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USE OF HEURISTICS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS TO DISTINGUISH
NONCREDIBLE INFORMATION

Master's Thesis

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I have written this Master's Thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources, and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper has been referenced.

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Abstract

Decision-making is one of the daily activities that many face, but people are not very rational when making those decisions. Especially when being under pressure of lacking time, mounting obligations and constant news. In such a stream of information overload, it is important to recognize credible information frugally and most effectively from noncredible. The aim of the paper was to show that the use of two deliberately chosen heuristics, expectancy violation and persuasive intent, in the decision-making process helps to achieve that. Randomized control trials were conducted with homogeneous group Estonian public authority managers (N = 28, women 68%, men 32%; weighted N = 36). With initial sample, the null hypothesis was not rejected, but the gender-weighted results showed that these heuristics do reduce the effort related to judging credibility in decision-making. While deciding, participants tended to approach the problem not systematically, but by some unspecified cues, which needs further research.

Keywords: noncredible information, decision-making, expectancy violation, persuasive intent

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1. Theoretical basis for the use of behavioral heuristics

1.1. Introduction

While making decisions, people also make mistakes. It has been repeatedly proven (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Elstein, 1999; Furnham & Boo, 2011; Luan et al., 2019) that human behavior and related decisions can lead to systemic cognitive biases. This is compared to the classical rationality based on Bayes' theorem, which is used to calculate conditional probabilities (Albert, 2003). To deal with complicated assessments and decisions, people use simplistic heuristics instead (Dhami et al., 2019). Heuristics are like mental shortcuts for decision-making to solve economic problems quickly and efficiently, without using complex modeling or analysis (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). For instance, using similar password whenever needing a new one, to make deciding easier and not to forget the secret wording. Although the use of heuristics is often considered a less competent way than, for example the use of other “rational” models, because they are said to be less accurate or overgeneralizing the results (Shanteau, 1989; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008).

In contrast, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) in their study of ecological rationality argue that less information produces more accurate results in some situations, like with a high

number of potential alternatives and small sample size. Gigerenzer (2021) says that in those cases described, the use of heuristics is not always better, but it is almost always justified. Especially when there is a lot of uncertainty, where one cannot optimize anymore, the heuristics are the go-to tools (Artinger et al., 2014). Heuristics can be useful or even more precise when there are few choices and low predictability (essentially meaning uncertainty), and the process of using the heuristic is easier for the decision maker to understand (Luan et al., 2019).

Identifying the problem first and then assessing its credibility should be part of the decision-making steps (Pornpitakpan, 2004). The decision makers could be given the tools to distinguish the misinformation more easily. The use of heuristics in minimal information environment was put to the test, namely how two purposely chosen heuristics in the decision-making process assists judging credibility of online information. Randomized controlled trial with middle managers as a homogeneous group, was conducted for that.

1.2. Decision making as a (resource intensive) process

Decision-making has been independently studied for a very long time, but Edwards (1954) was the first to publish an extensive review of the decision-making theory, explaining how people make choices considering the alternatives while assuming they behave rationally to maximize the expected utility. *Decision-making* can be simply defined as the process of identifying the decision, gathering information, then assessing and selecting the appropriate action from the alternatives (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). The complexity of decision-making occurs when several of those alternatives become available (Powell et al., 2011).

Decision-making research has mostly focused on individual decision-making, like behavioral decision theory (Kahneman, 1991), naturalistic decision-making (Klein, 1998), and intuition (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012) and organizational decision-making, like information processing (Conolly, 1977) and corporate behavior theory (Cyert & March, 1992). Newer important finding is that the individual and organizational decision-making research can be bridged, and the conclusions used vice versa using the ecological rationality approach (Luan et al., 2019).

In normative rational decision-making model, the problem is proceeded systematically, it is divided into smaller parts, which are treated logically, analyzing the problem in all connections and interactions (Lunenburg, 2010). A rational system is practiced when all the necessary information is available, there is enough time to collect and process the information, and the decision-maker operates in a stable environment (Towler, 2010;

Schoenfeld, 2011). According to Schoenfeld (2011) the rational decision-making process has six steps: 1) problem identification; 2) creating alternatives; 3) evaluation of alternatives; 4) choosing an alternative; 5) implementing the decision; 6) evaluating the effectiveness of the decision. And then one must repeat the process if necessary. This process might lead to desired results, but still a great deal of effort is needed (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008).

Cohen et al. (1972) showed years ago that decision makers operate in an irrational environment, dealing at the same time with a lot of uncertainty. It is intended that they use the normative choice models in the process, which assume that all known options and probabilities are given to the decision maker. But those rational models deal with the situations of *risk* instead, where the probabilities of the results are objectively known and the optimal option can be calculated (Knight, 1921). However, decisions are rather made under high pressure and very hastily, which is why Riabacke (2006) shows how peoples' decisions are often based on intuition and conscience.

