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**Examining Variation in Counter-Terrorism
Listing Regimes**


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Author's Declaration

I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.



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Examining Variation in Counter-Terrorism Listing Regimes

Andrew Worth

Abstract

Terrorism is a leading cause of concern throughout the world today. However, there is no consensus on how to identify, list, and target terror groups. Rather, each state has the ability to define, for itself, what the label of terrorist actually means. Ultimately, states create their own definitions of terrorism, despite a general consensus to combat terrorism. This leads to states creating terrorist listing regimes based on their security concerns, priorities, and interpretations of terrorism, allowing for variation in the listing regimes among states, yet cooperation between states is essential to reduce terrorist incidents. In this sense, the research of terror lists is particularly relevant because if these do not correspond to one another, then the likelihood of substantial cooperation in the field of counter terrorism is limited, despite most states agreeing in principle to fight terrorism. Moreover, there is a lack of substantial theory in Terrorism Studies capable of addressing these concerns. Of particular importance, there is an absence of research on the listing regimes themselves, regarding theoretical foundations, and the relationship between states lists in terms of similarity or variance.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the variation in these listing regimes, and determining how this variation can be explained. To do this, three alternative hypotheses are put forward, each of them grounded in a particular theoretical tradition in International Relations (IR) that provide differing explanations for the engagement of states in the international system. These three hypotheses, derived from the outlook of Neo Realism, the English School, and Constructivism, are tested to measure their explanatory power for the observed variation. Due to the lack of existing theory in terrorism studies, a secondary goal lies in connecting these neighboring International Relations theories to elements of terrorism studies, such as listing regimes. This is achieved in a two-step process; (1) through creating an overview analysis between five states, Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, and India, to observe variation among the selected states listing regimes and measure the hypotheses explanatory power, and (2) by

completing an in-depth analysis, through content analysis, of the most representative case's, in this instance the U.K., motivations for listing to examine the theory at work.

The analysis has shown the complexities of applying external theories to contemporary terrorism studies. The results show that there is a high degree of individuality concerning listing patterns of states. Initially, the Neo Realism based hypothesis is the most representative for a comparative overview of states. However, subsequent analysis shows that if analyzed qualitatively, the motivations of the listing pattern do not correspond with certain theoretical expectations. The research has provided valuable insight to the analysis of terror lists and provides a connection between listing regimes to the outside International Relations theories of Neo Realism, the English School, and Constructivism. Additionally, one theory, Neo Realism, has provided explanatory potential for the observed variations among the lists. Terror listing regimes, remains an area in demand of further investigation, and theorizing in particular. As such, this thesis has laid the groundwork for further examinations of state terror lists and the individual motivations for developing official state terror listing regimes, which are highly relevant for contemporary international politics, and remain an area in demand of further investigation, and theorizing in particular.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Countering terrorism is a strong priority for many governments in the world today. A decade and a half has passed since the events of September 11th, 2001 drove terrorism to be one of the key concerns of states throughout the world. Despite this there is no global consensus on how to identify, list, and target terror groups. The methods that states use to counter terrorism have direct implications on the well-being of its citizens and the integrity of the state. Of the methods at the disposal of states in their effort to counter terrorism is the process of targeting and listing terror groups as sanctioned by the state. States have the ability to independently create terror blacklists based on their security concerns, priorities, and interpretations of terrorism. This creates a situation in which states can create their own terror list, allowing for variation in the listing regimes among states, yet cooperation between states is essential to support the ongoing effort to reduce terrorist incidents. If the terror lists among states do not correspond to one another, then the likelihood of substantial cooperation in the field of counter terrorism is limited, despite most states agreeing in principle to fight terrorism. Due to the importance of combating terrorism, and particularly due to the evolving transnational nature of modern terrorism, states now more than ever need to hold a shared understanding of what constitutes terrorism and who should be labelled a terrorist. Without this, states cannot hope to counter a threat as large and diverse as terrorism, which is not bound by state boundaries or rules. Yet, since states can create their own terror lists and definitions of terrorism, the opportunity to share a common understanding can be lost, despite the general principles of being against terrorism.

The problem of terrorism and how states react to it is not diminishing. Terrorist's actions continue to dominate our news and with each new incident the question is regularly raised regarding what the government is doing to prevent this? The first step to understanding what a country is doing against terrorism is to understand who that country considers a terrorist group. Some governments publish official lists of the organizations that they consider to be terrorist groups. The topic of terror lists is especially relevant because it shows what groups states consider to be terrorists. While this may seem to be obvious at first, upon more detailed inspection it can become rather complicated. There is no

consensus definition of terrorism that states use to determine if a group should be labelled as terrorists. Rather each state has the ability to define, for itself, what the label of terrorist actually means. To this end states create their own definitions of terrorism, despite a general consensus that terrorism is something that should be opposed. By focusing on these lists it is possible to understand how states react to the threat posed by terrorism.

Previous studies on the topic of terror group listing have typically focused on specific consequences, that is, the results of being placed on the list (Bernstein, 2013) (Peed, 2005) (Goede & Sullivan, 2016). Others have discussed the concept that there are leading states in the field of counter-terrorism and have used the lists to show where these trends are most apparent. (Ilbiz & Curtis, 2015) Additionally, others have compared various state's lists to one another. Particularly useful to this thesis has been the work of Benjamin Freedman who compiled eight terror lists into one list. (Freedman B. , 2010) However, there remains a lack of substantial analysis of the results of the comparative list that was created, and since 2010 the state's lists themselves have changed considerably. What we have from this literature is a lack of definitional consensus on the concept of terrorism, yet a description of state lists as powerful instruments that can cause severe implications for the listed group or individual. These are created by powerful states and as a result it is possible to view trends in listing patterns and compare the lists against one another. Moreover, a theoretical account of listing regimes is absent, mirroring the a-theoretical nature of terrorism studies.

The question that will be answered is 'How can observed variation, if any, between the listing regimes of states be explained?' The goal is to examine what variation between the listing regimes exists and how this variation can be described. Simply put, what explains the variation in the listings? In order to answer this question, three alternative hypotheses are put forward, each of them grounded in a particular theoretical tradition in International Relations (IR) that provide differing explanations for the actions of states in the international system. These three hypotheses will be tested to measure their explanatory power for the observed variation. The first hypothesis (A) posits that states will have highly individualized lists derived from a neo realist viewpoint on international relations. The second (B) hypothesizes that states' action will reflect a desire to protect states that comprise the international society of states and is based on the English School.

And the third (C) suggests that lists will emulate a desire to protect themselves as well as other states with which they share a mutual identity, based on the theory of collective identity from Constructivist theory. Each hypothesis is grounded in theoretical foundations that assume attributes of the international system and of states. There is a lack to existing theory in terrorism studies capable of addressing this topic and therefore theory building is necessary to establish relevant links to neighboring disciplines, as is done here. Also, this contributes to these theories being measured for continued usefulness in explaining contemporary phenomena, such as counter terrorism policies. It's recognized that these IR theories present a state centric outlook, this study consciously opts for such an approach because it (a) allows for focus on the response, which remains state-centric; and (b) in order to create linkage between terrorism studies and International Relations literature; (c) to learn about the explanatory potential of these specific theories in the age of globalization of threats, including transnational or globalized terrorism.

The thesis' structure is broken into four main sections. The first will be concerned with detailing the background and definitional debate of terrorism, counter-terrorism efforts, and listing regimes themselves. The second will introduce the theoretical elements that make up each of the three hypotheses. The next section will introduce the case selection and methodology that will be used to analyze the lists. The fourth focuses on the analysis of the results and presents findings for answering the research question. The primary data which will be used are the official, publically available, terror lists from Australia, the Russian Federation, India, The United States, and The United Kingdom. These lists will be compiled into one comparative list and the results analyzed against one the three hypotheses with the aim to identify the hypothesis that hold the most explanatory power for the observations. Having identified the overall listing pattern among states, this allows for initial insight into the logic behind the listings. In a second step, the strength of the theoretical position corresponding to the observed listing pattern is further inspected by a qualitative analysis of one individual list in order to inspect in more detail the reasoning for the listing, and therefore the elements that have led to the particular listing pattern. This will be accomplished by performing content analysis on one of the list's supporting documents which provide justification of listing. In this way the general patterns of listing will be identified, through the comparative list analysis, and the supporting theory will be expanded in greater detail through examining an individual list.

There are some inherent limitations when researching state terror lists. First and foremost are the limitations for data availability, as not all are made available to the public. While researching terrorism and counter terrorism in general there are additional limitations regarding the classified nature of many government documents due to their sensitive nature and ongoing use against terror groups. This means that there may be additional documentation or justifications that are used within a government to base their position on counter terrorism that is not available at the time of this writing. Second, using a limited number of selected theories from another academic discipline brings with it another set of limitations. While the three selected schools of thought, Neorealism, English School, and Constructivism form part of the core literature of International Relations and therefore serve well to establish an initial link between terrorism studies and International Relations, it is in the end only three differing viewpoints. There may exist another theory that better explains the chosen phenomena, however the currently selected theories have been chosen due to the potential explanatory power and relative prevalence in academic literature. Third, despite the best effort to obtain the newest information available, the relationship between terror groups and states is a constantly moving target, and the field is constantly evolving as new groups appear, older groups fail to achieve their goals, others split to create alternative groups, alliances change, and the goals of states develop. The result is often that the state of the art research, by the time it is published, may not reflect the complete situation developing around the world. This is not to say that research of this type is in vain, rather it is necessary to understand the fields of terrorism and counter-terrorism as they exist today to further understand the changes that may occur tomorrow.

The lists themselves reflect the culmination of a state's history with terrorism, its definition, and the position that the state has towards terrorist groups. This thesis will approach the topic of listing regimes by first describing these various elements that come together to influence the creation of a state terror list. Then the lists themselves and their importance will be discussed. After that the theoretical foundations of the hypothesis will be detailed. Only when this has been completed can an analysis of the lists combine these elements and insights regarding the attributes of the state listing regimes can be discussed.

2. BACKGROUND OF TERRORISM AND LISTING REGIMES

2.1 DEFINITIONAL CONCERNS FOR TERRORISM

Only once the phenomenon of terrorism is understood that, in a second step, the counter measures can be explained. Therefore, this section introduces the definitional constraints, historical development, and contemporary forms of terrorism, before the next section explains the counter-terrorism measures in greater detail. This provides the background before which listing regimes, as a particular instrument of counter terrorism policy, can be analyzed. “Governments have developed definitions of terrorism, individual agencies within governments have adopted definitions, private agencies have designed their own definitions, and academic experts have proposed and analyzed dozens of definitional constructs.” (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 35) The basic discussion for any analysis regarding terrorism studies typically begins with a focus on definitions of terrorism. In the case of analyzing state listing regimes, and therefore states understanding of terrorism, it is paramount to discuss the topic of definitions within terrorism and counter terrorism studies, and in particular the issues surrounding the contended nature of the term. In this way, understanding the definitional problems associated with terrorism studies is of great importance to understanding the listing regimes themselves. As the definitional problems give rise to different understandings of terrorism, opposing viewpoints and theoretical assumptions can be made regarding the effort of states to classify and counter terrorism.

There has been a predominate focus in terrorism studies on addressing security concerns and providing a definition of the concept of terrorism or attempting to counter threats. Despite this, there is a lack of agreement regarding the definition of terrorism and the application of definitions to real world events. This lack of agreement can be best viewed as “an issue affecting studies of terrorism and other forms of political violence and a point of departure for much criticism within the literature.” (Martin & Weinberg, 2017, p. 12) In the debate within the literature surrounding definition and agreement the Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research by Alex Schmid (Schmid, 2011) is a core text that provides a basis for the field of terrorism studies which compiles many reports and discusses the subject in depth. In this text Schmid provides an analysis of many topics

related to the field, but of particular importance for this research is his work regarding the problem of defining terrorism, existing theories of terrorism, and the description of directories of terrorism groups and events. Additionally, the debate regarding the definition of terrorism is an important element to consider due to the implications that a generally agreed upon definition would have towards listing regimes and understanding how terrorism fits in the various approaches to understanding violence throughout the world. Particularly useful for this research is the work of Sudha Setty (Setty, 2011) which not only addresses the problem of consensual definitions in the field, but also provides analysis of the comparative perspectives and varying legal definitions among countries.

2.1.1 ACADEMIC CONSENSUS AND ATTEMPTS AT DEFINING

The problems of creating a conceptual definition of terrorism have been discussed extensively (Martin G. C., 2013) (Dugard, 1974) (Schmid, 2011) (Setty, 2011). Here the distinction should be made between academic definitions and the definitions created by states. There have been many academic attempts to draw distinctions and categorize different forms of terrorism. Classifying terrorism and terrorists into different groups based on identifying features is useful, however, a solid general definition of terrorism is still required in order to proceed. To this end, the academic community is far from being in agreement about a specific definition. Previous attempts to formulate a definition have often been clouded by problems of dealing with terrorism. For instance, Dugard's focus is on the problems of defining terrorism as it relates to the specific type of action taken, so that a broad definition did not restrict the potential for political opposition within a state. (Dugard, 1974) Another article that provided discussion around definitional problems is Teichman's (Teichman, 1989), where the distinction is made that there is a large divide between the common usage of the word terrorism within political violence and obtaining a specific narrow definition. There is also discussion about the relativistic nature of the term terrorism and labeling someone a terrorist as "The same kind of action, differentiated by behavioural and international characteristics, will be described quite differently by different observers." (Teichman, 1989, p. 507) What has come about is a multitude of definitions that are modified to fit specific research aims, alternatively

researchers sometimes create their own that specifically fits the elements they are looking at.

In the attempt to understand the definitional debate, the previously mentioned work of Alex Schmid (2011) is extremely useful when attempting to identify more recent attempts at an academic definition of terrorism. As such the revised academic consensus definition of terrorism (abbreviated rev. ACDT 2011) is very useful as a working definition of terrorism. This 12 point definition “tries to capture the core dimension of terrorism in its first paragraph (below in *italics*), with the remainder (points 2-12)¹ serving an explanatory purpose.” (Schmid, 2011, p. 86) The first point is the essential working definition that can be used; however, the other points provide clarification and support specific points that are often lost in a simplified definition. These additional points are relevant as they show how small and specific features can create a difference in opinion regarding their importance in finding a complete definition.

*Terrorism refers on the one hand to a **doctrine** about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial **practice** of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.* (Schmid, 2011, p. 86)

2.1.2 PRACTICAL CONSENSUS AND DEFINITION PROBLEMS

The non-academic definition is no less divided, albeit for different reasons. In this field definitions differ within states and between them as well. The reason for this is typically due to the goal or function of the defining body. For instance, many states will use definitions that benefits their security posture, regardless of the academic debate or consensus. This can take the form of vague descriptions or criteria for the inclusion of specific actions that single out certain groups which “encourages prejudice and intolerance” (Whittaker, 2007, p. 11) . Alternatively, creating a formal definition has the

¹See (Schmid, 2011) for the complete definition points 2-12

potential to “be complicated by the perspectives of the participants in a terrorist incident”, because they “instinctively differentiate freedom fighters from terrorists, regardless of formal definitions.” (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 35) Additionally, some states have multiple definitions within the government. This can be seen within the United States government where there are “more than 20 definitions of ‘domestic’ or ‘international’ terrorism, ‘terrorist activity’, ‘acts of terrorism’ or ‘federal crime of terrorism’, some partly changing and over-lapping, some radically different.” (Carus, 2008, pp. 1-2,19,22) Moreover, the definitions used by these departments is subject to change over time, as is showcased by the State Department making changes to its definition due to the changing interaction of US military personal and terrorists. (Schmid, 2011, p. 46) These differences in definition arise due to the highly politicized nature of terrorism. Terrorists themselves are often attempting some type of political change, and the states that are affected by terrorism have experienced political changes due to it leading to the political debate surrounding how to respond to terrorism, and even the use of the term terrorist being a politically charged term.

The United Nations has had trouble in establishing a universally accepted definition of terrorism as well. This runs alongside the United Nations mandate for member states to combat terrorism. Sudha Setty provides a concise example of the problem as “lack of a uniform and universally accepted definition, coupled with a mandate for strong counter terrorism laws and policy, has opened the door for potential abuse by member states in those areas in which the piecemeal international definition does not provide clarity” (Setty, 2011, p. 8) The mandate for strong counter terrorism actions from states is a very important factor for the topic of definitions and listing regimes as it sets the standard that states should be responsible for identifying and countering terrorists. It also provides a basis for the idea of terrorism being an issue that all states should respond to. Through the Security Council’s Resolution 1368 which directs that states should “combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist attacks” states were obliged to act against terrorism. (Combs, 2013, p. 241) Additionally, there is Resolution 1373 which concerns the control of financing and preparation of terrorist acts. (Combs, 2013, p. 241) As well, the UN has established a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) which aims to “promote collective action against international terrorism.” (Combs, 2013, p. 243) However, as Schmid details there are many shortcomings in the UN convention’s

proposed definition, ranging from lack of distinction for terrorism from other criminal acts, failing to identify civilians and non-combatants, and being generally too vague to be used in a legal or academic sense. (Schmid, 2011, pp. 55-57) This is critical in the international understanding of how nations are creating definitions of terrorism. Additionally, as Cindy Combs mentions regarding international law “it cannot be said to be an effective deterrent to terrorism” due to how the creation of law has been so “ad-hoc.” (Combs, 2013, p. 243) The notion that states will reject the proposed UN definitions of terrorism due to their interests not being addressed by the definition also shows how important specific elements of a definition can be. This is what allows states to justify its actions and the designation of someone or a group as a terrorist can have serious legal implications. To sum up, as Setty states “If the international community or any individual state is to address the problem of terrorist activity, it must first define terrorism’s parameters.” (Setty, 2011, p. 7) If this is not done on an international level, then individual states will create their own definitions that facilitate the goals and response to terrorism. This leads to differing terror lists, targets, and goals in the field of counter terrorism.

