

UNIVERSITY OF TARTU
Faculty of Social Sciences
Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies

Artur Täna

**EUROPEANIZATION OF MEMBER STATE'S FOREIGN POLICY:
ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY EUROPEANIZATION TOWARDS THE
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY**

MA thesis

Supervisor: Heiko Pääbo, PhD

Tartu 2019

I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary, sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.


.....
/ Signature of author /

The defence will take place on / *date* / at /
time /

..... / *address* / in auditorium number /
number /

Opponent / *name* / (..... / *academic degree* /),
..... / *position* /

Abstract

This purpose of this master thesis is to study the influence of the European Union to Estonian foreign policy towards the Republic of Turkey. It is thriving to answer the raised question by applying the concept of Europeanization to the empirical case. Through research, this thesis is aiming to contribute to the existing literature by two aspects: theoretical and empirical.

This research paper offers new conceptualization to the Europeanization of foreign policy. It argues that previously existing models do not offer comprehensive tools for systematic analysis and have many shortcomings for foreign policy conceptualization. This comes from the complexity of foreign policy analysis that requires focusing not only on the 'top-down' but also on the 'bottom-up' approach combining identity and national projection dimensions to the usual policy elements to the analysis. This thesis aims to fill that gap in the literature.

The empirical contribution thrives from the specific case that allows also to examine how the level of Europeanization is dependent on the pre-accession relationship, memberships to other international organisations and inter-union tensions. Estonia and Turkey have a long history of strong bilateral relationship that dates back to the foundation of both republics regardless of the geographical and cultural distance. This relationship has been supported by a mutual support to each other's aspirations to belong to the Western world by joining international organisations. The relationship got a whole new dimension with Estonia's accession to the European Union and NATO in 2004. Estonia's wish to keep both NATO and the European Union strong requires skilful diplomacy also with Turkey that is strongly linked to both organisations. This thesis is aiming to provide valuable empirical addition to understanding the complexity of the relationship between Estonia and Turkey as well as to understand better the role of small states' foreign policy in the European Union context.

KEYWORDS: Europeanization, European Union, Turkey, Estonia, foreign policy

Table of contents

Abstract	3
Introduction.....	5
Small state's foreign policy choices.....	6
Europeanization.....	10
1.1. Responses to Europeanization	14
1.2. Foreign policy of the European Union	16
1.3. Europeanization of foreign policy.....	20
1.4. Measuring Europeanization.....	23
2. Research design, data and methods	25
2.1. Conceptualization of foreign policy Europeanization	25
2.2. Data gathering	29
2.3. Conclusion of the theoretical chapters.....	31
3. Development of relationships.....	33
3.1. The development of European Union – Turkey relations	33
3.2. Estonian-Turkish relationship.....	40
4. Europeanization of Estonian Foreign Policy	49
4.1. Adaption and policy convergence	50
4.2. National projection	53
4.3. Identity reconstruction	55
4.4. Mapping Estonian foreign policy Europeanization	56
4.5. Estonia's response to European influence	58
Conclusions.....	60
Potential areas for future research.....	62
References	63

Introduction

Turkey is an important partner for both the European Union and Estonia. Turkey's geopolitical position, its membership to NATO, ongoing accession negotiations with the European Union or cooperation in the fields of economy, education and migration are only some of the examples of a multi-faceted relationship. Even though Estonia and Turkey have a long bilateral relationship that dates back to the foundation of both republics after the First World War, the dynamics of this relationship got yet another new layer with Estonia's accession to the European Union. This thesis will offer a theoretical explanation and an overview of the changes to the relationship between the two countries after Estonia joined the European Union in 2004.

This thesis tackles a research problem of how big influence does joining the European Union have on a small state's foreign policy. But what does a 'small state' mean? There are four different approaches to the question of small states: realist, neo-liberal, constructivist and dynamic definition approaches (Knudsen 2002, Maass 2009). The realist school of thought adopts a definition based on states physical attributes that are measurable. This can include for example wealth, size or population. (East 1973; Vital 1966). Small states are these who do not have these physical attributes. The second generation is from the neo-liberal school of thought and they pay a lot attention to the small states within international organizations (de Carvalho and Neumann 2015: Keohane 1969; Rothstein 1968) where states have to be more cooperative giving chance for states who's physical attributes are not so advanced. The small states definition according to the second generation would be that small states are those who "can never – acting alone or in a small group – make a significant impact." (Keohane, 1969:269). The third generation is from the constructivist school of thought who see that smallness is a matter of self-perception (Hey, 2003) and small states' definition is all about perceptions that "if a state's people and institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, or if other state's people and institutions perceive that state as small, it shall be so considered." (Hey, 2003:3). Finally, the dynamic approach (Almezaini & Rickli, 2017) that argues that the size of the state is dependent on the capacity to modify the conduct of other states, while preventing others

from affecting its own behaviour. It means that a state is small when it lacks the power it can exercise (Almezaini & Rickli, 2017).

Even though this thesis takes Estonia's smallness as a starting point, we can easily see that Estonia's position among small states is evident regardless of the theoretical framework chosen. Still, when trying to study dynamics and processes in the European Union, the most relevant theoretical framework comes from the second generation of scholars that focuses on smallness based on a state's position in international organisations. Undoubtedly Estonia is highly dependent on its membership to international organizations namely the European Union and NATO as well as to a multilateral world order. Therefore the neo-liberal theory assures us the correctness of the starting point.

Small state's foreign policy choices

Due to lack of resources and the capabilities, small states' foreign and security policy options are more limited than bigger states' ones. According to Mouritzen (1997) and Wivel (2005) small states' security options are either to favour influence or autonomy. If small state chooses to favour influence, it has to join an alliance (Almezaini & Rickli, 2017). They can either ally with or against threats (Walt, 1987). The strategy to align with threats is called band-wagoning and against threats, balancing. Generally, the idea behind band-wagoning is the hope to gain something and behind balancing the desire to avoid losses (Schweller, 1994). If a small state chooses to join an alliance, it can improve its influence in the international arena but at the same time it loses autonomy as in the alliance, the small state cannot make decisions autonomously. Neo-liberal school of thought also suggests that a small state can improve its influence through the membership of international organisations (Keohane, Martin, 1995). International organisations offer small member states a legal framework which constrains larger member states and at the same time offers certainty to the smaller ones (Almezaini & Rickli, 2017). International law is often considered to be more important by small states rather than big ones, as certain legal norms help to fight the anarchic international system where big powers determine the future of the smaller ones.

Favouring autonomy for small states means adopting the policy of neutrality (Almezaini & Rickli, 2017). Neutrality means that a small state stays out of all possible kinds of alliances and therefore tries not to get involved in conflicts between bigger states in the region. Favouring autonomy comes at a cost. If a small state chooses to adopt the policy of neutrality, it cannot no longer rely on bigger member states in case of armed conflicts (Wivel et al, 2014). Neither has it support from the principles of international law as a neutral state must stay out of all possible forms of alliances.

By joining European Union and NATO, Estonia has showed that it favours influence over autonomy in a fear of losses if stood alone. For Estonia the biggest security threat comes from Russia meaning Estonia has chosen to ally against threats which categorizes as balancing according to Walt (1987). For a small state in a geographical position like Estonia, the principles of international law and the strength of international organizations are of high importance. Estonia has also been able to increase its influence on the European level after joining the Union in 2004. Especially in the foreign policy context where all decisions are made anonymously (will be discussed in further depth later in this thesis), Estonian politicians have a strong position in representing the country's interests increasing its influence in Europe. Estonia has almost 4 times more MEPs per inhabitants in the European Parliament and one Commissioner (as all the other member states) which translates to much bigger influence than it would have without the Union.

The conclusion for the starting point of this thesis is that Estonia is a small state that can never – acting alone or in a small group – make a significant impact (Keohane, 1969:269). Estonia is favouring influence and has chosen to balance against threats when joining the European Union and NATO. Estonia is highly dependent on multilateral world order, international organizations and international law principles that help to fight the anarchic international system. Estonia has been able to increase its powers significantly at the European level, especially in the foreign policy context, and has much bigger representation per inhabitants than most of European countries. Still, how exactly the dynamics of the relations inside the EU is, is a topic for this thesis.

This thesis is contributing to the understanding of how big influence does joining the being a member of the European Union give to a small state's foreign policy. Being more explicit, this thesis is trying to understand what has been the impact of Estonia's membership to the European Union to its relationship with Turkey.

This thesis is aiming to answer two research questions: a theoretical and an empirical one. The theoretical research question is seeking to find an answer how to study Europeanization of a member state's foreign policy. Even though Europeanization of member state's foreign policy has also been studied before, this thesis argues that the previous conceptualizations of this topic do not offer comprehensive tools that would allow to both argue for the existence and measure the scope of Europeanization in different empirical cases. The empirical question seeks to answer how big is the influence of the European Union to Estonian foreign policy towards The Republic of Turkey. I seek to find out what are the policy domains that have been influenced the most by the European Union and what areas remain unchanged. Estonia and Turkey are tied through mutual membership to NATO that allows to examine possible conflicts between memberships in two different organizations.

Estonia's relationship Turkey is a fascinating but modestly studied area. The relationship is also firmly connected to the European Union that allows incorporating the theoretical framework of Europeanization to the study that will be discussed in further depth in the next chapter. The specific case allows also to examine how the level of Europeanization is dependent on the pre-accession relationship. As a side-result of this study, I am also able to elaborate on how Turkey is positioned in the eyes of the European Union and Estonia. The thesis examines the foreign policy of Estonia towards Turkey. This makes the research a small N comparative study. This master thesis has a case study research design as it is examining the foreign policies towards two different states and is trying to apply the concept of Europeanization to empirical cases.

The empirical data of this thesis is gathered using in-depth interviews and by performing discourse analysis. Interviews are conducted with civil servants working at the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs of Estonia and at European External Action Service. The choice of these institutions comes from the fact that they both represent the executive branch of the decision-making process and therefore the ideas expressed reflect the official positions (and stands that might not be publicly presented) of the respective entities. European External Action service has a dedicated department for overseeing relations with Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Estonia has a dedicated department for relations with Southeast European countries, including Turkey.

The aim of the interviews is to understand policies, beliefs, norms and values that guide the relationship. I am trying to understand the dynamics of the relationship and how the positions are formed towards these countries. I am not just trying to observe what the actions are that the EU or Estonia have taken but to see the causes for these actions. That can be a result of how these countries are positioned and perceived. The thesis will also address the question of inter-union dynamics between member states and the European Union.

Additional empirical data is gathered by performing discourse analysis on official publications, speeches and statements made by the politicians and civil servants. Information gathered by performing discourse analysis was also used as a preparation for the interviews conducted. For discourse analysis, I have used public statements, news articles and official documents.

This thesis is structured to three main parts: theoretical framework, overview of the relationship between Estonia and Turkey and Turkey and the EU, and Europeanization of Estonian foreign policy towards Turkey. Each main part has also divisions.

Theoretical framework part starts with an overview of integration theories, continues with the theoretical approach of Europeanization and ends with the theoretical approaches to Europeanization of foreign policy and an overview to the foreign policy decision making process from a judicial point of view. The part overseeing relations will start from an overview of relations between the EU and Turkey and continue with the overview of the relationship between EU and Estonia. Finally, I am examining in more depth the implications of Europeanization in Estonian foreign policy towards Turkey and fit it to the theoretical framework presented in the first chapter. The thesis will end with a conclusion and reference to used literature.

Europeanization

In the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century a new concept of European integration emerged – Europeanization. Europeanization was and is until today a highly contested and ambiguous concept that is defined and conceptualized very differently among various political thinkers and some are not even sure if the concept is worth keeping at all. Still, the concept is widely used by scholars who study European integration. The situation is well described by Johan P. Olsen, a Norwegian political scientist, who asked in 2002: ‘Is ‘Europeanization’ as disappointing a term as it is fashionable?’ (Olsen, 2002). Dyson (2002) agrees with Olsen’s view when stating that the concept has produced more questions than answers. The problem originates from two parallel processes happening in the study of Europeanization – from one hand, the concept is highly popular among scholars but from the other hand it is used to study very different phenomenon in the European political landscape starting from changes in the external boundaries to shifts in the governance systems of member states. Besides different topics, there is also no overarching definition nor conceptualization explaining the concept of Europeanization.

