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**INTERAGENCY APPROACH IN EU'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT DURING
MIGRATION CRISIS OF 2015: AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION OR UNUSED
OPPORTUNITY?**

Master's Thesis

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I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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Resümees

2015.aastal saabus peamiselt Itaaliasse ja Kreekasse rohkem kui miljon põgenikku Süüriast, Liibüast, jt riikidest, kus oli puhkenud verine konflikt. Kuna sellisel hulgal põgenike vastuvõtmiseks ei olnud valmis Euroopa Liit ega tema liikmesriigid, sai EL 2015.aastal terava kriitika osaliseks. Puhkenud kriisist lõikasid muuhulgas kasu populistlikud ja paremäärmuslikud erakonnad, kelle populaarsus rändekriisi ajal hüppeliselt tõusis. ELi süüdistati tegevusetuses ja peataolekus, mis võimaldas kriisil eskaleeruda ning kontrolli alt väljuda.

Magistritöö käsitleb agentuuride vahelist koostööd ELi kriisireguleerimisalastes tegevustes 2015 rändekriisi ajal, analüüsides EL agentuuridest Frontexi ja Europoli tegevust. Kolmanda kriisiga seotud osapoolena analüüsib töö mittetulundusorganisatsioonide (MTÜde) tegevust. Töö eesmärk on uurida, mis takistas agentuuride vahelist koostööd rändekriisi ajal. Autor püstitas hüpoteesi, et erinev organisatsioonikultuur ja kriisi tajumine takistas EL agentuuride ja MTÜde tegevust. Hüpoteesi kinnitamiseks püstitas autor kaks uurimisküsimust:

- a) kuidas tajusid Frontex, Europol ja MTÜd rändekriisi olemust?
- b) kuidas mõjutas organisatsioonikultuur Frontexi, Europoli ja MTÜde tegevust rändekriisi ajal?

Magistritöö annab ülevaate kriisi kui mõiste tähendusest ning kriisireguleerimise arengust, jõudes järeldusele, et globaliseeruva maailma tingimustes nõuab tõhus kriisireguleerimine aktiivset ja rahvusvahelist ning organisatsioonide vahelist koostööd. Autor annab ülevaate EL kriisireguleerimisalasest võimekusest ning tegevustest, samuti agentuuride vahelise koostöö põhimõtete rakendamise kohta tsiviil-sõjalise koostöö raames, jõudes järeldusele, et erinev organisatsioonikultuur muudab õiguskaitseorganisatsioonide nagu Frontex ja Europol ning mittetulundusühingute koostöö keeruliseks.

Töö uurib rändekriisiaegset koostööd läbi kolme aspekti: tegevused *hotspotides* ehk põgenikelaagrites, tegevused aluste jälgimisel merel ning tegevused piiripunktides. Autor jõuab järeldusele, et MTÜd tajusid kriisi humanitaarkriisina ning Frontex ja Europol julgeolekukriisina. Organisatsioonide erinev arusaam kriisist ning lisaks erinev organisatsioonikultuur põhjustasid olukorra, kus EL agentuurid ja MTÜd ei olnud võimelised tegema tõhusat koostööd, mis kinnitas töö hüpoteesi.

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List of abbreviations

BCP	Border Crossing Point
CEPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EASO	European Asylum Office
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUNAVFOR MED	European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
EURTF	European Regional Task Force
EMSC	European Migrant Smuggling Centre
EUROPOL	European Police Office
FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MS	Member State
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PSC	Political and Security Committee

1. Introduction

Moving from one country or region to another is not a new phenomenon, people in search for better life and opportunities have done it for centuries. Europe has not been any different from other regions – people have moved in and out for centuries in search for better life. The last mass migration within and from Europe occurred during WWII, when people from war-torn countries were looking to escape the horrors of fierce battles and war. Since then the Europeans had mostly witnessed atrocities only on TV and were enjoying arguably one of the best periods in recent history when the migration crisis of 2015 struck. In the early 21st century the European Union found itself in a situation where the internal borders between member states were not controlled, people and goods moved across borders unchecked, the principle of free movement was being taken for granted. To compensate the lack of control on borders, some of EU MS were and are relying on technical solutions at their borders and information exchange between MS, others only relied on information exchange.

As said, the privilege of free movement requires strict control of the union's external borders, which the EU had been striving for years. National governments, however, were not prepared to handle hundreds of thousands of migrants and as Boin & Rhinard (2008) argue, national preparedness might even not be sufficient any longer as successful response to crisis requires not only intergovernmental and interagency coordination but also international co-operation in crisis management. Furthermore, one of the countries to be affected by the influx, Greece, was still in turmoil caused by the financial crisis and therefore in even more vulnerable situation. Through agencies like Frontex and Europol the EU had means and resources available to interfere in the crisis at transboundary level.

The agreement between EU MS to let people and goods move across internal borders unchecked, known as the Schengen treaty, clearly states that internal borders may be crossed at any point without any checks on persons being carried out (Schengen, 2005).

This simple statement is at least a partial cause for one of the biggest crises in the history of the EU as migrants took advantage of this system and having reached Greece or Italy were able to move on to other EU countries. Arguably, life in the European Union is economically stable and secure. One might argue how much has the EU contributed to that aspect but the general standard of life in Africa or Asia cannot be compared to that of Europe. Some European countries such as Germany or Sweden have always stood out among migrants and these were the places the Africans and Asians were trying to reach as they started their journeys from their countries of origin (Frontex, 2016). As stated before, the fact that once you crossed the external border to Greece or Italy, you were in the EU and in the promised land, was widely known and used amongst the migrants. So, therefore it can be argued that in a way the Schengen system itself contributed to the crisis.

If a person or a small group of persons move from one country to another, it does not affect the overall security, however after 2011 the number of migrants sharply increased and especially in 2015 more than one million people came to the EU by crossing the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea, putting Italy and Greece as the external border states of the EU under pressure. Later on, as migrants moved on, after having reached the border countries of the EU, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia and other EU members started to struggle with the influx. As the EU had created the Schengen system, the union was heavily criticized by member countries, scholars and think tanks for not being able to foresee such a scenario and secondly for not being able handle the situation.

2015 migration crisis on the Mediterranean put the EU under pressure - thousands of people lost their lives trying to cross the sea to reach the shores of Europe. EU's response to the crisis was heavily criticized not only by politicians but also by scholars and think tanks (New York Times, 2015). Several member states harshly criticized EU's actions in handling the crisis, especially Hungary, Poland and other eastern MS, cracking the unity and solidarity the EU was so proud of (BBC, 2016).

According to Huysmans, the link between the abolition of internal border control and the strengthening of external border control rests on the assumptions such that control of the irregular movement of goods, capital, services and people happens at the border (Huysmans, 2006, p.70). Border control hence played a key role in the spill-over of the internal market into internal security, which became formally part of the EU policy at the same time with the completion of the EU internal market in 1992 (Horii, 2016). Border control, however, does not consist only of checks at the border, it includes other activities (risk analysis, information exchange, etc) and requires the efforts of multiple agencies. The EU as a supranational body consisting of multiple agencies, committees and other organization should have made the interagency approach pivotal for itself to succeed in its effort to manage the migration crisis of 2015 effectively.

The European Union was not created to be a security actor, it was to be an economic union, so the security aspect and co-operation in home and justice affairs was at first merely a spillover, rather unwanted one, one might even claim. However, by the beginning of the second decade of 21st century the EU had created several instruments through which to handle crises and by 2015 had already some experience in handling them. The financial crisis in Greece is the first to come to mind. Outside the EU, missions within CSDP had been implemented for several years by 2015, although it must be noted that for EU agencies concerned in 2015 and after, similar crisis had not occurred before.

The EU was not the only actor to react to the crisis as various NGOs also responded quickly and started providing humanitarian aid to migrants arriving in Europe. As EU agencies involved and the national authorities of Italy and Greece possessed limited capabilities, the addition of a humanitarian actor seemed welcome. When the hotspot approach was implemented, the NGOs set up their offices at hotspots to provide aid to migrants as efficiently and quickly as possible.

All of this seemed to provide solid basics for mutual co-operation and the efficient implementation of interagency approach to solve the crisis, however this was not to be the case as the EU agencies and the NGOs began blaming each other through mass and social media for hindering each other's work. As the blame game continued, it became

obvious that there were more significant reasons for such animosity than a single misunderstanding or mistake by one of the actors concerned. This required an in-depth look into the organizations involved and their organizational cultures and goals set for the crisis to understand whether the problems can be explained by organizations having different goals and perceptions for and of crisis. To understand whether the actors researched in this paper might have perceived the crisis differently and had therefore set goals that were obstructive for the other actor, the meaning of crisis and the management of transnational crisis must be looked into in-depth. Moreover, an understanding of crisis management tools and resources available to the EU is needed to exclude the possibility of failed interagency approach within the EU.

1.1. The purpose of the research, hypothesis and the research questions

The study of interagency approach is not something new, it has been dealt with by several scholars, albeit from different angle. Interagency approach has been also called “comprehensive approach” and within this paper, both are used as well. Robert Egnell has studied the approach in detail but from civilian-military co-operation perspective (Egnell, 2009). However, as the migration crisis is relatively recent, it has not been studied from the interagency approach perspective in detail as of yet. Given the unique position and composition of the EU, comprehensive approach seems inevitable but was this what happened in 2015? Egnell’s perspective of civilian-military co-operation might apply to given case as the NGOs are civilian organizations working to promote humanitarian causes and save lives, whereas Frontex and Europol can be both considered law enforcement agencies whose general task is to ensure security and safety of European citizens. The co-operation between law enforcement agencies and the NGOs have not yet been similar to the military, where Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) concept has been in use for quite some time. Perhaps it can also be used effectively in crisis management and the concept of interagency approach can be successfully implemented not only within the same institution but also with other partners.

Pielmus (2015) notes the strong, tradition reinforced organizational culture of law enforcement agencies which stresses the importance of regulated behaviour and adherence to strict norms. The members of law enforcement agencies are expected to uphold certain behavioural standards and must follow the orders or guidelines at all times. The NGOs on the other hand are known for their flexible organizational structures and might be established only for accomplishing certain tasks, making their lifespan short at times (Lewis, 2010). If one actor has a set of goals which do not change over time and follows them strictly, whereas the other actor might have goals that are changing over time and might have a flexible attitude towards the goals and how to achieve them, then the implementation of interagency approach cannot be effective.