These real-world decisions are largely characterized by *uncertainty* (Camerer, 1988; Radford, 1989). The term refers to situations where, in the absence of information, the decision-maker does not know all the possible options, together with their consequences and probabilities or the information is unknowable (Artinger et al., 2014; Dhimi et al., 2019; Gigerenzer, 2021). As described by Artinger et al. (2014), many strategic and managerial decisions must be made in conditions of uncertainty rather than in the conditions of perceived risk. To be clear, normative solution under the condition of risk is not the best one used under the condition of uncertainty (Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012). The typical decisions made are based on rational system risk models, which must predict the future, but when uncertainties occur, they make forecasting errors (Luan et al., 2019). Research on behavioral decision-making shows that people generally lack the cognitive ability to make informed and unbiased decisions in a complex environment (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Descriptive study models demonstrate that people do not follow preset rules to make decisions both under risk and uncertainty (Straub & Welpe, 2014).

1.3. Heuristics as shortcuts leading to cognitive biases, or an opportunity?

The term *heuristic* comes from the Greek word and means roughly “to find out or to discover.” Heuristics are any problem-solving strategies or simple rules of behavior, that are not guaranteed to be perfect or even rational, but are sufficient (Groner et al., 1983). The concept of *heuristic* in economics has many meanings though. For example, heuristics are described as so-called shortcuts or simplified rules of thumb for solving economic problems

quickly and economically, i.e., considering the time and amount of information required (Dhimi et al., 2019). Or it can be stated that using a heuristic is a subset strategy, with the aim to make decisions more quickly, frugally, and accurately than more complicated processes, ignoring parts of the available information (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Shah and Oppenheimer (2008) found that all heuristics mainly reduce cognitive effort by examining fewer cues and simplifying them, inspecting fewer alternatives, and integrating less information.

Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described and many others (e.g., Dhimi et al., 2019; Aikman et al., 2021) confirmed how the use of heuristics reduces the complexity of probability estimation and value prediction processes to simpler decision-making operations. Concurrently, heuristics are portrayed as effective cognitive processes, conscious and subconscious, that ignore some of the information (Gigerenzer, 2021). However, Herbert Simon (1990, p. 11), the originator of these studies, emphasizes that heuristics are “not optimization techniques, but methods for achieving satisfactory solutions with modest computational volume,” i.e., the simplest possible processes to replace the use of complex algorithms.

It is broadly believed that in an environment with known risk or known probability distributions, decision makers use heuristics mainly for effort-accuracy tradeoff to obtain a more or less accurate result with faster time and effort (Luan et al., 2019; Aikman et al., 2021). Which simultaneously means that a heuristic that ignores certain information cannot make more precise predictions than a much more complex model – that is with a known and defined risk – but if uncertainty comes into play in the decision-making process, a simple heuristic may perform significantly better than more complex models (Aikman et al., 2021). Even so with small samples, a heuristic often helps to achieve much better results, as convincingly shown by Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011).

Research has mostly focused on errors and cognitive biases that arise when using heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Dhimi, et al., 2019). The focus has been on errors so far for two main reasons: firstly, normal functioning is often measured by provoking mistakes – e.g., memory is examined by looking at forgetting –, and secondly, rejection of the respectable null hypothesis of rational models (Kahneman, 1991). In the current context, decision heuristics can be identified by the biases they cause. But now recent work has shown the advantages of heuristics and even encourages to use those shortcuts in decision-making process in number of cases (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Artinger et al., 2014; Luan et al., 2019; Aikman et al., 2021).

While perceptual fallacies point to the flipside of non-analytical decision-making, emerging research indicates that simple rules may be more effective for decision makers or even the only viable option for making appropriate decisions in certain situations (Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015). Some prior articles (Manimala, 1992; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Artinger et al., 2014) have described decisions made in a highly uncertain environment were more likely to be based on the use of heuristics than on an immense analysis of all available information. Furthermore, Shah and Oppenheimer (2008) clearly show that heuristics mainly reduce the cognitive effort involved in deciding on a task, and if they lead to results, the easier path is usually chosen.

In general, the cognition errors are due to the use of heuristics, but if people use the shortcuts anyway, they need to be guided to use the right heuristics at the right time. The systematic literary review of behavioral decision-making by Stingl and Gerald (2017) revealed a major research gap, that the focus has mostly been on the potential negative effects of cognitive biases while using heuristics, and that needs to be filled. Dhimi et al. (2019) show in their comparative study that heuristic research is currently very important contribution to the social sciences.