Europeanization offers a different view to the study of European integration. In addition to the usual bottom-up approach used by all the previous integration theories, it looks at the process from a new – top-down – perspective. One of the first attempts to understand Europeanization comes from Robert Ladrech (1994) who was looking at domestic politics and institutions in France and the effect the European Union has on them. Ladrech, professor of European politics at the University of Keele, argued that Europeanization is a process when European ‘political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’ (Ladrech, 1994). This definition shows the principal difference between the integration theories that were dominant in the second half of the 20th century and Europeanization. When previous theories were looking at the process of European integration as inevitable and self-acting (according to neofunctionalist theory) or as something that states have control over (like supranationalist or functionalist theories), then Europeanization is trying to understand

how the membership of the Union itself is affecting the ‘organizational logic’ of member states. This process is referred to as a ‘top-down’ approach or policy ‘downloading’ by scholars focusing on the concept.

Nevertheless, Europeanization is not only focusing on the integration process from a ‘top-down’ perspective but also refers to ‘bottom-up’ approach. When we examine the political processes of the European Union, we see that member states are definitely affected by the Union but also we must not forget that the process also works the other way around. As a quick example we might simply think of the sizes of representations that member states have sent to the European Union (Estonia’s representation to the EU exceeds any other Estonian diplomatic representation many times in a number of diplomats sent) or about the lobbying for suitable and ‘less-harmful’ legislation. The most effective way to do so is by uploading national policies to European level (Börzel, 2002). According to Börzel (2002), this is because of three main reasons. First, uploading policies to the European level decreases the costs of downloading them later on back to the national level. If a specific policy does not fit national legislation, it might be very costly, time consuming or administratively difficult to adapt it. To avoid that, member states try to first upload policies that fit their national legislation to European level. Secondly, policy uploading helps member states to keep control of the upcoming legislation so that strict standards imposed on the EU level would not create difficulties for national companies. This applies especially to sectors that are affected by EU’s environmental legislation. Thirdly, by uploading policies to the European level, member states can find support to their border-crossing challenges such as organised crime or environmental impacts. Bringing legislation and attention to these challenges to the European level can help to start legislating on these matters or at least put the topic to the agenda of the EU.

Even though I have until now brought mostly policy Europeanization examples, the concept does not concern only political changes but includes also changes in the normative framework. According to Radaelli, Europeanization is a “process of construction diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are

first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (2003:30). In this definition, Radaelli acknowledges changes in formal rules but puts much more emphasis on the changes that are concerning the normative framework and value system. Europeanization is a concept for studying the integration process of the Union not simply from a policy perspective but also (and often more importantly) from value perspective. The general question could be how the European Union affects the way its citizens see and understand the world and can we see how the Union itself is creating a pan-European identity.

Europeanization needs to be uncomfortable and it does not occur every time a European Union legislation, norm or value is transferred to a member state. Many scholars (Börzel, 1999; Duina, 1999; Héritier, 1996) have defined misfit or mismatch as an integral part of the concept. Misfit is needed to establish the causal link between the change in a member state and its membership to the European Union. It is an indispensable aspect of the concept because how can one argue that the change to a more European-like policy, norm, value etc. is linked to its membership to the European Union. Börzel (2003) defines two different kinds of misfits: institutional misfit and policy misfit. Policy misfit refers to a situation where there is a conflict between the EU’s and a member state’s policies. This could happen when a new EU legislation is challenging policy instruments already in place in a particular member state. For example, before Estonia joined the European Union, it had established one of the most liberal markets in the world that did not impose any tax on import products. However, when joining the Union, Estonia had to revoke this policy and make its taxation policy more conservative to ensure single taxation system in the European Union (Ehin, 2013). Institutional misfit is challenging the collective understandings and power structures. Börzel and Risse (2000) argue that misfit ‘leads to the process of socialisation and learning resulting in internationalization of new norms and the development of new identities.’ This type of misfit can be well illustrated by a recent example when the European Union introduced the so-called ‘quota system’ (relocation and resettlement schemes) to help the member states that were affected the most by migration flows. Then people in the member states were faced with a question if Europe is as united that help of this kind would be acceptable. These both examples are

referring to top-down approach of Europeanization where a member state takes over a policy or a norm from the European Union but what about bottom-up approaches?

The question how to exactly use the concept of misfit on bottom-up Europeanization is creating confusion among scholars. George (2001) argues that, indeed, policy downloading or top-down approach of Europeanization offers us more clear examples of the phenomenon. This is also the reason why many scholars are using the top-down approach of Europeanization in their research even if they acknowledge the other dimension. Howell (2004) argues that despite the fact that in case of up loading there is no misfit, the process of Europeanization is still taking place. For Howell, this simply shows that 'bottom-up type of Europeanization was effective and top-down Europeanization minimized' (Howell, 2004). Still, this distinction does not necessarily solve the problem of conceptual confusion. Does it then mean that every time a member state has successfully uploaded a policy, norm, value etc. to the European level it is a result of Europeanization? In this case, it would still make the concept too broad, unclear, and difficult to distinguish from a usual cooperation between a member state and the Union.

Relying on policy misfit as an integral part of the concept of Europeanization allows only to use the theory to describe very clear examples. Misfit can either exist or not and the concept does not offer any intermediate situations. It is also very difficult to determine whether or not the policy is indeed misfitting as the category remains subjective offering explanation to cases which share very clearly misfitting nature. To explain better the complexity of determining a misfit, I will bring an example discussed in further depth later in this thesis. When Estonia became a member of the European Union, it had to adopt all the trade agreements that the EU had with third countries. This meant cancelling all the previous bilateral agreements with countries outside the EU, including Turkey. We could define this adoption as a misfit because Estonia had already an existing legislation in place that needed to be cancelled and replaced. On the other hand, export from Estonia to Turkey grew 5 times from 2004 to 2008 following the adoption of the legislation. Could we therefore argue for the existence of misfit?

To avoid these questions Manners and Whitman (2000) argue in their book that in order to study Europeanization, one should rather focus on ‘difficult cases’ instead of misfit. Focus on difficult cases allows better to understand the concept of Europeanization. Focus on difficult cases does not necessarily mean that there is a misfit – that would eliminate the usage of bottom-up approach – but at the same time it helps to distinguish the process of Europeanization. This means that instead of having a single criteria of policy misfit we can now distinguish between the difficulties of each case and compare it to one another that was not possible while using the criteria of policy misfit. Being able to compare cases to one another helps to diminish the problem of subjectivity in determining the difficulty of each case as it allows to put single cases into a broader context. Thanks to the fact that difficulty of an individual case does not require a definite answer, (like policy misfit that can only exist or not) we are able to solve the problem of border-line cases where we are not able to establish if the policy was indeed misfitting or not. How exactly difficulty is understood in this thesis will be discussed in further depth under the methodological chapter of this paper.

1.1. Responses to Europeanization

According to Börzel (2002), member states can choose between three broad responses or strategies to Europeanisation: pace-setting; foot-dragging or fence-setting. What strategy a member state might choose is highly dependent on its economic development but also on its capacities to push legislation on European level.

Pace-setting

Member states that choose pace-setting strategy are actively involved in shaping the policies of the Union. These member states are trying to upload national policies to the European level and therefore avoid risks of policy misfit when adopting the legislation again back to national legislation. Member states that have a lot of legislation domestically in a specific policy area are more inclined towards pace-setting as this allows them to prevent potentially inconvenient legislation. Member states that choose pace-setting have to be also capable of pushing through their desired legislation. Having more

votes in the Council is undoubtedly an asset but it does not mean that pace-setting is a privilege for only bigger member states. Smaller member states who show competence in specific policy areas have also shown results in pursuing their policy goals on the European level. This is also supported by the fact that decision-making process in the European Union does not support situations where one member state can fulfil its desired policy goal entirely.

Pace-setters are also choosing different tactics among themselves. Liefferink and Andersen (1998) defined three types of pace-setters: forerunners, pushers and pushers-by-example (the context for Liefferink and Andersen was environmental policy but the theory will remain in place also for other policy domains). Forerunners are member states who wish to go beyond the goals set out by the European Union. They are asking for bigger national sovereignty to impose stricter national norms than the ones set out by the Union. Pushers are member states who encourage all the states to stick together and move forward together. They are opposing the idea of “two-speed” Europe, an approach that allows some member states to move forward faster while leaving slower ones behind. Pushers-by-example are member states that try to combine the two by first trying out different policies nationally and then push to implement them on European level.

Foot-dragging

Foot-dragging states are opposing member states that are trying to upload policies. This is usually because foot-draggers do not have a strong legislation in place that could be uploaded to European level. These member states are often in a difficult position, as besides the lack of domestic legislation, they also often lack the capabilities to engage in EU policy formation. Lack of experts, votes in the Council but also money and experience in the EU result in a situation where foot-draggers are opposing other member states uploads in a hope to get package deals, temporary exemptions or side payments. It is rarely the case that foot-draggers are able to stop the uploads from happening and their actions are rather motivated by the wish to gain short-term wins. It is also clear that the rates of non-compliance with the EU law is the highest among member states that have chosen to foot-drag.

Fence-sitting

Fence-sitting member states position themselves between pace-setters and foot-draggers. They are rather neutral about policy uploads and build coalitions with both sides of ad-hoc basis. Their domestic legislation is moderate meaning so they are usually not facing strongly misfitting policies but they are also not the ones who try to upload their policies to the Union. This is due to the fact that they usually do not have sufficient funds and/or expertise available to be able to constantly push for their policy goals. As with coalition building, they might do that on ad-hoc basis but they do not have a particular pattern to do so. It is possible that fence-sitting is also a result of unsuccessful situation-analysis. Fence-sitting member states might not understand the impact of the legislation on their state before the adaption or might not be able to act due to some domestic factors (like tensions between domestic political stakeholders). Fence-sitting is also used by member states to pursue domestic policy changes that are unpopular in their nature or changes that domestic political actors are unable to pursue for some reason. Fence-sitting allows to “shift the blame” to Brussels avoiding high tensions nationally.

1.2. Foreign policy of the European Union

As argued by Manners and Whitman (2017), European Union’s foreign policy has two parallel dimensions: national dimension and EU-wide dimension. The national dimension consist of policy areas that are controlled by member states and EU-wide dimension refers to areas where competence to legislate lies within the European Union. Therefore, we are not able to separate the foreign policy of the member states from the one of the Union. Unlike other policy areas, foreign policy is a very wide policy area with not so clear borders. Often the topics discuss rather depend on the exact dynamics of the relationship that define the relevant topics.

The competences of the European Union to create legislation are set out in the treaties. Before going into detail what are the exact competences that the European Union has in the field of foreign policy, it is useful to go have an overview how the competences of the

European Union are formed. Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) defines three types of competences the European Union has: exclusive competences, shared competences and competences to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of member states (TFEU, 2007). Legislation in exclusive competence areas are carried out only by the European Union and member states do not have the possibility to create their own or bypass the EU's legislation in these areas. These areas include the customs union, competition rules, common commercial policy but also monetary policy for Eurozone. In the areas of shared competences, member states and the European Union are both creating legislation but member states cannot legislate in areas where the European Union has already done so. This is also referred to as pre-emption principle (Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, 2011). Shared competences of the European Union include internal market, environment, transport, agriculture and more. As a third option, TFEU defines areas where the European Union shall only advise, support or coordinate the policies of member states. This means that EU has no possibility to legislate in these areas such as health, education, civil protection, culture etc. Nevertheless, the reality of competence dividing is more complex as policies often share traits from different policy areas, e.g. a regulation affecting EU's energy policy might also have an impact on the internal market rules (Keukeleire & Delraux, 2014).

Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is not mentioned in TFEU articles 3, 4 and 6 but that does not mean that the European Union does not have any competence in the area. First, foreign policy is a complex policy field that combines elements from almost all kinds of different policy areas from trade and transport to environment and culture. That means that when states are carrying out their foreign policy, they might very easily come across different topics that are exclusively under EU's competence even though foreign policy itself is not mentioned in Article 3 of the TFEU that defines exclusive competences. An example of this situation is external trade policy that falls under exclusive competence of the European Union but at the same time constitutes an important part of foreign policy doctrines. Secondly, even though CFSP is not mentioned in TFEU articles 3, 4 and 6, it is brought out in Article 24 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) that together with the TFEU lays the ground for European Union's competences in external relations. Treaties are also providing the procedure on how to

adopt some of the decisions that have an external action dimension like trade policies, development coordination, coordination with third countries, trade agreements etc. These procedures are specified in the TEU and offer clear guidance on who takes the initiative and what instances need to approve the proposal in order for it to become in force (see Table 1 by Keukeleire & Delraux below). The process of adopting legislation that has external dimension is not as clear and indubitable as ordinary legislative procedure that is used to adopt most of the EU's legislation. The adopting procedure might be different in terms of Commission's powers or the role of the Parliament but all the different external legislation types share the big role of the Council in the adoption procedure. Big role of the Council (which essentially means member states) is characteristic to all the adoption procedures of policies that have an external dimension.

Table 1. Legal basis for EU foreign policy making

	Commission	Council	European Parliament	Treaty Basis
Trade Policy	Proposal	QMV	Co-decision	Art. 207 TFEU
Development cooperation	Proposal	QMV	Co-decision	Art. 209 TFEU
Cooperation with third countries	Proposal	QMV	Co-decision	Art. 212 TFEU
Trade agreements (development and cooperation) agreements Association agreements	Recommendation to open negotiation; proposal for signing and concluding an agreement	QMV (with exceptions) QMV (with exceptions) Unanimity	Consent Consent Consent	Arts 207, 218 TFEU Arts 211, 212, 218 TFEU Arts 217, 218 TFEU
Interruption or reduction of economic and financial relations	Proposal (on basis of a CFSP decision), jointly with the HR	QMV	No role	Art. 215 TFEU
Action when treaty does not provide powers	Proposal	Unanimity	Consent	Art. 352 TFEU

Table 1. Source: Keukeleire & Delraux 2014

All CFSP decisions are made unanimously by the Council and shall follow the guidelines coming from the European Council. The right for initiative stands with the member states, High Representative (HR) and the Commission (together with the HR) but the final decisions of CFSP need to be taken unanimously. Nevertheless, the TEU still defines some cases where the Council could use Qualified Majority Voting (55% of member states representing 65% of the population are in favour) like when appointing a special representative or when adopting a decision that implements a pre-agreed stand on a Unions position. Still, CFSP decisions that adopt the formal positions of the Union have to be agreed with all member states. This is also due to the rules on how QMV can be used in CFSP. QMV cannot be used if the proposal has a military dimension nor when a

state declares that due to a vital reason of national policy, it cannot support using this type of voting system. It means that in principle states can block whatever CFSP decision they wish to. There is also a possibility for member states to use something called ‘constructive abstention’. This means that in case a member state is absent and declares its abstention, it is not obliged to follow the decision made by the Council but at the same time, the Council can still make a decision regardless of the abstention. However, as practice has shown that the Council does not vote on CFSP decisions, states are also not using the possibility for ‘constructive abstention’ (Keukeleire & Delraux, 2014). These are the reasons why CFSP decisions have to be always adopted unanimously.

To overcome the difficulties of moving forward with CFSP legislation – in case some member states are using their veto powers – is by using enhanced cooperation and permanent structured coordination (PESCO). These procedures allow creating legislation among some of the member states leaving the ones who do not wish to cooperate in the area out of the legislative procedure. PESCO was set up in November 2017 by member states who wished for more cooperation in the field of defence. The decision to participate in PESCO came voluntarily from member states and that allowed overcoming the difficulties of finding the unanimous agreement in the Council to cooperate in the area.

1.3. Europeanization of foreign policy

Among the first scholars to study Europeanization of foreign policy was Ben Tonra, professor of international relations, studying the impact of the EU membership on the foreign policies of Ireland and Denmark (Tonra, 2001). The concept of foreign policy Europeanization is narrowing down the usually very broad focus of Europeanization to specifically Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the way how the European Union is affecting the foreign policy of its member states. In principle, however, the concept and its features remain unchanged. Still we distinguish between the two dimensions of uploading and downloading that help to understand in which direction the process is working as well as we need to keep in mind that in order to show the causal link the cases selected should be ‘difficult’.

Europeanization of national foreign policies has been widely studied by Hill and Wong in their book “National and European Foreign Policy: Towards Europeanization” (2012). This literature provides great tools to understand the differences of foreign policy Europeanization as compared to other policy areas.

Hill and Wong (2012) define three aspects of Europeanization of national foreign policy. These are adaptation and policy convergence, national projection and identity construction. Each of the aspects is also provided with indicators that allow us to understand if the specific aspect of Europeanization is indeed present in the empirical case. The first aspect of Europeanization according to Wong (2007) is adaptation and policy convergence. This aspect is examining mainly the exact policies of the European Union and a member state and comparing one to another. A typical indicator is a common policy objective shared by a specific member state and the European Union but also increased salience of European political agenda and changes in bureaucracy. As explained earlier, Europeanization cannot occur without difficult cases (or misfit but as argued before focusing on misfit is not suitable for foreign policy analysis). It is important to remember it as just having same policy objectives does not necessarily mean that it is the result of Europeanization. However, it is useful to examine how common, EU-wide policy objectives and political agendas have taken over member state policies from pre-accession era.

Second aspect according to Wong is national projection. This mostly concerns ‘uploading’ national policies to EU level and using the EU’s ‘umbrella’ to increase the state’s position in the world. In foreign policy, this can be done by the help of the European External Action Service, that has a wide network of diplomatic representations that can be ‘used’ also by member states to pursue its foreign policy objectives in areas, where a member state has previously not been able to pursue its policies. Member states are able to rely on the insights gained from the EEAS’s representations but also try to put its political agenda to the EU level that helps to, as argued by Wong, to ‘multiply’ it, meaning to make it not just one member state’s policy but a EU-wide policy.

Third aspect defined by Wong is identity (re)construction. As European Union's foreign policy is based on EU's values (brought out in the Lisbon Treaty), this aspect is of great importance as it mostly concerns changes in value systems. This could refer to emergence of new norms and values in member states that previously were not emphasised but also to a common understanding of interests.

All these three different dimensions and indicators are also brought out on Table 2 below.

Table 2. Three dimensions of foreign policy Europeanization

Aspect of Europeanization	National Foreign Policy Indicators
1. Adaptation and Policy Convergence (downloading)	a) Increased salience of European political agenda
	b) Adherence to common policy objectives
	c) Common policy obligation taking priority over national <i>domaines réservés</i>
	d) Internationalization of EU membership and its integration process ('EU-ization')
	e) Organizational and procedural change in national bureaucracies
2. National Projection (uploading)	a) State attempts to increase national influence in the world
	b) State attempts to influence foreign policies of other member states
	c) State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella
	d) National foreign policy uses the EU level as an influence multiplier
3. Identity (Re)construction (cross-loading)	a) Emergence of shared norms/values among policy-making elites in relation to international politics
	b) Shared definitions of European national interests
	c) Coordination reflex and 'pendulum effect' where 'extreme' national and EU positions are reconciled over time via bilateral and EU interactions

Table 2. Source: Wong 2007: 326

1.4. Measuring Europeanization

Börzel (2003) has worked out a scale to measure Europeanization that combines different views of scholars that have focused on the concept (Héritier, et al. 2001; Radaelli 2000; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse-Kappen 2001) and offers an explanation to each category. These categories are as follows:

- Inertia refers to situations where member states resist to the change promoted by the European Union that often leads to non-compliance and even infringement proceedings. Inertia results in no change in the current situation.

- Retrenchment is a process where a member state increases the amount of misfit (difficulties) between the European and national level instead of trying to adopt to the changes (Kerwer, Teutsch, 2001). This is an opposite process to Europeanization.
- Absorption means integration European influence to domestic institutions without a substantial change, modifications nor resistance. This means that the level of Europeanization is rather low and the legislation on the national and European level rather similar already before.
- Accommodation is a process where a member state adopts European initiatives to its national level with substantial changes in the existing systems but without changing the principal features in place (Héritier, et al, 2001). This means that a member state was Europeanized substantially.
- Transformation is a dramatic change in state institutions where European pressure that makes a member state to change its core understandings, political systems, institutions etc. (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001).

2. Research design, data and methods

This thesis is looking to answer the question of how big influence does being a member of the European Union give to a member state's foreign policy. For that the thesis will examine the case of Estonian-Turkish relationship and compare it to the relationship between European Union and Turkey to find similarities and differences in the dynamics of these relations.

2.1. Conceptualization of foreign policy Europeanization

In this thesis I will look at foreign policy Europeanization from three dimensions: adaption and policy convergence, national projection and identity reconstruction. Adaption and policy convergence can be understood as the downloading dimension of Europeanization. National projection can be understood as the uploading dimension and identity reconstruction is referred to as cross-loading dimension that consists of traits of both uploading and downloading.

Europeanization consists of two equally important elements: a change that makes a member state more European-like and a difficulty or a misfit. According to Börzel (2003) the change can be measured on a five point scale as brought out earlier. These five categories are inertia, retrenchment, absorption, accommodation and transformation. As discussed earlier, inertia and retrenchment do not entail Europeanization as both of them are describing resist to the change just on different levels. Therefore, even though these categories are important for understanding different state responses to European pressure, they do not play an important role when the focus of the research is to determine levels of Europeanization in a specific member state. In this thesis I will focus on the remaining three categories of absorption, accommodation and transformation. Understandably these three categories are ideal types and when studying specific cases one might easily find that a value stands somewhere between the two categories. In these cases it is important


to use the tools from comparative politics in order to see the similarities and differences and understand the levels of Europeanization.

The other necessary element to argue for the existence of Europeanization is a difficulty or a misfit. Many scholars have defined misfit as an integral part of Europeanization (Börzel, 1999; Duina, 1999; Héritier, 1996). Misfit is needed to confirm that the change was indeed a result of Europeanization. However, misfit offer us clear cases only for the downloading dimension of Europeanization as it concentrates on the misfitting policy or an institutional change and cannot explain changes happening in other dimensions. This has been also noted by George (2001) who argues that the downloading dimension offers us more clear examples of policy misfit that is not the case with other dimensions of Europeanization. Manners and Whitman (2000) have suggested that instead of policy misfit one should rather focus on difficult cases as it allows to argue for the causal link between the change and Europeanization also in other dimensions of foreign policy Europeanization.

Difficulty in this thesis is understood along three dimensions: difficult due to policies and bureaucracies (policy and institutional misfit), state projection or identity. Difficult cases are conflictual by their nature due to state's vital interests in the domain. Difficult cases are the ones where state wishes to keep the status quo and even small adjustments or changes cannot be easily implemented. Difficult cases due to policies and bureaucracies entail the same traits as policy and institutional misfit explained earlier in this paper. Difficult cases due to policy misfit entail already existing legislation that is challenged by the EU-law and institutional misfit challenges existing bureaucracies and ways of doing things. Difficult cases due to state projection are challenging the way the state is seen in the world. This might entail previously strong (or hostile) relationships with other countries that is challenged by the European Union's vision to the relationship. Difficult cases due to identity are the ones where state's identity or value system is challenged by the European Union. This entails changes in vision to building relationships or value system on what the policy doctrine is built upon.

In this paper, I will therefore examine Europeanization on two scales: the level of change towards becoming more 'European-like' and the difficulty of the case. Only in case a change towards more European-like policy and difficulty appear together, one might argue for the existence of Europeanization. If examining difficulty and the size of the change on the same graph positioning big change (transformation) at the top of Y-axis and difficult case on the right side of X-axis, we see that all values appearing on the top right corner are extremely Europeanized while everything on the bottom left corner do not have traits of Europeanization. For Europeanization to occur, at least a minimal change (absorption) towards a more Europe-like policy has to take place even though the more difficult the particular case, the easier it is to notice first traits of Europeanization. If a member state makes a small change to a very delicate policy area due to European influence I would still argue for the presence of Europeanization as well as when the policy area is a very easy one but a change is substantial (transformation). The line between falling into the category of Europeanization and staying out of it is clearly not as obvious as pointed out on Graph 1. The graph is more a guideline of ideal types to help to position and compare different cases.