2.1.3 DEFINITION AS A BARRIER TO COOPERATION

The competing definitions can lead to problems in an answering the international call to combat terrorism. Obviously if two countries have different understandings of what terrorism is, then it is unlikely that they will be able to effectively work together to combat it. The failure of the United Nations to solidify a consensus definition for the international community means that states can establish their own understandings of terrorism. Ultimately this leads to a variation in the strategy deployed to combat terrorism as the very understanding of the topic is under debate allowing for a state’s ulterior motivations to become imbedded in the terrorism debate. This debate is highly politicized due to the ramifications of terrorist act, as well as the amount of energy, resources, and investment that goes into counter terrorism efforts, not to mention the emotional price of terror attacks themselves. Because of this, “basic meanings are complicated by widely varying differences in character and motivation, and in the perspectives that represents the viewpoint of those who would define.” (Whittaker, 2007, p. 24) When the task of creating consensus and definition is left up to the state, there is no guarantee that the desire to

combat terrorism will remain in conjunction with other UN members. Since the definition is left up to states, each states experience, history, political baggage, and goals regarding terrorism contribute to varying definitions. This means that the understanding of counter terrorism strategies may develop separately and hinder a more transnational approach to the problem of terrorism.

The driving forces behind these definitional problems lie in the fact that terrorism, at its core, is a highly contested political issue. The potential effects of terrorism on the politics of a state will be discussed in a later section, however it is important to note that political repercussions of attacks and the political discourse of safeguarding a country against future attacks are at the forefront of the political debate surrounding defining terrorism. Countering terrorism can be seen as a highly political issue between states, as well as within them. States are often found to be supporting groups, that another state may consider to be terrorists. Likewise, these debates tend to quickly become politicized between states, an example of this are the various groups that are currently entangled within the context of the Syrian Civil war. Some of these groups are receiving support from other states, and there are many groups, that have appeared in recent years, linked with the conflict that have been designated as terrorists by one state or another. In addition, with the definition left up to the state, the proposed course of action for state listing is open to debate. This can introduce many differing positions and theories on how states should, and do, interact, particularly in response to a threat as significant as terrorism.

2.2 ROLE AND CHALLENGES OF TERRORISM

2.2.1 MODERN HISTORY OF TERRORISM

In order to better understand the motivation for states to create terror listing regimes the history, impact, and communicative aspects of terrorism and counter terrorism must be briefly discussed. In modern times terrorism has been an influential tool. With advances in technology the access to weapons and instruments that can create fear has grown². There is a significant distinction that throughout history “terrorists are always something else, be they communists, nationalists, or fascist (among many possibilities).” (Law, 2009, p. 3) This distinction draws upon the importance of terrorism as a tactic that can, and has been, used by many different types of actors throughout time to counter state authority. It is important to remember this when viewing the state reaction to terrorism, since the groups themselves represent many different ideologies, threats, and movements. To clarify the modern history of terrorism the analysis of David Rapoport³ is extremely useful. He classifies the modern history of terrorism into four waves beginning in the 1880s and ending in the present day. (Rapoport, 2004) This distinction allows for a way to contextualize the modern history of terrorism.

The first of Rapoport’s waves begins with Russian anarchists in the 1880s which then spread to other parts of the world. The increase in radical political movements, development of more sophisticated explosives, and the expansion of mass communication and literacy rates led to the perfect storm of terrorist actions. (Rapoport, 2004) Similarly, Law describes how Tsarist Russia led to the creation of modern terrorism as ‘radicals introduced the language, justification, means, and strategies that shaped the use of modern political violence.’ (Law, 2009, p. 74) Widespread fear of terrorist’s actions began as terrorism was deemed a threat to all not just the elites, something that resonates in the 21st century as well. This fear was spread by news of the attacks which terrorized the state and society (Law, 2009, p. 92). Descriptions of daily newspapers running summaries of terrorist attacks within the country echoes the modern media of today in reporting the

² For a more complete breakdown of the history of terrorism see (Brice, 2015) and (Law, 2009)

³ Rapoport, D. C. (2004). *The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism*. In A. K. Cronin, & J. M. Ludes, *Attacking terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (pp. 46-73). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

actions of terrorists throughout the world. (Law, 2009) The anarchist wave would last until the 1920s when a new wave would emerge in the form of the anticolonial wave which lasted until the 1960s, and this wave would then give way to the New Left Wave which would begin in the 1960s and lasts until the end of the 20th century. (Rapoport, 2004) According to Rapoport, in 1979 the religious wave would begin and continue until the present. According to Louise Richardson “there has been extraordinary growth in the number of terrorist groups with religious motives” and these “religious groups have always managed to operate across borders.” (Richardson, 2006, p. 61) These waves represent a shift in the focus of terrorism, from state focused understandings to larger religious and ideology based movements. In this sense we can see the evolution of terrorism throughout history as it has progressed from very state-centric goals to the modern iteration that can encompass a global movement. Essentially, modern terrorists have presented a problem for states as “these actors have no interest in interstate rivalry and play by an entirely different set of rules.” (Richardson, 2007, p. 68) As terrorism has evolved the goal to distinguish between types of terrorist groups and create labels for terrorists has expanded. However, as the nature of terrorism has changed, the way that states respond to it has sometimes lagged behind.

2.2.2 TERRORISM’S IMPACT

To understand why governments focus on counter terrorism measures, and terror lists in particular, it is important to understand the impact that terrorism has on states. The potential consequences of terrorism are a driving force behind why states have taken to labeling and listing groups. The main aim of terrorism is to cause change, particularly political, through fear and manipulation, this demand for change is the element that is directed at states. As Siman-Tov, Bodas, and Peleg, 2016 state “terrorism’s main goal is to disrupt ordinary life fostering fear and helplessness in the population.” (Siman-Tov, Bodas, & Peleg, 2016, pp. 75-85) The fear levels that the public experiences are related to how the government responds to the incident. As they describe, a terrorist attack is a principal civic concern in many countries, yet statistically there is far more potential to die in a car accident or from cardiac arrest. (Siman-Tov, Bodas, & Peleg, 2016) Since there is “no uniform response to terrorism” (Siman-Tov, Bodas, & Peleg, 2016, p. 78) the

proper course of action for a country is up to debate. Terrorist attacks are not normal events, yet by creating an extraordinary reaction the impact on the public can be much greater⁴. Siman-Tov, Bodas, and Peleg suggest that these factors can be regulated through the level of preparation that a government is willing to support. (Siman-Tov, Bodas, & Peleg, 2016) This shows how, despite the rise of terrorism as a global threat, states are the recipients of violence and demands. This means that the response to terrorism, in the form of preparation for future attacks or retaliation for past attacks, is largely the prerogative of the states themselves despite the terrorist groups affiliation to spreading ideologies. Due to these potentially disastrous consequences of terrorist's actions, states have taken to labeling and listing the groups which they view as threats.

2.2.3 ACTS OF TERROR AS COMMUNICATION

Terrorism is a very specific form of political violence, and to understand the states reaction, in the form of listing regimes, it is necessary to describe certain features such as its communicative aspects to obtain background for how listing regimes can be understood. These are important to understand because “terrorism is often interpreted as a form of political communication.” (Crenshaw, 2014, p. 557) This means, a terrorist's activities are not the ultimate message; rather their message is encoded in their actions. (Tuman, 2010) Terrorism is essentially a communication process which is dispersed through public and mass communication with the goal to “create fear and signs of fear” in order to “imprint signs, messages, and images in our minds.” (Matusitz, 2013, p. 35) As such the very act of terroristic violence is communicative in nature and the response from a state, in the form of labeling a group as a terrorist organization and creating lists, can be viewed as communicative too. The fear that is spread through a society due to an attack is a communicative action since “it is aimed at a very large audience beyond the direct target.” (Matusitz, 2013, p.35) Since the victims are not only those who are actually wounded or killed, but the public, potential victims demand that their governments do something to identify and restrict potential terrorists, and states do this through creating terror lists. Instances of violence constitute a larger process of “communicating a message and generating a desired response.” (Tuman, 2010, p. 31) There is a message that the

⁴ See (Siman-Tov, Bodas, and Peleg, 2016) for greater analysis on terrorism's political impact.

group is attempting to broadcast and a violent attack allows for a wider audience and reception as the affected society and state reacts.

However, states take part in this communication. A terror group's message "is still transactional and bidirectional because the first message generates some kind of response, which will always be communicated back to the terrorist." (Tuman, 2010, p. 19) In response to terrorists communicative action (i.e. attack/declaration) states issue statements condemning the indiscriminate use of violence and discrediting their actions, and they may establish terror blacklisting regimes to communicate who they consider to be terrorists. This is because "terrorism is an act, a process, a plan intended to cause a response", and this response is typically expected from the state level. (Matusitz, 2013, p. 37) Governments may issue declarations of war and or announce new strategies that will be pursued to ensure that similar violence will not ensue. When governments respond it shows that the communicative aspects of a terrorist action are being received by the target audience. Additionally, other third party groups can be involved in this communication cycle, including the media, other national governments such as allies or enemies, and non-governmental actors. (Tuman, 2010) Examples of this third party communicative involvement, as Tuman notes, can range from the British reaction and the Taliban's reaction to the September 11th attacks against the United States. Both of these actors were (indirect) audiences of the communicative attack, and both heavily involved in the subsequent reaction that took place.

2.3 STATE REACTION TO TERRORISM

To better understand the basis for creating terror lists, in light of the definitional progress, history, communicative functions, and impact of terrorism, this chapter will describe the state reactions to terrorism that have taken place alongside listing regimes. There is no doubt that acts of terrorism can have profound impact on people and society. The concept of terrorism can prove difficult to define, and can take many different forms as the historical and communicative context changes with it. To understand why state terror lists are created, how states respond to the immense disruption that terrorist's actions create and how they consciously shape policy and responses in an attempt to prevent future attacks from occurring is necessary. This is because the relationship between terrorism and counter-terrorism is "mutually shaping" and "continues to determine local and international experience in complex and powerful ways." (English, 2015, p. 1) Any act of terrorism can be viewed in retrospect as causing a chain of reactions that have escalated due to the reaction of the threatened state. Richard English provides a short but quite useful example of this when he describes how al-Qaida's actions on September 11th caused a reaction of initiating a War on Terror, which in turn contributed to the war in Iraq, which, in part, led to the establishment of ISIS. (English, 2015) The strategy of what states do in the name of counter-terrorism can be thought in two ways, on one hand the prevention of future terrorism, and on the other the reaction, or retribution if you will, for an already committed act of terror. These elements lead to "an inter-relationship between counter-terrorism efforts, their effect on the spread of the violent jihadist ideology and their effect on civic harmony, civil liberties and human rights." (Omand, 2015, p. 58)

States are still the primary leaders in counter terrorism strategies, thus there is a state level reaction to what is sometimes described as a global or international threat. There has been a rise in concern regarding the globalization of terrorism and the spread of transnational terror groups. However, even though terror groups may be embedding themselves within global ideologies, their targets remain states. Groups that make up the most recent religious wave of terrorism, according to Rapoport's historical waves, sometimes have objectives that are anti-Western or that pursue global jihad. (Rapoport, 2004) Despite this, their attacks still target the citizens and security of states, and as such states are the primary drivers in the policy of countering terrorism. In this way while terror groups may

be viewed as transnational, or the result of globalization, the state response is still the primary area of focus to understand the various facets of counter terrorism policy.

2.3.1 STATE COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY

State terror listing regimes are only one element of a larger counter terrorism policy developed by the state, but in order to understand the motivation for terror listing regimes, other aspects of counter terrorism policy must be briefly detailed. The state's attempt to prevent terrorism has led to immense political and social changes within states. Creating terror lists and labelling groups as terrorists is only one of the many forms of counter terrorism policies that states can use. Put simply, counter terrorism deals with preventing and the control of terrorism. (Whittaker, 2007, p. 181) There exists an uneven relationship between the act of terrorism and the response a state provides to counter the act as "...far more money, time, person-power and violence are expended on state counter-terrorism than on the practising of non-state terrorism itself..." (English, 2015, p. 13) This vast amount of energy that has been spent on countering terrorism has brought with it many changes, from how state security is viewed to how modern warfare is conducted.

States have begun to label new threats and adapt their understanding of security to terrorism, "At the same time the GWOt [Global War on Terror] has significantly challenged, and arguably altered, the expectations regarding how liberal democratic states can and do behave in the international system." (Singh, 2015, p. 40) There has, additionally, been an increase in the expectations of what states should do in terms of having an obligation to prevent acts of terrorism. The United Nations Security Council resolution 1373, established soon after the attacks on 9/11, set the expectations for "all 185 states supporting it to work together against the aiding, supporting, harbouring, organizing and sponsoring of terrorism prevention." (Whittaker, 2007, p. 211) The emphasis from the U.N. on a state response is notable here. Despite the implications of terrorism as a global threat, states are mandated to act individually to prevent future terror incidents. A countries agreement with the responsibility to stop its land being involved with "acts contrary to the rights of other states is evaluated in light of what the state knew (or ought to have known) about the threat emanating from its territory and its genuine capacity to aver that threat." (Trapp, 2011, p. 65) In order for states to know the potential

threat to them and other states, they have had to properly identify the terroristic elements within their own state and, at times, other states.

2.3.2 IMPLICATIONS OF COUNTER TERRORISM POLICY

There have also been changes that have come about due to increased exposure to terrorism and the subsequent desire to label and restrict it. The public trusts the government to “protect the liberties and rights of the citizens, including the right to life in the face of murderous terrorism.” (Omand, 2015, p. 57) Until the September 11th, 2001 attacks “the ‘terrorism’ threat posed to liberal democratic states did not enjoy anything like the level of credibility that had accompanied the fear of Communism during the inter-war and then the early Cold War periods.” (Gearty, 2015) This has allowed for many changes to be made within states that would not have been possible in the years preceding the attacks.

The state has a duty to protect the public, while at the same time the state need to somehow have a way to identify security threats and prevent future threats from materializing. One of the ways of consistently identifying threats is to create official lists of who the government recognizes as a terrorist. In the wake of 9/11 the US and the UK created legal structures designed to combat terrorists and those suspected of supporting terrorism and “where the US and Britain have gone, others have tended to follow.” (Gearty, 2015, p. 91) This includes building up complex terror list regimes to label groups and target them as terrorists. Thus, the reaction to the 9/11 attacks “propelled to center stage new frameworks of laws” which are, “capable of being deployed against other groups and individuals deemed subversive as well.” (Gearty, 2015, pp. 90-91) This means that even though the intentions of the laws are to prevent terrorism, through specifically targeting terrorists, they have the potential to impact the rights of the very public they are intending to protect.

Possibly the most notable impact and state reaction to terrorist attacks has been the Global War on Terrorism (GWOt). At the heart of this are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and various operations around the world led by the United States and its allies. Armed groups “which are identified as ‘terrorists’ and at other times as ‘insurgents’, have contributed to sectarian conflict in Iraq, civil war in Syria, and civil unrest in Afghanistan and

elsewhere.” (Martin & Weinberg, 2017, p. 2) The GWoT represents the “most significant” conflict since the end of the Cold War. (Singh, 2015, p. 40) The events of September 11th, 2001 did not initiate the involvement of the West in this region, however it led to the “securitization of the region for the United states” and created a security industrial complex that specializes in ”counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, arms deals, security companies, state-building and humanitarian assistance projects.” (Brahimi, 2015, p. 23) These wars can be described as “humanity’s most extended, expansive, expensive attempt to extirpate non-state terrorism” which ultimately “prompted significant *increases* in levels of terrorist incident.” (English, 2015, p. 2) Many terror groups that have connections to these campaigns are identified through terror lists, and many of the countries that are being analyzed in the later section have been involved as well.

Additionally, “over the past decade or so the overall character of conflict within the international system has changed quite rapidly.” (Singh, 2015, p. 42) While wars involving direct hostility among countries might occur less, non-state players will continue to participate in armed hostilities. (Martin & Weinberg, 2017, p. 11) By using war as a response to terrorism, the tools of war had to change. Since small terrorist groups can not directly confront the West militarily they conduct hybrid warfare that uses “terrorism, insurgency, propaganda and economic warfare to sidestep what has been the West’s conventional capability advantage.” (Singh, 2015, p. 44) Due to this the West has had to adapt their strategy to meet these new challenges. As the cost related to traditional military campaigns has increased, some states have focused on alternative measures such as extensive listing regimes aimed at limiting the movement and abilities of terrorist organizations.

2.4 LISTING REGIMES

2.4.1 OVERVIEW

Now that the definitional complications, history, communicative aspects, and counter terrorism policies of states have been covered in regards to terrorisms impact on the state, a discussion of the listing regimes themselves can begin. After listing regimes, themselves have been detailed, their incorporation with International Relations theories, in the next section, can begin. One of the tactics, aside from traditional military methods, to counter terrorism has been the use of designated terrorist lists, or proscribed terror lists. “During the post-September 11, 2001 war on terrorism, it became clear to experts and the public that official designation and levels of individual suspected terrorist is a central legal, political, and security issue.” (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 39) This is an element of the counter-terrorism strategy that has been employed to move towards “more pragmatic, proportionate, case-by-case response system” which has been called for during the GWoT. (Rubin, et al., 2007, p. 45) The listing regimes should be viewed as a combination of the state definition of terrorism, history, security policy, reaction to terrorist acts, and showing the public the states reaction. They show the groups that the specific state wishes to designate and legally target as terrorists since “terrorism itself is, after all a label.” (Tuman, 2010, p. 32) This results of being officially labelled a ‘terrorist’ can come in the form of travel restrictions, financial sanctions, military confrontation, legal prosecution, assassination, or delegitimizing the goal and actions of a group, and “depending on one’s designated status, certain recognized legal or protections may or may not be observed.” (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 39) In this vein we should view the terror lists as a list of groups which the listing country designates as terrorists, thus implying a change in the rights of individuals belonging to that group, according to the issuing country.

