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**UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION FROM AN ETHICAL VANTAGE POINT: THE CASES OF  
TUNISIA AND EGYPT**

MA Thesis

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## **UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION FROM AN ETHICAL VANTAGE POINT: THE CASES OF TUNISIA AND EGYPT**

Ayder Ozan Telatar

### **Abstract**

This research elicits a thorough discussion on the normative aspects of the determinants of corruption. The crux of the argument focalizes around the notions of frustration and resentment in societies where the corruption rate is high. The main discussion on the theoretical part revolves around how self-interest centered actions hinder normativity on political decision making. Drawing on the literature on the ethical relativism, the second part of the research particularly focuses on the socio-political landscape of the respective country cases of Tunisia and Egypt to assess the extent to which the commonsense ethical dispositions affect the sustenance of higher rates of corruption. The examination of relevant social, political and economic parameters reveals that individual interests for private gains are likely to generate more corruption. Tunisia and Egypt cases demonstrate that rampant corruption juxtaposed to high levels of social distrust and resentment against the ruling elite is likely to turn into uprisings. From this perspective, this research elicits a novel way of understanding the causes of widespread public dissent both before and during the Arab Spring.

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## **Introduction**

Corruption as a phenomenon is very complex due to various different variables it harbors within itself conceptually. Such variables and indicators may be democracy, culture, ethics, social trust, social contract, inequality and different (and sometimes conflicting) individual interests. It is also complex and multifaceted because of its area of impact. In other words, to a certain extent, corruption is inherently rooted in every known system that has been established by mankind so far or as Joseph Nye (1967) asserted once, it is rather “endemic”. However, Nye narrowed down his views on corruption being perennial to governments. Thus, as a concept, corruption draws much scientific interest. Additionally, in politics the concept of corruption has been one of the trending topics as the multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and Transparency International give significant importance to multiple efforts to be launched. The reason why such labor get under way stems from the need of introducing and providing good governance to people. In this sense, there is a side of these efforts that is purely normative.

In theory, democratic principles are often associated with free and fair elections, separation of powers, impartiality and transparency of governments, independent media organs and human rights. Moreover, these principles and many more are tried to be implemented and revived into existence with the help of institutional mechanisms. Usually such institutions operate within the rationale of separation of powers. These institutions also are the cornerstones of a legitimate and fully functioning state apparatus. That is why when the concept of corruption is the discussion topic, governments should be taken into consideration as a whole. Though, in practice since corruption is quite infectious, governments are very vulnerable to it and its negative influence. Therefore, collective action might be more important than anything to better understand why and how corruption spreads. At this point, the concept of social contract comes into play and actually plays a very crucial role. In a simple explanation, social contract is a theory that “...in some way, the arrangement of all individuals subject to collectively enforced social arrangements shows that those arrangements have some normative property.” (D'Agostino, Gaus, & Thrasher, 2017) Thomas Hobbes, however, attributed this to a system that can be considered as monarchy. Though, the theory's very foundation of operation is not that different today than it is in the book called Leviathan. In other words,

the social contract theory was explained through a ‘Sovereign’ and its ‘Subjects’ in Leviathan. (Hobbes, 1985). The equation in simplistic terms works for both ways as subjects (citizens) give their full trust and power to select the Sovereign, in exchange the Sovereign provides safety, security and needs for its subjects. Of course there is the risk that the Sovereign exploits that trust and power available to him/her and turn towards more individualistic agenda in order to pertain power by any means necessary. As a result, state of nature goes into a state of war which is deemed inevitable in Leviathan due to human desire for power. In this sense, a possible war of all against all does not happen just because there is no safety and security provided by the Sovereign. It happens because, as also Hobbes asserted, there is a conflict between interests among people. Today the Hobbesian portrayal for the war of all against all takes arguably a different form. Except some niche cases, the surroundings of contemporary politics harbors this conflict between the Sovereign and its subjects. Nevertheless, this conflict often serves only to Sovereign as he/she holds the power and is able to redefine interests thus, neglects what its subjects actually demand. With regard to the modern governmental (presidential, parliamentary, semi-presidential and etc.) systems, this whole principle of social contract theory bears resemblance to what governments actually demand from people, namely their trust and ability to vote for them. However, there is still the risk of same kind of exploitation of that trust and power of electing through different ways. Such exploitation takes place in which government officials by not only abusing their offices but also misusing the public trust expensed beforehand. This frequently creates a potential sense of disconnectedness among people towards their governments.

This research intends to look at those different ways as well as the very motives and logic behind by taking the concept of corruption into consideration. The reason why the corruption is our focal point is because of the great magnitude of impact it has on aggregate level. As Nye asserts that corruption is inherently habitual in governments, this research also argues that corruption is one of the most important (if not the most important) reasons that drives governments out their course and end them either violently or nonviolently with the help of massive uprisings. This research also emphasizes the importance of normative repercussions of one’s own interests on corruption thus the respective concept is held individualistically. In other words, normative subjectivity on individual level is the key for the theoretical part. However, when it comes to discuss

about governments as a whole, the discussion cannot be held without including citizens that are subjects to governments. Therefore, it is argued that decision making on individual level in political realm, affects the aggregate as there are citizens to endure political leaders' actions. So taking part in corrupt actions arises from that normative subjectivity as one's own interest eventually outweighs others'. As a result, the concept of corruption paves the way for selfishness, neglect, and indignity in theory.

The theoretical framework starts with the definition problem of corruption due to the lack of one well-accepted definition of the concept. Although defining it is very problematic and this research tries to bring various definitions from other scholars such as Gardiner (1970), Jorgensen Farrales (2005), Philp (1997) and more; the framework takes Joseph Nye's (1967) definition as core since his definition mainly inspired or influenced other descriptions made. Alongside Nye's definition, Transparency International's detailed definitions on corruption are also introduced. These definitions are helpful to show different types of corruption as this research will be mainly focusing on political corruption. Also with the help of these definitions, a proper establishment of the understanding the normative side that corruption has as a concept. Defining it is significant because without setting a base, understanding and explaining the phenomenon is quite hard due to its different interpretations. Such interpretations arise from the fact that corruption is perceived subjectively as a concept. Moreover, these definitions are molded in the framework of George Klosko's (1987) principle of fairness and political obligation because this research argues that there exists great significance within co-operation among people in order to better constitute a common public trust fund. With the help of this common trust rooted in the society, as Klosko also asserts, it might be possible to make clear that nobody actually needs to misuse others' trust as everyone gets enough of public resources. In this way, this principle of fair play might offer a potential general understanding of dignity and fairness in which authorities would not theoretically be corrupted.

The framework then introduces the perception issue of corruption in a more narrowed and normative sense. This part deals with how the concept of corruption is embraced in terms of perceiving it. In other words, it is explained that corruption can be understood differently in various places thus, can be used differently for various purposes. The significance of this part lies within the argument itself that is linked to how it is

understood culturally as well as ethically. Therefore, this part first starts with what are the two main schools when it comes to perceiving a concept which are normative view and a revisionist view. The former view argues that normative actions are inherently good or bad and virtues or vices therefore, there are universally accepted normative actions that can be labelled as vice or virtue; whereas the latter deals with rather the consequences of normative actions in a more utilitarian and pragmatic understanding.

Moreover, Arnold Heidenheimer's (1970) typology is crucial at this point. With the help of his typology, the concept of corruption is defined through behavioral motives behind. Put differently, his definitions explain the gravity of corruption in terms of what incentives lie behind a corrupt action and what characteristics these definitions have. According to his typology, there are three definitions: (i) Public-office-Centered, (ii) Market-Centered and (iii) Public-interest-Centered. This research takes shape around the Public-interest-Centered definition as the hypothesis simply assumes that corruption damages and ignores public's demands.

The last part of the framework touches upon the theory of ethical relativism to complement and better explain the phenomenon as it is discussed that there are purely normative sides of the concept. Mark Philp's (1997) typology in this part helped forming another important part of the theoretical framework. In this part, Philp's typology introduces four social relation types in order to show how corruption comes into existence through these relations. They are: (i) Communal Relations, (ii) Market-Based Relations, (iii) Patron-Client Relations and (iiii) Political Relations. These relations are used in this research so as to better explain the motives behind a corrupt behavior while examining how and why that corrupt behavior arises. While Heidenheimer's typology deals with definitions of corruption to highlight motives behind a corrupt action, Philp's typology rather deals with explaining how those motives actually influence one's own decision making and action taking process through the theory of ethical relativism.

In practice, though, corruption exists under the concept of inequality in various ways. Therefore, this research eventually argues that corruption breeds inequality and subsequently leads more corruption. In that sense, government would lose its meaning (defined unofficially in the social contract it has with its citizens) as a legitimate entity and institutions due to utter neglect of public's needs and demands. Consequently, this

creates a feeling of estrangement among society. Lack of legitimacy of the states also leads to a sense of disconnectedness within people hence the frustration which results in unrest. Although, the theoretical framework for this research consists of several parts that explain the concept of corruption in a more behavioral way at first, in order to highlight and exemplify how it took form in practice, this research takes the cases of Tunisia and Egypt between the years of 2003 and 2011. The reason why Egypt and Tunisia are selected as country cases between the respective years is that to show how corruption causes inequality through the Arab Spring.

Building the theoretical framework around aforementioned typologies and theories, the empirical part emphasizes how corruption actually took place in Tunisia and Egypt between 2003 and 2011. The empirical part touches upon three main points for both countries which are: (i) Main Economic Reasons, (ii) Political Oppression, Freedom and Corruption and (iii) Global Competitiveness and General Development. Under the first point, the discussion is about how poor the social and economic conditions were due to rampant corruption and inequalities for both countries. In addition to this, in respective countries, neoliberal market values and opening to global market and liberalization process also rapidly led both governments to a disaster due to the corruption-driven political systems that were not able to carry such big reforms, hence the massive uprisings. The second point is more directed to social side of that erroneous agenda because it deals with how both governments performed in selected years in terms of providing better conditions for their people in line with considering people's demands. Under the last main part, Global Competitiveness and general Development, there are four different subparts which are: (i) Rule of Law, (ii) Stability of Institutions, (iii) Level of Socioeconomic Development and (iiii) Market Economy and Resource Efficiency. The data of these indicators are drawn from Bertelsmann Transformation Index's country reports for the respective countries. These indicators are deemed important as the government efficiency in terms of addressing the needs of people is questioned through the research. The World Bank data is largely used in order to provide a better insight on both Tunisian and Egyptian governments' efficiency. Similarly, the three main points used in Tunisian case are also provided in the Egyptian case, but with an addition of a subpart that is about the food crises happened in 1977 and 2008 in order to show how government efficiency was quite inadequate prior to Arab Spring.

While the Mo Ibrahim Index is only used to provide governance scores for respective countries between selected years, the Transparency International Anti-Corruption Glossary and Corruption Perception Index contributes this research with detailed definitions and statistical data about corruption. The Human Development Index (HDI) provided by the OECD and the Freedom House are some of the other significant data sets used in this research as well in order to show the importance of the influence of corruption and inequality on Tunisian and Egyptian people. While HDI data is used to highlight how the general development progressed in terms of socio-economic conditions; Freedom House scores emphasizes how freedom of people was affected under corrupt regimes of Egypt and Tunisia between 2003 and 2011 which eventually plays a key role in creation of discontent among people and disconnectedness between people and the respective governments.

## **1. Defining Corruption: The Theoretical Framework**

The concept of corruption has been one of the popular study topics for scholars for the last two decades. This study interest has grown simply because a relatively common perception among scholars has been established. Such common view concludes that the concept of corruption has been and is still degrading important aspects of human life. To briefly touch upon those aspects: socioeconomic life, overall prosperity, justice system, overall trust in institutions, state legitimacy and political stability can be given as some of them. Taking all of these into consideration, the concept of corruption still has one big internal and paradoxical problem which is the definition and perception of it. Although such scholars as Joseph Nye, Susan Rose Ackerman, Edward Banfield, Mark Philp and many more, have conducted intensive studies on the respective issue in various ways and came up with similar descriptions, there is still not one clear and textbook definition of corruption. Jorgensen Farrales (2005) argues that “[I]n fact, the most enduring aspect of the literature has been the continued difficulty in defining and conceptualizing corruption.” This ongoing problem of the definition of corruption is causing the internal part of the problem itself. In other words, the fact that there is not a universal definition, makes it harder for people to understand it at first. Subsequently they develop different perceptions towards the concept.

At this point, one’s state of mind and sociopolitical environment is one of the most essential factors and catalysts to conduct corrupt behavior. Then comes the paradoxical part of the problem which causes a loop as a result. Put differently, although corruption is seen as one of the major drawbacks by majority of people in the world, not everywhere has it negative connotations. This is derived from one’s ethical perception and normalization of corruption. When it is included in daily life, it moves like an epidemic and so it becomes the system itself and can no longer be perceived as foul or simply bad. Aftermath of the normalization process often shows that there is at least one side who benefits from it and I think it is fair to say that benefiteres, more often than not, are the ones who are given the public trust in the first place. That is why corruption does and will continue to exist in under any kind of regime and form of government at any given time. For instance, Gardiner (1970) asserts that the very concept of corruption is ineffaceable because men would eventually likely to compete for valuable but scarce commodities and are likely to take opportunities through corrupt ways to win the respective competition.

In a way this bears a slight resemblance to what Hobbes feared in his portrayal of the state of nature because it shows that being able to violate others' rights is possible under such competition which then requires men to survive by any means necessary. Furthermore, Edward Banfield (1975) who argues that human beings are innately opportunistic, when given the institutional, administrative or authoritative power, they are highly likely to be corrupt. However, on defining what corruption is, Joseph Nye's definition is one of the most cited definitions that also helped other scholars to shape their definitions on the subject. Joseph Nye gives his definition as following: "... [b]ehavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence." (Nye, 1967). This definition by Nye has set the base for the definition I developed in this research as well. This survey suggests that abuse or misuse of authorized power for personal interest and private gains is an act of corruption as it victimizes and damages the public in return. Nevertheless, this general understanding is valid on the definition but not on the perception of corruption as Philp (1997) suggests that "... [p]revention and prosecution of corruption is profoundly influenced not simply by how corruption is defined but, more deeply, by how we are to understand the character of politics." In other words, those who are involved in corrupt activities are abusing public both *de facto* by collecting private gains from public resources and adoptively by misusing the initial trust given to them by people. As a result both material and moral public resources are used and eventually nullified for private interests by those actors.

Lastly, according to the definition of Transparency International (TI), "[C]orruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain." (Transparency International, 2017). The keyword in this definition is "entrusted" because, that simply brings the institutional view point of the corrupt acts. To be precise, corruption is not a phenomenon that can be perceived as taking one person in front of another one in a queue or simply stealing money by using title etc. In fact, although these are still types of corruption, they compose a very small portion of it. Unfortunately it is much more complicated in today's world. The institutions on a scale which starts from hospitals to ministries, from army to universities, are where the actual corruption takes place. It could be said in a manner that state is the aggregate environment for corruption to happen the

most frequent because all of those small institutions are either linked or components of the state in a more institutionalized sense. Public trust plays a key role at this point of the argument since it is the actual concept that is being violated which also paves the way for corrupt acts in an ethical sense rather than actual. Further, in the actual sense, the word “entrusted” simply adds the concept of state legitimacy into the equation because state legitimacy gets damaged by the corruption as well. Therefore, there is a correlation (but not necessarily a causation) between the concepts of corruption and state legitimacy.

In this research, the focal point will be political corruption and grand corruption. However, it is a must that grand corruption should be defined first to better understand political corruption. According to Transparency International Anti-Corruption Glossary, grand corruption is “[t]he abuse of high-level power that benefits the few at the expense of the many, and causes serious and widespread harm to individuals and society.”, while political corruption is “[m]anipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth.” (Transparency International, 2017). In order to show the difference and the connection, and also not to make petty corruption seem unimportant; petty corruption is “[e]veryday abuse of entrusted power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies.” (Transparency International, 2017). Table 1 sums up the corruption types and their definitions given by TI.

**Table 1: Transparency International’s Definitions of Corruption**

<b>Corruption Types</b>	<b>Definitions (TI)</b>
<b>Petty Corruption</b>	Everyday abuse of entrusted power by public officials who usually provide easier access to citizens.
<b>Grand Corruption</b>	Abuse of high-level power that benefits the few at the expense of the many.
<b>Political Corruption</b>	Manipulation of policies, institutions and rules in allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers.

Source: Transparency International

In light of these definitions, I believe it is important to go back to Mark Philp's (1997) definition briefly touch upon the theoretical framework at this point. In parallel to Philp's (1997) arguments, there is the paradoxical part of the definition problem for the concept of corruption. George Klosko's (1987) introduces the concept of political obligation and fair play. According to principle of fairness and public goods connection, the key component is cooperation among people who belong to a specific community or society. Theoretically, cooperation among people creates some sort of a common trust fund located in a totally neutral zone in which there does not exist any superior authoritative power or agent for checks and balances of decisions made, meaning that there is no one in charge of what people's decisions should be based on. Decision making process is happening in the minds of individuals. However, since the cooperation is key, Klosko also introduces the concept of sacrifice as some sort of an insurance and/or a tool to justify and legitimize the act of doing one's fair share. In other words, public goods are supposed to be for public only but one should consider how much he or she is willing to sacrifice and subsequently should know that he or she will receive as much as he or she sacrifices. One of the major criticisms for this kind of a system is naturally the free rider problem and checks and balances on whether or not one is equally getting back what he or she gave. Yet, by the nature of this research, I will be focusing on the checks and balances and, the equality and fairness part simply because corruption which happens in that part damages the whole notion of common good and sacrifice exchange - "take equally as you give" - system more. Correspondingly, Klosko (1987) argues that: "[p]ublic goods are characterized by two main features: (a) they can be provided only by large numbers of people working in concert; (b) they cannot be enjoyed by particular individuals without being made available to a much wider group of people, frequently to all members of the community." He then adds, "[t]he connections between the principle of fairness and public goods lie in the need for cooperation, which is expressed in *a*, while the need for the principle of fairness grows out of *b*." (Klosko, 1987). Thus, if individuals play along by the rules there is only one simple task for them which is to trust the process and in others that they would also do the same; as a result there is a mutual and beneficial system that public goods are distributed equally. The word "entrusted" in TI's definition is important because there is a link between this political obligation and fairness principle theory and the concept of mutual trust. According to Klosko, (1987) trust creates a

common sentiment of belonging to the community among people. Therefore, mutual trust sweep the competition between people. In other words, if one sacrifices more or the most and naturally receives more or the most in return; others' sacrifices would not matter (or would lose its initial value as a contribution) because there would not be much resources left that is equal to their sacrifice to receive in the end. Though, according to Klosko, this notion of 'sacrificing more so as to receive more' is intrinsically against the principle of cooperation and mutual trust in the first place because people should not think in such a selfish or a greedy manner about the public good so everyone can benefit from it; that is the ultimate cooperation: mutual trust and respect. As Rawls (1971) also asserts: "[w]e are not to gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair share." Thus, it starts with the sacrifice rather than receiving a sum from a *deja* readymade public good. Nevertheless, while this theory could be one solution, perhaps it should have been applied from point zero and top-down; today's capitalist world lays obstacles on the path of this system thus it does not function in practice on aggregate levels almost at all. At this point, this research argues that when corruption exists or happens more, in (mostly unequal) societies since abuse of public goods often creates (at least a sense of) inequality, it affects the state legitimacy negatively. Consequently, when state legitimacy declines, there is a visible tendency for states to experience either revolutions, quasi revolutions (such as political protests nationwide) or civil war. In this sense, the existence of corruption plays a significant role on increasing inequality as a sentiment. In other words, in states where citizens feel living under unequal conditions, corruption would trigger a potential political alienation thus, people would not feel obligated to obey laws and/or follow regulations that are set by the state. Subsequently, corruption intensifies the feeling of inequality and exclusiveness which undermines the power of legitimacy held by state. Lastly, an undermined and damaged legitimacy would lose its meaning and its use on citizens which causes a tension that turns into a tendency to revolt against the state apparatus and the existing status quo.

