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**PREDICTORS OF EU SUPPORT CHANGE IN THE MIGRATION CRISIS  
CONTEXT OF 2014-2016**

MA thesis

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I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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# **PREDICTORS OF EU SUPPORT CHANGE IN THE MIGRATION CRISIS CONTEXT OF 2014-2016**

Daryna Hladchenko

## **Abstract**

This research aims to explore EU support formation change in the context of migration crisis. The objective of the thesis is to define EU support predictors and how this relation changed in the migration crisis of 2014-2016 context. Despite the expectation that EU support decreases in the aftermath of migration crisis, the empirical result proves, that EU support experiences a slightly upward trend after crisis. This research completes the previous scholarship with multidimensional definition of EU support formation, proving that the revision of the several predictors regarding a number of migration related dimensions of the attitude to the same phenomenon has greater explanatory power in comparison to one main reason of EU support formation. Furthermore, the research argues, that under the circumstances of migration crisis predictors of EU support formation were changed: political predictor meaningfully increased in its impact on EU support formation, while cultural predictor in the context of migration decreased in its role of explanation EU support formation after crisis. Finally, governments can more successfully conduct and communicate the EU policies regarding the migration issues to its citizens since they are aware of the mechanism of EU support formation citizens have, and act accordingly to the most meaningful components, that would resonate with the population more effectively and potentially EU support will experience meaningful upward trend.

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## **Introduction**

EU support has been changed in the result of migration crisis 2014-2016, which questioned crisis handling ability of the EU, which makes it a research problem of the thesis and possesses the research question of how migration crisis affected the formation of EU support ("Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015"; Connor, 2018; Dollar, 2018; European Parliament, 2019; Henley, 2020).

The first part of the research reviews the preliminary scholarship on EU support conceptualisation and its classical explanations: economic, cultural and political. Afterwards these dimensions are regarded in the migration context in order to define the changes, which happen in the mechanism of attitude formation within change of the context. The research aims at understanding of the mechanism of EU support formation to gain possible explanation of the factors shaping the EU support in the migration context. Furthermore, the awareness with the EU support mechanism formation provides with the possible approach in communication of the EU policies regarding migration question in a more effective way, because of the resonating with the EU citizens attitude formation regarding this phenomenon. This thesis will focus on the predictors shaping EU support before and after crisis in order to define the changes in the mechanisms of EU support formation and scholarship possible justification of the empirical outcome.

This research has two main dimensions of the way, how it contributes. The first contribution is made from the academic perspective, because the research revises the multidimensional nature of EU support formation on the contrary to the exhaustive scholarship of using one or maximum 2 predictors for building the model, 3 predictors in the context of migration for EU support is not exhaustively covered in the scholarship. Previous scholarship is mostly concentrated on the measurement of the 1 or 2 preconditions of EU support. For example, as Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) tested the model of EU support formation with the economic and political predictors (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). Meanwhile, De Vries was exploring the public support for the European integration with the predictors as utilitarian, identity and political (De Vries, 2013). This research applies also 3 predictors, which correspond to the ones of De Vries (De Vries, 2013), such as political, economic and cultural, but through the perspective of the migration context, which adds to the scholarship with the new angle of EU support

studies. However, this research will be concentrated on the migration angle of EU support formation.

Furthermore, the comparison between two period of time is being done for the revision of the impact of the crisis event and its potential impact on the attitude formation to the crisis handling institution in this regard. Consequently, this methodology can be used for the examination of the predictors of EU support in the context of other crises. The second dimension of this research value, is that through exploration of the formation mechanism of EU support on the basis of migration attitudes, the strongest component can be defined and be taken into consideration while forming the local realisation of the EU policies and communication campaign according to the migration predictor of EU support with the strongest importance for the population, which resonates with citizens, and consequently, their EU support grows.

## **Chapter 1. Concept of EU support**

### **1.1. Definition of EU support**

The literature defines EU support as the public approval of the European integration (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 414). The concept of EU support in scholarship defined as a type of support consisting from both national and international levels of influence of this institution. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) define EU support through its sources, divided in the categories as economic and political (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993: 507-508, 511).

Furthermore, the researchers recognise EU support as the multidimensional phenomenon. Hooghe and Marks (2009) state, that European integration is based on the principle of multi-level governance, which predispose the government formation and policy-making on the several levels, including the role of the citizens, who choose the governmental representatives, play the role of selecting the authority representing their interests (Hooghe and Marks, 2009: 2). Also, for example, Boomgaarden and the researcher's colleagues (2011) define 2 categories of the support: through the modes of support ("*utilitarian/specific/output-oriented support*" and "*affective/diffuse/input-oriented support*") and the objects of support ("*the regime*" and "*the community*") (Boomgaarden et al., 2011: 245). Under the concept of EU support the public support of the European Union is regarded in this thesis, and how it influences and is influenced by the political elites in the decision-making process. The reasoning behind the fact of EU support studying as one of the possible defining factors for the EU integration is justified for the following reasons described in the next part of the research.

### **1.2. Reasons for studying EU support**

Firstly, the EU integration proceeds more effectively, if the principle of solidarity among member states is present, and the lack of it is damaging for the state's cooperation efforts. Danish citizens voted against Maastricht Treaty ratification in 1992, which made EC reconsider the role of citizens and bargain the terms of the Treaty from the Danish side. Consequently, the citizens opinion on the referendum made possible the international document renegotiation (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993: 529). The example

considering migration crisis, general lack of solidarity among member states in tackling the crisis negatively impacted EU support, because states stopped cooperating effectively, as Fine (2019) explains (Fine, 2019: 1-2, 15). The solidarity can be preserved if the majority of the member states execute policies effectively and the local population of this states is not opposing to these policies. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2012) has the 4th Title dedicated to this concept, which demonstrates the valuability of solidarity on the formal level of normative documentation (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012). The importance of solidarity is observable through the example of Brexit: migration issue influenced EU support in the Brexit case, because migration was named as one of the key points in the agenda of the Eurosceptics, and respectively shaped the attitude of the citizens and their voting behaviour, which resulted in the Great Britain leaving the EU (Bulman, 2017). As an international institution, which unites 27, formerly 28 states before the Brexit, the EU aims at further integration and increase of cooperation between its member states in order to make the union stronger. For the predisposal of policy efficiency within its member states, the EU has to take into consideration the opinion of the local population, and provide them with the sufficient information to raise awareness about the importance of the respective provided policies, because public opinion plays a major role in policy success on the local level of realisation and further EU integration, which depends on the public acceptance of its policies and EU support of its citizens. The measurement of the public opinion impacting the EU policy-making is meaningful for the EU integration intensification, because the EU can increase its policy effectiveness through taking into consideration the mechanism of the public attitude formation towards the EU and possibly prevent the repetition of the analogical to the Brexit cases.

Secondly, the role of the public support in the EU policy making increased, because through the development of the EU integration treaties adoption the public attitude role became more highlighted and valued. The political elites cannot impose policies on their own behalf successfully without taking into consideration the public opinion regarding the agenda on certain issue or policy, because the role of the EU citizens in the EU integration increased because of the ongoing EU integration process, supported through the treaties, which also give more power in policy-making to the citizens of the EU. This development of the direct voting procedure to the European

Parliament in the framework of elections, through which citizens of the EU member states express their political will and directly elect the representatives to this institution. This phenomenon is called “universal suffrage”, which appeared in the treaties of the EU, and increased the role of the local population in choosing the representative to the European Parliament. The Treaty on European Union/Maastricht Treaty of 1992 provided EU citizens with the direct voting power in the European Parliament elections ("Legislation governing elections to the European Parliament Directorate-General for Research Working Paper Political series - W 13 -", 1997; "TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION", 1992).

Thirdly, except treaties, citizens also show their political preferences through the referendums, concerning the EU-related questions, and the one that define, whether state remain within EU or leave it in particular, which influences the whole Union and the state, respectively. The recent example is Brexit. The historical examples are the referenda in Denmark and Ireland in 1972, which resulted in these states membership in the EC, while Norwegian population abstained (Eichenberg, Dalton, 1993: 508). The ability of direct participation in the political life of the EU and the influence public opinion makes on the policy-implementation of this institution, forces political elites to reconsider their messages to their citizens regarding respective in order to shape a certain position. Consequently, knowledge of the correspondent way of communication of policies possible with the understanding of the preconditions of EU support formation.

### **1.3. Previous scholarship on EU support**

There are several branches of the way EU support concept discussion is presented in the scholarship. One of the dominant in quantity is that EU support is regarded as the citizens' support of the EU integration intensification, meaning that the power of the EU increases all over the policy-making among member states and the EU aims at enlarging within including new states in the union. This type of EU support will be used in the empirical part of this thesis, because the dependent variable covers the question on the EU citizens attitude whether the EU unification has to go further or not. For example, De Vries (2013) was exploring the public support for the European integration through the application of the three predictors, that were influencing EU support integration: the utilitarian, the identity and the political cues. De Vries made a conclusion, that average

citizens are less likely to be aware of the details of the policy making and its implications of the EU policies, and also that this category of citizens, who are not aware in the political details, are more likely to be influenced by the interpretations of the political elites and media (De Vries, 2013).

Due to one of the classifications of EU support on the basis of the people's acceptance of the EU, EU support is divided in the literature as the Euroscepticism and the Eurooptimism. Taggart (1998) provides the following definition of the Euroscepticism as the phenomenon, representing the opposition position, which is included in the European integration process (Taggart, 1998: 366). Euroscepticism addressed through several different approaches. For example, Taggart (1998) highlights the presence of the phenomenon on the 2 levels as on the elite and on the institutional levels. For example, the author also suggests the classification of Euroscepticism, depending on the level of EU opposition: the strongest opposition is formed by those, who are against the European integration, which results in the absence of approval of the EU as the institution. The second type represents those who does not consider the EU as the most efficient tool for the integration because of the methods as being excessively inclusive and undermining the compatibility of the differences between member states, despite the fact that this category of Eurosceptics does not oppose the presence of the EU in general. The third form of the Euroscepticism is shaped by those who consider the EU's approach towards the EU integration as overly exclusive, which is based on the selectivity in states' correspondence to its requirement (Taggart, 1998: 365-366). Another example of Eurosceptic attitude formation classification is demonstrated by Brack and Startin (2015), which show the following ones: firstly, EU citizens supports towards the EU decreases with time; secondly, people express affiliation with the agenda against further integration of the EU of the Eurosceptic parties in the national and European parliament; thirdly, traditionally EU supportive parties start to claim anti-EU ideas; fourthly, the growth of the amount of the civil society groups supporting Eurosceptic attitude towards the EU; media envisioning and declaration of the EU related questions variability increase; cooperation increase between the EU member states representatives of the Euroscepticism in the framework of the EU institutions (Brack and Startin, 2015: 240). Euroscepticism becomes a more highlighted topic because of the crises within the EU, because people's dissatisfaction with the EU reaction on the challenging

circumstances predisposes negative attitude to the crisis handling institution. For example, Brack and Startin (2015) state the increase in the topic discussion in the context of the Eurozone crisis (Brack and Startin, 2015).

The further development of scholarship on EU support formation is justified by the fact, that classical explanations currently are not capable of providing exhaustive reasoning of the phenomenon of EU support. EU support formation is influenced by the various crisis society undergoes, or went through in the recent past, which is why the predictors of the Euroscepticism and Eurooptimism demand exploration from the different perspective, depending on the crisis or any other meaningful event, that can possibly change the attitude formation of the EU citizens in general to institution. The complementary addition of the topical component of the certain crisis to the predictor of EU support formation does not undermine the value of previously defined three explanations (economic, cultural and political), dominant in the previous scholarship. On the contrary the research can provide with the broader vision of the issue, when economic predictor is regarded through the angle of crisis: for example, easier access to the market for the competitive potential employees-foreigners, make the local population fear for their working places. Respectively, it is observable, that freedom of movement as a reason for the employment migration forms the attitude of the EU citizens, depending on their attitude to it, and forms EU support, because the EU is an institution providing conditions for the migration increase. In order to examine how previous researches framed EU support preconditions formation with the regard to migration, this chapter will be divided in the three according sections, arguing the economic, political and cultural reasons for EU support formation with taking into consideration migration criteria.

Considering the recent event of the Great Britain leaving the European Union, the current scholarship elaborates about the citizens' attitude development of EU support and on the contrary EU scepticism, taking the whole EU as the research objects and the individual member states' too. Brexit became the notion for the whole EU about the importance of understanding of EU support's formation mechanisms. EU's migration policies made UK's citizens blame the EU as a body imposing these migration regulations, which negatively impacted the social attitude of the British citizens to this phenomenon and turned them against the EU, what was reflected in their voting behaviour at the referendum and finally, the UK left the EU. This example demonstrated the possible

precedent-setting case for other EU's member states, if the European Union will not take into consideration the preconditions of the EU's support formation towards its policies among the citizens of member states. The strength of the EU as a unity depends on the citizens support of it, and its policies respectively.