2.4.2 LIERATURE ON LISTING REGIMES

To understand the academic work that has already been conducted on terror listing regimes in particular, this chapter focuses on the efforts of specific studies. Specifically, literature regarding listing regimes is of great importance to this research, thus the work of Benjamin Freedman (Freedman B. , 2010) in 2016 must be detailed. By comparing the terror lists of 8 countries and organizations he shows the amount of variation that exists

in the lists, even among countries that are typically considered friendly and how these differences are dependent on a variety of factors for the listing party. The work of Ibiz and Curtis 2015 (Ibiz & Curtis, 2015) provides another look at the listing regimes of states. They approach the topic of listing regimes with the goal of explaining why certain countries have similar lists and why others have completely different ones. Their work is very useful for understanding grouping and trends in state listing regimes. Additionally the work of Goede and Sullivan (Goede & Sullivan, 2016) attempts to understand how terrorist lists operate and has a specific focus on security lists as a governance device. Their analysis of the usage of terror lists describes how they have moved from simple catalogues to regimes in and of themselves, with their own requirements for listing and repercussions. Their analysis of the decisions that lead to inclusion on a list is useful when attempting to understand how listing regimes work. Finally, Matthew Peed's 2005 (Peed, 2005) analysis of the foreign policy implications of blacklisting regimes is essential for its in depth review of the history and use of listing regimes in both pre and post 9/11 American politics. This allows for a more complete understanding as to the rise of listing regimes in the post 9/11 security and political landscape.

2.4.3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LISTING REGIMES

To better understand some of the reasons that may contribute to variation in the lists, this chapter will highlight specific elements of the lists that may correspond to the analysis in the later section. Many states have counter terror lists, or recognize a list created by another body such as the European Union or United Nations, however most, if not all, of these lists are different. This is where the idea of explaining variation through applying theories has become relevant. Even lists using similar definitions contain different terrorist actors. Additionally, states are not held to their definition, that is to say that they do not have to list all groups in the world that fit into their legal definition, rather they include them if and when it of strategic significance to the state. This is because “the act of defining and labeling the action as terrorism also marginalizes the terrorist/aggressors, for it precludes any possibility of legitimacy for their cause or sympathy for their actions.” (Tuman, 2010, p. 40) What this means is that when a group is labeled as participating in

terroristic actions, they are ostracized from regular existence as a group (or individual). This brings out the highly politicized nature of counter terrorism policies.

Since the politics of listing, or not listing, a group may be just as important as the actual countering of a group. As such the popular saying that one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter is especially relevant. States use these discrepancies to their advantage. The use of vague and open definitions allows for differing interpretations of just who is a terrorist. The use of listing and labelling is a matter of perspective, and these designations are not necessarily set in stone, as Martin details in the description of how "the U.S. Department of Defense conferred *protected persons* status on members of the Iranian Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO)" while "this group was regularly listed on the U.S. Department of State's list of terrorist organizations." (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 39) This is where the relationship between terror lists and state definitions is strongest, since through interpretation a state can differentiate designating opponents as terrorists but friends as freedom fighters, or simply not recognize their acts as terrorism, regardless of official definition of terrorism. (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 35) In this sense "the actual definition is not as important as the purpose for defining terrorism in the first place." (Tuman, 2010, p. 39) Thus the goal for defining terrorism, for states, is not necessarily to create a comprehensive and all-encompassing definition that can be universally accepted and used regardless of the context of the state's relationship to the potential 'terrorist' individual or group. By using a vague definition and only apply it when it benefits the state the "benefactors of terrorists always live with clean hands because they present their clients as plucky freedom fighters." (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 42) In addition, a state's list can reflect the patterns of decisions made in this regard, and show where the focus of counter terrorism policy lies.

2.4.4 THE FUNCTION OF LISTING REGIMES

In order to comprehend the significance of the lists, and value to the states lists being analyzed, there should be an overview of their function and use. It is important to note that the lists only have impact through the entity that creates and enforces it. This is another reason that theories applied to state lists should have some state centered qualities. To clarify the use of the lists "these should be used in a judicious, graduated and

reasonably quiet manner: their bite resets in actual or potential commercial disadvantage, not public humiliation.” (Stevenson, 2004, p. 71) This specific reference to abstaining from the aspect of humiliation is an important one to consider when discussing the lists. The lists act as a way to inform other governments, citizens, as well as the terrorist organizations themselves that they have been singled out to receive special treatment by the state. One example is that being added to the list spreads the word that the group has been ‘negatively assessed’ and “puts them on notice that permissive policies vis-à-vis those organisations could trigger unfavourable US treatment.” (Stevenson, 2004, p. 70) Accordingly, the lists are not intentionally designed to shame the groups into submission or to humiliate its members. (Stevenson, 2004) Rather, listing is a tool that can be used to designate an organization, or individual, to receive extraordinary treatment.

Since the goal of counter-terrorism is to diminish the capacity of terrorist organizations, this treatment tends to focus on their lifeblood; financial assets and legal rights. When groups have been labeled as terrorists the rights of the individual members erode as well, “suspected terrorists have not been designated as prisoners of war” rather alternative terms are used since “the rationale is that suspected terrorists are not soldiers fighting for a sovereign nation” this has allowed states to apply special treatment to those labelled as terrorists. (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 39) The U.S, in particular, has used this labelling technique to detain hundreds of prisoners in sites such as the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center. The lists function as a visible element of the state’s counter terrorism arsenal. While some types of terrorism can be considered a global phenomenon, the state lists represent the efforts of the individual states to combat the larger threat. The notion of state level response is important here since it is the states themselves that are largely responsible for counter terrorism operations and policies, even when they are directed against groups that present a global threat. Thus since it is states themselves that combat these terror threats, the lists the create to label the groups are particularly insightful.

2.4.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF LISTING REGIMES

The importance of designated terrorist lists lies in understanding the function and scope of counter terrorism regimes undertaken by states. As Benjamin Freedman states when discussing comparing blacklists “To a large degree, these lists of officially designated

extremist/terrorist organizations and suspected support groups highlight the security interests, priorities, and outlook of the particular countries...” (Freedman B. , 2010, p. 46) Thus, examining the listing regimes of states allows for a unique view into the policies that states pursue as well as a practical example of the dilemma proposed by competing definitions. Lists are an integral component of the counter-terrorism strategies that states can employ. Even when facing the globalized threat posed by the modern wave of terrorism, the terrorists actions are largely directed at countries and the response from the state. It has been observed that for the U.S. government “One of its most effective tools is the US State Department’s official List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” (Stevenson, 2004, pp. 69-70) States see lists as an important tool and use them, particularly in the legal and financial sectors. In terms of economic restrictions for terrorist organizations it has been noted that it is important for Western governments to use lists by tightening controls on funding sources such as charities that send money to terrorist groups, and freezing the groups assets. (Stevenson, 2004, p. 68)

Of particular importance for those outside of government and security circles, lists are one of the ways to observe how states interact with terrorist organizations, since most of the intelligence and security elements are kept secret and classified. Indeed, some states have lists which are classified, while other do not have lists or adhere to another’s list. This makes an official list that is publically released by a state a valuable view into their perception of terrorism. The lists themselves can be thought of as a culmination of a state’s process of defining terrorism, their history with terrorism, how the states and their citizens are affected by it, and by the policy that the state wishes to communicate through to these alleged terror groups and other states. Through analyzing the lists of states there is the potential to understand much more about the relationship between terrorism and the states attempt to counter it. In the following chapter the listing regimes of five states will be contrasted with the theoretical understandings of the international system. In this way an attempt will be made to understand the patterns of the lists and how they can be understood on the level of the international system as states interact among a host of contended topics, including terrorism.

3. EXPLAINING LISTING REGIMES: NEOREALISM, ENGLISH SCHOOL, AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

3.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORETICAL SECTION

Now that the overview of terror listing regimes has been completed, it is possible to make the connection between these lists and theoretical components. Currently “there is no consensus on any general theoretical laws of terrorism.” (Crenshaw, 2014, p. 557) This mirrors the theoretical problems that terrorism studies experiences, therefore, this section aims to bridge the gap between the current understanding of terror listing regimes, and the theoretical considerations of International Relations. The analysis of the terror lists is based on three hypotheses. These hypotheses concern the level of observed variation after analyzing the terror lists of countries and are developed on the basis of International Relations theories.

The first, Hypothesis A, is that states will have individually exclusive lists that reflect the security interests and preferences of the state as an individual entity in the global arena. This hypothetically means that the groups that are listed, and potentially any justification given, relates directly to state interests and national security. This would imply that the lists are created by the states to pursue *raison d'état*. The second hypothesis, Hypothesis B, assumes that the states have terror lists to preserve the integrity of states and statehood in a non-exclusive fashion. This means that the justification for listing the groups will be concerned with a group's actions universally against governments and human rights throughout the world and adhering to the notion of *raison de systeme*. The third, Hypothesis C, assumes a mixture of the first two, that state's terror lists will align with some states, but not all. Meaning that some states will mutually identify with certain states, but not others, and create their lists accordingly. Following this logic, the justification given for listing the groups will stem from the security concerns of allies or specific states. These hypotheses attempt to account for the potential variation that can be observed between these lists.

The reason for including wider International Relations theories, rather than drawing from counter-terrorism or terrorism studies theories, is twofold. Firstly, there is no concrete

theory on the listing regimes from within these disciplines. One alternative is to draw on theories from other, neighboring disciplines such as International Relations, as is the approach taken here. Secondly, since the list regimes are extensions of foreign policy and security decision making procedures, with direct implications for international politics, existing international relations theories regarding how states interact within the global system, should be applicable. The reliance on these theories, carries with it some potential pitfalls. More generally, International Relation theories will incorporate a more state-centric approach to the analysis due to their focus on the interactions among states. This is contrary to some observations of modern terrorism in a globalized context, and its transnational nature. However, counter terrorism policy is still derived from the state level, as states are the principle actors targeting terrorists. In light of this, the state-centrism of the theories is noted, but since the counter terrorism policy of the state, in the form of listing regimes is being observed, the focus of these theories is relevant. Another contribution of using these theories is that they are being checked for their continued usefulness in explaining contemporary phenomena such as counter terrorism policies.

The role of these theories, for our purpose, is to develop a lens to observe terror lists so that there is a theoretically informed base for the hypotheses. This effort at theory building, and for that purpose bridging international relations and terrorism studies, is particularly relevant since there is a lack of theory within terrorism studies that can be applied towards understanding various elements of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Essentially, “there exists no general theory of terrorism.” (Schmid, 2011, p. 202) Thus, importation of theory from corresponding fields is relevant as it provides a basis for understanding terrorism and counter-terrorism from alternative viewpoints. By applying various theories of how the international system operates there is an opportunity to understand how elements of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies fit into larger theoretical conceptions. Since “theoretical progress in Terrorism Studies has historically been retarded by a lack of definitional consensus on the subject.” (Schmid, 2011, p. 202) the importance of understanding the subject with outside theoretical frameworks is important. Due to this lack of existing theory there is a need to establish a theoretical basis for understanding components of terrorism studies, particularly listing regimes. Since listing regimes represent a state-oriented response to terrorism, state-centric theories are applied. By using these external theories from international relations, we can view terrorism as a

challenge to states and examine the ways in which states respond within those larger state-centric worldview frameworks.

As mentioned, the use of these theories applies a state-centric approach to the topic of counter terrorism. While the phenomena of terrorism may not be purely state-centric, as “terrorist groups have no interest in balancing or bandwagoning against US power” (Richardson, 2007, p. 69), the response to terrorism is pursued at the state level. This can be seen in the various definitional problems and efforts to counter, or prevent, terrorism that states have pursued as described in the first section. Applying state-centric theories then is used not to explore the phenomena of terrorism as such, but rather allows for an inspection of the state’s counter terrorism strategies themselves, and terror lists in particular. It is acknowledged that these theories may be considered as employing more traditional theoretical approaches, however their selection has been primarily based around their explanatory potential, and their reputable nature and ability to describe other areas of international relations, is a sought-after characteristic as they are used to describe something as complex as counter terrorism policies and state listing regimes.

3.2 THE NEOREALIST ACCOUNT OF LISTING REGIMES

This chapter will introduce the necessary elements of neo realism and create connections between it and counter terrorism listing regimes. To begin this, the hypothesis and critical elements of the theory will be introduced, and then expected listing patterns will be detailed through the lens of this theory to establish it for the subsequent analysis in the analysis section. The first hypothesis (A) is based around the notion that states will individually base lists on their security interests and preferences. The justification for listing groups will be concerned with national security and state security interests. The idea here is that the states have created these lists solely out of individual foreign policy preferences, and it has been shown that to some extent that these lists are elements of foreign policy with little to no consideration for overall definitions of terrorism or the safety and security of other countries.

This hypothesis assumes that the variation between the lists will exist due to each state having different goals and national security interests that aim to increase the position of the state in the anarchic self-help system that is international relations. The challenge for this hypothesis is the question of how the justification for being on the list fits into the individual national interest. To pursue this line of reasoning the realist viewpoint can be used as Jack Donnelly describes “Realism emphasizes the unending struggle for power and security in the world of states.” (Burchill & Linklater, 2013, p. 90) More specifically, “Neorealist theory, for instance, treats states as if they were individuals who try to maximize their ultimate aim of survival.” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 164) In this way, states are maximizing their survival potential by identifying threats and listing them.

The realist viewpoint that is stressed for this hypothesis is the notion of anarchy within the international system. This element is essential to understanding why the states would lead counter terrorism efforts with their self-interest as primary driver. This can be best described as how “in an anarchic system, where there is no ultimate arbiter, states that want to survive have little choice but to assume the worst about the intentions of other states and to compete for power with them.” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 54) According to this logic there is little room for sympathy among states and the need to protect others will come as secondary to their primary survival. Another description of

this anarchic system is that “Systemic forces create incentives for all states to strive for greater efficiency in providing security for themselves.” (Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 2009, p. 4) The cause of this anarchy is described as the result of human nature and lack of international supervision. (Donnelly, 2000, p. 9) Which in turn means that “In international relations, anarchy not merely allows but encourages the worst aspects of human nature to be expressed.” (Donnelly, 2000, p. 10) Meaning that states should be focused on selfish behavior that ensures their own survival and security. In theory, this should be visible in security documents such as terror lists. A key element of this anarchic system is the element of uncertainty since “pervasive uncertainty and potential threats are central to the conception of anarchy in neorealism.” (Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 2009, p. 28) The anarchic system coupled with uncertainty paints a picture of an international system that is comprised of states ruthlessly engaged in self-preservation. This is not to say that there is a particular focus on forcing other states into less secure positions, rather it is a focus on how states are individual actors within the anarchic system and how “Whether or not by force, each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its interests.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 113) This can be best surmised as “self-help is necessarily the principles of action in an anarchic order.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 111)

The self-interest of the state is paramount here. The neorealist perspective on international relations as established by Kenneth Waltz in his book *Theory of International Politics* lends itself as a particularly useful lens for this. According to Waltz, each unit must be able to place itself in a position that allows for it to care for its own needs. This is instrumental since it supposes that states will act independently in regards to terror listing programs. As viewed from this perspective each unit’s incentive is to put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so. (Waltz, 1979) The theory set forth in Waltz’s book does not attempt to address domestic politics and decisions, and this is not the aim of the research, rather it attempts to explain why, despite the growing economic interdependence between states, the relations among states will remain based upon individuality of the actors. Another viewpoint on this is that “because other states are potential threats and because there is no higher authority they can turn to if they are attacked.” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 54) This is especially relevant to terrorism since no other state responds or is impacted in the same way as the targeted state. In this self-help system units worry about their survival, and the worry

conditions their behavior. (Waltz, 1979) The notion of self-help in an anarchic system leads to the sense that there are high levels of competition. It should be noted that, as Dunne describes, there is not a denial that states can create alliance structures, “however, states have no choice but to put their own interests ahead of the interests of other states as well as the so-called international community.” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 54) In this sense a state’s interest would be countering and identifying terrorism for its own protection. The emphasis on individual priority is the leading feature here and it creates a distinct understanding of how states should behave when listing terror groups.

Corresponding to these principles of realism regarding how states should act, Hypothesis A recognizes that the states lists should have high levels of individual listing preferences. That is, a comparison of states terror lists will present a high degree of individuality. This should be based on the self-interest of the state, and due to the importance of security for the state. Terrorism, as detailed in the previous chapter, poses a significant threat to states security, both in terms of direct confrontation, but also in the form of changing the relationship between states and citizens, and how states react to non-state actors. Because of this it is expected that a majority of the state’s lists will correspondingly be concerned with specific groups that the state, and potentially no other states, view as problematic. In addition, the difficulty in forming a definitional consensus regarding terrorism means that states, despite having international mandates to counter terrorism from the UN, have a large degree of freedom to independently define and target groups on their lists.

3.3 THE ENGLISH SCHOOL ACCOUNT OF LISTING REGIMES

This chapter introduces the theoretical elements of the English School as it pertains to Hypothesis B, and creates connections between this theory and state listing regimes that will be used to evaluate the hypothesis in the later sections. The second hypothesis (B) is based on the assumption that states' action will reflect a desire to protect themselves and other states that comprise the international society of states. The justification for listing groups will be concerned with the threats that groups pose to the states that make up the international society, as well as the threats they pose to governments and human rights throughout the world. The idea here is that states have created their lists out of the desire to protect themselves, as member of the international society of states, and their fellow members of the society of states. Thus this position takes into account that states may have some consideration for the international attempt at defining terrorism and that the safety and security of other countries can be a factor for determining which groups become listed. This is because the society of states is itself comprised of states, it is concerned with the safety of its members introducing the concept of *raison de systeme*.