### **1.1.The Problem of Conceptualization**

Although this research's theoretical framework includes bits from multiple scholarly work such as ethical relativism, Hobbesian state of nature, Klosko's political obligation and fair play principle, Aristotelean virtue ethics, I believe it is fair to begin with the major debate of definition of the corruption because the definition of the concept

is the main reason that causes the emergence of many different and various views and attempts to understand what it really is. Jorgensen Farrales (2005) argues that putting such a large conceptual and controversial phenomenon in a clearly defined frame is impossible when says: “[I]t is Herculean in the sense that it requires an (impossibly) immense amount of knowledge of the different types of corruption that have existed throughout history. It is Sisyphean because our perceptions of corruption have evolved (and continue to evolve) over time, and what may be considered perfectly acceptable behavior today may be considered corrupt in the future.”

In other words, creating a universal and well-accepted understanding of the concept of corruption subsequently presupposes a Herculean effort which is too hard to put. In Ancient Greek mythology, Hercules was given twelve tasks of hard labor that required unthinkable amount of strength both physically and mentally. On the other hand, Sisyphean effort refers to useless and unending though not as hard efforts because the task given to him was never meant to be completed. Thus, Sisyphus could not complete his task and logically denoted it as it can never be completed. In a similar vein, although corruption has a label on it with negative connotations generally accepted around the globe, there is not a single clear definition nor accessible knowledge to do define it thus it would require a Sisyphean kind of effort. Additionally, the concept is ever-changing in terms of perceptions of it throughout the history. That is why it is not possible to put it in a frame that stays stable over time so there can be relatively and normatively well-accepted truth and understanding of it. Correspondingly, Gardiner (1970) states that:

“Corruption is a persistent and practically ubiquitous aspect of political society; it is unlikely that any reforms will ever eliminate it completely. Wherever, men compete for valuable but limited commodities, whether they are licenses to operate taxicabs, franchises to sell goods to the government, or freedom to operate a numbers game, there will be a temptation to secure these commodities through corrupt inducements if other efforts fail.”

Over the course of time, corruption has been exposed to some sort of a change in a conceptual sense. There are several reasons of this change but fundamentally, the major reason of that change stems from altered perceptions of individuals on the concept of corruption. Alongside this fundamental reason, naturally there are other important reasons

as well. Such reasons are; political culture, utilitarian understanding of material world, imperative passing over of basic citizenry rights (such as tax returns and etc.) due to slow or ill-functioned bureaucracy and many more. As it can be seen, the concept of corruption has been developing into something much more complex and specific based on where and under what circumstances it develops or occurs. Therefore, although there are similar definitions on what is corruption, those descriptions try to understand corruption by looking at how it does happen in practice in daily life rather than focusing on what it actually is first. “Fleck and Kuzmics (1985) argue that corruption as a phenomenon can be found in *all* societies that have reached a certain level of complexity.” (Farrales, 2005). Furthermore, in Ancient Greek and Rome, corruption was one of the major reasons, MacMullen (1988) and Wilson (1989) argues, for the decline of the respective empires. Subsequently, corruption studies as well have become complex and fractioned in itself. In fact, even today there are still two different and generally opposing ideas or views on corruption as a concept.

First is the normative view in which the concept of corruption is universally accepted as a vice. In other words, a moralist would argue that corruption undermines the normative side of societal well-being as well as damages economic growth and political stability of societies.

Second, in a counter argumentative tone, is the revisionist view under utilitarian understanding. For revisionists, corruption can and should be held upon a more objective way while discussing it how it should be defined. In addition to this, it can even be somewhat considered as a necessity in a way that it is inevitable anyway so why not using it to fasten some institutional deadlocks of bureaucracy. Nathaniel Leff (1964) in fact was one of the pioneers alongside with another famous revisionists Joseph Nye whose well-structured definition has been taken to be used in this research even though I do not share his revisionist views on the concept of corruption as a necessity. Nye published his scholarly works towards the end of 1960s, revisionist views has been challenged and criticized harshly not long after. In mid 1970s with authors such as Anne Krueger (1974) and Susan Rose-Ackerman (1978), functionalist view has arose and concluded that rent-seeking behavior is the motive behind corruption with a great negative effect on political and economic development of societies. In fact, Susan Rose-Ackerman has extended his remarkable study on corruption in late 1990s and turned her attention to economic growth

and development more specifically that eventually helped this research to touch upon economic factors, causes and determinants of corruption and to form a link between democratization process and corruption.

On the side of moral stand point about corruption, I am inclined to get closer to Rose-Ackerman's views on rent-seeking behavior rather than Nye's notion of corruption as a necessity and a mean to promote efficiency. However, in terms of definition, Nye's public office-centered approach still constitutes one of the most stable and well-applicable definition to real life. To go back to the origins of definitions it would be useful if one should mention Arnold Heidenheimer's (1970) typology as well. He has asserted that definitions of corruption are either *public-office-centered*, *market-centered* or *public-interest-centered*.

To begin with the public-office-centered definition, he argues that "[T]he main distinguishing characteristic of these definitions is that corruption involves the misuse of public or authority in exchange for some type of private gain." (Farrales, 2005). Put differently, the shaping characteristic in this definition is the abuse of public office. To strengthen this definition, it is important to extend the scale of the persons of interest on corrupter and corrupted line. Although by doing this, the definition gets bigger rather narrower and more deliberate. For instance, Gardiner and Lyman's (1978) definition states that: "...the exchange of money or material benefits in return for preferential treatment by a public agent."

Second definition is the market-centered one that argues corruption is an act that is driven completely by a utilitarian motive. Therefore, if one uses his or her authority or office then he or she sees the office as a business and subsequently he or she should seek to maximize the overall profit. Perhaps Jacob Van Klaveren's (1970) view on this definition sums up very clearly. "A corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the income of which he will... seek to maximize. The office then becomes a 'maximizing unit'. The size of his income depends...upon the market situation and his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the public's demand curve." However, one of the biggest criticisms about this definition is that it neglects the fact that there are non-monetary benefits. In other words, intangible benefits such as political support, prestige and etc. can also be gained from a corrupt act. Thus, it is not only about utility

maximizing in a sense that monetary gain but also non-monetary. Especially in today's world, corruption is often used for rather non-monetary utility maximizing purposes in politically and economically stable Western democracies. In another perspective, while Mark Philp (1997) asserts that market-centered definitions of corruption are useful because it may shed a light on corrupt behaviors in rent-seeking communities when it comes to establish some sort of an understanding of the concept of corruption yet he argues that it is not a way of defining it. Moreover, he disagrees with Van Klaveren's (1970) argument about market-centered definitions in terms of its definition criteria by simply saying that:

“[In Klaveren's system] the people are subject to the control of officials, where there exists a ‘regulating principle which gives to the officials and other intermediary groups a public existence with a purpose of their own.’ Thus, what defines an act as corrupt is not that it is income maximizing, but that it is income maximizing in a context where prior conceptions of public office and the principles for its conduct define it as such.” (Philp, 1997).

Yet, to be firm but fair, the market-centered definition is quite useful for describing rent-seeking activities that Rose-Ackerman has focused on. The reason why rent-seeking activities or societies are so essential is that corruption can be explained by those activities and motives. With the help of that, anti-corruption campaigns and movements could be improved. Thus, in a way, understanding rent-seeking activities and behavior is crucial to fight against corruption.

The third and last definition is public-interest-centered definition. To best introduce the idea, Heidenheimer uses a quotation from Friedrich (1966) and asserts that:

“The Pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power-holder who is charged with doing certain things, i.e., who is a responsible functionary or officeholder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions which favor whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests.” (Friedrich 1966: 74).

However, the biggest criticism directed to this definition is the question of ‘how do we define the public-interest?’ Moreover, can we measure the public interest? If yes,

according to which criterion should we do it? Isn't public interest something quite subjective? Nonetheless, one of the major reasons why public-interest-centered definitions are useful and favorited is that it's deliberate capture of difference between the types of corruption namely the individual and systemic. It may be said that "...whereas the market-centered definitions often emphasized the "how", "why" and maybe even "when" of corruption, public-interest-centered definitions seem to put extra emphasis on the "so what" of corruption." (Farrales, 2005). Thus, it deals with and focuses on the extent and degree of corruption which helps scholars and also us to distinguish which one (individual or systemic) is more detrimental to the common good and public interest. With this being said, at this point the definitions of corruption arguably should have some criterion that constitute the definitions' fundamentals. Put differently, questions such as "According to what do we decide an act is corrupt or not?" and "How to determine the abuse of public office precisely?" rise. In order to answer this question, scholars have adopted two different approaches. Table 2 shows Heidenheimer's typology for corruption definitions and their characteristics.

**Table 2: Heidenheimer's Typology for Corruption Definitions**

<b>Typology</b>	<b>Characteristics of the Definition</b>
<b>Public-Office-Centered</b>	Misuse of public office or authority in return for some type of private gain. Private gain could be either money or other material gains as well. Happens when entrusted political elite use their power to get personal benefits.
<b>Market-Centered</b>	Utilitarian motive behind. Public office is seen as a business. Therefore, maximizing the overall profit is the main aim. Neglects that there are non-monetary benefits such as political support, prestige etc.
<b>Public Interest-Centered</b>	Is about finding what public actually demand from governments. Corruption happens when those demands are used for political campaign purposes and not met at all in the end. Eventually, public sort of tricked into a game that they would not win so what is betrayed here is rather public trust at first. Then follows the private gain part of the equation.

First one is the public-opinion approach. According to this view, only factor that should determine what is corrupt and what is not in a society is the public opinion itself. Moreover, they also argue that norms too are effective on understanding corruption. “In support of their argument, they point out that what is considered corrupt in one society may not necessarily be considered corrupt may, because of changing norms, be considered corrupt at some point in the future. Therefore, public opinion is what determines corruption.” (Farrales, 2005).

The second view on the other hand is focusing on legalistic explanations. Thus, basically according to this approach, if a person got involved with corrupt activities yet has not broken any law, then whatever way he acted in cannot be considered as corrupt. “When officials have not broken any law, or when no law exists to regulate questionable conduct, then corruption has not occurred.” (Farrales, 2005). Although there is a clear distinction between these two approaches, scholars tend to pick both approaches when defining the concept of corruption because it is important to add the circumstances and conditions of an environment in which corruption occurs since it changes the norms, behaviors and eventually the perceptions on the respective concept.

As it has been mentioned above and defined with the help of Transparency International’s Anti-Corruption Glossary, there are three types of corruption. Although, some scholars still argue that political corruption is just a sub-type of grand corruption, I believe that it should not be considered as a different kind of grand corruption. Again, this creates a vicious circle about how to best define grand corruption, but political corruption distinguishes from grand corruption in several ways. However, for the sake of this research and the definition issue of the concept, it is fair to point out the most important difference between is the comprehensiveness of them. Put differently, grand corruption also covers corrupt acts that happen under political corruption by default because whereas the former touches upon the misuse or abuse of high-level power that severely damages society; the latter narrows down its scope to institutional level in which a decision making process in political realm has been affected by a corrupt act and eventually damages the allocation of resources. Hence, the abuse of position or power in both types stay as a similarity but the domain of corrupt acts beg to differ in the end since grand corruption is not only about abuse of political power. While grand corruption and political corruption are considered as on high-level, on the contrary, petty corruption

occurs comparatively on lower levels. According to Susan Rose-Ackerman (1997) "...while the primary motivation behind administrative/bureaucratic corruption is nearly always pecuniary gain, the motivation behind political corruption can either be pecuniary gain or the wish to remain in office." (Farrales, 2005). In other words, petty corruption simply happens on lower levels of institutions as well as happens on an individual level. Rather than politicians or high level state officials such as ministers or members of judiciary, it includes relatively lower level public officials (administrators, managers etc.) and mainly happens in any kind of ordinary place like schools, hospitals, police departments and so on between those officials and ordinary citizens. One of the most important and also dangerous characteristics of the petty corruption is that it happens almost everywhere and often includes cash exchange by hand hence it is hard to detect or track it. Jorgensen Farrales (2005) sums up that "[I]n grand corruption, the corrupt politician is usually cast as the agent, who is in turn answerable to the collective citizenry (the principal). In petty corruption, on the other hand, a corrupt bureaucrat is usually cast as the agent, and elected politicians are considered the principals." So to conclude, while petty corruption refers to such acts that is considered to be happening on lower levels of societies and/or institutions; grand corruption happens on a high level thus has more severe and aggregate (and most of the time negative) consequences. In a parallel vein, political corruption too happens on higher levels compared to petty corruption however, it is concentrated deliberately on (as it is self-explanatory) political institutions, political parties or including persons of interest such as political leaders, ministers etc. To simply generalize them under a broader framework; people who have political influence *de facto* and *de jure* might be said. One might as well add businessmen outside of political domain however that have enough power to buy political influence through lobbying for instance. Therefore, this research is bearing tendencies to take public-interest-centered definitions, since people themselves get to experience and face the negative consequences in a more severe way. The reason behind is that simply the betrayal to public trust by corrupt people. Although, I do not share the view that argues norms and values are universally accepted, it is true and visible that corruption has been recognized as a negative more than it has been seen as positive or normal phenomenon generally.

## **1.2. Deriving an Instrumental Definition: Philp's Typology**

At this point it is more essential to turn our attention towards definitions or perceptions of such norms and values rather than trying to define concepts by those norms. According to Joseph Nye's (1967) definition of bribery for instance, the concept refers to some sort of an action of using or giving rewards in lieu of perverted judgment and misuse of public trust by the person who is in charge of that respective institution/position. "In different western cultures, different understandings will exist as to when something meets these criteria: what counts as rewards, what sorts of influence are held to pervert judgement, what defines positions of trust, and how far other components of and individual's life are held to be constrained by the responsibilities associated with that trust." (Philp, 1997). Of course, today in our contemporary world we are living in a place in which post-materialistic values are highly influential on normative thinking and actions. Hence, norms are changing according to whatever values societies want to give more attention to and attach more meaning onto. This meaning attribution even comes before cultural values, traditions, customs etc., and shape the norms. For instance, "[I]t has been claimed that 'The (ancient) Greeks did not have a word for bribes because all gifts are bribes. All gifts are given by way of reciprocation for favours past or to come'." (Philp, 1997). Therefore, if there is no concept of bribery among people, how can one pervert another's judgement? The important point here is that the relativity of the context and the environment. In other words, the fact that if, not just corruption but any other concept is defined under some specific circumstances such as geography, living conditions, socio-economic situation, then when those circumstances change, definition becomes vague in several ways. First, there raises the question of whether that concept should be redefined. If yes, then what would be the new criterion to be used in order to redefine it? Second, due to changes, do sanctions still apply to people? Philp (1997) has an interesting argument on this view that this research too tends to emphasize. He simply advocates that since norms and values change and thus redefinition of concepts is necessary, public interest should be the key criteria of how to best perceive and name what is corrupt and what is not because public office and public interest are intertwined. "... [P]olitics is partly about the contestation and projection of conceptions of the public interest. ...Public office and public interest are, then, intimately connected. The open character of much public office is structured by principles and expectations that demand

office holders be guided by considerations of the public interest.” (Philp, 1997). Public interest therefore should be the focal point for public officials to understand what is on demand by people because public office is where public interest is represented in theory. Nevertheless, whenever the officials get involved with corrupt acts using their public office titles, powers or positions, it is impossible for public interest not to get damaged. Furthermore, Philp (1997) argues that for especially political corruption, there is a need for knowing or deciding what specific norms, moral standpoints and standards we have to embark on. In order to go into more depth of political corruption in a society, it is important to understand political culture and different relations under political rule in that respective society. However, as again Philp suggests:

“Once we have seen that problems in defining political corruption revolve around competing conceptions of the nature of politics we have to recognize that our earlier concern about falling prey to either Occidental arrogance or cultural relativism militates against agreement on the nature of politics in exactly the same way that it undercuts the ground for agreement on public office or public interest theories. We are left with the problem of knowing what norms or standards of politics we should accept.” (Philp, 1997).

It actually does not matter if we are looking from an angle that has adopted cultural relativist, subjectivist or universalist view towards how and what we perceive as political and moral standards in our own environments. That leads to an everlasting change of public interest. At this point, crucial aspect is understanding the specific political system in a society. In other words, if public office holders knew what sort of relations and interactions people are having with each other and the state, perhaps a general blueprint of the public interest could be drawn. For instance, communal relations are rather based on impromptu solidarity inter-family relations. “Exchange within such relationships is often heavily symbolic in character and freighted with issues of esteem, trust and status.” (Philp, 1997). Another one is market based relations in which market-centered-definitions overlap within. Such relations are mainly between firms and individuals who, *ceteris paribus*, seek profit maximization in those relations. “In a situation of pure market exchange, familial or other communal relations would be valued only so far as doing so maximized the individual’s advantage. Leadership has no place within such a system, since no collective action is sought, and prices achieve all desired coordination.” (Philp, 1997). On the other hand, when the system is based on patron-client relationships,

whereas state is highly inadequately centralized, institutional effectiveness also decrease. Thus, in these systems it is easier to see corruption due to "...a defective bureaucracy or a defective market." (Philp, 1997). Hierarchically, patron has easier access or even sometimes has the privilege to access to goods and services that is on demand by his/her clients.

One important point is here that these goods cannot be rendered by the state or the market itself because of defectiveness caused by incomplete centralization of the state. Therefore, clients pay for the goods and services simply by providing some other service that the patron wants or needs when requested. Naturally the exchange between the patron and the client is asymmetrical according to their possessed power and influence. Lastly, perhaps the most relevant and important type of relations that is intrinsically different than market and communal relations, namely the political relations. Even though it is substantially dissimilar, these relations bear resemblance to previous two. For instance, political relations, like communal relations, harbor a hierarchical order and an authority scheme within. "[U]nlike them, their legitimacy does not rely solely on tradition and solidaristic norms. The justification for political authority involves a broader claim for the legitimacy." (Philp, 1997). Table 3 gives deliberate definitions of social relation types.

