



University  
of Glasgow



NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF  
KYIV-MOHYLA ACADEMY



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# **The Role of Media Instrumentalization in the Wealth Defence Strategies of Oligarchic Systems: The Case of Ukraine**

CEERES Master's Thesis

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January 2023

Field of Studies: Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of:

- Master of Sociology in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: National University- "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy", Ukraine.
  
- International Master's (IntM) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: University of Glasgow, UK.
  
- Master of Arts in Social Sciences (MA) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: University of Tartu, Estonia.

Authorship Declaration: I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

Robert Kilpatrick, January 31st, 2023.

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## List of Acronyms

AFU – Armed Forces of Ukraine
BPP – Bloc Petro Poroshenko
IMI – Institute of Mass Information, Ukraine
OB – Opposition Bloc
UO – United Opposition
UDAR – Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform
PoR – Party of Regions
UNIAN - Ukrainian Independent Information Agency
VR – Verkhovna Rada

**Acknowledgements:**

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my academic supervisors, Dr. Kristina Muhhina and Dr. Anna Osypchuk. I thank them both for their time, guidance, and insight, without which it would not have been possible for me to complete this thesis. I am also very grateful for the continuous support from my parents. Finally, I would like to thank my partner, Cristina, for her patience, encouragement, and resolute belief in me.

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Introduction

The increasing prevalence of media acquisition by the very wealthiest individuals in society, often referred to as “oligarchs”, has been identified by scholars of media studies both in the CEE region (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2012; Örnebring, 2012; Roudakova, 2008; Štětka, 2012) and globally (Levy, 2016; Stiglitz, 2017; Voltmer, 2011). This study seeks to understand the different roles that media outlets fulfil for oligarchs by examining the case of Ukraine. Through the use of Jeffrey Winters’ (2012) theory of oligarchy, oligarchs are conceptualized as extremely wealthy individuals engaged in the process of wealth defence, which is a flexible and changing phenomenon, thereby resulting in a typology of oligarchic systems which manifest according to the different threats to oligarchic wealth. The main aim of this thesis is to understand how the role of media ownership and media instrumentalization by oligarchs will vary according to the primary mode of wealth defence (a.k.a. the type of oligarchy). Two different types of oligarchy, which have been present in post-soviet Ukraine, are studied in this thesis. These are namely the sultanistic oligarchy under President Victor Yanukovich and the untamed ruling oligarchy under president Petro Poroshenko. Subsequently, this study aims to answer the following main research question (RQ):

What are the forms of media instrumentalization in the wealth defence practices of Ukrainian oligarchs in transition from a sultanistic to an untamed ruling oligarchy?

In order to answer the above questions, the principles of Winters’ theory of oligarchy are used to develop expectations as to what specific role media outlets fulfil in the wealth defence strategies of the Ukrainian oligarchs within these two different types of oligarchies, presenting two different corresponding types of oligarchic media instrumentalization. These are namely a “clientelistic” form of oligarchic media instrumentalization within a sultanistic oligarchy, and a “pluralistic” one within an untamed ruling oligarchy, hence two sub-questions are developed in order to provide a clear answer to the main RQ outlined above:

1. How do oligarchs instrumentalize media in a sultanistic oligarchy?
2. How do oligarchs instrumentalize media in an untamed ruling oligarchy?

Since the current literature that outlines an “oligarchic” type of media environment draws attention to a wide variety of associated goals and practices, the RQs above seek to provide clarity as to the role that media instrumentalization can play in two different specific types of oligarchy, while also making the case that a greater understanding of the both the power resources and motivations of individual oligarchs, as well as the changing dynamics of oligarchic types, will provide greater insight into how and why oligarchs exercise their power through various means, including through the media. In order to answer the RQs, a qualitative multiple-case study was conducted comparing the media coverage of both the 2012 and the 2014 Verkhovna Rada elections in Ukraine. Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) was used in order to understand the way in which three different oligarch-owned online media outlets were instrumentalized over the two election campaigns, with a total of 259 and 287 articles analysed for each election respectively.

## **1.2. Contextual Background**

In the latter half of the decade following Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, a system developed in which the monopolistic and corrupt business interests of a handful of wealthy economic and political elites dominated the country’s key institutions. Despite significant changes to the Ukrainian constitution, its laws, and leadership, as well as periods of popular mobilization against elected rulers who were perceived to support and benefit from this system since then, the influence of extremely wealthy oligarchs has remained both surprisingly durable and key to understanding the political landscape of the country (Matuszak, 2012; Konończuk, 2015). The problem of oligarchy, or the continuing transfer of wealth into political power and vice-versa referred to as “*systema*” in Ukraine, has been a barrier to the country’s consolidation of democratic institutions, the development of rule of law, and its the integration into European Union institutions, all of which has subverted the trajectory of the post-soviet democratic transition in the country (Lough, 2021). The oligarchy and its influence are not hidden from public knowledge or scrutiny in Ukraine, with the names of the very wealthiest individual business elites and politicians becoming recognized as household names following numerous interviews, election campaigns, and stints in the highest levels of political office, as well as PR campaigns through media outlets and high-profile charitable donations. Neither is their influence as a group merely accepted by the Ukrainian populace as an inevitable or desirable effect on the country as a whole. This was especially the case in the period directly after the Orange Revolution of 2004-05 and is particularly relevant following the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, with the victorious presidential election campaigns of both the businessman and oligarch Petro Poroshenko, as well as the self-styled “outsider” candidate Volodymyr Zelensky, gaining popular support in part on a platform of taking on the

system of oligarchic control. Furthermore, sociological research conducted in 2019 confirmed that a large majority of Ukrainian citizens (74.4%) considered the enrichment of oligarchs and impoverishment of ordinary people as a very important problem to be solved.<sup>1</sup> Ukraine is by no means unique in Eastern Europe and the post-soviet region as a whole with regards to the development of a class of oligarchs in the 1990s which continues to maintain its influence to this day. Åslund (2005) considers the incidence of oligarchs to be “one of the most significant political problems after communism”. Konończuk, Cenuşa, and Kakachia (2018) delineate the negative influence of oligarchs in Moldova and Georgia, resulting in a similar assessment as outlined by Lough (2021) above, that oligarchic influence in these countries results in “limiting political pluralism, the capture of state institutions, corruption, monopolization, and more broadly the blocking of reform processes”.

Within this context of the significant influence of oligarchs within developing states, Levy (2016) in a report for *Reporters Sans Frontières* (RSF) focuses on the growing phenomenon of media acquisition by the very wealthiest “whose interest in journalism is secondary to the defence of their personal interests” (p.9). He highlights the importance of media outlets for oligarchs, including those in the post-soviet region, in silencing opposition, promoting both the preferred candidates and their business interests, and attacking rivals among other things. Specifically concerning media in Ukraine, Matuszak (2012) describes the mainstream media outlets as “a special example of the domination the oligarchs wield”, existing “primarily as a tool to defend one’s own interests” (p.34) with regards to the individual oligarchs in control of them. The sheer degree to which media coverage directly controlled by the Ukrainian oligarchy dominates the information sphere has also been drawn attention to by a report from the Ukrainian Institute for the Future (Andrusiv, et al. 2018), which outlines that, in particular with regards to television coverage, but also through newspaper and online news portals, the oligarchs capture the vast majority of the attention of the population in Ukraine.

The following section will review the current literature on this increasingly prevalent ‘oligarchic’ type of media, which has been identified as a distinct form of media instrumentalization which impacts upon both the media and political environments in which it operates. Aside from outlining the current literature on the topic, I will also make the argument that in order to understand how the media operates in an environment of significant instrumentalization by oligarchs, a theory of oligarchy is required, one which defines what is meant by the term “oligarch”, separates them out from other types of elites, and explains their core motivations and the resulting practices of media outlets controlled by oligarchs. Chapter 3 outlines the conceptual framework that shall be the basis for understanding the different ways in which oligarchic media can be instrumentalized, namely Jeffrey Winters’ theory of

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<sup>1</sup> Survey conducted by the Ukrainian Institute of Social Research with full results available (in Ukrainian) here: [https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg\\_files/pr\\_16\\_05\\_2019\\_smc-uisr-gr\\_present.pdf](https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/pr_16_05_2019_smc-uisr-gr_present.pdf)

oligarchy, from which two distinct forms of oligarchic media instrumentalization are conceptualized by the author: “clientelistic” and “pluralistic”. Chapter 4 is then devoted to the methodology, outlining the justification for Ukraine as the context of study, the choice of oligarchic media outlets, as well as the methods used to analyse content from said outlets. Chapter 5 presents the empirical analysis of said media outlets, with a discussion of said results with regards to both the literature and Winters’ theory presented in Chapter 6.

## 2. Literature Review

A common starting point for understanding why different media systems operate the way that they do, as well as how this relates to the political environment, is Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) *Comparing Media Systems*. Their work starts with the same postulation as Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’s (1956) *Four Theories of the Press*, which they quote directly. Namely, that “the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates”, a point that they expand upon, stating that “one cannot understand the news media without understanding the nature of the state, the system of political parties, the pattern of relations between economic and political interests... among other elements of the social structure.” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; p. 8). How does this statement apply in countries where extremely wealthy individuals, or oligarchs, exercise significant influence over both political and economic structures, as well as the media environment itself?

### 2.1 Media Instrumentalization

One of the concepts brought up in *Comparing Media Systems* is that of media instrumentalization, a term which Hallin and Mancini define as “control of media by outside actors - parties, politicians, social groups or movements, or economic actors seeking political influence - who use them to intervene in the world of politics” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004 p. 37). Here, the final example of an outside actor they list, “economic actors seeking political influence” can certainly be interpreted through the lens of oligarchy. Hallin and Mancini assert that instrumentalization of the media is one of the key aspects of the Polarized Pluralist model, a media-political system they first argued was typical of Mediterranean countries, characterized by a relatively more recent development of liberal institutions and weak commercial media markets, leaving media dependent on the state, political parties, the church, or wealthy patrons, and resulting in lower levels of journalistic autonomy and professionalism. They argue this leads to a media environment that is to a greater degree “politicized”, favouring commentary over balanced reporting (Hallin and Mancini, p. 138-142). This model has since been commonly extended to

“transitional” countries in the CEE region, including Ukraine, by media and communications scholars. For example, Voltmer (2011) notes the prevalence of directly applying the Polarized Pluralist model beyond the original scope intended by Hallin and Mancini and onto so-called “third wave” democracies, including post-communist countries in the CEE region (for examples see Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008; Wyka, 2008; Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011), in part due to the extent of media instrumentalization in the region:

“With its defining characteristics of journalistic partisanship, political instrumentalization of the media, and uncontrolled commercialization of the media industry, all of which are regarded as problematic and potentially obstructive to a healthy democratic public sphere, the polarized pluralist model seems to have become something like a catch-all category for media systems outside the Western world of established democracies” (Voltmer, 2011; p. 225).

Voltmer also argues that this extension of Hallin and Mancini’s model beyond its original scope, its use as a “catch-all category” homogenizes and obscures understanding as to the workings of media-political systems outside the western world, arguing that it is “rather implausible to assume that, whereas eighteen countries in Western Europe and North America are diversified into three distinct constellations of media–politics relationships, all the remaining media systems around the world can be sufficiently understood by only one model.” (Voltmer, 2011; p. 225).

I would argue that one of the main reasons that the polarized pluralist model has been applied in such a broad spectrum is because Hallin and Mancini’s definition of media instrumentalization itself is much too broad in the sense that it does not distinguish between the different groups by which media can be instrumentalized. The number of different ways in which media instrumentalization can manifest, as well as its pervasiveness globally, is highlighted by Kleis-Nielsen (2017), who outlines the three basic rationales for operating media: power, public service, and profit. He argues that what is referred to as instrumentalization in the field of media studies is basically any media that operates under the rationale of power, rather than either public service or profit, and that this motive is by far the most common globally and historically, arguing that media “subsidized either by proprietors, social and political groups, or governments — is common in most of the world” (p.6), with the profit and public service motives generally only becoming more prominent in a limited number of countries outside the “low and middle income countries” that make up the majority. Simply put, environments in which media is instrumentalized primarily by either governments, political parties, social groups, foreign governments, or indeed oligarchs are the norm and are likely to result in very different types of media-

political environments. Oligarchs have both very distinct power resources and contrasting motivations compared to, say, state governments, an aspect that has been noted with regards to an oligarchic type of media which has been highlighted by Mungiu-Pippidi (2008, 2012), Štětka (2012), and Levy (2016) and is outlined below.

## **2.2. The Oligarchic Media Ownership Model**

### 2.2.1. Oligarchic Media

Building on the context of Hallin and Mancini outlined above, an oligarchic type of media-political environment, based on a distinct form of media instrumentalization by wealthy individuals with political connections has been identified, with much of the scholarship focusing on the CEE region. Looking at the work of these authors together, a few consistent characteristics come forward that characterize oligarchic media instrumentalization.

Mungiu-Pippidi (2008) argues that media environments in the CEE region have developed along three distinct and divergent paths following the initial deregulation and liberalization from communist party control. These are (1) an atavistic path in which the has essentially returned media to the centralized government control akin to the soviet era, (2) a path of media pluralism towards one of the western-style media models outlined in *Comparing Media Systems*, normally the Polarized Pluralist model, and (3) a path of “oligarchization” and media capture. The use of the term “capture”, as opposed to that “instrumentalization” put forward by Hallin and Mancini is notable. Stiglitz (2017) outlines the origins of the term within the field of economics and how the analogy has then been applied to media, explaining that capture as a general term denotes “regulators who become overly empathetic or supportive of those they are meant to be regulating”, and pointing out that when this extends to media in the sense that “one or more of the parties that the media are supposed to be monitoring on behalf of society “captures” or takes hostage the media, so that they fail to perform their societal function.” This scenario is further complicated in the case of oligarchy, however. This is because, as noted by Mungiu-Pippidi, the pervasive influence of oligarchs in the CEE region, media capture itself has become a tool of state capture:

“State capture in a postcommunist context designates the situation in which the post-communist state has not succeeded in becoming an autonomous actor towards interest groups or vested interests. Media capture in postcommunist Europe is therefore not necessarily captured by the state. As the groups which

capture the media either have already captured the state or seek to do so, capture of the media (either public or private) should be seen as a companion of state capture, a complementary phenomenon” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008; p. 73).

In terms of the type of political environment that leads media systems towards the path of oligarchization, Mungiu-Pippidi argues that such an outcome can be identified in part by the high overall corruption scores given in the Freedom House *Nations in Transit* Index, arguing that the oligarchization of media is therefore a feature of environments where corruption is pervasive in what she refers to as a “particularist” society, where “norms of impartiality and fairness are widely infringed upon” and “public assets are not distributed in an open and transparent manner and citizens have no chance of being protected equally by the law or taxed equally by the tax authorities” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2012; p. 38). Hallin and Mancini also note that instrumentalization of the media is prevalent in environments where rational-legal authority is absent, a Weberian concept and form of rule based on adherence to formal and universalistic rules of procedure, meaning “businesses do not depend too heavily on the arbitrary decisions of particular officials who may, for example, favour an enterprise with which they are allied politically, nor are their fates affected too dramatically by which party happens to be in power at the moment” (Hallin and Mancini 2004 p. 57). This feature of an oligarchic type of media therefore conforms with Kleis-Nielsen’s (2017) definition of instrumentalized media as one being based on the rationale of power. However, the specific end of said power with regards to oligarchic media in particular is to access and protect nominally private assets in an environment in which the boundaries between public and private are not sharply delineated, hence some degree of influence over the public sphere is required in order to achieve said end.

The result of the path of oligarchization in the postcommunist countries that Mungiu-Pippidi studies is therefore a significant concentration of media assets among the wealthiest individuals, all of whom maintain political connections in order to access and protect their wealth. Štětka (2015) stresses the significance and prevalence of said patterns of media ownership in the CEE region noting that an “oligarchic model of media ownership has been spreading” in which local “business tycoons” (although she does use the term oligarchs as well) are buying up media outlets from the international investors who had previously dominated the market. This is particularly the case from 2007 onwards when the global financial crisis changed the priorities of foreign media owners who were formerly invested in the region. Levy (2015) outlines this tendency on a global scale, noting that mass media is becoming “the exclusive property of a handful of people, all business tycoons’, also employing the term “oligarch” interchangeably. Oligarchic media instrumentalization through ownership also generally aims to be non-transparent, although oligarchs are not always successful in this regard. Radu (2017), for example,

describes the lengths that investigative journalists working with the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) have gone to in order to uncover the ownership structures of media outlets in the CEE region, which are often obfuscated by shell or offshore company structures and proxies.

Both Stiglitz (2017) and Štětka (2012) also agree that this kind of media instrumentalization through direct ownership by oligarchs has a distinct impact on the entire media market, not only those outlets controlled by oligarchs. This is first and foremost because their media outlets are almost never profitable. Media outlets, then, are not acquired as a source of wealth generation themselves, rather they protect the oligarchs' other businesses. Štětka notes this characteristic specifically with regards to the local and wealthy owners of media in the region:

“... because of their core business interests lying elsewhere, the tycoons don't necessarily need to follow the classical business model and keep their media profitable as they are able to subsidize them from sources generated by other-than-media companies in their portfolio. Therefore, rather than seeking profit, they are often seen as using their media in order to exercise public influence and to advance their business and political goals.” (Štětka, 2012; p. 446)

Importantly, the lack of a profitability requirement for oligarchic media outlets to continue operating impacts upon the media market as a whole, since it becomes an entirely unfavourable environment for anyone, be it local or international investors, to set up their own commercial outlets to make a profit when competing against the oligarch-owned outlets. For-profit media will therefore be unviable in an environment dominated by media which operates under the rational of power.

### 2.2.2. Oligarchic Media Practices: “Jeans”, Advertorials, and Kompromat

A variety of specific practices associated with the oligarchic ownership model are identified in the current literature, with some overlap in the findings among researchers. The first is for the oligarchs to promote themselves or the businesses that they own. For example, Štětka (2012; p.446) outlines that media outlets commonly engage in “pure business PR” to the benefit of their owners, while Söderbaum highlights the role of media outlets in a more general positive framing of their oligarch proprietors and their role in society as “responsible citizens” (Söderbaum, 2018; p.63). For oligarchs who are actively and personally engaged in the political process as candidates, Levy also notes that media ownership is a valuable tool in more politicized self-promotion and campaigning for their own candidacy (pp. 25-27).

This final type of self-promotion links together with the most commonly mentioned use of media instrumentalization in the literature, namely the promotion of other political candidates or political parties that are of particular benefit to the oligarch media owners and their businesses. Media instrumentalization to this end is a key factor in the overlap between state capture and media capture as outlined above. This may include promoting the candidates and parties already in power, for example Levy argues that one of the key ways in which oligarchs instrumentalize their media outlets is to put them “in the service of the regime”, outlining the phenomena of oligarchs who “enter into alliances with governments, offering them mass media support in return for economic favours” (p.12). Mungiu-Pippidi also outlines the power of media to control state outcomes to the benefit of the oligarchs noting how “state subsidies, bailouts in case of debts, preferential distribution of state advertising and tax breaks for media owners are traded in exchange for favourable treatment of the media” (p.73). However, the promotion of political candidates and parties is not always in favour of the incumbent. Roudakova (2008) in particular highlights the fact that although it may be common for oligarch media owners to enter into a particularistic alliance with a politician, relationships between media outlets and individual political actors are not always long-term or predictable. Levy also highlights the power of the oligarchs to “make or break governments” (p.12) highlighting the extent to which their control does not always favour the incumbent.

The opposite side to the phenomenon of promoting particular candidates and parties as a means of state capture by oligarchic media outlets is also identified. Namely, the use of media outlets to denigrate or smear any candidates who might emerge with a platform contrary to the interests of the oligarch media proprietors. Štětka for example refers to the “suppressing of political opponents or competitors” as a key aspect of oligarchic media instrumentalization. Levy looks at this phenomenon in more detail through the case-study of oligarchic media in Greece, arguing that Greek oligarchs used their media outlets in 2015 to try (unsuccessfully) and prevent Alexis Tsipiras, a candidate with an openly anti-oligarchic campaign platform, from winning power. It also appears that individual oligarchs are not always united in which candidates are in their own interests or contrary to them, leading to smears against each other’s candidates as a result (Levy pp. 52-53). Both Štětka and Levy refer to this kind of competitive negative coverage, with the former noting that “media are frequently and openly used by their owners as weapons in political combat” (Štětka, p. 448) and the latter to the use of media as “baseball bats” to intimidate and denigrate opponents (Levy p. 54).

It is clear that, although patterns of ownership and their effects on the media market as a whole are consistent across an oligarchic media model as outlined above, actual media practices and the subsequent content varies to a significant degree. All of these practices, however, arguably fall into the two broader categories of “advertorials” and “kompromat” as conceptualized by Örnebring (2012). Both

of these types of media content are paid for in some sense, either by external actors or, in this case, oligarch media owners who are happy to continue running their outlets at a loss over a long period of time, with advertorial referring to “media content oriented toward promotion and positive content” and the kompromat to “media content oriented toward smearing and negativity” (Örnebring, 2012; p. 506). Both the payment and the promotional aim are also non-transparent, meaning that they are not explicitly labelled as such, regardless of whether or not it is obvious to the reader that the article is indeed paid for with a particular intent in mind. The practices outlined above show that either advertorials or kompromat can essentially be directed towards the relevant businesses, political candidates, or parties as per the interests of the oligarch media proprietor. Although Örnebring does not explicitly link these two practices to an oligarchic type of media instrumentalization in the same way as Levy, Mungiu-Pippidi, and Štětka do, he does point out that they are “commonly either paid for or ordered by political or business interests” and also refers specifically to oligarchs as individuals who “personify the clientelistic linkages between media and politics” (Örnebring, p. 503). Specifically within the Ukrainian media environment, such paid-for content is sometimes referred to as “jeans” (джинса), which the Ukrainian Institute of Mass Information (IMI) defines as “a hidden advertisement ... aimed at improving / deteriorating or creating a positive / negative image of political parties, individual politicians or people”, stressing the fact that such journalistic content is never marked as such in any way. Said articles are generally dedicated to only one politician or political force and are, specifically with regards to advertorials, strictly promotional, providing positive content without any comment or criticism.<sup>2</sup> Iwanski (2012), refers to jeans as a “political advertorial ordered and paid for by someone from the outside in order to promote (‘zakazukha’) or discredit (‘chernukha’) specific individuals”, with the two Ukrainian terms he uses corresponding to Örnebring’s “advertorial” and “kompromat”. Verstyuk (2013) also outlines the fact that so-called “jeans” articles in Ukraine have been known to be offered by media outlets for set prices, and that media outlets independent from oligarchic influence also engage in the practice as a revenue stream in an extremely crowded market, again showing the impact of oligarchic media outlets on the entire media environment.

The only means of oligarchic media instrumentalization mentioned in the literature that does not fall under the broad categories of advertorial and kompromat is the removal of information or news content that might in some way be relevant to the public interest. For example, Štětka refers to attempts to cover-up or divert attention from the commonly occurring corruption scandals that oligarch media proprietors are often subject to (p.447), with Levy referring to the replacement of news media with entertainment as another use of media by oligarchs (p.13, p.19, p.40). However, this type of media

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<sup>2</sup> Information on IMI monitoring of so-called “jeans” (in Ukrainian): <https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/metodolohiia-monitorynhu-materialiv-z-oznakamy-zamovlennia-dzhynsy-i28317>

instrumentalization may be difficult to identify since it essentially constitutes non-content unlike the practices outlined above.

### 2.2.3. A Theory of Oligarchy and Oligarchic Media Instrumentalization

It is clear from the literature above that there is an emerging oligarchic type of media ownership and media instrumentalization, with which there are a variety of associated practices. I would argue that a greater understanding of the both the power resources and motivations of individual oligarchs, as well as the changing dynamics of oligarchies and the types thereof, will provide greater insight into how and why oligarchs exercise their power through various means, including through the media outlets which they own. The studies highlighted above have pointed towards a notable trend with regards to a concentration of economic and political power into relatively few hands in both the CEE region and beyond, a phenomenon which Štětka (2012, p. 449) points out “has implications for the theory of media systems in postcommunist Europe.” In particular, these studies criticize the notion that post-communist media environments are transitioning from government censorship in the communist period towards one of the western, democratic media-political systems such as those outlined in *Comparing Media Systems* in which media, business, and political systems become differentiated. Although I would certainly agree with Štětka’s statement, I would also argue that what is currently missing from their studies in conceptualizing such an oligarchic type of media system is first and foremost a theory of oligarchs and oligarchy as the agents at the centre of the phenomenon they have observed. Where the existing literature has identified the existence of an oligarchic media environment, as well as the media practices that come as a result of said type of media environment, this thesis aims to shed light on the different roles that media instrumentalization can play for oligarchs, arguing that the specific role and subsequent media practices will ultimately depend on the type of oligarchy according to Winters’ theory.

The following section will outline a conceptual framework for understanding both the terms oligarch and oligarchy, derived from the core theoretical text of *Oligarchy* by Jeffrey Winters’ (2011). Winters provides an enlightening conceptualization of oligarchy which can provide an understanding of the different ways in which oligarchs choose to instrumentalize their media outlets. Other important aspects of oligarchies will also be discussed with regards to the contributions of Marandici (2021), Markus and Charnysh (2017), Havrylyshyn (2006), and Åslund (2005) among others. Importantly, Winters’ typology of different oligarchies will also be outlined in order to provide the basis by which the variable practices outlined above with regards to oligarchic media instrumentalization can be understood.

### 3. Conceptual Framework

The confusion and inconsistency surrounding the term “oligarchy” in the social sciences has been pointed out by both Winters (2011, pp. 1-3) and Leach (2005, p. 315) both of whom note that a direct translation of the two Greek morphemes which make up the word, resulting in a definition of “rule by the few”, is not useful for two reasons. Firstly, because in literally any form of government, including in representative democracies, those who govern are always by necessity a far, far smaller group of individuals than those who are governed. The second is that many of the individuals referred to as “oligarchs” in both media and academia are often not in direct positions of rule Winters. This is true of the Ukrainian subjects of this study Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoisky, and Victor Pinchuk, who are not currently holders of public office in Ukraine even though all three have previously held official positions within the Ukrainian political system.

#### 3.1. Oligarchs, Material Power, and Wealth Defence

##### 3.1.1. Material Power

Winters provides clarity by defining the basis of an oligarch’s minority power neither by their small number nor a position of rule, rather by a significant concentration of wealth, which he also refers to as ‘material power’ (Winters, 2011; p.4). Although it may seem obvious that oligarchs are wealthy actors in society, labelling their wealth as the defining aspect and basis of their minority power helps us to understand how oligarchs operate, their fundamental motivations, as well as the role that media ownership can play in achieving their goals. According to Winters, there are two key aspects of wealth, or material power, as a basis of power that can help us understand what oligarchy is and how it works.

Firstly, wealth is an extremely flexible form of minority power that both can be, but also requires conversion into other forms of power to take effect. Winters’ outlines a number of different power resources through which oligarchic wealth is typically realized (Winters, pp.12-16). These include first and foremost coercive power, achieved primarily through the hiring of private militia, bodyguards etc., as well as mobilizational power, for example through the use of paid-for protesters or purchasing the sustained engagement of lobbyists in order to influence decision makers on their behalf. Importantly for clearing up the conceptual confusion around oligarchs as rulers, and by extension oligarchy as a form of rule, Winters argues that the power of official positions is but one of the other means through which oligarchs can exercise their material power. The power of official positions can be gained directly,

generally by funding their own political campaigns leading to periods in office, or indirectly, for example by funding candidates with whom an individual oligarch might have prior agreements, as well as through bribery of the judges or deputies who wield their power through a specific role. Finally, as is clear from the studies outlined in the literature review above, media acquisition is another, and increasingly prevalent, means by which an oligarch can realize their material power, the details of which with regards to the contemporary Ukrainian oligarchy will be explored in this thesis.

Secondly, wealth is an extremely durable form of minority power, as well as a self-sustaining resource. Winters argues that material power is “unusually resistant to dispersion” in comparison with other forms of elite minority power (p.4). For example, the power that comes from direct rule through an official position can easily and quickly be taken away following an unsuccessful re-election campaign or, in either more radical or less democratic circumstances, a coup d’état or revolution. However, the personal wealth of an oligarch is both far more resistant to such changes, generally remaining regardless of whether they are voted out of office or not.

### 3.1.2. Wealth Defence

Understanding oligarchs through the lens of minority power as outlined above has important implications. Importantly, it means that the only significant and lasting threat to the power and position of an oligarch is through some kind of capture or re-distribution of their wealth. Due to this, all of the ways in which the material power of an oligarch is converted into other power resources, including those mentioned above, are done with the primary goal of protecting their wealth from such threats. This phenomenon, in which a smaller portion of the oligarchs’ wealth can be converted into many varied other forms of power in order to protect their vast wealth more generally, is referred to by Winters as “wealth defence”. Based on the above concepts of both material power wealth defence, Winters provides a clear conceptualization of both the terms “oligarch” and “oligarchy”. Firstly, the term oligarch refers to an individual with a significant enough concentration of personal wealth, of which a portion of said wealth is used to defend it as a whole. Essentially a wealthy individual engaged in the defence of their own wealth:

“Oligarchs are actors who command and control massive concentrations of material resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social position.” (p.6)

But what of the term oligarchy? As outlined above, since oligarchs do not by definition take up positions of rule, it is not accurate to think of oligarchy as either a regime type or a system of rule. Rather,

Winters argues that oligarchy refers simply to the process or different ways in which individual oligarchs defend their wealth from the threats against it, no matter what regime type or system of rule they find themselves in. Winters thus defines oligarchy as “the politics of wealth defence”, a process which can take place within almost any regime type and in a number of different ways resulting in a typology of oligarchies outlined below.

### 3.2. Typology of Oligarchies

The flexible way in which material power can be exercised means that oligarchy, or wealth defence, can manifest in a number of different ways according to the context in which it operates. Winters’ theory presents a four-way typology of oligarchy which outlines the main ways in which oligarchies manifest and will be key to understanding the different key roles that media can play with regards to wealth defence.