This hypothesis assumes that the variation between the lists will be minimal, taking into account the different national definitions and direct threats that each country may individually face, and that there will be an observable amount of cohesion between the listing regimes of states. Accordingly, country cares, not only about itself, but also about the well-being of other states. The challenge for this hypothesis is the question of how the justification for listing complies with the idea of international society preservation and not simply self-preservation as we have previously noted. To pursue these assumptions viewpoints from the English School will be used which are based in the notion "that the international system is more orderly and civil than realists and neo-realists suggest." (Burchill & Linklater, 2013, p. 89) and since there is "a very high level of order, and surprisingly little interstate violence, in the absence of a higher coercive authority." (Burchill & Linklater, 2013, p. 88) More specifically this view assumes that states are not locked into an anarchic individual struggle for self-survival as dramatically as the previous hypothesis assumes, rather that they are embedded into society, and follow shared rules and institutions allowing for relative order and co-existence.

The particular focus of the English School used here is the idea of international society, which assumes that states act as members of a society with the goal of preserving the society of states. This international society “exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.” (Bull, 1977/2002, p. 13) What we have then is a rather different view of the international system that places higher regard for the shared interests and values of states. We can see this regard for shared interests and values through the number of international organizations that states belong to, and, “international society is about the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states.” (Buzan, 2004, p. 7) This is not to say that these institutions become more powerful than the states or approach a sort of world government rather, it proposes “that states can enjoy the benefits of society without transferring sovereign prerogatives to a higher authority.” (Burchill & Linklater, 2013, p. 95) Thus the states retain their sovereignty but they are still the primary driver behind the common institutions. As such “it is states themselves that are the principle institutions of the society of states.” (Bull, 1977/2002, p. 68) This means that states make up the international society through the establishment of norms and values and expressly via their institutionalisation through institutions, within which the states are the dominant powers.

The preservation of the international society is of particular importance since it can be used to understand how states will react not only to direct threats, but also to threats elsewhere in the society of states. They “have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interests in maintaining these arrangements.” (Bull & Watson, 1984, p. 1) Since institutions are made up of sovereign states “threats to those institutions are existential to both the units and the social order.” (Buzan, 2015, p. 131) This means that threats which appear to target the institutions should be recognized as threats by all those who comprise the units which make up the international society. Additionally, when a member of the international society is under threat it would follow that other members of this society would take steps to aid and protect it. This can be surmised as “when the IS [international society] is attacked by an anti-systemic force, its self-defense mechanism, operated through its state units, should become most apparent.” (Mendelsohn, 2009, pp. 296-297)

Terrorism can be seen as such a threat due to its pervasive nature and ability to impact each state that makes up the society. Because the state units are the sovereign actors within the international society and there is no higher authority the only other actors that can come to aid the threatened member are the other states which belong to the international society. Hence we can see how this understanding of the international system assumes that states have reasonable justification to protect and support more than just their own national interests and, at times, will identify threats that do not necessarily pose a direct existential threat to themselves, but rather pose a threat to the other members of their international society. In essence “due to the desire to maintain the system, states are expected to relax their inclination for egotistic self-serving considerations and to collaborate in order to fend off the threat.” (Mendelsohn, 2009, p. 297) In this sense, terror lists are expected to reflect this proposed collaboration.

Consistent with the ideas of international society, common values, and an interest in maintaining the society of states, Hypothesis B prescribes that state lists will reflect these desires. In other words, a comparison of states terror lists should show a high degree of corresponding listings. Despite the problems presented by a lack of definitional consensus, states should instead use the vague definitional boundaries to list many groups according to the protection of society. This sentiment is presented in the UN mandate against terrorism and the states lists should have a majority of corresponding groups that are commonly listed. This is not to say that the lists will be completely identical. The very nature of states creating lists outside of the UN framework against terrorism indicates that there will be some degree of divergence, however this should only be at a minimal level with a majority of commonly listed groups that represent a threat to the international society. For terrorism in particular “violence-wielding non state actors such as Al-Qaeda” are a threat to “legitimacy not just of states but also of international society.” (Buzan, 2015, p. 132) Thus the reaction that is expected by Hypothesis B is that the states lists of will have many commonly listed groups which represent a desire to counter threats to the legitimacy of international society.

3.4 THE CONSTRUCTIVIST ACCOUNT OF LISTING REGIMES

This chapter presents the relevant theoretical elements of the Constructivist account and build connections between it and counter terrorism listing regimes in the form of Hypothesis C. To begin this, the hypothesis and essential elements of the theory will be introduced, and then expected listing patterns will be detailed through the lens of this theory to establish it for the subsequent analysis in the analysis section. The third hypothesis is formed around the assumption that a states' action will emulate a desire to protect themselves as well as other states with which they share a mutual identity. The justification states have for listing groups on their respective terror lists will be concerned with not only their protection, but also of a collective of states that they identify alongside. The idea here is that states have created their lists out of a desire to protect themselves and other specific states with whom they identify. Accordingly, states will not act entirely independently nor will they act unanimously when addressing terror groups. Rather, some states will form a collective identity, other states will not identify with this collective and follow their own individual security interests or form their own collective security interest with other likeminded states.

The reasoning for the inclusion of terror groups on the lists will be concerned with the security of allies or specific states, rather than the society of states or just the self. This hypothesis assumes that the variation between the lists will reflect these collective arrangements and there will be groupings of states that have similar listing preferences and other states that have dissimilar lists. To pursue these assumptions, and the notion of collective identity, the assumptions of constructivism will be used which are based on the idea that "international relations is a social construction rather than existing independently of human meaning and action." (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 163) As such states interact based on social constructions which have been cultivated over time and through previous interactions. This view assumes that states will not operate on a purely individual basis, as is prescribed in the first hypothesis, nor will they pursue a more universal approach, as is prescribed by the second hypothesis, but rather they will operate under smaller collective associations which have been formed through previous interactions and mutually held positions.

The notion of shared understandings and normative values are at the core of this theory. As such the constructivist viewpoint is extremely useful to understanding how states should interact on the international level. The emphasis on the social aspects of international politics are of particular importance. More specifically “the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material” and “these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behaviors.” (Wendt, 1995, pp. 71-72) The shaping of identities and interests, as described by Wendt, is a fundamental part of understanding the international system and how states interact within it. The culmination of these identities and interests are the formation of collective identities, when these identities and interests align. In light of this collective identity formation can be described as interaction caused by “interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity” coupled with “self-restraint.” (Wendt, 1999, p. 357) This does not negate the individual desires of the states, rather these individual desires are found to be shared with other states, creating a bond between them for a specific purpose. This bond may exist for many areas, and is expected to be visible for the purpose of preventing terrorism. Thus having an interest alongside another state “does not mean that actors are irrational or no longer calculate costs and benefits but, rather, that they do so on a higher level of social aggregation.” (Wendt, 1994, p. 386)

This describes a system where the basis for understanding the ‘Self’ is contrasted with how the ‘Other’ is understood. States have understandings of where they stand in relation to their ‘Self’ and other states and then can differentiate between these other states based on how they might mutually identify. States will act towards other states based on the way that states perceive each other. In other words, further cooperation “presupposes that actors do not identify negatively with one another.” (Wendt, 1992, p. 418) Therefore, if some states identify negatively with one another, it leads to limited cooperation in counter terrorism efforts. And as a continuation of this logic when states are able to further cooperate and they share similar interests and values they are more likely to include other actors in their understanding of ‘self’ thus creating groups or ‘we’.

The notion of collective identity is based on this conception of ‘we’. Being part of a group like this “gives actors an interest in the preservation of their culture.” (Wendt, 1999, p. 337) As these collective identities are strengthened through mutual understanding there

is also a move in the direction of protection of this collective. Terrorism, or the treat thereof, can be seen as a threat to the culture. This introduces the topic of collective security which, simply put, “refers to collective action in response to a collectively identified threat.” (Orakhelavshvili, 2011, p. 4) The pursuit of collective security means that the states place an importance in the protection of other elements of the collective with which they identify. Simply put, “collective interests mean that actors make the welfare of the group an end in itself.” (Wendt, 1999, p. 337) This creates a system which “requires states both to renounce the unilateral use of force for their own ends, and to come to the aid of other states that are the targets of aggression.” (Cusack & Stoll, 1994, p. 388)

For the sake of counter terrorism this would be using security structures, such as terror lists, to target terror groups that pose a threat to certain other states. Wendt has described this as a security system where “states identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all.” (Wendt, 1992, p. 400) This works because as a collective “the group of states which unites around a set of common values and principles” have the ability to “safeguard them and preserve or restore the states of things that they require.” (Orakhelavshvili, 2011, p. 11) Thus the collective identity fosters the need to defend itself, placing the protection of the unit alongside the defense of the individual units, or in this case states. The use of terror lists, is then justified not only to protect one’s own state, but also extended to protect those who are identified as sharing the collective identity. Since terrorism is such a potentially destructive force for the individual states, it follows that to preserve the system states will list relevant terror groups.

Conforming with the principle of collective identity and correspondingly collective security, Hypothesis C recognizes that a comparison of state’s terror lists will show strong correlation among certain states, however other states may have different listing preferences. In this way, when comparing the lists, countries that belong to group sharing collective identity should have a high degree of similarities. Other states are expected to have lists that are substantially different from the states in a collective arrangement. This can also be thought of using the labels trendsetter, trend followers, and individual players. (Ilbiz & Curtis, 2015) In this way the states will react differently, and form groups

showing collective identity (i.e. trendsetters and trend followers) that have high levels of consistency in their lists while some states, who are not part of the not collective (i.e. individual players), would have separate lists that do not correspond to the others.

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION AND EMPIRICAL PUZZLE

Despite the consensus to combat terrorism, as indicated by the UN directives against terrorism and the threat that terrorism poses to national security, there is a large degree of disparity in how states define terrorism and label terrorist organizations. This difficulty in defining the concept of terrorism makes it an essentially contested concept, especially due to the disputed nature of the phenomena. Coupled with the discrepancy surrounding an academic consensus on a definition as well as state definitions, the issue of defining terrorism, and subsequently countering it, is complex. The reason being that states should attempt to counter terrorism, since it poses a threat, yet states react differently and have different understandings of what constitutes terrorism and who is a terrorist. As previously discussed, states have competing methods and understandings when it comes to terrorism, yet they have all predominantly agreed to counter it. This creates a puzzling situation where there has been an indefinite agreement in response to the threat of an essentially contested concept. Through using the terror lists given by states it is possible to see how their definition is manifested in a real world context since the groups being listed have been designated as terrorist using a state's particular understanding of terrorism.

Through analyzing a state's listing preference, the working of the mechanism of one of the three hypothesis posited above can be inferred regarding the anticipated nature of the terror lists. Hence an analysis of the lists should provide an illustration of these theoretical expectations at work. This will be completed in two stages: (1) Identifying a potential listing pattern, which will then be checked against the hypotheses. (2) Checking if the list documentation corresponds to the theoretical reasoning; this will be done by examining the justifications provided by the state and seeing if it corresponds to the theoretical expectations. Combined, this approach allows for the viewing of a pattern of behavior to become apparent based on the theoretical viewpoints that have been established through the hypothesis. Essentially the analyzed lists will provide an illustration of the theoretical expectations at work and, as such, will look at the listing pattern to observe how it corresponds to the theoretical expectations set forth through the hypothesis. This allows for an analysis that examines the empirical case of the listing regimes while placing it, if

it fits, within the input pattern established by the larger theory governing the international system. Thus, the goal is to first establish the empirical listing pattern; and second, to check if the justification provided for the empirical listing matches the theory behind the related pattern.

4.1.1 CASE SELECTION

The states that have been selected to observe patterns of variation are the United Kingdom, Australia, Russia, India, and the United States. These five states are particularly insightful for understanding terror listing regimes due to their leadership in countering terrorism either on a regional or a global level as well as their policy of targeting terror groups through labelling and listing regimes. Additionally, these states have been selected based on the comparison, compiled by Benjamin Freedman in 2010⁵, in which eight lists were compiled. During this study it is noted that there was “less overlap than anticipated” (Freedman B. , 2010, p. 46), however the reasons for listing, or connection to larger theory in general, was not examined. The comparative list that will be created for our purposes will only focus on five of the eight that were originally used by Freedman. This is due to the aim of establishing connections to the hypothesis and theoretical assumptions, thus some of the lists will be excluded. The excluded lists are from the European Union and United Nations. This is due to the supranational nature of these organizations, since here we are interested in the interactions of states in the international system. Additionally, revision of this comparative list is necessary since these lists have been updated as countries have changed their focus since 2010. Since this time each of these lists have been updated by their respective government with the Australian list in November 2016, U.K. in December 2016, U.S. in June 2016, India in March 2015, and Russia in August 2015.

For the second stage of analysis one list will be selected and the justification provided for listing groups will be examined. The list will be selected based on the following. Of the five state lists that are included in the comparative list, one will be chosen. It must provide a clear example of the trend that is identified through the hypothesis selection. That is, it

⁵ (Freedman B., Officially Blacklisted Extremist/Terrorist (Support) Organizations: a Comparisof of Lists from six Countries and two International Organizations, 2010)

should represent the listing pattern that has been identified in stage one. More detail on the specific list will be provided in the description of step two of the methodology after the comparative list has been compiled and analyzed.

The confidential nature of this topic further complicates the case selection. Not all states have publicly available official terror lists. Additionally, while states may declare certain groups as terrorists, they may do so only in specific circumstances and might not publish it in an official list but rather a declaration or statement. Thus, one important restrictive element is the availability of having publicly available official terror lists. This limits the number of countries that can be examined greatly, for example many EU states do not individually publish a terror list in the same way that the previously mentioned five states do. Other states, such as Turkey, do not identify the organizations as such, rather they identify key individuals who have been identified by the state as terrorists. While these individuals often are members of larger terrorist organizations, the nature of their list differs greatly from the other selected states. This is a key factor while selecting the cases, as having a relatively similar format is important for efficiently analyzing the lists themselves. Thus, only states that have a list format for declaring their designated terrorist organizations are selected. These lists are released on the corresponding government webpage and one, the U.K. list is published as a document. In the case the U.S. the list is from the Department of State. The U.K. and Indian governments release this information under Home Office and Home Affairs respectively. The Australian government releases under the Australian National Security body. Russia has created a National Antiterrorism Committee which publishes their list on its website. Some states do not pursue large scale sanction campaigns against terrorists because they treat terrorism as a criminal matter. In these cases, the rule for responding to terrorism at the state level is represented in the criminal code and terrorist organizations and individuals are treated as high level criminals rather than special security actors.

To examine the patterns in the best feasible way it is important to look at states that will not preclude one of the hypothesis due to other factors of their relationships. For instance, if countries were only selected that belong to a collective defense organization, then it may appear that all states follow common listing patters when only this grouping of states have a collective security arrangement. To prevent this, countries have been selected that

represent elements present in each of the hypothesis, there are allies, members of collective security arrangements, as well as countries from different parts of the world and which have different security concerns. The only common feature between these countries, for the sake of this study, is that they have officially published terror lists. For instance, while the US and UK both belong to NATO, Russia, India, and Australia do not. Additionally, the selection of countries representing states all over the world, from Asia, North America, Oceania, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. This allows for local, regional, or global concerns over terrorism to be represented depending on the state listing preferences. These states represent differing state structures and governance types; however, the aim is not how a specific form of governance responds, but how states that form the international system do. That is to say, if state structure or governance type plays a significant role, then it should be reflected in the comparative list and offer an explanation for the observed variation.

Differences exist in the formats and style of the lists themselves, however they each provide a type of list with the name of designated organizations. The Australian government has, on its website, a Listed terrorist organisations page⁶ that is derived from the Criminal Code Act 1995, which was updated in 2002 to include terrorism organizations. In the U.K. there is a document entitled ‘Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations’⁷ published by the Home Office. The Russian Federation terror list is titled the ‘Unified federal list of organizations, including foreign and international, designated as terrorist by the courts of the Russian Federation’⁸ and is available on the website of the National Antiterrorism Committee. The Indian list is released by the Government of India on the Ministry of Home Affairs website as ‘List of Banned Terrorist Organisations under section 35 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.’⁹ The list being used from the United States is the U.S. Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organizations¹⁰ released by the Bureau of Counterterrorism on their webpage.

⁶ <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx>

⁷ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2>

⁸ <http://en.nac.gov.ru/unified-federal-list-organizations-including-foreign-and-international-designated-terrorist-courts.html>

⁹ <http://mha.nic.in/BO>

¹⁰ <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>

4.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

4.2.1 STEP 1: COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

The first step is to create a comparative list (Figure 1) that organizes all of the selected state lists. This is done by compiling the five separate lists into one workable document, creating a new master list which contains all the terror organizations that are referenced in the individual lists. This comparative list also contains the five states along another axis. An example of this is provided in Table 1. In this way, the potential variation will be observable between which lists contain similar or different groups. It also clarifies the frequency of the listing, in other words, if a group is listed by one, two, or all of the states. This is done through viewing the lists in their various formats and placing the relevant information into the new chart. Due to these various formats, which are all digitally published but differing website styles and layouts, each countries list will be approached individually and the named terrorist organizations placed within the comparative list.

