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**EUROPEAN UNION SMALL MEMBER STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL: A CASE OF EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY**

MA thesis

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I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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## ABSTRACT

Representation on the international arena has always been important for the European Union (EU), especially when it comes to international organizations as they are the main field for global decision-making. Particularly interesting has been EU representation in the United Nations (UN) and more specifically in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where only nation-states can be formal members. The restrictive for the EU legal set-up of the UNSC has left only one possibility for the EU voice to be heard – through its Member States (MSs). However, the questions remain: what MS is more likely to informally represent the EU positions, what causes it and to what level the MS will do it. Using the institutional-constructivist approach to the phenomenon of socialization. This thesis seeks to explain the difference in levels of informal representation of the EU positions aiming to find out what role the state size has on the level of socialization that leads to the informal representation of the EU positions.

The study draws on original data from 10 interviews with the representatives of the selected EU MSs delegations (Portugal 2011-2012, Germany 2011-2012, Germany 2019-2020, and Estonia 2020-2021) to the UNSC to, first, establish the level of socialization for each of them and understand what differences (if any) there are between them. Second, it seeks to establish what scope of interest each of the selected countries had prior to joining the UNSC and build a link between the level of socialization and the respective state size. Then, the research aims to find out what level of informal representation of the EU positions each of the EU MS in the focus of this research had.

This study arrives at two key findings. First, the results show that the state size does not have effect on the level of socialization of the EU MS. Second, the level of informal representation of the EU positions does not depend on the level of socialization that the EU MSs had prior to representing their national positions. It is apparent that the level of representation of the EU positions is largely defined by the importance that the EU MS attributes to representing the EU. Therefore, this thesis opens prospects for further studies of the topic.

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**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

EU – European Union

MS – Member State

MSs – Member States

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP – Common Security and Defense Policy

HR/VP – The High Representative of the Union for

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

UN – United Nations

UNGA – United Nations General Assembly

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

UK – United Kingdom

US – United States

**INTRODUCTION**

European Union has been actively engaged in global politics for decades, trying to gain recognition as an international actor and struggling to have more external representation on the international arena. Especially important for the Union has been its presence in the international organizations – United Nations (UN) in particular, as it is a platform where major strategic, security and political decisions are made. The difficulty the EU faces with the membership in the UN is the nature of the Union, that is both supranational and intergovernmental, whereas the UN requires an actor to be a nation-state to become a full member of the organization. Therefore, the representation of the EU in the UN is limited, and even though it has a permanent observer status at the UNGA, it largely relies on the MS in representation of its position in the UN, what becomes possible when the EU Member States (MSs) 'speak with one voice'.

EU MSs have the ability to 'speak with one voice' in the international environment where they coordinate their foreign policies, form a common position on an issue and then present it uniformly. With the case of the UN, MSs have committed themselves to the Article 19 of the Lisbon Treaty, that speaks about the MSs representation of the EU positions in the UN and coordination with other EU members if it does not contradict the UN Charter. Therefore, while the EU itself is not a full UN member, its interests can still be represented when its MSs coordinate each other's positions and vote or co-sponsor Draft Resolutions coherently in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) or United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC is in the focus of this thesis as it is a UN body, where members set agenda and make decisions according to their national interests and under the UN Charter (UN Charter: Article 4). However, there is still not enough knowledge about the ways in which the EU can be represented by the MSs in the UNSC and what implications it has. So, it is important to understand how the literature has portrayed the EU representation in the UN and UNSC to see what gaps there are in the research field.

The literature has been studying different aspects of the EU-UN relations, for example, Laatikainen & Smith (2006) explored EU policy coordination in the UN as well as EU presence in the UN policy arenas, while Rasch (2008) studied EU voting behavior in

the UNGA, however, particular attention attracts the question of how the EU is represented in the UN (Blavoukos et al. 2017, Burmester & Jankowski 2018, Chelloti et al. 2020, Monteleone 2019). In absence of formal representation in the UNSC, the EU is dependent on the EU MS speaking on its behalf (Drieskens 2009), what is possible through more informal EU representation, brought about by foreign policy coordination of the Member States and by the EU MSs serving on the UNSC defining their national positions in terms of, or at least by considering EU interests and interests of other EU MS. The scholarly works argue (Brinberg 2009, Da Silva 2019, Laatikainen 2015, Pirozzi 2010, Rasch 2008), that there is an ongoing process of socialization present between the EU MS in the UN, that implies their continuous coordination influencing how those EU MS, that serve on the UNSC, define their national positions on the UNSC. This thesis aims to explore how coordination of EU MS in the context of the UN results in informal representation of the EU on the UNSC, that is in EU MSs representing EU positions, and the role played by state size in determining the strength of socialization.

The literature that studies what explains informal representation of the EU by MS on the UNSC has provided an extensive research on the role that the EU plays there, how the EU MSs function in the UN framework and how coordination between the latter happens (Bouchard & Drieskens 2009, Kissack 2010, Rasch 2008). Laatikainen & Smith (2006) have presented a detailed descriptive overview of the EU MSs role in the UN institutions, focusing on the UNGA as the body where all of the EU Members are represented and, thus, can be better observed in terms of the effect that the coordination between the EU MS has on their decisions. However, the EU MSs have been studied considerably more widely across the UNGA dimension (Burmester & Jankowski 2014, Blavoukos et al 2017, Monteleone 2019, Hill 2006, etc.) rather than the UNSC one, what creates an imbalance in the knowledge that we have about EU MSs activity in this institution. This is natural given the challenge to study the UNSC; nevertheless, it is important. Therefore, this study tries to do that.

Apart from that, even fewer studies are related to the narrow scope of interest of this thesis – informal representation of the EU positions through the member states foreign policy decisions in the UNSC. The literature on the ability of the EU MSs to "speak with one

voice" in the UN, which is centered around EU MS "speaking with one voice", mainly addresses the cohesion between the MSs in their voting behavior and, although making a valuable contribution to the understanding of the concept, is mostly related to the UNGA. The uniformity of the MS voting behavior is considered that act as the indicator for EU MSs adopting a common position on issues. Some scholars (Burmester & Jankowski 2018, Barnard 2008, Monteleone 2015, Monteleone 2019) look at the voting cohesion of the MS and explain when and under what circumstances they vote more/less cohesively, and therefore, when they "speak with one voice", when they represent (a unified) EU positions. One of the findings (Burmester & Jankowski 2014) suggests that "small states tend to act cohesively in a bloc" and that the UNSC non-permanent members are more likely to deviate from the EU majority position. Another research (Blavoukous et al 2017) studies the link between intra-EU coherence and external effectiveness of the EU, where the latter is understood as the representation of the foreign policy interests in the UN. While these works explain the link between the common interests and voting cohesion in the UNGA, they do not explain what leads to more or less common interests, i.e., they do not explain what shapes the definition of interests and therefore, levels of cohesion. Therefore, they miss the point of socialization that the current thesis is trying to cover, the process when the MSs interact with each other and the change or acquirement of the EU interest occurs.

Even though the process by which EU MSs define their national interests at the UN/UNGA has so far remained insufficiently explored, this process has been studied in another context, namely in the context of EU foreign policy more generally. For example, Chelotti et al (2017) studies have found that socialization plays a role in the definition of national positions so that EU MSs at times even represent EU interests in absence of formal representation. There are two strands of literature that explore the socialization mechanism of the EU MS. The first one focuses on the effect that socialization mechanism has on the areas where EU MS play a stronger role in general - in the EU foreign policy area. It argues that institutional settings partly shape EU MS preferences and that such factors as lack of knowledge on the issue, complexity of the issue and the opinion of majority tend to define the strength that the socialization effect has on the EU MSs (Lempp & Altenschmidt 2007, Burmester & Jankowski 2014, Chelotti et al. 2016).

Besides, Burmester & Jankowski (2018) mention state size, saying that small states are more likely to act cohesively in a bloc, therefore are more likely to follow the majority. So, depending on these factors EU MS will be less or more likely to undergo the process of socialization and align their foreign policy positions with the EU ones. Although being a valuable contribution for understanding the socialization mechanism of the EU MSs for EU foreign policy more generally, these studies have not focused on how this works at the UN. We do not know whether coordination at the UN leads to similar socialization effects so that there is informal representation.

In parallel to the approach that studies socialization of the EU MSs in general, another strand of research looks at the process of socialization among EU MS that happens within the UN. The literature focuses on the steps that the socialization of the EU MS entails, therefore, it unravels how the EU MSs coordinate with each other and how the formation of the interest coherent with the EU one may form in the UN framework (Birnberg 2009, da Silva 2019, Farrell 2006, Hill 2006, Pirozzi 2010, Rasch 2008). The literature argues, that socialization between the EU MSs in the UN has different effect on the EU MS. Burmester & Jankowski (2018) state that core national interests of the EU MSs, domestic government attitude toward EU integration and duration of the EU membership define whether the EU MS will be socialized, i.e., whether it will adopt the EU position or position of the majority of the EU MS. Da Silva (2019) argues, that permanent UNSC members and members who have close ties with the US complicate the process of socialization and are less resistant to it. While the literature explores the process of socialization in the UN and the factors that make the effect of socialization on the MS stronger or weaker, it focuses on the UNGA and explores the factors that influence socialization there. With regard to informal representation on the UNSC, this means that we do not know what factors make one or the other EU MS more or less likely to represent EU positions; and moreover, we do not know how state size affects strength of socialization. Therefore, the existing literature creates a gap that does not allow to see what EU MS are more likely to converge their interests and adopt the interests of the EU, that are expressed in their activity on the UNSC.

This thesis aims to address this gap and explore one specific factor which could affect the degree to which MS represents state size/smallness. From existing literature, we know about state size and EU MSs socialization as well as EU informal representation, that in

the UNGA small member states, that have a UNSC membership, are likely to deviate from the EU majority voting cohesiveness and that they are likely to vote in a bloc (Burmester & Jankowski 2014, Burmester & Jankowski 2018). But this has not yet been studied for the UNSC. To find out whether the current knowledge about the role of smallness for socialization holds also for the EU MS activities on the UNSC, whether small states are more likely to speak on behalf of the EU i.e., informally represent its positions, this study explores this in more detail.

The EU representation on the UNSC and understanding what factors influence whether and when the EU MSs represent the EU positions matters because the EU would want to be more represented on the international arena and especially in the UNSC. It is important to know whether the EU MSs state size has implications for the level of representation of the EU positions because it helps the reader see under what configuration of MSs 'the EU voice' is more likely to be heard in such a major international organization as the UN and possibly project influence on the international environment. Also, finding out what factors matter for the levels of informal representation of EU positions, is important because it has implications for thinking and researching on such topics as the future of UNSC reform. When it is known what EU MS (big or small) is more likely to represent the EU, then it can be seen the candidacy of what state is preferable from this point of view.

Thus, considering the absence of formal EU representation in the UNSC but given the possibility of informal representation, the question that this research seeks to explain is:

> *What effect does state size have on the level of socialization of the MS that leads to the higher or lower representation of the EU positions on the UNSC?*

To answer this question, the thesis draws on the institutional-constructivist explanations of socialization and focuses on the cases of Portugal and Germany as well as Germany and Estonia, that differ in size in terms of their scope of interests and that were non-permanent UNSC members during 2011-2012 and 2019-2021 respectively. The scope of the research centers only  around the EU MSs that were non-permanent UNSC members. It analyzes their socialization process in the UN, including interaction/coordination, what generates informal representation by using qualitative methods and conducting interviews with the countries' representatives to the UN at the time. The informal

representation of the EU positions is measured by analyzing interview data and the Draft Resolutions that were co-sponsored by the selected countries - comparison of the issue-based and geographical scope of the resolutions both with the national and EU interests before the action made.

To explain the varying levels of representation, this study focuses on the state size a factor that affects levels of socialization, that in turn, brings about a certain type of foreign policy, i.e., higher, or lower level of informal representation of the EU positions. In this study the main process through which socialization of the EU MSs occurs is coordination – exchange of national position and alignment of them to formulate a common one. The scope of interest is taken as proxy of state size. The interests are defined by studying policy documents, statements, press-releases.

The hypothesis that the research suggests is:

> *State size positively affects the level of socialization, which increases the level of informal representation of EU positions in the UNSC by the EU MSs.*

The thesis contains three chapters. In the first one, the theoretical framework is laid out and built around the conceptualization of the informal representation of the EU interests, that provides the link to the mechanism of the EU MS socialization. The second chapter presents the methodological approach used for the research and explains the relevance of case as well as provides the operationalization framework of the research. The third chapter presents the empirical measurements on the variables in the case of selected EU MS at the UN by measuring: 1) level of EU MS socialization, 2) scope of national interests (reflecting state size) as what explains variation in levels of representing EU interest, and finally 3) level of informal representation of the EU positions. After that, the conclusions are presented.

## 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is going to, first, introduce the EU's representation in international organizations, distinguishing formal from informal representation, focusing on the formal aspect of it and looking into the rights that the EU has in the UN framework. Then, informal representation of the EU will be presented to show alternative modes of representing EU interests, when the formal representation of interests is not possible. More precisely the focus will be on the role that the Member States play in this process and how the EU interests can still be presented in the international arena when its MSs "speak with one voice". In order to explain under what conditions, the informal representation happen the conceptualization will build a link to the explanation of the informal representation of the EU interests on the UNSC that occurs through the mechanism of MSs socialization and consequently MSs informally represent EU interests in the UNSC. To explain the process, first, the general overview of socialization phenomenon will be provided, what will be followed by the concept of EU MSs socialization in general. The latter concept will include a discussion on EU MSs Europeanization of foreign policy to build a link between the process of socialization and an outcome – representation of the EU interests. After that, the focus will be narrowed down to the EU MSs socialization through EU coordination at the UN headquarters in New York. The chapter will finish with a discussion of factors that affect EU Member State socialization process, namely of the state size, which is therefore expected to also shape the degree to which a MS represents EU interests.

### 1.1. Representation of EU interests in international fora: formal and informal

*In this section, relying on the literature that studies how the EU interests are represented externally, EU general (formal) representation in the international organizations will be provided and followed by the discussion of EU's representation in the UN. Then the focus will be narrowed down to the representation of the EU interests through the Member States, what narrows the discussion down to the EU informal representation in the UN and, more specifically, on the UNSC to provide the theoretical base to the main argument of the thesis. The conceptual background will allow us to connect the informal*

*representation of the EU interests to the mechanisms of its occurrence, that are based on the socialization of the Member States' foreign policy.*

**Formal and informal external representation of the EU**

This research operates with the concepts of formal and informal representation of the EU on the international arena. In order to speak about the modes of external representation that the EU has, the research needs to establish the difference between the concepts and the key features that they have. When we speak about formal representation, then it is the process by which an actor of international relations is made 'present' through the official bodies of that actor and on behalf of the actor (Stanford Encyclopedia 2008). So, the key characteristic is the presence of official and internationally recognized element, when the representation happens according to the established rules, treaties, charters, etc. The concept of informal representation does not have the official, written in the documents element of making the actor 'present' on the international arena. There actor is represented through the bodies that do not act on behalf of the actor officially. There is no agreed framework of how the international actor is represented and the representation fully depends on the representing body.

Accordingly, when the actor that is in the focus of this study – EU is looked at, then the modes of its external representation (formal and informal) work differently and involve specific bodies of the EU. Formal representation of the European Union means making the EU present on its behalf through the set institutional framework and the bodies that are given that role. Formal representation of the EU depends on the policy area and the degree to which the powers are conferred to the EU by the MS in this area. Thus, in the economic and trade area the EU has had a long record of the external engagement due to exclusive competence that the Union has in this area, whereas in the Common Foreign Policy and Security (CFSP) area, which is the focus of this research, the formal representation of the EU has been a more recent phenomenon, enhanced with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. In CFSP the Union can be *formally* represented by: 1) the President of the European Council – summits with third countries at the levels of the heads of government; 2) the High Representative – matters related to CFSP, political dialogue on behalf of the EU with third parties and representation of EU interests in the

international organizations as well as international conferences; 3) EU Delegations – formally represent the EU in the third countries and at the international organizations (EU Commission Vademecum on the External Action 2011: 15).

But the EU external representation can be not only formal, there is also *an informal aspect of it*, when the EU MS can represent the Union without the treaty that assigns this right to them, when there is an informal agreement between the EU MS to represent the EU. The literature mainly presents informal representation of the EU in the international fora in the connection with the traditional formal form of representation (Lord & Pollak 2010, Smith 2008, Smith 2015). Whereas in the formal case the EU is represented or 'speaking' through an official EU body and usually holds and is engaged in a specific mode of work (status) in the international organization, the informal kind of representation has the element of 'speaking through EU official body' absent. In the case of formal representation, the actors/bodies have a recognized right to represent the Union, hence it is established legally, while informal representation is spontaneous and is not supported by any legal obligations, there is no sign of 'diplomatic presence' in the international environment (Lord & Pollak 2010: 118, Smith 2015: 28) Therefore, the interests of the EU are voiced differently and the expression of the common interests of the EU fully relies on the Member States of the EU in representing its positions.