There are two main factors which influence the primary mode of wealth defence for oligarchs. The first is the degree to which the oligarchs themselves control the coercive power necessary to physically defend their wealth and property from threats. In the modern era in particular, this factor is very closely linked to whether or not oligarchs are themselves in a ruling position, since oligarchs who rule directly are generally in control of the coercive means (the police, armed forces, etc.) required to protect their wealth and property and, in particular following the development of the nation-state, oligarchs who do not rule directly have their property defended externally by a centralized authority. The second factor concerns the “nature” of said rule, which Winters argues can either be individual (although the terms fragmented and personal are also employed) or collective (Winters p. 7). The nature of rule as a factor which influences the primary mode of wealth defence applies regardless of whether that rule is by oligarchs themselves or by an external authority. The variations in these two key factors with regards to the wealth defence strategies results in four distinct types of oligarchy. These should be considered “ideal types” in the sense that many oligarchies in practice fall somewhere on the spectrum in between each ideal type. These four types of oligarchy are:

- **Warring**, in which oligarchs directly and individually provide the coercive means of protecting their own personal wealth and are in direct competition with each other.
- **Ruling**, in which oligarchs collectively control the coercive power required to defend their wealth, developing conventions or institutions of collaboration in order to prevent destructive competition between each other.

- **Civil**, in which oligarchs forego the coercive power to defend their wealth to an institutional and impersonal central government, submitting to the rule of law in return for guaranteed property rights.
- **Sultanistic**, in which oligarchs forego the coercive power to defend their wealth to an individual, leading oligarch (sultan). In return for submitting to their rule, the sultan is responsible for protecting the wealth and property of the oligarchy as a whole.

Winters' typology of oligarchies is visualized in figure 1.0 below with the  $x$  axis denoting the extent to which the oligarchs control the means of coercion necessary to defend their wealth, and the  $y$  axis denoting the nature of rule, in other words whether oligarchs rule directly in a fragmented or collective way, or whether the external authority to which they submit is itself an individual (sultan) or a collective (state government).

Figure 1.0. Typology of Oligarchies.



Source: devised by author based on the diagram of oligarchic types provided by Winters (2011, p. 34).

### 3.3. Control over the Means of Coercion: Kleptocracy and State Capture

What are the key factors that lead to one different type of wealth defence, or another as displayed on the axes above, and how can this help us to understand the different roles and associated practices of oligarchic media instrumentalization in Ukraine and beyond?

One of the most important dynamics that influences the change from one oligarchic system to another is the capability and willingness of a central authority to provide a guarantee for the wealth and property of the oligarchs. This is the core incentive which pushes oligarchs to either relinquish or take greater control over the means of coercion required to defend their wealth, represented by the  $x$  axis in figure 1.0 above. Guaranteed property rights are the primary motive for oligarchs to abandon direct positions of power, relinquishing control over the means of coercion in the process (Winters, pp. 22-24). This guarantee can be provided institutionally and impersonally through the rule of law as in a civil oligarchy, or individually by a sultanistic oligarch through personalistic rule by law. Winters distinguishes between “high” and “low” rule of law, with the former referring exclusively to the property rights of oligarchs, or more generally the power of the legal system specifically with regards to the most powerful actors in society (Winters, p. 38). If the state does not have the means to guarantee the property of the oligarchy through law, or if a sultanistic oligarch uses the legal system as a tool to threaten the property rights of the rest of the oligarchy, the result will be greater motivation to engage in direct positions of rule, essentially controlling the coercive means required in order to protect their wealth. Åslund (2005) notes the absence of property rights, or the “high” rule of law as the key motivation for oligarchs taking a more active political role in a comparative study of Russian, Ukraine, and the USA, noting that:

“... they (oligarchs) have the possibility to use politics as a means of reinsuring their shaky property rights. Admittedly, they also use politics to extract more state resources and to undermine the property rights of others, whose political assets are weaker than they used to be, but the fundamental problem is the weakness of their property rights to already acquired property. For the very rich, politics is foremost a means to further their business interests.”

However, I would argue that this aspect of oligarchy and wealth defence arguably requires refining, since other researchers focusing on oligarchy, who also work with Winters’ theory as a basis, have noted a tendency for members of contemporary oligarchies to eschew taking up direct positions of rule within the political system they operate, despite the advantages such a position might bring in terms of defending their assets in contexts where property rights are not guaranteed. For example, Söderbaum

(2018) outlines the phenomenon of “post-politician” oligarchs in Ukraine who no longer hold political office, all of whom are among the very wealthiest in the country and make up the subject of this study. Furthermore, Markus and Charnysh (2017), in their study of the Ukrainian oligarchy between 2006 and 2012, find that what they refer to as “indirect strategies” of wealth defence, which are exercised primarily through the funding of political parties or the ownership of media outlets, have been far more effective than the assumption of positions of direct power in the Verkhovna Rada or other ministerial positions in both accumulating and defending wealth, an observation consistent with Söderbaum’s regarding the fact that the very wealthiest oligarchs no longer rely on direct positions of power. Although Markus and Charnysh accept the strong motivation for oligarchs to take up direct positions of rule, in particular when the rule of law required to protect their property is weak as outlined by Åslund above, they also outline that defending oligarchic wealth indirectly comes with two distinct advantages: flexibility and deniability. These two advantages appear to be particularly relevant in environments where, although property rights may still be weak, democratic elections remain open, competitive, and impactful, and there is some degree of public scrutiny towards the oligarchy itself.

The advantage of greater flexibility that comes by avoiding taking up direct positions of rule is alluded to above with regards to the fact that the power that comes with official positions is far easier to challenge and disperse than material power. Hence, in an environment that is electorally competitive, and therefore to some degree unpredictable, informal support of political parties either through funding, or support through their own media channels, as opposed to standing themselves, allows the oligarchs to “support any party at any point or contribute to directly rivalrous parties” (Markus and Charnysh, p. 1651), essentially meaning that they are able to hedge their bets in terms of protecting their wealth no matter the outcome. In terms of deniability, the wealthiest oligarchs are essentially able to better hide their involvement in the political system if they can exert influence without themselves standing for office. As mentioned in the introductory section, the problem of oligarchy in Ukraine is considered by its population as one of the most important problems to be solved, with Markus and Charnysh (p. 1662) also drawing attention to a 2014 statistic from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology showing that 26.3% of respondents answered the question “what should be done with oligarchs’ property?” with “it must be nationalized completely”. Thus, Markus and Charnysh (p.1652) point to the fact that indirect strategies of wealth defence are likely to have been more effective since “it makes sense to abstain from provoking the public, which is much more difficult when one assumes formal powers.” However, since the demands of wealth defence for oligarchs require engagement with the political sphere in an environment in which property rights are not guaranteed, total invisibility to the public may not be possible, hence Markus and Charnysh (p.1653) argue that “deniability is the next best thing”.

In light of this research on both the phenomenon of “post-politician oligarchs”, as well as the effectiveness of “indirect” strategies of wealth defence, a further detail can be added with regards to Winters’ theory on the wealth defence strategies of oligarchs. Although it is correct that oligarchs are incentivised to take greater control over the political process in order to defend their wealth in environments where property rights are not guaranteed, it seems that this can be achieved in two forms. The first is by taking up direct positions of rule, for which perhaps the most apt term ought to be “kleptocracy”. In environments where property rights are not guaranteed, yet democratic accountability remains in the form of competitive elections, the incentive to control the political process remains. However, due to the advantages of both flexibility and deniability outlined above, indirect strategies of exercising such control are more desirable for preserving oligarchic wealth. Indirect strategies of wealth defence have also been conceptualized by scholars as “state capture”. Havrylyshyn (2006), distinguishes oligarchic state capture from more straightforward lobbying by wealthy actors simply by nature of its pervasiveness:

“The difference in degree of such power and influence...is big enough to become a difference in kind: the oligarchs are able to influence not only economic measures affecting them directly but are powerful enough to influence the general direction of economic policy and even the outcome of elections. That is what one means by state capture.” (Havrylyshyn,2006; p. 202)

Marandici (2021) also uses the term state capture with regards to the oligarchy, referring specifically to the power of the “winners of the market transition” which, in the case of former soviet countries are the wealthiest oligarchs, to “exercise disproportionate influence over state institutions”, thereby removing state autonomy. As outlined in the literature review above, Mungiu-Pippidi (2008) explains that state capture and media capture by oligarchs are complementary phenomena and certainly the works cited above shed greater light on one of the core roles that media ownership can play in the wealth defence strategies of oligarchies within Winters’ theory of oligarchy. Namely, as one of the means the oligarchs can employ to indirectly control the political process in order to defend their wealth without having to take any of the risks associated with direct positions of rule.

### **3.4. Sultanistic and “Untamed” Ruling Oligarchies**

Since this thesis will focus on Ukraine as a case study of the different ways in which oligarchs instrumentalize media outlets, an in-depth exploration of the role of the media in the wealth defence strategies of all four main oligarchic types will not be possible. Instead, this thesis will focus on the use

of media in two particular types of oligarchy, namely that of sultanistic and “untamed” ruling oligarchies. This is because much of the literature on the oligarchy in post-soviet Ukraine, although not always framed through the lens of Winters’ theory, suggests this kind of shift in the primary mode of wealth defence from the former to the latter. Greater details of this transition with regards to Ukraine are outlined below in the case selection part of the methodology. In order to understand the role that the media can play in these oligarchic systems, I will outline below some of the key aspects of key aspects of sultanistic oligarchies specifically, as well as how the downfall of a sultanistic system of wealth defence will impact upon the wealth defence strategies of the rest of the oligarchy, since these two scenarios are the most directly relevant to Ukraine.

#### 3.4.1. Sultanistic Oligarchies

In a sultanistic oligarchy, the sole means of coercion required to defend wealth and property of the oligarchy as a whole are under the control of one oligarch, or “sultan”. In a modern context this means that the sultan is at the centre of the political system, generally serving as head of state in an environment with few divisions of power. In terms of oligarchic wealth defence in a sultanistic system, the sultan, owing to the fact that they control the entirety, or the majority, of the coercive means of wealth defence become the guarantors of oligarchic wealth. In return the rest of the oligarchs support the position of the sultan from political rivals who might threaten their position. This incentivises a personalistic approach to wealth defence which centres around good relations with, and support for, the sultan. Specifically with regards to wealthy oligarchs, this means that an impersonal rule of law which applies to all actors equally is absent in favour of a personalistic rule *by law* at the will and discretion of the sultan. The wealth of each individual oligarch is therefore threatened if the favour of the sultan, and the patronage that comes with it, is lost (Winters pp. 35-36).

The relationship between a sultanistic oligarch and any other members of the oligarchy constitutes a conventional ‘clientelistic’ or patron-client relationship. Such relationships are characterized primarily by a significant imbalance in power and status between the patron and the client(s), in which economic resources controlled by the patron are delivered to the client in return for political support in the form of votes, loyalty, protection etc., as well as their informal nature, since they are generally based on personal connections and are not enforced via an impartial legal framework (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972; Eisenstadt and Roniger; 1980). The durability of clientelistic relations is also emphasized, with a greater power imbalance between the patron and clients seen as an important factor which promotes said durability. In the case of sultanistic oligarchies, the control of coercive power by the sultan ensures a strong power imbalance between themselves and the rest of the oligarchy.

Beyond the patron-client relationship inherent to sultanistic oligarchies, the sultan also provides the external force to reduce the lateral threats that oligarchs pose to each other, since individual oligarchs do not possess the coercive means to pose a significant threat to each other. Hence, threats to oligarchic wealth overall do not stem primarily from each other, rather from challenges from below. These can be driven by political rivals and individual oligarchs, who may aim either to supersede the position of sultan, threatening the stability of the patron-client relationship between the sultan and the rest of the oligarchy, Threats can also come through popular movements from below, which aim to challenge the clientelistic system as a whole in the name of strengthening the rule of law, greater transparency, or through calls for wealth redistribution. Failure on the part of the leading oligarch to protect the wealth of the oligarchy as a whole from such threats is a challenge to the entire basis on which the patron-client relations are built and is cause for the destabilization of a sultanistic oligarchy. Furthermore, sultanistic oligarchs can cause destabilization themselves if they become a threat to oligarchic wealth through direct confrontation with a sufficient portion of the oligarchy, sacrificing the support of the oligarchy as a whole in a bid to centralize even greater power around themselves or an even smaller group of loyal supporters.

#### 3.4.2. "Untamed" Ruling Oligarchies

As Winters' makes clear in his theory, oligarchy is not a regime type and is in fact compatible with almost any regime type, including democracies, so long as it allows for concentrations of vast personal wealth. In line with this, sultanistic oligarchs, owing to the fact that they control the means of coercion which defends the oligarchy as a whole, are generally in direct positions of rule, although this may be within a democratic, authoritarian, or dictatorial regime. When it comes to the downfall of a sultanistic oligarch, Winters argues that, although a great deal of attention is paid to such events within the frame of a changing regime type the field of democratization or "transitology", a second, equally dramatic transformation regarding the mode of oligarchic wealth defence is often also apparent. Specifically, Winters outlines how this type of change in political regime will likely result in the shift from a sultanistic mode of wealth defence to what he refers to as both an "untamed" form of ruling oligarchy or as a "wild" oligarchy as defined below:

"The fall of a dictator who had successfully tamed a nation's oligarchy frequently produces both a transition to democracy and a transition to wild oligarchy, in which the formal institutions of law and punishment that were deliberately weakened during the authoritarian period prove too feeble to constrain oligarchs when electoral democracy displaces dictatorship." (Winters, p. 38)

Essentially, the removal or downfall of the sultan within a sultanistic oligarchy dramatically changes the wealth defence calculations of individual oligarchs for two key reasons. Firstly, there is no longer a single guarantor of oligarchic wealth in terms of the sultan himself meaning that oligarchs can no longer rely on a stable patron-client relationship in order to defend their wealth. Furthermore, sultanistic and personalistic rule *by law* is rarely replaced immediately with the impersonal and institutional rule *of law* and property rights since, as mentioned in the quote above, institutions of law are generally weakened during a sultanistic oligarchy. As explained above with regards to the motivating factors of different wealth defence strategies, oligarchs are therefore incentivised to take more control over the decision-making process, either through taking up positions of power (kleptocracy) or state capture. Either of these wealth defence strategies become both a possibility and a necessity for oligarchs in such a scenario, since institutions through which an impersonal rule of law could be exercised are neither strong enough either to control the wealthy oligarchs, nor to provide guaranteed property rights.


Secondly, since the leading sultanistic oligarch had previously exercised control over the entirety or the majority of the means of coercion for defending wealth, they were able to control the rest of the oligarchy to a certain degree, hence they reduced the possibility for lateral disputes between individual oligarchs. However, if the sultan is removed from power without a successor, resulting in the decentralization of political power, this “taming factor” regarding control over the behaviour of the rest of the oligarchy is lost. This means that individual oligarchs are free both to compete and collaborate with each other as they see fit when it comes to wealth defence. The primary result of this outcome is a significant increase in “lateral” threats between individuals and groups of oligarchs who seek to capture the state in order to protect their wealth and assets, since neither access to wealth and its defence, nor disputes between members of the oligarchy, will be managed by the sultan anymore.

#### 3.4.3. The Transition from a Sultanistic to an Untamed Ruling Oligarchy

When it comes to mapping the transition from a sultanistic to an untamed ruling oligarchy, I would argue that the latter represents a middle state between the four “pure” types of oligarchy outlined in Winters’ typology. Within this state, there certainly is a move towards greater control over the means of coercion required to defend wealth, either through kleptocracy or state capture. However, directly following the breakdown of a sultanistic mode of wealth defence, oligarchs have neither established the durable conventions of collaborative rule required for a true “ruling” oligarchy, nor have they amassed enough individual control over the means of coercion required to defend their own wealth as is characteristic of a “warring” oligarchy, since they were previously disarmed under the sultanistic system. As outlined above, the weak institutions of law are also not sufficient to control the oligarchs or

guarantee property rights, as is necessary within a “civil” oligarchy. In terms of a visualization along the two axes by which oligarchies vary, the instance of a sultanistic oligarchy being replaced by an untamed ruling one therefore represents a move towards the centre on the matrix of oligarchic types, as is in figure 2.0 demonstrated below:

Figure 2.0. Transition from a Sultanistic to an Untamed Ruling Oligarchy.



Source: devised by author.

In sum, sultanistic oligarchies are characterized primarily by patron-client relationships between the sultan, who is at the centre of power with control over the means of coercion, and the other members of the oligarchy, who provide political support for the sultan in return for access to rent-seeking opportunities and defence of their wealth. The fall of a sultanistic oligarchy often leads to a transition towards an untamed ruling oligarchy, in which the new democratic institutions are unable to control the behaviour of the oligarchs, who can compete or collaborate to capture the state in order to protect their assets. Importantly for understanding the role that media plays in the wealth defence strategies of the Ukrainian oligarchy, both academic literature and investigative journalism researching oligarchs in Ukraine, even if they are often not explicitly grounded in Winters’ theory of oligarchy, suggest that a similar transition from a sultanistic mode of wealth defence towards such an “untamed” ruling oligarchy

has also been made. This transition will be explored in the section covering case selection below and will be the basis for understanding the role that oligarch owned media outlets have played in the wealth defence of the Ukrainian oligarchy.

### **3.5. Theory of Oligarchy and Oligarchic Media Instrumentalization.**

Understanding media ownership and media instrumentalization as one of the many ways in which oligarchs can exercise their material power as a method of wealth defence is consistent with many of the observed aspects of the oligarchic media model in the literature review. Oligarchic media is non-profitable because the primary role of the media outlets is to protect the existing wealth and assets of the oligarch, rather than to generate wealth itself. In other words, a small portion of their wealth is essentially sacrificed, serving to protect the power and assets already in the hands of the oligarchs. The significant variety of actual media practices outlined in the current literature on oligarchic media is also consistent with the flexible and changing nature of oligarchy itself as outlined in Winters' theory. I would argue that an understanding that oligarchy itself comes in a variety of different forms is a missing element from the current literature on oligarchic media outlined above. Although the core function of an oligarchic type of media instrumentalization remains the same, to fulfil the function of wealth defence for the proprietor, I would argue that, since the nature of oligarchy changes according to the threats to their wealth as outlined with regards to Winters' theory of oligarchy above, so will the distinct role that media ownership fulfils in the defence of their wealth, as well as the subsequent media practices required to fulfil said role. Below, I will outline two possible scenarios with regards to two types of oligarchic media instrumentalization which fulfil the requirements for wealth defence in both a sultanistic and a post-sultanistic untamed ruling oligarchy. These will provide a tentative basis in terms of theoretical expectations for an answer to the main RQ outlined in the introduction, namely "what are the forms of media instrumentalization in the wealth defence practices of Ukrainian oligarchs in transition from a sultanistic to an untamed ruling oligarchy?" This will be then explored in greater detail with regards to the case of Ukraine below. Although the media practices outlined below can be summarized into the two main categories of *advertorials* and *kompromat* as per Örnebring's conceptualization outlined above, an understanding of the variable nature of oligarchy and wealth defence in Winters' theory can help in understanding the different roles these can fulfil for oligarch media owners.

#### **3.5.1. Sultanistic Oligarchies and Clientelistic Media Instrumentalization**

As outlined above, sultanistic oligarchies are characterized by patron-client relationships between the leading oligarch or 'sultan', who is in a direct position of power and in control of the means of coercion

for the defence of oligarchic wealth, and the other members of the oligarchy, who support the leading oligarch in return for access to, and defence of, wealth and assets. Since the primary route towards the wealth defence of each individual oligarch is a stable patron-client relationship with the sultan, it follows that the media outlets of individual oligarchs will be instrumentalized as a means of supporting this relationship. For this reason, oligarchic media is likely to be 'clientelistic' in the sense that it forms part of the core exchange inherent to clientelism, an exchange summed up by Hallin and Mancini as when "access to social resources is controlled by patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for deference and various forms of support" (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; p. 58). In the case of a sultanistic oligarchy, this could entail specifically access to rent-seeking opportunities and the unhindered control of lucrative assets, all of which requires the patronage of the sultan, in return for positive coverage in the form of advertorials of the sultan in media outlets owned by the oligarchs. Kompromat against the political rivals of the sultan is likely to complement this. This particular aspect of oligarchic media instrumentalization is highlighted by Levy (2016), noting that putting your media outlet "in service of the regime" is one of the main uses of oligarch-controlled media. Beyond drawing favour from the sultan himself, positive coverage of the sultan will also fulfil the other main wealth defence requirements of the individual oligarchs in a sultanistic oligarchy, namely to maintain the sultan's position of rule. Challenges to the sultan's position from below will threaten the patron-client relationship already in place, hence positive coverage (advertorials) of the sultan, and negative coverage (kompromat) of any political rivals, can help to maintain the incumbent sultan's position in particular during election campaigns in environments where elections do take place.

### 3.5.2. Untamed Ruling Oligarchies and Pluralistic Media Instrumentalization

As noted above with regards to Winters' observations concerning the period following the end of a sultanistic mode of wealth defence, the removal of a single guarantor of oligarchic wealth incentivises individual oligarchs firstly to take greater control over the means of coercion required to defend their wealth. In this case, oligarchic media instrumentalization becomes a tool of oligarchic state capture (rather than clientelism). This is consistent with Markus and Charnysh conceptualization of media (along with party funding) as one of the main indirect methods of wealth defence in order to maintain influence over the political process. The transition towards an untamed ruling oligarchy also essentially frees individual oligarchs from control by the sultanistic discretionary rule by law, giving rise to a more volatile form of oligarchy in which individual oligarchs can collaborate and compete with each other. In terms of how this affects the instrumentalization of media assets, I would argue that, although the key categories of advertorial and kompromat are still relevant, the core method of oligarchic wealth defence in an untamed oligarchy means that media outlets will be instrumentalized in a far more pluralistic way.

This is because a certain degree of lateral competition between oligarchs is also expected, since influence over important figures in the new system of rule, for example elected officials and political parties, is often at the expense of their control by other oligarchs. For this reason, positive coverage (advertorials) in an untamed ruling oligarchy is likely to be directed towards different candidates depending on their utility to different individual oligarchs (or oligarchic groups) as opposed to just the sultan who provides wealth defence for the oligarchy as a whole. Similarly, rather than negative coverage (kompromat) being directed at opponents to the sultan, it is likely to be directed against other oligarchs and their candidates who are rivals in the goal of state capture.

In summary, by looking at the phenomenon of oligarchic media instrumentalization through the lens of Winters' theory of oligarchy, that is as a means of wealth defence, we can understand how the actual content of oligarchic media outlets might change and adapt according to the requirements of said wealth defence within different types of oligarchy. Within a sultanistic oligarchy, oligarchic media is likely to be "clientelistic" in the sense that it is part of the patron-client exchange that are typical of sultanistic oligarchies, favouring positive coverage of the sultan both in order to guarantee their patronage and keep their position secure at the top. An untamed form of ruling oligarchy, which can follow the fall of the sultanistic oligarch, may change the specific role that media plays in the wealth defence strategies of the remaining oligarchs, leading to a "pluralistic" form of media instrumentalization in which oligarchs both cooperate and compete to capture the state in a volatile political environment, using their media outlets to promote political candidates and parties which benefit themselves, and attack those from which do not. This concept, that both advertorials and kompromat can be employed in a manner that is either clientelistic or pluralistic according to the mode of wealth defence, forms the deductive basis for the coding frames outlined in figure 4.0 in the methodology section below.

## **4. Methodology**

### **4.1. Case Selection**

#### 4.1.1. Context: Ukraine as a Sultanistic and Untamed Ruling Oligarchy

In order to understand the specific role of oligarchic media instrumentalization within different oligarchic systems, this thesis focuses on the context of post-soviet Ukraine. This is because Ukraine offers a good example of different types of oligarchy as per Winters' typology, and hence offers an opportunity to understand the different roles that media instrumentalization can fulfil within different oligarchic types. Although few researchers have explicitly applied Winters' theory to the context of the Ukrainian oligarchy (with Markus and Charnysh (2018) and Dalton (2022) being notable exceptions), research

into Ukrainian oligarchs does make clear that the primary mode of wealth defence has indeed changed across Ukrainian's post-soviet history. Following the initial "warring" period of wealth accumulation in the early years of the country's independence, in which a fairly diffuse spread of wealth without "established players" resulting in both maximum personal investment in the means of coercion and direct positions of rule, as well as maximum competition between "proto-oligarchs" looking to establish themselves (Markus and Charnysh, p. 1656), a sultanistic oligarchy was consolidated under President Leonid Kuchma, often referred to as the "father" of the Ukrainian oligarchy (Matuszak, 2012; p. 13). Since then, although the core of the oligarchy with regards to the specific individuals has remained constant, the primary mode of wealth defence has alternated between a sultanistic oligarchy and an untamed ruling oligarchy, as conceptualized in the framework above, with the determining factor being the changing constitution in Ukraine and subsequent division of political powers.

Since the first ratification in June of 1996, Ukraine has alternated between a presidentialist constitution and what is known as the "orange" constitution, put in place following the Orange Revolution in 2004, which significantly curtailed the power of the president in favour of parliament. Although Pleines (2012) analyses the effect of this change in constitution within the context of regime types, making the case that the presidentialist constitution gave rise to a competitive authoritarian regime and the parliamentarian "orange" constitution to a defective democracy of the illiberal type, his analysis, as well as that of other studies into the Ukrainian oligarchy (Kudelia, 2007; Kudelia, 2014; Matuszak, 2012; Pleines, 2016), also show how the changes in constitution affected the oligarchic wealth defence strategies.

The presidentialist constitution centred political power, and therefore the means of coercion required to acquire and defend oligarchic wealth, to a much greater degree around the president. The benefit of a close relationship with Kuchma was apparent in gaining access to rent-seeking opportunities through control over formerly state-run enterprises in a second wave of privatization, otherwise known as "insider privatization" (Puglisi, 2003). These assets were on the most part sold off at a fraction of their actual value (Plokhly, 2015; p.330). The presidentialist constitution also gave significant power to the president to appoint a number of other important officials, including the prime minister and cabinet members (Matsuzato, 2005), who specifically notes that this "fitted the clientist characteristics" of post-soviet Ukraine. The ability of the president to nominate important ministerial positions was significant, with Pleines (2012) noting the significant extent to which the office of prime minister was rotated (seven times in ten years) and ministerial positions were divided to the benefit of different oligarchic clans under the president Kuchma in the first instance of the presidentialist constitution. The word "clan" does not denote kinship or shared ethnicity when it comes to the Ukrainian oligarchy, rather it refers to "groups of people from regions (such as Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk) that

have a history of social, business, and family ties stretching back into the Soviet era” through which business interests are lobbied (Kuzio, 2016; p.185), and can essentially be conceptualized as networks of patronage. The rotation of different figures from each of the clans into important positions of power served as a way from any single one becoming powerful enough to challenge the sultanistic oligarch himself. This control over the means of coercion by a sultan, as well as their careful management over the relations of other oligarchs, both of which appear to be linked to Ukraine’s presidentialist constitution, are the two key aspects of a sultanistic oligarchy.

At different points in its post-soviet history, and still to this day, Ukraine has also operated under a constitution which places more power in the hands of the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada (VR). This constitutional change radically affects the wealth defence calculations of the Ukrainian oligarchy, since there is no single guarantor of wealth defence in the form of the sultanistic oligarch, as well as a lack of guaranteed property rights, all of which requires greater investment in the political process by individual oligarchs in order to capture the state and defend their wealth. The first instance of this constitution came following the Orange Revolution in 2004. Pleines (2016) also argues that the changes in constitution had a significant impact on how the Ukrainian oligarchy operated which, although does not cite Winters directly, is comparable to concepts of a sultanistic and untamed ruling oligarchy. He refers instead to single- and multiple-pyramids of power or authority, concepts taken from Hale (2015), arguing that the periods under both Kuchma and Yanukovych constituted a single-pyramid of power, and the Yushenko and post-Maidan periods led to multiple competing pyramids of power. Pleines argues that the orange constitution periods have been characterized by an increase in oligarchic rivalries compared with the presidentialist due to this change, pointing out that the oligarchs were free to act as an independent force without having to consider either Kuchma or Yanukovych, meaning it was possible to back different political candidates, as well as multiple (sometimes opposing) candidates at once (Pleines, 2016; pp. 117-119). Figure 3.0 below shows how the type of oligarchy has changed over Ukraine’s post-soviet history.

Figure 3.0. Timeline of the Ukrainian Oligarchy.



Source: devised by author.

This research focuses specifically on the re-establishment of a sultanistic oligarchy under Viktor Yanukovich, whose term ran from 2010 until he was ousted in the Maidan revolution in 2014, and the untamed ruling oligarchy under Petro Poroshenko, who gained victory in the post-Maidan presidential election in 2014 before losing out to current president Volodymyr Zelensky in the final round of the 2019 presidential election. Both of these periods display many of the key features of both a sultanistic and untamed ruling oligarchy respectively.

Following his presidential election victory in 2010, Yanukovich was able to concentrate power around himself primarily through a “compliant judiciary” which reinstated the presidentialist constitution that had formerly been in place under President Kuchma (Kudelia, 2014). This effectively reinstated a sultanistic oligarchy with Yanukovich fulfilling the role of the sultan controlling the means to defend oligarchic wealth. Close ties to Yanukovich became therefore the primary mode of wealth defence and accumulation for the oligarchs, with such proximity often achieved through the Party of Regions (PoR) which Yanukovich represented. Matuszak (2012) for example, noted that business expansion and takeovers were generally to the benefit of those oligarchs with the closest and longest ties to the party, with Rinat Akhmetov being the major beneficiary. Writing a year after Yanukovich’s term began, Shumylo-Tapiola (2011) makes clear that Yanukovich was right at the heart of the oligarchs’ wealth defence calculations, a core characteristic of a sultanistic oligarchies:

“At the time of Yanukovich’s election, experts tended to believe that internal competition among the oligarchs loyal to the PoR would guarantee a degree of pluralism ... However, the current situation in Ukraine would suggest that these elites wish to control the system and not expose themselves to the uncertainty of democracy. They see the consolidation of a presidential system around Yanukovich as a way of ensuring this, and there is still a lot in the state coffers that can be distributed among a small group of people for a price.” (Shumylo-Tapiola, 2011; p.8)

Furthermore, the characteristic of sultanistic oligarchies in terms of a personalistic rule *by law* was also apparent with Rojansky (2014) noting the significant increase in corporate raiding in this period, in which ostensibly legal means are employed to give legitimacy to what was essentially the seizure of businesses to the benefit of Yanukovich and his allies. Yanukovich also sought to remove political rivals to his position, with the legal cases and ultimate imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko being the clearest example. Dalton conceptualizes the monopolization of power around Yanukovich as key to building a sultanistic oligarchy, one that ultimately failed following a popular movement from below in the shape of the Maidan Revolution in 2014 (Dalton, 2022; p. 52).