The lists are published by different countries, thus there is a possibility that translation differences of the organization names will occur when they were placed on the state list. First organizations which appear in multiple lists and are spelled the same, clearly reflecting the same organization, will be compiled. Next, the groups which names contain minor spelling differences will be checked to verify that the intended group is properly referenced. While some groups are simply spelled differently for instance translations from Arabic commonly use different combinations of ui, i, or e to produce the same sound, however at times this can indicate a different name, particularly depending on how the state has chosen to translate since many groups share common phrasing in their naming. These groups, and corresponding countries, will then be uploaded into the comparative list using the most commonly recognized spelling of the group's name. The remaining groups will be those that are only recognized by one state. These will be checked to verify that the organization is not already listed under another designation by other countries. These naming differences will be uploaded into the list referencing the most commonly used and up to date international name for the organization, where major naming differences occur the alternative group name will also be listed alongside. In order to account for these spelling and naming discrepancies the supplemental material provided with some of the lists will be used, when this is not sufficient the databases of the

Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium¹¹ (TRAC) and the Global Terrorism Database¹² (GTD) will be used to clarify any transcription or discrepancies encountered. This will ensure that the correct group is being referenced each time despite potential naming differences. The remaining groups, which are not alternative names for previously uploaded groups, will then be uploaded to the comparative list under the assumption that only one state has listed the group. These will be checked against the databases again to confirm that they are separate entities from the other groups. In the situation where branches of an organization are listed by one state but not another, but the main organization is listed separately, the branch or wing will be listed separately as well. This is to account for states choosing to differentiate between an entire political group or a particular wing of a political group as being a terrorist organization.

TABLE 1

	State Name	State Name	State Name	State Name
Listed Group A (a.k.a alternative name)	✓		✓	
Listed Group B	✓	✓	✓	✓
Listed Group C (branch of B)		✓		

The comparative list displays the number of states that list a specific terrorist organization. This allows for an overview of listing patterns among selected states. The number of groups that are only listed once, twice, three times and so on will be recorded. Through this one of the previously mentioned hypotheses can be selected for further testing. The hypothesis is selected based on the following *criteria for selection* accounting for the possible hypotheses. For Hypothesis A, based in the self-interest of the state, the criteria will be that the organizations which are only listed once and, consequently, are not listed as terrorists by the other states, make up a majority of the listed groups. This will be recognized as being 50% or more groups being individually listed. For Hypothesis

¹¹ <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/>

¹² <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>

B, based on protection of the international society of states, the criteria will be that a majority of the states have corresponding lists and that groups will be listed by three or more states 50% of the time. For Hypothesis C, based on the idea of collective identities, the criteria will be that a grouping forms where some groups of states have 50% or higher correlation and others do not. In order to test these hypotheses, the percentage or times listed will be compiled as (1) comprehensive, all the compared states, (2) a selection of three states which have the highest degree of compatibility, and (3) a selection of two states who belong to a common collective security arrangement. It is expected, due to the exclusive nature of the hypotheses, that upon completion of the comparative list one hypothesis will explain the results. The comparative list, in a sense, would provide an illustration of the hypothesis in action. Since each of the three hypotheses are derived from theory about the international system, the theories assumptions should correspond to the reason for the matched hypothesis. In order to test this, a more detailed examination of one of the lists will be done.

4.2.2 STEP 2: CONTENT ANALYSIS

Step two identifies the reasons why one of the states has justified their listing in order to test it against the hypothesis' theory. Once a proposed hypothesis has been selected further testing is required. This will be achieved through analyzing the content of the most likely case's, that the observed hypothesis suggests, documents to see if it corresponds most closely to what the proposed hypothesis suggests, therefore it is also expected that the justifications to be most pronounced. If the theoretical expectations are prominent anywhere, they should be apparent here. As previously described one of the five will be selected for this element of the research. This documents will be analyzed according to the content analysis scheme described by Robert Weber. (Weber, 1990) Accordingly, the recoding units will be the sentences that make up the justification for each terror organization's inclusion on the list. Content analysis allows for us to understand the problems associated with the variation of terror lists because it clearly displays elements of the lists in a way that allows for discussion. By being able to focus on key indicator words, content analysis highlights the trends of a list and allows for observations to be made. Justification for each group is approximately a paragraph or two in length. The sentences of the justifications will be classified for each of the terror groups included in the list. A sentence will be counted where reference is made to self, other states, or is general, these will be defined later in this section.

The specific focus is references to the groups location, targets, area of operation, or goal etc. Examples of location or area of operation would be the words: based, in, located, across, or a specific country name such as Yemen or France. Additionally, words indicating actions or sentiments will be recorded in order to emphasize the nature of the sentence. For instance, in a sentence a group may be listed as opposing France or carrying out attacks in Yemen. The format will be the following Action – Subject, for example: attack – French citizens, or indicating word – location, such as: based in - Libya. Sentences which do not contain reference to these criteria will be not be listed since they do not contain an indication of where and why the group is being listed, and for our purposes do not indicate why the government has listed a group. Through labeling each sentence under these categories it is possible to observe the trends of the justification provided in the listing document. According to the hypothesis selected in Step 1 the

justifications in the individual list should reflect the assumptions made about why states have created their lists.

Examples of Actions

- Attack, bombed, killed, reject, support, resist, target, destroy, fighting, criticize, carried out, operates, oppose

Examples of words indicating location

- Based, in, from, within, originated, throughout

For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to describe in more detail the subject and what is meant by self, other states, and general. The first, *Self*, is concerned with identifying sentence elements that make specific references to the listing country. This is found as descriptions of the terror group threatening the security of the state, its citizens, interests abroad, or being active in the country. It is important to distinguish here that it is specifically the interests of the state or protection of its citizens that is being referenced here. Examples of this would be condemnation of an attack against its citizens abroad or the organization specifically targeting the listing government.

Examples of Self reference (listing state is Spain for sake of example)

- Country Name(Spain), abbreviations (ES), Citizens (Spanish, Spaniards)

The second, *Other States*, is concerned with identifying sentence elements that make specific reference to states other than the listing state. This is found as descriptions of the terror group threatening the security of other states, condemning actions pertaining to other states citizens, or describing the involvement of another state when it does not pertain to protecting the listing state. The distinguishing feature here is that the government's specific justification concerns the safety of another countries citizens or is citing a groups attacks against another state. Examples of this would be condemnation of a terror attack against another governments security forces or citizens.

Examples of reference to other states (assuming the listing state is not one of these)

- State Names i.e. United States, USA, America, Israel, Jordan, Egypt
- City Names i.e. Cairo, Paris (Use of these reference the state to which the city belongs. For instance, an attack in Paris is also an attack against the French.)
- Regions, with specific reference to a part of a country i.e. Punjab region of India, or Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) of Northern Iraq.
- Specific groups of countries i.e. Coalition Forces, African Union. These indicate a specific set of countries.

The third, *General*, is concerned with identifying sentence elements that refer broadly to terrorist actions against a number of states or people. This is found as descriptions of the terror groups affront to human rights, democratic values, or peaceful institutions without specific reference to either the listing state or other states. For this classification the term West, or Western, is considered general since a group being referenced as anti-Western does not specify a targeted state or nationality and is rather an indication of the groups general position. This classification also contains descriptions condemning terrorist's actions against humanity or international norms. Here it is important to distinguish between justification for including a group due to the actions of the group against commonly held values, not specifically an individual state. Examples of this would be condemnation of a terror groups actions against people, without specific reference to their nationality, or because of their noncompliance with international norms and human rights.

Examples of general reference

- Global, International, international community, multi-national (used generally), world, U.N., peacekeepers
- Regional, without specific reference to a part of a country i.e. West or Western influence.
- Crimes against humanity

This coding scheme allows for the state's justification of including groups on its terror list to be tested against the theoretical assumptions that are indicated from the hypothesis.

The hypothesis, and consequent theory, is identified through the formulation of the comparative list that is a compilation of the individual state's terror lists. Accordingly, the results of the content analysis should correspond to the theoretical assumptions made by the hypothesis that matches the comparative analysis of the lists. If the content analysis results match the theoretical criteria that justify the hypothesis, then it can be confirmed that there is correlation between the listing patterns and the hypothesis is derived from the theory. However, if the content analysis results contain discrepancies against the theoretical criteria, then there is a lack of correlation between the listing patterns and hypothesis from the specific theoretical viewpoint and another explanation is necessary, or there may be mitigating factors. Nevertheless, there would be no direct connection as suggested by the theories.

TABLE 2 *ALSO USES SPAIN AS AN EXAMPLE OF A LISTING COUNTRY

Group Name	Sentence #	Key Words	Classification
Example A			
	1	Action – Subject	Classification
	3	Indication – Location	Classification
Example B			
	1	Kill – Spanish Citizens	Self
	3	Based in – Spain	Self
Example C			
	2	Attacked – American	Other States
	3	Based in – Iraq	Other States

4.2.3 LIMITATIONS

There are some limitations that arise from this type of analysis. Firstly, there is strong focus on the receiving side, that is to say that states have the preeminent position in this analysis rather than descriptions of terrorism or actions of terrorists themselves. While the actions of terrorists have caused them to be recognized by states, and subsequently listed, this analysis has not been developed to measure the different types of groups that are listed and measure their impact on state listing. Therefore, it remains a possibility that the type of group plays a role in the observed variation between states list, as much as the states themselves. Also, there may be a need to fine tune the measurement of cohesion between states. One possible reason for this could be that the threshold is set too high to reflect realistic levels of cooperation. The question then would then be what is a sufficient level of agreement on these types of lists to indicate the potential to form collective identities? For the sake of this analysis the current thresholds will be kept, however it is important to note that this element may be revised in further examinations of the subject.

5. ANALYSIS

5.1 COMPARATIVE LIST ANALYSIS

Now that the phenomena of terrorism, and the states reaction to it through listing regimes has been explained, the theoretical connections to International relations theories established through hypotheses, and the methodological framework has been detailed the fusion of these previous sections can begin. These previous elements provide the necessary background for the lists, as well as create connections between the different theoretical viewpoints in a way that can be applied in the context of analyzing the lists themselves. The following analysis sets out to describe the actual lists within the frameworks created above.

Once compiled the Comprehensive List¹³ totaled 146 groups originating from five different state lists. There is a large degree of differentiation that is observable and little cohesion, showing the divisive nature of defining and labelling terrorist organizations. The trend is that as the number of states that agree on listing a group increases, the number of listed groups decreases. Of the 146 organizations only seven are listed by four or more states and only 21 are listed by three or more states. Of these only three are listed by all the states; Al Qaida (AQ), The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Lashkar-e Tayyiba or Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Correspondingly, only four groups are listed by four states, these are: (1) Al Nusrah Front, also known as Jabhat al-Nusra, which is listed by Australia, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. (2) Harakat-Ul-Mujahideen a.k.a. Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA) which is listed by Australia, India, the United States, and the United Kingdom, (3) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which is listed by Australia, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and (4) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) which is listed by Australia, India, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Fourteen groups are listed by three of the states out of the 146. Twenty-seven out of 146 groups are listed by only two states. An overwhelming 98 out of 146 organizations are included on only one state list.

¹³ See Annex 1 for the complete Comparative List

The highest degree of correspondence occurs between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Despite having the highest degree of compatibility, their lists still contain many differences, there are a large number of groups that are not equally represented across these three states. Compared to any other combination of three out of five states, however, these still represent the highest level of similarities among their lists. For the sake of testing Hypothesis C this will be the three state group of the highest compatibility. Between these three states there are 101 listed organizations. Only 17 groups are listed by all three of these states. Twenty-five groups out of 101 are listed by two of the states. Reflecting the trend that is highlighted in the comprehensive list, a majority of the listed groups are only listed by one of these three states. 59 out of 101 groups are only recognized by one of the three states. Considering that these three states, out of all five, have the highest degree of commonly listed organizations, it is highly indicative of the overall trend that these three states still have so many individually listed groups. Additionally, the selection of two states belonging to a collective security arrangement shows little common listing patterns compared to individual listing preferences. The United States and the United Kingdom, who are both members of NATO, have a combined 101 groups on their lists. Of these 101, only 36 are found on both of their lists with the remaining 65 being listed by only one of these two states.

5.1.1 CORRESPONDING HYPOTHESIS

According to the criteria for selecting a hypothesis, established in the previous methodological section, there should be a clear level of (in)compatibility between the lists. The level of compatibility is compared on three levels as (1) comprehensive, (2) a selection of three states which have the highest degree of compatibility, and (3) a selection of two states who belong to a common collective security arrangement. For the (1) comprehensive list, 67.1% of the groups are listed by a single state. Subsequently, 18.5% of groups are listed by two states, 9.6% by three, and 2.7% by four and 2.1% by five. (2) Among the three selected states, Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom the corresponding values are 58.4% individually listed, and 41.6% listed by two or more states. This breakdown has 24.8% of groups being listed by two of the three states and only 16.8% of groups being listed by all three states. (3) Between the two states belonging

to NATO the corresponding totals equaled 64.4% of the groups being listed by only one of the two states and only 35.6% of groups being listed by both states. These figures will now be compared against the criteria that was set for each hypothesis.

Hypothesis A, highlighting the self-interest of the listing states and assumes that there will be a high degree of mismatch between the lists due to the self-interested nature of states proposed by neo-realism. According to the selection criteria this hypothesis most closely matches the observable variations in the comparative listing scheme. The set criteria were that 50% or more of the groups would be individually listed and appear on only one state list. Among the comprehensive list, 67.1% of the lists are listed by only one state and groups are only listed by two or more states 32.9% of the time, showing a preference for self-interest. These results match this hypothesis and indicate that a Neo Realist viewpoint can sufficiently explain variations in the comparative state list. The additional inspection of the three state selection and NATO countries contribute to the same determination. Of the three states, AUS, USA, UK, 58.4% of groups are only listed one time, indicating that each country has listed primarily groups that it deems as a threat to themselves and not to other states. Only 16.8% of the groups appear on all three of these states lists indicating that these groups have targeted or threatens each of these states and that is why they have been listed, not out of a desire to protect each other. Between the two NATO states there exists a high degree of divergence between the lists with 64.4% of the groups appearing on either the list of the USA or the UK, but not on both. This runs in contradiction to what is proposed by both the international society and collective identity theories, which assumed larger overlap in the lists.

Hypothesis B, which focuses on the protection of the international society of states, required that an overwhelming majority of the states have corresponding lists and that groups will be listed by three or more states 50% of the time. As is previously described, groups are rarely listed by all five countries making up only 2.1% of the listed groups. In fact, even combining groups that were listed by three or more out of five only shows that only 14.4% groups are listed three or more times, showing a lack in unity for defending the international society of states proposed by the English School. Regardless, according to the comparative list that has been compiled there is only agreement regarding three terror groups, hardly an indication that all the states have created lists in order to

internationally combat terrorism. However, Al Qaeda is one of the universally listed groups, highlighting Buzan's description of "violence-wielding non state actors such as Al-Qaeda" as threats to "legitimacy not just of states but also of international society." (Buzan, 2015, p. 132)

While this hypothesis assumed that the threat terrorism poses to all countries, as threat to the society of states, as well as the UN's attempts to curtail terrorist groups, would lead to a global consensus of targeted terrorist groups there is little evidence that this is reflected in the listing regimes of these five states. Rather, the high levels of individually listed groups, as well as groups only listed twice, indicate that there is a lack of consensus, or willingness, in the way that states choose to approach countering terrorism. If states cannot, in any meaningful way, commonly identify and list terrorist groups, then there is little chance that there is any form of protection of the international society of states regarding terrorism and counter terrorism. Due to this Hypothesis B is not considered to be applicable to the comparative list results.

Hypothesis C, presumed actions in support of collective identities, requiring that groups form where some groups of states have 50% or higher correlation and others do not. While the immediate results show that a vast majority of groups are listed by only one state it does not rule out the possibility that other states have similar lists and that one state has provided many individual groups. In order to test for this the three most common state lists are reviewed to test for the possibility of the influence of a collective identity. In this case the three states with the most corresponding lists are Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Once the Russian and Indian lists were excluded the total number of listed groups decreased from 146 to 101 (a 30.8% decrease) and the number of individually listed groups decreased from 98 to 59 (a 39.8% decrease). However, even among these three states the percentage of groups listed one time remained high at 58.4%, with only 41.6% of the groups being listed by two or all of the states. Compared to the comprehensive list the number of groups that are all listed by the three states is much higher at 16.8% compared to 2.1% previously. This indicates that these three states have a higher degree of cohesion in counter terrorism understanding than other countries in general, perhaps showing "interest in the preservation of their culture" as suggested by Wendt. (Wendt, 1999, p. 337) However, this still did not meet the required 50% threshold

set in place for determining these three states terror lists to represent a collective security interest. Similarly, when only two countries, who belong to a common collective security organization, are compared the results are underwhelming. The United States and The United Kingdom, both members of NATO, only have a 35.6% overlap in their lists. A majority, 64.4%, of the groups listed between these two states appear only on one of the countries lists. Thus, there is still not enough correlation between the lists to indicate common listing policies as suggested by the views on Constructivism's collective identity. This suggests that for these countries, counter terrorism is primarily driven by domestic concerns. At its current state, the results show that while there are some minimal levels of overlap in the lists, a majority of the groups are listed by only a single state indicating that the lists themselves do not emulate states desire to pursue collective identity formation in regards to counter-terrorism.