Possible differences in organizational cultures might explain the difficulties in co-operating with each other that EU agencies and the NGOs had and still have in solving the migration crisis. All of this might have prevented the effective implementation of the interagency approach, so the hypothesis set for this paper is as follows:

Different organizational cultures and understanding of crisis prevented the effective implementation of interagency approach between the NGOs and Frontex and Europol during the migration crisis.

To research the hypothesis, the author put forward the following research questions:

- How did the NGOs, Frontex and Europol perceive the migration crisis?
- How did their respective organizational culture affect the actions of Frontex, Europol and the NGOs during the migration crisis?

The hypothesis will be researched using exploratory case-study methodology. Baxter and Jack have noted that binding the case will ensure that your study remains reasonable in scope (Baxter & Jack, 2008). As the migration crisis consisted of several issues and aspects, a range too broad to cover in a single thesis, a choice was made. The author chose three aspects where the use of interagency approach in crisis management will be scrutinized - firstly the activities in *hotspots* created by EU agencies and local authorities

in Italy and Greece to process the arriving migrants, secondly the EU's surveillance of vessels on the Mediterranean and the Aegean sea during the crisis and thirdly monitoring of border crossing points. All these aspects can be considered as part of crisis management instruments in 2015 and even today.

As Frontex and Europol are both law enforcement agencies, they follow strict rules on processing personal and operational data, thereby limiting the possibility to use internal documents for research purposes. Thereby the research had to concentrate on public material, namely the agencies' public documents and media articles. The research did not concentrate on any single NGO as there were and are several NGOs operating in Italy and Greece, thereby the actions of different NGOs were generalized for the purposes of this paper. Furthermore, the actions of two EU agencies, Frontex and Europol within the aspects mentioned above were analysed in depth and thirdly, the actions of NGOs were analysed to understand whether interagency approach in crisis management can be effectively used with third parties.

The thesis shows that the actors researched in this paper were not able to implement efficient interagency approach as the perceptions of the crisis varied. The NGOs perceived the crisis as mainly humanitarian issue, Frontex and Europol on the other hand perceived it as a border security and organized crime issue. As EU agencies acted according to their set of rules and tasks and dealt with what they thought was the problem at hand, i.e. stopping irregular migrants and when needed, restricting their arrival in Europe, the NGOs wanted to ensure the arrival of migrants as their stay in Libya or other similar countries was considered life-threatening. Furthermore, whereas units of EU agencies acted everywhere as a part of a bigger strategy, the NGOs were different as some of them were established only for certain period of time and acted locally. Conflicting goals resulted in conflicting actions (e.g. the NGOs tried to facilitate the arrival of migrants in Europe which was perceived by Frontex and Europol as illegal action, thereby causing tensions between EU agencies and the NGOs).

2. Crisis and its management

2.1. The meaning and perception of crisis

A big car crash along major route blocking traffic or a big house or blocks of houses on fire is a crisis, at least for the people involved in the event. Such an event, however, which is often somewhat “a routine emergency”, will most likely be forever within the competency of national, if not local authority. An emergency refers to a complex and urgent but also a routine problem (Boin & Rhinard, 2008). Crisis, albeit perhaps urgent and complex as well, is not routine. The Oxford Living Dictionary of English defines “crisis” as “a time of intense difficulty or danger” (The Oxford Living Dictionary of English, 2017), which in a sense captures the whole concept of crisis – it usually occurs on different levels and involves several fields of life. If one had visited Greek islands at the time of migration crisis in 2015, locals would have described their feelings and emotions in similar words. Crisis is a time of intense difficulty indeed, even if one’s life is not in direct danger. Interestingly, “crisis” is always defined differently by organizations or institutions and one single definition has not been agreed upon, so it comes down to perceiving an event as a crisis in order it to be called as such.

The perception of crisis, however, must be discussed as well. Although in most cases people and organizations perceive the crisis similarly and threats are easy to distinguish, one has to keep in mind that even in times of crisis, the organizations have their agendas and goals to strive for and therefore a crisis might provide the best opportunity for achieving an objective (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). Hitherto, co-operation in crisis cannot be taken for granted and may be complex as different agendas collide. This might mean severe difficulties in crisis response as organizations cannot agree on mutual goals. Inability to agree on the latter might result from different organizational cultures and perceptions.

As said, a crisis affects more people and organizations than at first meets the eye – think of the hurricanes around the world or the Icelandic Volcanic Ash crisis – the latter did not involve emergency services but rather transport systems, airlines, etc. Ansell, Boin and Keller (2010) have noted that the characteristics of crises are strikingly similar, no matter whether talk is about epidemics, energy blackouts, financial crises, ice storms, oil spills or cyber terrorism –they affect multiple jurisdictions, undermine the functioning of various policy sectors and critical infrastructures, escalate rapidly and morph along the way. Moreover, whereas “routine emergencies” that occur regularly, provide responders with experience of how to react, in a crisis past experience provides policymakers with little guidance (Ansell, Boin & Keller, 2010). Furthermore, it is vital to understand what kind of crises we have in the 21st century – last years have seen dramatic increase of terrorist attacks, disasters, etc but the list is not all-inclusive.

Interestingly, the EU has not defined “crisis” in a universal way and the term has remained open for any EU related actor, including EU agencies, to define as it sees suitable (Batora et al, 2016). Therefore “crisis” can be internal (e.g. a financial crisis), a perceived or other tangible threat to justice and home affairs (e.g. uncontrolled migration influxes) or external crisis (e.g. international conflict) (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013). When the EU began its crisis management activities by preparing and dispatching peace missions, “crisis” was thought of as an international conflict taking place outside the EU.

Modern crises are not bound by geographical borders or any other man-made limits, which requires the involvement of different actors in crisis management. These actors are less acquainted with each other, have different agendas and interests and are more dispersed (Ansell, Boin & Keller, 2010). EU has the most extensive cross-border connection in the world and the result today is an overall system in which many of the functions that sustain basic societal life (for example, energy grids, transport networks, food distribution, and financial flow structures) cross European political borders. It undermines the effectiveness of the nation-state’s traditional organizational, policy, and legal tools. As a result of a rapidly evolving character and unforeseen interactions, it is virtually impossible to recognize and understand a transboundary crisis before its consequences take effect (Boin & Rhinard, 2008).

2.2. Crisis Management

2.2.1. Phases of crisis

The strategic use of fear has become part and parcel of our world (Klein, 2007), as has the institutional expansion of state and international apparatuses devoted to “managing” known and potential security risks (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). Fear, however, must be controlled and risks managed by states and institutions as crisis management is seen as one of the core obligations of a state, yet states find themselves in a situation where the concept of crisis management constantly changes. Hart and Sundelius (2013) argue that the threats and challenges in Europe of the twenty-first century are less about the integrity of territory than about safeguarding the critical functions of society, protecting people, and upholding fundamental values and structures of democratic governance.

Boin, Ansell & Keller (2010) define crisis management as the coordinated and effective response to crisis situations, whose first target is to counter the threat and to minimize the consequences. Crisis management is also defined as the coordination of actions to control a critical situation during the pre – event awareness, prevention, preparation, response and recovery with the post event restoration (Shaw & Harrald, 2004). Hart and Sundelius (2013) have divided crisis management into pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis phase (see Figure 1), which have been studied from technical-managerial and strategic-political aspect, although there has not been much overlapping in the studies until lately.

The strategic-political aspect sets out guidelines on not only which risks should be dealt with but also what should be defined a potential threat or risk, including political level (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). The perception of a threat might be similar amongst European nations, however, the perception of a threat in North Korea or Russia is altogether different. Wider stakeholder-based perspective of crisis management is needed to be included so that one can explain why some emergencies upgrade into political controversies, which in turn escalate into national traumas and the cascading consequences of crises extend beyond what is the main operational focus in the parallel

field of consequence management (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). Certain crises turn into traumas and never come to closure and their after-shocks linger across generations, so it is important to know why this happens and what factors can prevent such a degenerate process occurring (Hart & Sundelius, 2013).

Pre-crisis phase involves preventive actions as planning and preparedness, at technical level it mostly includes early warning systems and educating specialists (mostly law enforcement officers and emergency services officials) to manage the crises (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). At political level the general question of what is perceived as a risk is decided upon, furthermore another vital issue is looked into: what is the level of risk the society or country is willing to accept? Should the city of Naples in Italy be evacuated right now in fear of the eruption or should we accept the fact that Mt Vesuvius will erupt one day and there will inevitably be some casualties but the Italian state and its emergency and social services are ready to help and evacuate at least some people from Naples? This is just one of the examples states, regions, cities, etc need to constantly think of. Integrated approaches to studying “risk, crisis and emergency management” have become the norm and the focus among both security and safety specialists has shifted towards generic vulnerabilities in modern societies, regardless of the source of the threat (e.g. critical infra-structures) (Hart & Sundelius, 2013).

Crisis phase is often thought to be the most important phase of crisis management and according to Hart & Sundelius (2013) it is hard to argue that all the planning and preparedness will be of no use if actions undertaken in crisis phase are random and not organized. Furthermore, Hart & Sundelius (2013) note that the problem here is that in modern high-tech world we are prepared for natural disasters and other similar events and crises in this field are thought of as preparedness failures. Hart & Sundelius (2013) talk about the “vulnerability paradox”, noting that the more invulnerable a community has been in the past, the more severe the social and political impact of any single disruption it does experience. They consider it to be a cultural phenomenon: the population is unprepared for hardship, and more likely to be traumatized and uninformed about ways to survive and recover (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). Politically, in an EU used to peace, wealth and safety, a major disruption to any of these is likely to generate intense pressure

to blame individuals and organizations for what happened and in the contemporary media climate, such blame is bound to focus on the leaders of government (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). Therefore, as mentioned before, the consequences of torrential rain cannot be considered a crisis, whereas the influx of thousands of people to a country which has only scarce resources and means to handle the situation can and will be considered one and the impact will be significant on all levels of society.

Post-crisis phase has been long known for the question of accountability. One might even argue that looking for somebody to blame is far more important than looking at the causes and possible preventive actions. The political and legal dynamics of accountability processes play a significant role in determining which crisis actors emerge unscathed and which end up with damaged reputations and careers (Boin et al, 2008). The burden of proof in post-crisis inquiries and accountability debates lies with the responsible policymakers and such accountability debates are often little more than “blame games” focused on identifying and punishing culprits rather than deliberating and reflecting seriously on crisis causes and consequences (Boin et al, 2008). A key challenge for leaders is coping with the politics of crisis accountability, without the use of unseemly and potentially self-defeating tactics of blame avoidance or “finger pointing” that only serve to prolong the crisis and heighten political tensions (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). As the accountability question looms large on the horizon and the level of involvement in given crisis rises up to politicians, it is difficult to expect to see thorough and neutral analyses on crisis management.

