ELITE MYTHMAKING ON THE RUN: THE CASE OF WORLD WAR TWO NARRATIVE IN MODERN UKRAINE

MA thesis

Supervisor: Heiko Pääbo, PhD

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I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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Andrii Nekoliak

ABSTRACT

The thesis inquires into governmental memory politics in Ukraine in the aftermath of Euromaidan protests focusing on the representation of the Second World War. At the theoretical level, the thesis has scrutinized concepts pertaining to studies in memory politics: political memory, memory agents, elite-mythmaking, and narratives. It also conceptualized the European discourses on the Second World War in order to evaluate newly forged Ukrainian narrative on WW2 in their light. At the analysis level, the thesis both scrutinized official legislative and administrative measures pertaining to WW2 remembrance as well as applied narrative analysis to the case of newly introduced narrative about the Ukrainians in WW2 by developing a set of narrative analysis categories. As the thesis argues, elite-mythmaking selectively ‘Europeanizes’ Ukrainian representation of WW2 while the narrative follows the essential characteristics of the Eastern Central European (ECE) historical narrative about the Second World War.
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Introduction

Remembrance of World War Two and issues pertaining to the representation of wartime past constitute a salient facet of political dynamics in the Eastern Europe. In fact, the narration of the past and interpretations of wartime events are often in a spotlight of political developments domestically and fierce ‘memory wars’ internationally (Blacker et al., 2013). The representation of the past is a hostage to memory politics and is constitutive to how modern societies not only frame the past per se, but also how they build up identities of the communities in the present.

Political developments in post-2014 Ukraine have placed a new importance on official governmental memory politics around remembrance of the Second World War (WW2). The representation of the past fell under unprecedented legislative and administrative scrutiny of political elites (memory agents) on how to commemorate and narrate the past. The aim of this thesis is to investigate this recent memory politics insurgency by outlining its main legislative, administrative, commemorative facets on the one hand and inquiring into what political elites communicate about WW2 in the content of this narrative on the other. The puzzle to investigate is whether the memory politics regarding WW2 in modern Ukraine may be called ‘European’ according to both what this politics installs in official public remembrance and what political elites communicate about the war themselves.

On the conceptual level, the thesis seeks to illustrate the conceptual argument that political elites engage in elite-mythmaking and narrative construction to install preferable representation of the past on the case of WW2 remembrance in modern Ukraine. Also, it conceptualizes the European discourses on WW2 in order to evaluate the newly forged Ukrainian narrative in their light thereafter. Thus, building on existing memory politics and narrative construction scholarship, the thesis scrutinizes both the memory agents’ mythmaking measures (political memory construction) and what these agents communicate about the Ukrainians in WW2 (narrative construction).

Against the backdrop of stated by the memory agents ‘Europeaness’ of new WW2 representation, this thesis investigates political memory construction and newly proposed narrative about the Ukrainians in WW2. Specifically, it tries to find out whether elite-mythmaking ‘Europeanizes’ Ukraine’s representation of the past and whether the narrative can be called ‘European’ or ‘Europeanized’ historical narrative on WW2. Additionally, in terms of practical relevance, the thesis’s aspiration is to contemplate about compatibility
of elite-mythmaking with Ukraine’s goal towards a pluralistic society stated by the champions of Euromaidan protests.

On the empirical level, the thesis engages in narrative analysis of the texts disseminated by the memory agents according to a set of developed analytical categories: antagonist and protagonist; key events; narrative’s character and narrative’s plot. The thesis uses the premises of structural and thematic narrative analysis in order to focus on both content and story-telling characteristics of the narrative and get comprehensive understanding of the relationships between its parts (antagonist v protagonist, key events and their place in the narrative, the abstract ‘plot’ relating the other parts). Further, the President, the Parliament and the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance are the main governmental ‘stakeholders’ over the representation and narration of WW2 in Ukraine. Thus, the narrative data analyzed includes presidential speeches, the remembrance institute’s books and video-materials as well as verbatim reports of the parliamentary sessions amounting to 39 texts and 19 video-clips. The collected texts were published or presented in 2014-2017 and intended to reflect post-Euromaidan memory politics. One limitation should be stressed. The analysis did not include texts pertaining to May 8 and 9 commemorations in 2017 due to time limits to complete the thesis on time.

The thesis has four chapters. The first chapter scrutinizes four main concepts: political memory, memory agents, elite-mythmaking and narratives. The second chapter conceptualizes the European discourses on WW2 as well as discusses trajectories of memory politics in Ukraine and the saliency of post-2014 memory politics in comparison to the two post-Soviet decades (1990s-2000s) based on scholarly literature over the issues. It also contains the core thesis pertaining to elite-mythmaking in modern Ukraine. The third chapter elaborates on narrative analysis as a research agenda, outlines analysis categories and speaks about narrative data analyzed in the thesis in more detail. Finally, the fourth chapter proceeds with the analysis of the narrative, discusses the findings and wraps up the elite-mythmaking argument.
1. Introducing the framework: Political memory and elite mythmaking

Emerging after the break-up of the Soviet Union successors states have found themselves in circumstances of post-imperial nation-building (Pääbo, 2011, p. 10-11). In the field of collective memory construction, new political realities allowed the Soviet successor states to narrate their own past in ways considerably different from previously official history (Blacker et al., 2013, p. 3-5). Collective memory and narration of the past are no longer subjects of state-driven suppression and omissions (ibid.). In fact, as Kuzio argues, the mentioned states are ‘re-claiming the past from the framework imposed by the former imperial core and thereby creating, or reviving, a national historiography that helps to consolidate the new national state.’ (Kuzio, 2002, p. 241)

The following chapter explores the main concepts for the Master’s thesis. It utilizes scholarships on political memory, memory agents, elite mythmaking and narratives. The goal behind such theorizing is to show that political elites mediate, exploit and institutionalize preferable representation of the past through particular historical narratives.

1.1. Political memory

The notion of collective memory was originally coined by Maurice Halbwachs in 1925 (Olick, 1992, p. 334). Halbwachs was the first to think of memory and remembrance as a social phenomena possible under social context of a group or, in Halbwachs’s words, ‘social frameworks’ (see Olick, 1992, p. 334-336). His theorizing lays in the foundations of nearly every modern account on social memory. For instance, Crenzel and Allier-Montano state their preference to Halbwachs’s approach by arguing that ‘individuals remember in their capacity as members of spatially defined and temporally situated groups that give meaning to individual experiences through specific frameworks’ (Crenzel and Allier-Montano, 2015, p. 2). Similarly, Misztal speaks about the individual act of remembering as socially and culturally conditioned. Remembering is ‘being constructed from cultural forms and constrained by our social context’ (Misztal, 2003, p. 11). Therefore, collective memory as such is ‘the integration of various different personal pasts into a single common past that all members of community come to remember collectively’ (ibid., p. 11). Memory is shared with other members of a group (intersubjective) through various cultural practices and communicated in various cultural forms (institutions and artifacts) (ibid., p. 12-13).
Aleida Assmann has advanced the conceptualization of collective memory further differentiating between its sub-types and introducing the notion of political memory.

The concept of political memory refers to ‘collective units’ such as nations and states in their effort to validate political actions or influence identity formation (A. Assmann, 2004, p. 25). A. Assmann differentiates collective memory on sub-types and positions political memory between social memory, which unites members of one generation, and cultural memory as an inactive (‘archival’) phenomenon (ibid., p. 25, 31-32).

On the one hand, political memory is distinct from social memory because it is intergenerational – political memory is transmitted between generations while social memory is not (ibid., p. 25). Moreover, political memory is inherently a ‘top-down’ phenomenon meaning that certain agents establish and uphold it in contrast to ‘bottom-up’ social memory (ibid.). On the other hand, political memory has an audience. Political memory expresses itself through a narrative, which constructs a coherent and emotionally compelling story of glorification or victimization, and is embedded in ‘material and visual’ as well as ‘performative’ (commemorative) representations (ibid., p. 26). These representations include symbols and texts, images and places, rites, commemoration ceremonies and monuments (ibid., p. 26; A. Assmann, 2008b, p. 55-56). At the same time, cultural memory refers not only to signs and artifacts, which are publicly circulated with attached meanings to them, but also to the ones that are not communicated or attended. In other words, political memory is always an ‘active’ one, whereas cultural memory exists in an inactive, or ‘archival’, form as well (A. Assmann, 2004, p. 31).

A. Assmann speaks elsewhere about active and inactive cultural memory by introducing the concept of canon and archive (2008a, p. 97-98). The former pertains to publicly communicated memory within a society, while the latter indicates a ‘passively stored’ memory of the past (ibid., 98). These categories encompass dynamics of remembering and forgetting inherent for cultural memory as a whole.

As a continuation of A. Assmann’s reasoning, Pääbo emphasizes the involvement of political power in his conceptualization. He defines cultural memory as a ‘top-down political memory related to power and constructed mainly by leaders of groups’ (Pääbo, 2011, p. 12). In other words, conceptual boundaries of cultural memory coincide with those of political as far as power relations penetrate what and how social groups remember. This indicates construction and installation of political memory from above.
Similarly, Jan Assmann also links political memory to power. In his view, political memory derives from ‘political organization that institutes it’ (J. Assmann, 2010, p. 122). The link of political memory to particular polity broadly speaking distinguishes it from other types of cultural memory. Although J. Assmann does not aim to define political organization in the text he gives examples of Nazi Germany and the French Republic as correspondent political organizations of particular political memories (ibid.).

Relation of political memory to power ultimately means that the former can change. Political memory is malleable to re-framing and depends on the broader context of political developments. In particular, political regime change contributes to how the past is communicated and framed.

Allier-Montano and Crenzel (eds., 2015) explore the relationship between regime change and social memory in a comprehensive case study on political violence remembrance in Latin America. According to the authors, renegotiating the meaning of the past events of violence has occurred as result of political transition in the region (2015, p. 10-11). This process manifests itself not only in creation of new narratives of ‘public truth’ about the experiences of mass political repression, exclusion and violence, but also in creation of new memory sites, circulation of documents and testimonies of the victims (ibid., p. 11). Those, to use A. Assmann’s vocabulary, material and performative signs and artifacts install new elements into political memories of post-dictatorial Latin American societies.

Furthermore, Assmann and Shortt (eds., 2012) argue about the dynamic and changing nature of memory as well. Representation of the past is mediated under a particular ‘cultural frame and political constellation’ (Assmann and Shortt, 2012, p. 3). In this relation, political regime change alters existing political constellations and establishes a competing set of value orientations in politics and society; regime change informs re-framing of political memory in public space by renaming streets and installing new commemorative events for instance (ibid., p. 7).

Drawing from outlined scholarly literature, it is possible to conclude that political memory refers to the collectively remembered past by large social groups that involve political organization or a political regime’s agency in its construction and communication. Political memory is publicly communicated through various material (texts, symbols, memorial sites) and commemorative representations. Those cultural forms usually embody a narrative of the national past, which has specific nation-glorifying or nation-victimizing
character. Finally, political developments, and political regime change in particular, inform reconstruction of political memory.

1.2. Memory agents

It is possible to distinguish several attempts to conceptualize actors of ‘memory work’ (memory agents) in scholarly literature. These attempts stem from different sub-fields of social and political sciences.

Cultural trauma theory advanced by Alexander (2004) outlines the process of cultural trauma formation involving important social actors as its agents. In cultural trauma construction, social groups or collectivities are seen as makers of solidarity pertaining to previously experienced suffering by members of collectivity (Alexander, 2004, p. 1). Traumatized groups seek representation by referring to harmful social processes or events that had affected their members (ibid., p. 11). Alexander uses the notion of ‘carrier groups’ to describe collectivities in their efforts to gain symbolic representation and recognition. In other words, carrier groups are the agents of cultural trauma construction from behalf of collectivities:

“Carrier groups may be elites, but they may also be denigrated and marginalized classes. They may be prestigious religious leaders or groups whom the majority has designated as spiritual pariahs. A carrier group can be generational, representing the perspectives and interests of a younger generation against the older one.” (ibid., p. 11)

Alexander takes a broad approach to defining memory agents of cultural trauma construction. The definition proposes an open-ended list of entities that can be carrier groups depending on particular societal context and usually including various religious, national, institutional actors. Nevertheless, the most important characteristics of carrier groups are that they articulate cultural trauma, have a place in the social structure of society, and possess resources to pursue acknowledgment (ibid.).

The other attempt to conceptualize memory agents comes from ‘memory games’ scholarship. The scholarship seeks to conceptualize ‘political uses of memory’ by various societal and political actors. In the most succinct manner, the ‘memory games’ argument holds that memory agents engage different ‘historicising strategies’ in order to use representations of the past for partisan political ends (Mink, 2008; Mink and Neumayer, 2013). Memory games are:
'the various ways by which political and social actors perceive and relate historical events, according to the identities they construct, the interests they defend and the strategies they devise to defend, maintain and improve their position in society' (Mink and Neumayer, 2013, p. 4-5)

Who are the actors of memory games? Mink refers to actors broadly as ‘various interest groups, political parties, or states’ (Mink, 2008, p. 469) ranging from ‘party leaders and activists’ to ‘elected officials (including members of parliament), journalists and judges’ (ibid., p. 478). Importantly, ‘militant historians’ constitute a separate subgroup according to Mink. These are professional historians, who use their expert status and, often working in governmental remembrance institutes, possess institutional resources to engage in partisan politics (ibid., p. 478, 486-487). In their other work, Mink and Neumayer (2013) differentiate actors of memory games further in a three-fold classification. Thus, institutional actors encompass the governments, political parties, and incumbents of public offices; ‘mobilized social groups’ refer to organized groups of former prisoners, ‘groups making pilgrimages to battlefields or martyrdom sites’; and, finally, professional groups of historians or journalists constitute the last layer of memory games’ actors (Mink and Neumayer, 2013, p. 5).

What unites the various actors involved in memory games is their willingness to use representations of the past for political agenda goals, may that be getting electoral support, obstructing political counterparts, or strengthening networks of supporters (Mink, 2008, p. 472, 474, 476). Overall, memory actors take a stance regarding and using representations of the past as a part of their agenda. Mink points out the need for pursuing a reconciliatory agenda in the case of conflict-laden past at the all-European level or, in other words, mitigate harmful memory games. He argues in favor of a positive mnemonic agenda, in which various memory agents would engage in ‘developing memory resources and incorporating historicising strategies into their action repertoires, the aim being to ‘recycle’ representations of ‘painful’ pasts in current political issues and contests’ (ibid., p. 488)

Scholarship on commemorative practices provides another insight on memory agency. For instance, Yurchuk focuses on memory agents from the perspective of commemorative practices in modern Ukraine. In a study on the nationalist underground remembrance and monuments building, the author speaks about ‘memory actors’ or ‘memory entrepreneurs’ as agents ‘who reinforce memory work’ on the ground (Yurchuk, 2014, p. 8). Yurchuk understands memory entrepreneurs as ‘people, interest groups,
organizations and institutions which directly and strategically take some actions towards influencing the way the OUN and UPA are remembered (ibid., 18-19). Her particular interest is in ‘who initiated the idea of the monument, who made decisions on its construction, and why it was built in a particular place at exactly that moment in time’ (ibid., p. 8). This approach helps to digest how and why various memory entrepreneurs (members of local and regional councils, the Orthodox Church clergy, activists and media) influence and frame construction of monuments commemorating the nationalist movement in Ukraine.

The most recent comprehensive attempt to outline who memory agents are and contextualize their ‘behavior’ belongs to Bernhard and Kubik (2014). Similarly to Mink, authors aim to conceptualize interplay between collective memory usage and politics. To do that, Bernhard and Kubik introduce an analytical framework that operates with the concepts of ‘mnemonic actor’ and ‘memory regime’.

Foremost, Bernhard and Kubik argue in favor the political science approach to memory studies with a focus on the ‘strategies that political actors employ to make others remember in certain, specific ways and the effects of such mnemonic manipulation’ (Bernhard and Kubik, 2014, p. 7). According to the authors, representation of the past in a particular society consists of a ‘set of discourses about the past’, which is negotiated, articulated and accepted in a certain version by broader society (ibid., p. 9). This means that various social groups hold with particular ‘historical memory’ as a sum of versions of the past (ibid.).

Furthermore, historical memory is interrelated with politics and political power dynamics. In this relation, Bernhard and Kubik argue that political actors play their role in historical memory construction as far as it is ‘also subject to manipulation on the basis of the self-interest of those in power and those contesting power’ (ibid., p. 9).

Bernhard and Kubik consider individuals, parties, and organizations as mnemonic actors and distinguish between mnemonic warriors, mnemonic pluralist, mnemonic abnegators and mnemonic prospectives (ibid., p. 12-15). Each category reflects the stance (strategy) taken by an actor when engaging in historical memory construction. Mnemonic warriors propagate vision of the past, which is seen as only legitimate and non-negotiable, and take assertive stance against other actors in ‘protecting’ their ‘true’ vision (ibid., p. 12-

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1 OUN and UPA refers to the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army existed in 1930-1940s. See for more in Rudling (2011) and Katchanovski (2015)
13, 15). In the same time, pluralists allow accommodation of competing versions of the past in a society and prefer to engage in political dialogue over the past (ibid., p. 13, 15). Abnegators favor ‘mnemonic equilibrium’ and withdraw from politicizing historical issues (ibid., p. 14). And finally prospectives hold a directional view on historical issues and are interested in the past only to justify their politically oriented agenda of building a utopian future; they are futurists, who are disinterested in ‘defending’ a specific version of the past, but rather seek to justify their political agenda’s vision of the future by drawing from past historical experiences (ibid., p. 14, 15).

It is important to add that Bernhard and Kubik place specific emphasis on political actors as mnemonic actors who aim to construct official historical memory. In this relation, the authors note their interest in memory regimes ‘whose formulation and propagation involve the intensive participation of state institutions and/or political society (the authorities and major political actors such as parties, who are organized to hold and contest state power)’ (ibid., p. 16).

The notion of a memory agent has been explored in several case studies as well. These studies elucidate the role of memory agency in construction and representation of the past by focusing on particular societal contexts or cases.

Aguilar (1999) operates with the notion of ‘agents of memory’ to describe activities of disabled veterans’ organizations during and after the Spanish Civil War. According to Aguilar, veterans organizations had shaped different, usually competing narratives about their wartime experiences along the lines winners and losers of military conflict (1999, p. 102-103). However, created to mourn the seemingly unforgivable traumatic past and sustain their members in the first place, veteran organizations of former Republicans became involved in reconciliatory processes to varying degrees in post-Franco’s Spain (ibid.).

