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**Ideology vs. interests: are the radical right-wing populists
the voice of the people?**


Case of Austria and Hungary

MA Thesis

Supervisor: Stefano Braghioli

Tartu 2020

I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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Abstract:

The main objective of this thesis is to find out whether selected populist radical right-wing parties (PRRPs) truly represent the electorate, their demands and voices, or is it their merely political-strategic rhetoric that encourages positions in which politics is driven by fear. And which accounts for the political processes of framing domains of anti-immigration. The research is seeking to examine, whether the populist radical right-wing parties in Austria (FPÖ) and Hungary (Fidesz) are in practice representing the people, or is it just an illusion created by them, that they address all real-life matters, salient for the society while endeavouring to gain political success.

This research will examine politics of fear as the strategic rhetoric tool for selected PRRPs and it will detect what are the issues PRRPs address in their pre-electoral speeches and how the rhetoric has changed through the recent years. On the other hand, the research will measure the social grievances by observing the electorates' opinions and issues they have been concerned about. The latter and its transformation will be compared to the speeches of PRR politicians and the main topics they are focusing on. This will help to demonstrate the match/mismatch, between the selected PRRPs' rhetoric, showing what they consider to be most important for the society, and the real-life grievances society actually has.

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Chapter 1.

INTRODUCTION

For centuries, a number of political powers have tried to label themselves as representatives of and fighters for *volonté générale* (general will), yet it has always been challenging. However, in contemporary politics, we witness the rise of new powers- Radical right-wing populist - that claim to be the true voice of the ‘pure people’ (Mudde, 2004) and real representatives of the electorate. Nevertheless, this research deems necessary to challenge the described self-understanding of radical right-wing parties and to test if their claim that they are expressing the general will of the people is valid. Populism, in general, has many facets, this research examines specifically the relationship of the electorate and populist radical right parties (PRRPs) (Mudde, 2016) and how they affect each other if they do so. The research analyses a number of existing literature, and examines Austrian and Hungarian radical right-wing parties- Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) and Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which played significant roles in encouraging the radical right-wing anti-immigration and nativist attitudes in the electorate. As for the case selection on which we will further elaborate on, it is important to underline an interesting observation of a number of scholars, according to whom in Western Europe and in recent years rather intensively and increasingly in Eastern Europe as well, the radical right-wing parties’ political rhetoric has been heavily dominated by the issues such as, immigration and refugee (Rydgren 2017; Bustikova 2017). In the times of the refugee crisis, selected PRRPs in their pre-electoral campaigns argue to address all the salient social and political issues, especially immigration and ... consequences, which worries people, and have not been faced by established political powers. Therefore, our Research Question (RQ) will be: To what extent are

the salient social grievances converging with the party rhetoric of the self-claimed representatives of the people, and what is its impact on the rise of PRRPs?

The mentioned relationship and influence of PRRPs and electorate on each other is especially interesting in the light of the refugee crisis 2015. The European refugee crisis is often described as the cause of the rise of PRRP; however, we do believe that the core determinants of the success of the PRRP in both countries' cases are more deep-rooted. Nevertheless, the crisis was one of the turning points in the history of success of PRRP. The public and academic discussion about the refugee inflow and its role in the increase of radical mainstream attitudes almost inevitably generate considerable heat. There are many studies conducted on the influx of refugees in Europe and radical right-wing populism as its probable legacy (Lansford, 2017), and yet, the scholars frequently diverge in their thinking on even the most critical questions related to those topics. Given the interest and importance of these recent highly influential events, especially to the people who support and/or encourage the radical attitudes in the society, it is necessary to examine the topic on a deeper and sufficient level, by covering not only the PRRPs but also the people's attitudes and try to contribute to the existing analysis. The question is not whether the refugee crisis influenced the success of PRRP at all or not. What seems to matter more, is if the 'politics of fear' (Wodak, 2015) as the strategic rhetoric tool for PRRPs and its focus on the anti-immigrant topics that represents one of the winning formulas for radical right-wing populists', have been an answer to actual real-life concerns and needs of Austrian and Hungarian societies.

Populism, as mentioned, by its nature, is an ambivalent concept, many scholars diverge on its definition from each other and offer various explanations of the cause, nature, and outcome. For some, it is a reaction to 'hot issues' like immigration, homeland, culture, and other social or politically significant events (Wodak, 2015). Meanwhile, others believe that populism and the 'populist moment' itself is a reflection of the economic and socially weak transformations that had been taking

place in the country for years (Mouffe, 2018). Thus, it is no surprise that populism is considered as ‘one of the main political buzzwords of the 21st century’ (Mudde, 2017).

Recent years have shown that the migration topic has become a rather important part of the populism discussion and particularly its radical right form. European societies had always been a shelter and home to millions of migrants, but their number significantly increased during the refugee crisis, and it is still on the rise. This social change is portrayed by radical right-wing populist parties as the cause of social grievances and current woes, therefore, as an undesired event (Wodak, 2015). On the other hand, mainly this politics and attitude of theirs define their current success and increased popularity. Their appeal meaningfully rests on their cultural agenda (Lochocki, 2018) which includes anti-immigration and anti-Islamization politics. Therefore, the object of the fight for populism, and to be exact its radical right-wing form, has changed its face and as Pelinka says it ‘does not so much mobilize against the (perceived) enemy above but more against the (perceived) enemy from abroad. Populism has become more and more ethno-nationalistic’ (2013). The thesis is driven by the concern that ‘politics of fear,’ which enables PRR to instrumentalise any kind of minority as the scapegoats for all the social-political challenges, subsequently will define the future of Europe and will normalize the nationalistic, xenophobic, racist rhetoric in its societies.

The overall policy objective of PRRPs, according to their claim, is to keep the nation as ethnically homogenous as possible and to safeguard the nation’s majority culture (Rydgren 2017). One of their main characteristics of PRRPs along with the ethnic nationalism is an exclusionary attitude towards immigrants and – to varying degrees – towards minorities (ethnic/racial), which is often demonstrated in xenophobia and sometimes racism. Therefore, it is no surprise, that PRR politicians in their pre-electoral speeches, in this times of refugee inflow, claim that they represent the ‘real’ voice of the people and that they apprehend themselves as

'guards of the interests of the ordinary people on the streets' (Hellström; Nilsson, 2010). The research seeks to study both, sides of the riddle- 'Supply Side' (Lochochki, 2018) and the 'Demand Side', which enables me to examine two sides of the problem: on the one hand, the political atmosphere of the state where PRRPs have benefited mostly from migration topic and have created the 'supply-side', which is based on the fear. And on the other hand, the 'demand-side', which is an indicator of social grievances. As for the supply-side, we will study political rhetoric of PRRPs in the pre-electoral period, manifested in the usage of Politics of Fear, of PRRPs and the demand side, will cover the real-life needs of the societies manifested as Social Grievances. In this research, I intend to focus on two PRRPs in two countries Austria and Hungary and question their representative politics, manifested in the official pre-electoral public speeches made by their leaders. I examine the mentioned speeches of key members and leaders of Fidesz and the FPÖ (Orban and H.C. Strache) using qualitative discourse analysis since I am interested in what the meanings and purposes of the speeches are. The paper is based on the idea that 'It is a political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust' (Huysmans, 2006) but the questions like who posed the real or imagined threat to society and whether the mentioned social distrust was referring to the migrants, or the established parties, still remain. Therefore, it is primary research that seeks to contribute to our understanding of political and social dynamics.

The first variable of this thesis is Politics of Fear as strategic political rhetoric, which gives space to radical right wings for political manoeuvrings, managing to spread fear and trigger feelings of frustration among the people. It is important to underline that we focus specifically on pre-electoral rhetoric of selected PRRPs (instead of their rhetoric in general), in order to look at its impact on public opinion. This is especially important in this research, as we intend to do a discourse analysis of pre-electoral public speeches that might have had an influence on social

grievances and attitudes of the people towards the social-political challenges of the countries and therefore to their political preferences manifested in electoral support. Another independent variable of the thesis is social grievances, which covers the salient social needs and demands of the society incorporating fears and real-life concerns of the electorate. The latter will be analysed using documents analysis and will be based on the EU Commission surveys about the public opinion aiming to find out what does the electorate think, what are the most important issues their countries are facing. Salient in this thesis refers to the socially, economically and politically important issues that affect the country and electorate and that might cause the social resentments. Those topics were detected based on the Eurobarometer surveys we will use in order to measure social grievances. And it consists of issues, such as pensions, education system, unemployment, immigration, taxation, economic crisis, crime, inflation, terrorism, government debt, health and social security. Only by analysing both phenomena and the main characteristics of these sides we can come closer to the unbiased and objective conclusions which might reveal the levels of correlations between the Political Fear or Social Grievances and the rise of new challenges (FPO, Fidesz) in Austria, Hungary.

In this thesis, we will try to find the correlation between the politics of fear and the social grievance and detect the grievances that have been addressed in PRRPs pre-electoral speeches. This will help to demonstrate the match/mismatch, between the selected PRRPs' pre-electoral rhetoric, showing what they consider to be most important for the society, and the real-life concerns society actually has. Hence it will reveal if the PRRPs have been facing the actual needs and fears of the people, or have they been spreading the nationalistic, anti-migrant attitudes into the societies? Comprehensive research like this will reveal not only the overlap between the supply- and demand-sides, but it also shows their effect on the electoral success of the populist parties.

This research cuts into the mentioned questions from different angles and consists of five chapters. Chapter two is divided into two subchapters and it introduces the main conceptualisations the research is based on and offers an in-depth understanding of them. The first subchapter explains populism in general and then switches to its radical right-wing form. It also covers how the right-wing populism makes use of the politics of fear as the strategic rhetoric tool. The second subchapter discusses the Social Grievances and tries to detect social resentments and demands electorates have. Chapter three deals with the Methodology, operationalisation, research method, case selection, and also underlines the limitations of the thesis. Chapter four explores the riddle and demonstrates how Fidesz and FPÖ reflect on the main social grievances and resentment, in recent years (covering a minimum of two national elections). The chapter also analyses their political success in the parliamentary elections. This chapter is focusing on each selected case study and analyses the change in demand and supply sides. Chapter five suggests an overview of the findings and the theoretical expectations in a more general context. It summarizes the research and compares the selected cases to each other, aiming to answer the main research question of the thesis.

Chapter 2:

2.1. Radical Right-Wing Populism and the Politics of Fear

Despite its complex character populism itself is often described as the ‘simplistic discourse’ (Mudde 2004), which represents a thin-centred ideology that easily changes its shape and its radical right-wing form is capable of fueling xenophobic tendencies in the nation (Mudde, Kaltwasser, 2017). Populism in the world has been revealed in many different forms, yet there is one big similarity between all of them, populism always manages to split the society into two antagonistic groups (Mudde, 2017), it separates Europe into different poles, it reshapes the geopolitics of the continent (Braghioli, Makarychev, 2018), and last but not least it is capable of dividing the country into ‘nation against the elite’ (Lochochki, 2018, Mudde, 2004). Nonetheless, there is still no agreement about the definition of populism, and therefore it is explained in various ways. Moffitt, for instance, describes populism as the political style and he believes that this understanding has four significant repercussions, first of all, it gives us an opportunity to understand populism as an ideology that works in both across regional contexts and organisational contexts as well by perceiving it as the “general phenomenon”. It also creates a so-called “grey area” in which the concept of populism moves between black and white areas. The third repercussion to Moffitt’s opinion is that instead of seeing populism as the “thin,” we should take its stylistic characteristics seriously, which would make sense of the alleged lack of ‘substance’ of the phenomenon. Lastly, according to him, this approach creates a new conceptual vocabulary for studying the concept, and at the same time, it brings into focus the style, mechanism, and activities of the populists (Moffitt 2016). Populism sometimes also has a positive connotation as an emancipatory force and essence of politics, which turns “people” into collective actors and mobilises excluded sectors of society for changing the status quo and for actual engagement into politics by reintroducing conflict to them (Laclau, 2005).

Various approaches and explanations of the concept of populism and its conceptualization make it evident that populism “can take very different shapes” and that it appears to be linked to other concepts, forming interpretative frames that might be more or less appealing to different societies” (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2017). However, existing perspectives enrich the research while studying its possible causes. Mouffe raises an interesting issue while talking about the concept of “populist moment,” which tries to explain the causes of the development of populist tendencies in the country. The concept according to her means that populism is an outcome or “variety of resistance” to the transformations in economic, social, and political fields “seen during the years of neoliberal hegemony” (Mouffe, 2018) which is successfully and often used by populist parties to meet the grievances and demands of societies that had been unaddressed by the establishment. Therefore, people tend to choose populist parties that are pleasing them and “buying” their support quickly, and that is why Mudde, for instance, also assumes that populism is a “highly emotional and simplistic discourse” (Mudde 2004). Many believe that the economic crisis opened the door for radical mainstream attitudes, especially in Southern and Central-Eastern European countries, where populist parties profited well from the economic crisis, and since then, populism is still here as the true legacy of the financial crisis, so-called ‘great recession’ (Kreisi and Pappas, 2015). This idea is also driven by the belief that economic and material well-being interest is what defines electoral preferences while voting. And in the condition of uncertainty, created by the crisis, those voters first and foremost are coming from their self-material interest while making the decision (Durkheim, 1957). In this state of uncertainty, some parties, by offering the new ideologies, are addressing challenges that are bothering the voters, and hence, both sides, parties, and the voters act strategically (Hawkins, Read, Pauwels, 2017).

As for the right-wing form of populism which is the research focus, there are many variations of how to refer to this party family. Some call it ‘nationalists’ (Ellinas, 2010), some ‘radicals’ (Norris, 2005; Minkenberg, 2001); others label it as ‘anti-migrants’

(Van Spanje, 2010). All of them are relevant and valid in their own way and capture reality rather well. However, this research is based on the term Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) (Mudde, 2016 ab?). This research is based on the conceptualisation offered by Mudde, who explains that ‘populist radical right shares a core ideology that combines (at least) three features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism’ (Mudde, 2007). He also underlines that individual political powers might characterize core ideological features such as anti-Semitism for instance, but in general, all the PRRPs have the mentioned three features in common (Mudde, 2017). Nativism itself is defined by Mudde as a combination of xenophobia and nationalism, while authoritarianism entails a strictly ordered society, in which the violations of authority are severely punished (Mudde, 2017). As for, where PRRPs stand in political space divided into two, socio-economic and cultural conflicts groups, ‘wherein the later the identity politics play out.’ According to Lochochki, the ‘most PRRPs do not have a very thought-through economic program; neither do they receive votes for their economic platform’ instead their appeal is defined by their cultural agenda (Ivarsflaten, 2008). He also underlines that it is crucial to differ PRRPs from radical extremists, which as Lochochki puts ‘are anti-democratic movements, running on a platform of ethnic, blood and soil racism’ while the ‘PRRPs are anti-elite parties that campaign on a very strict definition of national interest and national belonging, cumulated in a very narrow understanding of national culture’. Some scholars consider that Populist Radical Right wings need to be separated from right-wings. However, I refer to the belief that they are part of the right-wing populist phenomenon (Kaplan, Weinberg 1998, pp. 1–2). It is notable that Bustikova while talking about populism in Eastern Europe underlined that in the East there is a fine line between the radical right-wing parties and right-wing parties, such as for instance Fidesz. And hence it becomes more and more difficult to classify these political parties from the East as not Radical (Bustikova, 2016). She also emphasizes that the contemporary radical right-wing populism is rather a new phenomenon in the Eastern European countries, In Hungary which represent one of our study cases, and which is ethnically Homogeneous country, the radical right-wing did

not mobilise as much on ethnic issues as their western European counterparts, they rather focus on social and religious issues. However, the situation has changed after the refugee influx and suddenly, Eastern European PRRPs 'Westernised' and scapegoated minorities with different ethnic and religious backgrounds (we will clearly see this in our case study part below) (Bustikova, 2016).

The recent developments of PRRPs in Europe have revealed that the continent and its liberal democracy are at greatest odds. The PRRPs nowadays comprise the third strongest political power in most countries of the continent, and in its Western part it can receive "anywhere between 20 and 30% of votes" (Lochocki, 2015); As Timo Lochocki says, the PRRP has been triggering "a complex set of political dynamics" in decades already and moreover, it seems that PRRP is here to stay (Panizza, 2005). Rooduijn notices 'a little bit of populism can act as a force for good by recognizing discontent and broadening the political agenda' but the current form of the phenomenon characterises with use of nativism, which creates an icon of 'dangerous others' meaning 'immigrants or people of a non-majority race or religion' (Akkerman, Lange, Rooduijn 2016). These new tendencies 'divided' and 'redefined' Europe. Hence, it created the 'imagined geographies' of 'safe' and 'unsafe' spaces, with fear being used as a political resource to legitimize certain geopolitical positions" (Braghiroli, Makarychev 2018), and these political positions in Europe are successfully embraced and used by PRR parties, therefore, it is "moral obligation" for academics (Akkerman, Lange, Rooduijn 2016) to discuss the problem and protect liberal democracy.

Regarding the rhetoric PRRPs use, Lochocki points out that it is rather less aggressive, they are not openly racist, as Lochocki describes, and are instead dressing up their nativism and nationalism with conservatism, which gives them more validity and acceptance from society (Lochocki, 2015). The author also highlights the fact that the real nationalistic and xenophobic perspectives of right-wing populists are hidden with their strategy of underlying 'what constitutes their supposed core.' And so the exclusion of 'others' from 'discursively constructed supposedly protected national community' is

rather vague. Yet, enough to please the people who crave for their country to maintain the distinguished status in a ‘hyper-complex and globalized world.’ The ‘nationalistic nostalgia that positions itself as aggressively opposed to symbols of social change’ which is above all, as Lochochki says, immigration creates a fruitful environment for Populist right-wing parties to gain electoral success by offering people the ‘way out’ (Lochochki, 2015). He argues that ‘the populist radical right’s ‘political messaging’ on identity issues such as the European Union and immigration is the key to its success (and failure)’ (Lochocki, 2018). The author also offers a so-called winning formula—“for the nation, against the elite,” that is put forward by radical right-wing populists and that increases the chances of electoral success. Rydgren in his book ‘Radical right-wing parties in Europe’ also points out that PRRPs political messaging has been dominated heavily by the issues such as immigration and refugee, especially in Western European countries, although in recent years more and more intensively in Eastern European countries as well (Rydgren 2017; Bustikova 2017). Arzheimer adds that these are the topics that primarily attract electorates to PRRPs and that the distinguishing feature of the radical right-wing parties’ supports is that they want to forbid and restrict immigration to their country (Arzheimer, 2018). Rydgren, however, adds that it is not just immigration and refugee issues, that attract voters to the radical right-wing parties, but it is also radical right-wing messages that link these issues to supposed crime and other types of social unrest (Rydgren, 2018). Especially problematic, according to these messages are also portrayed, immigrants from Muslim countries, although it does not mean that PRRPs are welcoming to other groups (Kallis, 2017)

‘Cultural Differentialism’ that is how Simon Bornschier describes the above-described process of exclusion of ‘Others.’ He believed that the European New Right’s political agendas are based on the narrative of ‘Cultural Differentialism.’ However, they state that by that they refer to “not the superiority of any nationality or race, but instead stressing the right of people to preserve their distinctive traditions. [...]Immigration is directly linked to this conception since the inflow of people from other cultural

backgrounds endangers the cultural homogeneity that thinkers of the New Right, as well as exponents of right-wing populist parties, deem necessary to preserve” (Bornschieer 2010, 422/3).