Thus, Coleman (2016) suggests the following explanation of the EU scepticism formation among the UK's citizens, which lead to the voting in favour of Brexit. Its supporters claim sovereignty and autonomy in order to make immigration controllable as reasoning for leaving. Simultaneously, the author states, that immigration became an important social issue regraded in the agenda since 1990s (Coleman, 2016: 682-683). Boomgaarden (2011) highlights 3 types of preconditions of EU support formation: economic or utilitarian precondition, political cues and identity reasoning through the national identity and attitude towards migration (Boomgaarden, 2011: 252). The following chapter will provide with the information on the scholarship discussion about them.

### **1.3.1. Classical explanations of EU support: economic reasoning**

Taking into consideration the importance and the increased role of the public support of the EU for the policy-making, the following chapter is dedicated to three most frequent frameworks for the explanation of EU support formation mechanism in the scholarship: economic, cultural and political. Hobolt and De Vries argue (2016), that the scholarship of the EU citizens attitudes is predominantly focused on them being the outcomes of the political decisions, while application of the attitudes as preconditions of the certain phenomenon in policy making needs more elaboration, considering the field of EU citizens attitudes shaping the EU policy-making. As authors highlight, this lack of studying in the field trend reflected in the absence of enough on the formation of EU support (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 416).

Economic explanation of EU support formation is the one with the largest number of the researches and the broad scholarship through the lenses of the consequences understanding by the citizens of the market liberalisation and the effect on their economic capabilities. Hobolt and De Vries argue (2016) call economic cause of EU support as "utilitarian", because with the regard of the historical perspective the EU was created as a Coal and Steel Community, and was aiming at integration for the economic benefits the

union could provide with. And the first category of the scholarship on the economic preconditions of EU support the authors call “individual cost-benefit analysis”. This means that people, who are winning from the EU integration providing them with the freedom of movement and possibly better employment, will support the EU regarding their individual gains from it (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 420). For example, the explanation of EU support based on the professional occupation is suggested by Gabel (1998) as an explanation of EU support formation. The author reached conclusion, that benefiting from the EU membership economically and type of occupational activity of the citizens define the attitude to this institution. Consequently, for the unskilled workers the author applies the concept of relative wages, meaning that low-paid unskilled workers will benefit from the freedom of occupational movement within the EU, while high-paid ones will lose from the EU integration and demonstrate not supportive attitude towards the EU. Gabel (1998) argues about possible reasons for the economic factor to be valuable for the public support formation: EU promotes freedom of movement to increase economic cooperation within the EU member states; market liberalization as the EU value predisposes changes inside its member states, as the conduct of reforms to correspond to the EU’s policies recommendations (Gabel, 1998: 936-937, 940, 949). Within this logic economic explanation of EU support relies on the fact, that those, who are benefiting for the freedom of movement and have resources to do that, will be more interested in have open access to the new markets and possible better employment capabilities because of their educational and experience superiority in comparison to the local employees, are more likely to support the EU integration going further and generally are supportive towards EU as the institution promoting favourable for this category of the population opportunities. Simultaneously, those workers, who are in fear of losing their working places because of the lack of the competitive capability with the foreigners, are not supportive towards the border regulations liberalization considering working migration. Similar logic is applicable towards the businesses, and those involved into them, consequently, citizens who are representing the business, which profits from the ability to employ better or less expensive labour force, are supportive towards the EU as a working migration encouraging institution, while the business representatives, whose companies are not capable of competing with the international ones, coming to their market of interest because of the EU regulations, are not supportive towards the EU,

respectively. Hooghe and Marks (2004) highlight in their research, that citizens, winning from the EU's policies are "those with the high level of the human capital". The author links EU support formation with the potential income change: those whose wage is going to increase are EU optimists, and those who are at the risk of having their income decreased or lost, most probably tend to demonstrate Eurosceptic attitude (Hooghe, Marks, 2004: 415-416).

If citizens assume the profitability of the EU membership for their state's economy, they are more likely to be supportive towards the EU. Hobolt and De Vries (2016) and Montanari (2007) point out about the fact, that if citizens see the EU membership as beneficial for their state's economy, they will probably be supportive towards the EU (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 420; Montanari, 2007). Moreover, the way EU citizens see the economic situation (as positive or negative) of their country influences their support of the EU, not the policies, that the EU applies. Consequently, the overall state of their country is valued and taken into consideration, when forming the attitude to the EU (Gabel and Whitten, 1997: 92). The concept of relative human capital was also applied from the perspective of the national level. For example, as it was done in the research by Gabel (1998): the author took income-level within member states as the indicators, which was meant to represent the value for the certain society's national economy, which supposedly aimed at finding the causality between the level of the state's economy and the likelihood of its citizens to support the EU (Gabel, 1998: 940-941, 949).

### **1.3.2. Classical explanations of EU support: cultural reasoning**

Cultural factor influencing EU support is the support's precondition, based on the citizen's perception of threat from the out-group in regard to their in-group of belonging or/and affiliation with. The scholarship suggests, that people experience stronger affiliation with their national identity, are not supportive towards the EU, because pan-European culture promoted by the European agenda of unification can potentially undermine their separate from the EU national identity (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 420-421). For example, Hooghe and Marks (2004) remark that national identity is a shaping factor in the attitude formation through the development of the attitude preference on the basis of the group of belonging of the individual, as nation in this political explanation. Consequently, the affiliation with the certain nation can be the factor that makes chances

of EU support either level up or fall. The authors differentiate national identity categories in 2: exclusive and inclusive towards other national identities. Respectively, the citizens with the exclusive one, are more likely to demonstrate Eurosceptic attitudes, in comparison to those with the inclusive national identity. Furthermore, the way of citizens' understanding of European integration to the regard of perceiving it as a phenomenon that is the part of the national identity or it is threatful to it (Hooghe, Marks, 2004: 416-418). Another example, McLaren (2002) made a research comparing public support preconditions: economic and cultural, and proved, that exceptional cost and benefit calculations are not enough to understand the attitude formation. The attitude towards other cultures define the attitude to the EU, because citizens are concerned with their society needs, that can be undermined by the representatives of other cultures. McLaren (2002) made a dichotomy to measure the perceived threat: realistic (threat to the resources) and symbolic (threat to the way of life). Respectively, with the first element of the threat McLaren (2002) was measuring the impact of economic criteria, while the cultural one was regarded through the second question. The author concluded that the feeling of threat from other cultures from economic and cultural perspectives of the perceived threat, predisposes decrease in EU support (McLaren, 2002: 551, 553, 557-558, 564). Leconte (2015) argues that the classical way of political explanation of EU support formation is based on the differentiation of attitudes between the Eurosceptic attitudes of the citizens through the lenses of "peripheralist approach". This approach means, that the negative attitude to the EU was framed within the geographical borders and based on the exceptional national identities' representation (Leconte, 2015: 252). Consequently, for national identity should be also taking into consideration as a shaping factor for the decision-making process.

### **1.3.3. Classical explanations of EU support: political reasoning**

The domestic and international politics are interrelated, because the decisions made on both levels influence each other. That is why the envisioning of the EU policy-making should be considered not exceptionally on the whole unity level, but also, the national level counts. Putnam (1988) uncovers the "*entangling of domestic and international politics*" through the obligation put on the decision makers to take into consideration the needs of the international community, which pressures to correspond to

its demands and local groups of interests, asking to pursue their own interests (Putnam, 1988). This leads to the conclusion, that the understanding of the mechanism of the policy-making on the national level is beneficial for the succeeding in the whole union policies realisation.

The average EU citizens are not deeply aware of the sophisticated details of the EU policy-making, which makes them rely on their government's interpretation, and respectively their attitude to the EU is based on the image created by their local government. In the scholarship this phenomenon is called "*cue taking approach*" (2016), because governmental reasoning of the policies of the EU is more understandable to the citizens, because of their lack of informational accessibility regarding the overall EU related issues. Except that Carrubba (2011) highlights the idea, that political elites are the shaping power of the public attitudes through political statements using in its interests lack of informational awareness in the population, the elites form the opinion (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 421-423; De Vries, 2013; Carrubba, 2011: 141-142, 144). Political elites play the role of the shaping power in the formation of the public opinion. Supporting this statement Hooghe and Marks (2009) state, that economic, cultural and political framework of the attitude formation towards the EU integration can be defined by the governmental authorities, especially in the case of absence of the strong position of the citizens towards certain issue, or of the object the opinion need to be formed is new or people are hesitant (Hooghe and Marks, 2009: 13). Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) call the phenomenon of pursuing European ideas into national policy-making through using people's lack of involvement in the decision making as "*permissive consensus*", meaning, that citizens do not oppose what kind of policies the local authorities impose on the national level (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993).

Local political parties' interpretation plays a meaningful role in shaping citizens' attitudes to the EU policies, because pro-EU political elites are more likely to interpret the EU policies as beneficial, while the EU sceptic national parties are reflecting on the policies on the contrary, as those neglecting the national interests (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 421-423; De Vries, 2013). Consequently, there is a contradiction in the scholarship regarding how dissatisfaction with the local policy-making process by the local population affects EU support: the first part of the scholarship states that, if citizens are not satisfied with the national policy-making, they are more likely to seek for the solution

of their concerns from the EU, which explains the likelihood of their support towards this situation; the second part of the scholarship states that citizens dissatisfied with the policy-making by local authorities are more likely to be not supportive towards the EU, blaming this institution in the unsuccessful policy making.

In comparison to the previous category, where local governmental authorities play the role of the variable influencing the public knowledge about the EU and impact EU support accordingly, the media also is considered as the “cue” in EU support formation, through the attitudes shaping. National news media is a force, that creates the image of the policy for the citizens, because of the language, applied and interpretation being put by this actor, which means that attitude of the citizens to the EU and its policies depends on the media coverage of the issue, and can be biased, depending on the way, how the policy was reflected in the local media. Also, the media coverage of the political events, including the summits of the European Council, for example, can impact EU support by local population: Marquart and the researcher’s colleagues (2019) found out that EU support decreased in the result of the media coverage, because preliminary optimistic expectations about the outcomes of the regarded in the research summit made citizens disappointed with its real results (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 421-423; De Vries, 2013; Marquart et al., 2019).

Dissatisfaction with the local government’s policies make citizens support the EU policies as the solution to their local issues. This means that if local authorities are not capable to tackle the issues effectively, or citizens do not see the capability of local government to solve the problems, they want their problems solved with the other authority, - in this case the EU (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 421-423; De Vries, 2013). Another example, which supports this statement, that lack of trust to the local national government predisposes EU support: Ilonszki (2009) found the relation between the democratic performance of own country with the attitude to the EU: the more citizens are not satisfied with their national government democratic level, the more likely they are supportive towards the EU in case of Central and Eastern Europe states, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia; old member states demonstrate different pattern (Ilonszki, 2009: 1041, 1043, 1055-1056). The differentiation between different geographical blocks of countries in their attitude formation demonstrate the example of historical importance of the political development, that states are more likely to recreate

their political tradition in the policy-making. Due to the historical reasons EU member states vary in the level of believe in the EU as the phenomenon of the peaceful unification of states: the reasons of the states to join and remain in the EU depend on the reasons of choosing of being the part of the unity. For Germany it was an ability to enter the community of the European states after the mistakes of the past connected with the war. Eastern European states regard the chance of becoming the EU's members to leave negative consequences of the Soviet legacy. Thus, Great Britain has weaker affiliation with the EU, because of the past economic difficulties on the moment of joining in the 1950s, while since the 1970s the British economic capabilities were as an EU's overall or sometimes higher, and the economic reasoning lost its power in remaining in the EU: British population does not see the need in the EU, as it used to have before (Tombs, 2016).

Meanwhile on the contrary to the previous statement another scholarship states about the presence of the spillover effect, the phenomenon presented by Haas (1967), as an explanation of the European integration strengthening through changes in one sector of policy realisation involves the changes in other spheres (Haas, 1967). this case it explains the phenomenon when the population is satisfied with the local government, it will be more likely to be supportive towards the EU. This means, that this connection in attitude formation towards the EU works also with the same logic that citizens, who are not satisfied with the local government, are not supportive towards the EU either, because of the spillover effect (Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Ares, Ceka, Kriesi, 2017). Leconte (2015) states that citizens tend to blame the EU for every reason they are not satisfied with the political implications in general, simultaneously, being not satisfied with the local governments' realisation of the EU policies (Leconte, 2015: 252). Another similar example, Estonian local population was not satisfied with their state's unsuccessful efforts to comply with the migration quota, implied by the EU (Veebel, 2015). Instability inside the member state because of the EU policies local population dissatisfaction will entirely lead to the EU's support decrease, because local society will associate the unfavourable policies and their possible unsuccessful realization with the EU as a responsible for that actor.