Graph 1. Conceptualizing foreign policy Europeanization



Graph 1: Conceptualizing foreign policy Europeanization

Empirical part of the study will look at the same elements defined above and determine whether or not the particular case has traits of Europeanization. Additionally, after completing the empirical part of the study and examining different cases in Estonian Turkish relationship I will return back to this graph and position each individual case to the graph based on their values. First, I will examine each case and categorise the ones that are the most clear cut examples of the phenomenon. This is needed to be able to have points for comparison for the cases that do not offer such clear evidence. I will start by determining the most difficult case (based on the criteria explained above) and the easiest case with the most evidence to be able to determine the category. After that I will start putting all other values on the graph according to the clarity of the cases. After each positioning I will have more points of comparison on the graph that helps to position others. Still, I would argue that the graph is made to illustrate and systematize the results that are most of all presented in a descriptive way.

2.2. Data gathering

The thesis examines the foreign policy of Estonia towards Turkey. This makes the research a small N comparative study. This master thesis has a case study research design as it is examining the foreign policies towards two different states and is trying to apply the concept of Europeanization to empirical cases.

This thesis has two empirical chapters. The first of them is offering an overview of the relationship between Turkey and the European Union and Turkey and Estonia. The data gathered for these chapters is gathered from secondary sources and in-depth interviews carried out with civil servants (the structure of the in-depth interviews will be discussed shortly). Secondary sources can be divided in two: theoretical secondary sources such as books and scholarly articles and empirical secondary sources such as press articles, minutes from bilateral meetings or speeches from political actors.

The selection of theoretical secondary sources is based on a literature review on existing relevant published books and articles. The data gathering process for finding information about the EU-Turkey relationship was done using databases such as Google Scholar and ResearchGate. There is a wide range of existing literature focusing on various (often also very specific) aspects of the relationship. In this thesis, I have mostly used the introductory parts of these publications that offer relationship overviews bringing out the fields of cooperation and developments in relationships as further specialization is not required to answer the research question. It is important to stress, that in many cases the EU-Turkey relationship offers more material than Estonian-Turkish relationship. In these cases more information regarding the EU-Turkey relationship is not relevant as the purpose of this paper is to compare the foreign policies of the EU and Estonia, not to offer a conclusive overview of all aspects of the relationship.

Empirical secondary sources are especially needed to provide an overview of the national projection and identity aspects of foreign policy doctrines. The starting point for gathering this information was going through the list of official (state) visits. Speeches and statements given by high-level political actors during these visits were analysed using

discourse analysis methods. The criteria for ‘high-level’ political actorness was mainly their executive power to pursue changes to foreign policy. In the case of EU, it focused mostly on the High Representative but also Commissioners. In the case of Estonia, the focus was on the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. As will be discussed later in this paper, the foreign policy of the European Union is not as united and single voiced as many other policy areas where the Union has exclusive competence to legislate. Therefore, it was also needed to pay attention to the statements given by the heads of member states. The focus was mostly on bigger member states with more power in the Parliament and the Council.

In addition to the secondary sources, for the purpose of this thesis I have also conducted three in-depth interviews with civil servants representing the executive branch of the authority. The choice of civil servants interviewed was based on availability and the fact that they are working with the respective geographical areas. In-depth interviews were carried out using the same theoretical structure that was introduced in the previous chapter of this thesis (Hill, Wong, 2012). The interviews were compiled of three blocks of questions. The first one was focusing on the ‘downloading’ aspect of the relationship. I was asking about the changes in political agenda and objectives but also about changes in bureaucracies and procedures. The second part was focused the ‘uploading’ dimension of the relationship. In this part I am trying to understand how the respective entity is trying to influence others and how its influence in the world has changed. The third aspect was focused on the identity construction. In this section I was trying to understand what are the values in foreign policy making that define the concrete political actions and how have they changed in time.

All the interviews for the purpose of this thesis are carried out anonymously. All the sources agreed to be interviewed only in case their name nor position is mentioned in the thesis. All interviewees were asked to give their consent to participate in the interview, told about the purpose and use of it and explained the possibility to leave at any point. As agreed with the interviewees, they are referred to as ‘a source familiar with the topic’ or simply ‘the source’ in this thesis.

2.3. Conclusion of the theoretical chapters

To sum up the theoretical part of this thesis, I will now make a brief overview of the most important aspects of the theoretical part of this paper. The theoretical framework of this thesis can be grouped around three aspects:

- a) Foreign policy Europeanization is based on three dimensions: adaption and policy convergence, national projection and identity (re)construction.
- b) In order to argue for the existence of Europeanization, one should focus on difficult cases instead of misfit
- c) Measuring foreign policy Europeanization can be done on a five-point scale – provided by Börzel (2003) – that needs to be examined together with the difficulty of the case.

Europeanization as a theoretical concept needs to be understood as a process of European Union influence on its member states. This influence means changes in policies, laws, bureaucracies, institutional frameworks, perceptions, norms, values and much more. The concept is highly contested and therefore needs to be conceptualized with great attention to detail. In foreign policy context, Europeanization can be examined through three dimensions also referred to as downloading, uploading and cross-loading dimensions. Downloading (or adaption and policy convergence) dimension is examining mainly the exact policies of the European Union and a member state and comparing one to another. Uploading (national projection) dimension mostly concerns ‘uploading’ national policies to EU level and using the EU’s ‘umbrella’ to increase the state’s position in the world. Finally, cross-loading (identity (re)construction) mostly concerns changes in value systems.

Europeanization needs to be uncomfortable as it is the only way to distinguish the concept clearly from other processes. Even though many scholars (Börzel, 1999; Duina, 1999; Héritier, 1996) have defined ‘misfit’ or ‘mismatch’ as an integral part of the concept, George, (2001) argues that focusing on misfit creates confusion among scholars when examining the uploading dimension of foreign policy that is also the reason why most research in the area is focusing on downloading dimension. Therefore,

Manners and Whitman (2000) propose focusing on 'difficult cases' instead of misfit. Difficult case in this research paper is understood as conflictual by its nature due to state's vital interests in the domain and the ones where states wish to keep the status quo resisting even small adjustments or changes.

Finally, Europeanization can be measured on a scale by Börzel (2003) that defines five different levels of Europeanization: inertia, retrenchment, absorption, accommodation and transformation. Inertia and retrenchment refer to processes where no Europeanization is taking place and therefore these two categories will be disregarded as this thesis is focusing only on cases where Europeanization is indeed taking place. The level of Europeanization needs to be examined together with the difficulty of the case to be able to argue for the existence of the phenomenon. Therefore, in this thesis I will examine the level of Europeanization and the difficulty of the case as the two axis determining whether or not Europeanization is taking place and what is the level of Europeanization.

3. Development of relationships

In this chapter of the thesis, I will examine the relationships between the European Union and Turkey and the European Union and Estonia. The chapter provides an overview to the relationships but also works as a basis for analysis that will follow in the next chapter of this thesis.

3.1. The development of European Union – Turkey relations

The relationship between Turks and Europeans date back many centuries to the period of the Ottoman Empire. Even though in the context of Europeanization the Ottoman Empire might seem like going too far back in time, the historical context it carries is still very relevant until today. The two entities have a long history of co-existing geographically, politically and identity-wise next to each other. Europe and Turkey have seen times of war and friendship that still carries significance until today. Turkey's candidacy to become a member of the European Union as well as its NATO membership supported by its big army are only some of the factors that complicate the often tense relationship even more. As brought out in the previous chapter, the foreign policy of the European Union is very much dependent on the individual foreign policies of member states. Therefore, the stands towards Turkey are also highly dependent on the experiences and history of particular member states with Turks (or Ottomans) and Turkey. It is evident that member states who have been conquered by the Ottomans or have territorial and historical disputes with Turkey share a very different view on the Republic than those who are highly dependent on a strong NATO or are looking for emerging markets for their companies. This has been especially clear during the accession talks with Turkey. It is also important to stress that Turks and Turkey itself has also changed its stands towards the European Union being at times more leaning towards Europe and other times more to Asia. During the Turkish Independence War and under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the attitude of Turkey towards Europe was rather different then 50 years earlier during the Constantinople Conference period or 50 years later when Turkey invaded Cyprus as

a response to a coup on the island. This is simply to illustrate the dynamics of the multilayer and multifaceted relationship that I am going to examine in more depth below.

European Economic Community (EEC) was founded in 1958 and Turkey was one of the first countries interested in cooperating with the newly born union. Turkey had a long history with Europe already before the creation of the EEC. Without going back too much in history, Turkey showed in the Second World War how despite being between East and West (Turkey stayed neutral during most of the war) Turkey is still leaning towards the Western world when in the end of the war, it chose to enter the war on the Allied Forces side. 6 years earlier in 1952, Turkey had joined NATO that once again showed its commitment to the Western world. Therefore, it was natural that right after the creation of the EEC, Turkey and the EEC were both interested in finding opportunities for cooperation.

In July 1959, Turkey applied to become a member of the EEC but as it was not ready to meet the accession criteria at the time, the EEC offered to establish first an association treaty (Düzenli, 2010). EEC-Turkey Association Agreement (also referred to as Ankara Agreement) was signed 4 years later in 1963 and entered into force in December 1964. It was the first fundamental political agreement that was guiding the relationship between the EEC and Turkey that was meant to work as an interim phase towards Turkey's membership to the EEC (Aksu, 2013). The association agreement was second of its kind – 2 years earlier EEC had concluded an association agreement with Greece (Düzenli, 2010). The agreement between Turkey and the EEC was meant to establish a customs union between two entities and the possibility of accession to the EEC is rather implicitly mentioned than specifically determined. Ankara Agreement compiles of three stages that eventually establish a customs union. The first one, a preparatory phase, was meant to last for five years during which Turkey strengthens its economy to be able to fulfil the obligations for establishing the union. This phase was supported by the EEC's loans as well as tariff reductions. The second, transitional stage, lasts for 12 years and was meant for aligning the economic policies and establishing the union. The final stage did not have a time frame and was meant for closer coordination between the parties.

The Ankara Agreement laid the legal base for the creation of the institutional framework of EEC (EU) – Turkey relations. Even though not all the institutions dealing with Turkey – EU relationship are brought explicitly out in the association agreement, it still functions as a legal base for their existence.

Association Council

Association Council was established by the Ankara Agreement in 1963 and it functions as the main decision-making body that guides the relationship between Turkey and EEC (EU). The Association Council is able to adopt legally binding decisions in case they are made anonymously. Until today the Association Council remains an important institution for decision-making. The Association Council may also decide on establishing other relevant institutional frameworks, if it thinks they might provide useful support to the work of the Council. This is the legal base for the Association Committee and Joint Parliamentary Commission.

Association Committee

The Association Committee has been set up by the Association Council to prepare its meetings, write reports and exchange information prior to the Council meetings. The Association Committee itself has also many subcommittees that are focusing on different policy areas from economy, trade and market to agriculture and transportation. The Committee does not have any legal power and does not vote on topics but provides support to the Council.

Joint Parliamentary Committee

Joint Parliamentary Committee consists of members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the European Parliament. The Committee holds regular meetings between the two counterparts to enhance the cooperation between Turkey and EU as well as to exchange information between members of the parliaments. Joint Parliamentary Committee meetings are prepared and supported by the delegations to respective entities

that meet on regular basis prior to Committee meetings. Joint Parliamentary Committee is also meant to provide a platform for different experts and organisations (especially representing the Turkish civil society) for presenting their ideas and getting contacts with parliament members.

Customs Cooperation Committee

Customs Cooperation Committee is established with an aim to monitor the implementation of the Ankara Agreement. The Committee is of a technical nature and consists of experts from member states, the European Commission as well as Turkey. Committee is trying to find the best technical practices for implementation of the agreement and to solve any disputes related to it.

Turkey-EU Joint Consultative Committee

Turkey-EU Joint Consultative Committee was established many decades after the adoption of the Ankara Agreement. Nevertheless, the Committee's mandate still comes from the Ankara Agreement. Set up in 1995, the Committee consists of members of the European Economic and Social Committee as well as representatives of the civil society in Turkey (cite). The aim of the committee is to provide suggestion allowing Turkey to move forward with the European integration process.