According to Lochochki the Immigration and integration represent the crucial topics in their agendas, as those are successfully portrayed by PRRPs as social challenges that are not faced by ‘Elites,’ who own the power in the state. According to PRRPs, this circumstance weakens the country as the state’s primary task is considered to be the controller of ‘who or what enters, what happens within its realm’ (Lochochki, 2018). Lochochki explains that even though PRRPs benefited from the recent Euro Crisis, the actual success they gained was when the Immigration matters became more salient, and that is the ‘necessary condition’ for them to significantly raise (Lochochki, 2018). Many project results have revealed that radical right-wing populism combines a very anti-immigrant profile with a euro-sceptical attitude and that usually those parties frequently highlight the national values along with the historical institutions and tradition in their speeches. In addition to that, Muslims and non-Europeans are portrayed as the threat to the society and sometimes, and usually rather often, cores of every problem (regardless of its nature) country faces. This rhetoric inevitably raised topics such as identity and belonging, which I discuss further in the next subchapter. For now, I will only shortly emphasize that belonging is not only the feeling, but it also is a rather emotional attachment and as authors, Meret and Siim point it out “ it is part of everyday practices” which is very powerful especially when it comes to the politics of belonging which “concern both the construction of boundaries and inclusion/ exclusion of particular people, social categories and groupings within these boundaries” (Meret, Siim, 2013). The described discourse creates exclusionary rhetoric against ‘others’, which implies some kind of (ethnic/religious/linguistic/ political) minority and turns it into a scapegoat for most if not all current resentments and woes of the society and pictures is as dangerous and a ‘threat to ‘us’, to ‘our’ nation; this phenomenon manifests itself as a ‘politics of fear’ (Wodak, 2015). Our research independent variable is based

on this theory, which allows the study to cover the different ways of seeing the world through the PRRPs' eyes, as it operates in different ways which divide the world, its societies, and territories. This rhetoric naturalises and normalizes the fear of the 'others' ' no matter are those "others" real or imagined threat, what seems to matter more is that "they" do not belong to "US". Eventually, we end up having a situation where the fear spread by the PRRPs' rhetoric and discourses are deep-rooted in us and sometimes they are so powerful that it wins over our other important concerns and preferences. In this research, I do not assert that electorate is not concerned about the immigration, however, I do believe that there are many other salient issues people are worried about, but just because PRRPs address our biggest fear of losing identity and belonging, we forget to notice that the same PRRPs do not cover and address other real-life matters that sometimes affect our lives way more than imagined threats. This example is especially relevant when I discuss the Hungary case, which shows that people are still supporting PRRPs and their anti-migration agendas even though, in comparison to other countries where migration is a real issue, the total numbers of immigrants in Hungary show that this is not the biggest challenge the state faces.

The questions of how PRRPs cover and address immigration topics in their political rhetoric, how they reproduce, and implement them in a beneficial way, which ultimately gain success still remains and is rather complicated. This research claims that to encourage the above mentioned nationalistic, anti-migrant attitudes and increase the sentiments to 'the good old days' among the people, as described earlier, the radical right-wing populists use the 'Politics of Fear' as a political strategy. The political identification of the threat, whether it rests on the real or imagined danger, enables PRRPs to create antagonistic and complex relations between groups of people. 'They', meaning everyone who does not belong to the titular nation-state, represents a danger to the society-'US', 'our' culture, and the whole nation. The 'politics of fear' and politicization of immigration issues create insecurity and contestation over the topic between antagonistic groups. PRRPs claim that people are the object of threat while

immigration is framed not as a humanitarian issue but instead as a security issue and thus a danger to the nation, its people, and values. There are many interesting political and psychological studies on how Fear can be abused in politics (Hatemi, McDermott, Eaves, Kendler, Neale 2013). PRRPs have developed and adopted this strategy quite well in their policy-making.

Wodak Points out that PRRPs ‘offer simple and clear-cut answers to all the fears and challenges...for example, by constructing scapegoats and enemies – ‘Others’ which are to blame for our current woes – by frequently tapping into traditional collective stereotypes and images of the enemy.’ (2015) ‘Others’ could also be ‘Elites,’ who are responsible for the state and the transformations happening within the country, have been alienated as the response to their ineffectiveness. The answer to all the challenges the state faces for the PRRPs is not multiculturalism and integration. Instead, they benefit from it and ‘sees multiculturalism as a recipe to denationalize one’s (own) nation, to deconstruct one’s (own) people’ (Pelinka, 2013). David Altheide in his Book-Creating Fear (2002), also highlights the power of fear, which, as he says’ has become a dominant public perspective,’ he also underlines that time by the time it grows and defines the general attitude towards life. He also points out that every political group has its object of fear, and while ‘all sides express many fears and point to ‘blameworthy’ sources – often each other!’ the fear expands even more, to another level and that inevitably increases the ‘array of ‘victims’’ (Altheide, 2002). Wodak believes that radical right-wing populists successfully construct fear and’ legitimize their policy proposals’ (mostly it is manifested in restricting immigration (Wodak, Boukala, 2015)) ‘with an appeal to the necessities of security.’ She believes that every crisis somehow contributes to the process of constructing the fear and legitimizing new meanings of securitization (2015). Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) analysed the ways of legitimation used in language, and they identified four major categories: ‘authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization, and mythopoesis. Authorization is legitimation by referring to authority, be that a person, tradition, custom, or law. Moral evaluation

means legitimation by reference to value systems. Rationalization is legitimation by reference to knowledge claims or arguments. Mythopoesis is legitimation achieved by narratives; these are often small stories or fragments of narrative structures about the past or future'. They have also pointed out that apart from those major categories, there are other subtypes of legitimation. As for radical right-wing populists and their political language, the authors have detected the 'legitimization by moral evaluation and mythopoesis: the use of specific moral stances and exemplary reformulated historical narratives (myths) to legitimize 'Othering' and typically implement ever more restrictive immigration measures.'

Again, while employing the concept of 'Politics of Fear' this research refers to the conceptualisation of the phenomena offered by Ruth Wodak, who claims that the radical right-wing populists 'does not only relate to the form of rhetoric but its specific contents: such parties successfully construct fear and - related to the various real or perceived dangers- propose scapegoats that are blamed for threatening or actually damaging our societies, in Europe and beyond' (Wodak, 2015). She explains that PRRPs in their political strategy divide the people into two antagonistic groups: 'good' and 'bad' people, and so they try to build the new borders between them. The renationalisation tendencies, she says, were manifested in anti-elitist, nativist, and exclusionary politics they have adopted against 'Others'. Wodak explains that by the construction of 'dangerous others' and all the 'conspiracy theories' against them gives them an opportunity to touch the 'traditional collective stereotypes and images of the enemy' part of society is so sensitive towards (Wodak, 2015). She names the different 'hot issues' such as immigration, homeland, and culture and she says that radical right-wing populist parties activate on those electoral rewarding hot issues (she names several hot issues, like immigration, homeland, and culture). One of the main characteristics of radical right-wing populism as Jan-Werner Müller describes is an environment with the divided society into two antagonistic groups, this is a "necessary but not sufficient condition" to identify the existence of PRRPs in it. The author

believes that PRRPs are “always anti-pluralist” coming from the belief that they “and they alone represent the people” despite the fact that this claim of PRRPs is “not empirical: it is always distinctly moral” (Muller, 2017). To put it differently, this understanding offers “another way of saying that populism is always a form of identity politics.” As for radical right-wing populism, the “people” is associated with the ‘ethno-nationalist pattern: they are white, Christian (or at least not Muslim) and (in most cases) heterosexual. Migrants either cannot be part of the people, or they are expected to “assimilate.” Such is the anti-pluralist core of radical right-wing populism.’ (Petersen, 2018).

While analysing one of the most interesting radical right-wing populist party in Sweden-Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) - Hellström and Nilsson, already back in 2010, described it as the ‘Self -proclaimed friend of the people’ which intensively suggests that people need to speak up and to raise their voice against the problems such as integration and immigration, and according to their belief, those are the topics, society is genuinely and deeply concerned and worried about. And while doing so SD usually, as authors mention, employ the rhetoric of the ‘true heir of a long tradition of protecting people’ (Hellström; Nilsson, 2010) which ‘inevitably’ gives them ‘validity’ to speak in the name of ‘truth’, therefore is ‘saying what everybody knows’ (see further Wodak and Reisigl, 2001). The authors note that PRR parties' ability to exploit this rhetoric and highlighting the integration issue make people believe that the political elite has neglected to react on the significant ‘challenges’ caused by a mentioned issue in this globalised world. Hence, they manage to encourage people to alienate the political elite, as the elite has failed to face those challenges. Meanwhile, this PRRPs rhetoric at the same time strengthens the anti-immigrant attitudes in the society and accordingly they manage to mobilize the voters around their political agenda.

Akkerman, Lange, and Rooduijn also talk about the possible causal factors of strengthened radical right-wing populism. They suggest that the internal and external conditions influence political mainstream and parties’ politics, they distinguish two

types of crucial external power that might cause changes in politics- changes in the Societal environment and changes in the political environment. Authors explain that first type of change- in the societal environment - “ includes changes in cleavages, electoral markets and in media agendas as well as socioeconomic change and the emergence of new policy problems in society”, they explain that “First, the emergence of new policy problems as a result of globalisation has made citizens more concerned about sociocultural questions, most notably immigration and integration and law and order” (Akkerman, Lange and Rooduijn 2016) and authors claim that radical right-wing parties are those that incorporated this electorally rewarding issues in their political agendas and this defines their success over other established parties. Therefore, the research elaborates the idea that encouraging the anti-immigrant, nativist sentiments in many European societies (external conditions capable of influencing the political mainstream) was successfully used by radical right-wing populist parties as to the political strategy.

In the contemporary world, migration has become the key political issue and therefore having a comprehensive and advanced migration policy is already a critical element of a well-functioning state. Nevertheless, only a few European countries seem to have had success in preventing unwanted flows and in effectively managing migrant inflow. There is substantial evidence that outlines that the recent Refugee mass influx challenge has shaped many European countries' political and social atmospheres. The Refugee Crisis and the rise of radical right-wing populism highlighted new political and social cleavages in European nations and split them between the supporters of two antagonistic political concepts - ‘Security’ and ‘Solidarity’ (Braghiroli, Makarychev, 2018). Emerged political and social debates and increasingly hostile public opinion put the established political parties under pressure, and non-mainstream radical forces fueled this process by questioning established governments ability to respond to the crisis (Braghiroli, Makarychev 2018) Again, the Research does not say that the Migration and Refugee Crisis did not affect or play a role in the rise of radical right-wing populism. I

completely understand that migration has been one of the top concerns for Europeans in years already. However, I also believe that the resentment about the refugee crisis was a tip of the iceberg, yet it gave an opportunity to PRR parties to limit all the national problems only with migration. It allowed PRRPs to create scapegoats for all the social resentments, to picture them as a threat to the state and to the people, who are mainly portrayed to be the migrants. This research claims that radical right-wing populism needs migrants in order to blame migrants. Hence, by the refugee crisis, PRRPs were given the perfect opportunity to achieve success and to spread fear of ‘others’ among people. Therefore, xenophobia, racism, and nationalism found their way through the politics of fear and national sentiments were used as a political strategy by the Right-Wing parties.

The new lines of European political distinction and emerging new challengers to comprehensive and cohesive European politics towards the Refugee crisis have recently been the most debatable and arguable topics for scholars. The crash of interests of maintaining multiculturalism within the country and being labelled as rather ‘open’ than ‘close’ state (Braghiroli, Makarychev 2018) created a fruitful environment for PRR parties and gave them broad room to manoeuvre. Public opinion facing the refugee crisis became more sceptical and traditional in a way, as well as the ethnic line between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, and/or the distinction between two homogeneous and yet antagonistic camps on which the populism is based on - ‘The People’ and ‘The Elite’, or let us say ‘The Pure People’ versus ‘The Corrupt Elite’ (Mudde, 2007) became more and more blurred. These “us vs. them” sentiments and in general the refugee crisis have inspired radical right conservative political attitudes in the countries across Europe. In Lochocki's words, “The conservative policy on migration and integration is the *raison d'etre* of populist radical right parties (...) it mobilised conservative voters and serves as a perfect narrative to call for an exclusive national identity many European voters crave for” (Lochocki, 2018).

We follow the theory that the current form of the radical right-wing populist parties' object of fear has shifted and "it does not so much mobilise against the (perceived) enemy above, but more against the (perceived) enemy from abroad. Radical right-wing populism has become more and more ethno-nationalistic" (Pelinka, 2013, 9) and so 'others' applies not only to people who are not members of their nation-state so 'Us' but also to those 'elites' that are supporting those 'others' from abroad.

To summarize, in this research I refer to the theory offered by Wodak, who explains that Politics of Fear as a political strategy is successfully adopted by radical right-wing populists, and it is used to 'address the collective common-ground as well as their reasons and (rhetorical and communicative) means' (Wodak, 2015). The claim of PRRPs that they represent 'THE People' and *volonte generale* is actually composed of the nativist ideologies and manifests itself in the 'rhetoric of exclusion.' Exclusion of 'others' who 'do not want to integrate and adapt to our culture' and therefore are the 'threats,' which automatically makes PRRPs 'saviours of the Occident' (Wodak, 2015). Earlier, we have also explained how radical right-wing populists endeavour to benefit from sensitive topics with the use of their strategic rhetoric, which itself reproduces fears among the electorate and triggers people's sentiments.

2.2. Society and Social Grievances

At the beginning of this research, we have already mentioned that we aim to analyse two sides of the recent political debate- the rise of radical right-wing populism. In order to develop a comprehensive study of the issue, we examine both- 'Supply Side' and 'Demand Side' (Lochochki, 2018; Wodak, 2015) which we believe leads us to the richer answers to the questions laid out below. While the former, in this study represent the PRRPs and their political agenda demonstrated in their rhetoric. The latter, in this

research, refers to social grievances. Unlike many other studies in our research, the demand side refers to the socio-economic, cultural and political grievances/needs, instead of only voter behaviour (Guiso, Herrera, Morelli, Sonno, 2018). Understanding the demand side only as voters' behaviour limits the research and does not allow it to dig the problem on a deeper level. We believe that referring to the broader meaning of the mentioned phenomenon will give us more reliable, and viable answers. Accordingly, when I say we examine the demand side, it means we intend to find a core social determinant affecting peoples' grievances and their needs/demands, therefore, their behaviour and last but not least the voting behaviour. Again, in this subchapter, we deem to identify possible factors shaping collective grievances, which recently has been ending up causing 'populist episodes' (Mudde, Kalwasser, 2017). This approach also will help us to answer the question what are the actual needs of the people, and are those needs addressed and represented in supply sides and their political agendas or not? In addition, it will reveal why some voters appeal to radical right-wing populism? And last but not least, it will allow us to explain the social behaviour which is manifested in their voting. We will further discuss the factors which sometimes are very metaphysical but still manage to have an effect in practice on electoral and their political preferences. Covering the sentimental side of the problem will reveal that sometimes people tend to judge based on their emotions and feeling even though rationally there are other actual issues that are making their lives more difficult. For instance, the refugee crisis affected EU countries differently, while the government in Vienna welcomed the refugees to prevent a European humanitarian crisis (DW, 2015), Orban rather imposed the idea of closing the borders (BBC, 2015). The interesting and crucial point is that despite the heterogeneous impact of the crisis on the member countries, the EU electorate reacted rather similarly. The Eurobarometer 2018 shows that the electorate in countries with a restrictive refugee policy was almost equally concerned about immigration as the electorate in the ones comparably more affected by the crisis (see the Public opinion about the immigration at the end of the first year of the crisis, 11.2016, in selected countries: <https://bit.ly/2we7Ct4>). In this research, we try to analyse what are the

factors influencing the interests and concerns of the electorate. Where are those concerns coming from and if they are somehow activated by political powers and their political strategies? First and foremost, we will describe the Self-Interest- phenomena. Nonetheless, in order to understand what are the needs of societies we need to explain what is society itself. The classic sociological theorist, Emile Durkheim, suggested that society is 'a thing in itself, of its own particular kind' and uses the Latin term *sui generis*. This meaning refers to the belief that society is not a sum of many different parts, instead, it is an organism which is composed of many different parts and each of those parts is necessary to make the organism (society) work as a whole. Accordingly, society is not a sum of individuals, institutions, and groups, rather the whole entity consisting of all of the mentioned above and their interactions. However, in all fairness, we should also add that Durkheim also pointed out that humans themselves are inherently selfish and egoistic, but what makes society as the whole function, and is crucial for its existence is the collective consciousness which forms the moral basis of it. The interaction we have mentioned above is the way of constructing the collective consciousness, therefore common norms, beliefs, and values (Allan, 2005, pp.102, 137). Durkheim also believed that the emotional part wins over egoism as we are, in his belief, emotionally connected to the culture. That is why people tend to act more responsible, which is also a social and moral way to act (Allan, 2005). However, the author also analysed the state of uncertainty, which demolishes the feeling of the person of belonging to some 'group' (the condition of uncertainty can refer to the period of crisis as well, which is part of our study) and in this situation, according to Durkheim, people tend to show their selfishness again and act primarily following their self-material interests (Durkheim, 1957). The research is following also the belief, suggested by Hawkins, Read and Pauwels that, even tho Durkheimian mass theory grasps rather well the material concerns of the society, still is just economic approach and pictures the individuals and political parties as extremely rational decision-makers, still, this perspective leaves a number of 'anomalies unresolved'. The authors acknowledge the importance of the mentioned theories in understanding social

behaviour, yet it does match the contemporary political and social state. They point out that ‘there are not direct responses’ to modern challenges and discourses (Hawkins, Read, Pauwels, 2017). However, the Authors in their book *Populism and Its Causes* (2017) also add that in this rather challenging condition not only people but also radical right-wing populist parties act strategically as they benefit from the situation and offer new ideologies. they describe that this is why many scholars, starting from Durkheim to Betz (1994), portray both sides as ‘instrumental decision-makers maximizing their material self-interest, rather than cognitively vulnerable masses acting on a subconscious need for identity or a sense of belonging’ (Hawkins, Read, Pauwels, 2017). Yet, the author proclaims, that in general ‘populist attitudes are not invented by politicians to fill a gap in the citizens’ psyche, but constitute a pre-existing set of beliefs that can be activated under certain contexts’. Thus, what are certain contexts when people activate their radical right-wing populist beliefs? Not many studies have been conducted on the possible framing mechanisms of the radical right populist attitudes activation (Bos, VanDer Brug, and De Vreese, 2013). What is also interesting is the way the PRRPs address important issues for ordinary citizens. Their strategic ability to make use of those concerns, even the ones that are not related to their nationality, culture, or identity, enable PRRPs to put these challenges in a context that highlight the incompatibility between them and the “Others”. That way radical right wings manage to legitimate their xenophobic, racist and anti-immigrant positions. And ultimately to normalize and activate the same attitudes in the electorate's minds.