1.4. Credibility trial – efficient selection of different information

Kahneman et al. (2011) have found that the real challenge for leaders who want to apply quality control in decision-making is neither time nor expense — even highly experienced, competent people are mistaken — guided and disciplined decision-making process is most important. Even more so in the constant abundance of information, it is vital to learn how at first successfully distinguish credible information from noncredible, because credibility is becoming a very important criterion while selecting the source (Pornpitakpan, 2004). Here, resource-efficient heuristics could come to the rescue. Specifically, how the use of some handy heuristics could help people decide over information credibility more effectively.

More and more knowledge nowadays is provided online, including the amount that is solely shared over the Internet. Particularly the news is increasingly consumed via the web, not so much from the traditional media, like newspapers, radio, and television. According to Statista (2022), a provider of market and consumer data, the time spent with digital versus traditional media in the United States was quite similar in 2017–2018 (ca 350–370 min/day), but was 1,5 times higher in 2021 (479 min/day digital, 313 min/day traditional) and is forecasted to be almost 2 times as much in 2023 (500 min/day digital, 285 min/day

traditional). Digital consumers are now spending approx. 6,5 hours per day online, with 51% spent online via mobiles (GWI, 2022).

With its openness, the Internet allows virtually anyone to write, share and publish articles, even if they are often sloppy (Fitzpatrick, 2018). In an environment where everyone is free to publish stories, misinformation or even disinformation tends to rapidly spread (Pennycook & Rand, 2021). *Misinformation* is a false information that is presented as a fact, but *disinformation* is intentionally false and intended to deceive (Pennycook & Rand, 2021).

The users of online platforms and social media operators often lack the journalistic education and are motivated to sell advertising – therefore, published information can be biased and even misleading (Chen et al., 2015). The publication of online news is also driven by speed rather than fact-checking, even to the extent that the accuracy of the news is occasionally proportional to the speed with which information is disseminated (Fitzpatrick, 2018). Studies have confirmed that readers are aware of the credibility issues and are sometimes even suspicious of the information (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Pornpitakpan, 2004).

Various authors outline the main criteria for assessing information credibility: accuracy, authority (trustworthiness), fairness, objectivity (bias), currency, coverage (completeness) (Metzger, 2007; Thorson et al., 2010). Information that ignores or exceeds these norms is often considered less credible (Flanagin & Metzger, 2000; Thorson et al., 2010). If the source is noncredible, it is usually avoided, although, in some cases data may be deliberately shared (Fitzpatrick, 2018). Sundar (2008) explains that one of the best criteria for confirming the credibility is whether the source is an official authority or not; he was also the developer of the theory that online credibility judgment relies on the use of heuristics.

Most of the characteristics by which the credibility of a news item is assessed, require an analysis of the content, but research has shown that the average reader has trouble evaluating content. Metzger and Flanagin (2013) described how people rarely use the information judging criteria mentioned above to distinguish the credibility of online information, instead looking at more superficial features such as website design and navigability. In an online news consumption research conducted in University of Tartu, Härma (2015) found that consumers believe the texts from well-known portals and online publications to be more credible and whether the new information is in line with one's common sense (Härma, 2015). Meaning those decision makers also rely on using heuristics, like Sundar (2008) explained, and more than often this approach is justified, because it is mostly valid, while requiring less effort (Metzger et al., 2010).

So, people could make their deciding processes more efficient. By selecting few heuristics and comparing different types of information, they can quickly and effectively judge the credibility of the information without much cognitive effort. Schoemaker (1991) explained that one of those helpful heuristics may be *optimality*. The term is used in a variety of fields, like in economics to explain utility maximization, in physics to describe least effort principles, and in biology about the survival of the fittest. Pareto optimality means that no further changes can make one person better off without making another worse off simultaneously; or optimality may be described as a normative principle for rational choice (Schoemaker, 1991). But optimality is prone to confirmation bias, because it is primarily a view that confirms one's own view rather than the opposite.

1.4.1. Expectancy violation heuristic

Context-specific heuristics, derived from the optimality models and based on previous studies (Meola, 2004, Metzger, 2007, Metzger et al., 2010; Metzger & Flanagin, 2013), are more accurate in judging the credibility of a text. This research examines explicitly the expectancy violation and the persuasive intent heuristics, which were very commonly used by several hundred participants in various online information evaluation tasks, and these heuristics were indicated as primary cues while judging the credibility of data (Metzger et al., 2010; Sundar et al., 2009; Hilligoss & Rieh, 2008).

Expectancy violation means that if the object under study, like a website, or its content does not meet previously set expectations (i.e., information, appearance, layout, function, etc.), it is considered noncredible (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013). A study by Metzger et al. (2010) shows that the forms of this heuristic appear when the identity of the source is hidden or hard to interpret, a website asks for more information than it needs or offers more than the user has searched for, or when something unexpected appears to the user. For the latter example, say if intrusive pop-up ads appear next to a news page on a seemingly decent news portal. The most common expectancy violations are due to typographical or grammatical errors, as well as visual appearance or poor design of the source. Internet users often report that professional-looking content and smooth site navigation have a positive effect on their credibility ratings (Metzger et al., 2010).