The results showing that a majority of the groups are listed by only a single state could be caused by different factors. One such factor is that the driver for state listing could be focused on domestic concerns. This would make sense in regards to individual listing patterns, since the states would be focused on groups that pose the most concern to themselves, resulting in highly individualized lists and showing *raison d'état* at play. This could also explain the trend between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, since groups may have anti-Western positions, these countries would all be targeted, resulting in each country listing the group separately. While this gives the appearance of a common listing, each country could list these types of groups solely based on the individual threat. In addition, if we consider the historical waves of terrorism, as described by Rapoport, (Rapoport, 2004), the relative newness of the fourth wave of religious groups with more ideological leanings than the previous state-centric views on terrorism could potentially explain the results. The previous waves of terrorism are concerning the state and domestic changes, and only with the most recent wave is the focus changing from state level changes to global movements. The groups that are recognized by all, or a majority, of states could be a representation of this new wave of terrorist groups. Al Qaeda and ISIL for example have presented new ideas of what the face of terrorism is, and as the threats have changed, so has state's understanding of the threat. In this way, the states themselves are changing how they view and categorize terrorists based on the changing nature of terrorism. However, it takes time for states to

change the way in which they think about terrorism, and that could be why we see a transition from one wave to another, in the form of directing attention to a new type of terrorism.

5.1.2 HYPOTHESIS A: NEO REALISM AS MOST LIKELY CASE

Hypothesis A has the most explanatory power in determining why the observable variations in the comparative list. According to this hypothesis the reasons for a state to include terrorist organizations in their list will be mainly driven by self-help logic, and individualistic security concerns of Neo Realism. This is supported by Waltz as he described the way in which “each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its interests.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 113) Meaning that groups being listed by predominately one state represents an individualized understanding of terror threats. This should be due to the individualistic nature of the states counter terrorism focus and *raison d'état*. The high percentages of individual listings show that other considerations such as collective identities or the international society, and the threats posed to them are not necessarily understood equally among these states.

Despite self-help seeming to explain most of the observed pattern, some groups present universal agreement regarding their status as terror groups. If it were not for the relative minority of groups listed this way this could indicate elements of other theories, such as the international society and collective identity at play here. This may be explained by the waves of terrorism proposed by Rapoport. (Rapoport, 2004) Most of the waves have historically been state-centric, thus the state's understanding of terrorism has developed in this way. With the evolution of terrorism to become more religious and ideological based, as well as an increase in globalization, states have had to adapt their understanding of terrorism to encompass the new threat. Therefore, the leaders of this, such as ISIL and Al Qa'ida, are listed universally while most other groups are still labelled in light of the neo realist account of their threat to individual states.

By getting an overview of the variation between the lists themselves the justification for including groups in the lists is not obtained. The following section will analyze the reasons that a state has included organizations on their list. In this way there will be further

specification regarding the reasons for the observed pattern of listing. This will inform about whether or not the self-interest and selfish nature of states is to explain for what has been observed as a high degree of mismatch between states lists and a tendency for states to list organizations that are not listed by other states. Based on the observations of the comparative list and the criteria of Hypothesis A there is a high degree of variation between the lists indicating little overlap in terms of defining and determining what groups are terroristic threats. The neo realist viewpoint describes that states will be primarily concerned with self-interest in their listing regimes. This was assumed to be reflected in the degree of observed variation in the lists, and the subsequent analysis has indeed shown a large amount of variation between the lists. This means that the neo realist account of seems to be at work here and states are forming their lists out of concerns of self-interest, however only after analysis of the justifications can this be corroborated.

5.2 IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE U.K. LISTING REGIME

Now that the overall listing pattern has been established, an in depth analysis is required to verify the theoretical underpinning that has been used to establish Hypothesis A. For our purposes neo realism's position of self- help and egoism, as connected to terror listings in the previous sections, is expected to feature prominently. Based on the results of Step 1, the United Kingdom's list has been selected, due to its being the most like case, to be further analyzed in Step 2 as detailed below. This case represents the most likely reflection of Hypothesis A, since it displayed the strongest connection to the observed pattern of individual listing. In the case of the U.K. the Proscribed Terrorist Organisations list and the supporting information is provided from the Home Office in a document published 12 July, 2013 and last updated July 15, 2016. As the Home Office states: "This document lists the extremist groups or organizations banned under UK law, and provides the criteria that are considered when deciding whether or not to proscribe a group or organization." (U.K. Government, 2016) This document represents a unique case because the United Kingdom has one of the most extensive listing regimes in the world. Details about the groups are provided by the Home Office through justifications, concerning details about the group such as terror incidents they have been involved in, area of operation, modus operadi, relationships with other organizations, and key figures within the group. The document stands out because it represents the matched hypothesis, based on the neo realist view of self-help, in that it contains 31 groups which are listed only once out of the 98 that are found on the comparative list, despite being a part of the U.N. and NATO. This suggests an individual listing pattern that is most closely linked to the self-interested account of listing patterns contained in hypothesis A's, Neo Realist account. The next countries that came close to the U.K.'s number of single listing is India with 30 and the United states with 23. Russia's list contained 14 single listings and Australia's had none.

The completed analysis found 223 references to the actions or location of groups that provided justification for the U.K. government's listing. Every justification contained at least one description of the actions or location of the group in reference to why it has been listed. Of these 223 references 155 were categorized as *Other States*, 45 fell under the *General* category, and only 23 were labelled as *Self*. This means the self-interest and the

“self-help system” described by Waltz, (Waltz, 1979), is not reflected strongly in the justifications. Additionally, some group’s listing is solely justified based on one classification type. For example, a group’s justification is made up by many sentences, each of which can be classified under a different category, for some groups each classified sentence belonged to the same category. This was most common for the *Other States* category with 31 groups solely justified with sentences that corresponding with the *Other States* label. In terms of theory this can be interpreted as the fostering of collective identity formations and the dismissal of purely self-help motivated decisions. The *General* classification while used for 45 different sentences did not provide the sole justification for any group. The *Self* classification was used to label the sole justification of 4 groups. Most group’s justification sentences contained a mixture of classifications. 33 group’s justifications were classified based on a combination of the three classifications. This shows that most groups are justified using a combination of reference types.

5.2.1 OBSERVATIONS

The analysis shows that the classification of groups is predominately centered around the category of *Other States*. Contradicting the proposed self-help nature of the terror lists proposed by Neo-Realism. This classification means that a sentence contained reference to a group’s action or location which concerned another state or group of states, and not specifically the United Kingdom. This shows that the United Kingdom’s primary focus during the process of identifying and labelling terrorist groups lies in groups that are not necessarily focused on the United Kingdom itself. This means the self-help and egoist elements are not as prominent as suggested by the initial analysis. Whereas the overall pattern seemed to confirm neorealism and self-help principles, as pursued in Hypothesis A, the pattern of this individual list, although expected to match most closely with the Neo Realist hypothesis and therefore also be driven by self-help principles, displays significant concern with other states. This means that, at times, the justifications seemed to follow the patterns set forth by the other hypotheses. There is no doubt that groups which are a threat to the U.K. are acknowledged and listed as well, but the overall trend was listing non-U.K. based terror groups, which have a primary focus in fighting another government elsewhere in the world.

There is a noticeable trend of listing groups which are based in certain regions of the world. The Middle East, Asia, and Africa are the most represented, while only a small number of groups are listed that have formed in Europe. In addition, there are a significant number of Islamic groups that are described as having an ideology which supports global jihad or the establishment of a caliphate. These groups' resistance to Western influences, and in some cases Western military forces, is largely cited as a reason to be included in the list. In terms of theory this means that there are cases of support for other countries that matches with the collective expectation set by constructivist based Hypothesis B. Few groups, which are not based in the U.K., are described as being specifically against British interests, direct threats to security, or threats to British citizens at home or abroad.

There are many specific references to groups that operate in states other than the United Kingdom, and their attacks or operations against other state's governments are included in the justification for the British listing. This is interesting in light of the proposed Neo Realist viewpoint that argued "states have no choice but to put their own interests ahead of the interests of other states as well as the so-called international community." (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 54) Additionally, a majority of the groups are described as having goals related to other states or regions. Very few groups are described as specifically being against, or targeting, the United Kingdom, and in fact, a majority of the descriptions of a groups actions, in the form of attacks, bombings, or attempts, are concentrated in other countries and concerning the governments and citizens of other states. This would indicate a preference towards another theoretical view that emphasizes other states, such as the notion of collective identity or international society. However, when a group does become involved with the United Kingdom in some way, either by targeting its citizens, operating within its borders, or engaging militarily against it, it is very prominently described in the provided justification.

The groups which are listed often represent specific countries or regional conflicts. These are highly indicative of an Constructivist idea of collective identity where states "come to the aid of other states that are the targets of aggression." (Cusack & Stoll, 1994, p. 388) An example of this are groups who operate in Egypt, Palestine, and Israel and who target the Israeli and Egyptian state. The justifications specifically reference the threats these states face from terrorism. The political tensions linked to the conflicts in these countries

seem to be a motivator for listing groups. Likewise, there are many groups listed which operate in Pakistan and India. These listings correspond to the Indian state list, potentially reflecting political support for the government of India, since these groups do not contain specific references to the United Kingdom. This is also reflected in the number of groups which are referenced as participating in the Syrian Civil War. Many groups that participate in the conflict are listed, and some of these are universally listed in the Comparative List, such as ISIL. However, the British list contains many groups that are listed due to affiliation to ISIL. These groups range from being listed only by the U.K., and other states, but never by all states, showing the difficulties of applying the label of 'terrorist' in a real world context, particularly when political tensions are high.

The observations are in contrast to the expectation that many of the justifications would be classified as *Self*, and represent more egoistic, self-help patterns. There are many discrepancies between the theoretical expectations, the observed listing pattern, and the justifications for listing. The British list contained the most single listings of the five state's lists analyzed in the comparative state list, since other states did not list these groups. The hypothesis assumed that the reason was due to self-interest of the listing state and a primary concern with its own security. Thus, the expectation was that the U.K.'s listing tendencies would show a large focus on the *Self* category reflecting the individual nature of their list as proposed by neo-realism. There are 31 groups that only appear on the British list in the Comparative list. Hypothesis A proposes, in line with neo realist thinking, that by highlighting the self-interest of the listing states, it is assumed that there will be a high degree of mismatch between the lists due to the individual nature of states.

This individual nature of states is theoretically supported through the contributions of the neo realist school of thought which assumes that states will be self-interested and focused on groups that have the potential to harm or otherwise impact the listing country. This has not been observed through the justifications provided by the United Kingdom in their listing document. While there are some groups that have specifically been referenced due to their actions against the state, this does not make up a significant number of the listing categories. This is apparent from the fact that the *Self* categorization is only found for 23 sentences in the justifications of the listing document and only 17 groups contain a sentence categorized as *Self* at least once in their justification. Subsequently, only 4

groups are solely classified as *Self*, meaning that few justification sentences are recorded only containing references to the U.K. in some form or another. These instances of the category *Self* being used do not make up a significant number of the justifications and does not correspond with the theoretical expectations set by the hypothesis. There seems to be more collective identity components to the list than initially expected based on the neo realist underpinnings of the selected hypothesis.

5.2.2 OTHER STATES CLASSIFICATION

A majority of the justifications are categorized as *Other States*. This is contrary to the assumptions about Neo Realist reasons for individual listing, which is that the states lists will be different due to concern over its own security, the list shows a great deal of concern over the actions of terrorist groups in other countries and targeting other states. Despite having a large amount of individual listings, the British list seems to be primarily concerned with the actions of terror groups in other countries. For instance, many of the listings make reference to a groups attacks against foreign military forces such as Afnad Misr, which is only listed by the U.K., and is attributed to attacks against the Egyptian security forces as well as bombing Cairo University. Within this justification there is no reference made to the U.K. or the threat that this group poses to the country. This means that while the state's list does represent an example of a state creating their own independent list, the portrayal that states "put their own interests ahead of the interests of other states as well as the so-called international community." (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 54) is not apparent. Interestingly, and contrary to the expectation of groups uniting "around a set of common values and principles" (Orakhelavshvili, 2011, p. 11), it seems that there is identification with Egypt, showing a pattern of identification, but not with traditional allies such as other European states or the USA, but rather with former colonies and territories. Since some of the groups which are only referenced by the U.K. are justified due to their actions against other states it may be that only the UK views these actions as terrorism, or that it is in the U.K.'s interest to protect the government of another state, even if other states do not share this sentiment.

Out of 223 justifications 155 fell under the *Other States* category, meaning that more than half of the justification sentences that are found in the listing document produced by the U.K. government are concerned with other regions or countries outside of the U.K. and, perhaps more importantly, the U.K.'s interest is not being cited as a reason for listing the group. This shows a large degree of correspondence with the theoretical nature of international society and collective identity, as the security concern is not solely focused on the self. This means that a group such as Ajnad Misr may be only listed by the U.K., and not by the other five countries analyzed in the comparative list, for another reason than the immediate threat that the group poses to the U.K.

5.2.3 MIXED CLASSIFICATIONS

A majority of the group's justifications contained sentences that have multiple references to differing categories. This was apparent for groups that had longer justifications, especially when their described actions and locations concerned many different actors, countries, locations, and goals. An example of this is Al Murabitun, which has a justification that contains all three categories; *Other States*, since the group is active in Algeria, *General*, due to the groups global Islamic ideology, and *Self*, due to the groups being responsible for the death of British citizens. Similar classifications can be found for the Haqqani Network (HQN), which is based in Afghanistan, desires to eradicate Western influences, and is responsible for attacking British embassy staff, and ISIL, which is active in Iraq and Syria, pursues a global jihadist ideology, and facilitates the recruitment of British nationals as foreign fighters. There are usually multiple reasons that a group is listed. These examples show how complex the relationships between the listing state and the groups themselves can be. However, it should be noted that mixed justifications only appeared with all three classification types 10 times, and most concerned only two of the three classification types, with combinations containing *Self* being found the least. This shows that for most groups, the reason for justification stems from multiple sources, depending on the type of group and their goals and operational capacity, and the U.K. government has used many different areas to justify their listing. Ultimately, the category of *Self* is rarely used, and when it is, more often than not, it is used in conjunction with other sentences referring to the *Other States* and *General* categories.

5.2.4 GENERAL CLASSIFICATION

The next most prominent classification, after *Other States* concerns sentences that fall under the *General* classification. This classification was used when justification for listing a group is concerned with the groups ideologies, typically in the form anti-Western actions or calls for global-jihad, affiliation with other large terror groups, or outcry against the groups actions in a general sense without reference to other states. Few groups have been listed whose justification contains only a specific reference to this category, meaning that the existential threats “to both the units and the social order” described by Buzan, (Buzan, 2015, p. 131), have not been substantially represented. One example, Al Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI) is listed as being in Somalia and Ethiopia, yet the only other justification for its listing is that they are aligned with a global jihad ideology, the listing of this would be best explained through application of the international society framework. However, in most other cases when a group has a justification sentence that falls under this category it is only one element of the justification. Other referenced elements of the specific actions of a group are used, such as Al Gama'at al-Islamiya (GI) which is referenced as overthrow - Egyptian government, being categorized as *Other State*, and removal - Western influence, being categorized as *General*. In this way the groups listed on the U.K.'s terror list are not designated as terrorists solely due to factors related to the *General* category, rather these act as supporting facts that add to the justification as to why a specific group should be listed.

This classification is most typically found when a group has a declared ideology that seeks some type of change outside of national borders or a specific region or when a group is described as being anti-Western. Some groups have individually pledged goals of this type, and for others the anti-Western position and call for global jihad go together. Others have pledged support to larger groups that embody calls for global jihad or the establishment of a caliphate such as Al Qa'ida and ISIL. Listing these groups then resonates with the idea that “when the IS [international society] is attacked by an anti-systemic force, its self-defense mechanism, operated through its state units, should become most apparent.” (Mendelsohn, 2009, pp. 296-297) In both of these cases the British list rarely use this as a sole reason for listing a group as a terrorist organization showing that ideologies, while important for a groups identification, is not as important as the actions a group has taken to achieve their goals within this ideology. This also

shows the limitations of applying international society theory to terror lists, since the country that a group operates in, and their relationship to the listing state is more important than the ideological threat it provides the society of states.

5.2.5 SELF-CLASSIFICATION

The category of *Self* was used the least during the categorizing of sentences of the justifications, meaning that despite the neo realist expectation of self-interest and anarchy in the international system most of the justifications were concerned with other elements. Only 23 sentences can be described as referencing *Self*. Despite the fact the proposed hypothesis and neo realist theory which assumed self-interest would feature prominently, only 17 groups have at least one sentence with a reference to *Self*, showing some form of connection to the United Kingdom. One common use of this category was concerning groups that are responsible for the death, injury, or threat thereof regarding British citizens. There are 6 sentences referencing the threat, death, or injury of a British citizen in this manner. Another common justification is the group's participation in military actions against coalition forces, NATO, or Multi National Forces Iraq (MNF-I). There are also 6 sentences referencing these types of actions against military forces, which are included under the *Self* category due to the U.K.'s participation.

Interestingly, there are two sentences that reference British citizens being complicit in terror attacks linked to the terror groups. This was found in the form of a suicide bomber being a British citizen, and another in the form of recruiting British citizens as foreign fighters. Of these 17 only 4 groups are justified for inclusion on the list solely from sentences categorized as *Self*. These groups are Al Ghurabaa, Minbar Ansar Deen (Ansar al-Sharia UK), National Action, Saved Sect/ Saviour Sect. These groups are all described as being based in or operating across the United Kingdom and having a direct purpose of terrorist activities in the country, either through planning or encouraging violence, or through operating as a proxy for other terror groups outside the U.K. to receive foreign fighters and funds from Britain. These are the examples on the list that appear to be driven by the state taking care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so as described by Waltz. (Waltz, 1979)

5.2.6 GROUPS ONLY LISTED BY THE U.K.

As previously established by the Comparative List 31 groups are listed only by the UK. The justification for listing these groups was expected to be concerned with ‘self’ in some way based on neo realist expectations of self-interest. These represent some of the cases where self reference is used in the list. However, there is no indication that a group’s justification which contains *Self* is exclusive to the British list. There are some groups such as the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) which contains no reference to the *Self* category and instead only contains one reference to *Other States*. This group is not listed by any other states on the Comparative List, and therefore it is assumed that the group should be included because of self-interest of the U.K., however the only category found is *Other States* as it is based in Pakistan. So, while the U.K.’s list has the most individual listings, these listings are not necessarily centered around the U.K. and the justifications for listing these groups appear to be dispersed between the *General*, *Other States*, and *Self* categories. One particularly notable case is the group Jamaat UI-Furguan (JuF) which is only found on the British list. The justification contains references to the *Other States* category as the group is described to be promoting the destruction of India and the U.S., two other states that are both included in the Comparative List. Yet the U.S. and Indian lists both omit this group, and there is no reference to *Self* from the British list in including this group on their list. This shows a case where the United Kingdom has individually listed a group that the other states have not themselves listed, and the provided justification for listing concerns these other states that do not themselves label this group.

