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From Economic Independence
to Political Sovereignty:
Inventing "Self-Management"
in the Estonian SSR

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From Economic Independence to Political Sovereignty: Inventing "Self-Management" in the Estonian SSR

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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INTRODUCTION

In 1985, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, launched a campaign known as "perestroika." In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. The causes of and connections between these revolutionary events continue to be debated from various perspectives. The dissertation contributes to this debate by drawing on intellectual history to examine the specific conceptual dynamics in reformist discourse in the Estonian SSR. It investigates the ways in which, alongside well-known concepts such as "glasnost" or "pluralism," some other significant concepts spontaneously rose to prominence. They were institutionalized in law at the local level of the Soviet republics but eventually undermined the union's existence. The dissertation focuses on one particular set of conceptual changes: uniquely in the Soviet Union, the Estonian SSR witnessed the transformation of the Soviet concept "self-accounting" (in Russian, *khozraschet*) to territorial "self-management" (in Estonian, *isemajandamine, IM*). This transformation facilitated radical changes in the political situation in the ESSR in 1987–1988, which further served as an inspiration for a cascade of changes in other Soviet republics. The dissertation proposes a new approach to conceptual history, highlighting the role of "small concepts" in facilitating policymaking, mobilizing different actors, and serving as catalysts for national self-determination.

The aim of this introductory chapter is to lay out (1) the dissertation's theoretical framework and (2) introduce the case and the historical context relevant for understanding the nature and dynamics of conceptual change during perestroika. It consists of three sections. In the theoretical section, I situate the specific approach I propose in global research on modern revolutions, particularly in current scholarly debates on the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet collapse. Drawing on the Cambridge School of intellectual history, I develop a new approach that focuses on what I call "conceptual innovation" in pre- and revolutionary situations. The second section provides an overview of the case of conceptual innovation in the Estonian SSR and the historical context relevant for understanding its specifics. I argue that this innovation was shaped by the following constraints and opportunities: (1) the economic experiments and expertization of politics in the 1980s, (2) censorship and the "locked-text problem," (3) perestroika ideology in 1986–1988, and (4) the rise of global technoscientific discourse in the 1970s and 1980s. The dissertation investigates these enabling conditions as resources for the innovative acts undertaken in the semi-closed system. The third section (conclusion) summarizes the dissertation and shows how this approach advances existing scholarship, suggesting that it can serve as a foundation for a broader conceptual innovation theory for research on late state socialist milieus.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Structures, ideas, networks, and concepts in revolutions

In the most general sense, our case is part of a set of revolutions that unfolded in 1989 in Eastern Europe. Revolutionary processes lead to the radical restructuring of key spheres in society (political, economic, social, and ideological). They often lead to the overthrowing of particular political regimes themselves, often with the help of mass mobilization.[1] In what follows, I will try to give an overview of the four main approaches to these processes in the current scholarship on perestroika: (1) structuralist and (2) ideational approaches, as well as (3) transnational (entangled) history and (4) the study of conceptual revolutions, highlighting the relevance of the latter two for my own approach (which I develop in the next section).

In mainstream political science, we can broadly distinguish two kinds of approaches to the study of revolutions – structuralist and ideational.[2] The *structuralist* approach (represented by Moore, Skocpol, Tilly, etc.) stresses the impact of long-term structural factors as the leading causes of revolutions, such as socio-economic, demographic, and institutional elements of pre-revolutionary situations, sometimes calling the outcomes "social revolutions."[3] For example, Theda Skocpol has influentially argued that "revolutions are not made, they come" – that it is "objective relations and conflicts" among groups and nations that explain revolutions, not "the interests, outlooks, or ideologies."[4] The structuralist interpretations have presented the main causes of the Soviet collapse (1987–1991) in several ways, emphasizing the economic crisis (like the significant impact of the global

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[1] This label ("revolution") was assigned by contemporaries in 1989–1991. Aside from the "Russian Revolution" (which ended with the dissolution of the state in 1991), there were many other names that illustrated the specific character of the events: the "Singing Revolution" (*Laulev revolutsioon*) in the Estonian SSR, the "Velvet Revolution" (*Sametová revoluce*) in Czechoslovakia, the "Peaceful Revolution" (*Friedliche Revolution*) in the German Democratic Republic, and the "Negotiated Revolution" in Poland and Hungary. The years 1989–1991 have been also described as a "revolutionary wave" in Eastern Europe, as a series of revolutions occurring in various locations within a similar period, often inspiring each other and thus becoming "affiliate revolutions" with similar aims. See Mark N. Katz (1999), *Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves* (Palgrave Macmillan).

[2] Leon Aron (2012), *Roads to the Temple: Truth, Memory, Ideas, and Ideals in the Making of the Russian Revolution, 1987–1991* (Yale University Press), 16–19. Aron makes the same distinction (between structuralist and idea-centered approaches) in his 2006 article "Ideas of Revolution and Revolutionary Ideas," *Demokratizatsiya* 14, no. 3.

[3] Theda Skocpol (1979), *States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge University Press).* According to Skocpol, "social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below": ibid., 9.

[4] Quoted in Aron (2012), 17.

oil crisis from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s)[5] or the "clogged arteries" of social mobility in the Soviet Union,[6] but also citing other structural factors.[7] We can also count the theory of "political opportunity structures" (POS) as part of structuralist theory. Used mostly in social movement studies, POS stresses that institutionalized politics create both opportunities and constraints for political actors (collective and individual alike), affecting their prospects to mobilize and influence politics and society. According to POS, the factors that determine whether actors succeed are (1) the relative openness or closedness of the institutionalized political system, (2) the state's capacity and propensity for repression, and (3) the existence of conflicts among political elites, which can potentially lead to alliances between elite representatives and movement actors.[8]

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[5]   Egor Gaidar (2003), "The Inevitability of Collapse of the Soviet Economy," in *The Economics of Transition*, ed. Egor Gaidar (Cambridge: MIT Press), 30. For the same argument, see Vladimir Mau and Irina Starodubrovskaya (2004), *Velikie revolutsii ot Kromvelya do Putina* [Great Revolutions from Cromwell to Putin] (Moscow: Vagrius), 429.

[6]   Jack A. Goldstone (2003), "Revolution in the USSR, 1989–1991," in *Revolutions*, ed. Jack A. Goldstone, 261–271.

[7]   The recent comprehensive overview of the mainstream theories that explain the collapse of the Soviet system and state is in an unpublished 2017 paper by Neil Robinson, "Explaining Soviet Collapse," in the project Contemporary Russian Politics (DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.29620.76167). Robinson separates the collapse of the Soviet system from the Soviet state. Our case is more related to the collapse (specifically, the dissolution) of the Soviet state.

[8]   Doug McAdam (1996), "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings,* ed. D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald (Cambridge University Press), 23–40. From the late 1980s onwards, another approach has emerged in social movement studies in parallel to POS theory. It is the "framing theory," which has been mostly related to the works of David Snow and Robert Benford. See, for example, D. A. Snow and R. D. Benford (1988), "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," *International Social Movement Research* 1: 197–217; and D. A. Snow and R. D. Benford (1992), "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. A. Morris and C. M. Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press). Since then, it has acted as a complementary theory to POS and has often been used in the same framework. It focuses on the actors' strategies to "frame" the political agenda on the structural opportunities (but also to alter the perception of the opportunities). For using POS and framing theory in a combined way, theorizing the Soviet collapse, see, for example, Elena Zdravomyslova (1996), "Opportunities and Framing in the Transition to Democracy: The Case of Russia," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, ed. McAdam et al. For a closer analysis of the relation between the political opportunities, the concept of "master frame," and "collective action frames" in the context of the 1989 revolutions in East-Central Europe, see, for example, John K. Glenn (2001), *Framing Democracy*: *Civil Societies and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe* (Stanford University Press); Anthony Oberschall (1996), "Opportunities and Framing in the Eastern European Revolts of 1989," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, ed. McAdam et al. I have applied the framing theory to explain the tactics of the Czech dissidents in the late 1970s. See Juhan Saharov (2021), "Combining Laclauian Discourse Analysis and Framing Theory: Václav Havel's 'Hegemonic Rhetoric' and Charter 77," *Czech Journal of Political Studies,* vol. 2 (forthcoming). On the Estonian SSR case, see Vello A. Pettai (2004), "Framing the Past as Future: The Power of Legal Restorationism in Estonia" (PhD diss., Columbia University).

The *ideational* (as idea-centric) approach, by contrast, emphasizes the primacy of ideas and ideals behind revolutionary actions. Leon Aron has criticized the structuralist approach for downplaying the role of ideas in initiating the revolutionary processes, claiming that "objective" macro-structural factors (like economic crises) cannot explain *how* the revolutions start.[9] The proponents of the ideational approach claim that all revolutions have also been preceded by historical agents' asking deep moral and existential questions that have subverted the legitimacy of the prevailing norms.[10] Thus it is "ideas and actors," rather than "structures," that are the primary engines of revolutions.[11] For instance, Aron has emphasized the central role of ideas and ideals in the Soviet collapse, focusing on the massive discussion on morality, freedom, human rights, and "truth" in Soviet society in 1987–1991 and people's questioning of the very relationship between the state and the individual.[12]

The first decades of the 21st century witnessed the rise of a new paradigm of global, transnational, and entangled history seeking to detect global convergences, transnational networks of non-state actors, and their impact on each other. This paradigm has also been applied to reconsidering the 1989 revolutions (both their causes and their aftermath). For instance, a couple of recent studies emphasize the "extraordinary convergence of marketization, democratization, self-determination, and Westernization" in the 1970s and 1980s,[13] which paved the way for the collapse of state socialism and the global rise of neoliberal ideology and discourse.[14] The transnational approach has contributed a great deal to showing the entanglement of the Eastern-Central Europe dissident movements.[15] In

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[9]   Aron (2012), 16–19. For the ideational approach on the American Revolution, see Bernard Bailyn (1967), *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Harvard University Press). Especially in the 1990s, the structuralist transitology proliferated in mainstream political science and "continued to dominate accounts of the latest Russian revolution" in the 2000s (Aron 2012, 335).

[10]   I suggest that Vaclav Havel's notion of "existential revolution" would fall into the same category, although Havel meant "revolution" in terms of one's soul and ethics, rather than in a public manifestation. See Vaclav Havel (1991), *Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965–1990* (New York: Vintage).

[11]   Eric Selbin (2003), "Agency and Culture in Revolutions," in *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative and Historical Studies*, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (Belmont, CA: Thomson), 77.

[12]   Leon Aron (2012).

[13]   James Mark, Bogdan C. Iacob, Tobias Rupprecht, and Ljubica Spaskovska (2019), *1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe* (Cambridge University Press), 20. However, the authors also stress that part of the communist elites in Eastern Europe were ready to reform their states' economic systems to survive on the global market: ibid. On 1989 in a global perspective, see George Lawson (2004), *Negotiated Revolutions: The Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile* (London, Ashgate).

[14]   Philipp Ther (2018), *Europe since 1989: A History* (Princeton University Press).

[15]   For the transnational history of East European dissent, see Robert Brier (2013), "Entangled Protest: Dissent and the Transnational History of the 1970s and 1980s," in *Entangled Protest: Transnational Approaches to the History of Dissent in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, ed. Robert Brier (Fibre Verlag); and Kacper Sculecki (2019), *Dissidents in Communist Central Europe. Human Rights and the Emergence of New Transnational Actors* (Palgrave Macmillan).

studying the interactions between the Baltic and Czechoslovakian intellectuals in 1988–1989, Luboš Švec has used the concept of "spillover" (a theoretical construction proposed by historian Mark Kramer for studying the bidirectional interaction between the Soviet Union and East Central European states during 1989–1991).[16] However, he applied it not to states and their leaders but to non-state actors, showing the contacts between the Czechoslovakian opposition movement and the Baltic people's fronts, and the "bidirectional spillover" between the Baltic revolution and Czechoslovakia in 1988–1989.[17] Even so, Švec focuses mostly on dissident intellectuals in these movements, and not, for example, on the scientific circles or experts.

The equivalent of studying the factor of "within-system reformers" (or "intrastructural dissent," as Alex Shtromas terms it)[18] in state institutions has gained less attention in transnational history, although it is currently emerging. For instance, Robert D. English led the way in showing the transnational circulation of ideas between Eastern European and Soviet state scientific institutes and scholarly journals from the 1970s to the mid-1980s.[19] In terms of the reform socialist thought, Trencsényi et al. have pointed out different "perestroikas" in Eastern Europe, as several drafts for economic reforms emerged in the region without the direct impact of the "Gorbachev factor."[20]

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[16]   Mark Kramer (2003), "The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5, no. 4: 178–256.

[17]   Luboš Švec (2018), "Spillover of Revolution: The Baltic Republics and Czechoslovakia 1988–1989," in *The Baltic States and the End of the Cold War*, ed. Kaarel Piirimäe and Olaf Mertelsmann (Peter Lang), 175–187.

[18]   The concept was proposed by Alex Shtromas in 1981 as a reminder that, alongside "extrastructural dissenters," it is also important to consider the role of "intra-structural dissent." Shtromas divided the latter into two sub-categories as (1) "*egoistic* intra-structural dissent," by which he means individuals pursuing their individual or group economic interests (often by defrauding the state), and (2) "*altruistic* intra-structural dissent," which "consists of pursuit of constructive (but in official terms controversial) political, social, economic or cultural goals." The latter, as Shtromas observed in 1981, is "much less visible than negative, egoistic intrastructural dissent but is a much more functional vehicle of political change" (p. 75). See Alexander Shtromas (1981), *Political Change and Social Development: The Case of the Soviet Union* (Peter Lang), 67–87, quoted in Archie Brown (2007), *Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford University Press), 164. Commenting on Shtromas's distinction, Brown stresses that "by 1989 – following the development of freedom of speech and the advent of contested elections – the distinction between 'intrastructural' and 'extra-structural' dissent had become obsolete" (Brown 2007, 165). However, since the dissertation deals mostly with 1986–1988 (Studies II and III) and even earlier periods (1979–1985 in Study I), Shtromas's distinction seems applicable to those periods and illuminating for contemporaneous authors' views on the options for "political change" in the Soviet Union in 1981.

[19]   Robert D. English (2000), *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and The End of the Cold War* (Columbia University Press).

[20]   Balázs Trencsényi, Michal Kopeček, Luka Lisjak Gabrijelčič, Maria Falina, Mónika Baár, and Maciej Janowski (2018), *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe,* vol. 2: *Negotiating Modernity in the "Short Twentieth Century" and Beyond: 1968–2018* (Oxford University Press), 28–41.

Of the three approaches, the transnational history is most relevant for the current dissertation. As we will see below, the dissertation contributes to that emerging field of studies by tracing the transnational contacts and interaction between state socialist experts and members of the ruling establishment.[21] One of the dissertation's studies explores the transnational network of experts (the relations between the Estonian and Hungarian top officials in the service sector, as shown in Study I), thereby examining the agentive capacity of the "within-system reformers" in the mid-1980s.

One of the aims of this dissertation is to show also *how* the transnational developments in global science contributed to the political language on which we are focusing. While an increasing number of studies show the transnational convergence of technoscientific expertise and expert language during the Cold War, they do not show how its vocabulary and concepts were explicitly used at the microlevel in the 1989 revolutions.[22] Study III in the dissertation shows this microlevel manipulation most explicitly, by analyzing how the global scientific discourse (e.g., application of management theory, scenario method, system analysis) was used by Estonian experts and scientists in 1987–1988 for the conceptual innovation of *isemajandamine*.

Alongside its numerous strengths, the transnational approach also shows some limitations. While we can evaluate the influence of transnational circulation of ideas and programs on the actors' motivation and to the action itself (for instance, within the dissident movement around the Baltic Sea),[23] there are also cases where this oppositional action originates in a specific historical context and is related to a particular set of enabling conditions, thus being unique compared to other processes in Europe. One of the examples of this phenomenon will be shown in Study II, where we see first how the concept of "economic self-management" in the Estonian SSR (and in the rest of the Soviet Union as *khozraschet*) was very different from seemingly similar concepts in Poland (*samorząd*) and Yugoslavia (*samoupravljanje*), and secondly, how this originality served as a resource for the Estonian authors. Similarly, to relate the development of *khozraschet* in the Soviet Union to the "obvious inspiration from the Yugoslav model of enterprise self-

[21] For a recent study, see Bogdan C. Iacob, ed. (2018), "State Socialist Experts in Transnational Perspective: East European Circulation of Knowledge during the Cold War," *East Central Europe*, Vol. 45, Thematic Issue 2–3.

[22] For the transnational history of the scientific community, especially the interlinked developments in Soviet and Western technoscience and system analysis, see Egle Rindzevičiūtė (2016), *The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold War World* (Cornell University Press). For "cybernetic language" (cyberspeak), which supplied Soviet social scientists and policy experts with new terminology from the 1950s to the 1970s, see Slava Gerovich (2002), *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics* (MIT Press).

[23] Lars Fredrik Stöcker (2018), Bridging the Baltic Sea: Networks of Resistance and Opposition during the Cold War Era (Lexington Books).

management"[24] is debatable, as Soviet economic thought had its own conceptual reservoirs at hand. This case (and its impact on the Soviet collapse) shows why it is worth tracing the contextuality of microlevel concepts in terms of the 1989 revolutions. Below I will explain the importance of concepts during periods of radical change.

In the context of the theories of revolution, alongside the aforementioned (1) macro-structural or (2) ideational factors or (3) transnational aspects, it is also necessary to explore what can be called (4) "conceptual revolutions." I do not use this term here in the traditional sense (i.e., "conceptual" like Copernican or Darwinian revolutions in the history of natural sciences)[25] but in a more straightforwardly linguistic sense, emphasizing the role of "concepts" in politics. The Sovietologist Archie Brown was the first, in 1989, to describe the years of the mid-perestroika campaign (1987–1988) as a "conceptual revolution."[26] To quote Brown, "the conceptual revolution, like perestroika in general, was in many respects a revolution from above, stimulated by the new vocabulary of politics Gorbachev used."[27] Brown pointed out several concepts in Gorbachev speeches (explored in more detail in Chapter 2.3) that "helped to open space for the new political activity."[28] Brown also coined the term "Gorbachev factor," which referred to Gorbachev's personal influence on starting massive (and publicly visible) changes not only in the Soviet Union but also in other socialist states.[29]

Thus, in parallel with the long-term socioeconomic structures and moral ideas, we should also investigate "concepts" as mediators and stimulators, which can become essential functions at specific moments, shaping and facilitating the actors' intentions, understanding, and decision-making in politics. While the first three approaches all contribute to understanding the spectrum of different causes of modern revolutions, there is still a considerable research gap in understanding the dynamics of conceptual innovation to varying stages of political change. Likewise, we still lack sufficiently nuanced overviews of how it played out in different

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[24]   Besnik Pula (2018), *Globalization Under and After Socialism: The Evolution of Trans-national Capital in Central and Eastern Europe* (Stanford University Press), 69.

[25]   Paul Thagard (1993), *Conceptual Revolutions* (Princeton University Press).

[26]   Brown (2007 [1989]), 264.

[27]   Ibid., 264. Brown uses the term "conceptual revolution" concerning perestroika also in Archie Brown (2004), "Introduction," in *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia,* ed. Archie Brown (Palgrave Macmillan). Gorbachev himself compared perestroika with "revolution," by which he meant the continuation of the Leninist ideas in the October Revolution (in contrast to Stalin's aberrations). In a public speech in Khabarovsk in July 31, 1986, Gorbachev declared that "I equate the terms 'perestroika' and 'revolution'": *Pravda*, August 2, 1986. In early 1988, Edgar Savisaar titled his book *The Revolution Continues*, which was also the title of an essay written by Gorbachev in 1987. See Edgar Savisaar (1988), *Revolutsioon jätkub* (Eesti Raamat); and Mikhail Gorbachev (1988 [1987]) "Oktjabr i perestroika: Revoljucija prodolzaetsja," In *Izbrannye reci i stati*, vol. 5, 386–436 (Moscow: Politizdat).

[28]   Brown (2007), 264.

[29]   Archie Brown (1996), *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford University Press).

local contexts. Gaining such an overview would also involve examining the inter-action between such local processes.[30]

In the theories of revolution, there is a chain of analytical concepts like "relaxation," "reform," "repertoire," and "revolutionary situation" that also need to be clarified in order to understand the focus of the dissertation. While the term "revolution" can be used (and was used in 1988–1989) by contemporaries,[31] some political actors in the pre-revolutionary situation often try to reform and improve the system based on their interests. Many facets of the 1989 phenomenon that we are looking at can also be situated between reform and revolution. As a firsthand observer of the events of 1989, Timothy Garton Ash proposed to call them a "refolution," a mixture of reform and revolution, varying from country to country.[32] While retrospectively, the term "revolution" has been commonly accepted to denote the whole process, there was a crucial (and later, somewhat neglected) stage in this process, as we can certainly point out the period of "relaxation" in 1986–1987 in the Soviet Union before the much more turbulent period of 1988–1991.

As mentioned above, the openness or closedness of the regime is one of the key dimensions in political opportunity structure (POS) theory, but it has been acknowledged long before that school. In 1856, Alexis de Tocqueville mentioned that "it is not always that things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out. On the contrary, it oftener happens when a people… suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressures."[33]

Although many POS theorists and transitologists confirm Tocqueville's obser-vation, less has been said about specific "conceptual processes" of how these "mo-ments of relaxation" during the end of "pre-revolutionary" periods become early revolutionary situations. Charles Tilly has defined the nature of "revolutionary situations" (based on Leon Trotsky's conception of "dual power") in history by referring to the main two characteristics as "the appearance of contenders, advancing exclusive competing claims to control the state, or some segment of it" and the "incapacity or unwillingness of rulers to suppress these contenders."[34] While these conditions were indeed present in 1988 in the Soviet Union, I am more interested in looking at the more ambiguous start of this "situation" in which the

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[30] I am aware of the danger of the teleological approach, i.e., attributing the importance to specific processes only because of their possible relation to the "final result," which was gaining independence in 1991. Therefore, I try to reconstruct the debate based on the 1987–1988 context, using contemporaneous sources. See more on the dissertation's method in Chapter 1.2.