	Technical–managerial: the study of risk and crisis “management”	Strategic–political: the study of risk and crisis “politics”
<i>Pre-crisis phase</i>	Mitigation, preparedness, early warning as professional activity clusters and determinants of systemic resilience	Strategic interests and controversies about risk perception, risk acceptability and risk regulation
<i>Crisis phase</i>	Dynamics of individual, group and network information processing decision-making, coordination, communication under conditions of threat, uncertainty and urgency	Role of political, economic and bureaucratic self-interests and power relations in shaping crisis response operations
<i>Post-crisis phase</i>	Organization and delivery of long-term support and recovery programmes, lesson-drawing	Contested legitimacy of status quo through media and official investigations and debates, resulting in opportunities for advocates of change, reform and renewal

Figure 1 Three phases of crisis and areas of research within them (Hart & Sundelius, 2013)

A somewhat more straightforward way to look at crisis management is to distinguish preparedness and response phase of a crisis and talk of traditional and novelty crisis management (Baubion, 2013) as mentioned before, a crisis or rather an understanding of what kind situation is perceived as one, changes constantly. “The military is always preparing for the last war” is a famous saying and at times it seems to apply for crisis management as well. Traditional crisis management relied heavily on previous crises but as the world changes at ever quicker pace, one must look at the crisis of the 21st century and to manage it needs to understand what it is. If something is constant in crisis management, then it must be the fact that every new crisis will be different from previous ones.

Traditional crisis management	Dealing with novelty
PREPAREDNESS PHASE	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk assessment based on historical events; • Scenario based emergency planning; • Early Warning systems based on monitoring forecasting, warning messages, communication and link with emergency response. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk assessment includes horizon scanning, risk radars and forward looking, analysis to detect emerging threats. Frequent updates and different timescales, international analysis sharing, multidisciplinary approaches are key attributes; • Capability-based planning and network building; • Strategic crisis management training to learn agility and adaptability and create networks and partnerships; • Strategic engagement from centres of government.
RESPONSE PHASE	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Command and control system; • Standard Operating Procedures; • Strict lines of responsibilities; • Sectoral approaches; • Principle of subsidiarity; • Feedback to improve future management. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crisis identification/ monitoring, role of expertise; • Flexible and multi-purpose crisis management teams and facilities; • Common concepts across agencies to inform leadership with high adaptive capacities; • Similar tools and protocols that could be utilised for multi-crisis; • International cooperation; • Management of large-response networks; • Ending crisis and restoring trust; • Feedback.

Figure 2 Different approaches in crisis management (Baubion, 2013)

Modern crises have shown the incapability of traditional crisis management which relies heavily on standard operating procedures and strict lines of responsibility (Boin et al,

2008). After terrorist attack in Paris in November 2015, the suspect fled to Brussels, Belgium, where his whereabouts were quickly established by local police. The problem was, however, the Belgian law which at the time strictly forbade house searches at night, therefore delaying the detention operation by several hours. When police eventually searched the apartment of the suspect, he had already escaped (New York Times, 2016). Whilst the problem in this case was legal, the example clearly illustrates the need for more flexible approach in all areas. One can also discuss the involvement of political level in crisis management in this example, albeit somewhat philosophically – what if the Belgian government had ordered the police to raid the house at night? When looking at the flexibility in crisis management, inevitably the aspect of different cultures must be considered as well, especially when talking about the EU.

Not only are the legal systems and principles different within the EU, also the overall system and public bureaucracy must be thought of – for instance, Estonian and Scandinavian law enforcement officers have always struggled to co-operate with Southern European colleagues, as not only are their cultural perceptions and traditions different but latter countries also have several law enforcement agencies overlapping in their tasks. Thereby finding the right person within the right agency is a daunting and at times almost unsurmountable task.

2.3. Transboundary and Transnational Crisis Management

We must understand how crises have evolved and how a 21st century crisis differs from previous ones in order to discuss transnational and transboundary crisis management. In the future, we expect to see more and more transnational crises (Boin & Rhinard, 2008). To discuss crises that will cross borders, an understanding of what is transnational or transboundary crisis, is required. Three distinct features of transnational or transboundary crises can be distinguished:

- A crisis happens on an unexpectedly large scale (Baubion, 2013), e.g. terrorist attacks

- the fact that similar crises have not happened before – at least in human or crisis managers’ memories – or they have a very unusual combination (Leonard, 2012), e.g. Icelandic Volcanic Ash crisis
- their cross - border nature (Boin, Ansell, & Keller, 2010), e.g. the migration crisis of 2015

Every noteworthy modern crisis will get media attention and at times will be blown out of its proportions. Social media plays an integral role in this phenomenon as information moves quickly and is modified, either on purpose or by accident. The term “media crisis” has been used more and more often as time goes on. As mentioned, last mass migration in Europe occurred during WWII and Europeans have enjoyed relatively peaceful life ever since. It is somewhat inevitable that the migration crisis of 2015 took Europe by surprise as no one had given much thought to that. Not only were the member states ill-prepared, the Dublin system for asylum seekers was clearly not suitable for such an influx of migrants, etc, etc. The cross-border nature of a crisis will affect other states either directly (e.g. suspected terrorist flees from France to Belgium) or indirectly (e.g. the Icelandic Ash crisis which threw transport systems around the world into turmoil). The cross - border nature of any crisis can be described in terms of three dimensions; the higher a crisis scores on each dimension, the more transboundary it is (Boin, Ansell, Keller, 2010).

The first dimension refers to political boundaries as many crises fall within a geographically bounded political jurisdiction, such as a town (a factory explosion) or a country (a political crisis) (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). Crises can cross territorial boundaries and threaten multiple cities, regions, countries or even continents, a crisis can cross political boundaries vertically and horizontally (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). When lower levels of government (cities, counties, provinces, states) are overwhelmed by a crisis, for example, they may require help from higher levels of government (national, regional, international), which is the vertical dimension of transboundary activity (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). A crisis can also spread horizontally across the boundaries between two political jurisdictions operating at the same level of government

– like two cities or two nations. We expect transboundary crisis management to be more difficult when both vertical and horizontal coordination is required (Chisholm, 1989).

The second dimension is functional (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). A crisis can fall neatly within a policy, however, many crises spill over - they jump functional boundaries, threatening multiple life-sustaining systems, functions or infrastructures. For instance, crises may cross from a financial system into an industrial system, from the private to the public sphere, from one sector of industry to another - crises that cross functional boundaries are difficult to manage because they often involve systems with different logics and operating imperatives (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010).

The third dimension is time (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). Some crises are clearly demarcated in time: they have a defined beginning and ending. Many crises, however, exceed such time boundaries (Birkland, 2009). This may be because they are not single events, but rather a range of related situations, or it may be that a crisis has multiple effects that appear on different time scales. Crises that cross temporal boundaries are difficult to manage because they may require first responders to sustain the response for extended periods or because they create uncertainty about when to stand down from a response (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). They can also contribute to response fragmentation because different functional capabilities have to be mobilized at different times. In general, a crisis that scores high on all three dimensions is our typical transboundary crisis (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010).

These aspects mean that a successful response to a transnational crisis would be beneficial in international cooperation between the EU, its member states and other actors. According to Baubion (2013), in addition to exchanging good practices and/or defining common standards for interagency crisis management, international and regional cooperation could help national crisis management in different ways. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that transnational crises create a need for extreme adaptation and unprecedented cooperation under conditions in which these are most difficult to achieve – when the capacity and authority for response is divided across multiple organizations and jurisdictions or even between two or more countries and when the crisis

itself creates difficult patterns of interdependence among the actors involved (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010).

If the question of jurisdiction is not clear and an adequate and quick response to crisis is expected, international organizations might be the answer to look to. If a terrorist is on the run somewhere in the Netherlands, Belgium or France, should we not ask for EU agencies to locate and neutralize him or is this the question everybody is afraid to ask as it would undermine the nation-state's sovereignty? According to Boin, Ansell & Keller (2010) patterns of interdependence will be created by any such crisis, thereby a transnational body managing a transnational crisis does not automatically constitute a threat to nation-state's sovereignty.

2.4. EU as Crisis Manager

The EU has dealt with crises for quite some time and its capacities to do it effectively have evolved significantly over time. The union's role as crisis manager started with peace missions but it has evolved significantly ever since. The European Union is in a unique role as there is very little agreement on how crisis and security management efforts can be efficiently and legitimately organized at European level, therefore all efforts to enhance the EU's role will inevitably encounter this problem (Boin, Ekengren, Rhinard 2013).

EU is not a single polity, but an entity consisting of 28 member states which all have their own country-specific interests, traditions and rules. As Neal notes, "despite the integration Project, "Europe" is not a single polity and can not be treated as one" (Neal, 2009). Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (including border security) have long been considered as one of the core areas where countries can decide on how to regulate and act upon their best interests. The world, however, has changed and keeps changing so EU must face the reality – in order to preserve the four freedoms it must adapt to new situation and work together regardless of the differences. For instance the creation of European

Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex was a kind of a reaction to the processes and events evolving and happening around and in EU, 9/11 is considered to be one of the main factors behind the establishing decision (Neal, 2009).

As mentioned above, modern crises tend to be more and more transnational by their nature, making them difficult for any single nation-state to manage. As soon as crisis extends itself directly or indirectly to another country, its management becomes more complex, as new actors are to be considered. This puts EU in a seemingly perfect position to lead the effort to manage transnational crises in EU MS. The reality, however, is a bit more complex. Transnational or transboundary crisis undermines the effectiveness of the nation-state's traditional organizational, policy, and legal tools and it is much harder to address because, for one thing, it is unclear who "owns" a transboundary crisis and who should act on it. As it morphs from one domain to another, moving across geographical boundaries, responsibilities quickly blur (Boin & Rhinard, 2008). Perhaps more importantly, we lack the fundamental knowledge that would allow crisis managers to de-escalate chain reactions by swiftly "de-coupling" intertwined complex systems (Perrow, 1999).

