении, в нередуцируемых взаимоотношениях, объединяющих три различных члена: член переднего плана, репрезентирующий иное, чем является он сам, — репрезентамен, или носитель знака; другой член, репрезентируемый, — сигнификат, или обозначаемый объект, и третий член, для которого (или которому) делается вся эта «репрезентация другого», — интерпретанта, которая не обязательно должна быть человеком и даже просто одушевленным существом. Тем самым, действие знака — это способ его воздействия на мир, не только включая мир опыта и знания, но и распространяя это воздействие даже на материальный мир природы, причем, не только живой природы. Вопрос в том, какова причинная связь, причинность (каузальность), присущая знакам вследствие свойственного для них бытия в качестве знаков; как непрямая, косвенная причинность, так и отношения косвенно зависят от взаимодействий индивидов, создающих множественность мира.

Вопрос и в том, какова причинность (каузальность), которая модели-
рует то, что должно или может быть, — по контрасту с тем, что
имеется здесь и теперь. Связывать эту причинность с целевой кор-
ректно лишь в том случае, если знаки используются для формиро-
вания взаимодействия отдельных вещей, но приравнивать эту
причинность с «телеологией» — основное заблуждение, которое
характерно для современного развития семиотики; во многом это
заблуждение обусловлено некоторыми публикациями отдельных
пассажей из работы Пирса, в которой он исправляет эту ошибку, но
лишь в других пассажах из нее, которые столь долго оставались
неопубликованными. Вынося на свет эти пассажи, в которых Пирс
движется точно в том направлении, которое ранее было указано
Пуансо, данная статья предпринимает попытку своего рода обзора
современного развития семиотики, обзора, в котором намечается
полный объем семиозиса и показывается его коэкстенсивность с
границами самого универсума, где бы они ни были. Именно косвен-
ная, внешне детализированная формальная причинность (каузаль-
ность), которую проявляют знаки, делает возможным «влияние
будущего», согласно которому семиозис меняет релевантность
прошлого по отношению к будущему путем взаимодействия со Вто-
ричностью. Понимание этого положения (причинность, присущая
знакам) также делает очевидной ошибку сведения всего универсума
к знакам, ошибку, иногда именуемую «пансемиозисом».

Semiootikast semioeetikani: märgitoime koguulatus

Kuidas miski toimib, sõltub sellest, mis see miski on, nii sellest, mis liiki
asi ta on, kui ka temast kui konkreetsest indiviidist selle liigi sees: *ager
segitur esse* ehk toime johtub olemusest. See kehtib ühtmoodi nii
märkide, lõvide kui sajajalgsete kohta. See tähendab, et semioosi ulatuse
määramiseks on meil ennekõike vaja määrata, mis liiki see "märgiks"
nimetatud asi õieti on. Juba Poinsot väitis (ja sajandeid hiljem kinnitasid
tema öeldut Peirce'i tööd), et märkide kui märkide tõeline olemus seisneb
suhtes. Suhtes, mis ühendab kolme eraldi liiget ja on vähematele
koostisosadele taandamatu: esiplaanil asuv liige, mis esitab midagi muud,
kui ta ise on — esitis ehk märgikandja; seejärel see teine, mida esita-
takse — tähistatu ehk tähistatav objekt; ja kolmas liige, kellele või kelle
tarvis seda teist esitatakse — tõlgend, mis ei pea ilmtingimata olema isik
ja ei pea õigupoolest isegi hingestatud olend olema. Märgitoime on seega

viis, kuidas märgid mõjutavad maailma, sealhulgas kogemuse ja teadmise ilmast eluvälise looduse füüsilise maailmani välja. Oluline on see, milline on märkidele vastav põhjuslikkus, mis tuleneb nende kui märkide tõelisest olemusest. See on kaudne põhjuslikkus, kuivõrd suhted sõltuvad kaudselt indiviidide omavahelistest vastastikustest toimetest, millest koosneb maailma mitmekesisus, ja ühtlasi on see põhjuslikkus, mis kujundab selle, mis võiks olla, vastandina sellele, mis siin ja praegu on. Seostada seda põhjuslikkust eesmärgipärase põhjuslikkusega on korrektne, seni kuni märke kasutatakse üksikute asjade vastastoime kujundamisel. Kuid võrdsustada seda põhjuslikkust "teleoloogiaga" oleks põhimõtteline viga, mille poole kaasaegne semiootika on kippunud kalduma. See viga on sündinud suuresti tänu avaldatud osale ühest teatud Peirce'i esseest. Edasi Peirce parandab selle vea, osutades juba varem Poinsot' poolt maha märgitud suunas, kuid need lõigud esseest on jäänud avaldamata. Käesolev artikkel toob need avaldamata lõigud uuesti avalikkuse ette ja üritab anda ülevaadet kaasaegse semiootika arengust, manades esile semioosi kogu selles ulatuses ja demonstreerides, et semioosi piirid kattuvad universumi piiridega, kus iganes need ka ei oleks. Just märkide kaudne, väliselt määratlev vormiline põhjuslikkus teeb võimalikuks "tuleviku mõju", mis tähendab, et semioos muudab teisesuse vastutoimete kaudu mineviku olulisust oleviku jaoks. Märkidele omase põhjuslikkuse mõistmine paljastab ka universumi märkidele taandamise ehk pansemioosi ekslikkuse.

Meanings come in six

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Abstract. Though it seems to be reasonable to restrict the scope of semiotics, in order more completely to understand the semiotic phenomena it is necessary to specify all conceivable types of sign and meaning. The method of sextets is introduced that yields a uniform six-item structure of both general and special sign typologies. A general typology of signs and meanings in language and speech and a typology of referring are presented as the paradigms for the structure. In any sign typology in the framework of this structure, the categorisation of the unit of meaning is analogous to the first three items of the first paradigm. In any sign typology in this framework, the relation between the sign and the meaning is analogous to the relation of referring.

In the history of semiotics, the classification of signs has not been just a tool of application of the sign concept but also a means of a better understanding of the concept of sign itself, most notably in Charles Sanders Peirce's work[1]. In this article, an attempt is made to classify signs before defining the concept, in order for the classification to throw light on the concept itself. The underlying structure and the heuristic tool of both classification and definition is the sextet — a six-item set provided with a special structure[2].

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[1] See especially Peirce 1992 [1868], Peirce 1998 [1903], Peirce 1998 [1908].

[2] The concept of sextet has been explicitly introduced in Luure 2006a. In Luure 2001 and Luure 2006b there are examples of sextets, and in Luure 2002, three-item fragments of sextets are used.

Since Augustine[3], the concept of sign has tended to be defined by generalising the signs used in human language and speech. Hence the problem arises where this generalisation is to end. There is no obvious limit to generalisation. There have been attempts to find natural boundaries of the semiotic realm; such boundaries can be based only on some sort of intuition. Semiologists are not willing to extend the semiotic realm beyond the human society. Eco (1979: 6) wrote: "By *natural boundaries* I mean principally those beyond which a semiotic approach cannot go; for there is non-semiotic territory since there are phenomena that cannot be taken as sign-functions". For him, those natural boundaries weren't far beyond human society. The biosemioticians lowered this 'semiotic threshold' to the boundary between life and the inanimate world ('the Sebeok's Thesis'[4]). Thomas A. Sebeok wrote for example: "[...] semiosis is what distinguishes all that is animate from lifeless. Before semiosis, there was information" (Sebeok 1986: 15). However, as such, information is just a further generalisation, and if we stop there then the genuine reason why seems to be not any natural boundary between sign-like things and other things but lack of purpose in generalisation. This is explicitly stated by Stjernfelt (2007: 217): "I have nothing against, to be sure, the idea that physical processes may be described in semiotic vocabulary, but I just do not see that vocabulary adds anything to our knowledge of such processes. Thus, they seem to constitute a sort of semiotic zero-case where semiotic terminology may be added or not."

In this article, we are trying to show how introducing sign types of apparently no use can be justified. Sextets of sign types will be introduced which always include 'zero-cases'. This allows us to extend the semiotic concepts in general and the specific sign typologies in particular to their maximum generality, and also to discover new aspects of the sign concept.

The six basic types of signs

We start our analysis of sign typology from the untechnical opposition of sign and meaning. At this stage, we intentionally avoid appealing to established semiotic theories because we are to extend their limits as

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[3] See Augustine 397: II.1.1.
[4] See Kull, Emmeche, Favareau 2008: 42.

to some aspects[5]. Our — however indeterminate — preliminary account is that the sign both uncovers and covers its meaning for the interpreter. The sign is to serve as an intermediate link that, as it were, contains some amount of the information the original source of meaning has to offer.