[31] The term "Singing Revolution" was coined by Heinz Valk (a painter and activist in the Estonian Popular Front) in a June 1988 newspaper article. It referred to the events of summer 1988 in Estonia, which included mass gatherings and singings at the Tallinn Song Festival Grounds. See Heinz Valk (1988), "Laulev revolutsioon," *Sirp ja Vasar*, June 17, 1988.

[32] Timothy Garton Ash (1993), *The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* (New York: Vintage Books), 14.

[33] Alexis de Tocqueville (1983), *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Anchor Books), 176.

[34] Charles Tilly (1995), *European Revolutions, 1492–1992* (Blackwell), 10.

contenders emerge from the ruling elite. Which claims and arguments do these contenders use, and in which forms do they make it? Tilly's concept of "contentious repertoires" brings us closer to this question.[35] According to Tilly, "repertoires" refer to "claim-making routines that apply to the same claimant-object pairs: bosses and workers, peasants and landlords, etc." These can include, for instance, petition letters, pamphleteering, vigils, strikes, civil disobedience, and boycotts.[36] Therefore, repertoires function as an available structural menu for contenders (to choose their action form), but it also limits it, as according to Tilly, repertoire changes very rarely.

However, Tilly's approach on "repertoires" as a menu or program for contentious actions was related more to the direct, physical form of action and not so much to intellectual conditions. For instance, although Tilly highlights "pamphleteering" in France in the 18th century before the French Revolution, it does not show us the actors' manipulation (for example, with the prevailing neutral vocabulary) in the pamphlets to pursue their political goals, or *whether*, and if so, *how*, some concepts were made oppositional. With the theoretical approach in this dissertation (which will be described in more detail in the next section), I view concepts, argumentative languages, and even scientific methods as potentially open to innovation and manipulation. Thus, I want to expand the concept of repertoire for the innovators in revolutionary situations by moving from direct physical forms of contention to more abstract ones, taking into account much more linguistic aspects. Which kind of "concepts" and "languages" can be used in the moments when the regime's pressure has been relaxed, but only a limited array of concepts is at hand? To answer this question, I argue, we have to move from a structuralist and ideational approach towards a theory that could investigate the dynamics of these specific processes in semi-closed pre-revolutionary situations.

1.2. Conceptual and intellectual history. Method of the dissertation

How could we best approach the linguistic aspects of the "conceptual innovation" in the Estonian SSR during the mid-perestroika era? It seems that the best-known approach to the study of concepts, "conceptual history" (*Begriffsgeschichte*), developed by Reinhart Koselleck, cannot help us here. First, the Koselleckian approach has been to study the "key concepts" in a long-term perspective, focusing on distinctively modern socioeconomic and political concepts (state, future, revolution, representation, crisis, etc.). In Koselleck's words, *Begriffsgeschichte* tries to retrace the "dissolution of the old society of orders or estates, and the development of the modern world" by looking at how these twin processes have been "registered

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[35] Tilly has elaborated this concept in Charles Tilly (1993), "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758–1834," *Social Science History* 17: 253–280; see also Charles Tilly (2010), *Regimes and Repertoires* (University of Chicago Press).
[36] Charles Tilly (2008), *Contentious Performances* (Cambridge University Press), 14.

through language."[37] It is a "long-term, profound, and at times convulsive transformation of everyday experience" that reveals itself in the evolution of concepts.[38] Koselleck also talks about the periods of "turbulence," where the contest for the concepts intensifies. One such period was the *Sattelzeit* (ca. 1750–1850), during which the development of political and social discourse led to the conceptual change of the main concepts. Second, the Koselleckian understanding of the "concept" itself seems unsuitable for analyzing the case under study. According to Koselleck, the "key concept" is an "inescapable, irreplaceable part of the political and social vocabulary [and] combines manifold experiences and expectations in such a way that they become indispensable to any formulation of the most urgent issues of a given time."[39]

While we can view the perestroika campaign as a modernizing project, the Koselleckian method does not bring us closer to understanding the microlevel dynamics of the conceptual change during the period. I argue that we should analyze the period (as Study II does) as an extraordinary moment for "temporary and replaceable" concepts. I stress that there are certain moments in history where the modern "key concepts" do not have discursive resonance. These are temporal moments of a "conceptual void" where politics is conducted by small, technical, and temporarily constructed concepts that move to the center of the public discourse and the center of the political language. The small concepts (which can also be borrowed from other domains) play a central role during these moments, and focusing on them enriches our understanding of revolutions in history. In short, I see these kinds of conceptual moments as a research object here.[40] Moreover, understanding the context of these moments is crucial. We have to consider the manipulation and intentional ambiguity of the concepts in perestroika texts,

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[37] Reinhart Koselleck (2011), "Introduction and Prefaces to the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* [*Basic Concepts in History: A Historical Dictionary of Political and Social Language in Germany*]," trans. Michaela Richter, *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 6, no. 1: 8.

[38] Ibid., 9.

[39] Reinhart Koselleck (1985), *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Times*, trans. Keith Tribe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 64.

[40] On the other hand, Koselleck's understanding of concepts as *a priori* structures (stemming from Kantian tradition) that frame our thinking and without which communication and language could not exist is still of great significance when we look at the interregnum periods of "conceptual voids" in history, which was also the case in 1987. The term "self-management," which was manipulated by the ESSR's opposition movement, was a constituent mediator that helped to build and make room for political communication, just like Koselleckian "concepts" do in the course of history. In line with post-structuralist thought, we could also conceptualize "territorial self-management" as a "vanishing mediator" – a concept elaborated by Jameson, Badiou, Žižek, and others. A more detailed theoretical analysis of that particular concept is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, Kristian Petrov has applied it in Soviet studies to illustrate the temporal functionality of the concept "European home," which Gorbachev used regularly in foreign relations during late perestroika (1989–1991) yet which vanished completely (just like "self-management" in the ESSR) in 1991. See Kristian Petrov (2013), "Russia in the European Home? Convergence, Cosmopolitanism and Cosmism in Late Soviet Europeanisation," *Europe-Asia Studies* 65, no. 2: 341.

both by their creators (Gorbachev and his team) and by the opposition in Soviet republics. The paradoxical nature of the perestroika campaign, its simultaneous openness and closedness, allowed authors to manipulate using the "locked text" (examined more closely in Chapter 2.2), by choosing the flexible terms to extend their meanings in a particular direction. Therefore, the "usage of concepts" during this period needs meticulous contextual analysis.

However, the "small concepts" approach, in contrast to Koselleckian's "key concepts" elaborated in this dissertation, does not abandon the structure-agency axis. It is still a question of the conditions of agentive capacity for ideological innovation made within the "structures" during the early and mid-perestroika eras (1986–1988). We can differentiate between the available structural languages in this situation that can be innovated by the different "agents" through the same structures' options. That is why I find it reasonable to apply here another scholarly tradition, called "intellectual history" and developed by the Cambridge School, whose focus has been on the contextuality of the texts in the history of political thought. This school has usually focused on the pre-modern and modern periods in the history of political thought. Still, the ambition here is to apply it and develop it further with the perestroika period.

One of the leading lights of the Cambridge School, John G. A. Pocock, proposed that when studying the history of political thought, especially the pre-modern period, "each political author has to be seen as inhabiting a universe of *langues* that give meaning to the *paroles* he performs in them."[41] Pocock used the term "language" as a set of "idioms, rhetorics, ways of talking about politics, distinguishable language games of which each may have its own vocabulary, rules, preconditions and implications, tone and style."[42] For instance, we can use legal, federal, republican or other languages to argue for some particular political goal. In 1966, Pocock wrote:

> Any stable and articulate society possesses concepts with which to discuss its political affairs and associates these to form groups or languages. There is no reason to suppose that a society will have only one such language; we may rather expect to find several […] Some originate in the technical vocabulary of one of society's institutionalized modes of regulating public affairs […] Others originate in the vocabulary of some social process which has become relevant to politics.[43]

What kind of tools should we use to investigate these "languages," and how should we recognize them? In 1987, Pocock set down criteria by which historians could verify that a "language" was not their own fabrication:

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[41]   John G. A. Pocock (1985), *Virtue, Commerce and History* (Cambridge University Press), 5.
[42]   John Pocock (2009 [1987]), "The Concept of a Language and the *Metier d'Historien*: Some Considerations on Practice," in *Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method* (Cambridge University Press), 89.
[43]   John Pocock (1966), "The History of Political Thought," *Philosophy, Politics and Society* (2nd series), 195–196.

a) different authors carried out a variety of acts within it
b) they discussed one another's use of it
c) the investigators can predict the implications, entailed by its use in particular circumstances (the experimental test)
d) they can discover its use in unexpected places (the serendipity test)
e) they successfully exclude languages from consideration on the grounds of non-availability (the anachronism test).[44]

Here I would like to make some clarifications. Pocock used this concept by studying the history of political thought, seeing these languages as persisting over the centuries (e.g., civic humanism, or common law). I argue that we can also use this concept to study a much shorter time period and can also apply it to what I call "expert languages." The vocabulary of these languages can initially be neutral or apolitical. Still, they always have the potential to be used directly in the political field (for example, in direct argumentation in parliament) or, for instance, in the public press.[45] For example, I see the argumentation forms in cybernetics, system analysis, or future studies as part of the possible argumentative "languages" for different agents (see Table 1 in Chapter 2.6).

However, Pocock was more interested in studying "languages in which utterances were performed, rather than the utterances which were performed in them… hoping to find language as context, not text."[46] This dissertation looks at both topics, but especially the latter – how are languages used in utterances so as to achieve innovation (and promote reforms)? My main theoretical inspiration for this task has been the work of another leading scholar of the Cambridge School: Quentin Skinner. Skinner is known for suggesting that we can trace the history of concepts only through "their uses in the argument." Therefore, we ought to study what the authors were actually "doing" within an intellectual debate.[47] Both authors were also contributors to the "linguistic turn" in intellectual history in the 1960s.[48] While Pocock's approach seeks to reconstruct the more abstract "languages" of these debates, Skinner's approach consists of studying specific utterances as

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[44] Pocock (1987), 94. The list is a shortened version, quoted from Iain Hampsher-Monk (1998), "Speech Acts, Languages or Conceptual History," in *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree (Amsterdam University Press), 41.

[45] I suggest that this more narrow concept (as an elaboration from Pocockian "language") can also be applied on the "language of anti-politics" in East Central Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, where it became actually political in the sense that it (in)directly questioned the political regime's morality and legitimacy.

[46] Pocock (1987), 89.

[47] Quentin Skinner (2002), *Visions of Politics I: Regarding Method* (Cambridge University Press), 86.

[48] For the "linguistic turn" and the Cambridge School in intellectual history, see Eva Piirimäe (2008), "Keeleline pööre," *Keel ja Kirjandus*, nos. 8–9, 589−603.

distinctive kinds of conceptual "moves" made within these languages.[49] As Skinner writes, "to understand any serious utterance [as a move], we need to grasp not merely the meaning of what was said but at the same time the intended force with which the utterance is issued."[50] Below I will note three steps from the Skinnerian method, which I suggest should also be followed in exploring our case.

First, how should we proceed to understand the "intended force" of an utterance? In his influential early essay "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas" (1969), Skinner proposed two methodological steps for studying the history of political thought. To understand the intentions of the authors (who are writing "at the time when they wrote for the specific audience they had in mind"), first, we have to begin by "trying to delineate the full range of communications that could have been conventionally performed on the given occasion by the issuing of the given utterance." Secondly, we must "trace the relations between the given utterance and this wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the intentions of the given writer."[51]

The second theoretical assumption that I follow here is Skinner's assertion that we should pay attention to "available normative languages." These are the existing moral vocabularies that guide each author conceptually because "the problem facing an agent… must in part be the problem of tailoring his projects to fit the available normative language."[52] Like Tilly, Skinner emphasizes the conventional constraints for the innovator and illustrates it with the saying that "every revolutionary is to this extent obliged to march backward into battle."[53] Our aim should be to discover the actions of those authors who were contributing to particular discourses; thereby, we should "recognize the ways in which they followed or challenged or subverted the conventional terms of those discourses themselves."[54] We should see these discourses as conventional resources for the inventions, and we should "analyze a multitude of contemporaneous sources" in order to retrace the meaning that the author might have wanted to give to a text within that very specific context.

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[49] Whereas Peter Laslett (another member of the Cambridge School) implemented "temporal" contexts, Pocock highlighted "linguistic" contexts, "each existing side by side and perhaps interacting with others, while remaining distinct and having a history of its own." Eventually, Pocock preferred the history of political "discourse" to that of political "thought," wishing to widen and refine the field into the study of "speech, literature, and public utterance in general, involving an element of theory and carried on in a variety of contexts with which it can be connected in a variety of ways." Pocock (1988), "What Is Intellectual History?" in *What Is History Today?* (London: MacMillan Press), 114.

[50] Skinner (2002), 82.

[51] Ibid., 87.

[52] Quentin Skinner (1978), *Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge University Press), 12.

[53] Quentin Skinner (1988), "Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action," in *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics*, ed. James Tully (Princeton University Press), 112.

[54] Skinner (2002), 125.

Thirdly, Skinner has written on the conceptual innovation we are focusing on here, although from a slightly different perspective. In his 1969 article, Skinner emphasized that to understand the authors' intentions, we have to bear in mind that "they may deliberately employ a range of oblique rhetorical strategies" (e.g., irony).[55] In other words, we should understand the seemingly conventional content of public letters, proposals, or pamphlets as a possible rhetorical strategy to perform speech acts for goals that, at the same time, might challenge conventional norms. In a much later work, "Moral Principles and Social Change" (2002), Skinner focused specifically on rhetorical strategies of "innovating ideologists," a term he borrows from Max Weber. He buttressed his argument with the cases of how some authors changed the conventional "evaluative-descriptive terms" (and sometimes adjectives as well) in the "moral language" in 17th-century England.[56] For that linguistic action, Skinner distinguished several strategies that are relevant to our case. First, he asserts that "it is possible to perform certain acts simply in speaking or writing in a certain way."[57] He distinguishes five different strategies related to that assertion: (1) to coin new terms (which Skinner finds a rare one); (2) to transform a neutral into a favorable term (usually by metaphorical extension) and applying it in virtue of its extended meaning to describe the course of action you wish to see commended; (3) to apply a term normally used to express disapproval in such a way as to neutralize it; (4) to reverse the speech act potential of an existing unfavorable turn; or (5) to manipulate the criteria for applying a current set of commendatory terms.[58]

I propose that with the conceptual innovation of "self-management" in 1987, we are dealing with the second type of rhetorical strategy in Skinner's list; Skinner himself found the fifth one to be the least studied yet "the most widespread and important forms of ideological argument."[59] Although Skinner examines this language in relation to morality and economic behavior (coining or changing terms like "frugality," "discerning," "shrewdness," "spendthrift," "obsequious," and "providence" in 17th-century England), his approach is also applicable in other contexts and to different time periods.[60] The general principle here (irrespective of the historical period) is that these strategies are based on an existing vocabulary in society (which is available to use without fearing persecution, which is very important to our case) and that there are authors' intentional linguistic actions for transforming "a neutral into a favourable term" and then applying its "extended meaning" in the way they wish to see commended.

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[55] Ibid., 80.

[56] Ibid., 145–157.

[57] Ibid., 149.

[58] Ibid., 151–152.

[59] Ibid., 153.

[60] For example, as Skinner shows, the term "providence," which initially had only a religious meaning in England (as "God's providence") was stretched by several authors during the first half of the 17th century in such a way that the term began to be "applied to refer simply to acting with foresight about practical affairs." See Skinner (2002), 153.

Thus, my aim in the dissertation is to apply the Skinnerian method to explore contemporary history.[61] How can this contribute to the existing research in the field? In studying conceptual innovation in late totalitarian regimes (a concept that will be explained in Chapter 2.2), I find Skinner's insights relevant for three reasons. First, the constraints on self-expression are higher than usual in these regimes. Because of the "locked-text" phenomenon (again, analyzed in more detail in Chapter 2.2), authors are forced to continually assess what the censor might do and thus apply self-censorship. That intensifies the search for contemporaneous sources to make the change. Second, the interpretation and manipulation of concepts in the closed discourse becomes extremely diverse, providing opportunities for conceptual innovation. And third, the concepts were used in various ways, not only in the Russian language but also in various native languages in other Soviet republics, where the "rhetorical manipulation" of the translational aspect comes into play.

As a whole, the approach introduced here seeks to combine Pocock and Skinner in a single framework. It views "structures" as available intellectual resources (for the authors) and the "agency" of the authors as a capacity to make conceptual innovations using these resources. It focuses on the revolution's specific situation – the first emergence of the alternative political proposals within the censored and highly ideological public sphere. It is the situation in which the radical ideas enter the semi-public sphere, using previously accepted languages for that purpose. The question is, how have the conceptual innovations within these languages emerged and resonated in the semi-public sphere and made their way into the highest political arena? At the same time, the dissertation aims to expand the aforementioned scope of the traditional Cambridge School from studying exclusively the history of political thought to more practical politics – policy papers, reports, project proposals, and so on. It also wishes to extend the scope from philosophers to everyday political agents – top officials, experts, scientists, party intelligentsia, and so on, who were authors of the ideas and writings in the public sphere and the proposals in the closed offices in state apparatuses. I suggest that this modified approach enables us to shift our attention to the possibilities of conceptual innovations in these ambiguous situations where the distinct political battles are not shaped yet, on the interaction between the available "languages" and innovative

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[61] The application of the Skinnerian method on contemporary history, particularly on linguistic expressions during the Cold War period, is rare. A notable exception is Robert Brier, who has directly used the Skinnerian method to study East European dissident political thought and has pointed out the strategic use of the adjective "totalitarian" in the essays of Polish dissident Adam Michnik in the mid-1970s. According to Brier, Michnik intentionally used the term and concept "totalitarian" to highlight the communist regime's dangerousness, particularly to a Western audience, namely to French and West German left-wing politicians. With the help of this strategy, it initiated the comeback of the forgotten discourse of "totalitarianism" to the European and US intellectual and political elite in the late 1970s and 1980s. See Robert Brier (2011), "Adam Michnik's Understanding of Totalitarianism and the West European Left: A Historical and Transnational Approach to Dissident Political Thought," *East European Politics and Societies* 25.

policy proposals made within them, as well as on the short-term contextuality between the proposals themselves.[62]

In what follows, I will describe more specifically my sources related to the research. I analyze the authors' innovative use of contemporaneous propaganda practices (the quotations of Leninist classic works),[63] the discourse of market socialism (local economic experiments in the ESSR, reform models from other socialist states, the NEP), and the prevailing global scientific thought in the ESSR (cybernetics, system theory, management, future studies), as well as the contemporaneous scientific methods (like the usage of the scenario method in 1986–1987). I do not consider them causes of the revolution but "resources" for the conceptual innovation and its legitimation. I aim to delve deep into these resources, which were all available to Estonian authors.

The studies are based mostly on public essays, articles, and proposals from 1986–1988 (Studies II and III) and archive materials (especially Study I). The archive materials used for the dissertation are the archive of the ESSR's Ministry of Services and Juhan Sillaste's personal archive, both in the Estonian National Archive (*Eesti Rahvusarhiiv*, ERA), as well as the protocols of meetings of the Tartu Group of Self-Management (*Isemajandamise Tartu Grupp*) and the Cultural Council of the Creative Unions of the Estonian SSR (*Eesti NSV Loominguliste Liitude Kultuurinõukogu*) in the ERA. I have also used the protocols of expert group meetings in the ESSR's Planning Committee from August 1987 (from Ivar Raig's private collection). I conducted several semi-structured interviews in 2015–2020 with individuals who initiated the economic experiments before the perestroika period (Juhan Sillaste) or proposed the experiment drafts (Ivar Raig); with the leader of the Tartu Group of Self-Management (Marju Lauristin), and with economists and management scholars in the IME Council (*IME Probleemkomitee*) (such as Ivi Proos and Erik Terk). For the dissertation, I have also interviewed several other contemporaneous authors who wrote in the public press (Rein Ruutsoo, Peeter Vihalemm) and Rein Veidemann, who served as an editor of the pro-perestroika journal *Vikerkaar* in 1986–1989. Although the interviews are not my primary source material, they have provided highly valuable heuristic clues for understanding the authors' tactical and linguistic choices during these periods, for instance, for proposing economic experiments in 1983, for publishing in *Vikerkaar* in 1986, or for balancing the ideological content in the Four-Man proposal in 1987.

The dissertation focuses on the reformist discourse. Thus, the dissertation does not study or discuss dissident or Estonian radical-nationalist thought in that

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[62] For example, the relationship between the Estonian Planning Committee's nationwide contest of future scenarios in May 1987 and the Four-Man Proposal in September 1987, which is analyzed in Study III.

[63] For example, in 1986, the pro-perestroika magazine *Aja Pulss* in the ESSR had a monthly section for "Lenin's principles" as a practical manual for authors to use in public propaganda work. Perestroika as a campaign was also a "continuation of the revolution," based on Lenin's ideas.

period, for example, the shaping of the political agenda of the Estonian National Independence Party (established in July 1988) or the rhetoric of the legal restorationist movement (*Kodanike komiteed*) in 1989–1990. The reason for limiting the dissertation's scope in this way is, first, the scarcity of studies on Estonian reformist thought, as considerably more scholarly attention has been paid to the dissident and legal restorationist thought.[64] The other reason is that the legal restorationist thought emerged in the public sphere under the conditions of the uncensored press (1989–1990). Over the course of this period, previously radical ideas such as the legal continuity of the pre-war Estonian Republic were adopted (to various degrees) by all political forces, including the Estonian Popular Front. The focus of the dissertation is on the ideas and concepts that preceded this more liberal late-perestroika period in the ESSR and were part of the semi-closed but reformist mid-perestroika discourse. Another topic outside the dissertation's scope is analysis of the impact of the "phosphorite campaign" on the conceptual processes in 1987.[65] Again, significant research has been done previously on this topic, starting with Marju Lauristin's classic study from 1988 on the effect of the "phosphorite syndrome" on the publicity during 1987–1988.[66] The other reason for excluding the "phosphorite campaign" from this study is the broader temporal frame of the study, as the dissertation's aim is to map out more long-term intellectual resources for the conceptual innovation in 1987.