The represented positions are not necessarily included in the official EU document, it is rather the agreed on and common positions of the EU-27 as they are the key players in the intergovernmental CFSP area. Or it can also be the positions of the EU member states that are substantive and give voice to the EU in the international environment because the EU MS is part of that voice by definition. While these differences among the formal and informal representation of the EU apply to EU external representation in general, they also play out in the EU's representation in the international organizations, what will be discussed in the following chapters.

**Formal representation of the EU in the international organizations**

Over the past decades, the EU has increased its international role and, as a global actor, has developed relations with many international organizations and institutions. Such changes were the result of the Union's deepening integration processes and consequent expansion of the EU competences in the external representation. The legal personality of the Union was acquired with the introduction of the Treaty (Article 47, TEU), which made it possible for the EU to widen its scope of external relations, i.e. to enter into treaties that are the precondition for the formal membership. Besides, according to the Article 21 (1) (TEU), one of the aims of the EU became the development of the relations and partnerships with international and regional organizations. And, even though, up until the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty the EU had formal representation in some organizations (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Trade Organization (WTO), observer status at the UNGA, etc.), the Treaty has tried to move it ahead and enhance the EU competences in the international organizations field, for instance the EU has acquired an enhanced observer status in the UNGA, therefore, the positions and interests of the Union can be expressed by the different formal bodies and its international position has strengthened.

We speak about the formal representation of the EU in the international organizations when the Union's supranational bodies are allowed some degree of participation in the international organization and exercise some rights there. It is a widely studied and agreed on concept among researchers that varies only in terms of actors that represent the Union and capacities that it has. Gstöhl (2008: 5) argues that formal representation entails EU bodies' or EU bodies with Member States' participation in the activity of organization, presence of voting rights, contributions to the budgets of international organizations and ability to influence policies. Smith (2015: 22) specifies that formal representation occurs when there is a diplomatic presence (therefore supranational dimension presence) of the EU in the international organization and when it can express its values and interests.

While the legal personality of the EU has expanded Union's possibilities for cooperation on the international arena, its formal representation in the international organizations remains an entangled issue both in the question of who represents the EU as well as in

the question of how the EU should be represented, what refers to the mode of participation of the EU.

The issue of the body that represents the EU formally in the international organizations is complicated due to the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty as well as due to the division of competences between the Union and its Member States, therefore due to the internal specifics of the Union that define who is going to represent the EU in what international fora (Kaczyński 2011: 4). According to the TEU, the choice of a representing actor depends on the policy that is discussed in the international fora, i.e. on the extent of EU's engagement in that policy internally (Art.5(2) TEU). If the policy is within the competence of the EU, therefore if it has external competence there, then the Commission shall represent the Union (in WTO, for instance). However, when the policy is within the CFSP framework, then the HR is an actor speaking for the EU in the international arena (UN bodies, for example). The President of the European Council, according to the Article 15 TEU, 'should ensure the external representation of the EU' but without interfering with the HR. Besides, when the policy area falls between the CFSP and the internal EU policy then the HR and respective Commissioner usually represent it on the international arena, what is the case, for instance, with the Climate Negotiations (Kaczyński 2011: 6). Therefore, the body that represents the EU in the international organization depends on the area of competences of the EU, which results in the different combinations of EU representation in the international arena.

However, the competences that the EU has in the policy area is not the only nuance that defines the representative body of the EU, there is another important external factor that overrides the internal policy logic of the Union. In the international organizations, the EU can participate in the following ways: EU can participate alone, with its Member States and not participate at all (Kaddous 2015: 4). Such difference is based not only on the legal provisions listed in the Treaties and the position of the Member States on the issue, but also on the *international organization rules*. It means that the EU may not be allowed to be a member of the international organization if the rules of such organization say so, even if the policy area falls under exclusive or shared competence of the EU. Such conditions of the EU formal representation in the international organization lead to the

different modes that the EU can have there, i.e. the different extent of actions that the EU can perform there.

The classification of the mode of formal representation depends on the EU's abilities and rights that it can exercise in the international organization, which is an intricate issue due to the varied description of such modes in the literature (Debaere et al 2014, Kaddous 2015, Jørgensen & Wessel 2013, Gstöhl 2008). Jørgensen & Wessel (2013: 269) differentiate between *the observer* (International Labour Organization (IOL), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), UN bodies (UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNCHR, etc.) and *the full member status* (Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), etc.) that the EU can hold. While the latter status does not raise any questions as the EU can exercise all of the rights available in the organization, the former is spoken about when the Union has the right to participate in the meetings of the organization but does not have any voting rights. Moreover, the observer status can also imply that the EU's participation is strictly limited to formal meetings that follow the formal consultations and discussion step. The Union may be given a word only after all of its members have voiced their opinion, meaning that the EU loses its political weight in the international organization. Gstöhl (2008: 8) explains differentiation between an observer and enhanced observer status (UNGA), which the author also names 'full participant', and stresses that the former implies the right to attend meetings only, while the latter has the right to propose amendments and preside over meetings.

Therefore, it can be summed up that there is formal representation for the European Union when the international organization foresees such role to it, only then the internal configuration (division of competencies, EU MS willingness to give the EU the official right to represent in a particular policy area) of the EU comes into the picture and has the effect on the choice of the representing body that will officially speak for the EU positions in such organization. It is especially important for the CFSP area, where the EU does not have exclusive competences and it is the EU MSs that can collectively represent the EU positions. Moreover, the limits imposed by the international organization can lead to the

situation where the EU cannot be represented formally at all, but it is exactly the moment when informal representation by the EU MS that are members of the international organization comes into the picture. It is important because for the EU it means that even in such an intergovernmental area as CFSP its voice still can be heard.

**EU informal representation in the International Organizations**

The phenomenon of the EU informal representation in the international organizations is scarcely discussed in the literature, what can be explained by the focus on a broad formal presence and representation of the Union on the international arena as well as by the difficulty to study the presence of the phenomenon in the international organization. This limits the diversity in conceptualization but at the same time offers flexibility that can help tailor the informal representation of the EU to the international organization of our focus – UN and the UNSC more specifically.

When speaking about Member States informally representing the EU in the international organization, therefore, where, according to the legal framework of the organization, the EU cannot be represented through its official bodies and is not engaged in the activity of organization, the literature distinguishes between individual and collective informal representation (Farrell 2008: 28-29, Kaczynsky 2011: 5). The difference between individual and collective informal representation does not fundamentally change the main idea of such representation, where the EU is 'given a voice' through the representation of the national positions by the EU MS and is related to the configuration of actors representing the EU.

Informal representation happens no matter if the EU MS represent the EU positions individually or collectively. It especially refers to the UN bodies (discussed later), where it occurs when the EU MS give voice to the EU through expression of their national positions that are the same as the EU ones. Kaczynsky (2011: 10) also speaks about the possibility of external representation of the EU in the international organizations to be done through numerous actors. Even though the reference is given both to formal and informal representation of the EU in international organizations, the possibility of the latter representation is highlighted for the UN bodies. Therefore, it supports the argument of informal representation of the EU occurring where the EU does not have exclusive

competence in the area – CFSP and the external environment, therefore the rules of the international organization do not allow the EU to be officially represented in it and the only possibility for the EU to be represented is through the MS.

The collective aspect of informal representation is closely connected with the EU Member States phenomenon of 'speaking with a single voice' where they represent a single agreed upon position in the international environment. When studying informal representation of the EU from the collective angle the literature describes the phenomenon as common, not legally prescribed representation of a coordinated position in the environment where the EU is formally absent (Conceição-Heldt & Meunier 2014: 8, Jorgensen & Laatikainen 2010: 131). Therefore, the EU MS voluntary take the function of representing the EU positions due to the impossibility of the EU to be present in the international organization officially and discuss/agree upon the common positions that would represent the EU-27.

It is especially visible in the case of the international organization of the focus of this research, the UN and the UNSC in particular, where the EU is not formally represented and largely relies on the EU MS. Therefore, to understand the logic behind the informal representation of the EU there, the position of the Union in the UN needs to be described, including the formal aspect of it.

**EU representation in the United Nations**

One international organization has been especially widely studied to understand how the EU as a mix of intergovernmental and supranational functions and is represented there (Laatikainen & Smith 2006, Jorgensen & Laatikainen 2012, Monteleone 2015, Monteleone 2020, Rasch 2008). The UN – international organization that is in focus of this research has a complex relationship with the EU's due to the intricate structure of the UN institutions, each of which perceives the Union as an international actor differently from a legal point of view. Therefore, the EU enjoys several modes of participation in the UN bodies and, hence, has a different extent of rights there. Full UN membership is impossible for the EU as Article 4 of the UN Charter says that only states can be granted the member status.

In this thesis the focus is on the UNSC as the area of CFSP of the EU, but to understand the way the EU is represented there, the study also draws from the EU engagement in the UNGA, where it is the only international organization that has an enhanced observer status. It means that the EU has the right to attend meetings and, as an addition, to take part in the general debate of the General Assembly, orally suggest proposals and amendments (that later can be voted on at the request of an EU Member State) as well as to be involved in the various modes of communication that is ongoing in the UNGA (Zamfir & Fardel 2020: 10).

Since the Lisbon Treaty came to power, not only did the EU acquired its legal personality, but also changes in the external representation of the EU in the global arena have occurred. Previously, an observer status implied that the Union was represented on the UNGA by the Member State that was holding the Council Presidency (Smith 2006: 117), what can be considered as the case of informal representation as the MS ia s not the official EU body that is in the supranational dimension of it. Lisbon Treaty has introduced an important position for the external representation of the Union, including representation in the international organizations – the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union External Action Service was created, and EU delegations established, the task of which is to maintain external relations and formally represent the Union in the UN institutions across the world (Zamfir & Fardel 2020: 10). Therefore, currently having an enhanced observer status in the UNGA and an observer status in some other UN main bodies, the EU is formally represented by the head of the EU delegation, and by the HR/VP, the EU Commission (when the agenda is about trade) or the President of the EU Council when it comes to the special issues.

However, the formal representation that the EU has in the UNGA does not extend to the one of the most important bodies of the UN – the UNSC. The issues discussed in the UNSC concern issues the main interests of the states and the legal framework of the UNSC does not allow the participation of the EU. . The EU official bodies that represent the Union legally in other UN bodies (EU Delegation, HR/VP, etc.) do not have the competence to take action together with the EU Member States on the UNSC

(Drieskens 2008: 187). Therefore, the EU does not hold any status on the UNSC, hence, it is not represented there formally. The only option for the EU to 'speak' in the UNSC formally is for the EU HR/Head of the EU Delegation to hold a speech after the agreement of all UNSC Members to invite the official body of the EU (Rasch 2008: 180). Thus, it is evident that there is no formal participation of the EU in UNSC.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is impossible to have the interests of the EU to be presented on the UNSC as there are EU Member States present among the members of the UNSC, which at least potentially can represent the EU positions agreed upon, what they do by formulating their position in a way that reflects the EU-27 position. It should be noted that this research focuses on the non-permanent EU MS, that do not have a veto power and have not been in the UNSC since its creation, therefore, they do not have a strong discrepancy between each other.

Even though the UNSC its members follow the principle of national representation, where each member state represents only itself and speaks only on its behalf, the situation is more complicated and divergent for the EU MSs. The latter have committed themselves to the Article 34 of the Lisbon Treaty, that speaks about the MS representation of the EU positions in the UN and coordination with other EU members if it does not contradict the UN Charter. It means that the EU MS should communicate their positions with the other EU MS, both on the UNSC and UN in general; where possible defend the common position of the Union and inform the formal representation of the EU on the issues discussed in the UNSC. Therefore, the interests of the EU are not absent from the UNSC and the representation of the EU positions is left to the EU MS and the EU is dependent on the EU MS speaking on its behalf (Drieskens 2008: 614). Hence, the EU positions are represented in the UNSC only when there is a common position reached among its Member States or (speaking of individual informal representation) when the EU MS national position does not differentiate form the common EU one. So, instead of formal representation the EU is represented informally by the MS. Therefore, the phenomenon of informal representation is strongly emphasized in the UNSC.

Having explored overall participation of the EU in international organizations and distinguished formal and informal representation of the Union it became evident that there are other possibilities for the EU to be represented even if the environment does not foresee formal representation of the EU interests and is as restricted to states and representation of their national interests as UNSC. However, the phenomenon of informal representation shows that Member States and most importantly interaction and definition of the common position (coordination) between them can have a strong interest in the positions that are taken by them later in the UNSC. This raises the question of when/ to what extent/under what conditions EU MS informally represent EU common interests. This is addressed in the following section that focuses on a) socialization, b)size.

## 1.2. <u>Socialization and EU Member States Foreign Policy</u>

In this section, the socialization framework will be disentangled to show under what conditions informal representation of EU common interests by EU MS becomes more/less likely. For this purpose, it focuses on socialization and, more specifically (given the interest of this study on the difference in socialization of EU small and big MS in the UNSC), on size as a factor influencing the degree of socialization and therefore the likelihood of informal representation. First, the overview of the concept as well as process of socialization will be given, focusing on what it is and how it works. Then it will be followed by the conceptualizations of the EU Member States' socialization both inside the EU and in the context of EU MS coordination at the UN specifically. After that, the connection between the interaction of the Member States (i.e. coordination on UN-related issues, and more specifically on UNSC issues) as the process of socialization and the outcome of this process (i.e. informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC) will be presented, establishing that, in line with previous findings, level of informal representation varies with intensity (level) of interaction. In other words, more intense interaction leads to higher level of socialization – and therefore to higher more likely behaviour that follows expectations of 'appropriate behaviour' in the group (e.g., informal representation of EU interests). In order to connect the considerations of EU socialization at the UN to wider debates in MS acting in line with EU common interests, the discussion briefly touch upon the Europeanization of the EU Member States foreign policy. After establishing the causal link between the interaction of the Member States and informal

representation of the EU interests, the focus will be turned to an additional factor that affects the strength or intensity of the socialization process, i.e., that affects how much interaction/coordination results in MS defining their interest/position in accordance with common interests/position of all EU MS and therefore to the likelihood of informal representation of common EU interests by a MS. In this research, state size/smallness will be introduced as an additional factor that affects the ease/strength of MS socialization because the study is interests in difference between big/small EU MS when it comes to informal representation and therefore how (level of) interaction/coordination leads to (the higher level) informal representation. The conceptualization of the state size will be given to then connect it to the main argument of the thesis. More precisely, state size as what determines scope of interests – the latter then in turn increasing/decreasing chances for socialization, for an individual MS defining its interests in accordance with the common interest.

**Socialization framework**

International organizations, while being intricate actors on the global arena as well as having an entangled legal framework and cooperation practices, also have specific internal dynamics and an ability to influence its members and, more specifically, to shape conceptions of 'appropriate behaviour' of the members. When thinking about the ways in which in IOs affects behaviour of states that are members of this IO, socialization provides an answer. The socialization argument holds that IOs shape what members consider 'the right thing to do'. It became actively studied by the IR scholars at the end of the 20th century, where particular attention was given to the phenomenon of socialization (Hooghe 1999, Checkel 1998, Sabatier 1988). In the context of the EU, the phenomenon was studied in relation to different actors ranging from the Member State's officials (Hooghe 1999, Johnston 2001, Lempp & Altenschmidt, Beyers 2010, de Fleurs & Müller 2012) to the Member States themselves (Bearce & Bondanella 2007, Chelotti et al 2017, Monteleone 2010, Monteleone 2019), therefore there is no single definition or theory of the socialization, what speaks about diversity of its forms and understandings. Nevertheless, it is certainly a phenomenon that affects the behaviour of actors within international organization as well as in the international arena. For the present research the socialization is understood as the process of change in the EU MS

behaviour in a way that leads to the higher level of coordination (higher level of reaching and adopting the common position in the CFSP area), what results in the higher level of the informal representation of the EU positions. Further conceptualization of socialization will offer an explanation to the understanding of this phenomenon with relation to the EU.

Another important aspect of the phenomenon of socialization to understand the definition of it that is used in the research is the nature of socialization. In the literature, it is studied either as an outcome (result, product) (Lempp & Altenschmidt 2008, Beyers 2010, Hooghe 2005, Scully 2005, Trondal 2001, Monteleone 2010) or as a process (mechanism) (Chelotti et al, 2017, Johnston 2001, Checkel 2005, de Flers & Müller 2012). As an outcome it refers to the actors permanently internalizing the norms of the institutions/other actors they interact with and changing their behavior, therefore the socialization makes them either socialized or not. As a process, the socialization refers to the gradual change in the behaviour and adoption of the norms of the institutions and other actors together with the national ones. It is not a closed-ended process but rather ongoing, that can increase or decrease the level of socialization. In this research the socialization is understood as a process, which represents a learning mechanism with main stages that include interaction, exchange of norms/values and their gradual internalization or absence of it by the members. Higher level of socialization would mean that EU MS are more likely to informally represent the EU positions, whereas lower level of socialization means that they are less likely to do it. The outcome nature of socialization, presented blow,  will help understand the difference between the two.