Consequently, these explanations of EU support formation mentioned previously prove the importance of this research, because potential development of the

recommendations formulation considering communication of policies by the EU depending on the countries and the reasons of EU support formation for their citizens, is beneficial for the better understanding of the EU activities by the EU citizens and thus they can become more EU supportive.

## Chapter 2. EU support in the context of migration crisis

### 2.1. Definition of migration crisis

Migration is defined by the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) as “the movement of persons away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a State” (“Key Migration Terms”, n.d.).

The migration crisis in this research is the one happened with the pick in 2015 in the EU as a result of the Syrian war, which made refugees flee from the unstable region towards the shelter in the EU, Norway and Switzerland, which received 1.3 millions of applications for the asylum in 2015, which is the highest number since 1985 (“Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015”, 2016). Daniel and the researcher’s colleagues (2019), for example, explain the time framework for measuring before and after crisis outcomes of their research on the basis of defining the pick of the migration crisis (Daniel et al., 2019).

There are several types of migration classification, described in the scholarship. From the classical point of view, for example, Haberle (1955) provides information on the classification of the following ones. Firstly, “*the way in which migration affects the social relationships of the migrants*” and secondly, “*the differences in socio-cultural systems between areas of origin and areas of destination*” (Haberle, 1955: 66). Considering modern most spread classification the most regarded with the data analysis are the refugees, as the victims of the war or any other type of conflict. Refugees are the people representing category of migration, which aims at escaping from the dangerous for the life, wellbeing and health circumstances with the changing of the living place as a solution. Except that, working migrants are those who are benefitting from the freedom of movement within the European Schengen Zone, because they are travelling to other states in order to gain more beneficial economic preferences with the regard to the higher income and career opportunities. The migration crisis regarded in this research is the one caused by the war in Syria within the time frame of 2015-2016. UN Refugee Agency called 2015 as “*the year of the refugee crisis*” for the drastic impact of this event of the international politics, and other related spheres (Spindler, 2015). Finally, the highest number of refugees coming to the EU with the pick in 2015, and the recognition of the

crisis as an agenda-setting issue on the level of international institutions such as the EU and the UN, make the research framework of 2014-2016 justifiable.

## **2.2. Scholarship on attitude formation in the migration crisis**

The scholarship on the formation of attitudes to the EU in the migration context states, that in general anti-immigration sentiment predisposes negative attitude to the EU (Boomgaarden et al., 2011: 252). Respectively, the context should be taken into consideration, when measuring certain phenomenon, because the conditions may change the influencing factors on the support formation: Easton (1976), for example, states about the variability in the support expression location and time context, and calls this as “an appropriate context of meaning” (Easton, 1976: 438-439). Consequently, the question arises, whether the differentiation between the political, economic and cultural reasons in the migration context plays out and in case of confirmative influence, then how each of the predictors impacts EU support.

Migration is related to EU support in the regard, that freedom of movement is one of the values, promoted by the EU in its official statements and documents. For example, the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 predisposes the freedom of movement: Article 3(C) states, that no restrictions for the goods and people should be prohibited within Member States; Article K.1 on the “Provisions on Cooperation in The Fields of Justice and Home Affairs specifies freedom of movement and migration and asylum policies in the EU (“Free movement of persons”, 2020; “TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION”, 1992: 12, 131).

This research aims at examination of the scholarship explanation change in the attitude formation in the context of migration crisis, because presumably migration crisis influenced the support of the EU formation, taking into consideration how other crisis impacted the attitude formation of the citizens to the EU. For example, as Vasiloupoulou and Talving (2019) described the EU citizens attitude change to the EU because of the economic crisis. Through testing the hypotheses related to the importance of the challenging economic context, taking into account the wealth of the state, evaluation of the state of own state’s economy and occupation as the predictors of the fiscal solidarity support among EU member states in case of economic challenges, the authors came to the conclusions, that wealth of the state influence the support of the fiscal solidarity

(citizens of poorer states are less willing to help states in need economically). Finally, Vasiloupoulou and Talving (2019) accentuate the outcomes of this research the importance of the precise examination of the issue, connected to the EU politics from a specific angle of the problem, not exceptionally from the general measurement of EU support level (Vasiloupoulou and Talving, 2019). Another example in the scholarship are the following researchers: it was profoundly, but not exhaustively regarded, that migration is one of the components affecting EU support (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2018; Borzel, 2016; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007).

With this type of logic, there is an assumption, that migration crises also changed the way predictors of EU support formation affect the attitude to the EU, and this chapter is divided in three sections, which correspond to the classical explanations of EU support formation, but in the context of migration crises. Finally, the next chapter will regard, whether the dynamic of the attitude formation towards EU support changed because of the migration context, with the regard to the examples of other crises, that influenced the mechanism of the attitude formation.

### **2.3. EU support change during the migration crisis**

The first category of the scholarship states, that public EU support decreased in the result of migration crisis. The most popular opinion in the scholarship regarding EU support in the context of migration crisis lies within the fact, that EU citizens were not satisfied with the EU as a crisis handling institution. Pew Research Center states, that for the survey conducted in spring 2016, the biggest part of the respondents are not satisfied with the EU crisis-handling ability regarding the refugees ("Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015", 2016). Another example, Pew Research Center also states, that already in 2018 several countries of the EU for the survey conducted after crisis demonstrated deep dissatisfaction with EU's approach in handling crisis (Connor, 2018). That is why EU support decreased after the in the result of migration crisis.

Furthermore, the general Eurosceptic trend is observable through the EU in the recent years with the rise of the Eurosceptic parties, meaning that their supporters among EU citizens also increase, and potentially support of the EU as in institution is more likely to have a decreased level of support after the crisis. Additionally, these parties highlight

their anti-immigration sentiment as a key value, while putting development of EU integration going further not as a priority (Henley, 2020). The support of this type of parties is illustrative demonstration of anti-immigration sentiment growth among EU citizens and respectively this can potentially lower EU support as to the institution promoting freedom of movement. Despite the predominant assumption that lack of effective tackling of the crisis by the EU made public EU support level decrease, there are two other opinion in the scholarship regarding the attitude towards the EU.

The second type of researches demonstrate the position, that public EU support remained the same as before the crisis. Daniel and the researcher's colleagues (2019), for example, reached the conclusion, that neither attitude to the migration, nor attitude to the EU (remains on the level of neutral position) changed after the pick of migration crisis (Daniel et al., 2019: 18).

The third possible explanation of EU support level is that currently in after-crisis period it is experiencing upward trend in EU membership affirmative attitude by its citizens, demonstrating highest level of EU support membership since the fall of Berlin wall on the basis of Eurobarometer analysis (Dollar, 2018; European Parliament, 2019).

Consequently, EU support level change in the context of crises demands understanding of the mechanism formation and definition to which extent the crises changes the EU support formation in order to take EU support shaping factors into consideration in policy-making decision-making process and in communicating these policies to the population. Furthermore, even if EU support level was not changed by the crisis, its composition can be changed after crisis, representing the combination of factors, influencing the its formation.

### **2.3.1. Explanations of EU support change in the migration context: economic reasoning**

Economic preconditions with the regard of the migration angle is reflected in the working migration and individual gains or losses of the citizens as a result of freedom of movement, and also whether the state would benefit from the incoming work migrants or would loose from that. Consequently, as in the general explanation of the economic precondition criteria of EU support, in the migration context, the support formation is

divided on the individual and state level benefiting or on the contrary, losing from the EU integration intensification.

For example, from the individual perspective of economic explanation of EU support suggested by Gabel (1998), as the one, that citizens express their attitude to the EU (supportive or not) on the basis of their professional occupation. The author is of the opinion, that the EU's policies are more favourable to those, whose professional occupation predisposes and encourages the applied to its member states policies: the research aims at examination of the relation between individual economic interests and EU support. Gabel concludes, that there is a differentiation between the attractiveness of the EU's economic agenda as market liberalisation for skilled and unskilled workers: the first category is in favour of EU's policies in case their salaries are lower in their own country, that they can go to another one from the EU to earn more, for those who have higher salaries, workers from another countries will create competition and potentially can decrease their salaries, and consequently, this type of unskilled workers are not supportive towards EU as a promoter of the market liberalisation. For the skilled workers, the situation is the following: employers can choose their workers within the whole EU, which is those workers, who have high value human capital are benefiting from the EU's regulations and are supportive to the EU, while those with the lower experience and intellectual capabilities are not supporting the EU, the policies of which create them competition on the markets with the migrants (Gabel, 1998: 937-938, 940). Surwillo, Henderson and Lazardis (2010) were examining the preconditions of the Euroscepticism on the case of Poland in the pre-accession period in 2003: their findings demonstrate that there is a differentiation between the urban and rural population, farmers were especially against joining the EU. The justification lies within the fact of the present fear of the negative impact on the income of the farms in the result of joining: farmers were afraid of the increased competition on the market, which could turn into development of the impoverishment of the local rural communities. Simultaneously, the authors point out that this fearful perception of integration was caused by the lack of the informational campaign dedicated to these groups of the population (Surwillo et al., 2010: 1508). In comparison to Surwillo's et al. assumption about the type of occupation differentiation impact on EU support preferences, Mau (2005) suggested the vision, that social group defines the attitude to the EU, but based not only on the socio-economic characteristic,

but also on the self-perception of the individual as the one, who wins or loses from the European integration: if the person perceives him/herself benefiting from the EU membership, will support the EU. Simultaneously, the researcher states, that half of the EU's population do not regard themselves as any of the categories (losers/winners), and the overall trend among those, who define as any of those categories, are predominantly winners of the integration, except the Great Britain (Mau, 2005: 289, 306).

From the envisioning of the state winning or losing from the EU integration as the precondition of EU support with the regard to the migration aspect of this question, Gabel and Whitten (1997) examined the relation between the economic perceptions of the citizens and their voting behaviour in the regard to EU support, their research resulted in the conclusion, that economic criteria preconditions preferences in EU support: they found out that the not the EU policies define attitude but the perceptions of the citizens of the economy (Gabel and Whitten, 1997: 92). Finally, due to the scholarship citizens EU support is based on their understanding of the economic situation of their country as benefiting or loosing from the EU integration. If apply the migration criteria to this statement, then the working migrants coming to the country are contributing to its economic prosperity with taxation payments, fulfilment of the needed niches on the working market and consequently, if the citizens form the attitude, that migrants are contributing to the state's economy in general, they will be among EU supporters.

To summarise the scholarship on the economic precondition of EU support formation with the regard to the migration context, there are two main levels of the attitude formation: individual gains or loses from the migration working force, and the second framework is whether citizens think that on the national level their own state would benefit from the migration as an outcome of the EU policies.

### **2.3.2. Explanations of EU support change in the migration context: cultural reasoning**

From the perspective of the cultural reasoning of EU support formation lies within the fact of cultural acceptance of the migrants as the contributors to the local culture as an outcome of the EU integration intensification, freedom of movement and creation of preconditions for people from variable cultural upbringings to settle in the other parts of the EU: the cultural criteria of EU support through the context of migration is observable

through the local population acceptance of the incoming representatives of different cultures. For example, it was claimed by McLaren (2002), that attitude to the EU is predisposed by the feeling of “perceived cultural threat”, highlighting that the cost/benefit economic side of the migration perception is broadly reviewed in the scholarship, while cultural reasoning needs more research to be done. Hostility towards other cultures is definitive in EU support formation in a way, that that EU sceptics regard the EU as an institution, which promotes changes, that may lead to the “national degradation”. Citizens consider their culture at the risk of negative impact possessed by the out-group of migrants, who are the holders of their own cultural identity (McLaren, 2002: 551, 554-555, 564).

De Master and Le Roy (2000) were aiming at finding out whether xenophobic attitude negatively impacts EU support, and they proved that, because the EU as the unifying institution promotes cultural exchange and integration. Furthermore, there is a differentiation on the level of the explanatory power of the xenophobic attitude as a predictor of the non-support of the EU, depending on the presence of the xenophobia as one of the important points of the state agenda in relation to the European agenda, in case not, - other predictors influence more (such as economic factors, for example) (De Master, Le Roy, 2000: 433-434). Citrin and Sides (2008) were also regarding the cultural component of the migration context attitude formation: the authors compared the attitude formation towards migrants in the USA and in Europe and defined that locals of both groups of respondents are of the opinion, that the possibility of the migrants’ integration from the perspective of the language is disturbing. The research consisted of 3 dimensions of attitude formation towards the immigration: cultural, from the economic perspective regarding taxation question and from the security threat as a crime precondition. And cultural component of migration the citizens of both groups consider as a positive element that enriches the local cultural heritage (Citrin and Sides, 2008: 51, 43).

### **2.3.3. Explanations of EU support change in the migration context: political reasoning**

Crisis make citizens feel the consequences of the political decisions in their everyday lives, which is why, when previously they can have more interest predominantly in the national politics, because they used to see the influence of it directly, current

situation changed, because crisis affected not only one state, but the whole union in general, and only solidarity in actions of all member states could change the consequences of the event. However, when the crisis came, the importance of solidarity among member-states play out in the crisis solution. Respectively, the political component of EU support formation in the context of crisis became more valuable in the attitudes formation.