There are only a few studies which have applied intellectual history to the mid-perestroika period. Timur Atnashev is one of the few authors who has directly deployed the methods of the Cambridge School in studying the argumentative languages of the perestroika period, focusing on authors' agentive capacities in

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[64] On the Estonian dissident movement in the transnational context, see Lars Fredrik Stöcker (2018). On legal restorationist thought, see Vello Andres Pettai's PhD dissertation on the Citizen Committees (*Kodanike komiteed*) movement in 1989–1990, which can be considered a case study on one argumentative language that framed the quest for independence through the legal continuity of the prewar Estonian Republic. Vello A. Pettai (2004), "Framing the Past as Future: The Power of Legal Restorationism in Estonia" (PhD diss., Columbia University).

[65] The "phosphorite campaign" (also called the "phosphorite war") refers to the situation in the ESSR in spring and summer 1987, when local activists launched an environmental campaign against Moscow's plan to build phosphorite mines in northeast Estonia. Besides the potential "ecological crisis" that this plan posed to the ESSR, it was quickly related to the "demographic concern" over the increasing flow of migrants from other Soviet republics, which would have increased with the mining activities. This concern had emerged as an important issue among locals in the early 1980s. These two aspects (ecological and demographic concerns), as existential threats to the republic and to the nation, were arguably the additional triggers that led local scientists to push for territorial self-management, which could protect the republic legally from this kind of central planning. On the fears within the local population, see Olev Liivik (2018), "Glasnost Policy Reaching Estonia: Fear and Hope in the Protest Letters of Estonian Residents during the Campaign against the Phosphorite Mines in 1987," in *The Baltic States and the End of the Cold War*, ed. Kaarel Piirimäe and Olaf Mertelsmann (Peter Lang), 123–151.

[66] Marju Lauristin (1988) Fosforiidisündroom ja avalikkuse areng. *Eesti Loodus*, nos. 7–8.

the Soviet Union's central press.[67] By analyzing the changes in the usages of specific idioms, Atnashev showed that the pluralism, democratic values, and openness concerning state's reforms in authors' texts went through both a liberal period (1986–1988) and a much more conservative period (1989–1991).[68] The research in conceptual history on the perestroika period has been scarce as well. However, there have been some studies that analyze the concepts of "state," "perestroika," and "glasnost."[69] Only some Estonian works have scrutinized the adoption of the ESSR's sovereignty declaration (addressed in Chapter 2.1.). For instance, Hent Kalmo has shown how the constitutional resource of the concept "sovereignty" allowed its implementation on the union republican level in 1988.[70] From the perspective of entangled history, a valuable contribution for understanding the transnational aspect has been Lars Fredrik Stöcker's work on relations between the Estonian political elite, economic experts, and their Nordic partners to gain Swedish and Finnish know-how for the economic reforms in the ESSR in

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[67] Timur Atnashev (2010), "Transformation of the Political Speech under Perestroika: Rise and Fall of Free Agency in the Changing Idioms, Rules and Second-Order Statements of the Emerging Intellectual Debates (1985–1991)" (PhD diss., European University Institute, Florence).

[68] Comparing the radicalism of the ESSR press and Soviet central press, the difference in the liberal periods is remarkable; it is almost as if they traded places. Whereas the Soviet press in 1986–1987 was liberal, even radical, in its promotion of perestroika ideas (which in turn inspired Estonian authors in 1987), in 1989–1990 the Soviet press turned more conservative and nationalist: see Atnashev (2010). At the same time, the ideas of Estonian perestroika in the local ESSR press started slowly and carefully in 1985–1986 but opened up step by step to more radical ideas until, by mid-1989, it was no longer restricted by censorship.

[69] For the concept of "state" in the Lithuanian SSR, see Justinas Dementavičius (2011), "Lithuanian Political Thought in the Twentieth Century and its Reflections in Sąjūdis: What Kind of State Have Lithuanians Been Fighting For?" *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 6, no. 1: 89–110. For discussion of the concept of perestroika, see Kristian Petrov (2008), "Construction, Reconstruction, Deconstruction: The Fall of the Soviet Union from the Point of View of Conceptual History," *Studies of East European Thought* 60: 179–205. For a closer analysis of the concept of glasnost, see Michael S. Gorham (2014), "Glasnost Unleashed: Language Ideologies in the Gorbachev Revolution," in his book *After Newspeak: Language Culture and Politics in Russia from Gorbachev to Putin* (Cornell University Press), 48–75. On the political metaphors in the perestroika campaign, see Marina Kaul (1998), "Breakthrough and Blind Alley: The Lexicon of Perestroika," in *Political Discourse in Transition in Europe 1989–1991*, ed. Paul A. Chilton. Mikhail V. Ilyin, and Jacob L. Mey (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins), 95–111.

[70] Hent Kalmo (2010), "1988. aasta suveräänsusdeklaratsioon: silmakirjalikkuse tsiviliseeriv mõju," *Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi aastaraamat* (Tartu: ÕES), 267–282. On the ESSR's sovereignty declaration and its immediate "defense" in Moscow, see Mati Graf (2012), *Impeeriumi lõpp ja Eesti taasiseseisvumine 1988–1991* (Argo), 20–48, and Igor Gräzin (2015) "Suveräänsuse sünd ja ja Nõukogude Liidu kadu," *Akadeemia*, no. 11. For a recent study that places the ESSR's sovereignty declaration in the context of the 1989 revolutions (as the "first velvet revolution" in Eastern Europe), see Toomas Alatalu (2019), "Eesti (NSV) suveräänsus-deklaratsioonist," *Akadeemia*, no. 9.

1989–1990.[71] In Estonian, Erik Terk has written on the IME program and its relation with the Estonian Popular Front in 1988–1989.[72] However, the intellectual roots and analysis for the conceptual innovation of *isemajandamine* (Study II), and its entanglement with other concepts (Study III), have not been studied earlier.

Now that we have gained an overview of the theoretical background and methodology of the dissertation, let us clearly spell out its aim and research questions. The dissertation's aim is to examine the processes of conceptual change in a pre-revolutionary situation – how a concept can make space for other ideas, under what conditions the "conceptual innovation" is possible, and how a concept can be transferred from one disciplinary domain to another (which I call "conceptual transfer"). The dissertation analyzes all these interrelated processes in three publications (called "studies" in the text) and asks the following research questions:

1. How were "self-managerial relations" expanded through the economic experiments in the mid-1980s in the Estonian SSR? What was the model of "self-management" in the ESSR before its innovation in 1987?
2. Under what conditions and through what processes can the "conceptual innovation" emerge in a late totalitarian society?
3. How did these processes enable the emergence of the concept of "sovereignty" in late 1987?
4. What kind of conceptual transfers (from science to politics) were made to legitimize the innovation in 1987–1988?
5. How was the global scientific discourse used in the local context to legitimize these actions?
6. What kinds of political languages can be discerned in public discussions in the ESSR during perestroika?

We move now to our case. On the one hand, it illustrates the research debates described above (and what our new theoretical approach can contribute). On the other hand, it introduces the chronology of events in the Estonian SSR in 1987–1988 (described in more detail in Studies II and III).

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[71] Lars Fredrik Stöcker (2016), "Perestroika and the Economic 'Westernization' of the USSR: Soviet Estonian Market Pioneers and Their Nordic Partners," *Estonian Historical Journal*, nos. 3–4: 447–476.

[72] Erik Terk and Liina Tõnisson (2018), "IME programm ja Rahvarinne: vastastikune võimendus," *Eestimaa Rahvarinne 30* (Rahvarinde muuseum), 132–158; Erik Terk (2016), "Eesti majandusreformid 1989–1991. IME programmist iseseisvuse ja selle kindlustamiseni," *Olid alles ajad! Taasiseseisvunud Eesti Vabariik 25* (Rahvarinde Muuseum), 11–45.

2. THE CASE AND ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

2.1. From "self-management" to "sovereignty"
in 1987–1988

Two long years before Hungary's Round Table Talks (March–September 1989), before Civic Forum and Vaclav Havel's last arrest by the secret police in Prague in October 1989, and before the first mass demonstration in Romania in December 1989, the first revolutionary situation in Eastern Europe, where "the contenders advance claims to control some segment of the state," emerged in 1987 in Soviet Estonia. On September 26, 1987, a group of Estonian scientists published in the progressive local newspaper *Edasi* (*Forward*) a short article entitled "A Proposal: Estonian SSR to Full Self-Accounting" (*Ettepanek – kogu Eesti NSV täielikule isemajandamisele*).[73] Four men were named in the byline (Siim Kallas, Tiit Made, Edgar Savisaar, and Mikk Titma), and thus the document was quickly named the "Four-Man Proposal" (*Nelja mehe ettepanek*).[74] All four men were members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).[75] The proposal called upon the Estonian government and the scientific community to draft plans to achieve an independently operating economy in the union. The request declared the need for "a radical rearrangement of the Estonian economy and the society as a whole." The proposal's main message was that public debate should be started on how to gain "full self-accounting status" for the republic and how to place the economy (including all-union enterprises) on Estonian territory completely under the jurisdiction of the Estonian SSR. The article also proposed giving the republic its own currency (a "convertible ruble").

The Four-Man Proposal generated a torrent of articles from October 1987 until the end of 1988. The debate on "what it would take to carry out this transformation" took place every week, mostly in progressive newspapers, mobilizing reform-minded top officials, intellectuals, and academics from very different fields. But most importantly, the local CPSU branch came out in favor of the idea. The reform-minded vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, Indrek Toome, publicly endorsed the project and established a select expert group to develop the concept further at the beginning of 1988.[76] The idea as a political demand for Moscow

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[73] Siim Kallas, Tiit Made, Edgar Savisaar, and Mikk Titma, "Ettepanek – kogu Eesti NSV täielikule isemajandamisele," *Edasi*, September 26, 1987.

[74] To shorten the proposal's title, in the dissertation I also call the Four-Man Proposal the "IM Proposal" (IM – *isemajandamine*) and use the two terms interchangeably in the text.

[75] The Communist Party of Estonia (as a branch of the CPSU) was not an independent Party organization, and therefore people officially joined the CPSU.

[76] A year later, on December 1, 1988, in the meeting of the Council of Ministers, Indrek Toome said that "for Estonia, there is no alternative to territorial self-management." Hindrek-Peeter Meri (2008), *Tagasivaateid veerevast vagunist* (Tartu: Ilmamaa), 447. All translations of the quotes (as well as the interviews) from Estonian to English in this dissertation have been made by the author, if not specified otherwise.

was exported to other Baltic republics as well. In the autumn of 1988, the governments of all three Baltic republics established a common platform to begin negotiations with Moscow to gain "economic independence" from central planning.

Photo 1 (left): The title page of the proposal, published in the newspaper *Edasi* in September 26, 1987. **Photo 2 (right)**: The four signatories of the proposal in the Estonian Television studio in spring 1988, from the left: Savisaar, Titma, Made, Kallas. In the background is a banner with the IME slogan with a territorial image of the Estonian SSR. Source: Wikipedia.

Month after month, *isemajandamine* was gradually expanded (this is the main topic of Study II). The meanings that were initially connected only with economic policies (in late 1987) permeated the social and political sphere in early spring 1988. The Tartu Group of Self-Management (*Isemajandamise Tartu Grupp*), consisting of academics from various fields at the University of Tartu, stated in their first meeting on February 15, 1988, that "*isemajandamine* is not only an economic but also a social and ideological problem […] the hope is that regulating the society's economic base will also reactivate social mechanisms."[77] A fundamental shift in the rhetoric was the group's statement that "the economy is only an instrument for the ultimate goals of *isemajandamine*," which were the "increase of sovereignty and subjectivity, growth of welfare, increase of freedom of choice, etc."[78] The Tartu group also changed the abbreviation IM (*isemajandamine*) to

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[77] Aivi Ross, "Isemajandamise Tartu rühm," *Edasi*, March 19, 1988.
[78] Marju Lauristin, "Isemajandamisfoorum Tartus," *Edasi*, April 29, 1988.

IME (*Isemajandav Eesti*) in spring 1988.[79] In Estonian, "IME" literally means "miracle" (*ime*), which helped to give the movement a positive and creative image. During its peak (in summer 1988), IME gained an almost spiritual meaning in Estonia[80] (illustrated by Photo 3).

Photo 3: A banner from summer 1988, which reads: "IME. Let's Love, Care For, and Protect Estonia." Source: Wikipedia.

By autumn 1988, IME had multiple simultaneous meanings, as initially economic demands had turned to political ones – it denoted a social movement, economic independence, social self-regulation, and political sovereignty.[81]

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[79] One of the leaders of the IME movement, Marju Lauristin, recalls that "indeed, I held the chalk in a meeting in Tartu to write on the board a new abbreviation – IME" (author's interview with Marju Lauristin, 2020). In the dissertation, I distinguish the movement's phases as IM (September 1987–January 1988) and IME (January 1988–November 1988). Edgar Savisaar himself drew a distinction between the content of the Four-Man Proposal and that of IME, saying in December 1989: "I would not equate the 'self-management' proposal made in September 1987 with IME, which came into being in spring 1988 and was qualitatively on a different level." Kaupo Pollisinski and Raivo Lott (1989), "Aastalõpusimultaan nelja mehega majandusest ja muust," *Rahva Hääl*, December 31, 1989, 7.

[80] In June 1989, when Estonian deputies met Gorbachev in Moscow to negotiate territorial self-management, one of the Estonian deputies, Viktor Palm, mentioned to Gorbachev: "In Estonia, people's faith in IME is huge – it is like a religion at the moment." Toomas Sildam and Leivi Šer (1989), "Eesti delegatsiooni suurpäev," *Rahva Hääl*, June 2, 1989.

[81] There is a remarkable similarity between the discourse of "self-management from below in all social spheres" (as initiated by the Tartu Group of Self-Management in spring 1988) with the discourse of "organic self-management in the civic society" proposed by Czech dissidents

Indeed, from the perspective of world politics, the most important by-product of the mushrooming discourse on self-management was the revival of the forgotten concept of "sovereignty" at the end of 1987. An unintended consequence of the ongoing debate was that, together with economists, sociologists, and other academics, it also activated lawyers and legal scholars to present their views on the Four-Man Proposal. At first, the concept of "sovereignty" (in Estonian, *suveräänsus*) was brought into the debate by lawyers to remind economists what was necessary to establish full self-accounting in a republic.[82] From there, lawyers started to make a supporting argument that "sovereignty" was a constitutional right of the republic (irrespective of the fact that, only a year earlier, this concept was not perceived by reformers to apply to the political arena). In September 1988, the politically and legally more useful term "sovereignty" replaced "self-management" as the central concept in reformists' tactics.[83] However, the final maneuver was made due to a direct constitutional dispute with Gorbachev's team, who demanded in mid-1988 that Estonia confirm the new amendments in the Soviet Union's constitution. In response, on November 16, 1988, the Supreme Soviet of

in the mid-1980s. For instance, in 1985, Czech dissident Petr Uhl, in his essay "The Alternative Community as Revolutionary Avant-garde" (published in English), explicitly says that "social (and not merely economic) self-management is a combination of direct and indirect forms of democracy"; see Petr Uhl and Paul Wilson (1985), "The Alternative Community as Revolutionary Avant-Garde," *International Journal of Politics* 15, nos. 3–4: 188–197. In the same year, another Czech dissident, Rudolf Battek, argued in favor of "different forms of self-management" and the need for "pluralizing sovereignty" in the society. According to Battek, "social structures can be democratized by expanding the elements of self-management, limiting institutional growth, making allowances for ideas as motivational factor, and strengthening direct democracy by eliminating priorities and privileges." See Rudolf Battek (1985), "Spiritual Values, Independent Initiatives and Politics," in Vaclav Havel, *The Power of the Powerless*, ed. John Keane, 108. We can conceptualize this as republican language, as it promoted direct democracy, people's personal responsibility in relation to the state, and organic, "from below" initiave. The intriguing part is that whereas in East Central Europe, this "language" (in the Pocockian sense) was kept alive by dissidents, in the Estonian SSR, it emerged from the scientific community, in which many people were members of the Communist Party. On the relation between republicanism and East European dissident discourse, see Paul Blokker (2011), "Dissidence, Republicanism, and Democratic Change," *East European Politics and Societies* 25, 219–243.

[82] In October 1987, lawyers joined the ongoing debate by saying that "the republic's economic self-accounting cannot be achieved without the republic's sovereignty." At first, Indrek Koolmeister stated that "speaking of being a master in your country, it is not only an economic but also a political-legal category […] to speak about the people as master at the state level means to talk about the sovereignty of people, about its power, and about the ways of its realization." Indrek Koolmeister, "Isemajandamine ja ise majandamine," *Edasi*, October 25, 1987.

[83] During the 11th Plenum of the Estonian Communist Party in September 9–10, 1988, Estonian political scientist Andrus Park (a member of the CPSU and the ESSR's Academy of Sciences) invited others "to pay attention to the legal-political questions in order to secure the ESSR's economic independence," stressing that "the key word for the IME movement from now on should be 'sovereignty' and only then 'self-management.'" *Rahva Hääl*, September 11, 1988, 3.

the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty. The declaration asserted the ESSR's "sovereignty" and Estonian laws' primacy over those promulgated by Moscow's all-union government. This step became a blueprint that was soon followed by virtually all other Soviet republics (including the Russian SFSR) and many autonomous republics who declared their "sovereignty" in 1989–1990.

Thus, besides the well-known "Gorbachev factor," there was an influential "sovereignty factor" behind the disintegration of the Soviet empire.[84] Edward D. Walker has written the most meticulous study on the effect of the "sovereignty factor" on the USSR's dissolution.[85] Walker emphasized the importance of the sovereignty declarations adopted in 1988–1990, saying that

> "Sovereignty" killed the Soviet Union […] The concept of "sovereignty," more than any other competitor such as "democracy," "liberty," or "markets," was used with great effect by the anti-union opposition in the union's republics to challenge the authority of the USSR's central government.[86]

The political efficiency of the concept was also highly esteemed by Boris Yeltsin, who recalled later that "as soon as the word 'sovereignty' resounded in the air… the last hour of the Soviet empire was chiming."[87] Throughout 1990, Boris Yeltsin presented "sovereignty" as a central concept in his speeches in RSFSR regions, calling on regions to declare their sovereignty.[88]

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[84] Dragos Petrescu names three "external conjunctural factors" that were invoked in relation to the 1989 revolutions, namely, the "Vatican," "Reagan," and "Gorbachev" factors; see Dragos Petrescu (2014), *Entangled Revolutions: The Breakdown of the Communist Regimes in East Central Europe* (Editura Enciclopedică), 20. By the "Vatican" factor, Petrescu means the 1978 election of a Polish pope, John Paul II (Karol Józef Wojtyła), which had a direct influence on dissident stances in Poland in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s: ibid., 20. Surely we can add the "Helsinki factor" (or "Helsinki effect") to this list as another influence for dissident strategies, but it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. On this topic, see Daniel C. Thomas (2001), *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights and Demise of Communism* (Princeton University Press). I myself have analyzed the Helsinki effect on Charter 77 tactics in Saharov (2021).

[85] Edward D. Walker (2003), *Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (Rowman & Littlefield). For another analysis of the factor of sovereignty declarations in 1989–1991 (focusing on opportunities for ASSRs), see Jeff Kahn (2000), "The Parade of Sovereignties: Establishing the Vocabulary of the New Russian Federalism," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16, no. 1: 58–89.

[86] Walker (2003), 1.

[87] Boris Yeltsin (1994), *The Struggle for Russia*, trans. by C. A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Times Books), 112.

[88] In the summer of 1989, Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Palm (an Estonian academic and activist in the Estonian Popular Front) were both members of the "Inter-Regional Group of Deputies" (*Mezhregionalka*), led by Andrei Sakharov. In his interview with Mati Graf, Viktor Palm recalls that during their meetings with Estonian deputies in Moscow, "Yeltsin was otherwise quite silent in our discussions but came to life when we introduced him the concept of

In his book, Walker represents the structuralist approach, saying that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was "a peculiar case of institutional path dependency" where many laws and institutions had little or no practical meaning for decades and yet "sovereignty proved to be a legal boomerang that played a crucial role in the breakup of the Soviet state."[89] Walker also concluded that the previous administrative division and constitutional resources for the republics explains the nature of the dissolution – that is, "why the Soviet Union fragmented into fifteen, rather than five, or fifty, successor states."[90] Eventually, all 15 union republics (SSRs) in the Soviet Union and 26 different autonomous regions (including ASSRs) in the Russian SFSR adopted sovereignty declarations in 1988–1991.[91] This process, known as the "Parade of Sovereignties" (see the table below), put the central government at a serious disadvantage in its efforts to re-establish control over the Soviet Union and led to its dissolution in 1991.[92]

'territorial self-management' and 'sovereignty'"; see Mati Graf (2012), *Impeeriumi lõpp ja Eesti taasiseseisvumine 1988–1991* (Argo), 83. At the same time, Yeltsin took little interest in foreign policy and even less interest in concepts like "new thinking"; see Brown (2007), 242. Thus, Yeltsin was interested in concepts that had potential in his domestic political struggle with Gorbachev and could bring practical results.

[89] Walker (2003), 186–187.

[90] Ibid., 1. For more on the "administrative division of USSR" as a structural factor that offered different opportunities for union republics and autonomous republics in 1988–1991 in the Soviet Union, see Gregory P. Williams (2010), "When Opportunity Structure Knocks: Social Movements in the Soviet Union and Russian Federation," *Social Movement Studies* 9, no. 4: 443–460.

[91] For the analysis on the "sovereignty effect" in ASSRs (which focuses on the Tatarstan ASSR), see Jeff Kahn (2000).