This has become a conundrum for EU – although the union might not be welcome to step in and act upon when member states are not able manage the crisis on their own, as the latter will see it as the breach of their sovereignty, on the other hand EU is expected to react and manage the transnational crisis effectively but in a way that does not directly affect the sovereignty of a member state. Therefore, the management of any crisis on any level is always going to be difficult for EU. As the EU faces a range of crisis situations not only at its borders but also in its extended neighbourhood, its ability to understand, perceive and react to crises is becoming ever more relevant (Batora et al, 2016). Furthermore, each of these crises represents different kinds of threats and challenges and given there is no uniform EU approach to crisis response and management, adequate perception of and reaction to crisis is paramount (Batora et al, 2016).

Considering ever-changing security environment, EU crisis response is constantly being revised and improved and it is vital to take into account the efforts the EU has made and

is making by launching initiatives and processes aimed at keeping EU policies up to date with shifting security contexts (Batora et al, 2016). Since adopting Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the EU has been working on improving internal co-ordination and streamlining its approach and these efforts have been stressed by recent war in Ukraine, ISIS in North Africa and Asia (Batora et al, 2016). The reaction to ongoing crises are in fact reflected in EU Global Strategy, which refers to an integrated approach to conflicts (EU Global Strategy, 2016).

With the aggravation of climate change the number of crises is expected to increase even more, as natural and human-caused disasters have increased in frequency and scale during recent years (Georgiev, Egenhofer and Behrens, 2011). Batora et al (2016) underline the effects of pollution and contamination issues that will pose long-term threats to public health and the environment within the EU. Furthermore, serious and complex security threats such as terrorism will be too much to handle for any single EU member-state (Batora et al, 2016). This puts the EU under pressure to develop its crisis management to be efficient and coherent, although this would require solidarity in immediate response and responsibility in prevention and preparedness (Batora et al, 2016). As mentioned above, the EU does not define “crisis”, it distinguishes “internal” crisis (e.g. financial crisis), perceived threat from home and justice affairs (e.g. the uncontrolled influx of migrants) or “external” crisis (e.g. international conflict) (Boin, Ekengren, Rhinard, 2013).

Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard further elaborate that for the EU specifically there are three types of crisis: national or Type I crisis, external or Type II crisis and transboundary or Type III crisis (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013). Type I crises occur when available resources are no longer sufficient to meet the needs of the victimized population, for instance in natural disasters (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013). At the same time, within the EU this is an unlikely situation as EU member states generally have sufficient resources (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013). Boin indicates that crisis response work for EU mostly concerns Type II crises (Boin, 2008). Whereas national crises are the easiest for EU to operate within (organizing and sending humanitarian aid, experts, etc), external crises will include sending humanitarian aid and possibly experts within special crisis

management missions (Boin, 2008). Response to transboundary crisis is the field where the EU will face the most difficult obstacles as it requires co-operation of several actors with different agenda (Boin, 2008).

2.4.1. Crisis Management Tools of the EU

Missions

In essence, the EU has been involved in crisis management since the foundation of the union, as foreign aid was considered to be a tool for foreign policy. 1992 Maastricht Treaty was an important benchmark as it gave the EU an explicitly political and diplomatic role and the union has been increasingly involved in peacebuilding ever since (Blockmans, Wouters and Ruys 2010; Richmond, Bjørkdahl and Kappler 2011). The adoption of the EU Security Strategy in 2003 started the operational activities of the EU and by 2016 it had undertaken a total of 35 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations of various kinds – usually either civilian or civil–military operations with the Commission promoting other tools to support these missions (Batora, et al 2016).

Under the auspices of then ESDP the EU distinguished crisis management operations and crisis management missions, the former usually had a military component, while crisis management missions were usually of a civilian nature, therefore these two types of ESDP actions were often combined, especially in the field of civilian-military crisis management in which the EU specializes (Kuhn, 2009). One must consider, however, that the civilian peace missions have been tools for “external crisis” management and part of foreign policy of the union. When talking about internal crises (e.g. financial crisis in Greece) or events in the sphere of home and justice affairs (e.g. terrorist attacks in France and the following manhunt in other countries), the EU has not been able to rely on similar tools as the situation is remarkably different and involves interaction and co-operation with member states.

CSDP tools

Structures and organizations dealing with crisis management within CSDP

The EU has extensive range of structures and organizations in its use within CSDP. Several tools are permanent structures providing the EU the capabilities to monitor the international situation and react as quickly and adequately as possible. EEAS manages the Crisis Response System which covers crises outside the EU possibly affecting EU security or interests in third countries, CRS ranges from prevention and preparedness to response and recovery aiming to achieve a comprehensive EU crisis response and management capability (EEAS, 2017). An interesting tool of note is the EU Situation Room which, being a crisis centre, provides worldwide monitoring and current situation awareness 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and being the first point of contact for all information in crisis situations (EEAS, 2017). This provides the EU a tool which is constantly informed on and capable of initiating responses on everything even remotely affecting the union's interests around the world.

EEAS also includes CMPD (the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate), responsible for civilian-military planning for EU peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and operations (EEAS, 2017). In 2000, the Council of the European Union founded CIVCOM (The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management), an advisory body dealing with the civilian aspects of crisis management. A parallel military structure within the EU is EUMC (the European Union Military Committee). Both EUMC and CIVCOM receive directions and report to PSC. PSC (Political and Security Committee) is a permanent strategic level body within the Commission consisting of ambassadors of member states providing a forum for discussing CSDP matters and being an international situation watchdog for the EU.

Agencies involved in crisis management

Out of more than 40 EU agencies around Europe, perhaps four can be considered to deal with the direct aspects of crisis management, especially in the context of the migration crisis. CEPOL (the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training) provides courses on crisis management. Frontex is tasked with risk analysis and organizing joint

operations based on their risk assessment. Europol (European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation) is tasked with preventing and combatting all kinds of serious international organized crime and terrorism (Europol, 2017). EASO (European Asylum Support Office) coordinates the co-operation of EU MS on asylum. To facilitate more efficient co-operation between member states and Frontex, European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) was established in 2013. The main aim of EUROSUR is to increase the situation awareness capability and operational information exchange in combatting cross-border crime.

2.5. Interagency approach in crisis management

Facing recurrent complex crises requiring an improved coordination of civilian and military, international and local actors, the comprehensive approach concept has appeared both within international organisations (Nato, EU etc) and within governments (the US, France, the UK etc) (Wendling, 2010). The issue concerns restoring security, governance and development through an inter-agency, inter-ministerial or even an inter-organisational approach (Wendling, 2010). Partners need to understand each other (literally and figuratively), as well as each other's working methods, aims, goals, and motivations (Yakhlef et al, 2017).

Thomas, Bergethon & Reimer (2010) claim that the key to successful response to crisis management is the creation of a cross-discipline and interagency integrated response. National governments might fall short when it comes to responding adequately to crisis affecting several countries. According to Boin & Rhinard (2008), public bureaucracies will inevitably fall short of efficient crisis management. Is the integrated approach involving supranational or intergovernmental bodies viable solution in crisis management and does this change our perspective of EU's handling of the migration crisis? Nevertheless, crisis management in the European Union has evolved a lot during the past decades (Beger, 2010). EU started by organizing peace missions in Europe and elsewhere, however it has also contributed to co-operation in the area of crisis management by accepting Convention 10900/05 and Council Decision 2008/615/JHA which deal with

cross-border co-operation against terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. Furthermore, the previous chapter of this paper discussed the structures and institutions dealing with crisis management EU has developed over the past decade or so. This, however, does not mean self-evident success of interagency co-operation.

Efficient crisis management depends on co-operation (Boin & Rhinard, 2008). All the main actors during the migration crisis established working structures on the ground quite rapidly and were quickly operational. Whereas the response to crisis was rapid, it did not necessarily mean full and efficient co-operation. Every actor had its own interests and was doing its utmost to follow and achieve these. During recent a new concept of “Comprehensive approach” has emerged within the activities of the EU and NATO (Spily, Nečas, Žak, 2011). Both organizations have come to understand the importance of co-operation of different actors in crisis management. When NATO’s means are understandably military, the EU disposes of a broad range of both civilian security sector reform, police, justice, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring, etc) and military instruments of crisis management, giving the union a big advantage in dealing with crises (Spily, Nečas, Žak, 2011).

“Whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approaches have been often discussed in the context of civilian-military co-operation. Gheciu (2011) underlines the reluctance of the NGOs of co-operating with NATO as the latter is seen as a Western military organization unsuitable for civilian peacebuilding operations. Moreover, such process of competition and contestation between the NGOs and military might undermine the prospects of sustainable peacebuilding (Gheciu, 2011). As military and law enforcement organizations have similar organizational cultures adherent to strict norms and rules, problems between the NGOs and military can also occur between the NGOs and law enforcement agencies as well.

Conclusions from theoretical framework

The meaning and perception of crisis has changed over time and as the world around us keeps changing and evolving, the same applies to crises – globalization means more and

more crises will be transnational and transboundary and impossible to manage without implementing the interagency approach and effective co-operation. Different actors, however, find it difficult to co-operate with other actors as their goals do not match or even overlap and furthermore, the perception of crisis varies. Thirdly, the organizational culture of different actors might be altogether different as the discussed NATO-NGO partnership proved. All of this makes interagency co-operation very difficult to implement in practice.

3. Migration crisis of 2015

The Arab Spring in 2011 resulted in internal conflicts in several countries in Middle East and Africa and in civil war in Syria and Libya. As a result, people from these countries started to flee to other countries, mostly to Europe, to escape the horrors of war. Members of the EU, Greece and Italy, which became frontline states, could not handle the influx of migrants on their own and asked the EU for help. The EU understood the severity of the situation and committed itself to finding sustainable solution, which did not only involve using EU agencies and their means but also included initiatives on common asylum policy, migration policy, etc.

Political aspects are not covered in this paper, the author concentrates mainly on the application of comprehensive interagency approach between Frontex, Europol and the NGOs in three different fields – in *hotspots*, in the surveillance of vessels in the Mediterranean and Aegean and in border crossing points. Moreover, as the crisis included the actions of the EU as an organization and almost, if not all member states individually, it will be considered a transboundary crisis as it did not stay within the authority of one state. Several actors were and are involved in solving the situation which is still ongoing as of now, albeit in smaller proportion.

3.1. The choice of actors researched

The purpose of this research was to find how different organizational cultures and understanding of crisis prevented the effective implementation of interagency approach between the NGOs and Frontex and Europol during the migration crisis.