Further, Budryte (2014) speaks of female politicians as memory agents in the context of post-Soviet Lithuania. Political activism of female victims of the Soviet repressions aimed at communicating their traumatic past is the main characteristic for defining them as ‘agents of memory’ (see Budryte, 2014, p. 55-56). Again, in Budryte’s study, taking part in shaping collective memory about the past points at a memory agent. Budryte understands memory agents as ‘active social and political groups, who may or may not be in opposition to the ruling elite’ but driven with a goal to ‘obtain greater currency for their version of memory’ (Budryte, 2014, p. 58).
Finally, Pietraszewski and Törnquist-Plewa (2016) relate memory agents to memory narrative construction in a recent study on Wroclaw’s memory politics. Authors distinguish macro, meso, micro agents of memory acting to shift politics of memory at the local level. The European Union is an ‘institutional, supranational, transcultural agent of memory, which influences the local agents of memory in Wroclaw’ (Pietraszewski and Törnquist-Plewa, 2016, p. 41) primarily by pursuing agenda of multiculturalism and providing financial support to local memory agents. Meso and micro-level agents presented by national political and intellectual elites and local inhabitants respectively (ibid.). The underlying characteristic of memory agents in a study is that they all take part in the construction of memory narrative about Wroclaw’s past.

To sum up this section, the term memory agent commonly refers to a range of societal and political actors involved in collective (political) memory construction. Memory agents do have an agenda related to using representation of the past in partisan politics (‘historicising strategies’, ‘political uses of memory’), articulating specific historical experiences of a group, or in another feasible way relate themselves to collective (political) memory construction. Importantly, this thesis focuses on meso (national political elites) level of political memory construction in modern Ukraine.

Political elites represented by the governments, elected political incumbents and other state agents play a specific role as memory agents. The next section explores how and why political elites as memory agents engage in institutionalizing particular visions of the past. Defining their motives, strategies and tools will assist in clarifying and drawing conceptual boundaries of elite mythmaking as such.

1.3. Elite mythmaking

Why do political elites engage into political memory construction? Political elites usually want to strengthen a groups’ identity, legitimize their policies and rule overall, or instrumentally use representations of the past to gain affective popular support (patriotism and loyalty).

From the nation-building standpoint, political rulers want to make sense of the past, find and ground origins of the ruled community. ‘Collective identities,’ as Misztal puts it, ‘are seen as implying notions of group boundedness and homogeneity, and an emotional sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded group, involving both a felt solidarity with fellow group members and a felt difference from outsiders.’ (Misztal, 2003, p. 133).
According to Misztal, memory facilitates groups’ solidarity and feeling of belonging (ibid., p. 132-135)

Furthermore, Pääbo also links memory construction to the necessities of nation-building and argues that nations structure and internalize ‘national history’ in the form of national master narratives (Pääbo, 2011, 43-52). In this light, ‘every nation-state has its commonly shared ideological understandings of national past, which defines the framework that nationally conscious individuals identify with’ (ibid., p. 45). Political elites, thus, are seen as agents of national ‘myths’ (narratives) production in the context of nation-states consolidation (ibid., p. 46, 52). For Pääbo, national master narratives legitimize and strengthen national identity foremost (ibid., p. 46-47). They help to make sense of the past for the emerging national community.

From an international relations point of view, political elites want not only to provide greater currency of national identity, but also legitimize their policy-making. ‘Mnemonic legitimation’ is a term used by Müller (2004, p. 26) to refer to transmitting of legitimacy on foreign policy. On the one hand, political elites use representations of the past for drawing ‘historical analogies’ manually in day-to-day decision-making (Müller, 2004, p. 27). On the other, installed version of national memory itself informs the freedom to decide and conduct state policy. As Müller notes in this relation (ibid., p. 26), it ‘symbolically structures the political claim-making which is always both strategic and constitutive of politics, and effectively operates as a constraint in any given political culture by both proscribing and prescribing certain claims’. Therefore, memory influences states’ behavior internationally. Müller elaborates on the role of national memory in international relations further by stating ‘the point is that states react to shifts in the balance of power and the evolution of international institutions in ways which have been shaped by political culture – and memory in particular’ (ibid., p. 29).

Recent International Relations (IR) scholarship explores the nexus between memory and foreign policy further. The arguments hold that representation of the past embedded in ‘stories that states tell of themselves’ transcends into foreign policy making (Subotic, 2016) or that states want to address the issue of their ‘mnemonical security’ by legislating public remembrance (Mälksoo, 2015). In any case, political elites utilize representations of the past not only for domestic identity-building, but also to address political issues internationally.
Subotic (2016) advances the argument that political elites address challenges on international arena by selectively employing, re-activating or de-activating, narratives about the past and their elements. Subotic conceptualizes shared collective memory as embedded in the ‘state narrative’. In this framework, historical experiences provide a ground for shaping state narrative by political elites in order to address challenging issues. Subotic argues that ‘groups need a narrative, a compelling story of where did “we” come from, how did we come to be who we are, what brings us together in a group, what purpose and aspirations does our group have’ (Subotic, 2016, p. 612). Thus, the state narrative is a coherent story of national past that helps to assess current foreign policy issues, strategic threats, and make policy choices (ibid., p. 612-613). Next, when facing drastic political challenge or insecurity, political elites tend to manipulate that ‘autobiographical’ state narrative to address the tension:

“... narratives are selectively activated to provide a cognitive bridge between policy change that resolves the physical security challenge (for example secession of territory), while also preserving state ontological security through providing autobiographical continuity, a sense of routine, and calm.” (ibid., p. 611)

Mälksoo (2015) introduces the notion of ‘mnemonical security’ as sub-layer of ontological security paradigm in IR. Her argument holds that states address the sense of ‘ontological anxiety’ (2015, p. 226) by legislating historical remembrance practices (ibid., p. 222-223). For Mälksoo, national memory is the ‘backbone’ to a state’s narrative about itself, which is crucial for understanding behavior of particular states in international affairs (ibid., p. 224). In Mälksoo’s framework, ‘mnemonical security’ refers to the ‘idea that distinct understanding of the past should be fixed in public remembrance and consciousness in order to buttress an actor’s stable sense of self as the basis of its political agency’ (ibid., p. 222). However, after legislating a particular vision of the past, political elites are trapped in the need to re-affirm that version of it. In the case of conflict-laden pasts or mutually shared historical events shared between neighboring states, legislating remembrance inevitably spins insecurity further. As Mälksoo states, ‘the securitization of “memory” as the temporal core of a state’s biographical narrative leads eventually to new security dilemmas’ that in turn causes a ‘reduced sense of security among the competitive securitizers of issues of public remembrance in international politics’ (ibid., p. 222).

Finally, the last explanation for why political elites engage in political memory construction is the need for affective public support usually associated with notions of patriotism and loyalty. In this relation, Yinan He argues that constructing myths about the
past is instrumental, a manipulative tool of the ruling elites to foster national cohesion and patriotism (He, 2007, p. 51, 60). Simultaneously, this helps to strengthen domestic legitimacy of the ruling regime (ibid., p. 51, 55). Also, Liñán (2010) highlights the same unifying and legitimizing effects of public propaganda of narrated by elites country’s history.

The remaining question to address in this section is how political elites engage into political memory articulation and institutionalization. Essentially, answering this question will help to give meaning to the concept of *elite mythmaking*.

Miller (2012) approaches ‘the politicization of history’ as a part of theorizing ‘historical politics’. According to Miller, in the context of political pluralization, post-communist political regimes consolidate historical policies as a ‘set of practices concerning the political utilization of history’ (2012, p. 5). The political developments in Eastern Europe mark the emergence of historical politics as a phenomenon that integrates political actors, institutions (governmental and non-governmental), and methods of political usage of history and memory (ibid., p. 6-7). Moreover, Miller identifies institutional channels for how political elites in the region foster and institutionalize their representation of the past. Historical policy encompasses interference into the history curricula and the systems of public education, managing a list of Soviet totalitarian regime crimes for compensation claims, falsifying history museums with political agendas, and, finally, legislating representation of the past (ibid., p. 8, 9-10). And, the latter refers not to installation of commemorative days, but to the ‘laws establishing an interpretation of events as the only possible one’ as well as endorsing criminal liability for criticizing official version of the past (ibid., p. 11).

Moreover, Kasianov defines historical policy as a ‘social practice of using history and ‘historical’ memory in political activities with a goal of installing a version of representation of the past in social consciousness’ (Kasianov, 2014, p. 136). Also, according to Kasianov’s other definition (2016, p. 28), historical policy is two-dimensional – it entails ‘deliberate construction’ as well as ‘utilitarian usage’ of representation of the past.

Historical policy is inherently political. It implies ‘political instrumentalization’ of representing the past that means its application in ‘politics, ideological debates, legal and legislative practices, diplomatic, and military conflicts’ (2014, p. 136). Kasianov points
out getting popular loyalty of large social groups as the ultimate goal of historical policy; and implies that loyalty means imposing durable dominance over groups (2016, p. 29).

Political elites may also engage crude administrative practices for preferable representation of the past. Lagrou (1999; 2003) addresses relations between public remembrance and official ‘policies of memory’ in fostering the image of the Resistance to the Nazi occupation in post-1945 Western Europe. In discussed among others the Dutch case, governmental administrative policy took form of ostracizing veterans’ organizations by depriving veterans of military awards and public commemorations (2003, p. 535-536). In addition, regulation of the war monuments erection by the official governmental committee has homogenized the country’s memory landscape (1999, p. 72-73; 2003, p. 536). An altogether strict administrative policy in the Netherlands has unified representation of the wartime past and, as Lagrou argues, successfully implemented the image of national resistance.

‘National’ or ‘elite’ mythmaking is a term preferred by Y. He to describe elite—driven manipulation of the past (2007, p. 44, 47; 2009, p. 25-30). In her seminal article, He identifies institutional channels of myth construction. Political elites in power tend to obtain hegemonic control over ‘the institutional tools of memory construction, including school textbooks, museums and commemorative rituals, and post-conflict resolution measures, including war compensation programs’ (He, 2007, p. 47; see also He, 2009, p. 28-29). As He argues (2007), the ability to exercise unilateral control over mentioned channels means achieving success in installing that political elite’s version of the past.

By and large, elite mythmaking refers to a process of institutionalizing a particular vision of the past; it entails a set of public practices, usually administrative and legislative, by which political elites install preferable representation of the past. Elite mythmaking is constitutive to political elites as memory agents possessing necessary power, resources and outreach to construct and articulate their vision of the past. If mythmaking is a process, then political memory is its outcome or, in other words, an institutionalized in various cultural forms vision of the past. Finally, elite mythmaking has a number of complementary goals behind. In one way or another, political elites want to strengthen the national identity, legitimize states’ agency in international affairs, or facilitate affective popular support.

The next section reviews the notion of a narrative, and speaks of narratives in connection to collective memory. It concludes a theoretical chapter of the MA thesis.
1.4. Narratives

Somers and Gibson (1994) suggest that narratives constitute a foundation of social life as far as the latter is always ‘storied’ or, in other words, organized and framed in the form of a story. They develop their framework upon the premise that:

‘people construct identities (however multiple and changing) by locating themselves or being located within a repertoire of emploted stories ... that people make sense of what has happened and is happening to them by attempting to assemble or in some way integrate these happenings within one or more narratives’ (1994, p. 2)

In turn, having structured various experiences in coherent stories, actors then act on the basis of designed narratives. Therefore, Somers and Gibson argue about defining role of narratives by employing which ‘we come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities’ (ibid., p. 27).

Somers and Gibson conceptualize the narrative through delineating a number of its crucial features. ‘Narratives are,’ they state, ‘constellations of relationships (connected parts) embedded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment’ (ibid., p. 27, italics in original). Narrative implies sequential structure and ‘renders understanding only by connecting (however unstably) parts to a constructed configuration or a social network (however incoherent or unrealizable) composed of symbolic, institutional, and material practices’ (ibid., p. 28).

The connection between parts means that in a narrative disparate ‘events’ are turned into ‘episodes’ according to certain plot-lines (causal emplotment), that unites anteceding and proceeding episodes (ibid., p. 28). Emplotment assembles parts of a story in a coherent manner, it ‘allows us to construct a significant network or configuration of relationships’ between the episodes (ibid., p. 29). Moreover, narratives are characterized by ‘selective appropriation’ meaning that they prioritize and emphasize one event over the other (ibid., p. 29). Finally, temporality and ‘space’ refer to positioning of elements of the plot to each other (ibid., p. 28).

Furthermore, Somers and Gibson outline four-fold classification of narratives (ibid., p. 29-33). Foremost, ‘ontological narratives’ refer to the most foundational stories that provide social actors with an understanding of self. Importantly, ‘what to do’ always follows ‘who we are’ (ibid., p. 30). This means that ontological narratives ‘locate’ social actors on the one hand and serve the basis for the agency in social relations on the other.
Importantly, ontological narratives draw from the ‘public narratives’. The latter refers to those stories that are ‘attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than single individuals’ (ibid., p. 31). Institutions and social formations (churches, governments and nations) shape the public narratives (ibid.). Finally, Somers and Gibson differentiate between conceptual narratives as shaped by social sciences academia and meta-narratives as the most abstract pertaining in their meaning to universal forces governing social change (ibid., p. 32-33).

Patterson and Monroe (1998) argue about defining role of narratives in structuring political reality around. Narrative is a ‘story’ that sutures perceptions of events in a coherent fashion and, thus, affects the political behavior of individuals (ibid., p. 315, 319). They are, as Patterson and Monroe note, ‘especially useful in revealing the speaker’s concept of self, for it is the self is located at the center of the narrative, whether as active agent, passive experiencer, or tool of destiny’ (ibid., p. 316). Furthermore, narratives fulfill several complementary goals varying from identifying a pattern from distinct events, to providing a sense of positioning and purpose for groups, to being powerful tools for interpreting social relations (ibid., p. 319, 321-322).

The considerable amount of theorizing on narratives in relation to collective memory and remembrance belongs to James Wertsch (2002; 2008a; 2008b). His argument, if putted simply, states that narratives mediate collective memory by being ‘cultural tools’ of the representation of the past in particular societal and cultural contexts (2008a, p. 139). Representation of the past as such follows a narrative structure; it is organized in the form of story about events of the past (2008b, p. 123-124).

Furthermore, Wertsch differentiates between specific narratives focusing on particular settings, events and characters on the one hand, and ‘schematic narrative templates’ (2008a; 2008b) on the other. The latter is an analytical category that helps to delineate an underlying plot of a group’s history within a set of events. Schematic narrative templates involve a high level of abstraction and provide ‘a pattern that is applied to multiple events, thereby creating specific narratives’ (2008a, p. 142). In particular, national narratives do have such a structure when constructing national history and generalizing over a set of events across time. As Wertsch argues, schematic templates ‘produce replicas that vary in their details but reflect a single general story line …. these templates do not deal with just one concrete episode from the past’ but rather present overarching models for representation of the past (2008b, p. 123).
Generally speaking, schematic narrative templates allow and inform representing events of the past in coherent fashion and because of their abstract nature retain deep identity-related emotional appeal (2008a, p. 142). Basically, as Wertsch implies (2008b, p. 123), any study of collective memory is an enquiry into schematic narrative templates as the underlying patterns beyond distinct representations of the past.

Conceptualizing schematic narrative templates has originated from studying World War Two (WW2) remembrance. In this relation, Wertsch has explored the schematic template of Russian history. His core argument is that representation of WW2 in post-Soviet Russia follows an ‘expulsion of foreign enemies’ template. This template has a four-fold structure and encompasses the image of Russia as a) peaceful nation; b) viciously and savagely attacked from abroad; c) almost defeated; d) however, due to unprecedented people’s mobilization and heroism, it was able to eliminate the foreign enemy (2002, p. 156; 2007, p. 30). According to Wertsch (2007, p. 30), the template replicates itself in specific narratives of Russia’s history even unrelated to WW2. Also, Wertsch has found transition of the template between Soviet and pluralist post-Soviet accounts on WW2 history in Russia (2002, p. 105-115; 2007, p. 30-31).

To sum up, narratives play a crucial role in structuring political reality and revealing the notion of self for various social actors. They also provide a basis for political action by making sense of experiences, situating actors in broader social framework and prescribing actions. In relation to collective memory, narratives make it possible to communicate events of the past in a structured and accessible form.

The theoretical chapter of this MA thesis has scrutinized four conceptual categories stemming from various scholarship in memory studies. It was intended to develop the conceptual argument that political elites as memory agents engage in construction of political memory (mythmaking) by framing narratives about the past.

The next chapter illustrates the application of the conceptual argument to the case of the World War Two (WW2) representation in modern Ukraine. In the second chapter, I first discuss the European dimension of WW2 representation. Then, I proceed with a discussion of memory politics in modern Ukraine by differentiating between and contrasting post-Soviet (1991-2014) and post-Euromaidan (2014) periods. In the section devoted to trajectories of memory politics in Ukraine, I introduce my core thesis regarding elite-mythmaking in post-2014 Ukraine and its newly forged narrative. The argument
holds that in the latter period elite-mythmaking by memory agents creates a representation of WW2 by selectively ‘Europeanizing’ Ukraine’s narrative about the war.
2. European discourse on WW2 and trajectories of memory politics in modern Ukraine

The following chapter has a three-fold structure. In the first section, I outline what can be called the European discourse(s) on WW2 or ‘European memory’ of the 20th century. The second and third sections will proceed with a discussion of the developments of memory politics in modern Ukraine. This is a need to position Ukraine’s memory politics against a backdrop of European discourse on WW2 that defines this chapter’s structure. Importantly, the second section introduces the main thesis – the elite-mythmaking argument on World War 2 representation in post-Euromaidan Ukraine.