[92] Keeping in mind Mark Katz's concept of "affiliate revolutions" for describing the 1989 revolutions (Katz 1999), but also Mark Kramer's concept of "uni- and bidirectional spillovers" (Kramer 2003), we can elaborate the "parade of sovereignties" in the same way. The declarations inspired each other as the opposition politicians communicated with each other in all republics, causing a cascade of declarations in 1989–1990. One ESSR Supreme Soviet member, economist Valter Udam, recalls that during the session when sovereignty was declared on November 16, 1988, colleagues from other republics phoned constantly to inquire about the election's result. Valter Udam (1993), *Taasiseseisvumise raske tee ehk Vene impeeriumi lagunemise algus* (Ilo), 36. Estonian management scholar Erik Terk (who visited Slovenia several times in 1990–1992 with Estonian prime minister Savisaar) recalls that the text of the Slovenian sovereignty declaration (the May Declaration, published on May 10, 1989) was inspired by the Estonian equivalent and that many paragraphs in that text were directly copied from the Estonian declaration: author's interview with Erik Terk (Tallinn, May 11, 2018). This claim requires further study, but there was certainly a common bilateral interest in those processes, as the legal situation for Slovenian independence forces (to secede from the Yugoslav federation) was reminiscent of that of the ESSR.

The "Parade of Sovereignties" (SSRs):

1988		1989		1990	
Estonia	Nov. 16	Lithuania	May 18	Russian SFSR	June 12
		Latvia	July 29	Uzbekistan	June 20
		Azerbaijan	Sept. 23	Moldavia	June 23
		Georgia	Oct. 12	Ukraine	July 16
		Byelorussia	Dec. 7	Turkmenistan	Aug. 22
				Armenia	Aug. 23
				Tajikistan	Aug. 25
				Kazakhstan	Oct. 26
				Kirghizia	Oct. 28

While the importance of the "sovereignty effect" on the dissolution of the Soviet Union has been acknowledged, some of its questions remain unanswered. For instance, why did it happen first in Estonia and not in other Soviet republics? Why did the concept of "sovereignty" rise to prominence in Estonia in late 1987 at all? What was the reason for this particular development in the ESSR on the all-union scale?

As we saw from the process described above (and Studies II and III analyze its multiple facets exhaustively), the main point is that even though in November 1988 the "sovereignty of the ESSR" was declared on the grounds of the ESSR's constitutional rights, its unexpected "emergence" in late 1987 was related to something else. The rebirth of "sovereignty" in Estonia was caused by the need to form a legal basis for the project of "republican self-management." In other words, in 1987–1988, "sovereignty" was supposed to serve the goal of "self-management" and not vice versa. Estonian legal scholars who brought the "sovereignty of the republic" into the public sphere emphasized in November 1987 that "republican self-management presumes the sovereignty of the republic to expand its rights… and using the constitutional rights that ensure sovereignty is not only the republic's right but also its duty."[93] "Self-management" became a central political concept in the ESSR from September 1987 onwards, before it was replaced by its local successor, "sovereignty," in late 1988. It was an unintended conceptual consequence of the gradually expanding debate on republican self-management in 1987 (which in the Soviet Union existed only in Estonia). As a next step, it facilitated the emergence of the ESSR's sovereignty claim in 1988. Thus, to understand the spread of "sovereignty" in Soviet republics in 1987–1989, one should pay attention not only to constitutional factors but also to *why* the new claim arose, *what* its relation was to other concepts in the ongoing debate,

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[93]   Igor Gräzin and Peeter Kask, "Isemajandamisest ja suveräniteedist," *Edasi*, November 13, 1987. See also Indrek Koolmeister, "Isemajandamine ja ise majandamine," *Edasi*, October 25, 1987; and Gunnar Kuldvere interview with Urve Nõu, Heino Siigur, Tõnu Anton, Enn Hansberg, and Indrek Koolmeister, "Majanduslik ja õiguslik iseseisvus on lahutamatud," *Edasi*, December 8, 1987.

and *what* the contextual resources were that made it possible to create those preceding claims in the first place. Below is a figure (Figure 1) which schematically presents the dissertation's analytical framework for studying the conceptual processes in the ESSR:

Figure 1: Conceptual innovation in the ESSR. The revolutionary period (i.e. the era of dual power) in the ESSR starts with the adoption of the sovereignty declaration on November 16, 1988.

2.2. The "locked-text problem" in a late totalitarian system

Michael Gorham, the researcher of language ideologies of Russian history, has said that the "periods of rapid and radical change both shape and are shaped by language."[94] But what does it mean for a language to be shaped and itself shape change? What if the language during these periods is still very much "locked" by the prevailing ideology, and unlocking it poses a challenge? How could various native languages in other Soviet republics be manipulated to take advantage of these situations? These are the questions to be tackled in this chapter.

The period of 1985–1988 in the ESSR (as in the Soviet Union generally) was a period of "rapid and radical change" indeed, and language played a significant role in it. According to Gorbachev's chief advisor Alexander Yakovlev (the leading architect of the perestroika campaign), one of the first goals of this campaign in 1985 was to cancel out the empty rhetoric (*pustoslovie*) of the existing party language (*partgosiazyk*) and to restore seriousness to political speech.[95] For

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[94]   Michael S. Gorham (2014), *After Newspeak: Language Culture and Politics in Russia from Gorbachev to Putin* (Cornell University Press).
[95]   Ibid., 48–49.

Yakovlev, it was located in progressive, uncensored science, and the new campaign attempted to push for reform based on scientific methods, set free from ideological constraints.[96] This was in line with academic Andrei Sakharov's call to "free science from its chains." Yakovlev and Gorbachev believed that if they could bring together the best representatives of the sciences, they could articulate a broad vision of reforms. This pattern in Soviet reformism had its roots in the early and mid-1960s, when various economists were involved in Chairman Kosygin's drafts for economic reform.[97] A few years after perestroika, Yakovlev confessed that he bought into the "illusion" that all they needed was to "gather as full and reliable information as possible, analyze it strictly scientifically and then act in a corresponding way – in that case, everything will go in the necessary direction, an honest and reasonable policy will be formed."[98]

With his Finnish colleague Pekka Sutela, the Russian economist Vladimir Mau has labeled this mindset an "objectivity illusion" when analyzing Soviet economic policy during perestroika.[99] This produced significant changes in the public language. Due to the replacement of the chief editors by Yakovlev in 1985–1986, many statements in periodicals and scientific reviews in the Soviet Union started to make a similar assumption – that scientifically valid knowledge (freed from ideological restraints) on history, the economy, and society could and should provide direct guidance for efficient policy-making.[100] The promised liberation of science created a new type of linguistic situation for the reformist authors – writings on economic reform were (from then on) often built on progressive scientific arguments. However, besides the presumed "scientificity," the reform proposals in the public speech had to meet a second condition – they had to comply with the new ideology itself. Next, I will take a closer look at this condition in the speech situation in 1985–1987.

Although perestroika proclaimed the need for "new thinking" to overcome the economic (and moral) crisis, the speech situation for authors in the public media in the early years of the campaign (1985–1987) did not change dramatically. As Avizier Tucker put it, the Soviet Union in 1987 was still a late totalitarian society.[101] I am not applying here the transitological approach (by which the

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[96] A similar call – to restore the seriousness of "political language" based on scientific analysis – was made in the mid-1980s in some other socialist countries as well, such as in Yugoslavia by Serbian sociologist Slobodan Inić (1946–2000) in his 1984 book *Govorite li politički? Esej iz sociologije političkog jezika* (Belgrade). See Trencsényi et al. (2018), 34.

[97] Iakov Feygin (2017), "Reforming the Cold War State: Economic Thought, Internationalization, and the Politics of Soviet Reform, 1955–1985" (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania), 97–98.

[98] Alexander Yakovlev, cited in Pekka Sutela and Vladimir Mau (1998), "Economics under Socialism: The Russian Case," in *Economic Thought in Communist and Post-Communist Europe*, ed. H. J. Wagener (Routledge), 205.

[99] Sutela and Mau (1998), 205.

[100] Atnashev (2010), 139.

[101] Avizier Tucker (2015), *The Legacies of Totalitarianism: A Theoretical Framework* (Cambridge University Press), 7–10. According to Tucker, this distinction helps in separating

totalitarian regimes' institutional past influences its societies' transition to democratic political culture), but I aim to show the public authors' speech situation during the early perestroika era. In 1985–1987, all public media and the public language production were still monopolized by a single political party, even if it had changed some of its rhetoric. A public text had to meet strict rules; therefore, the state censored public text during the early perestroika era. Most importantly, the authors themselves arguably perceived the extensive low-intensity oppression through the censorship rules on public text, even when the state was softening censorship in 1987. In other words, even if the state opted not to censor some of the terms or arguments anymore, the authors believed and feared that the state might continue to do so.[102] Thus it was a late-totalitarian-era speech situation that led public authors to develop their self-censorship skills and operate only in the hierarchical Soviet public text's discourse.

However, there were ways to navigate between these rules. Estonian communication theorist Maarja Lõhmus has described this phenomenon as innovating the "text in a locked system".[103] Drawing on editing practices in the Estonian SSR's media in 1983–1984, Lõhmus concludes that despite the system's closed and hierarchical nature, innovation and creativity in the public text were obligatory features for late Soviet ideology. Editors even encouraged writers to display the

regimes that exercise "extensive low-intensity oppression" over the whole population (late totalitarianism) from regimes that exercise "narrow but intensive oppression" over a small, politically active section of the population (authoritarianism). Authoritarian regimes base their power on the military, while totalitarian regimes rely on the secret service. In our case, we can use this distinction to emphasize the importance of authors' fear of possible persecution and thus their cultivation of self-censorship (in 1985–1987) and the constant navigation between the rules for the public text. Tucker's notion of "late totalitarianism" (and its contents) overlaps considerably with Vaclav Havel's notion of "post-totalitarian society," in which ordinary citizens, out of a fear of persecution (as part of the totalitarian control-mechanism), participate in reproducing the communist ideology. Although their tactics were different, dissidents and perestroika reformers confronted the same challenge – how to meaningfully criticize the ultra-centralist, late totalitarian regime and how to communicate that criticism in a way that would avoid persecution. The "totalitarian" nature of the late-era Soviet Union was also elaborated by Vladimir Shlapentokh (1926–2015), who stressed the factor of "fear" for the people's behaviour in the Soviet society in the early and mid-1980s, see Vladimir Shlapentokh (2001), *A Normal Totalitarian Society: How the Soviet Union Functioned and How It Collapsed (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe)*.

[102] One of the economists in the IME movement, Ivar Raig, worked as the editor of the economic column "Idee" (Idea) in the newspaper *Noorte Hääl* (Voice of the Youth) in December 1987. He described the situation thus: "At the end of 1987, I and the writers at the newspaper never got complaints or orders from the censors, but I think it was because our own self-censorship in writing was so strong." Author's interview with Ivar Raig, February 12, 2019.

[103] Maarja Lõhmus (1999), *Toimetamine: kas looming või tsensuur* (Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus), 61–63. In her PhD dissertation, Lõhmus analyzed censorship practices in Estonian Radio in 1983–1985: see Maarja Lõhmus (2002), "Transformation of Public Text in Totalitarian System: A Socio-Semiotic Study of Soviet Censorship Practices in Estonian Radio in the 1980s" (University of Turku).

state's progressiveness and continuously "developing socialism."[104] Next, I will look at some of the concepts ("critique," "improvement," "experiment," and "plan") that had a paradoxical nature in the late totalitarian speech situation.

In the public text, the availability of the concept and practice of the "critique" in the late totalitarian discourse provided an opportunity to introduce new ideas that differed from the official ideology. The concept of "critique" in Soviet text meant introducing some "alien" ideology or theory only to demolish it.[105] As Study III in the dissertation shows, while in his 1983 book (co-authored with Lembit Valt), Savisaar introduced and "criticized" the Club of Rome (*Rooma Klubi*) and its relations with global studies, he managed to link it with "humanistic and socialist values," "progressiveness," and "common global goals" (e.g., the common threat of nuclear war), which were precursors of perestroika language.[106] More importantly for our case, Savisaar imported the argumentative language of the Club of Rome into the language of institutional policymaking in the Estonian Planning Committee (*ENSV Plaanikomitee*) in 1986 (see Study III). The planning institutions themselves partially enabled this: when Savisaar was nominated in 1986 as department chief of the Plan Committee, his department's official task was to come up regularly with improvement proposals within the system of a planned economy. The ideological job to "constantly improve the economic mechanisms" through the economic experiments started to pay dividends to Estonian marketeers by the early 1980s (for more details, see Chapter 2.4). The fourth example is the concept of "plan." In the 1985 contractual work experiment, before an independent budget could be acquired for contract units in services in the ESSR, the plan first needed to be exceeded (see Study I). In other words, the more contractual units fulfilled and exceeded the plan indicators, the more their economic independence grew. Thus, the concept of the "plan" not only constrained but also enabled the departure from a vertical command economy to a more horizontal market socialism.[107]

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[104]   Lõhmus (1999), 61–63.

[105]   Ibid., 17.

[106]   Lembit Valt and Edgar Savisaar (1983), *Globaalprobleemid ja tulevikustsenaariumid* (Eesti Raamat).

[107]   We can analyze this phenomenon in the late totalitarian regimes with the help of the analytical concept of "institutional amphibiousness," borrowing it from X. L. Ding's analysis on the role of state institutions in the reform process in China in the 1980s. As Ding observed, it applies if "an institution can be used for purposes contrary to those it is supposed to fulfil, and the same institution can simultaneously serve conflicting purposes" (298). According to Ding, this situation led to a process of "institutional manipulation" whereby institutions that "were set up by the communist regime for its own use" were "gradually co-opted by critical forces for counter purposes, all the while keeping up the protective facade that these were still party-state institutions" (299): X. L. Ding (1994), "Institutional Amphibiousness and the Transition from Communism: The Case of China," *British Journal of Political Science* 24, no. 3: 293–318. For instance, as shown in Studies I and III, we can see the ESSR's Institute of Ministry of Services in 1983–1985 (in Study I) or the ESSR's Plan Committee scenario department in 1986–1987 (in Study III) as an example of this double life, described by Ding. I suggest that we can expand Ding's concept to grasp the consequences of the usage of some particular action

Aside from the ideological and practical tasks for editors, experts, and marketeers (in newspapers, planning institutions, and ministries), we can explain this at a more theoretical level. Alexei Yurchak points out that the high "performativity" of using the official vocabulary in late socialism (the gradual "hyper-normalization" of the discourse) was precisely the reason why it was possible to manipulate the meanings by reinterpreting the existing "official" terms.[108] Therefore, "reinterpretation" in the late totalitarian system does not mean changing the previous meaning but continually modifying it within the frontiers of closed text. The constant modification of the concepts in the Soviet media was supposed to create the illusion of an ever-changing and developing society. However, this process gradually left these concepts hollowed out from any meaning that could be taken seriously. In the beginning, perestroika's campaign was part of that process. It was a modification of the old concepts in the ideological framework. Many intellectuals indeed accused the perestroika language of creating half-truths and being too conservative and technocratic.[109] However, as shown in Study II, because of this hollowness, this situation enabled several "speech acts," which eventually had unintended outcomes.

Thus, the first years of perestroika did not differ much from the logic of innovation processed in the media in the late totalitarian system. There was also a range of taboo topics (like the Yugoslav model, Kosygin reforms, and the Solidarity movement) that could not be touched upon publicly and which led to the development of self-censorship skills.[110] The progressive ideas in perestroika

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models in the late Soviet system ("critique," "improvement," "experiment," and "plan"), as their "conceptual amphibiousness" made it possible to serve conflicting purposes in the society simultaneously.

[108] Alexei Yurchak (2006), *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More* (Princeton University Press), 76.

[109] Even the project of *isemajandamine* itself became an object of attacks by more radically minded intellectuals in the Estonian SSR, as well as by an independent youth movement (*Noortefoorum*). The discourse that categorized the "self-management" project as one of the "half-truths" (created by the "*Komsomol* generation" of the 1960s) was generated in 1988–1989. See, for example, Harri Liivrand and Ants Juske (1988), "Tallinna Kevad 88 ja Eesti Sõltumatu Noortefoorum," *Vikerkaar* 10, 58; and Kaido Kama (1989), "Rahvuslikke perspektiive," *Vikerkaar* 5, 91–93.

[110] Those in the Soviet bloc carefully avoided comparing – even in 1989 – the Estonian SSR's "territorial self-management" concept with Polish and Yugoslavian models of "workers' self-management." Estonian management scholar and IME activist Erik Terk recalls that during his visit to Bulgaria in 1989 (to introduce the IME program to the Bulgarian economic experts), when he translated *isemajandamine* into English, the local reformers were startled and careful to use the term "self-management." This was the case because of the term's known relation with the Yugoslavian model, which was taboo in orthodox communist ideology (from correspondence with Erik Terk, November 2020). Similarly, Ivar Raig has recalled that the Four-Man Proposal in September 1987 carefully avoided a reference to the "Yugoslav model," and even "the reference to Hungarian experience in the proposal's text had to be balanced by adding 'Bulgarian' alongside the former because of the 1956 events" as another taboo in the Soviet public text (from the author's interview with Ivar Raig, February 12, 2019). Indeed, during the public debate on the proposal, which generated more than 50 newspaper articles in 1987–

language were displayed through a limited amount of "approved" concepts, which had to be compatible with classic texts of Lenin, decrees of the general secretary of the Party, work of the Soviet academics, eminent international scientists in the natural sciences (e.g., Nobel Prize winners), Soviet economic discourse from the 1920s (the NEP), and so on. According to Kristian Petrov, this was precisely the goal of perestroika – to produce "an open matrix that could be filled with different projections of alternative visions [...] intended to work *only* in the given context," which was the socialist ideology and Soviet system.[111] Metaphorically speaking, the task for the innovational ideologists of perestroika resembled the situation called the "locked-room mystery" for detectives in crime novels, where the solution to the puzzle can be found only on the basis of people's actions inside the room and not outside it. Like everyone who wrote in the Soviet public media, the Estonian authors faced the "locked-text problem" in 1986–1987.

2.3. The nature of perestroika's concepts

As described in the section on the theoretical framework, different generations of scholars have conceptualized the revolutions through (1) *structural* factors (as "social revolutions"), (2) *ideational* factors (e.g., "existential revolutions"), (3) *transnational* factors (as "entangled revolutions"), and (4) *linguistic-conceptual* factors (as "conceptual revolutions"), which is the case when analyzing the early and mid-perestroika period. In the previous chapter, we also saw how the "empty rhetoric" of the party language was supposed to be replaced by a new political language that would rely heavily on scientific argumentation, scrubbed of ideological content. However, the ideological control and censorship that had created the "locked-text problem" continued with perestroika in 1985–1987.

The usage of the terms had the utmost importance in the Soviet system. During early perestroika*,* there were occasionally all-day meetings in the CPSU's Polit-buro to discuss how to address some terms in Soviet political speak.[112] Even the general secretary himself had to confront the "locked-text problem." For instance, in 1985, Gorbachev could not use the term "reform" because of its Western origin and the taboo status of the Kosygin reforms in the public space during the

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1988, the author found only one piece that mentioned the IM concept's similarity with "the Yugoslavian developments": see Ago Vilu (1987), "Asi on üritamist väärt," *Õhtuleht*, October 1, 1987. These examples illustrate the ESSR's authors' constant navigation to avoid the taboo topics in the Soviet locked-text discourse and how tactical (and crucial) the linguistic conceptualization of reform drafts was during the early and mid-perestroika period in public space.

[111] Petrov (2008), 200. Petrov points out that the literal meaning of the word "perestroika" (restructuring) is to "produce changes within the construction": ibid., 200.

[112] Archie Brown (2009), *The Rise and Fall of Communism* (London: Bodly Head), 489.

Brezhnev era.[113] That is why technically sound and politically neutral concepts like "acceleration" (*uskorenie*), "breakdown" (*lomka*), and "dismantlement" (*demontaž*) were created by Gorbachev's team in 1985–1986. They were made as a safe set of concepts for introducing the new campaign.

In Leon Aron's words, "Gorbachev and his initial allies had been brought up in the Marxist tradition… and [therefore] lacked the conceptual categories and even a vocabulary to give coherence to their 'non-material' concerns."[114] Similarly to Aron, Walker D. Connor noted in 2005 that

> There was a continuing thread of discrepancy between the language Gorbachev used, including its ideological tint, and the content and tendency of his actions… to a degree, this was tactical – he could not show his hand to the Party. But it also highlights the deficiency of the political vocabulary available to him in the mid-1980s, which made it difficult for him to express how far he was willing to go, or perhaps even to understand it himself.[115]

I suggest that we should see this "deficit" in the political language also as an opportunity for proposing reforms. The limitations of the official vocabulary were one reason why Yakovlev and Gorbachev turned to progressive science. The political neutrality of the system-theory concepts made it possible not only to present the "ideologically free reforms" but also, in a more practical sense, to fight the hardliners in the CPSU by creating a new public linguistic platform. The sociologists and economists on Gorbachev's team equipped him with system-theory concepts like "feedback" or "self-regulation" that he could use in his speeches (some of which were written by the scientists themselves), which in turn allowed scientists to expand the concepts in the public sphere.[116] It led to a tripartite ecosystem between the general secretary, reformist scientists, and the public. It was a functional circle by which scientific language migrated into the public sphere.

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[113] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (1996). Similarly to Gorbachev, those in Czechoslovakia avoided the word "reform" in the 1980s so as not to affiliate themselves with the reform communists of 1968; see Ther (2018), 55.

[114] Aron (2012), 23. Aron probably has in mind the orthodox Marxist-Leninist classics in Soviet public text, because we can interpret the notion of "Marxist tradition" in a much wider sense, for instance, the theorists in the Frankfurt School, who certainly had the conceptual framework for elaborating "ethical and non-material concerns." Besides, Gorbachev was sympathetic toward Eurocommunism and had a friendly relationship with Zdeněk Mlynář; see English (2000), 181. Rather, the restriction on using unorthodox Marxist vocabulary was related more to the strong resistance from the conservative wing in the CPSU (even during perestroika) and the inertial "locked-text problem" in a late totalitarian system.

[115] Walker D. Connor (2005), "Builder and Destroyer: Thoughts on Gorbachev's Social Revolutions, 1985–1991," *Demokratizatsiya* 13, no. 2: 174.