In cognition, any source of knowledge serves as a sign, knowledge being the knowledge of its meaning. The difficulty of knowledge arises precisely from the covering side of the sign, its uncovering being what renders knowledge possible. In order to uncover its meaning, the sign is somehow to betray its meaning in spite of its natural tendency to cover its meaning 'with its own body'. We have a scale of different degrees in which the sign reveals its meaning. We are seeking for a series of notches of this scale in order to base some typology of signs and meanings.

A central illustration is provided by the signs and meanings involved in language and speech.

The most commonly known example of a sign phenomenon in language seems to be the linguistic sign in Saussure's sense[6]. The linguistic sign is a psychological entity consisting of two psychological terms: the signifier and the signified (Saussure 1959 [1916]: 66–67)[7]. We are using this example as a familiar point to depart from. Though the ontological status of 'signs'[8] and 'meanings' is open so far, the mental account is appropriate as far as the 'sign'–'meaning' relation in language and speech always is mentally mediated (with the possible exception of the mystical relation; *vide infra*). In any case, both the linguistic sign and its two terms can be construed as

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[5]   As to some other aspects, our examples may have a narrower scope than Peirce's theory of signs envisages.

[6]   "I propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace concept and sound-image respectively by signified [signifié] and signifier [significant]; the last two terms have the advantage of indicating opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts. As regards sign, if I am satisfied with it, this is simply because I do not know of any word to replace it, the ordinary language suggesting no other" (Saussure 1959 [1916]: 66–67).

[7]   See Saussure 1959 [1916]: 65–66: "[...] both terms involved in the linguistic sign are psychological [...]. [...] The linguistic sign unites [...] a concept and a sound-image."

[8]   Here and further, 'sign' and 'meaning', when in quotation marks, refer to our non-technical ad hoc expressions.

categories (in the sense of the result of categorisation[9]). In our account, the 'sign' and the 'meaning' in Saussure's linguistic sign are located as follows: the signifier is the 'sign' and the linguistic sign is the 'meaning'[10]. Here, the 'meaning' is recognised in the 'sign', and this is the way the "sign" is perceived. The meaning is a category; the category 'gives the meaning' to the sign. In other words, the linguistic sign 'gives the meaning' to the signified. The examples of the linguistic sign can be extended to other linguistic units. What counts in the analogy is not the two-term structure of the linguistic sign but the relation between a (relatively) 'meaningless' term and the 'meaning'. So, grammatical categories provide another example of such a linguistic unit.

Another well-known example is referring[11]. In the context of referring, the 'meaning' (it is called reference) of a referring expression (a 'sign') is the thing the referring expression picks out. It transcends the linguistic realm, reaching the extralinguistic world. The things of the world are mediated by their mental counterparts (representations) in mental models. In contrast to the linguistic signs, the 'sign' and its reference are on an equal foot.

Let us compare the above two examples. The linguistic signs and their analogues remain in the realm of the properly linguistic. The meanings aren't directly connected with the extralinguistic reality. The referring relation brings us into the realm of speech, or language use. From the point of view of reference, the linguistic signs are clearly deficient because the linguistic 'meaning' is underdetermined as to the reference: the reference of a sign may vary even if the sign itself is fully determined. For example, the word *fox* may refer to any of thousands of thousands of particular foxes, both real and imagined, or possibly to the class of foxes, and so on. On the other side, in linguistic signs, the 'meaning' is relatively more determinate. Though the sound of the word *fox*, in principle, can be miscategorised as expressing another world rather than *fox*, this should be construed rather as a deviation.

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[9]   See, e.g., Stjernfelt 1992, Kull 2002.

[10]   The reason why we don't want to construe the signified as the "meaning" is that the basic linguistic unit is the linguistic sign. It is the category to be recognised, and this is meant to be the "meaning" here.

[11]   A summary of the theory of reference in analytic philosophy can be found in Luure 2002.

Now let us see how far we can extend this contrast. So we are to seek after the 'zero degree' and the 'full amount' of determinacy and indeterminacy, or, in other words, revealing and covering. The 'sign' reveals its 'meaning' fully precisely when it reveals nothing besides itself, i.e, when the 'sign' doesn't represent anything else beyond itself. This is the extreme case in the direction from reference to the properly linguistic realm. There can be no mistake, no deviation, when a 'sign' is to be its own 'meaning'. And on the other side, taken as such, this 'sign' gives no hint as to its further 'meaning' beyond its 'meaning' as the 'sign' itself. This zero degree of sign is what semioticians have not been willing to include in the class of signs, or, in the first place, any semiotic phenomena of all, because it seems to lack the defining characteristic of the sign, viz., the sign is to stand for *something else*. However, as we put it in the beginning: the 'sign' both uncovers and covers its 'meaning'; and here, both covering and uncovering have been lead to their maximum.

What is the other extreme? In religious contexts, words and phrases are sometimes taken to embody supernatural beings or other transcendent entities. If we take the word in question to be the 'sign' then its 'meaning' is fully present in the 'sign' as it is embodied there; on the other side, the 'sign' has no feature revealing any information about its 'meaning' as the transcendent meaning remains fully unknown in its embodiment. In contrast to the zero degree example, here the meaning is fully determinate from the side of the 'meaning', and the sign doesn't reveal anything at all from the side of 'sign'.

The complete list of the notches of the scale of meaning determinacy follows.

1. The first notch: the *zero degree meaning*. The idea of the zero degree of meaning enables us to exhaust the scale of meaning determinacy/indeterminacy. In speech and language, the zero degree signs are the elementary tokens[12]. They reveal no meaning beyond themselves, and so, on this elementary level, they cannot be compared to other tokens nor identified as belonging to types.

They cannot be remembered (in the ordinary sense of the word) at that level as non-zero degree memory requires more meaning than

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[12]   We are using the usual type-token distinction as the distinction between general sorts of things (types) and their particular instances. In this particular example, the types are the linguistic signs. Correspondingly, we have in view the tokens of those signs rather than merely of, say, symbol strings.

that: the memory of a zero degree sign is the sign itself. There is an intimate connection between memory and meaning: a sign can be remembered just through its meaning; so types of memory correspond to the types of meaning. The zero degree signs can be said to have no meaning precisely in the same sense as it can be said that they cannot be remembered.

The zero degree signs are, in themselves, the most perspicuous signs. There is nothing arbitrary in their 'meaning'. However, from the perspective of the opposite end of the scale, they are the most 'meaningless' signs.

The zero degree signs are necessary as the ultimate bearers of the signs of higher type.

2. The second notch: the *repetitional meaning*. The tokens, which were incomparable at the first level, now become comparable. The comparison takes place by means of 'cross-identifying' the tokens: different tokens are taken to be 'identical' as each other's continuations. However, this 'identity' doesn't involve any category; the identity is seen strictly in the framework of the actual chain of comparisons. The token compared to is the 'meaning' of the token compared.

In speech, this is realised in repeating the same token, as, e.g., the second token of the word 'in' in this sentence repeats the first token of this word. The repeating token is the 'meaning' of the token repeated. In ordinary speech, such repeating may take place on the purely phonological level, even if the semantical meaning is not understood.

This sign type is, as it were, halfway between tokens and types. Categorisation is still underway. The token still cannot be recognised as belonging to a category but only is associated with another token. The meaning (and memory) is retained until the chain is broken. In that chain, the 'sign'–'meaning' relation is reversible: the 'sign' also can be regarded as the 'meaning' of its 'meaning' ('backward repetition').

The 'meanings' of the second type should not be confused with references. Their existence is in a strong sense relational: they exist by the means of relations to other such 'meanings'. (The 'signs' themselves belong to those 'meanings'.) And the type they are heading for is the linguistic sign and not the reference. In contradistinction to references, the 'meanings' of second type are no independent existence but are constituted by their relations to 'signs'.

The perspicuity of the repetitional signs is limited by the filter of the 'identity' criteria (such as phonology): only certain aspects of the token are chosen as relevant; this choice is external to the token itself. These aspects are chosen arbitrarily, though, of course, they *are* there in the 'signs'. Seen from the other side, the first rudiments of non-zero-degree 'meaning' are provided by the relations due to the 'identity' chain. True, the 'meaning' is not yet substantial as it boils down to the token relations where the (type) identity still is to be arisen.

3. The third notch: the *categorial meaning*. The identity proper of a (linguistic) unit arises only at that level. The scale as a whole reveals that, in its root, identity is the same thing as meaning. What arises as identity in the lower portion of the scale, further reveals itself as meaning. Categorisation is the first phase of the development of meaning.

The categorial 'meanings' are the categories the 'signs' are recognised to belong to. The 'signs' are perceived immediately as 'meanings'. The meanings are taken from a limited stock of possible meanings.