The strand of research that looks at socialization as an outcome sees it as a change in the members' behaviour towards the one promoted by the institutions of an international organization. Thus, socialization represents internalization of norms and interests of organization, where they permanently become a part of 'actor's property' (Lempp & Altenschmidt 2008: 9). Therefore, an actor acquires a socialized identity, that changes its preferences or 'adopts a pro-norm' behaviour as Beyers (2010: 5) notes. The socialization as an outcome by the influence of the institutions makes the actor adopt the positions/values of such institution, being in the institutional environment the actor starts acting according to the norms of it. The outcome of successful socialization is behaviour by an actor which displays the full adoption and representation of the positions of

institution when they fully substitute the national ones. But in the case of our study, the level of informal representation of the EU interest is in the focus, therefore, firstly, it is not the case of either being socialized or not socialized i.e., it is about representing more or less interests. So, the socialization is not understood as the outcome and, moreover, not only EU institutions but also EU MS play a role in it. Thus, the socialization as a process is the type the research is focused on.

When we turn to the literature that studies socialization as a process, then from the nature of it is evident that the phenomenon is continuous and includes certain elements for it to work. Monteleone (2015: 47) considers socialization to be a mechanism of change where the central element is gradual internalization. Members, through the processes of coordination and regular interaction in the social environment created by the international organization, form or reform their state preferences via exchanges within the social group what leads to adoption of similar positions between such members that are in line with the overall framework of international organization (Chelotti et al. 2017: 2, Johnston 2001: 487, Beyers 2010: 916). Checkel (2005: 802) stresses the 'socializing potential of institutions' and even claims that members are socially pressured to adopt/internalize the behaviour of a community, what is followed by internalization. Therefore, we see that the studies of socialization as a process consider the phenomenon to be a multi-stage social learning, where formation of positions corresponding to the environment of the community is conditional on the prior exchange of norms/values between the member states, where the key to the phenomenon is *interactions* that happen in the environment and lead to the internalization practices among members. For informal representation of the EU positions, it means that the EU MS represent the EU positions informally because they are a part of the EU and the informal representation is high when they are constantly involved in the mutual interaction (define positions by coordination, listen to the opinion of others and do things in the European way in general).

To understand how general conceptualization of socialization is applied to the EU we need to look at what stages are included in the process there and how it happens. The EU, while having many dimensions, represents a unique type of international organization with a comprehensive and strong institutional structure, so the socialization process there

is particularly prominent and is expected to affect areas such as CFSP, and the coordination at the UN as well as on the UNSC specifically.

**Socialization of EU Member States**

As it is already established in the conceptual framework of socialization, the environment for it depends on the organizational structure of the institutions. When international organization has clearly defined norms and values, developed functions and identity, then the socialization practices there are more intense, what makes the members more involved and affected by the process of socialization (Suvarierol et al. 2013: 3). Therefore, strength in institutions leads to intensity of socialization process and, as EU institutional structure is highly developed, it has the ability to create socialization practices, what means that it can influence the way Member States behave within and outside the Union. However, strong institutions are not the only element that preconditions the intensity of socialization of the EU MS, apart from them, the interaction between the EU Members plays a big role. Interaction between the EU MS resembles the practice of sharing of information, learning from the common EU experience and internalization of it. Therefore, the common EU positions are adopted through the process of reevaluation and reformation of the national positions of the EU MS (Alecu de Flers 2012: 26, Chelotti 2020: 6). Important feature is that EU gradually manages the socialization processes and learning between the Member States that this process involves, therefore, their impact cannot be viewed straight away but is rather seen when the Member States act outside of the internal framework, especially in the foreign policy area. For this research it means that informal representation of the EU positions is especially visible in the international environment like the UNSC, which is the focus of our research. Interaction on the UNSC issues makes it more likely for the EU positions to be represented by the EU MS through the national ones.

 A simple conceptualization of EU Member States foreign policy Europeanization can be divided into three forms: uploading, downloading and cross-loading (Börzel 2002, Tonra 2015). All of them speak about the influence of either 1) EU institutions on the Member States national policies that lead to their change in line with the EU norms and values; or 2) Member States influence on the EU norms and values by initiating certain

supranational changes in the policy-field; or 3) mutual exchange of practices, norms and values between the EU Member States (Aggestam & Bichi 2019, Monteleone 2019, Wong 2012). In this research Europeanization phenomenon in the foreign policy area combines downloading and cross-loading, thus the influence is projected both from the EU institutions and from the other EU Member States on each other. This means that beliefs, norms, and foreign policy behaviour is formed in the environment of 'facilitated coordination' (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004), where Members of the EU adapt to each other's practices and learn from them, what leads to a policy change or. Europeanization resembles EU Member States socialization in its entirety as EU institutions' influence mixed with the consultation, cooperation and intense interaction between the EU Member States makes their policies informally Europeanized (Aggestam & Bichi 2019: 517). For the informal representation of the EU positions in the UNSC, what is the focus of this research, this means the EU MSs, being a part of the Union and having internalized to a certain degree values and positions of it, interact and coordinate their positions with each other what leads to the higher or lower level of the informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC.

Therefore, the socialization mechanism of EU Member States on the UNSC can be described in the main following stages: the EU provides the framework which defines norms/practices 'how a 'good' EU MS defines its positions on the UNSC'; 2) They interact with each other inside this environment; and together this environment plus the interaction results in the socialization process. The outcome of this then is – a specific way how EU MS formulate their positions on the UNSC, more precisely is that they formulate their positions in a way that incorporates the common interests shaped by cross-loading (coordination) – which then leads to informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC.

**EU Member States socialization at the UN**
The international environment, that is the focus of this research is the UN, thus, it is important to know how the process of socialization between EU Member States affects whether and to what level EU MS represent common interests on the UNSC – and how this is reinforced by interaction/coordination among EU MSs. This will help the research

understand what leads to EU Member States informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC is needed. The scholarly works suggest (Da Silva 2019, Drieskens 2009, Laatikainen 2015), that an ongoing process of socialization present between the EU MS in the UN happens through continuous coordination/cooperation (e.g., coordination meetings), what later influences the EU MS actions in the main UN bodies. More specifically, it may influence how non-permanent EU MS who serve on the UNSC define their positions/interests which they represent on the UNSC. This means that those EU MS that are in the UNSC are continuously engaged coordination between themselves on the UNSC issues and cooperate with wider EU-27. The various formats of meetings that the EU MS have, lead to likeliness od formulation the common position and higher degree of its internalization i.e., informal representation on the UNSC as the national position.

The coordination processes of EU Member States within the UN have increased and were modified since the introduction of the Lisbon treaty, which has strengthened the coordination mechanism between them and made it more effective. The changes brought with the treaty contributed to the 'cross-loading' type of Europeanization of the Member States both inside the EU and in the international arena. The interaction and cross-loading between them have gained intensity, what was brought about by the coordination or concertation practices of the EU Member States on the international arena and especially in the UN (Laatikainen & Smith 2019: 125). The main supporter of the coordination practices of the EU Member States in the UN is the EU delegation, that facilitates meetings and day-to-day concertation between the EU Members. The practices, institutionalized by the delegation 'initiated new cycles of Europeanization' and created new opportunities for the EU Members to socialize (da Silva 2019: 11), which will be discussed in the later sections.

The main achievement of the EU delegation to the UN and EU institutions in general was construction of a robust mechanism that makes it possible to enhance the EU influence and EU MS behaviour even in such strictly intergovernmental organization as the UN. The EU Member States coordination and interaction is regular and effective through coordination meetings, where they are constantly engaged in the learning process: discuss the issues presented in the UN bodies, including UNSC; decide on their voting positions

and agree on the positions statements and resolutions of the EU that should be presented across the UN bodies (Smith 2008, Da Silva 2019). The environment at the meetings encourages the representatives of the EU Member States, who take the meetings very seriously, in finding a common position and following the coordination reflux, what results in the development of an 'EU culture of unity' (Laatikainen & Smith 2019: 156). The developed coordination among EU MS in the UN allows the EU voice to be heard even when it does not have such comprehensive rights as the full members. This means that the described coordination practices may increase the level of informal representation of the EU positions in the UNSC.

In the UNSC environment socialization happens to a lesser degree than in the UNGA, for instance, but it is still present. It has been discussed earlier that those EU Member States that are in the UNSC, according to the Treaties, should engage in coordination practices in international organizations to adhere to the common EU position there. It includes sharing of information on the issues of common interests with those EU Member States that are not present in the UNSC and making sure that the EU positions and interests are defended. Blavoukos et al. (2017: 453) adds that coordination between the EU Member States in the UNSC and the EU delegation plays a key role in the coordination of EU MS / ensuring representation of EU interests at the UN. The coordination includes formal and informal meetings between the EU UNSC members, where they try to come to a common denominator on the issues. EU Delegation promotes further Europeanization of EU MS behaviour on the UNSC by creating a new format of the UNSC EU Member States that increase their daily concertation and develops cooperation practices between the permanent and non-permanent EU Member States in the UNSC. There are weekly meetings held by the EU delegation – EU-briefer of the month where the UNSC issues are discussed with the wider EU-27 and the exchange of positions may happen; there are meetings on the ambassadorial and political-coordinator level as well as press stake-out after the UNSC sessions. These various forms of cooperation and coordination between the EU Members in the UNSC, often lead to the definition and the common EU positions and influence the way the EU MS define their national position and later represent them in the UNSC. Therefore, this puts in place the conditions that EU MS might represent EU common interests/positions which were defined in coordination with other EU MS.

The degree to which the socialization process of the EU MS will be influenced depends on several conditions. First of all, it depends on the willingness of the state to be socialized (Blavoukos & Bourantonis 2017: 2012). It means that whether the EU Member will represent the EU position on the UNSC or not is affected by the extent to which such state wants to internalize norm or adapt to the environment by changing the norms ad hoc, hence, how much it wants to become an object of the process. An incentive to engaging in the socialization process can be personal goals attainment, where UNSC EU position representation leads to the benefits on the international arena, mainly related to the 'importance' of the country (Monteleone 2019: 4-5). Also, EU Member States might internalize policies because of the pressure from the social environment, so coordination mechanism usually contributes to it (da Silva 2019). The EU MS might be seen as the one that diverges and 'sticks out' from the group, therefore, the EU MS might face 'peer pressure' form the other members and informal representation of the EU positions will be a logical decision to avoid it. Another factor that determines the strength of the effect of socialization relates to the process itself. It is argued that duration, frequency, and intensity of both formal and informal interactions between the EU Member States in the UNSC and other UN bodies increase the likelihood of the EU Members positions being reshaped by the socialization mechanism (Chelotti et al 2017: 7). Here needs to be a more substantive transition. While all these factors, by shaping socialization, can potentially shape likelihood of informal representation, the focus here is on another, so far unexplored factor, namely on the size of such EU Member State.

The state size directly affects the level of socialization of the EU MS and the likelihood to represent the EU informally, because it enters the equation of socialization in the form of the scope of interest. In this research the state size is defined in relation to the policymaking: the smaller the state, the lesser is its number of deliberated policies, therefore, such states do not have a wide scope of issues they pay attention to on then national basis, what limits them on the international arena (Thorhallsson & Wivel 2006: 655). This means that smaller states usually have fewer pre-defined interests – which increases chances that they formulate policy in coordination. This means that the state

size matters because it influences how likely it is that states do or do not define their interests in coordination.

The scope of interest is the definition of the state size that is used to study the way in which the state size affects the level of socialization of the EU MS in the UN and explain the degree of socialization of the EU MS that serves on the UNSC and therefore the extent to which it informally represents the EU positions. The focus is on the narrower range of interest that distinguishes small Member States from big ones. It is observed in the literature that small EU Member States have a limited range of issues they focus on. Panke (2010: 810) notices that they do not actively participate in the discussion of issues due to the shortages in the ministries and lack of national positions regarding the policies discussed. For socialization and therefore likelihood of informal representation, this means that whenever the issue exceeds their interest, they are more likely to coordinate with other EU members and alter their national position towards the EU one, when representing their national position in the UNSC (Panke et al 2018: 144). In other words, they are likely to define their interests in accordance/coordination with other EU MS. This means, with other factors (e.g., level of interaction etc.) being equal, socialization/Europeanization of small states' behaviour on the UNSC is more likely, they are more likely to represent EU common interests, than big MS. Tarp and Hansen (2013: 10) name the EU foreign policy to have a strong impact on the policies of small member states that happens through the intense coordination and interaction among the EU Member States inside the EU and in various frameworks on the international arena. For informal representation on the UNSC this means, that the small EU MS are more likely to represent the common EU position as their national one because of the EU foreign policy interest.

So, referring to the literature that studied the level of socialization of EU Member States – representation of EU positions nexus (De Flers & Müller 2012, Chellotti 2016) it is argued that the interaction between the EU Member States in the UN, which involves exchange of information and coordination of positions, provides a context in which the formulation of a national position by the  EU MS in the UNSC is likely to be done in a way that reflects the EU position. The reflection of the EU position in the national one is more likely to be seen in case of the smaller EU MS in the UNSC i.e., in case of the state

that does not have a wide scope of pre-defined positions prior to the UNSC membership and is therefore more likely to define its own positions/interests in terms of the EU positions/including interests of other EU MS. This means, the smaller the EU MS, the more likely is it, given similar levels of interaction/coordination, to informally represent common EU interests/positions on the UNSC. This, the connection between state size and likelihood of informal representation is what is going to be studied in the following chapter by studying the interview data provided by the representatives of the selected countries and the co-sponsorship of the Draft Resolutions by the EU MSs .

## 2. METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methodological approach, used to test the hypothesis formulated in the previous chapter of the thesis, which says that the size of the EU MS influences its level of socialization in the UN and therefore shapes the likelihood of a MS informally representing the EU positions on the UNSC. First, the following section discusses the type of the research design used to provide the answer to the research question. Then, the Chapter proceeds by giving the case selected for conducting the research and its justification, which is be followed by the operationalization of the analytical framework.

### 2.1. Research design

The aim of this research is to find out how the size of the EU MS, affects informal representation of the EU positions by those EU MS on the UNSC. To answer this question, the study uses small-n research design, which involves comparison of two EU MS that were members of the UNSC. In the literature small-n research is also called a paired comparison that is characterized by 'an intimacy of analysis' (Tarrow 2010: 25) which is a feature that the large-N research lacks. Also, the paired comparison provides the research with opportunity to be more detailed and contain an in-depth look on the selected cases. Brady and Collier (2004: 277) claim that in the selected research design the focus lies on the 'casual-process analysis' what helps to see the suspected dependency more clearly.

The choice of paired comparison analysis for the research of the EU MS informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC is justified by the following reasons: 1) there are up to three non-permanent UNSC members that are EU MS, so the number of the states is limited, what does not allow to use large-n research; 2) the difference in the socialization effect is better observed and informal representation is better traced when the focus is narrow, therefore, it allows to achieve the aims of the study, namely to isolate the effect of state size on representation. The paired comparison analysis, like all other small-n research studies is divided into two types: Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). In this research the MSSD is used, where cases similar on all potentially relevant dimensions (factors potentially determining the

extent to which a state represents EU interests) except for one are selected. The diverging factor acts as an explanation to the change in the outcome of the causal relationship that is studied (Anckar 2008: 3). Therefore, the case selection for the current research was based on the EU MS that do not occupy a permanent seat on the UNSC and have similar characteristics except for one that seeks to explain informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC.

To find out what effect the state size has on the strength of EU MS socialization in the UN and if it may lead to informal representation of the EU positions, two pairs of EU MSs, that served as non-permanent UNSC members are selected: Portugal and Germany (2011-2012) and Germany and Estonia (2019-2021). The choice was made based on the similarities the countries have and which may affect their likeliness to informally represent the EU positions on the UNSC: 1)the duration of EU membership – Germany and Portugal are old members of the EU, hence this factor explains the differences in the degrees of socialization, and the extent of representation is controlled for; Germany and Estonia are selected as the more recent case that provides current data; 2) UNSC membership during the same time period – both countries were non-permanent UNSC members during 2011-2012 and 2019-2021 respectively - this matters because they had the same formats of interaction on the UNSC issues and their UNSC agenda was the same; 3) differences in issues dealt on the UNSC  - this matters because they were dealing with the same issues on the UNSC agenda and the differences in issues could explain differences in the level of informal representation because when the EU MS speak on different issues then they do not have the united EU position on the UNSC, hence, the do not informally represent the EU.