[116] One of the leading public figures during perestroika, sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya, has noted that she belonged to Gorbachev's speechwriters' team in 1987. See Tatyana Zaslavskaya (2007), *Moia zhizn': vospominaniia i razmyshleniia. Izbrannye proizvedeniia,* vol. 3 (Moscow: Ekonomika), 554.

However, the "conceptual revolution" Brown had in mind was related to concepts from the realms of economics and law. During perestroika, in 1989, Archie Brown noted that Gorbachev and his allies used three "new concepts" in 1987–1988, which, according to Brown, "deserve special emphasis, as they helped to open space for new political activity and provide a theoretical underpinning for some of the concrete reforms that the more radical interpreters of perestroika were attempting to implement."[117] These were (1) "socialist pluralism" (*sotsialisticheskiy plyuralizm*) as a pluralism of opinion;[118] (2) "state based on the rule of law" (*pravovoe gosudarstvo*); and (3) "checks and balances" (*sderzhek i protivovesov)* as separation of powers.[119] All three received the endorsement of Gorbachev, which corroborates Brown's claim about "the revolution from above." However, I suggest that there were further layers within the conceptual revolution described by Brown, and that we need to note some critical reinterpretations of perestroika concepts "from below." This is where the processes in the Estonian SSR and "intended" manipulations with its native language come into play.

Khozraschet was an old Soviet concept. It was related to economic units in the planned economy and denoted the "self-accounting" of an individual enterprise (also translated as "self-sufficiency" or "cost-accounting" in English). In 1941, when the Soviets first occupied Estonia, *khozraschet* was translated into Estonian as *isemajandamine.*[120] In Soviet economic vocabulary, its roots date back to 1921, when Lenin and Bukharin explained the basis of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in terms of the "system of *khozraschet.*"[121] To work "on *khozraschet*" meant that a given economic unit had achieved self-sufficiency, in which costs were covered from the unit's profits, that is, independently of state directives. After the NEP, the term was revived during the Sovnarkhoz reform, the "Lieberman discussions",

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[117] Brown (2007), 112–113.

[118] Brown describes how Gorbachev took bold step of publicly embracing the concept of "pluralism" in mid-1987. According to Brown, "the notion of pluralism had been the subject of so many attacks by Soviet leaders and ideologists since it was adopted by 'Prague Spring' intellectuals in the late 1960s and by 'Eurocommunists' in the 1970s that it would have been difficult for anyone other than the top leader to break the taboo on endorsing it": Brown (2007), 110. However, the notion was first reinterpreted by Gorbachev as the "socialist pluralism of opinions" (in July 1987), and it was not used in a broader sense before July 1988, during the 19th Conference of the CPSU (as "political pluralism," which also meant the acceptance of a multiparty system): ibid. In this case, "socialist pluralism" (alongside "economic pluralism") was stretched into "political pluralism" in 1988. "Economic pluralism" (as a pluralism of different ownership forms) also emerged in the ESSR in 1987.

[119] Ibid., 112. However, Brown ignores *khozraschet* not only in the ESSR in 1987 but also in the Soviet central press in 1987, neglecting, for instance, (at least in 1989) Nikolai Smelev's articles.

[120] *Plaanimajandus. Majanduspoliitiline ajakiri* (1941), no. 1.

[121] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1984) *Polnoe Sobranie Socheneniia* [Complete Collected Works] (Moscow), vol. 44, 342.

and the Kosygin reform plans in the mid-1960s.[122] However, in the early period of perestroika, the term *khozraschet* returned to the Soviet economic debate, perhaps most powerfully with pro-perestroika economist Nikolai Smelev's article "Advances and Debts" ("Avansy i dolgi") in *Novyi Mir* in June 1987.[123] From mid-1987 onwards, Gorbachev incorporated the term into his programmatic vocabulary and frequently spoke of the need for "full cost accounting in enterprises" (*polnyi khozraschet predpriyatii*).[124] For instance, in his June 1987 speech in the CPSU Plenum, Gorbachev proposed that all state enterprises work "on full self-accounting and self-financing" starting in 1988.

Smelev described *khozraschet* as more than just an accounting term. As he saw it, the NEP marked the transition from "administrative socialism" to "*khozraschet* socialism."[125] However, in official Soviet economic discourse, the term still had a very technical meaning. It regulated only the management forms and hierarchial relations within the economic units. For instance, *khozraschet*'s qualifiers were "internal" (in Russian, *vnutrennyi*; in Estonian, *sisemine*) and "full" (in Russian, *polnyi*; in Estonian, *täielik*). *Vnutrennyi khozraschet* (internal self-accounting) was a management form in which only a small individual unit within a collective farm or enterprise (such as a brigade) had *khozrachet* status. In contrast, in *polnyi khozraschet* (full self-accounting), the whole enterprise or farm worked as an economically self-managing unit.

Thus "full self-accounting" was used everywhere in the Soviet Union only as a technical accounting term, referring to the enterprises' obligation to operate without losses and not to anything else. That was also the case with the Estonian SSR until 1987, when the Four-Man Proposal radically deconstructed the conventional meaning of *khozraschet*. In Skinner's terms, the proposal "transformed a neutral into a favourable term (by metaphorical extension) and applied it in virtue of its extended meaning to describe the course of action you wish to see commended." In terms of classical rhetoric, Study II describes this as a "catachrestical move," whereas Skinner, in his work, has instead leaned toward investigating the rhetorical form of paradiastole (the reframing of vice as a virtue). The

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[122] Kharkiv's professor of economics, Yevsei Lieberman (1897–1981), was the first figure who, following Stalin's death, brought *khozraschet* back to the economic debate with his 1955 paper "Khoziaistvennyi raschet i materialnoe pooshrenie rabotnikov promishl'nnosti" (Cost Accounting and Material Encouragement of Industrial Personnel), published in *Voprosy ekonomiki,* no. 6, 1955. On the "Lieberman discussions," see p. 39.

[123] Nikolai Smelev (1995 [1987] "Advances and Debts," in *The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse*, ed. Alexander Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus (Westview Press), 261–271 (translated from "Avansy i dolgi," *Novyi Mir* no. 6, 1987). Many observers have identified Smelev's article as the "main opener" of the public debate on economic reforms in the Soviet Union. Through Smelev's article, the NEP (a taboo subject during the Brezhnev era) was brought back to the public sphere as the Leninist economic model. In mid-1987, Gorbachev himself promoted the NEP as "an instructive model for future development": see Petrov (2008), 186.

[124] Mikhail Gorbachev (1987), *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York: Harper and Row), 88–89.

[125] Smelev (1995 [1987]), 263.

catachrestical move was made on two levels. The first was in September 1987, when the Four-Man Proposal lifted it from the individual-unit (enterprise) level to the territorial (republican) level. The second took place in spring 1988 in the Tartu Group of Self-Management and the IME Council, when the concept was expanded from the strictly economic level into a much broader social sphere. This move is the main content of the action, which I call "conceptual innovation" – changing the available concept so that it departs radically from its original set of meanings and constitutes a conceptual platform for the new political claims.

Although Gorbachev's vocabulary was limited, we see that some of its concepts were elastic and manipulable. As early as 1989, the Sovietologist Anders Åslund stated that "instead of changing terminology, Gorbachev redefines it… it would be foolhardy to try to establish firm definitions of these intentionally elastic concepts… we have to check their meaning in each context."[126] Thus, instead of importing concepts from the West, Gorbachev and reform-minded Soviet economists (like the aforementioned Nikolai Smelev) reinterpreted and extended their own "Soviet concepts" from socialist economic thought. They relied on the intellectual reservoirs from previous decades (including the NEP and Sovnarkhoz reform), legitimated by the *glasnost* policy that started in 1986. However, as the perestroika concepts had only "limited elasticity," which allowed them to stretch out only within the context of socialist ideology, they threatened to snap. In the end, by disrupting the meaning of *khozraschet*, the Estonian reformers set in motion unforeseeable processes for Gorbachev's team.

The aforementioned catachrestical move also had a specific linguistic resource. The Estonian term *isemajandamine* had the prefix "self-" (*ise-*), which made it remarkably similar to another Estonian term, *iseseisvus* ("independence"). The prefix was missing not only in the Russian word *khozraschet* but also in its translations to the native languages in other Soviet republics. This particular resource explains (but only partially) why the conceptual innovation of *khozraschet* happened in the ESSR and not, for example, in other Baltic republics. Study II shows why this linguistic resource can be considered an essential factor, as translations into other native languages did not start to resonate in the other republics.[127]

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[126] Anders Åslund (1989), *Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform: The Soviet Reform Process, 1985–88* (Cornell University Press), 2. During the early and mid-perestroika period, Åslund also worked as an economic diplomat at the Swedish embassy in Moscow.

[127] Although there were plenty of Russian terms with the prefix "self-" (such as *samooku-payemost*, *samostoyatelnost, samoupravleniye,* and *samofinansirovaniye,* which were constantly used in the perestroika economic discourse), the concept of *vabariiklik isemajandamine* was translated back to Russian in 1987 as *republikanskii khozraschet*; see, for instance, Arno Köörna (1988), "Respublikanskii khozraschet: shelaniya i realnost," *Sovetskaya Estoniya,* February 24, 1988; which initiated the next article by Jaroslav Tolstikov (1988), "Respubli-kanskii khozraschet: dalekaya perspektiva ili realnost?" *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, April 17, 1988. It formed a suitable linguistic platform for the Estonian Communist Party to negotiate with Moscow, as *khozraschet* was part of Gorbachev's campaign and speeches. I suggest that the processes in the ESSR in 1988 were monitored in Moscow through the ESSR's Russian-language media, and that is why the "backward translation" in the ESSR's newspapers (like

In terms of its "secessionist claim," the misuse of an economic term in such a consequential way was exceptional not only in the Soviet Union but also throughout Eastern Europe. Even though the alternative reform proposals were common acts in the repertoire of this region's reformist elite in the mid- and late 1980s,[128] none of them proposed economic secession on a territorial basis.[129] Prior to the 1989 revolutions, it was an innovative, unique rhetorical move with direct and practical consequences, as mass mobilization in favor of the idea followed in the ESSR in 1988.

However, merely mentioning a word does not lead to conceptual innovation. Just as any innovation (whether developing a service or a product) needs market potential, previous knowledge, teamwork, early adopters, and proposing a "new way of thinking," the self-management project required all the same resources. One of them was a range of "economic experiments" in the 1970s and 1980s in the ESSR and its community of experts.

2.4. Economic experiments in the ESSR

The Estonian SSR was an exceptional republic in the Soviet Union, as it regularly experimented with market elements to improve economic management. Nikita Khrushchev's Sovnarkhoz reform indirectly created the platform for this in 1957, by which the regional National Economy Councils (NEC) were launched in the Soviet Union. Even though NECs were canceled in 1965, the NEC period brought management training, consultation, and workers' incentive practices to Estonian

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Sovetskaya Estoniya) could be seen as the creator of two semantic fields in the public space. From September 1987 onwards, the term as used in Estonian had strong national connotations, whereas in Russian it had practical and economic connotations. The term's backward translation also became the common denominator of the project to introduce it in other republics. For instance, in September 1988, Ivar Raig published an article, "Respublika – na polnyi khozraschet," in the official newspaper of Azerbaijan's Communist Party, *Vyshka* (Watchtower) (September 6, 1988).

[128] For alternative reform proposals made within the Party structures in East Central Europe in the mid-1980s (for instance, in Poland and Yugoslavia), see Trenscényi et. al. (2018), 30–34.

[129] There is an interesting overlap of presenting the proposals for democratizing economy by the Four-Man Proposal in the ESSR and by the Polish Solidarity movement in emigration, both in mid-1987. After martial law was imposed in Poland in 1981, the Solidarity movement continued locally in underground but also in exile committees in the diaspora. Their rhetoric underwent an important shift, focusing on economics and the market rather than the role of workers' self-management in factories. It is remarkable that the rhetoric used by Solidarity in emigration was very much like the rhetoric that the Four-Man Proposal used in Soviet Estonia. In April 1987, the Solidarity committee in Brussels put forward a declaration demanding profound "economic reforms, equality amongst the various forms of ownership, a return to market mechanisms and a clear democratisation of the economy." For the economic declaration of the Solidarity committee in Brussels, see Miklós Mitrovits (2010), "From the Idea of Self-Management to Capitalism: The Characteristics of the Polish Transformation Process," *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe* 18, no. 2: 163–184.

enterprises.[130] From the early 1970s onwards, several methods for stimulating the economy were usually tested first in Estonia, before it was applied elsewhere in the Soviet Union (if indeed it ever was). Estonia gained a reputation as the "laboratory of economic experiments" for the union, whereas the actions in this laboratory were referred to in Soviet terms as "economic experiments for improving the economic mechanism."[131] In 1974, the first territorial agroindustrial association (*territoriaalne agrotööstuskoondis, ATK*) in the Soviet Union was launched experimentally in Viljandi County (*rajoon*) in the southern ESSR, which was soon expanded to other ESSR counties (in 1979 to Pärnu and in 1981 to all others). In 1983, by a decision of the Soviet Union's Council of Ministries, Estonian ATKs were expanded on the republican level, and *Eesti NSV Agrotööstuskoondis* (as the umbrella organization for local, regional ATKs) was launched.[132] According to the memoirs of its first director, Heino Veldi, the initial vision of the new organization was

> to create a territorial system consisting of different self-manageable blocs like agricultural and construction enterprises, scientific think tanks for developing regional agriculture, foreign relations with other countries' companies, etc.[133]

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[130] Raoul Üksvärav (2000), "Eesti juhtimismõtte areng," in *Jäljed. Meenutusi täiskasvanuhariduse lähiajaloost Eestis* (ed. Talvi Märja) (SE & JS), 109.

[131] In the early 1960s, there was an intellectual debate on how to decentralize and optimize the Soviet economy, most explicitly in the journal *Novyi Mir*. The central figure in this debate was the aforementioned Yevsei Lieberman, who opened the public discussion with the article "Plan, Profit, Bonus" in *Pravda* in September 1962, followed by the article "State and Market" in *Novyi Mir* (1963). That is why the debate has also been called the "Lieberman discussions." Lieberman's main proposal was to transfer decision-making power from the central government to the managers and staff of enterprises, reducing the number of instructions imposed from above. Additionally, he emphasized the principle of *khozraschet* and the need for direct negotiations between enterprises and potential buyers (stores). The ESSR's enterprises had a crucial task to fill this proposal. In 1965, two Estonian economists from the Institute of Economics, Leonid Brutus and Ülo Ennuste, were interviewed by the French Communist Party journal *Democratie Nouvelle.* Brutus and Ennuste revealed plans for a large-scale "economic experiment" in the Estonian SSR based on Lieberman's principles and theory of optimal planning, developed in the Central Economic Mathematical Institute (CEMI) by Nikolay Fedorenko. For that reason, the branch of the CEMI was launched in Tallinn in 1965, and Raul Renter (1920–1992) was appointed as its head. On the experiment's planned content, see Leonid Brutus and Ülo Ennuste (1965), "Un domaine d'experimentation economique," *Democratie Nouvelle*, March 1965, 89–94. In April 1988, Alari Purju introduced the 1965 experiment plans in the Estonian media; see Alari Purju (1988), "Ühest majanduseksperimendi katsest," *Noorte Hääl*, April 13, 1988.

[132] NLKP Keskkomitee ja NSVL Ministrite Nõukogu määrus nr. 151 ja ENSV Ülemnõukogu Presiidiumi seadus "Eesti NSV Agrotööstuskoondise moodustamise kohta" (approved February 17, 1983).

[133] Meelika Sander-Sõrmus (2018), "Endine põllumajandusjuht: uhke tunne oli kui toodang lehma kohta ületas 4000 piiri," *Põllumajandus.ee*, November 14, 2018.

Although the local party elite did not support such a radical vision, according to Veldi, at least, in 1983 "the Estonian agricultural enterprises acquired the right to sell their products to foreign countries and to develop technology and equipment, on the condition that their obligations related to republican and all-union funds were fulfilled."[134]

Even though the experiments had to be confirmed first by the Council of Ministries, the experiments were not planned "from above." By contrast, the experiments from the 1970s to the mid-1980s grew out from the economists of the "marketeers" (*rynochniki*). However, they had to fight on several fronts for their experiments to be recognized, as the local organs were mostly uninterested and resisted the proposals. The architects of the Estonian economic experiments (Valter Udam and ATK; Juhan Sillaste and contractual units; Jüri Kraft in the Ministry of Light Industry) had to negotiate with officials simultaneously in Moscow and Tallinn, and often use their personal contacts in Moscow to push through their ideas.[135] In all, these experiments were a distinctive feature in terms of innovation in the Estonian SSR's economy, differentiating it from other republics.

There were successful and unsuccessful attempts to experiment with "self-managerial relations" in the economy. For instance, the year 1982 saw an unsuccessful effort to experiment with regional *khozraschet* on Saaremaa (Estonia's largest island), proposed by two marketeers, Ivar Raig and Mikhail Bronshtein. The plan aimed to use Saaremaa as the incubation *raion* to test self-managerial relations in the economy.[136] During the experimental phase, agriculture, services, and light industry on the island were supposed to be fully self-accounting.[137] Despite having the official support of the ESSR's Academy of Sciences and Novosibirsk Institute of Industrial Economics, this proposal was eventually turned down by the ESSR's Council of Ministries.

Simultaneously, there was a preparation process for another experiment, which turned out to be successful. It was the "contractual work experiment" (*lepingulise töö eksperiment*), also known as a "service experiment" (*teeninduseksperiment)* in the ESSR's custom services in 1985 (the focus of Study I). This particular experiment was initiated by Juhan Sillaste, who served as an Estonian official in Gosplan in Moscow (1982–1983) and as the head of the Institute of Services (*Teenindusinstituut*) in Tallinn. During his Gosplan tenure in late 1982, the new CPSU general secretary Yuri Andropov and Nikolai Ryzhkov (the head of the

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[134] Ibid.

[135] For the importance of personal contacts in gaining the status of "experiment" for marketeers' projects, see Juhan Sillaste (2009), *Mineviku mustad kastid: Perestroika laborandi mälestused* (Tallinn); and Mati Laos (2017), *Jüri Kraft. Härra seltsimees minister* (Maaleht), 198–199.

[136] Ivar Raig (2018), "Saaremaa eksperiment, IME agraarprogramm ja Rahvarinde maaelu edendamise töörühm," in *Eestimaa Rahvarinne 30*, ed. Kostel Gerndorf (Rahvarinde Muuseum), 158–159.

[137] Author's interview with Ivar Raig (Tallinn, February 15, 2019). According to Raig, the island of Saaremaa (*Kingissepa rajoon*) was chosen for the experiment due to its status as a border zone in the ESSR, isolated from the mainland and therefore a suitable place for the incubatory method.

CPSU's CC economic department) started to encourage research on the practices of other Soviet states.[138] In February 1983, Politburo established a select working group to study COMECON countries' economic experiences to use those practical elements in the Soviet Union.[139] This group, headed by Gosplan chairman Nikolai Baibakov, was established to prepare proposals directly for the Politburo. Eventually, the expert group's leading members (Juhan Sillaste and Tatiana Koriagina) worked out the experiment's memorandum. It proved to be an essential step in the process that culminated with the contractual work experiment's approval in early 1985. The changes in the legislation related to the service experiment paved the way for the next experiment with "service cooperatives" (which the ESSR was also the first in the Soviet Union to try) in early 1987.[140] Eventually, the experiment's legislation became a blueprint for testing the cooperatives in all spheres, something that was officially permitted by the USSR's Ministry of Councils on May 26, 1988.[141]

In all, the conclusive principle for these actions was experimenting with the market-socialist element within the planned economy system. According to Estonian scholar Erik Terk, we should not interpret the period of economic experiments in the ESSR as a "pre-stage" for later economic reforms. While Terk admits that, for instance, "the contractual work experiment in services relates more than others to the market economy logic," in his words, most of them were only "local actions under the conditions of a command economy."[142] However, the dissertation argues that besides evaluating these experiments by the market economy system's standards, we can also see these experiments as "institutional resources" to expand self-managerial relations later in 1987.

Most of the architects of these previous experiments were involved with the IME project in 1988. They were among the authors behind the IME conception (including Ivi Proos, Ivar Raig, and Mikhail Bronshtein) or worked on the concept of ESSR's self-management in the ESSR's Economic Institute in Academy

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[138] Robert D. English (2000, 173) remarks that "He [Andropov] sponsored several economic innovations – 'experiments' in enterprise autonomy and decentralized management… Although in hindsight these can be seen as inadequate half-measures, they were reasonably bold in the climate and context of 1983. Moreover, they were linked to what would be Andropov's most lasting contribution – the beginning of the political-personnel changes that would later facilitate the inception of perestroika."

[139] COMECON is an acronym for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (in Russian, *Sovet Ekonomicheskoi Vzaimopomoshchi*). It was an economic organization from 1949 to 1991 led by the Soviet Union; it included the countries of the Eastern bloc, along with a number of socialist states elsewhere in the world but did not include Yugoslavia or China.

[140] Sillaste (2009), 110.

[141] NSVL Ülemnõukogu (1989), *Nõukogude Sotsialistlike Vabariikide Liidu seadus kooperatsioonist* NSV Liidus (Tallinn: Olion), 6.