On this level, the memory of 'meaning' is independent from 'signs': it is realised by the categories. The 'sign'–'meaning' relation is irreversible.

Now the perspicuity of the 'sign' is still less than in the case of the referential meaning. The 'meaning' is attached to the 'sign' arbitrarily, and moreover, to the same 'sign' different meanings can be attached in the framework of one and the same language (homonymy). On the other hand, the identity, in the common sense of the word, here has been fully established, or, in the other words, the categorisation process has come to its end.

4. The fourth notch: the *referential meaning*. Here the 'signs' (referring expressions) and the 'meanings' (references) are mutually independent entities.

The next step of the development of meaning (and identity) leads to the main paradigm of the 'sign'–'meaning' relation where the sign stands for its meaning. Similarly to the second notch, we have here an external relation; however, in contrast to the repetitional meaning, the 'sign' and the 'meaning' are not constituted by this relation but the relation is, as it were, added to the 'sign' and the 'meaning'. The meanings are (the representations of) the entities of the extralinguistic

world[13]. Memory here is   supported by the representations of the world.

The 'meanings' of the 'signs' depend on the circumstances of the world that are independent of the language. This makes the 'signs' even less perspicuous than the linguistic conventions do. On the other hand, language is regarded to be a universal description tool of the world. Everything conceivable (independently of language) can be expressed by means of language. This fills speech with meaning that reaches far longer than language.

5. The fifth notch: the *poetical meaning*. There is a further step to be taken in order for speech to become even more meaningful. Now we give up the restriction that the 'meaning' must be independent, and take the 'signs' to generate 'meanings' that are irreducible to entities independent from the signs. The 'signs' are in contact with things that are undescribable for us and yet are expressible by poetical 'signs'. In this expression, the 'sign' are expedient and every particular 'sign' is almost irreplaceable.

On the other hand, tiny changes can change the 'meaning' of the 'signs' drastically or even bereave them of meaning. Very little meaning is still retained in the 'signs' themselves. The memory is at the distance of a serious effort from us, demanding us to transcend our knowledge, i.e., our memory in the ordinary sense.

6. The sixth notch: the *mystical meaning*. Here the 'sign' is unperceivably a full embodiment of a (transcendent) 'meaning'. Besides the religious example's (in different doctrines such 'signs' may be God's names as God's incarnations, mantras as gods' incarnations, Holy Scripture as God's incarnation), in some cases a piece of inner speech may be construed as the embodiment of a thought having absolutely no understandable connection to the piece of speech.

The mystical 'signs' are the fully unconspicuous 'signs' because their 'meaning' is completely outside of what they are by themselves: they 'bear no sign' of their meaning. On the other hand, they are the best 'signs' in the sense that the 'meaning' is immediately present in them.

Memory stays beyond our reach; this also means that it is not our task to support memory, as this doesn't lie in our power.

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[13]　The extralinguistic world involves both real and fictional things, and even the linguistic units as parts of the world.

The six types of referring

Referring expressions are the 'signs' of their references as their 'meanings'[14].

In the theory of reference in the analytical philosophy of language, there have been attempts to establish correspondences between the linguistic means of referring (the linguistic characteristics of the referring expressions) and the way of referring. Among the main linguistic types of linguistic expressions are demonstratives, proper names and nominal phrases (the latter construed as descriptions, especially definite descriptions, that is descriptions meant to specify a unique thing as its reference). For example, Kripke (1980) states that proper names (in their typical use) are rigid designators, i.e., they refer to one and the same object in every possible world, whereas definite descriptions are non-rigid designators, as their references in different possible worlds depend on the different circumstances in the different worlds[15]. Analogously, Donnellan (1966) distinguishes between the attributive use and the referential use of definite descriptions. In the attributive use, the description refers to whatever entity uniquely having the property specified by the description. In the referential use, the description refers to the object the user of the description thinks uniquely satisfies the description, even if doesn't do so. Different possible worlds and different beliefs can be treated in a uniform way, construing both as models (mental representations). Then both Kripke's and Donnellan's distinctions are distinctions between rigid and non-rigid uses of referring expressions. Below they are generalised.

The typology of referring follows the general schema of the example in the last section as follows. In each item of the typology, the unit of meaning goes through the same process of categorisation and the subsequent emergence of meaning from identity. This is one of the ways different typologies are woven into a uniform structure.

1. The first type of reference: *demonstrative-like non-rigid* reference. Sometimes demonstratives are used strictly deictically, i.e.,

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[14]   More technical details and references can be found in Luure 2002.

[15]   For example, compare the sentence beginnings: "If Aristotle hadn't met Alexander..." and "If Alexander the Great's teacher hadn't met Alexander..." Instead of the rigid designator "Aristotle" we have the non-rigid designator in the second one.

as referring expressions referring to a reference determined by the extralinguistic context regardless of both the content and the choice of the word. In principle, such use is possible for other expressions as well.

In this case, the categorisation of the unit of meaning (in this example, the reference) is only starting. The determination of the reference (i.e., the referring), is most abstract. The expression is indifferent to its reference. It cannot determine any characteristics of its reference besides its location (or something similar) and is not able to assure the retention of its reference; when repeated, the expression cannot establish the identity of the reference. Here the reference lies in the *zero-degree* notch.

2. The second type of reference: *name-like rigid* reference. This is the use Kripke (1980) attributes to proper names. The expression is meant to refer to a particular, determined entity, and subsequently the same expression is repeated and meant to refer to the same entity as did the expression repeated.

The categorisation of the reference is in process but it still doesn't come to its end. The expression cannot change the reference, once the reference is settled. The reference retains itself but, as a meaning, it has no identity in itself but its identity is dependent on the stipulation identity of reference in the act of referring. The reference lies in the *repetitional* notch.

3. The third type of reference: *description-like non-rigid* reference. Here referring is analogous to the non-rigid, attributive use of definite descriptions. The reference is determined as whatever entity uniquely satisfying the description. So the expression is insensitive to any replacement of the reference: no replacement spoils the act of referring since it is interested only in the unique satisfaction of the description.

This is the place where the categorisation is completed. But the category of the unit of meaning still is indifferent to the meaning proper, that is the referring proper. The reference lies in the *categorial* notch. Only the following notch brings us to the reference proper, so to say, to the *referential* reference.

4. The fourth type of reference: *description-like rigid* reference. In the beginning, the reference is determined via a definite description the reference is uniquely to satisfy, and further on, the reference is stipulated to be identical to the first one. This is the way a certain real

unique identity is picked out in a way not depending on the circumstances of referring. In contrast to the second type of reference, the reference cannot be lost since it is anchored to the definite description.

What is happening now is analogous to the step from identity to meaning proper, i.e., from identity to referring. After the completion of the categorisation, the unit of meaning acquires its identity as independent from referring. The reference lies in the *referential* notch.

5. The fifth type of reference: *name-like non-rigid* reference. Let us take an example where the reference is still more independent from the expression so it takes again a *name-like expression* to catch it. Such necessity emerges when (fictional) references cannot be discriminated by means of their describable characteristics. Max Black (1952) imagines a world where there are only two totally similar ideally symmetric iron balls, Castor and Pollux. On these conditions we cannot know which is which, since there is no discriminating quality for them. Is then impossible to refer either to Castor or to Pollux? My suggestion is that we refer to them by means of their names, by means of which the references are generated and constituted. An analogous case is provided by abstract objects, say mathematical numbers: we can discriminate them only by their names.

Like in our first paradigm example 'signs' come to generate their 'meanings', here the referring expressions generate their meanings. The reference lies in the *poetical* notch.

6. The sixth type of reference: *demonstrative-like rigid* reference. Finally, when the references become entirely elusive and vitally important, the last means are expressions that resemble the demonstratives treated under the first item of this paradigm, except that they are rigid. Accordingly, the referring expression is not fully indifferent to its reference but is extremely interested of it. My example is again about the religious. Imagine that someone uses the referring expression *God*. Does this word refer to God or to Devil? We cannot catch the fact about this even by means of a name. In fact, these names function like demonstratives. The referring is a metaphysical fact but we don't have any sign to know this fact. And the reference of the same expression may differ according to situations. The expressions are rigid because the religious person really wants to refer to God, and not to Devil, however similar he may be to God.

Here the reference lies in the *mystical* notch, since we here have full indeterminacy.

Referring as a paradigm

The examples in the previous sections are meant to be paradigms serving as keys to the whole structure. In this article we will not give more paradigms nor any analysis of sign typologies built on other principles. We showed on the example of the second paradigm how the first paradigm works. The categorisation of the unit of meaning and its further development is a universal for all sign typologies in this framework. Now we are going to show how referring can be a universal model for sign typologies.