*Table 2.1 MSSD of the study*

| Factor | Germany | Portugal |
|---|---|---|
| The duration of EU membership | an old member | an old member |
| The UNSC membership during the same time period | UNSC member in 2011-2012 | UNSC member in 2011-2012 |
| Differences in issues | Same issues dealt with | Same issues dealt with |
| Size of the EU MS | big EU MS | small EU MS |

As the objective of this study is to understand what effect the size of the EU MS, that are the members of the UNSC, has on their socialization and consequent informal representation, it is the variable that the study centers on and it acts as the diverging characteristic between Germany and Portugal as the former differs in size with the latter. According to the hypothesis if the research: the smaller the EU MS, the higher is its level of socialization, so it is more likely to represent EU positions on the UNSC informally. Therefore, if we see the difference in the level of informal representation of the EU positions, where one EU MS represents the EU positions stronger than the other, then the state size will act as an explanation for such difference of informal representation of the EU by one country and not the other.

The present research is centered around phenomena of informal representation, socialization, and the scope of interest. According to the hypothesis, the causal relationship between these phenomena is built as follows: EU MS socialization in the UN makes the informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC higher if the socializing EU MS is small in size (i.e., in the scope of interest). Therefore, we have three variables: 1) independent – the level of socialization of EU Member States; 2) intervening – size of the EU Member States that are non-permanent members on the UNSC; 3) dependent – the level of representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by the non-permanent UNSC EU Member States. In order to find out if the suggested causal relationship explains the observed outcome, the research operationalizes these variables and employs qualitative methods of analysis to measure them: namely, interviews with experts and content analysis, what is described in the next section of this chapter.

## 2.2. Operationalization

In order to study the phenomena of socialization, informal representation and state size as well as to find out if the causal relationship between the variables explains the level of informal representation of the EU positions by the EU MS that serve on the UNSC, the research centers around indicators that measure the listed phenomena:

The level of socialization of EU Member States can be measured from *the frequency of coordination meetings that the EU MS have on the UNSC issues and the importance*

*attributed to the coordination meetings*. As was previously discussed in the theoretical chapter, the EU MSs in the UN are engaged in the regular coordination with each other. By looking at the frequency of meetings between the EU MSs on the UN and focusing on the participation and interaction during the meetings of the selected MSs, their level of socialization is established. The present research speaks about the high level of socialization when meetings between the EU MSs occur often and when they describe the coordination as valuable and needed. The low level of socialization is spoken about when the coordination meetings occur rarely and when the value in and the need for coordination meetings is not observed. The method used for measurement of the modes of engagement in coordination meetings and the importance attributed to coordination meetings is interviews with experts; that will be discussed later in the subchapter.

The level of representation of EU positions is operationalized by the research as *the match* between the EU position on the issue and the position that the EU MSs represented on the UNSC as well as the match in the voting, therefore, a common voting pattern; the *self-perception of the representation of the common EU position on the UNSC and as a relative importance a country assigns to representing EU interests.*

In this research *the match* is seen when the EU MSs position on the UNSC is the same as the EU position on the same issue and when there are no discrepancies in the voting on the resolutions. Therefore, if the selected EU MSs voice their national position regarding the same issue the EU voices its position on, and this position is similar, then the match is detected. When they do not diverge in their voting patterns, the match is also detected, If the match substitutes more than the 60% of the overall voiced positions on the UNSC and the deviation in voting is up to 10%, then the level of informal representation is high, if it is below 60% and the deviation in voting is more than 10% - then the level on informal representation of the EU positions is low.

The *self-perception of the representation of the common EU position on the UNSC* is seen when the EU MS represents the EU-27 interests in its national position on the UNSC. In the measurement paragraph it will be discussed in detail that the research mainly uses the interviews with the representative of the countries and the Draft Resolutions co-sponsored

by the EU MS of the choice to identify the match. If the interviewees state that the national positions represented the EU positions from 7-10 (on the scale from 1 to 10), then *the representation of the common EU position on the UNSC* is detected, and the level of informal representation is high. If the interviewees state that the national positions represented the EU positions from 1-6 (on the scale from 1 to 10), then the level of representation of the EU positions is low.

The *relative importance that the country assigns to representation of the EU interests* is seen when the interviewees state that the 'gave EU a voice' and found it necessary to do it. If the interview data indicates that the representation of the EU interests was important for the country of the focus of this research, then the level of informal representation of EU positions is high. If the country does not mention it or assign no importance to it, then the level of informal representation of EU positions is low,

The intervening variable – size of the EU Member States is operationalized as *the need for coordination when formulating a national position*, and also the *scope of interest* the chosen EU MS had prior to the membership on the UNSC is looked at, where the gap between the scope prior to membership and while being a member can be seen.

To measure the *need for coordination when formulating a national position*, the interviewees were asked questions on the process of formulation of the national position on the UNSC and the role that other EU MS played in it. If the data suggests that the selected country turned for help or consulted other EU MSs or felt the need to coordinate in order to formulate the national position, then *the scope of interest is narrow and the state size – small*. If the data does not suggest it – then *the scope of interest is wide and the state size – big*.

To measure *the scope of interests*, the interviewees were asked questions about the number of issues where the delegation of the selected country did not deal a lot *prior* to the UNSC membership; about the procedure of defining a position on the issues where the country did not have experience with; and how different (in the light of the EU coordination) was the definition of a position for such issues compared to the one where

the EU MS had a pre-defined position. If the interviewees states that the country had issues where it was difficult to identify the national position prior to or when being a member of the UNSC, then *the scope of interest is narrow – hence the state is small*; if there were no problems and all of the issues were covered – then *the scope of interest is wide – hence the state is big.*

To find out about the level of socialization of the EU MS that were non-permanent members on the UNSC, to see what was the level of and how the coordination between the selected countries of Germany and Portugal and other EU MSs happened on the UNSC issues; and to find out whether the EU positions were adopted during the process of socialization as the ones that the EU MSs would present on the UNSC by the selected states, the research used qualitative methods, among which the main was expert interviews. The expert interviews were also used to measure the state size, to find out about the width of the geographical scope and the number of issues that the country had a position on prior to the UNSC and while being there; and the level of informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by the EU MS, to find out how much 'voice' was given to the EU interests in the EU MS presenting their national positions on the UNSC.

Germany and Portugal were non-permanent UNSC members in 2011-2012, what dates 10 years back and could affect the validity if we compare it with the dynamics on the UNSC now. So, to ensure that the data is comprehensive as well as up-to-date and look into the current socialization of EU MSs in the UN, the study took an additional case of Germany and Estonia, that were non-permanent members of the UNSC in 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 respectively. This is also important to do for the comparison of the frequency of coordination meetings/ coordination formats in 2011-2012 and 2019-2021.Therefore, the research used semi-structured interviews with the representatives of the selected countries to the UN, that served there in 2011-2012 (Germany, Portugal) and 2019-2021(Germany, Estonia) respectively. In the social science studies interviews are argued to be the most effective method to collect primary data from the respondents who were 'in the field' and to fill in the knowledge gaps that exist in the researched field (Val Puyvelde 2018: 4). Also, the interviews reflect the external reality, so this method allows the research to get the needed data for establishing the frequency of meetings among the EU MSs representatives on the UN and for evaluating their level.

The research has chosen semi-structured format of the interview as it gives the interviewer opportunity to create a flexible framework of questions and allows to maneuver throughout the talk what generates more information for consequent analysis. In total, 10 interviews were conducted over the period of March to April 2021. The interviewees were high officials from Germany, Portugal and Estonia that were a part of their home countries' delegations to the UN during their UNSC membership. The distribution of the interviews with the governmental officials among the countries was as follows: Germany – 3 interviews, Portugal – 2 interviews, Estonia – 5 interviews. The interviews were conducted via different methods of communication: 7 – Zoom interviews, 1 – MS Teams interview, 1 – Skype interview and 1 – phone interview. The average length of the interview was 35 minutes.

The interviewees were contacted, and interviews arranged according to the standard methodological procedure. First the potential interview candidates were contacted by email or phone with the interview request, that included the data about the researcher, interview topic and purpose of the interview. The interviewees were provided additional information about the research and the list of interview questions if they expressed the wish to receive them. The interview guide contained four core questions that aimed to find out the details about the interaction between the EU MSs in the UN process as well as to understand when the adoption of the EU position by the EU MSs happens and for what reasons. Also, the interviewees were sent the consent form where all the conditions of the interview were described and agreed on by both sides. The interviewees were given an option to remain anonymous and were notified about the recording of the interviews. The interviewer repeated the conditions of the interview in the beginning of each of them to ensure the consent of the respondent. After the data was collected and transcribed, the recordings were deleted. After the research, analysis was completed the interviewees received the copy of it for their agreement and introduction of changes if needed.

In addition to the data on socialization that was gathered during the semi-structured interviews with the experts, to measure *the importance attributed to the coordination meetings,* the research also turned to the secondary and statistical sources to get the data on *frequency of the meetings* between the EU MSs in the UN. The calendar of EU MS meetings in the UN was analyzed, what showed the regularity with which the EU MSs were interacting in the UNSC.

To find out who was the level representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by Germany and Portugal, the research compared the degree to which the EU positions were similar with the positions of the selected EU MSs on the UNSC. The aim of the comparison was to find a match between the positions, by using Draft-Resolutions, that were co-sponsored by the selected countries, and by implementing another qualitative method, which is content analysis, to define what the position of either Germany or Portugal was on the issue brought up in the UNSC. The choice of the source for analysis was made based on the institutional specifics of the UNSC as well as on the findings from the scholarly literature. Usually, in the research on the EU MSs in the UN their voting patterns in the UNGA are analyzed (Burmester & Jankowski 2018, Chelotti et al 2017, Laatikainen & Smith 2006), what gives the picture of the extent to which the EU MS 'speak with one voice' and represent the EU position. However, this is not feasible for the UNSC as the voting is done unanimously and there is no data on the discussions that happen before the voting, so it is impossible to see if the voting reflects national position of the EU MS that is a non-permanent member of the UNSC, or the position projected by the EU. Also, some works have analyzed the UN General Debate speeches of the EU MS (Chelotti et al 2020), because the content of the speech is argued to be reflecting the national position of the MS. Nevertheless, this research focused on the Draft-Resolutions, that can be co-sponsored by any member of the UN voluntarily and with the aim to bring up an issue that the UN member finds to be important (Monteleone 2015). Co-sponsored Draft-Resolutions are such that either reflect issues/positions that are of special importance to the state co-sponsoring them, therefore show what the interest of the state is and indicate their position particularly well. Therefore, the thesis, by looking at the co-sponsored Draft Resolutions aims to find out what the issue that Germany or Portugal found important were. In this way their national positions on the UNSC were identified and then compared with their national positions before UNSC membership as well as with the EU positions on the same issue. When the research identifies that the issue presented in the co-sponsored Draft-Resolution is new to the EU MS and has not been in the national agenda prior to the UNSC, then the scope of interest of this EU MS is described as narrow. When the issue was present in the national agenda prior to the UNSC, then the scope is wide. If the content of co-sponsored Draft-Resolutions and, therefore, position of EU MS matches the EU position on the issue (expressed in the form of visible interest to the issue in the policy documents/news articles), then it is the case of the EU MS representing the EU position. In

turn, if there is no match, then it is the case of non-representation of the EU position. This process was conducted by doing a content analysis.

Content analysis or Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), as it is named in the literature, is a method that helps derive meaning of the data collected. It is argued to be the systemic way of interpreting the gathered material and making the conclusions/arriving at the new meaning of the data (Schreier 2012). The description and interpretation of the material happens in the framework defined by the researcher. In this thesis the focus was on the national position of the country on the issue discussed in the UNSC. Essentially, the QCA arrives at the conclusion about the environment it studies and proves to be useful for the study like the current one. By analyzing the content of the co-sponsored Draft Resolutions, the research identified the issue described there, and interpreted it by classifying geographically and thematically to find out what the national positions of Germany or Portugal, which they stated by co-sponsoring the Draft Resolution, were. Then, the same analysis was conducted to find out the EU position on the respective issues. The EU position was measured by analyzing speeches and statements given by the EU Head of Delegation on the UNSC, the European Council statements on the issues, the European Commission policy documents as well as the news articles. If the match between the national position on the UNSC of the countries in focus and the EU was found, then it indicated that an informal representation of the EU on the UNSC occurred. However, the match was regarded as result of socialization through EU coordination at the UNSC only then, when country's national position on the issue before membership in the UNSC was absent, what is discussed in detail below. To present the findings on the match between the national/EU positions on the issue the research used a table where the match/no match positions were compared and their ratio in the form of percentage was calculated. The percentage showed the share of matching EU/national positions presented in the Draft Resolutions to the share of the overall co-sponsored Draft Resolutions by Germany and Portugal.

To find out what scope of interest the countries of the choice had, the research also applies qualitative content analysis of the data that shows national positions of Germany and Portugal prior to their non-permanent membership in the UNSC. The sources used were press-releases, statements and news articles on the governmental websites such as the MFA website and findings from the media. By looking at the national positions that the selected

countries have voiced on the UNSC and categorizing them geographically and thematically, the study analyzes whether national positions and interests of Portugal and Germany changed or stayed the same since the beginning of the non-permanent membership on the UNSC. The aim is to define whether the scope of interest prior to the UNSC membership is narrow or wide. The idea is that if the scope of interest is narrow, then the selected state has no pre-defined position on the issue, meaning that the position must be formulated while on the UNSC, making it more likely that it will be formulated by taking into account input from coordination, in other words more likely to be 'representing' the wider EU position. In turn, if the scope of interest is wide, then the selected state has a pre-defined position on the issue and coordination meetings will not have strong effect on it, what will not lead to the informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC.

So, when the gap between the UNSC agenda and the national agenda of Portugal or Germany was identified, then it indicated the narrowness of interest, therefore, the scope prior to the UNSC was narrower when on the UNSC, what speaks about the small size of the state. After identifying the scope of interest and national positions of the countries on the issues that they raised by co-sponsoring Draft Resolutions, the results were added to the table where match/no match positions with the EU were given. By doing it, the research aimed to find out where the national position of the EU MS that did not exist prior to the UNSC non-permanent membership was filled in by the EU position i.e., where the gap in the scope of interest of the state was closed by the EU interest. As a result, such closing of the gap indicated indicates informal representation due to socialization/coordination of the EU positions on the UNSC by the EU MS that were non-permanent members.

## 3. ANALYSIS

This chapter provides the measurement of the selected variables. Firstly, it presents the analysis of the  level of interaction of the selected EU Member States – Portugal and Germany on the UNSC in 2011-2012 as well as Estonia and Germany in 2019-2020. The data presented is based on the results of the interviews conducted with the representatives from the countries and shows how and to what extent the interaction of the selected EU Member States in the US happened, how it has influenced the formulation of national position and what role the EU-27 play in the process. Next, the evaluation of the state size is given (where we look at the scope of interest to define the size: the wider national interest the selected EU MS has – the bigger the EU MS is), which is also based on the data gathered from the interviews as well as on the analysis of Draft Resolutions co-sponsored by the EU Member States of the choice. The draft resolutions will be analyzed and categorized according to the geographical and issue-based scope of interest. After establishing the size of the state, the chapter presents the evaluation of the informal representation of EU interests on the UNSC by the EU MS. The data is based on the interviews and on the comparison of the scope of national interest prior to the UNSC membership and during it with the corresponding interest of the EU.

**Assessing the level of socialization of Portugal, Germany, and Estonia on the UNSC**
In this section, the data obtained from the qualitative interviews will be evaluated to see to what extent Portugal, Germany and Estonia have been influenced by the socialization process and how much interaction and coordination was present between the EU MS in the UNSC as well as between the EU-27 in general. More precisely, the chapter analyses the process of interaction/coordination between the EU MSs, assessing it along the variables of frequency of coordination meetings and importance that the EU MSs have attributed to the coordination meetings. Also, the evolvement of socialization process of EU MSs in the UNSC in 2011-2012 is compared with the same process in 2019-2020, what helps identify the difference in the level of socialization overtime. The process of the definition of national position on the UNSC by the selected countries is analyzed towards the end of the section. The results of the interviews will be given country by country, presenting the answers to the interview questions received from the interviewees.

The assessment of the gathered data will be based on the previous literature, that used similar research method, as well as on the opinion given by the interviewed representatives from the selected EU MSs.

### 3.1. Level of socialization of Portugal and Germany in 2011-2012

The responses show that the overall formats of coordination between those EU MS that were in the UNSC and the whole EU-group were different from the coordination that is present now. The representative of Portuguese Delegation mentioned that in 2011-2012 the Lisbon Treaty has only started to take its effect "*It rather described and implemented what in reality was only developing. The Delegation of the EU was very weak*" (Interview 1PT). It suggests that the strength and frequency of coordination has changed with time and might bring different results on the UNSC.    This aspect is discussed in the subsections that come later in the chapter.

The overall way of how the interaction between the EU MS in the UNSC happened in 2011-2012 described by the Portuguese and German representatives does not differ considerably. The overall number of meetings in the UNSC, where the EU MSs were present can be seen in the table below (Table 3.1.), and the data suggests that the MSs had opportunities to hear each other's positions and possibly coordinate very often, considering that the presented figures do not include meetings, where only EU MSs were present.

