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**FROM BRONZE SOLDIER CRISES TO CRIMEA ANNEXATION: A
RESILIENCE TYPOLOGY IN ESTONIA.**

MA Thesis

Supervisor: Ph.D. Heiko Pääbo

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I have written this master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources, and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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Abstract

Resilience is seen elsewhere as a static definition. Usually under a positivist approach process of bouncing-back, adaptation, or transformation after a pressure. Seldomly it is seen as a constructive concept that relies on context and perspective. In that direction, this thesis proposes to reflect on the Resilience typology framework of Philippe Bourbeau, known as Maintenance, Marginal, and Renewal. The study object was resilience in Estonia, so it aimed at classifying resilience as maintenance, marginal or renewal in face of internal and external pressures. This research pre-assumed that in 2007 there was vague preoccupation about societal resilience in Estonia, while as in 2014 resilience was already present, and thus reinforced. This happened in face of internal and external disturbances – the Bronze soldier night riots, and the Annexation of Crimea are events understood as pressures. This study tried to unfold the type of resilience that the two periods in analysis led to. The predictable factors to influence resilience were firstly assumed as integration of society, Russian influence, and Europeanization, but were found differently in the results. This is a qualitative research, which made use of content analysis – coding method. The above stated method was the tool to analyze the National Security Concept (NSC) documents of Estonia – from 2010 and 2017 – and semi-structured interviews. The findings were that from 2007 resilience was as renewal while as from 2014 it was given as maintenance. The factors that influenced the resilience type in Estonia were Russian influence, internal cooperation, integration of society, critical services, EU and NATO. In that sense, resilience type in Estonia reflected on a non-static concept, relying on context and perspective – it was of a renewal type in one period, and in the other as maintenance. The results of this research showed that Estonia dealt with resilience, in the period of analysis, as a transformative concept and aimed at progressing it in face of internal and external disturbances.

Keywords: Estonia; resilience; renewal; maintenance; marginal; pressure; disturbance; internal; external; Bronze Soldier Night; Crimea Annexation; National Security Concept.

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Abbreviations

European Union (EU)

Government Security Committee (GSC)

International Relations (IR)

Maintenance, Marginal, Renewal (MMR)

National Security and Defense Coordination Director (NSDCD)

National Security Concept (NSC)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

Introduction

Resilience Theory tries to bring answers to a wide range of different issues such as disasters, development, terrorism, humanitarian conflict and so on. Seen in the literature, “a resilience analysis taps into sociological, institutionalist explanations, focusing on the institutional practices, cultural frameworks and social resources available to individuals and/or societies at a given point in time” (Hall 2010). This theory has been used to analyze the agency side of national resilience, which individuals are capable to be resilient to different sorts of pressure. In addition, the structure side when decision makers (within State and Governments) come up with national policies seeking for cohesion of a society. Thus, this research relies on the structure side of it. National security strategy is one of the sources that resilience is sustained. It represents the ability of a structure to respond to eventual crises, be it domestic or international. This structure will thus adjust their strategy based on resilience itself, in response to a pressure or shock.

In that sense, resilience is developed under State/Government sphere together with society, having value-sharing, identity and preparedness against internal/external pressure or other vulnerabilities. This is, thereafter, the key-point of this research underpinned by Resilience Theory on Philipp Bourbeau’s theoretical work. For this, I follow the Estonian case for resilience in face of pressures and events, The Bronze Soldier event in 2007 that took place in Tallinn, Estonia, and the Ukrainian uprising conflictual situation in Ukraine, with the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Both events raised perceptions in Estonia in different times considering resilience concept. The event in Tallinn represents resilience being properly developed in the national level; while as in the second event, I argue that it demonstrates resilience being effectively present/seen, and therefore maintained, within Estonian society from that point on. This research considers groups that are more vulnerable – the Russo-speaking population in Estonia is posed on the research as one. Therefore, the process of shock or pressure results in resilience being formulated at a State level towards society.

The assumption that resilience definition in Estonian National institutions were inconsistent or even vague before 2007, but consistently present in 2014 to date, is held. After initially reading some official documents in Estonia, Foreign Policy Yearbooks by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Defense documents, National Security Strategy of Estonia and a few others, it has been noticed that from the Bronze Soldier event in 2007, the superficial understanding was that Estonia started implementing the strategy of resilience amongst society from there on (this was timidly seen before 2007). So, Estonia initiated engagement with the vulnerable group that were more leaned to being affected by disturbances or shocks – the Russian speaking population so to say. National Resilience therefore has been raised since then as an important concept, under a collective development amongst national institutions and civil society.

Two events are visible - one given by internal disturbances, and the other external. Both having been perceived by national decision-makers in Estonia as threats, especially with what came as consequences, during and after those events, towards the vulnerable group/population. Furthermore, both events contributed to construction and reinforcement of resilience in Estonia¹. Therefore, the objective of this research is to analyze resilience in Estonia considering the period of 2010 and 2017. The events that have influenced resilience are posed, yet with possibility of new ones: The Bronze Soldier crises in 2007, and the Ukrainian conflict (annexation of Crimea to Russia in 2014). Considering the abovementioned timeframe, Estonian resilience has appeared to be renewed in 2007 and maintained in 2014². Thereby, this thesis is based on the following research problem: low resilience engagement in 2007 and its development towards a large resilience capacity in 2014, in Estonia. That is, before 2007 societal resilience in Estonia was little considered (or barely non-existent) in the national security concepts, while as in 2014 onwards it was well engaged. The research problem raises the main question to be answered: Which types of resilience did the two period of events lead to create and why?

¹ Resilience is found in the National Security official document of the Republic of Estonia.

² There is an initial assumption, to be not proved, that in 2007, after the riots of the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn, resilience engagement started as renewal, while as in 2014's external events there was maintenance of resilience.

When using resilience theory, one questions its relevance for the scientific field of research of Social Science and Political studies. In that sense, this research tries to highlight the theoretical importance on that matter, by bringing the case of resilience on the structure side of a State, and how disturbances or external shocks are set to change policies. Thereby, resilience “underscores that sources of change may be endogenous or exogenous and the outcome of change is not necessarily a return to a previous equilibrium” (Bourbeau 2016), but rather a further and continuous construction. In this sense, Estonia has appeared to observe societal gains, continuously, when introducing this term into their NSC.

The problematic of this project is relevant to be researched because it links aspects of the resilience theoretical framework, conceptualization (and typology) of Philippe Bourbeau. In addition, despite of being present in the NSC of Estonia, one can hardly follow English-based debates of how this concept has been formulated over the years in Estonia, and thus being tested using Bourbeau’s typology shall open new research opportunities in Social Sciences and IR.

This is a qualitative research, under a single case study analysis as previously mentioned, and the study object is Estonian Resilience³ found in the NSC document. This research thereby tries to investigate, considering some predictable factors but not limited to,⁴ what is the resilience type in Estonia in two periods. It proposes also to unfold what influenced resilience to be categorized as renewal, as marginality, and as maintenance, so the research question is properly assessed and answered, and expected presumptions are found and met accordingly. The following factors were initially identified as influential towards Estonian resilience: influence of Russia, integration of society, and Europeanization.

The theoretical development of Philippe Bourbeau is borrowed for this study, in which case will serve to extract the typological theoretical ground. This is a qualitative research; so, the chosen method to conduct measurements and reach results is qualitative content analysis –

³ Names commonly seen throughout this research that actually mean the same: societal resilience, social resilience, resilience, National State resilience. All of which have come from one source – State – towards society.

⁴ This research is open to find new factors.

coding. That will evaluate the NSC of 2007 and 2017 and also semi-structure interviews, so to receive a better overview and interpretations about the case. The interviewees will be State officials that have appeared to influence the formulation or update NSC of Estonia⁵. Initially it has been necessary to map the institutions and State officials related to both periods of events for a proper interview process. From there, interviews have taken place to begin interpretation and measurement of the responses. As said, qualitative coding is the preferred method expected to unfold the study object.

This thesis is divided into four main chapters with subchapters. The first chapter is related to the theoretical approach and literature review of resilience concept, the second brings a case selection analysis, the third speaks to the methodology of its research design, and the fourth reflects on the data analysis, followed by a final conclusion.

⁵ The concept of resilience in Estonia is found in the National Security concept. Thus, it is expected to follow the State's official personnel behind the construction/formulation of this concept, so the research findings can be reached.

1 – Resilience concept – International Relations, and the MMR typology.

The understanding about resilience terminology has been growing in various Scientific disciplines. From a starting point of view, the English word “resilience” is found in the Latin language as “resilire”, which means “jump back” (Bourbeau 2018:7), and also “an action of rebounding” (Rogers 2016:14). With more practical terms, the concept is generally defined by the Oxford English dictionary as: “the ability of people or things to recover quickly after something unpleasant, such as shock or injury; or the ability of a substance to return to its original shape after it has been bent, stretched or pressed”.⁶ From those definitions, we can highlight the following perspective: people, things or even substances (objects) acting to recovering against a shock or a pressure. That said, scholars have taken steps towards the understanding of the objects and actions that are within the concept of resilience, aiming to define better the term in a more scientific way. Thus, the improvement of resilience conceptualization has been widening its understanding scope, considering various scientific fields by a diverse range of disciplines. So, this is relevant for the development not only of a morphological linguistic of the word, but also for Social Sciences, Political Science, and IR which is the main field of this research.

The development of resilience definitions is posed by some in academia as homeostatic, autopoietic and a third one more focused on rethinking contextual possibilities of the present (Chandler and Coaffee 2017:4-5). The first one is keener to the bounce-back effect after an event, by “recognizing problems and addressing or responding to them and finally recovering with the minimum of disruption (Chandler and Coaffee 2017:5). The second, comes closer to a process of “self-transformation or self-regulation” – a more accurate term for this is “bouncing-forward”. (Chandler and Coaffee 2017:5). The third one is “more focused on developing resilience at the level of micro-politics or life-politics” (Chandler and Coaffee

⁶ Resilience. (n.d.) In Oxford dictionary.

<https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/resilience>

2017:6), structuring the idea of bringing solutions to problems. One thing to notice is that even within the same concept, we can see different perspectives of explanation.

Resilience concept opens a large window for a variety of domains that make academia “rethink forms of social, political and economic organization” (Chandler and Coaffee 2017:7) in a very interactive way. That said, many fields and domains of study, have contributed also to a great deal of research towards resilience. For instance, areas such as, psychology, socio-ecological, politics, geography, law and criminology (Bourbeau 2015), social and business organizational work (Rogers 2016:16). Therefore, these different fields and disciplines have proposed diverse concepts and understandings for the term resilience itself, by “studying, delimiting, criticizing, and even exalting it” (Bourbeau 2015). But for the benefit of this research, there will not be emphasis on this theoretical construction or development.

Philippe Bourbeau has connected many domains to come up with a new concept that fits better into IR. He explains that through a genealogical construction (Bourbeau 2018:6) (see more appendix 1), which shows a non-conclusive path to resilience definition. He has found, through that approach, an alternative way to the study of resilience, and moreover to the analysis of its correlation to world politics and IR. That is because it can embrace historical (dis)continuities, contingencies, and multi-directionalities, and rejects static historical linearity and determinism (Price 1997, as in Bourbeau 2018). It is based on different domains of study – psychology (bouncing-back terminology), social work (processual terminology), engineering (endurance and robustness terminologies), and ecology - or social-ecology - (equilibrium terminology, reorganization capacity) (See table 1). This contributes then to my proposed objective of study, which aims at a continuous and progressive concept for resilience in IR. That is, therefore, in favor of the theoretical approach used for this research.

Table 1. Multidisciplinary definitions of resilience

	Focus	Level of analysis	Definitions
Resilience	Positive adaptation	Individual	The capacity of an individual to positively bounce

			back from adversity
Resilience	Positive adaptation, process	Individual	A dynamic process encompassing positive adaptation within the context of significant adversity
Engineering Resilience	Equilibrium, return to stability	System	About studying the conditions specifying how far a system can be displaced from a fixed point of equilibrium and still return to that equilibrium once the disturbance has passed
Ecological resilience	Disturbance, persistence	System	The capacity of a system to experience disturbance and still maintain its ongoing functions and controls
Socio-ecological-business resilience ⁷	Robustness, reorganization, stability, Flexibility	System, organization	The amount of disturbance a system can absorb and still remain within the same state, the degree to which the system is capable of self-organization, and the degree to which the system can build and

⁷ Coping capacity on a high technocratic model. The rational adoption of risk reduction overcomes certain vulnerabilities for increasing an organization's competitive market place advantage" (Rogers 2016:16)

			increase the capacity for learning and adaptation.
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(Source: extracted from Bourbeau 2013:6-7)

These definitions carry the understanding that resilience is about responses to shocks. These responses are either followed, after a shock, by a: change or transformation; adaptation; or bounce-back aiming at constant equilibrium. They fall short in aiming at a continuous processual definition, depending on context and perspective that a group or individual face when in pressure. One aspect to consider is that not all groups or individuals will respond to shocks equally. Thus, these concepts carry alone modest theoretical grounds for the study of IR because they are centered on the fact that disturbance is a negative aspect, and resilience holds a positive status. There cannot be one definition more certain or accurate than the other if we analyze complexity of States and societies, all of them hold importance. Therefore, resilience in world politics and IR should not ideally carry such binary and rigorous static inferences – positive and negative (Bourbeau 2018). That said, Resilience is a multi-faceted concept, cutting across many disciplines. This helps scholarship to “make sense of issues and problematics that do not neatly fit within the disciplinary way academia has structured the production of knowledge over time” (Bourbeau 2018:2). This has been precisely the critique of Bourbeau, which makes sense to this thesis – scholarship tend to develop the definitions of resilience only from one theoretical domain, and IR has moved and showed to connect synergically many other fields of research⁸.

⁸ The study of IR holds many disciplines – History, Sociology, Politics, Geography, Law, Economy, for instance.

In that sense, Philippe Bourbeau has come up with a new definition to study resilience, which this research will borrow for use: “resilience is a process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks” (Bourbeau 2015:3). It is understood that the above proposed concept overcomes the dispositional, static and equilibrium stage that resilience had been argued before (Bourbeau 2015). And “the sources of transformative and change path may be internal or external, and that the outcome of change is not necessarily a return to a previous stage or mind” (Bourbeau 2015:3). The justification for choosing this definition instead of others relies on aspects of continuous change and transformation that a society might follow in face of a pressure or disturbance (be it internal or external), not necessarily static or return to a previous state. The result, after disturbance or pressure, might be positive or negative, and it can find different types of resilience. In Estonia, there are specific characteristics of society that finds this resilience concept of Bourbeau more suitable. Context and perspective are in consideration for that when integration of society, given the language minority of Russian speakers, makes the State bear close attention to.

In that direction, the main theoretical question for the new definition that Bourbeau proposes advances into a new epistemological avenue. Resilience is embodied in a concept of transformative path, and not necessarily a return to a previous stage or mind. Thus, there could not be a wiser operationalization process than using a specific typology for resilience for pointing different types of resilience in light of different periods, pressures, events or shocks. This means that distinct types of resilience can be inferred or deducted from different contexts – be it from the social agency or social structure. According to certain characteristics of a society, events or disturbances, resilience outcome can be divided in renewal, maintenance, and marginal (Bourbeau 2018).

This means that, in specific periods, resilience can be addressed in a certain way, but sometime later it can either be change or reinforced – due to pressure or shocks internally or externally - by different tools within a social structure. This serves well for my research

problem, considering Estonian resilience found in the Estonian NSC.⁹ In all, the study result of this Thesis is expected to be derived using Bourbeau's resilience definition and typology.¹⁰ This will be elaborated in the next sub-section, and more specifically in the empirical and analytical methods part.

1.2- A new avenue of research – MMR typology.

Events, shocks, or disturbances might have different ways of interpretation. In this case, within one actor structure, there might be interpretation of events in different ways. They can interpret a specific event as disturbing, or even another specific group of agents may interpret another event as disturbing, but other groups might not share the vision likewise. Furthermore, in certain times, one event might be interpreted by disturbing, while as a similar event but in different period, might not be perceived as such.

That said, resilience can be seen not only as a paradigm or a theory for study of world politics, but also as a complex and dynamic process. It depends on the object of reference, period of analysis, and interpretation of events, that reflects on how an individual or a society, or the State itself, perceives a shock or a disturbance, and it might affect directly the outcome situation. Therefore, from a structure point of view, the State has an important role in dealing with society. In order to keep society together, its cohesion must be well implemented, and this is put in practice by Governments through a set of policies that consider peculiarities and specificities of one society. Resilience is thus a multifaced concept that cut across many aspects of society and State, even much more when developed further in IR and international politics, with subdomains such as international development, humanitarian aid, and disaster reduction for instance.

The initial concept of resilience is constantly looking for a result towards equilibrium. Therefore, it seeks a static outcome, and binary assurance of “positive vs. negative”, that is: having the external pressure/threat is considered negative, but the resilience is the positive

⁹ Research problem: in Estonia there has been a low resilience engagement in 2007, and development of a large resilience capacity in 2014.

¹⁰ The study results are early presented in the introduction of this thesis, which are: Estonian National resilience was put as renewal in 2007, and as maintenance in 2017.

result. Social scientists such as Philippe Bourbeau developed a conceptualization more focused on continuous transformation. In attempts of trying to develop further this binary situation, Bourbeau came up with a new resilience theoretical approach more leaned to world politics, and conceptualized it as “a process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks” (Bourbeau, 2015:375)¹¹. Moreover, “resilience is an intuitive ideological fit with a neoliberal philosophy of complex adaptive systems” (Walver and Cooper, 2011), in which case has its “ontology in vulnerability” (Evans and Reid, 2013). Thus, one ground of agreement seems to be crucial within the terminology: resilience contributes to adjustments, adaptation, and transformation. Furthermore, there is a binary assumption that an internal/external pressure towards a system is reflected as negative, but the response, as being resilient, would eventually be considered good to that system – following change and transformation. However, there are also arguments for resilience as “being an obstacle to positive changes in some cases” (Bourbeau, 2016:28):

“I am not arguing that one should find a way to interpret terrorist attacks in large cities as positive policy. However, I do argue that there might be good reasons for wanting to transform a social structure, a given situation, a regime, a norm, an economic system of exploitation, etc. and that being resilient to these changes could be considered negative” (Bourbeau, 2016:28).