The idea is that in all varieties of sign and meaning there is a determining relation which is a generalisation of the referring relation. Like in the case of referring the referring expression refers to the reference, in the general case the sign determines the meaning. This determination is not meant to be similar to causal determination. It has no necessity in the causal sense but is similar to the case of a mathematical function where the argument of the function determines the value of the function.

The key provided by the second paradigm leads us to construe the relation between the sign and the meaning in the fourth item as the relation of determination similar to referring. There that relation reveals itself in the clearest way. In the first paradigm this relation *is* the relation of referring. Further, the types of referring in the last section give an idea how the sign determines the meaning in the each particular item of the typology.

In the case of zero-degree meaning, the sign determines the meaning analogously to the first type of referring; in the case of repetitional meaning, the sign determines the meaning analogously to the second type of referring; etc.

Beyond language

The signs in the framework of speech and language are not the sole signs. However, already in that framework we discovered strange

varieties of signs and meaning, such as zero-degree meaning and repetitional meaning that are almost outside language. Now we are going to take a further step and expand the signs beyond the framework of language and speech, staying in the limits of human activity.

We will exemplify six types of achieving a certain location by means of a tool. The tool is the item that goes through its categorisation in the first three stages and consequently develops itself to its extreme indeterminacy.

1. I want to be on the Earth. Except for conceivable rare exceptions it is granted that I am on the Earth. I do n't have any identifiable tool for it, though almost anything around me and in myself is part of that tool.

2. I want to be in the next room. I just stand up and walk there. I don't give the task of relocating me to anybody else than myself. I don't have to fix up any particular tool because I need not give to myself signs that go much further from myself. Any part of walking is almost the same as doing something in order to walk.

3. In the elevator I push the button. Pushing the button is a tool that gets its meaning from its function. It doesn't try to take us anywhere and it has no goal at all. But it is a ready, categorised tool.

4. The fairy-tale fox who plays possum in order for the peasant to take it to his sleigh in the hope to get the fox's fur uses the type of meaning that people often use. Here tools are available precisely because we use others' goals.[16]

5. I take a taxi and tell the driver where I want to be. Only now we reached the level where our previous examples belong. Language allows us to generate a limitless amount of new meanings and directly to make my goals others' goals[17]. So the whole realm of language and speech gets located in a more general sign typology.

6. I am on a floating ice floe and I am praying for getting on land. This takes the tool out of myself completely. Praying is not really talking and also it is no action as I cannot *do* anything (in the previous item doing was reduced to saying).

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[16] In Grice's (1957) terms this corresponds to the 'natural meaning'.

[17] Grice (1957) explains the emergence of this 'non-natural meaning' by the circumstance that I tell the address to the driver with the intention that he would drive me by means of recognising my intention.

There is life and there are signs and meanings at each level but life gets more and more intensive, ultimately revealing itself in the extreme.

Conclusion

Complete sign typologies need zero-degree cases where the sign and the meaning can taken to coincide. They are justified by symmetry to their opposite extremes the importance of which seems to be clear.

Since everything contains this zero-degree meaning, it is natural for semiotic not to restrict its scope.

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Значения бывают вшестером

Хотя кажется целесообразным ограничить сферу применения семиотики, для более полного понимания семиотических явлений необходимо осознать все мыслимые виды знака и значения. В статье вводится метод секстетов, на которым основывается единая шестеричная структура общих и специальных знаковых типологий. В качестве парадигм представляются общие типы и уровни знаков и значений в языке и речи и типы референции. В каждой знаковой типологии в рамках этой структуры категоризация, приводящая к единице значения, аналогична первым трем членам первой парадигмы и отношение между знаком и значением аналогично отношению референции.

Tähendused käivad kuuekesi

Kuigi semiootika rakendusvaldkonda tundub otstarbekas piirata, on semiootiliste nähtuste täielikumaks mõistmiseks vajalik välja tuua kõik mõeldavad märgi ja tähenduse tüübid. Artiklis tutvustatakse sekstettide meetodit, mis paneb aluse üldisemate ja erilisemate märgitüpoloogiate ühtsele kuueliikmelisele struktuurile. Paradigmadena esitatakse märkide

ja tähenduste üldised tüübid ja tasemed keeles ja kõnes ning osutamise tüübid. Iga märgitüpoloogia puhul vaadeldakse tähendusühiku väljakategoriseerumist analoogiliselt esimese paradigma esimese kolme astmega ning märgi ja tähenduse vahelist suhet analoogiliselt osutamissuhtega.

Несколько вводных слов[1]

Юрий Лотман

Семиотика культуры — дисциплина, находящаяся на перекрестке лингвосемиотического и историко-культурного циклов научных дисциплин, это историческая семиотика интеллектуальной деятельности человека. Обращение к культуре как семиотическому объекту ставит исследователя перед исключительно сложной ситуацией: он изучает семиотические модели, определяющие круг представлений и действий людей в потоке их исторического существования. Культура в семиотическом аспекте предстает как некоторый континуум языков, которыми пользуется самосознающее мышление человека, а действия, как вербальные, так и совершаемые с помощью разнообразных поступков, могут быть истолкованы как тексты на некоторых языках. Понять смысл исторических поступков людей, их поведения и их сочинений означает овладеть языками их культур.

Однако эта, столь простая в словесной формулировке, задача практически оказывается исключительно сложной. Во-первых, исследователь сталкивается с исключительным обилием семиотических структур (языков), с помощью которых человек той или иной эпохи стремится упорядочить свой опыт и осмыслить свои действия. Языки эти могут складываться в иерархии, весьма далекие по ценностным и иным характеристикам от тех, к которым привык исследователь. Следует иметь в виду, что сам исследователь неизбежно находится внутри некоторой культурной системы, и то, что он склонен считать «естественной истиной», чаще всего представляет собой систему языков его культуры. Поэтому понимание всегда есть перевод с «их» языка на «мой». Нахождение самого принципа организации языков внутри контиинума той или иной культуры представляет собой достаточно

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[1] Впервые опубликовано на польском языке в качестве предисловия к антологии по семиотике культуры: Łotman, Jurij 1993. Parę słów wstępu. In: Żyłko, Bogusław (ed.), *Semiotyka dziejów Rosji.* (Wybór tekstów i przekład Bogusław Żyłko.) Łódz: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, 13–16. Оригинал печатается здесь впервые. О происхождении этого текста см.: Жилко, Богуслав 2008. История одного текста Ю. М. Лотмана. *Sign Systems Studies* 36(2): 513–514.

сложную задачу. Следует также учитывать, что внутри той или иной семиосферы[2] возможны организации разной степени жесткости и структурной организованности.

Во-вторых, привычное семиотическое понятие «текст» выступает здесь в неожиданном виде. Сложность не в том, что под текстом мы будем понимать любую форму семиотической манифестации, в том числе и такую, как «текст поведения», а в месте, которое объекты этого рода занимают в системе культуры. Следуя соссюрианской традиции, текст рассматривают обычно как манифестацию языка. Текст противостоит языку как выраженное — невыраженному, материальное — идеальному и пространственно-отграниченное — внепространственному. Язык — кодирующее устройство. Поэтому именно в сфере языка определяется, какие элементы текста имеют значение, являются смыслоразличительными, а какие случайны и, с точки зрения смысла, «как бы не существуют». Только то, что дано в языке, имеет значение в тексте. Поэтому текст всегда есть текст на некотором данном языке. Следовательно, язык всегда дан до текста.

С этой точки зрения, текст выступает как пассивная упаковка, средство транспортировать смысл от адресанта к адресату. Всякое изменение смысла в процессе передачи может рассматриваться лишь как порча. Вся система нацелена на адекватность передачи информации. Выделяется простейшая функция — коммуникативная. Однако, как только мы вступаем в область активных в сфере культуры сложных семиотических систем, мы сталкиваемся с многочисленными парадоксами. Культура эволюционирует в сторону создания все более и более сложных языков, а сложные языки создают тексты, принципиально не поддающиеся однозначной дешифровке. Более того, сама роль текста в системе культуры меняется в сторону значительно большей активности. В целом ряде явлений не язык предшествует тексту, а текст парадоксально предшествует языку. Адресат получает «текст на никаком языке», по которому он конструирует язык или же выбирает наиболее подходящий код из запаса своей культурной памяти. Сюда относится широкий круг явлений от попадания в контекст данной культуры вырванных фрагментов других культур до фактов художественного творчества: всякое новаторское произведение искусства есть текст на новом языке. И аудитория учится этому языку по тем текстам, которые ей даются. Лингвистика рассматривает текст как манифестацию одного языка. В сфере культуры нормальным является случай, когда один и тот же текст зашифрован многократно несколькими кодами. Сложные

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[2] О понятии семиосферы см.: Лотман, Ю. М. 1984. О семиосфере. *Труды по знаковым системам* [*Sign Systems Studies*] 17: 5–23. [См. также перевод этой статьи: Lotman, Juri 2005. On the semiosphere. *Sign Systems Studies* 33(1): 215–239.]