*Table 3.1. Frequency of meetings on the UNSC in 2011-2012*

| Year | Total number of meetings |
|---|---|
| 2011 | 333 |
| 2012 | 198 |
| Average number of meetings a month | 26 |
| **Overall number of meetings** | **531** |

*Source: United Nations Security Council Calendar of Meetings*
*Retrieved from: https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2021*

As for the formats of meetings between the EU MSs at that time, there existed the following types, that can be roughly divided in the formal ("EU briefer of the month",

meetings between ambassadors and political coordinators) and informal meetings (bilateral cooperation, discussion of notes, etc.).

- **"EU briefer of the month",** formal <u>weekly</u> meeting, helped the EU MSs on the UNSC exchange the information and those EU MSs that were not in the UNSC at that time get the information about the issues raised in the UNSC. The interviewees (Interview 1PT; Interview 1DE; Interview 2DE) described this format as the one, where one EU MS shares the information discussed in the UNSC with other EU MSs. "*This format functions on the rotating basis between those EU MS that are among the UNSC members in that month.*" (Interview 1PT; Interview 1DE, Interview 2DE). The content of this briefing is more about the agenda of the UNSC that has been discussed on the UNSC up until the briefing and the upcoming issues.

  A representative of German delegation emphasized strictly informative framework of the briefings, saying that: "*The briefer has the full picture, possibly indicating his or her own view and referring to the specific views of other delegations. It is not meant to influence other EU MSs*" (Interview 1DE), a representative from the Portuguese delegation spoke in line with the German position, stating that "*there was no discussion or coordination between the EU MS during the EU briefer of the month format – only the information shared and received.*" (Interview 1PT)

Therefore, this format did not create the environment for all the EU MSs where the interaction and coordination of positions happened between those EU Members that were on the UNSC and those outside of it. Hence, this format did not socialize the whole of the EU-27 to the level where the positions could have been mutually exchanged and altered.

- **Meetings on the level of Ambassadors of the EU MS and Political Coordinators - ** every month. Meetings of the EU MSs ambassadors/political coordinators both those that were on the UNSC and in the wider UN framework. The representative of Portuguese delegation has noted that :"During the meetings we have discussed the UNSC issues and exchanged our opinions on them" (Interview 1PT).
- **Issue-based meetings -** issue-based meetings with the representatives of the UNSC members that could happen "*every week or even every day – it dependent on the subject. The coordination of the EU MSs was at those meetings*" (Interview 1PT)
- **Informal bilateral meetings** - the occasional coordination practices between the EU MSs on the UNSC. The analysis of the interview responses has shown that informal

comparison of notes or bilateral talks between the EU MSs on the UNSC were an existing method of coordination, which was not used with high frequency, because often the EU MSs would know what the national position on the issue they have. According to another representative of the German delegation to the UNSC in 2011-2012:

> "On the specific situations we would not even coordinate with the others because we would know that there is so much overlap that there is no need to do so. On smaller things we would turn to the other EU MS on the council, also to the US and try to coordinate with them. There is no problem to coordinate." (Interview 1DE)

Therefore, the coordination per se was possible and was easy to perform but it was not necessary to do it extensively due to the alignment of positions of the EU MSs. Mainly the coordinating part was used by the EU MSs to *'look for ideas, seek for political support or the outreach'*.

Overall, the range of the formats and *frequency of meetings* within those formats suggests that the EU MS interacted very often, what should speak for the high level of socialization (to the extent that it was possible 10 years ago), but the research needs to look into another indicator measurement, namely, at the *importance that Germany and Portugal assigned to the coordination meetings,* because the essence of the presented meeting formats is not in their procedure but in their perception by Germany and Portugal. Therefore, it is important to give a consequent analysis of these meetings given by the representatives of the selected countries.

**Importance assigned to the coordination meetings: Germany 2011-2012**

The main characteristic of coordination between the EU MSs that are the UNSC members, noted by the representatives of German delegation is that it is very different to the one in the UNGA, mainly due to the absence of formal representation of the EU. This argument is illustrated by the description of the coordination among the EU MSs on the UNSC by the interviewee from the German delegation:

> "There was no EU coordination per say on substance issues between us (Germany) and the EU MS on the issues that were dealt in the UNSC. There is a big difference between the workings of the UNSC and the UNGA." (Interview 1DE)

This leads to the conclusion that the formal coordination was absent. The interviewees highlighted the specifics of issue discussed in the UNSC and involvement in the process that makes the wider exchange of thoughts between the EU-27 redundant. The main material that circles around the UNSC is the Resolutions and you can only inform others (EU-27) on the subject matter, but you do not expect any feedback as "*others are not in the UNSC and they are not acquainted with the issues to the extent the EU MS in the UNSC is.*" (Interview 1DE). So, the coordination with wider EU-27 was not seen as something essential, beneficial, or necessary, what suggests that the <u>coordination meetings with the EU-27 on UNSC matters were not perceived as important.</u>

However, the emphasis in the responses was put on the uniqueness of the UNSC as an intergovernmental body, what leads to the absence of obligations to share the national positions beforehand and inform the EU and consequent absence of essential coordination between them and the wider EU. The representatives of German delegation described the process of sharing national positions as the following:

> "In the UNSC what you can do is launch an idea with other EU MS and discuss it there. But you have to defend your ideas among other 15 UNSC members, that are voting on that initiative. EU MS cannot help you there." (Interview 1DE, Interview 2DE)

Moreover, the exchange of information and coordination experience of the German delegation was described as the following: "*In the UNSC, you have two members of the EU and we try to follow the policy that is not in contradiction with the standards of the EU.*" (Interview 2DE) This explains the general alignment of positions between the EU MS on the UNSC and further stresses the point of weak coordination practices in general.

This shows that the coordination between the EU MSs is perceived as an additional component in the UNSC, it is more of an exchange of positions and opinions on issues than making sure that there are no discrepancies, which is also a rare phenomenon due to the like-mindedness of the EU MSs. This means that the coordination of the EU MSs in the UN framework and the UNSC as described by the representatives of the German delegation in 2011-2012 does not fall into the process of socialization where the key component is the alteration of national positions and attuning different positions to the mutual one. Therefore, the conclusion can be made that <u>the importance of coordination meetings on the EU positions</u> in its initial definition was low.

Therefore, <u>the level of socialization</u>, if the measurement is based on the two indicators of *frequency of interaction and importance assigned to the coordination meetings,* is established to <u>be high in the first indicator</u> and <u>medium in the second</u>, what on average makes <u>level of socialization of Germany high</u>.

**Importance assigned to the coordination meetings: Portugal 2011-2012**

In the received responses of Portuguese delegation, it could be seen that the process of coordination was emphasized more strongly and seen more frequently by the members of the Portuguese delegation to the UNSC, what could mean a *greater importance assigned to the coordination meetings*.

The data suggests that coordination is also dependent on the subject that was discussed in the Security Council as Portuguese representatives noted that "*it was important to know the position of the other EU MS if the subject has already been discussed*" (Interview 2PT). The EU-27 could be turned to and made aware of the issues (apart from the official EU-briefer of the month and the Ambassadorial meetings) only after the EU MSs on the UNSC have undergone the coordination process. It is only logical, taking into account the fact that  other EU-27 are not familiar with the UNSC agenda to the needed extent.

The data gathered from the Portuguese delegation to the UNSC in 2011-2012 has strengthened the point given by the German delegation about the like-mindedness of the EU countries and consequent alignment of the majority of the positions. However, *the importance of coordination* and coordination itself was more present in the responses. The representative of the Portuguese delegation stated that Portugal could alter its national position during the exchanges of opinion for the sake of reaching the common position between the EU MS: "*We tried to have the common position of the EU MS even if it meant to adapt a little bit your own position. In case of foreign policy decisions, we tried to be alike*" (Interview 1PT). This speaks for the attitude to coordination that is measured as high, and touches upon the subject of informal representation of the EU interests that is analyzed in the later chapters.

The national positions on the UNSC were described by the Portuguese representative in the following way:

> "Normally the positions were very similar (except in some subjects, where the EU MS have strong bilateral positions, especially France and the UK). But we always tried to be flexible, reach an agreement and get on board all the other countries in the UNSC. Sometimes the agreement was tried to be reached at the table (at the PC level or the Ambassador's level)." (Interview 2PT)

This means that the EU MSs are similar in their views by the definition but even if the discrepancies arise the position is tried to be formulated in a way that would not be different from the others. The tendency among the EU MSs on the UNSC that was pointed out by the Portuguese interviewee is that even when "*there were lots of discussions on the specific issues, the agreement was reached in the end*" (Interview 2PT).

The responses given by the Portuguese interviewee present the cooperation between the UNSC members that is related not only to the EU MSs but to the bigger like-minded group that shares similar views and values. As it was also noted by the representative of the German delegation: *"There is an inbuilt tendency to reach consensus."* (Interview 2DE) However, some of the discrepancies might arise on the particular issues important for the national interest and long-standing cooperation of the permanent UNSC members. The representative of Portuguese Delegation to the UNSC in 2011-2012 has mentioned that the coordination was easier the more EU MSs there was on the UNSC, what helped to balance out the strong national position of France, Germany, and the UK (that was an EU MS at that time):

> "These states will try to impose their own position but it is normal, but it's important to coordinate and they listen to us too. In 2011 it was maybe easier to have the two permanent members as they could control each other. Now there's nobody to control France from the EU." (Interview 1PT)

This finding brings out the point of the willingness of the EU MS to coordinate and the effect that it has both on the strength or frequency of it. Therefore, the level of the coordination is conditioned not only by the frequency of the meetings and importance assigned to them but also on the group of the EU MSs that are on the UNSC at the time and that themselves decide how much exchange of the information and alignment with the common position they need.

The responses given by the representatives of the Portuguese delegation present that the level of socialization was high as both the indicators of *the frequency of interaction* as well as the *importance assigned to coordination process* were measured as high.

Having analyzed the involvement and attitude of the EU MSs that are the focus of this research, it is visible that mostly the description of the coordination process and evaluation of its influence is similar due to the overall underdevelopment of the EU coordination framework as well as inbuilt tendency of the EU MSs to have similar positions what made coordination not essential. As a result, the research has established that the level of socialization for both MSs – Portugal and Germany in 2012 was high with minor observable deviations in the perception of the importance of coordination meetings in case of Germany, derived from the interview responses. And although the divergence is not considerable, it still indicates that there is variation between the small and big EU MS in the evaluation of this variable.

### 3.2. Level of socialization of Germany and Estonia in 2019-2021

When the research turns to the recent experience of EU MSs membership in the UNSC, which in this research is the experience of Germany in 2019-2020 and Estonia in 2020-2021, then it is seen that the coordination process has undergone many changes and enhanced in comparison with what the EU MSs had ten years ago. The difference was highlighted both by the representatives from Delegations that have been in the Security Council recently and those that were there in 2011-2012. The Portuguese representative has stressed this point before sharing his experience from ten years ago:

> "Now the Delegation of the EU is very strong, and they do a big work on the coordination. In practical terms that is a big difference. My colleagues tell me that sometimes they spend more time in the EU meetings than in those in the UNSC." (Interview 1PT)

However, the changes were rather qualitative than quantitative as the frequency of meetings has decreased(largely due to the pandemic) as could be seen from the table (Table 3.2). The formats of the meetings have also undergone slight changes as a couple of new types of them were introduced.

*Table 3.2. Frequency of meetings on the UNSC in 2019-2021*

| Year | Total number of meetings |
|---|---|
| 2019 | 263 |
| 2020 | 128 |
| 2021 | 19 |
| **Average number of monthly meetings** | 22 |
| **Overall number of meetings** | 391 |

*Source: United Nations Security Council Calendar of Meetings*
*Retrieved from: https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2021*

According to the gathered data on the formats of the meetings where EU MSs can take part, the range of meetings and briefings has increased with the key formats of 2011-2012 still in place. Currently, the coordination meetings between the EU MSs happen on all levels of the UNSC and the meetings are more structured compared to the situation 10 years ago:

- **Qualitative change in the "EU briefer of the month format"** - an important distinction with 2011-2012 can be also traced, where previously the interviewees stated that the briefing was post-factum mostly, however, now it is on the past and future agenda of the UNSC.

- **Meetings on the level of ambassadors/political coordinators/deputy political coordinators** - a representative of Estonian delegation has mentioned that "the EU coordination happens all of the time between the Ambassadors". And what is important, it is not only between those EU MS that are on the UNSC but also including the non-members:

    " Once a week on Tuesday morning we have a meeting of the Heads of the Missions from the EU MS, where the overall UN issues as well as specific UNSC ones are discussed. Every Friday the Political Coordination of the EU MSs have their meetings where the UNSC matters are also talked about." (Interview 1EE; Interview 2EE)

This means that the exchange of opinion and the sharing of ideas happens more extensively between the EU membership and the EU MSs stay in close contact that strengthens the overall EU position of the UNSC.

- **Expert-level meetings** - experts from the UNSC members discuss some specific issue, raised in the UNSC meeting. Members of Estonian delegation have mentioned that the coordination process is centred around the 'product':

  > "Coordination between the EU MS and the like-minded countries takes place on "the product" – resolutions, presidential statements, press statements. We coordinate when preparing stake-outs and documents" (Interview 1EE; Interview 4EE)

This shows that coordination is on-going but restricted to the specific areas, where the position of the EU MSs needs to be voiced, what also indicates when the EU MSs feel the need to coordinate.

- **Opportunity for the non-members of UNSC to attend meetings** - there is an opportunity for the EU-27 to be present at the UNSC meetings and the latter are broadcasted as well, so the information flow is considerable. However, not all of the EU-27 have the interest to do that as was noted by the Estonian representative:

  > "On the day when the UNSC meeting happens you also get the chance to brief the wider EU membership, whoever wants to listen to. Not everybody is interested in the topic, because not everybody has the capability, especially smaller EU MSs." (Interview 1EE)

- **New format – 'press stake-outs' (**for those EU MSs that serve on the UNSC) – joint press statements of the EU MSs that are given after the UNSC meetings on some issue. "*One of the EU MS Ambassadors or the EU mission serving in the UNSC reads out the summary of the meeting listing the positions of the EU MS and the UNSC members in general*" (Interview 1EE).

- **The UNSC consultations** – private meetings, which are not broadcasted; as well as many informal exchanges between the members of the UNSC

- **Informal exchanges during lunchtime –** Estonian representative has noted that a lot of information-sharing happens in the informal environment:

  > "We do meet regularly with the EU Members of the UNSC. We have lunch and we discuss the upcoming programme, and our plans, and sometimes we make EU stake-outs after some meetings. We discuss it briefly there and then the experts continue to discuss their detailed proposals. But we are also in touch regularly, via email and WhatsApp group." (Interview 2EE)

So, this means that institutionalized part of coordinating process between the EU MS in the UNSC is only a part of the whole picture. And it is up to the EU MSs to decide how frequently they will discuss the UNSC issues and consult each other. The described

formats of coordination show that EU MSs that are on the UNSC are largely involved in the process.

- **Coordination via WhatsApp groups**

Therefore, the listed contrast that has formed in the coordination between the EU MSs within the overall UN and the UNSC framework over the ten-year period suggests greater involvement in the coordination process, what speaks about different <u>level of socializatio</u>n between the EU MSs. The *frequency of meetings* and number of formats has increased; therefore, the <u>level of socialization has grown</u> as well and also indicates possible changes in perception of coordination, therefore, in the *importance attributed to the coordination meetings*. The difference will be seen from the analysis of German and Estonian responses presented in the following paragraphs.

**Importance attributed to coordination meetings: Germany 2019-2020**

The description of coordination process given by the representative of German Delegation to the UNSC in 2019-2020 shows that the country was highly involved in the process and even introduced some changes throughout its membership term that had strengthened the link between the EU MSs on the UNSC and those outside of it. The first thing that was pointed out by the German representative is that "*We're doing the day-to-day coordination work of the UNSC" (Interview 3DE),* however, this includes not only the EU MSs but also all of the UNSC members. The main emphasis during the German term in 2019-2020 was given to the procedural question, so to the way in which the exchange of information and opinion-sharing happened:

> "For Germany it <u>was particularly important to reach out to the other EU MS</u>, those that were not members of the Council and improve the coordination of the EU MS on the UNSC. In terms of outreach to the rest of the EU MS, we seconded a German diplomat to the EU delegation in NY here and this diplomat at the same time figured on the list of German delegation to the UNSC. He attended all the meetings and particularly closed consultations." (Interview 3DE)

So, the seconded German diplomat gave the EU MSs outside of the EU the better insight to what was going on, especially in terms of private consultations and informal meetings. According to the responses given by the interviewee, the seconded diplomat *"served like*

*an information bridge to the EU and delivered all the necessary information to the EU membership, did briefings and so on"* (Interview 3DE). This indicates <u>the difference in the importance attributed to the coordination meetings</u> expressed by Germany in 2019-2020 in comparison to 2011-2012. On the one hand the increased involvement of the country in coordination process may be caused by the enhancement of the coordination of the EU MS in the UN in general. But on the other, the format introduced by Germany was not continued, what suggests that the attitude to coordination by the individual EU MS defines the frequency and effect of it.