[142] See Terk (2016), 13.

of Sciences (*ENSV TA Majandusinstituut*), like Rein Otsason.[143] According to Rein Otsason,

> the economic school that took shape in Estonia well before perestroika revolutionized Soviet economics as a whole. And we should not think about that separately from Estonian independence. On the contrary: only thanks to the fact that we had this free-thinking school of economists was it possible to be the first among the Soviet republics to work out the concept of economic independence. When we formed the working group of self-management in the Economic Institute in 1988, I recruited the people related to the economic experiments.[144]

The marketeers not only proposed the experiments but were also connected with the ESSR's experts on management practices. We can outline two main hubs for experimental management practices from the early 1970s. These were the management school in Tallinn's Polytechnical Institute (TPI) and the Tallinn-based innovation center Mainor (launched under the Ministry of Light Industry's jurisdiction). It was a training institute for managers for market research and a consultancy bureau for enterprises. The bureau was renamed "Mainor" in 1982.[145] The experts at Mainor worked out several proposals for new experiments, including the "self-manageable complex in light industry" (*isemajandav tööstuskoondis kergetööstuses*) in 1975.[146] This experiment aimed to create an economically

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[143] While Savisaar was the leader of Mainor's expert group, Otsason was the head of the Economic Institute's expert group; these groups clashed over how to verbalize the official project of "self-management" and present it to the ESSR's Council of Ministries. They had different views on how to proceed with the republic's financial independence and the currency reform in 1988–1990. Whereas Savisaar supported the idea of a "convertible ruble" (*koru*), Otsason pushed for a national currency (*Eesti kroon*).

[144] Mart Laar, Urmas Ott, and Sirje Endre (1996), *Teine Eesti. Eeslava. Eesti iseseisvuse taassünd 1986 – 1991. Intervjuud, dokumendid, kõned, artiklid,* 226. Alexandr Yakovlev similarly said in an interview that "the ideas of perestroika were nourished in different fields for a long time, even too long… these ideas have been developed over the years by scholars, cultural figures, and people engaged in political activity… this explains the rapid acceptance of the ideas of perestroika and its overall strategy – not simply acceptance but the active support of the people." Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina Vanden Heuvel (1989), *Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers* (W. W. Norton & Company), 41–42.

[145] The name "Mainor" is an acronym formed from Estonian words: MA from *majandus* (economy), IN from *inimene / informatsioon* (person / information), and OR from *organisatsioon* (organization). Mainor's leadership stretches back to Raoul Üksvärav and Hillar Kala (the first director from 1971). It had two transnational aspects: first, the adoption and then application of American management theory (as a majority of Mainor's leaders stemmed from Üksvärav's school) and studying Finnish practices since the mid-1970s. In Finland, Mainor had good relations with Finnish consulting bureau MEC-RASTOR. In the late 1970s, Mainor become a training center in the Soviet Union for market consultancy and also had cooperation with US management scholars. Mati Laos (2014), *Mainori lugu* (Tallinn: AS Mainor).

[146] Hillar Kala (2014), "Mainori rollidest Eesti majandus- ja ühiskonnaelus," in *Mainori lugu* (Tallinn: AS Mainor), 546.

independent management unit for about 130 Estonian enterprises.[147] The experiment became Mainor's platform for extending light industry's self-manageable relations, which continued into the mid-1980s. In late 1987, when Edgar Savisaar was sacked from the Planning Committee (for publishing the Four-Man Proposal in the media), Mainor's director Ülo Pärnits hired him as the new head of the Mainor's science department.[148] Savisaar's new cabinet in Mainor instantly became the headquarters for the IME movement.

The author's interviews with the economists in the IME movement reveal that some of them initially perceived "territorial self-management" as an "experimental project to use the microeconomic model in a macroeconomic environment" (Ivi Proos),[149] but also as "the evolutionary outcome of the previous experiments that grew more radical through the years" (Ivar Raig).[150] In Proos's words, "national independence was not what we wanted to achieve with the proposal… in the beginning, it was just an idea for a new economic experiment – let us try to control the Estonian national economy and budget all by ourselves, as our best *kolkhozes* did."[151] Similarly, the references to *isemajandamine* as a "model" and "experiment" in late 1987 and early 1988 were frequently made by other economists.[152] The protocols of the first meeting of the expert group in the Plan Committee in August 1987 asserted that "the meeting aims to work out an economic model for territorial self-management."[153] In April 1988, at the IME Forum, Marju Lauristin suggested that "our idea of a self-managing republic can become a blueprint for other republics in the Soviet Union to follow."[154]

However, this blueprint "model," which was initially related to territorial economic independence, eventually came to be viewed as a "model of democracy."

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[147] Ibid.

[148] Laos (2004), 210–211.

[149] Author's interview with Ivi Proos (Tallinn, February 3, 2015).

[150] Author's interview with Ivar Raig (Tallinn, February 15, 2019).

[151] Author's interview with Ivi Proos (Tallinn, February 3, 2015).

[152] Arvo Sirendi, Estonian agricultural scientist, said in December 1987 that "as other regions in the Soviet Union would not move towards 'republican self-management' in the near future, we have to apply for the experiment status to this idea – it is inescapable for its implementation" (December 8, 1987, *Ühistöö*). Meanwhile, one of the signatories of the Four-Man Proposal, Mikk Titma, wrote that "the consent from the center for this economic experiment would mean great trust in our project": see Mikk Titma (1987) "Isemajandamise sotsiaalne kontekst," *Noorte Hääl,* December 16, 1987. The conceptualization of the project as an "experiment" continued in early 1988, as the head of the ESSR's Academy of Sciences, Arno Köörna, said in a speech in the Plenum of Creative Unions in April 1, 1988, that economists were working "on the theoretical and practical basis of the experiment of republican self-management." *Eesti NSV Loominguliste Liitude Juhatuste Ühispleenum* (1988) (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat), 35.

[153] "Eesti NSV täieliku isemajandamise kontseptsioon. Eesti NSV Plaanikomitee töögrupi liikmete mõttevahetuse koondseisukohtade protokoll," August 18, 1987 (in author's possession).

[154] Marju Lauristin (1988), "Isemajandamisfoorum Tartus" [Forum of Economic Self-Management in Tartu], *Edasi*, April 29, 1988.

In early 1989, Ivi Proos described the IME project as a part of "deepening democracy on the etalon principle" by which "several movements based on the initiative from below have created the islands of democracy, which altogether function as a democratically operating relational system, which in turn, as a mechanism, reproduces democracy (*demokraatiat reaalselt taastootev mehhanism*)."[155] In Proos's words, "this democracy may still be too much "singing," but it exists as a mechanism, and therefore we now have channels through which the will of the majority can influence the processes in society."[156]

We can draw several conclusions here. First, "experiment" was an economic-legal category institutionalized in economics. Innovations were possible only by acquiring the status of "experiment" through Soviet legislation. Therefore, we can see it as an "institutional resource" for the marketeers. Second, "experiment" was a model to follow – to expand self-managerial relations in the economy and politics. In this way, "experiment" has a family resemblance to the concepts mentioned above ("critique," "improvement," and "plan"), enabling changes to be made in the system.[157] Third, the history of experimentation in the ESSR provided cumulative practical knowledge for the Estonian economists, which they were able to use in the IME movement (Otsason's argument). Fourth, at the most abstract level, it developed the form of argumentation that we can call "the language of innovation," described in more detail in Chapter 2.6. Before doing that, we look at the adoption of the global scientific discourse in the ESSR before perestroika and its impact on the Estonian authors.

2.5. Global scientific discourse and the ESSR

Next, I will point out three global disciplines that had an impact on economic circles and innovational thought in the ESSR: these were management theory, system approach, and global- and future studies. I will start from the 1960s and finish with the perestroika period.

On a global scale, the period 1965–1975 was a phase of relaxation (*détente*) between the Cold War counterparts. Aside from the *détente* in foreign relations, cooperation increased between the scientists on both sides. It also impacted the adoption of US management theory in the Estonian SSR. After the Cuban missile crisis, in 1963, through the scientists' exchange program between the United States and the Soviet Union, a young Estonian economist, Raoul Üksvärav (1928–2016), had a unique chance to study management theory in the United

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[155] Ivi Proos (1989), *IME koolituskursuse konspekt. Isemajandav Eesti – radikaalse majandus-reformi variant. I osa.* (Eesti Majandusjuhtide Instituut), 24.

[156] Ibid.

[157] In the Soviet system, the "experiment" as a concept was meant to be only a test to stimulate the planned economy, often seen as a temporary action, and was not supposed to undermine or break the system itself. For a deeper metaphorical meaning of the "experiment" in perestroika ideology, see Marina Kaul (1998), 105.

States. In 1963–1964, Üksvärav spent most of the year at the University of California, Berkeley, but visited many US management scholars (including Douglas McGregor, Edgar Schein, and Harold Koontz) in several other universities as well (e.g., in MIT and Harvard).[158] Back in Tallinn, Üksvärav started lecturing in 1966 at the TPI (*Tallinna Polütehniline Instituut*) on management and system approach in organizational theory, becoming the management guru for the TPI students.[159] The concepts and methods borrowed from US management theory (leadership, management consultation, gaming, self-regulation, etc.) were adopted into local managerial studies. They formed a conceptual infrastructure for the scholars in the ESSR.[160] "Üksvärav's school" consisted of many management experts and economists (working at TPI and Mainor) who were later members of the IME movement and the Estonian Popular Front (such as Kostel Gerndorf, Erik Terk, and Peeter Kross).

From 1975 onwards, the TPI managerial school held conferences on management theory and practice, which attracted participants from all Soviet republics. Two of Üksvärav's students, Erik Terk and Tiit Elenurm, focused in the late 1970s and early 1980s on lecturing on consulting methods in innovatics (*innovaatika*), like the innovation game (*innovaatiline mäng*) for testing new employment forms, services, or products.[161] In his book *Leader – Innovation – Organization*, published in 1986, Elenurm stressed the need for the constant innovation of "self-managerial" relations in economic management, bringing the case of "brigade work" (as a new employment form) as a positive example. Elenurm emphasized the importance of an enterprise's "independence" in innovation processes (*uuendusprotsessid*), including its capacity for "diagnosing" the "innovation potential" in the organization.[162]

Aside from management theory, the cybernetics and system approach heavily influenced the Estonian sociologists at the University of Tartu. In the ESSR, history and economics were placed under the highest ideological control, whereas

[158] Raoul Üksvärav (2000), 101.

[159] In 1967, Üksvärav defended his doctoral dissertation, entitled "Majandusorganisatsioonide ülesehituse ja juhtimise probleeme Ameerika Ühendriikides" (The Problems of Structure and Management of Economic Organizations in the United States). Üksvärav's official approach was a "critique" of the Western systems. However, his lectures were based mainly on the personal experience and literature he acquired from the United States.

[160] For more on the adaptation of Western management theories in the ESSR in the 1960s and 1970s, see Martin Klesment (2009), "Interpretation and Adjustment of Foreign Concepts in Soviet Estonia: The Discussion and Adaptation of Management Theories," *European Review of History – Revue européenne d'histoire* 16, no. 1: 151–167.

[161] Erik Terk (1981), Analüüsi ja konsulteerimise meetodid uute toodete väljatöötamisel ja juurutamisel ettevõtetes. *VI majandusorganisatsioonide juhtimise probleemide konverents* (Tallinn: TPI); Tiit Elenurm (1985), Innovaatiline mäng juhtimisalase konsultatsioonitegevuse vahendina. *VII majandusorganisatsioonide juhtimise probleemide konverents "Juhtimise konsulteerimise teooria ja praktika"* (Tallinn: TPI).

[162] Tiit Elenurm (1986), *Juht – uuendused – organisatsioon* (Tallinn: Valgus), 55–70.

natural and social sciences received the least such control.[163] Therefore, sociologists' "language" was richer and more international than, for example, that of the local historians.[164] Social and natural sciences were much more combined – physics, philosophy, cybernetics, and social system modeling were often taught by the same individuals (e.g., Lembit Valt in Tartu).[165] In the 1960s, this created a generational division among the scientists, experts, and state officials. Marju Lauristin stresses the educational convergence in different social strata in the 1960s:

> Yes, we used system theory concepts, like feedback, input, or self-regulation, but we also did not have another language to speak. It was paradigmatic for social scientists at that time but actually for our officials too… and it did not start with perestroika. It existed as far back as the 1960s. It just became visible when it appeared under Brezhnev's mud.[166]

However, this shared language between the scientists and reform-minded *nomenklatura* did become politically significant right after perestroika began in 1985. In the Estonian public press, the debate over more humanistic and decentralized politics began precisely by placing the system approach and its concepts into the early discussion on politics in 1986.[167] Lauristin explains the further consequences of this pattern:

> Why did the IME movement happen in 1987–1988 in Estonia and not in Russia? Why did it mobilize so many people? Because we had a considerable number of scientists and executive officials trained by the same management school who

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[163] Peeter Vihalemm (2001), "Development of Media Research in Estonia," *Nordic Research on Media and Communication* 22, no. 2.

[164] There were a series of seminars in the second half of the 1960s in Kääriku, organized by sociologists from the University of Tartu (including Ülo Vooglaid, Marju Lauristin, and Peeter Vihalemm) that attracted colleagues from all over the Soviet Union. The topics of the discussions included not only theoretical approaches from Soviet scholars (e.g. Vladimir Yadov) but also global sociological thought (Robert Merton, Talcott Parsons, Kingsley Davis, etc.), as many texts by Western scholars were translated into Russian and printed for participants in advance. Marju Lauristin recalls that "when I attended international conferences, I did not have any problems getting orientated in global sociological theories… the journal *Sociology Today*, which introduced all the mainstream Western theories, had been regularly translated into Russian since 1965": Author's interview with Marju Lauristin (Tartu, November 29, 2018).

[165] One of the concepts from sociological cybernetics as a hybrid form of social and natural sciences – "self-regulation" – was later successfully incorporated into the self-management discourse by the Tartu Group of Self-Management; see Study II.

[166] Author's interview with Marju Lauristin (Tartu, November 29, 2018).

[167] Edgar Savisaar used system-theory vocabulary throughout his early essay "Võitlus mõtteviisi pärast" ("The Battle for the Way of Thinking"), written in 1986, published in the pro-perestroika magazine *Vikerkaar*. His critique targeted "centralism," using system-theory arguments to push for decentralization in economic and social life. Savisaar admitted in the essay that "the reader has certainly noticed that I'm following a system-analytic approach to a society"; see Savisaar (1987), "Võitlus mõtteviisi pärast," *Vikerkaar* 2, 56.

therefore spoke the same language – they had gained the same education in the same universities, under the same professors, and were interested in the IME's implementation.[168]

Yet it was not only system approach and management theory that connected the scientific community with the economic and power elite. In the context of the Cold War, the governments of opposing states promoted several new methods and disciplines. Some of them were initially related to large state projects, such as developing the Delphi and scenario method in the United States or computer science in the USSR.[169] In 1972, cooperation was established between American and Soviet scholars on a computer modeling and systems approach.[170] At the same time, due to the increasing concern about global problems (such as famines, increasing population growth, and the nuclear threat), another new field emerged in science in the early 1970s: "global studies" (*globaaluuringud*). One of the features of global studies was to present alternative "future scenarios" (as global models) to these problems. In the ESSR, the first scholar to join the Soviet scientific community of global studies was Lembit Valt (1934–2008), a physics and science philosophy professor at the University of Tartu in 1957–1970. One of Valt's students, Edgar Savisaar, approached global studies by examining the Club of Rome's role. In 1980, Savisaar graduated from the University of Moscow with a dissertation on global models' social and philosophical roots in the Club of Rome. In 1982, Savisaar wrote a book with Valt on global studies that was published in Estonia in 1983.[171]

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[168] Author's interview with Marju Lauristin (Tartu, November 29, 2018). From the interviews and public texts, we can suggest that this linguistic convergence between the scientists, officials, experts, and even party intelligentsia was also the main difference from the dissident discourse. For instance, a member of Russian dissident circles in the 1970s, Gleb Pavlovski, recalls that "during the late 1970s, we lacked an appropriate language to describe politics… in contrast to the term 'ethical,' the term 'political' was suspicious in the dissident movement… in the end, the moralistic project of human rights turned out to be politically weak and sterile"; see "Tatjana Žuržženko ja Ivan Krastevi intervjuu Gleb Pavlovskiga" (2011), *Vikerkaar*, no. 6. Thus, the availability of the system-theory language, shared by scientists and state experts, was one reason why the conceptualization for the new decentralist politics started among the social scientists and not among the extra-structural dissent.

[169] For a recent study on the connection between the rise of the future studies (including the scenario method) and US defense politics, see Christian Dayé (2020), *Experts, Social Scientists, and Techniques of Prognosis in Cold War America* (Palgrave Macmillan). On developing a nationwide computer network in the Soviet Union, see Benjamin Peters (2016), *How Not to Network a Nation: The Uneasy History of the Soviet Internet* (MIT Press).

[170] Egle Rindzevičiūtė (2016). Rindzevičiūtė shows the global rise of the system approach during the Cold War period, focusing on the role of the IIASA (International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis). The institute was a meeting point for US and Soviet scholars, established in 1972, located in Laxenburg, Austria. The IIASA's main task was to apply systems analysis to the research on global problems, mobilizing scholars from various countries. One of the Estonian representatives in IIASA was Erik Terk.

[171] Lembit Valt and Edgar Savisaar (1983), *Globaalprobleemid ja tulevikustsenaariumid* (Eesti Raamat).

Study III shows how, through their book and Savisaar's early essays (but also due to his personal career change), a new term – "future scenario"– migrated in 1985–1986 from the global studies discourse to the ESSR's mainstream press. More importantly, it changed the language of political decision-making. Namely, in 1985, Savisaar was nominated to serve as the head of a department in the Estonian Planning Committee, the highest economic planning institution in the ESSR (the local branch of the Soviet Gosplan). The department started to work on "development scenarios" for the ESSR's economic sectors. In May 1987, a public contest of "economic development scenarios" was announced by Savisaar's department. Although the "scenario method" was already known by the local management school since the 1970s, the contest for "future scenarios" was the first of its kind in Estonia.[172] Study III shows in more detail why I consider this a conceptual move in Skinnerian terms. Using the progressive scientific speak, Savisaar implemented an alternative language to hijack the "future" from the hands of the Communist Party, to make the debate on the ESSR's "alternative futures" public. The concept, which was borrowed from the scientific reports on global problems submitted to the Club of Rome, was eventually put into practice to work out the project of "territorial self-management."[173]

The other development by which Estonian authors manipulated the global science discourse was combining a system-theory approach directly with territorial self-management and confederal sovereignty. Study III looks at the "theory of self-management," elaborated by Estonian economist Uno Mereste in 1988.[174] Mereste was a long-time admirer of the system approach and combined it with

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[172] In 1991, Edgar Savisaar initiated the Estonian Future Congress (*Eesti Tuleviku Kongress*), which could be seen as a continuation of the first scenario contest, held in May 1987. The head of the congress was Lembit Valt, and the international visitors included the then-leader of the Club of Rome, Alexander King. A year later, in 1992, Erik Terk founded the Institute of Future Studies in Tallinn. See Erik Terk (2014), *Eestist ja ettepoole* (Tallinna Ülikool), 150–151.

[173] The term "global" had a somewhat controversial status in the Soviet Union until late perestroika. Publicly, it was strongly charged with negative connotations, as "globalism" was related to US world hegemony. At the same time it was used completely differently by Soviet scholars, who were focused on computer modeling, including by Lembit Valt in the 1970s in Tallinn and in VNIISI (Soviet Institute of Systems Research in Moscow, which was a partner of IIASA). As Rindzevičiūtė (2016) suggests, it was exactly from computer modeling that the geophysical (and not ideological) notion of "global" migrated to Soviet economists' texts on world economics, and then later on to political discourse (132). Eventually, it reached the highest political level in the Soviet Union in 1985, when the notion of "global problems" was used for the first time in CPSU congress documents (ibid.). According to Andrei Grachev (Gorbachev's personal adviser), Gorbachev himself related to a considerable degree with the ideas discussed by the Club of Rome, as well as with the Pugwash Conferences on global problems. See Andrei Grachev (2015), "Gorbachev and the New Political Thinking," in *The Revolutions of 1989: A Handbook*, ed. Mueller, Gehler, and Suppan (Vienna: ÖAV), 33.

[174] Uno Mereste (1989), *Mis on ISE-majandamine? Isemajandamisteooria alused* (Eesti Raamat).

economics and linguistics in his previous work.[175] In 1988, Mereste made a system-theory argument that we should consider the sovereign status of the ESSR as an "emergent result" of the economic system, connecting it with the Hayekian idea of a self-governing economy (see Study III).[176]

Alongside economics, the science of self-governing systems was combined in the ESSR with the philosophy of science. It was most often related to Ilya Prigogine and his Nobel Prize-winning theory of "open systems" and "self-organization."[177] For instance, the circle of science philosophers (including Meelik Kattago) argued in 1988 that "territorial self-management" is natural in a socialist system, as based on Prigogine's theory, the state as a system has reached the point of bifurcation, where the system's force of self-organization opens several paths for further development (see more in Study III).[178]

There were two think tanks in the IME movement; both established in January 1988: the IME Council (*IME Probleemnõukogu*) for scientists and the IME Forum (*IME Foorum*) for journalists. Both valued the scientific community's connections highly in the Soviet Union and the Soviet mainstream and scientific press. Networking with the Soviet institutes and newspapers as potential allies for promoting the project was the IME Council's intentional strategy. Below is a chart from summer 1988, drawn by the members in the IME Council, which diagrammed existing connections with the council's partners in the Soviet Union and elsewhere:

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[175] Uno Mereste (1985), "Süsteemiteoreetilisi mõlgutusi üld-, ühis- ja teaduskeele vahe-korrast," *Keel ja Kirjandus* 6, 335–342.

[176] Trencsényi et al. point out that Polish dissidents in the 1970s somewhat controversially connected economic liberalism with theorists with very diverse philosophical premises (e.g., Hayekian and Popperian criticism of Marxism with Arendt's approach to totalitarianism), as all of them could be used together in an anticommunist agenda: see Trencsényi et al. (2018), 154. In 1988 in the ESSR, Uno Mereste also used Hayekian critique on the socialist command economy (though not by name): see Study III. Ten years later, in 1998, Mereste wrote a review essay for Friedrich Hayek's book *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism* (translated into Estonian in 1997). The review strongly supported Hayek's ideas, describing the relations between market, objectivity, and system approach. See Uno Mereste (1998), "Majanduslik tegelikkus," *Akadeemia* 6, 1170–1193.

[177] Ilya Prigogine (1977), *Self-Organization in Non-Equilibrium Systems (Wiley).*

[178] Meelik Kattago (1988), "Traktaat iseliikumise allikast. Tasatuse kontseptsioon," *Viker-kaar*, nos. 1–6.