диалогические и игровые отношения между разнообразными субструктурами текста создают его внутренний полиглотизм и являются механизмом смыслообразования. Текст перестает быть пассивной упаковкой и становится генератором смысла, механизмом коллективного сознания. Таким образом, в культурном пространстве языки порождают тексты, а тексты — языки, отношения диалогизма и игровых конфликтов приводят к исключительной смысловой емкости, превращающей культуры в ее целостности в огромное «думающее устройство», наделенное своей памятью и способностью создавать возрастающую информацию.

В-третьих, семиотика культуры — дисциплина историческая. Насколько простейшие семиотические модели тяготеют к синхронии, сложные неизбежно существуют во времени. Они работают только в качестве динамических устройств, и «стрела времени» — неизбежная их координата. Одновременно являясь механизмом коллективной памяти, культура противонаправлена времени и борется с ним.

В-четвертых, простейшие семиотические модели, типа естественного языка, являются результатом спонтанного, лично-неосознанного процесса. Культура включает в себя постоянную интеллектуальную работу. Внутренняя ее информативность создается лавинообразным умножением звеньев, в которых следующий шаг осуществляется путем выбора из альтернативной ситуации («исчерпания энтропии», по определению акад. А. Н. Колмогорова). Но выбор предполагает свободу поведения и является интеллектуальным актом. Поэтому культура одновременно изоморфна индивидуальной личности и включает в себя интеллектуально самостоятельную личность как конструктивный элемент. Личность вступает по отношению к закономерным историческим структурам как текст по отношению к языку: элементом и обусловленным, и творчески активным.

Итак, культура в семиотическом аспекте — это полное внутренних противоречий органическое целое, руководящее человеком и создаваемое им.

Наконец существен еще один аспект. История культуры есть, в частности, история ее самоописаний. Создание метакультуры, рефлексии культуры над собой является неизбежной частью деятельности любой культуры как коллективного интеллекта. В этом отношении семиотику культуры можно рассматривать не только как научную дисциплину, но и как саморефлексию культуры второй половины XX века. Предваряя работы исследователей Московско-тартуской школы семиотики, хотелось бы напомнить читателю давние слова бл. Августина «мир соткан из антитез» («О граде господнем», XI 18). Семиотика культуры строится как исследование ее внутренних оппозиций, диалогических антитез, перекодировок, составляющих сущность интеллектуальной деятельности. Одновременно она позволяет человеку нашего времени — эпохи, когда антитезы мира сделались как никогда очевидным, ощутить свое единство с мировым процессом культуры.

История одного текста Ю. М. Лотмана

Богуслав Жилко[1]

В начале восьмидесятых годов прошлого столетия я получил предложение из лодзинского издательства составить антологию работ по семиотике культуры, которые возникли в кругу т. наз. Тартуско-московской школы. Несколько позже из Варшавы (из Министерства просвещения) пришло письмо, в котором сообщалось, что с 1 сентября 1983 года я могу начинать свою научную стажировку, длящуюся 6 месяцев, в Ленинградском университете.

Когда мое пребывание в Ленинграде приближалось к концу, я рискнул съездить в Тарту, чтобы обсудить планируемый сборник с главой семиотической школы, проф. Ю. М. Лотманом. Тарту тогда был «закрытым городом» и попасть туда, особенно иностранцу, было трудно. Но благодаря моим псковским и тартуским друзьям в середине февраля 1984 года я очутился в Тарту. Я остановился в доме друзей и сотрудников Ю. М. Лотмана — Ларисы Вольперт и Павла Рейфмана. Мы сразу по телефону связались с Профессором и на следующий день отправились в главное здание университета на его лекцию. После лекции Юрий Михайлович пригласил меня и Ларису Ильиничну (моего тартуского гида и опекуна) к себе домой на ужин. Для меня это было очень важное событие. Я мог увидеть дом великого ученого, увидеть его легендарный кабинет — библиотеку с не менее легендарным письменным столом, но и главное — побеседовать с его хозяевами. За ужином, который великолепно приготовила Зара Григорьевна, затрагивались разные темы: от новостей, касающихся научной среды, до актуальных политических событий. Меня расспрашивали о ситуации в Польше после введения военного положения. Москва в то время часто хоронила своих генсеков. Хорошо эту цепь похорон и вступлений на престол очередных «вождей» прокомментировал в тот вечер Юрий Михайлович:

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«Одного трупа похоронили (Ю. Андропова), а другой правит (К. Черненко)».

На следующий день я встретился с Юрием Михайловичем вторично у него дома, чтобы уже в «рабочей» обстановке обсудить составленный мною план будущего сборника. Его доминантой была история России и русской культуры, рассматриваемая *sub specie semioticae*. Юрий Михайлович одобрил мой проект, посоветовал учесть еще другие работы, которые оставались вне моего поля зрения. Подарил мне оттиски своих, только что напечатанных статей. Просил их передать своим варшавским друзьям — М. Р. Майеновой и С. Жулкевскому.

Вернувшись благополучно домой, я взялся за дело и к концу 1986 года сборник в машинописи был готов. Тогда появилась идея снабдить его коротким предисловием, написанным одним из главных его участников. После некоторых колебаний я решил обратиться с такой просьбой к Юрию Михайловичу.

Моя радость была неописуема, когда в апреле следующего года почтальон принес желто-коричневый конверт, содержащим письмо Юрия Михайловича и его «Несколько вводных слов».

Сборник «Семиотика истории России» вышел в 1993 году[2] (экономический кризис и бурные политические события, начавшиеся в 1989 году, не способствовали срочному печатанию книги) в серии «Человек и его цивилизация». Довольно большой тираж (5000 экз.) быстро разошелся.

Вступление Юрия Михайловича, содержащее интересные и важные мысли на тему «исторической семиотики» (в одной из последних его книг — *Внутри мыслящих миров* — им будет посвящена особая часть), существовало до сих пор только в польском переводе. Сейчас появляется возможность прочесть его в подлиннике.[3]

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[2] Żyłko, Bogusław (ed.) 1993. *Semiotyka dziejów Rosji*. (Wybór tekstów i przekład B. Żyłko.) Łódz: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie. В этой книге объемом в 383 страниц напечатаны переводы на польский язык статей Юрия Лотмана (4 статьи), Юрия Лотмана и Бориса Успенского (3), Бориса Успенского (3), Дмитрия Лихачева (1), Александра Панченко (1), Марии Плюхановой (2) и Бориса Егорова (1).

[3] Лотман, Юрий 2008. Несколько вводных слов. *Sign Systems Studies* 36(2): 509–511.

Specialization, semiosis, semiotics: the 33rd annual meeting of the Semiotic Society of America

Paul Cobley[1]

The 33rd annual meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, 'Specialization, semiosis, semiotics', took place, this year, entirely in a hotel. The Renaissance Hotel, Houston is set on its own lot and, like Houston itself, is car-friendly but forbidding for pedestrians who might wish to gain access to any signs of life beyond its edifice. The 20th floor, where the proceedings took place, looks out across the endless suburbs of Houston and further, into the pancake flatness of Texas. Although the conference was this year run under the auspices of the University of St. Thomas, whose open, welcoming, campus was just a mile or so up the road, delegates found themselves thrown together for the duration, braving the sessions at the conference or the individually wrapped soaps in the air-conditioned atmosphere of their rooms. The disadvantage of having a conference in a hotel that I am pointing out here, of course, is that there is no escape. In that respect, the Renaissance was a bit like the Valtionhotelli in Imatra, Finland, where annual meetings of the ISI have forced conference — goers to either stay indoors and engage with each other or face a legion of mosquitoes and profound ennui. Like the Imatra meetings, however, this SSA conference made the disadvantage into a virtue and any perception of that disadvantage a lost figment of memory. It is a measure of the conference's success that the main complaint I heard and, indeed, voiced myself, was that there was too little time and that the conference was too short.

The meeting took place over four days, 16–19 October 2008. It featured 5 plenary addresses, two plenary roundtables and around 46 parallel sessions. In contrast to previous meetings, there was a strong biosemiotic strand in the

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proceedings this year. These included two sessions on 'Biosemiotics': one featuring key international biosemioticians, Don Favareau, Jesper Hoffmeyer and Kalevi Kull, the other featuring Priya Venkatesan, Jennie Wojtaszek, Prisca Augustyn and Ted Baenziger. There were sessions on 'Biosemiotics and culture', 'Objects of desire, adventures in physiosemiosis and formal semiotics', a session on 'Abduction and culture' (which was largely biosemiotically inspired); and the biosemiotics plenary roundtable on definitions of semiosis which took place on Sunday morning (see *Fig. 1*). That two dyed-in-the-wool cultural semioticians, myself and Anne Hénault, were participants in the latter should indicate that biosemiotics' key importance is becoming palpable.