The literature on the Ukrainian oligarchy post-Maidan makes clear that the oligarchy very much remained relevant following the Yanukovich's removal, only that it operated in a very different way, one that I would argue is consistent with the characteristics of an untamed ruling oligarchy. Focusing just on the issues of oligarchy and wealth defence, the outcome of the revolution was the removal of the sultan without a successor, and the reinstatement of the "orange" constitution which gave greater power to the VR. Without either the required institutions to impartially enforce the rule of law and guarantee property rights required for a civil oligarchy, the individual control over the means of coercion to defend wealth required for a warring oligarchy, or the strong conventions of collaboration required for a ruling oligarchy, the Ukrainian oligarchy moved towards an untamed ruling oligarchy as conceptualized above. Oligarchs in such a situation are both incentivised to take more control over the political process through state capture to defend their wealth and are free to compete or collaborate with each other in the process.

Dalton agrees that post-maidan Ukraine ought to be considered a "ruling oligarchy" as per Winters' typology, although he does note some important caveats which arguably puts his assessment of the Ukrainian oligarchy into the category of *untamed* ruling oligarchy. The first reason he outlines is that "the oligarchs appear to have established no special-purpose, overarching, national standing committee for the realization of their collective political interests" (Dalton, 2022; p. 51). Winters defines a "pure" ruling oligarchy as one which "rules collectively and through institutions marked by norms or codes of conduct" (Winters, p.35), an aspect which does not seem to quite represent the situation for the post-maidan oligarchs. Instead, there appeared to be some competition for influence among the oligarchs following the Maidan, with Konończuk noting in particular the rise of Kolomoisky at the expense of other oligarchs in this period (Konończuk, 2015; p. 5). Sydorчук and Haran argue that the dissipation of political power after the Maidan did indeed create greater political competition and pluralism but note that this competition was primarily between "informal power networks concentrated around key political actors" largely referring to the oligarchs, many of whom they refer to directly as at the centre of said networks (Sydorчук and Haran, 2018; p. 264). However, this is not to say that the environment was maximally competitive as one would expect in a warring oligarchy, since they note that a "combination of competition and cooperation" and "tactical alliances between networks from opposing political camps" were common, as is more in line with an untamed ruling oligarchy as conceptualized above.

Dalton also caveats post-maidan Ukraine as a straightforward ruling oligarchy due to the fact that the oligarchs seek to control the political process primarily through indirect means rather than ruling directly, noting that the oligarchs "achieve political influence through a combination of sponsored representation in state bodies; alliances with the currently most successful political leaders, whose associates occupy or are placed in key positions in the state apparatus" (Dalton, 2022; p. 52).

Konończuk also outlines how the oligarchs were able to gain control over political power following the fall of Yanukovich through the Verkhovna Rada, primarily by providing the significant funding required for successful electoral campaigns, which are notoriously expensive in Ukraine (Konończuk, 2016; pp.15-16). It is clear that the benefits of deniability as outlined above with regards to studies by Markus and Charnysh are relevant in Ukraine, with meaningful elections and a populace that has shown itself capable of mobilization. Directly anti-oligarchic political campaigns have also been apparent since as early as the 2004 presidential campaign, in which the original privatization process that had benefited current oligarchs to such a degree was itself portrayed as plunder and theft (Paskhaver and Verkhovodova, 2007). The word “de-oligarchization” also entered the political vocabulary in Ukraine in 2015 when Poroshenko announced that it would be a priority policy, although the general consensus seems to be that this did not mean very much (Halling and Stewart, 2016). In response to this and in order to avoid undue public scrutiny, it seems that the post-Maidan oligarchs have been pushed towards state capture as opposed to kleptocracy in order to defend their wealth. It is the combination of both state capture and pluralistic competition between oligarchs in post-Maidan Ukraine, as summarized by Sydoruk and Haran below, which is typical of post-sultanistic untamed ruling oligarchies as outlined in the conceptual framework above, that makes it a good case for study:

“The democratic gains in Ukraine after 2014 were limited by a predominance of informal power networks that continued to shape the outcomes of political process to a much higher degree than formal institutions and were able to capture most of the new parties that came to prominence after Euromaidan. While competition between these networks definitely increased, they functioned with little respect for the formal rules, undermining prospects for the effective establishment of the rule of law and genuine government accountability.” (Sydoruk and Haran, 2018; p. 270)

Finally, it is clear that oligarchs invested more directly in the means of coercion required to defend wealth in the form of private militias after the Maidan. Journalistic sources have shown how Ihor Kolomoisky in particular had control over significant numbers of military personnel directly following the Maidan Revolution (Taub, 2015<sup>1</sup>; Taub 2015<sup>2</sup>; Nahaylo, 2019). Although this move was ostensibly a necessity to protect Eastern Ukraine following the Russian invasion of the Donbass region in 2014, Andrew Wilson also notes the fear among the Ukrainian oligarchy that the Maidan would develop into a mobilization against other members of the oligarchy, rather than focusing on solely Yanukovich. He notes the marches against residences of the Ukrainian oligarchs in, both Ukraine and across Europe (Wilson, 2014; p. 145, 183), hence the motivation to have more direct control over the means of

coercion if a central authority can no longer be relied upon to physically defend the oligarchs' property.

#### 4.1.2. Case: Media Coverage of the 2012 and 2014 Verkhovna Rada Elections

Within the context of the sultanistic and untamed ruling oligarchies in Ukraine outlined above, the research focuses in particular on oligarchic media instrumentalization with regards to the coverage of the 2012 and 2014 Verkhovna Rada Elections. Here, the 2012 election cycle constitutes an example of oligarchic media instrumentalization within a sultanistic oligarchy, and the 2014 election as an example within an untamed ruling oligarchy.

This focus serves firstly to narrow down the available data to that which is manageable for an independent researcher. Moreover, the value of media instrumentalization for an oligarch media proprietor is likely to increase dramatically when it comes to election campaigns. Örnebring (2012) outlines that instances of the two core ways in which media can serve the oligarchs, namely kompromat and advertorials, are likely to increase during election campaigns. I would argue that this would be especially relevant in the context of Ukraine where, although oligarchs exert a significant enough influence to call into serious question as to whether elections are truly "fair", they are certainly still free and meaningful, with the exception of the 2004 in which significant vote rigging was one of the key causes of the Orange Revolution. Elections bring both greater threats to wealth defence in terms of viable political rivals to the sultan, as well as greater opportunities for state capture through the positioning of the right candidates into parliament. This is not to say that media instrumentalization does not continue outside of election campaigns, as Örnebring does make clear. However, the stakes for the oligarchs, and therefore the requirement for and instances of media instrumentalization, are likely to be higher over the course of an election campaign. The political focus of media content during an election will provide a good way of understanding how the oligarchs are using their media outlets while keeping the primary research manageable for an individual.

The 2012 Verkhovna Rada elections primarily pitted Victor Yanukovich's Party of Regions (PoR) against a "United Opposition" (UO) led by Yulia Tymoshenko's Fatherland party. Yanukovich's support base for PoR was based overwhelmingly in the East and South of the country. It stood primarily on a platform of "stability" and increasing standards of living, running on slogans such as "From Stability to Prosperity," and "Stability Has Been Achieved!". The party also expressed criticism towards the importance of democratization and EU integration while advocating for closer ties with the Russian Federation. Yanukovich was also openly critical of the Orange Revolution in the lead up to the 2012 election, making clear that he did not agree that there had been any significant election rigging and that he was the legitimate winner of the 2004 presidential election (Kuzio, 2015; pp. 178-179). In terms of

direct and longstanding ties to the oligarchy, most financial support for PoR came from fellow Donetsk oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. (Kuzio, 2015 p. 176). Matuszak also notes that the two other oligarchs who make up this study (Ihor Kolomoisky and Viktor Pinchuk) did not have financial ties to the PoR prior to Yanukovych's presidential victory in 2010. Despite the potential for conflict between both oligarchs and Yanukovych following his consolidation, Matuszak argues that the evidence suggests that an agreement was reached to prevent this (Matuszak, 2012 p. 56). Hence, it will be notable to see any difference in media instrumentalization strategies of oligarchs with different relationships to the sultan with regards to the 2012 VR elections in Ukraine.

Although Yulia Tymoshenko had already been imprisoned following a string of dubious and politically motivated legal cases by the time of the 2012 VR elections, her party Fatherland remained the only genuine opposition to the PoR, with Tymoshenko herself remaining the most significant political rival threatening Yanukovych's position at the centre of the sultanistic oligarchy. Despite the fact that he was able to consolidate power very quickly through the change in constitution as outlined above, Yanukovych had only won very narrowly in the presidential election against Tymoshenko two years prior to the VR elections in question. Kuzio (2013) also outlines the fact that Tymoshenko had a long history of standing on radical, anti-oligarchic platforms, advocating for large-scale re-privatizations of oligarchic assets acquired in the Kuchma period. The 2012 election platform was no different in this regard, portraying the opposition as the "criminal-oligarchic Yanukovych regime" while advocating for the president's removal along with Tymoshenko's rehabilitation in political life, as well as a general pro-democratization and EU integration path for Ukraine (Kuzio, 2012). In 2012, Fatherland ran in cooperation with Arseniy Yatsenyuk's Front for Change to form the "United Opposition. However, Kuzio (2013) asserts that at this time only Tymoshenko and Fatherland represented a genuine opposition and threat to the sultanistic oligarchy, arguing that Yatsenyuk, along with Vitali Klitschko's Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) represented a more "acceptable opposition" to the PoR and general oligarchic interests, one that could be co-opted in a way that Tymoshenko's party could not.

As is common in Ukrainian elections, the configuration of parties and alliances was quite different in 2014 compared with in 2012, although with many of the same candidates still running. Yatsenyuk's Front for Change broke away from its alliance with Fatherland, standing independently as the People's Front. Fatherland itself was led by a released Yulia Tymoshenko. Klitschko's UDAR merged with the president's European Solidarity party to form the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. The Party of Regions was unable to survive the Maidan Revolution and the removal of Yanukovych, with a number of its candidates standing under the "Opposition Bloc" or as independents. In terms of platforms, almost all the parties stood on a pro-reform and pro-EU integration platform, both of which were important aspects of the Maidan, with only the Opposition Bloc standing against the changes the revolution stood

for. Despite having the only somewhat unique platform, their support base had essentially collapsed following the revolution and the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbass region of Ukraine (Olszański, 2014). Among the other parties, a key point of difference came in the proposed solutions for the on-going conflict with the Russian-backed separatists in the Donbass, with the Poroshenko Bloc favouring a diplomatic solution whereas both the Radical Party and Fatherland pushing for a military solution (Klymenko, 2017).

It should be noted with regards to both the 2012 and 2014 VR elections, however, that the differences in political platforms are not always the most important aspects of parties, both during election campaigns and in-between. Whitmore outlines the “weakness of ideology” when it comes to Ukrainian political parties, noting the very high tendency for changing alliances between parties who, on the surface, have little in common, as well as low levels of party discipline when it comes to voting, and high levels of defections from one party to another, making clear that parties in Ukraine generally do not fulfil the function of representing the interests of groups within society:

“Applying Western definitions of the functions of political parties, few, if any, parties in Ukraine can claim to aggregate interests, reflect societal cleavages, offer alternative governments or act as a linkage mechanism between state and society”. (Whitmore, 2014; p. 2)

She argues instead for the importance of “influence from financial industrial groups”, as well as the charisma of individual party leaders as of greater importance (Whitmore, 2014; pp. 2-3). Dalton expresses the same in terms of Winters’ theory of oligarchy and the flexibility of material power (wealth) in securing other forms of power for the oligarchs, noting that political institutions in Ukraine such as the Verkhovna Rada “bring together those with concentrated material power (oligarchs), proven mobilizational power (successful political leaders) and positional power (the holders of public and administrative office)” (Dalton, 2022; p. 51). Andrusiv et. al. also note that not only financial support but also positive media coverage are essentially ways of securing the services of proven political winners in the Rada to the benefit of the oligarchs (Andrusiv et. al., 2018; p.64). The abnormally high cost of election campaigns in Ukraine, the main elements of which Wilson puts down to patronage, bribery, and paid-for media coverage (Wilson, 2016; p.5), is testament to the fact that political parties in Ukraine at least to some degree represent the interests of financial-industrial groups (oligarchs), as opposed to aggregate interests among sections of the general population.

#### 4.1.3. Embedded Cases: *Segodnya, Fakti i Kommentarii, Unian*

The Ukrainian media environment is shaped by the presence of oligarch proprietors who control a significant number of influential outlets across all media types, leading to many of the phenomena

outlined in the literature review above regarding the growing prevalence of an oligarchic type of media across the CEE region and its characteristics. Ryabinska outlines the extent to which, media ownership in Ukraine is highly concentrated around the small number of beneficiaries of the early waves of privatization that took place following the country's independence from the Soviet Union, individuals who now control its largest industries and have often had strong links to the political sphere, including previous time in political office themselves (Ryabinska, 2014; p.49). Their media outlets are not profit-making ventures, an aspect which seriously affects the capability of any media outlet in the entire market to make a profit. Although the characteristic non-transparency of ownership was apparent in the early stages of oligarchic media acquisition, Dutsyk (2010) outlines the fact that "most large media now owners openly declare their media assets ownership". This is likely because their ownership of media outlets would be too much of an open secret to deny at this point, with information on the oligarchs and the media outlets that they own well documented (Ryabinska, 2011; Andrusiv et. al., 2018; Rybak, 2020). This is not at all to say that oligarch owned media is the only type of media in Ukraine. There is also a significant independent sector which has flourished in particular following both the Orange and Maidan revolutions. Although independent journalists have been subject to intimidation and pressure from authorities, they have also been key leaders in the aforementioned revolutions as well (Orlova, 2016). Despite this, the influence of the oligarchs over the media sector in Ukraine should not be understated. Many studies into the Ukrainian oligarchy stress their dominance over the media market and its importance in maintaining their exclusive position. (Andrusiv et. al. 2018, Sydorчук and Haran, 2018; Lough, 2021).

Within the two election cycles outlined above, the research focuses on the coverage within three oligarchic online news outlets: *segodnya*, owned by Rinat Akhmetov; *fakti i kommentarii*, owned by Victor Pinchuk; and *unian*, owned by Ihor Kolomoisky. All three of the oligarch proprietors are estimated to be among the very richest individuals in Ukraine and are at the forefront of three of the main oligarchic clans operating in the country (Matuszak, 2012; p.14). Akhmetov is part of the Donetsk network based in Eastern Ukraine, through which Yanukovych also emerged, and is invested in multiple industries including metallurgy, coal and renewable energy, and transport. Kolomoisky and Pinchuk were both originally part of the Dnipropetrovsk group which has since the early 2000s been split into the "Privat" group, led by Kolomoisky and another group centred around Pinchuk. Kolomoisky is the most heavily invested in banking and the extraction of oil and natural gas. Finally, Pinchuk also holds significant investments in metallurgy and transport, and has by far the largest media empire in the form of Starlight Media, which runs a large number of the most popular television channels in Ukraine. (Matuszak 2012, pp. 12 - 16; Andrusiv et. al. 2018; Lough 2021).

In terms of the media outlets chosen for study, *Segodnya* (<https://www.segodnya.ua/ru>) is an online news portal affiliated with the newspaper of the same name and is part of Akhmetov's Media Group Ukraine. *Fakti i Kommentarii* (<https://fakty.ua/>) is also an online news site affiliated with a long-running tabloid newspaper of the same name and is owned by Pinchuk's Starlight Media group. Finally, the Ukrainian Independent Information Agency (*unian*) (<https://www.unian.net/>) is an online only news site and part of Kolomoisky's 1+1 Media group (Dutsyk 2010; Matuszak, 2012; p.36). In terms of the selection criteria for these three outlets in particular, a few key aspects are worth mentioning. Firstly, as well as each outlet being under the control of one of the wealthiest Ukrainian oligarchs, all three are among the top 30 most visited news sites in Ukraine according to statistics from the Institution of Mass Information (IMI)<sup>3</sup>. All three outlets provide coverage in both Russian and Ukrainian language and have fairly well-managed archives which allows for analysis of coverage for both the 2012 and 2014 VR elections.

## 4.2. Research Design

Having established that the case of Ukraine constitutes both an oligarchic media environment as conceptualized in the literature review above, as well as a case of two different primary modes of wealth defence as per Winters' conceptualization of oligarchy, the research of this thesis seeks to outline how the different practices that have been associated with oligarchic media are influenced by the type of oligarchy, answering the main RQ, "what are the forms of media instrumentalization in the wealth defence practices of Ukrainian oligarchs in transition from a sultanistic to an untamed ruling oligarchy?" The research of this thesis constitutes a multiple-case (embedded) design as outlined by Yin (2009). Yin outlines the main rationale behind the use of multiple-case studies, and the primary advantage over the single-case study, as the logic of either literal or theoretical replication. This essentially means that each case is selected with the specific expectation of either similar results (literal replication) or different ones (theoretical replication) as per a theoretical framework relevant to the cases, one which outlines the circumstances under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found (Yin, 2009; p. 54). In terms of this study, cases have been chosen according to the logic of theoretical replication, with Winters' theory of oligarchy providing the expectation for how oligarchs might instrumentalize their media assets in different ways according to the primary mode of wealth defence, conceptualized as different types of oligarchy. The research design and case selection therefore relate directly to the sub-questions outlined in the introduction:

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<sup>3</sup> Ratings for websites in Ukraine from the IMI: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/rating-of-ukraine-websites-i35051>

1. How do oligarchs instrumentalize media in a sultanistic oligarchy?
2. How do oligarchs instrumentalize media in an untamed ruling oligarchy?

The rationale behind this multiple-case design should also be distinguished from that of sampling logic, which seeks to provide a representation of the entirety of a phenomenon. (Yin, p.56). Instead, theoretical replication seeks to test a specific theory through carefully selected cases.

This study also follows what can be considered an embedded design in the sense that both case studies contain multiple units of analysis which will be considered in isolation, rather than pooled together. This refers to the coverage of each of the three media outlets chosen for this study, which will be considered in isolation. As outlined above, not all of the oligarchs in this study will have had an equally close relationship to the sultanistic oligarch (Yanukovych) at the time of the 2012 VR elections, and some degree of independent strategies among oligarchs are expected within an untamed ruling oligarchy and the time of 2014 elections. Hence it is advantageous to consider each oligarchic media outlet as an embedded unit of analysis within each case. I have visualized the research design of the study as per Yin's framework of a multiple-case (embedded) design below:

1st case: oligarchic media instrumentalization in a **sultanistic oligarchy**: the case of the **2012** Verkhovna Rada elections:

- embedded unit of analysis: oligarchic media outlet *segodnya*
- embedded unit of analysis: oligarchic media outlet *fakti i komentarii*
- embedded unit of analysis: oligarchic media outlet *unian*

2nd case: oligarchic media instrumentalization in an **untamed ruling oligarchy**: the case of the **2014** Verkhovna Rada elections:

- embedded unit of analysis: oligarchic media outlet *segodnya*
- embedded unit of analysis: oligarchic media outlet *fakti i komentarii*
- embedded unit of analysis: oligarchic media outlet *unian*

### **4.3. Methods and Data Collection**

#### 4.3.1. Qualitative Content Analysis

In order to address the research questions outlined above, a qualitative content analysis (QCA) has been carried out relating to coverage of both the 2012 and 2014 Verkhovna Rada election campaigns within the chosen three oligarchic media outlets. This specifically entails QCA as outlined by Margrit Schreier, which involves describing the meaning of qualitative material in a systematic way by

assigning successive parts of your material to the categories of a coding frame (Schreier, 2012; p. 12). QCA falls under the broad banner of coding as a method of qualitative analysis, with some distinctive aspects which makes it suitable for this study. Schreier does distinguish QCA from the generalized concept of coding to some degree, noting that it relies to a greater extent on “concept driven” (a.k.a. deductive) categories, as opposed to coding, which she describes as an “inductive, iterative method” in which “codes and categories are not concept-driven, but data-driven”. For the researcher, this means that creating a coding frame (in particular the main- and subcategories) with clear definitions is a distinct (prior) step in the research process, separate from the coding of the material itself (Schreier, pp. 52-53). Developing these categories therefore relies on prior research or theory which is relevant to the source material. In the case of this study, this refers to both already existing research into the emerging “oligarchic type” of media, as well as Winters’ theory of oligarchy, as outlined above in the literature review and conceptual framework respectively. These are used to develop the main categories and subcategories of the coding frame shown in figure 4.0 below. This is not to say that the entire coding frame should be completed before the data collection stage, however. Although Schreier does advocate for concept-driven main categories, she also refers to the “emergent flexibility” of QCA, arguing that some of the specific codes and subcategories can be developed in a data-driven way to allow for important aspects of the material to be captured which cannot be predicted by the theory or previous research but are still relevant to the research question(s). Schreier argues that QCA is particularly suitable for descriptive and comparative research questions (Schreier p. 54) which is certainly true of the RQs in this study, both of which imply comparison in the aim to describe a particular phenomenon in two different contexts.

#### 4.3.2. Data Collection

The primary data was collected using the archives of the three oligarch-owned online media outlets in this study, namely from *segodnya.ua*, *fakty.ua* and *unian.net*, links to which are available in the appendices. The archives separated the articles by publication date, providing the title of every news article published that day which linked to the article in full. However, the archives were not searchable by key terms. Hence, dates were chosen for their proximity to the two elections. Dates two weeks out from each voting day were selected (from 15/10/2012 to 26/10/2012 and from 13/10/2014 to 24/10/2014 respectively) and then searched through manually by the author, with articles selected according to their titles as outlined below. Articles were also chosen for analysis from a further three dates (the 30<sup>th</sup>, 31<sup>st</sup> of July and the 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2012). These were the three days following the announcement that the 2012 Verkhovna Rada elections would be taking place. The main political parties running in the election all launched their campaigns on these dates and hence the articles

published on these dates provided rich data in terms of how these events were covered by the oligarchic media outlets.

In terms of which articles were initially chosen for analysis, this was done based on the title. Selected for analysis were articles with titles which directly referred to political parties or candidates standing in either of the elections, to either of the two presidents from the period (Viktor Yanukovych and Petro Poroshenko), or those which referred to any of the oligarch proprietors (Rinat Akhmetov, Victor Pinchuk, or Ihor Kolomoisky) or their charities or businesses. Furthermore, articles with titles that related the integrity of the election (accusations of falsifications, buying votes, or relating to election observers etc.) were also chosen for analysis, since they also provided clear examples of advertorials and kompromat as will be discussed below. Finally, and specifically with regards to the coverage of the 2014 VR election, articles with titles that related to either what was then known as the Anti -Terrorist Operation (ATO) taking place in the Donbass at the time, or a strike (taking place from the 13<sup>th</sup> - 15<sup>th</sup> of October 2014) in which a number of soldiers representing the Armed Forces of Ukraine took part were also selected. This is because the different ways in which these events were reported on in the three different oligarchic media outlets, despite not falling clearly into the category of advertorial or kompromat, are still examples of the way in which oligarchic media can be instrumentalized, the details of which shall be discussed below. A total of 247 articles were analyzed and coded for the 2012 VR elections and 281 for the 2014 elections respectively. It should be noted that an unequal spread in terms of the number of articles published in the different media outlets each day was reflected in the breakdown of articles from each outlet within the analysis. *Segodnya* consistently put out a much greater volume of articles than the other two media outlets, with *fakti i komentarii* providing the least and *unian* in the middle. A full breakdown of the number of articles analyzed from each election and each media outlet can be found in the appendices.

#### 4.3.3. The Coding Frame

The coding frame used to analyse the primary source material is outlined in figure 4.0 below. The first two main categories and subcategories are concept driven, based primarily on the existing research on oligarchic media instrumentalization outlined in the literature review section, resulting in two main categories of advertorial and kompromat as conceptualized by Örnebring (2012) along with subtypes capturing both advertorial and kompromat relating to political candidates, political parties, or the oligarchs themselves and their businesses, all of which are outlined as key goals of oligarchic media instrumentalization by Mungiu-Pippidi (2008, 2012), Štětka (2012), and Levy (2016). Similarly, in their description of “jeans” in the Ukrainian media, the Institute of Mass Information (IMI) point to both “political” jeans referring to candidates and parties and “commercial” jeans referring to businesses

owned by oligarchs. Based on the definitions of advertorials by Örnebring, the IMI, and the examples of content within oligarchic media brought up in the literature review (section 2.2.2.), content was coded as an advertorial which clearly promoted a particular candidate, party, or oligarch without any criticism or attempt at balance. In practice, this meant articles that exclusively promoted the actions, point of view, or campaign activity of a candidate, promoted content originating from party press services, or published exclusive interviews without any difficult or controversial questions. With regards to advertorials relating to the oligarchs, this referred to positive coverage of their businesses or charities, or portrayal of the oligarchs themselves. Content coded as kompromat was essentially negative content which sought to smear the political parties or candidates standing in election campaign, as well as other oligarchs. This often included through accusations of attempts of electoral fraud, in-fighting within a party or coalition, or an overall negative assessment of the party or candidates, the details of which are outlined in the results section. These categories and subcategories meet Schreier's prerequisites for an effective concept-driven coding frame for QCA. Namely, that the main categories are unidimensional and mutually exclusive, capturing a single aspect of the primary material to avoid mixing between the two. An important aspect of unidimensionality is the fact that the subcategories should be considered instances of the main categories themselves, which is also the case here (Schreier, pp. 83-86).

The third and fourth main categories are inductive categories. These were identified during the data collection stage as directly relevant to the main research question in terms of the role of media instrumentalization in the wealth defence strategies of the Ukrainian oligarchy, but which did not fall directly under either of the two other main categories. The first inductive category related to the extensive reporting vis-a-vis the integrity of the election. Although much of this kind of content amounted to straightforward kompromat in terms of accusing specific candidates and parties of various forms of cheating in the election campaign as a smear tactic (and was coded as such), some of this reporting did not mention specific candidates and yet was clearly of benefit to the incumbent parties and could also be regarded as an indirect method of their promotion. In both the 2012 and 2014 the political parties affiliated with the incumbent president were strongly expected to win. Hence, reassuring voters that the results were legitimate was of benefit to the incumbents, whereas casting dispersion on the likely results benefitting the opposition. This is especially the case in the context of Ukraine where clear election fraud had resulted in mass demonstrations, a re-run of the presidential election and reversed results in the 2004 Orange Revolution. The other inductive category related to bias in reporting of current events. This was especially clear in the coverage of the 2014 election, in which there were clear examples of differences in reporting bias between the oligarchic media outlets. Although these could not be considered advertorials since they did not mention any political party or candidate by name, the reporting angle was clearly to the benefit of one political faction over another,

thus relevant to one of the core goals of oligarchic media instrumentalization outlined above, namely state capture.

Figure 4.0. Main- and Subcategories of the Coding Frame.

Category Label	Category Definition	Example
Main Category 1: advertorial	Ordered media content oriented toward promotion and positive content.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subcategory 1.1: candidate promotion</li> </ul>	Advertorial promoting a political candidate.	"We will fight for every family that the government has forgotten today... We will protect the interests of Ukrainians from the inactivity of this government, said Yuriy Boyko."
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subcategory 1.2: party promotion</li> </ul>	Advertorial promoting a political party.	"Opposition Bloc will do everything for the shipbuilding industry to regain lost ground."
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subcategory 1.3: oligarch promotion</li> </ul>	Advertorial promoting an oligarch or an affiliated business.	"More than a thousand residents of Donbass received a monthly dose of insulin from Rinat Akhmetov."
Main Category 2: kompromat	Ordered media content oriented toward smearing and negative content.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subcategory 2.1: candidate smearing</li> </ul>	Kompromat attacking a political candidate.	"As for Yushchenko, he is a political corpse. Hoping for his success is as stupid as it was stupid to hope for Gorbachev's victory in the presidential election in Russia in 1996."
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subcategory 2.2: party smearing</li> </ul>	Kompromat attacking a political party.	"Opposition deputies are not satisfied with the electoral list. The party is in revolt."
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subcategory 2.3: Oligarch Smearing</li> </ul>	Kompromat attacking an oligarch or an affiliated business.	"Kolomoisky-gate: Who will be responsible for the elections at gunpoint?"
Main Category 3: election integrity	Content referring to electoral fraud and its prevention.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subcategory 3.1. elections are fair</li> </ul>	Content indicating that the elections are not fraudulent.	"The Voters Committee of Ukraine notes a significant improvement in the quality of the electoral process, a significant decrease in voter bribery, ..."
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subcategory 3.2. elections are unfair</li> </ul>	Content indicating that election fraud is taking place.	"In almost every third constituency, candidates try to bribe voters."
Main Category 4. biased reporting of current events	Reporting on current events aimed to build support for a particular political faction.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subcategory 4.1. soldiers' strike</li> </ul>	Biased reporting relating to AFU soldiers' strike.	"Beletsky also did not rule out that this (strike)action was planned by the Russian special services."
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subcategory 4.2. ATO</li> </ul>	Biased reporting relating to the ATO in the Donbass.	"ATO soldiers are freezing in Donbass and asking to send warm jackets and socks as soon as possible."

Source: devised by author.

Within most subcategories are a further number of “specifications”, which relate primarily to the actual candidates and parties that were promoted or smeared through advertorials and kompromat within the oligarchic media outlets. Thus, although an example of each subcategory (translated into English) has been provided to help in understand what kinds of content were coded within them, these were coded to a specification within one of these subcategories, as opposed to the subcategory itself. A full list of these specifications can be found in the appendices including the number of instances in which each were coded for. The coding units were either sentences or groups of sentences. At the most, an entire paragraph was coded if said paragraph for example was entirely dedicated to promoting one candidate. This meant that individual articles have more than one different type of code in them, serving for example as an advertorial for two different candidates from the same party, or providing an advertorial for one party in part of the article and then smearing another party or candidate in a different part of the article.

It should also be noted that the clientelistic and pluralistic type of oligarchic media instrumentalization as outlined in section 3.7 of the conceptual framework are not embedded into the coding frame itself, rather they will be identified through an analysis of the results once the primary material has been coded. For example, in the clientelistic type of oligarchic media instrumentalization expected from oligarchs within a sultanistic oligarchy, there would be a much greater degree of advertorials to the benefit of the incumbent president, who is most likely a sultanistic oligarch, and his political party, along with kompromat to the detriment of the incumbent’s most threatening political rival and their political parties. Since all the oligarchs benefit from a positive relationship with the sultan one would also expect more homogeneity of media instrumentalization strategies among different oligarchs. In a pluralistic type of media instrumentalization expected from oligarchs within an untamed ruling oligarchy, there would be a greater diversity of candidates supported, with oligarchs seeking to back their own political candidates and parties in order to capture the state and disparage those of other oligarchs. The change in the mode of wealth defence may also change the way in which they chose to cover other oligarchs, as well.