Cue-taking approach is also actively present in the migration context of the support formation. Additionally, the general EU's politics concern can become more politicised by the local political forces, which make people more interested in the issue, because it is being communicate to them. From the position of political parties, they have the freedom of the policies of the EU execution on the local level, which is why the preliminary meaning of the policy embedded in it by the EU can be realised differently on the behalf of the national authorities. For example, Hellwig and Kweon (2016) state on the example of Denmark, that attitudes towards migration are shaped by the political elites: trusted governmental representatives influence the mass opinion of the more educated category of the population. The authors highlight the multidimensional nature of the migration issue, which is why the further research of the question is justified (Hellwig and Kweon, 2016).

Except that the scholarship reflects the opinion, that party affiliation impacts its position regarding migration questions and the way the party communicates the policies, connected to the migration questions in the media: both for the questions of the European integration and the immigration policies citizens tend to follow the line through adaptation of their preferred party's position on the certain concern in a way as it is imposed by the party, they are affiliating themselves with. Furthermore, the higher level of party polarization regarding certain phenomenon, the higher the likelihood this party supporters to get under the influence of the party cues (Harteveld. E. et al., 2017).

Also, politicians can provide the local population with the positive or negative connotation of the EU policies through their statements in the media. Respectively, media as an intermediate variable in the communication chain of the policy has an opportunity to provide own interpretation and shape the population attitude to the policy or certain issue, in this regard about migration. Media interpretation based on the political statements provides its target audience and other its viewers and readers with the media's own framework of the issue, shaping the attitude of the population, influenced by the

information regarding certain phenomenon this logic is applicable to the migration issues. For example, media became a cue-making component of policies regarded the EU enlargement through communicating the relevant policies in a certain way in a case of Dursun-Orzcanca (2011), appealing to the media's role in shaping public of British citizens to the EU enlargement between 2002 and 2004: the success of the political campaign depends of the media coverage of the issue regarding the EU policies (Dursun-Orzcanca, 2011: 153-154).

Historical circumstances of the state may precondition certain attitude towards the migration: some states are more likely to be more opened to the migration related ideas then others. For example, Pietsch (2015) provides the example of Greece, the citizens of which demonstrate the envisioning of migration as a threat to their cultural identity and economic welfare. Citrin and Sides (2008) also pointed out Greece as the state with the more negative attitude to the migration (Pietsch, 2015: 46; Citrin and Sides, 2008: 43). Additionally, Citrin and Sides (2008) define Hungary and Czech Republic as the states historically being not in favour of the migration intensification (Citrin and Sides, 2008: 43).

To summarise, regarding the discussion about EU support change during migration crisis in the scholarship, there is no equal opinion o, whether EU support fell or grew or remained the same, because the conclusions vary between the researches and depend on the research design and interpretation. However, the dominant literature overview is concentrated on the dissatisfaction of the EU citizens with the EU as a crisis-handling institution in the circumstances of the migration crisis, which makes citizens being less supportive towards the EU after crisis than before it. Finally, this scholarship overview predisposes the following 1 Hypothesis: EU support decreases after crisis.

Moreover, in the process of literature review, it was uncovered, that the researchers define EU support as a phenomenon of multidimensional nature, which explanation from the angle of exceptionally one or two predictors is not exhaustive. Consequently, the 2 Hypothesis arises, aiming at verification, whether several predictors have substantially more explanatory power towards EU support formation in comparison to previously suggested one or two determinants of the phenomenon: economic, political and cultural predictors explain EU support better together, then every independent variable separately.

Finally, the third hypothesis stating that political predictor impacts EU support the most after crisis, is based on the fact that citizens are not aware of the sophisticated details of policy-making and accepting the information, directed to them by the political representative through agenda-setting, who are shaping people's attitude towards certain phenomenon.

## **Chapter 3. Empirical analysis**

### **3.1. Empirical data and sources**

Two data sets of European Social Survey are being used correspondent to 2 waves of the survey before the crisis and after it: the 7<sup>th</sup> wave (ESS Round 7, 2014) and the 8<sup>th</sup> wave (ESS Round 8, 2016). After weighting and filtering the identical set of EU states, the numbers of representative cases are the following: for the 7<sup>th</sup> wave N = 32897 cases; for the 8<sup>th</sup> wave N = 33016 cases.

### **3.2. Variables operationalisation**

ESS (European Social Survey) will be used for the empirical part of the research, because it contains information about attitude to the migration and EU support through its variables, and the time comparison is also possible, because of the data accessibility before the crisis (2014) – Round 7 and after it (2016) – Round 8. Sociodemographic variables are used as control variables, such as gender (gndr) and age (agea). Attitude to the migration is an independent variable presented within the both waves of the survey, every question uncovers one of the components of attitude explanation towards the migration:

- 1) Economic explanation: B32 (2014), B41 (2016) “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries”?
- 2) Cultural explanation: B33 (2014), B42 (2016) “And, using this card, would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?”;
- 3) Political explanation: B34 (2014) B43 (2016) “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?”

EU support as the dependent variable will be defined through the following variable, concerning the EU unification support: (B28 (2014); B37 (2016) “Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position”. The scale of the main variables of the research from “0” to “10”.

### 3.3. Methods

Throughout the research the large-N statistical study is conducted on the basis of analysis the results of the descriptive statistics and loglinear bivariate and multivariate regressions in SPSS. Preliminary the group represented in the both waves is being filtered in order to make the comparison between the results before and after crisis the list of states should be equal. After filtering, the list of states, whose citizens were the respondents in both waves and on the basis of whose answers the research is conducted, is the following: United Kingdom (GB), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Lithuania (LT), Czechia (CZ), Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Estonia (EE), Portugal (PT), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Hungary (HU), Sweden (SE), Ireland (IE). Afterwards, the data sets were weighted by the variable correspondent to the Population size weight (PWEIGHT), which is applicable in case of examination several countries with different number of population: these weights prevent bias of the overrepresentation of the results for the less populated states ("Weighting European Social Survey Data", 2014 :2).

The methodology aims at examination of the research hypotheses which are the following ones:

#### **H1: EU support decreases after crisis.**

The scholarship has three the most popular variations of the level of EU support change in the migration crisis context: EU support remained the same, as before the crisis; EU support increased after the crisis; EU support fell after the crisis. However, the most popular one is that EU support levelled down. Since EU citizens were not satisfied with the EU's efforts in handling the migration crisis, EU as an institution responsible for the reaction on the crisis experience its support level being dropped in the result if migration crisis (Connor, 2018).

For the examination of the EU support level difference descriptive statistics are used.

#### **H2: economic, political and cultural predictors explain EU support better together, then every independent variable separately.**

For the purpose of finding the outcome of this hypothesis, the bivariate loglinear regression and multivariate loglinear regression are used. As the scholarship predisposes the need of explanation EU support from several dimensions, not exceptionally within one or two predictors. This fact leads to the conclusion, better explanation of EU support

is based on the predictors possessing higher explanatory power, which why the wider selection of independent variables regarding certain topic from different dimensions on basis of theoretical review can potentially increase the explanation percentage of dependent variable formation (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; De Vries, 2013; Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Hellwig and Kweon, 2016).

**H3: political predictor impacts EU support the most after the migration crisis.**

For definition of these hypothesis result, firstly, the identification of Unstandardized B meaning will be done in the survey wave after the crisis, which demonstrates the effect predictors have on the dependent variable. Secondly, the Pratt's (1987, cited by Wu, Zumbo, 2017; Nathan, Oswald and Nimon, 2012: 2, 5) method will be conducted, which identifies the predictor with the strongest impact on the dependent variable.

The empirical part algorithm used in the research is the following. Firstly, the means of descriptive statistics provides with the information for the further needed meanings for the next stages of the research and demonstrates the general description of the overall trend of the meaning of each variable and how it changes before and after crisis.

Secondly, linear bivariate regression defines the number of the adjusted R square from the model summary, which shows the percentage of the dispersion is being explained by the one certain predictor separately from other influencing predictors. Also, the comparison of both waves before and after crisis define the change of meanings after the crisis. Thirdly, multivariate linear regression also the number of the adjusted R square from the model summary, which shows the percentage of the dispersion is being explained by the one certain predictor, when all influencing predictors are in the model both with the control variables and without them to define the input control variables do for the explanatory power of the predictors' model. The result of the multivariate and bivariate analysis highlights the difference, if present, between the explanatory power of the one predictor separately and when all predictors are present in the model, and how it differs before and after the migration crisis.

Furthermore, the effect identification lies within examination of Unstandardized B meaning in the Coefficients and comparison with other predictors' results: this result shows, how the dependent variable changes, if the predictor grows up for 1 point. Additionally, Pratt's method helps (1987, cited by Wu, Zumbo, 2017; Nathan, Oswald

and Nimon, 2012: 2, 5) to identify the predictor with the biggest impact on the dependent variable among other independent variables.

The reasoning of using European Social Survey for this research is the following. Firstly, its data allows to find the answers for the research questions. It provides with the opportunity to make a multivariate analysis with all three independent variables simultaneously, covering three types of explanations: economic, cultural and political. Also, it has the variable, that corresponds to the dependent variable about EU support: it is uncovered through the question whether the EU integration should go further or no. Furthermore, the comparison between the answers before the migration crisis and after it is also enabled by this data set, because it has the survey waves for the periods of 2014 and 2016. Moreover, both waves contain exactly the same questions, which makes the comparison of the analysis outcomes possible. Finally, the data set includes except the EU member states, which enables to make the data analysis within necessary for the research geographic scope of the EU. Except that, the previous scholarship was mainly concentrated on the analysis of the data from the Eurobarometer, which is why using another survey source for the analysis will complete the scholarship with the additional information (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 416).

Expected outcomes of the research will answer the question, whether and which of the explanations influences whether and how EU support formation changed after the crisis regarding its general level and its predictors, presumably shaping it.

### **3.4. Descriptive statistics**

Through the examination of EU support average meaning before and after crisis the Hypothesis 1 is being tested, whether EU support decreased after migration crisis.

#### **3.4.1. EU support means**

The estimated mean of the data states, that generally population supports the statement in the middle, meaning that in both cases in general people are tend neither to demonstrate Eurosceptic attitude, nor very supportive towards the EU. Comparing the results of the respondents answers for 2014 and 2016, before the crisis EU citizens were supporting EU integration less, than after the crises. Despite the fact, that difference in the mean denominators is not drastic, the data demonstrates a slight increase in the EU

integration affirmation: in 2014 in general the mean corresponds to 4.95 with the standard deviation of 2.653, which demonstrates the fact of wide variability between the answers, that unison solidarity is not present. While the mean of the after crises responses is slightly higher and corresponds to 5.21, which is 0.26 points higher to the previous category, the standard deviation of the latter remains approximately equal to the one before crises, demonstrating 0.044 points of decrease, meaning that the variability of answers is present similarly to the one in 2014 data set. This corresponds to the literature on the EU support change in after crises period, that the EU support increased (Dollar, 2018; European Parliament, 2019). Respectively, the number, received in the result of measuring the mean among all selected cases in both waves demands additional research of the mechanism of EU support formation, because substantially the crises predisposed change in the average support level, but not substantially. That is why the knowledge of the mechanism, what are the components of EU support in migration crises can possibly help in defining meaningful factors influencing the EU support, and furthermore, communicate the EU policies on the EU question more effectively and predispose the increase in the EU support among the EU citizens, because the political messages, formed according to the citizens' attitude formation mechanism to the EU in the migration context, will be more successful among the EU citizens, because they correspond to their opinion, and as the result people will envision the EU as the institution, which base its policy-making and communication strategies on the basis of the components the EU citizens value.

Finally, EU support demonstrates an upward trend in its average level among the citizens of the EU on the contrary to the suggested by the first Hypothesis, that the general EU support experiences decrease. The next question arises, how the attitude to the migration changed after the migration crises from the economic, political and cultural perspectives (see Appendix 1, Tables 1, 2).

#### **3.4.1. Economic predictor means**

Comparing the mean numbers of the EU citizens' definition of immigration as a good or bad phenomenon for their state's economic prosperity, both categories before and after crisis has the mean in the medium of the spectrum of the answers, meaning that most of the people does not provide immigration neither a positive nor a negative

connotation regarding the economic profitability from their activity in the territory of the respondents' states. However, the data shows a slight increase in the assuming beneficial role of the immigration during the year of 2016 in after migration crisis period, because the mean for the survey of 2014 remains on the level of 4.98, and after crises the mean of the answers climbs up to the average of 5.28, which is higher for 0.3 with the previous category, meaning, that the attitude to the migration as a positive phenomenon from the economic position increased. The standard deviation for both waves remains relatively on the same level of 2.459 and 2.475 respectively, describing the fact of wide versions of answers before and after crisis: the answers of people do not tend to experience the solidarity expressed by the respondents regarding the meaningfulness of the migration for the country's economy (see Appendix 1, Tables 3, 4).