What is important to understand is that there will be cases in which pressures can be considered good and resilience bad, and the other way around as well. “Approaches to resilience should be able to theorize situations in which endogenous or exogenous shocks

¹¹ This concept was initially one of the first steps towards a more concrete understanding about resilience. It was derived from a critique about stating that resilience has been seen elsewhere as “an all or nothing concept” in key security statements from States such as the United Kingdom, Canada, United States, France, Netherlands and Australia. The problem is that the concept interprets resilience as a static concept and thus needed reformulation, which was proposed by the theoretical typology of Bourbeau MMR. “A clear implication of this perspective is the absence of a multi-scalar conceptualization of resilience. Such a perspective also eschews the question of types of resilience, thereby creating a disconnect between the complexity of the contemporary social world and the tools developed to make sense of that world” (Bourbeau 2015).

could be seen also as positive and in which a resilient strategy could be understood as negative” (Bourbeau 2013:8). There should not be any static concept in this process, it is relevant that the understanding of the resilience is kept “normatively open” (Bourbeau 2013:8), and should not be followed as a form of equilibrium, but a continuous one. In this sense resilience approaches should be caring more about relations and contexts, rather than thinking through lenses of fixed essences or linear causal chains (Chandler and Coaffe 2017:4). The concept is engaging in processes of interaction in more reflective ways (Chandler and Coaffe 2017:5). So,

“Instead of returning to some prior equilibrium, societies often make adjustments that are best understood as moves to maintain their compatibility with the social construction of their particular collective identity and changing circumstances. Resilience is thereby grasped as an inherently dynamic and complex process” (Bourbeau, 2016:28).

To make it even clearer, with Bourbeau’s own words on his resilience development:

“Resilience is always a matter of degree; complete immunity towards disturbances and shocks does not exist. As such, societies can be more or less resilient both diachronically and synchronically. Resilience is also constantly in flux. It is not a fixed attribute or an unchangeable characteristic of a society or an individual. No society is always resilient and resilience does not express itself in a flat, stable, or variation-free way. Resilience does not imply finality as the process can never be fully completed; the process is inherently dynamic and always in movement. Furthermore, resilience is always normatively open, depending on the conceptualization of both the referent system and the crisis or shock to it. For example, on the one hand, resilience could be seen as negative if it reproduces fixed constructions of collective or national identity. On the other hand, resilience could be seen as positive, for example, as a response to a racist public policy shift. In sum, the concept has many sides and thus cannot be seen as intrinsically positive” (Bourbeau 2013:10).

Once more, under Bourbeau's perspective of a continuous and transformative definition, in world politics resilience depends considerably on context and perspective. On context because it can differ in terms of past, present and future – how successful a society is following a past, a current or a disturbance to come. As for perspective, it is about the perception that a unity (be it a State, government, society or individual) interpret the internal or external shock as a security threat, due to the fact that disturbances are “often a social construction involving multiple directionality and constant interactions between agential power and structure” (Bourbeau, 2016:29). With all that in mind, Philippe Bourbeau has come up with a new typological approach known as renewal, maintenance and marginal (simply as MMR). This typology approach is inspired by Stephen Dovern and John Handmer in 1996 (Bourbeau 2013:10).¹² It was introduced as a tool to fill in the gaps that resilience definition had in academia. This approach will then be used as my theoretical guide along this thesis, be tested upon qualitative method approach until reaching a conclusion on resilience in Estonia.¹³

Bourbeau is not the only one to stand alongside this typological work. In academia there is also a typology formulated by Lennart Olsson et al,¹⁴ that focus on resilience being normative, and not necessarily good or bad.¹⁵ So, they come close to what Bourbeau proposes on placing social change over stability (Olsson et al 2016:49). For that, Olsson et al argue that integrating social and natural dimension, so to explain resilience, might lead to politization and perfection of (neo)functionalism of society, which goes against

¹² These authors have come up with a three-class typology of resilience: resistance to change; change at the margins; openness and adaptation. They are focused on interaction of humans and natural systems, which means on sustainable development. It is also worth to mention that, strictly in social-ecology, similar interpretation of typological studies for resilience has been addressed by Davidson, J. L., C. Jacobson, A. Lyth, A. Dedekorkut-Howes, C. L. Baldwin, J. C. Ellison, N. J. Holbrook, M. J. Howes, S. Serrao Neumann, L. Singh-Peterson, and T. F. Smith. (2016) on Interrogating resilience: toward a typology to improve its operationalization. *Ecology and Society* 21(2):27. The types are: static, adaptive, and transformative. Nevertheless, Bourbeau has put the MMR typology in world politics interpretation before that.

¹³ In introduction, this has been mentioned briefly but will be examined properly in the research design and method analysis.

¹⁴ This is found on the paper “A Social Science perspective on resilience” by Lennart Olsson, Anne Jenerck, Henrik Thorén, Johannes Persson and David O’Byrne.

¹⁵ Literature often treats resilience as something good (Olson et al 2014). Being normative means that norms and values are socially constructed. Thus, interpretation, context and perspective of them have to be considered.

transformative ideals for societal resilience. Thus, they formulated a typology based on bounce-back, and bounce-forward attributes:

“we suggest a typology comprising two conceptual meanings, two attributes and four main types of definitions. The first conceptual meaning refers to the ability of a system to cope with stress and bounce back (BB); the second refers to the ability of the system to bounce back and transform (BB-T). The first attribute is descriptive, implying that resilience is neutral (N), i.e. neither inherently good nor bad; this is contrasted by a prescriptive attribute implying that resilience is desirable and good” (Olsson et al 2016:50)

The work proposed by the above-mentioned scholars at first comes very close to Bourbeau’s main point for a typology in resilience. However, it distances when typology is shown for the following reason: categorizing resilience in neutral, good, transformative good, and transformative neutral reflects still a static understanding. That is, in order to conceive these types of resilience, it is necessary to have some form of comprehension of the society, as a complex one, on how they receive the shocks or disturbances, and what the result of those interpretations will be. So, a more measured and accurate result is conceived. This is precisely why the MMR typology is a better fit to my study object, as there are not pre-assumptions that a result is inherently positive, negative, or neutral¹⁶.

According to Philippe Bourbeau, the MMR “types of resilience are not mutually exclusive, and they can be found in the same society diachronically and synchronically. Furthermore, a society can adopt one type of resilience in one domain and another type of resilience in another domain. By definition, resilience as maintenance is no more normatively negative or positive than resilience as renewal; as such, “there is no normative continuum that starts with maintenance and ends with renewal” (Bourbeau, 2016:30). Bourbeau highlights three types of resilience, which are: resilience renewal, resilience as marginality, and resilience as

¹⁶ Renewal, maintenance and marginality do not bring a structural linguistic understand that is good, bad or neutral. Rather, the interpretation might lead (or not) to that classification later after interpretation of results.

maintenance.¹⁷ Resilience renewal has its own objective on seeking for transformation of policy assumptions and potentially redefining social structures; therefore its criteria is to seek inescapable change.¹⁸ In contrast, resilience maintenance relies on adaptation, upon the objective of reinforcing the status quo against possible changes provoked by events (internal/external pressures or threats) (Bourbeau 2016)¹⁹. And resilience as marginality tends to bring responses that do not confront the core basis of a policy, responding on the boundaries of the current policy (Bourbeau 2013:12). In all, resilience speaks to the idea of progress, being a successful and progressive strategy.

When Philippe Bourbeau developed the MMR typology, the way he operationalized his variables was using discourse analysis on securitization. This method adheres aspects of social constructivism, depending on rhetoric's narratives of agents involved in the process of discussion (Bourbeau 2013). He considered the cases of migration in France and Canada in the 1990s; and for that to be analyzed, collective identity was one aspect to be seen when measuring data for results.²⁰ As seen in the previous section, the MMR typology uses one key aspect which is collective identity (mobilization of social collective memory): i) to reinforce a set of policies in order maintain the status quo; ii) to provide marginal adjustments in policies; or iii) being capable to formulate a new set of policies as a new beginning for a society. Therefore, the collective identity aspect of MMR typology speaks directly to my study case of Estonia and my problem of research, considering social-historic characteristics of the country.²¹

¹⁷ "Marginal type of resilience is characterized by responses that bring changes at the margins but do not challenge the basis of a policy (or a society)" (Bourbeau, 2016). Marginal resilience will be left open for analysis, according to research findings.

¹⁸ "Renewal type implies introducing novel vectors of response that will fundamentally change existing policies and set new directions for governance" (Bourbeau, 2016: 29)

¹⁹ It is important to mention that Philippe Bourbeau developed this new typological approach using a very specific case in the realm of migration in France and Canada in 1990s. So, this puts clear evidence that the approach is multifaceted and can also be interchanged to be used in other sub-domains of security, for instance. It fits well in my case analysis of Estonia National Security Strategy for resilience.

²⁰ Securitization through discourse analysis has been the main method of research used by Philippe Bourbeau to evaluate the types of resilience.

²¹ This will be described better in the section "Case Selection" and further on this thesis, but for now a brief overview relies on Recent historical developments after re-independence, such as accession to European

In that sense, a more detailed overview on the MMR typology is necessary. First, Resilience as Maintenance is characterized by adaptation in which resources and energy will be expended in maintaining the status quo (Bourbeau 2013:10). The importance will often be exaggerated in seek for measures against it. This type of resilience is based on re-affirmation of the value, benefit, and importance of the status quo. A society relying strongly on this type of resilience will deal with endogenous and exogenous shocks with rigidity, undermining the transformative consequences brought by these events (Bourbeau 2013:10). These disturbances will be socially constructed as being threatening and followed by interpretive dominant discourses (Bourbeau 2013:10).

Second, Resilience as Renewal is characterized by responses that transform basic policy assumptions and, thus, potentially remodel social structures (Bourbeau 2013:14). Resilience as renewal will (in an implicit or explicit way) fundamentally change existing policies and set new directions for governance. This type of resilience relies on redefinitions, reorganization of policies considering past experiences, collective memory, and social history (Bourbeau 2013:14) The importance of the disturbance may often be exaggerated, and the goal here is to present the option of renewal as inescapable (Bourbeau 2013:14).

Third, Resilience as marginality is characterized by responses that bring changes at the margins but that do not challenge the basis of a policy (or a society) (Bourbeau 2013). This type of resilience will address change to the boundaries of a certain policy, norm or social structure. Effort to acknowledge the disturbance and thus recognize that marginal adjustments are needed and are the focal point for this resilience type. It is also possible to see within this type that marginal adjustments can be made at one point in time, but in another period the same adjustment can be considered of crucial importance and not seen as marginal anymore (Bourbeau 2013:12).

Formulating a typology for resilience explains the continuity and progressive transformation that societies or individuals face when encountering endogenous or exogenous shocks. The proposed conceptual framework is known as “resiliencism” (Bourbeau 2013:9) and reveal

Union (EU) and NATO, for instance. Furthermore, the Russo-speaking population integration in Estonia; and lastly the threats and influences of Russia towards the Russo-speaking population in Estonia.

three aspects. First, resilience does not bounce back to a previous equilibrium; second, disturbances and adaptations might be different and depend on context and time, hence it navigates on past, present and future perspectives or experiences²²; and third shocks and disturbances might reveal distinct interpretations, meaning that “an event as of disturbance is often a social construction involving multiple directionality and constant interactions within a structure system - between agential powers and the social structure” (Bourbeau 2013:9). Thus, the idea of adhering context and perspective within the MMR typology fills another gap in academia when considering the complexity that the social world imposes on epistemology, stimulating a dialogue between ideas and evidence (Bourbeau 2013) and thus contributing for advancing IR knowledge.²³

²² How a society has passed some past adversity (retrospective), how a society is going through a present adversity (concurrent), or the likelihood that a society will pass through a disturbance in the future (prospective) (Bourbeau 2013:9).

²³ Bourbeau comprehends that context and perspective as major aspects for resiliencism, despite the work of Leach et al 2010, who says: “Much resilience thinking displays reluctance to recognize this socially contingent, normative aspect—that how resilience is evaluated depends on context and perspective” (Leach et al, 2010:3). Therefore, Leach et al (and mostly the security academia) argue that scholars adopting a resiliencist approach have failed to recognize context and perspective when evaluating resilience (Leach et al 2010, as cited in Bourbeau 2013:10). “If resilience is about anything it is about context and perspective” (Bourbeau 2013:10). Leach et al present in their work a chart of multiple framings of a social-ecological-technological system with the aim to highlight the understanding of epidemic’s governance, and for that context and perspective must be addressed: “a concern with framing allows attention to the many ways in which system boundaries, dynamics, functions and outcomes are open to multiple, particular, contextual, positioned and subjective assumptions, methods, forms of interpretation, values and goals. As such, divergent framings of the social, ecological and technological implications of ‘epidemics’ may be held, for instance, by diverse international organizations, technical agencies, sectoral ministries, professional disciplines, civil society groups or diverse local actors” (Leach et al 2010:3)

2 - Case selection, context, and perspective.

Resilience is a relevant approach to my research. This is because of the Estonian historical context is much related to what has been presented thus far – context, perspective, collective identity, and resilience - as tool for responses to shocks. Thus, the typology of Bourbeau will serve to analyze the context in the case of Estonia during specific times, in face of specific and recent historical developments/events. But for that to come about, it is important to understand what is in the background context that encounters the argument of resiliencism (or resilience conceptualization by Bourbeau). This will be described in the next paragraphs.

2.1- A brief historical background, Estonia and the Russian speaking community.

Estonian ties with Russia dates back from 18th century. In 1721, the Nystad Treaty transferred what is today Estonia (*Estland* and northern part of *Livland*) to the Russian Empire. In the 19th century, Russia began the Russification process²⁴ in Estonia, which was inconsistent until Alexander III. That was the beginning of a historical latter that developed throughout World War I, until Estonia gained its first independence from Russia following the *Manifest Eestima rahwastele* in 24 of February of 1918 to Tartu Peace Treaty signature on 2nd of February of 1920. So, one can see that these ties date back to the end of 17th, 18th and 19th century, and when it comes to migration as well. The first Russians settled in areas where today surrounds the western coast of Lake Peipsi, Tallinn, and in Narva – the sequence is: Russian Old Believers coming first; secondly, during Russian Empire and Estonian German nobility, a limited number of administrative jobs were taken by Russians in Tallinn; and then following industrialization in Tallinn and Narva through 19th and beginning of 20th century. Only during Soviet occupation, the migration number of Russian speakers grew considerably.

It is important to mention therefore that this the migration to Estonian territory from Russia differentiated from the periods above mentioned. The first migration, characterized from late 17th, were composed by Russian Old Believers settlers due to religion persecution in Russia

²⁴ This process was characterized by cultural and administrative transformations. Language, religion, judicial, education. All this changed from Germanic traditions to Russian ones.

for the Orthodox Church was following reformation²⁵; ii) second, Russification periods varying from Alexander III until beginning of 20th century encouraged by the new Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin²⁶; iii) third, after World War II and following Soviet Union occupation when many other Russian speakers from other Soviet countries came to Estonia seeking a better life²⁷, or appointed by the soviet chief labor reformists.

Before World War II, there was around 8,2% of ethnic Russians living in Estonia²⁸. In that period Estonia was ethnically one of the most homogeneous regions in Europe: 88% of the people living in the territory of the Republic of Estonia in 1934 were Estonians (Statistics Estonia). Throughout 20th century the percentage of Russo-speaking population grew in Estonia. After the first independence, and following World War II unfold of events, led by Stalin in the USSR and Hitler in Germany, Estonia was then a place of occupation by Russian Soviets according to Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact²⁹. During Soviet occupation, Estonia passed through diverse historical developments, and this was mainly due to the type of policies led by the USSR in strict times – periods from strict ruling as in Stalin, to other periods of soft rule and opening as in *perestroika* and *glasnost* policies during the 1980s. From all changes that Estonia faced during USSR occupation - change of social structure, with processes of sovietization³⁰, communist propaganda, collectivization, suppress of religion and culture, many deportations to Siberia and others – the one worth to mention for the development of

²⁵ Retrieved from: <http://www.starover.ee/history.html>. Accessed October 3rd, 2020.

²⁶ Retrieved from: http://www.estonica.org/en/History/1850-1914_National_awakening/The_post-revolutionary_situation_and_World_War_I_1907-%C2%961917. Accessed October 5th, 2020.

²⁷ Some of these Russian speakers got to Estonia also sponsored by Moscow (Raun 2009: 2).

²⁸ Estonia was already independent by end of World War I. Thus, implicitly saying minority is correct, as the Estonian National identity was already identified. It is historically proved that the minorities rights were well preserved in Estonia. The country had international recognition when launched the Law on Cultural Autonomy. That was a mechanism capable of offering liberty and freedom of choice for self-identification on national identity (Resende, Silva 2018: 86)

²⁹ According to Andres Kasekamp 2010, this is considered the worst decade that Estonia has experienced.

³⁰ Glavilit and creation of the soviet style of man. This man was superior for its ability in education, science, and hard work, fluent in Russian language and based on communist values. (Weeks 2012, as cited in Resende, Silva 2018:89).

this thesis is the migration of Russian-speakers³¹ to Estonia.³² This caused the population of Russians in Estonia to grow; thus, the minority of Russian-speakers³³ increased significantly as well - from 8% in 1930s³⁴ decade to 30% in 1989 (SOYUZ 1990). And if we take into consideration most recent demographic research from Statistics Estonia (*Statistikaamet* 2017), the population of ethnic Russians in Estonia is 25,09%³⁵. This adds up to 28% if we consider the shares of other ethnic minorities that are Russified (*Statistikaamet* 2017)³⁶.

For this thesis, I will make use of the terminology Russian-speakers, instead of ethnic Russians. This serves a better use of the group as a linguistic minority in Estonia and it is crucial for development of this thesis. The reasons for that will follow proper explanation in the factors that affect my study object, which can be seen in the research design chapter.

2.2 – Predictable factors for Resilience and connection to the case selection.

As mentioned in introduction of this thesis, the research will follow some factors that have shown to influence Resilience. These are: integration of Estonia, Russia's influence in Estonia, and Europeanization. We can find in each of those predictable factors a common ground - identity. What does each one of them represent? In which context they are chosen for this research? This section is structured so to explain the background of each of those factors, and how they have posed to be chosen for this research.

