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Securitization of Dual Citizenship in Germany

M.A. thesis

Supervisor: Thomas Linsenmaier, M.A.

Tartu 2019
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Eva Hörtner
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Eva Hörtner

Abstract

The securitization of migration has been well-researched. In stark contrast, a research gap exists concerning the securitization of (dual) citizenship across countries. This thesis addresses this gap by investigating two research questions. Firstly, it looks at discursive securitization by analyzing if and how the debate on dual citizenship is securitized, and whether or not representations of Turkish-Germans and Russian-Germans feed-into the securitization of dual citizenship within the German center-right discourse. Secondly, this study investigates how the management of unease, the securitization of routine, plays out in naturalization practices in Germany. The thesis focuses on the more concrete question of how the practice of awarding dual citizenship with naturalizations differs in Germany, with a focus on naturalized former Turkish and Russian citizens and naturalized Turkish-German and Russian-German citizens. To achieve this goal a discourse analysis is conducted drawing on 30 articles, from the center-right newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). Furthermore, changes in naturalization practices are investigated and the practice of awarding dual citizenship with naturalization is analyzed drawing on the naturalization statistics of the German Federal Statistical Office. The analysis shows that the center-right discourse on (dual) citizenship has to be subdivided into two discourses, a liberal and a conservative discourse. The conservative discourse’s securitization move seeks to establish the German identity as being existentially threatened by linking the discourse to representations of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ as Other, presenting them as ‘inferior’ and as “undermining the standards of the [‘German’] self” (Diez 2005, 628). The discursive representation of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ as ‘inferior’ is reflected in an ‘unease’ towards naturalized former Turkish/Turkish-German citizens. The representation of the ‘Russian-Germans’ as ‘different’ is partially mirrored in a relative ‘ease’ towards naturalized former Russian/Russian-German citizens. However, this ‘ease’ is tightened over time at a federal level.
**List of abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>Alternative for Germany (<em>Alternative für Deutschland</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union (<em>Christlich Demokratische Union</em>)</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Copenhagen School</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union (<em>Christlich-Soziale Union</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party (<em>Freie Demokratische Partei</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany (<em>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland</em>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of content

1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 7

2. Theoretical Framework – Securitization Theory ................................................................. 11

2.1. Discourses – The Copenhagen School of Securitization .............................................. 11

2.1.1 Boundary-drawing and citizenship ............................................................................. 15

2.1.2 Boundary-drawing and the securitization of citizenship ......................................... 19

2.2. Practices – Bigo’s Management of Unease ................................................................. 22

3. Research design and Methodology .................................................................................... 25

4. Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 34

4.1. Analysis I – Discursive Securitization ........................................................................ 34

4.1.1 Social integration as corner stone for legal integration – conservative discourse..... 35

4.1.2 Legal integration as cornerstone for social integration – liberal discourse .......... 40

4.1.3 The delineation of the Other in the debate of 1998/1999 and 2014 ....................... 43

4.1.4 ‘Turkish-Germans’ as the Other in the debate of 1998/1999 and 2014 ................. 44

4.1.5 ‘Turkish-Germans’ as the Other in the evaluation period of 2017 ......................... 48

4.1.6 ‘Russian-Germans’ as the Other in the evaluation period of 2016 ....................... 51

4.2. Analysis II – Management of Unease ........................................................................ 59

5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 71

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 75
1. Introduction

Headlines such as “Two passports – chance or threat?” (Monitor 2017), “terror with two passports,” (Müller 2014b) and the perception of politicians, especially members of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), that “dual citizenship is harmful” (Reimann 2017) suggest that mechanisms of securitization are at play concerning (dual) citizenship in German discourse. In German discourse, dual nationality is often closely associated with conflicts of loyalties. Dual citizens are presented as subject to manipulation, as a fifth column and as a “submissive tool” (Monitor 2017) of the state of their second citizenship (ibid.).

This thesis therefore aims to investigate if and how the center-right discourse\(^1\) on dual citizenship is securitized in Germany. Moreover, it aims to analyze how the discursive representations of Russian-German and Turkish-German dual citizens feed into (or do not feed into) the securitization of dual citizenship in the German center-right discourse. These groups are selected as they form the two largest groups of dual citizens holding both German and a non-EU citizenship\(^2\). This thesis analyzes how ‘Russian-Germans’ and ‘Turkish-Germans’\(^3\) are represented and incorporated into the logic of arguments in

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1 The center-right refers to the positioning of the newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that mostly reflects the political center-right position, and on which the discourse analysis is conducted.

2 In Germany, there are between 1.87 million (micro-census 2016) and 4.3 million (census 2011) German dual nationals. Out of this 4.3 million, 690,000 held Polish citizenship, 570,000 Russian citizenship and 530,000 Turkish citizenship simultaneously. As per the micro-census conducted in 2016 the figures of German dual citizens are currently much smaller and amount to 252,000 individuals with German-Russian dual citizenship and 247,000 individuals with German-Turkish dual citizenship (Destatis 2017c). In 2017, 19.3 million Germans had a migrant background; 2.8 million (14 percent) people with a Turkish migrant background, 2.1 million (11 percent) people with a Polish migrant background, 1.4 million (7 percent) with a Russian migrant background, 1.2 million (6 percent) with a Kazakh migrant background and 0.9 million (4 percent) with a Romanian migrant background. Since the year 2017, the micro census collects data on the languages spoken predominantly in households in Germany. In 2.5 million out of 24.0 million multi-person households a foreign language was mainly spoken. Turkish prevailed in 17 percent, Russian in 15 percent, Polish in 8 percent and Arabic in 7 percent of them (Destatis 2018b).

3 This thesis uses the terms Turkish-Germans/Russian-Germans throughout the study except when talking about naturalizations in Germany (c.f. footnote 5) or when specifically referring to the group of *Spät-Aussiedler* (c.f. footnote 14). Regarding the representation of Turkish-Germans/Russian-Germans, the terms are used in inverted commas to point out the constructed character of the representations. In chapter 4, different terms are only used if explicitly wanting to point out a different naming strategy within German discourse.
the discourse on dual citizenship. These two groups of dual citizens are especially interesting for investigation as a rift in relations between Russia and Germany as well as Turkey and Germany have taken place since 2014 and concerns have been voiced that these groups could be influenced by the state of their second citizenship. Therefore, against the background of political tensions at the state-to-state level, it could be expected that the discourse on dual citizenship for both groups is severely politicized, perhaps to the degree that it drifts into the language of security, so that it becomes securitized.

While the focus of this study is the discursive securitization of (dual) citizenship, it also looks at the practices of securitization. Scholars (Bourbeau 2014, 188; Léonard 2010, 236) have suggested “that it is possible to combine insights from the two approaches […] to study both the discourses and practices of securitization. Such a strategy can reveal interesting differences between everyday practices […] and discourses” (Léonard 2010, 236). The difference in discursive representation, and possible securitization of both ‘Turkish-Germans’ and ‘Russian-Germans’ may also be visible in specific practices of naturalization. The logic of routine and the logic of exception alongside each other makes it possible to combine insights gained from the study of both the discourses and practices of securitization. Furthermore, comparing securitizing discourses and practices can provide an understanding of how everyday practices and discourses differ from one another or complement one another (Bourbeau 2014, 188; Léonard 2010, 236).

For studying the securitization of everyday practices this thesis looks at naturalization practices in Germany. While Germany still upholds the principle of avoiding dual citizenship with naturalizations, statistics show that between 50.0 percent (2012, lowest number) to 61.4 percent (2017, highest number) of naturalization candidates from 2010 to 2017 were allowed to retain their citizenship (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67). Therefore, this study investigates how the management of unease, the securitization of routine, plays out in the naturalization practices of Germany. While this thesis does analyze general trends in the practice of awarding dual citizenship with naturalization, the focus is on the

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4 This high percentage is partially caused by the fact that EU-citizens have the right to dual citizenship, however, naturalization rates for EU-citizens are relatively low on average (Thränhardt 2017). Therefore, it can only partially account for this phenomenon.
concrete question of how the practice of awarding dual citizenship with naturalizations differs in Germany, particularly looking at the cases of naturalized former Turkish and Russian citizens and naturalized Turkish-German and Russian-German citizens, with.

Finally, the findings of the analysis of the discursive securitization of dual citizenship and the securitization of everyday practices are compared to examine how discourses and everyday practices interrelate concerning dual citizenship in Germany.

Literature on the topic of securitization and especially on the securitization of migration have gained in prominence (c.f. Bigo 2002; Bourbeau 2011; Doty 1998; Huysmans 2000; Huysmans 2006; Munster 2009; Watson 2009). The same holds true for scholarly literature on the politics of citizenship (c.f. Bauböck 2006; Howard 2009; Foroutan 2013; Joppke 2010; Kivisto and Faist 2010; Levy and Weiss 2002; Shachar et al. 2017) and dual citizenship (Faist 2007; Faist and Kivisto 2007). However, while the securitization theory has addressed the issue of migration in-depth, little has been written with the specific focus on citizenship, especially dual citizenship. Diez and Squire (2008) combine the topics of citizenship and the securitization of migration. The authors argue that citizenship traditions are quite stable and diverse citizenship trajectories shape the ways in which migration is securitized in different national discourses. They suggest that due to the trajectory of the ethnic citizenship definition in accordance with the *jus sanguinis*-principle in Germany “exceptionalism processes of securitisation [of migration] are more evident” (Diez and Squire 2008, 572). However, they do not look at how securitization processes might play out with regard to (dual) citizenship as such. By looking at the securitization of (dual) citizenship, this thesis addresses precisely this gap and applies the theory of securitization to analyze the securitization of (dual) citizenship.

This thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework, exploring first the Copenhagen School’s (CS) discursive approach to securitization (Buzan et al. 1998) and concepts of boundary-drawing, before examining Didier Bigo’s

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5 This thesis refers to naturalized former Turkish/Russian citizens when speaking of naturalized Germans that held the Turkish/Russian citizenship before naturalizing and were not allowed to retain their former citizenship with naturalization. It speaks of naturalized Turkish-German/Russian-German citizens when referring to naturalized Germans that were allowed to keep their Turkish/Russian citizenship with naturalization as German citizen.
“Management of Unease” (Bigo 2002). As the main focus of this study is on the discursive approach to securitization, more room is given to the discursive approach to securitization than to Bigo’s practices. Chapter 3 introduces research design and methodology, justifies case selection and discusses some of the study’s limitations. The empirical part of this thesis follows in Chapter 4 and contains the analysis and discussion. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the thesis.\textsuperscript{6} \textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{6} For reasons of readability everything written in German in this thesis has been adapted to the new German orthography.

\textsuperscript{7} All German articles were translated by the author herself.
2. Theoretical Framework – Securitization Theory

2.1. Discourses – The Copenhagen School of Securitization

The CS of securitization consists of a speech act approach to securitization (Buzan et al. 1998, 26–27). The CS builds on the core assumption that security is not an objective condition and that no issue is objectively perceived as threatening. Security is discursively constructed (Abrahamsen 2005, 57; Balzacq 2011, 1; Wæver 1995, 405). For issues to be perceived as threatening, they have to be construed as “existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor” (Buzan et al. 1998, 5). The CS’s approach to securitization is, thereby, based on a logic of exception (Buzan et al. 1998, 21; Bourbeau 2014, 187; Stritzel 2007, 367). It facilitates “the logic of necessity, the narrowing of choice, the empowering of a smaller elite” (Wæver 2011, 469).

Placed on a spectrum the CS distinguishes between nonpoliticized, politicized and securitized issues. Nonpoliticized issues are issues that are not dealt with by a state and are also not covered within the public. Politicized issues are issues debated publicly and are part of the public policy process. Securitized issues, in contrast, are issues exhibited as existentially threatening and therefore, need to be dealt with through emergency measures (Buzan et al. 1998, 23). The CS’s approach to securitization follows a binary logic according to which there either is a case of securitization or no securitization (politicized, non-politicized or de-securitized issues) (Bourbeau 2011, 42; Bourbeau 2014, 192).

Securitization is characterized by two main features. Firstly, it is conceptualized as a self-referential practice since it is based on the successful presentation of an issue as threatening (Buzan et al. 1998, 24). Secondly, securitization is designed as an intersubjective process meaning that the successful presentation of an issue as a threat is bound to audience assent (ibid., 25). This means that securitization is only successful if the issue presented as existentially threatening is accepted as such by the target audience. Lacking audience assent, the attempt of creating securitization can be understood only as a securitizing move (ibid., 24–25).
A successful securitization is made up of the following three parts (ibid., 25): the declaration of an existential threat, the endorsement of emergency action, and an impact on interunit relations. The declaration of an existential threat means that an issue is presented as threatening. The endorsement implies that the prior declaration has gained enough support so that a setting is created from which “it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return and necessity” (ibid., 25). The CS, therefore, implies that the endorsement of emergency action is an integral part of securitization. Finally, the impact securitization has on interunit relations is the substantial outcome. More specifically, this means that the logic shifts from ‘normal’ politics, to exception/emergency. In the CS’s understanding, adhering to the common rules is emblematic for the normal, non-securitized way (Floyd 2016, 679). In contrast, security means going beyond the normal rules – to exceptionalism – as emblematic for security. Exception, the logic of survival, is therefore indicative of security.

However, Roe is critical of this argument brought forward by the CS. He argues that audience support “serves to reveal securitization as a distinct two-stage process: the ‘stage of identification’ [(rhetorical securitization)], where an issue is defined as ‘security’, and the ‘stage of mobilization’ [(active securitization)], where the responses to that issue are thereafter established” (Roe 2008, 620). In Roe’s point of view, this two-stage process illustrates the importance of the actual implementation (not only endorsement) of emergency measures, in contrast to the CS’s view “that the existential threat has to be argued and gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures” (Buzan et al. 1998, 25) for securitization to be successful. This is relevant for the issue of the securitization of dual citizenship as it means that one has to differentiate between the discursive construction of dual citizenship as a security issue (rhetorical securitization) and active securitization, in the form of inter alia restrictive changes in the citizenship laws or the introduction of policy measures trying to limit the numbers of dual citizenship.

The CS distinguishes between three types of units that are central to the speech act approach to securitization; the referent objects, the securitizing actors and functional
actors. Referent objects refer to the entity that is claimed to be threatened. Securitizing actors are agents who declare an issue to be threatening through a securitizing move. Functional actors are agents capable of affecting the dynamics of a security sector (Buzan et al. 1998, 35–36). Further important units are referent subjects and the audience. Referent subjects point to a threatening entity, in contrast to the referent objects which constitute the items presented as existentially threatened (Balzacq 2005, 173–177; Vuori 2008, 70). Since, as mentioned above, securitization is conceptualized as an intersubjective process that depends not only on the securitizing actor who is carrying out a securitizing move by the utterance of security (coercion), but also on the target audience by either approving of or rejecting the securitization move (consent) – the audience is a crucial unit of the securitization process as well (Buzan et al. 1998, 25–31; Balzacq 2005, 184–185; Balzacq 2011, 8–9; Salter 2008, 321–322; Stritzel 2007, 363).

Besides actors, facilitating conditions that means the adherence to “(1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical” (Buzan et al. 1998, 32) and to “(2) the external, contextual and social” (ibid., 32) conditions also play an important role. According to the CS, the internal, linguistic-grammatical conditions are the most significant facilitating conditions for securitization to be successful. The internal, linguistic grammatical conditions refer to a grammar of security, the necessity to follow established linguistic and grammatical structures inherent to the security sector (ibid., 33). Stritzel (2012, 554–555) as well as Stritzel and Chang (2015, 550–551) operationalize the linguistic and grammatical structures of the securitizing speech acts according to the generic structure of (1) claim, (2) warning, (3) demand, and (4) propositional content. Accordingly, their typology of securitizing speech acts consists of the articulation of (1) a possible existential threat (empirical contextualization: account of the threat), (2) the realization of this threat, should inaction prevail (empirical contextualization: delineation of the outcome of inaction), (3) a call for action (empirical contextualization: description of a plan of action), and (4) evidence and justification of the claim and warning (empirical contextualization: presentation of evidence and/or justification (Stritzel 2012, 554–555; Stritzel and Chang 2015, 550–551).
The external, contextual, and social conditions reflect social conditions, such as the social standing of the person speaking security and his or her relationship to the target audience (Buzan et al. 1998, 33). Different contexts, furthermore, distinguish themselves in terms of “the general grammar of security as such plus the particular dialects” (ibid. 33), which is captured by the concept of ‘sectors’. In “Security. A New Framework For Analysis” Buzan et al. (1998) differentiate between five security sectors; the military, political, economic, environmental and societal sector. Depending on the sector, the securitizing actors’ social capital and position diverges. This means that the relationship between securitizing actor and the audience necessary for successful securitization is shaped by each sector respectively. Finally, in addition to internal and external conditions, an issue that will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 2.1.2., also characteristics of the alleged threat are a facilitating condition. Certain characteristics of the purported threat either expedite or hinder successful securitization. Linking the alleged threat to items that are perceived to be threatening by a large part of the audience increases the likelihood of securitization (ibid., 33).