#### **4.4. Limitations**

There are of course some limitations to this study which should be addressed. Firstly, in terms of validity concerns is the extent to which the oligarch owners of a media outlet actually exercise control over the editorial. This is important because, if they don’t have editorial control, it is very hard to justify that their media outlets are instrumentalized for wealth defence at all. Although it is difficult to say definitively the extent to which the oligarchs control the output of their media outlets, I would argue that the long-term non-profitability of their media businesses outlined in the literature review above must

point to power and influence as the primary motive for media ownership among the oligarchs, a goal which necessitates some degree of control over the output of the media business. The fact that oligarchic owners do instrumentalize media to their own benefit is taken for granted for this reason, with significant agreement in both the literature on media concentration among the wealthiest in the CEE region (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008, 2012; Štětka, 2012, 2016;) and in Ukraine specifically (Lough, 2021, pp. 28-29; Andrusiv et. al. 2019, p. 51).

A further concern in terms of validity is the fact that QCA as a method is necessarily interpretive, with the assignment of a code to a piece of the primary material relying upon to some degree on the interpretation of the researcher. Schreier outlines, for example, that although the qualitative nature of QCA requires the researcher to be comfortable with the idea that one's primary material can be interpreted in a number of different ways, not all interpretations are equally valid (p. 31). In this regard she also notes that validity is therefore not an "all-or-nothing criterion" in QCA, rather the researcher's interpretation is valid to a certain degree (p. 186). As outlined in the methods section above, the main and subcategories of the coding frame above are supported by the already existing literature on the instrumentalization of media outlets by oligarchs, as well as the workings and motives of oligarchy outlined in Winters' theory. In my view this increases the validity of the interpretations outlined in the coding frame compared with rival explanations. It is clear from the literature that oligarchs do indeed instrumentalize their media outlets to their own benefit and are not interested in providing accurate information in the spirit of public service, choosing to promote or smear relevant political candidates and parties not out of an ideological commitment to their platforms, rather as a means of protecting their own wealth and assets in an environment where property rights are not guaranteed. This thesis seeks only to compare the different ways in which this takes place within two different oligarchic types.

Perhaps a more significant barrier in terms of valid interpretations of the primary material is that the primary source material is not in the native language of the researcher. The Ukrainian media environment over the period of study was multilingual, with written sources in particular generally being available in both Ukrainian and Russian language. All three of the outlets that make up the primary material of this study provide articles in both Ukrainian and Russian language, generally without any differences between the two in terms of content. I have chosen to code the Russian language version of each article simply because it is the language that I am more comfortable with. Although there is still undoubtedly a language barrier compared with undertaking research in my native language, I would argue that the coding frame as outlined above does not necessitate the understanding of especially nuanced language which would only be accessible to a native speaker. Both advertorials and kompromat as main categories are fairly broad and easy to identify, with the subcategories pertaining

only to the targets on said main categories. The register of language within journalistic source material is also more approachable for a non-native speaker.

Researching in a foreign language also led me to focus on online (written) news media as opposed to television as the primary source material due to the fact that it is far more approachable for a non-native speaker, a decision which is arguably a limitation in terms of the utility of this study in outlining media instrumentalization by Ukrainian oligarchs in particular. This is because television is the most popular source of news for Ukrainians and also the media environment most dominated by the oligarchs. Over the short period of their study in August of 2018, Andrusiv et. al. estimate that around 80% of television viewers were tuned in to channels owned by what they refer to as the “big four” oligarchs, three of whom are the subjects of this research (Andrusiv et. al., 2018; p.53). However, they do also note that the online news space is very attractive for the oligarchs due to the low cost of running compared with television, citing Akhmetov, Kolomoisky, and Pinchuk as the most invested in the online media market (p.60). The only real difference in this area is the greater competition with both foreign media companies and independent outlets compared with television. It is not unreasonable to assume that this greater competition online may lead to less overt instrumentalization in the oligarchs’ own interests in an attempt to maintain a readership who might turn to the other, independent, online sources available if the resulting content is of a better quality. However, a focus on the impact of said competition on the online media sphere in particular is beyond the scope of this thesis.

## 5. Research Findings

Below are presented the results of the qualitative content analysis of media coverage of both the 2012 and 2014 VR elections in *segodnya*, *unian*, and *faktii i komentarii*. A number of articles are mentioned as examples of the different ways in which the media outlets were instrumentalized over the course of both election campaigns. These are cited using a coding system, rather than the using the in-text citations as used above. A code is given to each article explicitly mentioned below. These codes are then referenced in the “primary sources” section of the references below, which gives details on the article title, date of publication, and a link to the text itself. Codes beginning with “SE” are articles from *segodnya*, with “UN” from *unian*, and with “FA” from *faktii i komentarii*.

### 5.1. Coverage of the 2012 Verkhovna Rada Election Campaign in Oligarchic Media Outlets

The reporting of the 2012 Verkhovna Rada (VR) election campaign overwhelmingly promoted the incumbent candidates and parties at the expense of opposition parties and in particular to the detriment of the United Opposition (UO) coalition, the largest portion of which was made of candidates from Yulia


Tymoshenko's "Fatherland". This was done in a few key ways which were consistent among all three of the media outlets studied and will be outlined in more detail below. Namely, advertorials focussed on the benefits to the economy and public services of the PoR, followed the PoR's candidates along the campaign trail, and their commitment to the integrity of the electoral process. Kompromat articles focussed on the chaotic coalition politics of the UO, dismissed Yulia Tymoshenko as more of a nuisance rather than a genuine political prisoner, and accused the opposition of trying to cheat during the campaign. Kompromat articles were targeted far more at the UO and Tymoshenko herself rather than any of the other opposition parties. As was to be expected from the IMIs description of advertorial and kompromat articles in the Ukrainian media, there was distinct lack of comment pieces in which named journalists reflected on particular candidates and parties facing the vote. Rather, the extent to which different parties and candidates were reported on at all, as well as the way in which said reporting was framed, was the most important factor in how different parties and candidates were promoted or smeared. In this regard, the *lack* of comment pieces in the coverage was an important aspect of how the media outlets were instrumentalized since the media outlets could function essentially as an extension of party press services, focussing to a much greater degree on the activities of the candidates they sought to promote, passing on their message to the electorate without criticism or reflection.

#### 5.1.1. Articles Labelled as Political Advertising

It should also be noted that, exclusively with regards to coverage of the 2012 VR election campaign, there were some articles that were explicitly labelled as "political advertising" (*политическая реклама*). All of these were published in *segodnya* and almost all were advertorials for candidates from the PoR. The only exception to this was one article which was a case of kompromat, accusing the United Opposition of bribing the electorate (SE001). The others were articles which platformed the following PoR candidates; Maksim Lutskiy, Anna Herman, Tatyana Bakteeva, Leonid Kozhara, Vladimir Makeenko, and party head Oleksandr Evremov. These articles all followed the same format as shown in figure 5.0 below. The candidate being platformed is named in the title, a "political advertising" is contained tag underneath, it is then made clear in an introductory section that the candidate stands for the Party of Regions, and the main part of the article engages in one or more the forms of advertorial which shall be explored in greater detail below. However, I would argue that this label should not be given too much weight with regards to the analysis of advertorials and kompromat in the oligarchic media in the 2012 VR election campaign. This is mainly since there were a far greater number of articles which did although did not contain this political advertising label, were still clearly advertorials. Some of these also followed the exact same format as shown in figure 5.0, making those articles with

the political advertising label indistinguishable from those not designated as such, were it not for the label itself. This was true both for other articles in *segodnya* (figure 5.0), as well as articles in the other oligarchic media outlets, with one example from *fakti i kommentarii* (figure 6.0) shown below. Hence, it is difficult to determine why only a handful of articles were explicitly labelled as political advertising.

Figure 5.0: Two advertorials in *segodnya* promoting Oleksandr Evremov and Mykola Azarov. One is explicitly labelled as “political advertising” and the other is not.



Source: SE106, SE107.

Figure 6.0: Advertorial for Oleksandr Evremov in *fakti i kommentarii* without the “political advertising” label.



Source: FA015.

### 5.1.2. Coverage of the Party of Regions and their Candidates

Much of the coverage of the VR election campaign in 2012 was coded as an advertorial for Mykola Azarov (the incumbent prime minister representing the Party of Regions), Viktor Yanukovich and other notable candidates from the PoR, as well as more generally for the party itself. Advertorials for the PoR came in a few different types that were consistent across all three media outlets and shall be described below. Firstly, by highlighting the material benefit of the PoR and their candidates for Ukrainians in terms of investment, economic growth, infrastructure projects etc. and secondly, through a type of article that I would describe as “positive chronicling” of Victor Yanukovich and Mykola Azarov in particular. Finally, many of the advertorials and kompromat surrounding both the PoR and the opposition parties concerned the integrity of the election, the details of which shall be discussed in a separate section below.

#### *Material Benefits of the Party of Regions*

Many of the advertorials for the Party of Regions and their candidates centred around their work to improve the day-to-day lives of Ukrainians both by improving public services and by growing the economy. As outlined above, this content did not constitute comment pieces specifically advocating for the economy policies of the PoR, rather all three media outlets essentially printed the speeches, statements, and interviews in which PoR candidates boasted of their achievements and promises in this area without any criticism, a luxury not afforded to the opposition candidates. The majority of these related to Viktor Yanukovich and Mykola Azarov. Advertorials focused firstly on general economic growth, for example through the reporting of Yanukovich’s speech at both the PoR party congress, as well as at a meeting of the Council for Economic Reforms, where he boasts of successes in terms GDP growth, wage growth, and low inflation (SE002) (SE003). Advertorials for the PoRs also promoted their plans in terms of economic policy after the election. *Unian* reported on the authorities’ plans for a stimulus package as part of their election platform in more detail, boasting that it would provide “accelerated economic growth for 5 years” (UN001). Mykola Azarov was reported putting forward the PoRs plans for tax cuts in certain areas of the economy, as well as increased social spending in a “modernization” program which aimed to achieve 5% GDP growth (UN002). His confidence in further GDP growth for Ukraine was also reported on (SE004), as well as his assurance that there would not be any devaluation of the Ukrainian Hryvnia after the elections (SE005).

Other advertorials promoted economic programs of the PoR which targeted specific regions. For example, a report on Yanukovich’s promises to solve environmental issues in the Luhansk region

(UN003), as well as his intention to extend the programme providing maternity hospitals for the Crimean Peninsula (SE006). Similarly, Azarov was reported promising the residents of Zaporizhzhya that the bridge across the Dnieper would be operational within a year and that further investment in the engineering industry was coming (FA001) and promising to improve public transport into Kyiv (UN004), as well as to relieve traffic in the capital through road expansions (SE007). A number of advertorials focussed specifically on improvements to medical care that were tied closely to these two candidates, including reporting on Yanukovych's promises for better healthcare infrastructure in rural areas (UN005) and more investment in medical research and education (UN006). Azarov was also reported on declaring the success of the medical reforms in Ukraine thus far (UN007). Candidates other than Azarov and Yanukovych were also reported on in a similar way, all of whom were from the PoR. This included an article in which Tatyana Bakhteeva outlined the priorities of healthcare reform (SE104), Borys Kolesnikov promising affordable housing (SE008), and Taisia Povaliy declaring that Party of Regions were leaders when it comes to economic development (SE009).

#### *“Chronicling” the activities of the Party of Regions*

Another type of advertorial published in favour of the Party of Regions in 2012 were what I would describe as “chronicling”. Rather than promoting specific policies as outlined above. These advertorials sought merely described and followed the campaign activities of PoR candidates, including for example party conferences, speeches, and visits to various regions, albeit in a positive light. Chronicling advertorials were another example of a lack of commentary journalism which is still of benefit to one party over another. Although it may seem inconsequential that the campaign activities and movements of the PoR were followed, it is a kind of reporting that did not extent to opposition parties (in particular to the United Opposition coalition), further giving the impression that the three oligarchic outlets functioned more or less as a press service for the PoR in 2012. Once again, the majority of the chronicling advertorials were to the benefit of Viktor Yanukovych and Mykola Azarov, although not exclusively.

For example, there were articles chronicling Yanukovych's visits to Kharkiv (UN008), to the town of Yenakiyev in Donetsk Oblast (SE010), to a medical centre in Odessa (UN009) and to the Crimean Peninsula (SE011). A positive framing was evident in the reporting of these visits, with reports of the visits to Yenakiyev and Crimea emphasizing visual improvements to neighbourhoods in preparation for the president's visit, and the report on the visit to Kharkiv referring to Yanukovych's role in opening a new natural gas well. Some “chronicling” articles also focussed on more personal aspects of the president's day-to-day business, including article documenting him well-wishing PoR candidate Borys Kolesnikov (FA002) and head of the Communist Party of Ukraine Petr Symonenko (SE012) on their respective birthdays, as well as the president's own positive outlook on life following his 60th birthday

(SE013). This sort of content was not limited to reporting on Yanukovich either, with *segodnya* chronicling Borys Kolesnikov's visit to Slovyansk and the resulting preparations in the city (SE014), as well as articles chronicling Azarov's visit to a hospital in Odessa (UN010), and him giving a speech about the importance of sporting activities for the future of Ukraine (FA003).

The two types of content described above, namely that which highlighted the benefit of PoR for Ukrainians and chronicling, were often found together in the same article. For example, both the chronicling articles relating to Mykola Azarov mentioned above also reported on his funding promises for health and sports respectively. An article chronicling Yanukovich's visit to a hospital in Crimea (SE015) also mentioned the PoR's plans to build more of such centres across the peninsula.

### 5.1.3. Coverage of the Opposition Parties and their Candidates

With regards to the coverage of the opposition parties by the oligarchic media outlets in this study, there was greater variation between the outlets compared with their coverage of the PoR and their candidates. There were, however, still some clear similarities. Compared with the coverage of the PoR, which focused on investments in public services, followed the party on the campaign trail, and highlighted the strength of their leadership, much of the coverage of the United Opposition coalition in particular could be considered kompromat, much of which highlighted the in-fighting between different groups in the coalition without referring to their political platform. The only opposition party to get much positive coverage in any of the oligarchic media outlets was Vitali Klitschko's *Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform* (UDAR). The biggest difference in reporting between the media outlets was in the coverage of imprisoned opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko, with *unian* and *fakti* generally providing more positive coverage, while *segodnya* continued to smear the opposition figure to a greater degree.

#### *Chaos and In-fighting within the United Opposition*

Kompromat articles targeting the United Opposition (UO) highlighted the chaotic internal politics of the coalition, diverting attention away from the political platform they stood on or any of their policies. Such articles started from the very start of the campaign when the elections were first announced. *Fakti* (FA004) reported on serious disagreements within the coalition as to which candidates would make it onto the electoral lists, stating that the party was "in revolt", and taking quotes from jaded candidates who had been left off the lists. *Unian* and *segodnya* both reported on the strong criticism from imprisoned party leaders Lutsenko and Tymoshenko regarding which candidates had or hadn't made it onto the list (UN011) (SE016). Yatsenyuk was also reported on complaining about the final list of candidates for UO, with the article highlighting that we would have preferred more athletes and singers to have made it (UN012). *Unian* also reports on the defection of Olga Gerasimyuk to UDAR from UO,

following her dismissal that was “without reason” (UN013). *Segodnya* reported on two deputies who didn’t make it onto the list, saying that they were “betrayed” by party leader Yulia Tymoshenko, arguing that she had entirely lost control of a party consumed by internal struggle (SE017). This article also drew attention to apparent nepotism in the party lists of the UO, running an article on the appointment of the wife of imprisoned UO candidate Yuriy Lutsenko in the lists. These articles do not mention the UOs platform in terms of actual policies at all in the coverage. All that is mentioned with regards to policy in these articles is the supposed “ritual” of blaming the authorities (SE017). Finally, one of the few comment pieces on the election campaign published in *segodnya* describes Fatherland’s decision to form a coalition with Yatsenyuk’s Front of Changes as a “colossal mistake”, predicting a poor outcome as a result. PoR in contrast is commented on far less in the article, which only mentions that they ran a successful “balanced campaign” (SE019).

Kompromat articles of this kind extended beyond the difficulties and disagreements within the UO faction, also including coalition’s failed attempt to unite with Klitschko’s UDAR. For example, *fakti* reported at length on the “war of words” between UO and UDAR, in which an agreement to stand down in certain constituencies ended in disagreement between the two parties, describing both as on the “brink of a scandal” (FA005). *Unian* also published parts of a statement from the UO blaming the lack of success in the agreement on UDAR supposed lack of ethics, (UN014) while *segodnya* reported on Yatsenyuk’s disappointment in the lack of agreement with UDAR, (SE020). UDAR were also reported in blaming the UO for the lack of agreement, accusing them of “playing chess” (UN015) and “playing into the hands of the authorities” (UN016).

It becomes increasingly clear that the intention of this focus on the chaotic internal politics of the UO was to smear the rival political force when you compare the way that the PoR were reported on, not only in terms of economic policies and campaign activity as outlined above, but also the stark difference in terms of how the internal politics and coalition building of the incumbent party were reported on. Coverage in *unian* on a likely cabinet reshuffle quotes a political analyst from an Institute for Global Strategies, who describes such changes as a “significant renewal and rejuvenation of the government” (UN017) in stark contrast to the reporting of candidate lists for UO leading to “revolt” as outlined above. Fakti covered some defections to the PoR positively, noting that speaker of the VR Volodymyr Lytvyn “blessed” his candidates to join the party, seeing no problem in their decision (FA006).

### *Coverage of Yulia Tymoshenko*

Much of the media coverage of imprisoned opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko was also coded as kompromat. However, coverage of the UO leader was also the biggest point of difference between the oligarchic outlets that make up this study. The main difference in the coverage stemmed from the

extent to which she was portrayed either as a genuine political prisoner or smeared as a mere agitator and a nuisance. Both *fakti* and *unian* leaned more towards the former approach, whereas *segodnya* clearly followed the latter. Kompromat articles from *segodnya* for example focussed on her lack of cooperation during her time in hospital, which was portrayed as a naive inconvenience, as opposed to a genuine political protest. Many articles focussed on her refusal to accept medical treatment (SE021) (SE022), as well as her refusal to see Ukrainian doctors in particular (SE023). The suggestion is that these protests are not genuine and merely a way of avoiding the criminal case brought against her. For example, one headline reads that Tymoshenko had been asked to just “lie in bed less” by doctors (SE024) and another reading that she will “sooner or later have to prove her innocence in court” (SE025). An instance in which Tymoshenko was apparently given special treatment was also highlighted (SE026). Although this kind of coverage was most prevalent in *segodnya*, it was not entirely limited to this media outlet. For example, *fakti* also ran a story covering Tymoshenko stating that she was well enough to “fight with her jailors” but not to turn up to court (FA007).

Compared with *segodnya*, both *unian* and *fakti* published far fewer kompromat articles, portrayed Tymoshenko as a genuine political prisoner. *Unian* for example reported on the perspective of Tymoshenko’s defence lawyer, Serhii Vlasenko, providing a coverage of an interview in which he describes the “falsified criminal case” against, while also drawing attention to its wider anti-democratic consequences for Ukraine (UN018). A comment piece arguing that her imprisonment was not even necessary for a PoR victory, also states that Tymoshenko “should not have been imprisoned in principle” (UN019). *Fakti* also drew attention to her poor treatment, reporting on the fact that the extreme stress she was under, including the fact that she was chained to her hospital bed, was slowing her recovery (FA009). The difference in the reporting is especially clear with regards to a bizarre incident in which video footage of Tymoshenko in hospital was released online, clearly having been filmed without her consent. *Segodnya* focussed on the fact that the footage showed she was perfectly healthy, highlighting the fact she was lifting weights (SE029), in a way that is consistent with the reporting highlighted above, aiming to give the impression that she is evading justice. They also ran an article in which her lawyer admits that it is really her in the footage (SE030). In contrast, both *unian* and *fakti* focussed on Tymoshenko’s response, an open letter addressed directly to Viktor Yanukovich in which she demands release from the hospital, condemns the invasion of her privacy, and accuses the president of being a pervert, with *fakti* publishing the letter in full (FA010) and *unian* in part (UN020).

I would also argue that there was another way in which the media coverage of Yulia Tymoshenko, particularly within *segodnya*, was instrumentalized to benefit the incumbent PoR in the 2012 VR election. This was in the way that in which articles sought to stress that her imprisonment was in no way impacting on Ukraine’s potential closer ties with European Union institutions. Although these

articles may not smear the opposition leader directly in the same way as is outlined above, highlighting this fact reinforced the idea that Tymoshenko was not a political prisoner, an aspect central to the kompromat articles in *segodnya*. They also deny the obvious criticism of the PoR and Viktor Yanukovich that the persecution of political opponents *was* in fact threatening the possibility of agreements with the EU. As examples, journalists from *segodnya* took interviews from Ukrainians seeking visas in the embassies of various European countries, reporting that the Tymoshenko case is not impacting on the Ukrainians' ability to get them. They specifically highlighted the fact that opposition parties were incorrect to argue that it would result in schengen visas no longer being issued to Ukrainians. Furthermore, in the one embassy where it did seem that Ukrainians were finding it difficult to obtain visas, the German one, the problem was immediately dismissed, stating that "the Germans have always been very demanding" and also suggesting that the officials at that embassy were intentionally making the situation more difficult in order to take bribes (SE027). *Segodnya* also highlighted that Tymoshenko is not considered a political prisoner as per the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (SE028). *Fakti* also highlighted an interview with former President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski stating that "it would be bad if Europe looked at relations with Ukraine only through the prism of the Tymoshenko case" (FA008).

#### *Coverage of other Opposition Parties and Candidates*

In terms of coverage of the other candidates and parties taking part in the election campaign, none were reported on nearly as much as either the PoR or the UO. The main exception was Vitali's Klitschko's Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) for whom advertorials from all three oligarchic media outlets were published, making a stark comparison with the coverage of the UO in 2012. Articles covering UDAR did actually report on their election platform, mentioning their key goals and policies, which were absent from the reporting on the UO as outlined above. At the start of the campaign their party congress the five key goals of the party were highlighted, which included anti-corruption initiatives, greater powers to local governments and improving the living standards (FA011). Similarly, *segodnya* later printed a took quotes from Klitschko in which he outlines the party's key goals (SE031). It is clear that UDAR were promoted relative to other opposition parties in the oligarchic media. The same comment piece highlighted above which was so critical of the UO is also more positive towards UDAR (SE019). Klitschko's confidence in their ability to draw votes away from Andriy Shevchenko's and Natalia Korolevskaya's "Ukraine - Forward!" party was also highlighted in *fakti* (FA012). Finally, a potential political agreement between UDAR and PoR was also reported much more favourably than between UDAR and UO, reporting that Klitschko was ready to cooperate with the PoR for the benefit of Ukraine (SE033)."

Finally, one other candidate to whom some coverage was dedicated was the former president Viktor Yushenko, who in 2012 led his own political party “Our Ukraine” and towards whom kompromat articles were leveraged. Yushenko was described as a “political corpse” (SE019), the coverage of his party’s conference focussed solely on the severe criticism levelled at him by Dmitry Pavlychko, suggesting that he immediately drop out of the election (FA013).

#### 5.1.4. Election Integrity

Articles relating to the integrity of the election were a key source of both advertorials and kompromat in the 2012 election campaign. Such articles were overwhelmingly to the benefit of the PoR and to a lesser extent UDAR, and almost entirely to the detriment of the UO. Kompromat articles relating to election integrity included reports on corruption, attempts to bribe voters, and unfair control over media sources, while advertorials gave assurances on integrity of the election, focussing on international observers, as well as the PoRs supposed commitment to fairness and transparency. The result was a number of articles making clear that the authorities and observers were able to guarantee free and fair elections, alongside articles that claimed significant cheating was taking place specifically and exclusively on the part of the opposition.

When it came to reports of election integrity in relation to the PoR, a number of advertorials made clear that the incumbent party and president were doing everything in their power to ensure fair and transparent elections. Yanukovich was presented arguing that the PoR is committed to “the principles of democracy, the rule of law, a high level of political and legal culture” while also dismissing potential future questioning of the electoral transparency as destabilizing (SE035), while the PoR Governor of Kyiv Oblast also assured that elections will be “exemplary” in the Kyiv region (UN021). Azarov similarly was reported on dismissing any claims of unfair elections as merely attempts by the opposition to spoil their reputation, while stating that the PoR had fostered good conditions for a free and fair competition (SE036). PoR deputy Vladimir Makeenko also claimed that the incumbent party was somehow more interested in transparent elections than the competition (SE105). These articles also sometimes pointed towards the PoRs apparent successes and subsequent popularity with voters as important reasons as to why the party and its candidates were so committed to a fair election. For example, PoR deputy Ivan Popescu and deputy head of the party Serhii Tihipko were both reported on saying that the PoR was most interested in transparent elections since, according to them, they were had a significant lead in the opinion polls (SE037), (FA014). Details as to how the integrity of the elections was being ensured was also often linked to the PoR. Yanukovich was reported on promising video surveillance of polling booths (UN022) a move which was welcomed despite its high cost by Yuriy Miroshnicheko, the president’s representative in the Verkhovna Rada (UN023). Viktor Yanukovich was

also reported on instructing members of the clergy to stay neutral when it comes to electoral politics (UN024). Azarov was also portrayed as especially committed to healthy competition in politics in an article published in *segodnya* in which he expresses concern that voter turnout will be low due to poor weather (SE038).

It should be noted that the presence of international observers was highlighted as another assurance that the elections were free and fair. However, articles only explicitly referred to electoral observers from the Commonwealth of the Independent States - Election Monitoring Organization (CIS-EMO), an organization based in Russia not regarded as independent from the Russian authorities (Kelley, 2012), and would have favoured a strengthening of Yanukovich's position following a victory of the PoR in the VR elections. *Unian* ran three articles referring to electoral observers, with one assuring that bribery of voters will not affect the result (UN025), another dismissing claims of corruption aimed at the PoR (UN026) and one more which specifically links Mykola Azarov to the arrival of electoral observers (UN027). The head of the PoR Oleksandr Efremov was also reported on giving assurances that the votes will be counted by their own team, as well (UN028). *Segodnya* also ran an article in which an electoral observation organization from the Netherlands gave a "positive assessment" of the competition between the main political factions, stating that attempts at bribery were inconsequential, and that coverage of the parties was equal across the media environment taken as a whole. However, the organization, known as the 'International Expert Centre for Electoral Systems' (ICES), also had ties to the Russian Federation, and has been described as part of a "network of dubious election monitoring NGOs registered in foreign countries and featuring foreign experts" founded in 2005 following a number of colour revolutions in post-soviet countries in order to "distort critical coverage of domestic elections and polls in neighbouring states" (Bakalova, 2017; pp. 13-14). While the CIS international observers were often cited in an effort to show that the elections were free and fair, claims of corruption stemming from other electoral observers based in Canada were dismissed in *segodnya* as a "reproduction of the statements of some opposition forces in Ukraine" and an "instrument in the struggle of the political forces of Ukraine" (SE039).

Despite all of these confident assurances that the elections were free and fair, there were a number of kompromat articles accusing the United Opposition of cheating and corruption in the election campaign. Furthermore, it was commonly suggested that the coalition has resorted to cheating since they are not popular with the electorate. For example, an article covering the phenomenon of vote-buying by candidates heavily implies that UO candidates are those most involved, while stating that the PoR candidates are "more serious" (SE040). Two longer articles explicitly labelled as political advertising went into greater detail on UOs cheating. One covered supposed vote buying by UO, with PoR deputy Maxim Lutsky accusing his competitors of refusing to compete fairly (SE041), and another

in which another PoR deputy Vladislav Zabarsky reassures voters that the PoR are keeping track of all of the UOs electoral violations (SE042). Within one article in *fakti* the headline claimed that the authorities (and specifically the PoR) were “doing everything to hold fair and transparent elections” while the article also claimed others were engaged in “bribing voters and black PR”. This was followed by comments on the weakness of the opposition coalition and their supposed lack of commitment to their campaign promises, suggesting that engagement in cheating was a way of making up for a poor political platform and unpopularity with voters (FA015).

Furthermore, despite the evidence presented above with regards to the consistent support from the oligarchic media outlets towards the incumbent PoR, there were a few articles in which the UO were accused of corrupt support within the Ukrainian media. In the same *fakti* article mentioned above Oleksandr Efremov notes that the supposedly opposition got the most coverage in the media (FA015). In *segodnya*, attention was drawn to the fact that Nikolai Kniazhitsky, CEO of the independent television channel TVi, made it onto the party lists of the UO, stating that “it was impossible to think of a better reason for accusations of the channel's bias” (SE017). Finally, two articles covered a speech in which Viktor Yanukovych both admitted that paid-for coverage of political parties existed while also outlining that the authorities had “no levers of pressure on journalists” suggesting that such pressure and therefore coverage came from the other parties (SE045) (UN029).

Finally, the more favourable coverage in terms of advertorials for UDAR outlined above also extended to articles related to election integrity. Both *unian* and *segodnya* ran advertorials for UDAR, highlighting party leader Vitali Klitschko complaints about unfair campaign tactics being used against him and his party. Furthermore, these articles generally highlighted the fact that UDAR was subject to such tactics due to their popularity among the electorate. Essentially, they were worth targeting. For example, Klitschko was reported on stating that opponents were trying to “tarnish the reputation of UDAR in any possible way” through inaccurate negative press (UN030), as well as to “pressure us physically, with the help of the tax, prosecutor’s office, courts, and the police” which he puts down to the fact that the UDAR candidates are “a threat to those in power” (UN031). While these two articles referred generically to misconduct on the part of “opposition parties”, other articles favourable to UDAR also directly implicated the PoR. Klitschko was also reported on stating that kompromat against his party in the media was organized by the PoR and that the authorities were “afraid of him” (SE046), as well as that the far-right party “freedom” was working together with the PoR to smear UDAR (SE047).

#### 5.1.5. Summary of Oligarchic Media Instrumentalization relating to the 2012 VR Election

In summary, advertorials and kompromat articles were both important aspects of coverage of the 2012 Verkhovna Rada elections in the oligarchic media outlets. Advertorials were primarily for the benefit of

the incumbent Party of Regions and their candidates running in the upcoming parliamentary elections, as well as President Viktor Yanukovych. Advertorials for the PoR focussed on the economic policies of the party on a national and regional level, the party's commitment to fair elections, and put a positive spin on their campaign activity. A smaller number of advertorials were published in favour of UDAR, promoting the party as a more genuine contender in the elections in comparison with other opposition parties, and highlighting them as a victim of kompromat due to their popularity. Kompromat articles were published primarily to smear the UO and Yulia Tymoshenko. These drew attention to the chaotic internal politics and failed coalition building of the UO, while failing to mention their political platform. Kompromat articles also accused the UO of attempts at bribery and vote-rigging because they were unpopular with the electorate. In *segodnya*, kompromat articles aimed to smear Yulia Tymoshenko in particular, portraying her as a nuisance in attempts evade justice. The coverage of Tymoshenko was a point of difference between the oligarchic media outlets with *unian* and *fakti* portraying the UO leader as a genuine political prisoner. Finally, two kinds of articles, although did not fall under the category of kompromat or advertorial were still clearly of benefit to the incumbent PoR. These were firstly articles that referenced positive assessments of the election integrity (from dubious Russian-state affiliated electoral observers), as well as articles making the case that Yulia Tymoshenko's imprisonment was having a negligible impact on Ukraine-EU relations.