³¹ It is worth to mention that even though majority of these migrants were considered ethnic Russians, in contrast many other Soviet ethnicities came to Estonia as well. They were successfully Russified by the Soviet state and thereby a Russian-speaking population was formed. Ethnically is not so coherent group, but they use Russian as lingua franca/native language.

³² "Moscow's policies led to sweeping changes in the ethnic composition of the population of Estonia and Latvia, reducing the proportion of the titular nations by a rate that proved to be unique among union republic nationalities" (Raun 2009: 2).

³³ "Russians do not consider themselves to be an "ethnic minority" in Estonia. They refer to themselves as Russian speakers" (Girenko 1992). But one thing to consider is that there is also Ukrainian, Belarusians that speak Russian, however they serve as other ethnic minority when compiling total percentage. Nevertheless, all use Russian as native language.

³⁴ Here is more accurately to mention this was ethnic Russians, while in later periods the ethnicity varied from other Soviet countries.

³⁵ According to Statistics Estonia, most recent data is from 6th of September 2017. RV0222: POPULATION, 1 JANUARY by Year, Sex, County and Ethnic nationality.

³⁶ Ukrainians, Belarusians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanians RV0222: POPULATION, 1 JANUARY by Year, Sex, County and Ethnic nationality.

In general, integration is the act of combining two or more things so they can bond, collaborate, and live together. As for society, it is basically the act or process of association and union of peoples of different ethnicities that have lived over the past separately for different reasons. During Soviet Union, the ethnic population composition of Estonia varied, estimated from 90% in 1945 to around 60% by 1989 for ethnic Estonians; while as for Russian speakers, for the same periods, from around 7-8% to 35% (Raun 2009). What was seen is that after the reestablishment of Estonia's independence, the country inherited a divided society. The majority of the Russian speakers, albeit born in Estonia during USSR existence, became immigrants without even being considered technically as such (Jakobson 2014:7) – people without citizenship. This has to do with national identity, and with the national reawake process that a sovereign process of (re)independence brought along. Since there was restoration of independence in Estonia, the Russian-speaking community here stood in a void as for their immigrant status, so the State was granted the responsibility to move an integration process in terms of thinking further on naturalization process and thus integration policies³⁷ in various areas such as: education, labor market, citizenship and political, and media (Institute of Baltic Studies 2013) to mention a few.

Russia's influence in Estonia has to do with the way Russian foreign policy is conducted. The Russian speaking population migration to Estonia during 1940 to 1989 was, generally, a result of political legacy of how Moscow/USSR conducted its policies. Thus, the ethnic relations in the Baltic country have not come to happen in a vacuum space (Raun 2009:7). Therefore, the Eastern neighboring country holds historical perspectives and attachments that helped shape its foreign policy on how they see Estonia, with disagreements on the History of the 20th century for instance – historically, a narrative built over the years as Estonia being perceived as a possession of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union which still reflects in today's political positions. So, whenever Russia has a chance to meddling in a country that - i) has a minority of Russian speakers (this includes strongly ethnic Russians, indeed); and ii)

³⁷ “by the late 1990s the government accepted the state's responsibility to promote ethnic integration. The official goal was a multicultural Estonia in which each ethnic group would be able to retain its native language and culture but also a society in which a functional command of Estonian, the privileged state language, served as the basis for establishing a common civic identity and an informed citizenry that could readily communicate with each other” (Raun 2009:7).

was once part of their empire block (USSR) – they will try to do so by various means³⁸. In Estonia, this Moscow’s influence has shown signs to be made through media mostly.³⁹ In all, integration of the Russian-speakers solely through language learning has proven the Estonian State to be an insufficient policy when aiming at achieving societal cohesion (Nimmerfeldt, Rikmann and Hallik 2014: 5, as cited in Jakobson 2014:7). But with strategies of psychological defense and strategic communication (Estonian National Security concept 2017) pose as part of new policies to avoid difficult consequences from certain threats or disturbances.

Europeanization is part of a process for European integration, but also for evaluating the impact in EU of member State policies. So, it can be understood from two fronts - Europeanization is a term used to describe the effects of European integration on the politics and policies of its member states (and yet to be members) as well as the process of enhancing European-level political institutions (Ladrech 2002). Moreover, Europeanization tends also to deal, as per definition, with cultural aspects - identity of Europeans - so the cultural understanding that was constructed throughout centuries is that with the harmonization of various cultures we can have diversity and thus Europeanization (Schmale 2010). In addition, if the historical roots of the European unification project⁴⁰ are well shared, that can also push Europeanization process in countries such as member states and new potential members or associated partners. In that sense, Estonia has shown, since 1991, to be closer to Europe than Russia, so the identity value is shared with an European project that later contributed it to access to EU.

After 1991, Estonia reestablished its Independence. The country’s political leaders developed common willingness to continue the former process from 1940s. However, it was daunting

³⁸ So, we can infer one aspect that plays an important role, so Russia’s move are somehow dependent on that, in this case - identity.

³⁹ In 2009, Toivo Raun argued that “In the media “war”, Estonia does not have the resources to compete with the Russian Federation” (Raun 2009: 6). However, with the advent of social media, younger generation of Russian speakers in Estonia not being so close to television anymore, and the Estonian sponsored TV in Russian language created in 2015, results show differently. Estonia have shown resilience to adapt its approach to Russian speakers through media (Dougherty and Kaljurand 2015:16-17)

⁴⁰ Start of European Community of Coal and Steel, we can see the unification project being pushed by aspects of Europeanization, a one cultural identity that pushes the full body project of EU integration.

because international society and Estonian social structure changed⁴¹ considerably since then. Nevertheless, Estonia managed to initiate the process and approach to “western-world” considering specially institutions and blocks. EU and NATO⁴² were the core focus as it finally happened in 2004 (Kasakamp 2006, as cited in Resende and Silva 2018:101). The EU because of reasons such as: the Estonian national identity - as being closer to Europeans - access to market liberalization, and social and economic development in general; and NATO for security aspects related to Russia’s influence of meddling, and for being a major western institution for security. Thus, Estonian goal was clear after 1991: diminish Russian influence and increase the western influence sphere (Resende, Silva 2018: 100-120). But this, certainly, brought all sorts of challenges for the State government – i) bringing Europeanization process of new policies to complying to EU regulations and norms; ii) facing the evolving influence of Moscow politically⁴³, considering the Russian-speakers in the country and how societal cohesion could be developed from that point on.

Taking the reestablishment of independence in 1991, Estonia wanted to become closer to the western sphere. When we analyze that, the Estonian access to western institutions such as the EU, for instance, is the primary aim for shifting its core influential focus from Russia to western sphere after the collapse of USSR and many years of occupation. This, eventually, brings aspects of being closer to Europe culturally, and, thereafter , with EU membership in 2004 “becoming more European” (Tovias 2007:485-500). This is known as Europeanization and it requires complying to aspects found “in Copenhagen 1993:

“Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market

⁴¹ For instance, Finns, Germans and other ethnic minorities compose Estonian social structure before 1940.

⁴² Initially, this research does not bring NATO as a major influence. But it might change after evaluating the findings through my methods.

⁴³ Moscow have, since then, imposing some sort of influence, to mention media propaganda towards the Russo-speakers to de-stabilize societal cohesion. This can generate disturbances, pressure and threats towards Estonia, as seen in the cases analyzed in this research – April night riots in 2007 and Ukrainian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union". (Copenhagen European Council 1993:21-22).

In that view, Europeanization is thereby an important factor that might contribute to resilience in Estonia. That is, by means of involvement, construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal procedures (Moumoutzis 2011:612), a State can incorporate the framework structure of EU, domestically. Thus, this entails the understand that a State needs to consider the aspect of minorities' protection so to proceed with EU membership. This links directly to the minorities' integration level feature, found in Copenhagen in 1993, which also affects the aspects evolving resilience conceptual definition on interpretation of context and experiences⁴⁴. Indeed, culturally speaking, Estonia is self-recognized more as Europeans, so a sense of cultural relations was strongly advocated for Europeanization. Therefore, level of Europeanization in Estonia explains why it is considered a predictable factor for this research, as Estonia meant to shift itself from Russian to Western sphere of influence.⁴⁵

Still under post-1991, the international structure and the Estonian national structure was transformed. First, there was no longer a bipolar world, so Estonia willingness was to integrate into western sphere of influence as mentioned before, and in fact successfully accomplished that. Secondly, Estonian's ethnic composition was "totally changed compared to pre-World War II period of independence" (Pääbo 2008:9):

"Almost 40% of the population were no Estonians and the majority of them migrated to Estonia during the Soviet occupation. In 1992, the Estonian Citizenship Law from 1938 was restored and all Estonian inhabitants who came to Estonia after June 1940 (the month when the Soviet occupation

⁴⁴ "Resilience does not bounce back to a previous equilibrium; second, disturbances and adaptations might be different and depend on context and time, hence it navigates on past, present and future perspectives or experiences ; and third shocks and disturbances might reveal distinct interpretations, meaning that "an event as of disturbance is often a social construction involving multiple directionality and constant interactions between agential powers and the social structure" (Bourbeau 2013:9)

⁴⁵ Identity analysis aspects shall also be considered.

started in Estonia) and their descendants had to gain Estonian citizenship through naturalization. It made almost one-third of Estonia's population, mostly Russian-speakers, foreigners or non-citizens" (Budryte, 2005:65-66, as cited in Pääbo 2008:9).

This eventually led to a community division, within Estonian society, between Estonians and the Russian speakers. Albeit Estonian Government direct efforts to integrate the two communities⁴⁶, there was a major steppingstone event that developed more attention to that divide. That is, the April night riots from 2007 in Tallinn:

"The events of April 2007 brought Estonia and Tallinn to the headlines of the international press. A country that was considered as a transition miracle and had the image of a peaceful Nordic country was suddenly reported as a battlefield of ethnic tensions. The center of the capital, Tallinn, was bust up within one night and the Estonian government had to engage volunteers to help police suppress the riots in Tallinn and NorthEast Estonia" (Pääbo 2008:5).

But what have influenced this event to take place back in 2007? In short, the April night riots were caused due to the removal of a war memorial in Central Tallinn, Tonismäe ("The Bronze Soldier"), and its relocation at the Defense Forces Cemetery of Tallinn. The event reflected a division of interpretations and understanding of History from the two communities in Estonia – Estonians and the Russian Speakers. Particularly, historical context of occupations in Estonia, and more importantly in the World War II aftermath in Estonia, have led the construction of different historical perspectives towards that war memorial monument. This means that the Estonian and the Russian-speaking communities held (and might still hold) different interpretations for History. This is specifically known as historical narratives - that is, how a certain group(s) of people interpret a specific historical event, and this is related to construction of identity formation and political memory. Heiko Pääbo

⁴⁶ Specially because of access to EU. Integration of minorities was one major aspect to consider membership of the block.

explains it with the term “War of Memories”⁴⁷ (Pääbo 2008), that is related to identity; so, Iver B. Neumann brings the concept of identity formation through lens of (self) image, under a relational process where “the self and the other” are opposed (Neumann 1998:17). This relational process can create boundaries, be it individually or socially. States have the responsibility to manage those relations, including potential foreign policy strategies (when in the case of Estonia was clear for the Russian sphere of influence towards their language minority). That is, in the light of rhetorical discourses, and interpretations, the “self” has to, by all means, be protected from the “other”. So, security perceptions can reflect a positive image of the “self” because the “other” might be considered irrational and troublesome (Campbell 1998).

The two communities held different perceptions of self and other images, according to their identities and considering the symbolism (and thus the interpretation of a historical narrative) of the war memorial in Tonismäe (“The Bronze Soldier”) (Pääbo 2008: 10). For the Estonian community, the interpretation of what the monument meant was related to the Soviet occupation as being a forceful act. Estonia understands that Nazism and communism are part of similar classification of totalitarian regimes (Lauristin 2007, as cited in Pääbo 2008:19); thus there is no differentiation in terms of one being good and other the evil, both are negative conceived. The Russian-speaking community, in contrast, did not perceived Estonia was forcefully occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940⁴⁸ (Pääbo 2008: 11) and, moreover, they hold an understanding that Russians liberated Europe (and Estonia) from the Nazis⁴⁹ (an evil regime). Therefore, the monument *Tonismäe* (“The Bronze Soldier”) represented for the Russian speakers “a denial of the sacrifice of the Russian people and an equalization of the Soviet regime with the Nazi one, almost as criminal as the latter regime itself. In addition, the Memorial that symbolized occupation for the Estonians has a totally different significance for the Russian-speaking community” (Pääbo 2008: 12). So, the term “War of memory” from

⁴⁷ This term, explained from Pääbo, supports the reflection on identity building, collective memory that eventually influence historical narratives to be presented differently.

⁴⁸ In 2005, 56% saw it as voluntary act and only 30% of the Russian-speakers agreed with the Estonian position (Vetik, 2007, as cited in Pääbo 2008: 11).

⁴⁹ The Great Patriotic War in Russia is perceived as a people’s fight against fascism, not as a fight for Stalin or for the communists, as the Estonian narrative depicts it (Pavlovskiy 2008, as cited in Pääbo:12).

Pääbo helps to explain the conflictual narratives of History itself when it comes to the Bronze soldier monument.

This is particularly what led to the first event of shock proposed in this Thesis, as an internal disturbance – April night riots in 2007 (Cyber attacks as part thereof). This latter of events were major ones, including Russian influence (attacks in Estonian Embassy in Moscow). In the domestic side, the crises escalated to violent internal protests in Tallinn that led Estonia to re-think its integration policies when considering cohesion of society and, thereby, resilience; together with more integrating security policies - Broad State Security concept, for instance, in the NSC of 2010. A stronger and integrated society is necessary for coping in times of crises (Republic of Estonia 2010).

Thus, the author of this thesis perceps that resilience was conceived as renewal, before measuring the results of data. Russian speakers – influenced by media from outside - showed their unsatisfaction with Estonian policies of integration demonstrating looting and riots, ending up with one death, 170 injuries and over 1000 arrested people. Identity and collective memory are found to be a continuous process in the case of Estonia, it is not a steady unchanging product; it is however constantly being transformed according to new realities (Pääbo 2008: 25). Therefore, keeping society integrated affects resilience, and moreover finds ground on the resilience theoretical conceptualization. The societal system is able to ‘press the start button’ and respond to crises released from internal or external domains of the security environment – if they are well integrated and cohesive.⁵⁰

Furthermore, after 7 years, in 2014, another major disturbance, this time from outside, made Estonia develop and improve further the concept of resilience – the author of this thesis perceps that resilience was conceived as maintenance before measuring the results of data. Estonia had shown preoccupation with Russian threats in Ukraine – Annexation of Crimea⁵¹ - to spill over and cause problems of a possible invasion of Estonia. Eventually, there was

⁵⁰ According to Philippe Bourbeau this response can be conceived as renewal, maintenance or marginal changes.

⁵¹ It is not the focus to describe what have happened in Crimea, and how Russia annexed it. Rather, the event serves as a disturbance point to the Estonia case selection for this Thesis.

also attention for this spill-over effect to influence the Russian-speaking population in Estonia to similar extent as it happened in Ukraine⁵², followed by constant propaganda⁵³. Certainly, the level of intervention of Russia as of its national media, and often propaganda⁵⁴, might have led attempts of Moscow's influence towards the Russian-speaking population in Estonia in some way. For Russia, this is a way they perceive their foreign policy, under Putin's administration,

“reuniting those Russian speakers in what he calls the “Russian World” is a top priority. The concept is defined broadly, but loosely, with the Russian president claiming the right, indeed the duty, to protect Russian speakers—his “compatriots”—no matter where they live. Language, culture and the media are key tools in this endeavour” (Dougherty and Kaljurand 2015:5).

So, the question that was raised in Estonia during 2014 events in Ukraine were – “Will Narva⁵⁵ be next? (Dougherty and Kaljurand 2015:2)⁵⁶. Russian possibility of meddling in Estonia - and even an invasion during or after the 2014 Annexation of Crimea - was back then a major aspect of attention for resilience from the Estonian Government, considering the Russian-speaking community being a vulnerable group in the security environment. The way Russia operated that was using sources such as media, through means of political influence just as it was used to intervene in Crimea; so, signs of preoccupation were present in Estonia as well. However, the conclusion from Dougherty and Kaljurand report in 2015 on that front indicated positive findings – there could not be identified a “likelihood of Russia's state media succeeding in inciting widespread civil disturbances among Russian speakers in Estonia⁵⁷” (Dougherty and Kaljurand 2015:17). Moreover, an invasion possibility

⁵² Most recent statistics shows as ethnic groups: Russian (58.3%), Ukrainian (24.3%), Crimean Tatar (12,1%) Belarussian (1.4%) in Crimea.

⁵³ A process for the showing, germination and cultivation of ideas (Taylor, 2003:2).

⁵⁴ The Russian media frequently depict Estonia as a “fascist” country which seeks to oppress its Russian-speaking minority (Dougherty and Kaljurand 2015:17).

⁵⁵ A city in Eastern Estonia that holds a majority of Russian speakers inhabitants, about 96%.

⁵⁶ Estonia's “Virtual Russian World”: The Influence of Russian Media on Estonia's Russian Speakers. International Center for Defense and Security, 2015.

⁵⁷ There are “five principles that guide Russian speakers in how they consume Russian media: 1. Entertainment is primary, news is secondary; 2. Scepticism about any and all news sources is rampant; 3.

of Russia in Estonia concluded to be unrealistic, as Russia would not be interested in a high magnitude armed conflict with NATO (Dougherty and Kaljurand 2015:15).

During 2007 and 2014, there happened other events that drove attention of Estonia for the Russian influence factor – such as the Georgian War in 2008 for instance. Thus, in all, although Russian media did not seem to have caused civil disturbances in Estonia,⁵⁸ and no interest of a possible invasion, Russian speakers in Estonia are exposed to Moscow’s political influence in general aspects.⁵⁹ So this appears to be a crucial factor that have influenced Estonian resilience conceptual development for formulating a resilience approach to sustain societal cohesion.