Expectancy violations cause arousal, distraction, and even stress, distracting one's attention from the subject and drawing it towards the violation. However, even if expectations are violated, the result can be a negative or a positive reaction (Burgoon, 2015). Fogg (2003) proposes that those expectancy violations are observed and used to evaluate

credibility negatively or positively. Like that expectancy violations act as heuristics, as they allow a hasty judgment of credibility without too much considering the source's quality or using time-consuming methods of evaluation.

1.4.2. Persuasive intent heuristic

Persuasive intent is the opinion that information which appears to be biased or clearly seeks to influence a person (e.g., advertising), is not credible (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013). Commercial information has a strong negative cue on credibility, especially when the advertisement feels unexpected or invasive (Fogg, 2003; Metzger et al., 2010). The displaying of ads makes people think they are being manipulated, and this triggers a certain protection mechanism, which can lead to an instant negative judgment without further assessment (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013).

Sundar (2008) analyzes this phenomenon in terms of *intrusiveness heuristic*, where unsought and unwanted information negatively impacts the users' experience with website's content, as the annoyance is reflected to the whole source itself. Certain types of intrusive advertising, such as pop-ups or page redirects, were immediately related to website credibility (Metzger et al., 2010).

The persuasive intent heuristic looks to be affective based, meaning that users try to discover the hidden motives behind the information found on the Internet. This is one of the first cues people use to judge credibility, acting as a heuristic stopping rule (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013).

2. Methodology and data

2.1. Background

This study examines Estonian managers and the decisions they make when assessing the credibility of online text, but not their management decisions independently. The sample was chosen from the participants of Estonian state-run middle management development program, as they are an extremely homogeneous group – e.g., they have an increased interest in the subject and the same basic knowledge. Plus, midlevel managers are like linchpins of the organization, being mediators between top and bottom levels. If managers encounter a bias when judging a text, when they are influenced by the presentation of content, the results can be interpreted to other groups in the organization.

According to a very extensive study by Gallup (2019), it can be said that middle managers are perhaps the most important link in an organization. A middle manager is an

intermediary between top management and first level managers, spending most of their day – an average of five hours – interacting with people (Gallup, 2019; Mollick, 2012). Middle managers' influence on the organization is great, as they have a direct and large impact on most of the company's activities, and the performance (Mollick, 2012). Middle management must make daily decisions that affect the image of the entire institution, as well as the customer experience and the reputation as an employer.

Estonian state runs an annual development program for the middle managers of institutions (ministries, agencies, etc.) called KAJA. The participants for this study come from that course. KAJA program's aim is to increase efficient public administration through the growth of component middle managers. It is an initiative for personal development of a middle-level manager, while the emphasis is on raising the manager's self-awareness, analyzing personal skills, and identifying development needs. In particular, middle managers with many subordinates are invited to participate. (KAJA... 2022).

Decision-making is one of the main daily activities that majority of employees take, managers even more so. But as stated before, it can be a resource intensive task (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Identifying the problem while evaluating its credibility is part of the decision-making process, or it should be. To help to ease the burden for all the decision makers, they need to be given heuristic tools to distinguish noncredible information more cost-effectively. Decisions made in an uncertain environment, like daily life in an organization, were probably based on the use of some heuristics anyway (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Artinger et al., 2014).

To find out whether and how the use of two deliberately chosen heuristics, expectancy violation and persuasive intent, in the decision-making process helps to pick out more credible information, a randomized controlled trial (RCT) was conducted. RCT is one of the most common methods for determining whether there is a link between an intervention and an outcome (Bhide et al., 2018).

2.2. Research design and procedure

The study used a 2 (control / persuasive intent) × 2 (expectancy violation / expectancy violation and persuasive intent) between-subjects experimental design (Table 1). Group 1 was a control group that looked at the text without additional details. Group 2 was with persuasive intent detail, with an extra note at the beginning of the text. Group 3 was with an expectancy violation detail, there was an extra paragraph added. Group 4 was a general credibility testing group that looked at the text with both types of added details. A trial was conducted, with

participants randomly assigned to four reference groups: three treatment and one control group. Expectancy violation and persuasive intent conditions separately and together served as the independent variables. The dependent variables were the assessments they gave after reading a text. Persuasive intent and expectancy violation heuristics and their effect on the judgment of credibility were examined.

All participants were asked to read and sign an informed consent form prior to beginning the study. The survey was conducted entirely on the University of Tartu LimeSurvey platform. The data collected was confidential and analyzed anonymously, as well as the IP addresses of the respondents were made anonymous. Participation in the study did not pose a risk to health, it was voluntary, and no fee was provided.