Identity- This research tries to explore the various accounts and approaches that range from cultural, social, and political and that explains the ‘pulls’ and ‘pushes’. In order to do so, we aim to dig deeper into factors influencing social demands. Building on what we have already discussed earlier, it is clear that the feeling of social belonging to some group for every individual is crucial in order for her/him to behave socially and responsible. Identifying yourself as part of something bigger makes one feel more secure. Jef Huysmans ‘in his book-*The Politics of Insecurity Fear, migration and asylum*

in the EU- says that 'Insecurity is a politically and socially constructed phenomenon' and some political powers are aware of how to use the insecurities of the people in a way that can rearrange social and political interactions in the society. The author highlights that this political strategy of creating fear by using insecurity politics has 'a specific capacity for fabricating and sustaining antagonistic relations between groups of people' (Huysmans, 2006). Therefore, it also divides society into antagonistic groups and the ones who do not belong to the same 'secured environment' (group) are already the stranger and the possible object of the conflict. Conflicts, according to Boulding, in his book *Conflict and Defense*, represent 'a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other', and while social conflict theories are based on Marx's understanding of class clash, we in this research follow more broad perspective which is not limited just by economic factors that divide society into different social classes/groups. Instead, we believe that it is a bigger phenomenon and includes the conflict emerging from ethnic, religious, and other identity-based differences. However, converting these conflicts into an abstract belief of antagonistic groups/classes is furthermore part of the political strategy of contemporary radical right-wing populism.

As Vasiliki Neofotistos puts it in his book - *Identity Politics* - Identity is often used "as a tool to frame political claims, promote political ideologies, or stimulate and orient social and political action, usually in a larger context of inequality or injustice and with the aim of asserting group distinctiveness and belonging and gaining power and recognition." Nowadays, in this globalised world identity and maintaining it, it has gained high importance. As Fukuyama says, in his article about *The new identity politics*, its role in the rise of radical right-wing populism is less appreciated and that 'there has been a tendency to overstate the importance of economic motivation (...)' Because the fact is that this is ultimately a fight over identity.' Fukuyama says that the demand for dignity could be the biggest motivation for the people which ultimately

forms their political attitudes. And that demand for dignity is linked to the acknowledgement of one's identity and its culture. So what is identity?

Fukuyama in his book (*Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*) states that identity goes back to the term used by Plato: 'thymos'. The term refers to the part of the soul that seeks recognition and respect. Fukuyama states that one does not only need a house, food, and drink, but also recognition and evaluation 'at the rate that we think we deserve'. He adds that theories that picture people as only economically motivated decision-makers are not really comprehensive and the preferences and desires people have, are not always rational, accordingly their behaviour is not always rational, as those theories claim. Instead, he believes that as Socrates explained there is a 'third part of the soul' which is concerned mainly with having respect, which itself is linked to emotions. Absence of this respect and emotion makes one angry as the author says 'that drives you to violence, to politics, and to a lot of other things.' (Fukuyama, 2018)

Fukuyama mentions Identity Politics and says that its primal form was all about the small marginalised groups fighting for justice and recognition. However, the current form of identity politics has changed its meaning and how it applies to the bigger groups which were ones holding good positions in society. This research does not agree with his theory that PRRPs, as white, once appreciated, elites, have actually the case. The research deems that there is no explanation and justification of being racist and xenophobic, which maybe was not the intention of Fukuyama's book as well, yet it is important to underline. However, Fukuyama's perspective is still academically interesting. He mentions one book, *Strangers in Their Own Land* by the sociologist Arlie Hochschild, which is an interesting metaphor. The metaphor is about American people standing in line at the door named 'American Dream'. All of a sudden, some of the people jump in the queue and those people are mostly minorities. Yet, the Elite is the one who pushes, encourages and supports them to jump in. By that, Fukuyama describes the fear, concern and feeling of the radical right populist partisans. Ultimately,

the author explains, that nowadays, PRRPs supporters feel like the nations' identities and their politics are not undermined by the immigration which became such a big issue recently, but rather by the elites that have those open migration policies and implement them in their nations (Fukuyama, 2018). Hence, this process created the feeling of betrayal and fear in those people. Fear that has changed its object from strangers, that were representatives of other unfamiliar groups has turned into the fear of their own group members (Elites). Political elites that "showed their back" to society and their grievances, eventually end up being on the different side of the river where they become more and more distanced from ordinary people. Meanwhile, the same people believe that they need to fight along with other political powers. The power that appeals to their emotions, that "raises the voice for them", and of course that is interested in "who they are" and "who they want to be". In the end, a big part of the society wants to guarantee the stability and build upon what they have achieved, without any radical changes. That is the conservative, sentimental and nostalgic based politics PRRPs offer and promise in their speeches, therefore it is not challenging for them to capitalize on mass fears

Talking about fears, the next factor that I want to discuss as one of the determinants in shaping the social grievances and demands are the Emotions- In the previous chapter, we have already talked about the power of emotions and more precisely the fear and how it can shape the social discourses in the country. However, we have discussed the fear of coming and spread among people from the 'supply-side'. In this part of the study, we focus on the fears already existing in society, and hence we will try to explore how those fears affect social and political preferences. Fear is a very strong emotional tool that can determine people's behaviour. Sociologists Andersen and Taylor, in their book -Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society - write that society consists of the various groups and every person belongs to many groups at the same time. The groups could be as simple as family, workgroups, staff, friendship groups, or ethnic groups and others. All of them influence us at some point, and hence they represent the 'major determinants of our attitudes and opinions on everything' at every stage of our life.

Sociologists, they said, see the people as a group if they meet the following three characteristics: '1. Interact and communicate with each other; 2. Share goals and norms; and, 3. Possess a subjective awareness of themselves as 'we' - that is, as a distinct social unit' (Andersen, Taylor, 2007); That 'We' and the feeling of self-belonging to something brings people together and creates the group. Durkheim believed that social interaction constructs the culture for a particular group and then the members of those groups 'attach powerful emotions to it' (Allan, 2005).

According to psychological research, people tend to trust their group members, but 'others' are the unfamiliar ones who create discomfort for them. One of the mentioned psychological literature is a theory developed by Bowlby and Ainsworth (1991) who study social emotions and social interactions (without explicitly covering the political attitudes) and explored that fears, as well as phobias, increases the psychological discomfort and hence, people with the greater fear dispositions usually have the feeling of greater discomfort towards new and unfamiliar social situations, or new people and environments and will reveal less desire to interact with the mentioned strangers or environments. Bowlby, offered an attachment theory, explaining as an only 'lasting psychological connectedness between human beings' (Bowlby, J, 1969), and He believed that when in danger or unfamiliar situation one usually has a need of being near to the attachment figure. In the context of danger and new environment, the feeling of fear anxiety prevents one from adopting or assimilating the unknown information and hence it activates the notion of defensive exclusiveness (MacLeod, Mathews, 1991). Bowlby points out that the defensive exclusiveness notion is most likely to be activated in a state of losing something important, or when there is even a threat of losing something. When that is the case, one feels discomfort around 'others' and are less motivated to engage in any interaction with strangers, as it may trigger the fears of her/him, and ultimately one might end up feeling the fear anxiety as well (Garcia, Koelling, 1966). This process, therefore, pushes one to be defensive of herself/himself and to find a secure, comfortable situation. This Defensive exclusion prevents

one from being open to novel situations where they might discover that unfamiliar environment, or once strangers are not necessarily representing a threat to them. Avoiding novel situations and not stepping out of comfort zone makes one's fair untrained and therefore more sensitive towards everything unknown 'Thus, the applicability of this model to political preference formation in a western context should most profitably be explored by examining people's views on such topics as immigration, racial bias, or other explicit out-groups' (Hatemi, 2013). The notion of defensive exclusion becomes more powerful when fearful one meets representatives of other unknown groups (ex. Ethnic, religious, social).

Translating that psychological process into a radical right populist political context, we may see that people with radical right populist attitudes fear to somehow get in touch with 'out-group' people because they have already built the boundaries between 'us' and 'them'. And so, we can say that there is a direct correlation between fear disposition and political or social grievances and demands. Social phobias manifested in fear of out-group strangers triggers the emotions of fearful people as 'unfamiliar others represent novel stimuli' for them, that makes them expect to discover in it something 'most threatening'. Ultimately this fear is manifested in political preferences of society, and they focus either on 'protection of the in-group through defence attitudes, or promulgation of punitive policies directed against out-groups, such as support for anti-immigration policies' (Hatemi, 2013).

Overall, in this part of the research, we, on the other hand, we tried to include in the research other motivator factors for society, and we highlighted three central notions, such as self-interest, identity and emotions. The examination of the studies and literature of those phenomena revealed that all of them are quite powerful influencers which sometimes might win over the material interests of the individual. All the collected information we tried to translate into political contexts and see how they influence the political preferences of the one as well. Overall the study made a vivid number of things; first, the PRRPs can successfully use those grievances of the people and use that

against the people for their political aim by portraying all the problems through the radical right populist lens. Second - the cognitive map of the society defines their behaviour, attitudes, demands and preferences which are manifested in one of the biggest political tools- voting. Third, the emotions and culture enable us to experience the values, that gives us the reason and motivation, as well as the information about what is essential for us in life. Moreover, last but not least that political messages, articulated by PRRPs, that touches the values some people are appreciating and believing, activate the sentiments that are enhancing the radical right populists' success (Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo, Ostiguy, 2017).

Building on the literature we have already discussed above, we aim to conceptualise the Social Grievance, and so the 'demand-side' of this research, as the phenomenon which represents the social grievances and needs of the society. We have examined the number of determinants of social needs and preferences, and it was revealed that they differ in their character and nature. Some believe that social grievances are significantly shaped by economic interests (Durkheim, 1969), some highlight the importance of the subconscious state of the one and the desire of belonging to some group (Hawkins, Read, Pauwels, 2017) others talk about the shared identity and its power over social preferences (Neofotistos, 2013; Fukuyama, 2018) and others emphasize the emotions, such as fear, as one of the crucial factors defining our social attitudes (Bowlby, J, 1969). In this research, we study the actual social needs that ultimately define their behaviour. Such theorising allows adopting a more socio-psychological approach. Since we are focusing on quantitative polls, the applied concept of social grievance covers a number of issues and concerns that are salient to society according to the Eurobarometer. Therefore, we use the theoretical combination of the concepts mentioned above.

To summarise, in this subchapter, we tried to explore the Demand Side of the research and examine the possible social grievances. We studied the different sides of the riddle in order to find the core determinant for social preferences and their needs. To do so, first, we explained what the Society itself means. We dug the issue deeper and covered

different approaches and scholars. We covered various factors that might influence the social attitudes and covered the theories, such as mass theory, which portrayed the individual materialistic and self-interested/ motivated person who still has morals which pushes them to engage in social interactions. The above-discussed literature included the practical and theoretical determinants of social interests, their needs and concerns. The research claims that all these determinants are addressed and successfully used in speeches given by the PRRPs representatives. The power of rhetoric we have already explained in the previous subchapter while in this subchapter we wanted to focus what are their rhetorics consisting of and how this discourse and articulation enables them to capitalise on it. The politics of fear which represents the political strategy of radical right populists is useless unless it is not based on real fears of the people. Above we wanted to represent what those fears and concerns are about and how big of the influence they might have on each of us.

Chapter 3:

3.1. Research Question

One central element of the self-understanding of radical right-wing populist parties is their claim to be the “real” voice of the people. In other words, they claim to be the only party representing the interests of society. What does this perception refer to? Representing someone incorporates the belief that they are representing and addressing the salient social grievances of their electorate. This perception of the radical right-wing populist parties shall be tested.

The research question of this study examines: To what extent are the salient social grievances converging with the party rhetoric of the self-claimed representatives of the people, and what is its impact on the rise of PRRPs?

The research question implies that the match between the social grievances and the rhetorics of the PRRPs has an influence on the success of the mentioned parties. Hence, what we are looking at is the coincidence between these two factors that result in the rise of radical right-wing populism.

3.2. Variables and Operationalisation:

The independent and dependent variables of the thesis are

DV-The rise of radical right-wing populism

Indicator: Electoral success on the national level of the radical right-wing populist parties in two cases: Austria (Freedom Party of Austria) and Hungary (Fidesz)s in recent elections (at least two of them)

Measurement: Official results of national elections. The data will be collected from the official public sources, which in these two cases would be Austrian Interior Ministry and National Election Office in the case of Hungary. Moreover, the second source for the election results and their analysis would be the OSCE and ODIHR, as well as INTER PARLIAMENTARY UNION.

Reliability: the data and hence results would be collected from recent 6 to 7 years, within these periods at least two national elections have taken place. Analysing at least two examples will help to determine the factors and political or social environment that contributed to the success of the one selected PRRPs in Austria and Hungary.

Validity: The variable is measured and tested with numerous sources

IV1- The 'politics of fear'

Indicator: Will be examined the number of official pre-electoral public speeches given by leaders of the selected PRRPs (Orban, H.C.Strache) and will be revealed the Leading themes and the focus the party leader attempted to make in those speeches. The speech is one of the most common and effective ways for a political power to spread their political ideas and influence political social discourses.

Measurement: A discourse analysis of selected official pre-electoral public speeches.

Reliability: Building on the theories and concepts we have discussed above, we do believe that in order to determine the pre-electoral rhetoric and the articulation the selected radical right-wing parties use, which represents the powerful rhetorical tool for the 'Politics of fear' as part of their political strategy, can be best examined by studying the pre-electoral speeches of the leaders of those parties. This way we will be able to detect the central political and/or social issues they are focusing on.

Validity: The selected speeches given by the leaders are internally agreed between the party members and represents the party official politics not the leader's personal opinions. Those speeches are posted on online news publications committed to fact-based reporting and even on the official webpages of the selected parties, or the governments of the countries (and governmental power in Hungary's case belongs to the radical right-wing coalition). This is another indication that the speeches are agreed internally and demonstrated the position of the whole political power.

IV2-Social Grievances

Indicator: Salient social needs/ concerns and demands. based on the Eurobarometer survey which I use in this study the research indicates twelve salient social grievances: Crime, Economic Situation, Rising prices/inflation/cost of living, Taxation, Unemployment, Terrorism, Housing, Immigration, Health and Social Security, The education system, Government debt and Pensions.

Measurement: Polls conducted by the European Commission, Eurobarometer about social preferences, opinions and needs in selected countries (Austria, Hungary)

Reliability: Based on the European Commission's survey about 'What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?' we will be able to detect the most important grievances and expectations the electorate have from their government to address. 'Since 1973, the European Commission has been monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the Member States, thus helping the preparation of texts, decision-making and the evaluation of its work.' their studies cover major and significant issues 'concerning European citizenship: enlargement, social situation, health, culture, information technology, environment, the Euro, and defence' (EU Commission, 2016). The survey consists of approximately 1000 face to face interviews per country (Eurobarometer 2020).

Validity: The surveys will be selected in accordance with the years when the selected pre-electoral speeches were made and therefore covers at least two national Elections years that took place in each country.

The hypothesis the thesis is built upon is the following:

The stronger the convergence between, politics of fear', as the political strategy of right-wing parties, and the most salient social grievance is, the most likely radical right-wing populism is to rise.

3.3 Limitations:

Reflected on the conducted research, the thesis has various limitations. First and foremost, the focus on only one right-wing party in each country excludes the in-depth analysis of the political spectrum in the state. However, the selection of the PRRPs was defined by their electoral success and government participation in the recent period. Another limitation one can see is the focus on the party leaders' pre-electoral speeches. Parties' agendas, political platforms, fellow party politicians, or their governmental work is not covered in the research. PRRPs by their nature characterizes with the personalization of politics as Wodak has studied (2015). The third limitation one can detect is the Hungarian language. The good thing that allows me to conduct this research is that despite not being able to speak Hungarian wide array of the prime minister speeches are available in English the Hungarian governmental official webpage. But we cannot, however, exclude that on the one hand not all the speeches are translated on the webpage, there might be others as well that were ignored (yet, there is no evidence to claim that relevant speeches were left out). And on the other hand, specific connotation and nuances the native language might convey translated language might not convey in the same way. One more limitation we can also underline is that biased selectivity of cases(Yin, 1994, p. 80), although we tried to select the speeches that first of all were given as the part of the pre-electoral campaign and that have covered most of the social grievances,

we are still aware of the limitation. And finally, the limitations regarding the speeches, in case of FPÖ we were limited in the variety of the speeches of Strache. It was rather challenging to find complete pre-electoral speech as most of the videos one can see on Youtube, for instance, are cut and show only part of the whole speech. I would assume that many information on FPÖ official webpage related to Strache after the Ibiza scandal was removed from their channel. Nevertheless, it is only my personal assumption and there is no obvious evidence of it.

3.4. Case Selection

In this research, we focus on two countries Austria and Hungary and study social grievances within these countries along with the political spectrum of PRRPs (Particularly Fidesz and FPÖ). The case selection in this research was driven by the logic to reveal the power of ‘Politics of Fear’ of PRRPS in two countries Austria and Hungary, as well as their nativist, xenophobic and egoistic outlook on people. On the other hand, we wanted to demonstrate that even though the social grievances and resentments might be different in various countries, the outcome sometimes turns out to be the same. We believe that this is especially the case (which in this particular example refers to the probable rise of radical right-wing populism in the country as the result), if one of the ‘rewarding topics’ (immigration for instance) takes places in the state and creates the fruitful environment for the radical right wings to emerge, spread the fear, triggers the national sentiments and portray themselves as Messiahs.

This is why we focused on Austria and Hungary and exploited Most Different System Design in this research (we will further elaborate on MDSD below in next chapter). One thing that we wanted to stress is that for sure if we take the entire earth globe Austria and Hungary are not the most dissimilar system design. But since our sample is the EU member states, we can claim that these two countries

(despite the close geographical proximity and even to a certain extent shared historical background), they are the most dissimilar system design. Moreover, we are not looking only at the countries, we are also looking at particular parties in these states.