Therefore, the study case of Estonia for the Resilience theoretical typology is valid. To say that in Estonian Security Policy concept of 2010⁶⁰, the world resilience was officially mentioned “in the fourth chapter (in the English version only) – foreign policy, defense policy, internal security policy, cohesion and resilience of society” (National Security Concept of Estonia 2010:9). In 2017⁶¹, resilience was also mentioned (in both, Estonian and English) in a more developed way by addressing two hypothesis: “The more united a society and the more common values it shares, the less it can be influenced and the less susceptible

Young people are tuning out, abandoning TV in favor of the Internet; 4. Local news, not international, is of paramount interest; 5. Cultural attraction to Russia does not necessarily equal political attraction.

⁵⁸ Worth to mention that during the April riots in Tallinn, and the death of one Russian speaker, there happened a riot campaign at the Estonian Embassy in Moscow under leadership of the pro-Kremlin youth movement Nashi.

⁵⁹ “Many Russian speakers in Estonia, especially those at the lower end of the economic scale, with little or no knowledge of the Estonian language, are disengaged from the political life of their country. This “de-politicization” is, in part, a legacy of life in the Soviet Union, where civic involvement outside of Communist Party institutions was persecuted” (Dougherty and Kaljurand 2015:17). Moreover, this same report concludes that “The label “Russian” is not precise; some Russian speakers are ethnically Russian, others are a complex mix of nationalities—Ukrainians, Armenians, Belarusians and others that comprised the peoples of the Soviet Union” (Dougherty and Kaljurand 2015:5-6).

⁶⁰ “The capability of the state to prevent and avert security threats depends on the readiness to maintain functions that are vital to the existence of the state and the people. Social cohesion and the resilience of the critical services that are promoted in the interests of national development also strengthen national security when threats emerge. In promoting the resilience and cohesion of the society, the state co-operates with other members of civil society. Social cohesion is enhanced, and social risks prevented through higher employment rate and greater involvement in social life. The prevention of social risks is addressed in the national economic and social policy” (National Security Concept of Estonia 2010:17)

⁶¹ “A society’s resilience is its ability to recover quickly from the impact of negative phenomena, and restore its strength, flexibility and success” (National Security Concept of Estonia 2017:4).

it is to security threats. The more residents trust the state, the more resilient it is”. (National Security Concept of Estonia 2017:19). That means that the object of study for this research proves validity.

2.3 – Estonian National Security Concept

It is worth to explain what the National Security concept (NSC) of Estonia is, its background and development over the years⁶². There are, officially, developments on NSC from 2001, 2004, 2010 to 2017. The general objective in all of those documents are the same: “to secure the Nation’s independence and sovereignty, the survival of the people and the state, territorial integrity, constitutional order and the safety of the population” (Republic of Estonia 2001, 2004, 2010 and 2017). But in more specific terms, and also considering my predictable factors – societal integration, influence of Russia, and Europeanization – the concept definitely has shown different perspectives over the years, as it is stated officially in each of them: “The Concept is amended or reviewed pursuant to changes in the security environment and developments of the Estonian national security system” (Republic of Estonia 2001, 2004, 2010 and 2017). Only in 2017, it is possible to see a slight change to this dynamic to which Estonia addressed more clearly that not only was the concept subject to the changes of the security environment, but also in a period of every four years it should be updated, as seen hereinafter:

“The Concept is amended or reviewed pursuant to changes in the security environment and developments of the Estonian national security system, but each composition of the Riigikogu shall update the Concept at least every four years. At least twice during the four-year cycle the Prime Minister shall inform the Riigikogu about achieving the goals set in the concept” (Republic of Estonia 2017).

⁶² The security concept influences the way Estonia conducts its Foreign Policy (FP) as one of the country’s objectives in that front has to do with security (“Ensuring national security and the indivisibility of security; stability and predictability of international relations”). This justifies how security is relevant for Estonia’s position in IR. <https://vm.ee/en/estonias-foreign-policy-objectives>.

Therefore, the NSC is one conceptual understanding that over the years has been updated due to international “arena” of security changes. Some developments have been made, particularly in what I propose to study: societal resilience seen in the NSC of Estonia.

But if we bring the background of the NSC, in the beginning, the concept of national security in Estonia was not known as NSC. Differently, the first security document approved by the Parliament of Estonia was in 1996 and it is based on principles of territorial defense and total defense – found on the “Main Directions of the Estonian National Defence Policy” (Pernik 2014). The main goal of that initial concept was to prevent aggression against the Estonian State - “The document envisioned a joint and coordinated deployment defense, societal, and economic resources to prevent or divert threat or attack” (Riigikogu, 1996, as cited in Pernik 2014). We can see in 1996 a strong focus on military support to prevent attacks⁶³. In addition:

“the nation would develop Defense Forces with capabilities to provide military support to the civilian side to help to mitigate the consequences of natural emergencies, epidemics, and technical accidents, and to provide help to the civilian authorities in eliminating the consequences of disasters” (Pernik 2014:47).

From 2001 on, it is observed a small progressive and initial development towards what we know today as comprehensive security approach, yet not to full extension⁶⁴. Willingness to access as member to both NATO⁶⁵ and EU⁶⁶ were major examples of this conceptual

⁶³ This was eventually expected, due to the security environment - early stages of re-independence and end of Cold War. There was a concern of invasions, which reflects the History of many years of occupation, and bipolar order to multipolar transformation.

⁶⁴ Approach according to which all the factors influencing the nation’s security are considered. Its implementation encompasses all the sectors vital to ensuring national security. The main directions of broad-based security are foreign policy, defense policy, internal security policy, cohesion and resilience of society. The broad concept of security entails enhancement of the mutual co-operation of state authorities as well as international co-operation, and the involvement of other members of society in reinforcing security (Riigikogu, 2010 as cited in Pernik 2014).

⁶⁵ “In 1994, Estonia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and signed the PfP Framework Document” (Security Concept 2001:7). Following that, the country “approved, in May 1996, and NATO membership as a separate goal was inserted into all relevant Government programs” (Security Concept 2001:7). <https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/web-static/335/SecurityConcept.pdf>.

⁶⁶ “Estonia’s relations with the European Union is the Association Agreement signed in 1995, the so-called Europe Agreement that fixes Estonia’s final goal of membership in the EU. After ratification of that

progression - militarily and socially⁶⁷. The latter as a more strategical military defense capacity, while the former by societal means, cultural and minority integration. Moreover, Russia did not appear as a major concern to Estonia in the period that the document was issued: “Estonia does not see a direct military threat to its security neither now, nor in the foreseeable future” (Republic of Estonia 2001:8).

Full capacity into societal terms was not the main goal of 2001 NSC, but it was rather seen an initial process on social and minority integration front by making sure the minorities in the country had access to learning properly the Estonian language for a more harmonization of society, and acquisition of citizenship, if necessary, as seen in 2001 NSC:

“Two processes shape the nature of integration of Estonian society: the social harmonization of society based on knowledge of the Estonian language and on the acquisition of Estonian citizenship, on the one hand; and on the other hand creating conditions for maintaining ethnic differences, based on the recognition of the cultural rights of ethnic minorities. The three main components of the national integration program are linguistic-communicative integration, legal-political integration and socio-economic integration” (Republic of Estonia 2001:23).

Nonetheless, the NSC in Estonia has developed to a more solid societal security ground only in 2004 due to more proximity to regional-western institutions⁶⁸. In 2004, the NSC objectives were clearly positioned in the document in reflection to membership of NATO and EU structures (Republic of Estonia 2004: 3)

Additionally, in comparison to 2001, in 2004 the integration of minorities was pointed: “The integration of Estonian society is based upon two parallel processes: integrating society on

Agreement by the Riigikogu, the Government submitted its membership application to the EU in October 1995. On the basis of the Luxembourg summit decision in 1997, Estonia and the EU accession talks started” (Security Concept 2001:7). <https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/web-static/335/SecurityConcept.pdf>.

⁶⁷ Not limited to it, but for the sake of this thesis I consider this two aspects. Economical aspects of course come as consequences, but are not the focus here.

⁶⁸ As mentioned earlier in this thesis, integration of minority is a requirement for membership into EU for instance.

the basis of knowledge of the Estonian language and the acquiring of Estonian citizenship, and, on the other hand, supporting the preservation of ethnocultural diversity” (Republic of Estonia 2004:16). In comparison to 2004, in 2001, there was no such mentioning, this shows a development towards a more diverse Estonian society. In all, 2004 NSC there was no mentioning either of resilience approach, or any sort of similar concept, towards society. Lastly, Estonia had Russia’s image, still seen from the document, as a good relationship and no foreseen of threats, rather a further development of cooperation between the two countries (Republic of Estonia 2004:12).

Following that direction, NSC from 2010 was when firstly the term resilience could be seen⁶⁹. The main goals of 2010’s NSC were similar to 2004, but with relevant additional points as referring to comprehensive security approach and attention to civic society (Republic of Estonia 2010:4). In 2010’s NSC, integration of society was improved, and psychological defense is first mentioned. This is because cohesion of society was seen as an important aspect to which guarantees security as well. If citizens are able to defend themselves psychologically against disturbances⁷⁰, cope against crises, and are indeed prepared to face complicated situations, it makes it less complicated for the State to provide security. Also, one of the elements that guarantees security is integration, which enriches the plural society of Estonia (Republic of Estonia 2010:20-21):

Moreover, “the aim of psychological defense is to safeguard the security of state and society, to enhance the sense of security, to avert crisis and to increase trust amongst society and towards the actions taken by the state”, so “psychological defense and the recognition of constitutional values strengthen the resilience to avert anti-Estonian subversive activity” (Republic of Estonia 2010:20) is objectively placed in the NSC of 2010. There was first mentioning of resilience⁷¹ and social cohesion in 2010, which serves as a high point of proof towards my expectations that will be tested. What one can interpret from 2010 NSC document is that if a society is cohesive and resilience is promoted, responding to a threat or

⁶⁹ In the English version of the document. Estonian version of the term, resilience, was only inserted in 2017 version.

⁷⁰ This means society level of preparedness to cope against crises.

⁷¹ In 2010 resilience was included as resilience of critical services as well.

disturbance is more accessible in societal terms (Republic of Estonia 2010:7). Furthermore, and considering the predictable factors, it was also mentioned that Russia posits as a risk/threat due to their objectives of “restoration of its status as a major global power” (Republic of Estonia 2010:7)

Estonia has the latest development of its NSC in 2017. The developments compared to 2010 is considerably developed in terms of progress considering the predictable factors for this research. The document openly mentions Russia’s activities elsewhere, as major threats to Estonia, and as way of influence. So, in 2017 the NSC has been influenced by external disturbances and risks such as the annexation of Crimea⁷² (we can interpret that from what went on in 2014): i) “Russia has used military power to achieve its objectives. Russia has strengthened its armed forces and increased its military presence on the borders of NATO member states, including in the Baltic Sea region and on Estonia’s border” (Republic of Estonia 2017:4); and ii) “As Russia has become more aggressive in the past decade, Estonia works for greater unanimity and consistency in EU’s and NATO’s Russian policy. Estonia supports the continued enforcement of the restrictive measures imposed until their reasons have been eliminated” (Republic of Estonia 2017:10). Therefore, we see one more prove that Russia’s influence might serve to affect resilience in Estonia.

In all, the NSC is where resilience concept can be found and was deliberated and formulated in Estonia; so, it is one of the sources for this research. However, it is also important to mention that the NSC is rather a descriptive general strategy that encompasses the whole security environment – international and domestic. That is, it is not a specific book of policies, threat and risk analysis, or specific threats’ list where one is able to see the events that influence the NSC in Estonia. Nonetheless, one is able to interpret what the strategies, goals and observations mean. Expectedly, the document mentions EU and NATO considerably, and other National domestic capacities to reach resilience of society.

In that sense, State is the main articulator between security goals and society. With National capacities, in different security fronts, State can provide security – through critical services

⁷² This is yet to be tested in the method and analysis of findings section.

(Estonia 2010, 2017) to whole of society and enhance abilities of defense or resistance when in crises or emergencies. Also, State provides all the necessary capacity for society to defend themselves psychologically against threats. This is mentioned in the NSC extensively in 2010 and 2017. Therefore, one infers that for the NSC more broad analysis results will be extracted, and the focal results of this research will rely on the other qualitative methods proposed in next chapter.

Having said all that, this proves the point of relevancy of this research and its relation to resilience in Estonia by the following justifications: i) Estonian society has a language minority vulnerable group that frequently have been target of foreign meddling - 24% ethnic Russians and around 28% of Russian-speakers. Thus, Estonia officially is responsible for guiding the need for societal common value sharing, integration strategies being constantly monitored so to maintain cohesion and to avoid disturbance or shocks from outside; ii) the mentioning of the word “residents” in the NSC is interestingly posed there and leaves room open for any understanding in that direction. That is, amongst Russian speakers, there are Estonian citizens but also there might be other residents from different countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia for instance – as part of former Soviet Union countries - who speak Russian as well, and might be closer attached culturally to elsewhere. In addition, the wording approach - Russian-speaking population - is correctly assumed on this research considering the predictable factor integration of society. Thus, their integration in society and the influence of Russia/Moscow on them prove as being indicators here for a validity of this research as well as the fact that the resilience understanding in the NSC has been progressing continuously.

That speaks directly to the research problem using the theoretical approach arguments for a resilience type: in 2007 societal resilience in Estonia was little considered before 2010 NSC – being as renewal then; while as in 2014 onwards it was well engaged and maintained. Therefore, this thesis will contribute to the further development of resilience debate in IR. That will be done by trying to prove Bourbeau’s approach for the MMR resilience typology. To do that, this case selection will serve as an important aspect to consider, regarding perspectives of the context in Estonia - interpretations of events in Estonia – April night riots

in 2007 and Crimea annexation in 2014. Resilience in Estonia, which is found in its NSC, is thus the object of study. Moreover, factors such as: Influence of Russia; Level of integration; and level of Europeanization are posed here to have influenced Estonian resilience capacity. I will then try to link Bourbeau's typology into Estonian resilience for the proposed period. The way this research does it will be better encompassed in the next chapter, research design.

3 - Research design, data, methods, and predictable factors.

Estonia has shown subjective and objective signs of resilience within its State political structure. First, in the period of reestablishment of independence in 1991 one could assume to see resilience in Estonia, and secondly from 2007 on officially. This is said because the country was found in a critical situation after 1991, where it had to develop the State socio-political fronts, including an efficient security system, after many years of occupation as being part of the USSR. Political system, economy, institutional building, all this signified adapting and coping with what was going on in that period. Estonia had to start with the tools they had, and the country presented a successful way of transformation with full access to Western and European institutions. Following the years, Estonia developed resilience and inserted that on the NSC formulation and other defense documents. After shocks and disturbances seen in 2007 and 2014, NSC documents and State defense acts (Republic of Estonia, 2015)⁷³, were updated to provide a better understanding of resilience security wise from those years ahead. So, in a sense, resilience was subjectively present from 1991 as it was used to build Estonia's State structure; but objectively it took official place only years later - in 2010 NSC onwards.

Thus, resilience definition, marked as a process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks (Bourbeau 2015:3) has the aim of a continuous progression, changing from society to society, event by event, situation by situation. It does not aim at one linear understanding, which can result on being copied everywhere or to everyone else. It depends, thus, on context and perspective, on how a particular societal structure (or an individual) receives and understand the events of disturbances. This process outputs factors that will influence eventually the resilience type – renewal, maintenance or marginal. That explains why this resilience typological approach of Bourbeau is a transformative concept.

⁷³ The State Defense Act was approved by parliament in 2015 and passed new updated in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/502042019010/consolide>.

We can see, therefore, that the event of collapse of USSR was a positive shock for Estonia, which they used to change, transform, and progress the State. In addition, the Estonian structure followed changes up to point where the shocks of 2007 and 2014 affected resilience to be elaborated and included in the NSC more objectively. One crucial vulnerability for the events leading the shocks in 2007 and 2014 was the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. From what has been developed in this research, this vulnerable group represents one indicator for two of predictable factors in greater extent, and one in lesser – integration of society, influence of Russian, and Europeanization. First - to have a more cohesive society, minority groups must be well integrated; second - the group can be a target for Russia's influence; and third - Europeanization is given for the capacity of Estonian structure to identify themselves as Europeans, and consequently adhering to the institutional process of EU supranational policies for instance⁷⁴.

The study object of this research is resilience present on the Estonian National Security Concept official document. Thus, from this observation the main argument of my research is that in 2007 the National Resilience in Estonia was as renewal, in face of the Bronze soldier riots, while as in 2014 was maintained. My aim is to answer the following questions: Which types of resilience did the two period of events lead to create and why? Considering theoretical aspects, my background will be the Resilience theory, which is borrowed from Philippe Bourbeau MMR typology framework. In order to prove my initial assumption, qualitative code analysis of the NSC documents of 2010 and 2017 followed by a semi-structured interview with Estonian State officials are the main method that will indicate reliability for the central argument of this research. It is also important to mention once again the indicators given as predictable factors that are expected to influence towards the object of study, which are: Influence of Russia, level of integration, and level of Europeanization.⁷⁵

I have chosen a qualitative method of research. This is because the resilience approach is dependable on context and perspective, as mentioned in the theoretical part. Philippe

⁷⁴ If a group is not self-viewed as Estonians, will not consequently be viewed as the European cultural project either. Thus, minority integration is one crucial aspect to be considered as policy in the EU level.

⁷⁵ As it is a qualitative type of study, the research is open for new findings according to the methods' results. These are only predicable factor that seem to have contributed to resilience MMR typology in Estonia.

Bourbeau's typological development used a qualitative research method as well – centered on discourse analysis – for threats' perceptions on migration issues in different societies, more specifically through lens of securitization process.⁷⁶ With various and distinct contexts and perspectives, disturbances and shocks, interpretations and understanding of narratives are different as well. This is because shared ideas, knowledge, norms, values, and beliefs are a matter of social construction (Jackson & Sorensen 2007, Wendt 1992, Wendt 1999). Some groups interpret in a way, while others differently. With this said, a qualitative method would enhance the reliability of the research design, making it also viable. This research differs from Bourbeau's on the specific method of operationalization, and in the case analysis. Following along that direction, qualitative coding and semi-structured in-depth interviews, under an open-ended questionnaire with selective Estonian State officials – and also experts that deal with the subject - are the mechanisms to reach the expectation and assumptions of this thesis.