I am particularly interested in the societal sector as it is of key importance to the topic of (dual) citizenship. Societal security is concerned with individual as well as collective identities and the question of belonging to a community and the self-understanding of communities respectively (Buzan et al. 1998, 119–120). While societal security is, thereby, closely linked to political security, and identities and feelings of belonging are oftentimes interwoven with the political organizing principle of governments, it is, nevertheless, a distinct form of security (ibid., 119–120). Securitization in the societal sector, therefore, equalizes to the securitization of identities. Security action is, in general, mostly introduced toward and in the name of a collectivity (ibid., 36). Certain imagined communities or groups are depicted as threatened by divergent dynamics, inter alia by distinct cultures, economic integration or movement of people (Williams 2003, 513). Thereby, the focus of attention is implicitly on the ‘own’ community or ‘in-group’ by situating it in an existentially inimical environment. “By making the dangerous quality of

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8 There are discussions on the expansion of these list of sectors, e.g. if gender and religion should be distinguished from the societal sector (Albert and Buzan 2011).
certain ‘external’ developments the issue of debate, securitization shields its autonomy and unity from being questioned” (Huysmans 2006, 49). Thus, securitization in the societal sector has a unifying power, the image of a homogenous and harmonious in-group is upheld, asserted and reproduced by delineating it from an outside Other. For instance, by conjuring up an Islamic threat to Europe and the West, a Western cultural identity of unity is enhanced (ibid., 49–52).

The most significant referent objects of societal security are those groups that “carry the loyalties and devotion of subjects in a form and to a degree that can create a socially powerful argument that this ‘we’ is threatened; as to its identity” (Buzan et al. 1998, 123; emphasis in the original). Most commonly, these referent objects are “tribes, clans, nations, civilizations, religions and race” (ibid., 123). As scholars (Bhandar 2010, 331–333; Huysmans 2006, 48; Stolcke 1995, 8) have argued an issue that has been gaining prominence in regard to societal security is culture. Cultural identity and cultural distinctiveness play a crucial role in discussions about immigration, transmigration, multiculturalism and citizenship (Bhandar 2010, 332; Huysmans 2006, 51). A cultural Other is constructed as a potential threat to the in-group’s “national-cum-cultural uniqueness and integrity” (Stolcke 1995, 8). Regarding (dual) citizenship, the logic of cultural identity and distinctiveness is frequently employed to construct cultural similarity as a vital precondition for access to citizenship rights (ibid., 8).

To successfully securitize an issue within the societal sector thus “involves precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity, to oppose it to what it is not, to cast this as a relationship of threat or even enmity, and to have this decision and declaration accepted by a relevant group” (Williams 2003, 519–520; emphasis in the original). The nation is such a group.

2.1.1 Boundary-drawing and citizenship
Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “imagined political community” (Anderson 1991, 6). The imagined community is built on perceptions of who belongs and who does not belong to this shared community. It is therefore constructed and reinforced in processes of boundary-drawing (Simonsen 2016, 1154). Representations of citizenship
form an integral part of the construction of national identity. Citizenship is a concept based on membership. “The citizen is imagined – and inscribed – as a legitimate member of the imagined national community, particularly as nations are enacted and institutionalised by states” (Clarke et al. 2014, 108). From a group’s internal viewpoint, citizenship has a binary role, it differentiates insiders from outsiders. Taking on an external point of view, citizenship does not only differentiate between those inside and outside of the imagined community but furthermore distinguishes similar groups by marking the boundaries between them. In relational terms, citizenship as membership either links an individual or group to a larger social construct in processes of inclusion or isolates an individual or group from that social entity in processes of exclusion (Bauböck 2017, 65).

Membership boundaries can be bright or blurry boundaries depending on how difficult it is for individuals to cross them. Bright boundaries clearly differentiate between those who belong and those who do not belong. The boundaries are unmistakable, and individuals know their position in regard to the boundaries. The positioning of individuals draws on and reflects zones of self-representation. In the case of blurred boundaries, boundaries are not markedly distinct (Alba 2005, 22). According to Bauböck (2017, 67), it is precisely forms of converging membership, such as quasi-, semi- and plural memberships that challenge drawn boundaries as the types of membership blur the boundaries between social entities. “Yet, as Bauböck has argued, even in these cases an internally binary distinction continues to provide the hard core without which the very concept of membership loses its purpose” (ibid., 67). That means demarcation processes remain at play by juxtaposing an internal core group with the Other inside the membership boundaries. This means that exclusion does not occur only at the borders, i.e. state borders, but it occurs also within, i.e. inside the state/society. This creates the Other within. This is precisely this thesis’ focus when investigating the citizenship debate and the securitization of (dual) citizenship.

9 Bauböck conceptualizes quasi-members as individuals who receive some of the benefits and carry out some of the duties connected to membership while not being recognized as member, inter alia denizens. Semi-members, in contrast, are recognized members that are stripped of some of their rights and obligations, inter alia non-resident citizens (Bauböck 2017, 66).
The definition of these internal boundaries depends on the type of citizenship representation. “Although all citizenship criteria are inwardly inclusive and outwardly exclusive […], there are large differences in the inclusiveness of ethnic, civil and cultural citizenship criteria” (Reijerse et al. 2013, 614). Ethnic citizenship representation defines the national ingroup as a primordial community of common descent. This representation is derived from the *jus sanguinis* principle of nation-building. An inherently exclusionist nature underlies this form of citizenship representation. Civic citizenship representation defines the national ingroup as a community joined by the common adherence to a social contract comprised of a set of shared rules and values. This representation is derived from the *jus soli* principle of nation-building (ibid., 612–614). This form of citizenship representation is oftentimes said to be of an inclusive nature since it is quite easy for immigrants to fulfill civic citizenship criteria (Meeus et al. 2010, 307; Reijerse et al. 2013, 615). David Scott Fitzgerald, however, emphasizes that “while it is true that there is an inherent tension between the abstract principles of *jus soli* and an ethnonational understanding of the nation, governments have found many ways to resolve this tension in ways that are blatantly racist” (2017, 138), as an example he refers to the historical United States (ibid., 138). Furthermore, official citizenship status does not automatically go hand in hand with the majority group members’ acceptance of one as fellow citizen. Since citizenship is perceived subjectively by the majority group members, large discrepancies between the official citizenship regime and the majority groups members’ citizenship criteria can exist (Reijerse et al. 2013, 612–613). One has to therefore differentiate between formal and informal recognition of one’s membership status. One might have attained the *legal citizenship status*, while lacking the *informal recognition* by the majority group members (Bauböck 2017, 65). For the securitization of citizenship, this means that despite formal recognition of membership status internal boundaries can be drawn – through securitization – in accordance with the type of citizenship representation. The type of citizenship representation thereby provides the discursive resources upon which securitizing actors can draw and to which the audience responds.

As culture has become a key argument within the sector of societal security, culture has similarly gained in importance regarding citizenship representations (Bhandar 2010, 331–333; Stolcke 1995, 8). Since the Second World War negative racial and ethnic
discrimination in citizenship regimes across European countries have largely become illegitimate. This is largely true for positive racial and ethnic discrimination as well. However, some positive racial and ethnic preferences have remained in force. Positive discrimination is mostly framed as legitimate based on family and cultural ties (Fitzgerald 2017, 144). Similarly, outgroup discrimination is no any longer based on ethnicity and race, instead negative outgroup attitudes focus on the protection of culture. Liav Orgad (2015, 112; 2017, 351) argues that a restrictive turn or more specifically cultural turn is currently taking place across European states. This is most apparent due to the rise of policies directed at the protection of various forms and aspects of national. He also terms these policies “cultural defense policies” (Orgad 2017, 351). His point is reinforced by Reijerse et al.’s (2013, 615) conceptualization of cultural citizenship representation. According to Reijerse et al. cultural citizenship representation presents the nation as a culturally monolithic construct. This form of citizenship representation perceives immigrants as a threat to the maintenance of the majority group members’ culture. To preserve cultural homogeneity immigrants are expected to assimilate to the majority culture (ibid., 615). For the securitization of citizenship this means that the understanding of citizenship is not the core of internal boundary-drawing processes, but rather ‘culture’ is. Boundary-drawing delineates and reinforces the understanding of what – and who – is part of this culture and who is not.

Boundary-drawing, particularly in respect to national identity, is contingent on historical conditions (Simonsen 2016, 1157). “The construction of immigrant-native boundaries is, in each society, a path-dependent process that hinges on the materials available in the social-structural, cultural, legal, and other institutional domains of the receiving society, as well as on the characteristics and histories that the immigrants themselves present” (Alba 2005, 41). This implies that boundaries differ in character depending on a society’s history and context. According to Simonsen (2016, 1169) it is likely that a discursive path-dependency persists even after changes in the citizenship regime. Regarding the German citizenship regime, this would mean that even after the introduction of jus soli-elements into the German ethnocultural citizenship regime in 1999 and 2014 (Green 2005, 942), one could expect to find articulations of boundary-drawing that adhere to the logic of inclusion and exclusion of ethnic citizenship representations in the German
citizenship discourse. However, as argued above, ethnocultural representations of citizenship have become largely illegitimate across European states. As a consequence of the Second World War, this holds true for Germany in particular. Therefore, if a path-dependent process is at play, arguments in the German citizenship discourse should rather be fashioned in accordance with a cultural representation of citizenship.

2.1.2 Boundary-drawing and the securitization of citizenship

Holger Stritzel strongly criticizes the internalist position that the CS takes. Taking an externalist position himself, Stritzel highlights the importance of the wider discursive context that empowers or disempowers both the securitizing actor and the speech act (Stritzel 2007, 359–367). He further specifies that the securitizing actor and speech act are only relevant and only have a meaningful impact on interunit relations if the situation renders them important. He advances a conceptualization of securitization as a “dynamic three-layered triangle of text, context, and positional power” (ibid., 368). Stritzel differentiates between the socio-linguistic dimension of context, which he characterizes as quite flexible, and the socio-political dimension of context, which he sees as less fluid and more sedimented.

The socio-linguistic dimension of context refers to systems of essential principals of behavior and narratives that a linguistic act is embedded in. By drawing on the socio-linguistic dimension of context in the process of framing their points, actors can render the socio-linguistic context useful as a reservoir of metaphors and comparisons (ibid., 369–370). Regarding the issue of immigration and (dual) citizenship, the socio-linguistic context refers to meanings of immigration and citizenship and is closely linked to the construction of national identity, and integration policies in public debates across countries of immigration. The (non)integration or failed integration of immigrants, the compatibility of immigrant culture and religion with the majority culture, cross-border ties, national loyalty, and transnational political claims-making of migrants all play a crucial role in the process of constructing the meaning of immigration and (dual) citizenship in Germany, and countries of immigration in Europe and North America (Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 189). In addition, unemployment, the reduction in state aid, and terrorism are issues that have been linked to migration, integration, and citizenship across...
time and space (ibid., 203). If securitization actors can mobilize this context, the audience is more likely to consent to the securitization move. The success of the securitization of citizenship, thus, also depends on how a particular group is placed within that context, and on what discursive resources can be mobilized to securitize this group.

The socio-political context reflects socio-political hierarchies and orders that legitimate certain actors and grant them the power to impact upon the construction of meaning. Usually these contexts are highly asymmetric and therefore favor certain actors over others (Stritzel 2007, 369–370). Looking, for instance, at the religious institutional context in Germany, one big difference in the socio-political context is the fact that Christian churches and the Jewish community hold the status of a “corporation of public law” (ibid. 190), while there is no Muslim organization that enjoys the same status. Benefits connected to the status are, inter alia, the possibility to conduct religious education in public schools, to levy taxes, and to hold an office in public mass media programming and control boards. While action has been taken to organizationally incorporate organized Islam in Germany, the religious institutional set-up is still highly asymmetric and in this regard disadvantages the Muslim community within Germany. It reflects the fact that Islam’s position in Germany is still highly contested, as is the position of people associated with Islam – mainly people of Turkish origin or with a Turkish migration background – within or outside the imagined community (Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 190–197).

The performative power of threat texts is able to complement or alter the discourse conditions and thus reshape current power relations. Stritzel introduces acts of translation into the security literature which are, as he argues, always part of incorporating threats into the existing discourse. The more the articulated threats resonate with the existing discourses and the better the securitizing actors’ position of power, the likelier it is that this threat is subsumed into the dominant narrative. This means that presenting something as a threat works better if it resonates with discursively established tropes (Stritzel 2007, 370–373). Common tropes in German discourse that are relevant to this study include the ‘sociocultural backwardness’ of people of Muslim origin and their ‘unwillingness to
integrate’ (c.f. Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 201; Foroutan 2013, 6). Furthermore, people of Muslim origin are linked to ‘fanaticism’, ‘intolerance’ and ‘non-democracies’ (Foroutan 2013, 6). The concept of German Leitkultur (guiding culture) introduced into German discourse by conservative Christian Democrats, largely a strategic concept, draws on these tropes by implicitly juxtaposing German culture with that of Islam. It demands the adaptive capacity of German society and simultaneously seeks to strengthen national identity. At the same time, it implicitly constructs Islam as potential danger to the social, cultural, and political integrity of the national community (Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 198–204). Therefore, threat texts that try to establish Islam as, for instance, a cultural danger can be expected to succeed quite easily as they resonate with existing discourse.

Similarly to Stritzel, Balzacq emphasizes the dependency of successful securitization on the context. Security articulations need to be linked to their environment to be successful. It is the context that enables and restrains specific characteristics of the concept (Balzacq 2005, 184). One key contextual aspect is the question “which heuristic artifacts shall a securitizing actor use to create (or effectively resonate with) the circumstances that will facilitate the mobilization of the audience – analogies, metaphors, metonymies, emotions, stereotypes?” (ibid., 179).

The CS’s discursive approach to securitization centers on a speech act approach to securitization. Securitization is conceptualized as the construction of an existential threat following a logic of exception. Securitization is characterized as self-referential practice and an intersubjective process. In accordance with Roe (2008, 620) securitization can be divided into a two-stage process of rhetorical (stage of identification) and active securitization (stage of mobilization). The societal security sector, that is of upmost importance to the topic of (dual) citizenship, is concerned with questions of belonging to a community and the self-perception of communities. A perceived ‘We’ or in-group, i.e. a nation, is constructed as threatened. Cultural identity and cultural distinctiveness have become of key importance in debates on immigration and (dual) citizenship within the societal sector. A cultural Other is constructed as potential threat to the ‘We’ or in-group. Importantly, exclusionary processes take place not only outside, but also within
membership boundaries; creating the *Other* within. Such boundary-drawing processes are expected to be more successful if securitizing actors actively utilize and mobilize relevant socio-linguistic and socio-political dimensions of context.

### 2.2. Practices – Bigo’s Management of Unease

In stark contrast to the CS’s logic of exception, Didier Bigo’s approach to securitization centers on a logic of routine (Bourbeau 2014, 188). Bigo conceptualizes securitization as the everyday practices of bureaucracies, a continuum shaped by the employment of administrative practices, technologies of surveillance and territorial protection by security professionals. He emphasizes that the key to understanding the operating modes of discourses of securitization is a better comprehension of the routines that the process of securitization is embedded within. Bigo refers to these routines of securitization as the “management of unease” (Bigo 2002, 64), which nowadays is ever closer linked to the “globalisation of insecurity” (Bigo 2006, 389; Bigo 2008, 12–13). Security, as it is understood nowadays, comprises both national and international interpretations of security. This convergence of the understanding of security is especially relevant regarding the topic of migration. Furthermore, the securitization of immigration is the outcome of the technological advancement of the techniques of control and surveillance and not the other way around (Bigo 2002, 73; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008, 5; McDonald 2008, 570). This is closely intertwined with the development of “computerization, risk profiling, visa policy, remote control borders, creation of international or nonterritorial zones in airports, and so on” (Bigo 2002, 73). Focusing solely on discourses to understand the operating principles and mechanisms of securitization leads to an underestimation of the significant role of routines that are crucial to securitization (Bigo 2002, 73–74; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008, 5).