#### **3.4.2. Political predictor means**

From the political perspective of migration, EU citizens generally do not define migrants as those who make the respondents' EU states as better or worse living place, in both waves EU citizens attitude highlight the neutral position regarding the question among the respondents: before the crisis the mean reaches the number of 5.04, and 5.16 after the crisis. The slight increasing of the level of the attitude to immigrants as those making country a better place to live on 0.12 points demonstrate the increase in the optimistic attitude to the migration from the political perspective. The standard deviation of for the both waves provides with the information on the descent variability among the answers, solidarity in the answers is not definite regarding this question: before the crisis the deviation is demonstrated as 2.290, and after it became 2.292 (see Appendix 1, Tables 5, 6).

#### **3.4.3. Cultural predictor means**

The means regarding the average attitude of the EU citizens towards immigrants as a culturally enriching factor or on the contrary, - undermining, show, that in both waves people tend to have more positive attitude to the cultural impact of immigration with the difference in 0.02 points higher for the survey results after the crisis: before the crisis the mean is 5.67 and 5.69. For both waves the standard deviation predispose the descent

variability between the answers of the respondents: 2.542 for the answers before the crisis and 2.585 after the crisis (see Appendix 1, Tables 7, 8).

### **3.5. Bivariate linear regression**

The conducting of the bivariate linear regression provides with the information on the following points. Firstly, the number of the adjusted R square from the model summary shows the percentage of the dispersion is being explained by the one certain predictor separately from other influencing factors. Secondly, the significance from the operation of ANOVA shows, whether the hypotheses, based on the fact that economic, cultural and political predictors predispose the formation of the EU support or no, because in case the significance is moving towards “0”, it means, that the certain predictor can to a certain extent explain the dependent variable. Thirdly, the table of Coefficients highlights the prediction of choice among the respondents: if the respondent selects “0”, while answering for the question of the independent variable (predictor), his or her answer for the question of the dependent variable most likely corresponds to the Unstandardized B meaning of Constant. Furthermore, every time the answer of the respondent rises 1 point up for the independent variable, the dependent variable answer rises accordingly for the Unstandardized B meaning of the independent variable.

The second hypothesis of the research is being tested, that economic, political and cultural predictors explain EU support better together, then every independent variable separately.

#### **3.5.1. Economic predictor and EU support**

Looking at the results before the crisis, it is observable, firstly, that economic predictor explains 12.4% of the dispersion of the square explains EU integration support. Secondly, the significance from the operation of ANOVA shows that the significance is moving towards “0”, which means that economic predictor can be used for the explanation of EU support, which is the dependent variable. Thirdly, if the respondent chooses “0”, while answering the question of the independent variable “Immigration bad or good for country’s economy”, he or she most likely also chooses “3”, while answering the question of the dependent variable, because the Constant number of the Unstandardized B meaning equals 3.035. This result leads to the conclusion, that those

respondents, who assume, that migration is a negative factor for their country's economy, are not supportive regarding the European unification going, rather assuming that the EU integration went too far.

If the respondent is more optimistic towards the economic role of migrants, and chooses the option of "1" in the question of independent variable, then he or she would most likely also, as in the previous case, select an option of "3" in expressing the opinion regarding the EU unification. This result is justified, because the answer of the respondent rises 1 point up for the independent variable, the dependent variable answer rises accordingly for the Unstandardized B meaning of the independent variable: adding the Unstandardized B meaning of Constant (3.035) to the Unstandardized B meaning of independent variable (0.382) equals the meaning of 3.417.

Taking into consideration the average meaning of the answers, regarding the attitude to the economic dimension of the migration, which corresponds to the answer as "5", the respondents in general prefer to select "5" (4.945) to answer about their opinion towards the EU integration. This leads to the conclusion, people who are neutral regard economic migration precondition, also express neutral position regarding the EU support.

If the respondent expresses absolutely positive attitude to the migration as a beneficial phenomenon for his or her country, selecting "10" for this question of the independent variable, he or she according to the model would prefer the EU integration going further, and most likely chooses the option "7" in defining his or her support level towards the EU (see Appendix 2, Tables 1, 2, 3).

Regarding the results before the crisis, it is observable, firstly, that economic predictor explains 11.4% of the dispersion of the square explains EU integration support, which is 1% less, than it used to explain before the crisis. Secondly, the significance from the operation of ANOVA shows that the significance is moving towards "0", which means that economic predictor can be used for the explanation of EU support, which is the dependent variable. Thirdly, if the respondent chooses "0", while answering the question of the independent variable "Immigration bad or good for country's economy", he or she most likely also chooses "3", while answering the question of the dependent variable, because the Constant number of the Unstandardized B meaning equals 3.245, which is slightly higher, then the result before the crisis. This result leads to the conclusion, that those respondents, who assume, that migration is a negative factor for

their country's economy, are not supportive regarding the European unification going, rather assuming that the EU integration went too far, as it used to be before the crisis.

If the respondent is more optimistic towards the economic role of migrants, and chooses the option of "1" in the question of independent variable, then he or she would most likely select an option of "4" in expressing the opinion regarding the EU unification, which is 1 point higher, then it was before the crisis. The result can be explained even slight level increase in the attitude to the economic component of migration results in the more meaningful growth of the EU support level in comparison to the tendency before the crisis. This result is justified, because the answer of the respondent rises 1 point up for the independent variable, the dependent variable answer rises accordingly for the Unstandardized B meaning of the independent variable: adding the Unstandardized B meaning of Constant (3.245) to the Unstandardized B meaning of independent variable (0.370) equals the meaning of 3.615.

Assuming the fact, that the mean of the answers regarding the population attitude to the economic dimension of the migration after crisis remains on the choice of "5" similar to the result before the crisis the likelihood of choosing "5" on the dependent variable on the EU support remains the same, as before the crisis: the citizens who answer "5" on the independent variable also choose "5" (5.095) for the dependent one.

If the respondent expresses absolutely positive attitude to the migration as a beneficial phenomenon for his or her country, selecting "10" for this question of the independent variable, he or she according to the model would prefer the EU integration going further, and most likely chooses the option "7" in defining his or her support level towards the EU, which is the same prediction as for the results before the crisis (see Appendix 2, Tables 4, 5, 6).

To summarise, the explanatory power of the economic predictor decreased for 1% percent: before the crisis it used to be 12.4%, and after it turned into 11.4%. In both cases, before and after the migration crisis, economic predictor can be used for the explanation of the EU support formation, because the indication of the significance is going towards "0". Finally, the outcome of the coefficients tables comparison before and after crisis, the minimum level increase in the attitude to the economic component of migration turns into a more decent increase of the EU support level regarding low levels of attitude to the economic predictor of EU support for the results after crisis, while the expression of the

high level of positive attitude to the migration results in the similar pattern of attitude formation as before the crisis, while in general the outcomes of the more positive attitude to the migration results into the overall higher probability of EU support after crisis then before it. Meanwhile, taking into consideration the means of the answers before and after crisis for the independent variable on the economic dimension of migration, the results correspond to the neutral position both before and after crisis and both of them predict the same neutral choice of the citizens regarding the attitude to the EU integration going further.

### **3.5.2. Political predictor and EU support**

Reviewing at the results before the crisis, there are several features, firstly, that political predictor explains 13.6% of the dispersion of the R square explains EU integration support. Secondly, the significance from the operation of ANOVA demonstrates that the significance is moving towards “0”, which defines political predictor as the one that can be possibly used for the definition of EU support preconditioning element. Thirdly, if the respondent chooses “0”, while answering the question of the independent variable “Immigrants make country better or worse place for living”, the respondent most likely also chooses “3”, while answering the question of the dependent variable, because the Constant number of the Unstandardized B meaning equals 2.780. The result highlights the following pattern: citizens affiliating migration with the worsening factor for the life in their country, are more Eurosceptic.

In case the citizen shows more positive attitude towards the migrants’ role in the state’s living conditions the economic role of migrants, and chooses the option of “1” in the question of independent variable, then he or she would most likely also, as in the previous case, select an option of “3” in expressing the opinion regarding the EU unification. This result is justified, because the answer of the respondent rises 1 point up for the independent variable, the dependent variable answer rises accordingly for the Unstandardized B meaning of the independent variable: adding the Unstandardized B meaning of Constant (2.780) to the Unstandardized B meaning of independent variable (0.429) equals the meaning of 3.209.

Reviewing the average answer of the citizens on the political dimension of the migration, which demonstrates the overall neutral pattern through choosing “5” for the

answer, the likelihood of selecting “5” for the EU integration going further question is predicted by the outcome of the bivariate linear regression: 4.925.

If the respondent rates his or her opinion to the migration on the highest level of positive attitude to the migration has a good impact on the living in his or her country, selecting “10” for this question of the independent variable, he or she according to the model would prefer the EU integration going further, and most likely chooses the option “7” in defining his or her support level towards the EU (see Appendix 3, Tables 1, 2, 3).

The data analysis after the crisis shows the following patterns of EU support formation on the basis of the political migration attitude provides this part of the research with the following results: firstly, that political predictor explains 12.5% of the dispersion of the R square explains EU integration support, which is 1.1% lower, then before the migration crisis. Secondly, the significance from the operation of ANOVA shows the significance is moving towards “0”, which defines political predictor as the one that can be applicable for EU support formation explanation. Thirdly, if the EU citizen being surveyed chooses “0”, while answering the question of the independent variable “Immigrants make country better or worse place for living”, the respondent most likely also chooses “3”, while answering the question of the dependent variable, because the Constant number of the Unstandardized B meaning equals 3.052, which is slightly higher (for 0.272 points) in comparison to the received result for the survey conducted before the crisis in 2014. Despite the overall slightly more positive attitude to political type of migration after the crises in comparison to the data results before it, respondents associating migration with the negative conditions impacting their country demonstrate Eurosceptic attitude.

The respondent, who expresses less negative attitude in comparison to the previous example towards the political dimension of migration precondition of EU, and who selects the option of “1” in the question of independent variable, he or she would most likely also, as in the previous case, selects an option of “4” in expressing the opinion regarding the EU unification. This result is predefined with the next algorithm: if the answer of the respondent rises 1 point up for the independent variable, the dependent variable answer rises accordingly for the Unstandardized B meaning of the independent variable: adding the Unstandardized B meaning of Constant (3.052) to the Unstandardized B meaning of independent variable (0.417) equals the meaning of 3.469.

Regarding the means result on the independent variable answers remains in the same level as before the crisis and corresponds to the answer option “5”, EU support accordingly is revealed to be on the neutral position due to the regression outcome: 4.72.

In the situation, when the citizen prefers to express his or her maximum positive opinion towards the migration from the political perspective, choosing “10” for the answer on the question of the independent variable, the respondent more likely to be supportive towards the EU unification going further, and according to the model the choice regarding the question of the dependent variable stands at “6”, which is 1 point lower in comparison to the result before the crisis (see Appendix 3, Tables 4, 5, 6).

To summarise, the explanatory power of the economic predictor decreased for 1.1% percent: before the crisis it used to be 13.6%, and after it turned into 12.5%. In both cases, before and after the migration crisis, political predictor can be used for the explanation of the EU support formation, because the indication of the significance is going towards “0”. Overall, the outcome of the coefficients tables comparison before and after crisis, the minimum level increase in the attitude to the political component of migration turns into a more decent increase of the EU support level regarding low levels of attitude to the economic predictor of EU support for the results after crisis, while the expression of the high level of positive attitude to the migration results is 1 point lower, the result of the attitude formation before the crisis. Furthermore, after crisis the more positive attitude on the negative spectrum of predictor’s scale leads to the slightly higher EU support formation in comparison to the ones before the crisis. On the contrary, for the most positive evaluation of the phenomenon in the predictor predisposes slightly lower EU support level then before the crisis. Finally, through the revision of the average answer selecting pattern of the citizens attitude to the political dimension of the migration, the following information is being obtained: both before and after the migration crisis citizens on average have the neutral position to the political dimension of migration and this choice predicts equally neutral level of EU support before and after the crisis.

### **3.5.3. Cultural predictor and EU support**

Observing at the results before the crisis, they are represented by the three following components: firstly, the cultural predictor explains 13.9% of the dispersion of the R square explains EU integration support. Secondly, the significance from the

operation of ANOVA demonstrates that the significance is moving towards “0”, which defines cultural predictor as the one that can be possibly used for the definition of EU support preconditioning element. Thirdly, if the respondent chooses “0”, while answering the question of the independent variable “Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants”, the respondent most likely also chooses “3”, while answering the question of the dependent variable, because the Constant number of the Unstandardized B meaning equals 2.731. The outcome of the analysis is the following: respondents, who consider immigrants as undermining factor for the cultural life, demonstrate opposite to EU support sentiment.