**Table 3: Social Relation Types and Definitions**

<b>Social Relation Types</b>	<b>Definitions</b>
<b>Communal Relations</b>	Based on extemporary inter-family interactions in which trust, esteem and status hold great deal of value on exchange. Hierarchy within is strong.
<b>Market-based Relations</b>	Type of relations that one potentially enters to maximize one's profits. Exchanges often produce benefits and entire relationship is based on that maximization thus there is no commitment between parties. Hierarchy does not apply.
<b>Patron-Client Relations</b>	Patron is an intermediary provider for goods and services for its clients. Exchange is often completed when client provides labor. Hierarchy exists by default.
<b>Political Relations</b>	Concern decision, policy and rule making. Hierarchy is similar to Communal Rel. in terms of creating authority and order. Though the

	legitimacy is not based on traditions and norms. Unlike Market-based Rel. those in charge expect subjects to comply not because it is profit maximizing but they need recognition from them to stay.
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Source: Philp (1997) - *Defining Political Corruption*

In other words, to some extent political authority and legitimacy are essentially significant to society but they do not necessarily shape the societal or institutional structures. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that none of these relations are in competition with one another or try to come victorious on one another. These do exist in societies and communities in different proportions. The reason why they are mentioned at all is not because they can help to define concepts like corruption but rather to explain such concepts. These relation types show some patterns that individuals adopt and follow which can shape their normative thinking. To go more into specifics, political relations are playing a crucial role simply because such concepts like legitimacy, justification and authority are taken into consideration in accordance with public standards and demands. When people questions the political rule in communities (in terms of leadership) and the concept of public interest from a point of view that concerns whose interests are being looked out for, political argumentation becomes equipollence as legitimation and justification. However, these arguments naturally should be backed up "...with reference to the distinctive rights and responsibilities of the political body and of those subject to it or citizens of it." (Philp, 1997). Although these relation types are supposedly not in competition with each other, political relations however, is and perhaps ought to be different than others because people as citizens get to engage with political rule in a daily basis. The reason why is that, political rule ideally needs to be practical and sustainable therefore it is in some sort of a competition with others in these terms. In other words, what differentiates politics from other forms is that the public interest oriented approach makes the state more homogenous with regards to unity of citizens. Thus, in that case what public wants or demands simply becomes the solely important factor for states. On Hobbesian grounds for instance, this social unity discourse is processed under the concept of social contract. Hobbes (1985) describes this social unity through security and right to self-preservation as a mutual transfer of people's rights among themselves is important to create that unity. This social contract eventually results in the selection of a common ruler who theoretically would not misuse the power given for private gains. However,

Hobbes always makes his readers aware of the fact that human nature revolves around the desire for more power, there are always motives to break the social contract.

Today's contemporary political systems are not often built on such normative thinking that pays regard to dignity of political leaders. Therefore, those incentives to keep the contract are frequently ignored since more pragmatic understanding of government efficiency subrogated normative thinking. In this sense, for states to politically exist under legitimate and justified or just rules and regulations, norms that are developed or have already existed should overlap with political traditions, culture and practices. A potential impracticability there, between the norms and the actual political rule, harms the general development of social and political norms. Subsequently, norms become inevitably relative and subjective.

In light of these, societal relations and forms of exchange mentioned above are helpful to understand motives behind any kind of action but specifically the act of corruption in this case. For instance, where market based relations are the default social system within a society, the attempts to define public interest also shift towards to more utilitarian inclinations. Public officials tend to act in a manner that presupposes public office as a business with its only aim is to maximize profits regardless what public actually demands from the official, however market is providing 'some' goods and services under the name of common good thus the public is inclined to apply corrupt ways to get shortcuts (i.e. bureaucracy, health care, unemployment etc.). On the other hand, political relations are not alike as communal relations in which I would assume petty corruption occurs since communal relations are rather praising familial values and status quo over any other individual or group relationship within the society. Therefore, types of corruption such as small bribery, nepotism, favoritism etc. towards family members might be seen as normal as well. Nevertheless, political relations are about public interest. Maybe in contemporary world (especially in Western democracies), in practice it only seems like it is about public interest because market relations are (if not completely) constituting or shaping the most of the societal interactions and relations. This is exactly why the political rule and relations should exist and take the public interest as its only focal point. Because as it is stated in Klosko's principle of fair play and political obligation, cooperation and mutual trust are not commodities that can be simply traded or sold in return of power and influence or any other non-tangible benefits. These are

values and virtues rather than goods and services. Although Mark Philp divides the necessity of political rule into four different views, one specific view asserts that: "...one in which it provides a way of organizing the public powers so as to avoid conflict between those entrusted with public power and those subject to it" (Philp, 1997), reconstructs the very environment in which political corruption occurs. In other words, when it is assumed that there might be a power relation conflict between the power holder and the exposé (or those who are subject to that power and power holder), then follows the question of how does that power holder treat the ones who gave it to him/her in the first place? Is the power holder using the power for public's interests or own individual interests? Hobbes for instance, addresses those questions by introducing the ways of gaining power for the Sovereign. According to Hobbes (1985), if a sovereign arises to power by force it means that his/her people will show support because he/she will be feared. If, however, a sovereign is given the power by the subjects through proper ways (unanimous consent) then it means people are in fear of other people. The point in which I differ from Hobbes' and to some extent Philp's views however, is where I think a common consent could be formed without thinking that people fear each other. In other words, a common consent through well-established social trust could potentially curve out the fear among people therefore, sovereign would not theoretically be corrupted and there would be no need to discuss about misuse of public trust.

Even though answers to these questions can be and also are considered subjective, a normative stance can be taken while answering them; simply because doing so is not necessarily politically incorrect. The reason is that if the political rule itself requires or orders conflict between interests among people, then acting corrupt is not so abnormal since the normative understanding of public interest would have been already undermined and lost as a concept. Put differently, if a system or a political rule is corrupt from the beginning then normativity of labeling corruption as a foul action would not apply to people. Therefore, conflict of interests between the political rule itself and the ruled, would lead to a civil disobedience among people. As it was addressed in *Leviathan*, the Hobbesian war of all against all is indeed not so unimaginable if we consider a potential conflict of interests existed because political authority might be acquired/practiced violently or because power holders' political performance in the office simply may not give efficient results or be competent enough.

As a result, these will damage the political rule itself in terms of securing a conflict resolving elements and safe and stable territory for its people. Hence, the political authority contradicts with its intrinsic and default designation which is to avoid from the Hobbesian premise of a war of all against all. "... [P]olitical corruption is distinctive as a form of dereliction: if political authority is desirable because it orders fundamental conflicts between interests, the suborning of that authority to serve one particular set of interests covertly reinstates the domination which that authority is designed to avoid." (Philp, 1997). In other words, corruption is often rooted in depth of the systems and in order to carve it out, political systems should be established on strong and firm basis. Such basis rather ought to be ideological and developmental which in this case, again, is to take representing the public interest as a mission.

Conversely, although so far I have discussed that the concept of corruption or being corrupt is decided according to people's valuational and subjective judgements, thus it is rather on an individual level; political corruption has its detrimental consequences in both individual and aggregate levels. Such aggregate levels are namely the institutions that are subject to a state or the state itself, as the largest and biggest possible institution accepted is the state. For instance, "[F]or republicans, political corruption has less to do with individual rule infraction, and more to do with the systemic decay of the political culture." (Philp, 1997). Therefore, instead of focusing on individual levels, republican thought of social and political order is concentrating on systemic political corruption which also bears resemblance to Leviathan again in several ways. For instance, with regard to conflict of interests, Hobbes (1651) in his inestimable work Leviathan, asserts that: "...if any two men desire the same thing, which *nevertheless* they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies..." As a result of this conflict, a civil war outbreaks and for people to continue surviving this war there should be a forgoing of individual sovereignty to a common power, which he calls the Sovereign, who should emphasize the importance of political rule under the framework of laws and set of rules. Such laws and rules must operate in a way that enhances a general and overall security and peace within the community. Hence, Hobbes actually did not have much to discuss about political activity of individuals in general and when he did, he ascribed a rather negative meaning to it for which he sees it as a destabilizing factor. As a matter of fact, according to Hobbesian view, state or the formal order of the state is so important that

any kind of individual accomplishment, success or triumph would possibly trigger the civil war because individual political activity has everything to do with conflict of interests among people. In this sense, "...corruption is simply what people accuse each other of when they see them acting against their interests in some way..." (Philp, 1997). On the contrary, if a potential homogenous ideological state of nature would have been achieved, then there would be no need for conflict of interests nor a civil war; but rather there would be one common interest that is created by the will of people from the beginning and then given to a common enforcer of rules (the Sovereign) which has the ability to protect that interest alongside those who are subjects to it. In other words, linguistically, conceptually and of course naturally politics are relevant to political corruption and vice versa; yet merely the concept of corruption does not necessarily have to be pertinent to politics.

At this point, although individual triumph was feared by Hobbesian thinkers, Hobbesian sovereign state in which "...contractarian principle that the ultimate justification for sovereignty is its ability to allow us peaceably to pursue our interests..." (Philp, 1997), should concentrate on liberal understanding of how the distribution (and separation) of powers and constitutional order is established. In order to achieve this, we must return to public interest again and when there is one homogenous public interest in a sovereign state instead of many, logically it would be easier for a state to provide all kinds of security and basic needs as well.

Corruption as a broader concept in this system on the other hand, is located where the Sovereign stays. "The emphasis on constitutional order and the separation of powers is not concerned with tensions in the entire social body, but instead focuses on wits of ordering the structures of rule so that those entrusted with political power will act in the interests of those whom the state was founded to protect and will not usurp that power for their own ends..." (Philp, 1997). Thus, according to liberal thought as an alternative view to republican understanding, corruption is perceived as a foul action that is very diminishing to one's ethical standpoint and moral standards on misconduct in public office and abuse of political power for private gain. Whereas republican thought as it is mentioned before, sees corruption as less of a simple rule breaking or wrongdoing but instead more of a systemic virus spread into the political culture. Furthermore, as republican thought cannot make social order function without an operable political order;

corruption in social order means that political order is not functioning (otherwise corruption wouldn't exist) hence there would be a total collapse of the state legitimacy, political rule and order, constitutional grounds and etc., which leads the already existing nature of state to a state of war. In other words, while liberal view is more about individualistic values, republican view is concentrated on rather aggregate levels such as institutions or the state. However, although republican view of corruption as a cause of decline of the state is much more relevant to our modern day, I believe that these two different views exist together in contemporary world. While understanding corruption starts from the point where how individuals define and perceive it (liberal view), it grows to and occurs more on aggregate level which eventually leads to proportionately terrible consequences such as the decline of the state apparatus. Moreover, “[O]n Hobbesian and republican grounds it is possible to believe that an absolute sovereign or a dictator is necessary – but it is also possible for an essentially similar understanding of politics to generate much more moderate models of the state.” (Philp, 1997). In that sense, liberal view is much more preferable since the equivalent of the Hobbesian sovereign would be more or less a dictator in today's world.

With this being said, it is also important to understand that there are naturally different viewpoints on the concept of corruption and how it is perceived. Again, even though we would solve the definition problem, perception of the concept would inevitably be in constant change. Within the scope of understanding and perceiving political rule as in the case of republican or Hobbesian and liberal political and social order also differ from each other. Hence, this differentiation shapes other apprehensions of other concepts. In the following section I will briefly outline different ethical stances towards corruption through a survey of Joseph Waldman's (1974) argument.

### **1.3.Ethics and Corruption**

Waldman (1974) suggests four views that establish a link between ethical ideologies and the understanding of corruption. First one is a purely Kantian view in which he argues: “[C]orruption is always morally wrong since it denies the moral code.” (Waldman, 1974). The second is called '*antagonist perspective*' that has to do with general development of the country. He argues that if corruption affects the economic and political development negatively then it should be considered as morally wrong. Third

view he introduces is rather *revisionist*. “In some situations, corruption could have positive effects on the economic and political development of the country, and should then be considered as morally right actions.” (Waldman, 1974). Lastly, and he argues this one is as close to ethical relativism; the *pragmatist perspective* in which he asserts: “[C]orruption is seen as a way to participate in the development of the country that already enhances such social phenomenon.” (Waldman, 1974). Table 4 sums up the Waldman’s views on corruption by providing definitions.

**Table 4: Waldman’s Approaches on Morality via Corruption**

<b>Waldman’s Views (on Corruption)</b>	<b>Definitions</b>
<b>Antagonist Approach</b>	If an action’s consequences are negative non-relatively, then that is a bad action. In terms of corruption for instance, if it hinders economic and political development of a country then it is immoral.
<b>Revisionist Approach</b>	Holds that if corruption could somehow boosts the development in a given country regardless of the negative consequences it may bring, it is morally right to perform such actions or at least it is not immoral to do so.
<b>Pragmatist Approach</b>	Argues that any sort of pragmatic value brought by corruption cannot be seen as immoral because in the end there is a pragmatic gain for majority of people. These countries are particularly taking corruption as a system rather than a phenomenon of nature and try to use it to accelerate bureaucratic, political, economic processes that were very slow or non-existing in previous system.
<b>Kantian Approach</b>	Corruption is morally wrong no matter what the external factors because it denies the Kantian moral code.

While two people could agree on that they need a political rule, the way they see that specific rule could differ. Therefore, while what one might see as a resolution of conflict of interests, the other might see as corrupt. So as a result it is fair to say that it is relative and subjective. That is why when a state consults to take rather violent and cruel actions in order to preserve its sovereignty. It is likely to see that the interpretation of power holders on those actions are merely comprised of distrust. Such distrust is aimed at public interest. Herein, “...what distinguishes corruption from other forms of

destructive political behavior [such as incompetence] is that it works by eroding the distinction between private and public concerns and interests.” (Philp, 1997). Consequently, it has come to the question that asks how to best define and understand that distinction? Although Joseph Waldman’s views on corruption are rather focusing on the state or governmental side of the argument since it shows parallelism with economic and political development in countries, there is no or little argument on how he sees the individual moral judgment or decision making in this process. Waldman’s last viewpoint essentially gives the simple answer I tried to introduce in the beginning of this paragraph but does not help the argument to go further to explain the relation between morality of corruption or corrupt acts.

Cultural diversity has been emphasized more than ever in the past two centuries. This immense focus on the respective subject has also helped the development of ethnocentric understanding which is basically a prejudicious outlook that explicates our surroundings and reality via values, traditions and moral beliefs. For instance, in Ancient Greece, the Spartans believed that stealing was morally right. Elsewhere, Eskimos, due to rough living conditions and scarcity of natural resources (specifically food), allow their elderly to die by starvation when they reach to certain age; whereas in our modern day these two examples are perceived as morally wrong. “What is right in one culture may be wrong in another, what is good east of the river may be bad west of the same river, what is virtue in one nation may be seen as a vice in another, so it behooves us not to judge others but to be tolerant of diversity.” (Pojman & Fieser, 2012). Although there are big criticisms against this viewpoint that causes moral dilemmas, the main point this research wants to draw attention to is the inevitable change on conceptual understanding of normative perceptions on an individual level because I believe that with the help of this explanation it would be easier to explain and comprehend why corrupt behavior occurs and how it hinders the political stability and state legitimacy.

### **1.3.1. Objectivism vs. Relativism**

John Ladd (1973) introduces ethical relativism as a “...doctrine that the moral rightness and wrongness of actions vary from society to society and that there are no absolute universal moral standards binding on all men at all times.” What I find important in this definition of ethical relativism is that the part where moral standards cannot or do

not bind on all people at all times. The reason why it is important is that factually there is not any text-book, universally well accepted and absolute moral standards guideline. Therefore, it is just not possible to admit that any action such as killing, stealing, eating human flesh, burying deaths with valuable possessions or cremating them, inbreeding etc. is ‘absolutely’ morally right or wrong. In fact, this is one of the intrinsic problems of normativity and ethical relativism because although by default it deals with right or wrong (two moral standpoints that are out there we can believe in), it reduces our notion of normative tolerance by doing so. As Pojman and Fieser (2012) state it is important to acknowledge what is right to someone or in some places could be wrong to others in other places. Thus, we have to be broad and tolerant. However, inherently dichotomous context of ethical relativism subsequently renders us helpless on being tolerant to so-called ‘what is wrong’ in other communities. Hence, at this juncture one’s moral beliefs rather than absolute facts that is said to be found in reality, becomes the key factor of all that people can perceive.

On the one hand ethical relativists argue in this manner, their counterparts (moral objectivists) on the other hand beg to differ. With its broadest meaning, moral objectivism refers to a view that there are universal and objective moral standards therefore it is not possible for moral objectivists to accept the fact that for example murder is considered normal in other societies and cultures. In that sense, it is fair to say that corruption is considered as a vice most of the places in the world so one might argue that corruption as a concept is actually an objective moral fact. However, in our present day there are countries that interiorized the concept of corruption and implicated it in their daily life and processes of institutional structures. As Philp (1997) suggests “[M]oderate corruption can only be functional if it does not encourage heavy corruption; but where it is tolerated it inevitably produces widespread corruption, and where it is systematically penalized it tends to limited corruption.” In other words, as one of the advantages of corruption to the corrupter is preventing the waste of time and possibly spending of resources, it can easily be seen as harmless if indeed the defined corrupt act is some sort of jumping in front of people in the queue or so to speak ‘pull some strings’ in order to land on a job or a title. For instance, “...societies in eastern Europe were, for the most part, very inefficient and deeply riven with corruption – necessarily so because people were often unable to meet targets and deliver services without systematically breaking the rules.” (Philp, 1997).

Nevertheless, what is important here is not which view is dominant or more accurate but rather is to understand why ethical relativism is actually relevant and to some extent more appropriate and viable compared to moral objectivism. Table 5 includes definitions of two viewpoints for corruption.

**Table 5: Two Main Viewpoints for Corruption**

<b>Viewpoints for Corruption</b>	<b>Definitions</b>
<b>Objectivism</b>	Argues that there are objective moral facts that can be known absolutely. Corruption can be seen as a vice in most parts of the world thus it is regarded as an objective moral fact. Morally speaking, Moral Absolutism as a sub-type of Objectivism is more suitable as corruption is seen as vice and thus as a bad action, cannot be justified in any context.
<b>Relativism</b>	Adversely, one's environment, social interactions, motives, moral codes, socio-economic status, class, race, nationality, religion, sexual preferences and etc. all should be taken into account to arrive a decision about "why" somebody actually gets involved with a corrupt/bad act.

### **1.3.2. Types of Relativism: Subjectivism and Conventionalism**

In order to dig deeper and explain, Pojman and Fieser (2012) introduce two types of ethical relativism. First is 'Subjective Ethical Relativism' or simply 'Subjectivism', a view that argues "[A]ll moral principles are justified by virtue of their acceptance by an individual agent him- or herself." (Pojman & Fieser, 2012). Put differently, whatever an individual thinks, decides or does without any external influence such as peer pressure, culture, family values; and whatever he or she infers that it is wrong or right to do so, could actually be either wrong or right because according to that person, moral principles are definitely changeable and accepted in a total individual sense. Thus, he or she can create his or her moral principles and act accordingly but rejects the morally objective facts if there are some.

On the other hand, second view which is 'Conventional Ethical Relativism' or 'Conventionalism' claims that "[A]ll moral principles are justified by virtue of their cultural acceptance." (Pojman & Fieser, 2012). According to this form of ethical

relativism, external factors are rather playing the determinant role. Conventionalism presupposes that cultural values, the way that we are raised by our families, unwritten rules among people in a society, religion and so on, shape the development of our moral principles. Hence, a conventionalist is also a conformist to some extent because what is important here is the larger group and the principles accepted by them. Though both subjectivism and conventionalism reject that there are no objective moral principles and rather hold a view that they are created by people. “Where they differ, though, is with the issue of whether they are inventions of individual agents themselves or of larger social groups.” (Pojman & Fieser, 2012). In order to better understand subjectivism to begin with, the most capturing or accurate plot would be that “[M]orality is in the eye of beholder.” (Pojman & Fieser, 2012). For instance, Ernest Hemingway (1932) in his book *Death in the Afternoon* wrote that morality or rather a morally good or bad; or right or wrong action is receiving those adjectives after the action is done and according to how the respective action makes us feel. According to his words, if people feel well after taking an action then this feeling justifies it as morally right. Conversely, if people feel bad afterwards then it makes them conclude that the action was morally wrong to perform. However, one of the biggest weaknesses of this view is that the impossibility of self-recrimination. Whatever people might think as morally right to do basically cannot be refutable or interposed within this view. Therefore, the main principle for ethical relativism which is ‘to be tolerant towards different views’ cannot be achieved or applied, because eventually the argument between two opposing views on respective subject would go into a deadlock since both sides intrinsically think that they are right.