All of these institutions that have got their legal base from the Ankara Agreement are still functioning until today. Some of them are working more actively, others are meeting rather rarely. The frequency of meetings has also been dependent on the current state of Turkey-EU relations and the prospects for moving forward with the integration.

The final aim of integration for Turkey was undoubtedly accession to the Union. Turkey had already expressed that wish in 1959 when submitting its application to become a member of the EEC. Still, the process of accession was stalled in 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s due to troubled times in Turkey that brought the country a wave of terror, political uncertainty and economic downfall. The relationship with the ECC troubled even further due to Turkish military invasion to Cyprus in 1974 that divided the

island into two. On top of all that, Turkey went through two coup d'état's in 1970-1980 that even further distanced it from the EEC. After the coup in 1980, the European Community decided to freeze all relations with Turkey that also included all the measures and institutional meetings set out in the Ankara Agreement. This was a response to the undemocratic leadership and ongoing human rights violations. It took three years before the army held elections and handed the political power back to civilians in 1983. The democratic shift made also EEC to restore relations with Turkey but it took until 1986 when the Association Council met again in their usual setting

On 14 April 1987 Turkey applied to become a full member of the EEC. This application was not welcomed with open arms by all member states. Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl suggested Turkey prior to submitting the application not to rush the decision and to make sure the application comes when Turkey is ready for it (Aksu, 2013). This warning was rooted in the fears and doubts about the Europe's neighbour whose accession could bring a migrant flow but was not necessarily shared among all member states. During the troubled times in Turkey, Greece had become a member of the EEC in 1981. This of course made the accession for Turkey even more difficult as ongoing conflict in Cyprus made Greece to block Turkey's accession. Turgut Özal – Turkish prime minister at the time – was rather keen to submit the application while Leo Tindemans was acting as the president of the Council of the Ministers who was known to be more open towards accepting Turkey to the Union (Aksu, 2013). Tindemans referred Turkey's application the Commission (a move that helped Turkey to avoid strong opposition from Greece) that decided two years later, in 1989, that due to shortcomings on different policy areas Turkey cannot be recognized as a candidate country at that stage. Still, for Turkey the decision was a step forward as the Commission did not deny Turkey's eligibility to apply for a membership (Aksu, 2013). It ensured Turkey that it was not facing a similar faith with Morocco who's application was rejected on the grounds that it is not a European country (Warning, 2006).

The relationship between Turkey and the European Union made a huge step forward in the end of the 1990s when Turkey was granted a candidate country status. The decision did not come easily. Before the positive decision in Helsinki in 1999, the European

Council met in Luxembourg in 1997 where 12 countries (including Estonia) were awarded with a candidate status but Turkey was not among them. One of the reasons were poor bilateral relationship with Greece but also problems with human rights in Turkey. A year later in 1998, the Commission adopted the Strategy Paper for Turkey that included specific working areas and action points that Turkey had to follow in order to move forward with the accession. In addition, the Commission started publishing regular reports on Turkey's progress – a format that exists until today. The Commission used the same progress report format also for Eastern Enlargement countries – including Estonia – whose process of becoming a member of the EU had also started by the time. Greek-Turkish relations improved considerably in 1999 after devastating earthquakes hit the two countries causing loss of life and destruction. This period in the relationship – also referred to as earthquake diplomacy – helped to overcome many difficulties in the often complicated relations and also played an important role in the process of Turkey's membership status as thanks to the progress made after the earthquakes, Greece was ready to back Turkey as a candidate country. Turkey was granted a candidate country status in December 1999 but it took 6 more years before the official accession negotiations started in 2005. Even though the process is referred to as accession negotiations, in reality it means adopting 35 chapters of EU law that is non-negotiable. Accession negotiations became less and less active until in 2012 when the European Commission adopted Positive Agenda for Turkey's EU accession talks. Still, almost 15 years later, only 1 chapter out of 35 has been closed (chapter on Science and Research), 16 are open and 8 blocked.

Turkey and EU have been cooperating in the realm of defence since the beginning of 1990s when Turkey joined the Western European Union. Western European Union was a predecessor to CSDP – established by the Lisbon Treaty – that gathered European nations and promoted defence cooperation. In 1992, Western European Union established associated membership status (also granted to Turkey) to accommodate countries that are part of NATO but not European Union. Two years later in 1994, WEU also established a possibility for associate partnership that included countries that were neither part of the EU nor NATO. Estonia was one of them. WEU was more used as a platform for dialogue

and defence cooperation intensified and became more concrete after the adoption of Lisbon Treaty in 2009 that established CSDP and took over the previous role of the WEU. It means that Turkey remained an important partner to the European Union in terms of defence cooperation. Together with the EU, Turkey is currently involved in CSDP missions in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo and Palestine. As the majority of the members of the European Union are also members of NATO, defence cooperation must also be seen in the NATO framework where the relations between Turkey and EU members are more intensive than in the realm of the CSDP. As for many member states, including Estonia, NATO is the main provider of national security, defence cooperation with Turkey is of high importance and will be discussed more in this paper.

The European Union's delegation to Turkey is working with a very wide range of topics that project the Union's policies and help to make it more visible and known in Turkey. As EU-Turkey relationship (at least for the moment) is relying on the accession talks, then one of the most visible forms of EU's projection comes from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). By the means of IPA, the European Union is offering financial support to Turkey to improve a large variety of topics starting from democracy, rule of law, civil society and home affairs until education, rural development, energy, transport and environment. The currently ongoing IPA 2014-2020 has a total value of around 4, 5 billion euros. During the previous IPA period from 2007-2013 Turkey was given access to financial assistance of 4, 4 billion euros (European Commission, 2019).

3.2. Estonian-Turkish relationship

Estonian foreign policy towards Turkey is based on the Treaty of Friendship that was signed in 1924 and functioned as the basis for bilateral relationship. Before the Soviet Occupation, Turkey and Estonia signed several trade agreements and enjoyed a rather strong bilateral relationship. The Soviet occupation stopped the bilateral relationship for about 50 years. During that time, Turkey never recognised Estonia's occupation – a decision that helped to build a strong relationship after the end of the Soviet occupation. Another decision that helped to start a strong new relationship came from the meeting of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe that took place in Rome. During the meeting, Russia expressed its wish to be able to send military force to its neighbouring countries where it has vital national interest – a proposition highly dangerous for countries like Estonia. Turkey was among the countries who strongly rejected this proposal paving the way for a successful relation. The first visit to Turkey took place already in 1993, very soon after Estonia had regained its independence. Presidential visit to Turkey revived the Treaty of Friendship and kicked off a new start in Estonian-Turkish relations. When Turkish Estonian relations before the Second World War were above all based on building a strong bilateral relationship, then after re-gaining independence the situation in Europe and World had changed and the new relationship started be more based on multilateralism and alliances among the Western countries. Turkey and Estonia signed a free trade agreement in 1997. It was officially signed during the first ever visit of the president of Turkey Süleyman Demirel to Estonia. Estonia expressed its high support to Turkey becoming a member of the European Union. After Turkey was granted a candidate country status in 1999 in Helsinki, Estonian president Lennart Meri said:

'The decision to grant Turkey a candidate country status was an important one and I congratulate both the European Union and Turkish Government on this occasion. Turkey has been part of Europe throughout centuries and I believe that Turkey's candidate country status will enhance security and prosperity in Europe and will also show to the world that Europe is not just a club for Christians.'

(Meri, 1999)

Of course, it was a two way street. After re-gaining independence, Estonia-Turkey relationship was much focused on defence cooperation. Estonia's worry about the threat from Russia made it quickly look for allies in the West and cooperation possibilities in NATO and EU frameworks. By the beginning of 1990s, Turkey had already been a member of NATO for about 40 years after joining the alliance in 1952 just couple of years after the foundation of NATO. Turkey's support for Estonia's membership laid a strong foundation to the alliance between the two countries. In 1993 president Lennart Meri met with his counterpart president Süleyman Demirel. Estonia had just re-gained its independence and president Meri – who immediately started looking for ways to build alliances with the West – was looking for opportunities to find support for joining NATO. Meri expressed his worry to Demirel that an upcoming NATO summit in Madrid might leave the Baltic States to a 'grey area' without an invitation to join the alliance. Demirel reassured that Turkey will support Estonia's membership by saying:

'Don't worry. Turkey will be there. You can always expect our support.'

(Meri, 1998)

The relationship developed forward keeping in mind defence cooperation, Estonia's aspiration to join NATO and Turkish wish to become a member of the European Union. The president of Turkey came for an official state visit for the second time in 2002. In a speech given by Arnold Rüütel, Estonia emphasises the support for Turkish EU membership and promises to share experience in the best practices to join the Union. The European Union started accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 that was based on a European Council decision made in December 2004. The European Council in December 2004 was one of the first Council meetings after Estonia had joined the European Union. During the meeting, Estonia expressed its support to begin accession negotiation with Turkey. Prime Minister Juhan Parts described it after the meeting as follows:

"The government of Turkey has shown determination in the last few years to implement extensive political and economic reforms. I believe that the decision of the European

Union to open accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005 contributes to the future development of Turkey and improvement of Turkey's relations with Cyprus.”

(Vabariigi Valitsus, 2004)

According to a source familiar with the topic, Estonia's support to Turkey's aspiration to join the European Union was based on two equally important aspects. First, like established before, Turkey had given strong support to Estonia's accession to NATO. It was logical that Estonia would respond to this support by helping Turkey to become a member of the European Union. But it would be too simplified to see the support simply as a result of returning favours. For Estonia Turkey's continued position among the Western countries is a vital aspect from defence cooperation point of view. Accession prospect ties Turkey more to Europe and to the West that among other aspects helps to keep the NATO alliance (that is one of the cornerstones for the security of Estonia) healthy. The second reason is more related to the European Union itself. Estonia has always been supporting the enlargement of the Union. From one side the support for enlargement comes from the past experience when Estonia was becoming a member itself. Estonia has seen how the wish to become a member of the European Union pushed it to pursue reforms and how the financial and political support given by the Union has helped Estonia to develop swiftly. From the other side Estonia itself was accepted to the Union despite fears of Eastern enlargement that could bring negative effect to the Union. Not supporting others to join would therefore be incoherent foreign policy and would rather give a sign that the enlargement that made Estonia a member cannot be considered a success.

After Estonia joined the European Union in 2004, Estonian-Turkish relationship heavily relies on the Union. An indicator of the European Union dimension in bilateral relations can be seen when looking at the topics of recent political consultations between the two countries:

- 25 February 2016: Political consultations regarding European Union affairs
- 15 June 2016: Political consultations regarding security politics
- 25 November 2016: Political consultations regarding migration

- 9 May 2017: Political consultations regarding security politics

The meeting that took place in February and November 2016 are both based entirely on EU-policies. EU-Turkey migration cooperation is set out in the EU-Turkey refugee agreement that was also one of the topics that Estonia had to oversee during its presidency of the Council of the European Union. Defence cooperation has also an EU dimension in addition to Estonian-Turkish usual cooperation in NATO as Turkey is participating in CSDP missions in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo and Palestine.

Besides defence, migration and EU affairs, Estonian-Turkish cooperation in the field of education relies on various EU-funded frameworks. Educational cooperation with Turkey relies on ERASMUS, European Youth and Archimedes Foundation that are all supported (and controlled) by the European Union. Educational cooperation between Turkey and Estonia was also regulated prior to the Estonian accession to the EU by a cooperation agreement regarding culture, education, research and sports but the cooperation intensified with Estonian accession to the EU. Turkey has been a target country for Study in Estonia programme that is funded by the EU's Regional Development Fund. The programme promoting foreign students to study Estonia has increased the number of international degree student from 840 in 2005 to 4395 in 2017. Turkish student are in among the top 10 countries of foreign students (Piliste, 2018). EU has also supported many cultural cooperation initiatives between Estonia and Turkey. For example, Estonia has been organizing celebrations on Europe Day, EU has supported several cultural cooperation events like concerts etc.