With the slightly more positive attitude to the migrants’ impact on the cultural life, with the condition, that the respondent chooses the option of “1” in the question of independent variable, then he or she would most likely select an option of “3” in expressing the opinion regarding the EU unification. This result is justified, because the answer of the respondent rises 1 point up for the independent variable, the dependent variable answer rises accordingly for the Unstandardized B meaning of the independent variable: adding the Unstandardized B meaning of Constant (2.731) to the Unstandardized B meaning of independent variable (0.390) equals the meaning of 3.121.

Since the average answer of the EU citizens on their opinion towards the cultural role of the migration as a positive or negative factor for the local culture corresponds to the slightly above neutral position of “6” according to the means, according to the regression analysis result, the citizens most likely still demonstrate the neutral pattern of EU, preferring neither be Eurosceptics, nor express high level of support and select “5” (5.071) as an option.

If the respondent rates his or her opinion to the migration on the highest level of positive attitude to the migration has a good impact on the living in his or her country, selecting “10” for this question of the independent variable, he or she according to the model would prefer the EU integration going further, and most likely chooses the option “7” in defining his or her support level towards the EU (see Appendix 4, Tables 1, 2, 3).

The results of the data analysis after the migration crisis, provide the research with the following results: firstly, the cultural predictor explains 11.9% of the dispersion of the R square explains EU integration support, which is 2% lower, then the explanatory power of this predictor before the crisis. Secondly, the significance from the operation of

ANOVA demonstrates that the significance is moving towards “0”, which defines cultural predictor as the one that can be possibly used for the definition of EU support preconditioning element. Thirdly, if the respondent chooses “0”, while answering the question of the independent variable “Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants”, the respondent most likely also chooses “3”, while answering the question of the dependent variable, because the Constant number of the Unstandardized B meaning equals 3.161. The outcome of the analysis is the following: respondents, who consider immigrants as undermining factor for the cultural life, demonstrate opposite to EU support sentiment.

With the slightly more positive attitude to the migrants’ impact on the cultural life, with the condition, that the respondent chooses the option of “1” in the question of independent variable, then he or she would most likely select an option of “4” in expressing the opinion regarding the EU unification, which is 1 point higher in comparison to the result before the crisis. This result is justified, because the answer of the respondent rises 1 point up for the independent variable, the dependent variable answer rises accordingly for the Unstandardized B meaning of the independent variable: adding the Unstandardized B meaning of Constant (3.161) to the Unstandardized B meaning of independent variable (0.360) equals the meaning of 3.521.

Taking into consideration the means of the attitude of the EU citizens to the cultural aspect of migration, which corresponds to “6”, respectively, according to the outcome of the regression, citizens choosing this option, are likely to select “5”. Consequently, the pattern of the EU support formation prediction on the basis of the attitude to the migration in the regard of cultural impact remains the same in comparison to the outcome before the crisis, that despite more optimistic attitude to the migration, the EU support remains neutral.

If the respondent rates his or her opinion to the migration on the highest level of positive attitude to the migration has a good impact on the living fin his or her country, selecting “10” for this question of the independent variable, he or she according to the model would prefer the EU integration going further, and most likely chooses the option “7” in defining his or her support level towards the EU, which is the same outcome as before the crisis (see Appendix 4, Tables 4, 5, 6).

To summarize, the explanatory power of the cultural predictor decreased for 2%: before the crisis it used to be 13.9%, and after it turned into 11.9%. In both cases, before and after the migration crisis, political predictor can be used for the explanation of the EU support formation, because the indication of the significance is going towards “0”. On the negative attitude to the migration as a cultural component part of the scale, results state, that in case of a slight positive change the EU support rises more actively after crisis in comparison to the result before the crisis. Simultaneously, with the expression of the highest level of the positive attitude towards the migration the dependent variable remains on the same level, as before the crisis. Finally, despite the fact, that on average both before and after the crisis citizens are slightly more optimistic regarding the attitude towards cultural impact of migration, this result preconditions still neutral level of EU support, which means, that a slight increase in the independent variable does not drastically compact the rise of EU support level.

### **3.5. Multivariate linear regression**

The conducting of the multivariate linear regression provides with the information on the following points. Firstly, the number of the adjusted R square from the model summary shows the percentage of the dispersion is being explained by the group of certain number of predictors separately from other influencing factors. Secondly, the significance from the operation of ANOVA shows, whether the hypotheses, based on the fact that economic, cultural and political predictors predispose the formation of the EU support or no, because in case the significance is moving towards “0”, it means, that the certain predictor can to a certain extent explain the dependent variable. Thirdly, the table of Coefficients highlights the prediction of choice among the respondents: if the respondent selects “0”, while answering for the question of the independent variable (predictor), his or her answer for the question of the dependent variable most likely corresponds to the Unstandardized B meaning of Constant. Furthermore, every time the answer of the respondent rises 1 point up for the independent variable, the dependent variable answer rises accordingly for the Unstandardized B meaning of the independent variable.

In comparison to the bivariate linear regression, when simple adding of the coefficients is resulted in the prediction of EU support, since the multivariate regression

predisposes several variables as independent variables, the following formula has to be applied:

$$Y = \text{Unstandardized B of Constant} + \text{Unstandardized B of the first predictor} * \\ \text{option selected by the respondents} + \text{Unstandardized B of the second predictor} * \text{option} \\ \text{selected by the respondents} + \text{Unstandardized B of the third predictor} * \text{option selected} \\ \text{by the respondents}$$

Y- Dependent variable

This part is divided in the three sections: in the first section three main predictors of the research are highlighted to revise, what is the outcome for the dependent variable; the second section is added with two control variables such as gender and age of the respondent to observe, whether the mechanism of EU support formation differs from the model consisting exceptionally from the three main predictors; the third section aims at examination of the most impactful predictor for EU support before and after crisis.

### **3.6.1. Economic, cultural, political predictors and EU support**

#### **- before the crisis**

Looking at the results before the crisis, it is observable, firstly, that economic, cultural and political predictors explain 17,4% of the dispersion of the square explains EU integration support, which is substantially higher, then the explanatory power of every predictor separately. Secondly, the significance from the operation of ANOVA shows that the significance is moving towards “0”, which means that economic, political and cultural predictors can be used for the explanation of EU support, which is the dependent variable. Thirdly, if the respondent chooses “0”, while answering the question for all independent variables, he or she most likely also chooses “2”, while answering the question of the dependent variable, because the Constant number of the Unstandardized B meaning equals 2.217. This result leads to the conclusion, that those respondents, who assume, that migration is an absolutely negative phenomenon from all three dimensions, they are less likely to have optimistic attitude regarding EU support. This leads to the conclusion, that negative attitude to all three predictors of the migration simultaneously

predisposes more negative attitude to EU support as in comparison it is stated for each predictor separately in bivariate linear regression, when the outcome of EU support with absolutely negative attitude to each dimension separately preconditions 1 point higher EU support level, than it is for three predictors in the multivariate regression.

Revisioning the slight increase among all the predictors for 1 point, the result for the Dependent variable will follow the mentioned above formula:

$$Y = 2.217 + 0.188 * 1 + 0.156 * 1 + 0.174 * 1$$

$$Y = 2.735$$

This leads to the conclusion, that if respondent selects “1” for answer on all three questions of the independent variables, he or she most likely select “3” for EU support question. Respectively, the slight increase of the level of attitude impacts the increase of likelihood of EU support.

Regarding the average answers of the respondents on the predictors of the independent variables before the crisis, EU support will correspond to the following result as an average answer regarding it:

$$Y = 2.217 + 0.188 * 6 + 0.156 * 5 + 0.174 * 5$$

$$Y = 4.995$$

The result corresponds to the neutral position regarding EU support, which is option “5”. The same answer is observed as an average answer regarding EU support before the crisis in means in descriptive statistics analysis outcome.

In the situation, when the respondent expresses absolutely positive attitude regarding migration related attitudes, and selects “10” as an option for all of them, EU support results in the following outcome:

$$Y = 2.217 + 0.188 * 10 + 0.156 * 10 + 0.174 * 10$$

$$Y = 7.397$$

Finally, the most optimistic selection of attitudes predisposes an expression of generally high level of EU support with the option “7” (Table 1, 2. 3).

**Table 1. Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics			
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2
1	.417 <sup>a</sup>	.174	.174	2.409	.174	2075.826	3	29520

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

**Model Summary**

Model	Change Statistics
	Sig. F Change
1	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Predictors: (Constant), Immigrants make country worse or better place to live, Immigration bad or good for country's economy, Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

**Table 2. ANOVA<sup>a</sup>**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	36135.356	3	12045.119	2075.826	.000 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	171292.561	29520	5.803		
	Total	207427.916	29523			

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far  
b. Predictors: (Constant), Immigrants make country worse or better place to live, Immigration bad or good for country's economy, Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

**Table 3. Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.217	.037		59.168	.000
	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	.188	.008	.180	22.850	.000

Immigration bad or good for country's economy	.156	.008	.144	19.622	.000
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	.174	.009	.150	18.582	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

Looking at the results before the crisis, it is observable, firstly, that economic, cultural and political predictors explain 15,4% of the dispersion of the square explains EU integration support, which is higher, then the explanatory power of every predictor independently, but lower than the explanatory power of the predictors before the crises for 2%. Secondly, the significance from the operation of ANOVA shows that the significance is moving towards “0”, which means that economic, political and cultural predictors can be used for the explanation of EU support, which is the dependent variable. Thirdly, if the respondent chooses “0”, while answering the question for all independent variables, he or she most likely also chooses “3”, while answering the question of the dependent variable, because the Constant number of the Unstandardized B meaning equals 2.583, which is 1 point higher. Than before the crisis, which means that negative attitude to the migration predisposes less than before negative position towards EU integration.

Revising the slight increase among all the predictors for 1 point, the result for the Dependent variable will follow the mentioned above formula:

$$Y = 2.583 + 0.148 * 1 + 0.152 * 1 + 0.189 * 1$$

$$Y = 3.072$$

The result demonstrates the fact, that a slight increase on all variables of attitude to the migration does not change EU support drastically, remaining it on the level of option “3”, while in case of the situation before the crisis, the slight increase in attitudes impacted EU support through increase on 1 point.

Taking into consideration the average answers of the respondents on the predictors of the independent variables after the crisis, EU support will correspond to the following result as an average answer regarding it:

$$Y = 2.583 + 0.148 * 6 + 0.152 * 5 + 0.189 * 5$$

$$Y = 5.176$$

The result corresponds to the neutral position regarding EU support, which is option “5”. The same answer is observed as an average answer regarding EU support before the crisis in means in descriptive statistics analysis outcome and the same answer used to be before the migration crisis.

When the respondent expresses absolutely positive attitude regarding migration related attitudes, and selects “10” as an option for all of them, EU support results in the following outcome:

$$Y = 2.583 + 0.148 * 10 + 0.152 * 10 + 0.189 * 10$$

$$Y = 7,473$$

Finally, the most optimistic selection of attitudes predisposes an expression of generally high level of EU support with the option “8”, which is 1 point higher than before the crisis (Table 4, 5, 6.).

*Table 3. Model Summary*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics			
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2
1	.392 <sup>a</sup>	.154	.153	2.481	.154	1799.246	3	29749

**Model Summary**

Model	Change Statistics
	Sig. F Change
1	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Predictors: (Constant), Immigrants make country worse or better place to live, Immigration bad or good for country's economy, Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

*Table 4. ANOVA<sup>a</sup>*

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	33216.331	3	11072.110	1799.246	.000 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	183073.381	29750	6.154		
Total	216289.713	29753			

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

b. Predictors: (Constant), Immigrants make country worse or better place to live, Immigration bad or good for country's economy, Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

*Table 5. Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	2.583	.039		66.800	.000
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	.148	.008	.142	17.457	.000
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	.152	.008	.138	18.242	.000
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	.189	.010	.161	19.285	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

To summarise, the explanatory power of the model decreased for 2%: before the crisis it used to be 17.4%, and after it turned into 15.4%. In both cases, before and after the migration crisis, the model can be used for the explanation of the EU support formation, because the indication of the significance is going towards “0”. Slight increase of all predictors for 1 point more than minimum resulted in the increase of EU support before the crisis, while this change in predictors does not increase EU support level after crisis.

Meanwhile, the most optimistic expression of attitude to the migration in all three dimensions preconditions 1 point higher level of EU support, than it is stated in the similar equation before the crisis. Finally, applying the average answers of the EU citizens about migration to the regression quotation, EU support level for both cases, before and after crisis, remains on the same neutral level of “5”.

### **3.6.2. Economic, cultural, political predictors with control variables of age and gender and EU support**

Regarding the necessity to complete the model with additional variables, which implement the function of control variables in the equation of the regression, gender and age are added for the purpose of revision whether control variables complete the model.