On an individual thinking level, since there is no self-criticism on what one might do (correspondingly to what his or her moral standpoint is), if a person gets involved with corrupt actions for instance, yet does not necessarily feel bad afterwards, then the corruption is automatically justified by virtue of that person’s self-acceptance on the respective action. In contrast, conventionalism argues that instead of one person’s own moral judgements are the determinants of his or her moral principles, cultural norms and traditions are key factors that shape the establishment of one’s moral judgements because it is rather accepted by major groups and sometimes internationally and intercontinentally. Table 6 displays what types of Relativism are relevant to this survey alongside their definitions.

**Table 6: Types of Relativism**

<b>Types of Relativism</b>	<b>Definitions</b>
<b>Subjectivism</b>	Holds that all moral principles cannot vary due to external factors such as family, income, peer pressure, culture etc. Moral principles are understood in a total individual sense. Thus, all actions taken can be justified in theory. Only exception would be when one sees that the consequences of an action are bad and makes one feel bad afterwards. Understanding of common sense or collective action is rather low.
<b>Conventionalism</b>	All moral principles are shaped by the external factors particularly by the cultural acceptance. The way people live and with principles they live by is what determines their decision making process. Collective action is relatively higher than in Subjectivism but the concept of common sense and common good may or may not be better understood due to its nature of conformism. People follow generally accepted rules not because they think thoroughly first but because they are what the majority do, so they conform, follow and obey.

Conventionalism introduces two different theses within itself namely the ‘Diversity Thesis’ and ‘Dependency Thesis’. While the first one locates the diversity of cultures on its focal point and holds that “[W]hat is considered morally right and wrong varies from society to society, so there are no universal moral standards held by all societies”, the latter suggests that “[A]ll moral principles derive their validity from cultural acceptance.” (Pojman & Fieser, 2012). Herein the diversity thesis is valid because it’s rather focusing on societal level of acceptance and diversity of moral principles. The dependency thesis on the other hand, concentrates on cultural acceptance. One important point here is that the diversity thesis have parallels with the main idea that this research inclines to have which is one’s moral beliefs is completely individual and subjective thus what is considered as morally right or good could differ from person to person. Yet actually while the diversity thesis seems closer to what this survey argues, I believe that the dependency thesis is much more relevant in terms of real life applicability. In other words, advocates of the dependency thesis consider that the context is more important

than the content because it shapes and influences the beliefs about that content. “Morality does not exist in a vacuum; rather, what is considered morally right or wrong must be seen in a context...” (Pojman & Fieser, 2012). So in a sense each person in this world have their own realities that is dependent on their surroundings that are both visible (physical environment) and invisible (culture) therefore each of them has different sets of beliefs, different life experiences and perspectives that affect their perceptions. Moreover, conventionalism also supports the value of tolerance. For instance, let us imagine a value or concept that is considered morally wrong, say: *infanticide*. Now let us imagine that it is morally wrong in society A and vice versa in society B. Advocates of conventionalism argue that the members of society A and B mutually show respect and try to coexist with the fact that the other society (A or B) is doing something wrong. When this is achieved, tolerance comes in. Conventionalists do not argue that judging other cultures irrationally on the base of other (or our) specific cultural values and traditions are nothing but a disdain. Therefore, even though people might not like other cultural practices, they still should acknowledge them as others’ cultural practices and eventually respect it. However, from a relativistic point of view, the same argument can be used for both sides. “One cannot consistently assert that all morality is relative and then treat the principle of tolerance as an absolute principle.” (Pojman & Fieser, 2012). In this sense, conventionalism again leads to subjective moral judgements. Table 7 concludes the two theses of Conventionalism with their definitions.

**Table 7: Two Theses of Conventionalism**

<b>Theses of Conventionalism</b>	<b>Definitions</b>
<b>Diversity Thesis</b>	Diversity of cultures among societies in the world, creates diversity for moral principles as well. Universal moral standards do not exist.
<b>Dependency Thesis</b>	All moral principles are valid as long as they are culturally accepted. Therefore, culture is a major determinant on shaping moral principles.

#### **1.4.The Concept of Corruption through the Lens of Ethical Relativism**

Herein, the question is: Where does all this leave us in terms of understanding corruption as a concept and in a context? The simple answer or explanation would be to say that

corruption could be understood or rather perceived as morally good in some cultures while it is a vice in others. Although such statement is not wrong, there is a general negative connotation attached on the concept of corruption throughout the world. Though this does not necessarily mean that it is universally accepted as a vice.

Forsyth's first point is implying *low relativism* and also *low idealism* and to some extent utilitarian rhetoric. "According to Forsyth (1980), individuals' choices of action should be consistent with moral rules, but pragmatism should let individual define some exceptions to such rules." (Dion, 2010). Forsyth calls this '*Exceptionism*'.

Second position is called '*Absolutism*' in which there is again *low relativism* but *high idealism* which eventually makes it Kantian. Waldman's first point is bearing similarities to Absolutism in this sense. Forsyth (1980), in Absolutism, argues that individuals' choices of action should be in harmony with moral rules since those actions when in line with moral codes would produce the best results for all relevant people most of the time.

The third point is '*Subjectivism*' which is also discussed in the previous sections, in which it involves *high relativism* and *low idealism* and to some extent philosophical egoism like we can see in Hobbes' Leviathan and Adam Smith's works in general. For Forsyth (1980), personal values of individuals should lead their moral decision making process. Thus, this view is inherently against the notion of universal moral principles brought by Kant. Although there is a thin line between the third and fourth points (*Situationism*), "[I]ndividuals should try to ensure that their choices of action actually produce the best possible effects for all people concerned, even if it is necessary to transgress some rules or moral norms." (Dion, 2010). This view harbors *high relativism* and *high idealism* although it is not the absolute idealism since it considers that violating some rules and norms is okay after all for a greater good. It also may be said that situationism includes high individualism alongside high idealism and relativism; which presupposes or rather argues that individuals should take actions that would not harm their society and its benefits. So as to gather all the views that Waldman and Forsyth introduce, Waldman's moralist perspective and Forsyth's view of absolutism show similarities with each other in a way that they are influenced by Kantian idea of the possibility of universally accepted ethical standards and norms. Although, there is a huge

debate among ethics scholars and philosophers on this issue, the concept of corruption may or may not belong to any of the existing views. Moreover, Waldman’s revisionist perspective and pragmatist view bears a slight resemblance to Forsyth’s exceptionism in the vein of their pragmatic understanding of morality and utilitarian rhetoric on corruption. Pragmatic understanding of morality means that choice of actions made by an individual should be within moral rules however, some exceptions can be made to those rules if there is a pragmatic benefit in a situation. Thus, it is also utilitarian in a sense since pragmatism and utilitarianism go hand in hand usually in terms of maximizing utility might be considered as a pragmatic action. Table 8 provides Forsyth’s views and their definitions.

**Table 8: Forsyth’s Four Views on Morality**

<b>Forsyth’s Views</b>	<b>Level of Relativism</b>	<b>Level of Idealism</b>	<b>Definitions</b>
<b>Exceptionism</b>	Low	Low	Holds that pragmatic value of a consequence of an action regardless of possible negativity, can give people the option to make an exception on some situations about their moral principles.
<b>Absolutism</b>	Low	High	Holds that moral codes should be in line with choices of action to get the best result for all others that are relevant. Similar to Kantian approach.
<b>Subjectivism</b>	High	Low	Individualism is high in terms of making moral decisions. One’s personal values and codes are the only determinants for creating or shaping moral principles. Against Kantian approach.
<b>Situationism</b>	High	High	Resembles to Exceptionism in a way that exceptions can be made in obeying moral principles and codes but this time if only there is

			a greater good available as a result of actions taken.
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Nevertheless, it is important to talk about Aristotle’s ‘Practical Wisdom’ at this point in order to show that pragmatic understanding of morality and virtues does not (necessarily) constitute moral dilemmas at all times. However, his explanations do not justify utilitarian and/or pragmatic understanding of morality. Rather he tries to explain that there is a way for people to make sense of the decision making process when it is harder than it is supposed to be. Aristotle argues: “... a man of practical wisdom [is] able to [be] deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself... about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general.” (Ross & Brown, 2009). Thus, it is a state of mind backed up with pure reason in which individuals think and make better decisions and differentiate the concepts of good and bad from each other. However, practical wisdom should not be thought as a mean to justify such ends that are beneficiary for some and yet simultaneously maleficent for others. Intrinsically, practical wisdom involves a reasonable state of mind as Aristotle argues which helps people, who hold it, to realize that any kind of benefit, interest or alike situation that is only good for one’s self is not actually practical wisdom since it denies the wisdom part of it. “Practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods.” (Ross & Brown, 2009). Moreover, according to Aristotle again, practical wisdom and political wisdom is chained to each other. The reason why is as he discusses that they both share the same state of mind (the one that sets reason as base) yet are adverse in terms of their essence. He draws a connection between the practical wisdom and legislative wisdom when says:

“Of the wisdom concerned with the city, the practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative wisdom, while that which is related to this as particulars to their universal is known by the general name ‘political wisdom’; this has to do with action and deliberation, for a decree is a thing to be carried out in the form of an individual act.” (Ross & Brown, 2009).

In other words, practical wisdom is the starting point of what is considered as being virtuous for Aristotle. Though, individuals need to be careful while making

decisions because political wisdom simply requires as much deliberation as practical wisdom does according to him. What is the connection between ‘making decisions’ and ‘being virtuous’? Simple answer is that the former can be used as a mean to become the latter as it is an end. Vice versa is possible too. Then what is the connection between ‘being virtuous’ and ‘being practically and politically wise’? The same answer above applies here as well but one might need to explain the ‘being virtuous’ part in deliberation. Aristotle, for instance, argues that if one holds reason, which is the starting point of acquiring practical wisdom, then one’s actions show difference. This suggests that one’s state is the virtue in the strict sense. “... as in the part of us which forms opinions there are two types, cleverness and practical wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter involves practical wisdom.” (Ross & Brown, 2009). The reason why Aristotle deems that practical wisdom and political wisdom as important is that they somehow push people through for better understanding of what is good and bad individually and simultaneously for others around us. These two are not just about being wise or sophisticated in terms of life experiences or something more specific. It is rather about how to make proper decisions without giving damage to others. Moreover, even more idealistically he argues that in order to acquire or reach such a state of mind, one must look up to correct reason in which involves practical wisdom. However, he also adds that: “[F]or it is not merely the state in accordance with correct reason, but the state that implies the presence of correct reason, that is virtue; and practical wisdom is correct reason about such matters.” (Ross & Brown, 2009). So, rather virtues involve reason according to him. At this point, it is important to understand and accept morality as a whole phenomenon. It is not some concept that has got shortcuts to what is desired in the beginning. Although, there is not much prevention for one to take those shortcuts. It cannot not allow someone to do wrong by its nature. Therefore, morality does not necessarily set a wired fence between the good action and the bad (in terms of moral or actual sanctions against the bad). As Ross and Brown (2009) argues that virtues involve reason, reason too involves such concepts as prudence, trust, honor and etc. Exceptions can be made but the consequences would eventually damage the moral system that one owns. If it does not, then that moral system is not (in Aristotelean sense) a good moral system thus not harbor virtues within.

On the other hand, Forsyth's exceptionism simply argues that we can make some exceptions in our moral rules and decision making process when the consequences are rewarding in the end, whereas Waldman's antagonist perspective argues that corruption should be considered as morally wrong simply because it has detrimental effects on state's political and economic development. At this juncture this survey inclines to mix Waldman's and Forsyth's views. Antagonist perspective is quite accurate what this research argues which is to say that corruption degrades a potential overall frontward development in terms of institution effectiveness and state legitimacy. While discussing this, Forsyth's subjectivism brings the information about what lies beneath involving corrupt actions. Subjectivism provides an individual autonomy which subsequently turns into letting personal values shape one's moral decisions. Since it is subjective, it becomes legitimate and reasonable to one's own mind and reasoning. Eventually everyone has some certain and hardly changeable moral principles and everyone tries to live by those. Contrarily to some extent, situationism brings a rather thoughtful and more co-operative or solidaristic understanding. This means that people should take other people into consideration when choosing an action and more specifically they should choose an action that will produce the best possible results for relevant people around. However, simultaneously I find this slightly contradictory to absolutism since situation-based moral judgements could be ensured in many different ways depending on the situation itself and personal values.

Dion (2010) argues that Forsyth's situationism and absolutism is lacking an alternative intermediary view, which I believe that view shows parallelism with Aristotelean virtue ethics. "The primacy of prudence in virtue ethics makes impossible to sustain an absolutist view of situations and choices." (Dion, 2010). Aristotle's virtue ethics is concentrated on the Golden Mean that appears as the missing part between Forsyth's two respective views. Golden Mean, according to Aristotle, refers to pursuing high morality. "The aim is to perform the right action, with the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, and in the right way." (Garofalo, Geuras, Lynch, & Lynch, 2001). Although it sounds quite excessively idealistic and probably almost impossible to achieve, it should act as an in-between step for absolutism and situationism in terms of having high idealism. Corruption in that sense becomes both absolutist and subjectivist. Absolutist because if it might be considered as morally wrong by all people then it would

be justified that Kantian view of universal ethics is valid and that corruption is going to be a vice forever. However, where I beg to differ is the point that Aristotle's rhetoric does not necessarily suggest that there is a need for well-accepted ethical standards to reach high morality. He argues that: "[I]t is not something that we can easily comprehend and then apply by logic alone. It is something that we must live spontaneously." (Garofalo, Geuras, Lynch, & Lynch, 2001). Therefore, it is rather about being good in one's self and has nothing to do with a universal ethical standards that people consult to when they are troubled and cannot decide what the right thing to do is.

Furthermore, Garofalo et al. argue that although conventional ethics and cultural relativism harbors different perceptions, corruption is one of the concepts that they consider as a universally accepted vice. Detached from Aristotle-influenced Kantian notion of universal norms, they point out to a very important issue which is the core virtues and human potential. This means that there is a set of core virtues which can explain why cultural practices differ from society to society. "Our position is that, although there are degrees of corruption, it fundamentally consists of any behavior or practice that is unjustifiably exclusionary and obstructionist. It is behavior that imposes unjustifiable limits on human dignity and integrity or opportunities for the fulfillment of human potential." (Garofalo, Geuras, Lynch, & Lynch, 2001). In other words, while this research argues that concepts such as corruption which are mostly considered as morally wrong or a vice, it is still happening due to subjectivist reasoning and perception of the concept itself by individuals. People may or may not be aware of the consequences or how detrimental it can be, corruption, in terms of Aristotelean understanding of righteousness and being good, is seen as an obstacle on the path to reach to a full human potential. Although Golden Mean principle in theory, shall provide some sort of a guidance so people can follow and find the right way, coming at an understanding of how to 'be' good rather than 'knowing' what is good; the 'perfect' amount or extent or timing are all relative again. For instance, Robert Putnam's (1993) discussion on social and institutional disconnectedness between south and north Italy in which the rise of Mafia is also mentioned because Italians see Mafia as an intermediary and more efficient organization until it too became corrupt and oppressive. "Italians do not reject trust as a virtue, but their historical experience erodes their capacity to trust, at least in terms of government. Trust remains a virtue but is considered and ideal that is difficult to attain

under their circumstances.” (Garofalo, Geuras, Lynch, & Lynch, 2001). In this sense, Klosko’s (1987) argument and Putnam’s (1993) argument about mutual trust, reciprocation and co-operation among citizens are somehow pointing out similar signifiers that would eventually eradicate corruption.

Moreover, Kohls and Buller (1994) who are known as harsh critics of conventional ethics, argue that: “[c]ultures may make ethical mistakes just like individuals, and those which condone slavery or torture, for example, need to be enlightened, not tolerated.” Thus, the main message here is that the importance and hierarchical order of the core values because vice usually appears when core virtues are (intentionally or not) exchanged or traded for rather secondary or non-essential ones. As vice and virtue, good and bad, right and wrong are natural adversaries, the conflict between them and the dilemma they create for individuals when it comes to normative decision making “depends on the centrality of values at stake, the degree of social consensus regarding the ethical issue, the decision-maker’s ability to influence the outcome, and the level of urgency surrounding the situation. [Therefore, people] must be careful that core values are not sacrificed to preserve more peripheral values.” (Kohls & Buller, 1994). In order to create a link between Klosko’s (1987) and Putnam’s (1993) arguments, social and/or mutual trust is one of the core values mentioned in Kohls and Buller’s (1994) scholarly work, or at least ideally it should be. Rothstein and Ulsaner (2005) assert that “[c]ities, regions, and countries with more trusting people are likely to have better working democratic institutions, to have more open economies, greater economic growth, and less crime and corruption.” (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). The reason why mutual and social trust is one of the key concepts (if not the key) to better understand corruption is that it mainly constitutes the reason lying underneath the corrupt behaviors.

### **1.5. Social Constitution of Corruption: Building Social Trust**

Up until this point in this research the concept of corruption is tried to be shown from rather an individualistic view and in a more behavioral way. In other words, the decision making process to take a corrupt action and the reason behind why one actually engage in such actions was the focal point. Mutual trust appears to be the answer for the individual view simply because it exists between one another so it concerns rather

bilateral social relations. However, this is not always the case. There are other entities and institutions which people inevitably interact with in daily basis. The workplaces, companies, government offices are some of them. All of these harbor some sort of hierarchy within them. Doubtlessly, the most important institution that citizens interact with (without having a say on whether they want to have that interaction or not) is the government itself. At this point, trust becomes something that citizens are enforced to have towards the government at least in the beginning. When the trust is against the government then usually corrupt behaviors take place. Of course another important aspect of this equation is that the rule of law and the legitimacy of the state because these two generate and provide a framework for citizens to act accordingly. Ideally the legitimacy of the state apparatus should be working effectively so to punish and apply sanctions to those who act against the rule of law. There is another link here between the rule of law and social trust. It is not necessarily a causation but it may be said that when social trust cease to exist among people and between people and states, the rule of law loses its meaning and applicability. In other words, some might get involved with corrupt acts just because they wish to do so but usually they are huffed against the system by the creator of the system which is governments in this case. The reason they are dissatisfied could vary but this research intends to focus on inequality as a reason. Rothstein and Ulsaner (2005) as well argue in parallel ways when say: “[W]e argue that social trust is caused by two different, yet interrelated types of equality, namely economic equality and equality of opportunity. This argument has important implications for public policy because universal social policies are more effective than selective ones in creating both types of equality and thereby social trust.” (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005).

In terms of economic equality and corruption, this research focuses mostly on income inequality while regarding the equality of opportunity the focal point is rather the distribution of resources within a society. The former is taken as a variable because income inequality is one of the strongest inducements as it may lead to poverty in a fast-paced world like ours driven by materialistic and market-based (thus capitalist) theories and perceptions. Therefore, it is not surprising to see some citizens take extra precautions and measures to secure their future by disregarding the boundaries, hierarchies and rules and regulations in which they live. Eventually, it damages and weakens state legitimacy and rule of law. Perhaps, for governments, it is the worst case scenario when society has

not been satisfied with what they hold because certainly governments without citizens are not governments at all by default. In fact, both sides need each other. That is when the social trust comes into play. However, this time it proceeds from citizens to state apparatus which means that governments need to come up with a system that provides relatively proportionate distribution of resources and income equality so citizens can put their trust in the system. Moreover, meritocracy should ideally be the cut stone of that system provided so as to have equality of opportunity among citizens. A common and shared fate among citizens either it's good or bad is important because public demand is easier to understand for governments only then. "Since social trust is a measure of how people evaluate the moral fabric in their society, there is little reason to believe that countries with low social trust will establish universal social programs precisely because such programs must be based on a general political understanding that the various groups in society share a common fate." (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). Therefore, Rothstein and Ulsaner (2005) argue that when countries that have high inequality and untrustworthy governments are less likely to establish and implement stable and effective social and political programs and policies.