2.1. European discourses on WW2

Pakier and Strath (2010) contemplate over the notion of European memory. Under the authors’ scrutiny is the prospect for a ‘European viewpoint’ on events and issues largely pertaining to World War 2. According to Pakier and Strath, two fault lines characterize reflections on WW2 in post-war Europe. On the one hand, a temporal fault line, which emerges in post-1945 Europe, takes the end of the war as a ‘new zero hour’ for framing the past, and is encapsulated in ‘Never Again’ reasoning (Pakier and Strath, 2010, p. 2-3). On the other, the spatial fault line refers to West-East cleavage of remembrance prior to 1989 (ibid.). In this relation, the late 1980s mark a thematic shift in war interpretation ‘from heroism to collaboration’ which is characterized, with some reservations, as a more ‘critical confrontation with idealized and heroic national pasts’ (ibid., p. 3).

This ‘critical confrontation’ or ‘coming to terms with the past’ constitutes the defining characteristic of European discourse on WW2. In Pakier and Strath’s view, the ‘Europeanization’ of memory, thus, means ‘parallel processes of coming to terms with the past and contentious negotiation about what to remember and what to forget’ (ibid., p. 11). Thematically, Europeanization brings uncomfortable ‘dark pasts’ under public scrutiny (ibid., p. 14) and implies ‘efforts to establish transnational self-critical memory discourses on colonialism, racism and war collaboration in Europe’ (ibid., p. 12).

Moreover, Müller takes a two-fold approach to defining ‘Europeanization’ of representation of the past. Foremost, the emergence of ‘self-critical European memory’
 refers to ‘moral-political attitudes and practices’, by which European countries ‘work through’ national pasts (Müller, 2010, p. 26-27). More specifically, the process means there is a willingness to critically engage with national past as well as to ‘assume collective responsibility for past misdeeds and engage in public acts of atonement’ from behalf of nation-states and political elites (ibid., p. 27). The other way to approach Europeanization of memory is to consider it as a process of producing similar in content transnational European memory, in which European countries homogenize representation of their pasts in a unified framework (ibid., p. 26-27). The inspiration behind forging a common collective memory, and scrutinizing national ‘dark pasts’ in particular, is a pursuit of ‘common political culture in the process of arguing about these pasts’ (ibid., p. 28).

The Holocaust memory is an important stage of emerging European memory of WW2. In this relation, Müller notes that ‘a pattern seems to have emerged according to which individual European nations acknowledge their role in the Holocaust, while at the same time affirming its ‘universal significance’’ (ibid., p. 31). Importantly, Müller also argues about the emergence of a ‘common language of guilt’ in relation to the past, which does not, however, preclude ‘national collective memories’ from being ‘heterogeneous and discontinuous’ (p. 32). In other words, Müller argues that Europeanization of collective memories refers to practicing the ‘politics of regret’ and engaging in practices of critical reevaluation of national past (ibid., p. 27). This process does not necessarily imply creation of ‘thick’, or similar in content, European memory, but it rather may imply cultivation of ‘thin’ transnational memory with such practices in its core (ibid., p. 32).

In a similar fashion, Lebow (2006) points out the critical character of representing WW2 as a part of post-war memory politics in Europe. After some period of whitewashing memory politics, in which ‘the initial response of postwar elites everywhere was to portray their countries and citizens as victims’ (Lebow, 2006, p. 21), comes a self-critical stage of representation of the past. Since the end of the war, as Lebow states, ‘almost every country has undergone some kind of wrenching public debate about its role(s) in that conflict and the atrocities for which its government or nationals were responsible’ (ibid., p. 21). Moreover, Lebow structures ‘coming to terms with the past’ in Western European societies around two topics. The first, similarly to Müller’s reasoning, pertains to national histories and encompasses ‘attempts to incorporate ‘dark’ periods of history, formerly blocked off and even repressed as anomalous, into national history and consciousness’ (ibid., p. 35). The second focuses exclusively on the Holocaust in national past and encompasses ‘attempts to confront participation in the Holocaust and, more generally, the prewar,
wartime, and postwar treatment of Jews and other persecuted minorities in one’s country’ (ibid., p. 35).

The resolutions of the European Parliament as the major representative institution at the European level may serve as a reflection of European discourse on WW2 as well. The high-profile international documents usually focus on totalitarian regimes condemnation in common Europe-wide framework of remembrance.

The European Parliament (EP) in the Resolution on ‘European Conscience and Totalitarianism’ (2009) has outlined the framework of WW2 remembrance by cultivating condemnation of historical totalitarian regimes and stressed the need to ‘honour the victims, condemn the perpetrators and lay the foundations for reconciliation based on truth and remembrance’ (European Parliament, 2009, F). The resolution considers victims of state-perpetrated violence as a core of common European mourning and remembrance while acknowledging the ‘uniqueness of the Holocaust’ (ibid., G). Importantly, totalitarian regimes are seen as main protagonists of tragic 20th century pertaining to the events of WW2 as well, and, therefore, worth condemnation (ibid., sections H, I, J, K, L). On the level of policy prescriptions, the European Parliament focuses on victims and crimes of ‘totalitarian and undemocratic regimes’ by stating respect for the victims and calls for ‘truth and remembrance’ (ibid., § 1, 3). Moreover, the resolution calls for barring any restrictions on access to historical documents in the archives of member states and establishes August 23 as European Day of Remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes (ibid., § 6, 15).

The similar pattern of totalitarian regimes condemnation for WW2 and horrific historical events may be found in other international organizations documents (see e.g. OSCE, 2009). In this relation, the European Parliament’s Declaration on the ‘European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism’ (2008) is particularly revealing. The Declaration has condemned the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany for the outbreak of WW2 (EP, 2008, A). Also, it has stated that the ‘mass deportations, murders and enslavements committed in the context of the acts of aggression by Stalinism and Nazism fall into category of war crimes and crimes against humanity’ (ibid., B). In other words, state-perpetrated violence is considered to be legitimate and integral part of WW2 remembrance.

The critical character of European discourse of WW2 does not preclude regional variation in how war is represented and remembered. Scholars usually differentiate
between four different memory discourses on the Second World War (Mälksoo, 2009; Siddi, 2016). According to the argument, each discourse encapsulates a narrative regarding the war and can be identified in Europe’s regions. Due to different historical experiences, especially with regard to the Soviet Union’s role in WW2, those official discourses possess varying degrees of conflict potential (see e.g. Siddi, 2016). Furthermore, Karner and Mertens (2013) approach European discourse on WW2 by gathering case studies for their edited volume. They similarly note the persistent role of ‘national contexts’ or ‘nation-focused frameworks of memory’ in representation of WW2 in contemporary politics (Karner and Mertens, 2013, p. 7-9).

Siddi (2016) has outlined four official memory discourses and investigated the interplay between them in recent commemorative developments. According to Siddi (2016, p. 4), the Western European and German narratives are placed closely as similar in elevating Nazi war crimes, and memorializing the Holocaust particularly, in official memory politics. However, in the former’s case, representing underground resistance to the Nazis becomes central for national resistance myths ‘as the emblem of national rebirth during the occupation’ (Siddi, 2016, p. 4). Furthermore, the Central European narrative by is preoccupied with addressing Soviet totalitarianism and national suffering and tends to equate Soviet and Nazi regimes on the one hand (ibid., p. 5). On the other, it downplays issues of local collaboration in the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes (ibid.). Finally, Russia’s narrative is a continuation of Soviet practice on victory celebration. Obviously, the Soviet Union’s wartime crimes as well as ‘subjugation of East-Central Europe after 1945 are excluded from this grandiose narrative’ (ibid., p. 5). Importantly, WW2 narratives imply varying degrees of conflict potential according to Siddi. If the Western European and German narratives can be accommodated, then East-Central European and Russian are highly contested mutually due to different interpretations of the Soviet Union’s role in the Second World War (ibid., p 5-7). In general, Siddi notes a tendency towards ‘crystallising fragmentation’ among official memory narratives representing WW2 aggravated by ‘tensions about current affairs’ internationally (ibid., p. 10-11). This is especially true, as Siddi argues, in the case of opposing East-Central European and modern Russian narratives (ibid., p. 11).

The interplay between narratives on WW2 manifests itself not only in opposition between Russian and East-Central European discourses, but also in seeking recognition for the latter’s perspectives on war in a common European remembrance framework (Mälksoo, 2009; Neumayer, 2015). In this relation, Mälksoo argues about the quest of
‘subaltern’ Polish and the Baltics states’ narratives for symbolic recognition as a part of war remembrance at the all-European level (Mälksoo, 2009, p. 654). Foreign policy actions of the respective states have pursued the official condemnation of Soviet totalitarian regime crimes in particular (ibid., p. 654-656). Paradoxically, these ‘memory-political endeavors’ to fracture European WW2 remembrance is still seen by its agents as ‘assuming the real possibility of a unified and coherent common European remembrance of the war in the first place’ (ibid., p. 657).

Moreover, Mälksoo has elaborated on the defining features of ECE historical narrative in the context of her study as compared with Western European and German representations. According to Mälksoo (2009, p. 661-663), in the Polish and Baltics contexts, this historical narrative is encapsulated in:

a) Emphasis on communist regimes’ crimes;
b) Notion of ‘Yalta betrayal’ prescribing Europe’s ‘obligation to remember’ the distinct Eastern European wartime experiences, and also imposition of communism by the Soviet Uniob;
c) ‘comparative martyrology’ meaning centrality of national ‘self-attributed martyrdom’ and victimhood inflicted by the war and Soviet Union (2009, p. 663);
d) Downplaying the significance of the Holocaust, or, in the words of Mälksoo, the tendency to downplay ‘the sufferings of others as if empathizing with the sufferings of the others would reduce one’s own relative suffering’ (2009, p. 663)

Similarly to Mälksoo, Neumayer (2015) speaks of the same centrality of communist crimes to the ECE narrative. According to her research, the post-communist members of the EU (‘memory entrepreneurs’) have institutionalized the ‘crimes of communism’ narrative using the available institutional means after joining the European Union at the supranational level (Neumayer, 2015, p. 3-7, 13-17).

To sum up this section, a critical, or in other words ‘coming to terms with the past’, characteristic defines European framing and representation of WW2. Thematically, this means focusing on national ‘dark pasts’ of collaboration, exclusionary policies, ethnic cleansing and other misdeeds when narrating national histories. Also, the bottom-line of the discourse is a condemnation of historical totalitarian regimes and cultivating the foundational role of the Holocaust for modern WW2 remembrance as the most notoriously unique event in human history. Nonetheless, ‘European memory’ of WW2 does not preclude regional variation. In a strict sense of the term, European discourse refers to the
Western European narratives on WW2, whereas East-Central European narratives diverge in choosing the main topics and themes in their WW2 remembrance. One fault-line is especially relevant for this thesis. The Russian-Soviet narrative of victory celebration and its glorification is seen to be at odds with other European narratives of WW2 representation, in as far as they have had a critical reevaluation of their national histories and made mourning as central elements of the representation of war.

2.2. Trajectories of memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine

The ‘swinging pendulum’ is the best term to describe intricacy of memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine. Usually, Ukraine is characterized as a ‘divided’ society with fragmented collective memory and highly contested nature of debates pertaining to the issues of collective memory and identity (see e.g. Shevel, 2011). Governmental memory politics of changing incumbents has reflected this ‘divided’ nature of collective memory in Ukraine. This section reviews a ‘swinging’ nature of governmental memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine (1991-2014) relying on existing and well-established scholarly literature. Thereafter, I proceed with a discussion of drastic elite-mythmaking insurgency taking place in post-2014th Ukraine.

My core argument is that post-2014 Ukraine is a blatant case of elite-mythmaking pertaining to WW2 remembrance that encompasses a range of legislative, administrative and commemorative measures and practices. In contrast to the often ambivalent, as well as highly contested and reversible, memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine (1991-2014), current memory agents pursue a coherent memory politics strategy pertaining to WW2 representation. In post-Euromaidan Ukraine, the President, the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR) and the Parliament (MPs) negotiate, construct and install political memory of WW2 by decisively alienating the Soviet past on the one hand, and selectively ‘Europeanizing’ Ukraine’s narrative of WW2 and it’s elements on the other.

The newly forged narrative itself antagonizes the role and image of the Soviet Union in the war, and Ukraine’s Soviet past on the one hand. It disregards the Soviet interpretations of the war as ‘mythological’, invalid, and imposed. On the other hand, the narrative forges a preferable image of stateless Ukrainians and of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist underground in particular. The narrative essentializes Ukrainians as a coherent protagonist of the war. Finally, it takes an ambivalent stance with regard to the Holocaust
as well as obstructs the local ‘dark past’. In other words, the narrative essentially adopts characteristics of the Eastern Central European (ECE) historical narrative on WW2.

Legislative and administrative practices on the representation of the past in post-Soviet Ukraine reflect moving back and forth in installing the more 'nationalized' vision of WW2 by downplaying the ‘Great Patriotic War’ narrative and vice versa. In other words, swinging from the one side of memory politics the pendulum to the other. The sides of pendulum are preserving the ‘Great Patriotic War’ in legislation and commemoration or moving to WW2 remembrance while simultaneously providing a dimension for Ukrainian wartime nationalists’ recognition. Both imply different foreign policy orientations towards either integration of post-Soviet space or into the European Union.

In his analysis, Kasianov proposes to structure discussion over memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine by conceptualizing and distinguishing between the ‘Soviet-nostalgic’ and ‘national’ narratives (Kasianov, 2016). The former term captures the significance of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ primarily inherited from the Soviet regimes’ discourses, practices and rituals (ibid., p. 28-30). Whereas, the ‘national’ refers to emerging national Ukrainian narratives of heroism and victimhood, encoded in new ‘historical myths, memory sites and sacred symbols’ (ibid., p. 28). Competition between those two narratives characterizes the political struggle over the representation of the past in post-Soviet Ukraine’s governmental, legislative and commemorative practices according to Kasianov (ibid.). Throughout the paper, Kasianov implies that this is dependence of the trajectory of memory politics from the incumbent government in Ukraine, which is the most important to understand its collective memory dynamics. In fact, changing governments have emphasized, exploited and institutionalized in legislative and administrative practices the ‘Soviet-nostalgic’ or the ‘national’ narrative, or even the peculiar combination of both (ibid., p. 30-35).

Among other legislative initiatives, Kasianov (2016) discusses the case of adoption, deliberation and cancellation of the Law on the “Victory Flag” in Ukraine. In our view, this case exemplifies the pendulum nature of official memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine and, thus, is worth particular attention.

In late April 2011, Parliament led by the Party of Regions and the communist (Communist Party of Ukraine) majority adopted the official usage of the red flag in approaching celebrations in May. President V. Yanukovych had signed the law and it

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2 See more on Ukrainian context in the section ‘Key events’ of the third chapter of this thesis
entered into force before celebrations in May. The law defined the red Flag of Victory as a ‘symbol of victory of the Soviet people, its army and fleet, over the fascist Germany in the Great Patriotic War’ (Law, 2011, § 1, Article 1). Article 1 of the Law also prescribed to use replicas of the red flag together with the national one during any official event pertaining to commemoration of the war by public bodies, local self-government officials, and other organizations or civil associations (§ 2, Article 1).

However, such a drastic institutionalization of a Soviet-era symbol by the governing party caused a conflict-laden societal backlash (Kasianov, 2016; Korostelina, 2014, p. 58-65), as well as led the opposition MPs to file a motion before the Constitutional Court. In mid-June 2011, the Court had proclaimed unconstitutional provision of the Law on public usage of red flags together with the national Ukrainian flag. In the Decision (CCU, 2011, § 3.3), the Court decided that national symbols constitute a closed-ended list as defined in the Constitution, and that changing the procedure of their display requires constitutional (2/3) majority and not adopting ordinary law. Furthermore, the red Victory Flag as such does not belong to national symbols and, thus, should not be displayed with the national ones without alternating their ‘constitutional value’ (ibid., § 3.3, 4).

In a similar fashion, Shevel distinguishes between antagonistic political camps of nationalists and ‘unreformed’ communists, who have pursued their competing legislative agendas on WW2 remembrance throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s (Shevel, 2011, p. 147-155). For instance, Shevel has identified 23 legislative attempts to grant recognition to Ukrainian wartime nationalists (OUN and UPA) between 2000 and 2010 (ibid., p. 151-153). The surge of attempts made by President V. Yuschenko in 2005, who favored such recognition, has not been successful due to contestation in Parliament and even due to opposition within the presidential faction (ibid.). As the two examples show, attempts to drastically change memory politics by legislative tools were contested or even reversed in Ukraine by competing agents throughout the two post-Soviet decades.

Portnov (2013) uses the term ‘memory wars’ to describe memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine. In his account on ‘symbolic politics’ of the first three presidents of Ukraine³, Portnov points out ambivalence and situational dependence of presidents’ rhetorical strategies in representing the past (2013, p. 238-239, 243). These strategies usually incorporated Soviet symbols with national Ukrainian discourses in the search of a common historical narrative. Importantly, Portnov argues that essentially improvised

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symbolic politics of the presidents has never been successful due to existing cleavages in the Ukrainian society (ibid., p. 233, 247-248). Therefore, post-Soviet Ukraine’s political elites did not develop a ‘single, united national historical narrative’, but rather confined themselves to ‘nationalist’ or ‘Soviet alike’ narratives in representation of the past and WW2 (ibid., p. 247-248).

In a line with Portnov’s reasoning, Klymenko has found the pattern in how Ukrainian presidents addressed WW2 in her analysis of presidents’ commemorative speeches on Victory Day. According to her findings, presidents of post-Soviet Ukraine have represented WW2 in a way to ‘satisfy all members of the Ukrainian community who have various experiences of the war’ and ‘ambivalently combine diverse synchronic and diachronic discourses by referring to both the Great Patriotic War and World War 2’ (Klymenko, 2015, p. 398). As Klymenko shows (ibid., p. 394, 398), the usage of competing terms is linked to foreign policy orientations of the respective presidents towards more integration in the post-Soviet space (L. Kuchma, V. Yanukovych) or European Union (V. Yushchenko). Still, there is a great deal of continuity in presidential commemorative speeches. In fact, no one has decisively abrogated one of the competing narratives about WW2, but rather added new aspects and themes (ibid., p. 398-399).

Finally, Yurchuk delineates the whole range of premises that have defined ‘memory work’ in post-Soviet Ukraine. In addition to pluralization of memory related to democratic transition, Ukraine’s case encompasses important dimensions of de-Sovietization, decolonization, and nationalization (Yurchuk, 2014, p. 65). Under the latter three terms, Yurchuk understands the interrelated process of distancing from the Soviet past, or ‘Soviet legacies’ and symbols in her words, creating more space for genuinely ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘post-colonial perspectives on history’ (ibid., p. 65, 76).