The other sessions were encouragingly varied. It is true that scattered across the programme were the odd semiotic analyses of advertisements or other media and literary artefacts in papers that have rather become the bread and butter of semiotics meetings. Yet, the diversity and rigour of the sessions and papers demonstrated the strength and new horizons of contemporary semiotics. Music remained well represented, whether it was Matthew Shaftel's paper on Ives, Vincent Colapietro's on psychoanalysis and jazz, David Lidov on the efficacy of Jakobson's functions, Scott Murphy on the echoes of Wagner in the music in Hitchcock's films, or the Presidential Address by Robert Hatten (*Fig. 2*) that treated the audience to some close analyses of Mozart (through singing and the piano) while acting as a prelude to Hatten's ballet, Swerve, performed at the University of St. Thomas on the Friday night.

A strong local presence was felt at the meeting, as might be expected. Undergraduates and postgraduates (as well as staff) of the University of St. Thomas acquitted themselves exceptionally well with thoughtful papers, expertly delivered. It should not need saying that this is where the future of semiotics, or any discipline lies: in the energy and new ideas of young scholars. A flavour of this is offered by John Deely's quoting in his plenary a student at the university who observed, refreshingly, that semiotics is the endeavour that studies all the things that other disciplines take for granted. This is a fresh, and very accurate, way to account for the diversity in the field that we know so well. But freshness also entails seeing the past with new eyes. I was interested to see the sessions on Thomist semiotics and on Carmelite semiosis, as well as a jointly-presented paper in another session on 'García de la Madrid: ideas and signs in the Iberian grey zone (1650–1850) that follows the Black Hole (1350–1650)'.

Fresh eyes projecting the past into the future were also complemented by more directly future-orientated sessions and papers. A session on 'Semiotics and philosophy' focused mainly on contemporary accounts of consciousness, including 'neuro-consciousness'; a session on empirical semiotics was focused on synaesthesia; one on myths of technology was sceptical about some futures laid out for us by nanotechnology and cyborg mythologies;

while a session was also devoted to a topic which is of extreme interest even to the most committed atheist with an interest in what happens tomorrow as well as what happened yesterday: 'Theosemiotics: the study of the action of divine signs'.

Figure 1. Roundtable panel 'Definitions of semiosis' on October 19, 2008. From right to left, Winfried Nöth, Anne Hénault, Peter Harries-Jones, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Donald Favareau, Paul Cobley. Kalevi Kull taking the picture.

The quality and tenor of many conferences, of course, are judged by one or both of two things: its keynote papers /plenary addresses; and its book exhibit. The latter featured mainly US publishers (understandably, given the distance from European centres of publishing), commercial and university presses and was very good. The new works for sale indicated a vibrancy and breadth of endeavour which was reflected in the conference itself; the books presented for exhibition indicated tradition and the scholarly virtues, from the dual-translation Poinsot volume to the Peirce editions. For those interested in book retailing facts, Hoffmeyer's new volume, *Biosemiotics* (University of Scranton Press), was the best seller, with all copies snatched up before close of business on the third day.

Figure 2. President of the SSA, 2008, Robert Hatten (left), and John Deely, at a plenary session.

The plenary papers implied issues of specialization, as in the title's conference, but were most explicitly concerned with the intricacies of semiotics and semiosis. Either by chance or by design, the four papers in addition to Hatten's address, complemented each other perfectly and foregrounded semiotics' teaching, in a pedagogical and in a social sense. Kalevi Kull's paper, 'Semiosis makes the world locally plural' gave an account of semiotic endeavour through the lens of the "original university semiotics program on planet Earth", stressing the plurality in the conference that was evident in the microsemiotics of papers such as Elena Yakovleva's 'A semiotic intercultural approach to the @ sign' and the macrosemiotics evidenced in Myrdene Anderson's and Devika Chawla's 'Nonlinear evolutionary living, linear developmental lives' and others. Susan Petrilli's plenary, inaugurating her as the SSA's 7th Sebeok Fellow,[1] was concerned with the topic of semioethics, calling for dialogue and answer to the response of the other, as well as responsibility in the awareness — as only humans can have — of sign use. As such, her paper was about what she believes semiotics must teach the world at large. Deely's paper, on the other hand, while discussing 'the semiotic animal', was more tightly preoccupied with the actual conception of 'sign' and demonstrated that, despite semiotics sometimes being dubbed 'the study of the sign', we still have much to learn — and to teach — regarding what the sign relation entails. The theme

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[1]   See Nuessel 2008.

was continued on the Saturday evening as the University of St. Thomas staged, with two superb actors, a dramatic reading of Deely's 'A sign is what? A dialogue between a semiotist and a would-be realist', a text which keen readers of *Sign Systems Studies* will recognize as first having appeared in this journal (Deely 2001). My own plenary talk on 'Cultural implications of biosemiotics' was, characteristically, a sham, because it replayed or amplified, albeit self-consciously, the implications that Hoffmeyer had already cogently laid out in his 1996 book, *Signs and Meanings in the Universe*. However, it did strenuously seek to emphasize that we — the semiotics community — need to do more to make it generally known what a sea change in human understanding biosemiotics constitutes.

In one way, the intimacy of this conference reflected the fact that it is still a 'meeting' of a semiotic society. About 160 delegates attended and not only were they assembled for plenary sessions but meals were taken with all delegates together, in a room where the plenary papers were also given after or before the meals. On the other hand, intimacy should not be taken for closure or compartmentalization: over 20 different nationalities were represented at this meeting and the sheer diversity as well as the number of parallel sessions made it seem more like a well-organised IASS congress. My personal regret is that I did not have time to sit down and talk with so many friends and scholars and that I was unable to meet or have a prolonged conversation with as many of the people who were new to me as I would like. Also, I regretted having to miss some sessions while I attended other sessions. This was echoed by other delegates and it must be said that it is all too seldom the case that one encounters such sentiments at scholarly conferences. Under these circumstances, and in addition to the fact that there were no glitches, the organization of the meeting by Tom Broden of Purdue University and the local scholars, principally John Deely, went completely unnoticed — which is exactly how it should be. No greater testimony of the success of a conference can be given.

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Susan Petrilli named seventh Thomas A. Sebeok Fellow of the Semiotic Society of America

Frank Nuessel[1]

The thirty-third annual meeting of the Semiotic Society of America meeting was held at the Renaissance Houston Hotel Greenway Plaza October 16–19, 2008 in conjunction with the University of St. Thomas in Houston, Texas.[2] At this meeting Professor Susan Petrilli of the University of Bari, Italy was inscribed as the seventh Thomas A. Sebeok[3] fellow. Professor Petrilli's Fellow address was delivered on October 17, 2008 12:45–14:00 in a plenary session. Her presentation, entitled "Semioethics and responsibility: Beyond specialisms, universalisms and humanisms", was an outstanding presentation on the topic semioethics and its importance to all of us in the twenty-first century. The large audience was entranced by her insightful observations.

Professor Petrilli was born in Adelaide, Australia and she received her doctorate from the University of Bari, Italy in 1993 in Language Theory and Sign Sciences.

Professor Petrilli's research in semiotics includes, but is not limited to, the following areas: biosemiotics, bio-ethics, semiotics and interpretation, and the work of Lady Victoria Welby. The following are some of her books in semiotics that are essential to an understanding of this interdiscipline: (1) *Significs, semiotica, significazione* (Petrilli 1988), (2) *Materia segnica e interpretazione* (Petrilli 1995), (3) *Che cosa significa significare* (Petrilli 1996), (4) *Su Victoria Welby: Significs, e filosofia del linguaggio* (Petrilli 1998b), (5) *Teoria dei segni e del linguaggio* (Petrilli 1998a), and (6) *Percorsi della semiotica* (Petrilli 2005). Her forthcoming work on Lady

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[2] See Cobley 2008.

[3] November 9, 1920 – December 21, 2001.

Victoria Welby (Petrilli forthcoming 2009) is highly anticipated. In addition, she has co-authored several additional works on semiotics: (1) *Philosophy of Language: Art and Answerability in Mikhail Bakhtin* (Ponzio, Petrilli 2000), (2) *Thomas Sebeok and the Signs of Life* (Ponzio, Petrilli 2001), (3) *The Semiotic Animal* (Deely, Petrilli, Ponzio 2005), (4) *Reasoning with Emmanuel Levinas* (Ponzio, Petrilli, Ponzio 2005), and (5) *Semiotics Today: From Global Semiotics to Semioethics* (Petrilli, Ponzio 2007).