After the consent, the participants were given a text to read. Three of the texts had certain additions that could possibly affect the credibility of the text. The expectancy violation condition had an extra passage which included a bit unexpected recommendation compared to the content of the previous passages. The persuasive intent condition had a sidenote of “content marketing” without the extra passage, and the expectancy violation with persuasive intent condition had both additions. More details can be seen in Appendix 1. If the article read did not meet the expectancies or it was seen as persuasive, participants were expected to find the text noncredible.

Table 1. *RCT design*

	Heuristic condition used
Control group	No expectancy violation / no persuasive intent
Variable P	Persuasive intent / No expectancy violation
Variable E	Expectancy violation / no persuasive intent
Variable PE	Expectancy violation / persuasive intent

Source: Compiled by the author

After the short article, which varied by group, all the participants were asked to indicate their judgment on the credibility of the text. The answers were dependent variables in our analysis, the following wording was used:

- Please answer the following questions by moving the slider to the right or left.
 - How did you feel reading the text? (Very badly – Very well)
 - How convincing was the text? (Not at all – Very)
 - Was the content of the text what you expected? (Not at all – Very)
 - Did you feel affected in any way? (Not at all – Very)
 - If you want, you can specify what you felt when you read the text (even if the content was not clear).

After these questions, participants took a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and an Overconfidence Test (OT). Also, short descriptive statistics were collected. CRT is a three-point tool introduced by Frederick (2005), designed to measure the tendency to reject the predominant answer that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection leading to the correct answer. It is a great predictor of performance on various heuristics-and-biases tasks (Toplak et al., 2011). OT used here is a next version of previously developed tool to measure the individual overconfidence, as humans generally overestimate their knowledge and abilities (Michailova, 2010). Possible overconfidence levels can be accounted when judging the credibility of the text. The CRT and OT used are included in the Appendices.

Mini pilot was carried out before the main study with similar subjects, to assess the texts and questions given. After completing the experiment, short feedback was requested. It was indicated that the survey seemed to fill its purpose to help distinguish the credibility more efficiently with given heuristics.

2.3. Participants

4 participants were recruited for mini pilot study to assess the design. Participants were former university students who worked or had worked as middle managers. Participants were between 31 and 35 years of age ($M = 33,25$; $SD = 1,71$), with 2 women and 2 men. The participants were Estonian, with higher education degrees.

The main sample was collected from middle managers' development program KAJA 2021–2022. Inquiries and instructions to answer the survey were sent by e-mail to all the 49 participants in the program. Everybody was not able or willing to fully participate, but the completed survey response rate was very high at 57%. The final sample consisted of 28 people (19 women or 67,9% and 9 men or 32,1%; age: $M = 42,93$, $SD = 7,46$, age range = 32–56). All the participants were of Estonian nation, held a higher education degree and

worked as middle managers in some state institution, meaning the group being largely homogeneous. The random assignment can be seen on Figure 1.




Figure 1. Distribution among the groups. Source: Compiled by the author

2.4. Method of analysis

There were three condition groups the participants could be in. To assess the relationship between persuasive intent and expectancy violation groups, a one-way between-subject ANOVA in statistical software suite SPSS was conducted. The groups were first compared against each other, but binary analysis of combined condition groups and the control group was also enforced because of small sample.

Since women were over-represented in the sample, one analysis had weights applied to gender variable. Although the whole sample was randomized, more weight entitled to one subgroup seemed to lead to errors of estimation and the data comes aggregated. It is because women have much higher response rate and are more likely to fill out any surveys than men (Smith, 2008).

To explore the effect of the manipulation and the correlations between the dependent variables, Pearson correlational analyses were conducted within all levels of the independent variable groups. To find out the expectancies or persuasiveness of the text read, a non-numerical (with numbers hidden) Thurstone unidimensional scale was added, “not at all” written on one side of the scale and the other side being “very”. This type of scale is suitable for measuring expectancies or persuasiveness, since participants can easily point their attitude towards a choice, without fixating on a specific number.

If the participant did well on the cognitive reflection test, it was analyzed if more reflective people are more affected by the heuristic cues. Chi-Square independent test was used for overconfidence and cognitive reflection assessment. Also, correlational analyses were taken to see how overconfidence levels and outcomes relate.

3. Results

3.1. Manipulation effects

When conducting ANOVA between all the groups, interesting findings were revealed. Results showed that participants in the expectancy violation condition (22%) were more likely to indicate that they had felt more affected compared with those in the control condition (32%). Participants who viewed the article with “content marketing” marker said they were more likely to disagree that the article was convincing, but the findings were not statistically significant. Since the p-values were not less than 0,05, study failed to reject the null hypothesis and no there is no sufficient evidence to say that statistically significant difference was between the mean scores of the three groups.