In consideration of a potential existence for inequality and untrustworthy government, it is very understandable why corrupt behaviors and corruption find room to spread. In this kind of environment though the concept of shared fate is linked to the equality of opportunity. The lack of equality of opportunity in a given society usually means that some people of respective society are not given the same opportunities as the rest thus, as also George Klosko argues, they do not feel that they are treated fairly by the system. As a result of this, resenting segments of society tend to distance themselves. So shared fate at this juncture basically becomes a phenomenon that belongs only to group of people which makes it not shared anymore. In this cycle, one triggers the other endlessly. "People will place their trust only in their own group or class, and those with fewer resources will believe that they do not have the same opportunities as people with greater resources. People reason that the rich got that way by unfair advantage. Thus, people with less will demand radical redistribution from the rich to the poor and will seek to exclude those with greater resources from receiving benefits from the state or society." (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). The decisions made by dishonest governments in which there is high inequality prevails among people, social and economic policies get caught

on a trap of high inequality and instead lower the general trust, strengthen inter-group identification and raise the chances of permanent inconsistency and failure on redistribution of resources. In theory, in terms of redistribution of resources, people with greater resources are less in need of government benefits whereas poor people mainly get by upon such benefits. “Ironically, when you need to prove you are poor to get government benefits, the system creates resentment and distrust rather than empowerment and trust—and these very “means-tested’ policies fail to alleviate inequality and therefore fail to increase trust in fellow citizens.” (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). In a similar vein to what Rothstein and Ulsaner (2005) argue, income inequality and inequality of opportunity are standing as the first rings of this causal chain. Distribution of resources is the origin of this equation and when it is not done properly, the greater inequality means lesser social trust hence more corruption which leads to less inclusive social welfare programs.

Generalized trust both relies upon a substructure of economic and social equality so it can bestow a potential development of a more equal and egalitarian society. As income inequality or equality is rather covered under the topic of economic equality, social equality’s major concern is more likely to be equality of opportunity. In this sense, societal relations and connections within a society in which corruption exists due to great inequalities, might give good insights about how people actually interact with each other with regard to their way of living. In other words, one should simply consider enhancing equality of opportunity in order to create an egalitarian society at least proportionately. Robert Putnam’s (1993) idea of social disconnectedness is quite important at this point because that sort of disjunction is highly visible in societies with high levels of inequality. If we are to categorize people in these societies as rich and poor, then while rich are living a life with benefits that comes thanks to resources, poor are living a completely different life due to scarcity of the same resources. “The rich and the poor in a country with a highly unequal distribution of wealth such as Brazil may live next to each other, but their lives do not intersect.” (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). Thus, societies like this experience polarization from within. They tend to be exposed to both alienation and loss of trust for the governments due to inefficient social policies and services provided (or sometimes not even provided). Although, one should do better if one considers that creating well-accepted social policies and providing good social services is quite hard when it comes to explaining why some of the scarce resources should also go to the middle class.

Therefore, it is also hard to find complete support in a given society for such social welfare programs. With this being said, in relatively functional societies it may be talked about two types of trust relationship between and among people which are generalized trust and particularized trust. However, they become adversaries and the latter is likely to be higher in societies that has social stratification. A potential detachment from the concept of citizenship and lack of faith towards the notion of ‘state looks after us’ is what deviates people from the rule of law. In return, this damages the state legitimacy as it proves that the respective government is not capable of creating any. For instance, going back to Brazil example, “[t]heir children attend different schools, they use different health care services; and in many cases the poor can’t afford either of these services. The rich are protected by both the police and private guards, while the poor see those groups as their natural enemies. In such societies, neither the rich nor the poor have any sense of shared fate.” (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). The concept of shared fate becomes unmentionable when there is a distinctive class division in a society simply because the values as well as norms become changeable. In other words, people from different classes hold different values and adjust their norms according to those values over time. In parallel of what is discussed in this section, peripheral values and core values of different classes may clash with each other. A value or virtue that is considered as core in middle class for instance, can be considered as peripheral in upper class. As a result of this the way that people live is prejudged and even tagged as foul. Again as what Klosko (1987) argues, when there is the idea of ‘someone or some people “might” be getting more’, social distrust and untrustworthiness develop among people. “The assumption that others share your beliefs is counterintuitive, since strict class divisions make it unlikely that people actually have the same values as people in other classes.” (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). Hence this kind of thinking is extremely harmful because not only it prevents generalized trust to be developed but also changes the norms. People start to believe that actions that they would not take before, is not that bad to do so anymore. Virtue may become vice and also the other way around is possible. Moreover, linear to Klosko’s arguments, Jong-Sung You (2005) finds a link between fairness principle, generalized trust and corruption. “In a creative use of aggregate indices of income distribution, he shows that the skewness (fairness) of the distribution of income significantly lowers trust, while the dispersion of the distribution... does not significantly shape trust. How much

one earns is not critical for trust—but when the income distribution is highly unequal, social solidarity declines.” (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). Jong-Sung You (2005) also suggests that inequality is the starting point of this equation or rather vicious circle. He asserts that inequality is likely to foster a perception that accepts corrupt behaviors and eventually normalize them. In return, levels of corruption gets higher which augments the existent inequalities. Then this causal chain turns into a vicious circle in this sense.

Income inequality is the other variable next to inequality of opportunity. The latter includes rather more intangible values such as norms, perceptions and rights, the former’s focal point is income and distribution of resources in a fair manner. However, income inequality logically has more space to affect within a regime. Thus, spread of corruption is easier, less detectable and more influential. Income inequality deals directly with resources one holds or a group of people hold or going to have regularly. So the distribution of resources could be done in any domain. Nevertheless, as it is a cliché sentence already, the gap between rich and poor is widening on a daily basis. The greater the resources one holds the more the possibility for one to use it. Usually, it is used either influence person or persons directly or buy the influence/the influencer(s). Again usually, it is used most frequently in three domains. The first is politics in which it takes the shape of lobbying, donations, bribery and political contributions. Jong-Sung You (2005) calls this “grand political corruption” in parentheses. Moreover, in political domain these forms of corruption except bribery is considered acts that are normal to take under legal frameworks just because the rich have enough resources so they can actually conduct such acts. The donations, political contributions and lobbying activities are against the very nature of democratic, fair and free elections. It is also against the nature of law when the resources are used to bribe officials to influence law-implementing processes. This political corruption is rather called bureaucratic corruption. Lastly, there is also another corruption type which happens on the judiciary level by using resources to influence some members of it or at least the interpretations of them. This last one is called judicial corruption. According to these three sub-types of political corruption or corruption happens in political domain, all are rather wrong actions to perform if we consider them in a more ethical way. They are also wrong to do from the perspective of democracy in terms of free and fair elections, fair redistribution of income, enhanced equality of opportunity and so on. “In countries with authoritarian regimes, the rich and the powerful

can use or promote repression to advance their interests. In democratic countries, however, oppression as a substitute for corruption cannot be used, so the rich must rely on corruption more and more as inequality increases and redistributive pressures grow.” (Jong-Sung, 2005). In result, the polarization mentioned before, tends to increase because even if concepts such as race, nationality, language, ethnicity, religion and etc. would not stand as great obstacles in front of humanity, income inequality alone divides people into two camps anyways which are ‘rich’ and ‘poor’. Under such circumstances, I believe that it is hard to talk about such concepts as generalized trust, common good and fairness principle. Moreover, in authoritarian regimes incumbents’ aim is to stable the rent-seeking status quo and stay in charge as long as possible so they can reserve a bigger share of public and common goods for themselves. Therefore, under the framework of “fair elections” that is based on rent-seeking behavior, asking for people’s votes by providing promises is rather slower and less functional than buying the votes from people in return of tangible or intangible benefits. This “trade” between the power holders and citizens often happens including lower-income strata of societies due to scarcity of resources they hold. “... in a highly unequal society with elections, a large number of poor people are likely to sell their votes in exchange for money, gifts or favor, whereas the rich and the powerful will buy votes to maintain the status quo of inequality.” (Jong-Sung, 2005). Linearly, effects of unfair resource re/distribution are not to be felt only on the area of income related topics in real life. Perhaps it is even worse that those effects of income inequality are also visible on human behavior. In other words, the more rich and powerful stay in power the more inequality and corruption spreads. And the deeper it gets the more accepted it is thus more normalized among people. Political systems and regimes unlike human bodies do not have immune systems that eventually carve out the viruses. Political regimes rather have precautionary measures such as other institutions to fight against it or prevent it to happen in the beginning; but they are unable to fully eradicate corruption that is deeply rooted in the system. Therefore, eventually corruption becomes a part of the system, if not the system itself, because the existing corrupt status quo were there for too long so the concept of corruption is normalized. “If people are surrounded by corruption or perceive it to be the case, they may have to accept and even participate in corruption despite their values.” (Jong-Sung, 2005). Correspondingly, income inequality affects and changes perceptions about corruption and makes it acceptable

which people get accustomed to as a regular and normal behavior over time. In an environment like this, as rich and powerful take advantage and benefit from the corrupt system, they are also likely to put some resources aside for influencing people's perceptions about corruption. They tend to create a new perception about corruption by using their power and resources mostly on political level. Therefore, except the rich and powerful in respective society, the rest of the people are more likely to consider that political institutions are not to be trusted; that rules and regulations usually favor the rich; that justice is not going to be served on their behalf and that legitimacy does not exist and even if it exists it does not mean anything to them. "More people are likely to circumvent laws and regulations when they are considered illegitimate. Thus, people will more easily justify their corrupt activities as inequality increases." (Jong-Sung, 2005).

So to go back to Rothstein and Ulsaner's (2005) point about the potential liaison between honesty of governments and the extent of corruption, it is fair to say that dishonest governments are likely to be corrupt in a way that, not being corrupt is not an option due to people surrounding them. In other words, political leaders, members of the parliament or institutions like courts (judges), police forces, hospitals (doctors), universities (deans) who happen to get involved with corrupt activities tend to be loyal to each other. Thus, there rather exists a closed group of people who act in a corrupted manner. In this group, the relations dynamics are pretty similar to what Mark Philp (1997) asserts and pointed out in previous sections namely the patron-client relations. In parallel to Philp's views, Rothstein and Ulsaner also suggests that "[c]orrupt societies reflect patron-client relationships and corrupt leaders reward only those who show their loyalty rather than the entire society." (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). As a result of this, another type of political elite class comes into existence which can be named 'the corrupt elites'. Under these regimes with political elites are corrupt, there is a possible encouragement on citizens about involving into corrupt activities. In other words, if public vote for a politician or a group of politicians to be represented by them, and those politicians become corrupt in time, citizens look up to an example of corrupt politicians in almost every policy making process. As a result of this, while a corrupt elite gets to fill its pockets from resources that are open to public, citizens are likely to get taxed more in return. The more the taxation increases, the more the possibility of involving corrupt activities increases for public officials. "Corrupt governments have less money to spend on their own

projects, pushing down the salaries of public employees. In turn, these lower-level staffers will be more likely to extort funds from the public purse. Government employees in corrupt societies will thus spend more time lining their own pockets than serving the public.” (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). Correspondingly, public’s trust placed in political leaders in the beginning gets betrayed by the same leaders. In this context, the concept of generalized trust is rather unlikely to be achieved. Moreover, fewer resources lowers the chances for implementing social welfare programs. Yet, as incumbents want to keep this corrupt status quo, their intentions are not directed at social welfare programs to fight corruption anyways. Therefore, these social welfare programs should be implemented bottom-up rather than top-down. However, as inequality-corruption-inequality circle is never-ending, people with less resources as a result of corrupt leaders’ activities will not be easily persuaded to participate in these social welfare programs because they do not have as much resources as they did before. Plus even if it is done top-down, people would be regarding actions done by untrustworthy governments as dishonest naturally and approaching them with suspicion. “[P]eople will pay high taxes only if they believe that they get a reasonable value back in the form of services and benefits.” (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). So this survey tends to agree with what both Rothstein and Ulsaner and Jong-Sung You argue and asserts that inequality is causing corruption which in turn violates the concepts of public demand, public opinion and generalized trust and eventually causing even more inequality. Perhaps Larry Rother’s (1999) words summarize this vicious circle in a more precise manner on Latin America. He says:

“It’s a vicious cycle that is very hard to break. People don’t want to pay taxes because they say government doesn’t deliver services, but government institutions aren’t going to perform any better until they have resources, which they obtain when people pay their taxes.”

In this sense, people cannot establish trust with government who does not provide services thus, do not pay their taxes. It is often the case that when the corrupt elites have already extorted public funds, wage cuts and layoffs usually follows. This means that people are asked to pay some amount of money that does not exist or that they don’t hold and more importantly that was already taken from the public purse by corrupt ways. It is impossible to speak about generalized trust even among people in this kind of political regime let

alone between people and their dishonest government. Trust becomes more particularized and this paves the way for more stratified thus unstable society.

### **1.6. Conclusion**

In order to put clearly what are the several components of this theoretical framework and how it is related and linked to the concept of corruption, it can be said that they are: 1) The definition problem of corruption, 2) The perception problem of corruption, 3) Understanding corruption under ethical concerns, 4) Behavioral explanation of corrupt activities and rent-seeking behavior and lastly 5) Inequalities.

Defining such a broad concept is probably the very characteristic of corruption. As it is mentioned before, although this topic has been dwelt stressfully over the past decades, it still has not got a dictionary definition that is well-accepted throughout. It is only understandable that such a concept is too broad to put in any framework that could shift its semantic coding according to the context it goes in. However, instead of defining corruption, one could do better when turns his/her attention and focus to defining what is the public understanding of it and its consequences. This could also pave the way for better judgement on decision making and action taking steps and could prevent rent-seeking behavior to take place. Once the reassessment of the concept is done properly by looking at what it actually does to society, I believe corruption becomes more visible from that point on.

Perception problem on the other hand is much more complicated and complex than reevaluation of corruption. It is about how also others see corruption in their context and environments. The biggest problem of variable perceptions is that they are more often than not shaped by external factors such as social relations, family, socio-economic status, class divisions, ethnic conflicts, existing and non-existing resources and so on. Therefore, in different places of the world corruption can be seen as necessary evil. In parallel with this view, the theoretical framework argues that there are several ethical understandings to explain corruption and its consequences. In order to do this, theoretical framework tries to draw a line of arguments that put ethical relativism on the top and then break it into parts. These parts consist of different ethical considerations such as deontological normative approach and utilitarian revisionist approach first. Then the framework moves

towards the normative side of the argument with more emphasis on what actually motivates people when they engage with corrupt behavior.

Regardless of external factors mentioned above, this survey takes the notion of what Hobbes argues in *Leviathan* to provide a behavioral explanation for corrupt activities. Basically, individuals are only concerned of their own interests due to human nature desires more power. Potential conflicts of interests could lead a social war of all against all among people. However, this research takes stance on what happens when that conflict of interest is between the state itself and society as a whole. Theoretically, the argument is an individual (in this case a political figure) tends to put forward his/her own interests over majority's common interest for private gains due to selfish and interest-driven characteristics of human nature. When one person's interests for private gains outweigh the common interest, it brings frustration on people because people would eventually feel ignored by those who are supposed to represent the people. Klosko's fairness principle vanishes in this environment. Thus, lack of fairness and social cooperation brings more of itself upon itself. Then becoming corrupt might not be such a problem after all since an individual possibly operates in a way that his/her interests are covered and safe by all means. Jong-Sung You (2005) suggest that "...redistribution may turn vicious circles into virtuous circles. Democracy (or political equality) is not sufficient to curb corruption without economic equality, and democratization in highly unequal societies may even generate increased corruption in the short run."

Income inequality and inequality of opportunity as well are two major determinants of corruption. However, there is another variable that causes inequality which is social trust. Lack of social trust is likely to create inequality which in turn encourages and even force people to behave corrupt. Furthermore, since this causality is described as a vicious cycle, it may be fair to say that corruption tends to boost inequalities. Hence, society gets drawn into a social paradox or a trap. "This lack of trust concerns both "other people" and the government institutions that are needed to implement universal policies. Since social trust is an important intrinsic value (personal happiness, optimism about future) and also has political value (support for fair institutions, minority rights, tolerance, and so on) and economic value (its positive relation to individual earnings and aggregate economic growth), it may be that dysfunctional governmental institutions are the worst social ill of all." (Rothstein &

Ulsaner, 2005). Thus, countries that are known as poor and inegalitarian are often exposed to such a trap. They often find themselves in vacuum in which there are never-ending inequality, dishonesty and malfunctioned governmental institutions. As it was mentioned in here by Rothstein and Ulsaner, social trust is indeed an important intrinsic value. The reason why is because social trust is a concept that is needed within societies for them to coexist and cooperate stably and in a peaceful manner. In this sense, “[H]igh levels of inequality contribute to lower levels of trust, which lessen political and societal support for the state collect resources for launching and implementing universal social welfare programs in an uncorrupted and nondiscriminatory way.” (Rothstein & Ulsaner, 2005). So the gap between privileged and under-privileged rather grows bigger as government policies and measurements come up short to meet public’s demands. In this situation, what is mentioned before as an important component of the concept of corruption to better understand it, which is public-opinion-centered definitions (public demands) are going to be utterly neglected and even disregarded in some countries. Moreover, George Klosko’s arguments about political obligation and fairness principle among societies, are hinting that a common social trust fund is important to set sound and stable public demands that everyone can benefit from. In this way, hypothetically everyone would be trustworthy thus there would not be a situation in which people contemplate on acting corrupt since the system would ideally be fair to everyone in terms of resource allocation. Eventually, corrupt behavior would cease to exist since ethical relativism would be abandoned. In other words, individual interests would no longer be important because people would be acting according to fairness principle and based on a common trust fund in the first place.

What’s important here is that these decisions followed by actions are all utterly beneficial for majority of people. Therefore, that small portion of a respective society who do not feel satisfied due to government’s irresponsiveness for their demands could ideally openly state that there are other issues to be looked at which provides a newer way of understanding public demands. Governments should work non-stop to define those demands and try to bring policies into existence accordingly. The reason why defining and/or redefining public demands is important is that these definitions also help to regenerate some wrong perceptions on concepts like corruption for example. Knowing what people actually want from governments rather means collective actions and common sense than stratification and individualistic approaches to public goods and

services. Nevertheless, what happens in Tunisia and Egypt between 2003 and 2011, was the exact opposite of building social trust between respective governments and citizens. In Tunisia for example presidents Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali were main actors for what happened in Sidi Bouzid right before the massive protests took place whereas Hosni Mubarak's regime also was mainly guilty in Egypt. In other words, what was emphasized ethically up until this point were not present at all in both countries. Ethical concerns were abandoned for private interests and gains of these presidents. In Tunisia for example, crony capitalism and prebendalist understanding of governance and government became the cornerstones of both Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes. In Egypt, on the other hand, the regime was inclined to be established on socialist strategies during Gamal Abdel Nasser' regime. After Nasser era however, highly ineffective governments such as Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak brought frustration upon Egyptians both economically and politically. Although the following sections argue that neoliberal market strategies and liberalization process in Egypt and Tunisia were not suitable considering both countries' political and cultural history, it was not the main factor why both countries experienced such massive uprisings. They should be acknowledged as they had a fair share on triggering social movements (especially in Egypt), it was the very mindset of putting individualistic benefits in front of societies' demands. Thus, the following sections focus on how this ethical thinking of self-interest affected these countries both economically and politically.