In this research we seek to compare these two countries along with their PRRPs and their pre-electoral rhetoric, aiming to see whether they have been addressing the social grievances or not. Another important factor that drew me into choosing these cases was the refugee crisis which sheds the light on the groundlessness of their politics of fear. We wanted to see if these politics of fear as the rhetorical tool of PRRPs has in any way influenced public opinion on social grievances and on political preferences. It is worth mentioning that, although both countries have had (Austria till last year) the radical right-wing populist parties in charge (in government), still these parties have been very different in terms of their party history, leadership and influence on the political discourses of the country. In Austria FPÖ with its leader was the junior partner, so they have an influence on politics, but as they were in coalition with Austrian People's Party, they still did not own complete power over the government. Hence, FPÖ if we look at its history, is a permanent opposition party which even if it goes to the government still plays the opposition card. On the other hand, we have Fidesz in Hungary which has been the governmental party for a second decade already, and its leader- Orban has been a prime minister of the country. Hence, for the research we could have also chosen Jobbik in Hungary as an opposition party like FPÖ has been, yet it is important to note, that it is clear that since Orban does not have a real opposition on the left, the real challenges come from the right, and therefore sometimes his strategies have shifted one way or another because of Jobbik. Hence, in order to keep Orban to keep votes on the right, he moved to the right and became more radicalised (Bustikova, 2016).

The Dependent and the Independent Variables of the research have also in a way determined the selection of the countries. Both Austria and Hungary cases represent prominent examples of the success of radical right-wing populist parties, and of how these parties use the ‘politics of fear’ as the political strategy and instrument to manipulate the social preferences.

3.5. Research Design

The research employs the small N sample which gives more chances to examine the cases on a more in-depth (Lijphart, 1971) level. In order to analyse the variables, the research uses discourse analysis and document analysis. The discourse analysis is oft-used qualitative research method detecting the meanings of the language and how it is used in relation to social context. Using this method for this particular research opens an opportunity to instead of observing the speeches aiming to find a ‘truth’, but to understand what the rhetoric and so the speeches claim is the ‘truth’ and how it influences the society and their grievances. Discourse analysis will allow me to study the PRRPs rhetoric manifested in the language they use beyond the sentence/utterance boundaries, at the same time it will reveal the interrelationship between the used language and society (Stubbs, 1983:1). While the document analysis enables us to interpret the documents and to give the voice and meaning around the assessment topic. Document analysis allows us to review and evaluate the data in order to gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge (Corbin, Strauss, 2008). The Discourse analysis will be used to examine the official speeches given by the party leaders. For the purposes of other variables such as the rise of PRRPs measured by electoral success and the social grievances measured by the social concerns and needs will be used in document analysis. The aim of the analysis of the data is to detect the central themes PRRPs usually focus on and to make it apparent for all that sometimes their focus is different from people's interests.

As we have already mentioned the research is based on the Most Dissimilar System Design (MDSD) and Austria and Hungary in this thesis represent the most different cases. We wanted to name and demonstrate the factors that make these countries differ from each other.

Country	Developed Economy	The PRRP Holds 'Open' Political Power	'Open' Politics	EU Membership, Senior Partner	Transition countries of the Balkan route	The Rise of Radical Right-Wing Populism
Hungary	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Austria	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Austria and Hungary are different in many ways, however, we indicated the most important factors that are relevant to our research and influence the countries' political and social spectrums. First and foremost, we indicated the economic development of the country, which is important when we talk about social grievances and what is the impact of the economy on it. These countries are very different in terms of their economies, for instance, GDP per capita (in US dollars) of Austria according to the World Bank in 2018 was 51 461 955\$ which in last ten years has shortly changed in 2015 yet remains to be constantly growing, while GDP per capita of Hungary is 20 324 254\$ which is not even half of Austria (World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files, 2018). We based the economic development assessment of the International Monetary Fund evaluations and latest reports, according to which Hungary still belongs to the Developing economies, while Austria is part of the Advanced Economies countries' list. (IMF, 2020) The second significant factor we detected is political power here we will not go deep into this topic again as above we have already discussed the

different political roles and positions of selected PRRPs in the political spectrum of Austria and Hungary. In 'open' politics, we refer to the political reaction of these countries to issues such as immigration and the faces of these countries were importantly revealed in the Refugee Crisis period and in how the countries dealt with the 'challenge'. It showed that Hungary represents a relatively homogenous society while Austria is rather multicultural and characterizes with open politics to the refugee crisis. This factor is important to consider as the open or closed politics of the countries have had an important influence on the social and political discourses of the country, on which we will further elaborate on. In addition, we believe that it is important to consider that Austria is one of the senior member countries of the EU, while Hungary joined it in 2004. This needs to be considered when we talk about responsibilities in the EU and how are they shared between the member countries. In the light of the refugee crisis, for instance, we witnessed that Austria faced its part of responsibility while Hungary did not. Therefore this factor is very influential for its foreign as well as domestic politics, and thus it impacts social grievances within the country as well. Nevertheless, in times of refugee crisis which reached a peak in 2015, Austria and Hungary both were transition countries of the Balkan route and were one of the firsts facing the 'challenge' of immigration. This is a factor that makes these countries similar, however, it still affected both differently and yet was successfully used by PRRPs as the legitimation of their xenophobic politics. At the same time, this similarity became the causal factor for the rise of radical right-wing populism in both countries.

For instance, Austria was rather profoundly influenced by the refugee crisis 2015 and was one of the major receiving countries of new asylum claims as well as one of the most hosting countries accepting those asylum seekers in 2015/2016 (UNHCR, 2016). While, Hungary on the other hand, according to IOM, in 2016, out of 54,586 asylum applications, suspended 49,479, rejected 4,675 and according to Eurostat, accepted less than 1% of the asylum applications (425), with which the country

marked the lowest acceptance rate in the EU (IOM, 2018). This difference which has been the case since the refugee crisis is one of the essential facts to consider, as it shows once again an interesting face of radical right-wing populist parties creating an imaginary threat and using it as one of the most rewarding issues for their pre-electoral campaign, this is why it is important to study their pre-electoral rhetoric and how it influences society.

Furthermore, the notes taken at the beginning of the research process are always helpful as they contribute to the research by developing the study and giving initial ideas for the coding (Saldana, 2009). The Study is factor-focused in understanding the process of how part of the people from Austria and Hungary turned into fearful people with renationalised and nativists attitudes. The time range of the study covers at least two national elections and hence we will be able to examine official pre-electoral public speeches made in this period. Apart from that, another vital factor of limiting the time with almost the last decade is that through these periods significant social events like the refugee crisis has taken place, which gave another 'rewarding topic' to our selected PRRPs. This will also contribute to our study in the sense that it will show us how the crisis and the state of uncertainty work on people and their grievances, along with the politics of fear.

Chapter 4:

As pointed out in the methodology section, the pre-electoral Speeches of both parties, the Social Grievances and the Rise of Radical Right-Wing Populism manifested in electoral success in both countries will be analyzed subsequently in the form of a qualitative discourse and document analysis (respectively). According to the research question, the aim is to find out whether the ‘politics of fear’ as the rhetoric strategy of PRRPs converges with the social grievances, and if that defines in a way success of PRRPs.

4.1. The Case of Hungary (Fidesz)

Above, we have already talked about the importance of the rhetoric of the party and its impact on electoral preferences, that is why it is especially interesting to study the speeches made in public and in the pre-electoral period. In this subchapter, we will reveal how the rhetorical strategy of politics of fear of Fidesz looks like and how the party makes use of it. To do so in this research I analyse three different public and official speeches made by Fidesz party leader Orbán and published and translated by the government on their official website. All of the speeches are made while meeting with the electorate. Two of them are given in the pre-electoral period (March 29, 2014; and 15 March 2018) which enables us to examine the rhetoric of the party in electoral campaigns. The selected elections years resulted in the win of Fidesz and during these two elections socially, economically and politically important events such as the refugee crisis took place. Choosing this time range also enables us to observe the effect this refugee influx caused (if it did cause) and what was the reaction and the politics of the party on it. Therefore, it also allows us to see how the focuses and priorities of the party have changed and how these changes were framed in their rhetoric.

The third speech, from the selected ones, is an exception and unlike two others that were given for the electoral campaigns, this one is given while meeting with students. On the official website of the Government (which is Fidesz/KDNP coalition), it is titled

as ‘Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s presentation at the 26th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp’ in 2015. This particular speech was chosen because of various reasons, first of all, we wanted to compare and reveal the differences and similarities between the speeches given in electoral campaign periods and the one that does not have an intention of winning the election (spoiler alert: we ended up seeing that there is no significant difference between the rhetoric and emphasised issues in the speeches), on the other hand, we wanted to see how the rhetoric would change in one year after facing the first refugee influx challenge. Thus, the selection of the cases was also very much determined by the years in which those public speeches were made.

On the other hand, in this chapter, we examine the social grievances and resentments and how they are met by the party politics and their priorities. The research shows that the party prioritizes the most triggering and emotional topics in the speeches and meanwhile many important grievances of the people and interests are left out without proper attention and reaction. What is even more interesting is that regardless of the mismatch between the social grievances and the PRRPs focuses and priorities manifested in their speeches while meeting the society, still, we end up seeing the PRRP rise in the country. Therefore, we will try to analyse the core reasons for it and try to answer the mentioned research questions in the case of Hungary.

4.1.1. ‘Politics of Fear’ as Political Strategy

While studying and selecting Orbán’s speeches we have noticed that all the speeches are characterized by a number of similarities and commons which will be further detected and highlighted in our analysis. One very significant and obvious common between most of the public speeches given by him. Usually, they are rather extensive and long and characterize with emotionality and nostalgia of the past which we will discuss further down. Another characteristic between almost all of them (especially speeches made in pre-electoral periods) is that they are made either on historically and culturally

meaningful locations or days, or both. For instance, Orban usually starts with sentences like 'It all started when we assembled here 25 years ago', in which by 'here' he refers to Heroes' Square wherein 2014 on 29 of March he addressed half a million people (Novak, 2014) and by '25 years ago' he refers to the historically and politically most important day for Hungary, the day when the country regained independence from the Soviet Union. Another example we see in the 2018 speech in which Orban starts with highlighting the importance of the day: 'the day has come which lifts the hearts of every Hungarian. The day on which, in the great book of world history, a word was written in the Hungarian language: that was 'Freedom'.' On the day of the speech, people celebrated the 170th anniversary of the Hungarian revolution of 1848. The purpose of such beginning of the speech is to trigger the patriotic, nostalgic feelings and to prepare the listeners for following nationalistic monologue about the more sensitive and deep issues such as 'Us' (Hungarians) and 'Others'. 'Us' is always used in 'We' plural form and thus he makes people feel that he is part of them and therefore leaves an impression that he represents them.

The Future of Hungary

One more important resemblance between selected public speeches is that all of them are vaguely predicting the future but with no particular plan. His view about the future is rather blurred and unclear in many ways, there is no indication (in the speeches) of written or planned economic, political or social goals. According to him, the only clear thing about the future, in his words, is that it should be 'Hungarian': 'If in the future the country is not Hungarian, what is the point of progress?' (2018). For Him Future is 'uncertain' with its nature (2015) and he compares it to the state where they are 'at the prow, with a telescope in hand, scanning the horizon for unknown shores' (2015). Orban believes that while drawing conclusions about the future they always need to come from the past 'which we already know. In other words, in thinking about the future we are not competing to look far ahead of us, but rather competing to understand the past' (2015). Here, it is important to notice that this kind of uncertainty about the

future of the country and therefore its citizens already serves as an instrument to sow the fear among the people, especially when one talks in such a retrospective and hopeless way. Seeing the future of Hungary from the past means seeing the future from wars, occupations and fights for freedom, therefore this outlook in nowadays first seems to irrelevant and secondly seems to be unpromising and scary. That is why while reading Orban's speeches one has a feeling that the country is in a condition of war, the great war for survival 'the greatest battle that we could fight together is still ahead of us'. In this world which is full of challenges, and where 'great European countries and nations losing their countries', the fight in his opinion are inevitable in order to 'defend' the country 'which is ours' and this fight will be in the name of Love, love for 'Hungary and Hungarians' (2018).

The 'Others'

Orban often uses terms like 'Fights', 'danger', 'battle', or 'national sovereignty'. And when you read his speeches you have a feeling that there is a threat existing and Hungarians need to 'defend' themselves. Therefore, what makes Orban speeches warlike speeches are his threats, that for instance, if people do not choose and 'stand up for them' again, despite the fact that some of them might not even like them, the country will end up losing its territories, language, identity. As an outcome, someone, as he says, will 'occupy your homeland in the blink of an eye if you do not' (2014). However, Orban also comes up with a solution- Fidesz- which he often portrays as 'Saviours' or even 'Messiah' of the country, sometimes even of Europe. Because of this spirit of the constant fight against someone or something, Orban obviously needs a big enemy, and this enemy is referred to as 'Others'. Nevertheless, it is also interesting that the fight against 'others' is often justified, by the prime minister in all the selected speeches, again with love, yet, the object of the fight, so the 'others' vary and change its faces. The 'others' hence enemies can vary from Soros and leftist opposition in general, whose task is, as Orban says, 'to win power and implement the grand plan: to break Hungary, which stands in the path of immigrants; and first to settle thousands, then tens upon tens

of thousands of immigrants in Hungary within a few years' (2018), to immigrants, who for some reason are always mentioned as 'Illegal Immigrants' (2015, 2018) or 'people coming from places with different civilizational roots' (2014). Another time they are even mentioned as 'danger' (2018) (in 2014 March speech refugee influx in Europe did not represent a big issue for Hungary yet, that is why in a speech given in 2014 immigrants or refugees are not mentioned in anyways, however, this speech holds very exclusionary rhetoric against 'others' and is rather focusing on patriotism and on what being Hungarian means, which we will discuss further). Besides, Brussels, as EU reference, is also referred to as 'others', which wants 'to dilute the population of Europe and to replace it, to cast aside our culture, our way of life and everything which separates and distinguishes us Europeans from the other peoples of the world' (2018). Along with the European Union, which, as the prime minister believes, became an 'ideological obsession' and goes against 'sovereignty of a nation-state' and therefore is dangerous for them (2015). Nevertheless, the EU and EU countries are still seen by him more like victims rather than enemies, victims of their own 'Experiment' as he describes it. The definition of the 'Experiment' in his speech is rather offensive and xenophobic, as he explains it as a process in which 'several European countries have decided to welcome masses of people coming from places with different civilisational roots' and as an outcome of this 'experiment', in his opinion, the 'illegal immigrants' arrange terrorist attacks in Europe, and in general it increases the rate of crime in the countries and causes an economic crisis (2015). And while European countries 'surrendered' Hungary will not do so because Hungary to him is "Europe's Gaullists" that will keep endeavouring to save the European civilization (2015).

'Illegal Immigrants'

As we explained in the very beginning of this research, refugees and not 'illegal immigrants' (those are different things!) do not cause a crisis; they are fleeing from it. Let us finally explain what illegal immigrant which by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is referred to as 'irregular migrant' means. The term according to

IOM applies to ‘a person who, owing to **irregular entry**, breach of a condition of entry or the expiry of their legal basis for entering and residing, lacks legal status in a transit or **host country** ‘ (IOM, 2011) while a refugee is ‘A person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country ‘. Accordingly, we see that the ‘threat’ that endangers Hungary and its values is a victim herself/himself and the only fight she/he fought in the fight for the free and honourable life, by escaping the actual danger and asking for the protection. Already back in 2005 UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres urged ‘international community to make a clear distinction between refugees and terrorists while stressing UNHCR’s commitment to protecting both refugees and internally displaced people’ (Spindler, 2005), therefore confusing electorate and making them believe that refugees are terrorists is dangerous and causes negative emotions and fear from both, sides. Despite all of it, there is one thing we agree with Orban, mass migration is a matter that ‘provokes strong emotions’ (2015) and he definitely knows strategically how to make use of this sensitive topic in order to trigger electorate’s feelings and sow the fear in them against all the refugees.

Having discussed previously what ‘Politics of Fear’ means and how does it work we do believe that this rhetoric and formulation of a number of issues, especially immigration and refugee influx which is always described in Orban’s words as “illegal Immigrants” serves to only one mission and political strategy- to create an illusionary enemy that threatens Hungarians. By portraying the question of mass migration as the “question of common sense and morals, a question both of the heart and the mind” (2015) he attempts to make people and their identity, religion, patriotism, and passion for a country feel endangered and thus his conclusion about how to react -” Fight” sounds to be imminent and obvious. This strategy not only fears people but also draws them into expecting ‘survival plan’ instead of political plan and platform from political power, of

how to economically, socially or politically progress the country. As ruling political power calls them for the fight in order to “preserve Hungary as a Hungarian country”, because “there are those who want to take our country from us(...)foreigners coming from other continents, who do not speak our language, and who do not respect our culture, our laws or our way of life: people who want to replace what is ours with what is theirs” (2018). What we are trying to say is that the logical and even natural reaction to that is to think about either how to avoid it, or if it is unavoidable how to confront it, which is an outcome speech intended to get.

It is important to note that in this research I do not want to say that Orban and his party do not have relevant politically and economically strong goals for the country, this is the part of their political program which we do not study. However, we do say that in the selected public speeches that are translated in English and published on Fidesz/KDNP government official website do not cover any particular political program (these topics are only slightly addressed in his speech which we will discuss down) of how the country is going to develop economically, socially, or politically.

Political platform

As we have earlier mentioned Orban in his speeches, avoids an in-depth discussion about the economic and social plans for the future of the country. However, in all fairness, we decided to talk about the smallest parts of his long speeches where he refers to these topics. As we said, there are no particular goals underlined in the speeches, although, we do realise that these does not mean they do not exist, however apparently the prime minister even in his pre-election appearance does not consider it reasonable to clarify for the electorate what are the party’s goals and ways of a developing country. His views, in the speeches, about the future progress are as broad as this: ‘Now we need to and now we can build the new Hungarian economy where everybody gets a job...now we can stop the decline in our nation’s population...now we can give an honourable life to pensioners...now we can build schools that give chances and opportunities to future

generations' (2014), and this plan is mentioned in the very end of his speech. The discussion about the political platform in Orbán's public appearances (in selected cases) does not even take one per cent of the whole speech, while topics like 'securing the Hungarian land' 'obviously' always requires close observation and clarification. Although, in the next year (2015) speech we see the explanation of why Hungary's economic development might slow down in the future- 'Illegal Immigration', he believes that the: 'problem which we shall have to cope with is a problem which is economic in nature. Western experience shows that illegal immigrants contribute to rising unemployment' and he adds that it is 'as simple as one plus one equals two' to understand that: 'The arrival of new waves of people in countries with already high unemployment rates results in even higher unemployment'. Hence, this 'argument' somehow buried all his other, year ago given promises, and framed the logical conclusion that 'illegal immigration challenge' (which is, in fact, imagined enemy, created on electorates insecurities) limits the country to develop, or in Orbán's words 'It is a threat to the security of European people – a threat which undermines our ability to cement our economic achievements' (2015). This justification apparently has become enough for the prime minister in next election year (2018) to completely ignore and stay silent about the political or economic platforms, and instead, to rather artistically describe the 'big enemies', who oppose them and who want to build an 'evil' 'open society, a world without borders or nations, new forms of family devalued work and cheap workers'. Studying and detecting priorities of Orbán's public speeches allows us to assume that the political and economic goals aiming the progress of the country are one of the least prioritised topics of the speeches. Even though it is crucial for the electorate to hear because they have not imagined, but very real and practical problems which we will discuss in the next subchapter.