Having focused on memory of the Ukrainian wartime nationalists (‘Ukrainian’ perspective), Yurchuk distinguishes between several stages of memory politics regarding the issue. If the 1990s was characterized by a ‘relative vacuum’ of governmental memory politics, which enabled revival of social memory about WW2, then the mid-2000s marked a more assertive stance over introducing memory about the nationalists at the official level (discussed in ibid., p. 83, 102). In this relation, Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency (2005-2010) had brought not only ‘normalization’ of the topic, but also the first measures to institutionalize memory about Ukrainian wartime nationalists (ibid., p 126). As Yurchuk’s
research shows, Yuschenko’s memory politics mainly pursued joint celebrations of May 9 (Victory Day) by both Red Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA’s) veterans, establishing the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (2006), and awarding the Order of the Hero of Ukraine to prominent nationalists posthumously\(^5\) (ibid., p. 127-128; also see more in Rudling, 2010). Importantly, Yuschenko did not try to undermine and substitute the Soviet-era heroics of the Red Army, but rather to combine the heroics of the Red Army and UPA at the official level in his pursuit of a more national Ukrainian perspective on history (Yurchuk, 2014, p. 127).

However, these discrete memory politics measures of President Yuschenko with regard to commemorating Ukrainian wartime nationalists has largely failed. On the one hand, the installation of joint celebrations, as Yurchuk notes (ibid., p. 127), was not successful at the national level. On the other hand, succeeding President Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014) embraced a ‘restorational’ narrative of the ‘Great Patriotic War’, diminished the executive significance of UINR, while the judicial system challenged the awarding of Order to wartime nationalist (ibid., p. 132-133, 141-142; see also in Kasianov, 2015, p. 200-206).

Schools’ curriculum and history education reflect attempts to incorporate new elements in representation of Ukraine’s past. In this relation, Klymenko (2014) has identified attempts to reframe the narrative of WW2 in her analysis of history schools’ textbooks dated by 2005-2006 already. According to the author, this reframing substantiates the Ukrainian perspective on WW2 in the triangle of ‘de-Sovietization, nationalization and Europeanization’ (2014, p. 757). Klymenko has identified ‘key themes’, around which Ukraine’s WW2 narrative is organized. She argues that the schools’ narrative, on the one hand, emphasizes equal criminality of the Soviet and Nazi regimes, and takes an ambiguous stance regarding the Red Army as both ‘liberators’ and ‘occupiers’ (ibid., p. 765, 772). On the other hand, it introduces a Ukrainian national dimension by elevating Ukrainian wartime nationalists as ‘fighters for independence’ while simultaneously obfuscating topics of the Holocaust and collaboration (ibid., p. 770, 765-768, 772). Furthermore, the narrative regarding Ukrainian wartime nationalists presents timid attempts to incorporate the nationalists’ past into the curriculum and to somehow ‘reconcile the Ukrainian nation’ (ibid., p. 770). However, Klymenko has noted that in 2005-2006 textbooks ‘present the OUN and UPA as controversial figures, but more as

\(^5\) The nationalist is Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). See for more discussion over controversies around mentioned historical figure in Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014
fighters for Ukraine’s independence’ (ibid., p. 770). As such, the narrative contains elements of heroization and victimization concurrent with the necessity to provide a ‘cohesive narrative’ of war and ‘create a common national identity among young Ukrainians’ (ibid., p. 772).

When discussing the impact of those textbooks, it is important to keep in mind the differentiation between the dimensions of formal schooling and family stories. The latter, as Richardson shows (2004), may challenge public schools’ narrative of WW2. Additionally, regional factors, or ‘regional political cultures’ in the words of Katchanovski, do determine attitudes towards WW2, and the wartime sides in particular (the Red Army, OUN and UPA), in modern Ukraine (Katchanovski, 2014, 2015).

2.3. Elite-mythmaking in post-Euromaidan Ukraine

Political developments in Ukraine and the Euromaidan revolution of 2014 placed new importance on official memory politics. Representation of WW2 as well as of Ukraine’s Soviet past fell under unprecedented legislative and administrative scrutiny. The elite-mythmaking in post-Euromaidan Ukraine took the form of legislating historical remembrance and fostering commemoration of WW2 by administrative measures of public bodies and officials. The recent legislation and administrative decisions provide evidence of how the alienation from the Soviet past and establishing WW2 framework has been institutionalized and framed.

Foremost, the four ‘de-communization’ laws adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament on April 9, 2015 have established an official legal framework on representation of WW2. The Law “On Perpetuation of the Victory over Nazism” (2015b) establishes the time frame of war as 1939-1945 as well as adopting the official usage of ‘World War 2’ (Article 1). The law speaks about the ‘reverent attitude’ as a duty of the Ukrainian state and its citizens towards ‘the war veterans, participants of the Ukrainian liberation movement and victims of the Nazism’ (§ 1, Article 1). It has also installed two commemorative days. On the one hand, Memorial and Reconciliation Day was proclaimed to be commemorated annually on May 8 as the Day of ‘all victims of World War 2 of 1939-1945 in Ukraine’ (§ 2, Article 1). On the other, the law reframes May 9 as a ‘national holiday the day of victory over Nazism in World War 2 (Victory Day)’ (§ 3, Article 1). Furthermore, the law establishes the forms of commemorating the victory over Nazism and outlines the obligations of public bodies and officials in relation to WW2 remembrance in Ukraine. Articles 2, 3 and 4
outline the obligations of maintaining and erecting war monuments, the use of honor guards, facilitating ‘objective and comprehensive’ history research, and identification and maintenance of burial places. Finally, the law makes an effort to erase the notion of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ from official vocabulary. The concluding provision declares null and void a previous law that perpetuated the ‘Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945’ and amends the Labor Code by substituting the notion from the legislation (Article 7).

The law condemning the communist and Nazi’s regimes (2015c) banned communist and Nazi’s symbols from public spaces and criminalized propaganda of the regimes. As Shevel notes, this law has served as the legal basis for administrative action to remove Soviet-era monuments from the public space and rename streets, towns and districts in Ukraine (Shevel, 2016, p. 261). The law made a great deal of defining, in legal terms, the notion of propaganda, delineating the lists of Soviet security bodies, communist regime and NSDAP’s symbols (Article 1). The Article 2 of the law is devoted to defining propaganda of the regimes as:

“public denial ... , dissemination of information oriented to the criminal nature of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes, activities of the Soviet state security bodies, establishing Soviet rule in the territory of Ukraine or on its individual administrative territories, persecution of the fighters for independence of Ukraine in 20th century ...” (§ 2, Article 1, bold typeface added)

The law on legal status and honoring ‘the fighters for independence of Ukraine’ (2015d) is deemed to be the most controversial due to risks posed to freedom of speech and academia⁶. On the one hand, the law grants an official status of ‘fighters for independence’ to ‘the persons who participated in all forms of political, armed and other collective and individual struggle for independence of Ukraine in the 20th century as a part of governments, organizations, institutions and groups’ (§ 1, Article 1). The law provides a list of such authorities and institutions, encompasses organizations of Ukrainian wartime nationalists in particular, and provides social guarantees (Article 3), recognition of awards and military ranks (Article 4), and state policy in regard of the former members of listed institutions (Article 5). On the other hand, final provisions of the law, as previously mentioned, caused a backlash from the academics. The law speaks of legal responsibility for the persons ‘who publicly show contempt’ in regard of the fighters for independence

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⁶ See ‘Open Letter from scholars and experts on Ukraine regarding the so-called “Anti-Communist Law”’ (2015) initiated by Professor David Marples of University of Alberta (Canada) and signed by prominent political scientists, historians and other members of North American and European academia.
(§ 1, Article 6). It also recognizes ‘the struggle for independence of Ukraine in the 20th century’ as a legitimate cause and aspiration of the Ukrainian people and speaks about unlawfulness to deny the cause (§ 2, Article 6).

The last ‘de-communization’ law regarding access to archives (2015a) regulates the access to archival information of ‘repressive agencies of the communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991’ (Article 1). The provisions of the law are concerned with issues of guaranteeing various forms of access (Articles 7-8), defining former Soviet agencies and which documents may be accessed freely (Article 3), as well as outlining the state’s obligations and policy in the area (Article 4). The Law aims to build up an executive authority of UINR, through its Sectoral State Archive, as the main administrator of archival information (Articles 12-13).

The Presidential decrees and official documents (guidelines) of the UINR represent the administrative level of elite-mythmaking pertaining to the representation of WW2. The number of presidential decrees has substantiated the legal framework of historical remembrance by prescribing commemorative policy to public bodies in Ukraine.

In this relation, Decrees N169/2015 and N130/2016 addressed the ministries and regional state administrations and, in a line with ‘de-communization’ laws, prescribed to conduct actions and measures to commemorate WW2 in a scope of their administrative authority (Poroshenko, 2015a; 2016a). For instance, Decree N169/2015 spoke about the victory of the Ukrainian people over Nazism in the Second World War, commemorated war veterans as well as members of the ‘Ukrainian liberation movement’ by celebrating May 8 and 9. Furthermore, in the preamble, it provided a dimension of perpetuating memory of ‘victims of the war, war crimes, deportations and crimes against humanity’ in commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of WW2.

Interestingly, Decree N169/2015 canceled President V. Yanukovych’s previous Decree N604/2012 (Yanukovych, 2012) that had envisaged celebration the Great Patriotic War victory and the Soviet partisans’ movement for instance. The cancelled decree established the celebration of an ‘everlasting act of bravery of the people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, honoring memory of the fallen for the freedom of Fatherland’ (Yanukovych, 2012, preamble). The cancelled degree did not mention the dimensions of war victims, Ukrainian nationalist underground and did not name victorious ‘people’ at all.

The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR) is a central body of executive power that ‘realizes the state’s policy in revival and preservation of national
memory’ being engendered with a number of administrative powers (see chapter 3 of Statute of UINR in CMU, 2014). Acting within its discretion and capacity, the UINR issues official documents (guidelines) on commemorative policy.

Two months after the Euromaidan upheaval, the newly formed UINR issued the first Guidelines on WW2 commemoration (2014) and by doing so was the first institution to engage in elite-mythmaking of WW2. Guidelines opens with a discussion of the Victory Day celebration practice in the world and Russia. The document contrasts the role May 8 in Europe and May 9 in the post-Soviet space. In the sub-section on Russia, the document states that ‘considering the World War 2 as the Great Patriotic War, revival of Soviet tradition of Victory Day celebration is used also to rebuild and intensify ideological pressure of Russia on post-Soviet space’ (2014, section on Russia). It stresses that Victory Day is a ‘tool of Putin’s regime to rehabilitate the Soviet past’ and used to ‘justify the biggest crimes of the Soviet state and Josef Stalin himself” (ibid.). In the concluding passage on Russia, the UINR’s guidelines argue bluntly that this ideological pressure became a ‘foundation for pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian attitudes’ in the developments in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (ibid.). Furthermore, in a section devoted to Ukraine, the UINR has repeated that practice to celebrate Victory Day has originated in the Soviet past, and stated that the ‘second Sovietization of Victory Day’ attempted by V. Yanukovych’s regime has contributed to aggravating cleavages between Ukrainian citizens (2014, section on Ukraine). In UINR’s view, this restorational policy went against the ‘consolidation of the national views on place and role of Ukrainians in the war during the years of independence’ (ibid.).

The second chapter of Guidelines outlines the UINR’s agenda and perspective on commemorating Victory Day after the regime change. It emphasizes the need to remove Russia’s ideological pressure in any new commemorative policy of WW2 by ‘refusing Victory Day celebration in the Soviet format’ (ibid., section on UINR’s agenda). According to the UINR, the emphasis should be placed on memory about fallen soldiers and not ‘military parades as some form of war propaganda’ or ‘Soviet cult of war’ (ibid.). The new policy should encompass perspective of war victims, experiences of people under Nazi occupation and POWs in particular (ibid.). On the level of particular measures, the UINR stresses the need to introduce a commemoration of May 8, establish the wearing of the ‘Red Poppies’ in contrast to St George ribbon, and speak of Ukrainians’ contribution to the victory over Nazism regardless of wartime sides by commemorating ‘Red Army and Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s soldiers, ethnic Ukrainians in armies of the Allies’ (ibid.).
In subsequent years, the UINR has further developed the framework on WW2 representation and commemoration in a number of new guidelines (2015a; 2016). The 2015 document explicitly states the introduction of new commemorative paradigm in modern Ukraine as its goal. The major implication is to alienate from the ‘Soviet/Russian format’, which, as the document states, ‘does not correspond the historical memory of the Ukrainian people and all-European traditions, caused ignoring tragic pages of WW2, fostered a cult of war in social consciousness’ (Guidelines, 2015a, preamble). Moreover, elements of a new narrative about the war are the following: timespan 1939-1945; emphasis on a range of conflicts that included Ukrainians, and not on the Soviet-German war of 1941-1945; condemnation of the Soviet Union as Germany’s ally in 1939, and war crimes committed by the USSR; framing WW2 as a national Ukrainian tragedy and humanitarian catastrophe (ibid., section ‘Historical reference’). It is important to add that the UINR forges a vocabulary of referencing to WW2 by providing a list of ‘incorrect’ terms and expressions in the document. Thus, the ‘Great Patriotic War’, ‘German-fascist invaders’ and ‘Great Victory over fascist Germany’ should be substituted for German-Soviet war, Nazi occupants, and Victory over Nazism in Europe respectively (ibid., section ‘Vocabulary of WW2’).

On the level of practical measures, the UINR ‘recommends’ public bodies of all levels to hold art exhibitions and commemorative symphony orchestras concerts instead of parades; the adoption of the motto ‘1939-1945. We honor. We prevail!’; institutionalizes the red poppy as a legitimate symbol of war (ibid., section ‘Goal and recommendations’). In relation to the latter, the UINR also ‘does not recommend using as symbols of the victory red flag with a hammer and sickle, the five-pointed red star and “St George ribbon”’ (ibid.).

Finally, Guidelines devoted to 2016 commemorations in May (2016) has substantiated WW2 remembrance with adding a gender dimension to it. In addition to recapitulating already introduced elements and symbols and stating general policy direction, Guidelines’ main focus is on women and their wartime experiences. The document motivates the action by the need to reframe the ‘Soviet scheme of a heroic narrative’, in which the diverse experiences of women were reduced to number of ideologically motivated templates (2016, preamble). Thematically, the UINR devoted the 2016th commemoration to elevating the gender dimension and recommended secondary schools to hold events (lesson-requiem, performances, excursions) on topics related to women’s wartime experiences, including meetings with women who lived through WW2 (2016, section ‘Recommended forms’).
To sum up this chapter, elite-mythmaking in post-Euromaidan Ukraine encompasses an array of legislative and administrative practices to foster preferable representation of the past for memory agents. The elite-mythmaking is guided by an explicitly stated memory politics agenda to forge and install representation of WW2 instead of a Soviet-Russian narrative of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ and its symbols. Moreover, elite-mythmaking includes not only a reframing of the WW2 narrative, but also of Ukraine’s Soviet past in general; developing a new vocabulary, symbols (red poppies), and commemoration practices related to WW2 remembrance.

In order to justify the differentiation between memory politics in the post-Soviet and post-Euromaidan Ukraine, I advance the following arguments:

a) Elite-mythmaking in post-Euromaidan Ukraine has three memory agents acting behind it in a comprehensive manner. The President, the UINR and the Parliament construct and install preferable representations of the past and enjoy policy-making agreement over the issues of remembrance. As it was in case of ‘de-communization’ laws adoption when the UINR drafted the laws, Parliament adopted the drafts without alternation, and President signed the laws, and substantiated framework of WW2 remembrance by his own decrees. In contrast, political elites in post-Soviet Ukraine had never enjoyed such policy-making agreement in the area of how to represent the past or deal with Ukraine’s ‘divided’ collective memory;

b) Current elite-mythmaking goes unchallenged. At the same time, official memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine was highly contested and reversed. In this relation, examples of the ‘Victory Flag’ law or unsuccessful legislative attempts to grant recognition to Ukrainian wartime nationalists illustrate the ‘swinging pendulum’ nature of official memory politics between 1991 and 2014, when competing memory agents could not impose durable memory politics;

c) Current elite-mythmaking actually has a comprehensive agenda to foster preferable representation of WW2 in Ukraine by using available legislative and administrative means. In contrast, post-Soviet political elites pursued discrete memory politics measures at best, confined themselves to particular visions of the past (nationalist or Soviet), and often ambivalently combined topics and themes related to WW2 representation (Portnov, 2013; Klymenko, 2015; Kasianov, 2016).
The next two chapters of the Master’s thesis focus on the narrative on WW2 itself, which is being communicated and constructed in modern Ukraine. I intended to show that the newly forged Ukrainian narrative communicates WW2 by adopting essential features of the ECE historical narrative. The following chapter introduces research agenda of this thesis. It delineates the main categories for narrative analysis and introduces the empirical corpus of texts to analyze. Thereafter, concluding chapter proceeds with the analysis of the narrative and discussion of the findings.
3. Narrative analysis and sample texts analyzed

The following chapter introduces the research design for the thesis. In subsequent sections, it explores narrative analysis as a research tool, develops a set of categories for the analysis, and introduces the corpus of empirical texts pertaining to representation of WW2 in modern Ukraine under scrutiny of this thesis.

3.1. Narrative analysis as a research agenda

Usually focused on structure, sequence and elements of story-telling, narrative analysis approaches thus can assist in exploring complex historical narratives and structure discussion about a particular representation of the past across multiple texts. In particular, narrative analysis allows the researcher’s discretion in adjusting to a more content-oriented or structure-oriented study (Squire et al., 2008, p. 1-2, 12; Riessman, 2005, p. 2).

As Riessman argues, narrative analysis encompasses a ‘family of methods for interpreting texts that have in common a storied form’ (2008, p. 11). Narrative analysis is used in social sciences to evaluate various texts ranging from individual autobiographical stories to ‘political narrative’ of governments and nations (ibid., p. 7, 11). The focus of a researcher applying narrative analysis, as Riessman notes, is a ‘sequence of action’ and interplay between ‘intention and language – how and why incidents are storied, not simply the content to which language refers’ (ibid., p. 11). The focus on sequence and structure is what makes narrative analysis different from purely content-oriented qualitative approaches according to Riessman (ibid., p. 12).