## **2. Overview of Arab Spring and Tunisia**

It is no surprise that Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is very conducive to political instability. Due to its geopolitical location, political culture and rather autocratic tendencies, MENA countries are sadly remembered for their history of revolts, uprisings, overthrown regimes and military interventions. The latest and the biggest uprising regionally though is doubtlessly the Arab Spring, Arab Awakening, and Arab Uprisings or as some others prefer to call it, the Jasmine Revolution. Although Arab Spring got a lot of media coverage mainly for what happened in Egypt and in Libya particularly because clashes between masses and police forces in Tahrir Square were very violent and Gaddafi's rhetoric and actions forced UN and NATO to partake; it all started in a city called Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia. On 17<sup>th</sup> December 2010, a man named Mohamed Bouazizi who was a simple street vendor of fruits was doing his job until police confiscated his stall because it was illegal. Out of frustration, Bouazizi set himself on fire which he did not know would eventually ignite a much bigger blaze. Although it seemed that this was a small and unfortunate event back then due to poor political and socioeconomic conditions, this was far from a small discontent. In fact, it was a small discontent which made visible a much bigger one that people were having. Back then Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, al-Assad in Syria and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia were enjoying stable authoritarian regimes with extravagant nepotism and favoritism that caused high levels of corruption. Perhaps even more importantly, political and civil rights and in some places basic human rights were an issue hence the socioeconomic inequalities were very exhausting. Although it would be unfair to say that Tunisia is the most important country case because the origin of the uprisings was planted in Sidi Bouzid, the overall situation in Tunisia ought to be studied to understand how corruption played a major role in Tunisia's inevitable journey to Arab Spring.

Tunisia is one of the best examples in MENA region and also in Africa in general on economic stability, sound and accurate economic reforms, relatively better human development and rule of law. Compared to Egypt and Libya after the Arab Spring, Tunisia is achieving a lot today. Mo Ibrahim Index (2019) has ranked Tunisia 9<sup>th</sup> out of 54 African countries on overall governance in 2018. Figure 1 indicates the overall governance score of Tunisia between the years of 2008 and 2017. The categories and indicators taken for

respective data measurement are following: Safety and Rule of Law (including indicators such as Rule of Law, National Security, Personal Safety and Transparency and Accountability), Participation and Human Rights (including indicators such as Participation, Rights, Gender), Sustainable Economic Opportunity (Public Management, Business Environment, Infrastructure, Rural Sector) and Human Development (including indicators such as Welfare, Education and Health).

**Figure 1: Overall Governance Scores for Tunisia 2008-2017**



Source: Mo Ibrahim Index

Moreover, in order to go back in time a bit more than Mo Ibrahim Index (MII), Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) report written in (2003) also gives deliberate and detailed insights under various categories. However, to compare and contrast the respective indexes, this survey selects only some categories from BTI. They are following: Rule of Law, Stability of Institutions, Level of Socioeconomic Development, Resource Efficiency and Market Economy Development. BTI reports from the years of 2006 and 2008 are also available to present how the aforementioned categories in BTI

had changed over time. Although MII data indicates that Tunisia has been doing well since 2008 on overall governance, previous BTI reports suggests that the case was not like this at all prior to 2008.


The following sections consist of two parts. While ‘Main Economic Reasons’ part includes two BTI indicators which are: ‘Level of Socioeconomic Development’ and ‘Market Economy and Resource Efficiency’; ‘Main Political Reasons’ focuses more on the social influence of corruption. Under ‘Main Political Reasons’ there are three BTI indicators analyzed, namely: ‘Rule of Law’, ‘Stability of Democratic Institutions’ and ‘Political Oppression, Freedom and Corruption’. In Egyptian case too, the main two parts remain the same with same indicators used in Tunisian case. Though, an additional emphasis is made on ‘The Food Crises’ under the Main Economic Reasons in order to create a link between economic reasons and their political consequences by arguing that Egyptian government’s interest came before public’s interest and needs and eventually the government efficiency was far from achieved in terms of providing food for Egyptians. Ethically speaking, political leaders both individually and collectively made decisions based on their personal interests and for possible private gains which in turn resulted as even worse for citizens socially and economically. Neoliberal market values and liberalization agendas were not the main causes for rampant corruption experienced in respective countries. They were rather catalysts that accelerated a potential transition process towards uprisings. In this sense, Hobbes’ argument about ‘human desire for more power’ assists what is discussed in following sections through economic and political situations in Tunisia and Egypt. Therefore, this research intends to analyze these economic and political reasons through the normative discourse previously drawn under the theoretical part.

### **2.1.Main Economic Reasons**

Tunisian political history plays a key role on how Tunisian people should act in situations like these. “Its society has experienced a number of revolutions and sociopolitical protests during its modern history.” (Farooq, Bukhari, & Ahmed, 2017). Unions often were leading Tunisians to rightful protests. Organization of strikes and work stoppages were big parts of Tunisia’s political history. This was mainly due to the failure of neoliberal policies that were tried. Those uprisings and strikes were particularly caused

by a transition that almost every hybrid democracies had to have. Abandonment of centralist economic policies and agendas for neoliberal market model of the 1980s was the decision that changed Tunisia. “Tunisia’s socialist experiment achieved its desired goals of land redistribution and large-scale public investment in tourism and industrial infrastructure.” (Ben Salah, 1977). However, by 1970 President Habib Bourguiba rather sided with capital because he thought that bourgeoisie would be upset and turned against his regime if he goes with such policies any further. (Kaboub, 2013) Almost a life time advantage for Tunisia was that it was usually and particularly better at keeping the balance of the national and regional economic competitiveness. In early 1970s, Frezon (1972) suggested that Tunisia was a net oil exporter hence the *infitah* or the opening of its economy to the global market in such sectors as textile and light manufacturing was successful. Due to this big success, President Bourguiba had declared the 1970s as the country’s export-led growth decade. However, too much exportation brought rapid growth through oil and increased intermediate goods imports meaning that Tunisia was to suffer a high trade deficit. Figure 2 shows that there is sharp increase up to 3.14% of its GDP in 1974. Nevertheless, after 1974 the trade balance shows lots of ups and downs but staying below zero most of the time.

**Figure 2: Tunisia’s Trade Balance (% of GDP) 1985-2017**




Source: TheGlobalEconomy.com, The World Bank

So as a result Tunisia was in extreme debt. “Unable to meet their debt service obligations, Tunisia and Egypt, like many developing countries at the time, faced the bitter choice of defaulting on their debts or agreeing to very painful structural adjustment policies (SAPs) imposed by the World Bank and IMF.” (Kaboub, 2013). Figure 3 shows that although external debt of Tunisia hit its lowest in 1975 the trend is rather upwards (except in 1980)

meaning that a stronghold for Tunisian government which was its economic stability and sound economic reforms to keep it in that path was lost to export-led economic policies of neoliberal market economy. This eventually boosts more discontent among the people. Not only the bourgeois class but also lower-income families, tradesmen and artisans, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were hit by high inflation rates.

**Figure 3: Tunisia’s External Debt 1970-98**



Source: TheGlobalEconomy.com, The World Bank

When Zine El Abidine Ben Ali became the President of Tunisia, he did not replace the neoliberal policies embraced by Bourguiba although he inherited basically a wreck with 72.48% of external debt in 1989. Instead, Ben Ali followed Bourguiba’s footsteps. “The implementation of this neoliberal economic agenda by Ben Ali... was a deeply corrupt endeavor that enabled the inner circles of the regime to amass fortunes through privatization of SOEs, [state owned enterprises] exclusive/monopoly import licenses and mafia-style competitive advantage, backed by the state security apparatus and the political influence of the ruling party.” (Kaboub, 2013). Under these circumstances, it is only natural that Tunisian people often felt a sense of hopelessness while adversary voices were constantly muted violently. Moreover, probably the hardest hit that Tunisian

economy (alongside almost every economy in the world) took was that of the 2008 economic crisis. At this point, unions once again stepped in as well-established institutions and as warriors for laborers' and traders' economic and civil rights. Labor unions that showed some resistance however, were suppressed quickly with violence. "For historical and political reasons, [governments] kept a tight grip over the trade unions' leadership, but as the tensions between workers and their trade union representatives grew, several mass strikes took place leading to broad social movements for regime change." (Maher, 2011). Moreover, a significant element of authoritarian capacity is excessive control over the economy. This is crucial because discrete funding of a potential state security apparatus alongside rent supplies to those who can exchange his loyalty in return, entrenches future victories for selected officials. With the help of this, a sort of a smokescreen can be created in order to show that elections were free and fair, except they were not from the beginning. "This state control over economic resources limits the demands the state must make in extracting revenue from the public and enables the regime to reward loyalists, buy off potential challengers, and starve the opponents." (Way, 2008). Bellin (2004) and King (2007) also argue in a similar way as in political participation and interest in democracy was abandoned due to this discretionary control over the economy which eventually led to creation of a "rent-seeking urban bourgeoisie and landed elite..." as a result.

Where does the corruption take place? These statistics might just be numbers to some others. However, while Tunisian economy was far from getting better any time soon back then, the protests against Bourguiba actually paved the way for soon-to-come protests against Ben Ali because they all derived from the same problem which was unemployment brought by great socioeconomic inequalities. "In 1978, protests were organized by General Union of Tunisian Workers against the weakening financial crisis. In 1984, bread riots were begun because of high inflation rate. Few years after this, on the November 7, 1987 the then Prime Minister Zine el-Abidine Bin Ali declared President Habib Bourguiba mentally unfit to run the state as a result he became the President." (Farooq, Bukhari, & Ahmed, 2017). During Ben Ali's regime unemployment rate was rapidly growing alongside the numbers of frustrated youth. Although he declared Bourguiba as mentally unfit, Ben Ali too did not do much different. Furthermore, he did even worse perhaps. "In one Wikileaks document, a confidential assessment by the

United States Ambassador to Tunisia asserted that half of all commercial elites in the country were related to the Ben Ali family. Dissolving these patronage networks is fundamental to achieving good governance and establishing new partnerships with independent entrepreneurs.” (Popiden, 2012). In a corroborative manner, slogans like “Jobs for all”, “Down with the bribes and favouritism” and “Ben Ali get lost” echoed during the mass protests. (Abushouk, 2016). Then Ben Ali continued even further and in order to restrain utter youth rage directed at him he gave his word to them that “...he would create 300.000 jobs in the next 2 years, albeit ironically shortly thereafter issuing a decision to close down schools and universities and branding the protesters as “terrorists”.” (Abushouk, 2016). The African Development Bank (AfDB) states that “[B]etween 1980 and 2010, per capita income in the region [North Africa] averaged only 0.5 per cent per year. Unemployment has averaged about 12 per cent over the past two decades, the highest rate of any region in the world.” (Ogbonnaya, 2013). After this, the discontent had increased lightning-fast because mainly of the lack of legitimacy through false promises, excessive oppression and violence. “Sense of inequality and deprivation led them to revolt for democratic system.” (Kerson, 2011).

### **2.1.1. Level of Socioeconomic Development**

BTI reports from 2003, 2006, 2008 and 2010 often consulted to Human Development Index (HDI) scores to indicate the level of development in Tunisia. Table 10 shows the HDI scores of Tunisia between the years of 2003 and 2011. In 2003, the BTI report argued that Tunisia as a country was performing very well in terms of human development. “Social exclusion due to poverty, education or gender discrimination still exists; however, it continued to decrease over the evaluation period thanks to an increasing per-capita income, targeted governmental financial aid granted to underprivileged citizens, greater access to education for the lower class and the government’s active support for women.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003).

In 2006, although the development level stayed as “medium”, it has been reported that the Tunisian state is still far from providing even adequate levels of freedom of choice for all citizens. (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006). Again in 2008 BTI report, while Tunisian government were reportedly fighting fiercely against social exclusion due to gender, education or poverty, globally she was still far from ensuring freedom of choice for all

citizens. “Like many other countries in the MENA region, Tunisia fares relatively poorly in terms of the Human Poverty Index when compared to other medium developed countries, mainly due to its relatively high adult illiteracy rate (25.7%). Unemployment has hovered at high levels (officially around 14%) among young people, and increasingly among well-educated Tunisians.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008). While the illiteracy rate slightly decreased to 23.1% according to 2010 BTI report, unemployment maintained at around 14%. (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2010).

**Table 9: HDI Scores for Tunisia 2003-2011**

<b>Year</b>	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>Score</b>	0.682	0.689	0.695	0.701	0.707	0.710	0.716	0.718	0.719

Source: Human Development Index

As it can be seen on Table 9, the trend for Tunisia’s HDI scores tend to slowly increase. Between 2003 and 2007 the average increase is 0.005 whereas it is 0.0024 after 2007. Although the development did still exist, its pace was cut down by mainly 2008 global financial crisis but also by false economic policies and corrupt activities of the “presidential clan”. Table 10 sets forth Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores provided by Transparency International (TI).

**Table 10: CPI Scores for Tunisia 2003-2011**

<b>Year</b>	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>Score</b>	4.9	5.0	4.9	4.6	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.3	3.8
<b>Ranking</b>	39th	39th	43rd	51st	61st	62nd	65th	59th	73rd

Source: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index

In a corroborative manner, CPI rankings are getting lower (except 2010 ranking only). One interesting statistic is that Tunisia’s CPI score started to slightly decrease after 2005 but the country constantly dropped in rankings besides in 2010. So as a result it can be said that Tunisia’s human development between the respective years were worthy of note regionally, globally it was not enough as also BTI reports suggested. Domestically though, I believe the effects of this poor improvements and due to rampant corruption, socioeconomic development was eventually axed.


### **2.1.2. Market Economy and Resource Efficiency**

Tunisia was one of the exemplary countries not only in MENA region but also in entire Africa when it comes to market economy. “Nevertheless, in 2000 the country was ranked only 63<sup>rd</sup> in the “mostly free” category on the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, with a score of 2.9. Thus, the continued dense regulation and strong protectionist tendencies, including import licenses and quota setting, are still regrettable.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). Furthermore, BTI report from 2006 also reveals that Tunisia actually had not done any better or worse since 2003 as it stayed at the same spot namely 63<sup>rd</sup> with a score of 2.9. (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006). However, it is possible to find some relatively negative results on banking sector because of the lack of anti-monopoly policies. For instance, reforms in banking and finance sectors that deemed as “heavily regulated and undercapitalized” remained and the report adds that increasing number of powerful clans that are highly likely to create monopolies and even oligopolies is looming. (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). While 2006 report summed up that although previously mentioned possible monopolies and oligopolies tend to happen, it is still difficult to tell to what level those practices damage the whole economy. Nevertheless, in 2008 suggests serious dangers for Tunisia’s economy was facing and continue to face further. “The weakly developed Tunisian banking sector and capital market are more and more often cited as a hindrance to economic modernization. Among these weaknesses are the banks’ undercapitalization, the high level of non-performing loans as a share of bank assets as well as the high cost of credit for medium-and small-sized firms (around %11) and direct state interference (appointment of top rank bank executives by the president).” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008). As the reports suggested, political oppression and corruption, via presidential powers or security apparatus owned by the state, was rampant and damaging the economy in one way or another.

In terms of efficient use of resources Tunisian government was mainly able to use favorable macroeconomic conditions in order to help country’s economy to complete the transformation process it has been experiencing as smooth as possible according to 2003 BTI report. (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). However, the 2006 report begs to differ when asserted: “...government was able to attain most of its economic reform goals during the evaluation period and, in so doing, acted coherently. Yet, this evolution reflected an effective technocratic way of handling economic transformation more than a genuine

political coordination between conflicting interests.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006). In different terms which are rather more related to whether economic resources had been used efficiently or not; this survey used data provided by World Bank. To begin with, the Figure 4 shows Tunisia’s total reserves (including gold) in US\$ billion.


**Figure 1: Tunisia’s Total Reserves (US\$ billion)**



Source: World Bank


As it suggests that Tunisia’s total reserves had peaked in 2009. However, Figure 5 and Figure 6 seriatim displays the Tunisia’s merchandise exports in US\$ billion and fuel exports by percentage of merchandise exports. These figures also show that although total reserves hit the top in 2009, merchandise exports took a sharp decline in 2009 at around 5 billion US dollars (from 19.32 billion to 14.42 billion). Furthermore, Figure 6 suggests that fuel exports, an area in which Tunisia was led exporter in the MENA region once, gradually decreased. In 1981, Tunisia’s fuel export was 54.015% of its merchandise exports (2.5 billion US dollars) which means approximately more than 1.2 billion dollars are fuel exports income. Fast forward to 1987 when Ben Ali became the President of the country; total merchandise export is 2.1 billion whereas fuel exports is its 23.62% which approximately equals to less than 500 million dollars of fuel export income. Then, in 1997 this number was around still around 500 million dollars.

**Figure 2: Tunisia's Merchandise Exports (US\$ Billion)**



Source: World Bank

**Figure 3: Tunisia's Fuel Exports (% of Merchandise Exports)**




Source: World Bank

Moreover, Figure 7 and Figure 8 lastly indicates respectively that Tunisia's energy use (kg of oil per capita) and energy imports (% of energy use). These figures suggest that

starting country's use of energy (kg of oil per capita) increased between the years of 1995 and 2005. There was a slight decline of use of oil in 2005 which it dropped nearly 21 kilograms per capita, yet the increase in energy use continued until the year of 2009. Correspondingly, the percentage of energy imports too increased. An interesting note is that although the energy use per capita went down in 2005, the energy import percentage remained nearly the same compared to 2004 statistics. In 2004 the percentage was 19.59% while it was 19.641% in 2005. Furthermore, between 2003 and 2011, 2006 was the year for import percentage to peak with 24% of 858.3 kilos which means out of that 858.3 kg of oil use per capita, approximately 205 kg was imported.


**Figure 4: Tunisia's Energy Use (Kg of oil per capita)**



Source: World Bank

Although imported oil by kg per capita had faced a sharp decline in 2007 (app. 105 kg was imported), it increased to 182 kg in 2010 and 200 kg in 2011 again. What these fluctuations suggest is that an absence of constant efficient use of resources in Tunisia because overall picture of energy imports and energy use per capita indicates that averagely the country had imported nearly a bit more than 25% of its oil used per capita.

**Figure 5: Tunisia's Energy Imports (% of Energy Use)**



Source: World Bank

Table 11 displays the BTI Index scores of the indices discussed up to this point on the years of 2008 and 2010. Gradually though the scores do not seem to change much over two years however, as the reports and the World Bank Data helps this survey to deliberately show that a small decline of BTI Index scores in such a short time span actually mean rather bigger changes in real life in terms of socio-economic development, resource efficiency, rule of law and market economy development. Stability of institutions seems however, not changing due to absence of radical reforms on institutions.