Estonia is working on its projection in Turkey with limited resources available and on many occasions has to rely on the structures of the European Union. Estonian embassy in Ankara is currently compiled of an ambassador and two diplomats who are working on a range of topics from economic and political to cultural and educational cooperation. Still, on many occasion Estonia has to rely on the European Union to carry out these policies. According to the source, political coordination with the Commission is mostly taking place in Brussels. Diplomats in the Permanent Representation of Estonia to the EU attend meetings with Commission officials (notably from the European External Action Service)

on regular basis. Information gathered from these meetings is passed on to the Foreign Ministry in Tallinn that also coordinates with the embassy in Ankara. Despite the regular coordination meetings, member states might still find themselves in conflicting positions.

Free trade agreement between Turkey and Estonia was established in 1997 and annulled in 2004 when Estonia joined the European Union. As discussed previously in this paper, foreign trade falls under exclusive competences of the European Union. Therefore all the trade agreements made prior to the accession had to be annulled by the time of accession. Turkey is part of the European Union Customs Union that regulates the trade between EU and Turkey and replaced the previous free trade agreement between Estonia and Turkey. This means that since 2004 all the desired changes (if any) to trade agreement have to be negotiated on the EU level and cannot be concluded by member states like Estonia on their own. Nevertheless, joining the European Union made trade between Turkey and Estonia to intensify and in recent years Estonia has put more emphasis to improve business relations between the two countries by organising events to entrepreneurs in both Turkey and Estonia to introduce business and cooperation opportunities in both countries. During the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Estonia was also hoping to modernise the EU-Turkey trade relationship as was already previously defined as an objective by the European Commission following the EU-Turkey Summit in 2015.

Cultural and educational cooperation has been heavily relying on the European Union that has provided institutional frameworks and financial means to pursue cooperation in these fields. Estonia and Turkey are both involved in ERASMUS programme, European Youth programme and other programmes supported by the Archimedes Foundation that is funded by the European Union namely Study in Estonia programme that is funded by the European Regional Development Fund and is also targeting Turkish citizens to study in Estonia. Estonia has also been involved in many events held to celebrate the Europe Day, taking up the role to introduce Europe in Turkey.

E-government systems and e-residency have been one of the main 'soft' topics for Estonia to communicate outside its borders. However, according to a source familiar with the

topic, Estonia has not been very actively introducing e-governance systems in Turkey. Besides a few individual events focused on introducing e-solutions, Estonia has not done active promotion to these topics in Turkey. This is mainly due to two main reasons. First, Turkish authorities have not shown high interest towards these solutions and secondly Estonia is not able to actively work on promoting the topic all around the world and is instead focused on other markets and target groups.

During Estonian presidency of the Council of the European Union, Estonia was representing the European Union also outside the Union's borders, including in Turkey. Prime Minister Jüri Ratas paid a 2-day visit to Turkey in August 2017 during the Estonian presidency where the main topics included migration and terrorism. As agreed previously in the trio programme that was adopted before the Estonian presidency, Estonian, Bulgarian and Austrian presidencies focused on tackling migration issues that includes also monitoring Turkey-EU refugee agreement. During the meeting Prime Minister Jüri Ratas acknowledged Turkey's efforts in tackling migration and terrorism and emphasised that Estonia remains committed to EU's enlargement policy. The Turkish public saw the visit not as a bilateral visit between two countries but as a European Union visit. An implication of Ratas representing the whole Union took place during the press conference in Ankara where Ratas was asked about the funds that the EU promised to allocate to Turkey for agreeing to the Turkey-EU refugee agreement or when Ratas was commenting on possible accession of Turkey to the EU:

"Turkey is an important strategic partner not only for Estonia but all of the EU, and Brussels likewise wants to continue negotiations with Turkey despite differences. At the same time, we expect that Turkey improve its relations with EU member states."

(Vahtla, 2017)

However, in September, just couple of months later during the Estonian presidency Angela Merkel called to cease accession talks with Turkey – a view that for many reasons discussed before was definitely not shared by Estonia. Merkel argued that it has become clear that Turkey has no place in the EU, a view also shared by the Austrian government. Estonian foreign minister Sven Mikser responded that he does not expect the Union to

make any decisions regarding ceasing the accession talks with Turkey implying that the talks will continue until decided otherwise (Gotev, 2017). During his visit to Ankara in July, however, Mikser argued that pushing Turkey away from Europe is in nobody's interests (Nael, 2017).

Source familiar with the topic argues that Estonia does not want to pick sides in conflicts between Turkey and other EU members. To some extent Estonia is even trying to conciliate the relations between member states who do not wish to continue the accession talks (especially Germany, Austria and recently also Belgium) and Turkey or at least to call for a dialogue but to find a way that the EU would not push Turkey too far away. The prospect of a watershed between the EU and Turkey is potentially dangerous for Estonia as it also creates discords within NATO and instability in the EU neighbourhood.

In bilateral relationship, Estonia has also emphasised the similar position and identity of the two countries. In his speech in 1998 in Turkey, President Lennart Meri argues despite the geographical distance between the two countries, Turkey and Estonia share many similarities. He draws a figurative line from Estonia to Turkey and draws his audience's attention to the fact how the two countries are both on the border of Europe and Asia. Even though the figurative expression about being a bridge between the East and the West is often used to describe Turkey, Meri uses it also to for Estonia, showing the similarities of the two countries. Meri argued that the Baltic Sea in the North and the Black Sea in the South represent both a geopolitical hotspots that provides a good foundation for common understandings between the two nations.

After regaining independence, Estonia based its foreign policy on liberal values such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and human rights (Raik, 2018). To what extent Estonia can rely on liberal values today is debatable but undoubtedly liberal values set out in the Lisbon Treaty are still functioning as a guideline for foreign policy. Therefore the relations with countries who do not necessarily share the same value system might be conflicting. We might ask, is Estonia ready to avoid hard topics such as human rights in relations with Turkey in order to have a flourishing relationship in the field of defence? A source familiar with the topic argues that the value question is not

actively on the table in the NATO framework but prominent in the corridors of Brussels. According to the source, Estonia usually prefers to avoid addressing difficult questions with Turkey in a strong manner but also admits that being a member of the European Union, Estonia cannot keep its eyes closed to the shortcomings in following the democratic principles. I would argue that Estonia likes to see the possible accession of Turkey (that is based on conditionality and following the EU value system) and possible cooperation with Turkey separately. When we examine the statements given by the Prime Minister Jüri Ratas and foreign minister Sven Mikser during the time of Estonian presidency, the separation of these two topics is evident. Sven Mikser argues for the importance of cooperation:

“We support open dialogue between the EU and Turkey, with whom we have a lot of common interests – refugee agreement, economic cooperation, anti-terrorism cooperation and Customs Union.”

(Kamilova, 2017)

In the same statement Sven Mikser also argues for the need for conditionality:

“The European Union expects from all candidates – including Turkey – to follow European standards in terms of democracy and rule of law.”

(Kamilova, 2017)

The same structure is also used by Prime Minister Jüri Ratas, showing that even though Estonia finds it necessary that an EU candidate country follows the EU value-system, it does not find shortcomings in these principles to be an obstacle in bilateral relationship. Estonia prefers to keep these topics separated as it allows to pursue with cooperation while showing dedication to the EU value system.

The way how Turkey is perceived in Estonia can also be understood based on how Foreign Ministry is classifying the relationship with Turkey. Currently Turkey is part of a division that falls under the competence of the Undersecretary of European Affairs. The particular division is referred to as South-Eastern Europe and European Union’s department. According to a source familiar with the topic, the classification is based on the ongoing accession negotiations and many other common topics that the European Union and Turkey share. One of the recent and most prominent examples of that kind would be the Turkey-EU refugee agreement. Before that Turkey has been part of the division focusing on European and Transatlantic relations. This classification shows more focus on Turkey’s NATO membership than EU partnership.

4. Europeanization of Estonian Foreign Policy

Based on the previous empirical and theoretical chapters I argue that Estonian foreign policy towards Turkey is Europeanized but not within all dimensions defined by Wong (2007). We can see some level of Europeanization in the ‘downloading’ dimension, significant Europeanization in the ‘uploading’ dimension and almost no Europeanization in the identity reconstruction dimension of national foreign policy. Below I will examine the each dimensions in more depth and systemize them as brought out in the methodology part of this thesis. For that I will examine the specific case on two axis: the level of Europeanization and the difficulty of the case. As brought out earlier in this paper, the level of Europeanization can be measured on a five-point scale by Börzel (2003): inertia, retrenchment, absorption, accommodation and transformation. As inertia and retrenchment refer to processes where no Europeanization is taking place, they will be disregarded in this paper focusing only on Europeanization. Difficult cases are understood in this thesis as conflictual by their nature due to state’s vital interests in the domain where state wish to keep the status quo and even small adjustments or changes cannot be easily implemented. Below I will look at all three dimensions of foreign policy Europeanization as established earlier in this paper and measure each individual case based on its difficulty and level of Europeanization. Finally, I will put these individual cases on a two-axis scale that allows to systemise and illustrate Estonian foreign policy Europeanization towards Turkey.

.In the previous sections of this paper, I have discussed Estonian-Turkish relations among different policy areas and its relations to European Union. I have touched upon different policy areas including European affairs, economy, education, European values, defence, culture, terrorism and migration. To be able to conclude whether or not different aspects of Estonian foreign policy have been Europeanized, we need to look at all these individual policy areas and understand the difficulty of these cases.

4.1. Adaption and policy convergence

One of the most Europeanized topic in Estonian foreign policy towards Turkey concerns European affairs. The cornerstones of the relationship between the European Union and Turkey were already set before Estonia joined the Union in 2004. The starting point for Estonia was a Union that was associated with Turkey through Ankara agreement and who had fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and become a candidate country. It was convenient for Estonia to join the European Union where member states had already agreed to support Turkey in aspiration to become a member state. If we examine the difficulty of the case of European affairs in Estonian-Turkish relationship, we could argue that even though the EU's policy towards Turkey was suitable for Estonia, the case can still be considered to be rather difficult as Estonia undoubtedly wishes to keep the status quo in associating Turkey with the European Union. Prior to the accession, Estonia had promised Turkey support during the accession talks and the attitudes inside the Union made this promise easy to keep. Estonia fully adopted the EU's position and policies concerning Turkey without any misfit or inconvenience because it fitted well with Estonia's policy towards Turkey prior to the accession. We can still argue that the level of change towards becoming more European-like was rather high and is reaching the level of transformation as no previous legislation concerning Turkey's association with the EU was in place. Estonia was not previously able to change the course of Turkish accession talks – a possibility that became available after joining the Union.

At the same time, the topic of enlargement is also rather difficult due to conflicts among EU member states regarding Turkish accession. Estonia has always supported Turkey's accession based on conditionality that comes partly from Turkey's support to Estonia during Estonia's accession talks for NATO membership but also from a wish to 'anchor' Turkey to the European Union making sure it would continue to support and ally with the Western world. In case the EU should stop accession negotiations with Turkey, this topic will become extremely Europeanized as Estonia is forced to make a big step towards a direction it does not support. In the domain of EU enlargement, member states that are against a particular enlargement policy enjoy enhanced power situation due to veto rights. However, there are no veto rights that would allow Estonia to continue negotiations in

case some other member states are against it. Therefore European enlargement policy can potentially become even more Europeanized domain.

Economic relationship is modestly Europeanized but not a conflictual topic in Turkish-Estonian relations. We could see some traits of difficulties in the policy adoption dimension (all trade relations with countries outside of EU fall under the exclusive competence of the European Union) but it is difficult to argue that Estonia would have wished to continue trade relations with Turkey on the basis of the trade agreement signed prior to the Estonian accession. That is evident when looking at the growth in export after Estonia's accession to the EU that grew four times during just a four year period following the accession to the EU. Still, Estonia was obliged to cancel its free trade agreement with Turkey in 2003 prior to the accession and adopt the trade agreement between the European Union and Turkey that makes the topic highly influenced by the European Union. We can argue that the economic policy towards Turkey went through a transformation as it was formulated on a totally new base after Estonia joined the EU. But as the difficulty of the case is low, it is difficult to argue for high level Europeanization.