The chart of the IME Council's and the IME Forum's partners in the Soviet Union (1988). In the bottom left-hand corner are the connections drawn with partners from other states – Finland (*Soome*), Hungary (*Ungari*), and Poland (*Poola*). Source: Ivar Raig's private collection.

Another critical aspect has to be taken into account (as it explains the IME movement's success), which was scientists' and experts' competence in communication skills within the power elite. At the ESSR's Creative Unions plenum speech in April 1988, sociologist Aili Aarelaid observed the strategic "skills" of this generation:

> The leaders of this renaissance (*uusärkamine*) are the so-called Sixties generation, to whom it is the last (and thus very seriously taken) chance to fulfill the ideals of their youth on the nation's mission and democracy. Thanks to their political and professional maturity – as there are many philosophers, sociologists, historians, and economists – they realize the dangers that threaten Estonia and its national existence. This generation has years of combat experience in bureaucratic labyrinths that has equipped them (for this very moment) with such valuable skills – to use pressure tactics, to balance on the red line, to dictate the people's will to authorities in the language understandable to them, to sense the strategic backbone.[179]

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[179] Aili Aarelaid (1998), "Eksperdina loomeliitude ühispleenumil," in *Ikka kultuurist mõteldes* (Tallinn: Virgela), 12. These communication skills and cultivation of scientific language also had their drawbacks. According to Peeter Vihalemm, the Estonian Popular Front's "use of vocabulary" was one of the reasons why the Estonian youth movement (*Noortefoorum*) distanced itself from them. According to Vihalemm, "it was because of the coldness and technicality of the Popular Front's language" (author's interview with Peeter Vihalemm, 2020).

All in all, the global scientific discourse and the personal networks were harnessed by the ESSR's social and natural scientists to support the self-management proposal. Yet the system approach, scenario method, management theory, and science philosophy amounted to more than just intellectual resources for the scientific legitimation of the "self-management" project. I suggest that they were also part of the structural languages through which these claims could be further theorized and expanded.

2.6. The languages of Estonian perestroika

Following the Cambridge School, the dissertation's theoretical premise is that authors' conceptual moves in texts rely on, and develop, pre-existing languages. For example, one can deploy legal, economic, federal, or republican language to argue for one's political aims. I suggest that we can also distinguish "decentralist," "system theory," and the language of "innovation" as further examples of argumentative languages. While the two formerly mentioned languages have been illustrated above (mostly analyzed in Studies I and II), here I will elaborate on the features of the third one only.

The most characteristic feature of the language of (open) innovation is that it unlocks the discussion; it promotes a "new way of thinking" to search for unusual solutions; it facilitates brainstorming; it proposes a dialogue between scientists and decision-makers; it values feedback from the public; and last, it admits that there can be unexpected results that contrast with the initial phase.[180] I argue that this language was fundamentally different from previous regionalist economic thought in the Soviet Union.[181] To regionalists, experimenting with regional

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[180] In innovation theory, there is a distinction between the concepts "closed innovation" and "open innovation." While the former refers to innovation that is developed inclusively by the entrepreneur, through internal resources, often hidden from the public, the latter refers to the open character of the innovation process, using multiple external resources (including feedback from the public) to drive the innovation. See more in H. Chesbrough and M. Bogers (2014), "Explicating Open Innovation: Clarifying an Emerging paradigm for Understanding Innovation," in *New Frontiers in Open Innovation,* ed. H. Chesbrough, W. Vanhaverbeke, and J. West (Oxford University Press).

[181] In the Soviet Union, "regional economic thought" (*regionaalne majandusmõte*) was conducted mostly by the economists at the Novosibirsk Institute of Industrial Economics (IEiOPP), which cooperated with the US school of "location theory" from the mid-1970s. Its aim was to elaborate upon research (including mathematical modeling) for the more productive management of specific regions (*oblast*, *krai, raion*) in the Soviet Union, focusing on the characteristics and resources of the region. There was a series of joint seminars with scholars from the US and the USSR in Tallinn as early as the late 1970s: see Riina Lõhmus (1986), "Nõukogude-Ameerika majandusteadlaste ühisseminar Tallinnas," *Aja Pulss* 4, 14–15. For instance, at a Tallinn seminar on regional economic thought in 1986, the visiting scholars from the US were prominent regional economists like Karen Polenske (MIT), Gerald Karaska, David Boyce, and others. Abel Aganbegyan and Rein Otsason (as the organizers of the Tallinn seminar) were both involved with planning the regional economic reforms of the Soviet Union: ibid.

khozraschet was relatively limited in scope both territorially and substantially, as it was often imagined through the Chinese model of a "closed economic zone."[182] This model was also developed further by several economists in Estonia.[183] Yet there was one fundamental difference. There were multiple articles in the central press and scientific journals on regional reforms by Soviet economists, but none of them was meant to be discussed publicly. None of the drafts was supposed to stay in the incubation period and inspire public debate. It was a crucial difference between other reform drafts and the IM proposal. To use today's terminology, in September 1987, the IM proposal launched a start-up platform for alternative ideas. The proposal recommended to "release the republic's human and scientific potential" to "open the discussion" on how to work out the republic's economic independence.[184] Erik Terk (futurologist, Edgar Savisaar's adviser in 1987, and a member of the IME Council in 1988) recalls in his interview with the author:

> The "free economic zone" that the Soviet economists proposed would have meant a minimal and restricted area, such as Muuga Port near Tallinn. The self-management proposal undoubtedly promoted a much greater plan and did not stay within the limits of economic reforms. It balanced between the economy and politics and was intentionally left open to testing the possibility to expand the rights of the republic. In future studies, we call it "strategic anchoring" – moving forward step by step, continually mapping out the alternatives.[185]

Thus, although "regional economic thought" in the Soviet Union theorized similar topics (like creating territorial economic units in line with free-market principles), proposing this model for a Soviet republic as a whole was unprecedented, and according to Erik Terk, "a highly heretical move," even in the regionalists' camp. Below is a table that systematizes the grammar of those three languages – its arguments, actions, concepts, and metaphors.

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[182] For the observations and theoretical attempts of Soviet economists (such as A. Iziumov and S. Manezhev) to integrate the Chinese model into the Soviet system in the 1980s, see the recent study by Chris Miller (2016), *The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 101–119.

[183] Arno Kõõrna (1988), "Hiina ime ja Eesti IME," *Edasi*, October 6, 1988. On Kõõrna's proposal to make the ESSR the first "closed economic zone" in the USSR, see Study II. Along-side Kõõrna's proposal, there was also the so-called "Three-Man Proposal" in December 1987, which proposed to place the city of Pärnu and Pärnu county (*raion*) in the ESSR on a "full self-accounting" basis. Ivar Raig, Sulev Mäeltsemees, and Raivo Rajamäe (1987), "Ettepanek: viia üks rajoon isemajandamisele," *Noorte Hääl,* December 16, 1987.

[184] Kallas et al. (1987).

[185] Author's correspondence with Erik Terk (January 2021). Even in December 1989, the IME Council announced in a statement that "no one, including the ECP and the ESSR government, can monopolize IME. If there are different visions of IME, then they should be analyzed publicly… The IME Council was formed through an initiative from below, and the public IME forums showed that the reform idea has wide public support." "IME Probleemnõukogu avaldus," *Noorte Hääl*, December 28, 1989.

Table 1. The languages of Estonian perestroika

Lan-guages	Decentralism		System theory		(Open) Innovation	
	Autonomism	Confederalism	Cybernetics	Complex systems theory	Management theory	Future studies
Argument	The relations in the economy and politics should be based on decentralization, horizontal contractuality, and initiative from below		Society is a system and works through self-regulation and feedback		We should open the stage for experiments and alternative futures for the republic	
Actions	Decentralization and democratization in economics and management		Scientification of reforms		Experimentation	
					De-ideologization of the future	
	Confederalization of the USSR		Decentralization of society		Colonization of the future Strategic anchoring	
	Horizontal contractualization of economy and politics		Biologization of economy		Gamification	Futurization
	Continuous expansion of the republic's autonomy					
Concepts	Self-accounting (*khozraschet*)		Self-regulation		Experiment	Scenario
					Gaming	Alternative futures
	Contractual units Territorial self-management Sovereignty Confederalism Union treaty		Feedback Self-organization Emergence Sub-systems Convergence		Innovation Improvement Dialogue	
Metaphors	Direct relations Horizontality vs. verticality Bottom-up vs. top-down Sovereignty expansion		From below Economic units as cells Spontaneous order		Innovation game Laboratory Incubator Experimental republic Anchoring	

CONCLUSION

The dissertation develops a novel methodological approach to studying revolutionary processes, highlighting the value of exploring the dynamics of conceptual change in pre-revolutionary transformative moments. It focuses on the case of the Estonian SSR in the early and mid-perestroika period (1985–1988). This period – immediately preceding the "Singing Revolution" in Estonia – witnessed substantial new developments in public discussion and political thought. The dissertation analyzes the changes that took place in the reform socialist discourse in this period, tracing their links to those in broader Soviet, but also in global discourses since the 1960s. At the same time, it also highlights the uniqueness of the Estonian case, exploring the contextual resources that made possible the conceptual innovation that took place there. The conceptual innovation in Estonia led to the first revolutionary situation (the situation of "dual power") among the 1989 revolutions in Europe, thus contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Dissecting the dynamics of these changes, the study deepens our understanding of these broader processes and hopefully will serve as an inspiration for future studies on parallel or related processes elsewhere.

The dissertation's first thesis is that we can identify specific conceptual processes in pre-revolutionary periods through which specific and technical concepts, derived from an expert-language framework, acquire broader resonance and meaning in society, thus contributing to the rise of a revolutionary situation. The analytical term "conceptual innovation" that the study has introduced designates the conceptual process through which the meaning of a term is radically altered, so that it can eventually serve as a conceptual platform for new political claims. An example of this kind of innovation is the case of "self-management" (*isemajandamine, IM*) in September 1987. Alongside "conceptual innovation," the dissertation also analyzes a further set of processes – how a concept can make space for other concepts; how a concept can be used as an action model; how some concepts in late totalitarianism (e.g., "experiment," "critique," or "plan") served conflicting purposes (which I call "conceptual amphibiousness"); and how a concept can be transferred from one disciplinary domain to another (which I call "conceptual transfer"). The study shows how these conceptual processes sequentially unfolded in the ESSR in 1987–1988, culminating in the concept of "sovereignty" rising to prominence in late 1987.

The dissertation shows that the conceptual innovation of *isemajandamine* in 1987–1988 relied on several institutional, ideological, intellectual, and linguistic resources. It highlights the role of the scientific community of the ESSR in this process. This community used scientific concepts and methods (first to unlock and then gain control of the political language) that were very much part of the global scientific discourse. The dissertation demonstrates that global scientific thought and its local reception in the ESSR played a crucial role in legitimizing the "self-management" project. One of the specificities of the Estonian case was

that it served as a laboratory for economic experiments in the centrally launched initiative to reform the economic policies of the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

A series of economic experiments in the Estonian SSR in the 1980s created new employment forms (like "contractual units"), which led to a higher degree of economic independence for minor units in enterprises. This economic model enabled the IM group to advocate a similar model for a territorial unit in the Soviet Union. The discourse of scientific objectivity and a particular way of argumentation in the public sphere enabled social scientists to further develop reform ideas by creatively adopting scientific concepts (borrowed from economics, future studies, system approach, etc.). The global science discourse served as an intellectual resource for making "conceptual transfers" from scientific disciplines to politics to legitimize the "territorial self-management" claim. The table below schematically summarizes the resources for the conceptual innovation of IM:

Table 2. The contextual resources for the conceptual innovation of IM

Historical contexts	Available contextual resources for the conceptual innovation of IM
Institutional (I, II)	New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921–1928 National Economy Council in 1957–1965 Economic "experiments" in the 1970s and 1980s Inner / full self-accounting in enterprises (*vnutrennyi / polnyi khozraschet*)
Ideological (II, III)	Scientific objectivity discourse "New thinking" "Critique," "improvement," "plan," "experiment" The official campaign of "bottom-up" initiatives in economy
Intellectual (III)	Soviet regional economic thought Estonian managerial school System-theory thought Global studies and future scenarios
Linguistic (II, III)	The prefix "self-" (*ise-*) in *isemajandamine* was missing in Russian *khozraschet* and translations into native languages of other Soviet republics, including Latvian and Lithuanian

The dissertation's second thesis is that it is possible to create an alternative political language through expert languages in a late totalitarian regime. To confirm this thesis, the dissertation identifies three argumentative "languages" that Estonian authors used to describe and reform politics: (1) decentralist, (2) system theory, and (3) open innovation (see Table 1). The availability of these languages made possible "conceptual transfers" from one disciplinary domain to another. Below is the concluding figure for this process:

Table 3. Conceptual transfers from one domain to another in 1986–1988 in the ESSR

Conceptual transfers from one domain to another in 1986–1988 in the ESSR		
Domain	**Concept/term**	**New domain**
Economic administration	*Self-accounting* (khozraschet; isemajandamine)	Politics / foreign politics / economic politics / management
System theory / Management theory	*Self-regulation*	Social policy / economy / administrative policy
Philosophy of science / Physical chemistry	*Self-organization*	Politics
Futurology / Global studies	*Future scenario*	Economy / Politics
Cybernetics / System theory	*Feedback*	Politics
Economy	*Horizontal relations*	Foreign politics / federal politics

Finally, the dissertation's approach advances existing scholarship, suggesting that it can serve as a foundation for a broader conceptual innovation theory in the milieus where authors in the public sphere have faced the "locked text problem." It creates a theoretical framework for studying the role of expert languages within this situation, which can also be applied (or at least tested) to explore similar cases in the contexts of different countries of the former Eastern bloc or elsewhere.

SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN

Majandusiseseisvusest poliitilise suveräänsuseni: leiutades „isemajandamist" Eesti NSV-s

Doktoritöö pakub välja uudse metoodika uurimaks revolutsioonilisi protsesse, näidates mõisteliste muutuste olulisust eelrevolutsioonilisel perioodil. Töö keskmes on mõistelised muutused, mis leidsid aset Eesti NSV avalikus arutelus ja poliitikas 1985. aastal Nõukogude Liidus alanud „perestroika" kampaania keskpaigas (1987–1988). Töö asetab Eestis toimunud mõistelised protsessid maailma-ajaloolisse perspektiivi ning näitab, mil moel olid Eesti sündmused olulised Ida-Euroopa 1989. a revolutsioonide kontekstis ning avaldasid märkimisväärset mõju Nõukogude Liidu kokkuvarisemisele (1991).

Doktoritööl on kaks peamist fookust. Esimeseks on muutused Eesti NSV poliitilises keeles ja mõistetes. Briti sovietoloog Archie Brown on nimetanud perestroika keskpaika „mõistete revolutsiooniks" (*conceptual revolution*), pidades silmas NSVL keskvõimu poolt kasutusele võetud uute mõistete (nagu „õigus-riik", „pluralism" jm) mõju reformide radikaliseerumisele. Samas ei ole uurimist leidnud Eesti NSV-s toimunud samalaadne protsess, milles kerkisid esile eelkõige mõisted „isemajandamine", „iseregulatsioon" ja „suveräänsus". Töö näitab, kuidas mõiste „isemajandamine" pidev laienemine 1987. aasta lõpul ja 1988. a alguses (samuti kõigi kolme nimetatud mõiste kooseksisteerimine IME liikumises aastal 1988) avaldas olulist mõju võitlusele keskvõimuga. Doktoritöö eesmärgiks on seega uuesti mõtestada Eesti taasiseseisvumise konteksti, asetades fookuse esiteks varasemasse perioodi ning teiseks revolutsiooni keelelisele aspektile. See on oluline ka laiemas mastaabis, kuna Eesti NSV-st 1987. a alguse saanud mõistete revolutsioon laienes 1988 suvel teistesse liiduvabariikidesse ning kulmineerus vabariikide nn. „suveräänsuste paraadiga" aastatel 1989–1991.

Doktoritöö teine fookus on Eesti NSV teadlaskonna rollil neis muutustes. Intellektuaalide ja teadlaste roll 1987.–88. a sündmustes on küll üldiselt tunnustatud (loomeliitude pleenum, Rahvarinde loomine jne), ent samas ei ole vaadeldud teadlaste poolset poliitilise keele „hõivamist" läbi pikema perioodi rekonstruktsiooni. Kui seni on Eesti ajalookirjutus peamiselt käsitlenud poliitilist aja-lugu, siis käesolev töö võtab vaatluse alla perestroika perioodi intellektuaalse ajaloo, küsides, millised mõisted ja „keeled", millistest teadusvaldkondadest olid teadlastele vahenditeks poliitiliste muutuste ellu kutsumisel ja laiendamisel. Doktoritöö kasutab selleks Cambridge'i koolkonna intellektuaalajaloo meetodit, lähtudes John Pococki ja Quentin Skinneri teoreetilistest lähtealustest. Töö näitab, kuidas intellektuaalsed arengud teadlaskonna ja reformipoliitilise keele vahel Eesti NSV-s ei seisnud lahus maailmas toimunud samalaadsest protsessist 1960.–1980. aastatel. Siinsed arengud olid seotud ülemaailmses teaduskogukonnas esile kerkinud uue distsipliinidega nagu süsteemiteooria, juhtimisteadus, globaal-uuringud ja stsenaariumimeetod. Samuti ei seisnud need lahus sotsiaalsetest arengutest maailmas, nagu näiteks valitsusi nõustavate ekspertide (sh. ekspertkeele) rolli tõus poliitikas mõlemal pool Külma sõja rindejoont. Mainitud valdkondade

argumendid ja mõistestik said intellektuaalseks raamistikuks Eesti NSV sotsiaal- ja loodusteadlastele, mida oli võimalik kasutada poliitikasse sisenemisel perestroika tulekul 1985. aastal.

Töö üks teadlikke piiranguid on see, et keskendutakse alternatiivsele reformi- poliitilisele diskursusele ENSV-s ja teaduskogukonnale kui selle kandjale. Vaatluse all ei ole õigusliku järjepidevuse doktriini raamistamine Kodanike komiteede poolt (1989), ega näiteks dissidentide või 1988. a suvel asutatud ERSP retoorika analüüs.[186] Töö kronoloogiliseks lõpp-punktiks on ENSV Ülemnõukogu poolne suveräänsusdeklaratsiooni vastuvõtmine 16.11.1988.

Doktoritöö esitab sissejuhatuses lühiülevaate revolutsioonide uurimise ajaloost, paigutades „mõistete revolutsiooni" sellega laiemasse raamistikku. Esitatakse lühiülevaade neljast lähenemisest, mis võtavad aluseks erinevad fookused: (1) sotsiaalmajanduslikud struktuurid (2) idee-kesksus (3) rahvusülesed võrgustikud ning (4) mõisted ja keeleline aspekt. Kirjeldades mainitud lähenemiste võimalusi ja puuduseid, pakub töö seejärel välja uue kategooria millega analüüsida mõistete olulisust revolutsioonides. Selleks on „mõisteline innovatsioon" (*conceptual innovation*), mida töös rakendatakse 1987. a ENSV-s toimunud „isemajandamise" ettepaneku ja sellele järgnenud liikumise näitel ning analüüsib seda protsessi võimaldanud tingimusi.

Doktoritöö esimene väide on, et Eesti NSV-s toimus aastatel 1987–1988 spetsiifiline mõistelise muutuse protsess, millel oli oluline roll vabariigi poliitika radikaliseerumisele. Selle muutuse spetsiifika seisneb esiteks „väikeste" ja tehniliste ekspertmõistete muutmisel poliitilise debati keskpunktiks hilistotalitaarses poolsuletud süsteemis (vastukaaluks suurtele võtmemõistetele nagu nt „iseseisvus" või „vabadus"). Teiseks, selle protsessi käivitajaks saab olla mõisteline innovatsioon. „Mõistelise innovatsiooni" all pean ma silmas tegevust, mis lisaks termini varasema tähenduse muutmisele tekitab ka intellektuaalse platvormi mõiste edasiseks laienduseks ning uute mõistete esiletõusuks. Alates 1941. aastast ENSV plaanimajanduses kasutatud raamatupidamistermini (ettevõtte „isemajandamine") tähenduse innoveerimisest 1987. aastal sai kogu vabariigi teadlaskonda mobiliseeriv platvorm, mille kaudu laiendati termini mõistet nii ruumiliselt (majandusüksuselt territoriaalüksusele) kui valdkonniti („ettevõtte isemajandamisest" kõikide sfääride isemajandamiseni vabariigis). Kui publikatsioon I kirjeldab 1985. a toimunud majanduseksperimendi käigus toimunud teenindus-ettevõtete „sisese isemajandamise" laiendamist (millega suurenes üksuste majanduslik iseseisvus) kui majandusmudelit *enne* innovatsiooni, siis publikatsioonid I ja II näitavad mudeliga toimunud „mõistelist innovatsiooni" aastatel 1987–1988 ning toovad välja selle eeldused ja tagajärjed. „Isemajandamise" innovatsioon

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[186] Selle põhjuseks on nii see, et õigusliku järjepidevuse doktriini on teaduskirjanduses enam uuritud, vt nt Pettai (2004) aga ka see, et käesoleva töö fookus on eelkõige perestroika keskpaiga (1986–1988) avalikkusel, mil avalikku poliitilist diskursust mõjutas töös analüüsitav „suletud teksti" fenomen, samas kui Kodanike komiteede liikumine ja õigusliku järjepidevuse esiletõus avalikkuses algab 1989. aasta algul.