This focus also informs thematic and structural approaches to narrative analysis. In Riessman’s seminal typology on approaches to narratives, thematic narrative analysis is preoccupied with addressing ‘what’ is ‘told’ (Riessman, 2005, p. 2-3). The thematic narrative approach focuses on identifying main themes and topics in an analyzed narrative. Methodologically speaking, it requires the researcher to inductively extract categories for analysis from a variety of texts and sources (ibid., p. 2). As Riessman notes, ‘investigators collect many stories and inductively create conceptual groupings from the data’ (ibid., p. 2). In other words, students of narrative analysis build up their inquiry around key themes of analyzed narrative by scrutinizing oral and written texts under analysis. Importantly, the
thematic approach is useful for ‘theorising across number of cases’, and ‘finding common thematic elements’ when contemplating across a number of oral or written texts for one’s research (ibid., p. 3).

By contrast, structural narrative analysis focuses on language rather than content, or in Riessman’s words, ‘the way a story is told’ (ibid., p. 3). Although some focus on content is present when following the structural approach, the main concern is on ‘how a teller by selecting particular narrative devices make story persuasive’ (ibid., p. 3). Paying exclusive attention to language details and features of texts, structural approach fits ‘detailed case studies’ or examination of a few cases (ibid., p. 4). However, following the premises of structural approach without focus on content may imply danger to ‘decontextualise narratives by ignoring historical, interactional and institutional factors’ (ibid., p. 4).

Besides focusing on structural and thematic elements, narrative analysis is helpful in revealing identity categories (see e.g. Lawler, 2002, p. 242, 249-250, 255). In this relation, De Fina points out that considering narratives as ‘the prime vehicle for expressing identity’ is commonplace in social science scholarship (De Fina, 2015, p. 351). Specifically, De Fina distinguishes a ‘interactionally oriented approach’ to narratives that assists in digesting identities and delineating identity categories in a narrative. The ‘interactional’ perspective focuses on the ‘process of identity construction itself – the strategies used by narrators, co-narrators, and their audience to achieve, contest, or reaffirm specific identities’ (ibid., p. 352). It holds that narrators anchor or ‘position’ themselves within a narrative by ‘creating protagonists and antagonists, expressing evaluations of such characters’ actions’ (ibid., p. 360). By engaging in story-telling (narrative construction), members of, for instance, a group or a community ‘reproduce or recirculate generally shared representations about self and others’ (ibid., p. 363).

3.2. Eastern Central European (ECE) historical narrative template

As it argued in the previous chapter, the Eastern Central European (ECE) historical narrative on WW2 is exemplified with exclusive focus on Soviet totalitarian regime’s crimes and critical understanding of the Soviet Union’s role in the war (Mälksoo, 2009; Neumayer, 2015; Siddi, 2016). Therefore, it can be argued, that the ECE narrative considers the Soviet Union an equal criminal protagonist of the war and of inflicted national suffering when representing the past. Consequently, alleviating national suffering and downplaying the Holocaust and other context-specific ‘dark pasts’ follow up the
exclusive focus on the Soviet Union’s role in the ECE historical narrative on WW2 (see e.g. Siddi, 2016). Essentially, the ECE narrative template captures:

a) negative attitude towards the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as main national antagonists in the war;

b) centrality of national suffering elaborated in a set of martyrrological events with regard to outbreak, development, and the unjust end of the war (‘Yalta betrayal’ in Mälksoo, 2009). For instance, in the Polish and the Baltics’ context, central events of respective narratives would be the Katyn massacres (see Etkind et al., 2012; Fredericks, 2011) and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (see Berg and Ehin, 2009; Eglitis and Ardava, 2012; on ‘narrative of rupture’ in Estonian context in Joesalu, 2012);

c) downplay, omit, relativize the Holocaust and local ‘dark pasts’ in national narratives.

I follow both thematic and structural approaches to narrative analysis for the purpose of this thesis. My focus is on protagonists/antagonists in the narrative, key events, narrative’s character, narrative’s plot and its key terms as a product of elite-mythmaking of political memory of WW2 in modern Ukraine. These categories were extracted and designed based on reading the texts on WW2 representation on the one hand, and working through narrative construction literature on the other. Importantly, the categories are intended to capture elements of the Eastern Central European (ECE) historical narrative. More specifically, I transcended the elements into my own categories for the analysis. The following table summarizes the point and the following sections explore each category in more detail.

**Table 1. ECE narrative and narrative analysis categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECE historical narrative template</th>
<th>Narrative analysis categories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative attitude towards the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany</td>
<td>Antagonist and Protagonist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality of national suffering, martyrrological events</td>
<td>Key events (Ukrainian nationalist underground), narrative’s character, narrative’s plot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Holocaust and national ‘dark pasts’</td>
<td>Key events (the Holocaust, Ukrainian-Polish conflict), narrative’s character</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3. Analysis categories: Antagonist and Protagonist

In order to evaluate the antagonistic nature of the Soviet Union, this thesis focuses on its role in the outbreak, developments, the end of the war and overall image as provided by Ukraine’s narrative on WW2. Research questions for this category are the following: What are the roles of Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in the war according to new Ukraine’s narrative? Does the narrative frame its role as comparable and equally criminal to Nazi Germany’s role? More generally, how are the Soviet regime and Ukraine’s past in the Soviet Union defined and represented by memory agents?

Furthermore, turning to protagonists, the thesis focuses on representation of Ukrainians in the narrative. What is being said about Ukrainians in the war as protagonists? What is their role in the narrative? Who is included and excluded from representation of the war as its protagonists? What is being communicated about the protagonists with regard to outbreak, developments and the war’s end? What is being communicated and what are the relations between the antagonists and the protagonists in the narrative?

3.4. Analysis categories: Key events

Thematic narrative analysis is useful for digesting complex historical narratives around key topics in an analyzed narrative. By focusing on elements of the narratives, it helps to define key topics or key events in representation of the past. For instance, Abdou (2017) uses the premises of thematic narrative approach for digesting ‘key themes’, assessing ‘key actors’ and ‘key actors roles’ in the Egyptian national narrative provided in official history textbooks. In his framework (2017, p. 84), those categories encapsulate the ‘traits and characteristics of the key protagonists’ and ‘the actions attributed’ to them in the narrative of Egyptian textbooks (ibid.).

This thesis focuses on key events of Ukraine’s narrative of WW2 as well. In this relation, Wylegala’s (2017) conceptualization of the main events in Ukrainian collective memory is particularly useful for the thesis. In her recent study, Wylegala (2017) differentiates three crucial issues of Ukrainian past in relation to the war: WW2 and the OUN-UPA, the Shoah\(^7\), and the Polish-Ukrainian conflict\(^8\) (ibid., p. 2). On the one hand,

\[^7\] See more on the issue of Ukrainian nationalists’ participation in the Holocaust in Himka, 2012; Rudling, 2011
\[^8\] Polish-Ukrainian conflict refers to Volyn massacres of 1943, which was an ethnic purge of Poles perpetrated by the Ukrainian nationalist underground on territories of Volyn and Eastern Halychyna (modern Western Ukraine). For more see in Rudling, 2012; Snyder, 2003
the inclusion of the Ukrainian nationalist underground is justified by contestation over the issue of its role in WW2. In particular, representation of the OUN and UPA in modern Ukraine, as Wylegala argues, is ‘crucial for determining national identity and one’s place in the larger historical process’ (ibid., p. 2). On the other hand, the Holocaust and Volyn massacres of 1943 exemplify ‘uncomfortable matters which endanger the positive image of the entire national community, and which most Ukrainians would either prefer to forget or have already forgotten’ (ibid., p. 2). It may be said that if the first key event pertains to efforts to establish a heroic past in Ukraine’s narrative on WW2, the two latter speak of the ‘dark pasts’ in Ukrainian collective memory.

Therefore, following Wylegala and in order to differentiate key elements of Ukraine’s narrative on WW2, this thesis focuses on what is being said about the Ukrainian nationalist underground, the Holocaust and Volyn massacres of 1943 as the key events of modern Ukraine’s narrative about the war. The main question here is what does the narrative communicate about the key events?

3.5. Analysis categories: Character of the narrative

Elite-mythmaking produces certain kind of narratives usually referred to as self-glorifying, self-whitewashing and other-maligning myths (He, 2007, p. 45; He, 2009, p. 25). This reflects the instrumental nature of mythmaking argued by Yinan He: ‘ruling elites tend to create national myths for instrumental purposes and infuse these myths into national collective memory through institutional tools’ (2009, p. 25). Such narratives usually ‘glorify their own countries’ beneficence and virtues, deny guilt for crimes and blame others for tragedies’ (He, 2007, p. 45). Moreover, Pääbo elaborates further on each type of elite-produced narratives. In his framework, self-glorification refers to a nation’s ‘positive self-image’, and cultivating ‘national pride … virtue and wisdom’ (Pääbo, 2011, p. 60). Importantly, self-glorifying narratives combine heroism and victimhood when narrating the past as a means for elevating national pride (ibid.). Self-whitewashing narratives downplay particular events (‘national wrongdoings’, ‘dark pasts’) when representing the past by using omissions or justifying the event (ibid., p. 60-61). Finally, other-maligning narratives frame ‘the image of the Other’ as having a ‘negative character’, and by doing so ‘improve its own nation’s image’ (ibid., p. 61). Also, other-maligning myths mark the case of shifting responsibility on to others for the wrongdoing in particular (ibid., p. 81).
At the same time, as it argued in the second chapter, European discourse on WW2 introduces a critical, or ‘coming to terms with the past’, understanding of wartime events. In particular, Lebow (2006, p. 21, 35) points out ‘wrenching’ debates on wartime wrongdoings as legitimate part of WW2 discourse. So, acknowledging the responsibility for ‘dark pasts’ marks the case of Europeanizing historical discourse in a particular society.

Therefore, in order to assess the narrative’s character, this thesis focuses on how the key events are described in Ukraine’s narrative on WW2 in terms of glorification, whitewashing, shifting responsibility, or critical acknowledgment of wrongdoing.

3.6. Analysis categories: Plot

The category of plot evaluates three previous categories taken together: protagonists/antagonists, key events and narrative’s character. Under this category, I seek to evaluate what are the relations or ‘pattern’ between the three previous categories: What could be the abstract template encompassing interplay between protagonists and antagonists, key events and narrative’s character? Does the narrative communicates ‘trauma’ in terms of Aleida Assman (2004, p. 28) or does it proposes heroic template of Ukrainians participating in WW2? More specifically, does the narrative propose a story of resistance and liberation or does it speak about subjugation, inflicted suffering and trauma?

The corpus of sample texts analyzed in this thesis consist of 39 texts and 19 video-clips. As already argued, elite-mythmaking in post-Euromaidan Ukraine is a process of installing preferable representation of WW2 by three memory agents: the President, the Remembrance institute (UINR), and the Parliament (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine - VRU). For this reason, I have focused on the narrative produced by these three agents of mythmaking. The texts include: 19 presidential speeches and addresses; 13 verbatim reports of the Parliament of Ukraine (VRU), one VRU’s statement, and four statements of parliamentary factions or heads of parliamentary factions; 2 books issued by the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance and 19 video-clips made under the UINR’s auspices (e.g. by the request of the Institute and the Government of Ukraine).

The presidential speeches and addresses were collected from the official presidential website. Collecting the speeches was made in two rounds. In the first round, I browsed for speeches delivered by the President on occasions directly related to WW2 commemoration
(May 8 and 9, Remembrance Day of Crimean Tatars deportation). In the second round, the search was broadened to speeches that could have included references to WW2. The second round revealed that on a number of additional occasions the President brought up the topic of WW2 experiences in his addresses (Independence Day, addresses to military chaplains and military lyceum’s graduates – see Bibliography). The time frame of collected speeches pertain to 2014-2017.

Further, this thesis includes verbatim reports of Ukraine’s parliament as a third memory agent of elite-mythmaking. The verbatim reports and VRU’s statement were collected through Parliament’s official website (rada.gov.ua). Parliamentary factions’ statements and statements of factions’ leaders when those actors spoke about historical issues (four documents altogether) were also included. Here, gathering verbatim reports followed the same logic as when collecting Presidential speeches by browsing for plenary sessions devoted to WW2 remembrance in 2014-2017.

Finally, in its pursuit to forge a new narrative on WW2, the UINR has issued two books, which are included in this analysis. “Ukraine in WW2” (UINR, 2015b) was intended as a reference book and has a collective authorship by the Remembrance Institute. The second book, “The War and the Myth” (Viatrovych et al., 2016), has been published under the auspices of UINR and holds its official credential. The authors of 50 separate entries for the book are both co-workers (public servants) of the Institute, including its head and deputy head, and several academic historians affiliated to the Institute or brought in for the publication. Furthermore, 19 video-clips on WW2 remembrance presented by the Remembrance Institute in 2015-2016 and disseminating the new narrative were also included into the analysis. Importantly, these are not visual characteristics of the clips, but the narration they disseminate, that is under scrutiny in this thesis. In other words, the clips are treated as texts for narrative analysis.
4. Narrative analysis

The following chapter proceeds with the analysis of historical narrative of WW2 and its elements that are forged as part of elite-mythmaking in modern Ukraine. Based on the analysis of narrative data in this thesis, I argue that the narrative establishes the Ukrainians as a nation as a main actor (protagonist) of WW2. The focus of the narrative is on Ukrainians’ statelessness, which is defining characteristic of Ukrainian wartime experience. The ultimate cause of achieving the independence and state-building effort is implied and meant to be a teleological goal of the protagonist in the narrative. The Soviet Union is condemned as comparable and equally criminal to Nazi Germany due to its role in the outbreak and the wrongdoings committed during WW2. Moreover, new representation of WW2 is inextricably linked with defining Ukraine’s Soviet past in general. The major finding here is that the narrative includes discussion about pre-Soviet Union Ukrainian governments, representation of national liberation efforts during the war into representation of WW2, and antagonizes the Soviet state-building in Ukraine as alien. Importantly, the emphasis in describing wartime experiences is always placed on the Ukrainians, and not on the states and governments. In other words, according to the narrative, Ukrainians as a nation have contributed to the Allies victory over Nazism whereas being a part of the Soviet Union/Ukrainian SSR is downplayed.

Each section of this chapter is structured according to the narrative analysis categories introduced in the previous chapter: antagonist and protagonist; key events and narrative’s character; narrative’s plot. The narrative is dismantled into these elements, and the findings are grouped and discussed around each element (section). Importantly, the concluding section wraps up the whole thesis pertaining both to elite-mythmaking and narrative construction of WW2 in modern Ukraine. It discusses the findings, evaluates the Ukrainian narrative in the light of European discourses about WW2, contemplates about mythmaking, on the one hand, and conflict dynamics in Ukraine on the other.

4.1. Antagonist and Protagonist

In relation to the protagonist and antagonist in the analyzed narrative, there are six themes commonly brought by the President, the Parliament and the UINR:
a) Stateless Ukrainians are seen to be a protagonist and contributor to the victory over Nazism;
b) Ascribing teleological (directional) dimension to representation of WW2: historical experiences of WW2 are contextualized into an overarching story of Ukrainian struggle for national independence;
c) Contrasting genuine Ukrainian historical experience with the interpretation of the WW2 imposed by the ‘Soviet empire’ and associated with it relics (e.g. contrasting old militarist Victory Day with the newly installed Reconciliation and Remembrance Day, and Day of Defender of Ukraine associated with UPA);
d) Condemning the Soviet Union for its crimes in WW2;
e) Equating historical experience of Ukrainians in WW2 with contemporary warfare in Eastern Ukraine;
f) Equating the soldiers of the Red Army and Ukrainian nationalist underground movement and claiming legitimacy of Ukrainian nationalist underground in the struggle over Nazism

According to analyzed narrative data, every memory agent brings the themes in different configurations: addressing the majority of the themes at once (the president) or preferring to address one theme or some themes predominantly (the parliament, the UINR). This reflects the status of the memory agent in elite-mythmaking. On the one hand, the president’s commemorative speeches usually address all themes, always legitimize Ukrainians in different armies, and relate historical wartime experiences to the contemporary agenda. This reflects both the symbolic role of the president as the head of state addressing the nation and as a foreign policy decision-maker. On the other, the UINR addresses issues related to defining the Soviet past and the Soviet Union’s role in WW2 based on its status as a governmental institution using its expertise to engage with the issues in detail. At the same time, in parliamentary discussions, MPs engaged in elevating Ukrainian nationalist underground more, which reflects Parliament’s role as a stakeholder over the issue of legal recognition and MPs partisan involvement over the issue.

As to consistency between the agents, the president’s and the UINR’s stances usually coincide. In fact, the presidential May 8 and 9 speeches reproduced whole passages from the UINR official guidelines. In the parliament, some MPs opposed new WW2 remembrance on several occasions (Shufrych, Vilkul in VRU, 2016c). However, this should not suggest that the ‘Great Patriotic War’ discourse has vanished, but rather that its vocal supporters, former Party of Regions members, have chosen to avoid confrontation with the majority of MPs, who support the new framework. For the same reason, apparently, no one spoke out against them when ‘de-communization’ laws were discussed.
4.1.1. The President

The pattern of protagonizing the Ukrainians and antagonizing the Soviet Union can be identified in Presidential speeches and addresses. The presidential strategy is to disengage the genuine Ukrainian perspective on WW2 from the Soviet past by claiming statelessness, condemn crimes of the Soviet Union, and legitimize the experiences of the Ukrainians regardless of wartime sides in the nation’s victory over Nazism.