Next between-group dependent variable analysis was conducted, results were this: ‘How did you feel reading the text?’ ($F = 0,76$, $p = 0,53$), ‘How convincing was the text?’ ($F = 0,22$, $p = 0,88$), ‘Was the content of the text what you expected?’ ($F = 2,21$, $p = 0,112$), ‘Did you feel affected in any way?’ ($F = 0,05$, $p = 0,99$). The p-value was more than $p = 0,05$ or even $p = 0,1$, which indicates that the difference between these two groups means were statistically not significant.

Table 2. *Two-way ANOVA, ‘Did you feel affected in any way?’ variable*

Dependent variable * Gender					
Dependent Variable: Did you feel affected in any way?					
Group	Gender	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Control	woman	29.333	10.509	7.411	51.256
	man	62.333	14.863	31.331	93.336
Variable P	woman	37.250	12.871	10.401	64.099
	man	39.500	18.203	1.530	77.470
Variable E	woman	28.500	12.871	1.651	55.349
	man	74.000	18.203	36.030	111.970
Variable PE	woman	34.500	10.509	12.578	56.422
	man	64.000	25.743	10.302	117.698

A two-way ANOVA was performed to determine if dependent variables (Variable P, Variable P and Variable PE) and gender (women, men) had any significant manipulation effects. Since the p-value for participants gender was $p = 0,03$, ($p < 0,05$) in one setting (“Did you feel affected in any way?”) only, this factor had a sole statistically significant effect. It was seen that in the Variable E and Variable PE groups men felt much more affected than women when this question was asked (Table 2).

Then a binary ANOVA test was conducted between condition groups and control group, which also had no statistically significant results: ‘How did you feel reading the text?’ ($F = 0,00$, $p = 0,96$), ‘How convincing was the text?’ ($F = 0,01$, $p = 0,92$), ‘Was the content of the text what you expected?’ ($F = 0,02$, $p = 0,9$), ‘Did you feel affected in any way?’ ($F = 0,00$, $p = 0,98$).

Table 3 displays the correlations between dependent variables, which were the assessments given by the participants after reading the article, based on randomization of the group they were sorted to. A few statistically significant positive correlations appear, i.e. ‘Was the content of the text what you expected?’ and ‘How did you feel reading the text?’ ($r = 0,56$, $p = 0,05$); ‘How convincing was the text?’ and ‘Was the content of the text what you expected?’ ($r = 0,75$, $p = 0,01$).

Table 3. *Correlations between dependent variables*

		How did you feel reading the text?	How conv. was the text?	Was the content [...] you expected?	Did you feel affected in any way?
How did you feel reading the text?	Pearson Cor	1	.207	.558*	-.367
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.394	.013	.122
	N	19	19	19	19
How convincing was the text?	Pearson Cor	.207	1	.746**	.201
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.394		<.001	.410
	N	19	19	19	19
Was the [...] what you expected?	Pearson Cor	.558*	.746**	1	-.083
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.013	<.001		.736
	N	19	19	19	19
Did you feel affected in any way?	Pearson Cor	-.367	.201	-.083	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.122	.410	.736	
	N	19	19	19	19
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).					
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).					

Time was measured during the experiment, seconds spent answering the survey. Means were reported by group, Control (M = 668,22; SD = 201,38), Variable P (M = 546,91; SD = 77,44), Variable E (M = 518,48, SD = 203,99), Variable PE (M = 715,12, SD = 286,14), total (M = 621,88, SD = 213,6).

Lastly weights were applied to the gender variable, because women were over-represented in the small sample (67,9% women and 32,1% men), and the population weight was similar to 55% women, 45% men. Chi-Square square test was calculated with applied new weight to assess the dependent variables among the groups. New weighed sample was N = 36. These results looked much more convincing: 'How did you feel reading the text?' ($\chi^2 = 87,25$, $p = 0,01$), 'How convincing was the text?' ($\chi^2 = 88,25$, $p = 0,06$), 'Was the content of the text what you expected?' ($\chi^2 = 98,5$, $p = 0,04$), 'Did you feel affected in any way?' ($\chi^2 = 88,13$, $p = 0,04$). Indicating that all the gender-weighted variables had statistically significant results.

3.2. Overconfidence and cognitive reflection

Chi-Square independent test was used to determine whether there is a significant association between the level of overconfidence and cognitive reflection, and dependent variables. The results for those who answered correctly in the CRT, where much more higher, but still not statistically significant. People who were very confident in their answers in the OT (confidence level > 65%), were better to interact with credibility cues at least on one occasion ($p = 0,05$).

Weights by gender was applied here as well. No significant result was found in cognitive reflection test, but half the overconfidence test answers had many (χ^2 range = 35,2–42,1, p range = 0,03–0,05).

Pearson correlation analysis was done additionally. There was a strong positive correlation between attitudes and cognitive reflection levels in the Variable PE group ($r = 0,76$ $p < 0,05$) and even stronger positive correlation for the Variable E group ($r = 0,9$, $p < 0,05$).