Reviewing at the results before the crisis, it is observable, firstly, that economic, cultural and political predictors explain 17.5% of the dispersion of the square explains EU integration support, which is substantially higher, then the explanatory power of every predictor separately. Except that, the explanatory power is 0.1% higher with the control variables, than without them, which justifies addition of age and gender to the model. Secondly, the significance from the operation of ANOVA shows that the significance is moving towards “0”, which means that predictors can be used for the explanation of EU support, which is the dependent variable. However, in the regression coefficients results gender is defined as not significant for the prediction of EU support component, because its significance corresponds to 0.824, which is higher than acceptable 0.05 for being accepted. Despite that this predictor is going to be mentioned in the dependent variable calculations on the basis of formula, because even if it is not meaningful separately, it can be valuable with other variables of the equation and other meanings of the variables.

In the situation the respondent chooses “0”, while answering the question for all independent variables, he or she most likely also chooses “3”, while answering the question of the dependent variable, because the Constant number of the Unstandardized B meaning equals 2.540. In comparison to the model without control variables, the outcome is 1 point higher.

While modelling the slight increase among all the predictors for 1 point, the result for the Dependent variable will follow the mentioned above formula:

$$Y = 2.540 + 0.185 * 1 + 0.158 * 1 + 0.168 * 1 - 0.006 * 1 + 0.006 * 2$$

$$Y = 3.057$$

Consequently, in case the respondent selects “1” for answer on all three questions of the independent variables, he or she most likely select “3” for EU support question. Respectively, the slight increase among all predictors does not predispose increase of EU support.

Revising the average answers of the respondents on the predictors of the independent variables before the crisis, EU support will correspond to the following result as an average answer regarding it.:

$$Y = 2.540 + 0.185 * 6 + 0.158 * 5 + 0.168 * 5 - 0.006 * 50 + 0.006 * 2$$

$$Y = 4,752$$

The result corresponds to the same amount as for the minimum selection of options regarding the attitude towards migration, and control variables. This neutral position regarding EU support, which is option “5” correspond to the mean indicator of the descriptive statistics analysis.

In the situation, when the respondent expresses absolutely positive attitude regarding migration related attitudes and the oldest woman among respondents, and selects “10” as an option for all of them, EU support results in the following outcome:

$$Y = 2.540 + 0.185 * 10 + 0.158 * 10 + 0.168 * 10 - 0.006 * 114 + 0.006 * 2$$

$$Y = 6,978$$

Finally, the most optimistic selection of attitudes predisposes an expression of generally high level of EU support with the option “7” (Tables 1, 2, 3).

*Table 1. Model Summary*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics			
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2
1	.418 <sup>a</sup>	.175	.175	2.406	.175	1249.816	5	29434

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

**Model Summary**

Model	Change Statistics
	Sig. F Change
1	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Predictors: (Constant), Age of respondent, calculated, Gender, Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants, Immigration bad or good for country's economy, Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

*Table 2. ANOVA<sup>a</sup>*

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	36182.411	5	7236.482	1249.816	.000 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	170428.097	29435	5.790		
	Total	206610.508	29440			

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

b. Predictors: (Constant), Age of respondent, calculated, Gender, Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants, Immigration bad or good for country's economy, Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

*Table 3. Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.540	.072		35.404	.000
	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	.185	.008	.178	22.469	.000

Immigration bad or good for country's economy	.158	.008	.146	19.732	.000
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	.168	.009	.144	17.897	.000
Gender	.006	.028	.001	.222	.824
Age of respondent, calculated	-.006	.001	-.041	-7.755	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

Reviewing at the results before the crisis, it is observable, firstly, that economic, cultural and political predictors explain 15,6 % of the dispersion of the square explains EU integration support, which is substantially higher, then the explanatory power of every predictor separately, but 1.9% lower than before the crisis. Except that, the explanatory power is 0.1% higher with the control variables, than without them, which justifies addition of age and gender to the model. Secondly, the significance from the operation of ANOVA shows that the significance is moving towards “0”, which means that predictors can be used for the explanation of EU support, which is the dependent variable. On the contrary to the results before the crisis, after the crisis in the equation gender becomes a valuable component for EU support prediction.

If the respondent chooses “0”, while answering the question for all independent variables, he or she most likely also chooses “3”, while answering the question of the dependent variable, because the Constant number of the Unstandardized B meaning equals 2.817, which highlights the same pattern as before the crisis.

While modelling the slight increase among all the predictors for 1 point, the result for the Dependent variable will follow the mentioned above formula:

$$Y = 2.817 + 0.142 * 1 + 0.158 * 1 + 0.182 * 1 - 0.007 * 1 + 0.098 * 1$$

$$Y = 3.39$$

Consequently, in case the respondent selects “1” for answer on all three questions of the independent variables, he or she most likely select “3” for EU support question. Respectively, the slight increase among all predictors does not predispose increase of EU support, as in case before the migration crisis.

The average answers of the respondents on the predictors of the independent variables after the crisis shape the average EU support:

$$Y = 2.817 + 0.142 * 5 + 0.158 * 5 + 0.182 * 5 - 0.007 * 50 + 0.098 * 2$$

$$Y = 5.773$$

The result corresponds to the slightly higher, than neutral position regarding EU support, which is option “6”, which it the same level, as it was before the migration crisis.

In the situation, when the respondent expresses absolutely positive attitude regarding migration related attitudes and the oldest female person among respondents, and selects “10” as an option for all of them, EU support results in the following outcome:

$$Y = 2.817 + 0.142 * 10 + 0.158 * 10 + 0.182 * 10 - 0.007 * 100 + 0.098 * 2$$

$$Y = 7,133$$

Finally, the most optimistic selection of attitudes predisposes an expression of generally high level of EU support with the option “7”, which is on the same level as before before the crisis (Tables 4, 5, 6,).

*Table 4. Model Summary*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics			
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2
1	.395 <sup>a</sup>	.156	.156	2.476	.156	1098.229	5	29660

**Model Summary**

Model	Change Statistics
	Sig. F Change
1	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Predictors: (Constant), Gender, Immigrants make country worse or better place to live, Age of respondent, calculated, Immigration bad or good for country's economy, Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

*Table 5 ANOVA<sup>a</sup>*

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	33676.516	5	6735.303	1098.229	.000 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	181903.062	29660	6.133		
Total	215579.579	29665			

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

b. Predictors: (Constant), Gender, Immigrants make country worse or better place to live, Age of respondent, calculated, Immigration bad or good for country's economy, Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

*Table 6. Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	2.817	.072		38.936	.000
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	.142	.008	.137	16.764	.000
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	.158	.008	.144	18.956	.000
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	.182	.010	.155	18.527	.000
Age of respondent, calculated	-.007	.001	-.048	-8.829	.000
Gender	.098	.029	.018	3.399	.001

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

To summarise, the explanatory power of the model decreased for 1.9%: before the crisis it used to be 17.5%, and after it turned into 15.6%. In comparison to the results

without control variables, in case of adding them, the analysis gained 0.1% of additional explanation of EU support by predictors for the results before the crisis and 0.2% after the crisis. In both cases, before and after the migration crisis, the model can be used for the explanation of the EU support formation, because the indication of the significance is going towards “0”. Despite the fact of the gender’s insignificance issue on the model before the crisis, the variable is still taking into consideration in the equation from the position, that in combination with the certain variables and their meanings it still can influence EU support formation. The pattern connected with the result of increase of predictors for 1 point turned into the same outcome, as for the equation without the control variables., and also the prediction of EU support level remains the same before and after the migration crisis. When applying the means of the variables into the equation of EU support formation on the basis of the attitudes to the migration, the outcome remains the same, as it was before the migration crisis. Finally, even applying the most optimistic scenario of choosing the highest level of attitude to migration did not change the pattern of EU support and its level formation, resulted in higher EU support level, correspondent to the same meaning, as it used to be before the crisis. To summarize, the migration crisis did not affect drastically the prediction of EU support on the basis of the meaning for the migration attitudes and control variables, respectively.

The second hypothesis of the research is being approved, because in the result of the examination of the explanatory power of EU support formation drastically higher in case of all predictors of the model including control variables are present. Despite the fall in the explanatory power of the model for 1.9% after the crisis, the meaning is still valuable and corresponds to 156%. The outcome supports the previous scholarship, highlighting the importance of research EU support formation phenomenon through several predictors’ application, because of the dependent variable multidimensional nature (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; De Vries, 2013; Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Hellwig and Kweon, 2016).

### **3.7. Defining the explanatory part and impact of the economic, cultural, political predictors and control variables for EU support**

These part aims at providing two approaches in defining the strength of the certain independent variable in predicting dependent variable. The first approach lies within examination of the predictor’s effect on the dependent variable in the model, and is

conducted through the definition of the meanings of the Unstandardized B coefficient, the biggest number indicates the strongest impact, meaning that this predictor predisposes the possible changes on the result of EU support the most. The second approach applies through the definition of the most impactful predictor with application of Pratt's approach, based on the regression analysis. Moreover, the comparison of the results for these two categories before and after crisis provides with the information about the change of the most meaningful variables influencing EU support formation and whether and how the pattern changes after the migration crisis.

### **3.7.1. Predictors' effect on EU support formation**

Before the crisis cultural predictor ( $B = 0.185$ ) has an effect on EU support formation the most. The previous scholarship states the same, that is some cases of multidimensional evaluation of the predictors impact on EU support formation, cultural is on the level with economic or the strongest one, as in this case (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 421; McLaren, 2002: 551, 553, 557-558, 564). Despite the fact that the majority of the scholarship bases its justification of EU support formation through the economic explanation, it is the weakest effect on the dependent variable among three main predictors ( $B = 0.158$ ) in impacting EU support before the crisis. Political factor ( $B = 0.168$ ) has intermediate position between other two variables, stating that it matters more in influencing EU support level than economic criteria, but less than cultural (see Appendix 5, Table 1).

The migration crisis completely shifted the pattern of the predictors' effects on the dependent variable formation. The scholarship supports the change of EU support formation in the context of migration crisis ("Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015"; Connor, 2018; Dollar, 2018; European Parliament, 2019; Henley, 2020). Cultural component ( $B = 0.142$ ) started to have the least effect on the dependent variable among three main independent variables in comparison to the results before the crisis, where it used to be the strongest effect on EU support formation: the coefficient decreased for 0.043 points in the result of crisis. Economic dimension ( $B = 0.158$ ) of the attitude to the migration remains on the same level, but in comparison to the cultural and political predictors after crisis it takes the second place in impact on EU support formation. Effect of attitude to the migration in the framework of political dimension demonstrates a meaningful growth after crisis in its impact on the dependent

variable in comparison to other predictors on 0.014 points in its coefficients meaning:  $B = 0.182$  (see Appendix 5, Table 2).

### **3.7.2. Predictors' impact on EU support formation**

Pratt's approach of importance measures for the predictors in the loglinear regression (1987, cited by Wu, Zumbo, 2017; Nathan, Oswald and Nimon, 2012: 2, 5) lies within the following principle: it helps to identify the most impactful predictor in the model on the formation of the dependent variable. In this research it provides with the following information: firstly, which predictor is the strongest before the crisis and secondly, after the crisis, and consequently, compare the dynamic of change if present between the value of components in support formation. The methodology is based on the multiplying standardized regression coefficient (Beta) of the predictor of interest from Coefficients with the correlation of the predictor and the dependent variable (Pearson Correlation) (Table 7; see Appendix 5, Table 1). Before the results the results are:

- Economic predictor impact power on EU support = 0.05  
 $0.352 * 0.146 = 0.051392$ .
- Cultural predictor impact power on EU support = 0.07  
 $0.373 * 0.178 = 0.066394$ .
- Political predictor impact power on EU support = 0.05  
 $0.369 * 0.144 = 0.053136$ .

The result of the analysis of attitude formation before the crisis demonstrates, that cultural predictor impacts EU support the most, while political and economic remain on the same level lower, than the cultural. Previous scholarship supports this outcome, because in case of evaluation the impact of 2 factors of EU support, cultural impacted more in some cases, or equals the economic predictor (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 421; McLaren, 2002: 551, 553, 557-558, 564).