Foremost, in president’s view, the defining characteristic of Ukrainians in WW2 is their statelessness. This creates a paradoxical situation where the Ukrainians are seen as a ‘victorious nation’ contributing to transnational victory over Nazism, and granting liberty to other European nations, yet, being unfree themselves. The role of the Soviet government is usually downplayed by the president. As the president said during 2015 commemorations in May:

“Ukraine, even though not as an independent state, but due to its immense contribution to victory over Nazism – became a member of Anti-Hitler’s coalition. The Ukrainian people rightfully joined the victorious nations and the founders of the United Nations” (Poroshenko, 2015c)

As the passage shows, the president considers and equates Ukrainians’ contribution as a nation to the Allies’ victory over Nazism. Interestingly, he states that this was the ‘Ukrainian people’ (ukrainskiy narod), who joined the United Nations, and not the government of the Ukrainian SSR. This was ‘invaluable Ukrainians’ contribution in common victory of European nations over Nazism’, which is usually emphasized by the president (2015h). The president understands the protagonist as a Ukrainian national community. In order to downplay being a part of the USSR and continue the legal line of mythmaking, in which the Soviet state-building in Ukraine is argued to be illegitimate, this rhetorical strategy protagonizes the stateless nation versus the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. As a rule, the notion of statelessness immediately follows stating the contribution of Ukrainians. As the president said when addressing the Parliament:

“Ukraine, which was not an independent state, however became the member of Anti-Hitler’s coalition de facto, and we, Ukrainians, became a glorious nation. However, the end of WW2 did not give Ukraine liberty” (Poroshenko, 2015d)

Moreover, condemning the Soviet Union provides a moral ground for alienating the Soviet past: when this past is disentangled and there is no attachment to it, than it is possible to juxtapose genuine Ukrainian experiences to the false Soviet framework of WW2.
According to the president, these are ‘Kremlin leaders’, ‘communist regime’, ‘henchmen of the Soviet regime’ (2015g; 2016i) being condemn for mass repressions during WW2. Consequently, ‘crimes of communism’, ‘victims of communist regime’ justify disregarding both ‘Soviet-Russian imperial’ understanding of WW2 and eradicating the Soviet past from the public spaces. The Soviet Union, or ‘country of communist regime, in which paranoid intention to subjugate all nations of the Soviet empire, keep them in fear and obedience, was realized’ (2015g) is blamed as a ‘source’ of not only repressions, but as negative actor fueling WW2 (2015d). Therefore, ‘millions of Ukrainians exterminated by Bolshevism’ oblige contemporaries to eradicate ‘Soviet ideological junk’ from the public spaces (2016i). Administrative action to remove the symbols is ‘an issue of national security’, and the president ‘will not allow Novorossyian toponyms to slander Ukraine’ (2016i).

Finally, disentangling the Soviet past leads to discovering ‘new horizons of historical cognition’ (2015d), which includes the previously suppressed memory about nationalist underground (2015c; 2016d, g, j), shifting to 1939 and including Ukrainians in Allied Armies in WW2 remembrance (2015c, d; 2016g).

However, occasionally, the president undermines his reasoning himself. For instance, there is a tension to frame statelessness and being victorious at the same time. This tension is well exemplified with president’s attitude towards the Red Army’s role in WW2. On the one hand, in landmark commemorative speeches on May 8 and May 9, the president prefers to speak about contribution of the Ukrainians overall. On the other hand, in smaller address regarding liberation of Ukraine’s territory, the president continues to speak about the Red Army’s contribution:

“Victorious 22-months long battle for Ukraine became decisive reason of Nazi Germany and its allies defeat. The military pathways of proudly named the ‘Ukrainian fronts’ covered territory from Dnipro to Elba, from Kyiv to Vienna, to Prague and Berlin. Of course, not only Ukrainians took part in combat on that fronts. And, of course, Ukrainians took part on the other fronts of WW2. These were them [meaning Ukrainians in the Red Army] who participated in expulsion of Nazis from Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugolsavia, Austria and Czechoslovakia, and stormed the Reichstag.” (Poroshenko, 2016i)

On another occasion, the president inadvertently legitimizes Ukraine’s Soviet past by implying that the Soviet Union was not an antagonist in WW2. When addressing modern Ukraine’s hardships and condemning Russia’s aggression, the president states:

“Nowadays in the East of Europe, the unprecedented violation of international law since Hitler and Stalin is taking place. Insidious and greedy empire again does not count with states borders and tries to expand its living space. Ukraine again is resisting but only with one difference-
the enemy came not from the West, but from the East” (Poroshenko, 2016g; bold typeface added; similar passage in 2015d)

Altogether this suggests additional complications for the president as a memory agent to address being both a victorious nation and, yet, not having freedom on its own, and to keep to the notion of stateless protagonist and ‘de-Sovietize’ (Yurchuk, 2017) any reference to Ukrainians in WW2 consistently. As Yurchuk notes, ‘it proves difficult to eradicate the past that one was once a part of’ with memory agents continuing to ‘work within the old Soviet tradition from which they strive to distance themselves’ (2017, p. 105). In this thesis, however, it is rather the president, who exemplifies the tension. Whereas the UINR and MPs confine themselves easily to ‘de-Sovietizing’ rhetoric. This may suggest that the president keeps to a symbolic obligation to accommodate different wartime experiences when addressing the nation, while other memory agents hold more partisan-inclined views on the past.

4.1.2. The Parliament

Analyzed parliamentary sessions concentrated predominantly on relating wartime experiences to the contemporary agenda, and elevating the Ukrainian nationalist underground. On the one hand, since early 2014, the topics related to WW2 appeared in parliamentary discussions following the development of Russian aggression. For instance, some nationalist MPs compared and equated Russian aggression to Nazi Germany actions (Tiagnybok, Liashko in VRU, 2014b). Also, Crimean Tatars deportation in 1944 appeared in the discussions (Poroshenko, Herashchenko in VRU, 2014, Teteruk, Hopko in VRU, 2015c; Chubarov, 2015d; Liashko, Chubarov in VRU, 2015e; Dzhemilev, 2015; Hopko, Parubiy, Illienko in VRU, 2016c; Parubiy in VRU, 2016d).

Nevertheless, the major finding with regard to analyzed parliamentary sessions is that MPs establish continuity between wartime Ukrainians in the nationalist underground and Ukrainians nowadays. In this logic, the nationalist underground exemplifies the liberation struggle of the 20th century, and its experiences is seen to be continued in modern day Ukraine and invoked when speaking about contemporary events. As Yuriy Lutsenko stated:

“I recall coming to Lviv’s maidan and saying that this is only because we have Halychyna region, whole Ukraine can obtain liberty in the Revolution of Dignity; only because troops of UPA have sacrificed themselves, we have Euromaidan Self-Defense and
volunteer battalions in the East nowadays, and this country has a chance” (Lutsenko in VRU, 2015a)

The other people’s deputy argued about ‘spiritual line of Ukrainianess’ between the UPA and modern patriotic mobilization (Yavorivskiy, in VRU, 2014c). Similarly, the line of inheritance or ‘historical continuum’ between historical and present-day freedom fighters was stated numerously (Tiagnybok, Kyrylenko, Doniy in VRU, 2014c; Beresiuk, Mosiychuk, Lutsenko in VRU, 2015a)

The national liberation is struggle exemplified by the underground during WW2 motivates restoring ‘historical justice’ and granting legal recognition to wartime nationalists (Parubiy, Medunycia, Mosiychuk, Liashko in VRU, 2015a; Liashko in 2015d). As the Speaker of Parliament said during the session extensively devoted to OUN-UPA, and which has ended with the ‘de-communization’ laws adoption:

“our struggle is one hundred years long war [...]. One hundred years we are waging war against Russian imperialism and Russian occupation. This is the time to honor those people, who under the national flag and Trident fought for the Ukrainian state, from behalf of [modern] Ukrainian state.” (Parubiy in VRU, 2015a)

It is important to add that the notion of obligation to commemorate the nationalist underground (Liahsko, Stoyko, Turchynov in VRU, 2014c; Viatrovych, Shuhevych, Krul’ko, Holovko in VRU, 2015a; Medunycia in VRU, 2015c; Kniazytskiy in VRU, 2016c) is usually accompanied with the refrain that if there was no nationalists’ liberation struggle during WW2, Ukraine would not have emerged as an independent state decades after. This suggests teleological sequencing of narrative on WW2, in which the goal of achieving national independence is implied in relation to the past and proscribed to proceeding events.

4.1.3. The UINR

The UINR is the memory agent that provides the myth-making endeavor with appearance of professional expertise. Similarly to the president, the UINR disentangles the Ukrainian perspective on WW2 by arguing statelessness and alienating the Soviet past. The UINR’s publications focus on two things: condemnation of the Soviet Union role in WW2, drawing negative image of the Soviet Union with regard to its outbreak and development, and focusing on stateless Ukrainians as the main protagonist. Table 2 summarizes what is being communicated about protagonist and antagonist with the
disseminated narrative in greater detail with bibliographical references (see the Table 2 in Annex 1).

Foremost, the analyzed UINRs publications focus on rebuking the framework of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ remembrance as a ‘Soviet historiographic and ideological construction’, which helps to shift the beginning of the war to 1939 (Prymachenko, 2016a, p. 14). In this logic, the concept itself and the Soviet interpretation of WW2 at large were imposed unto Ukrainians and, as Prymachenko notes, the interpretation ‘does not correspond to the experience of the Ukrainian people during WW2’ (Prymachenko, 2016a, p. 14). In contrast, the Ukrainian experience of WW2 is related to ethnic Ukrainians’ experiences already in 1939 as a part of different states and regimes. Thus, it is stated that Ukrainians in Zakarpattia region, who resisted annexation of the region by the Hungarian army in early 1939, and Ukrainians in the Polish Army in September of 1939, were the first to experience the unfolding of WW2 (UINR, 2015b, p. 4, 6, 8-9; also Horobets, 2016a).

Secondly, this reasoning to refute Soviet interpretation of WW2 assists in antagonizing the Soviet period of Ukraine’s past. On one occasion, it is made by equating ‘Soviet’ and ‘Bolshevik’ for instance. Also, the negative attitude towards the Soviet state building as alien is prescribed to all Ukrainians. As Prymachenko argues:

“Only eight years had passed after the Holodomor⁹, and three after the Great Terror. For preceding WW2 decades, the communist regime exterminated at least five million people in Ukraine. Many considered the beginning of the Soviet-German war as opportunity to be free from Bolshevism” (Prymachenko, 2016a, p. 16)

Another UINR’s publication relies on pre-Soviet national building efforts in Ukraine in order to antagonize the Soviet past. In the context of discussing Ukrainians’ dividedness in the late 1930s between the USSR and other Eastern European states, the UINR makes reference to Kyiv’s provisional government of the Ukrainian Peoples Republic of 1917 (UNR), to show imposed character of statelessness before WW2:

“The Ukrainian revolution began earlier than in other countries of the region: in Lithuania, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia and the Balkans.

In December 1917, after the Kharkiv puppet government was formed and the Bolsheviks proclaimed a “Soviet Ukraine”, the Russian Bolsheviks unleashed war against Ukraine.

The fight against the Bolsheviks continued until 1921. This war and other conflicts exhausted Ukraine and it lost its independence” (UINR, 2015b, p. 8; see also Zinchenko et al., 2016)

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⁹ The Holodomor refers to man-made famine of 1932-1933 in the Soviet Ukraine
Importantly, this imposed statelessness is a major characteristic, which defines Ukrainian wartime experience. As Horobets states in the other UINR’s publication:

“The absence of its own state was a tragedy of the Ukrainian people, and, consequently, of its dividedness between warring parties of the conflict. In the beginning of German aggression against the USSR, Ukrainians were in the whirlpool of the great war for more than two years already.” (Horobets, 2016a, p. 29)

Furthermore, the UINR’s publications draw negative image of the Soviet Union, especially with regard to the outbreak and initial developments of WW2. Drawing a negative image is exemplified with condemning the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in 1939-1941 (Maiorov, 2016a, b; Horobets, 2016b; Galushko, 2016a; Pavlov, 2016a). In the Ukrainian context, it also means claiming that ‘the Soviets’ were not ‘liberators’ of Western Ukraine in September of 1939 (UINR, 2015b, p. 11; Zinchenko et al., 2016; Zinchneko, 2016b). Some authors make an effort to establish transnational remembrance of WW2 by including the Katyn massacres of Polish officers in the Ukrainian narrative of WW2 (UINR, 2015b, p. 10; Zinchenko, 2016a, c).

Also, the UINR’s publications refutes the Soviet propaganda myths related to WW2 developments in Ukraine. This includes revealing military losses and defeats of 1941 to undermine the unquestionable Soviet heroic interpretation of WW2 (Riabenko, 2016b), disregarding ‘Panfilov’s 28 Guardsmen’ as fabricated by Soviet military journalists case (Pavlov, 2016b), blaming Crimean Tatars for mass collaboration and justifying their repression in 1944 (Gromenko, 2016c, d, e), ‘silencing’ unpleasant past and developing false historiographical framework of WW2 (Riabenko, 2016f; Yaremenko, 2016).

This constant motive to condemn the Soviet Union leads to a paradoxical situation when discussion of the Soviet wartime crimes goes without a critical engagement with the fact that Ukrainians constituted a considerable part of the Red Army or the Soviet partisan movement (Riabenko, 2016e; Butko and Riabenko, 2016). In this relation, Riabenko devoted his entry to Red Army’s crimes against civilians on the territory of defeated Germany. By citing the Red Army soldiers’ letters as well as referring to preventive measures taken by the Soviet military command to uphold discipline, the entry speculates over the issues of looting and mass rape and argues that ‘the crimes were nor rare. For committing the criminal offenses many Red Army soldiers were sentenced by military tribunals’ (Riabenko, 2016 e, p. 215).
One passage is revealing in a sense of trying to legitimize its point by relying on ‘official Russian historiography’ but, in the same time, avoids expanding on what could be the Ukrainian perspective on the issue:

“The facts [events] of crimes against civilians were mass and are undeniable to such extent that even the official Russian historiography recognizes them. According to O. Rzeshevskiy, the president of the Association of historians of WW2, tribunals sentenced for offenses 4, 148 officers and great number of ordinary soldiers for the first few months of 1945 only” (Riabenko, 2016e, p. 217; bold typeface added)

The UINR tries to distance Ukrainians from the Soviet Union by arguing the Ukrainians’ statelessness in general. One UINR’s publication appropriates concepts existing in the Western scholarship to its own ends. As the UINR’s argues without referring to Timothy Snyder’s work directly:

“The victims of this clash of two totalitarianisms were both the military and civilian Ukrainians, the area between the Carpathians and the Don River became known as the ‘Bloodlands’. That was the price Ukrainians paid for a lack of their own independent state” (UINR, 2015b, p. 4)

Continuing this reasoning, Horobets stated that the Soviet troops ‘did not liberated [Ukraine] from the occupants, but only expelled them. The expulsion of the occupants did not bring freedom to Ukraine, but only different totalitarian regime’ (Horobets, 2016d). In other words, the end of the war brings the issue of Ukrainian statelessness back again (UINR, 2015b, p. 22-23)

The same pattern of protagonizing the Ukrainians exemplified with disseminated by UINR video-materials. Generally, the materials substantiate a general framework of remembrance already specified in UINR’s program documents as well as commemorate individual acts of military vigor in new pantheon of wartime heroes. The latter group is devoted to UPA’s underground fighters, Ukrainians in the Soviet military and intelligence, and Ukrainians in the Armies of Allies (see UINR and the Government, 2015d, e, f, g, h).

On the one hand, the visual materials use biographical stories of Ukrainians in the Allies’ armed forces to move from speaking about Soviet Ukrainians only in the new representation of the past. By referencing to individual biographies, the narrative establishes Ukrainian contributions to the victory over Nazism as part of transnational remembrance of WW2. One video-material (UCMC and UINR, 2015) speaks of profound losses of the war and its catastrophic impact and withdraws from praising the victory in WW2 at all.
On the other hand, they provide a framework for remembering wartime heroes regardless of wartime sides in a somewhat reconciliatory manner. In this logic, Soviet military men and women (UIINR and the Government, 2015d, g; UIINR and “UA: Ukraine”, 2016a) and nationalist underground fighters (UIINR and the Government, 2015f; UIINR and “UA: Ukraine”, 2016c) equally worth commemoration. Moreover, when it comes to defining the sides to which Ukrainians were part of, several video-clips frame Ukrainians as taking part in international endeavor to combat Nazism (UIINR and the Government, 2015a, b) and ending up as one of the United Nations founders (ibid., 2015c). In other words, the precise armies and sides matter and being mentioned when discussing discrete biographies, but overall endeavor is attributed to the national community of Ukrainians as a whole during WW2.

The other remarkable finding concerns the relation between WW2 and the War in Donbas in analyzed narrative. In this regard, three of the analyzed video-materials accompany narration of private letters to the fronts of WW2 with the footage of the fighting in Eastern Ukraine in 2014-2016. The three materials cite unnamed mother-to-son or son-to-father letters (UIINR, 2015a, b, c) in a manner that invokes direct analogy with the contemporary war. The remaining video-material features 97-years old war veteran speaking about losing his grandson, the National Guard soldier, in the Donbas war (UIINR, 2015d). By doing so, disseminated video-materials establish the link, in one occasion autobiographical one, between different wartime experiences, and equate the experiences across the times.

4.2. Key events: Ukrainian nationalist underground, the Holocaust and Volyn massacres of 1943

4.2.1 The Ukrainian nationalists

The new narrative of WW2 draws a preferable image of Ukrainian nationalist underground (OUN and UPA). The memory agents of elite-mythmaking include and justify the Ukrainian nationalists into new representation of WW2.

The president’s framing of the nationalist underground has a three-fold structure. Usually, the president refers to wartime nationalists as example of military vigor for the contemporaries to follow (Poroshenko, 2015b; 2016d, j). Moreover, the mentioning of members of OUN-UPA goes along with mentioning of the military and political
organizations from pre-WW2 and pre-Soviet past (1917-1922) (ibid.). This again suggests that the narrative of WW2 is also a narrative about the whole Soviet past.

Moreover, in presidential speeches and addresses, it is common to equate Red Army soldiers and veterans with the fighters of nationalist underground (Poroshenko, 2015c, d, h; 2016i, g). In this logic, Red Army and UPA’s veterans were both fighters for Ukraine’s freedom, and, thus, equally worthy of commemoration from behalf of the contemporaries. Domestically, these military and paramilitary organizations exemplify the protagonists of the narrative in the first place. As the president said on the occasion of 2015 May 9 commemoration:

“Going back to the Second World War, it should be said that alongside the leading role of the Red Army, the Ukrainian fronts and Soviet partisan movements, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army opened the second internal front against fascist invaders. The UPA considered Ukraine as independent state already back then, and not as a part of the Soviet Empire” (Poroshenko, 2015c)

Internationally, the president states overall contribution of the Ukrainians in UPA, Red Army and the Armies of Allies to victory over Nazism. In the same speech, president stated:

“The Ukrainians [Ukrainstvo] of the whole world has contributed to fight with Nazis. As a part of the armies of Anti-Hitler’s coalition: the American, British, Canadian and the others. In the resistance movements of different European countries. On the fronts of Europe, North Africa and South-East Asia, the Pacific and Atlantic oceans” (ibid.; see also similar in content passage in Poroshenko, 2016g)

Finally, the president invokes historical experience of WW2 in relation to contemporary fighting in Eastern Ukraine (2014; 2015h; 2016b). Again, analyzed speeches suggest a directional understanding of Ukraine’s 20th century past meaning that experiences of WW2, and of historical nationalist underground, are contextualized into an overarching story of national liberation. National liberation aspiration unites contemporary fighters with historical fighters for Ukrainian independence.