That, said, to evaluate the semi-structured interviews I have chosen the content analysis research technique. This chosen method enhances the capability of analysis of textual descriptive data in a more flexible way (Cavanagh, 1997). Therefore, the objective of content analysis, in this study, is to provide a proper understanding about resilience knowledge, which is the object of research. The data used, other than text data from semi-structure interviews, also includes the NSC documents of 2010 and 2017 (if necessary previous versions as well). The interviewees were chosen according to the composition within GSC of Estonia, who is the official Government body responsible to conduct the formulation and update of the NSC. The GSC is composed currently by minister of defense, the minister of economic affairs and infrastructure, the minister of entrepreneurship and IT, the minister of finance, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, and the minister of justice.

The GSC is led by the NSDCD. The security concept is first discussed and evaluated within this coordination group, then goes to Parliament for approval. Ideally, the interviews with

⁷⁶ Even though his methods are more indicated for securitization process of disturbances, my proposition of study – qualitative content analysis - is also valid for interpreting the understandings of resilience. For the language barrier limitations, political discussions in Estonian language cannot be followed. Rather, materials in English will be used followed by semi-structured interviews with State officials. Both fronts will be coded.

each State-official will be conducted, respectively to each Ministry. The interviews will not necessarily be conducted with high ranked officials but rather to whoever has knowledge and deals with the NSC and resilience within each Ministry. Including interviews with the NSCDCD is also an objective for enhancing data analysis (see appendix 2 distribution of officials)⁷⁷. It is not expected that the interviews are the State officials that were directly involved with the formulation of NSC of 2010 and 2014, because some of them are not actively or present in the governmental/political scene anymore. Nevertheless, since the study is about the structure – State - the Officials and experts that are in charge today hold sufficient knowledge about the process, be it from whichever year, despite the fact they were directly related to the NSC development or not. Involvement of them with security issues will be considered, nonetheless. Eventually, if the interviewee was involved in the formulation process, the better it is.⁷⁸ Also, for dealing with sensitive information, it is expected interviewees to remain anonymous, but this will be evaluated and addressed during the process, following their decision under proper written or verbal agreement, in the next chapter.

I also expect to have some difficulties when trying to access the State officials; so, using the snowballing technique (Puyvelde 2018:381)⁷⁹ is expected to be useful when interviewing. Also, formal contact, by e-mail, including the research topic, set of questions sent attached, and detailed information of my academic institution and supervisor, should be stressed when first approaching. Moreover, it is important that not much of the research objectives, hypotheses or expected results are disclosed before the interview, as this would avoid potential biases towards the results (Leech, 2002). In addition, the questions in the appendix follow a constructivist logic, where I leave the floor open for the participant to describe their responses freely. I begin with a more general and simple question (Leech, 2002), leave the more specific and longer questions for when trust and rapport is built (Leech 2002). The

⁷⁷ These officials are not necessarily the ones who will be interviewed. This will be accessed at individual interview level over next section - data analysis.

⁷⁸ The questions asked are in the Appendices (see more appendix 3).

⁷⁹ This technique enhances the chances of research recommendation within interviewees. “Using a strategy of snowballing—asking each interviewee to recommend and introduce the researcher to one or more other sources—can help identify additional interviewees and open doors”. (Puyvelde 2018:381)

questions follow a deductive methodological reasoning, as I already tend to ask them according to the MMR typology, and from the NSC documents – some predictability for the codes⁸⁰ and themes⁸¹ will come out of that. This is related to my technique of content analysis – to be explained in the next paragraphs. The notes about the interview process, including the pre-interview too, are addressed upon data analysis separately.

It is worth to mention that the idea of interviewing those State officials is to obtain a descriptive textual content, with more of an opinion and interpretation of context, that I could not acquire accessing only the NSC official documents. With that, the interpretation of the interviews will be followed accurately. The technique for this research – analysis of data of both NSC documents and interviews - will be qualitative coding. This will serve to evaluate properly into which category of typology resilience in Estonia is perceived/interpreted considering the time frame proposed by this research. Thus, my intension is to apply the MMR typology, and possibly improve it, if findings allow so, within the Estonian case of resilience. For that, I will borrow the resilience types from Bourbeau, code the research data – NSC and interview results - and see into which resilience type my content data analysis leads to – resilience as maintenance, resilience as renewal, or marginal resilience.

In the case of this research, a deductive/direct coding approach will be used to initiate the method – extracted from the MMR typology which can be validated or even improved (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1286). That approach already presumes the categories used before coding begins. Inductive approach, in contrast, would have been chosen if I defined the codes throughout data analysis. However, the research is open to possibilities of new code inclusion as the analysis continues. My intension is to identify majority of the codes prior to coding, so my research findings will be based on that (codes can be found over next paragraphs).

In that sense, the principal codes used will be deductively borrowed from the MMR typology scheme and will be appointed within the qualitative data section. But, in principle, after appointing initial codes, the method will follow a thematic categorization – according to

⁸⁰ “Codes are pithy labels identifying what is of interest in the data” (Braun, Clark 2006).

⁸¹ “Themes are a common, recurring pattern across a dataset, clustered around a central organizing concept”. (Ibid).

resilience theory, NSC documents, and interview questions (see appendix 3) – further improvement of code classification will be possible as well. As said in the previous chapter, NSC documents are rather general and serve to guide security in Estonia. The global idea is that State is the main provider of security in Estonia, and societal resilience is a tool to achieve that end. On that regard, State must provide to whole society a toolbox of capacities for cohesion, so they are able to respond to shocks. That is, services that enhance State and society capacity to cope and bounce-back when pressures come.

The NSC of 2010 focus on EU, NATO, global, regional and domestic threats affecting Estonia (yet not specifying the events – if Bronze Soldier riots, Crimea annexation for instance), and the critical services that State needs to provide to the society. This means that various specifics mentioning on April night riots, Ukrainian conflict, clear perception of resilience type, or other events that might influence the NSC or resilience, are not directly addressed. Despite not being addressed clearly open, the semi-structured interviews serve to reassure that those events represented threats for Estonian security environment. Nonetheless, one can also infer interpretations about some statements in the document, e.g: “The impact of distorted information may cause tensions in international relations, radicalization of certain groups of people and harm social cohesion, adding to instability” (Estonia 2010). Conditioning that one knows the Bronze Soldier caused the riots in Tallinn in April of 2007; thereafter, there is an interpretive connection from that sentence to April night riots. In sum, the NSC is a strategic concept; thus, it does not contain clear opinions or description of specific events. The same logic is sustained for the 2017’s version of the concept. This explains why the semi-structured interviews are necessary, in order to proceed with code analysis. Each interview’s result, and data texts, will be interpreted to see where they best fit typologically (see more, table 2).

The initial categories have been deducted after a familiarization process (Braun, Clark 2006) with the theoretical background of resilience, including the MMR typology, the aspects of resilience in the NSC of Estonia, and the interviewing process. So, they are constancy, adaptation, change, renewal, maintenance, marginality, Europeanization, integration of society, Russian interference (or influence) (see table 3). Worth to remind that for interviews,

it will be included categories for events/threats. To begin, the above stated codes are sufficient. Addition of sub-codes is also possible after the round of coding, when the researcher will be able to familiarize better with the data – properly done in chapter four.

Table 2. Expected results, assumptions

Assumed factors to influence resilience in Estonia	Events	Types of resilience	Focus	Expected characteristics according to Bourbeau
Influence of Russia Level of integration Level Europeanization	Annexation of Crimea 2014	Resilience as Maintenance	Quest for constancy and stability	Fixing national identity; Resurgence and/or saliency of political usage of collective memory; Reinforcement of existing agents' power relations
	—	Resilience as Marginality	Marginal adjustments	Changes at the margins that do not fundamentally challenge a policy; Responses within the boundaries of the norm or social structure
	Tallinn April night riots 2007	Resilience as Renewal	Efforts to remodel social structures	Remodelling of a given policy or social structures; Pressure (and potentially shift) in agents' power relations; Low mobilisation of collective/social memory

(Source: own figure)⁸²

Table 3. Codes

Codes
constancy, adaptation, change, renewal, maintenance, marginality, Europeanization, integration of society, Russian interference, events/threats

(Source: own figure)

When seeing the codes above, it is possible to trace patterns of categories, and thus separate them into themes. The theme 'resilience concept' have the codes: constancy, adaptation, and change. "Factors for resilience' have: Europeanization, integration of society, Russian

⁸² Based on Bourbeau's table (Bourbeau2013:15).

influence; Events/threats: April night riots, Ukrainian conflict; and ‘Resilience type in the NSC’ theme will group the codes: renewal, maintenance, and marginality (see table 4). This method will serve to guide the coding process. The codes are connected, through meaning, to words or expression that are marked and linked to each respective theme. There will also be room for inclusion of new codes – and sub-codes - as the analysis follow along, if necessary.

Table 4. Themes and codes

Themes	Codes
Resilience concept	Constancy, adaptation, change
Factors for resilience	Europeanization, integration of society, influence of Russia
Threats/events ⁸³	April night riots, Ukrainian conflict
Resilience type in the NSC	Renewal, maintenance, marginality

(Source: own figure)

The theme ‘resilience concept’ deals with the resilience theory understanding, developed on chapter 1 of this research. The definitions for resilience fall into classification of stability or constancy, stability or constancy after bouncing-back process; adaptation in face of pressures; and transformation in face of pressures. Therefore, this explains why the theme ‘resilience concept’ is chosen. Resilience factors - Europeanization, integration of society, and influence of Russia - are posed there as well to influence resilience. Threats and events – April night riots and Ukrainian conflict – are mentioned because they can be interpreted

⁸³ This is referred to the semi-structure interview questionnaires (see appendix 3).

from State officials as being influential for resilience in Estonia. In that sense, if an event is understood as threat to security environment in Estonia. ‘Resilience type in the NSC’ – renewal, maintenance or marginal – will be the outcome, and will be central to this research because it involves the study object.

In addition, qualitative direct content analysis is the method chosen to overcome limitations of language barrier that have been found throughout the development of this research. More in-depth discourse analysis would have been a good technique as well as done by Philippe Bourbeau on Canada’s migration case but cannot be followed because the speeches from the Estonian Government are in the Estonian language. Translations of such texts to English would not be a wise option either for it could diminish the credibility of the texts and thus decrease level of reliability towards the research results. Therefore, the intension is to make this thesis viable and more reliable in terms of expected results and findings with using the referred methods in this section. Other than that, analyzing English available official documents from the Government of Estonia, in the realm of security,⁸⁴ will be a valid methodological asset as well.

In all, it is worth pointing out again the importance of the predictable factors to conclude this research design section. All three factors – integration of society, influence of Russia, and Europeanization - are expected to influence resilience. Since the objective of this research is to identify the type of resilience, through specific proposed methods - content analysis of interviews and official documents – it will be possible to make a connection of each code to a respective theme. This way I will be able to categorize themes, connect to codes and identify resilience typology in Estonia in the proposed period, followed by the interpretation of the semi-structured interviews. In short, influence of Russia, integration of society, and Europeanization are crucial aspects for resilience and might influence its type. That said, with the events proposed as shocks or disturbances – April night riots, and annexation of Crimea – resilience entails to be understood as renewal, maintenance or marginal.

⁸⁴ Focus on the documents: National Security Concept of Estonia 2010, 2017.

When it comes Influence of Russia, it is posed here as a reference to pressures/disturbances in Estonia. I have chosen to list this as a factor for once the pressures or disturbances happened in 2007 and in 2014, Moscow took advantage of this by influencing Estonian society in different ways, considering the Russian speaking population in the country. This then led Estonian social structure to evaluate its national resilience when decision makers gathered to understand the situation and began discussion towards a new policy strategy.

As for level of integration, it is a relevant factor because it entails the social cohesion understanding that resilience theory relies on. When a society is cohesive, the level of response capacity once a pressure or shock reaches can be higher. In that sense, this is chosen also considering the Russian speaking population integration capacities driven by the State/Government of Estonian in light of 2007 and 2014 events of disturbance. The objective is to understand from the State level if the integration of society influenced the National Resilience and if so, what type – renewal, maintenance or marginal. In addition, if the national security strategy were only meant for Estonians or they were opened to include other minorities as well as part of the National resilience project.

Finally, Europeanization. This factor has been chosen because of the resilience concept being also mentioned in the EU level. The concept has been rhetorically mentioned in the EU since European Economic cooperation during 1980s (Romanova 2020). It developed to reach Commission level in the 2016 EU Global Strategy⁸⁵. Estonia became a member of the EU in mid 2000s - this has made State officials in Tallinn to adapt in terms of National security, especially in the aftermath of the events considered as disturbances for the matter of this thesis⁸⁶. During EU enlargement in early 2000s, Europeanization adhered changes in Estonian National level in a way that decision makers shared the same European values within the State, in seek for transformation, adaptation or changes for resilience.

⁸⁵ https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.

⁸⁶ The events expected to be measured are: April night riots in Tallinn 2007, Ukrainian conflict crises – annexation of Crimea. But it is not only limited to that, as the research is open for evaluating cases mentioned by the interviewees.

Therefore, this thesis tries to meet expected results, or assumptions. It follows the idea that in 2007 there was vague preoccupation about societal resilience regarding the internal or external disturbances, and when an internal pressure occurred, National Resilience was initiated; while as in the case of the external disturbance in 2014, resilience was already present, and consequently reinforced and maintained in face of external disturbances. In addition to that, the theoretical conceptualization of resilience from Bourbeau⁸⁷ will provide guidance to answer the research question: Which types of resilience did the two period of events lead to create and why?

A visual representation of the expected results can be seen in table 3 beforementioned. Also, the whole structure of the research can be seen from figure 1 in the end of this chapter. Therefore, my intension is to test the MMR typology, with the Estonian case of resilience, and the results might come equal or differently to the initial assumptions, as the research is open to new factors and for improvement of the typology.




Figure 1 (own source)

⁸⁷ A process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks (Bourbeau 2015:3).

4 – Qualitative analysis of interviews and official documents, measurement of data, and findings.

Before going straight into the qualitative code analysis, one needs to disclose the process of the interviews and its interpretive results in this chapter. Therefore, the objective of this part is to explore how the questions for the semi-structured interviews were thought, how was the process of approach to the interviewees, and the conclusion of the responses, so the position of each participant is understood. This will serve to initially understand the connection of the predictable factors, and the events of disturbances to the prospective findings, opening possibilities of new factors or events that came to influence the resilience approach in the NSC of Estonia. After that, the proposed data analysis will be evaluated and measured via content analysis and codes.

For every request of interview schedule or agenda, I made sure to include a front cover page with proper identification, research topic and title, thesis supervisor, and form of authorization for recording and disclosure of participant names. This identification has helped me to present a professional position when it comes to academic research. When approaching the proper State Ministries, options for in person or online interview were discussed beforehand, and basically the interviewees were open for either. One interview was held in person, and four others online via meeting platforms (See appendix 4)⁸⁸. The interviewees have formally and verbally agreed to have their names disclosed for academic purposes⁸⁹.

Furthermore, during the approach process, proper identification was clear, through standard University of Tartu e-mail address credentials. This has shown to increase interest level from the interviewees. Moreover, all interviewees felt encouraged to discuss about resilience and

⁸⁸ Mr. Kristjan Prikk's interview was held in person, at the Ministry of Defense in Tallinn. The ones held online were the following: Ambassador of Estonia to Sweden, Mr. Margus Kolga; Ministry of the Interior Project Manager, Priit Laaniste; National Defense Coordination Unit, Mr. Indrek Sirp; and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication, Head of Crisis Management Unit, Mr. Priit Saar

⁸⁹ In each interview, the interviewee would verbally signalize whether to agree or not having their names on this research. All of them have agreed so.

critical disturbances events in Estonia, even while dealing with high potential level of confidential information⁹⁰. In addition, from the moment the participants saw genuine interest from the researcher side – given that it is not quite often a foreigner from South-America is willing to understand more in-depth the Estonian NSC – they were promptly open to discuss about the proposed topic. So, all these aspects were considered when reaching to them.

From the Ministries that compose the GSC, and influence the NSC in a more precise way, I could successfully conduct interviews with all of them, except Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁹¹ The two formers are more related to issues far from the thesis purposes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in contrast, was the only institution that did not participate in the interviewing process⁹² that could have contributed somehow for the measurement of this research predictable factors. However, that does not lack reliability, because the data from the direct people involved (that led the resilience formulation process) are indeed as relevant and were taken accordingly. Considering the results, shown over the next subsections, there is no tendency of major lack of consensus or change of opinion amongst the Ministries involved during the formulation process of the NSC and resilience. For that reason, I have also included in my questionnaire a question on consensus and importance level of Ministries involved, to predict if one or other Ministry, in case of absence in this research, could indicate a certain loss of reliability towards the results (see appendix 3, question 13 and 14).

Effectively, the procedure for writing the interrogation inquiries in my questionnaire is based on the core of this research and on the NSC documents, relying on resilience and the factors of analysis. It is a total of fifteen questions, grouped from general to specific, and finishing again with general ones. Also, asking more descriptive questions was a way to meet the constructivist and qualitative type of research. So, as said elsewhere I started with more of a

⁹⁰ Ministry of the Interior has pointed out that the topic, including my questionnaire, contained sensitive information. So, that might not had been potential to be disclosed so easily. In the end, they double-checked my identify, credentials with my supervisor, PhD Heiko Pääbo. So, I was able to proceed with the interviews.

⁹¹ Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Information Technology was included as a member of the GSC after my period of analysis. Thus, it was not relevant for the purpose of this study.

⁹² Contacts did not respond, after several times.

general question, that is a description of Resilience concept (to evaluate the official understanding of the concept itself amongst State officials); followed also by a broad second question to build trust – official role/position of the interviewee during the formulation of the NSC, or experience with resilience and national security, if any. After that I initiated talking about the NSC characteristics - question number three aimed at receiving an answer about the shocks linked to my proposed period of analysis⁹³. Moreover, it was necessary to focus on the factors by mentioning and asking about their influence towards resilience - as question number four, five and six stated. Certainly, there was room left to receive inputs from the participants about other different factors as well. Following that direction, the next questions, until number twelve, aimed at evaluating the typological approach of renewal, maintenance or marginal in the proposed period of analysis. Then, it came finally to more broad questions about consensus amongst State Officials on the formulation of the concept, and the possibilities of acquiring more names to my interview process – snowballing process.