Even though education is not a difficult case, it has become much more European-like since Estonian accession to the Union. In comparison to economic sphere discussed above, education shows even less traits of difficulty. When one could argue that the fact that Estonia had to cancel its free trade agreement with Turkey shows a trait of difficulty in the case, then in the field of education Estonia did not have to cancel any previously existing policies and only benefited from joining pan-European initiatives in the field of education. Estonian-Turkish educational cooperation is based on ERASMUS, Study in Estonia programme, European Youth programme and support given by the Archimedes Foundation. All the pre-mentioned are European Union's programmes. After Estonian accession to the European Union cooperation in the field of education intensified a lot (e.g. Turkey is among the top 10 countries for foreign students in Estonia). Estonia had prior to the accession signed a cooperation treaty with Turkey that also covered the field of education but as already mentioned before, there was no need to cancel or amend it. Therefore, the level of change is accommodation as Estonia adopted European initiatives to national level without substantial changes to previous systems in place (Knill, 2001).

Medium level of change and low level of difficulty makes the Europeanization in the domain of education low.

Defence cooperation with Turkey is one of the most important aspects for Estonia in bilateral relationship and therefore also the most difficult case for Estonia. It is evident that the wish to continue with the status quo in the field of defence is very high due to Estonia's wish to keep NATO strong and united. Turkey as one of the biggest members of NATO in terms of the size of the army is an important partner keeping the union strong. However, Estonia's membership to the European Union has not influenced the dynamics of NATO relations from policy adoption perspective. Even though Turkey is participating to European Union's military operations in Europe and Middle-East, defence cooperation in the field of defence in the EU framework is rather limited and change towards a more European like policy therefore also very low. This makes defence cooperation a not Europeanized field of cooperation between Turkey and Estonia.

Terrorism and migration are not Europeanized topics. However, I would argue that the topics are nevertheless difficult. Estonia has kept a passive stand in migration (e.g. not fulfilling the allocation quota) that refers to a wish to keep the status quo without substantial changes in the field. Terrorism is by its nature a very difficult topic that has a raised interest and concern among citizens in every European country including Estonia. Still, we cannot see any substantial changes in the field that would affect bilateral relationship. Turkey and the European Union are cooperating in the fight against terrorism as well as have signed a refugee agreement but these topics have limited impact on Estonian policy towards Turkey (especially for Estonia as a receiver in terms of financial allocations). This makes terrorism and migration a not Europeanized policy domains.

Culture is the least Europeanized topic in the relationship between Turkey and Estonia. We can see limited support from the European Union for cultural cooperation and exchange that mostly concerns financial support to various events. Still, the change is almost non-existent in a policy field that has no traits of conflict. This makes cultural cooperation a non-Europeanized area of cooperation.

4.2. National projection

I would argue that the biggest changes towards Europeanization in Turkish-Estonian relations come from national projection dimension of foreign policy. After joining the European Union, Estonia has seen the relationship with Turkey through the Union's framework that has changed the nature of the bilateral relationship.

In bilateral meetings with Turkey Estonia often takes the position of the European Union. As discussed in more depth in the previous section, the topics addressed in the bilateral meeting are mostly part of EU's policies towards Turkey like Turkey's accession to the EU, migration, trade, or education. In many cases Estonian stand in a particular policy is part of a bigger EU-wide position. Therefore after the accession of Estonia to the EU, the meetings have become from Estonian-Turkish meetings to EU member state-Turkish meetings. This has intensified the relationship with Turkey and brought more topics on the table for meetings. Therefore, the change towards a more European like behaviour is very high that can be classified as transformation. Representing the European Union is a modestly difficult topic for Estonia as the European Union's position might be more conflicting than Estonia would necessarily like to voice in bilateral relationship. This is especially the case with progress reports published by the European Commission that lately have been rather critical towards human rights violations and shortcomings in democratic freedoms and rule of law in Turkey. High level of change and average difficulty makes Estonia's perception in bilateral relationship a Europeanized topic for Estonia.

Estonia might not be directly uploading policies concerning Turkey to the EU level but according to a source familiar with the topic, Estonia is trying to conciliate the relations between member states and Turkey or at least to call for a dialogue. For Estonia, Turkey is an important partner in NATO and discords with other EU members that might push Turkey further away from Western states are not in the interests of Estonia. Estonia has always called to continue accession negotiation with Turkey in a wish to 'anchor' Turkey to the Union – a view not necessarily shared by all member states. Clearly conciliation is a new field of work for Estonian diplomats as prior to the accession Estonia had no

interests in inter-Union relationships. Therefore the level of change is very high and can be classified as transformation. At the same time, the field is also difficult as it is in the interests of Estonia to keep the status quo in the current Turkey-EU relationship. Conciliation is very much connected to the enlargement (EU-affairs) domain discussed earlier in this paper as well as Estonia's new role as a member state of the European Union. As the topic includes a big change and is at the same time also moderately difficult, it has the traits of Europeanization.

Meeting Turkey as a member of the European Union requires Estonia to have stands on topics that are not usually very prominent in Estonia's foreign policy doctrine. According to the source, meetings with Turkey often also touch upon geostrategic challenges in further away regions like the Middle-East. This of course causes some difficulties as Estonian diplomats need to be able to express their and EU's stands on questions regarding topics that carry geopolitical importance for Turkey. As Estonia is not engaged in an active policy making process concerning the Middle-East region (due to lack of resources and representation), the topic is very much connected to the previous one concerning Estonia representing the European Union in bilateral relationship with Turkey. Estonia's positions usually remain vague and descriptive that makes the topic not very difficult for Estonia. The change however is modest and could be categorised as absorption. Low level of change in a rather easy field means that Estonia's role in the world is not a Europeanized topic in bilateral relationship with Turkey.

EU membership has given Estonia more strength in pursuing its foreign policy goals than it would without being a member. First, Estonia has been able to move forward with the cooperation in the fields of education, culture and economy thanks to the financial and bureaucratic help received from the European Union. Growing number of exchange and permanent students in both countries, advanced trade relations (export grew 5 times during the first 4 years in the EU) and regular event promoting cultural exchange are clear indicators of impact multiplication after Estonia joined the European Union.

4.3. Identity reconstruction

Identity reconstruction is the least observable implication of Europeanization of Estonian foreign policy towards Turkey. This thrives from the fact that Europe itself is not united in its stands towards Turkey.

Estonian foreign policy relies on European values but shortcomings from Turkey's side to meet them are not seen as obstacles for cooperation. Even though this is widely shared view to relationship with Turkey among other EU member states as well, some member states (Germany, Austria, and Belgium) see that Turkey's shortcomings have gone too far and further cooperation has become very difficult. There is also a difference between member states who support going on with the accession negotiations. Some of them (Nordic countries, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus) voice their concerns more strongly over human rights violations in Turkey while Estonia among with most of the EU-13 has decided to rather avoid criticising Turkey openly. There is not change towards a more European like attitude in this question as there is no one clear understanding in the European Union how relations with Turkey should be approached with a view on its shortcomings to meet European value standards. Therefore, the category is not applicable for the study.


There is also no consensus among EU member states about what could be the 'European interest' in relations with Turkey. For countries like Estonia – whose defence is highly dependent on NATO – partnership with Turkey revolves around defence cooperation. For Mediterranean countries partnership with Turkey is more important in the domains of migration and terrorism as well as to ensure stable development in their neighbourhood. A high number of Turkish citizens living in Germany creates a whole new dynamic in relations between the two countries. Greece and Cyprus are hoping to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. These examples are simply to illustrate the complexity of relations between Turkey and individual EU member states. It is also to illustrate the reason why it has been very difficult to define a single European interest that would also serve all member states. Therefore again it is not possible to examine the Europeanization of national interests because defining single 'European interests' is not possible.

4.4. Mapping Estonian foreign policy Europeanization

In this chapter, I will systemise the results presented in the previous chapter of this thesis by using the two-axis graph consisting of two essential elements of Europeanization: level of change and difficulty. As argued in the methodological chapter of this thesis, the graph offers great tools for examining difficulty and size towards more European-like policy together. It allows not only to see the levels of Europeanization but also to compare different cases to one another that helps to systemise the results and offer valuable starting point for asking future research questions.

If examining difficulty and the size of the change on the same graph positioning big change (transformation) at the top of Y-axis and difficult case on the right side of X-axis, we see that all values appearing on the top right corner are extremely Europeanized while everything on the bottom left corner do not have traits of Europeanization. The theoretical starting point before systematising thesis results is shown on Graph 2.

Graph 2. Conceptualization of foreign policy Europeanization




Graph 2. Conceptualizing foreign policy Europeanization.

As argued in the methodological part of this paper, I will start adding values to this graph starting from the clearest examples in terms on categorisation. This allows me to have comparative data on the graph for values that cannot so clearly be categorised.

I have first positioned EU affairs, defence, culture and economy to the graph below. These four domains offer clear examples and are positioned in four different corners of the graph. I argue that in comparison with EU affairs and economy, Estonia's perception has also went through a transformation but in terms of difficulty positions in between EU affairs (as an example of a difficult topic) and economy (as an example of rather easy topic). Education can be positioned in the middle showing moderate levels of change as well as difficulty. In relations with defence, cooperation in the fields of terrorism and migration has gone through a bit bigger change mostly due to EU-Turkey refugee agreement that to some extent is also affecting Estonia. In terms of difficulty, terrorism and migration stand between culture (as a very easy topic) and defence (as a vital interest topic for Estonia) as even though the topics offer heated debates, the impact of these policies is not as substantial as in the realm of defence. Estonia in world politics is a domain that has shown small change that can be compared to cooperation in the fields of migration and terrorism. Estonia in bilateral relationship is using more European stands and positions but does not actively engage in foreign policy. The difficulty can be positioned in between culture and migration offering still limited impact and importance to Estonian-Turkey relationship.

Graph 3 is meant to provide some systematisation and illustration to the topic. It allows to examine different domains of foreign policy and compare them to one another. Potentially, the graph also provides first input for future research focusing on the Europeanization of Estonian foreign policy in a particular policy domain.

Graph 3. Estonian Foreign Policy Europeanization towards Turkey



Graph 3. Europeanization of Estonian foreign policy towards Turkey

4.5. Estonia’s response to European influence

As discussed in the theoretical part of this paper, Börzel (2002) defines three broad strategies of member states in response to European influence: pace-setting, foot-dragging and fence-sitting. Pace-setting countries are the ones who are leading the integration and pushing other member states to follow the pace. Foot-dragging member states are obstructing further integration and oppose European influence in national politics. Fence-sitting member states are in between the last two options – they are rather neutral about policy uploads and build coalitions with both sides of ad-hoc basis.

All these strategies by Börzel (2002) are ideal-types and therefore I could not argue that Estonia is a clear example of any of these. Nevertheless, in relations between Turkey and the European Union, there are no clear examples of foot-dragging. The closest to foot-dragging at the moment is Estonia’s balancing technique between criticising Turkey for its shortcomings in following European values and finding actively cooperation in many

policy areas but as this is the strategy for many other member states as well, it would be difficult to argue even in this case for foot-dragging strategy as there is no single pan-European position in this question. Estonia's foreign policy strategy towards Turkey is balancing between pace-setting and fence-sitting. In some areas – notably accession negotiations and defence cooperation – Estonia is taking a more active stand in integrating Turkey with the Union. This would indicate a pace-setting strategy and readiness to upload policies to the Union level. On other policy domains – such as migration and economy – Estonia has remained more neutral.

Estonia is not among member state who would consider Turkey's shortcoming in the field of European value system (democratic freedoms, human rights etc.) to be an obstacle in bilateral relationship. Even though the topic is difficult and causing a lot of discussion on European level, the change in Estonia's behaviour has been minimal. Estonia has emphasised its concern over following democratic principles but as argued in the previous chapter, it is not seen as a preclusive condition. Therefore I would argue for a low level for Europeanization.