It is particularly interesting to analyze naturalization routines and changes in naturalization routines when examining the securitization of (dual) citizenship through the prism of Bigo’s definition. As Liav Orgad points out, “the law of naturalization functions as one gatekeeper – it is designed to include the desirable people and exclude the undesirable ones” (2017, 337). Naturalization routines mirror the self-understanding
of the in-group – the ‘We’ – at present and in the future. Furthermore, naturalization policies define the criteria for ‘good’ outsiders that are eligible to naturalization. Moreover, they contain the content and central elements to which these outsiders must subscribe to become part of the in-group. Naturalizations can thus be understood as a form of nation-building. Alongside other measures, such as national holidays and citizenship ceremonies, they are meant to enhance a feeling of belonging and unify the in-group around this communality (Orgad 2015, 87).

Naturalization routines and laws, as well as citizenship representations more generally, reflect the perceived nature of the in-group. Most communities rely on a combination of the three above-discussed ideal-typical conceptions of community; primordial, civic, and cultural. Transnational law, economic factors, and cultural considerations nowadays severely influence and shape the ideas behind naturalization routines and laws. Importantly, openness of admission criteria to citizenship should not be equalized to liberalization in access to citizenship status. While a current trend has been the relaxation of naturalization laws, largely based on economic and demographic necessities, a restrictive term or more specifically cultural turn has simultaneously taken place. Besides an increase in the application of criminal law in immigration control and in the naturalization process, one important trend indicative of this restrictive turn is the adoption of cultural integration requirements. These requirements, also termed “cultural defense policies” by Orgad (2017, 351), are aimed at the protection of various forms and aspects of national culture across European states. Cultural defense policies are grounded in five mechanisms: (1) citizenship tests, (2) language requirements, (3) loyalty oaths, (4) attachment requirements, and (5) integration contracts (Orgad 2015, 86; Orgad 2017, 351).

Empirical findings sustain the argument of a restrictive turn that has been taking place across European countries. The numbers of European states that have a compulsory language requirement have risen, citizenship tests have become the norm and integration pacts as well as loyalty oaths have become common within the last twenty years (Extramiana and Avermaet 2011; Goodman 2010; Orgad 2015; 112–113; Orgad 2017,
Thus, naturalization routines across Europe have changed tremendously. In countries, where the principle of avoidance of dual citizenship still prevails it is interesting to investigate, if this principle is upheld and if or how the praxis of awarding dual citizenship as part of the naturalization process differs.

By focusing on practices of securitization and discursive securitization when studying processes of securitization and boundary-drawing, this study aims at having a broader focus. In order to grasp the actual dynamics of the actual boundaries that are drawn in practice in routine naturalization practices, we have to look at those practices themselves and not just at discursive practices. Applying both approaches, the logic of routine and the logic of exception, alongside each other makes it possible to combine insights gained from the study of both the discourses and practices of securitization. Furthermore, comparing the securitizing discourses and practices can provide an understanding of how everyday practices and discourses differ from one another or complement one another (Bourbeau 2014, 188; Léonard 2010, 236).
3. Research design and Methodology

Securitization theory is concerned with the discursive construction of threats. The CS asserts that security can be studied discursively, therefore I rely on discourse analysis. Discourse can be defined “as a particular way of talking about and understanding the world or an aspect of the world” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 1; emphasis in original). Or as Dunn and Neumann put it, “a discourse [is] a system of meaning-production that fixes meaning, however temporarily, and enables actors to make sense of the world and to act within it” (2016, 17–18; emphasis in original). Discourses act as systems of meaning and thus can be dealt with as a kind of data for analysis. The more so as discourses produce and reproduce social realities through meaning construction. Therefore, it is key to scrutinize the construction of meaning as part of the social fabric. By means of language, discourses produce and reproduce background capacities for people to distinguish and determine subjects and objects ascribing upon them attributes and values and position them in relation to other objects (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 43).

In line with the CS’s poststructuralist understanding and conceptualization of discourse, this thesis conducts a poststructuralist discourse analysis. The analysis is based upon Dunn and Neumann’s (2016) and Hansen’s (2006) approach to studying discourse. Like all poststructuralist discourse analysts, they take the position that “everything can be read as text” (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 39; emphasis in original). That means that in contrast to Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 2003) which differentiates between a discursive and a non-discursive realm, Dunn and Neumann, as well as Hansen, emphasize that there is no extra-discursive realm. “That does not mean that nothing but text and talk exists, but, on the contrary, that discourse itself is material and that entities such as the economy, the infrastructure, and institutions are also parts of discourse” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 19). Hence, our world is understood as fully constituted by discourse (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 17; Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 19; Hansen 2006, 18). Therefore, the world and all its different aspects can be studied through the lenses of discourse analysis.
Hansen (2006, 18–19) understands language as political. This means that language is “a site for the production and reproduction of particular subjectivities and identities while others are simultaneously excluded” (ibid., 18–19). Hansen exemplifies her point by referring to the construction of women in nineteenth century Europe. At that time, women were perceived as inter alia motherly, emotional, and unable to understand complex political and financial issues. Through this construction of female identity the political involvement of women was seen as unfit or even dangerous. This understanding of female identity was understood as objectively true and was reified through language use that supported the superiority of males as political subjects. Identity-construction is always closely linked and facilitated by a simultaneous account of something different or ‘Other.’ By juxtaposing two characteristics, a privileged and a devalued one, identity is constructed relationally and along two dimensions. “It is constructed through a series of juxtaposed signs, to be a woman in nineteenth century discourse is to be different from – and inferior to – being a man, it is to be emotional rather than rational, […] and to be focused on the simple rather than the complex” (ibid., 19). Hence, identity construction is intrinsically linked to two processes, the process of linking and the process of differentiation (ibid., 19). The process of linking characterizes “nineteenth century European women” as motherly, emotional, and unable to comprehend complex issues. The process of differentiation juxtaposes the series of female characteristics to the male series of characteristics (ibid., 19). The process of differentiation establishes Othering/ “degrees of Otherness” (ibid. 37). However, representations as well as processes of linking and differentiation are never absolutely fixed. Since language is both structured and unstable, changes in discursive identity-construction are always possible, but rather difficult, as discourses seek to construct themselves as steady (ibid., 20–21).

Dunn and Neumann also stress the importance that representations play within discourse, particularly because they can have severe political repercussions. Representations are fabrications based on language. However, representations are not indifferent or harmless signifiers as they empower “actors to ‘know’ the object and to act upon what they ‘know’” (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 60). Thus, representations prepare the ground for certain types of action within distinct discourses, while they bar the way for other types of action in the
same discourses (ibid., 60). This is of high importance for the question of representations of migrants in German discourse, as these representations will entail social consequences. They define the conditions of how these groups will be treated.

This thesis focuses on representations of dual citizenship and dual citizens within German discourse. It seeks to analyze the center-right discourse on dual citizenship to explore whether this discourse securitized dual citizenship, and to explore whether there is in fact one or several competing discourses. In regard to representations of dual citizenship, particular attention is given to the representations of Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizenship/dual citizens with the aim to identify how those representations feed into the securitizing elements identified in (parts of) the center-right discourse on dual citizenship. Focusing on the processes of linking and differentiation, the thesis investigates which attributes are linked to the identity of Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizens and what processes of Othering are involved in the construction of each representation respectively. How do the characteristics attributed to Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizens differ? How does the process of Othering differ; which “degrees of Otherness” (Hansen 2006, 37, c.f. Diez 2005) are involved? How are these processes of Othering reflected in the naming of the groups, e.g. usage of hyphenation or not (e.g., Baban 2006, 189)?

In order to investigate differences in representations of Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizenship/dual citizens, this study look at discursive mechanisms that facilitate the respective representations. Faist and Ulbricht (2015, 200) highlight the importance of (1) symbolic exclusion, (2) culturalist ranking, and (3) generalization (homogenization) as discursive mechanisms through which the identity of ‘Turkish-Germans’ and ‘Russian-Germans’ are constructed in relation to the predominant ‘German’ identity in the process of boundary-drawing. (1) Symbolic exclusions operate mainly through the devaluation of cultural belief patterns connected with migrants and through the ‘up valuation’ of those connected to ‘native’ Germans, thereby establishing a (2) culturalist ranking. Cultural rankings enhance the categorization of various groups of migrants between migrant groups. Faist and Ulbricht exemplify this, by showing that transnationality is understood as highly acceptable and advantageous for highly skilled
aliens or citizens, but considered as indicative for exclusion regarding labor migrants in German discourse. (3) Generalization refers to the construction of a certain group, for instance the ‘category of Muslims’ as a comparatively monolithic community. Generalization is oftentimes closely linked to processes of devaluation and exclusion (Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 200–201). The following study analyses how these mechanisms play out in the discourse on Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizenship/dual citizens within Germany.

Drawing on the above-mentioned mechanisms this thesis thus aims to firstly investigate the securitization of the center-right discourse on dual citizenship/dual citizens in Germany, before examining the difference in the representation/securitization of dual citizenship/dual citizens by comparison across two cases. For this end, a comparative analysis of the center-right discourse on Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizenship/dual citizens is conducted. Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizens are the largest groups of Germans that hold a second non-EU citizenship (c.f. footnote 2). While dual citizenship is legally accepted for EU and Swiss nationals in Germany by enactment since 2007, dual citizenship for non-EU citizens and third country nationals is still mostly prohibited by law. Arguments against dual citizenship, such as military service of men in the country of one’s second citizenship, dual allegiance, or the fifth column-argument, are all cited in the case of Turkey and Russia. This is particularly relevant since 2014, as a rift in relations between Russia and Germany as well as between Turkey and Germany has taken place. However, this thesis expects a difference in the securitization of German-Turkish and German-Russian dual citizenship/dual citizens due to different discursive contextual factors, such as the integration and the compatibility of the immigrant culture and religion with the majority culture of these two groups, that are at play in the debate on dual citizenship within Germany. Therefore, this thesis seeks to answer the question if and how the debate on dual citizenship is securitized and how representations of these groups feed-into (or do not feed-into) the securitization of dual citizenship.

In order to compare and contrast the securitization of dual citizenship/dual citizens in the German center-right discourse, this thesis analyzes news articles. In order to retrieve these
articles, this analysis utilized the FAZ-archive\textsuperscript{10}. The non-tabloid newspaper FAZ was selected based on the widely read criteria (Hansen 2006, 85). Even though the national daily non-tabloid newspaper \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)} has a higher circulation than the FAZ, the FAZ is the leading national daily non-tabloid print newspaper across geographical Germany, while the SZ’s readership is mostly located in Southern Germany (Schröder 2016)\textsuperscript{11}. The FAZ can be said to have the most geographically diverse readership and has, therefore, a key role in defining and shaping nationwide discourses. The FAZ is a center-right, liberal-conservative national daily German newspaper. The FAZ displays the discourse at the center of German society and maps the discourse that is especially relevant for those shaping policy in Germany. While the FAZ offers the above-mentioned advantages, relying on the FAZ as the sole medium when analyzing the securitization of dual citizenship also imposes limitations. Analyzing the highly circulated tabloid-newspaper \textit{BILD} as well as regional newspapers in addition to the FAZ would add additional insights into how the discourse varies across different social strata of society, especially regarding which discourse – securitized or non-securitized – is dominant in the entire society, or across regions (the latter being particularly interesting in the context of current debates of the ‘xenophobic east’). However, due to the constraints of this study, collecting and analyzing the data of all these sources would have been too time consuming and costly.

Moreover, in order to study the discursive securitization across the two cases, the analysis is divided into four ‘high intensity moments’. These periods are determined based on Hansen’s (2006, 78) argument that “studies of ‘comparative moments’ evolve around a smaller number of clearly defined points in time” (2006, 78). In a first step, a timeline

\textsuperscript{10} The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitungs-archive can be found at \url{https://www.faz-biblionet.de/faz-portal}. It can be accessed via the Bayrische StaatsBibliothek (Bavarian National Library).

\textsuperscript{11} In the first quarter of 2018, the circulation numbers of the FAZ amounted to 240,000 copies sold (45,000 of it as e-papers). The circulation numbers of the FAZ Sunday paper reached 252,000 copies sold (47,000 thereof as e-papers). According to the Allensbach market and advertising media analysis, both FAZ and FAZ Sunday paper reach more than 850,000 readers per copy sold as all copies are read by three or more people on average (FAZ 2018). The Süddeutsche Zeitung has higher circulation numbers amounting to 352,573 copies sold (Statista 2018), however, the Süddeutsche Zeitung’s readership is mainly concentrated in the Southern regions of Germany (Schröder 2016).
starting with the September 1st, 1998 until the August 31st, 2017 was constructed that identified two ‘high intensity moments’, each of which consist of events of general importance regarding the issue of (dual) citizenship in Germany. Texts were selected based on the two identified periods around which political and media activity was particularly intense (Hansen 2006, 88–90). The time of evaluation is subdivided into two periods of general importance: the first period from September 1st, 1998 –May 31st, 1999 and the second period from September 1st, 2013 –December 31st, 2014. The first period, therefore, starts shortly before the German federal elections on September 27th, 1998, includes the campaign against dual citizenship in the Bundesland (federal state) of Hesse organized in 1998/1999 which was closely linked to the state election in Hesse on February 7th, 1999 and ends shortly after the passing of a new citizenship bill introducing the ‘option model’12 into German citizenship law in May 1999. The second period starts shortly before the German federal elections on September 22nd, 2013 and ends shortly after the abolition of the ‘option-model’ on December 20th, 2014. The text corpus was compiled by using a keyword search, including the key words ‘Doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft’ (dual citizenship), ‘Doppelte Staatsangehörigkeit’ (dual citizenship), ‘Doppelpass’ (holding two passport) and ‘Optionspflicht’.

In a second step, ‘high intensity moments’ for the discussion of dual citizenship focusing on the group of Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizenship/dual citizens were identified. For this purpose, the above-mentioned keyword search was itemized by combining these keywords with ‘Türk*’ (e.g. Turkish, Turkey, of Turkish background etc.) or ‘Russ*’ (e.g. Russian, Russia etc.). However, as the initial search did not yield any insightful articles on Russian-German dual citizenship/dual citizens13 the search was as a consequence broadened to include articles on the group of ‘Russlanddeutsche’

12 In accordance with the ‘option model’ children born to foreign parents in Germany are granted two citizenships by birth. They were then allowed to retain both citizenships until the age of 23, when they had to choose between the two citizenships. In 2014 the ‘option model’ was revised and since then children born to parents of third countries in Germany are also released from the ‘option obligation’ (if they are fulfilling certain conditions).

13 References to Russian-German dual citizens are marginal in the discourse on dual citizenship in Germany, and mostly refer the numbers of Russian-German dual citizens only.
(Russian-Germans) and ‘(Spät-)Aussiedler’ ((late) resettlers)\textsuperscript{14, 15} a by looking at periods around which political and media activity in regard to Russlanddeutschen/(Spät)-Aussiedler was particularly fierce. Due to historical facts, many of the so-called Russlanddeutschen/(Spät)-Aussiedler either hold dual citizenship or have the right to dual citizenship (Green 2005, 926–927). Regarding Turkish-German dual citizenship/dual citizens I identified one such high intensity moment in which identity is represented most clearly. This high intensity moment surrounds the event of the constitutional referendum held on April 16\textsuperscript{th}, 2017 that enabled 1.43 million Turkish citizens living in Germany to vote. The period of investigation is from the March 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2017 until August 31\textsuperscript{st}, 2017 searching for the key words ‘Doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft’ (dual citizenship), ‘Doppelte Staatsangehörigkeit’ (dual citizenship) and ‘Doppelpass’ (holding two passport) and ‘Turk*’. Regarding Russlanddeutsche/ (Spät)-Aussiedler one period of importance, in which the question of identity and belonging to Germany and the German state became particularly salient, was identified: the ‘Lisa case’\textsuperscript{16}. Regarding the Lisa-case, the following investigation period was selected: 1\textsuperscript{st} of January 2016 until 31\textsuperscript{st} of July 2016 searching for the keywords ‘Lisa’ and ‘(Spät)-Aussiedler*’ and/or ‘Russlanddeutsch*’. In total, 780 articles were selected as most relevant for in-depth analysis of the discourse

\textsuperscript{14} (Spät)-Aussiedler ((late) resettlers) are ethnic Germans/German nationals (deutsche Volkszugehörige) from the successor states of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States, inter alia from Romania and Poland, that immigrated to Germany as part of a special admission procedure. Until 31.12.1992 these immigrants are referred to as Aussiedler, starting from the 01.01.1993 as Spätaussiedler. With the recognition as Spätaussiedler immigrants automatically acquire German citizenship (BAMF 2018). Furthermore, Spätaussiedler do not have to renounce their former citizenship. Therefore, a high share of Spätaussiedler hold dual nationality. Out of the group of Spätaussiedler that immigrated from the Russian Federation to Germany 26.3 percent hold dual citizenship (BMJ 2018, 2; Worbs et al. 2013, 41–42). Russlanddeutsche (Russian-Germans) is a collective term for (Spät-)Aussiedler from the Russian Federation but also from other successor states of the Soviet Union that speak Russian as their mother tongue (Worbs et al. 2013).