## **5.2. Coverage of the 2014 Verkhovna Rada Election Campaign in Oligarchic Media Outlets**

Compared with the coverage of the 2012 VR elections outlined above, there were significant differences between the oligarchic media outlets that make up this study in terms of how they covered the 2014 elections. Rinat Akhmetov's primarily *segodnya* published advertorials which promoted the newly formed Opposition Block, whereas advertorials in Ihor Kolomoisky's *unian* focussed far more on the president and his coalition Petro Poroshenko Bloc (PPB). Going into the elections, PPB were in coalition with the People's Front party of then prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, for whom advertorials were published both *segodnya* and *unian*. It seems that *Fakti* published advertorials for any candidate who wanted it (or who were willing to pay) with two blocks of coverage dominated by advertorials from a wide variety of different candidates and parties on the 17th of October 2014 and then again on the 24<sup>th</sup> of October. Election integrity was again a focus and an important way of engaging in kompromat against opponents. This was especially the case in *segodnya* where, in contrast to the 2012 elections, coverage sought as much as possible to discredit the authorities' ability to guarantee fair elections. Another key difference related to the way in which the oligarchic outlets reported on current events. This was done in such a way as to benefit the political forces they were backing. For example, where *UNIAN* promoted the successes of Poroshenko's Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) against Russia-backed

separatists in the Donbass region, *segodnya* focussed on the devastation and destruction of the region as a way of attacking the authorities. Finally, there was more content relating specifically to the oligarch media proprietors themselves in 2014. In particular, this was the case in *segodnya*, which became a platform for promoting Akhmetov's charitable foundation.

#### 5.2.1. Oligarchic Outlets Promoting Different Political Factions

When it came to the 2014 VR elections, the divide, in particular between Kolomoisky and Akhmetov, was clear in terms of which political forces were being backed in their respective media outlets *UNIAN* and *segodnya*. As in 2012, advertorials allowed for outlets to essentially serve as the party press service for a particular candidate, providing positive coverage without challenge, whereas kompromat articles often linked a targeted party or candidate to accusations of electoral manipulation. This section will outline the use of both advertorials and kompromat in all three oligarchic outlets, which candidates and parties were promoted or smeared, as well as how.

##### *Segodnya coverage of the 2014 VR Election*

Many advertorials were published to the benefit of Opposition Block and their candidates in *segodnya*. Yuriy Boyko and Olesandr Vilkul were the most notable beneficiaries of this practice. As with the advertorials for the Party of Regions in 2012, advertorials for the party and its candidates focussed on the material benefits for Ukrainians in terms of spending on infrastructure, industry, and pensions. For example, coverage of Yuriy Boyko in *segodnya* was consistently linked to industrial revival. He was promoted in an article in which he advocated for more investment into shipbuilding (SE048), presenting the OB's plan for a restoration of the Donbass region focusing first and foremost on industry (SE049), and drawing attention to the OBs role in the reopening of the glass factory in Lysychansk (SE050). These articles presented the OB as the only party interested in the rejuvenation of the Eastern regions of Ukraine in particular, with Boyko stating in the shipbuilding article that "the authorities have divided Ukraine into two parts: the eastern part is bad, and the western part is good" and accusing the authorities of a preoccupation with war rather than industry and rebuilding (SE051). Advertorials for Boyko and the OB also promoted their opposition to a proposed pension reform, first in an article (SE052) which outlined their demands to freeze utilities along with pensions, but also generally outlined the party platform in its goal to "protect every Ukrainian family, every pensioner, every Ukrainian, no matter where they live" and distinguished themselves from the authorities due to their "knowledge and professional experience in government" as well as their plans to stop the war and save jobs. A second article then demanded a reverse in the pension freeze on top (SE053). There were also similar advertorials promoting Oleksandr Vilkul as a candidate for the OB which were also linked to Ukrainian

industry. The first criticized the authorities for trade deficits and imports harmful to domestic producers (SE054) and another encouraged miners and metallurgists to vote for the OB to protect their jobs (SE055).

Along with the advertorials outlined above, the OB were also portrayed as unfairly written off in terms of their chances for electoral success in two separate comment pieces. In an article summarizing the early campaign positions of various parties, a quote from political scientist Taras Berezovets is highlighted, in which he suggests that the OB have been wrongly “buried” in terms of expectations, noting that “the Opposition Bloc has doubled, even more than doubled, in less than a month” (SE056). Later in the campaign, the opinion of another political scientist, Kost Bondarenko, is published arguing that sociological data with regards to OB voters is inaccurate, and that the party is likely to do much better than the polling suggests (SE057).

Outside of the Opposition Block, the other candidate for whom advertorials were published in *segodnya* was then prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk from the People’s Front, a party in coalition with the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (PPB) leading into the election. Some of these advertorials I would categorise as “chronicling” as described with regards to the coverage of the 2012 election above. For example, *segodnya* reported on Yatsenyuk’s visits to Kharkiv (SE058), a meeting with agricultural producers (SE059), as well as reports of meetings with cabinet ministers which included a positive angle for the prime minister including plans for judicial reform (SE060) and a reduction in gas consumption from Russia (SE061). Other advertorials for Yatsenyuk also highlighted the material benefits his leadership brought for Ukrainians. There were two separate advertorials in which Yatsenyuk is promoted as the most decisive factor in bringing down gas prices for Ukrainians, in which he claims to have personally phoned market operators in order to bring the prices down (SE062) (SE063). He was also directly connected with the push to bring in anti-corruption legislation (SE064) and again with judicial reform (SE065), with neither article mentioning any other ministers (or the president) who were involved in either process. Most notably, *segodnya* published an exclusive long form interview with Yatsenyuk two days before the election which was heavily promoted (SE066). As well as the interview being published in its entirety at the start of the day, sections of the interview were repeatedly re-published throughout the day as separate articles. These highlighted different aspects of the interview, for example Yatsenyuk’s commitment to rid Ukraine of Russian influence, to orient the country’s economy towards European markets, to develop Ukraine’s agricultural sector, as well as to provide subsidies for low-income families to pay for their utilities.

As well as promoting the Opposition Block and Arseniy Yatsenyuk through advertorials, kompromat to the detriment of President Poroshenko was also published in *segodnya*. Many of these articles centred around the Presidential administration’s handling of the conflict in the Donbass. For

example, kompromat directed towards the President came in the form of sharp criticism of the government for failing to pay salaries and pensions of citizens in the Donbass region (SE067), as well as blaming the government on two separate occasions for Ukraine's lack of winter preparedness in the energy sector (SE068) (SE069). In *segodnya* in particular, criticism was also levelled towards the president for the appointment of Stepan Poltorak as Minister of Defence. Where both *unian* and *fakti* ran fairly neutral articles announcing the appointment, *segodnya* drew attention to the fact that Poltorak had been responsible for some of the violence against maidan protesters, as well as taking a quote from Mykola Sungurovsky, director of a defence-oriented think tank based in Ukraine stating that he "didn't see the qualities required" for a defence minister in Poltorak (SE070).

The most common way in which kompromat was levelled against the ruling Petro Poroshenko Bloc in *segodnya*, however, was by accusing them of cheating in the election. Kompromat articles accusing the government of cheating to ensure victory in the elections were exclusive to *segodnya* in the coverage of the 2014 campaign and manifested in a number of different ways. *Segodnya* drew attention to alleged physical violence against OB candidates, accusing the PPB, UDAR, and the People's Front engaging in an impromptu "people's lustration" of their candidates in Obukhiv (SE071), while Yuri Boyko was quoted stating that OB candidates were subject to "beatings and arrests" (SE072) and that there was an open war between the authorities and the opposition (SE073). Opposition Bloc candidate Nestor Shufrich was also promoted accusing the authorities of determining winning candidates in advance in part through use of the military (SE074), and another PoR candidate Vadim Rabinovich argues that changes to electoral law were done to the benefit of the current government (SE075). Within these articles, the OB were also often promoted as fighting to save the integrity of the election. For example, the mentioned article referring to the exclusion of OB candidates through extra-legal lustration (SE071) also states that the OB has in response "launched a large-scale program to protect the election results" and "will closely monitor every step of the authorities and inform the whole country and the whole world about the criminal actions of electoral fraud".

Finally, there were several articles, which, although did not accuse Poroshenko's government of cheating directly, sought to promote the idea that cheating in the campaign was incredibly widespread, thus casting doubt on the BPP as likely winners. Articles were published claiming that votes were being sold for 500 hryvnia (SE076), in exchange for buckwheat (SE077), and that there were deceased included on the lists of eligible voters in Odessa (SE078). Another article explicitly outlined that electoral manipulation was worse than during the 2012 Verkhovna election campaign (SE079). *Segodnya* was also the only of the three outlets to note the fact that the inability of Donbass residents to vote given the conflict would affect the outcome (SE080).

### *Unian coverage of the 2014 VR Election*

In contrast with *segodnya*, Ihor Kolomoisky's *unian* promoted Poroshenko through a number of advertorials and was far more critical of the Opposition Bloc. On top of that, another important member of the PPB and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, Volodymyr Hroisman, was the beneficiary of advertorials published in *unian*. One thing in common with *segodnya*, however, was that advertorials were also published promoting Arseniy Yatsenyuk in *unian*.

With regards to the coverage of Poroshenko, there were a number of advertorials either chronicling his movements on the campaign trail in a positive way or promoting his success in terms of the post-maidan anti-corruption reforms. For example, *unian* promoted the president's visit to the Dnipropetrovsk machine-building plant, in which he laid out his strategy to develop a space industry in Ukraine (UN032), as well as a visit to Zaporizhzhya as part of the campaign (UN033). Poroshenko's speech on the Day of Defenders was also published in full in *unian* (UN034). There were also two articles chronicling Poroshenko's visit and address to students in Dnipro, the first of which promoted the President's commitment to a European future for Ukraine and the other showing him singing the national anthem of Ukraine together with the students (UN035). In terms of Poroshenko's connections to anti-corruption reforms, a fairly long advertorial was published in *unian* praising the president's initiative in this area (UN036). The article used military language, describing new anti-corruption legislation as a "political counteroffensive" whilst also praising Poroshenko's role in the actual military, especially in the decision to dismiss the defence minister Valeriy Gelety. Furthermore, the PPB are described as the "undisputed leader in parliamentary ratings" as a result of the president's actions, while cooperation between the BPP and the People's Front was praised as instrumental in the adoption of the anti-corruption laws. Shorter advertorials praising the president in this area were also published, including one linking the presidential administration to the launch of a new procurement system (UN037), and another celebrating the achievements of both Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk, as the end of the "offshore era" for Ukraine (UN038).

Along with President Poroshenko, advertorials for Volodymyr Hroisman were also published in *unian*. Much like the OB candidates in *segodnya*, the PPB candidate was linked to improvements to infrastructure in the Donbass (UN039), as well as on two separate occasions to necessary decentralization reform (UN040) (UN041). Most notably, where *segodnya* chose to take a long-form interview with Yatsenyuk directly before the election day, *unian* promoted Hroisman with a similar exclusive interview, (UN042) describing his "brilliant career" in the introduction and positioning him as a potential alternative to Yatsenyuk as prime minister, before going on to discussing Hroisman's plans for modernization of military, decentralization, and investments into infrastructure.

Along with the advertorials promoting both Poroshenko and Horisman, however, *unian* also promoted Yatsenyuk in a way comparable with *segodnya*. An advertorial specifically linked him to the fight against money laundering and the “offshore era” in Ukraine (UN043), while another promoted his confidence for future economic growth in Ukraine (UN044). There were also two advertorials in which he laid out the importance of his border security plan for the country (UN045) (UN046). Beyond this, there were articles in *unian* chronicling a meeting with members of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches (UN047), as well as his intention to liaise with important figures from the agricultural sector (UN048). One important difference between *segodnya* and *unian* with regards to the coverage of Yatsenyuk, however, was that *unian* showed the conflict in policy between the Prime Minister and the Opposition Bloc, running an article (UN049) in which Yatsenyuk argues that the OBs criticism for his proposed pension reform is “populism and lies”. This conflict was not reported on in *segodnya*.

*Unian*, also leveraged kompromat articles against the OB on a number of occasions during the campaign linking the OB to corruption, to the PoR (who following the 2014 Maidan Revolution were in disgrace due to their connection to former President Yanukovich), and to Russia. For example, one notable kompromat piece drew attention to an investigation by the popular Ukrainian anti-corruption programme “schemes” which exposed Opposition Bloc candidates Yevhen Bakulin and Serhiy Katsuba each as the owner of luxury mansions near to Kyiv (UN050). The money to afford such property was linked to the corrupt acquisition of Chernomorneftegaz, referred to in the article as “Boyko Towers” implicating Yuriy Boyko due to the position of the OB candidate as Minister of Fuel and Energy at the time the deal was made. Another kompromat article in *unian* highlighted the fact that the election campaigns of both the Opposition Block and Oleh Lyashko’s Radical Party were led by the same person, the Russian political strategist Igor Shuvalov (UN051). The television channel “Inter” was also likened to a propaganda machine comparable with that of the Kremlin, promoting the interests of its oligarch owners in its support for the Opposition Bloc (UN052). *Unian* also drew attention to calls for lustration of former PoR candidates, in which the article identifies the greatest proportion of whom were now standing for the OB (UN053). Finally, both *unian* and *fakti* ran a story on the OB candidate Pavel Matviyenko who was egged in public, an incident which was not reported in *segodnya* (UN054) (FA017).

#### *Fakti i Kommentarii coverage of the 2014 VR Election*

Victor Pinchuk’s *fakti i kommentarii* followed a different pattern when it came to advertorials and kompromat cover the 2014 VR election in comparison with the other two outlets outlined above. *Fakti* did not consistently provide advertorials against any specific party or candidate, rather the media outlet ran advertorials for a number of different competing candidates and parties. All of these came in two

main blocks of coverage on the 17th of October and directly before voting day on the 23rd and 24th of October. Furthermore, *Fakti* did not direct kompromat articles against any political candidate or party in 2014.

On the 17th of October, *Fakti* ran advertorials for Vadim Rabinovitch from the Opposition Bloc (FA018), Olha Bohomolets standing for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (FA019), Serhii Tihipko and Oleh Tyahnybok, leaders of the “Strong Ukraine” and Freedom parties respectively (FA020) (FA021), as well as the independent candidates Vadim Stolar and Sergei Starun (FA022) (FA023). All of these articles followed the same format, positively introducing each candidate with reference to their previous work, followed by an uncritical interview in which the candidate could put forward their political platform without being challenged, resulting in an overwhelmingly positive article promoting each candidate. A very similar set of advertorials promoting a mostly different set of candidates also appeared on the 23rd and 24th of October. These articles were a mixture of interviews similar to those advertorials published on the 17th as well as content published directly from either a candidate’s speech or press service. These included two separate articles promoting Oleh Tyahnybok (FA037) (FA038), another promoting Serhii Tihipko (FA024), as well as articles promoting Svetlana Fabricant and Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy who were both also standing for “Strong Ukraine” (FA025) (FA026). Further articles promoted Volodymyr Hroisman and Vitali Klitschko who in 2014 also ran as part of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (FA027) (FA028), as well as independent candidate Vyacheslav Konstantinovsky (FA029). Finally, Yatsenyuk was also promoted through an interview with his parents (FA030).

Other than the article about Pavel Matviyenko mentioned above, *fakti* did not engage in what could be considered kompromat in its coverage of the 2014 VR election. The outlet was also fairly positive towards Petro Poroshenko and did not criticize the president in any way during the campaign. With regards to the appointment of Stepan Poltorak as defence minister, a move criticized in *segodnya* as outlined above, *fakti* only repeated the president’s words with regards to the minister’s positive qualities (FA031). Poroshenko was also actively praised in his decision to completely ignore the questions from a Russian journalist (FA032). Finally, other than advertorials for the OB candidates mentioned above the party itself, as well as any other notable candidates, were absent from the coverage of the election in *fakti*.

### 5.2.2. Oligarchic Outlets Promoting Oligarchs

During the 2012 VR elections, the oligarch media owners themselves were not mentioned. This was not the case during the campaign of the 2014 VR elections, with *segodnya* in particular being used as an instrument to promote Rinat Akhmetov and to a lesser extent smear Ihor Kolomoisky as well.

*Segodnya* became an important platform for the promotion of Akhmetov through advertorials for his charity, the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation. The charity primarily functioned in the Donbass region, providing aid for the residents suffering from the conflict. Articles promoting the charity were the most common type of advertorial on the platform over the course of the election campaign, with 36 different articles published in *segodnya* promoting the charity and its activities during the two weeks leading up to the election day alone. Just on the 21st of October there were 6 different advertorials promoting the charity in various ways. Said articles were all very similar, promoting the work of the charity in helping women and children in particular, taking interviews from individuals who received aid from the charity, as well as often promoting the role of the Shakhtar Donetsk football club (also owned by Akhmetov) in helping with the delivery of aid. There were also 11 different articles published in *unian* which promoted the Rinat Akhmetov foundation. These also appeared to be advertorials paid for by Akhmetov, as each article published in *unian* was an almost word-for-word copy of the one published in *segodnya*. For example, they both published articles regarding the distribution of humanitarian kits in the Donbass on the same day (SE081) (UN055), as well as both highlighting the fact that the charity had published a humanitarian needs map of the Donbass (SE082) (UN066). Both highlighted the FC Shakhtar's Donbass Arena as the centre of operations for aid delivery on the same day (SE084) (UN055) and both ran articles highlighting the delivery of insulin to those who needed it in the Donbass, as well (SE086) (UN056).

Beyond the Rinat Akhmetov foundation, *segodnya* was also used in order to publish advertorials promoting Akhmetov's most important business, Metinvest. Specifically, *segodnya* portrayed Metinvest as more than just a business, outlining its role in developing infrastructure in the Donbass and supporting its people (SE087). Another advertorial drew attention to stability and long-term stability of Metinvest despite the conflict in the Donbass (SE088). *Segodnya* also published an advertorial highlighting the fact that engineers from DTEK Donetskoenergo (also owned by Akhmetov) were working to fix power outages in the region (SE089). Finally, Metinvest was explicitly distanced from the so-called "Donetsk People's Republic", representatives of whom made a visit to the Khartsyzsky Pipe Plant (part of the Metinvest group) as a form of publicity (SE090). The other two oligarchic outlets published far fewer advertorials promoting either the oligarchs themselves or businesses they own. One appeared in Victor Pinchuk's *fakti* promoting the Pinchuk Art Centre (FA033). In *unian*, a single advertorial for Kolomoisky promoted his decision to fund aid programmes for internal displaced persons in Ukraine as a result of the conflict in the Donbass (UN057).

Finally, *segodnya* published kompromat targeted against Kolomoisky in particular. This was centred around a phenomenon dubbed "Kolomoisky-gate" (in *segodnya* only), in which the oligarch was accused of using his privately funded militia to intimidate voters at polling stations (SE091). *Segodnya*

also promoted the Opposition Bloc's criticism of the scandal, blaming the authorities for not conducting a proper investigation (SE092), as well as the Radical Party's Oleh Lyashko arguing that Kolomoisky should be dismissed from his post as governor of Dnipropetrovsk (SE093). Finally, the view of political scientist Kost Bondarenko that Kolomoisky's actions "undermines Ukraine's prestige on the world stage and debunks the myth that the country has moved along a democratic path of development after the Maidan" was promoted in *segodnya* (SE094).

### 5.2.3. Reporting on Current Events

The final way in which the oligarchic media outlets were instrumentalized over the course of the 2014 Verkhovna Rada election was through the way in which some current events were reported on. Although this coverage cannot be considered advertorial or kompromat in the sense that they directly promoted or smeared a political candidate or a party, it is clear that, in particular with regards to *unian* and *segodnya*, coverage of current events was done in such a way as to promote the same political factions that were promoted through advertorials outlined above. Essentially, coverage of current events clearly benefitted either the PPB and the president, or the Opposition Bloc.

The first context in which this was done was in the reporting of the conflict (referred to at the time by the Ukrainian authorities and media as the Anti-Terrorist Operation) in the Donbass region. During the election campaign, *unian* published a number of positive articles covering the conflict, highlighting in particular Petro Poroshenko's role in successes with regards to negotiations, procurement and the moral of servicemen. *Segodnya* on the contrary focused on the humanitarian crisis in the region and in particular on the poor conditions for soldiers. For example, *segodnya* ran articles highlighting the fact that Ukrainian soldiers in the Donbass were without winter clothes and are low on ammunition (SE095), reporting on the high numbers of fatalities (*segodnya*, SE096) as well as supposed lawlessness and cruelty on the part of the leadership in some battalions (SE097). The terrible conditions for civilians caught in contested territories was also highlighted (SE098), as well as the fact that military personnel sought to sue the Verkhovna Rada owing to the fact that they were unable to vote in the upcoming election (SE099). In contrast, *unian* reported on the arrival of new reconnaissance equipment into the conflict area (UN058), Poroshenko's announcement that the Ukrainian navy will be modernized (UN059), as well as on the service medals awarded to soldiers by Poroshenko (UN060). Poroshenko's successes in negotiation with regards to the conflict were also reported on including for the successful release of prisoners from DNR militants (UN061). It is clear that the reporting on the conflict by the two oligarchic media outlets benefits the factions that they were promoting through advertorials as outlined above, with *segodnya* casting doubt on the authorities' effectiveness to handle the conflict, while *unian* promoted Poroshenko's competence in this area.

Another area in which biased reporting was instrumentalized was on the issue of conscripts striking outside the Verkhovna Rada, allegedly due to the conditions of their military service. Here, *segodnya* portrays the strikes as legitimate, therefore as a result of the failures of the current government. The demands of the protestors in terms of winter uniforms and wage arrears are highlighted (SE100), and repeated in a separate article (SE101). People's Front deputy Anton Herashenko was also promoted in his request that promises towards the soldiers are fulfilled in terms of wages (SE102). *Unian*, on the other hand promoted ministerial advisor Zoryan Shkiryak's view that the strikes were illegitimate and, in fact, organized by the Russian security services (UN062), thereby shifting blame for the strikes away from Poroshenko and the BPP. They also lay the blame of the lack of resolution of said strikes at the hands of the protestors who rejected proposals offered to them (UN063). *Fakti* reported the conscript strikes in the same manner as *unian*, referencing Shkiryak view with regards to nefarious Russian intervention (FA034), as well as both Andriy Beletsky, then commander of the Azov Battalion, and President Poroshenko's agreement that the strikes were the result of foreign provocation (FA035) (FA036). These biases were then repeated in the oligarchic media outlets when another round of protests took place outside the Verkhovna Rada closer to the election day, this time on the part of the far-right "freedom" party and "right sector" organization. *Unian* reported the Minister of Internal Affairs' view that the protestors were paid to be there (UN064). The outlet also published the denial of "freedom" and "right sector" that they took part in the protest alongside a picture of protestors clearly holding the respective flags of each organization, while describing the serious violence they committed (UN065). *Segodnya*, on the other hand, described the protestors as "activists" and vastly played down the violence of the event describing how order "is provided by a relatively small number of law enforcement officers" (SE103).

#### 5.2.4. Summary of Oligarchic Media Instrumentalization relating to the 2014 VR Election

In summary, advertorials and kompromat articles were an important element of oligarchic media instrumentalization in the coverage of the 2014 VR election. However, unlike in the 2012 VR elections, they were employed to the benefit of different political factions by different oligarchic media outlets. *Segodnya* consistently promoted candidates from the OB, while *unian* consistently published advertorials for former President Poroshenko and his party, the BPP. Both outlets published advertorials for the Prime Minister at the time, Arseniy Yatsenyuk. *Fakti* published a significant number of advertorials but did not consistently promote a single political faction. Kompromat articles were common in both *segodnya* and *unian* and, once again, centred around accusations of election fraud. One aspect of media instrumentalization that was in contrast to the coverage in 2012 was that *segodnya* became an instrument for promoting its proprietor, Rinat Akhmetov, by publishing regular

advertorials for his charity and his key businesses. Finally, bias in reporting of the main news events at the time were very clear in *unian* and *segodnya*. This bias was likely with the intention to create further support for the same political factions that were promoted directly through advertorials.

## 6. Discussion of Results

Relating the results outlined above to the main research question, “what are the forms of media instrumentalization in the wealth defence practices of Ukrainian oligarchs in transition from a sultanistic to an untamed ruling oligarchy?” there is some support for both the clientelistic and pluralistic forms of media instrumentalization conceptualized above, the basis of which comes from Winters’ theory of oligarchy, albeit with some differences outlined below. I would also argue that the results presented above do make the case that understanding the oligarch type of media as outlined by Mungiu-Pippidi, Štětka, and Levy through the lens of Winters’ theory provide clarity in understanding how and why oligarchs instrumentalize their media outlets in differently ways according to context and requirements of wealth defence. I will argue below that this has implications for the understanding of both democratization and the development of media environments.

### 6.1. Clientelistic Oligarchic Media in a Sultanistic Oligarchy

The oligarchic media in the context of the sultanistic oligarchy in Ukraine was clientelistic in its coverage of the 2012 Verkhovna Rada in the sense that they were instrumentalized primarily as a means of supporting the position of the sultan (Viktor Yanukovich). All three media outlets published advertorials in support of Yanukovich and his political faction the PoR, while kompromat articles were published to smear the main political rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, and the United Opposition. Articles promoting the PoR’s and Yanukovich’s economic policies and leadership qualities, as well as those following them around the campaign trail, were common in all three oligarchic outlets. This, along with the lack of comment pieces, gave the impression that the oligarchic media basically functioned as a party press service for the PoR in the 2012 VR election. Criticism of Yanukovich and the PoR was very rare in *fakti* and *unian*, and non-existent in *segodnya*. The main weapon of kompromat across both elections were accusations of various forms of cheating in order to win votes, which was almost entirely directed towards the UO in the coverage of the 2012 election. The actual policies and campaigning of the opposition coalition were also ignored in favour of coverage with regards to political infighting.

This is not to say that all of the aspects of the 2012 election coverage fit the conceptualization of a clientelistic form of oligarchic media. Firstly, both *fakti* and *unian* did at least to some extent promote Yulia Tymoshenko's perspective, both through articles which accepted her status as a political prisoner, and also by publishing her scathing open letter to President Yanukovich. In this regard, it is clear that within the context of the sultanistic oligarchy in Ukraine, although all three of Kolomoisky, Pinchuk, and Akhmetov were dependent on a positive (clientelistic) relationship with Yanukovich in order to defend their wealth, Akhmetov was the closest to the president. Akhmetov previously represented the PoR in the Rada, and both Yanukovich's base of political support and Akhmetov's most important assets were based in the Donbass region of Ukraine. Kudelia describes Akhmetov as one of the "key insiders" who could benefit the most from rent-seeking schemes as a result of Yanukovich's presidency (Kudelia, 2014; p. 22). However, the relationship of both Pinchuk and Kolomoisky with the president is described as more of a truce by Matuszak (2012), since neither were directly part of the financial base of the PoR, but both also seemed to be exempt from the business raiding practices of the regime (Matuszak, 2012; pp. 56-58). I would argue that these differences in the relationship with the sultan are reflected in the media coverage. While all three media outlets published advertorials in favour of Yanukovich and the PoR, the greatest extent of said promotion came from *segodnya*, as well as the clearest attempts to smear the opposition.

One opposition party, UDAR, was also promoted through advertorials in all three oligarchic media outlets in 2012, although not in the same quantity as the PoR. Vitali Klitschko was able to outline his party's platform within the oligarchic media, and the party was reported favourably when it came to election integrity, in stark contrast with the United Opposition. I would argue that this confirms that Taras Kuzio (2013) was correct in his observation, outlined in the methodology above, that UDAR was essentially considered "acceptable" opposition compared with Tymoshenko's United Opposition, as well as one that ultimately could be co-opted. Even during the election campaign, it was made clear that UDAR would be invited into coalition with PoR (*unian*, October 17th).

## **6.2. Pluralistic Oligarchic Media in an Untamed Ruling Oligarchy**

The coverage of the 2014 Verkhovna Rada election within the oligarchic media outlets also fits with the pluralistic form of oligarchic media as conceptualized above to some degree. Following the breakdown of the sultanistic mode of wealth defence it is clear that a more pluralistic approach to wealth defence is apparent in terms of how the oligarchic media assets were instrumentalized, suggesting a move towards state capture as the primary role for the oligarchic media assets. Compared with in 2012, a range of different political factions were promoted through advertorials in a way that was not consistent

across the oligarchic media outlets. This was especially the case with both *unian* and *segodnya*, with the former consistently publishing advertorials for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, while the latter promoted the Opposition Bloc. Advertorials in all three outlets were very similar in content as those from the 2012 election, while accusations of cheating in the election were still the main source of kompromat. However, the different ways in which current events were presented was much more noticeable in the 2014 election, with *unian* and *segodnya* providing completely different pictures of the conflict in the Donbass (to the benefit of their own political factions), as an example.

Furthermore, Markus and Charnysh's concept of flexibility as one of the main advantages of indirect forms of wealth defence (such as media ownership and party funding), as outlined above in the conceptual framework, was far more relevant with regards to media instrumentalization in the untamed ruling oligarchy post-Maidan. Both *unian* and *segodnya* clearly backed more than one political faction at once for the 2014 election. Yatsenyuk and his People's Front party received positive coverage from both outlets, along with the main two factions backed by the oligarchic outlets, the PPB, and the OB respectively. Victor Pinchuk's *Faktii* seemed to commit to this approach completely by essentially providing a media outlet as a service to publish an advertorial for any political candidate who wanted one (or more likely were willing to pay for one), without consistently backing any political candidate.