Already in 2014, the president referred to the relevance of WW2 experiences for the contemporaries. In 2014 speech on Independence Day, the president invoked direct analogies between WW2 and unfolding military conflict in Donbas. As the president stated:

“The events of last several months became for us genuine war, even though undeclared. It may be commemorated as Patriotic War of 2014 in the future. As the war against foreign aggression. The war for Ukraine, its liberty, dignity and people. For Independence!” (Poroshenko, 2014)

10 The original word “ukrainstvo” is a stronger than “ukraintsyi” singular noun that refer to the nation as a whole.
The same speech was the first to equate various military formations from Ukrainian past in a sequential line of inheritance and to elevate Ukrainian wartime nationalists. By doing so, the president establishes a historical continuity between formations and experiences of the past and the present:

“Our Armed Forces, the National Guard, the Border Guard, volunteer battalions have inherited the glory of Kyiv Rus Knyazs’ armies and Zaporozhian Sych, Ukrainian Sych Riflemen and the fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the army of Ukrainian People’s Republic and Ukrainians protecting Ukraine in the Red Army” (Poroshenko, 2014)

Moreover, when addressing young graduates of the military lyceum in Kyiv, the president spoke on how newly installed commemorative Day of Defender of Ukraine associated with UPA (October 14) resonates with the contemporaries:

“[…] These words were many times proven by Ukrainian Sych Riflemen, soldiers of Ukrainian Galician Army, troops of Ukrainian People’s Republic[11], and fighters of UPA […] However, foremost this holiday, which was established by my decision last year, will resonate with contemporary heroes, participants of the war for our independence, participants of the Anti-Terrorist operation and combat.” (Poroshenko, 2015b)

The year after, the president again has established direct continuity between historical Ukrainian military formations. This time as opposing to the false Soviet/Russian tradition to celebrate the creation of the Red Army (February 23):

“Two year ago I decided to withdraw from false celebration of the main military holiday according to aggressor-state’s calendar. And new commemorative date has naturalized extremely quickly. Why? Because its roots in old Pokrova holiday, which used to be honored by our Cossack ancestors. Its roots in Sych’s hovels and in bunkers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army” (Poroshenko, 2016d)

In parliamentary sessions devoted to legal recognition of nationalist underground, nationalists only are considered to exemplify national liberation struggle, MPs justify nationalists as exemplifying ultimate and genuine Ukrainian wartime experience. This induces the MPs to frame the issue in terms of obligation to remember and engage Ukrainian nationalists as legitimate part of WW2 remembrance by available legal means (Parubiy, Medunycia, Mosiychuk, Liashko in VRU, 2015a; Viatrovych, Shuhevych, Krul’ko, Holovko in VRU, 2015a; Medunycia in VRU, 2015c; Kniazytskiy in VRU, 2016c).

The UINR’s publications follow the general trend to elevate wartime nationalists. On the one hand, the nationalist underground is seen as ultimately ‘Ukrainian’. As UINR’s publication stated when discussing Ukrainians’ contribution in WW2, ‘but only one army formation fought under the Ukrainian flag during the war – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’

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(2015b, p. 4). Also, in the same publication, Remembrance institute places UPA’s contribution in victory over Nazism alongside states’ military formations, i.e. the Red Army, the US Army etc. (ibid., p. 7). On the other hand, domestically-oriented UINR’s publication (Viatrovych et al., 2016) takes an openly apologetic and condescending framing of the wartime nationalist underground, which is considered to be comparable in nature to Western European resistance movements (Bigun, 2016a, b, c, d, e; Isaiuk, 2016a; Riabenko, 2016d; Butko and Riabenko, 2016; Viatrovych 2016b).

The UINR’s publications usually omit existing in Western scholarship controversies around nationalist underground (see footnote to Annex 1). Interestingly, for foreign audiences, UINR elaborates on the underground as example of anti-communist and anti-Nazi resistance movement (UINR, 2015b, p. 18-19). In domestically-oriented publications, the authors additionally take openly whitewashing stances. The head of the institute, for instance, denied at once exclusionary and xenophobic strains of nationalists’ ideology and aspiration to build a mono-ethnic Ukrainian state (Viatrovych, 2016b). Moreover, several entries tolerate collaboration of Ukrainian nationalists with Nazi Germany in the initial years of WW2 (prior to 1943). In such cases, the emphasis is placed on national liberation aspirations of the nationalists, which considered service in German military structures as a tool to achieve national independence (Isaiuk and Riabenko, 2016; Isaiuk, 2016a). In this logic, for instance, Wehrmacht’s military units “Roland” and “Nachtigall” recruited from Ukrainian nationalists and taking part in offensive against the Soviet Union in 1941 are seen as proto-Ukrainian national army. Interestingly, motives and intentions of Ukrainian nationalists to collaborate with Nazi Germany are prescribed to Ukrainians in general. As Isaiuk argues:

“Ukrainians were in need of allies in creating national military structures. The circle of possible allies was narrow, as far as the activity of these units was directed against the powers between which Ukrainians was divided […] And, for this reason, there was a need to find suitable ally, who would assist in creating future national army. Germany was considered to be suitable ally because of the common enemy – the Soviet Union” (Isaiuk, 2016a, p. 136)

The same entry emphasizes that created units had never belonged German SS (Schutzstaffel) units, but were ‘in operational command of Wehrmacht’ (ibid., p. 136). This juxtaposition of SS and service in Wehrmacht, or even service in German auxiliary police (ibid., p. 138), is repeated in the other entry on Ukrainian nationalists and German military (Isaiuk and Riabenko, 2016, p. 124-125). Apparently, claiming that these recruited from

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12 The commander of the Nachtigall Battalion was Roman Shukhevych - the future Supreme commander of the UPA. On intricacies of Shukhevych’s biography and mentioned military formations see more in Rudling, 2016
nationalists military units were not part of SS legitimizes them in the logic of the authors. Also, on one occasion, Isaiuk and Riabenko take rather condescending attitude to Waffen-SS volunteers. The following passage on division Waffen-SS “Galizien” is particularly revealing:

“Although the formation had had the notion of “SS” in its title prior to April 1945, the division from its beginning was only a military formation. For this reason, it belonged not to structures of general SS (Allgemeine SS), but to so called troops of SS (Waffen SS) […] Division ‘Halychyna’ was intended for military combat on the front alongside Wehrmacht” (Isaiuk and Riabenko, 2016, p. 125)

Although Isaiuk and Riabenko described that ‘Halychyna’ division engaged in combat with approaching into Western Ukraine the Red Army, and was used to suppress Slovak anti-Nazi uprising as well as Tito’s partisans in the Balkans13, they do not make any normative judgment over the issues but rather just document division’s military record (ibid., p. 126-127).

4.2.2. The Holocaust

The Holocaust has not emerged as a separate topic in elite-mythmaking of WW2 in modern Ukraine. The most striking is the cases of analyzed parliamentary sessions, during which notions of the Holocaust, Shoah or extermination of Jews have never been brought into discussions. The President and UINR have addressed or mentioned the topic of the Holocaust. However, in both cases, the topic has surfaced depending on intended audiences of disseminated texts and speeches.

In the case of the president, there is no consistency between different speeches. On the one hand, in Babyn Yar speech (2016f), president has addressed the issue of the Holocaust in Ukraine and framed it as part of the European remembrance of WW2. In the speech, the president addressed the topic of local Ukrainian collaboration in the Holocaust14. As it is argued previously in this thesis, revealing local participation in the Holocaust is usually seen as part of Europeanizing national discourses on WW2 (see e.g. Lebow, 2006). Moreover, in recent address on Holocaust Remembrance Day (2017a), the president spoke on preserving memory about the Holocaust, and dangers of totalitarian ideologies cultivating hate and crimes against humanity. On the other hand, the topic does

13 On wartime pathway of the Division see Rudling, 2012b and Khromeychuk, 2013
14 It is important to point out that the 75th anniversary of Babyn Yar shootings in Kyiv in September 2016 had an unprecedented international exposure and attention. Number of foreign dignitaries, including Presidents of Israel, Germany and European Council visited official mourning ceremony in Kyiv. See highlights about the event in Associated Press (AP, 2016) or President of EC Donald Tusk’s speech (2016)
not emerge in other presidential speeches and addresses, including devoted to 8 and 9 May (2015c, d, h; 2016g). For instance, on the occasion of Day of the liberation of Nazi concentration camps, the president did not mention Jewish victims of Nazism, but spoke in general terms about ‘millions of victims’ of Nazi camps, including ‘mass killings of prisoners of the war, civilians and children’ (2016c), and ‘millions of our fellow co-patriots’ (2017b), who ceased in the camps. Interestingly, in both cases, the president substantiated his speeches with either mentioning contemporary ‘captives and unjustly convicted in Russia and occupied by Russia territory’ (2015c) or with equating ‘Nazi camps’ and ‘Soviet gulags’ (2017b).

This leads to a conclusion that topic of Holocaust appears in presidential speeches depending on the level of international exposure of the event, as it was in the case of 75th anniversary of Babyn Yar shootings in Kyiv, or the occasion itself, as it was in the case of the Holocaust Remembrance Day address.

The Remembrance institute has addressed Holocaust differently depending on intended audiences of its texts. In analyzed English-language UINR’s publication (UINR, 2015b), Holocaust is mentioned and addressed when speaking about Ukrainians honored as the ‘Righteous among the Nations’ (UINR, 2015b, p. 5, 17) and Nazi crimes on territory of Ukraine (ibid., p. 16-17). The publications also mentioned local collaboration in one passage (ibid., p. 6). However, “The War and the Myth” (Viatrovych et al., 2016), which has been published only in Ukrainian, takes a situational mentioning of the Holocaust and Babyn Yar. Table 3 summarizes what is said about Nazi extermination of Jews in Ukraine according to the latter UINR’s publication, discusses context of when Holocaust, Babyn Yar or extermination of Ukrainian Jews are mentioned, and provides bibliographical reference (see Annex 2). As Table 3 illustrates, the Holocaust either appears in unrelated context to the issue of European-wide extermination of Jews or even in whitewashing context in the case of one author.

In general, neither presidential speeches nor UINR’s publications address or discuss the Holocaust as separate or significant topic of modern WW2 remembrance in Ukraine. Importantly, topic of the Holocaust resurfaces in speeches and texts of memory agents in relation to intended (foreign) audiences of disseminated information. Thus, because of the context of the event, in which Holocaust appears in presidential speeches, and the content of minor and scattered mentioning of it in UINR’s publications, it may be argued that the Holocaust is anomaly in newly forged narrative of WW2.
4.2.3. The Volyn massacres of 1943

The case of Volyn ethnic cleansing has not been addressed clearly or discussed in substance. The topic of Volyn appeared in reaction to Polish Parliament’s July 2016 vote to recognize the issue as genocide of the Ukrainian nationalists perpetrated against Polish civilians. This event had a reaction from behalf of the President and the UINR in the forms of press releases or commenting for domestic media (see e.g. Duda and Poroshenko, 2016; UNIAN, 2016). As such, Volyn massacres did not appear in analyzed UINR’s publications or presidential addresses, eligible for examining them as part of official governmental elite-mythmaking in this thesis.15

The Volyn massacres of 1943 was discussed in separate Parliament’s statement and two supporting parliamentary factions’ statements. The VRU statement (VRU, 2016a) was adopted following developments in Poland in the form of response to Polish Parliament.

Firstly, the VRU statement constantly avoids addressing the event of purging civilians in the first place. It never uses direct references, but always broad terms of ‘tragic pages of Ukrainian-Polish history, which concern the events in Volyn’, ‘Polish-Ukrainian conflict’, ‘innocent victims: Poles and Ukrainians’ (VRU, 2016a). Also, it broadens timespan of the event from 1943, which has direct association with UPA emergence, to speaking about ‘1940s’ generally.

Secondly, the statement did not mention or name the Ukrainian nationalist underground, or OUN and UPA, at all. The phrase ‘Ukrainian nationalists’ appears twice when the document cites the titles of Polish Parliament’s document on the issue of Volyn. Finally, the statement takes quasi-reconciliatory language and does not bring issues or notions of guilt and responsibility. Instead, it uses phrases ‘reconciliation’ and ‘forgiveness’ in a manner if mutual reconciliation has been already achieved. In this relation, the document has stated that contemporaries made ‘a lot for mutual forgiveness and commemoration of Ukrainians and Poles that had been killed during the conflict of 1940s’ (ibid.). Moreover, it considers the developments in Poland to legally frame the issue

15 It should be noted that since July 2016, UINR has engaged in commenting on the issue in two forms. Firstly, the head of the Institute, Volodymyr Viatrovych, commented on the issue for domestic audience. For instance, on February 28, 2017, Mr Viatrovych delivered a public lecture in the premises of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University entitled ‘Volyn’43: Why memory divides Poland and Ukraine’, and engaged into discussion with Polish historian Grzegorz Motyka over the issue. Secondly, co-workers of the UINR are active social media users. The topic of Volyn appears in social media groups of academic historians and UINR’s professionals (see historians.in.ua on facebook.com). However, content analysis of social media profiles is beyond design of this thesis.
of anti-Polish ethnic cleansing as unilateral ‘politcization of history’ (ibid.), which damages the diplomatic and strategic partnership between two countries. Similarly, ‘Narodnij Front’ has urged to focus on contemporary Polish-Ukrainian relations, avoid damaging the relations rather than addressing the issue of Volyn on its own (Faction ‘Nardonij Front’, 2016). ‘Batkivshhina’ faction asserted the developments as ‘slandering the Ukrainian nation and dignity of Ukrainians’ (Faction ‘Batkivshhina’, 2016).

By employing this three-fold tactics, the VRU statement dilutes addressing the event of Volyn-1943. Paradoxically but, according to the document, events in Volyn in 1943 turn from unilateral act of ethnic cleansing to bilateral Polish-Ukrainian conflict of the 1940s, the perpetrators remain unnamed, and, consequently, issues of guilt and facing responsibility are left aside and never addressed.

4.3. *Narrative’s character*

Getting down to the category of narrative’s character, it may be said that the narrative combines glorifying with omissions in the case of nationalist underground, and, basically, omits the Holocaust and wrongdoing of Volyn of 1943. To remind briefly, the category of narrative’s character focuses on how key events are described by memory agents of elite-mythmaking of WW2 in terms of glorification, whitewashing, shifting responsibility, or critical acknowledgment of wrongdoing. Importantly, self-glorification refers to ‘positive self-image’ encompassed in elevating national pride and virtues (Pääbo, 2011). Glorification may take form of praising heroism or heroic victimhood (see more in Pääbo, 2011, p. 60-61, He, 2007, p. 45). At the same time, whitewashing is usually exemplified with omissions or outright denials (ibid.). In this relation, memory agents of elite-mythmaking praise the nationalist underground for its national liberation aspiration and withdraw from addressing controversies around the wartime nationalists. Moreover, in comparison with other memory agents, the UINR makes further steps in drawing preferable images of the underground in more detail in its publications. This goes against a critical attitude of the Western peer-reviewed and English-language scholarship towards the underground and suggests that UINR’s activities fall into category of ‘militant historians’ (Mink, 2008) or ‘mnemonic warriors’ (Bernhard and Kubik, 2014) who consider their ‘history’ as an ultimate truth to be incorporated and remembered.

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16 See more in literature review by Umland, 2017
Furthermore, as a consequence of the apologetic attitude to wartime nationalists’ organizations, memory agents rather avoid addressing controversies around Ukrainian ‘dark pasts’. In this regard, only the president has attempted to incorporate the Holocaust into Ukrainian WW2 remembrance. However, as this thesis argues, these attempts were rather situational. Similarly, the UINR undertook pragmatic approach to addressing the Holocaust by employing different tactics for intended foreign or domestic audiences. Finally, the ‘dark past’ of Volyn remained unaddressed with memory agents reacting to memory activism on the issue from abroad. This may be explained with additional hardship to accommodate image of OUN – UPA as glorious resistance movement with strains of exclusionary ideology and act of ethnic cleansing.

4.4. **Narrative’s plot: ‘stateless victimhood’**

This category unites the categories of protagonist & antagonist, key events and narrative’s character and contemplates over a pattern between the elements. The narrative reproduces a pattern of ‘stateless victimhood’ by focusing on statelessness, antagonizing the Soviet Union, positioning protagonist against to ‘two totalitarianisms’.

Firstly, the narrative of WW2 places emphasis on statelessness of Ukrainians as the nation’s main characteristic. Either in the presidential speeches or in the UINR’s publications, stateless Ukrainians as a nation have contributed to the victory over Nazism. The Ukrainians are seen as co-equal to the Allies in their’ contribution in victory and ending up as the United Nations co-founder.

Secondly, the narrative ascribes the notion of a goal of national liberation to WW2 and the whole 20th century. The national liberation is implied when describing wartime developments, and, in this relation, victory over Nazism did not bring genuine liberation to the Ukrainians. One heading in UINR’s publication about the ‘return’ of the Soviet Union to the territory of Ukraine suggests formula that can be applied to the narrative as a whole: ‘victory, but not liberation’ (UINR, 2015b, p. 22). Importantly, memory agents of elite-mythmaking establish continuity between pre-WW2 and modern Ukrainian

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17 The term ‘stateless victimhood’ belongs to Yuliya Yurchuk (2017). According to Yurchuk, ‘unifying element’ of contemporary Ukrainian memory politics id: “the narrative of stateless victimhood, which conveyed the story of Ukrainians who were fighting for other’s interests. As Ukrainians had no country of their own, they were used by others states in pursuit of often-contradictory interests” (2017, p. 93). The term applies to this thesis as well.
statehood, and invest in Ukrainian nationalist underground as exemplifying liberation cause.