To research the use of interagency approach in migration crisis posed a serious question upon the author, namely who and how to look at as there are several possibilities. First the structures or organizations whose activities were to be researched had to be chosen. The author decided to research only the organizations who were active on both strategic-

political and operational level as it gave broader possibilities to look at the crisis. Hence the EU institutions were excluded from the research. The author admits that the question whether EU agencies can be considered as strategic-political actors might be debatable but for the purposes of this research they are considered as such.

As there are numerous NGOs, it cannot be said that all of them are actors on strategic-political level. However, the majority of them are actively trying to influence the political decisions of other actors, so the NGOs can be considered as actors on both strategic-political and operational level. Another problem concerning the NGOs is the different nature of these organizations. NGOs like Oxfam or Medecine Sans Frontieres employ hundreds of people, have long-term agendas which enable them to act in several countries and disaster areas, whereas small NGOs might only be project-based and created for short-term projects. Furthermore, the difference is also visible in financing as big NGOs have stable budgets which enable them to plan long-term, whereas small NGOs are able to operate short-term and use mostly non-paid volunteers.

The activities of the EU agencies and structures involved in the crisis were quite public and their actions therefore somewhat easier to track and follow. As Frontex and Europol were both involved in the crisis from the beginning, their selection seemed reasonable, if not inevitable. However, to research whether the comprehensive approach was used and worked with third parties as well, another organization or actor was needed. Having been involved in the activities both in Greece and Italy personally, the author was familiar how the situation was dealt with and who were the main actors involved - in addition to the EU agencies the national authorities and the NGOs. EASO and other EU agencies were excluded from the research as comparing only EU agencies did not seem reasonable as similarities in their activities and goals in general were to be expected.

Secondly, the national authorities of hosting member states were considered. Another issue emerged here as Italy and Greece as the main hosting countries during the migration crisis both have rather complicated bureaucracies. For instance, Italy has five different law enforcement agencies, who were and are involved in solving the migration crisis. Although these agencies may have a similar general goal, their detailed goals may be

overlapping, if not confronting, each other at times, making the research very complicated. For this reason the national authorities were excluded from this research. Moreover, as the research was to be conducted using public documents, it would have been difficult for the author to obtain understandable material as official documents in Greece and Italy are rarely translated to English.

The NGOs have played a pivotal role in the migration crisis and have been involved in the crisis for several years now. The author was aware of the problems concerning the NGOs in current research, as also mentioned before. Firstly, various NGOs operate in Italy and Greece. One organization may be active in Greece or only on a couple of Greek islands, whereas some are active in both Italy and Greece, therefore raising the issue whether all or at least the majority of NGOs had similar goals. The research was not to be conducted on possible different goals of various NGOs, rather the goals of NGOs were assumed to be largely similar. Furthermore, the activities of various NGOs were similar in their pattern across the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea area, giving the author a possibility to make an assumption that the activities and goals of the NGOs involved in the migration crisis and operating in Italy and Greece were similar in general. This assumption made it possible to include the NGOs as a third actor to be researched in this work.

The author also considered including political level actors such as PSC or EEAS in this research, however the decision was made to include only actors involved “on the ground”. The role of the EU institutions cannot be underestimated but they are not directly represented in crisis area themselves. Moreover, Frontex, Europol and the NGOs frequently work within the same physical space or area, giving ample possibilities to understand each other’s work and co-operate well, at least in theory. Thereby political level actors were excluded from this research, although it must be noted that some NGOs might be also political level actors.

3.2. Research design, methods and the sources of data

In preparing for the research the author had to decide what methods to use as a lot has been written on migration crisis already and the amount of available material is huge, although one might dispute the quality of some of it.

Case-study methodology was used in the research. A broad variety of different research studies is called case study research and there is no clear definition (Tumele, 2015). However, when discussing case studies, the citation by Robert Yin is frequently used: “A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (Yin, 2014). In detail, exploratory case study methodology will be used as the interagency approach might not have clear and concise set of outcomes (Baxter & Jack, 2008). This type of case study is used to explore those situations in which “the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes”, as Yin (2014) notes.

To research the interagency approach and the actions of Frontex, Europol and the NGOs during the migration crisis, especially in 2015, this research used analysis of different published texts. The dilemma here was what analysis technique should be used to achieve the best results. Content analysis and discourse analysis were both considered but the aim of the paper was not to count predetermined words or paragraphs in text and make conclusions based on numbers as such methods were not able to give the best possible answer to the hypothesis, although latent qualitative content analysis might include certain elements of discourse analysis. This led to mixed text analysis techniques being applied to this research. The author established following categories:

- The audience whom the text is meant for
- The main topic of the text
- The actors involved in the text
- The possible perception of the co-operation or interagency approach in the text

The categories helped to determine what were the main topics and who were the main partners or target groups for the organizations researched. Knowing what and who were important for the organizations during the migration crisis helped the author to determine the goals and actions of the organizations researched and to gain by that better understanding of organizational culture of Frontex, Europol and the NGOs and draw conclusions. Media texts and public documents were then analysed according to these categories. No numerical values were given or gathered through the research.

The material (legislation, speeches, press releases, articles, risk analyses, etc.) was obtained from available public sources (EU databases, agency websites, annual reviews of the agencies, the database for European Union legislative acts EUR-LEX, etc.). Articles from news agencies and newspapers were used as well. When using media texts, the author chose sources that are known for their credibility (e.g. BBC, Politico, The Guardian, etc) (see Annex 1). The material mostly covers the actions of the year of 2015, although some material also gives insight to modern day as well, as the crisis is still ongoing. The number of irregular immigrants reaching the shores of Europe may have decreased but the number of people trying to reach Europe who are waiting for their opportunity in neighbouring African countries (Libya, Morocco, etc) has not decreased (Frontex, 2017).

The validity of research methods and data analysis was an important issue in this work. Although the abundance of data concerning the migration crisis and the actors involved may be overwhelming at first, co-operation and the possible implementation of the interagency approach is perceived differently by each actor. Hence the author decided to apply document analysis as a research method. Several authors have brought forward the issue of bias when analysing documents, both in the researcher and the creator of the document as well (O'Leary, 2014). Secondly, as Bowen (2009) notes, the data of the document should not be considered necessarily precise, accurate or complete recordings of events that have occurred. The author wanted to establish if possible similarities or differences in goals and tasks of the actors somehow influenced the implementation of comprehensive approach. Furthermore, the difference in perceiving threat or danger might influence the way people or organizations see the situation.

3.2.1. Selection of criteria

To either prove or disprove the hypothesis, the author had put forward two research questions, which were looked into from the three aspects of migration crisis:

- activities in hotspots
- activities in border crossing points (BCPs)
- activities in handling the surveillance of vessels on the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea

As mentioned, the migration crisis consists of several aspects which cannot be scrutinized in a single paper, therefore a choice had to be made. The author chose the criteria mentioned above due to the fact that these aspects have been among the most debated and outstanding issues during the migration crisis. The nature of various activities in hotspots have been fiercely debated by all actors, similarly emotional “blame game” has been fought over the surveillance of vessels on the Mediterranean. In addition all the actors researched have been actively involved in these aspects (EU agencies are working side by side in *hotspots* and BCPs with the NGOS, similarly all actors are involved in the surveillance issue).

European Agenda on Migration will be given special attention in this paper as it was of vital importance in the context of interagency co-operation during the migration crisis. The Agenda established the framework within which the crisis was to be managed (including introducing key points for more efficient management of migration, establishing *hotspot* approach, etc) and was therefore an important instrument of interagency co-operation. As already noted in this paper, co-operation is essential in efficient crisis management and for this reason the Agenda must be considered a milestone in the management of migration crisis as it was the first time when the EU provided a complete plan which not only laid down the framework for operational co-operation but also provided member states with policy guidelines (relocation programme of migrants, renewal of Dublin system of asylum seekers, etc), therefore being an essential political agenda.

3.3. European Agenda on Migration

On May 13th, 2015, in response to increasing number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean, the European Commission approved the European Agenda on Migration, which for the first time introduced the *hotspot* approach (European Agenda on Migration 2015), which, in essence, was a working space for officers from Frontex, EASO and Europol to work together to register, identify and fingerprint the incoming migrants (European Agenda on Migration 2015). These working spaces were to be located at key arrival points in frontline member states such as Italy and Greece (European Agenda on Migration, 2017). Two other EU agencies are involved in *hotspots*: “Eurojust supports the cooperation between the Member States’ judicial authorities to dismantle and prosecute the smuggling and trafficking networks. Eurojust facilitates the use of judicial cooperation, European Arrest Warrants, joint investigation teams and coordination centres to ensure an EU judicial response. euLISA provides ICT expertise based on its operational management of the Eurodac system for registration of biometric data from asylum seekers and those irregularly crossing the external borders of the EU. It also assists national authorities to accelerate the registration process through optimal use of technologies” (Frontex, 2017). Of note is the fact that migrants who have been processed in *hotspots* are at times housed in *hotspots* and guarded by local authorities (either by police or army units), a fact which was later heavily criticized by several NGOs.

Moreover, various NGOs also established their offices at *hotspots*, providing migrants with advice and assistance in several aspects (legal, linguistic, etc). Hence all the actors researched in this paper are working together in the same area, making possible co-operation easier.

Furthermore, the Agenda introduced four key points how to manage migration better:

- Reducing the incentives of irregular migration
- Saving lives and securing external borders
- Stressing the need for strong common asylum policy
- The need for new legal migration policy

These points could not have been achieved successfully without implementing the comprehensive approach. When talking about reducing the incentives, the Agenda stresses the need to co-operate with third countries and addressing the root causes of migration together with the fight against human traffickers within these countries. Furthermore, the Agenda underlines the fact that the work of the agencies will be complementary to one another (European Agenda on Migration, 2015). This shows the Commission's intent to use comprehensive approach in *hotspot* approach and the assumption that the agencies will work together. "*Tools of comprehensive approach*" are mentioned in the Agenda, although they have not been mentioned or described in detail, leading to an opinion that all the EU agencies, institutions and means available at their disposal are considered as tools of the comprehensive approach in this context.