Hungarians and Hungarian mindset

While reading speeches, one often comes across the words like "Hungarian", "Hungarian mindset", or the sentences like "this is what Hungarians are", "We know

what it means to be Hungarian” (2014, 2015, 2018) and naturally it raises a question what does being Hungarian mean anyways in Orban’s mind? Orban seems to have a very explicit and comprehensive answer to that: “unified and strong, free and responsible, brave and sober, humanitarians and patriots”(2014) which at the first glance, seems to be rather a positive definition, however, if you put it in the war preparation like speech, which we should because that is the spirit Orban’s speech has, then it sounds dangerous especially because he continues with “Hungarian means to be part of huge and open conspiracy where we won’t allow the Hungarian language to be squeezed out of villages and cities, schools or churches. You are part of this large and open conspiracy where Hungary means it should be Hungarian” (2014). His definition of “Hungarians” usually in every subsequent part of his speeches becomes more and more nationalistic, fundamentals, and exclusionary towards “Others”. He believes that being Hungarian means to be a “Fighter”, to never give up, to be “Christian” who fight for their language, homeland and culture (2014, 2015,2018). He notes that Hungarians should have the homeland for Hungarians, because “This is our homeland, this is our life, and we have no other. Therefore, we shall fight for it to the end and we shall never surrender” (2018), this sentence which became quite popular and not only within the country might sound quite harmless without a full context. And the full context is that Orban believes that Europe is invaded by ‘illegal immigrants’ and Hungary is not going to share this fate. Sharing this fate, he says, in next one or two decades will result in “tens upon tens of millions will set out for Europe from Africa and the Middle East” therefore from people “from different civilizational roots” (2018) thus it means to hand the country over to foreigners who will ‘destruct and replace’ everything in their homeland.

Questionnaire

Orban often highlights “Let us be proud of the fact that we are the only country in the European Union which has asked people whether or not they want mass immigration “ (2018) and he refers to the eight million questionnaires Fidesz sent to the citizens. He

says that out of eight million they got back more than one million completed ones and this particular part of the 2015 years' speech is especially interesting. He says:

“More than two-thirds of Hungarians see the issue of the spread of terrorism as relevant to their own lives. Three-quarters of them believe that illegal immigrants are a threat to the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians. Four-fifths of Hungarians think that the Brussels’ policy on immigration and terrorism has failed and that we, therefore, need a new approach and more stringent regulations. In contrast to Brussels’ lenient policy, four-fifths of Hungarians encourage the Government to adopt stricter regulations to curb illegal immigration: regulations allowing us to detain people who have illegally crossed Hungarian borders, and to deport them within the shortest possible time. And according to eighty per cent of those who completed the questionnaire, illegal immigrants should cover the costs of providing for them during their time in Hungary... And finally, the most important response, which takes precedence over all others so far, is that the overwhelming majority of Hungarians – ninety-five per cent of those who completed the questionnaire – think that we must focus support on Hungarian families and the children they can have, rather than on immigration “(2015)

The picture Orban is painting of the Hungarians' concerns is considerably based on the outcome of this highly criticized questionnaire conducted in 2015. From his speech it might seem like all the Hungarians are hostile to immigrants, however, it is essential to understand that the questionnaire per se was radical, subjective and biased in many ways. The people who completed the questionnaire did not come up with those xenophobic ideas themselves, instead, the formulations of the questions were limiting them with answers. That is why we want to discuss the questionnaire in depth. The questionnaire contained 12 yes or no questions and an introductory letter from Prime Minister Orban. It was mailed to all citizens aged over 18 and as Orban mentioned they sent it to in total 8 million people. The questions of the mail were discriminatory,

xenophobic and unethical, for instance: “Do you agree that economic immigrants endanger the jobs and livelihoods of the Hungarian people?”

- “Would you support the government placing illegal immigrants in internment camps?”
- “Do you agree with the government that instead of allocating funds to immigration we should support Hungarian families and those children yet to be born?”
- “Do you agree that mistaken immigration policies contribute to the spread of terrorism?”

The introduction of the issue by Prime Minister, was explicitly and obviously linking the refugee crisis (which was again mentioned as ‘illegal immigration’) and the rise of terrorism and economic crisis. In fact, Orban made a proposal to people to make those ‘illegal immigrants’ pay for the cost of their detention. The letter said that accompanied the questions stated “Economic migrants cross our borders illegally, and while they present themselves as asylum-seekers, in fact, they are coming to enjoy our welfare systems and the employment opportunities our countries have to offer”, this sentence itself is the fabrication of reality and misleads the public attitude towards the dramatic situation of the refugees. Cécile Pouilly, a spokeswoman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights reacted on this questionnaire as well and underlined that there was no reason to think that migrants are seeking for the better jobs or that asylum seekers had anything to do with the terrorism. She stated: “This is fundamentally discriminatory and (...) these people deserve their human rights, as well as anybody else” and about the Hungarian government, added: “It is this government’s duty to fight against discrimination and xenophobia and by linking these two issues they are doing the opposite”. She also talked about the introduction part of the letter and described it as shocking as the prime minister was calling the economic immigrants “a threat which we must stop in its tracks”.

We believe that this malicious questionnaire is one of the perfect examples showing how political power can encourage hatred among society towards the artificial threat. The threat consists of nothing but people who escaped the fear of death in the war zones and people who are asking for an opportunity, again, asking, not threatening. This letter with its questions is a great illustration of the politics of fear which creates a false imagination and idea of the world, as well as unreasonable fears, and offers no empirical and thorough explanation. Orban aspires to make Hungarians believe that he is only representing the 'Hungarian stance'. Orban justifies his racist, xenophobic and nationalistic attitudes by making people believe that instead of imposing his positions on people represents the ones of the people. Prime minister highlights that he talks in the name of Hungarians who clearly 'have not lost their common sense' and the prime minister has to 'obey' to what 'Hungarian people have decided' (2015). Orban shares his pride that people in his country did not want 'illegal immigrants' but the question remains- who does want that? The answer most probably would be no one, and this would be rational, however, as we explained earlier the refugee is not an illegal immigrant and this is a case where words and terms have enormous importance.

One more thing I wanted to underline is that 2018 elections were the first to be held after the refugee crisis in 2015. This occurrence is important because, even though Hungary had the responsibility to take and resettle 1,294 refugees, the Hungarian government decided to not to do so. The Hungarian failure to accept their required quotas for refugees made the European Commission take the country to the European Court of Justice over the case. The government organized the referendum asking whether Hungarians wanted to allow the European Union to mandate the obligatory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary even without the approval of the National Assembly, or not. The referendum resulted in no answer. We would like to underline and agree with the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union that the government "abused" the institution of the referendum, and its campaign is "fundamentally incompatible with a human rights approach". The referendum was another call of Orban

to the electorate that they needed to be inhumane to the non-existing illegal immigrants (by non-existing we refer to the small number of refugees in the country).

In the end, there is one more common between the speeches- the end of the speech (especially pre-election ones). ‘Go for it Hungary, go for it Hungarians!’ (2014,2018) that is how Orbán finishes his long, nationalistic, warlike, sentimental and xenophobic public speakings, sometimes even with national anthems (2018 speech for instance) and calls Hungarians ones again for the support of his hostile politics, which he made it sound like an only option for Hungarians in this ‘frightening world’ where everyone who comes in their country is posed as a terrorist and someone who is trying to take their homeland from them.

4.1.2. Social Grievances

Research has already identified one of the key elements of the Fidesz ideology demonstrated in their speeches, the image of the big enemy and the exclusion of ‘Others’. We have also explained how the right-wing party makes use of the concrete topics to push citizens to mobilise and activate on the matters that are bothering ordinary citizens. On the one hand, Fidesz handles topics such as patriotism, identity, religion, and economy by referring to the incompatibility of different civilizations based on the differences in all the mentioned fields and values. Meanwhile, the refugee influx is portrayed as the real economic, political, and social danger to Hungary and which threatens their national sovereignty and sustainable development. Therefore, refugees (‘illegal immigrants’ in Orbán’s words) are often accused of a number of problems the country is facing in different areas. Accordingly, refugees ended up being a perfect object for the Fidesz political strategy to mobilise on insecurities, sentiments and fears of the electorate. This becomes obvious if we get familiar with the real concerns of the people. We have examined the Hungarian attitudes towards the different issues, aiming to understand what their real-life concerns are and whether they are in any way

addressed by Orban or not? We deem that the main resentment of the electorate is rather successfully imposed by the party.

In the previous subchapter, we have selected speeches given in three different years, 2014, 2015, and 2018. These years cover two national elections and significant social and political occurrence (Refugee crisis) for the whole Europe. Therefore, in this part of the research, we will stick to selected years and will see how the public opinion has changed in this period of time.

According to the survey, in 2014 March, the main concern of the Hungarian people was 'Unemployment' (57%), however, in 2014 speech Orban does not mention even once the unemployment problem even once. Although, twice in his long speech he briefly says that once in the future they will say that Hungarians defended and created jobs in the country, and also once he mentions that in the future, in the new economy everyone will get the job. Talking about the economy, and the 'Economic situation' of the country in general, it represents the second biggest concern of Hungarians and it reaches 38%. Here we would like to include the third biggest number (26%) because it is related to the economic situation and is about the 'Rising prices/inflation/cost of living', these economic problems except the earlier mentioned promise about the creation of a new economy were addressed only one more time in the whole speech, where he is bragging that after 2010 election they manage to have a 'solid economic growth'(2014). Then he continues in the same spirit and says that they managed and 'broke out of the debt traps' (debt in this speech was not mentioned anymore), nevertheless 12% Hungarian society seems to have a different opinion about that. The fourth-biggest resentment of people is 'Crime', and even though Orban does not directly mention the crime problem, he still talks about 'others' alluding to the opposition who are aiming to 'occupy' their homeland and to put people out in the street and to make them poor (2014). Other important concerns of the Hungarian people, in 2014, were ranging from 'Health and social security' (with 13%), to 'Pensions' (7%), or 'Housing' (6%), and 'Taxation' (5%), however, in 2014 pre-election speech of the Prime Minister did not mention any

of these issues apart from pensions, and even here with only one sentence ‘Now we need to and now we can give an honourable life to pensioners.’ (2014). Also, with only one sentence he covered the topic of ‘The education system’, while 3% of the participants of the survey believe it is important for the country. One of the least important issues for Hungarians at this time were ‘immigration’ (2%) and ‘terrorism’ (1%), neither Orban considered these topics important to notice in his speech and instead he focused on discussing the importance of the nation and patriotism.

Although, these data changed completely for the next year, November. Orban's main focus shifted away from being a patriot to fighting against the ‘others’ and this time ‘others’ are not only the opposition parties but also ‘illegal immigrants’ and everyone who supports their influx in Europe. Changed the social perspective about the important issues for the country. ‘Unemployment’ still remained the first concern of Hungarians (36%), but the second biggest problem now became ‘Immigration’ with 34 %. ‘Economic situation’ moved to third place and shared it with ‘Health and social security’ (23%). People believed that ‘Rising prices/inflation/ cost of living’ is not such a big problem anymore and in the year the percentage of the people who were concerned about the issue decreased by 8% (became 18%). The indicators of the issue like ‘Crime’, ‘Taxation’, ‘Housing’, ‘Government debt’ and ‘Education system’ remained relatively same, however, increased the number of people who think that ‘Pensions’ (12%, 5 per cent rise) and ‘Terrorism’ (8%, 7 per cent rise) became more important issues for the country. Looking at the numbers it is obvious that the biggest difference between 2014 and 2015 numbers shows the issue like ‘immigration’. Below, we will further talk about the immigrant numbers in Hungary and discuss whether it was rational or imagined fear. Before, we want to underline the higher correlation between the issues emphasised by Orban in his speech and issues that resented the electorate in 2015. Orban, as we talked in the previous subchapter, discussed rather extensively the refugee crisis and talked about ‘illegal immigrants’ that endanger the European Civilization and as well as their country in many ways. He names a number of the

problems countries will face if they give up and allow ‘others’ to come to their homeland. His list of the problems caused by immigration covers topics such as crime, terrorism, unemployment, security, economic situation, and government debt. Concluding out of the gathered information, the prime minister addressed all the main concerns of the people, however, the cause of all of these problems was portrayed to be immigrants. So the immigrants were accused to be the determinant of all the concerns people had. Hence, we can say that Orban indeed, reacted to most of the real-life matters of the year, however, the discussion was conducted in a context that blamed refugees to shape the social and economic challenges people were facing.

In 2018 (March) survey reveals that people have changed their priorities and concerns again. Right before the national election 2018, 46% of Hungarians consider that ‘Health and social security’ represents the most important challenge the country is facing. It is no surprise that in a country, where the leader comes up with the warlike speeches and scares his citizens with the constant big enemy, people are worried about their security. It is also not surprising that people are worried about the ‘Immigration’ (24%) and this fear is rather often ‘justified’ in Orban’s 2018 speech. Prime minister’s this pre-electoral speech is all about the immigrants and number of powers supporting mass immigration and therefore ‘undermining’ their national sovereignty, values, language, and religious roots in Hungary. Meanwhile, people are still very concerned about more real-life and thorough problems in the country, such as ‘Rising prices/ inflation/ cost of living’ and ‘Economic situation’ (22% and 17%). At the same time, 14% of the people see the ‘Unemployment’ and ‘Pensions’ as significant challenges the country is facing. Survey participants are less satisfied with the ‘Education system’ (13%) of the country as well. However, compared to 2015 fewer people (7%, decreased with 6%) believe that crime represents one of the most important problems for society. Compare to the previously selected survey, there was also no significant change in the indicators of the people who believed that ‘Taxation’, ‘Terrorism’, ‘Housing’ and ‘Government debt’, and the numbers usually range from 5 to 8 per cent. These marks illustrate that the biggest fears

of the people and preferences of what the country needs to work on more or less were covered in Orban's public appearances. In this 2018 year Orban highlights the two main problems the nation is facing, the opposition and the immigrants, and if we consider that people are mostly worried about social and health security and the immigration, we might assume that there is 'similarity' at least between social and political perspectives. However, other salient issues, characterized with the also high number of people resented about those topics, such as inflation, rising prices, pensions, and education system, are not even slightly addressed by the Prime Minister.

Looking at these surveys demonstrates that when it comes to real-life matters and concerns people are not limited to their fears. Instead, they have very empirical, rational and thorough opinions about what is needed to be handled better in their countries, in order to improve their social and economic living standards. On the other hand, the study of the demand side also reveals one essential feature of the PRRP though, its inclusiveness. Inclusive not in a pluralistic, democratic, or multicultural way, but inclusiveness of the number of important areas and subjects people are most worried about. Although, this research argues that in this way, meaning by being inclusive, PRRP, first of all, creates the impression that they respond to what is disturbing the public, in fact even at this time 'they' constantly implies a big enemy- 'others' and put all the blame on them. Therefore, inclusiveness of the salient issues, in anyways, represents a strategy for the supply side to make demand-side believe that their resentments are answered (whilst it is only partly true) and that political power 'cares'.

4.1.3. Rise of the Radical Right-Wing Populism

Above we have discussed the two sides (Supply and Demand) of the PRRP political debate in Hungary. We argue that the political fear and social grievances are likely to lead to the rise of PRRP in the country, here, we want to illustrate how these social resentments and political strategy of the Fidesz were manifested in the national elections

of the country. Due to the fact that our selected years of the study (pre-election speeches, and surveys about public opinions conducted in the same years) covered the last two parliamentary elections of Hungary, we will further discuss how these election results looked like.

On 6th of April, 2014 the ruling coalition, the Hungarian Civic Union-Christian Democratic People's Party (FIDESZ-KDNP), led by Prime Minister Viktor Orban took 133 seats. The coalition secured a two-thirds majority (66.83 %) in the new 199-member National Assembly (previously, the National Assembly had 386 seats) (INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, IPU, 2014). According to OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report (2014)

The electorate's participation was rather high and out of 5,027,820 people, almost half (2,264,780) of them voted for the coalition. In 2014 elections for the first time a new electoral system was used (it was adopted in November 2012). According to the new two-round system the 106 seats are elected by majority vote. The remaining 93 seats are elected under the proportional representation system using party lists. Out of 106 single-member seats, 96 ones went to the FIDESZ-KDNP coalition (National Election Office, 2014). In this election, for the first time as well, Hungarians citizens abroad were allowed to vote for the party lists. After the law on Hungarian citizenship modification and the simplification of the naturalization procedure for the people with Hungarian origins and knowledge of the Hungarian language, in 2010, about 200,000 (IPU, 2014) abroad, with Hungarian roots were able to register and participate in the 2014 national assembly election. Nevertheless, OSCE and ODIHR in the report stated that the government could have done better within the country with national minorities, in order to reach out and organise voter education activities (2014). The organisation also highlights that the voter education video which circulated on the Internet several weeks before election day, 'appeared to be in the format of an official election administration video. It included nationalistic imagery and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán

calling for non-residents to vote' (OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, 2014).

FIDESZ-KDNP, the Hungarian Civic Union-Christian Democratic People's Party of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, again came out on top with 66.83% of votes in the Parliamentary Election 2018 as well. Therefore, the coalition won the same amount of seats (133), however this time they got more proportional votes than the previous time (42). The 2018 election results were not only one another election for Hungary, its role in the state history was way more significant, not just for the country itself but for the EU and its values. The election was subsequent to the events like The refugee crisis, to the big questionnaire about illegal migrants, and referendum all of which we have discussed above. All of this revealed that country was rather xenophobic and scared. Scared of something imaginary, and imaginary because the migrant and especially 'illegal migrant' Orbán would always refer to, has never actually existed in the country. As I have already mentioned before, Hungary had a responsibility to resettle only 1,294 while many other countries according to the European quota system had to deal with significantly bigger numbers of refugees. Meanwhile, Hungary, in 2016 granted refugee status only to 425 people out of 49,479 asylum seekers. At the end that is not even 1% of the total number (IPU, 2018). At this point, we would agree with one of the opposition party (Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party) leader's Gergely Kovács's description of the situation, that the Prime Minister created a "phenomenon" out of a real European problem, and the government "is trying to pose every migrant as a potential terrorist". In addition, the mentioned party seeking to reveal the groundlessness of the immigration fear of the people, organized the campaign, spending most of its finances on it. The campaign was sarcastic in its nature, and held slogans such as "Did you know there is a war in Syria?", "Did you know? A tree may fall on your head?", or "Did you know? The average Hungarian is more likely to see a UFO than a refugee in his lifetime". The aim of the campaign was to encourage people to vote invalidly on the migrant quota referendum, however, this plan did not succeed,

neither in referendum nor in the following election. The election which took place after two years, and so gave two years of time to people to realise that the country was not facing any kind of threat from 'illegal immigrant', two years to notice that Hungary did not share its part of responsibility in EU, and to notice that they actually did not resettle big amount of refugees in the country.