Special mention is reserved for Professor Petrilli's recent book entitled *Semiotics Unbounded: Interpretive Routes through the Open Network of Signs*, co-authored with Professor Augusto Ponzio (Petrilli, Ponzio 2005), and reviewed by various scholars in the distinguished journal *Semiotica* (2008, volume 169(1/4): 223-360). This momentous volume is the second book ever to receive multiple reviews in that esteemed journal[4] (nine in all by Ted Baenziger, Jeff Bernard, Paul Cobley, Vincent Colapietro, Floyd Merrell, Hisashi Muroi, József Nagy, Winfried Nöth, and Frank Nuessel). As Editor-in-Chief of *Semiotica*, Marcel Danesi explains "[…] *Semotics Unbounded* fits into the tradition of key paradigmatic texts that require the attention of one and all" (Danesi 2008: 221). About this fact, there is no dispute.

Professor Petrilli's translations into Italian of many of Dr. Thomas A. Sebeok's influential works in semiotics merit mention here. They include *The Sign and Its Masters* (Sebeok 1985), *I Think I Am a Verb* (Sebeok 1990), *Semiotics in the United States* (Sebeok 1992), *A Sign Is Just a Sign* (Sebeok 1998), and *Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics* (Sebeok 2003).

The American Journal of Semiotics

For the first time in the history of the Thomas A. Sebeok Fellowship, a special issue of *The American Journal of Semiotics* (volume 24(4), 2008) entitled "Sign Crossroads in Global Perspective. Essays by Susan Petrilli 7th SSA Sebeok Fellow" was made available for members in attendance at the annual SSA meeting. This issue contains the following all new essays by Professor Petrilli:

1. "Semioethics and responsibility: Beyond specialisms, universalisms and humanisms" (pp. 1–48).
2. "Working with interpreters of the 'Meaning of Meaning': International trends among 20th-century sign theorists" (pp. 49–88).
3. "The relation with Morris in Rossi-Landi's and Sebeok's approach to signs" (pp. 89–121).

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[4]   The first being Jesper Hoffmeyer's *Signs of Meaning in the Universe*, reviewed in the special issue of *Semiotica* 120(3/4), 1998.

4. "Iconicity and the origin of language: Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) and Giorgio Fano (1885–1963)" (pp. 123–136) [This work is a revision of the Introduction for the English translation of Fano (1973) by Petrilli (1992).].
5. "Bodies and signs: For a typology of semiosic materiality" (pp. 137–158).
6. "Semiotic phenomenology of predicative judgement" (pp. 159–192) [This is a substantial revision of an earlier work by Petrilli (1999).].
7. "On communication: Contributions to the human sciences and to humanism from semiotics understood as semioethics" (pp. 193–236).
8. "Iconicity in translation: On similarity, alterity, and dialogism in the relation among signs" (pp. 237–302).

The articles in this special issue of *The American Journal of Semiotics* are representative of the various domains of semiotics in which Professor Petrilli works: (1) semioethics; (2) sign theory and semiosis; (3) iconicity and the origins of language; (4) semiotic materiality; (5) biosemiotics; (6) translation; (7) Lady Victoria Welby (1837–1912).

The final two pages (pp. 303–304) in *The American Journal of Semiotics* volume 24(4) contain information about the author. While these two pages suggest the extensive scope of Professor Petrilli's remarkable academic scholarship, they are, to be sure, incomplete. For a complete enumeration of Professor Petrilli's scholarly activity to date, the home page of her web site[5] provides more information about her extraordinary work and achievements, including a listing of 31 books authored, co-authored, edited and co-edited since 1988, and 243 articles published since 1981.

Editorial boards and related matters

Professor Petrilli serves as a member on editorial boards of some of the most esteemed journals in the field of semiotics today, namely, *Semiotica* (Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies), *TTR, Traduction, Terminologie, Redaction. Études sur le texte et ses transformations, Journal of Biosemiotics, Russian Journal of Communication, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law*, and *Signs* (International Journal of Semiotics). She is also a Co-Director of several book series including the following: (1) *Nel segno* (with Augusto Ponzio; (2) *Gli strumenti* (with Augusto Ponzio and Patrizia Calefato); (3) *Di-segno-in-segno* (with Augusto Ponzio and Cosimo Caputo); and (4) *Segni-di-segni* (with Augusto Ponzio and Cosimo Caputo).

She has been a Fellow of the International Communicology Institute, and an international visiting research scholar in the University of Adelaide, Australia and the Hawke Institute for Sustainable Societies, the University of South Australia.

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[5]   At http://susanpetrilli.com/.

Previous Sebeok Fellows

Dr. Petrilli joins an illustrious group of previous recipients of the prestigious Thomas A. Sebeok Fellow Award (see Deely 2005: 478–479 for more details about the previous recipients of this award, the sites of the Semiotic Society of America meeting, and the titles of the Sebeok Fellow Presentation), namely, (1) David Savan (posthumous award 1992); John Deely (1993); (3) Paul Bouissac (1996); (4) Jesper Hoffmeyer (2000); (5) Kalevi Kull (2003); and (6) Floyd Merrell (2005).

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Humanities: State and prospects

Winfried Nöth,[1] *Eero Tarasti,*[2] *Marek Tamm*[3]

The developments in the humanities over the recent years could be characterised by the following three tendencies: florescence of methodological "turns", increasing importance of interdisciplinarity, and extensive travelling of concepts. Looking at the list of titles of the books and articles produced in humanistic and social disciplines over the recent years one is led to believe that we are living in a time of "turns". New methodological turns are announced time and again, for instance, most recently, the performative turn, the spatial turn, and the iconic turn. Although each of these turns was first announced within a particular discipline, the ambition has usually been greater, proclaiming changes in the humanistic and social sciences in general. Evidently, scholars are eager to find methodological platforms to bridge the current classifications of sciences and to create new interdisciplinary fields of research. Clifford Geertz has aptly termed the process "blurring of genres". As has been argued by Mieke Bal, interdisciplinarity in the humanities mainly relies on concepts. Progress in the humanities means, first and foremost, emergence of new concepts and change or expansion of the semantic space of the old ones. The last few years indeed appear to have been the heyday for travelling concepts.

In order to give a survey of the new "turns", emergent interdisciplines and travelling concepts in the humanities, Estonian academic journal *Keel ja Kirjandus* ("Language and Literature") recently published a special issue on "Humanities: States and Prospects". The editor of the special issue, Marek Tamm, also interviewed at this occasion several internationally renowned

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scholars about the recent trends and future perspectives in the humanities. The responses from two of them follow below.[4]

M.T.: *How do you evaluate the developments in the humanities during the couple of recent decades? In your mind, what have been the most important trends, changes and achievements?*

W. N.: The decades towards the turn of the millennium have brought an increasing number of mostly self-proclaimed epochal turns in the humanities. After the "linguistic turn" in philosophy, we have seen the "semiotic turn" in linguistics, the "cognitive turn" in psychology, the "pictorial turn" in media studies, the "iconic turn" in aesthetics, the "cultural turn" in literary studies, and the "performative turn" in cultural studies. More recently, with the advent of posthumanism, the foundations of the humanities themselves seem to have suffered a deadly blow from which recuperation appears more than difficult. Is this zigzag course of successive changes of direction the symptom of a growing disorientation in the humanities, or is it nothing but the mere rhetorical gesture of scholars in defence of their own positions in the territory of humanistic studies?

Despite their apparent divergences, the various recent and current turns in the humanities have two directions in common, the first forward towards new intellectual horizons in a field of study felt to have become too narrow, the second looping back towards the humanities themselves in self-reflexive reconsideration of their own foundations which appeared necessary with each of the new changes of direction. At the turn of the millennium, the expansion of its horizons continues to be a challenge to the humanities. The growth of its domain certainly continues to be impressive, but in the wake of postmodernism, it seems that the most significant direction in the development of humanist studies is the one towards the self-reflexivity which lies in the relation of humanism and its object of study, which includes the humanities themselves.

The self-referential loop which has become a current design feature of the humanities is the sign of a paradigm shift from modernism to postmodernism in the course of which we have abandoned the modernist hubris of the once cherished view that the language of the humanist is a metalanguage speaking above, and aloof from, the objects which it seeks to investigate. In the first decades of the 20th century, for example, semiotics, the study of signs in culture and nature, confidently presented itself as the metalanguage of language, a system of metasigns serving as an instrument in the study of signs, and later, as the metamedium for revealing the deceptive strategies of the media. Today, we know that metasigns are nothing but signs, too, and the

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[4]   The earlier Estonian version has been published in *Keel ja Kirjandus* 8/9 (2008), pp. 740–743 and 744–746.

media are not the metalanguage of everyday language and discourse but represent a world which is in itself highly mediated before and while it is mediating in the media.