4. Discussion

Current study shows that the interaction between two heuristics, persuasive intent, and expectancy violation, did not appear to help distinguish the data more efficiently. At first sight anyway. Results were statistically insignificant, everything looked like a zero outcome, so that the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Not able to reject the H_0 meant that the

intervention had no desired effect. But it seemed, analyzing the answers given, looking at the graphic plots, reading the theory behind the heuristics and experiments performed, that participants of this particular research did use some kind of heuristics. However, the persuasive intent and expectancy violation did not show any significant value.

Why it did not work, appeared to be an issue with mainly the sample. Its distribution and size. Raking weights was worth a try. So, the weights were added, and all the gender-weighted variables had all of a sudden statistically significant result. It could have meant that the sample size, although randomized, was inconsistent compared to the population mean – which indicates more responses from men would have made a significant impact and possibly given much better results.

Interestingly, persuasive intent condition, with the “content marketing” sidenote, had much less of an impact on the credibility judgement. On the other hand, expectancy violation condition had participants question the credibility of the text more often. The most effective condition was the two heuristics combined, and it gave the most written feedback as well. Some of the comments were: ‘Feels like advertising’, ‘A bit confusing, mix of different content’, ‘This text rather confirmed what I mean, except for that part of gold.’, ‘It questioned my understanding so far.’, ‘Stupid thing. Who was it trying to convince?’. It did work.

The findings are meaningful for all the decision makers, since the results indicate that people tend to use rules of thumb to make decisions. At least regarding the judgment of information credibility, in this study it was online data. What can be definitely said, is that people process information, and they have some cues that explain the made decisions, but which heuristics are used for that, remains to be a bit unclear because of the failure with the original sample. Weighted variables showed that significance though. It is encouraging.

While deciding, people tend to approach the problem not systematically, but by their so-called gut feeling or some heuristic cues (Stingl & Gerald, 2017). If it is known that people use shortcuts anyway, at least they need to be guided to use right heuristics. Previous research has yielded much more confirming results on how heuristics, namely persuasive intent and expectancy violation, can help to efficiently judge the credibility of information (Fogg, 2003; Metzger et al., 2010; Flanagin & Metzger, 2000; Hilligoss & Rieh, 2008). So, further research on that part in Estonia needs to be done, with much larger sample size to begin with.

Summary

While judging the credibility of information, such as online news, people frequently use heuristic cues, because it's more efficient. The experiment showed that when assessing

the credibility of an online text, people used some external credibility cues, which at first could not be specified, since the results were not statistically significant. But when gender-weighted results were analyzed, it showed expectancy violation heuristic and expectancy violation combined with persuasive intent heuristic, were working as credibility judging cues just fine. Like was predicted by previous theory. The cognitive reflection test and overconfidence test showed no significant effect, although participants who answered correctly to the questions, reacted much better to the cues.

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APPENDIX A

‘Article used in the experiment
(Translated from Estonian)

Please read the following excerpt from the news of a well-known Estonian newspaper and then answer a few questions.

[Control group]

INVESTOR > Where to put your savings?

The price of fuel is rising, the price of gas is rising, and the prices of food are rising – we are daily surrounded by news like this. It is a new reality brought about by rapid inflation, a phenomenon that is diminishing the purchasing power of money.

For example, in 2021, Estonians had collected an estimated 8 billion euros, which lost as much as 360 million euros in value. The savings just stood in bank accounts. As the cost of living rose, the purchasing power of savings fell. Rapid inflation is making the situation more and more critical every day.

So that inflation does not negatively affect the value of our money, we should relocate our savings in such a way that their purchasing power is maintained and even increased over time. There are many ways to invest money. A lot of real estate is bought, there is a lot of talk about cryptocurrencies and stock exchange trading. One of the easiest ways is to buy precious metals, such as gold. Gold is a liquid asset class that has kept its value stable for centuries.

[Persuasive intent group]

INVESTOR > Where to put your savings?*CONTENT MARKETING*

The price of fuel is rising, the price of gas is rising, and the prices of food are rising – we are daily surrounded by news like this. It is a new reality brought about by rapid inflation, a phenomenon that is diminishing the purchasing power of money.

For example, in 2021, Estonians had collected an estimated 8 billion euros, which lost as much as 360 million euros in value. The savings just stood in bank accounts. As the cost of living rose, the purchasing power of savings fell. Rapid inflation is making the situation more and more critical every day.

So that inflation does not negatively affect the value of our money, we should relocate our savings in such a way that their purchasing power is maintained and even increased over

time. There are many ways to invest money. A lot of real estate is bought, there is a lot of talk about cryptocurrencies and stock exchange trading. One of the easiest ways is to buy precious metals, such as gold. Gold is a liquid asset class that has kept its value stable for centuries.