Apparently, Orban's focus in his speeches on migrants has been more powerful and successful than any other attempts by a number of NGOs and opposition parties to show people that there is not an actual danger in the refugees, and more importantly there is no refugee and especially illegal immigrant in the country.

Overall, we wanted to reveal the power of both sides- political power and its rhetoric, the social grievances and the people's resentments. We can say that there is a definite match between what people are most insecure and scared about and what ruling power is focusing on and posing as the threat. It is obvious that from both sides the priority is mostly national security and Hungary only for Hungarians. However, people have other important, very real, life-standards threatening concerns, such as unemployment, rising prices, inflation, low pensions, low-quality health and educational systems. The point is that while Orban and his party are in power for already a decade and focus on mostly imaginary threats, the country sets back in its economic and political development and that makes its citizens victims. Victims of Orban's political strategy (Politics of Fear) which for years already has managed to use the insecurities and fears of the people against them. It is essential to understand that when a radical right-wing populist party such as Fidesz in this case, believes and claims that it represents the electorate's interests and their concerns it means that the party represents all of the resentments of people. Being the voice of the people means talking for them, in their name, about the social and economic difficulties people are experiencing and having on a daily basis, and not only the fears or let us say fear of the people. Fear that is coming from the insecurity of the society which has had to fight for centuries for its independence. It is no surprise that Hungarians care about their national sovereignty and security, but one cannot limit

the electorate's grievances only to that interest. It is important to let people know what is actually happening, so when you do not accept refugees, the party and especially ruling party needs to make it clear for the society that they do not face that 'challenge' anymore, instead of still bringing up that topic and triggering sentiments and patriotic feelings of the electorate. We do believe that if people had the real picture of the problem the EU has been facing, and which Hungary has avoided in a way, the outcome would have been different. One's political preferences can easily be manipulated if you threaten them with something that undermines their safeness, their identity, and independence. In a more impartial and fair environment where citizens are not intimidated by the fear of survival, we think, more attention would be paid to more important issues such as employment, and economic development. People are not only what they are scared of, and if political power limits people to that means they are not the voice of the people anymore. Instead, they are acting in accordance with their own interest which is based on their political strategy (Politics of Fear).

After all, we come back to our research question- To what extent are the salient social grievances converging with the party rhetorics of the self-claimed representatives of the people, and what is its impact on the rise of PRRPs? And the answer is that the Fidesz and KDNP coalition according to what we have examined above are definitely not addressing most of the grievances of the society. However, they address the biggest one of all of the resentments, and this particular one is rather powerful in its nature. powerful enough to influence electoral preferences. But the fact is it is also the unreal, and unfounded, if we look at the actual numbers of the Refugees in Hungary in recent years - according to Asylum Information Database and European Council on Refugees and Exiles the rejection rate, just in 2019 for instance, to the granting of protection status in Hungary was 91.5% for the 468 applicants, in 2018 it was 61.5% for the 670 applicants, and in 2015 it was 83.3% for the 175,960 applicants (AIDA; country reports) - yet the coalition does not make it clear that almost every year the number of asylum seekers decrease and still the rejection rate for them to get the refugee status increases,

instead the party deludes the public due to their political strategy. So the question remains: does that make them the real voice of Hungarians?

4.2. The Case of Austria (Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ))

The case of FPÖ is in a way very different from Fidesz and at the same time similar in most important parts. First of all, the way FPÖ makes use of the Politics of Fear is rather sophisticated compared to Fidesz. I chose two different pre-electoral speeches given in 2013 and late 2016. The speeches reveal how the rhetoric has changed in the past few years and how the refugee crisis has influenced the focuses of the PRRP. Selected speeches show the political and ideological priorities of FPÖ and they are also good examples of rather less obvious and more advanced xenophobic rhetoric which is reproducing general-ambiguous prejudices. As for, social grievances part, I chose the data in respective years, and of course, two parliamentary elections results as an indicator for the rise of PRRP. We will also see that there are many important similarities in the discourses and the focuses FPÖ and Fidesz make which I will elaborate more on in the next chapter.

4.2.1. ‘Political Fear’ as the political strategy

FPÖ former chairman and eloquent and demagogue leader Heinz-Christian Strache (or H.C. Strache which is a brand name of the politician as Wodak would say) has given a number of memorable and very interesting speeches. Strache is a rather talented and convincing speaker who makes people feel like one of them. The one who understands them, and feels their resentments. The one who in the atmosphere where citizens are ruled and represented by, as Strache would describe, ‘literally an imbecile’ (2013) cares about them and conveys empathy to them. In General, Strache is very much portraying himself as one of the angry citizens, and his anger is directed towards a number of issues, starting from the established parties finishing with the EU and Brussels that act

without considering the people's will. 2013 speech was made in Tyrol which is a region in Austria, and he had very informal (even though it was a meeting within an official pre-electoral campaign). The region of Tyrol itself holds principal importance for FPÖ and according to party belief, it bears a great national significance for the country. In fact, party leaders (Strache, Hofer) believe that German-speaking Italian south part of the mentioned region should be allowed to join Austria which itself is one of their key nationalistic goals (Wodak, 2016). Therefore, it is particularly and let us say even personally interesting for the party leaders to win in this region. This is why the party represented a candidate who is 'committed Tyrolean, just as one would have wished for the Tyroleans' while the region had 'weakest governor Tyrol has ever had'. In general, Strache in his speeches is very offensive and aggressive towards established parties and in the way, he articulates himself while talking about them. Therefore, our first category which characterizes both speeches would be anti-establishment.

Anti-Establishment:

Strache is very direct about the reasons for the all maldevelopments within the country, and one of the main reasons for these maldevelopments, according to him, is the government and established parties themselves. He accuses the government of corruption and state budget squandering and says that the 'Court of Auditors has published a report which states that 72 million euros of taxpayers' (2013) money has been allocated via the ministries to companies close to the ÖVP'. He calls leader party members 'liars' who gave lots of promises but have not actually done any of them and 'in reality state completely fails to help and support their own families' (2013) because of them. He portrays the established parties as traders, traders of their own country-Austria. And says that they steal money people work for with taxes, that are rather high and people, hard-working people can 'hardly survive' in Salzburg or Tyrol. He says that the government gives away people to other countries like Cyprus while its own people (1.4 million Austrians) are on the poverty line. He calls the politicians from established parties 'weakest' and he justifies this assessment by personally knowing them 'from

Parliament' (2013). And those 'weak politicians' are not taking proper care of any field, starting from the education system in which, as Strache says, according to PISA results in Austria has very 'negative' results (as the matter of fact it is not true, as according to OECD report about the PISA results in 2012 Austria's performance is above OECD average) and finishing with the economic system. And he adds that considering all these he does not 'have faith in this system' (2013) by which he not only makes blameworthy the established parties for all the maldevelopment taking place in the country but also he makes attending citizens feel that he understands them and shares their opinion, that he is one of them who is as much concerned as they are.

In his 2016 speech, he also starts with maldevelopments that the country is experiencing because of the 'federal government'. The Red/Black coalition (SPÖ/VPÖ) in Strache's word is not 'capable of action' and describes it as a broken marriage that characterizes with 'irresponsible and frivolous actions'. Strache anti-establishment rhetoric holds rather adviser's tone aiming 'to analyze obvious maldevelopments, to draw conclusions from them and to find solutions' instead of just criticizing. This attitude creates an impression of him having good intentions and makes him look like a politician who is genuinely concerned and cares about the country, however the speech is very much about the anti-establishment leaders that impose their tough politics on people and do not protect the sovereignty of the country (we will further elaborate on sovereignty topic). He claims that federal government not only pursues tough economic policy and puts an 'enormous tax burden' on its citizens, but it also does not represent the interests of Austrian people in foreign relations and on EU level: 'We are entitled to demand that the Austrian federal government at least represents our interests within the European Union as best it can. But they do not do so' (2016). Strache goes even farther and claims that the government is not only ineffective and 'weak' but it also violates fundamental human rights such as the freedom of expression and voting. He portrays his party as 'fighter for real democracy', 'saviour', 'liberals' who call everything by its name and meanwhile federal government and 'self-appointed moral guardians try to demonize

whole concepts in order to make their use'. This way Strache positions FPÖ as the 'democratic underdog' (Hellström; Nilsson, 2010) which enables him to capitalize on that image and call for the support of the electorate.

Strache in both speeches refers to the established parties as 'They' and this way of redistribution of roles 'we' and 'they', indirectly intends to say that he and his party stand on the side of voters and that he is together with people in this fight. However, he alone, according to him, cannot change the country: 'I can only be the one who acts as a representative for you, who shakes people up, who ultimately also awakens their consciousness and who makes your opinion known loudly and who will fight for it, but the more people go with me and the more are willing to contribute to it, the stronger we will become and the more difficult it will be to stop us'. And so, by constructing himself as one of 'us' and asking for the support in the fight and back up, aiming to save 'us' from 'them'. Strache underlines that there is a gap between the people and the established parties 'representatives of the governing parties and democratic awareness and closeness to the people are lacking' and that this gap is caused by them (governing parties) not reflecting on the will of people. This rhetoric gives a room to him to also emphasize that this gap can only be filled by FPÖ politics which is all about 'transparency and openness' (2016). He in his speech conveys empathy towards 'hard-working' and in a way special people and portrays himself and the party that holds the 'truth' about what people want as accountable governmental positioning.

The 'Others'

Above mentioned others do, in Spraches speeches, do not allude to only established parties in the federal government, that engage in negotiations of free trade agreement that 'undermines' Austrian 'high food, health, and environmental standards' and agrees on 'sacrificing' Austrians' will to EU decision-makers' interests. But, he also detected other 'enemies' of Austrian society. First and foremost, he alludes to Brussels and in general the EU that 'threatens' sovereignty of the country and I will further elaborate on

it. Another important enemy of the society, in his mind, are big corporations and banks taxation model of which is profiting only for them while ‘they do it at the expense of all of us’ and ‘take from citizens’ (2013). He names as an example, ORF (Austrian Broadcasting Corporation) which charges citizens without permission if one is registered. The ORF, in Strache’s opinion, is not only a financial burden for the citizens, even though it is a compulsory household fee, but it also conveys ‘party political propaganda’ and ‘one-sided reporting’. One more enemy of Austrians is ‘self-proclaimed intellectuals’ who tell people ‘who they have to vote ‘and what would be a ‘wise’ decision (2017). By intellectuals here, he refers to, the ‘artists’ for instance and/or ‘dubious associations’ that ‘are bought over subsidies and often play an important role in the fight against the right, even if it is an inglorious role’. Except for from domestic ‘enemies of the fatherland,’ there are also enemies from ‘abroad’ and it ranges from Turkey and Turkish migrants that are not willing to integrate to immigrants in general, and particularly Muslim immigrants. The demonization of ‘perceived enemies’, once again gives an opportunity to capitalize on it and profit from the fear of the society, however, fear is not limited only by asylum seekers or corporations, it also covers individuals Frank Stronach, or as Strache would call him Frankie, Who is Austrian Canadian businessman that founded the party in Austria and wanted to implement ‘American madness’ where businessmen ‘can buy anything’ while he ‘believes’ that man is not ‘limited to his material circumstances’ (2016). All of these are ironic in a way if we consider the latest scandalous video of him, where he described how important financial support is for the party and that with finances they could control the media (like Orban as he said) he purported to be so concerned about because of its biased relationship towards established parties. However, the list of enemies’ people need to be conscious about does not finish here, he also warns citizens about Angela Merkel and her ‘refugee policy’ and says that she opened a door of Europe not only to refugees but also economic migrants. He describes her as ‘not only the most powerful but also the most dangerous woman in Europe, for whom the principle "right emanates from people" is only an empty phrase’ (2016). Merkel as the representation of

their opposite politics is not just a person with an antagonistic position for FPÖ, it is also a 'blameworthy' for all the 'woes' of Austria and whole Europe caused by immigration and its accompanying 'challenges' FPÖ is so focused on.

Above mentioned Anti-EU rhetoric is particularly interesting considering that Strache and FPÖ claim that their interest is not 'Austria's withdrawal from the EU - a so-called exit petit is completely wrong' they would rather assess their criticism of the EU as 'liberal wish' (2016). Yet, their attitude towards the EU that 'is once again proving to be a henchman for global corporate interests' and sound very much like a pro exit. Even though, HC Strache argues that he cares EU and that is why he is talking about the maldevelopments taking place in it, still he is very much anti-Brussels, anti-Eurozone, anti-EU banks and the organisational bureaucracies that 'violate member countries sovereignty' (2016) and for that Austria even pays membership money. Money that goes to 'Bankrupted states' while the introduction of Euro caused economic challenges and that according to 'the average Austrian has suffered a loss of more than 30% in real wages' (however, I have found no evidence of such statement/data from UBS) (2013). Strache describes EU and its elites as 'detached from the worries and fears of its citizens, makes completely lonely decisions and tramples on the sovereignty of the member states' and wishes an 'equal' and 'de-bureaucratized' atmosphere in the organisation in order to be able 'to work together with all political forces in Europe' aiming to strengthen and make 'comprehensive democratic reform' happen. The purported claim to be a pro-EU politician is aiming to deceive people and convince them that they share European values, however, their image of the EU is very different from the real EU picture. Their vision of EU excludes its openness, to migrants, to the Muslim religion, to new countries (like Turkey) excluded its constitutional basis manifested in Lisbon treaty, which in their opinion 'took important competences of sovereign country' and its free trade agreements with other countries' which undermines their standards. And so he concludes that the EU is acting 'irresponsibly' and its decision-makers let European people down. Thus we can see that the claim that

they are not anti-EU is not really valid, as FPÖ goes against everything the EU stands for and accuses it of undermining ‘the ordinary jurisdiction of the national states’ . The vision they have about how the EU should be working is not matching the actual picture of the EU. Therefore yes, probably they are not even against EU, but we should be accurate here, they are not against EU they have in mind and not the one that already exists they even admit that they want to ‘change of direction in line with the motto, as many citizens' wishes as possible and as little Brussels as is necessary’. It should be underlined that this anti-EU rhetoric is based on the anti-elite centred attitude, and the EU with its ‘decision-makers in Brussels’ is portrayed as an elite that acts regardless of its citizens will and imposes its politics to the people without even considering the needs.

The ‘others’ and ‘scapegoats’ are needed for FPÖ rhetoric in order to justify its discourse and to shift blame and simplify a complex phenomenon and development occurring in the country. The simplification of the problems, on the one hand, makes the discussion easy and simplistic which creates an illusion that the electorate can get easy, understandable, and clear-cut answers for the salient complex issues. And On the other hand, this rhetoric manages to evoke negative emotions and fear in the electorate which leads to appeal to the party that is claiming to fight for the people- FPÖ. his rhetoric and this detachment from ‘others’ are also accompanied with the use of personal pronouns like ‘I’ (‘ich’)- ‘ I deliberately say, so help me god for I trust in god, the right should again come from the people’ (‘ ich sage ganz bewusst so wahr mir Gott helfe, denn auf Gott vertraue ich und das Recht soll wieder vom Volk ausgehen’)- and ‘me’ (‘mich’) - ‘they did not listen to me, they criticized me (...) they insulted not only me (...) and now they realized that we were right’ (‘da hat man nicht auf mich gehört, da hat man mich kritisiert (...) beschimpft nicht nur mich (...) und jetzt kommen sie darauf dass wir Recht gehabt haben’)- and ‘we’ (‘wir’)- ‘We fight’ (‘wir kämpfen’)- and by ‘we’ he switches between ‘we’ as Austrians and ‘we’ as a party. With personal pronouns, he directs to the

electorate and simulates proximity and personal relationship and contact with people as their ‘advocate’, ‘representative’, and/or ‘saviour’.

Anti-Immigration

Strache in both speeches is very clear about what Europe means to FPÖ. He says Europe and particularly Western Europe ‘is more than just a geographical concept’ (2016), the Western culture, in his words, values ‘identity’ and ‘stands for the freedom of the individual and freedom of the people... The European concept of freedom roots in an idealistic worldview, which does not regard the existence of man as being limited to his material circumstances’. Western individualism grants freedom ‘as the highest good’ and it can only exist in the circumstances ‘where all fundamental rights, especially opinion rights, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of the press and information are actually given and guaranteed by the state’. The FPÖ with that rhetoric clearly attempts to arouse and trigger emotions and to create a sense of common European identity. The identity which values and has a number of ‘obvious’ characteristics such as Christianity as the cultural heritage (Wodak, 2015), gender equality, and freedom. However, in his speech, it is obvious that all these predominantly apply to European Societies and excludes the ‘others’ which in this case implies every non-European and especially Muslim Non-European. He emphasizes how important the freedom of expression, of religion, of speech for Europe and particularly for Austria and yet all these fundamental rights, for some reason, does not apply to migrants. Strache underlines the cultural ‘incompatibility’ and the of it reason is not only the different and foreign cultural background but also the different religion- Islam. This claim is justified with ‘ostentatious disregard by Muslims for the legal equality of men and women’ (2016) and says that all the Muslims marginalize women and force them to wear a burqa, and in his opinion, it should be forbidden in Austria. Accordingly, the bottom line of his rhetoric is that all Austrians in the country should enjoy fundamental rights and that they should have freedom of speech and

religion but no migrant can be Muslim because it is incompatible with Austrian Christian identity. HC Strache also explains the reason for it and we need to cite this:

'Symbolically, the House of Austria belongs to the Austrians as owners. We Austrians decide about our property. That is the same as with the Turks. There is the House of Turkey, there the Turks decide. Then there is the House of China and there the Chinese decide. There is the House of Greece and there the Greeks decide. Just as it should be everywhere as a matter of course. In the Austrian House, we decide. We decide, which house rules we give ourselves, which house rules we give, how many guests we want to allow in our house, under which criteria, how many guests can be accommodated in our guest room or not, we decide that. (...) We are experiencing racism, yes, but directed against us Austrians. You'll get hit on because you're Austrian. Then you hear (slang): "What are you looking at, you damned Austrian. You want foot blows?"
(2013)

Accordingly, Austria for immigrants is a 'guest house' and everyone who stays in this 'house' should obey the rules that are set in this house. The 'house owners' decide how many immigrants- 'guests'- they want in there and what would be the conditions for up comers. Strache even goes further, and says that because of the mass influx of immigrants they are the victims of racism in their homeland 'their ancestors' fought for and that Austrians cannot even dare to raise their voice against them. Therefore, we see how the speeches develop, he first creates the sense of common national and European identity and triggers nostalgic emotions by reminding the audience what they are (Christians, free, fighters, modern), and at the same time, he alludes to the differences to 'others'. And Strache simultaneously exploits exclusionary politics towards immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants and this way he justifies his racist, xenophobic agenda. In the end, he calls for the radical 'fight': 'If we want to protect our homeland, we have

to act more self-confidently and confront a wrongly understood tolerance even more resolutely than we until this day' (2016).