\textsuperscript{15} This thesis refers to (Spät-)Aussiedler if the period of immigration is not clearly defined, to Aussiedler if the immigration took place before 31.12.1992 and to Spätaussiedler if the immigration took place after 31.12.1992.

\textsuperscript{16} The ‘Lisa case’ refers to a Russian-German girl named Lisa, who was allegedly raped by Arab immigrants in January 2016. The ‘Lisa case’ was picked up by Russian media outlets in a fake news campaign and ignited protests by the Russian-German community within Germany.
on dual citizenship. 30 articles\textsuperscript{17} were selected as a final corpus according to the criteria of ‘add texts until nothing new comes up.’

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{timeline.png}
\caption{Timeline of investigation periods}
\end{figure}

After having analyzed the securitization of the discourse on (dual) citizenship the study turns to the investigation of securitization of everyday practices of the bureaucracies looking at naturalization practices in Germany. This study thus investigates how the management of unease plays out in the naturalization practices in Germany. First, general trends and changes in naturalization practices are examined focusing on liberalizations and restrictions in naturalization laws and practices paying particular attention to the five mechanisms that are indicative of deploying cultural defense policies: (1) citizenship tests; (2) language requirements; (3) loyalty oaths; (4) attachment requirements; and (5) integration contracts (Orgad 2015, 86; Orgad 2017, 351). This thesis then investigates the praxis of awarding dual citizenship with naturalizations. General trends in the praxis of awarding dual citizenship with naturalizations are analyzed. However, the focus lies on naturalized former Turkish and Russian citizens. The praxis is analyzed on German national level drawing on the naturalization statistics of the German Federal Statistical Office\textsuperscript{18}. This thesis investigates before the background of the discursive construction of those groups how the praxis of awarding dual citizenship with naturalizations differs in Germany, particularly looking at the cases of naturalized Turkish-German and Russian-German citizens. Finally, the analysis of the discourse on dual citizenship and the representations of Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizens within the

\textsuperscript{17} For the investigation period 1 14 articles were selected. For the investigation period 2 7 articles were selected. For the investigation period 3 5 articles were selected. For the investigation period 4 4 articles were selected.

\textsuperscript{18} The webpage of the German Federal Statistical Office can be found at https://www.destatis.de/DE/Startseite.html.
discourse and the analysis of the bureaucratic practices of awarding dual citizenship are compared to provide an understanding of how discourse and everyday practice with regard to dual citizenship in Germany differ from one another or complement one another.
4. Analysis
Having presented a synopsis of the Copenhagen School’s discursive approach to securitization and Didier Bigo’s Management of Unease, this section will firstly present the empirical results of the discourse analysis, after which the results of the investigation of everyday practices are presented. The main focus of the discourse analysis is on the different discourses regarding (dual) citizenship and more specifically, on elements of securitization within them. In addition, how Russian-Germans and Turkish-Germans are presented as Other, as part of the discourses’ overall narrative underpinning the securitizing elements in the discourse on dual citizenship.

4.1. Analysis I – Discursive Securitization
Looking at the two periods of evaluation that focus on events of general importance regarding the issue of (dual) citizenship in Germany – the first period from September 1st, 1998 – May 31st, 1999 and the second period from September 1st, 2013 – December 31st, 2014 – two discourses, one conservative, one liberal discourse, are identified within the center-right discourse on (dual) citizenship. It is striking how closely intertwined the debates on (dual) citizenship and integration are. A first finding with regard to the center-right discourse on dual citizenship is that the citizenship debate is being conducted against the background of two diametrically opposed understandings of integration: 1) Social integration as cornerstone for legal integration, that is to say the acquisition of German citizenship may only stand at the end of successful social integration; 2) Legal integration as cornerstone for social integration, the key stone of this understanding is that legal integration should be granted first and forms the ultimate starting point for social integration. Drawing on Stritzel and Chang’s (2015, 550–551) above-mentioned operationalization of the linguistic and grammatical structures of the securitizing speech acts, the conservative discourse “social integration as cornerstone for legal integration” is outlined subsequently by subdividing it into the generic structure of claim, warning, demand, and propositional content.
4.1.1 Social integration as cornerstone for legal integration – conservative discourse

According to Stritzel and Chang (ibid., 550–551) the claim amounts to the articulation of a possible existential threat. The account of this threat within the conservative discourse is based on the planned reform of the Law on Citizenship intending to introduce the *jus solis*-principle and the right to hold dual citizenship. This reform is seen as “a complete transformation of the basic characteristics of the Law on Citizenship” (Scholz 1999) and as such as “revolutionary” (ibid.), “radical” (ibid.) and “disastrous” (ibid.). The Law in planning is contrasted with the current Law on Citizenship. The current Law has been the tried and tested foundation of the German state. Articles (Böckelmann 1998; Scholz 1998) highlight that the guidelines of the current Law, in particular the avoidance of multiple citizenship and the right to citizenship based on parentage (*jus sanguinis*), have proven their value. Furthermore, it is claimed that these guidelines are the accepted standard in most European and also non-European countries (Scholz 1999). Hardliners of the conservative discourse even go a step further and argue that the planned changes in the Law on Citizenship are a “wrong and dangerous signal” (FAZ 1999a) that will cause “a wave of immigration without precedent and with unforeseeable consequences” (ibid.). Moreover, they “warn against foreign infiltration (*Überfremdung*)” (FAZ 1999a; FAZ 1999f) that will bring about a “division in society that threatens to divide the nation” (FAZ 1999a). By conjuring up “the demise of the occident” (ibid.) it becomes clear that the fear of “foreign infiltration” and of “a wave of immigration” is a fear directed against foreigners from outside the so-called “occident/the Western world”. Edmund Stoiber (at that time Prime Minister of the German state of Bavaria) is quoted as saying that the “developments are more dangerous than the terror of the Red Army Faction” (ibid.). By linking dual citizens as potential partners of terrorist organizations, the (global) security discourse is clearly triggered (ibid.).

The warning comprises the realization of the threat – in this case the “radical” revision of the Law on Citizenship – if inaction prevails. The outcome of inaction is presented as the erosion of the foundations of the identity of the German people. According to Scholz (1999) “the radical restructuring of the Law on Citizenship corrodes the foundations of
the identity of the German constitutive people (radikale Umstrukturierung des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts greift an die Grundlagen der Identität des deutschen Staatvolkes”), This is underlined by the fact that dual citizens can avoid “the national community of fate […], in case it does get rough in Germany” (Schmitt 1998; c.f. Kielmansegg 2014). These warnings are reinforced by the metaphors employed. The planned changes are compared to a “reckless undertaking (Husarenstreich)” (ibid.), that cannot be legitimized by a “simple parliamentary majority” (Scholz 1999; c.f. Kielmansegg 2014). Furthermore, it is said that naturalizations will from now on be “free of charge (zum Nulltarif)” (Scholz 1999; c.f. Böckelmann 1998) and simply serve “the survival of the public limited company Germany” (Carstens 2014). “Free of charge”, does not actually refer to naturalizations without any financial expenditures for those seeking naturalization, but it rather points towards ‘costs’ that arise out of individual efforts to integrate. In deviation from the existing law, a sufficient degree of integration will not be a mandatory prerequisite for the acquisition of citizenship any longer (Carstens 2014). “Naturalizations are disconnected from verifiable integration into local living conditions, in particular from the proof of language capabilities, without which integration into the local professional and working world can hardly succeed” (Scholz 1999). That a country permits naturalized citizens to hold multiple citizenship, as the planned Law on Citizenship intends, “without demanding a special individual determination of the naturalization candidate” (Böckelmann 1998) is without precedent throughout the world. Thereby, the regulative and integration functions of the Law on Citizenship are dropped. The planned Law on Citizenship is of promotional character. It solicits “continuously swelling family reunions from the motherland” (ibid.). Here Böckelmann deliberately uses the term ‘motherland’, rather than the German language term ‘fatherland’, as he directly refers to Turkish immigration. The planned Law on Citizenship stands for “being German at reduced prices” (ibid.), it is so to speak bartered away. Furthermore, the hardliners point towards “the relinquishment of the most effective threat of deportations towards potentially violent foreigners” (ibid.). Here, an instance of interdiscursivity takes place as the discourse draws on the case of “Mehmet” (Schmitt 1998). Mehmet, whose real name is Muhlis Ari, is a Turkish citizen who was born and raised in Munich as the son of Turkish parents, and who had been living in Germany for
over thirty years. In 1998 as a 14-year old he was deported to Turkey as a juvenile offender already having committed over 60 crimes (e.g. robbery, theft, and bodily injury) (Burger 2013; Wild 2010). The argumentation of the hardliners is that “Mehmet” could not have been deported if the planned Law on Citizenship would have been in force back then since he would have had German citizenship, and thereby supporting the claim that the powerful tool of deportations will be relinquished. As a result, they indirectly promote stigmas and fears of criminal foreigners who will soon enjoy the right to stay in Germany, no matter what crimes they commit, due to the planned Law on Citizenship.

The demand implies a call for action. In this instance, the plan of action is to prevent the planned Law of Citizenship from being passed, especially in the intended form. The core concern is that legal integration meaning the acquisition of citizenship forms the end of successful ex-ante social integration. The planned Law on Citizenship, however, means that “a sufficient degree of already completed integration […] shall not be prerequisite for the acquisition of German citizenship any longer: In this context also belongs the principle of avoiding multiple citizenship” (Scholz 1998). “An effective integration policy stands and falls with the willingness of the foreigner […] to wholeheartedly identify with our social and constitutional system. For this reason, the acquisition of German citizenship has to be the end of integration” (ibid.). This is why dual citizenship should not be endorsed as “it thwarts an effective integration policy” (ibid.) since “a clear orientation towards the Federal Republic of Germany is impeded or not even demanded (Scholz 1998; Kielsmansegg 2014). Thereby, naturalization becomes “arbitrary” (Scholz 1998). It is requested that naturalizations adhere to strict regulations regarding language capabilities, school degrees, previous convictions, loyalty to the constitution and financial independence. Also relinquishing the jus sanguinis-principle is seen as at least questionable as the principle “follows the natural family membership of a child” (Roellecke 1999; c.f. Böckelmann 1998). This is underpinned by the argumentation that replacement or supplement of the jus sanguinis-principle through the jus soli-principle does not guarantee an effective integration of the child affected. Even more so, as the citizenship might be acquired against the parents’ will as the parents must not have a right to disclaimer. The absolute minimum that is to be permitted is the ‘option model’, as it is indispensable that children make a final decision for or against the German citizenship
when coming of age (FAZ 1999d; Roellecke 1999; Scholz 1998). In 2014, it is once more strongly highlighted that the ‘option model’ is the absolute acceptable maximum as the acceptance of dual citizenship per se means that “Germany is dependent on [other states and] Turkey” (Müller 2014a) regarding inter alia military service. This must be avoided (Carstens 2014; Kielsmansegg 2014; Müller 2014a). Furthermore, it is emphasized that children must opt for or against German citizenship. The decision for one nationality is seen as unproblematic and possible without “unsolvable inner conflicts” (Carstens 2014).

The propositional content provides evidence and justification of the claim and warning. The general logic why the law on dual citizenship is considered a threat is because in the discourse, the relationship between state and citizens is seen as once characterized by mutual obligations and rights. Any fundamental change to the balance of rights and obligations alters this relationship, and is therefore a threat to German identity, to the German ‘way of life’ (Roellecke 1999; Kielsmansegg 2014; Müller 2014a). Furthermore, it is argued that foreign naturalization candidates will be privileged in comparison to their German fellow citizens. Important privileges would inter alia be the double voting right, the possibility to choose where to fulfill compulsory military service, and a greater freedom to travel should visa regulations differ according to citizenship. Another point mentioned is the acquisition of ownership that is reserved for nationals in many countries and would further privilege dual citizens (Scholz 1998; Roellecke 1999). This privileged treatment of dual citizens is not only not in line with the constitutional principle of equality but could entail “additional irritation and social upheavals” (Scholz 1998) between Germans and non-Germans. Above all, dual citizenship would “lead to frictions and conflicts” (Roellecke 1999) that will arise from obligations and rights that result from multiple citizenship. Most importantly, citizenship is not only concerned with questions of equality and equity, but also has to do with emotions. Citizenship is the “symbol of a shared feeling of communality” (ibid.; c.f. Kielsmansegg 2014). It is true that the nation cannot be equated with the state and therefore nationality and citizenship also cannot be equated. However, while nationality and citizenship do not have to be congruent, there should not be too great a disparity between the two (Roellecke 1999). The more specific explanation concerns the non-integration of foreigners that will be reinforced by granting dual citizenship. The already existing tendency of foreigners to
isolate themselves, “to withdraw into their own shells” (FAZ 1999a; c.f. Adam 1999) and to live in their own communities following their own laws will be boosted. This will lead to a ghettoization that “will promote hatred – from inside to outside and from outside to inside” (FAZ 1999c). The discourse warns against “multicultural fantasies” (Adam 1999) and against the “statistical perception of the world by politicians” (ibid.) that look at 70 million Germans facing seven million foreigners in Germany and consequently concluding that “there is no need to panic” (ibid.). What these politicians do not see is “tipping majority ratios” (Adam 1999; c.f. FAZ 1999f) in for example, schools, streets and districts that have been reality for some considerable time already. “The majority asserts itself with the result, that the underdogs feel like strangers in their own land” (Adam 1999; c.f. FAZ 1999f).

To sum it up, the threat of the planned Law on Citizenship, specifically its promotion of dual citizenship and of the jus soli-principle, materializes in a degradation of the basis of the German identity. In line with Faist and Ulbricht’s (2015, 189) findings, this degradation of national identity is closely interlocked with the non-integration or failed integration of foreigners that poses a risk to German society in form of ghettoization and tipping majority ratios. The rhetoric of the conservative discourse stays the same in 2014 focusing on the detail that the ‘option model’ should under no circumstances be abolished.

Moreover, in 2014, the topic of terrorism emerges in the conservative discourse on (dual) citizenship. Discursively this means that ‘terrorism’ is linked to dual citizenship. By making this link, an element of ‘threat’ is created. This link is established by headlines, such as “terror with two passports” (Müller 2014b) or subheadings like “jihadists are often also Germans” (ibid.). Dual citizenship is thereby linked to the “growing local Islamism” (ibid.) or the Salafist scene “that is the most dynamic and fastest growing extremist scene” (FAZ 2014b). This rapid growth is also linked to the fact that more women are becoming part of the scene who long for living “a life pleasing to god, alongside a fighter”. In light of this, the withdrawal of the German citizenship from dual citizens among Islamists has been discussed and necessary changes in German law proposed, despite the fact that this is an extremely sensitive issue due to recent German history (c.f. FAZ 2014b; Müller 2014b). While the topic of Islamist terrorism appears within the conservative discourse on dual citizenship and thereby links (dual) citizenship to an Islamist threat, the discourse
nevertheless still centers on the dismantling of the German identity as a result of non-integration or failed integration of foreigners.

4.1.2 Legal integration as cornerstone for social integration – liberal discourse

The claim of the liberal discourse on dual citizenship is that the current Law on Citizenship is “outdated” (Cohn-Bendit 1998) and is not “geared to the social reality in Germany any longer” (FAZ 1999b). The planned Law on Citizenship is seen as “way towards a modern integration policy” (ibid.) and necessary for Germany to “keep pace with the times in a globalized world” (ibid.). This holds particularly true since Germany – in stark contrast to the conservative discourse’s understanding – is regarded as “a country of immigration” (Cohn-Bendit 1998; FAZ 1999b). The liberal discourse pleads for a “liberal-minded Europe” (Cohn-Bendit 1998) that does not shut itself off to internal and external migration. Dual citizenship and acquisition of citizenship based on the territorial principle is viewed as desirable and as having a positive impact on integration. Furthermore, dual citizenship is understood as a necessary incentive as the abandonment of the former citizenship is oftentimes difficult, expensive and thus, unbearable for the naturalization candidates. Therefore the adherents of the liberal discourse demand dual citizenship and the abolishment of the jus sanguinis-principle (FAZ 1999b).