4.1 – Qualitative content analysis

The conclusive summary of the interviews' results will be addressed in this section⁹⁴. Not only does it enhance empirically my initial understanding about the topic, but also confirms the initial assumption of this research. That is based on the understanding about official perspectives of the personnel who participated, and work(ed), in the resilience formulation/update in Estonia. Following that, qualitative code analysis will be measured in the next section.

The interpretation of responses, from the semi-structured interviews, confirm that four out of five participants think that Resilience in Estonia was as renewal in 2010, and as maintenance in 2017 according to the NSC. Only one participant, has the understanding that resilience was given as marginality type in both periods. Moreover, regarding Europeanization there was no clear consensus on the term during interviews – varying from EU membership to

⁹³ This question proposes also to understand a predecessor period of my proposed time frame: 2004. That was only asked to enhance the interpretive possibilities about the factors within the NSC. The participant had more grounds to describe their answer more broadly. But it is important to state that this period – NSC of 2004 - will not be included in the code analysis.

⁹⁴ The interviews details and transcription will not be described for it does not add sufficient value to the thesis. Rather, a conclusive summary about it. The interviews are available by the author.

adhering to European procedures and policies, before and after EU access - responses were not thorough. Also, NATO procedures, especially comprehension approach, became an important aspect for security measures in Estonia. What has been observed is that the listing of internal/external events or disturbances (with addition of others) and the predictable factors will influence the resilience type. From first analysis of interviews one can see that the predictable factors contributed to how the State officials saw the events in the security environment as shocks to influence the NSC, and thus resilience. It can be represented by the following figure:




Figure 2 (own source)

It is valid to mention that these responses serve as an initial reflection. The code analysis data will serve to prove the relationship of categories – resilience type in the NSC + predictable factors. But in general, with the interview analysis it was possible to reassure and confirm the categories for the questionnaire. Logically, the responses obey the same structure, which can be conceived in the proposed themes: resilience concept, factors for resilience, threats or events and resilience type in the NSC.

After the conclusive summary of the interviews given above, as next step it is necessary to connect themes to codes. In addition, separating them in levels of importance to answer the research question. It is worth to remind that the interviews, and the responses to it, follow a frame of categories which are part of the following themes: resilience concept; factors for resilience, threats/events, and resilience type in the NSC. The logic behind the themes followed the interpretation of the interview questionnaire and early familiarization of NSC documents of 2010 and 2017. The chosen method will assess the interview questionnaire, and the NSC documents of 2010 and 2017, in order to maintain the objective of the research.

Additionally, when familiarizing with the NSC of 2010 and 2017, resilience is referred in both as “directions”, with the understanding of a strategy or solution for security in Estonia (Estonia, 2010:1); and part of “goals and guidelines”, which is seen as a tool to achieve the objectives of the NSC (Estonia 2017:1). In that sense, resilience is central to the document as well. But which type? That is why there is need to unfold it, aiming at that question. Furthermore, that explains the importance to have this specific theme – ‘resilience type in the NSC’ - as central to the analysis, so to successfully answer the research question. In the research design – chapter 3 (figure 1 below) – it has been presented that the object of study is ‘resilience type in the NSC of Estonia’. Therefore, it naturally embodies a higher hierarchy of importance (Stirling 2001) of that theme, aiming at the study result itself – types of resilience. The other themes, and correspondent codes that might be found, if not directly linked to type of resilience (or factors to influence resilience), will not be considered. This is to reach the expected result towards the research question. Therefore, the theme “resilience type in the NSC” and the codes “renewal, maintenance, and marginal” will be crucial.




Figure 1 (own source)

4.2 – Measurement of data: coding.

This sub-section will follow a sequence of code analysis for the semi-structured interviews, NSC of 2010, and NSC of 2017. Lastly, a bundle code analysis of the three sources is posed, with the objective to reflect on the themes' connections – that is, in face of the disturbances and shocks, Estonia's characteristics (enclosed in the predictable factors) were activated aiming at a resilience type for the two periods of 2010 and 2017⁹⁵. According to P. Bourbeau, resilience is: “a process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks”. With the confirmation about the internal and external shocks – from interview analysis - the relationship between them and the predictable factors (other factors found and included) will be unfolded. In that sense, the events influenced the predictable factors, and this connection, considering context and perspective of Estonia, resulted in the resilience type. This is to be developed in this measurement section.

⁹⁵ Code analysis reports can be seen from Appendices 5 to 8.

4.2.1 -Semi-structured interviews coding




Figure 3 (source: own qualitative data analysis, extracted from Quirkos software)⁹⁶

When coding the semi-structured interviews, the results have confirmed the analysis from the previous sub-section. Resilience concept was understood as constancy, given the official insertion of the term in the NSC of 2017, with proper meaning explanation⁹⁷. As addressed in the previous section, four out of five participants confirmed that Resilience in Estonia was as renewal in 2010, and as maintenance in 2017 according to the NSC. Only one participant has the understanding that resilience was given as marginality type in both periods, which followed minor changes in the resilience understanding. But this will be coded for further testing. Moreover, regarding Europeanization there was not a clear consensus on the term during interviews – participants often addressed Europeanization to EU membership, and

⁹⁶ On the side of every category there is a frequency. However, it does not influence the research, because this study does not measure frequency. It is a feature of Quirkos software that cannot be deactivated.

⁹⁷ A society's resilience is its ability to recover quickly from the impact of negative phenomena, and restore its strength, flexibility and success (Republic of Estonia, 2017).

adhering to European procedures and policies, before and after EU access - responses were not thorough in that sense. However, there was a quote from Mr. Margus Kolga that “State officials were quite Europeanized even before EU membership” – meaning that the mentality of civil servants towards work organization and knowledge about EU, internally, was already present. But still, considering the Europeanization concept of “becoming more Europeans”, that was not able to be extracted from the interviewees in a dense way; thus, it has not been possible to be measured properly by code analysis either. Also, NATO procedures, especially comprehensive approach for defense and security, became an important aspect for Estonia. What there has been observed is some level of connection amongst the categories, especially predictable factors, event/threats and resilience type. The relationship of these categories reflects on the results towards the study object – resilience type in Estonia.

According to the interview code analysis the results proved the initial assumption. Resilience as maintenance understanding about the events and the factors was the outcome for 2017 NSC. While as resilience as renewal was majorly appointed as the result for 2010 NSC. Mr. Priit Laaniste interpreted that the NSC did not hold major changes, but rather minor ones in 2010 and 2017. He addressed several times that a fundamental concept, such as the NSC, cannot be changed just because of threats or risk assessments. However, from coding analysis, it was able to see that his words did not entirely expressed that throughout the questionnaire. His answers contemplated the direction of the NSC, that truly cannot be changed constantly, as it is the “fundamentals of our security” he said. But he did not consider this typology for resilience itself. So, yes, in parts codes in the marginal type direction were there, four codes in total, but it was also able to see more codes in the renewal sphere in 2010. In that sense, interpretations for resilience as maintenance type in 2017 from Mr. Laaniste were also evident in the code analysis. To say that it does not reflect the early assumptions stated in the previous interview report of marginal resilience type and confirming my general research expectancy. So, in total the codes for all 5 participants concluded that resilience was given as renewal in 2010 and as maintenance in 2017.

Additional factors were included: instead of Europeanization, EU and NATO (as institutions) were included. The institutions were given as influential to resilience type. The former for

the solidarity aspect of security, shared in the Common Security and Defense Policy – mentioned by the participants. The latter for the understanding about NATO comprehensive approach to security being inserted in the 2010 NSC – also addressed by the interviewees. The code analysis showed that internal cooperation aspects, with the development of the Broad State security, were effectively addressed in Estonia. Moreover, critical services, or resources availability, were found to be necessary to conduct societal resilience. That means that State needs to provide to people in Estonia the tools for enhancing cohesion, including ability for civil defense - from individual to group level - in case of crises or war. In that same direction, a more integrated society will be able to respond better during times of pressure or disturbances, this includes the integration of Russian speaking minority, but also other minority groups as well. Special attention for the former were given because they represent almost 30% of the of Estonian society and have shown to be more exposed to Russian interference or influence.

Events to influence the NSC, to say the security environment, be it domestical or international have impacted the logical thinking of the Estonian security system. They were also coded. This was done for the benefit of my theoretical approach, when defining resilience as “a process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks” (Bourbeau 2015:3). So, some internal and external disturbances - extracted from semi-structured interview⁹⁸ method and its qualitative data analysis - came from inside and outside of Estonia from 2007 to 2014. The former is: the Georgian War, Ukrainian conflict, on-going threat of terrorism, migration crisis, and democracy crumbling (Brexit and foreign meddling in national elections of other countries). For the latter, there happened: April night events (which in a sense were a mixture of domestic but with foreign influence from Russia as well), and domestic natural disasters⁹⁹ (floods in 2005 and oil pollution incidents in 2006).

⁹⁸ For the same reasons already mentioned elsewhere, this same extraction from NSC were not possible. When dealing with events, threats perceptions for security is crucial. Thus, a security strategy document does not disclose open description of events or threats to a larger extent as an interview does.

⁹⁹ Input that came from Mr. Priit Saar, Head of the Crises Management Department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication.

My initial assumption is that in 2007, after the riots of the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn, resilience capacity was given as renewal, while as in 2014's external events there was maintenance of resilience. Therefore, this assumption is correctly presumed, taken from the data analysis results on the April night events as being internal (Bronze Soldier riots in Tallinn), and the Crimea annexation in Ukraine by Russia as being external which reinforced awareness about Russia and its intentions wherein Russian speakers inhabited. This makes the theoretical approach suitable for the initial expectation. The interview texts were coded, and the report can be seen from Appendix 5.

4.2.2- National Security Concept of 2010 coding.

From the interview results, it is evident that the events and threats were seen to influence resilience. Participants have addressed that as well, and events were coded in that direction. The NSC documents do not show more objectively the signs of specific events, rather it generalized as for threat of terrorism, radicalization and so on. In that sense, the events mentioned in the previous section can be used for the evidence which has been proved, with the exception of the Ukrainian crisis, that does not connect to the security environment seen in the NSC of 2010.




Figure 4 (source: own qualitative data analysis, extracted from Quirkos software)¹⁰⁰

The NSC of 2010 has resilience embedded-in as a tool to achieve security goals. It was initiated in the version of 2010. To say, resilience in society is necessary to secure the State, according to the approach of Broad State Security. This approach is related to the involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Defense towards an efficient security strategy (NSC). In addition, resources and critical services must be widely available for society so they can live and defend themselves against possible threats. Furthermore, this document specifically focusses on the new progress that the EU and NATO membership (and their enhancement within State structure) have resulted for Estonia. As mentioned in chapter 3 and beginning of chapter 4, the NSC of Estonia is a

¹⁰⁰ On the side of every category there is a frequency. However, it does not influence on this research, because this study does not measure frequency. It is a feature of Quirkos software that cannot be deactivated.

strategical policy document, it does not provide opinions, rather gives directions to the national security system.

Resilience concept in the NSC of 2010 was not conceptualized objectively, yet able to be seen throughout the document for 17 repeated times (Estonia 2010). The fact that the definition was not clear in there, it does not mean that it did not exist. It was rather hidden under blankets of interpretations, mostly related to cohesion of society. The extraction “readiness to maintain functions that are vital to the existence of state and the people” is related to possible pressures or shocks that may affect State structure, and the potential response to them. So, the idea of coping towards constancy in order to resist is central to this code. Also, one entails that “functions” are related to the State provision of “critical services” also mentioned in there – they are relevant to keep society cohesive. In addition, another understanding is that social cohesion depends on integration, when quoted “greater involvement in social life” (Republic of Estonia 2010:17). So, signs of higher integration of society to affect resilience could be seen from that period on.

As seen in the case selection chapter, Russian speakers as a minority group are included in the minority policies of Estonia. Although not clearly mentioned in the NSC of 2010, one can see the signs, especially because in 2007 Estonia suffered an intense internal domestic crisis - April Night riots. For that, the NSC states that: “The strengthening of civil society and the continuity in integration process reinforces Estonia’s security. Uneven regional development and poorly adapting social groups may, however, affect internal stability” (Estonia 2010:8). Integration was not a major strategy in 2004 NSC, minorly addressed through language and citizenship parallels only (Republic of Estonia 2004:16). That said, in 2010 this was re-shaped due to internal disturbances from 2007¹⁰¹ which make:

“Both states and non-state actors compete more actively in influencing the international media, public opinion and political decisions. The scope of the measures used, including the number and extent of information operations, is expanding. The impact of distorted

¹⁰¹ Already positively tested through the interviewing method.

information may cause tensions in international relations, radicalization of certain groups of people and harm social cohesion, adding to instability” (Republic of Estonia 2010:5).

The fact that the resilience concept was allocated in constancy does not mean that it was maintained as type for 2010. Resilience concept theme was placed to try to bring an idea of when resilience was inserted into the document – objective or subjectively. The criteria for type selection follow the MMR typology from Philippe Bourbeau. For clear comprehension on the type, context and perspective must be addressed, thus further interpretation of the document. In that sense there was one mentioning closer to what Bourbeau proposes in his resilience concept: “The gravest threats involve the combined effect of external and internal factors” (Estonia, 2010:7). This is the initial input for the interpretation avenue on what type of resilience the system holds, conditioning how shocks are perceived from inside or outside.

Another novelty is related to the factors that affected resilience in Estonia. Earlier on, this research proposed three factors – yet opened to new ones – and the code analysis of the NSC of 2010 added some others and removed one for showing no evidence in the coding process. Europeanization was withdrawn – there was no clear mentions or interpretations of Europeanization process from the “becoming more European” from the official document. NATO and EU were stressed constantly, in a sense that after membership process Estonia showed signs of implementation and willingness to work according to those institutions’ standards, so internally it was already Europeanized. Possibly, should the object of analysis be the NSC of 2004, more signs for Europeanization could be seen.

Democratic values and critical services were added as factors to influence resilience in the NSC of 2010. It indicates the norms and values that Estonia was pursuing and adhering to their State and social structure, and the latter relates to resources and services available to people in Estonia in normal and critical times. Fundamental rights, freedoms, protecting constitution order, rule of law, functioning of institutions for instance - following 6 years after accession to the desired institutions. To say that those democratic values were central, and relevant to

keep society cohesive in defense and security as well.¹⁰² Critical services are pointed as a group of services that must be available to society in order to sustain security capabilities when in peace, but also when needed to defend against attacks – infrastructure on communication, transportation, public health, psychological defense, financial system, environment, energy, cyber.

The early proposed expectation that in 2007, following the Bronze soldier night riots, resilience in Estonia has resulted in renewal. Yet this event is not clearly stated in the NSC, but it has been discussed by society to have threatened Estonia's security policy (Juurvee, Mattiisen, 2020). Resilience was given as renewal afterwards, especially considering the inclusion of a wide basis of critical services functionality for the use of society. After familiarization with the previous NSC¹⁰³ – of 2004 – it was noted that more resources to sustain critical services were improved in 2010's version. Neither resilience nor critical services were advocated as much on the previous document. More cohesion of government was also presented in the 2010 NSC, when Security and Defense were no longer activities of centralization to one or a couple of government body/agencies. The evidence of the inclusion of psychological defense appears as strong remodeling of a given policy in pressure amongst agents' power relations.

“Estonia as a democratic, open society may also be affected by the spread of extremist, hostile or hate-based ideologies. This may weaken social cohesion, reduce tolerance and cause social tension. In the environment of open and free media, attacks against cohesion of Estonian society necessitate greater attention to the sense of cohesion and psychological defense” (Estonia 2010:8).

This remodeling is seen through the new approach to security policy. The inclusion of Broad security concept into the NSC of 2010 reveals a sign in the renewal direction as well. The

¹⁰² “The precondition for reinforcing security is the functioning of democratic institutions and the principle of the rule of law, as well as the strength of civil society. For this purpose, the state supports citizen initiatives and the involvement of people in shaping public policy” (Estonia 2010:9).

¹⁰³ In the Case selection chapter.

whole-of-society is supposed to be involved with security, forming a better system. Three main government agencies were responsible to guide and update the security concepts in Estonia from 2010 – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Relations and Ministry of the Interior and cooperation with civil society. Initially what there was seen was the early stage of internal cooperation amongst those institutions together with society as well.

“A broad security concept entails the involvement of all sectors of the society, as well as an integrated approach, where the foreign policy, defence policy and internal security policy, as well as cohesion and resilience of the society, are employed for the purpose of achieving the security policy goals for the country as a whole. The security policy thus entails the development of all areas of national security, as well as extensive co-operation in strengthening international security” (Estonia 2010:3).

Given all that, it explains that in the NSC security concept of 2010, following the catalysis of the April night events, resilience was given as renewal, according to Philippe Bourbeau typology. The texts were coded, and the report results can be seen from Appendix 6.

4.2.3 - National Security Concept of 2017 coding.




Figure 5 (source: own qualitative data analysis, extracted from Quirkos software)¹⁰⁴

Resilience in the NSC document of 2017 is better developed. From the very beginning of the document one sees that Estonia has developed further the Broad State security concept to the whole-of-society – furthering inter-governmental cooperation in security, and not only Government cohesion but citizens and residents are widely participating in the security environment. Additionally, the comprehensive approach – based on NATO procedures – is highly observed together with the six pillars inclusion in the document – “military defense, the civilian support for military defense, international action, domestic and internal security, maintenance of the continuous operation of the state and society, and psychological defense” (Republic of Estonia 2017:3). A denser involvement of State (government) and society is

¹⁰⁴ On the side of every category there is a frequency. However, it does not influence on this research, because this study does not measure frequency. It is a feature of Quirkos software that cannot be deactivated.

posited so Estonia society can resist “in case there is a temporarily loss of territorial control” (Republic of Estonia 2017). Critical services and strategic communications are well embedded on that front. In addition, it says that “Estonia will defend itself in any case, no matter how overwhelming the opponent might be”. Indeed, the document showed a strong statement from the initial pages of the concept. In that sense, the document reflected signs that resilience was reinforced and given as maintained. Resilience is conceptualized, under a constancy meaning of bounce-back effect.