In 2014, Rinat Akhmetov also used *segodnya* in order to promote himself, primarily through charitable work in his name, an aspect that was entirely absent from the same media outlet in 2012. Self-promotion (and attacks on other oligarchs) was a surprisingly uncommon aspect of the oligarchic media in both elections considering its presence in the literature on oligarchic media as one of the main ways in which media outlets can be instrumentalized by wealthy individuals. This is likely due to case selection. Having chosen to focus on oligarchic media specifically over the course of two election campaigns, it is clear that the priority in terms of wealth defence through media is on promoting the right political candidates (in both a sultanistic and untamed ruling oligarchy) and making sure they get into power. Further research may enlighten the different ways in which oligarchic media between elections, compared with during a political campaign. With regards to Akhmetov's self-promotion during the 2014 Verkhovna Rada election, it is clear that Akhmetov needed image rehabilitation following the recent Maidan revolution which ousted Yanukovych, more so than either Pinchuk or Kolomoisky. Akhmetov's close connection with Yanukovych, whose corrupt regime was one of the main grievances of the Maidan protesters, essentially meant that he was more of a target for public discontent, as shown by the fact that his residences both in Kyiv and in Donetsk were picketed by Maidan activists in 2014 and at the end of 2013 respectively (Wilson, 2014; p. 145) (Grytsenko, 2016). I would argue that self-promotion as a means of wealth defence does become more important following the collapse of a sultanistic oligarchy, since the wealth defence that was essentially outsourced to the sultan becomes

the responsibility of the oligarchs themselves. Again, I would argue that this difference in coverage between *segodnya* and the other outlets shows Akhetmov's former privileged position within Yanukovich's sultanistic oligarchy.

### **6.3. Understanding the Media Practices of the “Oligarchic Type”**

A variety of practices associated with the oligarchic type of media ownership are outlined within the literature review. The results outlined above make the case that these practices can be best understood through the lens of Winter's theory of oligarchy and wealth defence. The publishing of both advertorials and kompromat in the media have been identified as important aspects of wealth defence. However, it is clear that these practices serve very different roles within oligarchic wealth defence depending on the type of oligarchy. Namely, within a sultanistic oligarchy the key aim is clientelism, in other words positive coverage in return for wealth defence, both in terms of supporting the position of the sultan and undermining their political rivals. Within an untamed ruling oligarchy, the goal is state capture, promoting either a specific political faction into government as a means of protecting wealth and assets in an environment without guaranteed property rights. The aspect of oligarchs “hedging their bets” in terms of wealth defence and essentially backing more than one political faction at once was also clear with regards to the more pluralistic form of media instrumentalization. The way in which advertorials and kompromat were used across the 2012 and 2014 VR elections by the Ukrainian oligarchs studied in this thesis make clear that there is flexibility in their political alignments but consistency in their underlying goal of wealth defence.

The results presented also go beyond outlining which candidates and parties were supported through advertorials and smeared through kompromat by which oligarchs, but also made clear the principal themes that came up within the articles themselves. Accusations around election integrity was the most common way of smearing an opponent in both elections in Ukraine, and articles focusing on a candidate or party's ability to raise living standards was, among other things, one of the most important themes within advertorials. The specific themes and sources of content for kompromat and advertorial is likely to change according to the political context of different countries and may be an avenue for further research into the role oligarchic media instrumentalization in wealth defence in a different context. Advertorials and kompromat were not the only ways in which media was instrumentalized by the oligarchs, however. The difference in reporting on current events was particularly notable in the pluralistic form of oligarchic media in 2014. This was an inductive aspect of the research not fully anticipated within the theoretical framework. However, it is clear that this form of instrumentalization essentially adds to the same goal of state capture through party support. The difference in reporting on

current events, combined with promotion of one political faction over another in the pluralistic form of oligarchic media, essentially led to different distorted pictures of reality for audiences.

Another aspect of media instrumentalization and wealth defence that I would argue is picked up within the results, is the fact that, as well as strategies wealth defence being flexible according to oligarchic type as outlined in Winters' theory, it is clear that there is some degree of differentiation in the approach to wealth defence between oligarchs *within* the same mode of wealth defence. For example, where Rinat Akhmatov's *segodnya* was fully committed to clientelism by promoting Viktor Yanukovych and smearing Yulia Tymoshenko, the other two outlets, although still heavily biased towards Yanukovych, arguably decided on a more flexible approach to wealth defence by at least providing some positive coverage of Tymoshenko. With regards to flexibility and wealth defence, it is clear that Victor Pinchuk's *fakti i komentarii* took this approach far more than the other media outlets in the coverage of the 2014 VR elections by not consistently backing any specific candidate or party.

#### **6.4. Theory of Oligarchy, Media, and Transitions**

As noted in the literature review, Štětka (2012, p. 449) argues that the oligarchization of the media in the postcommunist space has implications for understanding of media systems in the region, since the tendency towards "differentiation" of the media, business, and political systems seems to be reversing. While I would certainly agree with this statement, I would also argue that the concept that the mode wealth defence in oligarchic systems comes in different forms is a key missing aspect of the understanding of such a media environment and how it develops. Looking at the case of Ukraine, the media environment within country has been interpreted as "more free" in some periods since independence and less so in others. More positive assessments of the Ukrainian media are consistently given in the years of untamed ruling oligarchy compared with those of sultanistic oligarchy. Mungiu-Pippidi (2008, p.71) notes the periods of "progress and regress" in terms of the Freedom House media freedom scores in Ukraine, in which the pre-orange (sultanistic oligarchy) period is given a far lower score than the post-orange (untamed ruling oligarchy) period. This trend is also true of Reporters Without Borders assessments, both before and after Mungiu-Pippidi's article, with the scores with regards to media freedom rapidly declining during both Kuchma's and Yanukovych's presidency and improving following the orange revolution and the maidan.<sup>4</sup> The results presented above contradict these assessments somewhat, however. At least in terms of the oligarchic media in Ukraine which, as outlined in the methodology, captures the lions' share of the viewing audience in the country through

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<sup>4</sup> Reporters Without Borders Media Freedom Index: <https://rsf.org/en/index>.

numerous outlets the inclusion of which would be beyond the scope of this study, it would not be accurate to say that the media is either more or less “free” in either form of oligarchy, only that the wealth defence priorities of the oligarch owners have changed significantly. Without a theory of oligarchy, a clientelistic relationship with the sultan is rather interpreted as government censorship, and the pluralism in media reporting that is clear in a post-sultanistic untamed ruling oligarchy is not linked to oligarchic competition for state capture. The fact that Yanukovych sought to set up his own newspapers and media channels in preparation for a 2015 presidential election (Leshchenko, 2014; p 54.) is a clear indication that he did not have control over the oligarchic channels in a way that constitutes censorship, hence the attempt to move away from the clientelist relationship with the oligarchs and concentrate power. If Štětka is correct in saying that “oligarchic model of media ownership has been spreading” in the CEE region, I would argue that the best way in which its continuous changes and developments will be understood as countries in the region develop and undergo regime changes, will be through the lens of wealth defence.

This is an aspect of oligarchic theory that Winters’ draws explicit attention to with regards to theories of democratization and transitions more generally, rather than media specifically, noting that “the taming of oligarchs is an extremely important political phenomenon that has nothing to do with democratization” (Winters, p. 38), with oligarchic “taming” referring to the removal or minimalization of their negative impact on society as a whole in their pursuit of wealth defence. I would argue that the results above support this assessment with regards to media in particular. It is clear in the way that the three oligarchs in this have instrumentalized their media outlets that strategies of wealth defence are adaptable, and that the trajectory democratization that has taken place in post-soviet Ukraine has not diminished the impact of oligarchic wealth defence on the media and political environments. Interestingly, it appears that the latest presidential administration in Ukraine seems to be one of the few examples in which this idea that the problem of “taming” oligarchs as its own distant political challenge is taken more seriously, with Volodymyr Zelensky’s bill on de-oligarchization aiming to create a register of oligarchs operating in the country in order to limit what these individuals can and cannot do with their material power. The bill defines oligarchs through a number of different conditions, one of which concerns ownership of media assets. Notably, Rinat Akhmetov has since decided to abandon his media assets in order to avoid this official classification as an oligarch in Ukraine (Minakov, 2022). Certainly, the case of Ukraine could provide further paths for research in terms of targeted attempts to reduce the power of the oligarchy.

## 6.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis has sought to understand the role that the instrumentalization of media outlets fulfils in the wealth defence strategies of oligarchs through the case of Ukraine in both 2012 and 2014, answering the question: What are the forms of media instrumentalization in the wealth defence practices of Ukrainian oligarchs in transition from a sultanistic to an untamed ruling oligarchy? Using Jeffrey Winters' theory of oligarchy and the key concept of wealth defence as a basis, two different forms of media instrumentalization were conceptualized, a clientelistic form in a sultanistic oligarchy, and a pluralistic form in an untamed ruling oligarchy. The different types of media instrumentalization reflect the different main route to wealth defence in the two different types of oligarchy, namely clientelism and oligarchic state capture. The coverage of the 2012 and 2014 Verkhovna Rada election campaigns were analyzed through qualitative content analysis and compared, affirming to a large degree the two forms of oligarchic media instrumentalization which were conceptualized. Conceptualizing oligarchic media outlets as tool of wealth defence is presented as an important way of understanding the different roles the media can fulfil within a changing political environment.

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SE002	Янукович рассказал регионалам об их главной миссии	30/07/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/janukovich-racckazal-rehionalam-ob-ikh-hlavnoj-miccii-376447.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/janukovich-racckazal-rehionalam-ob-ikh-hlavnoj-miccii-376447.html</a>
SE003	Янукович хвастается ростом экономики	17/10/2012	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/day_news/YAnukovich-hvastaetsya-rostom-ekonomiki-390615.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/day_news/YAnukovich-hvastaetsya-rostom-ekonomiki-390615.html</a>
SE004	Азаров надеется на 1,4 триллиона ВВП	19/10/2012	<a href="https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/Azarov-nadeetsya-na-14-trilliona-VVP-391044.html">https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/Azarov-nadeetsya-na-14-trilliona-VVP-391044.html</a>
SE005	Азаров заверил, что обвала гривны после выборов не будет	25/10/2012	<a href="https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/Azarov-zaveril-cto-obvala-grivny-posle-vyborov-ne-budet-392468.html">https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/Azarov-zaveril-cto-obvala-grivny-posle-vyborov-ne-budet-392468.html</a>
SE006	Янукович в Крыму посетил суперсовременный роддом и посоветовал чиновникам сотрудничать с бизнесменами	23/10/2012	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/krym/YAnukovich-v-Krymu-posetil-roddom-i-podaril-30-skoryh-391807.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/krym/YAnukovich-v-Krymu-posetil-roddom-i-podaril-30-skoryh-391807.html</a>
SE007	Азаров хочет расширить Голосеевский проспект в Киеве	25/10/2012	<a href="https://kiev.segodnya.ua/kiev/kpower/Azarov-hochet-rasshirit-Goloseevskiy-prospekt-v-Kieve-392307.html">https://kiev.segodnya.ua/kiev/kpower/Azarov-hochet-rasshirit-Goloseevskiy-prospekt-v-Kieve-392307.html</a>
SE008	Любой украинец с 45,000 гривен в кармане сможет купить квартиру	19/10/2012	<a href="https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/reality/Lyuboy-ukrainec-s-45-000-griven-v-karmane-smozhet-kupit-kvartiru-390871.html">https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/reality/Lyuboy-ukrainec-s-45-000-griven-v-karmane-smozhet-kupit-kvartiru-390871.html</a>
SE009	Повалий уверена, что только Партия регионов может вывести Украину на путь развития	30/07/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/povalij-uverena-cto-tolko-partija-rehionov-mozhet-vyvecti-ukrainu-na-put-razvitija-376477.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/povalij-uverena-cto-tolko-partija-rehionov-mozhet-vyvecti-ukrainu-na-put-razvitija-376477.html</a>
SE010	К приезду Януковича в Енакиево красят в розовый цвет дома и ремонтируют заборы	17/10/2012	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/K-priezdu-YAnukovicha-v-Enakievo-krasyat-v-rozovyy-cvet-doma-i-remontiruyut-zabory-390543.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/K-priezdu-YAnukovicha-v-Enakievo-krasyat-v-rozovyy-cvet-doma-i-remontiruyut-zabory-390543.html</a>
SE011	В Крыму к приезду Януковича закапывают цветы в горшках и развешивают флаги	23/10/2012	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/krym/V-Krymu-k-priezdu-YAnukovicha-zakapyvayut-cvety-v-gorshkah-i-razveshivayut-flagi-391714.html#gallery18027">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/krym/V-Krymu-k-priezdu-YAnukovicha-zakapyvayut-cvety-v-gorshkah-i-razveshivayut-flagi-391714.html#gallery18027</a>
SE012	Янукович хочет, чтобы Симоненко было уютно в семье	01/08/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/janukovich-khochet-ctoby-cimonenko-bylo-ujutno-v-ceme-376681.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/janukovich-khochet-ctoby-cimonenko-bylo-ujutno-v-ceme-376681.html</a>
SE013	Янукович не заметил никаких изменений в жизни после 60 лет	22/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/YAnukovich-ne-zametil-nikakih-izmeneniy-v-zhizni-posle-60-let-391499.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/YAnukovich-ne-zametil-nikakih-izmeneniy-v-zhizni-posle-60-let-391499.html</a>

SE014	В Донбассе к приезду Колесникова швабрами вымыли асфальт	23/10/2012	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/V-Donbasse-k-priezdu-Kolesnikova-shvabrami-vymyli-asfalt-391719.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/V-Donbasse-k-priezdu-Kolesnikova-shvabrami-vymyli-asfalt-391719.html</a>
SE015	Янукович в Крыму посетил суперсовременный роддом и посоветовал чиновникам сотрудничать с бизнесменами	23/10/2012	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/krym/YAnukovich-v-Krymu-posetil-roddom-i-podaril-30-skoryh-391807.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/krym/YAnukovich-v-Krymu-posetil-roddom-i-podaril-30-skoryh-391807.html</a>
SE016	Тимошенко сильно возмущалась по поводу плохих мест в партии для ее "коллег" по уголовному делу	01/08/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/bjut-12-01-08-2012-376712.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/bjut-12-01-08-2012-376712.html</a>
SE017	Нардепы от БЮТ считают, что Тимошенко их предала	30/07/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/bjut-376390.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/bjut-376390.html</a>
SE019	Первые итоги выборов-2012	19/10/2012	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/elections/elections2012/Vybory-2012-Pervye-itogi--390868.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/elections/elections2012/Vybory-2012-Pervye-itogi--390868.html</a>
SE020	Яценюк считает, что позиция Кличко ставит под вопрос формирование демократического большинства	19/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/YAcenyuk-schitaet-cto-poziciya-Klichko-stavit-pod-vopros-formirovanie-demokraticheskogo-bolshinstva-391128.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/YAcenyuk-schitaet-cto-poziciya-Klichko-stavit-pod-vopros-formirovanie-demokraticheskogo-bolshinstva-391128.html</a>
SE021	Тимошенко отказалась от лечения в больнице и требует вернуть ее в Качановку	19/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Timoshenko-otkazalas-ot-lecheniya-v-bolnice-i-trebuets-vernutee-v-Kachanovku-391042.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Timoshenko-otkazalas-ot-lecheniya-v-bolnice-i-trebuets-vernutee-v-Kachanovku-391042.html</a>
SE022	Тимошенко устроила бойкот в больнице	22/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Timoshenko-ustroila-boykot-v-bolnice-74-22-10-2012-391574.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Timoshenko-ustroila-boykot-v-bolnice-74-22-10-2012-391574.html</a>
SE023	Тимошенко устроила бойкот украинским медикам	30/08/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/timoshenko-uctroila-bojkot-ukrainkim-medikam-376414.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/timoshenko-uctroila-bojkot-ukrainkim-medikam-376414.html</a>
SE024	Немецкие медики попросили Тимошенко меньше лежать на кровати	15/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Nemeckie-mediki-poprosili-Timoshenko-menshe-lezhat-na-krovati-390053.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Nemeckie-mediki-poprosili-Timoshenko-menshe-lezhat-na-krovati-390053.html</a>
SE025	Тимошенко рано или поздно придется доказывать свою невиновность в суде – гособвинитель	15/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Timoshenko-rano-ili-pozdno-prividetsya-dokazyvat-svoynevinovnost-v-sude-gosobvinitel-389916.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Timoshenko-rano-ili-pozdno-prividetsya-dokazyvat-svoynevinovnost-v-sude-gosobvinitel-389916.html</a>
SE026	Тимошенко выдали мобильный телефон в больнице	15/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Timoshenko-vydali-mobilnyy-telefon-v-bolnice-389932.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Timoshenko-vydali-mobilnyy-telefon-v-bolnice-389932.html</a>
SE027	Украинцев не бьют визами за Тимошенко	24/10/2012	<a href="https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Ukrainceve-ne-byut-vizami-za-Timoshenko-391826.html">https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Ukrainceve-ne-byut-vizami-za-Timoshenko-391826.html</a>
SE028	В ПАСЕ не считают Тимошенко и Луценко политзаключенными	08/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/V-PASE-ne-schitayut-Timoshenko-i-Lucenko-politzaklyuchennymi-388488.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/V-PASE-ne-schitayut-Timoshenko-i-Lucenko-politzaklyuchennymi-388488.html</a>
SE029	В интернете женщина, похожая на Тимошенко, поднимает гири и ходит на шпильках	17/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/V-internete-zhenshchina-pohozhaya-na-Timoshenko-podnimaet-giri-i-hodit-na-shpilkah-390380.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/V-internete-zhenshchina-pohozhaya-na-Timoshenko-podnimaet-giri-i-hodit-na-shpilkah-390380.html</a>

SE030	Власенко признал, что на видео из больничной палаты есть Тимошенко	17/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Vlasenko-priznal-cto-na-video-iz-bolnichnoy-palaty-est-Timoshenko-390457.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Vlasenko-priznal-cto-na-video-iz-bolnichnoy-palaty-est-Timoshenko-390457.html</a>
SE031	Кличко определил задачи для "УДАРа" в новой Раде	24/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Klichko-opredelil-zadachi-dlya-UDARa-v-novoy-Rade-392166.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Klichko-opredelil-zadachi-dlya-UDARa-v-novoy-Rade-392166.html</a>
SE033	Кличко согласился сотрудничать с "регионалами"	01/08/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/klichko-cohlacilcja-cotrudnichat-c-rehionalami-376772.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/klichko-cohlacilcja-cotrudnichat-c-rehionalami-376772.html</a>
SE035	Янукович обещает не допустить в Украине "политических войн и противостояния"	30/07/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/janukovich-obeshchaet-ne-dopucitit-v-ukraine-politicheskikh-vojn-i-protivoctojanija-376463.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/janukovich-obeshchaet-ne-dopucitit-v-ukraine-politicheskikh-vojn-i-protivoctojanija-376463.html</a>
SE036	Азаров похвастался, какие хорошие условия для выборов создал его Кабмин	24/10/2012	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/elections/elections2012/Azarov-pohvastalsya-kakie-horoshie-usloviya-dlya-vyborov-sozdal-ego-Kabmin-391948.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/elections/elections2012/Azarov-pohvastalsya-kakie-horoshie-usloviya-dlya-vyborov-sozdal-ego-Kabmin-391948.html</a>
SE037	В ПР уверяют, что больше всех заинтересованы в честности выборов	22/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/V-PR-uveryayut-cto-bolshe-vseh-zainteresovany-v-chestnosti-vyborov--391595.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/V-PR-uveryayut-cto-bolshe-vseh-zainteresovany-v-chestnosti-vyborov--391595.html</a>
SE038	Азаров расстроился, что Тимошенко не принимает участия в выборах	26/10/2012	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/elections/elections2012/Azarov-rasstroilsya-cto-Timoshenko-ne-prinimaet-uchastiya-v-vyborah-392715.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/elections/elections2012/Azarov-rasstroilsya-cto-Timoshenko-ne-prinimaet-uchastiya-v-vyborah-392715.html</a>
SE039	Леонид Кожара: Заявления некоторых международных наблюдателей о том, что украинские выборы недемократические, – это нарушение международных правил	24/10/2012	<a href="https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Leonid-Kozhara-Zayavleniya-nekotoryh-mezhdunarodnyh-nablyudateley-o-tom-cto-ukrainskie-vybory-nedemokraticheskie-eto-narushenie-mezhdunarodnyh-pravil-392089.html">https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Leonid-Kozhara-Zayavleniya-nekotoryh-mezhdunarodnyh-nablyudateley-o-tom-cto-ukrainskie-vybory-nedemokraticheskie-eto-narushenie-mezhdunarodnyh-pravil-392089.html</a>
SE040	Украинцы готовы продать свой голос на выборах за 500 грн	31/07/2012	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/500-hrn-za-holoc-376451.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/500-hrn-za-holoc-376451.html</a>
SE041	Объединенная оппозиция скупает голоса	22/10/2012	<a href="https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Obedinenaya-oppoziciya-skupaet-golosa-391598.html">https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Obedinenaya-oppoziciya-skupaet-golosa-391598.html</a>
SE042	Владислав Забарский: Вся информация о нарушениях избирательного законодательства со стороны оппонентов Партии Регионов размещена на официальном сайте ПР	23/10/2012	<a href="https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Vladislav-Zabarskiy-Vsya-informaciya-o-narusheniyah-izbiratelnogo-zakonodatelstva--391820.html">https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Vladislav-Zabarskiy-Vsya-informaciya-o-narusheniyah-izbiratelnogo-zakonodatelstva--391820.html</a>
SE045	Янукович об украинских СМИ: Кто платит, тот и заказывает музыку	17/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/YAnukovich-ob-ukrainskih-SMI-Kto-platit-tot-i-zakazyvaet-muzyku-390495.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/YAnukovich-ob-ukrainskih-SMI-Kto-platit-tot-i-zakazyvaet-muzyku-390495.html</a>
SE046	В антирекламе от ПР Кличко увидел, что власть его боится	15/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/V-antireklame-ot-PR-Klichko-uvidel-cto-vlast-ego-boitsya-389854.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/V-antireklame-ot-PR-Klichko-uvidel-cto-vlast-ego-boitsya-389854.html</a>

SE047	Кличко жалуется на черный пиар против "УДАРа"	25/10/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Klichko-zhaluetsya-na-chernyy-piar-protiv-UDARa--392503.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/Klichko-zhaluetsya-na-chernyy-piar-protiv-UDARa--392503.html</a>
SE048	Бойко: "Оппозиционный блок" сделает все, чтобы судостроительная отрасль вернула утраченные позиции	14/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/boyko-oppozicionnyy-blok-sdelaet-vse-chtoby-sudostroitel'naya-otrasl-vernula-utrachennye-pozicii-560743.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/boyko-oppozicionnyy-blok-sdelaet-vse-chtoby-sudostroitel'naya-otrasl-vernula-utrachennye-pozicii-560743.html</a>
SE049	Бойко презентовал план восстановления Донбасса	20/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/boyko-prezentoval-plan-vozstanovleniya-donbassa-562223.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/boyko-prezentoval-plan-vozstanovleniya-donbassa-562223.html</a>
SE050	Юрий Бойко считает, что вместо рытья канав в Украине нужно запускать производство	21/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yuriy-boyko-schitaet-cto-vmesto-rytya-kanav-v-ukraine-nuzhno-zapuskat-proizvodstvo-562562.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yuriy-boyko-schitaet-cto-vmesto-rytya-kanav-v-ukraine-nuzhno-zapuskat-proizvodstvo-562562.html</a>
SE051	Юрий Бойко считает, что вместо рытья канав в Украине нужно запускать производство	21/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yuriy-boyko-schitaet-cto-vmesto-rytya-kanav-v-ukraine-nuzhno-zapuskat-proizvodstvo-562562.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yuriy-boyko-schitaet-cto-vmesto-rytya-kanav-v-ukraine-nuzhno-zapuskat-proizvodstvo-562562.html</a>
SE052	"Оппозиционный блок" требует заморозить повышение тарифов на коммуналку и цен на социальные продукты	13/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/oppozicionnyy-blok-trebuets-zamorozit-povyshenie-tarifov-na-kommunalku-i-cen-na-socialnye-produkty-560193.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/oppozicionnyy-blok-trebuets-zamorozit-povyshenie-tarifov-na-kommunalku-i-cen-na-socialnye-produkty-560193.html</a>
SE053	Бойко: Пенсионеры поставлены за грань выживания	15/10/2014	<a href="https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/boyko-pensionery-postavleny-za-gran-vyzhivaniya-560906.html">https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/boyko-pensionery-postavleny-za-gran-vyzhivaniya-560906.html</a>
SE054	В оппозиции возмущены, что Украина закупает товары для промышленности за границей	21/10/2014	<a href="https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/v-oppozicii-vozmushcheny-cto-ukraina-zakupaet-tovary-dlya-promyshlennosti-za-grancey-562569.html">https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/v-oppozicii-vozmushcheny-cto-ukraina-zakupaet-tovary-dlya-promyshlennosti-za-grancey-562569.html</a>
SE055	Вилкул: Радикалы блокируют работу предприятий, рискуя сотнями тысяч рабочих мест	22/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/vilkul-radikaly-blokiruyut-rabotu-predpriyatij-riskuya-sotnyami-tysyach-rabochih-mest-562804.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/vilkul-radikaly-blokiruyut-rabotu-predpriyatij-riskuya-sotnyami-tysyach-rabochih-mest-562804.html</a>
SE056	Расклады в новой Раде: почему может возникнуть бунт и у кого есть шансы стать спикером	13/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/rasklady-v-novoy-rade-pochemu-mozhet-vozniknut-bunt-i-u-kogo-est-shansy-stat-spikerom-560124.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/rasklady-v-novoy-rade-pochemu-mozhet-vozniknut-bunt-i-u-kogo-est-shansy-stat-spikerom-560124.html</a>
SE057	Бондаренко: "Оппозиционный блок" может выйти на второе место на выборах благодаря не охваченным социологией избирателям	23/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/bondarenko-oppozicionnyy-blok-mozhet-vyyti-na-vtoroe-mesto-na-vyborah-blagodarya-ne-ohvachennym-sociologiyey-izbiratelyam-563260.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/bondarenko-oppozicionnyy-blok-mozhet-vyyti-na-vtoroe-mesto-na-vyborah-blagodarya-ne-ohvachennym-sociologiyey-izbiratelyam-563260.html</a>
SE058	Яценюк проверит, как строится "Стена" на границе с Россией	15/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yacenyuk-proverit-kak-stroitsya-stena-na-grance-s-rossiy-560812.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yacenyuk-proverit-kak-stroitsya-stena-na-grance-s-rossiy-560812.html</a>
SE059	Украина будет десятки лет восстанавливаться после агрессии РФ – Яценюк	17/10/2014	<a href="https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/ukraina-budet-desyatki-let-vozstanavlivatsya-posle-agressii-rf-yacenyuk-561694.html">https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/ukraina-budet-desyatki-let-vozstanavlivatsya-posle-agressii-rf-yacenyuk-561694.html</a>

SE060	Яценюк: Ключевым элементом работы новой Рады будет реформа судебной системы	13/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yacenyuk-klyuchevym-elementom-raboty-novoy-rady-budet-reforma-sudebnoy-sistemy-560144.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yacenyuk-klyuchevym-elementom-raboty-novoy-rady-budet-reforma-sudebnoy-sistemy-560144.html</a>
SE061	Яценюк: Украина сократила потребление газа на 16%	16/10/2014	<a href="https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/yacenyuk-ukraina-sokratila-potreblenie-gaza-na-16-561238.html">https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/yacenyuk-ukraina-sokratila-potreblenie-gaza-na-16-561238.html</a>
SE062	Яценюк: Я лично звонил операторам рынка и просил снизить цены на бензин	22/10/2014	<a href="https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/yacenyuk-ya-zvonil-operatoram-rynka-i-prosil-snizit-ceny-562888.html">https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/yacenyuk-ya-zvonil-operatoram-rynka-i-prosil-snizit-ceny-562888.html</a>
SE063	Яценюк – о снижении цен на бензин: Я сел на телефон и звонил ключевым операторам рынка	23/10/2014	<a href="https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/yacenyuk-o-snizhenii-cen-na-benzin-ya-sel-na-telefon-i-zvonil-klyuchevym-operatoram-rynka-563001.html">https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/yacenyuk-o-snizhenii-cen-na-benzin-ya-sel-na-telefon-i-zvonil-klyuchevym-operatoram-rynka-563001.html</a>
SE064	Яценюку не терпится принять антикоррупционные законы	14/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yacenyuku-ne-terpitsya-prinyat-antikorrupcionnye-zakony--560457.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yacenyuku-ne-terpitsya-prinyat-antikorrupcionnye-zakony--560457.html</a>
SE065	Свои идеи по поводу судебной реформы озвучил сегодня премьер Арсений Яценюк	13/10/2014	<a href="https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/svoi-idei-po-povodu-sudebnoy-reformy-ozvuchil-segodnya-premer-arseniy-yacenyuk-560365.html">https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/svoi-idei-po-povodu-sudebnoy-reformy-ozvuchil-segodnya-premer-arseniy-yacenyuk-560365.html</a>
SE066	Интервью Яценюка: Украина не хочет жить под российской диктатурой	23/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/intervyu-yacenyuka-ya-sdelal-vse-chtoby-idti-s-prezidentom-562863.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/intervyu-yacenyuka-ya-sdelal-vse-chtoby-idti-s-prezidentom-562863.html</a>
SE067	Юрий Бойко: На Донбассе будет крымский сценарий, если власть перестанет платить зарплаты и пенсии	17/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yuriy-boyko-na-donbasse-budet-krymskiy-scenariy-esli-vlast-perestanet-platit-zarplaty-i-pensii-561583.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yuriy-boyko-na-donbasse-budet-krymskiy-scenariy-esli-vlast-perestanet-platit-zarplaty-i-pensii-561583.html</a>
SE068	Бойко: Украина не готова к зиме	16/10/2014	<a href="https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/boyko-ukraina-ne-gotova-k-zime-561263.html">https://economics.segodnya.ua/economics/ews/boyko-ukraina-ne-gotova-k-zime-561263.html</a>
SE069	Бойко считает, что в нынешних условиях Украина не перезимует	21/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/boyko-schitaet-cto-v-nyneshnih-usloviyah-ukraina-ne-perezimuet-562470.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/boyko-schitaet-cto-v-nyneshnih-usloviyah-ukraina-ne-perezimuet-562470.html</a>
SE070	Полторак: какой министр обороны нужен Украине – мнения экспертов	13/10/2014	<a href="https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/poltorak-kakoy-ministr-oborony-nuzhen-ukraine-mneniya-ekspertov-560233.html">https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/poltorak-kakoy-ministr-oborony-nuzhen-ukraine-mneniya-ekspertov-560233.html</a>
SE071	Исключение представителей "Оппозиционного блока" из избиркомов дискредитирует выборы – ОБ	20/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/elections/vybory_2014/isklyuchenie-predstaviteley-oppozitsionnogo-bloka-iz-izbirkomov-diskreditiruet-vybory-ob--562272.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/elections/vybory_2014/isklyuchenie-predstaviteley-oppozitsionnogo-bloka-iz-izbirkomov-diskreditiruet-vybory-ob--562272.html</a>
SE072	Бойко: Сегодня доходит до избиений и ареста активистов "Оппозиционного блока"	23/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/boyko-segodnya-dohodit-do-izbieni-y-i-aresta-aktivistov-oppozitsionnogo-bloka-562977.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/boyko-segodnya-dohodit-do-izbieni-y-i-aresta-aktivistov-oppozitsionnogo-bloka-562977.html</a>