5.2.7 DISCUSSION

Ultimately, the In Depth Analysis does not corroborate the hypothesis and connected theory in any concrete way. As previously discussed, the expectations for the analysis of the U.K.’s proscribed terror list are not reflected in the observations of the list. While there are groups that the U.K. lists solely based on individual concerns, they do not make up a majority of the groups included on their list. In fact, very few groups are included based on this reasoning. Many more groups are included based on the actions against and concerns for other states. In light of this, it can be said that Hypothesis A, based neo realist axioms such as *raison d’état*, self-help, and anarchy, does not explain the individual listing

trend presented in this list, despite its explanatory potential for the Comparative List. While it explained the observed variation between the selected lists, the logic it utilized does not extend to the individual list. Many of the specific details concerning each of the categories used has been described above, however in general there was a preference of the *Other States* category being predominately used and most groups justification sections being mixed with *Other States* sentences forming the majority, and the *General* or *Self* references used more frequently in support.

No group is listed solely based on its *General* classification showing that location, in the form of a country or region, and where a group's actions take place is a more important element in how the U.K. views and identifies terrorist groups. In this sense, groups are being listed because they are targeting certain states, their citizens, and interests rather than simply because they are engaged in terroristic activities or because they are listed by other states or the U.N. This means that the English School idea of international society in Hypothesis B is not reflected, but rather Hypothesis C, with collective identities towards certain states. However, when an alleged terrorist group is active against the U.K., or within the borders of the U.K. in particular, they can be listed without any other justification related to other states. If no other state considers them terrorists, but the U.K. does, they will list them regardless.

In a sense, each of the three theoretical viewpoints can explain a small portion of the observations produced in the individual list analysis. The neo realist assumptions put forward in Hypothesis A can be seen in the groups that are listed due to their actions in, and against, the U.K. Yet, this does not extend to describe all the groups, and the assumptions put forward by the other two hypotheses can also be found in examples throughout the justifications. For instance, there are many cases of groups being listed due to their actions against other states, this can be seen as an example of the Constructivist expectations where the British list includes groups due to their desire to protect or assist another state that they identify with. Additionally, there are also example of groups being justified in part due to their adherence to global terror movements and general anti-government activities. In these we can see the examples of the English School's theory at work as groups are justified as being labelled terrorists based on their belief in global jihad against the world order, or their position as anti-Western. Rather

than attempt to explain all of the choices of the list within one theory, it is beneficial to apply a case by case approach to each of these terror groups justifications. Each is justified for a different reason, at different times, and therefore the theory that best explains it may be different as well, or one overarching theory may not work best.

There are several plausible explanations for the mismatch between the chosen hypothesis, selected on the basis of the findings for the overall listing pattern, and the qualitative analysis investigating justifications. This could be because groups have been listed at different times, and as such represent different forms of terrorist threats to the listing state. Here the work of Rapaport¹⁴ is once again referenced and the theory of terrorism waves can be used to view the different series of challenges that terrorist have presented governments. Some of these groups adhere to a global agenda, rather than the more state centric agenda of past terrorists. Thus some groups, particularly those who adhere to a general anti-Western or global agenda, are now being listed by more states, with the leaders of these ideologies, such as Al Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), being universally listed by all states. Since this is a relatively newer wave of terrorism, state responses to this new threat have begun to change to reflect new realities in the counter terrorism strategies that must be adopted. Other groups, that do not adhere to this type of ideology are then still being listed only by the states who they are of immediate concern. This shows that the reasons for the listing pattern could exist on the side of the, changing, phenomenon of terrorism itself and not solely the states. Meaning that newer, more global and ideologically based groups are special cases for counter terrorism, and this new threat allows states to form a different level of mutual understanding regarding this form of terrorism. This is another point of departure for future research on the topic, as there is the potential to formulate more qualitative studies across time periods and concerning how states identify with each other for counter terrorism purposes. However, a majority of listed groups are not purely ideologically driven and often have political goals in a target state, these are still listed in a highly individualized fashion by the listing states.

¹⁴ Rapoport, D. C. (2004). *The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism* (See Bibliography)

Another potential reason is that groups have different goals, and these are reflected in how the U.K. has responded to them. This study has been primarily from the state centric viewpoint and has not incorporated the vast number of different goals and groups types that exist around the world. As such it treated terrorists uniformly, as terrorist groups, however differences in characteristics may explain how states react. In this way, each group may be listed due to unique justifications that suite the time, ideology, location, and actions of the group, therefore no one theory could necessarily attempt to capture the reasoning across the entire list, at the level of individual states, especially since groups have been added to the list during different years and governments. This would mean that the list itself must not be observed as a uniform, static document. The motivations for listing groups can span different areas from self-security, protection of other states, political decision making, and so on. Additionally,

This is not to say that nothing can be said, a neo realist theoretical lens still explains the overall listing observations among states. This is important to note because no other hypothetical expectation provided an explanation of the observed variation in any significant sense at the level that Hypothesis A has. However, even though it has not explained the justifications in the individual listing of the British list it does not mean that this hypothesis is no longer relevant. One important consideration is that while references to *Self* may not have been used in a majority of the group justifications, the inclusion of certain groups can still be due to the self-interest of the United Kingdom, even if it is not explicitly referenced in the documentation. For instance, it may be in British interests to target terror groups that can destabilize certain governments. On the outward appearance it would seem that the British government is trying to protect these other states, however there is really an element of self to the motivation to do so because of non-stated interests in keeping that government secure. This means that further qualitative research is needed, particularly at the individual state level. The neo realist Hypothesis A explains the observations of the Comparative List, however it does not fully explain the observation of the individual list analysis. The explanations of the individual theoretical justification for including groups on a state list remains as a potential starting point for additional attempts at connecting external theories into terrorism listing research.

6. CONCLUSION

This research set out to examine the potential for using international relations theory to explain variation between the listing regimes created by states. The goal has been to examine the variation between the listing regimes and how this variation can be explained. In other words, what explains the variation in the listings? In order to answer this question, three alternative hypotheses are put forward, each of them grounded in a particular theoretical tradition that provide differing explanations for the actions of states in the international system. These were then assessed to measure their relative explanatory potential against observations of the state terror lists. Generally speaking, the analysis has provided noteworthy results in the form of imbedding international relations theory perspectives from Realism, the English School, and Constructivism into a discussion of state counter terrorism strategies. Additionally, the analysis proposes that for certain elements of understanding state listing regimes, particularly of how they are compared to other states lists, a neo realist viewpoint can offer insight.

The examination was carried out in two different steps. Three different hypotheses, all based in relevant theoretical literature, were developed in an attempt to explain the possible levels of variation in the listing patterns between states. For Step 1, establishing an overall pattern among state terror lists, a comparative list was made to observe the potential variation between five state's lists and to determine which hypothesis best matched the observed variation between lists. The lists selected for this were officially published by the governments of Australia, Russia, India, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Based on the observations made regarding the comparative list, the hypothesis with the highest degree of explanatory power was selected. In this case it was Hypothesis A which articulated that states lists would reflect a high degree of individuality based on the assumptions from the Neo Realist view on International Relations. This best explains the observed level of variation among the lists and provides a theoretical framework for understanding state terror lists. The other two hypotheses, one assuming that states would work together to protect the international society of states, established by the English School, and another positing that states lists would show groupings of states based on collective identity formation based around Constructivism, did not match to such a high degree.

The process of finding and detailing the level of variation among state lists was successful. After compiling and analyzing the five state's terror lists an observable trend was apparent and a corresponding hypothesis was selected. The individual lists were formatted and placed in a Comparative List (Appendix 1) that shows the groups and the listing states. Based on the observations of these five state lists, there is a high degree of individuality concerning listing patterns. While there are some groups that are universally listed by all countries, the trend developed that groups are more likely to be listed by fewer states. Overall a group is most likely to be listed by a single state. This is a Neo Realist premise, therefore, the overall pattern seems to correspond most closely to Hypothesis A. This occurred throughout the analysis and is observable between all five states, as well as between members of collective security arrangements such as NATO. Additionally, when viewing the three states that had the most similar lists there was still an apparent level of individuality for each state list. Only three groups are listed universally by all five states, and some are listed by combinations of 2,3, or 4 states. More significantly, most groups appear on only one state's list. Due to these factors it was observed that the state's lists have significant levels of variations, and despite the relationships between the states themselves, there remains a high level of individuality when it comes to creating their lists. These observations are most explained by Hypothesis A, offering a Neo Realist view, which contained the most explanatory potential among the three hypothesis for explaining the observed variation among the listing patterns.

Then for Step 2, the in depth analysis of the list that provided the best case for the hypothesis, the list which provided the best example of Hypothesis A in action was selected to be further analyzed. This list, which correspondingly was the U.K.'s proscribed terror organization list, was examined using content analysis to qualitatively determine whether the justification's given for including groups on the list matched the hypothetical and theoretical expectations established by Hypothesis A. This was accomplished by using content analysis on the provided justification for placing a group on the terror list. The content analysis frame concerned issues of referencing other states, self, and general references. These categories have been covered in greater detail in the previous sections, however the general aim was to provide a clear indication of the subject of the justification for including a group on the list to see if it aligned with the hypothesis' expectations of being self-focused and concerned with national interests or security. The

goal of this was to verify if the hypothesis selected based on the initial observations, held true to the individual level state list analysis.

The analysis of step 2, which focused on examining one list that most closely emulated the observations from step 1, however showed that if analyzed qualitatively, the motivations of the listing pattern do not correspond with what the theory initially lead us to expect. In fact, the results of this analysis indicate that while the U.K. is most representative of the hypothesis among a comparative list of states, the justifications that follows within the listing document do not match the reasons that the hypothesis is based upon. Upon a detailed analysis of the content of the U.K.'s list it has been determined that the assumption that the British list is individual and distinct from other lists due solely to self-interest is not sufficient in explaining the individual listing pattern. This could be because the justifications do not represent the real motivation and that the 'true' motivation can be derived from the pattern and observed behavior. Many of the groups that are listed solely by the United Kingdom are not justified due to any apparent connection to the British state, it's citizens, or their security.

Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the list is primarily concerned with the actions of groups in other countries, operating outside of the United Kingdom, that target other states citizens. This is particularly relevant since many of the groups included on the British list do not themselves declare that the United Kingdom is included in their goals or ambitions. While there are some groups listed due to their belief in global jihad, or anti-Western movements, a striking number are listed who have a primary focus on challenging a regime in another country. The justification provided by the British government for including such groups does not identify any connection to the British state, citizens, or interests for most of these groups, thus the assumption based upon neo realist principles of international relations theory do not fully explain the results of this individual list. Upon analysis, the individual list shows a higher degree of concern for the terror threat posed to other states than was initially assumed due to the hypothetical indications.

This means that, while it is possible to observe variation and establish patterns among the lists generally and explain the variation on a comparative level, the reasons for these lists being individually different is still subject to debate, since multiple elements of the neo realist, English school, and constructivist theories were present in the motivations for

listing. The neo realist perspective explains the observation that the lists will be different from each other because each state is different and has different goals, i.e. each has their own survival and security at heart and it explains the pattern at the systemic level. However, upon a closer inspection of an individual list this does not appear to be the case, since the U.K.'s list does not reflect a large amount of self-references when justifying groups. Rather, the U.K.'s list reflects a variety of positions within the justifications and the tendency is to reference other states. This lends itself to a more Constructivist understanding of international relations, as Hypothesis C proposed. In this sense, the U.K.'s list in particular presents a conundrum. When compared against a grouping of state lists it provides an excellent example of the neo realist based hypothesis, yet when it is closely analyzed it offers connections to other theoretical viewpoints as well. A reason for this may be that these International Relations theories are designed to explain the big picture and are not best for determining a particular state's policy at any given moment in time. To this end, while one of the theories provides insight into the differences between state's terror lists, no one hypothesis fully explains the justifications that contribute to an individual group's listing and the comparative list simultaneously. In order to go to the state level, further research is required on the individual lists, using other theories or approaches that cater to analyzing the actions and choices of individual states.

The second step of analysis brought into view the complexities of applying theories to the motivation and justification for an individual state's listing regime. Even though it did not substantiate the proposed hypothesis and theory, the work conducted for the theory testing yielded interesting results. Firstly, there has been an attempt to bridge the gap in the literature and theory concerning terrorism studies, and more specifically how states understand counter terrorism. The system-level theories from the English School, Constructivism, and Realism have all been incorporated into understanding how state terror lists should operate. Additionally, one of these theories, neo realism, has subsequently provides some level of explanatory potential for the observed variations among the lists. Yet, the hypothesis derived from this theory does not fully explain the content of a list itself.

This research has laid the groundwork for further examinations of state terror lists and the motivations for including, or potentially not including, terror groups on official listing regimes. Further research can be carried out that attempts to connect theories to the justifications of the individual state lists. Ideally, a larger study based on the design established in this paper could examine the justifications from multiple state lists in order to establish a more substantial theoretical connection. Alternatively, different theories of international relations can be applied within the same framework that has been used to test Neo Realism, the English School, and Constructivist ideas. In a sense this can be repeated with different hypotheses based on theories from many different disciplines in order to seek the theory with the highest level of explanatory power for both steps.

Terror listing regimes, while highly relevant for contemporary international politics, remains an area in demand of further investigation, and theorizing in particular. In this study, initial steps were made, but more remains to be done. Despite the intricacies terrorism poses to any attempt at theorizing, I still encourage further research along these lines, especially for International Relations and Terrorism studies to enter into more collaboration. For terrorism, to theorize better state response in a (still) largely state-centric world. For International Relations to, include, and gain analytical grip, on terrorism and how terrorism shapes dynamics of contemporary international relations.

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8. APPENDICES

8.1 APPENDIX 1: COMPARATIVE LIST

Individual Lists Sources:

Australia: <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx>

United Kingdom: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2>

Russia: <http://en.nac.gov.ru/unified-federal-list-organizations-including-foreign-and-international-designated-terrorist-courts.html>

India: <http://mha.nic.in/BO>

United States: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>

Comprehensive List: Times Listed				
1 Time	2 Times	3 Times	4 Times	5 Times (All States)
98	27	14	4	3
67.10%	18.50%	9.60%	2.70%	2.10%
3 State (here meaning AUS, U.S.A, and the U.K.) Times Listed:				
1 Time	2 Times	3 Times (All States)		
59	25	17	Totals 101	
58.40%	24.80%	16.80%		
NATO				
1 Time	2 Times (Both States)			
65	36		Totals 101	
64.40%	35.60%			

Comparative List:

Group Names	AUS	RF	IND	U.S.A.	U.K.
17 November Revolutionary Organisation (N17)					✓
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)				✓	✓
Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)				✓	✓
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	✓			✓	✓
Akhil Bharat Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES)			✓		
Al Badr			✓		
Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)				✓	
All Tripura Tiger Force			✓		
Al Mulathamun Battalion				✓	
Ajnad Misr					✓
Al Gama'at al-Islamiya (GI)		✓			✓
Al Ghurabaa					✓
Al Haramain		✓			
Al Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI)					✓
Al Murabitun	✓				✓
Al Nusrah Front (Jabhat al-Nusra)	✓	✓		✓	✓

Al Qaida (AQ)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent	✓			✓	
Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	✓			✓	
Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	✓	✓		✓	
Al Shabaab	✓			✓	✓
Al Umar-Mujahideen			✓		
Ansar al Dine (AAD)				✓	
Ansar al Islam (AAI)	✓			✓	✓
Ansar al Shari'a in Benghazi				✓	✓
Ansar al Shari'a in Darnah				✓	
Ansar al Shari'a in Tunisia				✓	✓
Ansar al Sunna (AS)					✓
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM)					✓
Ansaru				✓	✓
Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armée) (GIA)					✓
Army of Islam (AOI)				✓	
Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)		✓		✓	✓
Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)				✓	
Autonomous combat terrorist organization (ACTO)		✓			
Babbar Khalsa (BK)			✓		✓
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)				✓	✓
Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)					✓
Boko Haram	✓			✓	✓
Communist Party of India (Maoist)			✓		
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) -- People's War			✓		
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)				✓	
Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan		✓			
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)				✓	
Deendar Anjuman			✓		
Dukhtaran-E-Millat (DEM)			✓		
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)		✓			✓
Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) (IG)		✓		✓	
Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA)			✓		
Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) including GIMF Banlga Team					✓
Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM)					✓
HAMAS				✓	
Hamas Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades	✓			✓	✓
Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (Bangladesh) (HUJI-B)				✓	✓
Harakat-ul-Mujahideen/Alami (HuM/A))					✓
Harakat Mujahideen (HM) (a.k.a. Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harakat-ul-Ansar)	✓		✓	✓	✓
Haqqani Network (HQN)				✓	✓
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)				✓	✓
Hizballah				✓	
Hizballah's External Security Organisation (ESO)	✓			✓	✓
Hizballah Military Wing				✓	✓