Furthermore, one can understand from NSC 2017 that the resilience concept is effectively addressed. This was done because of the Estonian version of the word, “Kerksus”, that means in English resilience. This word was introduced into Estonian language by the “Eesti Keele Institut” (Official Institute of Estonian language)¹⁰⁵ in 2014-2015, and it was an expression taken from Natural Science - Physics. As seen in my interviews, Mr. Kolga was the responsible to think through and extend the word to National Defense thinking sphere during the draft of the NSC of 2017. In that document, it was possible to see already a clear conceptualization of the term: “A society’s resilience is its ability to recover quickly from the impact of negative phenomena, and restore its strength, flexibility and success” (Estonia 2017:4). The meaning of constancy is interpreted from that definition, which is connected to the theoretical framework of resilience from physics, so to say engineering bouncing-back for restoration of previous stage. The word was unknown by most part of society, and this shows willingness from decision-makers and organizations within society to assimilate the new expression taken from Anglo-Saxon linguistics to the Estonian language. Aspects of reinforcement of cultural identity, through means of language, were used to not only include the word on defense capabilities, but also reinforce its use and recognition within Estonian society. This shows a piece of evidence towards maintenance type of resilience.

In that direction, the document derived interpretations towards the factors that influenced resilience to be renewal, marginal or maintained. That is centered on Russian influence. The document reflected the global and regional security environment, and thus reinforcing constantly that Russia’s activities in the borders of Europe are dangerous and represent a

¹⁰⁵ <http://termin.eki.ee/militerm/concept.php?id=23271&term=kerksus>.

threat to Estonia and the EU. NATO was also highly observed in the document. Reinforcement of Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU, and the article 5 of NATO are constantly read throughout the concept. To say that Europeanization was also not included as a factor in the data analysis, because of the same motive as in the NSC of 2010. No clear assumptions about this process could be seen in the official document. In addition, the factors previously mentioned in 2010 are now reinforced, through the creation of the six pillars for security approach in Estonia – a progression of the Broad Security concept from 2010 and a clear enhancement of the cooperation capacity amongst Government and whole-of- society. That is, a “joint planning is crucial for the better use of the state’s and society’s resources and the improvement of resilience” (Republic of Estonia 2017:7).

In 2017 the Estonian State empowered more the provision of critical services, with special emphasis on strategic communication and psychological defense. All this to contribute to the union and cohesion of society in calm but also in pressured times. “In the event of a military attack, the entire nation will be involved in immediate defense and counterattack” (Republic of Estonia 2017:11), where “networks of civilian volunteers and the private- public partnerships also play an important role. So, to avoid that the concept addressed the necessity to “improve strategic communication to strengthen the cohesion of society and reinforce the positive international image of the country, as well as consolidate psychological defense to neutralize hostile information attacks” (Republic of Estonia 2017:7). Moreover, democratic values remained as a factor to play importance when interpreting a resilience type in Estonia. That is because of the cohesion of society, that has shown signs of reinforcement with the advent’s threats caused from an external pressure – Ukrainian conflicts, Crimea annexation. Society strengthens that through democratic norms and values, avoiding radicalization and extremism; thus, the terrorism influence.¹⁰⁶

Integration of society was one aspect coded that was reinforced in the NSC of 2017 as well. That was to be done by inclusive understandings and uniform regional development. It makes

¹⁰⁶ Not included as a predictable factor because it is well embedded into democratic values.

society stronger and more united, under a scope of powerful identity sharing of common values – one more feature for maintenance of societal resilience in the MMR typology.

“The purpose of integration in Estonia is to shape a culturally versatile society that has a strong identity and shares common values. The state will continue activities that facilitate the adjustment and integration of different groups in society to develop and improve the people’s willingness and opportunities to participate actively in societal life” (Estonia: 2017:19).

Although the concept did not mention directly the Russian speaking population, it was possible to code a statement that guaranteed that the State is responsible to treat equally “the most vulnerable segments in society”, that in a way highlighted that group in Estonia as a target of foreign meddling. Therefore, according to the code analysis, resilience in 2017 was given as maintenance. It has met my initial assumptions, with additional factors: internal cooperation, EU and NATO, critical services, and democratic values. The quotes extracted are coded and can be seen from the report results (Appendix 7).

4.2.4 - Bundle of NSC 2010, NSC 2017 and interviews – final measurement.

As said in the introduction of this sub-section, the aim of bundling all the data is to reflect on the connections found as results of the code analysis. This is to say that relationship amongst themes is unfolded. This is in accordance with the concept of resilience by Philippe Bourbeau: “a process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks” (Bourbeau 2013:5), which has been exposed extensively throughout this research, so restatement of it will not be necessary at this point. (see figure 5).




Figure 6 (source: own qualitative data analysis, extracted from Quirkos software)¹⁰⁷

According to code analysis results, the events mentioned in Table 5 stimulated the interpretations of the “factors” that influenced resilience type in Estonia. That said, interconnections between quotes from “events to influence in the NSC” and “factors to influence resilience type” were seen. Meaning that from the pressure of the events Estonia understood them as disturbing shocks, and then a specific type of resilience for the proposed period took place. This happened because of the “factors”, which were influenced by the disturbances. The factors found were internal cooperation, Russian influence, relationship with EU and NATO, integration of society, critical services, and democratic values.

Thus far we have seen that resilience was given as renewal in the NSC of 2010, being influenced by internal and external shocks; while in the NSC of 2017 resilience was given as maintenance and being influenced by internal and external shocks as well. Shocks (or events)

¹⁰⁷ On the side of every category there is a frequency. However, it does not influence on this research, because this study does not measure frequency. It is a feature of Quirkos software that cannot be deactivated.

which are listed in Figure 6. Now it is time to analyze the connections of the factors or variables, to enhance better the scientific results of this study.

Internal cooperation is the level of coordination of work inside governmental agencies regarding security, but also considering civil society. The internal cooperation work in security has been understood to have efficiently started from 2010 NSC and improved further in 2017 NSC - after the influence of the respective events listed in figure 6. That is, by the broad security concept inclusion, which evolved areas in foreign policy, defence policy and internal security policies¹⁰⁸ (Republic of Estonia 2010:3). This represented an extensive cooperation to enhance national security in Estonia. In 2017, this approach was improved considerably by reaching various other areas of State structure (governmental agencies, Ministries) and civil society working together in favor of national security. Estonia, thus, reinforced the broad security concept following principles of society and government as a whole (Republic of Estonia 2017:3). On the one hand, this entails the conception that following the events of disturbances from 2007 the type of resilience was renewal, because the broad state security derived from a total defense concept previously, being a renewed type of policy approach for security. On the other hand, in 2017 this approach was reinforced, with better development and therefore resilience type was given as maintenance according to the MMR typology.

Russian interference (Russian influence) is a factor found out to affect the resilience type. With the use of media as a tool for meddling influence, Russia can affect integration of society. Therefore, Russian influence uses an intervene variable that is media to form that triangle. So, the findings, specially from interviews' data, showed that through Russian media there was Russian interference in the resilience type of Estonia in the referred periods of analysis. With the "impact of distorted information may cause tensions in international relations, radicalization of certain groups of people and harm social cohesion, adding to instability". In that sense, Russian influence has also contributed for the resilience type in Estonia in both proposed periods. In 2007, after Bronze Soldier riots, resilience was renewal in that regard – Estonia responded by renewing its resilience, as a result that was seen in the

¹⁰⁸ The concept of Broad Security is more developed in 2017, as it has shown this research.

NSC of 2010. Certain aspects of it were remodeled to hold Russian interference off as much as possible. This could be seen with reshaping a set of policies within NSC – Broad State security approach, and more attention to integration of society for instance. Thus, 2007 disturbance served as a wakeup call for decision-makers, putting pressure in agent’s power relations when facing the internal disturbance of 2007. In 2017, the idea of resilience once built after the shocks from 2007 was followed by reinforcement in face of Crimea’s annexation in order to keep Russia sphere of influence off Estonia.¹⁰⁹ Defence forces were activated even more, military training exercises were reinforced with support of NATO’s allies, and drills were extensively held in Estonia. This all shows proof for reinforcement of existing agents’ power relations, which is a sign of resilience as maintenance in the MMR typology.

Relationship with EU and NATO, and each correspondent membership accession process, were also influential to the resilience type process of Estonia. Therefore, both were widely expressed in the documents of 2010 and 2017. It was understood that EU and NATO influenced considerably how resilience was processed in Estonia. From the former, because of the resilience rhetorical normative approach that EU has posed throughout the years (Romanova 2020). And due to the EU Global Strategy in which case mentioned resilience as well and provided a spillover effect – from supranational to national level - to the NSC of 2017 as for the “comprehensive approach of management of crisis¹¹⁰” (NSC 2017:14). The latter, NATO, was a key-driver for security, and, thus, with the comprehensive approach influencing defense. This was seen with the Broad State security concept which affected resilience type in the NSC.¹¹¹ In 2010, it was proved that EU and NATO contributed towards a resilience type as renewal in face of the correspondent disturbances. That is explained because both institutions influenced domestic policies in societal and military aspects. Comprehensive approach was renewed in Estonia, initiating a more cohesive working relationship amongst State civil servants when thinking about security. From there on, it was

¹⁰⁹ See “Will Narva be next?” (Dougherty and Kaljurand 2015).

¹¹⁰ Military troops sent elsewhere for United Nations’ peace operations.

¹¹¹ The more united a society and the more common values it shares, the less it can be influenced and the less susceptible it is to security threats. (Republic of Estonia, 2017:19).

an issue that had to involve the whole social structure of Estonia. For that, policies towards integration of society, psychological defense, effective communication were diluted. This reshaped the security concept from a total defence approach to broad state security. While as in 2017, EU and NATO served as influence to reinforce those measures started in 2010. As seen in other factors previously, there was a reassurance of existing agents' power relations when efficiently drafting the NSC of 2017. Resilience, once seen rhetorically from NATO and EU, was then officially introduced to Estonian language as the word "kerksus". This showed signs for fixing of national identity aspects considering the MMR typology.

Critical services were a new inclusion for factors that influenced the resilience type in Estonia. Many services are part of that, but the ones stressed the most attention were communication and psychological defense in both documents¹¹² and in the interviews. That is because resources were understood to be central for activation of resilience in a system, so to say in Estonia. If a society does not have access to resources, more unlikely it is its capacity to cope and respond during times of crisis. The one responsible for sustaining availability of the critical services is the State. This factor was even stated in the NSC of 2010 as "resilience of critical services". So, psychological defense and strategic communication were considered part of critical services. But in all, critical services influenced the type of resilience and the outcome was renewal in 2010 (after the disturbances from 2007 on) and maintained in 2017 (after the disturbances from 2014 on). This is proved by the remodeling of the NSC of 2010, when introduced the approach of "resilience of critical services", giving emphasis to a wide variety of resources needed for society to be cohesive and integrated to cope in difficult times. Following that idea, this was enhanced and reinforced in the NSC of 2017 when psychological defense and strategic communication were tools developed further even more (Republic of Estonia 2017:20).

Lastly, from coding democratic values, it came also to be a new factor that influenced type of resilience in Estonia. According to the NSCs of 2010 and 2017, democratic values keep society together. However, this was not found from the interviewees' point of view in a dense

¹¹² In 2017 strategic communication was inserted, and further development of psychological defense was given.

way – not because it is not important, but simply because it was not asked directly. Thus, it does not mean it is not relevant for resilience typology, it was not extracted from the interviews but from the NSCs code analysis. Nevertheless, the factor was still included in the results and were influential. Therefore, in NSC of 2010 democratic values that were adhered with membership of EU and NATO influenced resilience type to be renewal in Estonia. NSC of 2004 served to introduce these values, as membership was just occurring by then. In 2010, these values in fact were shown to be used correctly. By introducing the terminology Broad State Security, with more society and government cooperating more towards security issues. This indicated a renewal capability for resilience type. While as in 2017, the democratic values were stated as a form of reinforcement, and thus resilience as maintenance type. The security environment from the NSC 2017 was perceived in a way that one of the goals of Estonia was to maintain global order through western democratic values, so this could potentially influence security and, thus, resilience. This was a preoccupation due to “Brexit” being marked as a sign of “democracy crumbling”¹¹³, for instance. The reports of the qualitative coding can be seen from Appendix 8.

¹¹³ This was said by Mr. Margus Kolga.

Conclusion

The purpose of this Thesis was to test the MMR typology of Philippe Bourbeau. For that, the study object was resilience in Estonia. It aimed at studying resilience in Estonia so to classify it as maintenance, marginal or renewal in face of internal and external pressures. This was done considering my initial assumption that in 2007 there was vague preoccupation about societal resilience regarding internal or external disturbances - when an internal pressure occurred resilience was initiated. While as in the case of the external disturbance in 2014, resilience was already present and, thus, reinforced. Initially, the predictable factors to influence resilience were integration of society, Russian influence, and Europeanization.

The period of analysis was from 2007 to 2014. This was at first represented by the April night riots – in Bronze Soldier night – and Crimea annexation in Ukraine by Russia. The two periods represented disturbing moments that made Estonia bear closer attention to resilience in its NSC, which happened to be updated in 2010 and 2017. What could be seen from this document was a supportive source to test the typological framework of resilience, given the fact that the term, resilience, was officially mentioned in there – in 2010 (English version) – and in 2017 (Estonian and English versions). In sum, the intension was to follow the resilience definition that Philippe Bourbeau proposed - “a process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks” (Bourbeau 2015:3). By doing that, the focus was to answer the question on which type of resilience the pressures and events mentioned above (and others were also added) led to and why.

To reach the results, this thesis followed a structure. Chapter 1 talked about the theory for this research; the second chapter followed the background explanation for the case selection; the third chapter was the research design; and the fourth explained the data analysis. First chapter was about the theoretical background that supported this study. Thus, the theory that this research was based on was resilience theory, more specifically it borrowed the MMR typology to be used from Philippe Bourbeau. The general concept of resilience – bounce-back (equilibrium, stability), adaptation, and transformation - was introduced to give a better

overview on how resilience cannot consider the same standard concept on all occasions. Rather it constantly needs to be transformed, varying from different context and perspective. The MMR typology was more useful in the case of this study because it considered interpretation of internal and external disturbances, vulnerability of specific groups (as for Russian speakers in Estonia) and it is not focused on fixed attributes for resilience. In contrast, it provides ground for a transformative process and progressive concept, so to say seen as renewal, maintenance or marginal.

Chapter 2 touched upon the background for the case selection. This part was relevant for it provided an overview about the main vulnerable group in Estonia (touching on context and perspective), which was a target group for foreign meddling in 2007 and 2014. In addition, it showed the idea of the NSC as an official document of Estonia that has been responsible for the security strategy of the country. As resilience was officially mentioned in those documents, the document was relevant to be addressed. Therefore, the objective of this chapter was to delineate superficially when the Estonian territory became connected to Russian State, when migration to Estonia started, the differences between the historical migration periods – Before World War II and Soviet Period, and some statistics figures on Russian speakers in Estonia. Alongside that, the background chapter delivered the evolution of the NSC in Estonia, which was relevant to understand about resilience and how it developed further over the years. This evolution also was linked to an explanation about the predictable factors that could influence resilience: integration of society, Russian influence, and Europeanization.

Chapter 3 was dedicated to the research methodology. This is a qualitative research. It means that the techniques for findings relied on qualitative content analysis of the NSC documents from 2010 and 2017, and a semi-structure interview with some of State Officials (and experts). These officials were responsible for dealing with resilience in Estonia and had been present in the formulation process of the NSC in 2010 and/or 2017.¹¹⁴ A qualitative code analysis was also used to identify codes and themes in order to categorize them and evaluate possible co-relationships in the data analysis section. The aim was to find the type of

¹¹⁴ Present in the GSC or had dealt sufficiently with resilience previously.

resilience – if renewal, maintenance of marginal. The codes were first extracted from a familiarization process of the official NSC documents from 2010 and 2017 followed also by the semi-structured interviews. The initial codes were constancy, adaptation, change, renewal, maintenance, marginality, Europeanization, integration of society, Russian interference, April night riots, and Ukrainian conflict. These codes were framed into categories respectively: resilience concept, resilience type, factors for resilience, threats/events.

The fourth chapter focused on data content analysis, which was qualitative coding. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the sources used for coding were the NSC of 2010, 2017, qualitative semi-structured interviews and a final bundle of them all. This served to grasp the content of the documents and the interviews so to allocate quotes to respective themes. In that sense it provided a result that showed new factors for resilience; it also resulted that the “factors for resilience” codes affected the “resilience type”. In addition, the result of the code analysis disclosed new threats/events in the period frame. Moreover, the interviews incited interpretations, from State Officials, with regards to the threats/events or disturbances. That, therefore, served to find a connection between the “threats/events” category to influence the other category “factors for resilience”, which indirectly influenced the outcome towards the object of this study - “resilience type”.

From the data analysis and its interpretations, this research tested the MMR typology. Therefore, resilience type in Estonia proved the initial assumption that in 2007, after the riots of the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn, resilience engagement started as renewal, while as in 2014’s external events there was maintenance of resilience. This was seen from the qualitative interpretation of the NSC documents of 2010 and 2017, supported by perceptions from the State Officials’ interviews. Thus, Resilience showed to be renewal because it had its own objective on seeking for transformation of policy assumptions and redefinition of social structures (Bourbeau 2016); therefore, its criteria found inescapable change (Bourbeau 2016). The 2007 internal April night riots introduced novel vectors of response in resilience that remodeled a set of policies in security, starting from more cohesion in Estonian structure – seen in the introduction of Broad State Security, instead of Total Defense that was seen

before. So, Broad State security needed more integration of specific agencies from Government and society. This integration was certainly a key-point of more attention according to the results and represented “pressure in agents’ power relations” (Bourbeau 2013:15). In that sense novel policies regarding security and defense were introduced to the whole-of-society, including vulnerable groups more open to foreign influence (Russian influence). Therefore, the factors found to influence resilience type were Russian influence, internal cooperation, integration of society, development of critical services to keep society cohesive, enhancement of democratic values seen in the EU and NATO. The Georgian War in 2008, terrorism, migration, and natural disasters were also part of the chain of disturbances that influenced the renewal type of resilience as of 2007. Europeanization was one factor that did not reflect much consistency in the findings and could not be proven to affect resilience type in Estonia.