SE073	Юрий Бойко: Сегодня идет открытая война власти с оппозицией	23/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yuriy-boyko-segodnya-idet-otkrytaya-voyna-vlasti-s-oppoziciei-562972.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/yuriy-boyko-segodnya-idet-otkrytaya-voyna-vlasti-s-oppoziciei-562972.html</a>
SE074	Шуфрич: Власть определяет кандидатов, которые должны выиграть	22/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/shufrich-vlast-opredelyaet-kandidatov-kotorye-dolzny-vyigrat-562745.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/shufrich-vlast-opredelyaet-kandidatov-kotorye-dolzny-vyigrat-562745.html</a>
SE075	В "Оппозиционном блоке" считают, что менять законы за 6 дней до выборов – это преступление	20/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/v-oppozicionnom-bloke-schitayut-cto-menyat-zakony-za-6-dney-do-vyborov-eto-prestuplenie-562230.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/v-oppozicionnom-bloke-schitayut-cto-menyat-zakony-za-6-dney-do-vyborov-eto-prestuplenie-562230.html</a>
SE076	За голоса избирателей дают до 500 гривен – КИУ	20/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/za-golosa-izbirateley-dayut-do-500-griven-kiu-562160.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/za-golosa-izbirateley-dayut-do-500-griven-kiu-562160.html</a>
SE077	Черный PR: в Харькове покупают голоса за гречку и ремонт	21/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/kharkov/chernyy-pr-v-harkove-pokupayut-golosa-za-grechku-i-remont-562337.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/kharkov/chernyy-pr-v-harkove-pokupayut-golosa-za-grechku-i-remont-562337.html</a>
SE078	Выборы в Одессе: в полуразрушенных зданиях, без шариковых ручек и с риском саботажа	21/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/odessa/vybory-v-odesse-v-polurazrushennyh-zdaniyah-bez-sharikovyh-ruchek-i-s-riskom-sabotazha-562398.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/odessa/vybory-v-odesse-v-polurazrushennyh-zdaniyah-bez-sharikovyh-ruchek-i-s-riskom-sabotazha-562398.html</a>
SE079	Эксперты: "Грязные выборы" могут привести к судам и аннулированию результатов	24/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/eksperty-gryaznye-vybory-mogut-privesti-k-sudam-i-annulirovaniyu-rezultatov-563187.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/eksperty-gryaznye-vybory-mogut-privesti-k-sudam-i-annulirovaniyu-rezultatov-563187.html</a>
SE080	На парламентских выборах 2014 не смогут проголосовать 45% избирателей Донецкой области	15/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/na-parlamentskih-vyborah-2014-ne-smogut-progolosovat-45-izbirateley-doneckoy-oblasti-560838.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/na-parlamentskih-vyborah-2014-ne-smogut-progolosovat-45-izbirateley-doneckoy-oblasti-560838.html</a>
SE081	Гуманитарные наборы в рамках проекта Рината Ахметова "Поможем детям" продолжают выдавать на этой неделе	21/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/gumanitarnye-nabory-v-ramkah-proekta-rinata-ahmetova-pomozhem-detyam-prodolzhat-vydavat-na-etoy-nedele-562422.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/gumanitarnye-nabory-v-ramkah-proekta-rinata-ahmetova-pomozhem-detyam-prodolzhat-vydavat-na-etoy-nedele-562422.html</a>
SE082	Штаб Рината Ахметова презентует в Киеве гуманитарную карту Донецкой и Луганской областей	20/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/fond-rinata-ahmetova-prezentuet-v-kieve-gumanitarnuyu-kartu-doneckoy-i-luganskoj-oblastey-562208.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/fond-rinata-ahmetova-prezentuet-v-kieve-gumanitarnuyu-kartu-doneckoy-i-luganskoj-oblastey-562208.html</a>
SE084	Гуманитарный штаб Рината Ахметова возобновил раздачу детских наборов на стадионе Донбасс Арена	22/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/gumanitarnyy-shtab-rinata-ahmetova-vozobnovil-razdachu-detskih-naborov-na-stadione-donbass-arena-562938.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/gumanitarnyy-shtab-rinata-ahmetova-vozobnovil-razdachu-detskih-naborov-na-stadione-donbass-arena-562938.html</a>
SE086	Более тысячи жителей Донбасса получили от Рината Ахметова месячную дозу инсулина	24/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/bolше-tysyachi-zhiteley-donbassa-poluchili-ot-rinata-ahmetova-mesyachnuyu-dozu-insulina-563400.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/bolше-tysyachi-zhiteley-donbassa-poluchili-ot-rinata-ahmetova-mesyachnuyu-dozu-insulina-563400.html</a>

SE087	Не только бизнес	20/10/2014	<a href="https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/kso-pobezhdaet-zlo-561485.html">https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/kso-pobezhdaet-zlo-561485.html</a>
SE088	Группа "Метинвест" несет потери из-за боевых действий на Донбассе	21/10/2014	<a href="https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/gruppa-metinvest-neset-poteri-iz-za-boevyh-deystviy-na-donbasse-562461.html">https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/gruppa-metinvest-neset-poteri-iz-za-boevyh-deystviy-na-donbasse-562461.html</a>
SE089	Энергетики Ахметова полностью восстановили электроснабжение Макеевки	13/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/energetiki-ahmetova-polnostyu-vozstanovili-elektrosnabzhenie-makeevki-560346.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/energetiki-ahmetova-polnostyu-vozstanovili-elektrosnabzhenie-makeevki-560346.html</a>
SE090	"Метинвест" не имеет отношения к организации визита представителей "ДНР" на Харцызский трубный завод – компания	23/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/metinvest-ne-imeet-otnosheniya-k-organizacii-vizita-predstaviteley-dnr-na-harcyzskiy-trubnyy-zavod-kompaniya-563182.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/metinvest-ne-imeet-otnosheniya-k-organizacii-vizita-predstaviteley-dnr-na-harcyzskiy-trubnyy-zavod-kompaniya-563182.html</a>
SE091	Коломойский-гейт: Кто ответит за выборы под дулами автоматов	22/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/kolomoyskiy-geyt-kto-otvetit-za-vybory-pod-dulami-avtomatov-562883.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/kolomoyskiy-geyt-kto-otvetit-za-vybory-pod-dulami-avtomatov-562883.html</a>
SE092	"Оппозиционный блок" требует уволить Коломойского и расследовать организацию фальсификации выборов	23/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/oppozitsionnyy-blok-trebuets-uvolit-kolomoyskogo-i-rassledovat-organizaciyu-falsifikacii-vyborov-563036.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/oppozitsionnyy-blok-trebuets-uvolit-kolomoyskogo-i-rassledovat-organizaciyu-falsifikacii-vyborov-563036.html</a>
SE093	Президент должен немедленно уволить олигарха Коломойского – Ляшко	23/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/prezident-dolzhen-nemedlenno-uvolit-oligarha-kolomoyskogo-lyashko-563104.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/prezident-dolzhen-nemedlenno-uvolit-oligarha-kolomoyskogo-lyashko-563104.html</a>
SE094	Бондаренко: Скандал вокруг записи разговора Коломойского развенчивает миф о том, что после Майдана страна двинулась по демократическому пути	23/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/dnepr/bondarenko-skandal-vokrug-zapisi-razgovora-kolomoyskogo-razvenchivaet-mif-o-tom-cto-posle-maydana-strana-dvinulas-po-demokraticeskomu-puti-562973.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/dnepr/bondarenko-skandal-vokrug-zapisi-razgovora-kolomoyskogo-razvenchivaet-mif-o-tom-cto-posle-maydana-strana-dvinulas-po-demokraticeskomu-puti-562973.html</a>
SE095	Солдаты АТО мерзнут на Донбассе и просят побыстрее прислать теплые куртки и носки	21/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/soldaty-ato-merznut-na-donbasse-i-prosyat-pobystrye-prislat-teplye-kurtki-i-noski-562437.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/soldaty-ato-merznut-na-donbasse-i-prosyat-pobystrye-prislat-teplye-kurtki-i-noski-562437.html</a>
SE096	За сутки в зоне АТО ранены 5 украинских бойцов	22/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/za-sutki-v-zone-ato-raneny-5-ukrainskih-boycov-562737.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/za-sutki-v-zone-ato-raneny-5-ukrainskih-boycov-562737.html</a>
SE097	Скандал в батальоне "Слобожанщина": бойцы жалуются на беспредел комбатов в зоне АТО, те – подают в суд за клевету	22/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/Skandal-vokrug-batalona-boycy-rasskazali-pro-bespredel-kombatov-v-zone-ATO-te-podayut-v-sud-za-klevetu-562613.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/Skandal-vokrug-batalona-boycy-rasskazali-pro-bespredel-kombatov-v-zone-ATO-te-podayut-v-sud-za-klevetu-562613.html</a>
SE098	В оккупированном террористами Енакиеве работают за еду и с ностальгией вспоминают Януковича	16/10/2014	<a href="https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/v-okkupirovannom-terroristami-enakievo-rabotayut-za-edu-i-s-nostalgiey-vspominayut-yanukovicha-561030.html">https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/v-okkupirovannom-terroristami-enakievo-rabotayut-za-edu-i-s-nostalgiey-vspominayut-yanukovicha-561030.html</a>
SE099	Бойцы АТО подают в суд на Раду	23/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/boycy-ato-podayut-v-sud-na-radu-563051.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/boycy-ato-podayut-v-sud-na-radu-563051.html</a>

SE100	Срочники Нацгвардии пришли к АП и требуют демобилизации, выплат и зимней формы	13/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/srochniki-nacgvardii-prishli-k-ap-i-trebuyut-vyplat-i-zimney-formy-560294.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/srochniki-nacgvardii-prishli-k-ap-i-trebuyut-vyplat-i-zimney-formy-560294.html</a>
SE101	Срочникам пообещали зарплату, премию и продолжение переговоров	14/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/srochnika-m-na-bankovoy-poobeshchali-zarplatu-premiyu-i-prodolzhenie-peregovorov-560397.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/srochnika-m-na-bankovoy-poobeshchali-zarplatu-premiyu-i-prodolzhenie-peregovorov-560397.html</a>
SE102	Герашенко: Срочники-нацгвардейцы должны получить надлежащие выплаты и ответить за свои действия	15/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/gerashchenko-schitaet-cto-srochniki-nacgvardeytsy-dolzheny-poluchit-nadlezhashchie-vyplaty-i-otvetit-za-svoi-deystviya-560754.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/gerashchenko-schitaet-cto-srochniki-nacgvardeytsy-dolzheny-poluchit-nadlezhashchie-vyplaty-i-otvetit-za-svoi-deystviya-560754.html</a>
SE103	Активисты "Свободы" идут от Майдана к Верховной Раде	14/10/2014	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/aktivisty-svobody-idut-ot-maydana-k-verhovnoy-rade-560436.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/aktivisty-svobody-idut-ot-maydana-k-verhovnoy-rade-560436.html</a>
SE104	Татьяна Бахтеева: Главная цель реформы здравоохранения – каждый человек должен своевременно получать медицинскую помощь	23/10/2012	<a href="https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Tatyana-Bahteeva-Glavnaya-cel-reformy-zdravooxraneniya-kazhdy-chelovek-dolzhen-svoevremenno-poluchat-medicheskuyu-pomoshch-391774.html">https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Tatyana-Bahteeva-Glavnaya-cel-reformy-zdravooxraneniya-kazhdy-chelovek-dolzhen-svoevremenno-poluchat-medicheskuyu-pomoshch-391774.html</a>
SE105	Владимир Макеенко: Мы как представители партии власти действительно заинтересованы в проведении честных и прозрачных выборов	24/10/2012	<a href="https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Vladimir-Makeenko-Regionalnye-izbiratelnye-shtaby-maksimalno-podgotovleny-dlya-provedeniya-izbiratelnoy-kampanii-392063.html">https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Vladimir-Makeenko-Regionalnye-izbiratelnye-shtaby-maksimalno-podgotovleny-dlya-provedeniya-izbiratelnoy-kampanii-392063.html</a>
SE106	Александр Ефремов: Избиратели поддерживают Партию Регионов потому, что видят реальные результаты нашей работы	25/10/2012	<a href="https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Aleksandr-Efremov-Izбиратели-podderzhivayut-Partiyu-Regionov-potomu-cto-vidyat-realnye-rezultaty-nashey-raboty--392318.html">https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Aleksandr-Efremov-Izбиратели-podderzhivayut-Partiyu-Regionov-potomu-cto-vidyat-realnye-rezultaty-nashey-raboty--392318.html</a>
SE107	Азаров: Только ПР способна завершить модернизацию страны "под ключ"	30/07/2012	<a href="https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/azarov-tolko-pr-cpocobna-zavershit-modernizatsiju-strany-pod-kljuch-376458.html">https://politics.segodnya.ua/politics/azarov-tolko-pr-cpocobna-zavershit-modernizatsiju-strany-pod-kljuch-376458.html</a>
UN001	Для ускорения роста экономики власть готовит новый пакет инвестиционных стимулов	31/07/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/economics/finance/679042-dlya-uskoreniya-rosta-ekonomiki-vlast-gotovit-novyy-paket-investitsionnyih-stimulov.html">https://www.unian.net/economics/finance/679042-dlya-uskoreniya-rosta-ekonomiki-vlast-gotovit-novyy-paket-investitsionnyih-stimulov.html</a>
UN002	Азаров говорит, что ПР модернизирует страну «под ключ»	30/07/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/678851-azarov-govorit-cto-pr-moderniziruet-stranu-pod-kljuch.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/678851-azarov-govorit-cto-pr-moderniziruet-stranu-pod-kljuch.html</a>
UN003	Янукович обещает решить экологические проблемы Луганской области	17/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/society/704833-yanukovich-obeschaet-reshit-ekologicheskie-problemyi-luganskoy-oblasti.html">https://www.unian.net/society/704833-yanukovich-obeschaet-reshit-ekologicheskie-problemyi-luganskoy-oblasti.html</a>

UN004	Азаров говорит, что у жителей Троещины появился «удобный выход» в центр Киева	24/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/707601-azarov-govorit-chto-u-jiteley-troeschinyi-poyavilsya-udobnyiy-vyihod-v-tsentr-kieva.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/707601-azarov-govorit-chto-u-jiteley-troeschinyi-poyavilsya-udobnyiy-vyihod-v-tsentr-kieva.html</a>
UN005	Янукович решил посчитать, сколько скорых нужно селу	31/07/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/economics/other/679170-yanukovich-reshil-poschitat-skolko-skoryih-nujno-selu.html">https://www.unian.net/economics/other/679170-yanukovich-reshil-poschitat-skolko-skoryih-nujno-selu.html</a>
UN006	Янукович отмечает актуальность создания университетских клиник	24/10/2012	<a href="https://health.unian.net/country/707597-yanukovich-otmechaet-aktualnost-sozdaniya-universitetskih-klinik.html?_gl=1*12naf00*_ga*MTU4MzQ2Nzg3NC4xNjU1OTgwNzIz*_ga_JLSK4Y8K67*MTY2MDkyMzU1OC4zMy4xLjE2NjA5MjYxMjcuNjAuMC4w*_ga_P6EEJX21DY*MTY2MDkyMzU1OS4zMy4xLjE2">https://health.unian.net/country/707597-yanukovich-otmechaet-aktualnost-sozdaniya-universitetskih-klinik.html?_gl=1*12naf00*_ga*MTU4MzQ2Nzg3NC4xNjU1OTgwNzIz*_ga_JLSK4Y8K67*MTY2MDkyMzU1OC4zMy4xLjE2NjA5MjYxMjcuNjAuMC4w*_ga_P6EEJX21DY*MTY2MDkyMzU1OS4zMy4xLjE2</a>
UN007	Первый этап реформирования медицины практически завершен, уверяет Азаров	19/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/economics/other/706133-pervyy-etap-reformirovaniya-meditsinyi-prakticheski-zavershen-uveryaet-azarov.html">https://www.unian.net/economics/other/706133-pervyy-etap-reformirovaniya-meditsinyi-prakticheski-zavershen-uveryaet-azarov.html</a>
UN008	Янукович сегодня посетит Харьковскую область	25/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/economics/energetics/707802-yanukovich-segodnya-posetit-harkovskuyu-oblast.html">https://www.unian.net/economics/energetics/707802-yanukovich-segodnya-posetit-harkovskuyu-oblast.html</a>
UN009	Янукович посетил Центр репродуктивной медицины в Одессе	25/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/health/regnews/707789-yanukovich-posetil-tsentr-reproduktivnoy-meditsinyi-v-odesse.html">https://www.unian.net/health/regnews/707789-yanukovich-posetil-tsentr-reproduktivnoy-meditsinyi-v-odesse.html</a>
UN010	Азаров в Одессе передал оборудование областной больнице	09/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/health/regnews/702135-azarov-v-odesse-peredal-oborudovanie-oblastnoy-bolnitse.html">https://www.unian.net/health/regnews/702135-azarov-v-odesse-peredal-oborudovanie-oblastnoy-bolnitse.html</a>
UN011	Луценко высказал претензии к спискам объединенной оппозиции	02/08/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/679911-lutsenko-vyiskazal-pretenzii-k-spiskam-obyedinennoy-oppozitsii.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/679911-lutsenko-vyiskazal-pretenzii-k-spiskam-obyedinennoy-oppozitsii.html</a>
UN012	Яценюк "посетовал", что у него в списке нет спортсменов, писателей, певцов	03/08/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/680374-yatsenyuk-posetoval-chto-u-nego-v-spiske-net-sportsmenov-pisateley-pevtsov.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/680374-yatsenyuk-posetoval-chto-u-nego-v-spiske-net-sportsmenov-pisateley-pevtsov.html</a>
UN013	Герасимьюк ушла к Кличко после того, как Яценюк лично вычеркнул ее из списка	01/08/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/679688-gerasimyuk-ushla-k-klichko-posle-togo-kak-yatsenyuk-lichno-vyicherknul-ee-iz-spiska.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/679688-gerasimyuk-ushla-k-klichko-posle-togo-kak-yatsenyuk-lichno-vyicherknul-ee-iz-spiska.html</a>
UN014	Батькивщина ответила УДАРу: проблемы не с арифметикой, а с этикой, и не у нас	16/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/704449-batkivschina-otvetila-udaru-problemyi-ne-s-arifmetikoy-a-s-etikoy-i-ne-u-nas.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/704449-batkivschina-otvetila-udaru-problemyi-ne-s-arifmetikoy-a-s-etikoy-i-ne-u-nas.html</a>
UN015	У Кличко об оппозиции: сели играть в шахматы, а посреди игры нам говорят, что это преферанс	16/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/704382-u-klichko-ob-oppozitsii-seli-igrat-v-shahmatyi-a-posredi-igryi-nam-govoryat-chto-eto-preferans.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/704382-u-klichko-ob-oppozitsii-seli-igrat-v-shahmatyi-a-posredi-igryi-nam-govoryat-chto-eto-preferans.html</a>

UN016	У Кличко заявляют, что арифметика «Батькивщины» сыграет на руку власти	15/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/704301-u-klichko-zayavlyayut-chno-arifmetika-batkivschinyi-syigraet-na-ruku-vlasti.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/704301-u-klichko-zayavlyayut-chno-arifmetika-batkivschinyi-syigraet-na-ruku-vlasti.html</a>
UN017	СМИ: Арбузову прочат премьерство, Тигипко - кресло спикера	26/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/708274-smi-arbuzovu-prochat-premerstvo-tigipko-kreslo-spikera.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/708274-smi-arbuzovu-prochat-premerstvo-tigipko-kreslo-spikera.html</a>
UN018	Защита Тимошенко говорит, что Азаров сам опроверг ее вину по долгам ЕЭСУ	22/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/706788-zaschita-timoshenko-govorit-chno-azarov-sam-oproverg-ee-vinu-po-dolgam-eesu.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/706788-zaschita-timoshenko-govorit-chno-azarov-sam-oproverg-ee-vinu-po-dolgam-eesu.html</a>
UN019	Зря только Юлю посадили	24/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/common/707326-zrya-tolko-yulyu-posadili.html">https://www.unian.net/common/707326-zrya-tolko-yulyu-posadili.html</a>
UN020	Тимошенко просится обратно в колонию (обновлено)	19/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/705995-timoshenko-prositsya-obratno-v-koloniyu-obnovleno.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/705995-timoshenko-prositsya-obratno-v-koloniyu-obnovleno.html</a>
UN021	Киевский губернатор обещает, что выборы будут образцовыми	30/07/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/678881-kiievskiy-gubernator-obeschaet-chno-vyiboryi-budut-obraztsovyimi.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/678881-kiievskiy-gubernator-obeschaet-chno-vyiboryi-budut-obraztsovyimi.html</a>
UN022	Янукович дал добро на видеонаблюдение на выборах	03/08/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/680597-yanukovich-dal-dobro-na-videonablyudenie-na-vyiborah.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/680597-yanukovich-dal-dobro-na-videonablyudenie-na-vyiborah.html</a>
UN023	Представитель Януковича в ВР: демократия - это дорогая вещь	17/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/704907-predstavitel-yanukovicha-v-vr-demokratiya-eto-dorogaya-vesch.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/704907-predstavitel-yanukovicha-v-vr-demokratiya-eto-dorogaya-vesch.html</a>
UN024	Янукович наставляет священников на путь истинный	17/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/704983-yanukovich-nastavlyayet-svyaschennikov-na-put-istinnyiy.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/704983-yanukovich-nastavlyayet-svyaschennikov-na-put-istinnyiy.html</a>
UN025	Наблюдатели: подкуп избирателей не влияет на результат	25/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/707757-nablyudateli-podkup-izbirateley-ne-vliyaet-na-rezultat.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/707757-nablyudateli-podkup-izbirateley-ne-vliyaet-na-rezultat.html</a>
UN026	Наблюдатели: за подставные избиркомы некого винить	19/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/705767-nablyudateli-za-podstavnyie-izbirkomyi-nekogo-vinit.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/705767-nablyudateli-za-podstavnyie-izbirkomyi-nekogo-vinit.html</a>
UN027	Азаров ждет пять тысяч наблюдателей на выборах	17/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/704950-azarov-jdet-pyat-tyisyach-nablyudateley-na-vyiborah.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/704950-azarov-jdet-pyat-tyisyach-nablyudateley-na-vyiborah.html</a>
UN028	В ПР говорят, что данные о голосовании будут получать по «своим каналам»	25/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/708016-v-pr-govoryat-chno-dannye-o-golosovanii-budut-poluchat-po-svoim-kanalam.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/708016-v-pr-govoryat-chno-dannye-o-golosovanii-budut-poluchat-po-svoim-kanalam.html</a>
UN029	Янукович - о СМИ: Как говорят, кто платит, тот и заказывает музыку	17/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/705042-yanukovich-o-smi-kak-govoryat-kto-platit-tot-i-zakazyivaet-muzyiku.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/705042-yanukovich-o-smi-kak-govoryat-kto-platit-tot-i-zakazyivaet-muzyiku.html</a>

UN030	Кличко: Количество «чернухи» против УДАР достигла критического уровня	23/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/707134-klichko-kolichestvo-chernuhi-protiv-udar-dostigla-kriticheskogo-urovnya.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/707134-klichko-kolichestvo-chernuhi-protiv-udar-dostigla-kriticheskogo-urovnya.html</a>
UN031	Кличко обещает, что в парламенте всем провокаторам припомнит эти выборы	24/10/2012	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/707306-klichko-obeschaet-cto-v-parlamente-vsem-provokatoram-pripomnit-eti-vyiboryi.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/707306-klichko-obeschaet-cto-v-parlamente-vsem-provokatoram-pripomnit-eti-vyiboryi.html</a>
UN032	Украина должна выработать стратегию, которая вернет ей статус великой космической державы - Порошенко	21/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/998860-ukraina-doljna-vyirabotat-strategiyu-kotoraya-vernet-ey-status-velikoy-kosmicheskoy-derjavyi-poroshenko.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/998860-ukraina-doljna-vyirabotat-strategiyu-kotoraya-vernet-ey-status-velikoy-kosmicheskoy-derjavyi-poroshenko.html</a>
UN033	Порошенко 14 октября поедет с визитом в Запорожскую область	13/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/995527-poroshenko-14-oktyabrya-poedet-s-vizitom-v-zaporojskuyu-oblast.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/995527-poroshenko-14-oktyabrya-poedet-s-vizitom-v-zaporojskuyu-oblast.html</a>
UN034	Порошенко обратился к украинцам по случаю праздника Покровы и Дня защитника Украины	14/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/army/995750-poroshenko-obratilsya-k-ukrainsam-posluchayu-prazdnika-pokrovyi-i-dnya-zaschitnika-ukrainyi.html">https://www.unian.net/army/995750-poroshenko-obratilsya-k-ukrainsam-posluchayu-prazdnika-pokrovyi-i-dnya-zaschitnika-ukrainyi.html</a>
UN035	В Днепропетровске Порошенко вместе со студентами спел гимн Украины	21/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/society/999024-v-dnepropetrovske-poroshenko-vmeste-so-studentami-spel-gimn-ukrainyi.html">https://www.unian.net/society/999024-v-dnepropetrovske-poroshenko-vmeste-so-studentami-spel-gimn-ukrainyi.html</a>
UN036	Вехи недели. Президентский контрудар, очищение с нюансами и ожидание антикоррупционного всплеска	13/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/995236-vehi-nedeli-prezidentskiy-kontrudar-ochislenie-s-nyuansami-i-ojidanie-antikorrupsionnogo-vspleska.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/995236-vehi-nedeli-prezidentskiy-kontrudar-ochislenie-s-nyuansami-i-ojidanie-antikorrupsionnogo-vspleska.html</a>
UN037	В АП обещают запустить электронную систему госзакупок до конца года	15/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/economics/finance/996298-v-ap-obeschayut-zapustit-elektronnyu-sistemu-goszakupok-do-kontsa-goda.html">https://www.unian.net/economics/finance/996298-v-ap-obeschayut-zapustit-elektronnyu-sistemu-goszakupok-do-kontsa-goda.html</a>
UN038	Эпохальный день: конец "офшорной эпохи" и антикоррупционное бюро, День защитника Украины и новый глава Минобороны	14/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/995819-epochalnyiy-den-konets-ofshornoy-epohi-i-antikorrupsionnoe-byuro-den-zaschitnika-ukrainyi-i-novyy-glava-minoboronyi.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/995819-epochalnyiy-den-konets-ofshornoy-epohi-i-antikorrupsionnoe-byuro-den-zaschitnika-ukrainyi-i-novyy-glava-minoboronyi.html</a>
UN039	Правительство утвердило план восстановления инфраструктуры Донбасса	16/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/economics/finance/996953-pravitelstvo-utverdilo-plan-vosstanovleniya-infrastrukturyi-donbassa.html">https://www.unian.net/economics/finance/996953-pravitelstvo-utverdilo-plan-vosstanovleniya-infrastrukturyi-donbassa.html</a>
UN040	Гройсман: децентрализация власти начнется 1 января 2015 года	13/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/995483-groysman-detsentralizatsiya-vlasti-nachnetsya-1-yanvary-2015-goda.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/995483-groysman-detsentralizatsiya-vlasti-nachnetsya-1-yanvary-2015-goda.html</a>
UN041	Реформа местного самоуправления является ключевой и не несет опасностей для Украины - Гройсман	23/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/999678-reforma-mestnogo-samoupravleniya-yavlyaetsya-klyuchevoy-i-ne-neset-opasnostey-dlya-ukrainyi-groysman.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/999678-reforma-mestnogo-samoupravleniya-yavlyaetsya-klyuchevoy-i-ne-neset-opasnostey-dlya-ukrainyi-groysman.html</a>

UN042	Вице-премьер Гройсман: Наша зависимость от российского газа будет все меньше, а вот санкции против РФ – будут действовать все сильнее и сильнее	17/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/997563-vitse-premer-groysman-nasha-zavisimost-ot-rossiyskogo-gaza-budet-vse-menshe-a-vot-sanktsii-protiv-rf-budut-deystvovat-vse-silnee-i-silnee.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/997563-vitse-premer-groysman-nasha-zavisimost-ot-rossiyskogo-gaza-budet-vse-menshe-a-vot-sanktsii-protiv-rf-budut-deystvovat-vse-silnee-i-silnee.html</a>
UN043	Яценюк констатировал окончание «офшорной эры» в Украине	14/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/995753-yatsenyuk-konstatiroval-okonchanie-ofshornoj-eryi-v-ukraine.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/995753-yatsenyuk-konstatiroval-okonchanie-ofshornoj-eryi-v-ukraine.html</a>
UN044	Яценюк рассчитывает на экономический рост в 2016 году	20/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/economics/finance/998015-yatsenyuk-rasschityivaet-na-ekonomicheskiy-rost-v-2016-godu.html">https://www.unian.net/economics/finance/998015-yatsenyuk-rasschityivaet-na-ekonomicheskiy-rost-v-2016-godu.html</a>
UN045	Для отмены виз с ЕС Украина должна отгородиться «стеной» от России - Яценюк	15/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/996331-dlya-otmenyi-viz-s-es-ukraina-doljna-otgoroditsya-stenoy-ot-rossii-yatsenyuk.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/996331-dlya-otmenyi-viz-s-es-ukraina-doljna-otgoroditsya-stenoy-ot-rossii-yatsenyuk.html</a>
UN046	Государство, которое не контролирует собственную границу, не может быть членом НАТО - Яценюк	15/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/996622-gosudarstvo-kotoroe-ne-kontroliruet-sobstvennyu-granitsu-ne-mojet-byit-chlenom-nato-yatsenyuk.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/996622-gosudarstvo-kotoroe-ne-kontroliruet-sobstvennyu-granitsu-ne-mojet-byit-chlenom-nato-yatsenyuk.html</a>
UN047	Яценюк поручил министрам активнее сотрудничать с Церквями в социальной сфере	17/10/2014	<a href="https://religions.unian.net/state/997233-yatsenyuk-poruchil-ministram-aktivnee-sotrudnichat-s-tserkvyami-v-sotsialnoy-sfere.html?_gl=1*1es1orp*_ga*OTE5MTM2ODkyLjE2NjlzODU0NjQ.*_ga_JLSK4Y8K67*MTY2MzA4MTMzMzMC4xMC4xLjE2NjMwODMxOTluMzAuMC4w*_ga_P6EEJX21DY*MTY2M">https://religions.unian.net/state/997233-yatsenyuk-poruchil-ministram-aktivnee-sotrudnichat-s-tserkvyami-v-sotsialnoy-sfere.html?_gl=1*1es1orp*_ga*OTE5MTM2ODkyLjE2NjlzODU0NjQ.*_ga_JLSK4Y8K67*MTY2MzA4MTMzMzMC4xMC4xLjE2NjMwODMxOTluMzAuMC4w*_ga_P6EEJX21DY*MTY2M</a>
UN048	Яценюк до конца недели посчитает зерно в украинских закромах	16/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/economics/agro/997010-yatsenyuk-do-kontsa-nedeli-poschitaet-zerno-v-ukrainskih-zakromah.html">https://www.unian.net/economics/agro/997010-yatsenyuk-do-kontsa-nedeli-poschitaet-zerno-v-ukrainskih-zakromah.html</a>
UN049	Яценюк: Обещание отменить пенсионную реформу - популизм и ложь	24/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/1000608-yatsenyuk-obeschanie-otmenit-pensionnyu-reformu-populizm-i-loj.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/1000608-yatsenyuk-obeschanie-otmenit-pensionnyu-reformu-populizm-i-loj.html</a>
UN050	Журналисты нашли под Киевом дворец владельца «вышек Бойко» (фото + видео)	20/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/998213-jurnalistyi-nashli-pod-kievom-dvorets-vladeltsa-vyishek-boyko-foto-video.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/998213-jurnalistyi-nashli-pod-kievom-dvorets-vladeltsa-vyishek-boyko-foto-video.html</a>
UN051	СМИ: Кампаниями Ляшко и "Оппозиционного блока" руководит один и тот же человек	23/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/999882-smi-kampaniyami-lyashko-i-oppozitsionnogo-bloka-rukovodit-odin-i-tot-je-chelovek.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/999882-smi-kampaniyami-lyashko-i-oppozitsionnogo-bloka-rukovodit-odin-i-tot-je-chelovek.html</a>
UN052	"Интер" составляет конкуренцию информмашине Кремля в искусстве пропаганды - Сюмар	23/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/999962-inter-sostavlyaet-konkurenciyu-informmaschine-kremlya-v-iskusstve-propagandyi-syumar.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/999962-inter-sostavlyaet-konkurenciyu-informmaschine-kremlya-v-iskusstve-propagandyi-syumar.html</a>