The signature campaign of the CDU is condemned as it “stirs up feelings of resentment” (Exner 1999; FAZ 1999e) and “opens up deep emotional ditches” (Exner 1999; c.f. FAZ 1999f). Some even go so far as to describe the signature campaign as “scorched earth policy” (FAZ 1999e) and “spiritual arson” (FAZ 1999f). The campaign is seen as “endangering the coexistence of Germans and foreigners” (ibid.).

The warning, the outcome of inaction, means that either no Law on Citizenship or a too limited revision will be passed. Therefore, Exner (1999) makes a plea to “call all the parties from the street” (ibid.) and “bring all the parties to the table to facilitate an objective discussion” (ibid.) on a new Law on Citizenship. This is in the interest of all those, who are really interested in “integration and the promotion of a peaceful coexistence” (ibid.). The core argument is that legal integration triggers social integration. “Legal integration up to naturalization is a prerequisite for a real social integration. […]
Such a solution is particularly urgent for children, who are born in Germany and have grown up here” (FAZ 1999b).

The demand, a call for action, is to discontinue the signature campaign of the CDU, to stand against racist defamatory statements and against marginalization of any kind. Furthermore, it is to find a compromise “which should not be too difficult to reach if everyone is showing good will” (Exner 1999) and is “willing to objectivity” (FAZ 1999b). Especially important is “to lower the hurdles” (Exner 1999) for naturalizations. Dual citizenship for children born to foreign parents in Germany is “according to opinion polls capable of achieving a majority”, but not only according to polls. The ‘option model’, a proposal of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), is seen as a “workable compromise” (ibid.) and a “manageable solution” (ibid.) that can find a majority in Parliament. In 2014, the liberal discourse stands up for the abolition of the ‘option model’ that had been in place from 2000 onwards. Furthermore, it advocates that also those young foreigners who had to opt for one citizenship benefit retrospectively from dual citizenship. In particular, Aydan Özoguz, a Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)-politician and Commissioner for Immigration, Refugees and Integration from 2013 – 2018, campaigned for the retrospective dual citizenship for those children that the ‘option model’ had applied to so far. A common argument being that the “difficult decision [to choose between two citizenships should] not be imposed on young foreigners” (Banas 2014). The young adults who have to opt for one citizenship are referred to as “young foreigners”. This is in spite of the fact such individuals do hold both German and a non-EU citizenship until the age of 23 de jure, and predominantly opt for the German citizenship (Carstens 2014). This indicates that despite their German citizenship they remain looked at as the Other within the German membership boundaries.

The propositional content draws on France as evidence and justification of the liberal discourse. In France, it is argued, naturalizations and dual citizenship are not connected to “cultural loss due to poorly naturalized fellow countrymen” (Hanimann 1999) but are considered to be “an increase in value for the collective (kollektive wertmehrung)” (ibid.). In addition, the fear that “inferior Germans with insufficient language capabilities could come into being” (ibid.) is unnecessary. When looking at France, “a country that more
than any other is careful to ensure the status and purity of its language” (ibid.), the opposite is proven true. In 2014, the understanding that integration is a multi-directional path and “not a one-way-street” (Banas 2014) gains further prominence. In particular, as the chancellor Angela Merkel utilizes this argumentation and states that “immigration is an enrichment of our society” (ibid.). Furthermore, this illustrates that a shift of proponents of the liberal discourse has taken place. While the majority of the CDU opposed the liberal line of argumentation and strongly supported the signature campaign in 1999, in 2014 large parts of the CDU back the liberal discourse (Carstens 2014; Müller 2014a).

Following Stritzel and Chang’s (2015, 550–551) operationalization of the linguistic and grammatical structures of the securitizing speech act illustrates that the liberal discourse on dual citizenship does not make a securitizing move with regard to the issue of multiple citizenships. There is no account of a threat but rather the setting of an objective that is to modernize the current Law of Citizenship by adopting the jus soli-principle and allowing for dual citizenship.

The discursive representation of the signature campaign of the CDU within the liberal discourse, however, can be seen as an attempt of “counter-securitization” (Stritzel and Chang 2015, 551). Stritzel and Chang define counter-securitization as a “linguistically regulated process of resistance against crucial elements of the securitization process” (ibid., 552). The liberal discourse claims that the signature campaign in identifying a threat is threatening the peaceful “coexistence of Germans and foreigners” (FAZ 1999f) establishes grudges, and emotionally shakes up German society. However, the warning and propositional content are not empirically contextualized regarding this attempt of counter-securitization, while the demand is to simply stop the campaign. Therefore, it is an unincisive counter-securitization move, that certainly draws on strong metaphors when comparing the campaign to “scorched earth policy” (FAZ 1999e) and “spiritual arson” (FAZ 1999f) but only appears to a very limited extent in the liberal discourse on dual citizenship.
4.1.3 The delineation of the Other in the debate of 1998/1999 and 2014

Within the delineated discourses on (dual) citizenship, and the portrayal of the ‘outgroup’ or Other, most people “subliminally […] focus on the Turks” (Exner 1999) when speaking of foreigners. In most articles the Other is ‘the Turk’/’the Turkish-Germans’. They are the group nearly solely referred to within conservative and liberal discourses. There are some other groups that are made reference to, but they play little to no role in the debate on (dual) citizenship.

When talking about the necessary conduct of bilateral negotiations with the countries of origin of potential German citizens to prevent disadvantages and repressive measures against these “new German foreigners (neue deutsche Auslandsleute)” (Schmitt 1998) other groups are mentioned. “The Iranian teacher, the Kurdish activist, the Lebanese doctor, the Serbian member of the Bundestag and the Russian immigrant in police uniform holding a German passport” (ibid.) are named. Two things are particularly striking regarding these examples. Firstly, they are all still looked at as foreigners with German citizenship. Secondly, all of the mentioned groups are associated with respected occupations, a clear indicator for being well integrated in society. So, they may be seen as the Other within the German membership boundaries. Other groups that appear in the debate are “the resettlers” (FAZ 1999d) and “the German-Serbs” (ibid. 1999d) and “people from sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and India” (Böckelmann 1998). However, all of these groups only pop-up in one or two sentences, a short paragraph at maximum, and thereby, do not loom large within the debate on (dual) citizenship. These groups remain largely undifferentiated and unspecified and do not play an important role in the discourse on dual citizenship. This is also true, for the group of the ‘Russian-Germans’.

Besides the above-mentioned example, ‘Russian-Germans’ are brought up once more along with ‘Iranian-Germans’ and ‘Turkish-Germans’ in a subordinate clause (Carstens 2014) and in Günther Beckstein’s (back then, Bavarian Minister of the Interior) reference to “the resettlers and their children” (FAZ 1999d) as an example of a group that has had experienced difficulties of integration, even though all of them had at least German citizenship and most of them dual citizenship. In regard to the reference to the ‘resettlers’ it is even questionable if Beckstein referred to the group of ‘Russian-Germans’ as most of them already fall under the category of ‘late resettlers.’ Since ‘Russian-Germans’ are
barely mentioned through-out the entire time of evaluation in 1998/1999 and 2014, the keyword search is consequently broadened to include articles on the group of ‘Russian-Germans’ and ‘late resettlers’ as such without combining it with keywords around the topic of dual citizenship.

4.1.4 ‘Turkish-Germans’ as the Other in the debate of 1998/1999 and 2014

The Other in the form of ‘Turkish-Germans’ as a group is mostly referred to as “Turks” (Böckelmann 1998; Exner 1999), “German-Turks (Deutschtürken)” (Böckelmann 1998) or “Germany-Turks (Deutschlandtürken)” (Schmitt 1998). While sometimes ‘Turkish-Germans’ are still implicitly referred to as “guestworkers (Gastarbeiter)” (ibid.), in other instances they are already seen as “potential fellow countrymen (potentielle Landsleute)” (ibid.). Furthermore, in some texts a difference is made between the first generation of Turkish immigrants and the “second and third generation” (Böckelmann 1998; Schmitt 1998) of Turks, “the Turkish youth” (Böckelmann 1998; Schmitt 1998), in Germany. Whenever the ‘second and third generation’/‘the Turkish youth’ is explicitly mentioned, it is done so in a negative manner. The ‘second and third generation’ is characterized as “frustrated” (Schmitt 1998) and badly integrated. The poor integration is characterized by a strong tendency to watch Turkish television programs, by insufficient language skills, and by a propensity to violence. They are said to have neither mastered German nor Turkish. The only language they supposedly know is “the language of violence” (ibid.). This inclination to violence is underlined by the link between ‘the Turkish youth’ and “youth gangs” (Böckelmann 1998) and by the reference to the above-mentioned case of “Mehmet” (Schmitt 1998). This poor and unsuccessful integration is further emphasized by their tendency to “retreat into religious and national outsiderism” (Böckelmann 1998) and “self-ghettoization” (ibid.). Only the formulation that ‘the Turkish youth’ is “driven into a siding/into social seclusion (auf das soziale Abstellgleis gestellt warden)” (ibid.) hints at the possibility that the outsiderism and self-ghettoization might after all not be as self-induced as most of the articles lead the reader to believe. What differentiates the characterization of the ‘second and third generation’ from the first generation is their inclination to violence.
The group of ‘Turkish-Germans’ as such is characterized as “religious” (Schmitt 1998, Adam 1999, Böckelmann 1998), “badly integrated” (Schmitt 1998) and “low income earners or nonworkers” (ibid.). The religiosity is established in the discourse through the use of attributes. Thus, a Turkish woman is referred to as “chubby woman with a headscarf” (Schmitt 1998), and Turkish men a characterized by their clicking prayer chains (ibid.). The “chubby woman with headscarf” is not referred to by her name or further described. By only characterizing her by the shape of her body and the wearing of a headscarf the author implicitly takes up a discussion – the headscarf debate – that has been conducted in Germany since 1998. Within this debate one big thread of discussion sees the headscarf as emblematic for the subordination of women to men and the affiliation to a fundamentalist religious orientation. The headscarf is a symbol for Islam and its backwardness. The tacit reference to this thread of discussion is reinforced by the fact that the woman is indirectly quoted posing a question that concerns her husband and not herself (ibid.). Islam is seen as ‘hopelessly backward’ (Böckelmann 1998) and equated with fundamentalism, patriarchalism and paternalism (ibid. 1998). To be specific Böckelmann (1998) makes the equation that, “Islam minus fundamentalism minus patriarchalism minus paternalism minus the absolute claim for truth minus daily life- and political ethics equals to a liberal, democratic Islam” (ibid.). That this is the prevailing understanding of Islam and simultaneously seen as conflicting with the German value system is emphasized by problematizing Islamic religious instruction in German schools as one of the core reasons for unsuccessful integration of foreigners (Adam 1999). Furthermore, the mosque-goers are seen as antonym of well-integrated foreigners and as living in their own subculture (ibid.). The ‘Turkish-Germans’ are linked to the backward and religious Islam that is implicitly differentiated against a modern and liberal-minded ‘German’ that holds high the values of enlightenment, equality, and self-responsibility. Thus, the discourse on (dual) citizenship resonates with existing discourses that employ the common trope of ‘sociocultural backwardness' of people of Muslim origin and also with their reluctance to integrate, as the next section makes clear.

The poor integration of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ is first and foremost illustrated in this discourse by insufficient knowledge of the German language. In an article that describes
a meeting between a district mayor of Berlin and the same district’s commissioner for aliens with potential Turkish naturalization candidates, it is repeatedly stated that this meeting would be “unthinkable without an interpreter” (Schmitt 1998) which points towards basic German language skills at best. Also, the above-mentioned fact that the ‘Turkish Youth’ is characterized as having mastered neither German nor Turkish underlines this (ibid.). Furthermore, it hints at limited language skills on the side of their parents and indicates that the parents have not encouraged their children to master the German language. Moreover, ‘Turkish-Germans’ are linked to “bad transnationality” (Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 191) which is seen as facilitating the disintegration of immigrants (ibid., 191). “Turkish satellite channels” (Böckelmann 1998, c.f. Adam 1999), “the Anatolian greengrocer’s shop” (Adam 1999) and “the mosque nearby” (ibid.) are used as metaphors for living in “parallel societies” (FAZ 1999a). It is seen as emblematic for the ‘Turkish-Germans’ strong tendency to live in their own communities according to their own laws, their life in a subculture. Exemplary for this are confrontations of ‘Turkish-Germans’ with the Kurdish minority in Germany and the objectives of Islamic fundamentalist that are incompatible with Germany’s democratic basic order of the Basic Law (Exner 1999). Furthermore, the non-application for naturalization on the part of those Turkish citizens that fulfil the German naturalization criteria is understood as decision against Germany and against holding the German citizenship exclusively (Böckelmann 1998). Even more so, as Turkey “has built a golden bridge” for those Turks in the form of the so-called “pink passports”19 (ibid.). Simultaneously, the duty of loyalty of ‘Turkish-Germans’ is questioned as influenceable by Turkish politics and politicians instancing the election recommendation of the Turkish prime minister in the federal elections of 1998 (Böckelmann 1998). This topic gains prominence in the evaluation period of 2014, where Turkey is increasingly portrayed as “having one foot in Germany through its citizens” (Müller 2014a) and of perceiving of ‘Turkish-Germans’ as its own compatriots (ibid. 2014a). Often cited in relation to this topic is the Turkish President’s statement made in Cologne in 2008, where he said that

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19 The pink passport, actually named pink card (nowadays: blue card), can be applied for by former Turkish citizens that have renounced their Turkish citizenship. As holder of the pink card they enjoy extensive statutory benefits, inter alia the right to work and to take possession of their inheritance (Kraler 2006, 58).
“assimilation is a crime against humanity” (Bannas 2014, Müller 2014a). Turkey is seen to make efforts to permanently nurture its emigres and the emigres are portrayed as still feeling committed to Turkey (Kielmansegg 2014). The fear is expressed that “a permanently only semi-integrated compact ethnic minority with all conceivable political implications” (ibid.) will be part of the German societal reality. Hence, the discourse on (dual) citizenship links the ‘Turkish-Germans’ to being poorly-integrated via depictions of insufficient language skills, bad transnationality, a gateway for Turkey to influence Germany, and a deliberate decision against the German citizenship.

Closely linked to the topic of integration is their portrayal in relation to the labor market. ‘Turkish-Germans’ are depicted as part of the socially deprived, poor, and poorly-trained group of immigrants. Kreuzberg, a district in Berlin heavily populated with ‘Turkish-Germans’, is emblematic for this. The description of the district, that makes up a large part of one of the articles, characterizes it as a poor neighborhood and disadvantaged urban area. Moreover, it is said that the unemployment rate among foreigners in this district is at about 37 percent, a fact that cannot be concealed by handing out German passports to non-German unemployed (Schmitt 1998). Foreigners with a Turkish passport are the biggest group of foreigners receiving unemployment benefits, followed by Iraqis and Russians. While the figures show that the numbers of Turkish claimants of unemployment benefits has been decreasing for some years up until 2013, this is directly assumed to be linked to increasing numbers of former Turkish citizens holding either the German or dual citizenship. Consequently, they no longer can be counted as foreigners in the statistics (FAZ 2014a). Furthermore, the ‘Turkish-Germans’ are characterized as indifferent and ignorant towards the German unemployment benefit system. It is depicted as very difficult to explain “why unemployment benefits are accepted as evidence of one’s own maintenance, while unemployment assistance and social benefits are not”. The evidence of one’s own maintenance is necessary to apply for naturalization. However, the explanation seems to generate insufficient interest on part of the group of Turks anyhow (Schmitt 1998). This contributes to a picture, that associates ‘Turkish-Germans’ as uninterested, uninformed and passive since they are being portrayed as not having put any effort into obtaining information beforehand. Thereby, ‘Turkish-Germans’ are linked to low income earners or nonworkers, and to being uninterested, uninformed and passive.
As illustrated in the preceding paragraphs, ‘Turkish-Germans’ are defined through a positive process of linking backward, religious, poorly-integrated, low-skilled and low-paid workers or non-workers. This positive process of linking is implicitly opposed to the self-definition of ‘Germans’. While not directly mentioned in the articles, being German is associated with “tolerance, democracy, and enlightenment” (Foroutan 2013, 9) with being “hard-working, proper, and punctual” (ibid.). Thereby, the positive identity of ‘Turkish-Germans’ is juxtaposed to an idea of ‘Germaness’, through a series of linkes defined by a negative process of differentiating. The presented image of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ fully reflects the tropes of people of Muslim origin as ‘sociocultural backward’ and ‘unwilling to integrate’ (c.f. Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 198–204).