Thirdly, the narrative portrays the Soviet Union negatively and glorifies anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist underground. Due to the Soviet regime’s crimes and negative role in the outbreak and developments of WW2, the Soviet Union is condemned by memory agents. Moreover, the absence of genuinely Ukrainian ‘memory’ of the war is associated with the Soviet Union.

Fourthly, as to relations between protagonist and antagonist, subjugated stateless Ukrainians is juxtaposed to morally negative role of the Soviet Union in WW2. Memory agents prefer to deny and disentangle the Soviet past at once by ‘discovering’ Ukrainian past rather than engage in an attenuated discussion of formerly being a part of the Soviet Union. The notion of being between ‘two totalitarianisms’ is especially elaborated by the UINR for foreign audience while subjugation to an unjust regime and being deprived of Ukrainian perspective for domestic audience.

As to ‘martyrological’ events, the narrative considers wartime developments on Ukraine’s territory as martyrological rather chooses one event specifically. The imposition of the Soviet state structures in the Western Ukraine in 1939, mass repression of civilians during the war, the immense losses of the Battle of the Dnipro, Crimean Tatars deportations of 1944, and post-war crack down on Ukrainian nationalists exemplify martyrological events of new WW2 remembrance.

There is a hardship for memory agents to choose one specific event, which would symbolize diverse WW2 experiences and equally ‘speak’ to all Ukrainians nowadays. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, which is the most negative event on WW2 remembrance in the Baltics context, definitely exemplifies negative role of the Soviet Union in WW2 and its cooperation with Nazi Germany. The UINR’s publications have condemned the pact and covered its negative role in WW2 extensively (UINR, 2015b, p. 10-11; Galushko and Pyliavets, 2016; Zinchenko et al. 2016; Horobets, 2016a, b). However, the president and MPs prefer to speak about mass repressions committed in the Soviet Union (e.g. Poroshenko, 2015g; 2016e, h). This leads to suggest that the pact does not fit the status of the main martyrological event in the Ukrainian context. As far as the pact did not impact or was related to all Ukraine, it is doubtful that memory agents can invest great symbolic meaning, and, needless to say, to foster popular attachment to negative role of the pact. The efforts to establish the pact in newly forged remembrance of WW2 rather intended to
shift from 1941 to 1939 as the initial year of the war and relate to European discourses of WW2.

4.5. Discussion

The thesis has illustrated the conceptual argument that political elites engage in elite-mythmaking and narrative construction to install preferable representation of the past based on the case of WW2 representation in modern Ukraine.

On legal and administrative side of mythmaking, memory agents engage in construction of political memory of WW2 in Ukraine. The elite-mythmaking enjoys policy-making agreement over the issues of remembrance between the agents and has a comprehensive agenda to foster new framework of WW2 remembrance. The ‘artifacts’ of political memory of WW2 are: imposing ‘de-communizing’ legal framework on WW2; protecting the national liberation cause and wartime fighters for Ukrainian independence, disregarding Soviet state-building by the law removing Soviet relics from public spaces by the administrative measures; prescribing commemorative policy.

On the narrative construction side of mythmaking, the pattern of disentangling the Soviet past by condemning and antagonizing the Soviet Union’s role in WW2 is reproduced with simultaneous establishment of Ukrainian perspective on WW2: protagonizing stateless Ukrainians and stating their contribution to victory over Nazism, legitimizing Ukrainian wartime nationalists and Ukrainians beyond the Soviet Union.

The narrative construction is marked by essentialization of the past. This is well exemplified with the UINR’s understanding of the ‘myths’ of the past. On the one hand, the Remembrance Institute uses the notion in a narrow sense when referring to efforts to conceal unpleasant past. Fabricating information about Katyn massacres (Zinchenko 2016a, c) or blaming Soviet security forces sabotage actions on Nazis (Horobets, 2016c) discussed as myths in a sense of being falsified and fabricated in post-WW2 Soviet Union. On the other hand, memory agents of mythmaking use the notion in a broad sense when referring to Soviet interpretation of the war and whole period of Ukraine’s Soviet past. It is usual for the president, for instance, to contrast false Soviet and genuine Ukrainian commemorative days of Defender of Ukraine (see Poroshenko, 2014, 2015b).

This again suggests narrative’s prime focus on essentializing the representation of the past. In this logic, mythological and imposed Soviet interpretation of WW2 is disregarded.
as unreliable. Thereafter, the genuine experience and genuine ‘history’ is considered to be ‘discovered’ only nowadays by moving from the ‘myths’ or even ‘the Myth’ of the Soviet past (see e.g. Zinchenko, 2016a and Viatrovych, 2016c). As the Head of Remembrance institute stated in the front of the Parliament:

“We, unfortunately, see how the Soviet myths about the war are being used by the Russian Federation and its propaganda in order to wage war against modern Ukraine. For this reason, it is important to rid of these myths […] Our task is to return genuine memory about wartime years and rid of the Soviet clichés” (Viatrovych in VRU, 2015a; bold typeface added)

Moreover, these myths are claimed to contribute to Ukraine’s contemporary hardships. As Viatrovych argues, ‘preserving the Soviet myths about the war is extremely important for modern Russia, as far as they became main and sometimes the last remaining element of Soviet identity of some of our co-citizens’ (Viatrovych, 2016c, p. 253; italics added). This is an example of exclusionary, essentializing and even proselytizing understanding of ‘history’.

This immediately leads to contemplate over modern elite-mythmaking to contemporary conflict dynamics in Ukraine. This in only that upholding mythmaking by legal and administrative measures endangers freedom of speech and academic freedom, as prominent scholars are concerned (see Open letter by Marples, 2015), but also that elite-mythmaking is rather incompatible with building trust in a divided society (Dembinska, 2010). Domestically, the strong case in favor administrative measures and exclusionary understanding of the past would rather entrench cleavages, confine society to highly contested and mutually exclusionary frameworks of WW2 remembrance and spin the resentment further. In fact, future research may inquire in whether the elite-mythmaking is successful at all, or in other words, whether it has reciprocity and engagement from behalf of the broader public. The issue is especially relevant taking into account Ukraine’s regional diversity and different wartime experiences. Internationally, as Mälksoo suggested, legislating representation of the past does not ‘secure’, but aggravates ‘security dilemmas’ of the states (Mälksoo, 2015, p. 222-223). Following Mälksoo, it is possible to suggest that memory agents of elite-mythmaking in Ukraine will end up with even more reduced sense of ontological security (Mälksoo, 2015, Subotic, 2016) vis-à-vis ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine.

The European discourses on WW2 can be approached from ‘thick’ (content-oriented) and ‘thin’ (practice-oriented) standpoints (Müller, 2010). Firstly, the European remembrance of WW2 has a negative attitude towards historical totalitarian regimes and
establishes ‘memory of victims’ as bottom line for a common European remembrance of the war (see European Parliament, 2008, 2009). Secondly, European national contexts also show a variation in what is being remembered about WW2. Usually, the Western and German narratives of WW2 is seen as memorializing the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes in the first place in the national frameworks of WW2 remembrance (Mälksoo, 2009; Siddi, 2016). The Holocaust is central element of memorialization in the German discourse on WW2, while the Western European narratives elevate the national resistance against Nazi occupation (Siddi, 2016; Lagrou, 1999, 2003). At the same time, the Eastern Central European (ECE) narratives diverge further from the former two in towards emphasizing the Soviet Union’s negative role in their WW2 commemoration (Mälksoo, 2009; Neumayer, 2015; Siddi, 2016). Simultaneously, the ECE narratives overlook the unpleasant past of local collaboration with the Nazis in the Holocaust or obliterate other context-specific ‘dark pasts’, and establish, in the words of Neumayer, narrative of ‘crimes of communism’ in the region (Neumayer, 2015).

The ‘thin’ or practice-oriented approach to the representation of WW2 is encapsulated in practices of ‘coming to terms with past’ (Müller, 2010). By engaging in critical reevaluation of the national past, political elites recognize historical wrongdoings, memorise and engage into public atonement for wrongdoings. In this case, collaboration, exclusionary policies toward minorities in the past, ethnic strife become legitimate parts of ‘Europeanized’ national remembrances of WW2 projected by political elites in official governmental memory politics (Lebow, 2006; Müller, 2010; Pakier and Strath, 2010).

In the light of European discourses of WW2, the Ukrainian narrative follows the negative attitude towards the Soviet totalitarian regime in a line with the other European counterparts. The narrative construction of memory agents antagonizes the Soviet Union foremost in the national narrative of WW2. This is supported with legal action to delegitimize the Soviet state-building in Ukraine.

However, the memory agents remain ignorant of the Holocaust and obscure the ‘dark past’ of Volyn massacres of 1943. In content, as the analysis above has shown, the narrative is preoccupied with drawing ‘genuinely’ Ukrainian perspective on the war, focuses on the notion of statelessness and essentializes the past in general. This suggest that memory agents hold rather exclusionary understanding of the wartime experiences. In this understanding, the tragedy of Ukrainian Jews does not belong to the Ukrainian perspective and remembrance of WW2. Needless to say, wrongdoings in relation to Jews or ‘dark past’
of Volyn would undermine pattern of ‘stateless victimhood’ and the positive image of national liberation movement and, therefore, avoided in the narrative.

From ‘thin’ perspective on WW2 remembrance, the memory agents also do not follow practices of atonement for national wrongdoings. Elite-mythmaking easily disentangles the Soviet past and substitutes it with the search for ‘genuine’ Ukrainian history of WW2 framed in essentialising terms. The Soviet Union and Soviet Ukraine’s past are easily denied precisely because there is no attachment to this past among the memory agents or voluntarily embraced acknowledgment of being part of the Soviet Union in the past. In some sense, the Ukrainian mythmaking agenda to condemn the Soviet totalitarianism inadvertently coincides with European humanitarian dimension to commemorate victims of totalitarians during WW2 in modern remembrance. Finally, the memory agents are not ready to atone for the past, which they consider ‘Ukrainian’ and in which they invest symbolic attachment.
Conclusions

The aim of this thesis was to inquire in official governmental memory politics (mythmaking) pertaining to remembrance of World War Two in modern Ukraine. In order to evaluate whether this elite-mythmaking could be called ‘European’ (the puzzle), the thesis has examined political memory construction, encapsulated in legislative and administrative measures of political elites (memory agents), and construction of the narrative, which is being communicated by these memory agents.

In order to examine current memory politics in Ukraine, the thesis utilized concepts of political memory, memory agent, elite-mythmaking and narrative on the one hand, and ‘European memory’ of WW2 on the other. Thereafter, the thesis proceeded with analysis of the legislative and administrative framework installed by the President, the Parliament, and the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance as main ‘stakeholders’ of new commemorative paradigm of WW2. Then, by following the premises of structural and thematic narrative analysis (research design), the thesis scrutinized the narrative about the Ukrainians in WW2, which is being communicated by these memory agents as part of modern elite-mythmaking.

Based on the analysis, this thesis has argued that post-2014 Ukrainian memory politics concerning WW2 remembrance constitutes a case of elite-mythmaking of political memory of WW2 and constructs the narrative representing historical experiences of wartime past, which is suitable for contemporary agents of elite-mythmaking. The President, the Parliament and the Ukrainian Remembrance institute selectively ‘Europeanize’ representation of WW2 with regard to alienating the Soviet past and condemning the Soviet totalitarianism but, at the same time, do not aim to engage in ‘coming to terms with the past’ practices with regard to the national past. Furthermore, the narrative communicated by the memory agents reproduces the same pattern of disentangling Ukraine’s Soviet past and withdrawing to engage in discussion about intricacies of the national past, constitutive to the Western European or German narratives of WW2. Even though the memory agents officially state the need for more attenuated understanding wartime experiences and commemoration of WW2, they are preoccupied with developing more exclusionary and essentializing understanding of the past at the narrative’s level. Based on the analysis of the narrative data disseminated by the memory agents, this thesis suggests that the newly forged narrative follows the essential
characteristics of the Eastern Central European (ECE) historical narrative on the Second World War.
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Appendices
Annex 1

Table 2. Antagonist and protagonist according to UINR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protagonist / Antagonist</th>
<th>What is being communicated?</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians (role and image)</td>
<td>a). Chronological shift from 1941 to 1939</td>
<td>UINR, 2015b, p. 4; Horobets, 2016a; Prymachenko, 2016c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b). emphasis on Ukrainians as ‘divided nation’ between different states and regimes; inclusion of pre-Soviet Ukrainian state-building into narrative on WW2; emphasizing the role of national community in the victory over Nazism</td>
<td>UINR, 2015b, p. 6-9; Prymachenko, 2016d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c). ‘Ukrainian Liberation movement’ as legitimate actor of WW2, contributing both to the Allies’ victory over Nazism as well as national liberation struggle</td>
<td>UINR, 2015b, p. 7, 18-19; Maiorov, 2016c; Isaiuk and Riabenko, 2016, 2016d; Bigun, 2016a, b, c, d, e; Isaiuk, 2016a, b; Viatrovych 2016b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d). heroic pantheon: focus on soldiers of the Ukrainian background in the Armies of Allies</td>
<td>UINR, 2015b, p. 5, 24-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet Union (role and image)</td>
<td>a). condemnation of the Soviet Union for its role in the outbreak of the war and cooperation with Nazi Germany; focus on Molotov-Ribbentrop pact;</td>
<td>UINR, 2015b, p. 10-11; Maiorov, 2016a, b; Galushko, 2016a; Galushko and Pylavets, 2016; Zinchenko et al., 2016; Zinchenko, 2016b; Horobets, 2016b; Pavlov 2016a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b). critical attitude to the Soviet Union’s ‘scorched earth’ practice, military wartime crimes (unprecedented military losses, ill-prepared military operations on territory of Ukraine); separate emphasis on the Soviet totalitarian regime crimes on territory of Ukraine between 1939-1945 (shootings of civilians, mass repressions in Western Ukraine in 1939-1941) with a transnational focus (inclusion of the Katyn massacres); stating equal criminality of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany

d). ‘Victory, but not Liberation’: the Soviet Union’s ‘return’ is accompanied with mass repression, crackdown on Ukrainian nationalists, Crimean Tartars deportations of 1944

UIRN, 2015b, p. 11-15, 18, 20; Zinchenko, 2016c; Riabenko 2016b, c, e, f; Horobets, 2016c; Gromenko, 2016a; Galushko, 2016b

UIRN, 2015b, p. 22-23; Gromenko, 2016c, d, e; Horobets, 2016d
### Table 3. The Holocaust and “The War and the Myth” (Viatrovych et al., 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Holocaust</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Passage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mentioning</strong> of Babyn Yar</td>
<td>“Myth 15: Dniproges, Hreschatyk, and Uspenian Cathedral in Kyiv were demolished by Nazis” (Horobets, 2016b)</td>
<td>Extermination of Jews in Babyn Yar is mentioned in the context of addressing sabotage actions of retreating from Kyiv and Ukraine the Soviet security forces (NRVD): blowing up the dam of Dniproges powerplant, mine laying of Hreschatyk</td>
<td>“German occupation authorities used the explosions organized by the Soviet security forces to blame Kyiv’s Jews and justify their mass extermination in Babyn Yar in September 29 and 30, 1941” (Horobets, 2016b, p. 85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>mentioning of extermination of Jews and Babyn Yar</strong></td>
<td>“Myth 27: Ukrainian nationalists annihilated Jews during the war on a massive scale, especially in Lviv and Babyn Yar” (Riabenko, 2016d)</td>
<td>extermination of Ukrainian Jews and Babyn Yar are mentioned in the context of the controversy around the Ukrainian nationalists’ collaboration with Nazis. The massive collaboration is disregarded, and attributed to separate Ukrainian nationalists, who could have taken part in pogroms or willingly collaborated in the Holocaust. The</td>
<td>On German auxiliary police and the locals: “The regiments were organized from locals, Soviet POWs, former Soviet militiamen, and among them could have been members of OUN. By nationality, the regiments included not only Ukrainians, but also Russians and other nationalities. The locals sometimes took part in anti-Jewish pogroms, but those were not only Ukrainians, but also others.” (Riabenko, 2016d, p. 140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>On the ‘myth’ of nationalists’ participation in the Holocaust in general: “This is one more historical myth, using which Soviet and then Russian propaganda tried to</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2

In brief, there is a scholarly consensus on ideology and wrongdoings of Ukrainian nationalist underground. Genuine anti-Semitic and anti-Polish component of nationalists’ ideology as well as their participation in the Holocaust and anti-Polish ethnic cleansing in Volyn of 1943 is known and well-studied in the Western scholarship (Berkhoff and Carynnyk, 1999; Carynnyk, 2011; Himka, 2012; Rossolinski-Liebe, 2016, Rudling 2011, 2012, 2016). Also, see recent literature review on the issue in Umland, 2017.

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paragraph has clear whitewashing inclination. Supposedly, ‘Banderivtsi’ had been preoccupied only with massive extermination of Jews, Poles and female school teachers of Russian language” (Riabenko, 2016d, p. 140)
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Mentioning of the Holocaust in general “Myth 50: ‘No one is forgotten, nothing is forgotten’” (Yaremenko, 2016)
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Mentioned in the context of addressing issue of ‘silencing’ of inconvenient pasts in the late Soviet Union
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“Deportations of Crimean Tatars and Germans of Ukraine, Ukrainian-Polish conflict, as well as tragedy of Holocaust became taboos. Banning the memory about Jewish catastrophe was made because of Soviet authorities’ reluctance to consider Jews as the main victims of Nazi occupation […] Only during perestroika, speaking about Jewish victims has resurfaced. Unpopular themes were also occupation of Ukraine, ostarbeiter issue, and also Ukrainian liberation movement, which fought both Nazis and communists ” (Yaremenko, 2016, p. 248)
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Annex 2

Mentioning of the Holocaust in general

“War on Myths” Mentioned in the context of contemporary memory politics agenda with a ‘comparative martyrology’ inclination (Zinchenko, 2016a)

“Putin’s Russia is a country where Stalin is an ‘efficient manager’, the Russian people is a ‘victorious nation’, which ‘would have won without Ukrainians at all’, and the biggest catastrophe of 20th century is not the war, the Holodomor, or the Holocaust, ‘but demolition of the Soviet Union’” (Zinchenko, 2016a, p. 10)
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