UN053	В «Батькивщине» отмечают необходимость не допустить в парламент «регионалов» и коммунистов	15/10/2014	<a href="https://press.unian.net/press/996439-v-batkivschine-otmechayut-neobhodimost-nedopustit-v-parlament-regionalov-i-kommunistov.html? gl=1*bezopb* ga*OTE5MTM2ODkyLjE2NjIzODU0NjQ.* ga JLSK4Y8K67*MTY2Mjk5MTc5OC43LjEuMTY2Mjk5MjEyNS42MC4wLjA.* ga P6EEJX21DY*MTY2M">https://press.unian.net/press/996439-v-batkivschine-otmechayut-neobhodimost-nedopustit-v-parlament-regionalov-i-kommunistov.html? gl=1*bezopb* ga*OTE5MTM2ODkyLjE2NjIzODU0NjQ.* ga JLSK4Y8K67*MTY2Mjk5MTc5OC43LjEuMTY2Mjk5MjEyNS42MC4wLjA.* ga P6EEJX21DY*MTY2M</a>
UN054	В Запорожье экс-регионалу устроили мусорную "люстрацию"	15/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/996244-v-zaporoze-eks-regionalu-ustroili-musornuyu-lyustratsiyu.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/996244-v-zaporoze-eks-regionalu-ustroili-musornuyu-lyustratsiyu.html</a>
UN055	Гуманитарные наборы в рамках проекта Рината Ахметова «Поможем детям» продолжат выдавать на этой неделе	21/10/2014	<a href="https://health.unian.net/country/998604-gumanitarnyye-naboryi-v-ramkah-proekta-rinata-ahmetova-pomojem-detyam-prodoljat-vydavat-na-etoy-nedele.html? gl=1*1I2zwb* ga*OTE5MTM2ODkyLjE2NjIzODU0NjQ.* ga JLSK4Y8K67*MTY2MzI0OTI4NS4xNi4xLjE2NjMyNDk2MTEuNDcuMC4w*">https://health.unian.net/country/998604-gumanitarnyye-naboryi-v-ramkah-proekta-rinata-ahmetova-pomojem-detyam-prodoljat-vydavat-na-etoy-nedele.html? gl=1*1I2zwb* ga*OTE5MTM2ODkyLjE2NjIzODU0NjQ.* ga JLSK4Y8K67*MTY2MzI0OTI4NS4xNi4xLjE2NjMyNDk2MTEuNDcuMC4w*</a>
UN056	Гуманитарный штаб Ахметова обеспечил месячную дозу инсулина для дончан с диабетом	24/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/health/regnews/1000405-gumanitarnyy-shtab-ahmetova-obespechil-mesyachnuyu-dozu-insulina-dlya-donchan-s-diabetom.html">https://www.unian.net/health/regnews/1000405-gumanitarnyy-shtab-ahmetova-obespechil-mesyachnuyu-dozu-insulina-dlya-donchan-s-diabetom.html</a>
UN057	Председатель Днепропетровской ОГА договорились с ООН о предоставлении \$2 млн помощи для переселенцев	24/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/society/1000551-predsedatel-dnepropetrovskoy-oga-dogovorilis-s-oon-o-predostavlenii-2-mln-pomoschi-dlya-pereselentsev.html">https://www.unian.net/society/1000551-predsedatel-dnepropetrovskoy-oga-dogovorilis-s-oon-o-predostavlenii-2-mln-pomoschi-dlya-pereselentsev.html</a>
UN058	В Украину поступит новая разведывательная техника - Порошенко	14/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/995711-v-ukrainu-postupit-novaya-razvedyivatelnaya-tehnika-poroshenko.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/995711-v-ukrainu-postupit-novaya-razvedyivatelnaya-tehnika-poroshenko.html</a>
UN059	Порошенко заявляет, что Украина будет модернизировать отечественный военный флот	23/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/999982-poroshenko-zayavlyayet-chno-ukraina-budet-modernizirovat-otechestvennyiy-voennyiy-flot.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/999982-poroshenko-zayavlyayet-chno-ukraina-budet-modernizirovat-otechestvennyiy-voennyiy-flot.html</a>
UN060	Порошенко наградил орденами и медалями группу военнослужащих	22/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/army/999149-poroshenko-nagradil-ordenami-i-medalyami-gruppu-voennoslujaschih.html">https://www.unian.net/army/999149-poroshenko-nagradil-ordenami-i-medalyami-gruppu-voennoslujaschih.html</a>
UN061	Из плена освободили бойца «Айдара» и более десяти военных Нацгвардии – Порошенко	13/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/995395-iz-plena-osvobodili-boytza-aydara-i-bolee-desyati-voennyih-natsgvardii-poroshenko.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/995395-iz-plena-osvobodili-boytza-aydara-i-bolee-desyati-voennyih-natsgvardii-poroshenko.html</a>
UN062	Протесты Нацгвардии предотвращены в десяти украинских городах - советник Авакова	16/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/996641-protesty-natsgvardii-predotvraschenyi-v-desyati-ukrainskih-gorodah-sovetnik-avakova.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/996641-protesty-natsgvardii-predotvraschenyi-v-desyati-ukrainskih-gorodah-sovetnik-avakova.html</a>
UN063	Военные под Администрацией Президента отклонили предложение обмудсмена	13/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/995567-voennyye-pod-administratsiey-prezidenta-otklonili-predlojenie-obmudsmena.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/995567-voennyye-pod-administratsiey-prezidenta-otklonili-predlojenie-obmudsmena.html</a>

UN064	В столкновениях под Верховной Радой принимали участие боевики Корчинского и Ляшко - МВД	17/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/997127-v-stolknoveniyah-pod-verhovnoy-radoy-prinimali-uchastie-boeviki-korchinskogo-i-lyashko-mvd.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/997127-v-stolknoveniyah-pod-verhovnoy-radoy-prinimali-uchastie-boeviki-korchinskogo-i-lyashko-mvd.html</a>
UN065	"Свобода" и "Правый сектор" отрицают свое участие в столкновениях под Радой	14/10/2014	<a href="https://www.unian.net/politics/995803-svoboda-i-pravyyiy-sektor-otritsayut-svoe-uchastie-v-stolknoveniyah-pod-radoy.html">https://www.unian.net/politics/995803-svoboda-i-pravyyiy-sektor-otritsayut-svoe-uchastie-v-stolknoveniyah-pod-radoy.html</a>
UN066	Гуманитарный штаб Ахметова представил гуманитарную карту потребностей в Донецкой и Луганской областях	21/10/2014	<a href="https://health.unian.net/country/998690-gumanitarnyyiy-shtab-ahmetova-predstavil-gumanitarnuyu-kartu-potrebnostey-v-donetskoy-i-luganskoy-oblastyah.html?_gl=1*tcnrq*_ga*OTE5MTM2ODkyLjE2NjIzODU0NjQ.*_ga_JLSK4Y8K67*MTY2MzI0OTI4NS4xNi4xLjE2NjMyNDk2MjQuMzQuMC4w">https://health.unian.net/country/998690-gumanitarnyyiy-shtab-ahmetova-predstavil-gumanitarnuyu-kartu-potrebnostey-v-donetskoy-i-luganskoy-oblastyah.html?_gl=1*tcnrq*_ga*OTE5MTM2ODkyLjE2NjIzODU0NjQ.*_ga_JLSK4Y8K67*MTY2MzI0OTI4NS4xNi4xLjE2NjMyNDk2MjQuMzQuMC4w</a>
FA001	Азаров не наладится своему отпуску: можно говорить все, что угодно	16/10/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/154199-azarov-ne-naraduetsya-svoim-otpuskom-mozhno-govorit-vse-chto-ugodno">https://fakty.ua/154199-azarov-ne-naraduetsya-svoim-otpuskom-mozhno-govorit-vse-chto-ugodno</a>
FA002	Президент поздравил Бориса Колесникова с юбилеем	25/10/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/154587-prezident-pozdravil-borisa-kolesnikova-s-yubileem">https://fakty.ua/ru/154587-prezident-pozdravil-borisa-kolesnikova-s-yubileem</a>
FA003	Николай Азаров: «Любовь к спорту должна стать частью национального образа жизни»	01/08/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/151388-nikolaj-azarov-lyubov-k-sportu-dolzha-stat-chastyu-natsionalnogo-obraza-zhizni">https://fakty.ua/ru/151388-nikolaj-azarov-lyubov-k-sportu-dolzha-stat-chastyu-natsionalnogo-obraza-zhizni</a>
FA004	Депутаты от оппозиции не довольны избирательным списком. В партии зреет бунт	31/07/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/151273-deputaty-ot-oppozicii-ne-dovolny-izbiratelnyim-spiskom-v-partii-zreet-bunt">https://fakty.ua/ru/151273-deputaty-ot-oppozicii-ne-dovolny-izbiratelnyim-spiskom-v-partii-zreet-bunt</a>
FA005	Разборки союзников: «Батькивщина» и «УДАР» вступили в словесную войну	16/10/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/154170-razborki-soyuznikov-batkivshina-i-udar-vstupili-v-slovesnuyu-voynu">https://fakty.ua/154170-razborki-soyuznikov-batkivshina-i-udar-vstupili-v-slovesnuyu-voynu</a>
FA006	Литвин благословил своих соратников на переход в Партию регионов	31/07/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/151293-litvin-blagoslovil-svoih-soratnikov-na-perehod-v-partiyu-regionov">https://fakty.ua/ru/151293-litvin-blagoslovil-svoih-soratnikov-na-perehod-v-partiyu-regionov</a>
FA007	Тимошенко готова драться с тюремщиками, лишь бы не ехать в суд	30/07/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/151228-timoshenko-gotova-dratsya-s-tyuremcshikami-lish-by-ne-ehat-v-sud">https://fakty.ua/ru/151228-timoshenko-gotova-dratsya-s-tyuremcshikami-lish-by-ne-ehat-v-sud</a>
FA008	Александр Квасневский: «Для подписания соглашения с Евросоюзом нужны совместные усилия и украинского правительства, и оппозиции»	25/10/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/154605-aleksandr-kvasnevskij-dlya-podpisaniya-soglasheniya-s-evrosoyuzom-nuzhny-sovmestnye-usiliya-i-ukrainskogo-pravitelstva-i-oppozicii">https://fakty.ua/ru/154605-aleksandr-kvasnevskij-dlya-podpisaniya-soglasheniya-s-evrosoyuzom-nuzhny-sovmestnye-usiliya-i-ukrainskogo-pravitelstva-i-oppozicii</a>
FA009	Тимошенко еще долго будет прикована к больничной койке	15/10/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/154129-timoshenko-ecshe-dolgo-budet-prikovana-k-bolnichnoj-kojke">https://fakty.ua/ru/154129-timoshenko-ecshe-dolgo-budet-prikovana-k-bolnichnoj-kojke</a>
FA010	Тимошенко назвала Януковича «извращенцем»	19/10/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/154364-timoshenko-nazvala-yanukovicha-izvrashchencem">https://fakty.ua/154364-timoshenko-nazvala-yanukovicha-izvrashchencem</a>

FA011	Кличко на выборах окружил себя женщинами	01/09/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/151369-klichko-na-vyborah-okruzhil-sebya-zhencshinami">https://fakty.ua/ru/151369-klichko-na-vyborah-okruzhil-sebya-zhencshinami</a>
FA012	Кличко не боится политической конкуренции с Шевченко	30/07/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/151254-klichko-ne-boitsya-politicheskoy-konkurencii-s-shevchenko">https://fakty.ua/ru/151254-klichko-ne-boitsya-politicheskoy-konkurencii-s-shevchenko</a>
FA013	Дмитрий Павлычко: «Виктор Андреевич, подумайте, дайте народу отдохнуть от ваших призывов, потому что вы не знаете, куда идти»	31/07/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/151331-dmitrij-pavlychko-viktor-andreevich-podumajte-dajte-narodu-otдохнуть-ot-vashih-prizyvov-potomu-что-вы-не-знаете-куда-идти">https://fakty.ua/ru/151331-dmitrij-pavlychko-viktor-andreevich-podumajte-dajte-narodu-otдохнуть-ot-vashih-prizyvov-potomu-что-вы-не-знаете-куда-идти</a>
FA014	Сергей Тигипко: «Люди сегодня видят позитивные тенденции в социальной сфере. И поэтому их доверие к нам растет»	23/10/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/154433-sergej-tigipko-lyudi-segodnya-vidyat-pozitivnye-tendencii-v-socialnoj-sfere-i-poetomu-ih-doverie-k-nam-rastet">https://fakty.ua/ru/154433-sergej-tigipko-lyudi-segodnya-vidyat-pozitivnye-tendencii-v-socialnoj-sfere-i-poetomu-ih-doverie-k-nam-rastet</a>
FA015	Александр Ефремов: «Президент, правительство и наша партия делают все для проведения честных и прозрачных выборов»	26/10/2012	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/154604-aleksandr-efremov-prezident-pravitelstvo-i-nasha-partiya-delayut-vse-dlya-provedeniya-chestnyh-i-prozrachnyh-vyborov">https://fakty.ua/ru/154604-aleksandr-efremov-prezident-pravitelstvo-i-nasha-partiya-delayut-vse-dlya-provedeniya-chestnyh-i-prozrachnyh-vyborov</a>
FA017	В Запорожье толпа "люстрировала" экс-"регионала" в мусорном баке (видео, дополнено)	15/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189465-v-zaporozhe-tolpa-lyustrirovala-eks--regionala-v-musornom-bake-video">https://fakty.ua/ru/189465-v-zaporozhe-tolpa-lyustrirovala-eks--regionala-v-musornom-bake-video</a>
FA018	«Пока не остановлена война, в Украине нельзя построить сильную экономику»	17/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189577-poka-ne-ostanovlena-vojna-v-ukraine-nelzya-postroit-silnyu-ekonomiku">https://fakty.ua/ru/189577-poka-ne-ostanovlena-vojna-v-ukraine-nelzya-postroit-silnyu-ekonomiku</a>
FA019	Ольга Богомолец: «Кто-то должен «вылечить» нашу политическую систему.	17/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189573-olga-bogomolec-кто-то-должен-vylechit-nashu-politicheskuyu-sistemu-no-esli-rada-vyvody-ne-sdelat-i-rabotat-ne-nachnet-to-lechit-ee-uzhe-budet-narod-i-bez-anestezii">https://fakty.ua/ru/189573-olga-bogomolec-кто-то-должен-vylechit-nashu-politicheskuyu-sistemu-no-esli-rada-vyvody-ne-sdelat-i-rabotat-ne-nachnet-to-lechit-ee-uzhe-budet-narod-i-bez-anestezii</a>
FA020	Сергей Тигипко: «Власть, допускающая правовой нигилизм, не добавляет силы стране»	17/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189576-sergej-tigipko-vlast-dopuskayuschaya-pravovoj-nigilizm-ne-dobavlyaet-sily-strane">https://fakty.ua/ru/189576-sergej-tigipko-vlast-dopuskayuschaya-pravovoj-nigilizm-ne-dobavlyaet-sily-strane</a>
FA021	Олег Тягнибок: «Украинцы должны мобилизоваться, чтобы в следующем парламенте была сила, которая наконец-то закончит позорную традицию политических компромиссов с Москвой»	17/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189542-oleg-tyagnibok-ukraincy-dolzheny-mobilizovatsya-чтобы-в-следующем-парламенте-была-сила-которая-наконец-то-закончит-позорную-традицию-политических-компромиссов-с-москвой">https://fakty.ua/ru/189542-oleg-tyagnibok-ukraincy-dolzheny-mobilizovatsya-чтобы-в-следующем-парламенте-была-сила-которая-наконец-то-закончит-позорную-традицию-политических-компромиссов-с-москвой</a>
FA022	Сергей Старун: "Да, я оказываю помощь бойцам АТО, но за свои деньги и это не имеет никакого отношения к выборам"	17/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189536-sergej-starun-da-ya-okazyvayu-pomocsh-bojcam-ato-no-za-svoi-dengi-i-eto-ne-imeet-nikakogo-otnosheniya-k-vyboram">https://fakty.ua/ru/189536-sergej-starun-da-ya-okazyvayu-pomocsh-bojcam-ato-no-za-svoi-dengi-i-eto-ne-imeet-nikakogo-otnosheniya-k-vyboram</a>

FA023	Вадим Столар: «От громких политических лозунгов в квартире теплее не станет»	17/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189556-vadim-stolar-ot-gromkih-politicheskikh-lozungov-v-kvartire-teplee-ne-stanet">https://fakty.ua/ru/189556-vadim-stolar-ot-gromkih-politicheskikh-lozungov-v-kvartire-teplee-ne-stanet</a>
FA024	Сергей Тигипко: "Признавать свои ошибки — правильно, но двойных стандартов и политических репрессий быть не должно"	23/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189874-sergej-tigipko-priznavat-svoi-oshibki-pravilno-no-dvojnyh-standartov-i-politicheskikh-repressij-byt-ne-dolzno">https://fakty.ua/ru/189874-sergej-tigipko-priznavat-svoi-oshibki-pravilno-no-dvojnyh-standartov-i-politicheskikh-repressij-byt-ne-dolzno</a>
FA025	Светлана Фабрикант: «Правительство должно отчитаться о том, куда тратятся деньги, взятые займы»	24/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189941-svetlana-fabrikant-pravitelstvo-dolzno-otchitatsya-o-tom-kuda-tratyatsya-dengi-vzyatye-vzajmy">https://fakty.ua/ru/189941-svetlana-fabrikant-pravitelstvo-dolzno-otchitatsya-o-tom-kuda-tratyatsya-dengi-vzyatye-vzajmy</a>
FA026	Валерий Хорошковский: «Если у нас есть собственный газ, то мы можем использовать его для компенсации стоимости коммунальных услуг»	24/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189947-valerij-horoshkovskij-esli-u-nas-est-sobstvennyj-gaz-to-my-mozhem-ispolzovat-ego-dlya-kompensacii-stoimosti-kommunalnyh-uslug">https://fakty.ua/ru/189947-valerij-horoshkovskij-esli-u-nas-est-sobstvennyj-gaz-to-my-mozhem-ispolzovat-ego-dlya-kompensacii-stoimosti-kommunalnyh-uslug</a>
FA027	Владимир Гройсман: «Главная задача, которая должна не только найти понимание, но и войти в привычку у населения: ресурсы нужно экономить»	24/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189950-vladimir-grojsman-glavnaya-zadacha-kotoraya-dolzna-ne-tolko-najti-ponimanie-no-i-voiti-v-privychku-u-naseleniya-resursy-nuzhno-ekonomit">https://fakty.ua/ru/189950-vladimir-grojsman-glavnaya-zadacha-kotoraya-dolzna-ne-tolko-najti-ponimanie-no-i-voiti-v-privychku-u-naseleniya-resursy-nuzhno-ekonomit</a>
FA028	Виталий Кличко: «Демократам как никогда нужно объединяться»	22/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189794-vitalij-klichko-demokratam-kak-nikogda-nuzhno-obedinyatsya">https://fakty.ua/ru/189794-vitalij-klichko-demokratam-kak-nikogda-nuzhno-obedinyatsya</a>
FA029	Вячеслав Константиновский: «Свой выбор нужно защищать. Иначе обязательно найдется тот, кто попытается украсть или купить поддержку народа»	24/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189930-vyacheslav-konstantinovskij-svoj-vybor-nuzhno-zacshicshat-inache-obyazatelno-najdetsya-tot-kto-poprobuet-ukrast-ili-kupit-podderzhku-naroda">https://fakty.ua/ru/189930-vyacheslav-konstantinovskij-svoj-vybor-nuzhno-zacshicshat-inache-obyazatelno-najdetsya-tot-kto-poprobuet-ukrast-ili-kupit-podderzhku-naroda</a>
FA030	Петр и Мария Яценюки: "В детстве мы были слишком требовательны к сыну. Теперь видим результат"	24/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189952-v-detstve-my-byli-slishkom-trebovatelny-k-synu-teper-vidim-rezultat">https://fakty.ua/ru/189952-v-detstve-my-byli-slishkom-trebovatelny-k-synu-teper-vidim-rezultat</a>
FA031	Порошенко предложил Раде назначить главой Минобороны Степана Полторака	13/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189349-poroshenko-predlozhit-rade-naznachit-glavoj-minoborony-stepana-poltoraka">https://fakty.ua/ru/189349-poroshenko-predlozhit-rade-naznachit-glavoj-minoborony-stepana-poltoraka</a>
FA032	Порошенко продемонстрировал, как нужно общаться с российскими журналистами (фото, видео)	17/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189594-poroshenko-prodemonstiroval-kak-nuzhno-obcshatsya-s-rossijskimi-zhurnalistami-foto-video">https://fakty.ua/ru/189594-poroshenko-prodemonstiroval-kak-nuzhno-obcshatsya-s-rossijskimi-zhurnalistami-foto-video</a>
FA033	PinchukArtCentre объявил второй набор студентов на бесплатную стажировку в музее	17/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189626-pinchukartcentre-obyavil-vtoroj-nabor-studentov-na-besplatnuyu-stazhirovku-v-muzee">https://fakty.ua/ru/189626-pinchukartcentre-obyavil-vtoroj-nabor-studentov-na-besplatnuyu-stazhirovku-v-muzee</a>
FA034	Бунт нацгвардейцев мог приобрести угрожающие масштабы — МВД (видео)	16/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189514-bunt-nacgvardejcev-mog-priobresti-ugrozhayucshie-masshtaby---mvd-video">https://fakty.ua/ru/189514-bunt-nacgvardejcev-mog-priobresti-ugrozhayucshie-masshtaby---mvd-video</a>

FA035	Командир «Азова» о протесте под Администрацией президента: это отвратительный фарс	13/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189376-komandir-azova-o-proteste-pod-administraciej-prezidenta-eto-otvratitelnyj-fars">https://fakty.ua/ru/189376-komandir-azova-o-proteste-pod-administraciej-prezidenta-eto-otvratitelnyj-fars</a>
FA036	Петр Порошенко: "Мне было жаль смотреть на марш взрослых мужчин, которые повелись на провокацию заграничных спецслужб"	15/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189445-petr-poroshenko-mne-bylo-zhal-smotret-na-marsh-vzroslyh-muzhchin-kotorye-povelis-na-provokaciyu-zagranichnyh-specsluzhb">https://fakty.ua/ru/189445-petr-poroshenko-mne-bylo-zhal-smotret-na-marsh-vzroslyh-muzhchin-kotorye-povelis-na-provokaciyu-zagranichnyh-specsluzhb</a>
FA037	«Если не остановить олигархов, украинцев может ожидать совершенно необоснованный рост тарифов»	24/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189927-esli-ne-ostanovit-oligarhov-ukraincev-mozhet-ozhidat-sovershenno-neobosnovannyj-rost-tarifov">https://fakty.ua/ru/189927-esli-ne-ostanovit-oligarhov-ukraincev-mozhet-ozhidat-sovershenno-neobosnovannyj-rost-tarifov</a>
FA038	Олег Тягнибок: «Ассоциация с ЕС не поможет украинской экономике, если ей по-прежнему будут заправлять олигархи»	23/10/2014	<a href="https://fakty.ua/ru/189846-oleg-tyagnibok-associaciya-s-es-ne-pomozhet-ukrainskoj-ekonomike-esli-ej-po-prezhnemu-budut-zpravlyat-oligarhi">https://fakty.ua/ru/189846-oleg-tyagnibok-associaciya-s-es-ne-pomozhet-ukrainskoj-ekonomike-esli-ej-po-prezhnemu-budut-zpravlyat-oligarhi</a>

## Appendices

### Appendix 1. Links to archives for articles published in *segodnya*, *unian*, and *fakti i komentarii*

- Segodnya archive: <https://www.segodnya.ua/newsitemap.html>
- Unian archive: <https://www.unian.net/news/archive>
- Fakti i komentarii archive: <https://fakty.ua/ru/archive>

### Appendix 2. Breakdown of articles analyzed for the 2012 and 2014 VR elections

Media Outlet	2012 # articles analyzed	2014 # articles analyzed
segodnya	124	146
unian	85	92
faktii i komentarii	38	43
	total: 247	total: 281

**Appendix 3. Coding frame specifications  
and coding instances for 2012**

Code	# instances
<b>1. Advertorial</b>	
<b>1.1 Candidate Promotion</b>	
Andriy Shevchenko	2
Arseniy Yatsenyuk	1
Borys Kolesnikov	4
Igor Balenko	4
Ivan Popescu	1
Leonid Kozhara	1
Maxim Lutskiy	1
Mykola Azarov	76
Oleksandr Lukyanchenko	1
Oleksandr Yefremov	4
Serhiy Tihpko	3
Taisia Povaliy	1
Tatyana Bakhteeva	7
Vasily Salygin	14
Viktor Yanukovych	85
Viktor Yushchenko	6
Vitali Klitschko	4
Volodymyr Litvyn	1
Volodymyr Makeyenko	2
Yulia Tymoshenko	18
Yuriy Boyko	2
Yuriy Lutsenko	1
<b>1.2 Party Promotion</b>	
Fatherland	1
Freedom	1
Our Ukraine	2
Party of Regions	40
UDAR	15
United Opposition	8

<b>1.3 Oligarch Promotion</b>	
Ihor Kolomoisky	1
Oleksandr Yaroslavskyi	2
Rinat Akhmetov	1
<b>2. Kompromat</b>	
<b>2.1 Candidate Smearing</b>	
Arseniy Yatsenyuk	6
Dmitry Kutishenko	1
Dmitry Verzilov	1
Mykola Azarov	5
Mykola Tomenko	1
Serhi Tihpko	2
Vadym Kolesnichenko	1
Viktor Baloha	4
Viktor Yanukovych	6
Viktor Yuschenko	4
Vitali Klitschko	2
Volodymyr Litvyn	2
Yulia Tymoshenko	34
Yuriy Lutsenko	2
<b>2.2 Party Smearing</b>	
Communists	1
Fatherland	18
Freedom	3
Party of Regions	6
UDAR	3
Ukraine, Forward!	1
United Opposition	21
<b>2.3 Oligarch Smearing</b>	
Ihor Kolomoisky	0
Rinat Akhmetov	0
Victor Pinchuk	0
<b>3. Election Integrity</b>	
Elections are fair	39
Elections are unfair	37

**Appendix 4. Coding frame specifications  
and coding instances for 2014**

Code	# instances
<b>1. Advertorial</b>	
<b>1.1 Candidate Promotion</b>	
Anatoly Hritsenko	1
Arsen Avakov	1
Arseniy Yatsenyuk	45
Oleh Liashko	3
Oleh Tyahnybok	9
Oleksandr Vilkul	5
Olexander Olshansky	1
Olga Bogomolets	3
Petro Poroshenko	53
Sergei Starun	3
Serhiy Tihipko	7
Svetlana Fabrykant	3
Vadim Rabinovich	3
Vadim Stolar	6
Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy	1
Vitali Klitschko	5
Volodymyr Groysman	9
Vyacheslav Konstantinovsky	2
Yulia Tymoshenko	1
Yuriy Boyko	19
<b>1.2 Party Promotion</b>	
Civil Position	2
European Solidarity (BPP)	4
Fatherland	1
Freedom	6
Opposition Bloc	31
People's Front	2
Strong Ukraine	1
<b>1.3 Oligarch Promotion</b>	
Ihor Kolomoisky	1
Rinat Akhmetov	51
Victor Pinchuk	1

<b>2. Kompromat</b>	
<b>2.1 Candidate Smearing</b>	
Arsen Avakov	1
Arseniy Yatsenyuk	3
Borys Filatov	1
Mykola Azarov	1
Oleg Tyagnibok	
Oleh Lyashko	7
Pavel Matviyenko	3
Petro Poroshenko	18
Serhii Tihipko	1
Vitali Klitschko	1
Yulia Tymoshenko	2
Yurii Boyko	2
<b>2.2 Party Smearing</b>	
European Solidarity (BPP)	37
Freedom	4
Opposition Bloc	3
People's Front	2
Radical Party	5
Strong Ukraine	1
UDAR	1
<b>2.3 Oligarch Smearing</b>	
Ihor Kolomoisky	5
Rinat Akhmetov	6
<b>3. Election Integrity</b>	
Elections are fair	4
Elections are unfair	36
<b>4. Current Events</b>	
Conflict in the Donbass	
Successes	12
Failures	16
Soldiers' Striking	
In Support	5
Against	9