Refugee influx represents one of the biggest 'scapegoats' in Strache's rhetoric, and it gives the party an opportunity to accuse immigrants of causing challenges such as the rise of crime, unemployment, and cheap labour. Strache points out that there are 'enough Austrian criminals' and even though he does not like them as well still they have to live with them, but 'importing criminals into Austria in addition' would make those people believe that 'they can be criminals here without consequences' (2013). He also brings up an example of New year's eve when sexual assaults took place in Germany and uses it as an argument and justification of picturing immigrants as 'dangerous' and 'aggressive'. Those immigrants, according to him, are not willing integrate themselves in the host countries and it 'became obvious' when Austrians with Turkish origins after the failed military coup in July in Turkey organized a demonstration in Vienna as well, and this case showed 'for whom their heart beats in truth and how far the long arm of the totalitarian and dictatorial ruling Turkish prime minister Erdogan ultimately reaches' (2016). HC Strache's anti-Turkish attitude, in general, goes so far that he claims that there is no place in the EU for Turkey which does not fit into the organisation in anyways (with values, religion, geographically and economically as well). He portrays them along with other immigrants as aggressive and unmodernized Muslim societies that do not appreciate granted 'citizenships' and do not feel loyalty towards the host countries and this incompatibility might lead to the 'civil war' (2016). Therefore, he creates this dramatic picture where Austrians need to fight and raise their voice against refugee influx in order to avoid the drastic consequences. He covers his anti-Muslim attitudes with quasi-feminism and imaginary care for the Muslim women who are ALWAYS forced (never mentioned as the decision made by women) to cover themselves with the burqa. Strache shows a fake empathy to people who are in actual need of protection, but simultaneously he sets rules even for them and

talks about the criteria they need to meet in order to deserve living next to them ‘in their house’.

In the very beginning, I described HC Strache as an eloquent and demagogue and this is indeed true if we also look on how he manages to shift a perspective in his rhetoric and instead of coming up with aggressive and rude xenophobic and racist sentences he switches to ‘Austria first’ discourse. This way he not only makes Austrians feel privileged, which in a way also justifies his anti ‘others’ (immigrants, elites, EU, Turkey...) approach but at the same time makes people feel that someone cares about them and values them ‘first of all, responsibility towards our own compatriots’ (2013) responsibility of theirs is to preserve ‘social system and social structure, which is based on solidarity and cohesion’ and not to allow to anyone especially immigrants to ‘shake’ it ‘to its very foundations’ (2016). And as Austrian federal government representatives ‘do not do what we want’ and by what Strache alludes here to people including him, they need to ‘fire them them’ (2013) and elect ‘real sincere protector of the Austrian homeland and the Austrian people’ alluding to the FPÖ politicians as ‘saviours’ and ‘Messiah’ for the people that are victims of imposed politics of the established parties and ‘minorities’ in their homeland because of the mass refugee influx that, as he describes it, might lead to the ‘civil war’(2016).

‘Right/Law emanates from the people’ (‘Recht geht vom Volk aus’)

HC Strache in his speeches refers to his party (FPÖ) as ‘liberal’ and positions it as ‘fighter’ for the ‘peace in Europe in its truest sense’ (2016) as an ‘advocate’ of their ‘own countrymen’ and compares himself and fellow party leaders to the ‘the system politician’ that as in football, need to be followed by established parties. Their goal and duty, according to him, ‘as a social home party’ is to ‘uphold this national sovereignty and to raise awareness of the value of freedom of independence’ (2016). He creates this image of the ‘victim country’ and its ‘victim’ population. Victims of ‘others’ who

violate their fundamental rights and country peace and sovereignty, therefore he creates fear of losing their 'homeland' among society which unconsciously draws people into thinking about a solution- 'saviour' is needed. And he offers the solution- FPÖ- his party that stands for and values, as he describes, 'tradition, patriotism, home love, yes, we are standing for the value of family, we stand for the value of identity, for the fairness of performance and of course it should also be the freedom of each individual to believe in God' (2016). He argues that his 'liberal' party is determined to 'defend' the democratic principle that 'law is about people' and that 'Right/Law emanates from the people' ('Recht geht vom Volk aus') (which was in fact the party motto as well). He reminds people that power over their 'homeland' is in them and it should be used and then calls for action. Strache adds that those who fight against them also fight against the above-mentioned values the party believes to represent. He is clearly distancing the party and himself from the established parties and constructs a distinction between 'we' as the party and 'we' as Austrian and 'them', i.e. 'Black/Red parties' (ÖVP/SPÖ), or 'self-proclaimed elites' which claim to be 'moral guardians' and forbid people to call everything by its name and therefore violate freedom of speech, and he proposes changes manifested in rebuilding social justice for the people (2013, 2016). He poses his party as brave and courageous enough to speak out for the electorate that 'cannot enjoy their fundamental rights anymore' and that is limited in the way they express themselves and this limitation by 'self-appointed intellectuals' is justified with political correctness. Strache utilizes strategic rhetoric that allows him to picture party as 'saviour' and 'the voice' of Austrians who feel like 'second-class citizen' in their own country and simultaneously poses himself as one of them (Wodak, 2015), who is as much concerned about the occurring 'maldevelopment' in the country as rest of the society.

Strache creates the image of a 'democratic underdog' out of its party, that is always criticised and not respected, however, he also points out that no one can stop him and that he will fight until FPÖ is not the strongest party. He encourages the audience in this

fight to speak out and to do what party does ‘from one love, for our own children and our own family, for our own countrymen, for our own cultural preservation, for identity, for our fellow men - we have a responsibility for all this’ (2013). This approach of positioning itself on the other side of the political spectrum is capable of raising a feeling of compassion for the ‘victim party’ in the electorate. At the same time, it leaves an impression that FPÖ is part of the ‘unheard’ society that genuinely understands what people need and so is capable of fulfilling their needs. Strache strengthens this idea by emphasizing that the party addresses the ‘fundamental issues’ and ‘current problems’ (2016).

Strache reminds the audience of the historical fights their ancestors, their parents, the great and great-grandparents of our great-grandparents' generation went through in defence of Freedom. Hence he evokes the emotions and reinforces them through the belief and nostalgia of ‘good old days’, this, in turn, leads to anger towards the loss of power as a country and towards the domestic and foreign alleged enemies- ‘others’. The opposition against the EU as the bureaucracy that violates the sovereignty of Austria, towards Established parties that allows anyone to do so and that ‘censors’ the freedom of speech or abuses the people’s right to vote along with many other rights (2016) and towards the others coming abroad and not integrating into the country- in the end, leads to the creating conspiracy theories against everyone. The theory according to which citizens of Austria are not only represented but also are attacked from different sides. The only power that stands next to the ‘ordinary people’ in this atmosphere is portrayed to be right-wing parties that get stronger and stronger all around Europe (2016) and this is the only way. This rhetoric not only sows fear in the electorate, but it also limits them in their options and solutions.

Freedom of the speech right represents a rather important part of Strache’s speeches. He first emphasizes the importance of the freedom itself and says: ‘Freedom and justice must once again come from us, namely from the people and from no one else's dear friends’ (2016). The freedom he says is the ‘highest good’ and it can only exist in the

atmosphere where fundamental rights exist, ‘especially opinion rights, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of the press and information are actually given and guaranteed by the state’ and then he adds that media is monopolised in Austria as in totalitarian states and that is why he makes use of modern communication sources (2016). He explains that this way he expresses his opinion freely and ‘hurts’ political competitors (2016). Facebook has turned into an online-media ‘machine’ performative-semiotic construction of the self (Barton, Lee 2013) and it has a number of advantages. First and foremost, it is easily accessible, it is a quasi-informal, quasi-private and simultaneously quasi-public platform (Wodak, 2015) that, as Wodak and Angouri would say, opens new forms of participation (2014) and last but not least it is and good legitimation for the argument that media is monopolized and ‘marginalised’ needs to find other ways of communicating with electorate and presenting itself. However, Strache stresses that and distances himself and the party from the hate speeches that are used by some of his followers on Facebook and tries to avoid the responsibility of encouraging this attitude in the electorate. Yet, he is emphatic towards everyone who expresses their different political opinion as they are ‘criminalized’ while actual criminals are released (2016). He concludes with a claim that FPÖ is a ‘freedom fighter’ and that they fight ‘freedom of opinion’ (2016). Strache utilizes the theme of freedom in at least three different ways: first, to patronize the people that are judged for different political perspectives (like FPÖ supporters), second, to accuse the government in violating fundamental rights of its citizens, and monopolising the media, and third to portray FPÖ as the ‘saviour’ that wants to bring rights and justice in the country their ancestors fought for.

Political platform=Truth

FPÖ portrays itself as a reflective political party, reflective on past political, social and economic maldevelopment. As the party with ‘committed’ representatives and fighters. Politicians that are genuinely concerned about the people and their unaddressed issues. Therefore, it does admit that for established parties they are ‘annoying’ but Strache also

expresses a wish that he wished they did not have to be the one, that they also ‘want to achieve power and strength where we are not annoying’. Strache attempts to convince people that it is not what they want to be, but rather what they have to do in order to protect their country and people from ‘perceived enemies’ claws. He creates the idea that FPÖ is needed in the country as the ‘fighter’, ‘advocate’, and ‘voice’. HC Strache always talks excessively positively about his party fellow members and describes them as ‘honest’, ‘committed’, and ‘authentic’ (2013, 2016).

Strache talks about various problems and creates conspiracy theories around issues such as EU relations, the federal government, immigrants, and/or big corporations. But he also indicates the number of most important problems, and first and the most obvious he is focusing on in both speeches is high taxes. He believes that people should not be paying compulsory household fees such as ORF, especially considering the ‘fact’ that the media, as he says, is monopolized and represents only one-side political perspective. He says that hard-working Austrians should pay fewer taxes and especially families with many children should not be paying or even not paying taxes at all

‘If you have a third child, you pay less tax and if you have a fourth child, you pay no tax. That's the way it should be. There should be a child-rearing allowance for families. And the families should then decide if one parent stays at home with the child or if both parents go to work and with the child-raising allowance, with the child-raising allowance you might look for a childminder or put the child in kindergarten.’ (2013)

He believes that the solution for the people is to lower income tax rates, as well as average tax rates ‘So people know they will have more net worth when they work’ and people can afford more and the economy is ‘boosted’. Strache calls for drastic measures aiming to reduce the tax burden and it should be reduced from 45 per cent to under 40 per cent which ultimately, in his belief, will activate the ‘labour market’ (2016). Regarding the economy in general, he says that the government needs to invest in it

more, and need to save money and saving first for Austrians, instead of paying high membership fees to ‘Brussels’, and instead of giving the money away to bankrupted countries such as Cyprus (2013).

He shortly touches the investments in the job market and says that it is needed in order to secure it. However, he underlines that most importantly the government needs to forbid bringing ‘cheap labours from all over the world to Austria’ as it ‘pushes our workers into unemployment through wage deduction’ (2013). And then he switches to other social problems caused by immigrants, such as crime, terrorism, economic challenges, the possibility of civil war, and incompatibility of cultures. His rhetoric reveals that he needs migrants to blame migrants for the current social challenges. He believes that the party's purpose is to save Europe and the EU. Not the EU that exists, but the one they want the EU to look like. Part of the EU plans of FPÖ is to forbid Turkey entering it as they do not fit into the EU in any way. He also wants to keep Muslim migrants (not only Muslims though) away from Europe aiming to avoid aggressive people in the country who are ‘linked to the terroristic groups’. Strache believes that Turkish people should not even be able to get visa-free relations with the EU. And those who can enter the country should strictly be obeying the ‘superior’ European Christian culture. We have already talked above about his anti-immigrant narratives but what we wanted to underline here is that Strache creates the blameworthy enemy out of immigrants, which are causing most (if not all) socio-cultural and economic problems.

He believes that the party needs to establish direct democracy in the country, and rebuild sovereignty that has been violated by the EU. Strache briefly mentioned that the government needs to work on its educational system and to change PISA negative results. He also briefly mentioned in a 2013 speech that the Eurozone is very much a burden for Austrian and that they needed to stick to their previous currency as Denmark, Sweden, or Czech did. In his 2016 speech, he is very much against Free trade agreements with the USA and Canada and claims that they will undermine countries environmental and health standards and will work against local farmers. And after all

these, he concludes that people are facing in modern times the most difficult developments in every field and ‘change is needed’ not just in Austria but also in the whole of Europe.

Overall, studying Strache’s rhetoric shows that he addresses many topics, even in short speeches, and mentions many problems, not just in Austria but all around Europe. But, it is like throwing ‘bombs of fear’ in the society, as mentioned problems are lacking content and analysis. He emphasizes issues such as immigration, unemployment, economy, taxation, or EU membership fee and offers on them simplistic, unrealistic and meaningless solutions. Yet in the end, it leaves an impression that he is aware and concerned about all these problems. One important characteristic of the speeches is also legitimation of his arguments with simple examples, and even though they are simple, still they fulfilled their purpose. It creates an impression that Strache is not talking about unrealistic problems but about real ones, for this he uses the legitimation strategy, which gives his rhetoric ‘a normative dignity a to its practical imperatives’ (Berger, Luckmann, 1966, 110-111) and hence he convinces people that Strache is a knowledgeable politician.

4.2.2. Social Grievances

While Strache puts all the blame on established parties, EU, and immigrants for all the maldevelopments in the country, the salient social grievances still remain to be unsolved. I chose two surveys of European Commission revealing the salient issues for the society (conducted in the same exact periods as speeches were given).

The survey conducted in 2013 reveals that Austrian electorate in the pre-electoral period was concerned by issues such as Rising prices/ Inflation/ cost of living (38%), and the next biggest concerns were with 31% Unemployment and Economic Situation (30%). If we compare these numbers to the 2013 speech of Strache and his focus on it, we can assume that the party rather addresses the mentioned resentments of the people and expresses its awareness of the ‘dramatic’ conditions of ‘hard-working Austrian’ in these

fields. Strache underlines that it is indeed difficult to get by every month because of the high living expenses, rental prices and at the same time high taxes. He mentions that 1,4 million of Austrian are on the poverty line. However, he just shows empathy to the people and mentioned grievances, yet does not really go deep into the topics and comes up with a simple explanation that it is all the government's fault along with immigrants who represent cheap labours and cause average wages deductions. Nevertheless, he rather excessively talks about taxation emphasizing that it needs to be lowered otherwise it is a huge burden for every citizen. Yet, people who see taxation as the biggest issue for the country comprise one of the lowest numbers -only 8 %- which equals the number of the citizens that are highly concerned about the Crime and Housing. Nonetheless, mentioned last two concerns are also addressed by Strache in his rhetoric, especially crime, which is linked to the 'aggressive' immigrant influx (his rhetoric always in a way portrays immigrant as aggressive, unequal, and unmodernized human beings) so is the terrorism which is perceived as almost no threat and issue to the country (only 1%). Regarding immigration itself, the numbers increase here, and 12 per cent of Austrians believe that it is one of the most important issues their country is facing. In comparison with Strache's radical rhetoric about immigrants, as the cause of most of the problems, we can assume that people are still not worried about the issue as much as Strache himself. Although Strache still makes comments according to which Austrians in their homeland are victims of immigrants' racism towards them (2013).

Strache only briefly, with one sentences touching topics such as Health and Social Security, or Pensions, or Education system and even these one sentences are not about the solution, they instead are mentioned with the purpose of reminding people about the existence of those issues. Although, HC Strache explains a bit more about Governmental debt and underlines that it is one of the highest in the last 25 years. Rather more people are worried about governmental debt as well (17%) and believe that this issue should be faced and resolved by the country.

The whole picture changes in three years and by the end of 2016 (November) most of the electorate is concerned about the Immigration (36%) already. The next biggest social grievance in the pre-election period turned out to be Unemployment. And while the latter is completely ignored in Strache's speech in the same year, the former -immigration -and its 'side effects' were one of the main topics he focused on and expressed a big fear of 'civil war' caused by immigration processes. Strache again linked Terrorism and Crime to the refugee influx and constructs a conspiracy theory around Muslim migrant being connected to and financed by terrorist groups as one 'has geostrategic interests in this region'. He justifies his fear of rising crime and terrorism in the country by bringing the example of Germany, where on New Year's eve number of women were raped by immigrants. This fear and belief of Strache that immigrants will increase crime and terrorist attacks in Austria are not shared by the electorate though. Only 8% shares the politician's perspective on terrorism and 13% on Crime. After three years fewer people are worried about the Rising prices/ inflation/cost of living (18%) and we also witness a dramatic decrease in the amount of Austrians who see the Economic Situation of the country as one of the salient issues for their state (almost two times less- 16%). While Strache believes that the country's economy is endangered by immigrants and is going through a challenging period. Meanwhile, Strache does not mention at all the education system and that it needs to be taken care of, even though in 2016 even more people (16%) saw it as one of the most important issues. Fewer Austrians, compared to previous survey numbers, saw Government debt and Health and Social security as the reason for Social grievances (13%). Unlike the former, the latter was addressed by FPÖ leader, although Health only briefly, with a sentence, while the building social security is portrayed to be one of their aims and is, therefore, emphasized its meaning. Slightly decreased a percentage of people who were concerned about the Pension (11% was 12%), Housing (7% also decreased by one per cent) and Taxation which comprised twice less than 3 years before only 4%. And while Pension and Housing topics are not covered in Strache's 2016 Speech, Taxation is again a highly

discussed topic and this time he also came up with an exact plan party of which is to lower taxes with a minimum 5%.

The comparison of Social Grievances and Strache's speeches made in respective years show that Strache leaves many salient social grievances completely unaddressed and even the ones he addressed, is lacking content and is assessed in a very biased and simplistic way.

4.2.3. Rise of Radical Right-Wing Populism

Freedom Party of Austria in 2013 for parliamentary elections came up with a poster campaign 'Naächtenliebe'- which means 'charity', 'love of neighbour', or 'brotherly love'. However, the campaign calls people and preaches for the love predominantly to fellow Austrian and countrymen, excluding the immigrants and foreigners. The campaign, therefore, emphasizes again the importance of the Christian culture for the country (and therefore holds exclusionary character towards Muslims, FPÖ is against) and at the same time underlines the superiority of Austrians over foreigners. And even though there is a study showing that the campaign in fact 'strengthened positive attitudes towards the foreigners', therefore had a negative impact on campaign evaluation. However, the campaign did not influence party followers (Marquart, Matthes 2016). Nevertheless, we witnessed the electoral success of FPÖ in the 2013 parliamentary elections (compared to previous parliamentary elections in 2008).

According to the Austrian Interior Ministry and OSCE/ODIHR Freedom Party of Austria collected 962,313 votes (20.51%) and thus gained 40 seats in the parliament. The party gained third place with its votes and had only 7 seats less than governmental party ÖVP and 12 seats less than another governmental party SPÖ. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, both parties recorded their worst results since WWII (IPU,2013). According to an OSCE report in the 2013 Parliamentary election, an estimated 835,000 non-citizens with long term residence in Austria were not entitled to vote in the election. The organisation raised a concern that 'the restrictive regulations on

citizenship and the limitations on migrants' suffrage rights leave a considerable number of residents without political representation' (OSCE/ODIHR, 2013).