The Agenda therefore sets the basis for interagency cooperation between Frontex and Europol as both were heavily involved in the crisis from the beginning. Furthermore, the co-operation between all EU agencies and institutions is underlined as of crucial importance if the crisis is to be managed successfully. Interestingly, the Agenda does not mention the NGOs in any context. Although the importance of saving lives and offering protection for those in need is vehemently underlined, the activities of NGOs or expectations towards their actions are missing from the document. European Agenda on Migration established the base for crisis management in the migration crisis by introducing tools and means for the actors involved. Although its political success can be debated (the document was heavily criticized for establishing the relocation programme), the introduced tools for migration crisis in front line member states, such as the hotspot approach and interagency co-operation have been of vital importance.

The importance of cooperation in the area of migration, asylum and security had been long stressed by the EU. The Internal Security Strategy stated clearly "During its operations, Frontex comes across key information on criminals involved in trafficking networks. Currently, however, this information cannot be further used for risk analyses or to better target future joint operations. Moreover, relevant data on suspected criminals do not reach the competent national authorities or Europol for further investigation.

Likewise, Europol cannot share information from its analytical work files. Based on experience and in the context of the EU's overall approach to information management, the Commission considers that enabling Frontex to process and use this information, with a limited scope and in accordance with clearly defined personal data management rules, will make a significant contribution to dismantling criminal organisations. However, this should not create any duplication of tasks between Frontex and Europol” (Internal Security Strategy, 2010).

European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex

Frontex was created in 2004 as “the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union Frontex” (Frontex, 2017). In 2016 Regulation 2016/1624 established Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Its main tasks include (Frontex, 2017):

- Joint operations and rapid interventions at EU’s external borders
- Risk analysis
- Monitoring the situation at the borders

Looking at the tasks it is obvious why the EU underlines interagency approach and cooperation, in this case by Europol and Frontex. By 2015 smuggling people had become lucrative business, criminal networks had been created. Frontex alone simply would not have been able to handle the crisis as it lacked necessary means and resources, therefore Europol joined the effort, as it is tasked with combatting serious international organized crime.

Europol

Europol had been created to co-ordinate the efforts of EU MS in their fight against organized crime in its different forms. Trafficking in human beings is identified by Europol as one of the main security threats (Europol, 2017), moreover Europol was able to rely on intelligence from its member states. Whilst guarding the borders and apprehending human traffickers are pivotal, taking care of already arrived migrants was

not the task for Frontex or Europol. Various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were ready to come in and help to accommodate and take care of the migrants.

NGOs are now recognised as key third sector actors on the landscapes of development, human rights, humanitarian action, environment, and many other areas of public action, from the post-2004 tsunami reconstruction efforts in Indonesia, India, Thailand, and Sri Lanka, to the 2005 Make Poverty History campaign for aid and trade reform and developing country debt cancellation (Lewis, 2010). NGOs have been and are still highly praised for their humanitarian work and saving countless lives, on other hand, however, during the migration crisis they have also been criticised by authorities for assisting smugglers in bringing migrants to Europe and providing means to do so in a large scale.

3.4. Activities in *hotspots*

According to the European Agenda on Migration, EU agencies established five *hotspots* in the Greek islands (Lesvos, Samos, Leros, Chios and Kos) and five in Italy (Taranto, Pozzallo, Lampedusa, Trapani and Messina). Official Frontex and EU documents see the main actions of Frontex and Europol in *hotspots* as follows:

- Registering migrants to inform the EU and the hosting member state's authorities how many and from where people are arriving.
- Identifying migrants so people arriving in Europe would be known not only to the hosting member state's authorities but also to other member states as well, preventing migrants from applying for asylum in different EU member states
- Fingerprinting migrants to ensure arriving migrants claims of their identity can be proven and people not needing protection repatriated to their countries of origin

Frontex

In risk analyses and official publications such as press releases Frontex underlines cooperation with all parties involved to work towards solving the crisis, excluding no one. The public documents of Frontex are meant for broader public to show the intent and

plans of the agency to solve the migration crisis as effectively as possible, the main topic being the description of how the EU's external borders are being secured and frontline member states assisted (e.g. Frontex news release on 10th December 2015). The actors described in Frontex's public documents are either EU agencies and institutions or national authorities, other actors such as the NGOs are almost never mentioned. Moreover, Frontex describes its role in saving migrants' lives and fighting other means of trafficking as well, mainly trafficking in drugs (Frontex news release on December 4th, 2015). An interesting news release was also issued by Frontex on December 4th, 2015 describing the information exchange agreement signed by Europol and Frontex. The goal of the agreement is to prevent and combat cross-border criminal activities by cooperating in the planning and implementation of operational activities and also sharing the data of suspected criminals collected during the operations (Frontex news release on December 4th, 2015). This shows how interagency cooperation was deemed inevitable by both agencies and achieving the goals of both organizations directly depended on effective co-operation. Moreover, the same news release describes how the concept of European Regional Task Force (EURTF) had been jointly developed by Europol, Frontex, EASO and Eurojust. EURTF is described by Europol as "a shared office where the representatives of these agencies work together to coordinate the EU assistance to the national authorities facing massive migratory pressure. They assist in the identification, registration and return as well as criminal investigations of people-smuggling networks which takes place either in the ports or in specific reception centres" (Europol, 2015). *Hotspots* established in key arrival points are closely working with EURTF offices.

EURTF office became operational in Sicily, Italy in June 2015 and in Piraeus, Greece in January 2016 (Frontex, 2015). The EURTF project is a good example of interagency cooperation at EU level and proves that the EU was indeed committed to finding the best and most effective solutions to solve the migration crisis and was able to act quickly, if needed. One should note that the European Agenda on Migration was approved on May 13th, 2015 and the first EURTF office opened next month in Italy. Although not directly connected, this is another example of interagency co-operation as the EU agencies had already established *hotspots* in Italy and Greece by June 2015 and were looking for

possibilities for more efficient co-operation. EURTF office provided them a good opportunity for doing that.

Through their public documents Frontex wants the broader public to know they are dealing as efficiently as possible with what they perceive as a serious crisis and the agency's goal is to keep EU citizens secure by efficiently controlling the external borders, keeping the influx of migrants under control and combatting human trafficking. Interagency co-operation (especially with agencies like Europol or EASO) is frequently mentioned as an example how the agency is committed to solving the crisis and is using not only its own, but also other partners' means to achieve their goal.

The media texts did not pay much attention to the activities in *hotspots*, the actions of Frontex in frontline member states are discussed in general (what has the agency done and what powers granted to handle the situation more effectively, e.g. "EU Frontex force to help speed up deportations" (BBC on October 8th, 2015). Therefore, the media can be considered neutral towards Frontex in the question of *hotspots*. However, the media was sceptical towards the EU in their handling of the crisis, particularly in the matter of returning irregular migrants either to their countries of origin or to Turkey (ibid).

It must be mentioned that the EU-Turkey deal on migration was signed on March 20th, 2016, not only decreasing significantly the number of arriving irregular migrants to Greece but also establishing a working system of returning irregular migrants to Turkey. The deal stated, for instance, that for every Syrian migrant returned to Turkey, a Syrian migrant from Turkey would be resettled in the European Union. In addition to that system, the EU allocated three billion euros in aid to Turkey to help Syrian migrant communities there.

Europol

The official documents of Europol are, in their nature, similar to those of Frontex – the need for co-operation with the member states of the EU and other EU agencies is underlined and examples of interagency cooperation provided. Europol had created European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) in early 2016 "to support EU member states in targeting and dismantling the complex and sophisticated criminal networks

involved in migrant smuggling” (Europol, 2016). EMSC is closely co-operating with other EU agencies, including Eurojust and Frontex to combat criminal networks in human trafficking.

Europol documents do not discuss its involvement or activities in *hotspots* in detail, attention is turned to more strategic initiatives such as EMSC and Joint Operation Mare (JOT Mare). This can be explained by the fact that Europol’s task is to combat serious international crime and whatever information is gathered by its officers in *hotspots*, it will be considered as classified material and neither the information or the sources and methods are revealed even after the successful conclusion of an investigation. Moreover, the tasks and goals of Europol in *hotspots* are not discussed or described in detail, however considering the main tasks of the agency, gathering intelligence on human traffickers and criminal networks are without a doubt one of the main tasks of the Europol officers working in *hotspots*.

Lack of mention of Europol’s activities in *hotspots* in Europol’s own documents and publications is understandable but somewhat surprisingly the media follows similar trend. If an EU agency is mentioned in connection to the migration crisis, then it is Frontex or EASO. The media does not mention Europol’s role neither in relation to activities in *hotspots* nor in any other aspect of migration crisis. The role and mentions of Europol in the media increase considerably when terrorist attacks are being discussed as media perceives the agency as intelligence gathering and organized crime fighting organization. Hence the media perceives the role of Europol in the migration crisis differently than the agency itself.

NGOs

The documents of various NGOs describe their goals in *hotspots* as:

- Saving people’s lives as EU agencies are not up for the task, moreover as the conditions in *hotspots* are horrifying
- Taking care of migrants’ rights in Europe as EU agencies’ goals do not include caring for the migrants’ rights in *hotspots*

The NGOs frequently underline the fact that migrants are forced to live in hotspots and are not allowed to move elsewhere (Caritas Europa position paper on June 16th, 2016). The conditions in *hotspots* are criticized from the human rights point of view as according to the Danish Refugee Council the migrants are facing “gaps in information, lack of legal assistance, under-identification of vulnerable persons, restricted freedom of movement and de facto detention” (Danish Refugee Council on November 15th, 2017). The documents available at the websites of the NGOs stress the role of the organizations as saviours of people.

Interestingly, when addressing the EU or its agencies in relation to the migration crisis, similar to the media, the NGOs do no mention Europol. Frontex, however, is frequently mentioned.

Frontex along with Greek authorities is criticized for not letting migrants move to the Greek mainland in Greece and keeping the migrants in the islands near Turkey. This is considered to be human rights violation by the NGOs and Frontex has frequently been blamed for this action. This, however, is a good example of the lack of co-operation and communication between Frontex and the NGOs as the decision to keep the migrants in the islands was made by the Greek authorities and not Frontex.

Interestingly, the research within media texts did not produce NGOs positive reflections on Frontex actions in *hotspots* and the agency’s actions are always described negatively, as it is mostly seen as the main scapegoat for migrants’ troubles. The NGOs often show their negativity towards the fingerprinting of migrants, considering it abusive and a violation of migrants’ human rights. Moreover, the NGOs accuse Frontex of only being interested in border control and not saving lives.