4.1.5 ‘Turkish-Germans’ as the Other in the evaluation period of 2017

In 2017, the ‘Turkish-Germans’ are most commonly referred to as “German-Turkish community (deutschtürkische Community)” (Krüger 2017), “people of Turkish background (türkistämmig)” (FAZ.NET 2017, Krüger 2017), “German-Turks (Deutschtürken / Deutsch-Türken)” (FAZ.NET 2017, Mülller 2017) and “Germans with Turkish roots (Deutsche mit türkischen Wurzeln)” (Müller 2017). “Turks”, the form of naming that clearly prevailed in the newspaper articles of the evaluation periods 1998 – 1999 and 2014, is being replaced by the now prevailing forms of “German-Turks” and “people of Turkish background”. Whenever, the term ‘Turks’ pops up it, it is used to talk about those people living in Germany that exclusively hold the Turkish passport. This change of naming conventions reflects an emerging and growing trend of using “hyphenation as a way of emphasising one’s multiple cultural belongings” (Baban 2006, 189). Unlike in US-American and Canadian discursive traditions, the practice of hyphenation has been rare in German discourse. However, the term “German-Turk” could conceivably amplify “the hegemonic view in Germany that they are Turks as the emphasis is on the Turkishness” (Baban 2006, 189). The term ‘Turkish-German’ is, therefore, preferable as it reflects a political stance and “dislocates the homogeneous representation of German national identity by indicating that there exist Germans with Turkish origin” (ibid., 189). This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that ‘Russian-Germans’ are in the vast majority of cases referred to as ‘Russian-Germans’, the emphasis being on their ‘Germanness’ not on their ‘Russianness’ (c.f. chapter 4.1.6). Whereas, the naming
of ‘German-Turks’ not only prevails, but the term ‘Turkish-Germans’ is employed only once throughout all articles (Böckelmann 1998). In this particular article the term ‘Turkish-Germans’ is employed rather as a warning of what could happen if “German-Turks will have two passports and are thus also Turkish-Germans” (ibid.). Hence, it seems that the existence of Germans with Russian migration history is accepted in German discursive traditions, while the stress still lies on the Turkishness of ‘Turkish-Germans’. Nevertheless, the prevailing use of ‘German-Turks’ and of ‘people of Turkish origin’ still underlines that there are people of multiple cultural belongings among the German citizenry.

The positive process of linking the ‘Turkish-Germans’ to the backward, religious, poorly-integrated, low-skilled and low-paid workers or non-workers is supported by the evaluation period of 2017. It once more highlights the strong tendency of using “native-language media […] especially among older people and young people with a low educational attainment level” (Krüger 2017). Furthermore, it stresses that in general the group of ‘Turkish-Germans’ “come from families who came in the 1960s as guest workers from Anatolia to Europe” (ibid.) and originate from “educationally deprived, conservative-religious strata” (ibid.). The voting behavior of the ‘Turkish-German’ citizens regarding the constitutional referendum held on 16th of April 2017, is seen to prove “the failed integration of the German-Turkish community” (ibid.) across the political spectrum. The majority of people that were eligible to vote, voted for the constitutional changes that granted more power to president Erdoğan. As a consequence of the results, German politicians requested that ‘Turkish-Germans’ fully “commit themselves to their new homeland” (FAZ.NET 2017) and participate in a “dialog about a constructive shared future” (ibid.). A “further drifting apart of the German and Turkish cultural worlds” (ibid.) needs to be averted. Furthermore, it is unacceptable that some ‘Turkish-Germans’ seem to “believe that it is enough, to stand on the German basic law on tiptoes only” (ibid.). The CDU/Christian Social Union (CSU) calls into question the decision on granting dual citizenship for children of foreign parents born in Germany. They demand stricter regulations, including the abolition of the provisions granting the right to dual citizenship. Stephan Mayer a member of the CSU was quoted as saying, “I believe it is important that in the next legislative period we reverse the facilitations of
The basic idea underlying this line of argument is that one has “to decide: for a liberal country or against” (Müller 2017); for a European country where democracy and freedom of speech exist or “for a system minimizing freedom” (ibid.; c.f. Kehler 2017). The liberal regime generously granting and tolerating dual citizenship is perceived as especially “disastrous” (Müller 2017) if within the country of the second citizenship there is a regime that “never releases its (former) citizens and that always perceives them to be a metric for political maneuver (politische Manövriermasse)” (ibid.). This argument, despite its universal character, directly refers to the group of ‘Turkish-Germans’ as the author before and afterwards talks about the ‘Turkish-Germans’ and the headline of the article is “the choice of the Turks” (ibid.). While the generalization and presentation of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ as a collective entity prevails, and the process of linking ‘Turkish-Germans’ to the poorly integrated prevails, contrary views are voiced on a small scale.

The ‘Hayir’\textsuperscript{20}-campaign serves as a positive example. It exemplifies that the group of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ is not monolithic. Turgut Yüksel, a dual citizen, is quoted that “who has grown up and went to school here, he or she can surely not uncritically accept what Erdoğan has said” (Kehler 2017). Furthermore, he states that with their Facebook-campaign they would like to “encourage those, that would like to vote against” (ibid.) the constitutional changes. He further points out that “if someone will encounter irreversible damage, then those people, who despite their Turkish citizenship take a critical look at the situation” (ibid.).

Furthermore, the prevailing opinion that the voting behavior of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ in the referendum is emblematic for their poor-/non-integration is questioned. To use “the voting behavior as yardstick for integration […] is only plausible at first glance. To zero in on the question of dual citizenship is adventurous” (Krüger 2017). Various circumstances are listed that could potentially explain the voting behavior of the ‘Turkish-Germans’, inter alia cross-generational positioning and the enforced conformity of Turkish media (ibid.). In the evaluation period of 2017, the monolithic construction of the

\textsuperscript{20} Hayir = Turkish for no. The campaign that was triggered by two members of the Hessian Parliament, Turgut Yüksel and Mürvet Öztürk, pools protest actions in Hesse that stand against the referendum (Kehler 2017).
‘Turkish-Germans’ as poorly-integrated is scrutinized for the first time. This is closely linked to the fact, that it is also the first time that explicit references to individuals – Turgut Yüksel and Mürvet Öztürk – as positive examples are made and individuals of Turkish origin or with Turkish and German citizenship are directly quoted in a very personal, specific, and positive manner. The collective entity of the ‘Turkish-German’ is dismantled, but only to a very limited degree. Largely, the characterization of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ as poorly integrated still prevails, thereby supporting the above-delineated positive process of linking the ‘Turkish-Germans’ to the backward, religious, poorly-integrated, low-skilled and low-paid workers or non-workers.

4.1.6 ‘Russian-Germans’ as the Other in the evaluation period of 2016
The group of ‘Russian-Germans’ is referred to as “Russia-Germans (Russlanddeutsche)” (Budras 2016; Clemm 2016; Klimeniouk 2016; Soldt 2016), “(late) resettlers (Spätaussiedler)” (Clemm 2016; Soldt 2016) “Ethnic Germans from the former Eastern bloc (ethnisch Deutsche aus den ehemaligen Ostblockstaaten)” (Clemm 2016), as “group of immigrants (Gruppe von Einwanderern)” who immigrated either from Kazakhstan or Russia, or as part of the “Russian-speaking community (russischsprachige Community)” (Klimeniouk 2016). “The Russian-speaking community” is further subdivided into ethnic Germans, people of Jewish origin from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, children born in Germany, reunited family members, migrant workers and spouses of Germans (ibid). It is striking that in stark contrast to the ‘Turkish-speaking community’, a differentiation is made between different Russian-speaking groups. This distinction is underlined by the fact that some news articles deliberately differentiate between ‘Russian-Germans’ and ‘German-Russians’. In one article Heinrich Groth is referred to as ‘Russian-German’, while Alexej Danckwardt is introduced to the reader as ‘German-Russian’. Thereby, the article indicates that Heinrich Groth is of ethnic German origin, while Alexej Danckwardt is an ethnic Russian who moved to Germany (Wehner 2016). However, in some of the other articles the use of the terms ‘Russian-Germans’ and ‘German-Russians’ seems to be rather random. Having said this, the use of the term ‘Russian-Germans’ clearly prevails in all articles. No differentiation is made between different generations of ‘Russian-Germans’, the ‘Russian-speaking community,’ or ‘German-Russians’. However, the majority of the group immigrated to Germany in the
1990s and has thus been in Germany for a comparatively short period of time, especially when contrasting it to the group of ‘Turkish-Germans’ that has been living in Germany since the 1960s.

The ‘Russian-Germans’ are characterized as “well-integrated” into German society. After some initial difficulties on the side of the ‘Russian-Germans’ as well as on the side of the long-established Germans, they are said to have really arrived in Germany and to have fully integrated into society (Soldt 2016). This is emphasized by the very concrete, personal, and named representation of the ‘Russian-Germans’. Through means of direct reporting many ‘Russian-German’ individuals are introduced to the reader in a personal manner. Some of them are even portrayed as “shining examples of successful integration” (Budras 2016). What all of these ‘shining examples’ have in common is their fluent command of German. So that even the “nostalgic singsong of their Russian dialect” (ibid.) or “the soft trilling R-sound” (Clemm 2016) are portrayed as charming rather than disturbing. For some, it is even said that there is nothing left to signal their migrant background (Budras 2016). They are characterized as having kept “a part of their Russian identity” (Soldt 2016). Indicators of this Russian identity are the Russian-style food they eat, the holidays they celebrate, Russian hospitality, folklore and political discussions (Soldt 2016; Budras 2016). However, they are said to basically “have no cultural peculiarities or at least no irritating ones” (Budras 2016). By naming the infamous German pop singer Helene Fischer one could even argue that they are seen as having become part of German contemporary culture (ibid.). Regarding the integration of ‘Russian-Germans’ the collocation of “silent integration (geräuschlose Integration)” (Budras 2016; Clemm 2016) is employed quite frequently. This silent and soundless integration is further sustained by the fact that the long-established Germans when asked whether the ‘Russian-Germans’ have integrated themselves smoothly, either agree or “have heard nothing of the influx of the late resettlers” (Clemm 2016). While ‘Turkish-Germans’ are linked to bad transnationality, ‘Russian-Germans’ are mostly linked to good transnationality; the ‘Turkish-Germans’ negatively connoted “Anatolian greengrocer’s shop” turns into the “Russian convenience store” (Soldt 2016; Clemm 2016) that is the central meeting place of the ‘Russian-Germans’ and the center of Russian life. These ‘Russian convenience stores’ are characterized as “well sorted”
(Soldt 2016), as having “the best fish supply” in town (ibid.) and as “offering everything the Russian heart desires” (Clemm 2016). Only in one instance the ‘Russian convenience store’ is used as symbol for a dubious political attitude on the side of the ‘Russian-speaking community’ as you cannot only find “cabbage and cheezy detective stories, but also t-shirts with the portrait of Stalin or Putin as well as conspiracist writings” (Klimeniouk 2016). However, the “Russian convenience store” is positively connoted in the majority of cases. A further point underlining the good transnationality of ‘Russian-Germans’ is closely connected to their integration into the German labor market which is described in the next paragraph. The discourse links the ‘Russian-Germans’ to the well-integrated in the form of very good language skills and good transnationality.

The integration of the ‘Russian-Germans’ into the German labor market is seen as a “true success story” (Budras 2016) quoting indirectly the research report of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees for 2013. The employment rate is unusually high and the unemployment rate of about 7.2 percent is relatively low in comparison to other immigrant groups where about 10 percent are unemployed. When looking at the ‘Russian-German’ individuals that are quoted either directly or indirectly in the articles, (Budras 2016; Clemm 2016; Klimeniouk 2016; Soldt 2016; Wehner 2016) they are mathematicians, engineers, politicians, lawyers, historians and social anthropologists. People, therefore, who have either successfully gotten their educational and professional certificates recognized or have attained their university entrance qualifications in Germany (Budras 2016; Clemm 2016; Wehner 2016). Even those, who did not get their certificates recognized, were doing work for which they were overqualified “without a murmur” (Budras 2016). Furthermore, ‘Russian-Germans’ have turned into business founders, they have started “businesses, opened doctor’s practices, built car repair shops or hotels, in which artificial leather beds from Russian manufacturers stand in the classical black forest room” (Soldt 2016). Particularly in regard to their own businesses and hotels, the skill of speaking two or more languages fluently is seen as a big advantage and as an instance of good transnationality. An example for this is the transport company of Olesja and Eduard Rudi. “First, they only sold construction machinery to Kazakhstan, then they acquired articulated lorries for an own transport company. […] The company is expanding” (ibid.). Captions in the company are in “German, English and Russian”
(ibid.). Olesja Rudi is, moreover, the leader of the association of Russian-German businessmen and “studied in the United States” (ibid.). Furthermore, the Rudis nowadays “support […] the local soccer club financially and pay a contribution towards the costs of the gym for their employees” (ibid.). Moreover, not only the academics and business founders are very well regarded but also the non-academic ‘Russian-Germans’. They are characterized as “diligent, manually skillful workers” (Soldt 2016) and said to have been warmly welcomed by companies in need of capable workers. However, problems of integration into the labor market are also mentioned. The district Marzahn-Hellersdorf in Berlin is referred to as “cipher of problems of integration” (Clemm 2016) among the ‘Russian-Germans’. Here the unemployment rate of ‘Russian-Germans’ is at a high of about 21 percent of the 30,000 ‘Russian-Germans’ living there. Having said this, the large number of ‘Russian-Germans’ living in this district are not associated with self-ghettoization or of living in their own subculture. Rather the question is raised “if the spatial concentration of immigrants is a problem at all” (Clemm 2016). Regarding the group of ‘Russian-Germans’ two opposing mechanisms are said to be at play; “on the one hand strong segregation would reduce contact to the local population. […] On the other hand, networking by a close connection to the own ethnic group could facilitate to gain a foothold in everyday life and profession” (ibid.)

The district of Kreuzberg that is referred to as symbol of the poor integration of the ‘German-Turkish’ community into the labor market and characterized by high numbers of unemployment among the group of ‘Turkish-Germans’ is portrayed as emblematic for the failure of multiculturalism (Schmitt 1998). Marzahn-Hellersdorf which is for ‘Russian-Germans’ what Kreuzberg is for the ‘Turkish-Germans’ a symbol for high unemployment rates among the respective community is presented in a much more neutral manner. Facts and figures are stated but no devastating conclusion with respect to the overall integration of the group of ‘Russian-Germans’ nor multiculturalism as such are drawn. While thereby the integration of ‘Russian-Germans’ into the labor market and consequently into society is questioned, by and large the group is linked to being well-integrated into the local labor market, as well as well-trained and highly qualified. This is underlined by the fact that if a ‘Russian-German’ “catches one’s eyes, then it is one of the few who have not-yet-arrived, as they for instance drink alcohol in broad daylight”
Additionally, throughout all articles the ‘Russian-Germans’ are referred to as “homeowners” (Budras 2016; Soldt 2016). In Germany, a country where the majority of people are not living in their own home but in rented accommodation and homeowners are implicitly associated with higher strata of society, this underlines the characterization of ‘Russian-Germans’ as well-integrated into the labor market and characterizes them as better of immigrant group.

The religiosity of the ‘Russian-Germans’ is only mentioned once as they are said to having sought “their fulfillment […] in family, in church and in building houses” (Soldt 2016). Seeking their fulfillment in church suggests that they are regular church-goers. The statement is made in a very neutral manner and therefore hints at the fact that the ‘Russian-Germans’ religiosity is not perceived in a negative manner, however, at the same time it does not seem to play an important role in German discourse as it is mentioned only in one of the articles.

The merely positive representation of the ‘Russian-Germans’ is called into question by the happenings around the case of ‘Lisa’. The main focus lies on the political orientation of the ‘Russian-Germans’. The ‘Russian-Germans’ are at large represented as being rather “conservative” (Soldt 2016). Furthermore, they are said to “appreciate authorities” (ibid.) and their political argumentation is seen as oftentimes being in line with the arguments of the Russian official and media discourse (ibid.). However, they had been perceived as politically inactive and uninterested in politics (Wehner 2016). While the CDU had been seen as “natural sink” (Budras 2016) for the ‘Russian-Germans’ for a long time, a “separation process from the established political parties” (ibid.) has been taking place recently culminating in the demonstrations in January 2016 as response to the case of ‘Lisa’. The trigger for this on-going separation process of many (Budras 2016) is said to be the so-called ‘refugee crisis’.