**Table 11: BTI Index Scores for discussed indices (Tunisia)**

Indices	2008	2010
Rule of Law	3.5	3.8
Stability of Institutions	2	2
Level of Socioeconomic Dvp.	5	4
Resource Efficiency	6	5
Market Economy Dvp.	6.8	6.2

Source: Transformation Index BTI

As a result, all this numerical data provided points out one presumable result which is resource efficiency and market economy slightly declined over the selected years in Tunisia. However, this decline happened in an environment fueled with inequality due to poor economic strategies and corrupt behavior of officials in the first place. Moreover, while Tunisia was experiencing such a decline, it paved the way for more income inequality and unemployment. Thus, it was in a causal loop that Ben Ali's errors in different domains such as economic and social policies, and his rent-seeking behavior brought Tunisian people to the edge of the cliff in terms of living conditions. Educated youth was unable to find jobs, taxes were getting high, and resources were opened to international market to find rather short-term solutions for the external debt while Tunisian citizens still need a big portion of the resources to remain in the country. It is exactly the opposite what was discussed in the theoretical part namely the paying regard of public's demands.

## **2.2.Main Political Reasons**

### **2.2.1. Political Oppression, Freedom and Corruption**

Political oppression is one of the main characteristics of autocratic regimes. Since Ben Ali rose to power as the President in 1987, the word "discontent" was quite accurate to describe the atmosphere the country was in. Educated youth was unable to find jobs, there was political oppression against regime adversaries operated by state's security apparatus and there was even food shortages in rather lower-income and rural places of Tunisia. Main features of good governance which are allocation of jobs and redistribution of resources alongside tax reforms were key. Unfortunately, Ben Ali regime was not even close to creating welfare and employment. Ironically, his promise to create 300,000 jobs took a complete U-turn and government took actions including closing down some factories for private gains via clientelism. For instance, "Gafsa Phosphate Company led to strikes and six months of street fights, with security forces eventually laying siege to Gafsa." (Saleh, 2014). Mining was a major source for Tunisia's domestic economy as well as international but favoritism outweigh the mine workers' demands at that point. Mass dismissals happened in mining industry in Tunisia including Gafsa in return for personal favors.

This highly prebendalist agenda of Ben Ali regime continued on both big private enterprises and on NGOs. “To illustrate, in 2009, the winner and runner-up of a state auction for Tunisia’s third mobile phone license were both companies owned by husbands of Ben Ali’s daughters. In addition, the local dealerships of Fiat, Ford, Jaguar, Volkswagen, Audi, Seat, Land Rover, Hummer, Porsche and Mercedes were all owned by either the same two aforementioned relatives or by Leila Ben Ali’s brother.” (Noueihed & Warren, 2013). On an independent note, prebendalism, which means that elected officials rightfully think that they have a right to use public resources for their own supporters to further vote for them again, strongly prevailed on an aggregate level while it victimized the grass roots level in return. “In a July 2009 diplomatic cable, the U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia acknowledged that the rise in corruption of Ben Ali’s inner-circle stood in stark contrast to the growing inequities...” (2019). In parallel to what was discussed under the topic of familial relations and patron-client relations previously, Ben Ali’s highly corrupt network unsurprisingly include both types of relationships as both public and private resources were made benefits available. The familial relations basically became the whole statecraft with Ben Ali family running the most important income sources of the country as they wish; whereas the patron-client relationship was experienced by those who were desperate to be employed in return for pretty much anything. “Such organizations, such as Leila Ben Ali’s favored Bessma Society for the Handicapped, allowed the government to provide social services and favors in exchange for support of the regime. Tax evasion, bribe extortion and a network of patronage-granting NGOs created a widespread culture of clientelism and prebendalism.” (Srebernik, 2014). As a result of this agenda, public’s demand was high disregarded due to possible private gains for corrupt elite. Thus, this created a sense of disconnectedness between Tunisian people and the government in terms of government efficiency on looking after citizens as it was on a social contract. So, these politicians not only abused public office and trust, but also distorted the very meaning of the social contract for private gains.

Lack of state legitimacy was another major issue in Tunisia as well. While high favoritism were enjoyed by Ben Ali’s family, the promises made by Ben Ali before 1987 elections were far from kept. Usually countries that are in transition process to democracy a stable economy plays a crucial role. As a contingency plan though, free and fair

elections become institutional tools and mechanisms to retain/preserve democratic environment by giving voice to often oppressed citizens. However, in the Tunisian case politically corrupt elites did not meet public demands at all which shows that freedom is not credible under such circumstances. Table 12 shows Freedom House scores of Tunisia between 2003 and 2010, where 1 means the best thus “Free” and 7 marks the worst, meaning “Not Free”.

**Table 12: Freedom House scores for Tunisia 2003-2010**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Freedom Rating</b>	<b>Civil Liberties</b>	<b>Political Rights</b>
2003	5.5	5	6
2004	5.5	5	6
2005	5.5	5	6
2006	5.5	5	6
2007	5.5	5	6
2008	6	5	7
2009	6	5	7
2010	6	5	7

*Source: Freedom House (2019)*

As Table 12 displays, Tunisia during the selected years was not free, however, the slight increase to the worst score (7) under the domain “Political Rights” had affected the overall Freedom Rating with an increase of 0.5. So while Ben Ali and his family were spending big chunks of public resources for their own private gains, Tunisian citizens were utterly furious and frustrated because they all just wanted (or needed) an upgrade for their living conditions. For example, Ciezadlo (2011) and Bellemare (2011) spotted that food shortages (eventually food riots) took place in Tunisia at the end of 2010. “According to Bellemare, the second food crisis ... saw food prices increase by 40 per cent between January 2010 and February 2011, was most prominently associated with the so-called Arab Spring – a series of events which began with food riots in Algeria and in Tunisia in early January 2011.” (Ogbonnaya, 2013).

Another perspective on lack of legitimacy is that autocratic regimes’ practices are more likely to bring their dooms on to themselves. In other words, citizens are often affected by this lack of legitimacy since their demands are often not met, autocratic

regimes can easily damage themselves without knowing through their corrupt practices and oppression. Jack Goldstone (2011) argued that:

“Although such regimes often appear unshakable, they are actually highly vulnerable, because the very strategies they use to stay in power make them brittle, not resilient. It is no coincidence that although popular protests have shaken much of the Middle East, the only revolutions to succeed so far – those in Tunisia and Egypt – have been against modern sultans.”

Goldstone seems to be correct about his argument considering the turn the Arab Spring took in general. Lack of institutional mechanisms to prevent institutional errors to happen, favoritism and clientelism corroded the respective authoritarian regimes because they were structurally underdeveloped. Therefore, people did not think that their elected officials actually knew what the public was demanding from them and thus that they are capable of fulfilling those demands. In an environment like this, political dissent and lack of political obligation is inescapable.

### **2.2.2. Rule of Law**

According to the (2003) report for instance, it has been stated that there was some sort of an official independence for judicial branch yet that it was not protected from being influenced politically. “Judges are appointed by the President. The constitutional court cannot set or monitor any standards independently.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). BTI report of (2006) also had a similar rhetoric about rule of law when sets forth that some state powers actually were there although they were not able to have a role that enables them to control and ponder each other. In addition, report asserts that “[T]he president can rule in most legislative fields by decree.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006). Furthermore, it was written that judges are appointed by the President himself, hence they are quite exposed to political influence and pressure.(2006)

Under the political system changes, the 2006 report also adds:

“Opposition members of parliaments critical of this situation have faced varieties of intimidation and judicial harassment in recent years. The establishment of a second parliamentary chamber scheduled for summer 2005, which was introduced by constitutional amendment in 2002, may further neutralize the already weak lower house.

One-third of the members of this new upper house will be nominated by the president and elected indirectly by municipal councils and corporatist civil society organizations.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006).

As it was mentioned previously, these corporatist civil society organizations are either owned by the Ben Ali family or influenced and funded by them. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about some sort of a transparency and accountability. Although, the report (2006) also states that there were laws against corruption, “...according to countless reports in Western media, officeholders and individuals close to the ruling “presidential clan” can exploit their office for private gain free of legal prosecution. Practices of crony capitalism are said to be gaining ground. Yet, due to the absence of transparency, it is hard to determine the extent to which such practices permeate the economy as a whole.”

BTI report in (2008) too, did not change too much of its rhetoric compared to previous two reports. It has stated that the systematic changes in parliament which was introduced in 2002 actually affected only the ruling party and thus the “presidential clan” positively. Judiciary were still prone to political oppression and influence while “[T]he establishment of a second parliament chamber in 2005... has further blurred the parliament’s position within the Tunisian polity...” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008).

The rule of law scores, according to BTI Index had increased slightly between 2008 and 2010. Nevertheless, it was the most controversial topic to discuss since it damages the society’s perception of how the selected officials behave after the elections. It plays a role that it becomes some sort of a tool that provides order among citizens so that there would not be conflicts. With the help of the right implications of rule of law, citizens tend to trust the governments because they would feel looked after at least to some extent. In Tunisia though, that was not the case at all. The presidential clan of Ben Ali only “favored” the inner circle of Ben Ali family and the network expanded to people who give their loyalty in return of monetary or non-monetary resources.

### **2.2.3. Stability of Democratic Institutions**

Democracy status of Tunisia in terms of institutional stability and effectiveness, had been reported as inexistent according to BTI 2006 report. It has been stated that institutions were not legitimated democratically thus, the instability was derived from the

authoritarian tendencies of the state apparatus. Though, Tunisian institutions were administratively performing well within the region. (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006). In 2003 report however, it was said that: "...autocratic character of the political institutions in Tunisia means that questions about the stability and acceptance of "democratic institutions" by the relevant actors in the sense of this study cannot be answered reasonably." (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). Lastly, according to 2008 report, the rhetoric had changed a bit while stating that political power rather is in the hands of the president. "Parliament serves mainly as an instrument for the decision makers in the government and the ruling RCD [Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique]." (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008).

The social and economic policies that were adopted by first Bourguiba and later Ben Ali between 1980 and 2010, debilitated the country's economy, caused income inequality hence the displeasure socioeconomically, uncontrollable corruption and political tyranny and subjugation. This paved the way for government-led staffing in almost every governmental organization and institution such as Supreme Court judges, high ranked government officials in ministries, mass media patrons and many more. This led to political oppression hence the political corruption and grand corruption through networking and staffing employees who were most likely to vote for Ben Ali again in next elections. Therefore, stability of democratic institutions is automatically linked to those false economic strategies due to rampant corruption allowed corrupt elites to move even more freely in terms of creating networks via favoritism. In return, citizens develop a feeling of unrepresentativeness simply because income inequality (which is a result of false economic strategies) force them to side with Ben Ali regime in anyway.

In sum, important reasons which caused violent demonstrations are following: autocracy and autocracy-backed corruption, political oppression, police and state brutality, high inflation, shortages, high unemployment rates, economic underdevelopment and censorship. (Ogbonnaya, 2013). Stuart Levey (2011) suggested that the key grievance caused mass protests is official corruption – "a reality highlighted by the recent trials of Ben Ali and Mubarak for corrupt practices ranging from money laundering to drug trafficking." (Hess, 2013). Therefore, aftermath of these actions unsurprisingly resulted in loss of integrity fueled by socioeconomic inequities and hence the corruption. Unemployment was not eradicated, instead it was used for a political


campaign by the government itself. So this equation was basically resulted in favor of the government again although it seems that the government at least provided jobs for “some” people. However, in an ideal political environment where the elections are free and fair, the political oppression over separate power apparatuses do not exist, and impartiality is a key feature; governments are almost obliged to create employment but not in return for votes; just for they are under the same social contract as their subjects. Governments can only “expect” to be elected again after they actually follow the requirements of the respective social contract. In order to fulfill those requirements, they need to delve deep into public demand and seek out their trust. Dissimilarly, Ben Ali gave jobs to people who were already content with voting for him again and again. That is plainly a private gain which makes generating employment for only some portion of all citizens, an abuse of his public office which is the presidency in this case. As it was stated under the topic of institutional stability, government institutions were inadequate too because they were a part of the network created by Ben Ali as well. Thus, they were quite prone to political influence exclusively, which affected decision making process in a rather negative and subjective way.

### 3. The Egyptian Case before Arab Spring

Alongside Tunisia, Egypt also found a large room for itself in global media during Arab Spring. While main reasons for mass protests are quite similar to Tunisian case, I believe the Egyptian revolution that resulted in Mubarak's resignation was more grassroots oriented compared to what happened in Tunisia, in terms of socio-economic conditions. However, there are some similarities to Tunisia in terms of political history and socio-political movements. Civil society and massive numbers of disenfranchised youth with the help of social media tools such as Twitter and Facebook self-organized themselves and took the streets of Cairo, especially the Tahrir Square to demand better living conditions and resignation of Mubarak.

Egypt's political history, as it is a MENA country, is quite similar to Tunisian case. Mainly, people were (and still) living under poor conditions, basic human rights could not be provided by the government due to high abuse of public office for private gains by officials. Like in the Tunisian case, this survey consults to BTI reports for Egypt too. Yet, before delve deep into BTI country reports on Egypt, Mo Ibrahim Index gives an overview on Egypt's overall governance shown in Figure 9.

**Figure 9: Overall Governance Score for Egypt 2008-2017**




Source: Mo Ibrahim Index

In 2003 BTI report it was stated that excessive food imports and constant change in subsidy reforms with rapidly growing population resulted in high foreign debt in 1980s Egypt. Though 1990s was promising in terms of respective topics, economic development was still slow. “Additionally, the shrinkage of state benefits, a lack of fair elections, low participation, and the retention of political restrictions called the government into question.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). The pattern followed is the same in Tunisian case for variables selected which are: Rule of Law, Institutional Stability, Level of Socioeconomic Development and Market Economy and Resource Efficiency.

### **3.1.Main Economic Reasons**


Similar to Tunisian case, 1960s Egypt also met neoliberal market policies and agendas which eventually made the country dependent on foreign aid. It is important to bear in mind that Tunisia’s secret and somewhat sacred weapon was its strong economy and its high regional competitiveness. Unfortunately, Egyptian case do not have these features in terms of economic stability. Structurally, Egypt was much weaker when it comes to introducing new reforms over and over again. The foundations of Egyptian economy was not that strong regarding being dependent on fuel exports compared to Tunisia. Moreover, Gross National Income (GNI) was not high as well in Egypt. “By signing the 1979 Camp David Accords, Egypt had agreed to a peace treaty with Israel in exchange for substantial economic and military aid from the United States, which effectively meant leaving the Soviet camp in favor of the West and its free market economic doctrine.” (Kaboub, 2013). As a result, like in Tunisian case, Egypt was also stuck on foreign debt. Figure 10 and Figure 11 respectively indicate Egypt’s GNI in US\$ and External Debt of Egypt by % of its GNI.

**Figure 10: Egypt's GNI (US\$ Billion)**



Source: World Bank

**Figure 11: Egypt's External Debt (% of GNI)**




Source: World Bank

It actually does not necessarily seem as a poor performance overall when the Figures 10 and 11 are taken into consideration one by one. However, as this surveys intends to look at mainly between 2000 and 2010-11 in terms of levels of country development, there is an interesting period between the years of 2000 and 2005. In Figure 10, between the years

of 2000 and 2005, the GNI decreased sharply while Figure 11 suggests that in the same period external debt increased and went up to 40% of Egypt's GNI in 2004 which approximately equals to 40 Billion US\$. This eventually forced Egyptian government to take foreign aid mostly in food and fuel hence the increase in prices of respective products. This unfortunately meant that Egyptians, especially the ones who were living in rural areas were unable to provide food for their families.

Furthermore, as Figures 10 and 11 show that the country was performing badly in terms of finding means of production and using them effectively, trade and importation performance was not adequate as well. Figure 12 is a joint graph that displays Tunisia's and Egypt's Net Trade in Goods (BoP, US\$) while Figure 13 shows that Egypt's Merchandise Imports in US\$. The reason why this figures are used is to indicate how Egyptian government reacted to public demands on governmental level and how much they became externally dependent on providing goods to people in Egypt.

**Figure 12: Tunisia & Egypt Net Trade in Goods (BoP, US\$)**




Source: World Bank

As Figure 12 shows, while Tunisia were relatively stable, Egypt had fluctuations and was on a trend downwards since the early 2000s. It is not surprising Egyptians questioned

government's legitimacy and effectiveness especially on such a matter considering the country has two main tradeable products which are oil and wheat.

**Figure 13: Egypt's Merchandise Imports (US\$ Billion)**



Source: World Bank


Moreover, as Figure 13 indicates, becoming dependent to foreign goods importation has begun to increase again especially after 2005. Yet, in order to narrow down the reasons why Egyptian people rather felt neglected by their government, one must mention the inadequacy on providing food for people.

### 3.1.1. The Food Crises

Since Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptian social policy put food supply problems on its focal point. “Over time, Egypt’s provision of subsidized bread in particular has become a powerful symbol of the broader social contract between the government and the population, as a means to provide legitimacy in a political system where civil liberties and public participation are limited.” (Singerman, 1996). Therefore, it was important to take actions with regard to food policies in order to both promote better life standards for Egyptian people and to stabilize domestic politics in case of potential uprisings. Nasser’s government had rose to power in 1952 and the food subsidy reforms were exclusively and excessively adopted. This also brought extensive government intervention on market

economy and involvement in what to produce and how to produce. Moreover, most of these regulations were applied onto agricultural products changed the distribution of them as well. “These policies helped to hold prices down in the face of urbanization and rapid population growth. Ration cards were introduced for a small number of goods in the mid-1960s to shield people against shortages due to rising domestic prices and discontinuance of US food aid at the time of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.” (Gutner, 2002). Unfortunately, these newly introduces policy changes and food subsidy reforms were rather short-term or medium-term solutions at best. 1970s were even worse for Egypt in terms of subsidy reforms. During Anwar Sadat’s reign, the food subsidy system expanded both in costs and the variety of foods imported. “More foods were brought the subsidy umbrella, including beans, lentils, rice, frozen fish, meat and chicken, and the system reached a peak of 18 foods.” (Gutner, 2002). Figure 14 shows Egypt’s Food Imports by % of its Merchandise Imports in US\$ shown in Figure 13.

**Figure 14: Egypt’s Food Imports (% of Merchandize Imports)**



Source: World Bank

This so called subsidy reforms gave birth to food security problems which meant another policy addition or change for food security. In order to solve the food subsidy problems, large number of policies were pending to be applied already. While these were piling up, possibly the worst case scenario happened and “...world wheat prices skyrocketed from \$60 a ton to \$250 a ton by 1973, Egypt’s wheat imports surged from \$147 million to \$400

million.” (Sadowski, 1991). As a result “...sharp increases in the price of food staples and other products in 1977 ignited riots in Egypt that were seen as regime threatening, leaving a legacy of government caution and gradualism toward food policy reform, and economic reform more broadly.” (Gutner, 2002). Rioters filled the streets of Cairo and Alexandria, attacking government buildings and officials’ homes, as police violently tried to stop the massive riots while the military was called in order to try to stabilize the situation. The Egyptian government lifted the subsidy cuts on 20 January 1977, which were (interestingly) actually better cuts than the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested before the riots took place. Table 13 is a statistical table that integrates the numerical data shown in Figures 11 and 12. The last column gives how many billions of US\$ were spent for food importation within the merchandise imports.