ENSV-s aastatel 1987–1988 toetus nimelt mitmetele ressurssidele. Nendeks olid *institutsionaalsed* (nt. varasemad „majanduseksperimendid" kui legaalsed tegevus-mudelid); *ideoloogilised* („suletud tekst" ja „teaduslik objektiivsus" kui perest-roika-aegne argumenteerimisvorm); *intellektuaalsed* (globaalse teadusmõtte rakendamine ENSV-s); ning *keelelised* ressursid (sh. termini „isemajandamine" eripärane tõlge venekeelsest terminist „khozraschet").[187]

Doktoritöö kirjeldab perioodi 1985–1988 kui jätkuvat hilistotalitaarset süs-teemi. Tegu oli jätkuvalt ühe monoliitse partei, tsenseeritava „suletud teksti" ning julgeolekuteenistuse poolt kontrollitava režiimiga, mis muudab perestroika kui reformikampaania alguse eriliseks vararevolutsiooniliseks situatsiooniks. Tsen-suur muutus perestroika kampaania osaks ning tekitas spetsiifilise argumentat-sioonivormi autoritele. Reformiettepanekud avalikus ruumis pidid arvestama uue ideoloogilise kaanoniga ning lähtuma perestroika sõnavarast, seega peasekretäri ja tema nõunike kõnedest ning teadusliku objektiivsuse diskursusest. Töö kirjel-dab muuhulgas kuidas sotsiaal- ja majandusteadlaste poolne ideoloogilise keele „hõivamine" toimus ka peasekretäri meeskonnas ning millist mõju see avaldas ENSV arengutele, luues omalaadse teaduslik-ideoloogilise „kreoolkeele" siin-setele autoritele ja riiklikele ideoloogiaosakondadele.

Doktoritöö teine väide on, et hilistotalitaarses süsteemis on alternatiivne poliiti-line keel võimalik luua erialasõnavaradest. Selle teesi kinnituseks toon ma välja, et varase perestroika perioodil tärganud avalik-poliitiline keel koosnes erine-vatest raamistikest, mis olid pärit eriteadustest ning mida püüti rakendada, et kirjeldada ja reformida poliitikasfääri. Selle protsessi käigus toimus erialaste mõistete „siirdamine" teadusavalikkusest poliitilisse avalikkusesse (*conceptual transfer*). Argumentatiivseid keeli, mis seesugust siirdamist võimaldasid, eris-tatakse doktoritöös kolm: (1) detsentralism; (2) süsteemiteooria; ning (3) avatud innovatsioon (vt sellekohast tabelit nr 1). Ma väidan, et lisaks traditsiooniliste „keelte" uurimisele poliitilise mõtte ajaloos (vabariiklus, juriidilisus, jne), peak-sime seda kontseptsiooni laiendama ka teadus- ja nn. „ekspertkeeltele", mis osu-tusid ENSV puhul olulisteks kanaliteks mille kaudu poliitikat kirjeldati ja ellu viidi. Töö täpsemaks juhtumiks nende keelte eristamisel on „vabariikliku ise-majandamise" debatt, selle projekti mõtestamine ja legitimeerimine erinevate autorite poolt.

Nagu eespool mainitud, on töö eesmärk näidata, et Eesti perestroika keeled ei olnud isoleeritud muust maailmast. Vastupidi, nad oli tihedalt seotud Euroopa teadusteoreetilise-, majandus- ning intellektuaalse mõttega. Töö argument on, et peame nende esile kerkimist Eesti NSV-s mõistma ühelt poolt läbi eelneva aja-loolis-institutsionaalse arengu, aga teiselt poolt ka läbi diskursiivsete võimaluste, mida pakkus Nõukogude ametlik (leninistlik-marksistlik) diskursus; varasem detsentralistlik Nõukogude diskursus (nt NEP ning Rahvamajandusnõukogude reform) ja 1985. a alanud perestroika kampaania; teiste sotsialismimaade reformid; ning alates 1960-ndatest üha globaliseeruv teadusavalikkus, sh. NSV Liidus.

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[187] Vt kontekstuaalsete ressursside tabelit ingliskeelses kokkuvõttes (tabel nr 2).

Laiemas plaanis näitlikustab doktoritöö, milline oli teadlaste ja ekspertide roll ning osakaal Ida-Euroopa riikide 1980-ndate lõpu revolutsioonilistes sündmustes.

Doktoritöö aitab mõista Eesti lähiajaloos toimunud muutuste maailma-ajaloolist konteksti, võimaldades lugejal seostada Eesti NSV-s toimunud muutusi ülejäänud protsessidega maailmas. Nt vastupidiselt laialt levinud narratiivile, et innovatsioon ja tulevikku suunatud mõtlemine sai Eestis alguse pigem 1990-ndatel ehk turumajanduse tingimustes, näitab doktoritöö kuidas „avatud innovatsiooni" keel eksisteeris Eesti NSV-s palju pikemat aega, võttes alguspunktiks 1960ndad aastad. Tollane küberneetika ja süsteemiteoreetilise mõtte tõus maailmas, majandus-eksperimentide jada ENSV-s (sh eksperimendid teeninduse ja kergetööstuse valdkonnas 1980.ndate keskel), TRÜ sotsioloogide ja TPI juhtimiskoolkonna teooria ja praktika, tulevikustsenaariumide konkurss 1987 mais, IME projekt kui (tänapäeva sõnavaras *start-up*) platvorm alternatiivsetele ideedele ENSV tule-vikust – kõik need arengud on osalised selles, et saaksime vaadelda innovatsiooni Eestis (nii oma institutsionaalse arengu kui intellektuaalse mõtte osas) märksa pikemas ajalises perspektiivis.

Viimaks, doktoritöö näitab, kuidas mõiste „suveräänsuse" esilekerkimine sel perioodil toimus mitte läbi konstitutsioonilise ressursi kasutuse, vaid seoses läbi „isemajandamise" mõistelise innovatsiooni, mis tekitas debati (kui platvormi) uute mõistete esiletõusuks. Liiduvabariigi „suveräänsus" pidi juriidiliselt tagama vaba-riikliku „majandusiseseisvuse" projekti. Alles 1988. a septembris muutus „suve-räänsus" võtmemõisteks IME liikumises, kuna selgus, et sel on suurem potentsiaal tuua kaasa reaalseid muutusi föderaalses seadusandluses. Seega, töö näitab see-suguse mõistelise innovatsiooni ettekavatsemata tagajärgi poliitilises protsessis.

I artikkel

Saharov, Juhan (2018). "An Economic Innovation as an Icebreaker: The Contractual Work Experiment in Soviet Estonia in 1985," in *The Baltic States and the End of the Cold War*, eds. Kaarel Piirimäe and Olaf Mertels-mann (Peter Lang).

Doktoritöö esimene artikkel kirjeldab ja analüüsib Eesti NSV-s 1985. a toimunud „lepingulise töö eksperimenti" teenindusvaldkonnas. Eksperimendi põhisisuks oli uut tüüpi „lepingulise töövormi nr. 2" kasutuselevõtt Eesti NSV teenindus-ettevõtetes, mille kohaselt teenindusettevõtete töötajatel oli õigus rentida ette-võtte ruume ja inventari, moodustades teenindusettevõtte sisese „isemajandava lepinguüksuse". „Lepinguüksus" oli ühelt poolt kohustatud täitma ettevõtte plaani-näitajaid, ent teiselt poolt (olulise muudatusena senises ENSV teeninduses) jäi üksuse poolt tehtud üleplaanilisest tööst saadud tulu lepinguüksuse enda käsu-tusse. Artikkel kirjeldab ka eksperimendile eelnenud ettevalmistusperioodi (1979–1984), mille peamiseks figuuriks oli Eesti NSV Teenindusministeeriumi Instituudi juhataja ja Gosplani (NSVL Plaanikomitee) töötaja Juhan Sillaste ning Gosplani juures 1982. aastal moodustatud spetsiaalne töögrupp uurimaks Vastastikuse

Majandusabi Nõukogu riikide majanduskogemusi. Töögrupi eesmärgiks oli ana-lüüsida teiste sotsialismimaade praktikaid ja nende kasutusvõimalusi Nõukogude Liidu majandussfääris. Sillaste kui töögrupi üks liikmetest keskendus Ungari Rahvavabariigile ja selle teenindusvaldkonnale, kuhu toimus ka õppevisiit. Naas-nuna Ungarist koostas Sillaste raporti NSVL Ministrite Nõukogule „lepingulise töövormi" kasutusvõimaluse osas Eesti NSV-s ning 1984. aastal luba eksperi-mendiks ka anti. Lepinguüksusi oli võimalik hakata looma 01.01.1985 (millega eksperiment ametlikult algas). Eelpoolmainitud „lepinguline töövorm nr. 2" viidi kogu Nõukogude Liidus läbi vaid Eesti NSV-s.

Eksperimendi autori Juhan Sillaste üheks eesmärgiks oli tekitada ettevõtte-sisene *partnerlus*, millega paraneks teenindustööde kvaliteet ja defitsiidi vähene-mine tavatarbijatele. *Partnerluse* tekitamise eesmärgiks oli reform teenindus-valdkonnas, leevendamaks „vertikaalse", ülalt-alla suunatud plaanimajanduse meetodi mõju teenindusele. Selle kaasnähtuseks oli laiem muutus teeninduses 1985–1987, millega töötajatest said teenindusettevõtte juhtkonnale partnerid, teisi-sõnu, töötaja muutus objektist subjektiks. Artikli üheks järelduseks on, et „ise-majanduslike üksuste lepingulise töö" sisseviimine teeninduses on näide „horison-taalsest lepingulisusest" kui ühest kontseptuaalsest raamistikust varase *perestroika* perioodi reformimõttes (mis toob kaasa aktiivse subjektsuse lepinguüksustes).

Peale teenindusvaldkonna institutsionaliseerus see ka teistes valdkondades, nt Eesti NSV põllumajanduses 1986. aastal (läbi „töövõtulepingute" eksperimendi Eesti NSV Agrotööstuskompleksis). Edasist uurimistööd vajav hüpotees, mis antud artiklist koorub on, kas isemajandavatele suhetele baseeruvat „horisontaalset lepingulisust" (kui uut majandusmudelit 1985–1986 teeninduses ja põllumajan-duses) saab pidada varaseks näiteks detsentralistlikust keelest, mida poliitilisel tasandil kasutati ENSV „horisontaalsete suhete" loomiseks keskvõimu ja teiste liiduvabariikidega ning milline oli nende kahe (nö. majandusliku ja poliitilise detsentralismi) omavaheline seos.

II artikkel

Saharov, Juhan (2021). "**From an Economic Term to a Political Concept: The Conceptual Innovation of 'Self-Management' in Soviet Estonia,**" *Con-tributions to the History of Concepts,* **Vol. 16, Issue 1.**

Doktoritöö teine artikkel vaatleb „isemajandamise" mõiste ajalugu Eesti NSV-s, võttes fookusesse selle innovatsiooni aastatel 1987–1988. „Isemajandamine" oli kauaaegne Nõukogude plaanimajanduse termin (vene k *khozraschet*), mis tähistas kas „ettevõttesisest" või siis ettevõtte „täielikku" töötamist isetasuvuse (vene k *samookupaemost*) printsiibil – ettevõte sai tekitada kulusid vaid oma tulude baasil. I artiklis kirjeldatud töövorm (isemajandav lepinguüksus) on ettevõttesisese ise-majandamise näiteks. Mõiste radikaalne innovatsioon toimus 1987. a septembris, mil nn. „Nelja mehe ettepanek" pakkus välja idee viia kogu Eesti NSV „täielikule isemajandamisele" ning algatas vabariigi „majandusliku iseseisvuse" kui

majanduspoliitilise projekti läbitöötamise Eesti teadusavalikkuses. „Nelja mehe ettepanek" kasutas nõukogude plaanimajanduses majandusüksuse töövormi terminit pretsedenditul kujul, liites selle esialgsele tähendusele „territoriaalsuse" liiduvabariigi tasandil.

Artikkel toob välja kolm erinevat „dimensiooni" selle mõiste innovatsioonis, näidates selleks toiminguks vajalikku kontekstuaalset ressurssi (kui struktuuri) ja tegevust (kui agentsust): (1) lingvistiline (2) poliitiline (3) transnatsionaalne. Selleks rakendatakse artiklis Quentin Skinneri teoreetilist lähenemist intellektuaalajaloo distsipliinist, mille järgi me peaksime vaatlema igasugust ideoloogilist uuendust alati dialoogis olemasoleva sõnavara ja ideedega, et mõista mida autorid ja tekstid „teevad" võrreldes teiste tekstidega antud kontekstis. „Territoriaalse isemajandamise" kui mõistelise innovatsiooni *lingvistiline* dimensioon seisnes termini eesliite *ise-* ärakasutamises ettepaneku koostajate poolt. *Poliitiline* dimensioon seisnes selle muutuse „ettekavatsemata tagajärgedes" poliitilisele protsessile 1988. aastal, sh järk-järguline laienemine kitsast majandusmõistest kogu ühiskonna altpoolt (nn. iseregulatiivsetel alustel) juhtimist kirjeldavaks mõisteks, mis kulmineerus suveräänsusdeklaratsiooniga 1988. a novembris. *Transnatsionaalne* dimensioon seisnes selle mõiste toimimises kõikides liiduvabariikides kuna majandusliku iseseisvuse idee transformeerus kõikides liiduvabariikides Eesti NSV eeskujul suveräänsuse nõudeks aastatel 1989–90. Nii „majanduslikku iseseisvust" kui „suveräänsust" kasutati liiduvabariikide eliitide poolt edukalt võitluses keskvõimuga oma majanduslike õiguste laiendamiseks, teisisõnu, sel oli transnatsionaalne potentsiaal, kuna kõik liiduvabariigid vajasid ühist platvormi (ja seda plaanimajanduse mõiste võimaldas), mida kasutada läbirääkimistel Moskvaga. Selle konkreetseks näiteks tuuakse artiklis ära Balti liiduvabariikide ühine platvorm (mille algatasid Rahvarinne ja *Sajudis* 1988 suvel), mis kulmineerus 1989. a novembris Nõukogude Liidu Ülemnõukogu otsusega „Balti liiduvabariikide majanduslikust iseseisvusest".

III artikkel

Saharov, J. (2021, ilmumas). "From Future Scenarios to Sovereignty Declarations: The Scientific Promotion of 'Self-Management' in 1987–88 in Soviet Estonia," *Europe-Asia Studies.*

Doktoritöö kolmas artikkel vaatleb „territoriaalse isemajandamise" nõude kujunemise seotust esiteks globaaluuringutest pärit „tulevikustsenaariumi" mõistega ning teiseks vaatleb selle legitimeerimist Eesti avalikus ruumis läbi teadusmõtte, peamiselt läbi süsteemiteooria. Artikli väiteks on, et aastatel 1987–1988 siirdati teadusvaldkonnast poliitilisele väljale kaks mõistet – „tulevikustsenaarium" ja „iseregulatsioon", mille eesmärk oli legitimeerida Eesti NSV territoriaalmajanduslike õiguste laiendamise nõue. Artikkel toob välja kolm autorit, kes süsteemiteooriat või tuleviku-uuringuid otseselt kasutasid oma argumentide tutvustamisel: Edgar Savisaar, Uno Mereste ja Meelik Kattago. Artikkel kasutab teoreetilise

raamistikuna Quentin Skinneri meetodit intellektuaalajaloos, mis vaatleb autoripoolset mõistekasutust kui poliitilise tegutseja kõnetegu oma kaasaja situatsioonis. Artikkel näitab, et me saame anda spetsiifilise tähenduse mainitud autorite *tegevusele*, milleks oli innovaatilis-kontseptuaalne tegu või samm (*conceptual move*) olemasoleva keele sees, mille eesmärgiks oli siirdada teatud mõisted teadusvaldkonnast poliitikavaldkonda vabariigi reformimõtte kaitseks. Sellel olid mitmed kontekstuaalsed ressursid: (1) ideoloogiline ehk *perestroika* algusaegne argumentatsiooniloogika (reformi kasuks sai argumenteerida ainult läbi eriteaduste); (2) intellektuaalne ressurss, milleks olid 1960.–70ndatel ülemaailmses teaduskogukonnas esile kerkinud distsipliinid – süsteemiteooria, juhtimisteadus, globaal- ja tuleviku-uuringud ning nende retseptsioon Eestis. Perestroika algusaegne argumentatsiooniloogika (1985–1987) seisnes hierarhilise kõnediskursuse kasutamisel. Näiteks pidid Eesti reformimeelsed autorid siduma oma mõtteid ja väiteid NLKP peasekretäri poolse mõistestikuga või Nõukogude akadeemikute töödega. Ent Eesti autoritel oli võimalus neid ka ümber mõtestada või laenata mõisteid maailmateadusest.

Üheks seesuguseks näiteks toob artikkel Edgar Savisaare varased kirjutised globaal- ja tuleviku-uuringutest ning tema poolt kasutatud „tulevikustsenaariumi" mõiste siirdamise Eesti NSV Plaanikomitee halduspoliitika keelde. Nimelt 1987. a kevadel korraldas Savisaare osakond Plaanikomitees ülevabariigilise rahvamajanduse arengustsenaariumite konkursi, mille eesmärgiks oli (konkursi juhendi järgi) „saada originaalseid, teaduslikult põhjendatud, alternatiivseid tulevikustsenaariumeid", mille väljundiks oli muuhulgas „kujundada loomingulisi teaduslikke uurimisgruppe interdistsiplinaarsete uuringute arendamiseks vabariigis". Konkursi üheks tagajärjeks oli alternatiivsete stsenaariumitega jätkamine Plaanikomitees, mis seisnes „territoriaalse isemajandamise" ettepaneku väljatöötamisega ekspertgrupi poolt Plaanikomitees augustis 1987 ning selle avaliku esitamisega „Edasis" 29.09.1987.

Teiseks innovaatilis-kontseptuaalseks kõneteoks Skinneri raamistikus oli „iseregulatsiooni" toomine süsteemiteooriast poliitilisele väljale 1987.–1988. aastal, mida saab pidada „mõisteliseks siirdeks". Artikkel annab ülevaate selle mõiste ilmumisest 1987.a lõpus avalikku ruumi (kohe pärast „isemajandamise" ettepanekut), mis jõuab lõpuks nii IME ametlikku koondkontseptsiooni (esitati valitsusele 01.nov 1988) kui seadusandlusesse, milleks oli „Seadus Eesti NSV isemajandamise alustest" (vastu võetud 18.mai 1989). Lisaks IME liikumise dokumentidele, vaatleb artikkel „iseregulatsiooni" esinemist koos „isemajandamisega" teiste autorite 1988.a esseistikas, nt majandusteadlase Uno Mereste „isemajandamisteoorias" ning filosoof Meelik Kattago „tasatuse teoorias". Mõlemad teadlased põhjendavad „isemajandamise" reformi läbi omaenda erialakeele ja mõistestiku. Viimaks, artikkel toob välja kuidas ülaltoodud mõistestiku kasutamine andis omapoolse panuse „suveräänsuse" mõiste esile kerkimisele 1988. a jooksul. Nõue „majandusliku iseseisvuse" osas muutus küsimuseks vabariigi suveräänsusest. Eestist alguse saanud „mõisteline revolutsioon" laienes teistesse liiduvabariikidesse ning tõi kaasa suveräänsusdeklaratsioonide paraadi (1989–1991), millel oli oluline roll NSV Liidu kokkuvarisemisele 1991. a sügisel.

PUBLICATIONS

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Education and work experience:

(1)   Tartu University, PhD candidate in Political Science
(2)   Tartu University, 2008, MA in Comparative Politics
(3)   Charles University in Prague, 2007, Political Science (Erasmus)
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Work experience:
2009–2018 Johannes Mihkelson Center (non-governmental organization), head of the support services for asylum-seekers and refugees

Research and development activities:

1. Main research areas:
Intellectual and conceptual history in East-Central Europe; political theory; social movements and civil society; dissent; reform socialism; 1989 revolutions; self-determination of peoples.

2. Recent research projects:
2020–2024 PRG 942 "Self-Determination of Peoples in Historical Perspective"
2011–2014 ETF 8887 "Liberal Loyalties and Cosmopolitan Commitments: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives"

Teaching:
Courses:
2011 "Social Movements," Institute of Political Science, Tartu University. Seminars;
2020 "The Classics in Political Theory," Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, Tartu University;
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2012 "Introduction to Political Philosophy," Institute of Political Science, Tartu University.

List of publications:

Monographs or chapters in monographs:

Saharov, J. (2018). "An Economic Innovation as an Icebreaker: The Contractual Work Experiment in Soviet Estonia in 1985." In *The Baltic States and the End of the Cold War*, eds. K. Piirimäe and O. Mertelsmann. Peter Lang.

Pettai, V., and J. Saharov. (2013). "Estonia." *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Democracy in Europe*, ed. J. M. De Waele, F. Escalona, and M. Vieira. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Other research publications:

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Saharov, J. (2021 forthcoming). "Combining Laclauian Discourse Analysis and Framing Theory: Václav Havel's 'Hegemonic Rhetoric' in Charter 77", *Politologický časopis / Czech Journal of Political Science*.

Conference papers:

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Saharov, J. (2016). *An Economic Innovation as an Icebreaker: The Contractual Work Experiment in Soviet Estonia in 1985*. Paper presented at the conference "The Baltic Crisis, the End of the Cold War, and the Collapse of the USSR", November 25, Tartu University.

Other relevant publications:

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Saharov, J. (2009). "Märkmeid presidendi (m)ajast. Vaclav Havel, 'Lühidalt palun.'" *Vikerkaar* nos. 1–2.

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Töökogemus:
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1. Peamised uurimisvaldkonnad:
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2020–2024 täitja projektis: PRG 942 "Rahvaste enesemääramine ajaloolises perspektiivis" (grandi hoidja: Eva Piirimäe)
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Õppetöö:

1. Läbiviidud loengukursused:
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2. Seminaride juhendamine:
2020 Poliitikateooria klassikud, Johan Skytte poliitikauuringute instituut, Tartu Ülikool;
2019 Poliitikateooria probleemid ja vaidlused, Johan Skytte poliitikauuringute instituut, Tartu Ülikool;
2012 Sissejuhatus poliitilisse filosoofiasse, Riigiteaduste instituut, Tartu Ülikool.

Teadustööde loetelu:

Monograafiad või nende osad:

Saharov, J. (2018). An Economic Innovation as an Icebreaker: The Contractual Work Experiment in Soviet Estonia in 1985, *The Baltic States and the End of the Cold War*. Kaarel Piirimäe, Olaf Mertelsmann (Toim.). Berlin: Peter Lang.

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