As for 2017 the electoral success of FPÖ has considerably increased and even though it remained its third place after ÖVP and SPÖ, Freedom party gained almost as much (51 seats) as SPÖ (52 seats), and only 11 seats less than ÖVP. In total FPÖ received 1,316,442 votes (25.97%) (OSCE/ODIHR; Austrian Interior Ministry; 2013) . ÖVP leader Sebastian Kurz began coalition talks with FPÖ leader HC Strache and even though in 2013 election campaigns Strache was portraying his fellow party members as 'traders' who collaborated with ÖVP he still agreed on the coalition and they formed a government. Kurz on 18 of December (2017), was appointed as Chancellor, while Strache was appointed as Vice-Chancellor of Austria until 22 of May in 2019 when his secret videos were released and Ibiza scandal forced him to not only resign but also to leave the party.

The electoral success of FPÖ shows at least two things, first, immigration was one of the most rewarding topics for FPÖ (it is interesting that studies show that most of the established parties focused on immigration even more in their pre-electoral campaigns for 2017 election (Plescia, Bodlos, 2018)), and electorates' appeal to anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, and anti-EU rhetoric had risen.

Chapter 5:

Findings and Conclusion:

In this research, we analysed pre-electoral rhetoric of two parties, Freedom Party of Austria and Fidesz. The purpose of the thesis is to find the probable correlation between the pre-electoral rhetoric which I claim is manifested in the use of Politics of Fear as the strategic rhetorical tool and the Social grievances combination of which leads to the rise of radical right-wing populism. According to my hypothesis, there is at least one match needed, between the most salient social grievances (and the grievances as we can see above was measured by Eurobarometer) and the focus of the politics of fear in order PRRP to gain success. I endeavoured to show that PRRP rhetoric does not always represent the voice of the people, to the extent they argue to do. However, they indeed address the most provocative and most sensitive grievances that are attached to the society's emotions, identity, belonging. I discussed how important the identity, and feeling of belonging is for the person and how it might affect the one's political preferences, and I claim that politics of fear has enabled PRRPs, such as FPÖ and Fidesz, to trigger electorate's emotions, evoke their nostalgic and sentimental feeling to their 'Homelands' and to the 'old good days'. The way they manage to do so is Fear. As Wodak would say 'the fear dominates the political agenda at the present historical juncture' (2015) and our selected parties have indeed proved with their success that this politics pays off for them.

It should be underlined once again, that I do know that Austria and Hungary cases and selected parties are very different in many ways, especially with their political power and stand in the political spectrum of these countries. However, one specific occurrence which drew me into selecting these cases was Refugee Crisis 2015. Now, one more time I do believe that the Refugee crisis is not the main determinant of the rise of PRRPs, however, it played an important role in the change of image of

Social Grievances in both countries. Even though one country (Hungary) was by refugee crisis one of the least affected countries in the EU, if we look at the numbers of accepted asylum seekers applicants (425 in 2016 (IOM)) and another was one (Austria) of the most affected one in EU. According to the Federal Ministry of Interior of Austria in 2013 country had 17,503 applications for asylum, in 2015 this number increased more than five times and the country received 88,340 applications for asylum, in 2016 this number decreased to 42,285 and in 2017 to 24,735 (BM.I, 2017). these numbers look slightly different by UNHCR though, according to its 2016 Global Trends report Austria in 2016 received in a total of 39,900 new individual asylum claims, less than half the number received in 2015 (85,800) although still higher than in 2014 (28,100) (UNHCR, 2016). Nevertheless, Austria still was the sixth-largest recipient of claims for asylum according to UNHCR (UNHCR, 2015). And as the Austrian Federal Interior Ministry states, the country in 2015 approved 14.413 and in 2016 it allocated 22.307 refugees (BM.I, 2015; 2016).

These numbers reveal that Austria was indeed allocating lots of migrants in the country and so one would assume that Austrians had a more reason to see immigration as a 'danger'. However, what we see here is the social grievances in these economically, politically and socially very different countries, that were very differently affected by the refugee crisis are very close to each other, and especially percentages of the people who are concerned about the immigration. For instance, we see that most of the people in both countries, Austria and Hungary are mostly concerned about issues such as unemployment, rising prices, and economic situation. Immigration is one of the least important concerns of the citizens of these countries. The statistics became especially interesting from 2015 when Europe experienced the highest influx of refugees. Hungary already in June 2015, started building its wall against asylum seekers, yet one of the biggest grievances by 34% per cent of Hungarians was Immigration, meanwhile 56% Austrians saw immigration as a challenge for the country (European Commission). The second

biggest concern of both populations was Unemployment. According to Eurobarometer, at the end of 2017, in both countries, 28% of the populations were concerned about immigration. 28% per cent in both countries and we should keep in mind that meanwhile Hungary receives 3,397 asylum applications and rejects 69.1% of it (granted refugee status to only 106 persons) and Austria received 24,296 applications and it approves 21,079 applications (AIDA, 2017). Hence, the refugee crisis was indeed one of the turning points in the history of the rise of PRRP, however, it was never a core and real reason, the refugee crisis was just a tip of the iceberg and it just gave another rewarding topic to the PRRPs to scare people with an uncertain future even more. It is also very symbolic that one of the biggest grievances, in both countries, along with immigration was unemployment and it is interesting because the study of the selected PRRPs rhetoric shows that these to problems are very much channelled to each other and Immigration is portrayed as a danger to the labour market and many other things such as cheap labour, average salary deduction, or social security. All of these also show that no matter whether a country is influenced by refugee influx or not, the politics of fear and creating a big, scary picture out of refugees, that are seeking to get a better place to live in this world, always works and there always going to be an electorate that can get frightened even unreal dangers.

Therefore, when Orban focuses in his rhetoric on the immigration issue (which is not actually an issue for the country, if we look at the numbers) it is not always because there are dangerous ‘others’ from different civilizations as Orban would say is coming. No, it is because he talks about POTENTIAL and PERCEIVED danger to Hungary and its Christian culture. In Austria, we see that Strache was addressing comparably a real-life matter (not in 2013 though, because the country had 17,411 applications and the rejection rate for the refugee status was 75% (AIDA; 2013)) yet, his perspective was exaggerated and was one of the few salient issues out of various social grievances that were intensively addressed. In general, the

observation of the rhetoric shows that even though the political positioning of FPÖ and Fidesz in their countries are very different as well as the challenges of their states, they are rather similar in a number of ways. Their main focus is immigration and homeland. They both underline the superiority of European culture that in contemporary words need to be survived. In addition, they both emphasize indirectly the superiority of their own countries over foreigners (especially refugees) and their Christian culture. They both talk about the future that is uncertain and full of upcoming ‘dangers’ from every side. The leaders of these parties, both believe that immigrants endanger their cultural heritage and undermine their values. However, Strache in this sense goes further and says that Austrians experience racism in their own country from migrants. Also, both believe that immigrants are linked to the rise of economic, political and social problems, starting from the unemployment finishing with the crime and terrorism. Both see the open politics of Europe as a threat to European civilization which might be taken advantage of economic refugees as well, both have problems with rich politicians who try to buy votes (Orban with Soros, Strache with Frank). Both have an anti-Brussels attitude. Hence, what I try to say here is that their strategic rhetoric which serves to spread fear among the electorate are very much similar and therefore their focuses are very close to each other with the content.


Nevertheless, there are very interesting differences as well which is not just limited with content but also covers a technique of delivering speeches about conspiracy theories. Let us start with the content, Orban is rather more emphasizing the importance of the historical background of the country in his speeches and he uses it as an argument that Hungarians need to fight against others. Orban, speeches are more emotional and intending to trigger nationalistic feeling and nostalgias than FPÖ leaders. Meanwhile, Strache is a very (quasi-)informal, more modernised politician who directly communicates with people on Facebook and creates rap songs for them. Strache addresses more salient social grievances than Orban,

however, I call addressing- mentioning the problem, as I have already said before, he mentions lots of problems but only mentions without content or analyses of the problem, and comes up with simplistic solutions for them. Strache is explicitly anti-Muslimism while Orbán rather underlines the superiority of Christian culture. Strache talks more about taxation and its solutions while Orbán only mentions economic problems in general. Also, Strache is against the Eurozone, EU bureaucracy, also he is against Angela Merkel, as well as free trade agreements, and Turkey and its possible membership or even visa-free relationship with the EU. And last but not least FPÖ leader- Strache- had anti-government rhetoric. The latter is self-explaining though, Orbán has been already for the second decade in the power of the country therefore he did not need one, yet Orbán also used anti-opposition rhetoric in his speeches.

As for the research hypothesis again-The stronger the convergence between, politics of fear', as the political strategy of right-wing parties, and the most salient social grievance is, the most likely radical right-wing populism is to rise. Which implies that at least one match between the focus of the strategic rhetoric of the PRRPs and one of the most social grievances is, it is more likely that the rise of PRRP will happen. The observation and analysis showed us that there is always a correlation between the topics PRRPs are focusing on which serves to evoke fear of uncertain future, such as immigration for instance or unemployment, and the biggest social grievances in the society. We saw that people are very much concerned about immigration and this grievance is highly addressed by PRRPs and even channelled to most of other social, political and economic woes. This is enough to gain electorate appeal and vote for the electorate, however, it still does not mean that other social grievances of the people have been addressed. Addressing other ones by linking all of them to the immigration and the 'dangers' coming from it is not an answer, it is rather a simplistic solution for complex and big problems in various fields. However, this oversimplified 'solutions' and naive offers coming from the

PRRPs are still enough to win electorates' votes. That is why they are focusing on the 'rewarding issues' that triggers their emotional side and pushes them to make sometimes even groundless and irrational political decisions (Hungary case). Which brings us back to our research question- To what extent are the salient social grievances converging with the party rhetorics of the self-claimed representatives of the people, and what is its impact on the rise of PRRPs? – the research showed that the overlap between the social grievances and the party rhetoric is rather limited and the speeches of the PRRPs leaders hardly cover most of it (mostly immigration, taxation, crime, economic situation, and unemployment) of 12 salient social grievances (Crime, Economic Situation, Rising prices/inflation/cost of living, Taxation, Unemployment, Terrorism, Housing, Immigration, Health and Social Security, The education system, Government debt and Pensions). Nonetheless, the overlap on the issues such as immigration or topics that trigger electorates emotions and is seen as an endangering power is capable of drawing into appealing PRRPs. Below, I offer a visual illustration of the coverage of the social grievances in selected speeches. I counted how many times the grievance was mentioned in the selected speeches together and it shows that the rhetoric clearly focuses and emphasizes an immigration issue in the country. Regarding the immigration, I counted not only word 'immigration' itself, but also words that were used in the speeches in reference to the immigrants (Such as, illegal immigrants, migrants, refugee, asylum, others, foreigners, civilization, different continent, different culture, they, cheap labour, and in case of FPÖ Turkish people and Muslims as well). As for the rising prices/inflation/and cost of living, I include words like rising costs of rent or products. The rent cost could also go in the Housing section, however, according to the content in which it was mentioned (In Strache's speech in 2013) it was more about the prices and cost of living than about the housing. In the end, I ended up deciding that there was not any indication of Housing problem analyses by Strache or Orban. It is important to keep in mind that even though parties' leaders have mentioned social grievances in their speeches other than

Immigration, however mentioning does not necessarily mean going deep into the topic and actually talking about it. Some of these grievances were mentioned just by one sentence, and others were creating scapegoats for existing issues and therefore construed immigrants as the ‘blameworthy’ one's for the maldevelopments in these fields.



Source: Ana Abashidze

As we see from the chart, Immigration is the most discussed social grievance for both parties, However, as we see from the Eurobarometer surveys, immigration is not the only grievance people are concerned about in these two countries. Interestingly Housing which is a rather salient issue for the society that needs to be faced by their countries is not addressed by the PRRPs at all. Taxation which bothers 5% of the society is not addressed by Fidesz party leader in his speeches at all. What we see here is that selected

PRRPs leaders only partly address the social grievances and ignore other real-life matters people are concerned about. Focus on immigration, as we have said above, serves to spread fear to perceived enemies that, in PRRPs opinion, endangers social, political and economic atmospheres of these countries, and this politics of fear has paid off for FPÖ and Fidesz and brought them electoral success. According to Eurobarometer/Eurostat in Austria, the perceived proportion of immigration reaches 20.1 per cent while an actual amount is almost half, 10.4 per cent. At the same time, Hungarians, according to the same report, believe that in the country they have 8.8 per cent of immigrants while the actual number equals only 2 per cent (In this survey of EU commission an immigrant is defined as a person born outside the EU and currently legally staying in an EU country) (EU Commission, 2018). Therefore, we can assume that even though the real-life, salient social grievances are not actually represented by selected right-wing parties, they represent the biggest fears of the electorate, fears that are sowed by them and are sometimes completely unfounded, but still, they are capable of dominating the political preferences of societies.

Chapter 6

Conclusion:

In this thesis, we have studied Austria and Hungary and their PRRPs, who have held governmental power (FPÖ and Fidesz, respectively). Tested their claim to represent the ‘voice of the people’ and to see, whether they are in practice the voice of the electorate and their salient social grievances, or not. We conducted a discourse analysis of the pre-electoral speeches given by the leaders of the selected parties (FPÖ- Strache, Fidesz- Orban), aiming to find the convergence between their focuses and leading themes. The results were shown in contrast to the salient social grievances, which we have studied by document analysis. We deemed that the convergence, between the main themes of the PRRPs speeches and the most salient social grievance(s), would enhance the rise of radical right-wing populism in selected countries. We analysed their rhetoric, as a political and strategic tool of the PRRPs, which is manifested in the concept of the ‘politics of fear’. The politics of fear created our supply-side and covered the political spectrum of the riddle, while on the other hand, we analysed the demand-side of the riddle. The latter in our research referred to the society and their grievances, which in a way affects their political preferences. We wanted to compare these two sides of the problem and detect a probable correlation between them. The research showed that there was a convergence between the rhetoric and the most salient grievances such as immigration, unemployment, or crime. The immigration issue, in our research, was represented as one of the rewarding topics for the PRRPs, to which all the other mentioned problems like unemployment and crime were channelled. The analysis showed that PRRPs need the immigration problem, in order to be able to accuse immigrants of society's social grievances. This political strategy has resulted for them in an increased number of supporters, which demonstrated their appeal in the electoral vote in parliamentary elections, which took place before and after the refugee crisis 2015. Covering the refugee crisis as one of the influential factors,

allowed us to see how the rhetoric of PRRPs has reflected on the European challenge and how it was perceived. We ended up seeing people's concerns about immigration and that this issue was indeed one of the most salient social grievances. However, in the case of Hungary, this topic was rather exaggerated by Fidesz and therefore the grievance was groundless. Yet, the fact is PRRPs addressed the salient social grievance, although it is also important to acknowledge that there were a number of other salient social grievances which were only partly, or not at all, addressed. Nevertheless, as our hypothesis showed a match between the most salient social grievance, society's fear of immigration, and the focus of the rhetoric of PRRPs, by creating scapegoats, have been enough for the electorate to appeal to the PRRPs and support their electoral rise.

Hence, this research aimed to shed light on the PRRPs claim to represent THE people. We endeavoured to reveal that selected PRRPs claim to be the 'advocate' of their societies, in fact, is not accurate. There are various factors contributing to the success of political powers and therefore voter's support is shaped by a number of factors. Hence, there is no one formula explaining, each and every voter's political preferences, especially in two different countries, with two different political, social and economic conditions. Nonetheless, the factors such as identity and belonging, which hold significant importance for every human being, can easily be used against voters to shape and change one's political and social perspectives.

It is notable, that in the contemporary world we witness a considerable increase in nativist and xenophobic attitudes among the political spectrum. These nativist ideas are usually voiced by the PRRPs, to make use of Politics of Fear and to redefine current political and social discourses. PRRPs pave the way to the exclusionary politics, manifested in strategic rhetoric, which not only encourages the xenophobic, racist, and anti-immigrant attitudes, but also normalizes it. The ultimate 'Other' has been redefined many times by PRRPs and has been identified with a number of perceived enemies, ranging from immigrants to the EU. However, one big similarity

they have is that the word ‘other’ is utilized in reference to dangerous powers, who threaten their collective common grounds and homelands. PRRPs are successfully making use of this strategy. Through their rhetoric, they construct realities with people in need to be protected from others, in order to preserve their common grounds and homeland. Fear as the dominant public perspective (Altheide, 2002) has engaged in social life and it has gradually become an important factor, which draws people into appealing parties that argue to be ‘saviours’ of their countries and people. Nevertheless, this research has revealed that even though selected PRRPs successfully create fear and legitimize their nativist politics, by scapegoating and shifting the blame on ‘others’, still they do not represent the actual interests of the people, even in the pre-electoral period. And a number of real-life social grievances are hardly reflected and voiced in their political rhetoric, which is one of the most powerful tools for PRRPs.

We wanted to show that yes radical right/wing populist parties do address the issues that bother people and that cause the social grievances, however, they address those problems briefly and without in-depth analysis or the context. This way they create an impression of being the voice of the people and to talk about salient issues other parties are ‘scared’ talking about. Nonetheless, PRRPs do not really offer solutions for those grievances, they just address them in order to trigger the electorates’ emotions. We have seen that people in elected two cases have real-life, salient issues that affect their living standards and limit access, for instance, to the stable, progressive, and working economy, education, social sector or even, health system. This research revealed that those salient issues are addressed by PRRPs but in the context of creating the ‘blameworthy powers’ for all the current woes. Therefore, they utilize their rhetoric in a number of ways, first and foremost, they avoid responsibility and often justify it by not being in power and so is limited in their representation of people. Secondly, they create the illusion of addressing the resentments and grievances of the people, yet as observation and study of the

speeches showed us, many times PRRPs only mention the existence of the problem, without a plan of how to solve them. And last but not least, they create ‘perceived enemies’ who are endangering Europe's culture.

Accordingly, the thesis showed significant similarities between the selected two PRRPs rhetoric and the ways of how the language was used. It revealed the power of the politics of fear, and how it is capable of shaping social grievances and therefore in a way affecting political preferences of the electorate. We have seen that politics of fear in two different countries, with different challenges, and political or social conditions, work in the same successful way. Research showed that PRRPs do not represent the real voice of the people, they are only partly their voice, like many other political powers, however, PRRPs represent the fears of the people. The fears that are successfully used by PRRPs rhetoric in order to trigger nativist and xenophobic emotions and to make people feel threatened by the perceived ‘enemies’. This fear, nowadays, unifies many people all over Europe and emerges new political discourses in the continent. This is why we believe that this research can be generalized and used for the broader understanding of the current political debate about the rise of radical right-wing populism.

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