While in 2011-2012 representatives of German delegation positioned EU briefings to the EU-27 as a purely informative procedure, thus not entailing a coordination element, in 2019-2020 the discussion element was largely present and, therefore, the importance of coordination was high. The representative of the German delegation to the UNSC evaluated the coordination of positions of the EU MSs on the UNSC as well as in the whole UN framework as "successful". It was especially prominent in the description of the EU briefer of the month meetings:

> **"**Those EU MS that are on the UNSC presented what was going on, and those that are not on the UNSC could comment and **fit in their position**. So, in the end of the week, after many EU meetings you have a good overview of the EU MS". (Interview 3DE)

This means that the information was not only exchanged but also considered, and as a result the positions that Germany and other EU MSs that were on the UNSC shared with EU-27 could be given feedback on and modified to form a united front. Even though the German interviewee has indicated that the national positions of the EU MSs are alike in general, it did not exclude the possibility of Germany to represent the interests of others in its positions expressed on the UNSC:

> "When an EU partner approached us with a specific issue where it had a national interest/specific position, we tried to a certain extent to reflect it in our position. And usually there are no differences between our positions." (Interview 3 DE)

Here one more point that speaks for coordination on the specific issues is seen, what means that the frequency and strength of it can also be issue-based. Depending on the issue discussed, EU MSs that serve on the UNSC may coordinate with the EU partners that have specific national interests bilaterally. This suggests that the coordination process does not only focus on the EU-27 and those EU MSs that are on the UNSC but can also

be expressed on a micro-level between the individual EU MSs. It is another discrepancy from 2011-2012 as at that time the representatives spoke more about individualistic approach that the EU MSs employed.

The responses of the interviewee from the German delegation have also brought up the point on the formulation of national position that occurs in the consultations between the country's delegation to the UN and the capital. When the national position is needed to be presented on the UNSC, then the German Delegation to the UN first gathers together all of the necessary information, including the one that is coming from the EU meetings and briefings, what entails *"putting on paper the position of the EU MSs"* (Interview 3DE). In this way the German Delegation to the UN gives a recommendation to Berlin, where the latter approves it or not. Even though it is seen that in the end the decision of the national capital is the decisive one, the formulation of the position still includes consideration of the views of other EU MSs. This means that Germany _dedicates importance to and operates with the positions that the EU MS_ on the UNSC as well as the remaining EU MSs in the UNGA state. Moreover, the flow of information is not restricted only to the UN Delegation – national capital channel. It was stated in the interview that the exchange of positions also happens between national capitals, what makes the EU MS coordination on the UNSC issues transcend the UN framework.

Therefore, based on the answers received from the interviewee from the German delegation to the UNSC, the country attributed high value to the coordination process, what means that the _importance attributed to the coordination meetings_ was high, what, together with the _high frequency of meetings_ indicate that the level of socialization of Germany in 2019-2020 was high.

**Importance attributed to the coordination meetings: Estonia 2020-2021**

Results of the interviews with the Estonian Delegation to the UNSC suggest that the coordination between the EU MSs is characterized as ongoing and strong. The description of coordination process does not differ a lot with the one given by the German interviewees but contains details that refer to the perception of the process (i.e., importance attributed to coordination meetings) by Estonia as an individual EU MS. The representatives from the Estonian delegation have stressed that the coordination occurs

not only between the EU MS in the UN but also between Estonia and other like-minded countries (EU MS, UK, US, etc.): *"We are engaged in coordination between us and those countries that share our values – like-minded countries"* (Interview 1EE, 4EE), what shows that the process is not exclusive to the EU-27 and highlights that the coordination is issue-based.

It was stated by the interviewees that the formulation of national position also involves coordination between the EU MSs that are on the UNSC, especially on the 'fresh' topics, where the EU MSs try to reach the common position and represent the united response. The interviewees have given the following reflections on the consultations and exchange of opinions on the new issues:

> "There sometimes are new and complicated topics where we often discuss it with other EU colleagues and see where they stand. It can be substantive, but it can also be tactical. How to approach this issue best in the Council? Whether we do it together – Europeans/ EU and another Europeans/ like-minded group? When something new comes up or something becomes active again – that has been discussed before but hasn't been a big issue recently then we coordinate more." (Interview 2EE)

Therefore, consultations are more likely to occur, when the EU MSs have not previously formulated national position and they have been often used for strategic reasons – to make sure that the position voiced on the UNSC by the EU MSs is a strong one and was approached correctly.

However, it was also mentioned that once the national position has been formulated, the influence of other partners during the coordination meetings is very rare. The Estonian representative to the UNSC stated: "*I don't really recall that we have changed the speech or anything – national positions (as a result of coordination)". Press statements and stake-outs, things can change there."* (Interview 1EE). So, while in the making, positions of EU MS can influence the national one, but once it has been formulated – the changes do not occur. during the discussions on the new issues Estonian Delegation does seek the opinion from others and can have influence on and be influenced by the other EU MSs.

Nevertheless, the bottom line that the representatives of the Estonian delegation to the UNSC have stressed and that goes hand in hand with the responses of German delegation of 2019-2012 as well as German and Portuguese Delegation in 2011-2012 is the natural similarity of the EU MSs national positions. There was also mentioned a common EU

position, which is worked out in Brussels and which the EU MSs take as a basis on which their statements are formed. The EU MSs that serve on the UNSC often have the lines of their partners already, so the coordination is not required. An Estonian representative has referred to it the aligned positions as the following:

> "It's in a way business as usual. We know what their positions are, and we have already coordinated it in Brussels or among capital or here. " (Interview 3EE)

Due to the EU being a likeminded group and the intertwined character of the Estonian and EU interests, "*it is quite rare that the country thinks something completely different from other EU-27*" (Interview 4EE). It is only issue-specific questions that cause divergence. One of the interviewees from the Estonian delegation to the UNSC mentioned Middle East as an example where the process is different among the EU MSs and where the cooperation and coordination between them is considerably lower.

The overall analysis of the responses given by the representatives of Estonian Delegation to the UNSC, Estonia is evaluated as the country that *attributes high importance to the coordination meetings.* For the current research it means that Estonia is actively engaged in coordination on the UNSC and use it to make sure that the positions of the EU MSs on the UNSC are defined in line. Therefore, based on *the high frequency of meetings on the UNSC* and *high importance attributed to the representation of the EU positions*, the level of socialization of Estonia is high.

So, when drawing a comparison between the level of socialization of Estonia and Germany in 2019-2021, then it can be observed that for both EU MSs it was high and the variation across the MSs for this variable was not noticed, what was substantiated by the responses given by the interviewees from the countries. The following subchapter will investigate the state size that the selected countries had and see if and how the process of coordination influenced them.

**Measurement of the scope of interests as a reflection of state size of Portugal, Germany and Estonia**

In this section, the national interests of the selected countries are studied to see how wide the scope of interest was, what also indicates the size of the EU MS. First, the data was obtained from the interviews with the representatives of Portugal, Germany and Estonia

will be presented, that will give answers to how wide *the scope of interest* was and what difficulties were there when defining the national position. Then, the findings regarding *the need for coordination when formulating a national position* will be presented, based on the questions and analysis of the responses the interviewees from the selected countries gave. Data will be given in the following order: Portugal and Germany in 2011-2012 and followed by the same data regarding Estonia in 2020-2021.

### 3.3. Scope of interests as a reflection of state size: Portugal

When speaking about the formulation of the national positions, a representative from the Portuguese delegation has mentioned that the discussion of the issues raised on the UNSC and consequent formulation of the national positions has involved several stages:

> "First, I coordinated with all my colleagues in the mission, then with the colleagues from other EU MS and then with all other MS of the UNSC" (Interview 2PT)

The suggested data shows that opinions on the issues raised in the UNSC were important for the Portuguese delegation and coordination prior to defining the national position was needed.  It is supported by the argument given by another Portuguese representative (Interview 2PT) that the definition of the national position becomes easier, and the common position gains more validity, when they are coordinated and common ones. The later argument is explained by the fact that when a united EU MSs position is voiced on the UNSC it is approved by the other UNSC members easier. When there is division withing the like-minded group of the EU MSs, then it undermines not only the united front of the EU but also makes reaching the overall agreement of the 15 UNSC members more challenging.

It is seen that the UNSC and possible coordination with the other EU MSs has helped the country to establish strong and diversified national positions as well as play an active role during the membership in the UNSC.

When asked about *the scope of interest* of Portugal, the representative of the Portuguese Delegation to the UNSC has stated that the country has a long history and presence around the world that has formed in the past, what allows Portugal to add the national position to all the topics discussed on the UNSC and that prior to the UNSC majority of the issues were with defined national position. The response means that the

country did not have issues in establishing its position on the questions discussed during its membership in the UNSC. It was stated that*:"We were pretty independent to design our national position in the UN and then check it with Lisbon."* (Interview 1PT) However, the interviewee noted that whenever the EU MS has a limited knowledge of the situation it tries to follow other MS that has a better understanding of it. This means that, where the prior to the UNSC national position is limited, Portugal turns to the other MSs. Also, the experience on the UNSC was described as a learning one by the representative of the Portuguese delegation because prior to the membership the country did not come in contact in so many diverse questions:

> "The UNSC made us more developed in the positions. It is true that in some questions, where we already had a position, we were already active, but we became extremely active on the UNSC. It doesn't mean that we didn't have a position, we just weren't that active." (Interview 1PT)

This means that when being a member in the UNSC, Portugal was quite experienced and could present a national position, however, taking part in the processes that the UNSC entails, made the country take in list of new information and be engaged in the issues that were not looked at as closely before the membership. Even though this does not say that the scope of national interest of Portugal was narrow before, it certainly shows that the EU MS has expanded its focus and shown extensive interest to the issues that the UNSC dealt with.

Another interesting point regarding the scope of interest of the country was the introduction of new topics that were poignant around the world into Portugal's agenda, therefore, showing particular interest to the issues that were new and needed to be discussed in the UNSC: *"There were some questions not our agenda, like climate threat that we wanted to include in the UNSC agenda"* (Interview 1PT). Portugal felt the issue to be important, however not having a strong national interest beforehand, so it promoted the topic to be included to the UNSC agenda. Therefore, it can be seen, that *the scope of interest of Portugal was wide*, but the gap on some topics still was there.

So, from the analysis of the interview data it is visible that *the scope of Portuguese interest* was not narrow prior to the UNSC, it *was rather wide*; however, obtained measurements indicate, that Portugal felt strong need for coordination to formulate and uphold the national position, and the *need for coordination was high*. This says that measurement of

the scope of interests when joining the UNSC as a reflection of state size <u>for Portugal is</u> <u>small,</u> as the need for coordination was high and the scope of interest did have issues where the national position prior to the UNSC was not defined.

### 3.4. <u>Scope of interests as a reflection of state size: Germany</u>

As for the *need for coordination to formulate the national position*, the interviews have not shown that the country has it. It is engaged in coordination and stablishing of the common position, but the input of the other states is considered only for that – it is not used as help to define the national position.

The country is largely present around the world, what makes it involved in the global affairs as well as helps gather the needed information to define the national position regarding the issues discussed during the UNSC memberships. Therefore, the responses that representatives of the German delegation to the UNSC have made regarding the width of the national position, its formulation and the UNSC specifics that affect it show that the *scope of interest* of the country *has been wide* on the UNSC, but the formulation of national position happens not only based on the scope of interest.

It was stressed that even though Germany had no problems in defining its national position, the specifics of the UNSC does not make it difficult for the member states to come up with the positions. The representative of the German delegation to the UNSC has pointed out that:

> "Most of the files are regular items, hardly ever there is something totally new. Every country has long-standing positions on almost all UNSC matters, us including. And we promote those positions when we were not on the UNSC as well." (Interview 1DE)

So, the MS looks at the way how it acted previously to define its national position, therefore the need to have the extensive range of national positions is reduced. But there was a discrepancy noticed between the views expressed by the interviewees. Another member of German delegation to the UNSC of 2011-2012 has highlighted that the SC works in such a way that the MS does not really know about all of the issues that come up there: *"The UNSC is constantly reacting to things that happen elsewhere and come up in resolutions. And these things you cannot prepare for and can't necessarily have a position on all of them"* (Interview 2DE). The countries prepare for the work on the

portfolio that they are assigned and are engaged in the activity of a particular working group they chair in the UNSC.

 Moreover, the country wants to be engaged in the activity that would show its work from the most beneficial side and be visible for the international arena, so the preparations start long in advance and are extensive. However, the rest of the issues are new for any country on the UNSC:

> "It happens that you're confronted with a political development somewhere and the Council should react to this issue and the questions is how you can react and how the UNSC can react." (Interview 2DE)

Therefore, it means that it is not possible to have a pre-defined national position on all the UNSC issues prior to becoming a member of the UNSC. Although the responses of most of the interviewees suggest that a large portion of the questions discussed there are circling around year after year, the new issues make the MS - no matter how wide the scope of interest it, define the national position on the UNSC while being engaged in the work there.

The analysis shows that _the scope of interest of Germany is wide_ and has been so prior to the UNSC membership, but the unpredictability of the issues raised there can put any country in a situation where the national position was not pre-defined. The _need for coordination to formulate the national position_ is _absent_, i.e., _low_. This indicates that measurement of the scope of interests when joining the UNSC as a reflection of state size for Germany is big.

### 3.5. Scope of interests as a reflection of state size: Estonia

In the interview responses it was mentioned that on the issues that were not in the focus of the country Estonia takes advantage of the coordination process to understand the situation better and consults with other EU partners to get a deeper overview of the issue at stake where that partner has a long-standing national position:

> "Usually, we consult each other. It is really hard if we don't do it. Especially regarding the files concerning Africa. To get the reliable information by only option is to ask our EU colleagues or US colleagues that know the situation." (Interview 3EE)

One of the interviewees has used the term 'cooperation' between the EU MSs and mentioned that it is on a good level and without it the UNSC membership would have been more difficult. Also, the work of the EU delegation was highlighted:

> "EU as an organization works here very well and I do get lots of information from the EU mission. They help the EU-27 members a lot." (Interview 3EE)

This indicates that there are certain issues that come up on the UNSC where Estonia needs the EU MS and the EU assistance and during the discussions on the new issues Estonian Delegation does seek the opinion from others and can have influence on and be influenced by the other EU MSs. The preparation process involves input by the other EU MS that are in the UNSC and sometimes by those that are outside of it. Usually, the most input from other EU MSs have the issues that are new on the UNSC as most of the material is old and as was described by the Estonian representative "has a circular dynamic" (Interview 5EE), meaning that mostly the same agenda is discussed.

This point is strengthened by the response of one of the interviewees who states that: "*if our national position is not so strong – then we would support our partners and allies*" (Interview 2EE). Therefore, it means that formulation of national position on the issues where the country has little experience with is influenced by the coordination. And that *the need for coordination to formulate the national position is high.*

The responses given by the representatives mentioned the limited nature of the national positions prior to the UNSC more often than the previous states. According to the data gathered from the interviews, in the case of Estonia *"There is no situation where we don't have a position, we have to have a position"* (Interview 4EE) while serving on the UNSC because a lot of preparatory work for the SC has been done, but the size of the country played a role:

> "A challenge for a small country being in a SC is thar you have to have a position on everything. There are several issues where we didn't have positions before becoming a member of the UNSC, like African issues. We are a small country, we're not following very closely, but now being in the council we have to become experts everywhere." (Interview 1EE)

This proves that prior to the UNSC membership national positions of Estonia was limited in certain topic, so the *scope was narrow*, but it is also seen that *wider scope of interest was acquired during the preparatory* work for the UNSC membership. As a result, while

serving in the UNSC Estonia has refined its positions and developed a more detailed approach to the issues not covered before.

Another interesting aspect is that the replies of the interviewees suggest that to formulate a national position, it is not always necessary to understand the details of the issue or have a long-standing experience of dealing with it. Largely the national position of Estonia stems from: *"moral values that substitute our interest"* (Interview 1EE; Interview 3EE), where the country acts out of the interests of moral rightfulness and justice. So, it is not necessary to know the details of the act of violence to formulate a national position that condemns it.