[Expectancy violation group]

INVESTOR > Where to put your savings?

The price of fuel is rising, the price of gas is rising, and the prices of food are rising – we are daily surrounded by news like this. It is a new reality brought about by rapid inflation, a phenomenon that is diminishing the purchasing power of money.

For example, in 2021, Estonians had collected an estimated 8 billion euros, which lost as much as 360 million euros in value. The savings just stood in bank accounts. As the cost of living rose, the purchasing power of savings fell. Rapid inflation is making the situation more and more critical every day.

So that inflation does not negatively affect the value of our money, we should relocate our savings in such a way that their purchasing power is maintained and even increased over time. There are many ways to invest money. A lot of real estate is bought, there is a lot of talk about cryptocurrencies and stock exchange trading. One of the easiest ways is to buy precious metals, such as gold. Gold is a liquid asset class that has kept its value stable for centuries.

However, all the asset classes mentioned are quite demanding. Investing requires specific basic knowledge, in some cases a lot of money is needed to start, a person must have a high-risk tolerance. In addition, during anxious times no one knows when the right time is to buy or sell a property. This really means only one thing at the moment – money has to be taken into consumption. In the current hectic economic environment, it is wise to direct the money in your accounts directly into the economy. Indulge in something that has been postponed until now, take the family on a trip, enjoy dining at a restaurant, gift experiences – these are the real values that grow in time!

[Persuasive intent + expectancy violation group]

INVESTOR > Where to put your savings?

CONTENT MARKETING

The price of fuel is rising, the price of gas is rising, and the prices of food are rising – we are daily surrounded by news like this. It is a new reality brought about by rapid inflation, a phenomenon that is diminishing the purchasing power of money.

For example, in 2021, Estonians had collected an estimated 8 billion euros, which lost as much as 360 million euros in value. The savings just stood in bank accounts. As the cost

of living rose, the purchasing power of savings fell. Rapid inflation is making the situation more and more critical every day.

So that inflation does not negatively affect the value of our money, we should relocate our savings in such a way that their purchasing power is maintained and even increased over time. There are many ways to invest money. A lot of real estate is bought, there is a lot of talk about cryptocurrencies and stock exchange trading. One of the easiest ways is to buy precious metals, such as gold. Gold is a liquid asset class that has kept its value stable for centuries.

However, all the asset classes mentioned are quite demanding. Investing requires specific basic knowledge, in some cases a lot of money is needed to start, a person must have a high-risk tolerance. In addition, during anxious times no one knows when the right time is to buy or sell a property. This really means only one thing at the moment – money has to be taken into consumption. In the current hectic economic environment, it is wise to direct the money in your accounts directly into the economy. Indulge in something that has been postponed until now, take the family on a trip, enjoy dining at a restaurant, gift experiences – these are the real values that grow in time!

APPENDIX B

‘Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) used in the experiment
(Translated from Estonian)

Please answer the following short questions. Use only numbers (both integers and fractions!).

1. A tennis racket and a ball cost a total of 1 euro and 10 cents. The racket costs 1 euro more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? _____ cents.
2. It takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets. How long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? _____ minutes.
3. The lake has an area covered with water lilies. The area is doubling every day. It takes 48 days to cover the whole lake with water lilies. How long would it take to cover half of the lake with water lilies? _____ days.

APPENDIX C

‘Overconfidence Test (OT) used in the experiment
(Translated from Estonian)

Here are some general knowledge questions.

1. Please select only one of the three answers.
2. Once you've made your choice, we'd like to know how confident you are about your answer. Since there are three choices and only one answer is correct, the probability of the correct answer is 33%. So, 33% means you are only guessing and don't know the right answer, 100% means your absolute confidence.
 - a. You can enter any integer between 33% and 100% to express your confidence that the answer is correct.
 - b. Enter your number in the space provided after the question: “How confident are you that your answer is correct? _____%”

Please answer all the questions independently, without consulting others or seeking answers elsewhere. Even if you must guess the answers, you are 33% likely to answer correctly.

Thank you for your patience in completing this questionnaire.

1. How is an instant camera still called?
(Select one of the following; only integers between 33 and 100 are allowed in the comment)
 - a. Canon camera
 - b. Polaroid camera
 - c. Minolta cameraHow confident are you that your answer is correct? _____%
2. What does the rollmops mainly consist of?
(Select one of the following; only integers between 33 and 100 are allowed in the comment)
 - a. Herring
 - b. Pork
 - c. SalmonHow confident are you that your answer is correct? _____%
3. Which land does the Nobel Prize winner Gabriel García Márquez come from?
(Select one of the following; only integers between 33 and 100 are allowed in the comment)
 - a. Spain
 - b. Colombia
 - c. VenezuelaHow confident are you that your answer is correct? _____%

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