**Table 13: Egypt’s Merchandise and Food Imports**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Merchandise Import (Bill. US\$)</b>	<b>Food Import (%)</b>	<b>Food Import (Bill. US\$)</b>
2003	<b>12,95</b>	25%	<b>3,2</b>
2004	<b>15,95</b>	22%	<b>3,5</b>
2005	<b>22,4</b>	20%	<b>4,4</b>
2006	<b>18,91</b>	27,3%	<b>5,1</b>
2007	<b>37,1</b>	20%	<b>7,4</b>
2008	<b>48,3</b>	17,1%	<b>8,2</b>
2009	<b>44,9</b>	19%	<b>8,5</b>
2010	<b>52,9</b>	19%	<b>10</b>
2011	<b>58,9</b>	23%	<b>13,5</b>

*Source: World Bank and Author’s Calculations*

According to World Bank data provided, although the percentage of food imports had not shown a constant increase, merchandise imports except in 2006 and 2009 had increased steadily. What is even more significant is that between the respective years, food import in US\$ was always rising. For instance, food imports in 2011 (13.5 Bill. US\$) was four times higher than the imports in 2003 (3.2 Bill. US\$). So the economic reforms that was about food subsidies and opening the Egyptian market globally actually had very bad consequences on its people. Government efficiency was key to Egypt’s development

compared to Tunisia. Rampant corruption in Tunisia remained in the forefront alongside economic failures but in Egypt, it was rather how government acted and failed over and over again especially in terms of providing basic resources such as food for its people.

A lead economist in the Urban Development Unit with the World Bank, Judy L. Baker (2008) suggested that food prices increased and affected the household consumption of the urban poor directly. In terms of energy high energy prices, complementary goods and services were affected as well. For example, higher fuel prices directly hit transportation services as fuel was getting more expensive. So in the bigger picture, wrong governmental policies on imports actually did not provide more for people, it costed more which resulted in less goods and services. In order to prevent the food shortages, Mubarak yet again introduced another food subsidy reform in 1982. “The thinking was that a gradual strategy would not lead people to believe their living standards were being reduced.” (Sadowski, 1991). In summary, this new reform included reduction in the number of subsidized foods like meat, chicken, fish and etc. which were mainly consumed by higher income groups in Egypt. (Gutner, 2002). One important strategy was “...to better target the ration card system by introducing in 1981 the red ration cards, which offered a lower subsidy on goods such as sugar, cooking oil, tea and rice than the existing green card. The red cards are intended for people in higher income professions.” (Gutner, 2002). However, though this targeting system was somewhat decent in performance in the beginning, it was not exactly designed for the urban poor to get food in general. The reason was the inadequacy of government in identifying the poor households and provide them cards. “Data from the EIHS [Egyptian Integrated Household Survey] survey show that 11 out of 100 of the poorest quintile of the population do not carry a ration card, while 15 out of 100 of the second quintile also do not.” (Gutner, 2002). In light of these, Mubarak’s food subsidy reforms actually did not improve the ones introduced under Sadat’s regime or the ones adopted in the Nasser era. Rather, they followed the previous ones and failed again. As a result, Egypt’s socio-political culture and history led Egyptian people to take the same action as they did in 1977 and riot for high food prices and low wages, in the industrial city of Mahalla El-Kobra located in the Nile Delta. (Baker, 2008).

### 3.1.2. Level of Socioeconomic Development

In terms of socioeconomic development, I believe this survey makes sure that some Egyptian people still live under terrible conditions. According to 2003 BTI report, 20% to 30% of the population lives below the poverty line. (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). Although the report in 2006 indicated that almost 30% of the population live below the poverty line, it shed light on another important statistics which was the income inequality and consumption around 34% according to Gini Index of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006). This number did not change at all in 2008 report as well. Table 14 displays the HDI scores of Egypt.

**Table 14: HDI Scores for Egypt 2003-2011**

2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
0.622	0.628	0.634	0.642	0.650	0.658	0.660	0.665	0.668

Source: Human Development Index

As Table 14 shows, Egypt’s HDI scores are slowly increasing. However, prior to 2008 the average increase in scores is 0.007 while starting with 2008 the average increase in scores is 0.003.

**Table 15: CPI Scores and Rankings for Egypt**

2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
3.3	3.2	3.4	3.3	2.9	2.8	2.8	3.1	2.9
70th	72nd	70th	70th	105th	115th	111th	98th	111th

Source: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index

In a corroborative manner, Table 15 above sets forth CPI scores of Egypt in selected years. As it can be seen from the data, except the slight improvement in 2010, overall the country performed very poorly in terms of fighting against rampant corruption. Especially after 2007, scores are very low in parallel to its HDI score performance.

Egypt’s difference compared to Tunisian case was the rather more deliberately organized youth through social media. What was similar for Egyptian youth to Tunisian youth, though, is the fact that they were quite big in numbers and very angry at their governments because of the rising unemployment rates. “In Tunisia and Egypt, high fertility rates had produced a substantial youth bulge, such that by 2005 some 56.1 percent and 62.7 percent of the citizens, respectively, were under the age of 30.” (Hess, 2013).

These young people were educated as well like in the Tunisian case. Nevertheless, the job opportunities either did not exist or did not pay enough with regard to required labor. “In Tunisia and Egypt, official unemployment in 2005 had reached rates of 14.2 percent and 11.2 percent, respectively, leaving many youths frustrated with the political and economic status quo and the time needed to plot and organize anti-regime collective actions.” (Hess, 2013). Thus, similar to what happened to most of the MENA countries’ citizens, also happened in Egyptians. The Egyptian government almost completely failed in terms of providing basic needs for its citizens. This resulted in emerging feeling of dissatisfaction while country was in turmoil economically already. Plus, while citizens of Egypt try to live in such poor conditions, state legitimacy in the public eye was almost non-existent because of repeatedly failing food subsidy and other economic reforms.

### **3.1.3. Market Economy and Resource Efficiency**

In consideration of the socioeconomic development in the country, reportedly there were different domains such as foreign trade, state support and insurance systems that were still weak. “Because of the economic crisis, overall economic performance deteriorated as economic growth declined from 5.8% (1998) to an estimated 0.8% (2002).” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). 2006 report on the other hand, summarized that various new laws were introduced to improve the economic efficiency. “Undoubtedly, the institutional framework of the market economy, especially for protecting private property and enhancing competitiveness, has improved.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006). Although, there was some room for improvement, Egyptian government’s promises for providing food and creating employment was not kept and hence the one third of the population were still below the poverty line. Lastly, in (2008) BTI report it was stated that combatting against rising inflation and inadequate foreign exchange were set as main goals for Egyptian government to deal at first. However, as public debt maintained its rise due to Egypt’s political history with a strong emphasis on constant state interventions, the functioning of the market economy and resource efficiency were damaged. (Bertelsman Stiftung, 2008).

In conclusion, Egypt witnessed more than 1000 protests between 1998 and 2004. (Hess, 2013). Due to the inherent errors of neoliberal market strategies and liberalization policies, public’s demands was neglected once again. Hence, the streets of Egypt hosted

even more activists and anti-regime protesters, with an intense increase rate of 200 percent. (Hess, 2013). While unemployment and inflation was high, corruption was rampant and uncontrollable, ruling elite becoming 'corrupt elite' and poor can barely be provided basic human rights such as food, it is only natural that Egypt experienced a revolution this big. Economic policies as well as social policies were far from successful which eventually led to a discontent among Egyptians. However, the problem was that this 'discontent' was either ignored or went unrecognized. For both Egypt and Tunisia, the introduction of neoliberal market economy strategies was only helpful in short term. It is fair to say that these strategies showed some reasonable solutions to balance the economy between the public and private sectors. Nonetheless, it also showed "...how weak the political institutions were in directing economic activity for the benefit of the country as a whole." (Nagarajan, 2013). What was becoming even clearer is that the public trust placed in government and its institutions was abused. These corrupt elite became corrupt not because they abused their office and the powers came with it, but because they mistreated the public trust by disregarding the public's demands. The public office simply became a tool or a place to conduct such a rent-seeking behavior.

### **3.2.Main Political Reasons**

#### **3.2.1. Rule of Law**

According to 2003 BTI Report again, Rule of Law topic found a large room for itself in the report. It stated that the state of emergency continued with a strong emphasis on extraordinary presidential powers. "...executive branch has a lasting, formally safeguarded monopoly position. The president can make laws as presidential decrees, and keep politically relevant matters out of the ordinary courts. Even in parliamentary legislation, the president controls the submission of bills and motions and the voting process via the governing party." (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). Moreover, judiciary's stance was rather nominal because the executive often failed to implement decisions taken by judiciary independently, as judiciary was appointed by the executive hence they are prone to political oppression and influence exclusively and inclusively. Lastly, political corruption and the prosecution of corrupt officials were stated to be inadequate because of the dominance of governing party in the parliament. "As a rule, freedoms are not blatantly abridged, although violations by the police and the military are reported

occasionally. There is an inherent discrimination against women due to unequal treatment under the law.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). In light of the 2003 report, these are the important remarks under the ‘Rule of Law’ indicator which is not exactly pleasant since there was a state of emergency going on, where corruption was rampant and not punished and police and military interventions were becoming ordinary.

Although there was no state of emergency reported in 2006 BTI Report, the separation of powers suffered from constant intervention from the executive branch. “Most relevant is the fact that parliament’s ability to challenge the government and amend legislation remains restricted.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006). Due to this lack of separation, parallel network of courts came into existence. However, these military and security courts rather served as a tool in favor of particularistic individual gains as they used to report directly to the president. Security courts was focused on state security matters but in a loose manner. In other words, political crimes, terrorism, economic crimes and some malfunctions in public institutions were on their focal point. Although this seems as a decent attempt to spread justice within and around the institutions of different domains, it was largely the government’s courts serving to the president.

Unlike in 2003 report, the laws concerning corruption and its prosecution had changed. “The Administrative Control Authority, a governmental institution, investigates corruption cases in public offices and reports to the Supreme Court, which is then in charge of the prosecution.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006). Governing party’s attempts to eradicate corruption has given some positive results as some conspicuous politicians were convicted. “However, the campaign is politically motivated and tends to bring to justice only those figures of the ruling elite who were excluded by internal conflicts or affiliated with the outer, weaker circles of the elite.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006).

Perhaps the 2008 BTI Report gives the best insight about the problem of separation of powers in Egypt. According to the report, the Party Committee was one of the two very problematic institutions as it has the right to recognize and announce political parties and monitor their actions. The party tribunal on the other hand, “...was recently established to give those parties whose application for a formal status failed the right of appeal. Both are dependent on the executive power of the NDP thus making their operation an infringement of the principles of separation of power and judicial

independence.” (Bertelsman Stiftung, 2008). Lastly, in consideration of freedoms and human rights, the report summarizes that civil liberties, in practice, are violated by the state most of the time. Table 14 sets forth the Freedom House scores of Egypt in the selected years in order to show a general overview of freedom of rights, civil liberties and political rights.

**Table 16: Freedom House Scores for Egypt 2003-2011**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Freedom of Rights</b>	<b>Civil Liberties</b>	<b>Political Rights</b>	<b>Status</b>
2003	6	6	6	Not Free
2004	6	6	6	Not Free
2005	5.5	5	6	Not Free
2006	5.5	5	6	Not Free
2007	5.5	5	6	Not Free
2008	5.5	5	6	Not Free
2009	5.5	5	6	Not Free
2010	5.5	5	6	Not Free
2011	5.5	5	6	Not Free

*Source: Freedom House*

In theoretical explanations, what happened to MENA countries can be explained what George Klosko asserted namely, the principle of fairness and political obligation. The governments in Egypt and Tunisia did not do their parts which unofficially designated in the social contract they had with their subjects. Personal gains were acquired through different types of corruption, prebendalism, favoritism and nepotism which victimized the Egyptians and Tunisians eventually. This paved the way for a potential lack of faith and obligation towards the respective governments, which was the exact opposite what Klosko and this research argue. Perhaps, it can be said that economic reasons, or neglected human rights were more influential than the rampant corruption that drove people to riot against the authorities. However, the mindset that caused this economic faults and disregard of human rights is the same mindset that caused corruption because it is a notion of extreme individualism and profit maximizing which benefit only a very small portion of people who were fortunate enough to hold more power and resources than others. Lack

of state legitimacy made the citizens of these countries normally felt overlooked and to some extent destitute hence the anti-regime protests rapidly grew.

### **3.2.2. Stability of Institutions**

Institutional stability is quite problematic in all selected years in Egypt according to BTI reports. It is stated by the 2003 report that executive branch's extraordinary powers mainly hindered the institutional capacity and functionality for democratic improvement. The Party Committee for instance, was a very problematic institution in terms of recognizing and monitoring political parties. "The only opposition that might be potentially be taken seriously is the nonviolent Muslim Brotherhood, but it has not been authorized as a political party and thus has been unable to achieve any influence over the work of Parliament." (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). In 2006 and 2008 though, some constitutional changes were introduced, but in practice democratic principles were not followed. "On the one hand, they are subject to intervention and manipulation by the executive branch, on the other hand, an apparent over-bureaucratization renders them largely incapable of performing effectively." (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006). Thus the public's perception of and belief in these institutions were reportedly very low. Too much intervention and manipulation resulted in change in public perception about both executive and judiciary branches as they were seen as "marionettes of the regime". (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006).

Authoritarian capacity of MENA countries were quite prone to uprisings as it was stated by Jack Goldstone previously in Tunisian case. This means that there was extreme extents of state intervention in different domains. The presidential powers and the motto of separation of powers were antipodes. As BTI reports summarized too, judiciary was appointed directly by the president hence quite open to political influence by the executive. So, when authoritarian regimes like Egypt and Tunisia had met inherently erroneous neoliberal economy strategies and social policies, the results were rather bitter. "The regimes of Egypt and Tunisia were slowly being corroded by their personalism and lack of effective institutional mechanisms for maintaining long-term internal cohesion among elites and control over society." (Hess, 2013). Consequently, there was not any governmental office or institution for people to look up to and to trust. As the regime was intensely interventionist and as the institutions were quite open to external political

influence and pressure, trustworthiness of these institutions and eventually of the government were naturally questioned by the citizens. Socially speaking it brought frustration as people normalized seeing a corrupt politician getting no punishment for his/her actions. State apparatus was not able to provide neither order nor basic needs for people, let alone procuring public's demands.

### **3.3.Conclusion**

This research highlights some important points on how corruption is and ought to be defined at first. Then, it moves on to the challenges of perceiving corruption in different ways. Finally, as this research fundamentally argues that the concept of corruption is inherently normative, the research discusses the concept through ethics and politically philosophical standpoint. While approaching to the phenomenon of corruption in this way, there are some important aspects and concepts that need to be emphasized.

First, collective action is very significant because the research asserts that the public is being victimized as a result of corrupt behavior by public officials and politicians. Therefore, Klosko's (1987) argument namely, 'the principle of fairness and political obligation' harbors collective action. In fact, acting collectively is a must by default for societies in order to better understand what is at stake and what is the concept and the mindset that they are objecting to. "Defining corruption entails answering extremely difficult and perennial questions about the nature of office and the appropriate divisions between ethical spheres." (Sparling, 2017). In this sense, collaboration among people is key to set forth some ground rules in a normative sense.

The principle of fairness and obligation obviously consists of two parts. The first part in which the focus is on 'fairness' is about how one individual acts in order to influence others' actions in a good way. In other words, Klosko introduces the concept of sacrifice of public goods available to people. As one sacrifices enough, the fairness principle initiates some kind of 'obligation' feeling in others, which is the second part of the principle. This obligation sense is rather loosely defined and to some extent independent from politics at first. It is not about obeying the laws that are set by authorities but instead about being fair to one another among society. The politics, however, comes into play at the point where governments need to recognize this fairness principle and obligation feeling among the citizens. If there is no such system visible

among them, governments are obligated to provide this environment according to the social contract theory. This research argues that what was lost or failed to be recognized or even be provided by the Tunisian and Egyptian governments is this principle of fairness and political obligation due to corrupt behavior of political figures.

Second, related to collective action discussed above, social trust plays a crucial role. One of the main purposes of collective action is to establish a common trust fund among people and by the people. In order to do so, principle of fairness puts the concept of sacrifice on the spotlight as it was mentioned before. Although, the word ‘society’ often associated with a large number of persons, social trust is actually built rather individually at first. Therefore, so as to gain trust from others one should simply trust others and act in a manner that is completely trustworthy. There is always the risk of betrayal of trust but one should simply do what is required from him or her, which in this case to trust first. As being trustworthy and keeping promises are such rather intangible and conceptual actions they are about dignity, so it should be visible when someone does not hold that features inherently which could potentially help others to decide not to trust him/her in duties regarding public office for instance.

Ethical appeal of politics is substantially about normativity. However, this research takes the approach of social contract theory when discusses about normativity of politicians. The reason why the social contract theory hold much importance is because the argument of public demands should not be neglected. In fact, this research argues that the demands of public should be the key principle in the social contract theory in our contemporary politics. Although this research inclines more towards to Hobbesian understanding of state of nature, it certainly denies the system that Hobbes designed in *Leviathan*. “On Hobbesian and republican grounds it is possible to believe that an absolute sovereign or a dictator necessary – but it is also possible for an essentially similar understanding of politics to generate much more moderate models of the state.” (Philp, 1997). Following Philp’s suggestion, what is necessary to establish sound conditions to have moderate models is collective action and social trust. However, passing extraordinary powers to one man or a party of men who holds the same corrupt ideology is a mistake and is what happened in Tunisia and Egypt (and in many other MENA countries) as this research previously discusses.

At this point, one must question what lies beneath the motivation of obtaining power politically but using it rather arbitrarily. Thus, this research takes ethical relativism, and Aristotelian virtue ethics into account. It is discussed that according to Hobbesian understanding, conflict of interests are inevitable since one's interest eventually will outweigh others' interests due to human nature and desire for power. However, as a way of thinking and life, this is ideally and ethically wrong if one wants to be trusted by others and live in harmony. This was what Hobbes consequently argued in *Leviathan* namely a possible state of war in which everyone is against everyone due to clashes among their interests. The difference though, is that the conflict of interest in our modern times, is between people and the governments. At least, that was what happened to countries before and during the Arab Spring. This puts the issue of perception and ethical understanding of the concept of corruption on the spot due to the fact that the respective concept can be perceived differently in different places by different people. In political realm, "...each account perceives the need for political rule differently, what one account will see as resolving conflict, another will see as corrupt. Thus, where a state takes draconian action against an internal faction in the name of sustaining its sovereignty, it is open to challenge from an interpretation driven by distrust of those exercising power." (Philp, 1997). Therefore, Hobbes is right in terms of conflict of interest being inevitable however, wrong on devoting power merely to one person in order to solve the problem. In my opinion, it is not a surprise that such authoritarian regimes exist for long years when the social contract theory is exercised or applied in this way. It is also not that unimaginable that when given extraordinary powers, rulers tend to behave more corrupted. This eventually creates economic inequality as well as social and political. As a result, people get victimized. "Aristotelian view that a corrupted constitution is one in which rule is in the interest of the rulers at the expense of the ruled." (Sparling, 2017).

In practice, corrupt politicians brought the ends for most of the MENA countries. Private gains were so desirable for corrupt elite so they completely turned their heads away from what actually their own people wanted. This left ordinary folk in very bad conditions that eventually widened inequality. This destructive behavior of politicians only brought more benefits to them and frustration to people. At some point, what Klosko said when introduced the political obligation as a common sense was lost by those governments. Corruption bred more social, economic and political inequality in already

unequal society, which led to more corruption. Therefore, it is fair to say that people in Egypt and Tunisia (alongside other Arab Spring countries) were sort of forced to protest as a last resort, hence the massive uprisings happened in Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia and in Tahrir Square in Egypt. Consequently, Egyptians and Tunisians demanded their presidents' resignation respectively and following Ben Ali's resignation on 14 January 2011, Mubarak's regime was also overthrown on February 11, 2011.

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