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen/ Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Pir Panjal Regiment			✓		
Hizb ut-Tahrir		✓			
Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)					✓
Imarat Kavkaz (IK) (The Caucasus Emirate)		✓			✓
Indian Mujahideen (IM)			✓	✓	✓
International Sikh Youth Federation			✓		
Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)					✓
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)				✓	✓
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	✓	✓		✓	✓
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K)				✓	
ISIL's Branch in Libya (ISIL-Libya)	✓			✓	
ISIL Sinai Province	✓			✓	
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)	✓		✓	✓	✓
Jamaah Anshorut Daulah					✓
Jamaat ul-Ahrar (JuA)					✓
Jamaat-e-Islami		✓			
Jammat Mujahideen		✓			
Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)					✓
Jamaat Ul-Furquan (JuF)					✓
Jamiat Ihya at-Turaz al-Islami (The Revival of Islamic Heritage Society)		✓			
Jamiat al-Islah al-Idzhtimai (The Social Reform Society)		✓			
Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen			✓		
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front			✓		
Jaysh al Khalifatu Islamiya (JKI)					✓
Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi (JRTN)				✓	
Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)				✓	
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	✓			✓	✓
Jundallah				✓	✓
Jund al-Aqsa (JAA) which translates as "Soldiers of al-Aqsa"					✓
Jund al Khalifa-Algeria (JaK-A) which translates as Soldiers of the Caliphate					✓
Jund al-Sham (The Force of Greater Syria)		✓			
Kahane Chai (Kach)				✓	
Kamatapur Liberation Organization			✓		
Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup (KYKL)			✓		
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)			✓		
Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)				✓	
Kateeba al-Kawthar (KaK) also known as 'Ajnad al-sham' and 'Junud ar-Rahman alMuhajireen'					✓
Khalistan Commando Force			✓		
Khalistan Zindabad Force			✓		
Khuddam Ul-Islam (Kul)					✓
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)	✓			✓	✓
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) (Lashkar e Jhangvi)	✓			✓	✓
Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) or Lashkar-e-Taiba	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)			✓	✓	✓

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)					✓
Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF)			✓		
Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)			✓		
Minbar Ansar Deen (also known as Ansar al-Sharia UK)					✓
The Minin and Pozharsky Public Militia Movement		✓			
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) which translates as Mujahideen of Eastern Indonesia					✓
Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)				✓	
Muslim Brotherhood		✓			
National Action					✓
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) in Assam			✓		
National Liberation Army (ELN)				✓	
National Liberation Front of Tripura			✓		
National Socialist Council of Nagaland, NSCN (K)			✓		
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)				✓	
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	✓			✓	✓
People's Liberation Army (PLA)			✓		
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)			✓		
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF)				✓	
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)				✓	✓
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)				✓	
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)				✓	
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)				✓	✓
Revolutionary Struggle (RS)				✓	
Right Sector (a structural subdivision of the organization in the Republic of Crimea)		✓			
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)					✓
Saved Sect or Saviour Sect					✓
Shining Path (SL)				✓	
Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)					✓
Students Islamic Movement of India			✓		
The Supreme Military Majlis ul-Shura of the United Mujahideen Forces of the Caucasus		✓			
The Taliban		✓			
Tamil Nadu Liberation Army (TNLA)			✓		
Tamil National Retrieval Troops (TNRT)			✓		
Tehrik Nefaz-e Shari'at Muhammadi (TNSM)				✓	✓
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)				✓	✓
Teyre Azadiye Kurdistan (TAK)					✓
Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP)		✓			✓
Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C)					✓
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)			✓		
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)			✓		

8.2 APPENDIX 2: CONTENT ANALYSIS FORM

Content Analysis Form

	Group Name	Sentence	Key Words	Classification
1	17 November Revolutionary Organisation (N17)			
		2	oppose - Greek military; anti-US	Other States
2	Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)			
		1	aligned with - global jihad movement;	General
		1	fighting in - Syria and Lebanon	Other States
		2	Operating - Pakistan	Other States
		4	attack, into - Israel	Other States
		5	bombing - Iranian embassy; in - Beirut	Other States
		6	bombings - Iranian cultural center; in - Beirut; revenge for actions by - Iran, Hizballah	Other States
		7	threatened, demanded - Lebanese Government	Other States
		7	threatened attacks - Western targets	General
3	Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)			
		1	destruction - Israel	Other States
		2	hostile - 'reactionary' Arab regimes, states supporting Israel	Other States
4	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)			
		1	in - Southern Phillipine island of Mindanao	Other States
5	Ajnad Misr			
		1	based in - Egypt	Other States
		2	protect - Egyptian muslims	Other States
		2	avenge, abuse by - Egyptian security services	Other States
		3	attacked - Egyptian checkpoint	Other States
		4	attacks - Egyptian security forces	Other States
		6	attacks - Greater Cairo	Other States
		7	bombing - Cairo University	Other States
6	Al Gama'at al-Islamiya (GI)			
		1	overthrow - Egyptian government	Other States
		2	removal - Western influence	General
7	Al Ghurabaa			
		2	emerged, in - U.K.	Self

		4	based, operates within - U.K.	Self
8	Al Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI)			
		1	establish, in - Somalia; regain - Ogaden region of Ethiopia	Other States
		2	aligned themselves with - 'global jihad' ideology	General
9	Al Murabitun			
		1	active in - Mali, Algeria	Other States
		3	unite Muslims - 'Nile to the Atlantic'	General
		5	death of - over thirty people including Britons	Self
		6	targeted - uranium mine (supplies French reactors)	Other States
		8	fight, in - Mali, West Africa	Other States
10	Al Qaida (AQ)			
		1	destruction - Israel	Other States
		1	expulsion of - Western forces from Saudi Arabia; end - Western influence in the Muslim world	General
11	Al Shabaab			
		1	based in - Somalia	Other States
		1	campaign against - Somali transitional Federal Government and African Union	Other States
		2	in -Somalia	Other States
		2	intention - global jihad	General
12	Ansar AL Islam			
		1	from - Iraq	Other States
		2	anti - Western	General
		2	opposes - US, Washington	Other States
		3	operations against - Multinational Forces - Iraq (MNF-I)	Self
		3	operations against - Multinational Forces - Iraq (MNF-I)	Other States
13	Ansar al-Sharia-Benghazi (AAS-B)			
		1	anti - Western	General
		4	attacks - civilian targets; in - eastern Libya	Other States
		5	attack against - US special mission; killing - US ambassador, 3 Americans	Other States
		8	denounce - American military forces	Other States
		9	attack - US diplomatic compound	Other States
		10	threat to - Libya	Other States

		10	threat to -Western interests	General
		11	US designated - AAS-B	Other States
		11	UN listed - AAS-B	General
14	Ansar AL Sharia-Tunisia (AAS-T)			
		2	In- Tunisia	Other States
		2	eliminate - Western influence	General
		6	attack - US Embassy	Other States
		8	attacks on - US Embassy and American School; in - Tunis	Other States
		9	assasination - National Coalition Assembly members	Other States
		10	in - Sousse	Other States
		10	attempted, attack - British tourists	Self
15	Ansar AL Sunna (AS)			
		1	based in - Iraq, Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ)	Other States
		2	expel - all foreign influences from Iraq	Other States
		2	expel - all foreign influences from Iraq	Self
16	Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis			
		1	based in - Sinai region of Egypt	Other States
		3	attacks on - Egyptian security forces; in - Egypt	Other States
		5	attacks in - Cairo; against - Israel	Other States
		8	attack - Egyptian Interior Minister	Other States
		8	UK national - injured	Self
		9	attack in - Mamsoura	Other States
		10	South Koreans, Egyptian - died	Other States
17	Ansaru			
		1	based in - Nigeria	Other States
		2	anti - Nigerian Government	Other States
		2	anti - Western agenda	General
18	Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armée) (GIA)			
		1	in - Algeria	Other States
19	Asbat Al-Ansar			
		1	within - Lebanon	Other States
20	Babbar Khalsa (BK)			
		1	within - Punjab region of India	Other States

21	Basque Homeland and Liberty (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) (ETA)			
		1	in - Spain and France	Other States
22	Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)			
		1	based in - Eastern Pakistan	Other States
23	Boko Haram (BH)			
		1	based in - Nigeria	Other States
		1	targeted - Nigerian society	Other States
24	Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)			
		1	overthrow - Egyptian government	Other States
		2	allied itself to - 'global jihad'; threatened - Western interests	General
25	Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) including GIMF Banlga Team			
		1	around - the world	General
		5	murders - Bangladeshi-American	Other States
		6	hit list of individuals - Britain	Self
		6	hit list of individuals - Germany, America, Canada, Sweden	Other States
26	Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM)			
		1	replace - Moroccan monarchy	Other States
		2	global - extremist agenda	General
27	Hamas Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades			
		1	end - Israeli occupation; in - Palestine	Other States
28	Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)			
		1	accession of - Kashmir to Pakistan; spread terror - throughout India	Other States
		2	targeted - Indian security position; in - Kashmir; in - India proper	Other States
29	Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (Bangladesh) (HUJI-B)			
		1	in - Bangladesh	Other States
30	Harakat-ul-Mujahideen/Alami (HuM/A) (and Jundallah)			
		1	rejection of - democracy	General
		1	accession of - Kashmir to Pakistan	Other States

		2	anti - western	General
		2	anti - President Musharraf	Other States
31	Harakat Mujahideen (HM)			
		1	independence for - Indian-administered Kashmir	Other States
		2	attacks against - US	Other States
		2	attacks against - Western interests	General
32	Haqqani Network (HQN)			
		1	in - Afghanistan	Other States
		2	eradicate - Western influence; disrupt western military, political efforts	General
		3	Demanding US forces - withdraw	Other States
		3	Demanding Coalition Forces - withdraw	Self
		8	attack against - British Embassy vehicle; killed - UK national; killed - UK Embassy staff	Self
		9	target Kabul due to - UK interests	Self
		9	target Kabul due to - Western interests	General
		10	banned by - USA, Canada	Other States
		10	banned by - UN	General
33	Hizballah Military Wing			
		1	armed resistance - state of Israel; seize - Palestinian territories and Jerusalem; from - Israel	Other States
		2	supports - terrorism; in - Iraq, Palestinian territories	Other States
34	Hezb-E islami Gulbuddin (HIG)			
		1	anti - American	Other States
		1	anti - Western	General
35	Imarat Kavkaz (IK) (aka Caucasus Emirate)			
		1	across - North Caucasus	Other States
		2	attacks against - Russian state and civilians	Other States
		3	attack on - Domedodevo airport in Moscow; suicide attack - Moscow Metro	Other States
		3	killed - British National	Self
		4	terrorist activity in - Russia	Other States
36	Indian Mujahideen (IM)			
		1	establish - Islamic State; in - India	Other States

37	Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)			
		1	overthrow - Yemeni government	Other States
38	Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)			
		1	elimination - Uzbek regime	Other States
39	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)			
		1	establish - Islamic state; in - Uzbekistan	Other States
		2	over entire - Turkestan area	Other States
40	ISIL/ ISIS/ DAISH			
		1	active in - Iraq, Syria	Other States
		2	global - jihadist ideology; anti - western	General
		3	establish - Islamic state; in - the region; impose - rule; on - people	Other States
		7	poses a threat within - Syria; advances in - Iraq	Other States
		8	threat in - Iraq, Syria	Other States
		9	British nationals - fighting with ISIL	Self
		10	treating Iraq and Syria - theater of conflict	Other States
		10	operate - across border; cause - concern for whole international community	General
		11	series of blasts - in Baghdad	Other States
		13	Thousands of Iraqi civilians - lost their lives; ISIL have accounted - for a large portion of these deaths	Other States
		14	detained - foreign journalists and aid workers	General
		16	captured - Ramadi, Fallujah; fighting - Iraqi security forces	Other States
		17	car bomb - in Southern Beirut	Other States
		18	presence in - northern and eastern Syria	Other States
		19	responsible - numerous attacks and a vast number of deaths	General
		20	attract foreign fighters - including Westerners	General
		21	Maintained control - towns Syrian/ Turkish border	Other States
		21	interfered - free flow of humanitarian aid	General
41	Jaish e Mohammed (JeM) and Khuddam Ul-Islam (Kul)			

		1	Liberation - of Kashmir from Indian control; Descruction of - America and India	Other States
		2	Unifying - kashmiri militant groups	Other States
42	Jamaah Anshorut Daulah			
		1	merger of - Indonesian extremist	Other States
		2	recruits fighters in - Syria	Other States
		3	close ties - Daesh	General
		5	responsible - Bali attacks	Other States
		6	attack - Sarinah Mall in Jakarta	Other States
43	Jamaat ul-Ahrar (JuA)			
		2	establish Islamic caliphate in - Pakistan; to - indian subcontinent	Other States
		2	entend - global jihad	General
		3	grenade attack on - Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM); In Karachi; Killed - members of Sindh assembly; twin bombing targeting - volunteers	Other States
		4	attack on - Pakistan side of Wagah border crossing	Other States
		5	criticising - British government; treat Muslims in - Britain	Self
		6	fatal attacks on - Christian sites; in - Lahore	Other States
44	Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)			
		2	fatal - bomb attacks; across - Bangladesh	Other States
45	Jamaat UI-Furguan (JuF)			
		1	unite Indian administered Kashmir with - Pakistan; establish - Islamic state in Pakistan; destruction of - India, USA; recruit - jihadis; release - Kashmiri militarnts	Other States
46	Jaysh al Khalifatu Islamiya (JKI)			
		2	active in - Syria	Other States
		6	assisted - ANF, ISIL	General
		7	British individuals - carried out suicide attack	Self
		7	in -Aleppo	Other States
47	Jeemah Islamiyah (JI)			
		1	in - Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Souther Philippines	Other States
48	Jund al-Aqsa (JAA)			

		1	active in - Syria; against - Syrian government	Other States
		3	operating in - Idlib and Hama	Other States
		4	attack in - Maan village	Other States
		6	seize - Hama airport	Other States
		7	attack that targeted - resort hotel	General
49	Jund al Khalifa-Algeria (JaK-A)			
		2	allegiance to - ISIL	General
		3	ambush - convoy; killed 11 members - Algerian army	Other States
		4	beheaded - French national	Other States
		5	target - Western citizens	General
		5	target - Americans, French	Other States
50	Kateeba al-Kawthar (KaK)			
		1	from - more than 20 countries; seeking - just Islamic Nation	General
		2	fighting in - Syria	Other States
		3	aligned to - extreme groups & Al Qa'ida	General
		4	Western - Mujaadid commander	General
		5	attract - Western foreign fighters	General
51	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)			
		1	in - southeast Turkey	Other States
52	Laskar e Tayyaba (LT)			
		1	seeks - independence for Kashmir; creation of - Islamic state	Other States
53	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE)			
		1	in - North and East of Sri Lanka	Other States
54	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)			
		1	replace - Libyan regime	Other States
		2	part of - global Islamist extremist movement	General
		3	mounted operations - inside Libya; attempt to assassinate - Qadhafi	Other States
55	Minbar Ansar Deen (Ansar al-Sharia UK)			
		1	based in - UK; promotes and encourages - terrorism	Self
56	Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT)			

		1	based in - Poso, in Central Sulawesi	Other States
		2	leader- indonesia's most wanted terrorists	Other States
		3	attack - police and army	Other States
		4	Responsible - deaths of police officers; in - Poso	Other States
		5	Kidnapping, beheading - Christian farmers; in -Poso	Other States
		6	pledged its allegiance - to Daesh	General
		7	threatened attacks - across the country	Other States
57	National Action			
		2	across - UK	Self
		5	promotes idea that - Britain will see violent 'race war'	Self
		6	hostile - British state, rejects - democracy; endorsing - violence against ethnic minorities	Self
58	Palestinian Islamic Jihad - Shaqaqi (PIJ)			
		1	end - Israeli occupation of Palestine; create - Islamic state	Other States
		2	opposes - existence of the State of Israel, Middle East peace process, and Palestinian Authority, bombings - Israeli targets	Other States
59	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)			
		2	based in - Syria; involved with - Palestine intifada	Other States
		5	fighting in - Syrian War; support - Assad	Other States
		6	in support of - Syrian government, Hizballah, and Iran	Other States
60	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party - Front			
		1	in - Turkey	Other States
61	Salafist Group for Call and Combat			
		1	in - Algeria	Other States
62	Saved Sect/ Saviour Sect			
		2	in the - UK	Self
		4	based and operates within - UK	Self
63	Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)			

		1	transform - Pakistan	Other States
		2	destruction of other religions - Judiasm, Christianity, and Hinduism	General
64	Tehrik Nefaz-e Sharia'at Muhammadi (TNSM)			
		1	attacks - coalition	Self
		1	attacks - Afghan forces; in-Afghanistan	Other States
		1	support to - Al Qa'ida, Taliban	General
		2	suicide attack - army comound; in - pakistan; killing - 42 soldiers	Other States
65	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)			
		1	in - Pakistan, Afghanistan	Other States
		2	resistance against - Pakistani army	Other States
		2	removal - NATO forces from Afghanistan	Self
		3	attacks in - the west	General
		3	attempted - Times Square car-bomb	Other States
66	Teyre Azadiye Kurdistan (TAK)			
		1	operating in - Turkey	Other States
67	Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP)			
		1	in -Western China	Other States
		3	based in - Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan; operates in - China, central and asouth Asia, Syria	Other States
		4	attacks in - China	Other States
		5	links to - Al Qa'ida	General
		6	jihad against - Chinese authorities	Other States
		8	presence in - Syrian war	Other States
		11	in - Syria	Other States
		13	banned by - UN	General
		13	sanctioned by - USA	Other States
68	Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisis-Cephesi (THKP-C)			
		2	grew out of - Turkish extreme left movements	Other States
		3	fighting in - Syria	Other States
		4	attack in - Reyhanli, Turkey	Other States
		5	prominent in - Southern province of Hatay	Other States
		6	responsible for - Banias Massacre	Other states

8.3 APPENDIX 3: NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE

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
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