Conclusions

This thesis was tackling the research problem of how big influence does the European Union have on its member states' foreign policy. This question was addressed using Europeanization as a theoretical framework for the study. Europeanization can be categorised as part of European integration theories that aims to explain not only the 'downloading' dimension of integration but also 'uploading' dimension, offering suitable theoretical framework for studying changes in foreign policy. Foreign policy is a complex policy field combining aspects such as policy, national projection and identity and therefore cannot be approached by examining only legislative tools. The complexity of the policy domain is also the reason for the theoretical approach to foreign policy Europeanization in this thesis that is relying on a three-dimension approach provided by Hill and Wong (2012). The dimensions used in this thesis are adaption and policy convergence (downloading), national projection (uploading) and identity (re)construction (cross-loading). Foreign policy Europeanization is measured on a five-point scale provided by Börzel (2003) focusing on the three categories that describe changes towards Europeanization. To be able to argue for the existence of Europeanization, the examined case needs to provide a difficulty as argued by Manners and Whitman (2000). Therefore, the analysis in this thesis is conducted on a two-axis scale combining the difficulty of the case and the change towards a more European-like policy. Only in case these two aspects were present at the same time, I could argue for foreign policy Europeanization.

Following the theoretical and empirical part, this paper has concluded that Estonia's foreign policy toward Turkey is Europeanized in two dimensions: downloading and uploading dimensions. In addition to empirical findings, this paper also presents tools for analysing foreign policy Europeanization arguing that instead of policy 'misfit' defined as an integral part of Europeanization by many scholars (Börzel, 2002), one should rather focus on the difficulty of cases. The conclusion of this paper are:

- 1) Theoretical framework for analysing Europeanization of a member state foreign policy requires a focus on the difficulty of cases rather than policy misfit defined as an integral part of Europeanization by many scholars. Showing misfit in foreign

policy context is in many cases not possible as foreign policy does not only rely on legislative tools that would allow to examine a misfit between a Union's legislation and a member state's one. This comes from the complexity of foreign policy analysis that requires focusing not only on the 'top-down' but also on the 'bottom-up' approach combining identity and national projection dimensions to the usual policy elements to the analysis. Measuring foreign policy Europeanization has to be done comparatively meaning each individual case needs to be seen in relation with other cases. Ideal types for measuring Europeanization defined by many scholars (Wong 2007, Börzel 2002) help to understand the concept and show different responses of member states to European influence but do not offer help in comparing specific empirical cases to one another. Europeanization has to be measured on two axis that combine the most important aspects of the concept: difficulty and the size of the change towards more European-like policy.

- 2) The level of Europeanization in the downloading dimension of Estonian foreign policy towards Turkey depends on choice of policy area examined. We can see Europeanization in topics such as European affairs, economy and education. Cooperation in the area of culture, migration, terrorism and defence is not Europeanized. In the policy uploading (also referred to as national projection) dimension, we can see Europeanization in Estonia's perception and Estonia's position in the EU that have been influenced by the European Union following the accession. The dimension of Estonia in world politics is not Europeanized. The uploading dimension of Estonian foreign policy towards Turkey is Europeanized mainly due to the changing role of Estonia from a bilateral partner to European Union member state. In meetings with Turkey, Estonia is often speaking on behalf of the European Union also expressing EU's concerns and wishes. Estonia is trying to avoid conflicts between Turkey and European Union member states that might force Estonia to pick sides. To pursue that goal, Estonia is calling member states and Turkey for dialogue in order to find common ground. Estonia as a member state has to be able to express its own and the Union's stand on geopolitical challenges of Turkey, notably concerning the Middle-East region.

These are all indicators of Estonia's foreign policy Europeanization. In the third dimension, this thesis cannot establish the levels of Europeanization due to lack of unity on the European level regarding the third dimension towards Turkey. Nevertheless, this thesis offers empirical observations regarding Estonia's position towards Turkey from value perspective. I argue that even in the fields where we can see traces of Europeanization, the overall level of Estonian foreign policy towards Turkey is rather low as the policy areas are not conflictual and do not offer difficult cases. There is a possibility for a high-level Europeanization in case the European Union decides to cease accession negotiations with Turkey. It is in the interests of Estonia to see Turkey as close to the European Union as possible to ensure Turkey's ongoing commitment for cooperation with the Western countries, especially in the domain of defence.

Potential areas for future research

Further research in the area could focus on specific policy domains in the relations between Estonia and Turkey and examine the impact of the European Union on these areas in more depth. The findings mapped on Graph 3 can offer a valuable starting point for future research in the area questioning the reasons behind different levels of Europeanization. Future research could also touch upon small states foreign policy Europeanization on a more general level, finding similarities and differences between the levels of Europeanization among different member states that would allow to make wider generalizations about the changes of small states' foreign policy after joining the European Union.

References

- Aksu, K. (2013). *Turkey-EU relations: Power, politics and the future*. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Almezaini, K. S., & Rickli, J. (2017). *The small Gulf States: Foreign and security policies before and after the Arab Spring*. London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group
- Börzel, T. A. (1999). Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37(4), 573-596.
- Börzel, T. A. (2002). Member State Responses to Europeanization. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), 193-214.
- Börzel, T. A. (2003). *How the European Union interacts with its member states*. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2002). When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change. *SSRN Electronic Journal*.
- Bretherton, C., & Vogler, J. (2010). *The European Union as a global actor*. London: Routledge.
- Cowles, M. G., Caporaso, J. A., & Risse-Kappen, T. (2001). *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- De Carvalho, B. and Neumann, I.B (eds) (2015). *Small state status seeking: Norway's quest for international standing*. London: Routledge.
- Duina, F. G. (1999). *Harmonizing Europe nation-states within the Common Market*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Düzenli, E. (2010). *Free Movement of Turkish Workers in the Context of Turkey's Accession to the EU*. Middle East Technical University. Retrieved May 1, 2019, from <http://www.ikg.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/pdf/EsraHalat.pdf>

Dyson, K. H. (2002). *European States and the Euro: Europeanization, variation, and convergence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

East, M.A (1973). Size and foreign policy behaviour: A test of two models. *World Politics*, vol. 25, issue 4, pp. 556-576

Ehin, P. (2013). Estonia: Excelling at Self-Exertion. In S. Bulmer (Author) & C. Lequesne (Ed.), *The Member States of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

European Commission (2019, January 25). *Turkey - financial assistance under IPA II*. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/turkey_en

Gotev, Georgi (2017, September 8). *Estonian Presidency passes Turkey decision to Bulgaria*. Retrieved from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/estonian-presidency-passes-the-turkey-decision-to-bulgaria/>

Hadfield-Amkhan, A., Manners, I. R., & Whitman, R. G. (2017). *Foreign policies of EU member states: Continuity and Europeanisation*. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Héritier, A. (1996). The accommodation of diversity in European policy-making and its outcomes: Regulatory policy as a patchwork. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 3(2), 149-167.

Héritier, Adrienne, et al. 2001. *Differential Europe - New Opportunities and Restrictions for Policy Making in Member States*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hey, J.A.K. (2003). *Small states in world politics: Explaining foreign policy behaviour*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Howell, K. (2004). Uploading, downloading and European integration: Assessing the Europeanisation of UK financial services regulation. *Journal of Banking Regulation*, 6(1), 53-68.

Kamilova, Sandra (2017, July 18). *Välisminister Mikser: aitame eesistujana kaasa ELi-Türgi dialoogi jätkumisele*. Retrieved from <https://vm.ee/et/uudised/valisminister-mikser-aitame-eesistujana-kaasa-eli-turgi-dialoogi-jatkumisele>

- Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The Promise of Institutional Theory. *International Security*, 20(1), 39-51.
- Keohane, R.O. (1969). Lilliputians dilemmas: Small states in international politics. *International Organisation*, vol. 23, issue 2, pp. 291-310
- Kerwer, D. (2001). *Regulatory Reforms in Italy: A Case Study in Europeanisation*. London: Routledge.
- Kerwer, Dieter, and Michael Teutsch. 2001. Elusive Europeanisation. Liberalising Road Haulage in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*.
- Keukeleire, S., & Delreux, T. (2014). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Knudsen, O. (2002). Small states, latent and extant: Towards a general perspective. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, vol. 5, issue 2, pp. 184-200
- Ladrech, R. (1994) *Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The case of France*. *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol 32 No 1 pp 69-87.
- Maass, M. (2009). The elusive definition of the small state. *International Politics*, vol. 46, issue 1, pp. 65-83
- Manners, I., & Whitman, R. G. (2000). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Martina Warning. 2006. *Neighbourhood and Enlargement Policy: Comparing the Democratization Impact of the European Union in Morocco and Turkey*. CIRES
- Meri, Lennart (1998, October 16). *Vabariigi Presidendi Lennart Meri esinemine Bilkenti ülikoolis Ankaras*. Retrieved from <https://vp1992-2001.president.ee/est/k6ned/K6ne.asp?ID=3960>
- Meri, Lennart (1999, December 15). *Vabariigi President lõunasögil Euroopa Liidu riikide Eestisse akrediteeritud suursaadikutele*. Retrieved from <https://vp1992-2001.president.ee/est/k6ned/K6ne.asp?ID=3870>
- Nael, Merili (2017, July 18). *Mikser: Türgi tõukamine EL-ist eemale pole kellegi huvides*. Retrieved from <https://www.err.ee/608162/mikser-turgi-toukamine-el-ist-eemale-pole-kellegi-huvides>

Olsen, J. P. (2002). The Many Faces of Europeanization. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(5), 921-952.

Piliste, Kristiina (2018, March 13). *Eestis õppivate kraadiõppe välisstudengite arv ületas 4000 piiri*. Retrieved from <http://archimedes.ee/eestis-oppivate-kraadioppe-valistudengite-arv-uletas-4000-piiri/>

Radaelli, C. M. (2003). *The open method of coordination: A new governance architecture for the European Union*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies

Radaelli, Claudio. 2000. Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change. *European Integration on-line Papers* 4 (8): <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm>.

Raik, Kristi (2018, March 16). *Väärtuspõhine välispoliitika ujub nüüd vastuvoolu*. Retrieved from <https://diplomaatia.ee/vaartuspohine-valispoliitika-ujub-nuud-vastuvoolu/>

Research Agendas. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Risse-Kappen, T., Cowles, M. G. & Caporaso, J. A. (2001). *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Risse, Thomas. 2001. A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities. In *Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic Change*, edited by Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 198-216.

Rohstein, R.L. (1968). *Alliances and small powers*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rothstein, R. L. (1968). *Alliances and small powers*. New York: Columbia Univ. Pr.

Stephen George, 2001. *The Europeanisation of UK Politics and Policy-making: the Effect of European Integration on the UK*. Queen's Papers on Europeanisation p0017, Queens University Belfast.

Stephen M. Walt. 1987. *Origins of Alliances* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Tonra, B. (2001). *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*. Ashgate: Aldershot.

Vabariigi Valitsus. (2004, December 17). *European Council Decided to Open Accession Negotiations with Turkey*. Retrieved from <https://www.valitsus.ee/en/news/european-council-decided-open-accession-negotiations-turkey>

Vahtla, Aili (2017, August 17). *Ratas: It is important for Estonia that Turkey remains on European course*. Retrieved from <https://news.err.ee/613454/ratas-it-is-important-for-estonia-that-turkey-remains-on-european-course>

Vital, D. (1966). *The survival of small states: Studies in small power/great power conflict*. Oxford University Press: London.

Wivel, A., Bailes, A. J. K., & Archer, C. (2014). Setting the scene: Small states and international security. In C. Archer, A. J. K. Bailes, & A. A. Wivel (Eds.), *Small states and international security: Europe and beyond* (pp. 3–25). London: Routledge.

Wong, R. (2007). Foreign Policy. In P. Graziano & M. Vink (Eds.), *Europeanization: New*

Wong, R. Y., & Hill, C. (2012). *National and European foreign policies: Towards Europeanization*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Non-exclusive licence to reproduce thesis

I,

_____ Artur Tännä _____

(Author's name)

1. herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to reproduce, for the purpose of preservation, including for the purpose of preservation in the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright,

Europeanization of Member State's Foreign Policy: Estonian Foreign Policy
Europeanization towards the Republic of Turkey,

(Title of thesis)

supervised by _____ Heiko Pääbo _____.

(Supervisor's name)

Publication of the thesis is not allowed.

2. I am aware of the fact that the author retains the right specified in p. 1.
3. This is to certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons' intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation.

Artur Tännä

20.05.2019