Therefore, it can be said that _prior_ to having been involved in the processes undergoing in the UNSC Estonia *had a narrow,* where it did not extend to some specific issues. The information needed to formulate the national position in case it becomes difficult Estonia acquires through consultations with the EU and other like-minded partners, EU common statements or also the reports of the UN Secretariat, therefore, _the need for coordination to formulate the national position is high._ This suggests that measurement of the scope of interests when joining the UNSC as a reflection of state size <u>for Estonia is small.</u>


**Level of informal representation of EU positions**

In this section, the extent to which the selected EU MS give the voice to the EU and represent its interests on the UNSC is analyzed and presented. The data is taken from the interviews conducted with the representatives of the country's delegations to the UNSC in 2011-2012 (Portugal and Germany) and 2019-2021 (Germany and Estonia) and voting records as well as records of Draft-Resolutions co-sponsoring. First, the subchapter gives the evaluation of the EU informal representation in the positions of the selected EU MS, speaking first about the 2011–2012 UNSC memberships of the EU MS and then moving to the 2019-2021. In this way the extent to which each MS considered itself to have represented EU MSs is measured. Then, the scale that shows the level of the EU informal representation by the EU MS on the UNSC is given and the remarks of the interviewees listed. In addition to qualitative insights from the interview, also insights to voting patterns and co-sponsoring of draft resolutions by the EU MS on the UNSC are provided with the aim to identify how much one or the other MS represented EU interests/positions.

By comparing the representation of EU interests on the UNSC by big and small states, Portugal-Germany and Estonia-Germany, this section provides insights to whether big/small states in this sample represent EU interests more/less.

### 3.6. Level of informal representation of EU positions: Portugal 2011-2012

When the research looks at *the match* between the EU positions and the national ones that was measured using the Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by Portugal, then it is obvious that the match was complete, because the EU position was present on and consistent with all Draft-Resolutions that Portugal co-sponsored in 2011-2012 (Appendix 1). Out of **41** co-sponsored Draft-Resolutions only 5 were not co-sponsored together with Germany, what tells that the share of united EU-position among the non-permanent EU members on the UNSC was **87%**. And there was only **one abstention**[1] by Germany in the voting pattern out of 119 resolutions voted on, therefore, the voting deviation was **1.19%.** This suggests that there is an extremely high overall cohesion between EU MS that are non-permanent members on the UNSC; together with the high match of Portuguese voting and Draft-Resolutions co-sponsoring with EU positions, for Portugal as a non-permanent UNSC member in 2011-2012, the informal representation of the EU positions was high.

The representative of a Portuguese delegation to the UNSC of 2011-2012 has mentioned that Portugal was "*one of the strongest supporters of coordination*" (Interview 1PT) among the other EU MS, and in the light of the natural similarity and closeness of the EU MS positions, the national position was formulated to resemble the EU interests. It was stressed, however, that the national interests were the priority as the UNSC is where you represent a country. *The importance that the country assigns to representing the EU interests* was described by the Portuguese representative as follows:

> "EU as organization, for us it was important to show the unity and the existence of the Union. Portugal is very pro-EU; our position is very European. We have national position too, but it will be supporting the EU one" (Interview 2PT)

So, it can be seen that national positions and the EU positions were mixed together, and the country found value in representing the EU positions. Portugal mentions its European

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[1] Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on establishment of a ban on flights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya airspace]. Retrieved from: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/699784?ln=en

identity and the value that it has attributed to presenting the EU as a strong and united front in the UNSC. Since the country was greatly engaged in the coordination (to the extent where it was possible) and mentioned the instances where the national position could be influenced by the feedback given by other EU MSs, informal representation of the EU interests comes as a natural result of Portuguese Europeanness and performance in the UNSC.

In terms of self-assessment of *representation of the common EU position*, answers of the Portuguese representatives (Interview 1PT; Interview 2PT) suggest that, at least in their self-understanding, Portugal always 'gave voice' to the EU, therefore, represented the common EU position in its national one. The data presented in the table below (Table 3.3.) shows how the interviewees have evaluated the extent to which Portuguese national positions have informally represented the EU ones. The findings regarding voting pattern and co-sponsoring as well as qualitative insights from the interviews and qualitative data indicate that the EU positions were represented to a great degree, hence the informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC had high level.

*Table 3.3 Assessment of the degree to which the Portugal's positions reflect the EU positions on the same issue (2011-2012)*

| Year | Country | Interview | Interviewee's assessment of the degree to which the national positions reflect the EU ones (scale 1-10) | Comment |
|------|---------|-----------|------|---------|
| 2011-2012 | Portugal | 1PT | 10 | "We always give voice to the EU" |
| | | 2PT | High* | "The discrepancies in the positions of the EU MS on the UNSC were big, but after the discussion we usually came to the common one and represented it" |

*Source: Interview data*

Therefore, the measurement of *the match* between the EU and Portuguese interests, studied in the Draft-Resolutions, on the UNSC indicates that they matched completely, so the level of informal representation of the EU positions was high. According to the measurement of *the relative importance that the country assigns to the representation of the EU interests*, the level of informal representation of the EU positions was high. This

means that the overall level of representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by the Portuguese delegation in 2011-2012 is measured as high. According to the measurement of the self-assessment of *representation of the common EU position,* the level informal representation of the EU positions is also high as the average estimation on the scale is around 8-9. So, it can be established that the overall level of informal representation of the EU positions by Portugal during its time as a non-permanent UNSC member in 2011-2012 was high. So, the small EU MS has a high level of informal representation of the EU positions. It should be mentioned, that even though Portugal and Estonia are two separate cases, the findings from these cases are taken together and both treated as findings on "small states".

## 3.7. Level of informal representation of the EU positions: Germany (2011-2012)

When the research looks at *the match* between the EU positions and the national ones that was measured using the Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by Germany, then the full match between the EU positions and the German national ones is also complete. There was not one resolution, where the discrepancy between the positions was detected (Appendix 1). This means that every Draft - Resolution co-sponsored by Germany was in line with EU interests and co-sponsoring these resolutions meant to represent EU interests. This means that when Germany acted, in the form of co-sponsoring, this also meant to represent EU interests. Out of **53** co-sponsored Draft-Resolutions 14 were not co-sponsored together with Portugal, what is explained by the nature of Draft-Resolutions where Germany might have been invited to co-sponsor more or found it important to do so, whereas Portugal did not. This tells us that the share of united positions of non-permanent EU MSs on the UNSC was **73%**. And, considering the same voting data as in case of Portugal, the voting deviation was **1.19%**[2]**.** This indicates that the informal representation of the EU positions by Germany in 2011-2012, as can be seen from the pattern of co-sponsoring, was also present and according to the data its level was high.

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[2] Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on establishment of a ban on flights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya airspace]. Retrieved from: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/699784?ln=en

German representatives of the delegation to the UNSC have stated that Germany *"tried to consider the positions of the EU institutions and the EU MSs that were in the UNSC as well as outside of it"* (Interview 1DE) because the country found it important to support the EU and opinion of other EU MS. The interviewee gave a reference to the recent German UNSC membership of 2019-2020 saying that support of the EU position was "*especially applicable in 2019, where Germany, France, Estonia and Poland we wanted to give the EU a voice and therefore we often conducted stake-outs, press-stake-outs on the UNSC"* (Interview 1DE). So, according to the representative of German delegation, *the relative importance that Germany assigned to representation of the EU positions* is visible not only in the national positions stated in the UNSC but also in the participation of consultations/meetings/briefings/etc., therefore, greater involvement in coordination resembles giving the EU a voice and informally representing it.

However, the importance and main representation of the national position was also strongly highlighted, bringing in the individualistic characteristic of the UNSC, where only the nation-states are members and make decisions:

> "The whole idea was to give a voice to the EU always knowing that it's not eligible to become a UNSC MS for the time-being. In the UNSC the EU does not have a role there, it does not formally exist there. The EU representation is pretty much totally through the EU MS on the UNSC." (Interview 1DE)

This means that according to the interviews, the EU position was always considered in the representation of the national position because it was acknowledged that the EU as a legal entity did not have a place in the UNSC.

According to the measurement of *the self-perception of representation of the common EU position*, it could be said that the country saw the need in giving the EU a voice, what is indicated by the evaluation of the extent to which national positions represented the EU ones, given by the first interviewee, that can be seen in the table (Table 3.4).

*Table 3.4 Assessment of the degree to which the Germany's positions reflect the EU positions on the same issue (2011-2012)*

| Year | Country | Interview | Interviewee's assessment of the degree to which the national positions reflect the EU ones (scale 1-10) | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011-2012 | Germany | 1DE | 10* | "I do not remember where our position would not correspond to the EU position (*EU supranational) In the EU-27 there are files with diverging positions between the EU MS, of course." |
| | | 2DE | 0* | "Ten years ago, we didn't have an informal representation of the EU interests." *Complete adherence to the positions presented in the meetings/consultations |

*Source: Interview data*

However, another interviewee from the German Delegation to the UNSC has stated that *"Ten years ago we didn't have an informal representation of the EU interests"* (Interview 2DE), stressing that it was never the case when the positions that would be presented on at the EU coordination meetings were directly adhered to:

> "It was cooperation but not coordination where we would adhere to something that was presented at the EU coordination meeting. As a UNSC member you're alone, you have to come up with your own national view. You can take views on board, consult, but you make the decision yourself." (Interview 2DE)

Such polarization of views may indicate difference in perception of the informal representation of the EU positions, where the former interviewee spoke about views expressed and shared by those EU MSs that were on the UNSC and outside of it, while the latter spoke about the position that would be expressed by the supranational dimension.

Therefore, the measurement of *the match* between the EU and German interests on the UNSC, as visible from the voting/co-sponsoring pattern and from the qualitative insights from the interviews, suggests that they were largely aligned, so the level of informal representation of the EU positions was high. According to the measurement of *the relative importance that the country assigns to the representation of the EU interests*, the level of

informal representation of the EU positions was also high, but in comparison with Portugal it was a bit lower, especially considering the comment given in the Interview 2DE about the absence of informal representation. This means that the overall level of representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by the German delegation is measured as high. According to the measurement of the self-assessment of *representation of the common EU position,* the level informal representation of the EU positions is difficult to give an average number on as the estimation given by one interviewee is "10", but in the understanding of another it's "0". This happened because the second interviewee (Interview 2DE understood informal representation of the EU as representation on behalf of the EU, so representing EU positions without the national element. Nevertheless, it can be established that the overall level of informal representation of the EU positions for Germany as a big EU MS was high.

### 3.8. Level of informal representation EU positions: Germany 2019-2020

Measurement of *the match* between the EU positions and those stated by Germany on the UNSC, like in the previous cases shows that there were no discrepancies between them. So, both the EU and Germany had matching positions on the issues presented in the resolutions at that time. Also, there was no voting discrepancy on the resolutions in 2020 between Estonia and Germany, so the percentage of deviation is 0% and the country has co-sponsored all of the Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by Estonia. This speaks for the high level of informal representation based on this indicator.

Reflections of the German representative from the UNSC delegation of 2019-2020 say that *"for Germany multilateralism and the EU are a part of the DNA and are of the uttermost importance."* (Interview 3DE) and the country is a strong believer and supporter of the European Common Policy. This means it is important for the country to support the EU positions and be part of them, so the *relative importance of representation of EU positions* on the UNSC is attributed a high value. However, the fact that the country thinks about representation of the national interests first was mentioned as well, stressing that they are largely EU ones:

> "Technically, we are presenting our position, on the UNSC you are elected as a country, but we wanted to bring in the European perspective. We perceive our politics as a part of the European common approach." (Interview 2DE, Interview 3DE)

The German representative also presented the argument that "*in almost all areas the EU members have a rather similar approach, and the interesting thing is that the EU MSs vote always in line*" (Interview 3DE). This means that representing the EU positions is almost natural as the country is a part of these positions. The argument is further supported by the data on the extent to which national positions of Germany reflect the EU positions and 'give voice' to it (Table 3.5).

*Table 3.5 Assessment of the degree to which the Germany's positions reflect the EU positions on the same issue (2019-2020)*

| Year | Country | Interview | Interviewee's assessment of the degree to which the national positions reflect the EU ones (scale 1-10) | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019-2021 | Germany | 3DE | 9.5 | "We are very close, there can be small differences here and there in some way. The difference is rather minimal. I have no example in my mind where our position differed from the EU MSs during the previous UNSC membership." |

*Source: Interview data*

The high mark on the scale of the level to which EU positions are reflected in the national ones speak about the high self-assessment of representation of the common EU position by Germany. Nevertheless, the differences on the specific issues between the EU MSs were listed as something that may hinder the informal representation of the EU interest:

> "In the end of the day we are all national states and there are of course some differences. And the UNSC are not bound by the EU decisions, so it is a different approach. But we try to extent possible align the positions of the EU MSs. It also gave us the stronger position in the UNSC, because the other members of the UNSC knew that that is the position of the EU-27." (Interview 3DE)

Therefore, the responses given by the representative of the German delegation suggest that it is beneficial for the EU MS to represent the EU informally as it makes the position more valid and taken more seriously, so those EU MSs that are on the UNSC try to stick together for having a more powerful voice in the SC. Overall, it is observed that whenever

there is no divergence between the EU MSs, it is the EU positions that are represented by Germany.

Overall, the measurement of *the match* between the EU and German interests, studied in the Draft-Resolutions, on the UNSC indicates that all of the positions were matching and no deviations in the voting was detected, so <u>the level of informal representation of the EU positions was high</u>. According to the measurement of *the relative importance that the country assigns to the representation of the EU interests*, <u>the level of informal representation of the EU positions was high</u>. This means that the overall level of representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by the German delegation is measured as high. According to the measurement of the <u>self-assessment of</u> *representation of the common EU position,* <u>the level informal representation of the EU positions is also high</u> as the average estimation on the scale was around "9.5". So, it can be established that the <u>overall level of informal representation of the EU positions for Germany as a big EU MS was high</u>.


### 3.9. <u>Level of informal representation EU positions: Estonia 2019-2021</u>

When the research looks at <u>*the match*</u> between the EU positions and the Estonian ones that was measured using the Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by Estonia, here the picture is also similar to all of the previously discussed cases: the full match between the EU positions and the Estonian ones was detected. Estonia co-sponsored five Draft-Resolutions in 2020 (the numbers are considerably lower than in previous years for all UNSC members, due to COVID 19 situation), and all of them were co-sponsored together with Germany, what indicates the unity in representation and common position of non-permanent members in the UNSC. As was mentioned before, the share of deviation is the voting on the resolutions equalled **0%,** meaning full coherence. This indicates that, according to the patterns of voting and co-sponsoring, the informal representation of the EU positions by Estonia was present and its level was high.

The analysis of the responses given by the representatives of the Estonian delegation go in line with those presented by the members of other delegations. A strong sense of having a European identity, importance of representation of the EU positions and will to do it

can be seen from the acquired data, what is prominent in the comment given by the interviewed representatives of the Estonian Delegation to the UNSC: "*Estonia is an EU Member. EU interests are our interests*" (Interview 1EE, Interview 2EE). About informal representation of the EU positions also speaks the fact that the Estonian representatives emphasized the absence of need to make a distinction between the EU position and that of Estonia as one is the part of the other. The particular <u>*importance that the country assigns to the representation of the EU positions*</u> was mentioned:

> "We are the EU and the strong EU makes the strong Estonia. Our FP based on values in based on our interest. If the EU should be a much stronger player in the world, it will make Estonia stronger. So, all of this is based on our interest." (Interview 1EE)

It can be seen how the national interests represented by Estonia on the UNSC gain strength and provide benefit if they are united with the EU positions. It was mentioned by another representative of Estonian delegation to the UNSC that the country, although presenting its national position, follows the EU agreed common policy and the positions that have been agreed among the EU-27.

In general, it was difficult for the interviewees to distinct the EU interests and Estonian ones:

> "EU interests and Estonian interests are not different. We cannot make the distinction between the Estonian position and the EU position, they are combined. EU positions are agreed by our foreign ministers during the EU meetings in the EU, that's where the EU decisions are made." (Interview 2EE)

This shows that <u>*the representation of common EU positions*</u> is a usual practice on the Council. The interviewees stated that the country "speaks with the EU voice" all of the time as it is the part of it: *"The EU voice is heard in all of the EU MSs statements in the UNSC."* (Interview 1EE; Interview 5EE). And even though, like in the responses of other representatives of the selected countries, the occasional discrepancies that are issue-specific were mentioned, what indicated the areas where EU informal representation is limited, the EU interests are informally represented by the country. The data on the evaluation of the extent to which the EU positions are reflected in the national ones suggest a high degree of representation of these positions (Table 3.6):

*Table 3.6 Assessment of the degree to which the Estonia's positions reflect the EU positions on the same issue (2020-2021)*

| Year | Country | Interviewee | Interviewee's assessment of the degree to which the national positions reflect the EU ones (scale 1-10) | Comment |
|------|---------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| | Estonia | 1EE | 9 | "Estonia is the member of the EU; we also consider ourselves to be strong Europeans. Why I put 9, because there are certain issues, it depends on the government as well, on the head of the MFA. The nuances are in specific matters, like the Middle East. There were a few instances where Estonia did not participate in the EU stakeouts because we did not get the approval form the capital. So, that would be where 1 point goes". |
| | | 2EE | High | "It's high, but it's quite difficult to take all of these positions into pieces and say what scale there was. We don't have a problem where there's an EU position and we would want to do something completely different there. " |
| | | 2EE | 8-9 | "The number is high. I wouldn't give you the 10. Because in the EU-27 there are some MS that do not support the EU position that actively. And among those EU MSs on the UNSC it depends on the topic." |
| | | 4EE | Between 5-9 | "It depends on the issue where the national position is presented" |
| | | 5EE | Between 7-9 | "The EU MSs on the UNSC represent the EU almost always, except for the rare specific issues" |

*Source: Interview data*

Therefore, the measurement of *the match* between the EU and Estonian interests, studied in the Draft-Resolutions, on the UNSC indicates that they matched completely, so, according to this indicator, the level of informal representation of the EU positions was high. According to the measurement of *the self-assessed relative importance that the country assigns to the representation of the EU interests*, the level of informal

representation of the EU positions was high as well. According to the measurement of the *representation of the common EU position,* the level informal representation of the EU positions is also high as the average estimation on the scale is around 8-9. So, it can be established that the overall level of informal representation of the EU positions was high for Estonia in 2020-2021. This indicates that both EU MSs: small and big have represented the EU positions informally on the same level in 2019-2021 on the UNSC.