Representation appears hence to be impossible without self-referential loops in which signs are signs about signs, communication is communication about communication, reports are reports about reports, and mediations are mediations of mediations. In times which have lost their confidence in the grand narratives because everything seems to have been said before, the humanities have turned towards the signs which they once considered to be their instruments of reflection and which they now have discovered to be autonomous mediators of their own mediality. With this new turn, the humanities have gained the insight that the self-referential nature of their reflections does not mean a *circulus vitiosus* but a *circulus virtuosus*, in which the humanist is turning towards the humanities.

E.T.: It seems to me that unfortunately the humanities have been to a great extent loosing their former position as the cornerstone of European academic culture. Less and less universities seem to believe and invest in the idea of 'culture', *Bildung, sivistys*, as such. It is paradoxical that a discipline like semiotics has also accelerated this development. When it was launched as a new science in the 1960s it had a two-fold impact on high and popular culture. High culture was studied with 'modern' and 'efficient' approaches, such as cybernetics, information science, computer studies, formal logic, structural linguistics, and by this means their privileged status was questioned: art and high cultural objects were shown to function according to the same principles as any cultural 'text'. Particularly French structuralist and post-structuralist semiotics were iconoclast by their orientation.

At the same time, popular culture was taken up as a topic of academic discussion by these rigorous methods and thus elevated phenomena to a position of an esteemed object of research that had earlier been considered inappropriate as a topic of the humanities. We can say that high culture lost and popular culture won.

However, new orientations in epistemology, such as phenomenology and hermeneutics, have animated qualitative studies by taking into account how culture appears experienced by a subject. Value aspects, the axiological and ideological nature that are in the core of any humanist approach, have remained topical amidst the age of behaviourism and the natural sciences. It was Kierkegaard who said that the subjective and objective never meet. The same was said as early as by the logical empiricists when they showed, at the beginning of the twentieth century, that phi-phenomena cannot be reduced into ph-phenomena, i.e., to physical entities, and yet people seem to believe in the determinist models of wrongly understood natural sciences. The radical essence of the biosemiotics of the Uexkülls has been that man's symbolic, signifying activities are not reducible to biology — as it has been in

sociobiology — but that, quite the reverse, all biological and organic processes are processes of semiosis.

M.T.: *In which direction, from your point of view, are the humanities heading at present? What are the greatest challenges, the most promising perspectives, as well as the most serious problems a scholar in humanities faces in our time?*

W. N.: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault are among the anti-humanists who have proclaimed the end of humanism. Ever since then, the humanities have been pressed towards a position of defense. As the end of humanism continues to be affirmed, the neo-humanists proclaim the return of a renewed humanism. The most recent challenge to the humanist doctrine of the autonomy and freedom of the human mind is the vision of a posthuman world in which humans may no longer be the masters but might become the slaves of those intelligent machines which they once devised as their instruments of rational thought and labor.

While the posthumanists offer evidence of the growth of intelligence in complex systems and the likelihood of a future emergence of complex machines with a growing autonomy from human control and support, the humanists hasten to object that machines will never be able to feel or think since they lack autonomy, rationality, creativity, intentionality, self-referentiality, and consciousness. At the root of the humanistic objections and the dualistic views of humans and machines is the conviction of a gaping abyss between mind and matter.

What is missing in the ongoing debate is an evolutionary semiotic perspective to overcome the dualistic dilemma between the allegedly semiotic mind and the nonsemiotic material world, a broader view of the cultural semiosphere which extends beyond the sphere of the living. — With the advent of biosemiotics in the last decades of the twentieth century, the study of signs had expanded from the domain of culture to the one of semiosis in nature. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has become evident that further expansions are needed.

Intelligent machines are machines involved in sign processes. Are they true sign machines or mere instruments of human agents who use them for purposes of their own? The answer to this question is neither a yes nor a no; it is rather a matter of degree whether machines are involved in sign processes or not. In the study of signs in lifeless but intelligent machines, an important insight can be derived from C. S. Peirce: the sphere of signs is not only a sphere of autonomous living beings producing and interpreting signs. Instead, signs have a semiotic autonomy of their own; by no means are they mere instruments of autonomously acting sign users. The autonomy apparent in the life of signs which restricts the semiotic choices of those who make use of them is perhaps best described by Peirce's insight formulated in 1886: not

only sign producers but also the signs themselves are the educators of mankind.

Sign machines generate complex signs by means of mechanical devices. If signs evince a semiotic autonomy independently of the way of their production, machines can certainly be said to produce signs. The insight that signs have a life of their own and evince an autonomy in the semiosphere of the products of the human mind outside the human brain is quite compatible with the more recent notion of the "extended mind", according to which the human mind is not merely localized in the confines of the human brain but also extends over its projections into its material environment. Our mind includes its manifestations in its external semiosphere, from personal notes to libraries and data banks. The degree to which the signs mediated by machines evince an autonomy of their own is quite obvious from the way in which computer assistance is transforming our individual ways of writing and methods of research. The medium of the sign machine conveys a message of its own, the sign machine is not merely an instrument of the writer; it turns out to be the co-author of our writing processes.

On the other hand, we have also learned from Peirce as well as from Bakhtin that semiosis is a dialogical process. Our thoughts are addressed to other thoughts of our own, and our reasoning is the dialogical exchange of arguments among the several selves which constitute our mind. Will intelligent machines once be designed to perform inner dialogues of conflicting selves, which are not only symptoms of genuine creativity but also of self-doubt?

E.T.: The challenge of the humanities is simply how they can survive at all in the globalized world exclusively dominated by values of efficiency and economy. Only those disciplines seem to have chance which can make their results into marketed products for consumption. The university studies in the EU after Bologna aim at short and efficient studies preparing for certain clear-cut jobs in labour market, at the least possible costs. The university as a place of growth, deeper understanding of life, a universe of maturing, letting young people reflect on their aims, try and err, search for the values of their future life, a place in which they could follow the principle once expressed by a University rector in the words "Follow your passion — and furnish your mind", seems to be disappearing. Let me say that I am not worried about my own special field, which is music and musicology, since the more there is leisure time in society, the more music is filling it almost like a new religion, as a source of depth and signification of life. Thus music has markets, and musicologists have work. But in general, the idea that universities are all privatized and essentially funded by businessmen seems to be unrealistic at least on the European scale.

The newest fashion in science politics it to establish richly funded so-called 'innovation universities' all over the world designed to do nothing but

subordinate research for commercial use and for the needs of business life, thus narrowing the chances for serious basic research aiming at true scientific innovations.

Who would have an interest in funding studies about notions such as transcendence, existentiality, modal structures of signs etc.? One factor which may be a force of resistance are national cultures, which some decades ago were still generally considered something of the backward past, but which now seem to be one of the strongest interests to support the humanities. Anything concerning the national heritage or *patrimoine*, as they say in the Mediterranean culture, has always a 'social order'. Hence, the historical sciences seem to have a future.

On the other hand, in the contemporary world, the idea of national culture seems to have changed to the one of 'picturesque regional qualities' to be enjoyed as tourism. Last autumn, I visited Moldavia in Rumania, and saw how the main means of transportation were still horses and charts. However, I must say: wait for some years, and the same peasants will be hired to 'act' as peasants for tourists and that will be their major source of income; i.e., such humanities whose applications can be made a spectacle, for neo-oral culture, are kept alive.

However, my favourite concept in the more radical semiotics stems from the Southern Italian philosopher Augusto Ponzio, who speaks about *diritto di infunzionalità*, i.e., the right to dysfunctionality. Such a quietist principle has its roots both in European thought and in American transcendentalism and via those in modern ecological humanism.

One danger in the modern world of communication — which we semioticians have also been creating, sad to say — is that the symbol of humanist culture, the 'book', is loosing its position. Books are being less and less published, and young people read only the Internet and the Wikipedia. Of course, culture does not stem from reading as such but from thinking of what has been read. Yet if the discourse we are maintaining via books of our past and other cultures disappeared one would be close to the end of the humanities. Quite concretely, some years ago the bookstore of *Presses Universitaires de France* at *Place de la Sorbonne* in Paris, symbol of humanist research with books about everything, vanished and gave place for a fashion store for American-type youth culture. No one could prevent this from happening.

....*aber nicht diese Töne*... However, let us also see the positive aspects, the search for meaning and signification for one's life, the joy of becoming more and more competent through education. We are all perpetual students, we who try to be humanists. Modern techno-semiotic society also provides us with unbelievably efficient means for this endeavour as well as for cross-cultural understanding.

Semiotics of translation

Theoretical semiotics

Reviews and Notes