Resilience as maintenance relies on adaptation, upon the objective of reinforcing the status quo against possible changes provoked by the external event (Bourbeau, 2016) of Crimea Annexation in 2014. However, it was seen from the data analysis that the Ukrainian conflict was not the only major event to influence resilience type in Estonia, but with the additional ones: threat of international terrorism, migration crisis and crumble of democracy (Brexit for instance). All these influenced the update of the NSC in 2017, majorly seen from the inclusion of the word “Kerksus” (in English, resilience). The concept of constancy in resilience was officially addressed in the document; however, the MMR typological interpretation could still be evaluated if one considered the evolution of the document itself with regards to resilience. The fact that the concept was firstly inserted there as an effect of stability and equilibrium does not affect the outcome of this research. Therefore, maintenance was identified as the type of resilience from 2014 on, because it provided the idea of fixing national identity through “kerksus” inserted into Estonian language. Also, further improvement of the Broad State security approach more deeply in terms of comprehensive security approach is highlighted. All of that to reinforce societal cohesion and integration, so that society was capable to fight back against disturbances and restore its success (Republic of Estonia 2017:4). The factors that influenced resilience type were the same as in previous

paragraph and have reinforced the type of resilience, with a focus on Russian influence, critical services (psychological defense and strategic communication) and internal cooperation. Moreover, Russian media was pointed as an intervene variable towards Russian influence factor. Europeanization was one factor that did not show much consistency in the findings and could not be proven to affect resilience type in Estonia.

This study has enhanced the MMR typology from Philippe Bourbeau. His original operationalization was done in use of Securitization method of migration policies in Canada and France. This Thesis has shown a wider scope of usage for the typological approach and enhanced the Bourbeau's findings with the additional perspective of Estonia's case of resilience. Certainly, the methods used overcame the limitation of language initially posed; however, one can still argue that discourse analysis would have been the more appropriate tool for analyzing more in-depth the data and discussions on security policies in Estonia. Nevertheless, the aim was not to prioritize securitization of specific issues. In that sense, what makes academic research in political studies and IR unique is the ability to overcome constraints and find solutions for future work. Thereby, for the limitation of the language, qualitative coding of State documents in English and semi-structure interviews with State officials were the appropriate techniques to reach these results. Lastly, this study opens a great avenue of future studies for the global security environment is changing constantly. Resilience is being addressed at large of late in times of health epidemics, including in Estonia. The updated of the NSC is supposed to be released in 2021. Therefore, the MMR typology does represent a positive perspective of use in IR research.

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
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Appendices

Appendix 1 – Bourbeau’s genealogy of Resilience.



(Bourbeau, P. (2018) Genealogy of Resilience. *International Political Sociology*, 12(1), 19–35, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olx026>)

Appendix 2 – Estonian State officials according to time frame of analysis

State Officials in charge by period	Position	Year or period of analysis
Not relevant to the period of analysis ¹¹⁵	Minister of Entrepreneurship and Information Technology	Not relevant to the period of analysis
Rein Lang (2007 - 2010) / Urmas Reinsalu (2015 - 2019)	Minister of Justice	2010 / 2017
Kadri Simson (2016 - 2019)	Minister of Economic Affairs and Communication	2010 / 2017
Jürgen Ligi (2009 - 2014) / Sven Sester (2015 - 2017)	Minister of Finance	2010 / 2017
Marko Pomerants (2009-2011) / Andres Anvelt (2016 - 2018)	Minister of Interior	2010 / 2017
Urmas Paet (2005-2014) / Sven Mikser (2016 - 2019)	Minister of Foreign Affairs	2010 / 2017
Jaak Aaviksoo (2007-2011) / Margus Tsahkna (2016 - 2017)	Minister of Defense	2010 / 2017
Kristjan Prikk (before 2017) / Indrek Sirp (from 2017)	Government security committee - Director of the National Security and Defence Coordination	2010 / 2017

(Source: own figure)

¹¹⁵ This was not relevant to the period, because Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Information Technology was included as a member of the GSC after my period of analysis.

Appendix 3 – Questionnaire, semi-structured interview questions.

- 1) Could you describe what does State resilience mean?
- 2) Have you had any involvement with the Government Security Committee and the formulation of the Estonian National Security Concept in the past? Could you describe how /when was this involvement?
- 3) In international relations, the security concept is perceived as a response to external disturbances, shocks, threats, and so on. How do you understand the development of the Estonian National Security concept in three different periods, 2004, 2010, and 2017? Were there different events/disturbances/shocks associated with each period that made relevant changes into the concept itself? If so, what were they and their consequences to the national security concept?
- 4) In 2004 Estonia was following membership access to European union (EU). From there to date, how do you see Europeanization influencing the national security concept formulation? Is this an important factor for the formulation of the Estonian National Security Concept? If so, why?
- 5) Is the level of integration of/in Estonia, considering the Russo-speaking population, an important factor for the formulation of the Estonian National Security concept? If so, why?
- 6) Is Russian/Moscow's influence towards the Russo-speaking population in Estonia an important factor for the formulation of the Estonian National Security Concept? If so, why?
- 7) Officially, since 2010 a new expression was inserted in the Estonian national security concept, that was not mentioned before (at least rhetorically): resilience. Was this expression ever present, even if not officially, within State national security and defense before then? And how/why has the Government Security Committee came up with this concept?
- 8) What are the main differences that you would highlight from 2010 and 2017 National Security concepts, considering resilience?
- 9) In 2007 we saw the Bronze soldier (and other events) driving consequences into the domestic policies of Estonia. We also saw in 2014 the Annexation of Crimea influencing security policies here. Historical narratives and memory contribute to creating different perspectives, especially amongst the Russo-speaking population in Estonia which is constantly a target group for Russian/Moscow influence. How do you think this group of events (in 2007 and 2014) made the Republic of Estonia pay closer attention to new security concepts such as resilience?
- 10) 2010 or 2017. From when do you see national resilience capacity effectively being addressed from the State towards Estonian social structure, considering the Russo-speaking population?
- 11) How do you see the resilience capacity building in 2010? Was it something new that remodeled a set of policies? Or was it something that already existed? Please, elaborate.
- 12) How do you see the resilience capacity in 2017? Was it something that already existed and was only maintained and reinforced through existing policies? Or was it something new? Please, elaborate.
- 13) Would you say that there has been consensus regarding resilience and the National Security Concept of Estonia in the decision-making level?

- 14) What is ahead of Estonian National Security Concept? Is resilience still meant to be an important concept in the following years?
- 15) Who are the key people responsible for this concept that you would recommend me to interview apart from you? Do you advise me to interview anybody involved in that process specifically? If so, who?

Appendix 4 – Interviewees.

Interviewees	Position
Kristjan Priik	Current Secretary General of Ministry of Defense in Estonia. Former National Defense Coordinator in the Government Security Committee of Estonia.
Margus Kolga	Currently the Ambassador of Estonia to Sweden. Former Drafting leader of the NSC in 2017.
Priit Laaniste	Currently a Project Manager of Ministry of the Interior. Former direct contact from ministry of the Interior to Government Security Committee meetings.
Indrek Sirp	Currently the National Defense Coordinator of the Government Security Committee of Estonia
Priit Saar	Currently the Head of the Crisis Management Department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications of Estonia.

(Source: own figure)

Appendix 5

Code Report

This report was generated by Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes on Sat Dec 05 2020 22:43:46 GMT+0200 (FLE Standard Time).

Source Summary

Title	Author	Length	Quotes #
Kristjan Prikk	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	17435	49
Margus Kolga	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	17984	87
Priit Laaniste	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	15042	50
Indrek Sirp	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	18069	95
Priit Saar	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	13482	53

Codes' Summary

Title	Parent	Grandparent	Description	Author	Example of quote	Total Codes
Resilience concept	Resilience type in the NSC		In the literature, resilience theoretical definition relies generally on three fronts: constancy, adaptation, and change. This will serve to see how the resilience concept in the NSC documents is perceived according to the theoretical framework.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	"we talked about preparedness" Priit Laaniste	14
Resilience type in the NSC			As it is the study object, this theme aims at	Eric Arnon de	"Kerksus", "we progress continuously"	8

			reflecting on the results. So to answer the proposed question - why type of resilience? Was it given as renewal, maintenance or marginal? Context + perspective = type of resilience.	Carvalho Moraes	because the environment changes” Kristjan Prikk	
Constancy	Resilience	Resilience type in the NSC	Ability to cope with the disturbance, bounce-back and restore normal stage. Continuance.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“Our goal is not just society being able to fight back against foreign pressure or adversaries. But we have to make sure that even in tough times we are able to restore our way of life, our organization and our independence.” Kristjan Prikk	15
Adaptation	Resilience	Resilience type in the NSC	Ability to adjust, adapt after pressure.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	so the people who live in “Estonia they can pretty much survive fear against no matter the circumstances there are out	1

					there” Indrek Sirp	
Change	Resilience	Resilience type in the NSC	Transform after facing disturbances.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	-	
Renewal 2010	Resilience type in the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“this was rather part of the evolutionary process” Kristjan Prikk	38
Russian interference	Maintenance 2017	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“the way Russian government or State wants or can potentially (not only potentially but sometimes using the Russian speaking society needs as a sort of excuse for certain statements), so this is certainly one of the factors we have to consider” Kristjan Prikk	26
EU and NATO	Maintenance 2017	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“In 2007 we knew EU and NATO internally so much that we were able to pursue the process which was vital through our own means” Margus Kolga	29

Integration of society	Renewal 2010	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“this integration hasn’t been very successful, and the 2007 was one of the wake-up calls” Priit Laaniste	35
Critical services	Renewal 2010	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“the vital and critical services that are provided by the government or by some important private companies, that these services are available for the people, electricity, energy, fuel, communication, food, digital infrastructure” Indrek Sirp	6
Maintenance 2017	Resilience type in the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“to involve different stakeholders, and attention from decision-makers” Kristjan Prikk	48
Marginality 2010	Resilience type in the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“I would just say that what happened in 2007 in Estonia, and 2014 in Crimea, maybe it was a shock for the public, but it was not a shock	4

					for the Security Community” Priit Laaniste	
Internal cooperation	Maintenance 2017	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“My point was to include as much stakeholders as possible back in 2017 NSC, rather than keep it closed” Kristjan Prikk	7
Critical services	Maintenance 2017	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		6
Internal cooperation	Renewal 2010	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		7
Integration of society	Maintenance 2017	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		35
Russian interference	Renewal 2010	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		26
EU and NATO	Renewal 2010	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		29
TOTAL NUMBER OF QUOTES	334					
TOTAL NUMBER OF Codes	18					

and Themes	
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Appendix 6

Codes' Report

This report was generated by Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes on Sun Dec 06 2020 00:19:47 GMT+0200 (FLE Standard Time).

Source Summary

Document	Author	Length	Quotes #
National Security Concept 2010	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	59565	200

Codes' Summary

Title	Parent	Grandparent	Description	Author	Example of quote	Total Codes
Resilience concept	Resilience type in the NSC		In the literature, resilience theoretical definition relies generally on three fronts: constancy, adaptation, and change. This will serve to see how the resilience concept in the NSC document is perceived according to the theoretical framework.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	The gravest threats involve the combined effect of external and internal factors.	2
Constancy	Resilience concept	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	"The capability of the state to prevent and avert security threats depends on the readiness to maintain functions that are vital to	1

					the existence of the state and the people”	
Resilience type in the NSC			As it is the study object, this theme aims at reflecting on the results. So to answer the proposed question - why type of resilience? Was it given as renewal, maintenance or marginal? Context + perspective = type of resilience.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“In preparation for emergencies, the state organizes more training exercises involving all parties, establishes an up-to-date overview of the capabilities for managing the consequences of emergencies, and enhances readiness for utilizing national defence resources”	18
Integration of society	Renewal	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“The strengthening of civil society and the continuity in integration process reinforces Estonia’s security”	11
Russian interference	Renewal	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“Russia defines its interests departing from restoration of its status as a major global power, and occasionally does not refrain from contesting other countries”	10
Democratic values	Renewal	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de	“The precondition for reinforcing security is the	7

				Carvalho Moraes	functioning of democratic institutions and the principle of the rule of law, as well as the strength of civil society”	
NATO	Renewal	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“Estonia participates in NATO’s defence planning process through the fulfilment of NATO’s force goals”	44
Critical services	Renewal	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“Resilience of Critical Services Services that are essential”	37
Maintenance	Resilience type in the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		1
Renewal	Resilience type in the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“Psychological defence is developed in co-operation with all members of civil society”	25
EU	Renewal	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“The Treaty of Lisbon stipulates the principle of solidarity and the obligation of mutual assistance of the member states, which foresee	42

					comprehensive support in case of serious security threats”	
Change	Resilience type in the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Adaptation	Resilience type in the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Marginality	Resilience type in the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Internal cooperation	Renewal	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“A broad security concept entails the involvement of all sectors of the society, as well as an integrated approach, where the foreign policy, defence policy and internal security policy, as well as cohesion and resilience of the society, are employed for the purpose of achieving the security policy goals for the country as a whole”	2
TOTAL NUMBER	200					

OF Quotes	
TOTAL NUMBER OF Codes and Themes	15

Appendix 7

Codes' Report

This report was generated by Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes on Sat Dec 05 2020 20:13:03 GMT+0200 (FLE Standard Time).

Source Summary

Document	Author	Length	Quotes #
National security concept 2017	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	74834	231

Codes' Summary

Title	Parent	Grandparent	Description	Author	Example of quote	Total Codes
Resilience concept	Resilience type in the NSC		In the literature, resilience theoretical definition relies generally on three fronts: constancy, adaptation, and change. This will serve to see how the resilience concept in the NSC document is perceived according to the theoretical framework.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	"A society's resilience is its ability to recover quickly from the impact of negative phenomena, and restore its strength, flexibility and success"	3
Constancy	Resilience concept	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de	"A society's resilience is its ability to recover	4

				Carvalho Moraes	quickly from the impact of negative phenomena, and restore its strength, flexibility and success”	
Adaptation	Resilience concept	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Change	Resilience concept	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Integration of society	Maintenance	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“The more united a society and the more common values it shares, the less it can be influenced and the less susceptible it is to security threats”	18
Renewal	Resilience type in the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Maintenance	Resilience type in the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“all actors in society, monitoring the measures’ performance more closely than ever”	37

Marginality	Resilience type in the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Democratic values	Maintenance	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“The polarization of society due to adversarial opinions and understandings increases uncertainty and decreases society’s resilience”	7
NATO	Maintenance	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“implement the comprehensive national defence concept, focusing inter alia on development and funding critical capabilities, increase the efficiency of the cooperation between defence and security institutions, and employ to a greater extent the country’s research potential”	35
EU	Maintenance	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“More cohesive Foreign and Security Policy of EU ensures greater protection against security threats. A more	28

					integrated European Union is also more effective and powerful in international relations”	
Internal cooperation	Maintenance	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“The activity and cooperation of civil society, local governments and state agencies helps to shape a favourable environment for adjustment and integration”.	6
Resilience type in the NSC			As it is the study object, this theme aims at reflecting on the results. So to answer the proposed question - why type of resilience? Was it given as renewal, maintenance or marginal? Context + perspective = type of resilience.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“State agencies and local governments must cooperate more effectively to cope with society related security risks”	28
Russian interference	Maintenance	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	“As Russia has become more aggressive in the past decade, Estonia works for	14

					greater unanimity and consistency in EU's and NATO's Russian policy"	
Critical services	Maintenance	Resilience type in the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	"vital resources necessary for life—fresh water, arable land, food, energy—and climate change, as well as other changes in the environment brought about by human activity, may exacerbate tensions and lead to conflict"	51
TOTAL NUMBER OF Quotes	231					
TOTAL NUMBER OF Codes and Themes	15					

Appendix 8

Codes' Report

This report was generated by Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes on Mon Dec 07 2020 23:55:12 GMT+0200 (FLE Standard Time).

Source Summary

Title	Author	Length	Quotes #
Kristjan Prikk	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	17435	62
Margus Kolga	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	17984	93
Priit Laaniste	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	15042	64
Indrek Sirp	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	18069	109
Priit Saar	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	13482	75
Resilience in the NSC of 2010	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	12346	18
Resilience in the NSC of 2017	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes	5625	36

Codes' Summary

Quirk Title	Parent	Grandparent	Description	Author	Example of quotes	Total Codes
Resilience	Events to influence the NSC		General overview of theoretical development of resilience	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		16

Resilience type in the NSC	Events to influence the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		11
Constancy	Resilience	Events to influence the NSC	Ability to cope with the disturbance, bounce-back and restore normal stage. Continuance.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		16
Adaptation	Resilience	Events to influence the NSC	Ability to adjust, adapt after pressure.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		1
Change	Resilience	Events to influence the NSC	Transform after facing disturbances.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
April night events	Events to influence the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		10
Georgian War	Events to influence the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		4
Ukrainian conflict	Events to influence the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		10
Terrorism	Events to influence the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		4
Natural disasters	Events to influence the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		1

migration	Events to influence the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		4
Marginality 2010	Resilience type in the NSC	Events to influence the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		4
Security environment	Events to influence the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		7
Crumble of Democracy	Events to influence the NSC			Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		2
Internal cooperation 2017				Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Events to influence the NSC			Events, pressures, disturbances, threats that have influenced the NSC of Estonia - internally and externally.	Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		13
Renewal 2010	Resilience type in the NSC	Events to influence the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		40
Russian interference				Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
EU and NATO				Eric Arnon de		

				Carvalho Moraes		
Integration of society				Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Critical Services				Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Maintenance 2017	Resilience type in the NSC	Events to influence the NSC		Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		66
Democratic values				Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Internal cooperation 2017				Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Democratic values				Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Russian interference				Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
Integration of society				Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
EU and NATO				Eric Arnon de		

				Carvalho Moraes		
Russian interference				Eric Arnon de Carvalho Moraes		
TOTAL NUMBER OF QUOTES	457					
TOTAL NUMBER OF CODES AND THEMES	17					