Whereas in official documents Frontex is restrained in their attitude towards the NGOs and barely mention them at all. the media texts showed a different world. Quarterly and annual risk analyses and publications are considered as the official statements of the organization, therefore explaining their restrained tone. The tone in media, however, is different as Frontex and the NGOs blame each other, the former for not caring for

migrants' lives and rights, the latter for helping to smuggle people to Europe (Financial Times on December 15th, 2016). The dispute comes down to different goals of organizations as the main goal for the NGOs was to save people and care for their human rights, whereas for Frontex the main goal has been securing the borders and combatting human trafficking with Europol. Thereby the difference of goals can be attributed to as the main reason for the dispute between Frontex and the NGOs.

3.5. Surveillance of vessels on the Mediterranean and Aegean

Frontex

Surveillance of vessels in the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea is considered an important measure in controlling the borders of Greece and Italy by Frontex. The agency's official documents state that besides combatting human trafficking, search and rescue function is another important aspect of surveillance of vessels (Frontex press release on July 5th, 2017). Frontex's aim is to show through its official documents that the agency is doing all within its capabilities to combat human trafficking and save the lives of the irregular migrants as well.

Co-operation with other actors is frequently mentioned, the actors being:

- National authorities of a hosting country, i.e. Italy or Greece
- Member states of the EU contributing to the mission under the auspices of Frontex
- Other EU agencies

The co-operation between the authorities of a hosting country and Frontex is frequently described positively as profitable for both sides as texts describe the apprehension of criminals or rescuing migrants (Frontex press release on July 20th, 2017). Co-operation with other agencies is also positively described as being useful for achieving the goals for both parties. Europol has not been mentioned often in official texts of Frontex, although the cooperation with EU agencies is often underlined by the agency. The NGOs have not been mentioned in public documents of Frontex in regard to surveillance of vessels.

The analysis of media texts shows that Frontex is indeed mostly involved in two major aspects when surveying the vessels in the Mediterranean and Aegean – search and rescue of migrants and combatting human trafficking. However, as the executive director of Frontex Fabrice Leggeri put it: “While saving lives is a priority, dismantling people-smuggling networks operating in Libya is part of our mission.” (Frontex press release on June 28th, 2016). Media seems to be of similar opinion as Frontex is mentioned for saving lives, more importantly the agency is mentioned for blaming various NGOs for smuggling people to Europe. This blame game reached political level when executive director of Frontex Fabrice Leggeri expressed his concern as NGOs were sending their ships to pick up migrants near the Libyan coast (The Guardian on February 27th, 2017). Such action was considered to have encouraged human trafficking as the NGOs were picking people up from the Libyan waters. Allegations against the NGOs did not come only from Frontex as an Italian prosecutor also claimed to have proof of the NGOs smuggling people to Italy.

In assistance of Frontex and other relevant EU agencies, the EU launched European Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) in 2015, with the goal of search and rescue and dismantling smuggler networks. Although ongoing, the success of this mission, however, has been debated and cannot be firmly confirmed. Frontex does co-operate with EUNAVFOR MED in its surveillance operations and uses its resources for the surveillance of vessels in the Mediterranean and Aegean. European Agenda on Migration tasks the EU agencies to assist the member states’ authorities in the fight against the criminal network of smugglers by capturing and destroying the vessels before they can be used to transport people (Agenda on Migration, 2015).

Europol

According to its media releases the main aim of Europol to survey vessels in Mediterranean and Aegean is to combat human trafficking and international organized crime which is heavily involved with migrant trafficking. The co-operation with Frontex in this field is being underlined as an important tool to achieve Europol’s goals.

In March 2015 Europol launched Joint Operation Mare (JOT Mare) in response to the migration crisis and increasing number of irregular migrants. This effort was meant to enhance the co-operation between Europol, Frontex and member states of the EU to more efficiently tackle the challenges brought by the migration crisis (Europol annual review, 2015). This initiative was described by the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos as “a maritime intelligence centre reinforcing actions against people smugglers. The close cooperation between all national and European stakeholders will be encouraged in order to pursue further our objectives” (Europol, 2015). This joint operation is an example of interagency approach being implemented by the EU as the union and its agencies share a common goal of getting the migration crisis under control.

Although the joint efforts against people smuggling have been somewhat successful, human trafficking has still become more profitable than drug smuggling. One of the options how to conceal the payments made to smugglers is to use *hawala* banking.

Migrants from Islamic countries often use *hawala* banking, which is widespread in Islam. The *hawala* system is simple – if a person in Syria, for instance, wants to send money to his children in Germany, he goes to a certain shop or a person known to handle such issues and gives him the cash. Moments later the sender’s child gets a phone call or a text message telling him to go to a certain shop in the city he is in and he receives the money sent by his father (minus the commission, of course). The simplicity and efficiency of the system has made it very popular amongst Muslims and it is widely used in Islamic countries.

Hawala is also used in smuggling people as migrants pay their smugglers using the same system (EURACTIV, 2017). As interactions in *hawala* are done either by phone or instant message providers (WhatsApp, Messenger, etc), they are almost impossible to trace, especially if law enforcement agencies begin their investigations considerable time later. This enables smugglers to move people from one place to another without financial trace. When concentrating on surveillance of vessels in the Mediterranean, the media mostly focuses on the argument between Frontex and the NGOs, Europol is not mentioned. As

the media perceives the role of Europol to be more involved with dismantling criminal networks and not directly involved in maritime surveillance.

The NGOs

The main goal of the NGOs using their own vessels to save people arriving by sea from Libya, Turkey, Egypt and other countries is to save human lives. How irregular migrants arrived in these countries and how they were able to cross the sea or find vessels to go to the sea is not relevant for the NGOs as for them it is clearly a humanitarian crisis where lives are in danger. Some of the NGOs conduct their own rescue operations and are therefore critical towards Frontex and national authorities of Greece and Italy as their operations are deemed as meant for border control, not saving people. As the goal of Frontex is to secure the external borders of the EU and Europol is tasked with dismantling organized criminal networks involved in smuggling, the goals of the actors do not match or overlap. Whereas EU agencies are interested in knowing who are coming to Europe and procedures have been established to ensure that, the NGOs are trying to protect the “human rights of migrants” and provide migrants with all possible assistance beginning with food and ending with legal aid, translation, etc.

According to their own texts, the NGOs are actively saving lives as the EU and other actors are either not able or not willing to do that. Furthermore, migrants saved by Frontex or national authorities will not have their human rights guaranteed, as the NGOs have underlined for several times. Such approach puts the NGOs at odds with Frontex, other EU agencies and national authorities.

3.6. Activities in Border Crossing Points

Compared to previous two topics, activities in BCPs did not receive a lot of attention from any of the actors involved. Most irregular migrants arrived in Greece and Italy by sea, thereby it is understandable that issues concerning *hotspots* and the surveillance of vessels on sea were more crucial to EU agencies and the NGOs. Furthermore, when analysing

different BCPs, it is important to notice that migrants coming to Greece and Italy by land did not use conventional BCPs similarly to their comrades who reached Europe by sea. The NGOs criticized fiercely the national authorities of EU countries who were trying to stop migrants from crossing internal borders. As crossing the border between Schengen countries where the surveillance of borders was non-existent or weak, was easy, this led to a situation where due to mass border crossings some countries like Slovenia or Hungary decided to erect fences at their borders to control illegal border crossings, which in turn was heavily criticized by the NGOs as they would have preferred the removal of all possible obstacles from migrants' path. As Frontex or Europol were and are not tasked with securing the internal borders of the EU, the agencies did not come to contact with the NGOs on the issue of internal borders.

Frontex

According to its documents, Frontex sees its role as assistant to national authorities in BCPs. The agency has issued 3 news releases over a period of two years describing the apprehension of criminals and dismantling criminal networks. In addition, risk analyses also only describe the situation at borders and do not give many details on activities in BCPs. Frontex shows through its texts that the cooperation between them and the national authorities of EU member states is sustainable and produces results.

Compared to activities in hotspots and surveillance of vessels, the media has not taken up any interest on Frontex's activities in BCPs. As mentioned before, this is understandable as Frontex does not have a role in securing the internal borders of the EU member states.

Europol

Europol has not produced any documents related to its activities in BCPs. Considering the fact that the agency's task is to dismantle criminal networks and combat human trafficking, it does not come as a surprise. Lack of public documents does not mean lack of activities of Europol at BCPs in the context of the migration crisis, as the agency's goal is to collect information and data, which would help dismantle criminal human trafficking networks.

The NGOs

When discussing the issue of BCPs, the NGOs have not concentrated on Frontex or Europol. As mentioned, the agencies have not either been active in BCPs or have been active using other means, making it impossible for the NGOs to comment on the work of Frontex and Europol. Furthermore, as most of the arrivals took place by boats over the sea border, BCPs which are located on land borders, received little attention from the NGOs.

4. Discussion

A lot has been written on migration crisis of 2015 and the EU's handling of it, however the topic of interagency approach during the crisis has been barely touched, if at all mentioned. EU is a complex structure and at times decision-making and efficient interagency communication might be difficult to achieve.

This paper looked at interagency co-operation from the organizational culture point of view. As established, law enforcement organizations have distinct organizational culture, which is based on strict adherence to norms and values. If an order is given, it must be carried out precisely as ordered, without much considering the context officers are operating within. Given the character and general tasks of law enforcement, such strictness is understandable, however it might put police and other similar organizations at odds with groups and people operating in the same community as the goals of other groups might differ from those of law enforcement. Furthermore, the perception of the situation is essential. During the migration crisis Frontex and Europol understood the crisis as a situation where border security was at grave risk and migrants arriving in Greece and Italy might be a security risk. Moreover, as international organized crime was heavily involved in human trafficking during the crisis, it added another dimension to look into for Frontex and Europol.

When looking at the actions undertaken by the EU in 2015 and later, an interesting fact is revealed. Considering the fact that 2015 was the first year when the migration crisis first made the headlines and the number of irregular migrants crossing into the EU grew more than six times compared to 2014, the EU responded relatively quickly by introducing the Agenda on Migration. Furthermore, the Agenda serves as an excellent example of interagency co-operation as the EU agencies were given a framework to operate within and a set of goals to achieve. One should take into consideration that by early 2015 the crisis had not reached its peak. As the Commission did not seek previous approval of the Agenda, it can be considered as a rather successful measure. Although

some member states vehemently opposed some of the measures, namely the relocation of migrants, the Agenda can be considered as a good guideline how to tackle the crisis.