The ‘Russian-Germans’ have lately oriented themselves towards the right-wing populist party, the AfD, with right-extreme tendencies. The AfD and ‘Russian-Germans’ are said to be bounded by a “cordial and deep friendship” (ibid.). The ‘Russian-Germans’ are characterized as “a large group of immigrants with whom the AfD gets on perfectly”. This is underlined by statements put forward by Aleksander Lejbo, the founder of the network
of Russian-Germans in the AfD of Rhineland-Palatinate, a ‘Russian-German’ himself. According to Lejbo, the ‘Russian-Germans’ and the AfD’s worldview and principles “are 100 percent consistent” (ibid.). Furthermore, ‘Russian-Germans’ also do not believe in the concept of multiculturalism, “we do not believe in multiculti” (ibid.), as they have had experience with living in a multi-ethnic state. Therefore, they “feel the peculiarities intimately” (ibid.). During the demonstrations that took place as response to the alleged rape of the ‘Russian-German’ girl Lisa, ‘Russian-Germans’ were repeatedly reported to voice xenophobic slogans, to trivialize Nazi Germany and to disparage Germany’s leading politicians. One man is quoted that he “is tired of hearing about the Nazi-Crap” (Wehner 2016), he continues that “it is unacceptable that we as Germans should be ashamed” (ibid.). An old lady is quoted as posing the question “What Merkel has done in the past ten years?” (ibid.), the response given by the lady herself is that Merkel “has killed more people than Hitler did” (ibid.). Their behavior is, however, partly excused as they are “no real troublemakers” (Soldt 2016) while the demonstrations “did not fit at all to the behavioral patterns” (ibid.) of ‘Russian-Germans’. Furthermore, an explanation for this deviant behavior is found. ‘Russian-Germans’ have been made “jittery” (ibid.) and “switched into alarm mode (auf Alarm schalten)” (ibid.) by the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. The empathy the refugees experienced when welcomed with banners and under applause simply was a great deal too much for the ‘Russian-Germans’ “who had to work hard for their position in German society” (Budras 2016). They believe that their position, their “nest-building” (Soldt 2016), in society is endangered. Thus, it is not surprising that the ‘Russian-Germans’ clearly delineate themselves from the newcomers. Not only do they emphasize that they themselves cannot be equated to the asylum seekers, but they point out that they “are Germans” (ibid.). And with reference to the sexual assaults on New Year’s Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne, they point out that they “have usually great respect for women” (ibid.). In their point of view the “wrong people are coming to Germany now” (ibid.) indicating that they were the right people to come. This self-perception is reinforced by Peter Weiß, a Parliamentarian of the Bundestag, who underlines the different legal status of ‘Russian-Germans’ and asylum seekers and highlights “the fundamentally different legal status” (ibid.) of the two groups. There is no need for “a new integration program [since] the late resettlers arrived a long time ago” (ibid.)
However, it is important to engage in a constructive dialogue focusing on the accuracy of media coverage so that they let themselves not be goaded by Russian media reporting. Also, their support for the AfD is put into perspective as it is really difficult to estimate how many ‘Russian-Germans’ do indeed support the AfD since they cannot be singled out by the sound of their names or by their nationality. “Also, the polling institute Forsa that has already thoroughly analyzed the AfD-electorate, can only wave away on the question of exact numbers” (Budras 2016). It is also pointed out that many ‘Russian Germans’, inter alia the Association of Russian-Germans, have distanced themselves from the demonstrations and statements made during these demonstrations.” They do not want to damage the good relationship” (Soldt 2016) of ‘Germans’ and ‘Russian-Germans’. Guilt for the demonstrations is mainly allocated to the Russian media coverage and Russian officials, due to the “crude claim of the Russian state media” (ibid.) as they seek “to utilize this mood” (Wehner 2016) and the insecurity of the ‘Russian-Germans’. Only in one article is the argument that the ‘Russian-Germans’ as a “prime example for successful integration” (Klimeniouk 2016) truly called into question. This article describes the group as “extremely servile to Moscow” (ibid.) and as “prone to xenophobic slogans and to anti-European propaganda” (ibid.). The Russian media coverage that is part of Russia’s hybrid warfare is, consequently, said to build on pre-existing attitudes among the group (ibid.). The positive process of linking the ‘Russian-Germans’ to the well-integrated is severely questioned. However, while one article clearly speaks out against the characterization of ‘Russian-Germans’ as well-integrated, the others still link them to the well-integrated. However, it is acknowledged that many do hold questionable political opinions and political beliefs that diverge from the German majority’s beliefs (Soldt 2016).
As illustrated in the preceding paragraphs, ‘Russian-Germans’ are defined through a positive process of linking the religious (neutral), well-integrated, highly-qualified and well-paid (c.f. figure 2). ‘Turkish-Germans’, in stark contrast, are defined through a positive process of linking backward, religious (negatively connoted), poorly-integrated, low-skilled and low-paid workers or non-workers (c.f. figure 2). This series of links is at the same time juxtaposed against an implicit ‘German’ series of links through a negative process of differentiation. While not directly mentioned in the articles, being German is associated with “tolerance, democracy, and enlightenment” (Foroutan 2013, 9) and with being “hard-working, proper, and punctual” (ibid.). The presented image of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ fully reflects the common tropes of people of Muslim origin as ‘sociocultural backward’ and ‘unwilling to integrate’ (c.f. Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 198–204). In stark contrast to ‘Turkish-Germans’, ‘Russian-Germans’ are depicted through a positive
process of linking well-integrated, well-educated/well-trained, well-paid and religious (no connotation). Moreover, ‘Russian-Germans’ are linked to ‘good transnationality’. The two cases illustrate that different ‘degrees of Otherness’ prevail. Whereas the ‘Russian-Germans’ are merely presented as slightly “different” (Diez 2005, 628), the ‘Turkish-Germans’ are presented as “inferior” (ibid., 628). The ‘inferior Turkish-Germans’ are described as “undermining the standards of the self” (ibid., 628) through their lack of integrating themselves into German society. The group of ‘Turkish-Germans’ serves as the key reference point within the conservative discourse on dual citizenship. ‘Turkish-Germans’ are the Other in this discourse. The degradation of national identity that is conjured up by the conservative discourse on dual nationality directly links the non-integration or failed integration of foreigners to the ‘Turkish-Germans’ as a paradigm of bad integration. Thus, ‘Turkish-Germans’ are turned into the referent subject in the conservative discourse’s process of securitization that seeks to establish German identity as referent object and thereby, as existentially threatened. Looking at Roe’s (2008) two-stage process of securitization only the first stage – the stage of rhetorical securitization – is met. The CDU-signature campaign serves as an example of audience support for the conservative discourse’s securitization move. However, as jus soli-elements were introduced in 2000 and further strengthened in 2014, one cannot speak of having reached the second stage – the stage of active securitization – where actual emergency measures are being implemented. After analyzing the discursive securitization of dual citizenship, the next section focuses on the securitization of routines.

4.2. Analysis II – Management of Unease

After analyzing discursive securitization of (dual) citizenship, this part of the analysis centers on Bigo’s approach to securitization following a logic of routine, in this case securitization through a specific set of practices, that is naturalization practices/practices of awarding dual citizenship with naturalization. Green (2010, 174) identifies two stages of evolving citizenship policies in Europe. In the first phase during the 1990s, European countries liberalized their citizenship regimes as a response to changed realities as European countries had turned into countries of immigration. Access to citizenship for foreigners was facilitated. In the second phase starting around the year of 2001, access of
citizenship was restricted, as the logic changed “towards a thickening of citizenship, with many countries successively introducing assimilatory elements such as language and citizenship tests, integration courses and citizenship ceremonies” (ibid., 174). This thickening of citizenship is what Orgad refers to as cultural turn across European citizenship regimes.

These two distinct phases are clearly visible regarding changes in the naturalization conditions in Germany’s Nationality Law (Green 2010). In 1999, changes to the German Law on Citizenship were passed reducing the residence period necessary for legal entitlement to naturalization from fifteen to eight years, thereby halving the required residence period and significantly liberalizing naturalization conditions (BMI 2018; Goodman 2012, 680–681; Green 2010, 175; Hailbronner and Farahat 2015, 7). However, the 2004 and 2007 reform of the German Law on Citizenship introduced significant assimilatory elements (BMI 2018; Green 2010, 174) amounting to a cultural turn in Germany’s naturalization regime. These changes are described in the following paragraphs drawing on the above-mentioned mechanisms of cultural integration requirements/cultural defense policies that are utilized for the management of unease concerning the naturalization process: (1) citizenship tests, (2) language requirements, (3) loyalty oaths, (4) attachment requirements, and (5) integration contracts (Orgad 2015, 86; Orgad 2017, 351).

Citizenship tests are one of the five categories of cultural defense policies that seek to control for a high cultural integration of naturalization candidates by testing the general knowledge and cultural assimilation of naturalization applicants. They therefore function as a gatekeeper securing the inclusion of ‘desired’ foreigners, who have achieved a certain standard of cultural and knowledge-based integration and the exclusion of the ‘undesired’. In Germany, the federal citizenship test was implemented in September 2008 (BMI 2018). The federal test is a knowledge-based written test. Out of 330 potential questions, 33 questions are asked per test and 17 or more have to be answered correctly by the naturalization candidate (Heilbronner and Farahat 2015, 12). The questions are multiple choice in character and questions are focused on “history, geography, constitutional principles, national symbols and German customs” (Orgad 2010, 68).
Naturalization candidates with a German high school degree are exempted (Heilbronner and Farahat 2015, 12). The harmonized federal citizenship test was introduced as a consequence of a fierce debate over integration tests implemented on the federal state level by Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hesse in 2005/2006 (Etzioni 2007, 356; Hailbronner and Farahat 2015, 11). The citizenship tests in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hesse were more character-based and aimed at naturalization candidates of Muslim faith. This fact was evident concerning the test in Baden-Wuerttemberg where the test was utilized only in the naturalization process of immigrants from the member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Even though in Hesse, the test was administered to all naturalization candidates, the content made clear that it was also targeted towards naturalization candidates of Muslim faith (Etzioni 2007, 356; Orgad 2010, 67–68). Both tests focused on questions of gender equality, religion, marital relations, parenting, promiscuity, ethics, politics and culture and were very intrusive in character (Orgad 2010, 67–68). Possible questions were inter alia “Is it right that women obey their husbands and for men to beat their wives?” (Etzioni 2007, 356), “If your daughter dressed like a German, would you try to prevent her from doing so?” (ibid., 356) or “If someone described the Holocaust as a myth or folktale, how would you respond?” (ibid., 356). By (in-)directly testing people of Muslim origin, the citizenships test used in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hesse reflect the above-discussed process of linking the ‘Turkish-Germans'/people of Muslim faith to the sociocultural backward and poorly-integrated. Furthermore, the association of people of Muslim faith to the fanatic, intolerant and non-democratic (Foroutan 2013, 6) has induced a strong difference in treatment and discrimination regarding naturalization processes as part of the management of unease. The logic of securitization of routine centers on naturalization applicants of Muslim faith or with a Muslim background. As a consequence of heavy criticism both within and outside of Germany, the federal test was introduced and administered to all naturalization candidates and less intrusive in character (Orgad 2010, 68). Consequently, naturalization candidates from Turkey or naturalized former Turkish citizens create more ‘unease’ than the majority of naturalization candidates from the Russian Federation/naturalized former Russian citizens do, as Russia is a predominantly Christian nation.
In addition, language requirements function as mechanisms of the cultural defense policies and are therefore part of the practices of the management of unease. Language tests were first mentioned in the 1999 Law on Citizenship, before there were no formal language requirements. However, as the Law did not specify the language requirements it was within the discretion of the federal states to introduce language tests. Consequently, diverse language testing existed across the German states, “ranging from oral interviews to written exams” (Goodman 2010, 14; c.f. Goodman 2012, 664–665). Since the reform of 2004, language testing has been harmonized. Naturalization candidates have to prove language proficiency at level B1 of the Common European Reference Framework for Languages by providing a language certificate (testing listening, writing, reading and speaking skills) or a German (high school) diploma instead (Green 2010, 177). The 2007 reform introduced the possibility to naturalize already after six instead of eight years of residence, should the applicant be able to prove high levels of integration, inter alia in form of language proficiency at level B2 (Green 2010, 177; Hailbronner and Farahat 2015, 11–12). While a relaxation of naturalization laws for those with a high proficiency in German has taken place as they might already naturalize after six years of residing in Germany, access of citizenship for people with limited language capabilities has been restricted and consequently terminated. This illustrates that good language skills are perceived as crucial for becoming part of the ‘German in-group’ and have been reflected more and more in the naturalization regime and a feeling of ‘unease’ towards insufficient language capabilities.

Loyalty oaths are a further mechanism of cultural defense policies that can be implemented as part of the management of unease. In Germany, loyalty oaths were introduced in the 1999 Law on Citizenship requiring “a declaration of loyalty to the free and democratic constitutional order” (Hailbronner and Farahat 2015, 16). In 2007, “the revised law supplemented the (now amended) written statement of loyalty with an oral declaration to be made at the time of the presentation of the naturalization certificate” (Green 2010, 177). The two remaining mechanisms, attachment requirements and integration contracts, are not part of the German naturalization regime. Nevertheless, the expansion of the mechanisms of citizenship tests, language requirements and loyalty oaths illustrate that a cultural turn has taken place concerning the naturalization process.
in Germany. This is further underlined by further amendments of the German Law on Citizenship. Since the reform of 2004, all applicants for naturalization are security checked by the Federal Security Service (Green 2010, 177). The barriers for naturalization regarding the maximum of criminal charges were also tightened and the necessity of proving sufficient funds for existence were expanded to include all adult applicants. Prior to this, applicants younger than 23 years did not have to prove sufficient means for existence (BMJ 2018, 3; Green 2010, 177; Hailbronner and Farahat 2015, 12). Furthermore in 2015 an obligation to report the possession of multiple nationalities was introduced in Germany (Thränhardt 2017, 23–24). This clearly illustrates that while a relaxation of naturalization laws has taken place as the required time of legal residence was reduced from fifteen to eight years, cultural integration requirements and the application of criminal law in naturalization control have gained in prominence. This illustrates that the feeling of unease with cultural diversity has grown. This fear of foreign infiltration (Überfremdung) of the cultural ingroup has led to the implementation of cultural integration requirements – the management of unease – of the naturalization regime within Germany.

Finally, dual citizenship can be understood as management of unease – or as reflecting management of unease. Regarding dual citizenship with naturalization, some concessions have been made since 1999. This shows that a liberalizing trend has taken place concerning the practice of restricting dual citizenship with naturalization for all. Practices aimed at the management of unease have been relaxed for citizens of countries that are perceived as culturally close to Germany, such as for EU citizens, Swiss citizens or for Australian and Canadian citizens dual citizenship is either accepted as legally binding or prevails in the majority of naturalizations. The 1999 Law on Citizenship correlated with the renunciation of the 1963 Convention on Dual Nationality that severely limited the toleration of dual nationality. Since the reform of 2007, dual citizenship has been accepted as a rule for all EU and Swiss citizens. Before dual citizenship had been accepted for EU nationals under the condition of reciprocity in the citizen’s country of origin (Hailbronner and Farahat 2015, 7–12). Furthermore, the German Ministry of the Interior has published recommendations for countries whose nationals should be naturalized with dual nationality, i.e. because their countries of origin do not denaturalize their citizens. In
2007, this list included eight countries and has since then been expanded to include 25 countries in 2015\(^{21}\). This liberalizing trend regarding the acceptance of dual citizenship has also been reflected in the numbers of naturalizations with dual nationality in general, while in 2005 47.2 percent of recently naturalized Germans were allowed to keep their former citizenship, in 2017 it was 61.4 percent (c.f. figure 3; 66). For naturalization candidates of non-EU countries, naturalization with dual nationality is according to the law (with certain exceptions) not possible. However, in administrative practice naturalizations with dual citizenship differ largely across former nationality. In 2017, 88.6 percent of recently naturalized Germans from the United States of America (USA), 88.3 percent of recently naturalized Germans from Canada, 92.4 percent of recently naturalized Germans from Australia and 90.0 percent of recently naturalized Germans from New Zealand, were allowed to retain their former citizenship. For recently naturalized Germans from Albania (8.3 percent), Macedonia (7.8 percent), Montenegro (11.1 percent), Serbia (41.5 percent), and Turkey (17.2 percent) the percentage of people allowed to keep their former citizenship was much lower (Destatis 2018a). This illustrates that the liberalizing changes regarding naturalizations with dual citizenship have taken place only for certain nationalities. The management of unease regarding naturalizations with dual citizenship for EU citizens, Swiss citizens, and citizens from the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand has been replaced by a practice of ‘ease’ by (largely) accepting dual citizenship for those groups. The management of unease, however, prevails towards other nationalities, such as naturalization applicants/recently naturalized Germans from Albania, Macedonia and Turkey.