Table 7. Correlations before the crisis

		Immigration bad or good for country's economy	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	Gender
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1  31910	.629**  .000 31313	.650**  .000 31258	-.095**  .000 31904
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.629**  .000 31313	1  .000 31960	.704**  .000 31299	-.016**  .006 31953
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.650**  .000 31258	.704**  .000 31299	1  .000 31894	-.042**  .000 31887
Gender	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.095**  .000 31904	-.016**  .006 31953	-.042**  .000 31887	1   32888
Age of respondent, calculated	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.072**  .000 31822	-.113**  .000 31875	-.131**  .000 31802	.021**  .000 32790
European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.352**  .000 30307	.373**  .000 30409	.369**  .000 30251	-.020**  .000 30903

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

#### Correlations

		Age of respondent, calculated	European Union: European unification go further or gone too far
Immigration bad or good for	Pearson Correlation	-.072**	.352**

country's economy	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	31822	30307
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	Pearson Correlation	-.113**	.373**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	31875	30409
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	Pearson Correlation	-.131**	.369**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	31802	30251
Gender	Pearson Correlation	.021**	-.020**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	32790	30903
Age of respondent, calculated	Pearson Correlation	1	-.090**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	32799	30825
European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	Pearson Correlation	-.090**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	30825	30909

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The results after the crisis are the following:

- Economic predictor impact power on EU support = 0.05  
 $0.338 * 0.144 = 0.048672$ .
- Cultural predictor impact power on EU support = 0.05  
 $0.346 * 0.137 = 0.047402$ .
- Political predictor impact power on EU support = 0.06

$$0.354 * 0.155 = 0.05487.$$

After the crisis the trend is on the contrary to the outcome before the crisis: political predictor gained the highest coefficient, which defines its strongest contribution among other predictors to the common variance of EU support (Table 8; see Appendix 5, Table 2).

*Table 8 Correlations after the crisis*

		European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	Immigration bad or good for country's economy	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live
European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	Pearson Correlation	1	.338**	.346**	.354**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000
	N	31054	30515	30582	30382
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	Pearson Correlation	.338**	1	.650**	.670**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000
	N	30515	32147	31619	31464
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	Pearson Correlation	.346**	.650**	1	.718**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000
	N	30582	31619	32133	31494

Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	Pearson Correlation	.354**	.670**	.718**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	
	N	30382	31464	31494	32034
Gender	Pearson Correlation	.008	-.058**	-.001	-.006
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.147	.000	.807	.317
	N	31051	32145	32131	32033
Age of respondent, calculated	Pearson Correlation	-.086**	-.060**	-.111**	-.124**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	30954	32041	32027	31927

### Correlations

		Gender	Age of respondent, calculated
European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	Pearson Correlation	.008	-.086**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.147	.000
	N	31051	30954
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	Pearson Correlation	-.058**	-.060**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	32145	32041
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	Pearson Correlation	-.001	-.111**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.807	.000
	N	32131	32027
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	Pearson Correlation	-.006	-.124**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.317	.000
	N	32033	31927
Gender	Pearson Correlation	1	.025**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	33012	32899
	Pearson Correlation	.025**	1

Age of respondent, calculated	Sig. (2-tailed) N	.000 32899	32899
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Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

To summarise, through both dimensions in evaluation the strongest effect and impact of the predictors before the migration crisis, cultural predictor had both the highest effect on the dependent variable and the strongest impact on EU support simultaneously. Economic impact does not change, it remains on the same level before and after migration crisis. However, political predictor's impact slight increase made it the strongest predictor in the model of EU support formation.

#### **Chapter 4. Policy recommendations for the political elites regarding communication strategy of the EU policies to the EU citizens**

Firstly, the previous scholarship on the political elites influence on the public opinion regarding EU integration support proceeds with the theories of representation. Carrubba (2011) highlights permissive consensus, which predisposes political elites using thematic not involvement of its population into certain topics for its own benefit, which is not the theory applicable for the purposes of this research, because it relies on the population lack of interest in the topic, while building communication strategy preconditions awareness increase. From the perspective of communication strategy, the "cue-taking" approach in the politics is applicable, because due to this approach the political elite shapes public opinion. Consequently, formation of the supportive opinion through the policy making and communication is more likely to succeed with the knowledge of how this EU support is formed, and what citizens value the most (Carrubba, 2011: 141; Stimson, 1991).

Secondly, this part reviews what are the specific areas to pay attention to in the EU policy communication to make it effective, regarding the preconditions of EU support on the basis of the results in the empirical part of the research. Political predictor has both the strongest impact and the biggest effect on the formation of EU support after the crisis, it can be possibly explained, that the agenda set by the politicians and highlighting the migration crisis as a valuable nation-wide concern, which makes people consider whether migrants make their own country better or worse place to live in. Finally, in order to be

make a successful political message for increasing EU support, local authorities have to state migrants are making their own country better place to live in.

Taking into consideration, that this research aims at defining the patterns of the attitude formation regarding the EU support in the migration context, the same technology can be applicable by the authorities on the national level to find the EU support formation mechanism on the basis of the three dimensions of the migration on the national level for building successful communication conducting the successful policies in accordance to their citizens' priorities in the migration context to create the positive image of the EU with the regard not only to the overall EU pattern, regarded in this research, but also complementing existed knowledge with the national context. Because national context impacts the attitude formation and demands additional revision. For example, less supportive towards the immigration countries as Hungary, Greece and Czech Republic were defined, meaning that application of the overall EU model on the national level will have different outcomes, useful for the local authorities for the perspective policy making and communication of the EU policies (Citrin and Sides, 2008: 43). Consequently, this research can be applicable for further development of the scholarship and for the exploring the multidimensional nature of the phenomenon, as the crisis, affecting the societal attitude towards international institutions.

## Conclusions

Two out of three hypothesis were approved in the empirical part of the research. Firstly, despite the scholarship stating and the hypothesis accordingly stating that EU support decreases after the crisis, the means of EU support demonstrated a slight upward trend in comparison to the average meaning of EU support before the migration crisis. The second hypothesis of the research was approved, because political, cultural and economical predictors with control variables of gender and age explain EU support formation in the migration context meaningfully better, than each of the main predictors separately. Finally, migration crisis changed the formation of EU support: before the migration crisis cultural predictor of attitude to migration had the biggest effect and explained EU support formation the most, after crisis political predictor became the most meaningful in shaping citizens' attitude. That is why for predisposing increase of EU support, the local government has to communicate the message, that country is becoming better with incoming migrants, because politicians can shape the opinion through their political messages and statement for the media, and lack of awareness in the all the details of policy-making for average citizens make forming the opinion towards certain question easier.

The research was completed with the several following limitations. Firstly, taking into consideration that first and foremost the research aims at the defining the multivariate components of the EU support formation in the migration context, the data availability with the variables in the same data set, correspondent to the goals of the research is needed, which is why the European Social Survey is selected. However, the major problem of this research, that several member states of the EU are not included (Denmark, Italy, Latvia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Greece are excluded), because regarding the aim of the research in searching for the multidimensional explanation of the support formation from the position of the migration attitudes is of predominant importance to review the EU support pattern formation in general all over the EUPB, than to have all list of EU member states, while other accessible options, as Eurobarometr has the whole 27 EU member states and the Great Britain, but the EU support variable and migration attitude in the same data set are not capable of providing the information on all three dimensions of the political, cultural and economic dimensions of the attitude to the migration. Denmark was presented in the data

set of 2014, while being absent in the data set for the wave of 2016. Simultaneously, Italy was listed in the data set of the 8<sup>th</sup> wave of the ESS, while the survey in this country was not conducted in the 7<sup>th</sup> wave. Finally, despite the inability to regard the whole list of the EU states in the current research, the methodology of this research can be used for exploring the EU support formation for the whole list of the EU member states in the upcoming researches.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1

*Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the results before crisis*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
European Union: European unification go further or gone too far Valid N (listwise)	30909 30909	0	10	4.95	2.653

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

*Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the results after crisis*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
European Union: European unification go further or gone too far Valid N (listwise)	31054 31054	0	10	5.21	2.697

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

*Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the results before the crisis*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Immigration bad or good for country's economy Valid N (listwise)	31910 31910	0	10	4.98	2.459

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

*Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of the results after the crisis*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Immigration bad or good for country's economy Valid N (listwise)	32147 32147	0	10	5.28	2.475

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of the results before the crisis

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	31894	0	10	5.04	2.290
Valid N (listwise)	31894				

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of the results before the crisis

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	32034	0	10	5.16	2.292
Valid N (listwise)	32034				

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of the results before the crisis

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	31960	0	10	5.67	2.542
Valid N (listwise)	31960				

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

Table 8. Descriptive Statistics of the results after the crisis

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	32133	0	10	5.69	2.585
Valid N (listwise)	32133				

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

Table 9. Descriptive Statistics of gender before the crisis

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Gender	32888	1	2	1.52	.500
Valid N (listwise)	32888				

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

Table 10. Descriptive Statistics of gender after the crisis

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Gender	33012	1	2	1.52	.500
Valid N (listwise)	33012				

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

Table 11. Descriptive Statistics of age before the crisis

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Age of respondent, calculated	32799	14	114	49.74	18.627
Valid N (listwise)	32799				

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

Table 12. Descriptive Statistics of age after the crisis

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Age of respondent, calculated	32899	15	100	49.94	18.622
Valid N (listwise)	32899				

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

Table 1. Model Summary before the crisis

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.352 <sup>a</sup>	.124	.124	2.482

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Predictors: (Constant), Immigration bad or good for country's economy

Table 2. Before the crisis: ANOVA<sup>a</sup>

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	26315.183	1	26315.183	4272.838	.000 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	186642.307	30305	6.159		
	Total	212957.490	30306			

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

b. Predictors: (Constant), Immigration bad or good for country's economy

Table 3. Before the crisis: Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.035	.033		92.968	.000
	Immigration bad or good for country's economy	.382	.006	.352	65.367	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

Table 4. Model Summary before the crisis

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics			
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2
1	.338 <sup>a</sup>	.114	.114	2.538	.114	3934.429	1	30513

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

**Model Summary**

Model	Change Statistics
	Sig. F Change
1	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Predictors: (Constant), Immigration bad or good for country's economy

*Table 5. After the crisis: ANOVA<sup>a</sup>*

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	25342.517	1	25342.517	3934.429	.000 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	196543.195	30513	6.441		
Total	221885.712	30514			

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

b. Predictors: (Constant), Immigration bad or good for country's economy

*Table 6. After the crisis: Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	3.245	.035		93.789	.000
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	.370	.006	.338	62.725	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

Table 1. Model Summary before the crisis

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.369 <sup>a</sup>	.136	.136	2.464

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Predictors: (Constant), Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

Table 2. Before the crisis: ANOVA<sup>a</sup>

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	28870.466	1	28870.466	4753.490	.000 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	183716.845	30249	6.074		
Total	212587.312	30250			

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

b. Predictors: (Constant), Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

Table 3. Before the crisis: Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.780	.035		80.530	.000
	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	.429	.006	.369	68.946	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

Table 4. Model Summary after the crisis

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics			
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2

1	.354 <sup>a</sup>	.125	.125	2.524	.125	4343.802	1	30379
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Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

**Model Summary**

Model	Change Statistics
	Sig. F Change
1	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Predictors: (Constant), Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

*Table 5. After the crisis: ANOVA<sup>a</sup>*

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	27668.436	1	27668.436	4343.802	.000 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	193508.864	30380	6.370		
Total	221177.300	30381			

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

b. Predictors: (Constant), Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

*Table 6. After the crisis: Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	3.052	.036		85.076	.000
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	.417	.006	.354	65.908	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

Table 1. Model Summary before the crisis

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.373 <sup>a</sup>	.139	.139	2.462

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Predictors: (Constant), Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

Table 2. Before the crisis: ANOVA<sup>a</sup>

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	29717.985	1	29717.985	4904.437	.000 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	184249.884	30407	6.059		
Total	213967.869	30408			

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

b. Predictors: (Constant), Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

Table 3. Before the crisis: Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.731	.035		78.617	.000
	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	.390	.006	.373	70.032	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

Table 4. Model Summary after the crisis

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics			
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2
1	.346 <sup>a</sup>	.119	.119	2.531	.119	4145.582	1	30579

**Model Summary**

Model	Change Statistics
	Sig. F Change
1	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Predictors: (Constant), Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

*Table 5. After the crisis: ANOVA<sup>a</sup> ANOVA<sup>a</sup>*

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	26547.962	1	26547.962	4145.582	.000 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	195830.657	30580	6.404		
Total	222378.619	30581			

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

b. Predictors: (Constant), Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

*Table 6. After the crisis: Coefficients<sup>a</sup>*

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	3.161	.035		90.162	.000
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	.360	.006	.346	64.386	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

Table 1. **Coefficients** results before the crisis<sup>a</sup>

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	2.540	.072		35.404	.000
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	.185	.008	.178	22.469	.000
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	.158	.008	.146	19.732	.000
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	.168	.009	.144	17.897	.000
Gender	.006	.028	.001	.222	.824
Age of respondent, calculated	-.006	.001	-.041	-7.755	.000

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2014). N = 32897.

a. Dependent Variable: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

Table 2. **Coefficients** results after the crisis<sup>a</sup>

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	2.817	.072		38.936	.000
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	.142	.008	.137	16.764	.000
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	.158	.008	.144	18.956	.000
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	.182	.010	.155	18.527	.000
Age of respondent, calculated	-.007	.001	-.048	-8.829	.000
Gender	.098	.029	.018	3.399	.001

Note: Data from the European Social Survey (2016). N = 33016

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