**CONCLUSION**

This thesis was written with the purpose of finding out what difference there is between small and big EU MS in informal representation of the EU positions and to understand what level of informal representation of the EU positions there is on the UNSC. The UNSC is a unique body of the UN that is characterized by the restrictive requirements for its members, where only nation-states can be a member. The possibility of the presence of the EU in the UNSC has been questioned by scholars studying the EU-UN relations but the findings were quite limited. Therefore, this research aimed to understand the level of the EU positions representation in the national positions of the EU MSs that are non-permanent members on the UNSC. The thesis aimed to answer the question of: *What effect does state size have on the socialization of the MS that leads to the informal representation of the EU interests on the UNSC?*

The research relied on the socialization framework in studying the informal representation of the EU interests as the argument was that the higher socialization of the EU MSs leads to the higher level of representation. A comparative study of two pairs of EU MSs as non-permanent UNSC members was carried out. The pairs in the focus of the research were Portugal and Germany in 2011-2012 and Germany and Estonia in 2019-2021, according to their UNSC presidency time. The data was derived from 10 semi-structured interviews with the representatives of the delegations of Estonia, Germany and Portugal that were on the UNSC in 2011-2012 and 2019-2021, what helped establish what was the level of socialization, state size and the level of the informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC. In addition, quantitative data of the UNSC voting patter and Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by the EU MS on the UNSC were used to evaluate the level of informal representation. This has helped to establish what difference there was between the EU MS of different size as well as between the two time periods, what was used to understand how the selected EU MS performed across the three variables.

Firstly, the study has conducted the evaluation of the level of socialization of Germany-Portugal (2011-2012) and Estonia-Germany (2019-2012). To do so it provided the general characteristic of the process of coordination in the UNSC in 2011-2012 and 2019-2021, established *the frequency of coordination meetings and the importance that EU MSs attribute to the coordination meetings on the UNSC issues*. Secondly, the research

has established <u>the size of the EU MS</u> using the indicators of *the scope of interests and the need for coordination*. In this way the study has mapped out the limits of the national interest of the selected EU MS. And, finally, the research has found out <u>the level of the informal representation of the EU positions</u> on the UNSC by Germany, Estonia, and Portugal in 2011-2012 and 2019-2021, be measuring *the match* between the EU and national positions, *the representation of the EU common position and the importance that is assigned to representation of the EU interests*. In doing so it saw what the difference between the informal representation of the EU positions by two EU MS of the different sizes is.

The main findings of the research were the following: <u>the level of socialization</u> of <u>Portugal</u> as well as <u>Germany</u> was <u>high for both states</u> in 2011-2012, it also was <u>high</u> in 2019-2021 for <u>Estonia</u> and <u>Germany</u> that were members of the UNSC at the time. <u>The scope of interest as a reflection of state size</u> of the selected states in 2011-2012 was established as <u>small for Portugal</u> and <u>big for Germany;</u> in 2019-2021 the scope of interest as a reflection of state size was <u>small for Estonia</u> and <u>big for Germany.</u> For the hypothesis it means that the small state size does not cause a higher level of socialization as it was the same for the countries, therefore, the hypothesis is disconfirmed here. The <u>level of the informal representation</u> of the EU positions of <u>Portugal</u> in 2011-2012 was high, for <u>Germany</u> it also was <u>high</u>. In 2019-2021 <u>the level of informal representation</u> for both <u>Estonia and Germany</u> was <u>high</u>. For the <u>hypothesis</u> it means that the level of socialization does define the level of informal representation, so the hypothesis was <u>disconfirmed</u>. The general answer to the research question, therefore, is that the state size does not influence the level of socialization that does not lead to the higher or lower level of informal representation.

The comparison across big and small EU MSs indicates that there is indeed a difference in the state size established through qualitative and quantitative data, but in all the variables – level of socialization and level of informal representation the differences are absent or minor, what in the end does not affect the final measurement of the variable. The analysis of the selected EU MS has shown that they are largely alike across the variables. Nevertheless, the <u>qualitative observations</u> have shown that <u>there were variations across some indicators</u>, what is discussed later in the description of the findings.

The level of socialization in the time of 2011-2012 was 'high' for both Portugal and Germany. Since both states participated in the same coordination formats, there is no difference in this regard. At the same time, there is a minor difference regarding perception of coordination, namely, in case of Germany and Portugal in 2011-2012. At that time across the indicator of the importance attributed to the coordination meetings the qualitative observations have shown that for Germany it was of medium importance, therefore, lower than for Portugal. This does not change the overall level of socialization as it was similar for both of them. In 2019-2021 period, the level of socialization was high for both EU MSs as well. But as an additional finding it became evident that the frequency of coordination meetings was much lower if compared between 2011-2012 and 2019-2021, and although the results stay the same such qualitative change over time indicates the increase in the overall EU MS coordination in the UNSC.

The research has made it clear that the selected EU MSs differ in their scope of interest as a reflection of state size: Portugal and Estonia are established to be small, whereas Germany is recognized to be a big EU MS. The divergence was seen from the *need for coordination to formulate the national positions* on the UNSC that is felt differently by the MSs. The gap in the need between small and big EU MSs was detected, what explained the size measurement, namely it was visible from the comparison of the responses given by Germany and Portugal and Germany and Estonia. Germany did not express a high need to coordinate for formulation of the national position and showed the more individualistic approach, while Estonia and Portugal indicated that countries found it necessary to consult others on the topics where previous experience has been limited before formulating the national position. It was also established that prior to the UNSC Estonia and Portugal had some *gaps in their scope of interest* (Estonia more than Portugal) what made it narrower than while on the UNSC as *the scope of interest* of the EU MS on the UNSC issues is similar once they are there. For the research is means that there is a variation in state size between the selected countries.

The level of informal representation of EU positions by Portugal in 2011-2012 was 'high', and for Germany in 2011-2012 it was similarly 'high'. There were no major discrepancies detected in the measurement of the countries across the variable, as for Estonia in 2020-2021 the level of informal representation of the EU positions was high as well as for Germany in 2019-2020. However, based on the answers gotten from the interviews, some

differences still could be observed. The importance to represent the common EU position in the case of Germany in 2011 was lower than Portugal's, where the interviewees mainly stressed the individualistic factor and importance of representing national positions but with the EU positions in mind. Also, from the interview data it became apparent that only in rare instances that were related to the certain issue or geographic region (like the Middle East), the discrepancies between the EU MS were observed and reflected in the co-sponsoring of Draft-Resolutions as well as the abstention from the voting on the respective resolution. Overall, it can be observed that the measurement of the level of informal representation is alike for every studied in this research country.

Based on the findings derived from the research, certain implications can be stated. Following on the research gap mentioned in the introduction, the results of the thesis have shown that on the UNSC all of the EU MSs are equally engaged in the socialization process, what results in the same level of socialization and means that be it a small or a big EU MS – the positions are exchanged to the same degree. This leads to the main implication, that is the equal level of informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC. Therefore, both big and small EU MSs tend to converge their interests and come to the common EU position, which is later expressed in the UNSC activity. This means that the state size does not play a decisive role except for nuances mentioned earlier. Therefore, the EU is constantly informally represented in this UN body and its voice is heard through the EU MSs.

Even though the findings of the study have not supported the hypothesis, it is important to provide possible explanations to the divergence from the expectations of the study. As it is observed, the state size does not play a role in the causal link, i.e., the level of informal representation does not differ between small and big EU MSs. This can be either because: a) for small EU MSs UNSC membership is a matter of visibility and they are more visible when represent positions of the more influential group (i.e., of EU-27); b) the case of Germany might be not reflecting the variation as it is one of the most Europeanized big country – especially in its foreign policy; c) non-permanent members simply behave similarly due to their 'inferior' role on the UNSC making them all 'small' in relation to the permanent members.

Therefore, the limitations of the study, that has yielded several valuable findings, also

need to be acknowledged. First, the limited number of cases has not provided the study with a considerable variation across them as was initially expected. However, on the basis of interview observations, the study has still found out that there are nuances where the coordination is perceived as more important by smaller EU MSs and that small EU MSs need it more than the others, due to the gaps in the scope of interest. Secondly, the analysis of voting patterns and co-sponsoring of Draft-Resolutions did not reflect the diversity of EU representation, but by conducting interviews and asking about relevant importance assigned to representing the EU positions, it was evident that all the selected MSs dedicate high importance to it. Thirdly, the study has focused on the coordination of the EU MSs only in NY, whereas extensive coordination is also happening in Brussels and between the capitals. Nevertheless, the qualitative insights form the interviews have shown that the level of coordination in UN is increasing and EU MSs have lots of opportunities to discuss and exchange positions on the issues.

The limitations provide several directions in which this research can be further developed. One possibility to increase the validity of the level of socialization and the level of informal representation of the EU positions could be to expand the number of the selected countries, focusing on all small EU MSs and big EU MSs non-permanent members in the UNSC since 2012. In this way the difference in the measurement of the variables could be seen more precisely and the research will find out how big-small EU MSs differed along the variables in the selected time period. Another possible direction is to compare the level of socialization and informal representation of the EU positions between the permanent and non-permanent EU MSs to find out what effect the permanent membership has on the perception of the informal representation of the EU positions. A more comprehensive study could also include an anthropological research – to see how the teams of the MS on the UNSC formulate the positions, where, and how EU coordination/voices from other EU MSs enter the picture in this process; or geographical focus can be widened, where coordination in Brussels and between the capitals can be studied. In addition, a more precise measurement of levels of informal representation of the EU positions could be included in the research, where the question of what EU MS means by speaking on behalf of the EU on the UNSC would be studied.

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**APPENDICES**

**Summary of the analyzed Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by Portugal and Germany (2011- 2012)**

| Country | Total number of resolutions | Issue-based scope | | Number of resolutions not co-sponsored by other EU MS (open resolutions, other members co-sponsor) | Match with the EU position on the same issue | Issue-based scope |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Portugal | 41 | Africa | 12 | 5 | 41/41 | • Somalia – piracy and armed robbery<br>• Measures against Taliban (2011)<br>• UN peacebuilding office in Guinea-Bissau (Africa)<br>• Cessation of all settlement activities by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory<br>• Measures against Taliban (2012) |
| | | Syria | 6 | | | |
| | | Libya | 6 | | | |
| | | Balkans | 4 | | | |
| | | Middle East, terrorism | 7 | | | |
| | | HIV, Children in armed conflict | 3 | | | |
| | | Other | 3 | | | |
| Germany | 53 | Africa | 18 | 14 | 53/53 | • **2011**<br>• re-establishment of the UN Monitoring Group on arms embargo against Somalia<br>• extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (2)<br>• on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran<br>• extension of the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA)<br>• on acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia<br>• on authorization of the deployment of additional military personnel and capacities to the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)<br>• on extension of the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – Afghanistan<br>• on the situation in Mali |
| | | Syria | 6 | | | |
| | | Libya | 5 | | | |
| | | Balkans | 4 | | | |
| | | Afghanistan | 7 | | | |
| | | Middle East (remaining) and terrorism | 4 | | | |
| | | HIV, Children in armed conflict | 4 | | | |
| | | Other | 5 | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | • on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)<br>• **2012**<br>• on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of the States of the Gulf of Guinea<br>• on increase of the size of the Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons]<br>• on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan |

**List of Interviews**

| GERMANY | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Code** | **Affiliation** | **Interview format** | **Date** |
| 1DE | German Delegation to the UNSC in 2011-2012 | Zoom meeting | 24.03.21 |
| 2DE | German Delegation to the UNSC in 2011-2012 | Phone | 29.03.21 |
| 3DE | German Delegation to the UNSC in 2019-2020 | Zoom meeting | 30.03.21 |
| PORTUGAL | | | |
| 1PT | Portuguese Delegation to the UNSC in 2011-2012 | MS Teams | 26.03.21 |
| 2PT | Portuguese Delegation to the UNSC in 2011-2012 | Skype | 23.04.21 |
| ESTONIA | | | |
| 1EE | Estonian Delegation to the UNSC | Zoom meeting | 19.03.21 |
| 2EE | Estonian Delegation to the UNSC | Zoom meeting | 05.04.21 |
| 3EE | Estonian Delegation to the UNSC | Zoom meeting | 09.04.21 |
| 4EE | Estonian Delegation to the UNSC | Zoom meeting | 12.04.21 |
| 5EE | Estonian Delegation to the UNSC | Zoom meeting | 16.04.21 |

**Interview request form**

Dear Mr/Ms,

Please allow me to introduce myself. I am Maria Khrapunenko and I am a Master's Student at the University of Tartu's Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies located in Estonia.

Currently, as a part of my Master's Thesis, I am conducting a research, which focuses on the EU Member States' interaction in the UN and informal representation of the EU positions in the UNSC.

I would greatly appreciate the opportunity to interview *(name),* given his/her previous experience as a part of *(country's)* mission to the UN in 2011-2012 when *(country)* was on the UNSC. I understand that the events were quite a long time ago, but I am interested in the process rather than content: how the briefings/coordination meetings were conducted, how much information was disseminated between the EU Member States, etc. Part of the questions is focused on the Draft-Resolutions – how the co-sponsorship happened. And there are questions regarding the informal representation of EU positions on the UNSC – if the EU interests were considered when presenting country's national position.

I am well aware of the heavy workload and of the fact that *(name)* receives many requests such as mine. Nevertheless, I can assure *(name)* that this interview will be short (around 30 min) and would be of invaluable help for my research. Would it be possible to forward my request to him/her?

If *(name)* has the time in the upcoming weeks, might we be able to speak over Skype/Zoom?

I am available to speak over any other preferred method of communication as well.

If *(name)* would like to know anything more about me and/or my research, I would be happy to provide all of the needed information and answer all of the questions. Anonymity is always an option for the interview.

With best regards,

Maria Khrapunenko

**Interview consent form**

Dear Sir or Madam,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the research project. By signing this form, you confirm that:

- You have voluntary agreed to participate in the project.
- You have been informed about the researcher's professional interest and scope of research.
- You have been told about the purpose and topic of an interview.
- You have been able to ask questions about the interview and they have been answered.
- You have been informed about the interview process.
- You have given consent to the digital recording of the interview and use of your responses.
- You know that you have the right not to answer the question and leave the interview if you do not want to continue it.
- You understand that any attributed quotes from the interview will only be used for academic work. If we have agreed to conduct the interview anonymously, quotes will be attributed to 'a source familiar with the situation'.
- You know that you have a right to see the completed research product and request changes if you do not like the use of your responses.

**Interview guide**

Intro

1. Could you please briefly explain your position during (*country's)* term on the UNSC? How were you involved in EU coordination on UNSC-related issues?

Part 1: Type/mode of interaction/coordination

1. Could you tell me how does the coordination of EU member states on UNSC-related issues work in practice/what stages are there? To what extent do EU MSs share their national position on the issues/consult each other?

2. How does the coordination process (EU delegation and EU MS) influence the formulation of the national position? Do you and other EU MS try to make the positions alike/the same/ close to the EU?

3. When it comes to the co-sponsoring of Draft Resolutions, how do you decide what Draft-Resolution to co-sponsor? Is it also coordinated/discussed?

Part 2: State size

1. During your current term in the UNSC, did it happen that an issue came up on which you did not really have a prior position?
2. Do you look at what others EU MS position is if you ever find it hard to define your own?

Part 3: Informal representation

1. When serving in the UNSC did *(country)* primarily represent its own interests or also considered/tried to represent the EU ones? Was it important for *(country)* as a UNSC member and an EU member state to give the voice to the EU?

2. Could you walk me through the process of how your country defined its national position in the UNSC?

    a. In this process, what was the stage when you consulted with other EU partners/national capital, did it shape the formulation of your position – if it did? If it did not, what was then the role of the coordination meetings?

    b. Do you notify national capital of other positions of the EU MS? Is it important/does it add value to the position when it is an EU position?

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**17/05/2021**