Having looked at the difference in discursive representation across the cases of ‘Turkish-Germans’ and ‘Russian-Germans’, I now turn to practices of naturalization investigating how these difference in representation is reflected in these practices – which can be understood as management of unease. Looking at the praxis of awarding dual citizenship

\(^{21}\) The 25 countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Cuba, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Eritrea, Honduras, Iran, Lebanon, the Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia and Uruguay. However, in some cases the recommendations target specific groups only, i.e. many Latin American countries prohibit denaturalization of nationals only if they were born in the respective country (BMI 2015, 32–33; Thranhardt 2017, 24).
as part of the naturalization process across the cases of recently naturalized former Turkish and Russian citizens (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67), it becomes evident that the percentage of naturalization with dual citizenship has permanently been lower for recently naturalized former Turkish citizens than for recently naturalized former Russian citizens. This reflects the difference in representation of the two groups, whereas one creates much more ‘unease’ than the other. The difference is particularly salient in the years of 2005 – 2007 (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67), where the share of naturalized Russian-German citizens even exceeds the percentage of total naturalizations with dual nationality. While the percentage of naturalized Russian-German citizens remains significantly higher until the year of 2013, starting from 2014 the share decreases so that in 2016 and 2017 the share of naturalizations with dual citizenship is almost equal for recently naturalized Turkish-Germans (16.4 percent in 2016, 17.0 percent in 2017) and Russian-Germans (18.0 percent in 2016, 17.4 percent in 2017). Figure 3 illustrates that the share of acceptance of dual nationality is generally higher for women (c.f. figure 3, 66; c.f. Thränhardt 2017, 15). However, this does not hold true for naturalized Russian-German and Turkish-German citizens. The lower share of naturalized female Turkish-German citizens might be connected to the above-mentioned headscarf debate (c.f. chapter 4.1.4) that constructs Muslim women as subordinate to men and as objects of Muslim fundamentalism, patriarchalism and paternalism. This is reflected by a survey conducted by a research group, led by Dr. Naika Foroutan, that shows that 38 percent of the German citizenry believe that whoever wears a headscarf cannot be German. Moreover, Muslim women wearing a headscarf and people with a Muslim migrant background in general are perceived as counter categories to the German self-perception among large parts of the population (Foroutan et al. 2014, 6–7). Regarding the lower share of naturalized female Russian-German citizens the discursive analysis of the representation of Russian-Germans in German discourse does not indicate reasons for the difference in treatment. Also, looking at the educational attainments of Spätaussiedler and immigrants from the former Soviet Union (including Russia), female immigrants were even better educated than male immigrants to Germany (Worbs et al. 2013, 46).
### Figure 3. Dual citizenship with naturalization in Germany 2005 – 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share of naturalized Germans retaining dual citizenship (in percent)</th>
<th>Share of naturalized Turkish-German citizens among naturalized (former) Turkish citizens (in percent)</th>
<th>Share of naturalized Russian-German citizens among naturalized (former) Russian citizens (in percent)</th>
<th>Share of Spätaussiedler (late resettlers) among naturalized (former) Russian citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td><strong>47.2</strong></td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td><strong>26.3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td><strong>50.0</strong></td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td><strong>22.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td><strong>49.7</strong></td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td><strong>17.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td><strong>53.6</strong></td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td><strong>17.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td><strong>54.2</strong></td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td><strong>17.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td><strong>57.8</strong></td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td><strong>16.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td><strong>61.4</strong></td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td><strong>17.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ø=average; ♂=male; ♀=female

**All values are given in percentage.

***Percentage of Spätaussiedler (late resettlers) of all naturalized (former) Russian citizens; numbers of Spätaussiedler among naturalized former Russian citizens have been indicated since the year of 2010 only

**** Grey shaded areas indicate a higher share of acceptance of dual nationality for women

Source: Destatis (2006-2017a, 2017b, 2018a)
Regarding the case of naturalized Russian-German citizens it can hardly be said in what way the share of naturalizations with dual citizenship is influenced by the immigration of the Spätaussiedler as numbers are not provided by the Federal Statistical Office. According to Worbs et al. (2013, 41–42) the share of dual Russian-German citizens among the group of (Spät-)Aussiedler who immigrated from the Russian Federation to Germany lies at 26.3 percent. This is due to the fact that in accordance with paragraph seven of the Law on Citizenship (Spät-)Aussiedler are naturalized without necessarily having to renounce their former citizenship (BMJ 2018, 2; Worbs et al. 2013, 42), a management of ‘ease’ in naturalization practice towards the (Spät-)Aussiedler. Therefore, the high percentage of naturalized Russian-German citizens among former Russian citizens might partially relate to the naturalization of Spätaussiedler. However, looking at figure 3 shows that the percentage of naturalized Russian-German citizens does not correlate to the share of Spätaussiedler among naturalized former Russian citizens as the share is sometimes significantly higher (i.e. 2010, 2015, 2016, 2017) and sometimes lower (2013, 2013). Also, when comparing the numbers of Spätaussiedler immigrating
from the Russian Federation to Germany in the years of 2005 – 2009 to the numbers of naturalized former Russian citizens with and without dual citizenship the numbers of immigrating *Spätaussiedler* does not always correspond to the numbers of naturalized Russian-German citizens. This means that the observed high share of naturalized Russian-German citizens is not reducible to the effect of *Spätaussiedler* (c.f. figure 5 and 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>Total number of immigrating <em>Spätaussiedler</em> from the Russian Federation</th>
<th>Total number of naturalizations of former Russian citizens</th>
<th>Total numbers of naturalized Russian-German citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>21,113</td>
<td>5055</td>
<td>2885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5189</td>
<td>4679</td>
<td>2773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3735</td>
<td>4069</td>
<td>2534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2682</td>
<td>2439</td>
<td>967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>2477</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Immigration of *Spätaussiedler* from Russia and numbers of naturalized former Russian citizens/naturalized Russian-German citizens
Source: Source: Destatis (2006–2017a, 2017b, 2018a); Worbs et al. (2013)

Figure 6. Immigration of *Spätaussiedler* from Russia and naturalization of former Russian citizens/Russian-German citizens
Source: Source: Destatis (2006–2017a, 2017b, 2018a); Worbs et al. (2013)
This finding of different groups being treated differently echoes the existing literature (Thränhardt 2017). The unequal treatment at the federal level is exacerbated even more at federal state level. For example, in Bavaria, naturalized Turkish-German citizens amounted to 2.8 percent in 2016 and 3.8 percent in 2017. Whereas, naturalized Russian-German citizens amounted to 51.0 percent in 2016 and 39.0 percent in 2017 (Bayerisches Innenministerium 2016, 9; Bayerisches Innenministerium 2017, 10). In Saxony-Anhalt, naturalized Turkish-German citizens amounted to 12.5 percent in 2017. Naturalized Russian-German citizens totaled up to 37.0 percent (Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen-Anhalt 2018, 21). In Saxony, naturalized Turkish-German citizens amounted to 7.5 percent and naturalized Russian-German citizens to 15.1 percent in 2016 (Statistisches Landesamt des Freistaates Sachsen 2017). Overall, what these statistics of naturalization with dual nationality show is that administrative practices regarding naturalizations with dual citizenship are shaped by an immense asymmetry in treatment. In some cases, the acquisition of dual citizenship with naturalizations is (legally) accepted and part of the logic of the naturalization routine in Germany reflecting relative ‘ease’ for those groups. In other cases, dual nationality with naturalization is much less a routine procedure and treated as much more problematic reflecting the relative ‘unease’ for those groups. Naturalized Turkish-German citizens are clearly outside the everyday practices of bureaucracies across time. Regarding naturalized Russian-German citizens the picture is more nuanced. Over time the administrative practices have tightened up and the share of naturalizations with dual citizenship have significantly decreased. However, numbers of (Spät)-Aussiedler immigrating from the Russian Federation to Germany, while having decreased until the year of 2012, have increased since the year of 2012, albeit at a very low level. While in 2012, 1,817 Spätaussiedler arrived in Germany, 6,118 arrived in the year of 2015 (BAMF 2017). Also, the share of Spätaussiedler among naturalized former Russian citizens has increased significantly since the year of 2014 (compare figure 3, 66). A look at the administrative practices in Bavaria, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt shows that the share of naturalized Russian-German citizens differs at federal and federal state level.

22 The remaining federal states did not give numbers for naturalizations with dual citizenship at all or only broken down by continent (not country).
Regarding naturalization laws and naturalizations with dual citizenship in Germany a liberalization has taken place as the time of residence necessary for naturalization has been halved and dual citizenship has been legally accepted for EU and Swiss nationals. However, shortly after the liberalization of naturalization laws, cultural integration requirements were introduced and tightened over time. Similarly, while the acquisition of dual citizenship was loosened in legal terms and in administrative practice for certain nationals, for the naturalization of other nationals with dual citizenship remains virtually impossible. An immense difference in treatment and ‘unease’ towards naturalization applicants with Muslim faith/of a Muslim migrant background including naturalized Turkish-German/naturalized former Turkish citizens has to be ascertained. Concerning naturalized Russian-German/naturalized former Russian citizens the picture is more nuanced. The share of naturalized Russian-German citizens has severely fallen among the group of naturalized former Russian citizens (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67). While the immigration of (Spät-)Aussiedler has certainly influenced the relative ‘ease’ towards naturalization applicants from Russia especially in the years 2005 – 2008 (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67), at a federal state level, the exact impact of the immigration of (Spät-)Aussiedler cannot be determined as statistics are partially missing and numbers of naturalized former Russian citizens, naturalized Russian-German citizens and the immigration of (Spät-)Aussiedler do not always correlate (c.f. figure 5, 68; figure 6, 68).
5. Conclusion

The analysis illustrates that two discourses, a conservative and a liberal discourse, exist in regard to the center right discourse on dual citizenship in Germany. It further shows that the debate on (dual) citizenship is being conducted amidst two diametrically opposed understandings of integration. The conservative discourse understands social integration as essential for legal integration meaning that the acquisition of (dual) citizenship might only follow successful social integration. The liberal discourse, in contrast, considers legal integration to be the key to social integration. According to this understanding, legal integration forms the ultimate starting point for social integration. The conservative discourse seeks to securitize the discourse on (dual) citizenship by presenting the German identity (referent object) as being in danger of degradation. This degradation of the German identity is intertwined with the non-integration or failed integration of foreigners that pose a risk to German society. The foreigner, the Other, in the conservative discourse is ‘the Turk’/are ‘the Turkish-Germans’. ‘Russian-Germans’ are of minor to no importance in the discursive securitization of (dual) citizenship. The representation of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ as inferior and as subverting the norms of the self in the form of their non-integration feeds into the securitization move of the conservative discourse as a prime example for bad/failed integration. The ‘Turkish-Germans’ are turned into the referent subject in the conservative discourse’s securitization move that seeks to establish German identity as a referent object and thereby, as existentially threatened. Looking at the two-stage process of securitization that differentiates between the stage of identification (rhetorical securitization) and the stage of mobilization (active securitization) (Roe 2008), only the stage of rhetorical securitization is met. The CDU-signature campaign mirrors the audience’s support for the conservative discourse’s securitization move. However, as jus soli-elements were introduced in 2000 and further strengthened in 2014 one cannot speak of having reached the second stage – the stage of active securitization – where actual emergency measures are being implemented. The liberal discourse does not securitize/make a securitizing move concerning the issue of (dual) citizenship. There is no account of a threat but rather the setting of an objective that is to modernize the
currently valid Law on Citizenship. Having said this, the representation of the CDU’s signature campaign constitutes the endeavor of a counter-securitizing move. This counter-securitizing move appears to a very limited extent though, as only claim and demand of the generic structure of Stritzel and Chang’s operationalization of the linguistic and grammatical structure can be filled with content.

Concerning the management of unease in the naturalization practices in Germany, this thesis illustrates that a liberalization of naturalization laws was followed by the subsequent implementation of cultural integration requirements in the form of citizenship tests, language tests, and loyalty oaths. The adoption of cultural integration requirements is emblematic for an ‘unease’ towards the cultural Other. This is further supported by the application of criminal law in naturalization control. The ‘unease’ towards the cultural Other is particularly strong concerning naturalization applicants of Muslim faith/with a Muslim migrant background including naturalized former Turkish/Turkish-German citizens. This practice of ‘unease’ reflects the representation of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ as ‘inferior’ to ‘Germans’. Regarding naturalized former Russian/Russian-German citizens, practices of the management of unease are more diverse. In the years of 2005 – 2008 (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67), this study depicts a relative ‘ease’ towards naturalized former Russian/Russian-German citizens in the form of high numbers of naturalization with dual citizenship. This number, however, decreases over time until reaching an absolute low in the year 2017, where naturalizations with dual citizenship were almost the same across the two cases of investigation. When looking at naturalization statistics at a federal state level, the picture becomes even more complex. There are three states that provide detailed numbers/percentages of naturalization with dual citizenship across countries, the share of naturalized Turkish-German citizens has been extremely low (c.f. page 60–61) in all three federal states in 2016/2017. Concerning the share of naturalized Russian-Germans this thesis discerned a stark difference between the state of Bavaria where naturalization with Russian-German citizenship amounted to 51.0 percent in 2016 and 39.0 percent in 2017 (Bayerisches Innenministerium 2016, 9; Bayerisches Innenministerium 2017, 10) and the state of Saxony where naturalizations with Russian-German citizenship amounted to 15.1 percent in 2016 (Statistisches Landesamt des Freistaates Sachsen 2017). This clearly shows that naturalization routines, relative ‘unease’/’ease’, towards naturalizations with
Russian-German citizenship differ on a state and federal state level. On a state level, the relative ‘ease’ that prevailed in the years 2005 – 2008 has slowly been replaced by an ‘unease’ towards naturalizations with dual Russian-German citizenship that clearly manifests itself in the years 2015 – 2017 (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67). While this ‘unease’ is reflected in the naturalization practice of the state of Saxony in 2016, relative ‘ease’ towards naturalizations with Russian-German citizenship still prevails in Bavaria and Saxony-Anhalt in 2016 – 2017. The high share of naturalized Russian-German citizens in 2005 – 2008 as well as the decreasing and low share of naturalized Russian-German citizens in 2009 – 2017 is not reducible to the effect of immigration of Spätaussiedler, as the number/share of naturalized Russian-German citizens do not always correlate to the number/share of immigrating Spätaussiedler (c.f. 5 and 6) or naturalized Spätaussiedler (c.f. 3). The representation of ‘Russian-Germans’ as slightly different is reflected in a relative ‘ease’ towards naturalized former Russian citizens/Russian-German citizens in the years of 2005 – 2008 and in the practices of the federal states of Bavaria and Saxony-Anhalt. However, the changing practices at state level – the practice of ‘unease’ that replaces the practice of relative ‘ease’ – does not mirror the representation of ‘Russian-German’ as a paradigm of successful integration (c.f. figure 2, 58).

By analyzing the securitization of (dual) citizenship in Germany this thesis contributes to closing the research gap that exists in applying the securitization theory (discursive securitization and the securitization of routine) to citizenship as such and dual citizenship in particular. The combination of the two approaches across the two cases showed that analyzing the discursive securitization alongside the securitization of routine enriches the analysis of securitization processes. This is particularly true as discursive (non)securitization might be mirrored in the securitization of routine as in the case of ‘Turkish-Germans’ and naturalized former Turkish/Turkish-German citizens but might also differ as exemplified in the case of ‘Russian-Germans’ and naturalized former Russian/Russian-German citizens. Looking only at discursive securitization or securitization of routine alone might, consequently, show a one-sided picture. By solely investigating the center-right discourses on (dual) citizenship, this study is clearly limited as it depicts securitization processes and representations of ‘Turkish-Germans’ and
‘Russian-Germans’ within these very concrete center-right discourses. Consequently, for future research, it would be interesting to investigate how the securitization processes differ across various discourses of the political spectrum, across regions and across tabloid and non-tabloid newspapers and whether the diverse discourses can account for changes in the practices towards naturalized ‘Russian-German’ citizens, and for differences in treatment across the federal states.
Bibliography