The paper looked into the actions and goals of Frontex and Europol and found them similar, as both agencies perceived the situation as a security crisis. This, to an extent, was to be expected as both are agencies of the EU and their goals contribute to general goal of the EU which was to control the external borders and fight human trafficking. In their official documents both agencies are quite restrained and polite towards each other and value the co-operation with the other agency when the topic of co-operation comes up. This is understandable as Frontex and Europol work closely with each other and good working relationship is expected to achieve the results for both agencies.

When looking at the media texts, the situation is similar. The relationship between EU agencies is not always good and media has been used at times to gain the upper hand, however, in the context of the migration crisis Europol and Frontex have not used the media to refer to possible problems in their co-operation, in the contrary, the cooperation has been described as efficient and successful. Such approach cannot always be taken for granted in crisis situations as problems occur on both operational and strategic level and the temptation to use media to gain an advantage might be too sweet to turn down. In this crisis, however, such problems were not brought to the attention of media.

Looking at the interagency approach from the NGOs' point of view, the situation could not have been more different. Frontex and Europol do not criticize the NGOs in their official public documents, however looking at the media, the situation is different. Firstly, as expected, a lot of emotion is involved. The NGOs are especially critical towards Frontex who they see as the main culprit in the death and misery of arriving migrants. Although the EU and its agencies are committed to saving lives according to their public documents and indeed, the vessels of Frontex are patrolling the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea to help migrants and assist in case of possible shipwrecks, the NGOs find it unsatisfactory and consider the activities of Frontex both in *hotspots* and at sea hostile towards the migrants with the only goal of securing the borders and not caring for the migrants.

Interestingly, as one of the main goals of Frontex is to control the external borders of the EU effectively, the criticism by the NGOs is rather surprising as Frontex is not only expected to conduct the surveillance of vessels but also stop the migrants before they could reach the shores of Greece or Italy undetected. Moreover, helping vulnerable and other people in need is also an important agenda for Frontex, so close co-operation between the agency and the NGOs would be a logical assumption. This shows that the NGOs do not take into account the goals of Frontex in their work and are trying to achieve their goals by showing the efforts of the EU as punitive and abusive. It is important to note that although Frontex, Europol and the NGOs are all actively involved in solving the migration crisis and they need each other to achieve their respective goals, the difference in perceiving the crisis and diverging goals have hindered co-operation a lot.

As all actors involved have different goals and perceive the crisis differently, the criticism towards other actors (the NGOs vs EU agencies) is almost inevitable. Both EU agencies perceive the crisis as a security problem (people are entering EU illegally, their identities and intentions are not known, the facilitators are part of a large and well-organized criminal network, etc). Making borders secure and breaking the networks of human trafficking have been the main goals for both Frontex and Europol. The NGOs, however, see the crisis as a humanitarian problem and want to bring as many people to Europe as possible, regardless of their background and status, so these people would be safe from horrors of abuse and war. EU agencies are also committed to saving lives, however they are interested in bringing people to *hotspots* where they are registered and accounted for, as the goal is to control the migration flow. The NGOs see these actions as violations of human rights as the migrants should be allowed to move around freely, regardless of their status. As the goals of organizations did not match, conflicts followed, as was shown in text analysis.

Not surprisingly, the EU had underlined several times the importance of saving lives at sea. The NGOs, by their own account, have exactly the same goal, so this should be a field where co-operation was to be expected. The reality, however, is different, as Frontex and the NGOs have blamed each other through media and no effort on co-operation has

been made, at least not in public. Activities conducted in co-operation between Frontex and the NGOs would have been beneficial to both parties as it would have given them the opportunity to prove their original intent and use the capabilities of other partners. One must consider, however, the accusations of Frontex and at times of national authorities, which have quite bluntly said that the NGOs are smuggling people to Europe themselves. This aspect would explain the lack of co-operation as no EU agency or national authority would ever agree to breaking a law or smuggling people to Europe.

The relationship between the NGOs and Europol is more peaceful. It can be explained by the fact that Europol is not so visibly involved in the activities as their goal is to break the criminal networks of smugglers. These activities cannot be observed or be known by third parties in order for them to be successful, so the NGOs do not come into contact with Europol so often as they do with Frontex. Moreover, the migrants at sea and in *hotspots* and BCPs mostly come in contact with Frontex officers, so the critique is mostly concentrated on the latter.

In the introductory part of the thesis the author set a hypothesis which stated that different organizational culture and perception of crisis prevented the effective implementation of interagency approach. The paper showed that Frontex and Europol perceived the crisis as a security crisis, whereas the NGOs perceived it as a humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, Frontex and Europol both have organizational cultures similar to law enforcement organizations. Both agencies also second staff from EU member states to crisis areas. In their respective countries these seconded officers work as policemen or border guards, i.e. for military-style or law enforcement organizations. Furthermore, the seconded officers are given security-related tasks (registering, identifying, debriefing) in crisis areas, which might even more enhance their perception of security crisis.

The NGOs perceived the migration crisis as a humanitarian issue, where human lives were at risk and even after arriving in Europe, the migrants' rights were not guaranteed and protected. As the NGOs concentrated on saving lives and protecting migrants' rights, their actions inevitably collided with those of Frontex and Europol as these agencies had different goals. Furthermore, the organizational culture of the NGOs is fundamentally

different from that of Frontex and Europol. Small NGOs rely on donations and funding from projects (some of them are created for short-term projects), their agendas might be short term and they are staffed by volunteers. Although big NGOs have large budgets and they are able to plan long-term, the organizational culture of the NGOs is different from that of law enforcement organizations. The NGOs as a rule do not have long traditions and they do not adhere to strict norms and rules.

The paper showed that the NGOs had different perception of the migration crisis than Frontex and Europol. Moreover, the NGOs organizational culture is also different from that of Frontex and Europol, which prevented the implementation of interagency approach between these three actors during the migration crisis.

5. Conclusion

This paper analysed the implementation of interagency approach during the migration crisis of 2015. Three actors involved in the crisis were selected (Frontex, Europol and the NGOs). The author set a hypothesis that “different organizational cultures and understanding of crisis prevented the effective implementation of interagency approach between the NGOs and Frontex and Europol during the migration crisis”. This hypothesis was researched using following research questions:

- How did the NGOs, Frontex and Europol perceive the migration crisis?
- How did their respective organizational culture affect the actions of Frontex, Europol and the NGOs during the migration crisis?

The paper showed that the hypothesis was correct as EU agencies perceived the crisis as a security issue and the NGOs as a humanitarian issue, preventing effective implementation of interagency approach. Moreover, differences in respective organizational cultures enhanced the problems the NGOs, Frontex and Europol had to face when interacting with each other. The paper found that the co-operation between Frontex and Europol was efficient as both organizations not only had similar goals and perceptions but also shared similar organizational culture.

The paper first concentrated on the meaning of crisis and modern crisis management, showing that the meaning and perception of crisis has changed over time and more crises will be transnational, hence impossible to manage without implementing the interagency approach and effective co-operation. Different actors, however, find it difficult to co-operate with other actors as their goals do not match or even overlap and furthermore, the perception of crisis varies. Thirdly, the paper found that the organizational culture of different actors might be altogether different. All of this makes interagency co-operation very difficult to implement.

The paper analysed the implementation of interagency approach during the migration crisis through the activities of Frontex, Europol and the NGOs as they were heavily involved during the crisis. Three criteria were selected: the activities in *hotspots*, the activities in the surveillance of vessels on the Mediterranean and Aegean and the activities in BCPs.

The paper showed that EU agencies co-operated with each other as they had similar goals and perceptions but were unable to do so with the NGOs as their perception of the crisis was different. When looking at the activities in *hotspots* and in the surveillance of vessels, the NGOs were especially critical of Frontex, as the agency's actions did not enable the NGOs to perform its tasks. The difference in goals led to public conflict, where both sides accused each other in media. The NGOs remained similarly active in BCPs as they criticized the actions of national authorities. As Frontex was in a less visible role in BCPs at external borders and had no role at internal borders, the NGOs did not come into conflict with Frontex or Europol when activities in BCPs were concerned.

Frontex, Europol and the NGOs are and will be heavily involved in solving the migration crisis and similar complex crises in the future and they need each other to achieve their respective goals. This, however, also brings forward an interesting dilemma – as the goals of researched actors were and are diverging and perceptions differ, the co-operation proved to be difficult to implement.

As the essence of crisis keeps changing and one actor (state, organization, etc) is often not able to manage the crisis on its own, we must consider interagency co-operation as an inevitable measure for successful crisis management. Although actors involved will have diverging goals and perceptions in a crisis situation, a compromise must be found to ensure safety and security of all people involved. The compromise, however, will be difficult to negotiate, as the organizational cultures of the NGOs and military or law enforcement organizations vary. This problem within civil-military co-operation needs to be addressed and studied further to make the co-operation between the NGOs and military or law enforcement organizations more efficient.

6. Summary

The thesis looked into the implementation of interagency approach by Frontex, Europol and the NGOs during the migration crisis of 2015. The thesis set a hypothesis that different perception of the migration crisis and organizational cultures prevented efficient implementation of interagency approach by actors involved. To prove or disprove the hypothesis research questions were set forward. The author researched the topic by analysing media texts and texts issued by Frontex, Europol and the NGOs, focusing on three categories: activities in *hotspots*, activities in the surveillance of vessels in the Mediterranean and Aegean and activities in BCPs. The research proved that the NGOs perceived the migration crisis as a humanitarian crisis, whereas Frontex and Europol perceived the crisis as a security crisis. Furthermore, the organizational culture of the NGOs differs from that of Frontex and Europol who have organizational cultures similar to that of law enforcement organizations.

As the understanding of crisis and organizational cultures were different among the actors researched, the hypothesis was proven to be correct. As the organizations researched have different organizational cultures and also different perceptions of the migration crisis, interagency approach was not implemented. As the essence of crisis keeps changing and one actor (state, organization, etc) is often not able to manage the crisis on its own, interagency co-operation must be considered as an inevitable measure for successful crisis management. Although actors involved will have different goals and perceptions in a crisis situation, a compromise must be found to ensure safety and security of all people involved. The compromise, however, will be difficult to negotiate, as the organizational cultures of the NGOs and military or law enforcement organizations vary. This problem within civil-military co-operation needs to be addressed and studied further to make the co-operation between the NGOs and military or law enforcement organizations more efficient.

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Annex 1

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